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YUGOSLAVIA'S DISINTEGRATION: AN INTERPRETATION

by

DEJAN GUZINA, B.A. Hons.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
August 25, 1995
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YUGOSLAVIA'S DISINTEGRATION: AN INTERPRETATION  

submitted by  
Dejan Guzina, B.A. Hons.  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the degree of Master of Arts  

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ABSTRACT

This thesis offers a particular understanding of the self-destructive mechanism of the Yugoslav socialist self-management system. The emphasis is on the ways in which the institutional arrangement of the idea of communism within the constraining framework of multi-ethnic community was transformed to its very opposite - the confederal organization of the states, that base their legitimacy on the ideology of ethnic nationalism. Since such collectivist type of nationalism relies upon the essentialization of differences between "us" and "them", the very concept of ethnic nationalism seems to "favor" the means of ethnic war to achieving the political aim of the nationalist elites in creating a nation-state. In this regard, this thesis outlines the extent to which the ideology and praxis of the Yugoslav socialist system can be understood as the most responsible for the hindrance of the emergence of the pan-Yugoslav democratic movement, as well as the rise of the post-communist ideologies of mutually exclusive ethnic nationalisms.

Nonetheless, unlike the predominant "realpolitik" interpretations of the causes of the violent breakdown of Yugoslavia, as well as their reductionist understanding as to "who are the good guys to be assisted, and the bad guys to be punished," this thesis pinpoints the role of the essentialization of the imageries of the Balkans as barbarous and uncivilized. It is the understanding of the author of this thesis that such "modes of inquiry", no matter whether they emanate outside or within the region, represent not only the crucial methodological impediment towards analyzing Yugoslavia's disintegration, but also a powerful political tool in the "realpolitik" considerations about the future of the newly emerged post-Yugoslav nation states.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to my advisor Dr. Piotr Dutkiewicz for his guidance and support throughout my entire graduate studies, particularly for his patience and trust in me during the work on this thesis. I would also like to thank Dr. John H. Sugler for introducing the world of new paradigms which stimulated me to perceive Yugoslavia's disintegration from different perspective(s). My gratitude should be extended to Dr. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone for her inspiring lectures and encouragement during my first days at Carleton University. Thanks to Antonio Franceschet for his critical comments as well as for helping me express my ideas in clear English.

Finally, without my wife's endless support and patience, it would not have been possible to answer the responsible and gratifying role of a father of two during the work on this thesis. All my love goes to Gordana, Isidora and Filip.
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are in many ways persistent, because they are provoked by the very forces of the
globalized world economy liberalism thought to work against them.\textsuperscript{12}

In the end, these two faces of nationalism (and communism), brought
together in the specific historical, political and economic context of Yugoslavia,
do not derive their significance because of the actual territory on which such
technological and essentialist aspects of nationalism work hand in hand. The
destructive pattern of reason and unreason at work in the former Yugoslavia can be
found elsewhere across time and space (e.g., Nazi Germany after the Weimar
years, or Iran in the early 1980s). In other words, the significance of the Yugoslav
story is not in showing what happened in the Balkans during the 1970s and 1980s,
but in enlightening the ways in which particular ideas and situational conditions
influence each other while creating particular identities and realities. The
elements of this interplay are not specific to any culture, land or people, and,
therefore, can, under similar conditions, be put to work anywhere else with equally
great results.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} On the understanding of the process of globalization as a paradoxical universalization
of particular and the particularization of universal see Roland Robertson, \textit{Globalization Social
Theory and Global Culture} (London: Sage, 1992)

\textsuperscript{13} It is for these reasons that the great French writer warns us that "the plague bacillus
never dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant for years and years in furniture and lined
chest; that it bides its time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and bookshelves, and that perhaps the day
would come when, for the bane and the enlightening of men, it would rouse up in rats again and
send them forth to die in a happy city." See Albert Camus, \textit{The Plague} (Middlesex, England
Penguin Modern Classics, 1971), 252
be reached, the following chapters will be dedicated to such a task. However, the purpose of the introduction of this thesis is to delineate the main hypotheses of my own approach to interpreting the meaning and symbolism entailed by the collapse of Yugoslavia, an approach that will serve as the basis for offering tentative explanations and suggestions for Yugoslavia's violent break-up.¹

Coping with the multifaceted reality of the Yugoslav system and its disintegration has forced me to apply an equally multidimensional approach. Therefore, while I will be using more "conventional" approaches of institutional and political economy analyses. I will also appeal to Edward Said's and Maria Todorova's critique of "orientalist" and "balkanist" discourse(s).² Still, such deliberate eclecticism does not mean that the following chapters will lack important points of convergence that will preserve the firm structure of the paper, and thus answer the task of offering a coherent (or, at least, as much as it is possible) account on the underlying and proximate causes of Yugoslavia's disintegration.

Liah Greenfeld's understanding that the images and perceptions of reality should be contextualized within the ideological, political, economic and sociocultural "situational constraints" will be used to provide these points of convergence, and will serve to link different aspects and dimensions of

¹ If this seems to be "pretentious", the reason lies in the author's need to respond to the moral/intellectual responsibility of being faithful to oneself. Faithfulness that can be achieved, in the words of Julia Kristeva, only at the price of becoming a dissident, "a stranger to country, language, sex - indeed any notion of a sovereign identity of man." Qt in Richard K. Ashley, "Living on Border Lines. Man, Poststructuralism, and War." in International Intertextual Relations, ed. James Der Denan & Michael J. Shapiro (New York. Lexington Books. 1989). 313

² The reasons for such "strangeness" are personal for the author came to Canada as a Yugoslav diplomat, only to find himself being "fortunate" to be in the position to choose to stay here and thus trade his previously defined identities for the sense of rootedness and strangeness.

Yugoslavia’s disintegration Greenfeld maintains that social order (the overall structure of society) represents a materialization of the images people possess of themselves. Still, the links between the two are not direct, i.e., the (nationalist, communist, fundamentalist, etc.) imagery is not capable of completely shaping its social and political expressions. Thus, due to the existence of the situational constraints, not only the images but social reality itself will eventually vanish and be replaced with new images and corresponding realities.

In the case of Yugoslavia the imagery of communism was certainly the idea with enough power to impose its own imprint on social structures. And yet, at the end of the process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, the imagery of ethnic nationalism with its own distinct realities became predominant. In the analysis of the “black box” of the Yugoslav metamorphosis, emphasizing the links between the images and perceptions of society with the existing material conditions will be an invaluable tool in the analysis of Yugoslavia. Accordingly, I have tried to design each chapter to represent one single point of departure or set of interrelated aspects (dimensions) of the very same phenomenon I am concerned with—the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Thus, the application of Greenfeld’s methodological framework does not preclude other approaches. On the contrary, since there are several dimensions to the Yugoslav story, the usage of different conceptual tools to the analysis of the interplay among distinct perceptions, ideas, ideologies, institutional and material conditions, as well as their situationing within a broader global context, is certainly theoretically justified from such a perspective.

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5 See Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1992). It should be noted at the outset of this paper that the term “situational constraints” is somewhat misleading. “Situational constraints” can not be understood solely as impeding the full realization of some ideas in the material world; they also have to be understood as conditions that favor certain type of outcomes at the expense of others.
Following this broad approach, the first chapter will be dedicated towards the critique of the imageries of the Balkans. Although the "orientalist" and "balkanist" conceptualization of Balkan events gained momentum after the collapse of Yugoslavia, the reason I start from the chronological end of the Yugoslav story lies in today's prevalent understanding that the situation "there in the Balkans" is just another page of violence in the all too repetitive Balkan history. However, there is much more into the story of Yugoslavia's disintegration! After all, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Dresden were not destroyed by the barbarous Huns, but by the defenders of the supreme virtues of Western civilization, which perhaps demonstrates the readiness for destruction that is embedded in every nation, culture or individual. The nineteenth century Western European imperialism and twentieth century totalitarianism of Eastern Europe are more than sufficient confirmation of Arendt's view that faceless violence is rooted in the very condition of modernity, and that, for example, fascism can not be understood simply as a specifically German characteristic (or, ethnic cleansing as a Balkan or Serbian one).  

From this perspective, the perception of the Balkans as "barbarous" is not only insufficient when explaining the questions of Yugoslavia's dissolution into the violence, destruction and hatred among former neighbors, but more importantly, such "mode of inquiry" emerges as the crucial methodological impediment towards analyzing Yugoslavia's disintegration, the very event it claims to explain. In other words, the dissemination of one-dimensional images of the Balkans tends to constantly perpetuate the Balkan question, and, thus, in a perverse way, to preserve the "truthfulness" of the "western" image of the Balkans as uncivilized.

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Chapter 2 is based on Said’s notion that identities of “us” and “them” always involve a contest among individuals and institutions over appropriating historic, social, political and cultural processes that define a certain society. From this viewpoint, it will be argued that in the case of Yugoslavia national historiographies were never truly about the past. Quite the contrary, they emerged as a powerful aid to nationalistic politicians only to disseminate the two most widespread myths about the Balkans. The first one is that of the “ancient hatred between the Serbs and the Croats”, while the second one is the “fact” about Yugoslavia being the artificial creation of the Versailles Treaty. In both cases, the purpose was to identify the continued existence of Yugoslavia with human sacrifice and loss. Accordingly, it will be argued that national historiographies as creators of “adversarial knowledge” can hardly be understood as unbiased or politically neutral. They are closely related to the production of a knowledge that is inseparable from power relations, and as such they are one of the key factors that have led to Yugoslavia’s disintegration, providing republican elites with the intellectual justification for the ethnocratic policies they were pursuing. In other words, if we had read more carefully what “national” intellectuals were writing, we should not have been surprised with the level of destruction and violence that followed Yugoslavia’s break up.

In this light, it has to be noted that before the beginning of the siege of Sarajevo, the tragedy of the totally destroyed city of Vukovar forced Bogdan Bogdanovic, the most prominent architect of the former Yugoslavia, to identify such actions and policies as the “ritual of city killing”. The “diabolical” choice of the most beautiful former Yugoslav cities: Dubrovnik, Osijek, Vukovar, Mostar, Zadar, Sarajevo..., some of them already transformed into rubble, uncovers the

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7 See “Ritualno ubijanje gradova.” in Druga Srbija (Beograd: Plato, Beogradski krug & Borba, 1992), 34-36
intentions of the barbarians: not to merely kill or ethnically cleanse, but even more, to humiliate the very notion and symbol of the *city*. As Bogdanovic reminds us, the meaning of the term *city* is etymologically connected with the terms of "citizen" and "cosmopolitan" - the terms that have defined our civilization for centuries. Therefore, if the symbolism of these words is destroyed and erased from our collective memory, what remains is our identification as "Serb. Croat. Muslim... nationality. tribalism"; all of which provide a narrow conceptual space which is both anachronistic and incompatible with the ideals of modernity. Nonetheless, all of these "anachronisms" were espoused by the ideologues of "cultural" nationalism as the only way towards protecting "our" identities against "theirs".

Yet, such consequences of the "ritual of city killing" need not surprise us. For if the city (polis) is the space which gathers together different identities and unites them in a common identity (qua citizen), which transcends or reconciles differences of ethnic origin or religious background (without nullifying them), then the strategy of city destroying is nothing less than the call for ethnic and religious conflicts that were supposed to be superseded by the development of the polis. Also, this implies that what is at issue here is not the (modern) city versus the (pastoral or traditional) country, but rather the city as polis (public space of equals, protected by citizenship rights) versus city as defined by modern barbarians (or, should we say, historians and ideologues of "cultural" exclusivistic nationalisms), for whom the notion of city is based on the idea of sameness (national, religious, cultural).

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8 Ibid., 35
The central part of this thesis (in Chapter 3) will focus on the system, the people, and the events that allowed the imagery of ethnic nationalism to become predominant in the years preceding the war. In that sense, the institutional set up of the country, which was based on the application of Lenin’s maxim that communist federations should be “socialist in content and national in form,” will be granted the role of the most important constraining factor while dealing with the causes of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Since the ideological rigidity prevented the founding fathers of the Yugoslav self-management system to look for the solution to Yugoslavia’s cleavages in direction of its genuine democratization, Yugoslavia was reduced to the cartelized power system of republican oligarchies.

However, since at the same time the Yugoslav federal units were defined strictly in ethnic terms, the communists themselves planted the seed of nationalism into the very foundation of Yugoslavia. In the course of events, the rules of non-interference into the affairs of other federal units effectively hindered any economic or political reform that might contradict regional particular interests. Unfortunately, the side-effect of those rules has been the blockage of the emergence of pan-Yugoslav political movement that would be based on liberal ideas of individual freedoms and citizenship rights. Instead, as will be shown in the thesis, the political space that had been freed with the delegitimization of the communist phraseology was filled with the collectivistic ideology of ethnic

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10 Nonetheless, I will not ignore the type of images expressed by Picasso’s infamous “Guernica”, a painting that has become a symbol of resistance to the absurdity of 20th century predatory wars. Nor am I unaware of the bitter irony that today we no longer require a Picasso Painting, as a medium of representation, has been replaced by television technology, making us both witnesses and collaborators to the many instantaneous and new Guernicas on our screens at Vukovar, Sarajevo, Grozny. Thus, while this paper will not explicitly deal with the war, its shadow will be present on each page.

11 The enlightening discussion on different aspects of the former Yugoslav quid pro quo policy can be found in Laslo Sekelj. Yugoslavia The Process of Disintegration (New York Columbia UP, 1993).
nationalism. Consequently, the collapse of Yugoslavia coincided with the transformation of the former Yugoslav republics into "nation" states.

The role of the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic can not be understated in the collapse of Yugoslavia. Yet, it will not be granted a central place. Neither Milosevic, nor Croatian and Slovenian presidents Franjo Tudjman and Milan Kucan can be seen as the principal culprits of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Instead, they will be presented as its main executioners. I am not implying that Milosevic, or anyone else who had been deeply involved in the process of "fostering" the crisis and eventual war in Yugoslavia can be freed from many responsibilities - moral, historical, or legal! My point is simply that the collapse of Yugoslavia can not be understood by narrowly focusing on the role of one or couple of personalities. Hence, the predominant "realpolitik" explanations of the Yugoslav collapse, that are typically "supported" by endless historical examples "confirming" the symbolism of the Balkans, will be discarded altogether as credible explanations of the causes of Yugoslavia's disintegration.

In that sense, nationalism in Yugoslavia has always shown two distinct faces: a "rational" one, as a powerful political technology of communist (as well as postcommunist) leaders seeking to legitimize their interests; and an "essentialist" one, perceived as a search of communist (as well as postcommunist) societies for identity within the distinctively modern framework of an expanding global market economy, budget constraints, mass unemployment and the political culture of intolerance. Yet, the contemporary liberal notion that our particularistic identities (e.g., national, religious, cultural) are just transitional impediments towards an economically homogenized and politically liberalized world seems inept. The paradox of the globalization process is such that our distinctive particular identities
are in many ways persistent, because they are provoked by the very forces of the
globalized world economy liberalism thought to work against them.\(^{12}\)

In the end, these two faces of nationalism (and communism), brought
together in the specific historical, political and economic context of Yugoslavia,
do not derive their significance because of the actual territory on which such
technological and essentialist aspects of nationalism work hand in hand. The
destructive pattern of reason and unreason at work in the former Yugoslavia can be
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\(^{12}\) On the understanding of the process of globalization as a paradoxical universalization
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\(^{13}\) It is for these reasons that the great French writer warns us that "the plague bacillus
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would come when, for the bane and the enlightening of men, it would rouse up in rats again and
send them forth to die in a happy city." See Albert Camus, *The Plague* (Middlesex, England
Penguin Modern Classics, 1971), 252.
Chapter 1

Journey through the Night: From Geopolitics of Balkanization to Discourse on Balkanism

Balkanism Balkanization: 1. the term that has been coined in the West supposedly to indicate public mores and customs that are prevailing in the public life in the Balkans: lack of principles, means justifies ends policy, deceit, bribery, political assassinations, passion for enrichment, servitude towards superior and crudeness towards lower on the social ladder. Compare with Byzantium.¹

If European identity, as Agnes Heller has maintained, is characterized by the "recognition of the accomplishments of others." then "the myth of Occident and Orient is not a juxtaposition of civilization with barbarism but rather of one civilization with another." and "European (Western) cultural identity has been conceived as both ethnocentric and anti-ethnocentric." If Europe has produced not only racism but anti-racism, not only misogyny but also feminism, not only anti-Semitism but also its repudiation, then what can be termed "Balkanism" has not yet been coupled with its complementing and ennobling antithesis.²

1.1 Introduction

For many of its former citizens, Yugoslavia was a peaceful and relatively prosperous modern European country. Yet, the decade of economic hardship and political instability in the 1980s produced another type of reality that, in a stark way, resembles the brutal and fearsome experiences of World War II in the Balkans, an era which most of us thought forever gone. It is this apparent similarity between the 1940s and the late 1980s that forces foreign observers, as well as local participants, to claim that everything that is happening to former Yugoslav lands and their peoples is just another bleak page of violence and

² Maria Todorova. "The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention." Slavic Review 53, no 2 (Summer 1994) 452
destruction in the already too repetitive story of the Yugoslav state. This, on the other side, seems to fully justify the popular perception in the West of the Balkans as the synonym for "reversion to the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the barbarian." Accordingly, when the collapse of communism in the Balkans did not open the door for the triumphal entrance of liberalism, policy and analysis gave way to "bogus historical parallels drawn from textbooks and newspaper reminiscences." 

Not so surprisingly, the biggest "invention" of political pundits and academics was that Yugoslavia was built across a civilizational and cultural zone of fault lines! Not knowing that the Balkans, in Stephen Pavlowitch's succinct phrase, are made up not only of fractures and watersheds, but also of passageways and crossroads, overnight Balkanologists ended up essentializing the supposedly irreconcilable historical, economic, political, territorial and cultural diversities that have always existed in Yugoslavia. Consequently, the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia - an unhappy child of the Versailles Treaty, as we are so often told - became the inevitable outcome of a false and imposed experiment in supranational engineering which did not take into account such "primordial" differences.

In the subsequent sections of this chapter, the imageries of the Balkans that emanate outside the region will be critically assessed, following Edward Said's and Maria Todorova's critique of "orientalist" and "balkanist" discourses. Samuel P. Huntington's understanding of global politics, as well as George Kennan's portrait of the Balkans, will be exposed as examples of the "orientalist" and "balkanist" discourses, which serve the purpose of creating and maintaining relations of domination between the "analyst" and the "object" of study. Thus, in

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3 Ibid., 53.
4 Steven K. Pavlowitch, "Who is 'Balkanizing' Whom? The Misunderstanding Between the Debris of Yugoslavia and an Unprepared West." Daedalus 123, no. 1 (Spring 1994) 215
5 Ibid., 216
the following pages the orientalist and balkanist discourses will be presented as one of the crucial methodological impediments towards analyzing Yugoslavia's disintegration. Moreover, it will be argued that through the essentialisation of the negative and one sided images of the Balkans, "orientalist" and "balkanist" discourses can be understood as the factors that also work towards constantly perpetuating the crisis, and thus preserving the "truthfulness" of the imageries of the barbarous Balkans.

1.2 Orientalist Discourse and Contemporary Global Politics

For Huntington, the end of the Cold War has brought about an end to economic and political conflicts in the world. Instead of ideological kinship, new alliances are emerging in its place, comprised of nations that share the same cultural background and belong to the same civilization. In such a world, the principal conflicts of global politics are likely to occur between nations and groups of different civilizations because the interactions among people of different civilizations "invigorate differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history". The fault lines between civilizations are becoming "the battle lines of the future", of which the most important one in Europe is the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500. In the Balkans this line coincides with the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires, which today separates Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of former Yugoslavia. On the Western side of the

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6 Samuel P Huntington. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no 3 (Summer 1993) 26. For Huntington civilization is the highest and broadest level of cultural identity, which is defined by "common objective elements" such as history, religion, language, customs, institutions etc. According to him, people have different levels of identity, i.e., somebody can be a Roman, Italian, European or Westerner, but this person can not become a cosmopolitan, because there are no bridges among different civilizations: "The civilization to which he (sic) belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he (sic) intensely identifies" (p. 24).
border is a civilization based upon Western Christianity that is characterized by the common experiences of feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, etc. On the Eastern side of the border are the Orthodox and Moslem civilizations that have never been strongly influenced by the Western experiences that became the foundation of a Western liberal economic and political system.

But, what are the "facts" entailed by such an understanding of the war in Yugoslavia? Does this mean that it is "our" (read, Western Christian) turn now to raise the Berlin Wall, in order to protect Western cultural ideals from the tides of eastern chaos? What kind of questions are suppressed by such a "civilizational" perspective? For example, how can such an approach help explain the rise of Fascism and Nazism within Western borders in the countries where the Renaissance and Reformation have also been founded? Or, is Huntington's article written with the aim of reaching policy makers, more than his colleagues in academia?

The "Clash of Civilizations" is the product of Huntington's work on the project "The Changing Security Environment and American National Interests", which was done under the auspices of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at the Harvard University. It is an excellent example of the US International Relations tradition of identifying the foreign policy relevant issues and suggesting how the US should respond to international challenges. Also, to the extent that Huntington delineates different approaches the Unites States (or the West, since he uses these terms interchangeably) should pursue to protect their interests and culture, the article cannot be understood as an analysis of global politics. Instead, the "clash of civilization" thesis emerges as Huntington's

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contribution to the debate among American scholars and policy makers about the agenda the US faces after the collapse of communism and the end of Cold War. If I am correct about Huntington’s intentions, then, when he writes, “[T]he Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe.” this is not just an empirical statement but, at the same time, a suggestion for policy makers aimed at directing the American foreign policy. To this extent, the following remarks leave little doubt about Huntington’s list of challenges (threats) that are facing the US in the near future:

Some openings in Arab political systems have already occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist movements. In the Arab World, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. ... In Eurasia the great historic fault lines between civilizations are once more aflame. This is particularly true along the boundaries of the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc of nations from the bulge of Africa to central Asia. Violence also occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Philippines. Islam has bloody borders. ... If they [Russians] reject liberal democracy and begin behaving like Russians [read, traditional, authoritarian, nationalist] but not like Westerners, the relations between Russia and the West could again become distant and conflictual.  

8 Huntington, 31.
9 Ibid., 32, 36, 44. Against such an "analysis" of contemporary global politics we can posit Roland Robertson’s thesis on the paradoxes of globalization. The universalization of the particular and particularization of the universal; liberal and ethnic; homogenous and heterogeneous; McWorld and Jihad; they are all part and parcel of the same globalization process. and none of the civilizations are excluded from it. The globalization of these paradoxes does not necessarily mean that we will end up living in a "better" world than the one expressed by the bipolar logic of the Cold War. Unfortunately, the marriage between McWorld and Jihad in Oklahoma City and Japan’s metro stations give us enough reason not to be overly optimistic. Still, Robertson’s approach allows us to understand that the communicative channels among distinct cultures and civilizations are not only possible but the central characteristic of the globalization process. Thus is something the "clash of civilizations" thesis completely misses. See Globalization, Social Theory and Global Culture.
Huntington's portrayal of the virtues of Western civilization can only be sustained by positing them against the vices of other cultures (primarily: Islamic, Confucian and Orthodox Christian). Thus, his proposition seems only to invigorate the problems of a world community. For these reasons, Edward Said insists that today one can write about "Western civilization" only from an ideological perspective. He attributes to Huntington "a sort of detached superiority for a handful of values and ideas, none of which has much meaning outside the history of conquest, immigration, travel and the mingling of peoples that gave the Western nations their present mixed identities".\textsuperscript{10} Said concludes that Huntington's "far from convincing" thesis on inter-civilizational conflicts is but another attempt in producing and falsifying the "West" and the "Orient".

In other words, the "clash of civilization" thesis can be understood as the prime example of how "theorists and apologists of an exultant Western tradition" have the power and capacity to "retain a good deal of their hold on public consciousness," thus legitimating their standards as the Western standards.\textsuperscript{11} Therefore, such Huntington-type of analysis emerges not only as a methodological impediment towards a better understanding of the conflicts in the Balkans and other hotbeds of crisis in the world, but also as a constraining factor which covertly present the interest of power politics as analysis itself.

1.3 The Rhetoric of Balkanization

Contours of the "balkanist" discourse have already been delineated in my exposure of Huntington's thesis as just another example of "orientalist" discourse. However, Maria Todorova has recently argued for the need to treat "balkanism" on


\textsuperscript{11} Ibid, p 5.
its own, and not just as a "sub-species of orientalism." Following Foucault and Said in developing her arguments, she insists that the critique of colonialism has not led to the "critiques of domination and dependence outside the colonial context, as in the case of the Balkans." What makes "Balkanism" idiosyncratic is the fact that the Balkans are at the same time geographically part of Europe, yet culturally constructed as "the other" of Europe. This positioning of the Balkans within the two spheres - one geographical and the other symbolical - has enabled the "West" to externalize the Balkans as "a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the 'European' and 'the west' has been constructed". The function of such imagery is to exempt "'the west' from charges of racism, colonialism, Eurocentrism and Christian intolerance. The Balkans, after all, are in Europe, they are white and they are predominantly Christian." 

James Der Derian offers a somewhat different reading of such symbolism. The common understanding of the term "Balkanization" implies the condition of mutual hostility among neighboring states following the collapse of a larger political unit. Der Derian maintains that such a definition is perhaps meaningless given that the entire history of the state-system and international relations could be seen as that of balkanization, i.e., as a process of breaking existing structures into

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12 Todorova, 453.
13 Ibid., 454. Another "ism" that can be posited against Balkanism is Central-Europism. If the Balkans are to be labeled as the Mr. Hyde of Europe, then, according to Milan Kundera, Central Europe is the representative of the best Western values. As it is always the case with such symbolic constructions, in order to be persuasive they have to rely on the "abomnable Other". In Kundera's case it is Russia with its authoritarian-type civilization that belongs to Asia rather than Europe. It is not surprising that in the eve of Yugoslavia's collapse the same debate over virtues of Central-Europism touched the Balkans. Many prominent Slovenian and Croatian intellectuals traded Yugoslav for newly rediscovered Central-European identity, while Serbian intellectuals could not help themselves but to understand a rediscovered interest in "Mitteleuropa" as a new "Drang nach Osten". A very good introduction to Central European debate is In Search of Central Europe, ed. George Schopflin and Nancy Wood (Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books, 1989)
smaller pieces (the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire, the rise of nationalism, the process of decolonialization). But, he also points out the significant links between the usage of “balkanization” and the larger question of order. In other words, whenever such a term is being used, the real issue is - what kind of order is being produced by balkanization? According to Der Derian's words, that “balkanization has legs”. A certain type of behavior, whether in the Balkans, Burundi or anywhere else, is labeled as such. Therefore we are at liberty to create our own understanding as regards what should replace it.

According to Der Derian, between the two World Wars the term “balkanization” was used to delineate the two most articulate ideas of order at the time - a Wilsonian and a Marxist one. These world views had been using “balkanization” to define their own “solutions” to the question of world order. “for the Marxists balkanization or federation, barbarism or socialism, nationalism or internationalism; for the Wilsonians, balkanization or confederation, despotism or liberal constitutionalism, nationalism or cosmopolitanism.” Times have changed, but Der Derian maintains that both views have proved unable to solve “the fundamental contradiction between the principle of self-determination and the requirements of international order.” Having in mind the contradictions between the principle of the right of nations to self-determination and the requirements of international order, questions emerge as to what kind of new world order is being offered today when the balkanization discourse is back to its “country of origin”? What does it means for the Balkans, for the term itself, and finally for us all?

15 Ibid., 491
16 Ibid., 491.
Although in most English language dictionaries the prime example of balkanization can be found in the hostilities among the Balkan states after the Balkan wars in 1912-1913, the term itself was coined in the 1920s.17 From our contemporary perspective of becoming witnesses to yet another Balkan war, it is interesting that the Fact-finding Commission of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in its 1914 report on the causes of the Balkan wars never emphasized the rhetoric of balkanization. Despite all the atrocities the warring sides committed against civilians in the period 1912-1914, the members were able to resist the overwhelming power of over-generalization and labeling. Their credo is best encapsulated in the following words:

The real culprits in this long list of executions, assassinations, drownings, burnings, massacres, and atrocities, furnished by our report, are not, we repeat, the Balkan peoples. Here pity must conquer indignation. Do not let us condemn victims... The real culprits are those who by interest or inclination, declaring that war is inevitable, end by making it so, asserting that they are powerless to prevent it... What is the duty of the civilized world in the Balkans?... It is clear in the first place that they should cease to exploit these nations for gain. They should encourage them to make arbitration treaties and insist upon making them. They should set a good example by seeking a judicial settlement of all international disputes.18

The First World War erupted the same year this report was published, showing that the report came too late and that the "civilized" world did not stop exploiting small nations for its gain. Today, with the eruption of the "Third" Balkan War, the Report's findings and suggestions are once again ignored. The experiences of 1912-1913 have been decontextualized only to essentialize the Balkans as the land of "the other".

17 See Der Dernt 487
18 Qt in Todorova. 455-456
The realist guru of American foreign policy and former Ambassador to Yugoslavia, George F. Kennan, has undertaken such a task. Ironicallly, his "deconstruction" of the Report's findings was done under the full support of the Carnegie Endowment itself, that decided to reprint the Report in 1993 with the new introduction written by Kennan. The idea was to bridge those two events, and, according to the president of the Carnegie Endowment, Morton Abramowitz, the man best suited for the job was Kennan, so that we "all now benefit from his insight, his sure sense of history, and his felicitous style." While I am unaware and unconcerned of his style, it is important to note Kennan's particular insights and sense of history of the Balkans. There is much to disagree with here.

Kennan maintains that the importance of the Report for the 1990s lies primarily "in the light it casts on the excruciating situation prevailing today in the same Balkan world with which it dealt." Unlike the writers of the Report written in 1914, who begged for readers' understanding that the real victims were the Balkan peoples, he suggests that at the beginning of the twentieth century the Balkan states (Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Romania) have been ruled by monarchs who were "as a rule somewhat more moderate and thoughtful than their subjects." But, in the subsequent paragraph, Kennan adds that in the end there is not so much difference between the Balkan peoples and their leaders. Once the forces of modern nationalism have touched the Balkans, "nowhere did this have a more violent, intoxicated effect than on the politicians and military leaders of the newly founded Balkan countries. ... And it was hard for people who had recently achieved so much, and this so suddenly, to know where to stop."

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20 Qt. in Todorova, 456.
21 Kennan, 5.
22 Ibid., 3
Hence, everything is exactly the same eighty years later. Despite tremendous change in the rest of Europe, the Balkans still threatens the peace in Europe. In Kennan's words, "this writer knows of no evidence that the ability of the Balkan peoples to interact peaceably with one another is any greater now than it was those eighty years ago." For Kennan, it is a puzzle that needs to be solved. However, so far his "historical insights" have told us that only politically naive believe (as he seems to believe of the authors of the original Report) that liberal values can be introduced to peoples "less moderate" than their rulers, who on their side do not know "where to stop". To answer the Balkan puzzle, therefore, Kennan has to look for the other side.

Fascinated with such resistance of the Balkan people to change, Kennan offers the realist mishmash of "historical insights", "cultural" understanding of the region and skepticism towards the liberal idea of progress as the panacea for everything. Obviously, he says, it is a problem "with very deep historical roots". But, "one must not be too hard on the Turks", since the roots of the problem reach back even before them in the Byzantine penetration of the Balkans. The developments of those earlier ages had the effect. Kennan insists, of "thrusting into the southern reaches of the European continent a salient of non-European civilization which has continued to the present day..." Thus, Europe is vindicated, saved from the embarrassment of the Balkans being considered a part of Europe:

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23 Ibid., 7
24 However, the Croatian nationalist intellectuals need not celebrate too early. Although everything in Kennan's arguments implies the clear cut border between Europe and non-Europe, with one stroke of the pen, the Croats are put into the same category as the Serbs. The only one who are saved from the Balkans are Slovenes, "who are really an alpine people, and who will, let us hope, remain remote from Balkan political affairs". The reason for putting the Serbs and the Croats into the same basket is that, despite Kennan's Byzantine phraseology, he sees the aggressive nationalism as the strongest motivating factor involved in the Balkan:
25 Ibid., 6, 7
It will be argued that these states of mind [non-European] are not peculiar to the Balkan people - that they can be encountered among other European peoples as well. True enough, but all these distinctions are relative ones. It is the undue predominance among the Balkan peoples of these particular qualities that seems to be decisive as a determinant of the troublesome, baffling, and dangerous situation that marks that part of the world today.²⁶

Accordingly, Kennan’s “historical insights” are based on the assumption that whether it is 1913 or 1993 we are dealing with the same Balkan world. However, the Balkans that were inflicted with the Balkan wars in 1912-1913 are not the same Balkan world of today. In fact, the only country that connects those two years is Serbia, while in 1912-1913, both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were still the part of the “civilized” Hapsburg Empire. Thus, they were excluded from the wars in the South of the Balkans. Wars that concern not only the efforts on the part of the newly emerged Balkan countries to carve up as much territory as possible, but that also concerns the way the European great powers dealt with the “Eastern Question”, i.e., with the dilemma of who should fill the gap in the balance of power structure of the pre-World War I Europe, that have been changed by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It is fascinating that such a connoisseur of history as George Kennan fails to mention these events. It is even more unexplainable (or, is it?) that he, as a former Ambassador to former Yugoslavia, doesn’t even mention such a word (Yugoslavia), let alone offer his own explanation of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Therefore, the only plausible answer he can offer for the tragedy of the Balkans in the 1990s is just another example of “orientalist”, or in words of Todorova, “balkanist” discourse, that further transforms the imagery of the Balkans into “one of the most powerful pejorative designations in history, international relations, political science, and, nowadays.

²⁶ Ibid. 6
general intellectual discourse.”

But, what might be the purpose of producing the predominant imagery of the Balkans as uncivilized and barbarous?

Todorova maintains that the discourse on balkanization is directly connected to the question of order and that it can not be understood without its links to power politics. However, unlike Der Derian’s, her focus is the Balkan region itself. Also, she is not interested in the way liberals and Marxists depict the Balkans. Instead, she wants to grasp a broader western understanding (“inventing”) of the Balkans that underlies our perceptions (no matter whether Marxist, liberal, or postmodern) of the Balkans today. According to her, the perception of the Balkans has always been shaped by a mixture of romanticism and Realpolitik that resulted in either advocacy for or demonization of the Balkan population (Philhellenism, Turkophilia, Slavophobia, Turkophobia, Slavophilia...), depending upon a great power politics of the day. The latest discovery of the Balkans as the “dark other of ‘western civilization’” has to be understood as dependent upon the “western” need to delineate new borders, because the old ideological ones have lost their importance with the collapse of communism. Thus, as in the case with the “orientalist” discourse, “balkanist” discourse serves the purpose of legitimizing the “western” standards as the standards of the world. In other words, it not only provides new rules for the membership in the privileged club of the western nations, but, even more importantly, it justifies the choice of who should be let in and who kept out!

\footnote{Todorova. 460 Todorova also maintains that Kennan wrote his article with the full knowledge of the butcheries of the two world wars, and still is capable of writing about distinctly non-European dimension of the Balkan slaughter. “One is tempting to ask whether the Holocaust resulted from a “due” or “undue” predominance of barbarity.. (b)esides, Kennan wrote his essay only a year after the “neat and clean” Gulf war operation during which there were twice as much casualties as incurred by all sides during the two Balkan wars” (p. 459)
1.4 Conclusion

Whether we (i.e., "others") are faced with the more sophisticated and supposedly more "liberal" language of Samuel Huntington, or with the "naked" realist prose of George Kennan, it seems that there is not much that can be done. Either way "we" (i.e., the members of those nations that are not predomately white, or at least that do not belong to the Western Christianity type of civilization) would be labeled as unfit for democracy and liberalism. This is so because either our great grandparents were not capable enough of creating an Enlightenment movement of their own, or because of "our undue" propensity for barbarity. The circle is thus closed, while the stranglehold of power politics over our lives seems to be unbreakable. And yet, every time we repeat Said's phrase that "East isn't East," or ask the question who is balkanizing whom, as Pavlowitch and Todorova do, we are trying to break it.

However, to the extent that the stronger pole on the power-knowledge axis is on the side of power, a different type of narrative on Yugoslavia seems a rather useless exercise. After all, the rhetorical strategy of regional, ethnic and cultural stereotyping along the north-south and west-east axes is not just a "western" practice. No matter how deeply we reach the south-east, further down the road lies "real" south-east, from which our present position appears as if it is on the north-west. For these reasons, Marko Zivkovic points out that "[T]he South and the East themselves tend to transfer the same odium that they receive from those positioned further 'up' to regions and peoples lying further 'down' the North-South and West-East gradients of depreciation."28 Also, that from the time when the North assumed political and economic supremacy in Europe, "northerners" and

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28 Barbarians at the Gate: Stories Serbs Tell Themselves (and Others) About Themselves (Ph.D proposal, University of Chicago, January 1995), 10
"westerners" ascribe to themselves cerebral qualities of rationality, control and mastery while visceral ones of emotionality, unreliability and general looseness to "southerners." These "gradients of depreciation" thus appear both as reflections and reinforcing of unequal distribution of power.

Still, Agnes Heller has defined the European identity to be characterized by the recognition of the accomplishments of others not out of her political naiveté, but rather in understanding that we are all participants in the production of social life. Furthermore, the identities of "us" and "them" are never static, but they always involve, as Said maintains, a contest among individuals and institutions over appropriating historic, social, political and intellectual processes that define society in a particular age. From this perspective, the causes of Yugoslavia's disintegration seem to be connected to the "ancient" enmities among Yugoslav nations only to the extent that power holders within and outside the region have been successful in using frozen imagery of the Balkans to produce the "adversarial knowledge" (Edward Said) to achieve their particular interests. While some of the rhetorical strategies of depicting the one-dimensional picture of the Balkans by those living outside the region have been delineated in this chapter, the following chapter will deal with the creation of the "adversarial knowledge" from within the region.

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29 Ibid., 9
30 See Heller's account on the European identity at the beginning of the chapter.
31 "East isn't East", 3
Chapter 2

Dualities at Work: National Historiographies and the Parallel History of the Yugoslav Idea

Historians are to nationalist politicians what poppy growers in Pakistan are to heroin dealers.

E. Hobsbawn

Not only is the Yugoslav reality as twisted as the tunnels that held the Minotaur, but the observer keeps coming face to face with himself, seeing his own image spring out from what he thinks are the events of history, unable to separate projection from observation, fact from reflection, self from the other.

E.A. Himmel

2.1 Introduction

The existence of pro-Yugoslav and anti-Yugoslav sentiments has always been an intrinsic part of the history of the Yugoslav idea and state. In the forgotten 1960s and late 1970s, when the number of self-professed "Yugoslavs" reached its peak, it seemed that the Yugoslav peoples had finally learned to live together and that the often heard slogan of "brotherhood and unity" had become a practice which was fully legitimized by the Yugoslav system. Yet, it is painfully

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1 Qt. in Robert M. Hayden, "The Triumph of Chauvinistic Nationalism in Yugoslavia: Bleak Implications for Anthropology," The Anthropology of East Europe Review. Special Issue War Among the Yugoslavs 11, no. 1&2 (Spring & Fall 1993). 74
2 "The Yugoslav Labyrinth," The Anthropology of East Europe Review. Special Issue War Among the Yugoslavs 11, no. 1&2 (Spring & Fall 1993). 38.
3 The hyphenated word "Yugoslavs" reflects the often overlooked fact that the Communist Party never accepted the idea of the Yugoslav nation, and that officially whoever identified him/herself as a Yugoslav did that out of his/her lack of national consciousness or out of rejection of national identification. Those people were never granted a status of being a part of a newly emerging "imagined communities", as it was the case with Macedonians and Montenegrins in 1945 or with Bosnian Moslems in 1961. A category of hyphenated Yugoslavs was introduced in 1961, which means that in the following statistical yearbooks Yugoslavs have been represented only as "Yugoslavs", i.e., surrounded by the quotation marks. However, it also implies that the Communist Party and the state never seriously initiated debate over the meanings of Yugoslav identity. Accordingly, political debates about the national question in Yugoslavia in the 1980s
obvious today that slogans of "brotherhood and unity" served the purpose of justifying the political monopoly which the Communist Party enjoyed in the society. Before we were able to question such cynical "double-talk" it was too late - "[B]rothers started to kill one another, and unity fell apart as if Yugoslavia were only a part of a communist fairy tale".4

Today, on the ashes of this "fairy tale" we are witnessing the emergence of newly sovereign and independent states. Their ideology is, however, the same: an "ill-fitting shirt" of nationhood, with sleeves that are, as Slavenka Drakulic warns us, too short and a collar that is too tight. "You might not like the color and the cloth might itch. But, there is no escape; there is nothing else to wear."5 And yet, what gives her fear is that which excites many: the call of blood and the rediscovery of the bonds of ethnicity. To say: "Yes, I am of that ethnic origin, but..." is an act of treason. For Croats, because of Vukovar and the parts of Slavonia which are under Serbian control/occupation; for Moslems, because of hundreds of thousands killed and expelled from their homes by the Bosnian Serbs' campaign of ethnic cleansing; for Serbs, because of the mass expulsions from Croatia and parts of Bosnia, memories of Jasenovac and the fear that an independent Croatia is founded on the image of the Nazi puppet Croatian state run by Croatian ultra-nationalists (Ustaschas) during World War II6, and so forth.

have never taken into account the possibility of combining ethnic bonds with the political and civil allegiances for the country in which so many different nationalities have lived.

4 Slavenka Drakulic, "Overcome by Nationhood", in Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of War (London: Hutchinson, 1993), 50.

5 Ibid., 52.

6 Jasenovac was the most notorious concentration camp during the Second World War in Croatia. According to independent foreign estimates, fascist Ustaschas regime executed 70,000 to 100,000 people, mainly Serbs, but also Jews, Gypsies and Croatians that had been labeled as communists. However, Serbian nationalists' estimates are close to 700,000, while the historian and the president of Croatia Franjo Tudjman puts these figures as low as 30,000. However, no matter which of these figures is closer to truth, something which we will never know, what remains undisputed is the dark symbolism of Jasenovac as a site of pogrom and physical annihilation for all those who bear the mark of difference. Even before the beginning of the war in Croatia in 1991.
Yet, before Yugoslavia’s violent break-up, a different type of war ravaged
Since at least the mid. 1980s, the main aim was to present one’s own nation as
more modern, rational and democratic. Thus, efforts have been made to present
the other parts of Yugoslavia, in particular Serbia and Montenegro, as the real
“Balkans”, with the connotations of crookedness and violence, as opposed to the
rational and democratic northwest. Of course, such ethnic stereotyping was
intended for double consumption: at home, for strengthening national vs. Yugoslav
identity, and abroad, for presenting oneself as the defender of “real” European
values.8

Following such a double move, my aim in this chapter is to depict the
content of such politics. Firstly, I will try to delineate the process of creating the
“other” within the Balkans, i.e., within the territory of former Yugoslavia. It will
be shown that the imagery, themes and notions that have been invoked by the
rhetorical strategists in former Yugoslavia reflect the “classification struggle” of
the European periphery for recognition by the more powerful “western” players.
This implies that invoked images have not been chosen accidentally, but that they
have already been predetermined by their implicit acceptance in the West as
accurate descriptions of the Balkans. In the second section, I will argue that the
destruction of Yugoslavia was preceded with the articulation of a particular type of
“adversarial knowledge” that was based on the two most widespread myths about

Jasenovac became the rallying cry for Serbian nationalists. It is by exploiting those figures (but
also as the reaction to their counterparts in Croatia that did exactly the same, but from the opposite
direction) that Serbian nationalists have been able to develop the extremely influential and
detrimental notion about the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia as the “slaughtered people”, i.e., those
who survived the Holocaust.

7 See Milica Bakic-Hayden & Robert M. Hayden, “Orientalist Variations on the Theme
of Balkans’ Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics.” Slavic Review 51, no 1

8 See Marko Zivkovic, Barbarians at the Gate: Stories Serbs Tell Themselves (and
Others) About Themselves (PhD proposal, University of Chicago, January 1995), 10.
the Balkans. that of the "centuries old" hatred between the Serbs and the Croats. and the "fact" of Yugoslavia being an artificial creation. Since these two historical myths are now generally accepted as common truths about the Balkans. I will attempt, in the subsequent parts of the chapter, to offer an alternative reading of the history of the Yugoslav idea, as well as to offer my understanding of the basis of the nationalism that became the predominant force in the late 1980s in Yugoslavia.

2.2 Balkan Gradients of Depreciation

More recently, the most ambitious attempt in depicting the south-east part of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as less civilized and more violent part of the Balkans can be found in the *Habits of the Balkan Heart* written by two Croatian Americans, Stjepan Mestrovic and Miroslav Goreta, and by the former aid to Croatian President Slaven Letica.\(^9\) Not unlike Samuel Huntington, they understand the war in the Balkans in terms of clashing cultures, i.e., between western, peaceful and democratic culture (Slovenia and Croatia) and eastern, primitive and backward Orthodox culture (Serbia and Montenegro).\(^10\) According to them, the "Dinaric social character" of the Serbs, habituated by "fraud" and

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9 *Habits of the Balkan Heart: Social Character and the Fall of Communism* (College Station: Texas UP. 1993)

10 The authors develop their own clash-of-civilization kind of arguments: "We thus arrive at the following tentative hypothesis: reconstruction following the war of 1991 in Yugoslavia will depend upon furthering the democratic cultural base and overcoming the aristocratic, even barbaric influences of other cultural bases. Specifically, one could argue that Slovenia and Croatia - even if they offer a mixture of these two ideal types - tend toward Western cultural values in that they display anti-Communist patterns, a Catholic and therefore universalist base, a tendency toward pluralism, a recognition of values pertaining to human rights, European political values, and a willingness to adopt a free-market economy. By the contrast, Serbia and Montenegro have espoused neo-Communist orientations, an Orthodox cultural base that tends to share power with government, a tendency towards unitary state, and tendencies to dominate existing power structures". See *Habits of the Balkan Heart*, 36.
"deceit", led them not only to symbolically destroy the Oedipal figure of Tito (one of the writers is a psychiatrist) but to attack Croatia in 1991. On the other side, the authors understand a Croatian nation to be represented by the symbolism of the "Croatian Lady", the Virgin ("Mother of God") who supposedly appeared to the faithful in Medjugorje. Western Herzegovina, many times since 1981. Thus, against the "father-dominated" and "war-loving" Serbs, the Croats emerge as peace loving people with a good faith in their "Gothic" hearts for the Virgin Mary.

However, the significance of Medjugorje supersedes the Croatian borders for at least three reasons. First, the location of Medjugorje symbolizes the dividing line between the Western Catholicism and the Eastern type of Christianity. It is located in western Herzegovina with its Croatian majority, while across the Neretva river lies eastern Herzegovina with its Serbian majority. Secondly, in the period of the collapse of communism the Virgin emerges as the symbol of the "discovery of one's [right to] national self-determination versus a slave morality that surrenders to the expansionist aim that emanated from Belgrade and Moscow." Lastly, the symbolism of Medjugorje in the post-communist era is uncovered by the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbian aggression and the failures of the West to prevent it, the authors maintain, helped the reemergence of the Islamic self-consciousness and the rise of the suspicion that the perceived Islamic fundamentalism would replace the communist threat in the Christian West. This, the authors hold, "is the ultimate cultural meaning of Medjugorje in the post-Communist world and the sociological significance of its location in Bosnia and Herzegovina."  

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11 For example, on page 36 of Habits of the Balkan Heart the authors maintain that "it is well known in Yugoslavia that Serbs and Montenegrins adhere to a sort of cult of warrior. They habitually own guns and engage in hunting as part of machismo set of values. Within Yugoslavia, they are known for being stubborn, irascible, and emotionally unstable."

12 Ibid., 125-126.

13 Ibid., 130.
How should we read *Habits of the Balkan Heart*? This work reveals, as Gerasimos Augustinos has rightly pointed out, more about the authors' prejudices regarding the Balkans and the West than about the complex political issues surrounding Yugoslavia's break-up and the dismemberment of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\(^{14}\) Their dubious social theorizing, in which they try to find support in the works of authors such as Spengler, Veblen and Toynbee, as well as the Croatian American anthropologist Dinko Tomasic, usually ends up projecting a particular type of negative social characteristics onto an entire people (Serbs), and, as such, it "borders on genetic determinism."\(^{15}\) Although cultural issues are at the heart of the Balkan question, one can not explain the rich texture of the "habits of the Balkan heart" if I am allowed to borrow their phrase, on the basis of a few ethnic stereotypes.

It seems to me that what has already been said with respect to the "clash of civilization" thesis in the previous chapter can be repeated here. After all, once the authors' language is stripped of its anti-Serbian metaphors, what we are left with is the proposition that the impending great conflict on the global stage is between the East and the West - Huntington in disguise. *Habits of the Balkan Heart* is just another example of "orientalist discourse" and the ways power (in this case, to influence the media) produces a certain type of "knowledge", that legitimizes the very practice of stereotyping I am trying to expose.\(^{16}\) In this particular case, the work Mestrovic et al. are trying to accomplish depends upon the negative images of the Serbs in the media as the principal culprits for all the atrocities committed in


\(^{15}\) Ibid., 151

the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, such images rarely, if ever, show the difference between the Serbs in general and the Serbs as individuals. Not at all surprisingly, and fully in line with "North-South and West-East gradients of depreciation," that have been introduced in Chapter 1, "Serbian" accounts of themselves and others represent a mirror image of the "Croatian" ones. The former president of the "Third" Yugoslavia and the most influential Serbian writer, Dobrica Cosic, locates the reasons for the break-up of Yugoslavia in the offensive character of Croatian nationalism:

The foundation of their nationalism has been religion, ever since the mid-nineteenth century. So, the Croatian is a Catholic even more than a nationalist. Catholicism in Croatia has the role of an outright constitutional principle. Hence the Croat's profound hostility towards the Serb, guilty in his eyes of two capital sins - both an Orthodox or an atheist and a communist! ... And behind Croatian nationalism there lies... hatred of diversity. This ideology subsequently became part of the Serbian people's unconscious, exacerbating antagonism and antipathy, to the extent of mutual hatred and the desire to fight. The tragedy of Serbia and Croatia is exactly that of Cain and Abel.17

This apparently objective statement implies the defensive character of Serbian nationalism. The war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina is, we are told, by no means provoked by Serbia. Quite the contrary, Serbia is just helping its brethren west of the Drina river who are left to Cain's mercy. The reversion of roles is complete. Croats are no longer peace-loving people dedicated to the Virgin Mary. They emerge as aggressive folks, ready to fight against anybody who is different than them. The road to labeling all Croats as hidden extremists and ultra-nationalists (Ustashas) is thus cleared. Although the "Father of the Serbian Nation" has never crossed this road and the word Ustasha is not even used

in the previously quoted paragraph, it is implicitly there. We can feel it in the air, ready to be picked-up by some less scrupulous (or less tactical) author, such as the leader of the Serbian nationalists Vojislav Seselj, only to fall indiscriminately upon all Croatian heads.

But, by labeling Croats as barbarous only half of the required work is being done. What still needs to be presented to the West is that Serbia is the “Shield of Christendom” against the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. However, with hundreds of thousands of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the whole territories cleansed of every trace of Islam - from mosques to toponyms - a different light with respect to who is to be characterized as a “Turk” is shed. David Rieff made this point accessible to anyone, while reporting from the battlefields of Bosnia and Herzegovina: “[t]he Ottoman empire at its most bloodthirsty and caricatural lives on more completely in the Serb Republic of Bosnia than anywhere in Anatolia.... If anything, it is the Bosnians of Sarajevo, with their fierce devotion to the idea of a multi-confessional, multi-cultural state, rather than the Serbs or the Croats, who are the real Europeans of the former Yugoslavia.”

It is not hard to enlarge the list of the authors from all parts of the former Yugoslavia who “help” us to understand the rebalkanization of the Balkans. The general trend of such a “political culture” approach is by now too obvious. It delineates national characteristics in a static and non-evolutionary way, while, at

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18 There are too many volunteers for such a “noble” task. To the shame of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art, some of its most influential members (Mihailo Markovic, formerly the member of the Praxis group and presently the ideologue of the Milosevic’s party; historian Veselin Djuretic and Milorad Ekmevic, to name a few) are at the forefront of this ideological battle.

19 Qt in Zivkovic 14 At the same page Zivkovic makes an interesting point arguing that the irony of policy of ethnic cleansing is that it denies “Turkushness” which is central to Serbian identity. “shown blatantly by the Turkish etymology of the name of the leader of Bosnian Serbs Radovan Karadzic.” In other words, by destroying any visible trace of “500 years of Turkish slavery”, Serbian nationalists are inadvertently destroying their identity as well.
the same time, it replaces the ideological other under communism with a geographical cultural other of the Orient. The irony, however, of this rhetorical strategy is that none of the former Yugoslav authors seems to realize that such "us vs. them" dichotomizing originates in the "West", and that quite often it is "western" accounts of the Balkans that not only embody the "barbaric" Balkan nations but the "enlightened" as well. Nonetheless, depicting yesterday's neighbors as barbarous is just the first phase of a "double move" directed not only outside the region, but also towards creating national identities within the region. Thus, not only foreign observers, but local population as well, have to be persuaded that the Yugoslav idea and state was never a solution to the national question in the Balkans. Such a task was effectively undertaken by national historians.

2.3 History as Politics

Croatian American historian Ivo Banac describes Yugoslavia as a "firm citadel that could be maintained only by human sacrifice." According to him, the Serbian goal and interest for Yugoslavia have been to unite all the Serbs living under the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires into one independent state. Having realized the impossibility of a single Serbian state that could unite all Serbs under one roof, they chose the Yugoslav option instead. The Croats, not unlike the Serbs themselves, were interested in Yugoslavia in order to regain independence from Austria-Hungary as well as to reclaim large parts of Croatia from Italy. This, however, implies that Yugoslavia emerged merely out of necessity for Serbian and Croatian elites. Once the international situation would allow such a move, this

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20 See Milica Bakic-Hayden & Robert M Hayden, 4
"interim station" can, with supposed ease, be abandoned with the aim of creating independent national states. Thus, while the birth of Yugoslavia has its historical reasons, its maintenance beyond a certain point only enhances the impossibility of solving the question of national liberation under the framework of a joint state of South Slavs. In other words, the distinct national agendas that were crystallized in the mid-nineteenth century are to be understood both as the causes of Yugoslavia's creation and its eventual disintegration:

Indeed, despite dictatorship and attempts at democratic renewal, occupation and wars, revolutions and social changes, after 1921 hardly any new elements were introduced in the set pattern of South Slavic interactions. The game was open ended, but pawns could proceed only one square at a time, except on their first move. Bishops always moved diagonally. [...] [The national question] was reflected in the internal, external, social, economic, and even cultural affairs. It was solved by day and unsolved by night. Some days were particularly bright for building, some nights particularly dark for destroying. One horn of the dilemma was that a single solution could not satisfy all sides. Was the other that a firm citadel could be maintained only by human sacrifice?22

Why should we assume that Yugoslavia is was a solution that could not satisfy all sides? Despite Banac's excellent points about the distinct agendas of Serbian and Croatian elites, he undermines the equally important issues over which there have never been disputes among many Serbian and Croatian "chess players" (at least, till late 1980s). In particular, there was a common understanding that ethnically mixed areas in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia make Yugoslavia the only viable barrier to the alternative of the politics of ethnic differentiation and homogenization. Hence, Banac's identification of Yugoslavia with human sacrifice seems to indicate more about the author's

22 Ibid. 415-416  Banac's book deals primarily with the national agenda of the first Yugoslavia. However, what is already suggested with the chess metaphor about the first Yugoslavia is further extrapolated in some of his other works, allowing me to "stretch" the metaphor to cover the whole period of the existence of the joint state of the South Slavs
inability to differentiate between one or two particular models of the state and the idea of the joint state itself, rather than the impossibility of a “single solution” that can satisfy all sides. This, however, leads to another question under which assumptions can we claim that, once the rules of the game are set, nothing can prevent chess-like behavior apart from the break-up of the state itself? 24

Two very influential authors, Croatian historian and president Franjo Tudjman, and Serbian writer and former president of the “Third” Yugoslavia Dobrica Cosic, are quite explicit in conceiving “nation” in a thoroughly organicistic manner, i.e., as a united organism within which there is no space for internal conflict. For Tudjman, every nation has the “natural and historic right to its sovereignty and its place in the human community just as the individual has in society”. Even more, “[O]nly a free and sovereign nation, like a fully developed and free human being, can give its full contribution to the world.” 24 Cosic is even more explicit than Tudjman:

Only big nations are capable of paying their respect to the individual. In the case of small nations it is not possible because of the national myths and taboos. Only nation itself can be great, while the moral responsibility of an individual demands sacrifices to community, nation, state. 25

Thus, according to these authors it seems that a Serb, a Croat, or whomever, is not a person unless he or she possesses a national self-consciousness. At the same time, such an “individual” can fully develop his potentials only within the

23 Marko Zivkovic maintains that Banac’s “rather clumsy” chess metaphor does not grasp the essence of the Serbo-Croat conflict. The main idea in chess is to force a king to surrender, while in the Balkans the main targets are the pawns. Thus, he suggests that it is better to invoke a Chinese game of Go, “for this conflict is more about surrounding the enemy’s population, making it a minority and ‘eating’ it, while taking care not to be surrounded and eaten in return.” See Imagination is Reality: Uses of History in the Yugoslav Conflict (Unpublished paper. University of Chicago, 1992). 5.


framework of a nation state. Hence, in the name of freedom (identified only in terms of national liberation), the historical experience of living in one country, i.e., Yugoslavia, has to be abolished. The identification of freedom itself with the nation to which we belong can only have one outcome - the replacement of all differences and complexities within multi-ethnic society, including political and ideological disputes, with national ones. The final victim in the case of Yugoslavia was Yugoslavia itself, since the ideal of Yugoslavia, as Djuro Kovacevic maintains, was the only barrier to the politics of nationalistic differentiation.

The ideological defeat of the very idea of Yugoslavia, however, has preceded the political defeat of Yugoslavia. Tudjman, Cosic and other authors "analyzed" the national question much before the outbreak of the war. Although the break-up of Yugoslavia seems to vindicate their "historical" insights, it is my understanding that their claims have more to do with the creation of conditions that have led to Yugoslavia's disintegration, than with the anticipation of the Yugoslav collapse. The aim of their essentialist historical accounts was to impose the viability of their preferred alternative to Yugoslavia - completely homogeneous nation states. Yet, this could only be accomplished if historians were to make

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26 For those who are not capable of living up to their national potentials a member of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art and historian, Veselin Djuretic, reserves the following words Serbian sediment, rootless cosmopolitans, domestic foreigners, domestic anti-Serbs, intellectual weeds, etc. See Popov, 18


28 Aleksa Djilas maintains that the irresponsible behavior of intellectuals is the prime cause of the war. According to him, the war between the Serbs and the Croats is just the continuation of the war which started on the pages of Serbian and Croatian nationalistic historiographies and literatures. Moreover, that the war is but the consequence of the "pathological subjectivity on the large part of Serbian and Croatian intellectuals in using non-truths and half-truths while interpreting national relationships." See "Krvavu pero savremeno antijugoslovenstvo i njegov izvori," in Raspad Jugoslavije: produzetak ili kraj agonije, 100.
the Yugoslav public forget the prophetic words of the great Croation writer Miroslav Krleza: "God save us from a thousand years of Croation culture and Serbian heroism!"

However, the "fine tuning" of public consciousness was complete. The repetitiveness of history has become the destiny of the Balkans, while the national academies of science and arts have emerged as the main manufacturers of Manichean historical imageries, according to which history is a conflict of collective, homogenized actors whose identity is formed and sustained by resilient collective historical memories.  

Banac's chess metaphor thus pops up at the surface of these accounts just to show that, as Zivkovic aptly observes, "[W]e are given to understand that this collective memory refuses to be suppressed by any universalistic ideology, let it be that of communism or liberal democracy, and that it time and time again reasserts itself on the stage of history."  

Can we accept such an understanding of history at its face value?

Eric Hobsbawn reminds us that the history which is part of our knowledge is not what has been preserved in popular memory, but "what has been selected, written, pictured, popularized and institutionalized by those whose functions is to do so [read: historians, ethnologists, linguists, journalists...]."  

In a similar vein, Robert Hayden maintains that for achieving such a task the role of intellectuals is of the utmost importance. They are as necessary as they were in the nineteenth

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29 The new opening of the Serbian question and the rise of Slobodan Milosevic started in 1986 with the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art (see Chapter 3 of this work). On the Croatian side, the Yugoslav Academy of Science and Arts changed its name to Croatian Academy of Science and Arts in 1991, thus rejecting the name that was part of its history from its very first days in 1866, when it was founded by the Bishop Josip Jure Strossmayer to become the first institution ever to bear the Yugoslav name.

30 *Imagination is Reality*, 7

century to provide "the ideological and pseudo-empirical justification for the particular little sovereign entity and its politics of cultural imperialism."¹²

Needless to say, the politics of cultural imperialism has nowadays been replaced with the politics of ethnic cleansing, the "justification" of which has been supported by two "facts". First, that the bloody war between the Serbs and the Croats is just another explosion of the ancient hatred between these two peoples. Second, that Yugoslavia is the product of the Versailles Treaty, and as such has always represented an artificial creation that could only be sustained through sacrifices of national freedoms. Such stereotyping has a receptive public not only in the former Yugoslav republics, but outside the region as well. Some of the reasons for the popularity of these myths and symbols have already been delineated in the previous chapter on the discourses of "orientalism" and "balkanism". At this point it suffices to say that such platitudes have become the guiding principles of Western policy makers, while their usage in everyday political conversation is recognized, in the words of Mihajlo Mihajlov, as a sign of a well informed and sophisticated understanding of the situation in the Balkans.¹³

For these reasons, the author of this paper feels obliged, first, to offer his conceptual understanding of nationalism and, secondly, give a somewhat different reading of the aforementioned "facts" of the history of Yugoslavia.

¹² Qt in Zivkovic, *Imagination is Reality*. 8

¹³ On myth creation and the ways it hinders the solution to the situation on the territory of former Yugoslavia see "U carstvu mrtvila," *Nedeljne Informacione Novine, NIN* (Beograd), 30 september 1994, pp. 28-29
2.4 The Ideology and Identity of Nationalism

In his often quoted statement on nationalism, John Dunn maintains that its persistence can only be understood as "the starkest political shame of the twentieth century." Dunn argues that the predominant Enlightenment way of thinking does not allow the nation to be understood as a conceptual unit of analysis. Nationalism acts against the prevalence of the universalistic concepts of the secular religion of modernity based on natural law, human reason, progress and humanism. In other words, it undermines the ethical basis of modernity which relies on the idea that the fundamental ethical unit can only be an individual human being.

The original idea of nationalism, however, is inseparably linked to the rise of modernity in the eighteenth century and the Enlightenment principles around which the modernity project was founded. The underlying assumption of modernity was centered around the concept that the nation can be understood only by its goal - a nation-state, and that its legitimacy in turn rests on the will of the people, who are constituted as body of citizens. However, the location of sovereignty within the people and their recognition as fundamentally equal, without regard to which social strata they belong, represent the basic ideal of democracy as well. Therefore, nationalism was from the very beginning defined in civic terms and, as such, perceived as closely interrelated to the ideals of

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34 The word "nationalism" will be referred to here as both the nationalist ideologies organized around certain principles (civic, ethnic/cultural) that foster distinct types of the national identity, and as the sense of communal identity prevailing under socio-cultural, economic and political matrices of society, that serves as the basis for developing ideologies of nationalism in return. Exclusionary forms of nationalism are seen only in one of the possible combinations between institutional/ideological and essentialist (cultural/ethnic) aspects of nationalism.


liberalism and democracy. Or, in the succinct phrase of Liah Greenfeld.

"[N]ationalism was the form in which democracy appeared in the world, contained in the idea of the nation as a butterfly in a cocoon."\(^{37}\)

Apart from these links to democracy, nationalism was initially perceived as a non-particularistic ideology, whose universalist principles make it particularly attractive to people in those states that have been already profoundly influenced by the advent of modernity and the corresponding changes in economic, social and political realities of those states. Thus, the transformation of the already existing Western states in the nineteenth century (Britain, the British dominions, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the USA) into nation-states was centered around the question of exercising sovereignty within pre-existing "societies of order". The final result was the creation of a national identity that was intrinsically political, i.e., that was primarily understood as a sense of belonging to a political community of citizens with equal rights.

The mutation of such an understanding of nationalism already started with the Napoleonic wars.\(^{38}\) Despite the Kantian insistence on the supremacy of individual rights, the difficulty German intellectuals had in accepting such ideals is related to the fact that the "bearers" of citizens' rights and the Enlightenment project were French soldiers. Furthermore, at that time Germany, or for that matter, any other contemporary Central-European country, was conspicuously left out of European political maps. Consequently, while in the case of Britain, as the first Western nation, structural changes were followed by the rise of nationalism,


\(^{38}\) Greenfeld maintains that the first transformation of civic nationalism, that was born in Britain in the XVI century, occurred at the end of the XVIII century in France, "that first anti-Western nation". Eventually, France became part of the West, while the collectivistic features of its civic nationalism became less important. See her chapter on France, 89-189.
Greenfeld maintains that in most of the other cases the scenario was quite the opposite: "the importation of the idea of popular sovereignty - as part and parcel of the idea of the nation - initiated the transformation in the social and political structure." Furthermore, while the rise of nationalism in the West coincided with the rise of the nation-state within pre-existing state structures, in the "Other" Europe nationalism came as the reaction to foreign rule, and as such, preceded the formation of the future nation states. Accordingly, as Sugar maintains:

[T]he frontiers of an existing state and of a rising nationality rarely coincided: nationalism there grew in protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern - not primarily to transform it into a people's state, but to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands.  

The reactive nature of Central-European nationalism against imperial powers is, thus, not the only important feature that differentiates it from the Western pattern of national development. Since there were no clearly defined borders of the future nation states, nationalism tended towards justifying particular territorial claims in the name of the membership of the group, which was "objectively" identifiable through its distinctive way of life, history, culture, language, etc. This means that the individualistic national principle, that has been based on citizens' fundamental equality, was transformed into the collectivistic principle that emphasizes a people's uniqueness. The biggest consequence of this change has been, however, that the links between democracy and nationalism were severed. Greenfeld offers a concise explanation of the significance of this change:

Collectivistic ideologies are inherently authoritarian, for, when the collectivity is seen in unitary terms, it tends to assume the character of a collective individual possessed of a single will, and someone is bound to be its interpreter. The reification of a community

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39 Ibid., 10.
introduces (or preserves) fundamental inequality between those of its few members who are qualified to interpret the collective will and the many who have no such qualifications: the select few dictate to the masses who must obey.\footnote{Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, 11.}

Hence, the problem eventually emerged when the "interpreters" of the national will started raising conflicting claims over the same part of the territory: claims that, from this perspective, can be justified only on the basis of historic, ethnographic and linguistic accounts. For these reasons, Sugar maintains that:

\begin{quote}
[\text{e}ach nationality [is tempted] to produce a history at least as glorious as its neighbors, whose claims conflicted with its own. However, even biased and distorted history proved incapable of producing the desired result. What could not be claimed, even the broadest and the most imaginative use of the slightest evidence, was simply invented.\footnote{"External and Domestic Roots of Eastern European Nationalism." 41.}
\end{quote}

In the course of history, as Dunn aptly observes, the blend of historicist thought and nationalist action have produced an explosive mix that have led not only to excess in just wars among equally "self-righteous tribes", but also too many situations in which there seems no longer to be any conceptual, let alone practical possibility of a just peace.\footnote{Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future, 62.}

The distinct socio-economic, political and cultural situational constraints that permeated Western and Central Europe, therefore, created different concepts of nationalism. One, based on a liberal understanding of citizens' rights; the other, on the messianic notions of the will of a people. One, sharing Hegel's trust in reason as the progressive unfolding towards justice and freedom; the other, understanding history in romanticist and evolutionist terms, according to which the possession of a homeland (Volkstaat) is the precondition for each nation's fulfillment. And finally, one as the outgrowth of already existing states; the other, aimed at the "invention" of nation-states. Nonetheless, despite the importance of
the aforementioned differences between Western and Central European nationalism, it would be a mistake to succumb to the conventional (liberal and Marxist) understanding of ethnic (cultural, historic) nationalism as distinctly anti-modern.

One side of Central-European nationalism is the celebration of the local. The other side, particularly after the emergence of nation states in the region, has become increasingly open to the influences of the global conditions that are characterized by the predominance of nation states existing within the framework of the world economy. A large degree of competitive (asocial and mercantilist) behavior produced by the world economy seems to contradict its universalistic pretensions of free trade and the famous "harmony of interests". Instead, these conditions are best described in terms of zero sum game, according to which the gain of one player necessarily means the loss of another. However, the principles of zero sum game with no win-win solution also imply that Thrasymachus' power politics and ethical nihilism are better suited for the conditions of modernity than the universal principles of natural law and Enlightened reason. Hence, in the words of Dunn, it seems that the prevailing rules of the global condition make it impossible "for an agent to have good reasons to deny to themselves anything which they desire and are able to appropriate."44 Thus, the roots of nationalism are not only in the ideologization of the idea of kinship, but, even more importantly, in our "egoistic utilitarian consciousness" that equally permeates all states of the world.45

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44 Ibid., 63
45 If nationalism is to a great extent reducible to individuals' and groups' "self righteous egoistical consciousness", as Dunn maintains, then there is no reason to label nationalism as politically shameful. It seems more appropriate to link immorality of different groups' attempts to impose their local economic, political and cultural interest over the interests of others to the rules of zero-sum games that prohibits win-win situation, i.e., where gains of one player necessarily means the losses of other.
Central-European nationalism, accordingly, grew out of the usage of invention and imagination in the fight of local elites against the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian Empires: a usage that eventually fostered a sense of ethnic bonding and belonging to particular groups. On the other side, the more utilitarian aspects of nationalism have been developed through the process that has been initiated by the power interplay among nation-states within the context of the emerging world economy. In other words, this "utilitarian" aspect of nationalism has been shaped by the states' efforts to deal with the problems emerging in the spheres of economic integration, administrative control and cultural cooperation, all of which mark the advent of modernity itself. The impact of these global structural changes in Central Europe and other parts of the globe, according to Anthony Smith, has been twofold: first, the nation became identified with new forms of social integration with a common civic outlook and ideology; secondly, the fusion and stabilization of these innovations became impossible without the active involvement of an ethnic stratum.46

The ambiguity and continuity of this process has made nationalism a product or reflection of the major components of modernization, in addition to being a constitutive element of modernity itself. Closely related to this is the emergence of the nation, first, as a web of social relationships, that is best suited for dealing with the challenges of modernity; and secondly, as an individualized collective that takes precedence over competing identities - regional, familiar, gender, occupational, etc. Therefore, even though we may talk about predominantly civic or ethnic components of distinct ideologies of nationalism, or, predominantly democratic or authoritarian nation states, both aspects are interdependent and equally fundamental (although, depending upon concrete

example, with different volumes of influence to the practical conditions within which nations and nationalisms have been developed).

Thus, in order to understand the development of nations and nationalisms, we cannot base our understanding only on particular nationalist ideologies. Without emphasizing the context, or, in words of Greenfeld, "situational constraints," that provide nationalisms with both their particular ideas and grounds for action, we can, at best, offer a one-sided understanding of modernity that essentializes differences between civic and ethnic nationalism, while reifying the Enlightenment principles of modernity itself. However, as life itself brings about changes to any set of situational constraints, we can expect eventual transformations in any given national identity and national ideology. Therefore, nations and nationalisms are constantly reshaping themselves. Whether these metamorphoses will be for good or for bad, i.e., whether they will reflect a more civic or ethnic outlook, as well as more democratic or authoritarian framework, depends on the extent of the modification of the equilibrium among main political actors, competing ideologies, and political, economic and socio-cultural conditions.47

47 In trying to conceptualize my own understanding of nationalism I was to a certain extent influenced by Liah Greenfeld's ideas on the situational constraints, that have been developed in her monumental study *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. However, the differences in our views should be highlighted. Greenfeld takes the Weberian stand that social reality is essentially symbolic. Social order (the overall structure of society) represents a materialization of the image people possess of themselves. As long as this image is sustained in the minds of a sufficient majority, or minority with power to impose it, material structures of society will remain unchanged. Once this is not the case (due to the work of situational constraints), not only image but social reality itself will vanish only to be replaced with new images and corresponding realities. The imagery of nationalism is clearly the idea with enough power to impose its own imprint on social structures. Still, the links between the two are not direct, i.e., the imagery is not able to completely shape its social and political expressions. Ideas of a certain kind are just necessary conditions for certain kinds of action. Greenfeld understands society to be "an open system, and whether or not the existing potentialities are fully realized depends on many factors entirely related to the nature of these potentialities" (p. 25). Yet, in her analysis of the five most dominant nationalisms - British, French, German, Russian and American, she does not seem to follow her own methodological framework. Hence, she ends up reifying the differences between civic and
2.5 Origins of Nationalism in Yugoslavia

It is not an exaggeration to assert that the former Yugoslav state was the most complex and diverse country in Europe. Yet, the creation of Yugoslavia was "logical and even natural consequence" of "shared significant political and geostrategic interests and economic aspirations" against great powers of the day. The "naturalness" of Yugoslavia's creation is even harder to comprehend, for the process of "discovering" one's own and neighbor's distinctive nationality started only at the end of the eighteenth century, when the first conditions of national life had been developed. In spite of present nationalists' efforts to show otherwise, the ethnic nationalism to the extent that the redefinitions of the national identities become almost impossible. This leads the reader to believe that Germany and Russia will always remain inherently authoritarian societies, while Britain and the USA democratic. Also, Greenfeld never raises the question as to what extent British imperialism was justified by civic nationalism, i.e., to what extent it allowed the creation of the distinction between the civilized nations and the barbarous ones. This is not to say that the virtues of civic over ethnic nationalism are of dubious value, but simply to warn that the reification of civic discourse can serve particular political interests. Nonetheless, such mususes of civic discourse are still a lesser evil than the excesses of ethnic nationalism in pre-war Germany or in Bosnia and Herzegovina today. In conclusion, the inconsistencies of Greenfeld's analysis are perhaps the result of her insistence on the prevailing power of ideas over real life, without fully appreciating that both images of society and social realities always work hand in hand. Accordingly, this leads to the gap between her sophisticated instrumental methodological framework of analysis and the essentialist conclusions at which she arrives.


Within its borders Yugoslavia incorporated different nationalities (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians and Moslems, including various national minorities of which Albanian and Hungarian were the most important ones), religions (Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim), cultural traditions (Central European, Byzantine, Ottoman), alphabets (Cyrillic, Latin), and social structures (industrial, quasi-industrial, agrarian).

See Lederer, 397.
South Slav life up until that point was essentially non-national. This is not to say that a sense of ethnic bonding did not exist, or had not yet been developed, but to remind the reader that in the Middle Ages it was the feudal status, and not the idea of the ethnic nation state that was the defining social criterion.

The Austrian efforts to modernize and centralize the multi-national empire in the beginning of the last century finally triggered the cultural and political dissatisfactions among the empire's subjects. The birth and rise of Slovenian, Croatian and Yugoslav national movements is part and parcel of this process that culminated in the rise of national movements throughout Central Europe to the point were it became threatening to the very existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The rise of Serbian nationalism was not dissimilar to this pattern. The Serbian rebellion against the Turks in 1804 became national only through the material help and intellectual guidance of the Austrian Serbs of Vojvodina. Having lived in the part of the Hapsburg Empire that was economically and

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61 Lederer observes that throughout the Ottoman occupation of the Balkans there was not one single school of factory developed. Even in the Austrian held territories, the situation was far from being satisfactory. Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the population of Slovenia (always economically the most developed region in former Yugoslavia) was largely illiterate, uneducated and uninterested to "the call of blood" or to "power of an idea," that is the raw material of which nationalities are formed." See Lederer, 400-403 For these reasons, this section deals primarily with the Serbo-Croat issues. The Macedonian and Bosnian Moslem national questions erupted only in the twentieth century.

62 See Hammel, "The Yugoslav Labyrinth," 41. The emphasizing of the continuity of the Serbian and Croatian mediaeval kingdoms serves the purpose of justifying land claims in present territorial conflict. As Hammel marvelously observes, the Serbs base their claims "on the fullest dispersion at the height both of the Nemanjić expansion and the Diaspora occasioned by the Turks, turning both victory and defeat into territory." The Croats, on the other side, justify their claim on "natural borders" with Serbia at the river Drina on the grounds of "their" mediaeval presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Today, this momentum gains another type of literature that originated among Western academics and liberal journalists. Its political aim is to popularize the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state. By emphasizing the distinctive character of the mediaeval Bosnian state that was neither Serbian nor Croatian. See Noel Malcolm Bosnia A Short History (London: Macmillan Ltd., 1994), The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, ed. Mark Pinson (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1994), and Writings on the Balkan War Why Bosnia… ed. Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifschultz (Stony Creek, Connecticut: The Pamphleteer's Press, 1993).
"culturally" richer than the Ottoman held territories of the south, they were already embedded with a sense of national identity. Thus, despite differences that have characterized the social, cultural and political life of the South Slavs in the Balkans, there became one increasingly significant characteristic that was shared by each of those groups - the growing perception of imperial rule as foreign (mis)rule, no matter whether it was an Austrian, Ottoman, or Magyar one.

Throughout the nineteenth century, as Lederer maintains, the Serbian national problem was both "national" and "international", which, at least in one important way, made it distinctly Central European. In the mid-nineteenth century Serbia was already de facto an independent state while still de iure under Turkish tutelage (Serbia finally won independence at the Berlin congress in 1878). However, the key issue of the Serbian national question was that the frontiers of the emerging Serbian state did not coincide with those of the Serbian nation. Furthermore, throughout this period the Serbian nascent merchant class and intellectuals from Vojvodina not only acted as "an established transmission belt of ideas ... into the Pasaluk of Beograd", but rather they became more of "an active reservoir of administrative, political and intellectual leadership for 'Serbia'."

Accordingly, ever since 1804, every Serbian national program has incorporated the ideas that have been looking for changes in the prevailing international order: changes that might enable the unification of Serbs living scattered throughout Austrian, Magyar and Turk held territories with Serbia Proper. However, this...

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53 Lederer, 400
54 Ibid., 404-406. Historical reasons that have led to widespread dispersion of the Orthodox population, that eventually became identified with the Serbian nationality, have to do with Turkish pressures westward that have created several waves of Serbian migration into then Southern Hungary, as well as Slavonia, Dalmatia and central Croatia. These areas are from 1578 known as Military Frontier (Krajina). Krajina was created to prevent further advancements of Turks and it played a vital role in the Hapsburg defense system. Also, Krajina was under direct military rule of Vienna, while the population (half of it Orthodox, half Catholic) enjoyed special privileges in return. It was incorporated into Civil Croatia only in 1881. From today's perspective.
could be done only by "striking a decisive blow at Turkey, and by fending off incursions of Austrian power (and to somewhat lesser extent Russian) in the Balkans." This, however, implies that for most of the Serbian elite, the Yugoslav idea was useful before World War I only to the extent that it facilitated Serbia's principal goals of uniting all Serbs in one country.

The national idea in Croatia grew out of the local aristocracy's need to reconcile differences and hostilities towards the Magyars with the political necessity of collaborating with them. Reacting to the Austrian centralizing policies of Germanization and secularization, they opted to support the Magyars. However, at the end of the eighteenth century the Magyars once more assumed responsibility for Croatia and, shortly afterwards, introduced the politics of Magyarization. Thus, going back and forth between Austrian and Magyar pressures, the Croatian elite eventually developed two distinct national programs: one emphasized the Croatian exclusivism; the other, the South Slav cooperation that eventually gave birth to the Yugoslav movement.

The basic precepts of the Croatian national program had been already developed by the 1830s. They emphasized the importance of distinct Croatian language, the administrative-political union of Civil Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, control over Krajina, the eventual absorption of Bosnia, and the modernization of Croatian lands. Compared with the Serbian program, these precepts uncover the same trust in the ideal of nationhood. Furthermore, they both reveal the Central-European pattern of raising conflicting claims over the same

it is important to note that once national affinities replaced religious ones, the stage in Krajina was set for the ethnic contest whether it is more Serbian or Croatian. With the collapse of Yugoslavia, this question once more emerged, with the full consequences of the Serbo-Croat war for property rights over Krajina. In the light of the latest Croatian offensive against the Croatian Serbs in Krajina, it seems that this question is once and for all settled with the consequence of creating an ethnically pure Croatian state, and at the same time, ending 400 years of joint life between the Serbs and the Croats.

Cohen, 6
territory - in this case, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Inevitably, as Lederer asserts, the radicalization of both the Croatian and the Serbian nationalist demands made of Bosnia and Herzegovina "the neuralgic point" in their mutual relations:

Which national viewpoint would in the end prevail? The Croat view of Bosnians as Croats, and the Serb view of Bosnians as Serbs produced diatribes on both sides and an avalanche of "scientific" treatises on the historical, linguistic, ethnic, religious, anthropological "facts" involved. The problem, however, was insoluble for the generation before World War I, as it became insoluble for the generation that preceded World War II.56

The real problem, however, was in the geostrategic nature of the region. Serbo-Croat squabbling over Bosnia had only been partially justified with their assertion of the historic right to a (Serbian or Croatian?) homeland. Establishing the "truth" over proprietary claims on Bosnia had to do more with the recognition that the control over a "Bosnian middle zone" would enable either side to have the predominant position in any future Yugoslav state. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, both sides have already accepted the idea of the inevitability of the Yugoslav state.57

In the nineteenth century, Austria had her own reasons to secure control over Bosnia and Herzegovina. First, realizing that if Serbia took control over Bosnia and Herzegovina the collapse of the Empire would become inevitable, Austria developed an extremely radical anti-Serbian posture. Accordingly, with the Ottoman fall in Bosnia, that came as the result of the Serbian rebellion in Bosnia in 1875. Austria managed to assert control over Bosnia at the Berlin Congress in 1878. A "customs war" against Serbia was introduced in 1904-1906, and finally,

56 "Nationalism and the Yugoslavs," 425
57 Ibid., 425. Unfortunately, with the break up of Yugoslavia in 1991, the same question emerged at the surface. In spite of the Serbian and Croatian rhetoric on the right to Bosnia and Herzegovina, they only serve to justify a land-grab. The real concern, however, is the same - how to secure central place in the territory of former Yugoslavia.
Bosnia was annexed in 1908. For these reasons, Nikola Dugandzija maintains that Austria-Hungary opted for the war with Serbia in 1914 in order to finally wipe out the idea of the joint state of South Slavs.\textsuperscript{58} Secondly, while being in control of Bosnian affairs, Austria had tried to create a Bosnian national identity that was to serve as the barrier against the further rise of pro-Yugoslav sentiments among Bosnian Serbs and Croats. However, such Austrian politics proved to be a failure. It only strengthened the Croat and Slovene sympathies for the Yugoslav cause. At the same time, it directed the Serbian national program towards accepting Yugoslavia as a framework within which the Serbian question could be successfully solved.

The birth of the idea that the South Slavic nationalities should establish a joint state is closely related to the so-called Illyrian movement in Croatia in the 1830s. Its political aims were to nourish Croatian linguistic and territorial rights in the then Hungarian controlled Croatia. Also, the movement's most influential members had understood a Croatian "revival" as the first step towards the broader ethnic and political unity of the South Slavs. The basis of these ideas was the view that both the Croats and the Serbs are just parts of the larger South Slavic, or as they thought at that time, Illyrian nationality, which also incorporates Slovenes, Bulgarians and the Bosnians.\textsuperscript{59} Although, Illyrians did not attract too much attention in Croatia, or elsewhere, it was nevertheless under their influence that the Croats rejected the distinctly Croatian kajkavian dialect in favor of the stokavian, which was spoken by the Serbs as well.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{58} Nikola Dugandzija, *Jugoslavenstvo* (Beograd Mladost, 1987), 105-109
\textsuperscript{59} Cohen, 4.
\textsuperscript{60} Lederer, 415. The Croatian acceptance of stokavian dialect as the literary Croatian language represents a clear cut case of the ways in which nations are created through invention and imagination. Croatian national identity might have taken a completely different outlook, if they had opted for the kajkavian dialect instead. At the same time, Slovenians rejected stokavian dialect in favor of the separate local dialect that eventually became a distinct Slovenian language.
In the 1860s, the Illyrian ideas were further significantly developed by Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Canon Franjo Racki. For the first time, they had advanced the political interests of achieving a single Yugoslav state of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes. Both Strossmayer and Racki believed that a supranational Yugoslav ideology of accentuating common ethnic, cultural and political bonds of the South Slavs can transcend differences that have been fostered through the centuries of the South Slavic subjugation to foreign rule.\(^1\)

However, during the same period, the proponents of the Yugoslavism in Croatia had to compete with other ideologies that sharply contrasted with their tranethnic goals. Thus, in opposition to the advancement of Yugoslav sentiments, a movement based on the extremely chauvinistic ideology of Pan-Croatianism emerged. Its main effort was directed towards poisoning any cooperation among Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, in order to "sanctify the Croat cause and imbue the "nation" with self-confidence by harping on the glories of its past and a great future destiny."\(^2\)

Nonetheless, pro-Yugoslav and pro-Serbian sentiments were gaining momentum in Croatia. In 1905, two Dalmatians, Frano Supilo and Ante Trumbic, created a Croato-Serb Coalition that soon became the leading party in Croatia.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Cohen, 5.

\(^2\) Lederer, 420. The leaders of the movement were Ante Starcevic and Eugen Kvaternik. Starcevic is also known to have coined anti-Serbian term Slavoserbs. that defines Serbs as Orthodox slaves to other Slavs. He maintained that the Serbs are the most obnoxious of all beasts. that they have no conscience, do not know how to read, can not be thought in anything, and that the only difference among them is in the level of their agility and shrewdness. See Djilas, Osoravana zemlja, 58. Nowadays, he is celebrated in Croatia as one of the "fathers of the Croatian nation".

\(^3\) Dalmatia has always been a stronghold of Yugoslavism. The reason for Dalmatia's interests in Yugoslavia is closely tied to Italian territorial ambitions over Dalmatia. Pro-Yugoslav feelings were further stressed in the World War II when Croatian ultra-nationalists (Ustasas) traded Dalmatia for Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was only with the Yugoslav Army blockade of Dubrovnik during 1991 that the Dalmatians finally become disenchanted with Yugoslavia. Such a military move can be understood only as a deliberate attempt to break all ties that existed between the two people in order to make any future cooperation hard, if not impossible.
At first, the Coalition's members believed that some kind of South Slav unity was possible within a federally structured Hapsburg's state. However, with the deterioration of the international situation, they opted for an independent state organized around the federal lines. During World War I, the Coalition members organized around the Yugoslav Committee, worked towards advancing the idea that Croatian interests lie within "Yugoslav framework, through cooperation with the Slovenes, the Hapsburg Serbs, and with Serbia; in other words, through fundamental changes in the international sphere." However, Supilo's and Trumbić's polycentric Yugoslavism and, at the same time, their disagreements with then Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pasic made them unpopular with the Serbian government. Pasic, on his side, believed that federal Yugoslavia would only "weaken and isolate Serbia", that was at that time engaged in the war for survival against Germany and Austria-Hungary as the Entente's ally. Finally in July 1917, Pasic and the Committee, in words of Cohen, "worked out a compromise on a joint statement (the so called Corfu Declaration) endorsing the creation of a South Slav state along democratic and parliamentary lines", while the issue of the state's federal or centralist structure remained unclear.

With the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the World War I, the old world order collapsed, and the door for the creation of the Yugoslav state was finally open. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had been proclaimed in Belgrade on December 1, 1918, along the lines advocated by Nikola Pasic.

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64 Džiša, Osporava zemlje, 59-62. The Coalition's Yugoslavism was based on the basic precepts of liberal ideology. This allowed Croatian politicians to shift their argumentation from historical rhetoric to the phraseology of human rights and the right of national self-determination. This helped the Serbs from Croatia to become more active in the political life of Croatia. Thus, with the Croato-Serb Coalition, mutually particularistic Serbo-Croat accounts have been replaced with the principal discussions on the universal political rights that are equally applicable to both Serbs and Croats.

65 Lederer, 426

66 Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia, 11-12
happened almost two months before the Paris Peace Conference started. However, even then, the Allied disposition towards its creation was lukewarm at best. The original plan was to preserve a Hapsburg Empire by granting widerautonomies to its constituent nationalities. When Vienna, a few months before its final collapse, failed to accept a separate peace with the Entente powers, they finally opted for its dissolution. Of course, without the Entente's acceptance, Yugoslavia would have hardly been possible. Still, Yugoslavia was legitimized not only on the basis of the Entente's acceptance of the fait accompli of a newly created state, but even more because of its public endorsement of the Wilsonian Points that enshrined the right of nations to self-determination as the key principle in the emerging (supposedly liberal and democratic) new world order.

It is therefore obvious that the thesis on centuries old animosities between the Serbs and the Croats can not be sustained. Instead, throughout the nineteenth century there was a slow and gradual process of developing linkages between the two peoples. For centuries, Orthodox and Catholic Slavs, as well as Serbs and Croats, have lived together under the tutelage of Austria-Hungary. Also, throughout all this time they have never fought wars against each other as Serbs and Croats. Instead, as Steven Pavlowitch asserts, they fought "each other in earlier wars between empires into whose armies they had been drafted, and in World War II as collaborationist soldiers against insurgents, or as communists against anticommunists, but in this configuration so had Croat fought against Croats, Serb against Serbs." 67

Furthermore, although the Yugoslav idea had been originally endorsed by a handful of Croatian intellectuals, on the eve of World War I, the Croato-Serbian Coalition emerged as the most powerful political force that worked against

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Austria-Hungary from within its borders, with the aim of creating Yugoslavia. This is not to say that there have not been bitter disputes over many questions, such as the status of any future joint state (federal or unitary), a lack of understanding over Bosnia, miscomprehensions about the easiness with which differences might have been overcome, etc. Still, this does not correspond with those accounts of ancient animosities between the Serbs and the Croats.

Yugoslavia is certainly the product of the Versailles Treaty, but only to certain extent. As I have already described, there were many more elements in this story that preclude us from disqualifying Yugoslavia in such a manner. When it comes to its artificiality, the real question is to what extent can any state be seen as an artificial or illegitimate one. Yugoslavia that existed between 1918 and 1941 had definitely altered the Croatian and Slovenian perception of Yugoslavism as the product of greater Serbian ambitions, disguised by the banner of official Yugoslav unitarism. This had brought to the fore the conflict between the two distinct state concepts - centrist vs. federalist. Latinka Perovic has encapsulated the reasons for these differences in the following manner:

The Serbs responded to the permanent crisis of the first Yugoslavia with a question: why did we go to war? The Croats and Slovenians had another question: why should we have less within new Yugoslav state framework than we did within Austria-Hungary?68

However, these questions have never been pushed to the point of rejecting the state altogether. Although the national union did not fulfill the "all-too-high" expectations of 1918, the Yugoslav framework appeared to have gained acceptance. Hence, in 1939 Serbian officials had finally discharged the idea of a

68 "Yugoslavia was Defeated from Inside," in Yugoslavia: Collapse, War, Crime, ed Sonja Biserko (Belgrade: Center for Anti-War Action, 1993), 60. Alekša Đijas offers a somewhat different reading of the main dispute in the First Yugoslavia. According to him, the real issue was a sort of "duel" between two centrist conceptions - Serbian and Croatian one. He maintains that the Croatian nationalists have never accepted the idea of federal Croatia, nor they have had plans for granting Serbs and Italians with a local autonomy. See Osporavana zemlja, 259-260
unitary state and accepted the Croatian demand to create a separate state unit Banovina of Hrvatska (Croatia). Slobodan Jovanovic explains this shift as the result of awareness that "the attempt to use the power of the state to create, in as short time as possible, a single Yugoslav nationalism which will stifle Serb or Croat nationalism has not succeeded. ... If Yugoslavia as a national idea has met with difficulties in Serb and Croat nationalism, that does not mean it must necessarily encounter the same difficulties as the state idea." 69 However, the rising hopes for a more democratic and federal Yugoslavia were shattered by the German occupation in April 1941. This put an end to the short life of the First Yugoslavia.

2.6 Conclusion

The rise of the South Slav nationalist movements followed the basic precepts of the ideology of Central European nationalism, particularly in the case of the rise of Serbian and Croatian nationalism. The situation with the Yugoslav nationalist idea is more complex. Although it followed the same precepts, the Yugoslav movement eventually developed a rather distinct, more integrative kind of nationalism. In each of these cases, however, the perception of a foreign threat was the most important situational constraint in the development of South Slav nationalisms. However, Croatian and Serbian nationalism reacted to foreign pressures with the particularistic urge to become even more exclusive, ethnic and collectivist, whereas the Yugoslav response was the opposite - cooperation and compromise, although never fully based on the more civic idea of nationalism.

The reason for this may be related to the early twentieth century context, which did not allow for the rise of more liberal and democratic regimes. Thus, the

69 Quoted in Cohen. 19. Slobodan Jovanovic was the most influential Serbian historian and political writer before the Second World War.
optimum was achieved in 1939 when the federal version of the Yugoslav idea was prevalent. When it comes to the "nation-state" that was created on the basis of Yugoslavism, Yugoslavia did not collapse because of internal weaknesses as it is usually maintained. It was rather a victim, like many other Central European countries, of global structural uncertainties - the break up of the principles of the international order that have been espoused by the League of Nations, the crisis of liberal and democratic regimes, the world economic crisis 1929-1932, and, most importantly, the rise of extreme ideological regimes in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Communist Russia.

In this context, the nationalist transposition of the essentialist historical accounts about the first Yugoslavia on the conditions that were prevailing in the case of the second Yugoslavia (citadel-like metaphors of Yugoslavia being a "Serbian graveyard", "Croatian tragic mistake", "the national prison", etc.) are based on the distorted presentation of the history of the idea and the state of Yugoslavia. As such, they show that historical knowledge can hardly be understood as unbiased, or politically neutral. The purpose of myth creation in political affairs, as I have tried to show with the accounts on the ancient enmities between the Serbs and the Croats, is closely tied to the production of a particular type of knowledge that becomes inseparable from power relations. No matter how unreal or fantastic some political myths appear, once they are publicly endorsed, they become "real". They can only be materialized, however, by universalizing one's particular position beyond the concrete social and historical conditions of the time, i.e., by representing one's position as ethical and other's as immoral, one's nation as civilized, the other as barbarous, etc. Ironically, no one seems better suited for the dissemination of such a-historical and universalistic accounts than historians themselves. In the words of Michael Foucault:
[Historical] discourse strongly resembles the demagogue's refrain: "No one is greater than you and anyone who presumes to get the better of you - you who are good - is evil." The historian, who functions as his double, can be heard to echo: "No past is greater than your present, and, through my meticulous erudition. I will rid you of your infatuations and transform the grandeur of history into pettiness. evil. and misfortune. ... In this world where he [historian] has conquered his individual will, he becomes a guide to the inevitable law of a superior will. Having curbed the demands of his individual will in his knowledge, he will disclose the form of an eternal will in his object of study."

"The inevitable law of a superior will" is the historian's trust in an unchanging historicity of his particular cultural or national identity. Such historical accounts present national and cultural differences as reified sets of opposed essences. This, however, opens the door for the rise and/or further enhancement of "adversarial knowledge", which, as the Yugoslav case in the late 1980s has shown, proves to be the basis for the rise of xenophobic nationalism and chauvinism. The history of Yugoslavia, like history of any other country, is the history of continuities and discontinuities. By falsifying Yugoslav discontinuities, "national" intellectuals were able to offer a historical understanding that corresponds to a particular nationalistic interest. National intelligentsia in Yugoslavia, as if it has followed the nineteenth century Central European pattern, have insisted that the roots of the crisis are to be found in distinct national characteristics. Such historically induced differences are here to stay, without any possibility of the evolution of national identities and ideologies. Thus, the

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71 See Said, 5-8

72 David Apter warns us that "[M]yths of founding, transformations, and redemptions whether represented in recognizable myths or embedded in accounts of developmental states. correspond to Plato's noble lie. ... Such myths of disjunction are the foundation points for all states. " Qt. in Bette Denich. "Unmaking Multi-ethnicity in Yugoslavia: Metamorphosis Observed." *The Anthropology of East Europe Review. Special Issue. War Among the Yugoslavs* 11, no 1&2 (Spring and Fall 1993): 58.
questions such as the legacies of communism, lack of a political culture of
democratic liberalism, economic crisis, etc., did not even "deserve" to be
mentioned in their accounts on the Yugoslav crisis. Nonetheless, the real story
always intersects with the individualized collectives, while the attempt to define
any identity group in a unilateral way is possible at the price of simplifying and
violating a complex fabric of society. Hence, it is my understanding that the
politics of ethnic homogenization was fully conceivable only through the assertion
that the continued existence of Yugoslavia is equated with human sacrifice.

In this chapter I have tried to "deconstruct" the national historiographies of
the territory of the former Yugoslavia as the "adversarial knowledge" that had
served the purpose of justifying the disintegration of the Yugoslav state. However,
while their role in the disintegration of Yugoslavia has been given some place in
this chapter, the nationalist ideas (and movements) alone are powerless without the
particular context that makes them potent. Furthermore, it is my belief that only
by emphasizing the Yugoslav institutional arrangements, such "mundane"
questions concerning economic, socio-cultural and political constraints can again
become legitimate and necessary for any coherent account on Yugoslavia. Hence,
the following chapter will be dedicated to delineating the institutional set up of the
second Yugoslavia that have led to a peculiar symbiosis between nationalism and
communism in the make-up of Yugoslavia.

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73 See Djilas, "Krvavo pero savremeno antijugoslovenstvo i njegovi izvor." 102
Chapter 3

The Self-Destructive Mechanism of the Yugoslav Federal System and the Process of Disintegration

*The power of imposing a vision of divisions, that is, the power of making visible and explicit social divisions that are implicit, is the political power par excellence: it is the power to make groups, to manipulate the objective structure of society.*

Pierre Bourdieu

*Yugoslavia neither should nor can exist as institutional service to certain republics, as a kind of confederation. I believe it would result in the political disintegration of the whole [while] parcelling out Yugoslav socialism into separate, republican socialisms would inevitably lead to the emergence of a quite different social reality... Each nationalization of socialism as idea, movement or organization always ends in the emergence of a totalitarian ethnocentric community.*

Veljko Rus

3.1 Introduction

Despite many terminological peculiarities of the Yugoslav socialist self-management system, that have led a great number of western analysts to believe that Yugoslavia had been "different" (something of a bridge between the liberal West and the communist East), the country that emerged from the ashes of World War II clearly belonged to the communist world. As such, it shared the most important characteristic of every other communist state - the party monopoly in society, the justification of which was found in the basic tenets of the ideology of Marxism and Leninism. Consequently, the founding fathers of the Second

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2 These prophetic words were written in 1971. Qt. in Laslo Sekelj, *Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration* (New York: Columbia UP, 1993).
Yugoslavia. Josip Broz Tito and his "ideological lieutenant" Edvard Kardelj, closely adhered to the two most important Leninist practices: first, the policy of democratic centralism; and second, the pragmatic principle according to which multi-ethnic communist states can successfully solve national problems with the formula - "national in form and socialist in content." However, at the end of the process of Yugoslavia's disintegration, nationalism became both the "form" and the "content" of Lenin's formula.

In order to understand how it was possible that parts of a whole (federal units) had a bigger say than the whole itself (federation) in a system supposedly defined by the principle of democratic centralism, the following pages will analyze the disintegration of the Yugoslav communist "federal" system. Having in mind the links in Yugoslavia (as well as in other former multi-ethnic communist states) between two apparently opposing ideologies - communism and nationalism - it seems appropriate to start by delineating Lenin's principles that have served for decades as the basis for dealing with the national question in multi-ethnic communist states. The subsequent sections will deal with the varieties of Yugoslav federations. However, the emphasis will be the federal and self-management model that was developed along the rules designed in the 1974 Constitution. In the final part of the chapter, I will try to show that the Yugoslav cleavages in the 1980s can best be understood as the "natural" outcome of the Yugoslav communists' national policies, and that, as a result, the crisis was built into the very foundations of the Yugoslav system. The consequences of national homogenization, differentiation, and, eventually, civil war and the dissolution of the country soon followed.

Thus, in accordance with my interpretation of Greenfeld's "situational constraints", I will attempt to show extent to which the ideology and practise of Yugoslav communism were capable of imprinting their images on society; and, to
what extent the communist institutional set up, working as a mediator between reality and ideas was, on one side, faithful to communist ideals, and, on the other, malleable by the changes in people’s perceptions of reality, thus paving the way for the rise of nationalism.

3.2 Communist Federation: National in Form...Nationalist in Content

Lenin’s national strategy can be broken into three central parts: first, prior to communist take over, there is the promise of the right to national self-determination, including the right to secession; second, following the communist victory, introduce the process of assimilation which includes territorial autonomy of all compact national groups; and third, a communist party has to be centralized and free of all kinds of nationalist leanings. The dialectical reasoning behind these apparently contradictory statements on the right of nations to self-determination and, at the same time, the insistence on the party’s need to pursue policy of centralism, uncovers that for Lenin class allegiances remained of a higher order than national ones. Lenin was sure that by promoting self-determination, nations would use this right only to decide to remain within the already existing unions. Or, as Connor asserts:

Lenin could readily conceive of a nationally aroused people acting in opposition to their best economic interest by fighting for independence. But with nationalistic suspicions laid to rest by the offer to independence, economic motivation would win out.

However, even if the "unimaginable" happens, it would not represent too much of a problem, because Lenin thought that the party is not obliged to automatically support the right of every nation to self-determination. In Lenin’s

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2 Ibid, 35
mind, only those national movements that lead to socialist revolution were worth supporting. In addition, once the revolution is over, the settlement regarding self-determination rights would become less relevant, for such decisions would be guided by principles of "scientific socialism" rather than by ethnic allegiances. In other words, the ideology of the party and its organizational scheme of democratic centralism emerges as central to ensuring the socialist content of every multi-ethnic communist state. The central paradox between "national form" and "socialist content" is thus solved: the multi-ethnic communist state is a federation of national republics in which the real power is exercised by a unitary party. Under such conditions, nations may even "flourish", but not nationalisms, which would be transcended by the ascent of a common class content. 5

But, as we all now know, why should we accept at face value the distinction between "form" and "content". Do not national forms, as Connor insists, "in and by themselves, help to reinforce and perpetuate that sense of group uniqueness which, according to the Communist Manifesto, should be daily more and more vanishing?" 6 This is even more problematic, having in mind Lenin's insistence that "national form" incorporates such practises as division of country into autonomous and self-governing territorial units according to nationally determined borders, illegalization of any departure from the principle of equality of nations, equality of languages, autonomous cultural policies, etc., which can hardly be seen as compatible with the "socialist content" of the state itself. 7

Moreover, in hindsight we see that the practices of communist parties in power only further strengthened "national form" at the expense of the "socialist

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6 National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, 495
7 ib. 36
content" Once the communist party in multi-ethnic states became the only "legitimate" state party, communist leaders found themselves surrounded by the problems that had been generated. In words of Rakowska-Harmostone, by "the lack of effectiveness of government performance, the conflict between broad social forces and the 'New Social Class of Milovan Djilas,' and ethnic and regional demands for autonomy and genuine federalism." The answer to these cleavages was found in further "theoretical elaboration" of Lenin's guidelines. In a sense, the "solution" was worth Lenin's practical genius, since it consisted of broadening the legitimacy base of the Party along national lines, while keeping the principle of democratic centralism intact. Gregor Tomc explains this shift in an almost deterministic manner:

Sooner, or later, its [the Party's] basis of legitimacy had to shift to representation of other particular segments of society. This was especially the case because there were no other political parties left to represent these other segments. So the party had to claim a new and broader basis of legitimacy to make its interests credible to all sections of society, with the exception of "class enemy" - however these were defined. The party had to develop from the avant-garde of the proletariat to become representative of all people of good will. In short, it becomes a people's party - and,... it is the people who embody the nation in modern societies. In this sense ruling communist parties unavoidably became national parties.9

From then on, communist parties were balancing between the two bases of their legitimacy - the one based on nation and the other on class. According to political interests of the day, either one has been used to secure maintenance of the party's predominant position. Since a radical shift in either direction could have easily endangered its ruling position, every period of liberalization and decentralization initiated by the party was followed by a period of restored dogma

8 "Communist Constitutions and Constitutional Change." 205.
and centralization, which was also inaugurated by the party. Hence, those two distinct legitimacy bases became borders within which party members were allowed to situate themselves. This also meant that they could identify themselves either as "communist nationalists" or "national communists", but rarely as "internationalists" in the classical Marxist sense of the word.

However, the perpetual circle of reforms and counter-reforms represented nothing but the way the communist party was trying to solve the basic paradox of every communist state - how to reconcile any recognition of spontaneously generated social demands with the leading (monopolistic) role of the party? In other words, the party's failure to accommodate the demands of emerging new social forces to participate in social life led inevitably to mechanisms for maintaining of the political status quo. or in Chalmer Johnson's terms, the development of "transfer goal culture":

A Communist party in power adopts a transfer culture, which it expounds and defends as moving society towards a utopian goal culture but which in fact has as its first two priorities the preservation of the party's power monopoly and the maintenance of the social system. Third in priority, but still of decisive importance, are schemes thought to be necessary for achieving the goal culture... All three demand societal mobilization, a process that is inevitably alienating because at least a third priority have never been legitimized among the mass of the population.

In Yugoslavia, as it was the case with any other communist federation, the priority of maintaining the system demanded the "reconciliation" of social pressures for change with the leading role of the party along ethnic lines. From what has already been said, such a "solution" seems to have been the only possible

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10 Ibid., 70
11 See Anthony D Smith, "Communist Nationalisms", in Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Martin Robertson Press, 1979), 115-149
one of which the party elite could think, since Yugoslavia, like any other communist state, was by definition perceived by their creators as a conflict free society. Accordingly, it is logical that the answer could not be found in developing western style interest groups, or in trying to institutionalize conflict resolution mechanisms for a "conflict free" society. In the following section, these strains will be supported by a more detailed account on Yugoslavia's particular experiences.

3.3 Institutional Set-Up of Yugoslavia's Cleavages

Although the final consequence of the institutional design of the Constitution in 1974 was the confederalization of Yugoslavia, Tito wanted to achieve two goals with this design, and neither one was purposely directed towards the disintegration of the country, as it is now usually maintained among the nationalist intelligentsia circles in the "Third" Yugoslavia (i.e., Serbia and Montenegro). Quite the contrary, and in accordance with Johnson's "transfer goal culture" thesis, the Constitution of 1974 can be better explained as yet another attempt of the old cadre, led by Tito and his aid Edvard Kardelj, to solve the problem of the reemerging nationalism on one side, and the rise of liberal

13 The first and more successful attempt was in the World War II when the Communist party emerged as a national unifying force. In the bloody civil war which raged at the same time as did the war against the German (as well as Italian, Hungarian and Bulgarian) occupying forces, the partisan movement proved to be capable of attracting and uniting citizens of different nationalities. Accordingly, despite the Ustasha policy of genocide against Serbs, and its use of Moslems to carry out the same policy in Bosnia, the increasingly alienated population of the so called Independent State of Croatia, together with most of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, joined the multi-ethnic partisan forces. Thus, as V P. Gagnon rightfully observes, "the image of 'ethnic groups' in conflict even during World War II must be seen as part of an ideological construct in which 'ethnic groups' are portrayed as actors by nationalist politicians and historians." See "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/1995) 134 More about different rhetorical strategies that have been used by nationalist historians and politicians in the territory of former Yugoslavia see Chapter 2 of this work
tendencies which could potentially diminish the communist influences in society. On the other. The idea was that the reformed selfmanagement system could sustain high rates of growth, while the decentralized federation could alleviate both the pressures for the further democratization of the system, as well as the regional appetites for a higher share in decision-making process at both the republican and the federal level. However, the party completely failed in preparing the economy for the new qualitative stage of modernization, as well as in solving the problem of rising nationalism. On the other hand, it did manage to successfully prevent the rise of democratic social movements that would cut through regional borders. In the following pages I will argue that the answer to the question "how did this happen?" rests on the assumption that the causes of the crisis were built into the very foundations of new Yugoslavia.

3.3.1 An Inappropriate Institutional Model

From its very outset, on November 29, 1943 in Jajce, when the second meeting of the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (i.e., the Council of the 'partisan Movement) had announced the creation of the Federal People's Republic, Yugoslavia was organized around two principles - a federalist and a communist one. In full accordance with Lenin's federal formula, however, the justification for the re-creation of Yugoslavia was not found in over-publicizing the class content of the socialist revolution, but rather in the national liberation struggle. The emphasis on the national principle (form) was further strengthened in the first Constitution of 1946 that included such notions as the right of peoples to self-determination, along with the right to secession (Article 1), as well as the equality of all nationalities and their right to use their own

14 An excellent survey of the different stands of the Communist party of Yugoslavia regarding the national question in the years preceding World War II, as well as during 1941-1945.
language, culture and identity according to their own particular conditions (Article 13).

Each nation was given a separate federal unit (with the notable exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina because of its multi-ethnic configuration), with assemblies, governments, courts, anthems and other symbols which implied equal standing in the federation, irrespective of each republic's size and population. Nonetheless, federalism in this phase was just a "façade federalism" (Carl Friedrich), since the system was thoroughly centralized.\(^{16}\) Thus, as Dennison Rusinow asserts, federal arrangements were "carefully counterbalanced by a highly centralized but carefully multi-national one party dictatorship, with police apparatus and a centrally planned command economy."\(^{17}\) This essentially Soviet model was abandoned in the early 1950s, because the Yugoslav leadership had become aware of the complete failure of the forced collectivization, a policy that pushed the country to the edge of famine. Consequently, it was not only the break with Stalin in 1948, but even more the adverse impact of the command economy and the desire to receive American aid to combat famine, that forced the party finally to break its adherence to Stalinism (two years after Tito's famous "no" to Stalin).

A solution to the problems created by the Stalinist model were found in workers' self-management system. The key idea was to allow enterprises to become more autonomous with independent decision-making powers, that were


supposedly managed by the workers. Furthermore, over the years, most prices were eventually liberalized, while investment decisions were gradually given to companies, with the consequences of "transferring economic power from the central ministries to the banking system and the regional authorities."18 On the other side, most fiscal instruments and control over foreign currency and trade remained in the firm control of the federal center. The most important consequence of this contradictory situation was the rise of interregional competition over scarce, but centrally, allocated resources. However, given the national character of Yugoslavia's regions, this competition quickly became equated with competition among the nationalities:

Questions like priority for basic or processing industries (concentrated in different regions), or which resource, seaport, railroad, or highway should be developed first, were again and by 1963 openly interpreted as national questions by those involved and by public at large. Political leaders defending local and economic interests were regarded (and increasingly saw themselves) as national leaders defending vital national interests.19

At the same time (1950-1965), the "socialist content" of society was defended by further enhancing the role of the party elite over the process of social stratification, liberalization and destalinisation of the state. Hence, as Connor asserts, for the first and only time in Yugoslav history, all references to self-determination were avoided in the 1953 Constitution. The same period also witnessed the short-lived campaign of Yugoslavism (Jugoslovenstvo), the theoretical justification of which, as of any other system's "ism", was provided by Kardelj.20 "Yugoslavism", which was at the time fully supported by Tito, was defined as a pan-Yugoslav supra-national socialist patriotism that was supposed to

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19 Rusinow. 134.
20 National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, 224, 434-437
transcend all cultural, linguistic and economic differences in the country. This, however, implies that two crucial causes of Yugoslavia’s crisis in the 1980s, "decentralization bereft of democratization and conflicting principles of self-management and dictatorship of the proletariat [under the disguise of socialist Yugoslavism], were from the outset woven into the very foundation of the self-management system."21

The policy of "Yugoslavism" was eventually dampened by its very founders, because in many parts of Yugoslavia it was perceived as a threat to their distinct identities. Thus, republican leaders successfully discredited it as another attempt of Serbian hard-liners to create a Yugoslav identity in the image of a Serbian nation.22 Not surprisingly, it was Kardelj who justified dismantling the very concept of "Yugoslavism" he helped create. In the speech given at the Eighth Party Congress in 1964, Kardelj depicted centralized planning as the key cause of nationalism. Centralization, whether perceived as economic, or psychological (Jugoslovenstvo) directly provokes local nationalisms. Hence, it is not a solution to the problem, but its cause. A new "miraculous remedy" had to be located, and it was found in the atomization of decisions at subregional levels. The perception of decentralization would, according to Kardelj, bring about the deterritorialization of the national rivalry and thereby move people away from perceiving issues in ethnonational terms.23

Finally, in 1966 Tito supported non-Serbian regional leaders and proponents of economic and political decentralization, which brought the downfall of the Serbian conservative and centralist Alexander Rankovic. With the purge of Rankovic and his followers, the road towards the federalization of the party was

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21 Sekelj. 3-4.
22 Rusinov. 134-135
23 Qt. in Connor. 440-441.
open. At the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, republican branches were given the right to appoint their representatives to the Presidium (former Central Committee) and the newly created Executive Bureau (the top of the Party), which consisted of two representatives from each republic and one from each province. Nonetheless, despite a larger role for republics in creating the party's policies, the principle of democratic centralism remained intact, thus allowing the party to successfully control society. This would become painfully obvious to Croatian and Serbian leaders in 1971 and 1972 respectfully.

In the economic sphere, from 1965 (the year of economic reform) until 1971, Yugoslavia operated under a "free wheeling economic system" that came to be known as a "laissez faire socialism". The economic reform eliminated almost all central command planning, reducing the federal role in controlling the foreign currency regime, as well as a funding the less developed republics and provinces. Moreover, this period witnessed the birth of a new managerial elite that arose to the position of challenging party bureaucracies. Still, since the so called policy of "de-etatization" stopped at the republican doors, the liberalization of economic life was not followed by democratization. Instead, the policy of decentralization further strengthened the process of the nationalization of political life.

Therefore, the consequences of "market socialism" proved to be ambiguous. On the one side, those were the years of a rising standard of living which was fueled by high growth rates (the average for the period 1953-1971 was 9.8%), on the other, the top party echelon was increasingly aware of its eroding position in the society due to the ever-rising role of a technical-managerial entrepreneurship elite and its fusion with the republicans' leadership. Also, the maintenance of fixed low prices for raw material, agriculture, transport and energy for the sake of

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24 Ibid., 537
25 Shoup, 130.
boosting economic growth of more developed regions, only enhanced international competition (because the regions were organized nationally). Thus, the growing autonomy of republics, in combination with the "socialist market economy", ended up in the general surge of nationalist feelings that could be found in all parts of Yugoslavia.²⁶

In such a situation, when the "national form" was gaining upper hand against the "socialist content", the party's pendulum once more moved, but this time (1971-1974) into the direction of reasserting the principle of democratic centralism. However, the assertion of the democratic principle did not take the form of the recentralization of the country. Instead, the party opted for the destruction of the "socialist market" model, and its replacement with the "economy-by-agreement" model, followed by the mammoth bureaucratic restructuring of self-management boards, that had been thoroughly atomized at the local level. The main political aim was thus achieved - the break up of the power base of the emerging liberal managerial class. The collapse of "liberalism" was followed by the purge of republican elites in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Vojvodina and Macedonia.²⁷ However, while the liberal power base had been successfully destroyed, Tito opted to preserve intact Lenin's formula - "national in form,

²⁶ For more detailed account of the years that preceded 1974 see Rusinow's classic study The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974 (Berkley: University of California Press, 1977).
²⁷ In the case of Slovenia, however, only top of the "liberal" party's echelon was replaced. On the other hand, in Serbia and Croatia Tito rebureaucratized the party structure more thoroughly. The possible explanation for such distinct approach is that Serbia and Croatia were always seen as the most important parts for the stability of the country. Thus, Tito was more concerned to have obedient party leadership in Croatia and Serbia than in other parts of Yugoslavia. Given such circumstances, Slovenia had 20 years of politically uninterrupted development which accounts for its political culture and tact during the crisis of the 1980s. It allowed reform prone Slovenian communists to painlessly undertake the transition from communism to a more democratic regime. Unfortunately, the same period will be remembered in totally different light in Croatia and Serbia. While the political life in Serbia was characterized with constant internal political frictions, Croatia witnessed a full re-bureaucratization of social life. In both cases, communist as well as postcommunist leaders were totally unprepared for the challenges that the collapse of the system brought about.
socialist in content." Accordingly, despite the purges in 1971 and 1972, the political system was even more decentralized. The 1974 Constitution assigned to the republics and provinces the status of national states, while "the powers of the federal center were reduced to a few roles such as foreign policy, defense and a minimum of economic instruments".  

Therefore, this period uncovers a set of political moves and counter-moves that can be explained only if we keep in mind Johnson's "transfer-of-culture" thesis: that the most important of the party's tasks is the maintenance of power. In that regard, it is no surprise that within a month (June/July 1971), first, Tito pushed the Yugoslav Parliament to adopt Amendments to the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) which further expanded the status of autonomous provinces within Serbia by granting them sovereign rights; and, then, a few weeks later, the President gave a speech announcing "that any confrontation between the Federation and republics is wrong and harmful, because the two are inseparable parts of our self-managing organization. Our sovereignty is one and indivisible - be it republics or the federation that are involved."  

Those words, as it is now known from history books, were directed against the Croatian communist leadership, which was headed by Mika Tripalo and Savka Dabcevic-Kucar. To what extent they can be seen as "liberals" (according to western interpretations) or "nationalists" (according to the official Yugoslav understanding) is debatable. Still, the fact remains that on December 1971 Tito crushed the "Croatian spring". A year later he suppressed the so-called Serbian liberals in an equally brutal fashion. While the fall of Tripalo and Dabcevic-Kucar  

28 Rusinow, "Nationalities Policy and the National Question," 136  
29 Qt. in Connor, 226.  
30 For example, the Croatian "maspok" (mass movement) was based on the links between the idea of nationhood, Catholicism and the Latin alphabet. Obviously, this "cultural" nationalism could have been possible only at the expense of those Croats who did not share the same alphabet and religion as Croats.
is well publicized in western accounts of Yugoslavia, surprisingly little had been said about the importance of dismissing Serbian communist chairman Marko Nikezic and secretary Latinka Perovic. However, one of the most astute writers on the former Yugoslav affairs, Croatian journalist Jelena Lovric, maintains that the elimination of the Serbian circle in 1972 was perhaps more detrimental for the destiny of Yugoslavia than the removal of Croatian "national liberals":

The Serbian leadership of the time, therefore, took the view that Yugoslavia was not synonymous with Serbia, but was the collective concern of all of its peoples; the Serbs were not, nor should they be, more responsible for it than others. Serbia had its own house to set in order and would, in the long run, do more for the Yugoslav federation by focusing on its own development and modernization. The liberals were acutely aware of the backwardness of their republic, and took account of the fact that the remote Serbian hinterland bore little resemblance to "liberal" Belgrade. With the purge of the liberal circle, the movement to "separate" Serbia from Yugoslavia was permanently derailed; and the option of a democratic Serbia was closed. Another option, however, remained - an option which was to grow ever louder.

In 1974 another circle between "national form" and "socialist content" was over. In a dialectical fashion, the party and state structure underwent a series of changes, that have not only been in accordance with the changes already anticipated in the Constitutional amendments of 1971, but also with the key demands of the Croatian "mass movement" (a full republican control over national economies, for instance). On the other side, a further decentralization of the system was counter-balanced by the careful choice of new republican elites, that were, in accordance with the third of Lenin's maxims, to keep the party centralized and free of all national proclivities. However, the experiences of 1950s and 1960s have already shown that decentralization without democratization in a one-party

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state has never ceased to generate the immanent crisis of modernization. Moreover, each of previously described cycles ended in further pushing the pendulum towards the "national form" at the expense of the "socialist content". The final break with the formula came at the Eleventh Party Congress in 1978, when Tito gave his last address to a party congress, stressing the importance of "democratic centralism" as "the basic principle of the internal relations, organizational standards and entire acitivity of the LCY." Yet, at the same congress, the process of the federalization of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was finally over. From then on, the Central Committee and the Party Presidium were organized solely on the basis of the ethnic principle, which successfully blocked the application of the principle of democratic centralism at federal level.

Nonetheless, although the leading role of the party was maintained at the level of the constituent units, changes in federal structure of both the party and the state have, as Rakowska-Harmstone observes, eroded the party's monopoly of power and introduced elements of pluralism. This, however, meant nothing less than the system designed to provide the lasting stability and prosperity after Tito's death could not be able to achieve such a task, because it depended upon a factor outside the system - the charisma of Josip Broz Tito. Hence, no matter how careful Tito was in choosing his successors, once he ceased to be a constant in the Yugoslav power equation, they started acting according to rules that were delineated in the 1974 Constitution. Consequently, as William Zimmerman has aptly pointed out, in the late seventies the decision-making process stopped being Leninist, while failing to become pluralist in character.

32 Sekelj, 6
33 Qt. in Connor, 539
34 "Communist Constitutions and Constitutional Change," 219
35 See Shoup, 132
3.3.2 Yugoslav Crypto-Confederation

The new Constitution was built on the basis of two opposing assumptions: first, the party should regain a more central role in all the aspects of social life (therefore, the 1974 Constitution essentially explains its leading role in society), and second, that the unleashed, genuine forces of decentralization should somehow be accommodated. It was Kardelj, as it was the case with any other Yugoslav "constitutional" problem, who had found the "solution" to the quandary of how to break the links between the "positive" forces of decentralization and "detrimental" forces of rising nationalism. The idea was to upgrade the self-management system in such a manner that it would allow a shift of powers from republics to communes and the enterprises. The hope was, as George Schopflin asserts, that "they would emerge as the true foci of power, loyalty and identity, thereby transcending ethnicity." However, even if this was party's main intention, it was doomed to fail because of the privileged status of the republics and provinces which had not been curtailed.

Instead, the 1974 Constitution was founded on the concept of dual sovereignty: that of the "working people" and of the "nations and nationalities". However, very soon the idea of dual sovereignty proved to be internally inconsistent. The channels through which "working" people were supposed to enjoy their rights were designed to work only within republican and provincial structures, allowing them to become the primary source of authority at the expense of federal institutions. In that regard, it is interesting to note that it was Kardelj himself who provided the arguments for the thesis on the internal inconsistencies of the last Yugoslav constitution. In his political testament "The

Development of the Political System of the Socialist Self-Management" (1977). Kardelj encapsulated the essence of the 1974 Constitution in the following manner:

In fact, we no longer have a classical federation or confederation, but rather a self-management community of nations and nationalities of a new type, which is not based exclusively on a division of state functions, but above all on common interests determined by self-management and a democratic constitutional agreement among the republics and autonomous provinces. In this way, the self-management system has given an entirely new, democratic quality to inter-nationality relations as well.17

Hence, Kardelj ties the self-management system directly to "community of nations and nationalities", and, even more, defines Yugoslavia as a "democratic constitutional agreement among the republics and provinces." But, such an understanding (which was the official party view at the time) of what Yugoslavia is, implies firstly, that self-management has nothing to do with the rights of "working people", let alone citizens' rights; secondly, that the "late Yugoslav federation was a permanently constituting and not a constituted state"18 and, lastly, that the consent of all contractual sides when deciding to change the elements of the contract becomes indispensable. Since the contractual sides are sovereign in their decisions, "unanimous consent" emerged as the basic principle of the Yugoslav political life.

The unanimous consent in the former Yugoslavia, however, should not be equated with the principle of consensual decision-making. The essential element of unanimous consent in principle is a right to reach decision by vote, while in the


18 Emphasis added

Yugoslav case unanimity was reached without vote and on the basis of "cooperation" among regional oligarchies. Moreover, as Kostunica asserts, "if the unanimous consent of all federal units is a constitutionally valid mode of decision making, the power of veto is an obvious practical consequence, and therefore an integral part of it." The specifics of the Yugoslav federation, therefore, was that it had been actually constituted as a confederation. Its main features were:

- The Chamber of the Republics and Provinces of the Yugoslav Assembly worked according to the rule of unanimous consent. The delegates (12 from republics and 8 from provinces) were obliged to represent the stands of their respective federal units (articles 286, 295, 296).  

- In the Federal Chamber (30 from republics, 20 from provinces), decisions were made by majority vote. Still, the delegates remained obliged to their respective federal units:

- The final outcome of such structuring of the federal Assembly was the situation of equal representation of the constituent units, irrespective of their size. As a consequence, larger units became underrepresented, while smaller ones overrepresented:

- Since the elections have been replaced with the complicated procedure of political appointments which were primarily concerned with ethnic mathematics, individuals were not able to appear as citizens, but solely as "atom[s] of national interests."  

- The members of the highest Yugoslav political body, the Presidency of the S.F.R. of Yugoslavia were responsible not to the Federal Assembly, but to republican and/or provincial assemblies. Even more, the federal Assembly did not

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40. See Ustav Socialisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (Beograd Rad. 1974)
41. Kostunica, 87
have any say in those appointments (apart from announcing them to the Yugoslav public), which had been the sole prerogative of the assemblies of republics and provinces (and, more importantly, their respective party committees).

- The republics and provinces are responsible for their respective development (article 251), and accordingly for the execution of the federal laws on their territory (article 273); and

- The Yugoslav constitution required the unanimous consent of all the federal units, while the republican constitutions, and even the constitutions of the autonomous provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo, did not need to be in accordance with the Constitution of Yugoslavia. Consequently, the constitutional impasse of the late 1980s had already been anticipated by the rule that any amendments should be deemed passed only when they are adopted by the Federal Chamber (2/3 majority was required), as well as by the legislative assemblies of all of the constituent units (which proved to be impossible).

The problem was further exacerbated when the right of veto very soon became the basic principle under which each federal unit operated, no matter what kind of question was at stake. This had detrimental consequences for the legitimacy of the Federal Executive Council (Yugoslav government) in a twofold way. First, it created a peculiar parallelism between decision passing (the responsibility of the central state institutions) and decision making (republican responsibility) powers. Secondly, the lack of a constitutionally set vertical power balance between different levels of government deprived the federal government "of the capacity to act as a collectivity with its own democratically articulated political will. Accordingly, with the Constitution of 1974, Yugoslav republican

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42 Lidiya Basta Posavec, p. 56
elites were given both the form and the substance of the national existence and political power. The changes in the opportunity structure in Yugoslavia which emerged as a direct result of the new institutional make-up in 1974 further undermined links between the republics and the federation. Regional leaders, as Klaus Von Beyme aptly comments, no longer counted on upward mobility in the central government apparatus. Instead, they created new opportunities in their republics and provinces and within their respective ethnic or national context.\textsuperscript{43} At the same time, the inter-personal relations at the federal level have been guided by the iron law of the "ethnic key."\textsuperscript{44}

The policy of "ethnic key" was Tito's deliberate attempt to try to keep the federal center from being dominated by one national group, i.e., either by Serbs or a Croato-Slovenian coalition. Despite, "current nationalist fairy tales" about the Second Yugoslavia being dominated by the Serbs, the rigid use of "ethnic key" assured an almost mathematically balanced distribution of federal posts between cadres from republics and provinces.\textsuperscript{45} Furthermore, as the events in Croatia and Serbia between 1971-1972 have shown, Tito proved to be equally hostile to any kind of nationalism. Yet, as the result of the policy of essentializing the ethnic aspects of people's identities at the expense of civic ones - a practice which have

\textsuperscript{43} Klaus Von Beyme. "Regime Transition and Recruitment of Elites in Eastern Europe." \textit{Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration} 6, no. 3 (July 1993): 413

\textsuperscript{44} The most thorough analysis of the "cadre policy" in Yugoslavia can be found in Lenard J. Cohen's lengthy study \textit{The Socialist Pyramid: Elites and Power in Yugoslavia} (Oakville, New York, London: Mosaic Press, 1989)

\textsuperscript{45} Bogdan Denitch, \textit{Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia} (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1994). 38 The only exception to the rule was the ethnic configuration of the Yugoslav National Army, where Serbs did have a complete preponderance among the officers and generals (70% of them were Serbs). One of the reasons, according to Denitch, is that in World War II Montenegro and Krajina had contributed disproportionately more to the partisan forces than some other regions, which led a great number of Serbs from those areas to opt for a military career. Furthermore, military careers proved to be less attractive to economically more developed regions in the country, such as Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina.
been further supported by the Constitutional arrangements of 1974 - it is not surprising that, in Denitch's words:

One unanticipated but in retrospect predictable result was that loyalties to the republics, which for the most part meant national loyalties, were kept high, while loyalties to a federal Yugoslavia were kept low. Even during Tito's lifetime it used to be said that he was the only real Yugoslav. That turned out to have been a bad mistake for which the present generations are paying.\(^{46}\)

Hence, institutional changes in the 1970s allowed republican oligarchies to use "ethnicity" as a legitimate basis for asserting claims against each other, and all together against the federal government. Since the 1974 Constitution granted republics and provinces state prerogatives, all the appointments of resources have become the function of republics and provinces. Consequently, it became strategically more effective, as Rakowska-Harmstone observes, for communist federations in general, to aggregate interests on an ethnic base.\(^{47}\) This, in a country as ethnically diverse as Yugoslavia, while still socialist in "content", only strengthened the links between two authoritarian ideologies - communism and nationalism. There was, however, a clear predominance of "form" over "content" Or, as Alexa Djilas asserts:

Being a communist dictatorship, Yugoslavia was not a part of the main political currents which were taking place in (Western) Europe the development of liberal political culture and the evolution of national ideologies. Instead, Yugoslav communist regime tried to block any form of political pluralism. Thus, the evolution of national ideologies towards embracing liberal cultural values has been prevented.\(^{48}\)

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\(^{46}\) Ibid., 39

\(^{47}\) More about the reason which lies behind the "strategic efficacy of ethnicity" see "The Nationalities Question." in The Soviet Union Looking to the 1980s, ed R. Wesson (The Hoover Institution Press, 1980), 129-155

\(^{48}\) "Hrvatsko-srpski sukob i liberalna demokratija," in Srpsko pitanje, ed Alexa Djilas (Beograd Politika Press, 1991), 147
Nonetheless, as long as Tito was alive, his omnipotence and Yugoslavia's international standing in the world divided by the cold war, presented sufficient guarantees for the unity of Yugoslavia against any centrifugal pressures. The 1980s in that respect brought drastic changes. Tito's death in 1980 and a severe economic crisis triggered by the oil shock of 1979 set about the fatal logic of disintegration. The squabbling "fraternal" republican leaderships entered this decade with the double curse of authoritarianism and economic failure, while, as Anton Bebler maintains, the "confederal frame began to obtain political muscle and soon turned out to be the central instrument for dealing with political controversies in Yugoslavia." \(^{49}\)

3.4 Life is Elsewhere

The consequences of the institutionalization of the combative federalism of communist nationalisms became too obvious in the late 1980s, when the country became completely fragmented along economic, social, political, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious lines. The subsequent pages will deal with some of those divisions. First, I would try to delineate the economic and social aspects of Yugoslavia's failure to secure both a modern economy and a socialist welfare state and, accordingly, maintain the legitimacy of the socialist self-management system. Second, the 1989/90 debate among the proponents of three distinct concepts aimed at reforming the Yugoslav system will be presented. These are: the "real federation" model (Serbia, Montenegro), "confederal" suggestion (Slovenia, Croatia), and a so called "third option" as a half-way between the previous two concepts (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia). The last section will deal with


\(^{50}\) Anton Bebler. "Yugoslavia's Variety of Communist Federalism and Her Demise." \textit{Communist and Post-Communist Studies} 26. no 1 (March 1993) 81
the mechanisms which lie behind the "friend-enemy" relationship among republics. It will particularly emphasize the nationalist elites' policies of ethnic homogenization and differentiation, that made a violent "withering away" of Yugoslavia a frightening reality.

3.4.1 The Illusion of Success

For Yugoslav citizens, the self-management system seemed to work rather well until 1982. The population enjoyed higher rates of the standard of living than in any other communist state, while the annual average growth rate for the period 1974-1979 was a rather high 6.1%. Also, the Yugoslav policy of open borders, i.e., the possibility for Yugoslavs to leave the country whenever they wished, was another reason the country was perceived as the envy of Eastern Europe. Therefore, from the perspective of the late 1970s, it looked as if everything confirmed the system's legitimacy and the "self-management vitality as a reform alternative to 'orthodox' state socialism".51 On top of that, the 1981 Census results have shown the highest number of citizens ever to identify themselves as Yugoslavs - 1,218,268, or 5.4% of all Yugoslav citizens (in Croatia 8.2%, Bosnia and Herzegovina 7.9%, Serbia Proper 4.8%, Slovenia 1.4%, etc.). At the same time, the percentage of mixed marriages was at a steady 13% (the lowest in Macedonia 7%, the highest in Vojvodina 27%), showing that national divisions were more the concern of political elites than ordinary people.52

However, in 1982, the foreign creditors (the "five-leg animal" - the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 600 commercial banks, western governments, and the Bank for International Settlements in Basel) finally decided

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51 Cohen, 30.
52 See Ruza Petrovic. "National Composition of the Population." Yugoslav Survey 24, no 3 (August 1983) 18-26
to "expel" Yugoslavia from the international financial market due to its ever growing foreign debt and the inability to service interest rates to its main creditors on scheduled time. Within a few years the economic situation drastically changed, showing that the bureaucratized self-management system was totally inept to deal with demands of restructuring the Yugoslav economy on the basis of economic criteria. Accordingly, without foreign financial injections, the system proved to be incapable of maintaining high rates of growth and an ever-rising standard of living. This significantly altered the population's perception of the legitimacy of the system.

In 1987 already 6.7 million households (95% of the total) could not survive on a regular income, while the living standards fell to 1967 level. Furthermore, the growing number of people of different education, age and sex started identifying themselves with their national background. The speed of the process of "national awakening" is well reflected in the last Yugoslav census data from 1991. It shows a drastic decline in number of people who identified themselves as Yugoslavs - only 700,000 (in Slovenia 0.6%, Croatia 2.2%, Bosnia and Herzegovina 5.5%, Serbia Proper 2.5%, etc.). Hence, it seemed that nothing remained of the legitimacy of the system, let alone of the "self-management vitality".

However, it seems that the real problems with the Yugoslav economy (and the system) started much before 1982, and were related to the difficulties that all

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53 See Branko Colanović, Dugovi Jugoslavije (Novi Sad Dnevnik, 1985).
54 Sekelj, 47
55 For example, the survey of Yugoslav youth in 1986 indicates that republican, i.e. national, and religious loyalties became the most important foci of their identification. Data testify that the political views of such different social groups as peasants and students within one nation had been more similar than the views of the same social strata that transcend national borders. Furthermore, nationality became the most important criterion in choosing a marriage partner (for 46% of subjects), as well as best friend (36% of them) Qt. in Tomec. 76.
56 See Cohen, 175
politically guided economies (so-called planned economies) faced. In a system which prohibits the privatization of social property as a means of "liberating" the economy, the only possible mechanism that allowed Yugoslavia to sustain its growth was the international financial market. However, there are two issues that need to be addressed. One is Yugoslavia's openness to foreign credits, while the other is a tremendous increase in Yugoslavia's indebtedness. For instance, Yugoslavia more than quadrupled its debt in less than 8 years - from 4.6 billion US dollars in 1974 to close to 20 billion US dollars in 1981.\(^7\)

Oswaldo Sunkel maintains that in the post-World War II period there have been two long-term trends in the international economy. The first one lasted from 1950 to 1970, and the second one from 1980 on. The first was characterized with the exceptionally rapid and sustained growth of the world economy and the expansion of international trade. This trend was also followed by the "exceptional and sustained expansion" of private and direct foreign financing, while interest rates were on their minimum.\(^8\) Thus, under the conditions of cheap foreign credit in the 1970s, many other developing countries also opted for the strategy of borrowing foreign capital. However, the unanticipated "oil shocks" in 1974 and 1979 drastically changed the international financial market. After 1980, the world witnessed slow and unstable growth, along with rising protectionism and the historic increase in interest rates on foreign credits.

The main consequence of the newly emerged trend in the world economy in 1980s was that loans which were taken at one level of interest rates, had to be returned at different, much higher rates. Miroslav Pecujlic asserts that as the result

\(^7\) For a detailed account on Yugoslavia's indebtedness, see Colanovic
of the upward swing in interest rates (as well as because of the rise in the prices of modern technology and oil between 1973 and 1984) Yugoslavia was forced to pay to foreign creditors and partners fifty billion dollars more than it would have to pay otherwise under the conditions that had been prevailing in the early 1970s. 59

Still, Yugoslavia was not the only country that suffered such a blow. And yet, there have been many other countries that proved to be capable of overcoming those "shocks" (e.g., South-East Asian countries). Therefore, the real question is how did Yugoslavia invest foreign loans and why did it opt for an import-substitution strategy of growth instead of the export-led model of development that proved to be more beneficial?

In the early 1960s Yugoslavia faced a dilemma of how to solve the modernization crisis; a dilemma that had emerged at approximately the same time in most of Eastern European, Mediterranean and Middle East countries. Its causes have been closely interrelated with the fact that the first quantitative stage of modernization (urbanization plus industrialization) was over. All of these regions were at the threshold of the new qualitative phase of modernization. However, the answer to these challenges were different, implying different outcomes as well. According to Sekelj, in the 1970s the character of a political system played the predominant role in determining the response to the crisis of development:

59 Qt. in Jovica Trkulja, Osvajanje demokratije. ogledo postkomunizmu (Beograd, Izdavacka agencija Draganic, 1993), 71 In the light of such figures, it can be argued that Yugoslavia, as well as other socialist economies, perfectly fit the function of additional sources of capitalist extra-profit, thus fully supporting the thesis that those markets serve primarily as a means of providing extra-profit for the huge expenses of post-industrial welfare states. Furthermore, the logic of "uneven development" provokes stability and prosperity on one side of pole, while economic, political and social crisis on the other. Nonetheless, although core-periphery tensions have certain value in explaining Yugoslavia's collapse, emphasizing this line of thought can only be done at the expense of its systemic features. After all, the fact that many developing countries responded to the crisis of global restructuring differently, implies that the adaptability of the system to internal as well as external pressure seems to be the key starting point, and therefore, more important than the logic of "uneven development", in explaining the roots of economic and political crisis in many socialist countries in the 1980s.
[t]he modernization crisis was either transcended thanks to a
democratic political system [the case of Italy], or it led to further
dramatic political changes entailing a democratic shift and the
overcoming of the modernization crisis, or at least paving the way
[the cases of Spain, Portugal and Greece]... On the other hand,
socialist countries never took that democratic turn, and therefore
continually generated modernization crisis until it took the shape of
a general crisis of socialism.

The same East-European pattern was repeated in Yugoslavia. Although
economic reasons were pushing Yugoslavia towards opening itself to the world
market, the party leaders were guided only by the political rationale to "preserve"
the country (i.e., the one-party system) from the "detrimental" effects of the
Westernization. Thus, they perceived the modernization crisis primarily as the
problem of economic restructuring; whereas the main, underlying issue was the
"redistribution of political, and therefore overall social power." Since economic
reforms of 1961 and 1965, as well as constitutional reforms in 1971 and 1974,
never challenged the foci of political power in Yugoslavia (the party monopoly),
the Yugoslav socialist self-management system remained incapable of completing
the modernization process. Consequently, the crisis continually regenerated since
1965, only to acquire "forms of centrifugal nationalism under the auspices of
republican national leadership of the LCY." Unlike the southern European
countries that have based their modernization efforts on the political participation,
economic initiative, and the role of the civil society, the Yugoslav leadership opted
to preserve its "leading" role in society. Thus, Ralf Darendorf's perception that

60 "Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration," 154
61 Ibid., 4
62 Ibid., 5
63 In 1964 Talcott Parsons predicted the breakdown of the communist system, using his
notion of evolutionary universals. Evolutionary universals are institutional innovations or
breakthroughs, which allow a given society to successfully adapt itself to its environment. Some of
the key evolutionary universals are money and market universalistic legal system and democratic
associations. From this evolutionary point of view, Parsons understood the communist system as
more archaic than that of western societies, because of the lack of participatory and pluralistic
the former USSR ended in the perpetual process of modernization without modernity can be well applied on Yugoslavia.\footnote{1}{1 \cite{1}}

The inflexibility of the system and the rigidity of the official state communist ideology prevented Yugoslav leaders to make a "better" choice. Tito and the inner circle of the bureaucrats rejected the South-Eastern Asian model of export-led growth as ideologically ominous and potentially threatening to the system. From their perspective, it seemed politically hazardous to allow multinational companies a free entrance to the country as well as to import the capitalist and anti-socialist organizational techniques in the economy! Consequently, Yugoslavia entered the global economic crisis in 1979 without sufficient economic instruments to deal with higher costs of energy, technology and capital, while the huge investments in fixed assets, based on the borrowed capital, were not supported by rational economic parameters.

In the same period, the labor productivity increased at annual average rate of 1.7%, while the average personal incomes grew much faster, opening the door for an excessive rise in consumption.\footnote{2}{2 \cite{2}} In 1985, in order to fill the gap between the productivity of labor and wages, the federal government, led by a communist conservative Branko Mikulic, opted for the inflationary economic policy as the only remaining means of legitimizing the system (the so-called policy of programmed inflation). In 1988, after three years of constant pressure from the IMF, Mikulic (and party conservatives) decided to reject the policy of soft budget

political institutions. "I \cite{1} do indeed predict that it [communist system] will prove to be unstable and will either make adjustments in the general direction of electoral democracy and a plural party system or regress into generally less advanced and politically less effective forms of organization, failing to advance as rapidly or as far otherwise may be expected." \cite{2} Talcott Parsons and the Collapse of Eastern European Regimes, Theor. Culture and Society 10 (London, Sage, 1993), 145-151.

\footnote{1}{1 \cite{1}}
\footnote{2}{2 \cite{2}}
constraints. Instead, series of short-term measures were introduced - devaluation of Dinar, the rise of interest rates to their real level, and the removal of price control. Those measures were further enhanced by economic reforms aimed at restructuring the banking system, the organization of the enterprise, and opening the doors for foreign investment.\(^6\) However, the spiral of the perpetual growth of incomes and prices could not have been successfully broken, since the situation of economic hardship had provoked a series of workers' unrests across the country.\(^7\) Under such "well-nigh desperate conditions" of economic chaos and hyperinflation Mikulic was replaced as Prime Minister in January 1989 by a communist reformist Ante Markovic.\(^8\)

After spending a year trying to secure consensus of the party conservatives and republican oligarchs for his program of radical economic reforms, Markovic finally announced his program in December 1989. Working against the annual hyperinflation of 10,000%, monetary chaos, record unemployment (more than two million of the labor force), crippled production, and massive foreign debt, the Yugoslav government tried to create the conditions for the restructuring of ownership and the legalization of political pluralism in the country.\(^9\) Still, despite initial massive public support for Markovic and his program, an important event was only a month away from his announcement of economic measures. This event proved to be detrimental for the reform efforts of the last Yugoslav government.

In January 1990, the Fourteenth Extraordinary Congress of the LCY was interrupted, never to be resumed again, because of the walkout of Slovenian

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\(^6\) Shoup, 133

\(^7\) According to official data, in 1987 there have been 1685 strikes with more than 288,686 participants, in 1988, 1700 strikes with 390,000 workers, and in 1989, 10,000 strikes which involved more than one million workers. See Trkulja, 95

\(^8\) Shoup, 134 Also, see Egon Zizmond, 104

\(^9\) See Sekelj, 257-258
delegates.⁷⁰ From then on, Yugoslavia stopped being one party state, with the overnight result of all federal institutions losing basis of their legitimacy. However, at the republican level, the situation was different. Due to the institutional peculiarities of Yugoslavia, "state" and party leaders of the former Yugoslav federal units were able to legitimately continue representing the interests of their respective republics. Furthermore, the Slovenian communists, then at slower pace, the others, rejected the principle of democratic centralism. Accordingly, republican leaderships started campaigning for multi-party elections at the territory of their republics.

The elections were organized throughout 1990. First, in Slovenia and Croatia, and then in every other Yugoslav republic.⁷² At the end of the year, the

⁷⁰ As it is the case with many other aspects of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, there is no clear agreement over the "date" which marks the final collapse of Yugoslavia. For one group of authors, it is the collapse of the Communist party of Yugoslavia on January 1990, for the other, it is the date when Slovenia and Croatia have been officially recognized by the EC - January 1992. I personally opted for April 6, 1992 when the EC officially recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina which was followed by the immediate beginning of the war. The reasons for such "choice" have been described in the Introduction to this work. Here it suffices to say that although Yugoslavia as a state practically ceased to exist already on January 1990, its spirit was irrevocably killed by the act of an early recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state, and, more importantly, by the beginning of the siege of Sarajevo by Serbian nationalist forces.


⁷² The elections were first held in Slovenia on April 8, when an united opposition won the majority of seats in the Parliament (55%), while the leader of the Slovenian reformed communists Milan Kucan was elected President of the Presidency of Slovenia. In Croatia the elections were held on April and May. Although the Croatian Democratic Union took only 41.5%, it won a two-third majority in all three houses of Parliament, thanks to majority electorate system. The Parliament appointed Dr. Franjo Tudjman President of the Presidency of Croatia. In Macedonia the elections were held in November 11. Macedonian opposition nationalist party won the elections, but the reformed communists in coalition with some other parties preserved the influence. The President of Macedonia became a life-long communist functionaire Kiro Gligorov. On November 18 elections were held in Bosnia. The Moslem Party of Democratic Action won 86 seats in the Parliament, followed by the Serbian Democratic party (72) and the Croatian Democratic Union (44). Finally, on December 9, elections were held in Serbia and Montenegro. As a candidate for President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic won 65.35% of votes. Thanks to majority system, his Socialist Party, which obtained 45.8%, won 77.6% of the seats in the Serbian People’s Parliament. Albanians from Kosovo boycotted the elections in Serbia. Data are from
rhetoric of "communist nationalisms" was replaced with the rhetoric of post-communist ethnonationalisms, only to confirm Vlachnik's account of nationalism as the last stage of communism, or, in his words, "[i]t is the last ditch effort of the obsolete ideology to find support in society for dictatorship ... At the same time, nationalism is the expression of opposition to communism."  

However, the only difference was that the rhetoric of ethnonationalism tried to present itself in a "decent light", by constantly appealing to constitutional-democracy facade. Nonetheless, the sequencing of the first multi-party democratic elections in communist Yugoslavia, as Lidija Basta-Posavec points out, proved to be of utmost importance in the secessionist strategy. The federal government was not capable of organizing federal elections, and thus it was suddenly confronted with new, democratically elected opponents.  

At the same time, as Milica Uvalic observes, the open economic war started between Slovenia and Croatia, on one side, and Serbia, on another. In September 1990, Serbia "forgot" to transfer sales tax revenues to the federal budget, which was followed by Slovenia's decision to stop payments to the Federal Fund for the less developed regions in Yugoslavia. In October 1990, Serbia imposed special taxes on Slovenian and Croatian goods. Then, the main republican commercial banks started bying foreign exchange on the black market in the neighbouring republics hoping to secure as much "hard currency" as possible before the "D Day" of dismantling Yugoslavia. In December 1990, there was no single

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republican law that remained in conformity with the federal legislation. Finally, in June 1991, the first Yugoslav war (between Slovenian territorial units and the Yugoslav army) started, to be followed by the military clashes between Croatian Serbs (with a full support of the Yugoslav Army) and the Crotian military. From then on, the only question that remained unanswered regarding the destiny of Yugoslavia was the question of timing; i.e., when would the international community stop perceiving Yugoslavia as a sovereign entity.

Nonetheless, it has to be noted, if only for "historic" reasons, that Markovic's government successfully deregulated the economy, eliminated control over pricing and opened the process of the privatization of "social property." Markovic's overall program was otherwise based on the understanding that the transformation of society could be peacefully achieved only through the two-step process: economic reform from above and the reconstruction of civil society from below. In that regard, his dismantling of the self-management system, as well as the institutionalization of the right to strike and the "new" forms of industrial democracy and property, were perceived as the development of the necessary building blocks for the emergence of a stable environment with a high level of predictability and regularity. This stability would also allow the protection of a nascent civil society against the discriminatory usage of power. However, it was in anticipation of these exact achievements that, as Laslo Sekelj maintains, Markovic became public enemy No. 1 for all republican governments. From their perspective, no matter whether they had been ideologically close to Markovic (as with Slovenian president Milan Kucan) or not (as Croatian and Serbian presidents Tudjman and Milosevic), the toppling down of his program was a necessary move to fully legitimize their exclusionary, republican and national

76 Ibid., 245
77 See Sekelj, 259-260
interests. The resignation of the last Yugoslav Prime Minister on December 20, 1991, followed by the changes on Balkan maps, are the direct outcome of their success.

3.4.2 The Peripheralization of Yugoslavia

Social changes that were induced by the Constitution of 1974 and further provoked by the "import substitution strategy" of development, complemented the political as well as the economic aspects of the Yugoslav system that I have discussed so far. Carl-Ulrik Schierup argues that at the end of the 1960s Yugoslavia had aspirations to enter the category of the "core" industrialized states. Instead, by opting for the self-management system, by the 1980s it ended up in a position "no less peripheral than its position as a poverty stricken neo-colonial appendix to the European core economies before World War II."8

Schierup, whose analysis relies heavily on the work of some of the most prominent sociologists and economists of what used to be Yugoslavia, maintains that the economic crisis in the 1980s reinforced the importance of the "proto-rural" character of the working class in Yugoslavia. According to him, the fact that urban population never sold its agricultural land allowed the emergence of "private agriculture" as a main "shock absorber" for the hardships of the 1980s. This phenomenon of urban workers heavily relying on rural agriculture as a supplementary source of income reaffirmed the traditionalization of all social relationships in society. However, although the economic crisis fostered the development of the "retrograde type of labor reproduction", the real underlying causes of the predominance of the urban-rural working class in Yugoslavia lay within the Yugoslav socialist system. Despite rhetorical claims about the

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Yugoslav socialist market economy, market institutions never actually succeeded in fully replacing the "bureaucratic dictatorship over needs". The lack of economic criteria, together with the party policy of the pervasive industrialization of the country, created the demand for the numerous, semi-skilled, proto-peasant working class.79

This type of working class, with its peculiar industrial culture, was more reinforced as such by the Law on Associated Labor (1976). Its basic assumptions were a carbon copy of the 1974 Constitution: consequently, the application of the Law led to the replacement of the socialist market mechanism of commodities with the so-called "economy by consensus". This meant that workers, as the "owners" of social property, would control the most important companies' decisions. Also, it further meant that self-management was designed not only to be a replacement for market forces, but a substitute for democracy as well. Yet, it was never the case. A self-management system as a form of participatory democracy itself negates the basic principle of democratic centralism. However, the Yugoslav version of a self-management was defined in terms of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", thus allowing the party to remain fully in control over decision making process. Accordingly, all decisions continued to be reached through different levels of governmental agenices, on the one hand, and communist managers, on the other. In other words, self-management turned out to be an auxilliary form of party-state power, which, with the gradual collapsing of the

79 In the period from 1948 to 1981 Yugoslavia witnessed a major rural exodus, with more than 6.5 million migrants moved to a city. At least in the case of Belgrade, this first generation of "citizens" proved to be a strong electorate base for the ultranationalist Serbian parties in the early 1990s. Those "urbanized peasants" are also known for, on the one hand, ceasing to be peasants, while, on the other, becoming resistant to civic characteristics of urban life. Accordingly, they opted for their "third way" of the "newly created" mass culture, which were influenced by both primitivism and kitch.
party-state structure along republican borders, even further enhanced a territorial atomization of the Yugoslav society.\textsuperscript{80}

At the micro level the consequences of the implementation of the self-management system were equally grave. Yugoslav companies were closed, protectionist enclaves which were opposed to innovations and new technologies because they endangered the privileges of the employed, as Marjan Korosic maintained.\textsuperscript{81} Similarly, as early as 1981 Josip Zupanov was fully aware that:

As the success of a firm came to depend more and more on administrative intervention and informal relationships with local bureaucratic power structures, so economic and functional criteria for employing new labor tended to be eliminated. Instead, 'mechanical solidarity', centered around the primordial loyalties of family, friendship, locality and ethnic group, became the most important criterion for accepting new members, while relations of 'organic solidarity' increasingly dissolved.\textsuperscript{82}

However, from the party perspective, the most important outcome of the self-management system was the emergence of the corporatist coalition between localized bureaucracies and proto-peasant working class, "crystallizing around the central values of redistribution and egalitarianism."\textsuperscript{83} This coalition, as Zupanov maintains, is a coalition of unequal partners in which the local bureaucracy "protects" workers by guaranteeing jobs, stable incomes and social privileges. On the other hand, by accepting the official party ideology, the "protected" labor provide the system with the basis for its claims to legitimacy. Yet, the economic, social and political crisis in 1980s revealed that the self-management system functioned primarily by the means of manipulation by political oligarchies. In the

\textsuperscript{81} Qt. in Scherup, 93
\textsuperscript{82} Qt. in Scherup, 94 Emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid. 89 Also, see Josip Zupanov, \textit{Marginalije o društvenoj krizi} (Zagreb Globus, 1983). pp 33-63, 130-156
conditions of an already nationally stratified and compartmentalized society. Self-management became just another way of promoting one's particular national interest.

The same logic of "mechanical solidarity," that Zupanov described at a micro level, thus became predominant at the macro level as well, paving the way for passionate debates on "who exploits whom?" "who was better off?" "who benefited from Yugoslavia?" etc. Steven Burg maintains that in 1970s the economic structure of society still allowed the interregional policy of "trade-offs." However, with more complex economic problems in 1980s, regional leaderships found it hard to calculate what should be endorsed and what should be rejected from the governmental packages. Being concerned only with their respective constituencies, they, as Rusinow points out, started to "scream [that] it is their nation that has been robbed of resources for development by any form of centralized redistribution or pan-Yugoslav economic strategy."

The growing public obsession with regional relations, as Kori Udovicki rightly observes, "led not to a grater understanding of facts, but to the creation of regional economic mythologies that fed into feelings of inequality and victimization in the respective communities." A perception of "being exploited" thus served as an important rationale for justifying the nationalist oligarchies' policies against each other. This perception of injustice in the relations between regions (defined solely in national terms), rather than the injustice itself, finally

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84 Qt. in Rusinow, "Nationalities Policy and the National Question," 143
85 Ibid., 143.
86 Interregional Trade in Yugoslavia 1970-1987 Was Disintegration in Store? (Ph D diss. Yale University, January 1993) Udovicki's main thesis is that data do not allow such drastic conclusions about any side being "exploited." In other words, different aspects of the system impared different parts of the country differently. Udovicki also shows that the economy tried to escape the grip of politics as much as it could. However, in a society which had been primarily defined by considerations of maintaining power, economic rationale did not have too much weight (with the conspicuous exemption of Slovenia)
brought the different elements of the Yugoslav crisis together, paving the way for the rise of the populist leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia (1987) and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia (1990), with whom the nightmarish scenario of the violent destruction of Yugoslavia became a distinct reality.

3.4.3 **Constitutional Stratagems**

The constitutionally abolished participation of individual citizens in the political life of the country made "a dissolution process the only political value that was given a proper chance to be articulated as a political program."\(^{87}\) Since 1980 Yugoslav citizens became passive observers (and eventually participants) of the process of the articulation of many ideas which challenged the legitimacy of the Yugoslav state. Consequently, this was also a time that had "legitimized" graffiti-like political slogans that cherished the particular against the common identity such as: "Kosovo-Republic", "Slovenia, my country", "Bosnian spirit", "All Serbs in a Serbian Land", "Vojvodian identity", etc.

By the end of the 1980s, the process was over. The predominant perception of Yugoslavia as "a forced community" of all against all found its articulation in the different strategies for creating independent and sovereign nation-states. Yet, given the fact that Yugoslavia still enjoyed its sovereign status abroad, the republican national elites were forced to express their "vision" of a joint life in new, democratically reformed Yugoslavia.\(^{88}\) Thus, three proposals dealing with the organization of a "joint" life in Yugoslavia emerged - Yugoslavia as a confederation (Slovenia and Croatia), Yugoslavia as a federation (Serbia and

\(^{87}\) Basta-Posavec, 157

Montenegro), and lastly, Yugoslavia as "something in between" (Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Slovenian representatives were the first to articulate their vision of confederal Yugoslavia. Their carefully constructed proposal in 1989 of an "asymmetrical federation" (which was later, in the second half of 1990, supported by the Croatian side to become a "confederal" model) was based on the rejection of the majority vote principle. Slovenian leaders rightly feared that such a principle would lead to the praxis of outvoting their proposals because of the Serbs' demographic dominance in Yugoslavia. Therefore, they adamantly defended a consensus ruling principle as well as the right to self-determination, including the right to secession, which were embodied in the Constitution of 1974. The Slovenian stance of "asymmetrical federation" was most forcefully expressed by its president Milan Kucan who announced that "we will live only in such a Yugoslavia in which sovereignty is assured, as the permanent and inalienable right to self-orientation of all the nations... where we will regulate common issues in a federal state according to the principle of agreement". This understanding of the "right to self-orientation" was even more comprehensively phrased by the constitutional expert Ivan Kristan:

The right of self-determination is one of man's immanent rights and freedoms... The right of self-determination as a collective right of nation and as a right of an individual is receiving... new characteristics from the point of view of the correlation of the right of self-determination with other human rights: it is considered that the right of self-determination is a condition for the accomplishment of all human rights.

Kristan's stand anticipates the future ethnic character of a Slovenian state, according to which the right of a nation to self-determination is understood more

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89 Qt. in Cohen, 62.
in its ethnic sense, than in the sense of a demos, i.e., of citizens' political rights. Thus, in the new Slovenian Constitution (1991) it is maintained that "[t]he principal right of Slovenian people to self-determination [relies on] the historic fact that Slovenians throughout centuries of fight for national liberation have realized distinct national identity and realized their statehood."\(^{91}\)

Similarly, in 1985 Zvonko Lerotic, a political scientist and eventually a special aid to the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman identified federal republics with predominant nations within each of the republics (i.e., Croatia to Croats, Serbia to Serbs, etc.) Furthermore, by defining the term "nation" as synonymous to the terms "ethnos" and "demos", Lerotic collapsed all the differences that exist between an ethnic and a democratic state. This allowed him to identify Yugoslav republics as nation-states (which, according to his understanding of nation, implies ethnic states as well), despite the fact that ethnically perceived nation-states coincide with Yugoslav republics only in the case of Slovenia.\(^{92}\)

Consequently, when the Slovenian and Croatian "Model of Confederation" reached the public with suggested definition of Yugoslavia as an agreement between independent sovereign states, i.e., "Yugoslav republics that as such [independent and sovereign states], are constituting [confederation] on the basis of the right of nation to self-determination," it was outrightly rejected by Serbia and Montenegro. According to its critics, the "Model" assumed Yugoslav republics already to be sovereign entities, which, at least formally, was not the case. Secondly, and more importantly, apart from Slovenia, no other Yugoslav republic was an ethnically homogenous state; thus, the realization of the confederal model would have the consequence of opening the national minority question in

\(^{91}\) Qt. in Vojin Dumitrijevic, Nezveznost ljudskih prava: na putu od samovlasca ka demokratiji (Sremski Karlovci. Novi Sad: Izdavacka knjizarnica Zorana Stojanovica, 1993), 67

\(^{92}\) Sekelj, 246. 278
Yugoslavia. Finally, while this proposal constantly referred to the European Community, the word "Yugoslavia" was not even mentioned in it.

The Serbian position, on the other hand, was centered around the idea that in a communist Yugoslavia, Serbia was deprived of its proper weight because of the special autonomous status which the 1974 Constitution gave to its provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo. Serbian representatives vehemently rejected any notion of a confederal Yugoslavia, which was understood as a road towards full disintegration of the country. In that respect, the unanimity among Serbian parties was almost complete. Slovenian and Croatian plan was understood as a way of reducing the national status of more than two million Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the uncertain position of a national minority. Its consequence would be the reopening of the Serbian national question, which was thought to have been solved with the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918.

For these reasons, the Serbian and Montenegrin proposal supported the idea of a Yugoslav federation, which would be ruled by the majority principle on the basis of sovereignty of citizens in federal units, "as in the case of any modern federation" (as it could have been read in the Serbian media in those days). Nonetheless, despite its democratic phraseology, the Serbian and Montenegrin proposal did not take into account the complexities and historic differences of the Yugoslav republics and peoples. Instead, it served the purpose of advocating the state in which all Serbs will remain living together. Accordingly, it is not surprising that this new and apparently democratic Yugoslav house looked like a "Procrustean bed" to everybody else in Yugoslavia. As in the case of the Croatian and Slovenian proposal, its main flow was in the universalization of the particular interests of one nation over the interests of the others.

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93 Ibid, 255
Bosnian and Macedonian presidents, Alija Izetbegovic and Kiro Gligorov, offered to the "Yugoslav public" their proposal in the eve of the wars in Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991, i.e. under an already extremely tense situation in the country. In this light, it is understandable that they wished to present their program as a "third way" between the previously offered competitive concepts of a federal and confederal Yugoslavia. Accordingly, "Platform on the Future of the Yugoslav Community" was based on the concept of dual sovereignty - those of republics and that of Yugoslavia which supposed functions in many ways paralleled those of the Yugoslav federation from 1974 (i.e., unified market, guaranteeing of human and minority rights on the territory of all Yugoslavia, common foreign and defense policy). Nonetheless, despite their political wisdom not to define their option as pro-federal or confederal, the way they defined the right of nations to self-determination implied its proximity to a Slovenian and Croatian model. "Platform" explicitly states that the right of nations to self-determination is possible only in the case of those peoples who are already organized within existing Yugoslav federal units. This means that such a right is limited to nations within existing republican borders, and that it can not be understood as the right of peoples living across republican borders (for example, Serbs and Croats, spread across republican borders). Hence, as in the case of the model of confederation, the right of nation to self-determination is reduced to the right of federal units to self-determination. Moreover, despite the multi-ethnic configuration of the Macedonian and Bosnian population, it was explicitly stated that citizens in republics have right to decide by referendum (on the basis of majority principle) on the question of national self-determination.94

94 Samardzie, 124-125
However, the election in November 1990 in Bosnia and Herzegovina already disrupted a delicate ethnic and political balance that had existed among its three constituent nations (according to the 1991 Census, approximately 43% were Moslems, 31% Serbs, 17% Croats, and 6% Yugoslavs). As in the case of any other former Yugoslav republic, the election process legitimized nationalist parties to the extent that 90% of all votes went to those parties in accordance with census results. As the Unicameral Parliament was ruled by a majority principle, the constant threat existed whereby two of the parties could, unsuspectingly, outvote the third, and thereby marginalize the national population it represented. Finally, in mid. 1991, a tacit Moslem-Croatian coalition had been formed, supporting a confederal solution to Yugoslavia’s crisis, while the Bosnian Serbs remained faithful to Milosevic’s federal model. Under such conditions, Izetbegovic’s insistence on the right of federal units to sovereign status, was perceived by them (and Serbia as well) as the agreement of two sides against the third one. This is even more so, having in mind that Izetbegovic justified his proposal on the idea of sovereign Bosnia as the republic of all of its citizens irrespective of their nationality. However, the idea of citizens’ republic was originally the basis of the Serbian proposal of the federal Yugoslavia, that was outrightly rejected by Izetbegovic. Thus, despite its democratic phraseology, as in the case of previous two proposals, the Platform was written from a particularistic perspective that did not take into account the needs of a whole, but, in this case, the interests of the Moslem and Macedonian nations.

So, at the end of 1990 and at the beginning of 1991, it was obvious that Yugoslavia reached a constitutional impasse. While a "third option" and a "confederal" model appeared to Serbian representatives as a road towards the

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95 See Trkulja. 104-107
secession. "federal" Yugoslavia looked equally unacceptable to everybody else because of its potential "centralist" threats. However, since the rule by consensus was still the alpha and omega of Yugoslav politics, it slowly became obvious that such an impasse could be broken only by way of force. Unfortunately, the painful experiences of inter-ethnic wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have shown that the painless transition of federal units into independent states was possible only in the case of a full coincidence between the right of nations to self-determination and the right of republics to self-determination, i.e., only in the case of Slovenia, as the most ethnically homogenous republic in the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, a superficial reading of those approaches can lead one to conclude that behind the "real federation" concept lies the aspiration of a Greater Serbia, while the "confederal" Yugoslavia's model can be understood as a better way of dealing with political issues in a diverse country such as Yugoslavia. However, a closer look at the various proposals has shown the equal amount of rigidity and the genuine lack of interest for compromise as a crucial instrument of every rational policy. Throughout this period, neither side tried to reconcile both approaches, or to incorporate viewpoints that would combine both civic as well as collective rights.

In 1985 Schopflin already pointed out that the argument that the solution to Yugoslavia's crisis cut across republican borders came too late. This was due to a widespread and genuine lack of interest for the other. He suggested that the real question had been: "whether the republican elites retain[ed] enough of [a] commitment to Yugoslavia in real terms to maintain it as a single state?"\textsuperscript{96}

Obviously, the answer to such question was "no", because collective rights already

became a predominant issue of Yugoslavia’s policy, for which there was no way of reaching a compromise. However, the crucial importance of the subservience of the individual to the collective identity, and the rights derived from such an identity, is in creating the atmosphere of uncertainty and a lack of trust. Although, the politics of national identity did not look ominous in the case of Slovenia, once those principles enshrining collective rights were embedded in the constitutions of other Yugoslav republics (all with ethnically mixed population) the destruction of Yugoslavia became “constitutionalized”.

Julie Mostov maintains that in the environment in which "national or ethnic identity provides the basis for the distribution of social goods", while "political subjects are limited to ethnically defined collectives", the politics of national identity is incompatible with a democratic transformation of (post)communist societies. Even in the situation of fully respecting the rights of other national and ethnic groups, the essentialist accounts (or in words of Mostov, a "thick cultural understanding") of "centuries old struggle for national liberation" preserve a distinct possibility for other ethnic groups to become second rate citizens. This is so because the instantly created ethnic minorities in all of the former Yugoslav republics (and other former communist states) are constitutionally described as members of collectivity first, which implies that their "ethnic status is theirs by virtue of national origin and not because of their individual position on particular policy issues or their party affiliation and, thus, is permanent."98

The 1990 Croatian Constitution is in that regard a symptomatic example of creating suspicions among different collectivities. For example, in the Constitution that is based on the realization of "the thousand year dream of the

98 Ibid., 23
Croatian People" to establish a national sovereign state of the Croatian People. It is also written that "the members of other nations and national minorities, who are her citizens, will be guaranteed equal status with citizens of Croatian nationality." And yet, 1991 demonstrated that jobs, property rights, and even residence status, relied upon having a Croatian citizenship. However, the criteria for Croatian citizenship for non-Croatian residents included knowledge of national culture and history, that was determined by tests administered by commissions with significant arbitrary powers. Consequently, in the course of realizing Croatian "cultural nationalism" in 1991, Serbian Cyrillic script has been practically banned, while thousands of Serbs lost their jobs. Eventually, by the way of connected vessels, the Croatian Serbs had turned to aspiring nationalist leaders, whose radical program of separation from Croatia only provided additional fuel for armed conflict and bloodshed in the second half of 1991.

Analyzing nationalist strings in the constitutions of the former Yugoslav republics. R. Hayden came to similar conclusion as Julie Mostov. Once constitutional nationalism is envisioned as a "right of particular nation to decide fundamental questions", it is only a matter of time before minority resentment will lead to demands for greater equality and even "induce secessionist movements in the largest minorities" (Serbs in Croatia, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albanians in Serbia). Furthermore, Hayden claims that the "appeal of constitutional nationalism may reveal the elements of Central European thought that make military or bureaucratic 'ethnic cleansing', if not genocide itself, inevitable". Or, in words of Ernest Gellner, "given multinational reality some

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99 Ibid., 18.
101 Ibid., 673. For the straunts of Central European thought that make ethnic cleansing possible see Chapter 2 of this work.
territorial political units can only become ethnically homogenous if it either kills, or expels, or assimilates all non-nationals.\footnote{102}

The analysis of Yugoslav constitutional stratagems has shown that the principle of majority democracy in combination with an ethnic understanding of nation can not work within the framework of multi-national communities. The heterogeneous character of population (national, cultural, religious) implies the impossibility for ethnic minorities to become tomorrow's majorities (unless they pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing!), which is a sine qua non condition of democracies based on the one-man one-vote principle.\footnote{103} The rigid insistence on the majority principle for one’s republic, in combination with the emergence of ethnic nation-states proved to be detrimental for all of former Yugoslav republics, with the exception of Slovenia, which was the only homogenous society, capable of applying the principles of liberal democracy in an undiluted way. For others, the majority principle of national referenda (that had been used to legitimize the emergence of new nation-states) only radicalized inter-ethnic relations, because the newly emerged national minorities were, as Basta-Posavec points out, never democratically integrated into constituting procedure of new nation-states.\footnote{104} Thus, it is appropriate to conclude that the newly emerged nation-states failed in their efforts to escape a Yugoslav Catch 22, i.e., the legitimacy crisis of a country that is not accepted by all of its ethnic members.

3.4.4 The Triumph of Chauvinistic Nationalism and the Mediazation of Hatred

The economic, social, constitutional and political fragments of Yugoslavia's disintegration that have been offered to the reader, suggest that ethnonationalism

\footnote{102} Qt. in Mostov, 33
\footnote{103} See Goati, 55-56
\footnote{104} "Federalism Without Democracy, Political Rights Without Citizen." 158
was built into the self-management socialist system from its very outset. Far from being a primordial base for the development of an "authentic" Heideggerian community, Yugoslav ethnonationalisms emerged primarily as an instrument of manipulation by those who recognized that "social divisions were the vehicle to redefining and obtaining political power." Thus, ethnonationalism can be understood as the political technology par excellence for the manipulation of those social divisions. However, ethnonationalism can also be seen as related to people's search for identity, as well as their need to recognize their lives as worth living amidst the expanding economic crisis, unemployment and the predominance of the politics of intolerance: such needs that can be answered in many different ways. Markovic's efforts to offer a consociational type of community based on tolerance and pluralism was one of those "lost" possibilities that might have become the "essentialist" base of the newly imagined Yugoslav identity, had not the federal government surrendered itself to the rising forces of ethnonationalism.  

Despite this outcome, nonetheless, it has to be underlined that the attractiveness of ethnonationalism did not rise out of the magnetic qualities of some obscure "call of blood", against which the option of a less emotional, legal and rational democratic pluralism would not have much of a chance. Quite the contrary, what makes ethnonationalism powerful in Yugoslavia, and elsewhere, has little to do with its emotional appeal, but more to do with the context within which it has been developed. As has been previously discussed, the "nature" of

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the links between the "socialist content" and the "national form" of the Yugoslav system did not permit the federal government to break the systemic advantages that ethnonationalism had enjoyed for decades.

Republican oligarchies were forced to fight against each other, and all them against the federal government, over the control of their feuds. Moreover, in the process of "transcending" Yugoslavia as a common state, republican elites were further compelled to develop certain techniques of instrumentalization of the essential aspects of ethnonationalism. The content of these mechanisms of polarization reflects the perception of the Other within and outside the Balkan region which helped to create a certain type of "adversarial knowledge". This knowledge became the crucial factor in perpetuating our (lack of) understanding of the problem of the Yugoslavia's dissolution, which was described in previous chapters. This section, however, will deal primarily with the analysis of technical and operational aspects of, in such a way perceived, politics of "identity" in the cases of Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia. The reason for my focus on these three former Yugoslav republics is related to the systemic approach I employed in this chapter, and which suggests that the relationship within this triangle was of the crucial importance for both the preservation and disintegration of Yugoslavia.

The Inter-Republican Principle of Non-Interference. Until 1980, i.e., until Tito's death, the model of manipulation bore the mark of a rigid authoritarian type

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of patronage policy. Its main characteristics were: a firm control over
depoliticized citizens after the crushing of the Croatian "mass movement" in 1971
and the fall of Serbian "liberals" in 1972; and, accordingly, the elimination of the
public from the decision-making processes. Furthermore, in accordance with the
1974 Constitution, Yugoslavia's "federal states" became the sole bearers of
cartelized power, controlled only by the undisputed authority of Josip Broz Tito.

Given the socialist and multi-national character of the country, the cartelization
(decentralization without democratization) of the party-state appeared to be the
only possible answer to those constraining factors. Still, in order to work, this
model, as Laslo Sekelj asserts, had to be based on strict rules of the policy of non-
interference among regional elites:

The boundaries of the jurisdiction of Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo,
Novi Sad, etc. (capitals of federal units) of their monopoly of power
had to be absolutely clear. Each had nothing to do beyond its
boundaries, as the others had no access to their boundaries. If that
geographic and administrative approach was ever rejected in favor of
a national one, the very idea of monopolistic cartelization of power
would definitely fail. 108

The weakest link of this model, however, was the constitutional settlement
of the Serbian provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo) that became integrative elements
of the federation in 1974, thus allowing them to escape the jurisdiction of
Belgrade, and reducing its authority to Serbia Proper. Although this de facto
federalization of the biggest Yugoslav republic is nowadays almost unanimously
perceived in Serbia as the major proof of Tito's anti-Serbian policy, the underlying
reason for such a constitutional set up was to preserve the system. From this
perspective, a possibility of a unified Serbia, whether democratic or not, appeared
threatening to the other republican and provincial oligarchies, because it could be
achieved only at the price of dismantling the cartelized party-state system. If

108 Yugoslavia The Process of Disintegration, 218
Serbia were democratic, it would have probably triggered pro-democratic movements across its borders and thus would have become a threat to other republican centers. An undemocratic Serbia would also represent a threat, because it would tend to unite all Serbs, and therefore necessarily interfere into the other republics’ affairs. However, in hindsight, the difference between the two options suggests that in the case of the former scenario, the collapse of the federal system might not have coincided with the disintegration of the country, while in the latter, the collapse of the system inevitably led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Nonetheless, the elevation of provinces to the status of virtual republics achieved a certain balance of power in Yugoslavia. But, this could have occurred only on a short term basis, i.e., as long as Tito was alive. However, after 1980, members of the Presidency were directly responsible to their respective republics, and not to the Federal Parliament. In other words, there was not one single remaining institutional factor which could prevent a Serbian political elite to question its "inferior" status vis-à-vis other republican elites. Accordingly, from the systemic point of view, there was no doubt that Serbia would sooner or later challenge the "principle" of non-interference. The only uncertainty was when (and in which ways)?

The Opening of the Serbian Question. The Serbian national movement, that eventually became populist and nationalist in character, was triggered by the Albanian nationalist demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981. The outburst of Albanian students was in a way "illogical", because two of the main slogans of demonstrators, "ethnically pure Kosovo" and "Kosovo Republic", were achieved long before the year of the demonstration. According to the 1981 Census, Kosovo

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was already ethnically pure with more than 80% of its population being Albanian, and it enjoyed de facto republican status since the amendments to the Yugoslav constitution in 1971, which was further strengthened in the 1974 Constitution.

However, despite Kosovo's de facto equal political status with other federal units, the province was not equal in absolute terms; i.e., according to the federal Constitution. Vojvodina and Kosovo did not enjoy the right to self-determination, including the right to secede from Yugoslavia. In other words, the main reason for the violent explosion of Kosovo demonstrations was in the perceived defect of the federal system, that "failed" to grant Kosovo Albanians the status of a nation. On the other side, there are other important reasons, particularly appalling economic and social conditions in Kosovo, that were articulated in the spring of Kosovo's discontent in 1981. Nonetheless, as Laslo Sekelj asserts, "the structural characteristic of the Yugoslav system as a whole was the transposition of all social and political conflicts into ethnic ones." In that sense, the Albanian demonstrators were probably the first to realize that Tito was dead, and that the time has come to pursue the decentralized logic of the Constitution to its very limits. However, the radicalism of their claims for an ethnically pure Kosovo directly threatened Serbia's territorial integrity. Accordingly, its side-effect was the re-awakening of the Serbian nationalist sentiments.

Neither Vojvodina, nor Kosovo, were integrated into the legal system of the federal unit which they belonged to. For example, laws approved by the Serbian parliament had to be confirmed in the provincial parliaments, while provincial

legislation did not need to be confirmed in Serbia Proper. This meant practically that the provinces were capable of blocking any Serbia's passage of laws, while Serbia Proper did not enjoy the same, reciprocal right. Moreover, the court of appeal beyond the Supreme Court of Kosovo was not the Serbian but the Federal Supreme Court. Finally, both provinces enjoyed a veto right over any Serbian attempt to change the federal, or even its own constitution. In the early 1980s, the existing Serbian party elite was still trying to change this paradoxical situation, using institutional channels, i.e., by appealing to other republics for support in redressing its unbalanced constitutional status in regard to other federal regions. It is important to note that, at the time, Serbian party policy was characterized with tact and a lack of assertiveness to nationalize the Kosovo question. Such tactics eventually became the target of the ever stronger criticism among the "awakened" nationalist intellectuals in Serbia and their counterparts in the conservative circles within the party.

Also, apart from their "soft" stand on the Kosovo question, the Serbian reformists of the early 1980s were known for their advocating of the elimination of the party bureaucrats' control over local decision making, reliance on private initiative and enterprise, free secret-ballot elections within the party and the multiple candidates in state and party elections. This, perhaps even more than their approach towards the Kosovo question was perceived as a threat not only among party conservatives in Serbia but elsewhere in Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, as Crnobrnja maintains, reformists' efforts were to no avail, since most other republics were unwilling to compromise. Quite the contrary, using their right of

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113 See Crnobrnja, 93-94.
veto, they managed to successfully block all of Serbian suggestions, despite the fact that many of them seemed to have been thoroughly justified.\textsuperscript{115} Hence, instead of opting to open the constitutional question, and thus publicly recognize that a full scale economic and social crisis in the 1980s has its counterpart in the political sphere, regional elites were acting according to their particular interests. Or, in words of Sekelj:

Since the totality of politics was reduced to (con)federal quid pro quo, a weaker Serbia (i.e. Serbian oligarchy) was in the interest of the other five oligarchies, as it was the interest of the Serbian oligarchy to be faced with the weakest possible republican-national oligarchies. Therefore, the rest of Yugoslavia firmly supported the sovereign-state pretensions of both provinces, while they, in close alliance, uncompromisingly defended their feuds and claimed the federalization of Serbia as the supreme democratic achievement.\textsuperscript{116}

Accordingly, because of the Serbian leadership's failure to achieve the constitutional settlement of the Serbian question, and moreover, because of the lack of any coherent policy towards Kosovo at the Yugoslav level (apart from nebulous slogans about the counterrevolution), the Serbian national intellectuals became ever louder in their claim that time had come for Kosovo as the "cradle of Serbian civilization", to be re-united with its mainland.

The Rise of Serbian Populism. In 1986, the situation became even more exacerbated when representatives of Kosovo Serbs came to the federal Assembly in Belgrade, demanding their grievances be listened to about the increasingly tense inter-ethnic situation in Kosovo. Their main claim was that they, as the de facto ethnic minority in Kosovo, have been the object of discrimination and persecution since the late 1960s (i.e., after the fall of the Serbian conservative Alexander Rankovic), when ethnic Albanians resumed the full control over Kosovo affairs. Furthermore, it was stated that Serbs have been collectively expelled from Kosovo

\textsuperscript{115} The Yugoslav Drama, 94.
\textsuperscript{116} Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration, 203.
(in the late 1940s 28% of Kosovo population were Serbs, while in 1991 only 10% of Kosovo population remained of the Serbian ethnic background) as part of an organized campaign of, in today's terminology, "ethnic cleansing" with a twofold aim. First, to create ethnically pure Kosovo, and second, to secede from Yugoslavia and to join Albania, and thus create "Great Albania."¹¹⁷ This raising the question of the status of the Serbs from Kosovo seems to mark the beginning of the last stage of Yugoslavia's disintegration because those events provoked the rise of the Serbian populism and, consequently, the ascent of Slobodan Milosevic to the top of the Serbian party-state.

The Serbian party leadership at the time was still trying to challenge the Yugoslav constitutional arrangement vis-à-vis the status of its provinces, as well trying to combat the rise of nationalism in the republic. However, Milosevic kept a low profile during the party campaign against the draft "Memorandum on the Position of Serbia in Yugoslavia", which had been written by a group of influential members of the Serbian Academy of Art and Science. In retrospect, it is obvious that from the very outset of the new wave of the Serbian nationalism Milosevic situated himself more on the side of the "national form" than of the "socialist content". This position earned him respect among the "awakened" Serbian intellectuals. After all, it could have hardly been different, given the fact that the "Memorandum" provided Milosevic with the intellectual platform that fully justified his policy, both at the Serbian and the inter-republican level.¹¹⁸

In the "Memorandum", the Serbs were portrayed as the only nation in Yugoslavia that was left without its own state. Also, it was explicitly stated that the question of integrating Kosovo and Vojvodina within its borders, and

¹¹⁷ There is a long list of articles that either agree or disagree with those claims. However, from the systemic perspective, I am more concerned with the question of the perception those grievances provoked in different parts of the country.
¹¹⁸ Mark Thompson, The Paper House. 210-211
addressing the "inferior" status of the Serbs in Croatia, had become of the crucial importance for the integrity of the Serbian nation in Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{119} However, those words certainly did not deserve to be labeled as nationalistic. They were a mere description of the state of Serbian and Yugoslav affairs, and in many ways it coincided with the views espoused by the Serbian party reformists. Nonetheless, what made the authors of the "Memorandum" the intellectual fathers of the Serbian nationalism is reflected in their analysis of what provoked such "appalling" conditions of the Serbian nationhood.

The authors of the "Memorandum" maintained that Serbia's lagging in its economic development compared to Slovenia and Croatia was directly related to the Yugoslav political and economic system. They asserted that the communist Yugoslavia preserved its Comintern dogma, according to which Serbia was held most responsible for economic and political oppression of other Yugoslav nations in the inter-war period. From that perspective, the acceptance of the Serbian leadership to continue financing the Fund for the less developed regions in Yugoslavia, when Serbia itself was far behind Slovenia and Croatia in its economic development, was perceived as "the capitulation of the Serbian representatives" in the federation. They proved to be totally "unprepared for the historical task" of defending Serbian national interests in Yugoslavia against the policy of retaliation that was supposedly pursued by other Yugoslav republics. Thus, on the basis of their critique of the Yugoslav system and the economic policy of the Serbian party leadership, the authors drew the following political conclusions: firstly, there exist aan "anti-Serbian coalition", in which the predominant role is played by Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina; and secondly, the work of such a coalition is based on the premises - "weak Serbia, strong

\textsuperscript{119} See Slavoljub Djukic, \textit{Kako se dogodo vojna} (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 1992), 111-122, Crnobrnja, 100-102, and Nebojša Popov, 16-17
Yugoslavia." Those two clichés eventually became the essence of Milosevic's populist policy. In 1987, Milosevic became a "national saviour", earning this epithet while protecting a group of Kosovo Serbs from being beaten by the Kosovo police with the words that transformed a party apparatchik into the leader of the masses: "No one has the right to beat the people." Within a few months, playing on the ever growing mediatization of the plight of Kosovo Serbs, while repeating the arguments from the "Memorandum" about the inability of the Serbian party apparatus to address the Serbian "grievances" at the federal level, he managed to organize a party coup and become the undisputed leader of the Serbian party-state.

In 1988-1989, Milosevic's orchestrated campaign of massive marches of the Kosovo Serbs was directed towards gaining full control over the Serbian autonomous provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina. In the course of events, those marches turned into mass rallies that were held across Serbia under the slogans of "the happening of the people" and "the anti-bureaucratic revolution". The peak of these marches was reached with the one-million-people rallies in Belgrade (in the autumn of 1988) and Kosovo (on June 28, 1989). The massage that Milosevic sent from these rallies to the rest of Yugoslavia did not leave any doubt that the "rallies of truth" represented a point at which Serbia's acceptance of Yugoslavia as the framework for addressing Serbian national interests became dubious at best.

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120 The presentation of the "Memorandum" is largely based on Crnobrnja, 96-102
121 Interestingly enough, during student anti-Milosevic demonstrations that were held in Belgrade in March 1991, the same man who gained fame by protecting the "people" from police justified the use of the not-police and the army with the words that "the destructive march of chaos and violence" has to be stopped. See Thompson, 204-205
122 The Eight Session of the Serbian Central Committee, that was held in Belgrade on September 24, 1987, represents a full political victory of Slobodan Milosevic and his fraction against the opposing reformist fraction led by then president of the Presidency of Serbia Ivan Stambolic.
123 The unsurpassed analysis of those rallies so far can be found in Slavoljub Djukic, *Kako se dogodio vodja.*
Accordingly, at the rally in Belgrade, Milosevic publicly talked about Serbia being surrounded by enemies; while in Kosovo Polje he opted to deliberately light the nationalist flame by contemplating about the importance of Kosovo in the history of the Serbs, completely ignoring the fact that modern Kosovo is mainly populated by the Albanian population.

In the course of events, the "happening of the people" proved to be a full-scale success in the cases of Vojvodina and pro-Serbian republic Montenegro, because their party leadership were among the most conservative ones in the former Yugoslavia. Without enjoying any popular support, they "voluntarily" resigned under the pressure of the mass demonstrations that have been organized in Novi Sad and Titograd. It should be noted, however, that in Vojvodina the majority of population is Serbian in origin, while in Montenegro, pro-Serbian. A completely different situation existed in Kosovo in which Albanians represented the 90% majority. Under such circumstances, Kosovo Albanians perceived the "happening of the people" not as the "anti-bureaucratic revolution", but as the new wave of Serbian nationalism against the autonomy of the province. As a way of responding to the rising Serbian pressure, Albanians organized rallies on their own in support of their party leadership and the existing autonomy of Kosovo. The demonstrators' insistence on the ethnic purity of Kosovo and its status as another Yugoslav republic, was used by Milosevic as the pretext for toppling down the Kosovo party leadership. Immediately afterwards, under the extremely tense situation in the province, the Albanian-dominated provincial assembly "voted" for the constitutional amendments that allowed Serbia a full control over Kosovo. Finally in September 1990, the Serbian Parliament adopted a new constitution.
according to which the autonomy of both Vojvodina and Kosovo were subordinated to the central Serbian authorities.\footnote{124}

Thus, Milosevic’s use of mass politics can be seen as a purposeful and active creation of nationalistic emotions with the aim of showing other republican elites that the new Serbian leadership is no longer “weak” and that it stands for a united and strong Serbia.\footnote{125} In that regard, the rise of the Serbian populism from marginal to dominant phenomenon can only be understood as the result of the complete failure of his predecessors to change Serbia’s position established in the 1974 Constitution through the institutional channels.\footnote{126} In order to achieve the constitutional changes in Serbia, for which the approval of both provinces was necessary, Milosevic realized that he had to “delegitimize” the party leadership of the provinces. Accordingly, tactical reasons, more than anything else, turned the party apparatcic par excellence into the leader of masses. In the eyes of the masses, Milosevic’s provincial opponents seemed to be typical bureaucrats (“chair warmers”), whose vested interests worked against the interests of the people. The instrumentalization of the masses enabled Milosevic to by-pass the system and other republican oligarchies in their right to veto any changes they might deem detrimental for their particular interests. In other words, the "anti-bureaucratic revolution" emerged as Milosevic's policy of fait accompli, a policy that would

\footnote{124} Nonetheless, the years of living in the united post-communist Serbia, 1990-1995, uncover the fact that Albanian Kosovars never accepted the "third" Yugoslavia as their legitimate home. It could have hardly been otherwise, because of the strong rule of the Serbian president brought the full colonialization of all aspects of social life in Kosovo. Furthermore, since all measures of the Serbian side are seen by the Kosovo Albanians as a mere act of occupation, in the situation where neither side will give up its maximalist propertary claims on Kosovo, it is certain that all potentials for violent explosion of another hot bed of crisis in the Balkans are actively present. The only reason why Kosovo still did not suffer the destiny of Bosnia and parts of Croatia is perhaps that the most influential political party of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, opted for peaceful boycott of the Serbian rule, instead of advocating violent demonstrations that had prevailed in Kosovo in 1981 and 1988.

\footnote{125} See V. P. Gagnon, Jr., "Serbia's Road to War," 117-125

\footnote{126} See Popov, 16.
supposedly force the other republics to accept the Serbian resolve to gain control over its own affairs.

Nonetheless, the “achievements” of Milosevic’s populist policy in Serbia and Montenegro provoked the breaking of the non-interference policy in different regions’ affairs. It also gave the rationale to the “Memorandum’s” claim about the existence of the “anti-Serbian coalition.” Still, the rise of Milosevic can not be used as the all-explanatory variable of the Yugoslav case. Focusing the analyses on the one single personality, document or event (e.g., Milosevic. “Memorandum”, rallies of “truth”) inevitably leads to the deproblematization of the objectively inferior constitutional status of Serbia vis-à-vis other federal units, the lack of good will on the side of other republican elites to address this issue, the co-existence of competing national and anti-Yugoslav programs in other regions, in particular in Slovenia and Kosovo, etc.\textsuperscript{127} All of these imply that the list of causes for Yugoslavia’s disintegration is much longer and that the lack of compromise, which was built into the system, between the main Yugoslav actors effectively blocked any possibility of democratic solution to Yugoslavia’s crisis. This paved the way for the war option to gradually emerge as the one most vocal.

As has been argued throughout this chapter, the Yugoslav situational constraints did not allow much space for the independent actions of the institutional actors within the system. The instrumentalization of the populist policy on the part of the party oligarchs represented a calculated risk that had been undertaken to warn the party elites that the time had become ripe for necessary changes to the system. In that sense, the rise of the Serbian populism in the late 1980s strongly resembles the rise of the Croatian mass movement in 1971.\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{128} Similar point is made by Bette Denich in her "Metamorphosis Observed."
However, the main difference was that in the latter case Tito was still alive and played the role of the supra-institutional integrative force that bound the system, people and country together. In the case of the Serbian populism, the federal system was already thoroughly nationalized along regional lines.

The Slovenian Way Out of Crisis. The situation in Slovenia was, on one side, similar to those of Serbia and Croatia, and, on the other, utterly different. While the crushing of the “Croatian mass-movement” in 1971 and the “Serbian liberals” in 1972 was followed by the full re-bureaucratization of their respective republican parties and all aspects of social life, in the case of Slovenia’s “road affair” in 1969 Tito replaced only the top party echelon. Given such circumstances, Slovenia had 20 years of politically uninterrupted development which accounted for its rather developed political culture compared to other federal units. Nonetheless, the institutional setup of the system did not “allow” the Slovenian elite to support reformists in other republics. Instead, with the emergence of the crisis in 1981, the Slovenian leadership opted for a policy of national pluralism within its own borders, fearing that too much of Yugoslavia might infringe on its distinct identity. This policy, on the other side, could have been achieved only if the political structure of Yugoslavia was further weakened. Hence, much before the ascent of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, the Slovenian party elite emerged as the most adamant and zealous guardian of the 1974 constitutional principles that successfully transformed Yugoslav federation into confederation.

In mid-1980s, all elements of the Slovenian way out of the crisis were fully elaborated. As in the case of Serbia, it was the intellectuals who justified the politicians’ moves. Slovenian “Memorandum” turned out to be the independent journal “Nova revija” (New Review), which emerged as the result of the new
union between a group of the Slovenian politicians from Ljubljana (capital of Slovenia) and dissident intellectuals.\textsuperscript{129} Against the Titoist phraseology of brotherhood and unity among Yugoslav nations, the Slovenian intellectuals and growing number of politicians started advocating the politics of national reconciliation between the winners and the losers of World War II in Slovenia.\textsuperscript{130}

As the result of such policy, dissident Slovenian intellectuals and emigrant political organizations became gradually incorporated into the republic’s political life as equal partners. This, on the other side meant, that the Slovenian political elite was the first to exchange ideological and political loyalties for national ones.\textsuperscript{131}

With the closure of the reformist option in Serbia, the Slovenian stand in defense of 1974 Constitution became even more radicalized. Also, the rise of Milosevic forced the Slovenian party leader Milan Kucan to undertake reforms at “home” at even faster pace. The crucial event that fused these two strands of the Slovenian strategy together is related to the full Slovenian support of the Albanian miners’ strike in Kosovo in February 1989. By proclaiming that strikers’ defense of Kosovo’s autonomy represents the defence of Yugoslavia, the Slovenian leadership practically announced that it only accepts Yugoslavia as it was defined by the 1974 Constitution.\textsuperscript{132} Furthermore, since all Slovenian parties were present at the meeting which was organized in Ljubljana in support of Kosovo miners, it could be said that the process of national reconciliation in Slovenia was complete (in February 1989). What emerged from this meeting is the consensual understanding of all Slovenian parties about the causes of the structural crisis of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[129] Sekelj, 213.
\item[130] Cmbrjna, 110
\item[131] Ibid., 110; Cohen, 59
\item[132] See Sekelj, 214
\end{footnotes}
the Yugoslav society. This understanding was based on the “recognition” that the way out of the Yugoslav crisis leads through a two-fold process: first, the pluralization of the national life within the republican borders, and second, the instrumentalization of the perception of the common enemy (Serbia), outside Slovenian borders. Thus, such an understanding served the purpose of preparing the homogenized population for the option of leaving the country altogether.133

Consequently, the Slovenian Party Congress in 1989 already explicitly indicated that Slovenian nationalist elites did not support the option of preserving Yugoslavia, but rather their own interests. At the Congress, the Slovenian reformists offered the program “Slovenia - 2000”, which advocated confederal Yugoslavia between the “pluralist West” (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the Bolshevik East (Serbia, Montenegro and Yugoslavia), the latter supposedly incapable of organizing a modern, representative and democratic regime.134 The following year, “Nova revija” published “The Slovenian National Program”, which became the political platform of the opposition for the following elections. It, as in the case of the program of the Slovenian reformists, espoused the idea that the Slovenian road towards Europe can not be achieved within the Yugoslav framework.135

The Collapse of Croatian Silence. The Croatian party leadership, throughout the years of heated public confrontation between the Serbian and Slovenian leaders over the future of Yugoslavia, tried to play the role of a power broker between the Serbian and Slovenians maximalist claims. Being pro-Yugoslav, i.e., pro-Titoist more than any other republican elite, they hoped to find

133 Ibid., 216.
134 Ibid., 215.
a formula of new Yugoslavia that, in words of Crnobrnja, would not pit Serbs against Croats. Accordingly, they rightly understood that the central problem of Yugoslavia is not Kosovo but Serbo-Croatian relations. However, they were also disposed toward the "socialist content" more than the other republican elites, and they rejected all Serbian efforts to revise the 1974 Constitution, seeing it as a nationalist threat to the system. Thus, in the crucial years of the Yugoslav crisis, they adopted the position of privately endorsing Slovenian claims, while publicly keeping their voice low, which earned their policy an ironic label - "Croatian Silence". However, with the pluralization of the political life in Croatia in late 1989 and early 1990, the opposition ridiculed such a stand on two grounds. First, the Croatian communists were accused that they failed to advance the interests of the republic at the federal level. Secondly, given their record as the former participants in the crushing of the "Croatian Spring" in 1971, Croatian communists could not legitimately represent Croatian regional interest against the perceived Serbian threat. On the basis of this critique of the Croatian communists, Franjo Tudjman, the leader of the Croatian Democratic Union, won the elections of May 1990.

Nonetheless, despite Tudjman’s anti-Serbian rhetoric, which more than compensated for the previous Croatian policy of silence, his political platform proved to be a carbon-copy of the Serbian "Memorandum". The only difference was that the role of Albanians had been assigned to the Croatian Serbs. The core of the Croatian Democratic Union’s program was the affirmation of Croatian "identity and sovereignty" and the reorganization of Yugoslavia into alliance of states. Hence, as Cohen asserts, without explicitly calling for Croatian secession, "Tudjman left no doubts that ... Croatia would strive to operate on an independent

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136 "The Yugoslav Drama," 114.
137 Cohen, 95.
basis within a radically reorganized Yugoslavia. In other words, Croatia joined Serbia and Slovenia in their discontent with Yugoslavia. Still, the most controversial aspects of Tudjman's platform was his view that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be incorporated in the new Croatian state. This was because, in Tudjman's words, Croatia and Bosnia "constitute a geographical and political unity, and have always formed a joint state in history." This and other similar statements regarding the "superior" position of the Croatian Serbs in the republic opened the chain-reaction process of mutual Serbian and Croatian accusations and counter-accusations that gradually turned into the war only to confirm Clauzewitz's maxim that war is the continuation of politics by other means.

3.5 Conclusion

The analysis suggests that Slovenian and, in later phase of the Yugoslavia's crisis, Croatian, "cross-sympathies" for the plight of Kosovo Albanians, as well as Slovenia's inter-ethnic alliance with some of the most conservative elites in the country (for instance, conservative leadership of Kosovo and Vojvodina) can be understood only as an "alliance of convenience". The raison d'être of this alliance with the most conservative non-Slovenian political groups, as Sekelj observes, has been the defense of the federal constitutional system:

[The constitution of 1974] was basically a confederal act which clearly separated Yugoslavia into feudal estates. And that same feature was decisive in the elaboration of the program of a separate Slovenian way out of the Yugoslav crisis. The communist and post-communist Slovenian governments which used to be the staunchest defenders of the 1974 Constitution until December of 1990 were the first to break its fundamental principles [once Slovenia became independent state]. Thus, the motive of the Slovenian anti-Milosevic

138 Ibid., 96
139 Qt. in Cohen, 97
140 Denuch, 56.
policy was predominantly their own interest, and only in the second place was it Slovenian opposition to the Bolshevik elements of the Serbian political elite. However, the same motive came to include opposition to all Yugoslav democratic initiatives [for example, the Serbian pre-Milosevic policy to reform the party and the system].

Accordingly, the spiral of changes in the 1980s in Yugoslavia (the rise of the Slovenian national consciousness, the ascent of Milosevic to power, Serbia's violent crushing of Kosovo's de facto status of one of the constitutive units of the Yugoslav federal system, followed by the mediazation of the Kosovo question, the break-up of the federal communist regime and its replacement with nationalist elites, etc.) did not in any way alter the quid pro quo policy of the republican national elites. Quite the contrary, party elites, being in control of media in their respective regions, managed to successfully skew communication links on the territory of former Yugoslavia to the extent that Yugoslavia's informative space became compartmentalized as it had never been before. Hence, while TV viewers in Serbia were presented with the picture of Kosovo Serbs being prosecuted and drawn out from their homes, TV programs of other republican centers were presenting the same events in a way that was sympathetic to Albanian cause, showing total disregard for the plight of Kosovo Serbs. The similar set up of the "media coverage" was repeated during the ten days of the war in Slovenia, as well as during the violent war in Croatia between the Croatian Serbs and the "federal" army, on one side, and the Croatian territorial units, on the other.

In the end, as Bette Denich aptly observes, "viewers who otherwise had never supported Communism or the Party, nevertheless identified with the attack on the Serbian party on the part of the other republic leaders, while viewers in Croatia and Slovenia identified with their leaders as standing up against the threat

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141 *Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration*, 224
embodied by the Serbian party." Thus, although the publicization of the political life had the positive consequence of awakening of the apoliticized masses, its main effect was the further aggravation and polarization of the already existing communication pattern of an ever increasing opposition as actors (political and intellectual elites) mutually responded to each other's responses ad nauseam. Or, in Denich's words:

[e]ach side consistently presented itself as victim, or potential victim, the Other as threat or potential threat, so that neither party responded to the Other directly, but only to its own projections of the Other. Each reacts to the Other as a threat, and in its reactions, reinforces the behavior that appears threatening. Nor were these perceptions questioned by those who increasingly identified with their own "people." Victimization appeared to be an all-powerful mobilizer of ethnic solidarity.\[143\]

Finally, in 1990, the process of national homogenization was over. The results of the first multi-party elections in the communist Yugoslavia suggest that the politics of "national form" emerged as the essential characteristic of the newly created ethnocratic regimes with the consequence that the dissolution of the party-state (with the exception of Slovenia) did not open the door for the democratic transformation of Yugoslavia. Instead, the dissolution of communism brought an end to Yugoslavia as well. In the meantime, its geographic space became divided among the number of small nation-states that base their identity on the "thick" cultural understanding of nationalism. However, such politics of "identity" is distinctively antiliberal, because it treats citizenship rights not as individual rights extended to all members of society, but as the collective rights of a particular ethnic group.\[144\] Hence, one type of second-class citizens in communist

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\[142\] "Metamorphosis Observed." 55.

\[143\] Ibid., 56

Yugoslavia (those who were not members of the oligarchy), has been replaced with other one in the newly emerged ethnic nation-states.
Conclusion

If we believe absurdities, we commit atrocities.

Jean Jacques Rousseau¹

The analysis of the causes and consequences of Yugoslavia’s disintegration implies that there are many more unsettling questions to be asked than conclusions to be suggested. For these reasons, I will not try to offer a systematic account of what has been “proved” by the analysis. Instead, some points that underlie a broader significance of the Yugoslav case will be emphasized. Also, some (fragmented) suggestions that seem to be of the utmost importance for better understanding of the question of the future development of post-Yugoslav nation states will be presented.

1. The focal point of this thesis was the analysis of the relations between the ideas that served to justify and legitimize the communist institutional arrangements of Yugoslavia, on one side, and the economic, social, constitutional and political aspects as well as consequences of the socialist self-management system, on the other. Following Liah Greenfeld’s notion on “situational constraints”, I outlined the extent to which the ideology and the praxis of the Yugoslav system seem to be the most responsible for the emergence of the post-communist ideology of ethnic nationalism. At the same time, however, I tried to pinpoint the role of the “imagination” in labeling the Balkans as uncivilized and barbarous. The reason why I found it necessary to inform my approach towards the causes of Yugoslavia’s disintegration with Edward Said’s and Maria Todorova’s critical remarks on “orientalism” and “balkanism” has been emphasized throughout the paper. It deals with my understanding that the

¹ Qt. in Robert M. Hayden, “The Triumph of Chauvinist Nationalism in Yugoslavia Bleak Implications for Anthropology,” The Anthropology of East Europe Review, Special Issue War Among Yugoslavs 11. no. 1&2 (Spring & Fall 1993) 77
"essentialization" of the Balkans represents the methodological obstacle for the analysis of Yugoslavia's break-up and post-Yugoslav events, as well as a powerful political tool in the "realpolitik" considerations in regard to the future destiny of the region - considerations that emanate not only outside but also within the Balkans.

2. The disappearance of Yugoslavia as a joint state of South Slavs is irrevocable. The only remaining link with the past seems to be the inter-ethnic war between its former central constituent units. It is this extreme solution to the Yugoslav crisis that makes the question of the causes of Yugoslavia's violent disintegration significant. However, unlike the predominant realpolitik reductionist understanding as to who are the "good guys to be assisted and bad guys to be punished", my aim was to delineate the self-destructive mechanism of the Yugoslav socialist self-management system, which did not seem to receive the appropriate place in the accounts of the causes of Yugoslavia's disintegration. The absence of such accounts in the existing literature is itself a puzzle. For many decades, Eastern European countries have been analyzed through the prism of the critique of communist ideology and practice. Yet, the analysis of the fall of communism was too easily replaced with the rhetoric of the re-emergence: from history, to culture, to nationalism, to nineteenth century principles of liberalism and realpolitik, etc.

For these reasons, the institutional set up of Yugoslavia, which was based on the application of Lenin's federal principle - "socialist in content and national in form" - was given the central place in my delineating the causes and consequences of the deep economic, political and structural crisis of the Yugoslav system. I tried to emphasize ways in which the institutional set of the idea of communism within the framework of multi-ethnic community was transformed to its very opposite - the confederal organization of the state based on the ideology of
ethnic nationalism. My understanding is that with the legitimacy crisis of socialism, that was triggered by the severe economic crisis in the early 1980s, followed by the re-emergence of the Serbian national question and the political crisis of the system, the rhetoric of "socialist content" lost its appeal. However, since the system proved to be genuinely hostile towards reforms that would allow the emergence of civic movements and the concept of civil society, what was left of the system was the praxis of "national(ist) form".

Thus, a successful implementation of nationalism by former communists was based on the already pre-existing authoritarian characteristics of the Yugoslav socialist system. Furthermore, as I tried to show in this thesis, Yugoslavia was always defined as a community of nations that have been perceived exclusively in ethnic terms. In other words, such a view of the nation was already ingrained into Lenin’s formula “socialist in content and national in form.” Consequently, when the question of the right of nations to self-determination emerged on the political agenda of the republican elites, they unwittingly acted as good Lenin’s students, and defined the question of self-determination in the same way as the national question in Yugoslavia was treated throughout its history, i.e., not in political terms of citizens’ rights but in ethnic terms of group rights.

3. The violent break-up of Yugoslavia has shown that the collectivist understanding of ethnic (cultural) nationalism “favors” the means of war and brutality to achieving the political aim of creating a nation-state. Since ethnic nationalism is based on the essentialization of the distinction between “us” and “them”, the very concept of ethnic nationalism invigorates the existence of double moral standards: one for “us”, the other for “them”. If anything, the collapse of Yugoslavia, followed by the inter-ethnic wars for territory, seems fully to corroborate Liah Greenfeld’s point that the knowledge of the content of nationalist ideologies and structural conditions within which those ideologies
situate themselves. can help us anticipate the policies of nationalist elites once they come to power. In the Yugoslav case, as I have tried to indicate, this means that the "ritual of city killing" and the policy of ethnic cleansing were prepared long before the actual policies took place.

4 Although the institutional set up of the country, with the consequences of the deep economic and structural crisis of the Yugoslav society, are perceived in this paper as the necessary conditions of Yugoslavia's break-up, the role of sufficient conditions should not be understated. No matter how powerful the disintegrative forces were built into the Yugoslav federal system, it was only with the collapse of communism in 1989 that the republican oligarchies were capable of freely unleashing those forces throughout Yugoslavia. In that sense, the disintegration of Yugoslavia became "inevitable" only when the right of nation to self-determination, which is originally democratic idea, became accepted by the international community (i.e., the European Community and the United States) as the principle in solving Yugoslavia's crisis. However, in the context of ethnic nationalism in Yugoslavia, it should have been primarily understood as a "tool in republican leaders' struggle for power."\(^3\)

It should be remembered, however, that when Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally proclaimed independence on June 25, 1991, all the principal international factors (the EC, the CSCE, the USA, Russia) were still supporting the idea of territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. On July 5, at the conference in the Hague, it was decided that the solution to Yugoslavia's crisis should be pursued along principles of inviolability of borders that have been enshrined in the Final


Act of Helsinki and the Paris Charter for New Europe, as well as the right of
nation to self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Such an understanding was still predominant in the Brioni Declaration that was
signed by the sides in conflict on July 7, and which was brokered by the EC.
According to this document, a three-month moratorium was established on the
decisions of Slovenia and Croatia from June 25, while it was agreed that the
border regime in Yugoslavia should remain under the control of the federal
authorities.

Nonetheless, as Slobodan Samardzic points out, in August 6, 1991 the new
EC declaration on Yugoslavia introduced the idea that the protagonists of the
conflict are not Yugoslav nations but republics. Consequently, internal borders
within Yugoslavia were granted the status of international borders. With this
change in the understanding of the causes of the Yugoslav crisis, the European
Community lost its stand of impartiality, imposing and supporting the Slovenian
and Croatian understanding of the conflict against the Serbian one. This change
was not much of a problem in the case of Slovenia, because it was the only
ethnically homogenous republic in Yugoslavia. However, in the case of Croatia,
and eventually Bosnia and Herzegovina, it seemed to hinder the possibility of a
peaceful solution of the Yugoslav crisis. Therefore, by granting the right to self-
determination to Yugoslav republics, the European Community, followed by the
United States, abandoned the idea of supporting the territorial integrity of

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4 See “Declaration of the European Community on the Situation in Yugoslavia on July 5.” Yugoslav Survey: A Record of Facts and Information 32, no 3 (Belgrade, 1991) 66-67
Yugoslavia. Consequently, as early as August 1991, Yugoslavia was treated as a mini Soviet Union, while Belgrade was perceived as the center of Serbian hegemonic policy. The full account of the reasons for such a drastic change in the European Community's stand in regard to Yugoslavia's crisis can not be offered here, because it merits a thesis of its own. Here it suffices to say that Germany's pressure towards recognizing Slovenia and Croatia as independent and sovereign states coincided with the time when it presided over the EC (from June 1991 to January 1992). Finally, in December 1991, Germany recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent and sovereign states, as did the other members of the EC in January 15, 1992.

Thus, it can be suggested that within a few months, the European countries, followed by the United States, turned from passive observers and supporters of Yugoslavia's integrity into active participants in the post-Yugoslav drama. This, however, implies that the emergence of the "New World Order" was not followed by the establishment of the new rules of conduct in the international relations. Quite the contrary, what we were faced with in the case of Yugoslavia was, in Richard Falk's succinct phrase, "the menace of geopolitical regression." On the other side, it could have hardly been different, given the fact that, as Jan Oberg maintains, "politicians in Europe and the superpowers had trained themselves in

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7 See Analysis: Inter-Ethnic Conflicts and War in Former Yugoslavia (Belgrade Institute for European studies, 1992). 32-41

8 It is interesting to note that the European Community Arbitration Commission (so-called Badunter Commission) was granted the task of justifying the new EC stand. Opinion no. 1 of the Commission suggested that Yugoslavia is "in the process of dissolution", which allowed the EC to justify Yugoslavia's dissolution without breaking the basic international principles of the illegitimacy and unacceptability of the unilaterally proclaimed acts of secessions. Furthermore, Opinion 4 suggested that only Slovenia and Macedonia fulfill the criteria for the recognition. Yet, it was Croatia which was recognized under the German pressure, while Macedonia's recognition was blocked by Greek veto. See Samardzic. "Putevi evropske politike ...," 99-103.

not solving conflicts through 45 years’ of the cold war, when the purpose of the East-West conflict was to “balance”, “deter”, “build confidence”, etc. Therefore, the involvement of the so called international factor in the former Yugoslavia implies that despite the rhetoric of growing irrelevancy of territorial boundaries, “establishing new spheres of influence and redrawing maps is as much part of the emerging New World Order as the transcendence of boundaries by transterritorial processes.”

5. Arguably the most important factor in the future development of the region is the linkage between the rise of exclusive nationalism in the Balkans and the ever-growing pressures of globalization. Although Yugoslavia was drawn into the process of peripheralization since the late 1960’s, it was only with the collapse of communism that each of the former Yugoslav republics embraced the free market principles along with the basic precepts of the liberal ideology - the role of parliament, multi-party elections, free press, etc. Nonetheless, apart from Slovenia, other former Yugoslav republics can not be characterized as stable states with a developed civil society or a stable economy. Instead, the appalling social conditions of millions of people throughout the former Yugoslavia seem fully to vindicate Benjamin R. Barber’s thesis on “Jihad vs. McWorld”:

[t]he forces of Jihad and the forces of McWorld operate with equal strength in opposite directions, the one driven by parochial hatreds, the other by universalizing markets, the one re-creating ancient subnational and ethnic borders from within, the other making national borders porous from without. They have one thing in

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common: neither offers much hope to citizens looking for practical ways to govern themselves democratically. 12

Thus, the emergence and instrumentalization of exclusive nationalism among former communist, turned nationalist, leaders in former Yugoslavia seem also to be inspired with their fear that the radical changes towards the full liberalization of society can endanger their privileged positions. In this sense, it can be argued that the inter-ethnic war is not only the cause of the failed economic reforms in Serbia and Croatia, but also the main excuse that serves to justify the failures of transformation policies.

Nonetheless, not all of the newly emerged Balkan nation states will end up sharing the same position on the periphery of the global order. Their access to the “world system” will rely not only upon internal factors (economic, political, cultural, etc. conditions) but also upon the strategic interests of the “center”. Accordingly, the dominant economic and political interests of the center along with the structural conditions that predominate in Slovenia (successful transition to a stable economic and political environment) will most likely allow the full democratization of the Slovenian nation state. However, in the other former Yugoslav republics, the maintenance of the basic precepts of liberal ideology will most probably be achieved under the auspices of a strong paternalistic state. 13

Furthermore, as long as war continues to be the fact of life in the former central Yugoslav republics (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia), I am afraid that the “terror of tribalism”, ethnic rivalries, rudimentary experiences with democracy and further peripheralization of national economies will remain the key characteristics of the relations between the nascent post-Yugoslav nation states.

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