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NL-339 (3/77)
Quebec as a Non-State Nation Actor
in International Relations

by

Deborah Landey, B.A.
May 1, 1978 by Deborah Landey

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Masters of Arts
in International Affairs.

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The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of this thesis, submitted by Deborah Landey, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to examine the legal and political aspects of the international behaviour of the province of Quebec.

The first chapter discusses the international legal and domestic constitutional norms that govern the participation of member states of federations in the international arena.

The second chapter considers some of the various conceptual frameworks that have been developed by scholars in the past decade to examine various types of non-state actors. The Bertelsen non-state nation actor framework is offered as a useful framework to analyse the international behaviour of various Quebec governments.

The third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters focus upon the case of Quebec and the four Quebec administrations of Johnson Bertrand, Bourassa and Levesque in an attempt to determine what the international goals, resources, and strategies of various Quebec governments have been and how both the domestic and international environments have served to facilitate or constrain these governments. The use of a common framework will help to highlight the similarities and differences that existed among Quebec governments.
NOTE ON SOURCES

I have relied heavily on official documentation and secondary sources. However the insights of some of the participants were also sought. Useful interviews were conducted in London, England at the General Delegation of Quebec and at the High Commission of Canada; in the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa; and at the University of Laval in Quebec.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTE ON SOURCES</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1 International Legal and Domestic Constitutional Aspects of Member State Participation in the International Arena</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I The Member State of Federal Systems and International Personality</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II The Member State and International Responsibility</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III The Member State and International Representation</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2 The Non-State Nation Actor Framework</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I The Limitations of the Nation-State Respective</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Federal States and the Non-State Nation Actor Framework</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Methodology</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 The Case of Quebec: A State within a State</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4 The Johnson Administration</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5 The Bertrand Administration</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6 The Bourassa Administration</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7 The Levesque Administration</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 8 Conclusions</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix Arrangements concluded by Quebec 1963-76</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table I</th>
<th>The most important issues in the November 1976 Campaign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Growth of Support for Nationalist Parties in Quebec 1966-76. 127
INTRODUCTION

Traditionally the study of international relations has focused on the behaviour of the nation-state in the international system. This is, at least in part, explained by the fact that the origins of the study of international relations lie in the study of eighteenth and nineteenth century diplomatic history, which is of course the history of the nation-state. Regardless of the reason why this concentration of interest arose, one consequence is that the behaviour of other entities has not received sufficient attention from scholars seeking to understand the full complexities of the international system. A study of these entities would help us to understand their impact upon the political unit of which they are presently a part, namely the nation-state of residence, and it would contribute to our understanding of how they affect the international system.

One entity of this system that has received some attention is the nation-state in the process of becoming; that is to say, various nationalist movements whose aim is to create their own nation-state and thereby gain a respectable and legitimate place on the international stage. No one would deny that the Palestinians have had a very significant impact on Lebanon and Jordan, which at different times were and continue to be their nation-states of residence. This impact has also been felt by the regional system where recognition is growing that some sort of accommodation will have to be reached with them if a secure peace is to be achieved.
Newly emerged third world states are often very conscious of the impact of subnational entities which compete with the nation-state for the loyalties of its citizens. In these cases, the state which has the recognition of the international community, is really a collection of various nationalities and/or tribal groups who deny the legitimacy of a political unit which was often thrust upon them by a departing colonial power. The present difficulties in Eritrea, the Ogaden desert, and the now historical war in Biafra are all manifestations of this problem.

A second non-state entity that is increasingly being recognized as a significant actor in the international system is the multinational corporation. This entity which often has no particular political allegiances has a very far reaching influence on many countries in both developing countries such as the historical role of the United Fruit Company in Central America, and on many developed states such as the impact of INCO on Canada. Large national corporations such as the large industrial union, can equally have an impact on the domestic scene and upon the international system. A review of the ability of the textile industries, in conjunction with the textile unions, to force the American and Canadian governments to seek to reduce the importation of cheap textiles should be enough to convince anyone of their ability to have a significant impact domestically and internationally.

A third entity that has not received its rightful share of attention from scholars of international relations is the member state of a federation, especially those federations which appear to be reasonably stable and do not have within their boundaries a nascent nation ready at any moment to thrust itself on the world scene. Perhaps it
is this very stability which discourages inquiry, or perhaps it is an appreciation of American constitutional history, which would seem to indicate that the federal state will, if necessary, resort to civil war to maintain its authority.

The international behaviour of a member state of a federation is the concern of this paper. Canada is one of a number of federations whose member states do not possess formal external competence and therefore are not entitled to participate independently in the international arena.

Any observer of provincial behaviour would know that provinces do, and have for a long time, interacted with the outside world. This is especially true if one looks at their relations with neighbouring states. This behaviour has always been rationalized as being administrative and not requiring any assertion of external sovereignty. The acceptance of this behaviour indicates a willingness of the central government to accept that the provinces can and do have legitimate interests that sometimes necessitate action outside the borders of Canada.

While Quebec has signed administrative agreements with American states, it has played a much larger international role as well which has led it to insist on the right to participate in the international system in a manner heretofore reserved for states. The reason for this behaviour is that Quebec sees itself as the principal institutional manifestation of the French Canadian nation and as the principal instrument of its economic-social-political-cultural development. A political unit which perceives itself in terms of being the protector and proposter of a national community is bound to behave in a manner different from that of a province which sees itself as having "interests" in particular
areas which sometimes necessitate external activity.

The present Quebec government, with its policy of sovereignty-association, will of course be likely to insist upon the necessity to interact with the international environment, but it is not the first Quebec government to do so. This paper will look at Quebec governments since 1966 in an attempt to determine to what degree their behaviour, motives, goals and strategies are different from previous administrations and to what degree they demonstrate continuity with the past.

This paper is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one considers certain aspects of the international legal and domestic constitutional aspect of member state participation in the international arena with particular emphasis upon the Canadian situation. During the first few years of the debate concerning provincial participation in international relations, the issue was considered primarily from the legal and constitutional perspective. Chapter one attempts to synthesize the legal and constitutional dimension by focusing upon three key legal problems surrounding member state participation in international affairs. These are the questions of international personality, international responsibility and international representation. Can member states of a federation possess an international personality? Are they responsible in international law for any arrangements they might conclude with third parties? Are they entitled to separate representation abroad in international organizations and conferences? In an attempt to answer some of these questions, a brief analysis of the constitutions of other federations is offered as well as that which is operative in the Canadian context. Some conclusions are drawn as to what constitutional changes might be made in Canada to accommodate the aspirations of Quebec governments.
The second chapter focuses upon some aspects of recent theoretical approaches to the study of non-state actors in the international system and puts forward the Bertelsen framework as a tool for analysing Quebec's international behaviour. The behaviour is examined in an attempt to understand the motivation that propelled Quebec into the international arena. Have Quebec governments felt that they have a civilizing mission to perform? Have they used external relations as a tool of domestic development? Do they seek sovereign statehood? The framework forces one to ask what kind of non-state actor is Quebec? What factors facilitate the international behaviour of Quebec governments and what constrains it? What sorts of resources are available to such an actor to pursue its goals? Indeed what are these goals? Have Quebec governments consistently sought some form of international status and, if so, have they pursued similar strategies to obtain it? How has the federal government reacted to the demands of Quebec governments? Have other actors in the international system been influential in promoting the goals of various Quebec administrations. These are the kinds of questions that one is able to answer, at least in part, using the Bertelsen framework.

Chapters three, four, five, six and seven examine the case of Quebec and the four administrations of Johnson, Bertrand, Bourassa and Levesque in terms of the non-state nation actor framework. The author is fully aware that the practical and philosophical groundwork for Quebec's role in the international arena was laid by certain individuals in the Lesage administration. The decision to deal with the period 1966-78 was taken for primarily pragmatic reasons of time and manageability. The
legal and constitutional rationale posited by members of the Lesage
government, such as Paul Gérin-Lajoie, are discussed in the legal
chapter.

Chapter eight draws some conclusions.

The rationale for examining the legal and political aspects
of this multifaceted question is both objective and subjective.
Objectively the legal and constitutional perspective of this issue
provides an essential backdrop for any consideration of political,
sociological or economic factors. A political analysis was then
decided upon since it is both a vital part of the problem and of
particular interest to this author.
Chapter I International Legal and Domestic Constitutional Aspects of Member State Participation in the International Arena

I The Member State of Federal Systems and International Personality

International personality is defined as the capacity to be a bearer of rights and duties under international law. This definition emphasizes the two principal components of the legal notion: that an entity with rights and duties exists, and that those rights and duties are regulated by international law. Theories about member state participation in international affairs revolve around three concepts, each of which is examined below: sovereignty, competence, and recognition.

Jurists look to the concept of sovereignty as a criterion for international personality. There is agreement that federal states possess an international personality derived from their unquestioned sovereignty. The position of member states, at least on the theoretical level, is disputed. On the theoretical plane there are three concepts of sovereignty. Some consider sovereignty divisible. The federal state and its member states are sovereign within their own spheres of jurisdiction. This view was supported by Paul Gérin-Lajoie when he was Minister of Education in the Lesage government. When it was suggested to him in an interview that Canada had only one international personality, he retorted: "C'est une erreur. Une fédération comme le Canada possède au contraire une double personnalité, l'une émanant des domaines où le fédéral est compétent, l'autre des domaines que la constitution désigne comme provinciaux.” Others view sovereignty as indivisible. It must be possessed by the federal state as a whole. This concept is upheld by the federal government.
in Canada. Yet a third group, chiefly Soviet jurists, maintain that sovereignty is concurrent, that both the federal state and its republics are sovereign. This view is incorporated in the constitution of the USSR.

As far as the practice of states is concerned, the crucial distinction has been made between capacity that originates in the internal constitution of a state, and capacity that is a direct function of sovereignty. No domestic endowment of capacity can vest a member state with sovereignty. This was clear at the United Nations Law of Treaties Conference at which a clause pertaining to the capacity of member states was discussed. Article 5 (2) stated that, "State members of a federal union may possess a capacity to conclude treaties if such capacity is admitted by the federal constitution and within the limits there laid down." It was argued that since the federal union is delegated with sovereignty, not the member state, the clause was not within the parameters of a convention codifying the law of treaties between sovereign states. One of the principal reasons for the rejection of the clause was that the majority of states held that the status and capacity of a member state should not be determined solely by the internal constitution of the state. This would diminish the authority of international law and "establish a principle potentially disruptive of state representation in the international community."

The conclusion drawn from the evidence is that "member states cannot claim the status of an international person on the basis of sovereignty." The competence endowed upon a member state by its constitution is another criterion for international personality that has been exten-
sively examined by international lawyers, constitutional experts, journalists and politicians at both levels of government. There are basically two schools of thought. On the one hand it is posited that member states of a federation do not possess a personality distinct from the federation. R.C. Ghosh writes: "It is not possible for member states of a Federal State to be recognized as International Persons for the simple reason that they are not "states" in the sense in which the term is used in International Law." When member states do enter relations with other states, they do so as agents of the federal government. On the other hand, it is argued that member states, endowed with a limited international competence by their constitutions, may possess a limited international personality. They are therefore, subjects of international law.

There are several federal states whose constitutions are not so bereft of explicitness on the question of competence in foreign affairs as in the Canadian. Four types of federal state can be classified. There are those where the conclusion of treaties and the power to approve or implement them is the sole responsibility of the central authorities, namely, India, Malaysia, Burma, Austria, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Libya. In the United States, foreign affairs is generally restricted to the federal government, but a great deal of transnational activity by member states exists. There are those whose member states may act in certain areas, subject to the approval of the federal government, namely, Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland and the USSR. Finally, as is the case in Canada and Nigeria, the federal government is competent to conclude treaties but not to implement them.
Before considering the case of Canada, a brief analysis is offered of each of the constitutions of the United States, Switzerland, West Germany and the USSR to assess which, if any, of these states possess international personality on the basis of their constitutional competence.

The constitution of the United States delegates the treaty-making power to the President and the Senate. Article II, Section 2 (2) says that the President "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur." Article VI provides that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States of America, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land."

Article I, Section 10 (3) declares that no state "shall, without the consent of Congress ... enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power." The numerous administrative and technical agreements between states and the border provinces of Canada have not necessitated the approval of Congress. Those that did include the Northeast Interstate Forest Fire Protection Compact of 1951, the Great Lakes Basin Compact of 1955, and the Minnesota-Manitoba Highway Agreement of 1962. These sorts of agreements do not involve activities of a sovereign nature with potential national and international consequences. The conclusion drawn by most international jurists is that the states of the United States do not possess international personality and are not subjects of international law.

It is interesting to note that, in a country where the residual power lies with the member states, judicial decisions such as Missouri v. Holland (the famous migratory birds case) have consistently supported
the central government. In Canada, where the Fathers of Confederation sought to strengthen the central government by placing the residual power in federal hands, judicial decisions and political reality have created the opposite situation.²⁰

In Switzerland, Article 8 of the constitution states that the federation has the right of "concluding alliances and treaties with foreign powers and in particular treaties concerning customs duties and trade."²¹ Article 9 gives the cantons the right to conclude treaties in areas of public economic regulations, border and police relations.²² On these subjects, a canton may communicate with the inferior authorities or officials of a foreign state. Otherwise, all communications with foreign states must take place through the intermediary of the Federal Council. All agreements are subject to the control and consent of the Federal Council. As far as those agreements concluded by the Federation on behalf of the cantons, international jurists are undecided as to whether they are federal or cantonal treaties.²³ Morin suggests that it is necessary to examine the form and content of each one.²⁴ Swiss jurists conclude that "the federal treaty-making power is unlimited."²⁵

In the German example, Article 32(1) places the conduct of foreign affairs within the jurisdiction of the Bund: "The maintenance of relations with foreign states is the concern of the Federation,"²⁶ with the caveat that the Länder may, with the consent of the Federal government, enter into treaties with foreign states. The right to enter into treaties of a political nature is reserved to the federation: "Treaties which regulate the political relations of the Federation or relate to matters of federal legislation require the consent or participation, in the form of a federal law, of the bodies competent in any specific case.
for such federal action." The federal and Lander governments reached agreement in 1957 on the course to be followed by the federal government when it negotiated agreements on matters within Lander constitutional jurisdiction (the Lindau Agreement). This agreement permits the federal government to engage international obligations in spheres of Lander jurisdiction, provided the latter is consulted.

The Lander have entered into few agreements with foreign states and these are of a functional nature. In order to implement the compacts, the consent of the federal government is required. When the Lander are contracting parties to an agreement, they are recognized in both German constitutional law (Port of Kehl case 1953) and in international law as subjects of international law.

The case of the Soviet Union is atypical. Article 76 of the constitution declares the sovereignty of the Union Republics. Article 80 reads "A Union Republic has the right to enter into relations with the other states, conclude treaties with them, exchange diplomatic and consular representatives and take part in the work of international organizations." Article 73, clause 10, however, stipulates quite clearly that the jurisdiction of the Union has overall responsibility for "representation of the USSR in international relations; the USSR's relations with other states and with international organizations; establishment of the general procedure for, and co-ordination of, the relations of the Union Republics with other states and with international organizations; foreign trade and other forms of external economic activity on the basis of state monopoly." As a result of political negotiations, the Ukraine and Byelorussian Republics were admitted to the United Nations in 1945. In as much as they are members of the IAEA,
ILO, UNESCO, WHO, WMO, ITC and are parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, they can be said to possess rights and perform duties. Western jurists, pointing to the centralized nature of the Soviet Union, generally agree that the Soviet Republics have little scope for independent action.

International lawyers conclude that the German Länder, the Soviet Republics, and in certain instances the Swiss Cantons can employ constitutional competence as a criterion for international personality. Their respective constitutions permit them a limited competence and third states who treat with them are cognisant of the limitations. In these three cases, the member units of the federation were possessed of an international personality prior to joining their federations. It is more a case of maintaining a certain level of their previous personality rather than acquiring it anew. In the Canadian context, there is no question of any of the provinces possessing an international personality prior to confederation. The three founding provinces and British Columbia were British colonies at the time of union and Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta were brought into existence by the federation. Newfoundland did not possess external sovereignty, and therefore upon joining the federation in 1949 it had no personality to relinquish.

Canada is unique among federal states. Its constitution makes only one reference to competence in foreign affairs. Section 132 reads, "The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all powers necessary or proper for performing the obligations of Canada or of any province thereof, as part of the British Empire, towards foreign countries, arising under treaties between the Empire and such foreign
countries." Canada's ultimate acquisition of sovereign status was not contemplated in 1867. Bearing that in mind, Canadian jurists point out that the widest possible latitude in foreign affairs was endowed upon the Canadian government. It is argued that this is indicative of the fact that the central state was intended to have exclusive jurisdiction in this sphere. No differentiation was made between subject matter of provincial or dominion jurisdiction.

Gradually Canada acquired the concomitant treaty-making power. The first stage in this process was the participation of the Canadian government in the negotiations culminating in an imperial treaty concerning Canada, the Treaty of Washington 1871. The next step was the signature by Canada of the Treaty of Versailles 1919 as a member of the British Empire. Finally Canada signed the Halibut Fisheries Treaty as a sovereign entity in 1923. This last procedure was approved by the Imperial Conference of 1923, "Bilateral treaties imposing obligations on one part of the Empire should be signed by a representative of that part." The 1926 Imperial Conference confirmed this principle and it was embodied in law by the Statute of Westminster in 1931.

Up until 1937 Canada was able to conclude and implement treaties on any subject. In the Aeronautics and Radio cases the Privy Council seemed prone to countenance wide federal powers of implementation. Lord Sankey, Lord Chancellor, had declared in 1930 that he and his colleagues did not intend to interpret the constitution in a narrow and technical way but rather in a large and liberal way. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Bennett government felt secure in adhering to and implementing three conventions adopted by the International Labour
Conference, even though they dealt with matters within provincial legislative competence. When the case came before the Privy Council, the personnel had changed completely. Some Canadian jurists were highly critical of the fact that not one of the five on the Board for the Labour Conventions Case had decided the Radio Case in 1932. They argued that the constant change of personnel led to inconsistency and that the JCPC could never evolve a real understanding of Canadian constitutional and political realities.

The principle on which the decision was made is a fundamental one in English and Canadian law. The power to make and ratify treaties lies exclusively with the Crown. No implementing legislation is required if the Crown is acting within its prerogative, namely, matters of peace, war, and cession of its territory. In other matters, implementing legislation must be sought from parliament. Thus Lord Atkin's pronouncement "Within the British Empire there is a well established rule that the making of a Treaty is an executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail alteration of the existing law, requires legislative action." The theory on which this is based is the division of powers between the Crown and Parliament. The Supreme Court of Canada maintained this principle in the Arrow River Case some five years prior to the Labour Conventions Case.

Inspired by traditional practice and the new ideas of cooperative federalism, the Privy Council took this principle one step further. It bifurcated the treaty implementation power. It was felt that provincial autonomy was threatened. Treaties might be utilized by the federal government as tools to intrude in areas which, in the absence of a treaty, were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the province.
Hence the famous dictum denoting the bifurcation of the treaty implementation power. "While the ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters she still retains the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her original structure." 47

The decision was seen to have stripped the central government of its power to bind all the separate regional parts of the country to a national policy. Canadian jurists predicted doom for the future efficacy of Canadian foreign policy. The rabid reaction is understandable in the context of the thirties when national policies were considered requisite if Canada was to cope with the changing economic system. 48 The legal rationale of the decision was also questioned. Many jurists could not accept the differentiation made by Lord Atkin between "empire treaties" and "dominion treaties". One such legal writer traced the treaties signed between 1867 and 1937 and found that, except for a brief period following the war, there were no empire treaties, eo nomine. In the majority of cases His Majesty or His Majesty's representative, the Governor-General, was the contracting party. 49 The replacement of the latter by dominion ministers did not warrant the conclusion that Section 132 was obsolete and that in the matter of so-called dominion treaties the Canadian government was no longer possessed of the competence to implement. 50

The impact of this change in doctrine was felt after the Second World War when Canada became a member of the United Nations and its related agencies. In 1947 when a resolution was submitted to the General Assembly calling upon member states to encourage the teaching of the UN Charter in schools, Canada abstained from the voting. 51 A similar situation
occurred in 1948 when Canada voted in favour of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but warned, "In regard to any rights which are defined in this document, the federal government of Canada does not intend to invade other rights which are also important to the people of Canada, and by this I mean the rights of the provinces under our Federal Constitution." Despite the absence of a federal state clause, Canada voted in favour of the final Covenant on Human Rights in 1966. The process of ratification has been difficult. Premier Johnson complained in 1968 that application of the Covenant to all parts of Canada violated the constitution. The Covenant was not finally ratified until 1976 and then, only after a special conference with the provinces where an understanding was reached as to the implementing measures falling within provincial jurisdiction.

Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have had the effect of balancing Lord Atkin's view that federal legislative competence was not enlarged by Canada's accession to international sovereignty. Two cases are viewed by some jurists as milestones in the gradual reversal of the Labour Conventions doctrine. The first is the Reference Re: Tax on Foreign Legations, which came before the Reference Court six years later. The Court was asked whether the City of Ottawa and the Village Park of Rockliffe had the right to impose taxes on foreign and Commonwealth Legations. The view of Judges Rinfret and Taschereau was that this would contravene customary international law. La Forest wrote of the decision, "From a limitation on provincial powers, and self-implementing federal executive powers respecting matters necessarily incidental to the exercise of sovereign power on the international plane, it is a short step to say in regard to such matters there
must necessarily be federal legislative power, for by definition these matters go beyond the concern of the provinces and so fall within the opening words of Section 91 of the BNA Act." In the second case, Re: Offshore Mineral Rights, the Supreme Court decided that jurisdiction over offshore resources could only be exercised by a sovereign entity in international law. This decision was heavily criticized by a number of Canadian jurists, one of whom wrote, "The court made the fatal mistake of equating jurisdiction in a federal state at the international level in relation to foreign countries, and jurisdiction in a federal state at the internal level as between the federal and provincial governments." With such a strong division among jurists, the value of this decision as a milestone in the reversal of the Labour Conventions doctrine is questionable.

Irrespective of these developments, the situation whereby the federal government has competence to conclude, but not to implement treaties dealing with matters of provincial jurisdiction, persists. Solutions to this problem have been posited. A.M. Jacomy-Millette sees two possible solutions. The first is that a limited treaty-making power be extended to the provinces by an amendment of the BNA Act. The provinces would be competent to conclude treaties in areas within their constitutional jurisdiction. The new constitution would emphasize that the federal government is responsible for global national policies. Mechanisms for joint consultation would be set up and approval of both levels of government would be necessary before the conclusion of an agreement by the provinces. The second solution "which would be a 'second-choice' would be for the federal government to have exclusive jurisdiction over treaty-making. In this instance compulsory and regular
consultation of the provinces would have to take place. R. Atkey supports the first solution when he asserts that "some means must be found for accommodating the desire of some provinces to project their legitimate domestic activities into the international community." The province of Quebec has put forward extensive arguments for treaty-making powers. The articulation of the logical relationship between treaty-implementation and treaty-making was made at a Quebec parliamentary committee meeting on the constitution in 1964. André Patry made the following statement:

There is no reason to dissociate two operations of the same act, making and applying the accord. I do not see why the one who concludes the accord does not have the right to put it into effect or why the one who puts it into effect does not have the right to conclude it. This is in the logic of things, again they are two aspects of the same operation which is the concluding of an agreement with another party. Moreover, if Quebec has the exclusive right to legislate in the educational, cultural and private law fields, why should not this same Quebec have the right to agree with the other states and draw many benefits from the resulting exchanges, to do it with full authority and without restriction ..., not have the right to deal on the basis of equality with foreign states, and with international institutions in the field of its constitutional competence.

A year later, his arguments were reiterated publicly by Paul Gérin-Lajoie, Quebec Minister of Education, in a speech before the Montreal Consular Corps in which he claimed full treaty-making powers for the province of Quebec. Ten days after this Jacques Yvan-Morin wrote a series of articles in "Le Devoir" in which he posited the basic legal arguments found four years later in the Working Paper on Foreign Relations presented to the constitutional conference of February, 1969.

Quebec's arguments for extended provincial competence are fourfold. The first argument is a symmetrical one. A reading of
the Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver General of New Brunswick Case (1892) and the Bonanza Creek v. the King Case (1916) illustrates the parallel executive authority of the provinces. In the first, the Privy Council ruled that the lieutenant governors had all the powers of the royal prerogative necessary for provincial purposes. In the second, it was ruled that the distribution of powers under the grant of executive authority follows the distribution under the grant of legislative powers in the BNA Act. According to Morin, these decisions do not accord with the Anglo-Canadian conception of federalism which since the time of Sir John A. Macdonald has seen the provinces as "grosses municipalités". The Working Paper further concludes that the constitution has primacy over the Letters Patent of 1947 which authorized the Governor-General to exercise the royal prerogatives in external affairs. The second argument is a comparative one. The example of other federal states is used to endorse their claims. The third argument concerns the international practice of states for which Article 5(2) of the Law of Treaties convention is cited. At the time the Working Paper was drafted, the article had not been rejected by the international community. Even when it was, Quebec could return to the viewpoint it had held in 1967, "There is no rule of international law which prohibits member states from being endowed with the capacity to conclude treaties with other states." The final argument is a political one, namely, "what must be done to make federalism work".

The federal government does not accept Quebec's interpretation of the law. It argues that the two Privy Council cases are
irrelevant, since at the time they were decided, the Crown's external prerogatives had not yet devolved upon Canada. The contention that the Letters Patent are inferior to the constitution is considered incorrect since the former is a constitutional document. The argument based on the delegation of royal prerogative to the Governor-General has been discussed by a number of Canadian jurists. Szabowski writes:

If there still existed any doubt as to the federal government's exclusive authority to make treaties irrespective of subject matter, this delegation of royal prerogative to the Governor-General seems to have intended to extinguish it once and for all. Consequently the Governor-General-in-Council possesses now exactly the same power, in scope and extent, to issue full powers and to ratify treaties as does the Queen; hence, the Canadian Government is legally free to make the legislative jurisdiction of the provinces.

Other writers support this argument including Grenon, Cheffins, Morris, and Delisle.

The comparative approach is discounted on the grounds that the historical experience of other states is quite different and that no two situations are analogous. As far as Article 5(2) was concerned, Canada vigorously opposed it at both United Nations conferences. The principal objection was that the paragraph was tantamount to inviting other states to interpret the constitution of any country for themselves. In terms of "what must be done to make federalism work" the federal government issued two White Papers. The first devoted two chapters to methods of cooperation in foreign policy. The second outlined formulae for consultation and involvement of the provinces in international conferences on education.

The constitutional issue has yet to be settled in Canada.
The question of whether the provinces should be endowed with competence to conclude treaties is still debated.

One final criterion for international personality is that of recognition. There is disagreement among lawyers about the role recognition plays. One group argues that recognition has a "constitutive effect and is the essential condition of international personality", and others consider that recognition is "merely declaratory, international personality being primarily a question of fact". The latter opinion was upheld by the Institut de Droit International in 1936.

Many jurists who oppose the constitutive view of recognition accept it as valid for member states of federations. Various judicial decisions have upheld the constitutive viewpoint. In Jolly v. Maink (1933), a case dealing with Australia's right to adhere to the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations, it was ruled that a "refusal by foreign states to recognize any separate personality in a Dominion would leave them quite outside the family of nations." Other jurists consider the international personality of the member state rests primarily on the competence endowed it by the constitution. This competence is a prerequisite of recognition. The principle upheld at the United Nations conference on the Law of Treaties was that the ability of a member state to become an international person depends on both internal capacity and recognition. Thus although the USSR has allowed all fifteen republics to enter into direct relations with other states, only two have been recognized by the international community.

Conclusion

A study of the three legal notions, sovereignty, competence
and recognition illustrates the role of domestic law in the determination of member state status in the international arena. All too often the protagonists in the debate on international status for the provinces consider only one aspect of the legal problem.

Member states cannot claim international personality on the basis of their limited sovereignty. This does not mean they are unable to become international persons. This can occur when the constitution of the state endows them with a degree of competence and third states agree to treat with them. If the constitution is unclear on the subject, as in Canada, the generally acknowledged principle is that third states should never intervene in the internal affairs of that country by interpreting the constitution in favour of the member state.
II The Member State and International Responsibility

The arguments supporting provincial competence to conclude treaties may seem very logical and laudable from a purely domestic point of view, but they cannot be analyzed without a consideration of international responsibility. Three aspects of this issue are examined below. First, federal authorities often attempt to defend breaches of international obligation by reference to constitutional lack of competence, namely the failure of a member state to fulfil an obligation. The validity of this argument is analyzed. Second, the question of who is responsible for the obligations undertaken by a member state is considered. A related legal issue is that pertaining to agreements concluded by member states in excess of their competence. Finally, the question of responsibility in the Canadian context is focused upon. The provinces have concluded numerous international arrangements and their exact legal status is examined.

International responsibility is defined as "a principle of international law; and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation."80 This definition emphasizes the two principal components of the legal notion: international responsibility and international obligation.81 Virtually all legal decisions and legal writers maintain that the federal state is responsible for the acts and omissions of its component units. The federal state is responsible for fulfilling its international obligations. Responsibility cannot be evaded by invocation of municipal constraints. This is a well established principle of international law.
This opinion has been upheld by various legal institutes. In 1927, the Institut de Droit International debated the topic of state responsibility for harm perpetrated in their territory to foreign property or persons. The conclusion reached was that the federal state "ne peut invoquer, pour se soustraire à cette responsabilité, le fait que sa constitution ne lui donne ni le droit de contrôler sur leur États particuliers, ni le droit d'exiger d'eux qu'ils satisfassent à leurs obligation." In 1929 a similar conclusion was reached by the Harvard Law School in a draft convention on state responsibility for injury to foreigners: "A state is not relieved of responsibility because an injury to an alien is attributed to one of its political subdivisions, regardless of the extent to which the national government, according to its constitution, has control of the subdivision." These two studies were conducted prior to the League of Nations Conference in 1930 which examined this issue. The final text of that conference concluded that "a state cannot avoid international responsibility by invoking its municipal law." The International Law Commission has supported this position. In 1961 Garcia Armador said "les actes et omissions des subdivisions politique sont imputable à l'État quel que soit l'organisation interne de ces subdivisions ou le degré d'autonomie dont elle jouissent."

Various international tribunals have reached this conclusion. In the Montijo arbitration of 1875, the Court was asked if the Federal Government of Colombia was responsible for the damage caused to American citizens when their treaty rights were abrogated by a member state. The federal government was held responsible for the misconduct of the member state. In 1929 in the Hyacinthe-Pellat claim, a French citizen wished
to recover a sum of money he had been forced to loan the Revolutionary
Mexican State of Senora in 1913. The federal state was deemed re-
sponsible for "tous les actes des états particuliers qui donnent lien
à des réclamations d'États étrangers." 87

Federal courts have also acknowledged the responsibility
of the federal state to fulfill its international obligations.
In Re: Ownership of Offshore Mineral Rights, the Supreme Court of
Canada concluded, "Canada is the sovereign State which will be recog-
nized by international law as having the rights stated in the
Convention of 1958, and it is Canada, not the Province of British Columbia,
that will have to answer the claims of other members of the international
community for the breach of obligation and responsibilities." 88

According to international law the federal state is responsible
for all international obligations it has undertaken. Responsibility for
international obligations undertaken by a member state raises a separate
issue in international law. There are two schools of thought. Some
consider the federal state directly responsible for the fulfilment of
obligations undertaken by a member. The other school does not discard
the possibility that member states may be responsible for their inter-
national obligations. This latter view is a logical extension of the
legal fact that international agreements bind only contracting parties.

No international court has ever had to deal with a claim
arising out of a breach of international obligation by a member state.
The dominant legal opinion is that the responsibility depends upon the
status of the member state, which in turn hinges on the constitution
of that state and recognition by third parties. The notions of inter-
national personality and international responsibility are linked.
Garcia Armador said in 1956 that responsibility depends on the "degré de contrôle ou autorité que l'État fédéral exerce sur les activités internes de l'État fédéré et la mesure dans laquelle il assume la représentation internationale." If member states enjoy a more or less independent international competence according to their constitution, and foreign powers agree to treat with them in full knowledge of that fact, then member states are responsible for that obligation. As has been demonstrated, most federal authorities maintain close control over the international activities of their member states. In most cases, therefore, the federal state would be directly or indirectly responsible. This is perhaps the reason why an international court has never had to deal with a claim arising from a breach of obligation by a member state.

A related aspect of this problem is the conclusion of agreements by member states in excess of their competence. The prevailing doctrine is that the agreements concluded by member states not constitutionally competent are null and void. The federal authority is not responsible in this instance. If, however, the federal authority intervenes to legitimize the agreement then it assumes an indirect responsibility for the fulfilment of that obligation, at least from the external point of view.

Agreements between the provinces and third parties have involved federal government concurrence and have been given legal effect by the government. "The exchange of notes gives international legal effect to the arrangements between the province and the foreign entity, but does not involve the province itself acquiring international rights or accepting international obligations." The Ontario Department of Highways concurred
with this view in a report concerning a proposed international bridge at Kingston. "An international bridge requires close cooperation and agreement between the two sovereign states. The respective governments of Canada and the U.S.A. have sole jurisdiction in respect of international obligations entered into on behalf of their nations and thus the government of Canada must sanction by legislation any undertaking which necessitates an agreement with the U.S.A. or any agency thereof." 93

Certain procedures are adopted at the domestic level to ensure that provincial agreements are given legal effect. In 1958 New Brunswick concluded its first international arrangement with Maine. This entailed construction and maintenance of a bridge between Campobello Island and Lubec, Maine. Canada passed federal legislation in September 1958 which enabled New Brunswick to enter into the agreement with Maine. 94 To complete the project New Brunswick had to secure the consent of the federal government namely, ratification of the compact. 95 Similarly in 1951, New Brunswick obtained federal approval before passing an Order-in-Council enabling its Minister of Lands and Mines to seek entry into the Northeastern Forest Fire Compact. 96 In 1960 an agreement was concluded between Ontario and Minnesota which resulted in the bridge across the Pigeon River. After approving the final agreement the federal government adopted an Order-in-Council in 1961. 97

The federal government has also intervened to give legal effect to agreements entered into by Quebec. The first such intervention was when the Quebec Education Department signed an agreement with the Association pour l'Organisation des Stages en France. The latter offered to receive ten Quebec students per year. Ottawa intervened to modify
the terms of the agreement, obtaining two of the ten places for its own candidates. The federal government authorized the agreement with an exchange of letters, 23 and 27 December 1963 between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the French Ambassador to Canada.

With the ententes of February and November 1965, the federal government was not involved in the negotiating phase. The first entente was signed in Paris on 27 February 1965 by two representatives of the Quebec government, Paul Gérin-Lajoie and Claude Morin, and by the French Minister of National Education. It provided for a program of exchanges of students, teachers, and researchers. In Quebec it was considered by some to constitute the first "official agreement" between a Canadian province and a foreign country. An exchange of letters took place on the same day between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the French Ambassador.

On 14 May 1965, the Quebec Minister of Cultural Affairs, Pierre Laporte, went to Paris to initiate new discussions with the French government for the conclusion of another agreement. On 24 November 1965 an entente was signed. It is interesting to note that in the first entente the contracting parties were 'France' and the 'Province of Québec'. In the second it was 'France' and the 'Government of Quebec'. No reference was made to the "accord-cadre" that the federal government had signed with France on the 17 November 1965. This latter agreement stipulated that any province could sign an agreement with France in the sphere of culture, education and scientific research providing the prior approval of the federal government was obtained. A hurried exchange of letters between the Secretary of State for External
Affairs and the French Ambassador took place on the same day.

On 14 September 1967, a procès-verbal was adopted by the Premier of Quebec and the French Minister of Education. The subject of this accord fell within the parameters of the 1965 "accord-cadre" and the federal government did not consider it necessary to intervene. This was equally the case with the Protocol between Quebec and France of 9 February 1969. Three "lettres d'ententes" were signed in Paris on 24 January 1969. One of them dealt with proposed cooperation on a communication satellite project. Mr. Sharp made it clear that the Quebec government should have consulted the Trudeau administration before disclosing its plan for a joint communications satellite and including in it a letter of intent to the government of another country.

The attitude of the American government made it unnecessary for the federal government to intervene over the Quebec-Louisiana agreement of 9 September 1969. On the 31 May 1967 the American Senate adopted a resolution that endorsed and welcomed the establishment of closer ties with Canada and its provinces. The Americans have never encouraged a Canadian province to claim external sovereignty.

The various arrangements that have been concluded by the Quebec government since 1963 range from accords, ententes, protocols, joint communiqués, to procès-verbaux. There is agreement among at least some jurists that these Quebec arrangements possess no international validity of their own. They create no mutually binding obligations under international law and are not enforceable in the event of default. The covering letters of the Canadian government are, therefore, legally unnecessary. On the other hand Quebec did act, in some cases unilaterally and in excess of its competence. The ententes were intended to serve,
at least in part, as precedents for de jure status. It can be argued, therefore, that from both the internal and external perspective, the covering letters were necessary.

Conclusion

The extent of responsibility in international law is directly related to the degree of competence endowed upon the member state by its constitution. Those member states that possess an international personality are responsible for their obligations internally and externally. In the Canadian context the provinces are not international persons. The federal government intervenes to give legal effect to provincial agreements and thus assumes an indirect responsibility for the fulfilment of the obligation.
III The Member State and International Representation

The right of *jus legationis* and membership in international organizations is generally reserved to the central state. Member states do send representatives abroad. This raises the question of whether member states are entitled to immunity. This is examined below. The extent of provincial representation in the international sphere is then considered.

International immunity is defined as "all those exceptions from the laws and jurisdiction of a State that are based on a norm of international law that sovereign states enjoy immunity before the national courts of foreign countries." It is an accepted principle of international law that sovereign states enjoy immunity before the national courts of foreign courts of foreign countries. The position of member states in international law is disputed. There are two schools of thought. One school asserts that only sovereign states or their recognized agencies are entitled to international immunity. The other school maintains that member states may be entitled to international immunity if they enjoy an international personality.

The latter viewpoint has been consistently upheld in the French courts. Moreover those member states who are international persons, the Ukraine and Byelorussia, do enjoy the immunities and privileges of other UN members.

Some individual countries have granted immunities to member states. According to Section 1, subsection 2 of the Diplomatic Immunities Act of 1952, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom may by order-in-council confer "on the Chief representatives in London of the States
or Provinces of a Commonwealth Country and on the members of their staff performing consular functions, an immunity from suit and legal process and an inviolability of premises and archives similar to that possessed by foreign consuls in the United Kingdom. This section applies to the federations of Canada, Australia, India and Nigeria.

No rule of international law requires that these privileges be extended. Indeed, it is generally considered to be diplomatic courtesy on the part of the host country.

It is interesting to note that the government of Quebec accorded certain fiscal privileges to foreign consuls in 1961 and 1965. As early as 1967 the government was discussing the possibility of extending immunities to international organizations and consuls resident in Quebec in accordance with the Vienna Conference codification of 1961 and 1963. In 1974 new legislation concerning the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs was adopted. Article 23 of that law gave the Lieutenant Governor the right to extend certain privileges to consuls if their countries reciprocate. This article is contrary to the position of the federal government which refuses all official competence in this domain to the provinces. Once again a precedent for de jure international status was being sought.

Whether or not member states are entitled to immunity in foreign countries is entirely dependent on the laws of the host country. Only sovereign states and member states possessed of an international personality are recognized in international law as qualified for exemption from the laws of a foreign state.

Member states may, nevertheless, assert themselves on the global scene. Historically the provinces have been interested in securing
adequate external representation of their needs. In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century the provinces were concerned with immigration and commerce. In 1868, a federal-provincial conference on immigration endorsed a Quebec proposal that each province send its own immigration officer abroad. In 1871 Quebec appointed two temporary agents in Europe followed in 1882 by two more. The task of these officers was to encourage immigration to Quebec. Federal-Provincial rivalry was evident in this process and full control over immigration reverted to the federal government in 1875. The provinces were thenceforth able to appoint sub-agents but these would work under the Agent-General of Canada. This arrangement was seen to be necessary to avoid duplication of work and increase uniformity of policy. With the establishment of the High Commissionership in 1880, the provinces were able to appoint Agents General. Quebec appointed one in Paris in 1882. The other provinces appointed Agents-General in London; Nova Scotia (1885), New Brunswick (1887), British Columbia (1901), Prince Edward Island (1902) and Quebec and Ontario (1908).

The expansion of provincial representation abroad came in the 1960s. The initial thrust on the external plane emanated from the province of Quebec in the mid-sixties when it sought the right to develop its own external relations. In the seventies similar demands have been voiced by other provinces. Ontario and Alberta have created institutional mechanisms to pursue their external interests. John Holmes writes "the diplomacy of the State, particularly a federal state like Canada, is challenged by the loosening of its federal structure. The result is not the death of diplomacy but rather its multiplication and complication."
By 1977 Ontario had opened offices in sixteen foreign cities, seven in Europe (London, Brussels, Frankfurt, Paris, Vienna, Milan and Stockholm), one in Asia (Tokyo), six in the United States (New York, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, Cleveland and Minneapolis) and two in Latin America (Mexico and Sao Paulo). Ontario and Alberta were both considering opening an office in Washington in 1971. Ottawa objected to this and the final agreement of 1973 established a foreign service officer in the embassy in Washington to deal with the four paramount interests of these two provinces, namely, energy, the automobile pact, commerce, and the Great Lakes.

Quebec had fifteen offices abroad in 1977. There were five in Europe (Brussels, Dusseldorf, London, Milan and Paris), one in Asia (Tokyo), eight in the United States (New York, Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Lafayette, Atlanta, and Washington), and one in Haiti. Quebec has an advisor in the Canadian embassy in Abidjan. Since the Andras-Bienvenue agreement on immigration of 1974, Quebec has appointed immigration officers to serve in Canadian embassies abroad including those in Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Argentina, France, and Belgium. Quebec is the only province with this arrangement.

The provincial offices abroad are primarily concerned with trade, tourism, and industrial development. "Although provincial governments are not empowered to appoint diplomatic or consular representatives ... they can, of course, maintain offices in other countries and appoint officials to deal with matters of provincial concern that relate essentially to the private sector."

As Ivan Head wrote, the purpose of these provincial offices are to bring to the provinces tourists or industrialists who will conduct themselves according
to Canadian law. 126

The fact of provincial interest in the external environment is not new but the approach of the provinces to the question of international affairs is. "The overall approach is centred on the need for greater autonomy at the provincial level but also - and in the opposite direction for participation (the key word with concetration nowadays) in the formulation of a national economic policy as regards national as well as provincial needs and consequently national and provincial exchanges abroad, the more so in time of world economic crisis and recession." 127

The desire of the provinces to share in the formulation of national policy can be readily demonstrated. In 1975 for example, Manitoba's Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce submitted a brief to Ottawa outlining the position of his government on the GATT negotiations. He suggested that Ottawa develop its negotiating policy in conjunction with the provinces. 128 This brief was followed in the same year by a joint brief from the governments of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia. The provinces were asking for federal-provinces deliberations to ensure "that the legitimate interests of the provinces were incorporated into the Canadian negotiating position." 129

At the opening session of a federal-provincial first ministers conference in Ottawa on 23 May, 1973, the Premier of Newfoundland asked that the provinces be able to participate directly in the forthcoming Law of the Sea Conference. 130 He made it quite clear that he was referring to participation in the preparations for the conference as well as the nomination of representatives to the meeting themselves. 131 The Canadian delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference of 1975 included provincial
representatives from Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, British Columbia and Newfoundland.

The provinces are also interested in participating in those international organizations which deal with matters within provincial legislative jurisdiction. According to Lord Atkin's doctrine of watertight compartments the provinces are responsible for the implementation of such legislation. Even if they were not their participation would be desirable. Membership of international organizations is restricted to the federal state. Some agencies of the United Nations made provision for the associated membership of entities not in control of their foreign policy. It is generally agreed that these provisions were formulated specifically for the colonies whose independence was pending. The formula was that application for membership would be sponsored by the central state. The latter would be responsible for the fulfillment of the obligations of the entity.

Two thirds of the established membership would have to accept the application. The new member would not be entitled to vote or to be elected to a position in the organization. Quebec has argued that the provinces should be allowed some form of special status in international organizations that deal with technical as opposed to political issues.

"Un grand nombre d'organisations interétatiques n'ont été fondées que pour la solution, ou moyen de l'entraide internationale, de problèmes jugés jusqu'ici de nature purement locale." The federal government maintains that highly political matters are often discussed at ILO, UNESCO, WHO and FAO conferences and that this distinction cannot be made. The government has, therefore, sought to involve the provinces in these organizations by way of representation on Canadian delegations.
For education conferences sponsored by UNESCO, the Commonwealth, the OECD and La Francophonie this procedure has worked well.

Quebec did acquire special status in the Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique in 1970. Quebec has consistently viewed participation in certain organizations as "une ouverture sur le monde". The concern for cultural and linguistic sovereignty provided Quebec with a particular vocation for international francophone organizations. In an article in Le Devoir on 20 April, 1967 Paul Gérin-Lajoie stated that Quebec must coordinate internal and external activities within its competence; participate in UN agencies such as UNESCO, ILO and WHO; play a leading role in the francophone community; and open a Delegation-General in francophone Africa to promote cultural, economic and technical cooperation. 135

At the conference of the Agence in Niamey, 16-20 March 1970, the possibility of admitting non-sovereign entities was discussed. The African states and France favoured some form of special status for Quebec. 136 The position of the Trudeau government was clear. "Canada's position is quite simple ... only Canada, a sovereign state, can participate as a member in International Conference". 137 A compromise was reached between Quebec and Ottawa. Article 3(3) reads:

Dans le plein respect de la souveraineté et de la compétence international des États membres, tout gouvernement peut-être admis comme gouvernement participant aux institutions, aux activités et aux programmes de l'Agence, sous réserve de l'approbation de l'État membre dont relève le territoire sur lequel le gouvernement participant concerne exerce son autorité et selon les modalités convenues entre ce gouvernement et celui de l'État membre.

The voting formula decided upon was, that the Canadian delegation would have only one vote but that the federal government would abstain from
voting if the government of Quebec presented objections in areas within provincial legislative jurisdiction. In October 1971 when the second General Assembly of the Agence was held in Ottawa the Cultural Affairs Minister of Quebec, M. Cloutier, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Sharp, issued a joint statement on the precise nature of Quebec's role in the Agence. M. Cloutier thought the arrangements would ensure a distinct identity for Quebec within the Canadian delegation. Quebec would be allowed to speak in its own name on all subjects within its competence. Quebec would also have direct contact with the Secretariat of the Agence in Paris. In December 1977 New Brunswick was also admitted to the Agence as a "gouvernement participant".

The concern of all provincial premiers for the economic well-being of their respective units has led to an increased number of provincial ministerial visits abroad. In September 1975 Premier Lougheed visited Europe with a fifty-five man delegation which included four cabinet ministers. The purpose of the trip was to encourage European investment in the province. Alan Blakeney spent five weeks in the Far East in May-June 1976. In Tokyo, he tried to allay the worries to Japanese businessmen over the government's public ownership policies. The Premier also expressed Saskatchewan's interest in a possible joint venture with Japanese business in the development of the province's uranium.

Premier Davis spent five days in Europe in September 1976. He met with German bankers who specialized in investment in North America. In London he spoke to British businessmen and sought to dispel fears about FIRA requirements and government policy. "I can tell you we in Ontario won't nationalize International Nickel." In February 1976 Premier Moores spent two weeks in Europe. He was accompanied by the Minister of Industrial
Development, the Minister of Fisheries and Minister of Forestry and Agriculture. The visit was designed to promote trade and economic development between Newfoundland and various European countries. Mr. Moores was seeking support for his idea of European fishing catches off the coast of Newfoundland being processed in the province. This would create between five and ten thousand jobs in the province. In October 1975 Premier Bourassa visited Iran. The final communiqué released after his visit referred to trade agreements with the Quebec government estimated to be worth at least six million dollars over five years.

Conclusion

From the above discussion of the international legal and constitutional parameters of this issue, one might conclude that there have been two key problem areas for the Canadian federation. These are international representation specifically participation in international conferences and organizations and the conclusion and implementation of agreements. If Quebec remains in confederation then constitutional changes will be necessary in this field for essentially political reasons. Should Quebec separate and become completely independent, or sovereign associate or part of a Canadian commonwealth, it can be argued that the resolution of these matters could be achieved extra constitutionally. Other provinces are less concerned to have their rights specifically enshrined in the constitution than is the Cartesian oriented Quebec.

The question of international representation in the form of offices abroad should not pose much of a problem for the federation and constitutional provisions in this area may not be necessary. Provincial offices abroad are largely for commercial, financial, and touristic
purposes. A certain flexibility has evolved and provinces are able, if and when they so wish, to open offices abroad. It can be argued that the recent refusal of the federal government to permit Quebec to open an office in Dakar is an anomaly in the normal pattern of federal response to provincial requests, caused in large part by the present conflict between the two levels of government.

Provincial participation in international organizations and conferences is somewhat more difficult to regulate. A distinction has to be drawn between organizations and conferences that relate to matters completely within provincial jurisdiction, those that pertain to shared federal-provincial competences, those that deal with matters not envisaged by the 1867 constitution, and those within federal competence but which are nonetheless of concern to the provinces. The modalities available for representation at such conferences or organizations are either a pan-Canadian representation or a distinct provincial representation within the overall Canadian delegation. As far as admission to international organizations is concerned, a precedent has been set by Quebec and New Brunswick in the ACCT. It is debatable, however, whether this formula would be feasible or acceptable to nations in large organizations such as the UN and its specialized agencies.

The conclusion of agreements raises perhaps the most difficult question. Only a few federal constitutions confer power upon member states to conclude agreements with third parties. This limited competence is always subject to overall federal approval. A possible solution for the Canadian situation is to insert a constitutional provision similar to that of the German and Swiss constitutions that would enable provinces to sign agreements in areas of their competence. In areas of shared competence the
federal government should ensure that adequate consultation takes place between the two levels of government. Matters that were not covered at all by the 1867 constitution, for which the federal government assumed responsibility, but which are of great concern to the provinces should once again be rigorously discussed by both governments before agreements are signed.

It can be suggested therefore that Article 132 of the BNA Act, which has long since been outmoded, be replaced by provisions that ensure the federal government's supremacy in international affairs but in which limited provincial competence is recognized. In terms of extra constitutional arrangements that might facilitate cooperation between the two levels of government, a permanent federal-provincial mechanism might be created to organize such cooperation. The periodic meetings of ministers and civil servants that take place regularly might be utilized as fora for the discussion of international issues.
CHAPTER 1

Footnotes


4. Ibid., p. 17.

5. Le Devoir, 1 May 1965, p. 5.


15. Ibid., p. 49.

16. Ibid., p. 51.
17. Federalism and International Relations, p. 54.


23. Ibid., p. 46.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 41.

28. Federalism and International Relations, p. 56.

29. Bernier, op cit., p. 44.


31. Ibid., p. 58.


38. The Aeronautics Case; Arose from federal legislation made necessary by the adoption of the Convention regulating Aerial Navigation (1919) which Canada signed as a member of the British Empire. The JCPC ruled that Section 132 applied.

The Radio Case: Arose from Canada's negotiation of an International Radio Telegraph Convention (1927). The JCPC rules that the legislation be implemented under the "peace, order, and good government" clause.


41. Scott, op. cit., p. 493.

42. Szablowski, op. cit., p. 30.


44. Ibid., p. 308.

45. Ibid., p. 308.


50. Ibid., p. 495.


53. Ibid., p. 157.


55. Ibid., p. 142.


59. Levy, p. 93.

60. Le Devoir, 14 & 15 April 1965.


63. Ibid., p. 18.

64. Le Devoir, 30 April 1965, p. 4.


68. Federalism and International Relations, p. 15.


70. Szablowski, op. cit., p. 28.


75. Head, op. cit., p. 394.

76. Wershof, op. cit., p. 47.

77. Bernier, op. cit., p. 74.

78. Bernier, op. cit., p. 78.

79. Ibid., p. 79.


82. Ibid., p. 22.


84. Ibid., p. 93.


90. Bernier, op. cit., p. 117.

91. Ibid., p. 120.
92. Federalism and International Relations, p. 267.
96. Ibid., p. 79.
98. Le Devoir, 6 March 1965, p. 4.
99. Ibid.
100. Le Devoir, 24 April 1965, p. 1.
104. Torrelli, op. cit., p. 286.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. See Appendix
110. Bernier, op. cit., p. 121.
111. Ibid.
112. Levy, p. 87.
114. Torrelli, p. 292.

115. Ibid.


117. Ibid.

118. Torrelli, op. cit., p. 288.


122. Francois Beaulne.

123: Ibid.

124. Ian MacDonald, Statement to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, in Canadian Federalism and International Relations, Department of External Affairs, 1975.

125. Federalism and International Relations, p. 39.

126. Head, op. cit., op. 392.


129. Ibid., February 1976, p. 45.


131. Ibid.

132. Levy, op. cit., p. 79.

133. Le Devoir, 15 April 1965, p. 5; see also L. Sabourin, "La Participation des provinces canadiennes aux organisations internationales", Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 3, (1965) pp. 82-6.
134. Federalism and International Conferences, op. cit., p. 12.

135. Le Devoir, 20 April 1967, pp. 4-5


140. Ibid.

141. An official, External Affairs, in an interview 20 January, 1977

142. Ibid., October 1975, p. 246.

143. Ibid., May 1976, p. 144.

144. Ibid., September 1976, p. 222.

145. Ibid., February 1976, p. 49.

146. Ibid.

147. Ibid., October, 1975, p. 247.
Chapter 2 The Non-State Nation Actor Framework

Nos théories trainent derrière nos partiques et nos pratiques derrière les faits.
Jacques Berque

I The Limitation of the Nation-State Perspective

The conceptual schema that dominated most of twentieth century thought was based upon the nation-state as the fundamental unit of analysis. This emphasis is hardly surprising given the predominance the state has enjoyed as an actor in global politics. Since the Second World War, however, the nature of international relations has undergone revolutionary changes. One aspect of these changes has been a proliferation of new actors on the global scene, such as international organizations, supranational organizations and multinational corporations. In addition, the number of states has increased as a result of the process of decolonization. Increasing interdependence exists among these entities as they grapple with a vast array of political, social and economic problems that oft times defy the human imagination. The extent of this interdependence can be demonstrated by a glance at some of the most fundamental problems of our time: relations between industrialized and developing countries; the food, energy and resource crises, and the ever present and expanding arms race. The complexity and diversity of the post-war environment, led to an increasing discrepancy between the reality of the cosmos and the state-centric perspective of it. The paradigm did not stimulate the exploration of the behaviour of non-state entities in the system, or the impact those entities have upon the traditional unit of the state and the international system as a whole.
The multifaceted nature of the contemporary international environment has dictated a radical change in our conceptualization of the world around us. The past ten years have witnessed various attempts by political scientists to develop concepts that permit analysis of non-state actors. One such concept was that of 'linkage' defined as "any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another". The basic unit of analysis was the linkage which consisted of direct or indirect inputs and outputs between the entity and its environment. This conceptualization represented an attempt to break away from the dichotomy of 'domestic/national' politics and 'international' politics. Although an interesting development of thought, the idea did not capture the imagination of other scholars. Two years later, another conceptual schema was put forward that of transnational relations. This analytical tool was designed to monitor activities transpiring across state systems, providing those activities were not initiated or controlled by the central foreign policy machinery of the state. Arrangements, covenants and interactions of multinational corporations, trade unions, churches, scientific bodies, international cartels and organizations were focused upon.

In 1972, Rosenau, Davis and East edited a volume analyzing various aspects of international politics in which Oran Young posited his idea of a mixed actor model of the universe. In his critique of the state centric paradigm, Young reflected that the emergence of a variety of new actors in the international environment, and the growing interdependence and interpenetration of those units, must denote a major
modification of the 'billiard ball' model of international relations. Moreover, he argued, the intervention of non-state actors in the international system constitutes a tacit and de facto erosion of the attributes of external sovereignty and territoriality that are intertwined with the modern concept of the state. De jure, however, international law does not recognize entities not in possession of complete or limited sovereignty. This leads one to ask whether the contemporary perspective of international law is anachronistic. As Friedman admonished, "The extent of the structural changes in international relations in our time requires a far more basic reorientation of our thinking in international law." 151 As far as the concept of territoriality is concerned, this has certainly been eroded by the superstructure of entities not defined in terms of state boundaries that now coexist with the infrastructure of the nation-state system. A further erosion of the concept of territoriality has resulted from the attempt by one nation-state to impose its law upon members of another nation. A good example of this is the attempt of the American government to impose American laws concerning 'trading with the enemy' upon Canadian subsidiaries of American multinational corporations. Some integration theorists have argued that ultimately the erosion of the concept of territoriality will result in a depoliticized, international, harmonious world state. 152

Young does not argue that the emergence of actors other than states will supersede the latter. These other actors are merely joining the ranks of the international system. "The basic notion of a system of mixed actors requires a movement away from the assumption of homogeneity with respect to types of actor, and therefore, a retreat from the postulate of the state as the fundamental unit of world politics." 153 With the mixed
actor conception of the global environment, there is far greater empirical potential, since the relationships between various types of actor as well as the individual behaviour of diverse actors can be examined. Although such a system is highly dynamic, there is no reason why it cannot remain stable over time and absorb conflict. Indeed, a decade ago, Galtung argued that high entropy (a low degree of order resulting from the heterogeneity of the system) would have a high conflict-absorbing and conflict-solving capacity. He also noted trends in the system which he considered would gradually undermine the basis of the nation-state.

Galtung outlined four types of identification, other than national identification, that would play an important role in the developed world. The first of these was subnational identification, loyalty to a geographic unit within the nation-state which would lead to the growth of communalism. This is a trend that has had increasing impact upon developed countries such as Canada, Belgium, France and Spain. Secondly, the idea of crossnational identification was developed. This phenomenon results from the dependency of neomodern societies on the corresponding segment in other nations and leads to a process of interpenetration. The outcome can be loyalty to more than one nation. A good example of this is the dependence of Israeli Jews upon the support and sympathy of American Jews which has provided the latter with crossnational loyalties. The third pattern of identification was transnational, instances where the unit to which one's loyalty is directed is an organization or an idea that transcends national borders. The recent articulation of world-wide revolution towards a quasi-Marxist state of such groups as the Red Army, the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Red Brigades and the Tuppamaros demonstrates
the emergence of transnational loyalty. Finally, Galtung envisaged the growth of supranational identification toward entities such as the EEC. His vision for the future of developed nations was "a steady growth in the mutual interpenetration and intermeshing of all developed, industrialised nations with neo-modern segments with each other; using INGOs and IGOs as building structures and individuals with cross, trans and supra loyalties as building blocks."156

The idea of subnationalism in developed countries broached by Galtung is a phenomenon that has been subjected to much analysis primarily because of its potential to undermine the nation-state unit from within. In a world consisting of thousands of distinct ethnic groups and only one hundred and fifty or so states, the revolutionary potential of ethnic nationalism and self-determination of nations is obvious.157 There has been a growing tendency for peoples to perceive human relations from the perspective of the ethnic group. This is a global phenomenon affecting both developed and developing countries. Ethnic conflict in post-industrialized societies is of particular interest to scholars, since by definition these societies have had more time to evolve, stabilize and integrate potentially disintegrative forces within their midst. Milton Esman is one scholar who has analyzed the phenomenon and has suggested five prerequisites for the existence of modern ethnonational solidarity. These are first a culture based upon a common language, religion and historical experience which is self-conscious and aware of its future; second, the presence of grievances based on real or perceived political, economic and cultural deprivations; third, the increasing expectations of the group; fourth, a decline in the legitimacy of the central power organs; and fifth, a rival political
organization to which the group can project its aspirations.158
Another scholar interested in explaining 'communalism' in modern
society, A.Z. Zolberg, has differentiated between traditional and
contemporary ethnicity.159 The latter is secular not religious.
It stresses language problems, economic discrimination and political
inequity. Zolberg identifies four fundamental factors that have
led to the pursuit of collective demands by ethnic groups. Modern-
ization is considered an important factor that emphasizes cultural
differences and traditional antagonism such as linguistic disadvantages.
The increase of social mobilization is seen as producing a growing
dissatisfaction with individual solutions to cultural inequities.
A good example of this is the discontent that has been expressed by
some Quebecers concerning the Official Languages Act of 1969. This is
seen to be an 'individual' solution to their aspirations by enabling
the individual, rather than the collective society, to advance. Zolberg
views the growth of the modern state as a factor that has contributed
to the creation of images by different groups in the society. In this
context he refers to the conscription crisis as an example of a public
conflict that fostered images by one group of the other. Finally, he
considers that the interrelated nature of modern society produces spill-
over. To obtain cultural autonomy requires control of the private
sector, of external relations and so on.

If a collective group meets the above criteria, what impact
will it have upon the nation-state of residence and the international
environment? This question was examined across systems in the Non-State
Nations Project, initiated in 1970.160 A common systems framework was
utilized and the volume considered the Palestinian Arabs, the Zionist
movement, the Kurds, the Basques, the Welsh, and the Navajo. The suggested definition for a non-state nation was "an entity that operates in a manner normally associated with a nation-state but is not a generally recognized nation-state." The major characteristic of such an entity is its assertion or action implying sovereignty while it is not de jure or de facto recognized as such. Although they employ this definition, the authors state categorically that not all non-state nations seek complete independence and recognition as separate nation-states. Ethnicity is not seen to be a necessary variable in the equation but it was a factor of importance in most of the case studies.

The study draws some conclusions about the impact of non-state nations on the nation-state of residence. Three general types of national autonomy sought by non-state nations were classified: (1) complete sovereignty and independence, (2) intermediate federal autonomy and (3) national assertion short of autonomy. The majority of cases fell into the intermediate federal autonomy category. Non-state nations in this grouping seek a broad range of rights within the existing state. These include the official preeminence of the local language, the establishment of laws derived from the religion of a non-state nation, claims upon the national economy (including claims commensurate to the non-state nation's population and also special claims to revenue received from natural resources of the non-state nation), representation in the central organs of government, control of local government and the right to conduct independent foreign relations. The relationship between the non-state nation and the nation-state of residence was conceptualized thus:
**NON STATE NATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation of Residence</th>
<th>Outcome: Non-state nation disappears (either is 'underground or destroyed)</th>
<th>Outcome: Either non-state nation or nation-state prevails. There may be a showdown.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suppress Non-state Nation</td>
<td>Resources: Non-state nation has few resources from outside sources.</td>
<td>Resources: In this case the non-state nation usually has considerable resources from outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodate Non-state Nation</td>
<td>Outcome: Federal or Interim Solution</td>
<td>Outcome: Non-state nation becomes independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resources: Extensive resources including opportunities from within the nation-state.</td>
<td>Resources: Extensive resources from outside the nation-state. May have resources within, including tradition of decolonization.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of these forms of national autonomy produces different impacts upon the international environment. A movement driven underground or exiled can be a destabilizing force in international politics i.e. the Palestinians. The replacement of one state by another or the fragmentation of one state into two is often viewed with apprehension by many states. The calling into question of the principle of territorial integrity could have a very destabilizing effect on many countries especially upon federations or newly emerged third world states. The development of autonomous units within federal systems can also have an impact on the international system if those units interact directly with the external environment.
II Federal States and the Non-State Nation Actor Framework

The concept of subnational groups would seem to have particular significance for federal systems whose existence must be seen as a recognition of the existence of more than one distinct group within the boundaries of the state. However, traditionally, federal states have been treated as unitary states by the international community. Recognition of the division of competence inherent in federal states might have led to an encroachment upon the fundamental principle of state sovereignty. Member states of federations do, however, interact with their external environment with varying degrees of frequency and intensity. A multitude of factors might determine the interaction such as the level of economic development, the constitutional structure of the federation, the level of decentralization and the political culture of respective member states. It is likely that member states of developed societies which possess a significant degree of autonomy and are responsible for the socio-economic development of their respective units, will be very concerned about the international environment. This is especially the case with the increasing interdependence of all actors and the importance to all of them of such issues as the state of the world economy and energy situation. Member states have become increasingly aware of the fact that many of their problems and answers to those problems originate in the international environment.

One scholar has labelled the process of member state involvement in international relations as the "internationalization" of federal states. The internationalization of Canadian federalism is attributed to the twofold process of the transformation of the international system.
after the second world war and the particular pattern of constitutional and political development in Canada which has created a high degree of decentralization. Painchaud suggests that the major effect of internationalization has been the "diffraction" of the foreign policy system of the federation.

The following schema was presented to illustrate the process.

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Central State → Member State → International System
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The direct interaction of the central state with the international environment is assumed. The diagram illustrates the way that the member state and international system can and do interact directly with each other. This is an important advance on the idea of the member state as a mere pressure group operating indirectly upon the foreign policy machinery of the central state. The member state might well continue to affect the foreign policy of the central state while at the same time developing its own links.

Areas in which the Canadian provinces might directly intervene have multiplied. The subject of many contemporary international dealings, particularly those matters which touch people directly, are matters of provincial responsibility. Problems of industrial growth, technological interdependence, labour relations, energy and resource questions, social welfare, education, culture and communications are either the exclusive responsibility of the provincial government, or shared with the central state. The provinces have, therefore, insisted on the one hand on greater input into the process of foreign policy formulation in matters of cardinal importance to provincial development. On the other hand, some provinces have sought a more independent and autonomous role upon the international
scene. The two are not mutually exclusive although a province like Alberta might place more emphasis on the former activity, while Quebec might place as much if not greater emphasis on the latter.

The question as to whether member states of federations can be said to possess a foreign policy has been raised by a number of scholars. The notion of foreign policy is a complicated one and there is still considerable debate among scholars as to its precise meaning and how it should be explained. In terms of units of analysis, one scholar has compartmentalized foreign policy into three units; decisions (unique and specific, such as the American decision to intervene in Korea); policy (a series of decisions which together make a policy); and behaviour (policy in action). In terms of an overall definition, foreign policy is often defined as the needs that states wish to relay to the international environment. It is also seen as an instrument that conveys the requirements of the international environment to the national since the equilibrium of the whole depends on the continuous adjustment of the parts thereof. An American scholar viewed American foreign policy as "a means to influence the other states and problems in the international environment." Modelski regarded foreign policy as "activities designed to change the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment." Hermann has posited a similar definition. "Foreign policy consists of those discrete official actions of the authoritative decision makers to influence the behaviour of international actors external to their own polity." Janice Stein proposed that foreign policy be defined as "les efforts autoritaires d'une société nationale pour contrôler son environment externe pour la préservation de situations
favorables à l'étranger et pour la modification de situation défavorables."

Robert Jackson attempted to initiate a debate on foreign policy and ethno-regionalism. The objective of his analysis was to explain Quebec's foreign policy in terms of the evolution of its perception of becoming a nation-state. To accomplish this, a definition was selected that did not assume that all international actors are independent states. Modelski's definition was chosen, but "activities" was replaced by "those discrete actions".

The unifying element of all these definitions is the idea of changing the behaviour of other states. Changing the behaviour of other states to maintain a favourable international environment is an activity pursued by sovereign states who exercise legitimate influence and power in the system. The United States, for example, is constantly involved in global politics such as the Middle East, Southern Africa, East-West and North-South relations. It attempts to mould various situations in keeping with its world view. Member states are rarely in a position to influence states in the system in matters of global politics. The intention of changing the behaviour of other states exists but for the purpose of achieving less grandiose objectives which are often related to their own internal development. Hermann asked: "is it appropriate to designate as foreign policy actions addressed to external actors but initiated solely for the purpose of changing all or part of the government's own society?" Rosenau, in his analysis of foreign policy as adaptive behaviour, would agree that indeed it is. "Any foreign policy behaviour, undertaken by the government of any national society is considered to be adaptive when it copes with or stimulates changes in the external environment of the society that contribute to
keeping the essential structures of the society within acceptable limits. Franklin Weinstein's study of Indonesian foreign policy is pertinent for smaller countries, especially developing ones. The central organizing concept of his analysis was the "uses of foreign policy". He asserted that the Indonesian government in the years 1962-70 had utilized foreign policy for the defense of the nation's independence, the mobilization of the resources of the outside world for the country's economic development, and the achievement of a variety of purposes related to domestic political competition. In this context, foreign policy is considered as the actions of a community directed to external actors with the intention of changing their behavior for primarily internal purposes.

The notion of foreign policy as an instrument to enhance domestic development, which can be drawn from this discussion, is an interesting perspective from which to analyze Quebec's international behavior. While this is borne in mind throughout the analysis, this paper focuses upon the interaction of Quebec with its external environment.

III Methodology

The manner of the study of international relations has become eclectic in the past decade. An area of inquiry has emerged that does not regard the disciplines of philosophy, history, economics, politics, anthropology and psychology as mutually exclusive. These subjects have been incorporated into the field, together with new tools of analysis such as transaction, content, events and attribute analysis. As noted earlier, our concepts have evolved to facilitate better understanding. New methodologies and approaches were developed to answer the growing
dissatisfaction of political scientists with the traditional historical approach. The latter was considered to be only one method of contributing to the development of knowledge. The so called "scientific revolution" in political science was based on the desire to cumulate knowledge. A scenario from "Alice in Wonderland" illustrates the point well. The Queen was telling Alice that it was a great advantage to have a memory that worked both ways. Alice replied that she was sure her memory didn't work in that fashion, that in fact, she was sure she could not remember things before they happened. "It's a poor sort of memory that only works backwards" said the Queen. The essence of the scientific approach is encapsulated in that comment, namely the explanation of past phenomena and prediction of future ones.

Since the emphasis of the scientific study of international relations is based upon the cumulation of knowledge, leading theorists have maintained that theory building can advance only if researchers are willing to process the information they amass through a common framework. There are several well known analytical frameworks already developed to guide research on external behaviour. They are inapplicable, however, for purposes of this study. Decision-making models are inappropriate for an entity like Quebec which is not yet involved with the international system to the extent of having to take high level, high profile, political decisions such as the American decision to intervene in Korea or Vietnam. Such models are normally state centric, more suited to the study of complex inter-governmental organizations such as those in the United States. A much lauded framework has been that of Michael Brecher et al but the core unit of analysis is the state as it functions within the international system at any point in time and space.
An analytical framework that was developed for non-state nations is the Bertelsen one and it is utilized in this paper.\textsuperscript{179} The framework is an adaptation of Churchman's system framework that was created to analyse the industrial firm.\textsuperscript{180} It consisted of five basic considerations: the total system objectives, specifically the performance measures of the whole system; the system's environment, especially the fixed constraints; the resources of the system; the components of the system, their activities, goals and measures of performance; and the management of the system.

Bertelsen's adaptation was as follows: the goals of the decision-makers; their resources, those factors that influence outcome, but are controlled by the decision-makers; the environment, including elements not controlled by the decision-makers, and finally the projects/missions undertaken by the decision-makers to achieve their goals.\textsuperscript{181}

If the non-state nation actor has more than one set of decision-makers, the resulting set of decision-making subsystems is evaluated by two criteria: unity of purpose as revealed in goals across decision-making subsystems and compatibility of strategies employed.

Two measures of success are also offered. These are durability and audibility. Bertelsen points out that the non-state nation desires to continue to exist and to be able to pursue its objectives (durability) and that it be perceived by the international community (audibility). This leads one to inquire about the means Quebec has utilized to remain durable and become audible in the international community.

There are several reasons why the use of such a framework is useful during the study of a non-state actor. The fact that the nation-state has been the predominant actor in the international system has had many effects upon the study of that system. The study of the nation-state has, in effect, set the ethos for the study of international relations.
The development of decision-making theory has drawn our attention to the necessity of identifying the decision-makers in a state and their goals. Some theorists have focused our attention on the necessity of examining the environment within which the state acts and how this environment can hinder or promote the attainment of the goals of the decision-makers. A sub-class of the environment is the resources that a state can command in its attempt to achieve its objectives. The attention of most other scholars has also focused upon the strategies that states pursue in their attempt to achieve their goals.

The relatively unmapped territory of the non-state actor makes the terrain seem much more unfamiliar because of the great diversity of such entities. The value of the Bertelsen approach is that it directs our attention and efforts back into the areas which have been essential to understanding the behaviour of the nation-state and its impact upon the international system. Moreover, the framework assists the researcher in categorizing certain non-state actors as non-state nations. A non-state nation is defined as an entity which operates in a manner normally associated with a nation-state but which is not generally recognized as one. Characteristically such behaviour will imply a claim to sovereignty even though the actor is not generally recognized as possessing such status. An entity that behaves in a manner normally associated with a nation-state is quite different from an entity which may occasionally appear on the international stage but, which for one reason or another is not really an actor, and instead plays a "cameo part".

Since Quebec possesses a government and has behaved in the international arena in a manner normally associated with a nation-state
although not recognized by the international community as being a fully fledged nation-state it would seem both logical and reasonable to consider Quebec a non-state nation actor, and to use the Bertelsen framework in the study of its external behaviour. Once Quebec is categorized as a non-state nation actor, the framework directs one's attention to the identity of the decision-makers and their goals. By highlighting the role of the decision-maker, one seeks to distinguish between the politically recognized leadership of the actor, and the leadership roles of other institutions such as the bureaucracy or non-governmental groups in the society. One would expect any study of the international behaviour of a state to include a discussion of these institutions and the environment in which they operate. However, it is often more difficult for a scholar to determine exactly what constitutes the resources and the environment for a non-state actor. The Bertelsen framework serves as a means of ordering the researcher's perceptions of the actor under study and of directing the researcher's attention to the significant areas of investigation.

Furthermore the framework utilized by Bertelsen et al. enabled them to draw some conclusions about the impact of non-state nations upon the nation-state of residency, and the various possible reactions of the state of residency to the non-state nation. This has provided other researchers with a classification of the types of autonomy pursued by non-state nations which leads one to inquire if Quebec can be classified in any of these categories.

The framework enables one to observe the similarities and dissimilarities in different decision-making subsystems by utilizing
the two criteria set out by Bertelsen (p. 59). In this way application of the framework permits one to determine to what extent there is compatibility of objectives and strategies among different decision-making subsystems within any one administration and continuity of goals and strategies between different administrations. Moreover one also sets out to determine if the non-state nation has remained in existence and in steadfast pursuit of its goals (durability), and if it has succeeded in being perceived on the international stage (audibility).

The framework is useful for the following reasons. In the first place it enables the researcher to compare non-state actors as a new type of actor on the international stage. Secondly, the researcher's perceptions of the actor under study are ordered and focused upon goals, resources, environment and projects. Third, the framework posits two measures of success for the non-state nation, audibility and durability. Fourth, the conclusions drawn by Bertelsen et al suggested that there are three types of national autonomy pursued by non-state nation actors which leads one to ask if the particular non-state nation one is studying has pursued one or more types of national autonomy. Finally the framework has guided the production of comparative research and will continue to do so. It is also sufficiently flexible to include material idiosyncratic to each case.
CHAPTER 2

FOOTNOTES


154. Ibid., p. 137.


156. Ibid., p. 308.


161. Ibid., p. 2.

162. Ibid., p. 247.
163. Ibid., p. 254.


166. The international legal and domestic constitutional aspect of this question with emphasis on the Canadian situation is examined in Chapter one.


168. Ibid., p. 32.


179. See page 51 of this chapter for definition of non-state nation.


Chapter 3 The Case of Quebec: A State Within a State

The concept of a "state within a state" was developed by the German writer Johann Gottlieb Fichte in the nineteenth century to depict what he perceived to be a nation in the German midst. The term became a peg on which German nationalists hung their anti-semitism, believing that the Jewish people could never pay complete allegiance to Germany. Jewish Germans did possess the attributes that have been characterized by Jacques Brossard as constituting the objective criteria for the existence of a nation. These are the Mazzinian elements of common language, history, culture (in the broadest sense of social institutions), way of life and conception of the world. Of these, he suggests that language is the most important. "La langue est le plus fort des liens nationaux. Elle est intimement liée à la vision du monde de chaque individu aussi bien qu'à l'expression des éléments socio-culturels de la collectivité nationale, dont elle paraît être en certains cas le point de convergence." In addition, there are two subjective criteria which animate the objective ones, rendering otherwise passive attributes into a potent force. One is "la conscience commune" which is when a group is conscious of its distinctiveness and thinks collectively in terms of "they" and "we". The other is group possession of a "vouloir vivre collectif".

The facts about Quebec are well known. Eighty percent of the five and a half million people are francophone. The awareness of distinctiveness, that Quebec "n'est pas une province comme les autres", is common to all groups in the society whether they be federalists or independentists. The voluntarist element of wanting to live together
is strong and more and more menacing as far as the federation is concerned. French Canadian history has demonstrated its will to survive as a collective entity, resisting all attempts at assimilation. Defeat in 1759, subsequent assimilation efforts on the political and linguistic levels, and the conscription crisis have all moulded a powerful "same collective". Lloyd George's remarks come to mind: "You may say you have been oppressed and persecuted - that has been your power! You have been hammered into very fine steel and that is why you have never been broken." 184

The Canadian "crisis" identified by the Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism arose from the fact that Quebec had become a self-conscious "state within a state" in the Fichtean sense of constituting a nation within a state. Moreover, the government of Quebec had become the principal organ through which this "nation" sought to fulfill its goals and aspirations. The process of the government becoming the voice of the Quebec nation has been described by one scholar as the nationalization of the Quebec government. Two factors had been important in retarding this development. These were the predominance of the Church and the demographic expansion of the French population outside Quebec in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The result of this migration was that French Canada became a nation extending across the country rather than one confined within the territorial limits of Quebec province for which the Quebec government would be responsible. 185 By the early 1960s, however, the fact that there were francophone communities elsewhere in Canada ceased to prevent francophone Quebecers from perceiving themselves as "les Québécois", a distinct entity from other French Canadians.
The other factor that had prevented the nationalization of the Quebec government, the Church, was also on the wane. The rapid demise of the Church as a controlling force in the society was one of the most remarkable events of Quebec history. Trudeau had said in 1961 that the clerical elites had "empêché de s'accréditer parmi nous la notion d'un État dont la fonction eut été d'intervenir activement dans le processus historique et d'orienter positivement les forces commentaires vers le bien général." 186

The so called "Quiet Revolution" involved a process of government intervention in numerous domains heretofore controlled by the Church. The government became an instrument for the expression and fulfilment of the needs of a distinct nation. Quebec governments since 1960 have assumed their national responsibility. Whether under the guise of "statut particulier", "égalité ou indépendance", "souveraineté culturelle", "souveraineté-association", successive Quebec governments, whatever their political affiliation have worn the nationalist mantle.

The following citations from Quebec leader's demonstrate the nationalist orientation:

Jean Lesage: Nous croyons que le Québec est l'expression politique du Canada français et qu'il joue le rôle de mère patrie de tous ceux qui, au pays, portent notre langue. 187

Daniel Johnson: Comme point d'appui d'une nation, le Québec veut être maître de ses décisions en ce qui a trait à la croissance humaine de ses citoyens, à leur affirmation économique, à leur épanouissement culturel et au rayonnement extérieur de la communauté québécoise. 188

Jean-Jacques Bertrand: Mais cette communauté, cette société, cette nation, sous laquelle il n'y avait pas de Canada française, est animée d'un vouloir-vivre tenace que trois siècles de vie en Amérique du Nord n'ont pas emoussé. 189
As the modernization of society began in the 60s, it was no longer a question of something being undertaken "for Quebec". The underlying significance of the Quiet Revolution derived from the fact that it was launched "by Quebec". Assuming that Quebecers constituted a nation and the government of Quebec had become the political expression of that nation, it was only logical that Quebec should project itself abroad, develop an international presence and maintain relations with third parties. A degree of legitimacy to act in the international arena was conferred upon the provincial government of Quebec by many Quebecers since the federal government appeared alien to the aspirations of the francophone community. "J’ajouterais que le gouvernement fédéral, dans sa politique extérieure, s’est montré moins respectueux de la dualité canadienne que dans sa politique intérieure, ce qui n’est pas peu dire."

It can be argued that Quebec intervention in the international arena was not based upon caprice. It was founded on the need to harmonize "survivance" and "épanouissement" and achieve balanced internal cultural and economic development. To accomplish this, outside francophone resources were cardinal for the continued progress of a French cultural society. The role of the government of Quebec in the international arena was no longer viewed as purely the extension of its constitutional responsibilities,
but as an instrument of socio-political-economic development of a distinct national community. An integrated policy of development required access to the international system. The structure of Quebec provided it with a means to intervene in that system.

The central international doctrine that successive Quebec governments have had for the past ten to fifteen years has therefore been threefold. First, Quebec governments have perceived themselves as the exponents of the distinct national community of Quebec both within and without Canada. Secondly, Quebec has claimed the right to extend its internal competencies to the external level. Finally, the Quebec government has seen itself as the instrument of development for the province. The means to achieve these ends have included negotiating and signing binding arrangements with third parties, dealing with the latter directly, and gaining admission or "adhesion" to certain international organizations.
CHAPTER 3

FOOTNOTES

183. Ibid., p. 67.


188. Daniel Johnson, Notes pour une allocation à New York, 12 January 1967, Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, Quebec.


Chapter 4 The Johnson Administration (June 1966 - September 1968)

GOALS

One of the central objectives of the Union Nationale government when it swept the Liberals from office in 1966 was constitutional change. Whereas the Liberals had been content with de facto recognition of Quebec's right to pursue its own policies in certain fields i.e. pensions, the new UN administration demanded de jure recognition of the Quebec government's authority.

The UN argued that without these powers Quebec could not survive as a distinct entity in North America. It needed control of more government sectors to fulfill its goal of "épanouissement."

Several weeks after his victory of 5 June 1966, Johnson declared to the "Association Hebdomodaires de langue française du Canada":

Le Québec étant le principal foyer de la nation Canadienne française, il faut que le gouvernement du Québec exerce tous les droits et assume toutes les responsabilités d'un véritable État national. Au lieu de nous agripper à une constitution désuète qui s'amère incapable d'assurer la coexistence harmonieuse des deux communautés, nous proposons hardiment une nouvelle alliance qui permettrait à celles-ci de s'épanouir librement, chacune dans le sens de sa culture particulière et de coopérer ensemble, dans l'égalité, à la gestion de leurs intérêts communs.

One aspect of the constitution that required review was the question of international relations and the powers Quebec should be allowed. Bertelsen has postulated that societies which fall into her third cell, the intermediate federal autonomy category, would among other things insist upon the right to conduct independent external relations. The underlying philosophy of successive Quebec governments from 1960-1976 has been that Quebec should have the right to extend
its internal competencies to the external level. The demand has therefore been for limited rather than full external sovereignty.

The Lesage government had presided over the initial significant thrust of the province of Quebec into the international arena. A Delegation General had been opened in Paris in 1961 and members of the Quebec government had signed two ententes in 1965 with France. Specific treaty-making rights had been explicitly demanded by members of the Lesage administration. The principle of extending provincial competence over internal matters to the international plane had been articulated by Paul Gérin-Lajoie in his capacity as Minister of Education to the Montreal Consular Corps in 1965. His speech and the ideas contained therein laid the foundations for subsequent Quebec government claims.

The federal government had been forced to innovate in that it signed an umbrella accord with France in 1965 that enabled the provinces to sign agreements in certain identified areas. While stressing the overall responsibility of the federal government for external affairs, the Pearson administration had nevertheless sought to accommodate the incursion of the Quebec government.

The Johnson government was insistent upon its right to negotiate directly with third states, sign binding arrangements, attend international conferences of interest to the province, and to participate as an observer or associate member in certain international agencies like UNESCO, ILO, WHO, and FAO. Quebec wanted these rights clearly recognized, defined and enshrined in a new Canadian constitution. The government was also concerned that there be mechanisms instituted for consultation and cooperation between Ottawa and Quebec. Quebec's obvious interest in international relations and her manifestation of the above behaviour contribute
to the construction of an image of Quebec as a member of this category. Johnson saw these measures as essential means to ensure the cultural survival of Quebec. During the two years of the Johnson government, Quebec sought a special international status. To obtain it, Quebec very often behaved in a manner normally associated with a nation-state. Without renouncing its federal links, it often refused to obey the constraints. An analogy has been made between this behaviour and the right to strike, advertising the grievance while remaining part of the enterprise. Quebec certainly succeeded in being audible in both the domestic and the international environments.

RESOURCES

Two major resources that affected outcomes might be discussed here. The first was the burgeoning of nationalism in Quebec. It was clearly an important factor in Quebec politics and provided the government in power with added legitimacy. The roots of nationalism, the reason for its emergence in post-industrial societies, and its expression in Quebec were touched upon in Chapter Two. Its importance as a resource is that the self-perception of "nationhood" affects behaviour within the federal system and outside it. The implication of this was that Quebec must have greater autonomy than the other provinces and that it, not Ottawa, must be responsible for most programmes affecting social and cultural development, both in their domestic implementation and in any external manifestation.

There were members within the Johnson cabinet with separatist leanings and Johnson was constantly steering a difficult course between the moderates and the nationalists. This was a problem for the Liberal Party as well. Levesque had his supporters were rebuffed when they
proposed a motion calling for an independent Quebec at a party meeting, and they left the party to form the Mouvement Souveraineté- Association. In September of that year, Levesque said:

"We will have to dare seize for ourselves the entire liberty of Quebec, its rights to all the essential elements of independence, that is to say, the full control of each and every one of its principal collective decisions. That means that Quebec should become a sovereign state. Only in this way will we finally find security of our collective existence which otherwise would only remain uncertain and crippled."

Although the Liberals would not endorse separation, they themselves were calling for a new constitution in which Quebec would have special status and broader powers. At the annual Liberal convention in Quebec City, October 1967, the Liberal Party rejected separation but passed, with virtual unanimity, a resolution calling for special status. The basis for their special status resolution was a background report drawn up for the party by Paul Garin-Lajoie. The concept specifically said that within those areas of provincial responsibility, the provincial government is totally sovereign and that this sovereignty extended into the international system. The province argued it had the right to conduct external relations in those fields of provincial responsibility. It advocated control over radio and television, immigration and manpower policy and a greater role in economic policy and international affairs. It specifically supported a new constitution based upon the two nations concept. Opposition leader Jean Lesage appealed for internal unity on the question. "For the love of French Canadians, for the love of Quebec, I ask the leader of the Union Nationale for a truce between us on partisan politics on the constitutional question ... We French Canadians must stop fighting among ourselves."
A similar position was adopted by non-governmental elite groups in Quebec society such as the Estates General. Made up of selected representatives of organizations such as school boards, professional groups, trade unions and Chambers of Commerce, it came into being in 1961 under the aegis of the St. Jean Batiste Society. The group expanded to include delegates from all provinces except Newfoundland. At a four day meeting in November 1967, four resolutions were passed. The first concerned the right to self-determination for the French Canadian nation whose "national territory" was defined as Quebec province; the second recommended exclusive powers for the state of Quebec over international relations, transport and communications, immigration, broadcasting and other fields; the third promoted the concept of a unilingual Quebec and the fourth advocated full jurisdiction over Quebec air space. Delegates from the other provinces regretted the pro-independence attitude of the meeting. This was a clear endorsement of the government's pursuit of intermediate federal autonomy. Zolberg's concept of "spillover" discussed in Chapter Two can be brought to bear here. Given the basic assertion of the Estates General that Quebec had the right to self-determination in Quebec, then control of as many sectors as possible would be necessary to attain it.

The extent of support for its position within the attentive public was not lost upon the government of Quebec. Quebec ministers began to make public statements concerning the government's position on international affairs. The government also sought to strengthen the governmental mechanism necessary to coordinate and implement external objectives. Associate Education Minister, Marcel Masse, was the first Quebec cabinet minister to make a clear statement of the government's position
on international relations. In an address to the St. Jean Baptiste Society, he deplored the constitutional traditionalism of the federal government. "Il est nécessaire que le gouvernement fédéral cessé de fonder sa doctrine constitutionelle en cette matière sur une conception rigide d'un juridisme étroit qui camoufle mal le jeu des intérêts acquis." He stressed that the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs had been created to administer Quebec's expanding external relations and that more personnel would be required to perform those functions at home and abroad. The expansion of the federal-provincial relations department was a second resource of the Johnson government. As noted in Chapter Two, Milton Esman has suggested that one of the prerequisites for ethnic solidarity is the existence of a rival political organization to which the group can project its aspirations. Similarly, if a member state is going to undertake international behaviour, it must develop an institutional structure through which it can act. The expansion of the federal-provincial relations department was a recognition of this necessity and it provided the institutional framework through which Quebec could assert itself.

The reorganization of 1967 provided the Quebec government with a more centralized organ of control, one endowed with a broader mandate. The role of the new ministry was to be fourfold; to coordinate all activities of the government outside of Quebec; to survey all relations that can exist between the government of Quebec, its ministries and those outside Quebec; to survey negotiations of ententes and make sure they conform to the interests of Quebec; and to take the necessary measures to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation. Article 3 of the Bill read:
The Minister can, with the authorization of the Lieutenant Governor, conclude any agreement which he judges to be in accordance with the interests and rights of Quebec, with any other government or organization outside Quebec. This authority can be given to the Minister even in the case where a law prevents a person other than himself from concluding such an agreement. 201

The Ministry was henceforth to be responsible for Quebec offices abroad, previously within the ambit of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Commerce. A determining role in the initiating, coordinating and organizing of Quebec representation abroad was given to the Ministry.

Bill 33 aroused considerable discussion in Ottawa where many viewed the ministry as an embryo of a foreign affairs department. Diefenbaker asked Pearson in the House on March 1 if the federal government had been consulted and whether its attitude to the question of foreign relations by the provinces had changed since Paul Martin's April 1965 statement. Pearson replied that he had not seen the Bill and had not been consulted. The position of his government remained that the federal government had exclusive responsibility for the conduct of external relations. 202 On March 2, Johnson expressed confusion as to why anyone should be alarmed about the Bill since it "proposed nothing more than administrative changes." 203 Both Johnson and Lesage stressed that the legislation did not give Quebec new constitutional powers. Johnson told the Legislative Assembly that the new department would be a purely administrative organ, coordinating the work of the ministries of cultural affairs, education, industry and commerce, and tourism. At the same time he resolved that Quebec should "occupy fully all domains of its jurisdiction under the constitution and enlarge the horizons of Quebec." 204
Clearly this was an important step. The provincial government was making use of the hierarchical controls at its disposal to exert greater dominance in this area. One aspect of this increased centralization was that conflict was channelled through to the level of senior officials and cabinet members who fought with their counterparts in the federal government. Institutionalization of its objectives ensured both audibility and durability. The likelihood was that this administrative organ would expand, seeking a more policy oriented mandate from the government.

THE ENVIRONMENT: DOMESTIC

Attempts were made to accommodate Quebec within a modified federal structure. The process of constitutional review was begun in which Quebec was able to voice its opinions to the rest of Canada. Since 1965, the Pearson government had also endeavoured to answer Gérin-Lajoie's criticism (see p. 69). It did so in two specific ways. First, Canadian external aid was allocated in increasingly large amounts to developing francophone countries. Embassies were set up in those countries. A concerted effort was made to reorient Canadian foreign policy along bicultural lines. Furthermore, the federal government institutionalized a federal-provincial dimension to foreign policy when it created the Federal-Provincial Coordination Division in 1967.

The first concrete initiative for constitutional review came from the province of Ontario. John Robarts convened the Confederation of Tomorrow Conference in November 1967. Two central issues were discussed, namely the place of French Canada in Canadian society and the relationship between federal and provincial governments. Johnson welcomed the conference
as "the beginning of a new Canadian federalism". The conference was to be a meeting at which the provinces could "determine the measure of our consensus and the range of our differences". (Robarts) It was designed to produce not decisions, but discussion.

The Quebec government's statement was succinct. Johnson traced the development of the Canadian crisis stressing the lack of French Canadian rights outside Quebec, the incursion of the federal government upon areas of provincial jurisdiction, and finally the inadequacy of the division of responsibilities between the two levels of government. 205 Johnson outlined four constitutional goals. A new constitution should outline the fundamental principles on which the country is based, in particular, acknowledgement of the existence within Canada of two nations. French and English would be the official languages of Canada. Secondly, the distribution of powers would be altered. The reserve and disallowance powers of the federal government should be eliminated since the possession of these prevents the provinces from exercising complete internal sovereignty. In addition, Quebec wanted free rein to make its own decisions affecting the growth of its citizens in the realms of education, social security and health, economic development, cultural fulfilment, and international relations. Third, Quebec wanted to see the institutionalization of intergovernmental cooperation. Fourth, Canadian institutions such as the federal public service, the NCC, the Senate and the CBC should be broadened. It was indicated that public opinion was conscious of the necessity for Quebec to extend itself outside its own borders. It is interesting that Quebec utilized the extent of public support for its international aspirations in a formal
brief to the conference. The primacy of the federal government in foreign policy matters was acknowledged. At the same time it was emphasized that Quebec is the mainstay of French Canada and it therefore has an interest in educational, cultural and technical exchanges. Within the context of Canadian foreign policy, Quebec should be able to sign its own ententes with third powers on matters within its jurisdiction; participate in federal delegations to international organizations of which Canada is a member and that concern themselves with matters within provincial jurisdiction; and involve itself in international conferences that are of specific interest to it and in which Canada does not participate.

In his general treatment of the inadequacies of the constitution, Johnson made an explicit reference to the problem of external relations.

In international affairs, the situation created by the present constitution is equally confused. Practice established during the past half century, and not any constitutional text, gives the federal government responsibility for what we call foreign policy. Yet nowhere is this defined. Nor does the constitution say anything about the bonds of every kind which, more tightly and in increasing number, link modern nations in fields almost all of which it reserves to the provinces. As a result, efforts to resolve any differences which may arise today between governmental sectors over relations they may or may not have with foreign countries or organizations, are based on more or less acrobatic interpretations of the constitution or of constitutional practice.

Quebec's views were reiterated at the Constitutional Conference of February 1968. The opening statement of Quebec stressed the importance of a new constitution recognizing a "two-nation" Canada. This led to the dramatic confrontation between Justice Minister Trudeau and Premier Johnson. Trudeau expressed his complete rejection of the concept of "statut particulier" arguing that the increase of Quebec's
powers would result in a decrease in their powers at the federal level. The two nations theory would lead to independence. For Johnson, special arrangements for Quebec were an essential element in the continuation of Confederation. He stated categorically that dealing with the language problem was only giving Quebec an aspirin, no more.

The position of the Quebec government in its relations with other countries was developed more extensively in the mémoire it presented to the conference. In this presentation, it suggested a new or revised constitution. A secretariat was established which played a significant role both in preparing a report on the propositions submitted and in trying to stimulate the provinces to take part. Quebec's propositions, contained in a 52 page document, were by far the most comprehensive. A systematic vision of a decentralized federation was put forward.

Once again, the government of Quebec was emphatic about its right to sign agreements and participate in international conferences. The central government should not be allowed to monopolize international relations, otherwise it would endow itself with competences that in the absence of an international agreement would be within provincial jurisdiction. Quebec stressed the need to have direct contacts with the francophone world for the realization "de l'égalité culturelle entre les deux nations". It was felt that these relations would be to the general advantage of Canada.

The outcome of the February conference was the establishment of a mechanism that would continue the process of constitutional review. A continuing committee for constitutional review was formed to consider
the three questions of constitutional change, regional disparities and language rights. It was decided that each government would submit a series of "propositions" or statements on matters which should be included to reflect the binational nature of the country.

It is interesting to compare the proposals of Quebec for international relations with those posited by other provinces. Both Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia were ardent centralists. The constitution should accord Ottawa all the competences and powers necessary for a strong and united Canadian foreign policy. Ontario also stressed the primary responsibility of the federal government for international relations. Ontario did, however, advocate greater provincial participation at the level of policy formulation. Both Quebec and Ontario suggested the creation of mechanisms that would enable the provinces to express their opinions about treaties, representation at international conferences, and foreign aid. The demand for these mechanisms and for a more efficient flow of information between the two levels of government has been a constant one from Ontario and more recently from Alberta.

While a non-state actor may possess certain resources which it uses in its effort to assert itself, the state also possesses resources with which to fight back. Canada brought these resources to bear in its allocation of external aid to francophone countries. The increase of aid to francophone countries was an essential tactic to illustrate that the federal government was indeed capable of representing French Canadian concerns abroad. Indeed, this provides an excellent example of a policy directed at external actors but initiated for internal purposes. Given the interest of this paper on the question of the ability of a member state to influence the behaviour of the resident state, Canada's response to Quebec's assertiveness is both interesting and instructive. The federal government had both the resources and the authority to channel large sums
of capital and technical assistance to francophone countries. Its potential support for developing countries far exceeded that which might be offered unilaterally by Quebec, a reality skillfully utilized by the federal government to stem the tide of recognition of Quebec's aspirations begun in Gabon, 1968.

The growing interest of the federal government in francophone Africa was expressed at a Colloquium on Canada and Francophone Africa held in Montreal in January 1965. At this conference, the viewpoint of Quebec was outlined by Jean Marc Leger and that of Canada by Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs. Leger suggested that cooperating with francophone Africa would enable Quebecers to "nous mieux découvrir". He advocated the creation of a French sector in the federal bureau of aid and an international cooperation division within the Ministry of Education in Quebec. A modest level of international assistance by Quebec was envisaged "que le gouvernement du Québec ait sa propre politique de coopération, si modeste soit elle au départ, qu'il profite pour la lancer de l'année de coopération internationale." 210 Paul Martin, for his part, stressed that the Canadian government was contributing $4,000,000 to UNESCO in the 1965 fiscal year as opposed to the annual $300,000 of previous years. Part of the money would finance education programmes in francophone African countries.

On July 8, 1965, it was announced that Canada would increase by one million, the amount provided for a programme of cultural exchanges with French-speaking countries. This included scholarships, art exhibitions and theatrical presentations. The programme, inaugurated in 1963, involved exchanges with France, Belgium and Switzerland. 211
In September 1966, while addressing a briefing session of French language teachers going abroad, Martin announced increased aid to francophone countries. The government had increased aid to francophone Africa from $300,000 in 1963 to $8,000,000 in 1966 and to francophone Asian countries from $368,000 to $3,500,000. Allocations for bilateral aid 1966-67 were $11,000,000 for francophone African countries as opposed to $18,500,000 for Commonwealth African countries.  

In January 1967, Trudeau visited five francophone countries in which embassies had been opened in 1966. Proposals for closer relations were discussed with various governments. One year later, Lionel Chevrier was sent on a six week tour of French speaking Africa. An announcement that Canada would contribute $30 million in aid to French Africa over three years, expanding to $40 million in five years, resulted from the mission.

Canada was also promoting the idea of a French speaking Commonwealth. Such a project was discussed with President Senghor during his official visit to Ottawa in September 1966. In October, Martin gave a lengthy written answer to a question on this subject in the House. He emphasized that the federal government represented Canada on the international plane and that it was anxious to promote the interests of all Canadians including francophones. The government was, therefore, sympathetic to the idea of developing closer links with other francophone countries. No definite proposals for an organization had been formulated. The question of Ottawa’s ability to represent the legitimate interests of all provinces continues to be contentious. The government of Quebec insists that not only does the federal government not adequately and correctly represent Quebec abroad, but that it actually
misrepresents Quebec's behaviour in an attempt to discredit the
government and its avowed aim of independence.

Quebec was obviously wary of federal government motivation
in its espousal of the francophone cause. Conflict between the two
governments erupted over Canada's signature of a cultural accord
with Belgium in May 1967. Quebec was not consulted about the accord
or informed of the impending signature until the eleventh hour.
The accord was designed to last five years and it foresaw exchanges
of professors, students, programmes in cinema, science, television
and radio. A permanent Canadian-Belgian Commission was to be set up. 216

Although the accord dealt with areas of provincial jurisdiction such
as academic, scientific and technical cooperation, no provision was
made for provincial participation. The possibility of allowing for
provincial participation had been considered by officials in external
affairs but this option was not followed. It can be speculated that
this was, at least in part, due to political considerations. The
federal government was doing just what Quebec had said it would, acquiring
powers which, in the absence of the agreement, it would not otherwise
have. The Quebec government was outraged and Johnson made it clear in a
number of statements that Quebec wished to be consulted about inter-
national agreements concerning areas of provincial competence and that
Quebec, not Canada, was responsible for the representation of French
Canada abroad in cultural and educational matters. Quebec refused to
participate in the Belgo-Canadian entente which was consequently
inoperable until 1975 when provisions were made for Quebec involvement.

Paul Cliche wrote in Le Devoir:

À moins d'être aveugle et stupide, on s'aperçoit qu'il
y a là un mouvement concerté pour couper les ailes.
On peut peut-être y réussir momentanément, mais on ne peut frustrer indéfiniment la volonté d'émancipation d'une population.

The policy of the federal government was outlined in two White Papers in 1968. "Federalism and International Relations" outlined the international legal and the domestic constitutional aspects of the question. Its fundamental position was that the division of Canada's external sovereignty was not negotiable. This viewpoint was a complete negation of Quebec's argument that it should be able to extend its internal competencies abroad. Indeed, the whole paper was designed to consider the aspirations of all provinces, not just Quebec. The federal government was always concerned that it not appear as if Quebec aspirations were being given special treatment.

One chapter was devoted to the development of methods of federal-provincial cooperation. Indemnity agreements, ad hoc covering agreements and general framework agreements had been devised to enable the provinces to sign their own agreements. The process of consulting and including provincial delegates on Canadian delegations was outlined. It had worked well for UNESCO and Commonwealth conferences. At an intergovernmental conference at UNESCO in September 1966 on the Status of Teachers, the Canadian delegation included Deputy Ministers from New Brunswick, Quebec and British Columbia. At the fourth Commonwealth Education Conference in Lagos, February 1968, the Canadian delegation included Deputy Ministers from Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Alberta and Quebec.

Procedures for inclusion of provincial delegates in education conferences was amplified in the second White Paper "Federalism and International Conferences of Education" issued by the Trudeau government.
in May 1968. It was in response to the events of February and April when Quebec had attended Education Conferences in Gabon and France. Six main conclusions were drawn. The indivisibility of external sovereignty was endorsed. Within the framework of Canadian foreign policy the government was seeking to protect and promote the interest of all Canadians and both linguistic groups. The government would work closely with the provinces to achieve balanced delegations that take full account of both federal jurisdiction in external affairs and provincial jurisdiction in education. Relations with French speaking states were being expanded, thus recognizing the special interests of Quebec. Foreign affairs matters should be discussed by the Continuing Committee for Constitutional Review. Finally, the government welcomed further suggestions from the provinces. 220

The paper was issued on 8 May 1968 at the outset of the federal election campaign. Trudeau politicized and publicized the issue, turning it into a very successful peg on which to hang his strong federalist campaign. He took a particularly firm stand on the issue of Quebec's international ambitions. At a press conference on May 9, Trudeau stated: "Too often the distinction is lost between just an accidental involvement of a province in some international activity and the desire of a province to establish constitutional precedents and international precedents which, in our view, would be detrimental to federalism. We think there is one way to keep Canada united as a federal form of government and that way is to make sure that in international matters, Canada speaks with one voice." 221 Trudeau continued this vigorous attack on Quebec's claims. At a speech in Montreal later on during the month he said, "La vocation internationale du Quebec passe par Ottawa, seule adresse pour la preparation des rencontres internationales." 222 At
the end of the month Trudeau attacked the two nation concept before a Winnipeg audience.

There was an extremely apprehensive reaction in Quebec to Trudeau's stand on this issue and the way in which he stirred it up for the purpose of vote catching. Johnson commented that the White Paper was "plus électoral que patriotique". Ryan's feeling was "nous ne sommes pas en présence uniquement d'une souveraineté a sauvegarder, mais de deux souverainetés a concilier." Brossard lamented that Quebec's special interests were being treated in a similar vein to those of other provinces, "bien qu'il soit le seul État fédéré au monde qui concentre sur un territoire étatiquement organise la quasi-totalité de l'une des deux nations réunies pour une fédération." Paul Sauriol deplored Trudeau's attitude, "Elle est vraiment inadmissible."

It was a clear example, however, of the political resources available to the government which provided it with the necessary legitimacy to counter both the national and the international aspirations of Québec.

**THE ENVIRONMENT: INTERNATIONAL**

The attitude of the French administration toward Quebec constituted one of the most important external factors in facilitating Quebec's entry into the international system. De Gaulle's visit to Quebec in 1967 and his cry of "Vive le Quebec libre" internationalized the Quebec issue. The pressure placed upon the Gabon government by France to invite Quebec to the Conference of Education Ministers in Libreville enabled Quebec to participate in its first international conference on an equal footing with other nation-states. It enabled Quebec to fulfil its goal of extending an internal competence to the external plane and of acquiring an international presence and status.
De Gaulle's visit to Quebec has been the subject of much discussion. According to one scholar, a metamorphosis of his attitude to Quebec had occurred between 1965 and 1967. It was explained in terms of de Gaulle's world view and his antagonism toward the Anglo-Saxon world and American hegemony in particular. De Gaulle had recently prevented Great Britain from entering the EEC; had recognized China; withdrawn his troops from NATO; and suggested in Phnom Penh that America withdraw from Vietnam. His performance in Quebec "contribuait à la remise en cause généralisée de l'imperium americain." The idea of a small French community surviving and prospering, yet constantly threatened by two hundred million anglophones, was odious to him. Civil servants in the Quai d'Orsay later advanced the hypothesis that de Gaulle wanted to make up for France's negligence toward Quebec since 1760 and that he did not envisage a completely independent Quebec but one associated with Canada. On the Quebec side, the declaration was unexpected. Once Johnson had recovered, he intervened publicly and interpreted de Gaulle's words in the broadest possible way, as did Claude Ryan, namely that de Gaulle supported the position of the provincial government for a new constitution and the right to determine its own development. Opposition leader Lesage condemned de Gaulle's action. Mayor Drapeau intervened publicly in the debate, commenting that Quebeckers were able to determine their future for themselves.

The federal government reacted immediately and strongly to de Gaulle's statement. Following a cabinet meeting on the morning of July 25, 1967, a formal statement was issued which expressed the government's disapproval. "However, certain statements made by the President tend to encourage the small minority of our population whose aim is to destroy
Canada; and, as such, they are unacceptable to the Canadian people and its government.\textsuperscript{229} The next day de Gaulle left Canada, cancelling his visit to Ottawa.

After the visit a public opinion poll was conducted in Montreal, Quebec City and Trois Rivières with interesting results. The majority of respondents did not feel that de Gaulle's action merited rebuke although his stature did go down in most people's esteem. Drapeau's comments were endorsed, over those of Johnson and LeSage. The federal government was considered to have reacted too harshly. The majority supported Johnson's interpretation of de Gaulle's words.\textsuperscript{230}

De Gaulle's visit provided an international dimension to what the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission had termed the "Canadian crisis". On September 13 1967, an article by a Canadian priest living in Japan appeared in Le Devoir. It described the impact that de Gaulle's visit had upon Japan. Previously, many Japanese had been unaware of a French Canadian community in Canada. For three days in July, the events were constantly reported in the Japanese press. An upsurge of interest occurred in the internal problems of a country hitherto perceived as possessing none.\textsuperscript{231} Articles appeared in the New York Times, London Times and Le Monde. For a few days the world's attention was focused upon Quebec. One might argue that this ability to focus world attention on its cause is one of the non-state actors most powerful weapons. It raises the consciousness of the actor's domestic population, it puts the central government on the defensive, and it makes the international community aware of the aspirations of the non-state actor. If this non-state actor is also in possession of some form of legal constitutional governmental authority, as are provincial governments, its ability to
generate such attention is greatly increased. It is in recognition of the increased authority that flows from the possession of status that many Arab states have urged the Palestinians to form a government in exile. While such a government would not receive universal recognition, it would increase the legitimacy of the Palestinians and would give them increased stature.

Support continued to be forthcoming from de Gaulle. He issued a statement on July 31 after a cabinet meeting. He noted that there was among French Canadians a unanimous conviction that, after a century under the BNA Act, they were still not equal or free. In August, the French government announced an increase in technical and economic aid to Quebec intended "to help the French of Canada to maintain and develop their personality." At a press conference on November 27, de Gaulle called for the "advent of Quebec to the rank of a sovereign state". A complete structural and constitutional change was advocated for Canada.

The French administration under de Gaulle was instrumental in obtaining an invitation for Quebec to attend the Francophone Education Ministers Conference in Gabon in 1968. France was no doubt alarmed by Canadian incursion into the francophone world. De Gaulle's vision of a French union of two hundred million Frenchmen might well be undermined by a strong Canadian presence in Africa. By involving Quebec, rather than Canada, in this francophone institution, France was demonstrating a willingness to be less exclusive in the francophone world but at the same time maintaining its hegemony in the francophone world. The government of Gabon extended a direct invitation to Quebec to attend the conference, probably unaware of the diplomatic implications of its action. On February 19, Ottawa advised Gabon that
it had instructed its ambassador designate to Libreville not to proceed with the presentation of his credentials to Gabonese authorities.234 Gabon was a mere pawn in the triangular conflict.

Mr. Cardinal, Quebec Minister of Education, led the Quebec delegation at the conference. As far as the Minister was concerned, cultural agreements with France and Quebec's "unquestioned rights in education", amounted to a precedent for future education agreements with other French speaking countries.235 Québec also sent a delegation to the second conference held in Paris, April 1968. On both occasions, the federal government attempted to persuade Quebec to lead a Canadian delegation. Premier Robichaud tried unsuccessfully to convince Quebec to cooperate with the government by joining in a Quebec - New Brunswick delegation that would have a more national flavour. This was unacceptable to the Quebec government since it was an unprecedented opportunity for Quebec to win for itself a clear right to act as an independent actor on matters of provincial jurisdiction. Certainly a precedent was set which gave Quebec greater bargaining strength for a more independent role at future conferences.

PROJECTS

The principal target of Quebec's external behaviour was France and "la francophonie". Bilateral relations with France were intensified under the Johnson government. Substantively, the agreements concluded with France were concerned primarily with cultural matters. Some economic areas were beginning to be discussed, but nothing significant was achieved. The cultural agreements concluded by Johnson were designed to secure increased Quebec-France contact which would ensure the growth of a vital French cultural society. They are examples of Weinstein's notion of external
relations being utilized to enhance the internal dynamic of the society.

In May 1967, Johnson made an official visit to Paris accompanied by sixteen senior civil servants. After discussion with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Couve de Murville, verbal agreement was reached on seven subjects; cooperation in satellite broadcasting; the establishment of a joint study committee on French investments in Quebec; exchanges of research workers in the field of nuclear and hydroelectric energy; the association of Quebec civil servants in the elaboration of France's sixth economic plan; an exhibition in France of French Canadian civilization; loans of French artistic masterpieces to Quebec for touring exhibitions in Quebec, and finally French assistance with the organization of a Quebec youth and recreation department. The most controversial aspects of the discussions were the satellite project and the installation of a proposed French nuclear reactor in Quebec to lessen the latter's dependence on Atomic Energy of Canada. For Johnson, the audience with de Gaulle was a personal as well as a political triumph. He referred to it as a culmination of his own thirty-year struggle for the recognition of French Canadian rights. Johnson was treated like a Head of State, making the pilgrimage to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. In spite of a serious strike in Paris, and an important debate at the National Assembly, eight French Ministers met with Johnson.

Cooperation was augmented after de Gaulle's visit in July. September 1967 saw the conclusion of a protocole-verbal between Johnson and Alain Peyrefitte, Minister of National Education in France. No signature was attached to the agreement because of the diplomatic furor that had
been caused by de Gaulle's visit. The agreement created new Franco-
Quebec institutions in the area of scientific and technical research.
Exchanges and scholarships were increased threefold. Peyrefitte took
note of Quebec's wish to institute regular ministerial meetings. The
French government decided to increase its contribution to Quebec
programmes from 5 million francs (1967) to 24.8 million francs in 1968
to 32.5 million francs in 1969, to 40 million francs in 1970. The
text of the statement of the Quebec government read as follows:

Ils ont permis d'explorer une foule d'avenues nouvelles et d'envisager des mesures qui, en trois ans, vont littéralement décupler le volume des échanges de toutes sortes et la circulation des personnes entre les deux communautés.

The third major Franco-Quebec initiative of the Johnson years was prefigured in the de Gaulle and Peyrefitte visits. Within days of Mr. Peyrefitte's departure, the French Minister of Youth and Sports François Missoffe, arrived in Quebec to discuss proposals for a Franco-
Quebec Youth office. Among the principles agreed upon by Mr. Missoffe and his Quebec hosts was the strict equality between Quebec and France in costs, benefits, and voice in the administration of the organization. The principle of equality was indicative of a significant step forward in Franco-Quebec relations from cooperation to association. Creation of the office was well received in Quebec since it enabled young people other than students to travel to France. The 1965 ententes had been criticized for their exclusivity. Sixty seven percent of those on exchanges in 1970 were from rural and working class backgrounds. Bill 59, creating the Office Franco-Québécois pour la Jeunesse, was passed in the legislature in November 1968. In the legislature in 1971, the objectives
of the office were detailed.

L'office a essentiellement pour but deux choses: 1) de procéder au rapprochement de la France et du Québec par des échanges de jeunes. Donc, ces échanges sont relativement volumineux, ils se situent entre 1500 et 1600 par année de chaque côté. 2) Il a pour but, à travers ces échanges, de fournir aux jeunes Québécois de 18 à 30 ans, la possibilité de mieux participer au retour, au développement de leur milieu de sorte que toute l'action de L'Office est fonction du développement de milieu, est fonction de l'intégration des jeunes de cet âge au développement du milieu.

CONCLUSION

It is fair to conclude that Quebec during the Johnson administration can be classified as a non-state nation actor in the intermediate federal autonomy category which, among other things, demands a more autonomous role in the international system. Quebec did, on occasion, behave in the international system in a manner normally associated with a nation-state. For example, its very attendance at the Francophone Education Ministers Conference in Gabon in 1968 implied that it possessed a degree of external sovereignty.

This behaviour gained audibility for Quebec upon the international stage. Once again it must be stressed that the ability to focus the attention of the international community upon one's goals is an extremely powerful weapon for an actor aspiring for international status. Quebec's international goals and interests became obvious to the francophone community which, initially at least, made it possible for Quebec to attend the conferences. In addition, the international community was made aware of the significant divisions within Canada by de Gaulle's intervention and his cry of "Vive le Quebec libre". The publicity surrounding the visit and his proclamation awakened the international community to the fact that there was a subnational entity within the bosom of the Canadian state, certain
segments of which aspired to make that nation into a state. While the
government of the day was not necessarily such a segment in toto, it
nonetheless contained elements within it that were at least sympathetic
to the separatist option. Under Johnson, therefore, both governmental
efforts and the intervention of certain external actors enabled Quebec
to obtain audibility upon the international stage.

At the domestic level, the constitutional claims of the
Johnson government in the area of international relations were heard
by other provincial governments and the central government at various
constitutional conferences. To ensure that Quebec's external aspirations
would be recognized, the Johnson government expanded the Department of
Federal-Provincial Relations. Its conversion into the Intergovernmental
Affairs Department was a highly significant step in Quebec's attempt to
institutionalize its goals and to secure a coherent administration of
objectives rather than the heretofore ad hoc methods of procedure.

In terms of the unity of purpose of decision-making subsystems,
there was compatibility of goals and strategies under Johnson. He
himself held the portfolio of Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs as
well as that of Premier.

To counter the Quebec government's claim to represent the French
Canadians, the central government used the carrot and stick routine with
other states in an attempt to be the sole representative of the Canadian
Confederation. The decision to suspend diplomatic relations with Gabon,
and its implied threat to do the same to any state that oversteps the
bounds in dealing with a Canadian province was the stick. The carrot
was the step up in the amount of interaction with many of the French
speaking states which greatly needed the assistance. It was of course
difficult for Canada to gain sufficient leverage over France to make the stick portion of this formula effective and therefore France's behaviour is best seen as being governed by domestic political considerations.
CHAPTER 4

Footnotes


198. Ibid., 1967, p. 137.

199. Ibid., 1967, p. 179.


201. Loi modifiant la Loi du Ministère des Affaires Fédérales-Provinciales du Québec et certaines lois annexes, 14 April 1967, Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, Quebec.


204. Ibid., p. 59.

205. Preliminary Statement by the Government of Quebec, Confederation of Tomorrow Conference, Proceedings, (Toronto: 1967), pp. 2-4 of Appendix B.

206. Gouvernement du Québec, Mémoire sur la question constitutionnelle, Ottawa 5-7 February 1968, pp. 15-16. This latter claim was put forward in the light of the Conference of Francophone Education Ministers taking place in Gabon in February 1968 at which Quebec but not Canada was represented.


211. CIIA Monthly, July-August 1965, p. 86.
212. Ibid., September 1966, p. 106.
216. Accord Culturel entre le gouvernement du Canada et le gouvernement du Royaume de Belgique, 8 mai, 1967, Article 9.
221. CIIA Monthly, May 1968, p. 53.
224. Ibid., 11 May 1968, p. 4.
225. Ibid., 14 May 1968, p. 4.
228. Ibid., p. 396.
231. Ibid., 13 September 1967, p.5.
233. Ibid., p. 92.


Chapter 5: The Bertrand Administration (October 1968-April 1970)

GOALS

One of the most fundamental reasons for the debacle of the Union Nationale in the provincial election of April 1970, was its lack of direction and action in the year following Johnson's death. Education Minister, Jean-Jacques Bertrand, who replaced Johnson, had a reputation for being much more moderate than his predecessor. The party was in flux for some time since, at first, Bertrand was only interim leader of the party and could, therefore, not speak with the authority of a confirmed leader. Initially, his position on constitutional matters and on Quebec's relations with France was that Johnson's policy should be continued. His first statement on constitutional issues came on the 4th of November, 1968, soon after Ottawa had refused to share with the provinces its new 3 percent Social Development Tax which was ostensibly to pay for medicare. His comments were forceful:

\[\text{Depuis les derniers mois, nous sommes témoins et je regrette d'avoir à le déplorer d'une attitude fédérale à la fois arrogante et impérialiste. Le gouvernement a en effet entrepris de s'immerger dans un nombre étrange de secteurs provinciaux, de manière directe ou indirecte.}\]

In terms of Quebec's relations with France, Bertrand stated at his first press conference that there would be no change in the importance accorded France-Quebec relations, but that his government would place greater emphasis on the economic aspect of those links.
As Bertrand became more established in power, he sought a normalization of Franco-Quebec relations. Bertrand felt confident to effect this change after he had fought off a vigorous challenge by Mr. Cardinal for the leadership of the Union Nationale in June 1969. Bertrand was concerned to maintain relations with France and to secure special arrangements for Quebec in matters pertaining to "la Francophonie". His strategy was more compromising than that of Johnson, although there was conflict with Ottawa about Quebec representation at international conferences and over the place it should occupy in the Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique formed in 1970. In adapting this strategy, he was breaking with that of his predecessor. Bertrand did not renounce the necessity of Quebec participation in francophone institutions, but he was much more willing to compromise. This caused some tension between himself and officials in Intergovernmental Affairs.

RESOURCES

The Union Nationale, under Bertrand, was unable to harness the nationalist support it needed to continue as a viable political force in Quebec politics. A tension which surfaced rapidly after the death of Johnson concerned the fundamental orientation of the party. Johnson had succeeded in attracting new elements to the party in the early 60s, especially youthful elements. He had done so by officially contemplating the separatist option. The philosophy of "égalité ou indépendance" could be translated as "pas nécessairement le séparatisme, mais le séparatisme si on nous y force." While not a prisoner of the ultra nationalist wing of the party, Johnson's orientation gave that segment of the party the impression that it occupied a determining place.
Bertrand was less of a nationalist, a weaker leader, and consequently, presided over a divided cabinet. The lack of leadership at the top filtered down through into the ranks. With the Liberals becoming resolutely federalist, and the Parti Québécois ardently separatist, the Union Nationale was losing its moderate support to the Liberals and its nationalist support to the PQ. The latter had been formed in October 1968, and had rapidly become a strong political force in Quebec, underestimated by both provincial and federal politicians.

Quebec politics were being polarized. At the Liberal Congress in October 1968, the party altered its position considerably from that of the previous year. Although not present at the conference, the two individuals most responsible for the turnaround were Trudeau and the deceased Johnson. The resolution adopted differed markedly in emphasis from that of 1967, reflecting the national Liberal leader's disdain for the two concepts of "statut particulier" and "deux nations". Unlike the previous year, no mention of the term "statut particulier" was made. The two nations perspective which was an integral part of the 1967 resolution was also deleted. Realizing that, with Johnson gone, victory might be theirs at the next election, the congress rallied behind Lesage in order that concerted opposition might be launched against Bertrand.

It was not until April 1970, three weeks before the election, that Bertrand awoke to the reality that his party had no platform on which to run. He announced that his party would wait a maximum of four years for constitutional review. If by that time, nothing had been accomplished, the independence option would be considered. The declaration was an attempt to emphasize that his party could accommodate both
nationalists and moderates. Largely redundant in electoral value, this turnabout did nothing to assist the Union Nationale in its attempt to depolarize the political scene of April 1970. Bertrand had underestimated the discontent in 1970 resulting from the lack of success in constitutional revision, the level of economic stagnation, and high unemployment. Bill 63 had antagonized many nationalists who thought it too conciliatory towards the anglophones. The moderates were suspicious of men like Marcel Masse, Jean-Guy Cardinal and Jean-Paul Beaulieu who were considered undeclared separatists.

With these changing political forces in Quebec, the divisions in the UN and a strongly assertive federal government the Bertrand administration was not in a position to be dogmatic. The Ministry of Inter-governmental Affairs was, however, under the nationalist wing of Marcel Masse. He made his position quite clear during a visit to France in January 1970. Speaking to the Diplomatic Press Association, he declared, "Notre position a-t-il ajouté est que les États fédérés du Canada possèdent le droit et le pouvoir de s'occuper d'affaires étrangères dans les domaines qui leur sont réservés par la constitution." This was not out of line with the fundamental concept of provincial sovereignty that had been developed by Paul Gérin-Lajoie and which was part of Quebec's international doctrine. Where Masse and Bertrand seem to have parted ways is in their respective viewpoints of the extent to which political harassment of Ottawa should be applied to attain that objective. Bertrand was a forerunner of Bourassa in that his strategy was more pragmatic and less nationalist. In keeping with Bertrand's objective of a more economically oriented external projection, the Ministry set up new offices in Chicago (1969) and Dusseldorf (1970). Representatives were sent to
Boston, Dallas, Los Angeles and Louisiana to investigate the possibility of opening new offices in those cities.

THE ENVIRONMENT: DOMESTIC

The election victory of Trudeau in June 1968 was an important element in the domestic environment. Trudeau had not only maintained, but greatly extended, French-Canadian Liberal support which clearly reinforced the Quebec federalists. In October 1968, the Official Languages Act was introduced. For Trudeau, Bill C-120 was the panacea for Canadian ills. It was a law designed to put certain of the recommendations of the Laurendeau-Dunton Report into effect. English and French were declared the official languages of the country, having rights and privileges in institutions of government and parliament. The public would be able to deal with government officials in the language of their choice. Consultations with the provinces to establish bilingual districts were foreseen and the position of ombudsman was created to ensure the efficacy of implementation. In Quebec, the Official Languages Act was seen as legislation that was long overdue. There was scepticism among some Quebecers as to whether the Act would be the catholicon of Quebec problems.

The interest of the federal government in promoting a policy of bilingualism has two important aspects with respect to the question of who represented whom... A federal government with a clearly enunciated and implemented policy of bilingualism would be in a much stronger position to appeal to French-speaking Canadians for their loyalties and to claim to represent them. Equally, such a government would be better able to assert to the international community that it was
reflective of its national society and, therefore, to lessen the credibility of Quebec claims to the contrary.

The process of constitutional review continued in February 1969. At this Conference, Premier Bertrand tabled a working paper on the issue of Quebec and international relations. Quebec's fundamental international doctrine was unchanged. The Quebec government expressed its opinion that,

"le véritable problème qui se pose actuellement entre le gouvernement fédéral et les gouvernements provinciaux résulte de ce que l'on n'a pas encore pu on voulu fixer les mécanismes nécessaires pour que les États fédérés puissent entretenir des relations avec l'étranger, dans les domaines de leur compétence et pour ce ce relations n'ail lent pas à l'encontre de la politique étrangère du pays." 244

What was interesting about the paper were the recommendations for representation at international conferences. The suggested procedures for such conferences emerged from the Quebec-Ottawa conflict over the Education Ministers Conference to be held in Kinshasa, January 1969 and the "francophonie" conference to be held in Kinshasa. They represented a compromise on the position the Johnson government had upheld over the Libreville and Paris conferences of the previous years; without renouncing Quebec's claim to a distinctive presence in Canadian delegations. The recommendations of the paper for representation at international conferences were as follows: Quebec's delegation, headed by a minister in each case, would go to international conferences and join the overall Canadian delegation; the Quebec minister would speak on behalf of his government unless other Canadian delegations agreed that he could speak on behalf of the delegation as a whole; the presence
of Quebec would be clearly signified by name plates and the flying of the Quebec flag; the Canadian delegation would cast votes only when there was unanimous agreement in the delegation; and invitations sent directly to member states of the federation would be reported to the federal government. These provisions represented an attempt by the Quebec government to ensure a distinct presence for Quebec within the overall Canadian delegation. In a sense, Quebec had no alternative. The federal government's carrot tactics had deterred other francophone African countries from pursuing the Gabon strategy. However, the change of Quebec strategy also resulted from Bertrand's personal desire to secure a realization of Quebec's goals in a less confrontational manner.

The position of the federal government over the participation of Quebec in the conferences at Niamey and Kinshasa was a continuation of its policy outlined in the White Paper of 1968. The government's harsh stand over Gabon and its increase of aid to francophone countries had been successful diplomacy. Niger's government was much more prudent than that of Gabon. When issuing invitations to francophone countries for the conference in Niamey which would lay the foundations of "la francophonie" the Niger government invited Canada and the Secretariat of the Conference invited Quebec. This created a very different situation to that of Gabon and Paris to which Canada had not been invited. However, the conference was considering a broader question than education, and Canadian resources were far greater than those of Quebec. In November 1969, just after the invitations to the conference had been issued, Paul Martin was propitiously on tour of francophone
Africa visiting Niger, the Congo, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Rwanda. On November 30, after talking to Paul Martin in Niamey, President Diori stated at a press conference that Canada was doing its best to send a delegation to the conference and that the delegation would be made up of representatives of all French speaking provinces in Canada. Diori also announced that Canada had offered "special aid" to Niger in the form of special credit facilities extended over the next four years for the Mariana Secondary School in Niamey and a grant of 20,000 tons of wheat.

Trudeau was concerned that one delegation attend since it was not a conference dealing specifically with education but with "la francophonie" in general. He said in the House on 27 November 1968 that the composition of the delegation would be "in accordance with the policy established by the Right Honourable Mr. Pearson at last year's federal-provincial conference. A delegation to such a conference will represent all Canadians and particularly French speaking Canadians who do not live only in the province of Quebec, but also in other provinces." Negotiations between the two levels of government began. The postponement of the conference and the illness of Premier Bertrand delayed their progress. Trudeau announced in a press conference on 23 December 1968, that a Canadian delegation would be sent and that negotiations were underway as to the make-up of the delegation. He also announced that Canada had been invited to the conference at Kinshasa.

The fact that Canada had also been invited was a constraint upon Quebec for it would necessarily have to compromise. It was forced either not to attend or to participate in some way in the federal delegation. The question was how could it participate in a Canadian delegation, yet
maintain an autonomous position and voice at the conference. On February 5, 1969, Claude Morin, Deputy Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs met with Marc Lalonde to discuss the conference. Five days later, Premier Bertrand announced that Quebec would send a delegation to the conference that would join the Canadian delegation there. The Quebec delegation would represent Quebec on matters of education and culture. It was decided that Pelletier would lead the Canadian delegation and Marcel Masse the Quebec delegation. On February 13, the federal government issued a statement which said that Pelletier would exercise the single vote of the Canadian delegation, but in event of disagreement, Canada would abstain. At the conference itself, Quebec was listed as a separate participant. Canada agreed to pay up to 30% of the proposed budget. Ottawa and Quebec would divide the portion of Canada's contribution not paid by Ontario and New Brunswick.

A similar arrangement was evolved for the Education Ministers Conference to take place in Kinshasa on January 13, 1969. Trudeau had proposed certain conditions under which Quebec might participate in the Canadian delegation that "would be acceptable to our two governments." Quebec would either chair or co-chair the delegation and would speak for Quebec in all matters within Quebec's constitutional jurisdiction. Quebec would be appropriately identified in meetings, on all documents produced by its government, on the automobiles of Quebec delegates, and the Quebec flag would be displayed. The voting arrangement would be the same as for the N'namy conference.

Bertrand's opinion was "de la sorte il me semble que les prérogatives de nos deux gouvernements seront respectées." He
remained firm about the right of the Quebec government to appoint its own delegates. For the Kinshasa conference, Quebec insisted on going separately and joining the Canadian delegation there. The projection at Kinshasa and Niamey of one representation, but two delegations, was certainly an accurate reflection of the internal Canadian situation. Gradually, however, the duality of delegations to Education Ministers' Conferences faded into the background. In the December 1969 conference, the delegation was led by the Quebec Minister of State for Education and there were no problems involved. On 28 January 1970, the Secretary of State told the House of Commons that Canada had been invited by Mauritania to the Conference. The delegation was announced on February 17. It would include representatives from New Brunswick, Ontario, Manitoba and would be led by the Quebec Minister of Education, Jean-Marie Morin. The same procedure was followed for the second conference in April.

The federal government had been successful in impressing upon external actors that it, not Quebec, was to represent Canada abroad. Quebec ceased to receive separate invitations to the Education Ministers Conference after Kinshasa. The ability of the federal government to assert its authority was enhanced by the reluctance of the international community to open the Pandora's box of the international status of member states of federations and/or non-state actors. A few members of the francophonie, under great pressure from France, had been willing to go where angels feared to tread. Most states, either from a concern over the legal implication of such action, or a more self-serving desire not to create potential problems for themselves in terms of their own
minorities, were only too happy to see the federal government assert itself and they did nothing to assist the province of Quebec. In this way, the federal government was able to include representatives from other provinces with French populations, thus undermining Quebec's assertion that only it could represent French Canada. Quebec had no alternative but to retreat. In doing so, however, it maintained a distinctive, as opposed to special, presence in Canadian delegations.

The Quebec government did not retire so easily from its position on the place Quebec should have in "la Francophonie". Officials in the Intergovernmental Affairs Ministry were adamantly opposed to Ottawa's proposals for the second francophone conference to take place in Niamey in March 1970. Sharp had said in the Commons on February 5, 1970 that "the principles that were followed in the past for attendance at Education Ministers' Conferences would be followed." As far as Marcel Masse was concerned, these proposals were "nettement inacceptables" and would constitute "un recul si elles étaient acceptées par le gouvernement québécois." "Ce n'est plus un paraolue qu'Ottawa veut imposer au Québec, c'est un étou", was the comment of Deputy Minister, Claude Morin. The proposed statutes for the organization had been submitted to Ottawa and Quebec in December. Since that time, arguments had continued as to how Quebec could play a positive role in the agency. On March 4, Masse revealed that Trudeau had written to Bertrand the week before, offering Quebec co-presidency of the delegation. Trudeau had also suggested a revision of the voting procedure to allow the Canadian delegation to vote in accordance with directions from Ottawa which was a departure from the previous practice
of abstention if disagreement existed, to which Quebec was totally opposed.

Masse emphasized that Quebec wanted to be represented at Niamey "en tant que Québec" not by "des Québécois". "Le gouvernement central ne veut pas reconnaître au Québec un statut particulier dans la délégation fédérale: ses représentants seront sur le même pied que les Manitiobains et les Ontariens." Quebec was insisting on four principles: that it be able to speak in its own name; that it nominate its own delegates; that when voting, the Canadian delegation must have the consent of Quebec on matters within provincial jurisdiction; and that a place be reserved for Quebec at Niamey proportionate to its importance in "la Francophonie". These principles were finally accepted by Ottawa on March 12, 1970. The special status that Quebec did obtain in "la Francophonie" was due as much to the intervention of France as to the willingness of Ottawa to compromise.

After the second Niamey conference of March, Mr. Sharp visited Paris and Bonn. In Paris, he met with French Foreign Minister Schumann and attempted to normalize relations. He outlined three basic prerequisites for this. Cooperation between France and Quebec must be carried on in consultation with Ottawa. France must avoid taking positions on the Canadian constitution, and Franco-Canadian cooperation should become more of a reality. A categorical statement was obtained from Schumann that asserted the French government had absolutely no intention of intervening in the internal affairs of Canada.

In October 1969, a statement was made in the House by Jean Pierre Goyer, the Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for
External Affairs. The statement was in response to the comments made by junior Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Jean Lipkowski, during his controversial visit to Quebec earlier that month. It was a forceful reiteration of federal views. One phrase in particular was clearly directed at Quebec-France relations. "The sharing of external sovereignty would permit perpetual intervention in the constitutional and internal affairs of Canada. Therefore, Canada's future would be decided through changing interests of the international community."

THE ENVIRONMENT: INTERNATIONAL

France continued to support Quebec on a bilateral basis, at least on the cultural and political level. In January 1969, Bertrand dispatched Jean-Guy Cardinal and Jean-Paul Beaudry, Education and Industry and Commerce Ministers respectively, on an official visit to France. They were warmly greeted by French Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. A tremendous amount of protocol treatment and publicity was given to the Ministers. Reports in the press indicated that the high profile given the ministers was the idea of the French government and that the signing of the three letters of entente was suggested by the French. Cardinal was embarrassed on his return to Quebec since his government had expressed their concern during his absence. He referred to the accords as expressions of future intentions only. Cardinal did use the visit successfully to obtain publicity which he needed to run against Bertrand for the leadership of the UN party in June. In his speeches at various receptions given by the French government, he referred more often to Daniel Johnson than to Bertrand and linked Quebec's international activities with the process of
constitutional review.

By July 1969, Bertrand had been confirmed as leader of the UN and Pompidou had replaced De Gaulle. In his letter to the newly elected French President, Pompidou, Bertrand indicated that France should cease giving offense to Ottawa. "J'ai exprimé au nouveau gouvernement français mon désir de maintenir d'étroites relations avec la France sans négliger les relations avec la Canada." Apparently, he had felt the need for a normalization of relations for some time. At the time of the leadership campaign in June, one of his advisors said, "L'une des choses que nous voulons faire est de reprendre en main nos relations avec la France. Elles nous échappent depuis que le général De Gaulle a lancé son Vive le Québec libre en 1967."

Neither the French government nor the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs seemed ready to accept normalization. The French Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Jean de Lipkowski (in effect, the junior minister to French Foreign Minister Schumann) was invited to Quebec in 1969 by Marcel Masse. He was also invited by the federal government to include a visit to Ottawa. Pompidou recommended that Lipkowski not pass through Ottawa. This was justified by Gilles Loiselle, the director of press information in Quebec House in Paris. By refusing to send Lipkowski to Ottawa, the French government was stressing that there would be a continuity in the Gaullist policy of "giving priority to close exchanges with Quebec in those areas where Quebec had competence."

It is possible to speculate that at least part of the reason for the continued willingness of the French government to give aid and assistance to Quebec was the necessity for successive French presidents to demonstrate
their loyalty to the basic policies of Gaullism in order to maintain their own position within the French political system.

It can be argued that Lipkowski's comments were directed as much at a French audience as they were to that of Quebec. At a press conference on October 14, he talked about the bi-partite study in progress for a France-Quebec satellite. He made reference to a decision taken in January to proceed with the project. This was in contradiction to Cardinal's January statement that the three letters had been expressions of future intentions. He also commented on the BNA Act, noting its silence on the subject of telecommunications. The reaction of both Bertrand and Masse is indicative of the tension existing between the two. Bertrand maintained a neutral position and did not intervene to defend Lipkowski's comments as Johnson had done over "Vive le Québec libre" in 1967. After requesting that the French government cease to embarrass Ottawa, he might have expressed more negative feelings about the remarks. This might have caused a public airing of his disagreement with Masse who defended Lipkowski's statements and said that Ottawa was creating "unnecessary problems". On this occasion, the reaction of at least some Québécois was negative to French interference. A certain skepticism pervaded attitudes towards Quebec-France relations when the communique issued by Lipkowski referred once again to the necessity of stimulating French investment in Quebec. No investment had been forthcoming. Indeed, on July 30 of that year, it had been announced that Michelin was to establish two industrial installations in Bridgewater and Picton, Nova Scotia. French business had not been at all convinced that Quebec province offered good return on its investments.
It continued to locate where it deemed it to be most profitable. Nova Scotia was accessible to the sea and the necessary component parts could be easily transported there. Labour was cheaper and, most importantly, the province was not viewed as a bastion of syndicalism. Financial stimulants were high for potential investors. Also, Michelin wanted the working language to be English since its location in Canada was part of an overall strategy to enter the USA market. Michelin had expanded, initially, into countries where salaries were low and labour docile (Spain and Ireland). Economic motivation and the rationality of the multinational corporation were more important in Michelin's decision to locate in Nova Scotia, than were France's relations with Quebec.

France's intervention at Niamey during the second francophonie conference was crucial in securing Quebec its status as a "gouvernement participant". While concerned about Quebec's desire to secure a unique presence in the Agence, France was more interested in its own position in the francophone world and it, therefore, manipulated Quebec's concerns to serve its own. At this second conference, the provisionary statutes of Jean-Marc Leger, the interim Secretary, were presented. They had been circulated to all governments prior to the conference and Quebec had indicated to France its interest in playing a distinctive role. France itself was not in agreement with the type of organization Leger envisaged. Leger's attitude was that the organization "a créer ne serait pas au servile de la langue française, mais plutôt au service de la coopération grace à la langue française." His vision was of an agency composed of sovereign states, founded on the principle of multilateral cooperation in the cultural and technical areas, with a structured secretariat, a
large budget (approximately $16 million) and precise programmes, in the 263
domaines of culture, information, social action and development.
France was concerned lest the organization become a competitive entity
in the francophone world and it was reluctant to see an agency made up
of sovereign states only. A counter proposal was, therefore, submitted
by the French government at the conference. It was a fifteen page
document which outlined its conception of a francophonie. The document
proposed an agency that would be composed not only of sovereign states
but of partially autonomous governments (like Quebec). It also suggested
a modest budget and secretariat. The counter proposal caused division
at the conference as each side lobbied for support.

Realizing the importance of securing French participation in the
new agency, many African states supported the French formula. Pelletier
remained adamantly opposed to the French document with its potential
ramifications for Quebec. An agreement was finally reached in committee
that allowed Quebec and other non-sovereign states to sign the agreement
establishing the agency. Quebec would not have treaty-signing powers,
direct membership or voting powers. Actual details of its role were not
negotiated with the federal government until October 1971. France
had succeeded in its objective of establishing a modest agency. Its
budget for 1970 was $300,000 and for 1971, $1.3 million to 1.8 million.
With such a limited budget, the Agency would not be able to sponsor
significant aid programmes. Rather, it would, initially at least, serve
as a clearing house for information.

PROJECTS

The principal targets of Quebec’s external behaviour continued
to be France and "la Francophonie". The three letters signed in January 1969 concerned the setting up of a committee to stimulate French investment in Quebec; the continued study of a satellite for the transmission of French education and cultural programs; and the contribution of 70 French professors to the future University of Quebec. With the exception of the latter offer, the three "letters of intent" required no significant input from France. It is not unfair to conclude that the political mileage derived from its support of Quebec during the visit of Cardinal et al in January 1969, far outweighed the benefits accrued by Quebec. Perhaps the growing dislike of the "political strings" attached by the French to their cultural assistance led Bertrand to consider pursuit of exchanges with other francophone countries. Like his predecessors, he was particularly aware of the need for contacts with other francophone countries to maintain a vibrant French culture and to enhance the Quebec sentiment of national identity.

There was, therefore, some diversification of contact with the francophone world. On July 2, 1969, Quebec and Gabon agreed to cooperate in a small teacher-student exchange. In March 1970, a communiqué of cooperation between Quebec and Louisiana was issued. Exchanges of professors, students, audio-visual material and books were envisaged. Technical cooperation in the petroleum industry, fisheries and hydrology was also mentioned in the communiqué. Both these cultural links lessened the dependency of Quebec upon France for cultural rejuvenation.

CONCLUSION

The Quebec government under Bertrand also sought a more autonomous role in the execution of its international relations and
thus also can be classified in the intermediate federal autonomy category. It is interesting to note, however, that the Bertrand government, due in large part to his political leanings and to changing international circumstances, was less enthusiastic about behaving in the international system in a manner normally associated with nation-states.

The Working Paper on Foreign Relations presented by the Quebec government to the February 1969 Constitutional Conference revealed the above two tendencies. On the one hand a legal and political case for extended provincial competence in the international arena was articulated. On the other hand, a willingness to obey the overall constraints implicit in continued membership in the federation was demonstrated. Bertrand was willing to compromise over Johnson's demands for independent representation at international francophone conferences.

Despite the change of strategy, the aspirations of the Quebec government for extended competence in the international arena were still audible to the international community. At the Francophone Education Ministers Conference the Quebec government initially insisted upon a "delegation within a delegation". The modalities eventually worked out enabled Quebec to lead the delegations to such conferences. Bertrand did, however, insist upon a distinct Quebec presence in "La Francophonie". In this one particular organization Quebec was participating with other nation-states. The position secured by the government of Quebec in Canadian delegations to francophone conferences and the distinct status gained in the Agence assured Quebec of audibility and durability in the francophone world.
Within Quebec itself it seems fair, on the basis of newspaper reports and interviews, to conclude that there was considerable divergence of opinion over the strategy to be pursued, between the politically recognized leadership and the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs. Philosophically, Bertrand and Massé agreed in that both thought Quebec should be able to extend its internal competences to the external level. Bertrand was, however, determined to secure a normalization of relations between Ottawa-Quebec-Paris and to obtain the realization of his demands in a less confrontational manner.

The federal government did accommodate Quebec when it felt that this strategy would appear to be a reasonable one to Quebecers. Its linguistic policies, its granting of participating government status to Quebec in "La Francophonie", its suggestion that Quebec ministers lead Canadian delegations to francophone conferences were all part of this strategy. It pursued such a strategy in an attempt to head the demands of the Quebec government off at the pass, thus stemming the tide of further demands. It also considered that this strategy would win over the minds of fair minded Quebecers to its standpoint thus undermining the credibility of the Quebec government.
244. *Document de Travaill sur les relations avec l'étranger, Conférence constitutionelle, Comité permanent des fonctionnaires, Québec, 5 février 1969*, p. 5. See Chapter one, pp. 24-26 for legal arguments supporting Quebec's international claims.
255. For France's intervention see "International Environment".


264. Modalités selon lesquelles le gouvernement du Québec est admis comme gouvernement participant aux institutions, aux activités et aux programmes de l'Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique, convenues le 1er October, 1971.

Chapter 6 The Bourassa Administration (April 1970- November 1976)

GOALS

The new administration shortly made it clear that its external relations would be consistent with the government's top priorities. "La coopération internationale est à notre avis un instrument indispensable de rapprochement et d'enrichissement des peuples et le complément nécessaire de nos priorités internes." 266 The major objectives of the Liberal government reflected two interrelated drives, one of which was economic development and the other "cultural sovereignty". One key argument in the chain of anti-separatist reasoning was that cultural survival depends upon economic prosperity. An often quoted example of language disappearance following an economic depression is that of the Gaelic speaking community of Ireland which was decimated by famine and migration during the second half of the nineteenth century. Many Quebec Liberals argued that economic disaster would ensue if Quebec were sovereign. This would result from the loss of markets in Ontario and Western Canada, a serious capital drain, the immigration of Quebec's economic elite, the loss of equalization payments and budgetary deficits necessitated by the reorganization of the government and the moving of thousands of civil servants from Ottawa to Quebec. Cultural survival, many argue, is dependent upon economic prosperity and such prosperity depends upon Quebec staying in the Canadian federation. On the whole the Quebec Liberals under Bourassa believed that Canada needed a flexible form of federalism, including "cultural sovereignty" and "fiscal decentralization". The underlying position seemed to be that
Quebec was not really different from the remainder of Canada except from the viewpoint of language and culture. Consequently Quebec did not need special status in non-cultural areas. In domains of cultural concern more powers would be needed. The problem with this position at least as far as the federal government was concerned, is that all sectors of Quebec life are considered to have cultural implications and the extent of the cultural sector was never fully defined. At a minimum however it covers radio and TV, education, arts, humanities, most social programs including immigration and external competence over matters within provincial jurisdiction. The meaning of the slogan "cultural sovereignty" was that Quebec should have the final word in policy-making in these various domains. The potentially all-embracing nature of the slogan "cultural sovereignty" led some individuals to question Bourassa's commitment to federalism. This viewpoint has some validity in that it highlights the fact that Bourassa's commitment to federalism was a purely pragmatic one. This fact would offer little satisfaction to anglophone nationalists. That he saw the federal system as the best means within which to achieve Quebec's goals and separatism as a "dangerous adventure" is borne out by the actions of his government.

RESOURCES

Bourassa campaigned on a strong federalist platform which was endorsed in two provincial elections. In the election of 29 April 1970, the Liberals had campaigned on an unequivocal platform in favour of a "fédéralisme rentable". They committed themselves to close fist negotiations with Ottawa as the other provinces toward a new and more equitable share of the fiscal resources and powers.267 "Fédéralisme
rentable" implied two factors. The first was that the central government must "equalize" public revenues among the different regions of the country. It was argued by many Quebec Liberals that Quebec, with a 10 to 15 percent lag behind the Canadian average per capita incomes, had benefited and would continue to do so from remaining a province within the federation. Secondly, it was argued that a federation enables its member states to save money and expertise by sharing public services which would otherwise have to be duplicated. If Quebec were a separate country it would have to maintain its own embassies abroad, a central bank, and armed forces. Quebec Liberals under Bourassa and most English-speaking Canadians considered that great advantages could be derived from the maintenance of one common department of external affairs, one common network of trade agencies and immigration offices and one common foreign aid agency. If Quebec were a separate entity, the maintenance of these services would increase the taxpayer's burden. The basic Liberal argument was that Quebec should endeavour to make federalism work better for Quebec on the one hand, and on the other secure increased powers in areas of cultural concern. In this way federalism would offer all the benefits of cultural sovereignty and profitable federalism and none of the risks associated with separation in whatever form it might take.

It was argued that the election of 1970 was a triumph for federalism since 55% of the electorate had voted for one of the two parties favoring that political structure. Of the 45% left, perhaps an estimated half would give federalism another chance. If, however, one took into account that 20% of the electorate were anglophones, the Parti Québécois
had managed to secure one third of the vote.268

Although not yet a majority, the PQ was extending its power base from the intellectual milieux to include organized groups in the society such as the labour unions. The growth of support for the nationalist parties in Quebec from 1966-76 is shown in Figure I.

![Bar Chart]

Figure 1 Growth of Support for Nationalist Parties in Quebec, According to the Elections of 1966 (6), 1970 (19), 1973 (24) and 1976 (34) and according to Pre-election Surveys Published in 1973 (21), 1975 (29) and 1976 (32). Figures are percentages based on total numbers of registered electors (not only those who cast ballots).
The 1973 election was yet again considered a resounding victory for federalism in which the Liberals gained 54% of the vote and 102 out of 110 seats in the Assembly. Most of the debate during this campaign had centred around the PQ budget released on 9 October 1973 decrying the economics of federalism. Bourassa and his Finance Minister, Raymond Garneau, released government studies on 24 October showing that Quebec received more money than it contributed to the federal system and that this trend would increase. It was an election battle of opposing sets of statistics and strong criticism by the Liberals of the separatist platform. This concern for bookkeeping and assurance of an adequate distribution of the wealth of Canada is, in some ways, a warning of the battle which would be waged between the PQ government and the federal government over the cost and benefits to Quebec of its status as a province. Bourassa called the result a "victory for common sense". The PQ, however, had won 30% of the popular vote but had only six seats to show for it. The polarization of Quebec politics had extinguished the Union Nationale which failed to win a seat and the Parti Creditiste was reduced to 2 seats. This mutation in Quebec politics was to prove to be a vitally important factor in 1976. It appeared that Bourassa had a strong mandate, yet the nationalist vote was gradually being channelled into support for a party committed to a radically new order.

To implement its goal of "souveraineté culturelle" the Bourassa administration announced in the throne speech of 1974 that it would make French the official language of the province. Legislation was tabled in the Assembly on 21 May 1974. It repealed the controversial Bill 63.
that had been passed in 1969 which had guaranteed freedom of choice to parents and immigrants since the latter were opting almost exclusively for the English-language school system. For the business sector, a system of awarding government contracts to companies favouring the use of French was devised. Certificates would be issued to companies promoting the use of French. These companies would then be shown preference by the government in subsidies, concessions and contracts. The government would provide financial and teaching assistance to businesses promoting French and French speaking persons at all levels of their operation. French would be the language of the civil servant, municipal administrations and school boards. The Bill was finally approved on July 30 by 92-10.272

Bertelsen asserts in her framework that non-state nation actors in the intermediate federal autonomy stage of development will insist upon the predominance of its ethnic language. The implementation of a comprehensive language policy by the Bourassa government was a manifestation of just such a tendency. Once again this program was only another step in a process leading from Bill 63 to Bill 101 which is seen by Quebecers as a means to secure the rightful place of their national language within the boundaries of Quebec.

The activities of the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, 1970-76, reflected the preoccupation of the Bourassa administration with the economic well being of the province. The offices that had been planned for by the Ministry under Bertrand were opened. Primarily designed to encourage American investment and tourism in Quebec and to secure markets for Quebec products, these offices were in Boston, Dallas, Los Angeles,
and New Orleans. An office was opened in Tokyo (October 1973) to encourage Japanese-Quebec trade. A Delegation-General was also opened in Brussels, in 1972. Bourassa was particularly concerned to locate an office in the heartland of the EEC to increase trade between Quebec and member countries of the EEC. The delegation was to serve as an observation post on developments in the EEC. After the creation in 1975 of a Belgian-Quebec subcommission to operate the 1967 Canada-Belgium accord, the delegation was responsible for a substantial program of exchanges particularly at the university level.273

Bertelsen noted that non-state actors of the intermediate federal autonomy category will seek to conduct their own external relations and that they will seek to have representation in the organs of the central government. The modalities of Quebec's behaviour under Bourassa reflect both these two drives. Quebec was able to pursue its own goals both unilaterally and through the machinery of the central government. The Bourassa administration was concerned with "le fond" of external relations rather than "la forme" which had been important to his predecessors. While this might be seen in some respects to be a restriction on Quebec in fact it could be considered as giving Quebec additional flexibility. In view of the federal government's refusal to allow the present Quebec government to open an office in Dakar, the relative ease with which the Bourassa government obtained permission for offices in Brussels and Tokyo is illustrative of the extent to which cooperation between the two levels of government provided added flexibility for Quebec.

To cope with the diversification and increased scope of Quebec's international relations, the Intergovernmental Affairs Department Act was passed in 1974. It is interesting that although the language of the Act was far more provocative than that of the 1967 Act,
there was no reaction from the federal government. One could argue that the lack of response to what would otherwise be considered a provocative constitutional assertion and incursion into areas of federal responsibility, was due at least in part to the political truce in effect between Quebec and Ottawa.

The guidelines for Quebec's action in external affairs were summarized in terms reminiscent of the 1909 Canadian Department of External Affairs Act. According to the drafters of the new Act, the legislation was designed to complete the institutionalization of the Department's function as coordinator. It was also aimed at setting out the guidelines for Quebec's action in the field of intergovernmental affairs. The Minister was given a definitive role in the formulation of external relations policy. Article 10 stipulated that the "Minister is responsible for elaborating and proposing to the government external relations policy and for implementing policy adopted by the government." He was also assigned with powers to conclude ententes. Article 15 of the Act stated that: "The Minister shall recommend the ratification of international treaties or agreements to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council in fields within the constitutional jurisdiction of Quebec." This was a formal documentation of Quebec's long standing ambition to sign its own agreements. The article raises interesting legal questions since this privilege has never been accorded to Quebec by the federal government. An international agreement cannot be ratified by the Lieutenant-Governor or the Crown in right of Quebec and in the absence of any agreed solution from Ottawa. Whether or not it will be employed by the present Quebec government as a constitutional precedent remains to be seen.
As far as Quebec's external representation was concerned, Article 36 reads:

In the elaboration and administration of external cooperation programmes, the Ministry must promote the consolidation of external cooperation programmes, the Ministry must promote the international francophone institutions in which the government of Quebec participates and ensure, in this respect, the participation of Quebec in international development programmes.

All international activities were to be coordinated through the Ministry including foreign missions and intergovernmental conferences and missions.

"Ces mesures visent évidemment à favoriser la concertation de l'expression des positions du Québec est resolu à poursuivre sa-marche dans le monde moderne." The budget of the Ministry increased from $13,824,600 in 1974/5 to $19,088,900 in 1975/6. Within those totals, the amounts spent on international relations had remained relatively constant ($5,018,300 in 1974/5 and $5,462,300 in 1975/6), while the amount spent on international cooperation jumped from $5,751,600 to $9,233,600 in the same years. Although this increase could be explained at least in part by inflation, no doubt some of the increase was due to joint Quebec-CIDA programmes being implemented during these years. The types of budgetary priorities Quebec was working under in international relations is obvious when one considers its 1974/5 budget of $1,963,855,400 for social affairs and $1,698,082,600 for education. Making use of central government machinery therefore gave Quebec greater latitude in international relations.

For ideological reasons, Bourassa was able to cooperate with the federal government in many spheres, including international relations. During this administration, the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs was involved in various joint development projects in the Ivory Coast, Mali
and Morocco. On the other hand Quebec did pursue cooperative ventures unilaterally, such as that with Spain to operate a cardiological centre and with the Lebanon to run a teaching programme. There was relatively little conflict with the federal government over external relations. Quebec ministers and Bourassa himself often voiced Quebec's traditional argument about extending its internal sovereignty abroad to ensure the "épanouissement" of society. Such comments were, however, always preceded by commitments to the federal system. Bourassa was not on the offensive in this domain and did not set out to harass Ottawa over external relations.

ENVIRONMENT: DOMESTIC

The process of constitutional review underway since 1968 came to a dramatic halt in 1971. The stumbling block was the very issue that had prompted it in the first place, the question of devolution of power to the province of Quebec. Profound difference of view between Quebec and the other governments, the increased support for separatism within Quebec, and Trudeau's staunch belief that there could be no special status for Quebec without destroying Confederation, constituted the underlying reasons for the failure. The disputed area of jurisdiction that actually led to the rejection of the Charter was that of social policy. Quebec wanted legislative primacy in the field of income security, by which the Quebec government meant that no federal legislation in that field should be allowed to conflict with provincial laws. The federal government feared that acceptance of the entire Quebec proposal, including revenue transfers, would mean the erosion of the federal power to redistribute wealth. A compromise was put forward which added family, youth, and
occupational allowances to pensions and provincial primacy was seen to be maintained. However, it fell short of Quebec's wishes, since the new list of concurrent powers was shorter than Quebec had envisaged. Some ambiguity remained as to the extent of provincial paramountcy. Leading newspapers in Quebec indicated that the Bourassa decision was in keeping with the sentiments of the majority of the attentive Quebec public. The idea of greater powers being devolved upon the Quebec government does seem to have been confirmed by a McGill University Reserach team led by Richard Hamilton and Maurice Pinard. French speaking respondents were interviewed. 13% indicated that they favoured independence and another 39% said they thought more powers should be transferred to the Quebec government. 21% were in favour of maintaining the existing division of powers.

Uncomfortable with the position of his predecessors on the issue of international relations and their explicit desire for de jure recognition of Quebec's aspirations, Bourassa did not pursue constitutional clarification of the matter. As long as Quebec participated through the federal machinery, the central government's policy would at least be to some extent influenced by the need to make the policy compatible with the policy of the Quebec government. If the Quebec government had refused to participate then federal policy could have been established without having to reconcile it with Quebec's interests. Thus, it was hoped that participation through federal machinery would serve as an important restraint on the freedom of action of the federal government.

Through central government machinery, Quebec was able to secure its place as leader of Canadian delegations to francophone conferences
and a "special status" in the Agence. Moreover, it was able to expand its horizons into the domain of international development assistance. A number of projects were undertaken in francophone African countries which enabled Quebecers to be in contact in yet another context with other French cultures.

In the area of federal-provincial representation in delegations, Quebec participated with other provinces in the three institutions of "La Francophonie": the Agence, the Conference of Francophone Education Ministers and the Francophone Conference on Youth and Sport. The modalities of Quebec's "gouvernement participant" were published in 1971. Both levels of government expressed satisfaction with the arrangement. As far as the biannual Francophone Education Ministers Conference was concerned, the practice throughout the six years of the Bourassa administration was that a Quebec Minister would lead the Canadian delegation consisting of provincial representatives. This procedure had begun to emerge under Bertrand and worked very well under Bourassa. In this way the federal government was acknowledging Quebec's special interest in francophone institutions, while essentially treating Quebec as a "province comme les autres". For its part, the Quebec government could ensure control over an area of paramount interest to it. The same arrangement was arrived at for the Francophone Conference on Youth and Sport.

Quebec participation in delegations to international organizations continued to work well under Bourassa. A representative of Quebec would often co-chair delegations or simply participate in the capacity of a delegate under the leadership of other provincial representatives. The federal government welcomed Quebec participation in the
central government's external affairs network. This enabled it to project a harmonious image abroad which prevented the interference of third parties such as France. From an internal perspective, as well as being able to facilitate Quebec's activities abroad, it would, if necessary, be in a position to restrain them. There was therefore a high degree of flexibility and cooperation between the two levels of government. While ostensibly Quebec was being treated as a "province comme les autres", which was in keeping with the federal government's overall policy outlined in the 1968 White Papers, there were at least two areas in which special provisions were made for Quebec.

One such area was that of development assistance. The federal government, through CIDA and the Quebec Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, cooperated on several projects in francophone African countries. Given the financial resources of the federal government, it was responsible for the financing of the projects. Quebec provided the staff and consultants. A regional centre for instruction on various aspects of the hotel business in Banako, Mali, was set up in April 1974. Approximately one hundred enrolled from Mali and neighbouring countries. Quebec sent four professors from the "Institut de Tourisme et d'Hôtellerie" in Quebec City. 284 ITHQ also provided the staff to train people for a tourist business in the Ivory Coast. An agreement to put this particular project into effect was signed by the federal government and Quebec in November 1974. 285 Another joint project came in response to a Peruvian request for assistance in setting up schools in Peru. Once again CIDA underwrote the project and Quebec provided the consultation services.

CIDA announced in July 1976 that the provinces had joined the federal government in a vaguely defined programme under which they would
cooperate in food and agriculture aid programmes to developing countries. The new project called the Voluntary Agricultural Development Aid Programme would be aimed at increasing and diversifying Canada's contributions to the world food problem. Such an endeavour had first been proposed at a First Ministers' Conference in 1974 and arose from a long standing request from provinces that they be allowed to participate in Canadian aid programmes. It can be speculated that this was perhaps an attempt by the federal government to ensure that Quebec was not seen to be receiving any form of special treatment. Provincial requests to participate in external federal aid programmes were, therefore, met by the government as it sought to represent national goals and objectives in an area of concern to all Canadians.

The federal government also showed considerable flexibility toward Quebec in the area of immigration. It is yet another example of Quebec participating in the execution of federal policy to ensure the adequate representation of its needs. The first agreement was signed in May 1971 and it enabled Quebec to assign its own orientation officers to Canadian embassies in selected foreign capitals.

The parties to this agreement understand and accept that the activities of the federal officer are Canadian in scope. Consequently, a Quebec presence in a federal office does not have as its objective or effect to place the Quebec government in a privileged position in the field of immigration recruitment and selection as compared to other provinces, but to enable a Quebec orientation officer to receive, and to advise, counsel and assist an immigrant who has chosen Quebec as his place of settlement.

As far as the Quebec Minister of Immigration was concerned, the agreement would give “Quebec special status in the field of immigration and would be a first step in a global immigration policy for Quebec.”
The next step toward the global immigration policy came in October 1975. The second immigration agreement, which replaced that of 1971, stipulated that Quebec immigration officials must be consulted concerning all applications destined for the province. The objective of the agreement was to increase immigration of French speaking foreigners as well as those willing to integrate into the French language and culture. Quebec officials would be able to participate in recruiting and selection missions with federal officials and to meet the candidates to inform them about living conditions in Quebec. At the same time the final decision on the acceptability of immigrants would be left to the federal government. The agreement was designed to counter the fact that less than 40% of the immigrants who settled in Quebec in 1974 were French.

With a cooperative Quebec government in power, the federal government was able to secure a normalization of relations in the Ottawa-Paris-Quebec triangle. Shortly after the election victory of 1970, the Minister of Regional Economic Expansion predicted improved Franco-Canadian relations. He stated that relations had been improving for some time and should further improve "now that it is evident at least that a majority of Quebecers do not want to separate. If France does not understand that it will never understand anything." During the Bourassa years there was increased functional and political cooperation between Canada and France. The visit of French Foreign Minister Schumann in September 1971 set the tune for the following years. Schumann stressed that his government was still pursuing a special relationship with Quebec but that there was a new understanding between the French and Canadian governments.

Premier Trudeau visited Paris in 1974, making it clear that he had no wish
to reopen the debate over the triangular relationship. During his visit, it was decided to extend Franco-Canadian cooperation in the areas of energy and industry. One study group was to be set up to examine industrial cooperation in the domains of surface transport, aerospace and marine industries, and the other to examine joint possibilities for the development of Canadian energy resources.

Similarly, cooperation with Belgium was able to get off the ground. In September 1970, a cultural exchange agreement was signed. April 1971 saw an agreement pertaining to scientific, industrial and technical cooperation and exchanges of academics. A mixed commission was set up to operate the agreement. "The agreement is indicative of the increasingly close relations between our two countries." The infamous 1967 cultural accord was finally rendered operative in 1975 when a Belgo-Quebec Commission was created.

**ENVIRONMENT: INTERNATIONAL**

The French administrations under Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing recognized the strong desire on the part of the Bourassa government for continued relations with France but not at the expense of Ottawa. During his various visits to France, Bourassa made the attitude of his government quite clear. France, therefore, continued to pay special attention to Quebec in order, at least in part, to maintain the support of Gaullists. It did so, however, without giving diplomatic offense to Ottawa. While in Paris in December 1974, Bourassa was invited to attend the weekly meeting of the French cabinet. This was the first time a visiting dignitary had been thus privileged. Bourassa was able to put forward his proposals concerning the direction he felt Franco-Quebec
relations should take. His main objective was to secure French support in the implementation of Bill 22 through a process of exchanges in the business and industrial sectors. Giscard d'Estaing expressed his support for Quebec after the cabinet meeting. "The important projects your government is conducting will provide an opportunity for us to help Quebec on a cultural level in your endeavours to make French ... the language used in administration, business and in the technical fields."  

Normalization at the political level culminated in the visit of the French Minister of the Interior to Quebec in July 1976. The headline in "Le Devoir" was "Quebec fait un accueil correct mais sans chaleur a Poniatowski." At a press conference given by Poniatowski and Gerard Levesque during the visit, a page in the triangular relations of Ottawa-Quebec-Paris was turned, at least temporarily.

Il faut être clair sur ce problème. Nous entendons avoir de bonnes relations avec les autorités fédérales canadiennes. Nous nous entendons également et c'est l'objet du message dont je suis porteur pour M. Bourassa, avoir des relations privilégiées et directe avec le Québec.

PROJECTS

One example of the external environment being utilized to promote internal development was the Bourassa/Chirac agreement of December 1974. The intention of the agreement was to advance Quebec-France cooperation in six principal areas, the most important of which was to be the exchange of managers, technicians and engineers. Those from Quebec would reside in France for brief periods to observe the functioning of French enterprises. Their French counterparts would spend time in Quebec enterprises to contribute to the on-the-spot process of francization. Such exchanges would facilitate the use of French in industrial and other
establishments in Quebec. Quebec schools and laboratories were to be furnished with a bank of modern, scientific, and technical information. In this way France would be contributing to Quebec’s initiatives to diffuse French expressions into the teaching system which was hitherto being exposed to largely English terminology. This portion of the agreement quickly bore fruit. During 1976, 350 professors and teachers went to France to compare French programmes with their own and to study industrial terminology.

Also outlined were proposals for industrial cooperation. Enterprises in Quebec had suggested that a joint Franco-Quebec industrial cooperative group be formed to encourage joint ventures in the fields of transport, electronics, chemicals, food, pollution control, communications and mining. Also mentioned was the possibility of transferring professional skills from one country to another which would encourage mobility of workers. In the area of natural resources it indicated that the idea of exporting enriched uranium from Quebec to France was being explored. It is interesting to note that despite the scope of the Bourassa/Chirac agreement which considerably enlarged the span of Quebec-France relations, there was little reaction in Ottawa. The central concern of the federal government revolved around the proposal to build a uranium enrichment plant as part of the James Bay Development Project. This was communicated to the Quebec government which immediately sought to reassure the government as to the exploratory nature of its talks with France.

Bourassa, like other provincial premiers in the 1970s, made a number of personal tours of European and Near Eastern capitals in an
attempt to encourage trade and investment for Quebec. As early as possible after the 1970 election, Bourassa travelled to Europe. The FLQ crisis of October 1970 caused him many internal problems which preoccupied his government until the beginning of 1971. In April 1971 Bourassa left for a sixteen day tour of Western Europe. The purpose of the trip was threefold; to entice European investors to Quebec and to counteract the impropitious climate for investment that had resulted from the events of October; to evaluate the cost effectiveness of Quebec's missions and headquarters abroad, and to discuss the possibility of closer economic and cultural ties between Quebec and Europe. 301

In all capitals, he was seen in the company of the Canadian Ambassador which was a conspicuous break with the behaviour of previous government officials. There was a notable absence of ceremonial events during his visit to Paris. In a radio interview in Paris, Bourassa gave some indication of the role he hoped France would be able to play in assisting Quebec's economic development. Emphasizing Quebec's reliance on the United States as an investment source, Bourassa suggested that France could assist in the diversification of the province's investment sources. 302 In a T.V. interview on the 19 April Bourassa expressed "a certain disenchantment" felt by some Quebecers about the lack of French investment in Quebec. 303 Bourassa's public criticism of France's meagre investment rate in Quebec indicated the desire of his government to place France-Quebec relations on a "cooperation rentable" footing.

Other European tours were undertaken, one in November 1972 and one in April 1974. During the later visit Bourassa met with François
Xavier Ortoli and Christopher Soames, President and Vice President of the Commission of the EEC respectively. It was the first time a provincial premier had been received by the administrative leaders of the Community. His talks with them revolved around the EEC's discussions with Canada, the linguistic and monetary policies of the EEC, the energy question and European investment in Quebec. He was particularly concerned to attract high technology investment in Quebec to develop the province's natural resources. Bourassa attempted to impress upon his European audience that it was in this sector "que peut s'orienter ou s'intensifier la collaboration entre le Québec et l'Europe." 304

Bourassa's pilgrimage to Iran in October 1975 was designed specifically to diversify Quebec's trading and investment partners. A trade accord was signed that had as its objective the increase of Quebec's exports to Iran had provided for Iranian investment in the province. 305 Estimates of the value of the accord ranged from $300 to $600 million. It involved cooperation in six areas: education; energy; construction; industry and mines; agriculture; and cultural affairs. The largest transaction envisaged involved the export of 2,000 - 5,000 prefabricated housing units a year to Iran, a project estimated to be worth about $100 million. Other proposals included the sale of 10,000 tons of powdered milk to Iran over five years, joint participation in a forestry project in St. Felicien Quebec, cooperation of the government owned Société Québécois d'Exploration Minière with the Iranian government to develop the mining industry in Iran and possible cooperation between the two governments in the field of electrical energy.

To assure follow-up of the agreement, the Director General of International Relations in Intergovernmental Affairs acted as coordinator.
for future developments. In February 1976, a Quebec mission composed of representatives from the ministries and firms implicated in the accord visited Iran. A series of accords followed. SOQUEM arranged to assist the Industrial and Mining Development Bank in Iran to organize the mining industry. A programme of cooperation was traced between the Iranian Minister of Energy and Hydro-Quebec. A programme for cooperation involving Quebec medical professors teaching in Iranian universities and exchanges was evolved. To oversee these various accords a Quebec-Iran bureau of cooperation was established.

CONCLUSION

The Bourassa administration is in some ways the most interesting of the four; while it might seem to be an anomaly in that Quebec appeared to be acting within the accepted constraints of a member state of a federation, in fact Bourassa presided over a considerable diversification of Quebec's external behaviour. It is fair to conclude that Quebec still fell within the intermediate federal autonomy category. There were as many references in the speeches of Bourassa and Gerard Levesque, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, to the need to extend provincial competence in international relations, as in those of previous Quebec premiers and ministers. They were always tempered, however, with statements of commitment to federalism. If the Quebec government under Bourassa dropped the demands for de jure change, it certainly did not discontinue its attempt to expand Quebec's competencies de facto. A good example of this was certain of the clauses in the new Intergovernmental Affairs Act. Article 15 of the Act, if implemented, would enable Quebec to behave in a state like manner.
Bourassa's central concern during the lifetime of his administration was with the economic development of the province. He was convinced that such development would provide economic prosperity for all Quebecers and that this in turn would win the hearts and minds of Quebecers for federalism. He was, therefore, more prepared to cooperate with the federal government if such cooperation would win for him sufficient freedom to undertake both domestic and international activities to attract foreign investment. To accomplish this goal, Bourassa was concerned more with results than with questions of prestige. The modalities of the Quebec government's behaviour during the Bourassa administration reflected this concern. Both the machinery of the central government and the government of Quebec's own institutional mechanisms were employed in the pursuit of goals. The latter was streamlined and refined to cope with the increased diversity of Quebec's international behaviour.

Bourassa's administration did not seek to advertise it external behaviour or attempt to impress upon the federal government and the international community that it was possessed of external sovereignty.

Internally, it would appear that there was virtually no conflict between Bourassa and the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Gerard Levesque. There seemed to be compatibility of objectives and strategy between the two decision-making subsystems. The mandate of the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs was considerably broadended in 1974 and the Minister given a formal role in the decision-making process which had heretofore not been the case. There can be no doubt that the broadening of its mandate was undoubtedly a sure way to increase the audibility and durability of the government of Quebec aspirations.
For its part, the federal government appeared willing to allow the Bourassa government considerable latitude in its external behaviour, secure in the knowledge that this was being undertaken to obtain continued Quebec support for federalism. What the federal government might not have considered was how it would act if a Quebec government decided to promote economic prosperity as a means to convince Quebecers to support the idea of sovereignty.
CHAPTER 6

FOOTNOTES

266. Allocution du Premier Bourassa au diner offert par le
gouvernement du Québec en l'honneur du Gouverneur et d'un
groupe de parlementaires de l'Etat du Maine, 4 May 1972,
P. 3, Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, Quebec.


269. A. Bernard, What Does Quebec Want, Toronto: James Lorimer &


271. Ibid., p. 1165.

272. Ibid., p. 1244.


274. Intergovernmental Affairs Department Act, Ministry of Intergovernmental
Affairs, Quebec, Chapter II, Article 10.

275. Ibid., Chapter II, Article 15.

276. Ibid., Chapter IV, Article 36.


278. Annual Report of the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, Quebec

279. A.M. Jacomy-Millette, "International Diplomatic Activity of Canadian
Provinces, with Emphasis on Quebec Behaviour", 7(1) Revue Générale
de droit, 1976, p. 23.


281. Ibid.

282. A. Bernard, op. cit., p. 78.

283. See Chapter One, pp. 32-33.


288. Agreement concerning information, recruitment and selection of foreign nationals residing outside of Canada for permanent residence or temporary employment in the Province of Quebec, Office of the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, 17 October, 1975.


292. Ibid., 1974, p. 1283.

293. Ibid.

294. Ibid., 1971, p. 90.


298. Relevé des conclusions et des décisions arrêtées au cours des entretiens entre le Premier ministre du Québec et le gouvernement français, Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, Quebec.


301. Ibid., April 1971, p. 90.

302. Ibid., p. 91.

303. Ibid.


305. Communiqué de presse entre le Québec et l'Iran en matière de coopération, Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, Quebec.


307. Ibid.
Chapter 7 The Levesque Administration (November 1976 -

GOALS

Bertelsen has defined a non-state nation as "an entity that operates in a manner normally associated with a nation-state but is not a generally recognized nation-state." Given that the "raison d'être" of the Parti Québécois is its goal of political sovereignty for Quebec, accompanied by an economic association, ostensibly some form of common market with the rest of Canada, it is fair to say that for the Quebec government, Quebec is simply in a process of transition, an entity which will soon assume its rightful place in the international system. In the meantime, it sees no reason why it should not behave as if the process had been completed. Sovereignty-association is a concept implying that all constitutional powers currently held by the federal government be devolved upon the government of Quebec, accompanied by the establishment of decision-making mechanisms in the economic sector controlled jointly by the governments of Quebec and Canada. The PQ feels the proposal to be consistent with the basic objectives shared by a large proportion of French-speaking Quebecers, namely, survival of the French language and "nation" in Quebec, and economic development. Full political sovereignty would necessitate the transfer of all powers to Quebec, in the fields of taxation, foreign affairs and defense, agriculture, communications, energy, resources, justice, labour, and immigration. Economic union (which is more than a monetary union and could be more than both a common market and a free-trade association) is a "federal arrangement" in which the participating entities preserve
their sovereignty while agreeing to collaborate in the areas of currency, tariffs and trade. The central institutions would include a central bank, an economic council, a tariff commission and joint committees. Political sovereignty, the PQ argue, would give Quebecers control of the areas so essential for the collective progress of the society. One such area would be foreign relations. Control of this domain would enable the Quebec government to foster the social and economic development of the society. In the economic sphere the PQ maintains that federal policies are detrimental to Quebec's economic development and that political sovereignty and economic union would enable decisions to be made in Quebec by Quebecers. From a socio-cultural perspective, a politically sovereign Quebec would be able to offer better services to the society and would ensure the continuation and preeminence of French culture.

The sovereignty concept proposed by the PQ is, in many respects, reminiscent of Johnson's "égalité-indépendance" notion. In his treatise, Johnson had said:

> il faut établir au Canada une constitution nouvelle qui instituerait au sommet, pour l'ensemble du pays un organe vraiment binational, où les mandataires des deux communautés pourraient travaillé ensemble, sur un pied d'égalité à la gestion de leurs intérêts communs. Et à défaut de pouvoir se réaliser dans un fédéralisme nouveau et binational, la nation canadienne française n'aura pas d'autre choix que de faire l'indépendance du Québec. 308

In terms of the Bertelsen framework, however, there is a significant distinction. Johnson's Quebec was, in Bertelsen terminology, of the intermediate federal autonomy type which, while demanding the enhancement of its powers, still recognized itself as part of a larger
whole to which Quebec owed some allegiance. The present government must be classified with those non-state actors for whom sovereignty is the only legitimate goal. Levesque has, of course, tempered this drive for sovereignty by stating that what he really desires is equality with the rest of Canada, "féderalisme à deux" rather than complete independence. In his inaugural speech on 8 March 1977, Levesque said that the PQ option would establish:

un nouveau type d'association, inspirée de formules que bien d'autres peuples pratiquent déjà, et qui leur a grandement servi à coopérer et à se développer ensemble, métés sans les tensions permanentes, les inégalités politiques et les risques constants d'animosité du féderalisme traditionnel. 309

It has been an essential tactic for Levesque to stress the "association" aspect of his option. The CBC Sunday Morning Survey of April 3, 1977, illustrated that 32% of the respondents approved of "souveraineté-association", but only 16% approved of "souveraineté" without "association". In October 1977 survey data was published by the Reader's Digest and it was based on a sample of 832 respondents. It demonstrated that the proportion of those who supported the "souveraineté-association" option had climbed to 40% while 19% accepted the idea of independence with "association". Members of the Parti Québecois who have studied these surveys maintain that if a referendum were held in 1978, the support for political sovereignty in an economic association with the rest of Canada would reach at least 40% of the votes cast (that is 30% would vote yes, 45% would vote no and 25% would abstain). Since support for this option has been growing since 1966, the Parti Québecois argue that by 1980 they would have a chance of
winning the referendum on the question of political sovereignty and economic association.

As discussed by Franklin Weinstein in his study of Indonesia, one of the primary goals of external relations can be to enhance the internal objectives of a society. This truth has long been grasped by the PQ as well as by preceding governments. This was recognized by Claude Morin during a speech in March 1978 when he said:

Je postule ici que la politique extérieure d'une nation est au service de ses objectifs internes et que ceux-ci sont déterminés, entre autres facteurs, par son histoire, sa géographie, sa démographie, son économie et ses buts plus spécifiquement politiques. 311

The change in the objectives of the new government has dictated a change in behaviour. External relations are of cardinal importance to an entity preparing for its independence. Quebec's behaviour in the international arena since November 1976 has been characterized by a conspicuous break with the behaviour of the previous administration. The present government has taken every opportunity it can to assert itself as an independent entity in the international arena. It has also gradually been evolving policies it would pursue should it become independent. It is interesting to note the extent to which pre-1976 PQ objectives in the international field have been modified by the constraints of the environment. The key modifying influences have been the United States and what would be a truncated anglophone Canada, as will be explained below.

One might briefly summarize the external relations objectives of the PQ prior to its election. In the construction of an independentist platform, PQ party documents have included explicit ideas about the...
external environment. The philosophical orientation of early party platforms was solidarity with the third world and recognition of the principle of national self-determination for other "nations." The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states would be respected. Later platforms indicated that an independent Quebec would seek to have stronger ties with "La Francophonie," relations with the third world, particularly Latin America, and close ties with Canada and the USA. It would also be interested in gaining admission to the United Nations. In the economic sphere, the PQ put forward its idea for a common market emphasizing that the terms of the GATT agreements would be respected in the organization of its economic policy. Intentions to restrict and regulate foreign investment were reiterated in the writings and speeches of party leaders. There were also suggestions that the repatriation of profits and dividends of companies would be restricted. There was discussion of nationalization in key sectors of the economy. In the area of defense, a withdrawal from NORAD and NATO was envisaged. In a sample budget, tabled prior to its election, the following allocation of funds was suggested: $26,252,400 for bilateral and multilateral foreign relations, $44,160,900 would be devoted to development assistance, and $164,913,000 for a force of 312 approximately 8,000 soldiers.

There has been a continuing reassessment of the above goals in the light of the political and economic reality of the North American continental system into which Quebec is locked. Although perhaps feasible in the abstract, economic autarky would involve a decline in the standard of living to such an extent that it is very unlikely that
the ordinary Quebecker would consider this alternative. The PQ has, therefore, been forced to suggest the idea of economic association with the rest of Canada. However, such an association necessitates the willing cooperation of the rest of Canada and its cooperation, if forthcoming at all, depends upon the policies pursued by an independent Quebec.

RESOURCES

In the November 1976 election, the PQ obtained 42% of the popular vote. The question of "independence" was considered a key issue for only 7% of 1,095 respondents, as indicated in Table 1. Support for the sovereignty-association option since 1962 is documented in Table 2. (see next page) In an attempt to sell the idea of sovereignty-association, Levesque has recently emphasized the "confederation" aspect of his philosophy. His recent article in Report on Confederation, in which he outlined his ideas about the nature of a true confederation, is but one example. The likelihood for success of the Levesque alternative has been lessened by the election on April 15, 1978 of Claude Ryan to the leadership of the Quebec Liberal Party. After its humiliating defeat in 1976 the party was left without a leader and for sixteen months there was a political vacuum in Quebec since Rodrigue Biron had failed to revitalise the Union National as a viable alternative in the political arena. The sovereignty-association debate was, therefore, polarized around MM. Levesque and Trudeau. Levesque now has to face an opponent within Quebec. It is too early to predict the extent of support in Quebec for a rejuvenated Liberal party under Ryan. It would not be unreasonable to project, however, that many of those who voted
TABLE 1 THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES IN THE NOVEMBER 1976 CAMPAIGN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Ranked First by</th>
<th>Ranked Second by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The economy</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The honesty of the government</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The right to strike in the public sector</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill 22 - and enrolment in English schools</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadianization of the constitution</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All issues equally important/no answer/don't know</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of answers</td>
<td>(1,095)</td>
<td>(1,091)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage in favour</th>
<th>Percentage against</th>
<th>Percentage undecided</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Number of Respondents.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970(spring)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970(autumn)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(not available)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data collected by Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton from various surveys and (except for 1977 figures) published November 10, 1976 in Montreal's Le Devoir and The Gazette and the Toronto Star. Questions included the word "separation" except in 1977 when the question read: "The Parti Québécois wants Quebec to become an independent country associated economically with the rest of Canada. If the government of Quebec were able to establish such an economic association with the rest of Canada, would you then vote in a referendum for or against Quebec becoming an independent country?"
for the PQ in 1976, with the encouragement of Claude Ryan no less, because of its good government platform, will switch if a viable alternative is presented to them. Moreover, the success that the PQ has had in attracting the nationalist vote will be challenged by the Ryan camp. Unlike Raymond Garneau, Ryan is not in favour of a status quo federalism. He supports the idea of greater decentralization in certain key areas of which international relations will likely be one. Constitutional arrangements that enable Quebec to pursue its development will be sought by a Liberal provincial government. It is interesting to speculate, as Daniel Latouche has done recently in a CBC interview in April 1978, upon the possibility of a Liberal government, once elected, taking Quebec out of Canada if those arrangements were not forthcoming.

The PQ is, however, in power and has all the instruments of government at its disposal. Since its election, Claude Morin has headed the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs. His longevity and expertise in this area of government are well known. The perspective he has on Quebec-Ottawa relations was developed in his recent book. The criterion he utilized in judging the progress Quebec had made in the federal-provincial arena was the extent to which the powers of Quebec had been extended (as opposed to confirmed). His conclusion about the extent of Quebec's "gains" in the 1960s was that in most areas they were nonexistent. "In setting up the Quebec Pension Plan, Quebec conquered no new constitutional territory, but simply occupied a field of its own that Ottawa had been preparing to mine." His views run contrary to those of many anglophones who feel that Quebec obtained de facto special status in a number of areas under the Pearson
administration. Morin's conclusion about international relations is that Quebec made two gains. It no longer had to work through federal middle men and had achieved an international presence.

It can be suggested that the orientation of the Ministry has shifted since November 1976 under the leadership of Claude Morin whose fundamental objective has always been the extension of Quebec's powers. Since November 1976 the political beliefs of those at the political, level of government have coincided with those in the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs. This has not always been the case as was demonstrated during the Bertrand administration. The convergence of ideas makes the likelihood of an assertive international behaviour more probable. Over the past year and a half, the Ministry has appeared to have made full use of its prerogatives as defined in 1974 to assist in the assertion of its presence abroad. Since 1976 the Ministry has not pursued cooperative policies with the federal government. In the area of representation at international conferences, where cooperation had been paramount under Bourassa, there has been continued friction. The first attempt by Quebec to assert itself was at the World Water Conference in Mar del Plata, Argentina, in March 1977. At this conference, Quebec Environment Minister, Marcel Leger, announced that he would speak for Quebec only and not for Canada. The next day, in Brussels, Jacques Yvan Morin refused to preside over the Canadian delegation at the Francophone Education Ministers Conference which had been the custom under Bourassa. Canada and Quebec delegations sat at separate tables bearing separate flags. Trudeau strongly criticized these actions and threatened to bar Quebec from attending international
conferences if it continued to renounce its ties with the rest of Canada. He told his weekly press conference that Quebec officials cannot go to international meetings and "behave as though the province had an international personality." At the December 1977 meeting of the Agence, Claude Morin did just that by putting forth the sovereignty-association option of his government in an address to the conference. In September 1977 a senior civil servant in the Ministry was appointed to deal specifically with communications between Quebec and international organizations. By insisting upon a distinct identity and voice at international conferences and by seeking to establish a direct unilateral network of relations with international organizations, Quebec is laying the fundamental cornerstones for an independent presence abroad.

ENVIRONMENT: DOMESTIC

The strategy of the federal government in dealing with Quebec's assertiveness in the international arena has been to impede such attempts whenever and wherever possible. A good example of this was the government's refusal to allow Quebec to open a Delegation-General in Dakar, Senegal. The reason given for the refusal was that the Canadian embassy already deals with Senegalese educational, cultural, and assistance needs and that if Quebec so wished, it could install an officer in the embassy. This strategy has not been lost on the present Quebec government which has accused the federal government of deliberately obstructing legitimate external activities of Quebec. The Quebec government has suggested, indeed, that activities which the central government permitted under Bourassa are now being denied it.
The federal government has also continued its strategy of presenting itself as the only government capable of representing national, including francophone, interests abroad. While asserting ultimate federal responsibility, the government has responded to provincial insistence on input into the formulation of Canadian policy in the on-going GATT negotiations. This has been used by the government to demonstrate its ability to articulate national goals and objectives in an area affecting all Canadians. In order to emphasize its capability to represent francophones, the idea of a French Commonwealth was proposed in Ottawa in October 1977. Jean-Pierre Goyer, Minister of Supply and Services, who was newly responsible for Canadian relations with francophone countries, indicated that the organization would be patterned on the Commonwealth model. Quebec was to be excluded since this would be an organization that dealt with political matters and to which only sovereign states could be admitted. It can be argued that this was another attempt by the government to undermine Quebec's assertion of its sovereignty. The idea was unacceptable to Quebec and was not well received in France who once again saw a threat to its leadership in the francophone world.

Like the Quebec government, the federal government has also pursued a strategy of being uncooperative. The Quebec government is not insensitive to this strategy and they have accused the government of deliberately seeking confrontation. They claim that many activities that were undertaken by the Bourassa government are now viewed as unacceptable incursions into areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction. In July 1977 the PQ released documents demonstrating conflict with
Ottawa over Quebec's dealings with the EEC. Quebec had requested a role on the subcommittee for industrial cooperation between Canada and the Community. The subcommittee was to have met in May 1977. Despite a number of requests prior to the meeting, Quebec was not informed of the arrangements in time to participate.

While politically and diplomatically the government has pursued non-cooperative strategies, it has continued to demonstrate flexibility in one area of particular concern to Quebec, that of immigration. The intention of the recent agreement signed by the federal and Quebec governments is to give a determining voice to Quebec in the selection of immigration candidates. Quebec governments have always considered it important for them to have a distinctive voice in the formulation and execution of Canadian immigration policy. The present government, however, views control of immigration as a vital instrument for a sovereign state. Given that underlying philosophy it is interesting that the federal government was willing to cooperate. It can be argued that it represented an attempt to illustrate the extent to which Quebec can be free to develop its society within the confines of the federation. In a similar vein the government recently introduced a Bill which would enable citizens to be tried in either English or French. All provinces have endorsed the concept although only four will be able to render it operational.

Another aspect of the domestic environment has been the intervention of provincial government leaders in the sovereignty-association debate. It was suggested in an article by Michael Oliver that special status for Quebec, while it may have been a feasible constitutional
option in the late 1960s is no longer workable given the increased assertion of autonomy by other provinces. This would appear to be the case if the recent statements by both Premiers Lougheed and Blakeney are any indication. Lougheed enunciated proposals for constitutional reform at the March 1978 meeting of the Canada West Foundation. His principal contention was that there should be no special status for any one province, but the possibility of special status for various governments through the expansion of concurrent powers. Other of his proposals included provincial appointment of 40% of federal and regulatory agencies; restriction on the doctrine of the federal emergency power; complete provincial jurisdiction in the field of indirect taxation and the creation of a constitutional court to interpret federal and provincial jurisdiction. He rejected the sovereignty-association option saying "it won't wash in Western Canada."

Premier Blakeney has sought to alert the Canadian public to the need to seriously consider significant changes to Canadian constitutional arrangements. He has argued that there are real grievances within most provinces over the present constitutional framework and over the manner in which the federal government has utilized these arrangements for its own ends. The recent action of the federal government with respect to the reduction in sales tax is but one example of the federal government using its large treasury to "persuade" the provinces to follow its lead. Premier Blakeney suggested at the Canada West Foundation meeting that it might be necessary, as part of a larger constitutional package, to enable different provinces to have different relationships with the federal government, shades of special status. This attitude on the part
of an English speaking politician is certainly more forthcoming than normal and has been warmly welcomed in Quebec. It must be stressed, however, that while Premier Blakeney has expressed a willingness to consider new and perhaps novel constitutional arrangements which would better reflect the needs and aspirations of Quebec and the other provinces, he has not given any support to the idea of sovereignty-association. Reform of the present system is possible and indeed necessary but the creation of a totally new system, as suggested by the Quebec government, is a non-starter.

ENVIRONMENT: INTERNATIONAL

Initially, France's reaction to the PQ victory was one of cautious restraint possibly encouraged by François Cloutier, the Quebec Agent-General, who is reputed to be an ardent federalist, and by Canadian diplomats in Paris. When the French Trade Minister, André Rossi, visited Ottawa in January 1977, he told an Ottawa news conference that France would continue relations with Quebec but only in areas where the province has jurisdiction. "France’s position is not to intervene in the internal affairs of another country." During his visit to Quebec, Rossi met with Levesque and other members of the government but the meetings were concerned with economic rather than political issues. Rossi and Bernard Landry, the Quebec Economic Development Minister, agreed to expand exchanges of technical information and industrial experts, Michael Roy wrote of the visit: "Toutefois, la récente visite de M. André Rossi... a démontré à Ottawa comme à Québec, que Paris conserve une attitude prudente réserve à l’égard du problème canadien."
This correct attitude was maintained during Claude Morin's trip to Paris in April 1977. He was warmly welcomed by French officials but his views were treated with a "neutralité bienveillante". Only one statement was made in support of Quebec's independentist views and that came from the Mayor of Paris, Mr. Chirac, who assured Morin of Gaullist support. This is interesting inasmuch as it was a fair indication of the extent to which Giscard d'Estaing would be compelled to demonstrate continuing allegiance to Gaullist sentiments in the French election. The French government did, however, agree to implement the Quebec government's recommendation contained in clause one of the Johnson-Peyrefitte procès-verbal of 1967. This was a suggestion for regular ministerial meetings, a practice normally reserved for inter-state consultations. In accordance with this suggestion, Rossi invited Bernard Landry to Paris and the Quebec government invited MM. Segard and Peyrefitte, Ministers of Communications and Justice respectively, to Quebec.

By November 1977, the political situation within France was changing. Giscard d'Estaing was preparing for crucial spring elections and was interested in securing Gaullist support. To do so, he played on feelings of French grandeur and prestige during Levesque's visit. Levesque was royally treated. He was invited to the French Assembly and adorned with the high honour of a grand officer of the Legion of Honour, the highest decoration France can bestow to those below the rank of Head of State. Levesque was the first Canadian to receive the decoration. Canadian law requires that the recipient of a foreign decoration should request prior authorization from the Canadian Committee
for Decorations. This procedure was not followed. In a clear pitch for Gaullist support, Giscard d'Estaing told Levesque:

Whatever happens, Quebec may be assured of the fraternal sympathies of France... You will determine yourself, without interference, the paths of your future. You have the right and the capacity to do it. What you expect from France... is understanding, confidence and support. Rest assured you will have these along the road you decide to follow. 322

THE UNITED STATES

The Americans have expressed concern about the long run viability of a Canada without Quebec and the disruption it would cause to American investments in Quebec and the rest of Canada. In a recent study of the implications of an autonomous Quebec for Quebec-United States relations, it was suggested that the amount of capital investment and military assistance the United States is prepared to provide in foreign countries depends upon the particular policies pursued by that government. 323 It was indicated that since November 1976 the New York capital market has been lending Quebec less money and at higher interest rates. The concern for long term stability for investment is a further question. Businessmen reacted quite negatively to the January 1977 Economic Club speech. "I didn't find the speech reassuring at all and I am not interested in investing in a political experience" said one businessman. Others commented that the "uncertainty over Quebec is greater than ever tonight." While the expressed concern of investors is no doubt genuine, it should be swiftly pointed out that American investment can be found in the most diverse of political regimes from Chile to Poland. The Americans may also be worried about the capability of a truncated
Canada's contribution to NORAD and NATO and to be an effective actor in international fora such as the UN and GATT, and at periodic consultation sessions. The role that an independent Quebec would play in NORAD and NATO could be an issue for the United States. On a more altruistic level, the experience of the American Civil War and the necessity of using force to maintain the Union has left an indelible mark upon America and has produced a sympathetic orientation toward the Canadian government.

The importance of the American attitude for the outcome of Quebec's goal of sovereignty-association has not been lost on the government of Quebec. Quebec benefits from approximately $5 billion of American investment. It is an important supplier of raw material to America. It provides more iron ore, asbestos, copper, aluminum and newsprint than any other province. Quebec is a significant exporter of precious metals, timber and wood pulp. It also supplies hydro-electric power to New York. Under two continental agreements, the Canada-USA Defense Sharing Agreement and the Canada-USA Automotive Agreement, Quebec is able to market two other commodities, the passenger car and aircraft engines and parts.

Many in Quebec believe that an essential component of its survival, should it become independent, would be continued American investment in Quebec and access to American markets by Quebec. It can be argued, therefore, that at least part of the modification of pre-1976 projections has been a response to this reality. In order not to alarm United States officials and business, no further statements have been made about a radical restructuring of the economy. Similarly, a number of statements have been made recently that indicate a changed
perspective of the defense issue. In a Time interview on February 13, 1978 Premier Levesque stated that an independent Quebec would carry a defence burden similar to that now carried by the province: "it would be completely nutty not to keep the normal, basic western ties, including NATO." Claude Morin further clarified this revised view in a March 8, 1978 address to the Quebec City Branch of the CIIA. "Le Québec sait qu'il fait partie de la communauté des pays industrialisés d'occident. Il ne peut s'isoler du système de défense mis en place dans le cadre de l'Alliance atlantique, quelle que soit le formule de participation qu'il adoptera."

The opinions of non PQ Quebecers have also been an important modifying factor upon the government. Whereas many Parti Québécois members are "neutralist" and third world oriented, the Québécois, as a whole are fairly conservative and not anti-American. Since the PQ came to power through the usage of electoral and democratic means, it has had to shift the emphasis of its external relations program to concur with the aspirations of the majority. The PQ has made great efforts to reassure Quebecers that an independent Quebec would be on good terms with the United States.

PROJECTS

An attempt was made by the Quebec government soon after its victory in November 1976 to reassure American financial circles of Quebec's intentions. In the January address to the Economic Club (1977), Levesque spoke of the orientations of an autonomous Quebec emphasizing that they would be realistically adapted to the international environment at the time of independence. "We are absolutely dedicated to
being good neighbours." One week later, Rodrique Tremblay, the Minister of Industry and Commerce spoke to a group at Northwestern University in Chicago. He, like Levesque, spoke of the inevitability of independence.

The above speeches and the one given by Levesque to the French National Assembly in November 1977, were reacted to somewhat negatively by the attentive public in Quebec, Ottawa and the United States. It was felt that Levesque was not representing the complete range of sentiments in Quebec. While Levesque was seeking to establish a sovereign state, he had no mandate to do so.

CONCLUSION

Given the goals of the Levesque administration, for political sovereignty and economic association with the rest of Canada, its attitude to international relations clearly differs from that of its predecessors. The present Quebec government takes every opportunity to behave in a manner normally associated with a nation-state because it openly aspires to create a "state" out of its "nation". International relations are of cardinal importance to a politically sovereign state even if it remains economically dependent upon other actors. It would be fair to conclude that the present government can no longer be regarded as being in the intermediate federal autonomy category, but rather is now in the category seeking sovereignty and independence. This transition naturally influences the type of behaviour the Quebec government is likely to display.

Equally, the open espousal of sovereignty by a member of its federation affects the manner in which the federal government behaves. It has moved to block the efforts of the present government to make its
views heard. It has had to play this strategy carefully as the federal government wishes to continue to appear as the reasonable contender in the dispute. While consistently preventing attempts by the Quebec government to assert itself, the federal government has continued to portray itself as the representative of national interests, hence the suggestion for a francophone commonwealth to be led by Canada. This strategy has led to accusations by the Quebec government that the central government is denying Quebec its rightful place in the international arena. Such criticism was levelled at the federal government over the question of opening an office in Dakar.

The Quebec government continues to take every opportunity to behave in a state-like manner. It has disassociated itself from the Canadian whole of which it continues to be a part at a number of international conferences. Representatives of the Quebec government have been taking every opportunity to make their goals heard to the international community. The latter cannot be unaware of the present government's aspirations after the speeches of Premier Levesque in Paris and New York and those of Claude Morin in Abidjan (December 1977) and more recently in England.

In recent statements, representatives of the Quebec government have sought to temper their position by indicating that the Parti Québécois is not separatist but rather is seeking a new contract with the rest of Canada. This was the tone of Levesque's recent article in Report on Confederation.

It has been suggested in interviews that within Quebec there is a fair degree of compatibility of goals and strategies between the
political leadership and the bureaucracy. This has enabled the Quebec government to pursue a coherent and assertive strategy against the federal government. The Quebec government is clearly setting precedents. This strategy will not be lost upon the attentive public or the next administration, whatever its political affiliation. Even if the next government returns to the intermediate federal autonomy category, it may well be difficult to deny formal recognition of the aspirations of Quebec governments for a more autonomous role in international affairs.
CHAPTER SEVEN

FOOTNOTES


314. Ibid., p. 9.


316. Ibid., p. 1822.


326. Morin, Allocution, op. cit., p. 16.

Chapter Eight  Conclusions

Having studied various non-state nations utilizing the framework of goals, resources, environment and projects, Bertelsen et al concluded that the possible relationship between a non-state nation and a nation-state of residence could be conceptualized in a fourfold manner. This conceptualization can be found on page 52. In terms of the Bertelsen conceptualization this paper would conclude that from the inception of the Johnson administration until November 1976, the central government and the government of Quebec were operating in the confines of Cell 3. The present government of Quebec differs from previous governments in its explicit goal of statehood for its nation.

The analysis of Quebec's international behaviour has led this author to the unmistakable conclusion that within the criteria posited by Bertelsen, Quebec can be defined as a non-state nation actor. There are recognizable political leaders, who, because of their democratic accession to power, came to speak with an authoritative voice on behalf of the actor. These political leaders have had, and continue to have, identifiable goals which they pursue in a coherent fashion with the resources at hand. The leadership of the actor has, over the years, developed a variety of strategies and techniques for utilizing the resources to achieve goals. Often these strategies have required the non-state actor to behave in a manner normally associated with a nation-state which, if one accepts Bertelson's definition, is the primary characteristic of a non-state nation actor.

In terms of many non-state nation actors Quebec is in a very unusual position. Mao Tse-Tung in his writings on guerrilla warfare said
that most national liberation movements would at some time have to set themselves up as a self-contained unit in the liberated areas. This new unit would become the core of the new state. It would provide services to the population, as well as winning their political loyalties. It would be able to carry the war forward into its final conventional stage and then speak for the newly created state in international fora.

In many respects Quebec has already reached this state of affairs. It is not merely an ethnic group like the Basques or a displaced group like the Palestinians who aspire for territory on which to build a homeland for their people. Quebec is a recognizable political entity with recognizable territorial boundaries and Quebec governments can and do claim to represent the interests of a distinct political community within those spheres of responsibility which are given to all provincial governments. Quebec governments are in a position of being able to implement many policies in those areas to win the allegiance of Quebecers. This governmental machinery is also available to carry the campaign against the central government. This is, of course, a much more comfortable position from which to proceed than the one enjoyed by most other nationalist movements that must first gain audibility in the larger national and international community of the existence of the entity for which they claim to speak, and then gain control of the entity.

Quebec governments up until 1976 made particular demands in the area of international affairs which has led this author to classify Quebec as a non-state nation actor in the intermediate federal autonomy category. The primary motivation for the demands of various Quebec governments has been their perception of Quebec as the homeland of a
distinct national group with its own culture and institutions. The establishment and maintenance of a distinct national culture with a suitable level of economic development requires access, its leadership believes, to the international community which can provide both the opportunity and the means for a full blooming of nationhood. Therefore, successive Quebec governments set about to create the intellectual and ideological justification for its demands to participate in the world community. One of the conclusions of this paper is that, given the importance of the government machinery to a successful intrusion into the international community, Quebec has developed over the years sophisticated machinery which administers the external relations of Quebec governments. The very existence of such machinery provides Quebec governments with audibility and durability in both the domestic and international communities.

This is not to assert that all Quebec governments sought to play exactly the same tune in an identical manner. Another conclusion of the paper is that there were significant differences among the four administrations studied. These differences arose in part because of varying perceptions of whether Quebec, to achieve its goals, could remain in the federation, or whether it would be necessary for Quebec to accept that favorite truism of nineteenth century nationalists that the only legitimate state is a sovereign nation-state, and that all nations must become states. The Johnson government argued that only extended powers for Quebec, including a more autonomous role in international relations, would make it possible to remain in Canada. Bertrand also sought a more extended competence for Quebec and achieved a
distinct presence for Quebec in international francophone institutions. His strategies, however, tended to be more pragmatic than those of Johnson. Bourassa utilized the central government's machinery, in addition to that of Quebec, to achieve an extended international presence for Quebec. In this sense, whilst appearing to respect the limitations implicit in continued membership in the federation, Bourassa actually succeeded in obtaining a considerable diversification of Quebec's external relations. The present Quebec government is very active on the international stage since, given its explicit goal of political sovereignty, a legitimate personality in the international community is a necessity. Moreover, the role of third parties might be very important in achieving success as an independent entity and the government is, therefore, seeking support from various other actors.

An examination of the impact of the international environment upon the outcome of the goals of various Quebec governments has demonstrated that other actors in the system, particularly France, have played an important role in facilitating the entry of Quebec governments into the international arena. The French government's advocacy of the objectives of the Quebec government, often at the expense of Ottawa, in international francophone institutions was of cardinal importance to Quebec governments in gaining audibility and durability in the international francophone world.

The central government during the years 1966-78 has reacted in a number of ways which have both accommodated and challenged various demands of Quebec governments. Under Pearson, the federal government was perhaps more concerned with accommodating the aspirations of Quebec
governments within the overall context of maintaining the supremacy of the federal government in external relations. Thus, certain administrative procedures were introduced to enable the provinces to act in the international arena. A division was created within the Department of External Affairs charged with the specific responsibility of ensuring adequate federal-provincial cooperation in those areas of provincial jurisdiction and of particular concern to the provinces. Canada's external aid programme was directed in such a way as to better reflect the dual cultural heritage inherent in the federation. The Pearson government was, however, not beyond pursuing a hard-line strategy when it considered that the Quebec government or its allies had overstepped the limits of acceptable behaviour. Hence, decisive action was taken at the time of de Gaulle's visit to Quebec in 1967 and again in 1968 when relations were suspended with Gabon.

Basically, the Pearson strategy would appear to have been one based upon the belief that answering certain of the criticisms of the Quebec government would satisfy and placate the majority of reasonable Quebecers. In this way only a small segment would then favor the pursuit of a tactic designed to achieve the separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada. This was a tactic of accommodation, but a form of accommodation designed to undermine the credibility and reasonableness of the opponent, thereby isolating it from the mainstream of political thought. While not open "suppression", it was a tactic pursued in the hope that the extremist segment would be isolated and thereby destroyed. Needless to say, this strategy has its Achilles' heel. There is always the possibility that such a tactic, rather than stem the tide of
demands, would, on the contrary, contribute to stoking the fires of such demands. One criticism of the Pearson administration has been that, in many areas of federal-provincial relations, the tactic of pursuing accommodation tactics in order to undermine the opposition backfired primarily because of the lack of an equal amount of opposition and challenge to the underlying position of the Quebec government.

The unequivocal attack on the fundamental assertion by Quebec governments, that only they could adequately represent Quebecois interests, came with the new Trudeau government in 1968. His election victory gave the federal government strength and popularity. Trudeau had campaigned on a "stop Quebec" stand, two of the issues of the election being the idea of special status for Quebec and the participation of Quebec governments in the international arena. A new feeling of confidence emerged in federal circles. The election of a French Canadian Prime Minister who had led the national Liberals to a majority government on a strong federalist platform altered the political balance. Trudeau brought in French-Canadian representation at the highest levels of policy making and put Ottawa on the offensive. There were now two opposing poles of French Canadian power. Ottawa pursued an aggressive strategy and directly challenged the Quebec government's claim to being the principal, if not sole, representative of Quebecers. The federal government was able to bring all its resources to bear to set itself up as the entity best able to represent national interests.

The primary tactic of the Trudeau government was one with a double-edged sword. The underlying premise of the Quebec government was challenged overtly in a confrontational manner, especially during
the years 1968-70. On the other hand, the federal government continued the strategy of seeking to appear to be the moderate, reasonable protagonist. Policies of increased external aid to francophone countries were continued. Internally, the Official Languages Act was an important step toward proving that the federal government was indeed capable of representing all Canadians, especially francophones. In areas of special concern to Quebec governments such as social affairs and immigration, the federal government attempted to arrive at a set of arrangements that would enable the Quebec government to feel that it had sufficient leverage over policy implementation and formulation to meet the needs of Quebecers. Once again it was a strategy designed to isolate that segment of Quebec society determined upon a more radical solution to the problem.

According to the Bertelsen conceptualization of the relationship between non-state nations and nation-states of residence, there are four possible outcomes. Essentially this paper has concluded that from 1966-76 both the central and Quebec governments could be categorized in Cell 3. Since 1976 the goals of the Quebec government have been to seek independence in some form of economic association with the rest of Canada. Thus, the present Quebec government desires to proceed to Cell 2. This goal has not gone unchallenged by the federal government. In most areas the federal government has sought to challenge the credibility of the Quebec government. The latter has been repeatedly challenged as a means of appealing over its head directly to the general public. An example of this was the behaviour of Minister of Urban Affairs, André Ouellet, at the recent First Ministers' Conference. At
the gathering he challenged the presentation of the Quebec government on the question of housing. This response was meant to demonstrate to the general public that it was the Quebec government, not the federal government, who was responsible for the slowdown in the continuation of new housing in Quebec. Ouellet's tactic of announcing a new federal posture some weeks later which responded to some degree to the complaints of the Quebec government then illustrated that the federal government could be responsive and flexible. This, of course, enhanced the federal government's image and credibility with the general public, while damaging that of the Quebec government.

In the arena of international affairs the federal government has challenged the claims of the Quebec government. Trudeau visited the Economic Club in New York to put forward the federal case. The Canadian government has promoted the idea of a francophone commonwealth that would exclude Quebec as a distinct entity but include it as a part of the Canadian presence in the organization. The federal government has prevented the Quebec government from securing a presence in francophone Africa. On the other hand, it has continued to attempt to represent the interests of Quebec and other provinces by consulting with them about the ongoing GATT negotiations. This is all part of a strategy to appeal to the attentive public in Quebec and to demonstrate that the federal government is willing and able to represent their interests. The referendum might well be won or lost on the ability of the federal government to illustrate successfully that the benefits of federalism outweigh the costs.

Bertelsen's conceptualization does, however, suggest that the
central government could act to suppress the non-state nation and that
the two possible outcomes of such suppression would be that either the
non-state nation would disappear, Cell 4, or that there would be a show-
down in which one or the other entity would prevail, Cell 1.

In the opinion of this author, Cell 4 is not an option in the
Canadian context. In order for the non-state nation to disappear it
would have to be physically destroyed in a manner that could only be
similar to the destruction of the Sabines by the Romans, namely,
genocide. Members of the present federal government including the Prime
Minister have said that, if the majority of Quebecers voted for
independence in a referendum recognized to have been conducted in a
democratic fashion, they would never consider the use of force. Those
who cite the 1970 implementation of the War Measures Act as an example
of the willingness of the government to act harshly are comparing
apples and oranges. The October Crisis of 1970 must be seen in its own
particular context. It was perceived by the Bourassa government, the
Montreal police, civic leaders and many Quebecers that a small group of
individuals were committed to the overthrow of the government through
violent and revolutionary means. The central government was called
upon to assist in the repression of this group. After the fact the
tactics were questioned by civil libertarians who were suspicious of
the motives of the participants involved in the decision to invoke the
Act.

It is unlikely that the majority of Canadians would support the
use of force to suppress the democratically expressed will of Quebecers.
They have not the stomach for such action and many simply do not care
sufficiently for their Québécois brethren to countenance such an action that would cause the prestige and sanity of anglo-Canadians to be questioned by the international community. Many Canadians seem to feel that if Quebecers wish to express an "ay" or "nay" for self-determination that they should be allowed to proceed and that "God will pay his debts without money".

There are degrees of suppression, however. While military suppression is almost surely out of the question, the possibility that the Quebec government might be challenged in other ways is not. If the referendum was considered by the federal government to be unfair; then it might conduct its own. This possibility has not been ruled out by the federal government which has passed legislation enabling it to hold its own referendum. In this case a showdown might occur in which either party could prevail, Cell 1.

The possible options in terms of the Bertelsen conceptualization would, therefore, appear to be threefold. The non-state nation of Quebec may become independent after a referendum, Cell 2. This would depend on the acceptability of the referendum to the federal government. A showdown between the two levels of government is also a possibility, Cell 1. Although surveys have demonstrated the growth in the number of people prepared to consider the "sovereignty-association" option, the number of people who favor "independence" without "association" is small. A referendum suggesting this latter alternative would surely flounder. A referendum based on a "sovereignty-association" option would not go unchallenged by the federal government who might conduct its own referendum to determine if anglo-Canadians were prepared to
form an economic association with Quebec. If the outcome were negative, the Levesque government might then appeal to the Quebec people to approve a unilateral declaration of independence arguing that the rest of Canada is unwilling to negotiate with the Quebec government for a new contract. The decision of Quebecers to endorse such an alternative would be based upon their emotional commitment to Canada and their perception of whether such an alternative would be in their best economic interests.

If a referendum is conducted and defeated, then a Quebec government might be elected that would have as its goal intermediate federal autonomy, Cell 3. A Liberal government under Ryan might possibly fall into this cell and attempt to acquire more powers for Quebec governments as preceding Quebec administrations have done.

There are many areas of this problem still to be explored. One area of research might be to consider the economic feasibility of independence and the various forms of association such as a free-trade association, a common market and a monetary union. One aspect of this might be a detailed study of the logistics of dividing federal property, the national debt, and the federal treasury.

A paper might be prepared that considers sociological trends. Is support for independence likely to grow? What are the attitudes of other Canadians, both English and ethnic, to Quebec?

Quebec might be compared to other provinces or indeed an independent look might be taken at other provinces to determine what their international aspirations are. What constitutional reforms, if any, do they seek in this area? Does the federal government adequately
represent the aspirations of the rest of Canada?

Another area for research, one that would be particularly interesting for an anglo-Canadian to pursue, would be to investigate the workings of the Quebec Intergovernmental Affairs Department to determine its exact relationship with the political leadership. It might also be compared to other such government organizations in provinces such as Alberta or Ontario.

Quebec might also be compared with other non-state nation actors. Such a comparison might well demonstrate that Quebec, as well as being a nation, is also a potentially viable political unit with considerable resources at its disposal, whereas many other non-state nation actors may not possess such resources. On the other hand, the above analysis has suggested that the Quebec situation is in many respects not a unique one in that there are many parallels to be drawn between Quebec and other non-state nation actors.

This paper has attempted to illustrate the impact, both real and potential, that such actors have upon their nation-states of residence and the international system. As a category of actor, the non-state nation is a significant one in the international system, that is contributing to the transformation of the system itself. Therefore far more attention should be given to non-state nation actors by scholars attempting to gain a full understanding of the international system.
CHAPTER 8

Footnotes

Appendix: Arrangements concluded by Quebec 1963-76

E.Q.I.-1963/1

(1) Titre:


(2) Objet:

Vente de bois recuperé.

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
(1) Titre:
Contrat entre l'Office de récupération forestière des Bassins des rivières Manicouagan et Aux Outardes et Transtrade Ltd., Montréal, agissant en son nom entre autres comme acheteur accrédité de Cartière Burgo.

(2) Objet:
Vente et expédition de bois de premier choix en dehors du Canada.

(3) Date et signature:
Signé à Paris, le 15 novembre 1963, par Monsieur Moisejs Teitelbaum, Président et actionnaire principal dûment autorisé de Transtrade Ltd., corps politique et incorporé ayant son siège à Montréal et par Monsieur Lucien Cliche, Ministre des Terres et Forêts de la Province de Québec, signant pour et au nom de l'Office de récupération forestière des Bassins des rivières Manicouagan et Aux Outardes, Québec, P.Q.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:
Le 1er septembre 1964, date de la première expédition et le 20 novembre 1964, date de la dernière expédition.

(5) Documents joints:
E.Q.I.-1963/3

(1) Titre:

Contrat (Addendum au) entre l'Office de récupération forestière des Bassins des rivières Manicouagan et Aux Outardes et Transtrade Ltd., Montréal.

(2) Objet:


(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
(1) **Titre:**

(2) **Objet:**
Vente pour exportation en France de 40.000 cordes de bois de papeterie.

(3) **Date et signature:**

(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**
Le 20 juillet 1964, date de la première expédition et le 20 novembre 1964, date de la dernière expédition.
(1) **Titre:**

Protocole d'accord entre l'Office de récupération forestière des Bassins des rivières Manicouagan et aux Outardes et la Compagnie Commerciale des bois et pâtes à papier C E D A R, de France.

(2) **Objet:**


(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
(1) **Titre:**

Echange de lettres-accord entre le Gouvernement du Québec et le Gouvernement de la République Française sur un programme de coopération technique entre le Ministère de la Jeunesse du Québec et l'Association pour l'organisation des stages en France (l'A.S.T.E.F.).

(2) **Objet:**

Accord relatif à des stages en France d'ingénieurs et de techniciens canadiens, à l'organisation de voyages d'études pour des ingénieurs et industriels canadiens, à la création de centres franco-canadiens de formation professionnelle, de centres de diffusion de documentation technique et d'une association franco-canadienne d'ingénieurs, spécialistes et techniciens ayant accompli un stage en France.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Le 1er avril 1964.
(1) **Titre:**

Entente entre le Québec et la France sur un programme d’échanges et de coopération dans le domaine de l’éducation.

(2) **Objet:**

Entente visant des échanges de chercheurs et de professeurs d’Université, le perfectionnement des professeurs québécois d’Ecole Normale et l’élaboration de programmes scolaires et d’enseignement technique spécialisé ainsi que des échanges d’étudiants.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
Arrêté en conseil No 1480, concernant certaines concessions fiscales aux représentants non canadiens de pays étrangers.

Concessions fiscales accordées à certains représentants de pays étrangers, occupant un poste dans la province de Québec, pourvu que le pays que représente tel officiel confère des privilèges similaires aux représentants de la province auprès de tel pays.

Signé à Québec, le 27 juillet 1965 par Monsieur Julien Chouinard, Greffier du Conseil exécutif.

Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
E.Q.I.-1965/3

(1) **Titre:**

Entente sur le coopération culturelle entre le Gouvernement du Québec et le Gouvernement de la République Française.

(2) **Objet:**

Entente signée en vue de la promotion de la langue française et axée sur des échanges intellectuels, littéraires, artistiques et scientifiques; la réalisation de ce programme sera facilitée par le truchement d'organismes, de conférences, de stages et d'expositions entre les deux Gouvernements signataires.

(3) **Date et signature:**

Signé à Québec, le 24 novembre 1965, par Monsieur Pierre Laporte, pour le Gouvernement du Québec et Monsieur François Leduc, pour le Gouvernement de la République Française.

(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
(1) **Titre:**

Procès-verbal entre le Ministère de l'Education du Québec et l'A.S.T.E.F.

(2) **Objet:**

Formation d'une Corporation sans but lucratif dénommée "Centre de diffusion de la documentation scientifique et technique française au Québec". L'objet du Centre sera de promouvoir au Québec la diffusion de la documentation scientifique et technique française.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
E.Q.I.-1966/1

(1) **Titre:**
Entente de réciprocité entre l'État de la Caroline du Sud et la Province de Québec en matière de transport.

(2) **Objet:**
Tous les véhicules automobiles légalement enregistrés ou immatriculés dans l'État de la Caroline du Sud ou dans la Province de Québec peuvent être utilisés à l'intérieur de l'État sans être obligés à l'immatriculation ou au paiement d'aucun droit sauf les exceptions prévues à l'entente.

(3) **Date et signature:**
Signé le 2 février 1966, pour l'État de la Caroline du Sud, par Monsieur S.N. Pearman, Chief Highway Commissioner et pour la Province de Québec, Madame Claire Kirkland Casgrain, Ministre des Transports.

(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**
Le 2 février 1966.
(1) **Titre:**

Arrêté en conseil concernant l'exemption d'immatriculation du véhicule de promenade par un étudiant qui n'y réside pas.

(2) **Objet:**

En vertu de l'arrêté en conseil 1983 du 2 novembre 1966, la période d'exemption d'immatriculation de trois mois stipulée à l'article 12 du Code de la route est prolongée à l'égard des étudiants étrangers pour la période pendant laquelle ils sont inscrits dans une université, collège ou école de la province, en autant que ce privilège est accordé aux étudiants du Québec dans les Provinces du Canada ou dans l'État ou résident ces étudiants étrangers. Le privilège au sujet de l'immatriculation s'applique "mutatis mutandis" au permis de conduire.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
(1) **Titre:**
Déclaration commune du Président du Rwanda et du Premier ministre du Québec en matière culturelle.

(2) **Objet:**
Intensification des échanges culturels entre les deux peuples et engagement du Gouvernement du Québec à verser pendant trois années la somme de $50.000 à l'université de Butare.

(3) **Date et signature:**

(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**
Le 1er janvier 1968.
E.Q.I.-1967/2

(1) Titre:
Entente de réciprocité entre la Province de Québec et l'État de la Floride en matière de transport.

(2) Objet:
Tous les véhicules automobiles légalement enregistrés ou immatriculés dans l'État de la Floride ou dans la Province de Québec peuvent être utilisés à l'intérieur de l'État ou de la Province étant partie à l'entente sans être obligés à l'immatriculation ni au paiement d'aucun droit sauf les exceptions prévues à l'annexe "A" de ladite entente.

(3) Date et signature:
Signé le 1er septembre 1967, pour l'État de la Floride, Monsieur Arch Livingston, Director, Dept. of Motor Vehicles, et Monsieur William T. Mays, Chairman, Public Service Comm.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:
Le 1er septembre 1967.
(1) Titre:

Procès-verbal entre le Gouvernement du Québec et le Gouvernement de la République française en matière de coopération.

(2) Objet:

Elargir et renforcer le cadre des ententes signées en 1965 par l'institution de réunions périodiques entre les ministres intéressés et le renforcement des structures interministérielles des deux pays afin d'accélérer les procédures et accroître l'efficacité de la coopération entre la France et le Québec.

(3) Date et signature:

Québec, le 14 septembre 1967.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
(1) **Titre:**

Entente et avenant à l'entente conclue entre l'Editeur officiel du Québec et la Documentation française en matière de publication.

(2) **Objet:**

Pour l'entente:
Entente ayant pour but de favoriser respectivement la diffusion des publications officielles du Québec en France et celle des publications officielles de France au Québec.

Pour l'avenant:
Establissement d'un cadre commercial à l'intérieur duquel l'Editeur et la Documentation coopéreront et coordonneront leurs actions respectives en vue de favoriser la diffusion de toute publication et document audiovisuel et donner l'exclusivité de la distribution en France et au Québec desdites publications officielles.

(3) **Date et signature:**

Pour l'entente:

Pour l'avenant:

(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
(1) **Titre:**

Échanges de lettres entre le Québec et New York en matière d'exemptions fiscales.

(2) **Objet:**

Traitement et exemptions fiscales des représentants du Québec à New York.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
(1) Titre:

Protocole et avenant relatifs à la création de l'Office Franco-
Québécois pour la Jeunesse.

(2) Objet:

L'Office ainsi créé a pour objet de développer les relations entre
la jeunesse québécoise et la jeunesse française et, à cet effet,
d'encourager et réaliser des rencontres et des échanges de jeunes cadres,
aussi que des responsables dans le domaine des activités de jeunesse, de
loisirs et de sports, et ce, en vertu de l'entente Franco-Québécoise du
27 février 1965 sur un programme d'échanges et de coopération dans le
domaine de l'éducation.

(3) Date et signature:

Pour le protocole: signé à Paris, le 9 février 1968, par Monsieur
Jean-Marie Morin, pour le Gouvernement du Québec et Monsieur François
Missonne, Ministre de la Jeunesse et des Sports.

Pour l'avenant: signé à Paris, le 17 avril 1969, par Monsieur
Jean-Marie Morin, Ministre d'État à l'Education pour le Gouvernement
du Québec et Monsieur Joseph Comiti, pour le Gouvernement de la
République française.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Pour le protocole, le 5 novembre 1968.
(1) Titre:

Arrêté en conseil concernant l'aménagement projeté par le Gouvernement des États-Unis d'un barrage hydroélectrique sur le fleuve St-Jean, à Dickey, Maine, et les terrains du territoire québécois nécessaires à la réalisation de ce projet.

(2) Objet:

Acceptation de principe des propositions du Gouvernement des États-Unis, relativement à la durée du traité, se rapportant à la disponibilité des terrains et droits du Québec nécessaires à l'aménagement hydroélectrique de Dickey (Maine) et confirmation des attributions de l'Hydro-Québec en tant qu'agent du gouvernement pour la réalisation québécoise du projet, y compris l'autorisation de procéder, à l'amiable ou par expropriation, selon la procédure prévue par sa loi constitutive.

(3) Date et signature:

Signé à Québec, le 3 octobre 1968, par le Greffier du Conseil exécutif, Monsieur Jacques Prémont.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
(1) Titre:

Entente de réciprocité entre la Province de Québec et l'État de Georgie en matière de transport.

(2) Objet:

Tous les véhicules automobiles légalement enregistrés ou immatriculés dans l'État de Georgie ou de la Province de Québec peuvent être utilisés à l'intérieur de l'État ou de la Province étant partie à l'entente sans être obligés à l'immatriculation ou au paiement d'aucun droit sauf les exceptions prévues à l'entente.

(3) Date et signature:

Signé le 1er décembre 1968, pour la Province de Québec par Monsieur Fernand Lizotte M.D., Ministre des Transports et Communications et pour l'État de Georgie, trois signataires (noms illisibles). Chairman and Members Reciprocity Committee.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Le 1er décembre 1968.
(1) Titre:
Arrêté en conseil No 3677, concernant une demande de la Southern Canada Power Company Ltd., pour exploiter de l'énergie électrique aux États-Unis.

(2) Objet:
Autorisation à Compagnie Southern Canada Power Limited, à exploiter de l'énergie à la Newport Electric Division of the Citizens Utilities Company, une qualité mensuelle de 1250 kilowatts.

(3) Date et Signature:
Signé à Québec, le 13 novembre 1968, par Monsieur Jacques Prémont, Greffier du Conseil exécutif.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:
le 31 décembre 1968.
(1) Titre:

Échange de lettres entre la France et le Québec en matière de communications.

(2) Objet:

Coopération franco-québécoise dans les domaines de l'éducation et de la culture par les moyens de télécommunications par satellite; association pour la construction du satellite Symphonie (échange de programmes éducatifs, culturels et scientifiques en langue française).

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
(1) Titre:

Échange de lettres, entre la France et le Québec en matière d'investissements.

(2) Objet:

Renforcement de la coopération franco-québécoise par le développement des investissements et des échanges industriels, et par le création d'un Comité franco-québécois chargé de faciliter les opérations de coopération industrielle.

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.

(5) Documents joints:

Nil.
(1) Titre:

Echange de lettres entre la France et le Québec, en matière culturelle.

(2) Objet:

Suite à la création de l'Université du Québec, établir les modalités de participation de la France au fonctionnement de cet établissement, (besoins en personnels enseignants français, coopération avec l'enseignement supérieur français).

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
(1) **Titre:**

Echange de lettres entre l'Université d'Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) et le ministère de l'Éducation Nationale, Québec (Canada) en matière d'éducation.

(2) **Objet:**

Envoi de professeurs de la Province de Québec à l'Université d'Abidjan, République de la Côte d'Ivoire.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

E.Q.1.-1969/5

(1) 
Titre:

Procès-verbal entre le Québec et le Gabon en matière d'éducation.

(2) 
Objet:

Développer la coopération entre le Gabon et le Québec notamment dans les secteurs de l'enseignement technique et professionnel.

(3) 
Date et signature:


(4) 
Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
E.Q.I.-1969/6

(1) Titre:

Echange de lettres entre l'Etat du Vermont et la Province de Québec au sujet du Lac Memphremagog.

(2) Objet:

Etude conjointe sur le taux de pollution du Lac Memphremagog.

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Le 7 août 1969.
(1) **Titre:**

Echange de lettres concernant Derro-Tétouan.

(2) **Objet:**

Participation du Gouvernement du Québec au Programme de Développement Économique Rural du Rif Occidental de la région de Tétouan au Maroc.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.

(5) **Documents joints:**

Nil.
(1) Titre:

Entente de réciprocité entre l'État de la Caroline du Nord et la Province de Québec en matière de transport privé.

(2) Objet:

Tous les véhicules automobiles légalement enregistrés ou immatriculés dans l'État de la Caroline du Nord ou de la Province de Québec peuvent être utilisés à l'intérieur de l'État ou de la province étant partie à l'entente sans être obligés à l'immatriculation ou au paiement d'aucun droit sauf les exceptions prévues à l'entente.

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Le 19 août 1969.
(1) **Titre:**

Communiqué conjoint du Gouverneur de la Louisiane et du Premier ministre de la Province de Québec en matière culturelle et technique.

(2) **Objet:**

Intensification des relations entre le Louisiane et le Québec par la création, par le Gouvernement du Québec, d'un poste de représentant permanent en Louisiane, d'échanges de jeunes et de missions dans le domaine des monuments historiques et archives, échanges aussi en hydrologie, pétrochimie ainsi que dans le domaine du tourisme.

(3) **Date et signature:**

Signé à Québec, le 11 septembre 1969.

(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
E.Q.P.-1969/10

(1) **Titre:**

Convention entre divers états, relativement à la protection des forêts contre le feu.

(2) **Objet:**

Participation de la Province de Québec comme membre de la "Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission", dont le mandat est de protéger les forêts limithophes contre le feu.

(3) **Date et signature:**

Signé à Québec, le 23 septembre 1969, par Monsieur Claude G. Gosselin, Ministre des Terres et Forêts de la Province de Québec et Monsieur Austin Wilkins, Président de la "Commission".

(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
(1) Titre:

Convention relative à l'Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique.

(2) Objet:

Les États membres de l'"Agence", liés par l'usage de la langue française ont pour but de promouvoir et de diffuser les cultures des parties contractantes et d'intensifier la coopération culturelle et technique entre elles.

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Le 31 août 1970.
(1) **Titre:**

Echange de lettres entre le Canada et le Québec en matière d'éducation.

(2) **Objet:**

Entente entre le fédéral et le Québec au sujet de l'envoi d'un expert en TV éducative à Dakar par l'UNESCO.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
E.Q.L.-1970/3

(1) **Titre:**

Echange de lettres entre le Congo et le Québec en matière d'éducation.

(2) **Objet:**

Demande de deux experts québécois en planification de l'éducation, en vue d'une étude approfondie de l'enseignement au Congo et afin de doter le pays d'une organisation scolaire la plus adaptée possible.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
E.Q.I.-1970/4

(1) **Titre:**

Protocole d'entente entre la Société Siemens Canada Limited et le Gouvernement du Québec.

(2) **Objet:**

Organisation de stages de travail pour spécialistes en génie électrique et électronique d'une durée totale de deux ans. La Société-mère Siemens A.G., en République fédérale allemande, rédevra jusqu'à six stagiaires québécois diplômés d'universités (préférence maîtrise en sciences).

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

1970.
E.Q.I.-1970/5

(1) Titre:


(2) Objet:

Le Conseiller québécois est accrédité auprès du Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale de Côte d'Ivoire aux fins d'informer ce Ministre et son gouvernement du système d'éducation du Québec et de son évolution.

(3) Date et signature:

Signé à Québec, le 5 août 1970, par Monsieur Julien Chouinard, Greffier du Conseil exécutif.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
(1) **Titre:**


(2) **Objet:**

Définir les conditions de réalisation et les modalités de financement d'une opération qui sera effectuée sous la responsabilité de la CEGOS, et dont l'objectif sera d'amener un nombre accru d'industriels français à s'implanter au Québec.

(3) **Date et signature:**

Nil.

(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.

(5) **Documents joints:**

Nil.
E.Q.I.-1970/7

(1) **Titre:**

Arrêté en conseil no. 4408 du 25 novembre 1970 concernant la ratification d'un contrat conclu par REXFOR avec Transtrade Limited de Montréal.

(2) **Objet:**

Autorisation pour REXFOR de faire l'expédition en Italie de la quantité de bois faisant objet dudit contrat.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

(1) Titre:

Contrat entre la Société de récupération et d'exploitation forestières du Québec, désignée également sous le nom de R E X F O R et Henderson Lumber Company Limited, Montréal.

(2) Objet:

Vente de 12.000 à 15.000 cordes de bois de papiers pour fins d'exportation en Europe.

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Le 1er juin 1971, date de la première expédition et le 31 octobre 1971, date de la dernière expédition.
E.Q.I.-1970/9

(1) Titre:

Échange de lettres entre le Vermont et le Québec au sujet du Lac Memphrémagog.

(2) Objet:

Classifier le Memphrémagog, cours d'eau international.

(3) Date et signature:

Signé le 14 décembre 1970 à Montpellier, au Vermont, par Monsieur William Albert, Director Water Supply and Pollution Control Division, State of Vermont.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
(1) Titre:
Convention et protocole final entre le Canada et la République fédérale d'Allemagne en matière de sécurité sociale.

(2) Objet:
Entente prévoyant les modalités d'application des lois sociales des deux pays aux nationaux des deux parties contractantes. Ces lois visées par l'entente sont les suivantes:

La législation de la République fédérale d'Allemagne concernant:
- l'assurance-pension des ouvriers
- l'assurance-pension des employés
- l'assurance-pension des travailleurs des mines
- l'assurance-pension supplémentaire des travailleurs de la sidérurgie
- l'aide aux agriculteurs âgés et

La législation du Canada portant sur:
- la loi sur la sécurité de la vieillesse
- le régime de pension du Canada
- le régime de rentes du Québec

(3) Date et signature:
Signé à Ottawa, le 30 mars 1971, par Monsieur John Munro, Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social du Canada et le Professor Dr. Kurt Jantz, Ministre fédéral du Travail et des Affaires sociales de la République fédérale d'Allemagne.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:
Le 1er mai 1972.
(1) Titre:
   Protocole d'entente.

(2) Objet:
   Modalités selon lesquelles le Gouvernement du Québec est admis
   comme gouvernement participant aux institutions, aux activités et aux
   programmes de l'Agence de Coopération culturelle et technique.

(3) Date et signature:
   Signé à Québec, le ler octobre 1971, par l'Honorable Mitchell Sharp,
   Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures du Canada et l'Honorable
   Robert Bourassa, Premier ministre du Québec.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:
   Nil.
(1) Titre:
Entente de réciprocité entre la Province de Québec et l’État du Wisconsin en matière de transport.

(2) Objet:
Tous les véhicules automobiles légalement enregistrés ou immatriculés dans l’État du Wisconsin ou dans la Province de Québec peuvent être utilisés à l’intérieur de l’État ou de la province étant partie à l’entente sans être obligés à l’immatriculation ou au paiement d’aucun droit, sauf les exceptions prévues à l’entente.

(3) Date et signature:

(4) Entrée en vigueur:
Le 3 janvier 1972.
Titre:

Objet:

Date et signature:
Signé à Québec, le 14 janvier 1972, par le Secrétaire général de l'Organisation de l'Aviation Civile Internationale, Monsieur Claude Gastonguay, Ministre des Affaires sociales du Québec et Monsieur Gérald Harvey, Ministre du Revenue du Québec.

Entrée en vigueur:
Le 1er janvier 1972.
E.Q.I.-1972/3

(1) **Titre:**

Contrat entre l'Institut de Culture Hispanique de Madrid (Espagne) et le Service "Placement Étudiant" de la Province de Québec (Canada).

(2) **Objet:**

Offre d'un programme d'étude de langue et culture espagnole (niveau élémentaire, moyen et supérieur) aux étudiants envoyés à cette fin par le service "Placement Étudiant" de la Province de Québec.

(3) **Date et signature:**

Signé à Madrid, le 8 avril 1972, par Monsieur Jean Ignacio Tena Ybarra, pour l'Institut de Culture Hispanique de Madrid (Espagne), et Monsieur Gérard Cadieux, pour le Gouvernement du Québec.

(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Le 8 avril 1972.
(1) Titre:

Procès-verbal de la réunion de la fondation de la Commission Conjointe de Coopération Québec-Massachusetts.

(2) Objet:

Resserrement des liens entre les États du Québec et du Massachusetts et entre leurs populations d'origine et de culture françaises. Institution d'échanges réguliers entre les deux territoires.

(3) Date et signature:

Signé à Montréal, le 16 avril 1972, par Monsieur Donald Moisan, Président de l'American and Canadian French Cultural Exchange Commission (signature inexistant), et de Monsieur Yves Michaud, Co-président et Commissaire général à la Coopération avec l'extérieur.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
(1) **Titre:**

Communiqué conjoint du Gouverneur du Maine et du Premier ministre de la Province de Québec.

(2) **Objet:**

Elaboration d'un programme d'échanges touchant l'éducation, la culture, les communications, échanges de jeunes travailleurs, la voirie, l'économie et diminution des obstacles à l'échange de la main-d'œuvre temporaire entre les deux États.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
(1) Titre:

Protocole d'entente entre la députation provinciale de Madrid et l'Institut de Cardiologie de Montréal.

(2) Objet:

Protocole relatif au perfectionnement du personnel du Centre Cardiovasculaire de la Cité Sanitaire Francisco Franco de Madrid, à un programme de collaboration, à la diffusion mondiale des travaux scientifiques, le tout en collaboration avec l'Institut Cardiologie de Montréal.

(3) Date et signature:

Signé à Québec, le 12 mai 1972, par Monsieur De Guise Vaillancourt, Faculté de médecine de l'Université de Montréal, Monsieur Yves Michaud, Commissaire général à la Coopération du Québec avec l'extérieur, Monsieur Gilles Beausoleil, Ministère des Affaires sociales du Québec, et Monsieur le Président de la députation provinciale de Madrid et les témoins (signatures illisibles).

(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
(1) **Titre:**

Echange de lettres entre la France et le Québec en matière de communications.

(2) **Objet:**

Dans le cadre des accords de coopération franco-québécoise le Gouvernement du Québec est prêt à réaliser avec le Gouvernement français un programme expérimental en transmission instantanée par voie spatiale à des fins culturelles, scientifiques et éducatives.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
(1) Titre:

Echange de lettres entre la Province de Québec et l'Etat de Virginie en matière de transport.

(2) Objet:

Entente de réciprocité concernant le transport de fruits et légumes entre les deux parties concernées.

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
(1) Titre:

Entente de réciprocité entre l'Etat du Delaware et la Province de Québec en matière de transport.

(2) Objet:

Tous les véhicules automobiles légalement enregistrés ou immatriculés dans l'Etat du Delaware ou dans le Province de Québec peuvent être utilisés à l'intérieur de l'Etat ou de la Province étant partie à l'entente sans être obligés à l'immatriculation ou au paiement d'aucun droit sauf les exceptions prévues à l'entente.

(3) Date et signature:

Signé le 14 septembre 1972, par Monsieur William J. Warren, Jr., Director, Motor Vehicles pour l'Etat du Delaware et Monsieur Bernard Pinard, Ministre des Transports de la Province de Québec.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Le 14 septembre 1972.
1) Titre:
Mémorandum d'entente.

2) Objet:

3) Date et signature:

4) Entrée en vigueur:
Le 1er avril 1973.

5) Documents joints:
Nil.
(1) Titre:
Entente de réciprocité entre l'État de Iowa et la Province de Québec en matière de transport.

(2) Objet:
Tous les véhicules automobiles légalement enregistrés ou immatriculés dans l'État de l'Iowa ou dans la Province de Québec peuvent être utilisés à l'intérieur de l'État ou de la province étant partie à l'entente, sans être obligés à l'immatriculation ou au paiement d'aucun droit, sauf les exceptions prévues à l'entente. Il est de plus entendu mutuellement que tous les véhicules dûment immatriculés au Québec seront éligibles pour la réciprocité dans l'Iowa suivant une demande écrite à cet effet, et, dans le cas des camions et des tracteurs moyennant le paiement d'un frais de deux dollars par véhicule.

(3) Date et signature:
Signé le 11 décembre 1972, par Monsieur Mike Sellers, Chairman, Department of Transport of Iowa et Monsieur Bernard Pinard, Ministre des Transports du Québec.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:
Le 11 décembre 1972.
(1) **Titre:**
Entente de réciprocité entre l'État de Pennsylvanie et la Province de Québec en matière de transport.

(2) **Objet:**
Tous les véhicules automobiles légalement enregistrés ou immatriculés dans l'État de Pennsylvanie ou dans la Province de Québec peuvent être utilisés à l'intérieur de l'État ou de la Province étant partie à l'entente sans être obligés à l'immatriculation ou au paiement d'aucun droit sauf les exceptions prévues à l'entente.

(3) **Date et signature:**
Signé le 26 février 1973, par Monsieur Bernard Pinard, Ministre des Transports pour la Province de Québec et Monsieur Jacob G. Kassab, Secretary, Department of Transportation, et Monsieur Robert W. Culliffe, Deputy Attorney General, pour l'État de Pennsylvanie.

(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**
E.Q.I.-1973/2

(1) Titre:

Echange de télégrammes confirmant l'existence d'une entente de principe entre la Province de Québec et l'État du Maryland concernant le transport de produits.

(2) Objet:

Réciprocité accordée par chaque juridiction à l'autre partie concernant le transport de produits par véhicules dûment enregistrés.

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Le 10 avril 1973 pour le Maryland.
(1) Titre:

Echange de lettres entre le Liban et le Québec en matière d'éducation.

(2) Objet:

Accord pour la mise en application du programme de coopération en matière d'éducation (utilisation de la technologie dans l'enseignement, conception pédagogique et technique des établissements scolaires, l'encadrement pédagogique et le perfectionnement des maîtres).

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
(1) Titre:
Echange de lettres constituant une entente de principe entre l'Etat de l'Alabama et la Province de Québec en matière de transport.

(2) Objet:
Exemption de l'immatriculation et même privilège de réciprocité accordés entre les deux parties concernant les véhicules de commerce.

(3) Date et signature:

(4) Entrée en vigueur:
Nil.
(1) **Titre:**

Echange de lettres entre le Québec et l'Agence de Coopération culturelle et technique (et le Gouvernement du Mali) en matière de formation hôtelière.

(2) **Objet:**

Participation du Gouvernement du Québec au Centre régional de Formation hôtelière de Bamako, Mali.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
E.Q.I.-1974/3

(1) Titre:
Echange de lettres entre la Syrie et le Québec en matière de tourisme.

(2) Objet:
Assistance québécoise à la Syrie en matière de tourisme.

(3) Date et signature:
Signé à Montréal, le 2 avril 1974, par Monsieur Muhammad Faye Al-Rifai, Consul honoraire, Consulat de Syrie à Montréal et Monsieur André Patry, Conseiller culturel, Gouvernement du Québec (lettre non signée), en date du 9 août 1974 à Montréal.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:
Nil.
(1) Titre:

Protocole d'entente entre le Ministère de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être du Canada, le Ministère des Affaires sociales du Québec et l'Organisation panaméricaine de la Santé ainsi que l'Organisation mondiale de la Santé.

(2) Objet:

Modalités de la coopération des organismes gouvernementaux et paragouvernementaux du Québec avec des organismes internationaux de la santé, dans les domaines de la planification sanitaire de l'enseignement de la biostatique et de la recherche.

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Le 1er avril 1974, pour trois ans.
(1) Titre:

Echange de lettres entre le Canada et le Québec concernant le projet "Centre de formation hôtelière en Côte d'Ivoire."

(2) Objet:

Accord sur les modalités de la participation de l'Agence Canadienne de Développement Internationale (ACDI) et du Gouvernement du Québec à la mise en œuvre dudit projet.

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
E.Q.I.-1974/6

(1) Titre:

Echange de lettres entre le Canada et le Québec concernant le projet "Escuelas Superiores de Educacion Profesional (E.S.E.P.)" au Pérou.

(2) Objet:

Accord sur les modalités de la participation de l'Agence Canadienne de Développement International (ACDI) et du Gouvernement du Québec pour la mise en œuvre d'un programme l'éducation au Pérou.

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
Titre:

Echange de lettres entre le Canada et le Québec concernant le projet "Développement des Services de Santé de Base au Sénégal".

(2) Objet:

Accord sur les modalités de la participation de l'Agence Canadienne de Développement International (ACDI) et du Gouvernement du Québec à la mise en œuvre dudit projet.

(3) Date et signature:

Signé à Ottawa, le 1er mai 1974, par Monsieur Mitchell Sharp, Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Gouvernement du Canada.
Signé à Québec, le 16 mai 1974, par l'Honorable Gérard-D. Lévesque, Ministre des Affaires intergouvernementales, Gouvernement du Québec.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
(1) Titre:
Accord de principe entre l'Éditeur officiel du Québec et l'Office français des techniques modernes d'éducation nommé "L'OFRATEME".

(2) Objet:
Distribution de façon non exclusive, des produits audio-visuels gouvernementaux du Québec en France d'une part, et, d'autre part, des productions de l'OFRATEME.

(3) Date et signature:
Signé à Québec, le 21 juin 1974, par Monsieur Charles-Henri Dubé, pour l'Éditeur officiel du Québec et Monsieur C. Bonnefoy, pour l'OFRATEME.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:
Nil.
(1) **Titre:**

Arrangement relatif à la protection sociale des participants à la Coopération franco-québécoise.

(2) **Objet:**

Application du titre III de l'entente sur la Coopération culturelle entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement du Québec du 24 novembre 1965 pour la protection sociale des participants aux échanges entre la France et le Québec.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Le 19 juillet 1974.
(1) **Titre:**

Procès-verbal entre son Excellence le ministre des Affaires sociales du Québec, Monsieur Claude Forget, et son Excellence le ministre de la Santé du Liban, Monsieur Osman Dana, en matière de coopération hospitalière.

(2) **Objet:**

L'admission de candidats Libanais aux études universitaires en médecine et à des postes d'internes ou de résidents dans les centres hospitaliers d'enseignement du Québec.

(3) **Date et signature:**

Signé à Québec, le 16 septembre 1974, par Monsieur Osman Dana, Ministre de la Santé du Liban et Monsieur Claude Forget, Ministre des Affaires sociales du Québec.

(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
E.Q.I.-1974/11

(1) Titre:
Echange de lettres entre le Québec et la Syrie en matière de tourisme.

(2) Objet:
Octroi par le Gouvernement du Québec de quatre bourses d'étude dans le domaine hôtelier à des étudiants syriens pour poursuivre leurs études à l'Institut de tourisme et d'hôtellerie du Québec.

(3) Date et signature:

(4) Entrée en vigueur:
Nil.
(1) Titre:

Protocole d'entente entre le "CONSEJO NACIONAL DE INVESTIGACIONES CIENTIFICAS Y TECNICAS" d'Argentine et l'INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE du Québec.

(2) Objet:

Accroître les liens et la coopération entre les deux parties et contribuer au développement de projets conjoints de recherche scientifique et technique.

(3) Date et signature:

Signé à Québec, le 10 octobre 1974, par Dr. Horacio Rimoldi pour CONICET, et Messieurs Louis Berlinguet et Charles-E. Beaulieu pour l'INRS.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Le 10 octobre 1974 pour une période de 5 ans et renouvelable automatiquement d'année en année.
(1) Titre:

Accord de collaboration entre l'Institut national d'assurance contre les accidents du travail (nommé INAIL) Italie, et la Commission des accidents du travail de Québec (texte italien).

(2) Objet:

Les assurés de l'INAIL et de la Commission victimes d'un accident de travail ou d'une maladie professionnelle et qui changent de lieu, ou de séjour dans la province de Québec ou en sol italien, bénéficieront des soins nécessaires à leur état et remboursement sera fait à l'organisme du pays de nouvelle résidence.

(3) Date et signature:


(4)Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
E.Q.I.-1975/2

(1) Titre:

Echange de lettres entre le Canada et le Québec concernant le projet de développement des centres pédagogiques régionaux (CPR) au Maroc.

(2) Objet:

Accord selon laquelle le Gouvernement du Canada, par l'intermédiaire de l'ACDI, confie au Gouvernement du Québec la mise en œuvre du projet.

(3) Date et signature:

Lettre non signée avec copie du télex jointe, de Monsieur Allan J. MacEachen, Secrétaire d'État, Ministère des Affaires extérieures, Canada, datée du 12 février 1975 à Monsieur Gérard-D. Lévesque; et, signé le 14 février 1975, par l'Honorable Gérard-D. Lévesque, Ministre des Affaires intergouvernementales du Québec.

(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
(1) Titre:
Echange de lettres entre le Québec et l'Unesco concernant les bourses UNESCO/QUEBEC.

(2) Objet:
Mise à la disposition des États membres de l'Unesco de dix bourses d'études par le Gouvernement du Québec pendant trois ans.

(3) Date et signature:

(4) Entrée en vigueur:
Nil.
(1) **Titre:**

Compte rendu des entretiens entre Monsieur Jean-Pierre Soisson, Secrétaire d'Etat aux Universités, et Monsieur François Cloutier, Ministre de l'Education du Québec, en matière de coopération universitaire.

(2) **Objet:**

Echange de vues sur l'évolution des enseignements supérieurs et de la recherche scientifique, en regard notamment, de la création en France du Secrétariat d'Etat aux Universités et détermination des moyens pouvant assurer une progression marquée de la coopération universitaire par les deux parties.

(3) **Date et signature:**

À Paris, par Monsieur Jean-Pierre Soisson, Secrétaire d'Etat aux Universités, (non signé), et à Québec, par Monsieur François Cloutier, Ministre de l'Education du Québec, (non signé).

(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
(1) **Titre:**

Compte rendu des entretiens entre Monsieur René Haby, Ministre de l'Éducation de France et Monsieur François Cloutier, Ministre de l'Éducation du Québec, en matière d'éducation.

(2) **Objet:**

Développements de la coopération franco-québécoise dans le domaine de l'Éducation:

a) Échanges d'enseignements.

b) Programmes relatifs aux enseignements technologiques.

c) Conseil d'orientation franco-québécois pour la prospective et l'innovation en Éducation (C.O.P.I.E.).

d) Modernisation de l'Éducation en France.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
(1) Titre:

Convention concernant certains échanges commerciaux entre le Royaume du Maroc et le Québec.

(2) Objet:

- Acquisition par le Maroc d'un nombre minimal de cinq mille génisses laitières du Québec.
- La Société des Alcools du Québec, des disposée à procéder pour fin de vente au Québec, à l'achat de vins marocains.

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
E.Q.I.-1975/7

(1) **Titre:**

Echange de lettres entre le Canada et le Québec concernant la participation du Québec à l'accord de coopération culturelle entre le Canada et la Belgique.

(2) **Objet:**

Mise en œuvre concernant le mandat, la composition et les modalités de fonctionnement de la Sous-commission belgo-québécoise.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Nil.
(1) Titre:

Procès-verbal entre le Gouvernement du New Hampshire et du Québec en matière de coopération.

(2) Objet:

Identification des domaines susceptibles de donner lieu rapidement à des actions de coopération réciproques (éducation, culture et coopération technique).

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nul.
E.Q.I.-1975/9

(1) **Titre:**

Convention de coédition entre le bureau de l'Éditeur officiel du Québec et la Documentation française en matière d'édition.

(2) **Objet:**

La convention a pour but de fixer les disposition devant régir les rapports de l'Éditeur et de la Documentation en ce qui a trait à la publication de l'oeuvre originale intitulée provisoirement « l'influence française aux États-Unis ».

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

"À compter de la signature".
(1) **Titre:**

Entente entre le Gouvernement du Canada et le Gouvernement du Québec en matière d'immigration.

(2) **Objet:**

Entente portant sur l'échange de renseignements, le recrutement et la sélection des ressortissants étrangers qui demeurent à l'extérieur du Canada et qui désirent résider de façon permanente dans la Province de Québec ou être admis à titre temporaire pour y exercer un emploi.

(3) **Date et signature:**


(4) **Entrée en vigueur:**

Le 17 octobre 1975 (pour une période de trois ans et renouvelable par tacite réconduction).
(1) Titre:

Communiqué de presse entre le Québec et l'Iran en matière de coopération.

(2) Objet:

Coopération dans les secteurs suivants: éducation, énergie, construction, industrie et mines, agriculture, affaires culturelles. Constitution d'une "équipe de mise en oeuvre".

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Nil.
(1) Titre:

Protocole d'accord entre l'Institut National de l'Audio-visuel de France, et l'Office de Radio-Télédiffusion du Québec en matière de télévision.

(2) Objet:

Promouvoir des échanges de programme de télévision à caractère culturel, scientifique, technique et éducatif.

(3) Date et signature:


(4) Entrée en vigueur:

Le 16 janvier 1976 (durée de deux ans).
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