Contesting Power: A Comparison of Muslim Civil Society Responses to Counter-radicalization Policies in Canada and the U.K.

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Public Policy

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario

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Abstract

In the context of the ‘war on terror,’ counter-radicalization (CR) policies are a form of security governance that uses social, cultural, and educational programs to preempt the future possibility of political violence. Based on a problematic understanding of ‘radicalization’ as the transition toward ‘extreme’ Islamic ideology, CR policies have principally targeted Muslim communities. As Muslim civil society organizations (CSOs) are enlisted to support counter-radicalization objectives, they have to balance advocating for Muslim communities – including raising concerns about anti-Muslim discrimination in CR policies – on the one hand, and on the other, acceding to participate in counter-radicalization initiatives. Employing a qualitative comparative approach, my dissertation shows how Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. develop strategic responses to CR policy pressures. Data for this research are based on interviews with decision-makers at Muslim CSOs, policymakers, and informed individuals as well as analysis of policy documents and security practices related to counter-radicalization.

I propose a conceptual framework that integrates theorization of power (Haugaard, 2012, 2021) with an organizational institutionalist model (Oliver, 1991), arguing that CR polices create relations of power between state institutions and Muslim CSOs, and responses of Muslim CSOs are best understood as contestations within these relations of power. My analysis reveals that, despite following different patterns of development, CR policies in Canada and the U.K. govern Muslims through racialized practices and notions of the “suspect community,” risk, and preemption. Through CR policies, state institutions seek to produce compliant CSOs that unreflexively reproduce relations of domination. With the awareness of these dynamics, Muslim CSOs engage in sophisticated power contestations: 1) they make strategic choices about availing CR-
related funding, cooperating with state security institutions, and responding to state institutions’ withholding legitimacy for CSO activities, 2) they criticize state institutions for insufficiently including Muslim CSOs in the CR policymaking process and for ignoring the concerns of Muslim communities, and 3) they challenge dominant discourses in CR policies and demand more transparency about the knowledge basis for CR policies. This dissertation shows how, despite institutional constraints, CSOs can use their agentic power to engage in meaningful contestations toward emancipatory goals.
Acknowledgements

This dissertation project was made possible by the support of numerous people. I am most grateful to my supervisor, Frances Abele, whose patience, advice, and guidance were critical throughout this dissertation project. The time and effort she dedicated reading numerous drafts and providing important feedback were crucial in taking this dissertation to completion. I remain appreciative of her inviting me to contribute to her own research projects at pivotal moments during my doctoral journey. I have learned a great deal from Frances’ scholarship and research, and from our delightful intellectual discussions.

I am especially thankful to my committee members, Susan Phillips and Jeffrey Monaghan, who have gone above and beyond their call of duty. Susan’s incisive reading of my dissertation drafts and helpful feedback contributed to a significantly improved finished version. Her encouragement led me to discover new research trajectories and pursue fulfilling teaching opportunities. Jeff has been nothing but supportive since joining my dissertation committee. Not only did he provide valuable feedback on my dissertation but his scholarship has also greatly influenced my own work. I have benefited immensely from collaborating with him on various research projects. I remain deeply indebted to my supervisor and committee members for the time and energy they have invested in my growth as a scholar. I also want to express sincere thanks to my thesis examiners, Dr. Narzanin Massoumi and Dr. Atiya Husain, for taking the time to carefully read my dissertation, for engaging me in an enriching discussion during my thesis defence, and for their valuable insights. I look forward to continued discussions with them.
I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the support I received from the School of Public Policy and Administration at Carleton University. The department provided a supportive research environment and allowed me the necessary flexibility to pursue my desired dissertation topic. I am grateful to Graeme Auld, Jose Galdo, Saul Schwartz, and others in the faculty and staff who were enthusiastic about my research. This dissertation research would also not have been possible without the generous funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation, and Carleton University.

I am thankful to my PhD cohort members, Ariel Root, Robyn Hoogendam, Russell Iqbal, and others, with whom I was able to share the joys and pains of the journey through graduate school. I am also appreciative of the friendships I cultivated during the course of this dissertation research. My sincerest thanks to family and friends whose understanding and support were indispensable during the arduous period of dissertation research and writing. I cannot put into words how much it meant to have loved ones and close friends encourage me, read my drafts, and help me unentangle convoluted ideas.

Finally, I would also like to express deepest gratitude to the members of civil society organizations who participated in this research, graciously making time for me and patiently answering all my questions. Their work in crafting and demanding for a more equal and just world is a constant source of inspiration.
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<td>ATA</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Act (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATIA</td>
<td>Access to Information Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>British National Party (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSBT</td>
<td>Building a Stronger Britain Together (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACP</td>
<td>Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSA</td>
<td>Canadian Border Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCE</td>
<td>Commission for Countering Extremism (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCRS</td>
<td>Cross Cultural Roundtable on Security (Public Safety Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Close-circuit television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRF</td>
<td>Community Resilience Fund (Public Safety Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPN-PREV</td>
<td>Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRPRLV</td>
<td>Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence (Montreal, Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Calgary Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Counter-radicalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRA</td>
<td>Canada Revenue Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRV</td>
<td>Countering Radicalization to Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Canadian Security Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTIO</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism Information Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTSA</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015 (U.K.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering Violent Extremism</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCLG</td>
<td>Department of Communities and Local Government (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERG22+</td>
<td>Extremist Risk Guidance 22+ (U.K. – radicalization risk factors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAVE</td>
<td>Families Against Violent Extremism</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOCUS</td>
<td>Furthering Our Community by Uniting Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOI</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOSIS</td>
<td>Federation of Student Islamic Societies (U.K.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Eight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCHQ</td>
<td>Government Communications Headquarters (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCTF</td>
<td>Global Counter Terrorism Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICLMG</td>
<td>International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIS</td>
<td>Institute of Islamic Studies (University of Toronto)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSET</td>
<td>Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (Royal Canadian Mounted Police)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRFAN</td>
<td>International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISNA</td>
<td>Islamic Society of North America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACFEST</td>
<td>Muslim Arts and Culture Festival (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCB</td>
<td>Muslim Council of Britain (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>Muslim Engagement and Development (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERIT</td>
<td>Multiagency Early Risk Intervention Tables (Ottawa, Ontario)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>Muslim Students Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCCM</td>
<td>National Council of Canadian Muslims</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHS</td>
<td>National Health Services (U.K.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSCOP</td>
<td>National Security Community Outreach Program (Royal Canadian Mounted Police)</td>
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<td>NUS</td>
<td>National Union of Students (U.K.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NYPD</td>
<td>New York Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPE</td>
<td>Organization for Prevention of Violence (Edmonton, Alberta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCT</td>
<td>Office for Security and Counter-terrorism (Home Office, U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN</td>
<td>Research Participant from Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PET</td>
<td>Preventing Extremism Together (U.K.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIP2</td>
<td>Partnering in Practice - Preventing Social Polarizations II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Public Safety Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUK</td>
<td>Research Participant from the U.K.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVE</td>
<td>Preventing Violent Extremism</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVEPF</td>
<td>Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund (U.K.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAD</td>
<td>Canada Revenue Agency’s Review and Analysis Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RICU</td>
<td>Research, Information and Communications Unit (Home Office, U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARS</td>
<td>Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCREEN</td>
<td>Supporting Counter-radicalization Efforts by Ethno-cultural Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (U.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STREET</td>
<td>Strategy to Reach, Empower, and Educate Teenagers (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPS</td>
<td>Toronto Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSAS</td>
<td>Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCL</td>
<td>University College London</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNB</td>
<td>University of New Brunswick</td>
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<tr>
<td>UOIT</td>
<td>University of Ontario in Toronto</td>
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<tr>
<td>UQAM</td>
<td>University of Québec in Montreal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAF</td>
<td>Vulnerability Assessment Framework (U.K.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WRAP</td>
<td>Workshops to Raise Awareness of Prevent (U.K.)</td>
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Chapter 1 – Introduction

Overview and Rationale

Since the mid-2000s, the problem of ‘radicalization’ has gained policy attention in Canada, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and other western nations, emerging as a “vehicle for policy-makers to explore the process by which a terrorist [is] made” (Kundnani, 2012b, p. 4). In the context of the post-9/11 ‘war on terror,’ radicalization is commonly understood as a process through which “seemingly ordinary” Muslim individuals come to adopt “extremist” ideas that putatively lead them to “jihadist terrorism” (Malthaner, 2017, pp. 369–370). In the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, states focused on combating transnational political violence by ‘Islamist’ groups. However, the deadly attacks in London and Madrid in the mid-2000s by perpetrators of Muslim background prompted western policymakers to consider the underlying reasons for ‘homegrown’ or ‘domestic’ terrorism – attacks in western countries planned and initiated by Muslims who were born or raised in those countries (Crone & Harrow, 2011). These developments led to the focus on ‘radicalization’ through which policymakers sought to understand how Muslims develop “extreme positions or ideologies” that “justifi[y] the use of violence” (Public Safety Canada, 2018a).¹ As the policy response to ‘radicalization,’ counter-radicalization, therefore, aims to tackle Muslims developing “extreme” ideologies and beliefs that are assumed to be linked to violence (Kundnani, 2012b).

Counter-radicalization (CR) policies are a part of a wide spectrum of national security responses to ‘domestic terrorism.’ On one end of the spectrum, states deploy ‘hard’ or coercive practices that include the use of covert intelligence, targeted

¹ The term ‘radicalization’ is in quotes because its definition is contested (Schmid, 2013). I discuss the definitional aspects of radicalization in some detail in Chapter 2.
surveillance, detention, and incarceration. The use of counterterrorism laws and policing techniques constitutes what I refer to as “counterterrorism practices.” On the other end of the spectrum, to complement counterterrorism practices, states use ‘soft’ or non-coercive approaches to prevent a future occurrence of political violence (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018). These approaches, which include community policing, social programs, education and training modules, youth mentoring, targeted psycho-social interventions, and filtering of online content, are what I term “counter-radicalization (CR) policies.” With CR policies, national security agencies have intensified outreach among Muslim communities with the goal of building trust and enlisting their support in detecting and reporting on signs of ‘radicalization.’ Through such engagements, CR policies seek to intervene preemptively in the “pre-criminal” space to disrupt the radicalization process and avoid the “risk” of a possible future incident of political violence (Martin, 2014; Mythen, 2020). Figure 1 depicts a United States (U.S.) government document showing the spectrum of national security responses from counter-radicalization to counterterrorism.

Since their inception, CR policies have been widely criticized for not meeting their stated goals. As CR policies were instituted in response to concerns about Muslims residing in western countries being drawn to political violence, these policies make crude

---

2 Despite the distinction between counterterrorism and counter-radicalization, there is considerable room for crossover in techniques, especially as counterterrorism practices were reoriented for domestic use to devise CR policies (see Ragazzi, 2017; Sabir, 2017).
3 CR policies are referred to by different names in different countries. Canada and the U.K. favour the use of countering radicalization to violence (CRV) and counter-radicalization (CR), respectively, to describe non-coercive efforts by national security agencies to prevent future occurrences of political violence. The same policies in the United States (U.S.) and Australia are named countering violent extremism (CVE) (Australian Government, 2019). The United Nations (UNESCO, 2016) has chosen to use the label preventing violent extremism (PVE). There are some differences in the makeup of CR policies in different countries; nevertheless, CR policies across nations share several fundamental assumptions about the nature of the problem of ‘radicalization.’
assumptions about radicalization being associated with certain conservative Islamic beliefs (Huq, 2007; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Additionally, in both Canada and the U.K. (and other countries), CR policies have paid disproportionate attention to acts of political violence by Muslim perpetrators, even though other acts of political violence have been officially recorded (see Figure 2).

Figure 1

*The Spectrum of National Security Efforts from Counter-radicalization (or Countering Violent Extremism) to Counterterrorism*

![Image of spectrum diagram showing the transition from community engagement to counterterrorism.](Image)


In the U.K., the almost exclusive focus of CR policies on Muslim communities has prompted scholars to observe that CR policies stigmatize Muslims by treating them as the “suspect community” (Breen-Smyth, 2014; Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009b). Important scholarship has noted that CR policies in the U.K. have sought to not only

---

4 In my dissertation, I favour the use of the term ‘political violence’ over ‘terrorism’ to describe ideologically motivated violent attacks targeting large populations. This is because ‘terrorism’ has pejorative connotations and, as Stampnitzky (2014) describes, has evolved to refer to violence deemed to be illegitimate by state actors. Political violence, on the other hand, is a neutral term and encompasses violence by state and non-state actors more broadly while reserving judgement on the legitimacy of the political motivation (see Cohan, 2005).
disrupt pathways to political violence but also to shape the identity and culture of Muslim “Others” thought to be incompatible with “British values” (Elshayyal, 2020; Lynch, 2013). CR policies have enhanced surveillance and social control of British Muslims, viewing them primarily through the lens of security (Ragazzi, 2017). Empirical work from Canada has shown that the radicalization indicators used to identify ideational and behavioural changes toward political violence, encode racial and religious bias against Muslims (Monaghan & Molnar, 2016). Scholarship from the U.S. and the U.K. has expressed grave concern that as civil society organizations, social, cultural, and educational institutions, and other “frontline” individuals are enlisted to support CR policies, they are effectively transformed into surveillant agents for state security agencies (Nguyen, 2019b; Winter et al., 2021). In all, it remains unclear whether CR policies are achieving their objectives as they have furthered the stigmatization and alienation of Muslim communities.

Figure 2
Recorded Incidents of Terrorism by Type in Canada and the U.K.

Note. The incident type was determined based on the perpetrator group. ‘Islamist’ inspired incidents are attacks by groups labeled as Jihadi, Muslim extremist, and listed ‘Islamist’ terrorist entities such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, etc. Right-wing incidences are attacks
by groups labeled as neo-Nazi, anti-Muslim, and anti-Semitic (Source: Global Terrorism Database (START, n.d.)).

Muslim civil society organizations (CSOs) – nonprofits led by or serving Muslim communities – play a complex role in the context of CR policies. National security and policing agencies approach Muslim CSOs to support outreach and engagement with Muslim communities and implement social and cultural programs that are thought to prevent ‘radicalization.’ In light of the critiques of CR policies, Muslim CSOs also play an important role in advocating for the interests of Muslim communities, including raising concerns about anti-Muslim discrimination and stigmatization resulting from CR policies. Muslim CSOs thus have to navigate a tension between agreeing to requests for their participation in implementing state-security led CR policies and resisting CR policies when they are detrimental to the Muslim communities they serve. Despite the complex role Muslim CSOs are expected to play under CR policies, there is limited empirical and theoretical research exploring how these organizations respond to the pressures of overbearing CR policies. My dissertation responds to this gap in the literature by showing how Muslim CSOs interpret the pressures from CR policies and develop organizational responses to these policies.

I propose a conceptual framework that integrates the theorization of power (Haugaard, 2012, 2021) with an organizational institutionalist model (Oliver, 1991). Using this framework, I show that CR policies create relations of power between state

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5 The incidents of terrorism recorded in the Global Terrorism Database rely on “publicly available, unclassified source materials,” specially, “media articles and electronic news archives” (START, 2019, p. 3). The field for “Perpetrator Group Name” in the database is coded to “Unknown” when perpetrator information is not available (p. 43). Though the creators of the database claim that they apply “a single definition of terrorism over the full span of the database” (p. 4), the concept of terrorism itself is contested and deployed discursively by state actors (Stampnitzky, 2014). Readers should bear this in mind when considering the information provided in Figure 2.
institutions and Muslim CSOs and argue that the strategic responses of Muslim CSOs are best understood as contestations within these relations of power. As such, my dissertation has broader significance for understanding of the way in which power is exercised in relationships between state institutions and civil society organizations. In addition, my dissertation contributes to the understanding of how the racialization and Othering of Muslims are enabled through national security practices and how this has bearing on the strategic choices of Muslim CSOs.

**Research Questions and Conceptual Approach**

CR policies represent national security-driven imperatives that encroach on the social, cultural, and civic spaces where Muslim CSOs are active. As state institutions recruit Muslim CSOs to implement CR programs and support counter-radicalization objectives, Muslim CSOs balance keeping paramount the interests of the communities they serve, on one hand, and on the other, acceding to participate in national security initiatives. Through an analysis of CR policies and practices and interviews with Muslim CSOs and other stakeholders, my dissertation research generates new empirical data about Muslim CSOs’ experience of CR policies and their power-informed organizational strategies in response to CR policies. To this end, my research asks:

- What has been the pattern of evolution of CR policies over time in Canada and the U.K.?
- What are the processes through which CR policies impact the work of Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K.? How do Muslim CSOs in the two countries experience pressures from CR policies?
- What strategies have Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. developed in response to CR policies? What considerations do Muslim CSOs take into account in developing responses to CR policies?
To address these research questions and inform the empirical analysis, I take an interdisciplinary theoretical approach. First, I use the public policy theories of “critical junctures” (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007) and “policy mobilizing” (Peck & Theodore, 2010) to illustrate how CR policies developed in response to the “shocks” of political violence by Muslim perpetrators, how transnational policy ideas about ‘radicalization’ as a problem of Muslim violence traversed across national jurisdictions, and how CR policies came to target domestic Muslim populations. By using this approach, my dissertation offers a new lens for comparison of CR policies in Canada and the U.K.

Second, I turn to the literature on critical terrorism and radicalization studies, which elucidates how CR policies govern domestic Muslims as a “suspect community” whose political, cultural, and religious expressions are viewed through a lens of risk (Awan, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013), and how preemptive interventions are privileged to prevent the tenuous possibility of future political violence (an inherent unknown) (Martin, 2014). The comparative work in my dissertation shows how these characteristics are manifest in CR policies in Canada and the U.K., and how racialization is central to the operation of CR policies (Ali, 2020; Younis, 2021). I explicate these phenomena by centering the insights from research participants affiliated with Muslim CSOs.

Finally, I bridge the literatures concerned with community power/empowerment (Gaventa, 2006; Pettit & McGee, 2020; VeneKlasen & Miller, 2007) and sociology of (nonprofit) organizations (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990; W. R. Scott, 2008) to propose an original conceptual framework for analyzing the responses of CSOs to pressures from public policies. Specifically, I fold the theorization of power by Haugaard (2012, 2021) into the organizational institutionalist model by Oliver (1991) to build my conceptual
framework. Using the framework, I show how CR policies create relations of power across four dimensions between state security institutions and Muslim CSOs. Each dimension of power provides an analytical container to examine power contestations that inform Muslim CSO responses. Briefly, the first dimension of power, or “Power 1,” encapsulates CSO responses to state institutions’ use of coercion, selective granting or withdrawing of legitimacy to CSO activities, and allocation of funding (Haugaard, 2021, pp. 154–159). The second dimension, “Power 2,” functions as “conflict over structure” where CSOs respond by demanding that state institutions include them in the policymaking process and consider the concerns of their constituents in the policy design (p. 161). The third dimension, “Power 3,” functions in the realm of “epistemic conflict” where CSOs contest the discourses, taken-for-granted knowledges, and norms that are proliferated through state policies (p. 165). The fourth dimension of power, or “Power 4,” describes the process of “subjectification” where governance techniques by state institutions are used to produce disciplined CSOs that unreflexively reproduce relations of domination (Haugaard, 2012, p. 47). When CSOs become aware of the operation of Power 4, it creates the possibility that they engage in contestations across one of the other dimensions of power. My proposed conceptual framework clarifies how Muslim CSO responses to CR policies are sophisticated contestations of power that occur across the dimensions described above. Through this dissertation analysis, I strive to make theoretical and empirical contributions to several disciplines including critical radicalization studies, organizational institutionalism, nonprofit studies, and community empowerment.
Assessing the Research on Radicalization/Counter-radicalization

There has been an abundance of scholarship focused on the discriminatory aspects of national security measures in the context of the ‘war on terror’. Canadian research has scrutinized the institutionalization of anti-Muslim and anti-Arab discrimination in counterterrorism law (Bahdi, 2003), the human rights violations, detention, and torture of Canadian Muslims (Abu-Laban & Nath, 2007; Choudhry & Roach, 2003; Macklin, 2008), the questionable use of immigration law to “cast out” undesirable Muslims (C. Bell, 2006a; Razack, 2008), the surveillance of Canadian Muslims (Bhabha, 2018), the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on Muslim women (Rygiel & Zine, 2016; Thobani, 2007), the biased news reporting on Muslim political violence (Kanji, 2018), and the racialization and Islamophobia enabled through counterterrorism practices (Bahdi & Kanji, 2018; Wilkins-Laflamme, 2018). Research has also provided accounts of Muslim communities’ experiences of securitization through the ‘war on terror’ practices (Jamil, 2014; Nagra, 2017).

Specific interest in ‘radicalization’ has surged since the mid-2000s as western policymakers began to consider “the process by which a terrorist was made” (i.e., radicalization) with the aim of devising preventative measures to disrupt that process (i.e., CR policies) (Kundnani, 2012b, p. 4). With the goal of supporting CR policies, the bulk of literature on radicalization and counter-radicalization has sought to formalize a ‘science’ of radicalization, focused on explaining the different reasons for ‘radicalization,’ and providing the knowledge necessary to legitimize the interventions that form part of CR policies (D. M. D. Silva, 2018). Recent Canadian research has given

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6 (e.g., Amoore & Goede, 2008; Aradu & van Munster, 2009; Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008; Cainkar & Selod, 2018; Cesari, 2009; Diab, 2015; Green, 2017; Holloway, 2008; T. Z. Ismail et al., 2014; Jamal & Naber, 2008; D. Kumar, 2020; Ralph, 2013; Razack, 2008; Sharma & Nijjar, 2018).
attention to counter-radicalization, with a particular interest in trying to understand what motivates and how to prevent Muslim youth from travelling to participate in conflicts in countries in the Middle East and Africa (Ghosh et al., 2017; Joosse et al., 2015; Rousseau et al., 2019; Thompson & Bucerius, 2020), the role of the internet in contributing to radicalization (Hassan et al., 2018), and radicalization in prison settings (Schultz et al., 2021).

Critical security and terrorism studies scholars, among whose work my dissertation intervenes, have been instrumental in challenging the state-centered agenda dominant in radicalization studies. Critical security and terrorism studies scholars, among whose work my dissertation intervenes, have been instrumental in challenging the state-centered agenda dominant in radicalization studies.⁷ British and other European scholars have been particularly prolific in noting several worrisome aspects of radicalization studies and the U.K.’s counter-radicalization strategy, Prevent.⁸ Among these, one line of critique addresses the conceptual weakness of the label ‘radicalization’ itself. These studies have drawn attention to the fact that in the context of the ‘war on terror,’ policymakers have used ‘radicalization’ discursively to refer to a process of cognitive or ideological transformation of Muslims towards a set of ‘extremist’ religious beliefs that propels them to political violence (Kundnani, 2012b; Pisoiu, 2013; Richards, 2011; Sedgwick, 2010). The lack of specificity in these uses of ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism’ is compounded when considered alongside the weak empirical evidence upon which radicalization research is based (Sageman, 2014). Post-9/11 radicalization studies have relied on very small samples that overrepresent Muslims and make a priori assumptions about “Islamic

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⁷ A critical approach to studying terrorism and security “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted, but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing” (Cox, 1981, p. 129).

⁸ Prevent was first presented to the U.K. Parliament in 2003 but was made public in 2006 as part of the country’s counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST (Thomas, 2010).
difference (variously explained in terms of lack of integration, a lack of secularism, the existential threat posed by Islam to the West, or external Islamic influences . . .)” being linked to political violence (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010, p. 889). These assumptions betray how Orientalist ideas about Muslims and Islam have shaped the policy view of ‘radicalization’ (Kundnani, 2012b, 2014; Sharma & Nijjar, 2018).

Such racialized inferences have prompted the construction of Muslims as the “suspect community” that is perennially at risk of radicalization (Awan, 2012; Breen-Smyth, 2014; Hickman et al., 2012; Nagra & Monaghan, 2020; Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009b). The same understanding has obviated the need for evidence, prompting racialized practices that code cultural, religious, and political expressions of Muslims as risky (Heath-Kelly, 2013; Monaghan & Molnar, 2016; Mythen et al., 2017). The “Muslim paranoia narrative” has encouraged the deployment of a wide net of policing and non-policing techniques that seek to “preempt” the (inherently unknowable) possibility of future political violence by Muslims (Aistrope, 2016; Heath-Kelly, 2012; Martin, 2014; Mythen, 2020). The proclivity for preemption and the interpretation of ‘radicalization’ as a process of cognitive transformation has justified security-led CR interventions in social, cultural, and community realms of society (where social ideas are shaped) in order to disrupt the ‘radicalization’ process among Muslims (Ragazzi, 2017).

In the U.K., Prevent has been shaped as a modality for governing “Muslim conduct across areas of social, cultural and religious life” (O’Toole et al., 2016, p. 161). Recent changes to Prevent that obligate public sector employees to report on signs of radicalization have only further securitized the healthcare, education, and social service sectors, disproportionately impacting Muslims (Heath-Kelly & Strausz, 2019;
Moreover, the discourses of national values undergirding CR policies serve to racialize Muslims, casting them as dangerous Others (Ali, 2020; Lynch, 2013; Sabir, 2017; Younis, 2021). This not only foments Islamophobia but also renders counter-radicalization techniques that seek to shape cultural and religious identities of Muslims into acceptable subjectivities of the “good” Muslim (Nguyen, 2019a; Ragazzi, 2016).

Critical research on radicalization and counter-radicalization in Canada is decidedly limited, especially compared with the prolific work in the U.K., Europe, and the U.S. This relative dearth of research can be partly attributed to the fact that full-fledged CR policies were only recently institutionalized in Canada (Kubicek & King, 2019; Ragazzi, 2016; Winter et al., 2021).

Securitization refers to a process of permeation of security logics and practices into non-security domains of society (Buzan et al., 1998; Huysmans, 2014). I pay heed to insights of securitization studies scholars who highlight that the process of securitization is enabled through political discourse that constructs an enemy posing a national security threat and calls for the institutionalization of a set of actions to diffuse that threat (Wæver, 1995).

Islamophobia does not merely refer to individualized prejudice, discrimination, abuse, or violence against Muslims. According to legal scholars, Reem Bahdi and Azeezah Kanji (2018), Islamophobia is “[p]erpetrated by private actors and [emphasis added] the state for the purposes or with the effect of creating fear and hostility towards Muslim communities” (p. 345). This conceptualization underlines that Islamophobia also refers to a structural process that is “authorized by the state” (Bakali, 2019, p. 3). State-driven Islamophobia may be overtly coded in law and policies but can also be subtle, “targeting Muslims without explicitly naming them” (Bahdi & Kanji, 2018, p. 323). Bahdi and Kanji (2018) suggest that structural Islamophobia is propped up by racialized practices of state institutions, historically-rooted Orientalist assumptions about Muslims and Islam (specifically, that Muslims are “inherently violent, patriarchal, alien, and inassimilable”), treatment of Islamophobia as “aberrant” individual (private) hate, and the denial or minimization of the existence of Islamophobia. In studying Islamophobia, Massoumi and colleagues (2017) make the case that attention should be given to how “institutions and policies” as well as “agents and interests” drive the “the social, political and cultural action[s]” from which the “infrastructure of subordination” of Muslims arises (pp. 3–4, 6). Additionally, important scholarship has argued that Islamophobia as a form of anti-Muslim racism (Garner & Selod, 2015; Husain, 2020b; Meer & Modood, 2012; Sayyid, 2014). This body of work has highlighted how “[r]eligion is ‘raced,’ and Muslims are racialized;” in other words, how “racial meaning” is ascribed to Muslims (Garner & Selod, 2015, pp. 11, 13). Enabled through the actions of state institutions and the media, racialization is an exercise of power which “draws a line around all the members of the group; instigates ‘group-ness,’ and ascribes characteristics, sometimes because of work, sometimes because of ideas of where the group comes from, what it believes in, or how it organizes itself socially and culturally” (p. 14). In the context of Islamophobia, racialization establishes a “unity of gaze” with which to view and engage with the Muslim Other. Following these works, for my dissertation, I treat Islamophobia as a structural process that involves the Othering and racialization of Muslims through a series of policy ideas and practices. This allows me to examine the ways in which CR policies encode and propel Islamophobia.
However, terrorism prevention measures (essentially, counter-radicalization in all but name) have been rolled up into the functions of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) since 2006. Public Safety Canada has also pursued community engagement in the context of national security since the mid-2000s. My research has revealed only two accounts that analyze the RCMP’s terrorism prevention measures (C. Edwards et al., 2015; Hanniman, 2008). Neither would be classified as critical scholarship but both provide rich insights into the RCMP’s efforts in tackling ‘radicalization’ and ‘domestic terrorism.’ In more recent work, O’Halloran (2021) has evaluated the policy consistency in CR policies at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels by examining the policy frames, goals, instruments, and subsystems implicated. Yet another avenue of radicalization research has looked beyond Muslim violence, especially with CR policies having recently expanded their ambit to include “right-wing extremism” (Scrivens & Perry, 2017).

Among critical scholarship on counter-radicalization, Monaghan’s (2014) research uncovered that at least 18 federal agencies expend resources to combat ‘radicalization.’ The internal documents he obtained suggest that federal agencies have relied on crude assumptions connecting Islamic beliefs to violence, and have viewed surveillance as an important tool to tackle radicalization. Subsequent research found that the RMCP’s radicalization indicators codify discursive assumptions about Muslims that are “harnessed to legitimise crude racism” (Monaghan & Molnar, 2016, p. 410).

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11 Right-wing extremism (RWE) encompasses the activities of a range of violent and non-violent groups that are nationalist, racist, xenophobic, anti-immigrant, antisemitic, and anti-Muslim. For the purposes of defining RWE for my dissertation, I follow Perry and Scrivens (2016) characterization of RWE as a movement “animated by racially, ethnically, and sexually defined nationalism . . . [t]his nationalism is typically framed in terms of White power, and is grounded in xenophobic and exclusionary understandings of the perceived threats posed by such groups as non-Whites, Jews, immigrants, homosexuals, and feminists” (p. 821).
Elsewhere, I have shown how CR policies engender the securitization of Muslim CSOs by shifting the boundaries of security within everyday social and political interactions (F. Ahmad, 2020). More recently, I have worked with a colleague to assess how the expansion of CR policies has impacted Québec’s education sector (Millett & Ahmad, 2021). Despite the transnational implications of CR policies, comparative work, surprisingly, remains limited to Silva’s comparison of CR policies in Canada, the U.K., and the U.S. (D. M. D. Silva, 2018; D. M. D. Silva & Deflem, 2020), and Kawser Ahmed and his colleagues’ (2018) assessment of community-based and community-focused counter-radicalization programs in Canada, the U.K., Australia, and several European countries.

In this dissertation I provide a comparative analysis of how CR policies in Canada and the U.K. have evolved in response to anxieties about Muslim political violence and have replicated – through transnational knowledge exchange – understandings of ‘radicalization’ as a problem of Muslim violence. I examine the evolution of CR policies at different levels of government using concepts of critical junctures (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007) and policy mobilizing (Peck & Theodore, 2010). Whereas previous works have undertaken a technical analysis of CR policies (O’Halloran, 2021) and shown how different national jurisdictions share similar preemptive policing practices (D. M. D. Silva & Deflem, 2020), my research considers the political context within which CR policies have evolved. The comparison of the evolution of CR policies in the U.K and Canada allows me to examine the impact of transnational exchange of ideas and practices that underpin CR policies in the two countries and how CR policies have affected Muslim communities and CSOs.
Conceptual Framework: Bridging Power and Organizational Institutionalism

The conceptual framework I propose in my dissertation integrates theories of power (Haugaard, 2012, 2021) within an organizational institutionalist model (Oliver, 1991). I propose that this framework is useful for examining how CR policies – which are formulated to address Muslim ‘radicalization’ and reliant on racialized knowledges and practices – create relations of power between state security institutions and Muslim CSOs. Within my framework, Muslim CSO responses to CR policies are best understood as contestations with state institutions within the relations of power rendered by CR policies. Organizational intuitionalist theories, which explain how norms and taken-for-granted knowledges shape the structure and choices of organizations, have been applied in the context of CSOs (Alexander, 1996; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; W. W. Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; W. R. Scott, 2008). Separately, notions of power have been applied to organizational studies in various ways (C. Anderson & Brion, 2014; Clegg et al., 2006; Pfeffer, 1992); however, the literature on organizational institutionalism has not sufficiently incorporated theories of power (Clegg, 2010; K. A. Munir, 2015). By connecting theories of power with organizational institutionalism, my framework not only addresses a gap in the literature on organizational institutionalism but also proposes a novel way of understanding how CSOs interpret the operation of power in public policies and adopt strategies to resist discriminatory policy designs and discourses. Indeed, in developing my framework, I took direction from the work of scholars and practitioners who have applied the thinking of power to identify how oppressed communities can identify and resist hegemonic power to achieve their emancipatory goals (Gaventa, 2006, 2021; McGee, 2020; VeneKlasen & Miller, 2007).
Previous studies in the U.S., the U.K., and Europe that have assessed Muslim CSO responses in the context of the ‘war on terror’ have utilized organizational institutionalist theories to a minimal extent (Kortmann & Rosenow-Williams, 2013; Malik, 2013; Shier & Graham, 2013; Werbner, 2011). Of exceptional note is a study from Germany which examines the impact of post 9/11 developments on “Islamic umbrella organizations” that have been thrust into supporting state “integration” policies, acting as community contacts for state institutions and the media, and leading activism against discriminatory counterterrorism practices (Rosenow-Williams, 2012, 2014). Relying on Oliver’s (1991) organizational institutionalist model, Rosenow-Williams (2014) proposes that Muslim umbrella organizations have primarily pursued strategies of compromise to balance the conflict between internal influence from members and pressures from the external environment.

Concepts of power based on Foucauldian ideas have also been used productively to study CR policies, mainly analyzing the disciplinary and responsibilizing mechanics of these policies (Abdel-Fattah, 2020; Ali, 2014; Ragazzi, 2016). Within these analyses, the responses and resistance by Muslim CSOs are only considered minimally. As Akinwami (2012) observes, Foucauldian-inspired examinations of power emphasize “one-sided views of practices shaped, conditioned or steered by ‘powerful’ actors” and “not as much enthusiasm is channelled towards telling a more complex story involving other actors – often ‘less’ powerful – who act on these practices in differential ways” (p. 449). My conceptual framework, in contrast, pays attention to the complex actions of “less powerful” Muslim CSOs confronting CR policies. By considering the relevance of theories of power and organizational institutionalism concomitantly, my framework seeks
to show the “interactive dynamics” between Muslim CSOs and state security agencies (Akinwumi, 2012, p. 449). Through this original approach, I assess the actions of state institutions trying to recruit and influence Muslim CSOs through techniques of power as well as the responses of Muslim CSOs to navigate and resist the actions of state institutions within the relations of power established by CR policies.

**Overview of Methodology**

The objects of analysis in my dissertation research are civil society organizations (CSOs). Specifically, I focus on Muslim CSOs responding to CR policies to understand how CSOs respond to the power relations rendered by public policies. CR policies enmesh national security imperatives within social, cultural, and community realms of society where CSO activities are focused. By impinging on these realms, CR policies impact Muslim CSOs in multiple and complex ways, setting up contestations of power. It is within this context that I seek to understand Muslim CSO responses to CR policies.

For my dissertation research, I adopt a qualitative research design comparing the cases of Canada and the U.K. In order to learn how Muslim CSOs understand, interpret, and respond to CR policies, I conduct semi-structured interviews with decision-makers at Muslim CSOs and with experts informed about CR policies in the two countries. For a richer understanding of the context that has informed CR policymaking, I also conduct interviews with government bureaucrats and members of policing agencies. The primary data in Canada are drawn from interviews with 20 managers and board members of Muslim CSOs, five senior managers of organizations implementing CR programs, three bureaucrats and individuals affiliated with law enforcement, and two experts familiar with Canada’s CR policy landscape. In the U.K., I interview 10 managers and board members of Muslim CSOs, two senior managers of organizations implementing CR
programs, and one expert with knowledge of CR policies in the country. The identities of all participants and their organizations have been anonymized.

A textual analysis of policy documents, parliamentary hearings, and news sources is used to triangulate the interview findings and situate them within the broader political and social context of each country (Fusch et al., 2018). An extensive review of the secondary literature of CR policies and their impact on Muslim communities in Canada and the U.K. provides additional context. The case-centered qualitative comparative research design used in my dissertation research is appropriate for capturing rich perspectives from multiple actors in the contentious setting of CR policies, thus allowing for an “in-depth understanding of historical processes and individual motivations” (Della Porta, 2008a, p. 202). Using this research design, I have created a study that offers a first look at the lived experiences of Muslim CSOs confronting CR policies in Canada and adds depth to studies from the U.K. that have examined how Muslim CSOs experience CR policies (e.g., Malik, 2013; Qurashi, 2018). In Chapter 3, I provide a full description of the research design and methodology of my dissertation research.

Organized of the Remaining Chapters of the Dissertation

Including the current chapter, my dissertation is organized into a total of 10 chapters. In Chapter 2, I elucidate the theoretical and conceptual pillars important for my research in three parts. The first part clarifies how the concept of ‘radicalization’ has been defined and used in policy and security circles. Drawing on critical radicalization studies scholarship, I show how the narrow understanding of ‘radicalization’ as Muslims developing ‘extremist’ ideologies has shaped CR policies (Kundnani, 2012b). The second part of this chapter discusses the theoretical concepts of critical junctures (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007) and policy mobilizing (Peck & Theodore, 2010). I argue that these
concepts are useful in observing 1) the evolution of CR policies as responses to “exogenous shocks” of political violence by Muslim perpetrators, and 2) their rapid deployment based on ideas and best practices exchanged in transnational fora. These theories also explain how, across national jurisdictions, CR policies have adopted governance approaches that target domestic Muslim populations. The third part of this chapter starts with an explanation of the building blocks of my conceptual framework: Haugaard’s (2012, 2021) theorization of four dimensions of power and Oliver’s (1991) organizational intuitionalist model that underscores how organizations develop strategic responses to pressures from the external environment. I proceed to detail an original conceptual framework that integrates Haugaard’s (2012, 2021) thinking on power with Oliver’s (1991) organizational intuitionalist model. According to this framework, CR policies create relations of power between state institutions and CSOs across four dimensions; CSO responses to CR policies are shaped by these relations of power and appear as contestations with state institutions that occur within each dimension of these relations of power.

Chapter 3 is dedicated to explaining my research design and methodology. I define key concepts used in my research and the geographical and temporal bounds of this study. The chapter includes the rationale for choosing a case-oriented, qualitative comparative research design, arguing it is best suited to uncover the processes through which CR policies create fields of power between state institutions and Muslim CSOs. The chapter justifies the case selection of Canada and the U.K. and outlines the data collection strategy in the two countries, including how interviews were conducted with participants and what the data analysis process entailed. This is followed by a discussion
of the research limitations of this dissertation. The chapter concludes with a reflexive statement about my positionality as a racialized, Muslim scholar.

In Chapters 4 and 5, I show how CR policies in Canada and the U.K. developed over time at critical junctures, where transnational policy ideas about radicalization and counter-radicalization mobilized, coalesced, and propelled the institutionalization of counter-radicalization governance. Chapter 4 is focused on Canada and analyzes the development of CR policies over three distinct time periods: 2000 to 2006, 2006 to 2015, and 2015 to present. I note that, while CR policies had been part of the terrorism prevention mandate of federal policing and public safety agencies, these policies have intensified across provinces and municipalities since 2015. I identify how CR policies in Canada have principally targeted Muslim communities. Chapter 5 shows how CR policies developed in the U.K., how these policies have been active since the mid-2000s, and how the U.K. has been a global innovator of CR policies. I analyze the CR policy development over three periods: 2000 to 2011, 2011 to 2015, and 2015 to present. Over time, CR policies have gone through several changes, but have retained their problematic focus on managing and controlling the political and cultural expressions of Muslims in the U.K. In Chapter 6, I compare CR policies in Canada and the U.K., by showing that – despite following different evolutionary patterns and exhibiting different levels of institutionalization – they retain the core characteristics of treating Muslims as the “suspect community,” governing Muslims using notions of risk, and relying on preemptive security practices enacted across a wide range of social sites. Chapter 6 surfaces how racialized practices enable the implementation of CR policies and how CR policies are experienced by research participants from Canada and the U.K.
Chapters 7 through 9 apply my conceptual framework to analyze the research data, showing how CR policies render relations of power between state institutions and Muslim CSOs and how Muslim CSOs develop strategic responses to CR policies within these relations of power (Haugaard, 2012, 2021; Oliver, 1991). Chapter 7 highlights “Power 1” contestations that revolve around Muslim CSO decisions to avail CR-related funding, to cooperate with state security agencies in CR initiatives, and to challenge state institutions’ selectively granting or withholding legitimacy to CSO activities. Chapter 8 illustrates “Power 2” contestations that encompass “conflict[s] over structure” (Haugaard, 2021, p. 161). Here, Muslim CSOs challenge state institutions for not sufficiently including them in the CR policymaking process and for using CR policies to primarily target Muslim communities. Chapter 9 covers the workings of “Power 3” and “Power 4.” Power 3 is evident in “epistemic conflicts” (Haugaard, 2021, p. 165) where Muslim CSOs challenge the discourses and implicit knowledges upon which CR policies rest. Power 4 describes the process of subjectification of Muslim CSOs using disciplinary techniques.

My dissertation concludes with Chapter 10, a summary of the research contributions and key findings of my dissertation research. The chapter 1) reiterates how CR policies use racialized practices to govern Muslims through the lens of suspect communities, risk, and preemption, and 2) reviews how CR policies create relations of power between state institutions and Muslim CSOs and how the strategies adopted by Muslim CSOs are shaped by these relations of power. This chapter also discusses the broader significance of this research and posits its utility for understanding how CSOs can meaningfully contest onerous requirements of public policies; how social processes
of racialization seep their way into public policies, making them relevant to the strategies of CSOs serving racialized and ethnic communities; how broader justice-seeking movements can benefit from examining their strategies through the lens of power; and how policymaking is deficient when the views of impacted marginalized communities are not properly accounted for. The chapter ends with a discussion of the shortcomings in this research and possible directions for future research.
Chapter 2 – Theoretical Guideposts and Conceptual Framework

In this chapter, I expound on the conceptual and theoretical pillars which guide my dissertation research inquiry. I start with a discussion of how ‘radicalization’ has been conceptualized in the post-9/11 context. I show that ‘radicalization’ remains definitionally vague, conceptually underdeveloped, and its common understanding as the ideological transformation of Muslims towards ‘extreme’ Islamic beliefs undergirds CR policies (Kundnani, 2012b). Next, to explain the development of CR policies in Canada and the U.K., I establish the relevance of the concepts of “critical junctures” (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007) that explains how significant policy revisions occur at opportune windows, and “policy mobilizing” (Peck & Theodore, 2010) that explains how policy ideas and paradigms travel across national jurisdictions to inform policy content and application. I argue that these concepts are useful to understand how CR policies evolved in the aftermath of incidents of political violence by Muslim perpetrators and relied on ideas and best practices plucked from transnational security fora for rapid deployment. Then, I describe an original conceptual framework that integrates Haugaard’s (2012, 2021) theorization of power within an organizational institutionalist model (Oliver, 1991). This framework proposes that CR policies create relationships of power between state institutions and CSOs across four dimensions. These relationships of power shape the strategies CSOs use to respond to CR policies. In this section, I also provide an overview of the building blocks of power and organizational institutionalism on which my conceptual framework relies. In describing the conceptual framework, I highlight how it is applied to analyze Muslim CSO responses to CR policies.
Understanding ‘Radicalization’\textsuperscript{12}

In research and policy communities, ‘radicalization’ has come to signify the development of ‘extreme’ ideas and beliefs, that do not necessarily produce violence, yet are assumed to be linked to violence. In particular, the popularization of ‘radicalization’ in the context of the ‘war on terror’ was motivated by a desire to understand how Muslims develop ‘extreme’ Islamic beliefs that are linked to terrorism.\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, ‘radicalization’ has proven to be a malleable term which has recently been expanded to refer to various political ideologies deemed deviant by state agencies. Since academic studies on ‘radicalization’ reflect these views and have influenced perceptions of radicalization among policymakers and national security agencies (D. M. D. Silva, 2018), it is necessary to discuss these here.

There has been a steady increase in the use of the term ‘radicalization’ in academic articles and news stories since the transit systems bombings in Madrid and London in the mid-2000s; nevertheless, its definition remains unclear (Kundnani, 2012b; Schmid, 2013; Sedgwick, 2010). In referring to a process associated with ‘terrorism’ and ‘violent extremism,’ the post-9/11 usage of ‘radicalization’ represents a departure from its previous use to indicate a transition toward unorthodox or revolutionary (i.e., “radical”) politics (Richards, 2011; Sedgwick, 2010). Kundnani (2012b) suggests that, in the context of the ‘war on terror,’ radicalization refers to a “psychological or theological

\textsuperscript{12} The sporadic use of quotation marks around terms such as ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism’ are meant to draw attention to the fact that these terms and their definitions are disputed.

\textsuperscript{13} It is worth mentioning that ‘terrorism’ itself is a social and political construct with no agreed upon definition (E. Ahmad, 2001; Schmid, 2013; Stampnitzky, 2014). Even though most countries define terrorism in law, state security agencies apply terrorism charges selectively. In Canada, since 9/11, 55 of the 58 terrorism charges have been against Muslim perpetrators (Nesbitt, 2019). Moreover, Canada has a long history of using national security measures for policing and surveillance of Indigenous people (Crosby & Monaghan, 2018; Proulx, 2014).
process by which Muslims move toward extremist views” (p.7). Noting how these assumptions have carried forward into concerns about so-called ‘foreign fighters’ travelling to join combat in Syria and Iraq, Malthaner (2017) surmises that radicalization is an “analytical paradigm to interpret and explain phenomena of political violence, notably in research on jihadist terrorism” (p. 369).

He reiterates the common understanding of radicalization as “the gradual adoption of ‘extremist’ ideas that promote and eventually lead to acts of terrorism, thus focusing attention on processes of cognitive and ideological transformation, mainly at the individual level” (Malthaner, 2017, p. 370).

Sedgwick (2010) points out that in these characterizations of radicalization, ‘extremist’ views or ideas are only meaningful relative to “moderate” or “mainstream” views, which themselves are context-dependent, politically-motivated discursive formations, not specific notions. Moreover, in targeting Muslims, this conception of ‘radicalization’ prompts policymakers to delineate “moderate” from “extreme” Islamic ideas, which should raise considerable concerns for secular, liberal states (Kundnani, 2012b; Sedgwick, 2010).

These definitions of ‘radicalization’ reveal several assumptions that warrant closer examination. First, radicalization is thought to be a process of developing a set of ‘extreme’ ideas, which oppose the political mainstream but do not always result in ‘violent extremism.’

It is well established that the link between ideas and violent

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14 “Foreign fighters” usually refer to “transnational insurgents” or “combatants on foreign soil” (Borum & Fein, 2017). However, the term has seen a resurgence in recent years to describe of young, supposedly ‘radicalized’ Muslim combatants, especially from western countries, who travel to participate in conflicts in Syria and Iraq (see Schmid & Tinnes, 2015).

15 ‘Extremism’ and ‘violent extremism’ are additional fuzzy concepts used in the context of the ‘war on terror.’ ‘Extremism,’ used synonymously with ‘radicalism,’ refers to ‘political ideologies’ that deviate from society’s norms (Borum, 2011). But society’s norms are socially and politically constructed, so ‘extremism’ is an imprecise signifier for a set of ideologies deemed, by the state, as deviant or undesirable. ‘Violent extremism’ refers to the use of violent methods to advance ‘extremist’ positions (Schmid, 2013).
behaviour is tenuous (Pisoiu, 2013; Schuurman & Taylor, 2018). Even most national security agencies acknowledge a distinction between ‘radicalization’ and ‘violent radicalization’ (see Table 1). Still, it remains unclear how ‘radicalization’ is different from legitimate forms of political activism and the determination of which set of ‘extreme’ ideas relegate an individual to the category of ‘extremist’ is highly subjective (McCaulley & Moskalenko, 2008; Schmid, 2013). In its usage, radicalization implies that extreme ideas are a “necessary precursor” to violent behaviour, prompting national security agencies to focus on the development of extreme ideas (Borum, 2011, p. 7).

However, as Richards (2011) observes, we still do not know whether “the radicalized” are those who commit acts of violence, support terrorist groups, are sympathetic to the same causes as terrorist groups, have political beliefs that oppose prevailing political and social norms (e.g., democracy), or use non-violent means to achieve these political goals. Noting that the use of ‘radicalization’ serves dominant political agendas, some terrorism researchers conclude that the concept of ‘radicalization’ has little analytical merit and that national security efforts should focus on preventing violent behaviour, not policing ideas deemed to be ‘extreme’ (Borum, 2011; Richards, 2011; Sageman, 2014).16

Table 1
National Security Definitions of Radicalization in Canada, the U.K., and the U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Conceptions of ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>• <strong>Radicalization:</strong> is a process by which an individual or a group gradually adopts extreme positions or ideologies that are opposed to the status quo and challenge mainstream ideas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This term is often used synonymously with terrorism, indicating that terrorist acts are motivated by ‘extremist’ (i.e., political or religious) ideas. In my dissertation, when I reference ‘extremism’ or ‘violent extremism’ as used in policy or research documents, I do so with the awareness that these terms have significant shortcomings.

16 Advocates of the use of the concept of ‘radicalization’ acknowledge that it is unclear whether radicalization refers to the transition toward developing ‘extreme’ ideas/beliefs or violent behaviour. Still they claim its usage has policy merit because of the potential of “non-violent extremists” to “undermine and threaten democracy and societal cohesion” (Neumann, 2013, p. 893).
• **Radicalization to violence**: is the process by which individuals and groups adopt an ideology and/or belief system that justifies the use of violence in order to advance their cause.

• **Violent extremism**: is a term describing the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve extreme ideological, religious or political goals. (Public Safety Canada, 2018a)

**U.K.**

• **Radicalization**: refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism

• **Extremism**: is vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas. (HM Government, 2011)

**U.S.**

• **Radicalization**: the process by which American citizens and residents turn to violence, using Islam as an ideological or religious justification (Patel, 2011, p. 1)

• **Violent Extremists**: individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals (Patel & Koushik, 2017, p. 13)

The second assumption that undergirds ‘radicalization’ is that it refers to how Muslims become ‘extremists.’ Following the lack of clarity about whether radicalization is an ideological shift or a behavioural change, the use of radicalization has led researchers and policymakers to determine which Islamic beliefs are ‘extreme’ and inherently linked to political violence. This dynamic is reflected in the national security policing of ‘Islamist’ or ‘jihadist’ groups, whose motivations and beliefs are scrutinized in the event of terrorist attacks. Some scholars have noted that the ‘radicalization’ has retained the focus on Muslims and Islam because of the influence of the “new terrorism

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17 ‘Islamism’ is a contested term developed by western scholars to refer to an ideological position that Islamic law (*Sharia*) and/or values should inform public and political life. In recent years, Islamism has been used interchangeably with ‘political,’ ‘radical,’ ‘extremist,’ and ‘fundamentalist’ Islam (Mozaffari, 2007). There is a wide range of ideological diversity among Islamists, many of whom are part of national politics (e.g., En-Nahda party in Tunisia). Owing to this vagueness, a few years ago the Associated Press decided to be much more deliberate in the use of the term ‘Islamist’ (Ohlheiser, 2013). In a similar vein, in the context of the ‘war on terror,’ ‘Jihadist’ has become shorthand for ‘Islamist’ combatants or groups (Sedgwick, 2015). This dilutes the richness of the Islamic concept of *Jihad* as a form of self-sacrifice or moral struggle (Mohammad, 1985). As much as possible, I avoid using the descriptors, ‘Islamist’ and ‘jihadist.’ Where I do use these terms for lack for better alternatives, I do so with the full awareness that there are fundamental problems with their usage.
thesis” (Kundnani, 2012b). The new terrorism thesis is rooted in Orientalist ideas popularized after the end of the Cold War, in the nineties, through works such as Bernard Lewis’ *The Roots of Muslim Rage* and Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*, which argued that the “west” and “Islam” are incompatible (Huntington, 1993; B. Lewis, 1990). According to the new terrorism thesis, ‘Islamist’ groups represent a new kind of terrorist threat because they are inherently violent, their motivations are “inscrutable,” their ends are non-negotiable, and their threat is compounded with ready access to weapons of mass destruction (Laqueur, 2000). These ideas carried over into the post-9/11 use of ‘radicalization,’ affirming a new “conventional wisdom” that the “Islamic difference” of Muslims in the west – coded as religiosity, lack of integration, and linkages with Muslim majority countries – is a legitimate basis for detecting radicalization (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010).

The third assumption in the definition of ‘radicalization’ is that it is a process of psychological and/or ideological or cognitive transformation. Indeed, the early research on ‘radicalization’ focused on asking what individual-centered factors pushed Muslims toward ‘Islamist’ ideologies, which were thought to be linked to violence. Emphasis was placed on understanding the “pathways” to radicalization and identifying the stage in the pathway where a “cognitive opening” allowed individuals to embrace specific ideologies that legitimate the use of violence (e.g., M. King & Taylor, 2011; Moghaddam, 2005; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). One such influential study, developed by the New York Police Department (NYPD) based on profiles of just 11 terrorist attackers in the U.S. and Germany, proposed a staged “model” of radicalization. According to the model, Muslims, prompted by a search for “identity,” traverse a pathway of linear stages; at one
stage on the pathway, they adopt “jihadi-Salafi” Islamic ideology, which readies them to participate in terrorist attacks (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). The study warned that “radicalization incubators,” venues where individuals radicalize, include Muslim social spaces such as mosques, cafes, and student associations (p. 22).\footnote{Its crudeness notwithstanding, the NYPD model of radicalization inspired wide scale surveillance of Muslim neighbourhoods, mosques, student associations, and other community spaces in New York and New Jersey between 2002 and 2014. The surveillance activities were ultimately ceased as part of a settlement agreement in two lawsuits brought against the City of New York (Bridge Initiative, 2020).} The NYPD and other models of radicalization that have tried to uncover “pathways” toward radicalization have not stood up to empirical scrutiny and have been criticized widely for relying on small numbers of positive cases without control groups, not accounting for alternative and non-linear factors, pre-determining the influence of ‘Islamist’ ideologies, and disconnecting individual action from its social and structural contexts (Kundnani, 2012b; Malthaner, 2017; Pisoiu, 2013; Sageman, 2014). The critiques of these early psychological and individual-centered theories of radicalization have prompted more sophisticated studies on radicalization that account for social networks (Sageman, 2004), recruitment groups (Malthaner & Waldmann, 2014), social and economic factors (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009), perceived grievances (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Khosrokhavar, 2005), online interactions (Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Koehler, 2014), and various other factors. Elsewhere, I have undertaken a systematic review assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the different theories put forth in the radicalization studies literature (F. Ahmad & Monaghan, 2019). There, I infer that radicalization studies have recently broadened to account for structural and sociological factors, but that these engagements are selective and limited. Though national security agencies have gradually acknowledged that radicalization occurs through an interplay of several factors, its early concerns about the exceptionalization of
Muslim violence, the limited contributory role of state violence and foreign policies, the lack of specificity about how ‘extreme’ beliefs lead to terrorist violence, and weak empiricism in radicalization studies, remain intact. The discursive and politicized use of ‘radicalization’ prompted Walklate and Mythen (2018) to argue that we should dispense “with the ideas of radicalization as a multi-purpose catch-all concept” (p. 219).

Noting the ways in which ‘radicalization’ has been conceptualized, Pisoiu (2013) remarks that the “malleability” of its use “hardly comes as a surprise, given the lack of conceptual clarity and the proliferation of meanings and understandings of what the radicalization process might be, how it occurs, and how it might be explained” (p. 246). Indeed, the malleability of radicalization is most apparent in recent efforts by national security agencies and researchers to seamlessly apply the underdeveloped notion of ‘radicalization’ to other forms of ‘extremist’ violence. As of 2019, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has adopted a typology of “violent extremism” that delineates “religiously motivated,” “politically motivated,” and “ideologically motivated” forms of political violence (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2020). Within “ideologically motivated violent extremism,” the intelligence agency places “xenophobic violence,” “gender-driven violence,” “anti-authority violence,” and “other grievance driven violence.” Through these classifications, CSIS is able to both retain the focus on Muslim radicalization (under “religiously motivated” violence) and expand the ambit of radicalization to target far-right groups, anarchists, “incels,” and other unspecified types of political activists they deem to be threats to national security.19 In the U.S., media

19 “Incels” is a portmanteau for “involuntary celibates,” an online community of mostly men who feel their inferior social status is a result of sexual rejection by women (Hoffman et al., 2020). Since 2014, there have been a handful of violent attacks in the U.S. and Canada where the perpetrators were allegedly motivated
reporting of the Capitol building attack in January 2021 reflects how the “domestic terrorism” descriptor has been discursively stretched to include attacks by Muslim perpetrators as well as supporters of former President Donald Trump (Shamas & Ismail, 2021). In the U.K., in response to critiques that the conceptualization of ‘radicalization’ has been used to unjustly target Muslim communities, CR policies have indicated a recent, tangible move toward targeting far-right violence (C. Allen et al., 2019; Dearden, 2019). Important scholarship has suggested that as CR policies adopt an ideologically “colourblind” approach, it only embeds the anti-Muslim focus and racialized aspects of ‘radicalization’ deeper into CR policies and further out of sight (Younis & Jadhav, 2020).

For my dissertation research, I recognize that ‘radicalization’ remains a nebulous concept, and pay special attention to how radicalization is deployed in security and political discourse to exceptionalize Muslim violence. The incorporation of the vague conceptualization of ‘radicalization’ into CR policies contributes to the problematic manifestations of those policies.

**CR Policies at the Confluence of Critical Junctures and Policy Mobilizing**

In this section, I discuss two theoretical concepts that will assist in the analysis of the evolution of CR policies in Canada and the U.K. First, I review the concept of critical junctures (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007) that has been used to explain how rapid policy changes come about in response to exogenous shocks. The shocks of “domestic terrorism” – acts of political violence on domestic soil by citizens or residents of the same country – by Muslim perpetrators created critical junctures that offer opportunities for realignment of political actors, paradigms, and policies. Second, I introduce the

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by incel views. In May 2020, Canada became the first country to charge a 17-year youth for incel-related terrorism (S. Bell et al., 2020).
concept of policy mobilizing (Peck & Theodore, 2010) that explains how policy ideas traverse across different national jurisdictions. The specific experiences of each country notwithstanding, ideas about ‘radicalization’ and the appropriate policy response to address radicalization (i.e., CR policies), are learned and mobilized across different nations through transnational fora. For each of these concepts, I provide examples of how previous studies have applied them in the context of the ‘war on terror.’ Together, these theoretical concepts provide the foundation for analyzing the development of CR policies in Canada and the U.K. undertaken in Chapters 4 and 5.

**Critical Junctures and CR Policy Activation**

Historical institutionalist scholars, who study how institutions change over time, have drawn attention to the importance of critical junctures in policymaking (Pierson, 2011; Thelen, 1999). The concept of critical junctures has been applied widely to examine changes in welfare state regimes, economic policy, market regulation, foreign policy, and other policy regimes (e.g., Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Christiansen & Vanhoonacker, 2008; Collier et al., 2001; Hacker, 1998; P. A. Hall, 1993; Steinmo, 1988). Viewing public policies as institutional arrangements, historical institutionalists have suggested that policies observe long periods of “path-dependent institutional stability,” which are interrupted by short and sudden “phases of institutional flux” or critical junctures, “during which more dramatic change is possible” (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007, p. 341; Mahoney, 2000). Critical junctures are a result of “large exogenous shocks,” due to which “the structural (that is, economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on political action are significantly relaxed for a relatively short period” (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007, p. 343; van Hooren et al., 2014). In response to shocks, critical junctures heighten the probability of choosing from a wider range of
policy options and ideas than predicated by path-dependent, incremental patterns (Hogan & Doyle, 2007; Soifer, 2012). As policy creation does not start from scratch, attention should also be paid to “critical antecedents” or “factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture that combine in a causal sequence with factors operating during that juncture to produce a divergent outcome” (Slater & Simmons, 2010, p. 889). Any divergent policy choices made during critical junctures set new institutional paths and, therefore, have long-lasting institutional impact (Collier et al., 2001).

The notion of critical junctures has found some resonance in terrorism studies. Terrorist attacks represent the type of exogenous shock that would result in critical junctures in policymaking. Indeed, the attacks of 9/11 created a “state of exception,” which remapped counterterrorism in the U.S. and globally (Van Munster, 2004). It ushered in the global ‘war on terror’ that gave rise to ‘preemptive’ wars, draconian counterterrorism laws, unlawful detentions, and the heightened surveillance and policing of Muslims. In Canada, the impact of 9/11 was profound. Soon after the attacks, it was (erroneously) suggested that some of the 9/11 attackers had entered the U.S. from Canada. There was immense pressure on Canada to develop anti-terrorism legislation in lockstep with the U.S. In late 2001, the Anti-terrorism Act was passed into law, leading to the addition of a counterterrorism section (section 83.01) to the Criminal Code, the establishment of a list of terrorist entities, the intensification of surveillance and intelligence gathering capabilities, and the use of stringent financial tracking to deter terrorist financing (Department of Justice Canada, 2001). The impact of 9/11 was not only felt in Canada. Argomaniz (2009) maintains that 9/11 created a critical juncture that

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20 (e.g., Amoore & Goede, 2008, 2008; Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008; Cainkar & Selod, 2018; Holloway, 2008; T. Z. Ismail et al., 2014; Ralph, 2013; Razack, 2008; Sharma & Nijjar, 2018).
led to an overhaul of national security policies and laws across Europe. In the U.K., even though a counterterrorism legal framework was already in place, the events of 9/11 propelled the adoption of the *Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001* that led to enhanced police powers, asset and property seizure abilities, aviation security, and provisions to detain terrorist suspects without charge or trial (Elliott, 2003; House of Commons, 2001). In sum, these changes to counterterrorism laws were possible during the critical juncture created after the attacks of 9/11. These counterterrorism laws became “critical antecedents” to the future development of CR policy. Said differently, CR policies were built upon the national security institutional infrastructure created in the aftermath of 9/11. In Chapters 4 and 5, I apply the concept of critical junctures to examine how incidences of domestic terrorism by Muslim perpetrators operated as exogenous shocks that allowed key directional changes in CR policies in Canada and the U.K. In assessing the development of CR policies, I follow van Hooren et al. (2014) who assert the importance of assessing “quality of change” in policies in addition to change in instruments and goals.

*Policy Mobilizing and Transmission of CR Policy Ideas*

The theoretical insights from studies of critical junctures explain why opportunities for developing new CR policies are created, but do not adequately explain how specific CR policies are developed and chosen. The concept of “policy mobilizing” is helpful to understand the development of CR policy ideas (Peck & Theodore, 2010, 2015). Like policy transfer, policy mobilizing starts with the assumption that policy norms, ideas, practices, and techniques are exchanged and learned across national contexts (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 2000; Peck & Theodore, 2010). However, whereas policy transfer emphasizes “lesson drawing” from a policy marketplace by bounded-
rational policymakers, policy mobilizing suggests that policy adoption is constrained by important sociological and institutional factors (R. Rose, 1991). Policy mobilizing draws attention to power relations, ideological alignments, and the impact of epistemic communities and experts in transnational fora where policy exchange occurs (Haas, 1992; Legrand, 2015; Peck & Theodore, 2010). Importantly, policy mobilizing further posits that policies seldom travel as complete “packages;” instead “they move in bits and pieces – as selective discourses, inchoate ideas, and synthesized models – and they therefore ‘arrive’ not as replicas but as policies already-in-transformation” (Peck & Theodore, 2010, p. 170). Policies not only “mutate and morph during their journeys” but also respond to “local politics” and governance contexts of policy mobility (McCann, 2013; Peck & Theodore, 2010, p. 170). In addition to these characteristics, policy mobilizing occurs at a rapid pace as policymakers face pressures of “fast policy,” to adopt policy “best practices” and technical solutions that can be quickly tailored to local needs (Peck & Theodore, 2015; Temenos & McCann, 2012). Under these conditions, policymakers turn to ideas and norms already vetted by trusted contacts in the policy communities to which they belong (Temenos & McCann, 2012). Here, policy mobilizing stresses how particular ideational assumptions in these mobilizing and mutating policies endure. Policy mobilizing draws attention to the “discursive frames” or “signifiers” used to describe policy responses, which tend to emphasize their technical versus political dimensions (N. Rose, 1999; Temenos & McCann, 2012).

Below, I provide a few examples of how concepts from policy mobilizing and policy transfer have been used by terrorism scholars to explain how, in response to the events of 9/11, particular national security norms, ideas, and policies made their way
across different countries. The United Nations (U.N.) and other transnational fora have been instrumental in counterterrorism policy mobilizing. After the 9/11 attacks, U.N. member states came to share the view that ‘Islamist’ groups like Al-Qaeda posed an existential terrorist threat, and responded by enhancing their respective national security measures (International Peace Academy, 2002). The 2001 *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373* propelled U.N. member states to strengthen financial tracking and tighten immigration policies for national security reasons (Fenwick, 2002; Roach, 2006; Rosand, 2003). In this early period of the ‘war on terror,’ through policy mobilization, there was convergence around the new terrorism thesis and discourses of the dangerous Muslim. This justified the application of draconian counterterrorism laws against Muslims, the curtailment of their civil liberties and human rights, and the criminalization, surveillance, and detention of Muslim individuals (Baker-Beall, 2014; C. Bell, 2011; Mythen & Walklate, 2008).

Despite the shared policy formations and ideational assumptions of national security policies in western nations, differences in local politics and governance contexts produce some distinctions in policies and their application in each country. As policy mobilizing theory posits, the tendency of policies to “mutate and morph” during the process of mobilizing contributes to these differences (Peck & Theodore, 2010, p. 170). For example, during the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks, Canada mainly relied on immigration law to detain and deport individuals suspected of being terrorists, and it was not until 2004 that the first individual was charged under the *Anti-Terrorism Act* (Roach, 2005). By contrast, the U.K. was more aggressive in using its anti-terrorism legislation to authorize preventative arrests, investigative powers, and suppression of
rights, and moved more quickly to develop the legislative and regulatory frameworks that would set the stage for later counterterrorism legislation and CR policies (Fenwick, 2002; Roach, 2011). Despite these variations, the transnational learning of policy knowledge continued as Canada was looked to the experience of the U.S. and the U.K. (Kubicek & King, 2021). U.K.’s own strong position in the U.N. Security Council, the European Union, and G8 helped to export and “determine and shape security agendas” in other member nations, evincing policy mobilizing (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009a, p. 369). The above examples illustrate that in the context of the ‘war on terror,’ policy mobilizing offers a way to understand how policy ideas, norms, and techniques of national security travel across nations in “bits and pieces” (Peck & Theodore, 2010, p. 170).

Previous research has also utilized policy mobilizing and policy transfer to examine the cross-national proliferation of CR policies. Roach (2018) outlined the importance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178 in the institutionalization of CR policies across member states to address the “foreign fighters” problem. Monaghan (2015) showed how Canada, despite having limited experience with prison radicalization, adopted norms and policies to tackle prison radicalization through participation in and learning from the G8 Roma Lyon Group, a network of security and intelligence practitioners tasked with developing “best practices.”

Canada embraced the idea that the radicalization of Muslim prisoners posed a significant risk and developed corresponding policy responses shaped entirely from policies crafted in the U.S. and U.K. Based on these examples, one can infer that utilizing concepts from policy mobilizing and policy transfer has the potential to yield important insights regarding CR policies, including how

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21 Prison radicalization refers to concerns about the spread of ‘extremism’ and recruitment to terrorist organizations in correctional facilities (see C. R. Jones, 2014).
policy-informing discourses about the dangerousness of Muslims get normalized. As I examine the development of CR policies in Canada and the U.K. in Chapters 4 and 5, I pay attention to how policy ideas travel across national jurisdictions and how these ideas mutate along the way before being adopted in Canada and the U.K.

**CR Policy Power and CSO Responses**

The objective of my research is to examine how Muslim CSOs interpret and navigate the pressures exerted through CR policies. For this, I propose that CR policies should be thought of as relations of power between state institutions and CSOs. As scholars of power have previously argued, viewing policies through the lens of power helps to uncover power mechanisms that define “the (im)possible, the (im)probable, the natural, the normal, what counts as a ‘problem.’” (Hayward, 1998, p. 16). By analyzing power, “citizens and their organizations” can build their own power to mobilize and advocate against discriminatory policies (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2007). Additionally, conceiving of power as a set of relations implicates a “shared political accountability” toward undoing unjust policy structures (McGee, 2020, p. 56). Drawing on these insights, I engage with theories of power to explain how CR policies specifically, and public policies generally render relations of power between state institutions and CSOs.

Addressing my research objective also requires an understanding of how CSO behaviour is shaped by exogenous institutional pressures. For this, organizational institutionalist theories provide the necessary grounding. By integrating theories of power (Haugaard, 2012) within an organizational institutionalist model (Oliver, 1991), I propose a conceptual framework for my study through which I analyze how CR policies configure power relations between state institutions and Muslim CSOs, and how Muslim CSOs use...
their agentic power\textsuperscript{22} to develop strategies in response to the power exerted from CR policies.

**The Four Dimensions of Power**

The concept of power is vast and has been tackled across disciplines.\textsuperscript{23} While acknowledging the conceptual differences among power theories, I align myself with the view that power is a set of relations between actors that shapes social outcomes. This view allows me to examine how relations of power between state institutions and CSOs are established through public policies. Specifically, I follow Huagaard’s (2012, 2021) theorizing of power, which moves beyond conventional binary accounts of “power-over” and “power-to” to account for power in an integrated framework of four dimensions highlighting how agency and structure work concomitantly to limit and enable forms of power-informed actions (also see Gaventa, 2021; Pettit & McGee, 2020). Considered within democratic systems, the application of Haugaard’s (2012, 2021) multidimensional framework of power provides a rich understanding of the ways in which public policies developed by state institutions exert power upon CSOs, and how CSOs use their agentic power to respond to the power from public policies. In the discussion below, I explain the four dimensions of power theorized by Haugaard (2012, 2021), clarify how they are applicable to interactions between state institutions and CSOs, specify how they are relevant for CR policies, and identify how I examine these dimensions of power for my study.

\textsuperscript{22} Here, I am using “agentic” power to refer to the “power-to” actions taken by CSOs, either individually or in coalition with other CSOs, in response to decisions by state institutions (see Campbell, 2009). I am conceiving of CSO agentic power as strategic actions that largely fall outside their day-to-day operational activities.

\textsuperscript{23} (E.g., Baldwin, 1980; Clegg, 1989; Dahl, 1957; Foucault, 1980; Gaventa, 2006; Gramsci, 1971; Lasswell & Kaplan, 2017; Latour, 1984; Lawrence & Buchanan, 2017; Lukes, 2005; Machiavelli, 1961; Morriss, 2002; Parsons, 1960).
The First Dimension of Power or “Power 1”: Power 1 has been theorized based on the ideas of Max Weber, a foundational thinker in organizational studies, who associated power with the notion that, in a social relationship, one actor “will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance” (Wallimann et al., 1977; M. Weber, 1978, p. 53). In his influential conceptualization, Dahl (1957), applying Weber’s relational model in pluralist democracies, describes power as an inter-actor contestation: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (pp. 202-3). This form of power has conventionally been associated with the phenomenon of “power-over” that entails domination or coercion (Gaventa, 2006; Haugaard, 2012; Lukes, 2005). Some power theorists claim that Power 1 should be understood as “visible” power determining “who prevails in decision-making” in situations of conflict (Polsby, 1963, p. 4). However, Haugaard (2012) argues that power is central to the working of democracies, and that conceptualizing Power 1 as “domination” with zero-sum outcomes is reductive (p. 35). He observes that “democracy constitutes an assembled set of structural constraints that renders conflict positive-sum” (Haugaard, 2021, p. 157). Power 1 can therefore be better construed as the structure-bound actions of both A and B. Citing the example of electoral contests in a democracy, Haugaard (2012) explains that if A enjoys an electoral win over B, it does not mean absolute domination; the structures of the election process leave open the possibility of B being able to win over A in the future. As the example of the election contestation

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24 Haugaard (2012) and others have noted that domination in this sense refers to “non-structural, pre-modern” power of, say, the sovereign (see also Machiavelli 1961).

25 Haugaard’s (2012) election example distinguishes between the episodic power of the “momentary” electoral contest, and the dispositional power inherent in the durable structures or “the rules of the game” which offer both actors, A and B, the potential to use “power over” (see Clegg 1989).
illustrates, “structures are both enabling and constraining” (Giddens, 1984, as cited in Haugard, 2012, p. 36). Applying Haugard’s conception of Power 1 to interactions between state institutions and CSOs allows us to consider actions by both state institutions and CSOs within structural arrangements rendered by public policies. Even though CSOs are rarely in a position to exert “power-over” state institutions, Power 1 interactions assume that both state institutions and CSOs agree about the general structure of a policy arrangement, or at least to work within that structure for a period of time.

Dahl (1957) suggests that the “base” of Power 1 is an actor’s resources, and Haugard (2021) similarly conceives of resources as the modalities through which Power 1 is enacted. Among these, “coercion” (including violence) is an extreme resource through which Power 1 can be applied, but which is normatively reprehensible in that it violates democratic norms and threatens the stability of the structural arrangements of democratic institutions (Haugard, 2021, p. 154). “Authority,” another resource, is more apt for the workings of Power 1 between state institutions and CSOs, especially as democratic structures are assumed to temper coercion and encourage ‘soft’ governance. Authority, or more specifically, political authority, is conferred based on the belief in the legitimacy of those exercising power within a structure. Those with political authority may further their interests by using power-over on others. However, authority is “confined in scope” not only through democratic rights protections but also because perceived abuse of power-over can inspire others to take collective action to strip the

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26 In a separate work, Uphoff and colleagues articulate six kinds of resources that form the base for power 1: economic resources, social status, information, physical force, legitimacy, and authority (Ilchman & Uphoff, 1969; Uphoff, 1989). Haugaard’s (2012, 2021) work intersects with these and importantly, locates them within inter-actor dynamics in democratic structures.

27 Haugaard’s (2012) taxonomy of power suggests a sharp conceptual distinction between coercion and political authority. However, in practice, holders of political authority also have wide discretion to wield coercive forms of power-over such as in cases of police misconduct or other abuses of authority.
authority of those holding it (e.g., outvoting an incumbent). Such collective action is enabled by what Haugaard (2021) calls “citizen-authority” backed by fundamental rights (e.g., freedom of expression) (p. 156). This conceptualization helps to locate Power 1 in the public policy formulations by actors with political authority and the corresponding collective action of CSOs to hold those holding political power accountable (McGee, 2020).

Though not discussed adequately by Haugaard (2012), “legitimacy” as another resource of Power 1 has been elaborated at length by other scholars (Uphoff, 1989). In the relations between state institutions and CSOs, the legitimacy of the former is based on belief in democratic structures. But how can CSO legitimacy be understood? In their seminal work, Deephouse and colleagues (2017) define organizational legitimacy as “the perceived appropriateness of an organization to a social system in terms of rules, values, norms, and definitions” (p. 32; also see Suchman, 1995). For CSOs, legitimacy leads to increased material, social, and moral support for their mission and activities, even if those activities are contentious (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). The perception of various stakeholders – including beneficiary communities, the general public, state institutions, donors, and peer organizations – contribute to CSO legitimacy. Therefore, just as social legitimacy from beneficiary communities is essential for CSOs, “sociopolitical legitimacy,” or an organization’s favourability to “outside institutions and authorities” (i.e., state institutions), is important as it increases an organization’s likelihood of success and survival (E. T. Walker & McCarthy, 2010, p. 318). Conversely, once an organization is deemed illegitimate, it is likely to lose support and find it difficult to continue its work (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). Considering the discussion on legitimacy under Power 1, we
can infer that state institutions, with political authority, can use power-over to confer sociopolitical legitimacy on CSOs or deprive them of it.

As a final point, Haugaard (2021) stresses the significance of economic resources suggesting that in capitalist democracies, “money functions analogously to authority” and “distribution of economic resources defines positions within the economic system” (p. 158). In interactions between state institutions and CSOs, economic resources also serve another purpose. Financial allocations by state institutions signal legitimacy of certain CSO activities. At the same time, CSO dependence on government financial resources shapes CSO actions in varied ways (Bryce, 2006; Fyall, 2016; Malatesta & Smith, 2014). Research from the U.S. and Canada suggests that neoliberalism and the expansion of the nonprofit contracting regime have “diminished and constrained the community sector by government intervention in nonprofit organizations” (Evans et al., 2005; Malatesta & Smith, 2014; S. R. Smith & Lipsky, 1993, p. 204). This development creates two possibilities for CSOs. On the one hand, cutbacks in reliable government funding drive CSOs to rely on market-oriented approaches (vendorism), adapt their missions to meet market demand, adhere to administrative demands placed upon them by funders (bureaucratization), and resort to partnerships to access new and greater resources. Scarce resources and increased restrictions result in the loss of CSO autonomy and power. On the other hand, as some CSOs are recruited for public service delivery responsibilities, they have become more important for governments, securing them predictable roles as government contractors, and earning them a seat at the public policy table (albeit in a limited capacity) (Bass et al., 2007; Bryce, 2006; Fyall, 2016; Nathan, 1996). Mosley (2011) suggests that government funding of human service CSOs steers these
organizations toward favouring “insider tactics,” i.e., “participating in government committees and commissions, providing public testimony, and lobbying policy makers for changes,” over “disruptive tactics” such as protests and boycotts (p. 437).

I extend these insights and notions of Power 1 to examine how CR policies structure power relationships between state security agencies and Muslim CSOs. Power 1 encompasses actions by state security institutions to advance their CR policy mandates and the CSO responses to those actions. In translating Power 1 to practice, some scholars have focused on the “visible and definable aspects of political power – formal rules, structures, authorities, institutions, and procedures of decision-making” (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2007, p. 47; also see Gaventa, 2006). Therefore, as part of Power 1, I pay attention to exercises of political authority by state institutions that include CR-related legal impositions (e.g., the Prevent Duty in the U.K.), policing and investigative functions (e.g., surveillance of members of Muslim CSOs by the federal police and intelligence services in Canada), allocation of CR-related funding, and granting or withdrawal of legitimacy to Muslim CSOs (e.g., charitable status revocations). Under Power 1 relationships, CSO responses are based on whether CR policy practices are perceived to be just, harmful, or beneficial for CSOs or their constituent Muslim communities. Accordingly, Muslim CSO responses under Power 1 encompass actions to hold accountable state institutions with political authority (e.g., by demanding procedural fairness), but within the confines of the CR policy structure (in other words, the Power 1 category does not include CSO challenges to the structure of CR policies themselves; this is discussed under Power 2 below). Power 1 responses by Muslim CSOs also include strategic decisions about the degree to which to cooperate with state institutions for
pursuing CR policy objectives and their choices in response to CR funding allocations (i.e., accepting or rejecting). Table 2 summarizes the key aspects of Power 1.

Table 2
Summary of the Discussion of Power 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conceptualization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exercised by state institutions through</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Observed in state institution actions through</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observed in CSO actions through</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Applied to CR policies** | State institution actions:  
  - Imposing legal obligations upon CSOs (e.g., Prevent Duty in the U.K.)  
  - Policing and investigative actions (e.g., RCMP and CSIS visits in Canada)  
  - Allocating CR-related funding  
  - Withdrawing legitimacy through various exercises of political authority (e.g., charitable status revocation)  
Muslim CSO responses:  
  - Accepting or rejecting CR-related funding  
  - Being strategic about cooperating with state institutions in order to seek concessions for Muslim communities  
  - Challenging the granting or withdrawal of legitimacy |

The Second Dimension of Power or “Power 2”: Power 2 – while still describing a type of “power-over” – critiques how relational structures between actors preclude the consideration of certain agendas. Concerned with the “dynamics of nondecision-making,” Bachrach and Baratz (1962) elaborate Power 2 as power exercised
“when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A” (p. 948). Power 2 reflects the “mobilization of bias” through which “some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out” (Schattschneider, 1960, as cited in Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, p. 949). Power 2 implicates “certain powerful people and institutions” or “hidden political agenda-setters” who are responsible for placing boundaries on participation and excluding “certain actors or views from entering the arenas for participation in the first place” (Gaventa, 2006, p. 29). This mobilization of bias legitimates “a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures (‘rules of the game’) that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970, pp. 43–44). Haugaard (2012) connects this operation of Power 2 to Giddens’ structuration process observing that over time, Power 2 leads to self-perpetuating reinforcement of structures “that constitute the rules of the game or dispositional power, which preclude certain action” (p. 38). In the interactions between state institutions and CSOs, Power 2 manifests as policies and procedures that create barriers for equal participation, disregard for certain agendas, and systematic reproduction of injustices and discrimination.

Haugaard (2012) does not view Power 2 as absolute domination. He argues that, within democracies, despite the structures established through Power 2 interactions, there still exists the scope for contestation using instruments of procedural justice (as in Power 1). However, he distinguishes Power 2 and Power 1 by identifying Power 1 as “structured power conflicts” that are “relatively shallow . . . as there is underlying consensus around
the reproduction of the social structure,” and the Power 2 as “conflict over structure,”
where there is “fundamental disagreement over the social order and, frequently, the status
authority status [sic] of the other is seen as unreasonable” (Haugaard, 2021, p. 161). Also,
as McGee (2020) notes, Power 2 still leaves the possibility of holding those with political
authority accountable (unlike Power 3, which also reproduces systemic biases but is not
tied to identifiable political actors).

The exercise of Power 2 manifests when state security institutions use their
political authority to devise policies that “exclude and devalue the concerns and
representation of other less powerful groups” and prevent “voices and issues from getting
a fair public hearing” (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2007, pp. 47–48). Power 2 is reflected in
policymaking that considers only a narrow set of agendas, and that benefits dominant or
elite interests. In the case of CR policies, I observe the exercise of Power 2 from state
institutions as power-over exercises which forego or limit consultation with affected
communities and CSOs during CR policy development. I also examine which policy
agendas are given preference and which are ignored. Within the relations of Power 2,
CSOs use their agentic power to “disseminate analysis and alternative perspectives”
about how prevailing structures are unjust and discriminatory (VeneKlasen & Miller,
2007, p. 48). CSO responses to Power 2 also entail efforts “to develop ties with powerful
allies to increase their political voice and presence” and to create “broad-based
constituencies for policy and institutional reform that reduce systemic discrimination”
(VeneKlasen & Miller, 2007, p. 48). Following these empirical insights, I pay attention to
how Muslim CSOs raise concerns of CR policies being developed without proper
consultation with Muslim communities and make demands for greater community
inclusion in decision-making processes. I also describe the “alternative perspectives” advanced by Muslim CSOs (through public education) that highlight the discriminatory aspects of CR policies and the ways in which CR policies have ignored certain agendas, especially issues of safety facing Muslim communities (e.g., white supremacist violence).

In the analysis of Power 2, I also observe collective action taken by Muslim CSOs in collaboration with other CSOs to boost their own “power-to” capacity to advocate for changes in CR policy structures (Haugaard, 2021, p. 156). Table 3 summarizes the essential characteristics of Power 2.

**Table 3**

*Summary of the discussion of Power 2*

**Power 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptualization</th>
<th>“Power over” exercises that shape policy structure by preventing certain actors from participating and by excluding certain agendas from consideration; results in “conflict over structure” (Haugaard, 2021)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exercised by state institutions through</td>
<td>Political authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed in state institution actions through</td>
<td>Limiting consultations with communities/CSOs impacted by policy, and including or excluding certain agendas for policy consideration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed in CSO actions through</td>
<td>Demands for greater community inclusion and for consideration of particular agendas; dissemination of alternative perspectives on policy issues; collective action to highlight structural discrimination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Applied to CR policies** | **State institution actions:**  
- Excluding Muslim CSOs and Muslim concerns in CR policy agenda  
- Practicing discrimination in CR policies (e.g., targeting CR policies to tackle Muslim ‘radicalization’ to the exclusion of other forms of political violence)  

**Muslim CSO responses:**  
- Demanding greater inclusion of Muslim CSOs/communities in CR policy development  
- Highlighting how CR policies disproportionately target Muslims, foment Islamophobia, and overlook far-right violence that harms Muslims  
- Taking collective action to advocate for better (structures of) CR policies |
The Third Dimension of Power or “Power 3”: Whereas Power 1 and Power 2 are exercised by identifiable agents, Power 3 “is the relationship between the social consciousness of social actors and the reproduction of relations of power” (Haugaard, 2012, p. 42). Power 3 was first theorized by Lukes (2005) to connote “insidious power” through which the powerful “secure the consent to domination of the less powerful” by influencing their ideologies, values, and forms of behaviour (see also Gaventa, 2006, p. 29). Since Lukes’ initial proposal, Power 3 has been conceptualized as power that is “internalized” (Gaventa, 2006), that constitutes the property of social structures constructed through “multiple, interacting, large-scale social processes” (Hayward, 2018, as cited in McGee 2019, p. 53), and that, in the Foucauldian sense, lies in social knowledge itself (Haugaard, 2012, 2021). In a relational structure, Power 3 captures how institutional practices, norms, and values influence and shape the positions and preferences of actors. Power 2 and Power 3 both reference “nondecision-making” attributes of power and systemic bias. However, in Power 2, the structural outcomes are exercises of “power over” by actors who benefit from the bias. By contrast, in Power 3, “agency and intentionality are highly nuanced or actually absent” because power “operates as ‘self-reproducing social processes in which the thinking and behaviour of the powerful and powerless alike are conditioned by pervasive norms’” (McGee, 2020, p. 53).

Haugaard (2012) contributes to the conceptualization of Power 3 by aligning Giddens’ view on structuration with Foucault’s post structuralist conception of power/knowledge. Giddens’ structuration theory breaks the structure versus agency
dichotomy, arguing that structure and agency exist in a mutually reinforcing dynamic.\textsuperscript{28} Giddens (1984) conceives of agentic actions as bound by the rules and resources of a structure, and at the same time, the “social action” of actors reproduces and reinforces the structure of the system itself. He writes: “structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of practices they recursively organize” and “[s]tructure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling” (Giddens, 1984, p. 25).

For Foucault (1995), power is diffuse and is constituted in the techniques, practices, norms, and discourses of social institutions. These institutional techniques, practices, norms, and discourses circumscribe the boundaries of knowledge of social actors who develop internalized truths within which their actions are bound. This formation of “power-knowledge” becomes the basis of a system of thought or “episteme” of the social actor (Foucault, 2002). Haugaard (2012) notes the parallels between Foucault’s conception of power and Giddens’ structuration theory as they both emphasize “the tacit social knowledge that actors use to reproduce social structure and the reproduction of relations of domination” (p. 42). Interested in exploring the possibilities of resistance in Power 3, Haugaard (2012) notes that because structures are socially constructed through repeated actions, there exists a possibility of changing structures as actors engage in reflexivity of their social knowledge and amend their actions accordingly. Haugaard (2012) clarifies that internalized knowledge falls in the realm of

\textsuperscript{28} Those who argue that structure takes precedence rely on the Durkheimian tradition, which stresses that “social facts,” i.e. legal rules, moral obligations and social conventions (norms), embedded in social structures are determinants of human behaviour (Durkheim, 1985). By contrast, the agency-centered tradition – most strongly expressed in the rational choice assumptions of economic models and the more nuanced Weberian tradition – privileges the importance of interpreting the reasons and deliberations of “rationally purposive” human actions (M. Weber, 1978).
“practical consciousness” where it has tacit or taken-for-granted meaning, prompts “unreflective internalization of routine,” and results in the structuration process (pp. 42, 49). On the other hand, “discursive consciousness” is “a form of consciousness-raising whereby actors reflect discursively upon the implications of structuration practices,” and confront what appears to be the “natural order of things” or their tacit knowledge (Haugaard, 2012, p. 46). This notion of discursive consciousness mirrors the reflexivity process from structuration theory, which is an important aspect of Power 3 resistance (Haugaard, 2021). Through discursive consciousness raising, social actors can engage in what Haugaard (2021) describes as “epistemic conflict” to challenge the social construction of structures (p. 165).

Power 3 manifests in the interactions between state institutions and CSOs as values, norms, discourses, and self-evident knowledges that define what sets of actions are acceptable. Through a structuration process, these actions result in the formations of structural arrangements that perpetuate exclusion and discrimination. The internalized knowledges tied to structural arrangements are reinforced through policy and media discourse as well as through policy practice. Within the relations of Power 3, CSO resistance to unjust structures entails a process of recognizing the injustice in structures, engaging in “consciousness-raising and education efforts,” and advancing alternate discourses (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2007, p. 49). Practice-oriented considerations of Power 3 suggest that CSO demands for greater transparency from state institutions to uncover

29 Here, it is worth noting the overlaps with Gramsci’s “hegemonic power,” which states that political and civil society advance the interests of social elites through “common sense knowledge,” a notion that intersects with tacit social knowledge. Gramsci also emphasized discursive struggles when he characterized counter-hegemony as process of reclaiming and re-capturing “common sense” knowledge (Gramsci, 1971; Kohl-Arenas, 2015).
the internal workings of policymaking serve the important purpose of exposing which values and knowledges are given precedence in policymaking, so that CSOs can publicize and challenge them (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2007, p. 49).

Considering Power 3 in the realm of CR policies that structure relationships between state security institutions and Muslim CSOs, I pay attention to how knowledge about the problem of ‘radicalization’ is mobilized and which discourses are given precedence in articulating the problem of ‘radicalization.’ This is done through a close analysis of policy documents and parliamentary discussions about ‘radicalization.’ Earlier in this chapter, I discussed how ‘radicalization,’ inspired by the new terrorism thesis, emerged as a signifier of a process by which Muslims develop ‘extreme’ beliefs thought to lead to political violence. In both Canada and the U.K., I examine how the discourses of ‘radicalization’ have shaped CR policy formulations and actions by state security institutions that have treated Muslim violence as exceptional, and have resulted in the treatment of entire Muslim communities as suspect. In addition, I pay attention to how CR policy discourses have furthered the “racialization” of Muslims in the context of the ‘war on terror.’ In their influential work, critical race studies scholars Omi and Witant (2015) define race as a social construct that “signifies and symbolizes social conflict and interests by referring to different types of human bodies” (p. 110). They describe racialization as a process of extending racial meaning through which, “the social identities of marginalized and subordinate groups . . . are both imposed from above by dominant social groups and/or state institutions, and constituted from below by these groups themselves as expressions of self-identification and resistance to dominant forms of categorization” (p. 106). In the “social conflict” of the ‘war on terror,’ the racialization
of Muslims denotes a process “by which appearance as well as expressions attributed to Muslim bodies and Islam are framed within a social order which sees these as backward, foreign and threatening” (Garner & Selod, 2015; Younis, 2021, p. 40). Following these insights, racialization is engendered through knowledge conceptions and discourses about the Muslim “Other.” Specifically in CR policies, I examine how discourses of national “values” have been used to cast racialized Muslims as dangerous outsiders who have to continuously prove their commitment to the nation state (see Valluvan, 2019).

To examine Muslim CSOs responses under Power 3, I pay attention to how Muslim CSOs have confronted the knowledges and discourses undergirding CR policies. In particular, I observe how Muslim CSOs have developed their own “discursive consciousness” about issues pertaining to ‘radicalization’ and advanced alternate discourses. Finally, I examine how Muslim CSOs have demanded greater transparency from state security agencies to gain a deeper understanding of what knowledges have resulted anti-Muslim systemic bias through CR policies. Table 4 encapsulates salient aspects of Power 3.

**Table 4**

*Summary of the Discussion of Power 3*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conceptualization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercised by state institutions through</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed in state institution actions through</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Observed in CSO actions through conscious raising and education efforts; advancing alternatives to dominant discourses; demands for greater transparency of policy knowledge.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application to CR policies</th>
<th>State institution actions:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reinforcing implicit knowledge about ‘radicalization’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Proliferating discourses that view ‘radicalization’ as a problem of ‘extreme’ Islamic ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pursuing practices that racialize Muslims and use national “values” discourses that casts Muslims as dangerous Others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslim CSO responses:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Confronting discourses of ‘radicalization’ in policy and media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Demanding greater transparency of justifications for CR policy knowledge and practice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The Fourth Dimension of Power or “Power 4”: Haugaard (2012, 2021) is among the handful of theorists who has extended the multi-dimensional power framework to a fourth dimension. He develops Power 4 based on Foucault’s account of “subjectification” through which social actors are responsibilized and disciplined to inadvertently reproduce relations of domination. In this sense, Power 4 is an extreme manifestation of Power 3 outcomes, enabled through a sophisticated process of governmentality (Foucault, 1979, 1995; N. Rose et al., 2006).

The concept of governmentality draws attention to the “rationalities and technologies” of governance across different institutions in contemporary liberal states (N. Rose, 2000, p. 324). Governmentality has inspired important scholarship to understand how state institutions responsible for social well-being and security (policing, social service, schools, hospitals, and others) come to prioritize certain social problems as deserving to be governed, develop conceptions and knowledge about the problem and subjects to be governed, and “govern in the light of that knowledge” (Foucault, 1979; Garland, 1997; N. Rose, 2000; N. Rose et al., 2006, p. 87). Per governmentality,
institutions are “techniques and procedures for directing human behavior” that manage societal subjects through a field of power relations, which includes directly or indirectly conveying the (institutionally) preferred subject behaviour (N. Rose et al., 2006, p. 83). Coercive techniques are not necessary; by rendering social knowledge about the norms and values (or “truths”) that people ought to follow, institutions imbue a sense of self-responsibility and self-disciplining (Miller & Rose, 1990). At all times, the conduct of social subjects is monitored and managed; if conduct is considered deviant, institutions “seek to act upon pathologies” to “reaffiliate” the subject toward what is considered “normal” (Foucault, 1995; N. Rose, 2000, pp. 324, 330). Rose (2000) suggests that the action of managing conduct in this manner supplies the needed “strategic coherence” across institutions of different types (p. 324). It is what binds apparently contradictory institutional techniques such as zero-tolerance policing alongside rehabilitative schemes.

As noted, Power 4 seeks to achieve outcomes similar to Power 3. Norms and values render self-evident truths against which those being subjected to Power 4 are disciplined. Haugaard (2012) observes that the internalization of discipline, the desired outcome of Power 4, makes “structuration largely a practical consciousness reflex action” (p. 49). Said differently, through Power 4, the disciplined subject unreflectively reproduces the social structures contributing to the continued Power 3 domination of the subject. In the relationship between state institutions and CSOs, Power 4 acts to “secure compliance based upon internalized self-restraint” as well as the responsibilization of CSOs (McGee, 2020, p. 54). The dominating aspects of disciplining notwithstanding, Haugaard (2021) remains optimistic that Power 4 under democratic structures can have emancipatory aspects through a complex process of “see[ing] the self from the
perspective of others” (p. 172). Once CSOs recognize the operation of Power 4, they will likely use contestation strategies under one of the other dimensions of power. Therefore, for this research, I limit myself to observing how Power 4 from state institutions acts upon CSOs (by observing the extent to which CSO behaviour exhibits self-restraint).

For the examination of Power 4 in CR policies, I engage with scholarship addressing CR policies in Australia, the U.K., and the rest of Europe using the lens of governmentality (Abdel-Fattah, 2020; Ali, 2014; de Goede & Simon, 2013; Ragazzi, 2016). Power 4 supports the understanding that the goal of CR policies is not merely to ensure a reduction of violent behaviour, but also to manage the conduct of Muslim communities. As Qurashi (2018, p. 3) succinctly puts it, “a key component of de-radicalisation programmes hinges on a cultural transformation of Muslim identity to view the west and all it stands for (its ways of life, values, and politics) with a more positive attitude” (p. 3). Following these works, within CR policymaking, I observe Power 4 in state institutions developing conceptions of “problem” communities, gaining “knowledge” about them, and then acting based on that knowledge. For my study, I pay attention to how CR practices cast Muslims, “vulnerable” to radicalization, as problem (or “suspect”) communities, and prescribe notions of preferred “good” (pro-western/moderate) Muslims versus “bad” (radical/religious) Muslims (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018; Mamdani, 2004; Ragazzi, 2016). Based on such unspecific classifications, CR policies manage the conduct of entire Muslim communities through a range of disciplinary techniques that I focus on in my assessment. Since the “good” Muslim can always turn “bad,” Muslim communities also have to assume the responsibility of self-policing and self-disciplining their own communities (Nguyen, 2019b). I examine the
ways in which Muslim CSOs are impacted by such expectations. In Table 5, I capture the key aspects of Power 4.

Table 5

Summary of the Discussion of Power 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power 4</th>
<th>Conceptualization</th>
<th>Exercised by state institutions through</th>
<th>Observed in state institution actions through</th>
<th>Observed in CSO actions through</th>
<th>Application to CR policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The process of subjectification to create disciplined and responsibilized actors who unreflectively reproduce relations of domination (Haugaard, 2012)</td>
<td>Governmentality or rationality and techniques of institutional governance to manage “conduct;” proliferation of “truths” which socialize subjects to following desired conduct (Rose, 2000)</td>
<td>Institutional practices of getting to “know” problem communities; prescription of norms and values to which those communities should conform along with the implied punitive action for deviance</td>
<td>Impact on CSOs observed in their self-restraint; resistance by CSOs pursued as responses to Power 1, Power 2, or Power 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Organizational Institutionalism and CSO Strategies

Within the broad study of sociology of organizations, which focuses on organizations and their environment, organizational institutionalism is an approach that stresses how “social facts,” norms and values, and cultural-cognitive elements (or taken-for-granted understanding and symbols) shape the structure and choices of organizations (J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; W. W. Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; W. R. Scott, 2008; Suddaby et al., 2010; Zucker, 1987). Organizational intuitionist theories challenge the assumption that organizational decisions are based on (bounded) rational choices to maximize efficiency, instead proposing that organization decision-making gives
precedence to satisfying external expectations, as this leads to greater legitimacy and increases chances of survival (Haveman, 2000; Swaminathan & Wade, 2016). Central to organizational institutionalism is the construct of the “organizational field,” which is conceptualized as the “domain where an organization’s actions were structured by the network of relationships within which it was embedded” (Wooten & Hoffman, 2017, p. 56). The organizational field is a “recognized area of institutional life” comprising a community of organizations sharing a common understanding of their field and the “issues” facing the field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Wooten & Hoffman, 2017). For this study, I assume Muslim CSOs are part of an organizational field by virtue of having to address issues pertaining to the targeting of Muslim communities under the ‘war on terror.’ Scott (2008) notes that “organizational fields help to bound the environment within which institutional processes operate” (p. 44). The “institutional environment” is pertinent because it captures the “regulations, customs, and taken-for-granted norms” in the broader social context of organizations which “impinge upon and shape their organizational behaviour and outcomes” (Swaminathan & Wade, 2016, p. 1). In their seminal work, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) propose that organizational institutionalism is evident when organizations in the same field exhibit homogenous structures and practices, a process they call “institutional isomorphism.” They theorize that this process occurs through the mechanisms of 1) coercive isomorphism, “formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations” by external institutions and cultural expectations of society (p. 150), 2) mimetic isomorphism, organizations modelling themselves after other organizations perceived to be more legitimate or successful (p. 151), and 3) normative
isomorphism, the knowledge convergence of organizational members through the process of professionalization (p. 152).

Organizational institutionalism has prompted rich empirical research examining how processes in CSOs are institutionalized in response to pressures emanating from their environment (Alexander, 1996; e.g., Beaton et al., 2020; Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; Lounsbury, 2001; W. W. Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Suárez & Hwang, 2013). However, organizational institutionalism has also been critiqued for overemphasizing isomorphism and other mechanisms that explain organizational stability and conformity over organizational change (Wooten & Hoffman, 2017, p. 58). Yet another criticism leveled against organizational intuitionalist approaches is that they imply an “institutional determinism” that minimizes the role of agency in organizational decision making (Haveman, 2000; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2017, p. 281). Among scholarship aimed at remedying these shortcomings, Oliver’s (1991) work stands out for considering how organizations can respond strategically to pressures from the institutional environment. Oliver (1991) combines organizational institutionalism with insights from resource dependence theories, which stipulate that organizations make active choices to manage against the environmental uncertainties emanating from dependence on others for resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). She argues that “organizational responses will vary from conforming to resistant, from passive to active, from preconscious to controlling, from impotent to influential, and from habitual to opportunistic, depending on the institutional pressures toward conformity that are exerted on organizations” (Oliver, 1991, p. 151). Accordingly, Oliver (1991) proposes a conceptual model of five organizational strategies (with three tactics per strategy) representing varying degrees of
active agency, ranging from passivity to increasing resistance: *Acquiesce, Compromise, Avoid, Defy*, and *Manipulate*.

- *Acquiesce* corresponds to conformity to institutional pressures. Under this strategy, Oliver (1991) places the tactics of *Habit, Imitate, and Comply*. *Habit* and *Imitate* emerge from unconscious adherence to taken-for-granted rules and mimetic isomorphism, respectively. *Comply* indicates “conscious obedience to or incorporation of values, norms, or institutional requirements” (p. 152). *Comply* is differentiated from *Habit and Imitate* as the former reflects a strategic action “in anticipation of specific self-serving benefits” (p. 153). Oliver hypothesizes that organizations pursue an *Acquiesce* strategy to increase social legitimacy and economic gains.

- The strategy of *Compromise* is pursued when organizations are “confronted with conflicting institutional demands” or when organizational autonomy is threatened due to “inconsistencies between institutional expectations and organizational objectives” (p. 153). The former process aligns with organizational institutionalist explanations, whereas the latter accounts for resource dependence mechanisms. Included under *Compromise* are the tactics of *Balance, Pacify, and Bargain*, which account for how organizations accommodate expectations of different stakeholders with varying degree of agency. Specifically, with *Balance*, organizations find ways to conform to various stakeholder expectations; with *Pacify*, organizations can manage with only partial conformity; and with a *Bargain* tactic, organizations can seek concessions from their environment in return for compromise. Though *Compromise* entails “conforming to and accommodating institutional rules, norms,” this strategy is distinct from *Acquiesce* because with *Compromise* “organizations are more active in promoting their own interests” (p. 154).

- *Avoid* constitutes organizational attempts “to preclude the necessity of conformity” (p. 154) through tactics of *Conceal* or disguising non-conformity, *Buffer* or creating structures that help to decouple technical or core activities from external demands to avoid institutional impingement, and *Escape* or departing from the organizational field where institutional pressures are exerted. With organizations actively trying to “circumvent the conditions that make conforming behavior necessary” (p. 156), the *Avoid* strategy reflects greater agency than *Acquiesce* or *Compromise*. In assessing Oliver’s model, Scott (2008) notes that the *Avoid* strategy occurs when regulative pressures supersede normative and cultural-cognitive ones, and when compliance is perceived to yield high symbolic gains but is costly to implement (p. 172).

- The *Defy* strategy “is a more active form of resistance to institutional processes” that occurs when the cost of nonconformity is perceived to be low, when organizational norms and interests diverge substantially from institutional requirements and values, and when organizations perceive they can argue the
rationality of their alternative conduct (Oliver, 1991, pp. 156–157). According to Oliver (1991), this strategy includes the tactics of *Dismiss* or ignoring institutional rules and values, *Challenge* or contesting institutional requirements, and *Attack*, an aggressive tactic involving “vehemently denouncing the institutionalized values and external constituents that express them” (p. 157).

- The final and most active form of strategic response described by Oliver (1991) is *Manipulate*, “purposeful and opportunistic” attempts through which organizations “actively change or exert power over the content of the expectations themselves or the sources that seek to express or enforce them” (p. 157). Here, organizations have the agency and means to pursue tactics of *Co-opt* or persuading powerful institutional constituents to join the organization or its board, *Influence* or attempts to shape institutional rules and values (such as through collective advocacy), and *Control* or dominating external constituents applying institutional pressure. The *Manipulate* strategy emerges either when organizations do not recognize the legitimacy of institutional pressures, or when the pressures are weak and can be altered or controlled.

Oliver (1991) goes on to suggest that to analyze organizational responses, attention should be paid to the reasons for institutional pressures, the institutional constituents responsible for exerting these pressures, the content of institutional pressures, the mechanisms used to apply these pressures, and the broader environmental context of institutional pressures. Overall, Oliver’s model captures how the confluence of and interaction among the organizational ability, autonomy, and connectedness to the external environment; the managerial perceptions; and the reasons and forms of institutional pressures shape organizational responses. Despite the apparent strength of Oliver’s model in locating agency within an organizational institutionalist approach, Scott (2008) cautions that it might excessively discount the impact of social facts and cultural-cognitive forces in shaping the actions of organizational managers and members (p. 174). He also warns that Oliver’s model is most productive when considering the possibilities of collective versus individual organizational strategies. In the next section, I show how
Haugaard’s (2012, 2021) theorization of power (discussed earlier) can be integrated into Oliver’s (1991) model to fully consider how CR policies produce institutional pressures – including cultural-cognitive ones that Scott (2008) is concerned about – from state institutions, and how Muslim CSOs develop collective responses using their agentic power.

**Muslim CSO Responses to CR Policy Power: A Conceptual Framework**

Despite being vested in understanding how social processes and external pressures shape organizational choices, organizational institutionalist approaches have been tentative about engaging with the literature on power (Lawrence, 2008; K. A. Munir, 2015). This holds for Oliver’s (1991) model discussed above. The limited scholarship in organizational institutionalism that has considered power directly is confined to the study of entrepreneurship (Clegg, 2010), innovation (Dover & Lawrence, 2012), and intersections with social movements theories (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2017). It has furthermore maintained a dichotomy between “power-over” and “power-to” dynamics (Lawrence & Buchanan, 2017). Responding to the call for including power more prominently in organizational institutionalism (Clegg, 2010; K. A. Munir, 2015), I propose a conceptual framework that integrates Haugaard’s (2012, 2021) theorization of the four dimensions of power with Oliver’s (1991) organizational institutionalist model.

My proposed framework stipulates that public policies establish relationships of power between state institutions and CSOs across Power 1, Power 2, Power 3, and Power 4 dimensions. Drawing from organizational intuitionalist theories, these relationships are bound within organizational fields where power contestations occur. State institutions exercise power by configuring the institutional environment of CSOs, and CSOs view these as institutional pressures to which they develop strategic responses. This follows
from Oliver’s (1991) model. The framework is depicted pictorially in Figure 3 and discussed in detail below.

**Figure 3**  
*Power Dimensions of Public Policy and CSO Power*

**Power 1**: As discussed earlier, Power 1 describes “structured power conflicts” or conflicts between state institutions and CSOs within the bounds of policy structures.

Within democratic structures, state institutions have the authority to create and implement
public policies. Power 1 is exercised through coercion, use of political authority, and allocation of financial resources. Power 1 includes coercive tactics, state institutions granting legitimacy to certain CSO activities by allocating them economic resources deeming some CSO activities as legitimate and others as not. Under CR policies, Power 1 exercised by state institutions include legal rules, national security investigative functions, funding of CR programs, and selectively ascribing legitimacy to some Muslim CSOs over others.

In the relations of Power 1, CSOs use their agentic power by either complying with policy requirements or negotiating for amendments to policies. Within CR policies, I suggest this can be observed through Muslim CSOs negotiating with state security agencies for fairer CR policy implementation, deciding whether to accept or reject CR funding, and legal and administrative challenges to actions by state institutions perceived as unjust. Mapping these CSO responses onto Oliver’s (1991) framework, I suggest that these CSO responses correspond to:

- a strategy of *Acquiesce* using a tactic of *Comply*: Under CR policies, examples include CSOs accepting CR funding for projects or implementing programs or participating in outreach activities requested by state security agencies

- a strategy of *Compromise* using tactics of *Balance, Pacify*, or *Bargain*: CSOs pursue a *Compromise* strategy when institutional expectations are at odds with organizational interests. Under CR policies, Muslim CSOs pursue a *Compromise* strategy when they perceive CR policy requirements to conflict with the needs of their constituents. Through a tactic of *Pacify*, Muslim CSOs partially satisfy demands of state security agencies and though a tactic of *Bargain*, they seek concessions from these agencies.

- a strategy of *Avoid* using tactics of *Conceal, Buffer, or Escape*: CSOs use the apparatuses available within a policy structure to find ways to evade conforming to institutional requirements without being scrutinized. I posit that this strategy is likely unavailable to Muslim CSOs under CR policies because of the national security mandate of CR policies, which have disproportionately scrutinized Muslim communities and CSOs.
• a strategy of *Defy* using tactics of *Challenge*: The strategy of *Defy* reflects active resistance by CSOs when the institutional requirements are substantially divergent from organizational interests and when organizations believe they can present a sound rationale for alternatives to the prevailing institutional norms. Principled opposition to accepting CR funding would correspond to a tactic of *Dismiss* and legal challenges to the withholding of legitimacy would map onto a tactic of *Challenge*.

The reason I do not map CSO responses to more active strategies of resistance, namely the tactic of *Attack* and strategy of *Manipulate*, is that Power 1 contestations are “shallow” in that they take place within the bounds of policy structures (Haugaard, 2021, p. 161). I also exclude the tactics of *Habit* and *Imitate* under the strategy of *Acquiesce* because these tactics represent an unconscious adoption of institutional rules. I instead argue that CSO responses to Power 1 are conscious contestations that occur within the bounds of policy structures.

**Power 2**: Power 2 constitutes state institutions using political authority to include or exclude the consideration of certain agendas in policymaking. Over time, such exclusions result in durable policy structures that are difficult to contest. In the relationship between state institutions and CSOs, Power 2 sets up a “conflict over structure.” Through the exercise of Power 2, state institutions can limit CSO involvement (e.g., through consultations) during policymaking, or choose to advance policy agendas that benefit those in positions of political authority. Earlier, I suggested that CSO responses to Power 2 involve making demands for greater inclusion in policymaking, mobilizing alternate analyses and perspectives to show how policies are discriminatory, and acting in collaboration or coalitions to advocate for policy change. Based on this, I map CSO responses to Power 2 to the following strategies in Oliver’s (1991) model:
• A strategy of *Defy* using tactics of *Dismiss* or *Challenge*: The active resistance of CSOs advocating for different policy structures evinces a *Defy* strategy. Under CR policies, Muslim CSOs highlighting discriminatory aspects of CR policies align with the tactic of *Challenge*. Disruptive actions by CSOs like boycotts also map onto the tactic of *Challenge*.

• A strategy of *Manipulate* using tactics of *Co-opt* or *Influence*: the strategy of *Manipulate* reflects purposeful attempts by organizations to actively change their institutional environment. CSOs using coalitions to enhance power-to-capacity to advocate for policy change map on to the *Influence* tactic under *Manipulate*. This is true for Muslim CSOs responding to CR policies. The *Co-opt* tactic involves proactive practices of recruiting organizational constituents into organizations. This tactic is likely unavailable to Muslim CSOs under CR policies but may be possible under other policy domains.

Under Power 2 responses, I have not included the tactic of *Attack* because that constitutes a set of aggressive actions by CSOs to denounce institutional values. I argue that the tactic of *Attack* corresponds to CSO responses under Power 3 because it constitutes an aggressive attack on institutional values. By contrast, CSO responses to Power 2 still use procedural justice mechanisms to achieve alternative policy possibilities or structures, defended by their own rationality; these responses better map to the tactic of *Challenge* under the strategy of *Defy* in Oliver’s (1991) model. Under *Manipulate*, I do not include the tactic of *Control* because in a relationship between state institutions and CSOs, it is highly unlikely that CSOs will be able to “dominate” state institutions in the way Oliver (1991) describes.

**Power 3:** Power 3 describes how tacit knowledge, norms, and discourses tied to broader social processes shape the actions of state institutions and CSOs alike to reproduce policy structures that perpetuate relations of domination. Though Power 3 is not agent specific, state institutions can perpetuate Power 3 in ways that result in discriminatory policy structures by reinforcing dominant discourses through policy practice and its discursive representation (for example, in media). In CR policies
developed in the context of the ‘war on terror,’ Power 3 is realized through discourses about ‘radicalization’ that are based on the racialization of Muslims as dangerous Others. Given that internalized knowledges render Power 3 possible, resistance to Power 3 is difficult. It requires CSOs to engage in discursive conscious raising and re-education. CSOs can resist power 3 by demanding greater transparency about what knowledges and discourses are given precedence by state agencies in policymaking, by challenging discourses normalized by state institutions, and by offering alternative discourses and conceptions on pertinent issues. I argue that CSO responses under Power 3 map on to the following strategy in Oliver’s (1991) framework:

- a strategy of Defy using a tactic of Attack: through the tactic of Attack, organizations pursue avenues to “assault, belittle, or vehemently denounce institutionalized values and external constituents that express them” (Oliver, 1991, p. 157). I suggest CSO actions of reflexivity or “discursive consciousness” raising, learning about the knowledges given precedence in public policy formulations, self-educating, and developing and proliferating alternative discourses, together map onto the Attack tactic.

- a strategy of Manipulate using tactics of Co-opt or Influence: Muslim CSOs use a strategy of Manipulate and tactic of Influence when they try to convince some stakeholders (e.g., the media) to use their preferred discourses.

**Power 4:** Power 4 seeks to produce disciplined and self-restrained CSO subjects who unconsciously reproduce relations of domination. This is achieved through specific governance practices of state institutions, i.e., how they prioritize some policy problems and develop conceptions of the problem, and which techniques they use to achieve disciplinarity and responsibilization. In my discussion of Power 4 in CR policies, I follow scholars who have examined the techniques and rationalities of governance in national security and other public policies. Haugaard (2012) is optimistic about the possibility of CSO resistance to Power 4, and CSO resistance to Power 4 likely results in contestation
of Power 1, Power 2, or Power 3. So, instead of focusing on CSO resistance under Power 4, I focus on CSO subjugation. When Power 4 operates as desired, CSOs show self-restraint and unknowingly follow and internalize institutional expectations.

**Additional Considerations:** Through the conceptual framework I describe, I aim to show how Muslim CSOs respond collectively, as part of an organizational field, to different dimensions of power exerted by state institutions through CR policies. Oliver’s (1991) model offers substantial theoretical grounding to consider CSO responses; however, it fails to adequately account for the provenance of the “power-to” exercises by CSOs in the strategies of Defy and Manipulate. Partnerships and coalition building represent important means through which Muslim CSOs can amass “power-to.” However, Muslim CSOs can also boost their “power-to” through the activities of representative organizations that can either collate the responses across CSOs, or lead actions of resistance despite risks of reprisal by state institutions. This observation is based on insights from organizational ecology theories, which study “populations” of organizations (Haveman, 2000). In the two countries I study, Canada and the U.K., I observe how the presence of representative Muslim CSOs (e.g., National Council of Canadian Muslims in Canada and the Muslim Council of Britain in the U.K.) impacts the ability of Muslim CSOs to adopt Defy and Manipulate strategies. In the U.K., some Muslim CSOs have come to existence specifically to counter anti-Muslim discrimination in counterterrorism practices and CR policies (e.g., PreventWatch, CAGE, and others). These organizations have been at the vanguard of producing discourses that challenge
those commonly adopted by state security agencies. I pay attention to how their presence has shaped the collective responses of Muslim CSOs in the U.K.  

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have described the key theoretical concepts that I rely on for the research analysis I undertake in my dissertation. I have drawn from three disciplinary traditions to situate the analysis of how CR policies have developed in Canada and the U.K., how they are experienced by Muslim CSOs, and how Muslim CSOs fashion strategic responses to the power exerted from CR policies. First, I have relied on critical studies of radicalization and counter-radicalization (e.g., Kundnani, 2012b) to review how the concept of ‘radicalization’ has been understood in research and policy communities in the context in the ‘war on terror.’ This discussion aims to illustrate the knowledge basis for CR policies in Canada and the U.K. Second, I have looked toward public policy literature – specifically, the concepts of “critical junctures” (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007) and “policy mobilizing” (Peck & Theodore, 2010) – to explain how CR policies have evolved in response to concerns of “domestic terrorism” by Muslim perpetrators while plucking ideas and best practices from transnational fora for rapid deployment. Lastly, I have integrated theorizations of power (Haugaard, 2012, 2021) and organizational institutionalism (Oliver, 1991) to propose a conceptual framework for understanding how CSOs develop strategic responses to CR policies. In the data analysis

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30 An ecology informed approach would analyze the full population of Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. While it is possible to partially identify Muslim charities (see Appendix 1, Table 1), there is no comprehensive database of nonprofits in the two countries from which Muslim CSOs may be readily identified. Overcoming this deficiency would require creating a custom database, an undertaking outside the scope of this dissertation research. Another drawback of my framework is that it ignores internal characteristics of organizations that may explain variation in strategy among individual organizations within a organizational field in each country.
I will undertake in Chapters 7 through 9, I rely on this conceptual framework to show how CR policies establish power relations across four dimensions between state institutions and Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. The framework provides the scaffolding to analyze the data collected for my dissertation research, which shows how Muslim CSOs respond to these manifestations of power from CR policies. In the following chapter, Chapter 3, I describe the research design and methodology I use for my dissertation research.
Chapter 3 – Research Design

This chapter outlines the case-oriented, qualitative research design that I deemed most suitable for learning about and comparing the experiences of Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. confronting CR policies. The fundamental assumption informing my research is that CSOs, situated between the state agencies that propagate CR policies and Muslim communities, are 1) themselves subject to power through CR policies, and 2) enlisted to act as intermediaries between state agencies and the Muslim communities whom CR policies target. Accordingly, for my research, I developed a case-oriented design aimed at providing a thick understanding of how key decision makers in Muslim CSOs understand CR policies, what organizational strategies and tactics these decision-makers develop based on their meaning-making of CR policies, and how they engage in contestations with state agencies promoting CR policies.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the scope of this research study and a definition of the terms and concepts used. Next, a rationale is provided for why a case-oriented, qualitative comparative research design is best suited for my dissertation research. I argue that a case-oriented (versus variable-oriented) research design is most apt to uncover the complex ways in which CR policies interact with organizational processes “as an interpretable whole” (Della Porta, 2008a, p. 204). Then, the benefits of a comparative approach in case-oriented research are discussed. A rationale for the case selection of Canada and the U.K. is provided, arguing that the similarities and differences between the two countries make them suitable for a “paired comparison” (Tarrow, 2010). Following this discussion, the chapter details the data collection strategy and selection and description of the research participants included in this dissertation research. Semi-structured qualitative interviews were used to collect the primary data for a comparative
analysis of Muslim CSO responses across the two selected cases. I developed confidence in primary interview data through triangulation, including an analysis of policy documents and parliamentary hearings, and secondary research (Flick, 2004; Olsen, 2004). Next, the chapter discusses the limitations of this dissertation research. I conclude this chapter with a reflexive statement outlining my positionality as a researcher and addressing concerns about “subjectivity” often leveled against qualitative research.

**Research Scope and Key Terms**

Specifying the scope or boundary conditions in a qualitative research study is important because it delineates the conditions under which one would expect any theoretical inferences from the research to hold (Harris, 1997; Rohlfing, 2012). This applies for a small-N, case-oriented research study such as mine. Scope conditions are a means through which researchers convey elements of the context under which the data and analysis of case-oriented research should be considered and to what extent the findings are generalizable.

**Unit of Analysis**

The unit of analysis is the subject or entity upon which a research is focused “in order to create summary descriptions of all such units and to explain differences among them” (Babbie, 2007, p. 95). The units of analysis in this dissertation are Muslim civil society organizations. Following Howell and Lind’s (2010) work examining the impact of counterterrorism practices on non-governmental organizations in different national contexts, I define civil society as “the arena where people deliberate upon and organize around shared, collective purposes” (p. 3). For my research, I assume civil society is a

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31 Civil society is a contested concept. The depictions of civil society have been critiqued widely for not having clear boundaries (Kasfir, 1998), being institutional extensions of state projects of domination and
distinct and recognizable “sphere” of society separate from the spheres of state, market, family, and individuals; at the same time, civil society intersects with each of these spheres of society. Civil society constitutes a range of formal institutions (such as registered nonprofits, charities, and associations) and informal entities (such as social movements, coalitions, and campaigns). Despite the diversity in institutional formation, I heed the fundamental assumption that civil society is a venue where “different values, ideas, and political visions are debated, contended, and struggled over” (J. Howell & Lind, 2010, p. 3). This assumption provides the basis for my hypothesis that state agencies attempt to use CR policies to re-shape social values in the sphere of civil society.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) are defined as voluntary and nonprofit organizations including registered charities that contribute to “social well-being” (M. H. Hall, 2009, p. 25) and “building stronger communities” (see Sharkey et al., 2017). Literature from nonprofit studies suggests that CSOs play the following functions in society: 1) providing service delivery of different social and economic services such as education, health, housing, etc. (Kendall, 2004; Salamon et al., 2000); 2) fostering collective social expression catering to social, cultural, spiritual, and professional interests, and promoting pluralism and diversity (Frumkin, 2002; M. H. Hall, 2009; Salamon et al., 2000); 3) advocating for changes to public policy and social attitudes to advance the interests of specific social groups (Jenkins, 2006); 4) building community by playing an “integrative role” helping to “create habits of trust and reciprocity that in turn

can control (F. Ismail & Kamat, 2018), and disregarding notions of power in social relations (Buttigieg, 2005). While acknowledging these important critiques, I continue in a tradition of previous research (see M. Edwards, 2009) that has examined civil society, especially its organizational forms.
contribute to a sense of ‘community’” (Putnam, 2001; Salamon et al., 2000, p. 7). In multicultural societies, CSOs are crucial for ethnic and religious minorities as they provide essential services, foster civic and political engagement, and advocate for and represent concerns facing these communities (Bloemraad, 2006). In this context, CSOs act as key agents or interlocutors that state agencies turn to in order to understand concerns facing particular communities.

Muslim CSOs, are a subset of CSOs (nonprofits including registered charities) that serve Muslim communities and act as agents situated between state agencies and diverse Muslim communities. There are two broad categories of Muslim CSOs that I include in my study:

- **Muslim-led CSOs**: CSOs with a mandate to serve Muslim communities, where a Muslim-identity is central to the organization or Islamic principles guide the organization’s actions, and whose leadership and board (predominantly) self-identify as Muslim; and

- **Muslim-serving CSOs**: CSOs that do not necessarily have self-identified Muslims in their leadership or board but offer programs and services that benefit Muslim communities either by virtue of the demographics in the organization’s catchment area or because Muslim communities fall within the organization’s beneficiary/target communities.

Within these two broad categories, Muslim CSOs can play various social, cultural, political, and civic functions, classified as: 1) civil rights and political advocacy, 2) immigrant settlement and social services, 3) religious services and theological education, 4) cultural and civic engagement, 5) community or international development, and foundations, and 6) associations and special interest groups. Table 6 outlines how the Muslim CSOs by function type correspond to the Muslim CSO categories of Muslim-led or Muslim-serving, identified above. For illustrative purposes only, I have provided examples of organizations in Canada and the U.K. that would fall under each function.
type. The specific names of Muslim CSOs included in this study are kept confidential as per the informed consent obtained from research participants.32

Table 6
Muslim Civil Society Organizations by Function Type Included in the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslim CSO Category</th>
<th>Muslim CSOs by function type</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim-led or Muslim-serving</td>
<td>Civil Rights and Political Advocacy</td>
<td>Canada: National Council of Canadian Muslims&lt;br&gt;U.K.: Muslim Council of Britain, Rights and Security International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim-serving</td>
<td>Immigrant Settlement and Social Services</td>
<td>Canada: Muslim Social Services of Kitchener-Waterloo&lt;br&gt;U.K.: Muslim Welfare House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim-led</td>
<td>Religious Services and Theological Education</td>
<td>Canada: Mosques such as the Al-Rashad Mosque or Islamic schools such as Iqra Islamic School&lt;br&gt;U.K.: Finsbury Park Mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim-led or Muslim-serving</td>
<td>Cultural and Civic Engagement</td>
<td>Canada: Canadian Council of Muslim Women&lt;br&gt;U.K.: MEND, MACFest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim-led or Muslim-serving</td>
<td>Community or International Development and Foundations</td>
<td>Canada: International Relief Canada, Inspirit Foundation&lt;br&gt;U.K.: Islamic Relief, Aziz Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim-led</td>
<td>Associations and Special Interest Groups</td>
<td>Canada: Canadian Islamic Chamber of Commerce&lt;br&gt;U.K.: City Circle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The examples in this table are for illustrative purposes only; the actual names of organizations included in the study are not identified to maintain confidentiality.

32 It is worth clarifying that my interest in focusing on Muslim CSOs was to learn about perceptions and experiences with CR policies. Given the diversity of CSOs working among and representing ethnically, racially, culturally, and denominationally diverse Muslim communities, one would reasonably expect there to be different opinions and perspectives. Perceptions also differed based on particularized experiences CSOs had with security and policing agencies. Though some scholarship has chosen to focus on inter-organizational conflicts or intra-organization politics as explanations for organizational actions (e.g. Atasoy, 2003; Knott, 2018b), I have deliberately avoided such an approach. My hypothesis is that the CR policy environment has a bearing on Muslim CSOs of various types based on the “Muslim community” being targeted by state institutions as “the site of radicalisation in need of government reform” (Ali, 2014, p. 140). So inter-organizational or intra-organizational tensions, which are undeniably present, have little bearing on the process I am interested in exploring in my research.
**Geographical Scope**

My research focuses on Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K., a subject which must take into account jurisdictional considerations within the two countries. In Canada, the matter of federalism is germane. Unlike counterterrorism laws, which (as part of the Criminal Code) fall under federal jurisdiction, CR policies in Canada are diffused across federal, provincial, and municipal jurisdictions. As I explain in Chapter 4 in some detail, provinces and municipalities have developed their own CR policies in response to local concerns about ‘radicalization’ and ‘violent extremism.’ It follows that Muslim CSOs in different provinces experience CR policies differently. As of 2016, however, the federal government has been coordinating existing CR efforts and funding CR organizations and projects across the country. My research includes the experiences of Muslim CSOs in urban centres in the provinces of Ontario, Alberta, and Manitoba. A more detailed discussion of my selection strategy for organizations and participants is provided in the Data Collection and Analysis section of this chapter.

In the U.K., CR policies have been administered by the Home Office (in the central government) since the mid-2000s. However, as I detail in Chapter 5, there has been some variation in how Prevent, U.K.’s CR policy, has been implemented. In the earliest iteration of Prevent, local authorities were provided funds from the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) to implement CR-related programs. The local authorities were targeted for CR programming based on the proportion of Muslim populations residing in those authorities. Accordingly, Muslim CSOs in these local authorities had more interaction with CR policies than in other regions of the country. Subsequent changes to Prevent saw the Home Office consolidate administration of CR policies. And, in 2015, a Prevent Duty was passed into law that requires all public sector
employees, including local authorities, to report on signs of radicalization. These developments together suggest that awareness about CR policies has become even more widespread. For my research, I included Muslim CSOs in England and Wales, particularly those based in the regions of London, West Midlands, and Yorkshire, where CR policies have been active since Prevent-funded programs were initiated. The experiences of these organizations have offered insights into how the impact of CR policies have been felt by Muslim CSOs over time. Additionally, in order to capture the experience of a broad base of Muslim CSOs, I included representative or umbrella organizations who could speak for the interests of Muslim CSOs across the country.

**Temporal Scope**

Since CR policies are so intimately tied to the counterterrorism laws and practices that dramatically expanded under the ‘war on terror,’ I conducted my examination of the national security policy environment from the year 2000 onward. Since then, CR policies in Canada and the U.K. have followed distinct trajectories. In Canada, a federal CR strategy was announced only recently, though preventative measures and community outreach aspects of CR have been part of federal policing efforts since the mid-2000s. In the U.K., CR policies were institutionalized in the mid-2000s and community policing efforts under the New Scotland Yard started even before then. So, my study begins from 2000 and spans through the year 2020. I collected primary data between September 2018 and December 2019.

**Generalizability**

Case-oriented research aims to develop a thick understanding of “unique and complex social configurations” that lead to “middle-range theories” that are temporally and spatially bound (Della Porta, 2008a, pp. 200, 206). Through a process of systematic
testing and gradually relaxing scope conditions, these theories can be extended and
generalized to other contexts (Rohlfing, 2012). The processes described in this
dissertation are historically and politically contingent upon the specific contexts of
Canada and the U.K., but the cases can offer inferences that are useful for understanding
other instances of similar phenomenon or for building theory (Gerring, 2004; Yin, 2013).
When combined with comparative strategies, the “causal-analytic” benefits of case
studies are amplified because similar complex relationships are examined and tested
across multiple contexts (Della Porta, 2008a, p. 207). Therefore, even though my
inferences are based on the experiences of Canada and the U.K., they likely have
relevance for other national contexts. When considered carefully within social and
political circumstances, the mechanics of how CR policies exert power over Muslim
CSOs could provide insights for how CR policies impact Muslim CSOs in other national
contexts.

The Case-oriented, Qualitative Comparative Research Design

A case-oriented research design seeks to explain “how” or “why” certain social
phenomena work (Yin, 2013) through the development of detailed knowledge and
“thick” descriptions of complex sociological processes (Della Porta, 2008a). Qualitative
research methods are used to pursue “inquiry [and] the collection of data in a natural
setting” using “interpretive/theoretical frameworks” and both inductive and deductive
analyses to establish patterns and themes (Creswell, 2012, p. 43). Since my research
seeks to generate new empirical data about the experiences of CSOs and how they make
meaning of the CR policy environment, a qualitative method is most appropriate.
Furthermore, as Creswell (2012) counsels, a qualitative research method is apt when the
goal is a complex, detailed understanding of a new issue, as is the case in my dissertation.
A case-oriented design is also suitable to examine a small number of cases – in my research, Canada and the U.K. – as it helps to make understandable the “unique and complex social configuration” of each case (Della Porta, 2008a, p. 206). My research design produces rich descriptions of the CR policy environment, Muslim CSOs’ understanding of the CR policy environment, and organizational choices as Muslim CSOs navigate the role they are expected to play within CR policies. My small-N case-oriented research is informed by the “interpretive framework” of social constructivism, where I acknowledge that reality is subjective and the perspectives of my research participants represents how they make meaning of CR policies based on social, historical, and political contexts (Creswell, 2012, pp. 20–21).

In research relying on qualitative methods, a case-oriented research design is usually contrasted with a variable-oriented research design (Della Porta, 2008a; Ragin, 2014). The latter seeks causal explanations following the inferential logic of large-N quantitative research. It relies on existing theory to parameterize explanatory variables; the researcher, then, looks for covariations among explanatory variables and observes changes in the outcome of interest or dependent variable. Like statistical research, variable-oriented qualitative research designs are biased toward assembling as many data points as possible in order to increase the generalizability of inferences (G. King et al., 1994). While a variable-oriented research design is undoubtedly useful in certain situations, I did not find it to be relevant for my research. Though I began with the hypothesis that CSO choices are impacted by CR policies, there was limited theoretical and empirical guidance to predict *a priori* which variables were relevant. During the course of my research, even as I started identifying the relevant factors, parameterizing
these factors into variables was not practical. Instead, by using a case-oriented research design, I was able to use “dense narratives” to identify social mechanisms within and across cases while accounting for the temporal sequencing of CR policies as they impact Muslim CSOs (Della Porta, 2008b, pp. 204, 209). Dense narratives proved to be an essential tool to examine how organizational members make meaning of the CR policy environment, account for power relationships with state institutions, and orient their actions toward particular programs and practices. My research design was also informed by the guidance that a case-oriented design is particularly apt for examining sociological relationships in studies of political violence (Della Porta, 2008b, p. 207).

**The Benefits of a Comparative Approach**

A comparative approach is used to look for variation in the explanatory processes (or variables) across two or more cases with the goal of strengthening the basis on which to draw inferences about the social phenomena being studied (Della Porta, 2008a; Ragin, 2014). Similarities and differences found in the cases of Canada and the U.K. yield insight into the relevance of national context, history, and specific patterns of state-CSO relations. In my case-oriented qualitative research, I am able to look for similarities and differences in the characteristics of CR policies and the mechanisms through which they impact the work of CSOs. The comparison relies on the process of developing dense narratives to describe each of the cases. Attention is paid to “each case as an interpretable whole,” while “seeking to understand a complex unity rather than establish relationships between variables” (Della Porta, 2008a, p. 204). Within the typology proposed by Skocpol and Somers (1980), my research aims to bring out the “contrast of contexts” of Canada and the U.K. that generates knowledge through an examination of the unique features of each case. I model my research on previous studies that have compared CSOs
serving immigrant and racialized communities across national contexts (e.g. Bloemraad, 2006; Chaudhary & Guarnizo, 2016). In the section that follows, I present my rationale for the case selection of Canada and the U.K.

**Case Selection: The Rationale for the Cases of Canada and the U.K.**

A case-oriented research design favours selecting cases with the aim of obtaining dense knowledge across cases that helps to reveal social mechanisms and clarify theoretical assumptions (Ragin, 2014). Case-oriented researchers seek cases where outcomes or social phenomena of interest are present in order to access the “analytic gains to be derived from an in-depth analysis of positive cases of a phenomenon” (Della Porta, 2008a, p. 212). To understand why two cases with very similar characteristics produce different outcomes in the social phenomenon of interest, researchers are advised to select “most-similar cases” (Przeworski & Teune, 2000, p. 32; Tarrow, 2010, p. 234). By contrast, “most different cases” are prudent when researchers are interested in understanding how cases with dissimilar characteristics result in similar outcomes of interest (Przeworski & Teune, 2000, p. 34; Tarrow, 2010, p. 234). However, case selection is not limited to these ideal types only, and usually involves different comparisons that mix these ideal types to strike the right balance between capturing what makes each case unique (“individualizing”) and identifying the common features across cases (“universalizing”) (Tilly, 1984). My selection of Canada and the U.K. as relevant cases to understand the interaction of CR policies with Muslim CSOs is based on the understanding that these two cases share some overlap in their social and political

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33 Selecting positive cases is advisable in case-oriented research, even though this approach violates the maxim of “not selecting on the dependent variable” found in variable-oriented and quantitative research designs (Della Porta, 2008a; G. King et al., 1994).
systems, but also have distinct histories and experiences with political violence. In case-oriented research, Tarrow (2010, p. 244) notes the advantages of a comparative study of just two cases, or a “paired comparison.” He suggests that paired comparisons retain the intimacy of analysis of a single case study, yet provide an opportunity to test theoretical assumptions derived from single cases, thus increasing “inferential power” and serving as a “building-block strategy” toward a multi-case analysis (Tarrow, 2010). In focusing on the comparison of the cases of Canada and the U.K., my research design enjoys the benefits of paired comparisons. In the following paragraph, I describe the characteristics of the cases of Canada and the U.K. that support their selection as cases for my research inquiry.

Canada and the U.K. make for interesting comparative cases as they share liberal welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990), have sizeable Muslim populations and active Muslim CSOs (see Appendix 1), and have active community cohesion policies that affect Muslim communities (Tolley & Vonk, 2016). Muslims in both countries experience discrimination and stereotyping based on religion (see Appendix 1). Having formerly been a part of the British colonial empire, Canada has a political system of parliamentary democracy that mirrors that of the U.K. Both countries are economically prosperous and cooperate closely on economic, military, and national security issues as attested by their memberships in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Group of Eight (G8), North American Atlantic Treaty (NATO), Five Eyes, and the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) (C. Barker et al., 2017; Global Affairs Canada, 2011). Both countries have a thriving civil society with a federally governed regulatory system for CSOs that was enhanced after 9/11 to scrutinize CSO activities more closely.
Despite these shared characteristics, much sets the two countries apart. Canada is a settler-colonial state based on the displacement (and continued subjugation) of Indigenous peoples and their ways of being (A. J. Barker, 2009). Canada’s political system is marked by federalism – separation of political powers across the federal government, provinces, and territories – which was a result of a series of historical compromises during nation-building across a vast geography (Cairns, 1977). In Canada, multiculturalism has constitutional status and is an essential part of the national identity (Tolley & Vonk, 2016, p. 25). By contrast, the U.K.’s imperial and colonial past forms a major part of its national identity (K. Kumar, 2000). As a consequence of immigration from its former colonies, multiculturalism is a demographic reality in the U.K., but has not received constitutional or legislative affirmation (Tolley & Vonk, 2016, p. 109). Both countries have had distinct historical experiences with political violence, which partly explains why CR policies in the two countries developed differently. In the U.K., Prevent is a nationally governed CR policy that has been in effect since 2006, whereas Canada institutionalized its federal CR policy only in 2018. Table 7 summarizes the characteristics of Canada and the U.K. that are germane to my dissertation research.
Table 7  
Comparing the Country Characteristics of Canada and U.K.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>U.K.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Systems</strong></td>
<td>Parliamentary democracy (HM Government, n.d.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary democracy with a federal system where lawmaking is shared</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>among federal government, provinces, and territorial governments (Bosc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; Gagnon, 2017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OECD, G8, NATO, Five Eyes, Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF); Having</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a long land border with the U.S., Canada also shares a strong trade and</td>
<td>virtue of geographical proximity, the U.K. and Europe share a strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security relationship with the U.S.</td>
<td>security and trade relationship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size of civil society</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada has 170,000 nonprofits that include 86,000 registered charities</td>
<td>There are over 160,000 registered charities in England and Wales,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Imagine Canada, 2019). About 50 percent of revenue of CSOs comes from</td>
<td>among 400,000 CSOs (National Audit Office, 2012; NCVO, 2020). Charities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government support and the dominant function of CSOs is to foster</td>
<td>in the U.K. are service delivery function dominant and 45 percent of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collective social expression (M. H. Hall, 2009).</td>
<td>CSO revenues come from government support (Salamon et al., 2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Share of Muslim Population</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationally the percentage of Muslim population is 3 percent of the</td>
<td>According to the 2011 census, Muslims make up 5 percent of the total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total population, with more density in certain regions such as the</td>
<td>national population with certain regions having greater density such</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Toronto Area at 8 percent and Montreal at 6 percent (see</td>
<td>as the cities of Bradford (25 percent), Birmingham (22 percent) and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1).</td>
<td>Manchester (16 percent) (see Appendix 1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community cohesion and integration policies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism is an important part of nation-building and is</td>
<td>Though multiculturalism is a demographic fact, it does not have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constitutionally affirmed (Library of Parliament, 2018; Tolley &amp; Vonk,</td>
<td>constitutional or legislative backing (Tolley &amp; Vonk, 2016, p. 109).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016, p. 25). Federal agencies (esp. Canadian Heritage and Immigration,</td>
<td>Local authorities bear the responsibility for implementing community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees and Citizenship Canada) provide funding for social cohesion,</td>
<td>cohesion programs, preventing racial discrimination, and tackling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community development, anti-racism initiatives, cultural and ethnic</td>
<td>“anti-social behaviour and extremism” (DCLG, 2009). Only refugee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>programming, and new immigrant settlement. Provinces and municipalities</td>
<td>integration programs are centrally funded (Saggar &amp; Somerville, 2012,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have their own multiculturalism policies.</td>
<td>p. 43).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CR policies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal CR policy was released in 2018; most CR policies are</td>
<td>Home Office governed CR policies have been implemented since 2006,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provincially and municipally based (discussed in detail in Chapter 4).</td>
<td>having undergone significant changes over the years (discussed in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>detail in Chapter 5).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through the comparative case-oriented analysis, I explain the difference in CR policy regimes in the two countries, illustrate how CR policies shape the institutional
environment of Muslim CSOs through relationships of power, and explicate the strategic responses Muslim CSOs develop based on the power relationships established by CR policies. The comparative examination of CSOs also allows me to investigate how the problem of ‘radicalization’ is understood by CSOs, and what actions CSOs take to strike the right balance between responding to demands placed upon them by CR policies and meeting the needs of Muslim communities they serve.

**Data Collection and Analysis**

The primary data for my dissertation research are drawn from semi-structured, in-depth interviews with managers and board members of CSOs, government officials, and lawyers and academics familiar with the CR policy landscape in Canada and the U.K. The interview data are complemented with participant observation at national security conferences, and an interpretive analysis of government reports, organizational documents, and news stories.

**Data Collection in Canada**

For the data collection, I adopted a phased approach. In the first phase of research, I focused on data collection in Canada. In the summer and early fall of 2018, using my knowledge of CSOs in Canada and publicly available information (news reports, public websites, and institutional reports), I developed a list of Muslim CSOs in Canada (eight in total) that had experience interacting with federal agencies on matters of national security. These CSOs were based in urban centres in Ontario, Alberta, and Manitoba, and included organizations that work with Muslim communities of different ethnicities and religious denominations. The goal of this exercise was to ensure that I included Muslim CSOs of different function types (see Table 6) in my study. I relied on my professional network to identify and contact an initial set of participants at CSOs, and these
participants introduced me to other participants at Muslim CSOs. In some cases, I was able to connect with CSOs I had identified beforehand; in other cases, participants introduced me to organizations that were not on my list. In relying on introductions through participants but trying to ensure that I included Muslim CSOs of different function types, I used a mix of purposive and snowball sampling. This strategy emulates the “stratified nonrepresentative sampling” technique suggested for variable-oriented qualitative research (Trost, 1986). The sample of CSOs included in my study is not statistically representative as they were not randomly sampled. As noted earlier, this is an acceptable strategy for case-oriented research (Della Porta, 2008a). Since my goal was to learn about the experience of Muslim CSOs that had interactions with state agencies on matters of national security, my selection was biased toward those types of CSOs.

Ontario-based Muslim CSOs are over-represented in my study to account for the fact that the density of Muslim communities in Ontario far exceeds that in Alberta and Manitoba (see Appendix 1).

I started interviewing participants from Canadian Muslim CSOs in September 2018, conducting the bulk of my interviews (in-person) between September 2018 and June 2019. Table 8 shows the participants from Muslim CSOs included in my research. Participants were Executive Directors, senior managers, or had current or previous board affiliations at these CSOs. Since full-fledged CR policies in Canada are still relatively

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34 For interested readers, this note provides an overview about the representativeness of the sample included in this study. In the case of Canada, the 16 Muslim CSOs from Ontario, Alberta, and Manitoba included in this study represent about five percent of the total number of registered Muslim charities in these three provinces (see Appendix 1, Table 11). However, because this sample includes umbrella organizations that represent the interests of Muslim CSOs at a national level and that interact with state security agencies routinely, the sample is meaningful for understanding Muslim CSOs’ experience of CR policies. In the U.K., the 10 CSOs represents a decidedly smaller sample of the over 4000 registered Muslim charities in England and Wales (see Appendix 1). However, as with the case of Canada, the organizations included in this study were in a position to speak about Muslim CSOs’ experience with Prevent.
recent, representatives of Muslim CSOs shared their experiences with counterterrorism practices and CR policies, intertwined together. In addition to representatives of Muslim CSOs, I interviewed managers of CR-focused CSOs whose mandate is to implement CR programs. These organizations came into existence on or after 2015, once the federal or provincial governments started funding CR programs. Including the perspectives of CR-focused CSOs offered me an opportunity to examine how their experiences differ from that of Muslim CSOs. I also interviewed two bureaucrats at Public Safety Canada and one member of local police in Alberta charged with implementing a police-led CR program. In addition, I interviewed two experts, a Canadian charity law expert and an academic who had no organizational affiliation but is well-informed about the CR policy landscape in Canada. All these research participants are noted in Table 8. The names of participants and their organizational affiliations have been anonymized in accordance with the consent given by participants. When attributing quoted statements to participants from Canada, I use the label “PCAN” followed by an assigned interview number. In Appendix 2, I provide additional details about the CSO types to which participants belong, the date of the participant interviews, and the region of the country where the CSOs are located.
Table 8
Research Participants and Organizations from Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslim CSOs by function type</th>
<th>Number of organizations</th>
<th>Number of participants</th>
<th>Gender distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights and Political Advocacy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>M: 1 / W: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Settlement and Social Services</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>M: 2 / W: -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Services and Theological Education</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>M: 3 / W: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and Civic Engagement</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>M: 1 / W: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community or International Development and Foundations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>M: 1 / W: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associations and Special Interest Groups</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>M: 1 / W: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>M: 9 / W: 11</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR-focused organizations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>M: 3 / W: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police and government</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>M: 2 / W: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts / Informed persons</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>M: 2 / W: -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Total participants (n) = 30; Gender distribution: Men (M) = 16; Women (W) = 14.

In addition to interviews with the participants listed in Table 8, I conducted informal conversations with six police officers (four from the RCMP), two civilians attached to regional police agencies, and several leaders (over 20) of Muslim CSOs. Conversations with these individuals are not included in the data analysis, either because they were unwilling to sign consent forms, or because we could not find time to arrange a formal interview during the period I was collecting data for my research. Nevertheless, these conversations provided me valuable insights that allowed me to deepen (and validate) the analysis of the data included in this study.

In order to gain a first-hand understanding of how CSOs interpreted CR policies, how state institutions presented the importance of CR policies, and the interaction between representatives of state institutions and CSOs, I attended five counter-
radicalization related events during the course of my research: 1) in November 2018, a counter-radicalization conference organized by the Organization for the Prevention of Violence titled, *Partnering in Practice: Preventing Social Polarizations* in Edmonton (AB); 2) in June 2019, an annual meeting focusing on radicalization held by the John Howard Society of Ontario in Barrie (ON); 3) in November 2019, a counterterrorism training (CTIO) workshop run by the RCMP in Markham (ON); 4) in March 2020, a symposium titled, *Addressing Unconscious Bias, Diversity, and Inclusion in National Security*, by Public Safety Canada in Ottawa (ON); and 5) in December 2020, a virtual event, *From Coast to Coast: The Mapping of Canadian P/CVE Programs*, publicizing a new report by the Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence (CPN-PREV). During these events, I used a participant observation approach to examine the content of these sessions, the framing used by government versus CSOs, and the dynamics during interactions between CSOs and government agencies (Li, 2008). In addition, I carefully reviewed and interpreted government documents and parliamentary hearings related to counter-radicalization (though these were not formally coded). The aim of the document review was to understand the intent and rationale of policy choices and the discourse used to justify government priorities. Finally, in order to situate the remarks of my participants temporally and in the context of larger public discourse, I relied on news stories from national and regional news agencies to verify matters of historical record. Thus, I lent strength and validity to my qualitative research through triangulation of data from multiple sources (Fusch et al., 2018).
**Data Collection in the U.K.**

I began the data collection phase in the U.K. in April 2019, a few months after starting data collection in Canada. I followed the same process as in Canada. Based on secondary research, I made a list of potential Muslim CSOs in England and Wales that had experience on matters of national security (six in total), and relied on professional contacts to make introductions to leaders at a handful of Muslim CSOs. Participants I met during the first stage of interviews introduced me to participants from other CSOs. I made three trips to the U.K. for data collection, for seven to 10 days each in April 2019, July 2019, and November 2019. As a result of visiting the U.K. for only brief periods of time and several interview meetings getting cancelled due to scheduling conflicts, I was able to collect data from far fewer participants in the U.K. Nevertheless, my data captures representative voices from Muslim CSOs of different function types and CSOs that represent Muslim communities of different denominations. As CR policies in the U.K. impact the social services sector, I included among my participants a worker at a health unit and a teacher who worked in a neighbourhood with a predominantly Muslim population. In addition to Muslim CSOs, I was able to speak with two participants who manage organizations implementing CR-focused programs. None of the government or police officials I attempted to contact replied to requests for interview; therefore, I was not able to include them in my research. I also spoke with one academic familiar with the CR landscape in the U.K. Broadly speaking, participants I interviewed in the U.K. had much to share about the experiences of Muslim CSOs with CR policies, which have been active since 2006 and have affected the Muslim community profoundly. The U.K. also has a far more robust record of research, reports, and news coverage of Prevent and its impact on Muslim CSOs. Therefore, even though I was able to recruit fewer participants
in the U.K., I was able to complement my primary data with the extensive secondary data on the Muslim experience with CR policies in the U.K. The analysis of government documents and important reports by various civil liberties and human rights organizations allowed me to build confidence in my interview data analysis. News reports helped me place remarks by participants among prevailing public discourses at different points in time. Table 9 provides information about my anonymized research participants from the U.K. When attributing statements to participants from the U.K., I use the label “PUK” followed by an assigned interview number. In Appendix 2, I provide additional details about the CSO types to which participants belong, the date of the participant interviews, and the region of England and Wales where the included CSOs are located.

Table 9
Participants and Organizations from the U.K.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslim CSOs by function type</th>
<th>Number of organizations</th>
<th>Number of participants</th>
<th>Gender distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights and Political Advocacy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>M: 1 / W: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Settlement and Social Services</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>M: 2 / W: -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Services and Theological Education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>M: 1 / W: -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and Civic Engagement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>M: - / W: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community or International Development and Foundations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>M: 1 / W: -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associations and Special Interest Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>M: 1 / W: -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>M: 6 / W: 4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| CR-focused organizations                                       | 2                       | 2                      | M: 1 / W: 1        |
| Police and government                                          | -                       | -                      | M: - / W: -        |
| Experts / informed persons                                     | 1                       | 1                      | M: 1 / W: -        |

*Note. Total participants (n) = 13; Gender distribution: Men (M) = 8; Women (W) = 5.*
**Outreach and Interview Protocol**

I contacted all participants through a recruitment email. The recruitment email contained information about the objective of my research and an attached consent form including the terms of confidentiality and anonymity of my research. The consent form clarified that participants would not be identified by name and would be given the option to identify their organizations or keep their organization’s name anonymous. Almost all participants from Muslim CSOs chose not to identify their organizations, while government officials from Canada were comfortable disclosing their affiliation.

The vast majority of my interviews took place as face-to-face, in-person conversations. Most interviews lasted about an hour, with the shortest interview taking 45 minutes and the two longest ones taking over three hours. I travelled to meet the participants at a location of their convenience. For logistical and scheduling reasons, in Canada, I had to conduct one interview over the phone and in the U.K., I had to conduct two interviews via Skype video call. All in-person interviews were recorded using a digital recording device. In my interviews with CSOs, I asked about the focus of their organization’s work, how they understood the problem of radicalization, how they assessed the CR policy environment, their experience interacting with state agencies on matters pertaining to CR policies, and their organizational responses to CR policies and a prevailing national security climate that primarily targets Muslim communities. In interviews with government and police agents, I asked about the history of CR policies, what they saw as the objectives of these policies, and what they thought about the critiques of CR policies overly focusing on Muslim communities. I have included my interviews protocols in Appendix 3. All digitally recorded interviews were transcribed.
Once I verified the interview data, the original digital recording was removed from the digital recording device.

Data Analysis

I began analyzing the interview data from Canada in June 2019 and the U.K. data in December 2019. I sequenced the interviews and the analysis in this manner so that Canadian data could help me identify and think through the theoretical implications, which I could examine and test during the U.K. data analysis. This proved to be a worthwhile strategy as it helped me develop confidence in my theoretical framework. The sequencing of data analysis also allowed me to undertake a systematic comparison of CR policies and the processes through which they have impacted Muslim CSOs.

For analysis of the interview data, I used NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software. NVivo has been noted to be beneficial for managing, analyzing, and coding different types of qualitative data in various fields (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). I used NVivo to code my transcribed interviews and field notes. Following my conceptual framework (Chapter 2), the coding categories were derived to capture how CR policies create relations of power between state institutions and CSOs. I started with an initial set of coding categories that I refined as I undertook data analysis. The coded interview data helped to guide the categories under which I present my findings. The data coding categories are listed in Appendix 4.

Research Ethics

As my research involved human subjects, I obtained clearance for my dissertation research from the Carleton University Research Ethics Board. I began data collection after I obtained ethics approval for this project on 18 September 2018. All interview data is encrypted and stored on a dedicated flash drive. I gave participants the option to opt
out of the study if they changed their mind after the interview, though none did. My
interviews were conducted with participants in their professional capacity; nevertheless,
in order to avoid any possible risk to them, I assured them that they would not be
identified by name. Being anonymous also allowed participants to be as frank as possible
about sensitive matters during the interview. I also provided participants the option to
have their organization name identified; however, the vast majority of participants chose
not to have their organizations identified. During the course of the interviews, it became
clear why. A few participants shared informally that they did not want their remarks to
cause negative repercussions for their organizations, including greater scrutiny from state
security agencies or reprisals related to funding. As a result, I decided to de-identify all
Muslim CSO names in presenting findings. I took additional care to make sure
organizations (and individuals) are not easily identifiable based on other types of
information. For example, instead of stating the city of the participant organization in
Canada, I, instead mention the region or province. I take seriously my responsibility as a
researcher in working among vulnerable communities; I believe I have taken the
necessary precautions to ensure no harm or risk comes to my participants as a result of
their participation in this research study.

Research Limitations

In this section, I discuss some of the limitations of my dissertation research. The
first limitation is a product of my research design. Since I am using a case-oriented
qualitative comparative methodology, my theoretical inferences hold within a specific
geographical and temporal scope (Della Porta, 2008a). In other words, my findings
convey the process through which CR policies impact Muslim CSOs in the context of
three provinces in Canada and three regions in England and Wales. To achieve greater
generalizability, additional research is required where the scope conditions are relaxed so the validity of my theoretical propositions can be further tested (Rohlfing, 2012).

The second limitation has to do with the sample of organizations included in this study. I relied on a combination of purposive and snowball sampling to recruit participants from Muslim CSOs of different function types from different regions. CSOs included in the study also had experiences interacting with national security agencies in significant ways. Nevertheless, the sample of organizations included in my study is limited in a few ways. First, with more time and resources, my sample could be improved by including a greater number of Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K., although in the case of the U.K., I was able to rely on extensive secondary research to supplement my primary data. Second, my Canadian sample included many more organizations centered in Ontario relative to other provinces. To some extent, this is to be expected, considering almost half of Canadian Muslim communities reside in Ontario (Shah, 2019). Still, my organizational sample could be strengthened by including more CSOs from western provinces. Also, missing from my sample are Muslim CSOs based in British Columbia and Québec. The experience of Québec warrants special attention as the province has had fraught relations with Muslim communities as attested in Québec Charter of Values debate, the deadly mosque shootings in 2017, and legislative actions such as the hijab ban for public sector employees via the passage of Bill-21 (Bakali, 2015; Koussens, 2020).

Third, most of the CSOs in my sample serve communities of the Sunni Muslim denomination. My sample would benefit from greater inclusion of organizations serving other Muslim denominations. Finally, most of the CSOs in my sample serve Arab and South Asian Muslim communities. Notably, my sample would need to include a greater
number of Black-led Muslim CSOs to adequately reflect the particular experiences of Black Muslims, whose marginalization occurs at the intersection of Islamophobia and anti-Black racism.

Finally, case-oriented qualitative research is often critiqued for not producing data that is valid (the data is “accurate”) and reliable (repeated inquiries yield the same data) (Babbie, 2007; Della Porta, 2008a). However, this charge is misleading on both counts. First, as qualitative researchers routinely do, I have used triangulation techniques to validate my findings (Fusch et al., 2018). The opinions expressed in interviews reflect a reality facing Muslim CSOs and Muslim communities that has been similarly assessed in other independent studies. Second, my own lived experience informs the data analysis I undertook. However, I view this as a strength and contribution of research, not a shortcoming. In the next section, I provide a reflexive statement where I acknowledge my positionality in greater detail.

**Reflexive Statement**

As I noted in the previous section, my lived experiences including my professional background and my positionality as a racialized scholar of Muslim background were crucial in shaping the scope and direction of my dissertation research. I became interested in this dissertation research project as a result of an incident at my previous job. Prior to starting my PhD, I was part of the leadership team at a U.S. nonprofit organization, Soliya, that works with youth from Muslim majority countries and from the U.S. and Europe. At some point during my tenure at Soliya, the U.S. Department of State approached Soliya inviting the organization to apply for CR-related funding. This incident made me curious about the concepts of radicalization and counter-radicalization and how CSOs are recruited within the ambit of national security efforts.
My positionality as a racialized Muslim researcher informed this research in profound ways. I was working as an immigrant in the U.S. when the events of 9/11 transpired. Since then, I witnessed the unfolding of the ‘war on terror’ that had significant repercussions for Muslim communities around the world. Reading stories about detentions and torture of Muslims affected me deeply. I coped by making light of ‘travelling while Muslim,’ but also calibrated for the potential of a ‘random’ security check. In fact, my professional work with Soliya was partly motivated by a desire to engage meaningfully with a public and political climate that vilified Muslims. In any regard, I brought this background (or, perhaps, baggage) into my interviews with participants. I would like to think my cultural and religious background helped me gain access to people and have the types of conversations that another researcher might not have had. The goal of my interviews was to learn from the opinions of participants, but when asked, I was forthcoming about my own views on CR policies. My living and working in Canada also meant that I was able to more readily connect with Muslim CSOs in Canada than in the U.K.

Finally, through this research, I was motivated to present a perspective that is often overlooked in dominant public and media discourse about Muslim stories. In mainstream terrorism studies as well, Muslim communities are reduced to objects to be managed through national security governance (Ali, 2014). My goal was to tell stories of Muslim communities through representatives of the community. I saw my role as telling those stories while being mindful of negative stereotypes (for example that ‘radicalization’ is endemic to Muslim communities) and placing my findings in broader theoretical and empirical context. Taking my cue from critical studies in terrorism, I hope
my research can contest “taken for granted knowledge” in mainstream terrorism studies that shapes national security policies (R. Jackson, 2012). Ultimately, I would consider my research as having met its goals if my participants feel it has reflected their voices faithfully and can be used by Muslim CSOs to further advocacy on behalf of Muslim communities.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have provided details of my research design and methodology. I have justified the choice of a case-oriented, qualitative comparative research design for my research that examines the impact of CR policies on Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. I have provided my case selection rationale, my data collection strategy, and the data analysis process. I have discussed how I fulfilled my ethical responsibilities as a researcher and how my positionality as a racialized scholar of Muslim background had bearing on the research process. In the next two chapters (Chapters 4 and 5), I present my analysis of the evolution of CR policies in Canada and the U.K., respectively, followed by a comparative analysis of the two countries’ CR policy development in Chapter 6.
Chapter 4 – CR Policy Development in Canada

The current chapter (Chapter 4) and the next chapter (Chapter 5) are dedicated to outlining the development, evolution, and implementation of CR policies in Canada and the U.K., respectively, from 2000 onwards. For each country, I identify the specific exogenous shocks of political violence by domestic Muslims that provided “critical junctures” for CR policy change (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). In both countries, CR policies were based upon the “critical antecedents” (Slater & Simmons, 2010) of counterterrorism measures established in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Differences in the critical junctures operative in Canada and the U.K. produced divergent timelines in each country with respect to the development of CR policies. However, “policy mobilizing” (Peck & Theodore, 2010) – policy ideas converged upon and shared via transnational fora – informed the content of CR policies in each country as they developed. In both countries, a common understanding of the problem of ‘radicalization’ as the ideological transformation of Muslims towards ‘extreme’ beliefs has led to their surveillance and control. CR policies aim not only to prevent a future occurrence of political violence but also to shape cultural and ideological norms of Muslims in order to disrupt their ‘radicalization.’

This chapter, Chapter 4, outlines the development and evolution of CR policy in Canada over three timeframes: between the years 2000 and 2006, between 2006 and 2015, and 2015 onwards. Figure 4 shows, in broad strokes, the development of CR policies in Canada through these time periods.
2000 – 2006: Prevalence of Counterterrorism over Counter-radicalization

The shocking attacks of 9/11 in the U.S. mark a critical juncture that initiated the global ‘war on terror’ and remapped the national security policy landscape across the world. The ‘war on terror’ introduced counterterrorism legislation and national security policing practices that would become the critical antecedents to future CR policy development. Canada was particularly impacted after 9/11 because of its geographical proximity to the U.S., the erroneous idea that one of the attackers had travelled to the U.S. from Canada, and the fear that Canada might be the next target (Roach, 2005). The Anti-terrorism Act (ATA) introduced changes to the Criminal Code, which, for the first time, defined terrorism as an act committed “in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause . . . with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its economic security” (section 83.01 of the Criminal Code). The ATA changes represented a marked
departure from traditional criminal law standards by defining a crime (“terrorism”) based on type of motive, by curtailing suspects’ rights against self-incrimination, and by expanding pre-emptive policing through preventative arrests and restraining orders (i.e., terrorism peace bonds) (Roach, 2005). With a primary focus on transnational terrorism, CT practices were enhanced to include 1) the tightening of asylum seeking and the use of immigration law to detain suspected individuals and conduct secret hearings based on the issuance of a security certificate, 2) the scrutinizing of financial transactions by organizations and individuals sending funds internationally, and 3) the listing of terrorist groups and individuals associated with those groups. This listing later led to the 2007 Passenger Protect Program or the “no-fly list” which prevents people suspected of having terror links from traveling by air (Aiken, 2000; Roach, 2005). In 2005, the government established Public Safety Canada and Emergency Preparedness Canada (later to become Public Safety Canada), which among other things was charged with coordinating national security activities among various policing and security agencies.

These changes to Canadian counterterrorism practices were clearly the result of policy mobilizing. The focus on terrorist financing and the tightening of refugee flows was a response to guidance under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 (Roach, 2006). The definition of terrorism in the Criminal Code reflected a similar definition used by the U.K. under the Terrorism Act 2000. The core ideas informing counterterrorism efforts in Canada and elsewhere were based on the “new terrorism thesis,” which found resonance across security agencies in the west (Stampnitzky, 2014). As I explained in Chapter 2, according to the new terrorism thesis – itself a discursive frame that informed national security policy mobilizing on a global scale – the nature of terrorism had transformed
after the end of the Cold War because political violence by Muslim perpetrators represented a new and more dangerous type of terrorist threat (Kundnani, 2012b; Laqueur, 2000). The new terrorism thesis, already popular in security circles before 9/11, was validated by the attacks of 9/11 and became the quasi-official outlook for counterterrorism policy making. New counterterrorism laws and practices were established based on the belief that previous experiences and responses to terrorism were no longer relevant to tackle the “new” Islamist threat. Even though Canadian laws and policies did not explicitly identify Muslims as dangerous, in practice, counterterrorism efforts were directed to tackle the ‘Islamist’ threat and target Muslims, who had ethnic, racial, and familial attachments to countries in West Asia and North Africa, and who, thus, became targets of surveillance, profiling, and policing (Bahdi, 2003; Razack, 2007). Muslims (and Arabs) faced numerous instances of individual and systemic discrimination as a result of being targeted by counterterrorism practices (Bahdi, 2003). Muslims were more likely to be stopped during border travel, disproportionately targeted in national security investigations, represented as menacing others in the media, and faced with a climate of increased anti-Muslim hate (Bahdi, 2003; Hanniman, 2008; Karim, 2000; Razack, 2007; Zine, 2001). It was believed that CSIS had paid informants spying on Muslims in mosques (El Akkad, 2006), and it had become commonplace for the RCMP and CSIS to visit Muslims at their homes and workplaces to make intimidating inquiries about national security investigations (CAIR-CAN, 2004). Some of the most egregious instances of discrimination occurred when inaccurate information passed from Canadian to U.S. security agencies led to the rendition and torture of Maher Arar and other Arab-Canadians (House of Commons Canada, 2009; O’Connor, 2006; Pither, 2008).
In the years just following 9/11, ‘hard’ counter-terrorism practices of detention and investigation dominated the Canadian national security response. Canada relied on instruments of Immigration law, such as security certificates, instead of terrorism charges (C. Bell, 2006a). There were virtually no references to ‘radicalization,’ ‘extremism,’ or counter-radicalization in policy documents or parliamentary debates on national security. In 2004, following a three-year review of Canada’s counterterrorism legislation, the Paul Martin Liberal government released Canada’s first national security strategy in a report titled, *Securing an Open Society* (Privy Council Office, 2004). Reeling from the experiences of the 2003 SARS outbreak and informed by the 2004 Madrid train bombings by a local Al-Qaeda cell, the document acknowledged that Canada’s national security approach balances national security with “core Canadian values of openness, diversity and respect for civil liberties” (Privy Council Office, 2004, p. vii). While noting “religious extremism” and “domestic extremism” among terrorist threats facing Canada, the strategy also indicated that Canada wished to avoid “stigmatization” of specific communities and that community involvement would be necessary to “prevent” future Madrid-like attacks. These comments were a response to critiques from academics and civil society groups who had noted the “disproportionate impact” of national security policies on Arab and Muslims in Canada and charitable organizations doing humanitarian work in the Middle East (see Department of Justice Canada, 2004). The strategy document is among the earliest references to community engagement and prevention that undergird present-day CR policies. The document recommended the establishment of the Cross Cultural Roundtable on Security (CCRS) comprising members of “ethno-cultural and religious communities from across Canada” who would “engage in a long-term
dialogue to improve understanding on how to manage security interests in a diverse society and will provide advice to promote the protection of civil order, mutual respect and common understanding” (Privy Council Office, 2004, p. 2).

This period of policy development is notable for the formation of the critical antecedents to the development of CR policy. Both the emergent landscape of counterterrorism law and practices, and the dominant discourses surrounding them – influenced by the new terrorism thesis – began to crystallize as components of a shared epistemic frame and policy-making environment for national security. National security activity was marked by the domination of ‘hard’ counterterrorism practices and the security practice of treating Muslims and Arabs as risky subjects and security threats based their race, religion, and ethnicity. As the following sections elucidate, CR policies in Canada can be seen as a direct extension of counterterrorism practices. Even as Canadian security institutions began to shift toward community-oriented or ‘soft’ national security policing approaches, their engagement with Muslim communities remained fraught. The discrimination faced by Muslim communities has impacted the buy-in to national security initiatives among Muslim communities. As I discuss in the next section, a conjunction of national security related developments domestically and the European experiences of political violence, such as the 2004 Madrid train attacks and the 2005 London transit system attacks, provided the critical juncture that opened the door for CR policy development in Canada.

2006 – 2015: The Beginnings of Counter-radicalization

The decade corresponding to Stephen Harper’s Conservative government (2006 – 2015) marks a distinct period for CR policy development in Canada, during which the problem of radicalization was gradually acknowledged. There are a few events that led to
the shift in CR policies in 2006. The year before, a series of coordinated attacks on the London transit system directed security attention toward the problem of ‘homegrown terrorism’ – understood as a problem of Muslims born and raised in the west who were ‘radicalized’ and plotted or perpetrated terrorist attacks on western soil without interference from foreign militant groups (Crone & Harrow, 2011). In early 2006, the newly elected Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper prioritized the ramping up of ‘hard’ counterterrorism efforts to combat radicalization. The new government expanded anti-terrorism measures, added more groups to the list of terrorist entities, intensified the financial tracking of terrorist groups, and tightened immigration and refugee flows based on the belief that terrorists were entering Canada (Collacott, 2006; Nesbitt, 2019). A report by the conservative think tank, the Fraser Institute, identified the problem of terrorism as lying within Muslim and other ethnic communities and insisted more had to be done to make these communities adhere to “Canadian values” and that “moderate” Muslims should be enlisted to support national security efforts (Collacott, 2006). These notions indicate policy mobilizing as they reflect how the problem of ‘radicalization’ was being thought about in the U.K.

In late 2006, the O’Connor Commission of Inquiry report assessing the actions of Canadian national security agencies in relation to the torture and rendition of Syrian Canadian, Maher Arar, was released. Relying on copious CSO testimonies of discrimination of Arabs and Muslims in national security investigations, the report

35 In its public report, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) defined “homegrown extremism” as “the indoctrination and radicalization of individuals into the ideology espoused and propagated by al-Qaida,” making explicit that homegrown terrorism refers to terrorist violence by Muslim individuals purportedly motivated by “extremist political or religious ideologies” (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2010, p. 13).
recommended that the RCMP should seriously address “racial, ethnic, and religious profiling” and discrimination of Muslim communities as it was counter-productive to building community trust necessary to tackle national security concerns (O’Connor, 2006). In response to the recommendations of the O’Connor Report, the RCMP established the National Security Community Outreach Program (NSCOP) run by community coordinators at each RCMP Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (INSET) located in the six largest cities of Canada: Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Edmonton, Calgary, and Vancouver (C. Edwards et al., 2015; Hanniman, 2008). Based on a community policing model, the NSCOP aims “to promote understanding and dialogue with the Canadian public, including the minority communities that are most likely to be impacted by National Security policing measures and anti-terrorism legislation” (Hanniman, 2008, p. 279). Under the NSCOP, RCMP officers conduct meetings with community and CSO leaders from Muslim, Arab, South Asian, and Tamil communities, attend community events, and inform people about the different terrorism prevention activities of the RCMP.

According to Hanniman (2008), through the NSCOP, a Muslim community advisory committee suggested outreach protocols for the RCMP, which included limiting workplace visits, refraining from “inappropriate” and intimidating questioning, and avoiding interviewing women alone (p. 280). Through NSCOP, the RCMP sought to establish key contacts, build trust with impacted communities, and enlist community help in counterterrorism efforts (C. Edwards et al., 2015). The comprehensive report by Edwards et al. (2015) suggests that NSCOP efforts are also considered important for building “community resilience” against “violent extremism” and radicalization of “lone
actors,” individuals who “self-radicalize” toward violent extremism. However, it concludes that RCMP senior officers view NSCOP and other community outreach efforts to be far less important than the RCMP’s investigative functions. In other words, while the establishment of the NSCOP was (and continues to be) the template for RCMP’s counter-radicalization efforts, it is pursued half-heartedly. An RCMP officer echoed the same sentiments during an RCMP-led counterterrorism training I attended during my field research in November 2019.

Evidence of policy mobilizing, especially from the U.K. to Canada, is also apparent in this period. A 2009 report prepared for the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) captures the learnings of an RCMP-led Canadian police delegation after a 2008 visit to the U.K. to study its CR strategy, Prevent (CACP, 2009). The report relied on the U.K.’s conception of radicalization, defining it as a “process by which individuals are introduced to and accept an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views” (CACP, 2009, p. 2). While praising the “whole-of-government” approach adopted by the U.K., the report noted that the “nature of the radicalization threat in Canada is different” (p. 2). The report established the salience of radicalization for Canada by citing the so-called Toronto-18 plot disrupted by the RCMP in 2006, and the ongoing terrorism trial of Momin Khawaja. It criticized Prevent’s exclusive focus on Muslim communities and “the threats and risks posed by radicalization and extremism associated with Islamist ideology” (p. 12). In practice, however, Canadian counterterrorism policing and NSCOP

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36 The “Toronto 18” refers to the 14 adults and 4 youths arrested and charged with plotting terrorist attacks in Southern Ontario (McCoy & Knight, 2015). Momin Khawaja – the first person charged under the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act – was convicted in 2009 for financing and facilitating a bomb plot in the U.K. (CBC, 2009).
efforts continued to disproportionately target Muslim communities in Canada. Around this time, the RCMP launched the counterterrorism training workshop titled the Counter-Terrorism Information Officer Initiative (CTIO) that would offer terrorism and radicalization training to “frontline” agencies such as municipal and provincial police, correctional services staff, firefighters, first-aid responders, transportation and energy sector staff, and others (CACP, 2010, p. 5). The offerings of CTIO workshops have since grown and continue to this day (F. Ahmad & Monaghan, 2021; S. Bell, 2019). In June 2009, the RCMP released an independent report titled, Radicalization: A Guide for the Perplexed, re-iterating the definition of ‘radicalization’ from the CACP report. Even though the RCMP report claimed radicalization is not a “Muslim thing,” it spent significant time describing the problem of “homegrown,” “Islamist” radicalization (RCMP, 2009). The report stated that the goal of CR efforts led by the RCMP is “to build communities that are resilient to radicalization that could lead to terrorist violence through effective support and prevention programming ” (RCMP, 2009, p. 15). Through his research of internal RCMP, CSIS, and Public Safety Canada documents, Monaghan (2014) revealed how notions of radicalization among national security agencies were constructed around the “Islamist” and Muslim threat. Ultimately, even as ‘radicalization’ was acknowledged, it remained an elastic concept both specific to Islam and vague enough to be applied to a wide range of “problematic” ideologies (Monaghan, 2014).

In 2011, a Special Senate Committee on Anti-Terrorism confirmed “the centrality of Islamist extremism as a threat to Canada and to Canadians” (Senate of Canada, 2011, p. 9). The report made a case for investing in more research to learn about “radicalization to violence” in Canada. The same year, Public Safety Canada announced the Kanishka
Project that would fund research to “understand terrorism in the Canadian context” and how “policies and programs can best counter terrorism and violent extremism in Canada” (Public Safety Canada, 2015). Through the Kanishka Project, the government would invest $10 million over five years on terrorism and radicalization related research-oriented projects (Public Safety Canada, 2016a). Among other initiatives, the Kanishka Project would go on to fund a research network called the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS) and a project run by the Canadian Council on Muslim Women to build resilience via inter-community and inter-faith dialogues. Later that year, on the ten-year anniversary of 9/11, Prime Minster Stephen Harper asserted that “Islamicism” was still the “biggest” threat to Canada, claiming the problem had become “diffuse” and emanated from “home-grown Islamic radicals” (CBC, 2011b). As other scholars have noted, the spectre of “homegrown” radicals affirmed the status of Muslims as “dangerous internal foreigners” who had to be policed, surveilled, and subject to counterterrorism and CR interventions (Dhamoon & Abu-Laban, 2009; Kowalski, 2016). During this time, despite the NSCOP outreach efforts, hostile RCMP and CSIS visits to homes and workplaces of Muslims continued as before.

These earlier attempts to articulate and address the problem of radicalization were also reflected in Canada’s 2012 counterterrorism strategy, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism*, which notes that “[v]iolent Islamist extremism is the leading threat to Canada’s national security” (Public Safety Canada, 2013a, p. 2). The use of the notion of “resilience” is evidence of policy mobilizing of a paradigm that was gaining traction in counterterrorism efforts globally (Jacoby, 2016). Citing examples of the Toronto-18 plot and Momin Khawaja’s terrorism charge, Canada’s counterterrorism strategy identified
the risk of radicalization of “‘homegrown’ Sunni Islamist extremists” (Public Safety Canada, 2013a, p. 7). With the overarching aim of “building resilience” defined as “fostering a society in which individuals and communities are able to withstand violent extremist ideologies and challenge those who espouse them” (p. 11), the strategy specified a “Prevent” element. The “Prevent” component in Canada’s counterterrorism strategy not only reused the title of U.K.’s CR strategy (Prevent) but also took inspiration from its content. In the U.K., the initial version of the Prevent strategy sought to both “tackle violent extremism” and foster “community cohesion” (DCLG, 2007, p. 9). The “Prevent” element in Canada’s counterterrorism strategy shares similar aspirations, suggesting policy mobilizing from the U.K. Continuing to view radicalization as a process of ideological transformation, Canada’s “Prevent” element aimed to: 1) develop greater community resilience to violent extremism and radicalization, 2) challenge “violent extremist ideology,” and 3) reduce the risk of individuals “succumbing” to violent extremism and radicalization (Public Safety Canada, 2013a, p. 15). The “Prevent” element was based on “building partnerships with” and “working closely” with communities and local-level partners. As examples of existing “Prevent” work, the strategy cited the RCMP’s National Security Outreach Program (NSCOP) and the Public Safety Canada led Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security (CCRS). Interestingly, the 2011 Senate Committee report had critiqued the CCRS for not being sufficiently independent from Public Safety Canada and for becoming a “one-way briefing from the Department [of Public Safety],” rather than a roundtable where legitimate community grievances could be heard (Senate of Canada, 2011). The Building Resilience Against Terrorism strategy was also among the earliest instances of the government’s plans to
support “positive alternative narratives” to counter ‘extremist’ ideology, even though such programming did not materialize until several years later.

In sum, this period marked the beginning of Canadian security agencies acknowledging and formulating the problem of ‘radicalization.’ The conception of ‘radicalization’ adopted by Canada, as an ideological transformation toward ‘violent extremism,’ was influenced by the U.K.’s definition (Monaghan, 2015). Yet, as policies travel as “selective discourses” and “inchoate ideas,” Canada did not fully replicate U.K.’s CR approach but rather selectively plucked some paradigms and practices, such as “Prevent” (Peck & Theodore, 2010). These were operationalized based on existing infrastructures of security and policing. In this context, Public Safety Canada made overtures of community outreach through the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security and funded research under the Kanishka Project. At the same time, the RCMP pursued community policing and offering counterterrorism trainings for select “frontline” institutions. The federal counterterrorism strategy document emphasized “building resilience” through these efforts. It appeared that Canada had imported a patchwork of ideas from the U.K. versus the whole “package” of Prevent (Peck & Theodore, 2010, p. 170). The result was a mix of dispersed and uneven CR policies and practices. This period continued to be dominated by ‘hard’ counterterrorism practices (arrests, tightening of immigration, growing the list of terrorist entities, and others) with a tepid foray into CR policies. The perceived threat of “Islamist extremism” remained at the heart of terrorism prevention in Canada.

2015 – Present: The Institutionalization of Counter-radicalization

There were several reasons for a shift in CR policies in 2015. In response to an unprecedented attack over two consecutive days in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu (Québec)
and Ottawa in 2014 by two individuals allegedly influenced by ‘Islamist’ ideology, the Harper Conservatives overhauled the ATA (via the controversial Bill C-51), facilitating greater use of ‘hard’ counterterrorism laws and policies. Later that year, when the Trudeau Liberals came to power holding a majority government, they began their term with a commitment to amending some of the draconian elements of counterterrorism measures introduced through Bill C-51 and to establishing a federal agency that would coordinate CR efforts nationally. At the same time, in response to the mounting panic around ‘foreign fighters,’ various provinces and municipalities started developing their own CR initiatives. Starting in 2016, as the federal government ramped up CR funding through the Community Resilience Fund, CR-focused organizations and initiatives grew across the country. In 2018, the federal government released a national CR strategy, and CR efforts largely continue to maintain focus on ‘radicalization’ of Muslim youth. However, with the defeat of the terrorist group, ISIS, in 2018, and with recent public and political attention on white supremacist violence, CR policies have been showing an appetite to tackle other forms of violence deemed to be disruptive to Canadian law and order. In this section, I outline the chronology of these developments in CR policies.

Understanding the CR policy changes in 2015 requires an examination of how the threat of radicalization was perceived in the immediately preceding years. Since releasing the Building Resilience Against Terrorism strategy in 2012, the Canadian government has been publishing an annual Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada (e.g. Public Safety Canada, 2013b, 2014, 2016b). The 2014 report raised serious concerns about the phenomenon of “extremist travellers” or “foreign fighters,” individuals who travel to participate in conflicts in Syria, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Public Safety Canada,
The report highlighted cases of Muslim youth from Ontario and Alberta who were identified as “extremist travellers,” implying that the radicalization of Muslim youth had become a pressing national security issue. The report suggested that “extremist travellers” returning to Canada may pose a threat of domestic terrorism in Canada. A separate public report by CSIS expressed “alarm” about “the increasing number of Canadian citizens or residents who leave the country to participate in terrorist activities abroad” affirming that “[s]uch individuals pose very serious threats to the security of Canada” (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2014). The “foreign fighter” phenomenon served to elevate the problem of ‘radicalization.’ The government responses continued to focus on ‘hard’ measures such as travel restrictions and arrests. Community-oriented CR efforts referred to the CCRS and more “training and dialogue with communities” so they could better understand the threats posed by “radicalization to violence” (Public Safety Canada, 2014). In a thinly veiled reference to the responsibilization of Muslim communities, the RCMP clarified that the purpose of the training and education was for communities to learn “the responsibilities that they, in turn, have in safeguarding Canada” (Cullen, 2014).

In conjunction with a panic around foreign fighters, concerns were mounting about “lone actors” who operate individually and do not belong to an organized terrorist group, but still “self-radicalize” toward “violent extremism” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Spaaij, 2011). The fears of lone actor radicalization echoed CSIS and RCMP concerns of the “ordinariness” of radicalization, making them difficult to identify and address (Freeze, 2011; RCMP, 2009). As examples of the threats posed by the radicalization of lone actors, the 2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada cited the Boston Marathon bombings in the U.S. (Markon et al., 2013), the arrests of
Esseghaier and Jaser for the VIA Rail plot (CBC, 2015a), and the arrests of Nuttal and Korody for planning an attack on the B.C. Legislature Building (CBC, 2015b). Canadian policing and security officials were concerned about the impact of the emergent terrorist group, ISIS, encouraging lone actors to commit acts of terrorism (S. Bell, 2014b). The October 2014 attacks in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu (Quebec) and in Parliament Hill, Ottawa over a period of two consecutive days only confirmed the threat of lone actor terrorism in Canada (Zekulin, 2014). The attackers in both situations were Muslim converts who were identified as radicalized lone actors inspired by ‘Islamist’ ideology (Gollom, 2014; Woods & Bruser, 2014). The unprecedented attacks shattered the belief that Canada was largely immune to the types of ‘Islamist’ inspired terrorist attacks in the U.K. and the U.S. (C. Edwards et al., 2015).

The attacks constituted the exogenous shocks that set into motion significant changes in counterterrorism and CR activity (Forcese & Roach, 2015). In the aftermath of the October 2014 attacks, the Harper government accelerated the passage of the Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act, which gave CSIS expanded investigative powers (Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act, 2015) and operationalized the previously passed Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, which gave the government the power to revoke the citizenship of dual citizens convicted of terrorism (Canadian Bar Association, 2014). In January 2015, Prime Minister Stephen Harper declared “violent jihadism” as a danger to all Canadians and tabled Bill C-51 (the Anti-Terrorism Act 2015) to overhaul counterterrorism legislation (McGregor & O’Malley, 2015). Changes included lowering the threshold of proof for terrorism charges; making it easier to obtain restraining orders (terrorism peace bonds) for suspects; a new charge for promoting or
advocating terrorism offences; granting CSIS increased disruptive powers to expand the agency’s traditional intelligence gathering functions; increasing the duration of preventive detentions; and expanding the definition of activities that “undermine the security of Canada” (Forcense & Roach, 2015). These provisions were widely seen as an embrace of a more draconian counterterrorism approach and faced severe opposition from civil liberties groups and Muslim organizations who were concerned that the changes would result in over-policing of Muslim communities as well as surveillance of various forms of legitimate political dissent (Choudhury, 2017b). Nevertheless, the bill received assent in June 2015.

In light of these developments, it appeared that CR policies at the federal level had all but taken a back seat to counterterrorism efforts. Provinces and municipalities, who were also concerned about ‘radicalization’ and ‘violent extremism,’ began taking initiative, giving rise to new counter-radicalization programs. The city of Montreal and the province of Québec pioneered the institutionalization of counter-radicalization in Canada. Responding to the October 2014 attacks and a wave of Québec youth leaving to participate in the conflict in Syria, the city of Montreal, with support from the province of Québec, established the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV) in March 2015 (CPRLV, 2016). As an independent nonprofit, CPRLV, would develop its own radicalization “prevention” programming and would refer only cases “representing an immediate danger” to the police. Working with partner organizations in education, social work, and healthcare, CPRLV programs ranged from providing radicalization training, to interventions based on social and psychological counselling, and mentoring and reintegration for cases of violent radicalization. CPRLV also has a
research unit and a confidential hotline for residents of Québec to request support for suspected cases of radicalization. In 2015, of the 186 calls that CPRLV received, 71 percent were related to “politico-religious” radicalization, which was shorthand for concerns about ‘Islamist’ radicalization (CPRLV, 2016). In 2015, the government of Québec also adopted a three-year CR action plan which would require ministries of immigration, education, health, and social services to collaborate and develop capacities to address radicalization (Québec, 2015; Valiante, 2015). As a result, several programs emerged to offer radicalization training modules for different ministries (CPN-PREV, 2020; Millett & Ahmad, 2021; Ministère de l’Éducation et Ministère de l’Enseignement supérieur, n.d.).

In Calgary, Alberta, in response to several Muslim youth having travelled or attempted travel to join conflict abroad, the Calgary Police Service (CPS) launched its own CR initiative called Calgary ReDirect in September 2015 (Calgary Police Service, n.d.; Saba, 2019). Calgary ReDirect represented a local law-enforcement (police) led, national security community policing model that drew upon the past experience of CPS in engaging ethnic communities on matters of youth crime (Ottis, 2016). Taking inspiration from the U.K.’s Channel based intervention (described in the next chapter), the ReDirect model relies on referrals of suspected cases of youth radicalization from community members, schools, youth centres, healthcare providers, and other police officers (Calgary Police Service, 2020; Robertson, 2015a). The team, comprising police officers and social workers, assesses the referrals and decides how to proceed (Saba, 2019; D. M. D. Silva & Deflem, 2020). If the case is identified as one of ‘radicalization,’ the ReDirect team approaches the “client” and invites them to participate, on a voluntary
basis, in an individualized intervention and mentorship plan developed in partnership with other social services agencies in the city. Most of the referrals to the ReDirect program have been Muslim youth (Ottis, 2016).

In Toronto, Canada’s largest city, the Toronto Police Service (TPS) based its CR initiative on a “community mobilization model” developed in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan (which was itself modeled on a program in Glasgow, Scotland). In the Saskatchewan model, police work in partnership with local community groups and health, education, and social service agencies to tackle crime and social disorder and improve community safety (Sawatsky et al., 2017). Instead of setting up a new program to tackle radicalization, in June 2015, Toronto added extremism to its existing FOCUS initiative, a police (TPS) and United Way run multi-agency table which meets weekly to identify individuals and groups most “at risk” of crime or social ills, and collectively develop solutions for harm reduction (Beddall, 2019; S. Bell, 2016). A group of social service, youth, education, health, and community service agencies who are part of the FOCUS table can refer confidential cases identified as “Acutely Elevated Risk (AER) Situations” or “situations that merit risk intervention because of a high probability that they are or will eventually become emergencies involving social disorder, crime or victimization” (B. Smith, 2018). The FOCUS table collectively develops an intervention or “wrap around supports” for the case by leveraging the services of a subset of agencies who are part of FOCUS. Interventions are designed to be activated in the “pre-criminal” space with a focus on “risk-reduction” (B. Smith, 2018). It is notable that since inception, radicalization or extremism has not been among the top 25 risks that FOCUS tables have considered (City of Toronto, 2018). Canada’s capital, Ottawa, also pursued a similar
model to Toronto’s, and chose to tackle ‘violent extremism’ through its multi-agency intervention table, MERIT (MERIT, 2015).

In addition to government-led CR initiatives, a patchwork of Muslim community-led CR initiatives appeared across the country (Robertson, 2015c). These initiatives emerged as Muslim communities faced policy pressures to tackle ‘radicalization’ assumed to exist in their communities. In 2014, the Muslim community in Calgary organized a conference with discussions focused on understanding radicalization (Calgary Herald, 2014; CBC, 2014a). The same year, the Somali Congress committed to preventing Somali youth from traveling abroad to participate in conflict by fostering a greater sense of belonging, integrating teens into “positive” networks, and providing religious education and one-on-one mentoring (Hilts, 2014). Around the same time, the imam of a Calgary mosque established an independent religious counselling and social activity program for congregants in his mosque to directly and indirectly address ‘violent extremism’ (Hussain, 2016). In Windsor (Ontario), the imam of a mosque supported the RCMP and law enforcement by counselling a disturbed Muslim youth wishing to travel to participate in conflict abroad (S. Bell, 2014a). The Canadian Council of Imams committed to providing lectures against ‘violent extremism’ in mosques as well as counselling (Ahmed et al., 2018, p. 10). A few other community-based initiatives started work against ‘extremism’ via awareness building and counselling (e.g., the Islamic Foundation of Toronto, Muslims Against Terrorism, and the “CrISIS” education module by the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat) (Ahmed et al., 2018, pp. 6–8). Hayat Canada and Families Against Violent Extremism (FAVE) emerged as initiatives to support the family members of individuals caught in political violence (FAVE, n.d.; Hayat Canada, n.d.).
Paradise Forever was launched by a Muslim convert and former extremist to dissuade individuals from ‘extremism’ via counselling and group discussions (Robertson, 2015c). An active community member of the CCRS, Hussain Hamdani, used his personal capacity to counsel Muslim youth and build connections between Muslim communities and the RCMP and CSIS (Ahmed et al., 2018; Carter, 2014).

As these developments were occurring at the provincial, municipal, and community levels, a sharp change came at the federal level, when the Liberals were elected to a majority government in October 2015. The Liberals ran on a platform to amend the harsh provisions of Bill C-51 that the outgoing Harper Conservatives had codified (Fine, 2015). Notably, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau tasked his Minister of Public Safety with creating “an Office of the Community Outreach and Counterradicalization Coordinator” indicating a renewed federal commitment to CR policies (Prime Minister of Canada, 2015). The Liberals would see this commitment through and establish the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (Canada Centre) in 2017 (Freeze, 2016; Public Safety Canada, 2017a). The Canada Centre’s mandate was to coordinate CR efforts across the country and provide CR policy guidance. After a countrywide consultation, the Canada Centre released a *National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence* in 2018 (Public Safety Canada, 2018a). In this strategy document, the Canada Centre indicated that the federal government would engage in, 1) CR knowledge mobilization, 2) addressing online radicalization, and 3) supporting “intervention,” including existing CR initiatives. Through the Community Resilience Fund (CRF), the Canada Centre started funding CR projects that included research initiatives, new programs, and support for existing CR
initiatives. The Centre was allocated a budget of $35 million for the first five years in the 2016 budget, with $10 million a year of ongoing funding (Public Safety Canada, 2020a). The CRF funding has supported police or public safety-led CR initiatives, research or mapping exercises, and online and nonprofit interventions (see Appendix 6). The CRF funding gave rise to new CR-focused organizations, such as the Organization for Prevention of Violence in Edmonton (OPV, 2018), and new CR programs, such as Project Reset, run by the John Howard Society (John Howard Society, n.d.). Appendix 6 outlines all the projects funded by the CRF.

The establishment of a national CR strategy evinced policy mobilizing as the Canadian strategy aligned with that of other western countries, many of whom had developed national CR strategies in 2015 after the U.N. resolutions on ‘violent extremism’ (D. M. D. Silva & Deflem, 2020). Earlier, in 2014, in response to the alarm around the “foreign fighters” phenomenon, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 2178 encouraging member states to “to engage relevant local communities and non-governmental actors” in developing CR strategies and do so “by empowering youth, families, women, religious, cultural and education leaders, and all other concerned groups of civil society” (U.N. Resolution 2178, 2014, p. 6). An year later, the U.N.’s General Assembly Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism recommended that member states adopt a national CR policy (U.N. General Assembly, 2015). Canada’s federal CR strategy and CR efforts at provincial and municipal levels relied on these same ideas. Policy mobilizing also explains how Canada was able to rapidly import and deploy CR initiatives across different levels of government at the critical junctures created by concerns of ‘Islamist’ terrorism and ‘foreign fighters.’
Since 2015, the CR landscape across Canada has expanded to include several CR
initiatives, which are still in the early stages of implementation (CPN-PREV, 2020).
Despite these developments, the threat assessment had not changed through 2017. The
2016 and 2017 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, continued to view the
“principal” terrorist threat as that of violent extremists inspired by ‘Islamist’ ideology
(Public Safety Canada, 2016b, 2017b). The reports emphasized the risk posed by
returning Canadian extremist travellers. This opinion was shared by CSIS (Canadian
Security Intelligence Service, 2016). Additionally, fears of lone actor (Muslim)
radicalization continued to inform policy, along with greater fears of online radicalization
(Public Safety Canada, 2017b). Canada continued to (and still continues to) use ‘hard’
counterterrorism practices in parallel with its CR strategies. As ‘hard’ counterterrorism
practices continue alongside ‘soft’ CR policies, the two approaches collide, with the
former dominating the latter (Ashworth & Zedner, 2014). The 2017 Public Report on the
Terrorist Threat to Canada boasted the use of terrorism peace bonds (a type of
restraining order), enhanced use of the ATA arrests, the no-fly list, and the listing of
terrorist entities (Public Safety Canada, 2017b). The RCMP INSET teams emphasized
their work on counterterrorism workshops under the Counter-terrorism Information
Officer initiative, which trains first responders to identify signs of ‘radicalization’ and
terrorist threats (mainly related to ‘Islamist’ suspects). Muslims still continue to
experience surveillance and unannounced visitations by the RCMP and CSIS to their
workplaces (Nasser, 2019; Robertson, 2015b).

Another marked shift in CR responses occurred in 2018 as white supremacist and
other forms of “ideologically motivated violent extremism” began to be seen as
legitimate national security threats (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2020). In January 2017, Alexandre Bissonnette, motivated by anti-immigration and Islamophobic sentiments, engaged in deadly mass shootings in a mosque in Québec City (Perreaux, 2018). The shootings in Québec were part of a larger trend across western countries of increasing far-right violence drawing public and political attention (Boutilier, 2018; Cai & Landon, 2019; S. G. Jones, 2018). Canada has had a long-standing problem with armed right-wing groups but national security agencies had shown little interest in treating the problem as a national security issue (S. Bell, 2018a; Perry & Scrivens, 2016). However, this type of ideological violence seems to be gaining national security attention. This shift indicates policy mobilizing of common security concerns, as the agenda of far-right violence has been gaining security policy attention transnationally (see Munich Security Conference, 2020).

Certain events, nationally and internationally, were used to justify the expansion of national security to target far-right violence. In April 2018, a man inspired by misogynistic “incel” ideology drove a van into pedestrians, killing several people in Toronto, and raising concerns about “incel” terrorism (The Fifth Estate, 2019). At the same time, it appeared that ISIS was losing in combat in Syria and Iraq, and in December 2018, the U.S. declared victory over ISIS (Landler et al., 2018). These developments prompted a notable change in the 2018 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada. While maintaining that the principal terrorist threat was still from individuals and groups inspired by ISIS and Al-Qaeda, the report, for the first time, acknowledged the threat posed by those who harbour “right-wing extremist views” (Public Safety Canada, 2019). The 2019 public report from CSIS revised its threat assessment to include various types
of ideologically motivated ‘violent extremism,’ which included “xenophobic violence,” “anti-authority violence,” and “gender-based violence” (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2020). The RCMP has indicated that it will be adding material on “incel” violence in its *Terrorism and Violent Extremism Awareness Guide*, a publication to help families and first responders recognize “indicators or early warning signs” of radicalization, which was last updated in 2016 to include right-wing, left-wing, and “sole motivation” extremist groups (S. Bell, 2020; RCMP, 2016). In addition to applying preventive CR techniques to forms of violence beyond Muslim violence, Canada also seems intent on using ‘hard’ counterterrorism tools to address these issues. Since June 2019, Canada has added six neo-Nazi and far-right groups to the terrorism watchlist. In 2020, the RCMP charged an individual accused of murdering a woman in a massage spa with an incel-related terrorism charge. Together, these developments suggest that the national security gaze is looking beyond ‘Islamist’ violence, and Canada seems keen on applying both counterterrorism practices and CR policies to tackle various forms of ‘extremism.’

In summary, CR policies have seen a flurry of activity in Canada since 2015. In addition to CR initiatives being instituted at different levels of municipal and provincial government, the federal government has outlined a national policy and is playing a leadership role in coordinating CR efforts across the country (O'Halloran, 2021). Federal funding through the CRF has boosted existing CR efforts and given rise to new programs and organizations (see Appendix 6). This marks a significant shift in the CR landscape in Canada as prior efforts to prevent ‘radicalization’ were wrapped in the community policing functions of the RCMP and community outreach activities of Public Safety
Canada. It appears that the RCMP is also interested in expanding preventive efforts, such as training “frontline officers and community members to recognize the signs of violent extremism so that problems can be spotted and dealt with before they get out of hand” (S. Bell, 2019). CR efforts continue to focus on and frame Muslim violence as exceptional, with recent counterterrorism and CR initiatives showing significant racial bias (Schmidt, 2020). There also appears to be interest from the RCMP, CSIS, and Public Safety Canada in focusing on more than just ‘Islamist’ violence (S. Bell, 2020; Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2020). Meanwhile policy mobilizing is apparent as Canada is coordinating closely with its western counterparts to share knowledge and develop best practices.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown how CR policies have developed in Canada as a response to critical junctures created by incidences of political violence by Muslim perpetrators and the transnational policy mobilizing of key ideas pertaining to the ‘radicalization’ of Muslims. These have resulted in CR efforts overwhelmingly targeting Muslims communities. I have suggested that CR policies can best be understood by studying their development across three distinct periods of time: 2000 to 2006, 2006 to 2015, and 2015 to present. Conventionally, CR policies in Canada have been part of national security community outreach efforts by the RCMP and Public Safety Canada for terrorism prevention. However, since 2015, the landscape of CR efforts has swelled considerably. Across provinces and municipalities, there are various types of CR initiatives that continue, mainly, to focus on Muslim ‘radicalization.’ Since 2018, interest is rising among national security agencies to expand the ambit of CR policies to target
other forms of political violence. In the next chapter, I discuss the trajectory of CR policies in the U.K.
Chapter 5 – CR Policy Development in the U.K.

CR policies in the U.K. followed a very different trajectory from those in Canada. The U.K. institutionalized counter-radicalization through *Prevent*, a component of its counterterrorism strategy made public in 2006. Significant changes to *Prevent* were made in 2011 and 2015. 2015 also saw the introduction of a new Countering-Extremism Strategy meant to complement *Prevent*. Therefore, I discuss the development of CR policies in the U.K. over the following time periods: between the years 2000 and 2011, between 2011 and 2015, and 2015 onwards. Separating the analysis of CR policies into these three periods elucidates how different forces, including shocks from incidents of political violence and transnational engagements, helped shape the development of CR policies. It also sheds light on how CR policies’ relationship with Muslims in the U.K. evolved in these different time periods. The timeline below (Figure 5) shows, in broad strokes, the evolution of CR policies in the U.K. The circumstances of these developments are set out in greater detail below.
2000 – 2011: The Institutionalization of Counter-radicalization under the Labour Government

The U.K. is no stranger to the phenomenon of ‘domestic’ terrorism, having dealt with several decades of political violence arising from the conflict in Northern Ireland. Until the year 2000, counterterrorism legislation was incorporated in a series of temporary emergency measures that had been renewed several times since the 1970s (Fenwick, 2002). In July 2000, the U.K. passed a permanent Terrorism Act 2000, based on the recognition that Irish Republican political violence was less of a concern after the peace process, and that U.K. had instead to be vigilant against the rise of “Islamic extremism” and the potential of attacks from disparate domestic groups, such as animal rights or environmental activists (Fenwick, 2002; HM Government, 1998). Indicative of policy mobilizing, transnational security ideas revolving around the “new terrorism thesis” that called for renewed anti-terrorism responses in wake of a changed landscape.
dominated by “inscrutable” Islamist terrorists (Laqueur, 2000), provided justification for U.K.’s new counterterrorism legislation.

With the passage of the Terrorism Act 2000, the U.K., for the first time, defined terrorism as an offence with a “political, religious or ideological” cause and permanently adopted draconian provisions such as terrorism detentions, stop and search, and the proscribing of organizations deemed to be connected to terrorism (The Guardian, 2009b). After the attacks of 9/11, the U.K. was quick to expand the strict provisions of the previous year’s law under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which allowed indefinite detention of “suspected international terrorists,” tightened border controls, and intensified monitoring and sanctioning of terrorist financing (Fenwick, 2002; The Guardian, 2009a). Offering a policy mobilizing explanation, the government argued these additional measures were a response to the guidance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373; at the same time, several U.N. member states, including Canada, reused the U.K.’s definition of terrorism from the Terrorism Act 2000.

The attacks of 9/11 came at the heels of a summer of ethnic disturbances in the north of England that implicated Muslim communities. In response to those conflicts, a government report chaired by the Chief Executive of the Nottingham City Council, Ted Cantle, expressed concerns about racialized Muslim communities living “a series of parallel lives” and recommended that “there is an urgent need to promote community cohesion” by emphasizing shared values (Cantle, 2001). In 2002, when Permanent Secretary and former director of the intelligence agency Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), David Omand, was tasked with developing a national counterterrorism strategy in the aftermath of 9/11, concerns about the domestic “Muslim
problem” in the U.K. and international “Islamic extremism” became intertwined (Thomas, 2010). Omand’s recommended counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST, was presented to Tony Blair’s Labour Cabinet in 2003. It identified community cohesion as an important component of preventing “Islamist terrorism” (HM Government, 2006). CONTEST, which would become the framework for the U.K.’s counterterrorism approach, consisted of a CR strand, Prevent, plus additional strands focused on ‘hard’ counterterrorism measures, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare (HM Government, 2006; Omand, 2010). The Prevent strand, “concerned with tackling the radicalisation of individuals,” was mostly underdeveloped until the bombings in London’s transit system in July 2005 (the 7/7 attacks) by British Muslims who were thought to have been inspired by Al-Qaeda (Thomas, 2014).

The 7/7 attacks created a critical juncture for the development of CR policy in the U.K., allowing a focusing of policy attention on Muslim ‘radicalization.’ Up until that point, transnational terrorism by ‘Islamist’ groups was seen as more important than domestic ‘radicalization,’ as the underdevelopment of the Prevent strand of CONTEST had made clear. The 7/7 attacks provided a critical juncture for the robust development of CR policies. In 2006, the CONTEST counterterrorism strategy was launched publicly as a response to these incidents of “domestic terrorism,” with the Prevent strand taking on a life of its own. There is some evidence of policy mobilizing as a Home Affairs Committee visited France and the Netherlands to learn how these countries were addressing the problem of “homegrown” terrorism and taking efforts to foster “integration” of Muslims by leveraging relationships with local Muslim community groups (House of Commons, 2005, s. 95-107, 127-128). In late 2005, when the U.K. was
in charge of the presidency of the European Union, it would share a *Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism* (Presidency of the European Union, 2005), indicating exchange of policy ideas about ‘radicalization.’

This first iteration of *Prevent* had several notable characteristics, which revealed a degree of inconsistency. There was a recognition that ‘radicalization’ had plural causes, including grievances and a sense of alienation emanating from “socioeconomic factors such as discrimination, social exclusion, and lack of opportunity” (HM Government, 2006, p. 10). However, the government’s response concentrated on radicalization due to the development of “radical ideas.” While *Prevent* acknowledged the importance of community cohesion programming, its implementation emphasized “the battle of ideas” to overcome the “ideological motivation” of extremists (HM Government, 2006, p. 13). As *Prevent* (and CONTEST, overall) was a response the “principal terrorist” threat of “Islamist terrorists,” it prompted the government to almost exclusively target Muslim communities in *Prevent* interventions. The community issues and community partnerships mentioned in the CONTEST strategy document only refer to the Muslim community (HM Government, 2006).

Following the 7/7 attacks, the Muslim Contact Unit set up under Scotland Yard after 9/11, was encouraged to continue strengthening existing relationships with Muslim communities (Hellyer, 2007). The government reached out to different Muslim groups across Britain, setting up working groups under the “Preventing Extremism Together” (PET) banner (HM Government, 2006). Based on the recommendations of the PET working groups, the government established the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) through which *Prevent* funding would be channeled ostensibly for
“winning hearts and minds and preventing individuals being attracted to violent extremism in the first place” (DCLG, 2007, p. 4). Though DCLG came into existence to address a national security concern, its remit spanned the broad functions of “promoting shared values, supporting local solutions, building civic capacity and leadership, and strengthening the role of faith institutions and leaders” (DCLG, 2007, p. 5). It was thought that the DCLG would provide grants to local authorities who would be able to complement other streams of community cohesion programming with Prevent funds (Thomas, 2014, p. 477).

In 2007, the government provided pilot funding of £6 million under the Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund (PVEPF) of Prevent, which the DCLG would use to support “priority local authorities in developing programmes of activity to tackle violent extremism at a local level” (Birt, 2009; DCLG, 2008, p. 5). Seventy local authorities were prioritized because of their high proportion of Muslim populations, at 5 per cent or higher, making plain that Prevent funding through DCLG was intended to target Muslim communities (Thomas, 2010). The Prevent model was intent on working with “mainstream Muslim organizations” in order to resist the “ideas” of “radical” Islamist groups (DCLG, 2007; Kundnani & Hayes, 2018). This thinking led the government to use Prevent funds to support theological counter-narrative programs such as the “Radical Middle Way” project and provide support for the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board, a committee to oversee training and accreditation of imams (Birt, 2009; McLoughlin, 2010). Between 2007 and 2011, the DCLG would spend £80 million, of which approximately £62 million would be provided to local authorities for Prevent programming, with the remaining earmarked for support of a Community
Leadership Fund (CLF). Prevent funds would be used to establish a supporting bureaucracy that included 300 additional police positions, some of whom were attached to regional Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) (Thomas, 2010). In addition, the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), established in 2007 within the Home Office, assumed some Prevent-related responsibilities, including “strategic communications;” the OSCT would employ about 200 civil servants by 2011 (Kundnani, 2009). Local authorities disbursed PVEPF funds mostly to support community dialogue and discussions on “violent extremism” and “general education” programs, though funds also supported leadership training, arts and culture programs, and sports and recreation programs (DCLG, 2008, p. 19).

In 2009, the Labour government presented a more detailed update to the CONTEST strategy, which reiterated a commitment to Prevent. The core ideas of Prevent were unchanged, but its objectives were restated as: challenging extremist ideology and supporting mainstream voices, disrupting those who promote violent extremism, supporting individuals vulnerable to recruitment, increasing resilience of communities to violent extremism, and addressing grievances being exploited by ideologues (HM Government, 2009, p. 80). The focus on Muslim communities remained paramount as the principal threat was still seen to be from “Islamist terrorists,” but the government stated that “the principles of our Prevent work apply equally to other communities” who may be targeted by violent extremist groups. The language of “vulnerable” individuals was used to justify a new Channel intervention program where police, local authorities, and community organizations would work together to identify
those at risk of radicalization and devise an appropriate (de-radicalization) intervention (HM Government, 2009, p. 90).

The need to increase community “resilience” to ‘violent extremism’ became the motivation for leadership programs, trainings for faith leaders, and increased engagement with women and youth. The government also highlighted its work in the education sector such as “citizenship education in mosque schools” and toolkits for schools to impart “knowledge and skills to be able to challenge extremist narratives” (HM Government, 2009, p. 88). Finally, the government made clear its intent to disrupt and challenge the views of extremists – even if they were non-violent – based on its belief that violent ideology and violence are linked. The Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) housed in the OSCT at the Home Office would play an active role in disrupting online and media messaging of extremists through “strategic communications” campaigns. These actions would be complemented by the legal enhancements in the Terrorism Act 2006, which would allow the government to prosecute those who “glorify” terrorism (HM Government, 2009, pp. 89, 153).

However, by 2009, the criticism against Prevent was mounting. One of the main concerns with its implementation was its targeting and stigmatization of Muslim communities. The targeting of Muslim communities and organizations under Prevent resulted in the treatment of British Muslims as the “suspect community” (Breen-Smyth, 2014; Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009b). To enact Prevent, government agencies mapped British Muslims as a cohesive population category, when previously racialized communities were tracked based on ethnic backgrounds such as Bangladeshi, Pakistani, and others (Ali, 2014). As local authorities promoted Prevent projects, concerns arose
that Prevent was another vehicle for surveillance of Muslim communities (Kundnani, 2009). Local authorities and community organizations revealed that they were being forced to provide information about individuals from Muslim communities. Concerns about surveillance of Muslims were compounded as news broke that, between 2007 and 2010, the Home Office had funded a project (labelled Project Champion) to place neighbourhoods in Birmingham with high density of Muslim populations under secret CCTV surveillance (Isakjee & Allen, 2013; P. Lewis, 2010).

Because of the stigma attached to working on Prevent-funded projects, some local authorities decided to rename PVEPF/Prevent programs so as not to alienate Muslim communities (Birt, 2009). Other local authorities (e.g. Bradford Council) refused Prevent funding altogether (O’Toole, Jones, et al., 2013). Moreover, the government did not have transparent criteria for allocating Prevent funding. The government’s actions seemed to suggest that it was making theological assessments of which Muslim groups were ‘moderate’ and which were ‘extreme.’ On one end, Prevent was funding groups deemed to be moderate (even if they were not rooted among Muslim communities) in order to push back against Al-Qaeda style ‘extremism’ (Birt, 2009). At the same time, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), an association of 500 Muslim organizations, which was initially a part of the Preventing Extremism Together taskforce, was sidelined for not being moderate enough simply because MCB was vocal in its criticism of the U.K.’s foreign policy (McLoughlin, 2010). On the other end, the government was also engaging directly with Salafist groups viewed to be extreme but non-violent, through Prevent funds and through community policing efforts by the Muslim Contact Unit (Barclay, 2011; Spalek & Lambert, 2008). In all cases, Prevent was accused of encouraging a form of
“social engineering” with the government favouring particular values instead of fostering “shared values” as Prevent purportedly aspired to do (Thomas, 2010). It seemed that, in attempting to win the battle of hearts and minds, Prevent was actually seeking to produce a “change in attitudes among Muslims” (DCLG, 2007, as cited in Thomas, 2010, p. 446).

Another concern with Prevent was that by conflating community cohesion and counter-radicalization objectives, cohesion objectives were eclipsed by security objectives (Birt, 2009). Channelling Prevent funds via the DCLG was intended to grant local authorities autonomy in allocating these funds; however, in practice, counterterrorism unit officers attached to local authorities were influencing how local authorities spent Prevent funds (Kundnani, 2009). Prevent seemed to be alienating Muslim communities from local authorities and stoking inter-community tensions as other ethnic and religious groups found it unfair to be excluded from receiving Prevent funding (Birt, 2009; Husband & Alam, 2011). A report by the House of Commons Committee on Communities and Local Governance noted that Prevent was unable to meet its community cohesion objectives because it was being diluted in favour of counterterrorism and counter-radicalization goals (House of Commons, 2010).

Reiterating the problems with Prevent, such as the Muslim-only focus and the government selectively partnering with particular Muslim groups, the report recommended that “community cohesion work and work focusing on shared values should be decoupled from the Prevent agenda” (House of Commons, 2010, p. 67). In conjunction with these developments, scholarship on counter-radicalization emphasized that lack of clarity about ‘radicalization’ itself (or “who the radicalized are”) contributed to the amorphous boundaries of Prevent, allowing it to be deployed for ideological social
control, community cohesion, and preventing ‘violent extremism’ all at once (Richards, 2011, p. 143).

In summary, the 2000 to 2011 period is notable for giving life to U.K.’s CR policy, Prevent, as part of its counterterrorism strategy. Prevent arose in 2006 as a response to the deadly 7/7 attacks on London’s transit system by Muslim perpetrators who were thought to have been radicalized domestically. Though there is some evidence of early policy mobilizing between U.K. and other European countries, Prevent evolved to become a policy innovation of its own. The policy focused on the radicalization of British Muslims through partnerships with “moderate” Muslim groups based on the understanding that this would keep at bay ‘extreme’ ideas thought to cause ‘violent extremism.’ The goals of Prevent were muddled: it was clearly a national security response but also claimed to foster community cohesion. In practice, Prevent established a bureaucracy that securitized British Muslims and sought to govern their political and cultural expression. Toward the end of this period, it was widely acknowledged that Prevent had failed to meet its community cohesion objectives and, per the government’s own reports, Prevent had further alienated British Muslims. Prevent was thought to have securitized community cohesion and had little to show in terms of its effectiveness in combatting ‘radicalization.’

2011 – 2015: The Impact of “Muscular Liberalism” on CR policies

There was a significant change to the design of Prevent in 2011, after the May 2010 change in government from Labour to a coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats (henceforth, the Coalition government). Intent on addressing the shortcomings of Prevent, the new government undertook a review of Prevent. Based on public remarks made by government officials, it seemed apparent that the Coalition
government wished to steer Prevent toward a heavy-handed security approach. In a public speech delivered at the Munich Security Conference – an important forum for transnational exchange of security policy ideas – Prime Minister David Cameron attacked state multiculturalism, saying that Muslim youth were being drawn to extremism because of the lack of a strong national identity: “we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, muscular liberalism [emphasis added]” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2011). The notion that the government had been too inclusive was reflected in reports by right-leaning think tanks who argued that previous Prevent partnerships with non-violent “political Islamist” groups were “flawed” and, in some cases, were further radicalizing young Muslims (Maher & Frampton, 2009). Without offering any clear conception of radicalization, the Coalition government chose to portray this perceived over-inclusion as a lack of commitment to a particularized national identity.

The new government released a revised Prevent strategy in June 2011 with the updated goals of: responding to the ideological challenge of terrorism; preventing people from being drawn into terrorism; and working with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalization. In addition to dropping the language of vulnerability, resilience, and political grievances included in the previous version of Prevent, the updated strategy had several notable changes. First, the government introduced a narrow definition of extremism as the “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values [emphasis added], including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs” (HM Government, 2011, p. 107). Moving away from the view that radicalization has plural causes, the government stated
that “radicalization is driven by an ideology” (HM Government, 2011, p. 5). Using these narrow conceptions of ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism’ and based on a subjective assessment of who adheres to “British values,” the government declared it would no longer work with ‘extremist’ organizations. Under this new policy direction, Prevent withdrew funding for several Muslim organizations, including the Islamic Foundation, which produces theological literature, and an award winning project called STREET which worked among youth at a Salafi mosque in Brixton (O’Toole et al., 2011). Here, the transnational influence of the Orientalist ideas of the new terrorism were apparent as the Home Office continued to maintain a racialized view of ‘radicalization’ as a process of ideological transformation of Muslims.

Second, with the 2011 update, Prevent decoupled itself from community cohesion goals and clarified that Prevent would not be used for intelligence gathering. It appeared that the government was paying heed to the criticisms that Prevent had securitized U.K.’s integration strategy. However, the government’s motivating concern seemed to be that in trying to reach a variety of organizations in the interest of community cohesion, “funding sometimes even reached the very extremist organisations that Prevent should have been confronting” (HM Government, 2011, p. 1). The government would no longer route Prevent funds via the DCLG to local authorities. Instead, the OSCT in the Home Office would determine how Prevent funding would be allocated to local authorities. As a result of this shift, the government reduced the number of local authorities targeted for Prevent programming, from 94 to 28 (Kundnani, 2009; Thomas, 2014). Selection of local authorities was purportedly based on intelligence about extremism but in practice, the
choice of local authorities still seemed to be based on the proportion of Muslim population (O’Toole et al., 2011).

With decisions about Prevent funding being made at the Home Office, information about allocations and priorities became less transparent. Studies noted that the announcement of separation notwithstanding, operational overlap between Prevent and community cohesion across local authorities persisted (O’Toole et al., 2012). Despite the claim that cohesion funding would be provided under a separate umbrella, local authorities were still required to maintain some Prevent programming and coordinate activities with counterterrorism policing. Even if Prevent was deemphasized by local authorities, the Home Office found avenues to continue Prevent activity anyhow. As an example, in Leicester, Prevent activity was simply removed from the purview of local authorities to be delivered via an independent nonprofit organization (Thomas, 2014). Prevent funding would continue to support the police and administrative bureaucracy that had been set up earlier. But, support for community capacity building, interfaith work, and “empowerment work with Muslim women and young people” lost support in favour of trainings to identify signs of ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism’ (Ganesh, 2015; Thomas, 2014, p. 486).

Third, Prevent would work actively and directly to dissuade the promotion of ‘extremist’ ideology, even if it was not espousing violence. Here, the government affirmed that it saw extremism and violence as linked, which was specially problematic as the definition of ‘extremism’ was broad enough to include legitimate forms of political dissent (Boukalas, 2019; Martin, 2014). The revised Prevent strategy stressed the importance of disrupting online radicalization and referenced the need to address various
forms of ‘extremism.’ For example, for the first time, the *Prevent* strategy specifically referenced “extreme right-wing terrorism,” but noted it is “much less widespread, systematic or organised than terrorism associated with Al Qa’ida” (HM Government, 2011, p. 15). The refusal to acknowledge the severity of far-right violence in the U.K. flew in the face of the racialized practices of *Prevent* and the everyday hate and violence experienced by racialized and Muslim communities in the U.K. The 2011 version of *Prevent* also reiterated its commitment to multi-agency *Channel* interventions as a way to de-radicalize individuals suspected of moving toward ‘violent extremism.’ In fact, the government seemed keen to ramp up ways to identify and divert individuals thought to be radicalizing into the *Channel* program that aimed to bring about behavioural and attitudinal changes against extremism (Martin, 2018; Thomas, 2020).

The murder of a British soldier in Woolwich in May 2013 by two individuals thought to have been radicalized by ‘Islamist’ ideology propelled the government to deepen its commitment to tackling extremism (Casciani, 2013). The Prime Minister set up a *Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism* in the aftermath of the murder “to identify any areas where our current approach was lacking and to agree practical steps to fight against all forms of extremism” (HM Government, 2013). The report from the taskforce made several recommendations to deepen the government’s encroachment into civil society and social institutions. It called for greater scrutiny of charities, implicating Muslim charities, based on the belief that charitable status can be exploited by “extremist preachers and groups” (HM Government, 2013, p. 2). It proposed making the delivery of *Prevent* and *Channel* a legal requirement upon local authorities, which would diminish the authority and independence of local government even further.
It recommended placing an obligation on schools, universities, and prisons to curtail extremism and bolstering efforts to counter online extremist messaging. Such stringent requirements to address ‘radicalization’ in schools, universities, prisons, faith-based organizations, and charities, exposed the government’s ambition for further securitization of a broad cross-section of society (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016).

Instead of tackling the conceptual shortcomings in the radicalization discourse, the emphasis on “British values” under the revised 2011 Prevent strategy only confounded matters. Several scholars noted that the notion of British values remained subjective (and vague, as the government arbitrarily determined who was committed to British values) and, extremism, defined by its distance from British values, seemed to suggest legitimate forms of political dissent were extremism (Martin, 2020; O’Donnell, 2016; Richardson, 2015). Still, the focus of Prevent remained on Muslim communities. Muslims were seen as a source of risk to be monitored for signs of ‘radicalization,’ and at the same time, they were at risk of becoming influenced by extremist ideology, so had to be prevented from being drawn toward it (Heath-Kelly, 2013). The revised Prevent policy expected Muslim communities and organizations to assume responsibility to continually demonstrate a commitment to “British values” as a proxy for disavowing extremism. Despite the government insistence that Prevent was not an intelligence gathering avenue, Muslim communities felt they were expected to provide information about members of their own communities (see Abbas, 2019). Overall, Prevent fostered secrecy and distrust, and alienated Muslim communities; there continued to be stigma attached to participating in Prevent funded projects (Mohammed & Siddiqui, 2011). With fewer funding options available under a climate of financial austerity, Muslim
organizations faced the difficult choice of having to rely on Prevent funding even if they were unhappy about its scope and implementation, or forgoing those funds altogether (Thomas, 2014).

To summarize, the 2011 to 2015 period saw Prevent revised in significant ways. By this point, Prevent was innovating with CR policy changes domestically and became a template of policy ideas for other European countries and Canada (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009a). The newly elected Coalition government positioned Prevent as means to combat its version of extremism, defined as a lack of commitment to “British values.” This view aligned with the government’s criticism of state multiculturalism, which it thought was too accommodating of too many different viewpoints. Prevent was re-oriented to directly combat the ideological ‘radicalization’ rather than violent behaviour. The understanding of ‘radicalization’ as a process of ideological transformation showed consistency with the transnational security view of radicalization that had gained traction in other western countries. Under the updated Prevent strategy, the government centralized the governance of Prevent, broke off partnerships with Salafi and other Muslim religious groups deemed to be ‘extremists’ for not adhering to British values, and separated Prevent from community cohesion goals. DCLG was no longer responsible for disbursing Prevent funds; instead, the OSCT within the Home Office would make decisions about Prevent priorities and funds allocation. Though the government claimed that it had contracted Prevent with the 2011 changes, very little changed in practice. Local authorities still had to maintain Prevent-related activity but had less say in the process. Prevent-related decisions became more secretive. The Woolwich murder of 2013 further entrenched the centralization of Prevent in the Home
Office. It made the government consider imposing stringent requirements on local authorities and other social institutions to combat extremism. The government indicated a greater interest in identifying signs of radicalization and placing individuals thought to be on the pathway to radicalization into the Channel de-radicalization program. These developments laid the foundation for Prevent to transition to its next stage, described in the following section.

2015 – Present: Counter-radicalization as a Legal “Duty” and the Counter-extremism Strategy

The most significant changes to Prevent were made in 2015. These changes were prompted by a highly publicized 2014 story about “Operation Trojan Horse,” where an anonymous accusation was made that an “Islamic takeover” was underway in schools in Birmingham and other Muslim majority areas (Shackle, 2017). Independent investigations would later find the accusation to be false and amounted to nothing more than school administrators structuring the school environment to accommodate the cultural and religious needs of students, as per guidance from the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) (Holmwood & O’Toole, 2018). Nevertheless, the notion that Muslim majority schools were “imposing hardline religious education and fostering extremism” captured the national imagination, shaping the political discourse among conservative politicians and feeding into suspicion about Muslims unwillingness to “integrate” into British society, i.e. their lack of commitment to “British values” (Shackle, 2017). The Trojan Horse story broke at the same time as concerns were mounting about young British Muslims travelling to Syria and Iraq, allegedly to participate in conflict alongside ISIS. The government also felt pressure to “rethink” its domestic terrorism approach in light of the sensationalist beheading videos
released by ISIS featuring an individual “John” suspected of being a British citizen (Watt et al., 2014). Together these incidents provided a critical juncture during which the government made major updates to *Prevent*.

The government took two significant steps. First, in February 2015, the *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA)* was passed to restrict travel and movement for those attempting to travel abroad to participate in conflict. In addition, *Prevent* was amended to require “specified authorities” to “have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism” (section 26(1)). The specified authorities in Schedule 6 of the *CTSA* included institutions in local government, criminal justice, education, health and social care, and police. The requirement on these institutions came to be known as the “*Prevent Duty,*” and was described in detail in a supplementary government document released later that year (HM Government, 2015b). Second, in July 2015, the re-elected Prime Minister David Cameron, gave a speech at a school in Birmingham describing “the threat of extremism and the challenge of integration,” where he made confusing linkages between non-violent “Islamist extremism” ideology, the actions of ISIS, practices such as female genital mutilation, and activities of civil society organizations critical of British government policy, apparently to provide the rationale for a “Counter-Extremism Strategy” that would be much more ambitious in scope than *Prevent* (Prime Minister’s Office, 2015). Together, the *Prevent Duty* and the Counter-Extremism Strategy would lead to the proliferation of CR across public and nonprofit institutions in the U.K. I discuss these in turn below.

The *Prevent* Duty guidance reiterated the definition of extremism as opposition to “British values” and of radicalization as “the process by which a person comes to support
terrorism and extremist ideologies,” as first specified in the 2011 update to Prevent (HM Government, 2015b, p. 27). The Prevent Duty made it a legal obligation for local authorities, schools, universities, National Health Services (NHS) institutions, social service providers, prisons, and police to “demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in their area, institution or body” and to ramp up monitoring and enforcement of ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism’ (HM Government, 2015b, p. 3). The guidance document indicated that the Home Office would focus Prevent activity across 50 “priority areas” and stressed the importance of information sharing and coordination across different agencies and with the Home Office. Schools were expected to “include an explicit requirement to promote fundamental British values as part of broader requirements relating to the quality of education and the promotion of the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils” (HM Government, 2015b, p. 10). Universities were asked to screen for and exclude speakers who would promote “extremist views” thought to radicalize students. All implicated institutions were expected to provide appropriate training for staff to identify signs of radicalization and make referrals for Channel interventions. Especially striking was language asking schools and childcare providers “to assess the risk of children being drawn into terrorism, including support for extremist ideas that are part of terrorist ideology” and for staff to have “training that gives them the knowledge and confidence to identify children at risk of being drawn into terrorism” (HM Government, 2015b, p. 11,12). The government claimed that Prevent Duty requirements were similar to “safeguarding” requirements attached to the code of conduct in caregiving professions (Home Office, 2019b; Local Government Association, 2020, p. 11).
In the adjacent policy developed as the Counter-Extremism Strategy, the government outlined its plan to build upon Prevent to target non-violent extremist ideology across British civil society (Birt, 2019). In the strategy, the government explained how ‘extremism’ harms British values and promotes hatred while extensively referencing the isolated lives of communities where there are “alternative systems of law” and “harmful and illegal cultural practices” (HM Government, 2015a). While few examples of far-right violence were mentioned in the strategy, the overwhelming number of cases and examples related to problems perceived among Muslim communities: it was amply clear that the strategy alluded to a “backward, foreign and threatening” imaginary of British Muslims (Younis, 2021, p. 40). Presented in a manner that appeared to complement the Prevent Duty guidance, the Counter-Extremism Strategy highlighted the danger of extremism in schools, universities, local authorities, prisons, and charities by citing the examples of the “Trojan Horse” plot, the invitation of extremist speakers, the lack of attention paid to extremism by councils, and the abuse of charitable status. The strategy was expanding on the same concerns first laid out in the 2013 report by the Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism (Dawson & Godec, 2017). The strategy described new efforts to counter online extremist ideology, build partnerships with community organizations, disrupt extremists through “new targeted powers,” and build cohesive communities (HM Government, 2015a, p. 17). It seemed that the government wished to have CR activities enmesh with community cohesion objectives, albeit with the Home Office in full control of these efforts. The government attempted to introduce a Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill to parliament in 2016 that sought power to ban extremist groups, disrupt extremist behaviour, and close down premises used to support
extremism (Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2016). The Bill did not pass into law because a government human rights committee found it to be “confusing, based on questionable assumptions, and risk bringing law abiding people under unnecessary scrutiny” (CAGE, 2019; P. Walker, 2016). With the government unable to properly define the concepts of “nonviolent extremism” and “British values,” members of the police and faith groups raised concerns that the bill would curtail free speech (Calvert, 2016; Townsend, 2016).

In 2017, the government changed tactics. In response to attacks on Westminster Bridge, the Manchester Arena, London Bridge, and Finsbury Park Mosque within a span of four months, the newly elected Theresa May government established the Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE). In the 2017 Queen’s Speech, Prime Minister May indicated the goals of the CCE were to identify examples of extremism (presumably through research), help the government develop new policies to tackle extremism, and support civil society in “promoting and defending pluralistic values” (Dawson & Godec, 2017, p. 50). The CCE calls itself a “a non-statutory expert committee of the Home Office” and indicates it has “no remit on counter-terrorism policies, including Prevent,” yet the overlap in the objectives of Prevent and the CCE in challenging extremism are too obvious to ignore (Commission for Countering Extremism, n.d.). The appointment of the commissioner of the CCE was met with opposition because she supported Prevent and was seen to lack credibility among Muslim communities (MEND, 2018).

Separately, as part of the Counter-Extremism Strategy, the Home Office has been providing counter-extremism funding under the Building a Stronger Britain Together (BSBT) program since 2016 (Home Office, 2020a). BSBT has a total budget of £63
million for “supporting civil society groups to stand up to extremism in their communities,” of which £4 million was spent in 2016/17 and a total of £8.8 million was spent through 2019 (Home Office, 2019c; UK Parliament, 2017, 2019). The *BSBT* funding is entirely separate from the *Prevent* budget, which is between £35 million and £47 million per year (Maryam, 2021; Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016, p. 25). Given the broad scope of the Counter-Extremism Strategy, *BSBT* funding has faced the criticism of securitizing civil society, especially Muslim civil society, much like the initial iteration of *Prevent* (Birt, 2019; Wolfe-Robinson, 2019).

The *Prevent* Duty has generated significant controversy. The foremost concern relates to the requirement upon public sector workers to detect signs of vulnerability to ‘radicalization,’ especially as the government itself had failed to properly define ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalization.’ With the government’s expressed goal of monitoring ideas supposedly opposed to “British values,” human rights groups were duly concerned that the *Prevent* Duty would encourage teachers, doctors, and other social sector workers to incorrectly see signs of radicalization in religious expression by Muslim students and clients (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016). As part of the *Prevent* Duty, public sector staff were offered trainings called, *Workshops to Raise Awareness of Prevent* (WRAP), that took guidance from the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) that had been used for determining *Channel* interventions since 2012. The VAF relied on 22 factors (or more) for detecting vulnerability to radicalization based on a forensic psychology tool named the Extremist Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG22+) (Knudsen, 2020). The ERG22+ assesses ‘radicalization’ across three dimensions – engagement, intent, and capability – that include factors as benign as “need for identity, meaning, belonging,” “need for
excitement, comradeship or adventure,” “political/moral motivation,” and “mental health” (Knudsen, 2020, p. 41) Additionally, the Channel guidance provided example indicators such as a change in “style of dress or personal appearance to accord with the group” (HM Government, 2020, p. 52). The ERG22+ indicators have been widely criticized for not recognizing the complex factors that may contribute to political violence and for being discriminatory against Muslims (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016; Rights Watch UK, 2016). When asked for details, the government has been hesitant to share the scientific basis for the indicators (Qureshi, 2016).

The worry about the Prevent Duty disproportionately targeting Muslims were realized as, in 2015/16, the year that the Prevent Duty was made a statutory requirement, 70 percent of the 7,631 Prevent referrals made were related to “Islamist” radicalization and the most number of referrals (33 percent) came from the education sector (Home Office, 2017). Only 14 percent of referrals were forwarded to a Channel panel for further assessment and less than 5 percent were assigned a Channel mentor for further intervention. Of the total referrals, 56 percent were young people under 20. Both the error rate of Prevent referrals and the overrepresentation of young people was worrisome (BBC, 2017). There was also concern that a Prevent and Channel referral would remain on the record of students, impacting their future prospects (Rights Watch UK, 2016).

Additionally, concerns were raised that the Prevent Duty transformed the role of teachers, healthcare staff, and social sector workers into surveillant agents of the state. Especially, in the education realm, it was justifiably thought that the Prevent Duty would discourage students from expressing themselves freely. A letter from several academics stated that Prevent’s characterization of ‘extremism’ as an undesirable ideological
propensity made it likely that the Prevent Duty “will have a chilling effect on open
debate, free speech and political dissent” (The Independent, 2015). Public sector
radicalization trainings, WRAPs, were found to be of mixed quality and at best, served to
underline that public sector employees should be looking for signs of radicalization
instead of developing a nuanced understanding of the concept of radicalization (Open
Society Justice Initiative, 2016, p. 44). Even though concerns were raised that the Prevent
Duty would violate the confidentiality of caregiving professions, the government’s
conflation of the Prevent Duty with “safeguarding” led to ready proliferation of the duty
(and therefore, securitization) across the social sector (Busher et al., 2019; Heath-Kelly &
Strausz, 2019; Thomas, 2020). Also, because the Prevent Duty was obligatory, with non-
compliance implying censure, employees erred on the side of over-referring to Prevent
(Martin, 2018). After the Prevent Duty was enacted, several stories surfaced that
highlighted the absurd premise for Prevent referrals. Examples included a nine-year old
referred for making a joke, the parents of a nursery school child referred because school
administrators heard the child say “cooker bomb” instead of “cucumber,” and a 15-year
old referred for holding pro-Palestinian views (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016, pp.
69, 72, 86). These developments have formed the basis of the argument that the Prevent
Duty has led to the responsibilization of the public and social sector toward counter-
radicalization (Martin, 2018; Thomas, 2017).

The Prevent Duty has not only contributed to more stigmatization and
discrimination against Muslims (especially young people) but has also fed into to a
general climate of self-censorship. Despite these concerns, the infrastructure of Prevent
has been bolstered with the Prevent Duty. The Prevent Duty has placed further Prevent-
related obligations on local authorities who have to build local counter-radicalization
capacity and maintain Prevent Panels comprised of council officials and police
(Boukalas, 2019; Home Office, 2019b). Prevent has centralized the role of the police in
coordinating Prevent activities across institutions, establishing posts of Prevent
Coordinators within the counterterrorism units to advise local Prevent Counter-Terrorism
Intelligence Officers on how to assess cases for Channel referrals, and local Prevent
Engagement Officers on how to liaise with community organizations and facilitate
neighbourhood or community policing (Boukalas, 2019, pp. 472–473). Education, health,
and other social institutions have ramped up Prevent-related trainings, WRAP, to identify
signs of radicalization: as of 2019, over 1.1 million public sector workers had received
WRAP trainings (Bush et al., 2019, p. 459; Home Office, 2019d). In addition, schools
have modified curricula to promote “British values.” All these changes are planned,
coordinated, and monitored by the OSCT within the Home Office. The shadowy
Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) branch of the Home Office,
effectively pushes government counter-narrative propaganda online under the umbrella of
“strategic communications” (Cobain et al., 2016). The Home Office’s Extremism
Intelligence Unit keeps track of different groups it understands to be extremist, monitors
extremist speakers on campus, and advises the government on how to respond (Quinn,
2019). Between 2012 and 2019, 1,500 individuals have received “help” through the
Channel program for “Islamist” and “right-wing” radicalization (Home Office, 2019d). In
2018/19, Prevent had directly funded 203 “community projects;” in addition, through the
BSBT program, the Home Office had funded 253 projects between 2016 and 2019 (Home
Office, 2019c, 2019d). These elements showcase the extensive infrastructure of U.K.’s counter-radicalization policies.

The period from 2015 onward has seen intensified CR activities across the U.K., with the introduction of the Prevent Duty and the complementary Counter-Extremism Strategy. The obligatory Prevent Duty represents an additional layer of surveillance and control of Muslims in the U.K. Caregiving institutions are now required to report on signs of radicalization, an obligation that is seen to further securitize the social and health sector in the U.K. The targeting of Muslim communities by CR policies continues based on the crude understanding that their cultural and religious expressions are an affront to British values. CR policies in the U.K. are also being re-oriented to target far-right violence as well as other forms of dissent seen as “left-wing” radicalization (Home Office, 2019d). Even though policymakers are claiming an embrace of “colourblind” CR policies, little has been done to address the anti-Muslim, racialized structures of CR policies that remain intact (Younis & Jadhav, 2020). At the same time, the criticism of Prevent by human rights groups and Muslim CSOs has persisted. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation himself pointed to the negative impact of Prevent and raised questions about its efficacy (Amnesty International UK, 2018; D. Anderson, 2016; El-Enany, 2019). In January 2019, the government announced an independent review of Prevent (Home Office, 2019a). However, the appointment of the reviewer, Alex Carlile, was opposed because of past statements he had made supporting Prevent (Bowcott, 2019; Rights Watch UK, 2019). In January 2021, the government announced William Shawcross as the new reviewer of Prevent. This, too, has run into issues because Shawcross has a record of making Islamophobic statements. Human rights groups and
hundreds of Muslim CSOs have decided to boycott the *Prevent* review, saying Shawcross’ appointment calls into question the government’s good faith commitment to having an independent review (Grierson, 2021; Hooper, 2021). At the same time, the government has been making claims that its Counter-Extremism Strategy is weak and requires an overhaul to better confront “hateful extremism” (Warrell & Staton, 2020). Together, these patterns suggest a further consolidation and expansion of CR policies that portend an intensification of the targeting and stigmatization of Muslim communities.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have presented a chronological development of CR policies in the U.K. There is some evidence of importation of ideas pertaining to counter-radicalization from European countries before the public launch of U.K.’s CR strategy, *Prevent*, in 2006. However, since then, *Prevent* has emerged as a policy innovation that other countries, including Canada have looked to for ideas. Moreover, *Prevent* has developed in response to incidences of political violence by Muslim perpetrators. These dynamics indicate that policy mobilizing and critical junctures are relevant to understanding the evolution of CR policies in the U.K. To highlight the notable changes in CR policies in the U.K. over time, I have examined them over three distinct time periods: 2000 to 2011, 2011 to 2015, and 2015 to present. Today, CR policies in the U.K. are encapsulated in the *Prevent, Channel* (de-radicalization) interventions, and the most recently instituted Counter-Extremism Strategy.

CR policies have institutionalized an administrative infrastructure that implicates security agencies and the police, but also places legal requirements to tackle ‘radicalization’ upon local authorities, educational institutions, the public health system, social service organizations, and other public sector institutions. Funding through *Prevent*
and the Counter-Extremism Strategy has supported programs such as online counter-narratives, mentorship and leadership development, youth interventions, and counter-extremism initiatives at mosques and community organizations. In this chapter, I have shown that through these interventions, the U.K.’s CR policies have primarily targeted British Muslims. CR policies have been based on a rationale that views Muslims as perennially at-risk of radicalization and assumes some conservative Islamic beliefs to be inherently linked to violence. CR interventions in the U.K. have not only sought to prevent violent ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism’ but also attempted to influence the ideological beliefs and thoughts of Muslims. CR policies have animated the subjective notion of ‘British values,’ to which Muslim communities must demonstrate adherence as evidence of shunning ‘extremism.’ In the next chapter, I compare CR policies in Canada and the U.K. underscoring how they are experienced by research participants included in this study.
Chapter 6 - Discussion and Comparison of CR policies in Canada and the U.K.

This chapter offers a comparative analysis of CR policies in Canada and the U.K., informed by the foregoing discussion of CR policy evolution as the product of inflections at critical junctures and policy mobilizing of transnational ideas about ‘radicalization.’ To that end, I highlight how CR policies manifest in practice in the two countries, drawing on the insights from research participants. This analytical approach underlines how CR policies are experienced by Muslim communities and their CSO representatives in Canada and the U.K. “Communities” sit at the heart of counter-radicalization efforts, yet the voices of communities that bear the “costs of security” are often overlooked (Goold & Lazarus, 2019, p. 10). Centering CSO and community perspectives illuminates how they “understand and experience questions in relation to human security” (Spalek, 2012, p. 10), thus adding to counterterrorism and counter-radicalization research, which is dominated by analyses from “above” narrated by counterterrorism experts, policymakers, and academics.

CR policies across western nations evolved at critical junctures (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007) created in the aftermath of incidents of political violence by Muslim perpetrators. Best practices in CR policies and common understandings about the problem of ‘radicalization’ are coalesced in transnational fora, from where norms and best practices are selectively plucked (Peck & Theodore, 2010). CR policies, despite evolving differently in Canada and the U.K., exhibit certain core characteristics (Ali, 2020): the construction of Muslims as “suspect” communities through racialized practices, the reliance on notions of risk and resilience, and the proliferation of preemptive security practices. This chapter explores each of these characteristics, highlighting the racialized practices that underpin CR policies and the experience of CR
policies by research participants in Canada and the U.K. The discussion in this chapter
sets the stage for the subsequent analyses (chapters 7 through 9) of how CR policies
create relations of power between state institutions and Muslim CSOs, and how Muslim
CSOs engage in contestations within those power relations.

The Core Characteristics of CR Policies in Canada and the U.K.

Drawing on empirical insights from the U.S., U.K., Europe, and Canada,
scholarship has noted that CR policies exhibit certain common characteristics across
national jurisdictions. First, as policy solutions created to address political violence by
Muslim perpetrators, CR policies have constructed domestic Muslims as the “suspect
community” (Breen-Smyth, 2014; Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009b). The suspect status of
Muslims is further affirmed through Orientalist and racialized knowledges and practices
Younis, 2021). Second, in light of the racialized understanding of Muslim violence, CR
policies characterize ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism’ not merely as public safety issues,
but as threats to national values (Martin, 2020). This view has led to the
institutionalization of CR governance based on notions of ‘risk,’ while impacting the
relations between state institutions and Muslim communities (Heath-Kelly, 2013). Third,
this risk-oriented approach militates in favour of present action to disrupt the future
possibility of ‘radicalization’ that might lead to political violence, i.e., preemption
(Heath-Kelly, 2012; McCulloch & Wilson, 2016). This thinking has rendered tools
necessary for assessing risk about a “categorically unknowable [emphasis added]” future
(Martin, 2014, p. 63). The desire for preemption has prompted the recruitment of a wide
range of social sector and community actors to identify the future risk of ‘radicalization’
and act upon it at a variety of sites spanning policing, education, health, and social
services (F. Ahmad, 2020; Kundnani & Hayes, 2018; Nguyen, 2019b; Ragazzi, 2016).

Below, I assess how these common characteristics manifest in CR policies in Canada and the U.K.

**Racialization of Muslims into the “Suspect community”**

Several scholars (especially in the U.K.) have noted how CR policies have contributed to the making of Muslims into a “suspect community” (Abbas, 2019; Awan, 2012; Breen-Smyth, 2014; Ragazzi, 2016). To capture the targeting of Muslims under the ‘war on terror,’ Pantazis and Pemberton (2009b) appropriate the concept of “suspect community,” defining it as:

> “a sub-group of the population that is singled out for state attention as being ‘problematic’ . . . individuals may be targeted, not necessarily as a result of suspected wrongdoing, but simply because of their presumed membership of that sub-group. Race, ethnicity, religion, class, gender, language, accent, dress, political ideology, or any combination of these factors may serve to delineate the sub-group” (p. 649).

In other words, the “suspect community” is made through the process of racialization.

Kundnani’s (2012b) important scholarship highlights how Orientalist ideas about Islam and Muslims, rooted in the “new terrorism thesis,” have shaped policymakers’ understanding of ‘radicalization’ as: “why do some individual Muslims support an extremist interpretation of Islam that leads to violence?” (p. 5). This racialized (and depoliticized) understanding of ‘radicalization,’ affirmed through alarmist anti-Muslim political and media discourse, has led to the deployment of CR policies as technologies of surveillance and social control of entire Muslim communities (Ali, 2020; Kanji, 2018; Sharma & Nijjar, 2018). Younis (2021) underlines that CR policies engender Islamophobia by engaging in a process of racialization by which “Muslim bodies and Islam” come to be seen as “backward, foreign and threatening” (p. 40). He warns that
even as CR policies claim to target various forms of political violence, the nation-building aspirations of these policies necessitate the production of the racialized Muslim Other. The “colourblindness” of CR policies is merely a veneer that serves to “sustain racist structures and those in power from the charge of racism” (p. 41).

**CR Policies and “Suspect” Communities in Canada:** Canadian CR policies exemplify racializing practices that implicate Muslims. Policy documents, ranging from the RCMP’s *Radicalization: A guide for the perplexed* to the more recent federal *National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence*, maintain that radicalization is not “a Muslim thing” (Public Safety Canada, 2018b; RCMP, 2009). Nevertheless, as we saw in Chapter 4, CR policies evolved at critical junctures created by incidents of violence by Muslim perpetrators. Among research participants, a senior bureaucrat in Public Safety Canada cited the cases of the “Toronto 18” and “extremist travelers” to Syria as markers around which CR policies have developed (PCAN20). The Muslim focus of CR policies is further affirmed as ‘radicalization’ is understood as a cognitive process of developing “extremist positions and ideologies” along with the view that the “main terrorist threat to Canada” is from “violent extremism” inspired by ISIS and Al-Qaeda (Public Safety Canada, 2018a). In an RCMP-organized counterterrorism training I attended, it was patently clear that the national security investigations were mainly “about the Islamic faith” (F. Ahmad & Monaghan, 2021). CSIS and the RCMP continue to show up without warning at the homes and workplaces of Muslims, ostensibly to pursue national security leads (Nasser, 2019), and the Muslim focus persists in CR efforts at the provincial and municipal levels. For example, Quebec’s action plan against radicalization was a response to the “violent radical current of Islam” with interventions mainly
targeting Muslim youth (Millett & Ahmad, 2021; Québec, 2015, p. 7). In Calgary’s ReDirect program, the majority of referrals have been Muslim youth (Ottis, 2016). As Sharma and Nijjar (2018) note, the focus on “Islamic terrorism” in CR policies has engendered “processes of racialization that affix and intensify surveillance regimes” against Muslims (p. 73).

Views from research participants also underline how CR policies foster racialized practices. A participant who has researched CR policies internationally noted that the programs are “indirectly premised on that same idea and this old guard thinking that Islam is an actual predictor of radicalization” (PCAN2). He elaborated:

“When you craft an intervention based on that as the dominant framework and based on radicalization, you don’t even have to say ‘Muslim’ anymore. You don’t even have to say ‘Islam’ anymore. People just know, and that’s one of the reasons you continuously see the trend where 80 percent to 90 percent of the referrals made to things like ReDirect are classified as Islamic fundamentalism” (PCAN2).

The participant underlined that the “dominant framework” of ‘radicalization’ (forged in transnational fora) equates radicalization to Islam and accounts for racialized practices where Muslims are the primary targets of CR policies. It creates, as a participant affiliated with an Arab professional association remarked, a climate where every Muslim is “presumed a foreigner and dangerous until you demonstrate otherwise, whereas other communities are presumed to belong until the individual demonstrates otherwise” (PCAN8).

Participants also felt that the policy view of ‘radicalization’ did not reflect community perceptions of the problem. A participant affiliated with the board of a national religious organization expressed consternation about the targeting of Muslim Students Associations (MSAs) by RCMP and CSIS as follows: “It’s only if you believe
in that conveyor belt theory of radicalization that the MSA would be a place of interest” (PCAN10). She was reflecting that surveillance attention is directed to Muslim organizations and groups because current practice still relies on the empirically unsound, racialized “conveyor belt theory of radicalization,” which assumes that Muslims are radicalized by being exposed to Islamic ideology at Muslim social spaces like student associations (Kundnani, 2012b; L. Powell, 2016).

Participants were vocal in sharing the view of radicalization among Muslim communities, which challenges the “dominant framework’s” racialized view linking ‘radicalization’ to Muslims. Mosque leaders I interviewed said that ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism’ are not “high priority” issues “because we don’t frequently encounter it, but when we do encounter it, it is of course concerning and alarming” (PCAN12; PCAN15). Other participants affiliated with mosques indicated how extant policies do not recognize that mosques take “full responsibility” for public safety, going so far as to ban those deemed to be “troublemakers” (PCAN9). Finally, a few participants expressed the idea that political violence emerged at the intersection of broader societal factors, including anti-Muslim hate, discrimination, criminalization, and povertization (PCAN10; PCAN11; PCAN19; PCAN25; PCAN26). A bureaucrat from Public Safety Canada validated this observation when he indicated that, during consultations about radicalization, Muslim CSOs would want to talk about issues like “crime, education” and “hate speech” (PCAN30).

**CR Policies and “Suspect” Communities in the U.K.:** Since its inception, *Prevent* has embodied racialized practices. As a policy response to the 7/7 bombings, *Prevent* saw itself addressing the intertwined problem of Muslims in the U.K. living
“parallel lives,” and international “Islamic terrorism” (Thomas, 2010). Prevent interventions and funding have targeted neighbourhoods with the highest proportions of Muslim populations. When it was launched, Prevent aligned national security objectives with community cohesion, with interventions aiming to change “attitudes among Muslims” (DCLG, 2007 as cited in Thomas, 2010, p. 446). Muslim CSOs believed that Prevent was being used to conduct surveillance on Muslim communities and shape Muslim beliefs (Birt, 2009; Kundnani, 2009). In 2011, as Prevent dropped community cohesion aspirations and became more centralized, it affirmed the suspect status of Muslims by adopting racialized discourses in which ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalization’ were believed to occur due to ideational shifts toward ‘extreme’ Islamic beliefs assumed to be antithetical to “British values” (Kundnani, 2015; O’Toole et al., 2011). The year after the introduction of the Prevent Duty in 2015, most of the Prevent referrals were Muslims (Home Office, 2017). The operationalization of Prevent is based on the view that Muslim communities are the “principal sites of radicalization” (Ali, 2020, p. 588). Ali (2020) observes that, as Muslim communities are responsibilized for tackling ‘extremism’ and structures and practices of surveillance are expanded through the Prevent Duty, Prevent remains “racially marked” (pp. 588-589).

Participants from the U.K. were attuned to the fact that the framing of ‘radicalization’ in Prevent aided in the racialization of Muslims. One participant familiar with the history of counterterrorism in the U.K. and affiliated with the board of a human rights organization remarked, “radicalization is such a nebulous thing” that “[a]nything can go in it” (PUK10). However, to make the concept tractable, the government, especially under the Conservatives, worked on the assumption that “the primary key
determinant [of radicalization] was ideological” (PUK10). This ideological focus thus directed CR policies toward Muslims.

However, the narrow view of ‘radicalization’ as ideologically motivated stood at odds with how participants from Muslim CSOs interpreted the problem. Like Canadian participants, participants from the U.K. highlighted the shortcomings of the “linear” and “mechanistic” “conveyor belt” model that dominates CR policies (Mythen et al., 2017, pp. 185–186). A manager at a national civic engagement organization noted:

“One of the points that comes up time and time again is when there’s a discussion about . . . when it comes up in groups [inaudible] and there’s a discussion about terrorism and political violence and motivations behind it, a lot of CVE and *Prevent* theories about conveyor belt theories that people start by becoming religious, start wearing hijabs, start praying, and start going along this conveyor belt towards terrorism. That’s kind of the [inaudible] behind . . . Obviously, that’s, no one in our, I think, hardly anyone in the Muslim community agrees to that theory, but there’s almost like a gap where if there’s like the government in the UK in particular is unwilling to have a discussion on foreign policy. Muslims are citing that foreign policy of this country has been a major factor in people’s . . . I’m not saying that it’s justification, but around this kind of discontent, anger, or frustration . . . it’s around the foreign policy of the UK and the US, which has been a major factor. It seems to be that discussion is not being given a platform or a platform worthy of that particular [inaudible]. It seems to be that has been sidelined as a discussion” (PUK4).

The participant is arguing that Muslim CSOs would like to see the discussion of ‘radicalization’ expand to include structural issues such as foreign policy. This is similar to how participants from Canada wished to talk about broader issues of criminalization, discrimination, and hate in the context of ‘radicalization.’

Finally, participants from the U.K. pointed to the fact that *Prevent* was a way to control Muslimness itself. A participant affiliated with a grassroots Muslim organization shared the story of the “Trojan Horse” plot, a “manufactured scandal” used to stoke fears that “Muslims are infiltrating state institutions” (PUK2). The *Prevent* Duty was enacted
to find ways to “report them and get rid of them or intervene in some way . . . to rip out all that and call it ‘extremism’ and ‘part of the problem’” (PUK2). Despite the fact that the administrators of the schools implicated in the Trojan Horse plot were not found to have violated any regulations, ‘extremism’ was weaponized through a “widening of the whole scope of Prevent.” The Prevent Duty, the participant argued, was “a new system of policies of suspicion . . . fear, surveillance even, and changing the relationship between Muslim citizens and state” (PUK2). The participant’s narrative thus provides insight into how the racialized practices of Prevent are experienced and interpreted by Muslim communities.

**Governing Muslim Risk and Instilling Resilience**

The “risk society” thesis, which elaborates on the proliferation of risk-thinking across institutions in modern societies (Beck, 1992), has been used to productively interrogate CR policies. Following from the “new terrorism thesis,” the attacks of 9/11 and the bombings of the transit systems in London and Madrid validated the security view that a “new” and more dangerous form of (Muslim) political violence was afoot (Mythen, 2020; Mythen & Walklate, 2006). This prompted security institutions to seek new knowledges about this supposedly riskier political violence and develop tools to assess its potentiality. The concept of ‘radicalization’ came to signify the risk of Muslims developing ‘extreme’ (Islamic) beliefs that prompted political violence (Kundnani, 2012b). In recent years, the ‘radicalization’ discourse has been cemented as fears have grown (transnationally) about domestic Muslims traveling to join conflicts in Syria and Iraq and subsequently returning, posing the risk of committing political violence on domestic soil (D. M. D. Silva & Deflem, 2020). Informed by this anxiety, CR policies have been enacted as a risk assessment system, directed at all Muslims, for early
identification of dangerous/“bad” Muslims (Heath-Kelly, 2013). In her influential work, Heath-Kelly (2013) argues that CR policies arrived as a governance tool for identifying and managing Muslims who were at once “risky” – for having “a propensity to be dangerous,” and “at-risk” – for being “vulnerable to developing a propensity of dangerousness” (p. 408). Thus, CR policies perform a securitizing function, conducting surveillance to identify “risky” Muslims alongside a disciplining function to change their attitudes and beliefs so they might increase their “resilience to violent extremism” (p. 405). Because a risk society individualizes risk, the disciplining aspect of CR policies seeks to responsibilize Muslim communities and their civil society representatives to manage risk and vulnerability among their own members (Mythen, 2020). Though the risk assessment of CR policies is expressed in neutral and technical terms, in practice, they engender the racialization and social sorting of Muslims. This observation led Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) to remark, “the label of ‘radicalization’ has become a tool of power exercised by the state and non-Muslim communities against, and to control, Muslim communities in the twenty-first century” (p. 901). Together the racialization of Muslims into the “suspect community” and their governance as “risky” or “at-risk” subjects has fostered a climate of Islamophobia (Bakali, 2019).

**Governance of Muslim Risk and Resilience in Canada:** A risk-informed approach has been at the core of CR efforts in Canada. Prior to the federal government adopting a full-fledged CR strategy, policing agencies such as the RCMP have been assessing the risk of “radicalization to violence” (Monaghan & Molnar, 2016, p. 399). In their analysis, Monaghan and Molnar (2016) note the transnational influence on Canada’s risk approach, finding that the Canadian “indicator catalog” is based on “best practices of
the UK and the US” (p. 404). RCMP counterterrorism trainings invite trainees to keep an eye out for things as benign as “significant changes of interests,” or “change in the way of thinking and interacting with others” or “wearing tattoos, signs and symbols” as possible indicators of ‘radicalization’ (RCMP, 2016, p. 24). In an RCMP counterterrorism training I attended in 2019, attendees were provided information about ‘radicalization’ risk indicators but RCMP officers insisted that these risk indicators were race-neutral. Yet the case studies used and the counterterrorism training’s clear emphasis on religious and ideological factors made it apparent that policing and intelligence agencies were primarily interested in identifying the risk of radicalization among Muslims (F. Ahmad & Monaghan, 2021). As Monaghan and Molnar (2016) observe, the window-dressing of “bias-free” policing provides cover for “the racialized practices of policing” that code “Islamic difference” as risk (p. 408). Security agencies rely on stereotypes and implicit bias to determine who is at risk of radicalizing. The act of deeming a radical or terrorist relies on a “I know it when I see it” approach and has been used to vilify political, cultural, and religious expressions of Muslims (Mazigh & Kanji, 2016; West, 2020). Since the federal government’s adoption of a full-fledged CR strategy, risk and preventative factors have remained important (Kubicek & King, 2021). The federal CR strategy identifies the different (risk) factors that propel individuals to radicalize to violence (social networks, grievances, vulnerabilities, etc.) as well as “protective factors” (positive influences, belief systems, trusted avenues, etc.); together, these factors inform different CR interventions (Public Safety Canada, 2018b). A participant who works as a bureaucrat in Public Safety Canada noted that the notions of
risk factors and protective factors were also central to multi-agency CR efforts at the municipal level (PCAN30).

Alongside risk assessments, “building resilience” has also been central to Canada’s terrorism prevention interventions (Public Safety Canada, 2013a). The federal counterterrorism strategy states that prevention efforts aim to foster “resilience of communities to violent extremism” so Canada can “bounce back quickly when terrorist incidents do occur” (pp. 14-15). Canada’s federal CR strategy aims to build “resilient communities and individuals” by funding programs nationally through the Community Resilience [emphasis added] Fund (Public Safety Canada, 2018b). Within these endeavours, Muslim communities are framed as vulnerable or “at-risk,” which, as Heath-Kelly (2013) astutely observes, turns “community resilience” into a form of securitized “disciplinary governance” that protects the rest of society from the dangerousness of “what [the at-risk] might produce” (p. 405). Moreover, in CR policies across western countries, Stephens and Sieckelinck (2020) find that “resilience” is a “fuzzy concept” that lacks a clear definition and has a potentially depoliticizing effect by obscuring “fundamental and systemic issues” (p. 145). Thus, “community resilience” responsibilizes individuals and communities for overcoming their own inability to resist the lure of “violent extremism” (also see Chandler, 2014). Additionally, directing the “community resilience” interventions of CR policies at Muslim communities and not others underscores that their cultural, racial, and religious difference is why Muslims require these interventions in the first place. In this way, the “community resilience” paradigm engenders racialized governance of Muslims. In separate work, a colleague and I have studied how CR policies in Québec aspire that the education sector will build
resilience to “violent extremism” among Muslim students (Millett & Ahmad, 2021). Our analysis shows that incorporating CR goals into teacher responsibilities, student expectations, and school curricula heightens the surveillance and stigmatization of Muslim students, feeding into the overall climate of Islamophobia in the province.

One participant who has conducted extensive research into CR policies reflected on how the “dominant framework” of “radicalization” in CR initiatives across Canada leads to the racialized assessment of Muslim risk. As he notes below, Islamic difference and beliefs become risk indicators:

“. . . speaking with people about the conditioning of that term ‘radicalization,’ and what they think that terms means. Picture that person. We’re finding you’re overwhelmingly associating that with people who are darker skinned, bearded, and who might have something on their head, and when you talk about characteristic traits and beliefs, it’s Islam, Muslim, jihad of a variety of kinds, a holy war . . . these discourses” (PCAN2).

Participants were keenly aware that CR policies are operationalized to see risk in Muslimness itself. One participant, the board chair of a national religious organization, described a meeting with government officials where a Conservative MP asked her colleague, “Do you believe in Sharia?” (PCAN10). This short interaction conveys much: Muslims are seen as inherently “risky” because their fundamental beliefs are suspect; racialized imaginations inform state security interactions with Muslims; and securitized “disciplinary governance” aims to define and control acceptable forms of Muslim thought (i.e., those that repudiate Sharia). The same participant conveyed that it was “offensive” that Muslims were “singled out as the cause of the problem instead of part of the solution” (PCAN10). A senior manager of a cultural organization remarked on similar assumptions inherent in the notion of “building resilience.” In an interaction her organization had with Public Safety Canada, she observed the agency’s pre-set agenda
stressing the idea of “building resilience, which is a framework that assumes that the problem already exists [in the Muslim community]” (PCAN11). These types of engagements, where Muslims are treated as “risky” and “at-risk,” result in “stoking fear” and Muslims “experiencing an unusual amount of hate and fear” (PCAN19).

**Governance of Muslim Risk and Resilience in the U.K.:** CR policies in the U.K. have governed Muslims as “risky” subjects since their inception. Having evolved at critical junctures after acts of “domestic terrorism” by Muslim perpetrators, Prevent has almost exclusively targeted Muslim communities. Additionally, by privileging a shallow understanding of radicalization as a cognitive process of developing ‘extremist’ ideas, Prevent has assumed the presence of risk in specific kinds of Islamic beliefs thought to be ‘extreme’ (Kundnani, 2012b; Mythen et al., 2017). The nominal acknowledgement of plural factors of radicalization was dropped in the 2011 updates to Prevent, after which radicalization has been understood to be squarely “driven by ideology” (HM Government, 2011, p. 5). By adopting the definition of ‘extremism’ as “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values,” Prevent has included “extreme Islamist” views within its remit, even if those views do not espouse violence (Kundnani, 2015). The Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF), a risk assessment tool based on factors listed under the Extremist Risk Guidance (ERG22+), was used to “identify those persons ‘at risk’ from violent extremism and to ‘support’ them” through Channel interventions (Heath-Kelly, 2013, p. 405). With the enactment of the Prevent Duty requiring public sector workers to refer individuals thought to be at risk of radicalization, the ERG22+ factors were incorporated into public life more widely (Qureshi, 2016). Several studies have noted the weak (or nonexistent) correlation between the ERG22+ factors (which
assess intent, capability, and engagement) and “expressing extremist views – never mind engaging in serious violence” (Mythen, 2020, p. 176; Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016; Pettinger, 2020). Despite the scientific veneer of risk assessments, the lack of specificity of the ERG22+ factors has led to a racialized understanding of Muslim risk producing “false positives” (Aked, 2020; Younis, 2019). The year after the enactment of the Prevent Duty, 70 percent of Prevent referrals and 76 percent of Channel interventions were related to “Islamist extremism” (Home Office, 2017). Only 5 percent of total referrals received Channel support and alarmingly, the majority of those referred were young people (under 20) (BBC, 2017). Based on interviews with Channel mentors, Pettinger (2020) describes Channel as relying on “subjective, intuition-infused” interventions which act upon traits and behaviours that appear unrelated to violence. He concludes, “[a]s a result, everyday behaviors become national security concerns—although in specific, racialized bodies” (p. 980).

Whereas the pre-2011 iteration of Prevent referred to building “resilience to violent extremism” through cohesion, the 2011 update has defined resilience as the capability of individuals and communities to “rebut and reject proponents of terrorism and the ideology they promote” (HM Government, 2011, p. 108). Interestingly, the Countering Extremism Strategy has brought cohesion and “integration” back into the discussion of ‘radicalization’ by suggesting that communities who lead “isolated lives separated from the mainstream” are “less resilient to the threat posed by extremism” (HM Government, 2015a, p. 37). This quotation references the government’s explicit view that Muslim communities are not sufficiently integrated into the “mainstream” (Birt, 2019). In this conceptualization, it seems apparent that the government identifies Muslim
communities as deficient in some way that necessitates resilience. Related documents suggest that education plays an important role in building resilience: “[s]chools and childcare providers can also build pupils’ resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental British values and enabling them to challenge extremist views” (Department of Education, 2015, p. 5). Much as in Québec (Millett & Ahmad, 2021), Muslim students in the U.K. are constructed as “risky” and “at-risk” with CR interventions seeking to boost their resilience to “violent extremism.”

Research participants from the U.K. described how Prevent and Channel risk-assessments not only targeted Muslims unfairly but also had serious shortcomings. The Executive Director of a human rights organization reflected that the risk assessment in Prevent “is not even about violent extremism” (PUK5). She elaborated:

“It’s about values and ideas, and I think that’s really quite problematic, particularly when you’ve got an . . . extremism is defined in relation to British values, the rule of law, and all things that are so nebulous at their heart and that could capture so much. Then you have very, very broad indicators of extremism because these indicators are built on those definitions. By virtue of that, you have indicators like signs of someone maybe changing their dress code to a more conservative dress code or marks and grades going up and down and all things that are essentially very normal” (PUK5).

The participant’s comments provide insight into how the “British values” formulation in CR policies has contributed to viewing risk in Muslimness itself, where things as benign as one’s clothes and grades become indicators of risk. The participant provided examples of how Muslims are seen as “risky” and “at-risk.” She referenced the case of Shamima Begum – a young woman who traveled to Syria as a minor and supported ISIS – whose citizenship was revoked by the Home Office on grounds of national security risk (BBC, 2021; also see Choudhury, 2017a). Whereas Shamima Begum was treated as a “risky” subject, the participant said visibly Muslim women were assumed to be “at-risk”: “[i]f
you’re a Muslim woman who doesn’t speak English and wears a hijab, you’re a real walking potential risk of radicalization” (PUK5). In essence, risk is bound to Muslimness in one way or another through CR policies.

A few participants cited the “Trojan Horse” incident (PUK2, PUK6) as an example of racialized practices of risk assessment that harm Muslims. Based merely on an anonymous tip, Ofsted (the school regulator) accused Muslim administrators of “fostering extremism” in schools that served Muslim majority students (Shackle, 2017). Participants told me the accused administrators were following standard practice by accommodating the cultural practices of students. A participant who previously worked as a teacher clarified, when schools are “representative of culture and community,” it fosters “institutional buy-in” (PUK6). Participants remonstrated that despite being among the top-performing schools in the country, the implicated schools were singled out merely because they were Muslim-run (also see Holmwood & O’Toole, 2018).

At the time of data collection for this research, the government had invited CSOs to provide evidence of how Prevent was harming Muslim communities. The manager of a civil rights and advocacy organization shared that the treatment of Muslims as risky subjects has been so deleterious that it is difficult to quantify the degree of harm Prevent has caused among Muslim communities:

“I think it’s really hard to measure the impact and of course, government . . . when they have things like . . . When they want people to submit to investigations or inquiries, they really want statistics. They want that quantitative data, but you just can’t measure the harm that’s done to the thousands of people who are being reported under Prevent and might come into contact with police or might come into contact with other people who make up the Prevent panel. You just can’t measure that harm that’s done or maybe the lack of trust that’s caused. You can’t measure the deterrent effect really of having a kind of broadly surveillant or
monitoring system within health services, and that’s really concerning for us, and we see that in other elements of our work” (PUK8).

A few other participants also shared the view that the harm wrought by Prevent on Muslim individuals and communities was both grave and unquantifiable (PUK5, PUK6).

In sum, the risk-based thinking that ungirds CR policies has oriented the security gaze upon Muslims who are seen at once as “risky” and “at-risk.”

**Preemptive Interventions and the Expansion of Security**

McCulloch and Wilson (2016) note that the logics of pre-crime or preemption have gained considerable traction under the ‘war on terror’ (p. 2). With “risk as a dispositif,” CR policies constitute a form of security governance that anticipates the future risk of political violence and takes present-day action to preempt that inherently unknowable future (Aradau & Van Munster, 2007; Martin, 2014, p. 62). Preemption is distinct from prevention in that the former eschews reliance on past knowledge to anticipate future risk (McCulloch & Wilson, 2016, p. 3). Drawing on Louise Amoore’s (2013) scholarship, Pettinger (2020) underscores that CR policies rest on “the governance of possibilistic risk imaginaries rather than probabilistic risk trajectories” (p. 972). McCulloch and Wilson (2016) clarify that in prevention, “[r]isk is tied to a more probable and calculable future,” whereas preemption, “looks to less proximate and incalculable futures” (p. 3) that are made known through continuous surveillance and “big-data, algorithmic rationality to sort and categorize this imagined risk” (Heath-Kelly, 2017 as cited in Pettinger, 2020, p. 972).

Building upon the racialization of Muslims as the “suspect community” and Muslimness itself as inherently carrying risk, preemptive governance has equated “risk indicators with ethnic and racialized identities,” resulting in “forms of Muslim profiling
through which domestic populations are subjected to discriminatory police treatment and more intrusive surveillance” (Monaghan & Molnar, 2016, p. 409). Thus, the expansion of CR policies into non-security domains of society should be examined through the lens of preemption and the corresponding governance of the anticipatory risk of Muslim violence. The recruitment of public sector agencies, social sector employees, and CSOs to widen surveillance of Muslims for CR interventions renders what Sharma and Nijjar (2018) call a “racialized surveillant assemblage” that “spawns paranoid forms of racism, rendering migrant-Muslim populations as sites of (trans)national insecurity, uncertainty, and violence” (p. 73).

**Preemptive Governance and the Expansion of Security in Canada:**

Preemptive governance is evident in the operationalization of national security-related risk assessments and interventions. Preemption guides the policing practice of using risk indicators to predict the possibilities of “radicalization to violence.” The imaginary of the risky Muslim who bears the possibility of committing a future act of political violence makes it possible to operationalize risk through “Islamic difference” (Monaghan & Molnar, 2016, p. 408). The imagined risk of future violence by Muslims is pithily captured in an RCMP counterterrorism training slide that Monaghan and Molnar (2016) share in their work. The slide, titled “The future of terrorism?” without accompanying text, has a grainy picture of a young girl in a hijab standing next to a box or suitcase while clutching some sort of device in her hand (p. 408). This “racialized imagery” of a child as the “future of terrorism” makes it possible to locate the site of preemptive CR interventions in Muslimness and Muslim bodies, old and young, male and female. In addition to federal policing efforts, the emphasis on preemption is also evident in
municipal CR efforts. For example, the city of Toronto’s FOCUS initiative incorporates “Countering Violent Extremism Prevention/Intervention” using a “risk-driven” approach for “reducing crime and improving community resilience” (B. Smith, 2018). FOCUS interventions are identified as operating in the “pre-criminal sphere” (i.e., as a form of preemptive governance) where “radical ideology (beliefs and feelings)” is understood to develop, and therefore can be disrupted to avoid a possible future of political violence (B. Smith, 2018). Québec’s CR action plan also privileges preemptive interventions among racialized Muslims. For example, education sector employees are encouraged to take radicalization trainings and promote attitudes and skills among students to avoid future radicalization to violence (Millett & Ahmad, 2021). Social-psychological interventions used by municipal CR initiatives (e.g., Calgary ReDirect) are also rooted in preemptive logic.

Even though preemptive CR interventions are couched in the congratulatory language of “community resilience,” some research participants saw these interventions as avenues of surveillance of Muslim communities. One participant, a former board member of an Ontario mosque, recalled an outreach event organized by Public Safety Canada and local police at the mosque, shortly after a turbulent period when a mosque attendee was implicated as a ‘foreign fighter.’ She said that, at one level, the outreach event held in the outdoor premises of the mosque was “nice” because people could “interact and have fun.” It was “positive PR, both for the mosque and for law enforcement,” allowing “relationship-building” (PCAN9). However, the police presence worried one woman attending the mosque who asked the participant: “Why are they here? Is something wrong? Is the mosque in trouble?” She recounted that the police
officers asked questions, some of which were “sincerely curious,” but others were “willfully ignorant” and “really rude.” She ended her account with the following reflection:

“I think there was also an internal struggle. Even for myself and when I would talk about it with friends as well, it was just . . . What's the point of outreach? What are we doing? Is it helpful? Are we just feeding into their intelligence gathering capabilities or is this actually going somewhere? I still don't have an answer to that” (PCAN9).

The participant’s story underlines the unease with which community outreach and other CR interventions are perceived by Muslim communities. There may be some positive aspects to these interactions, but they are overshadowed by the feeling that such events may be avenues for “intelligence gathering.” A participant who studies CR policies internationally was more emphatic in noting that surveillance was a part of CR-related police outreach:

“. . . you can never convince me that having a police officer in an organization or in a mosque would not be surveillance to some extent, period. Having that intervention is surveillance. It might also be social work. It might also be health. It might also be education, but it will always have that investigative aspect to it. That’s part of the MO of policing. They live on information and data, so these practices are still happening” (PCAN2).

Noting the importance of “information and data” to policing and investigation, the participant indirectly references preemptive governance’s need to continuously collect surveillance information in order to assess the future possibility of political violence.

Participants from Canada viewed CR policies as extensions of counterterrorism efforts as opposed to distinct policy formations (like Prevent in the U.K.). To some extent, this characterization is unsurprising because full-fledged CR policies are fairly recent, having emerged only in 2015 (Kubicek & King, 2021). As discussed in Chapter 4, Canada’s CR policies developed through piecemeal policy mobilizing of transnational
ideas and best practices. Even though CR initiatives (with varying degrees of institutionalization) exist at provincial and municipal levels (see O’Halloran, 2021), research participants were more familiar with the terrorism prevention efforts of the RCMP and the outreach efforts of Public Safety Canada. When I asked participants about CR policies, most referred to these federal preventative efforts, which continue to this day. Specifically, nearly all participants referred to unannounced and intimidating visits by the RCMP and CSIS. Some referred to outreach to mosques by Public Safety Canada (PCAN6; PCAN9; PCAN10; PCAN26). Several participants were aware of the Community Resilience Fund (PCAN10; PCAN11; PCAN22). It appears that the federal government’s delayed and tentative adoption of full-fledged counter-radicalization has impacted participants’ impression of CR policies. Nevertheless, participants were clear that preemptive efforts of national security were based on racialized practices that viewed Muslims as risky. A participant who has a long history of supporting community members who have been accosted by the RCMP and CSIS noted the blurred lines between outreach for prevention/preemption and intelligence gathering for investigations:

“They’re investigations because when they have the outreach, there’s genuine outreach, and sometimes when they say it’s outreach, it may just be a pretext for an investigation. You never know, and that’s what we tell people. ‘We never know if it’s about you or if it’s about somebody else because their job is to get information’” (PCAN18).

Preemptive governance and the expansion of security in the U.K.: There is a rich body of work examining CR policies in the U.K. as forms of preemptive governance. Heath-Kelly (2013) was among the early interveners to argue that “the ‘radicalisation’ discourse” is deployed “to make terrorism pre-emptively governable and knowable” through Prevent (p. 394). With Muslim individuals and communities framed through risk,
*Prevent* uses a range of security and surveillance practices across Muslim neighbourhoods in order to gauge the possibility of their radicalizing in the future (pp. 402-403). *Channel* interventions are techniques of disciplinary governance to manage the behaviours and attitudes of “at-risk” Muslims, vulnerable to a future of violent extremism (p. 405). In the view of counter-radicalization as preemptive security governance, young people and children become legitimate targets of *Channel* interventions; by June 2011, over 1,000 young people had received Channel interventions (p. 406). The introduction of the 2015 *Prevent* Duty has further ushered “a new phase of preemptive interventions, again largely focused on Muslims and targeting young people in particular” (Mythen et al., 2017, p. 196). The *Prevent* Duty recruits the education, health, and social service sectors to expand surveillance in the interest of identifying individuals at “risk of radicalization” (in the future) and referring them to be considered for a *Channel* intervention (in the present). Racial imaginaries animate the identification of future ‘radicalization’ risk. Soon after the *Prevent* Duty was enacted, stories appeared of Muslim students being referred to Prevent merely for making jokes, mispronouncing words, and holding pro-Palestine views (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016). In 2015/2016, over 2,000 children (under 15) were referred to *Prevent*, with the vast majority being Muslim (Home Office, 2017; Travis, 2017). Studies have found that the *Prevent* Duty in the health sector (Heath-Kelly, 2017; Heath-Kelly & Strausz, 2019) and the education sector (Busher et al., 2019; Winter et al., 2021) has become a “banal” extension of everyday practice by casting the duty as a form of “safeguarding.” Whereas safeguarding conventionally referred to protecting children and populations with special needs from abuse, under *Prevent*, the Home Office has incorporated into safeguarding
protection “from being drawn into terrorist related activity” (HM Government, 2015b, p. 21). Within these transitions, evidence is immaterial; preemptive CR interventions are based on “an obsession with worst-case logics in the face of banality” and racial anxieties about risk-laden Muslims (Pettinger, 2020, p. 981; Younis & Jadhav, 2020). With the enmeshing of safeguarding and counter-radicalization, Prevent “not only sets the agenda on what it means, but also creates a reality around it as a tangible process that produces a set of associated techniques and mechanisms” (Mythen et al., 2017, p. 197). The preemptive logic of the Prevent Duty has produced a “chilling effect” among Muslim students in schools and a racialized self-censorship among families, teachers, and health workers (Faure-Walker, 2019; Winter et al., 2021, p. 5).

Research participants from the U.K. were expressly concerned with the statutory requirements of the Prevent Duty and how it has co-opted safeguarding. A participant affiliated with grassroots Muslim CSOs noted that the Prevent Duty has encouraged a “tick box mentality” (PUK2), or a reluctant assumption of responsibility, explained by another participant as follows: “The main thing is that we’ve done our job in referring. I don’t know. Somebody else who has more expertise will then deal with it” (PUK10). Participants shared that the Prevent Duty made things “uncomfortable” for employees at education and health institutions “because they feel it subverts the relationship of trust that they think should pertain between teacher, pupil, lecturer, student, doctor, and patient” (PUK2). However, it was different for schools because the “language of safeguarding and protection of children is much more different and emotive” (PUK2). A participant affiliated with the board of a human rights CSO that had convened Muslim CSOs in a discussion around Prevent elaborated:
“...the language of safeguarding has been incredibly powerful in terms of making it easier for [teachers] to see this part of what they do as part of their professional duty. They’re saying now they can fit it into safeguarding. It was just another part of safeguarding that they were doing.

...They’re sort of normalizing it and there are some who would then question whether it is the same level of safeguarding. There is this heated conversation saying, “Well, it’s not really safeguarding in the way that other forms of safeguarding are safeguarding because who are we safeguarding? Are we safeguarding the child are or we safeguarding ourselves from the child?” (PUK10).

The participant’s remarks echo observations that the use of safeguarding in Prevent has facilitated its incorporation into banal everyday professional practices (Heath-Kelly & Strausz, 2019). However, as the participant notes, unlike conventional safeguarding which protects children, it was unclear who was being safeguarded against whom once safeguarding was deployed under counter-radicalization. The Executive Director of a human rights organization clarified: “It’s safeguarding the public, not the individual. It’s about identifying an individual that may pose a security risk to the public” (PUK5). The same participant remarked that safeguarding “is about identifying a child and their parents who . . . would potentially have a propensity to commit an act of terrorism,” thus reflecting the deployment of safeguarding towards preemptive ends of counter-radicalization. Additionally, she noted that while the safeguarding narrative has been “very useful for the government because it sounds a lot more palatable and it’s about children,” it is effectively a racialized, disciplinary practice targeting Muslim children so they may not be “able to speak about things they want to speak about” (PUK5).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I argue that CR policies in Canada and the U.K., having evolved in response to incidents of political violence by Muslim perpetrators and having adopted
the dominant policy view that ‘radicalization’ is associated with Islamic/‘Islamist’ ideology, represent a form of racialized security governance directed mainly at domestic Muslims. In particular, I show how CR policies in Canada and the U.K. engender the racialization of Muslims into the “suspect community,” govern Muslims by treating them as simultaneously “risky” and “at-risk,” and are undergirded by a logic of preemption that relies on racialized imaginaries of the future possibilities of Muslim political violence in order to apply security and disciplinary techniques upon Muslims in the present. Drawing on the discussion from the previous two chapters, I also show that while CR policies in Canada and the U.K. share these characteristics, they also follow distinct forms of operationalization. For example, in Canada, CR policies insist that radicalization is not “a Muslim thing,” yet CR practices reveal a fixation on Muslim communities. By contrast, the policy design and implementation of CR policies in the U.K. (especially, Prevent) have been overtly directed at Muslim communities. In Canada, the assessment of Muslims as risky is most apparent in the risk indicators used by policing and intelligence agencies. In the U.K., risk assessment tools that deem Muslims as risky are used more widely as social and public institutions make Prevent referrals for Channel interventions. Finally, in Canada, preemptive governance practices are dispersed with varying degrees of consistency across CR initiatives in provinces and municipalities. On the other hand, in the U.K. preemptive governance is most apparent in the Prevent Duty, which mandates that public sector employees monitor and report on signs of radicalization. This is of special concern in schools, where children and young people are referred for intervention to avoid the possibility of their ‘radicalizing’ in the future.
Importantly, my analysis includes the perspectives of research participants to highlight how CR policies are experienced and interpreted by Muslim CSO representatives. In Canada, participants expressed concern that the “dominant framework” of radicalization equated radicalization to Islam, prompting policing and intelligence agencies to focus on Muslims. Participants indicated there was a gap between community and security interpretations of the problem of ‘radicalization.’ Participants were concerned that in CR policies, Muslim religiosity was coded as posing a risk of ‘violent extremism’ and interventions focusing on community resilience assumed the problem of radicalization existed in the midst of Muslim communities. Participants were gravely concerned about unsolicited visits by the RCMP and CSIS and about counter-radicalization outreach activities being used for intelligence gathering. Participants from Canada saw CR policies as extensions of previous counterterrorism prevention tactics versus distinct policy formations. By contrast, participants in the U.K. were keenly aware of (and concerned with) Prevent, the U.K.’s CR strategy. In the U.K., participants expressed concerns about how Prevent’s understanding of radicalization as a cognitive process of developing ‘extreme’ Islamic ideology led to Muslims being treated as suspects. Participants raised significant concerns about the Prevent Duty for widening the expansion of surveillance against Muslims and attributing riskiness to Muslims through the British values discourse. One particular worry to participants was the government’s use of the “safeguarding” discourse in counter-radicalization, as it fostered the normalization of surveillance and referrals of Muslim students in schools under the guise of everyday professional practices of safety.
In closing, this chapter has compared and contrasted CR policies through extant critical scholarship on CR policies and by centering the perspective of research participants included in this study. The discussion has highlighted different dimensions of CR policies and their racialized practices. The discussion in this chapter lays the groundwork for the next three chapters, where I show how CR policies create relations of power between state institutions and Muslim CSOs, and more pertinently, how Muslim CSOs engage in resistance and contestations within different dimensions of power.
Chapter 7 – Muslim CSO Responses to Power 1 in CR Policies

Following the discussion of the characteristics of CR policies in Canada and the U.K. and Muslim CSOs’ experience of CR policies, in this chapter and the subsequent two chapters (Chapters 7 through 9), I examine: 1) how CR policies create relations of power between state institutions and Muslim CSOs, and 2) the strategic responses of Muslim CSOs to CR policies and the considerations paramount in these responses. Data for this analysis are primarily drawn from interviews with leaders and managers of Muslim CSOs. The interview data are complemented by an analysis of public statements by Muslim CSOs, policy documents, parliamentary records, and relevant news stories.

To analyze CSO responses to CR policies, I rely on my proposed theoretical framework which treats public policies as creating relations of power between state institutions and CSOs. Drawing on Haugaard’s (2012, 2021) theorization, I propose that public policies create relations of power between state institutions and CSOs across four dimensions: 1) “Power 1” encapsulates power-over actions by state institutions within the bounds of a policy structure, creating a “structured power conflict;” 2) “Power 2” constitutes state institutions’ use of political authority to include or exclude particular agendas, mobilizing a “conflict over structure;” 3) “Power 3” refers to the reproduction of relations of power through tacit social knowledge and state-centred discourses, setting up an “epistemic conflict;” and finally, 4) “Power 4,” refers to efforts to produce disciplined CSOs who will unreflexively reproduce relations of domination. While these dimensions of power are mutually constitutive, for analytical purposes, it is useful to examine CSO responses separately under each dimension of power. Importantly, in my theoretical framework, I map CSO responses under each dimension of power onto Oliver’s (1991)
organizational institutionalist model to examine how CSO responses balance strategic concerns with pressures from the institutional environment shaped through CR policies.

The current chapter focuses on Muslim CSO responses to Power 1 rendered by CR policies. Power 1 has been conventionally theorized as one actor prevailing over another by getting the latter to do something they “would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957). Haugaard (2012, 2021) builds on this conceptualization to suggest that within democracies, Power 1 exercises are structure-bound (Giddens, 1984) and, therefore, establish contestations that occur inside the bounds of policy structures. Under CR policies, Power 1 contestations between state security institutions and Muslim CSOs arise when the former take action to advance their policy mandates and CSOs respond within the bounds of the policy structure. As discussed in Chapter 2, Power 1 is observed in decisions by state security institutions related to mobilization of economic resources, use of coercive authority as part of national security investigations, and selective granting of legitimacy to Muslim CSOs. CSO responses under Power 1 are constituted in their decisions regarding availing national security funding, cooperating with state security agencies, and using different approaches to challenge the withholding of legitimacy by state institutions. In the analysis that follows, I identify how CSO responses map onto the strategic categories proposed in Oliver’s (1991) organizational institutionalist model, considering the limits and possibilities of strategic choices available to CSOs under Power 1 contestations.

**Muslim CSO responses to Allocation of Counter-radicalization Funding**

The allocation of economic resources by state institutions is one medium through which Power 1 is exercised (Haugaard, 2021). In Canada and the U.K, allocations of funding for CR programs by national security agencies are an integral part of CR
policies. Between 2011 and 2016, the Canadian federal agency, Public Safety Canada, allocated CR funding primarily toward research under the Kanishka Project (Kubicek & King, 2021). Since 2016, Public Safety Canada’s Community Resilience Fund (CRF) has been steadily increasing funding to CR projects, and organizations are invited to apply for CR funding grants under calls for proposals. As shown in Appendix 6, between 2016 and 2020, the CRF disbursed over $21 million in funding.

Since the mid-2000s, the British government has allocated funding under Prevent for implementing CR-related programs. The allocation of these financial resources to CSOs was specifically directed to address the problem of Muslim ‘radicalization.’ Until 2011, Prevent funds were allocated to the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), which distributed the funds to local authorities that in turn provided grants to Muslim community organizations (Kundnani, 2009; Thomas, 2010). Between 2007 and 2011, the DCLG spent an estimated £80 million in Prevent funding, which was disbursed among various Muslim CSOs (DCLG, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Kundnani, 2009). Since 2011, the Home Office has been allocating Prevent funding directly to organizations instead of going through the DCLG (Ganesh, 2015; Thomas, 2014). Between 2015 and 2020, it is estimated the Prevent budget has averaged around £44 million per year, though the Home Office, citing national security concerns, has been reticent about disclosing the amounts and recipients of funds allocated through Prevent (Maryam, 2021). Additional CR funding is available under the Counter-Extremism Strategy’s Building a Stronger Britain Together (BSBT) program, which has funded £8.8 million in grants as of 2019, and Muslim CSOs have been among the grant recipients (Home Office, 2019c). Unlike Prevent funding, which is allocated directly by
government agencies, BSBT invites organizations to apply for funding through calls for proposals (like Canadian CRF funding). Muslim CSOs have responded to the availability of CR funding in a variety of ways detailed below.

**Muslim CSO Responses in Canada**

Muslim CSOs in Canada have been reluctant to apply for CR-related funding. Hardly any Muslim CSOs in Canada have accepted funding from Public Safety Canada’s Community Resilience Fund (CRF) (see Appendix 6). Among prominent Muslim organizations, the Canadian Council of Muslim Women accepted funding to run a CR-related program in 2014 as part of the Kanishka Project (Public Safety Canada, 2016a).

During my interviews, I asked research participants about the rationale for not applying for CR funding. One research participant, a senior executive of a national advocacy organization, explained that not taking CR-related government funding afforded them management independence, and provided them the necessary distance from state institutions to hold them accountable on matters of national security:

“…we don’t typically accept government funding unless it’s for a very specific project…[it’s] part of what makes us who we are. It’s an important part of what we do . . . to say no to lots of really good funding . . .

I think what becomes really tricky for us is that we want to be able to be in a position always where we have no incentive to water down our critiques on Public Safety.

. . .

We’re always in that calculus, and there are so many things that are tempting to … because we need the money, so we’re just like, ‘Ugh. Should we? Shouldn’t we? No, we can’t’” (PCAN 7)

A majority of research participants echoed the sentiment expressed in the above remarks (see Appendix 5 for an interview matrix containing participant responses by data coding
categories). Participants felt that foregoing national security related government funding allowed them the independence to hold the government accountable on behalf of their constituent Muslim communities. In their comprehensive report surveying CR programs globally, Kundnani and Hayes (2018) note that Muslim CSOs are invited to apply for national security related funding based on the premise that they have legitimacy in Muslim communities, but once they receive government funds, their social legitimacy among Muslim communities is compromised, putting them in a “double bind” (p. 13).

Based on my research data, it appears that Muslim CSOs in Canada face this double bind, and must balance the economic benefits of CR-related funding against the possibility that accepting CR funding might damage their social legitimacy among Muslim communities. In response to this dilemma, Muslim CSOs in Canada have been tentative about applying for CR-related funding. One participant, a program manager at an organization running a national youth mobilization project, reflected that his organization was considering applying for CRF funding, but wanted to ensure they could advance their own programming related to Islamophobia within a CRF-funded project:

“So, community resilience . . . We did dedicate a little bit of the piece, and I can’t say for certain, but from my perspective, I thought of a compromise . . . and a way to negotiate to say, ‘We qualify for the Community Resilience Fund, but we’re going to marginalize their discourse as far as we can while still keeping it on the table. We’re going for as a narrow of a scope and as far as possible, and broaden the scope of what is at the heart of our interests, which are about actually dealing with hate.’ That’s where we started to deal more with Islamophobia and intersectional [issues]’” (PCAN22).

These remarks convey a desire to maintain control over organizational programming to prevent it being co-opted by the agenda of state security agencies: this is the “calculus” (PCAN7) that Muslim organizations face when accessing national security related funding. Whatever decisions Muslim CSOs make about CR funding, it is important that
their constituent communities continue to perceive them as independent of government control and able to hold government agencies accountable for CR policies and other national security practices that have been harmful to Muslim communities over the years.

This strategic reluctance toward national security related government funding is especially striking because Muslim CSOs face consistent core funding challenges. As one participant, a senior manager at a Muslim CSO in Western Canada, articulated: “. . .we have no operational funding. We have a few monthly donors. It’s not enough. We’re always struggling to keep the lights on” (PCAN 13). This view aligns with empirical research findings that CSOs serving ethnic and racialized communities in Canada suffer from lack of sustained and core funding (e.g., Guo & Guo, 2011; Hopkins, 2006; Mukhtar et al., 2016).

Research participants informed me that they evaluated government funding on a case-by-case basis. One participant, representing a prominent religious institution with national reach, informed me that mosques were open to accepting funding under the Communities at Risk: Security Infrastructure Program (SIPS) in order to enhance physical security against hate-motivated violence targeting Muslims (see CTV News, 2017):

“It’s called SIPS . . .Yeah. It’s basically about strengthening the infrastructure of your centre to protect you against attack. I think it was introduced after the Québec attack.

. . .

We received one, and we put up fences, lighting, fixed locks, and that stuff. The government lady who helped process the grant was very good and helpful. It was a very good relationship” (PCAN10).

Muslim organizations also accept funding from other government agencies such as Canadian Heritage for cultural programming and civic engagement projects (e.g.,
Canadian Council of Muslim Women’s Civic Works project) and Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada for providing immigrant settlement services (e.g., Muslim Social Services of Kitchener) (Latif & Ali-Mohammed, 2021). Though an independent analysis of revenue sources of Muslim CSOs is beyond the scope of this dissertation, research participants indicated that Muslim CSOs largely relied on community contributions (see Qasgas & Chowdhury, 2019). Participants familiar with mosque operations informed me that fundraising and revenue diversification was an important function for imams and mosque board members (PCAN10; PCAN15; PCAN17).

**Discussion:** Power 1 responses of Muslim CSOs trying to find the right balance between benefiting from financial resources and maintaining social legitimacy in the eyes of Muslim communities maps onto the strategy of *Compromise.* A *Compromise* strategy is in play whenever CSOs explicitly balance demands emanating from the institutional environment (such as the need for funding and socio-political legitimacy) against the pursuit of organizational objectives (such as serving the interests of the communities they represent and maintaining legitimacy among their members and constituents) (Oliver, 1991). Additionally, Muslim CSO actions related to funding correspond largely to tactics of *Pacify* or *Bargain.* The tactic of *Pacify,* or partial compliance to stakeholder expectations, is evident in Muslim CSOs selectively choosing to accept government funding from non-national security sources (not seen as problematic by their Muslim constituents), but being tentative about national security related CR funding that would be seen negatively by Muslim communities. The tactic of *Bargain,* or seeking concessions for some degree of compliance to institutional pressures, is apparent in the above remarks by the participant (PCAN22) who was considering CR funding as long as
his organization could maintain control over its desired programming. Muslim CSOs in Canada refusing to apply for CR funding still follow the strategy of Compromise because the reasons for their refusal are based on a strategic calculus of balancing competing interests (rather than a purely principled opposition).

**Muslim CSO Responses in the U.K.**

CR funding as part of Prevent has a long history and presence across the public and social sectors in the U.K. As Prevent has gone through different stages of evolution in the last 15 years, Muslim CSOs’ engagement with Prevent funding has been dynamic and varied (especially as compared to Muslim CSOs in Canada). There are several salient aspects of Prevent that Muslim CSOs have had contend with. First, Prevent was launched and designed based on the assumption that ‘radicalization’ was a problem endemic to Muslim communities (DCLG, 2007; Kundnani, 2009). In the pre-2011 Prevent implementation under the Labour government, Prevent funds were allocated through local authorities ostensibly to foster “community-led” allocation. Yet in reality, the Home Office and Counter-Terrorism Unit police officers pressured local authorities to direct funding toward specific Muslim CSOs seen as friendlier to government objectives (Kundnani, 2009; O’Toole et al., 2011). Furthermore, Muslim CSOs were eligible for CR-related funding because of their access to and legitimacy within Muslim communities, but once they accepted the funding, that social legitimacy was put in jeopardy (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018). The director of An-Nisa Society, which received Prevent funding in 2007 but has since stopped taking CR-related money, eloquently articulated the problem with CR funding:

“The most glaring concerns of the Prevent strategy are the targeting of the whole Muslim community as potential terrorists, the fusion of counter terrorism with community cohesion and community development
initiatives and the mainstreaming of Prevent in the core services of local councils.

The strategy has a heavy surveillance focus, which has considerable risks involved and is morally dubious.

The strategy is confusing and unclear. It aims, for example, to strengthen the ‘capacity’ of Muslims to resist violent extremism and to build ‘resilience.’ Whatever that means is open to differing understandings. At one level, the euphemistic and vague terminology serves the purpose of getting the strategy past the Muslim community with little protest. The loose definitions also leave the strategy open to interpretation at the risk of being counterproductive. It gives officers substantial leeway in implementation with no accountability to Muslims, who are the subject of it.

... Funding grassroots Muslim groups to deliver Prevent is unhelpful as it causes them to lose credibility and trust with the very groups the government wants them to engage. Hardened extremists are not likely to attend projects funded by the government. Nor are parents going to send their children to ‘preventative’ projects that will stigmatise them. There is so much hostility to the strategy amongst Muslims once they become aware of it, that local councils and funded groups finding implementation difficult, are resorting to disguising the source and objectives of the funding by being ‘economical’ with information and using misleading labels” (Khan, 2009, p. 4).

Here, Khan points out that the objectives of Prevent are vague, its security mandate portends to harm community cohesion objectives, it is an avenue of surveillance of British Muslims, and it has little accountability and little community support, neutralizing the community trust-building aspirations of CR policies. Khan’s sentiments reflected the experience of several Muslim CSOs that availed funds under Prevent.

The majority of research participants confirmed the view that funding from CR policies is controversial and divisive for Muslim CSOs. One conversation with a participant who has been on the board of prominent Muslim CSOs and human rights organizations and who is well informed about the CR policy landscape, illustrated the different considerations for Muslim CSOs through Prevent’s history:
“When they were giving out the funding, local authorities were suddenly given this money and they were told effectively where to spend it and so then they had to find projects to spend it on, so lots of local organizations were saying, ‘Well, we’ve got this youth football team that we’d like to get money for.’ Well yeah, but it’s got to be about preventing radicalization, so then you have this whole repackaging of projects you’ve always wanted funding. As long as you can say that the groups that you’re funding are at risk of radicalization, then you get the money, and they knew it was all made up. They knew that as long as you framed it in the right way . . . your only funder. The funder requires you to say this.

. . .

If you say this, then you’ll get the funding but as a result, it’s been creating this whole discourse in which everybody was seeing groups at risk of radicalization because that’s what the money required.

. . .

And that was the debate that was taking place in the community at the time. Some people were saying, ‘No. This is dangerous. We shouldn’t be colluding in creating these profiles of the community.’ Others were saying, ‘Look, we need money for this stuff.’ This is how you frame it. We do it for all funders. We just tweak our funding application to put it within the language. If you apply to a charitable foundation for people at risk of whatever, you always will marginalize or deprive . . . You have to emphasize how marginalized and deprived they are. So, it’s not that different from doing what you do with any funding application. It’s framing it within language that the funders want.

. . .

But there were some groups that said, ‘Well, I’m not going to take any Prevent funding because it is wrong.’ Others took it knowing that they were . . . They were clear that this was a way of getting funding for things they were already doing, and often the local authorities were also clear that this was just a way of spending local . . . every grant they got from the government. Why look a gift horse in the mouth?” (PUK10).

These remarks illustrate a number of ways in which Muslim CSOs have engaged with CR-related funding under Prevent. Some Muslim CSOs have boycotted Prevent funding based on principled opposition, such as in An-Nisa Society (after the 2007 pilot), the Waltham Forest Council (Taylor, 2015), and several others. One participant, a senior manager at a national organization that encourages Muslim civic participation, said their
organization simply accepts “no government grants,” preferring to rely on “pure community funding” (PUK4). Yet other Muslim organizations “repackaged” existing programs, framing them in terms of “preventing radicalization,” in order to receive *Prevent* funding (PUK10). This had the unfortunate effect of securitizing ordinary CSO activities by bringing them into the umbrella of *Prevent*, implicitly ascribing the risk of ‘radicalization’ to participants in innocuous community activities such as “youth football” (PUK10). Moreover, as the above participant reiterated later in the interview (and had been observed in independent research), *Prevent* funding allocations sowed divisions between Muslim communities and non-Muslim communities, even though it was initially devised with the goal of improving community cohesion (Birt, 2009; Husband & Alam, 2011).

Another participant, a manager at a prominent Muslim umbrella organization with national reach, suggested that the overall climate of austerity facing Muslim CSOs has bearing on their decisions related to CR-related funding. She indicated that there are some Muslim CSOs who are accepting CR-related funding out of financial necessity:

“... this is quite a topical issue at the moment – as the demand for funding has increased because of other sectors that funding has decreased from – for example, the arts and education, and the cuts that have administered to that seconds – it means that other organizations are often looking in other places and therefore, taking funding [from *Prevent*]... Their work on counter-extremism is dependent on the fact that they really need funding” (PUK3)

*Prevent* funding has become fraught with even more controversy in recent years, especially since the enactment of the *Prevent* Duty in 2015 and the allocation of additional funding under the Counter-Extremism Strategy’s BSBT program. One participant, who occupies a leadership role in a Muslim umbrella organization and sits on
the board of a prominent mosque in London, shared that his mosque and “the majority of the Muslim community don’t work with Prevent” (PUK1). Another participant expressed that Muslim CSOs remain skeptical about participation in Prevent because Muslim communities feel it is still being used to conduct surveillance on them (PUK 5). At the same time, a manager at an umbrella organization representing Muslim charities in the U.K. informed me that “small mosques and Muslim charities” accept Prevent funding “for survival” (PUK12). Some Muslim CSOs have applied for and received funds under the BSBT program (Home Office, 2019c, 2019d), but various Muslim organizations have protested against organizations that have accepted BSBT funding on grounds that CR policies are anti-Muslim. At the time I was collecting data for this research, several prominent leaders from Muslim CSOs chose to boycott the Bradford Literature Festival because it received BSBT funding (Birt, 2019; Wolfe-Robinson, 2019). A director of an organization that accepts Prevent funding summarized the different considerations facing Muslim CSOs when it comes to CR-related funding:

“I think again . . . Yeah. Definitely there’s a negativity attached to the Muslim community in terms of, ‘Prevent money equals . . . This is against the Muslim community. It’s evil,’ if I’m just summarizing and then therefore the negativity that’s associated with it . . . and in fact, it’s as simplified as that and it’s like if you were taking - I don’t know - sports money that would be seen very differently. If you’re using the money for the same thing, the stigma that’s attached to the Home Office, rightly or wrongly, is a very negative one in terms of its negative impact on Muslim communities.

It wants to do things to the Muslim communities and so therefore, what you’re doing is spying on the Muslim community. I think it was a fundamental of it. I don’t think you get . . . Yeah. I think those are the essentials of it, and then the organizations that are therefore taking it [Prevent money] . . . You’re not a community organization effectively because what you’re doing is you’re part of the state structure to therefore influence on communities, so yeah” (PUK9).
The participant shares that, by and large, there is stigma attached to accepting CR-related funding (from the Home Office) because of the negative experience of Muslim communities with Prevent. Muslim communities view Prevent funded projects as an avenue to spy upon Muslim communities. Those who accept Prevent funding are seen to be “part of the state structure.” In other words, their social legitimacy in the eyes of Muslim communities is compromised.

Independent empirical work from the U.K. validates the views of research participants. In a study focusing on Bradford and Leeds, Abbas (2019) showed how Prevent funding sowed internal divisions among Muslim CSOs and community members as implementing Prevent-funded programs invited CSOs and community members to conduct “internal surveillance” on their own communities. Qurashi (2018) found that Prevent funding has been used to exploit the “financial insecurity” of young Muslim CSOs with “deep roots” in the community. His work revealed that, in exchange for Prevent funding, CSOs were expected to keep Prevent officers apprised of the dynamics within the community, especially at religious events and in mosques (i.e., conduct surveillance). Overall, research participants in this study and independent research have identified a prevailing sentiment that Muslim community organizations who choose to accept funding from Prevent or the Counter-extremism Strategy experience diminished credibility among Muslim communities (O’Toole et al., 2016; Qurashi, 2018). This has prompted several Muslim CSOs to keep their affiliation with Prevent concealed (PUK11).

**Discussion:** As an indication of Power 1, Muslim CSOs in the U.K. have adopted a range of responses ranging from practical acceptance to principled opposition in
deciding what to do about CR-related funding. The variation in approaches appears to be more diverse than those used by Muslim CSOs in Canada. The small and financially insecure Muslim CSOs that accept funding from CR policies would best be thought of as following a strategy of *Compromise*, because they balance institutional pressures against internal values and organizational needs (Oliver, 1991). Muslim CSOs accepting CR funding without any stipulations evince a tactic of *Balance*, including situations where Muslim CSOs keep their receipt of Prevent funding a secret. Where Muslim CSOs accept CR funding but frame existing programs in terms of CR priorities, they deploy a tactic of *Pacify* by complying only partially to external stakeholder demands (Oliver, 1991). Finally, participants suggested that “the majority of” and prominent Muslim CSOs do not accept CR funding based on principled opposition rooted in the incompatibility of organizational values with the institutional expectations of CR policies. This approach maps onto a strategy of *Defy* and a tactic of *Dismiss* because these CSOs frame their disavowal of CR funding as a principled rejection of CR policies citing the harm these policies have caused their constituents. This differs from the rationale provided by participants from Muslim CSOs in Canada, which base their refusal of CR-related funds on striking the right compromise between institutional pressures and maintaining legitimacy among their constituents.37

37 In both Canada and the U.K., CR funding has given rise to an ecosystem of organizations and programs dedicated to counter-radicalization. Among the research participants for this study, I included leaders of these organizations and programs. Since these organizations are not Muslim CSOs as per my definition, I have not included their strategies in my dissertation analysis. However, their strategic choices offer an interesting counterfactual for the strategies chosen by Muslim CSOs. These organizations and programs have generally been more willing to advance conceptions and initiatives that align with that of state security agencies and, therefore, are seen as reinforcing the securitization of Muslims (e.g., Millett & Ahmad, 2021). Therefore, if I were to analyze their strategies based on my proposed conceptual framework, their choices would map onto the strategy of *Acquiesce* and tactic of *Comply*. 
Cooperation with National Security Agencies

Power 1 is also exercised through coercion or the application of political authority to benefit the interests of power holders (Haugaard, 2012). This aspect of Power 1 is manifest in CR policies when state security agencies conduct surveillance and national security investigations as part of these policies. Some scholars have argued that CR policies are akin to community-policing programs, that encourage CSOs and Muslim community members to notify national security agencies about “suspicious” activities (Nguyen, 2019b). Thus, CR policies legitimize surveillance for the purposes of national security. In Canada, Muslim CSOs are invited to cooperate with national security agencies in various ways. Research participants informed me that Public Safety Canada directly reaches out to mosques and community members in order to provide national security trainings and share information about national security initiatives (also see Roberts, 2016). As part of the National Security Community Outreach Program (NSCOP), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) conducts its own outreach with Muslim CSOs for trust-building and to encourage communities to share “suspicious” information (Hanniman, 2008). Finally, the RCMP and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) show up at the home and workplaces of Muslim community members to inquire about persons of interest in national security investigations (Nasser, 2019). Almost all Muslim research participants in my study had experienced one or more such visits from the RCMP and/or CSIS.

In the U.K., as part of Prevent, the Home Office and policing agencies have tried to establish “trust” with and win “hearts and minds of” Muslim communities so they would resist “being attracted to violent extremism” (DCLG, 2007, p. 4). Despite the government’s insistence that it does not collect surveillance data through Prevent,
Muslim communities feel that the community relationships established through Prevent have been used to monitor the activities of Muslims (Qurashi, 2018). The enactment of the Prevent Duty has only reinforced the idea that Muslim communities are under scrutiny, undermining trust between state security agencies and Muslim communities. Nevertheless, as I discuss below, Muslim CSOs still cooperate with national security agencies for strategic reasons.

**Muslim CSO Responses in Canada**

During my interviews, I asked representatives of Muslim CSOs about the extent to which they engaged with national security agencies. All participants from Muslim CSOs indicated that they cooperated with national security agencies in one way or another. They indicated that such engagement provided the strategic benefit of being able to readily place community concerns before contacts in national security agencies or government bureaucracies. In the words of a participant who leads research projects at an international development organization and maintains a board affiliation with a national advocacy organization:

“I think there are people trying to engage the government that way. A . . . B; it doesn’t mean that just because they’re participating that they’re buying into it wholesale. C; they’re probably doing it in part for money or status or traction with influential policymakers, which is what they’re supposed to do as organizations” (PCAN4).

As these remarks indicate, Muslim CSOs cooperate with state institutions for potential utilitarian benefits, but also to gain “traction” with policymakers before whom community concerns can be raised. His remarks clarify that engagement does not equate to capitulation to security agencies’ demands, but does open the possibility for negotiating and seeking concessions on behalf of Muslim communities. Data from my
interviews highlight that Muslim CSOs cooperate with state security agencies not only because it facilitates relationships that can be leveraged for community benefit, but also because they see it as a responsibility or duty. An imam of a mosque from Ontario noted that he cooperated with national security agencies both because it was his “duty,” and because it had the added benefit of helping to address a problem faced by a mosque youth trying to cross the U.S. border:

“One of our active youth a few years ago . . . a really good youth who has good connections. He’s one of those who has really good views and he’s nice. You’d listen to him. They stopped him from crossing the border, and the problem here is that he works in the States. So now they’re stopping him from going to his work and providing for his family. This is a big deal. It was for no reason. He was a good helper. Actually, when we had one of the meetings [with CSIS and RCMP], we approached them and I said, ‘You know what? You want kind of cooperation and help in looking out for the security and safety of our country. It’s our duty - not only your duty - but you are working against us. This is how. One of the good members and one of the good youth . . . You stopped him from his work and from crossing the border. This is not good.’ The good thing out of this was that after a month they met with him, and they said, “Now you're allowed to cross. There’s no issue” (PCAN17).

Research from the U.S. validates the notion that patriotic duty and strategic interests both motivate Muslim communities to cooperate in national security efforts (see S. Howell & Jamal, 2008). In Canada, several news stories have noted that input from Muslim communities has been instrumental during national security investigations (e.g., Robinson, 2014). Indeed, research participants had much to say about the mutual benefits of national security cooperation. One participant, a former board member of a mosque in Ontario, said cooperation was necessary because it facilitates “relationship-building and community-building” and “[w]e need to learn about each other” (PCAN9). An imam in Western Canada said his relationship with the RCMP allowed him to offer feedback on problematic elements in counterterrorism trainings (PCAN15). He was invited to offer a
module on Islam in counterterrorism trainings as well as diversity and sensitivity trainings to the RCMP and local police. Through these efforts, he believes he was able to emphasize that “Islam isn’t a threat.” Another participant who runs a national youth engagement program described how the RCMP invited him to talk to and educate their officers, saying they wanted him “to come in from his work experience and train investigators about how they should rethink jihad, rethink community engagement, and rethink radicalization based on his personal stories” (PCAN22).

As participants highlighted the importance of engagement with national security agencies, they also expressed that unsolicited visits by CSIS and RCMP to people’s homes and workplaces were detrimental to community trust. These visits were variously described as “upsetting” (PCAN10), “scary” (PCAN15), “terrifying” (PCAN9), and “negative” causing some youth to become “detached from the mosque” (PCAN17). Participants felt that the basis for investigation was never clear and that CSIS or RCMP visits blurred the lines between community outreach and surveillance. One participant, a lawyer affiliated with a civil rights group who had represented many community members during informal CSIS and RCMP visits, mentioned that the reasons for such visits are often based on weak foundations:

“... tips come in from crazy places. Americans raid a cave in Afghanistan and there’s a computer with emails and contacts in Canada, and so the Americans give it to the Canadians and the Canadians follow up here because there’s a connection. There’s some correspondence. Somebody’s CC’d. There may be 50 people on the CC, but they’ve got to chase it down. I’ve had that case. I said, ‘You’re chasing it down because somebody from there copied him on an email from here.’ What do you do?” (PCAN18).

CSIS and RCMP visits have been a part of Canadian counterterrorism efforts since 9/11; Muslim CSOs have previously expressed concerns about these visits in the O’Connor
Commission testimony (Hanniman, 2008). An executive at a national advocacy organization said that CSIS visits are “kind of starting up again” as the agenda for ‘radicalization’ has gained momentum (PCAN7). She goes on to describe the stigmatizing nature of CSIS visits:

“. . .there are lots of people who don’t want to come forward. It’s hard to know how many they are, but we often hear about people. ‘I know somebody, but they don’t want to come forward because they don’t want to admit that CSIS came to their door for fear of being ostracized by their own community’ . . . and that the Muslim community will then shun this person because it’s almost contagious” (PCAN7).

Muslim CSOs have continued using their relationships with federal and police agencies to express grievances against oppressive and discriminatory CSIS visits. Importantly, these visits underline the coercive power held by state security agencies and heighten the awareness of the expression of Power 1 in the interaction between Muslim CSOs and state institutions. I infer that the operation of this power relationship prompted a few research participants to express doubt about the impact of their engagement with state security agencies. This was eloquently expressed by one participant who formerly sat on the board of an Ontario mosque and actively engages with Public Safety Canada:

“Whenever I’m there, sometimes I doubt . . . I don’t know. I am constantly doubting whether or not I should be there or not. Maybe . . . no. Let me rephrase that. I’m constantly doubting whether or not I’m having the desired influence that I want to have. I strongly believe that if you’re not at the table, then you’re on the menu. I sometimes don’t know in my own capacities to be the one on the table representing our community, because sometimes I feel like . . . I don’t know. Somebody else might have a better or bigger influence on things” (PCAN6).

The metaphor of being on the menu if you are “not on the table” was repeated to me by a few other participants who also cooperated with the RCMP and Public Safety Canada on matters of national security. This metaphor conveyed the sentiment that by engaging with
national security agencies (being “at the table”) Muslim CSOs could exert their agentic power to shape policy matters in favour of Muslim communities. If they did not engage, Muslims would be mere recipients of these policies (“on the menu”). At least two other participants also shared doubt about whether their engagement was having the desired impact, suggesting a very conscious strategic approach (PCAN9; PCAN22).

Discussion: These actions of Muslim CSOs map onto the strategy of Compromise and the tactic of Bargain. They maintain working relationships with state security agencies in order to advance the interests of Muslim communities, and thus strike a compromise in the face of competing pressures from the external environment and their members and constituents (Oliver, 1991). This compromise corresponds to a tactic of Bargain because Muslim CSOs do not simply comply to demands from national security agencies; they use their relationships with state security institutions to seek concessions for Muslim communities. Finally, I posit that the Compromise strategy described here represents a CSO response to Power 1, because it falls within the bounds of the policy structure. Under such Power 1 strategic responses, the likelihood of success of CSO’s achieving their desired objectives depends on the discretion of the agent or institution (the powerful) with whom Muslim CSOs have a relationship. By contrast, as I discuss in Chapter 8, Muslim CSO responses to Power 2 offer greater potential to address the systemic inequities embedded in policy structures.

Muslim CSO Responses in the U.K.

Muslim CSOs in the U.K. also cooperate with members of the government bureaucracy and police units responsible for counterterrorism. A participant, who is the chairman of the board of a prominent mosque in London and has a senior management
role in a Muslim umbrella organization, described the efforts the mosque took to develop a strong working relationship with the police and the central and local governments:

“First of all, when we took over the mosque, we tried to gain some sort of trust between us and other sectors, especially the police level, government level, and local government like the council and others. We made it clear for everybody that we work with everybody in partnership. We don’t work as someone who you come and tell them what to do. We are here to work with everybody at a partnership level, which means that they don’t come to us and tell us what to do on this and that. Of course, if there are concerns and they come to us, approach us, and show their concerns, if there is anything and Alhamdulillah [thanks to God], we don’t have any concerns as a mosque. We have a great relationship with the police, with the council, and even with some officers in the Home Office and so on. We have a good relationship with everybody, and we work in accordance to this relationship. We don’t have this sort of issue. People from the Home Office or from the police don’t come and tell us, ‘Look. We have this issue. We want you to do this.’ We have that. As I said, we won’t accept that. We make it clear.

... We won’t accept that because, at the end of the day, we know our duty, we know our responsibility, and we know that although it is important to work with these bodies - which is very important and we might maintain and very good relationship with them - we don’t allow anyone to tell us what to do as a mosque, as an organization, and as a community” (PUK1).

These remarks succinctly capture the two motivations that Muslim CSOs have for maintaining a working relationship with national security agencies: first, they describe it as part of their duty as British residents, and second, they think it is strategically beneficial to work with these agencies. Later in our conversation, the participant clarified that his mosque needs to ensure a good working relationship with security agencies, so that they can raise issues of public safety facing Muslim communities.

In the above remarks, the participant also underscored that the relationship with the police is not a capitulation to their demands. On the contrary, the participant firmly stated that maintaining the mosque’s independence was an important condition of their
engagement with police and agents from different levels of government. As I have noted in the previous section, several Muslim CSOs in the U.K. have sought to maintain their independence by not accepting funding made available as part of Prevent (a tactic of Dismiss). Of the Muslim CSOs that “work with Prevent” in some capacity (PUK11), there is variation in the strategies that Muslim CSOs choose to arrive at the ‘right’ balance between cultivating a working relationship with security agencies and maintaining their own autonomy. Ample secondary research confirms that Muslim CSOs in the U.K. maintain strong working relationships with the government and security bureaucracy, and that Muslim civil society actors were “actively involved in (re)shaping and contesting the implementation of Prevent” (O’Toole, DeHanas, et al., 2013, p. 53).

The Muslim Council of Britain, the largest Muslim umbrella organization in the U.K. with a membership of 500 Muslim CSOs, has strived to maintain working relationships with different central governments. Over the years, the organization’s access to government has allowed it to elevate concerns about government actions (including Prevent) that have negatively impacted British Muslims, though such criticism has also at times caused the organization to be viewed less favorably by governments and security agencies (Braginskaia, 2015; McLoughlin, 2010).

Like the participants in Canada, participants in U.K. were also reflective about their engagement with national security agencies and participation in Prevent. Those that chose to refuse Prevent funding said their decision was based on principled opposition (PUK1; PUK4). One participant, the director of an organization that accepts Prevent funding to implement training workshops, responded as follows when I asked about her
organization’s approach to accepting funding from *Prevent* when it was so unpopular among Muslim communities:

“Yeah. I’m not agreeing or disagreeing. I completely understand and yes, you can accuse me of different things in terms of . . . taking Home Office money means this, which they’re fully aware of but, at the same time, I guess I’ve tried to assuage a little bit of our guilt by kind of not having Home Office employed to what we’re doing, and we’d like to feel that we’re part of a conversation that’s happening” (PUK9).

The above reflection mirrors the sentiment of “being on the table and not the menu” shared by Canadian participants (PCAN6). The participant from the U.K. justified accepting *Prevent* funding by stating that it allowed their organization to “be part of the conversation,” and therefore shape how the conversation develops. In other words, the organization decided that they would accept *Prevent* funding to facilitate direct engagement with policymakers and possibly influence policymaking through that engagement.

**Discussion:** The strategic choices of Muslim CSOs that cooperate with state security agencies in order to bring forward concerns facing Muslim communities and potentially influence CR policies map onto the strategy of *Compromise* and tactic of *Bargain*. This bargaining is evident in how Muslim CSOs in the U.K. seek concessions with respect to CR policies as they are being invited by state institutions to cooperate on matters of national security. In cases where Muslim CSOs do not accept *Prevent* funding to retain independence, but still cooperate with national security agencies, they are still pursuing a strategy of *Compromise* and tactic of *Bargain*. The refusal of *Prevent* funding is based on strategic calculations of maintaining organizational independence but also maintaining ties with security agencies to fetch concessions for Muslim communities (as indicated in the above remarks by participant, PUK1). Some Muslim CSOs in the U.K.
have also refused to cooperate with the Home Office on the government’s terms. In a recent example, after the announcement of William Shawcross as the independent reviewer of *Prevent*, several Muslim CSOs said they would not participate in the review (Grierson, 2021). These refusals and abstentions correspond to a strategy of *Defy* and tactic of *Dismiss*. As discussed earlier, the strategy of *Compromise* under Power 1 has limits as it relies on the discretion of powerful state institutions.

**Responses to Granting and Withholding “Sociopolitical” Legitimacy**

Power 1 includes the ways in which holders of political authority utilize that authority for power-over maneuvers that advance their interests (Gaventa, 2006; Haugaard, 2021). Within CR policies, I suggest that state institutions using their authority to selectively grant or withhold legitimacy to CSOs is an exercise of Power 1. As I noted in Chapter 2, in addition to legitimacy from constituents and the wider public (social legitimacy), legitimacy from state institutions (sociopolitical legitimacy) is essential for CSOs to effectively carry out their work (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). State institutions exercise Power 1 though the allocation or withholding of legitimacy as a resource. In Canada and the U.K., this exercise of Power 1 is manifest in formal actions (such as the revocation of charitable status or determination of which CSOs are worthy of receiving CR funding) or informal actions (such as casting aspersions on the reputation of a CSOs by implying that they are affiliated with listed terrorist entities). In this section, I discuss how Muslim CSOs have responded to these assertions of Power 1.

**Muslim CSO Responses in Canada**

Though this was not included among my initial set of questions, several participants (PCAN3; PCAN4; PCAN10; PCAN18) affiliated with Muslim CSOs in Canada drew my attention to the fact that Muslim CSOs feel they are being unfairly
targeted by Canada’s tax regulator, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) in the name of national security. A participant, who has a board affiliation with a national advocacy organization and has written media stories about matters concerning Muslim communities, remarked:

“The CRA is the big one, obviously, because we’re talking about . . . You were talking about how a lot of the time the community depends on these charity status institutions like ISNA - The Islamic Society of North America - or of Islamic Relief, or of some mosque in Ottawa. Exactly, right? That area, for example, has had some seriously negative interactions in a way that leaves the community very, very . . . not desperate. I don’t know . . . because they get fined or whatever, but it doesn’t necessarily always tank the organization. It leaves the trust between these two entities more or less shattered because the Muslim community has a difficult time perceiving the CRA or whichever other organization as being able to accurately apprehend exactly what the threat is. How do you know that my money that’s going to this NGO in Kashmir . . . How do you know, as the CRA, that the money over there ended up in the hands of straight-up terrorists or whatever it is? If the money that you're donating to Gaza ends up in the hands of Hamas, which is the government of Gaza, is it fair to necessarily penalize IRFAN Canada or whichever organization . . . Islamic Relief in Europe or whatever for that kind of thing?” (PCAN4).

The participant’s remarks raise many important points for discussion. First, he notes several Muslim CSOs have been targeted by the CRA on grounds of national security/counter-radicalization. Some have been fined (e.g., Islamic Society of North America, ISNA) whereas others have had their charitable status revoked (e.g., IRFAN Canada). Second, these Muslim charities were targeted and penalized because the CRA believed they violated national security laws and regulations by knowingly or unknowingly providing material support to listed terrorist entities. He specifically cites IRFAN Canada’s support for Hamas, a group listed as a terrorist entity in Canada. In the case of the Ottawa Islamic Centre and Assalam Mosque (referred to as the “mosque in Ottawa” by the participant), the CRA revoked the organization’s charitable status for
inviting speakers deemed by the CRA to “promote hate and intolerance” (S. Bell, 2018b).

Third, the participant acknowledges that the CRA has the difficult task of assessing whether or not charitable funds are being misused; nevertheless, the recent actions by the CRA that penalize Muslim charities leave the trust between state institutions and Muslim CSOs “shattered.” Fundamentally, Muslim CSOs believe that they are being targeted disproportionately and unfairly under the ambit of counterterrorism and CR policies.

Two important reports released in 2021 provide empirical insights into the “prejudiced” targeting of Muslim charities through CRA audits (Emon & Hasan, 2021; McSorley, 2021). Both reports, one by the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group (ICLMG) and one by the Institute of Islamic Studies at University of Toronto (IIS), highlight that the CRA’s Review and Analysis Division (RAD), responsible for investigating terrorist financing among charities, has disproportionately targeted Muslim charities for “knowingly or unknowingly” supporting terrorism (McSorley, 2021, p. 4). The ICLMG report states that between 2008 and 2015, RAD revoked the status of eight charities, of which six were Muslim charities. Since 2016, the charitable status of four additional Muslim charities has been revoked. The IIS report highlights the cases of three Muslim charities: IRFAN-Canada, the Islamic Shi’a Assembly of Canada, and Islamic Centre of Ottawa Assalam Mosque (Emon & Hasan, 2021). After a protracted period of audits, IRFAN-Canada’s status was revoked because the CRA determined that the organization provided financial support to “organizations linked to Hamas” (p. 60). In the case of Islamic Shi’a Assembly, the CRA determined the organization was serving “collateral political purposes” and promoting the “revolutionary ideals” of the government of Iran (p. 42). In both cases, the IIS report contends that the CRA’s
decisions were highly politicized and informed by Canada’s foreign policy positions on Israel/Palestine and Iran, respectively (also see Wildeman, 2017). The Ottawa Islamic Centre was issued a revocation because the CRA assessed that speakers invited to the mosque promoted “hate and intolerance,” linking the content of their past lectures to concerns about “radicalized individuals” who attended the mosque (p. 31). The IIS report highlights that CRA’s decision intersected with Canada’s wider CR policies that used preemptive governance and racialized practices to target Muslims who hold conservative religious beliefs (see Sharma & Nijjar, 2018). Both reports underline that Muslim charities work “to address the very social issues that can lead to violence;” revoking their charitable status limits the ability of Muslim CSOs to do this important work and undermines the goal of “increasing the safety and security of people in Canada” (McSorley, 2021, p. 6).

Research participants in my study shared the view that the CRA’s targeting of Muslim CSOs is biased. One participant, who works as a charities lawyer, said that broader discourses about the dangerousness of Muslims reflected in policy documents and reinforced in media narratives could be prompting the CRA to target Muslim charities unfairly (PCAN18). In response to the CRA’s revocations, Muslim charities have limited options. All the organizations mentioned in the IIS report have challenged their revocations through legal means. The success of these challenges has been mixed. Charities that were issued warnings and fines (not revocations), have responded by making public statements that they would comply with CRA recommendations to improve governance and financial systems (e.g. ISNA Canada, 2018). Muslim CSOs have used their relationships with federal agencies to raise the issue that the targeting of
Muslim charities is having a “negative” impact on the trust between state security agencies and Muslim CSOs (PCAN4).

In addition to using the formal mechanisms described above, state institutions may grant or withhold legitimacy to CSOs informally by discursively implying a nefarious connection. A participant shared a situation faced by the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM) in the past when “Harper’s spokesman referred to NCCM as a ‘known terrorist sympathizer’” (PCAN3). It was widely reported that in 2014, Prime Minister Harper’s spokesman, Jason MacDonald, falsely accused NCCM of having ties to a terrorist organization (Todd, 2014). During the Bill C-51 parliamentary hearings in 2015, a Conservative MP once again raised this baseless accusation against NCCM (Bill C-51, 2015). NCCM is the most prominent Muslim organization in Canada and was able to file a defamation suit against the official in the Harper government. Informal action by government officials to tarnish a Muslim CSO’s reputation shows how the granting of legitimacy under Power 1 acts concomitantly with the utilization of specific Islamophobic discourses as part of Power 3 (this is discussed at length in Chapter 9).

Discussion: Together, actions by state institutions to selectively grant or withdraw legitimacy as part of CR policies and broader counterterrorism efforts constitute an exercise of Power 1 and have raised concerns for Muslim CSOs who feel they are under heightened scrutiny. As a participant highlighted, this has been detrimental to trust-building between state institutions and Muslim CSOs, a desired outcome of CR policies (PCAN4). Just as Muslim CSOs make strategic choices around CR-related funding, they make strategic choices with regard to sociopolitical legitimacy that state institutions appear to allocate as a resource as part of CR-related national security
governance. According to my framework, actions by Muslim CSOs who use legal channels to challenge charitable status revocations map onto the strategy of *Defy* and the tactic of *Challenge*, as they use the law and other procedural justice mechanisms to directly challenge institutional processes. However, it should be noted that not all Muslim CSOs have the capacity or financial wherewithal to mount legal challenges. In case they are unable to file a legal or administrative challenge, they are left with no choice but to resort to a strategy of *Acquiesce* and tactic of *Comply*. This refers to a conscious acceptance of institutional demands without any negotiation or resistance (Oliver, 1991). Additionally, relying on existing relationships within state institutions to seek improvement in the overall climate of securitization facing Muslim CSOs maps onto a strategy of *Compromise* and tactic of *Bargain*. As discussed above, the strategy of *Compromise* has limits as it relies on the discretion of state institutions to provide remedies.

**Muslim CSO Responses in the U.K.**

Whereas participants from Canada were primarily concerned about Muslim charities facing charitable status revocation, participants from the U.K. drew my attention to other ways in which state institutions in the U.K. grant or withhold legitimacy.\(^{38}\) In the pre-2011 iteration of *Prevent*, local authorities allocated funds to Muslim charities based on pre-existing relationships. The Home Office directive during this period was to allocate *Prevent* funds to Muslim CSOs. However, after the 2011 changes to *Prevent*, the same Muslim CSOs that were seen as deserving of government support had funding

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\(^{38}\) Though not highlighted in my research interviews, there is a body of empirical research that has examined the impact of counterterrorism financing laws and charities regulation on Muslim charities in the U.K. (see J. Howell & Lind, 2010; Yasmin & Ghafran, 2019).
abruptly revoked (see Ganesh, 2015; O’Toole et al., 2011). A participant well-versed with the Muslim CSO landscape in the U.K. shared the following anecdote:

“The STREET project [sic] are also an interesting example of where the government’s approach to Muslim civil society comes up against its own ideological position of what good Muslims are. The street project was run out of Brixton Mosque and for years it was a poster boy of Prevent in the sense that the Brixton Mosque has a largely black, Caribbean, convert, Salafi Muslim congregation, and so the street projects have existed prior to any Prevent funding because they’ve already recognized that . . . They did youth outreach work. They were working with local young people at risk who were could have been involved in street gang violence and stuff, but they’re also seeing that some of their congregation were sort of drifting off. Richard Reid was somebody who’d been through it. The shoe bomber had been to the Brixton Mosque and he ended up leaving the Brixton Mosque and ended up as the shoe bomber, so they started doing a lot of Prevent counter-radicalization stuff before there was any Prevent money and then Prevent money came along and they were quite happy to carry on doing it, and they were quite happy to be sort of rolled out as the example of how it’s been something done at its best.

What was ironic was that when the government changed, they cut off the funding to somewhere like the STREET project because while they were effective and the police kept rolling them out and saying, ‘These are really good. They deal with ideology also.’ From the government’s point of view, this was still a socially conservative Salafi Muslim organization, and so they didn’t want to fund it, and so they cut the funding from the organization straight away. I think for a while the police tried to carry on funding it without that, but the Home Office had to direct them not to fund it” (PUK10).

In his remarks, the participant notes how the government decision to suddenly pull funding for projects that were previously funded under Prevent was unsettling for Muslim CSOs. Importantly, he notes how the decisions about allocating or denying funding to CSOs were determined based on whether CSOs fit into the mould of “good” Muslims, conceived by the Home Office as those who adhere to “British values” (HM Government, 2011). An award-winning project like STREET was dropped ostensibly because its conservative Islamic approach did not fit within the discursive frame of the
Home Office’s “good” Muslim (also see Barclay, 2011). The participant’s remarks reflect how Power 1 actions of deeming certain CSOs as legitimate (for receipt of government funding) are tied to Power 3 discourses (of the “good” Muslim). Later in the interview, the participant shared that in the interest of supporting the right type of CSOs (that fit within the Home Office’s conceptions of deserving “good” Muslims), the Home Office funded numerous “one-man shops that managed to get huge amounts of money,” rather than community-supported Muslim CSOs (PUK10). This analysis was echoed by a few other participants (e.g., PUK4; PUK12).

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the majority of participants informed me that, as Prevent priorities have shifted after 2011, prominent Muslim CSOs have been much more reluctant to accept Prevent funding. This is because Prevent is widely seen as a policy that stigmatizes Muslim communities (PUK7). Moreover, according to independent reports, since 2011, the government has been “cultivating a network of ‘grass roots’ Muslim voices to promote ‘counter-narratives’ to combat the appeal of ‘extremist narratives’” (Hayes & Qureshi, 2016). The organizations who are chosen to receive financial and technical support from the Home Office have limited independence or community legitimacy, as they are expected to reproduce state-centered views on discourses around ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalization’ (p. 37). The one research participant who oversees an organization that receives Prevent funding confirmed that the Home Office decisions about funding are not transparent and can appear arbitrary (PUK9). She gave examples of competitors who were previously supported by the Home Office, but had their funding revoked for unexplained reasons. In order to manage against that scenario, she said that they maintain a strong working relationship with the Home Office.
and focus on the quality of their work: “you have to create good products because we have to . . . If we go bust, then we go bust, so we’ve got to keep on top of the game of quality” (PUK9). However, she also noted that the Home Office expected a show of total allegiance to the Prevent agenda. She described the following private exchange with a Home Office official:

“A Prevent coordinator said to me, who now works for the Home Office, ‘Do you like Prevent or you don’t like Prevent?’ That’s what I don’t like. It’s very polarizing, even when people ask you that question, and I’m like, ‘What makes you say that?’ He’s like, ‘Well, I don’t get when you write some of the blogs. They’re quite critical.’ Again, they see critical thinking as negative” (PUK9).

Her remarks suggest that the state official’s questioning was “polarizing” because it sought to probe her loyalty toward Prevent. By stating that “critical thinking” is seen as “negative,” she was implying that the Home Office can withdraw legitimacy for organizations merely based on holding views that are “quite critical” of Prevent. As I will discuss in Chapter 9, this creates a climate of fear and self-censorship revealing how this aspect of Power 1 works in conjunction with Power 4.

Discussion: In the U.K., participants described decisions by the Home Office to selectively allocate Prevent funding to those Muslim CSOs that fit within the government agency’s conception of “good” Muslim organizations as a form of granting legitimacy. This amounts to an exercise of Power 1 by the Home Office, which takes advantage of political authority and the difficult financial climate facing Muslim CSOs. As I discussed earlier, CSO responses to CR funding decisions by the Home Office have varied from principled opposition (a strategy of Defy and tactic of Dismiss) to accepting funding while trying to achieve some form of compromise (a strategy of Compromise and tactics of Balance and Pacify).
My (limited) research data suggest that Muslim CSOs in the U.K., unlike those in Canada, do not commonly pursue legal challenges against state institutions (associated with a strategy of *Defy* and tactic of *Challenge*) to confront the granting and withholding of legitimacy. This is partially explained by the way Power 1 is exercised by state institutions. In Canada, the CRA’s charitable revocation poses an existential threat to Muslim CSOs prompting CSOs to mount a stronger challenge against state institutions. On the other hand, in the U.K., the granting of legitimacy is expressed by selectively allocating *Prevent* funding. Given that *Prevent* funding is divisive to begin with, Muslim CSOs strategies have not focused on challenging *Prevent* funding (though, as I discuss in the next chapter, Muslim CSOs have demanded greater transparency from the Home Office). Another explanation for the difference in CSO responses in Canada and the U.K. under Power 1 could reside in the difference in the ecosystem of Muslim CSOs in the two countries and the influence of particular organizations in that ecosystem. In Canada, NCCM, a civil liberties organization that spearheads a legal approach, is very influential in shaping the overall strategies used by Muslim CSOs: as a participant admitted, “[Muslim grassroots organizations] turn to NCCM for guidance” (PCAN3). In the U.K., the absence of an NCCM-like organization could explain why Muslim CSOs are less inclined to mount similar legal challenges. On the other hand, as I will discuss in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 in more detail, the U.K. has a more vibrant ecosystem of Muslim CSOs who proactively confront CR-related structures and discourses.

39 To confirm the insight that particular Muslim CSOs have influence over the strategies other Muslims adopt in the landscape of Muslim CSOs, an ecosystem or network analysis would have to be undertaken. This has not been conducted as part of this dissertation research and will be pursued as future research.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I have elucidated the different strategies adopted by Muslim CSOs in response to the assertion of Power 1 by state institutions as part of CR policies. I have illustrated Power 1 contestations between state security institutions and Muslim CSOs occur through decisions related to allocation of funding for CR programs, outreach by federal and policing agencies among Muslim communities for different purposes ranging from trust-building to pursuing national security investigations, and the granting or withholding of legitimacy through formal means, such as revoking charitable status, or informal means, such as defaming a Muslim CSO by implying a connection to a terrorist group.

Muslim CSOs in Canada have been reluctant to apply for CR-related funding. Participants indicated that if they accepted CR funding, Muslim communities might view them as compromised in their ability to hold state security agencies accountable. In other words, Muslim CSO decisions about CR funding prioritize maintaining social legitimacy among Muslim communities. Those considering to apply for CR funding said their programmatic and organizational independence was paramount. Following my conceptual framework, I suggest that Muslim CSOs in Canada are pursuing a strategy of Compromise (with tactics of Pacify and Bargain). In the U.K., research participants shared that most Muslim CSOs have refused Prevent funding on the principled grounds that Prevent stigmatizes Muslims in the U.K. These refusals correspond to a strategy of Defy and a tactic of Dismiss. Some Muslim CSOs in the U.K. who accept CR funding under Prevent or the Counter-Extremism Strategy appear to follow a strategy of Compromise, as their decisions involve balancing institutional pressures and internal (financial) needs. I find these CSOs to be following tactics of Balance or Pacify. The
greater variation in strategies used by Muslim CSOs in the U.K. relates to the Prevent’s long history of being used explicitly to govern ‘radicalization’ among British Muslims, and its embedding in education, health, and other social sectors. The boundaries of CR policies were apparent for all participants in the U.K. who were able to describe the unjust practices of Prevent. By contrast, most participants in Canada did not see a sharp distinction between CR policies and previous counterterrorism efforts (this difference in perception is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6).

Participants from Canada suggested that Muslim CSOs have maintained a cooperative working relationship with state security agencies. These relationships have allowed them to raise concerns facing Muslim communities such as unsolicited visits by the RCMP and CSIS to the homes and workplaces of Muslims. This approach corresponds to a strategy of Compromise and a tactic of Bargain. Muslim CSOs in the U.K. have also cultivated working relationships with state security agencies in order to highlight issues of public safety facing British Muslims. Like Muslim CSOs in Canada, this corresponds to a strategy of Compromise and a tactic of Bargain. However, the U.K. landscape also contains Muslim CSOs who have refused to cooperate with state security agencies on the latter’s terms. This aligns with a strategy of Defy and a tactic of Dismiss.

Participants from Canada expressed grave concern about the revocations of the charitable status of Muslim charities under the guise of counter-radicalization and other national security concerns. Muslim CSOs facing those revocations have mounted legal challenges that correspond to a strategy of Defy and a tactic of Challenge. Others that are using their relationship within state institutions to seek improvement in the securitization facing Muslim CSOs are using a strategy of Compromise and a tactic of Balance. In the
U.K., sociopolitical legitimacy from state institutions has been tied to which Muslim CSOs are considered worthy of receiving Home Office funding. However, as participants noted, prominent Muslim CSOs have largely distanced themselves from Prevent funding. As noted above, those that rely on Prevent funding are following a strategy of Compromise. In my analysis, I also suggest that the influence of key organizations likely shapes the strategies of Muslim CSOs in each country. In Canada, the legal expertise of NCCM and its national prominence likely facilitates other Muslim CSOs to choose legal strategies that constitute a strategy of Defy and a tactic of Challenge. By corollary, the absence of an NCCM-like CSO in the U.K. likely limits the extent to which Muslim CSOs choose legal strategies.

Through a discussion of the strategic choices made by Muslim CSOs, I have also shown that Power 1 contestations have certain limits. Muslim CSOs who adopt a strategy of Compromise to seek concessions from state security agencies for Muslim communities are reliant on the discretion of those agencies. Those who have refused to accept CR-related funding (either pursuing a strategy of Defy or Compromise) are faced with the difficult task of securing funding for their activities from alternate sources. Legal challenges to contest state institutions withdrawing sociopolitical legitimacy on national security grounds are costly and have limited probability of success (as national security decisions are shrouded secrecy). In the next chapter, I discuss how some of these limitations can be overcome by CSOs engaging in Power 2 contestations under CR policies.
Chapter 8 – Muslim CSO Responses to Power 2 in CR Policies

Power 2 refers to the exercise of “power-over” through the “mobilization of bias” by which only those agendas that benefit powerful people and institutions are “organized into politics” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962, p. 949; Gaventa, 2006). Haugaard (2012) notes that the repeated exercise of Power 2 reinforces the relational structures which constitute the “rules of the game” that preclude certain actors or views from being considered at all (p. 37). In Chapter 2, I argue that state institutions exercise Power 2 in their interactions with CSOs by determining which agendas are considered and which opinions get heard during the development of public policies (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2007). In CR policies, the exercise of Power 2 is apparent in which communities are consulted during policymaking and which “problems” are prioritized by state security agencies. Following Haugaard (2021), the exercise of Power 2 sets up a “conflict over structure” between state security institutions and Muslim CSOs regarding CR policies (p. 161).40 In the context of CR policies, state security institutions exercise Power 2 by insufficiently including Muslim CSOs in policy consultations and by paying attention almost solely to Muslim ‘radicalization.’ In this chapter, I discuss how Muslim CSOs develop responses to the exercise of Power 2 in CR policies.

Muslim CSO Responses to not being Sufficiently Included in CR Policymaking

One aspect of Power 2 is manifest in how state institutions create barriers to the participation of certain marginalized groups in the policymaking process (Gaventa, 2006). As discussed earlier, CR policies and counterterrorism measures operate along a continuum of national security efforts. Participants from CSOs, specially in Canada, do not always see where counterterrorism ends and counter-radicalization begins. For that reason, CSOs responses under Power 2 also span the boundaries of counterterrorism and CR policies, not falling neatly into one category or other. For example, Muslim CSO programs to combat Islamophobia are not solely directed solely to the exercise of power under CR policies. Instead, CSOs develop programs to combat Islamophobia knowing full well that CR policies is one of many contributing factors leading to its prevalence.
In both Canada and the U.K., CR policies, as part of the national security apparatus, are marked by a lack of transparency. Though the federal government in Canada undertook a national consultation exercise before the launch of the 2018 *National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence* (Public Safety Canada, 2018a), activities to disrupt future acts of political violence were already taking place across federal agencies, provinces, and municipalities before the federal strategy was launched. In these activities, Muslim communities have not been adequately consulted. The community outreach component of CR policies, such as the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security (CCRS) hosted by Public Safety Canada, is supposed to give Muslim and other marginalized communities the opportunity to provide input into national security policies. But, a Senate report, found the CCRS to be a “one-way briefing” from government agencies to communities (Senate of Canada, 2011). As I have discussed in previous chapters, intimidating, unannounced visits by the RCMP and CSIS to the homes and workplaces of Muslims, ostensibly to advance national security investigations, continue despite community protests (Hanniman, 2008). At the municipal and provincial level, CR initiatives are mainly led by local police, so community input into their designs is limited.

In the U.K., after an initial consultation exercise with Muslim organizations as part of the Preventing Extremism Together working group (Hellyer, 2007), the opinions and concerns of Muslim CSOs have been largely sidelined. Since 2009, numerous Muslim CSOs have pointed out the many underlying problems in *Prevent*, including the vague definition of ‘extremism,’ the racialized nature of *Prevent* targeting Muslims as “suspect” communities, the detrimental effect of the 2015 *Prevent* Duty on the social
sector, and the secretive nature of Home Office decisions (Abbas, 2019; Thomas, 2020). Prevent has been a polarizing policy, and comments from research participants make it clear that Prevent, through an exercise of Power 2, has indeed resulted in a “conflict over structure.” Below, I discuss how Muslim CSOs have responded to being sidelined within CR policymaking.

**Muslim CSO Responses in Canada**

Research participants from Canada indicated that CR policies overemphasize the problem of ‘radicalization’ among Muslim communities. Participants noted that CR policies make incorrect assumptions about “Muslims being a problem community and being a source of violent radicalization” (PCAN11). Though this dominant policy view is proliferated in media coverage on ‘radicalization,’ it tends to overlook the lived experience of Muslim communities. The following remarks by a senior manager at a cultural and civic engagement organization reflect the view that the ‘radicalization’ frame is imposed upon Muslim communities:

> “I think that the concerns about radicalization that people here seem to express are just reflections of what the media has been saying. I have actually never spoken with anyone – we communicate with a lot of Muslims, not just at [our organization], but in the broader community – who has ever said anything about worrying . . . about anyone is going to commit violence. Obviously, those cases do exist. I think that they’re so sparse . . .” (PCAN25).

Research participants who are imams of mosques concurred that the way ‘radicalization’ is framed in CR policies and in wider media coverage does not align with the experience of their congregants. In the words of the Executive Director of a national religious organization:

> “If you were to . . . on the scale of one to ten, let’s say, in terms of agency and frequency . . . radicalization and extremism were definitely not on
top ... it was not a high priority because we don’t frequently encounter it, but when we do encounter it, it is of course concerning and alarming” (PCAN12).

‘Radicalization,’ therefore, is framed and constructed from the top-down, through securitization, and imposed on Muslim communities as an issue they must respond to. The framework in CR policies “assumes that the problem already exists,” without offering any evidence to corroborate that assumption (PCAN11). An executive at a national advocacy organization elaborated:

“...our community faces this sort of constant potential of being stigmatized as radical or potentially. We’re always already potentially radical. The effort we have to put in to be vigilant against that . . . against the stigma or to prop ourselves up in ways that will help us say, “You’re accusing me of that, but look. I have all my ducks in a row, and now I can fight you on this accusation and say I’m not a radical or I’m not supporting radicals” (PCAN7).

In the previous chapter (Chapter 7), I describe how Muslim CSOs use relationships with state security agencies to seek changes in CR practices. However, I argue that these types of CSO responses (within Power 1 relations) are inherently limited as they constitute contestations within the bounds of a policy structure. By contrast, CSO responses under Power 2 represent a challenge to the policy structure itself, as illustrated in the CSO actions discussed below. For example, one participant noted how Muslim CSOs had organized a boycott of outreach events to Muslim communities because they were not attended by senior government representatives (PCAN18). Noting that such outreach to Muslim communities had historically been superficial at best, the participant described how under the Harper Conservative government, government bureaucrats would not attend outreach meetings with Muslim CSOs, choosing to send frontline police
and security agents instead. As a show of resistance, Muslim CSOs collectively agreed to boycott these meetings unless higher-level government representatives attended:

“Actually, a few of these outreaches were organized by the security agencies themselves. [My colleague] and I said, “What a minute. Where’s the government? How come there’s no government representatives? They’re always asking us to be involved, but the government’s not sending any representatives to hear our concerns,” so we actually, in some ways, put a boycott and said, “We’re not going to attend any more events unless the government sends a representative at the minister level or a deputy minister. That got the agencies quite upset” (PCAN18).

The strategy highlighted by the participant shows one way in which Muslim CSOs have responded under the exercise of Power 2. Muslim CSOs have also responded by demanding greater consideration of concerns facing Muslim communities through the legislative process. One participant affiliated with the board of a national advocacy organization directed my attention to how the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM) demanded greater oversight and accountability for the practices of the RCMP and CSIS, in order to gain clearer insight into the processes and practices used by these agencies (PCAN3). He shared that when the Trudeau Liberal government introduced Bill C-59 to review and reform the national security legislation expanded by Bill C-51, NCCM provided the following oral submissions before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security:

“We commend the current government for fulfilling its election promise to review Bill C-51, as its condition for supporting the bill in the first place, and to consult with Canadians. While we welcome, for instance, that Bill C-59 proposes to create a national security review agency with more oversight and review than we currently have, our general objection remains constant: this law goes too far, it virtually guarantees constitutional breach, and it offers inadequate justification. It strengthens the security establishment when the evidence available gives every indication that the institutions carrying out national security intelligence gathering and enforcement mandates are in disarray—rife with bias and
bullying from the top down. Oversight of those agencies is not sufficient; real reform is necessary” (National Council of Canadian Muslims, 2017).

In their submission, NCCM granted that Bill C-59 led to the creation of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), which is mandated to independently review national security and intelligence activities conducted by CSIS, the RCMP, the Canadian Border Security Agency (CBSA), and other government agencies. However, NCCM also argued that having an oversight agency is not enough, noting that the reforms under Bill C-59 keep intact the powers of CSIS, an agency directly responsible for the rights violation of Muslim communities, and whose actions have fed into a social climate of Islamophobia (Kanji, 2017). Importantly, NCCM alludes to the fact that CR efforts have fallen short of earning the trust of Muslim communities, asserting that “if the government wishes to collaborate with communities on prevention, it needs to build trust and confidence first” (National Council of Canadian Muslims, 2017).

**Discussion:** Actions by Muslim CSOs to boycott consultation and outreach efforts by state security agencies map onto the strategy of *Defy* and a tactic of *Challenge*. This follows from the observation that this strategic choice constitutes active resistance to institutional demands (Oliver, 1991). By boycotting consultations, Muslim CSOs convey the view that the process of consultation is performative, and seek to deny it any semblance of legitimacy (PCAN3). It amounts to a power-to expression by Muslim CSOs that challenges the very structure of CR policies. Additionally, Muslim CSOs using the legislative process to amend the structure of CR policies and other national security measures pursue a strategy of *Manipulate* and a tactic of *Influence*. Through such legislative interventions, Muslim CSOs attempt to shape the institutional rules or the structure of the policies themselves (Oliver, 1991).
Muslim CSO Responses in the U.K.

Unlike participants in Canada who did not always see CR policies as distinct from counterterrorism practices, all participants from the U.K. were familiar with, and had strong opinions on Prevent. One participant, a manager leading multiple projects at a national umbrella organization, summarized how Prevent had made ‘radicalization’ or ‘extremism’ the primary lens through which state institutions engage with Muslims in the U.K.:

“Specifically, the things I would focus on are the complete damaging of trust between state and communities. I think that there is a general sense that the only way in which the government will engage with Muslims is through the lens of counter-extremism... as radicals we de-radicalize. There’s a problem to be solved. That kind of lens” (PUK3).

In her remarks, the participant highlights how Prevent’s engaging with Muslims through the lens of ‘radicalization’ has damaged trust between state institutions and Muslim communities. As such, state security agencies have ignored concerns of safety facing Muslim communities. Later in our interview, she stated, “Muslims’ opinions and views are always being spoken over” (PUK3). Another participant, who is the chair of the board of a prominent mosque in London, reiterated that Muslim CSOs and communities have been sidelined during the development and implementation of Prevent:

“When Prevent started, we hadn’t been consulted as a community. They sort of imposed it on us without consulting the Muslim community with, ‘This is what we’re doing. What do you think? Are there any concerns whatsoever?’ because they affect us as a community. We hope that this review will be some sort of resolution and they’ll learn their previous mistakes” (PUK1).

At the end of his remarks, the participant is referring to the independent review of Prevent announced by the government in 2019. As reflected in the participant’s comment, during the time I was collecting data for this research, Muslim CSOs seemed to
be optimistic about the independent review. Another participant informed me that the
review itself was a result of a sustained campaign by Muslim CSOs and human rights
organizations (PUK5). The campaign involved legislative lobbying, and publishing
reports and news stories demanding a review to evaluate Prevent and accordingly, bring
changes to its structures. In this campaign, Muslim CSOs made the case that meaningful
consultation with Muslims should be an essential part of any re-design of Prevent. The
participant described the work her organization undertook as follows:

“In our report, we laid out a number of recommendations. One of them
was that the statutory duty should be abolished. The second was that there
should be an independent review of Prevent. We had asked for that when
we published our report in 2016. We’ve then been advocating for that at
the domestic, regional, and national level. We’ve pushed a number of
special rapporteurs to push for it. We’ve got parliamentary committees.
We’ve had a number of different political and other stakeholders and it’s
culminated, essentially, in this. I think it really has, and it’s been obviously
broader than [our organization], but I think a lot of our work instigated it
and we’ve been behind the movement toward this” (PUK5).

The participant’s remarks highlight the range of strategies used by Muslim CSOs
under Power 2. Muslim CSOs relied on “special rapporteurs” who had the ear of
policymakers to make the case on behalf of Muslim communities. They advocated
parliamentary committees and government bureaucrats. The Muslim Council of
Britain briefed the opposition Labour Party in search of allies and champions
(Muslim Council of Britain, 2016). In this expansive undertaking, Muslim CSOs
made their case at different levels of government, articulating their specific and
clear demands, often coordinating efforts with human rights and civil liberties
organizations. The announcement of the Prevent review was seen as a successful
outcome of that process.
Unfortunately, the optimism about the Prevent independent review was short-lived, as the government’s final choice for the reviewer, William Shawcross, had previously made hostile remarks against Muslims. Muslim CSOs felt his appointment was a bad-faith act on behalf of the government, and in response, hundreds of Muslim CSOs announced a public boycott of the review process (Hooper, 2021). This boycott was an assertion of their agentic power under Power 2, as it called for a change to the structure and terms of the government’s review process. In their open letter, Muslim CSOs implored others to boycott the review stating: “if Muslim organisations engage with this Review, it strengthens its legitimacy and its power to recommend policies more harmful to the community” (National Muslim Organisations, 2021). This statement makes clear that the boycott by Muslim CSOs was an attempt to diminish the legitimacy of the review process. Muslim CSOs rightly believe that without their inclusion, the review of Prevent would likely fail to fulfill its intended objectives of justifying and rationalizing the policy.

**Discussion:** Boycotts and legislative advocacy fall within the strategies of Defy and Manipulate respectively. As with Canadian Muslim CSOs, the strategy of Defy is an expression of CSO resistance in response to severe inconsistencies between institutional pressures and internal values and interests (Oliver, 1991). Boycotts by Muslim CSOs further map on to the tactic of Challenge because they are not merely ignoring the institutional demands from CR policies, but taking a stance of defiance on moral grounds. These are strategic actions seeking to deny legitimacy to the process or structure established by state institutions. As I will discuss in Chapter 9, the act of boycotting is
complemented by the use of alternate discourses to justify the moral rationale of the act of defiance. Legislative advocacy maps on to the strategy of *Manipulate* and the tactic of *Influence* as it involves efforts to change institutional rules and values rendered through CR policies (Oliver, 1991). Through the act of advocacy, Muslim CSOs attempt to influence agents within state institutions so these agents will amend the structure of CR policies to make them more favourable to Muslim communities. As the independent review of *Prevent* highlights, legislative advocacy involves supplying these agents with alternate processes and discourses that they can use to propose alternatives to existing policy structures. In both Canada and the U.K., Muslim CSOs use similar strategies and tactics to advocate for the proper inclusion of Muslim CSOs and communities in the policymaking process for CR policies.

**Muslim CSO Responses to CR Policies Selectively Targeting Muslims**

Power 2 encompasses actions by those in power to selectively pay attention to certain agendas that are to their benefit (Haugaard, 2012). Within CR policies, this has been expressed in state security agencies deciding which types of ‘radicalization’ are important and, therefore, worthy of intervention by CR policies. By prioritizing the perceived threat of ‘radicalization’ of Muslims and downplaying the threat of white supremacist or far-right violence as a national security risk, state security agencies are exercising Power 2. This prioritization has led to Muslims being treated as the problem or “suspect community” by state security institutions. In turn, the framing of Muslims as a national security threat has fostered a climate of Islamophobia.

In Canada, the practices of counterterrorism and counter-radicalization have targeted Muslims disproportionately. Even as CR policy documents claim to not solely focus on Islam and Muslims, racialized practices and a narrow understanding of
‘radicalization’ as a Muslim problem has promoted state security agencies to mainly focused on acts of political violence by Muslims (Nagra & Monaghan, 2020). As I describe below, research participants indicated that the targeting of Muslim communities as the “problem” or “suspect” community under counterterrorism measures and CR policies, has propelled Islamophobia. Through these policies, the frequency and intensity of anti-Muslim discrimination and white supremacist attacks targeting Muslims have increased markedly in recent years (Bensaid, 2020; Moreau, 2020).

In the U.K., Prevent has overtly targeted Muslims since its inception. As CR policies have evolved over the last 15 years, they have only furthered the Othering of Muslims and their treatment as the “suspect community” (Abbas, 2019; Breen-Smyth, 2014; Lynch, 2013). The almost exclusive targeting of Muslims under CR policies has contributed to Islamophobia in the U.K. (Massoumi et al., 2017; Qurashi, 2018). Within this climate, Muslims face a heightened risk of violence by white supremacist groups. In response to these dynamics, Muslim CSOs have launched campaigns and programs that highlight how Muslim communities are in fact victims facing unrelenting far-right violence and not “suspects.” Below I discuss in detail how Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. perceive bias in CR policies (Power 2) and develop responses that highlight how CR policies have ignored Islamophobia and white supremacist violence.

**Muslim CSO Responses in Canada**

Research participants were unanimous in saying that the ‘radicalization’ agenda has ignored the issue of safety facing Muslim communities, i.e., white supremacist violence. An executive of a national advocacy organization noted that for Muslim communities, “the radicalization that we deal with the most is white supremacist radicalization and protecting our community from that” (PCAN7). Another participant, a
lawyer affiliated with a national advocacy organization who has provided legislative submissions on behalf of Muslims, said the following about how they discuss the issue of “radicalization to violence:”

“Our general approach has been to keep it general and to remind that the tent is wider than just Muslim. It’s about all we’re able to do, and that generally means pointing to the white supremacists. It’s not the most effective comment, but it’s the one that has given us . . . For an advocacy organization that is concerned about the lack of attention being paid to the problem of white nationalist violence, it’s an opportunity to say, ‘Hey. What about those guys?’” (PCAN3).

The participant’s remarks reveal how Muslim CSOs are highlighting that the concept of ‘radicalization’ should be broadened to capture the phenomenon of “white nationalist violence.” At the same time, the participant acknowledges that making demands to widen the “tent” is not the “most effective.” This reflection points to how Muslim CSOs have diverse views and approaches about how best to resist the structural oppression of Muslims through CR policies. For example, a few research participants expressed reluctance and even opposition to the idea of broadening the tent of CR and other national security policies because doing so would further empower and embolden the RCMP and CSIS to continue the racialization and securitization of Muslims (PCAN25). Nevertheless, the above participant’s (PCAN3) organization pursues the strategy of demanding increasing the scope for CR policies because it has gained “traction” in showing that the current CR policy structures are discriminatory toward Muslims. His remarks are a representation of at least one way in which Muslim CSOs are viewing and responding to the CR policy structure under Power 2 manifestations.

Participants also explicitly connected the oversight of white supremacist violence by state security institutions with incidents of anti-Muslim violence. During the time I
was collecting data for this research, the 2017 attack on the mosque in Québec City was still fresh in the minds of most participants. In addition to resulting in overt violence, the Executive Director of a national religious organization noted that Islamophobia negatively impacts the mental health and socioeconomic well-being of Muslim youth:

“A lot of young people of course are reacting to Islamophobia, and the impact of Islamophobia itself and hate has unfortunately been underestimated so far and hardly anybody’s really calculating it. In the U.S., there have been studies, especially on American Arabs for instance, where they show that like, 50 percent of Arabs are clinically depressed. A big factor has to do with Islamophobia and then, of course, the socio-economic . . . and because of Islamophobia, they’re having trouble getting jobs, they’re having trouble in their studies, and so on. These are clinical studies that are showing this. Similar studies get to prove what’s happening to the wider Muslim community in America, and of course, in Canada as well” (PCAN12).

The downplaying of Islamophobia by state security institutions creates the general environment for anti-Muslim violence by groups and individuals who espouse white supremacy. This phenomenon is an outcome of structural bias in CR policies, a Power 2 manifestation. The responses of Muslim CSOs under Power 2 include publicly challenging the structure of CR policies, running campaigns and programs to disseminate alternative perspectives on the problem of ‘radicalization’ that highlight anti-Muslim violence, and taking collaborative action for advocacy to change CR policy. It should be noted that these responses under Power 2 also include presenting alternative discourses to those proliferated by state security institutions. As such, Muslim CSO responses under Power 2 overlap with those under Power 3, which are discussed in Chapter 9.

One manner in which Muslim CSOs challenge CR policy structures is by inquiring why state security agencies have overlooked white supremacist violence. Muslim CSOs have highlighted the oversight of white supremacist violence and far-right
activity in private meetings with state security agencies as well as in public statements. One participant, a communications director at a cultural and civic engagement organization, described a meeting between Muslim CSOs and the RCMP where RCMP officers were flaunting the success of CR interventions. During the meeting, the participant asked, “if you’re so successful, why don’t you use some of this on the white supremacists?” (PCAN25). The NCCM has been at the forefront of efforts to demand that white supremacist violence be characterized as “terrorism” (see H. Jackson, 2021). To this end, NCCM has written open letters, hosted community townhalls, organized public events, and given testimony before parliament (PCAN7; also see Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism, 2021; National Council of Canadian Muslims, 2020).41 After the targeted killing of a Muslim family in London, Ontario in June 2021, NCCM worked with several Muslim CSOs to organize a vigil, which leaders of all federal political parties attended. The event, which was broadcast live, provided an opportunity for Muslim CSOs to highlight Islamophobia and the issues of safety facing Muslim communities (Gollom, 2021). The advocacy efforts of NCCM are at least partly responsible for the Canadian government placing white supremacist groups on Canada’s list of terrorist entities over the last two years (Tunney, 2021). But as I mentioned earlier, there are different perspectives among Muslim CSOs about whether broadening the scope of CR policies to include white supremacist violence is the best strategy (PCAN3; PCAN1).

41 NCCM has also used legal action to challenge legislation that discriminates against Muslims. Most recently, NCCM, in partnership with the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, filed a Charter violation case against the Québec government regarding Bill-21, a provincial law that prevents public sector employees from wearing religious symbols, but in practice, disproportionately targets teachers who choose to wear the hijab (Bruemmer, 2020). I have not included those examples in this analysis as they are not specifically directed against CR policies or the national security infrastructure.
Muslim CSOs are also challenging the “suspect” status they have been assigned under CR policies by running campaigns and programs to inform the general public that they are in fact victims of anti-Muslim violence and discrimination. An executive at a national advocacy organization remarked:

“We have a number of public advocacy files that we work on, including national security. We do anti-Islamophobia work that’s a little bit more grassroots, so doing trainings and workshops with different organizations. Our biggest one right now is we’re doing a lot of work in the education sector, and going into schools, going into school boards, and teacher’s colleges to teach teachers about how not to be Islamophobic or help them identify what Islamophobia can look like” (PCAN7).

The participant’s remarks highlight how Muslim CSOs are running campaigns to educate public sector employees and the general public about the extent of Islamophobia. I learned from participants that Muslim CSOs in border towns are applying pressure on elected representatives at the municipal, provincial, and federal levels to change national security measures that unfairly prevent Muslim youth from crossing over to the U.S. border (PCAN1; PCAN9; PCAN17). Organizations such as No Fly List Kids have advocated for the removal of the names of children from Canada’s Passenger Protect Program, the so-called “no-fly list” (NoFlyListKids.ca, 2020). Yet another category of programs is using creative means to express the harms of Islamophobia. One such initiative is the Rivers of Hope project that uses art to draw out the connection between racism and Islamophobia by “featuring the work of Muslim and racialized artists who use the arts to challenge racism and Islamophobia” (Riversofhopeproject.com, 2020). A unique example of how Muslim CSOs have highlighted the discrimination and stigmatization of Muslims under CR policies relates to the launch of the National Security Student Helpline for students at the University of Toronto (Institute of Islamic
Studies, n.d.). The helpline – which provides pro bono legal support to students who are approached by CSIS and the RCMP – was created in response to unsolicited (and intimidating) inquiries made by national security agencies at the university’s Muslim Students Association (Nasser, 2019). The high-profile launch of the helpline underscored how Muslims are subject to discrimination and bias in national security efforts.

Muslim CSOs are also advancing campaigns against Islamophobia by working in collaboration with other Muslim CSOs and human rights and civil liberties organizations. Participants informed me that Muslim organizations routinely work together against Islamophobia. One participant, a director at a cultural and civic advocacy organization, described how her organizations was approached by a national organization of a different Muslim denomination to meet jointly with Public Safety Canada and work together on projects to combat Islamophobia. In their words:

“[they] approached us to work on projects together with them. I think because we do so much work around Islamophobia and disrupting and contesting stereotypes about the Muslim community, there’s a level of trust that other Muslim communities have for us. Even if they don’t agree with some elements of our practice, they see us as connected in these other struggles for Muslims placed in Canada” (PCAN25).

In another example of Muslim CSOs working together, in 2015, the Winnipeg based Islamic Social Services Association and NCCM together produced a report titled United Against Terrorism, in which they presented a joint understanding of ‘extremism’ and its impact on Canadian Muslim youth (Islamic Social Services Association, 2015).\(^{42}\) The same year, a coalition of Muslim CSOs, foundations, and the Canadian Race Relations

\(^{42}\) The United Against Terrorism report was initially supported by the RCMP, but upon publication, the RCMP withdrew its support, citing problems with the report’s “adversarial tone” (CBC, 2014b). This report illustrates the Power 2 contestation about CR policy structure between the RCMP and the CSOs working on the report.
Foundation partnered to launch a survey of Muslims in Canada (The Environics Institute, 2016). Based on the results of the survey, a coalition of Muslim organizations issued a joint statement to emphasize that instead of focusing on ‘extremism’ among Muslim communities, the government should take action against racism and religious discrimination commonly experienced by Muslims in Canada (National Council of Canadian Muslims, 2016). In 2017, a coalition of Muslim CSOs joined forces with the Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI) to launch a media campaign against Islamophobia (Singh, 2017). A year after the 2017 Québec City mosque shootings, several Muslim CSOs and civil rights groups joined together to launch the #IRememberJanuary29 campaign to urge the federal government to recognize “January 29 as a National Day of Remembrance and Action on Islamophobia and other forms of religious discrimination” (January29.ca, n.d.). As a result of the campaign, in January 2021, the federal government declared January 29th as a National Day of Remembrance of the Québec City Mosque Attack and Action Against Islamophobia (Canadian Heritage, 2021).

**Discussion:** Muslim CSO contesting Power 2 in CR policies by finding opportunities to highlight the discriminatory nature of CR policies maps on to the strategy of *Defy* and the tactic of *Challenge*. This includes the different programs and campaigns that Muslim CSOs run to highlight Islamophobia, thus challenging the characterization of Muslims as the “suspect community” under CR policies. Through these actions, Muslim CSOs also show how CR policies have disproportionately targeted Muslim communities while ignoring white supremacist violence that threatens Muslim safety. In light of this oversight in CR policies, Muslim CSOs work collaboratively to
advocate for changes to the structure of CR policies. These actions map onto a strategy of *Manipulate* and a tactic of *Influence*, as they involve Muslim CSOs’ attempts to influence decision-makers in state institutions to amend the institutional design of CR policies.

Data from my participants highlight how Muslim CSOs work in collaboration with other CSOs to achieve advocacy goals. While collaboration and partnerships among nonprofit organizations are a common feature of advocacy (Chin, 2018), my analysis adds nuance to extant scholarship by suggesting that collaborations for advocacy represent CSOs using their agentic power to respond to the relations of power (specifically, Power 2) rendered by public policies.

**Muslim CSO Responses in the U.K.**

Research participants from the U.K. were keenly aware that CR policies’ exclusive targeting of Muslim communities was discriminatory. The chairman of the board of a London mosque and a manager at an umbrella organization expressed this concern as follows:

“...we are proud to be Muslims and we are proud to be British. There’s no contradiction whatsoever between these two. We don’t have extremism within our community. There is an issue which we need to deal with but we cannot say that it is the main issue within the Muslim community. There is some element of figures here and there, but they are a very tiny minority, as in any community.

They’re putting legislation in the United Kingdom which are targeting the Muslim community in particular, and this is what we’ve seen, like the whole Prevent strategy and some counter-terrorism legislations. We can see that it is mainly targeting the Muslim community. This is not acceptable. This is why we feel that something has to happen, and this sort of strategy should change to be [inaudible] ... 

The other thing is what I believe, personally, myself. I still believe Prevent is not working properly, and it is targeting the Muslim community, mainly. They said that it is for the far-right extremism, but at the end of the day, we can see that the statistics and the figures show that it is mainly targeting the Muslim community” (PUK1).
In the above remarks, the participant opens by noting there is no contradiction between being British and Muslim. This is in direct reference to Prevent’s characterization of ‘extremism’ as a disavowal of ‘British values,’ and the weaponization of this discourse against British Muslims. The participant notes that the targeting of Muslims under Prevent belies the fact that the government’s own statistics show a far greater prevalence and risk of white supremacist violence (see, for example, Butcher & Luxen, 2019; Kundnani, 2012a).

Noting the link between CR policies and Islamophobia, a senior manager at a civic engagement organization described Prevent as “a discriminative policy that disproportionately affects the Muslim community” and an “example of institutionalized Islamophobia” (PUK4). Another participant from a national umbrella organization remarked how the institutionalization of Islamophobia in Prevent results in white supremacist and far-right violence against Muslims being ignored:

“That’s not helped when, for example, you have real concerns around Islamophobia that are dismissed and you have real concerns around the safety and security of mosques that are often dismissed as well. You don’t have equality in terms of how the threat against Muslims is treated. Even within Prevent, for a really long time, the far-right was ignored. There is a resurgence recently within Prevent to include that, but previously it wasn’t. I think there’s that kind of . . . in the form of a lack of trust” (PUK3).

The participant’s remarks underline that because the safety and security of Muslims facing white supremacist violence is not part of the Prevent agenda, it has been overlooked, eroding trust between Muslim communities and state institutions. Muslim CSOs have long stressed that the threat of “racism and hatred manifesting itself so starkly in the form of anti-Muslim hatred, Islamophobia and xenophobia” is a real and present
danger (Muslim Council of Britain, 2010). The U.K. has a long history of organized far-right violent movements, such as the British National Party (BNP), that have incited and participated in anti-Muslim violence (Lambert, 2013; Pupcenoks & McCabe, 2013). In face of this reality, the Home Office’s treatment of Muslims as the “suspect community” represents an exercise of Power 2 wherein only some agendas are considered while others are deliberately ignored. In response to this exercise of Power 2, Muslim CSOs in the U.K. (much like Muslim CSOs in Canada) have responded by running programs and campaigns to highlight Islamophobia and thus challenge their “suspect” status. CSO responses to Power 2 also contain a significant discursive component; for analytical reasons, I will analyze those under Power 3 in Chapter 9.

Mosques are important institutions for fostering Muslim community building and civic and political participation (McLoughlin, 2005). In response to CR policies, mosques have boosted their roles in supporting anti-Islamophobia. A research participant affiliated with the board of a London mosque described the wide range of programming at his mosque to address racially motivated attacks and Islamophobia:

“We do a lot of hate crimes and Islamophobia events here. They’re not just for the Muslim community, but for wider society. We have a good relationship with organizations who stand up to racism. One of them is called Stand Up To Racism. We even work with the police and the council on that. A lot of activities are happening here” (PUK1).

The participant’s comments highlight that unlike in Prevent, where impositions are placed upon Muslim communities, through anti-racism and anti-hate programming, his mosque defines the nature of its relationship with the police. Police are invited on the mosque’s own terms to help combat racism faced by the community. In another example, the Finsbury Park Mosque in North London has been notable for tackling Islamophobia
as well as addressing violence using community approaches. Famosly, in 2005, the mosque board took back control of the mosque from Abu Hamza Al Masri, an imam who made inflammatory speeches and was later convicted of terrorism charges in the U.S. (Arnell, 2015; Cobain, 2021). More recently, in 2017, the mosque suffered a tragedy when a van attacker drove into pedestrians outside the mosque, killing one individual and injuring nine (BBC, 2020b). In light of these challenges, the mosque has committed to holding intercommunity and interfaith events to discuss community approaches to address Islamophobia (Finsbury Park Mosque, 2013, 2018b). The mosque also participates in “Visit My Mosque Day” events organized by the Muslim Council of Britain, where the general public is invited to learn about Muslim institutions and Muslim communities (Finsbury Park Mosque, 2018a; Visit My Mosque, n.d.).

Research participants (PUK3; PUK10; PUK4) identified student activism against Islamophobia as another prominent component of Muslim CSOs’ challenge to Prevent. One participant (PUK3) was previously involved in the “Students Not Suspects” campaign run by the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) and the National Union of Students (NUS) (T. Saeed, 2019). The campaign highlighted how Prevent has “physically shut down spaces for organising and educating against oppression, turned students into suspects and educators into informants, and opened politically active and vocal individuals – especially Muslims – up to deeply damaging accusations and smears of ‘extremism’” (NUS, 2017). According to another participant knowledgeable about U.K.’s counterterrorism landscape (PUK10), activism against Prevent has encouraged leadership development, civic engagement, and the politicization of youth activists who grow into the student leaders spearheading anti-Islamophobia activities. The NUS
electing Malia Bouattia as its first Black, Muslim president was momentous for Muslim student activism.43

“... there was also a huge amount of work on leadership programs, which I think did have an effect in the long term because you had this whole generation of young Muslims who had quite a good political training and were trained as activists, and you can see that now in people like the NUS. If you look at the National Union of Students, you can see the demographic change taking place. Muslims are far more politically active. They’re running for election and getting involved in student union positions. I think the election of Malia Bouattia was quite a big moment because it was the first Muslim woman who was elected as the president of NUS, but that election didn’t happen in a vacuum. It was a sort of combination of several years of political activism, people going through all sorts of leadership training programs, and all that kind of stuff.

To that extent, I think it’s made the community much more activist and much more activist in a whole variety of different areas, not just in relationship to this, but also in other areas around civil and fiscal rights, around human rights, and around environmental activist, so in that sense it’s been incredibly positive” (PUK10).

The rise of Islamophobia in the shadow of Prevent has spurred on Muslim CSOs who are dedicated to combatting Islamophobia. For example, the organization, Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND), was set up in 2014 to overcome Islamophobia by encouraging Muslim political activism, challenging the anti-Muslim discourse in the media (MEND, n.d.), and “taking a critical position on how power has legitimized Islamophobia” (PUK7). As one participant explained:

“MEND is a community non-government organization and NGO, which has the aim of tackling Islamophobia in the UK. [MEND’s] main mission objective is to empower the Muslim community in regard to political engagement in the UK, as well as engaging with the media. [MEND] has identified those are the two key unique avenues by which Islamophobia is tackable in the UK context” (PUK4).

43 The success of Bouattia’s election as the culmination of activism, advocacy, and leadership nevertheless revealed the deeply ingrained social and political climate of Islamophobia in the U.K. Bouattia, despite her substantial qualifications and achievements, faced tremendous backlash and was called a “terrorist sympathizer” precisely for her anti-Islamophobia activism (Aitkenhead, 2016).
In other examples, Muslim youth groups are using charity fundraisers to speak out against anti-Muslim hate (Farand, 2017). Local communities across the U.K. also conduct interfaith dialogue events to humanize Muslims in efforts to mitigate Islamophobia at an individual level (Malik, 2013). Muslim arts and cultural events, such as Mfest in London and the Muslim Art and Cultural Festival (MACFest) in Manchester, engage wider members of society to “bridge cultures and tackle Islamophobia” (Hashem, 2018).

Research participants highlighted that partnerships are important for CSOs to enhance the impact of their work against Islamophobia. The senior manager of a national organization that encourages civic participation among Muslims offered the following explanation about their partnership structure:

“We have a number of identified delivery partners and we have stakeholders. Delivery partners are partners in the community i.e., mosques in your locality, Muslim organizations, and schools who are going to be a part of you being able to advocate your message. We have a team of volunteers and based upon the strengths of that particular group . . . You have a team of volunteers who have very good, strong relationships with mosques in their area. They might be from a . . . [inaudible] . . . background. They might have studied in a Madrasa. They’ll have good connection with their mosques. We leverage that connection or, if there’s a person involved with local civic organizations, then we’ll touch upon their contacts, the kind of strengths that happen to happen within their work. You might have a working group which solely focuses on campaigns. They haven’t got the capacity, they haven’t got the community, and they haven’t got many mosques in their area, so they’ll focus on campaigning, stakeholders, and having a connection with the local elected officials, the local police, and local media. It’s very much a tailored approach, firstly, upon the need of that community, and also the strengths of that community too” (PUK4).

The above analysis showcases how the CSO leverages the collective strength and voice of Muslim communities through its ties and networks among small community
organizations and mosques. Campaigns are designed to rally support from different types and sizes of organizations. The networked structure is a way for small community organizations to bring forward their collective concerns and have larger campaigns respond to the needs of their local communities. The approach described suggests less of a persistent structure and more of a network of partnerships leveraging strengths when relevant. Naturally, this is not the model adopted by every Muslim CSO. Nevertheless, it provides a rich insight into the way a networked partnership boosts CSOs’ agentic power to resist Islamophobia.

One participant underlined the fact that Muslim CSOs of different religious denominations, political persuasions, and agendas have entered into partnerships of different types to demand changes to the policy structure of U.K.’s CR policies (PUK3, also see Malik, 2013). In 2015, hundreds of Muslim CSOs issued a stern joint letter opposing the introduction of the Prevent Duty, which as explained earlier, requires school teachers, university educators, National Health Service employees, and social services workers to learn about radicalization through professional trainings, and make Prevent referrals for individuals in their care believed to be “at risk” of radicalization (HM Government, 2015b). Muslim CSOs expressed concern that the Prevent duty would chill free speech in institutions of learning and foment anti-Muslim discrimination in the health sector (El-Enany, 2019). The joint letter from Muslim CSOs noted:

“3) We reject the portrayal of Muslims and the Muslim community as a security threat. The latest Act of Parliament, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, threatens to create a ‘McCarthyite’ witch-hunt against Muslims, with nursery workers, schoolteachers and Universities expected to look out for signs of increased Islamic practice as signs of ‘radicalisation’. Such a narrative will only further damage social cohesion as it incites suspicion and ill feeling in the broader community.
4) The expedient use of undefined and politically charged words like ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ is unacceptable as it criminalises legitimate political discourse and criticism of the stance of successive governments towards Muslims domestically and abroad. We strongly oppose political proposals to further ‘tackle’ and ‘crack down’ on such dissenting voices in the Muslim community despite their disavowal of violence and never having supported terrorist acts” (Joint UK Muslim Statement, 2015).

In the joint letter, Muslim CSOs thus expressed their displeasure with the design (content and language) of the Prevent Duty. They suggested the new law would encourage institutions to view benign acts of “Islamic practice” as signs of radicalization and, at the same time, disagreed with the premise that Muslim communities are a security threat. Muslim CSOs were supported by other organizations and social sector representatives in opposing the Prevent Duty. In Newham, educators, student unions, local politicians, and others joined Muslim CSOs in stressing that Prevent is “divisive,” is leading to “increasing division and to a breakdown of trust,” and is “spying on our younger people” (Ramesh, 2015). In 2017, when the Commission for Countering-Extremism was established (as part of the Counter-Extremism Strategy), over 100 Muslim CSOs wrote an open letter to the Home Secretary questioning the need for the Commission and the choice of the commissioner, indicating she had “no grassroots credibility” (MEND, 2018). The letter suggests the commission does not clarify the definition of ‘extremism’ or ‘radicalization’ and is biased to problematizing “Islamist extremism,” rather than “far-right extremism.” The letter from Muslim CSOs was supported by a corresponding supporting letter from civil liberties organizations including Amnesty International (Amnesty International UK, 2018).

Discussion: The Muslim CSO responses under Power 2 I have described above map on to the strategy of Defy and a tactic of Challenge. The mapping is based on the
justification that the various actions by Muslim CSOs – to highlight Islamophobia, to resist the onerous demands under Prevent, to indicate how Muslims are victims of white supremacist violence, to underline how white supremacist violence is ignored in CR policies, and to find various ways to humanize Muslims to upend the “suspect” status assigned to them – constitute ways of showing the rational and moral deficits of Prevent (and CR policies, generally). Whether through organizational or collaborative action, Muslim CSOs are making clear that the very structure of Prevent is discriminatory for Muslims in the U.K.

Despite the obvious similarities and overlaps in the strategies used by Muslim CSOs in Canada and Muslim CSOs in the U.K., there are also noticeable differences. Muslim CSOs in Canada (led by NCCM) are using the strategy of Manipulate and a tactic of Influence to advocate for changes in CR policies and national security measures to address white supremacist and far-right violence. Muslim CSOs in the U.K. have also used the strategy of Manipulate and the tactic of Influence, but toward the end of drastically redesigning Prevent (e.g., by demanding an independent review). Yet even as Muslim CSOs in the U.K. have raised concerns about white supremacist violence, many seem skeptical about the expansion of Prevent, demanding instead that it be scrapped (e.g., Joint UK Muslim Statement, 2015). The majority consensus among Muslim CSOs seems to be that Prevent has failed. One participant said that even among the handful of Muslim CSOs who support the objectives of Prevent, the dominant view is that the policy in its current form has not met those objectives (PUK3).

The difference in strategies in the U.K. and Canada is a result of the difference in the structure of CR policies in the two countries and how Muslim CSOs perceive and
work within those policy structures. In the U.K., Prevent was launched specifically to prevent ‘radicalization’ among Muslims. As a participant noted, Prevent’s design and implementation have resulted in Muslims being securitized and targets of racialized practices, thus eroding trust between state institutions and Muslim communities (PUK3). As the Prevent Duty has been brought into law, Muslim CSOs have felt a deepening of the institutionalization of surveillance of Muslims across society. Therefore, most prominent Muslim CSOs in the U.K. oppose Prevent. Participants said that Muslim CSOs were enthusiastic when the independent review of Prevent was launched as it offered the possibility of putting their grievances on the record and addressing the discriminatory effects of the policy. One participant hoped state security agencies would “learn their previous mistakes” (PUK1) and commit to an overhaul of Prevent.

In Canada, the Trudeau Liberal government adopted a full-fledged national CR strategy only recently, and has been cautious about using policy language implying that ‘radicalization’ is solely associated with Muslims (Public Safety Canada, 2018a). As discussed in Chapter 6, Canada’s CR policy approach has been tentative and piecemeal, so most participants do not see CR policies as distinct from broader counterterrorism practices. Hence, the resistance to CR policies is more muted compared to the U.K. A participant from a prominent Muslim CSO in Canada indicated that “we try our best to engage” (PCAN7), suggesting a preference for pursuing Power 1 contestations to CR policies. Through Power 1 engagements or even Power 2 challenges (PCAN3), some CSOs hope to make CR policies (and other national security measures) less discriminatory by ensuring they are applied consistently against white supremacist violence, which poses an imminent threat to the safety of Muslims. However, this
strategy is not uniform. Some research participants suggested it was counter-productive to demand the widening of national security to include white supremacist groups because it would empower state security agencies to target Muslims with even greater impunity (PCAN8; PCAN11; PCAN25). When the Canadian federal government placed Proud Boys, a far-right group, on the list of terrorist entities in early 2021, a prominent Muslim activist wrote an op-ed on the merit of using the national security apparatus to curb white supremacist violence. Acknowledging that “[a]nti-terrorism legislation is the wrong tool” and that it targets racialized people and Muslims, she declaimed, “we will forever call for its abolishment” (Mazigh, 2021). At the same time, she argued, while the national security apparatus is intact, it should be used to “eliminate violence done by white supremacists against marginalized groups” (Mazigh, 2021). This insight best captures the tension between competing strategies of resisting CR policy: one, which demands it be applied fairly across the spectrum of political violence, and the other, which asks for it to be curtailed or abolished, so it cannot be used to harm Muslims and other racialized communities. The case of Canada shows how these competing strategies exist simultaneously and how Muslim CSOs are using both to challenge the status of Muslims as “suspect communities” and demand that state security institutions address ant-Muslim violence.

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted how Muslim CSOs use their agentic power to challenge the structure of CR policies. As theorized in Chapter 2, these challenges by Muslim CSOs constitute responses to the exercise of Power 2, which sets up a “conflict over structure” (Haugaard, 2012, 2021). Power 2 exercises by state security agencies include not adequately consulting with Muslim CSOs or accounting for their concerns in
the design and implementation of CR policies. The exercise of Power 2 is also apparent in how CR policies narrowly focus on the agenda of Muslim ‘radicalization’ or ‘extremism’ while ignoring white supremacist violence that poses a safety and security risk to Muslims. CR policies’ treatment of Muslims as the “suspect community” who pose a risk of political violence has contributed to a climate of Islamophobia.

As part of Power 2 contestations, research participants indicated that Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. have used a strategy of boycotting certain outreach and consultation events organized by state security agencies. These boycotts are a means of conveying that Muslim CSOs do not view the consultations organized by state security agencies as legitimate. In my conceptual framework, the action of boycotting maps on to a strategy of Defy and tactic of Challenge. Through boycotts, Muslim CSOs are also able to highlight the moral and rational deficit of CR policies that are developed after perfunctory consultations.

Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. use a range of legislative advocacy approaches to influence policymakers to amend the design of CR policies to account for the concerns facing Muslim communities. In Canada, participants cited examples of submissions by CSOs during national security bill hearings. In the U.K., participants described the multi-level government advocacy that led to the announcement of the independent review of Prevent in 2019. The use of advocacy maps onto a strategy of Manipulate and a tactic of Influence in my conceptual framework. It accounts for strategies that seek to influence policymakers to change the structure of CR policies to make them less hostile toward Muslims.
Participants alerted me to the fact that Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. are running programs and campaigns to highlight that, contrary to the portrayal of Muslims as “suspects” under CR policies, Muslims are in fact victims of Islamophobic violence. As part of these campaigns, Muslim CSOs are disseminating alternative perspectives on ‘radicalization.’ Muslim CSOs are running programs and campaigns individually or in collaboration with other CSOs to boost their agentic power. Programs and campaigns to highlight Islamophobia map onto a strategy of Defy and a tactic of Challenge in my conceptual framework, because they challenge and disrupt the assumption in CR policies that Muslims are a national security threat.

Research participants shared that by highlighting the extent of Islamophobia, Muslim CSOs are urging state security agencies to acknowledge the seriousness of, and take action against, white supremacist violence. These actions map on to a strategy of Defy and a tactic of Challenge. However, in Canada, some Muslim CSOs have used advocacy strategies to encourage state security agencies to target white supremacist groups with counterterrorism tools and CR policies. This constitutes a strategy of Manipulate and a tactic of Influence. Still, other CSOs are reluctant to expand the scope of CR policies based on the concern that it would grant more power to secretive national security agencies and do little to lessen the securitization and racialization of Muslims. These Canadian CSOs, like their counterparts in the U.K., are using the strategy of Defy and the tactic of Challenge to demand that CR policies be redesigned completely.

Research participants drew attention to the fact that, given their negative experience with Prevent, Muslim CSOs in the U.K. do not trust state security agencies. Some Muslim CSOs have, therefore, focused on the demand that Prevent be scrapped entirely.
The strategies used by Muslim CSOs in response to Power 2 (described in this chapter) are qualitatively different from responses to Power 1 described in the previous chapter (Chapter 7). Haugaard (2021) describes Power 1 as establishing “structured power conflicts” where contestations are “relatively shallow.” By contrast, Power 2 sets up a “conflict over structure” where there is “fundamental disagreement” over the design of structural arrangements. Under Power 1, Muslim CSOs confront decisions related to whether or not to accept CR-related funding, to what extent they should cooperate with state security agencies, and what action they should take when state security agencies refuse to grant sociopolitical legitimacy to CSOs. By contrast, under Power 2, Muslim CSOs are using their agentic power more substantially to challenge the structure of CR policies by highlighting discrimination, exclusion, and agenda bias. Through their actions, they are questioning the legitimacy of superficial consultation processes and demanding that policymakers address the anti-Muslim bias encoded in CR policies. In the next chapter, I discuss how Muslim CSOs are engaged in discursive, Power 3 contestations.
Chapter 9 – Muslim CSO Responses to Power 3 in CR Policies and the Dynamics of Power 4

Power 3 draws attention to the reproduction of relations of domination resulting from tacit social knowledge connected to wider social processes (Haugaard, 2012; Hayward, 1998; Lukes, 2005; McGee, 2020). In the relationship between state institutions and CSOs, Power 3 is manifest in norms, discourses, and internalized knowledges reflected in policy structures (Gaventa, 2006; Haugaard, 2012). The exercise of Power 3, therefore, results in an “epistemic conflict” or a contestation of knowledges and discourses between state institutions and CSOs (Haugaard, 2021, p. 165). In CR policies, Power 3 is embedded in the knowledge base about ‘radicalization’ that undergirds CR policies and how the formation of those knowledges is tied to broader social forces. This chapter focuses on CSO responses that expose the implicit knowledge base informing state institutions’ development and implementation of CR policies, and that advance alternative discourses to those privileged by state security agencies. Additionally, I identify how CSO responses to Power 3 map on to the organizational institutionalist model (Oliver, 1991) I leverage for my conceptual framework.

Haugaard (2012) theorizes Power 4 as conceptually distinct from Power 3 to capture the process of producing disciplined and responsibilized social actors who unreflexively reproduce relations of domination. A focus on Power 4 in state-CSO relations foregrounds governmentality, or “rationalities and technologies” of governance through which state institutions manage the “conduct” of CSOs (N. Rose, 2000, p. 324).
In this chapter, I also examine how state institutions exert Power 4 through CR policies, and how those actions impact Muslim CSOs.44

**Muslim CSO Demands for Greater Transparency in CR Policies**

The exercise of Power 3 occurs through the establishment of tacit social knowledge (Haugaard, 2012). As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, knowledges about ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism,’ formed and coalesced in transnational fora and disseminated to different national jurisdictions, underpin CR policies (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018; Peck & Theodore, 2010). Since the mid-2000s, the discourse of ‘radicalization’ has become a signifier of a “psychological or theological process by which Muslims move towards extremist views” (Kundnani, 2012b, p. 7). This racialized understanding of ‘radicalization’ has informed the “official narrative” that “distorts public discourse” and justifies CR policies targeting of Muslims (Kundnani, 2015, p. 8). This shared discursive understanding of ‘radicalization’ is internalized across security institutions, allowing CR policies to target Muslim communities without sufficient evidentiary basis (Mythen et al., 2017). Thus, the ‘radicalization’ discourse informs the knowledge basis for CR policy decision-making.

Canadian CR policy documents claim that the government is “concerned with all forms of violent extremism, not associating this phenomenon with any particular religious, political, national, ethnic, or cultural group” (Public Safety Canada, 2018a); nevertheless, state security agencies have paid disproportionate attention to Muslims under CR policies and other counterterrorism measures, a phenomenon that has been

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44 I have not included CSO resistance to Power 4 in my analysis because, as noted in Chapter 2, the recognition of the operation of Power 4 likely results in CSOs using contestations across one of the other dimensions of power.
described as the “Muslimization of the problem of terrorism” (Nagra & Monaghan, 2020, p. 173). In the U.K., *Prevent* emerged as a CR policy solution to specifically address ‘radicalization’ among Muslims. Despite recent attempts to use *Prevent* to preempt far-right violence, Home Office decisions continue to affirm the status of Muslims as the “suspect community” (Breen-Smyth, 2014). As *Prevent* decision-making has become centralized in the Home Office, it has become more difficult to learn about the rationale for CR policy decisions (e.g., Maryam, 2021; Qureshi, 2016). In an effort to both understand what knowledges are mobilized by state security agencies in their CR policy decision-making, and expose anti-Muslim bias in these knowledges, Muslim CSOs are demanding greater transparency in decisions that inform CR policymaking. These efforts constitute a response to CR policies under Power 3.

**Muslim CSO Responses in Canada**

Research participants from Muslim CSOs shared that they have consistently asked state security institutions to be more forthcoming about what information and analysis motivate the targeting of Muslims under CR policies and national security practices. A participant who works as a lawyer and has interfaced with the RCMP and CSIS on national security matters since the early 2000s described the inquiries of Muslim CSOs as follows:

“They had stereotypes in their head and deficiencies of who their advisors were as to looking for the threats. We asked them. We said, ‘Who are your advisors?’ and they didn’t want to share who their advisors were. We asked, ‘Where are your reference materials to make the threat assessment?’ They weren’t sharing that with us at the time. We said, ‘What are your sources to determine if somebody’s a threat or not?’” (PCAN18).

The comments reflect that national security actions have been based on “stereotypes,” and that state agencies deliberately withheld their evidentiary bases or hid their
nonexistence. Muslim CSOs were unconvinced that the RCMP and CSIS were consulting people with credible expertise or legitimacy in Muslim communities. The participant also notes that that CSOs had no visibility into how national security agencies developed the “threat assessment” that led to the targeting of Muslims in Canada. Despite requesting the participation of communities in CR efforts and counterterrorism measures, national security agencies have been reluctant to share the information that Muslim CSOs have been requesting. The participant’s remarks imply that Muslim CSO requests for more transparency can reveal that CR and counterterrorism practices by state security institutions are based on bias and stereotype (i.e., tacit social knowledge) instead of facts.

Another participant, the Executive Director of a cultural and civic engagement organization, described a meeting where Muslim CSOs asked the RCMP how “the threat from the Muslim community” is hierarchized relative to other forms of crimes and violence (PCAN26). She shared the following exchange in the meeting between CSOs and the RCMP:

“They [the RCMP] have their spiel and they say, ‘We’ve been seeing the problem intensifying in Ottawa,’ and we say, ‘Can we have a little bit more specifics? What are the numbers? What are the cases?’ It’s actually part of their . . . Part of their presentation to the community is to say, ‘We have an increasing problem. We need your help. We can’t do it on our own.’

. . .

We said, ‘If you’re telling us that you’re relying on us to be part of the solution, can you tell us how in your experience, these cases’ . . . They have a composite that they’ve prepared, which is a ridiculous thing. Why don’t you just give an anonymous case study instead of having a composite which is like a chimera?

. . . It doesn’t correspond to any reality. Doug Best, the RCMP guy, was saying, ‘It’s intensifying, and we’ve had some really terrible things. 13-year olds doing this,’ so we said, ‘Could we have a little more detail? If you’re saying you need our help, could you explain to us how, in that
particular case, the Muslim community could have intervened and how the leadership or the community could have intervened?"

... 

In fact, most of the cases we talk about are the thwarted. So, we said, “If you had data specific as to what kind of cases you’ve come up against and where you see the leadership realistically has a role to play. You’re taking this roadshow, telling us, ‘We need your help.’ In other words, ‘You’re part of this thing that is spawning.’ The problem . . . There’s no numbers . . . Doug Best actually . . . at the event, he just alluded to it. He said, ‘People ask us for numbers, but the fact is that we can’t give numbers because they’re changing all the time.’ That was the extent of his-

... 

It looks very, very sketchy” (PCAN26).

There is much to unpack in this participant’s comments. She first notes the RCMP’s requests for “help” in national security efforts because “we can’t do it on our own.” This benign framing is emblematic of community policing through which the police effectively expand surveillance by encouraging communities to monitor their own members (Nguyen, 2019b). In the meeting described by the participant, Muslim CSOs asked the RCMP for details about “cases” and “numbers,” in order to better understand the extent of the problem and determine the role Muslim CSO leaders should play. Instead of supplying the information requested, the RCMP provided “composites” (or profiles) that the participant stated are like a “chimera,” tenuously connected to real data and poor substitutes for actual case studies. The RCMP’s response reveals that they are both unforthcoming about the knowledge basis for their CR interventions among Muslim communities, and also dismissive of CSO requests. Another participant, a program manager at a civic engagement organization engaged in anti-Islamophobia organizing, indicated that the RCMP will say, “[y]ou don’t see everything we’re doing because that’s how successful we are . . . that we’re thwarting all these things so that you don’t see
them” (PCAN11). The participant’s comment implies that the RCMP’s use of thwarted cases (or what would have happened without RCMP intervention) is unverifiable, making the claim patently self-serving and reinforcing of security discourse. By focusing on thwarted cases, the RCMP amplifies the magnitude of the ‘radicalization’ problem without quantifying it, while further rationalizing the value of CR policies and their own enforcement role. Overall, this lack of transparency and use of bad-faith arguments prompt the participant’s remark that the enterprise looks “very, very sketchy” (PCAN26).

The analysis shows how Muslim CSOs are using their agentic power to point out the shaky foundations of CR policies. Muslim CSOs use requests for data and transparency to highlight how implicit knowledges – on which the “chimera” of the Muslim Other is based – create anti-Muslim bias and justify racialized practices in CR policies. The view from research participants about the weak knowledge basis for counter-radicalization aligns with independent research that has characterized CR policies not as the result of evidence-based policy making, but rather “policy-based evidence making” (Mythen et al., 2017).

In response to this lack of government transparency, a few participants stressed that Muslim CSOs are pursuing community-led research for their own knowledge generation (e.g., PCAN8; PCAN10; PCAN19). One participant, the director of a foundation that supports anti-Islamophobia programs, recounted that Muslim organizations came together to commission the Survey of Muslims in Canada by the Environics Institute (The Environics Institute, 2016). The project arose in a climate where Muslim CSOs feel that the ‘radicalization’ discourse has come to achieve specific racialized, anti-Muslim meaning:
“It doesn't mean the 22-year-old white dude in that small town who had a pipe bomb that blew up in the back of the cab. We know it doesn’t mean him. It means only Muslims, and it means mostly brown Muslims” (PCAN19).

The participant laments that ‘radicalization’ is known as something associated with “brown Muslims,” and ignores other forms of violence. Community-led research offers a means to challenge the dominant discourse on ‘radicalization’ by replacing implicit knowledges and biases with reliable empirical data.

**Discussion:** Muslim CSOs are engaging in Power 3 contestations with state security institutions by expressing doubt in the knowledge basis of CR policies and demanding greater transparency. These responses correspond to a strategy of *Defy* and a tactic of *Attack*, through which Muslim CSOs seek to denounce the basis of institutional demands by state security institutions (Oliver, 1991). As state institutions approach Muslim CSOs to request cooperation in CR efforts, Muslim CSOs use their agentic power to demand justification for the disproportionate targeting of Muslim communities. In addition, Muslim CSOs are using their capacities to generate new knowledges through research to challenge state-security centered discourses on ‘radicalization.’ This also maps onto a strategy of *Defy* and tactic of *Attack*. CSO demands for greater transparency as part of Power 3 contestations or “epistemic conflicts,” work in alignment with Power 2 conflicts “over structure” (Haugaard, 2021). By questioning the implicit knowledges that uphold CR policies, Muslim CSOs are in effect challenging the structure of CR policies.

**Muslim CSO Responses in the U.K.**

Participants from the U.K. drew my attention to the fact that much of the CR intervention in the U.K. was based on weak evidence and Muslim stereotypes. Describing his research into counterterrorism practices and CR policies, a participant, who is
knowledgeable about the U.K.’s counterterrorism efforts and has been involved in convening Muslim CSOs to discuss the implications of Prevent, said:

“Then what I was beginning to be much more aware of was the fact that there’s a huge amount of research on all of these issues that people who are involved in academia were doing research on Muslim communities were engaging in is... but there were very few kind of grounded researchers working on the counterterrorism policy area and, as a result, that was sort of an evidence-free zone where... centre-right think tanks could write whatever they wanted because there was nobody else” (PUK10).

The participant is highlighting how the foundational research on counterterrorism and later, CR policies, was dominated by “centre-right think tanks” whose work was largely “evidence-free.” It did not match up to the lived realities and discussions among Muslim communities in the U.K. for whom terrorism “wasn’t a big issue” and “employment, education, housing, and all of these issues are far more important” (PUK10).

As Prevent has become institutionalized and proliferated across the social sector with the enactment of the Prevent Duty, Muslim CSOs have been concerned about how the government is evaluating “success” and using the information collected as part of Prevent interventions. Participants expressed skepticism about the knowledge base and published statistics on which Prevent interventions are based. According to the manager at a national Muslim umbrella organization:

“Then going back to the practical elements, we then also decided that there would have to be something in there about how effective the policy is and how measurable its successes are. The Home Office releases its statistics every year and, for example, it will say things like, ‘We have stopped 50 young people from going over to Syria.’ It may well say those kinds of things, but there’s a lack of evidence really in how that’s been done, in whether Channel panels or Prevent were directly involved or indirectly involved, and what causes a lot of... not suspicion, but a kind of apprehension around those kinds of stats is how, in high profile cases like the Shamima Begum’s case of the three girls who went from... there was a list of failures from Prevent.

...
Yeah. From the whole process that kind of suggests that maybe they don’t have a handle on the issue as much as they say they do. We wanted to make sure there’s something in there about it being effective and about being measurable, and then the final thing was a policy being open to evaluation and criticism. That’s been one of the biggest things in the aftermath of people criticizing Prevent. It’s been the fact that many have been delegitimized as extremists. Many people have been . . . their views have been sidelined and undermined” (PUK3).

The participant is highlighting how the Home Office touts success based on individuals who have been prevented from traveling overseas (allegedly to partake in political violence). However, she is also underscoring that there are inconsistencies in government statistics that are apparent from high profile “failures.” Her organization and others are demanding more transparency so that they can learn the Home Office’s measure of success and open it to “evaluation and criticism.” At the same time, the government has been combative, deeming individuals and organizations who make information requests and who are critical of Prevent as ‘extremists.’ I have argued that the act of delegitimization by state security agencies is a use of Power 1 (coercion) to take away the ability of Muslim CSOs to hold the former accountable. In other words, state institutions use their political authority to transform Power 3 epistemic conflicts into Power 1 structured conflicts, an act that changes the contestation in their favour (Haugaard, 2021).

This analysis was echoed by other participants, including the Executive Director of a human rights CSO who felt that the discussions between Muslim CSOs and the Home Office on Prevent “hasn’t been a constructive engagement;” for the Home Office, “it’s very much been about, ‘[h]ow can we promote this and how can we shut down dissent through undermining those that are raising concerns?’” (PUK5). The same participant went on to say that there is a lack of clarity about “what’s happening with the information that is being gathered” from those accessing services funded by Prevent (PUK5). She
shared that her organization has placed a *Freedom of Information Act* (FOI) request to the Home Office to access information about a study (ERG22+), which the government cites as the basis for the “indicators” of radicalization included in *Prevent* and *Channel* interventions (Knudsen, 2020; Qureshi, 2016). At the time of my interview, the Home Office had not yet furnished them with the information they requested.

The above examples show how CSOs are demanding more transparency in the knowledge base that the Home Office uses to implement *Prevent*. Through these actions, Muslim CSOs seek to gain insights into the assumptions and decision-making criteria used by state security institutions. It is also a way for CSOs to expose anti-Muslim bias in the underlying tacit knowledge that CR policies are based on. Additionally, like Muslim CSOs in Canada, Muslim CSOs in the U.K. are also generating their own knowledge through community-led research. At the time I was collecting data for this study, the Muslim Council of Britain was running a National Listening Exercise to centre community perspectives on counterterrorism and counter-radicalization (Muslim Council of Britain, n.d.). A participant familiar with the project said it was a way to learn how Muslims in the U.K. “feel about the ways in which the definitions of ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’” are deployed by “the police, the media and politicians” (PUK3). The project sought to ask Muslims:

> “What would be the one thing that they would like to see changed around counter-extremism and counterterrorism policies? If they knew of any anti-extreme or counter-radicalization efforts in their local areas, and whether they thought they were effective or not effective” (PUK3).

Knowledge from the study would be used to challenge the knowledge base and discourses that the government uses to justify *Prevent.*
**Discussion:** Muslim CSOs in the U.K., like Muslim CSOs in Canada, are using a strategy of *Defy* and a tactic of *Attack* to engage in Power 3 contestations related to the knowledge basis of *Prevent*. By demanding greater transparency into CR policies, Muslim CSOs aim to hold the Home Office accountable and highlight anti-Muslim bias in the agency’s assumptions about ‘radicalization.’ Through such challenges, Muslim CSOs expose the structural bias in CR policies that results in almost exclusive targeting of Muslim communities. We see, therefore, how Power 3 contestations by CSOs work alongside Power 2 challenges to the structure of CR policies. Participants from the U.K. additionally highlighted that the Home Office has responded to requests for greater transparency by accusing those who make such requests as being ‘extremists’ themselves. I argue that this response constitutes a coercive use of power by state institutions, effectively transforming Power 3 epistemic conflicts into Power 1 contestations which favour state institutions. It also undermines trust-building with Muslim communities, which is ostensibly a goal of CR policies. Muslim CSOs in the U.K., like their Canadian counterparts, are also conducting their own research to generate community-centered conceptions of ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism.’

**Muslim CSO Challenges to Dominant Discourses of CR Policies**

In the conceptualization of Power 3, discourses play a central role in affirming the taken-for-granted knowledges that shape the actions of actors within a structure (Haugaard, 2012). CR policies rest upon particular discourses of ‘radicalization,’ a floating signifier that, in the context of the ‘war on terror,’ refers to the process by which Muslims develop ‘extreme’ religious beliefs that are assumed to lead to political violence (Kundnani, 2012b). This notion of ‘radicalization’ is rooted in Orientalist views of the “new terrorism thesis,” which asserts that Islam is incompatible with the “west”
Building upon the ‘radicalization’ discourse, CR policies result in the racialization of Muslims where their race, religion, culture, and political expressions are intertwined to deem “Muslimness” itself as a threat to national security (Razack, 2008; Sharma & Nijjar, 2018; Sian, 2017). As a consequence of these dominant discourses, Muslims have been cast as dangerous, risky, and the “suspect community” (Breen-Smyth, 2014; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Kundnani, 2012b). Power 3 is exercised in the reinforcement of the above discourses by state security agencies. As CR policies make overtures of “colourblindness” by expanding their ambit to target more than just Muslim political violence, they retain these underlying racial discourses and structures (Younis, 2021). This only makes it more difficult for Muslim CSOs to contest Power 3 in CR policies.

Even though Canadian CR policy documents have maintained that “a wide spectrum of ideologies” cause ‘radicalization’ (Public Safety Canada, 2018a), adjacent national security publications affirm that the “principal terrorist threat” facing Canada is by Muslims who radicalize to violence (Public Safety Canada, 2019). The discursive assumptions that connect radicalization to the risk of Muslims being drawn to violence are also present in internal terrorism training documents used by the RCMP (Monaghan & Molnar, 2016; Nagra & Monaghan, 2020). National security discourses that treat Muslims as “dangerous internal foreigners” (Dhamoon & Abu-Laban, 2009) have been reiterated by political leaders thus injecting anti-Muslim discourses into popular and media consciousness (Kanji, 2018; Wilkins-Laflamme, 2018).

CR policies in the U.K. were developed to manage British anxieties about political violence by Muslims residing in the U.K. Prevent was deployed as a discursive
intervention to win “hearts and minds” in the ideological battle of ‘extremism’ (DCLG, 2007). Through Prevent and the Counter-Extremism strategy, the Home Office has used the discourse of “British values” with racialized understandings of ‘radicalization’ to imply that Muslims are prone to ‘extremism’ (Ali, 2020). The racialized targeting of Muslims in CR policies is accompanied by state institutions’ and government actors’ use of Islamophobic discourses (Sian, 2017). The same discourses are rehearsed in the media and contribute to Islamophobia more widely (Zaheer, 2021). In this section, I discuss how Muslim CSOs challenge the racialized, anti-Muslim discourses in CR policies.

**Muslim CSO Responses in Canada**

Participants shared that Muslim CSOs are confronting anti-Muslim discourses intertwined with CR policies on multiple fronts. Muslim CSOs are directly challenging state security discourses through open letters, legal and legislative submissions, and in private meetings. CSOs are also taking on the task of challenging media discourses that paint Muslims as dangerous. Finally, Muslim CSOs are running public education programs to present alternatives to the anti-Muslim discourses intertwined with national security.

A participant affiliated with the board of a national advocacy organization said that his organization leverages its position to shed light on unjust counterterrorism and counter-radicalization interventions by the RCMP and CSIS that violate Charter principles. Doing so, he says, has cast doubt on the credibility of their actions. He described the impact of that strategy as follows:

“They really want to repair the relationship because they know that they’ve lost their legitimacy. They can’t do their job as long as [our organization] is calling them racists and abusers of the Charter, which is what we’ve been doing consistently, and we continue to do that” (PCAN3).
CSO actions that question the legitimacy of actions by state security agencies are especially salient in the context of CR policies because it hampers the latter’s ability to build trust with Muslim communities, one of the goals of CR policies. Another participant, the chair of the board of a religious organization with national reach, described how, in a meeting with Public Safety Canada, her organization pushed back against the government agency’s characterization of “violent extremism”:

“... She talked about the problem with the name that the countering violent extremism ... of the office. Your office ... the new one that you’re trying to found. Every example you give is a Muslim example, and so how that is part of the mental framework of framing Muslims as the problem, whereas we know that there are also way more attacks by white nationalists, in the States anyway. They have figures to show it. White supremacy, and then I think environmentalism, and then Muslims ... They’re on the list ...” (PCAN10). The participant’s remarks provide insights into how her organization expressed concerns about the concept of “violent extremism” that uses the “framing” of Muslims as “the problem.” Like participants from other CSOs (e.g., PCAN11; PCAN26), her organization also demanded clarity on how Public Safety Canada hierarchizes different types of violence.

Participants expressed the importance of resisting media discourses that paint Muslims as violent. In Canada, incidents of political violence by Muslims receive greater media attention and are framed as attacks on the “west,” with perpetrators identified by their religion, race, or ethnicity (Kanji, 2018). According to one participant who serves as the director of programs of a civic engagement organization in Ontario:

“... public and media discourses about Muslims being a problem community and being a source of violent radicalization and extremism are so powerful that they override Muslims’ own experiences of their communities” (PCAN11).
Her remarks indicate that media discourses are so powerful that they shape the way Muslims themselves feel about the problem of ‘radicalization.’ Another participant, a principal at an Islamic school and a former board member of the mosque in her community, said that Muslim CSOs conduct Islamic education to “make sure that they [the local community] understand Islam in its proper context . . . to make sure that they’re not won over by whatever the media’s portrayed” (PCAN1). The Executive Director of a public foundation that supports anti-Islamophobia programming talked about her organization’s community-led journalism program:

“We also launched this community-based journalism piece that elevates voices that are overshadowed, and that is directly and indirectly linked to counter-radicalization, because I think it’s much harder to keep going down that road if people are already on guard or influenced. The social media piece especially is quite distressing in terms of how quickly it can ferment hate and perpetuate the same stereotypes. I am thinking that that’s a systemic piece” (PCAN19).

The participant considers the tackling of conventional media and social media discourse as a “systemic piece” to overcome the stereotyping of Muslims. The executive of a national advocacy organization said their organization not only does “media advocacy” to correct the “discourse around radicalization,” but also “advocate[s] for better reporting and better journalism” (PCAN7).

Contesting the dominant discourses about Muslims being associated with ‘radicalization’ has found Muslim CSOs educating the public about Islamophobia. I discussed some aspects of this endeavour in the previous chapter (Chapter 8) when describing the anti-Islamophobia programming that Muslim CSOs are pursuing. Public education about Islamophobia is a way for Muslim CSOs to introduce new discourses about Muslims and Islam. The participant from the national advocacy organization
indicated that their media advocacy efforts are complemented by “community outreach and education”:

“We do a lot of that work, and what that ends up looking like is a lot of workshops and trainings, and also the development of resources . . . Like, putting together manuals and guides” (PCAN7).

While the above participant focused on their organization’s work on developing educational resources, the participant affiliated with an Islamic school shared that public education about Islam and Muslims is a way to humanize Muslims:

“As a Muslim community . . . we’re always finding opportunities to involve the greater community to come and see us as we really are, and hopefully then, instead of believing everything they hear, they can come and ask. That’s what our hope is. That’s always what our hope is. It’s for them to not take everything at face value, and never assume anything, but to come and ask” (PCAN1).

Together the above examples showcase the strategies that Muslim CSOs are using to mount a discursive (Power 3) challenge to dominant discourses about Muslim propensity to violence or ‘radicalization’ that underpin CR policies. Importantly, Muslim CSOs are using a lens of anti-racism and equity to challenge the racialized construction of Muslims as dangerous or risky (Dhamoon & Abu-Laban, 2009). This approach allows Muslim CSOs to show solidarity with other forms of discrimination based on race, religion, or culture and question the inequity of CR policy structures (see Mclaughlin, 2005). In 2018, the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM) responded to the 2018 Public Report on the Terrorism Threat to Canada (Public Safety Canada, 2019) by noting that the language in the report “unfairly stigmatizes Canadian Muslim communities and other racialized minority groups while minimizing the growing role of white supremacist and far-right groups in perpetuating violent attacks inside Canada” (National Council of Canadian Muslims, 2018). The director of the public foundation that
funds anti-Islamophobia programming asserted that “at its core, the work of the foundation is about equity” (PCAN19).

One participant, the program manager at a Muslim civic engagement organization, reflected that the design of a youth engagement program among Muslim and non-Muslim youth was influenced by an understanding of anti-Islamophobia as “fighting the three evils of Doctor King, and that actually, Islamophobia was just yet another iteration of militarism, poverty, and racism” (PCAN22). In addition, “everything that was happening, like police brutality, police shootings, police harassment, and the police-community relations breaking down,” motivated him to focus program discussions around “racism, poverty, and militarism.” He believed this would offer youth an opportunity to express views on violence broadly including war, the militarization of police, and “violent extremism.” He described his experience of the program as follows:

“Interesting, over the course of the last year, everybody that we’ve worked with . . . We’re delivering the project in five cities, and all the young people have wanted to work on racism and poverty-related things, whether it’s affordable housing and shelters, whether it’s gender-based violence, or whether it’s Islamophobia and anti-Blackness or anti-Indigenous racism. People are working on these intersections of equity and poverty.

Everybody’s steering clear of the militarism thing. Even though all the options were explained, and they were told, ‘If these thematic focus areas are not appealing to you, and you want to prioritize something else, we’ll support you in that,’ people typically gravitated towards the racism or poverty pieces of the suggestions that we made. If people had said, ‘We want to focus on environment or media literacy and media ethics,’ we would have been able to support that. That was within the scope of our project because the scope of the project was just anything related to building community and civic engagement and social justice, broadly speaking” (PCAN22).

His observations reveal that young Muslims view Islamophobia, anti-Black racism, and anti-Indigenous racism as connected issues of oppression that are a product of structural inequities. This insight is particularly revealing because it
suggests that Muslim CSOs using an anti-racism and equity discourse to frame anti-Islamophobia is not only based on strategic framing (Benford & Snow, 2000) but also rooted in their experiences as Muslims. The CSO actions described above show how Muslim CSOs are disrupting the dominant security-centered discourses of ‘radicalization.’

**Discussion:** My conceptual framework postulates that Muslim CSO actions to confront racialized discourses that tie Muslims to ‘radicalization’ exhibit Power 3 contestations. The CSO actions map on to the strategy of *Defy* and the tactic of *Attack* because their approach seeks to “denounce institutionalized values and the external constituents that express them” (Oliver, 1991, p. 157). These discursive challenges by Muslim CSOs indicate that CSOs are engaged in “discursive consciousness” raising, which allows them to confront taken-for-granted meanings of ‘radicalization’ (Haugaard, 2012). Muslim CSOs are executing this strategy by directly confronting the actions of state security institutions, rectifying media discourses, and educating the wider public about Islamophobia. These efforts represent a defiance to dominant security discourse that reinforce CR policies. Importantly, Muslim CSOs recognize the racialization of Muslims under CR policies and are responding by underscoring connections of Islamophobia to other forms of racial oppression and issues of equity. This sophisticated contestation in Power 3 seeks to challenge the structural and discursive basis of CR policies.

**Muslim CSO Responses in the U.K.**

Muslim CSOs in the U.K. are challenging racialized security discourses that paint Muslims as national security threats. The discursive contention arises from the Home
Office’s use of an unspecific yet thick notion of “British values” and the government agency’s implication that Muslims are insufficiently committed to these “values,” making them prone to ‘extremism’ (Elshayyal, 2020). The Home Office has also committed itself to the idea that ideology drives political violence. In addition to pointing out the weak evidentiary basis for the Home Office’s claims (discussed earlier in this chapter), Muslim CSOs have also challenged the rationality of the Home Office’s position. A participant who works as a Channel mentor and engages in other Prevent-related projects, justified the Home Office’s view as follows:

“Extremist ideology, with all its complexities, isn’t just going to undertake violent acts. There’s a worldview that precedes it as in their mindset, and there’s a psychology of in-group/out-group. Those things have a manifestation in the politics. That manifestation in the politics is not necessarily violent extremism. It’s going to be an ideology, which is very extreme. There will be a small number of those people undertaking violent acts. If you’re going to challenge it, you may end up challenging this ideology, which is much broader than merely just challenging the extremist acts, so that makes sense, and so here there’s an arena that falls under the extremism area. Counter-extremism is a separate strategy to the Prevent strategy, which is theoretically much broader and not securitized. This is an area which is not to do with terrorism. This is just an area to do with; what type of social values do we believe in and what do we promote, or what type of things are harmful to our society” (PUK11).

The participant’s remarks reveal several dimensions of the Home Office’s position. He confirms the Home Office’s view that ideology drives political violence. This view justifies Prevent interventions against (Muslim) beliefs that are assumed to be ‘extreme,’ even if they are non-violent. Stating that there is a distinction between Prevent and the Counter-extremism Strategy, he argues the latter is about “social values.” But since Prevent also uses a calculus of distance from “British values,” Prevent and the Counter-extremism Strategy together work to exceptionalize Muslim violence. In response, Muslim CSOs have stressed that the purported bifurcation between Prevent and the
Counter-extremism Strategy exists in name only, as they share security objectives and discursive assumptions about the riskiness of Muslims. One participant, the Executive Director of a national human rights CSO, shared that her organization has publicly expressed concern about the Home Office’s discourse around British values as follows:

“By using these very broad notions and by Prevent and extremism not being about violence, inherently you’re saying there are certain values that are not British, and then what are those values that are not British? Who are those people that are not considered to fit within that? I think that there is a very real issue, and obviously what we’re seeing in the context of people who are classified as potentially Islamic extremists, is that there is a belief system and a way of living that may place you outside of that, and being within that and having those attributes means that you are more likely to go and be violent” (PUK5).

The above remarks exemplify the concern of Muslim CSOs about the vagueness of “British values” because it is being used to “classify” people as “extremists” simply because they may hold conservative religious “beliefs.” Muslim CSOs in the U.K. have been scathing in their criticism of the rationality and morality of CR policies. A participant (PUK3) informed me that the Muslim Council of Britain has used its position and access to Muslim CSOs to produce briefs and deliver presentations before officials that point out Prevent’s stigmatizing effects and its failure to earn the trust of Muslim communities (Muslim Council of Britain, 2016). After the Prevent Duty was made into law, Muslim CSOs wrote an open letter criticizing the Prevent Duty for “the criminalisation of Islam,” for silencing “legitimate critique and dissent,” for labeling “numerous normative Islamic opinions” as ‘extremist,’ and for using “undefined and politically charged words like ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’” (Joint UK Muslim Statement, 2015). As an alternative to the Home Office discourse, a participant shared that Muslim CSOs and human rights organizations have argued that “a British value is about tolerance and is about the idea of living a multiplicity of identities and beliefs that
sit together;” an understanding, CSOs claim, the Home Office disregards in its discourse of “British values” (PUK5). Participants (e.g., PUK7; PUK8) also alerted me to the work of organizations like MEND (described in the previous chapter), CAGE (Qureshi, 2017), and PreventWatch (PreventWatch, n.d.) whose mandates are to challenge the Home Office’s CR discourses.

Muslim CSOs are also confronting the racialized media discourses which frame Muslims as violent and “alien,” and cast doubt on their “Britishness” (A. Saeed, 2007). A participant, who sits on the board of a prominent London mosque, shared that the mosque took legal action against news organizations that falsely implied the mosque was connected to ‘extremists’ or ‘terrorists’:

“The media are careful, especially after we took action against some media who wrote some false statements about the mosque. We took legal action against them and we won the cases, so this made the media more careful in dealing with issues related to the mosque because they know that we are serious and we mean business. We will not tolerate someone who tries to discredit, label the mosque as extremist, or give false information and statements about the mosque” (PUK1).

In addition to taking legal action to protect their reputation, Muslim CSOs are also influencing media stories through a direct engagement with journalists. A manager at a civic engagement organization explained his organization’s approach:

“We do hold roundtable dinners with media journalists, so major journalists from BBC and Guardian. We hold dinners with them. We share stories with them to try and have positive stories about the Muslim community in the media. Whenever the stories in the media which actually incorrectly represent the Muslim community or discriminates on the Muslim community or the religion, then we’ll actually encourage people to complain to the regulator to ensure that those stories are changed” (PUK4).

The participant’s remarks suggest Muslim CSOs are also using the long-term tactic of relationship building with media institutions to influence how stories about Muslims and Islam get written. At the same time, his organization also encourages Muslim CSOs to
use procedural justice tools, such as complaining to the regulator, to rectify discourses that “discriminate” against Muslims.

Muslim CSOs have been adept at using human rights, social justice, and anti-racism frames as part of their own discursive assertions. The organization CAGE campaigns against “discriminatory state policies” to strive for a “world free of injustice and oppression” (CAGE, n.d.). CAGE views generating its own “narrative” of the ‘war on terror’ as a counter-hegemonic undertaking to challenge “the exercise of racism and Islamophobia that operates structurally . . . [and] . . . reinforces notions of Muslims as a threat” (Qureshi, 2017, p. 3). CAGE has also been vocal in rejecting the expectation that Muslims and Muslim CSOs have to denounce ‘terrorism’ or ‘radicalization’ as a pre-condition to societal membership. This view echoes the remarks of a Canadian participant who said Muslims face an “added tsunami of a weight” of having to distance “ourselves from any form of violence” (PCAN12). Referring to this phenomenon as the “politics of condemnation,” CAGE argues that it “presupposes a lack of humanity” in Muslims and is fundamentally Islamophobic (Qureshi, 2017, p. 6). Through reports, public events, and media campaigns, organizations like CAGE and PreventWatch relate the oppression of Muslims under Prevent to racism, injustice, and suppression of dissent (PreventWatch, n.d.).

The vocal discursive opposition to the Home Office’s discourses comes at a cost, however, because the Home Office has been combative in responding to criticism. CAGE has been singled out for insufficiently engaging in the “politics of condemnation” and for condoning violent acts (House of Commons, 2016; Qureshi, 2017). Earlier in this chapter, I highlighted how the Home Office has not shied away from maligning the
reputation of Muslim CSOs who have demanded more information about the knowledge bases of Prevent (see earlier remarks by participant, PUK3). As I noted in the previous subsection, through such actions, state institutions seek to transform Power 3 epistemic conflicts into Power 1 structured contestations where state institutions can use their political authority in their favour.

**Discussion:** Muslim CSOs in the U.K. (like their Canadian counterparts) also use a strategy of *Defy* and a tactic of *Attack* in Power 3 contestations to confront dominant CR discourses that are privileged by the Home Office. Muslim CSOs have publicly condemned CR policies (and Home Office actions) by claiming that they rest on discriminatory, anti-Muslim discourses. Specifically, Muslim CSOs have claimed that the discursive use of ‘British values,’ ‘extremism,’ and ‘radicalization’ in CR policies racializes British Muslims as dangerous Others. This shows how Muslim CSOs undertake “discursive consciousness” raising efforts to challenge the taken-for-granted discourses of ‘radicalization’ (Haugaard, 2012). With these alternate discourses, Muslim CSOs are connecting anti-Muslim discrimination in CR policies to racism and other forms of injustice against marginalized peoples. Muslim CSOs are also confronting media discourses through a strategy of *Defy* and a tactic of *Attack* by generating their own reports and stories and by complaining to the national regulator about stories biased against Muslims. In addition, Muslim CSOs’ cultivating relationships with journalists to affect how stories about Muslims are reported indicates a strategy of *Manipulate* and a tactic of *Influence*.

There is a qualitative difference in the nature of Power 3 CR policy contestations between Muslim CSOs and the Home Office in the U.K., and Muslim CSOs and state
security agencies in Canada. In the U.K., Muslim CSOs are using more direct and more forceful discourses to discredit and delegitimize discriminatory Home Office actions. This may result partially from the heavy-handed way that the Home Office has implemented and defended Prevent. As government criticism and calls for transparency have been consistently met with combative responses, Muslim CSOs have had to be more vocal and direct in their actions. The more sophisticated contestation of Home Office discourse can also be partially attributed to the ecosystem of CSOs in the U.K., where several Muslim CSOs exist specifically to hold the Home Office accountable on Prevent and other counterterrorism practices. Muslim CSOs in Canada have also called out the discriminatory nature of CR policies and counterterrorism measures, but their attacks on CR policies have not been as aggressive as their counterparts in the U.K. The criticism has mostly centered on pointing out inconsistencies in CR policies, i.e., that CR policies have disproportionately targeted Muslims in Canada and have not been applied evenly (e.g., against white supremacist violence). This comparatively less vehement criticism could be a product of the less assertive presence of CR policies in Canada and the willingness of some security agencies (e.g., Public Safety Canada) to consult with Muslim CSOs.

**Power 4: The Subjectification of Muslim CSOs**

Haugaard (2012) theorizes Power 4 as the process of subjectification which produces disciplined and responsibilized social actors who unreflexively reinforce relations of domination. Power 4 is realized through governmentality or “rationalities and techniques” of governance by which state institutions develop knowledge of the social subject and convey preferred subject behavior via self-evident “truths” (N. Rose et al., 2006). In other words, Power 4 results in the internalization of discourses, norms, and
values (of Power 3) such that subjects unreflexively adhere to expected institutional behavior. Applying Power 4 to the relationship between state institutions and CSOs in the context of CR policies directs attention to the ways in which state institutions develop knowledges about the problem of Muslim ‘radicalization,’ the expectations that state institutions place upon Muslim CSOs, and the extent to which Muslim CSOs internalize those expectations. I focus on how CR policies impact Muslim CSOs as these policies govern Muslims as subjects of concern, placing them in reductive categories of “good” Muslim and “bad” Muslim (Mamdani, 2004). According to this binary, the “good” Muslim is compliant with western “values” and adheres to “moderate” Islam while shunning “bad” Muslims who follow dangerous “extremist political Islam” (Mamdani, 2002, pp. 767–768). However, the concept of ‘radicalization’ endorses the idea that every Muslim is on the verge of becoming “bad,” – or as a participant put it, “always already potentially radical” (PCAN7) – requiring Muslims to continuously showcase their “good” credentials. The analysis in this section centers how research participants perceive the operation of Power 4 in CR policies. Based on participants’ reflections, I also assess the extent to which CR policies are successful in achieving discipline and responsibilization of Muslim CSOs.

**Impact of Power 4 on Muslim CSOs in Canada**

One of the most profound reflections of Power 4 came from a participant who suggested that Muslim communities’ own views on “violent extremism” are shaped by “public and media discourses about Muslims being a problem community.” She explained:

“... it’s really an example of what W.E.B. Du Bois called “double consciousness,” which is that we’re never just experiencing ourselves on our own terms, and that we’re always at least partially seeing ourselves
through the eyes of others who are determined to racialize us and to represent us as other” (PCAN11).

The participant references Du Bois’ concept of “double consciousness,” which he used to explain that the racialization and oppression of African Americans at the hands of white society resulted in an internalized conflict producing a “sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of the other, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity” (Du Bois, 2007, p. 8). Applying the concept of “double consciousness” to the Muslim experience, the participant suggests that the racialized practices of CR policies in the context of the ‘war on terror’ result in Muslims “experiencing ourselves” through the expectations and discourses normalized as part of oppressive CR policies, rather than “on our own terms.” The participant’s remarks offer an astute description of the assertion of Power 4, where CR policies render tacit social knowledges and discourses so widely that they even “override” Muslims’ own lived experiences. Her comments thus tie the exercise of Power 4 dynamics to the racialization and Othering of Muslims through CR policies.

Exertions of Power 4 often result in self-censorship and what some British scholars have called a “chilling effect” (Thomas, 2020; Younis & Jadhav, 2020), a finding supported by the examples of Muslim self-censorship provided by participants. An executive at a Muslim social service CSO in western Canada described the hesitancy of Muslim clients to discuss matters related to national security:

“They were so afraid of both the police, and the community looking bad or themselves looking bad, that [they] would just clam up and never talk to us ever again. That was what. . . this community just had so much fear from so many different directions.

. . .

Very afraid, just because they were seen talking to someone that they kind of. . . if they had any inkling, they were just like, ‘I don’t even want to be
seen talking to that person. I want to show everyone I’m on the straight and narrow.’ Do you know what I mean? I think that’s very natural” (PCAN13).

The participant’s observations indicate that Muslims are reluctant to talk about counterterrorism and CR policies precisely because they are the targets of those policies. Not only do they self-censor, but they also stay on the “straight and narrow,” a phrase that suggests the mechanics of discipline. This observation was validated by an executive of a national advocacy organization:

“. . . a lot of communities, a lot of organizations, and even a lot of individuals are really scared to talk about it. They’re scared to talk about radicalization. They’re scared to talk about even being accused of being a radical. No one wants to admit, or no one wants to put that out there for fear of the stigma that will carry regardless of if it’s true or not” (PCAN7).

The fear and stigma noted by the participant appear to be prevalent, resulting in self-restraint among Muslim CSOs. An imam of a mosque in Ontario told me that after the CRA revoked the charitable status of the Assalam mosque in Ottawa, his mosque decided to filter out some planned speakers “to avoid any trouble” even though the imam believed they were “good people” (PCAN17). Another participant affiliated with the board of a mosque in Ontario suggested that “fear” of being “stigmatized and discriminated” drove decision-making at her mosque:

“They do ban people from the mosque. When they see something wrong, they’re already preventing it. I think in general, the Muslim community is afraid of being stigmatized and discriminated against, and sometimes that social pressure leads them to do things. Maybe they’re trying to solve a problem that they’re just being told. . . ‘You’re probably going to look guilty, so let’s try to change that.’ That’s at least my. . . Again, maybe that’s just my PR hat on there, but I see that that’s a fear that sometimes drives a lot of decisions that people make in our community in general” (PCAN6).

Interviews with the participants also suggested that alongside the dynamics of disciplining, Muslim CSOs are being responsibilized to manage ‘radicalization’ in their
communities, even to the extent of disciplining children’s behaviour. The principal of an Islamic school shared the following anecdote about a middle school student:

“When you go to radicalization, that is not acceptable under Islamic rule and theology, especially when it’s killing innocents. That absolutely is taught to our children, especially at our school. They know. They understand and we’ve had children who have brought up... Last year we somebody who, as a joke, brought up ISIS.

... As a joke brought up ISIS, but we took it very seriously. We pulled this child in and we said, ‘Under no circumstances are you allowed to mention this.’ We talked to the whole class and they were warned that if that was mentioned again, it would be an immediate suspension, so we take that extremely seriously” (PCAN1).

While it is difficult to extrapolate or generalize from one incident shared by the participant, these remarks indicate that, to some extent, Muslim CSOs are taking upon themselves the responsibility of monitoring and acting upon the problem ‘radicalization.’

An additional dynamic of Power 4 is manifest in how state security inspired templates of the “good” Muslim/“bad” Muslim are internalized among Muslim CSOs. A participant who led a national youth engagement program and has provided trainings to the RCMP shared the following conversation with an RCMP officer:

“One Muslim cop actually, who wasn’t a senior decision-maker, but was a very experienced veteran cop investigator who was working in the national security prevention and intervention space, was talking about how, ‘We talk about good guys and bad guys all the time.’ He said, ‘These cops... You’ve got to realize that they don’t understand what academics are talking about and even what activists are talking about.’ He was giving me feedback on my presentation, and he was saying, ‘You’ve got to really explain things in terms of good Muslims and bad Muslims, and then they’ll get it,’ and I said, ‘I’m not doing that.’ He was like, ‘Why?’ and when I explained, he was like, ‘Okay.’ I could see he wasn’t satisfied, but he couldn’t stop” (PCAN22).

The participant’s conversation with the RCMP officer affirms that state security agencies understand ‘radicalization’ in stark terms of “good Muslims” and “bad Muslims,” and believe this binary has explanatory power. Unfortunately, this discourse is so strong that
it has led Muslim CSOs to emphasize the “good” Muslim credentials of their communities, a result of Power 4 where Muslims see themselves “through the eyes of others who are determined to racialize” and represent them as “other” (PCAN11). A participant who is affiliated with the board of an Ontario mosque shared that the community holds annual Canada Day events where elected officials, local police, and RCMP officers are invited and celebrated. The Canadian flag is prominently displayed at the event and printed on publicity materials, tablecloths, mugs, and other event paraphernalia. Another participant familiar with the event described it as a “concerted effort” by the community “to prove themselves to be good Canadians” (PCAN28). In a separate example, a participant who manages a youth and jobs programs at a social service provider in Ontario argued the merit of their organization’s ice-hockey program for Muslim youth as follows:

“That’s why ice hockey was important, because ice hockey . . . Although it may be just a sport and just skating, it’s about more than that. First of all, it’s this country’s sport. When the people that don’t accept us see that you’re doing this, there’s a little bit of, ‘Oh, look. This guy’s trying.’ We have to try. We have to keep trying until we’re accepted” (PCAN5).

Through examples of the Canada Day event and the ice hockey program, participants provided glimpses into how Muslim CSOs find opportunities to showcase the community is comprised of “good” Muslims who are “trying.” Considered in light of the increasing white supremacist violence against Muslims in Canada (Hasan, 2021), the remarks of the participant, PCAN5, also reveal the unending nature of trying to prove “good” Muslim credentials. The communications director at a civic engagement organization reflecting on these Power 4 dynamics, noted that:
“... we’re so oriented towards thinking of inclusion as a goal to a Muslim or anti-Islamophobia liberation, so we just seek to prove capable of being included by acting as patriots and capitalists” (PCAN25).

The participant is describing how disciplining from Power 4 has limited Muslims and Muslim CSOs to conceive of “anti-Islamophobia liberation” merely as inclusion. However, like Coulthard (2014), whose work critiques the “politics of recognition,” the participant expressed criticism of the goal of Muslims merely becoming “patriots” or “capitalists.” As another participant engaged in anti-Islamophobia organizing discerned, this approach not only “solidifies Muslims’ participation in the settler-colonial nature of the state” but also “makes it difficult to see a path out of Islamophobia that simultaneously challeng[es] the state structures of national security that are committed to Islamophobia” (PCAN11).

**Discussion:** In this analysis, I have explored how research participants experience the operation of Power 4 in CR policies. One participant described it as a production of “double consciousness” where the experience of Muslims is shaped by the dominant security discourses that cast them as racialized Others. Participant remarks indicated how fear and stigma drive Muslim communities and organizations into exercising self-censorship in discussions of counterterrorism and counter-radicalization. Participants shared examples of responsibilized behaviour where Muslim CSOs were taking it upon themselves to manage ‘radicalization’ among their communities. The impact of Power 4 is also apparent in Muslim CSOs finding opportunities to highlight “good” Muslim credentials of their communities. However, some participants were keenly aware of how the goal of merely acting as “patriots” is a limited form of challenging the Islamophobic structures upon which CR policies rest.
Impact of Power 4 on Muslim CSOs in the U.K.

In the previous section, I show how Muslim CSOs in the U.K. are engaged in Power 3 discursive contestations by demanding greater transparency about the knowledge basis of CR policies, and by challenging state-centered CR policy discourses. I also discuss how the Home Office has responded by delegitimizing the CSOs engaging in discursive challenges. Even though the act of delegitimizing CSOs is an exercise of Power 1 by state institutions, it contributes to the functioning of Power 4. By taking punitive action against those who criticize Home Office discourses about Prevent, the Home Office effectively designates which discourses are unacceptable (and might lead to retribution). Thus, without needing to take explicit punitive action, the threat of possible hostility by the Home Office results in self-censorship among Muslim CSOs. These dynamics were conveyed in the following remarks by a manager at a national Muslim umbrella organization:

“. . . there’s been a real difficulty in trying to have conversations about Prevent without facing some kind of delegitimization. I think there’s been a real narrowing of what you can call debate around this topic. To the point where people feel they have to censor themselves, but there are only certain spheres in which they can say truly what they feel or what they think their beliefs are. I think a lot of Muslims also link counter-extremism to the erosion of their Muslim identity and the erosion of them being able to express themselves as Muslims. Lots of people have concerns that if they present as conservative Muslims or religious Muslims, this is a negative thing to be perceived by the rest of society” (PUK3).

Another participant, a manager at an organization representing Muslim charities in the U.K., confirmed that the Home Office’s actions under Prevent were creating “a climate of fear” where charities had “self-censored” themselves (PUK12). In addition to fostering this climate of censorship, the governance of Prevent has led to the “erosion” of “Muslim identity” itself. By suggesting that certain expressions of Muslimness are acceptable, it has narrowed the space for “conservative” or “religious” Muslims to express themselves
freely (PUK3). The participant’s implication that Muslims may be changing behaviour to not “present” as “conservative,” describes the process of disciplining resulting from Power 4 dynamics. A participant who founded a prominent grassroots Muslim organization and is a scholar of contemporary Islam framed these dynamics as follows:

“To render Muslims peaceable, they have to be somewhat distanced from their religious tradition, or an official interpretation of Islam is pushed by the state. That means that Islamic reform is at the centre of security policy, but also it must sit within the ideas of what good religion looks like, under a secular democratic state” (PUK2).

The participant’s remarks suggest that through Prevent, the Home Office seeks to “reform” (i.e., exercise control over) Islam, and Muslimness itself, until Muslim behaviour falls within the boundaries of “an official interpretation of Islam [that] is pushed by the state.” Independent scholarship in the U.K. has also noted how Prevent aspires to manage Muslim identity itself. Qurashi (2018) posits that “a key component of de-radicalisation programmes hinges on a cultural transformation of Muslim identity to view the west and all it stands for (its ways of life, values, and politics) with a more positive attitude” (p. 3). Noting how the focus on ‘radicalization’ led to the demographic mapping of Muslims in the U.K., Ali (2014) contends that the goal of CR policy discourses is “to identify” Muslims “and in so doing constitute the ‘Muslim community’ as the site of radicalisation in need of governmental reform” (p. 140). Drawing on the concept of governmentality, Ali (2014) describes Power 4 dynamics, positing that CR policies render “the Muslim community as a governable entity that is subject to intervention and management” (p. 140). Ragazzi (2016) maintains that CR policies govern by treating ‘Muslim communities’ as a “reified, monolithic, and cohesive group which is collectively responsible” for acts of political violence by Muslims (p. 728). “Trusted” or “good” Muslims are coopted into the state security apparatus and
responsibilized to police “risky” (“bad”) Muslims (Heath-Kelly, 2013; Ragazzi, 2016). Finally, Ali (2020) argues that Prevent institutionalizes racial anxieties about Muslims from broader British society, engenders the “racialization of radicalization and extremism” such that Muslimness itself becomes the target of CR policies, and “actively contributes to the production of racial violence perpetrated in defence of white Britain” (p. 592). Together, these insights flesh out the ways in which Power 4 operates in CR policies.

A participant engaged with grassroots Muslim groups further reflected on the “good” Muslim, “bad” Muslim dichotomy in Prevent:

“It has to operate on a binary of good Muslim and bad Muslim. The point is not the definition. The definition is vague because the power to define arbitrarily rests with the state and its agents. The vagueness is actually part of its power, so there’s always this slight shifting of goalposts and shifting of that line between good and bad over time if you look” (PUK2). His view confirms the dynamic and discursive nature of these categories where “the state and its agents” hold the authority to define it “arbitrarily.” By keep the boundary between these categories fluid, state security institutions can designate who falls within these categories and what purpose those ascribed to these categories will serve. As Ragazzi (2016) says, these categories serve in the “management of diversity,” functioning as a “divide and rule strategy,” but also to curtail political contestation and demobilizing dissent by placing Prevent’s “shifting goalposts” in the realm of national security (p. 737). In response to the governance of Muslims through these binary categories, some Muslim CSOs have chosen to present an image of Muslims and Islam in the “best light” (Malik, 2013, p. 213). Muslim CSOs carry the “tsunami of weight” (PCAN12) to showcase Muslims as peaceful and contributing members of society and British subjects of “good character” (Brown, 2010, p. 177). The rationale for this response by Muslim
CSOs was best reflected by a participant from Canada whose organization works with various Muslim CSOs nationally:

“. . . essentially it becomes, how do you sound like a good liberal citizen? How does a Muslim prove that they’re a good liberal citizen? Small ‘L’ liberal. That essentially becomes our work and I think that’s the best we could have been able to come up with in terms of how to protect our community” (PCAN7).

The participant states that the idea of showcasing Muslims as “liberal citizens” corresponding to the “good” Muslim category is motivated by finding a way a “protect” them from the crosshairs of national security. However, she also articulates the difficulty a Muslim CSOs has in determining what makes a Muslim a “good liberal citizen.”

Because despite these efforts by CSOs to “protect” their constituent communities, state institutions retain the authority to shift “goalposts” and shift “the line between good and bad” (PUK2). I followed up by asking the participant what she thought about the right of Muslims to express “illiberal” views. She responded:

“They may have the right, but they don’t have the privilege. The kind of power you would need to stake that claim without feeling that your very presence in this country is at stake . . .” (PCAN7).

She makes two important observations here. First, that CR governance has strived to take away the “privilege” or “power” of Muslims (and Muslim CSOs) to act in an illiberal manner. This is recognizable as Power 4, which regulates the “conduct” of subjects, so they act according to the preferred prescriptions of state institutions (N. Rose, 2000).

Second, these policies have made it appear that Muslims’ national “presence” itself is at stake. Such exertion of discipline is made possible by mobilizing the national “values” discourse and “Islamophobic and racial logic” that make Muslims appear “backward, foreign and threatening” (Abdel-Fattah, 2020; Younis, 2021, p. 40). The participant engaged with several grassroots Muslim groups reflected on how the governance of
Prevent produces “self-censorship” and “self-governing” (or responsibilization) more widely among Muslims:

“The post-9/11 generation don’t know anything different. My own children . . . I hate the fact that they have to internalize the stigma. They have to mind their Ps and Qs. They have to maybe not broach certain subjects. I teach at a university and I struggle to get my wonderful . . . yeah I have a minority of my students happen to be of the Muslim faith background. I struggle to get them to talk about these issues because they know that the university itself is a securitized space now, so they self-censor . . .

This is what I was saying to you earlier, the self-censoring and self-governing . . . There are two kinds of this. There’s the self-censoring. What they really want . . . They don’t want self-censorship. They want self-governance so that you actually are happy and you can totally agree with the regime of discipline that you’re living under. You agree with it saying . . . so you don’t even self-censor. You just agree. Do you see what I mean? . . .

That’s the difference between . . . Self-censorship is only an approximate position. What they really want is to create are secular Muslims who agree with the security state policy. That’s what they want. They want agreement. Let’s not beat around the bush” (PUK2).

Effectively, the participant is expressing how Power 4 in CR policies controls and shapes the religious and political expression of Muslims into state-centered ideas of acceptability.

Discussion: Research participants in the U.K. were keenly aware that Prevent uses a form of governance seeking to mould Muslims into a governable “community” to which various disciplining and responsibilization techniques can be applied. As a result, Muslim communities and Muslim CSOs have felt the pressure to self-censor themselves. Participants highlighted how Prevent has mobilized the national values discourses and racialized logics and practices as means of governing Muslimness itself. Participants expressed that Muslims felt hesitant to present as “conservative” or “religious” Muslims. At the same time, discourse and governance distinguish “good” Muslims from the “bad”
Muslims whose behaviour “good” Muslims are expected to monitor and tame. In response to these Power 4 dynamics, some Muslim CSOs have chosen to emphasize the “good” Muslim credentials of their community, recognizing this choice as an expedient strategy for avoiding the attention of state security institutions. However, participants also acknowledged that such an approach has its limits because, in the face of Islamophobic knowledges and discourses that underpin CR policies, it is difficult to know what makes a “good” Muslim.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have highlighted how Muslim CSOs are challenging the discursive elements of CR policies (in Power 3 contestations). This “discursive consciousness raising” (Haugaard, 2012) allows Muslim CSOs to challenge the tacit knowledges and discourses in CR policies that become part of public and media discourse while simultaneously legitimizing CR policies.

Participants from Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. described how they are demanding more transparency from state institutions about the knowledge basis for CR policy decisions. In doing so, they are seeking to learn what specific knowledges are mobilized by state institutions and, at the same time, expose anti-Muslim bias in those knowledges. In both countries, state institutions have not been forthcoming with this information. As a result, Muslim CSOs are undertaking community-led research to generate knowledges and narratives about ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism.’ Together, these undertakings map onto the strategy of *Defy* and the tactic of *Attack* in my conceptual framework.

Muslim CSOs in both countries are also confronting state security institutions and media organizations when these institutions advance racialized discourses that serve to
present Muslims as dangerous Others incompatible with national “values.” In Canada and the U.K., Muslim CSOs are challenging the CR discourses used by state institutions through open letters, legislative submissions, and private conversations. Participants from Canada shared how Muslim CSOs are using community-journalism initiatives and deploying public education efforts to offer alternative discourses to the anti-Muslim discourses found in the media. One participant described this as a “systemic piece” in the broader effort to challenge the securitization and racialization of Muslims. Participants from the U.K. informed me that Muslim CSOs are using legal challenges and filing complaints with the regulator when news stories falsely accuse Muslim CSOs of being associated with ‘extremism,’ or when news stories are biased against Muslims. I categorize these actions by Muslim CSOs as falling under the strategy of Defy and the tactic of Attack. In addition, Muslim CSOs in the U.K. are developing relationships with journalists to influence how stories about Muslims are reported. This maps onto a strategy of Manipulate and a tactic of Influence in my conceptual framework. In both Canada and the U.K., Muslim CSOs are using discourses of anti-racism and equity to connect the targeting of Muslims under CR policies with other forms of racialized oppression. Through this, they are drawing attention to structural aspects of Islamophobia engendered by CR policies.

Despite several overlaps in the strategies used by Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K., there are also distinctions in Power 3 contestations by CSOs in the two countries. Muslim CSOs in Canada have used discursive challenges to point out that state security agencies have applied CR policies unfairly, which has led to the near-sole focus on Muslim violence to the exclusion of white supremacist and far-right violence. Muslim
CSOs in the U.K. have used a more aggressive approach to challenge the legitimacy of Home Office discourses in Prevent, with some CSOs calling to abolish Prevent and counter-radicalization entirely (CAGE, 2020). I infer that these differences arise partly because CR policies in the U.K. are more pervasive and onerous, and because the Home Office has taken a combative stance in response to any valid criticisms of Prevent. By contrast, CR policies in Canada are incipient and diffuse, and the federal agencies responsible for CR policies have shown some openness to consulting with Muslim CSOs. I also infer that the difference in strategic approaches in the two countries can be partly attributed to the ecosystem of Muslim CSOs in each country. In the U.K., there are several Muslim CSOs whose mandate is to challenge CR policies and national security measures. Their work has created space for other Muslim CSOs to also be vocal about adopting discourses that are oppositional to CR policies. On the other hand, in Canada, NCCM, an influential national advocacy organization with no clear U.K. counterpart, has preferred to use its position to highlight the inconsistencies in CR policies rather than calling for a revocation of those policies altogether. The NCCM position appears to shape the dominant discursive response of Muslim CSOs to CR policies.

While Muslim CSOs are using their agentic power to challenge CR discourses, state institutions continue to exercise Power 4, a process of subjectification to produce discipline and responsibilization among CSOs. This chapter also describes the mechanics of Power 4 in CR policies and its impact on Muslim CSOs. Participants from Muslim CSOs in Canada described how CR policies’ targeting of Muslims has created a climate of “fear” and “stigmatization” prompting Muslim CSOs to practice self-censorship. Participants shared examples where Muslim CSOs were self-governing their behavior,
such as asking school students not to joke about ISIS and not inviting speakers for fear that their conservative views would draw national security focus. Participants also informed me that the discursive use of the “good” Muslim/“bad” Muslim binary prompted Muslim CSOs to showcase the “good” Muslim credentials of their constituents, hoping this would lead to them no longer being seen as dangerous Others. However, few participants also remarked that by aiming for inclusion, Muslims were limiting the scope of anti-Islamophobia, which some argued should challenge the state structures that foster Islamophobia.

Participants from the U.K. expressed more concern about the disciplining actions of the Home Office in response to criticism of Prevent. One participant shared that Prevent aimed to control the expression of Muslim identity itself. Indirectly referencing the management of “conduct” through governmentality (N. Rose et al., 2006), participants said that fear of Home Office retribution compelled some Muslims to not present as “conservative.” Participants also reflected on how the “good” Muslim/“bad” Muslim dichotomy was enacted such that Muslim CSOs focused on showing constituents as British subjects of “good character” (Brown, 2010, p. 177). One participant remarked that the goal of Prevent was self-censoring and self-governing, the outcome of Power 4. Implied in the stories and narratives of participants was the importance of the discursive (Power 3) and structural (Power 2) contestations to confront and possibly, eliminate CR policies altogether.
Chapter 10 – Conclusion and Future Research

In the context of the ‘war on terror,’ counter-radicalization (CR) policies have emerged as a relatively new form of security governance. CR policies constitute ‘soft’ or non-coercive techniques that operate in the non-security sectors through social, cultural, and educational programs to preempt the future possibility of ‘radicalization’ and political violence, principally among Muslims. Based on a narrow understanding of ‘radicalization’ as the transition towards ‘extreme’ Islamic ideology, CR policies have targeted and stigmatized Muslims as the “suspect community” (Breen-Smyth, 2014; Kundnani, 2012b). At the same time, Muslim communities and Muslim civil society organizations (CSOs) are expected to assist state security agencies in achieving the objectives of CR policies. This observation has prompted Nicole Nguyen (2019a) to describe counter-radicalization as a “racialized state project that casts Muslims as both terrorist threats and coproducers of public safety” (p. 7). In light of these dynamics, my dissertation shows how Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. experience CR policies and how they negotiate relationships of power with the state institutions responsible for designing and implementing CR policies. Based on an analysis of CR policies and practices, and qualitative interviews with managers and board members of Muslim CSOs, policymakers, and informed individuals, my research sheds light on the different strategies that Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. use to resist the discriminatory and racialized practices deployed by state security agencies in the name of counter-radicalization.

Research Contributions

My dissertation research makes empirical and theoretical contributions toward several literatures and disciplines. I propose an original conceptual framework that
integrates theories of power by Haugaard (2012; 2021) within an influential organizational institutionalist model developed by Oliver (1991) for analyzing how CR policies create relations of power between state institutions and CSOs, and how Muslim CSOs develop strategic responses within these relations of power. Through this conceptual framework, I contribute to the literature on organizational institutionalism, which has been tentative about drawing upon theories of power (Clegg, 2010; Lawrence & Buchanan, 2017; K. A. Munir, 2015).

My research also contributes to the literature of nonprofit studies where recent work has elaborated on how CSOs – despite facing austere funding environments and being dependent on government institutions for resources – engage in effective advocacy on behalf of their constituents (Almog-Bar & Schmid, 2014; Mosley, 2011; Neumayr et al., 2015). Whereas literature on nonprofit studies has conventionally suggested that neoliberal regimes have inhibited CSO autonomy and power (Bass et al., 2007; Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Evans et al., 2005; Hasenfeld & Garrow, 2012; S. R. Smith & Lipsky, 1993), my research suggests that, nevertheless, Muslim CSOs are finding creative ways to use their agentic power to challenge CR policies on behalf of Muslim communities. The operation of power, as sketched out in my conceptual framework, is also material for understanding the relational dynamics when state institutions recruit nonprofits for co-production of public and social goods (Najam, 2000; Pestoff & Brandsen, 2008; Turnhout et al., 2020). Relatedly, my dissertation adds to the study of organizations serving racialized, ethnic, and immigrant communities45 by providing an

45 (e.g., Bloemraad, 2006; Chaudhary & Guarnizo, 2016; Cheung & Phillimore, 2014; Eade & Garbin, 2006; Eid, 2007; Guo & Guo, 2011; Handy & Greenspan, 2009; Koopmans & Statham, 1999; Ku, 2011; Kwong, 1984; Snyder, 2011).
empirical account of how Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. steadfastly fight the anti-Muslim discrimination, racialization, and securitization engendered through CR policies, while continuing to provide various services and support for Muslim communities.

Joining scholarship interested in community empowerment and the role of civil society (Gaventa, 2006, 2021; McGee, 2020), my work underlines how marginalized and racialized communities can mobilize in the face of hegemonic oppression. In general, the theoretical framework I propose offers a conceptual foundation for integrating theories of power into the analysis of CSOs working in several sectors from environmental (N. L. Hall & Taplin, 2010) to women’s rights activism (de Jong & Kimm, 2017; Lépinard, 2014), elaborating on a mutually constitutive relationship between CSOs and state institutions, where CSOs can use their agency across different axes of power.

Finally, this research study adds to scholarship on critical radicalization studies. In the U.K., a rich body of work has examined CR policies from a variety of critical perspectives across disciplines.⁴⁶ In Canada, there have been a few notable interventions providing a critical assessment of CR policies (e.g., Jamil, 2016; Monaghan, 2014; Monaghan & Molnar, 2016). My research adds to these works by 1) showing how CR policies in Canada and the U.K. have evolved in response to anxieties about political violence by Muslim perpetrators drawing on policy ideas developed in transnational fora; and 2) illustrating how notions of “suspect community,” risk, and preemption – core to CR policies (Ali, 2020) – are experienced by Muslim CSOs and operationalized through racialized practices. The comparative research across the two countries responds to calls to centre community perspectives in counter-radicalization and counterterrorism research.

(Goold & Lazarus, 2019; Spalek, 2012). Furthermore, the empirical analysis of the constructions of “suspect community,” risk, and preemption adds to works in critical criminology centered on racialized communities – Black, Indigenous, and others – who are subject to similar dynamics through security, policing, and surveillance policies (Crosby & Monaghan, 2018; Maynard, 2017; Owusu-Bempah, 2017).

In the remainder of this chapter, I summarize the key findings of my dissertation research and discuss their broader significance. This is followed by a reflection on how the insights from this study can help to generate alternate conceptions of public safety. Based on gaps in my dissertation research, I discuss possible areas of future research inquiry. I end this chapter with a closing reflection.

**CR Policies and the Construction of Suspect Communities, Risk, and Preemption**

The concept of critical junctures has been used by historical institutionalists to understand sudden shifts in policies (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Pierson, 2011) whereas policy mobilizing draws attention to the plucking of “selective discourses, inchoate ideas, and synthesized models” from transnational fora for “fast” policy development (Peck & Theodore, 2010, p. 170, 2015). In this dissertation, I have used these policy frameworks to examine the development of CR policies in Canada and the U.K. While terrorism prevention measures were being employed by the RCMP, CSIS, and Public Safety Canada since the mid-2000s, Canada adopted full-fledged CR policies in 2015 during the critical juncture brought about by the attacks in Ottawa and Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and anxieties about Muslim youth travelling to join conflicts in the Middle East. These events drove the rapid development of CR policies at the provincial, municipal, and federal levels as the government looked to the experiences of other western countries to pluck key ideas and practices for rapidly formulating a Canadian CR policy response (CACP,
Notions of ‘radicalization,’ “prevention,” and “resilience” reflect a selective adoption of the ideas from the U.K., the U.N., and other international security venues (Kubicek & King, 2021, pp. 183–184; U.N. General Assembly, 2015). In the U.K., the 2005 London transit system attacks by Muslim perpetrators provided the critical juncture that brought Prevent to life. There is some evidence to suggest that the government looked to the Netherlands and France for policy inspiration before launching Prevent in 2006 (House of Commons, 2005, s. 95). Prevent has since become a policy innovation taking a trajectory of its own, but it is still based on a transnational security understanding of ‘radicalization’ as the development of ‘extreme’ Islamic beliefs (D. M. D. Silva & Deflem, 2020). Initially, under Prevent the goals of community cohesion and counter-radicalization (targeting Muslims) were aligned, but these were separated in the 2011 update (Thomas, 2014). In 2015, the dual panic of the supposed Islamization of schools and “foreign fighters” (a concern shared transnationally) saw the Home Office introduce the Prevent Duty, a law requiring public sector employees to report on signs of ‘radicalization’ (Thomas, 2020). The same year, a distinct Counter-Extremism Strategy was launched which brought back into CR policies the issue of lack of Muslim “integration” (Birt, 2019).

Despite following different patterns of development and exhibiting different degrees of institutionalization, CR policies in Canada and the U.K. adhere to a “dominant framework” of radicalization that includes the following core ideas and characteristics: Muslims are targeted as the “suspect community” through racialized practices (Abbas, 2019; Breen-Smyth, 2014); Muslim governance is based on notions of risk (Heath-Kelly, 2013); and preemptive techniques are deployed at multiple sites spanning policing,
education, health, and social services to tackle the future possibility of ‘radicalization’ (Martin, 2014). To compare how CR policies in Canada and the U.K. exemplify these characteristics, I centre the experiences of research participants from Muslim CSOs.

**Racialization and the Construction of the “Suspect Community”**

My research builds on the work of critical race and security studies scholarship that has highlighted the processes through which racialized communities are constructed as existential threats to conceptions of Eurocentric nationhood (Cainkar & Selod, 2018; Fassin, 2011; Fekete, 2004; Kapoor, 2018; Razack, 2008; Valluvan, 2019). CR policies are based on the assumption that Muslims are susceptible to “[supporting] an extremist interpretation of Islam that leads to violence” (Kundnani, 2012b, p. 5). Based on this understanding, entire Muslim communities are treated as “suspect” and subject to surveillance. This understanding evinces similarities with how Black and other racialized communities are constructed as being prone to crime and violence (S. Hall, 1978; Muhammad, 2019; Welch, 2007). In Canada, this treatment of Muslims is evident in the tactics of the RCMP and CSIS visiting the homes and workplaces of Muslim individuals and the disproportionate targeting of Muslims by CR policies at provincial and municipal levels. Participants from Canada lamented that radicalization has been equated with Muslims and Islam resulting in every Muslim being treated as “a foreigner and dangerous until you demonstrate otherwise” (PCAN8). Participants felt that security agencies construct ‘radicalization’ as a Muslim phenomenon instead of connecting violence to broader structural factors, including anti-Muslim hate, discrimination, criminalization, and povertization.

In the U.K., the Muslim focus is explicitly built into *Prevent*. Prevent interventions have targeted neighbourhoods with the highest proportions of Muslim
populations and *Prevent* Duty referrals have disproportionately been Muslims (R. da Silva et al., 2021; Home Office, 2020b). Like participants in Canada, participants from the U.K. also expressed that radicalization should include broader structural factors such as foreign policy. Finally, participants in the U.K. expressed that the *Prevent* Duty has introduced “a new system of policies of suspicion . . . fear, surveillance even, and changing the relationship between Muslim citizens and state” (PUK2).

**Risk-based Governance of Muslims**

Orientalist ideas rooted in the “new terrorism thesis” have led to a transnational security consensus that Muslim political violence is unprecedented and more dangerous than earlier forms of political violence (Kundnani, 2012b). This has inspired new risk assessment tools for identifying and managing Muslims who are considered both “risky” (for having the potential of possibly committing future political violence) and “at-risk” (for being vulnerable to being recruited into carrying out acts of political violence) (Heath-Kelly, 2013). In Canada, indicators for ‘radicalization’ used by the RCMP code “Islamic difference” as risky (Monaghan & Molnar, 2016). As outlined in the federal CR strategy, risk and protective factors form the basis of CR interventions (Public Safety Canada, 2018a). Community resilience is a desired outcome of CR interventions; however, the focus on Muslim communities as primary targets of CR policies implies that an inherent deficit among Muslims necessitates their building resilience. Participants from Canada not only reflected how radicalization indicators coded racial and Islamic difference (e.g., dark skin or a beard) but also that Muslims were “singled out as the cause of the problem instead of part of the solution” (PCAN10).

In the U.K., the coding of Muslim risk is most apparent in the use of the ERG22+ risk assessment tool to assess the potentiality of ‘radicalization’ (Open Society Justice
Participants from the U.K. were keenly aware that the ERG22+ risk indicators were “not even about violent extremism” and things as benign as changes in dress code and student grades become coded as signs of ‘radicalization.’ Muslims are either seen to be risky or considered to be at risk: “[i]f you’re a Muslim woman who doesn’t speak English and wears a hijab, you’re a real walking potential risk of radicalization” (PUK5). The vagueness of the indicators has encouraged subjective and intuition-based assessments of risk where “everyday behaviors become national security concerns – although in specific, racialized bodies” (Pettinger, 2020, p. 980). Thus, normal Muslim behaviour comes to be seen as a security risk. This analysis connects with the criminology literature on the proliferation of risk-thinking in policing and security governance, which has paid attention to how racial biases get encoded into everyday technologies of risk management (C. Bell, 2006b; Ericson & Haggerty, 1997; Hannah-Moffat, 2018; Harcourt, 2015).

**Preemptive Interventions and the Expansion of Muslim Surveillance**

 Combined with risk-thinking, CR policies also rely on preemptive interventions that seek to act in the present to avoid the future possibility of political violence (Heath-Kelly, 2012; Martin, 2014). Preemption is made possible through the racialized assessment of Muslim riskiness and the expansion of Muslim surveillance across security and non-security domains of society (Heath-Kelly, 2017; Sharma & Nijjar, 2018). In Canada, preemption is apparent in the continued surveillance of Muslims in their homes and workplaces and in how Muslim youth have emerged as populations of interest for CR interventions (Monaghan & Molnar, 2016; Nasser, 2019). CSOs perceive CR-related outreach as being used for “intelligence gathering,” and counter-radicalization practices as extensions of counterterrorism surveillance.
In the U.K., since the enactment of the Prevent Duty, the majority of referrals have been Muslim youth under 20 years of age (Home Office, 2020b; Mythen et al., 2017), thus “subvert[ing] the relationship of trust that . . . should pertain between teacher, pupil, lecturer, student, doctor, and patient” (PUK2). The concept of safeguarding, used to protect populations in need from abuse, has been coopted under Prevent to serve the purposes of counterterrorism and counter-radicalization (Davies, 2016; McKendrick & Finch, 2019). Participants noted that this formulation not only obfuscates who is being safeguarded against whom, but also facilitates the normalization of CR preemption into everyday professional practices.

**Power-informed Framework for Analysis of CSOs**

As a key theoretical contribution, I propose a conceptual framework positing that public policies create relations of power between state institutions and Muslim CSOs. Understanding the operation of power is important for oppressed peoples to “overcome the domination to which they are subject” (Calves, 2009, as cited in Gaventa, 2021, p. 111) and to build and use their own power toward emancipatory goals (Haugaard, 2012; McGee, 2020; VeneKlasen & Miller, 2007). From this perspective, CSOs apply their agentic power to find “possibilities of resistance” in the face of coercive and hegemonic forces (Gaventa, 2021, p. 125; also see J. C. Scott, 1990). Taking my cue from this scholarship, I use Haugaard’s (2012, 2012) theorization of power within democratic structures to suggest that public policies create relations of power between state institutions and CSOs across four dimensions (described below). The institutional environment of CSOs is shaped across the four dimensions of power, which determine the possibilities and limits of CSO strategies outlined in the organizational institutionalist model proposed by Oliver (1991).
• Power 1 refers to power-over exercises by state institutions where they use their political authority to impose legal requirements upon CSOs, demand cooperation, grant or withhold legitimacy to CSOs, provide funding, and apply coercive tactics to advance policy objectives. Power 1 sets up “structured power conflicts” (Haugaard, 2021, p. 161) or contestations that occur within the bounds of a policy structure. In response, CSOs make strategic choices about funding, about cooperation with state institutions in order to further advocacy goals on behalf of their constituents, and about how to challenge the selective granting and withholding of legitimacy. These responses map onto the strategies of Compromise and Defy in Oliver’s (1991) organizational institutionalist model.

• Power 2 is also a power-over exercise by state institutions to include or exclude participation of certain actors in the policymaking process and to only consider those agendas and perspectives that benefit powerholders. Power 2 sets up a “conflict over structure” (Haugaard, 2021, p. 161) to which CSOs respond by demanding greater inclusion in the policymaking process and disseminating alternative perspectives that should be considered within policy design. Challenges to Power 2 include CSOs working collaboratively to advocate for changes in the policy design. These CSO responses map onto the strategies of Defy and Manipulate.

• Power 3 exercise by state institutions is manifest in the tacit knowledges, discourses, and norms (connected to broader social processes) that underpin policy structures. Thus, Power 3 sets up an “epistemic conflict” (Haugaard, 2021, p. 165). CSO responses under Power 3 include strategies to demand greater transparency to expose the knowledge bases of policies, engage in consciousness raising and education efforts, and advance alternative discourses to the ones privileged by state institutions. These CSO responses also map onto the strategies of Defy and Manipulate.

• Finally, Power 4 refers to state institutions’ use of “rationalities and technologies” of governance to produce disciplined (compliant) CSOs that unreflexively reproduce relations of domination (Haugaard, 2012; N. Rose, 2000, p. 324). Under Power 4, state institutions reiterate norms and self-evident truths (much like Power 3) and convey preferred CSO behaviour prompting CSO responsibilization. Once CSOs realize the action of Power 4, they can respond by adopting strategies listed within the other dimensions of power.

The conceptual framework provides the analytical grounding for understanding how CR policies, which primarily target Muslim communities, render relations of power between state security institutions and Muslim CSOs. Importantly, the framework is useful for analytically situating Muslim CSO responses as articulated by the research participants in
this study. Below, I present the findings of my research, starting with Power 4, as it showcases the subtle and systemic operation of power and establishes the foundation for CSO power contestations in the other dimensions. Specifically, Muslim CSOs’ awareness of the operation of Power 4 helps to contextualize their responses as strategic contestations to challenge the exercise of power by state institutions rather than as simple operational or programming decisions based solely on pragmatic concerns.

**The Operation of Power 4**

Research participants in Canada and the U.K. were keenly aware of the operation of Power 4 from CR policies, describing it as producing a “double consciousness” among Muslims such that their own experience of themselves was overridden by the policies that “are determined to racialize” and “represent [Muslims] as other” (PCAN11). Participants noted CR policies fostered self-censorship based on the “fear” of being “stigmatized and discriminated.” They shared that CR policies are fundamentally Islamophobic and seek to control Muslimness itself, resulting in some community members being afraid to present themselves as religiously “conservative.” One participant gave an example where an Islamic school felt compelled to reprimand a child for “joking” about ISIS. This provides a glimpse into how Muslim CSOs are being responsibilized to self-manage ‘radicalization’ that supposedly exists in the midst of Muslim communities. Participants referenced that CR policies govern Muslims based on reductive categories of “good” Muslim/“bad” Muslim. This prompted the observation that Muslim CSOs carry the “tsunami of weight” to showcase Muslims as peaceful and contributing members of society, i.e., as “good” Muslims (PCAN12). These dynamics, a participant remarked, encourage the myopic view that anti-Islamophobia is about “inclusion” in nationalist and capitalist state projects whereas “to see a path out of Islamophobia” it is important to
challenge “the state structures of national security that are committed to Islamophobia” (PCAN11). Haugaard (2021) astutely notes that to “see the self from the perspective of others” under Power 4 can prompt the oppressed and marginalized to mobilize against structures of domination (p. 172). As such, Muslim CSO’s awareness of the operation of Power 4 has prompted them to engage in the contestations of Power 3, Power 2, and Power 1.

**Power 3 Epistemic Conflicts**

Research participants from both Canada and the U.K. informed me that Muslim CSOs engage in Power 3 contestations by challenging the dominant discourse in CR policies as well as demanding that state security institutions be more transparent about the knowledge basis for CR policies. CSOs have written public letters critiquing CR policies, engaged in legislative advocacy to insert their preferred discourse into the public record, and pushed back against CR policies in private meetings with policymakers. Muslim CSOs have demanded greater transparency with the aim of exposing the anti-Muslim knowledge base that results in racialized CR practices. They have also confronted anti-Muslim discourses in the media. In both countries, participants shared how Muslim CSOs conduct their own research to generate community-centred knowledges related to ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism.’ Together these actions reveal how Muslim CSOs enact strategies of Defy and Manipulate.

In the U.K. Muslim CSOs have questioned the legitimacy and efficacy of Prevent. In addition, they have challenged the “British values” discourse that has been used to Other Muslims. To draw attention to discriminatory structures of CR policies, Muslim CSOs in Canada have also called out state security agencies as “racist” and “abusers of the Charter” (PCAN3). In both countries, CSOs have drawn on anti-racism and equity
frames to challenge the racialization of Muslims under CR policies and to advance counter-hegemonic discourses. In the U.K., a critical mass of Muslim CSOs has called for the elimination of Prevent. Unlike in the U.K., Muslim CSOs in Canada have used their discursive critiques to demand fairer and more consistent application of CR policies across all forms of violence. To this end, Muslim CSOs have inquired how state security agencies hierarchize Muslim violence relative to other forms of violence.

The more assertive opposition to CR policies in the U.K. results partly from the combative stance of the Home Office, which has sought to malign Muslim CSOs that have critiqued Prevent. I posit that through these tactics, the Home Office seeks to transform Power 3 epistemic conflicts into Power 1 contestations that occur within the bounds of a policy structure. Power 1 contestations favour state institutions as they turn attention away from the misuse of political authority and the problematic structures of policies to relatively “shallow conflicts” (Haugaard, 2021, p. 161). An interesting finding of my data analysis indicates that the coercive actions and combative position of the Home Office in the U.K. have prompted CSOs in the U.K. to resist more forcefully and show a preference for Power 3 contestations. Through Power 3 contestations, CSOs seek to question the legitimacy of policy decisions by state institutions and challenge their underlying assumptions. By bringing Power 3 discursive contestations to the public domain, CSOs seek to influence the wider public, whose support state institutions require to pursue their policy goals.

**Power 2 Conflicts Over Structure**

To challenge the structure of CR policies, Muslim CSOs have complemented the discursive Power 3 challenges with Power 2 contestations. Here, Muslim CSOs have criticized state institutions for insufficiently including Muslim CSOs in the CR
policymaking process and for ignoring perspectives and concerns of Muslim communities. Muslim CSOs have also confronted state security agencies for the disproportionate targeting of Muslim communities under CR policies.

In both Canada and the U.K., Muslim CSOs have used the strategy of boycott as a show of resistance against state institutions for not accounting for the concerns of Muslim communities, and have used legislative advocacy to demand changes to CR policies. CSOs from both countries have used their contacts with policymakers to indicate that CR policies have ignored issues of safety facing Muslim communities such as white supremacist and far-right violence. Several Muslim CSOs in the U.K. have demanded the elimination of Prevent altogether. Relatedly, Muslim CSOs have launched programs that highlight Islamophobia in the hope of underlining the violence and harms Muslims face. In both countries, Muslim CSOs are forming partnerships with civil liberties and human rights organizations to advance anti-Islamophobia programming and have launched education campaigns about Islamophobia.

Together, these actions of Muslim CSOs represent strategies of Defy and Manipulate. As noted above, Power 2 contestations by Muslim CSOs to challenge the structure of CR policies are used in conjunction with discursive Power 3 challenges. However, Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. have adopted different approaches, which, following the organizational institutionalist view (Wooten & Hoffman, 2017), I posit are a result of the degree of institutionalization of CR policies. CR policies in Canada are incipient, piecemeal, and seen as overlapping with counterterrorism measures instead of distinct policy instruments (as discussed in Chapter 6). In response to CR policies, prominent Muslim CSOs have focused on demanding consistent application of
CR policies across all forms of violence. A prominent Muslim activist reflected on this strategy, clarifying that Muslim CSOs should call for the ultimate “abolishment” of counterterrorism measures and CR policies, but as long as these instruments exist, they should be used to “eliminate violence done by white supremacists against marginalized groups” (Mazigh, 2021). On the other hand, the response of Muslim CSOs in the U.K. is reflective of the long history and deeply institutionalized nature of Prevent. The Prevent Duty and its cooptation of the notion of safeguarding have widened the scope of counter-radicalization across social and public sector organizations. The draconian nature of Prevent has promoted vigorous opposition from prominent Muslim CSOs, including calling for the termination of Prevent. The variation in the responses of Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. is thus indicative of how variation in institutional pressures shape CSO responses.

**Power 1 Structured Conflicts**

Haugaard (2021) describes Power 1 conflicts as “shallow” because the contestations occur within the bounds of a structure and do not pose jeopardy to the structure itself. Muslim CSO responses under Power 1 constitute strategic decisions about whether to avail themselves of CR-related funding, the degree to which they cooperate with state security institutions, and how to respond to the granting and withdrawal of legitimacy by state institutions.

Muslim CSOs in Canada have been reluctant to apply for CR-related funding. CSOs feel that accepting CR-related funding might jeopardize their legitimacy among Muslim communities. Even the participants who considered applying for CR-related funding expressed that maintaining independence and autonomy from state security agencies was imperative. These considerations reflect the conventional thinking from
nonprofit literature that independence from government institutions is important for CSOs to be effective community advocates (Frumkin, 2002; Salamon et al., 2000). By contrast, various participants in the U.K. indicated that prominent CSOs reject *Prevent* funding based on principled opposition to CR policies. However, participants also indicated that small and financially insecure CSOs did in fact take *Prevent* funding, but often kept their affiliation with *Prevent* concealed for fear it might compromise their legitimacy among Muslim communities. Muslim CSO decisions related to CR-related funding map onto the strategies of *Compromise* or *Defy* (in case of principled opposition). Nearly all participants described *Prevent* funding as divisive. Overall, CR funding presents a difficult choice for Muslim CSOs facing austere funding environments. Independent research suggests that the Home Office is aware of the financial insecurity facing Muslim CSOs and *Prevent* funding is a way to lure them into partnerships in order to conduct surveillance upon Muslim communities (Qurashi, 2018).

Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. cooperate with state security agencies on matters of national security and counter-radicalization. In Canada, participants indicated that mosques and other CSOs participate in ‘radicalization’ related outreach events conducted by Public Safety Canada. In the U.K., participants described having a working relationship with the police and Home Office officers. Participants from Canada who interact with Public Safety Canada and the RCMP in different fora explained their rationale as follows: “if you’re not at the table, then you’re on the menu” (PCAN6). These participants believe that by being “at the table,” Muslim CSOs could use their agentic power to shape CR policies instead of being passive recipients of those policies. The same rationale for engagement with the Home Office was echoed by a participant
from the U.K. Other participants said they cooperated with national security agencies because it was a “duty,” it facilitated relationship building, and it had the strategic benefit of elevating Muslim community grievances before policymakers. However, in Power 1 contestations, state security agencies hold power-over discretion, and often Muslim CSOs strategies to leverage their participation, such as getting the RCMP and CSIS in Canada to stop their stigmatizing visits to peoples’ homes and workplaces, have limited influence, if any. This is why, in the U.K., some Muslim CSOs have refused to cooperate with the Home Office on the agency’s terms, thereby evincing a strategy of Defy.

Muslim CSOs have also found themselves engaging in Power 1 contestations in response to state institutions selectively granting and withdrawing legitimacy to Muslim CSOs. Participants from Canada shared that Canada’s tax regulator, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), had revoked the charitable status of several Muslim charities on grounds of national security. Additionally, participants from Canada and the U.K. noted that state institutions have informally withdrawn legitimacy from Muslim CSOs merely by suggesting certain Muslim CSOs have affiliations with listed terrorist entities. Government officials have cast aspersions on the reputation of prominent Muslim CSOs like the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM) in Canada and the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in the U.K. Muslim CSOs in Canada have contested the withdrawal of legitimacy by taking legal action (a strategy of Defy). In both countries, CSOs have used their relationship with policymakers to highlight the negative impact of these actions on Muslim communities (a strategy of Compromise). Once again, it is quite apparent that these Power 1 contestations have inherent limits as the state security institutions hold tremendous power-over capacity.


**Broader Significance**

In my dissertation, I have proposed an original conceptual framework to illustrate how the design and implementation of public policies create relations of power between state institutions and CSOs, and how those relations of power shape the way CSOs engage in contestations with state institutions. I have applied the framework to examine the power relationships rendered by CR policies and how Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K. mount challenges against discriminatory CR policies across different dimensions of power. My dissertation project not only generates new empirical data but also has significance for broader scholarship.

First, my framework recognizes the disciplinary power (Power 4) that state institutions exert upon CSOs. While I have identified its operation upon Muslim CSOs in the context of CR policies, it can be extended to CSOs working with any subordinated community under different policy settings. Using the framework, I suggest that awareness of the operation of Power 4 propels CSOs to use various types of contestations as described under Power 1, Power 2, and Power 3. The formulation I have proposed breaks from the binary of cooptation versus resistance (see Pettit & McGee, 2020) and argues that, in the face of hegemonic power, CSOs use a combination of sophisticated resistive strategies to advance emancipatory objectives and advocate on behalf of their communities (Gaventa, 2021; McGee, 2020). Power 1 contestations are favoured by state institutions as they pose the least risk to their political authority. Though Power 1 contestations have limits for CSOs, they can be useful for seeking concessions and reforms within policy structures. Power 2 and Power 3 contestations by CSOs question the rationale for decision making by state institutions and challenge the legitimacy of the discourses used to justify policies. These contestations strike at political authority
because when such contestations are brought into the public domain, they can impact the public support necessary to sustain policies. I have shown that CSOs engage in all three types of power contestations to advance the goals of emancipation.

Second, by integrating a framework of power within an organizational institutionalist model, I have shown how relations of power rendered by public policies limit or enable CSO strategies. Whereas organizational institutionalist approaches have been critiqued for institutional determinism (where the agency of organizations is subordinated to the point of irrelevance) (Haveman, 2000), in my framework, I account for the different ways in which institutional pressures constrain CSO choices but also leave room for meaningful contestations. For example, disciplinary power (Power 4) and coercion (under Power 1) by state institutions can lead CSOs to (consciously or unconsciously) Acquiesce to institutional demands. However, because CSOs occupy a legitimate place in democracies (providing services, fostering collective expression, conducting community advocacy, etc.), they are able to utilize agentic power to pursue strategies of Compromise, Defy, and Manipulate in contestations of Power 1, Power 2, and Power 3. I also show that organizational resources and access to networks are necessary for CSOs to pursue certain strategies (e.g., to mount legal challenges). By accounting for these factors, my analysis also draws upon considerations present in resource dependence theories (Malatesta & Smith, 2014).

Third, my analysis of the Power 3 contestations by CSOs shows how the discursive underpinnings and justifications of CR policies are tied to broader social processes of racialization. CR practices that cast Muslims as “suspect” and risky contribute to a climate of Islamophobia. But, in a cyclical relationship, the climate of
Islamophobia, reflected in media and political discourses, encourages racialized CR practices. In this sense, policy discourses are mutually reinforcing of broader dynamics of racialization. This dynamic provides insight into how structural racism is upheld and becomes relevant for CSOs serving ethnic and racialized communities. The case of the U.K. is particularly problematic as the Home Office has decided to go on an offensive against CSO discourses instead of reflecting on systemic racism in CR practices.

Fourth, my proposed conceptual framework and the accompanying analysis are salient to various justice-seeking efforts. Indeed, my conceptualization about the relationship of power between state institutions and CSOs is inspired by the work of practitioners who have been thinking about these dynamics through work among gender activists (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2007), worker and peasant movements (McGee, 2020), Indigenous movements (Zibechi, 2020), and other liberation movements. The multidimensional power lens that informs my framework acknowledges the insidious and structural operation of power where “the conspiratorial intentions of powerful agents may or may not be obvious,” but also takes the position that “political responsibility can be found and resisted” (Pettit & McGee, 2020, p. 5). Similarly, the framework assumes that the policy structures and norms are dynamically constituted through continuous contestations between the state institutors and CSOs; so, “power can be destabilised or created anew through collective awareness and through the articulation and enactment of alternatives” (p. 6).

Finally, my analysis of CR policies from the perspective of the communities most impacted by these policies underlines deficiencies in policymaking when the views of marginalized communities are inadequately accounted for. The case of CR policies in
Canada and the U.K. reveals major gaps in the how state security institutions understand and prioritize issues of public safety versus what communities impacted by CR policies value and experience. This is not only problematic from an equity and justice lens but also undermines the apparent trust-building goals of CR policies. In a recent article, Holdo (2021) suggests that state institutions face an apparent trade-off between “efficiency and democratic legitimacy” when designing CR policies (p. 477). From the perspective of state institutions, the urgency of the problem of ‘radicalization’ demands rapid deployment of policy solutions (based on prevailing security wisdom) at the expense of democratic values (p. 480). The opposing view suggests that “the one-sided focus on efficiency may be problematic not only from a democratic perspective, but also strategically mistaken” in that policies may not be able to achieve their objectives (p. 481). However, my analysis underscores that the characterization of CR policies as an efficiency versus democracy trade-off is misplaced because it makes the CR policymaking process appear depoliticized and disconnected from broader social processes. The analysis in my dissertation underlines how racial imaginaries about the dangerous Muslim and the process of racialization inform the characteristics of CR policies in multiple national contexts. CR policies are merely another state instrument reflecting discourses and practices that normalize the “casting out” of Muslims from the body politic (Razack, 2008). Holdo (2021) himself admits that the participation of Muslim CSOs in CR policymaking (in the Swedish context) is hampered by “features of ‘radicalization’ discourses and wider and more longstanding patterns of social and political exclusion” (p. 479). The analysis I have undertaken also lays the foundation for understanding how CR policies (and indeed, public policies generally) establish relations
of power between state institutions and marginalized and racialized communities and their civil society representatives. Within these relations of power, policy engagements are best understood in the language of politically charged power contestations instead of in the value-neutral conceptions of inclusion and trust-building.

**Policy Implications: A Community-centered Alternative to Public Safety**

My dissertation shows how Muslim CSOs experience CR policies and the power-informed contestations CSOs undertake to resist the racialized and discriminatory practices state institutions use to advance CR policy objectives. These analyses have salience for the expansion of CR policies toward other forms of violence. The vague and malleable container of ‘radicalization’ has been used to racialize domestic Muslims as dangerous Others (Kundnani, 2012b; Pisoiu, 2013), but more recently it has been deployed to treat as deviant a wide range of political beliefs (Martin, 2020). With ‘radicalization’ conceived as a transition to ‘extreme’ beliefs rather than political violence, CR policies have justified interventions in the social, cultural, educational, and community realms where social values and beliefs are formed (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018). This type of “diffuse securitization” has, in effect, broadened security-informed governance across society (Huysmans, 2014). The enactment of the Prevent Duty in the U.K. epitomizes how security and surveillance responsibilities have been placed upon workers in education, health, and social work sectors. In his persuasive analysis, Ragazzi (2017) notes, “the ‘securitisation of social policy’, in other words, seems to mark a ‘re-colonisation’ of social policy by the security logic, but only for racialised and ethnicised minorities” (p. 170). Huysmans goes so far as to say that this form of securitization rearranges “social and political relations around enemies, risks, fear, and anxiety” (Huysmans, 2014, p. 14).
CR policies not only impact racialized and ethnic communities; they also rearrange the social structures that hurt minority rights, civil liberties, and community advocacy more broadly. In her essay highlighting racialization through counterterrorism (including, counter-radicalization), Husain (2020a) writes that the purpose of the label of the “terrorist” (or radical) is to have their “political ideas exist outside the scope of acceptable discourse and licit protest.” When used by state security institutions, the label serves to disappear not only the person but also their politics. This dynamic is of foremost concern in the latest “post-racial” and “colourblind” turn in CR policies (Younis & Jadhav, 2020). The British government has responded to critics of Prevent by suggesting Prevent is targeting “right-wing” and “Islamist” extremism equally (Home Office, 2020b). In Canada, federal policing and national security agencies have suggested that Canada is concerned with “all forms” of ‘violent extremism’ (Public Safety Canada, 2018a). While this ostensible transition toward neutrality has been met with some enthusiasm (Al Jazeera, 2021; CLC, 2021), these transitions raise serious concerns. First, it legitimates the use of the label of “terrorist” and “radical” more widely, granting state agencies even greater power in deeming who is a terrorist or radical. Indeed, as the counter-radicalization apparatus has been expanded to tackle white supremacist violence, it has also been deployed to curtail legitimate forms of political dissent including anti-capitalist protests and environmental activism (BBC, 2020a; Crosby & Monaghan, 2018; Martin, 2020). Second, the posture of neutrality does little to address the underlying, racialized structures that make CR policies flawed in the first place. As some scholars have observed, colourblindness is merely a performance that serves to obscure racism in
structures of national security, removing these important concerns from public visibility and making them more difficult to contest (Younis, 2021).

So, the policy-oriented questions before us are: What can be done about CR policies? What are the alternatives? One of the fundamental problems with CR policies (and national security measures) is that they are defined not by those who are impacted most by their implementation, but by powerful elites. Noting the continuity between the security measures as part of the ‘war on terror’ with earlier forms of national security policing in Canada, activist Gary Kinsman (2019) notes:

“Canada’s national security is defined by those with political and class power who define their interests as the ‘national interest’. It is their security that is being defended in national security. It is our various movements for social and ecological justice that challenge their national security. . . .

‘We’ are the ‘national security risks’ that they are fighting against. We need to resist their national security since their ‘security’ is based on our insecurity, oppression and exploitation” (pp. 133-134).

Kinsman’s (2019) powerful observation is based on the realization that the capitalist and political class has used national security to control and suppress those that threaten establishment institutions and politics. As it stands, counterterrorism and counter-radicalization policymaking is undemocratic, elite-driven, rooted in the military-industrial complex, and largely ineffective at preventing future acts of political violence (Blakeley et al., 2019). In light of this reality, claims that state-driven CR policies are ‘community-oriented’ sound disingenuous. Research participants in this study were keen to observe that in its policy use, ‘radicalization’ fails to account for broader structural factors facing marginalized communities (e.g., povertization) as well as violence inflicted by actions of
state institutions (e.g., foreign policy and militarism). Thus, the ‘radicalization’ discourse enables state institutions to create relations of domination over CSOs.

Rooted in this understanding, a collective of Muslim CSOs and human rights organizations in the U.K. have advocated for discarding the use of ‘radicalization’ and dismantling CR policies. A new type of “national” security ought to be based on maintaining the safety of communities and the public, versus the sanctity of institutions of capital and power. This requires a fundamental re-orientation of national security, which no doubt is an uphill task. CSOs, who have rich experience in advocating for civil and social rights for marginalized communities and who understand the pressing safety concerns of the communities they serve, can play a critical role. They can help in re-imagining a new world of security “socialized” in the interest of ordinary people (Blakeley et al., 2019, p. 51). The Muslim civil rights and advocacy organization, CAGE, proposes that state agencies should take action to remedy the broader material and structural conditions (inequality, discrimination, etc.) that lead to lack of social cohesion (CAGE, 2020). State policies can create the regulatory conditions and provide the financial resources that allow CSOs to develop and pursue meaningful community-led programs geared toward improving social harmony and mitigating the social conditions that may lead to violence.

In the contemporary environment of swelling anti-racism movements, there is an opportunity to step back and consider how, like policing, national security has historically harmed racialized and Indigenous communities. The policy considerations I have highlighted above take inspiration from abolitionist traditions and contemporary social movements that have underlined the structural racism and violence inherent in the
practices of policing (and security) institutions. Canadian activists calling to “defund the police” offer the clarification that:

“...defunding is part of a broader movement geared toward reimagining safety and security in our society. It is about transitioning not only funding, but power, equipment, and force away from forces of state violence and repression and committing to invest, instead, in community-centered forms of safety. It is part of a broader abolitionist vision for addressing the root causes of harm and violence in our societies instead of policing them. It is part of a movement to fund decent, long-term affordable housing, public transit, and community-led antiviolence projects rather than using mass public funds on forces whose primary role is to surveil, arrest, brutalize, incarcerate, and kill.” (Maynard, 2020, p. 5).

A community-centered form of national security would follow from the above vision. It would reallocate the billions of dollars assigned to national security budgets toward community-centered, civil society-led programs working toward social, economic, and racial justice and “community-led antiviolence projects.” These efforts would diminish the power of policing and security agencies and strengthen the power of civil society.

**Research Gaps and Future Research**

My dissertation has sought to provide a rich understanding of how Muslim CSOs experience securitization from CR policies and the strategy these CSOs use to resist power exerted from these discriminatory policies. However, it has also generated several questions that would benefit from further research.

In Chapter 3, I mention that my dissertation relies on data collected from a limited sample of CSOs from three provinces in Canada and three regions in England and Wales. Additionally, I noted that the sample underrepresents the experience of some racialized groups (e.g., Black Muslims) and Muslim denominations (especially, non-Sunni denominations). I hope to extend my dissertation research by collecting additional data from CSOs serving other geographies, ethnic groups, and denominations – particularly
the experience of CSOs led by Black Muslims. This research would bring greater depth to my findings through an intersectional analysis of anti-Black racism and Islamophobia (Husain, 2020b; Mugabo, 2016). Additionally, although 45 percent of the research participants were women, my analysis would have benefitted from the incorporation of intersectional feminist theories on power and patriarchal subjection (A. Allen, 1998; Crenshaw, 1989; Fraser, 1990). Such perspectives are especially important as Muslim women often experience Islamophobia in more pervasive ways (Alimahomed-Wilson, 2017; Zine, 2006).

Another shortcoming of my analysis is that it focuses on differences between CSO strategies in Canada and the U.K. but offers limited explanations for differences among CSO strategies within each country. Future research would benefit from an ecosystem analysis of Muslim CSOs that examines how differences in size, funding sources, services offered, staff background, and other internal factors influence the choice of CSO strategies (e.g., see Donaldson, 2007). In my analysis, I intuit that the centrality of certain organizations (e.g., NCCM in Canada) and the presence of certain organization types (e.g., organizations dedicated to the opposition of Prevent in the U.K.) influence the strategies used by other organizations. An ecological and spatial analysis would also help me validate these intuitions and systematically examine inter-organizational networks (e.g., see Archibald, 2007; da Costa, 2016).

In general, my proposed conceptual framework would benefit from further validation in different national contexts. This could be accomplished by including shadow cases of a few other countries to examine the power contestations between CSOs and state institutions under CR policies. In particular, including the cases of the U.S.,
France, and the Netherlands – where the ‘Muslim problem’ has been elevated to public and political discourse in specific ways – would be relevant to learning how CR policies have configured power relationships between state institutions and Muslim CSOs (Aziz, 2017; Fadil et al., 2019; Walklate & Mythen, 2018).

The validity of my framework could also be tested against the experience of other marginalized communities targeted by national security policies. The experience of Tamil-Canadians, for example, who have also been previously targeted under national security for putatively having links to listed terrorist entities (Sivalingam, 2009), would be a useful contrast with the Muslim experience. In particular, it would be important to observe how Tamil CSOs struck the balance between placating the demands of state agencies while effectively advocating on behalf of Tamil Canadians. My dissertation has focused on community perspectives that are underrepresented in critical terrorism scholarship, but it could be complemented by also exploring how official national security knowledge is produced, and providing a fuller picture of how ‘common-sense’ understandings of international policy paradigms are balanced against domestic policies and politics.

Finally, organizational scholars have recently started drawing on insights from social movement theories to understand the conditions under which CSOs choose different community mobilization and grassroots activism strategies (e.g., K. Weber & King, 2014). Social movement theories have stressed the importance of political opportunities, resources, and frames in explaining how movement strategies emerge (Benford & Snow, 2000; Jenkins, 1983; D. S. Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Future research would benefit from examining how the power-informed conceptual framework I
have proposed intersects with social movement concepts and explanations. While my
dissertation research has focused on formal organizations, I am also keen to understand
the extent to which informal and grassroots organizing influence the strategies of CSOs.
Social movement theories would aid me in assessing this dynamic.

**Final Remarks**

September 2021 marks two decades since the beginning of the ‘war on terror.’
During this time, this forever war has encompassed the lives of peoples all over the
world, but has especially impacted the lives of Muslims. Under the banner of national
security, state-driven counterterrorism and counter-radicalization measures have been
used to unjustly target Muslims as dangerous Others. In the midst of these injustices,
Muslim CSOs have played a crucial role, advocating for community interests and
resisting discriminatory and racialized practices and discourses. However, state
institutions also approach Muslim CSOs to seek assistance in implementing national
security programs that are discriminatory to Muslim communities. Based on this
observation, I have pursued my dissertation as a means of understanding what motivates
state agencies to reach out to CSOs to involve them in CR programs, and how CSOs
navigate the dual pressures of responding to demands for their involvement in state
security projects and effectively advocating on behalf of Muslim communities who have
been subject to harm through national security policies.

My dissertation research has been a labour of discovery and learning. I came to
appreciate in some depth how political and security discourses give meaning to
unspecific concepts such as ‘radicalization’ and ‘terrorism.’ I have come to understand
that CR policies, though presented as non-coercive alternatives to national security ‘hard’
policing, operate as formations of power. The goal of CR policies is not merely to
prevent violence, but to reshape society by managing the behaviour and thoughts of specific members of society considered to be inherently violent. This ascription, under the ‘war on terror,’ has been assigned to Muslim communities, but given the politicized and malleable construction of ‘radicalization,’ it can be seamlessly applied to members of society whose beliefs and ideas are deemed to be unaligned with the dominant political discourse. Importantly, CR policies have widened the operation of security governance in social, cultural, and civic spaces where social values and beliefs are formed, and where civil society is active. Thus, CR policies encroach upon the work of civil society, posing significant concerns for the unencumbered working of CSOs. The chief insight of my dissertation research is that CR policies (and public policies generally) create relations of power between state institutors and CSOs. In these relations of power, state institutions rely on a range of mechanisms to influence and control the work of CSOs, some obvious and overt – such as controlling resources – but some less so – such as making state-centered discourses of national security appear obvious. Nevertheless, I was also encouraged to learn that Muslim CSOs are finding multiple avenues of resistance. CSOs were able to break out of the discursive hold of CR policies and courageously challenge the flawed foundations of CR policies using progressive frames of anti-racism and equality. My dissertation research is inspired by their spirit and contributes to knowledge that centers the importance of a thriving civil society for a vibrant and inclusive multicultural society.
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Appendix 1: Overview of Muslims and Muslim CSOs in Canada and the U.K.

Muslims and Muslim CSOs in Canada

Contrary to popular belief, Muslims are not new arrivals in Canada. They have been here since before Confederation. While the early contact of Muslims with Indigenous people of Turtle Island is not documented, the 1854 census recorded three Muslims in Canada: Mahommah Baquaqua a formerly enslaved Muslim-born West African who would go on to publish a memoir, and James and Agnes Love, a Scottish couple who were converts to Islam (Hamdani, 1984; H. Munir, 2017; National Humanities Center, 2009). The first mosque in Canada, Al-Rashid Mosque, was built in Edmonton in 1938 (Waugh et al., 1983). Since the beginning of the twentieth century, immigration has been the primary reason for an increase in Muslim populations in Canada.

According to the 2011 National Household Survey, containing the most up-to-date population data on Muslims, there are 1,053,945 Muslims in Canada, making up over 3 percent of the Canadian population (Statistics Canada, 2011). This is a significant increase from the 2001 Census, which recorded 579,640 Muslims living in Canada (Hamdani, 2015). About 68 percent of Muslims in Canada were born outside Canada, though the share of Canadian-born Muslims has been steadily increasing (Hamdani, 2015). This shifting demographic is also reflected in the much younger median age of Canadian Muslims (28 years), compared to the overall Canadian population (37 years) (Agrell, 2011). Eighty-eight percent of Canadian Muslims self-identify as “visible
minorities” among whom there is considerable ethnic and cultural diversity. Figure 6 indicates the ethnic background of Canadian Muslims.

**Figure 6**

*Ethnic Backgrounds of Muslims in Canada*

![Bar chart showing ethnic backgrounds of Canadian Muslims]

*Note.* (Source: National Household Survey, 2011)

The majority of Muslims reside in the province of Ontario (55 percent of Muslims) followed by Québec (23 percent of Muslims). Muslims comprise urban communities that live in major metropolitan areas of the country (Shah, 2019, p. 12). Over two-thirds of all Canadian Muslims live in Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. Table 10 shows the percentage of Muslims in major metropolitan centres in Canada.

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47 “Visible minority” is a population category used in the Canadian census to denote people of colour. The category is defined in *the Employment Equity Act* as “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour” (Statistics Canada, 2017).
Table 10
Percentage of Muslims Living in Major Canadian Metropolitan Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metropolitan area</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Percentage of total Muslim population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windsor</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calgary</td>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchener-Waterloo</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* (Source: Shah, 2019).

Canadian Muslims appear to have higher levels of education compared to their counterparts from other faith backgrounds (Shah, 2019, p. 16). Despite this fact, in the 2011 National Household Survey, Canadian Muslims reported higher unemployment rates (13.9 percent) compared to the national average of 7.9 percent, as well as compared to the average unemployment rate among visible minority Canadians (9.9 percent) (Hamdani, 2015, p. 25). As with most visible minority Canadians, underemployment is a serious issue facing Canadian Muslims (Hamdani, 2015, p. 27). Likely as a consequence of poorer employment rates, the average income of Canadian Muslims was $30,336 compared to the income of $40,650 for all Canadians (Hamdani, 2015, p. 28). Overall, Canadian Muslims face more economic hardship relative to other Canadians.

Religion is an important part of Muslim identity. Based on the 2016 Environics Survey of Muslims in Canada, the majority of Canadian Muslims (64 percent) identify as belonging to the Sunni denomination, followed by 8 percent identifying as Shia, and 10
percent within affiliations of Ismaili, Ahmadi, non-denominational and other (Shah, 2019, p. 26). According to a 2016 Environics Survey of Muslims in Canada, religious observance among Muslims has strengthened since the previous survey in 2006 (The Environics Institute, 2016). This is indicated by more young Muslim women wearing the hijab (head covering) and more young Muslims regularly going to mosques for prayers.

Muslims in Canada feel a strong sense of belonging with Canada and are politically and civically active. According to the nonprofit, The Canadian-Muslim Vote, a large majority of Muslims (79 percent) voted in the 2015 federal elections and the 2018 provincial elections in Ontario (79 percent in the ten ridings surveyed) (Mainstreet Research, 2015, 2018). As per the 2013 General Social Survey, relative to other Canadians, more Canadian Muslims participated in activities of civic, ethnic, and religious organizations (Shah, 2019, pp. 27, 29). In fact, qualitative studies suggest that involvement in religious activities propels Muslims toward greater engagement in general political and civic activities (Bullock & Nesbitt-Larking, 2013).

Islamophobia, discrimination, media stereotyping, and fear for personal safety have been reported as issues of primary concern facing Muslims, particularly Muslim women and youth (The Environics Institute, 2016, p. 22). The 2016 Environics survey found that one in three Muslims had experienced discrimination and stereotyping based on religion or ethnicity. Unfortunately, since 9/11, Canadian Muslims have been at the receiving end of such experiences based on the commonly held assumption that Islam is associated with terrorism. The Environics survey reveals a large gap between perceptions of Canadian Muslims and Canadian non-Muslims regarding “how many Muslims in Canada . . . support violent activity abroad.” Only 7 percent of Canadian Muslims
believed that a significant number (defined as “most/many” or “just some”) of Muslims in Canada supported violence abroad, while 29 percent of Canadian non-Muslims believed a significant number of Muslims in Canada supported violence abroad (The Environics Institute, 2016, p. 41). In a survey led by the Association of Canadian Studies, two-thirds of non-Muslim Canadians indicated there is an “irreconcilable” conflict between “Western” and “Muslim societies,” and around 40 percent of Canadians seemed most worried about “Islamic fundamentalism” as a source of global threat (Jedwab, 2015, pp. 47, 100). In a more recent national poll by Angus Reid Institute and the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, 59 percent of respondents felt that “homegrown radical Islamic terrorism” poses a “quite serious” or “very serious” threat to Canada (Angus Reid Institute, 2018).

Government discourse has fed into the anxiety about Islam and Muslims. In 2011, former Prime Minister Stephen Harper claimed that “Islamicism” is the greatest threat facing Canada (CBC, 2011a) and the former director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) suggested that the religiosity of Muslims obviates their participation in the political process (Bullock & Nesbitt-Larking, 2013). In the 2015 federal election campaign, the Conservatives made the wearing of niqab during citizenship ceremonies an electoral issue and promised to set up an RCMP hotline for “Barbaric Cultural Practices Against Women and Girls,” an action characterized as “blowing a racial ‘dog-whistle’” against Muslims (Keenan, 2015). During the same election campaign, Conservative party officials stoked fears of “jihad” and “terrorism” in political speeches (Patriquin, 2015). Analysis of survey data has also found that residents of Québec maintain greater negative attitudes toward Muslims relative to residents of
other provinces (Wilkins-Laflamme, 2018). It is not surprising, then, that Québéc has had vociferous public and political debates concerning integration of Muslims, has passed legislation that has impacted Muslims adversely, and was the site of the deadliest-ever Canadian mosque shootings in 2017 (Abedi, 2020).

Canada has thriving and diverse Muslim CSOs serving its various Muslim communities across the country (Latif & Ali-Mohammed, 2021; Qasqas & Chowdhury, 2019). There is no comprehensive count of Muslim charities and nonprofits, but partial information about Muslim charities can be gathered from the list of registered charities maintained by Canada’s tax regulator, Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). The *Income Tax Act* of Canada designates charities as three types of organizations – charitable organizations, public foundations, and private foundations – that serve the purposes of: relief of poverty, advancement of education, advancement of religion, or certain other purposes beneficial to the community (Kastner, 2020). As of April 2021, of the over 86,000 charities registered with the CRA, 476 were listed as charities with a purpose of advancement of religion under the category of Islam. This number does not include the Muslim charities that are not registered with the sole purpose of advancement of religion. See Table 11 for queries from the CRA database on registered charities with “Muslim” or “Islam” in their names.
Table 11

Canadian Charities with “Islam” or “Muslim” in their Names

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Search field</th>
<th>Charity purpose</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Canada Count</th>
<th>ON Count</th>
<th>AB Count</th>
<th>MB Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Advancement of religion</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim or Islam</td>
<td>Advancement of religion</td>
<td>Support of religion</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim or Islam</td>
<td>Relief of poverty</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim or Islam</td>
<td>Advancement of education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim or Islam</td>
<td>Other purposes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>476</strong></td>
<td><strong>288</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Table includes charities nationally and in the provinces of Ontario (ON), Alberta (AB), and Manitoba (MB), where the Muslim CSOs included in my dissertation research are based (Source: Canada Revenue Agency).

Not counted in Table 11 are Muslim charities that do not have “Muslim “or “Islam” in their names (or that are not registered with the purpose of advancement of religion under the category of Islam). These include Muslim-led foundations (e.g., The Olive Tree Foundation), educational and research institutions (e.g., The Tessellate Institute), ethnic and social service groups (e.g., Somali Centre for Family Service), cultural and civic engagement organizations (e.g., The Noor Cultural Centre), international aid organizations (e.g., International Development and Relief Foundation), and other charities. In addition to charities, Canada has several Muslim-led and Muslim-serving nonprofit organizations that are not registered charities. Most prominent among such nonprofits is the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM), a civil rights and advocacy group that uses legal strategies to fight for the rights of Canadian Muslims. Unfortunately, Canadian Muslim charities have faced stringent financial scrutiny after
9/11 based on fears that Muslim charities may be misused to fund terrorist activities (Sidel, 2010). Furthermore, two recent studies found systemic anti-Muslim bias in government actions pursuing Muslim charities for financial and tax irregularities (Emon & Hasan, 2021; McSorley, 2021). In summary, there is a thriving Muslim civil society in Canada that plays several important functions serving Canadian-Muslim communities.

**Muslims and Muslim CSOs in the U.K.**

Muslims have been living in Britain since the 16th Century. Queen Elizabeth I’s cultivation of trade and political relationships with Islamic empires resulted in the presence of diplomats, merchants, artists, and others from those empires in England (Brotton, 2016). There is also record of an English convert to Islam and of the arrival of enslaved Muslims on ships captured by the Spanish (BBC, 2009). Sea-faring brought waves of Muslims to Britain between the 18th and 19th Centuries (Ansari, 2018; Knott, 2018a). Muslim sailors, mostly from India, who were employed by the British East India Company, abandoned their ships because of poor working conditions and remained to live in Britain. Naval cooks from what is now Bangladesh also arrived and found work in restaurants. The construction of the Suez Canal also brought Yemeni Muslim sailors to Britain. By the end of the 19th Century, there were tens of thousands of Muslims in Britain settled mostly in port towns and cities. The first mosque in Britain was built in Cardiff in 1860 (BBC, 2009). Since the end of the Second World War, Muslim economic migrants and their families from India and Pakistan have immigrated to Britain.

According to the 2011 U.K. Census, Muslims, as the second largest religious group in the country, make up 4.8 percent of the population of England and Wales and 4.4 percent of the entire population of the U.K. (Kaur-Ballagan et al., 2018; Muslim
Council of Britain, 2015). The number of Muslims in England and Wales increased from about 1,546,626 in 2001 to 2,706,066 in 2011 (Muslim Council of Britain, 2015). The 2011 Census records that in England and Wales, 47.2 percent of Muslims were born in the U.K., slightly up from 46.4 percent in 2001 (Muslim Council of Britain, 2015, p. 22). With a median age of 25 years, the Muslim population is younger on average age than the average age of the overall population of England and Wales (40 years) (Muslim Council of Britain, 2015, p. 27). One in three Muslims in the U.K. is under the age of 15 (Kaur-Ballagan et al., 2018). Muslims in the England and Wales are ethnically and racially diverse, with Pakistani Muslims making up largest share (38 percent) of the Muslim population, followed by Bangladeshi Muslims (15 percent), and Black African Muslims (8 percent). See Figure 7 for details on the ethnic backgrounds of Muslims in England and Wales.

**Figure 7**

*Ethnic backgrounds of Muslims in England and Wales*

![Ethnic backgrounds of Muslims in England and Wales](image)


The vast majority of Muslims in the U.K. live in four regions of England and Wales: London, with a Muslim population of 12 percent, West Midlands (7 percent),
Yorkshire and the Humber (6 percent) and North West England (5 percent). It would appear that Muslims in the U.K. are predominantly urban dwellers with a significant percentage of Muslim populations living in cities, as noted in Table 12.

**Table 12**
*Percentage of Muslims Living in Major Metropolitan Areas in the U.K.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage of total Muslim population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>Yorkshire and the Humber</td>
<td>25 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>22 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>North West England</td>
<td>16 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>12 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Muslims in the U.K. appear to have levels of education comparable to the rest of the British workforce, albeit Muslims perform slightly worse in some regards. In the 2011 census, with regards to educational attainment, about 26 percent of Muslims in England and Wales indicated having “no qualification” compared to 23 percent for the entire workforce. The share of Muslims with the highest qualification levels is 24 percent compared to 27 percent for the entire workforce (Muslim Council of Britain, 2015, p. 60). Yet British Muslims have a significantly greater unemployment rate (7.2 percent) relative to the general U.K. population (4 percent) (Kaur-Ballagan et al., 2018, p. 13). According to independent studies, Muslims face a “religious penalty” in addition to “colour racism” that produces worse employment outcomes for racialized Muslims in the U.K. relative to non-Muslim and other racialized groups (Khattab & Johnston, 2013;

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48 The 2011 U.K. census asked individuals to indicate their educational qualifications that included “apprenticeship,” “vocational/work-related qualification,” “foreign qualifications” and “no qualification” (Office for National Statistics, 2021, s. 4).
Modood, 2005). Not surprisingly then, between 2006 and 2008, British Muslims earned the lowest hourly wages (with median earnings of £8 per hour for Muslim men and slightly lower for Muslim women) relative to hourly wages earned by other religious groups and the British average of £9.90 per hour (National Equality Panel, 2010, p. 132). Based on data from the same period, Muslim households had a median household wealth of £42,000, lowest among religious groups, and significantly less than the median of the white British household wealth of £221,000 (National Equality Panel, 2010, p. 208). The data also points to large variation within Muslim ethnic groups: Bangladeshi Muslims had assets of £15,000 whereas Pakistani Muslims had assets of £97,000. One study found a greater prevalence of poverty among Muslim households, at an alarmingly high rate of 50 percent compared to households of other religious groups and the national average of 18 percent (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2014, p. 34). Around 46 percent of British Muslims live in the poorest and most economically deprived neighbourhoods of England and Wales (Muslim Council of Britain, 2015, p. 46).

A citizenship survey by the government found that religious identity is more important for British Muslims than for other religious groups (DCLG, 2011d, p. 18; Kaur-Ballagan et al., 2018, p. 37). Additionally, this survey found more British Muslims were practicing religion than from the previous survey conducted in 2006. According to a survey by the Bertelsmann Foundation, 75 percent of Muslims in the U.K. identify as Sunnis, 8 percent as Shia, and the rest belong to other denominations (El-Menouar, 2017). Among Sunnis, there are distinct, active sub-sects that have origins in South Asia (Weller & Cheruvallil-Contractor, 2015, p. 310).
British Muslims feel a strong sense of belonging with the U.K. In the 2011 Census, 73 percent of British Muslims described themselves as “British only,” “English only,” or “British” and “English” and no other identity (Kaur-Ballagan et al., 2018, p. 35). The degree to which British Muslims self-identity as British or English surpasses the degree to which British Hindus self-identify as such, and is slightly less than the degree to which British Sikhs and British Christians identify as British or English. Multiple independent surveys at different points in time have confirmed that British Muslims feel a strong sense of belonging to Britain as well as to their local neighbourhood (Kaur-Ballagan et al., 2018, pp. 33, 34). Contrary to claims that British Muslims are alienated from British society, British Muslims actively participate in politics and in civil society (Dobbernack et al., 2014). British Muslims are “highly supportive” of British democracy and actively participate in electoral politics (Heath & Khan, 2012). Surveys find that British Muslims are more satisfied with how British democracy works compared to the British public as a whole, and younger British Muslims appear more interested in voting in general elections compared to other British non-Muslims in their age cohort (Kaur-Ballagan et al., 2018, pp. 40, 42). British Muslims report volunteering in nonprofit organizations or charities at levels comparable to British non-Muslims, though young Muslims are more likely to volunteer relative to older community members (Kaur-Ballagan et al., 2018, pp. 50, 54).

Especially since 9/11, British Muslims have faced a climate of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim prejudice. According to a 2011 government survey, the general public believes that Muslims were most likely to be subject to racial prejudice (DCLG, 2011d, pp. 9–11). In the same survey, British Muslims led religious groups in reporting
experiences of harassment based on race and religion as well as discriminatory treatment from public service institutions. With one in four young British Muslims having experienced discrimination and one in five fearing being physically attacked, British Muslims continue to experience anti-Muslim prejudice (Kaur-Ballagan et al., 2018, pp. 61–62, 65). Surveys suggest that the “clash of civilizations” view holds sway in Britain, with over half the British public indicating that Islam is incompatible with the values of British society (Kaur-Ballagan et al., 2018, p. 79). According to a Pew survey, under a third of British people hold unfavourable views toward British Muslims; the unfavourable view of Muslims increases as political affiliation shifts rightward (Wike et al., 2016). Despite these perceptions and despite Muslims being disproportionately targeted under counter-terrorism measures, surveys consistently find that British Muslims maintain comparable levels of concern about terrorism and extremism as the overall British public (Kaur-Ballagan et al., 2018, p. 72). British Muslims attribute biased coverage by the media as contributing to their poor treatment in the U.K. (Clements et al., 2020, pp. 65–67).

The U.K. has several thousand Muslim CSOs that serve British Muslims in a variety of ways. An exact count of Muslim CSOs in England and Wales is not recorded. However, of the 169,820 charities registered with the Charities Commission of England and Wales, 1,483 have the title “Muslim” in their name and 2,664 that have the title “Islam” in their name. There are likely thousands more Muslim CSOs that either do not have the terms Muslim or Islam in their names, or that are not required to register with the Charities Commission. Muslim CSOs in the U.K. play various functions including providing faith-services (mosques), advocating for community interests, providing
international aid, supporting education and social services, fostering civic engagement, and creating space for cultural activities (Knott, 2018b; Weller & Cheruvallil-Contractor, 2015). In a recent book, Elshayyal (2019) provides a rich account of the variety of ways in which Muslim CSOs have supported rights and equality based claims on behalf of British Muslims. The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) is the most prominent Muslim umbrella organization representing 500 regional and national Muslim CSOs across the U.K. Despite concerns about Muslim charities financing terrorism or supporting extremism, little evidence exists to support these claims (Knott, 2018b).

**Discussion:** Based on the discussion in this Appendix, we can glean that Muslims in Canada and the U.K. have several common characteristics and few distinct ones, especially as they pertain to my study of CR policies and Muslim civil society responses to CR policies in the two countries. Muslims in Canada and the U.K. are urban and relatively young populations for whom their religious identity is important. Both Canadian and British Muslims have been subject to anti-Muslim discrimination and their relationship with rest of society and the state is shaped by a discourse that views Islamic and “western” values at odds with each other. Muslims in both countries have been at the receiving end of national security measures. This experience stands in contrast with the reality that British and Canadian Muslims exhibit a strong sense of belonging to their respective nations. Both British and Canadian Muslims are politically active in their respective countries and participate enthusiastically in civic activities. In both countries, Muslim CSOs are active and have been subject to additional scrutiny based on government concerns that Muslim charities may be exploited to finance terrorist activities. In terms of differences, Muslims in the U.K. appear to face more economic
deprivation than Muslims in Canada. In terms of wealth, some Muslim ethnic groups in the U.K. (e.g., Bangladeshi communities) significantly lag behind the national average. British Muslims also have much higher unemployment rates and earn much lower wages compared to the national averages. Canadian Muslims also have higher unemployment and lower incomes but the difference with the national Canadian average is less severe. Both countries have distinct patterns of Muslim migration and settlement. 60 percent of British Muslims are South Asian (from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India), the largest share of ethnicity among British Muslims. In Canada, only 36 percent of Muslims are ethnically South Asian, followed by 25 percent who are ethnically Arab. In totality, these similarities and differences among British and Canadian Muslims provide the necessary contextual background of Muslims in the U.K. and Canada to inform the analysis of how CR policies shape the responses of Muslim CSOs in the two countries.
### Appendix 2: Details of Research Participants

#### Research Participants in Canada

**Table 13**

*Participants from Muslim CSOs in Canada*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant code</th>
<th>Muslim CSO type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date of the interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PCAN1</td>
<td>Religious Services and Theological Education</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>3 October 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN3</td>
<td>Civil Rights and Political Advocacy</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>4 October 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN4</td>
<td>Community or International Development and Foundations</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>4 October 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN5</td>
<td>Immigrant Settlement and Social Services</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>18 October 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN6</td>
<td>Associations and Special Interest Groups</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>16 October 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN7</td>
<td>Civil Rights and Political Advocacy</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>11 October 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN8</td>
<td>Associations and special interests</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>15 October 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN9</td>
<td>Religious Services and Theological Education</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>20 November 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN10</td>
<td>Religious Services and Theological Education</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>22 November 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN11</td>
<td>Civil Rights and Political Advocacy</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>23 November 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN12</td>
<td>Religious Services and Theological Education</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>28 November 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN13</td>
<td>Immigrant Settlement and Social Services</td>
<td>Alberta / Manitoba</td>
<td>1 December 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN15</td>
<td>Religious Services and Theological Education</td>
<td>Alberta / Manitoba</td>
<td>2 December 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN17</td>
<td>Religious Services and Theological Education</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>10 January 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN18</td>
<td>Associations and Special Interest Groups</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>22 January 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN19</td>
<td>Community or International Development and Foundations</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>8 February 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN22</td>
<td>Cultural and Civic engagement</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>20 October 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN25</td>
<td>Cultural and Civic engagement</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>23 November 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN26</td>
<td>Cultural and Civic engagement</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>23 November 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN28</td>
<td>Civil Rights and Political Advocacy</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>26 September 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN33</td>
<td>Religious Services and Theological Education</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>31 May 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 14

**Other Participants in Canada**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant code</th>
<th>Organizational affiliation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date of the interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PCAN2</td>
<td>Post-secondary institution</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>26 September 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN14</td>
<td>Regional police</td>
<td>Alberta / Manitoba</td>
<td>1 December 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN16</td>
<td>CR-focused org / program</td>
<td>Alberta / Manitoba</td>
<td>3 December 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN20</td>
<td>Public Safety Canada</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>6 March 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN21</td>
<td>CR-focused org / program</td>
<td>Quebec / Eastern Canada</td>
<td>27 March 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN23</td>
<td>CR-focused org / program</td>
<td>Quebec / Eastern Canada</td>
<td>4 May 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN24</td>
<td>CR-focused org / program</td>
<td>Quebec / Eastern Canada</td>
<td>4 June 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN20</td>
<td>Law firm</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>8 October 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN27</td>
<td>CR-focused org / program</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>2 March 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN30</td>
<td>Public Safety Canada</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>28 February 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Research Participants in the U.K.

Table 15
Participants from Muslim CSOs in the U.K.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant code</th>
<th>Muslim CSO type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date of the interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PUK1</td>
<td>Religious Services and Theological Education</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>1 May 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUK2</td>
<td>Associations and special interests</td>
<td>Yorkshire and the Humber</td>
<td>14 May 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUK3</td>
<td>Civil Rights and Political Advocacy</td>
<td>Yorkshire and the Humber</td>
<td>2 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUK4</td>
<td>Civil Rights and Political Advocacy</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>16 May 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUK5</td>
<td>Civil Rights and Political Advocacy</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>2 May 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUK6</td>
<td>Immigrant Settlement and Social Services</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>13 May 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUK7</td>
<td>Immigrant Settlement and Social Services</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>16 May 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUK8</td>
<td>Civil Rights and Political Advocacy</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>17 May 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUK10</td>
<td>Community or International Development and Foundations</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>4 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUK12</td>
<td>Cultural and Civic engagement</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>19 June 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16
Other Participants in the U.K.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant code</th>
<th>Organizational affiliation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date of the interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PUK9</td>
<td>CR-focused org / program</td>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>4 July 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUK11</td>
<td>CR-focused org / program</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>1 November 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUK13</td>
<td>Post-secondary institution</td>
<td>Yorkshire and the Humber</td>
<td>24 March 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: Interview Protocol

Interview protocol for participants from Muslim CSOs in Canada

- Could I start by asking you about your current position and work? What is your involvement with your organization? How did it come about?
- What are you hearing about regarding ‘radicalization’ from the Muslim communities you serve?
  - Prompt: What are the specific concerns from the community and youth?
  - Prompt: Does your organization worry about the problem of radicalization?
- What is your organization’s view/position on the government’s counter-radicalization (CR) policies?
  - Prompt: Have you applied for CR-related funding?
  - Prompt: What, if any, activities or strategies has your organization taken in response to the government’s emphasis on counter-radicalization?
  - Prompt: Does your organization confront the question of Muslim ‘integration’ in relation to CR policies?
- How do you think the broader political climate negatively affecting Muslims in your region/province/Canada impact your organization’s work?
  - Prompt: Do you think there is the relationship between the national security emphasis on counter-radicalization and Islamophobia? Could you explain.
  - Prompt: Does your organization have programs to combat Islamophobia? If so, what are they?
- Counter-radicalization programs are largely led by national security agencies. In your work, do you interact with police and/or national security agencies?
  - Prompt: What does that relationship look like? What value, if any, does it have?
  - Prompt: Can you give me examples of your interactions with police and/or security agencies?
- Regarding counter-radicalization and national security, do you work in partnerships with other organizations?
  - Prompt: How does your organization establish these partnerships? Can you provide specific examples?
- Can you tell me a little bit about strategy development and decision-making process with regards to taking action related to counter-radicalization initiatives?
  - Prompt: To what extent do actively consult with community members/constituents on matters related to national security?
- Have you seen organizations – social service or mosques or other orgs serving Muslims – respond to counterterrorism and counter-radicalization in specific ways? Can you share some examples/insights?
- Anything else you would like to share?
Interview protocol for participants implementing CR-focused programs in Canada

- Could I start by asking you about your current position and work? What is your involvement with your organization? How did it come about?
- Can you tell me a little bit about the history of how your organization began working on CR programs?
  - Prompt: How do CR programs advance your organization’s mandate?
- How does your organization understand the problem of ‘radicalization’?
  - Prompt: How does your organization account for the critiques of ‘radicalization’? E.g., unspecific/indicators, targeting of Muslims, etc.
- What type of partnerships do you have with other community organizations?
  - Prompt: In what capacity do you interact with Muslim CSOs? What do you hear from them about their views on counter-radicalization initiatives?
- In your work, do you interact with police and/or the RCMP/Public Safety Canada?
  - Prompt: What does that relationship look like? What value, if any, does it have?
  - Prompt: Can you give me examples of your interactions with police and/or security agencies?
  - Prompt: Do you have any concerns with aspects of counter-radicalization prioritized by state security agencies?
- How do you think the broader political climate negatively affecting Muslims in your region/province/Canada impact your work on counter-radicalization?
- Regarding counter-radicalization work, do you work in partnerships with other organizations?
  - Prompt: How does your organization establish these partnerships? Can you provide specific examples?
- Can you tell me a little bit about strategy development and decision-making process with regards to taking action related to counter-radicalization initiatives?
- Anything else you would like to share?
Interview protocol for participants from Muslim CSOs in the U.K.

- Could I start by asking you about your current position and work? What is your involvement with your organization? How did it come about?
- What are you hearing about regarding ‘radicalization’ from the Muslim communities you serve?
  - Prompt: What are the specific concerns from the community and youth?
  - Prompt: Does your organization worry about the problem of radicalization?
- What is your organization’s view/position on the government’s counter-radicalization (CR) policies (Prevent)?
  - Prompt: Have you applied for CR-related funding?
  - Prompt: What, if any, activities or strategies has your organization taken in response to the government’s emphasis on counter-radicalization?
  - Prompt: Does your organization confront the question of Muslim ‘integration’ or compatibility with ‘British values’ in relation to CR policies?
- How do you think the broader political climate negatively affecting Muslims in your region/country impact your organization’s work?
  - Prompt: Do you think there is the relationship between the national security emphasis on counter-radicalization and Islamophobia? Could you explain.
  - Prompt: Does your organization have programs to combat Islamophobia? If so, what are they?
  - Prompt: What does your organization think about the independent review that is planned for Prevent?
- Counter-radicalization programs are largely led by national security agencies. In your work, do you interact with police and/or national security agencies?
  - Prompt: What does that relationship look like? What value, if any, does it have?
  - Prompt: Can you give me examples of your interactions with police and/or security agencies?
- Regarding counter-radicalization and national security, do you work in partnerships with other organizations?
  - Prompt: How does your organization establish these partnerships? Can you provide specific examples?
- Can you tell me a little bit about strategy development and decision-making process with regards to taking action related to counter-radicalization initiatives?
  - Prompt: To what extent do actively consult with community members/constituents on matters related to national security?
- Have you seen organizations – social service or mosques or other orgs serving Muslims – respond to counterterrorism and counter-radicalization in specific ways? Can you share some examples/insights?
- Anything else you would like to share?
Interview protocol for participants implementing CR-focused programs in the U.K.

- Could I start by asking you about your current position and work? What is your involvement with your organization? How did it come about?
- Can you tell me a little bit about the history of how your organization began working on CR programs?
  - Prompt: How do CR programs advance your organization’s mandate?
- How does your organization understand the problem of ‘radicalization’?
  - Prompt: How does your organization account for the critiques of ‘radicalization’? E.g., un-specific/indicators, targeting of Muslims, etc.
- What type of partnerships do you have with other community organizations?
  - Prompt: In what capacity do you interact with Muslim CSOs? What do you hear from them about their views on counter-radicalization initiatives?
- In your work, do you interact with police and/or the Home Office?
  - Prompt: What does that relationship look like? What value, if any, does it have?
  - Prompt: Can you give me examples of your interactions with police and/or security agencies?
  - Prompt: Do you have any concerns with aspects of counter-radicalization prioritized by state security agencies?
- How do you think the broader political climate negatively affecting Muslims in your region/country impact your work on counter-radicalization?
  - Prompt: How does your organization address the concern that Prevent has targeted and alienated Muslim communities?
  - Prompt: Do you have any concerns accepting Prevent funding?
  - Prompt: What does your organization think about the independent review that is planned for Prevent?
- Regarding counter-radicalization work, do you work in partnerships with other organizations?
  - Prompt: How does your organization establish these partnerships? Can you provide specific examples?
- Can you tell me a little bit about strategy development and decision-making process with regards to taking action related to counter-radicalization initiatives?
- Anything else you would like to share?
Appendix 4: Data Coding Protocol

Following the literature review and conceptual framework, the interview data was coded to the following themes.

Experience of CSOs

1. Suspect communities
   a. Radicalization is associated with Islam or Muslims
   b. There is a gap between security and community view of radicalization
   c. Security definition of radicalization is “nebulous”
   d. Security view of radicalization embraces simplistic, linear models whereas radicalization occurs due to complex/structural factors

2. Risk
   a. Radicalization encodes Muslim traits (e.g., religious behaviour) and Muslimness as “risky”
   b. Community resilience assumes that the problem of radicalization is pre-existing among Muslims
   c. Concerns that the national “values” discourse has defined Muslims as risky
   d. CR/Prevent has caused unquantifiable harm to Muslim communities and/or fostered Islamophobia

3. Preemption
   a. CR outreach and engagement is being used for surveillance
   b. Concerns about RCMP and CSIS unsolicited visits
   c. Prevent Duty has changed state-Muslim relations
   d. Using safeguarding under CR/Prevent is problematic
   e. Positive view of safeguarding

Power 1

1. Funding
   a. Noting divisive/controversial effects
   b. Noting threat to organizational independence
   c. Principled boycott
   d. Strategic reluctance
   e. Repackaging existing programs for receiving CR funding
   f. Case by case consideration of security funding
   g. Climate of austerity and broader financial constraints
   h. Relying on alternative funding sources

2. Cooperation
   a. Strategic cooperation/establishing working relationship to influence policymakers
   b. Feeling that is it a duty to cooperate in national security investigations
   c. Cooperating partially while expressing grievances and challenging processes
   d. Voicing uncertainty about the value/effect of outreach & cooperation
   e. Being proactive about setting the terms of relationship with security agencies
3. Legitimacy  
   a. Formal withdrawal of legitimacy by state institutions on grounds of national security (e.g., CRA) seen as biased  
   b. Informal withdrawal of legitimacy by suggesting a CSO has affiliation with listed terrorist groups seen as biased  
   c. Legal challenges to formal and informal withdrawal of legitimacy  
   d. Complying with administrative requirements due to relative lack of power  
   e. Recognitions of delegitimization as state institutions deeming some CSOs as ineligible for CR funding  
   f. Countering delegitimization with refusing CR funding  

Power 2  
1. Exclusion from CR policymaking  
   a. Calling out superficial consultations by state security agencies  
   b. Boycotting participation  
   c. Engagement to lobby for greater oversight/accountability of state security agencies  
   d. Open critique of CR policy, including calls for reform/abolition  
   e. Legislative and lobbying activities to influence CR policies  
   f. Use of special policy advocates (rapporteurs)  
   g. Coordinating with civil rights and human rights organizations  
   h. Attacking legitimacy of policy formation through challenge/critique  

2. Disproportionate targeting of Muslims  
   a. Calling out that the safety of Muslim communities has been sidelined  
   b. Calls to broaden CR reach to target other forms of violence  
   c. Calls to question CR policy foundations instead of widening scope of CR  
   d. Asking why white supremacist violence has been overlooked  
   e. Educating the wider public about Islamophobia  
   f. Running different programs against Islamophobia  
   g. Collaboration with other CSOs and advocating for policy change  
   h. Providing aid to targeted/discriminated people  

Power 3  
1. Demands for transparency/data  
   a. Requesting information and data that inform policy decisions  
   b. Questioning the legitimacy of information sources  
   c. Community-led research  
   d. Demanding justification for anti-Muslim bias  
   e. Pointing out lack of or poor evidence in government research  
   f. Demanding criteria to evaluate/critique  

2. Challenging discourses  
   a. Letters, legal submissions, private meetings  
   b. Challenging media portrayals  
   c. Building media relations  
   d. Advancing alternative discourses  
   e. Using anti-racist, civil rights, equality frame
f. Challenging implicit knowledge in ‘radicalization,’ British values, etc.
g. Pointing out stigmatization

**Power 4**

1. Subjectification and disciplining
   a. Self-censorship & internalizing gov/media discourse
   b. Policing constituents’ speech/action
   c. Trying to appear more Canadian or British (e.g., hockey, “good liberal,” capitalism)
   d. Presenting a “good” Muslim image
Appendix 5: Interview Matrix

The tables below indicate the numbers and percentages of research participants from Muslim CSOs who spoke about a given theme. These data reflect the perspectives of 20 participants from Canada (PCAN) and 10 participants from the U.K. (PUK) with respect to each overarching theme and each subject or CSO response.

**Table 17**  
**Interview Data Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>PCAN</th>
<th>PUK</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>PCAN %</th>
<th>PUK %</th>
<th>TOTAL %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suspect Communities</strong></td>
<td>Radicalization associated with Islam, Muslims, or Islamic ideology</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gap between security and community view of radicalization</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Nebluous&quot; security definition of radicalization is</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security view of radicalization embraces simplistic, linear models whereas radicalization occurs due to complex/structural factors</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk</strong></td>
<td>Radicalization encodes Muslim traits (e.g., religious behaviour) and Muslimness as &quot;risky&quot;</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community resilience assumes that the problem of radicalization is pre-existing among Muslims</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concerns that the national &quot;values&quot; discourse has defined Muslims as risky</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CR/Prevent has caused unquantifiable harm to Muslim communities and/or fostered Islamophobia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preemption</strong></td>
<td>CR outreach and engagement is being used for surveillance</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concerns about RCMP and CSIS unsolicited visits</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>53%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prevent Duty has changed state-Muslim relations</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>5%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<td>Using safeguarding under CR/Prevent is problematic</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>80%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Positive view of safeguarding</td>
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<th>PUK</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>PCAN %</th>
<th>PUK %</th>
<th>TOTAL %</th>
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<td><strong>Funding</strong></td>
<td>Noting divisive/controversial effects</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>60%</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Noting threat to org. independence</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Principled boycott</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic reluctance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>40%</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<td>Repackaging existing programs for receiving CR funding</td>
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<td>Case by case consideration of security funding</td>
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<td>23%</td>
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<td>Climate of austerity and financial constraint</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>17%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Alternative funding sources</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>30%</td>
<td>37%</td>
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<th>Subject</th>
<th>PCAN</th>
<th>PUK</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>PCAN %</th>
<th>PUK %</th>
<th>TOTAL %</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Power 1</strong></td>
<td>Strategic cooperation/establishing working relationship to influence policymakers</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>90%</td>
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<td>70%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feeling that is it a duty to cooperate in national security investigations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperating partially while expressing grievances and challenging processes</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>53%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voicing uncertainty about the values/effect of outreach &amp; cooperation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Being proactive about setting the terms of relationship with security agencies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>10%</td>
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<th>Theme</th>
<th>Subject</th>
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<th>PCAN %</th>
<th>PUK %</th>
<th>TOTAL %</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimacy</strong></td>
<td>Formal withdrawal of legitimacy by state institutions on grounds of national security (e.g., CRA) seen as biased</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal withdrawal of legitimacy by suggesting a CSO has affiliation with listed terrorist groups seen as biased targeting of Muslim CSOs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal challenges to formal &amp; informal withdrawal of legitimacy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complying with admin requirements due to relative lack of power</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delegitimization through ineligibility for funding grants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>7%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Countering delegitimization with boycott/solidarity in refusing CR funding</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Subject</td>
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<td>% PCAN</td>
<td>% PRIK</td>
<td>% TOTAL</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion from Policy Making</td>
<td>Calling out superficial consultations by state security agencies</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boycotting participation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engagement to lobby for greater oversight/accountability of state security agencies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Open critique of CR policy, including calls for reform/abolition</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>37%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Legislative and lobbying activities to influence CR policies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of special policy advocates (rapporteurs)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinating with civil rights and human rights orgs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attacking legitimacy of policy formation through challenge/anti-terror</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disproportionate Targeting of Muslims</td>
<td>Calling out that the safety of Muslim communities has been sidelined</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Calls to broaden CR reach to target other forms of violence</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Calls to question CR policy foundations instead of widening scope of CR</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>37%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asking why white supremacist violence has been overlooked</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>53%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Educating the wider public about Islamophobia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Running different programs against Islamophobia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collaboration with other CSOs and advocating for policy change</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Providing aid to targeted/discriminated people</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power 3</td>
<td>Demands for Transparency &amp; Data</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>37%</td>
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<td>Requesting information and data that inform policy decisions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>40%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Questioning the legitimacy of information sources</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community-led research</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demanding justification for anti-Muslim bias</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pointing out lack of or poor evidence in gov research</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenging Discourses</td>
<td>Letters, legal submissions, private meetings</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Challenging media portrayals</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building media relations</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advancing alternative discourses</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Using anti-racist, civil rights frame</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Challenging implicit knowledge in &quot;radicalization,&quot; British values, etc.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pointing out stigmatization</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>57%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power 4</td>
<td>Subjectification &amp; Disciplining</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>53%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-censorship &amp; internalizing gov/media discourse</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policing constituents' speech/action (include here: banning people/acts that might appear extremist)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trying to appear more Canadian or British (e.g., hockey, &quot;good liberal,&quot; capitalism)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 6: Grants and Contributions - Community Resilience Fund (Public Safety Canada)

Table 18
Projects funded by Public Safety Canada through the Community Resilience Fund between 2016 and 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization, Place &amp; Program</th>
<th>Grant Amount</th>
<th>Duration (yrs)</th>
<th>Budget year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project type - Police-led</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario Provincial Police - CVE e-learning project on radicalization</td>
<td>$40,811</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2016-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$87,355</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2017-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calgary ReDirect</td>
<td>$1,300,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2017-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmonton Police Service - Resiliency Project</td>
<td>$2,266,807</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2017-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.C. Ministry of Public Safety - Shift B.C.</td>
<td>$2,000,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2018-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCUS Toronto</td>
<td>$1,048,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2018-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERIT Ottawa</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2018-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project type – Online / technology related CR effort</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project SOMEONE - Concordia University</td>
<td>$366,921</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2016-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moonshot CVE - Redirect Method</td>
<td>$1,500,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2018-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MediaSmarts/HabiloMédias - Pushing back against online hate</td>
<td>$107,146</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2017-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$539,462</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2019-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QuantSpark Foundation - Tech Against Terrorism</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2019-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YWCA Canada - Block Hate (online)</td>
<td>$759,762</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2019-20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Project type - Research / mapping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization, Place &amp; Program</th>
<th>Grant Amount</th>
<th>Duration (yrs)</th>
<th>Budget year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SecDev Foundation - Public health model monitoring of online risk factors for PVE</td>
<td>$112,650</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2016-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moonshot CVE - Assessment of online rad</td>
<td>$227,930</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2016-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Waterloo - Foreign Fighters Radicalization</td>
<td>$256,950</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2016-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association for Canadian Studies - Public Perception on radicalization</td>
<td>$147,798</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2016-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queen's University - Centre for International and Defence Policy</td>
<td>$105,800</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2016-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University College London, University of New Brunswick, University of Waterloo - Terrorism Risk Assessment Tools</td>
<td>$546,405</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2017-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRLV, Montreal - families and violent extremism</td>
<td>$60,595</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2017-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryerson University - Australia and UK comparisons</td>
<td>$546,000</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2017-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Québec, Montreal - CEPN anti-radicalization research</td>
<td>$1,657,234</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2017-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Québec in Montréal, Sherbrooke University, Concordia University - CPN PREV</td>
<td>$1,500,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2018-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Ontario Institute of Technology - Right-wing extremism scan in Canada</td>
<td>$366,985</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2018-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston Children's Hospital, McGill University - Resiliency and violent extremism</td>
<td>$348,538</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2018-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Fraser University - Schools and PVE</td>
<td>$61,050</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2018-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryerson University - Reporting Thresholds Replication Study</td>
<td>$415,317</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2019-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cégep Édouard-Montpetit - Far right in QC</td>
<td>$304,253</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2019-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moonshot CVE - Research on Global Incel community</td>
<td>$494,165</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2019-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leiden University - Non-involvement in terrorism</td>
<td>$423,847</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2019-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishop's University - research into generativity and violent extremism</td>
<td>$206,880</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2020-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGill University Health Center Research Institute - Evaluation of an intervention model addressing violent radicalization</td>
<td>$1,706,617</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2020-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Québec, Montreal, Partnering in Practice - Preventing Social Polarizations II (PIP2)</td>
<td>$149,885</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2020-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization, Place &amp; Program</td>
<td>Grant Amount</td>
<td>Duration (yrs)</td>
<td>Budget year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Prevention of Violence (OPV)</td>
<td>$1,293,763</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2017-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Howard Society - Project ReSet</td>
<td>$1,750,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2018-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRLV - Mentorship Program</td>
<td>$156,944</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2019-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorktown Family Services - Behavioural health model</td>
<td>$2,335,302</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2019-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Students Commission of Canada - Impact the Outcome anti-radicalization community workshops</td>
<td>$73,300</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2019-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute for Strategic Dialogue - Extreme Dialogue</td>
<td>$397,464</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2020-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aurora Family Therapy Centre - Supporting Counter-Radicalization Efforts by Ethno-cultural Networks (SCREEN)</td>
<td>$1,822,913</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2020-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Ark Centre for Excellence - Community Action for Muslim Youth Integration</td>
<td>$96,630</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2020-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les YMCA du Québec - youth participation workshops on radicalization and identity</td>
<td>$75,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2020-21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* The table is based on publicly accessible information supplemented with information provided by the Government of Canada in response to *Access to Information Act* request (Public Safety Canada, 2021, pp. 1062–1066). In the above table, * indicates a one-time grant. As of February 11, 2020, the CRF had funded a total of 30 projects totaling $21,628,867 (Public Safety Canada, 2020b). To date, the Canadian Ark Centre for Excellence is the only Muslim CSO that has received CRF funding.