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IN THE BELARUSIAN S.S.R. AND ALLOCATION
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THE POLITICS OF SOVIET "FEDERALISM":
A CASE STUDY OF THE BELORUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL ELITE
AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO AGRICULTURE, 1964-1971

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY

WILLIAM JAMES MCGRATH

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
DECEMBER 1981
The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies acceptance of the thesis

THE POLITICS OF SOVIET "FEDERALISM":
A CASE STUDY OF THE BELORUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL ELITE AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO AGRICULTURE, 1964–1971

submitted by William James McGrath, Hon. B.A., M.A., in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Chairman, Department of Political Science

Carleton University
October 8, 1982
Abstract

This dissertation attempts to provide a description and analysis of the group of officials who were involved in the administration of agricultural affairs in the Belorussian SSR from 1964 to 1971. The study was designed to explore the conjecture that the actions and speeches of this regional elite would manifest a sense of nationalism. No clear evidence of such a tendency was discovered. Instead, the author uncovered what he believes to be a politically significant pattern of behaviour whereby agricultural officials in the Belorussian SSR sought to defend and advance local interests through bureaucratic politics. Specific focus was placed upon the Soviet budgetary and resource allocation processes in order to highlight this trend. Particular consideration was given to the degree to which central officials appeared to be responsive to regional entreaties for inputs to agriculture. Generally, the elite in Belorusussia seemed to enjoy success in advancing the interests of agriculturalists in their union republic. The dissertation concludes with a discussion of the general implications of the findings produced through investigation of the Belorussian case.
In memory of Larry Collins

For a friend whose fortifying companionship is much missed.
Acknowledgements

Though my dissertation is a narrowly focused one, I owe thanks to a wide range of individuals and institutions for assistance I received while working on this project. First and foremost, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, for her advice, encouragement and criticism. I appreciated her patient tolerance when I was unable to get on with my work and am even more grateful for her clearly expressed impatience when I was in a position to make progress. Professors Bohdan Bociurkiw, Radoslav Selucky and Peter J. Potichnyi read a rough draft of the thesis and provided me with numerous helpful criticisms and suggestions for improvement. Professors J. Hough, T. H. Rigby and the late V. Holubnychy, none of whom I have ever met, graciously responded to requests to read my dissertation proposal and sent me detailed comments which I appreciated greatly. I was grateful for their thoughtful responses when I received them but now that I have a full-time teaching position I marvel at their generosity and better realize the sacrifices of time they made. Michael Wallack and Victor Zaslavsky, two colleagues at Memorial University whom I have the good fortune to count as my friends, helped me solve technical problems in preparing an elite data file for computer analysis and each provided critically important general counsel. Two friends who live in Washington, D.C., John McDonnell and Marta Pereyma, kindly helped in securing material from the Library of Congress. I am grateful too, to Dr. Jan Zaprudnik who sent me some photocopied material drawn from his own library.
I am indebted as well to the Canada Council and Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies for financial support. I enjoyed the great privilege of being able to spend a year in the Soviet Union on the academic exchange arranged between Carleton and Leningrad Universities and am grateful to the officials of both institutions for that opportunity.

Finally, I should like to note how important the support of my family was to me during the time I have worked on this project.
ABBREVIATIONS AND RUSSIAN LANGUAGE TERMS USED IN TEXT

Gosbank - Gosudarstvenny bank - state bank
Gosplan - Gosudarstvenny planovyi komitet - state planning committee
khozraschet - khoziaistvenny razchet - economic calculation or economic accountability
Komsomol - Kommunisticheskii soiuz molodezhi - The Young Communist League
Oblast - a 3rd level administrative territorial subdivision
raion - a 4th level administrative territorial subdivision
Sel'khoztekhnika - administrative unit responsible for agricultural machinery supply and repair
ispolkom - ispolnitelnyi komitet - the executive committee of an administrative unit, e.g., obispolkom
kolkhoz - kollektivnoe khoziaistvo - a collective farm
obkom - oblastnoi komitet Partii - highest party committee at the oblast level
sovkhоз - sovetskoе khoziaistvo - state farm
Ts.S.U. - Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie
chernozem - rich black soil
nomenklatura - roster of political appointments and those eligible for appointment
plenum - formal meeting of the full party committee
samizdat - self-publication, uncensored writings
CONVERSION TABLE FOR MAJOR CROPS

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This thesis focuses upon a segment of the political elite of the
Belorussian union republic and their role in the administration of the
agricultural economy of their region of the USSR during the seven years
immediately following Nikita Khrushchev's forced retirement from the
Soviet political leadership. The project was undertaken in the
expectation that it would reveal a trend towards a changed composition
of the elite, and manifestations of new forms of political behaviour
by elements within the elite. More specifically it was anticipated
that members of the elite would begin to demonstrate during this period
a restiveness over central control of the agricultural economy and
would articulate a concern to increase their own decision-making
authority in that sphere.

In order to indicate how these expectations arose and seemed
reasonable to the author, it is necessary to survey briefly those portions
of the academic literature bearing upon the Soviet political elite,
minority nationalities in the USSR and the administration of the Soviet
agricultural economy which are most relevant to the study.¹

¹The terms minority nationalities, non-Russian nationalities and
non-Russian ethnic groups will be used synonymously throughout this study.
Minority nationality, though it is somewhat awkward is the term used most
frequently. The name Belorussia will be used throughout rather than the
more cumbersome, Belorussian Union republic.
industry with its own handbook." There is a sense, of course, in which virtually all studies of Soviet politics can be regarded as examples of elite analysis but Dr. McAuley is referring here to a distinct body of literature which is composed of studies which have sought to extend, organize and analyze systematically data which bear on the character of the Soviet elite. Socio-economic background, level of education and career patterns are representative subjects for analysis in this stream of inquiry. A rather astonishing amount of descriptive empirical analysis in this vein, focused primarily upon the central political elite, has been published throughout the 1970s and thus far in the 1980s. It is from this work that we derived research questions and the conceptual framework for our inquiry into the Belorussian elite.

Study of the Soviet political elite has been under way since the earliest phase of Soviet studies, when Kremlinological analysis was fashioned. Methods of analysis were developed which applied specifically to the Soviet system where on the spot investigations were impossible and an outward monolithism masked intense factional disputes among the political elite. Illuminating as these studies often


2"Character" is used here as a convenient shorthand term to denote the elites' social backgrounds and career patterns.

3Much of this literature will be referred to momentarily. Here reference will be made to only one work, very similar in orientation to the just mentioned Farrell reader and published not long after it. Carl Beck, et al., Comparative Communist Political Leadership (New York: McKay Company, Inc., 1973).
were, they were run through with judgements based on often shaky foundations.\(^1\) Gradually, however, a pool of quantitative data which set out the more salient details of the personal and career backgrounds of the Soviet elite was accumulated. Elite analysis, as we now know it, began to take shape.\(^2\) Empirical analysis carried out in accordance with strict methodological procedures, became increasingly possible. Broad studies of the central elite appeared quickly one after another. Eventually, these were supplemented by narrower studies focusing upon regional and functional elites.\(^3\) Very briefly, we shall consider some of the more noteworthy of these works.

One of the more influential of the early studies of the Soviet elite appeared in a landmark work in comparative politics, Political Power: USA/USSR, by those prototypical "new mandarins," Samuel Huntington and Zbigniew Brzezinski.\(^4\) The central Soviet political elite, these authors demonstrated, was dominated by SRAPP's - Slavic-stock

\(^1\)In making this comment, I am in no way seeking to agree with the harshly critical view taken of "Kremlinology" by scholars such as William A. Welsh, who maintains that "the field of comparative communist studies has come a long way from the sterile era of Kremlinology toward more systematic efforts to describe political and other elites...." See his, "Elites and Leadership in Communist Systems: Some New Perspectives," Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. IX, Nos. 1 and 2 (Spring-Summer, 1976), p. 162.

\(^2\)One of the earliest studies in this vein was by G. Schueller, The Politburo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951).

\(^3\)John Armstrong published an analysis of the Soviet Ukrainian elite in 1959 which means that this generalization has to be qualified but the bulk of attention centered, first on the central Soviet elite and only later on regional and local elites. See J. Armstrong, The Soviet Political Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1959).

Russian born apparatchiki. Brzezinski and Huntington drew special attention to the social and professional backgrounds of the elite which they maintained affected the political attitudes of the Soviet elite. Hence, they argued that

The peasant-worker origin of the Soviet elite has left an imprint on its behaviour and mores. It is certainly reflected in the directness, roughness, even occasional crudeness of official expression, both domestically and in relation to those foreigners whom the Soviet leaders view with hostility. It also stimulates a marked tendency common among the less educated masses, to simplify issues and reduce them to black and white categories....

Political experience and engineering background combine to give Soviet leaders a highly-focused direct, down-to-earth, problem solving approach, without concern for legal niceties and with little tendency toward compromise solutions. The Soviet elite compared rather unfavourably on these dimensions with the American one. The American political leaders were portrayed as men marked by moderation, restraint, and a belief in compromise solutions and American politics was considered to be permeated with "legal styles, legal concepts, and legal ways of thought and behaviour." Living as we do in a post-Watergate era, these generalizations are not so readily accepted now as they once were and the conclusions about the Soviet elite by association are thrown into some doubt. Contemporary researchers are sceptical about Brzezinski and Huntington's inferences

---

1 Z. Brzezinski and S. Huntington, op. cit., pp. 131-132. The phrase SRAPP was coined to serve as a counterpart to WASP (White-Anglo-Saxon Protestant).

2 Ibid., p. 140 and p. 146.

3 Ibid., p. 139 and p. 146.

about elite attitudes but there is no question that their work stimulated much thought and discussion and it provided a reference point for much subsequent research on the elite.

These subsequent research efforts have embraced a number of concerns. Recruitment of the elite, its socialization, its attitudes and beliefs, degree of integration and career patterns have been analyzed closely. The prevailing consensus is that the revolutionary intellectuals of the early regime gave way to a corps of managerial modernizers whose careers in turn have become increasingly bureaucratized. The rate of turnover in this elite is gradual, especially so in the last decade, but it appears to bring in candidates with ever-higher levels of technical qualifications and experience. Most of these elite members are males. They can claim plebian parentage but are, themselves, drawn overwhelmingly from white-collar occupations. Work largely within the party apparatus, especially that which required exercise of general managerial skills, appears to be the most reliable route to high-status positions within the elite but other avenues are viable. Overall, it emerges that the "character" of the elite has altered so that its


2 For a fuller statement of this argument see J. H. Kautsky, "Revolutionary and Managerial Elites in Modernizing Regimes," Comparative Politics Vol. 1, No. 3 (July, 1979), pp. 441-467.
members increasingly are more able in the technical sense that they have advanced specialised training and might be presumed to have an interest in exercising control in the decision-making areas in which they have particular qualifications. We were prompted then to try and ascertain whether the nature of the elite in Belorussia corresponded with the pattern found in other studies.

One of the outstandingly important features of Soviet society is that it is multinational. This is especially noteworthy during a time when there seems to have been a flourishing of ethnic nationalism globally. Numerous multinational or binational states have been shaken due to the restiveness of one or more of their constituent populations. The extent to which nationalism of various Soviet nationalities has become a problem for the all-union political leadership in the USSR is a topic which is given sharp attention in many current publications on the USSR.¹

Students of this subject demonstrated some time ago that there was a great disparity between the theory and practice of national relations and federalism in the Soviet Union.² The gap between the professions of the Soviet leadership and the actual political realities in the USSR has been pointed out clearly. It is apparent that an official


declared policy of internationalism masks concerted efforts to cause people to assimilate with Russian language and culture.¹ We know that the Soviet nationality problem has not been "solved" and the official description of Soviet society as a "new historic community of peoples" is hyperbolic.² Having demonstrated these points, scholarly attention has begun to shift to new problems. The individual minority nationalities increasingly are being treated as important in their own right and we are beginning to see some very good political sociology providing us with insight into the development of the individual minority nationalities of the USSR.³ Questions of political economy are more and more coming to the fore and scholars are now giving much more attention


than previously to "ethnic demands and resource allocation." ¹ The single hypothesis advanced in the current wave of publications on nationalities in the USSR which most influenced the planning of this project has been advanced by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. She has suggested that "orthodox nationalism" may become an increasingly potent force in Soviet politics. Orthodox nationalism is "nationalism that is expressed by the ethnic power elites through available legal and political channels that has as its aim the maximization of political autonomy within the system." ² It is suggested further that certain of the Soviet ethnic power elites have a tendency "to press for greater participation in the power structure and consequently in policymaking. In the economic sphere, an exclusive federal preserve, they battle central planners over resource allocation, mostly without success." ³


³Ibid., p. 137.
Belorussia is a strategically important part of the USSR and this writer was stimulated to inquire as to whether "orthodox nationalism" was becoming a force in that union republic. Belorussia, it might be noted has not received a tremendous amount of attention from Western scholars.  

In its early stages this study was concerned broadly with whether this orthodox nationalism was evident in the general realm of agricultural policy. Agricultural affairs were selected for attention because signally important developments took place in this policy area during the period analyzed.  


2 There are many analyses of current Soviet agricultural policy. Amongst the works I have found useful, the following stand out. Alec Nove, "Soviet Agriculture Under Brezhnev," Slavic Review, Vol. XXIX,
attention was centered eventually on the resource allocation process in agriculture and the part played therein by the union republican elite from the Belorussian SSR.

Resource allocation in the centrally planned and managed economy in the USSR has attracted the sustained attention of numerous highly talented Western economists. For a considerable period of time many of them were able to agree that that economy was conceptualized best as a command economy. The great relevance of this model for examinations of the administration of the Soviet agricultural economy was highlighted by the late Jerzy F. Karcz in a signally important article. Karcz illuminated especially skillfully the objectives and mechanisms of command farming in the USSR. He explained how command farming techniques involve gross distortions in prices, output, investment, capital equipment and land use. Further, command farming typically culminates in excessive regulation of production and the granting of inadequate consideration for local area conditions. Hence and unsurprisingly, low output and poor productivity are persistent problems of


1 Gregory Gosman is acknowledged widely to have written a seminal article which develops this theme. See his, "Notes for a Theory of the Command Economy," Soviet Studies No. 2 (October, 1961), pp. 101-123.

an agricultural economy which conforms to this model. The command economy model has proved to be a tremendously useful one but noted economists such as Joseph Berliner have come to question the appropriateness of its continued application.¹ Specialists in the study of Soviet economies have begun to discuss alternate explanatory models. Thus we have scholars such as Ruth V. Greenslade and Gertrude E. Schroeder suggesting that a model of a bureaucratic economy or "buroeconomy" can better focus contemporary research on the Soviet economy.² While the command economy model laid emphasis upon the ability of the political leadership to enforce its dictatorial control, the bureaucratic economy model highlights the role of bureaucrats below the top political leadership. This model gives greater attention to the tendency of elements in the bureaucracy to pursue narrow departmental interests and to try and increase control over resources and manpower whenever possible. In light of these arguments, we thought it worthwhile to examine resource allocations to Belorussian agriculture.

Though not mentioned above in the survey of the streams of literature most relevant to this study, the writings of Jerry F. Hough were a source of great stimulus to the author of this thesis and influenced the general approach of this study.³ Hough has argued that


³I refer especially to various essays of his which deal with questions of theory and method in the study of Soviet politics. Conveniently these have now been brought out in a single collection. See, Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).
for much of the period after the Second World War Soviet studies were confined to a kind of academic ghetto within which a certain view of the Soviet state-society relationship was dominant. Gradually this research programme with its emphasis upon Soviet totalitarianism has been giving way to alternate approaches. Hough has been particularly prominent among those recommending the utilization of new approaches and methods in the study of Soviet politics. His work has demonstrated that significant political activity takes place not only at the "commanding heights" of Soviet politics but at its periphery as well. Many scholars have been willing to grant that there are factions and groups at the central and upper levels of the Soviet power structure, but Hough has led the way in highlighting the fact that the local party and governmental officials are not passive and compliant followers of official rules. Rather than viewing regional political figures as simple rule followers, they are seen as active creatures engaged in a practically continuous attempt to maximize their influence and power. From this standpoint, social and political reality is not fixed and

\[1\text{Ibid., pp. 1-3.}\]

\[2\text{It is seldom the case that totally new ideas are introduced in the social sciences, and the research programme I refer to here is no exception to this remark. Merle Fainsod, for example, was alert long ago to the fact that a good regional official had}

"to be a middleman or broker, mediating between the rockbottom needs of his constituents and the niggardly resources which the centre made available to them. As a representative of the oblast, and indeed as a condition of his own survival the oblast secretary had to press for allocations of supplies to the oblast, for budgetary appropriations which would enable him to fulfill the commitments which the centre imposed on him."

"immutable. Instead it is open continuously to construction and
deconstruction. Actors do not only occupy roles; they have some
possibility of shaping them.\(^1\) This research programme holds more
strongly than others to the view that the CPSU is a complex network
for bargaining and negotiating. It does not dismiss, of course, the
idea that the party might serve, as well, as a vehicle for the issue
and implementation of commands, but it shows that regional figures
can be recalcitrant and suggests that the rule, the larger the
organization "the smaller the percentage of its actions that represent
directly the desires of the ultimate sovereigns of the organization,
its higher officials," has application in the Soviet context.\(^2\) The
argument in Hough's work which was most important for this study is
his assessment that the Soviet system was moving towards what he
regards as "institutional pluralism" during the period under
investigation so that political power was becoming more diffused in
the USSR.\(^3\)

The questions this thesis addresses are ones which emerge from
the literature surveyed above. Following the tradition of elite
analysis which has been described we thought it worthwhile to try and

\(^1\) There are scholars other than Hough who have been advancing
this interpretation. One of the more notable attempts is by William
Taubman, *Governing Soviet Cities* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1973). See, as well, Robert V. Daniels, "Soviet Politics since
Krushchev," in *The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev and Kosygin*, ed. by
A rather general attempt to portray the Soviet political system as a
"bureaucracy writ large" should also be cited here. See, Alfred E.

\(^2\) G. Tullock, *The Politics of Bureaucracy* (Washington, D.C.:

\(^3\) Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory*
establish just what is the character of one of the more important regional elites in the Soviet system; pursuing the line of inquiry opened up by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone in the study of the nationalities' problem in the USSR, it appeared worthwhile to try and establish whether "orthodox nationalism" was manifested by the elite particularly in the area of agricultural affairs where following recent arguments of important economists we might anticipate a move away from a system of command to one which allows greater scope for bureaucratic bargaining and attempts to maximize regional and departmental interests. Finally, the research was undertaken with a view to ascertain whether the general arguments made by Jerry Hough about the evolution of the Soviet system had specific application in the case of Belorussian agricultural administration.

The method employed in this work is indicated in its subtitle. It is a case study, more specifically, it is an "interpretative case study."\(^1\) This type of study is selected for analysis because of an interest in the case rather than an interest in the formulation of general theory....explicit use (is made) of established theoretical propositions. In these studies, a generalization is applied to a specific case with the aim of throwing light on the case rather than improving the generalization in any way.\(^2\)

An eclectic mix of techniques of analysis will be used. Elite data, for instance, will be treated in aggregate form. The principal


\(^2\) A. Lijphart, ibid., p. 692.
analytical technique, however, will be textual analysis. Sovetskaia
Belorussia, for example, the newspaper of the central committee of the
Belorussian party organization, the governmental Council of Ministers
and the union republican Supreme Soviet will be carefully read for
evidence related to our theme.

The balance of this work will consist of the following components.
First, an attempt will be made to present concisely information about
the Belorussian context most relevant to this study. Next, Belorussian
agriculture and its development will be considered. The central Soviet
leadership's agricultural programme then will be described and the
institutional context within which agricultural resource allocation
decisions are made will be described. Investigation will proceed thereafter
to the role of the elite in the agricultural resource allocation process.
Attention will focus on both the full-time party officials and government
bureaucrats. Having examined the activities of the elite in the
agricultural appropriations process, the elite's backgrounds will be
scrutinized for evidence which might help explain the role they play.
Finally, attention will be brought to bear upon the question as to
whether a sense of nationalism influenced the elite in Belorussia and
impelled its members to attempt to influence the central decision-makers
responsible for agricultural planning and budgeting. This study, we
should hasten to add, deals primarily with central-regional relations
in Soviet federal administration. The political elite in Belorussia
is multinational and Russians are strongly represented within it.
This dissertation deals with the elite in Belorussia, rather than the

1 The period considered from late 1964 to the end of 1971 spans
the duration of one Five-Year Plan and the setting of another. This period
was focused upon because it was a strategically important one in the overall
history of Soviet agriculture during which the all-union leadership began
to upgrade substantially the commitment of resources to agriculture.
Belorussian elite. Nonetheless, some special consideration will be
given to the Belorussians within the elite in order to ascertain
whether they have a distinctive orientation in trying to obtain
resources for agriculture in "their" union republic.

The topic of this study, and its scope and relevance, has been
outlined. While it is readily granted that federal relations in the
Soviet system are distinctly hierarchical, we hope to demonstrate that
elements of competition and bargaining are inherent in those relations
and enjoy, in fact, a thriving existence. Thus, in the pages to follow,
a case study of a union-republican elite and its effect upon aspects
of the agricultural decision-making process will be provided.
CHAPTER II

CONTEXTS—HISTORICAL, DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL

The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of contemporary Belorussian society, especially Belorussian rural society. This is an effort basically in stage-setting for later analysis of the Belorussian elite and its performance in agricultural administrative decision-making.

We shall begin with a brief historical perspective outlining some of the historical conditions under which the Belorussian nation came into being.

The Origin and Development of the Belorussian Nation

It is difficult to pinpoint the date at which any nation can be said to have emerged. It is especially difficult in the case of Belorussia which has had a tumultuous history marked by periods of rule by Lithuanians, Poles and Russians.

Contemporary Belorussian nationalists trace the roots of their nation back to the Krivichi, a Slavic tribal society which moved into the territory now known as Belorussia between the sixth and eighth centuries A.D.¹ Petty princedoms were established during that

¹In an interesting samizdat document, for instance, the anonymous author suggests that the Krivichi used Belorussian speech and refers to the Krivichi alternately as Belorussians. See, Letter to a Russian Friend (London: The Association of Belorussians in Great Britain, 1979), p. 35. Soviet experts writing in officially approved sources disagree on the extent to which the ancient Slavic tribes displaced or became mixed with and influenced by pre-existing communities in the region. V. V. Sedov has suggested that the Belorussian people and language developed upon a Baltic substratum. He maintains that such evidence as is provided by the study of burial mounds and toponymic
time which in turn in the period from the 9th to the 10th century
were incorporated into the ancient Kievan state. They remained a
part of this state until the 13th century, and it was within it that
the inhabitants received the Eastern form of Christianity when Prince
Vladimir the Great adopted Christianity from Byzantium in 988.¹
When Kievan Rus disintegrated in the mid 13th century, the Belorussian
lands were included within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.² There is
some controversy over the status of Belorussia within this political
unit. Its law code was, for example, originally written in Belorussian
which might seem to suggest that the Belorussians occupied a leading
position, but the currently accepted view amongst Soviet historians
is that the Grand Duchy was a highly unequal federation in which the
Belorussians were subordinate.³ The Grand Duchy became linked with the
smaller but more culturally advanced realm, Poland, in 1386 when
Jagiello, Grand Duke of Lithuania, became king of Poland upon his
marriage to that country's queen, Jadwiga.⁴ The Lithuanian Duchy was

¹I. M. Ignatenko, Istoriia Belorussoi SSR (Minsk: "Nauka
²See N. P. Vakar, Belorussia. The Making of a Nation
⁴See O. Halecki, "From the Union with Hungary to the Union with
Lithuania," in The Cambridge History of Poland, I, edited by W. F.
Reddaway et al. (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 19–193; and N. P. Vakar, op. cit.,
pp. 45–47.

data suggests that Balts who inhabited the region prior to the Slavs
did not leave but were assimilated once the Slavs began to inhabit
the territory. See V. V. Sedov, "K proizkhodjeniui belorusov,"
Sovetskaia etnografiiia, 2 (1967), pp. 112–129. This interpretation
has been attacked by V. A. Zhuchkevich, "K voprosu o baltiiskom
substrate v etnogeneze belorusov," Sovetskaia etnografiiia, No. 1
narodnosti," Sovetskaia etnografiiia, No. 5 (1968), pp. 79–92. The
critics dispute the importance Sedov attaches to the Baltic stratum.

¹I. M. Ignatenko, Istoriia Belorussoi SSR (Minsk: "Nauka
²See N. P. Vakar, Belorussia. The Making of a Nation
⁴See O. Halecki, "From the Union with Hungary to the Union with
Lithuania," in The Cambridge History of Poland, I, edited by W. F.
Reddaway et al. (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 19–193; and N. P. Vakar, op. cit.,
pp. 45–47.
affected strongly by the older, more highly developed culture of Poland and eventually in the 16th century, the two realms formally were merged by the Union of Lublin into a single political union, the Rzeczpospolita Polska.\(^1\) Twenty-seven years later in 1596 the Uniate Church was established with the declaration of the Union of Brest. This religious union of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches followed the model of the political union achieved at Lublin.\(^2\) Initially this affected principally the landowning class which was under pressure to assimilate with Polish culture. Soviet historians suggest that it was during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that a Belorussian national culture began to solidify.\(^3\) One sign of this is that a large scale revolt took place during the period from 1648 to 1654, which in the judgment of the leading Western authority on Belorussian history, had economic, religious, and nationalist aspects all at the one time; "...the peasant revolted against authority which oppressed him economically in the person of the landowner, who was in most cases, Catholic in faith and Polish in his way of life."\(^4\)

In the eighteenth century, Belorussian territory came under Russian rule. During the period from 1772 to 1795 Poland was partitioned three times and ceased to exist altogether as an independent


\(^2\)The history of the Uniate Church in Belorussia is treated by Vakar. See N. Vakar, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-63, 65, 68, 74, 130, 246, 253 and 278.

\(^3\)I. M. Ignatenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-62. The important role of the printer and scholar, Frantsisk Skorina, is stressed in this account.

\(^4\)N. Vakar, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
political entity. The next phase in Belorussian political history has been described concisely by an American historian of Belorussian descent. Ivan Lubachko judges that when the Belorussian territories were incorporated within the Russian empire "national persecution was interwoven with feudal oppression." The actual details of the policy of national persecution are described more ably by another historian, Nicholai Vakar, but neither Vakar nor Lubachko are drawn strongly to social or economic history and, as a result, the details of the feudal oppression are not recounted fully in their works. To acquire more detailed information on socio-economic arrangements, we have to turn to Soviet historians. They insist that serfdom restrained


3 The national persecution became particularly intense after an uprising of the Poles in 1831. Vakar judges that the Belorussians suffered from the repression of the Russian imperial state even more than the Poles despite the lack of Belorussian involvement in the uprising. The government, he believes was so "surprised and frightened by the revolt, it now believed that anyone who was not Orthodox in faith and Russian in speech was an actual or potential enemy of the empire." Hence in 1839 the Uniate Church which now had more than a million followers was abolished and the use of Belorussian in official places was prohibited. See N. Vakar, op. cit., p. 69.
the development of Belorussia's agricultural economy. Prior to the
Emancipation edict of 1861, more than three-fourths of the Belorussian
peasants belonged to landlords and of those 97 percent were on the
corvee system. The formal abolition of serfdom during Alexander II's
reign did not mean the end of feudal relations. The reform of 1861
was framed and implemented so as to benefit the dvorianstvo or
landholding gentry. The peasantry received just thirty-five percent
of the total land whereas sixty-five percent remained under the control
of landlords, the church and the largest of the landlords, the state.
The peasantry received land on condition that they repay the state
money paid on their behalf to individual landlords in compensation for
their giving up the land. Hence, the peasantry acquired land but on
unfavourable terms which gave rise to widespread social frustrations.
Consequently, the Belorussian peasantry took part in a large scale
insurrection which spread across Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine and
Belorussia in 1863. The uprising was put down but the tsarist
government made some adjustments in land apportionments and redemption
payments.¹

There was a nationalist dimension to the uprising on
Belorussian territory due to the leadership of Kastus' Kalinovski.²
The imperial authorities were not conciliatory in their reaction to
these nationalist aspirations in Belorussia. As Vakar demonstrates,

¹This brief paragraph is abstracted from Ignatenko's work with
an attempt to exclude his occasional tendentious flourishes. See

²For a brief assessment of Kalinovski, see N. Vakar, op. cit.,
pp. 71-72.
a concentrated effort at Russification and conversion of Belorussia's population to Orthodoxy ensued once order had been restored.¹

The development of capitalism began to accelerate in Belorussia after the abolition of serfdom. Increasing numbers of factories and plants were established in urban centres. The working class increased its numbers from 2.9 thousand in 1879 to 31,000 in 1900.² Capitalist relations took root in the agricultural sector, particularly in the central and western regions of Belorussia.³ Landlord farming was the normal arrangement.⁴ The enactment of the Stolypin agrarian reform led to some restructuring of the rural community.⁵ Soviet historians indicate that, as a consequence of this reform, approximately twenty percent of peasant farms passed to khutors (privately owned homesteads) and otrubs (private farms whose owners lived elsewhere).⁶

When one reviews the developments discussed above it is not difficult to agree with the Soviet historian I. M. Ignatenko when he judges that

the Belorussian nation formed under unfavourable historical circumstances during a protracted period of time. It was only at the beginning of the twentieth century that its principal features took shape.

¹Ibid., pp. 74-75. For a Soviet work which provides a great deal of factual materials on this period when Russian and Baltic German gentry were brought to Belorussia to assume the control of landed estates, see S. M. Sambuk, Politika tsarizma v Belorussii vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka (Minsk: "Nauka i tekhnika," 1980).
²I. M. Ignatenko, op. cit., p. 137.
³Ibid., p 142.
⁴Ibid.
⁵Ibid., p. 169.
⁶Ibid., p. 172.
⁷Ibid., p. 154.
Ignatenko goes on to suggest that as a national liberation movement grew, it had two basic orientations—revolutionary social democratic and petit bourgeois. Though Soviet historians are loath to concede the point, it is the activities of the latter which were at least initially more significant. The national movement was stimulated into heightened activity by the revolution of 1905.¹ A Belorussian newspaper, Nasha Niva (Our Land) began to appear and a nationalist political group, the Socialist Hramada elaborated a programme calling for cultural autonomy and political federation.² Two especially significant members of the Nasha Niva group were the poets, Janko Kupala and Jakub Kolas. Their works eventually came to enjoy a status in Belorussia literature comparable to founding figures in other national literatures.³

The period from 1906 to 1917 is viewed by the leading historian on the subject as the formative period of Belorussian political nationalism.⁴ Important as it is, it did not culminate in the emergence of a movement with a strong popular following in spite of some spectacular achievements in the cultural field it was nonetheless clear that the movement was ill-prepared to face the emergencies which arose with World War I and the Russian Revolution.⁵

¹ N. Vakar, op. cit., pp. 85-86.
² Ibid., p. 86.
³ Ibid., p. 88.
⁴ Ibid., p. 91.
⁵ Ibid., p. 92.
The emergencies indeed were dire and the political history of this period is acutely complicated. During this time of political confusion countless political groups emerged. A body known as the Belorussian War Relief attracted diverse nationalist groups who restyled the War Relief into the Belorussian National Committee which subsequently was transformed into the Belorussian Central Rada which came under the control of the Socialist Hramada who renewed their demand that a federal system of government be established. For our purposes, it suffices to say that following the Great War, revolution, civil war and war against Poland, Soviet power was established in Belorussia. The war against Poland which was not terminated until 1921 resulted, however, in the loss to the USSR of approximately 38,600 square miles of Belorussian territory which was not recovered until 1939 when Stalin and Hitler's foreign ministers signed the infamous Non-Aggression Pact which led to the dismemberment of Poland.

The western portion of Belorussia, then, was to undergo a period of development significantly different from that of East Belorussia. The Western Belorussians were a territorial minority within Poland accounting for approximately four percent of the population. The overwhelmingly majority of Poland's Belorussians were peasants. The region they inhabited was the most backward economically within Poland. The

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2A. Polonsky's history of interwar Poland indicates that in the Polish census of 1921 there were 1,060,000 people who gave their nationality as White Russian or Belorussian and another 49,000 as "locals." These latter, Polonsky reckons, were Belorussians as well. The majority of this population was Orthodox but it contained within it a significant Catholic minority. See A. Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 1921-1939. The Crisis of Constitutional Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 38.
historical experience of these Western Belorussians was not a positive one. They became alienated, and for good reason, from the Polish state. First the Poles had encouraged the development of Belorussian nationalism so as to heighten the sense of distinctiveness from Russians but the eventual development of this nationalist movement caused Polish authorities such alarm that they sought to repress it. Particularly upsetting to the Poles was the favourable interest many Belorussian nationalists took in the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. Joseph Rothschild estimates that this was an important period in the development of Belorussian nationalism for the attempts to suppress the nationalism only served to fortify it. "By the time of Poland's destruction in September, 1939, the loyalties of its Belorussian citizens were divided between aspirations for independence and hopes for unification with their Soviet Belorussian brethren."  

The people of this troubled region were buffeted subsequently by their initial incorporation into the USSR, by German occupation during the Second World War and their eventual reincorporation into the Soviet Union.


2 Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), p. 42. Not surprisingly Soviet historians are harsh in their assessments of Poland's rule over Western Belorussia. For one such appraisal dealing specifically with agricultural development see, B. E. Kukharev, Sel'skoe khoziaistvo Zapadnoi Belorussii, 1919-1939 (Minsk: Vysheishiaia shkola, 1975).
The history of Eastern Belorussia under Soviet power divides, in Michael Arysky's judgement, into two major periods: one lasting from 1917 to 1938 and the other from 1938 to the present. During the first phase conditions for the further development of a sense of national identity were, on balance, favourable. This was particularly true once the turbulence of the revolution and the war with the Poles subsided. A programme of Belorussification was initiated in the Belorussian Soviet Republic. "Belorussian nationality was declared predominant and Belorussian the official language. Russian was banned from schools, courts and offices—even homes." Cultural activities generally were fostered, and the political authorities were able to enlist the services of the previously mentioned poets, Janko Kupala and Jakub Kolas. One Western authority on minority nationalities in the USSR, Walter Kolarz, goes so far as to say that the role which Kolas and Kupala played in Soviet Belorussia is unparalleled throughout the USSR. No Belorussian Bolshevik ever assumed the role of a national leader of the Byelorussians—the leadership was in the hands of Kola and Kupala. The "golden age of Belorussian culture" was, however, short.

1 M. Arysky, "The Birth of Belorussia," Times Literary Supplement, No. 3, 670 (June 30, 1972), p. 743. This review appeared anonymously while Arysky was still resident in the Soviet Union and active in the dissident movement. He is now an emigre. The two-fold division may seem too limited and the dating of it is open to questions as well, but Arysky's emphasis upon the importance of the revolution as a turning point in the development of a Belorussian culture and sense of national identity is well-taken. The actual Belorussification programme did not get under way until 1922.

2 N. Vakar, op. cit., p. 139.

lived.\textsuperscript{1} The French authority on Soviet minority nationalities, Helene Carrere d'Encausse judges that the period of cultural revolution in the 1920s produced results the central political leadership did not welcome.

On all sides, new elites were springing up, gradually replacing the old ones steeped in nationalism. But at the same time, these new elites, pushed forward by the Communist parties, became imbued with the very nationalism which they were to have stamped out. The most flagrant case was that of the Belorussian elite.\textsuperscript{2}

A campaign was launched against "bourgeois nationalism" and this was followed by the collectivization of agriculture which produced changes so profound in the Soviet social order that it is frequently termed a "revolution from above."\textsuperscript{3} Collectivization was followed by a new round of purges. They were of such a devastating nature that it is understandable that Agursky wants to make this period a fundamental dividing mark in Belorussian history.

The year 1938 was a complete social and national change of course in the history of Byelorussia (as it was, indeed, for Russia as a whole). But this change did not acquire such depth and scale in any other part of Russia (sic). (This was officially reflected in the speech by Vyshinsky at the trial of Bukharin and others in 1938, where it was stated that all the Byelorussian leadership without exception consisted of agents in the Polish intelligence service). One can count on one's fingers the number of people of some measure of distinction in one or another sphere of Byelorussian life who survived the purges of 1936-1938.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1}This is Lubachko's description of the 1920s. See his, Belorussia Under Soviet Rule, pp. 80-92.


\textsuperscript{3}The phrase is Stalin's but it has been adopted by many Western historians.

\textsuperscript{4}M. Agursky, loc. cit., p. 743. Again, Agursky's basic judgement about the nature of the change seems sound but he is imprecise about dates. The first purge of nationalist elements in the Belorussian CP took place in 1929. The purges of 1937 and 1938 were a second round which went well below the leadership levels to remove functionaries of even the lowest levels of party and government administration. See N. Vakar, op. cit., p. 146 and p. 150.
The purge of the elite provided, in the estimation of Leonard Schapiro, the leading Western historian of the CPSU, a salutary lesson to those who wished to rise in the party that nothing less than complete subordination of national interests to the interests of the USSR, as decided by the party leaders in Moscow, would be accepted.¹

The long dark night of Stalin's terror was followed soon by the calamities produced by the Second World War. The German attack on the Soviet Union quickly overran Belorussia. The Nazis as David Dallin has demonstrated pursued two contradictory policies in Belorussia. They used the territory as a dumping ground for people they regarded as undesirables and they sought to stimulate Belorussian national consciousness so as to build up a buffer group between the Poles and Great Russians.² Some Belorussian nationalists collaborated with the Nazis but Dallin's overall judgement is that "the efforts to encourage the nationalists won few to the German cause and antagonized many."³ Indeed the partisan movement grew ever stronger and harassed the Germans with increasing force as time progressed.⁴ Whether the partisans under Soviet control had a strong sense of national consciousness is not a subject upon which I am confident to comment but it is interesting to note that some contemporary Belorussians


³Ibid., p. 225.

⁴The guerilla warfare phase in Belorussia's history is very complicated as diverse groups struggled amongst themselves, made attacks on the Germans and preyed on the local peasantry. For an admirably precise account, see N. Vakar, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-206.
express a clear sense of national pride in that phase of their history when the partisans embattled the Germans.  

In the post-war era Belorussia, consisting now of a reunited eastern and western Belorussia, has undergone the concluding period of Stalin's rule, the years of transition after Stalin's death and the period of Khrushchev's ascendancy in Soviet politics and the experiment with de-Stalinization and finally the now lengthy phase of rule during which Leonid Brezhnev has emerged as the dominant personality in the Soviet leadership.

1 There is, for example, a quite interesting publication which appeared first in Belorussian which deals with the war-time experience of the ordinary citizens of Belorussia. The authors used an oral history approach and produced a book aimed at a general readership. In case after case villagers told their interlocutors about suffering they underwent during the wartime. While these humble people did not have it as their self-conscious aim to parade their phenomenal endurance and fortitude, the reader cannot help but be impressed with this. The authors of this book which consists largely of transcripts of interviews added some commentary of their own about Belorussia's history during German occupation. They assert that "the Nazis were soon to realize to their horror that they had miscalculated in counting on the meekness of the Belorussian people. They were harassed by hundreds of thousands of Belorussian partisans..." And again, "The republic 'of the most-harmless of Slavs' as was first assumed by the 'planners' of peoples' fates in fascist Berlin, proved itself to be a land of a mass partisan movement. The almost half a million-strong army of people's avengers in Belorussia...." Passages such as these suggest that the partisan experience may have stimulated a sense of pride which has a very specific national dimension to it for at least some current-day citizens of Belorussia. I quoted here from an English language edition of the book. See A. Adamovich, Y. Bryl' and V. Kolesnik, Out of the Fire, translated by A. Graf and N. Belenkaya (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), pp. 443 and 458.

2 The final phase of Stalinist rule was, in the estimation of Nikolas Vakar, one during which the authorities manipulated "the political symbols of separate Belorussian identity within the Union, while the last real foundations of Belorussian nationhood were being assimilated or downright removed." N. Vakar, op. cit., p. 214.
The period since Stalin's death is one which has witnessed, as was mentioned at the outset of this study, a rise in the expression of nationalism in the USSR. This type of development is less clearly evident in Belorussia than elsewhere. Nationalism developed later and in weaker form in Belorussia than in neighbouring territories. This is not to say, however, that manifestations of nationalism have not appeared during the latest stages of Belorussian history. It is known, for example, that members of the Belorussian intelligentsia protested the neglect and destruction of Belorussian historical monuments in the late 1960s. An anonymous dissident Belorussian author whose work circulated in samizdat form expresses great hope about the current phase in the development of the Belorussian nation.

It is difficult to say when a Belorussian generation will grow up completely cured of their linguistic inferiority complex, and unashamed of their national identity. However, the formation of this generation is today no longer an idle dream but a living reality which is pushing up its young shoots towards the sun on the rejuvenated 'Belorussian cornfield.'

...There are many signs pointing to the rise in the near future of a united national front which will be called upon to complete the work started in Belorussia by Bahushevich and Kupala, Lenin and Charyyakou. Then my nation will have come to recognize and understand its destiny, that 'measure of perfection.' it will have become master in its own house and will hardly allow itself to be forced into alien linguistic clothing.

While the author speaks of a united national front, it is clear that he places his greatest hopes in the growth of a sense of national identity amongst the intelligentsia. The strength of national identification amongst all Belorussians in the modern day is a question that has interested a number of Western scholars. There appear to


---2---Ibid., p. 53 and p. 56. Emphasis as in text.
be two broad groups, one of which is rather optimistic about the vitality of Belorussian nationhood and another which is more pessimistic. The relative strength of the optimism and pessimism varies, of course, from individual to individual.¹

The question whether a strongly anchored mass Belorussian national consciousness exists does not, in any view, admit of a conclusive answer. We cannot under present circumstances engage in independent survey research in the Belorussian SSR. Hence, we must rely on our reading of history, on the evidence produced by Soviet scholars and indirect indicators available in official Soviet statistics.

'My own interpretation of this evidence is that, to a striking degree, the Belorussian population has been "Russianized." I do not think, however, that we can speak yet of a mass "Russification" ¹

of the Belorussian population. Certainly, some social groups might have succumbed to both these processes but suggestions that separate ethnic self-consciousness has been extinguished in Belorusia seem premature.

Because this question is an important element in the backdrop to the subject for research in this study, some attention must be paid to analyses which bear upon contemporary mass national consciousness in Soviet Belorussia. Our starting point, is the branch of Soviet scholarship most concerned with analysis of the development of national consciousness, ethnography. Soviet ethnographers suggest that there are three main processes which affect ethnic groups in the USSR.

These are ethnic consolidation which involves the fusion of a number of kindred linguistic and cultural units into a single ethnic entity; ethnic assimilation which entails the absorption of small groups of

1 The distinctions are used as formulated by Vernon Aspaturian. See his, "The Non-Russian Nationalities," in Prospects for Soviet Society, ed. by A. Kasof (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968), pp. 159-60. Aspaturian suggests in the Soviet context we should distinguish between Sovietization, Russianization and Russification. He defines Sovietization as "the process of modernization and industrialization within the Marxist-Leninist norms of social, economic and political behavior. Russianization is defined as the process of internalizing Russian language and culture within the Soviet Union.... Finally, Russification,...is defined as the process whereby non-Russians are transformed objectively and psychologically into Russians...." pp. 159-60.

2 Iu. V. Bromlei's work is a critically important element in this research programme. Bromlei is a highly prolific writer. One of his more important theoretical articles is available in English language translation. See his "The Term Ethnos and Its Definition," in Soviet Ethnology and Anthropology Today, ed. by Iu. Bromlei (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), pp. 55-72. For some sharply expressed views from his Soviet colleagues on Bromlei's use of conceptual distinctions, see "Oobzhdenie stat'i Iu. V. Bromleia 'Etnos i endogamiia'," Sovetskaia etnografiia, No. 3 (1970), pp. 86-103.
one nation by another (this process is divided into two sub-types—forcible and natural assimilation), and inter-ethnic integration which involves the interaction of different linguistic and cultural units and which leads to their sharing some common ethnic features. This last is indicated to be the primary orientation in the current day interaction of ethnic groups in the USSR.\textsuperscript{1} In their investigations into "interethnic integration" Soviet ethnographers have produced a substantial amount of empirical data which bears upon the national consciousness of the minority nationalities in the USSR. It is possible to strip away the interpretation Soviet experts place on this data and to gain some partial insight into the extent to which individual national cultures are being strengthened or weakened.\textsuperscript{2}

Soviet ethnographers are drawn strongly to analysis of the development of bilingualism in the USSR.\textsuperscript{3} Their claim is that it should be viewed as one of the factors which cements friendship and cooperation between Soviet nationalities and which undercuts ethnic prejudices. The development of competence in more than one language is a particularly strong trend in Belorussia. Nationalities such as the Poles are adopting Belorussian in increasing numbers.\textsuperscript{4} The most

\textsuperscript{1}This statement of the classification scheme used by Soviet ethnographers is drawn from the work of one of the leading Soviet experts in the field. V. I. Kozlov, Natsional'nosti SSSR (Moscow: Statistika, 1975), pp. 196-198.

\textsuperscript{2}The general interpretation Soviet scholars must place on this evidence is, of course, that Soviet nationality policy works fairly and effectively and that national cultures mutually influence and enrich each other.

\textsuperscript{3}For a representative treatment of this subject see, S. I. Bruk and M. N. Guboglo, "Dvuzyclie i sblizhenie natsii v SSSR," Sovetskaia etnografija, No. 4 (1975), pp. 18-32.

\textsuperscript{4}6,899,000 persons listed Belorussian as their native language in 1970. This represented an increase of 813,000 individuals over the 1959
notable aspect of this trend, however, is that Belorussians in large numbers learn Russian.\footnote{The educational system in Belorussia is geared strongly towards the promotion of Russian language instruction especially in urban centres where almost all students take their instruction in that language. See, R. Solchanyk, "Russian Language and Soviet Politics," Soviet Studies, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1 (January, 1982), p. 37. The western oblasts, Brest and Grodno, have fewer citizens who have experienced higher or secondary education than those in the eastern oblasts and consequently would be somewhat less prone to adopt Russian language. Soviet data indicate that Brest had 377 citizens per every 1,000 persons in 1970 who have some secondary or higher education and the figures for Grodno were 361 per every 1,000. This compared to an average of 440 per 1,000 for the entire Union republic and 736 per 1,000 with some secondary or higher education for the city of Minsk. These data are drawn from a report in Sel'skaia Gazeta, No. 113 (May 19, 1971), p. 3.} Table 1 shows this trend by age group. The overwhelming portion of the bilingual Belorussians have Russian as their second language. In total, more than sixty percent of the Belorussian population in Belorussia has good command of Russian.

The Belorussian position can be compared to that of the other major nationalities by checking Tables 1 and 2.

Western researchers tend to place a different interpretation to that of Soviet scholars on the evidence of linguistic change. Helene Carrère d'Encausse suggests that "among the Slavs the Belorussians seem to be the ones most in the grip of linguistic Russification."\footnote{Helene Carrère d'Encausse, op. cit., p. 170.} If adoption of Russian language as a first language by non-Russians validly indicates Russification, then Belorussians are indeed amongst the most "Russified" of the minority nationalities in the USSR.

Table 3 shows that when viewed in relative proportions, the Belorussians have a greater "Russified" segment of their population than any other nationality having union-republican status.

\*\footnote{census. The number of Belorussians, though, increased during that period by just 785,000.}
TABLE II:1
THE DIFFUSION OF BILINGUALISM IN DIFFERENT AGE GROUPS OF THE MAJOR SOVIET NATIONALITIES (IN PERCENTAGES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalities</th>
<th>Up to 10 Yrs.</th>
<th>11-19 Yrs. old</th>
<th>20-29 Yrs. old</th>
<th>30-39 Yrs. old</th>
<th>40-49 Yrs. old</th>
<th>50-59 Yrs. old</th>
<th>60 Yrs. and older</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgians</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaidzhans</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavians</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhiks</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE II:2

LINGUISTIC CHANGE AMONG SOVIET NATIONALITY GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality Group (Republic level only)</th>
<th>% who consider the language of their ethnic group as native in Russian</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussian</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaidzhan</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavian</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhik</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiza</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE II:3.
LEVEL OF "RUSSIFICATION" OF THE LARGEST NON-RUSSIAN NATIONALITIES (1970 CENSUS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalities</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>&quot;Russified&quot; proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>40,753,246</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>9,195,093</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td>9,051,755</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>5,298,818</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaizhanis</td>
<td>4,379,937</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>3,559,151</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgians</td>
<td>3,245,300</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavians</td>
<td>2,697,994</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>2,664,944</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhiks</td>
<td>2,135,883</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenes</td>
<td>1,525,284</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>1,452,222</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>1,429,844</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>1,007,356</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Belorussians who read and speak Russian apparently are disposed more favorably to intermarriage than unilingual Belorussians.¹

A Soviet ethno-sociologist, L. Drobizheva, discovered through survey research that 98.2 percent of Belorussians in the BSSR she questioned

¹For a persuasive discussion of the theme that ethnic intermarriage is related to nationalism or ethnic consciousnes, see Brian D. Silver, "Ethnic Intermarriage and Ethnic Consciousness Among Soviet Nationalities," Soviet Studies, Vol. XXX, No. 1 (January, 1978), pp. 107-16. The Soviet view of the importance of intermarriage as an indicator of the development of nationality relations can be found in V. I. Kozlov, Natsional'nosti SSSR, pp. 227-47.
who read newspapers in Russian or who read both Russian and Belorussian language newspapers viewed interethnic marriage with favour, whereas, just 80.2 percent of those who read newspapers mostly in Belorussian did so.¹

The offspring of couples who are Russian and Belorussian may have a strong tendency to identify themselves as Russian. Soviet ethnographers have produced some evidence which bears on this matter. Before commenting on this work, it should be explained that the ethnic identity of urban Soviet citizens is recorded in internal passports which they must carry. The passport is applied for at the age of fifteen and when the applicant reaches the age of sixteen he or she receives the passport. In the case of the offspring of mixed marriages, the adolescent child can choose either the mother's or the father's nationality. Once this choice has been made it cannot be altered.² L. N. Terent'eva has carried out a study which has as its focus the ethnic self-identification of adolescents born into ethnically-mixed families.³ She drew her samples from the three capital cities of the Soviet Baltic republics. Table 4 indicates that to a very striking degree Russian identity is favoured by juveniles of Russian and Belorussian parentage.

TABLE II:4

RELATIONSHIP OF CHILDREN'S NATIONALITIES TO THOSE OF FATHER'S
(AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NUMBER OF YOUTHS REPRESENTING
GIVEN COMBINATION OF NATIONALITIES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father</th>
<th>Mother</th>
<th>Chose Father's Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>84.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Belorussian</td>
<td>89.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussian</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: L. N. Terent'eva, "Opredelenie svoei natsional'noi
prinadlezhnosti podrostkami v natsional'no-smeshannykh sem'iyakh,"

The considerations just reviewed which bear upon linguistic
change, intermarriage and adolescent national identification might
suggest that the future of a separate national consciousness in
Belorussia is not good. We should not move too hastily, however,
to this conclusion. Roman Szporluk, after reviewing evidence of
this sort, points out that the "Belorussians continue to identify
themselves as such." He asks, though, whether "Belorussianess
is becoming to some extent a territorial or political concept?" 1

1R. Szporluk, "The Nations of the USSR in 1970," Survey,
Some writers contend there is a good deal more to "Belorussianness" than this. Agursky points out that "a numerous Belorussian intelligentsia has sprung up in the humanities, all of whose work is carried out in that language."\(^1\) J. Stankevich, writing in 1975, suggests furthermore that, "the development of (Belorussian) literature, as a part of national culture, is today vitally alive."\(^2\)

V. Bykov, one of Belorussia's most important contemporary literary figures, made an important address on Belorussian literature to the union republic's Union of Writers. Segments of this circulated in samizdat form and in a portion of it Bykov asked

> How has it come about that our literature which has enriched ranking with works of genius, should have reached a point where for two years in succession not one book has appeared which deserves the award of a state prize? And why are the prizes for non-Russian literature held, to put it mildly, in such low esteem that even when they are awarded they languish in oblivion for months on end and nothing is heard of who has won them or of when the awards are to be made?...

> I believe the cause of this evident decline is to be found in the very place where the progress of our literature was planned. Something very simple has happened: where literature is concerned, somehow or other all sense of proportion has been lost and literature has been done to death by an excess of guidance and tutelage. (Applause)

> Whilst our economy has passed beyond the phase of voluntarism, it must be frankly stated that it flourishes in literature to this day. Literature is far more of a "command economy" than the economy itself. Our economic life is evolving toward relationships that are increasingly more functional and sensible, yet literature has remained in the state that agriculture was in until recently (applause): anyone concerned with it was only too ready to charge

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1. M. Agursky, loc. cit., p. 743. Some of the numbers of this intelligentsia, no doubt, carry their work out first in Russian and then translate it into Belorussian.

in with some harebrained scheme and interfere with what in any case is not the world's most productive patch of land....

Writing a good book is a hard job in every way; but getting it published is even harder. The fact is that in this country the only works which are easy to have published are mediocre ones, books which have nothing to say and which are exactly like the hundreds of previous ones already familiar to critics and publishers....

And yet—we must keep on and work. We are on the threshold of a great date in our history. We have plenty to write about and talent should never shirk its responsibility. Literature did not start yesterday and will not end tomorrow. There is more to Belorussian literature than what appears under the imprint of the state publishing house....

In conclusion, I should like to say that despite the somewhat gloomy thoughts that I have expressed, I believe in the creative power of literature, just as I believe in the reasonableness, common sense and goodwill of those responsible for guiding it. I should also like to take this opportunity of thanking the many writers who, before this congress, gave such eloquent proof of their civic courage and professional solidarity in reacting to a certain attack that was directed against me. So long as we writers are united on such vital matters and are prepared to declare ourselves openly, then the Belorussian people may rest assured about the future destiny of its literature.1

Bykov's address is important primarily as an expression (and it is, moreover, a beautifully eloquent one) of the need for artistic freedom. At the same time, however, it conveys the sense that the best Belorussian writers perceive themselves to be the inheritors of and contributors to a distinctive cultural heritage.

Whether this culture and its attendant sense of ethnic particularism will flourish or wither remains to be seen. Much will depend upon the continued vitality of the humanistic intelligentsia but just as much or more will hinge on the ordinary toilers in industry and agriculture. The strength of their attachment to a distinct Belorussian identity is not a matter one can be certain of even for

Vasil' Bykov, "Writing in Belorussia," Partisan Review, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2 (Spring, 1972), pp. 255-63. Bykov alludes to strong criticism that he was subjected to due to his portrayal of characters in his wartime fiction.
the historical period under investigation in this study. Any estimates of the nature of the future situation is even harder to make. Interesting though this subject is, we have to leave it at this point and move on in our attempt to provide by way of background information an overview of contemporary Belorussian society.

Belorussia--Demographic Trends

Demographic trends in Belorussia conform broadly with the general trends characteristic of the European part of the Soviet Union which bore the brunt of the shock waves set off by the Second World War and which earlier experienced the calamitous collectivization of agriculture campaign engineered by Stalin. The pattern of population growth in Belorussia reflects its tumultuous history. In this post-Second World War period Belorussia has recorded its best population growth. Table 5 indicates the general pattern of population growth in the Belorussian SSR along with that of the other union republics, and Table 6 indicates the territorial distribution of that population within Belorussia. The rate of population growth in the Belorussian SSR has, however, slowed in rough correspondence

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# TABLE II:5

DYNAMICS OF POPULATION GROWTH IN THE UNION REPUBLICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Republics</th>
<th>In Thousands</th>
<th>Growth in Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>69,902</td>
<td>108,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK SSR</td>
<td>35,210</td>
<td>40,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bel SSR</td>
<td>6,899</td>
<td>8,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek SSR</td>
<td>4,334</td>
<td>6,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh SSR</td>
<td>5,597</td>
<td>6,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian SSR</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>3,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerb. SSR</td>
<td>2,339</td>
<td>3,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lith. SSR</td>
<td>2,828</td>
<td>8,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mold. SSR</td>
<td>2,057</td>
<td>2,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lat. SSR</td>
<td>2,492</td>
<td>1,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kir. SSR</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>1,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzh. SSR</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>1,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arm. SSR</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turk. SSR</td>
<td>1,042</td>
<td>1,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Est. SSR</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>1,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>159,153</strong></td>
<td><strong>190,678</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE II:6
POPULATION BY ADMINISTRATIVE AREA: 1959 AND 1970
(Population Figures in Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1959 Total</th>
<th>1970 Total</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Percent Change 1959-70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussian S.S.R.</td>
<td>8,055</td>
<td>9,002</td>
<td>3,908</td>
<td>5,094</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brest Oblast</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>1,295</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gomel Oblast</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td>1,533</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grodno Oblast</td>
<td>1,078</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minsk Oblast</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>2,457</td>
<td>1,327</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mogilev Oblast</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>1,227</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitebsk Oblast</td>
<td>1,276</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE II:7
FEMALE FERTILITY BY UNION REPUBLICS, 1958-1974
(Number of Births per 6,000 Females 15-49 Years of Age)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Republics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>159.2</td>
<td>122.4</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>84.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>158.8</td>
<td>165.3</td>
<td>158.5</td>
<td>186.0</td>
<td>156.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

with the slowdown throughout the European part of the USSR.\footnote{As one expert has noted there are two demographic worlds in the USSR. One of these is made by the Soviet Europeans in the western part of the USSR and the other by the central Asian population and other national groups in the eastern part of the Soviet Union. See Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Decline of an Empire. The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt, translated by Martin Sokolinsky and Henry A. LeFarge (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979), pp. 58-70.} Table 7 shows the position of Belorussia relative to that of some other of the union republics.

The population of Belorussia contains a number of separate national groups. The major element in the population is its Belorussian component, but there is a significant number of Russians, Poles, Jews and Ukrainians in the BSSR. Table 8 indicates the relative weights of the two largest population groups and of the minority populations in Belorussia.

TABLE II:8
POPULATION OF BELORUSSIAN SSR BY NATIONALITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Belorussians in Percent</th>
<th>Russians in Percent</th>
<th>Other Nationalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>4,983</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>5,569</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>8,055</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>9,002</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Polish population in the BSSR declined rapidly according to the census data from 539,000 in 1959 to 383,000 in 1970. Belorussia contains the largest portion of Poles in the USSR and the largest...
segment of these live in Western Belorussia. V. I. Kozlov, one of the leading Soviet ethnographers, discusses this drop in numbers somewhat gingerly.\footnote{V. I. Kozlov, \textit{Natsional'nosti SSSR} (Moscow: Statistika, 1975), pp. 115-16 and 256.} It appears that the decline is due less to out-migration than to a changed declaration of nationality from one census to another and this in turn likely is due to the simple considerations that the individuals involved see advantages in being Belorussian within the BSSR or that they have been assimilated linguistically. Tremendous losses amongst the male population were recorded during the First World War, the revolutionary period and the Second World War. Hence, women outnumber men in the Soviet population generally and Belorussia provides no exception in this regard as can be seen in Table 9. The discrepancy is gradually being reduced in the post-war period.

The years of Soviet power have been years of industrialization and urbanization. An outflow of peasants have made their way to the cities and made the dramatic changes in life-style which are required in order to make the transition to an urban way of life. Table 10 indicates the changes in the patterns of urban and rural population growth in the USSR in the period between the census of 1959 and 1970. Generally we can surmise that the migrants from town to city have been the younger, more vigorous and ambitious members of the rural community. There is still, however, a considerable segment of the Belorussian population to be found in the rural community. Indeed, when we consider place of residence together with nationality, we discover that the Russian population in Belorussia is clustered
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Republic</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>Union Republic</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorusia</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>Kirgizia</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>Turkmenia</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaidzhan</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>USSR as a whole</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE II:10

THE DYNAMICS OF URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION GROWTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Growth in population (in percentages)</th>
<th>Portion of urban population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK SSR</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bel. SSR</td>
<td>-9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek SSR</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh SSR</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian SSR</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerb. SSR</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lith. SSR</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mold. SSR</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lat. SSR</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kir. SSR</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzh. SSR</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arm. SSR</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turk. SSR</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Est. SSR</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in its cities and the Belorussians make up the largest segment of the rural population as can be seen in Table 11.

This rural population is widely dispersed throughout the Belorussian countryside. V. A. Krutalevich has published a work rich in data about the settlement patterns of the inhabitants of the Belorussian countryside. There are more than 27,000 villages dotted across rural Belorussia and only 16 percent of these contain more than one hundred homesteads. In every third hamlet, there are no more than twenty households.¹

TABLE II:11

RURAL POPULATION AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION AND BELORUSSIAN REPRESENTATION IN THE SOVIET RURAL POPULATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussian SSR</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians in the USSR overall</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians within the BSSR</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Belorussians have migrated not simply from town to city within the BSSR but have moved to other regions within the USSR as can be seen in Table 12. This latter movement has been promoted and organized to a considerable extent by Soviet officialdom.

Lubomyr Hajda has shown in a recent publication that the age patterns of the Soviet population vary over a very broad range. As can be seen in Table 13, Belorussia resembles Lithuania with regard to the age profile of its population. Each has a higher proportion of both older and younger age cohorts in their populations than do the Russians. The smaller segment of the working age group is due to the outmigration from Belorussia mentioned earlier. Belorussia, in fact, has had higher net outmigration than any other union republic in the period between the censuses.

A Sociological Description

While discussing the direction of demographic trends in the USSR, allusion was made to the extraordinary social changes the USSR has undergone within a compressed period of time. It was mentioned that the years of Soviet power have been years of concentrated urbanization and industrialization. Correspondingly, the same years have witnessed an expansion of the working class (largely of an involuntary nature during the 1930s but having a more spontaneous or unforced quality thereafter) and a shrinkage of the peasantry. There has been a very substantial growth as well of white collar workers in Soviet society. The Soviet economy seems to have been able to absorb almost limitless numbers of engineers and the educational system has produced large numbers of technical specialists of various kinds. 

(See Tables 14 and 15).

---


2 Ibid., p. 480.
TABLE II:12

DISTRIBUTION OF BELORUSSIANS IN THE USSR (IN THOUSANDS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1959-70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>6,532</td>
<td>7,290</td>
<td>+12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Belorussia</td>
<td>1,382</td>
<td>1,762</td>
<td>+28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>+14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>+33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>+73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>+71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>+54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>+50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>+15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>+83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghizia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>+49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhikistan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>+44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>+69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>+78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7,914</td>
<td>9,052</td>
<td>+14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## TABLE II:13

AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNION REPUBLICS (IN PERCENTAGES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Age Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>23.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>39.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Age Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE II:14
CLASS COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF BELORUSSIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Farmers</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligentsia and White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collar Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE II:15
NUMBER OF SPECIALISTS WITH HIGHER AND SECONDARY EDUCATION EMPLOYED IN THE BELORUSSIAN ECONOMY BY SPECIALTY (IN THOUSANDS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speciality</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All specialists with higher education</td>
<td>159,0</td>
<td>235,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>38,1</td>
<td>67,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agronomists, Zootechnicians and Veterinarians</td>
<td>10,9</td>
<td>16,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economists</td>
<td>10,2</td>
<td>18,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity Researchers</td>
<td>1,6</td>
<td>2,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurists</td>
<td>2,7</td>
<td>3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>16,0</td>
<td>20,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers, Librarians and Cultural and Educational Workers</td>
<td>72,9</td>
<td>97,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N. Korzun, in a hymn of praise to the planned and proportionate development of Soviet society, was forced to concede that the distribution of labour resources in Belorussia was not altogether perfect. Specifically, he allowed that there was a problem of shortage of specialists, and especially of those needed for the agricultural economy. This, indeed, is a serious problem the specific dimensions of which are documented reasonably clearly in the work of Soviet rural sociologists. Our description of Soviet rural society, it should be noted, is based largely on this work.

Before proceeding to their detailed descriptions, brief consideration will be given to the overall frame of reference, Soviet Marxism, within which these works are confined. Official spokesmen in the USSR claim that the Soviet Union has been a socialist society since the mid-1930s. In their view, the bases for class antagonism in Soviet society were undercut with the nationalization of industrial enterprises and the collectivization of the agricultural sector of the economy. The Soviet Union, its official spokesmen proclaim, is at the stage of "developed socialism" in the overall process of building communism and the general trend in social development is toward social homogeneity. In the interim, relations between the two principal classes which make up the population are friendly as are relations between the two classes, on the one hand, and the intelligentsia, on the other.


2A concise useful description and critical commentary on the development of this line of inquiry can be found in, Terence Cox, Rural Sociology in the Soviet Union (New York: Holmes and Meier, Inc., 1979).
The intelligentsia—those employed in mental rather than manual labour—are considered to be a stratum rather than a full-fledged class. The members of the intelligentsia who work full-time in important decision-making positions in the apparatus of the party and the state, normally considered to be the power-elite or ruling class in Western social science, are said to work on behalf of society and in the interests of advancing socialism. Spokesmen from the Soviet ideological apparatus insist that there is a correspondence between base and superstructure in their society. The nationalization of the means of production has led to the establishment of non-exploitative relations of production and the emergence of socialism and communism. The possibility of a power elite or ruling class emerging and ruling in its own selfish interest is denied a priori and the claim is advanced that no social group can oppress another under the conditions prevailing in Soviet socialism.¹

Some Soviet social scientists have found this simple framework of three major social groups—working class, peasantry and intelligentsia—based upon the differentiating criteria of relationship to property (nationalized or collectivized) and type of labour (manual or mental) overly restrictive.² Particular controversy centers upon those elements lumped into the category of intelligentsia. As my


²For a very useful overview of discussions among Soviet sociologists on social structure, see M. Yanowitch, Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union (London: Martin Robertson and Co., 1977), pp. 3-22.
colleague at Memorial University, Victor Zaslavsky, has argued that the desire of Soviet sociologists to move away from a simplified and abstract picture of class structure to the more realistic picture of a society consisting of a number of groups with often contradictory interests is especially noticeable in a discussion of the intelligentsia's role in society.\footnote{1}

Hence, separate investigations have been made into the structure and function of such occupational groupings as engineers and technical personnel and scientists and important work has been carried out analyzing differentiation among the rural intelligentsia.\footnote{2} Venture-some Soviet sociologists have contributed substantially to the understanding of the development of stratification of the Soviet social structure.\footnote{3}


One of the more capable of the Soviet Union's rural sociologists is Belorussia's Zinaida I. Monich.¹ Her publications contain a considerable amount of empirical data derived both from survey research and from the standard statistical yearbooks customarily drawn upon by Soviet social scientists. Monich insists that the rural social structure should be divided into four groups: the working class, peasantry, intelligentsia and white-collar workers.² The working class is represented by sovkhoz agricultural labourers and industrial workers, plus service industry workers such as those employed in schools, medical and cultural-enlightenment institutions. The collective farm peasantry, the largest group in the rural community includes all those who are involved in physical labour and who work on collective farms. Hence, Monich does not include workers in industrial enterprises located on kolkhozes in the working class.³ Rather she takes the view that

what is decisive in determining their class affiliation is their association with the collective--farm--cooperative form of property, which defines those differences in the conditions of labour and the forms and scale of payment for it that are manifested among both collective farmers and workers.⁴

The intelligentsia or professional and para-professional groups are separated from white-collar workers with respect to the degree of complexity of the mental work they engage in and the extent to which

---

²Z. I. Monich, Intelligentsiia v strukture sel'skogo naseleniia, pp. 12-16.
³Ibid., pp. 24-25.
physical labour is mixed with their mental work. The white collar workers engage in simpler forms of mental work and frequently engage in physical work as well.\(^1\)

Monich is constrained to emphasize throughout her analysis positive aspects of Soviet social development. Nonetheless, we can derive from her work and that of her colleagues some sound descriptive information about the rural community and gain some insight into the nature of the human base around which Belorussian agriculture has developed.

The collective farm peasantry was largely unskilled during the period investigated in this study which dovetails with that of Monich's work. In 1970, 70 percent of the kolkhozniki were unskilled labourers. This did mark, however, a decline from 74 percent in 1966. During the same period the percentage of skilled workers in the agricultural sector rose from 16 to 30 percent. (23,056 individuals were added in this period to the skilled worker category).\(^2\) Monich appears to be heartened by these figures. She suggests that change and virtual revolution is taking place in the work involved in such pre-existing occupations as those of dairymaids, pig tenders, calf herders, poultrymen and herdsmen. Mechanized work is supplanting manual effort in these areas.\(^3\)

The age structure of the kolkhozniki is not particularly favourable as can be seen in the Table 16. Just 6.7 percent of the people of all ages taking an active part in the life of the kolkhoz were young people up to 30 years of age.\(^4\) It is noteworthy that a

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 25.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 32.

\(^3\)Ibid., pp. 30-31.

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 33.
large segment of pensioners still have to labour. The largest number of them are unskilled and have to engage in arduous manual labour.¹

Monich reports that her interviewees on the collective farms were alarmed over the problem of personnel for agriculture in the future. Today the villages are undergoing a demographic aging due to a mass-scale migration of young people out of the countryside. As a consequence, a rational combination of older and younger personnel is unattainable.²

**TABLE II:16**

CUMULATIVE AGE DISTRIBUTION OF COLLECTIVE FARM PEASANTRY
TOTAL SAMPLE DRAWN FROM FOUR RURAL SOVIETS IN VITEBSK,
GOMEL, MOGILEV AND BREST OBLAST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age, Years</th>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and over</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Z. Monich, Intelligentsiia v strukture sel'skogo naseleniia, p. 35.

The data on education provides no surprises. The older age groups who perform unskilled work generally have little formal education.³ Disparities in educational backgrounds between social groups are quite noticeable as can be seen in Table 17 which also makes

### TABLE II:17

**Levels of Education of the Rural Population of the BSSR by Social Groups**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Groups in the Population</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Higher, Unfinished</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Incomplete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class (Entire)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligentsia and white collar workers (Entire)</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolkhozniki (Entire)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Groups in the Population</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Higher, Unfinished</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Incomplete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class (Entire)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligentsia and white collar workers (Entire)</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolkhozniki (Entire)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

clear the modest enhancement of educational backgrounds that took place in the period between the census of 1959 and 1970.

The division of labour between the sexes in Belorussian agriculture conforms to a general Soviet pattern. As Monich notes "the sphere of mechanized work is a male privilege and that of manual labour is reserved to women."\(^1\)

Belorussian sovkhozes are more mechanized than the kolkhozes.\(^2\) Consequently, the segment of the agricultural working force employed on them is somewhat better educated but only marginally so. The principal difference between the kolkhozes and sovkhozes as far as the composition of the work force in terms of age, sex and education is that on the latter there are more young people who have attained incomplete secondary education.\(^3\)

Monich found that the numbers of workers in industrial enterprises in the rural economy were increasing and that the percentage of young people was greater than on the farms and their general level of education of these workers was higher.\(^4\) Workers in the service sector were on the increase as well but were predominantly female in contrast to the workers on rural industrial enterprises.\(^5\)

---

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 42.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 45. In 1969, for example, there was an average of 64 equipment operators and mechanics per sovkhoz whereas there were only 38 per collective farm. Correspondingly, the data on mechanization of farm operations showed that on the sovkhozes 6.4 percent of the cattle were housed in completely mechanized structures, as were 9.2 percent of the pigs and 18.7 percent of the fowl. On the kolkhozes, the corresponding figures were generally lower: 3.4 percent, 25.8 percent and 6.9 percent.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 47.

\(^4\)Ibid., pp. 48-49.

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 49.
The numbers of clerical workers was expanding as well during the period covered by Monich's study. She found them to be a highly variegated group with respect to their levels of education. The more skilled members of this group readily find employment in towns, Monich acknowledges and,

as a consequence, the countryside either lacks entirely members of many needed occupations or recruits for this work persons having neither the necessary skill nor an education enabling them to acquire it.

Overall, then, Monich depicts a rural social structure which subdivides into a collective farm peasantry which comprised 68.5 percent of her sample, a working class which accounted for 19.2 percent; professionals or paraprofessionals who made up 10.1 percent; and finally, the smallest group at just 2.2 percent, the clerical workers.

The professional and paraprofessional group is a strategically important one comprised as it is of engineers, technologists, agonomists, animal husbandrymen, veterinarians, economists and accountants. Monich's account emphasizes its growth in the BSSR but acknowledges at the same time that supply has not satisfied need or demand. Consequently, large numbers of people hold jobs without having technical qualifications for them.

The point is that nearly one-half the posts of engineers and technicians on kolkhozes and sovkhozes are held by people of practical experience only, lacking technical education (2,297 individuals out of 4,660).

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1 Ibid., p. 53.
2 Ibid., p. 55.
3 Ibid., p. 67.
Those professional and paraprofessionals who provide services of some kind rather than those whose work is related to tangible material production are in short supply in the Belorusssian countryside. Monich points out that the current number of medical personnel is too low and the fact that they overwhelmingly are general practitioners "does not meet the needs of modern public health."\(^1\) Similarly, there are very few cultural and enlightenment workers in the countryside who have received special training in schools for this purpose (in 1969 there were 634 such individuals from a total of 4,248 heads of rural clubs and houses of culture.\(^2\)

The level of training received by those in positions which involve management of a segment of the farm's operations is singularly low. Thus Monich found that 83.5 percent of the brigadiers of production brigades on kolkhozes and 77 percent of them on sovhozes were self-trained without any form of specialized education. The heads of livestock departments were self-trained to similarly high degrees--80 percent on the kolkhozes and 73.5 percent on the state farms.\(^3\) Monich illuminates the negative consequences which flow from the lack of skilled manpower at this level:

Lacking the required knowledge for skilled guidance of the sector of production entrusted to them, such personnel, working in the old way, hold back the rise in the efficiency of collective state farm production and hinder scientific and technological progress. As a consequence of the inadequate skills of the middle-rank managers, it is quite common for their functions to be foisted upon the chief (service) specialists. The work suffers doubly from this: the leadership of the brigade or livestock operation gains little from this kind of half-way replacement and the time and energy of specially trained people

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\(^1\)Ibid., p. 77. Monich does not say so but it is likely that many of these medical personnel are the less qualified felchery.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 78.

\(^3\)Ibid., pp. 105-106.
is used up in inappropriate activities, causing positive loss to their principal duties in the scientific organization of labour and the introduction of advanced experience and the achievements of science into agricultural production.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 108-109.}

The situation improves at the highest level of management. Thus Monich reports that 79.2 percent of the chairmen of kolkhozes and 94.4 percent of the sovkhoz chairmen had some form of specialized education.\footnote{Ibid., p. 114.} When one considers the entire professional and para-professional work force, however, it can be seen readily that a large-scale upgrading of skills is imperative if Belorussia is to develop an effective modern agriculture. Of the 30,056 people holding jobs in these categories only 7,708 had higher education in the period under review here.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 120-121.}

There is a greater degree of mobility amongst this segment of the agricultural work force than any other. The single most important cause of this personnel turnover is acknowledged by Monich. It is simple

\begin{quote}
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\end{quote}

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\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\ldots
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
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\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
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\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\ldots
\end{quote}

Diverse factors contributed to this dissatisfaction—ineffective housing, low pay, conflicts between farm experts and farm managers, excessive working hours, lack of equipment and materials necessary for one’s work. As Monich points out, “the working conditions of
the rural professional and paraprofessionals still require marked improvement.¹

The modern-day Belorussian rural community for the period studied here has been described. The contemporary Soviet political leadership obviously did not inherit a highly trained youthful agricultural working force. The situation rather was quite the opposite. This emerges with clarity in the empirical investigations of Soviet rural sociologists.² The legacy of the Stalin years, it is clear, weighs heavily on the countryside. During Stalin's years of leadership the gap between rural and urban centres deepened as priority was given to industrialization. The gulf remained a deep one for the period reviewed here.³

¹Ibid., p. 164.

²We have concentrated here on Monich's analysis both for sake of ease of exposition and due to its solid empirical base, but there are numerous other studies which complement her work. For two such works, see V. I. Bovsha, V. D. Laptenka et al., Sotsial'nye izmeneniiia v sovremennom sele (Minsk: "Nauka i tekhnika," 1978) and I. V. Poluian, Tekhnicheskie kadry belorussoi derevnii i razvitie sel'skogo khoziaistva respubliki (Minsk: "Nauka i tekhnika," 1978). The work by Bovsha and Laptenka makes clear the continuing gradual upgrading of the agricultural work force down into the more recent period which is outside the time frame of our study. See especially, pp. 48-49. Both these works will be drawn upon further at a later point in this dissertation.

Cultural Orientations

It is difficult to acquire information about the cultural attitudes and orientations of the rural population of the BSSR. This problem is especially acute in the case of Western Belorussia. Soviet sociological investigations provide some meagre evidence. V. T. Kolokol'nikov carried out a study of marital and family relations among the kolkhozniki in the Brest and Grodno oblasts. He expresses some concern about the restricted cultural lives of the region's inhabitants. 58.7 percent of his sample did not go to the movies, and 30.7 percent did not listen to the radio; 26.5 percent did not read papers and the vast majority of rank and file collective farm members (87.6 percent) were not pursuing studies of any kind. 74 percent of the sample reported that in their leisure time they rested without doing anything in particular. These findings would seem to suggest a considerable degree of mass estrangement from official Soviet culture. Later in his article Kolokolnikov allows that many services essential to daily living are at too low a level and collective farm families, especially its women members have "to spend an enormous amount of time and strength on work in the household and the garden farms." A corresponding view of the restricted cultural lives of the kolkhozniki in central Belorussia emerges clearly in the published research of P. Simush. He reports on a survey conducted

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1 V. T. Kolokolnikov, "Brachnosemeineye otnosheniia v srede kolkhoznogo krestianstva (Iz opyta konkretnogo--sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia v Brestskoi i Grodzenskoi oblastiakh Belorussskoi SSR), Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, No. 3 (1976), pp. 47-60.

2 Ibid., p. 87.

in the village of Komsomol'skoe in Minsk oblast. Simush was concerned especially to establish the extent to which the kolkhozniki were reached and affected by Soviet mass media. The overwhelming percentage (95%) of the kolkhozniki listened to the radio, but he found that their listening habits were highly selective and only 10 percent listened to broadcasts that dealt with economic, scientific or atheistic themes. In reading of newspapers proved to be a regular habit for 42.7 percent of Simush's sample; another 23.6 percent indicated they read newspapers from time to time and a rather large 33.7 percent did not read newspapers at all. Up to 40 percent indicated that they preferred newspapers in Russian language. No figures are provided on the national backgrounds of the survey's respondents. The village library was used by just 48 percent of those surveyed and only 5 and 4 percent of those borrowed books dealing respectively with agricultural and social-economic themes.

Films were popular with a segment of Simush's samples. 32.2 percent reported that they normally attended film viewings once a week; 30.3 viewed films more often than once a week and 37.5 percent did not bother to watch films at all. Simush notes that in the main old films are shown and it is only seldom that films are available which deal with agriculture. In his conclusion, Simush expresses the customary optimism about the Soviet future that Soviet academics perforce must give voice to, but his empirical inquiry establishes

1 Ibid., p. 123.
2 Ibid., p. 124.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
that in the interim, life in the Belorussian countryside is far from a rich or advanced state.\footnote{Ibid., p. 126.}

Investigations into the religiosity of the inhabitants of the region provides further evidence of this. After making the obligatory introductory note about the great progress made towards eradicating old ways and mores, two authors, who visited the village of Ol'shany in Stolinskii raion in Brest oblast, report on the presence of Orthodox and Pentecostal believers in the community and suggest reasons that they think account for the tenacity of religious belief.\footnote{L. V. Mandrygin and N. I. Makarov, "O kharakteere i prichinakh sokhraneniiia religiozných verovanii u krest'ian zapadnykh oblastei Belorussii," Voprozy nashchnogo ateizma, Vypusk 1 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl,'" 1966), pp. 223-238.} Mandrygin and Makarov do not indicate the proportion of believers in the community but acknowledge that religious survivals are still widespread and together with other old traditions exercise an influence upon an important part of the kolkhozniki. Following a rather extensive description of the manifestations of this religiosity, the authors attempt to explain its presence. They point first to the large degree of illiteracy which characterizes the kolkhozniki. Again, they provide no percentages and suggest simply that there are many who are illiterate and are therefore especially susceptible to what the writers would regard as the superstitious appeals of the Church. The concluding section of the article presents a bleak view of the hardships experienced by the kolkhozniki in their daily lives.

The low standard of living, social difficulties and so on create a propitious favourable psychological ground for the activities of religious believers. At the same time, these conditions
set up important obstacles to organizational and ideological work among the population.¹

These observations are relevant to our earlier sociological description but in this context the point I should like to emphasize is that the authors make it clear that substantial numbers of the kolkhozniki hold to traditional beliefs.

Michael Agursky argues strongly that religiosity is an important factor in Belorussian life. There is, he asserts an enormous vitality of a religious faith among the Byelorussian people and one can hardly doubt that this factor will continue to play an important and ever increasing role in the future.²

There is some reason to believe there is a measure of overstatement here but there is no gainsaying the fact that the proportion of religious believers in Belorussia is high.³

We have now considered briefly some major aspects of Belorussia's development. Major historical, demographic, social and cultural features have been taken into account. Belorussia has undergone, as was noted above, dramatic changes. Its demography, social structure and cultural life have all been altered during the years of Soviet power and yet historical continuity is discernible as well. The peasantry, in particular, to a significant extent, appear to remain rooted in traditional attachments. Overall, the society

¹Ibid., p. 238.

²M. Agursky, loc. cit., p. 743.

³If the assessment put forward in Lithuanian samizdat of the condition of the Roman Catholic Church in Belorussia is to be trusted, it would appear that Catholicism, at last, is in a stagnant condition in Belorussia. See V. Stanley Vardy's The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 166-67 and pp. 269-71.
endures as both a distinct and important element in the Soviet system.

Focus now will be brought to bear upon the development of Belorussian agriculture.
CHAPTER III

BELORUSSIAN AGRICULTURE

The Natural Resource Base

... behind all of human history there is this actor—an actor who promptly transforms himself, who is always adroit, who always presses himself forward, and who is often decisive in his intervention. What shall we call him? Space? The word says too little. The earth? An equivocal name. Let us say the geographical milieu.¹

The geographical milieu, we are concerned with in this study, is the one found in the Belorussian SSR. Our interest is addressed particularly to the constraints set and opportunities presented by that milieu for development of agriculture.

Soviet Belorussia is part of a larger region whose natural features do not promise a rich agriculture. The Baltic Republics, Belorussia and sections of the RSFSR adjacent to Belorussia are situated on the East European plain whose agricultural land varies in quality from poor to the moderately productive. The Belorussian SSR itself subdivides into three agroclimatic regions: the North which is moderately warm and humid; the Centre which is warmer and moderately humid and the South where the degree of humidity is less stable and where it is relatively warm.² These three regions can be broken down


²Brief useful descriptions of the geography of the region can be found in the following works. See J. P. Cole, Geography of the USSR (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 216-229; P. Lydolph, Geography of the USSR. Topical Analysis (Elkhart Lake,
further into western and eastern subregions which are distinguished by their moisture supply.\(^1\) Within the Belorussian SSR the northern segment is distinct due to moraine ridges of the Lithuanian-Belorussian highland. There are a large number of hills and ridges in this region which have been formed by glaciers and there are lakes of glacial origins.\(^2\) Southern Belorussia consists of a broad lowland depression. The Belorussian Polessie, located in the south, is a swampy marshy land which covers hundreds of square miles. Unused lands, not unexpectedly are common in this area.\(^3\) The central zone is a geographically transitional one between the distinct northern and southern areas.

The climate in Belorussia is transitional from a maritime to a continental one. Hence, the winters tend to be mild and damp, summers generally are cool with heavy precipitation, autumns are moist and the weather highly variable in the spring.\(^4\) The average annual number of days with precipitation is two hundred and amounts to five to six hundred millimeters a year.\(^5\)

More than twenty-three varieties of soil have been identified in the Belorussian union republic but just four of these are dominant:


\(^1\) N. D. Astashkin, Prirodnye resursy BSSR, pp. 310-311.
\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 315-316.
\(^3\) Ibid., pp. 312-314.
\(^4\) Ibid., pp. 305-306.
\(^5\) Ibid., p. 313.
Brown Forest, Grey Forest, Sod Podzolic and Peat-bog. The central region of the BSSR is the location where soils are best, and consequently one finds extensive cultivated areas. Grain crops are grown here. The principal grain crop is winter rye which relatively speaking stands up well to typical Belorussian weather conditions.

Grain crops are cultivated in the north of Belorussia as well but here barley is a favoured crop because of soil and weather conditions.

Land cultivation is difficult in the south due to the swamps and marshes characteristic of the Besse region. Buckwheat and millet, however, are grown here.

Leguminous crops are cultivated in the Belorussian SSR with peas grown principally in the centre and north and fodder lupine concentrated in the south.

Industrial crops are an important element in the overall Belorussian agricultural production. Sugar-beet and fiber-flax are the two most important of these. Flax cultivation tends to be concentrated in the north while sugar-beet production is favoured in the south and the west of Belorussia.

Potatoes are grown all over Belorussia and they are regarded as an important crop because they are used as food, as livestock fodder and as an industrial crop. Potato cultivation generally has been the most successful in the southern and central regions.

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1 Ibid., pp. 307-309.
2 Ibid., p. 314.
3 Ibid., p. 312.
4 Ibid., p. 315.
Vegetable farming is attempted in the suburban districts of most of Belorussia’s cities. The southeast region has proven to be the most productive base for this type of agriculture.

Livestock fodder is grown throughout Belorussia. Hay meadows and pastures tend to be clustered in the southern region.¹

Livestock farming is an especially strategic element in Belorussian agriculture and is carried on throughout the union republic. Dairy and beef cattle, pigs, sheep and fowl are all bred in Belorussia. Cattle and pig rearing are the two most important forms of livestock farming. Cattle breeding and poultry farming are carried on throughout the union republic whereas pig-rearing tends to be concentrated in the central region.²

Plant growing accounts for approximately 40 percent of Belorussian agricultural commodity output and livestock-breeding for 60 percent. In value of commodity output, flax accounts for more than 14 percent, grain for almost 8 percent, potatoes for 7 percent. More than 41 percent was forthcoming from cattle-breeding nearly 14.5 percent from pig-breeding, poultry gives just under 2.5 percent and


²The information on livestock farming is derived from the same section of the economic geography by Mel' nichuk.
sheep-breeding just one percent.\(^1\)

In 1971, there were 2,174 kolkhozes and 834 sovkhozes in Belorussia. The kolkhozes of Belorussia account for a significantly greater amount of the agricultural production than the sovkhozes. The sovkhozes produce approximately 32 percent of the grain, 13.3 percent of the flax, almost 15 percent of the potatoes, 18 percent of the vegetables, 23 percent of the meat, 20 percent of the milk, 17 percent of the eggs and 15 percent of the wool.\(^2\)

Table 1 indicates that the Belorussian economy is an important agricultural producer for the overall Soviet economy. Its production is close to that of Kazakhstan despite its much smaller size and considerably lower amount of cultivated area. (See Tables 2 and 3 for descriptions of land use in Belorussia).

Belorussian agriculture accounts for 3 percent of the ploughed land, 2.9 percent of the area under crops, and 4.4 percent of the cattle in the Soviet Union. This region accounted, however, for 22.4 percent of the flax, 14 percent of the potatoes, 14 percent of the vegetables, 5.6 percent of the meat, 6.1 percent of the milk and 3.9 percent of the eggs produced in all of the Soviet Union in 1971.\(^3\)

\(^1\) A. G. Lis, Problemy razvitiya i razmeshcheniya proizvoditel'nykh sil Belorussii (Minsk: Mysl', 1972), p. 102.


\(^3\) A. G. Lis, op. cit., p. 101.
TABLE III:1

PROPORTION OF PRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES BY UNION REPUBLICS, 1966-70
(IN PERCENTAGES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grain</th>
<th>Sunflower Seed</th>
<th>Potatoes</th>
<th>Sugar Beets</th>
<th>Raw Cotton</th>
<th>Flax Fibre</th>
<th>Vegetables</th>
<th>Fruit &amp; Berries</th>
<th>Livestock &amp; Poultry</th>
<th>Milk</th>
<th>Eggs</th>
<th>Wool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK SSR</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>42.44</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussian SSR</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek SSR</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh SSR</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian SSR</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaizhan SSR</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian SSR</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavian SSR</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian SSR</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz SSR</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik SSR</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian SSR</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen SSR</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian SSR</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE III: 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BELORUSSIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC--LAND USE 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(THOUSANDS OF HECTARES)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All land with drainage network including agricultural land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ploughed field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All sown field area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardens and berry farms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayfields (all)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayfields including improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasture (total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasture including improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private plots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unused land</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE III:3

SOVIET BELORUSSIA--AREA OF PRINCIPAL CROPS PLANTED

(For all types of farms in hectares)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All area sown</td>
<td>4,542,100</td>
<td>5,212,000</td>
<td>4,913,000</td>
<td>6,000,6</td>
<td>6,047,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total grains</td>
<td>3,629,700</td>
<td>3,475,500</td>
<td>3,391,600</td>
<td>2,889,7</td>
<td>2,603,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rye</td>
<td>1,968,400</td>
<td>1,567,600</td>
<td>1,528,500</td>
<td>1,714,500</td>
<td>858,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>86,200</td>
<td>262,300</td>
<td>239,000</td>
<td>187,100</td>
<td>441,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>356,700</td>
<td>377,100</td>
<td>348,100</td>
<td>397,600</td>
<td>717,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oats</td>
<td>869,200</td>
<td>794,300</td>
<td>653,700</td>
<td>195,300</td>
<td>276,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckwheat</td>
<td>194,200</td>
<td>244,700</td>
<td>294,300</td>
<td>95,500</td>
<td>40,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>583,300</td>
<td>929,000</td>
<td>874,600</td>
<td>1,002,700</td>
<td>956,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Crops</td>
<td>128,500</td>
<td>312,800</td>
<td>302,700</td>
<td>354,600</td>
<td>313,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flax</td>
<td>103,600</td>
<td>274,900</td>
<td>257,100</td>
<td>282,300</td>
<td>261,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar Beets</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58,700</td>
<td>48,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fodder Crops</td>
<td>159,100</td>
<td>432,900</td>
<td>302,100</td>
<td>1,738,100</td>
<td>2,223,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables and melons</td>
<td>41,50</td>
<td>61,800</td>
<td>42,100</td>
<td>48,600</td>
<td>48,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legumes</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>166,500</td>
<td>272,700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Development of Belorussian Agriculture

Belorussian agriculture has developed in uneven spurts during the years of Soviet power.\(^1\) The Civil War years were ones when the central political leadership had its attentions engaged more directly on other problems and apart from the forced requisition of grain from the peasantry did not fashion a well developed agricultural policy. During the NEP years Belorussian agriculture made advances. Symon Kabas judges that the head of the Belorussian Commissariat for Agriculture during these years, Prishchevov, was a man of outstanding organizing ability and imagination.\(^2\) As a result of the NEP in general and Prishchevov's measures in particular, Belorussian peasant agriculture recovered rapidly (from its downturn during the years of war, revolution and civil war).\(^2\)

Policy changed, however, in dramatic fashion after Lenin's death. Collectivization of agriculture was initiated in 1928.\(^3\) Its effect was devastating in Belorussia.

To elude the surrender of property, farmers kept only one cow and killed the rest. Horses were taken to the local market and abandoned there. When joining the kolkhoz...the peasant handed over his old equipment (carts, plows, barrows and harness), but everything he valued he hid, in the hope that the kolkhoz would one day be dissolved.\(^4\)

---

\(^1\) The particular concern in this work is with Belorussian agriculture in the early years of the Brezhnev agricultural programme. A brief sketch of agricultural development prior to that time, however, is provided.


\(^3\) There is a substantial literature of extraordinary quality available which deals with Soviet collectivization of agriculture. Particularly excellent is the study by M. Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, translated from the French by Irene Nove, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968).

\(^4\) S. Kabas, op. cit., p. 108.
Thus began, for Belorussian peasants, the long years of Stalin's ascendance in Soviet politics. The Soviet system during the years of Stalin's leadership was a totalitarian system. Usually in such systems we can trust that if something was claimed to be true, the opposite would be true. And so it was with agriculture. Stalin and other figures in the Soviet leadership claimed that their agricultural policy was designed to close the gap between town and country in the USSR. Nothing could have been further from the truth. The peasants were the badly treated orphans of the Soviet system during this period.

Resettlement into "kolhoz centres" in Belorussia involved severe measures...against those who were unwilling to cooperate. First the stoves in their houses were destroyed, then the roofs were pulled down....This ruthless operation deprived thousands of families of pleasantly situated farmsteads....

Western Belorussia was added to Soviet territory in 1939 and was subjected to a parallel "socializing" process. This, however, was not carried through to its completion. Hitler's decision to invade the USSR resulted in virtual complete disruption of the Belorussian economy. In the post-war period a rehabilitation programme was initiated which was designed to restore the pre-war Stalinist command farming system. In Western Belorussia, the campaign to collectivize agriculture had to be renewed. This was carried out quite intensely and was largely completed in 1952.2

The importance of the incorporation of West Belorussia was mentioned already in the second chapter when attention was focused upon

1Ibid., p. 111.

2Details on the pace of the two collectivization campaigns, the one before and the other after the war can be found in I. M. Ignatenko et al., Istoriia Belorusskoi SSR (Minsk: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka i tekhnika," 1977), pp. 362-364 and 453-456.
the historical development of the Belorussian nation. There emphasis was placed upon the significance of the addition of a population which had a stronger sense of Belorussian national consciousness than that of the Belorussians in the eastern territories. Here we should like to reiterate the importance of the acquisition of Western Belorussia with regard to agricultural development.

The territory was first gained when Poland was partitioned between USSR and Germany in 1939. Soviet Belorussia's size was increased by 34,000 square miles and her population increased by approximately 4,700,000.\textsuperscript{1} The annexed territories were primarily agrarian in character. Thus the total cultivated area increased from 3,514,800 hectares to 5,212,000 hectares.\textsuperscript{2} These territories were regained with the defeat of the Nazis and have become important centres of agricultural production.

A number of historians from the Institute of History of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences suggest that agricultural workers in Belorussia confronted large and complex tasks at the outset of the 1950s.\textsuperscript{3} Had they been fully candid they would have mentioned that the political leadership provided by Nikita Khrushchev had a great impact upon the handling of those tasks. Indeed, Khrushchev significantly added to them. His enthusiasms in the agricultural sphere are well known. Collective farms, he proposed, should be amalgamated wherever possible and converted into state farms. Hence, the number of Belorussian sovkhozes rose rapidly from year to year (between 1960 and 1964 alone the number of

\textsuperscript{1} N. Vakar, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 159.
\textsuperscript{2} S. Kabys, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 112.
\textsuperscript{3} I.M. Ignatenko \textit{et al.}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 481.
sovkhозes rose from 300 to 529).\footnote{1} Similarly, an increase in
the planting of maize in Belorussia was registered during the Khrushchev
era. The era was indeed an eventful one, but there is no space here
for a detailed consideration of the diverse measures adopted by the
restless Soviet leader in his quest to better Soviet agricultural
performance. Let it simply be noted that the assessment made by
Erich Strauss about the general situation in Soviet agriculture
after Khrushchev's rule has specific application in the case of
Belorussia. The assessment in question suggests that Khrushchev
managed to lift agricultural production out of the rut of the
last years of the Stalin era, but not to create the conditions
for self-generating further progress.\footnote{2}

Agricultural Development in Belorussia in the Early
Brezhnev-Kosygin Years

The period from 1965 to 1971 was, on balance, a rather good
one for Belorussian agriculture. It improved its rate of output
significantly. Table 4 lists the yields of principal crops for the
period from 1964 to 1971 compared to all-union average figures.

G. Rudenko, a Gosplan deputy department head, has pointed out,
Belorussian performance in making sales of the following commodities
to the state grew at a higher rate for the period 1966 to 1970 in
comparison with that of 1961 to 1965 than other union republics
(grain - 143%, potatoes - 137%, sugar beets - 173%, flax - 116%,
vegetables - 155%, cattle and poultry - 175%, milk - 159% and

\footnote{1}{For a discussion of Khrushchev's objectives and motivations in
pushing this campaign, see E. Strauss, Soviet Agriculture in Perspective
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969), pp. 178-188.}

\footnote{2}{Ibid., p. 224.}
eggs - 181%\textsuperscript{1}. Similarly, the Belorussian share of the total output of meat in the USSR rose from 4.8 percent in the period from 1961 to 1965 to 5.4 percent in the period from 1966 to 1970. Belorussian production of milk went from 5.68 percent in 1965 of the overall Soviet total to 6.21 percent in 1971. Egg production rose from 3.8 percent to 4.1 percent during the same time period.

TABLE III:4

YIELDS OF GRAINS, BELORUSSIA AND ALL-UNION AVERAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All-Union</th>
<th>Belorussian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Further comparison of the period from 1966 to 1970 with that of 1961 to 1965 reveals that the overall value of agricultural production increased by 45 percent; the harvest of wheat by 43.4 percent.

\textsuperscript{1}G. Rudenko, "Territorial'noe razdelienie truda i spetsializatsiia, Ekonomika sel'skogo khoziaistva, No. 3 (1973), p. 62.
percent. The production of meat and milk increased by 73 and 66 percent respectively.\footnote{N. I. Dementieva and F. P. Sen'ko, \textit{Sel'skoe khoziaistvo Belorussii} (Minsk: "Uradzhai," 1980), pp. 34-35. The increases are even greater during the last decade than during the early Brezhnev years under investigation here. Consequently the level of Belorussian agricultural performance heightens still further in the period from 1971 to 1981.}

Improvements in the levels of labour productivity in Belorussian agriculture are quite striking by Soviet standards at least. This is a subject which has been given attention in a recent interesting publication by an American student of Soviet rural and agricultural development. Alfred Evans, Jr., discovered when he examined the levels of gross production per worker in agriculture across all the Soviet union republics from 1960 to 1978 that Belorussia was unique.

Gross production per worker rose rapidly in the USSR from 1960 to 1978. Wide differences existed in the rates of increase in production per agricultural labourer among the union republics. However, there was no pattern of more rapid increases in the republics, that were below the average for the USSR in 1960. Belorussia achieved equality with the all-union level and subsequently surpassed the all-union average, but the other union republics below the all-union level of production per worker in agriculture in 1960 tended to maintain similar positions in proportion to the USSR average through 1978.\footnote{Alfred Evans, Jr., "Interrepublic Inequality in Agricultural Development in the USSR," \textit{Slavic Review}, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Winter, 1981), p. 576.}

Belorussia was the only union republic from a group of ten to improve its position in this regard. In short, these were years of improved agricultural performance in Belorussia.

\textbf{International Comparisons}

The measuring rod used for judging the development of Belorussian agriculture in the previous section was a historical one. Belorussian
agricultural performance from one period simply was compared to another. The results expressed as they were in percentages, had an impressive ring to them. When viewed in comparative perspective, however, they appear less dramatic. Table 5 compares the yields of some basic crops cultivated in Poland and Belorussia. Poland is selected for comparison due to its geographical proximity to Belorussia and its roughly similar growing conditions for agricultural crops.

### TABLE III.5

**YIELDS OF SOME BASIC CROPS IN POLAND AND BELORUSSIA**

(OUTPUT IN QUINTALS PER HECTARE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Belorussia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cereals</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rye</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oats</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar-beet</td>
<td>324.0</td>
<td>214.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>176.0</td>
<td>140.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Poland is not a country which is renowned for its strong agricultural performance in the modern day. Yet we see that its rates of production exceed those of Belorussia for virtually every commodity.¹ Were we to

¹Alec Nove has made a detailed comparison of Belorussian agricultural development with that of Eastern Poland which is the region of Poland resembling Belorussia most closely. His remarks are illuminating. Polish smallhold agriculture evidently presents some features that can hold back its efficiency. It showed up very well compared with
## TABLE III:6

**YIELDS OF SELECTED LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average weight of slaughtering cattle (kg. live weight)</th>
<th>Average weight of slaughtering pigs</th>
<th>Average yield of milk per cow (kilograms)</th>
<th>Average yield of eggs per hen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland 1970</strong></td>
<td>351</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>2,456</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belorussia 1970</strong></td>
<td>318</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>2,087</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soviet governmental bureaucrats generally have not been thought important enough to win the concentrated attention of political scientists, the ones in the agricultural administrative system have been thought to be particularly insignificant. Mary McAuley's view of their standing is representative, I think, of expert opinion.

Agriculture as a sector has few organized institutions. The agriculture ministries inherited from Stalin were few in number and the neglect of agriculture had made them institutions of secondary importance. In addition the relegation of agriculture to a poor neighbour status meant that as a profession it attracted neither able personnel nor resources.

This situation has been changing somewhat, but even if the government bodies concerned with agriculture are few in number and of secondary importance we should consider them briefly as elements with the agricultural decision-making system.

The Supreme Soviet

According to the constitution, the "highest organ of state power in the USSR" is the Supreme Soviet. It is a two chamber body which is charged with a wide range of responsibilities as the primary legislative body within the state. One chamber, the Soviet of the Union, is elected by the people at large. There is one deputy for each three hundred thousand voters. The Soviet of the Nationalities, the second chamber, is composed so as to reflect all of the national

---


2 Please note that all references here are to the constitution of 1936. For the text of this constitution and its successor adopted in 1977 and a concise insightful commentary on both, see S. Finer, Five Constitutions (Sussex: Humanities Press, 1979), pp. 28-29 and 119-193. The reason for referring throughout to the 1936 constitution is that it is the one that was formally in effect for the period analyzed in this study. The description in the text, however, is in the present tense for stylistic reasons.
widen our comparative frame of reference to include West European
countries or North American ones then Belorussia's output figures
would look still more insignificant.

The tremendous variation of growing conditions from one country
to another, however, undercuts the value of such comparisons. The most
important comparison for our purposes here is that of Belorussia
relative to other union republics. Again, the variation of the
geographical milieu poses a problem. It is difficult to find "like"
to compare to "like."

In this next section, though, we will seek to compare
Belorussian agriculture with that of the Baltic Republics and wherever
the data will allow it with the central region of the non-chernozem
zone in the RSFSR.

**Belorussian, Baltic and Russian Agricultural Compared**

The Baltic Republics, Belorussia and the central non-chernozem
zone of the RSFSR are roughly similar climatically and in terms of
their crop and livestock emphasis. Dairying and livestock raising
are the most important aspects of their agriculture. Lithuania

the depressed Belorussian kolkhozy in the first post-war years,
but this suggests that individual peasants can do better than
neglected, undercapitalized and underpaid kolkhozniki, a conclusion
easy to reach. The problem is: Can they do better than a reorganized
and more intensive form of kolkhoz-sovkhoz agriculture?

Nove does not answer the question explicitly but the balance of the
discussion suggests strongly that without changes in the Polish system,
its position relative to Belorussia's will decline. See A. Nove,
"Agricultural Performance Compared: Belorussia and Eastern Poland,"
in *Economic Development in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Vol. 2*
*Selected Analyses*, ed. by Z. M. Fallenbushl (New York: Prager, 1979),
p. 280. Even if Belorussian agriculture were to overtake Eastern
Poland, it still would be quite distant from the output of some of
Eastern Europe's more efficient agricultural producers such as the
East Germans or the Hungarians.
is the Baltic republic which is most similar to Belorussia with regard to the importance of agriculture in the overall economy of the union republic. While agriculture is important in the Latvian and Estonian economies, they have higher degrees of industrialization and are especially noted for the production of consumer goods.

Table 7 provides an introductory look at the agricultural profiles of the Baltic union republics and the central region of the Russian Republic’s non-chernozem zone along with Belorussia.

The Russian oblasts involved here are larger than the other units which complicates the comparison somewhat. Hence, the Russian agricultural gross production is higher than in the other units.

(Note Table 8.) Lithuania and Belorussia, however, are the two areas with the highest rates of growth as is shown in Table 9.

**TABLE III:8**

GROSS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION (FOR ALL CATEGORIES OF ENTERPRISES; IN CONSTANT PRICES OF 1965; IN MILLIONS OF RUBLES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>3,761</td>
<td>4,034</td>
<td>4,121</td>
<td>4,309</td>
<td>4,293</td>
<td>4,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (central raion)</td>
<td>6,076</td>
<td>6,113</td>
<td>6,667</td>
<td>6,587</td>
<td>6,665</td>
<td>6,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Republics</td>
<td>3,297</td>
<td>3,348</td>
<td>3,638</td>
<td>3,693</td>
<td>3,376</td>
<td>3,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1,453</td>
<td>1,544</td>
<td>1,684</td>
<td>1,694</td>
<td>1,765</td>
<td>1,826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>1,062</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>1,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE III:7
PROFILE OF BALTIC, RUSSIAN NON-CHERNOZEM AND BELORUSSIAN AGRICULTURE (NOVEMBER 1, 1970)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total area sown (thous. hectares)</th>
<th>Portion of total sown by principal categories of crops (thous. hectares)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Crops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussina</td>
<td>6,047</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic</td>
<td>5,022</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR raion</td>
<td>13,732</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total area sown (tech. crops)</th>
<th>Flax (thousand hect. sown)</th>
<th>Sugar beet (thousand hectares sown)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussina</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR raion</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total area sown (Cereals)</th>
<th>Rye (thous. hect. sown)</th>
<th>Winter Wheat (thous. hect. sown)</th>
<th>Spring Wheat (thous. tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussina</td>
<td>2,505</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic</td>
<td>1,923</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR raion</td>
<td>6,690</td>
<td>1,548</td>
<td>1,172</td>
<td>646</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Livestock cattle (thousand head)</th>
<th>Meadow area (thousand hectares)</th>
<th>Natural pastures (thousand hectares)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussina</td>
<td>3,693</td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td>1,611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic</td>
<td>2,765</td>
<td>1,292</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR raion</td>
<td>5,773</td>
<td>3,973</td>
<td>3,751</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gross fixed and variable capital in agriculture on December 31, 1970 (millions of rubles)
Belorussian          4,852  - 4.25% of overall total
Baltic               5,541  - 4.85% of overall total

Average Annual Numbers of Workers in all Aspects of Agriculture
Belorussian          492,000
Baltic               274,000
RSFSR raion          864,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Republics</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (Central raion)</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEVEL OF YIELD OF SUGAR BEETS (CENTNERS PER HECTARE)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (Central raion)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEVEL OF YIELD OF FLAX (CENTNERS PER HECTARE)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (Central raion)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEVEL OF YIELD OF POTATOES (CENTNERS PER HECTARE)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (Central raion)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE III:7.3--Profile Continued

NO. OF HEAD OF CATTLE AND PIGS ON PRIVATE PLOTS (THOUSANDS OF HEADS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>1,482</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>1,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Republics</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>1,349</td>
<td>1,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (Central raion)</td>
<td>1,491</td>
<td>1,435</td>
<td>1,513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PRODUCTION OF MEAT (BY SLAUGHTER WEIGHT THOUSANDS OF TONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Republics</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (Central raion)</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PRODUCTION OF MILK (THOUSANDS OF TONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>3,219</td>
<td>4,124</td>
<td>5,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Republics</td>
<td>4,411</td>
<td>5,056</td>
<td>5,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (Central raion)</td>
<td>6,673</td>
<td>7,892</td>
<td>8,988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PRODUCTION OF EGGS (MILLIONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>1,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Republics</td>
<td>1,073</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>1,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (Central raion)</td>
<td>2,538</td>
<td>3,013</td>
<td>4,533</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE III:7.4--Continued

**AVERAGE YEARLY YIELD OF MILK FROM ONE COW**
**IN KILOGRAMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>1,818</td>
<td>1,884</td>
<td>2,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Republics</td>
<td>2,497</td>
<td>2,683</td>
<td>2,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (Central raion)</td>
<td>2,214</td>
<td>2,232</td>
<td>2,577</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Ibid., 253, 251, 294-95, 300-01, 308-09 and p. 325.
TABLE III:9

RATE OF GROWTH OF GROSS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
(ON ALL ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES, IN PERCENT OF 1960)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (central raion)</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Republics</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Ibid., p. 38.

When we look at the rate of supplies to agriculture, the reasons for the gains made by Lithuania and Belorussia become clear. Consider fertilizer first. Here Belorussia seems to do particularly well. This is indicated to some degree by Tables 10, 11 and 12.

TABLE III:10

SUPPLY OF MINERAL FERTILIZERS TO BELORUSSIAN,
BALTIc AND RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE
(IN CONVENTIONAL UNITS, THOUSAND TONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Ts.S.U., 'Sel'skoe khoziastvo SSSR, p. 158.
### TABLE III:11

**Supply of Fertilizer to Agriculture**

(Kilograms per Hectare of Ploughed Field)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>Percentage increase over 1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>160.2</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>155.7</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>113.4</td>
<td>197.7</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>143.7</td>
<td>210.5</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table II does not indicate the supply of fertilizer to the central region of the non-chernozem zone because of the absence of data. It was possible to obtain data on the distribution of fertilizer to the non-chernozem zone in 1972, however, from a secondary Soviet source.

### TABLE III:12

**Supply of Fertilizer to Agriculture in 1972**

(Kilograms per hectare of ploughed field)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mineral</th>
<th>As percent of USSR</th>
<th>Organic (in tons)</th>
<th>As percent of USSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (Central raion)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Belorussian agriculture benefits in a similar manner from the distribution of nitric, phosphate, phosphoric, and potash fertilizers.

The tractor parks of each of our units increases substantially during the period under investigation. The increases were both absolute and relative. Belorussia, for example, maintained for 3 percent of the total Soviet tractor park in 1960 and 4.1 percent in 1970. Belorussia occupies an intermediate position between the Baltic Republics and the non-chernozem zone of the RSFSR on a variety of measures. Thus we find that the number of tractors in use for each thousand hectares of ploughed land is greatest in the Baltic Republics and smallest in the RSFSR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE III:13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRACTORS IN AGRICULTURE (IN PHYSICAL UNITS, THOUSANDS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (Central raion)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Ts.S.U., Sel'skoe khoziaistvo SSSR, pp. 380-381.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE III:14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF TRACTORS PER 1,000 HECTARES OF PLOUGHED LAND (IN PHYSICAL UNITS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (Central raion)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A similar result is obtained when we take into account the data available on the grain combine park in the USSR.

**TABLE III:15**

GRAIN COMBINE PARK (THOUSANDS OF UNITS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Republics</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (Central raion)</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Ts.S.U., Sel'skoe khoziaistvo SSR, p. 386.

**TABLE III:16**

NUMBER OF GRAIN COMBINES IN USE PER THOUSAND HECTARES OF PLOUGHED LAND (PHYSICAL UNITS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Republics</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (Central raion)</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Ts.S.U., Sel'skoe khoziaistvo SSR, p. 387.

Belorussia's livestock farming generally is about equally mechanized as that of the Russian union republic's non-chernozem zone, but the Baltic republics have yet a higher level of mechanized livestock farming.
### TABLE III:17

**MECHANIZATION OF WORK ON LIVESTOCK FARMS OF KOLKHOZES IN 1970**  
(IN PERCENT OF NUMBER OF LIVESTOCK OF GIVEN TYPE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Milking of cows</th>
<th>Supply of Water</th>
<th>Distribution of fodder</th>
<th>Cleaning manure from livestock premises</th>
<th>Electric clipping of sheep</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>Pigs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Republics</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR (Central raion)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alfred Evans, Jr. has undertaken a more comprehensive comparative analysis than the one presented here. In his examination of levels of agricultural development in all fifteen of the union republics in the USSR, he underlined the relative impressiveness of improvements made in the Baltic Republics and Belorussia.

...the Baltic republics and Belorussia have advanced agricultural development in less favorable natural conditions. Those republics receive more precipitation than most other sections of the USSR, but have podzolic soils, large areas of swamp land, and a cool climate. Causes other than the natural environment must be sought to explain the higher rates of agricultural development in the Baltic republics and Belorussia than in the Ukraine, which has generally superior physical conditions for agriculture.

The immediate reason is not hard to find. Outputs have increased as a consequence of heightened inputs. The evidence available on the overall level of investment in Soviet agriculture indicates that Lithuania and Belorussia are the two union republics which have augmented their agricultural funding at the highest rate. If we consider the trend in capital investment in agriculture for productive purposes we discover that Belorussia increased its share of the overall funding from 3.3 percent in 1960 to 4.2 percent in 1970. Lithuania's level of investment increases at a sharper rate rising from 1.6 percent to 2.5 percent. The level of funding in 1970 had increased by 347 percent over 1960 in the case of Belorussia and 387 percent for Lithuania (see Table 20). Capital investment for both productive and non-productive purposes follows a parallel trend as can be seen in Tables 18 and 19).
### TABLE III: 9

**GOVERNMENT AND KOLKHOZ CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE FOR PRODUCTIVE AND NON-PRODUCTIVE PURPOSES (IN CONSTANT VALUE - JAN. 1, 1969; MILLIONS OF RUBLES)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,895</td>
<td>6,569</td>
<td>11,545</td>
<td>17,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Ts.S.U., *Sel'skoe khoziaistvo SSSR*, p. 360.

### TABLE III: 19

**GOVERNMENT AND KOLKHOZ CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE FOR PRODUCTIVE PURPOSES (IN CONSTANT VALUE - JAN. 1, 1969; MILLIONS OF RUBLES)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>5,476</td>
<td>9,535</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>126</td>
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</table>

**SOURCE:** Ts.S.U., *Sel'skoe khoziaistvo SSSR*, p. 360.
Belorussia's agriculture, as we noted earlier, has developed in spurts. The period under review is, on balance, one of positive development. If one's benchmark is a historical one, the advances under review in this work are rather dramatic. Past performance is improved upon significantly. If the criteria for assessment involve comparison, the results are less startling but within the Soviet context, the position of Belorussia's agriculture appears to have been enhanced in both an absolute and relative sense.

We shall now begin to consider how this came about.
CHAPTER IV
COMMAND FARMING IN THE BREZHNEV YEARS

The New Agricultural Programme

How do we explain the recent improvement in Belorussian agriculture? As was suggested in the last chapter, in large part, the acceleration in development of Belorussian agriculture can be explained by the fact that the central political leadership altered the priority given to agriculture in a fundamental way.

The quantity and quality of publications devoted to describing and analyzing this new agricultural programme adopted by the Soviet leadership in 1965 is quite impressive. No attempt can be made here to extend that line of analysis. Rather, our aim is simply to summarize points made already by others which are particularly germane to this study.

Soviet agricultural policy took an important turn once Khrushchev was ousted from power. Khrushchev, it is only fair to add, contributed to that new policy.

Khrushchev's role in agricultural policy was disastrous and yet indispensable. By repeated and resounding failure, he discredited the worst of the Stalinist approach to agriculture, clearing the way for something new.¹

Khrushchev's interest in agriculture was intense. He stressed over and over again the importance of improving agricultural performance.

By forcing his colleagues and the entire party apparatus to focus their attention on agriculture and by keeping them so focused for a decade, Khrushchev drove the entire Soviet leadership through a collective education.²

Jerzy Karcz suggests that the new programme introduced by Khrushchev's successor, Leonid Brezhnev, represented a "partial decompression" of Soviet command farming.³ Just what did this "partial decompression" entail? First of all, state procurement quotas were lowered and stabilized. The procurement target for cereal was set and remained unchanged for the entire five-year plan. Livestock procurement targets were established on a gradually rising scale. This created an atmosphere which allowed for "decompression" of command farming because these measures provided farm managers with some

¹Thané Gustafson, Reform in Soviet Politics, p. 16.

²Ibid.

³Jerzy P. Karcz, "From Stalin to Brezhnev: Soviet Agricultural Policy in Historical Perspective," in The Economics of Communist Agriculture. Selected Papers, p. 434. The March 1965 plenum was the occasion for announcement of the new programme by the central leadership. An important series of resolutions were issued on March 26 and April 1. The resolutions are printed in the following source: Resheniiia Partii i Pravitel'stva po khoziaistvennym voprosam, Vol. 5 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoj literatury, 1969), pp. 606-620.
opportunity to determine the number of livestock they should maintain and to plan the scope of sowings for fodder crops. The 1965 programme included a major reform of the prices paid by the state for agricultural commodities. Prices for wheat and rye were raised on average by 12 percent for the former and 22 percent for the latter. Further, it was decided that above-plan sales to the state should earn a 50 percent addition to the basic price.

The cultivation of small grains was to be encouraged throughout the Soviet Union by a uniform price as well. The price for buckwheat was raised 200 to 300 rubles per ton; the new rate for millet was 110 rubles per ton up from 80 rubles, and the price for rice was raised by 80 rubles to 300 per ton. Prices for barley and oats were increased for Belorussia, the Baltic Republics, the Ukraine and segments of the RSFSR. The new prices established were 90 rubles per ton for barley and 75 rubles per ton for oats.

Livestock-raising is the most important element in the Belorussian agricultural economy and it benefited from a price raise which was approved on May 2, 1965. Milk prices already had been raised on January 1. 1 The political leadership sought as well to revise the terms of trade for agricultural products and consequently they set new prices for agricultural machinery and spare parts. Consequently, they set new electricity rates on January 1, 1966. State retail prices were revised as well when the extra surcharge on commodities sold in the rural segments of the USSR was dropped. The financial position of both kolkhozes and kolkhozniki were improved by

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the announcement of measures which authorized the State Bank to write off existing state loans to weaker kolkhozes and which required that the system of labour remuneration be altered so as to provide kolkhozniki with payment on a guaranteed monthly basis. Relatively, removal of restrictions on private plots promised to allow collective farmers and others to enhance their individual economic positions.1

The political authorities announced their commitment to a substantial rise in the level of investment into agriculture. In the first instance, this was supposed to result in increased deliveries of machinery to the agricultural sector and an expansion of maintenance and repair facilities for that machinery. Subsequently, and this is of profound importance for the development of Belorussian agriculture, commitments were made to increase the supply of mineral fertilizer for use in agriculture and to engage in a comprehensive land improvement programme. Furthermore, programmes were announced to improve electrification, housing and public amenities in rural areas. Generally, the political authorities adopted a new line towards agriculture and they increased both absolutely and relatively the volume of investment channelled into that sector of the economy which in the Soviet context represents a dramatic departure from the past.

Conservative as the Brezhnev program may be in its emphases on central investment instead of reform of management or basic structures, it is next to revolutionary, at any rate when compared to traditional Soviet policy, in its apparent recognition of the need for balance, breadth and a long view. Having accepted the need for a radical reconstruction and modernization of the countryside, the Kremlin also evidently accepted the implications that such a major undertaking engenders a flood of related needs for

1 For further discussion of all these points, see ibid., pp. 212-216.
off-farm production basic infrastructure, development of new resources, scientific research and much more. That they have accepted that fact and launched such a wide array of large programmes is the most extraordinary aspect of Brezhnev policy.¹

The administration of agriculture was altered as well by Khrushchev's successors and the Ministry of Agriculture was restored to the responsible position it held prior to Khrushchev's organizational tinkering. Hence, the All-Union Ministry was charged once more with the overall responsibility for supervision of agricultural production. Its operational powers include control over investments in state and collective farms and the drafting of measures to encourage agricultural specialization.

The party apparatus was altered as well for it had been bifurcated into industrial and agricultural branches at the local level by Khrushchev and this decision was rescinded by the new leadership.²

It was suggested at the outset of this chapter that the accelerated development of Belorussian agriculture could be explained due to the new agricultural policy established by the central leadership. This, however, is not sufficient to explain the particular form that the development took. In order to understand this we need to take into account the activities of Belorussian union-republican officials and their attempts to influence the agricultural appropriations process. Before describing the details of that activity some stage-setting must be done. Hence, in the next section of this

¹T. Gustafson, op. cit., p. 27.
²For further discussion on these points; see A. Nove, op. cit., pp. 387-388.
chapter the framework within which resources are allocated to agri-
culture will be described.

Planning and Budgeting for Agriculture:
Institutions and Process

This section of the chapter has a simple theme. It is that
the policy preferences and priorities of the central party leadership
are dominant within the institutional complex which produces decisions
on allocations for agriculture. There is, as well, a simple counter-
point to the main theme and that is that there are agencies within
this same institutional complex which provide union-republican
leaderships and elites with the opportunity to influence decisions on
allocation of resources to agriculture.

The description of the agricultural decision-making institu-
tional complex to follow will deal first with party and then with
government institutions. Next an attempt will be made to clarify
the interrelationship between them and the nature of the planning and
budgeting decision-making process which results in allocation of
resources to agriculture.¹

The Politburo, the party's executive body is of overriding
importance. The late Merle Fainsod, in his excellent text on Soviet
politics pointed out that the Politburo's

concerns embrace the definition of goals, the determination of
priorities in both domestic and foreign policy, the reconciliation
of conflicting bureaucratic interests, the identification of major
problems, the formulation of broad policy directives, checks on
their implementation and decisions on important appointments to

¹The objective in the first phase of this section is simply to
provide a brief formal description of the institutions involved in
decision-making on allocation of resources to agriculture.
party and governmental offices. It is at the Presidium (Politbureau) level that basic decisions of Soviet life are either made or approved.¹

The union republics have representatives at this strategic locus of decision-making.² Among the regional representatives during the period covered by this study was the first secretary of the Belorussian CP, P. M. Masherov, who is included as a candidate member. The former first secretary of the Belorussian CP, Mazurov was a full member of the Politburo from 1965 to the end of the period under study. The Politburo's rule in economic planning is to set the fundamental economic parameters such as the share of investment in national income, the proportion of the state budget that will be devoted to military spending, or the relative priorities of the consumer and the agricultural sector.³

Political initiative and power have clearly been concentrated for long atop the Soviet system. This does not mean, however, that Soviet policies are simply developed. The complexity of the politics involved is reflected in the workings of the Politburo, the individual members of which differ in their assessments of what is politically feasible at any given time; their judgements of the desirable and who probably weigh against each other the advantages to be gained from any course of action in the struggle for power.⁴ Complexity is inherent in the


² The Politburo meets weekly, however, if Brezhnev's report can be trusted, and it is unlikely that all the union-republican members could attend each session. L. I. Brezhnev, "Central Committee Report," Current Soviet Politics, VI, The Documentary Record of the 24th Congress of the CPSU (Columbus, Ohio: American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1973), p. 35.


very nature of decision-making in advanced industrial societies. Policies are seldom formed in a tidy sequential process.¹

Our world is a world of limited serial information processors dealing with complexity that for all practical purposes is infinite in comparison with their information gathering and computing powers.²

Thus as the Politburo members may be important, they are still dependent upon subordinate agencies of the Party. Information must be processed and assembled in order that functional decisions are formulated.³

The All-Union Central Committee Secretariat of the party and the staff agencies responsible to it are tremendously important in this regard.⁴ The secretariat is often termed the nerve centre of the CPSU.


⁴The ten man Secretariat is served by twenty-three departments whose staff was estimated in 1966 to number between 1300 and 1500. See A. Avtorkhanov, The Communist Party Apparatus (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966), p. 209. A former Central Committee official, identified as A. Pravdin, reports, in an interview with the British academic Mervyn Matthews, that during his employment there were over 900 responsible staff workers who were assisted by 2400 other personnel. A. Pravdin, "Inside the CPSU Central Committee," Survey, Vol. 20, No. 4, (Autumn, 1974), p. 95. In addition to the agricultural department (otdel'), the activities of the departments for light and food industries, planning and financial organs, chemical industry, trade and domestic services, transport and communications, construction, and science and educational institutions have some bearing on agricultural decision-making.
The Party secretaries pay close attention to the fulfillment of party decisions down through the hierarchy. Each of the secretaries is responsible for overseeing a specific policy area. F. D. Kulakov was the secretary responsible for agriculture for the period of this analysis. These officials by the nature of their positions have a vested interest in central policies. Furthermore, non-Russians are poorly represented at the senior levels of this "nerve"centre" of the party.

Since the death of Kuusinen in 1964, none of the ten or eleven Central Committee secretaries has been a non-Russian.¹

The agricultural department of the party apparat is made up of appointed officials who work in a number of different sections which are organized to correspond with major aspects of agricultural production. Hence, sections exist for such things as land cultivation, mechanization, and procurements. In addition there are sections for the major regions of the USSR. The Baltic republics and Belorussia are treated as one region by the Central Committee apparat. Unfortunately no information which was revealing came to light during the research effort for this project about the size or general operation of this section.²

The general secretary of the Party, Leonid Brezhnev, directs the Secretariat's work. He has evidenced a close personal interest in agricultural policy throughout his tenure. It is worth noting as


²For a general discussion of the powers and responsibilities of the Central Committee Secretariat and the staff apparatus, see Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 410-424.
well that the General Secretary has a personal "secretariat," whose role has become increasingly important.¹

The Central Committee of the CPSU is one central party organ which provides a potentially important opportunity for the union republican officials to exercise their influence directly because representatives from each of the union republics are present within this body. The Central Committee is in theory the executive of the Party and the Secretariat and Politburo are formally subordinate to it. The party rules set out the functions of the Central Committee:

Between the congresses, the CC CPSU directs the activities of the Party, the local party bodies, selects and appoints leading functionaries, directs the work of central government bodies and social organizations of working people through the Party groups in them, sets up various Party organs, institutions and enterprises and directs their activities, appoints the editors of the central newspapers and journals operating under its control and distributes the funds of the Party budgets and controls its execution.

The Central Committee represents the CPSU in its relations with other parties.²

Formally then, it is a very important body. During Stalin's lifetime, however, the Central Committee degenerated into a vestigial organ, while its importance has been enhanced considerably in the post-Stalin period its large regionally dispersed membership is at a considerable disadvantage vis-a-vis the Politburo and Secretariat in any competition for power.³ The committee consisted of 241 full voting members and 155

¹Ibid., p. 419.


³On some occasions the Central Committee has played a crucial role in the factional struggles of the top leadership. One outstanding example was the plenary session of 1957 which expelled the "Anti-Party" group from office. See M. Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 327-328.
non-voting candidate members during the period under review. The Belorussian party apparatus increased its membership on this body in the years after Stalin's death.\(^1\) Party rules call for at least one plenary session of the committee every six months. While the superior policy role of the Secretariat and Politburo cannot be doubted, the opportunities for influence allowed by central committee membership should not be minimized. The central and regional officials are bound by ties of interdependence and CC membership heightens the visibility of one's particular region. There are particular reasons for underlining this point with respect to agricultural decision-making.

Darrel P. Hammer, a close student of the party's operations, in commenting on the relationship between regional party secretaries and the appointed officials of the agricultural department of the Central Committee apparatus, has noted that:

> The agricultural department has economic responsibilities and certainly needs specialists on its staff. But...the success of the agricultural programme has always depended on the work of the territorial secretaries. Under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the regional Party leader has been more intimately involved in problems of agriculture.... The director of the Central Committee's agricultural department will necessary work with the regional secretaries--and will usually come from this group himself.\(^2\)

The final All-Union level gathering where regional and central officials interact is the Party's Congress, the "supreme organ of the

\(^1\) One of the first to draw attention to this was Yaroslav Bilinsky. For an insightful discussion of the favored position, compared to other non-Russian union republics, of the Ukrainian and Belorussian apparatus during this period, see Y. Bilinsky, Changes in the Central Committee: Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1961-1966 (Denver: University of Denver, 1967), pp. 13-16.

CPSU. "According to the Party rules, Party Congresses are to be held once every five years.\(^1\) Two were held during the time frame of this study. The Congress is attended by thousands of delegates who adopt resolutions, formally elect the party's executive and listen to numerous speeches, the most important of which is the report of the Central Committee to the Party. This is normally given by the general secretary of the Party and it is really the report of the Secretariat and the Politburo. Among the matters routinely discussed at the Congress is agriculture. Brezhnev noted at the 24th Congress that for a number of reasons this has been and remains the most complicated and difficult sector of our economy.\(^2\)

The union republican level organs of the party are based on the same pattern as those at the centre. Lenin was forced by unwelcome circumstances to accept federalism as a form of state organization, but he was able to successfully turn back attempts to federalize the party. The Party's operational principle, he insisted, must be democratic centralism. This principle continues in effect today. Hence as Avtorkhanov notes, the statutory position of the union republican communist parties is like that of other regional organs.

The central committee of Turkmenistan has no more rights than the Orel oblast committee; indeed the CPSU statutes place together in one and the same paragraph the rights of the central committees in the union republics and the Russian oblast committees.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Rules of the CPSU, op. cit., p. 173.


\(^3\) A. Avtorkhanov, op. cit., p. 172.
Statutory and actual position, however, are not necessarily the same thing.\textsuperscript{1} Some regional organizations are in fact more equal than others. Hence, certain union-republican leaderships can make their influence better felt than can those of autonomous republics and oblasti while others in the smaller union republics will be less influential.

There is a tendency in Soviet political studies, as represented in Avtorkhanov's work, to take Soviet spokesmen at their word when they emphasize the party's centralism but to discount as rhetoric anything in the same account about democracy within the party. There is good reason to be impressed by the instruments at the disposal of the central party leadership in its efforts to ensure compliance to its policies. It controls recruitment to elite positions in Soviet society and administers a massive programme of political socialization.\textsuperscript{2}

The CPSU is, however, a complex organization. Katz and Kahn's generalization on the nature of organizations should provide students of the Soviet political party with some food for thought:

\textsuperscript{1}John Armstrong demonstrates that the Ukrainian party elite were able to resist the initiation of a purge of their organization in the post World War II period. It is difficult to imagine any oblast organization successfully deterring Stalin's minions. J. A. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case of Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus (London: Atlantic Books, 1959).

The general point is that organizations are less integrated than biological systems; their patterns of cooperative interrelations also represent constrained adjustments of conflict and struggle. The adjustment is not only the compromise of past antagonisms but also of immediate differences of feeling, belief and interest. The contrived character of organizations means that by nature they contain built-in sources of conflict. Many facts of organizational life can be readily understood if the model of organizations is one which views social patterns not as fixed and rigid interrelations but as the outcome of a continuing tug of war. The implication of this model is that organizations are always in a process of change and that the constancy attributed to the system is exaggerated by the fact that the verbal level for describing an organization remains the same even when the processes of organization do not.1

From this standpoint, policy is the product not only of calculations of figures in the Politburo but of the attempts to influence decision-making on the part of their regional subordinates who seek to preserve, gain or enhance their importance. Subordinates in any organization, following Katz and Kahn, can be expected to try to influence the course of affairs within the organization so that developments are consistent with what they view as their needs.

Those subordinates work in a party apparatus which extends down from the all-union level to the union-republican, oblast and raion territorial levels. At each level, we find executive agencies and staff departments on the model already described. Party officials at the local or raion level have specially onerous administrative responsibilities in the agricultural sphere. Robert F. Miller has described insightfully the operation of party leadership at the local level. He indicates that the forms and processes of indirect Party leadership are maintained at least part of the time... The heads and instructors of the organizational and the agitprop departments of

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the raikom carry on traditional Party missions of training and distribution of cadres, strengthening the PPO of the villages and farms, etc.\(^1\) This pattern of leadership gives way to another during the most important phases of the agricultural cycle such as the harvesting period.

At such times the raikom seems to shift gears, transforming itself (that is, its leading core of apparatchiki) into a managerial organ of a particularly forceful type, with raion agriculture as its enterprise. Deluged with demands by their superiors for reports on plan or campaign target fulfillment, raikom secretaries immerse themselves in the most detailed questions of production. Regular patterns of authority are often disrupted, as responsible officials from all walks of life in the raion centers—raikom instructors, agricultural officials, journalists, and even school principals—are dispatched by the secretaries as raikom plenipotentiaries to individual farms where they are expected to apply unceasing pressure for the attainment of the campaign's goals.\(^2\)

Analysis of the role of governmental administrators in the Soviet Union has not been an enticing subject for many Western students of Soviet politics. Governmental administration generally comes in for a chapter or two in the many textbooks currently available on the market but specialized monographs are exceedingly rare.\(^3\) While

\(^1\)Robert F. Miller, "Continuity and Change in the Administration of Soviet Agriculture since Stalin," in The Soviet Rural Community: a Symposium, edited and with an introduction by James R. Millar (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 77. PPO stands for primary party organization. The party is organized on a functional as well as a territorial basis so that party organizations are established in all major spheres of activity.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 78.

\(^3\)As T. H. Rigby notes

"In the West the study of Soviet governmental institutions and their history has been rather neglected in favour of research on the party and political struggles of the top leaders."

T. H. Rigby, Lenin's Government: Sovnarkom 1917-1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. xi. No better beginning to setting the imbalance right could have been provided than Rigby's fine study.
Soviet governmental bureaucrats generally have not been thought important enough to win the concentrated attention of political scientists, the ones in the agricultural administrative system have been thought to be particularly insignificant. Mary McAuley's view of their standing is representative, I think, of expert opinion.

Agriculture as a sector has few organized institutions. The agriculture ministries inherited from Stalin were few in number and the neglect of agriculture had made them institutions of secondary importance. In addition the relegation of agriculture to a poor neighbour status meant that as a profession it attracted neither able personnel nor resources.¹

This situation has been changing somewhat, but even if the government bodies concerned with agriculture are few in number and of secondary importance we should consider them briefly as elements with the agricultural decision-making system.

The Supreme Soviet

According to the constitution, the "highest organ of state power in the USSR" is the Supreme Soviet.² It is a two chamber body which is charged with a wide range of responsibilities as the primary legislative body within the state. One chamber, the Soviet of the Union, is elected by the people at large. There is one deputy for each three hundred thousand voters. The Soviet of the Nationalities, the second chamber, is composed so as to reflect all of the national


²Please note that all references here are to the constitution of 1936. For the text of this constitution and its successor adopted in 1977 and a concise insightful commentary on both, see S. Finer, Five Constitutions (Sussex: Humanities Press, 1979), pp. 28-29 and 119-193. The reason for referring throughout to the 1936 constitution is that it is the one that was formally in effect for the period analyzed in this study. The description in the text, however, is in the present tense for stylistic reasons.
units in the federation. The union republics by virtue of a 1966 constitutional amendment, have thirty-two representatives each in the body. In theory, the other principal organs of state power are subordinate to the Supreme Soviet, but neither the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet or the Council of Ministers are subordinate in practice. The Supreme Soviet has not, to this point in Soviet history, been an important legislative body. Its two houses meet jointly as a rule for brief sessions twice a year, during which the time of its deputies is taken up largely by speeches, receptions, and more speeches, interrupted occasionally by the call for a vote on a legislative proposal. The vote will be, as always, unanimously in favour of the proposal, and the end of the session will see, as a rule, from five to ten important pieces of legislation passed into law.  

The very size of this body, more than 1,500 delegates, precludes any serious discussion of issues. Consequently, sessions of the Supreme Soviet are given over to acclamation and approval of the regime's actions and provide scant opportunity for the representatives of the union republics to affect legislation.

More interesting than the Supreme Soviet sessions are those of its standing commissions: thirteen of which are elected from among the memberships of each chamber of the Supreme Soviet. The committee sessions are private which probably facilitates a more frank discussion of issues than is possible in the public sessions of the Supreme Soviet. One must be careful not to inflate the importance of these committees. They perform a modest but not unimportant function, that of investigating and analyzing legislative proposals and their implementation. To this end,

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they can call upon outside experts, scientists and technical specialists for advice.¹

In a careful analysis of the incrementally increasing importance of the standing committees, D. Richard Little points out that,

the party leadership has clearly indicated an interest in obtaining a higher degree of rationality and public acceptance of its legislative enactments. To the extent that legislative committees can be used to inject a democratic element into the policy-making process and to expose inefficiencies in the operation of the ministries, without challenging the basic authority of the party leadership, the latter has come to support such developments, and has done so in recent years.²

It seems a reasonable suggestion that committee members may act as representatives of special interests.³ A standing committee appears to be one of several likely forums where union-republican representatives may seek to influence the development of implementation of legislation and where log-rolling and trading of favours takes place.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the collegial Chief of State of the Soviet Union, is formally elected by members of the All-Union legislature. It has not until recently been considered an important decision-making body in the Soviet system for its activities were principally ratificatory and symbolic. The fact that the last several chairmen of this collective-presidency have been important


political personalities, may mean the Presidium now exercises some initiative in the policy process. The fifteen vice-chairmen of this body are representatives of the Union republics. By tradition, it is the president of the Supreme Presidium of the individual Union republic who serves.¹ The possibilities for influence are obviously constrained but the Presidium is entrusted with highly significant constitutional competences. By virtue of Article 49, the Presidium can issue decrees, convene and dissolve the Supreme Soviet, interpret any Soviet law in operation, conduct popular referendums on its own initiative, annul the decisions of the all-union and union-republican Council of Ministers, appoint and remove the higher commands of the military, declare martial law in any locality of the Soviet Union and generally act on behalf of the legislature during the intervals between its sessions. The Presidium's actual decision-making power is not a subject for easy assertions, but historically it has been less important than a formal statement of its powers would suggest. Furthermore, there is no clear evidence that Union-republican officials have actively exercised influence through this body but we note it here nonetheless as a potential point of influence for the regional representatives.

The Ministerial System

The Council of Ministers is the supreme administrative organ in the Soviet Union. In light of the broad scope of governmental activity in the Soviet Union, it is an especially important body. Included in its very broad membership are the Chairmen of the Council

¹The Soviet Parliament, p. 78.
of Ministers of the Union Republics who serve *ex-officio*. The degree of influence afforded union-republican officials by this membership is at best modest, but it must be noted as one of the access points for representation of regional interests. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers and its Chairman oversee the work of the Council and it is interesting to note, given our focus upon Belorussia, that from 1965 through to the end of the period studied here, the First Deputy Chairman of that body, was Kirill T. Mazurov, the former first secretary of the Party in the Belorussian republic.

There are a number of ministries which have responsibilities in the sphere of agricultural policy. Most obviously the USSR Ministry of Agriculture is the principal agency concerned with agriculture. Its internal organization follows the production-branch format with separate directorates (glavki) for grain crops, potatoes and vegetables and so on. There are, however, other ministries concerned with agriculture. There are the Ministries of Land Improvement and Water Conservation, the Ministry of Rural Construction, the Ministry of Procurements and the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machinery. The last is an all-Union Ministry whereas the others are union-republican ministries.¹ Other ministries whose activities are affected very much by developments in the agricultural sector are the Ministry of Meat and Dairy Industry, the Ministry of the Food Industry and the Ministry of Trade. The all-union Ministry for Chemical Industry is responsible *inter alia* for the production of fertilizers and is subsequently of importance to the workings of the "agro-industrial complex." The

¹See subsequent paragraph for an explanation of this distinction.
complicated bureaucratic structure of the USSR Council of Ministers also includes State Committees and various specialized agencies. 1 Among those with functions related to the agricultural society, are the State Committee on Forestry, the Agriculture Supply Agency (Soviuzsel'khозtekhiika) and the Chief Administration of the Microbiological Industry.

There are in the Soviet Union three types of ministries—all-union, union-republican and republican. The first and the last deal with matters that are within the exclusive competence of the central and union-republican governments respectively. Union-republican ministries deal with matters that are the common concern of the two levels of government. The number of ministries in this area of joint jurisdiction (sovместная компетенсия) has been increasing steadily whereas the number of republican ministries has been diminishing. As we noted above, the principal agencies concerned with agriculture are already in this category of shared authority.

The State Planning Committee (USSR Gosplan) is the agency under the Council of Ministers which is charged with the responsibility of economic planning and coordination. Gosplan is a complicated bureaucratic entity in its own right. It is directed by a chairman and a collegium which numbers around thirty-six members. Gosplan might be likened to a nerve centre. It is a critically important agency in the Soviet planning system. Its importance is crucial for the topic under

1"The distinction between a ministry and a state committee generally revolves around the institution's responsibilities. A ministry is usually in charge of a single branch, and its orders usually are binding only on its own subunits. A state committee is an agency whose responsibilities cut across a number of branches and whose decrees often relate to other ministries. " Jerry P. Hough and Merle Fainsod, op. cit., p. 385.
investigation in this study, the allocation of resources to agriculture. 

Gosplan serves to coordinate and control the various governmental 
bodies which deal with agriculture.

Quite important as well are various ancillary agencies in the 
governmental system which have planning responsibilities. These 
include the State Supply Committee (USSR Gosnab), the State 
Committee for Science and Technology, the State Committee for Labour 
and Wages, the State Prices Committee, the State Construction and Rural 
Construction Committees and the Ministry of Finance.

The union-republican governments are organized similarly to 
the central government. The legislatures are unicameral but they 
function in a manner like the all-union Supreme Soviet. The 
relationship between the Presidium of the union-republican legislatures 
and the Council of Ministers and between these two agencies and the 
union-republican Supreme Soviet is based on the all-union model. The 
union-republican governments produce laws, resolutions and orders that 
are within those of the USSR, and they are supposed to control the 
implementation of those laws, issues and orders. The tremendous 
uniformity achieved in Soviet law-making relative to the country's 
diversity serves as an indicator of the limited range of autonomy 
 enjoyed by these union-republican governments. 1

1 For a formal description of the general structure of the 
Belorussian union-republican government and the tasks and responsibilities 
of the various ministries and state committees concerned with agricultural 
resource allocation, see G. P. Basov, V. S. Karpik and V. A. Kuchinskii, 
Organy gosudarstvennoe upravlenijaBeloruskoi SSR, 1919-67 (Minsk: 
"Nauka i tekhnika," 1968), pp. 17-57 and 120-657. Once again just as 
at the all-union level, it is important to stress the co-ordinating 
role played by Gosplan in the general work of government officials 
whose work involves the development of Belorussia's agriculture. The union 
republican Gosplan is subordinated to its all-union counterpart as well as 
to the Belorussian Council of Ministers.
The Intriguing Permanent Delegations

One of the linkages between the central state organs and those of the union republics in the planning-budgetary process of which we know too little is the one provided by the permanent delegations of the union-republican councils of ministers to the All-Union Council of Ministers.¹ The most detailed description in the Soviet literature of their role, known to this writer, is provided by A. M. Krokhotkin.

The permanent delegations play an important role in the period of the development and, particularly, at the stage of the consideration of the drafts of the plan and the budgets of the republics in the governmental agencies of the USSR.

During the period of preparing the draft plans and budget, the permanent delegations provide assistance in the planning agencies, sending them information and other material.²

¹Until recently the permanent delegations had been ignored by Western scholars. Peter J. Potichnyj of McMaster University, however, presented a paper which deals with these agencies at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, held in Washington in August, 1980. He was kind enough to send me a draft copy of this useful contribution which expounds whatever evidence he could find on the delegations and begins to rectify their past neglect. This chapter contains several of the same quotations from an article by a Soviet scholar of state law as are to be found in Potichnyj's paper. I would like to underline the fact that the first draft of this chapter which contained the citations in question was written independent of Potichnyj's contribution and indeed was submitted for criticism to the supervisor of this dissertation a full year prior to the appearance of Peter Potichnyj's paper. The reason for the selection of the same quotations from Krokhotkin's article can be explained relatively easily. It is owing to the fact that it is one of the very few sources available which provides some hard descriptive information about the permanent delegations and fortuitously and happily for this writer many of its references are to the Belorussian case. Potichnyj identifies five separate areas in which the postpredstva (the permanent delegations) have some importance: participation in the review of draft legislation of the USSR government; participation in the preparation of draft economic plans and budgets of the union republics; participation in the field of cultural policy; participation in general inter-republican ties and communications and participation in the sphere of diplomatic relations. See F. J. Potichnyj, "Permanent Representations of Union Republics in Moscow," unpublished paper prepared for delivery at the 1980 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August, 1980.

Krokhotkin underlines the importance of the activity of the postpredstva in examining the drafts of the national economic plan and budget—and the cash and credit plans as well of the all-union State and Construction Banks. He points out:

It is quite understandable that the representatives of the state planning committees and other departments of the republics cannot remain in Moscow during the entire period of examination of the draft plans and budgets, and therefore in their absence the full responsibility and duty of supporting or modifying particular figures in the plan and budget rests upon the permanent delegations which provide information as required on these matters and sometimes make representations, either on the instructions of the republics' governments or on their own initiative, to the higher organizations of the USSR.

The impression one arrives at from Krokhotkin's discussion is that the delegations serve as very important lobbies for the union republics in Moscow. They represent the union republic in dealing with all the agencies of the central government involved in the planning-budgetary process. The postpredstva are involved instrumentally as well, Khokhotkin informs us, in the monitoring of union-republican performance in plan fulfillment.

During the year the union republics, as a rule, have to raise certain operational questions before the government organs of the USSR (and less often, the RSFSR) upon whose favourable resolution the fulfillment of particular indices of the plan depends.... The postpredstva play an important role in substantiating and carrying through various requests of the republics. The postpredstva know well the situation with regard to plan fulfillment in particular branches of the economy and culture of the republic.

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1 Ibid., p. 94.

2 Without greater information it is hazardous to make much of this point which has to be put in the tentative form, "one has the impression" rather than the more positive "one can be certain." In a personal communication to me Professor Bohdan Bociurkiw suggested that the importance of the postpredstva probably has been undercut since the late 1950s when the chairmen of the union republican Councils of Ministers became ex officio members of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
and especially with regard to difficulties which arise in particular areas.

This entails a high volume of activity for, in 1961 alone the Belorussian Permanent delegates followed up on approximately two thousand letters from the union-republican government in addition to assignments passed on to them orally by their union-republican colleagues.²

In turn, the postpredstva sent approximately 1,400 letters to various central government agencies.³ Krokhotkin does not limit himself to a description of the role of this agency; he advocates improvements which would further firm the position of these bodies which appear to be akin to mini-embassies for the union republics at the all-union level of government.⁴

Joint Administration and the Central Control of Planning and Budgeting

It must be emphasized that allocation of authority to the all-union and union-republican government bodies involved in the planning-budgetary process for agriculture is not sharply defined. Close delimitation of authority decidedly was not a hallmark of the Russian pre-revolutionary legal tradition and during most of the

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¹Ibid., p. 96.
²Ibid.
³Ibid., pp. 95-97.
⁴It is interesting to note that M. A. Shafir stresses that Krokhotkin has overemphasized the role of the permanent delegations and takes issue with him on better entrenching their status. M. A. Shafir, "Federativnye nachala v strukture organov Soiuza SSSR," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 11 (1968), p. 44.
Soviet period of rule it has seemed that the central leadership has had a vested interest in confusion in the allocation of authority.\(^1\)

The legislation which empowers the Belorussian agricultural and planning-budgetary ministries is highly general and vague in its stipulation of the economic prerogatives of the Belorussian SSR government.\(^2\) To the extent that this limitation does stipulate specific discretionary rights which the individual ministries might exercise autonomously, it grants them modestly and within narrowly circumscribed limits.\(^3\) When we deal with the subject of planning, and budgeting for agriculture we are treating an area that is the joint responsibility of the all-union and the union-republican governments.

Areas of joint administration have come in for a good deal of attention from Soviet scholars of state law in recent past.\(^4\) Belorussian scholars, like those of the other union republics, consistently claim that their union republic enjoys its full-sovereign


\(^2\) Though it was not their objective to make this point, it emerges very clearly in the collectively authored work by Belorussia's specialists in the study of Soviet state law which was cited earlier. See, F. G. Rasov et al., loc. cit.

\(^3\) This and related issues are discussed very fully in a recently published article. See I. S. Koropeckyj, "Economic Prerogatives," in The Ukraine within the USSR, ed. by I. S. Koropeckyj (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 46-54.

rights in the Soviet federation and that the planning-budgetary process, in particular, functions so as to reconcile the general interests of the all-union population and the specific ones of the inhabitants of the Belorussian SSR.

Soviet scholars do allow, though, that there are some problems in the workings of the machinery of state in this country. In particular, they have expressed concern that the delineations of areas of responsibility charged to the two levels of government have been too vague and imprecise.\(^1\) While there is a distinct possibility that union-republican governments might be able to exploit certain of these areas of ambiguity to their own advantage, it is more likely that the lack of constitutional precision in stipulating economic prerogatives works to the advantage of the central government in the sense that it allows central officials to extend their decision-making discretion.\(^2\) The bureaucratic officials of the union-republican level


\(^2\) The first possibility is suggested by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone in her "The Dialectics of Nationalism," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXIII, No. 3 (May-June, 1974), p. 13. Suggestion that the latter holds true emerged from my reading of the literature cited in the last footnote. One of the most specific instances of all-union exploitation of constitutional ambiguity described in the literature will be cited here in full.

"In practice, separate government agencies sometimes transgress the existing rules for implementation of joint and exclusive powers of the USSR and the republics. For example, the Gosplans of the union republics must work out draft plans for the development of the economy in their own republics for all branches of industry
in these areas of shared competence, it should be noted, are the subject to the principle of "dual subordination." Ministry officials are responsible to their union-republican Council of Ministers and to their central ministry in Moscow as well.

The Planning and Budgeting Process

The setting of an annual plan and budget for agriculture is a complex affair which involves a variety of considerations. It culminates in a plan that sets a number of basic indicators for agricultural development. These include:

state procurements (purchases) of the main types of agricultural products and raw materials;
deliveries of these products to the state for stockpiling;
state investments of agriculture;
commissioning of fixed assets and productive capacities;
deliveries to agriculture of industrial goods, such as tractors, motor vehicles, mineral fertilizers, building materials, mixed feeds and vitamin supplement meal for livestock farming;
irrigation and land improvement schemes;

designated as union-republican or republican and for those enterprises under all-union ministries (except defense) located within the republic. However, this norm is often violated in practice because the all-union ministries and enterprises designated as subject to union-republican ministries do not send in their suggestions for draft plans to the planning organs of the union republic. And what is more, there are cases when changes were made in plans by union-republican ministries of the Union without the agreement of the Council of Ministers of the union republics that told extremely negatively on the cooperation of efforts of the enterprises and seriously hampered planning in the union republics."

V. V. Kopeichikov, Mekhanizm gosudarstva v Sovetskoi federatsii (Moscow: Juridicheskaia literatura, 1973), p. 152 (emphasis added). I beg the readers indulgence in including such a long citation but one has to read Soviet state law literature long and closely for hard information about how the government machinery really operates. In the instance of the book from which this passage was drawn, the author makes this criticism only after a very extended discussion of the ways in which union republics realized their sovereignty in the Soviet federation.
a percentage decrease in the prime costs of agricultural output on state farms that are not fully run on a profit and loss basis. In order to reach this point, a great deal of complicated work has to be completed which divides into two main stages. Once overall priorities have been determined by the party's Politbureau. Stage one begins with the issuance of "control figures" by the USSR State Planning Committee to the USSR ministries and the republic councils of ministers. These control figures are set in accordance with goals set out in the five-year plan and set the targets for and the limits upon economic development. This rough plan is submitted to the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Ministers for approval. Once it clears that hurdle, the control figures are dispatched down through the ministerial system to eventually reach the enterprises. The enterprises take the control figures or broad directives passed to them by the Ministry as guidelines and work out drafts of their own detailed plans designed to meet their targets. These plans, in turn, are routed upwards through the ministerial system. The Ministry, in this phase,

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Note concerning Ministries. There are numerous relevant ministries. Some of these changed their status during the period investigated. The Ministry of Rural Construction, for example, was a republican ministry from its establishment in 1965 until 1967 when it became a union republican ministry. The State Committee for Grain, Fodder was in existence from 1965 to 1969 and was then abolished.

conducts intensive negotiations with both its enterprises and with the State Planning Committee, and upon their conclusion the ministries are obliged to accept a final set of plan targets that are officially approved by the Council of Ministers. \(^1\) Whereupon the Ministry sets final targets for its enterprises. \(^2\) This process generally lasts from May until September at which point the second major stage of the planning process begins. The ministries disaggregate their plans and distribute them to their enterprises. Each enterprise has, at the end of this process, a detailed plan which sets out the year’s work. James R. Millar provides an excellent summary description of the nature of the negotiations between planners and economic administrators which run through this plan setting process:

each seeks to wring maximum advantage or to protect a margin of error from the other side. Each side knows what is at stake, and the fact that this process is repeated every year affords considerable experience in negotiations to all parties. Enterprise managers know that the ministry and Gosplan will seek to cut fat out of their plans, and they set target levels accordingly. Gosplan and ministry workers know that managers try to protect a margin of error and add fat that can be cut, and they revise targets so as to cut beyond the obvious fat into the reserves against uncertainty. But managers know that Gosplan knows that they know that Gosplan will cut a bit more than the obvious fat, and so the game goes in infinite regress, in what is a form of bureaucratic guerilla warfare that is well known in the West wherever budgets are negotiated between administrative units. \(^3\)

The planning exercises focuses on physical units of inputs and outputs. Consequently a separate financial plan and budget must be prepared. The budget and the overall financial plan, it should be emphasized have a distinctly subordinate role in the planning process. \(^4\) In view

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2. Ibid.


4. The role of the budget and the nature of the budgetary process is the subject of a fine but now somewhat outdated study by one of
of the fact, however, that the budget gives expression to resource allocation decisions for agriculture in financial terms which in turn provide a useful measure of the commitments of the central political leadership to development of agriculture in the union republics, we shall attempt to pay it close attention.

Budgetary revenues are obtained from turnover taxes levied on consumer goods and from payments from profits of public enterprises. Budgetary expenditures are of four kinds. There are expenditures for financing the national economy, for social-cultural programmes, for national defense and for administration. It is this first category of expenditures that is of most concern for this study because one of the elements within this category is agriculture.¹

The process through which the budget is elaborated is similar to that just described for the plan. The Ministry of Finance compiles guidelines on income and expense for all-Union agencies and union-republican ministries of finance. The union-republican financial functionaries adapt these guidelines to their area and pass on instructions to the various union-republican ministries, to departments of finance of the oblast soviets and soviets of cities. These departments


¹For a full description of revenues and expenditures, see P. Marer, op. cit., pp. 32-62.
divide, their estimated allotments and send on further guidelines to
governmental agencies subordinate to them and to the direct producers
in agriculture.¹ After the authorities of each agricultural enterprise
have seen their instructions and drafted a budget, they send these
drafts on to their superiors who are responsible for their coordination.
All drafts eventually wend their way back to the central authorities.
These officials make formal reports to the central government as do
their Gosplan colleagues.

Both the plans and budgets are discussed at sessions of the
all-union and union-republican Supreme Soviet sessions and are
approved after relatively minor modifications have been made.
Finally, the approved plan and budget is sent down the bureaucratic
ladder once again.²

¹Agricultural workers generally are employed either on state
farms or collective farms. The distinctions between these two kinds
of property have become less sharp down through Soviet history, but
the kolkhozes are to a greater extent than the sovkhozes, self-financing.
"Nonetheless," as a Soviet economist notes.
"the state budget finances a large complex of work relating to
land improvement, the control of pests of agricultural plants and
diseases of animals, the training of personnel, and other measures
for collective farms just as for state farms."
V. H. Semenov, "The Financing of Agriculture," Problems of Economics,
Vol. XVII, No. 10 (1975), p. 73.

²The "bureaucratic guerilla warfare" commented upon in
describing the planning process goes on with equal intensity in the
budgetary sphere. See Donna Bahry, "Republic Politics and the Budget
Policy in the USSR," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1977), pp. 38-39. We know from a
samizdat source that in the case of at least one union republic this
struggle has engendered bitter feelings. An anonymous contributor to
Politicheskii dnevnik comments on the struggle over appropriations
between all-Union and Ukrainian administrators' and notes the strength
of feeling with which the administrators from the Ukraine insisted
that their union republic suffered due to the decisions of all the
all-union authorities on allocation of funds. See "Natsional'nyi vopros
Gertsena, 1972), p. 91. This particular samizdat source is one we are
fortunate enough to know a good deal about. It was established by
The foregoing brief description, however dense it may have been to read, oversimplifies a vastly complex reality. Budget-making and the setting of plans in the USSR absorb the energies and talents of a tremendous number of people. Especially important are the party and government officials at the centre. Less important but still significant are the party and government officials at the union-republican level. It is to them that attention now will be brought with special reference to the struggle for resources mentioned above in the description of the planning-budgetary process.

CHAPTER V
BELORUSSIA'S AGRICULTURAL OFFICIALS AND
APPROPRIATION POLITICS

The Russian Tsar of the ancien regime...was rarely able to put across permanently anything that displeased his bureaucracy and violated its power interests. His ministries which were subordinated directly to him as the autocrat, represented as Leroy Beaulieu very correctly observed, a conglomerate of satrapies which fought among each other with all the means of personal intrigue and bombarded each other with voluminous "Memoranda" in the face of which the monarch as a dilettante was quite helpless.¹

Imperial Russia and the modern-day Soviet Union are vastly different from one another in countless respects. Still there are numerous other ways in which they resemble one another. One of these involves the propensity of bureaucrats to bombard each other with other memoranda. Unfortunately for Western political scientists, access to this channel of communication is closed. We are forced to rely upon indirect evidence in an attempt to piece together the elements that led to Soviet decisions.

In this chapter, the indirect evidence available which bears upon the role of Belorussian officials in the resource allocation decision-making for agriculture will be brought into focus. This evidence consists largely of statements by these officials, or full-

length speeches and articles which appear in the press, in journals
and in the official records of meetings of party and government bodies.
It is recognized that these speeches and statements are not in them-
selves very significant inputs into the Soviet decision-making process.
In the interpretation advanced here, though, they are considered to
be reflective of the positions taken by the Belorussian officials in
their private channels of communication with officials at the centre.¹
On the basis of the same calculation, the writings of academic
specialists in the field of Belorussian agriculture will be examined.²

Before proceeding to examine the specific priorities the
Belorussian agricultural elite are concerned with, attention will be
directed briefly back to a concern mentioned at the outset of this
study. At that point, it was suggested that this study proceeded from
the expectation that the attitudes and activities of the decision-making
elite who administer Belorussian agriculture would manifest a sense of
"orthodox nationalism." The agricultural decision-making elite in

¹ There are numerous studies which in trying to deal with the
politics of the policy process in the Soviet Union rest on the premise
that the speeches and articles of political figures and the writings
of academics can be regarded reasonably as vehicles for interest
representation. The most recent example of work in this vein which is
immediately relevant to this study is the book by Thane Gustafson,
Reform in Soviet Politics. Lessons of Recent Policies on Land and

² Several studies are now available which seek to clarify the
role of academic specialists in the Soviet decision-making process.
See R. Remnek, ed., Social Scientists and Policy-Making in the USSR
(New York: Praeger, 1977); William Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives on
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969);
O. Eran, Mezhdunarodniki. An Assessment of Professional Expertise in
the Making of Soviet Foreign Policy (Ramet Gan, Israel: Turtledove
Publishing, 1979). An especially thorough study in this vein has been
produced by one of the University of Toronto's specialists in the
study of Soviet politics. See P. H. Solomon, Jr., Soviet Criminologists
and Criminal Policy: Specialists in Policy-Making (New York: Columbia
Belorussia, that is, were presumed to be restive about the degree of central control over agriculture and were expected to press for more autonomy of decision-making. It was not anticipated that direct evidence of this pressure for autonomy would be bountiful given the closed and secretive nature of the Soviet political process but the writer trusted nonetheless that indirect evidence could be garnered. Initially, it appeared that these hunches would be confirmed. While undertaking background reading on the Khrushchev years which immediately preceded those which are the focus of this study, traces of evidence were found which suggested that Belorussian agricultural experts were irritated over land-use policy and the diversion of grass-lands to grain production.\footnote{1} Later reading of the stenographic report of the March 1965 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU provided details from the then first secretary of the Belorussian CP, K. T. Mazurov, of what he purported to be conflicts with Khrushchev over agricultural policies (more of which later).\footnote{2} Hence, it seemed that the activities of Belorussian officials might provide a very interesting case-study of "orthodox nationalism" and its limits in the Soviet system. Signs of this political orientation were encountered less frequently as research progressed, however, and attention was drawn increasingly to what appears to be a sustained effort on the part of officials involved in the administration of Belorussian agriculture not to gain more autonomy but more resources for the development of the branch of the Soviet economy they supervise. The special pleading which these officials engage in

\footnote{1}{For example, see F. S. Martinkevich, Razmeshchenie i spetsializatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva Belorussskoi SSR (Minsk: "Belarus", 1961), pp. 34-35.}

\footnote{2}{Pienum TsK KPSS, 24-26 martâ 1965 g. Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Politizdat, 1965), pp. 74-76.}
is interpreted as a species of interest representation which is characterized here, as appropriation politics. The needs identified in the speeches, reports and writings of these officials are, we trust, the same ones that attention is called to during the planning and budgeting process which results in the allocation of resources to agriculture. This phenomenon now will be brought into focus with attention given to discussion of agricultural problems by officials firstly in the Party apparatus and then by those in governmental positions and finally the contributions of academic specialists will be taken into account.

The March 1965 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU served as the occasion for announcement of a long term agricultural programme which has been maintained; while having been added to, down to the current day. The plenum gave Belorussia's party leader, Kirill T. Mazurov, the opportunity to give voice to long-standing grievances of those involved in agriculture in his union republic. Animal husbandry, he noted, yielded only deficits.

In other parts of this country deficits on livestock might be made up by profits from other branches of farming. But we had nothing with which to cover deficits and in consequence collective and state farms found themselves in a distressing financial position. This affected first and foremost payment for labour. It is known that the pay of workers on collectives is the lowest (in the union republic). A similar situation prevails in all of the non-black earth zone in the Russian Federated Republic and in the Baltic States.¹

Livestock and meat prices were at an unacceptably low level for Belorussia. Mazurov made clear the need to bring prices and production costs into synchronization. He went on to argue that the role in Soviet agriculture of the non-chernozem zone of the Soviet Union had

¹ Plenum TsK KPSS, 24-26 martha 1965 g. p. 74.
been evaluated improperly and that more funds were needed for agriculture in the Baltic republics, Belorussia and the north and west of the RSFSR.¹ Mazurov, it should be noted, was appointed to full membership in the Politburo of the all-union CPSU and to the first deputy chairman's position in the presidium of the Council of Ministers at this time.²

His successor as first secretary of the Belorussian CP and candidate member of the all-union Politburo was P. Mashkov. Mashkov had occasion to comment on the importance of the 1965 party plenum one decade later.³ Not unexpectedly, he paid tribute to the insight of the central leadership which in 1965 set the broad contours of Soviet agricultural policy for the next fifteen years. The subsequent relatively systematic effort to provide increased material supports for agriculture earns strong praise from Mashkov. He remains silent, however, about his own assiduous efforts to ensure that Belorussian agriculture derived substantial specific benefit from that general policy.

We have indirect evidence, however, which indicates that he was not hesitant in pointing to the agricultural needs of his union republic. During the first all-union Party congress he attended in the capacity of Belorussian first secretary, for example, he reminded

¹Ibid., pp. 74-76.

²A persuasive case is made by a leading Kremlinologist that Mazurov was for the period under review here a persistent champion of the agroindustrial complex in the USSR. See Werner G. Hahn, The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960-1970 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1972), pp. 150-186.

the question of land reclamation is of exceptionally high importance. The implementation of an extensive program of reclamation operations is opening up great new prospects for our republic. It is no accident that drained peat bogs are commonly termed a gold mine.... There are plans for draining more than 1,500,000 hectares of land in the republic during the next five-year period. We hope the volume of these operations will increase in the future.

We consider it highly important also to channel the maximum effort and funds into as rapid a solution as possible of such urgent tasks as the satisfaction of agriculture's needs for necessary machinery and mineral fertilizers. Without this, all other measures might prove to be of little effect....

Masherov's speeches, in general reflect clearly the two-sided role of the regional party official. On the one hand, he identifies priorities and leads the union-republican party and government apparatus in making entreaties to central officials to increase the technical-material level of Belorussian agriculture through centrally granted indents of capital and material. On the other hand, Masherov is obligated to prod, to press down upon his union-republican colleagues to draw more

1See, speech by P. M. Masherov, Current Soviet Policies V. The Documentary Record of the Twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. From the translations of the Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Columbus, Ohio: American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1973), p. 53. Masherov's colleague in the Politburo of the Belorussian CP, T. Ia. Kiselev, pointed to some specific needs of Belorussian agriculture during a speech at the same party congress. He pointed out:

"Practice shows that some machines manufactured for land melioration work need improvement, while others that have given a good account of themselves are not manufactured in sufficient quantity. The USSR Ministry of Machine Building and Civil Engineering should study the question of increasing the output of special highly productive continuous-action, earth-moving machinery and of vibrating stubbing machines and other machines for the construction and maintenance of drainage canals. It is essential that the USSR State Planning Committee provide for the expansion of the production of ceramic pipe to meet the entire needs of drainage work. The production of plastic pipe must be organized for this purpose on a substantial scale at enterprises of the Chemical Industry...."

effectively upon untapped internal reserves in an effort to meet planning targets. This latter orientation is prominent in numerous of Mashenkov's addresses. In January of 1968, for example at a plenum of the Belorussian Central Committee he complained of serious inadequacies in the work of party, state and economic organs in the leadership of kolkhoz and sovkhoz production.

The leadership of the Gomel oblast was held up for special criticism. Its level of production was held to be inadequate and the factors responsible for this were said to be internal. The leading cadres in the oblast, Mashenkov charged, were not performing their duties adequately. Mashenkov expressed impatience that despite ever improving inputs of technology, fertilizer, the wherewithal for land reclamation and guaranteed remuneration for kolkhoz and sovkhoz workers production levels were not showing commensurate increases.²

It is often the case that when Mashenkov address the subject of agriculture in his speeches and reports he emphasizes the diverse problems of Belorussian agriculture which cannot be dealt without the infusion of funds. These remarks are normally sandwiched between a prolonged introductory comment on the various achievements of Belorussian agriculture and an optimistic closing which indicates Mashenkov's hopes for the future. The development of Mashenkov's arguments in an article titled, "Beneficial results-inspiring


2 Ibid.
prospects" is typical of his approach in discussions of agrarian issues. He deals generally with improvements in the mechanization of agriculture in the Belorussian SSR and mentions specifically

Thus, the milking of dairy cattle is now mechanized in the republic to the level of 57 percent and the distribution of fodder on beef cattle farms remains for the present at a low—14 percent.  

In the same article, Masherov specifies the need to improve flax production. He deals with a favourite theme when he turns to the subject of land improvement and its priority and argues as well that if the livestock and dairy production in the union republic is to improve it will require the building of new production complexes.  

1965 was an important year in the history of Soviet agricultural development. The March plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was the one which witnessed the preliminary charting of the course the Soviet leadership had decided to take in agriculture. Corresponding plenums of the union republican central committees were called to consider problems of agricultural development. P. M. Masherov made a speech primarily of an exhortatory nature and individual Party secretaries and officials joined in discussing it. Masherov complained of subjectivism and insufficient attention to economic laws in the past development of agriculture. These, of course, had become the stock criticisms of Nikita Khrushchev's leadership. He proceeded thereafter, to urge that all of the great possibilities for future development of Belorussia agriculture be exploited. V. A. Mikulich, the Brest obkom first secretary, initiated


2 Ibid., pp. 42-43 and 44-45.
his commentary on this speech with the observation that his oblast needed two or three flax mills in the immediate future. He went on further to point out that dairying suffered in his oblast due to the fact that workers had to make do with outmoded insufficiently productive equipment.  

Mikulich also made mention of another problem which had been the subject of one of his previous addresses which had been published in Sovetskaia Belorussiia and that was the need for more qualified personnel on Belorussia's agricultural enterprises.  

G. A. Kriulin, the first secretary of the Mogilev oblast was not hesitant, when making his contribution to the discussion of Masherov's report, to point out the drainage of land is kept back for us due to inadequate facilities and land improvement technology.  

S. A. Pilotovich, another obkom secretary, articulated still another need of Belorussian agriculture. He made the recommendation that meadow improvement stations should be established in order to strengthen the meadow cultivation effort.  

The needs of the livestock industry are a priority for the Belorussian party apparatchiki. During the first year of the period analyzed in this study, the press carried reports of party conferences which were held in the six oblasts into which Belorussia subdivides. A. N. Sloboda was one of the speakers whose remarks were reported upon. Sloboda expressed special concern over the inadequate degree of mechanization attained in handling fodder. There was too much manual labour in this sphere of agricultural production, according to this speaker.

4Ibid.
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I. Mikulovich, Grodno obkom secretary in 1965, stated the need as well for machinery in livestock farming in the most adamant terms allowable for CPSU functionaries.¹

Frequently, party officials expressed concern for the extent of electrification in the rural sector and the reliability of supply of electricity for essential operations. At the Grodno oblast party conference, for example, complaints were registered over interruptions in the transmission of electricity which were particularly bothersome because they tended to occur during the times of most intensive work.²

The all-union Party Congress ratified the decision in 1965 that 1.5 - 1.6 million hectares of boggy land should be reclaimed in Belorussia. The republican central committee held a plenum subsequent to this which was addressed by party secretary, F. A. Sursanov. He pointed out in the course of his report that it would be necessary to expand the output of enterprises producing drainage pipe in order that the five-year plan targets be met. Further, he drew out the need for more specialists in land improvement.³ The secretaries of the individual Belorussian obkoms were prominent in the reported discussion of Sursanov's report. F. F. Mitskevich of Grodno underlined the liming needs of his oblast and recommended that a plant for its production be established.

¹S.B., No. 116 (May, 1965), p. 2. Complaints that Belorussian livestock production is held back due to a low level of mechanization echo down through reports of party meetings carried in the press from the beginning of the period under investigation to its end. Hence, we find in 1971 that a report of a party conference in Mogilev obkom indicates that five different speakers remarked upon inadequate levels of mechanization. See Sel'skaia Gazeta, No. 27 (February 2, 1971), p. 3. Hereafter referred to as S.G.


in Grodno.\(^1\) A. N. Aksenov of Vitebsk proclaimed that

The planning authorities have not fully understood the peculiarities of our oblast. We ask them to consider our suggestions on the improvement of the capacity of drainage work by closed drains and the improvement of plans for technical crop cultivation on land not requiring drainage.\(^2\)

Aksenov concluded his commentary with an expression of concern for the living conditions experienced by land improvement specialists working in the field and recommended that they be provided with trailers and gas stoves.\(^3\)

Land improvement is a complex undertaking and commentators on Surbanov's report were quick to point to its more important implications. G. Zukets, for example, pointed out land improvement of large territories affects the supply of water for the population and for agricultural production. At present, many villages in the raions of the Polissie still secure their water primarily from wells or open fresh-water springs. Following the construction of hydro-melioration systems, the level of subsoil waters will lower. This means, it will be necessary to develop more contemporary means, which measure up to sanitary requirements, of supplying water to rural localities for everyday and production needs.\(^4\)

L. I. Khitrun was the last individual to comment on Surbanov's report. Khitrun, at this time, served as head of the important agricultural supply agency, Sel'khoztekhnika. Later he would be appointed Deputy Minister of Agriculture for the USSR. During his work in Belorussia, he appears to have been a determined defender of his agency.

We consider it is necessary to expand the network of Sel'khoztekhnika departments in the current five-year plan. It will be expedient to have a specialized department in every raion for fulfillment of work in liming soil, extraction of peat and improving pastures and meadows.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) S.B., No. 145 (June 26, 1966), p. 3.

\(^2\) Ibid.


\(^4\) Ibid.
Surganov continued to express concern for the subject of land improvements in 1966. He published an article in the all-union journal 
Ekonomika sel'skogo khoziaistva in which he reiterated the points made 
at the party plenum just discussed and went further and pressed the case 
for cultivating an improved form of technology for land improvement work. 
Surganov stressed that a considerably higher level of mechanization was 
important to the continued progress in the land reclamation effort. 

Surganov returns in this discussion to themes propounded by Kiselev in 
state agencies which will come in for discussion in a later phase of 
this work. He complained that general all-purpose construction machines 
were produced in disproportionate numbers relative to the specialized 
machinery needed for ditch-digging and canal construction. 1 Surganov 
stressed as well the importance of improving the material base and the 
qualifications of the staff of rural repair stations. 2 

Party officials, on occasion, resort to an interesting tactic 
when emphasizing the need to mechanize Belorussian agriculture. They 
will suggest very discreetly that Belorussia is lagging behind other 
union republics in technical development. A. A. Prokopenko, for 
example, in commenting on a speech of T. Ia. Kiselev's in February of 
1967 remarked that Beloruss had milking machines, electric trolleys 
and other equipment of the type used to mechanize livestock operations 
in the Baltic republics. 3 The need for greater mechanization of other 
sectors of the agricultural economy are deemed no less essential by 
party functionaries. Witness this complaint made at a congress of 

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1 F. Surganov, "Meliorirovannye zemli vazhpi rezerv dal'neishego pod'ema sel'skogo khoziaistva," Ekonomika sel'skogo khoziaistva, No. 6 (1966), p. 35.
2 Ibid., p. 36.
specialists in agriculture:

Recent times have witnessed a weakening of the material stimulus for flax and sugar beet producers and a definite underestimation of mechanization requirements. It is necessary to decisively rectify these defects in the organization of flax and sugar beet production.\(^1\)

The all-union central committee held a plenum in October, 1968 and it marked an important stage in the central leadership's policy-making for agriculture. Werner Hahn interprets Brezhnev's orientation at this point as that of a determined protector of the agricultural sector agitated over the diversion of funds which were originally earmarked for agriculture to other sectors of the economy.\(^2\) The republican central committees held follow-up plenums shortly thereafter. Once again, we witness regional party officials taking an opportunity to make complaints and identify priorities. G. A. Kriulin, the first secretary of the Mogilev oblast expresses frustration that the progress made in the specialization of livestock farming in his oblast had been limited due to the failure of rural construction organizations to keep up with the volume of work scheduled for them.\(^3\) V. A. Mikulich reinforced this complaint when he had the floor to discuss developments in the Brest obkom.\(^4\) P. E. Rubis, chairman of the Vitebsk Oblast Executive Committee, underlined the importance of one of the themes in first secretary Masherov's report to the plenum when he had the opportunity to speak and this was the identification

\(^1\)S.B., No. 74 (March 29, 1968), p. 2. Similar complaints are voiced about inadequate mechanization of potato harvesting as can be noted in a report of a meeting of leading agricultural officials in Minsk obkom in January of 1966. See, S.G., No. 17 (January 21, 1966), p. 1.


\(^4\)Ibid.
of the need for better trained personnel to work in Belorussian agriculture. Specifically, the importance of training qualified "mechanizers" for work on Belorussian agricultural enterprises was dwelt upon.1

The responses of party and government officials to criticism from the union republican leadership are interesting to observe. It is commonly the case that they will acknowledge faults in the area of their responsibility but will couple to this reference to some particularly intractable problem and the concomitant need for greater inputs to alleviate it. The leadership of the Gomel obkom, as was pointed out earlier in reference to Masherov's speeches, came in for stringent criticism at the 1968 plenum of the Belorussian C.P. The first secretary of the obkom allowed that this criticism was deserved when he participated in discussions on agriculture at the Belorussian C.P.'s Twenty-Seventh Congress. He pointed out, however, that pastures and ploughed fields in the Polessie region were under water for sustained periods of time and requested technical assistance in the solution of this water supply regulation problem so that his obkom could enjoy normal conditions for agricultural development. He requested as well the supply of one hundred to one hundred and twenty thousand tons of mineral fertilizers.2 L. I. Khitrun, head of

1Ibid. This concern comes through in numerous discussions of Belorussian agriculture. As mentioned above, Masherov underlined its importance at the party plenum in question. He raised it again in addressing the Third Congress of Collective Farmers of Belorussia. See the report of his speech in S.B. (November 13, 1969), p. 2. Similarly, E. Erokhin champions the idea that more has to be done to produce the "mechanizers" needed for Belorussian agriculture. See E. Erokhin, "Uvelchenie proizvodstva zerna--glavnaia zadacha," Kommunist Belorussii, No. 2 (1969), p. 42.

2S.B., No. 45 (February-23, 1971), p. 3.
Belsel'khoztekhnika, responded directly to first secretary Masherov's criticisms of his agency made at the April 1965 plenum of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee. He pointed out that a number of improvements already had been made and that strenuous efforts would be made to correct remaining inadequacies. This government administrator was not loath, however, to press in a party forum for more inputs for his agency and an expansion of its capabilities. Specifically, he argued that technical maintenance stations should be built on all agricultural enterprises with complex maintenance needs. He pointed out, moreover, that more liming materials were needed and that their production had to be increased.

Agriculture is one of the central subjects on the agenda for discussion at Party Congresses. In 1971 when the Belorussian C.P. held its Twenty-Seventh Congress the regional officials made their concerns known and provide us again with some evidence of the type of claims they attempt to make upon the centre. G. A. Kriulin, especially pressed the point that more trained specialists were needed for Belorussian agriculture and complained that the Belorussian agricultural academy was insufficiently equipped for proper training of those specialists it did graduate. The Ministry of Agriculture for the USSR was the target of his most particular criticism on this point for he suggested that the Ministry had failed over an eight-year period to advance the credits to the Belorussian agricultural academy so that it could proceed with needed construction and improvements.

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While less important than the Party, the government is a significant element in the Soviet agricultural decision-making system. Agricultural problems are frequently at the centre of attention during meetings of governmental bodies. The most important governmental figure for the period we are concerned to describe and analyze here was T. Ia. Kiselev, Chairman of the Belorussian Council of Ministers. Consequently, he is one of the individuals to regularly address the all-union Supreme Soviet sessions. These addresses follow a set pattern. Progress made in the economy in the past year or years is recounted and the challenge of future planned increases in the quantity and quality of production are addressed. Areas where Belorussian officials might be criticized are pinpointed and then the priorities and problems of the union republic are taken up normally along with a request for more disbursements from the centre.

Finally, there is an optimistic coda on the improvements anticipated in economic performance. It is the "appropriation politics" portion of the speeches we single out here. In 1966, for example, Kiselev complained that the shortage of productive capabilities did not allow for the treatment of milk and meat in good time with the result that Belorussian sovkhozes and kolkhozes were suffering losses due to the low quality of their products. He underlined especially the serious inadequacy in supply of refrigeration capacity. In turning his attention to technical crops, Kiselev found again that the state of material-technical supply to Belorussian agriculture was not what it should be and the need for greater inputs to provide capacities to ensure the treatment of the entire crop of flax was underlined.¹

The following year's Supreme Soviet session witnessed a more extended argument from Kiselev. He addressed the issue of rural construction and took up the specific issue of construction of living quarters for those in the rural sector underlining the devastation wrought by the Nazi forces during the Second World War which included the ruin of three-quarters of the union republic's living quarters.

Kiselev, then, noted that

Unfortunately, several central ministries fail to take this into account and reduced the amount of central capital investment in construction of housing.... We hope that the ministers [concerned] ... will find the means to increase the appropriation for construction of housing for collectives within the jurisdiction of their enterprises which are located on the territory of our republic.

After endorsing the wisdom of the central leadership and the policies inaugurated by the March 1965 plenum of the CC CPSU, Kiselev remarked that as a higher level of production is being attained, new problems and needs are emerging. In particular, he drew attention to meat production and the aspiration to produce a more varied assortment of dairy and meat products.

Consequently it is necessary to pay greater attention to the development of enterprises for the processing of meat and dairy products, and to the extension of cold storage units. We ask again that minister comrade Antonov look into this question.

At the same Supreme Soviet session another important Belorussian official, V. E. Lobanok, First Deputy Chairman (Agriculture) of the Belorussian Council of Ministers dealt with the issue of land improvement which is critical to the development of Belorussian agri-

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1 S.B., No. 241 (October 31, 196.
2 Ibid., p. 3.
Lobanok emphasized the need for better materials and highlighted a specific problem with regard to production of types of drainage pipe. More materials were needed, he claimed, or there would not be a sufficient amount of pipe produced, in light of the plan target for land drained. Lobanok also dealt with another priority issue for the Belorussian agricultural elite, the mechanization of livestock and dairy industry. He identified a definite need for production of more varied lines of machinery and complained of the disproportionate manufacture of limited types of machinery for this industry. He pointed out that the milking machines for over 300,000 cows had been produced but not nearly enough machinery for distribution of fodder. Lobanok recommended in addition to the central officials of the ministry of agriculture that they set up a special bureau and factories for production of the needed machinery.

When Kiselev addressed the Supreme Soviet in 1968, the remarks he made were brief but pointed. He reminded his audience that the wartime devastation of Belorussia was unrivalled in the USSR which is a theme that often appears in these speeches. He requested specifically that

Gosplan think about the BSSR's proposals which are already known to them for preparation of farm products, especially dairy and livestock products.2

V. E. Lobanok paid tribute in his speech at the same session to the Party and its leadership which was credited with responsibility for

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2 Ibid.
Belorussia's great development. After expressing his deep and unending gratitude Lobanok moved on to suggest that Belorussia's growth could be even greater if certain of its needs were better met. He spoke, in particular, of the need for better manufactured pipes in drainage work and for better trained cadres of agricultural workers. He also identified a need for five million tons of lime for land improvement work whereas the plan stipulated the production of only two million. In 1970, Kiselev again raised agricultural priorities of the Belorussian SSR when addressing the Supreme Soviet. He commended the central planners for increasing the production of agricultural machinery but noted this heightened production still did not meet the Belorussian need for machinery to further the mechanization of livestock, potato, flax and sugar beet production. Kiselev pointed out, as Belorussian officials frequently do, when they breach the subject of livestock production, that a prime condition for its heightened productivity is the deployment of new technology for preparation and handling of fodder. While he noted that the sale of beef and poultry were up, the Chairman of the Belorussian Council of Ministers indicated as well that the capacity for meat preparation and handling was growing too slowly.¹ The Supreme Soviet of the USSR is not an important law-making body. Nonetheless, the Belorussian participation in its sessions reported here is, in my view, noteworthy. Kiselev's and Lobanok's speeches, I think it is fair to say, consistently have served as vehicles for identifying the needs and problems of the Belorussian economy and provide us with an indication of the sorts of claims Belorussian officials seek to make upon those at the centre.

Sessions of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet provide us with further indications of the sorts of claims made by Belorussian bureaucrats in their attempts to influence decisions made on appropriations by the planning authorities.

V. E. Lobanok is again a prominent figure in these discussions. He complained at the mid-year meeting of the Belorussian legislature in 1965 about the reduction and diversion of grassland to grain production. This, as he pointed out, was ill-considered in a union republic where livestock production is a central priority of agricultural production. Nikita Khrushchev was not named but there is little question that he was on the mind of the speaker in voicing this criticism. Khrushchev had prodded the Belorussian officials along with others to expand the acreage given over to grain production during his campaigns for higher grain production.

In the report of the discussion which transpired following Lobanok's address, several officials take the opportunity to point to needs and problems that they perceived. D. V. Tiabut, who was Chairman of the Minsk oblispolkom, emphasized the importance of land improvement and its complexity. He reminded his fellow members of the legislature that there were more than a million hectares of boggy land in his obkom which had substantial potential for agricultural production once the necessary drainage and irrigation work was completed. A. I. Vorontsov, second secretary of the Gomel obkom, made the specific

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1 S.B., No. 141 (June 17, 1965), p. 2.


3 S.B., No. 142 (June 18, 1965), p. 3.
request that Gosplan increase their capital investment for surveying work and recommended that we "more quickly need to begin the output of machines for mechanized work on the meadows and pastures."

Rural construction is a priority subject for Belorussian government officials and it is given substantial attention during the period from the end of 1964 to 1971. The chairman of the Vitebsk oblys polkom, P.E. Rubis made a report to the Belorussian Supreme Soviet in 1967 which criticized the officials of the lately created Ministry of Rural Construction in scathing terms. He went on to suggest certain areas which needed priority consideration. One of these was rural road construction and the other was the training and supply of more qualified architects ready to develop suitable plans for rural dwellings. One of the commentators on Rubis' report, V. K. Lutskin (chairman himself, of another oblys polkom, that in Mogilev) agreed that the Ministry of Rural Construction could be criticized for poor work but maintained that the criticism should be carried further to embrace Gosplan which had not supplied the Ministry with a full productive base, enough machines nor sufficient personnel with engineering and technical backgrounds.

Lutskin took up one of the themes of the report made by Rubis when he participated in the 1968 year-end session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet. In the discussion period which focused upon the draft plan and budget for the forthcoming year, Lutskin made the argument that Gosplan had to resolve several problems if the good beginnings which

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1 Ibid.
had been made in road construction in the past year were to be con-
solidated in the future. The absence of good rural roads is, however,
a chronic complaint in Soviet agriculture and Belorussian officials are
hardly unique in registering concern over this. P. E. Rubis was a
participant in this general discussion as well. While he did not
argue for any additional disbursements for agriculture specifically,
he did point to a problem of the rural community. Rubis complained that
the budget for the rural Soviets in his oblast was only ten million
rubles and that they lacked needed specialized personnel such as
accountants.

V. E. Lobanok's speech to the Belorussian Supreme Soviet in 1969
was not one in which one discerns much claim-making. Rather, it
emphasizes the need to drawn upon internal reserves and to better
organize the labouring effort in agriculture. Other members of the
elite, however, were not loath to do this in the ensuing discussion
of Lobanok's speech and once more we acquire some indirect evidence of
appropriation politics. L. I. Khitrun, the head of Belsel'khoztekhnika,
expressed concern over the fact that liming materials were produced in
insufficient quantities for soil rehabilitation and maintained that
there was a need for special departments of his governmental agency to
be set up in all the raions of the union republic. M. A. Klimenko of
Grodno oblast reported upon substantial progress made in the establish-

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1Piataia sessia Verkhovnogo Soveta Belorus'skoi SSR Sed'mogo sozyva
Stenograficheskiy otchet (Minsk: "Belarus", 1969), p. 113. Transportation
problems are not limited to difficulties with roads. Witness the complaint
of a railroad official that there is insufficient loading and unloading
equipment at numerous Belorussian railway stations. S.G., No. 9 (January
12, 1966), p. 3.

2Ibid., p. 267.

ment of a hydro-technological installation but suggested that this would be stymied soon for the want of sluices and regulators.¹

The 1971 session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet was marked by especially frequent requests for indents to diverse sectors of agriculture. This may derive from the fact that during 1971 Belorussian bureaucrats would have been busy not only with the operational plan in its annual and quarterly forms but with the medium-term five-year plan as well. At any rate, we do witness numerous statements that the material-technical base of Belorussian agriculture has to be improved. P. E. Rubis participates in discussion of the draft plan and suggests that land melioration targets cannot be met in his oblast without strengthening the productive base of the land improvement work organizations. Further, he requests that Gosplan and the Ministry of Agriculture fully satisfy his oblast's requests for "agricultural technology, auto transport and equipment for mechanizing the processes of production."² K. V. Matiushevskii, chairman of the Brest oblispolkom joined in

In the current five-year plan the capital investment channelled into agriculture has grown significantly. However, too little of it is apportioned to premises for livestock raising on sovkhozes. Even now serious difficulties have been encountered on many sovkhozes of the oblast in the winter quartering of cattle. And is it not the case that the number of cattle are increasing by 27,000 head and 25,000 head during the five-year plan. Insufficient appropriations are provided for acquisition of technology for sovkhozes.³

²Vtoraja sessiia Verkhovnogo Soveta Belorussskoi SSR. Vos'mogo sozyva. 'Stenograficheskii otchet' (Minsk: Belarus', 1972), pp. 227-228.
³Ibid., p. 237.
The Grodno oblispolkom chairman, Ia. V. Lashkevich, dealt with the issue of rural construction. He insisted that in order to meet the goals set in a postavlenii of the Central Committee of the CPB that sixty-nine million rubles more of capital investment than that set by the planners was required for the union republic's sovkhozes and there was a shortfall of sixty-two million rubles in the quotas of material-technical supply established for the kolkhozes. Another theme which emerged was the need for improved supply of electricity to the rural sector. As one Supreme Soviet candidate remarked:

Everyone knows that the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of our day cannot operate properly without a steady and reliable supply of electricity. Meanwhile, many of the enterprises in our raion and even oblast still have not secured a reliable supply of electrical energy. There are more than a few examples where... several enterprises systematically did not receive any electricity for hours, days or weeks.

The immediately following speaker complained as well about rural electrification:

In our oblast many kilometers of electrical line are in utterly unsatisfactory condition and require urgent restoration and fundamental repair. The oblast, however, is completely lacking in the means necessary to achieve these ends.

We request that Gosplan and the "Energoestroimontazh" trust annually make provision for the needed amount of capital investment which will ensure the construction and the reconstruction of electro-transmission lines and even the apportionment of transformer stations of large capacity...

The condition of "roadlessness" (bezdorozhnost') came in for attention again as well. Many neighbouring raions, one speaker commented, were not connected by hard-covered roadways. "We are lacking approaches to several railway stations and to the procurement

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1 Ibid., p. 245.
2 Ibid., p. 266.
3 Ibid., p. 271.
and supply bases.\(^1\) Roadways within the kolkhozes and sovkhozes are often in atrocious condition if trust can be placed in the accounts presented by speakers at the Supreme Soviet sessions. An official from Vitebsk oblast, A. E. Andreev emphasized the benefits that would be derived from a better network of roadways.

Improvement of the roads would facilitate the further raising of agricultural production, the reduction of outlays in the economy, and the raising of the standard of life for the rural population.\(^2\)

It is not only during the Supreme Soviet sessions that the press features the positions taken on agricultural issues by government officials. Throughout the year, Soviet newspapers and journals contain articles and speeches by government bureaucrats which give us some sense of the intra-bureaucratic communication that take place with regard to allocation of resources and setting of production goals.

On some occasions the Belorussian officials articulate concern over highly discrete or specific issues and on others they deal with more general matters. We will review some of these instances. Unhappily, we have no way whatever of ascertaining whether the recommendations made with regard to the first type of issue fell into a void or whether they were responded to sympathetically by the central planners. Hence, we will mention only a couple of these to convey their flavour and then will concentrate on more general issues.

In 1965, for example, an official of the Belorussian Gosplan made the recommendation that the resources should be deployed so as to

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 272.
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 276.
allow the widened use of aviation technology in agricultural production.¹
S. G. Skoropanov, Minister of Agriculture, pointed to the same need a full
six years later. At a conference which focused upon means of heightening
the fertility of Belorussian soil, Skoropanov advocated the importance of
further developing aviation technology for agriculture so as to facilitate
application of fertilizers to the soil.

L. I. Khitrun, head of Belsel'khoztekhnika, dealt with the problem
of rural water supply on one occasion but did not return to it as far as
was determined in this investigation. His discussion of the issue is,
however, sharp in tone. He pointed out that his agency could fulfill
work on water supply for the rural population but had not received the
necessary equipment and materials.

The importance of the matter demands that this matter be resolved
favourably and the resources be allotted by way of the plan for
water supply of the rural population.²

The importance of land reclamation and the need to maintain it
as a priority comes out again and again in the commentary by Belorussian
officials on agriculture. Not unexpectedly it is a staple theme in the
presentations of the Minister of Agriculture. In an article written in
an all-union journal in 1965 he emphasized that "Any appreciable increase
in agricultural production, without land improvement here is practically
impossible."³

² S.B., No. 43 (February 19, 1967), p. 3.
³ See S. Skoropanov, "Povysit' plodorodie belorus'kikh zemel'," Ekonomika sel'skogo khoziaistva, No. 10 (1965), pp. 77-78. Skoropanov is
a long time proponent of land reclamation in Belorussia. See, for example,
his Osvoenie i ispol'zovanie torfnogo-bolotnoykh pochv (Minsk: Izdatel'stvo
Akademii sel'skokhoziaistvennykh nauk BSSR, 1961). Skoropanov, it might be
noted, is a Russian. Attention will be given to the possibility that a
sense of nationalism might motivate Belorussian agricultural administrators
but Skoropanov's various public statements seem to show that a Russian
national background inhibits in no way the identification of the needs of
Electrification is another general theme which appears prominently in Belorussian analyses of the condition of the agricultural sector of the economy. N. Gaidukevich, a state official responsible for agricultural use of electrical energy complained in 1967 that the level of electrification in the Belorussian countryside was too low. "In 1965, on average, on a kolkhoz, only 128,000 and, on a sovkhoz, 287,000 kilowatt hours were used."¹ He went on to point out that the most labour intensive aspect of Belorussian agriculture is livestock production and underlined the gravity of the fact in light of the consideration that it was as well the strategically most important part of the union republic's agricultural sector. Gaidukevich called, then, for the provision of funds which would allow the deployment of more powerful transformers which in his view was the key to better service.

Still another issue which garners the continued attention of Belorussia's agricultural officials is the need for technically trained personnel. E. Alekseevskii complained in an article written for a party journal that

At present, even in raions where irrigation is a fundamental importance, there is only one hydraulic engineer or technician for every ten to twelve farm holdings. It is perfectly obvious, that under these conditions, one could scarcely count upon serious improvement in the organization of the utilization of irrigated canals and works.²

There are repeated calls for the provision of funds for the training of so-called mechanizers as well who would be competent in the operation of modern agricultural machinery and for veterinarians and other specialized personnel. A. Ialovik, an Agricultural Ministry

Belorussian agriculture and the petitioning for resources to satisfy those needs.


official, for example, expressed concern that in 1967 there were only 475 engineers and 1,174 technician-mechanizers on the sovkhozes and kolkhozes of the union republic.

On numerous enterprises technical engineering service is performed by practical workers. It is clear, that they cannot always carry out this work at the level of contemporary demands. It is patent that this personnel will not suffice.¹

L. I. Khitrun stated in strong terms the need to "set to rights the payment of mechanizers' labour" and improve the conditions of their work," when he addressed a conference of agricultural specialists in 1968.²

It is not simply the payment for mechanizers' labours which has to be "set at rights" according to some Belorussian agricultural officials. The design and supply of the machinery they use has to be reformed as well. Very detailed suggestions and complaints emerge from the Belorussian bureaucracy on this score. The Deputy Minister for Agriculture, for example, noted that

At present, the problem of mechanization is being solved mainly by quantitatively increasing the number of excavators, bulldozers, graders and scrapers produced. These are general purpose construction machines and in many respects do not meet the requirements of land improvement specialists.

We should long ago have had increased the output of land improvement machines.... Back in 1963 the Melioramash Design Bureau worked out a design for a crawler land improvement chassis and the equipment to be mounted on it. The design aroused great interest among land improvement specialists, and they have recommended persistently that series production of the chassis be organized more quickly.... But Soiuž'sel'shhoztekhnika decided to adhere to the present modifications of swamp tractors.

Unfortunately, there are quite a few such cases. A decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers


of the USSR called for new high capacity land machines to be
developed and introduced into production in the 1966 to 1970
period.

But in 1967 the assignment for manufacture of the RUN-I
universal frame with changeable attachments was not fulfilled.
In the period from 1967 to 1969 we did not receive excavators
to build canals between 1.7 and 2 metres in depth, canal
cleaners, machines for arranging drainage on drained land with
mechanized laying of tile. The Ministry of Tractor and
Agricultural Machine Building of the USSR fell short with land
improvement tractors with a 75 horsepower motor in 1969. In
the final analysis, all of this is hampering us in raising
labour productivity.1

The problems with machinery do not end with the matters of
supply and demand. Belorussian officials identify serious problems
in the repair and maintenance of that machinery which is delivered.

Repair is effected under conditions where

specialized equipment and devices are used rarely, repair is made
by the tractor operators themselves primarily in unsheltered
areas; a majority of the worn parts are replaced by new ones
and the rebuilding of parts and units at the enterprises of the
Agricultural Equipment Association virtually is not affected.
Control of repair quality is inadequate.2

Increase in the supply of soil improvement additives and
fertilizers to Belorussian agriculture is another matter which appears
to be close to the hearts of the agricultural apparat in Belorussia.
The Minister of Agriculture concluded an article which stipulated in
detail the best means of applying powdered lime which were beyond the
present resources of the Belorussian S.S.R. and maintained that it was

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1_Izvestiia_ (September 5, 1970), p. 2. I am indebted to my
former colleague, John McDonnell, for drawing this article to my
attention. John, who is working on a very significant line of
research focused upon the Soviet defense industry, kept his eye
peeled for mentions of Belorussian agriculture in the press that he
had to follow for his own research, while we were both associated
with Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies.

essential that agriculture in the non-chernozem belt be more rapidly supplied with the equipment necessary for transportation and applying lime.¹

A. Aleksankin, the Minister of Land Improvement and Water Resources, linked the need for fertilizers with one for trained specialists at the same time.

We are also disturbed very much by something else. If every ruble invested in land improvement is to do more work, the improved land must receive larger applications of chemical fertilizers. In coming years we absolutely must obtain them.... Agronomic work is specific here and qualified specialists are needed to successfully carry it out. VUZ and tekhnikums in the country are not training personnel to work on drained land. Specialists with this background might be trained within our republic by the Belorussian Agricultural Academy in Gorki. The Ministry of Agriculture USSR ought to study this possibility and take measures.²

In the second chapter of this work, an attempt was made to provide a brief sociological description of the Belorussian rural community. The studies carried out by Soviet rural sociologists were found useful in that endeavour. One thing that became quickly apparent when considering that literature is that Soviet scholars are not disinterested observers of the phenomena they study. They tend to demonstrate concern over the continued development of agriculture's material-technical base. Their reports are studded with identifications of problems and suggestions for their amelioration. Typically, the form these commentaries take is that statistics indicating great progress made in a certain area of activity will be cited as an intro-


ductory note and then the scholar will move on to discuss his or her recommendations for change which will produce still greater progress.

N. I. Bakhtin, for example, when discussing the mechanization of agriculture remarks that taking into account just the period from 1965 to 1969 one finds that the mechanical milking of cows and handling of fodder on pig and cattle farms rose by three times. Nonetheless, he suggests the level of mechanization is too low. "Complex mechanization and automation in many aspects of livestock farming has only just begun." 1 It, he pointed out, had reached in 1971 a level of only 9 percent on cattle farms, 42 percent on pig farms and 31 percent on farms specializing in poultry production. 2 Following a discussion of the multiform benefits to be derived from heightening this level of mechanization, Bakhtin reminds his readers that it is a process which is linked closely with electrification. Having made his transition to this subject, Bakhtin notes again the great progress made in improving the extent of electrical service to rural Belorussia before going on to urge improvements. He recommends development of electric-powered machinery over the fuel driven variety for numerous aspects of agricultural production. 3 The disparity between the level

1 N. I. Bakhtin, Gorod i derevnia, ekonomicheskie aspekty (Minsk: Izdatel'stvo "Belarus", 1974), p. 77. The importance of mechanization is, as one might expect, a topic of long-standing in the discussions of agricultural specialists. Going back to Khrushchev's period of rule, one finds complaints about the level of mechanization and the failure of Soviet industry to produce machinery adapted to local agricultural conditions. See M. E. Matsepuro, "K voprosu obosnovaniia napravleniia mehanizatsii rabot na zhivotnovodcheskih farmakh nechernozemnoi zony strany," Trudy, Vol. 1 (Minsk: Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva vysshego, srednego, spetsial'noi i professsial'noi obrazovaniia BSSR, 1963), pp. 33-64.

2 N. Bakhtin, ibid.

3 Ibid., p. 90.
of electrical service between town and country is a subject for some
critical observations. Industry, he suggested, consumed approximately
62 percent of Belorussia's electric power, whereas agriculture
accounted for only 7 percent.

For one industrial worker in the republic, 8,941 kilowatt
hours of electricity are consumed but for one kolkhoznik or
worker on a sovkhoz—only 380 kilowatt hours, or 23 times
less.\footnote{Ibid., p. 91.}

Bakhtin proceeds from this subject to that of "chemicalization" of
Belorussian agriculture. Once again, the great strides forward made
in previous years are rhymed off before noting the need for the still
further development and delivery of chemicals to Belorussian agri-
culture.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 97-19. Soviet agricultural specialists emphasized
this theme through the period under review. See A. Kireev, "Khimia-
vernyi soluznyk khleboroba," Kommunist Belorussii, No. 2 (1965),
pp. 28-32.}

Belorussia's needs in this sphere are enormous. After
five years of a substantial liming programme, Belorussian agricultural
specialists in 1970 pointed out that there were still 6.5 million
hectares which still were in need of lime.\footnote{F. S. Martinkevich and I. T. Cherniavskii, \textit{op. cit.},
pp. 122-123.}

The tremendous importance to Belorussian agriculture of land
drainage and land improvement is stressed throughout the period under
review in the writings of agricultural specialists. Belorussia has,
after all, approximately 6.5 million hectares of bog and swampy land.\footnote{N. I. Bakhtin, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 98.}
repeatedly by Belorussia's agricultural academic specialists. Bakhtin's discussion of this theme applauds the central Soviet planners for increasing the investment channelled into land amelioration for the ninth five-year plan period by 2.3 times over the amount set for the eight five-year plan. Soviet scholars demonstrate concern, though, not only over the level of funding in a given area but they deal as well with highly specific aspects of agricultural decision-making. Thus N. D. Astashkin, though encouraged by the increased investment in this area, expresses grave concern about the delivery of ceramic drainage pipe to Belorussian agriculture. He suggests that priority should be given to the construction of factories in Belorussia which specialize in the production of such pipe.

Academic specialists give substantial attention to the human "inputs" into the Belorussian agricultural economy as well as those of a material nature. The level of education achieved by those who live in rural areas is a subject on which concern is expressed. Bakhtin, for example, suggests that in an era when complex mechanization of agriculture has got underway, it is imperative that the agricultural work force be technically skilled and well-qualified for

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2 N. I. Bakhtin, op. cit., p. 98.

their jobs. Again, the discussion of past accomplishments and future needs raises questions about how full or empty the scholar wishes to claim the bottle might be. He expresses considerable satisfaction that the number of "mechanizers" rose from 27,500 in 1940 to 143,700 in 1970. Nonetheless he argues there are still too few individuals with specialist skills employed in Belorussian agriculture. Further, he notes that while there was an increase from 1960 to 1970 of agricultural specialists by 2.2 times, the increase achieved in industry for the same period was on the order of 3.3 times.

Regional officials in the Soviet Union are portrayed sometimes as though they are caught in a hierarchy of cast-iron relationships. It is well-known, for example, that they come under tremendous pressure to enforce the economic plan decided upon by central decision-makers. The foregoing discussion suggests, however, that they may not be merely enforcers of the plan. Rather, it appears that they enjoy some latitude to represent the interests, as they see them, of agriculture in their region. These representations of interest, from the party, state and academia, furthermore, appear to have a reinforcing quality. Each stream of representations complements the other, and it appears that the officials in Belorussia tug together in an effort

1 N. Bakhtin, op. cit., p. 103.
2 Ibid., p. 104.
3 Ibid., p. 108. V. Kozhar raises an important point when he complains about the migration of newly educated technical specialists out of the agricultural sector to urban centres. In his view, it is important not only to educate new specialists but to make working conditions sufficiently attractive that they will want to stay in occupations in rural Belorussia. See V. Kozhar, "Podgotovka kadrov mekhanizatorov," Kommunist Belorussii, No. 2 (1966), pp. 17-20.
to win the allocation of more resources and equipment. The party officials, governmental bureaucrats and academic specialists in Belorussia appear then, to engage in appropriation politics. Indeed, the special pleadings which appear in public view, are in all likelihood, the mere tip of an iceberg.

It should not be thought that this automatically places them in conflict with officials at the centre. There is some reason to believe that central and regional officials become interwoven in a rather complex interdependent network. This seems, at least, to be a fair characterization of the relationships established by officials involved in the village reconstruction programme. The village reconstruction scheme is a modification of an earlier plan of Khruschev's who aspired at one time to create agrarian cities. In 1965 the Belorussian Deputy Chairman of the Construction Ministry commented on the need to reduce drastically the number of villages in Belorussia and advocated the large-scale construction of two-story apartments for the rural population. This, of course, if adopted, would mean substantial changes for the Belorussian peasantry who were accustomed to one-story dwellings and dispersed villages immediate to the land they worked. Both Belorussian Party and Government officials were to become advocates of this programme and as Hahn demonstrates it had very strong supporters in the central apparatus of rule. Belorussian and all-union officials worked together on village planning recommendations and these were adopted by the Belorussian Council of Ministers.

Footnote: The broad outline of the history of this programme have been dealt with insightfully by W. Hahn, op. cit., pp. 199-206. The account here simply supplements his analysis with some evidence drawn from the Soviet Belorussian press.
Further, the decision was made to establish a republican ministry of rural construction. The Belorussian press gradually began to give prominence to articles which dealt with rural living conditions. E. Grekhov, the Deputy Chairman of the Grodno obispolkom, championed the merits of the two-story rural dwelling and proceeded to argue as well that designs for rural hospital facilities were seriously needed as was a general improvement of the material-technical base of rural construction. Later in the same month that Orekhov's article was published, two journalists collaborated on an article which reported very favorably upon the design of the two-storied rural home. In February of 1967 the government of the Belorussian SSR held a conference on rural construction which attracted over four thousand delegates. The principal report made at the conference was presented by T. Ia. Kiselev, the Chairman of the Belorussian Council of Ministers. Both in his report and in ensuing discussion, the village reconstruction programme received favorable mention. The sobering note of the cost of a full-scale programme rural construction on five-year plan basis was made known, however, and that was the rather daunting sum of two billion rubles. Later in 1967, there was an all-union conference on.

1 Ibid., p. 200.
5 Ibid., pp. 1-3.
7 Ibid., p. 3. It was USSR Gosstroi Chairman, Novikov, who raised the issue of cost but he, nonetheless, commended the Belorussian example.
rural construction and V. G. Kamenskii, Deputy Chairman of the Belorussian Council of Ministers, was a featured speaker.¹ In 1967, as well, status of the republican ministry of rural construction was altered to that of a union-republican ministry. In 1968, the Deputy Chairman of the Belorussian Council of Ministers indicated that the government planned to reduce the number of villages from thirty thousand to six thousand and that for the short term six experimental kolkhozes and sovkhozes would be developed.² During 1968, however, as Hahn shows, diverse articles appeared in all-union newspapers criticizing this programme.³ This did not disuade first secretary Mashurov from selling the advantages of the programme to the thousands who attended the Third Congress of kolkhozniki which was held in November of 1969.⁴ The debate on this issue continued on after the closing date of the period studied in this dissertation.⁵ Keith Bush, a close observer of Soviet agricultural developments, noted in 1975, that in the realm of rural construction, battle has been joined by opposing factions and the smoke is still too dense for us to see which side is winning.⁶

⁵In March of 1971, the final year under investigation in this study the Belorussian press carried a special supplement containing diagrams of model two-story homes and accompanying laudatory descriptions of their advantages. See, S.G., No. 63 (March 19, 1971).
It apparently was the case that in the late 1960's serious consideration was given to adopting the rural construction programme as soon as the Belorussian prototype had been developed. It failed, however, to win the immediate approval of the Kremlin's "last-say" decision-makers. No doubt, the cost factor of several hundred billion rubles loomed large in their minds.

The episode highlights, however, the complicated intertwinnings of political actors in the Soviet context. Here we appear to have some central and union-republican officials allied in their advocacy of a particular priority while still other central officials emerged who opposed this ambitious scheme.

The question of the effectiveness of the Belorussian attempts at appropriation politics remains to be discussed. The fact that they do engage in this activity from the bases of both the party and the government bureaucracy, I hope, has been clearly demonstrated.

**Plans, Budgets and Belorussian Agriculture**

It is not necessary to read the preceding pages very closely to see that at both the beginning and the end of the period under inquiry members of the Belorussian agricultural elite are raising the same sorts of matters. They continue to identify problems and needs in the areas of land improvement, mechanization of agriculture, electrification of rural Belorussia and so on. Does this mean that their claims have fallen upon deaf ears and that the Belorussian elite singularly lacks in influence?

That conclusion would be too rash. Consider the central planners first. *Gosplan's* officials gave attention to the needs of Belorussian agriculture at several points when they drew up the ninth
five-year plan. In the area of land improvement a promise was made to begin delivery of the sort of machinery Belorussia's officials had clamoured for so long.

Agriculture is to receive deliveries of more productive earth-moving machinery and land-improvement continuous motion machines, high capacity machines for applying concrete to irrigation canals and machines and equipment that ensure continuity of the technical process of opening ditches, laying pipe and filling these in again. All of this will make it possible to build land-improvement installations based on new forms of technology and high output equipment. The subject of land improvement elicited the still further promises that projects will...be continued to drain agricultural land in the wet zone of the RSFSR, the Baltic Republics and the Belorussian SSR. There are plans to set up projects to drain the Polissie lowland, to arrange water intake and reservoirs to maintain this region's water balance and normal moisture of drained peat soils.

Drainage is only part of the battle in a land-improvement programme. Application of fertilizers is of substantial importance to the programme's success.

A full supply of chemical fertilizers will first go to crops worked on watered and drained lands and also in the wet areas of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, Belorussian SSR and the Baltic Republics where the use of fertilizer yields the greatest return.

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1 No full-fledged five-year plans were published between 1939 and 1971. In 1972 an expanded version of the 8th Five-Year Plan directives were published in book length form. This publication is the source of the information dealt with here. See N. E. Baibakov, Gosudarstvenny piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR, na 1971-1975 gody (Moscow: Politizdat, 1972).

2 Ibid., pp. 187-188.

3 Ibid., p. 194. Promise, of course, is one thing and performance another.

4 Ibid., p. 196.
The ninth five year plan looks forward to a period beyond that covered in this study. When we look back over the years of the eighth five year plan we find that delivery of resources to Belorussian agriculture showed notable improvement in areas addressed by the officials in Belorussia which just have been discussed above. Their pleadings tended to concentrate on certain key problem areas: chemicalization and related land improvement needs, mechanization, electrification and specialization of personnel and related upgrading of skills.

When we look at the figures for the period of the eighth five year plan it quickly can be discerned that delivery of mineral fertilizers practically doubled over the previous five-year plan. During the same time, more than 900,000 hectares of boggy land were drained and 3.4 million hectares of acidic soils were limed.1

A leading Western agricultural economist has some interesting views on the fertilizer usage in Belorussia. Arcadius Kahan reckons that when it comes to this subject the influence of Belorussia's officials reaches to the top-most decision-making body in the USSR. Belorussia has reached the highest level of mineral fertilizer application, exceeding all other republics by a wide margin. Given such information, the performance of crop yields during the last decade ceases to be a mystery. A similar situation has developed in Lithuania. There is little doubt that the apportionment of mineral fertilizers to Belorussia and Lithuania required not a decision by the bureaucrats in the state planning committee but a decision by the Politburo.2

While Belorussia's success in obtaining inputs of fertilizer is striking, Belorussia improves its position with regard to other inputs as well.

1P. M. Mashurov, the first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party, trumpeted these accomplishments at the Twentv-seventh Congress of the CUP. See P. Mashurov, "Otchetnyi doklad pervogo sekretaria TsK KPB, P. M. Mashurov na XXVII S'ezde Kompartii Belorusii," Kommunist Belarusii (1971), p. 10.

The speeches and reports just dealt with in the preceding section of this chapter seemed to indicate that Belorussian agriculture was in special need of mechanization during the period studied. Some progress was made in this regard. There were 81.6 thousand tractors reported to be at work in Belorussian agriculture in 1970 which compares with 55.4 thousand in 1965 and 10.4 thousand in 1940.\textsuperscript{1} The number of grain harvesters operating in Belorussian fields rose similarly from 33.4 thousand in 1940 to 56.9 thousand in 1965 to 81.2 thousand in 1970.\textsuperscript{2} The workload of individual machines declined with the addition of these new mechanical units in the following order.

\begin{center}
\textbf{TABLE V:1}
\end{center}

\textbf{WORKLOAD OF MECHANIZED EQUIPMENT IN BELORUSSIAN AGRICULTURE (IN HECTARES)}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lcccc}
\hline
\hline
Kolkhozy      &       & 68   & 42   & 40   &       \\
Grain Combines & 1,236 & 223  & 99   & 93   &       \\
Tractors      & 110   & 146  & 62   & 43   & 41   \\
Sovkhozy      &       & 354  & 1,025 & 206  & 105  & 96   \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}


\textsuperscript{1}Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov Belorusskoi SSR, Narodnoe khoziaistvo Belorusskoi SSR v 1970 g. Statisticheskii sbornik (Minsk: "Belarus", 1971), p. 139.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid.
The Belorussian economic yearbook for 1971 lists the number of workers and the amount of mechanical equipment to be found on a purportedly average sovkhoz. Table 2 reproduces these figures and Table 3 provides some further more detailed information on the extent of mechanization of farm operations of Belorussian kolkhozy and sovkhozy.

**TABLE V:2**

**AN "AVERAGE" SOVKHOZ**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average number of workers</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractors</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain Combines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average sown area.(hectares)</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,852</td>
<td>2,362</td>
<td>2,349</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Ibid., p. 84.

Electrification is another cardinal need officials identified in the pages above. It appears that improvements in this area have been realized as well within Belorussia as can be observed in Table 4.

**HIGHLY TRAINED MANPOWER IS REQUIRED TO MAKE A SUCCESS OF MODERN AGRICULTURE.** Belorussia was largely without such a work force until the relatively recent past.\(^1\) Substantial difficulties stand in the way of resolving this problem. So long as there is a wide gulf between the rural and urban sectors of the society in terms of the material standard of living, specialists will be loath to remain in

\(^1\)There were relatively few specialists in total and those present were employed principally in the administrative apparatus rather than on the farms. See I. M. Ignatenko et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 482-483.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sowing and planting of vegetables</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potato digging</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvesting of sugar beets by beet combines</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loading of sugar beets</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loading of potatoes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loading of mineral and organic fertilizer</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haymowing</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haystacking</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stacking of straw</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical milking of cows</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanization of water supply on farms for</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cattle</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pigs</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sheep</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poultry</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>99.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanization of fodder distribution on farms for</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cattle</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pigs</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poultry</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanization of cleaning of livestock lodgings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cattle</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pigs</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poultry</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric clipping of sheep</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE V:4

**SUPPLY OF ELECTRICITY TO BELORUSSIAN AGRICULTURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of sovkhozes receiving electricity</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>99.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of electro energy in millions of kilowatts</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>167.7</td>
<td>307.0</td>
<td>349.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Kolkhozes receiving electricity</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of electro energy in millions of kilowatts</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>259.4</td>
<td>428.6</td>
<td>514.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Národnoe khoziáistvo Belorussoi SSR v 1971 g. Statisticheskii sbornik, p. 88.
the countryside. Nevertheless, some progress has been made in this area as well. Hence, the number of specialists (agronomists, zootechnicians, engineers and veterinarians) on the sovkhozes increased from 2,053 in 1965 to 3,198 individuals in 1971 and the figures for the kolkhozes are 7,075 in 1965 and 11,218 in 1972.¹ A particularly critical element in the agricultural work force are those with the skills necessary to qualify for the designation "mechanizer." These handlers of modern agricultural equipment have been trained for work in Belorussian agriculture to the following extent.

TABLE V:5

"MECHANIZERS" ON BELORUSSIAN KOLKHOZES AND SOVKHOZES (THOUSANDS OF INDIVIDUALS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>116.2</td>
<td>143.7</td>
<td>147.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolkhozes</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>94.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovkhozes</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Ibid., p. 96.

It appears to be the case that the Belorussian share of the infrastructure necessary for agricultural development has risen not only absolutely but relatively as well. In 1940, the Belorussian tractor part accounted for 1.95 percent of the overall Soviet total. By 1965, the Belorussian share had climbed to 3.43 percent and in 1971 it was 4.7 percent of the total. We witness a similar climb for the Belorussian share of grain harvesters from 2.5 percent of

¹Narodnoe khoziaistve BSSR v 1971 g., pp. 91 and 14.
the total in 1965 to 4.1 percent in 1971. Table 6 provides evidence of the generally improved relative position of Belorussian agriculture.

TABLE V:6

THE BELORUSSIAN SHARE OF THE OUTPUT OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY (IN PERCENTAGE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractor ploughs</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor stubble breakers</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>10.08</td>
<td>9.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor drills</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor cultivators</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potato harvesters</td>
<td>11.42</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>26.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor mowers</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor rakers</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>5.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windrowers</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forage harvesters</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>3.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pick-up bailers</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beet harvester</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


When we turn our attention from physical units of measure to financial ones we find a corresponding pattern of improvement for Belorussia.

At first glance, budgetary data suggest that the increase in inputs to Belorussian agriculture has been dramatic. Looking initially at data for the Belorussian union republic alone we see that there has been an absolute rise in the amount of the state budget which has been channelled into agriculture. This can be seen on table 7 which is on the following page.
### TABLE V:7

**BSSR BUDGET (MILLIONS OF RUBLES)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>262.0</td>
<td>220.9</td>
<td>223.0</td>
<td>272.4</td>
<td>322.5</td>
<td>352.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further, when we look at the structure of the budgetary outlays in Belorussia we see that the proportion of the overall budgetary allotment to the economy which goes to agriculture has gradually risen. (See Table 8.)

It is interesting to note as well that the Belorussian share of Soviet budgetary allotments increased during the period analyzed here. The allotments that the Belorussian SSR received in the budgeting process are shown in Table 9. The Belorussian share of the overall Soviet population during this period was 3.8 percent. The budget is just one of the means central officials use to distribute funds and, as a consequence, budgetary data must be used very cautiously in discussion of this kind.\(^1\) Changes in fixed capital investment in agriculture may provide us with a more sound guide to the ability of Belorussian officials to obtain what they need in the bureaucratic infighting which is generated over resource allocation questions in the Soviet Union. Belorussia's standing on this criterion improved as well as will be remembered from the discussion in chapter three of this work.\(^2\) Grey Hodnett is a scholar whose interests include both nationality relations and agricultural policy in the Soviet Union. He provides the results of an interesting computation in one of his publications.\(^3\) Hodnett took both population data and the figures for fixed investment in agriculture in an attempt to gauge the commitment of resources to the union republics. His results seem to support the general trend which has been under discussion here as is shown in Table 10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of Overall Budget to Economy</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which agriculture accounted for</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and industry and construction</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Ibid., p. 119 and p. 127.
TABLE V.9

BUDGETARY ALLOTMENTS--BELORUSSIAN

SHARE OF OVERALL SOVIET TOTAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Calculations of the percentages allotted to Belorussia include the additions customarily made to the original outlays made by the Minister of Finance after sessions of the Budget Committees of the Supreme Soviet. These increments did not, in any case, significantly change the Belorussian portion of the budget. The data for the computations was called from Current Digest of the Soviet Press, translations of reports on Supreme Soviet sessions for individual years.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>254</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgizia</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhikistan</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaidzhan</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussiya</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By Soviet standards and relative to most other union republics, Belorussia made progress in building up the infrastructure necessary to improved agricultural performance. The output of that agricultural economy did begin to increase during the period under review as was noted in chapter three. The amount of the increase, though, must have been a disappointment to both Belorussian and all-union officials. Belorussian agriculture is beset, just as Soviet agriculture is generally, by problems. Hence, while the quantity of electricity tapped by the rural sector from the state electricity grid has grown to a striking degree, there are serious remaining difficulties with regard to the quality of service. The state may deliver more mineral fertilizer to the enterprises but if they lack proper store houses, which is not uncommon, then a significant portion of the fertilizer will become unusable. There are problems with the other inputs as well. One of the reasons that such great quantities of machinery are delivered to agriculture is that the machines tend to break down quickly and the machines which are supplied tend to be those which can be produced with relative ease.

All in all, however, by Soviet standards there has been decided improvements in Belorussian agriculture. The improvements realized have been slow to come and have been made only at great cost but improvements they remain. Belorussia's officials, it has been claimed here, have played a role in contributing to that outcome. Attention now will focus on these bureaucratic officials in the party.

apparatus and government administration with a view to finding clues which might help explain their ability to play this role.
CHAPTER VI

THE AGRICULTURE ELITE:
CONCEPT, SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS

The Elite Concept

Giovanni Sartori has complained strenuously about the sloppy manner in which concepts are utilized in modern political science. His criticism applies with special force with regard to the concept elite. It has been demonstrated, for example, that there are at least seven different meanings attached to the term which can be culled from the theoretical literature.

In view of the fact that a considerable measure of confusion exists, it seems appropriate that an attempt be made to clarify the sense in which the term elite has been used in this study. The elite theorist whose work is best suited for adaptation to the analysis of Soviet politics, in my view, is Roberto Michels. This is the case


for several reasons. One of these is thatMichels approached the
analysis of elites with a view to explaining how and why it came
about that revolutionary socialist parties degenerated and betrayed
their radical egalitarian and democratic principles. The revolutionary
leaders of the Bolshevik party certainly espoused radical egalitarian
and democratic principles and it is, at least, arguable that they did
so sincerely.¹ I do not think, at this point, that it is necessary
to present any lengthy supporting argument to buttress the statement
that these democratic principles, whether expressed sincerely or not,
were betrayed to a grotesque degree as the Soviet political system
developed. Michels is the writer on elites who was influenced most
by organization theory. Hence, he was inclined to pay special
attention to the organizational or bureaucratic bases of power.² The
relevance of this line of inquiry to the Soviet case is clear. One
scholar has gone so far as to liken the Soviet political system to a
"bureaucracy writ large."³ It is, in any case, a political system

¹For an interesting review essay which refers to principal
scholarly interpretations of Bolshevism, see, Stephen F. Cohen,
"Bolshevism and Stalinism," in Stalinism. Essays in Historical
Interpretation edited by Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton

²Michels was influenced in interesting ways by Max Weber's
work and person. For an interesting examination of the relationship
between the great pioneer theorist of bureaucracy and his younger
friend see the article by Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "Max Weber and Roberto
Michels. An Asymmetrical Partnership," Archives européennes de

³Alfred G. Meyer is a well-known authority on Marxism-
Leninism and Soviet politics. He has argued very forcefully that
modern organization theory, or more specifically the theory of
bureaucracy illuminates the dynamics of modern day Soviet politics
to a greater extent than other competing theories. He used the
particular phrase cited above in the following publication, "USSR,
For the fullest development of this interpretation, see Alfred G.
which is dominated by the Communist Party and that political party is itself a complex organization which is bureaucratically structured. Michels' emphasis upon the organizational or bureaucratic bases of power is especially appropriate for the Soviet case in which the authority over collective resources is vested largely with the party-state bureaucracy. Still another reasons why Michels' elite concept recommends itself is that Michels' work on elites does not necessarily pose an exclusive choice between elite and class theory. The other noteworthy classical elite theorists Pareto and Mosca were ideologically conservative and in some sense undertook intellectual work in opposition to that of Karl Marx.¹ Michels too became a conservative and ultimately a supporter of Italian fascism. He, initially, however, was a socialist and his work allows for the logical possibility of Marxist investigations of class and studies of elites complementing one another.² In quite an interesting but not often noticed passage, Michels spells this out.

The principle that one dominant class inevitably succeeds to another, and the law deduced from that principle that oligarchy is, as it were, a preordained form of the common life of great social aggregates, far from conflicting with or replacing the materialist conception of history, completes that conception and reinforces it. There is no essential contradiction between the doctrine that history is the record of a continued series of class struggles and the doctrine that class struggles invariably

¹There are numerous commentaries available on the development of elite theory. I found two critical overviews especially useful. These were T. Bottomore's Elites and Society (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1966) and G. Perry's Political Elites (New York: Praeger, 1969).

culminate in the creation of new oligarchies which undergo fusion with the old. The existence of a political class does not conflict with the essential content of Marxism, considered not as an economic dogma but as a philosophy of history; for in each particular instance the dominance of a political class arises as the resultant of the relationships between the different social forces competing for supremacy, these forces being of course considered dynamically and not quantitatively.\(^1\)

The reason that this aspect of Michels' thinking is attractive is that in recent years some serious Marxist analyses of the Soviet system and of Soviet-type societies have begun to appear.\(^2\) This work has led to some questioning of old assumptions on the part of Western social scientists and led to questions as to whether it is most appropriate to speak of a ruling class, a power elite or a political stratum as the politically dominant element in Soviet-type societies.\(^3\) This debate need not detain us here. If we follow Michels, I think, it can be seen that those who suggest that one must make an exclusive choice between elite and class theory have posed an artificial or false opposition between two lines of inquiry.\(^4\) We justifiably can proceed to investigate the nature of an elite and simply hold open the question of its relation to the respective classes in a society. Whether the elite is independent of all classes, or the "operating arm"

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\(^1\) R. Michels, op. cit., p. 354.

\(^2\) For an exposition of the themes developed in this literature and a critical commentary upon them, see P. Bellis, Marxism and the USSR. The Theory of Proletarian Dictatorship and the Marxist Analysis of Soviet Society (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979).

\(^3\) For an insightful excursus on these dilemmas, see Alec Nove, "Is There a Ruling Class in the USSR?" Soviet Studies, Vol. XXVII, No. 4 (October, 1975), pp. 615-638.

\(^4\) David Lane suggests that neo-Marxists have tended to depict a ruling class in the USSR while those who have adopted totalitarian theory have postulated that there is instead a ruling elite. D. Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR (London: Martin Robertson, 1978), p. 191.
of a single class are just two logical possibilities which might be
taken seriously. Resolution of this issue in the Soviet case would
require, in any event, empirical analysis of a sort different from
that ventured here.

The Overall Membership of the Communist Party in Belorussia

Members of the elite, it has already been mentioned, are members
of the Communist Party. Hence, we turn attention first to the overall
composition of the Party with special attention to the age, sex, education
and nationality of its membership within the Belorussian SSR. Once this
information has been considered, we shall focus attention upon the party's
elite.

The Communist Party of Belorussia (CPB) has undergone a profound
transformation during the history of the Soviet Union. The CPB was a
numerically small, weak political agency which was dominated by Russians
in its early history. The CPB is now a strong political force in the
sense that it has a monopoly of political power in the BSSR and has
increased its numbers significantly.¹ In 1923, for example, there were
just 2,890 full and 600 candidate members in the party. By 1960, the
party's membership stood at 183,855 full and 19,592 candidate members.
Belorussia's territory increased substantially, of course, between these
dates due to the Soviet Union gaining back from the Poles the western

¹ A recent study show that the rates of recruitment during the
late 1960s and 1970s to the Belorussian CP and the Komsomol have been
the second highest and highest respectively of all the union republics.
Mary McAuley, a very acute student of contemporary Soviet politics,
suggests that the Belorussian leadership, backed by its intelligentsia,
has been concerned especially to strengthen the party's Belorussian identity.
See, Mary McAuley, "Party Recruitment and the Nationalities in the USSR: A
Study in Centre-Republican Relationships," British Journal of Political
Science, 10, 4 (October, 1980), pp. 468-469. McAuley's explanation as to
why this trend developed is brief, as might be expected, in an article which
focuses upon all fifteen union republics. She suggests that there was a
change in the Soviet political climate during the Khrushchev years which
led to greater emphasis upon national differences and rights of union
republics. This, she reasons, prompted Belorussians to become more assertive
about representation.
segment of Belorussia. From 1961 to 1971 the party's membership increased from 266,248 full and 25,987 candidate to 412,873 full and 21,654 candidate members.  

The party's increase in numbers, which might be viewed as a strengthening of the party's base, is discernable in all of the oblasts within Belorussia. It is noteworthy, though, that the party is less strong numerically in the two western oblasts, Brest and Grodno, which make up, as was noted before, a large part of the territory most recently incorporated into the USSR.

TABLE VI:1

PARTY MEMBERSHIP BY OBLAST
1955-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oblast</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brest</td>
<td>15,176</td>
<td>21,020</td>
<td>32,253</td>
<td>44,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitebsk</td>
<td>19,523</td>
<td>30,515</td>
<td>55,498</td>
<td>71,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gomel</td>
<td>25,413</td>
<td>37,321</td>
<td>59,787</td>
<td>74,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grodno</td>
<td>11,951</td>
<td>18,906</td>
<td>34,875</td>
<td>46,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minsk</td>
<td>35,309</td>
<td>52,316</td>
<td>94,509</td>
<td>126,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mugilev</td>
<td>19,742</td>
<td>28,648</td>
<td>42,274</td>
<td>52,360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The advanced age of the current-day Soviet all-union leadership and the political implications of their longevity have been staple items for discussion amongst journalists and scholars for a
number of years now. Less noticed has been the gradual aging of the Communist Party membership as a whole. This general trend in the CPSU is reflected, but to a reduced degree, in its Belorussian wing. The composition of the Party during the years since Stalin's death has altered gradually so that it has become less markedly a party of young men and a party which is more representative of the respective age groups which make up the Soviet population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Up to 21</th>
<th>21-30</th>
<th>31-40</th>
<th>41-50</th>
<th>51-60</th>
<th>over 60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1, 1950</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1, 1960</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1, 1965</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1, 1968</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1, 1971</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: I. M. Ignatenko, Kommunisticheskaia Partiia, pp. 121-123.


In the post-Stalin period, the history of the Party has been a less perilous one for its membership and gradually the Party's profile has altered in terms of the length of service of its membership. This general trend in the party shows up in the specific case of Belorussia as can be seen in Table 3 which provides data for the period under study here. Again this is a trend which has continued down through the period outside the frame of this study and it is now the case that well over fifty percent of the party's membership has belonged to the party for over a decade.

**TABLE VI:3**

**LENGTH OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP**
**1940-1971**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of yrs. in Party</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 10</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-20</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Calculated from data available in I. M. Ignatenko et al., Kommunisticheskaia Partiia, pp. 114 and 116-17.

Traditionally women have been underrepresented in the C.P.B. Little was done to alter this situation until the relatively recent past. During the "Brezhnev years" the representation of women gradually and consistently has been strengthened. Women accounted for 18.1 percent of the party's membership in 1964 and had edged up to 20.5 percent in 1971 which is the final year of the period under examination in this study. The trend, though, continued throughout
the period following 1971. By 1978, for example, women accounted for 24.2 percent of the CPB membership.

Educational qualifications are of great importance to individuals generally in modern industrial societies. They are of special importance in Soviet society which has undergone an intense directed form of development requiring large numbers of trained manpower. The communist party leadership has been concerned that its recruitment effort draw individuals into the party who have completed the formal educational system. Generally one can discern an upgrading of the party membership in the sense that an ever-rising population of the membership has completed secondary or higher education.

TABLE VI:4

EDUCATION OF CPB MEMBERSHIP 1950-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Higher Percent</th>
<th>Incomplete Higher Percent</th>
<th>Secondary Percent</th>
<th>Incomplete Secondary Percent</th>
<th>Primary Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: I. M. Ignatenko et al., Kommunisticheskaya Partiia, pp. 88-89.

The Belorussian CP has steadily but modestly added those with advanced education in agriculture to their ranks. In 1964, of those individuals with completed higher education who became members of the party, 3,362 of them were agronomists and other specialists in

1I. M. Ignatenko et al., Kommunisticheskaya Partiia, p. 72.
agriculture. In 1971, the number of individuals with this type of background has increased to 9,379. A corresponding trend is discernible for those with secondary level education. 7,681 of the entrants into the party in 1964 had completed their secondary education in the field of agriculture. There were increments with each successive year so that by 1971 there were 13,772 party recruits who had this type of education. The party's priorities in recruitment of the educated can be more clearly discerned when we observe the evidence available about the occupational breakdown of the party's white-collar worker (sluzhashchicë) membership. (See Table 5). The party has increased its numbers most dramatically amongst the engineers and technologists. There has been a modest increase in the ranks of the agricultural specialists.

The social origins of party members in the Soviet Union indicate that while the party may be increasing its numbers amongst those with higher education, it has increased as well the proportion of manual workers in its ranks. Table 6 indicates the extent to which the CPB has become a more representative party in a social sense during the Brezhnev years.

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 92-93.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All Communist Party Members</th>
<th>Line Administrators or Executives in Industry, Transport, Communications, Construction, Sovkhozes</th>
<th>Engineers and Technologists</th>
<th>Agricultural Specialists</th>
<th>Workers in Science, Health Services, Education and the Arts</th>
<th>Workers in Retail Trade, Public Catering and Supply Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** I. M. Ignatenko et al., *Kommunisticheskaya Partiya*, pp. 78-79.
### TABLE VI:6
CLASS COMPOSITION OF THE BELORUSSIAN POPULATION AND THE CP(B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Farmers</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Collar Workers</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


T. H. Rigby's definitive study of Communist party membership trends in the USSR discerned four general patterns of nationality composition within the minority nationalities' union republics:

1. Where the indigenous nationalities have consistently maintained clear predominance in the local party membership.
2. Where the indigenous nationalities, although in the past strongly underrepresented in "their" party organizations, have managed to maintain...and seem likely to maintain this majority for the foreseeable future.
3. Where the indigenous nationalities, though constituting a plurality or even an absolute majority of the local population, now appear unlikely ever to attain (or regain) a numerical majority in the party membership.
4. Where the indigenous nationalities are so heavily outnumbered in "their own" areas that their attainment of even a plurality in the local party membership seems out of the question—even in cases where their rate of party membership is relatively high.\(^1\)

Belorussia fits into the second of Rigby's patterns. The recruitment of Belorusians into the Belorussian CP has been favoured during...

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the Brezhnev years modestly over other nationalities so that the proportion of Belorussians increased from 67.4 percent in 1964 to 70.2 percent in 1971. This trend, though did not go sufficiently far to correct Belorussian "underrepresentation" relative to Russians and Ukrainians in the CPB. (See Table 7).
### TABLE VI:7

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE BELORUSSIAN PARTY AND POPULATION
(1959 and 1970)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Population 1959 Census</th>
<th>Party Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Communist Party Members per 1,000 Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td>6,532,000</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>121,758</td>
<td>64.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>660,000</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>40,150</td>
<td>21.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>333,000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>8,427</td>
<td>4.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nationalities</td>
<td>731,000</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>16,920</td>
<td>9.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,056,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Population 1970 Census</th>
<th>Party Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Communist Party Members per 1,000 Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td>7,290,000</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>292,009</td>
<td>70.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>938,000</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>77,033</td>
<td>18.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>191,000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>18,275</td>
<td>4.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nationalities</td>
<td>583,000</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>28,595</td>
<td>3.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,002,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Elite Sample Drawn from the Party's Membership

In this study, as was noted earlier, we follow Michels' suggestion that organization itself has an oligarchical nature. Organizations generate oligarchies or elites—I am using the terms synonomously here—and these elites tend to prevail over the mass membership of their organizations because of a variety of advantages such as access to secret information which accrue to high-level holders of office in an organization. With specific reference to Soviet society, we operate from the premise that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the dominant political agency in that society and suggest that just a segment of its membership should be regarded as a bona fide elite.

We have to modify Michels' elite concept, however, in two senses. First, we have to prune from it his assumptions about social biology and social psychology which are utterly negative in what they suggest about the capabilities of ordinary citizens, and second, we have to modify his concept in view of Soviet political reality which unlike the situation Michels addressed is characterized by a monopolistic political party. The elite consists, first of all, as Michels would insist, of the full-time workers for the Party, its apparatchiki. It is not, however, confined to them. The CPSU's membership includes individuals who work full time in government or economic administration, the military, the security service, trade unions, the Komsomol or youth organization, the press and other important institutions. Numerous of these individuals are regarded properly as well as members of the Soviet political elite.
The focus of this particular investigation is on those involved in the administration of agriculture within the Belorussian SSR. The elite sample for this study, then, consists of those individuals who have attained membership in the Central Committee or the Central Auditing Commission of the Communist Party in Belorussia and whose work would involve them in administration of agricultural decision-making. This last mentioned point may seem to be expressed cumbersomely but we cannot say simply that the elite is made up of agricultural administrators because many of the individuals in the sample do not work full time in agriculture. Party first secretaries, for example, at each administrative level in the BSSR have general executive responsibilities and are concerned with the whole broad range of policies administered within the localities in which they are resident.

Not all within this elite are equally important. There are clear gradations in the elite. Some of the most important individuals have positions not only within the Belorussian SSR but they serve, as well, as representatives on all-union decision-making bodies. The First Secretary of the Party in Belorussia, for example, is a candidate member of the Party Politbureau at the all-union level and the Chairmen of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and of the Council of Ministers of the Belorussian SSR serve as ex-officio members on the central government's counterpart agencies. All three have been "elected" as

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1 Scholars who have studied the all-union apparatus have demonstrated that at this level of the Party one finds representatives of the key functional groups in Soviet society and a strategic point for information exchange between the Politbureau and major interests in the system. The same points apply at the union-republican level. See, Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis," American Political Science Review, Vol. XLII; No. 4 (December, 1968), p. 1232.
well to the all-union Central Committee of the Party. Further, the Second Secretary of the Belorussian CP and the first secretaries of the Minsk Oblast Party Committee, the Brest Oblast Party Committee, the Grodno Oblast Party Committee and the Mogilev Oblast Party Committee have been selected as representatives on leading all-union CPSU organs.

Taking just the union-republican offices into consideration, the members of the Party's Politbureau and Secretariat and the obkom (Provincial party committee) first secretaries have to be regarded as especially strategically important elements within the Belorussian

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elite. These figures are the "professional politicians" in the elite, those whose roles require that they exercise direction and leadership. Next in importance would be party officials who occupy responsible positions in the departments of the Belorussian party apparatus which are responsible most immediately to the Party's Secretariat and which would be concerned with planning and budgeting for agriculture. Many lower party officials meet the criteria for entry into the sample considered here. Various raikom (district party committee) first secretaries engage in agricultural administration and have central committee or central auditing committee membership. Important, as well, are diverse officials in the governmental bureaucracy, economic administrators and leading academicians. The Chairman of the Praesidium of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet, the Chairman and First Deputy Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, ministers of government involved in planning and budgeting for agriculture and oblispolkom (provincial government executive committee) chairmen were included in the sample. Some directors of agricultural enterprises were included as well.¹

The Top Organs of Rule in the BSSR and their Occupants

The Politburo of the CPB Central Committee had fifteen different individuals who attained the status of full membership for the period studied here and ten candidate members. Table 8 indicates the year individuals were "elected" to the Politburo for

¹Biographical information and career pattern data on all these individuals was gathered from a number of Soviet sources. The single most useful one was the Bielaruskaia Sovetskaia Entsiklapedyia (Minsk: Akademija Nauka BSSR, 1969). Also helpful were the copies of Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR V-VIII (Moscow: Izvestiia Sovetov Deputatov Trudashchikhsia SSSR, 1958, 1963, 1966, 1970).
all those who were members of the Politbureau in December, 1971 at the termination point of this study.  

TABLE VI:8
LENGTH OF MEMBERSHIP ON THE POLITBUREAU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was possible to establish the age and length of Party membership of thirteen of these Politburo members.

TABLE VI:9
AGE AND PARTY AFFILIATION OF POLITBUREAU MEMBERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Party Member, Since</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The organization of this section follows directly on that used by Borys Lewytskyj in his survey of the ruling organs of the Soviet Ukraine. See, B. Lewytskyj, "The Ruling Organs of Ukraine," in Ukraine in the Seventies, ed. by Peter J. Potichnyj (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic
The top political figures in Belorussia were considerably younger than their all-union counterparts for the period under investigation. Just three members or 23 percent of the Belorussian CP Politburo were born before 1914 whereas 57 percent of the all-union Politburo had been born before that date. The information on the date of party entry indicates that the vast number of the Belorussian Politburo members joined the Party after 1939 in contrast to their all-union counterparts who had joined the Party before that time and who were the "beneficiaries" in a very immediate sense of the Stalinist purge of the Party apparatus in the 1930s. While younger than their all-union counterparts, there was no individual who joined the party after Stalin's death, even though seventeen years had lapsed by 1971, who had been promoted to Politburo rank in the BSSR. At the union-republican level, advance to the highest level comes gradually though not so gradually as at the centre. The educated backgrounds of the top-most union republican leadership contrasts with that of those at the all-union level. Generally, it is likely that they had the benefit of a sounder formal education. Half the members of the Belorussian

Press, 1975), pp. 267-8. Throughout the balance of this chapter, the immediate source of the references to the elite's careers is the author's own elite file. The file was constructed by drawing on a wide range of sources. The Russian language and Belorussian language sources used were referred to already on page 207. Here we will make reference to only the English language sources-containing biographical information on elite personalities which were drawn upon in constructing the file. These were E. Crowley et al., eds., Party and Government Officials of the Soviet Union, 1917-1967 (Metuchen, N. J.: Scarecrow Press, 1968); E. Crowley et al., eds., Prominent Personalities in the USSR (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1968); B. Lewyttskyj, The Soviet Political Elite (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1970); Grey Hodnett and Val Ogareff, Leaders of the Soviet Republics 1955-1972 (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University Press, 1973); and P. Potichnyj et al., eds., Current Soviet Leaders, Vol 1 and 2 (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1975-76).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Type</th>
<th>Graduation year of First Programme of Study</th>
<th>Graduation Year for Those who Added Party School Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pedagogical Institute</td>
<td>1931 - 1</td>
<td>1946 - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Institute</td>
<td>1934 - 1</td>
<td>1943 - 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Institute</td>
<td>1939 - 4</td>
<td>1956 - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State University</td>
<td>1945 - 1</td>
<td>Total 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party School</td>
<td>1948 - 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party School and Technical Institute</td>
<td>1955 - 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party School and Agricultural Institute</td>
<td>1957 - 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party School and Pedagogical Institute</td>
<td>1960 - 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Politbureau graduated after the turmoil of the second world war, while all-union Politbureau members are largely the products of the less demanding educational system of the 1930s. It is noteworthy, however, that the only apparent higher education received by five of the members of the Belorussian Politbureau was at the party's Higher School.

Each of the members of the Secretariat of the CC of the CPB are members of the Politbureau. Hence, we will not pause here at any length for a separate discussion of the Secretariat's membership. Brief consideration, however, will be given to the careers of the union republic's first secretary, P. M. Masherov and to careers of the two individuals who served as Party Secretary for agriculture during the period under review in this study. P. Masherov, an individual of apparent high abilities, was born in 1918. He claims to have peasant origins and was a Belorussian. He graduated from the Vitebsk oblast pedagogical institute and then taught secondary school from 1939 to 1941. Masherov fought as a Partisan during the war and directed underground Komsomol work in German occupied Belorussia. After the war, he undertook work as a Komsomol secretary. Masherov's career became linked closely with that of Kirill T. Mazurov, who was first secretary of the Belorussian CP from 1956 to 1965. In 1947, Masherov succeeded Mazurov as first secretary of the Belorussian Komsomol organization. He served in this post until 1954 when he became a secretary on the Minsk obkom communist party apparat. Once more he was following Mazurov who served in the Minsk region.

1 Masherov was killed in an automobile accident on October 4, 1980 and was succeeded by T. Ia. Kiselev.
party organization from 1947 to 1953. Masherov served little time in Minsk, however, and was posted as first secretary of Brest obkom in 1954. He served there until 1959 (Mazurov had started his career in party work in Brest oblast in 1941). Masherov was next brought to work as a secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee and after three years was promoted to the position of second secretary in 1962. Finally in 1965 he succeeded Mazurov as first secretary of the party.

F. A. Surganov, one of the two individuals to serve as agriculture secretary of the central committee of the CPP was trained as an agronomist. A Belorussian of peasant origins, who was born in 1911, he graduated from the Belorussian Agricultural Institute in 1939. Surganov's political career began in the Komsomol. He was senior to Mazurov and preceded him into work for the party in the Minsk region in 1947. Surganov rose to the position of first secretary of the Minsk obkom in 1955-56. By this time Mazurov had been transferred from full-time work in the Minsk party apparatus to the position of Chairman of Council of Ministers, the top governmental administrative post. Surganov became a secretary of the Central Committee of the CPB simultaneous with Mazurov's promotion to first secretary in 1956. In 1959 Surganov became agricultural secretary and held this post through the balance of the trying Khrushchev years and down to 1968 when he was promoted to the position of second secretary. His successor as agricultural secretary was V. F. Mitskevich. Mitskevich, also a Belorussian of peasant origins

1 Surganov was shifted from this position to that of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on June 18, 1971. In a personal communication, Prof. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone noted that she was struck by the fact that Belorussians held the strategically important second secretary's job which is the key to control of nomenklatura in the union republic. As she pointed out this serves as an indicator of either the degree to which they are Russified and/or trusted.
was born in 1918 and completed his education as a zootechnician in 1939. He served with the Soviet army during the wartime and began a political career in 1946 which eventually involved service in a series of party and governmental posts. Mitskevich became Chairman of the Minsk obispolkom in 1955 and served in this position until 1962. These terms overlapped with Mazurov's postings first as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and then as first secretary of the party. In 1962, Mitskevich was transferred to Grodno as first secretary of the oblast party central committee and his posting lasted until 1968 when he succeeded Surganov, as agriculture secretary of the CC – CPB. Generally, it appears that the Belorussian apparatus has been served by talented party secretaries. Mazurov and Masherov particularly demonstrated that they were able and other secretaries appear to have been appointed to posts for which they were suited.

The obkom first secretaries are critically important in the Soviet administration system. Jerry Hough has likened them to French departmental prefects. Another authority has pointed out insightfully that they are both less and more than this: less, because the existence of the obkom secretariat and bureau dilutes to some extent the powers of the first secretary as a "line administrator"; and more, because of the global responsibilities of the party apparatus in Soviet society, such that there is scarcely an area of organized activity in his region on which the obkom secretary may not be called upon to make a decision, or a social institution or organization for whose performances he cannot be called to account.²


The turnover of obkom first secretaries in Belorussia for the period reviewed in this study was low. The union republic is divided into six oblasts and four of these had the same first secretary from 1964 to 1971. In the remaining two oblasts two individuals in each oblast served as first secretaries. It was possible to accumulate social background and career pattern information for all eight of these figures. One of the things that emerges suddenly from this data is that the obkom secretaries had clear career connections with either Mazurov, Mash'erov or both. A. N. Aksenov, for example, first secretary of Vitebsk oblast from 1966 to 1971 began Komsomol work in 1945 which would have overlapped with Mazurov's leadership of that organization. Aksenov worked up through the Komsomol ranks and succeeded Mash'erov as Komsomol first secretary in 1954. G. A. Kriulin in turn, took over the Komsomol leadership and then went on to work in the central apparatus of the party when Mazurov and Mash'erov were first and second secretaries respectively. Kriulin was thereafter dispatched to Mogilev oblast and became first secretary in 1964. Linkages of this type are apparent in the case of each of the obkom first secretaries. Work in the Komsomol apparatus is strategically important and is an element in the career backgrounds of six of the eight individuals who were first secretaries of the central committees of the six oblasts within the Belorussian SSR.
TABLE VI:11

OBKOM FIRST SECRETARIES: AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>January, 1965</th>
<th>January, 1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 45</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56+</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE VI:12

OBKOM FIRST SECRETARIES: DATE OF JOINING THE PARTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Range</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925-28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937-41</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942-45</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-59</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE VI:13

OBKOM FIRST SECRETARIES: EDUCATION OF ALL SECRETARIES FOR ENTIRE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Complete Higher</th>
<th>Incomplete Higher</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Party School</td>
<td>6 (of whom had higher party school only)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some features of the obkom party secretaries' backgrounds are made clear in Tables 11 to 13. As can be readily seen, the regional level elite was basically a group of middle-aged individuals for the period under review here. The group was all-male and six of the officials who served as first secretaries were Belorussian while two were Russian.\footnote{I am indebted deeply to my colleague, the sociologist Victor Zaslavsky, for help in establishing the national identities of many of these individuals. Victor, a Soviet emigre, has lived and worked in the BSSR for substantial periods of time. He went through my entire elite file, noting names, patronymics and places of birth in an attempt to identify the nationality of individuals. This aided me tremendously for the nationality of many figures included for analysis in this study was not identified in the standard biographical sources. Victor is himself an authority on nationality problems in the USSR and has published a number of articles on Soviet society since emigrating to the West. See, Victor Zaslavsky, "The Ethnic Question in the USSR," Telos, No. 45 (Fall, 1980), pp. 45-76; "Socioeconomic Inequality and Changes in Soviet Ideology," Theory and Society, 9 (1980), pp. 383-407; "The Regime and the Working Class in the USSR," Telos, No. 42 (Winter, 1979-80), pp. 50-70, and Victor Zaslavsky and Yuri Luryi, "The Passport System and Changes in Soviet Society," Soviet Union, 6, Pt. 2 (1979), pp. 137-153.} All had completed some form of higher education but three of these individuals had the benefit only of education at the Higher Party School.

The obkom secretaries in the Belorussian SSR are, on balance, individuals with long experience in the party and who generally do not appear to have a substantial identification with any primary occupation outside the party. This point is worth noting in view of the scholarly discussion over whether the CPSU leadership is deliberately recruiting individuals for important party positions who already have established specialized non-party careers.\footnote{Frederick Fleron published a number of articles which focus upon this phenomenon at the all-union level. See, Frederick J. Fleron Jr., "Toward a Reconceptualisation of Political Change in the Soviet Union: The Political Leadership System," Comparative Politics, Vol. 1 (1969), pp. 228-44 and "Change in the Representation of Career Types in the Soviet Political Leadership System, 1952-1965," in Political Leadership in the USSR and Eastern Europe, ed. by R. Barry Farrell (Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., 1970), pp. 108-139.}
In the Belorussian case, at least insofar as obkom first secretaries are concerned there is no evidence of this trend. The typical obkom first secretary in Belorussia is a general political executive who was involved in the war and proceeded soon thereafter into full-time work either for the Komsomol or the party apparat. An exception to this general pattern is provided by the youngest of the obkom secretaries. V. A. Gvozdev is a co-opted specialist who was born in 1931 and graduated from the Belorussian Agricultural Academy in 1953. He worked first as an engineer on a Machine Tractor Station of which he subsequently became the director. Gvozdev became a member of the CPB in 1956 and seven years later began work as a party secretary at the raion level. He worked his way up to the first secretarysthip of the Gomel oblast in 1969.

The obkom secretaries, as a group, are individuals with wide political experience. They have had careers which show a history of geographic and political mobility. I. K. Poliakov's career is representative. He began his political career as a Komsomol secretary in Minsk oblast; from there he proceeded to be a second, then a first party secretary at the city level in Vitebsk; later he was transferred into governmental administration as Chairman of the oblishpolkom in Gomel oblast; next he became the first secretary for the Gomel obkom and later was transferred to the first party secretary position in Minsk oblast.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in the BSSR had three chairmen during the period investigated in this study. The career of one of these individuals, F. A. Surganov, was just discussed when we dealt with the secretaries to the CC of the CPB.
The other two individuals were V. I. Kozlov and S. O. Prititskii, each of whom died while serving as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Kozlov was a Belorussian of peasant origins. He was born in 1903 and became a party member in 1927. His career was that of a political generalist. He began work in the party apparatus in 1937 and shifted back and forth between party and government posts. He was appointed Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1948 and remained in the post until his death in 1967. His successor, Prititskii, also a Belorussian with peasant family origins was a longtime apparatchik with generalist skills. He began his political work as underground organizer for the Komsomol in 1932 in that part of western Belorussia which was then under Polish control. During the Second World War he was a Partisan and afterwards was appointed Komsomol second secretary. He then moved to be second secretary and subsequently first party secretary in Grodno oblast. Prititskii was brought to the work in the central apparatus of the Belorussian Communist Party and then was dispatched again to work as a first secretary at the oblast level. Finally in 1968 he was appointed Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and as was noted before died while holding that position.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers in the BSSR during the entire period investigated in this study was T. Ia. Kiselev. Kiselev is a Belorussian of peasant origins born in 1917 in Gomel oblast. Like Masherov his formal education prepared him to be a teacher. In the Soviet context, this also serves as background training for officials who make their careers performing ideological work for the party. Kiselev's
first full-time political work was in this field beginning in 1944. He had graduated from the Gomel Teachers' Training Institute in 1941 and had acted as director of a secondary school from 1941 to 1944. He then attended the Higher Party School of the CC - CPSU and graduated in 1946. Kiselev returned to Belorussia to work in Brest oblast first as a party instructor and then as a secretary. Kiselev apparently demonstrated talents as a party organizer as well as in ideological work and his subsequent political career was that of a generalist executive. He worked in the central apparat of the CPB in Minsk from 1948 to 1952 and then was transferred to Brest oblast as first party secretary. He was promoted directly from that position to the post of second secretary with membership in the Politburo of the Belorussian CP in 1956. In 1959 Kiselev was transferred to the post of Chairman of Council of Ministers and held this position down through the period surveyed here and beyond until he succeeded P. Masherov as first secretary of the Belorussian CP.

Some other government officials' career will be examined briefly. Vladimir Lobanok is first deputy chairman of the Belorussian Council of Ministers, responsible for agriculture. He, too, is a Belorussian born into a peasant family and has his higher education in the field of agriculture. After wartime leadership of a partisan brigade he moved steadily up the party and governmental hierarchies serving in executive positions as both an obkom first secretary and oblispolkom chairman prior to taking up work as Minister of Production and Procurement of Agricultural Products.

The Minister for Agriculture, a Russian, S. G. Skoropanov, has had a much more restricted or specialized career. Skoropanov is an
agricultural specialist, a professor who became a Presidium member and Academic Secretary of the Department of Pedology and Soil Amelioration of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences. He has served as Minister for Agriculture since 1962. Similarly, L. I. Khitrun's career is of the specialist type. Each of his major posts has been in the agricultural sphere in the governmental apparatus working first in the Belorussian SSR, as Chairman of the Sel'khoztekhnika ministry, then as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers BSSR, and then being elevated to the all-union government in Moscow. The same holds true for the highly specialized career of A. V. Aleksankin, Minister of Land Reclamation whose career seems have been spent entirely in this area. It was not possible to establish conclusively the nationality of either of these last mentioned officials.

The Belorussian Agricultural Elite: Aggregate Data Analysis

As was noted previously, the elite sample considered here consists of those individuals with some responsibility for the administration of agricultural affairs and who have attained membership on the Central Committee or the Central Auditing Commission of the Belorussian CP. In the concluding section of this chapter, the results of an analysis of aggregate data bearing upon the backgrounds and career patterns of this elite will be set out.¹ Full-time party and government officials, and directors of especially important agri-

cultural enterprises form the bulk of this elite. Altogether it was possible to compile information related to the backgrounds of sixty-one individuals. Information about the elite's background and career patterns were available for a number of variables. The more important of these were: (1) Date of Birth; (2) Date of Party Entry; (3) Sex; (4) Nationality; (5) Social Origin; (6) Education; (7) Primary Occupation; (8) Political Status; (9) Career Specialization; (10) Geographic Mobility; (11) Political Mobility; (12) Representation on Central Party Bodies; (13) Representation on Central Government Bodies; (14) Inter-organizational Circulation Through Career.

Such are the marvels of modern computer technology that it was possible to regroup the information related to date of birth and party entry so as to set together groups of individuals and to thereby create the further variables: (15) Age Cohort; (16) Party Generation. Frequency distributions were made of all variables and then correlation matrices were utilized to ascertain relationships between specified variables. This was done in order to arrive at some conclusions about the sort of individuals who rise to positions of importance in the agricultural apparat of the Belorussian SSR.

1Acknowledgement must be made here to Dr. Peter J. Potichnyj in whose graduate seminar in Soviet politics at McMaster University I began study of the Soviet elite and who developed the coding form which was modified for use in this study. Potichnyj, in turn, it perhaps should be mentioned, made clear his substantial indebtedness to B. Lewytskyj of Munich, S. Bialer of Columbia University, and Grey H. Hodnett, then of York University. The codebook denoteing all the variables and their individual values is included as an appendix to this chapter.

2This was done in clear recognition of Dankwart Rustow's stricture that "a study of social background can furnish clues for a study of political performance but that the first cannot substitute for the second." D. Rustow, "The Study of Elites: Who's Who, When and How," World Politics, Vol. XVIII (July, 1966), p. 699.
Gender

The subject of women's lot in the Soviet system is one which has attracted a considerable amount of recent scholarly attention. One gathers from these studies that the liberation of Soviet women long ago reached an impasse. While the role of women in the economy has changed substantially during the years of Soviet power, the political role of women has not altered so dramatically. This is not to say that there has not been change in the rate of women's political participation but it is to point to the continuing absence of women in positions of important political leadership in the Soviet political system. The Belorussian pattern is unexceptional in the Soviet context. Women are represented in significant numbers in local soviets and there is evidence that, to a notable extent, they are active in spheres such as administration and education and public health. They are not prominent, however, in the political elite as it has been operationalized for this inquiry. Just two members of the elite are female and no one of them is in a strategically important agricultural decision-making position. The elite, then, is to a very considerable extent a male-dominated one.

1 Just a couple of the more important titles of recent studies will be mentioned here. For an interesting collection of articles, see D. Atkinson, A. Dallin and G. Lapidus (eds.), Women in Russia (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1977). The following work seems to have won such high recognition that it will serve as the benchmark for all future work on this subject. See, G. Lapidus, Women in Soviet Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

Social Origin

The relationship between political and social stratification is a persistent concern in elite studies. Analysts are concerned to discover whether important political offices are the preserve of a social minority or if they are open to the population at large. The overall Soviet elite as was mentioned earlier, generally claim to either worker or peasant backgrounds. The Belorussian agricultural elite, we discovered, conforms to the general Soviet pattern. It was not possible to determine the origins of nine members of the sample but thirty-six of the remainder were said to have peasant family backgrounds, fifteen had industrial proletarian origins while just one figure was the offspring of a member of the technical intelligentsia. The rather high proportion of the elite stemming from the peasantry is, on the face of it, slightly anomalous. As the Belorussian peasantry has shrunk relative to other elements in the social structure with economic modernization, so has its share of the party's membership declined.¹ The elite, then, is to some extent distinct from the mass membership of the party in a sociological sense.² This seems somewhat odd in a society where the industrial proletariat holds to a formally honoured position. When one bears in mind, however, the relatively recent changes in Soviet social structure with the country becoming predominantly urban in the 1970's, the fact that so many of the elite have rural backgrounds is less disconcerting.

¹Kompartiia Belorussii v tsifrakh," Kommunist Belorussii, No. 8 (1968), p. 35.

Further, our sample is composed of that segment of the Belorussian elite whose jobs are in some way related to the agricultural sector of the economy.

**Primary Occupation**

The elite population is, not unexpectedly, one marked by upward social mobility. Hence, when we consult the information available on the non-political professions or vocations of the elite we discover that most of them hold positions which required some form of specialist training. Hence, while the bulk of the elite may have issued from proletarian or peasant families; they, themselves, generally became members of the intelligentsia. Just six members of the elite were industrial or agricultural workers prior to taking up work in the party apparatus and beginning careers which carried them into the elite. Most of the remainder had vocations which qualified them for membership in the intelligentsia--18.0 percent, for example were engineers; 19.7 percent agronomists and 22.9 percent teachers or researchers.

**Career Specialization**

While many of the elite draw upon the specialized training of their primary occupations after they are members of the elite, it is not unusual in the Soviet context for an individual to pursue an elite occupation which is radically divorced from his primary one. The most important members of the elite are executives and the executive generally performs his work by getting others to do theirs. The higher a member is in the elite the more likely it is that his elite occupational pattern will be one where he will have exercised general
executive skills rather than the specialized ones of a technocrat. As J. W. Cleary has maintained in an analysis of the elite in Kazakhstan, it is feasible in the Soviet context to subdivide the political elite into a line and a staff elite.

Line units could be defined as those organizing the attainment of society's collective goals, by deciding when, where and how available resources (in the broadest sense) are to be utilized. Staff units would then be concerned with providing facilities and means for attaining these goals.¹

Cleary goes on to suggest that at the union-republican level the line elite is made up of those who staff the positions of Central Committee secretaries, obkom first secretaries, obispolkom chairmen, the chairmen and deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers, and the chairman of the Presidium of the union republican Supreme Soviet. The staff elite is composed principally of ministers within the Council of Ministers, the heads of State Committees subordinate to the Council of Ministers and heads of Central Committee departments.²

There are ascertainable differences in the career patterns of the two types of elites. There is a higher frequency of interchange, for example, among the line elite than among the staff elite. The staff elite, then, have careers which develop within a more restricted range, and are therefore more specialized, than that of the line elite. The line elite's occupations do not coincide with organizational lines. Rather, they move from work in one organizational apparat to another.


²Ibid., pp. 333-35. Cleary's comment on the inclusion of ministers from the Council of Ministers in this particular category is worth citing. "If the inclusion of the latter (ministers) appears odd, it should be remembered that ministers in the Soviet system are not the counterparts of ministers in a cabinet system; they are better likened to permanent secretaries..." p. 335.
where they have to employ their general supervisory abilities. Upon examining the aggregate data on the elite we discover that eighteen of them can be identified as members of the staff elite category and thirty-four as members of the line elite. The information available on the other members of the elite was too scanty to assign them with confidence to either category. There were only three members of the sample whose career specialization was of the type George Fischer has found to be so significant for party executives involved in the supervision of the industrial sector of the economy.

George Fischer closely analyzed the career patterns of three hundred and six high-ranking Party executives and found that four principal career patterns could be discerned in the mass of information he had accumulated:

Dual Executives: party executives (with or without technical training) who as a rule did extensive (four years or more) work of two kinds within the economy, technical work and party work, prior to getting a top party post.

Technicians: party executives (with or without technical training) who did extensive technical work, but not extensive party work, within the economy.

Hybrid Executives: party executives who received technical training but had no extensive technical work in the economy.

Officials: party executives whose careers include neither technical training nor extensive work in the economy.¹

Fischer discerned further that the Dual Executives were becoming increasingly prominent in the overall Soviet political elite. The implications of this trend, in Fischer's estimation are far-reaching. It is his argument that the Soviet Union is experiencing much less difficulty in finessing the transition to modernity than many of his

colleagues suppose. Fischer is particularly concerned to combat the notion that political pluralism is a necessary feature of modern industrial societies. He insists that if the Soviet elite is able to continue to recruit and promote technically skilled individuals whose primary loyalty is to the Party, then the Soviet Union will continue to be stable politically. Indeed, he suggests that the Soviets are pioneering, as an alternate to pluralist systems, a new model of modern industrial society, which he terms monism. 1 "The monist model holds for a social order in which all power is public power. Such public power rests in the state." 2 The bulk of the Belorussian line elite from this sample appears to fall into Fischer's hybrid-elite category.

It will be recalled that Frederick Fleron's analysis of trends in the all-union central committee pointed to the ever heightening importance of co-opted specialists in the political elite. 3 Fleron's operationalization of the co-opted specialist concept which required a completed higher education and seven years of work in one's vocation prior to an active political career was followed in this study. It was possible to ascertain that only eight of the sample fell into this category. This is not an especially significant number, just over thirteen percent of the sample but it is worth noting that six of these individuals were the more recent recruits to the elite entering in either the 1966 or 1971 central committees but not present in that of 1961.

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1 Ibid., pp. 133-153.
2 Ibid., p. ix.
3 Supra., p. 215.
Education

The possibility of shaping "consciousness" through the educational system was a beckoning one for many of the Bolshevik leaders after the Russian Revolution. They were not able to agree, however, how to best achieve this end. As a consequence, the orientation of the educational system altered several times as one or another group gained the upper hand.\(^1\) Finally, in the early 1930's the priorities in education which exist to the present were set. Technical education with a strong emphasis upon engineering was favoured strongly. All earlier radical experimentation in pedagogy and administration of education was scrapped and a hierarchical meritocratic educational system gradually was consolidated.\(^2\) Great emphasis has been placed upon higher education in the Soviet system and the overall membership of the Party which is supposed to serve as the leading and guiding force in Soviet society has become an elite, in a sense, as we have seen already relative to the general population with regard to educational attainment. This applies with even greater force to the elite. The Belorussian political elite is made up overwhelmingly of individuals with post-secondary educational credentials.

\(^1\) A model study recently has been published which carefully analyzes the forces which shaped the educational system and the social impact this system exerted. See Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921-1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

\(^2\) The remarks compress ruthlessly a complex sequence of events. The years of transition extend up to the late 1930's and then in the early 1940's everything was thrown akimbo by the Nazi invasion and the turmoil of World War II. Kendall E. Bailes economically describes and analyzes developments in education through much of this period in his *Technology and Society Under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of Technical Intelligentsia, 1917-1941* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 216-261.
There was only one member of the elite sample who did not have post-secondary schooling. Of the remainder, ten had university degrees, nine were graduates of technical institutes, eleven received degrees from agricultural institutes and eighteen attended the Higher Party School. Nine members of the sample had received both a higher academic education and received instruction as well from the Central Committee's Higher Party School in Moscow.

Nationality

Investigation of the national origins of a political elite in a multi-national state is a subject which needs little justification in an epoch during which minority nationalisms have flourished. The Soviet Union is, of course, one of the world's most complex and varied states in the world from the standpoint of its ethnic composition. Fifteen separate nationalities have union republics named for them and the union republics in turn contain diverse minority nationalities.

The sample was made up of forty-four Belorussians (72.1 percent), nine Russians (14.8 percent), one Ukrainian (1.6 percent), one Jew and there were six individuals (9.8 percent) whose nationality could not be identified. This balance conforms very roughly with the representation of nationalities within the CPB. In the chapter to follow this one, the significance of national origins will be discussed more fully.
Regional Postings

The career record of seventeen of the figures in the elite indicated that they had held positions in the western oblasts of the BSSR. This region, as was noted earlier in Chapter Two, was incorporated into the USSR initially as a result of the Molotov-von Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 and the territory was lost and then regained during the Second World War. The full incorporation of this territory, then, did not truly begin until the post-war period. Hence, it is a more politically sensitive region than eastern Belorussia. Of the seventeen individuals in our sample who held posts in this region we find the top-most figures in the elite. Thus, Kirill Mazurov, P. Masharov and T.Ia Kiselev all had postings in western Belorussia. No strong or clear findings emerge with regard to whether local cadres held posts of responsibility or whether those born and trained elsewhere are "parachuted" into the region. Of the seventeen individuals in question, it was not possible to establish the place of origin for five, another five are natives of the western oblasts and seven others were dispatched to western Belorussia from other regions.

Age and Generations

Karl Mannheim's work, which can be ranked among the more important efforts of twentieth century sociology, drew attention many years ago to the importance of analyzing age groupings in a given country's social structure. He suggested in an essay on generations that individuals in the same age group "have a common location in the social and historical process" and they thereby are limited "to a specific range of potential experience, predisposing them for a certain
characteristic mode of thought and experience, and a characteristic type of historically relevant action.\textsuperscript{1} It is only in very recent past that research on generations has been pursued intensively.\textsuperscript{2} A number of prominent specialists in the study of Soviet society and politics recently have been persuaded as well of the importance of analyzing the succession of generations in the Soviet political system.\textsuperscript{3}


\textsuperscript{2}Important research carried out in the American and European settings indicates that certain experiences have a differential effect upon the attitudes of separate generations in a society. The Great Depression, for example, seemingly affected those who were young in the 1930's from the population of the United States to a greater extent than older members of the society. Relatedly, Ronald Inglehart has demonstrated that Western European youth's political attitudes has been affected more by post-war affluence than older members of those societies. See, Angus Campbell \textit{et al.}, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 90, and R. Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 4 (December, 1971), pp. 991-1067.

TABLE VI:14
AGE COHORTS IN THE BELORUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL ELITE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>No. of Individuals in Cohort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901-1908</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909-1916</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917-1924</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-1932</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-1940</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-1948</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first cohort has been discussed more than any other in general studies of the Soviet elite because it is the one which fortuitously came of age to pursue careers when the ranks of bureaucracy had been thinned because of Stalin's purges. Sometimes termed "the Brezhnev generation" it contains individuals who rose meteorically in the Soviet bureaucracy. With regard to our specific sample, we find important members of the elite, such as the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the BSSR and the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, in this cohort but not the top-most members such as the Party secretaries or the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. They are to be found in the next cohort which is composed of individuals born between 1909 and 1916. This generation is

more mixed in character. Its oldest members had an opportunity to
rise rapidly during the purge if they graduated from college at an
early age, while the youngest barely had a chance to graduate from
college before the outbreak of the war. Indeed, many of the latter
had not completed their education by 1941, and essentially were
thrust upward during the war.1

The next cohort came to their young adulthood in wartime. The bio-
ographies of many indicate that they were wartime Partisans. The
Partisan experience must have been an important one for these
individuals.2 Belorussia was devastated by the Nazi invasion. Two
hundred and nine of its cities and district centres were destroyed as
were ninety-two hundred of its villages.3 Service in World War II,
John Armstrong conjectures, probably instilled a strong sense of
the expendability of human life on the part of the Soviet elite.4 We
are not speaking, here, however, of a remote push-button war and those
with Partisan experience, in particular, are likely to have an acute
sense of war's human costs. The remainder of the elite fall into a

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1 Ibid., p. 6

2 John Armstrong underlines the modest nature of the Partisan
effort in his, The Politics of Totalitarianism (New York: Random
House, 1961), pp. 160-64. Nonetheless, one senses that involvement
in a resistance effort would lead to the development of a special
bond for those concerned. The Partisan experience figures prominently
in the writings of Vasil Bykov, a contemporary Belorussian writer who
has raised the ire of Soviet cultural watchdogs on more than one
occasion. See V. Bykov, "Kruglianskiy most," Novyi mir (1969), pp. 33-
57, and "Volch'ia stat'a," Novyi mir (1974). The latter appears in
My attention was drawn to Bykov's fiction by a brief notice given of
his work in the excellent study by Deming Brown, Soviet Russian
Literature Since Stalin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979),
pp. 277-78.

3 S. P. Margunskii, Belorussiia v Soiuze Sovetskikh Respublik
k 50 letiju obrazovaniiia SSSR (Minsk: "Nauka i tekhnika," 1972),
p. 261.

post-war generation in the sense that they were too young to participate in the war. They matured in a country undergoing an intensive and extensive reconstruction effort and probably have lingering memories of immediate post-war privations which contrast with the relative well-being of the contemporary epoch.

It is important in the Soviet case to take into account not only the individual's biological age but his "political age" as well which is measured according to the year in which the given individual joined the Party. The Party's history, like the country of which it is so central a part, has been a turbulent one. Students of this subject maintain that there are cohorts of party members whose periods of party entry, which is a basic formative time in one's political career, differ markedly. The year that the individual members of the elite joined the Party was ascertainable in all cases. Five of the elite joined the Party before 1929 which was the period prior to Stalin's acquisition of full control over the machinery of the Party. Seven joined during the tumultuous period from 1929 to 1936 when the campaign for collectivization for agriculture was launched and the first Five Year Plan was initiated. Fourteen of the elite sample entered the Party between 1937 and 1940 which was the period when the Stalinist purges reached their climax and the possibility of war loomed ever longer. Nineteen members of the elite sample entered the Party during the Second World War; nine became Party Members during the post-war years prior to Stalin's death and seven more members of the sample became members of the CPSU in the year after Stalin's death.
On the Interrelationships of Social Background and Career Development Variables

A crosstabulation of the generation or cohort variable with that of educational attainment revealed the following results. (See Table 15). The pattern which emerges here is probably typical in the Soviet system at large. The oldest cohort was drawn into the higher educational system at a critical juncture. Moshe Lewin, one of the leading contemporary students of Soviet society, and one who is particularly knowledgeable about the early political development of the USSR, points out that at the time period in question:

Tentatively, it is possible to speak of an initial period of "proletarianization" (or produktsionnyj), with workers being preferred, pushed into universities, schools and administrations, by vydvizhenie (lifting up) and special mobilizations. Parallel to this process went spetsnezdvo, baiting and attacking educated specialists, the transformation of academics and universities into "production brigades" with an overwhelming emphasis on social origins. In fact, universities were to be almost suppressed to make way for more production oriented vuzy (institutions of higher learning)—an attitude which was to be reversed only in about 1934.1

This cohort was made up of young individuals who were drafted into the system of higher education to become in short order technical specialists to replace the so-called "bourgeois-specialists" in the administration of the state and the economy. It was a time of massive, given the resources of the state, support for education of the socially humble. The technical educations received were rudimentary and narrow in their design but many of the graduates took advantage of the great career possibilities which opened up for them.

TABLE VI:15
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENTS OF BELORUSSIAN ELITE AGE COHORTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years of Birth</td>
<td>1901-1908</td>
<td>1909-1916</td>
<td>1917-1924</td>
<td>1925-1932</td>
<td>1933-1940</td>
<td>1941-1948</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Totals</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>56 Overall Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The next two cohorts in our sample have a striking number of individuals who have only Higher Party education. This, too, is of a piece with overall Soviet development for these cohorts came of age for higher education under different circumstances.

The recruitment of workers to offices was formally forbidden at the end of 1930, and later recruitment to vuzy became again a matter of some ability and preparation. A temporary halt of the cruder forms of spetseestvo also occurred at this time, and as the plans to discipline the workers in the factories, the peasants in the kolkhozy and the officials in the offices unfolded, in conditions when the workforce doubled and sometimes trebled, a new strategy for instilling stability, raising productivity and mastering the human disorder and flux was adopted, which entailed creating a new strong layer of bosses. Such an "elitarist" policy, not without its baffling reversals, continued to be supplemented from 1934 on by the conservative social policies of "the great retreat"—a set of classical measures of social conservatism, law and order strategies, complete with a nationalist revival, trying to instil values of discipline, patriotism, conformism, authority and orderly careerism.¹

In the face of the "great retreat" and then the tumult of the War it became more difficult to acquire a regular full-time education. Hence, the trend towards higher party education only. Those who did receive full-time day college educations, however, were receiving training which became increasingly rigorous. The individuals in the sample who were too young to participate in the war tend to have completed higher educations whose calibre probably surpasses that of their seniors.

Crosstabulation of the party generation variable with nationality and social origin highlights a segment of the elite which warrants brief comment.

¹M. Lewin, op. cit., p. 155.
### TABLE VI:16

NATIONALITY OF BELORUSSIAN CP AGE COHORTS OR "GENERATIONS"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Generation (period of entry into party)</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<td>Russian</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Jew</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre 1929</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-1936</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937-1940</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-1945</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1952</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post 1952</td>
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</table>

### TABLE VI:17

SOCIAL ORIGIN OF BELORUSSIAN CP AGE COHORTS OR "GENERATIONS"

<table>
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<th>Party Generation</th>
<th>Social Origin</th>
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<th>Technical Intelligentsia</th>
<th>Row Totals</th>
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<td>Peasant</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post 1952</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Belorussian Party apparatus like that in the other union republics was decimated by a purge launched in 1937. As was noted earlier in Chapter Two, the purge was aimed first at those accused of the sin of nationalism and those Belorussians who moved quickly into the elite as a result of the purge would be especially sensitive about expressions of nationalism. As can be seen Table 16 the largest single component of Belorussians in the party generation are those who joined the Party in the period from 1937 to 1940. The table on social origin indicates that this group was largely peasant by background.

Zygmunt Bauman, an emigre Polish sociologist, has argued for some years now that Western researchers have failed to realize the extent to which the mores of Communist party membership have been influenced by ambitious off-spring of the peasantry eager to make careers and secure social advancement.

Information on a number of aspects of the elite's career development were collected. The hierarchy of party and state offices were ranked into categories of high, medium and low political status and the interval between joining the Party and attaining a position of

---

1 Leonard Schapiro, op. cit., p. 482. The purge is customarily labelled the "Yezhovschina" for Yezhov, who Stalin chose to be its director as head of the security service. A continuation of the purge eventually swallowed its eponymous former supervisor.

high status was measured. Six individuals or 9/6 percent of the sample were classed as low in political status, thirty individuals or 49.2 percent were of the middle rank and 41.0 (twenty-five individuals) were ranked as high in political status. The bureaucratization of political careers in the Soviet context is brought out when one notices that 49.2 percent of those who made it to positions of high status took sixteen to twenty years to do so while another 22.0 percent of the high political status category worked for eleven to fifteen years before reaching that rank. When the generational factor is taken into account, one finds that the largest single cluster of individuals (twelve or 48.0 percent) are from the 1909 to 1916 generation whose formative political experiences were described earlier. This group subdivides into a segment of five who joined the Party in the period from 1929 to 1936 which has been described so graphically by Lewin in a passage cited earlier and another lot of seven who joined in the wake of the "Yezhovschchina." (For full details check Tables 18 and 19).

Elite Turnover

Elite turnover is a subject to which the investigator's attention is naturally drawn. When we examine the occupancy of some of the leading offices in the Belorusian agricultural decision-making complex we find a moderate pattern of turnover. During the period that

The operationalization of the variable political status is set out in Appendix B which follows this chapter. Thanks are owed to Dr. R. Blackwell who sent me a listing of the cut-off points he is employing to separate individuals into different political ranks in a current research project on the Soviet elite. These criteria were modified for use here.
### TABLE VI:18
CROSSTABULATION OF GENERATION BY ELITE STATUS

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<td>23</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>61</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

|        | 11.5%     | 32.8%     | 37.7%     | 0%        | 14.8%     | 3.3%      | 100%   |

### TABLE VI:19
CROSSTABULATION OF PARTY GENERATION BY ELITE STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Generation (Defined by Period of Party Entry)</th>
<th>Prior to 29</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>Post 1952</th>
<th>Row 1952</th>
<th>Totals</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Totals</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|        | 8.2%      | 11.5%    | 2.3%  | 31.1% | 14.8% | 11.5%     | 100%      |
this study is concerned with, 1964 to 1971, two individuals served as Party's agricultural secretary in the union republican central committee secretariat—F. A. Surganov and V. F. Mitskevitch. Three individuals—G. A. Filippov, V. I. Bavrin and N. A. Sukhii served as head of the Central Committee's agriculture department. P. S. Adamovich was head of the Food Industry Department of the Party's central committee for the entire period we are concerned with. Similarly, just one individual occupied the position of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers responsible for agriculture. V. E. Lobanok is the individual who served in this important administrative role. S. G. Skoropanov was Minister of Agriculture throughout the period analyzed here. One individual, A. V. Aleksankin and two, L. I. Khitrun and B. M. Pozharskii, respectively, served as Minister for Land Reclamation and Chairman of Belsel'khoztekhnika (the government agency responsible for supply and repair of agricultural machinery). There was, in addition, one minister of the food industry, A. I. Erei, and two ministers for the meat and dairy industry, V. K. Shamgin and V. I. Bavrin, for the period we are concerned with.

While there has been a stable set of leading cadres discernable in our sample, individuals in the party and government bureaucracy do not enjoy iron-clad security. In fact, as the very knowledgeable French Societologist, Basile Kerblay, has pointed out Soviet political careers are attendant still with risks and positions are not definitely acquired. ¹ The overall membership of the Central Committee

of the Belorussian CP changed on the following order during the period we analyzed. Seventy new members won full membership to the Central Committee of 1971 which succeeded that of 1965 and sixty-nine members lost their full membership. Forty-five new candidate members were "elected" and thirty-one failed to win re-election. Of the forty-one new candidate members there were four who previously were full members of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Party. Confining our attention more narrowly to the agricultural elite sample analyzed here we find twenty-one individuals received promotions which brought them up to the elite level as defined for this study during the period of time which was focused upon and there were thirteen who were demoted from the elite or who died during that span.

Casting a look back at the information compiled about Belorussia's political elite, we find that the elite base has been strengthened throughout the period studied in the sense that the party's membership has increased substantially. Two noteworthy features of this expansion in party membership from the standpoint of the problems under review in this study are that to a modest degree the proportion of Belorussians and of individuals with advanced agricultural educations has increased. Narrowing our vision to the elite, as defined earlier, it appears that the elite is a relatively well-educated group, and it promises to become ever more so in view of the fact that younger members of the elite tend to have better formal education. The elite membership was relatively stable and was particularly so for those in the more important positions during
the period under consideration in this study. The elite are internally fragmented, to some degree, in the sense that there are social cleavages such as national and social origin which formally separate people but there are a number of shared ties as well. A key group within the elite have the shared experience of having been involved as Partisans during the Second World War and thirteen of them worked within the Komsomol apparatus before undertaking work in the party. In addition, they all share the predicament that regional economic performance is one of the most important criteria in judging their individual effectiveness and these judgements, in turn, have obvious bearing on the career chances of the elite's members.

It is the view of this writer that the ties that bind are more important than the cleavages which fragment or divide. The elite while not formidably impressive can arguably be viewed as a relatively coherent and effective group in the Soviet context.
Appendix A

Coding Form For Elite Data

1) Identification Number [Columns 1,2,3]

2) Card Sequence Number [Column 4]

3) Age (Year of Birth) [Columns 5,6] Variable 1

4) Party Age (Year of Party Entry) [Columns 7,8] Variable 2

5) Sex [Column 9] (1) M (2) F Variable 3

6) Nationality [Columns 10,11] Variable 4
   00 Missing Information
   01 Belorussian
   02 Russian
   03 Ukrainian
   04 Pole
   05 Jew
   06 Other Nationality

7) Social Origin [Columns 12,13] Variable 5
   00 Missing Information
   01 Workers' begat
   02 Peasant's begat
   03 Technical Intelligentsia
   04 Creative Intelligentsia

8) Education and Higher Degrees [Columns 14,15] Variable 6
   00 Missing Information
   01 No higher education
   02 Unfinished higher education
   03 Finished higher (liberal)
   04 Finished higher (technical) university
   05 Finished higher (mechanical institute other than agriculture)
   06 Agricultural Institute
   07 Military Education
   08 Higher Party School
   09 Higher Party School and finished higher academic education
9) Non Political Profession or Vocation [Columns 16, 17]  
Variable 7

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<td>Agricultural worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Industrial (or related) engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Agronomist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Teacher-researcher-science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Teacher-researcher-nonscience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Doctor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Fine arts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Non-professional/white collar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>General executive</td>
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10) Identification by Party Status [Columns 18, 19]  
Variable 8
All Union Level (1961)

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>C.C. Cand. member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>C.A.C. Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Politburo full</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Politburo cand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Sec. and Politburo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
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11) Identification by Party Status [Columns 20, 21]  
Variable 9
All Union Level (1966)

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<td>C.C. full member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>C.C. Cand. member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>C.A.C. member</td>
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<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Politburo full</td>
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<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Politburo cand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Sec. and Politburo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
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<td>08</td>
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12) Identification by Party Status [Columns 22,23] Variable 10
   All Union Level (1971)
   00 Missing Information
   01 C.C. full member
   02 C.C. Cand. member
   03 C.A.C. member
   04 Politburo full
   05 Politburo cand.
   06 Sec. and Politburo
   07 Secretariat
   08 None of these

   UR Level (1961)
   01 C.C. full
   02 C.C. cand.
   03 C.A.C.
   04 Politburo full
   05 Politburo cand.
   06 Politburo full and secretariat
   07 Politburo cand. and secretariat
   08 Secretariat
   09 None of the above

14) Identification by Party Status [Columns 26,27] Variable 12
   UR Level (1966)
   01 C.C. full
   02 C.C. cand.
   03 C.A.C.
   04 Politburo full
   05 Politburo cand.
   06 Politburo full and secretariat
   07 Politburo cand. and secretariat
   08 Secretariat
   09 None of the above

15) Identification by Party Status [Columns 28,29] Variable 13
   UR Level (1971)
   01 C.C. full
   02 C.C. cand.
   03 C.A.C.
   04 Politburo full
   05 Politburo cand.
   06 Politburo full and secretariat
   07 Politburo cand. and secretariat
   08 Secretariat
   09 None of the above
16) Identification by Position When Elected to [Columns 30,31]
   Above Mentioned All Union Status (1961) Variable 14
   01 Secretary (agricultural) Regional
   02 Secretary (industrial) Regional
   03 Departmental Chief (agricultural) Regional
   04 Departmental Chief (industrial) Regional
   05 Central party apparat functionary
   06 General Secretary (central)
   07 General Secretary (Bel. S.S.R.)
   08 Second Secretary (Bel. S.S.R.)
   09 Secretary (Bel. S.S.R.) and Politburo
   10 Obkom Institute Secretary
   11 Obkom Secretary
   12 Secretary of City Gorkom
   13 Military Estimation
   14 Police
   15 Diplomatic Corps
   16 Komsomol
   17 Chairman Council of Ministers (Bel. S.S.R.)
   18 Deputy Chairman (Bel. S.S.R.)
   19 Minister Council of Ministers
   20 Deputy Chairman Council of Ministers, B.S.S.R.
   21 None of above/not relevant

17) Identification by Position When Elected to [Columns 32,33]
   Above Mentioned All Union Status (1966) Variable 15
   01 Secretary (agricultural) Regional
   02 Secretary (industrial) Regional
   03 Departmental Chief (agricultural) Regional
   04 Departmental Chief (industrial) Regional
   05 Central party apparat functionary
   06 General Secretary (central)
   07 General Secretary (Bel. S.S.R.)
   08 Second Secretary (Bel. S.S.R.)
   09 Secretary (Bel. S.S.R.) and Politburo
   10 Obkom Institute Secretary
   11 Obkom Secretary
   12 Secretary of City Gorkom
   13 Military Estimation
   14 Police
   15 Diplomatic Corps
   16 Komsomol
   17 Chairman Council of Ministers (Bel. S.S.R.)
   18 Deputy Chairman (Bel. S.S.R.)
   19 Minister Council of Ministers
   20 Deputy Chairman Council of Ministers, B.S.S.R.
   21 None of above/not relevant
18) Identification by Position When Elected to [Columns 34,35] Above Mentioned All’Union Status (1971) Variable 16

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<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Secretary (industrial)</td>
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<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Departmental Chief (agricultural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Departmental Chief (industrial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Central party apparat functionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>General Secretary (central)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>General Secretary (Bel. S.S.R.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Second Secretary (Bel. S.S.R.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Secretary (Bel. S.S.R.) and Politburo</td>
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<td>Obkom Institute Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Obkom Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Secretary of City Gorkom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Military Estimation</td>
</tr>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Diplomatic Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Komsomol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Chairman Council of Ministers (Bel. S.S.R.)</td>
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<td>Secretary (industrial)</td>
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<td>03</td>
<td>Dept. Chief (agricultural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Dept. Chief (industrial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>C.C. apparat functionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
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<td>07</td>
<td>Sec. Secretary</td>
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<td>Obkom Secretary</td>
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<td>City Sec. or Raikom Sec.</td>
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<td>Mil. Est.</td>
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<td>Police (law enforcement apparat)</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Diplomatic Corps</td>
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<td>Komsomol apparat</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Journalism apparat</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Trade Union apparat</td>
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<td>Chairman Council of Ministers</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman Council of Ministers</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Industrial Official (e.g., factory dir.)</td>
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<td>Educational Official</td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>None of above/not relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Council of Ministers functionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Labour aristocracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Chairman Pres. of S.S.B.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Member Pres. of S.S.B.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Oblispolkom Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Chairman C.A.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Dept. Chairman Minister Council of Ministers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20) Position Occupied When Elected to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Secretary (agricultural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Secretary (industrial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Dept. Chief (agricultural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Dept. Chief (industrial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>C.C. apparat functionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Sec. Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Obkom 1st Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Obkom Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>City Sec. of Raikom Sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mil. Est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Police (law enforcement apparat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Diplomatic Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Komsomol apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Journalism apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Trade Union apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Chairman Council of Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman Council of Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Minister Council of Ministers (agricultural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Minister Council of Ministers (non-agricultural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Agricultural Official (e.g., sovkhoz dir.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Industrial Official (e.g., factory dir.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Educational Official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Worker (agricultural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Worker (industrial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Scientist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>None of above/not relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Council of Ministers functionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Labour aristocracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Chairman Pres. of S.S.B.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Member Pres. of S.S.B.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Oblispolkom Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Chairman C.A.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Dept. Chairman Minister Council of Ministers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
21) Position Occupied When Elected to Above Mentioned U.R. Status (1971) Variable 19

| 01 | Secretary (agricultural) |
| 02 | Secretary (industrial)   |
| 03 | Dept. Chief (agricultural) |
| 04 | Dept. Chief (industrial)  |
| 05 | C.C. apparat functionary  |
| 06 | General Secretary         |
| 07 | Sec. Secretary            |
| 08 | Obkom 1st Secretary       |
| 09 | Obkom Secretary           |
| 10 | City Sec. of Raikom Sec.  |
| 11 | Mil. Est.                 |
| 12 | Police (law enforcement apparat) |
| 13 | Diplomatic Corps          |
| 14 | Komsomol apparat          |
| 15 | Journalism apparat        |
| 16 | Trade Union apparat       |
| 17 | Chairman Council of Ministers |
| 18 | Deputy Chairman Council of Ministers |
| 19 | Minister Council of Ministers (agricultural) |
| 20 | Minister Council of Ministers (non-agricultural) |
| 21 | Agricultural Official (e.g., sovkhoz dir.) |
| 22 | Industrial Official (e.g., factory dir.) |
| 23 | Educational Official      |
| 24 | Worker (agricultural)     |
| 25 | Worker (industrial)       |
| 26 | Scientist                 |
| 27 | None of above/not relevant |
| 28 | Council of Ministers functionary |
| 29 | Labour aristocracy        |
| 30 | Chairman Pres. of S.S.B.S.S.R. |
| 31 | Member Pres. of S.S.B.S.S.R. |
| 32 | Oblispolkom Chairman      |
| 33 | Chairman C.A.C.           |
| 34 | Dept. Chairman Minister Council of Ministers |

22) Geographic Mobility [Columns 42,43] Variable 20

| 01 | All jobs Minsk |
| 02 | All jobs Brest |
| 03 | All jobs Grodno |
| 04 | All jobs Gomel |
| 05 | All jobs Mogilev |
| 06 | All jobs Vitebsk |
| 07 | 1 Obkom other than Minsk |
| 08 | 2 Obkoms other than Minsk |
| 09 | 3 Obkoms other than Minsk |
| 10 | 4 Obkoms other than Minsk |
| 11 | 5 Obkoms other than Minsk |
| 12 | Minsk then Moscow |
| 13 | Minsk to other U.R. capital |
22) Cont'd.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Not Relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Most jobs in oblast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Minsk then diplomatic corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Various oblasti</td>
</tr>
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</table>

23) 1st Recorded Job [Columns 44-45] Variable 21

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<thead>
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<tbody>
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<td>Low level, economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Low level, scientific, juridical, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Low level political (e.g., below raikom sec.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Intermediate level Party apparat (obkom worker, below secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Intermediate level Government administration (below obliispolkom chairman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Intermediate level Police and law apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Intermediate level Trade Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Intermediate level Diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Intermediate level Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Intermediate level Komsomol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>High level Party Apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>High level Government Apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>High level Police and law apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>High level Journalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>High level Diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>High level Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>High level Komsomol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>High level Educational Network</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24) 2nd Recorded Job [Columns 46-47] Variable 22

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
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<td>01</td>
<td>Low level, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Low level, scientific, juridical, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Low level political (e.g., below raikom sec.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Intermediate level Party apparat (obkom worker, below secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Intermediate level Government administration (below obliispolkom chairman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Intermediate level Police and law apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Intermediate level Trade Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Intermediate level Diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Intermediate level Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Intermediate level Komsomol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>High level Party Apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>High level Government Apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>High level Police and law apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>High level Journalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>High level Diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>High level Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>High level Komsomol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>High level Educational Network</td>
</tr>
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</table>
25) 3rd Recorded Job [Columns 48-49] Variable 23

<table>
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<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Low level, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Low level, scientific, juridical, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Low level political (e.g., below raikom sec.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Intermediate level Party apparat (obkom worker, below secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Intermediate level Government administration (below oblishpolkom chairman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Intermediate level Police and law apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Intermediate level Trade Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Intermediate level Diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Intermediate level Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Intermediate level Komsomol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>High level Party Apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>High level Government Apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>High level Police and law apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>High level Journalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>High level Diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>High level Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>High level Komsomol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>High level Educational Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>to indicate job unchanged</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

26) 4th Recorded Job [Columns 50-51] Variable 24

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Low level, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Low level, scientific, juridical, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Low level political (e.g., below raikom sec.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Intermediate level Party apparat (obkom worker, below secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Intermediate level Government administration (below oblishpolkom chairman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Intermediate level Police and law apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Intermediate level Trade Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Intermediate level Diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Intermediate level Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Intermediate level Komsomol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>High level Party Apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>High level Government Apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>High level Police and law apparat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>High level Journalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>High level Diplomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>High level Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>High level Komsomol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>High level Educational Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>to indicate job unchanged from 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
27) **5th Recorded Job** (Columns 52, 53) Variable 23
   01 Low level, etc.
   02 Low level, scientific, juridical, etc.
   03 Low level political (e.g., below raikom sec.)
   04 Intermediate level Party apparat (obkom worker, below secretary)
   05 Intermediate level Government administration (below obisplkom chairman)
   06 Intermediate level Police and law apparat
   07 Intermediate level Trade Union
   08 Intermediate level Diplomat
   09 Intermediate level Economic
   10 Intermediate level Komsomol
   11 High level Party Apparat
   12 High level Government Apparat
   13 High level Police and law apparat
   14 High level Journalism
   15 High level Diplomat
   16 High level Military
   17 High level Komsomol
   18 High level Educational Network
   19 to indicate job unchanged from 3
   20 to indicate job unchanged from 4

28) **Year Attained Recorded Job 1** (Columns 54, 55) Variable 26

29) **Year Attained Recorded Job 2** (Columns 56, 57) Variable 27

30) **Year Attained Recorded Job 3** (Columns 58, 59) Variable 28

31) **Year Attained Recorded Job 4** (Columns 60, 61) Variable 29

32) **Year Attained Recorded Job 5** (Columns 62, 63) Variable 30

33) **Interorganizational Circ. Through Career** (Columns 64, 65) Variable 31
   01 Only in party apparat
   02 Governmental administration
   03 P.A. and G.A. (low circ. 3)
   04 P.A. and G.A. (high circ.)
   06 Military and government administration
   07 Komsomol only
   08 Komsomol and G.A. and/or P.A.
   09 Police - law apparat only
   10 Policy and G.A. and/or P.A.
   11 Trade Unions only
   12 Trade Unions and G.A. and/or P.A.
   13 Non-organizational
   14 Party apparatus and Educational Network
   15 Party apparatus and diplomatic corps
34) Career Specialization by Ec. Sector [Columns 66,67] Variable 32
   01 pure agriculture
   02 pure industrial
   03 mix of agriculture and industrial
   04 non-economic
   05 service sector
   06 mix of agriculture and services

35) General Functional Identification
   01 line official (party apparat primarily)
   02 line official (government apparat primarily)
   03 line official (balance party and government)
   04 staff official (party apparat)
   05 staff official (government apparat)

36) Career Specialization
   01 Professional Politician (no higher education and party career)
   02 Adaptive Politician (higher education but less than 7 years in primary occupation)
   03 Cooptic Politician (higher education and at least 7 years in primary occupation prior to political career)

37) Political Status
   01 High
   02 Medium
   03 Low
APPENDIX B

Operationalization of Political Status Variable

High Positions

Party

First Secretary of Central Committee, C.P.B.
Full Member of Politburo of Central Committee, C.P.B.

Government

Chairman of the Council of Ministers, B.S.S.R.
Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet, B.S.S.R.

Party

Second Secretary of Republic Central Committee
Secretaries of Central Committee, C.P.B.
Candidate member of Politburo of Central Committee, C.P.B.

Government

First Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers, B.S.S.R.

Party

Chairman of Party Control Commission, C.P.B.

Government

Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers, B.S.S.R.

Medium Positions

Party

Deputy Chairman of Party Control Commission, C.P.B.
Department Head, Central Committee, C.P.B.
Chairman of Central Auditing Commission, C.P.B.
First Secretary of Obkom, or Gorkom of Minsk.

Government

Vice-President of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet, B.S.S.R.

Ministers

Minister of the B.S.S.R.
Chief of Main Administration, B.S.S.R.
Mass Organizations

Chairman of Republic Trade Union Council

Party

Apparatus work in the Central Committee, C.P.B.
Party Organizer, Instructor, Central Committee, C.P.B.
Section Head of Department of Central Committee, C.P.B.
Deputy Department Head of Central Committee, C.P.B.
Second Secretary or Secretary of Obkom
First Secretary of Gorkom — other than in Minsk

Government

Chief of Functional Division, B.S.S.R.
Deputy Chief of Main Administration, B.S.S.R.
Deputy Minister of Republic Council of Ministers
Chairman Oblast Executive Committee

Low Positions

Party

Second Secretary and Secretaries of Gorkom
First Secretary of Raikom
Department Head of Obkom Apparatus

Government

First Deputy Chairman of Oblast Executive Committee
Department Head, Oblast Executive Committee
Chairman of City Executive Committee

Party and Government

When the subsequent position is unknown and no further indication is given of his career development, it is assumed that the individual no longer occupies important political position in the system.
CHAPTER VII

A NOTE ON THE MOTIVATION OF THE ELITE

Although brief marginal comments on the complex problem of the elite's motivation in its involvement in appropriation politics have been made, this issue should be confronted more directly. The view taken here is that the explanatory framework which best makes the attitudes and actions of the elite in Belorussia explicable and most successfully illuminates the dynamics of the Soviet agricultural administrative decision-making process is the bureaucratic politics model.¹ Some brief background information on this approach will be considered and then an attempt will be made to defend the position just asserted.

Explaining the policy process and its outcome in contemporary states absorbs the time and attention of legions of political scientists. Few of them, however, produce works which gain the reputation of land-mark studies. One such work which has generated considerable discussion over the last decade, is Graham Allison's, The Essence of Decision.² Allison analyzed the Cuban Missile Crisis with the aid of

¹This theoretical approach or model (the terms are meant to be interchangeable in this context) supplies the further advantage that it facilitates a disciplined systematic comparison of the Soviet case to others.


"Professor Allison has written a major book, a path-breaking enterprise, full of insight for studies in foreign and domestic policy alike, and for training in public affairs."
three conceptual models. He labelled these the Rational Actor Model, the Organizational Process Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model. It is the last of these which interests us here but very brief mention will be made of the other two.

Allison maintained that one popular mode for analyzing policy results was to focus upon the calculations and deliberations of a society's "last-say" decision-makers. Here one encounters the familiar metaphor of the national corporate person seeking to maximize benefits and to minimize costs from various courses of action. This model has implicitly informed analyses of Soviet domestic and foreign policy for

in later days, Allison's work has been the subject of criticism equal in vigour to Neustadt's praise. Prior to listing these works, acknowledgement must be made that many of these criticisms are cogent, particularly those of R. J. Art, but it should be noted at the same time that several of these critics seem to be losing sight of the simple truth that "a good book is a good book is a good book." See Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," Policy Science, 4 (1973), pp. 467-490; James Nathan and James K. Pitfalls," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 6 (Spring, 1978), pp. 81-91; Miriam Steiner, "The Elusive Essence of Decision," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2 (June, 1979), pp. 389-422; and R. Harrison Wagner, "Dissolving the State: Three Recent Perspectives on International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Summer, 1974), pp. 435-466.

Allison's explanation of the utility of these diverse models gives rise to some unnecessary ambiguity. He does not make it altogether clear whether he follows the "instrumentalist" view that theories are neither true nor false merely more or less useful, or whether he holds to the "realist" position which holds that our theoretical propositions are literally true. Some readers, then, might conclude that Allison provides alternate explanations of the same phenomena and one can be preferred to another on the grounds of its analytical potency. Other readers, the closer ones, in my view, might conclude that the same thing has not been explained in three separate ways but that three complementary views of a complex decision-making process have been provided, each highlighting different aspects of it at different points in time. Some of Allison's unnecessary muddiness is cleared up in a very insightful discussion in what is regrettably an unpublished paper. See Denis Stairs, "Analytical Relativism and the Single Case," paper presented for the Inter-University Seminar on International Relations, 1976.
some time. We are quite accustomed to references to "the Soviet Union decided" or "the Kremlin has resolved that" in studies of Soviet politics.

The second model draws special attention to the standing operational procedures of whatever governmental organizations are involved in making and administering the policy in question. This line of analysis has received scant attention in Soviet studies due to the almost insuperable obstacles encountered in data collection.\(^1\) The approach highlights, nonetheless, an important and highly germane set of considerations for the policy analyst.

The Governmental or Bureaucratic Model is the one about which Allison seems to be most enthusiastic.\(^2\) This model focuses attention upon the competitive bargainings of rival governmental actors.\(^3\) This, most decidedly, is not bureaucracy as portrayed in Weber's Ideal type with the emphasis upon

\(^1\)To some measure, Merle Fainsod was able to clarify the "standing operational procedures" of the party, government, security and Komsomol organizations in Smolensk oblast. This was due, of course, to the fact that the Smolensk party archive fell into the hands of the American government at the end of the Soviet World War. See M. Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (New York: Random House, 1963).

\(^2\)Allison was a member of the Bureaucratic Politics Study Group at Harvard, and it was to this model that he returned when writing an article for the special 1972 supplement to World Politics which treated theory and policy in international relations. See G. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and some Policy Implications," in Theory and Policy in International Relations, ed. by Raymond Tanter and Richard E. Ullman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 40-70. I should hasten to add that in suggesting that the bureaucratic politics approach usefully applies in the analysis of Soviet politics I am not thinking principally of the statement of the approach in this particular article where it is presented to a considerable extent in a formal and rigid fashion and presents an array of highly detailed questions which cannot be answered reliably in the Soviet context.

\(^3\)Allison, to be sure, is not the first to consider or employ the approach, but he is a premier figure due to his systematic
hierarchical organization, impersonality of operations, intensive use of rules, complexity of administrative tasks, secrecy, and employment of specially trained personnel on a career basis. 1

Rather, it is a bureaucracy honeycombed with defenders of parochial interests. These partisans see issues differently as a consequence of the varying roles they perform. It is anticipated that they will defend determinedly their narrow power interests within the constraints imposed upon them by the overarching organizing and political system of which they are an element. 2 The disagreements and conflicts between them are resolved through game-like bargainings and manoeuvre. Policy is seen as the resultant of "the pulling and hauling of rival bureaucrats." 3

The philosophical underpinnings for this approach ostensibly are those of logical empiricism or neopositivism which holds that

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2Readers familiar with the development of Soviet studies will recognize readily some affinities between this approach and Kremlinological studies which elaborated, as an alternative to the totalitarian model, a conflict model of Soviet politics. For an example, see Carl Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, 1966). Though affinities are present, the bureaucratic politics approach is not tied irretrievably to a conflict model of Soviet politics. Merle Fainsod is regarded by many as the most distinguished proponent of an interpretation of Soviet politics which insists on its totalitarian character. He, however, was very much alert to the presence of bureaucratic politics. Witness, his very insightful discussion on the pervasiveness of bureaucratic politics in the economic planning process. See Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, revised edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), pp. 412-420. Hence, one can disagree over precisely what type of political system we find in the Soviet case, but still agree that bureaucratic politics goes on within it.

social science involves no essential differences from the natural sciences. Hence, Allison claims to follow Carl Hempel's well-known covering-law mode of explanation.\(^1\) While we would defend the value of the "bureaucratic politics" analysis of the Soviet policy-making, it should be made clear that in doing so we would not proceed from the same philosophical premises Allison's work purportedly rests upon.\(^2\)

Since the time Allison carried out the research for his study, the neo-positivist school in the philosophy of social science, which was practically dominant in North America, has come under sustained attack.\(^3\) So much so, that authors now refer to current phase of the philosophy of social sciences as post-positivist. Some aspects of this post-positivist philosophy influence the understanding of bureaucratic politics employed here. First we will note there is no longer any consensus as to what constitutes a proper analysis of causation in human affairs.\(^4\) It does seem, however, that it is safer to assume that the bureaucratic politics explanation rests on probabilistic premises rather than ones of a universal kind as required by the

\(^1\) G. Allison, *op. cit.*, pp. 278-279.

\(^2\) While no writer has forced successfully a mediatory position between the naturalist and humanist approaches to the social sciences, this seems possible in principle. Hence, this writer is impressed favourably by efforts in this direction. The attempts of Jurgen Habermas to argue for the validity of empirical-analytical, historical-hermenutical and critical approaches in the study of human affairs seem especially constructive. See J. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, translated by J. J. Schapiro (Boston: Beacon, 1971).


deductive covering-law strategy of explanation. We should not anticipate, then, that all bureaucrats will play the bureaucratic politics game at all times in the way Allison describes it. Nor should we expect, as Allison does, that there is an invariant connection between policy results and the skill and will exercised by the players of the bureaucratic politics game. Further, the post-positivist philosophers have argued persuasively that those who have followed the covering-law strategy have paid too little attention to interpreting the meaning of actions undertaken by whatever actors are the focus of analysis. ¹ This will be an explicit concern here rather than an implicit one, as in Allison's work, where, in a sense, it is smuggled into his account. ²

Bureaucratic Politics and the Soviet Context

Even very severe Marxist critics of American government allow that a highly intense form of bureaucratic politics is carried on within its various institutions. ³ The very institutional setting for American politics with its elaborate provisions for separation of powers and checks and balances appears to foster this type of politics. In the Soviet case, one does not find the same institutional devices

¹Perhaps the best indicator of political science's difficulties here is the publication of a critique of "scientific" political science by one of its former leading champions. See Gabriel Almond and Stephen J. Genco, "Clouds, Cuckoos and the Study of Politics," World Politics, Vol. XXIV, No. 4 (July, 1977), pp. 489-522.


promoting bureaucratic politics. Rather, we find ones which mute it. Indeed, some scholars would insist that the nature and role of the Party, its ideology and historical-cultural tradition are such that a bureaucratic politics approach to decision-making analysis in the Soviet context must be regarded by reasonable opinion as utterly unsuitable. ¹ From this standpoint, the outstanding trait of the Russian historical-cultural tradition is its autocratic and authoritarian political heritage. Some scholars would insist that it is submission to authority and compliance with the dictates of the central authority rather than any possibility of some form of political pluralism featuring bargaining and negotiation one can expect due to the force of historical tradition in the contemporary Soviet Union. The weight of the autocratic tradition, no doubt, continues to exert influence but if one is going to have regard for historical continuity, it should be remembered that Imperial Russian history witnessed the gradual development of a regional political consciousness and the emergence of the expression of provincialist ideologies.² The traditional Russian political culture, then, was multi-faceted and reference to it can derive evidence both for and against the development of regional bureaucratic politics in the contemporary Soviet system.

The role of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union, it might be argued, is such that it mitigates against the possibility of officials


pursuing particularist goals. There is no question that Marxism-
Leninism places a taboo upon localism and departmentalism and the
elevation of specific or particular interests over the universal or
general interests of the Soviet population as interpreted by the
party. It does not disallow, however, the representation of interests.
Indeed, Soviet Marxism legitimates this activity to an extent.
Ideological spokesmen maintain that in Soviet society the
community of fundamental interests does not rule out particular
class, social group or stratum interests due to their differing
conditions.¹

Soviet social science has been giving increasing attention as well to
the representation of interests and to the resolution of conflicts
which arise from their presence.² Once more, then, it appears safe to
maintain that although there is an overarching political-ideological
consensus discernible in the Soviet case we can anticipate that
interest representation of the sort depicted by the bureaucratic
politics school operates within its boundaries. Further, one might
note that the frequency with which officials of the ideology apparat
and party leaders invoke the charge that there has been too much
localism and departmentalism in the administration of Soviet policy
suggests that union-republican elites defend union-republican
particularist interests with a persistent determination.

The paramountcy of the Party and its leadership, finally,
might be regarded as so powerful and the scope of its decision-making

¹G. Glezer, "Contradictions Under World Socialism," World

²See, for example, M. N. Perfil'ev, Obshchestvennye
otnochenia (Leningrad: Nauka, 1974), pp. 191-209, and F. P. Koghelev,
Ekonomicheskie interesy pri sotsializme: formy ikh realizatsii
(Moscow: Moskovskii universitet, 1975).
role so extensive that once more the notion that bureaucratic politics might influence Soviet politics is cast in doubt. The Party, however, is a bureaucracy itself and substantial studies of its operation have demonstrated that bargaining and negotiation between its regional and central officials is characteristic of its operation.¹ The aspiring analyst of bureaucratic politics in the Soviet case, however, must adapt the approach to certain institutionalized features of the Soviet system and most especially to the pre-eminent role of the party’s Politbureau in the Soviet decision-making system. Fortunately, we have the fine model of Jiri Valenta to follow who has shown convincingly that it is possible to grant due recognition to the Politbureau’s special decision-making role whilst demonstrating the presence and the impact of bureaucratic politics.²

We need not, it seems to me, cede any ground to those who consider the bureaucratic politics approach an inappropriate one for the analysis of Soviet politics. Rather, it seems to be the case that this type of politics is overwhelmingly important to the Soviet case, at least in the area of planning and budgetary decision-making. This, in fact, was recognized some years ago by Franz Schurmann in a very cogently argued introduction to an article in which he compared economic administration in the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. In both countries, he argued,

As long as we have “administration by men,” we have politics. Politics may be seen as the struggle of men, individually or collectively, to achieve aims under conditions of scarcity; in


other words, gain for one will mean loss for the other. Since the economics of Russia and China still depend largely on command, politics pervade the administration of the economy. Different segments of the state bureaucracy compete with each other for scarce resources and put pressure on the policy-makers to set goals which favour themselves. The main aim of every organization of the state bureaucracy is the maximization of its own interests. What both the Russians and Chinese denounce as a major defect of bureaucracy, namely departmentalism (vedomstennost') or localism (mestnichestvo)--pen wei chu yi for both in Chinese--we see as an action pattern in the pursuit of these interests.¹

Following the premises of the bureaucratic politics approach we anticipate that Soviet officials who participate in the budgeting and planning process make recommendations and proposals which reflect their positions within the bureaucracy of party and state. As Morton Halperin, a colleague of Allison’s and co-author with him, has argued "Where an individual sits in the process determines in large part the faces of the issue that he sees and helps to determine the stakes that he sees involved and hence the stand that he takes."² Officials seen from this perspective develop "competitive not homogenous interests" through the performance of their roles.³ Officials will tend, then, amongst other things, to try to secure and enhance influence for themselves and will attempt to maintain or increase budgets for the bureaucratic agency to which they are attached.

Coming down from the rarified level of theoretical arguments about the nature of bureaucracy to the empirical plane treated in this study we found that officials in the Belorussian party and government


³Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 146.
persistently pointed to needs of the agricultural economy they supervised. This seems very much in keeping with the premises of the bureaucratic politics approach which leads us to expect that officials will become champions of the particular field with which they become involved. It must be added, though, that no strong direct evidence was encountered of the competition and conflict that theorists of bureaucratic politics maintain is omnipresent. Rather, the identification of needs just spoken of frequently had a quality whereby it seemed that the officials were making petitions to the central authorities instead of engaging in competitive bargaining. Moreover, it should be noted that this took place in a highly structured context. We drew for example, from speeches made at plenums at the union republican and obkom levels by officials of the Belorussian agricultural administration. These meetings were ones held in sequence with all-union gatherings which had taken place first and which set general guidelines for discussions at lower levels. The central authorities, then, to a very considerable extent set constraints upon their regional subordinate in the overall process of considering appropriations for agriculture. Nevertheless, it seems significant that within parameters set by central officials the Belorussian officials time and again point to the need for this or that kind of input to the agricultural economy. These examples can be found virtually at random. Just to cite, for review purposes, one which is conveniently at hand, we find that the agricultural secretary of the central committee of the Belorussian Communist Party while looking in overview fashion at the development of agriculture in his union republic pauses to discuss the harvesting of potatoes and this gives him occasion to complain about the inadequacy of the machinery for this task. Then he turns his
attention to flax production and he complains that the USSR Ministry of Light Industry has been too slow in constructing shops for the industrial preparation of flax straw. Within this one article numerous instances can be found of a regional official specifying areas of need. The two particular examples chosen happen to be within one paragraph of each other. The foregoing remarks might suggest that bureaucratic politics in the Soviet case is a pretty tame affair with regional officials simply pleading for more resources. Indirect evidence suggests, however, that it goes beyond this. Thane Gustafson has pointed out that officials from the "southern"--Central Asian and the "northern"--Slavic and Baltic union republics clash over the priority to be given to the development of agriculture in their respective regions. We find that voices from Belorussia are amongst those which argue for granting of high priority to development of land improvement technology and intensification of agricultural production in the wet and acid areas of the USSR.

We do not get to see very much by way of open conflict over this matter of alternate strategies for development of agriculture, but there appear to be contesting streams of recommendations on priorities and it seems reasonable to follow Gustafson in taking the view that the


3For example, see S. N. Maliën, "Nužno Respubliki-vygodno strane," Ekonomicheskaiia gazeta, No. 40 (1965), pp. 15-24. All the discrete petitions for diverse selected inputs which we have witnessed emerging from the Belorussian bureaucracy tend to reinforce this general strategical approach.
behind-closed doors conciliation of these interests is difficult to achieve. Thus, the attitudes and activities of the officials involved in Belorussian agricultural administration, it is suggested here, conform to a pattern. Like officials in other union-republics they are drawn into bureaucratic politics so as to secure ever greater appropriations for development of agriculture. The bureaucratic politics has a highly distinctive Soviet colouration given the deeply authoritarian and highly centralist nature of the political system but at root there is a bureaucratic politics which takes place.

The premises of the bureaucratic politics approach suggest that regional officials in an agricultural administrative apparatus are almost bound to become champions for more resources for their particular sphere of responsibility. It may be the case that another set of attitudes beyond those of the bureaucratic politician may serve to motivate members of the Belorussian elite. There is a possibility, I would like to suggest, that a sense of a kind of nationalism also may impel Belorussian officials to lobby for resources. Nothing more than a note of speculation on this theme can be developed here due to the absence of open evidence of nationalism among the elite and to the impossibility of ascertaining through direct observation and interviews whether these officials hold to nationalistic attitudes.

There is a distinction sometimes made in discussions of motivations between "in order to" and "because" motives. Perhaps this can be applied usefully here. The activities which came under review

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in chapter five are ones which can be regarded plausibly as ones engaged in "in order to" secure further development of Belorussian agriculture. The individuals involved will have differing motivations but some I would like to suggest may have been so engaged "because" of their commitment to their local territory and its population. These would be our nationalists or, as I would prefer to call them, "quasi-nationalists." Their nationalism is a nationalism with some essential attributés shorn off. It is not a nationalism aimed at independent statehood. It is not a nationalism which appeals openly to ethnicity as a principle of cohesion to mobilize people's energies and activities. It is, however, a nationalism that demonstrates a concern about the development of one's native land. It is a nationalism that seeks to advance the interests of one's own territory and population, though it does not do so by making explicitly claims narrowly in the name of one nationality.

The fact that the leading political figure in the Belorussian union republic, P. Masherov, himself expressed criticism of any tendency towards "national egoism" on the part of union republics might be counted against the suggestion that quasi-nationalism might develop amongst the Belorussian elite. Masherov it might seem would be on guard against the development of just the set of attitudes we suggest might have taken

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1In arriving at this formulation, I am indebted to two sources. Victor Zaslavsky, a Memorial University colleague, is developing the idea in work which now is in progress that quasi-social movements have emerged in the Soviet union and his description of this phenomenon in conversation was one I found quite persuasive. The other source is the work by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone which has been cited several times previously dealing with the presence of "orthodox nationalism" in certain union republics. The quasi-nationalism, if it does indeed exist, would be milder in its nature than orthodox nationalism. It would not involve pressure for more autonomy but would entail lobbying for more resources with scrupulous regard paid to official norms of permissible activity.
root. Masherov, in this instance and in all of his speeches, was
scrupulously faithful to the official formula on nationality relations
in the USSR. This does not necessarily mean that Masherov mindlessly
accepted the rules of the game and passively restrained from advancing
Belorussia's economic interests. It might be argued that, in fact,
he interpreted the Soviet doctrine on nationality relations in a way
which was favourable to the union republics and allowed their officials'
legitimate leeway to seek to strengthen their economic bases. The
room for manoeuvre in securing this end is limited in light of the
official disapproval of economic nationalism but some margin does
remain. Masherov, I think, was inclined to operate within that limited
area. Some indication of this is provided in the discussion of
nationality relations in which he made his own criticism of economic
nationalism.

In order to demonstrate this, though, we must back up briefly
and consider the nature of the official theory on nationality
realotions which was propounded in the Soviet Union for the period
under discussion in this account.

Briefly, the...theory postulated that all Soviet nations and
nationalities were in the process of growing ever closer together
(sblizhenie) under the impact of continuous growth and multipli-
cation of factors common to them all, while their particularistic
factors tended to diminish and to disappear. Eventually this
process will result in their merger (sliianie) into an indivisible
Soviet nation. The whole process was represented as a part of a
dialectical sequence in which the development and "flowering" of
particular national cultures serves at the same time to strengthen
their common content and thus to build an ever closer unity.1

1Teresa Rakowska-Harastone, "The Dilemma of Nationalism in the
p. 123.
Masharov, as chief spokesman for the Belorussian elite, emphasized the degree to which the flourishing of Belorussia's economy was dependent upon its integration in the all-union economy. The overall thrust of Masharov's article is to stress the fact that the flourishing and merging of nations is a "deep and many sided process." While that process is working its way to its distant conclusion, Masharov suggests that a strenuous effort to build up the individual parts of the overall economy is in the general interest of the Soviet population.

In virtually every speech or article of the Belorussian leaders we find that they express pride in the progress that has been made in building up the Belorussian economy. They indicate as well the importance of continuing to further develop and strengthen that economy. Is this just empty rhetoric, standard and tiresome flourishes incumbent upon the speech-maker? Perhaps so, but there may be a measure of genuine commitment behind those words. Let us consider further and more specifically the nature of some of these statements.

In November of 1971, P. Masharov addressed a meeting convened to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the Belorussian


2 Ibid., p. 12.

3 The statements of Soviet leaders provide, of course, ripe targets for satirists. No one has thrown darts into the balloons of their hyperbole more accurately than Alexander Zinoviev, once employed as a professional philosopher in the Soviet Union, but now living in Western Europe. With the example of his work in mind one feels very uneasy about suggesting that any genuine sentiment is expressed in the pronouncements of a high Soviet official. Nonetheless we cannot dismiss altogether the possibility that top Soviet political figures may evince some of their genuine beliefs and commitments when their highly ritualized speeches are presented and their articles are published. For the most acclaimed of Zinoviev's many recent works, see A. Zinoviev The Yawning Heights, translated from the Russian by Gordon Clough (New York: Vintage Books, 1980).
State University. He remarked that

Belorussian State University graduates are to be encountered in any corner of Belorussia, as well as beyond its frontiers, and the fact that our republic has become a region of universal literacy with a high standard of economic and cultural development: that it now has highly qualified scientific cadres at its disposal is due to a large degree to the fruitful efforts of the collective of the Belorussian State University—the right-flank detachment of Belorussian higher education.\footnote{P. Masharov, S.B., No. 255, (Nov. 2, 1971), p. 1.}

Masherov goes on and on in the same rather high-flown and predictable fashion while discussing Belorussia's culture and the contribution of the university to it. It may just be, though, that underlying these stale formulations there is a certain measure of genuine pride in the development of Masherov's native union republic.

Masherov's commentaries on the development of Belorussian agriculture might be seen in the same perspective. Typically these contain sections where he rhymes off the accomplishments of the union-republic. Thus,

The union republic's agricultural scientists have rendered a great deal of practical assistance with the development of agriculture in recent years. Belorussian scientific research institutions of soil science and agro-chemistry, for example, have performed a great deal of work to study the republic's soil and to achieve the most effective use of chemical means of land reclamation, ...

The plant breeders and seed-growers have many accomplishments to their credit. A plant breeding centre has been created and a long-range plan for the development of plant-breeding work up to 1990 ...

A large group of Belorussian scientists were awarded the 1974 State Prize of the USSR for developing and bringing into cultivation highly productive potato varieties ...

The republic's agricultural workers have been able to achieve new results in recent years and have achieved marked successes in raising soil fertility and increasing yields and gross harvests of farm crops ...

A great deal of work has been performed in the republic to improve the planting structure for grain crops and to expand the areas planted to barley and winter wheat ....
During the decade which has passed since the March Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, new drainage systems have been created in Belorussia on an area of more than a million hectares. This equals the accomplishment of all the previous years....

Efforts are underway to improve feed production and the technology involved.... The main thing is that changes have occurred in the composition and quality of the feed....

During the period from 1966 to 1973 a total of 13 million square metres of housing was completed in rural areas, 1,000 general education schools, pre-school establishments for 28,700 children, hospitals with a combined total of 2,800 beds and many other cultural and personal-service facilities were constructed. Piped in water, gas and television are increasingly becoming a part of the lives of the rural population.

A number of these claims might be questionable as is customarily the case when Soviet leaders dwell on achievements and it might be noted as well that there is nothing distinctive about union republican leaders speeling off a seemingly endless list of great accomplishments. Hence an experienced analyst of Soviet politics is unlikely to find any of the just-cited passage (which is representative of innumerable other ones) to be noteworthy. There is a possibility, however, that it is in the sense that this and other speeches and articles may convey the sentiment of this sort which is to say—"look here, this is what we have done, which it must be granted is pretty good, and we can do more." That Belorussian officials may have developed just such an assertive attitude is a hypothesis suggested in a recent article by Mary McAuley. She suggests, furthermore in referring to the 1960s, that "the movement upward of Mashorov, clearly an able individual, into the all-union party leadership as a candidate member of the

1P. Mashorov, "Sel'skoe Khozialistvo Belorussskoi SSR na pod'eume" in Kursom Martovskogo Plenuma, ed. by V. A. Golikov et. al. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1975), pp. 87-98.
Politburo means that the Belorussian party has a powerful voice at the centre.\(^1\)

Another Belorussian with a voice at the centre was K. T. Mazurov, the highest placed of the Belorussian elite who had all-union responsibilities for the bulk of the period analyzed in this work and who did not speak directly to the issues of Belorussian development often. "It is interesting to note, though, that in an "election" speech given when accepting the nomination to Supreme Soviet membership for a Belorussian constituency that in a discussion of the great achievements of the Soviet order he pointed out

It is especially pleasant for me to note the high rate of development of the economy and culture of the Belorussian SSR and growth in the well-being of the Belorussian people.\(^2\)

Customarily, in the field of Soviet studies, we treat the claims of Soviet political figures with great scepticism. This statement, however, might just be the sincerely expressed thought of Belorussia's most important and powerful "quasi-nationalist."

To briefly capitulate the position taken in this chapter, it was suggested that the motivation of the Belorussian elite involved in what was termed appropriation politics is accounted for best and primarily by the bureaucratic-politics model. In addition, the speculative note was advanced that efforts to obtain more resources might have been fueled in supplementary fashion for those who are Belorussians by a sense of "quasi-nationalism" whereby they took

\(^1\)Mary McAuley, "Party Recruitment and the Nationalities in the USSR: A Study in Centre-Republican Relationships," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 10 (1980), p. 469. It is necessary, of course, to put the "Party in the past tense" insofar as Masseby is concerned for, as was noted earlier in the discussion of the Belorussian elite, he died in a traffic accident.

special pride in advancing the development of what is "their" union republic. This latter point could be developed, however, to only a very modest degree in view of the nature of the evidence available and the inherent difficulties in ascertaining whether Belorussian leaders express genuine convictions to any degree when they make their pronouncements on the development of Belorussia's economy and culture.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

This study began from the conjecture that inquiry into the actions and speeches of the Belorussian agricultural elite would uncover a pattern of "orthodox nationalism." The elite, it was anticipated, would manifest a drive to increase their autonomy in agricultural decision making. No clear evidence of such a tendency was discovered. Instead, the author believes he uncovered a pattern of "appropriation politics," which is to say, it appears that the elite in Belorussia sought through bureaucratic politics to influence planning targets and outlays of resources set for agriculture in the Belorussia SSR. Further inquiry results in the finding that the Belorussia's agricultural performance compared favourably with that of most other union republics. Similarly, examination of the available data suggested that Belorussian agriculture was the recipient of greater absolute and relative outlays of resources through the planning budgeting process than formerly was the case.

Whether there is a relation between these phenomena cannot be demonstrated conclusively. The possibility exists that the central Soviet leadership decided to channel funds and resources into Belorussian agriculture for reasons that were independent of the entreaties made by the Belorussian elite. Decision-making analysis, in any context, confronts riddles of this kind. One can seldom be certain that "inputs" have been identified correctly and that their relation to "outputs" has been grasped properly.
In this case my view of the evidence, however, is that Belorussian officials channelled strong efforts into bureaucratic politics, and this was a necessary but not sufficient condition in the explanation of increased outlays for Belorussian agriculture.

In addition, the access to the central leadership, gained after Mazurov's promotion stands out as an important factor. Similarly, without the central leadership's persistent efforts to upgrade overall Soviet agricultural performance through a substantial subsidy, it is unlikely that Belorussian agriculture would have been singled out for increased outlays. Other factors, as well, no doubt could be adduced, but it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that there is a relationship between the Belorussian union-republican elite's pressing of claims and special pleading and the final allocation of resources for Belorussian agriculture. Indeed, the argument here is that the relationship is one whereby the latter can be seen as an explanadum and the former a part of its explanans or to use the language of the behavioural political science the allocation of resources to Belorussian agriculture can be seen as a dependent variable and the activities of the union-republican elite can be seen as an independent variable.

This study, as was noted previously, has been written under the influence of certain developments in post-postivist philosophy of social science. The character of the "bureaucratic politics" explanation offered is, I think, in accord with the model of explanation sketches, that has been emerging from the work of individuals such as Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre and Anthony Giddens. This view stipulates that the understanding of human action necessitates an attempt to establish the intention of actors involved in the situation under study,
and that this can be done only by locating the action in its rule-governed social context. The efforts of the Belorussian elite to influence planning targets and budgetary outlays are understood, then, from this perspective not as law-covered but as rule-referring. It is my guess that the rules which condition the playing of roles in the Soviet context have been changing gradually in the post-war period so that the broker or bargaining role of union-republican elites has become more central than was formerly the case.

One has to be very wary in drawing implications out of limited case studies. This, however, is a legitimate activity and it will be pursued here. The first consideration, which comes to mind, bears generally upon the Soviet policy process and particularly upon the role of the union-republican elites in that process. Most academic experts for long held to the view that the policy process in the Soviet Union and Western advanced capitalist democracies were dissimilar. The dichotomy between "ideological" and "instrumental" political systems, for example, enjoyed general acceptance. While it was allowed that one could discern conflict in the Soviet policy process, this was viewed principally in personalistic terms. A few individuals at the

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1 This distinction was advanced by Brzezinski and Huntington. See Z. Brzezinski and S. P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: The Viking Press, 1965), pp. 71-76. There is a curious quality to Brzezinski and Huntington's discussion of the Soviet policy process which has been noted by Jerry Hough. On the one hand, they were pioneers in the "interest group" approach to analysis of Soviet policy but, on the other, whenever they drew explicit comparisons they portrayed the Soviet policy process as one which is very strongly an example of top-down domination. See J. Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 178-180.

2 I am referring here to the orientation of much of the "Kremlinological" literature authored by S. Pross, R. Conquest and others which was footnoted earlier in the text.
apex of the Soviet power hierarchy in this conceptualization engaged in a kind of Machiavellian Realpolitik manipulating their individual coteries of subordinates in a pursuit of power for power's sake. This view tended not to take too seriously the notion that serious issues of principle might be the source of this elite conflict.

Later studies have called this portrayal of the Soviet policy process into question. Some scholars discovered that a bureaucratic model which called attention to conflicting priorities of the diverse institutions and formal roles within the institutions that make up the Soviet political system was useful in their research efforts. This widened significantly the number of actors who had to be considered as logically possible sources of influence in the making of public policy in the USSR. Others showed that those actors held to conflicting perceptions of priorities not only due to factors related to the roles they occupied but because they had reasoned disagreements over issues of principle and these crystallized into separate ideological groupings.

Gradually, an alternate view of the Soviet policy process has been elaborated. Scholars have suggested, for example, that an incrementalist decision-making strategy, that is, one which seeks to make only gradual relatively modest alterations in established policies,


has become increasingly common in the Soviet Union. Previously, the scholarly consensus was that incrementalism was a distinctively Western mode of decision-making. Now, however, many accept the view that incrementalism is a necessary outcome in the Soviet Union of the push and pull of the competing elites' claims on scarce resources.

The evidence consulted in this study seem to conform partially with this latter view. It conforms with it in that it can be seen that because resources are not unlimited the Belorussian claims will necessarily conflict with those of other union-republican elites and make an intense pattern of bargaining and negotiating necessary which unhappily for western scholars takes place behind closed doors. The appropriations decisions considered here depart, however, in character from the commonly accepted notions of incrementalist decision-making in that the centrality of hierarchy and central coordination stand out as clearly as the process of mutual adjustment.

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2Parenthetically, I would like to distance myself from the strong normative approval of incrementalism which runs through this literature.

3The important research of Paul Cocks which deals with the party leadership and the policy process highlights the fact that the leadership determinedly has striven to break away from and go beyond to narrow bureaucratic politics and incremental decision-making which seem to have steadily dominated Kremlin decision-making since Khrushchev. To this end, they have adopted PPBS-type technique and systems.
The inquiry pursued here has resulted in some findings about the resource allocation process through planning and budgeting which are parallel to those of other recent research or are at least compatible with those produced by other scholars. Donna Bahry, for example, found that in her study of republic politics and federal budget policy in the Soviet Union that "planning and budgeting represent the epitome of bureaucratic politics." Further her analysis of socio-cultural expenditures revealed that the rise of several Belorussian officials to national prominence in the early 1960's was matched, over the decade, by an increase in spending relative to the other republics.

Jack Bielasiak's study of policy decisions on expenditures from the Soviet budget for "financing the national economy" leads him to suggest approaches to policy development. Cocks is impressed by the extent to which the leadership has been able to exploit those instruments and to maintain its supremacy in decision-making processes. Hence, Cocks take pains to counterbalance recent interpretations of the Soviet system which emphasize group competition, bargaining and bureaucratic politics with his own which places stress upon hierarchy and the primacy of central over sub-central interests. He does this in full recognition that both interpretations are valid and each emphasize an aspect of the decision-making process. My only quarrels with Cocks are that he seems to overestimate the extent to which the leadership has directed the "scientific-technical revolution" to serve its own ends and he does not allow seriously for the possibility that an unintended consequence of the leadership's drive to "rationalize" policy making through use of more sophisticated information-processing devices might be to increase the influence of regional subordinates in the decision-making system. See Paul Cocks, "The Policy Process and Bureaucratic Politics," in The Dynamics of Soviet Politics, ed. by Paul Cocks, R. V. Daniels and Nancy Whittier Heer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 156-178. The quotation is from p. 168. See as well, Paul Cocks, "Retooling the Directed Society: Administrative Modernization and Developed Socialism," in Political Development in Eastern Europe, ed. by Jan F. Triska and Paul M. Cocks (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), pp. 53-92.

1 D. Bahry, op. cit., p. 133.

2 Ibid., p. 129.
that decisions in this area are subject to a variety of political, military and socio-economic considerations. Hence, there is no automatic decision rule or formula which determines expenditures for agriculture, in particular. Rather, there is scope for bureaucratic politics.

The preceding analysis speaks partially to another large and serious issue. The implications of the Soviet treatment of minority nationalities for the stability of the political system has drawn the attention of some very prominent scholars. Richard Pipes, for example, has examined this question and has articulated what is probably the dominant view. His argument is that the union-republican elites enjoy the forms but none of the substance of power. Hence, they are prone to dissatisfaction and resentment and should the central leadership fail to grant them significant amounts of decision-making discretion political instability will result.

This study focuses upon such a restricted range of phenomena that one cannot generalize safely from it. Nonetheless, it does contain the suggestion that the argument Pipes puts forward may be overstated badly. It appears to be the case that one can assert reasonably that the Belorussian elite successfully influenced the resource-allocation process during the years focused upon by this study. Whether or not union-republican elites are satisfied by having

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influence is a moot point but it is a logical possibility. At any rate, it is my strong suggestion that the focus of the discussion on the nationality problem-political stability issue should be altered. First, we need a series of empirical inquiries to establish the extent to which union-republican elites generally are able to influence the broad array of Soviet, social, economic, cultural and political policies. Once the facts of this matter are established, we will have a better grounding for the discussion of the issue Pipes treats. My speculation on this point is that the bureaucratic-political elite is an unlikely source of political stability. To harken back to phraseology which often was employed in student radical debates of the 1960s, the Belorussian example suggests that the union-republican elites appear to have opted to work within the system rather than to confront it. Presumably, if those within-system efforts bear perceived fruit, then, the elites are likely to remain relatively content with their status.

The results of this study have some bearing on another general issue and that is the question as to whether the Soviet Union can be considered a genuine federation. Where does the Soviet Union fit on the continuum of states ranging from unitary to confederal ones? The question hinges, of course, on the meaning that one gives to the term federalism. This poses a problem because the literature bearing on this issue is in a rather depressingly confused state. Once Wheare's coordinate view of layer-cake model of federalism was accepted widely but nowadays we have scholars like Samuel Beer announcing to his

1Valerie Bunce's recent article on union-republican successions and policy innovation is an important step in this direction. See V. Bunce, op. cit., pp. 379-401.
colleagues that

federalism as the mutually exclusion allocation of powers between
the general and state governments--dual federalism, it may be
called, belongs to the past.¹

When we turn from scholars engaged in empirical inquiries like
Beer's examination of American intergovernmental relations to the
theoretical literature bearing on federalism we encounter more
problems. Scholars have given diverse meanings to the term,
federalism.²

Does this mean, then, that we simply should grant to the Soviet
political leaders, the benefit of the doubt and allow them to maintain
that Soviet federalism has facilitated the equal development of all
members of the "new historic community of peoples" which makes up
the Soviet population? I think not, and as was mentioned at the out-
set of this study, there is a strong tradition of scholarship which
seeks to show that the Soviet performance is wanting when viewed from
the standpoint of its own terms and definitions.

We need not and should not, however, confine ourselves when
judging any human organization purely to its own terms and definitions.
We should strive to clarify what we mean generally by a particular

¹This was in his presidential address to the American Political
Science Association in 1977. See Samuel H. Beer, "Federalism,
Nationalism and Democracy In America," American Political Science

²It was formerly my intention to review the strengths and
weaknesses of Carl Friedrich's view of federalism as a process;
W. Riker's perception of it as a bargain; W. S. Livingston's notion
that federalism is a quality of society and other similarly prominent
views, but this task has been rendered redundant by the appearance of
a recent publication which carried this task out in competent
time in Quest of Meaning (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1978).
category such as federalism and explore how closely or distantly different political systems approximate or diverge from it. Federalism, in my view, to paraphrase Schumpeter's famous definition of democracy is a political method, that is to say a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political--legal and administrative decisions....

The particular form this institutional arrangement takes is one whereby the government is made up of both constituent territorial governments and a central or national one; each of which can deal directly with the population with regard to those activities that it has constitutional responsibility over. A federation, moreover, is one that not only is organized as such but which in its operation has regard for what has been termed the federal principle. My view of the operation of this principle is that it refers to a situation where the relevant political actors take seriously the principle of maintaining unity in diversity and diversity in union. The practical manifestation that this would take is that the constituent and central governments would enjoy substantial opportunities to influence the development of policies and to reconcile their views of what is in the particular good and general good of their respective territorial constituencies. In this sort of political system stress is placed upon the value of diffusion of power.


Such a diffusion of power may be termed noncentralization.... Noncentralization ensures that no matter how certain powers may be shared by the general and constituent government at any point in time, the authority to participate in exercising them cannot be taken away from either without mutual consent.¹

The political process described and analyzed in this work does not, in my judgement, conform to such a description of federalism. The concentration and centralization of power discernible in the planning and budgeting process is such that it provokes the conclusion that the term federalism is one of dubious applicability in the Soviet case. Hence, it has been placed quite deliberately within quotation marks when it appears in the title of this work.

Mention of distribution of power raises the last general issue which this study touches upon. In the introduction to this work, reference was made to the research programme in contemporary Soviet studies which most influenced the formulation of the research problems dealt with here. Jerry Hough was mentioned, in particular, as a scholar whose work had sparked others to look at the regional officials in the USSR in a new light. Reference was made again to Hough's work earlier in this particular chapter when it was suggested that his writings were very persuasive on the merits of the use of a bureaucratic model in analyzing Soviet politics. Having made these acknowledgements to Hough's work, it is incumbent upon me that I address the problem as to how the findings of this work dovetail with the most controversial aspect of his interpretation of modern Soviet politics. Hough has elaborated an ideal type model of a political...

system which he has labelled institutional pluralism. He has argued further that the political life in Soviet Union has moved substantially in the direction of this model. "What then does institutional pluralism mean?...The central aim of the concept institutional pluralism is to suggest that there has been some diffusion of power" to some of the major interest groups in the Soviet Union. This investigation did not result in the discovery of diffusion of power in the resource allocation decision-making process of agriculture. It did lead to the uncovering of what this writer regards as evidence of attempts to influence central decision-makers. The "appropriation politics" took place within the context of two hierarchical structures, the party and the government. The power to decide upon appropriations, seemed clearly to be concentrated at the centre. This is not to say though that the "federal" relationship between central and union republican ones is a simple hierarchical one. Rather, it appears to be complex and interdependent. The development of this type of relationship does not, in my view, amount, however, to a diffusion of power to the union-republican élite seen as an interest group. The union-republican élite in the estimation adopted here gained not in power but, as was mentioned above, in influence in the period under review.


3 In making the distinction between power and influence, I am following the usage recommended by David V. J. Bell. See his Power, Influence and Authority (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 16-34.
Who has political power and in which direction is the political process tending are classic questions for specialists in the study of Soviet politics. Hough has made an intellectually bold attempt to answer them. This study, based though it is upon a narrow range of evidence, does not confirm his most recently stated views, but it would not have been produced without the inspiration provided by his work.
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