Democracy Promotion and the Quest for Regional Order

A critical view of U.S. and Canadian democracy assistance in the Americas

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy

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Abstract

As Canada greatly expands and reorganizes its democracy assistance programs, there is a need to situate its democracy promotion efforts in relation to those of its more powerful neighbour. Yet most analyses of democracy promotion fail to look at the more controversial aspects of this field of practice, particularly its relation to advancing larger foreign policy objectives. The Americas offers an important area of investigation for a critical comparative analysis of democracy promotion given the U.S. historic role and Canada’s growing interest in the region, as well as the competing visions of democracy that are being contested throughout the hemisphere. Through an empirical examination of democracy assistance programs in Haiti, Peru, and Bolivia, this project explores the extent to which Canada and the United States have used their democracy programs to accomplish geopolitical and economic objectives that in fact contradict the democratic aspirations of popular groups and social classes in these three countries.

The dissertation contributes to the neo-Gramscian critique which highlights the ways in which democracy promotion favours a model of low-intensity democracy, or polyarchy. It adds to this tradition by addressing its main theoretical gaps, that is, the failure to consider how different core states advance different forms of democracy promotion, how they affect social relations in terms of both class and identity, and how they operate in more stable political environments. It also acknowledges the positive impact that democracy promotion may sometimes have, particularly in terms of institution building. Through an examination of the case studies, a critical typology of democracy promotion strategies and tactics is developed that distinguishes between forms that mobilize and reinforce the hegemony of specific elite sectors and those that seek to consolidate polyarchy at a more systemic level. In the case of Canada, a more progressive tradition of democracy promotion that empowers grassroots and popular organizations must also be considered. The typology is situated within a cultural political economy that embeds Foucauldian notions of governmentality and discourse within a neo-Gramscian approach to world order and hegemony.

It is argued that the extent to which U.S. and Canadian actors use their democracy programs to advance conflicting foreign policy objectives reflects a range of factors, including the evolving position of each state in world order, the structure of their respective democracy promotion fields of practice, and the historical-institutional legacy of specific actors. Bilateral relations with the countries in which programs are being implemented as well as the local political context also shape the form of democracy promotion. For the United States, democracy assistance programs are implemented by actors within a tightly woven democracy promotion field of practice organized by the state as an extension of its foreign policy apparatus. For Canada, the state has only begun to strategically shape the democracy promotion field of practice to accomplish imperial objectives.
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In the course of conducting the field research, I had the privilege of meeting many local political actors and democrats whose commitment to social change was both an inspiration and a call to action. I thank them for generously sharing their time and knowledge with a foreigner. My family and friends provided the moral support without which I might have decided long ago to abandon this project. The encouragement and support of my parents was particularly important.

Above all, my wife and life partner, Kelly-Anne, provided the ongoing intellectual stimulation, spiritual encouragement and financial support which ensured that the writing of this dissertation was a rewarding and pleasurable experience even as time passed and the exigencies of everyday life increasingly exerted their toll. This dissertation is dedicated to Kelly-Anne and our newborn daughter, Ella, whose arrival into the world marks the spirit of new beginnings which this work evokes.
Democracy Promotion and the Quest for Regional Order: 
A critical view of U.S. and Canadian democracy assistance in the Americas

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Glossary

ACILS – American Center for International Labor Solidarity (U.S. DAA; one of four sister organizations of the NED)
ACL – Asociación Civil Labor (Civil Labour Association – Peruvian NGO)
ACOBOL – Asociación de Concejalas de Bolivia (Association of Women Councillors of Bolivia)
ADEX – Asociación de Exportadores (Association of Exporters – Peru)
ALBA – Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America – regional association for economic cooperation)
ANAMAH – l’Association Nationale de la Magistrature Haïtienne (National Association of Magistrates of Haiti)
ANMH – Association National des Medias Haïtiens (National Association of Haitian Media)
APRA – Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance – Peru’s oldest political party which drifted from left to right; party of President Alan García)
APRODEH – Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (Pro-Human Rights Association – Peruvian NGO)
BAI – Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (Bureau of International Lawyers – Haitian human rights organization aligned with Lavalas)
CAJ – Comisión Andina de Juristas (Andean Commission of Jurists)
CAAAP – Centro Amazónico de Antropología y Aplicación Práctica (Amazonian Centre of Anthropology and Practical Application – Peruvian NGO)
CAINCO – Cámara de Industria, Comercio, Servicios y Turismo de Santa Cruz (Chamber of Industry, Commerce, Services and Tourism of Santa Cruz – Bolivia)
CARICOM – Caribbean Community and Common Market
CARLI – Comité des Avocats pour le Respect des Libertés Individuelles (Committee of Lawyers for the Respect of Individual Rights – Haitian NGO)
CCAD – Canadian Centre for the Advancement of Democracy – proposed Canadian agency that would provide support to political parties
CCI – Cadre de Coopération Intérimaire (International Cooperation Framework – development plan in Haiti launched by interim government)
CCITU – International Confederation of Trade Unions (world’s largest union federation)
CCP – Confederación Campesina del Peru (Confederation of Peasants of Peru – significant political force in the 1970s)
CD – Convergence Démocratique (Democratic Convergence – coalition of political parties opposed to Lavalas that dissolved after the coup of 2004)
CEADESC – Centro de Estudios Aplicados a los Derechos Económicos Sociales y Culturales (Centre of Applied Studies for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – Bolivian NGO)
CEDEP – Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participación (Centre of Studies for Development and Participation – Peruvian NGO)
CEPB – Conseil Electoral Provisoire (Provisional Electoral Council – Haiti)
CEPB – Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia (Confederation of Private Businessmen of Bolivia)
CGTP – Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (General Confederation of Workers of Peru – significant political force in the 1970s)

CHIRAPAQ – Centro de Culturas Indígenas del Perú (Centre of Indigenous Cultures of Peru)

CHPP – Conférence Haïtienne des Partis Politiques (Haitian Conference of Political Parties – anti-Lavalas alliance formed in the late 1990s)

CIDA – Canadian International Development Agency

CIES – Consorcio de Investigación Económica y Social (Economic and Social Research Consortium – Peru)

CIPE – Center for International Private Enterprise (U.S. DAA; one of four sister organizations of the NED)

CLADEM – Comité de América Latina y el Caribe para la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer (Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Defence of Women’s Rights)

CLED – Centre pour la Libre Entreprise et la Démocratie (Centre for Free Enterprise and Democracy)

CNDDHH – Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (National Coordinator for Human Rights – Peru’s most well known human rights organization)

CNE – Corte Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Court – Bolivia)

COB – Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Labour Central – formed in the wake of the revolution of 1952; decisive political force until late 1980s)

COMIBOL – Corporación Minera de Bolivia (Mining Corporation of Bolivia – parastatal created after revolution of 1952)

CONFIEP – Confederación Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas (National Confederation of Private Business Associations – Peruvian organization that supported Fujimori)

CONAP – Coordination Nationale de Plaidoyer pour les Droits des femmes (National Coordinator for the Advocacy of Women’s Rights – Haitian NGO)

CONSODE - Consorcio Sociedad Democrática (Consortium for a Democratic Society – Peruvian coalition supported by USAID)

CPH – Concertation pour Haïti (Concertation for Haiti – group of Canadian NGOs and other organizations which opposed Lavalas)

CVR – Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (Truth and Reconciliation Commission – Peru)

DAA – Democracy assistance agency

DFAIT – Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (originally named Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

DP – Development and Peace (Canadian Catholic NGO and DAA)

ECLAC – Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

EERP – Emergency Economic Recovery Program (Haiti’s neoliberal program after return of Aristide in 1994; negotiated as precondition of his return)

EMS – Elite mobilization strategy

FAM – Federación de Asociaciones Municipales (Federation of Municipal Associations – Bolivia)

FBDM – Fundación Boliviana para la Democracia Multipartidaria (Bolivian Foundation for Multiparty Democracy)

FBH – Fédération des Barreaux d’Haïti (Federation of Haitian Bar Associations)
FCM – International – Federation of Canadian Municipalities (Canadian DAA)
FEUH – Fédération des Étudiants Universitaires d’Haïti (Federation of Haitian University Students)
FL – Fanmi Lavalas (Haiti’s most popular political party)
FLRN – Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction Nationale (Front for National Liberation and Reconstruction – Haitian paramilitary organization)
FMOCCP – Federación de las Mujeres Organizadas en Centrales de Cocinas Populares (Federation of Women Organized in Popular Kitchens – grassroots organization in Peru)
FNH – Fondation Nouvelle Haïti (New Founding of Haiti – NGO)
FOKAL – Fondation Connaissance et Liberté (Foundation of Knowledge and Liberty – Haitian NGO headed by former Prime Minister, Michèle Pierre-Louis)
FF – Forum of Federations (Canadian DAA)
FRAPH – Front pour l’Avancement et le Progrès Haïtien (Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti – paramilitary organization)
FTSMB – Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (Union Federation of Mining Workers of Bolivia – most powerful union until late 1980s)
FTQ – Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec (Federation of workers of Quebec)
FUNDAPPAC – Fundación de Apoyo al Parlamento y a la Participación Ciudadana (Foundation for Support to Parliament and Citizen Participation – Bolivian NGO)
GPC - Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana (Group for a Citizen’s Proposal – Peruvian coalition supported by USAID)
GRESP – Grupo Red de Economía Solidaria del Perú (Network of Economic Solidarity of Peru)
ICKL – Institut Culturel Karl Lévesque (Haitian NGO)
IDEA – Instituto de Derecho y Economía Ambiental (Institute for Rights and Environmental Economy – Peruvian NGO)
IDEA International – Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International DAA supported by both Canada and the United States)
IDRC – International Development Research Centre (Canadian research institute)
IFES – International Foundation for Electoral Systems (U.S. DAA)
IGH – Interim Government of Haiti
IIPS – Instituto de Investigación y Capacitación Pedagógica y Social (Institute for Research and Pedagogical and Social Capacity Building – Bolivian NGO)
IJJDH – Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (U.S. NGO aligned with Lavalas)
ILD – Instituto Libertad y Democracia (Institute for Liberty and Democracy – Peruvian NGO established by Hernando de Soto)
INRA – Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (National Institute for Agrarian Reform – Bolivian state institution)
IOM – International Organization for Migration
IPEDEHP – Instituto Peruano de Educación en Derechos Humanos y la Paz (Peruvian Institute for Education in Human Rights and Peace)
IPSP – Instrumento Político para la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Political Instrument for Sovereignty of the People – precursor to the MAS in Bolivia)
IPTK – Instituto Politécnico Tomás Katari (Bolivian NGO)
IPYS – Instituto Prensa y Sociedad (Institute Press and Society – Latin American network)
IRI – International Republican Institute (U.S. DAA; one of four sister organizations of the NED)
IU – Izquierda Unida (United Left – political coalition in Peru in the early 1980s)
ITECA – Institut de Technologie et d’Animation (Institute of Technology and Facilitation – Haitian NGO)
LAPOP – Latin American Public Opinion Project (U.S. research project)
LPP – Ley de Participación Popular (Law of Popular Participation – decentralization initiative in Bolivia launched by President Sanchez de Lozada)
MAS – Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism – political party of Evo Morales)
MIDH – Mouvement pour l’Instauration de la Démocratie en Haïti (Movement for the Establishment of Democracy in Haiti – political party that merged with Lavalas splinter group after coup; led by Marc Bazin, close ally of the United States)
MIEEHH – Mission international d’évaluation des élections en Haïti (International Mission for Monitoring Haitian Elections; spearheaded by Elections Canada)
MIF – Multinational Interim Force (temporary peacekeeping force in Haiti led by Canada, France and the United States in the wake of the coup in 2004)
MMPP – Mujeres Parlamentarias del Perú (Women Parliamentarians of Peru)
MMR – Movimiento Manuela Ramos (Peruvian women’s NGO)
MNR – Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Movement – one of Bolivia’s oldest political parties which drifted from left to right; party of former President Sánchez de Lozada)
MPP – Mouvement Paysan Papaye (Peasant Movement of Papaye – peasant association of the central plain)
MRTA – Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (Peruvian guerrilla revolutionary movement active during ‘internal conflict’)
NLG – National Lawyers Guild (U.S. association)
NCHR – National Coalition for Haitian Rights (Haitian human rights NGO strongly opposed to Lavalas; changed its name to RNDDH)
NDI – National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (U.S. DAA; one of four sister organizations of the NED)
NED – National Endowment for Democracy (U.S. DAA)
OPs – Organisations Populaires (popular organizations in Haiti associated with Lavalas)
OPL – Organisation du Peuple en Lutte (Organization of People in Struggle – Haitian political party that split from Lavalas)
ORIT – Inter-American Regional Labor Organization
OSI – Open Society Institute (U.S. DAA)
PAJ – Programme pour une Alternative de Justice (Programme for an Alternative Justice – Haitian NGO)
PAPDA – Plate-forme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif (Haitian Platform for the Advocacy of an Alternative Development – radical NGO opposed to Lavalas)
PC – Parliamentary Centre (Canadian DAA)
PD – Plate-forme Démocratique (Democratic Platform – coalition that united political and civil society opposition to Lavalas in early 2000s)
PIH – Partners in Health (U.S. NGO active in Haiti)
PJ – Red de Participación y Justicia (Network of Participation and Justice – coalition of NGOs in Bolivia)
PNH – Police Nationale d’Haïti (Haitian National Police)
PNP – Partido Nacionalista Peruano (Peruvian Nationalist Party – leftist party led by Ollanta Humala)
PP – Perú Posible (Peruvian political party of former president Alejandro Toledo)
PPS – Polyarchy promotion strategy
POHDH – Plate-forme des Organisations Haïtiennes de Droits Humains (Platform of Haitian Human Rights Organizations)
PROÉTICA – Consejo Nacional para la Ética Pública (National Council for Public Ethics – Peruvian coalition of NGOs supported by USAID)
RD – Rights and Democracy (Canadian DAA)
RLCD – Red Latinoamericana y del Caribe para la Democracia (Assembly of the Latin American Network for Democracy – regional affiliate of the WMD)
SCFAID – Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (Canadian parliamentary committee)
SCFAIT – Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canadian parliamentary committee)
SAKS – Société d’Animation pour la Communication Sociale (Group for the Facilitation of Social Communication – Haitian NGO)
SOFA – Solidarité Femmes Haïtiennes (Haitian Women’s Solidarity – NGO)
SPDA – Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental (Peruvian Society for Environmental Rights)
UNASUR – Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (Union of South American Nations – intergovernmental union in South America modelled on the EU)
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
USAID OTI – Office of Transition Initiatives
WMD – World Movement for Democracy (initiative launched by the NED)
YPFB – Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (Bolivian petroleum parastatal)
Maps

1 Maps from Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection of the University of Texas at Austin. Produced by U.S. Central Intelligence Agency: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/index.html
Introduction
Democracy promotion and the quest for regional order:
A critical view of U.S. and Canadian democracy assistance in the Americas

"We are in a new moment in Latin America. And we are the true authors of our own destiny, and there is no nation in the world that can judge us, over who is more democratic or not. We each have our own unique process of democratization"

– Fernando Lugo, President of Paraguay, at the seventh summit of the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA) (Fox 2009).

Since the third wave of democracy spread across the globe, democracy promotion has become one of the fastest growing fields of international development. Advanced capitalist democracies, international organizations, international financial institutions and non-governmental organizations alike have made it their business to promote democracy in a diverse range of cultural, economic and geographic settings. In 2008, EU members alone spent more than US$ 6.7 billion in democracy assistance, the United States US$ 4.8 billion and Canada a no-less impressive US$ 763 million. Advocates of democracy promotion maintain that it constitutes an “international norm” (Gershman and Allen 2006) and that “the United States, especially in the last century, has played a pivotal role in making the advancement of democratic values a legitimate foreign policy objective” (McFaul 2004: 148). Despite such assertions, democracy promotion has not been without controversy – by their own admission, U.S. practitioners have confronted a growing backlash, which they attribute both to George W. Bush’s unpopular invasion of Iraq (Carothers 2006) and the opposition of ‘hybrid’ regimes (Gershman and Allen 2006).³

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³ In a review of Canada’s democracy promotion efforts conducted by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (SCFAID 2007), Canadian parliamentarians reaffirmed this position, arguing that the backlash against democracy promotion by hybrid regimes may be overcome through an approach “that speaks to democracy assistance in global developmental terms.”
Yet criticism of democracy promotion cannot be reduced to these causes alone. Some of the most insightful criticisms have come from scholars, activists and political leaders with democratic credentials, many of whom argue that the United States and other powerful actors in the international system use democracy promotion as a form of interventionism. According to William Robinson (2003; 1996), whose work provides the most important scholarly critique, democracy promotion is used to support polyarchy, a term coined by the political scientist Robert Dahl (1967; 1971) to signify formal liberal-democratic systems based on electoral contestation and the right of citizens to participate. This model of ‘low-intensity democracy’ (Gills 2000) is supported by local and global elites as a form of hegemony to ensure political stability in the new global economy; it is intended to prevent deeper notions of democracy that include social and economic dimensions from taking hold. As the above quote by the President of Paraguay, Fernando Lugo, illustrates, Latin American leaders in particular have increasingly rejected the U.S. model, as well as its self-image as the global champion of democracy.

Advocates have responded by noting that democracy assistance is delivered by a range of actors targeting ideologically diverse civil society organizations and political parties (Allen 2005). As one commentator has argued (Coppedge 2007), the debate over democracy promotion versus interventionism is less about whether the United States favours polyarchy – a “precious achievement” by any standard – than whether it uses its promotion of polyarchy to undermine social democracy. The defenders are right to point to the diversity of actors involved in democracy promotion and the pluralism that often defines their approaches. Yet they tend to overlook the ways in which democracy promotion is linked to foreign policy objectives that limit the scope of democracy, as well
as the instances in which democracy assistance is manipulated to accomplish ideological agendas that selectively and strategically define autocrats and democrats (and yes, often at the expense of social democracy as well as other democratic visions).

As Canada greatly expands and reorganizes its democracy assistance programs, there is a need to comparatively situate its efforts in relation to those of its more powerful neighbour from a perspective that considers these issues. The Americas offers an important area of investigation given the U.S. historic role and Canada’s growing interest in the region, as well as the competing visions of democracy that are being contested throughout the hemisphere. Have Canada and the United States used their democracy assistance programs in the new millennium to accomplish geopolitical and economic objectives that in fact contradict the democratic aspirations of popular groups and social classes? This dissertation seeks to respond to this question through an empirical examination of democracy assistance programs in Haiti, Peru, and Bolivia.

The perspective offered here breaks with much of the mainstream literature on democracy promotion and democracy assistance, which focuses mainly on questions of strategy, assuming that democracy programs are necessarily beneficial to the ‘recipients’ of the countries in which they are implemented. It questions the legitimacy of the democracy promotion enterprise – its implicit claims to cultural superiority, double standards, and the foreign policy objectives to which it is explicitly linked by its state

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4 I follow Burnell (2008) in distinguishing between the term democracy promotion, which encompasses a wide range of political and economic strategies advanced by the state to promote democracy (including coercive ones), and democracy assistance, which focuses more specifically on projects and programs intended (at least ostensibly) to support democratic development.

5 One can imagine, for instance, the popular outcry in Canada or the United States had Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez decided to launch a democracy promotion campaign in the wake of George W. Bush’s highly contested electoral victory in 2000, or Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s prorogation of the Canadian parliament in December 2009 to avoid discussion on the handling of Afghan detainees. The double standard has been observed by Latin American leaders. On his weekly TV program, *Alo Presidente*,
practitioners. At the same time, this dissertation builds on the growing critical literature while subjecting some of its central claims to the same critical reflection. It addresses its main theoretical gaps, that is, the failure to consider how different core states advance different forms of democracy promotion, how they affect social relations in terms of both class and identity, and how they operate in more stable political environments. It situates itself within the neo-Gramscian tradition but rejects the argument that democracy promotion must be understood exclusively – or even primarily – as a modality of power that reinforces the hegemony of transnationalized fractions of capital. Rather, I argue that democracy assistance programs often target diverse social sectors in elite civil society in the interests of stabilizing these societies as a whole, or in destabilizing regimes opposed on ideological grounds. While this certainly benefits transnational capital as the dominant social group, it also reinforces the hegemony of ethnic groups which have always enjoyed a privileged position in postcolonial society.

This project contributes to a critical theorization of democracy promotion by distinguishing between forms that mobilize and reinforce the hegemony of specific elite sectors and those that seek to consolidate polyarchy at a more systemic level as a project of stabilization. As such, it views democracy promotion as a form of power which encompasses both strategies of stabilization and destabilization depending upon the political context. In the case of Canada, a more progressive tradition of democracy promotion that empowers grassroots and popular organizations must also be considered. This dissertation thus draws upon a cultural political economy (Jessop and Sum 2001) to make sense of such complexity by embedding Foucauldian notions of governmentality.
and discourse within a neo-Gramscian approach to world order and hegemony. Such an approach provides a more complete account of the forms of power related specifically to a project of stabilization than a narrow political economy. It allows for a wider understanding of the diversity of democracy promotion strategies, tactics, and practices. It also escapes the logical fallacy of critical accounts which implicitly assume that because Canada and the United States manipulate some of their programs they are all harmfully interventionist.

I argue that the extent to which U.S. and Canadian actors have used their democracy programs to accomplish stabilization or destabilization objectives in Haiti, Bolivia, and Peru reflects a range of material, ideological and institutional factors. For the United States, democracy assistance programs are implemented by actors within a tightly woven democracy promotion field of practice organized by the state as an extension of its foreign policy apparatus. For Canada, the state has only begun to strategically shape the democracy promotion field of practice to accomplish imperial objectives. This is happening at the very same time as U.S. democracy assistance programs have suffered a growing crisis of legitimacy. This project therefore contributes to discussions on the evolution of Canadian and U.S. imperialism and the ways in which they are interwoven and linked, emphasizing the importance of both material and ideological factors. The focus on the Americas is intended to provide a deeper theorization of the dynamics of democracy promotion in the hemisphere as a regional dimension of neoliberal world order.

The intellectual desire to contribute to a critical theory of democracy promotion was motivated by my own experience as a coordinator for a Canadian-led international State for the Americas, that the democratic space in Venezuela was shrinking (Gordon and Webber 2010).
electoral observation mission in Port-au-Prince during the winter of 2005 – 2006. The mission was mandated to monitor the presidential elections of 2006 after a coup in 2004. This provided the encounter through which I was exposed to the contradictory reality of Canada and the international community’s attempts to promote democracy while undermining it in so many other ways. Among other things, this included what can only be seen as the legitimization of a flawed electoral process in which state authorities were repressing the popular movement associated with the previous government. Although a popular candidate ended up winning the presidential elections in 2006, the destruction of the popular movement in civil society ensured that the dominant classes and political elites who supported the coup ultimately had their way.

Selection of cases

Although democracy assistance programs have not been confined to a particular part of the hemisphere, certain countries have certainly received more attention than others. The three countries selected in this study are all priority countries for both Canadian and U.S. development assistance (ODA) in the Americas. For Canada, they have all ranked amongst the top five destinations of bilateral assistance for ‘democratic governance’ through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) since 2000 (Guatemala and Jamaica have also consistently been among the top five). While the top destinations of U.S. bilateral assistance in the equivalent category, ‘governing justly and democratically,’ have varied from one year to the next, Bolivia, Peru and Haiti have all been major destinations. Table 1 summarizes total Canadian and U.S. democracy

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6 Canada’s other ODA priority countries in the region are Colombia and Honduras. For the United States, they are Colombia and Ecuador.
assistance as disbursed by CIDA and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in each country from 2001 to 2009.\(^7\)

**Table 1: Total U.S. and Canadian democracy assistance in the cases (2001 – 2009)\(^8\)**

(Amounts in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Haiti</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>$139,394</td>
<td>$38,284</td>
<td>$81,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>$224,933</td>
<td>$62,501</td>
<td>$101,078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perhaps more significantly, the three countries selected in this study exhibit substantial variance when it comes to democratic development and the prospects of consolidating polyarchy. Such variances are representative of larger patterns of change and stability in the Americas. In the countries being swept by the so-called ‘Pink Tide,’ leftist governments claim to be deepening the democratic process: in Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay and Argentina, a modern form of social democracy has taken root; in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, new socialistic visions are being articulated. In Mexico, Peru and Colombia neoliberal polyarchy seems more stable, though this stability barely conceals the sharp social tensions that continue to simmer below the surface. In the most extreme case in the hemisphere – Haiti – chronic instability and social conflict seem to be preventing the consolidation of either polyarchy or any democratic alternative. In order to better understand the variability of democracy assistance programs, I have selected three cases that have exhibited differing outcomes when it comes to the prospects of

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\(^7\) *Nota Bene:* All figures referring to U.S. and Canadian programs presented throughout this study are presented in their respective currencies unless otherwise stipulated. Financial data is also presented according to the fiscal years of each government: For Canada, this begins on April 1 of one year and ends on March 31 of the next; for the United States, this coincides with the calendar year.

\(^8\) Canadian data was provided to this researcher by the CIDA Senior Director of the Americas on January 6, 2010. Information was extracted from CIDA data system (CRAFT) December 20, 2009. U.S. data from 2001 to 2005 was extracted from USAID’s budgets (2009). Data for 2007 to 2009 was taken from
consolidating polyarchy as well as differing historical relations with Canada and the United States. These differences in turn reflect distinct political economies and historical structures, albeit with important underlying similarities.

In many ways, Bolivia and Peru could not be more different than Haiti. Home to the great Incan and pre-Colombian civilizations, Peru is the most geographically diverse of the three countries. The prosperous urban settlements along the Pacific coast are hemmed in by the hulking Andean mountain chain to the east, on the other side of which lies the vast selva (jungle) of the Amazonian rainforest. While the vast majority of Peru’s 27.9 million inhabitants speak Spanish, Aymara and Quechua continue to be spoken widely in the Andes addition to the numerous languages spoken by the indigenous peoples of the Amazon. Nearly half the population is of indigenous descent, about 15 percent European, and 37 percent mixed, or mestizo (a small fraction is of Chinese, Japanese, or African descent). Those of European descent tend to be concentrated primarily in the wealthier coastal cities.

Bolivia, for its part, has remained a landlocked country for most of its history. Although its capital is technically Sucre, where the judicial branch of government is located, the executive and legislative branches sit in La Paz. As the Andes descend to the east from the highland region around La Paz, the fertile agricultural regions of the sierra lowland gradually give way to Bolivia’s share of the Amazonian rainforest. One of the most indigenous countries in Latin America, 55 percent of Bolivia’s population of 9.52 million inhabitants is of indigenous descent, 15 percent European, and 30 percent mestizo.

USAID’s congressional request for 2009 (U.S. Department of State 2009), which included actual figures for 2007, estimates for 2008 and requests for 2009 request. As such, figures for 2008 and 2009 may vary. All economic and population statistics are taken from the World Bank’s 2009 World Development Indicators Online, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/. Statistics on ethnic composition are taken from
The vast majority of people of European and *mestizo* descent are concentrated in the capital and the prosperous agricultural regions of the eastern lowlands. The indigenous population is concentrated in the high plateau around Lake Titicaca, or *altiplano*, of the western highlands, and is divided mainly between the Aymara and Quechua ethnic groups. Both Peru and Bolivia are extremely rich in mineral deposits, with significant natural gas, petroleum, zinc, iron, lead, gold, timber, and silver reserves (Bolivia also has large tin reserves while Peru has one of the world's largest copper supplies). With a much more extensive industrial and resource base, Peru's economy is significantly larger than Bolivia's: the GDP of both countries in 2007, for instance, was measured at $107.3 billion and $13.12 billion, respectively. In 2006, the poorest 20 percent of Peruvians held only 3.9 percent of the country's income share while the richest 10 percent held 38 percent. In 2007, the country's total external debt reached US$ 35.86 billion. The poorest 20 percent of Bolivians held 1.8 percent of the country's income share in 2005, while the richest 10 percent held 44 percent. Bolivia's external debt reached US$ 2.60 billion in 2007.

On the eastern side of the Central American isthmus, the Caribbean republic of Haiti has played a central role in the history of the Americas incommensurate with its modest size. The vast majority of Haiti's population is of African descent, with a small mixed African-European, or *mûlatre*, elite comprising only 5 percent of the population.¹⁰ Based in the urban centers and inhabiting an exclusive cultural world alongside a small black political elite, the *mûlatre* elite speaks French, the language of the former colonial

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¹⁰ Included in this percentage is a small population of individuals of Lebanese descent who migrated to Haiti at the turn of the century and who play a dominant role in the country's economy.
rulers. Creole, a French patois with strong African, Spanish and English influences, is spoken by Haitians of all social classes. In the cultural sphere, the urban-rural divide extends far beyond language, with the Haitian peasantry practicing their own syncretic fusion of African traditions grounded in vaudou and Catholicism. Crisscrossed by mountains and valleys, Haiti has suffered from one of the world’s most extreme cases of overpopulation and deforestation on the earth – a fate which has not been compensated for by any significant natural-resource base. Most of its peasant population is engaged in subsistence farming. The total population of the country was 9.61 million in 2007, with a small GDP of US$ 6.72 billion. Although figures on income share are not available in the case of Haiti, its small economy was saddled with a total debt of US$ 1 billion in 2007. The poorest country in the Western hemisphere, 80% of Haiti’s population live under the poverty line, and 54% live in abject poverty (Central Intelligence Agency 2008) (Tables 10 and 11 in chapter three contain detailed economic statistics for each country).

Despite these significant differences, however, Bolivia, Peru and Haiti share traditions of endemic poverty, inequality, racism, class domination, dependency and underdevelopment that have rendered them inhospitable terrains for the establishment of democratic societies. All three countries are essentially agrarian, with peasant majorities having long constituted a racialized and exploited other by dominant classes tied to the old colonial order. The authoritarian state forms that took root in all three have always rested on precarious internal foundations, and the partial democratic transitions that each has undergone have been conditioned by the legacies of the past. All three have suffered from U.S. imperial domination, though this has been most profound in the case of Haiti. Canada’s emergence as an imperial power is also most apparent in that country. Both the United States and Canada also have strong mining interests in Peru and Bolivia.
Research design

The empirical focus of this investigation is an analysis of Canadian and U.S. democracy assistance agencies (DAAs) in Haiti, Bolivia, and Peru from 2000 to 2008. DAAs include state agencies such as USAID and CIDA, quasi non-governmental organizations (QUANGOs) such as Rights and Democracy in Canada and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and its sister organizations in the United States, as well as various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and for-profit development contractors. Although the focus is primarily on programs with a civil society or political party component, the investigation also considers programs dealing with democratic governance more broadly.

The methodological principles adopted by the research differ from traditional policy-evaluation frameworks, grounding themselves in what Robert Cox (1996) refers to as critical theory. Problem solving theory takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized as the given framework for action. Since the ideologies and practices that may inform these institutions are not called into question, problems are considered in relation to the specialized areas of activity in which they arise. Critical theory, in contrast, directs its attention to the social and political complex as a whole, calling into question the power relations that inform state and government actions in the domestic and international spheres. Critical theory recognizes that claims of value-free inquiry by problem-solving theories are belied by virtue of the fact that they implicitly accept the prevailing social order as their own framework.
Although Cox’s neo-Gramscian analysis of capitalism and the international system is situated within the ‘new’ historical materialism (Gill 2003), this large theoretical umbrella covers a number of distinct tendencies. Robinson’s (2004) work on democracy promotion, for instance, is situated within a fairly unique argument regarding the transnational nature of global capitalism that posits the end of the traditional nation state. The theoretical framework used in this analysis draws more heavily upon the assumptions of Cox’s original approach, which gives more credence to the importance of states, institutions and values in configuring social reality. While the neo-Gramscian tradition is often legitimately critiqued for focusing too much on class relations, I agree with Jessop and Sum (2001) that it has the potential to contribute to a Marxist-inflected cultural political economy that focuses on the interplay between the material and the discursive. In this spirit, I draw upon concepts associated with Gramsci and Foucault within a Coxian reading of social structures to theorize the power dynamics of democracy promotion. States and social forces are situated in a material base, but not in a narrow economistic or deterministic sense. This broader view of social relations resonates with the feminist political economy literature that emphasizes the centrality of both production and reproduction in defining power relations, as well as the intersectionality of oppressions and the interconnectedness of culture and economy (Peterson 2003).

From this theoretical vantage point, two sets of research questions guide the analysis. At the general level, they are:

1. What are the political consequences of specific democracy assistance programs in terms of how they affect the balance of power between the state and specific social forces in civil and political society in each country?
2. How might we theorize the strategies, tactics, and practices of DAAs in terms of

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11 Given the complexity of such programs in Haiti, the focus is mainly on those introduced between 2000 and 2006.
their direct and indirect affects on local power relations?

At the level of comparative analysis

1. What are the similarities and differences in the ways in which Canadian and U.S. DAAs go about promoting democracy?
2. Is it possible to speak of the emergence of a common North American approach to promoting democracy?12

The research strategy to respond to these sets of questions consists of a theoretical and empirical analysis of democracy assistance programs in the three cases assessed against the political context in which they operate. A focus on the political context was deemed essential not only for a critical methodology, but also because policymakers themselves formulate democracy assistance programs in relation to larger foreign policy objectives, international trends, and national development issues. To examine these programs in isolation overlooks the larger context in which they are specifically linked in addition to falling into the trap of problem-solving theory. The research focus thus aimed at providing a broad understanding of trends and developments in democracy promotion in the Americas by Canada and the United States rather than a detailed analysis of specific programs and projects.

The recursive investigation of programs and context led to the retroductive formulation of a critical methodological framework from which theoretical and comparative generalizations on the nature of Canadian and U.S. democracy promotion are offered. The framework is summarized below in Table 2. Following a post-positivist historicist methodology, the framework avoids formulating strict causal relations between variables in favour of an approach that seeks to uncover the underlying tendency of the ensemble of structural relations and forces. The variables themselves are viewed less as
reified objects or fixed universals than problematized objects of inquiry (Persaud 2001).

Table 2: Methodological framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core state</th>
<th>Critical theorization of DAA behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position in world order</td>
<td>Political characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to peripheral state</td>
<td>Relation to local social forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of DP community</td>
<td>Nature of political ideological project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical-institutional legacies of DAAs</td>
<td>Affect on hegemonic relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peripheral state</th>
<th>Theoretical generalizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of hegemony</td>
<td>Typology of forms of democracy promotion (strategies, tactics and practices)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of forces</td>
<td>Comparison of actors and approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position in world order</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with donor</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Accordingly, the methodological framework situates the analysis of democracy assistance and democracy promotion within a larger political context, which is disaggregated according to interconnected variables in two separate categories: the ‘core state’ (Canada and the United States) and the ‘peripheral state’ (Haiti, Peru, and Bolivia). These terms are intended to avoid the conventional language of the field of international development, which frames the relationship in terms of ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’ states without paying attention to the fact that states which provide aid are often quite predatory in the global economy. Using a cultural political economy perspective that draws heavily upon Coxian historical materialism, I analyze the primary material on democracy promotion and democracy assistance in relation to the political context. I argue that the configuration of variables identified in each category condition the type of approach (or

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12 This analysis excludes Mexico from the consideration of North American approaches to democracy promotion.
approaches) toward democracy promotion adopted by core states in peripheral (and semi-
 peripheral) states.

The analysis of primary material in relation to the political context also provides
the basis for generalizations on the behaviour of individual DAAs in each case, which is
assessed in relation to their main political characteristics. This is defined in terms of the
main local actors that receive support, including the sectors of society that they represent,
their visions, mandates, and connection to the larger processes of democratic change
unfolding in their countries. By analyzing such characteristics, we may discern the
objectives and political impact of the programs on the local political scene, which is
defined in terms of its affect (intended or actual) on hegemonic relations between
different social forces in civil and political society. The theorization of strategies, tactics
and practices by DAAs according to their political impact allows for a critical typology of
the forms of democracy promotion and a comparison of different actors and approaches.

The primary material of this study consists of numerous program and strategic
documents reviewed in three languages, as well as over 88 interviews conducted in
Canada and the three case studies (see Appendix for a full list of interviewees).
Interviews in the ‘field’ were conducted over a three-month period beginning in January
2009, with civil society organizations that had either received Canadian or U.S. funding,
embassy officials in the foreign policy and development sections, international
organizations, representatives of political parties, academics, and other experts on
democracy.\textsuperscript{13} Interviews were conducted in Lima, La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and
Port-au-Prince. A questionnaire combining general and specific questions was used for

\textsuperscript{13} Funding for the field research was generously provided by the International Development Research Centre through a Canadian Window on International Development award.
each interviewee, though interviews were open-ended with the questionnaires serving
mainly as interview guides. Interviews were conducted in English, French, and Spanish.
The diversity of interviewees made it possible to develop a deeper understanding of both
specific programs and the general political context. Additional interviews with Canadian
experts, representatives of government agencies and NGOs as well as social movements
critical of Canadian democracy promotion efforts were carried out in Montreal and
Ottawa. In some cases, the interviewees requested anonymity or non-attribution of
comments.

Needless to say, some difficulties were encountered in determining which
programs to consider since there is considerable inconsistency in the use of aid categories.
In some cases, for instance, justice programs with a strong civil society component may
be included under rule of law instead of democratic governance; in other cases, they may
be classified as human rights projects. The term governance, moreover, is a notoriously
imprecise and elastic concept that seems to tell us more about ‘donor’ interests than
development needs – in Bolivia, for example, CIDA’s democratic governance
programming focuses on regulating the mining and mineral sector – a sector which not
coincidentally holds great interest for Canadian mining companies. In the end, this did
not pose a serious difficulty since it was possible to identify all of the programs in a given
country and then determine which ones were relevant to the study.

In the case of any critical analysis, it is important to engage in a process of self-
reflectivity to challenge one’s own political assumptions. In this sense, it should be stated
from the outset that my sympathy for the democratic aspirations of progressive
movements often denounced as ‘anti-systemic’ or populist is not difficult to discern. In
its own modest way, this research project is a work of solidarity with popular movements
and their attempts to chart their own democratic course. But this political orientation
does not come at the expense of intellectual honesty, nor does it succumb to the
temptation to romanticize popular democratic movements which do not always act as
democratically as they purport to be. Alternatives to neoliberal polyarchy are carefully
scrutinized according to their own internal contradictions and historical limitations. I
have also sought to avoid critical generalizations of democracy promotion that do not take
into account the ways in which many programs do in fact contribute to strengthening
democratic practices and institutions. While I recognize the importance of engaging with
policy discussions on the future direction of Canadian democracy promotion, the
arguments presented here are primarily interpretive rather than prescriptive.

**Summary of chapters**

The theoretical concepts deployed throughout the dissertation are described in chapter
one, which provides a review of the literature on democracy promotion and imperialism –
both U.S. and Canadian – in neoliberal world order. It ends with a typology of
democracy promotion tactics based on three dominant strategies or forms. The first form
consists primarily of programs that are strategically designed to mobilize elite social
forces in civil and political society to undermine a popular movement or government. I
refer to the individual tactics to advance this strategy through various programs and
initiatives as elite mobilization tactics (EMTs). In Gramscian terms, EMTs serve to
coalesce a hegemonic bloc engaged in a war of position to impose polyarchy over more
substantive notions of democracy. The second form is based on a strategy of promoting
polyarchy in more general terms by strengthening and reforming the political system and
a more pluralistic ensemble of actors in political and civil society. I invoke Foucauldian
concepts such as discourse and governmentality to theorize the ways in which polyarchy promotion tactics (PPTs) rationalize the functioning of democratic institutions and construct liberal citizens that stabilize neoliberal order (though these concepts remain embedded in a Gramscian analysis of hegemony). The third form is grassroots democracy promotion, which focuses primarily upon empowering popular social forces and progressive NGOs in civil society.

Chapter two introduces the first component of the political context which shapes the form of democracy promotion – the variables associated with the core state. For the United States, the historic instrumentalization of DAAs by the state is commensurate with the U.S. history of regional and global imperialism. In the case of Canada, DAAs have traditionally been more autonomous. This reflects the distinct historical traditions of Canadian democracy promotion and the position of the Canadian state in regional order. With the reorganization of Canadian democracy promotion under the auspices of the Canadian state, however, there is considerable evidence that programs are becoming much more ideologically driven. Chapter three assesses the political context from the perspective of the peripheral state, emphasizing the importance of viewing the cases from a cultural political economy perspective that emphasizes the importance of social relations rooted in class and identity. Through an analysis of historic structures and the ongoing struggles to democratize the social order, it provides a counter-narrative of authoritarianism and democratization to democracy promotion discourses that overlook the interplay between external and internal variables. This chapter sets the stage for the analysis of each case by demonstrating that the transition to polyarchy was premised on the maintenance of significant inequality in social relations and world order.
Chapters four, five and six then explore the shifting forms of democracy promotion in each country from 2000 to 2008. In all three countries, U.S. democracy assistance programs respond strategically to the prevailing balance of power through a combination of elite mobilization and polyarchy promotion strategies. Canada's programs also contribute to elite hegemony but are less strategically guided by the state. In Haiti, however, the programs of both Canada and the United States mobilized and supported elite opposition in political and civil society against the Lavalas government in the early 2000s. After the coup in 2004, both countries provided considerable legitimacy to the de facto government and sought to institutionalize a new polyarchic order. This more aggressive form of democratic interventionism reflects Canada's growing imperial role in the hemisphere and the efforts of the Canadian state to use its democracy assistance programs to accomplish unrelated foreign policy objectives.

In Peru, Canadian and U.S. actors have contributed to the promotion of polyarchy since the elite-led transition of 2000, though the U.S. has also given indications that it might switch to a more interventionist approach if 'anti-systemic' forces – a term designating both radical indigenous movements and the left-wing nationalist party, the Partido Nacionalista Peruano – continue to accumulate. In Bolivia, U.S. and Canadian DAAs also contributed to the promotion of polyarchy in the early 2000s, with the U.S. switching to a partial policy of elite mobilization as the indigenous movement organized under the leadership of Evo Morales and the Movimento al Socialismo made its way to power. In both countries, Canadian DAAs have also supported grassroots organizations associated with the popular movements. This contrasts with their approach in Haiti, where they aligned themselves with NGOs opposed to the popular movement. This
alignment reflected the deep fractures in Haitian civil society, as well as a certain degree of opportunism on the part of Canadian DAAs.

The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings in each case and offers some theoretical generalizations on Canadian and U.S. democracy promotion and their implications for trends in regional order. I argue– with a certain degree of caution – that we may speak of an emerging North American approach to democracy promotion which strategically coordinates the actions of state agencies, QUANGOS, and NGOs to facilitate the consolidation of neoliberal polyarchy in the interests of regional order. Yet given the contradictions of neoliberalism – including increased poverty, pauperization, and social precariousness – this neoliberal bloc is already an anachronism. While democracy assistance programs may continue to exist, it is unlikely that they will succeed anywhere in the region at stabilizing polyarchic systems beyond, at best, the medium term. As Latin American states continue to challenge the legitimacy of democracy assistance programs, the United States and Canada may find it increasingly difficult to resort to interventionist strategies to advance foreign policy objectives.
Chapter one
Towards a critical theory of democracy promotion

Despite the central importance of democracy promotion in the foreign policies of Canada and the United States, few critical studies have comparatively assessed the democracy assistance programs of each country. The neo-Gramscian literature – most notably the work of Robinson (1996; 2003) – offers the most sophisticated critique of U.S. democracy promotion as a transnational practice intended to reinforce the hegemony of local elites tied to the global economy. Although this analysis is important, democracy promotion is not monolithic. To make sense of the different forms, strategies, and tactics of democracy promotion and the different approaches that have informed Canadian and U.S. democracy assistance programs in each of the cases – the main research objectives of this project – it is necessary to overcome gaps in the critical literature by reconstructing a neo-Gramscian framework that is more sensitive to the variability between forms of democracy promotion and the approaches taken by core states.

This chapter will elaborate a framework for the investigation of Canadian and U.S. democracy programs in Haiti, Peru and Bolivia. The question that orients the first part of this chapter is why, as Smith (2000) asks, neoliberal polyarchy – a specific and limited notion of democracy – has gained something approaching hegemonic status in the world system. A Gramscian reading of democracy inspired by the historical materialist literature on democracy and capitalism provides the beginnings of an answer by situating different conceptions of democracy within specific social projects and hegemonic struggles. A critical engagement with the neo-Gramscian tradition then provides a framework for situating polyarchy as the hegemonic social project of dominant states and transnational forces within the neoliberal world order. The struggles from below that
contest this hegemony are revealed through the critical strands of the democratization literature that theorize how popular movements have shaped the struggle for democracy since the transition from authoritarianism. The second step in the elaboration of the critical framework is to ask how Canada and the United States contribute, specifically, to advancing neoliberal polyarchy in the Americas, thereby reproducing neoliberal world order at the regional level. This requires some engagement with the critical political economy literature on the material, geopolitical and discursive dimensions of U.S. and Canadian imperialism, and their respective relations with the Americas. Here, I emphasize the importance of a neo-Gramscian view of middlepowermanship which situates Canadian imperialism in terms of both material interests and the ideological role that the Canadian state has taken on in legitimizing the norms of neoliberal world order through the projection of its status as a middle power.

In the second part of this chapter, I introduce elements of a cultural political economy approach to address the gaps in the neo-Gramscian literature. The framework – elaborated by way of critique of the Robinsonian account – is rooted in the observation that Canada and the United States advance different approaches to democracy promotion that reflect the historic traditions of their respective democracy promotion fields of practice. The extent to which programs are strategically used by the state to advance neoliberal polyarchy depends upon these traditions, as well its general material interests in regional order and its specific bilateral relations with the country in which programs are being implemented. A cultural political economy integrates Foucauldian notions of discourse and governmentality within a Gramscian conception of hegemony to distinguish between strategies of democracy promotion that seek to organize and mobilize local elites into neoliberal hegemonic blocs and those which seek to promote polyarchy at
a more systemic level by stabilizing elite patterns of governance. This allows for a
typology that theorizes democracy promotion in terms of shifting strategies of de-
stabilization and stabilization. In both cases, diverse social sectors in elite civil society
benefit in addition to transnationalized fractions of capital. A critical typology of
democracy promotion strategies and tactics must also consider how some agencies –
mostly Canadian – support grassroots organizations and popular movements. Its
practitioners are more distant from state objectives, though they are still dependent upon
state funding and share many of the notions of cultural superiority that underpin
democracy promotion as a field of practice.

I. The dialectics of democracy and democratization

Democracy as a hegemonic project

If the very notion of democracy promotion assumes a common understanding of what is
in fact a contentious concept, a brief overview of its history as an idea and social
practice reveal no such consensus. Since the democratic transitions of Latin America
and other parts of the Third World have led to the implantation of a specific form of
democracy best described as polyarchy, a deeper understanding of this form of
government and how it differs from other notions of democracy is in order. While the
adoption of the main features of polyarchy by most governments in the Americas is an
historical development that represents considerable progress from the days of the military
dictatorships, it is also a conception of democracy that focuses exclusively on the political
sphere. This section will situate polyarchy in historical and theoretical terms, juxtaposing
it against the radical tradition which considers the political, social and economic

14 Robinson (1996), for example, follows W.B. Gallie in arguing that democracy is a contested term,
wherein “intersubjective of vested class and group interests are often ensconced in what is presented as
scientific, objective discussion of democracy.” See also Hidalgo (2008).
dimensions of democracy. I introduce some of the main concepts associated with the thought of Gramsci, which serve as the basis for the neo-Gramscian theoretical framework developed in the following section. I end with the proposition that democracy can best be conceived of as a hegemonic project, the political content of which depends upon the social forces and ideologies to which it is linked in a particular historic juncture. This view will then guide the analysis of democracy promotion in the following chapters.

Within the political science literature, the concept of polyarchy was first proposed by the American political scientist, Robert Dahl (1967), who defined polyarchy along two dimensions: public contestation and the right to participate. Because democracy as a broad category may include more than just these dimensions (and since he recognized that even actually existing democracies are not fully democratized), Dahl (1971) advocated the term polyarchy over democracy to signify regimes that have been substantively popularized and liberalized along these two axes. Despite the idealized way in which Dahl portrays this political system in the American context, his distinction between polyarchy and democracy remains heuristically useful. Above all, it recognizes that democracy is a contested concept and that one must deploy a more specific term to identify the formal political institutions characteristic of advanced capitalist democracies.

The concept of polyarchy must be situated historically, however, in terms of its relation with the economic form of social organization to which it has always been linked – capitalism. It is within the tradition of class-analysis and historical materialism that the contradiction between the principles of equality contained in the concept of democracy

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15 These dimensions are further broken down into eight institutional conditions: 1) freedom to form and join organizations; 2) freedom of expression; 3) right to vote; 4) eligibility for public office; 5) right of political leaders to compete for support and votes; 6) alternative sources of information; 7) free and fair elections; and 8) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.
and the drive toward individual accumulation on which liberal capitalism is based have best been theorized. As Barrington Moore (1966) once demonstrated, the liberal bourgeois transformations of Western Europe were neither democratic nor egalitarian except in the narrow sense that they called for constitutional governance by the commercial class against aristocratic and monarchic privilege. The extension of the suffrage in western capitalist states only occurred gradually and unevenly as class struggle and national wars forced governing elites to make concessions to working class movements (Therborn 1977; Nun 2003). Social struggles to democratize liberalism have also included those directed against its patriarchal dimensions – as feminist theorists such as Pateman (1989b) have demonstrated – as well as its tolerance or open support of racial privilege (Dhaliwal 1996). In the postwar era, the economic crisis of the 1930s and the rise in labour organization and militancy led western capitalist states to adopt policies to reconcile the tensions between capitalism and democracy through social citizenship (Marshall and Bottomore 1991) and the development of national welfare-state regimes (Esping-Andersen 1999), particularly in the Scandinavian social democracies. Such policies were facilitated by an international regulatory framework with controls on short-term capital flows and foreign direct investment (Cox 1987; Ruggie 1982).

The radical tradition in both core and peripheral states has always offered alternative notions of democracy in theory and practice. At the theoretical level, most have followed Marx himself in viewing socialism as the precondition for the full realization of democracy inasmuch as it abolishes the class distinctions that restrict

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16 See Macpherson (1977) for an analysis of pre-capitalist conceptions of democracy and how they emphasized the importance of economic equality for political participation.
17 See Wood (2002) for an in depth historical materialist analysis of democracy and capitalism. Wood also discusses how representative democracy in the American experience was explicitly designed by the founding fathers as a filter against the masses by combining elements of democracy and oligarchy
effective political participation under capitalist democracy and provides for new
democratic forms through which people can exercise self-autonomy. But Marx also
formulated the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat which, while reversing the
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie under capitalist society, justifies the notion of coercion in
the socialist transition (Panitch 1988). The authoritarian impulse was developed more
explicitly in the Leninist vanguard model.

Lenin’s contemporary, Antonio Gramsci (1971), reinforced the democratic
tradition of socialism by theorizing the importance of securing consent for the transition
in bourgeois democracies. He maintained that in countries which had undergone
profound capitalist social revolutions, such as Britain and the United States, the
bourgeoisie could lead and direct society primarily through consent rather than coercion.
From this initial insight, Gramsci built a complex theory of hegemony as a form of social
power. Hegemonic representations of society are constructed socially by organic
intellectuals associated with different social groups and classes and confer considerable
legitimacy upon the established order. They are articulated and defended across the
multifarious institutions of the civil society and the state (or the integral state) within
realms such as the educational system, state apparatuses, the church and the public media
through a totality of institutional and discursive practices that constitute who we are and
how we think (Williams 2005). Hegemony produces ‘imagined communities’ that
stabilize the structure of accumulation and rationalize social contradictions by obfuscating
structural antagonisms or transforming them into simple differences (Persaud 2001).
They become socially embedded to such an extent that they are taken to be the natural
order of things (Cox 2001).
In hegemonic formations, a direct frontal attack on the state, or a ‘war of movement,’ was tactically unsound; instead, in Gramsci’s view, counter-hegemonic popular forces must undermine the legitimacy of the social order ‘through a war of position.’ Although Gramsci’s theoretical contributions opened up new possibilities for a democratic transition strategy to socialism, he himself remained a devoted Leninist. His use of the concept of hegemony was anchored firmly within the Bolshevik tradition, which, in the lead up to the October Revolution, emphasized the importance of consolidating the hegemony of the proletariat. As Anderson’s (1977) early attempt to clarify Gramsci’s legacy in the west makes clear, the distinction between the war of movement and the war of position was strictly tactical and sequential. “To formulate proletarian strategy as essentially a war of position,” Anderson writes, “is to forget the necessarily sudden and volcanic character of revolutionary situations, which by the nature of these social formations can never be stabilized for long and therefore need the utmost speed and mobility of attack if the opportunity to conquer power is not to be missed (1977: 75).”

The extent to which a dominant class or historic bloc transcends social contradictions through material concession to subordinate groups determines the form of hegemony which prevails in a given social formation. Since the Gramscian typology of hegemony will be drawn upon in later chapters, the four main forms, as presented by Persaud (2001), are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Forms of hegemony

| 1. Integral hegemony - considerable degree of class compromise between dominant and subordinated social forces |
| 2. Decadent hegemony - articulation between the political and cultural spheres is fragile – a hegemonic ideology may exist but institutional mechanisms of compromise are weak |
| 3. Minimalist hegemony - ideological unity exists only among intellectual, political and economic elites strongly averse to any form of intervention by popular social groups in state life To contain dissent, a strategy of cooptation (trasformismo) prevails and the state resorts to a politics of passive revolution |
| 4. Class supremacy - the ruling class dispenses with maintaining any illusion of consent and dominates society through organized violence and coercion |

As Hill (2007) stresses, the process of creating a counter-hegemony is fundamentally an educative process in which organic intellectuals and leaders assist subordinate classes to develop the necessary practical reason to overcome moral and intellectual submission. Yet, Gramsci does not provide a theory of what deeper forms of democracy might look like in either capitalist or socialist society, nor does he break with what Golding (1992) refers to as “the metaphysics of the working class subject.”

Within the socialist tradition, the task of addressing these issues began with New Left intellectuals and the new social movements that emerged in the 1960s (Hauptmann 2001). Participatory democrats were amongst the first to develop a schema of how society might be organized along vertical and horizontal lines through participatory institutions in both the economic and political spheres (many sought to synthesize the socialist and liberal tradition, a philosophical perspective which best reflects my own normative preference).

If progressive democratic theorists have sought to articulate philosophical visions of democracy, the real world of democratic experiments has occurred mostly in the Third

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18 See also Morera (1990) for a discussion on the role of democracy in Gramsci’s thought. Morera argues that Gramsci was committed to a view of democracy that emphasized emancipation from multiple sources of oppression, though he rejects post-structuralist appropriations that detach the notion of hegemonic struggle from the centrality of class.

19 See C.B. Macpherson (1977) for the classical exposition and Carole Pateman (1989) for a feminist reading. Benjamin Barber’s (1984) conception of ‘strong democracy’ has also been influential. Other
World (Luckham 1998). Often, they served as the ideological basis for mass mobilizations against authoritarian regimes that eventually led to the ‘third wave’ democratic transition (as in Haiti and Nicaragua), though they were almost always eclipsed, in the end, by minimalist notions of democracy advanced by elite oppositions. In recent years, however, radical notions of democracy are once again gaining ground against minimalist alternatives, particularly in Latin America. Although the new Latin American left does not present a standardized discourse or explicit set of practices, it has emerged as a “collection of principles, ideas, practices and institutions” (Dagnino, Olvera and Panfichi 2008: 27). At the local level, participatory forms of democracy have developed most famously in the Brazilian municipality of Porto Alegre, but also across the Andean region in Bolivia, Ecuador (Van Cott 2006; 2008) and Peru (Hordijk 2005). At the national level, the emergence of ‘twenty-first century socialism’ in Venezuela and indigenous socialism in Bolivia are the most notable democratic experiments. Both are rooted in mass social movements and have supported the use of referenda to enable mass participation in key decision making, recall (revocatoria) to ensure ongoing accountability of elected officials, and participatory institutions at the local level. In Bolivia, the democratic experiment has also recognized traditional indigenous practices such as communal justice, emphasizing the importance of decolonizing the state, popular sovereignty, redistribution, and social justice. As Patzi (2004) observes, the notion of indigenous democracy in Bolivia is defined by the subordination of authorities to the community; the representative ‘leads through obedience’ (manda porque obedece) to the people.

philosophical visions include radical democracy (Laclau and Mouffe 2001) and deliberative democracy (Fraser 1990) (Cunningham 2002).
To be sure, such experiments are not without their own internal contradictions and challenges. The centralization of power in the hands of the executive to carry out sweeping reforms, for instance, is as much of a threat to the new vision of participatory democracy as it was to previous socialist projects. In the Andes, some have warned that indigenous democracy often reproduces gender inequality and contains certain authoritarian tendencies in its own right, including the use of violence to intimidate political opponents (Thede and de la Fuente 2008; 2007). Whatever challenges they may face, however, it is these new visions of democracy that are colliding with the traditional vision of polyarchy in a new historic juncture.

I therefore end this discussion with the proposition that democracy can best be conceived of as a hegemonic project (or counter-hegemonic), the political content of which is socially and historically constructed. Although it is possible to distinguish between formal and substantive variants of democracy based on the extent to which democratic practices transcend the political sphere, any schematic notion of democratic development should be discarded. For if the tendency in western states was once the deepening of democracy through the welfare state, the emergence of neoliberal polyarchy – which must be considered a specific variant of polyarchy in its own right – has at least partially reversed this process. And if many Latin American countries have developed vibrant participatory practices at the local level, democratic political institutions at the national level are at times dysfunctional. The struggle for democracy is historically contingent, with different historical protagonists advancing democratic struggles in different spaces according to specific hegemonic projects. Table 4 summarizes the main social forces and projects in the postwar era as a guide for the discussion in the case

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20 See Lopez (2007) for a leftist critique of Venezuela's socialist project.
chapters. These projects are presented as ideal-types based on their main political and economic characteristics. With this as a background, I now turn to a discussion of how during the third wave of democratization that spread across Latin America – neoliberal polyarchy temporarily emerged as the hegemonic definition.

Table 4: Democratic projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visions</th>
<th>Social forces</th>
<th>Political and economic project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Polyarchy – bourgeoisie; middle class;</td>
<td>representative institutions; liberal freedoms;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal</td>
<td>elite political parties + transnational capital; IFIs; symbolic</td>
<td>(different degrees of market regulation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>core states</td>
<td>inclusiveness (post-Washington consensus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantive</td>
<td>Social – working class; trade unions; left parties</td>
<td>polyarchy; redistributive state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>{</td>
<td>+ direct democracy* (in theory); state ownership of means of production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participatory – + new social movements</td>
<td>+ direct democracy (especially local); redistributive state**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>+ indigenous movements and parties; popular forces</td>
<td>+ decolonization; anti-neoliberal; popular sovereignty; socialistic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Direct democracy defined as direct assemblies, citizen participation, recall and referendum
**Neoliberal variant also exists

Coercion and consent in the regional system: A neo-Gramscian view

The conceptualization of democracy as a hegemonic project calls our attention to the fact that democratization itself must be understood as a social process in which power relations are redefined. To overlook this central dimension of democratization is to ignore the socially-rooted power relations that sustain authoritarian systems in the first place. Democratization involves dialectical struggles between actors advancing contending visions of society that deepen or restrict the possibilities of change. In the context of the third wave democratic transitions in Latin America and elsewhere, the process has been conditioned, on the one hand, by popular movements making demands from below, and on the other, by governance strategies that have sought to reduce the content of democracy to polyarchy from above. While the democratization literature
deals with the first aspect, the neo-Gramscian literature deals with the second. By combining the two approaches, we may arrive at a theoretical understanding of democratization that emphasizes both structure and agency to contextualize the role of U.S. and Canadian democracy assistance programs.

Before I review what each literature has to say about democratization, however, I begin with an overview of the neo-Gramscian approach and its importance in situating the roots of authoritarianism and democratization within structural shifts in world order. The historical evolution of authoritarianism and democracy in the Americas provides an entry point through which we may consider larger shifts in the nature of U.S. and Canadian imperialism. This provides a theoretical background to situate neoliberal polyarchy as the preferred model of governance and accumulation in the regional system as a sub-unit of the contemporary world order.

Neo-Gramscians follow Robert Cox in applying the notion of hegemony and its associated concepts to understanding the dynamics of international power. Like world-systems theory (WST) and dependency theory, neo-Gramscians emphasize how capitalism operates across state boundaries as a systemic whole. Within this system, extraction of surplus flows from subordinate and weaker levels of production to the dominant and stronger. The accumulation structures of different states are interlocked by dominant classes which form historic blocs that operate across state boundaries. State forms vary according to their position in the world order and the configurations of social forces that underpin them. In Cox's formulation, the state is not a mere instrument of class rule, but is circumscribed by the knowledge on the part of state agents of what the
class structure and world order make possible and what they preclude. A state also possesses a relative autonomy in the form of a *raison d'état*, which defines its efforts to maintain itself and pursue its goals in the interstate context.

The social structure of accumulation, forms of state, and structures of world order each constitute historic structures which interact dialectically and contain material, ideational and institutional dimensions. Although neo-Gramscians have not presented a systematic framework for understanding democratization, the process might be conceived of as one in which dialectical struggles that reconfigure the balance of power occur across all three historic structures. The nature of democratization in each structure is described in Table 5.

**Table 5: Democratization as structural transformation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historic structures</th>
<th>Social structure of accumulation and domination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratization (dialectical struggle)</td>
<td>Democratization of social relations of exploitation and domination caused by shift in the balance of power in civil and political society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forms of state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratization of political institutions and state ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Position in world order/ regional order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diminished external pressures and constraints on decision-making</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dialectical interaction between historic structures sustained authoritarian systems throughout the history of the most of the republics of Latin America and the Caribbean (with some important exceptions, such as Costa Rica since 1948 and Chile before the coup of 1973). As early as the latter half of the 19th century, the United States defended local landlords and oligarchic states against popular insurrection, undertaking...

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21 Whereas those theories locate the nexus of exploitation between core and peripheral countries in unequal exchange relations, however, Cox (1987) defines the world system in terms of hierarchical relations between different social structures of accumulation.
more than thirty military interventions between 1904 and 1934.\textsuperscript{22} U.S. interventions – some of which also led to occupations – substituted the need for class compromise by strengthening the hand of the state and its coercive institutions aligned with the interests of U.S. multinationals. U.S. interventionism in this phase of world order reflected inter-imperialist rivalry between world powers and the use of direct political controls to extract surplus from weaker states (Cox 1996).\textsuperscript{23}

With the emergence of a \textit{Pax Americana} world order in the post-war era, the policy of direct intervention was replaced by CIA covert operations and the training of Latin American security forces in counter-insurgency tactics.\textsuperscript{24} In the context of the ideological polarization of the Cold War, such operations helped consolidate authoritarian reversals that undid democratic gains achieved through earlier struggles led by the working class that threatened to spillover in more radical directions (Neuhouser 1998; 1992) (Harding and Petras 1988). What emerged from this process was what Rodriguez and Menjívar (2005) refer to as a U.S.-Latin American interstate regime founded upon calculated and systematized political violence to maintain social inequalities.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{22} Chapter three will look at this process in more depth in the case studies, as well as the social formations that developed in the post-colonial period.

\textsuperscript{23} It should be noted that Cox avoids trying to define an “unchanging essence of imperialism” in contrast to many Marxist accounts. He argues that the structural characteristics of dominance and exploitation between different states correspond to successive hegemonic and non-hegemonic world orders (Cox 1996: 143).

\textsuperscript{24} See Blum (2004) for a detailed overview of CIA covert operations in the Third World, as well as a detailed analysis of the infamous School of the Americas. See also Chomsky and Herman’s (1979) classic on the topic.

\textsuperscript{25} For instance, U.S. support to Operation Condor, an alliance between the military governments of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil in the 1970s which “carried out combined, illegal, extraterritorial operations using disappearance, torture, and extrajudicial execution to eliminate political enemies (McSherry 2005).” Even the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was often used to carry out covert political operations, with the most notorious example being the case of AID’s Office of Public Safety (OPS) in Uruguay, which channeled funding to death squads and local police targeting a growing leftist mass movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Blum 2004).
In contrast to much of Latin America, Canada's advanced industrial economy and integration into a continental labour market precluded U.S. domination through more aggressive forms. As an advanced capitalist democracy in its own right, its subordination to U.S. imperialism was sustained through cultural hegemony in civil society and class struggles channelled through liberal democratic institutions (1989). At the same time, Canadian trade policy tended to avoid a more formalized form of economic integration with the United States so as to maintain a certain degree of independence (Macdonald and Schwartz 2002). Within the Americas, Canada also avoided U.S.-dominated Pan-American institutions such as the OAS (Klepak 2006) and tended to respect the U.S. sphere of influence.

The Canadian state also maintained a certain degree of foreign policy autonomy, breaking ranks with its ally on key foreign policy issues in the region such as the handling of relations with socialist governments like Cuba and Nicaragua under the Sandinistas (Matthews and Pratt 1988). Although it enjoyed a privileged position in the world capitalist system, the formulation of foreign policy was arguably open to a broader stream of currents, including a more radical approach to international development assistance rooted in what Pratt (2003) refers to 'humane internationalism,' which included the conviction that an orderly and more equitable world was in the interests of the rich.

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26 See Williams (1989) for a summary of the debate on the nature of Canada's subordination to U.S. imperialism. The view adopted here is the 'region within the centre' approach proposed by Williams and Panitch.

27 As Morrison (1998) argues, this approach reflected, among other things, the absence of economic interests in developing countries that might conflict with broad humanitarian goals supported by the Canadian public. See also Noel and Thérien's (1995) study of development assistance by 16 OECD countries, which demonstrates the importance of welfare state regimes on foreign aid policies. Canada's index score for ODA as a percentage of GNP from 1971 to 1989 correlated with the position of its welfare state as a 'medium socialist' regime.
industrialized countries. Canada’s development as an imperial power in the Americas in its own right only began with the shift to neoliberal world order.

As Macdonald (1995) argues, however, the humane internationalist strand may have reflected a more enlightened approach to development than the current neoliberal model, but was still rooted in paternalistic and universalizing beliefs associated with field of development as a whole. These beliefs were shaped by the imperial ideologies of the past associated with both the English experience of empire and Canada’s own encounter with the colonial ‘other’ through its missionary tradition (as we shall see, such attitudes have also shaped the field of democracy promotion).

The shifts in world order that opened up the possibility for a partial democratization of the regional interstate system began in the mid 1970s. The destabilizing factor was the debt crisis, which overlapped and interacted with larger structural trends in the world economy (including declining profitability, stagflation and the demise of the Bretton Woods system). For Cox and the neo-Gramscians, these structural transformations led to a new model of accumulation based on neoliberal globalization. Neoliberal imperialism, in turn, has operated indirectly through the imposition of economic policies that benefit transnational fractions of capital as a whole (Cox 1996). Globalization has also been characterized by projects to lock-in neoliberal policies at the regional level under the auspices of powerful states representing the interests of transnational capital (Strange 2009).

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28 Defined in Coxian terms as a process in which dominant fractions of capital in core states merged capital holdings through transnational corporations linking production chains across national boundaries. In the new division of labour, low-value manual labour became concentrated in peripheral countries and high-value activities remain concentrated in the core. In both core and periphery, the state was internationalized to adjust to the rhythms of the global economy, thereby transforming the state civil society-relations that previously underpinned particular state forms.
The debt crisis also contributed to the exhaustion of authoritarian regimes throughout the Third World, including in Latin America. As collective actors re-emerged to demand democratic change, liberal elites began supporting polyarchy as an alternative form of governance to both authoritarianism and deeper notions of democracy. Such elites received support from core capitalist states and transnational institutions which began promoting low-intensity democracy as the political flipside to the emerging global economy. I now turn to a brief look at the democratization literature to highlight the importance of collective actors in mobilizing against authoritarianism before looking at the ways in which transnational actors, including the United States and Canada, have supported the construction of a regional system in the Americas based on neoliberal polyarchy.

**Democratization from below**

If the democratization literature is in fact heterodox, it is all too often reduced to the theoretical contributions of U.S. academics whose works focuses on the role of political culture and elites in bringing about transitions to democracy defined exclusively in the formalistic sense. Although this project emphasizes the contributions of more critically-minded scholars who focus on social struggles in advancing different democratic projects, I briefly review the mainstream approaches since their assumptions, as we shall see, are often reflected in the worldviews of the democracy promoters.

In North America, the literature on democratization resonates with the modernization approach that developed in the 1950s and 1960s, though it rejects its pessimistic assumptions on the prospects for democracy in the developing world. It is worth noting that many of the theoretical assumptions on the prospects for democracy in
Latin America were formulated by problem-solving theorists aligned with U.S. foreign policy who once justified its tolerance and support for authoritarianism. Such antecedents include Samuel Huntington’s well known argument on the importance of bureaucratic authoritarian states in maintaining political stability in ‘changing societies’ and Howard Wiarda’s (1974) argument that authoritarian traditions in Latin-Iberian culture should be tolerated as a lesser evil than communism since they respected property rights and social order (Haynes 1988).  

The mainstream U.S. political science literature on democratization that developed in the mid-1980s transposed many of the earlier theoretical assumptions and normative biases of the modernization and liberal-pluralist schools to the post-authoritarian context. Senior conservative academics such as Huntington (1991) and Wiarda (1990) abandoned their early pessimism, reversing the equation between modernization and democracy and re-discovering democratic elements in Latin American culture. Within the mainstream literature, a Dahl-Schumpeterian-influenced elite behaviouralism also became extremely influential. The latter approach was exemplified in O’Donnell and Schmitter’s (1986) work, which attributed democratic transitions to elite pacts in the context of authoritarian regime crises. For the most part, scholars tended to focus on the institutionalization of regular elections and formal democratic political institutions as the measure of overall consolidation (Linz 1990), while some continued to emphasize the importance of widespread liberal political values (Seligson 2000)

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29 See Clement (2003), Berger (1997) and Guilhot (2005) for an analysis of how such scholars served as organic intellectuals for the established order.

30 Schumpeter’s classic work, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* ([252 Schumpeter, Joseph Alois 1950/a; ]), envisioned no larger role for the citizenry in a democracy other than the periodic selection of its political leaders. In distancing himself from Schumpeter’s aristocratic assumptions on the political irrationality of the masses, Dahl (1971) rendered the Schumpeterian view more attractive, wedding it to a Tocquevillian pluralist conception of democratic equilibrium through interest group competition.
Others were more concerned by the restriction of citizenship rights to the political realm and began taking a more critical approach to the transitions. Even those who recognized the incompleteness of democratic transitions within the comparative politics literature, however, often failed to theorize the ways in which external forces have restricted its scope.

Outside of the comparative politics literature, many scholars, particularly in the field of historical sociology, reinstated collective actors and social struggles in civil society at the centre of the analysis of democratization. Rueschemey et al. (1992), for instance, highlight the importance of the working class in pushing for democratization in the Americas, as does the work of Neuhouser (1998) and Collier and Mahoney (1997). These authors argue that economic crisis, including skyrocketing debt, acted as a catalyst for popular mobilization. Latin American scholars were also critical of the 'paradigma de la transición' (Raventós 2008). Hershberg and Jelin (1996) note, for instance, that while the pernicious effects of the military dictatorships amply justified an initial concern with securing the basic institutions of democracy, "it is nonetheless striking that the classic studies of democratization in Latin America have made no mention of authoritarian relations based on differences of gender, ethnicity, or race in a region characterized by vast inequalities along these and many other dimensions" (Jelin and

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32 From a feminist perspective, Waylen (1994) added gender to the category of collective actors as women's movements played an important role in de-legitimizing authoritarian regimes in Latin America. Many popular movements were also linked to like-minded human rights groups in Europe and North America (Kaldor 2003). Their actions were inscribed in 'transnational ethical alliances' (Keck and Sikkink 1998) with social forces at the level of global civil society.
In a more recent volume, *Innovación Democrática en el Sur* (Raventós 2008), scholars from the developing world examine the role of social movements in bringing about democratization, the contest between different democratic projects linked to competing social forces, and the ongoing struggle for rights and citizenship.

Social scientists influenced by cultural studies have focused on the activities of social movements as instances of 'cultural politics' encompassing struggles to democratize different spheres and dimensions of life, including the eradication of social inequalities (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998). In one of the most ambitious studies on democratization, the three-volume *Sociedad Civil, Esfera Pública y Democratización en América Latina* edited by the Peruvian sociologist, Aldo Panfichi, Latin American scholars further developed the analysis of the struggle over the meaning of democracy in different spheres of society. The authors emphasize the conflict between neoliberal visions of democracy associated with external actors and internal elites and those being advanced by various workers, peasants, and social movements. Such contributions offer a dialectical understanding of democracy that provide an in-depth theorization of the internal dynamics of democratization. They may be integrated within a neo-Gramscian reading of the external dimensions of democratization to highlight the continuity in the struggles from above and below which have shaped the process since the beginning of the third wave.

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33 The authors also note, however, that those radical scholars and activists who emphasized social rights in the 1970s and were generally contemptuous of bourgeois democracy were forced to revalorize formal democracy as a result of the grave human rights abuses committed by the dictatorships.
Global (and regional) governance from above

Before we turn to how the United States and Canada have supported neoliberal polyarchy in world (and regional) order, a brief theoretical digression on competing neo-Gramscian views on the current world order is required. According to Robinson’s account (2004), globalization has spawned, or is in the process of spawning, a transnational capitalist class (TCC) that has come to dominate the U.S. state and foreign policy in the interest of this class as a whole. The U.S. state itself is but one node in an emerging transnational state (TNS) which includes other core states and transnational organizations. For Cox, on the other hand, the nation state has not been entirely superseded; he uses the term nébuleuse to describe the “unofficial and official transnational and international networks of state and corporate representatives and intellectuals who work towards the formulation of a policy consensus for global capitalism” (2002). Together, they constitute a transnational historic bloc in the new world order. For reasons which will be justified shortly, the theoretical framework used for this project draws upon the Coxian model, though Robinson provides the most comprehensive account of how global and regional institutions began promoting neoliberal polyarchy as a new model of governance.

For Robinson (1996), democratization occurred as transnational forces aligned with political elites began denouncing the excesses of the military regimes and favoured polyarchy as an alternative to more radical democratic projects proposed by popular civil society. Structurally, these elites were linked to nascent transnational fractions of the bourgeoisie which favoured new forms of consensus-based control and opposed the old crony capitalist structures that limited opportunities for capital accumulation. As political elites began contesting elections for the first time in years, victorious populist leaders began presiding over neoliberal stabilization packages in direct violation of their
campaign promises. What emerged through this contradictory process was neoliberal polyarchy (Robinson 1996) or low-intensity democracy (Wilson, Gills and Rocamora 1993) as a new hegemonic form of governance that has contained structural transformation through a strategy of ‘passive revolution’ (Abrahamsen 2001). The United States and other transnational agencies have played a leadership role in promoting this model in Latin America as a regional dimension of world order.

Latin America’s new leaders were reinforced by a never ending cycle of borrowing from the international financial institutions, conditional upon adjustment programs which deepened the neoliberal process and further integrated the national economy into global capitalism. Deregulation of the financial sector and the removal of capital controls, liberalized trade agreements and investment regimes, among other policies, led to the subordination of the national economy to transnational capital, particularly its speculative financial component. Taken as a whole, these policies contributed to a ‘new constitutionalism’ in which the disciplinary power of neoliberalism was enforced through the competitive pressures of the global economy and the destabilizing threat of mass capital flight, thereby locking-in reforms over the long-term and preventing the re-regulation of capital (Gill 2002; 1995).

In addition to the international financial institutions, the economic and political aspects of the neoliberal project were institutionalized in the regional system by the main

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34 To be sure, neoliberalism in Latin America – which served as the laboratory for neoliberal reform in the 1970s – was in many instances imposed by military dictatorships prior to democratic transition. See Klein (2007) on how neoliberalism was imposed under the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile and Dupuy (1997) on the connection between neoliberal reconfiguration and the Duvalier dictatorship in Haiti.


inter-state political organization, the Organization of American States (OAS). Just as the IFIs began advancing a notion of ‘good governance’ in the 1980s, the OAS began championing liberal democratic norms as a condition for participation in the inter-American system. And – just as the IFIs linked democratic governance to the free market – the OAS also advocated economic liberalization and promoted free trade and liberalized investment in the new regional system.\(^{38}\) This is not to say that the OAS has not led significant initiatives for defending democracy, including an amendment to the organization’s charter which provides for the suspension of any member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force.\(^{39}\) The OAS’ defence of representative democracy is a significant rupture with its previous toleration of authoritarian regimes during the days of the Cold War. Despite important democratic features of hemispheric governance institutionalized by the OAS, however, the organization has been a strong supporter of neoliberal trade and investment policies such as the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (Shamsie 2004).

**U.S. democracy promotion as transnational hegemony**

A crucial factor that contributed to the consolidation of neoliberal polyarchy over more substantive visions of democracy during the democratic transitions in Latin America was the implementation of democracy assistance programs by the United States.\(^ {40}\) For

\(^ {37}\) In theoretical terms, the notion of disciplinary neoliberalism provides a bridge between Marxian understandings of international hegemony and Foucauldian conceptions of governmentality (Fraser 2003).

\(^ {38}\) See Abrahamsen (2001) for a critique of how the IFIs force governments to respond to two ‘irreconcilable constituencies,’ pitting the interests of external donors and creditors against the needs of the poor domestic majority.

\(^ {39}\) Shamsie (2004) also refers to an OAS protocol to respond automatically to illegal interruptions of democracy in any region of the country, a unit to safeguard democratic institutions and procedures, and an Inter-American Democratic Charter as a guide for democratic behaviour.

\(^ {40}\) Much of the academic discussion on democracy promotion fails to consider the issue of U.S. imperialism, focusing instead on whether the spread of democracy will facilitate international peace (Parish and Peceny 2002) (Doyle 2000), or on more mundane concerns, such as the efficacy of specific democracy promotion
Robinson, who offers the most complete critical account of democracy promotion, the partial switch away from supporting authoritarian regimes (they are still tolerated when they maintain stability) can be traced to policy discussions in the late 1970s and early 1980s when U.S. elites earnestly began debating the most appropriate political model for achieving social control and stability in Third World countries.\textsuperscript{41} Organic intellectuals and state managers associated with both the U.S. state and the emerging transnational elite reflected upon the structural changes to reorient policy, advocating the use of an underdeveloped and underutilized instrument in U.S. foreign policy typically associated with covert CIA operations – political aid – to guide the democratic transitions in a direction that would ensure the stability in the interests of the world capitalist market.\textsuperscript{42}

As the U.S. state became the chief mediator for the transnational bloc, it developed a new infrastructure of political aid that served the interests of transnational capital as a whole. The democracy assistance agencies (DAAs) designed to advance the foreign policy interests of the United States are located both within and outside the state. While USAID’s Office of Democratic Initiatives (ODI) led the way from within, NED and its sister organizations were established as quasi non-governmental organizations (QUANGOs) in 1983 by an act of Congress (these agencies will be looked at in more}

\textsuperscript{41} Although Robinson’s theses on democracy promotion were outlined in Promoting Polyarchy (1996) prior to the full development of his theory of global capitalism, I treat the two as a coherent whole since his earlier work has been integrated into his later arguments. Promoting Polyarchy in Latin America (2006) bridges the two. His early work provides a rich analysis of the key policy documents and decision makers who articulated this emerging strategy which is unfortunately beyond the scope of this review to present.\textsuperscript{42} See Guilhot’s (2005) genealogical analysis of how the new field of democracy united necons, former leftists, and idealists in a common hegemonic project in support of the ‘American Proposition.’
Robinson's empirical research on democracy promotion examines how each of these agencies typically channels assistance to local elite organizations in civil and political society with the aim of undermining radical visions of democracy favoured by popular sectors. As a whole, they "coalesce into a complex and multilevel U.S. intervention network" (2006: 106) providing support to elite coalitions that wage a war of position against the popular movement or government in question. Robinson explores how this model was used by the United States throughout the 1980s to steer democratic transitions in Haiti, Chile, and the Philippines away from popular alternatives, as well as in Nicaragua, where it was used to undermine the socialist government of the Sandinistas.

While Robinson has provided the most comprehensive critique of democracy promotion, scholars and journalists have drawn upon his model without situating it within a globalist theory of the international political economy. In recent years, for instance, several critical scholars and investigative journalists have shown how U.S. democracy assistance programs have sought to undermine socialism in Venezuela (Barker 2007; Barry 2007; Cole 2007; Agee 2005; Clement 2005; Murillo and Schrank 2005; Leight 2004; Wilpert 2003; Encarnación 2002), El Salvador (Thompson 2009), Bolivia (Bigwood 2008; Dangl 2008; Rizvi 2008; Golinger and Allard 2009), Haiti (Hallward 2007; Bogdanich and Nordberg 2006) and, most recently, Honduras (Golinger 2009; Calloni 2009). In the African context, Hearn has analyzed the funding of local elites

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43 The NED affiliated organizations are the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), and the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (Solidarity International). Although the NED refers to itself matter-of-factly as a QUANGO (Lowe 2008), I use the term to highlight the fact that the NED and its sister organizations often serve as unofficial vehicles of U.S. foreign policy.

Robinson’s (2008) more recent research has emphasized the fragility of the neoliberal polyarchic system throughout Latin America. For while the political elites who managed to impose the neoliberal project upon the state in the wake of the democratic transitions came to exercise hegemony in political society – forcing even leftist parties to except the strictures of global capitalism – they have been unable to achieve anything near hegemony in civil society. The contradictions of global neoliberalism, including increased poverty, pauperization, and social precariousness, have fueled the explosion of anti-neoliberal popular movements which have shifted the locus of conflict back from civil society to the state. The inability of dominant classes tied to the global economy to exercise hegemony in civil society means that the task of constructing a legitimate neoliberal order remains a constant problematic of world (and regional) order. Within this context, democracy promotion retains its importance as a transnational modality of power intended to support local social forces aligned with transnational capital. Before I provide a critique of the limitations of the Robinsonian approach for understanding U.S. and Canadian democracy promotion in the Americas, however, it is necessary to explore the distinct role that Canada has played in reproducing neoliberal polyarchy in the regional system.

Canada’s contribution to neoliberal regional order

Although Canada entered the field of democracy promotion in the mid 1980s, virtually no critical scholarly analysis exists on how it has gone about promoting democracy. Most analyses are descriptive and few case studies have actually been investigated. To the
extent that a debate on Canadian democracy promotion exists, it has been defined by
discussion on the future direction that it should take (for example, on whether or not
Canada should support political parties). Such contributions rarely address the tensions
between Canada’s own support to neoliberalism and its commitment to democracy
assistance.44

Many analysts have explored how Canada has promoted neoliberalism in the
Americas, however, and some have also examined how it has put forward doctrines that
help legitimize neoliberal order. A comparative analysis of U.S. and Canadian
democracy promotion must therefore begin by looking at some of these contributions,
particularly in terms of the importance of the concept of middlepowermanship as
conceptualized from a neo-Gramscian perspective. This concept allows us to theorize
how Canadian imperialism reflects both material interests and the ideological role that the
Canadian state has adopted in advancing the neoliberal world order. As such, it is
compatible with recent neo-Marxist accounts (Gordon 2009; Gordon and Webber 2008;
Spronk 2009) that situate Canadian imperialism in the Americas within the growing
interests of Canadian transnational corporations – particularly in the mining sector – but
fail to theorize Canada’s imperialistic policies in countries where its material interests are
minimal – such as Haiti and Afghanistan.

As Rochlin (1994) argues, Canada’s growing involvement in the inter-American
system must be situated within the shifting hegemonic structures and international
distributions of power which have conditioned Ottawa’s hemispheric policy. Since the
early 1990s, Ottawa’s policy in the Americas has been guided by a neoliberal

44 Those scholars who have contributed to this discussion are generally supportive of an expanded role for
Canada, emphasizing the importance of values in shaping Canadian foreign policy (Welsh 2007) (Kopstein
development model aggressively promoted by business groups such as the BCNI (now the Canadian Council of Chief Executives) (Carroll 2003) (Ayres 2004). The continental trade deals served as the initial vehicles for neoliberal transformation in that they provided the context for a mobilization of a national interest around the ideology of international competitiveness. At the same time, Canada has looked beyond its partnership with the United States to increase its political and economic activity in the Americas in general. In 1990, it finally entered the OAS and became one of the major proponents of a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) throughout the latter half of the decade. More recently, the free trade agenda has been an essential component of the Americas Strategy under the government of Stephen Harper (discussed in detail in the following chapter). Canadian development assistance has also shifted away from Africa to the Americas. Canadian support to hemispheric integration must therefore be understood as one dimension of the general accumulation strategy of Canada’s dominant social bloc – itself transnational in orientation and constitutive of the larger neoliberal historic bloc on the global scale.

Although Canadian trade relations with Latin America remain modest, its material interests are linked to growing direct investment. Currently valued at $87.2 billion (DFAIT 2008a), Canadian investment in the region increased six-fold throughout the 1990s (ECLAC 2003). Canadian direct investment is concentrated primarily in mining in the Andes and in the financial sector of Caribbean tax havens (Ruckert and Macdonald 2008). Extractive industries constitute the most important Canadian investment and

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45 The milestones of integration include the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) in 1989, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, and more, recently, the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) in 2005.
Canadian mining companies have been particularly influential proponents of trade and investment liberalization. Drawing upon Harvey’s notion of accumulation by dispossession, Gordon (2009), Webber (2008) and Spronk (2007) provide a new framework for understanding Canadian imperialism in the Americas that highlights the ways in which Canadian mining companies and the Canadian state have promoted neoliberal policies in the Americas that have dispossessed indigenous peoples of their land. Canada has also followed the U.S. lead in pursuing bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) in the Americas as the prospects of an FTAA and hemispheric integration diminish. As Grinspun and Kreklewich (cited in Shamsie 2007) argue, such agreements help to lock in or cement neoliberal reforms in the absence of continental trade and investment rules.46

In this context, the Canadian state has developed modalities of power which allow it to contribute modestly to a neoliberal world order. Indeed, Cox (1996) has argued that Canadian ‘middlepowermanship’ must be understood precisely in relation to its contribution to the hegemonic order of Pax Americana. According to Neufeld (1999),47 Canada as middle power has supported hegemonic global order by: 1) facilitating and mediating and defusing potential destabilizing conflicts; and 2) by sacrificing short-term national interests for the greater good, thereby reinforcing the notion that the global order is not narrowly American but based on the common good. In some cases, Canadian

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46 Canada has ratified FTAs with Chile (1997), Costa Rica (2002), and Peru (2008), concluded FTA negotiations with Colombia, and is in the process of negotiating deals with the Dominican Republic, Panama, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and Central America.

47 The concept of Canada as a middle power emerged in the postwar era as a regulative ideal directing the Canadian state to play an important role in multilateral fora as facilitator and mediator to defuse potential conflicts. Neufeld (1995) follows Cox in using the term middlepowermanship in a neo-Gramscian sense to describe how the concept of middle power was framed in terms of dominant class interests in Canada to reinforce the notion that the global order was not a narrowly American order, but one which truly
middlepowermanship includes the use of force to maintain or restore stability through peacekeeping operations (Afghanistan and Haiti are notable examples). Short-term sacrifices on behalf of *Pax Americana* are apparent insofar as Canada has incurred significant domestic criticism of its efforts to restore stability in two countries where Canadian economic interests are actually minimal. At the same time, Canada’s contribution to reinforcing the hegemonic ideology of neoliberal world order on the international stage is closely intertwined with domestic efforts of the state aimed at advancing a conception of Canadian identity that underscores the “essentially just and humane nature of Canada’s foreign policy, understood in turn as the ‘natural expression’ of the essentially just and humane political-economic order at home (Neufeld 2004:120).”

But Canada’s contribution to neoliberal world order – or its specific value-added – is the harnessing of its historic reputation as a middle and non-colonial power to confer legitimacy upon the norms and rules of the world system (of course, as Canada continues to play a more interventionist role in defending neoliberal world order, it will increasingly sacrifice this reputation). In 2000-2001, for instance, Canada took the lead in articulating a ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine within the UN-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001). The doctrine, which states that "the power of the sovereign state can be legitimately revoked if the international community decides

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48 DFAIT often uses consultative mechanisms to help cement popular support. Critics such as Macdonald and Schwartz (2002) have exposed the political manipulation behind such mechanisms. A personal anecdote further illustrates their intent. As a representative of an NGO with a project in Afghanistan, I attended a workshop organized by CIDA and DFAIT in which NGOs were exposed to the ‘myths’ behind negative public perceptions of the war and were encouraged to develop public engagement strategies to counter these perceptions. Some of the myths included the notion that Afghanistan represented a U.S.-led
that the state is not protecting its citizens," provides a powerful ethical justification for so-called humanitarian imperialism (Ignatieff 2003). It is also closely associated with the concept of human security, which was elevated to a key priority in Canadian foreign policy by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, under the Chrétien government. Although the concept has justified progressive initiatives such as the campaign to ban landmines, it has been increasingly used to justify a moral obligation on the part of the Canadian state and the international community to intervene in 'failed states' in which the inability of governments to impose order leads to alleged global and national security threats. According to Thede (2008), foreign policy documents that invoke such concepts, including Canada's important *International Policy Statement* (2005), have defined a 'hard security' approach which justifies interventions in 'dangerous borderlands' where threats may in fact be minimal. Such doctrines provide a context in which external hegemonic actors can justify intervening in the domestic affairs of peripheral countries by claiming to be responding to human rights abuses and regional security threats.

At the regional level, Canada has contributed significantly to the development of an inter-American governance framework that combines neoliberal economic policies with low-intensity democracy. Often, this has been accomplished through the championing of democratic norms and practices through the OAS, such as the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which established a framework for the expulsion of

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49 See Charbonneau and Cox (2008) for an analysis of how Canada has drawn upon the peacekeeper myth to reproduce global capitalist world order. See Fenton (2008) for a critique of the history and evolution of the responsibility to protect doctrine.

50 See Morton and Bilgan (Bilgin and Morton 2004) for an historical materialist critique of the concept of failed state.
members who have undergone an alteration of – or interruption in – the democratic order. While the Charter provides an important statement in support of representative democracy, Canada and the United States promoted it at the same time as they were advancing the FTAA – an agreement which would have locked-in unpopular liberalization policies and further insulated the realm of economic decision-making from popular democratic pressures. Within the hemisphere, moreover, Thede argues that Ottawa has consistently defined human rights narrowly, emphasizing civil and political rights and adopting “a stance that is generally hostile to attempts to enhance the recognition and implementation of economic and social rights” (2005: 2). The Canadian government has refused to ratify the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), for instance, which provides guarantees of social and economic rights.

**Canadian democratic interventionism?**

Given Canada’s strategic use of its status as a middlepower to promote neoliberal polyarchy, does the Robinsonian model of democratic interventionism provide an adequate framework for comparatively investigating its programs? While few critical scholars have assessed the applicability of the interventionist model to Canadian democracy promotion, investigative journalists have contributed to the development of a more critical approach by looking specifically at how democracy promotion has empowered elite civil society in Haiti (Engler 2008; 2006a; Engler and Fenton 2005; Fenton 2005). Although they provide an invaluable starting point for critically assessing

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51 See Major (2007) for an overview of Canada’s involvement in promoting regional democracy instruments.

52 See also Shamsie (2007) on how CIDA played an instrumental role in catalyzing and shaping the revision of Colombia’s mining code in 2001, which retracted indigenous rights and paved the way for the privatization. The signing of the FTA with Colombia despite serious concerns over human rights violations
Canada's contribution to reinforcing low-intensity democracy, they focus on a problematic case and overlook multiple ideological tendencies in Canadian democracy promotion practices.

In short, Canada and the United States may increasingly be harmonizing their approaches to democracy promotion, but they still have distinct features which cannot be overlooked. The evolution of Canada’s approach to democracy promotion may be understood from the perspective of the tensions between the 'humane internationalist' strand of Canadian development and the increased subordination of development programming to neoliberal foreign policy objectives. As Pratt (1990) argues, the humane internationalist strand has historically been linked to Canada’s history as a non-imperial power, fairly progressive NGOs, a socially-active Church, and social democratic values. At one point, this conception helped inform a more progressive notion of Canada’s role as a middle power, although, he concedes, it has steadily been eroded (2001). While Pratt may overlook the assumptions of cultural superiority that have historically underpinned Canada’s approach to development (Macdonald 1995), the concept does help illuminate the different historical and institutional circumstances in which the Canadian democracy promotion field of practice developed as a subfield of international development.

The following chapter will provide a more detailed historical overview of the democracy promotion traditions of each country; for now, suffice it to say that Canada’s main vehicle for delivering democracy assistance, the quasi-NGO Rights and Democracy, has historically advanced a rights-based approach to democratic development which was established specifically in opposition to the forms of democracy promotion that were
being developed in the United States in the 1980s (Schmitz 2004). This occurred at a time when many politicians and policymakers remained committed to an alternative development perspective that was just beginning to be subjected to the economic and geopolitical pressures associated with the transformation of the international economy.

As we shall see, the partial instrumentalization of Rights and Democracy as well as other Canadian NGOs by Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT)\(^3\) and CIDA (whose own autonomy in formulating development policy has steadily eroded) is a recent phenomenon that is apparent in the case of Haiti but less so in both Peru and Bolivia.\(^4\) CIDA has also traditionally focused its democracy assistance on institution building rather than empowering civil society groups or political parties, like the U.S. DAAs. It reinforces polyarchy, but not necessarily at the expense of other visions of democracy.

II. Towards an alternative critical model

Despite the immense importance of Robinson’s theory, therefore, its explanatory power for a comparative investigation of U.S. and Canadian democracy promotion is limited. Even for an assessment of U.S. democracy promotion, the democratic interventionist approach is inadequate. The following briefly highlights these limitations in more depth before proposing an alternative theoretical model that considers multiple forms of democracy promotion within a critical understanding of the global economy that does not dismiss the ongoing importance of national legacies in shaping democracy promotion practices. It remains within the neo-Gramscian historical materialist tradition but from

\(^3\) The acronym originally stood for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

\(^4\) Although it is outside the scope of this analysis, a review of the literature on European democracy promotion reveals similar divergences with the U.S. approach. As Grugel (2004) argues, approaches to regional governance in neoliberal world order are shaped by the symbols that reflect and recreate the identity of states and societies. He highlights the importance of its social democratic traditions in driving a more grassroots-oriented approach to building democracy from the bottom-up within transnational ethical networks (Grugel 1999).
the standpoint of a cultural political economy that theorizes both the hegemonic and
discursive dimensions of democracy promotion. The model was constructed
retroductively based on the field research of this project.

The limitations of the interventionist model are based on two interrelated factors: 1) its exclusive empirical foundation in politically polarized or unstable countries; and 2) the lack of theorization of different historical forms of democracy promotion by a wider range of actors. Both of these factors contribute to a theorization of power relations reduced to a narrow conception of hegemony. To this we might add that it advances a rather simplistic view of polyarchy with little recognition that it may or may not be linked to a neoliberal agenda. On the first point, we need only look at the cases which have been examined by those who have applied the interventionist model. These include countries which have undergone extreme periods of polarization, such as Nicaragua, Haiti, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Honduras. On the second point, Robinson’s tendency to homogenize democracy promotion strategies is grounded in a particular theory of the global economy, which, as we have already seen, posits that globalization has displaced the importance of the nation-state as well as the traditional imperial objectives of the U.S. state in particular. Because his interpretation tends to subsume different policy practices of core states and those of non-state actors under the umbrella of an all-encompassing TNS, he overlooks important distinctions in the ways in which national institutions, identities, and interests shape different approaches to democracy promotion.

Thus, while the actors of the nébuleuse have collectively articulated a model of governance based on free market reforms and low-intensity democracy, the most aggressive forms of democracy promotion continue to be practiced by the United States in line with its historical pattern of imperial intervention and unique set of ideological
justifications stemming from its position in the world system. As Grandin (2007) has argued, democracy assistance programs in Latin America have in large part been shaped by neo-conservative ideologues in the Reagan and George W. Bush administrations, such as Elliot Abrams, Otto Reich, John Negroponte, Robert Kagan, and John Bolton. As we shall see in the following chapter when we examine the history of U.S. democracy promotion more carefully, neo-conservative ideology was particularly important in shaping the nascent democracy promotion industry in the context of the Cold War under the Reagan administration. Such ideological considerations cannot be overlooked since they condition the historical form that U.S. democracy promotion practices have taken compared to those of other core states. While Robinson’s work offers the most systematic analysis of how U.S. democracy promotion operates, he paradoxically downplays its continuity with traditional forms of U.S. imperialism.

A critical theory of democracy promotion must therefore ground itself in a reading of neoliberal world order that does not homogenize the imperial practices of core states. In this respect, Cox’s original formulation of the neo-Gramscian approach provides a more useful framework. It more accurately discerns the duality of the raison d’état of the U.S. state, which seeks to organize production both nationally and internationally in accordance with the interests of transnational capital while pursuing American geopolitical goals in the interstate context. This line of thinking also resonates with

55 Under Reagan, Abrams was Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the early 1980s and later Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. He was found guilty for his involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair but later pardoned by President George H.W. Bush. Abrams was later named Deputy National Security Advisor for Global Democracy Strategy in 2005 by President George W. Bush. Otto Reich was Assistant Administrator of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in charge of US economic assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean in the early 1980s. Reich also established and managed the inter-agency Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean between 1983 and 1986, which disseminated propaganda on the Sandinistas. As Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs under George W. Bush, Reich joined with Abrams in
approaches to regionalism in the Americas that look at how the actions of the U.S. state are shaped by both political calculations as well as its commitment to deepening global capitalism at the regional level (Payne 2000). Such dualities are particularly apparent in neo-conservative ideology, whose proponents in the George W. Bush administration such as Vice President Richard Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld are both transnational capitalists and adherents of a strong nationalistic ideology of U.S. global dominance. This theoretical position allows us to understand how democracy promotion as practiced by the U.S. state represents both a continuation of previous forms of imperial intervention as well as the new modalities of regional governance promoted by a wider ensemble of actors.

One of the more original critical works on U.S. democracy promotion to be published in recent years, Nicolas Guilhot’s *The Democracy Makers* (2005), emphasizes the importance of analyzing the historical and social construction of agents and their ideologies. Guilhot largely agrees with the neo-Gramscian approach, but argues that it has not taken the time to analyze these dynamics. As a result, it overlooks how democracy promotion has developed historically as a field of practice associated with neo-conservatives deeply committed to the ‘American proposition.’ The concept of a field of practice is borrowed from Bourdieu, who highlights the ways in which the intentions, meanings, values and understandings of a practitioner connects to a field which permits a particular kind of practice. The ideational is in turn linked to specific forms of capital – social, material and scientific – and inscribed in structural contexts. In providing covert support to the aborted coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in 2002 and in destabilizing the government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti in 2004.

56 This approach also resonates with Panitch and Gindin’s analysis of U.S. imperialism (2003), which argues that while the U.S. state may serve as a ‘general coordinator for international capitalism’ – a
the case of the U.S. democracy promotion field of practice, Guilhot argues that it is
defined by a close network of state agencies and NGOs linked together by ‘double agents’
who move back and forth freely between them.

A focus on agents and structure allows us to make sense of the different
democracy promotion approaches of core states, which continue to reflect diverse
domestic political arrangements and foreign-policy orientations. Core states involved in
democracy promotion have evolved different approaches that reflect their own democratic
cultures and institutional arrangements. National actors involved in promoting
democracy have multiple worldviews and have evolved distinct historic levels of
autonomy from the state. While democracy promotion typically stabilizes societies where
local elites have failed to create hegemonic social orders on their own terms, the extent to
which programs are strategically used to advance a particular ideological agenda depends
upon these legacies, as well as the position of core states in the world and regional order.
If the United States has evolved a democracy promotion infrastructure that strategically
responds to the shifting balance of power in peripheral states, the Canadian state has only
recently (and partially) begun moving in that direction.

Although any analysis of democracy promotion must be based, *a priori*, on an
interpretation of objective factors, it should be noted that this reading provides greater
space for the theorization of resistance at multiple levels of governance. It allows us to
better conceptualize the tensions between core states and the possibilities, in the Canadian
context, of contributing to discussions on the development of a progressive approach to
supporting deeper forms of democratic development. It recognizes that foreign policy

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metaphor they borrow from Perry Anderson – it continues to use its power to advance and protect interests
defined in national terms.
remains a site of struggle in which the dominance of neoliberal social forces may be contested, a factor that risk being downplayed by arguments that overstate the power of the transnational bloc in dictating the foreign policy of core states. In short, such a perspective allows for a more nuanced debate and diverse repertoire of strategic action.

Table 6 provides a configurative framework for assessing the variables that condition the form of democracy promotion adopted by core states. The constellation of variables that interact to determine the extent to which democracy promotion is strategically used are distilled as follows: at the highest level of consideration is the position of the state in regional (or world) order, its imperial traditions, material interests and ideological preferences. These provide the structural context in which a particular democracy promotion fields of practice takes shape. The structure of this field is defined by the way in which democracy promotion is integrated into the overall foreign policy objectives of the state, as well as the nexus that defines the relation between DAAs and the state. This relation contains material, ideational, and institutional dimensions. The historical – institutional legacies of individual DAAs are also important. Chapter three will look at all of these factors in depth for both Canada and the United States. While these variables condition an overall propensity on the part of a core state to intervene, the likelihood of an interventionist approach will of course depend upon the specific relations with the peripheral state and the local political context. Interventionist forms of democracy promotion are premised on a certain configuration of social conditions, particularly the inability of local elites to rule hegemonically on their own terms. The local political context, in turn, recursively shapes overall bilateral relations and the position of the peripheral state in the world system, thereby influencing the extent to which an interventionist strategy is politically feasible (I will argue, for instance, that a
partial switch on the part of the United States toward an interventionist strategy in Bolivia was abandoned when it was called out by the Bolivian government).

**Table 6: Factors influencing the form of democracy promotion (DP)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core state engaged in DP</th>
<th>Core - peripheral bilateral relations</th>
<th>Local political context</th>
<th>Form of DP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Position in regional system</td>
<td>- Material interests</td>
<td>- Form of hegemony</td>
<td>- Material interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial traditions</td>
<td>- Foreign policy objectives</td>
<td>- Balance of forces in civil society</td>
<td>- Material interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material interests</td>
<td>- History of imperial domination</td>
<td>- Position in regional system</td>
<td>- Foreign policy objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological preferences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- History of imperial domination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Field of practice</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP in foreign policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State – civil society nexus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Historical institutional legacies of DAAs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to the state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of autonomy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World view (values)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of the form of democracy promotion, it must be considered from a broader theorization of social relations than the Robinsonian approach has thus far provided. For as I will argue in the following chapters, democracy assistance programs target diverse social sectors in elite civil society (defined below) – not just those representing the interests of transnationalized fractions of capital. Even the most interventionist forms are in fact quite heterogeneous. This is where the possibility of integrating a cultural political economy within a neo-Gramscian approach – a project proposed by Jessop and Sum (2006) – becomes particularly fruitful. By looking at culture and identity, we may gain a better understanding of how democracy promotion operates as a project of governance that reinforces patterns of elite rule rooted in class, ethnicity and the colonial legacy. Looking at democracy promotion from this perspective calls attention to the shifting strategies of stabilization and destabilization that underpin its different forms. For if certain peripheral countries have more stable hegemonic orders, then democracy assistance programs – even when they are ideologically driven as in the
case of the United States – are less likely to focus on building local hegemonic blocs that destabilize popular governments. In such places, Gramscian concepts such as the war of position do little to elucidate how democracy assistance agencies affect power relations. The more subtle notion of common sense is also restricted since constructions of democracy rarely appeal to individuals at this level of rationality.

The integration of discourse analysis, however, can help us understand the ways in which “the discursive constitution of the political imaginary” (Jessop 2006) helps stabilize particular political regimes through the creation of liberal democratic subjects and subjectivities. As Mosse and Lewis (2005) have argued in their examination of aid, policy and global governance, international development puts in place ‘regimes of truth’ that structure the field of action of individuals. This is still connected to hegemony and its ethical-political dimensions, but it takes seriously the notion that the material and ideational are mutually constitutive, calling attention to the importance of knowledge and rationality in constituting relations of power at different social scales. ‘Foucauldizing Gramsci,’ as Sum proposes (2008), allows us to say more about how power operates – its micro capillaries in every day life – without overlooking the different forms of social domination to which it is tied. This also resonates with Bourdieu’s conceptualization of field of practice, which views discourse as an important element in the construction of a particular field without overlooking structural considerations.

The concept of governmentality, which draws our attention to how governing consists of a plurality practices that seek to guide or affect the conduct of populations (Walters and Henrik Haahr 2005), is particularly instructive. The emphasis on the micro-physics of power through the multiple techniques of rule, strategies and practices by which governance is enacted (Gunn 2006) – as well as the concern with policy as an
organizing framework for practices of rule (Walters and Henrik Haahr 2005) — are important for discerning the specific ways in which democracy promotion contributes to neoliberal governance at a more subtle level. Discourse analysis also helps situate democracy assistance programs within notions of cultural superiority that explicitly or implicitly frame activities. As Dhaliwal (1996) argues, democracy promotion is inscribed in discourses of cultural superiority in which western states get to determine what democracy means and use their geopolitical power to impose such definitions against deviant states. From the perspective of governmentality, democracy promotion can be seen as a manifestation of a will to govern exerted by rich over poor countries. Foucauldian critiques of development that focus on how ‘metropolitan’ centers seek to reorder the relationship between things and people in the ‘borderlands’ through aid and development practices in a manner that veils and separates development problems from the rationality of advanced capitalist societies is particularly important (Duffield 2002). As we will see in chapter three, democracy promoters have conceptualized authoritarianism and the lack of democracy as something that is entirely internal and culturally based.

Thus, democracy promotion is not only a form of power in which transnational actors empower local fractions of transnationalized capital, but a project of governance which seeks to stabilize the social order at a more systemic level. At the same time, the will to govern exerted by different actors and states includes different forms of rationality that may contain progressive dimensions – such as democratic institution building – and need not preclude alternative visions of democracy. Promoting polyarchy in general terms is not necessarily a bad thing, though it may of course be used to accomplish anti-
democratic objectives or contradicted by neoliberal policies that do in fact limit the scope of democratization.

A critical typology of democracy promotion strategies and tactics

From this theoretical vantage point, one may distinguish between the following forms or strategies of democracy promotion and their associated tactics: 1) those defined by elite mobilization tactics (EMTs) that mobilize and coordinate elite constituencies; 2) those defined by polyarchy promotion tactics (PPTs) that seek to improve the functioning of the political system by targeting the state and a wide range of local actors; and 3) those defined by a grassroots orientation focused on empowering popular movements and organizations. Table 7 summarizes the main characteristics of each approach from the vantage point of ideal-types and their relation to the concept of hegemony. The column ‘form’ calls attention to the types of hegemonic social formations in which each approach predominates and ‘political characteristics’ refers to the linkages between DAAs and local social forces, as well as the nature of the political ideological project from a Gramscian – Foucauldian perspective.
### Table 7: Democracy promotion strategies and tactics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Political characteristics – impact</th>
<th>Tactics and practices*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite mobilization</td>
<td>Social bloc – elite civil society</td>
<td>Build capacities of opposition parties; facilitate coalition building; boycott popular party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ Minimal elite hegemony or counter-hegemonic bloc in power</td>
<td>Hegemonic bloc/ war of position → DAAs reinforce crisis of authority/ regime change; destabilization</td>
<td>Reinforce elite NGOs and CSOs opposed to the government; reinforce private sector consolidate civic opposition front; legitimize democratic interventionism at home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyarchy promotion</td>
<td>Social bloc – elite civil society</td>
<td>Direct process of state reform and manage PR campaign; promote justice reform and human rights; popularize party platforms; promote system-wide reform of political system; reinforce inclusive institutions; sponsor decentralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ Decadent elite hegemony</td>
<td>Political ideological project</td>
<td>Measure and manage popular perceptions; support mainstream NGOs and transparency coalitions; reinforce private sector; define citizenship through workshops and campaigns; discursively frame democratic discourse in public sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots mobilization</td>
<td>Social bloc – popular forces</td>
<td>Programs do not provide funding to state institutions or political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ Minimal or decadent hegemony of elite</td>
<td>Political ideological project Extend democratization → DAAs contribute to counter-hegemony</td>
<td>Support grassroots organizations and progressive NGOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Grouped together according to programs that address the state and political parties (political society) and those that focus on civil society.

While the first two forms of democracy promotion are associated with material interests and ideologies in the global economy, they are also embedded in a particular episteme, that is, an inter-subjective knowledge that constitutes a ‘background’ that construes a particular reality and defines a field of actions. In the case of Canada, polyarchy promotion is linked more to normative preferences than strategic political considerations since its programs are much less likely to be ideologically driven (this is a crucial point that will be developed in subsequent chapters). For both U.S. and Canadian policymakers and organic intellectuals, democracy promotion may reflect an explicit strategy of governance as well as deeply-held beliefs in the superiority of liberal
democracy over other forms of government. These beliefs are embedded in the very institutions that constitute democracy promotion as a field of practice. While the actors that reproduce this discourse may not consciously link themselves to a particular notion of world order, their knowledge ‘background’ is perfectly harmonious with neoliberal global governance.

Although it is often difficult to distinguish between such approaches in practice, one can categorize them in terms of the extent to which they are directly linked to a state-defined political agenda. This agenda, in turn, is typically activated by state agencies which justify a more politicized form of democracy promotion as a strategy to counter democratic backsliding or political crisis. In this regard, specific programs must be analyzed qualitatively as a whole in order to arrive at a big-picture understanding of the approach that predominates in a given country during a given period of time. Those strategies that deliberately seek to alter the balance of power between local social forces in order to undermine a government or hegemonic movement are labeled interventionist (though a case may be made that all forms of democracy promotion are in some shape or form interventionist). They represent a much more politicized form of democracy promotion which targets political aid to elite social forces in civil and political society with the aim of creating local hegemonic blocs capable of countering popular democratic alternatives in either a situation of authoritarian transition or once a popular movement has already come to power.

The main focus of the interventionist approach is on mobilizing elite coalitions in political and civil society and reinforcing their efforts to engage in a war of position. In many cases, the opposition succeeds at generating a crisis of authority for the state, often by using superior access to communications technology to advance claims of human
rights abuses by the government. Indeed, human rights have become a key battleground on which the war of position between competing social forces is often waged, with both sides seeking to capture or maintain popular legitimacy. The war of position is also carried out on U.S. territory, both by organizations linking together American and local elites and by the QUANGOs themselves.

PPTs are different in that they consist more of an ensemble of programmatic activities that contribute to the promotion of polyarchy through particular thematic interventions across civil society, political society and the state. Coalitions and organizations may be supported, but the focus is on reinforcing a particular rationality of governance and the institutional arrangements to improve the overall functioning of polyarchy. They contain two basic dimensions: 1) the creation of liberal subjects; and 2) the strengthening of traditional democratic institutions and support to new mechanisms of inclusive neoliberalism. In the realm of civil and political society, the capacity-building workshop for local parties or civil society groups represents the paradigmatic practice through which democracy promoters transmit particular discourses on how to engage the state and channel grievances through institutional mechanisms. At the institutional level, PPTs focus on reinforcing a range of institutions from parliament to the justice sector. Often, there is a strong emphasis on supporting decentralization initiatives and human rights-monitoring offices, such as ombudsman.

PPTs may have very beneficial effects, including reinforcing important civil society watchdogs, empowering women’s groups, promoting stronger democratic institutions, reinforcing electoral processes, and sponsoring or supporting important laws, bills, policies, codes and reforms. But they are ultimately inscribed in unequal global power relations in which democracy ‘practitioners’ from rich countries frame a particular
discourse on the barriers to democratic development and the appropriate action to strengthen the democratic system. This discourse invariably calls attention away form the global relations of inequality that underpin local authoritarian tendencies, focusing, instead, on a diagnosis of local political culture as the primary impediment to democratic change. The practitioner, or technical expert, imparts his or her ‘technical expertise’ through capacity-building workshops and other training exercises to inculcate democratic political values, thereby building new, politically-moderate liberal subjects committed to the parameters of representative democracy. The focus on creating liberal democratic subjects is explicitly formulated in USAID evaluation frameworks, which seek to measure political values in order to monitor progress in imparting new-democratic orientations. In this way, PPTs serve to condition the limits of the possible and contain social contradictions that threaten to spill-over into more radical forms of resistance. In so doing, they may stymie the development of actors who might draw upon a larger repertoire of action to further democratize the state and society, much in the way that democracy has historically advanced through a process of conflict and radical action in Western states. PPTs thus create liberal subjects very different from the historical protagonists that advanced democracy through a process of confrontation and struggle in the past.

Like the interventionist forms of democracy promotion, PPTs tend to focus exclusively on reinforcing NGOs within civil society, particularly within elite sectors. Table 8 provides a schematic overview of the main characteristics of elite and popular civil society. Although NGOs may act in solidarity with popular civil society, they tend

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57 USAID bases its country programming upon the findings of the Americas Barometer surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project. This will be explored in each of the cases.
to be based in the capital and possess staff rich in cultural, linguistic, and social capital. Their representatives are typically educated individuals from dominant ethnic and linguistic groups. While many are inspired by a radical philosophy of social change, they tend to be pragmatic and moderate in their demands, with little connection to the social movements engaged in the day-to-day struggles for social existence. Instead, they focus on thematic issues and depend upon the international community for funds to implement specific projects. In a context of polarization, they may side with local elites over popular movements, as we will see in the case of Haiti. Those grassroots NGOs with a more substantial social base that do receive support often become professionalized and incorporated into mainstream civil society networks. Others do not possess the capacity or the institutional structures that would render them eligible for donor funding.

**Table 8: Elite versus popular civil society**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite civil society (characteristics): led by political elites, dominant class and middle class; associated with dominant ethnic groups; linguistically and culturally rooted in life-worlds of former colonizers; centred in capital and other urban centres</th>
<th>Organisations: business and other private sector associations, conservative think tanks, transnational corporations, media, church groups, consultancy firms, philanthropic organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGOs: based in elite civil society but are ideologically diverse; represent subordinate groups rather than organize and mobilize them; typically depend on donor funding; radical NGOs may bridge the gap with popular civil society through solidarity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular civil society (characteristics): rooted in subordinate classes and social groups; institutionally weak Organisations: popular social movements, trade unions, grassroots organisations, organisations de base (including dioceses and church groups motivated by liberation theology)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ideologically, PPTs resonate with a post-Washington consensus concern with broadening participation and social inclusion without challenging the actual distribution of wealth and power (Robinson’s work does not focus on this ideological dimension nor have others yet considered it). Although activities that encourage parties to adopt pro-poor platforms may place poverty on the political agenda, for instance, they reinforce the
impression of social inclusion when in fact many of the traditional elite political parties which receive funding have no interest in advancing a popular agenda. The focus then becomes on managing citizens expectations and changing popular perceptions to demonstrate that the system does in fact work. An increased focus on the state in democracy assistance programs also reflects the failure of previous neoliberal governance strategies which mainly targeted civil society. Decentralization schemes may also provide new spaces for citizen engagement and local political participation supported by radical sectors, but remain inscribed within a neoliberal governance model that downplays the role of the state and transnational power holders in formulating development strategies (Mohan and Stokke 2000). In sum, PPTs may have many positive effects, but they may also contribute to a much more successful strategy of passive revolution than the interventionist model.

Despite the differences in approaches to democracy promotion, those practitioners who have not directly contributed to an interventionist strategy rarely question the legitimacy of affecting political transitions. They operate on the assumption that the foreign policy interests of their home states are benign or, in any case, do not criticize them since they are dependent upon state funds. Nancy Thede, a professor at the Université du Québec à Montréal who worked for many years with the Canadian organization, Rights and Democracy, argues that democracy promotion is inscribed in a particular epistemic community characterized by a lack of theoretical insight or critical thinking. Questions on the political interests behind democracy promotion are rarely – if ever – asked, and most individuals within the field of practice spend their time focusing

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58 In some cases, this objective is even explicitly formulated in the titles of specific projects, such as in the IRI's (2005) *Improving Citizen Perceptions of Political Parties* in Bolivia.
on developing new and innovative approaches that resonate with the latest development fads articulated by their funders. Because they are not inclined to question the basic motives that underscore official support for spreading democracy and because they share the same normative commitments to pluralism as their state funders, they can easily be mobilized by the state to adopt a more interventionist strategy against popular governments accused of violating liberal democratic principles. PPTs can therefore quickly transition into EMTs in the right political conditions.

But to reduce all forms of democracy promotion to a form of hegemony or governmentality associated with neoliberal world order is to grossly over-simplify a complex field of transnational action that contains multiple, and often contradictory, practices. Indeed, NGOs that receive government funding may, in some cases, support grassroots organizations that maintain a popular social base and commitment to transformative action. Grassroots democracy promotion is typically advanced by Canadian and European NGOs, progressive religious groups and trade unions with a strong commitment to human rights and social justice issues. Although many of these organizations deploy PPTs, grassroots democracy promotion should be considered a separate approach since it channels assistance to groups involved in popular struggles. As previously discussed, such groups may be part of transnational ethical networks that have long acted in solidarity with popular movements in the Third World. This approach may be characterized according to the way in which democracy promotion activities are carried out by drawing inspiration from Macdonald’s (1994) research on international and local NGOs in Central America. Macdonald notes that some international NGOs base their activities on the notion of ‘accompaniment,’ which prioritizes respect for control by

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59 Interview with Nancy Thede, Professor, l’Université du Québec à Montréal, June 1, 2009
the local partner and provides both monetary and non-monetary forms of support for the struggles within a larger commitment to the process of social change. Activities may include technical training, brigades, exchanges and human rights advocacy, as well as financial support. Such activities may also contribute to a process of consciousness-raising surrounding the social struggles of partner organizations. Yet, in many cases, organizations that advance a grassroots approach still operate according to assumption of cultural superiority. They are also usually dependent upon state funds, which may encourage them to act opportunistically. Thus, as I will argue in chapter four, Canadian DAAs which typically adopt a grassroots approach actually contributed to a strategy of elite mobilization in Haiti where there interests and reading of the political situation converged with the Canadian state.

Of course, since many democracy promoters invariably frame their activities as contributing to grassroots organizations and popular mobilizations – including even the most conservative actors – it can be difficult to differentiate between a genuine grassroots approach and a more subtle strategy of cooptation. Again, one must analyze specific programs qualitatively as a whole in order to arrive at a global understanding of the approach that predominates in a given country by a given actor during a given period of time.

**Concluding remarks**

This chapter has emphasized the importance of viewing different conceptions of democracy as hegemonic projects, the political content of which are socially and historically constructed according to the lived struggles of social actors. To bridge the theoretical gap between internal narratives of democratization and the influence of external factors, I have sought to integrate critical conceptions of democratization that
highlight the importance of social agents from below within a neo-Gramscian understanding of how transnational structures have sought to impose neoliberal polyarchy from above. This conceptualization allows for a dynamic understanding of democratization as an ongoing dialectical process which continues to unfold.

Accordingly, I have emphasized the importance of a critical conception of democracy promotion in advancing a limited notion of democracy as a form of hegemony in the new global economy. Specifically, a critical understanding emphasizes the importance of a conjunctural understanding of democratization in which the internal de-legitimization of authoritarian regimes coincided with a new hegemonic strategy on the part of the United States and other transnational actors to stabilize neoliberal world order through the promotion of polyarchy. As Robinson and others have demonstrated, the United States has developed an infrastructure of political aid that strategically deploys democracy assistance programs to undermine popular movements in many different countries. Canada has also played a role in reproducing neoliberal order through its economic policies and the projection of middlepowermanship in both the region and larger global arena. This is not to insinuate that polyarchy is not a considerable improvement over authoritarianism, however, nor that it fails to offer greater possibilities for social forces seeking deeper forms of democracy. Across the Americas, many states which have adopted the basic features of polyarchy have increasingly challenged neoliberal hegemony by reviving deeper notions of democracy associated with the participatory tradition. Their actions, in turn, indicate the need for critical researchers to continue examining how democracy promotion has sought to contain new visions of democracy long after democratic transitions have taken place.
But considerable gaps remain in the critical literature that necessitate a reconstructed framework to better address the central research objective of this project, that is, how Canada and the United States go about promoting democracy in the Americas. Thus, while Robinson has provided the most systematic and coherent critical theory of democracy promotion thus far, his research has not paid attention to the variance that characterizes the approaches of different actors involved in democracy promotion as a field of practice. His research has focused almost exclusively on identifying the modalities of democracy promotion associated with the U.S. interventionist model at the expense of a larger analysis of how democracy promotion operates as a transnational political practice. For Canada, this model is highly limited given its distinct historic traditions and institutional arrangements that have only recently undergone a shift in a more interventionist direction. Critical Canadian scholars have unfortunately not looked at this question in any depth, though they do provide a theoretical context in which we might situate Canada’s role in reproducing neoliberal order.

I have therefore proposed a framework that relates specific forms of democracy promotion to both the local political context in which they are deployed as well the factors that condition the level of instrumentalization of democracy promotion agents by the Canadian and U.S. states. National actors involved in promoting democracy have different worldviews and historic levels of autonomy from the state. The extent to which programs are strategically used to advance a particular ideological agenda depends upon these legacies, as well as the position of core states in the world and regional order. A neo-Gramscian framework grounded in a cultural political economy allows for a more nuanced understanding of how different forms of democracy promotion stabilize
neoliberal polyarchy with different levels of strategic intent. The concept of hegemony is complemented with an appreciation of how particular discursive constructions seek to build liberal citizens. Tactics that mobilize elites are quite different from those that seek to consolidate polyarchy; those that empower grassroots actors also must be considered.

The following chapter will draw upon the framework and typology introduced here to comparatively assess the evolving U.S. and Canadian approaches to democracy promotion in the new conjuncture. The level of instrumentalization of specific democracy assistance agencies will be explored in more detail before we look at the historical political context of Haiti, Bolivia, and Peru. I will argue that the current conjuncture is marked by both a regional backlash against U.S. democracy promotion which makes the interventionist strategy less feasible and a more strategic instrumentalization of Canadian democracy promotion that makes one more probable. But as we will see in the case chapters, these tendencies have only affected Canada’s approach in the case of Haiti, where its projection of middlepowermanship has been most pronounced.
Chapter two
Continuity and change in Canadian and U.S. approaches

Thomas Carothers, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the most well known public commentator on U.S democracy promotion, recently stated: “Many established democracies and international organizations are engaged in democracy support around the world. When U.S. politicians speak about democracy promotion, they should take note of this fact and not portray the United States as the lone eagle of global democracy promotion... The more U.S. democracy promotion is seen as part of a broad-based global effort rather than a special American cause, the more effective it will be” (2007b). If such discourses have interpellated U.S. allies like Canada, however, to what extent have Canadian actors situated their efforts within a U.S.-led global effort of democracy promotion? What are the implications of such developments for the analysis of the different forms of democracy promotion that will be observed in Haiti, Peru and Bolivia?

This chapter will provide an overview of the themes and developments that have characterized U.S. and Canadian democracy promotion in the new millennium. I draw upon the framework introduced in the previous chapter to explore in greater detail the evolution of the structure of the democracy promotion fields of practice of both countries. As such, it provides a macro-level overview of trends in democracy promotion which will provide a background to the analysis of the agents of democracy promotion and their programs in the chapters on each of the three cases. I begin with a short historical overview of U.S. democracy assistance agencies and democracy promotion field of practice. I then examine the new conjunctural circumstances in the Americas – in
particular, the shifting balance of regional power – which have contributed to a backlash against U.S. democracy promotion. This has led to a concerted effort on the part of U.S. policymakers to universalize democracy promotion, making the contributions of actors like Canada all the more important. It has also led the United States to act more cautiously in deploying an interventionist approach, though the political objectives of its programs remain explicit.

The second section examines the evolving institutional and discursive elements of the Canadian democracy promotion field of practice. I argue that although it has been historically more autonomous from state foreign policy objectives with a strong-grassroots orientation, Canadian DAAs have increasingly become subordinated to a state project of promoting neoliberal polyarchy. This project has been characterized by a concerted effort to centralize democracy promotion efforts and redefine democracy in narrow terms, portending the development of a more interventionist strategy just as one becomes less feasible for the United States. Yet as I will argue in the following chapters, these developments have thus far only affected the form of democracy promotion in Haiti, where, for the first time, Canada adopted an elite mobilization approach. While there are obvious signs of convergence between the Canadian and U.S. democracy promotion fields of practice, considerable differences remain.

I. The evolution of U.S. democracy promotion

The argument that Canadian and U.S. democracy promotion are two sides of the same coin has been advanced, as noted in the previous chapter, by investigative journalists such as Fenton (2009; 2008; 2006a) who have provided important insight into Canada’s

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60 For the United States, the arguments are based on a reading of primary and secondary material; for Canada, such sources were supplemented by interviews conducted in Ottawa and Montreal.
democracy assistance programs in Haiti. Such claims identify significant tendencies in the evolution of Canadian democracy promotion. They do not, however, provide a sound basis for the interpretation of the empirical information that will be presented in the following chapters. In order to better understand how U.S. and Canadian democracy promotion have evolved – and the extent to which they have converged – it is important to examine the history and evolution of their respective democracy promotion fields of practice in relation to larger conjunctural shifts that have affected their standing in the regional order. Table 9 summarizes the main DAAs for each country, their traditional relation to the state, the general approach to democracy promotion, the major shifts that have affected this approach and the overall impact on the structure of the democracy promotion field of practice.

**Table 9: North American democracy promotion agents and approaches**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>DAAs</th>
<th>Historic characteristics</th>
<th>Shifts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Agents</td>
<td>CIDA, EC, IDRC</td>
<td>Semi autonomous</td>
<td>Middlepowermanship; reorganization by state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUANGO</td>
<td>RD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Partial convergence with U.S. DP field of practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>DP, Alternatives, FF, PC</td>
<td>Polyarchy; grassroots</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Agents</td>
<td>USAID, OTI</td>
<td>High-level of Instrumentalization*</td>
<td>Decline of U.S. dominance in the periphery; backlash against DP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUANGOs</td>
<td>NED, NDI, IRI, CIPE, ACILS, IFES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>OSI, Partners of the Americas</td>
<td>Polyarchy; elite mobilization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractors</td>
<td>Chemonics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Some act more autonomously than others; e.g. NDI

The U.S. democracy promotion field of practice contains a plethora of state agencies, QUANGOs, NGOs, and private contractors. In terms of its structure, it is defined by the use of democracy promotion as a strategic modality of power and the close
integration of DAAs into the state apparatus. Since 2001, the Office of Democracy and Governance (ODG) has coordinated U.S. programming in these areas in collaboration with local USAID missions. USAID’s OTI is also a key player, targeting short term political assistance to countries undergoing political transitions or experiencing political crises. As I will argue in the following chapters, OTI has highly political objectives and is often the decisive mechanism through which democratic interventions are launched. U.S. Ambassadors play a key role in this infrastructure, strategically orienting democracy programs to accomplish foreign policy objectives. In addition, the State Department works through a number of mechanisms to promote democratization, including the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (McIntosh Sundstrom 2005).

The NED, for its part, channels funds in equal portions to its four sister organizations – the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) and the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (Solidarity International for short). All of these organizations, including the NED itself, also receive funds from other international donors and foundations. The NDI also partners closely with the Carter Center, an NGO established by Jimmy and Rosalyn Carter. In addition, U.S. democracy promotion includes NGOs with a more multilateral character, such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), which focuses on providing support to electoral democracy. Private institutes like George Soros’ Open Society

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61 A policy paper prepared by Thomas Melia (2006) for Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice provides an excellent overview of the main actors in the U.S. ‘democracy bureaucracy.’ Needless to say, the document is of interest for its descriptive, rather than critical analytical, value.

62 Between 1994 and 2001, the Office was called the Center for Democracy and Governance.

63 Founded in 1987, IFES boasts many prominent Republicans and Democrats on its board, including Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Senate of the Foreign Relations Committee, as well as prominent international board members such as former President of Colombia, Andrés Pastrana. The chairman of its
Institute have also come to play an increasingly important role amongst U.S. democracy promotion practitioners, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, large-scale development contractors such as the Washington-based Chemonics – a transnational corporation that works primarily for USAID – also play an important role.

Apart from USAID, the most significant of the U.S. DAAs are the QUANGOS. These agencies link together the state and civil society through ‘double agents’ (Guilhot 2005) associated with the foreign policy establishment that operate freely across both. From its inception, the NED was closely integrated into official policy circles in Washington, though its credibility and that of its sister organizations has always been based on their highly questionable ‘non-governmental’ status. Over the years, the Board of Directors has regularly included individuals who have served at the highest levels of the foreign policy establishment, as has been the case with both the IRI and NDI. NED board members have included former U.S. Secretaries of State, Henry Kissinger and Madeleine Albright (who is also the current Chairman of the NDI), former U.S. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, former National Security Council Chair Zbigniew Brzezinski, former NATO Supreme Allied Command in Europe, General Wesley K. Clark, and the former Deputy Secretary of Defense and head of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz (Scipes 2005). The current Chairman of the IRI is John McCain. As Guilhot (2005) argues, moreover, many of the early supporters of the NED, including its president, Carl Gersham, were key figures in the emerging neo-conservative movement.

Despite the explicit links to the U.S. government, foreign policymakers and intellectuals have repeatedly depicted the NED and its sister organizations as independent board of directors is William J. Hybil, a close associate of U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney (Hallward 2007).
and neutral NGOs. Alexandra Silver (2006) at the Council on Foreign Relations, for instance, follows the Executive Director of Freedom House, Thomas O. Melia, in insisting that these organizations are independent from the State Department (the NED must report to Congress) and are motivated by democratic values rather than partisan or ideological objectives. Michael Allen, Visiting Fellow at the NED and the co-editor of the e-bulletin, *Democracy Digest*, emphasizes the ideological diversity and bipartisan nature of the NED and its agencies, arguing that “the notion that such politically diverse rivals conspire to promote a shared strategic goal of securing American hegemony...is risible to anyone even vaguely familiar with the range of views, programs and perspectives they encompass” (2005: 42). As a grant-giving institution, there is no question that the NED has supported civil society organizations and political parties of many ideological stripes. The NDI has also adopted a fairly pluralistic approach to its democracy promotion programs, maintaining formal ties with the Liberal, Socialist, and Centrist Democrat internationals.

Since its inception, however, the NED’s approach to pluralism in some countries has been compromised by its intense ideological biases in others (as I will argue in the following chapters, the IRI is also often fiercely partisan). Although the NED’s opposition to specific governments is always justified in terms of principled concerns with the quality of democracy, countries which are singled out tend to be those which oppose U.S. interests. This reflects how democracy assistance has always been embedded within strategies of democracy promotion carefully linked to foreign policy.

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64 Allen’s (2005) defence of the NED was written in the context of a scathing review of Guilhot’s *The Democracy Makers*. Although he accuses Guilhot of failing to review actual program documents, he himself conveniently overlooks the political intent announced in many such documents and the ideological biases in statements made by various actors. This dissertation provides many examples of such biases,
objectives that have very little to do with supporting democracy. Thus, under the Reagan administration, when the endowment was established, democracy promotion was used to guide transitions from authoritarianism away from socialist alternatives while bypassing stable authoritarian regimes that remained allies of the United States.\textsuperscript{65} The fate of the Sandinista revolution was one of the more tragic consequences of this dualistic policy. With the end of the Cold War, the activities of the NED and other U.S. DAAs in Central America and Eastern Europe began to attract increased criticism within Congress. Traditional conservative think tanks like the Cato Institute were joined by radical publications like The Nation in denouncing the endowment for meddling in the internal affairs of other countries. Although the NED remained but one component of the U.S. democracy promotion infrastructure, it became the "lightening rod," in the words of Thomas Carothers, "for a much broader debate over whether and how the U.S. government should foster democracy abroad" (1994:131).

In 1993, the House of Representatives voted to cut off funding for the endowment, though the following year funding was actually restored, with an increase from $30 million to $35 million (Rieffer and Mercer 2005). Under the Clinton administration's grand strategy of 'democratic enlargement,' democracy promotion became more closely linked to the prosperity of the 'new world order' and a strong commitment to supporting free markets.\textsuperscript{66} The liberal-democratic triumphalism of the 1990s no doubt contributed to

\textsuperscript{65} The double standard reflected the administration's commitment to the Kirkpatrick doctrine, which held that the United States was justified in supporting authoritarian systems in its fight against communism (LaFeber 1999).

\textsuperscript{66} While the administration launched interventions in Kosovo and Haiti which were justified in terms of human rights and democracy, the United States continued to ignore democratic deficits in states that remained strategic allies or important markets for U.S. exports (for example, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and China) (Rieffer and Mercer 2005). One notable initiative in the area of democracy promotion was the
a more favourable climate for the NED and other U.S. DAAs, which managed to avoid major controversies. As the century came to an end, the NED launched the World Movement for Democracy, a self-described ‘network of networks’ linking together democracy groups across the world. The movement – headquartered at Gershman’s office – was closely linked to key neo-conservative figures that would later play a prominent role in the administration of George W. Bush.67

In the new millennium, U.S. democracy promotion has once again taken on a strong ideological hue. NED reports (2006; 2007) and statements by Gershman (2000; 2008), who continues to head the endowment, have targeted so-called populist governments in the Americas – particularly in Venezuela – as the main enemies of democracy. At the first meeting an anti-leftist regional affiliation of the World Movement for Democracy in Panama in February 2008, the Red Latinoamericana y del Caribe para la Democracia (RLCD), Gershman announced the ideological battle in no uncertain terms. Commenting on the spread of democracy in the 1990s, he stated:

But no sooner were these doctrines in place then there appeared a different kind of threat to democracy, a backsliding that took the form of the relentless concentration of executive power in Venezuela, and the “insurrectionary” toppling of constitutional governments through massive street demonstrations in Ecuador and Bolivia. To the extent that this assault on democracy took place under the cover of populist demagoguery and avoided blatant military coups and open forms of repression such as imprisonment, exile, and torture, many tended to ignore the backsliding or even to develop an attitude of tolerance towards it.

There is no question that the government of Hugo Chávez has on occasion acted undemocratically; what is reproachable, however, is the fact that the NED has fixated on

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67 According to Barry (2005), the movement receives most of its funds from the U.S. government and right-wing foundations such as the Bradley Foundation (which also provided funding to the Project for the New American Century)
developments in Venezuela and other 'populist' countries while entirely ignoring
democratic backsliding in other countries in the region which have remained staunch
allies of the United States such as Colombia. The endowment also selectively aligns
itself with democratic social struggles, advocating stability for some regimes and the
toppling of others. As I argue below, the ideological agenda is apparent throughout the
'democracy bureaucracy,' though it has encountered growing resistance which has led to
significant shifts in the democracy promotion field of practice. To this we now turn.

The 'Pink Tide' and the backlash against U.S. democracy promotion

The administration of George W. Bush entered the White House with the same rhetorical
fervour for spreading democracy as the Reagan administration twenty years earlier. As a
result of its interventionist policies and overall foreign policy incompetence, however, the
administration succeeded at generating an unprecedented backlash against democracy
promotion. The backlash itself occurred against the backdrop of declining U.S. in the
global arena and the emergence of regional challengers in Latin America and Eastern
Europe that questioned the legitimacy of the U.S. brand of democracy. The crisis of U.S.
leadership at both the global and regional level has forced the United States to look to its
allies to play an increased role in supporting neoliberal polyarchy and stabilizing world
order. It has also led to discursive shifts that have redefined the practices of the U.S.
democracy promotion field of practice.

democracy promotion as revolutionary reshaping of U.S. foreign policy and national
security. In Latin America, U.S. opposition to popular governments was justified by a 'securitization' discourse which depicted anti-neoliberal social movements and governments a threat to U.S. and hemispheric security (Carranza 2009). The USAID budget for democracy programs also steadily increased, from $1.2 billion in 2004 (USAID 2005) to $1.7 billion in 2008, at which point it accounted for 12.2 percent of all international development assistance (USAID 2008). While the NED’s annual budget remained more or less the same throughout the 1990s, it rapidly increased in the 2000s from $40 million in 2004 to $74 million in 2006 (Lowe 2008). In 2008, the USAID budgetary request for the NED reached an astounding $80 million (USAID 2007b), with a total of $99.2 million actually being approved after rescissions (in the context of the growing recession, the Obama administration’s request for 2009 reduced this amount back to a still-hefty $80 million) (Epstein and Nakamura 2009). Bush also appointed hardliners to key positions within the democracy bureaucracy, including Elliot Abrams, who was named Deputy National Security Advisor for Global Democracy Strategy in 2005.

Despite the vast amount of resources committed by the Bush administration to promoting low-intensity democracy and the free market, political instability associated with neoliberalism became more prominent throughout the 2000s. Across Latin America, leftist governments supported by mass social movements roundly rejected the Washington Consensus. At the same time as neoliberal polyarchy has failed to underpin national hegemonic structures, Pax Americana has suffered a growing crisis of authority

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68 Although the Bush administration continued to support autocratic regimes in both the Middle East and Central Asia, the invasion of Iraq established a new threshold in U.S. democratic interventionism with by now well known disastrous consequences (Rieffer and Mercer 2005).

at the global and regional levels (both the symptoms and causes include imperial overextension, the rise of China and regional powers such as Russia and Venezuela, the hollowing-out of the U.S. economy and the spectacular collapse of the global neoliberal financial model). Regionally, this crisis has manifested itself in the inability of the United States to discipline openly hostile governments, particularly those of Venezuela and Bolivia. These countries have joined with Cuba, Honduras, Nicaragua, Dominica, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in forming a regional trade association, the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA).\(^7\) Latin American efforts to offset traditional U.S. dominance in the region have led to several other initiatives to promote greater political and economic integration, including the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR) – a recently established intergovernmental union that will integrate the Mercosur and the Andean Community of Nations within an EU-like structure (Phillips 2009a).\(^7\)

These developments have coincided with a backlash against U.S. democracy promotion in both Latin America and the former Soviet bloc, where restrictions have been placed on the activities of NGOs.\(^7\) The role of U.S. democracy promotion in supporting the so-called color revolutions in Central Asia and the Caucuses has been of particular concern to the Putin government. In Venezuela, the NGO which launched the campaign

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\(^7\) The leaders of several of the ALBA states, as well as their allies in Ecuador and Paraguay, have taken to regularly criticizing U.S. policy in public forms.

\(^7\) UNASUR recently expressed deep concern over the provisional U.S. - Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement, which will facilitate U.S. access to several Colombian military facilities (Phillips 2009).

\(^7\) Although allegations of U.S. interventionism have been advanced by opportunistic autocrats and critical scholars alike, American foreign policy intellectuals and policymakers tend to reduce all criticism to the former. See, for example, Carother’s (2006) characterization of the backlash, as well as Gershman and Allen’s (2006), both of which attribute the backlash to ‘hybrid regimes.’ Gershman and Allen note that the backlash has occurred in a “relatively limited number of countries – approximately 20 out of the more than 80 countries where democracy assistance is provided” (2006: 46). One is left wondering whether they would be so cavalier about dismissing concerns surrounding the violation of state sovereignty if U.S. parties
for the recall referendum against President Chávez, Súmate, was charged with treason and conspiracy for receiving financial support for their activities from the NED in 2003. In Haiti, the New York Times published a damning piece on the role of the IRI in undermining the government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide that significantly tarnished the organization’s reputation (Bogdanich and Nordberg 2006). In Bolivia, the Minister of the Presidency, Juan Ramón Quintana, publicly alleged that U.S. democracy assistance programs have been used to support regional forces opposed to the central government (Velásquez Espejo 2007). More recently, the President himself, Evo Morales, has charged that USAID with funding the electoral campaigns of regional prefects who are key figures in the opposition to the central government (Faqundez 2009).

Although those movements and government contesting neoliberal-polyarchy have been dismissed as populist and ‘anti-systemic,’ U.S. policymakers and foreign policy intellectuals have registered the backlash as the consequence of increasing global inequality. A report commissioned by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, *Non-Governmental Organizations and Democracy Promotion, "Giving Voice to the People,"* for instance, takes stock of the global backlash against U.S. democracy promotion, warning that the inability of Latin American governments to “adequately convert constituents’ concerns into responsive laws and policies is one important factor driving the poor and the politically marginalized toward leaders who promise popular but often shortsighted solutions” (United States Senate 2006: 7). This greater concern with economic inclusion is reflected in USAID’s (2005) most recent democracy and governance framework, which emphasizes the importance of social rights and making and civil society organizations began receiving support from hostile regimes abroad in response to the growing fragility of its own democratic institutions.
democracy ‘work’ for marginalized groups such as women, youth, and minorities. The new language that informs USAID’s approach to democracy promotion reflects the post-Washington consensus, which moves beyond neoliberalism by acknowledging the need to tackle poverty and inequality as objectives in their own right (Onis and Senses 2005).

Yet, the change in rhetoric has not led to a decoupling of the neoliberal model from democracy promotion efforts. Speaking on democracy promotion in Latin America before the House International Relations Committee in 2006, Paula J. Dobriansky (2006), Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs, summed up the ongoing conventional wisdom: “We will work with all governments from the left, from the right, as long as they are committed in principle and practice to the core conditions of democracy, to govern justly, to advance economic freedom and to invest in their people...U.S. policy offers a positive vision based on the benefits of representative democracy, free markets, economic integration, and faith in the transformative power of freedom in individual lives.” What the statement fails to acknowledge, of course, is that the positive relation between economic freedom, free markets, economic integration and democracy is hotly contested throughout the region. The discourse of democracy promotion has thus evolved to acknowledge problems of poverty and inequality without actually affecting the ideological economic model to which it is linked. In the absence of serious policy realignment away from neoliberalism, the shift in the discourse on democracy promotion indicates, unfortunately, little more than a weak attempt to prevent ‘anti-systemic’ contenders from gaining further political ground. Paul J. Bonicelli, USAID Administrator

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73 While the post-Washington consensus may represent a considerable improvement over traditional neoliberal policies, Onis and Senses (2005) question whether the ‘crack in the neoliberal armour’ will lead to fresh thinking and accelerate the search for viable development alternatives by its main proponents, including the World Bank.
for Latin America and the Caribbean, acknowledged the strategic reasons behind the new concern with issues of social justice at a speech at a CIPE conference in Lima, Peru, when he proclaimed, “frustration with the failure of democratic institutions to deliver improved standards of living may further enable the purveyors of populism” (2007). Gershman’s (2008) comments before the RLCD also emphasized the need to tackle poverty more effectively in the context of growing ‘populism’ in the region.

In addition to the discursive shift underpinning U.S. democracy promotion, there is a much greater concern amongst foreign policymakers with giving it a more international flavour. This was also reflected in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, which recommended that USAID and the NED strengthen partnerships with Latin American, European, and international organizations in implementing democracy assistance programs, a strategy that seems to reflect the need to give a more universalistic quality to declining *Pax Americana*. Much of this rhetoric responds specifically to the impression that the War on Terror has severely damaged U.S. credibility. The presidents of the IRI, Lorne Craner, and the NDI, Kenneth Wollack (2008), argue that the concept of democracy promotion must be rejuvenated by, *inter alia*: “re-energizing U.S. alliances among democratically minded nations inside and outside of the United Nations” and “announcing the intent to conduct democracy promotion as much as possible by working with allies and through international organizations to give such efforts greater legitimacy and an international face.”

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74 This is further evidenced by U.S. support for bilateral free trade agreements for trade and investment liberalization with the collapse of the FTAA.

75 Democracy promoters have also noted that they have been forced to “invest more time and effort in quasi-diplomatic activities” such as explaining their programs to local authorities (Gershman and Allen 2006: 47).
There is some indication, however, that democracy promotion will be used to consolidate a new right in Latin America through efforts such as the World Movement for Democracy’s RLCD. In the context of the recent coup in Honduras, moreover, Roger Noriega (2009), the former U.S. Ambassador to Honduras and prominent neo-conservative, claimed that ‘Chávez acolyte’ President Manuel Zelaya was legitimately ousted by the military for insisting on pushing an illegal constitutional referendum intended to allow a second presidential term. Noriega is part of the recently formed *Unión de Organizaciones Democráticas de América* (UnoAmerica), a coalition of right-wing NGOs across the continent which seeks to coordinate civil society opposition to leftist governments. UnoAmerica has sought to legitimize the coup in Honduras, publishing numerous articles on its web-site defending the new government, including an article by the coup president, Roberto Micheletti. Moreover, as Golinger (2009) points out, the main opposition forum to Zelaya, the Democratic Civil Union of Honduras, includes many NGOs funded by USAID and the NED. The United States (and Canada) recognized the results of fraudulent elections hosted by the coup government in November 2009, which were in violation of an internationally-brokered compromise with Zelaya. The ‘show election’ that brought Porfirio Lobo to power has in turn ensured the continuity of the oligarchic agenda which was behind the coup (Joyce 2010).

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76 Democracy promoters such as Freedom House (2009) have provided new ammunition to the interventionist model by arguing that “21st Century Authoritarians” in China, Venezuela, Iran, Russia and Pakistan are employing soft-power methods to advance their interests internationally, thereby “tilting the scales toward less accountable and more corrupt governance across a wide swath of the developing world.” See the Americas Program web-site for multiple articles debunking this myth and providing a critical account of the actions of the coup government: [http://americas.irc-online.org/](http://americas.irc-online.org/).

77 Other key neo-conservatives which have lobbied on behalf of the coup government include Otto Reich and Daniel W. Fisk, who, among other high-ranking positions, was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere affairs under President George W. Bush (Thompson and Nixon 2009). Mr. Fisk’s defense of the de facto government is particularly noteworthy given his new role as Coordinator for Governance with IRI, a position he assumed in September 2009.
These developments, in conjunction with the evidence that will be presented in the case studies, suggest that the United States is strategically adopting a mixed approach to democracy promotion that combines elite mobilization with more benign activities associated with polyarchy promotion. In the new conjuncture, the interventionist model seems to be reserved only for the most problematic countries in regional order – Haiti, Bolivia, Venezuela and perhaps Honduras – where there are strong counter-hegemonic tendencies. But, as we will see in the case of Bolivia, the interventionist model may be abandoned when shifting regional dynamics render it politically unfeasible. Conversely, the softer approach to democracy promotion seems to be advanced in countries where elites have managed to maintain a certain degree of social stability. As we will see, this has been the case in Peru. The deployment of different forms of democracy promotion therefore responds to a division of the Third World into two groups, a logic that Rojas (2004) has identified in relation to aid practices and global governance more generally. In the first group are those countries which demonstrate qualities conducive to market-led development; in the second are those in need of a much firmer hand. In effect, the strategy responds to the changing configuration of regional power and the different forms of hegemony that exist in a given social formation. I now turn to a discussion of the evolution of Canadian democracy promotion to illustrate developments that have led to a closer convergence with the U.S. model, though the Canadian field of practice maintains distinct historically-rooted features.

II. Democracy promotion in the Canadian context
The rights-based model

While the Canadian state has long contributed to the formulation of regional and global hegemonic practices, Canadian democracy promotion as a field of practice has
historically enjoyed a much greater degree of autonomy from foreign policy pressures than its American counterpart. This reflects the different historical circumstances in which Canadian democracy promotion came into being, as well as the different actors that defines its field of practice. The historical institutional legacies of individual DAAs have been decisive in shaping Canada’s overall approach. Despite these differences, Canadian democracy promotion practices and discourses have increasingly become integrated into middlepowermanship in the service of neoliberal world order.

The bulk of Canadian democracy assistance at the national level has traditionally been channeled through CIDA, which supports democratic development through a wide range of executing agencies, including Elections Canada, Canadian and international NGOs, national governments and multilateral institutions. Canadian democracy promotion has traditionally followed two patterns: 1) technical assistance to governments administered by NGOs, crown corporations, and CIDA itself; and 2) support to civil society organizations in peripheral countries through NGOs, particularly Canada’s main instrument for promoting democracy, Rights and Democracy. In terms of the former, technical assistance is often used to support electoral processes, with Elections Canada playing an important role in supporting electoral commissions and electoral observation missions around the world. CIDA also supports electoral observation directly through the OAS, as well as the Ottawa-based NGO, CANADEM, an organization that selects and deploys qualified experts for electoral observation missions around the world. NGOs such as the Parliamentary Centre and the Forum of Federations also work with legislators and government institutions to enhance technical capacity and strengthen governance institutions. Within the justice sector, the National Judicial Institute is a major player in
implementing programs to enhance the rule of law. CIDA itself often provides technical experts and funds to various governance initiatives, though, in some cases, it also works through implementing agencies to deploy experts and manage projects.\(^{80}\)

Many of the organizations involved in Canadian democracy promotion thus focus on strengthening specific institutions. As I will argue in the following chapters, they promote polyarchy but with much less of a strategic-political agenda than U.S. DAAs. In terms of support to civil society, Rights and Democracy – originally named the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD) – was mandated by the Canadian Parliament in 1988 to support the universal values of human rights and the promotion of democratic institutions and practices. Unlike the NED, the organization was not conceived of as an instrument to advance foreign policy objectives in clearly defined ideological terms. It was not associated with a government policy of democratic interventionism but rather with Canada’s growing development efforts. Whereas the NED was led by neo-conservatives close to the Reagan administration, Rights and Democracy was launched by the much more moderate Progressive Conservative Party; its first president, moreover, was a social democrat – recently retired NDP leader, Ed Broadbent.

From the outset, the Special Joint Committee that called for the establishment of the agency was concerned that it maintain an inclusive approach to democracy promotion that differed from the U.S. approach in both theory and practice.\(^{81}\) The Committee went

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\(^{79}\) I was the former Director of its elections program.

\(^{80}\) Deployment for Democratic Development (DDD), a multi-country program which channels Canadian expertise to developing countries to support capacity-building efforts in specific governance sectors, is a recent example of a CIDA program implemented by a partner agency. Rights and Democracy and the Institute of Public Administration of Canada (IPAC) are the implementers of DDD.

\(^{81}\) The Committee stated that the agency should be endowed “with carefully prepared guidelines for supporting activities by non-governmental organizations.” It warned that “to ensure that the Institute is
so far as to express serious concern about including the term ‘democracy’ in the name of the proposed agency. The report warned that many “have cautioned against the use of the word “democracy” and its derivatives in the formulation of the name and the mandate of an eventual institution. This terminology, they have reminded us, has acquired an ideological, political and cultural meaning which differs profoundly from one region of the world to another…Others are concerned that it will be received as indicative of the philosophy of the present USA administration” (cited in Schmitz 2004:15). Although the term ‘democracy’ was eventually included in the name of the proposed agency, the concern for differentiating Canadian activities in the area of democracy promotion has carried over throughout the years. Until very recently, Canada has consciously avoided using the term ‘democracy promotion’ in favour of terminology such as ‘support to democratic institutions’ and ‘support to good governance,’ which are considered less ideologically charged. According to Victoria Sutherland, Manager for CIDA’s Office for Democratic Governance, Canada has traditionally supported democratic development – not promoted it – since the emphasis has always been placed on strengthening democracy in collaboration with governments that have requested CIDA’s support rather than promoting a specific model of democracy.82

Rights and Democracy has historically remained open to a variety of ‘national perspectives on democratic development,’ advancing a rights-based approach with four main thematic areas: democratic development; economic and social rights; indigenous people’s rights and women’s rights. This approach was formulated by Nancy Thede, a

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82 Interview, Gatineau: December 19, 2009.
professor at l'Université du Québec à Montréal with a progressive and expansive view of
development who previously worked for the organization. Over the years, its
programming has emphasized expanding citizenship participation in the public sphere as
both a right and a *sine qua non* of democratic consolidation (Thede 2002). It works
directly with grassroots organizations in its partner countries and emphasizes groups
committed primarily to human rights issues. One of the few comparative studies on NED
and Rights and Democracy program funds (Scott and Walters 2000), for instance, notes
that the latter has focused almost exclusively on supporting human rights groups,
devoting virtually no funds to strengthening business or pro-market civil society
organizations. This stands in sharp contrast to the approach of the NED, which has
emphasized market reform and has provided considerable support to business
organizations. Its support to civil society has thus traditionally targeted a much different
constituency than its U.S. counterpart. The board of the organization has also differed
from that of the NED insofar as it is comprised mainly of international and national
human rights activists and academics rather than high-ranking foreign policymakers. In
short, its commitment to a rights-based approach to democratic development has
traditionally been grounded in both its institutional and aid practices.

In many cases, moreover, Rights and Democracy has taken a highly critical
approach to Canadian foreign policy, as well as the business activities of Canadian
enterprises, including in the mining sector in Peru (Rights and Democracy 2002). Thus,
although Rights and Democracy’s status as a crown corporation means that in legal terms

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83 At the time of the FTAA discussions, Rights and Democracy (Bronson and Lamarche 2001) published a
report which was highly critical of the track records of previous trade agreements. In the aftermath of the
failed Doha round of WTO discussions, Rights and Democracy again called for a human rights framework
for a trade system that permits diverse development strategies.
it is essentially a parastatal, in practice it has historically maintained a much greater degree of independence from official foreign policy than its U.S. counterpart. It is a QUANGO in the sense that it was set up by and is accountable to parliament but has historically enjoyed considerable autonomy (though as I will argue below, this is rapidly changing). The same holds true for the other main actors involved in democracy promotion, most of which have NGO status but receive almost all of their funding from CIDA and DFAIT. Many of these organizations engage in grassroots development initiatives and some are genuine expressions of civil society groups motivated by values of solidarity and accompaniment. Development and Peace, for instance – the official international development organization of the Catholic Church in Canada and one of the most important contributors to democratic development – supports grassroots civil society groups around the world and has publicly criticized many of the neoliberal policies that have led to increased poverty and inequality. Development and Peace claims to be inspired by ‘Gospel values,’ including the core tenet of Liberation Theology – that is, the ‘preferential option for the poor.’

At a basic ideological level, therefore, one must distinguish between the explicitly pro-market orientation of the NED and its sister organizations and the more critical approach of the Canadian agencies involved in democracy promotion. Such differences between Canadian and U.S. democracy promotion practices reflect the different material, institutional and ideological conditions in which Canadian democracy promotion has developed and have shaped the structure of its field of practice. As we have seen, in the

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84 A recent report (2008) released by the organization on the food crisis, for instance, calls attention to the roots of the problem, condemning the IFIs, multinationals, and government of the North for having promoted a global food production system that places commercial interests above ensuring people’s right to food.
late 1980s the Canadian state was just beginning its process of reconfiguration around a
national and global strategy of accumulation that conflicted with the ‘humane
internationalist’ tradition of its development community. The establishment of Rights
and Democracy occurred at a time when many politicians and policymakers remained
committed to an alternative development perspective. NGOs such as Development and
Peace, moreover, developed their own philosophies of development that reflected
progressive social constituencies often aligned with leftist movements. CIDA itself
continued to articulate a fairly progressive commitment to a more expansive, rights-based
notion of democracy in its 1996 policy, *Human Rights, Democratization and Good
Governance*. The policy emphasized the importance of empowering citizens through its
democratization programs, which, according to the document, are guided by the goal
“that all citizens in developing countries are able to actively and meaningfully participate,
directly or through civil society or elected representatives, in the exercise of power and in
the public decisions that affect their lives (CIDA 1996).”

At the same time, however, CIDA’s commitment to humane internationalism has
steadily eroded over the years, giving way to the gradual triumph of commercial and
geopolitical interests in the formulation of aid policy (Pratt 2001). In the realm of
democracy promotion, the conversion of CIDA to a more business-friendly approach to
development assistance has coincided with a lack of political will by both Liberal and
Conservative governments to implement the rights-based vision originally elaborated in

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85 Pratt (2003) explains this steady erosion in terms of factors such as the increased influence of DFAIT and
the Department of Finance over CIDA within an overall process of governmental conversion to neoliberal
orthodoxy. These agencies have traditionally been closely aligned with the interests of the dominant class
and have directed ODA in the interests of Canadian capital as well as strategic departmental concerns.
Morrison (1998) largely concurs with Pratt but argues that CIDA has been more responsive to the interests
and demands of NGOs than he would suggest. See also exchange with Joly (Pratt 2003) on the extent to
the Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance policy. Instead, Canadian democracy promotion efforts have been increasingly reframed to fit a neoliberal foreign policy agenda within a new discursive construction of democracy.

**Signs of instrumentalization**

The reformulation of what it means to support democracy comes at a time when Canada has considerably enhanced its financial commitment to supporting democratic development while rationalizing and centralizing its overall approach. CIDA's democracy assistance budget, for instance, rose from $223 million in 1996 to $477.9 million in 2006 – an increase of 114% (Government of Canada 2007). The budget of Rights and Democracy alone has doubled in recent years, from $5.45 million in 2002-2003, to $10.69 million in 2006-2007 (DFAIT 2008b). CIDA and DFAIT have also played a leadership role in reorganizing Canadian democracy promotion initiatives at the institutional level, though such efforts have been fraught with considerable confusion. Both bureaucracies have also played a leading role in consolidating a field of practice under a loose forum called the Democracy Council.

As for the reformulation itself, the instrumentalization of democracy promotion is most apparent in Canada's America Strategy, which identifies free trade and investment as essential to shared regional prosperity, as well as important features of democratic...
governance. As Macdonald and Ruckert (2008) have observed, however, the strategy reproduces the same commitment to the neoliberal development policies that have been rejected by popular movements and governments across the region. A recent statement by the Americas Policy Group (APG), a working group of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), states that: “The exercise of human rights and democracy are prerequisites of broadly based prosperity and not the other way around. There is no “trickle-down” relationship that links increased investment, for example, with greater recognition and protection of human rights or the growth of democracy…In fact, the lesson of history suggests that investment in a context of denial of human rights and democracy only serves to further entrench relationships of inequality” (2009: 5). Despite this evidence, Canada has prioritized bilateral relations with those countries which have pursued a neoliberal agenda, including those which, like Colombia, have been responsible for serious human rights violations (as we shall see, Haiti has also been a major priority country).

At the same time, the regional discourse of the Canadian state has increasingly reflected the post-Washington consensus approach to neoliberal governance, with

(IDRC). The Council serves as a forum for dialogue and information sharing to disseminate best practices on democratization programming.

The Americas Strategy was never actually released by the government, though its main principles are contained in the document, Canada and the Americas: Priorities and Progress (Government of Canada 2009) (Interview with DFAIT official. Ottawa: June 3, 2009). True to form, DFAIT invited university students and NGOs to submit position papers on Canada’s approach after the Harper government had already articulated the strategy (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Policy Research Division 2009).

The Official Development Assistance Accountability Act (Bill C-293) passed by parliament in March 2007 also provides a restrictive notion of democracy defined in terms of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, though it notes that it is not limited to this (House of Commons Canada 2007).

The APG is comprised of forty NGOs, including human rights groups, churches, labour unions, development organizations, and research institutions.

Although Canada has not openly named its key partners in the region within the new Americas Strategy, these may easily be discerned from the countries which Prime Minister and the Governor General have visited in the past few years, namely Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Haiti and the Caribbean in general.
ideological conservatives such as the Prime Minister himself vaunting the merits of Canadian social democracy as a third way approach to the extremes of the market and the socialist development. The Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL), an Ottawa-based QUANGO that adheres primarily to a neoliberal-based agenda of hemispheric integration, has also articulated a post-Washington consensus discourse that resonates with the hegemonic aspirations of the Canadian state. Its Executive Director, Carlo Dade (2008), for example, has argued that with the demise of the Monroe Doctrine in the hemisphere, Canada is in a unique position to continue championing free trade and regional governance since it shares similar concerns with Latin Americans on issues of social justice. While a social democratic regional partnership would most likely be welcomed by many Latin American governments, Dade seems to overlook the fact that Canada’s championing of free trade and its disruptive presence in Haiti over the past several years is hardly reflective of a commitment to issues of social justice. FOCAL’s own dismissal of leftist government in the region as ‘anti-systemic’ undermines the basic mutual respect required for such a partnership.

Unfortunately, however, policy discussions around Canada’s future involvement in promoting democracy are characterized by a complete absence of debate on the tensions between democracy and foreign policy interests and any reference to the crisis of democracy promotion currently confronting the United States. A review process undertaken by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (SCFAID) of the Canadian parliament also fails to deal with these important issues in any

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93 I do not consider FOCAL a DAA since it is primarily a think tank; it does very little in the way of actually implementing democracy programs. 
94 A FOCAL Policy Paper (Torres 2006), for instance, identifies anti-systemic neo-populists as amongst the most serious threats to democracy in the Americas.
depth. The SCFAID report (2007) acknowledges some of the controversies surrounding
democracy promotion, going so far as to note that it is often perceived as being “neo-
colonial” and associated with “the great power or national security interests of a
particular state or group of states that are rich and powerful in the international system.”
Yet it follows Thomas Carothers and NED President Carl Gersham – both of whom
testified before the committee – in attributing the backlash against democracy promotion
to self-interested autocrats and the fiasco in Iraq, thereby missing the opportunity to
reflect on some of the larger political and ideological issues at stake. This is not
surprising given that the committee did not meet with any actual critics of democracy
promotion in its hearings (meetings and witnesses are listed in an appendix to the report).
Likewise, the report emphasizes the traditional rights-based orientation of Canadian
democracy assistance but fails to acknowledge how Canadian foreign policy has not lived
up to this standard. It calls for a leadership role for Canada in the promotion of
democratic development internationally but does not consider the mounting case against
the democracy promotion practices of its main ally. Invoking worn out images of
Canada’s role in the international system, DFAIT’s response to the report noted that
“unlike other countries, Canada is neither perceived as advancing a particular agenda nor
to be pushing one version of democracy over another” (DFAIT 2007: 4).

The pressure to conform to a new policy consensus has arguably affected the work
of Rights and Democracy in recent years. According to Thede, the organization has
increasingly subordinated itself to government priorities that conflict with its mandate,
citing its abandonment of the Declaration of Indigenous Rights at the prodding of the
Conservative government as an example of the concessions it has been willing to make to
advance itself organizationally. She equates this, in part, with a more government-
friendly mentality on the part of consecutive presidents since 2002. Rights and Democracy has also followed the government lead in terms of its priority countries, having established offices in Haiti and Afghanistan, where it manages considerable country programs. As we shall see, its traditional emphasis on supporting grassroots organizations can be called into question in the case of Haiti, where it has mostly supported NGOs which have opposed the popular movement in that country. These activities have generated significant criticism from Canadian investigative journalists, with Foreign Affairs’ (2008b) recent review of Rights and Democracy recommending that it “strengthen its public relations work and its image, especially among the Canadian public, in order to remedy the negative press publicity received during the past year.”

More recently, Rights and Democracy has been the scene of an unfolding political drama in which some board members have accused the government of Stephen Harper of steadily replacing colleagues who have stepped down with neo-conservative ideologues. Among other things, three new board members, including the organization’s Chair, University of Toronto professor Aurel Braun, have criticized the operations of the organization, alleging that it has been pro-Palestinian. In particular, they cite grants made to one Israeli and two Palestinian NGOs critical of the Israeli government’s human rights record. At the same time, they have accused the president of mismanaging organizational funds. Other board members have denounced these charges as spurious, citing their willingness to repudiate the grants in question and DFAIT’s positive 2008 financial audit as evidence that there is a larger agenda in motion. In January 2010, Rights and

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95 Montreal: June 1, 2009.
96 Specific allegations will be explored in chapter four.
Democracy’s president, Rémy Beauregard, died of a heart attack after a tense board meeting on the future direction of the organization (Siddiqui 2010) (David 2010).97

One board member who resigned in protest over the turn of events, McGill law professor, Payam Akhavan, has been particularly outspoken. In an interview, he noted that despite several concessions that had been made to the new board members, they persisted in denouncing the president. Linking this specifically to a neo-conservative approach to handling issues of democracy and human rights, Dr. Akhavan stated: “this begins to resemble a kind of ideological crusade where you are on a witch hunt. You don’t want to let the issue go because you need a good guys and bad guys’ narrative. You need a narrative of people who are the champions of freedom, or Israel, or democracy and liberty or whatever it might be.”

The Conservative government appointed Gérard Latulippe, a former Quebec Liberal provincial cabinet minister who ran for the Canadian Alliance in 2000 and recently served as the head of NDI in Haiti, as the new president of Rights and Democracy. His political views fit perfectly well with the new board mission. As the Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations reports (2010), Latulippe warned that the concentration of Muslim immigrants undermined the proper functioning of Quebec society during the public consultation on “reasonable accommodation” of immigrants in Quebec undertaken in 2007.

The turn of events seems to indicate a politicization of Rights and Democracy’s board and an increased instrumentalization of the agency to accomplish unrelated foreign policy objectives (given these circumstances, one wonders whether the agency will begin adopting a tough discourse against ‘populism’ in the Americas such as the one that has

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97 See Wells’ (2010) report in Macleans for an excellent overview of the board appointments.
defined the U.S. field of practice). Moreover, the controversy comes in the wake of unexpected government cuts to two smaller Canadian NGOs: the Montreal-based Alternatives, a fairly radical NGO which has been critical of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan; and the faith-based human rights organization KAIROS, which has been critical of both Israel’s actions in the Palestinian territories and Canadian environmental policy (Ivison 2009). According to the president of the CCIC, Gerry Barr, “this represents a problem that is becoming more worrisome. Our organizations are being told to stop criticizing certain positions of Canada, or else their funding will disappear. This touches in large part Israel, but not exclusively. Climate change and human rights in Colombia are also relevant… it starts with two or three organizations, like KAIROS and Alternatives, to make an example, but the government pressure affects several NGOs.”

Another indication of the instrumentalization of democracy assistance is the establishment of a Democratic Transitions Fund within the Glyn Berry program at DFAIT, an initiative that was launched in response to the SCFAID report. Whereas Canada has in the past avoided activities such as political party support, the new program emphasizes ‘non-partisan support to political parties’ in countries where there is violence and political instability or where there is a risk of democratic backsliding. Although the program defines democracy promotion in terms of “increasing citizen influence over decision-making processes to address democratic crises” (DFAIT 2008b), the rights-based language of a previous era has been considerably diluted to advance a basic notion of human rights as protection against abuses of civil and political rights by failed states. One DFAIT official who was interviewed stated that even the emphasis on ‘citizens’ in

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98 Barr was quoted by Castonguay (2010, my translation), who has been chronicling the Rights and Democracy controversy carefully in Le Devoir.
the new program has been somewhat controversial within the department since it could be used to defend notions of ‘popular democracy’ advanced by ‘populist regimes’ such as the one in Venezuela.99 Critics of the ‘citizens’ language argue that Canada should define democracy strictly in terms of the definition of representative democracy provided by the OAS Inter-American Democratic Charter. The official repeatedly expressed concerns about the quality of democracy in Venezuela, noting that the Glyn Berry program provided funds to a ‘get out the vote’ campaign in the last round of elections in that country.100 While this in itself is not necessarily a bad thing, the ideological context in which such activities are being formulated cannot be ignored.101

Again, the extent to which the Venezuelan government is undemocratic is open to debate. The point here is that Ottawa has increasingly adopted political criteria to determine with whom it will partner, applying loose standards of democratic development to partners such as Colombia and more stringent ones to those it opposes on ideological grounds.102 The risk is that Canada will begin selectively applying its traditional policy of ‘constructive engagement’ to different countries in the region, with those governments that do not conform to its political vision being singled out, perhaps, for a U.S.-style campaign of destabilization. Indeed, Canada has played a more active role in supporting

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99 Interview, Ottawa: June 3, 2009
100 As of yet, no one has critically investigated the Glyn Berry program’s activities in Venezuela. Fenton, however, (2009) has written a short article that provides evidence to indicate that the Canadian government has sought to tarnish the reputation of the Venezuelan government, having contributed some $198,168 to a report authored by the World Movement for Democracy, Defending Civil Society, which denounces Chávez as a ‘would-be caudillo.’
101 Concerns on the nature of democracy in Venezuela echo statements made by Minister of State for Latin America, Peter Kent, who visited Venezuela in January 2010. Following his trip, in which he failed to meet with any representative of the government, Mr. Kent declared “there’s no question the democratic space in Venezuela is shrinking and that President Chávez has a history of concentrating power in the executive, which has undermined democratic institutions, including the courts” (Berthiaume 2010).
102 On this issue, Ottawa’s position mirrors a statement released by the IRI, which asserts that: “In Latin America, where democracy has been threatened in countries like Venezuela and Bolivia, Colombia remains
U.S. ideologically-driven initiatives, including the establishment of the previously-mentioned regional affiliate of the World Movement for Democracy, the *Red Latinoamericana y del Caribe para la Democracia* (RLCD), which brings together mainstream NGOs critical of the leftist governments in the hemisphere. The Canadian government, in conjunction with the NED and Copa Airlines, funded the network’s first assembly in February-March 2009 (Asamblea de la Red LAC 2008). Moreover, Canada has become increasingly intertwined with the U.S. democracy promotion field of practice, exchanging personnel and creating close links between different organizations such as FOCAL, Rights and Democracy, and the NED.

Even more significantly, the Minister of State for Democratic Reform, Steven Fletcher, announced in June 2009 the establishment of an independent advisory panel to provide advice on the establishment of a ‘non-partisan democracy promotion agency’ supported by both the Liberals and the Conservatives (Government of Canada 2009e) that would provide funding to political parties. The independent panel tabled its report in December 2010, proposing a Canadian Centre for the Advancement of Democracy (CCAD) with a suggested annual budget of $30 to $70 million (Axworthy et al 2009). While it is too early to tell whether the institute will adopt an ideologically driven dedicated to building democratic institutions, making it a critical player in the hemisphere’s geopolitical landscape (IRI 2008)."

103 The connection between Beatrice Rangel – a FOCAL board member and one-time advisor and chief of staff to former Venezuelan President, Carlos Andrés Pérez - and the NED is particularly interesting. According to Robinson, the Perez government and Rangel personally were involved in supporting Washington’s efforts to undermine Sandinistas by channelling U.S. funds to the opposition. In an interview with Fenton (2006), Rangel acknowledged that she facilitated a NED grant to FOCAL in 2004. Rangel stated: “I believe the United States has, right now, such a bad image, the work would proceed much better, and it would be a better investment, for NED if FOCAI does the job because Canada, Canadians don’t elicit these kinds of feelings of rejection that Americans do now.” FOCAL’s connection to Rangel was facilitated by its Chair, John Graham, former Canadian ambassador to Venezuela in the early 1990s and the first head of the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy.
approach along the U.S. model, the members of the advisory panel are all proponents of U.S.-style democracy promotion.\textsuperscript{104}

In their report (Axworthy et al 2009), the advisory panel proposed certain safeguards to uphold the autonomy of the CCAD, though these measures do not appear to be sufficiently robust. Such measures include the accountability of the agency to parliament, cross-party consultation on the appointment of board members by the government, the appointment of international board members, and the location of the agency outside of Ottawa – very similar measures, in other words, to those which have failed to prevent the instrumentalization of Rights and Democracy. Given the way in which the government dismissed concerns voiced by all three opposition parties over the appointment of Latulippe as the new president of this agency (Cheadle 2010), the proposed framework does not inspire too much confidence. Critics who characterize the CCAD initiative as a U.S. style attempt to create a foundation for ‘political warfare’ (Fenton 2010) may be exaggerating the threat, but the evidence does seem to indicate a disconcerting trend towards a more ideologically-driven model of democracy promotion.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{104} The panel consists of four members: Les Campbell, a former New Democratic Party (NDP) staffer who served as Regional Director for the NDI’s Middle East operations; Eric Duhaime, NDI Resident Director of the Political Parties Program and Deputy Director in Iraq; Thomas Axworthy, Chair of the Centre for the Study of Democracy at Queen’s University; and Senator Pam Wallin. Although not part of the democracy promotion establishment, Wallin is a strong proponent of the recent free trade agreements with Colombia and Peru despite human rights concerns and strong civil society oppositions in both countries to the trade agreements (Wallin 2009). It should be that there has always been a strong Canadian influence within the NDI; writing in 2004, Schmitz (2004) observed that Campbell was one of 29 Canadians working for the institute.

\textsuperscript{105} It is also interesting to note that one of the main advocates of a political-party support agency has been highly critical of the so-called populist governments in Bolivia and Venezuela, calling upon the Canadian government to implement political party support programs in these countries to encourage greater pluralism (Legler 2006).
Concluding remarks

If the new global conjuncture has given rise to a backlash against U.S democracy promotion, the efforts of the Canadian state to rationalize and centralize its approach to democracy promotion offers new possibilities to provide low-intensity democracy with a universalistic makeover. Canada seems to have eagerly adopted this role, redefining the way in which democracy is conceptualized by Canadian practitioners and undertaking considerable efforts to reorganize the democracy promotion field of practice under the leadership of DFAIT and CIDA. Canadian middlepowermanship, in short, has increasingly come to define Canadian democracy promotion as a field of practice in the service of neoliberal governance. In such circumstances, it is uncertain whether the grassroots tradition will survive the institutional and discursive changes underway. While the historical – institutional legacies of Canadian DAAs may militate against the full integration of Canadian democracy promotion into the service of transnational capital, the grassroots tradition may become increasingly remote. There is a danger, moreover, that Canada’s traditional grassroots approach will provide new value-added to the attempt to legitimize forms of democratic interventionism intended to stabilize neoliberal polyarchy.

As we shift the analysis to the case studies, however, we will see that these macro-level trends in Canadian democracy promotion have not fully trickled down to the national level. Democracy assistance programs have only been partially configured to advance non-democratic foreign policy objectives. In Bolivia and Peru, the extent to which Canada seeks to consolidate polyarchy has not specifically undermined other visions of democracy; in some cases, the grassroots orientation of some of its DAAs has actually increased the possibilities of counter-hegemony (of course, polyarchy promotion tactics also increase the possibility of creating elite-led hegemonic orders). Only in Haiti
– a country where Canada has most sharply adopted an imperialistic approach rooted in middlepowermanship – has Canada’s approach come to resemble that of its more powerful neighbour. It is for this reason that a critical theory of democracy promotion must consider both the national structure of the democracy promotion field of practice as well as shifts in the regional order and bilateral relations with specific countries. While there are strong indications that the Canadian and U.S. democracy promotion fields of practice are converging and perhaps even becoming intertwined, thus far this is a tendency rather than a fait accompli.

We must therefore look to the internal dynamics of democratization and social struggles that have characterized the experiences of each country as well as their historic relations with both Canada and the United States to better situate the democracy assistance programs that will be examined in depth in the second part of this dissertation. For each has undergone rapid processes of social change associated with neoliberalism and democratic transition that have reconfigured the forms of state and the relations of power between different classes and social groups. The hegemonic relations that characterize each country in particular have evolved significantly in the past few decades and one cannot situate the forms of democracy promotion that characterize the approaches of the U.S. and Canada without a proper understanding of the social landscapes in which they operate.
Chapter three
Narrating authoritarianism and democracy in Haiti, Peru and Bolivia

Reflecting on a lengthy career of leading U.S. military interventions in Central American and Caribbean nations, General Smedley Butler, a former High Commissioner in Haiti, declared: “I spent thirty-three years and four months in active service in the country's most agile military force, the Marines...and during that period I spent most of my time being a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism (Galeano 1973: 108).” Not long after Butler delivered his famous speech in 1933, the soldier turned dissident published a book entitled *War is a Racket*, which demonstrated that, despite the high-minded rhetoric of official U.S. foreign policy, interventions and occupations in Latin America and the Caribbean mostly served the purpose of propping up local oligarchs catering to the shared interests of U.S. multinationals, local landlords, bankers and merchants in the world capitalist system. This intersection of international and local power relations traditionally supported the authoritarian state form in most of the region, including in Haiti, Bolivia and Peru. With the switch to a transnational strategy of governance based on consent, neoliberal world order has led to a central contradiction in each of these countries: while the forms of state have been partially democratized, social relations remain highly exploitative and the pressures of world order restrict sovereign decision making.

Democracy promotion programs overlook this contradiction by focusing exclusively on the internal dimensions of democratization. With different levels of strategic intent, they reproduce undemocratic social structures by promoting social stabilization rather than social transformation. Consciously or unconsciously, they conceal the shared responsibility of advanced capitalist states and local elites in the
maintenance and reproduction of such structures. This chapter thus provides a counter
narrative to the dominant discourses of democracy promotion by way of a historical
political economy of Haiti, Peru and Bolivia. It serves as a prelude to the examination of
democracy promotion in each country from 2000 to 2008. Its purpose is twofold: first, I
seek to situate the authoritarian state form within the social structures of accumulation,
forms of state, and pressures of world order established in the colonial and post-colonial
period according to the theoretical framework established in chapter one. In all cases,
these historic structures have long required coercive forms of governance to ensure the
rule of dominant classes tied to the international economy. I focus in particular upon the
struggles of subordinate classes and ethnic groups to modify and resist these forms of
governance. I also seek to identify historic continuities in the social orders of each
country to demonstrate that democracy assistance programs must be understood as a form
of power that seeks to stabilize social orders whose main features pre-date neoliberalism,
although each, to different degrees, has been transnationalized. This is not to say that
such programs are necessarily successful – as we will see in Bolivia, they are often unable
to contain radical challenges to traditional patterns of governance.

The second objective is to provide an overview of how competing social forces
have sought to modify and transform the social order in the era of democratic transition.
During the period under consideration, I argue that in each country a different
configuration of forces shaped the prospects for deeper forms of democracy, though in
none of them did democratization lead to the establishment of a genuine hegemonic order.
Understanding this historical background is essential for situating the objectives and
strategies of democracy promotion in each country. For if the U.S. and, to a lesser extent,
Canada, have used democracy assistance programs as a means of promoting neoliberal
polyarchy throughout the region, the form of democracy promotion and its associated tactics respond to the political context in which they are deployed. This is particularly the case for the United States, though Canada too has framed its programs within strategic considerations that respond to local political conditions. This chapter thus provides an analysis of the second-level variables which determine the form and strategy of democracy promotion, completing the framework introduced in the previous chapter, which focused on larger trends in regional order and the historical-institutional legacies of democracy assistance agencies (DAAs). In particular, the strategic deployment of elite mobilization tactics (EMTs) versus polyarchy promotion tactics (PPTs) depends upon the balance of power between competing social groups, as well as the position of peripheral states in the world (or regional) system. The analysis will therefore examine the configuration of power leading up to the deployment of EMTs in Haiti and PPTs in Peru and Bolivia in the new millennium. This configuration is summarized at the end of the chapter. The remaining chapters will then look at these strategies in each case in considerable depth.

I. The historical roots of authoritarianism

This section will provide a comparative analysis of the historical evolution of the social structure of accumulation, state form, and position in world economy of the three cases from the colonial period to the transition to democracy. Roughly, the narrative for each country ends in 2000. The objective is to situate the patterns of authoritarianism within the historic structures that developed in the colonial and post-colonial period. As indicated in chapter one, the process of substantive democratization is analyzed according to social struggles that dialectically affect these structures. We will see that, despite
ongoing social struggles between competing social forces to democratize the social order, none of the three countries has historically undergone a lasting process of democratization through the hegemony of a democratic historic bloc (although, again, this is changing in Bolivia). Dominant classes and political elites have relied more on coercion than consent to stabilize the social order, although there have been multiple democratic breakthroughs and regressions throughout the history of each country. In dialectical terms, this has meant that, on the one hand, political elites and dominant classes have failed to lead a post-colonial nation-building project predicated on some degree of democratization of social relations and the form of state and, on the other hand, subordinate classes and social groups have only succeeded at extracting minor and temporary concessions. The narrative offered here is grounded in two separate yet complementary traditions: macro historical approaches that seek to explain large-scale structures such as the world capitalist system and the historicist tradition of historical materialism which focuses on 'history from below.'

In taking such an approach to the history of the cases, I am arguing primarily against the Latin American Traditions (LAT), which explains deeply entrenched patterns of authoritarianism primarily in terms of culture and focuses mostly on elites in its account of political history. This is important since it is the assumptions of the LAT which often implicitly and explicitly frame U.S. and Canadian democracy assistance programs, which typically focus on the need to transform political culture to help consolidate liberal democracy. The LAT has been popularized through six successive editions of *Latin American Politics and Development*, edited by Howard Wiarda and Harvey Kline (2000), each of which has assembled different scholarly contributions on the main political problems afflicting specific countries and the region as a whole (not all
of which, to be sure, are written from the LAT perspective). Although contributors work mainly within the field of political science, those who adopt a LAT perspective emphasize the importance of history and culture in shaping the struggle between democracy and authoritarianism. Each edition, for instance, provides a country-by-country historical analysis of Latin American, including Haiti, focusing on the development of political culture from the colonial period to the present. The contributions of the different scholars vary in sophistication. In the case of Bolivia, Gamarra and Malloy (1996) focus on bureaucratic patrimonialism and intra-elite factional struggle as the main barriers to effective democratization, which they link to Bolivia's dependent position in the international capitalist economy. While they provide a fairly sophisticated account of the interaction between political traditions, class and group interests and the world economy, their view of history focuses almost entirely upon elites. David Scott Palmer’s (2000) contribution on Peru situates authoritarianism primarily in the ‘Spanish colonial heritage.’ While Palmer emphasizes political fragmentation, elite rivalry, dependence in the international economy, and the exclusion of the ‘Indian subculture’ in creating political instability and sustaining authoritarian traditions, he ultimately fails to explain how historical struggles between different social forces have continuously reproduced and modified the authoritarian tradition in the context of shifting social struggles and patterns of world order.

But the most impoverished account of the barriers to democracy appears in the reappearing contribution on Haiti by Georges Fauriol, a Senior Associate of the Center
Dr. Fauriol identifies multiple causes behind the authoritarian tradition in Haiti, including elite attitudes and the failure of both the political and economic elite to commit themselves to a nation-building project. His main argument, however, focuses on 'the character of society,' which he disparages as illiterate, isolationist, fatalist and rooted in voodoo. "More African and Creole than French," Fauriol (2000: 567) writes about Haiti's culture, "more illiterate than not, and historically more isolated than any other country in the Caribbean, Haitian culture has to a degree generated an enduring demoralized attitude regarding the nation's potential." Fauriol's crude reductionist account of Haitian culture could easily be dismissed were it not for his important position at the CSIS and the IRI, which render him an important figure in Washington's policy community on Haiti. In 2001, Fauriol led a delegation of the IRI to Haiti, an organization whose presence was denounced by many actors – including the U.S. Ambassador at the time – for undermining democracy in that country.

What all of these narratives have in common is that they tend to focus on culture and elites, underestimating the importance of local class struggles and their connection to shifting patterns of world order in shaping particular state forms. Like the more mainstream accounts of the democratization paradigm, the role of the United States is generally seen as positive and the relation between capitalism and democracy as reinforcing. Cultural traditions are reified as social forces in their own right and static notions of class pervade the analysis.

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106 The CSIS is a Washington-based think tank, which, according to its web-site, is "dedicated to finding ways for America to sustain its prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world." Its list of conservative scholars includes Howard Wiarda, a Senior Associate.
What is required to counter such problem-solving narratives is an historical approach that analyzes the importance of social struggles in reproducing and modifying state forms according to hegemonic ideologies and evolving patterns of resistance inscribed in the world capitalist system. Viewing history from the perspective of subordinate groups and their struggles against different forms of domination is essential to understanding how particular social orders are configured and re-configured. As Barrington Moore famously stated: “For all students of human society, sympathy with the victims of historical processes and scepticism about the victors’ claims provide essential safeguards against being taken in by the dominant mythology (1966: 593).” The historical analysis of the cases will therefore highlight the role of subordinate groups in struggling against different forms of domination inscribed in unequal social relations, different configurations of state and civil society relations, and evolving patterns of world order.

Specifically, the approach is inspired by the history from below associated with the Gramscian and British Marxist historian traditions within historical materialism, as well as the French Annales tradition\textsuperscript{107} and the early Subaltern Studies Group (SSG). A synthetic approach to these traditions provides another dimension of a cultural political economy that remains embedded in the historical materialist tradition.\textsuperscript{108} If the SSG increasingly took a post-structuralist turn, however, there is still a need – as the Latin American historian Florencia Mallon argues – to “tie earlier perceptions about the

\textsuperscript{107} See Kaye (1984) for an excellent overview of what the British Marxist historians share in common with their French Annales counterparts.

\textsuperscript{108} The SSG, which was originally inspired by Gramsci’s writings on history, such as Notes on Italian History, has gone the furthest in rejecting elite history in favour of perspective that emphasizes the role of social struggles between ’subaltern’ and dominant groups in shaping historical developments. Scholars in this tradition follow the Indian historian Ranajit Guha (1988) in defining subalterns in terms of the general
capitalist world system, labour, and peasantries to emerging concerns about culture and power" (1993). While neo-Gramscians tend to focus their own analyses primarily on the international political economy, Cox’s historicist ontology of social structure provides a bridge to conceptualizing the link between history as it is shaped from below and the pressures of the international environment.

**Colonialism and rebellion in the old order**

From this theoretical vantage point, I begin the overview of the different social struggles that have defined the historical trajectories of each country up until the recent democratic transitions. The organization of the narrative is based on a periodization of shifting patterns of stability and change in the social orders of the cases throughout three historical epochs: 1) the colonial period, in which the patterns of social relations and the structure of the economy were initially established; 2) the post-colonial period until the Second World War, during which time the elites of each country failed to lead a nation-building project that might have partially transcended the social divisions inherited from the past, and 3) the postwar era until the late 1970s, when each country advanced a different solution to unresolved social contradictions.

In terms of the social structures of accumulation that were established in the colonial period, the slave mode of production established by the French in the colony of Sainte Domingue was considerably different from the neo-feudal system that took root on the Spanish mainland. Situated on the western side of the island Hispaniola – one third of its total territory – the French colony of Sainte Domingue grew to be the most profitable colonial territory in the world, providing France with its main source of primitive capital.
accumulation. French planters in Sainte Domingue in turn provided the greatest individual market for the European slave trade. The whole social structure rested upon the labour of about half a million African slaves, whose numbers were maintained by the perpetual arrival of new slaves who could be worked to death and exhaustion by unscrupulous plantation owners (James 1963).

On the continental mainland, the Spanish Crown established a neo-feudal system of labour control, the *encomienda*, in the Viceroyalties of Peru and Mexico after conquering the peoples and advanced civilizations of the land. The system subordinated, but did not destroy, the traditional communal economy, which was protected in part by the mountainous landscape. As Hahn (1992) argues, the colonial system led to the creation of a hybrid social formation based on the articulation of two separate modes of production – a capitalist mode associated with the Spanish colonizers and an indigenous mode linked to the *ayllus*, or communal lands. While labour and taxes were extracted by colonial authorities and many Indians were pushed off their land by large landowners, or *hacendados*, colonialism was, in the words of the historian Herbert Klein (2003), “fundamentally postulated on the idea of the preservation of the pre-existent Indian society and government.”

In the Viceroyalty of Peru, the Spanish reformed the traditional mandatory public service requirement of the Inca Empire, the *mita*, to force indigenous peoples to work in lucrative mines such as those in Potosí (as well as a small number of African slaves). Colonialism also institutionalized new patterns of inequality in gender relations. In pre-Colombian culture, women were considered minors or adolescents (*sulka*) but they still managed to maintain an important status in the community. Within the *ayllu*, the social way.
pressures of the conquest exerted a particularly detrimental affect on the status of the indigenous woman, who, as the population declined, was transformed into a reproductive commodity and were often held responsible for the suffering and problems of men (Choque Quispe, Taff and Stephenson 1998).

The growing bankruptcy of both the Spanish and French monarchies as each sought, ineffectively, to prevent the rise of the much more dynamic and capitalist-driven expansion of the British Empire, led to the first deep fissures in the colonial system in both Sainte Domingue and the Andean region. In the Spanish colonial territories, the so-called Great Rebellion, which lasted from 1780 to 1781, was first launched in the Quechua-speaking areas north of Lake Titicaca under the leadership of a local trader, José Gabriel Condorcanqui, who, claiming descent from the last Inca king, took the name Tupaj Amaru.109 The insurrection engulfed the entire countryside in the territories now known as southern Peru and the Bolivian highlands, with more than 80,000 Indians mobilized in the struggle to create a more just social order. In the Aymara highlands of Bolivia, an unknown peasant from the town of Macha, Tomás Katari, overthrew the colonial governor, adopting the name Tupaj Katari to identify himself with his Quechua counterpart. The rebellion gave rise to multiple utopian social visions that continue to define resistance movements to the present day. Indigenous women also played a crucial role in the uprising, serving both in the ranks and as officers, particularly the wives and sisters of the principal male rebels and female members of the native political hierarchy but also peasant women (Campbell 1985). The rebellion was brutally crushed, but the

109 The rebellion was linked to the Bourbon Reforms implemented by the Spanish Crown in the 1770s, which intensified colonial extraction and managed to alienate the Indian, Creole and Mestizo populations.
tradition of Indigenous self-determination and revolutionary resistance continues to inform indigenous movements to this day.

In Sainte Domingue, revolutionary ideals began circulating in the colony as France underwent its own social revolution in the final decades of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century. The mûlatre elite – which had always constituted a privileged commercial class under colonial rule – were the first to make demands on the part of colonial authorities for increased rights. When their overtures were rebuffed, they entered into an uneasy alliance with slave revolutionaries led by the charismatic leader, Toussaint de l'Ouverture. A period of intense warfare was unleashed as the revolutionaries mobilized the slave population, including women, against French planters; when the rebels finally defeated the armies of Napoleon Bonaparte, dispatched to quash the insurrection originally undertaken in the name of the Republic, Sainte Domingue – rechristened Haiti – declared its independence in 1804. With this decisive act, the revolutionaries forever entered the historical record of humanity as having led the only revolutionary overthrow of a slave society.\textsuperscript{110}

Not long after the revolution in Haiti, the Creole caste in the Spanish colonies would find a second opportunity to end Spanish domination and expel the Iberian overlords – though they would carefully avoid rallying the Indian population to their cause.\textsuperscript{111} After defeating royalist forces in Peru, San Martín proclaimed the country's independence in 1821. Bolivia quickly followed suit, gaining its independence in 1825. As in Haiti, however, the new states that emerged from the ashes of the colonial order reinvigorated old patterns of exploitation at the expense of subaltern classes and ethnic

\textsuperscript{110} Soon after, the antagonistic class and racial interests in the former colony erupted into open conflict when the two factions which led the war of independence became mired in their own civil war.

\textsuperscript{111} The heroes of the movement, Simón Bolívar and José de San Martín, received weapons and soldiers from the newly independent Haitian people before launching a successful offensive against Spain that led to the independence of Venezuela in 1817.
groups, repudiating the radical social visions associated with the popular insurrections of the 1780s. Despite struggles to democratize the historic structures inherited from the past, the social order remained rooted in coercion.

Postcolonial nation-building

Mallon (1995) refers to the period from 1780 to 1930 as Latin America’s ‘long nineteenth century,’ in which the region experienced and struggled with the twin processes of transition to capitalism and nation-state creation. From the perspective of the creation of a hegemonic order, the quandary with which Latin American leaders were confronted was whether it would be possible to construct a nation, that is, a community whose members were legally equal citizens out of a society based on colonial regional divisions and ethnic hierarchies. We may add that the two crucial dimensions of this question were: 1) the extent to which elites were prepared to institutionalize forms of consensus-based governance between themselves; and 2) the degree to which subaltern classes would be integrated into the nation as equal citizens. As such, a successful nation-building project presupposed a certain degree of democratization. From the perspective of the ruling classes of Peru and Bolivia, the ‘Indian problem’ defined the political agenda well into the twentieth century. In Haiti, the dilemma revolved around the incorporation of the newly-constituted peasantry into the political life of the nation. In all three countries, liberal constitutions inspired by enlightenment ideals were promulgated, but the systems of production remained rooted in the exploitation of the subordinated classes. A non-hegemonic solution to the problem of nation-building emerged, with political consequences that extend to the present era. When the democratic transitions did finally occur, the social contradictions associated with highly unequal historic structures
continued to undermine the possibilities of stable patterns of governance. Democracy assistance programs have sought to overcome this instability by increasing the ability of dominant classes and political elites to lead hegemically.

Haiti’s early rulers supported the maintenance of the plantation-export model to restore the country’s economy, establishing a tradition of paternalistic and patriarchal rule which underpinned the new social order. The peasantry resisted, refusing to accept the replacement of their white masters by ones of a darker skin. Despite their role in the revolution, women were also systematically excluded from the new political order and were legally deemed minors – a status that lasted until 1979 (Charles 1995). Only a small fraction of the black military succeeding at transforming itself into a class of landowners, the _grandons_, which managed to control the labour of impoverished peasants though a semi-feudal system called the _metayage_. Despite the presence of this form of _grande exploitation_, the _petite exploitation_ associated with the small peasantry predominated in the countryside.

Although plantation sugar production remained peripheral, the peasantry increasingly resorted to small-scale coffee production to obtain cash for basic necessities. On the basis of this production, the black military elite, landowners and the urban-based commercial _mulatres_ grafted a new system of exploitation. In the new system of surplus extraction, the urban-based _mulatres_ used their privileged access to international markets to position themselves as interlocutors with the peasantry and the _grandons_, purchasing coffee – often through middlemen _spéculateurs_ – at steadily declining prices throughout the nineteenth century. The state added to the parasitic arrangement by creating a network of customs houses to heavily tax the flow of coffee-cash exchanges, securing the material basis for the black political and military elite to reproduce itself. Much of the
surplus was also used to pay off a ‘compensation’ of some 150 million francs imposed by France for the loss of its slaves.\textsuperscript{112}

Despite the scorn heaped upon Haiti’s *commercants* and political elites by western colonial powers, the comprador classes were in no position to challenge Haiti’s dependent status in the world economy. Trade relations were therefore reconstituted on an extremely unequal basis, with the United States replacing France as the country’s main trading partner. To protect the Haitian market from European – particularly German – encroachment, U.S. Navy ships enforced a policy of gunboat diplomacy, landing in Haitian waters a total of 24 times between 1849 and 1913 (Chomsky 1993). Quite apart from the external contradictions associated with its position in a world order based on white supremacy, the merchant-state alliance rested on precarious internal foundations. As the state increasingly took on a prebendary or parasitic form in which political office served the primary function of economic accumulation, competition for the spoils of state became fierce (Dupuy 1997). The ‘recurring crisis’ reached its apex between August 1911 and July 1915, when six presidents followed each other in rapid succession (Trouillot 1990: 99).

In Peru and Bolivia, successive Creole presidents opted for what the historian Mark Thurner (1996) refers to as a ‘selective project of decolonization’ and state formation, in which the social pact established by colonial authorities was rapidly undermined as communal lands came under increasing attack by *hacendados*. With the Creoles monopolizing political power, various land acts were passed in both countries and the peasantry found itself having to confront the demands of the landowners without

\textsuperscript{112} Haiti was forced to borrow from French banks at exorbitant interests rates to make the payments, the last instalment of which was received in 1947 (Hallward 2004).
the limited forms of protection traditionally offered by the Crown. In some cases, the abolition of customary rights of the indigenous population was conceived of as a project of enlightened liberalism, designed to transform Indian tributaries into propertied citizens. Although some short-lived governments sought to restrict the abuses associated with what is sometimes referred to as a policy of ethnocide (Platt 1987), a weak oligarchic state whose material base rested on the taxation of the peasantry began to take root. From the 1840s to the 1870s, a succession of caudillos came to power based on precarious alliances between different elite factions.

In the absence of a durable social compromise with the indigenous population, rebellions continued throughout the postcolonial period. Such rebellions were particularly acute in times of national crisis, when indigenous groups articulated radical conceptions of society that clashed with the post-colonial order. Such was the case during the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) in Peru (Mallon 1995) and the Federal War (1898) in Bolivia (Hylton and Thomson 2007), when indigenous groups sided with particular factions in inter-elite conflicts. In both cases, however, indigenous communities were abandoned by their elite allies once their political usefulness had run its course. In the aftermath of both conflicts, a brutal wave of repression ensued as the elites closed ranks against the indigenous population. Even these forms of inter-elite alliance were short-lived, however, with political instability constituting the norm well into the twentieth century. In the absence of a serious effort to ‘hegemonize’ (Mallon 1995: 15) state power, social conflict shaped both inter-elite relations and the relation between the state and subaltern classes.

At the level of the world economy, the decline of Pax Britannica brought with it new opportunities for the penetration of American capital throughout Latin America. In
1897, direct U.S. investment totalled only $308 million – by 1914, it had reached $1.2 billion and, by 1929, U.S. investment soared to $3.5 billion (O'Brien 1999). In the Andes, U.S. capital targeted two growing sectors in the mining industry – copper in Peru and tin in Bolivia. Although Bolivian oligarchs retained control over mineral companies, U.S. banks provided most of the financing for the development of transportation networks and modernization of mining infrastructure. Profits of the tin companies were also invested abroad, with the largest Bolivian-owned company, the Patiño Mines and Enterprises Inc. (PMECI), for instance, being incorporated in Delaware (Gallo 1991).

U.S. interests also predominated in the hydrocarbon sector, with Standard Oil of New Jersey consolidating massive holdings in the early 1920s. When economic recession hit in the mid 1920s, U.S. banks began overseeing the collection of Bolivia’s taxes and custom receipts and played a direct role in setting government fiscal policies (Lehman 1999). In Peru, the long-standing tradition of state ownership of the mines was broken in 1901 when a new Mining Code opened up the sector to foreign investment. U.S. capital was attracted by one of the most liberalized regimes in Latin America, as Liberal presidents sought to modernize the Peruvian economy under U.S. guidance (O’Brien 1999). The U.S. multinational, Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation, came to dominate the mining industry for the next several decades. The corporation also began purchasing the lands around its mines and, by the 1930s, formally joined the ranks of the hacendados when it became Peru’s single largest landowner (Becker 1983).

Although Canadian interests in Haiti, Bolivia, and Peru were minimal well into the postwar era, it should be noted that Canadian banks predominated in the English Caribbean throughout much of the late nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. The Canadian state protected such interests vigorously, and in many cases sent troops to help
British authorities re-establish order during periods of political unrest (examples include Bermuda from 1914-1916, St. Lucia from 1915-1919, and Jamaica from 1940-1946) (Engler 2009). During this period, Canada also established a small presence in the mining sector when Canadian-based capital took over the British company, Peruvian Corporation, which owned the railway (Becker 1983) (though Canadian foreign investment remained minimal until the 1990s).

U.S. political dominance was exerted directly only in its own backyard in the Central American and the Caribbean region, where a string of invasions and occupations were launched from the early 1900s to the 1930s. In Haiti, the ‘reoccurring crisis’ served as the immediate pretext for a U.S. invasion in 1915, when Woodrow Wilson dispatched the U.S. Marines on Haitian soil for the first time in the island’s history. Among other things, the Marines protected U.S. corporations that had bought up huge tracts of land, the Haitian American Sugar Company (HASCO) and United Fruit, against growing peasant revolts (Castor and Garafola 1974). The ensuing occupation lasted nearly twenty-years. The American military regime implemented what Hallward (2004: 27) refers to as Haiti’s first structural adjustment program, reorganizing the economy to the mutual interest of U.S. capital and large landowners. This period also marks the beginning of Haiti’s debt problem, which reached $40 million to the United States alone by the time the Marines left in 1934 (Farmer 2003:101). But the most ominous consequence of the U.S. occupation was the reorganization of the Haitian military and the increased centralization of the Haitian state. Up until then, the Haitian military was strongly nationalistic and saw itself as the heir to the revolution and the struggle to overthrow slavery. The military was repressive, but repression was not its exclusive raison d’être. With the dismissal of the
old military and its replacement by the gendarmerie, the military became the crude
instrument of class domination.\textsuperscript{113}

More than anything, the U.S. occupation should be seen as a response to the
inability of Haiti’s ruling class to secure Haiti’s pattern of dependent accumulation for the
mutual benefit of Haitian and American capital. With the constant infighting between
different factions for control of the state, the United States intervened to create a power
bloc capable of maintaining Haiti’s explosive contradictions through a revamped coercive
state apparatus. The mûlatres benefited the most from the intervention as the black
political elite were increasingly shunted aside by racist American occupiers.\textsuperscript{114}

Hegemony – even in the narrow sense of compromise exclusively between fractions of
the ruling class to stabilize the regime of accumulation – was substituted for a temporary
supremacy.

The U.S. occupation of Haiti thus provides the most graphic illustration of the
elected affinity that governed the shared interests of U.S. capital and local dominant
classes in the emerging Pax Americana. These interests were antithetical to any degree of
democratization of the highly unequal social structures inherited from the colonial past.
In this phase of the world system, there was little pretence about creating democratic
structures in peripheral states and social contradictions were repressed through naked
force. Although the dominant classes in Peru and Bolivia were able to contain social
contradictions through repressive oligarchic states with little external support, Haiti’s
particular social structure of accumulation rendered stable patterns of elite rule nearly

\textsuperscript{113} Both Georges Fauriol (2006) and the historian, Philippe Girard (Girard 2005), have characterized the
occupation as a benevolent response to massive political instability. They overlook the obvious ways in
which American authorities reconfigured class power and race relations to the mutual benefit of the United
States and the local mûlatre elite.
impossible. Due to its geographic proximity to the United States and extremely subordinate position in the world economy, a dependent relation was formed between Haiti’s dominant class and the U.S. state that was unparalleled in the more remote and inward-looking republics of Peru and Bolivia. This point is particularly important when assessing the configuration of power relations that has led to specific forms of democracy promotion designed to stabilize neoliberal polyarchy in the current conjuncture. In effect, the interventionist forms of democracy promotion that later developed in Haiti are part of a long-standing pattern of U.S. interventionism that has served the mutual interests of dominant classes and U.S. capital.

**The attempt to resolve the national question in the postwar era**

With the failure of elite factions to establish any form of hegemony in the three countries well into the first half of the twentieth century, mounting social pressures led to different attempts to resolve the national question in the postwar era. In the Andean countries, the expansion of the mining sector, the increased proletarianization of the indigenous peasantry, and the growth of a small urban middle class exacerbated social tensions as workers and peasants began to organize in cross-class alliances. Under the leadership of the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (MNR) in Bolivia – the country’s first mass-based party – an alliance of these two forces would culminate in the 1952 revolution. In Peru, the emergence of its own mass-based party in the mid-1920s, the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA), similarly coincided with growing agitation on the part of peasants and workers, though it was the military which eventually

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114 The head of the occupation, Marine Colonel L.W.T. Waller, was particularly renowned for his racial hatred of black people (Chomsky 1993).
sought to put an end to the country’s national problem in the revolution of 1968.\textsuperscript{115} Although both parties were influenced by radical socialist currents, they were led primarily by pragmatic middle class intellectuals committed to a \textit{mestizaje} view of the nation as a cultural synthesis of European and indigenous traditions.\textsuperscript{116} Haiti’s historical trajectory followed an altogether different path. There, the supremacy of the \textit{mûlatre} elite led to an increased sense of black identity expressed through \textit{noirist} ideology on the part of different segments of Haitian society excluded from the new power arrangement. But instead of being channeled in a national-popular direction, a black politician and \textit{noirist} intellectual, François ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier, came to power in 1957, instituting what has since become known as the archetypical neo-fascist third world dictatorship (Trouillot 1990).

In Bolivia, the alliance between the MNR and the militant \textit{Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia} (FTSMB) – a mining federation founded in 1944 – constituted the most decisive force behind the revolution. Led by the middle class intellectual, Victor Paz Estenssoro, the MNR seized state power on the basis of mass support from the FTSMB and the emerging peasant unions in April 1952. Within weeks of the revolution, a union central, the \textit{Central Obrera Boliviana} (COB), was established to serve as a parallel government alongside the revolutionary state. A series of progressive measures were passed, including land reform, which broke up the powerful estates. Bolivia’s mines were nationalized with the newly-formed parastatal,

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{115} Radical parties were also established in Peru and Bolivia during this period, including the Peruvian Socialist Party in 1928 by José Carlos Mariátegui – Latin America’s most renowned early Marxist theorist. Mariátegui articulated one of the first modern popular democratic visions in the Americas, incorporating the concerns of the working class, peasantry, indigenous population, and women within his party (Valente 2008).
\end{footnotesize}
Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL), consolidating its control of most of the mining industry (Gotkowitz 2007).

The revolution of 1952 initially represented a radical rupture with the power of the *hacendados* and tin barons and the legacy of U.S. imperialism. Dominant commercial classes and right-wing factions in the military remained powerful, however, and Paz’s vice president, General René Barrientos, launched a coup in 1964. With the support of the CIA, the coup put an end to fears that the COB leadership and the leftist faction of the MNR would reassert control over the revolutionary process. To counter the influence of the miners, Barrientos strengthened ties with the peasantry in what is commonly referred to as the Military-Peasant Pact. The San Juan massacre of June 1967 in which 87 striking miners were killed by the state in northern Potosí sealed the isolation of the workers (Nash 2001: 189). With the death of Barrientos in 1969, leftist military generals temporarily took control of the state, with General Torres launching a radical initiative to revive the revolutionary process in the form of the Popular Assembly of 1971. The assembly, which was organized along the lines of a soviet, represented, according to Mayorga and Gorman (1978), “the most serious attempt realized by the working class of Bolivia or Latin America to organize itself as state power.” But the assembly was short-lived as conservative factions in the Bolivian military reasserted control under the presidency of Hugo Banzer Suárez.¹¹⁷

The *banzerato*, which lasted from 1971 to 1980, signified the coming of age of a new agricultural elite based in the fertile eastern lowlands, particularly in Santa Cruz de la

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¹¹⁶ They also discouraged women’s active involvement in politics and contributed to the marginalization of women’s voices until a second-wave of feminism came of age in the late 1970s, most notably in Peru (Valente 2008).

¹¹⁷ Torres fled into exile in Argentina, where he was assassinated in Buenos Aires by the henchmen of the military junta under Operation Condor (McSherry 2005).
Sierra. In this region, land reform in the wake of the revolution was barely carried out and traditional haciendas were increasingly converted into extensive agro-businesses (Eaton 2007). Under the dominance of the cruceño elite, which sought state protection of its coffee, sugar and petroleum holdings, the state returned to its traditional policy of repression against both peasants and workers.118

Peru’s attempt at resolving the national crisis did not occur until 1968, when General Juan Velasco Alvarado launched a coup d’etat in an attempt to restructure the state, economy and political system. Although the impetus came from radical factions in the military, the revolution was still rooted in organized labour and peasant associations, particularly the closely-aligned Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP) and the Confederación Campesina del Peru (CCP). Moderate sectors of the petty bourgeoisie and nascent industrialists also opposed the traditional oligarchy and aligned with the military (Bamat 1983). From 1969 to 1975, the Velasco government nationalized most of Peru’s large-scale mining operations and implemented an ambitious land-reform initiative. The new corporatist arrangements also sought to empower workers much further than in the Bolivian case, with the government granting part of the utility and shares of nationalized enterprises to workers, who were included on managerial boards. An import-substitute industrialization program constituted the cornerstone of the revolutionary program, with industrial production increasing at 9.1 percent per year from 1969-1975 (Becker 1983: 24). U.S. investment by 1975 was down by approximately 40 percent from the Belaúnde period, with several U.S. multinationals – including Cerro de Pasco Corporation and Marcona Mining Company – suffering

118 The Massacre of the Valley in Cochabamba in January 1974 in which between 80 to 200 peasants were killed by the state for protesting the removal of subsidies under an early IMF program signified, this time
expropriation (McClintock and Vallas 2002: 27). Peru’s socialistic military government during this period constituted a considerable regional anomaly as virtually all of its neighbors were under the control of right-wing military governments closely aligned with the United States.

The reformist policies of the military government led to the political and economic decline of the landowners and traditional oligarchy. But the emerging bourgeoisie also became weary of the project of popular mobilization and government expropriation of foreign enterprises. In the end, Velasco’s reform project conducted under the banner of national development, the mestizo nation, and class conciliation provoked a sharp polarization of social forces—failing to recruit either the bourgeoisie or the people. In a bloodless coup, Velasco was deposed by a right-wing faction in the military, led by his prime minister, General Morales Bermúdez, who moved back to the political centre and re-established good relations with the United States (Bamat 1983).

In Haiti, progressive social forces never succeeded at capturing state power in the postwar era – even for a limited period of time. Civil society remained extremely weak and the state continued to be pitted against the nation in the interests of the political-merchant alliance. As the Haitian-American political scientist, Robert Fatton (2002), emphasizes, one major factor behind the weakness of civil society and the lack of mass parties was the near absence of a working class, which, in Latin America, has historically served as the main protagonist behind democratic reform. In this context, the Duvalier dictatorship – which lasted until 1986 and included both Papa Doc and Jean-Claude ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier – formalized the recurrent crisis by freezing the patterns of social around, the abandonment of the peasantry.
relations through constant repression, rendering what was once the exceptional response to periods of unrest the new state of normalcy.

The backbone of the dictatorship, the infamous *Tonton Macoutes*, served as a national militia and secret police to counter the traditional military elite and terrorize the population into passive support of the regime. The indiscriminate use of violence by militiamen enjoying complete impunity against real or imagined opponents of the regime – including traditionally protected sectors of society such as women, children, and the elderly – consolidated a chronic state of fear. Under the Duvalierist state, gender oppression committed by the state was redefined as women were systematically targeted and held accountable not only for their own actions, but also for those of their relatives (Charles 1995). Intellectuals and professionals were a favoured target of the regime. In total, estimates of the number of people killed range between 30,000 to 50,000 (Trouillot 1990). Duvalierism sought to legitimize its naked repression through a popular anti-American, anti-mulatre discourse and state ideology grounded in *vaudouisaint* mythology.

While Duvalier’s nationalist rhetoric and blatant use of terror may have at times irritated Washington, he remained careful not to challenge the interests of American capital.119 Domestically, the regime found its most important support amongst the black political elite and the small, albeit influential, class of *grandons*. Through import substitution policies, moreover, the state established several public monopolies which provided it with new sources of revenue and reinforced its links with a small class of

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119 Even in his first four years of power when the nationalist rhetoric was as its height, Duvalier received $40 million in aid from the U.S. government for obliging his benefactor by blocking Cuba from admission to the OAS in 1962 (Farmer 2003) ($40 million was also the amount of Haiti’s total debt in 1970) (Schuller 2006).
nascent industrialists (Fass 1988). By the late 1960s, the stage was set for a new phase in Haitian history, when a period of rapprochement between the United States and Haitian state coincided with the brutal repression that followed the implementation of the Anti-Communist Law by Papa Doc in 1969. That same year, Nelson Rockefeller's visit to Haiti encouraged the mulatre to begin abandoning their (largely unjustified) suspicion of the Duvalier regime and the traditional pact between the United States and Haiti was reaffirmed. The pact was sealed when President Nixon sent U.S. vessels to patrol the shore-line to ensure the peaceful inauguration of Baby Doc in 1971 (Trouillot 1990: 204).

Thus, in Haiti, Peru, and Bolivia, very different solutions to the historical problem of non-hegemonic orders developed in the postwar era. These solutions reflected evolving social relations and the formation of new class and social actors in civil and political society. In none of these countries, however, did popular forces succeed at creating a democratic historic bloc capable of institutionalizing a more democratic order. As we turn to the period of democratic transition, we will see how pressures from the emerging neoliberal world order would provide new opportunities for democratization in all three countries, though the social structures of accumulation and domination, the forms of state, and the position in world order would continue to restrict the possibilities for genuine democracy.

II. Neoliberalism and the transition to democracy

If the attempt to resolve the national problem took on different forms in each of the countries, the people of Haiti, Bolivia, and Peru all found themselves under the unsympathetic rule of dictators by the late 1970s. Each would find new opportunities and possibilities – as well as constraints – as a new cycle of social protest swept across the
region and paved the way for the transition to democracy. Yet the social orders that emerged from this process reproduced the patterns of class exploitation as subordinate groups were unable to challenge the imposition of neoliberal polyarchy as a hegemonic project. In each country, the struggle for a deeper democratic order was inhibited by a combination of internal and external factors, as it had always been in the past. In Haiti, where neoliberalism preceded the democratic transition and helped re-galvanize the social movements, the most coherent democratic alternative emerged from within the Lavalas movement. The power of the dominant classes and the weight of U.S. imperial practices would ensure, however, that the new democracy would remain subordinated to transnational capital. As for Peru and Bolivia, where democratic transition also occurred as a result of popular mobilization led by the left, in neither country were popular forces able to articulate an effective response to the growing economic crisis of the early 1980s. In Peru, the rise of a terrorist left precluded a popular alternative as the state slid into a populist authoritarianism representing the interests of dominant fractions of capital. In Bolivia, the political elite created a new exclusionary political system while managing one of the most aggressive neoliberal plans on the continent. As the Bolivian state launched a phase of ‘inclusive neoliberalism’ in the 1990s, it inadvertently contributed to the remobilization of popular groups under the leadership of the indigenous movement.\textsuperscript{120}

At this stage in the history of the countries studied here, Canada also emerged for the first time as an important actor in promoting regional order. In Haiti, where Canadian

\textsuperscript{120} I borrow the term from Craig and Porter (2006), who state that “while retaining core conservative neoliberal macroeconomic and pro-market policy settings, ‘inclusive’ neoliberalism adds ‘positive liberal’ approaches to emphasizing ‘empowerment’ to enable participation (and ensure ‘inclusion’) of countries and people in global and local markets. These include: institution building and an enabling state ensuring global market integration; building human capital via services (health, education); empowering and protecting the rights of the vulnerable through participatory voice and legal access; engendering moral obligations to community and work.”
material interests were quite minimal, it aligned with the United States, the IFIs, and other actors to aggressively promote a neoliberal development model against the wishes of the popular government. The concept of middlepowermanship perhaps best explains this stance. In Peru and Bolivia, Canada developed material interests in the mining sector which informed its support for neoliberal policies. Webber and Gordon (2008) draw upon Harvey’s concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ to interpret the expansion of Canadian mining interests across Latin America beginning in the early 1990s. As the authors point out, the Canadian mining industry is the largest in the world and much of its outward investment targets Latin America. The Canadian companies’ share of the larger company exploration market in Latin America and the Caribbean, for instance, has grown steadily since the early 1990s up to 35% by 2004. Canadian companies have the largest share of all of their competitors, with seven companies placing among the top 20 mineral exploration investors in the region from 1989 to 2001. Canada also supported the neoliberal governments of Bolivia and Peru through generous aid programs, and contributed to U.S.-led security efforts.

By 2000, the configuration of power had evolved in each of the cases, and the prospects for deeper democracy once again shifted. This section will examine the struggles over democratization and the attempt to impose neoliberal polyarchy in the lead up to the new conjuncture. The concluding section will end with a summary of the power configuration that conditioned the form of democracy promotion in each case based on the trends identified in the previous chapter and the historical developments identified here. Specifically, the configuration of local social relations and position in world order will be analyzed as the backdrop for the deployment of EMTs in Haiti and PPTs in Peru and Bolivia at the turn of the millennium.
Before turning to the struggles over democratization and neoliberalism, Tables 10 and 11 provide a comparative statistical portrait of the economies of Haiti, Peru and Bolivia, as well as poverty and inequality at the beginning of the new millennium. The economic statistics provide some indication on how the economies of each country evolved differently between 1975 and 2005.

Table 10: Economic statistics for Haiti, Bolivia, and Peru

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<td>Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (current US$ millions)</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>2,009</td>
<td>2,864</td>
<td>2,908</td>
<td>3,849</td>
<td>4,312</td>
</tr>
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<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>1,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry value added (% of GDP)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>...</td>
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<td>-35</td>
<td>138.1</td>
<td>-47</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt stocks, total (current US$ millions)</td>
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<td>757</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>1,173</td>
<td>1,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI (current US$ millions)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (current US$ millions)</td>
<td>2,405</td>
<td>5,337</td>
<td>4,868</td>
<td>6,715</td>
<td>8,398</td>
<td>9,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita, PPP (US$ thousands)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1,660</td>
<td>2,010</td>
<td>2,510</td>
<td>2,930</td>
<td>4,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry value added (% of GDP)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of payments (US$ millions)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>-387</td>
<td>-161.4</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>-39.4</td>
<td>437.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>External debt stocks, total (current US$ millions)</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>4,805</td>
<td>4,275</td>
<td>5,272</td>
<td>5,785</td>
<td>6,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI (current US$ millions)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>-239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (current US$ millions)</td>
<td>16,413</td>
<td>18,838</td>
<td>26,294</td>
<td>53,674</td>
<td>53,290</td>
<td>79,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita, PPP (US$ thousands)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3,160</td>
<td>3,120</td>
<td>4,110</td>
<td>4,750</td>
<td>5,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry value added (% of GDP)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of payments (US$ millions)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>-1,594</td>
<td>-2,140</td>
<td>-590</td>
<td>-141</td>
<td>1,527</td>
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<tr>
<td>External debt stocks, total (current US$ millions)</td>
<td>6,118</td>
<td>12,884</td>
<td>20,004</td>
<td>30,833</td>
<td>28,639</td>
<td>28,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI (current US$ millions)</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2,557</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>2,579</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As indicated by the figures in Table 10, Bolivia and Haiti have nearly identical population sizes and rates of growth, though Bolivia’s GDP growth has nearly doubled that of Haiti’s. Peru’s economic growth in the 1990s and early 2000s was impressive, though, as we shall see, its benefits have not been shared equally. GNI per capita has
increased in Bolivia and Peru; in Haiti, however, it was actually lower in 2005 than it was in 1985. Although statistics on inequality and poverty over time are unavailable, Table 11 demonstrates that the majority of the population in all three countries has remained below the poverty line and that each is still highly polarized along class lines. Industrial development has been weak in all thee countries and balance of payments fluctuations have reflected the vagaries of commodity prices.

Table 11: Poverty and inequality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Haiti</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>Peru</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population below national poverty line*</td>
<td>Population below national poverty line</td>
<td>Population below national poverty line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income held by poorest 10% (2001)</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>62.7%</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income held by richest 10% (2001)</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The external debt stock for each country has also progressively risen with the exception of Peru in the early 2000s. FDI in Haiti has been modest despite the emphasis on attracting foreign capital in the export manufacturing assembly sector (the large influx of FDI in 2005 represented a revival of the sector during the coup years of the Latortue government). In Peru and Bolivia, in contrast, huge influxes of foreign capital, concentrated mostly in mining and hydrocarbons, began entering the economy in the 1990s with the implementation of privatization and liberalization laws (Bolivia’s negative balance in 2005 was the result of the partial nationalizations initiated by the Morales government). Thus, each country has had different experiences with neoliberal


development strategies reflecting their different resource bases. In none of them, however, has the legacy of dependency, poverty and inequality been overcome. We now turn to an analysis of how neoliberalism has played out differently in each country and how it has interacted with the struggle for democracy.

**Popular democracy and forced neoliberalism in Haiti**

In Haiti, where the neoliberal reforms initiated by Jean-Claude Duvalier triggered the popular democratic movement, an analysis of the democratization process must begin with an examination of the neoliberal project and its early social consequences. Although neoliberalism helped trigger — for the first time in Haiti’s history — the formation of a popular civil society opposed to the state, this opposition was severely constricted by the aggressive class relations rooted in the social relations of production and the forms of imperial dominance related to its position in world order. An early example of reintegration in the emerging global capitalist system, Haiti’s economy was transformed from a heavily-regulated economy into a cheap labour-zone for transnational capital with one of the most liberalized economies in the world. The reconfiguration occurred under the auspices of the so-called American Plan after Jean-Claude Duvalier had inherited the republic from his father. The plan, developed by USAID and launched in the late 1970s, advocated a development strategy predicated on Haiti’s low-wage comparative advantage to foster agro-processing industries (non-traditional agro exports) and assembly manufacturing. In return for implementing the plan, the Haitian government received large amounts of aid and loans from the World Bank and the U.S. government, most of which were used to enrich the Duvalier family (altogether, it is estimated that Papa Doc

* National poverty line statistics for each country were compiled between 1990 and 2005; the specific year
and Baby Doc took $900 million in multinational and bilateral loans for their own individual purposes) (Schuller 2006: 4).

Export manufacturing rapidly increased its share of exports in the so-called Golden Years of the plan, rapidly growing from 14% in 1971 to 58% in 1985. Many of the corporations operating in the sector were U.S.-based, with an initial frenzy of investment leading to the establishment of more than 150 U.S. firms – most of them new – engaging in assembly manufacturing by 1972. Large segments of Haitian capital increasingly integrated themselves into the new circuits of transnational capital, marking a new direction for Haiti’s haute bourgeoisie. Despite the hype surrounding the development potential of this sector, however, its lacklustre results from the very outset should have left little question on its efficacy as a development strategy. Assembly manufacturing failed to expand after 1984, doing little to resolve the unemployment crisis and creating few backward and forward linkages with the rest of the economy.¹²³

As the country’s economy deteriorated, the IFIs continued to lend money to the government, fuelling the corrupt practices of the Duvalier family. In 1980, the IMF lent $22 million to the government, most of which was apparently squandered in the first few weeks of disbursement (Schuller 2006: 3). The allure of employment and the consolidation of large tracts of land necessary for agro-business did induce large numbers of peasants to migrate to the cities, where they were increasingly crowded into some of the worst slums, or bidonvilles, in the hemisphere.¹²⁴ The manufacturing sector could barely absorb the surplus labour. The emphasis on export manufacturing was

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¹²³ Between 1975 and 1981, the Haitian debt quintupled with the assembly enclaves contributing more to the foreign bank accounts of local elites than the revival of the national economy (Dupuy 1997). By 1987, the total debt reached $844 million (Schuller 2006)
complemented by an open trade regime and agricultural policy with equally deleterious effects on the local economy. The local rice market was decimated in 1986, when the IMF demanded that the country lower import tariffs on rice and end support to rice farmers (Dupuy 1997).

The sharp decline in living standards triggered the formation of a civil society opposition, the backbone of which was the *Ti Legliz* ecclesiastical movement whose social base was rooted in the urban poor and the peasantry and whose most charismatic figure was the liberation theologian, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide. At the frontlines of the protests appeared Haitian women from various social classes, whose shared experience of oppression under the Duvalier dictatorship had ironically rendered them more conscious of their political role in Haitian society. On April 3, 1986, more than 30,000 women took to the streets of Port-au-Prince, marking the arrival of the modern women’s movement on the political scene (Charles 1995). At the same time, a new modernist faction tied to the global economy and critical of the corrupt practices of the state began advocating for modest political reforms, hoping to control the terms of the impending transition (Clement 1997). As the protestors increasingly called for the resignation of Duvalier and the immediate introduction of elections, Duvalier succumbed to pressure by the military and fled into exile to France in the winter of 1986. A National Council of Government dominated by the military took power, organizing elections for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. Despite the dominance of the military on the political scene, the constitution of 1987 embodied a deeply democratic vision of society with elections on multiple levels and severe restrictions on executive power. But

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124 One of the most tragic examples of the failure of the export manufacturing sector to provide sufficient and decent jobs for Haiti’s urban poor is Cité Soleil, the country’s largest, poorest slum.
as the popular movement radicalized and increasingly sought the *dechoukaj* (uprooting) of the entire social order, many within Haiti’s liberal elite fraction grew timid and rallied behind the military hardliners to block a potential democratic transition, opting for a strategy of maintaining ‘Duvalierism without the Duvaliers’ through a series of a military dictators (Trouillot 1990).

When presidential elections finally did occur in 1990, Aristide easily won the contest with 67.5 percent of the vote as the head of the popular Lavalas movement which united many of the popular groups in the struggle for democracy.\(^\text{125}\) Aristide’s victory symbolized the failure of U.S. democracy assistance programs, which channelled millions of dollars to elite sectors of the population (Robinson 1996). These programs did not succeed at welding together a hegemonic bloc to counter Lavalasian hegemony in popular civil society since the elites were themselves too divided and their project fundamentally at odds with the popular vision espoused by Lavalas and supported by the majority of the population. For all of Aristide’s fiery rhetoric, however, Lavalas’ actual political program was by no means revolutionary. Philosophically, the Lavalasian project was rooted in the constitution of 1987, which moved well beyond liberal democratic principles by calling for agrarian reform and declaring health care, housing and education, food and social security fundamental human rights. It also provided the blueprint for a radical vision of decentralization which has never been fully implemented (Shuster 2006). Dupuy (2007: 20) labels this political project ‘radical maximalist democracy,’ which he contrasts with the ‘minimalist democracy’ (i.e., polyarchy) supported by segments of the population.

\(^{125}\) Lavalas is Creole for avalanche. As Father Aristide often proclaimed, “Alone we are weak; united we are strong; altogether we are a cleansing torrent.”
dominant class and middle class political parties. But Aristide also confronted the near impossible task of having to reconcile the demands of hostile and contradictory forces, including his constituency rooted in the urban poor and the peasantry, the divided elite, and the military and paramilitary factions (Fatton 2002). Well aware of this precarious position, the Lavalas program called for little more than a modest redistributive social-democratic agenda which did not stray too far from the neoliberal precepts which Aristide himself sanctioned through a renegotiated deal with the IFIs.

Nine months after the election of Aristide, General Cedras led the old authoritarian apparatus in a coup d'état that led to the installation of a junta regime that brutally suppressed the Lavalas movement over the next three years. In a process that Robinson (1996) refers to as the ‘class cleansing’ of civil society, the repressive state apparatus waged an all out war of attrition against the popular movement to purge civil society of any notion that it might have a role to play in the political process. The United States condemned the coup, but noted that Aristide had brought in on himself by alienating civil society. A weak sanctions regime was put in place by the U.S. government and the OAS as the military continued to receive U.S. support.

Given Lavalas’ moderate approach, it is difficult to understand why the elite would again turn to the military to reverse Haiti’s nascent transition. Part of the response certainly lays in the ambiguous cultural identity that much of the elite, particularly its mulatre component, inherited from the slave past. Fatton writes (2002: 53): “the dominant class is conscious of its privileged status in the social order and is bent on

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126 Dupuy (2007) argues that, while Aristide captured and articulated the democratic aspirations of the popular movement between 1987-91, his theocratic view of politics combined with his and his cadre’s class interests and the constraints of the domestic and world-systemic structures of power led him to break with the agenda of the mass movement. We will examine this argument in more detail in the following chapter.
defending it. It has an adversary position toward subordinate classes, whom it regards with scorn and fear. Even when this class views poverty as a serious issue, Thomaz’s (2005) research demonstrates that elites tend to view the black majority as the ‘other,’ emphasizing cultural factors such as language and religion as the main causes of their poverty. While elements of a shared culture certainly do exist, this has not translated into the notion of a national interest, even defined in narrow ideological terms as the hegemonic project of the dominant class. In an interview in Port-au-Prince, the Prime Minister of Haiti from 2002 to 2004, Yvon Neptune, went so far as to identify the dominant class as a foreign elite with virtually no community of interest amongst itself that acts no differently than any other foreign investor whose main interest is to maximize profit and avoid paying taxes.

By 1994, key policymakers in the Clinton administration decided to take the initiative and return Aristide to power rather than wait for the Haitian elite to craft the terms of its own transition. Bowing to domestic pressure from the African American community – including the Congressional Black Caucus – to end the human rights fiasco that was leading to an influx of Haitian boat people on the shores of Miami, Clinton launched Operation Uphold Democracy to restore Aristide to power. As anticipated, the military action was met with little resistance. Although there is much debate on the precise causes of the U.S. intervention, the new politics of democratic world order unquestionably received additional impetus by domestic concerns triggered by the

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127 Interview: July 17, 2008.
128 Anyone who has spent time in Pétion-Ville, Port-au-Prince’s wealthy suburb, with Haiti’s elite can attest to the deep antipathy that is typically felt towards the vast majority of the population. It does not take much time before the typical member of the dominant class – with varying degrees of contempt – will explain to the uninitiated foreigner that the country’s real problem results from its uneducated and ignorant masses who are not yet prepared to govern themselves democratically.
refugee crisis, as well as the recent embarrassing retreat of American soldiers in Somalia (Dupuy 1997).

Aristide’s reinstatement provided the United States with the perfect opportunity to usurp the decision-making prerogatives of the government by imposing a neoliberal program that would constrain the Lavalas movement and encourage the dominant classes to cooperate with the newly-restored President. The basis for the internationalization of state decision-making was contained in the very negotiations that brought Aristide back to power. Operation Uphold Democracy was predicated on the condition that Aristide accept the Emergency Economic Recovery Program (EERP), formulated by the usual cast of suspects – the World Bank, IMF, Inter-American Development Bank and USAID – at a meeting in Paris. Once more, the program called for an export-led manufacturing approach that would take advantage of Haiti’s comparative advantage – cheap labour, and an agricultural program based on cash crop-production (Robinson 1996).

It was at this juncture that Canada began taking a much more active role in Haiti following the coup and the restoration of Aristide. Together with the United States, France, and Venezuela, Canada was one of the group of ‘Four Friends’ which helped broker the Governors Islands Accords. Canada played a major role in sustaining a UN peacekeeping operation, both financially and in terms of personnel (Fonseca 2005). Although its support to Aristide was unequivocal, its commitment to democracy was attenuated by its support for the political and economic conditionalities that were a condition for Aristide’s return. Neufeld (1999) explains Canada’s considerable involvement in Haiti during this period in terms of its evolving approach to middlepowermanship in which foreign policy objectives were increasingly formulated in terms of supporting Pax Americana and the neoliberal world order. While Canadian
investment in Haiti remained minimal, cultural ties (largely because of the large size of the Canadian-Haitian population) between the two countries provided the Canadian state with an important opportunity to contribute to the effort to stabilize neoliberal order in a troubled country.\(^{129}\)

The EERP also called for the mass privatization of Haitian state enterprises, which were deemed corrupt and inefficient. While this was undoubtedly true, Aristide had advocated turning them into cooperatives to benefit the masses rather than a small group of private interests (Hallward 2007). The international plan was thus a direct violation of the modest political and economic vision for which the Haitian population had voted for prior to the coup.\(^{130}\) To stabilize the situation, the monopoly of violence was transferred to external authorities as a series of UN missions were deployed to keep the peace. While external forces did little to dismantle the paramilitaries, Aristide did move courageously to abolish the military against the direct opposition of the United States (Stotzky 1997).

Although the international strategy considerably weakened the Lavalas movement by forcing it to adopt a program that was opposed by its grassroots constituency, the elite opposition once again failed to coalesce into a force capable of challenging Lavalas' dominant position in political society. Elite political parties remained fragmented as leaders constantly shifted their political allegiances and underwent repeated realignments depending upon opportunistic calculations of personal gain. Ultimately, however, it was

\(^{129}\) Throughout the 2000s, direct Canadian economic interests in Haiti increased significantly with the presence of companies like SNC-Lavalin and Gildan Activewear. Fenton (2005) argues that these companies benefited significantly from Aristide's second ouster in 2004, at which point they expanded their operations and were rewarded new contracts under the coup government supported by Canada, the United States, and France. This topic will be addressed in the following chapter.

\(^{130}\) Had Haiti's 'Friends' been serious about alleviating endemic poverty, they might have, as Shamsie (2007) emphasizes, encouraged a sustainable agricultural policy that would have funneled resources to the peasantry to enhance local subsistence production. Lavalas itself had called for increased support to the
Haiti’s internal political practices rooted in its polarized social formation and the toll of neoliberal reforms that led to the weakening of Lavalasian dominance in political society as the 1990s drew to a close. The first rift in the party structure occurred in 1995 when Lavalas split into two main groups: Fanmi Lavalas (FL) – composed primarily of Aristide supporters and resistant to the neoliberal reform program – and Organisation Politique Lavalas (OPL; later renamed Organisation du Peuple en Lutte) – composed of many prominent intellectuals and openly supportive of privatization and deregulation. The issue of privatization was the defining political question of the second half of the 1990s and the one around which the OPL-FL facture formally crystallized.

Though many in OPL were legitimately concerned by Aristide’s personalistic style of rule and the traditional practices of one-manism, as Fatton (2002) argues, the internecine internal struggles that resulted in the fragmentation of Lavalas reflected the desire of petit bourgeois and intellectual notables to capture the state as a means of enhancing their class status. OPL thus provided a new vehicle for politicians seeking to access state power for personal gain. The alliance with the United States and the neoliberal project enhanced the bargaining power of OPL leaders and their ability to extract concessions on the part of the Lavalasian government. Additionally, the Lavalasian base in popular civil society was weak and unable to counter the superior organizational and material capacity of the dominant class. The popular bloc, rooted primarily in the precarious social conditions of the lumpen poor, succumbed to the burdens of extreme scarcity and proved unable to act politically beyond the short term (Fatton 2002). The old politics of the parasitic state so deeply rooted in Haiti’s polarized

peasantry in the form of micro-credit, state-led cooperatives, extended irrigation and land reform to improve the lot of the peasantry (Dupuy 1997).
social structure of accumulation and climate of material scarcity thus prevailed against the democratic aspirations of the mass social movements. Aristide did manage to gain considerable support from the peasantry, but many of its leaders grew disillusioned with his acceptance of structural adjustment programs. As Hallward (2004: 34) notes, many of Haiti’s most significant peasant organizations condemned FL for its cooperation with structural adjustment and accused it of becoming anti-populaire. But in distancing themselves from FL, such groups contributed to the demobilization of the Lavalas base which served as the last bulwark against the internal and external elites aligned to the neoliberal project.\textsuperscript{131}

Despite the external pressures and its own internal divisions, FL did achieve some major accomplishments, particularly in the area of justice, where it courageously went after key human rights violators for the first time in Haitian history, dismantled the FADH, and abolished the hated chef de section, which had long served as the instrument of state coercion in the countryside. Perhaps most impressively given its limited resources, the Lavalas government oversaw the creation of more schools than were previously established throughout all of Haitian history, presiding over a literacy campaign that reduced illiteracy from 62 percent in 1990 to 48 percent by 2002 (Hallward 2004: 33). The presidential elections in 1996 also represented Haiti’s first ever democratic transfer of presidential power – a political accomplishment of major significance.\textsuperscript{132}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{131} Critics of Aristide and the Lavalasian leadership note that their political efforts were concentrated primarily on national reconciliation and appeasing the international community when they should have been focusing on organizing and empowering the organisations populaires (Jean and Maesschalck 1999). While this is in part true, such criticisms overlook the precarious and dependent position of the Lavalas government.
\item \textsuperscript{132} According to Hallward (2004), both Aristide and Préval resorted to the ‘weapons of the weak’ to resist the neoliberal pressure: prevarication and evasive non-cooperation, particularly in terms of the demand for
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Yet the overall capitulation of FL to the neoliberal program weakened their popular support and further disorganized the civil society groups that had been so active in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Sensing the weakening of the Lavalas movement, the elites waited for a pretext to launch a massive campaign to counter FL. The disputed 2000 senate and the presidential elections provided the catalyst for a new such offensive. U.S. and Canadian democracy assistance programs provided the material and ideological assistance required to mobilize the elite to take down the Lavalas government once and for all.

Transition and authoritarian regression in Peru

While the struggle for democracy occurred in large part as a result of the mobilization surrounding early neoliberal reforms in Haiti, in the Andean cases neoliberalism emerged as a hegemonic project in the context of economic crisis after the democratic transitions. In Peru, the decline of the left and its loss of legitimacy as a result of its terrorist faction would worsen throughout the 1980s until the country's fragile democracy descended into the populist authoritarianism of the Fujimori years. Throughout both periods, the state advanced neoliberal reform on behalf of the dominant classes and transnational interests. The neoliberal project then carried over when a return to democracy occurred in 2000 and popular social forces remained unable to articulate a counter-hegemonic alternative.

The conservative military government of General Morales Bermúdez initiated the neoliberal turn in the late 1970s, but it was not until the democratic transition in 1980 that the conservative government of Victor Belaúnde Terry began to implement a more-encompassing neoliberal program in response to the debt crisis. From 1970 to 1979, privatization. The IFIs responded promptly to Aristide's foot dragging in the privatization of nine state-
Peru’s foreign debt increased seven fold. By 1980, it had already reached $6 billion (Pastor Jr and Wise 1992: 93). Austerity measures to deal with the debt by the Bermúdez’s government reinforced popular discontent with the rightward shift of the military regime. The government was confronted with mass mobilizations on the part of the left, including a general strike in 1977 that was the largest in the country’s history. For the first time, an organized women’s movement began to emerge, primarily out of the ranks of the left (Henríquez 1996). Although Bermúdez responded by banning strikes under a state of emergency, he announced the establishment of a constitutional assembly to oversee a democratic transition in 1978. While the assembly was dominated by leftist parties – many of them tied to peasant associations and organized labour – the show of force was deceiving.

The progressive weakening of the left following the democratic transition reflected a convergence of both ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ factors. Despite its dominance of the political landscape, the left remained fragmented and divided, a factor which contributed greatly to the victory of Belaúnde in the 1980 elections. The formation of a united left coalition, Izquierda Unida (IU), occurred only after the 1980 general elections had been lost.133 At the national level, the coalition disintegrated into revolutionary and reformist camps by the late 1980s (Levine and Romero 2006). As the state continued to distance itself from popular demands, labour unions and peasant associations such as the CCP and CAN began to lose the last forms of influence that they had enjoyed since the Velasco era. Belaúnde continued to move in a neoliberal direction,

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133 The victory of several UI candidates in the 1983 municipal elections, including Alfonso Barrante – the first leftist mayor of Lima – did not lead to a lasting alliance, though it did lead to the beginning of a nascent tradition of participatory democracy at the local level (Remy S. 2005).
signing an agreement with the IMF and World Bank. Neoliberal coalitions also emerged to restore profitability on the basis of IFI-sponsored austerity packages and systematic attacks against organized labour. These coalitions supported the democratization process as a means of eroding the power of the corporatist state and preventing leftist factions in the military from returning to power (Conaghan, Malloy and Abgattas 1990).

The decline of the left was hastened by the rise of the Sendero Luminoso, a Maoist organization that arguably contributed more than any other factor to the declining prospects for a popular alternative to the neoliberal model. Founded as the Communist Party of Peru in 1968 by the charismatic philosophy professor, Abimael Guzmán, Sendero attracted many intellectuals and peasants in the highlands, particularly in its home region of Ayacucho, where it led popular education campaigns throughout the 1970s. Inspired by a Maoist philosophy of popular war in the countryside, Sendero increasingly adopted a strategy of indiscriminate violence. In May 1980, the group announced that it would adopt terrorist activities as a third stage of guerrilla struggle as it symbolically burned the ballots of the country’s first elections in years. Around the same time, a smaller, Marxist-Leninist, guerrilla movement called the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA) emerged, though its acts of violence were more targeted and less indiscriminate than those committed by its Maoist rival. The advance of Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA exerted a debilitating effect on the countryside as peasant communities were effectively caught in the crossfire of the conflict between the state and the guerrillas. Under the Belaúnde government, the military was given full reign to deal with the insurgency through mass repression in the campo. At the same time, Sendero’s assault on ‘reformist’ grassroots associations, particularly women’s organizations, was equally debilitating. Under these circumstances, peasant communities
turned to self-defence, forming *rondas campesinas* under military guidance to protect themselves (Crabtree 2002). In the urban areas, *Sendero* even targeted associations of the poor, including the vibrant communal kitchens owned and operated by local women, the *comedores populares* and *Comités del Vaso de Leche* (Hays-Mitchell 2002).  

In 1985, the victory of the APRA presidential candidate, Alan García Pérez, led to a second phase of economic reform, known as ‘unorthodox adjustment.’ García’s victory represented popular resentment against the neoliberal model, which he denounced as imperialistic. Among other things, García implemented a 10 percent ceiling on foreign debt service, a decision which led to Peru being designated an ineligible borrower by the IMF in August 1986. At the same time, however, the government allowed imports to rise considerably, leading to an overall depletion in foreign reserves and increased debt. The initial growth spurred by García’s heterodox model vanished and a crisis of hyperinflation began to spiral out of control: by 1988, inflation reached 1,722 percent (Pastor Jr and Wise 1992: 100). By the eve of the presidential elections of 1990, Peru had experienced one of the “most rapid and severe peace-time deteriorations of living standards ever recorded (Hays-Mitchell 2002).” At the same time, a climate of fear continued to prevail as the military generalized its campaign of repression in the *campo* to deal with the terrorist attacks of *Sendero Luminoso*. Although the public were mostly opposed to *Sendero*, the ‘shoot to kill policy’ of the armed forces contributed to a decline in moral authority on the part of the state (Taylor 1998).

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134 In 2001, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was mandated to investigate the violence that took place during the country’s civil war. The Commission estimated that approximately 70,000 Peruvians were killed during the conflict, with some 54 percent having been murdered by Sendero, 1.5 percent by the MRTA, and the remainder by the state (the worst period of killing by the state occurred under the Belaúnde government between 1983-1984) (Peru Support Group 2004).
The decline of the traditional left coincided with the rise in importance of the informal sector of the economy. García’s political support was strongly rooted in the informal sector of the economy, a connection that was reinforced through social programs and a discourse that often attacked the privileges of organized labour (Barr 2003). The appeal to the informals – particularly in the urban shanty towns, or pueblos jovenes – reflected the new economic reality in which the material basis of organized labour was rapidly eroding; in Lima, for instance, the industrial work force shrank from 744,000 in 1976 to 430,100 in 1989 (Roberts 1996: 79). In the 1990 elections, Alberto Fujimori, a public academic with some notoriety who campaigned under the banner of the newly-formed political party, Cambio 90, adopted a similar strategy of appealing to the informal sector while playing on fears generated by Sendero Luminoso’s terrorist activities. As the traditional party system polarized, a vacuum of representation was created in the political centre which Fujimori was able to exploit (Tanaka 2006).

After winning the elections, however, Fujimori violated his campaign promises by implementing a radical neoliberal reform program by decree. To consolidate his support amongst the military and prevent congressional interference in the militarization of the state, Fujimori dissolved Congress, interrupted judicial functions, and placed some political leaders under house arrest on April 5, 1992 in what is commonly known as the self-coup, or autogolpe. According to Burt (2006), the government based its legitimacy on an instrumentalization of fear in which the regime deployed state power to silence and intimidate opponents at the same time as it sought to discursively exploit existing fears in society in order to maintain a disorganized civil and political society. The traditional ‘party-cracy’ was denounced by Fujimori for its corruption and inability to deal with Peru’s problems as unions and civil society organizations were systematically
undermined. The disarticulation of civil society was reinforced institutionally through social policy mechanisms that bypassed existing civil society organizations by establishing direct links between ad hoc groups and the executive (Solfrini 2001).

Although state violence became more targeted than under the García government, the military presence was vastly expanded in the countryside. The establishment of the paramilitary death squad, the Grupo Colina, also led to several well-known incidents in which civilians were wrongfully killed, including the Cantuta, Barrios Altos, and Santa massacres (Peru Support Group 2004). The Grupo was supervised by Fujimori’s infamous head of intelligence, Vladimiro Montesinos (currently serving out a sentence for sixty-three charges ranging from drug trafficking to murder). According to Yashar’s (2005) well known study of indigenous mobilization in Latin America, the Peruvian state’s repression of the peasantry served to destroy existing peasant organizations – which had never been as strong as in other countries in the region to begin with – and prevent the formation of new ones. State repression, civil war, and geographical barriers prevented the formation of trans-community indigenous networks that might have, as in the case of Bolivia, contested the imposition of a neoliberal citizenship regime. To this should be added the rise of the informal sector and the political attraction of informal workers to Fujimori’s ‘neo-populist’ appeals that bypassed traditional organizational forms (Barr 2003).

After an initial phase of stabilization dubbed the ‘Fuji-shock,’ the government liberalized the trade and investment regime, reduced subsidies for agricultural producers, oversaw tax reform, drastically reduced the size of the public sector and undertook a massive privatization of state industries. Despite Fujimori’s appeals to the masses, the real beneficiaries of the Fujimori government consisted of the winners of the economic
reform process. Indeed, as Tanaka (2006) and Durand (2002a) have argued, ‘Fujimorism’ always enjoyed the support of business associations, including the Confederación de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas del Perú, which represented sectors of the business community linked to large-scale mining, finance, and commerce who benefited from trade liberalization, privatization, and foreign investment. Business interests linked to new exporters and multinationals were particularly supportive while workers were increasingly marginalized (Durand 2004). As Solfrini (2001) argues, a new labour code which stipulated that negotiations could only occur at the enterprise level increased the atomization of labour struggles and exacerbated the historical problem of the division of the Peruvian workers.

At the same time, Fujimori expanded social policies and state relief for the poor, particularly during his second administration, which saw the highest social expenditure levels in more than two decades (Tanaka 2006). Nonetheless, poverty and inequality continued to grow. In the urban centres, increased poverty gave rise to a proliferation of comedores populares: by the mid 1990s, approximately two thousand were in operation in Lima feeding approximately two-hundred thousand people per day – an indication of the ways in which women were forced to shoulder the burden of neoliberal austerity (Hays-Mitchell 2002). The peasantry were also hard-hit by Fujimori’s reforms. Small-scale producers in the highlands and selva were particularly affected by the liberalization of the agricultural sector and the rapid increase in imports, as many farmers were pushed back into subsistence agriculture or forced to sell their labour power elsewhere. Larger-scale producers in the irrigated valleys of the coast were able to take advantage of the new
demand for specialty crops on international markets, with asparagus farms proliferating throughout the 1990s.¹³⁶

Fujimori's reforms also led to an influx of foreign direct investment in the mining sector as U.S. and Canadian multinationals also began taking advantage of the new investment regime. In 1990, for instance, private operations only accounted for 55% of mineral production throughout the country; by 1999, private operations accounted for 95% of mineral production. Transnational enterprises, such as Minera Yanacocha, a subsidiary of the Denver-based Newmont Mining Corporation, came to play a dominant role in the mining sector (Bury 2005). Before 1990, no Canadian mining company operated in Peru. By 2008, Canadian mining companies dominated the sector with a hundred mines under their control (Engler 2009). By the end of the 1990s, 51.5 percent of all mining projects in Peru involved Canadian companies (North, Patroni and Clark 2006a) (in the chapters on Peru and Bolivia, we will see how the Canadian state has sought to ensure an ongoing liberal investment climate under the guise of democratic governance programs since 2000).

Despite Fujimori's democratic backsliding, IFI support to its star pupil was unwavering. After initially voicing their concern over the suspension of democracy, the World Bank, IMF, and IDB continued to disburse loans to the government. As tensions between Fujimori and the Congress mounted, the World Bank issued a statement praising the president's economic program. After the autogolpe, a temporary slow down in IDB disbursements did not last long; by the end of the year, a total of $390 million was

¹³⁵ In addition to the government's largely inadequate social programs, Fujimori resorted to a particularly abusive and controversial measure to deal with the increase in poor people - forced sterilization of poor women, particularly in marginalized but not necessarily over-populated rural areas (Boesten 2007).
disbursed as originally predicted. The IMF, for its part, renewed its agreement with Peru in September 1992 after noting that it had achieved its goals laid out in a 1991 Letter of Intent (Stokes 1996). Canada also supported the Fujimori government through aid as its material interests and role in promoting regional order increased throughout the 1990s. In 1990, Peru received $CAD120 million in development assistance from Canada – the largest amount to any country in Latin America (Rochlin 1994: 222).

Fujimori’s repressive state apparatus also benefited from massive U.S. military assistance. Under the Garcia government in the late 1980s, Peru re-established strong military ties with the United States in the context of the war on drugs. The new relationship was consecrated in 1988 with the establishment of the largest U.S. base in Latin America, the Santa Lucia, in the heart of the upper Huallaga Valley. Canada also temporarily ‘piggybacked’ with the U.S. militarization of the region by providing training of military forces and supplying intelligence-gathering equipment in Colombia and Peru in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Rochlin 1994: 221). The establishment of the military alliances was reinforced by massive military aid to Peru, including the transfer of 212 helicopters which allowed the Peruvian air force to gain control of its airspace for the first time. In 1992 alone, the Fujimori government received $140 million in military aid and $95 million in economic assistance. Training of Peruvian forces in counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics tactics reached such proportions that, in 1999, 1,300 members of the national police and armed forces were trained in over one hundred programs by the U.S (Beggar 2005).\(^{137}\)

\(^{136}\) Meanwhile, Peru’s average annual agricultural trade balance, which, until 1980, had been consistently in surplus, declined drastically: from 1986-90, deficits equaled $216 million, from 1991–95, they had reached $383, and, from 1996–99, the total amount was down somewhat at $346 million (Crabtree 2002).

\(^{137}\) Peruvian forces also included several graduates from the School of the Americas, including Vladimiro Montesinos himself (Beggar 2005).
The gradual return to democratic governance did not begin until October 1993, when Congress was reinstated and a new constitution was approved by referendum. The new constitution included several mechanisms which introduced, for the first time, elements of direct democracy, including the right to participate in public affairs via referendum, legislative initiative, and removal or renewal of authorities (revocatoria). Without diminishing the potential of these mechanisms, the Peruvian sociologist and noted scholar of participatory democracy in Peru, María Remy (2005), argues that they were inscribed in Fujimori’s overall attempt to bypass traditional political parties and establish direct unmediated relations with the people.\textsuperscript{138} They formed part of a neoliberal project of participation, which sought to undermine organized interests in both political and civil society while giving the impression of individual empowerment (Panfichi 2007).

As the 1990s drew to a close, however, the massive corruption and abuses committed by the Fujimori government became less tolerable as the terrorist threat of Sendero Luminoso subsided. In Lima, middle class intellectuals and professionals increasingly dissatisfied with the authoritarian measures of the government began to form a burgeoning human rights movement. As in Haiti, the progressive wing of the Catholic Church associated with liberation theology, a movement with its roots in Peru, played a leadership role. In the 1980s, for instance, the Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social (CEAS) had played an important role in creating and institutionalizing Peru’s main human rights coalition, the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (Levine and Romero 2006). When the 2000 elections resulted in massive fraud and irregularities, the Coordinadora – as it is usually referred to – allied with several other human rights and

\textsuperscript{138} This theme was also discussed in some depth during an interview (Lima: January 20, 2009).
women’s groups in Lima and led mass mobilizations against the regime. At this stage, U.S. democracy promotion groups such as the NDI and the Carter Center began actively promoting the Coordinadora as well as other NGOs, such as Transparencia, which monitored the 2000 elections and played a key role in denouncing the results. Even during the controversy of the elections, official U.S. support did not cease and no aid was suspended. Ultimately, in the two crucial conjunctures of the Fujimori presidency – the autogolpe and the rigged elections of 2000 – the United States chose not to risk its new cooperation with Peru on security issues, free-market reform and narcotics control over its concerns with the lack of democratic governance (McClintock and Vallas 2002). In contrast, Canada played a more active role in applying pressure on the Fujimori government, with the Canadian foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, playing a leading role on an OAS-facilitated dialogue roundtable, or mesa, involving key domestic political actors from government, opposition, and civil society in a collective effort to negotiate a consensual and peaceful solution to the political crisis.

In the fall of 2000, a series of political scandals – including the broadcast on national television of a videotape showing intelligence chief, Montesinos, bribing an opposition congressman to join Fujimori’s coalition – prompted Fujimori to announce new elections. Before they could be held, the president fled the country and faxed his letter of resignation to Congress from his ancestral homeland, Japan. After years of repression, structural adjustment, and self-destruction by the left, however, popular civil society and leftist political parties were weak and unable to organize a social basis for a more expansive notion of democracy during the transition process. The virtual disappearance of indigenous movements from the political scene was particularly
debilitating. The election of a U.S.-educated economist of humble indigenous origins, Alejandro Toledo, to the presidency in 2001 signalled the triumph of a neoliberal democratic project. Canadian and U.S. democracy assistance programs sought to stabilize the new arrangement.

**Pacted democracy and inclusive neoliberalism in Bolivia**

Bolivia’s democratic transition occurred in the same context of economic crisis as Peru’s, after which an alliance of political elites succeeded in imposing a neoliberal project on the population over more than a decade of reform. Unlike Peru, however, popular social forces in Bolivia were able to reconstitute themselves under the leadership of the indigenous movements, which began to articulate a popular counter-hegemony by the end of the twentieth century. The crisis began during the banzerato, when the Central Bank began printing money to deal with growing balance of payments deficit. As global tin prices began declining, Bolivia’s debt grew from $551 million in the early 1970s to $2.9 billion by 1984. Between 1979 and 1984, the Bolivian peso was devalued by 250,000 per cent; and by mid-1985 inflation had reached 14,500 per cent (Dunkerley and Morales 1986: 90). From 1978 to 1982, no less than 8 military and civilian governments had sought to deal with the debilitating crisis.

In this context of instability, the military acquiesced to general elections in 1982, which resulted in the presidential victory of Hernán Siles, the leader of the MNR splinter group, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda* (MNRI). Siles’ inability to deal with the crisis, however, led vice-president Jaime Paz Zamora to side with Congress in calling early elections in 1985 in the so-called constitutional coup (Gamarra 1996). What emerged from this process was the foundation for a new system of elite control resting on two main pillars: 1) the use of the democratic pact – or *Pacto por la*
Democracia – between the traditional political parties; and 2) a shared commitment to deepening the neoliberal reform process. Together, these pillars constituted the basis of an elite compromise which, in Gramscian terms, may be conceived of as a form of decadent hegemony. The basis of the pacts was the fact that none of the presidential candidates was able to obtain the 50 percent necessary for an outright victory throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In these circumstances, Congress must vote for the president.\(^{139}\)

While the use of the democratic pact helped stabilize Bolivian politics during the initial period of its transition, it reproduced the traditional decision-making style of authoritarian rulers (Gamarra 1996). The authoritarian style of decision-making and policy formation was most obvious in the implementation of the second pillar of the elite pact – the deepening of the neoliberal reform process. Kohl (2006) identifies three phases in neoliberalism after the initial stabilization packages of the 1980s, providing a useful periodization of how the reforms evolved and responded to shifting social conditions and new social demands. The first phase, which radically restructured the economy through a far-reaching stabilization package, began with the return of Paz to the presidency and lasted until Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada came to power in 1993. The second phase consisted of an attempt to consolidate and deepen the neoliberal program under Lozada and Banzer – the first military dictator in the region to transition back successfully to democratic politics – from 1993 to 1999. The final stage was defined by the mass mobilization led by the indigenous movements to reverse the program and transform the state, beginning with the Cochabamba ‘Water Wars’ in 2000.

\(^{139}\) The first pact was formed between the old party of the revolution, the MNR, led by the elderly Paz, and the Acción Demócrata Nacionalista (ADN), a right-wing party founded by military dictator Hugo Banzer. Paz governed until 1989, after which the MNR formed a pact with Zamora of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) to secure the presidency of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. Lozada governed until 1997, when a new pact with the ADN led to Banzer’s return to the presidency.
With Lozada as finance minister, Paz launched the first phase of neoliberalism through Presidential Decree 21060, commonly known as the New Economic Policy (NEP), in late 1985. The plan, which contained 220 separate laws, was the result of a top-secret bipartisan emergency economic group led by Lozada – a Bolivian who spent so much time in the United States that he spoke Spanish with an English accent. Lozada – or Goni, as he is typically referred to in Bolivia, returned to his native country as one of its wealthiest businessman.\(^{140}\) The plan included measures such as the elimination of food subsidies, the removal of almost all price controls, the freezing of government wages, trade liberalization, cuts to social spending, and a 300 percent hike in the price of oil. Although it succeeded at stabilizing inflation, the cost of adjustment was borne exclusively by the poor. Real wages, for instance, dropped by 40 percent two years into the program (Klein 2007). By 1993, the poverty rate exceeded 70 percent (Gamarra 1996).

The most debilitating aspect of the neoliberal program was the government decision to break with the state’s historic role in the mining sector. Under the very leader who had nationalized the mines as the defining act of the revolution, the government greatly reduced the mining operations of the state mining company, the Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL), opening the way for the return of private interests in the mining sector. The powerful Federación de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (FTSMB) was unable to mount an effective defence of the state-run mining industry, which was attacked as being unprofitable and suffered huge losses as a result of the collapse of tin prices in October 1985. By the end of 1986, more than 20,000 miners were dismissed,

\(^{140}\) The emergency economic group based much of their plan on a program of shock-therapy devised by the famous American economist, Jeffrey Sachs, at the request of Banzer prior to Paz’s congressional victory
bribed, fired, and forcibly retired. In August 1986, the miners responded by marching on La Paz to confront the government (Sanabria 2000). Bolivia's powerful labour movement, the COB, called over 450 strikes and work stoppages in 1985 to protest the neoliberal policies (Kohl 2006).¹⁴¹

Unlike many other Latin American countries that adopted neoliberal reforms in the 1980s, the state assumed a leadership role in designing and implementing the program while the IFIs largely remained on the sidelines. The driving force behind the neoliberal coalition was the traditional political parties as well as organized business, particularly the Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia (CEPB), and the agro elites of the eastern provinces. But the IFIs and the United States also provided considerable support. With the implementation of the NEP, the Reagan administration, which had imposed sanctions on the Siles government for failing to live up to coca eradication promises, agreed with the IMF to withdraw demands on the Paz administration that Bolivia begin servicing its defaulted debt (in return, Paz signed off on a joint U.S.-Bolivian military operation against drug traffickers in Santa Cruz) (Lehman 1999). The IMF and World Bank also continued to provide loans throughout the 1980s and 90s. According to Farthing (1997), anti-coca efforts led to increased police brutality and human rights violations against the rural poor.

The last stand of the miners signalled the demise of the FTSMB and constituted a serious blow against the main labour federation, the COB. In one fell swoop, the material basis for the organization of the most radical sector of the working class was effectively

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¹⁴¹ Extreme measures were also taken to control labour unrest - when union leaders launched a hunger strike, Paz directed the police and military to round up the country's top 200 leaders and fly them to remote jails in the Amazon. They were only released when the unions agreed to call off their protests (Klein 2007).
dismantled (Sanabria 2000). Dislocated minors and state workers migrated back to rural communities and flooded the urban centres in search of work. Imports also began flooding the market and led to the loss of more than 35,000 manufacturing jobs over the course of the next five years. The World Bank sought to stabilize the situation by introducing a Social Emergency Fund (SEF) of $239.5 million over four years, channelling funds to hundreds of small projects mostly administered by NGOs (the program was later renamed the Social Investment Fund (SIF) and became a permanent fixture – one which was reproduced in many other countries that were forced to implement SAPs) (Kohl 2006).

Many of the casualties of the new market forces made their way to El Alto – the enormous city perched on top of the mountains above La Paz. Over the next two decades, neoliberal dislocation continued to push miners and factory workers there, until the population reached a total of 650,000 by 2001. Most of El Alto’s inhabitants are indigenous, with the vast majority working in the informal sector. As the city began developing new neighbourhood and workers’ associations, it would go on to play a leading role in the anti-neoliberal movement in the 2000s (Gilly 2005) (Arbona 2007). Others were pushed to become coca growers since the crop paid roughly ten times as much as other crops. By 1989, an estimated one in ten workers was working in some aspect of the coca or cocaine industry (Klein 2007).

As protests continued to mount, Goni’s return to the presidency in 1993 marked a second phase of neoliberalism explicitly linked to a project of inclusion. In many ways, Goni’s reforms prefigured the style and content of the post-Washington consensus by coupling neoliberal reform with more socially-oriented policies. They are perhaps best conceived of as ‘inclusive neoliberalism’ in that they sought to appeal to a broad
constituency while maintaining a focus on economic restructuring. The center piece of the plan was the Plan de Todos (Plan for All), which combined neoliberal policies such as the privatization of the largest state-owned firms with land reform, constitutional change and an ambitious decentralization project. The most controversial aspect of the plan was the capitalization programme, whereby the government sold 50 percent of its shares in state enterprises to multinational enterprises in five key sectors of the economy, among them the hydrocarbon sector. The privatization of the state oil company, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), was also accompanied by the introduction of a new Law on Hydrocarbons, Law 1689 of 1996, which liberalized the sector and sought to attract private and foreign investment by reducing taxes and feeds on newly discovered reserves to 30 percent (Kohl 2006).

At this stage, the Canadian state became a major supporter of Goni’s reforms and sought to facilitate the development of the new liberalized regulatory framework in the interests of Canadian mining companies. Like Peru, Bolivia had been an important recipient of Canadian development assistance throughout the 1990s, receiving CAD$50 million in aid in 1990 alone. According to a 1996 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, Canada began affecting hydrocarbon policy in Bolivia in 1989, when CTDA, Petro-Canada and the Bolivian government began working together to modernize the public oil and gas industry through the Bolivia Oil and Gas Project. The report notes that 22 Canadian firms received spin-off benefits from the project (see Office of the Auditor General of Canada 1996: chapter 29, exhibit 29.11).

To balance the privatization program, the other measures of the plan were ostensibly targeted at the popular sectors, particularly the indigenous population. This reflected the new reality in which opposition to neoliberalism increasingly passed to
indigenous *campesino* groups associate with the *katarista* movement (Yashar 2005). Inspired by the historical resistance of Tupaj Katari, indigenous movements denounced cultural, economic and political oppression and placed demands for autonomy at the centre of their claims. The emergence of the movement marked an ‘indianization’ of peasant unions and a new social project inscribed in a struggle for decolonization (Rojas 2009, 2010; Patzi 2004; Prada 2008). Although politically fragmented, the most notable expression of the movement was the foundation of the *Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia* (CSUTCB) in 1978.

As indigenous groups launched a new cycle of popular mobilization, mainstream politicians and social scientists began responding to the discourse on multiculturalism first articulated by the CSUTCB, officially acknowledging the country’s ethnic and cultural diversity. The constitutional reform of 1994 recognized Bolivia as a multicultural and multi-plural nation, sanctioning the right to exercise customary law in indigenous communities (Van Cott 2002). The land reform initiative was launched in 1996 with the establishment of the *Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria* (INRA), with the stated goal of distributing state lands to landless peasants. Although some such redistribution did occur, the new reform legalized absentee ownership, speculation, and very large fallow holdings – further alienating indigenous and peasant groups who were largely bypassed by the plan. In August 1996, the CSUTCB organized a march from all corners of the country to arrive at La Paz, where they demanded the modification of INRA.

The decentralization initiative was embodied in the *Ley de Participación Popular* (LPP), which radically restructured the relations between different levels of government. The LPP created over 250 new, largely rural municipalities, mandating them with
participatory planning mechanisms and citizen budget oversight. In total, more than 300 municipalities were established and approximately 3,000 communities and neighbourhood associations recognized (Gamarra 1996). While critics on the left charged that the LPP sought to shift government responsibilities from national to local government, few disputed the benefits of participatory planning and fiscal oversight by local civil society organizations representing poor urban neighbourhoods and the rural indigenous population. The local municipal governments began serving as training grounds, moreover, for indigenous political actors that were about to disrupt the balance between the traditional political parties (Kohl 2006) (Albó 2002). In the end, the unintended consequence of the reform was the further mobilization of counter-hegemonic social forces and their political institutionalization.

The initiative was also opposed by more conservative forces, including the CPSC, the Comité Cívico de Tarija, and the comités cívicos located in the other parts of the media luna (Gamarra 1996). At this stage, these regions began to oppose ‘western centralism,’ which had long worked in their favour through economic development schemes and neoliberal policies that supported agro exports. As radical indigenous political forces began winning municipal elections, the comités cívicos led by the CPSC became vocal proponents of a new autonomista project that advocated not only regional political governance but also departmental control over natural resources and the lion’s share of tax revenue (Eaton 2007). The competing regionalist and municipal projects of

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142 The LPP had actually undone certain key features of previous decentralization arrangements, however, by downgrading regional assemblies to mere councils which would be indirectly elected by municipal courts and by stipulating that departmental authorities would serve as representatives of the national executive branch at the regional level.
decentralization would collide after the MAS came to power in 2006 and launched a constitutional reform process.

The turning point in the balance of power between the traditional political parties and the new indigenous political actors occurred in the 1995 municipal elections with the victory of several leaders associated with the *Instruimento Político para la Soberania de los Pueblos* (IPSP) in 11 municipalities in Cochabamba. The IPSP – the predecessor of the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS) – emerged as a movement of indigenous *camposino* unionists, especially the coca-producers unions of the Chapare. In the 1997 national elections, four IPSP leaders, including Evo Morales, the General Secretary of the coca producers union, were elected to Congress. Two years later, the IPSP ran for the first time under the name of the MAS in the municipal elections, winning nearly 40 percent of the vote in Cochabamba (Thede 2009). According to Van Cott (2008), the LPP recognized indigenous communal forms of governance that had operated informally for years. With the institutionalization of these forms of governance through resource transfers and elections, new political actors began to emerge which helped consolidate new visions of radical democracy at the local level.

According to Yashar (2005), the IPSP developed in the same valleys where the *katarista* movement had formed and benefited from its associations and strategies. This is an important point in accounting for the very different configuration of social forces that characterized Bolivia and Peru as the century drew to a close. For, as Yashar emphasizes, the repression of the Peruvian state first disorganized existing indigenous and peasant associations in the Peruvian countryside and then prevented the formation of new trans-community networks. Indigenous groups in Bolivia faced a very different situation insofar as the government did not preside over a massive campaign of repression.
Through the LPP, the Bolivian state actually created new organizational spaces that helped reinforce new indigenous political identities.

As the indigenous movement developed into a significant force at the political level, the mobilization of indigenous groups across civil society throughout the second half of the 1990s marked a new phase of resistance by the popular movements after years of being on the defensive. The resistance was fuelled by a new round of controversial policies pursued by the Bolivian state following Banzer’s return to the presidential palace in 1997, especially his government’s aggressive coca eradication policy and privatization of natural resources. After years of pressuring the government to take a more active role in eliminating coca destined for cocaine processing, the United States found an active ally in Banzer’s administration, which launched a coca eradication program under the ‘Zero Coca’ policy. In 1999, Banzer further alienated the indigenous population when the government sold the municipal-owned Cochabamba water company to Aguas del Tunari, a consortium led by U.S.-based Bechtel. Two months after taking control, the company raised rates, in some cases by as much as 400 percent. The people of Cochabamba responded by forming the Comité por el Agua y la Vida, shutting down the city on three occasions in the early months of 2000.

The so-called ‘Water Wars’ marked not only the first popular victory against neoliberalism, but the consummation of an alliance between different indigenous groups as coca growers in the Chapare under the leadership of Morales articulated their own grievances with those of the people of the city of Cochabamba, protesting throughout the crisis in solidarity. In the highlands, moreover, a former Marxist and ‘indigenous nationalist revolutionary’ leader by the name of Felipe Quispe mobilized peasants against the INRA and a water privatization law. Both Quispe and Morales ran in the 2002
presidential elections, with Morales coming a surprising second behind Goni, who made a second successful bid for the presidency (during the campaign, many Bolivians were angered by the threat of U.S. Ambassador Manuel Rocha that the United States would reconsider its aid program if Morales won).

As Webber (2005) notes, the re-articulation of popular forces led to a more fruitful exchange between Marxist and indigenist ideologies, something not witnessed in Bolivia since the 1920s. While unions such as those that organize the cocaleros remained important actors, the resistance to the privatization of water was organized by new social subjects embodied by the Coordinadora. These are often multi-class, territorially-based organizations composed mainly of the ‘new working class’ rooted primarily in the informal sector (Spronk 2007). Other examples include the neighbourhood associations that have proliferated in El Alto. The struggles that they have launched against ‘accumulation by dispossession’ have been framed in larger social and political issues that transcend a narrow focus on reversing privatization (Spronk and Webber 2007). As the century came to an end, moreover, movements of subordinated groups, including indigenous peasants and workers, coca growers, marginalized communities, women, landless peasants, teachers and university students began to converge (Romer 2008a).143

As Goni’s second administration increasingly resorted to repression to deal with the state’s crisis of authority – most notably in the so-called ‘Gas Wars’ in El Alto in 2003 – the stage was set for a radical transformation of the political landscape (these topics will be discussed in depth in the chapter on Bolivia). It was in this context that democracy assistance programs in Bolivia were launched to save the traditional system from

143 The vice president of Bolivia and sociologist, Álvaro García Linera (1999), has written extensively on the new social movements and the importance of the ‘nueva clase obrera’.
imploding. Although both Canada and the United States sought to stabilize the system, the U.S. actors moved to a strategy of elite mobilization as the balance of forces began rapidly shifting.

The configuration of power relations at the turn of the millennium

This chapter has sought to trace the development of historical struggles to create more inclusive social orders from societies that were built on colonial exploitation and social structures rooted in class, racial, and gendered domination. If the subordinated classes and social groups of Haiti, Bolivia, and Peru have entered the new millennium with very different prospects concerning their ability to articulate a counter-hegemonic alternative to neoliberal polyarchy, all three countries have lengthy historical traditions of resistance from which to take inspiration. From the colonial ashes, however, the social structures of accumulation, state forms, and position in the world capitalist system that emerged did not provide fertile terrain for a nation-building project that might have overcome the divisions inherited from the past. The attempt to resolve the national question in the postwar era led to different state-civil society configurations in each country and, in Peru and Bolivia, the first real attempt to create a real hegemonic order. In the Andean countries, the expansion of the mining sector, the increased proletarianization of the indigenous peasantry, and the growth of a small urban middle class exacerbated social tensions as workers and peasants began to organize cross-class alliances. Mass parties began to form and sections of the military became radicalized. In Bolivia, the result was revolution from below led by an alliance of the middle-class, miners, and the peasantry in 1952; in Peru, it was the revolution from above initiated in 1968.
In both cases, however, the revolutionary process was never consolidated and dominant classes and right-wing military factions, particularly in Bolivia, were able to restore the power of capital. Haiti's historical trajectory followed an altogether different path. There, the supremacy of the mulatre elite led to an increased sense of black identity on the part of different segments of Haitian society excluded from the new power arrangement, but the political weakness of the peasantry and the near absence of a working class prevented this sentiment from being channelled in a national-popular direction. The result was the reassertion of the black military-political elite under one of the most totalitarian dictatorships the region has ever seen – Duvalierism.

When the modern struggle for democracy did begin, popular forces in each country played a decisive role, but in none of the cases were they able to resist the neoliberal project advanced by local elites, the IFIs, the United States and, to a lesser extent, Canada. Consequently, the democratization process itself was largely restricted to political institutions while social relations remained exploitative and the pressures of world order further constricted autonomous decision making. This is the fundamental paradox of the democratization process as it has occurred under neoliberal world order. At the same time, each country has undergone dramatic changes in its social structure of accumulation, forms of state and world order that affected the balance of power between different social forces as the democratization process continues to unfold. These changes have interacted with long-standing historical patterns to produce a configuration of factors that conditioned the different forms of democracy promotion in the new millennium, summarized in Table 12 below.
Table 12: The configuration of power at the end of the millennium

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social relations – forms of state</th>
<th>World order</th>
<th>Hegemony</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Haiti</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Highly exploitative social structure</td>
<td>High level of subordination in world economy</td>
<td>Weak counter-hegemony based on political power of popular sectors; class stalemate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular civil society weakly in control of the state</td>
<td>Strong imperial pressures</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fragmented political elite</td>
<td>Deployment of Canadian middlepowermanship</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authoritarian dominant class</td>
<td>Externally-forced neoliberal integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contested neoliberal polyarchy</td>
<td>Increasing level of subordination in world economy</td>
<td>Non-hegemonic alliance of white-mestizo dominant class and political elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitative social structure</td>
<td>Increasing U.S. and Canadian economic interests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disarticulated popular civil society movement</td>
<td>Internally-driven neoliberal integration</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban middle-class human rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak political parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elite control of the state</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exploitative social structure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reactivation of popular forces</td>
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<td>Strong elite political parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crisis of state</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fragile neoliberal polyarchy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minimal democratization of social relations – increased inequality; partial democratization of political institutions; increased external pressures on decision making</td>
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</table>

In Haiti, the most coherent democratic alternative to neoliberalism emerged from within the Lavalas movement before the coup in 1991 undermined its prospects. The resistance of the dominant classes to any type of reform and the weight of U.S. imperial practices would ensure that, after President Aristide was restored by the Marines in 1994, the new democracy would remain subordinated to transnational capital. In this context, neoliberalism was an externally-imposed project upon a popular government that had the affect of systematically weakening its social base. As popular control of the state was systematically weakened, the dominant class and political elite remained unable to counter Lavalas' weak political hegemony. With the emergence of Canada as a new imperial actor in Haiti, the stage was set for North American DAAs to intervene on behalf of the political elite and dominant class through the deployment of elite mobilization tactics (EMTs) that would help generate a crisis of authority.
In Peru, the decline of the left and its loss of legitimacy throughout the 1980s eventually gave rise to the populist authoritarianism of the Fujimori years—supported in large part by the new urban poor. Throughout both periods, the state advanced neoliberal reform on behalf of the dominant classes and transnational interests while discursively cultivating a climate of fear. Both Canada and the United States supported the process of neoliberal reform and remained committed allies of the Fujimori government. The neoliberal project then carried over when a return to democracy occurred in 2000 and popular social forces remained unable to articulate a counter-hegemonic alternative. The dominant class remained in control of the state apparatus and democracy assistance programs were deployed to help stabilize the new institutional arrangements through polyarchy promotion tactics (PPTs) associated with an inclusive neoliberal project.

Bolivia’s democratic transition occurred in the same context of economic crisis as Peru’s. With U.S. and Canadian support, an alliance of political elites succeeded in imposing a neoliberal project on the population that dominated the political landscape for the next twenty years. Unlike Peru, however, where neoliberalism was more closely associated with repression and leftist disintegration, popular social forces in Bolivia were able to reconstitute themselves under the leadership of the indigenous movements, which began to articulate a popular counter-hegemony by the end of the twentieth century. U.S. and Canadian democracy assistance programs sought to remedy the situation by building the legitimacy of the state and preventing the rise of an ‘anti-systemic’ alternative through PPTs.

The following chapters will analyze the forms of democracy promotion deployed by Canada and the United States in each country from 2000 to 2008. As we shall see, while a particular configuration of power helped determine the form of democracy
promotion at the beginning of the period in question, the evolving political situation has led to different phases of democracy promotion in Haiti and Bolivia. Ultimately, however, the contradictions of democracy promotion in neoliberal world order have prevented the consolidation of neoliberal polyarchy in any one of the three countries.
Chapter four
Polyarchy at any cost in Haiti

In the winter of 2004, the world watched as Haiti once again descended into political chaos. In the wake of escalating confrontations between opposition groups and Lavalas militants on the streets of Port-au-Prince, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was forced to flee the country for a second time as paramilitary factions controlling large sections of the countryside made their way to the capital to depose the government. Those who drew parallels with the bloody coup that had overthrown Aristide soon after Haiti’s first-ever democratic elections were quickly told that the events of 2004 were nothing like those of 1990. This time around, civil society was unanimous in its insistence that Aristide had squandered his popular mandate through corruption and human rights abuses, generating a crisis of authority that could only be resolved through his immediate resignation.

In this chapter, I will argue that this narrative was used by Canada and the United States to justify support to elite social forces through democracy assistance programs. In fact, Aristide was neither saint nor devil – despite some flaws his government was democratic and he maintained popular support until the very end. This chapter thus reaffirms the ongoing relevance of the interventionist model with the caveat that it cannot be reduced to a modality of power intended mainly to reinforce transnationalized fractions of the local elite. Although democracy assistance programs did support such fractions, they targeted multiple social groups in Haiti’s complex civil society – including seemingly progressive NGOs. This was particularly so in the case of Canada. Democracy promotion should thus be situated within the larger historic problematic of stabilizing Haiti’s unequal social order, even if the primary beneficiary has been transnational capital. I also reject assumptions by critics of Canadian democracy
promotion which explain the anti-Lavalas position of Canadian DAAs primarily in terms of CIDA co-optation. While Canadian imperialism in Haiti reflects material interests and the projection of neoliberal middlepowermanship, the instrumentalization of Canadian DAAs reflected both opportunism as well as the split in Haitian civil society between NGOs and the Lavalas movement. In short, a configuration of national and international variables conditioned the form of democracy promotion.

The analysis of democracy assistance programs is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes elite mobilization tactics (EMTs) that were advanced between 2000 and February 2004. During this period, the IRI led the process of elite coalition-building in political society while IFES helped mobilize a civil society opposition and manufacture a human rights crisis. CIDA contributed to the campaign to destabilize Aristide’s government by channelling funding to small organizations and coalitions representing seemingly progressive constituencies. Such funding helped distort the perception of the social basis of the opposition to Aristide. Despite such efforts, the heavily-subsidized opposition ultimately failed to articulate an expansive hegemonic ideology to garner popular support.

The second part of the analysis focuses on democracy promotion under the interim government from 2004 to 2006, during which time American and Canadian democracy assistance programs continued to mobilize elites as the interim government unleashed a ‘scorched earth policy’ (Dupuy 2005) of repression against Lavalas. Despite this repression, Aristide’s former Prime Minister, René Préval, won the presidential elections of 2006. With the destruction of the Lavalas base, however, Préval rose to power at the head of a weak political coalition which has accepted the neoliberal agenda. Since his victory, democracy assistance programs have switched to a softer strategy of polyarchy
promotion. Although I refer briefly to some of these programs, the concept of polyarchy promotion is not theorized in depth until the following chapter on Peru, where it has constituted the dominant form of democracy promotion.


Debunking the master narrative

Although Haiti is the one country examined in this study where a popular notion of democracy informed the democratic transition, external forces played a decisive role in restricting the scope of democracy throughout the 1990s – a topic that was covered in depth in the previous chapter. From 2000 onward, the political situation further deteriorated as Haiti’s bourgeoisie and political elite once again resorted to force to undermine the popular movement. A coup in 2004 led to an interim government led by the most reactionary sectors of Haitian society until democracy was partially restored in 2006. A brief overview of this tumultuous history is required as the national context in which democracy assistance programs must be situated. Here, the intent is not to provide a defense of Aristide and Lavalas as such, but rather, to counter the campaign of vilification that legitimized the interventionist approach.

The period under consideration begins with the hotly contested general elections of 2000, which led to a presidential victory for Aristide as well as a Fanmi Lavalas’ (FL) majority in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. The senatorial elections were called into question, however, when the Conseil Electoral Provisoire (CEP) applied a vote-apportioning methodology to grant first-round victories to eight senatorial seats won by FL candidates.¹⁴⁴ The presidential elections that followed led to a landslide victory for

¹⁴⁴ Rather than include the votes cast for all candidates in its calculation of voting percentages, the CEP only counted the votes cast for the top four candidates. The percentage of votes thus cast for the FL
Aristide, but the refusal of many opposition parties to field candidates meant that his victory was deprived of considerable legitimacy. Thereafter, opposition forces demanded the immediate resignation of Aristide despite the resignation of seven of the eight senators in 2001 – the so-called Option Zéro. The civil society opposition contained Haiti’s traditional business elite as well as many middle class NGOs which formed elite civil society (a concept described in chapter one). Led by wealthy industrialists such as Andy Apaid and Reginald Boulos, the opposition branded itself the Groupe des 184 (G-184) – a name which was a better indicator of the number of individuals, rather than the number of organizations, it represented (Hallward 2007: 107). Joined by the Convergence Démocratique (CD), a coalition of traditional political parties, the two coalitions constituted the Plate-forme Démocratique (PD). The PD remained marginal, however, and Fanmi Lavalas (FL) continued to enjoy the highest level of popular support despite the worsening economy and pressure on Aristide. Table 13 summarizes the results of a USAID commissioned CID/ Gallup opinion poll obtained by Dupuy (2005: 190) but never made public. The poll was conducted from March 1-8, 2002.

Table 13: Poll on political preferences in Haiti (2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adult population identifying with FL</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Social sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of support for Aristide</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>High level of support among women and the poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of support for CD</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Support concentrated in middle and upper class</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The crisis generated by the opposition rested on the claim that Aristide was dangerously backsliding into authoritarianism, committing massive human rights

candidates – who had unquestionably obtained an initial plurality of votes – were artificially increased to spare them having to compete in a second-round of elections. Although the same methodology had been used in the 1990 and 1995 elections (Hallward 2007), its application in the context of the increased polarization of 2000 discredited what the OAS and other election observers had otherwise considered one of Haiti’s fairest elections.
violations and encouraging wide-scale state corruption. Since the extent to which we condemn the activities of the democracy promoters depends upon the veracity of this claim, some critical reflection is required. Peter Hallward provides the most systematic refutation.\textsuperscript{146} On the argument put forward by Aristide’s opponents that the government had created a human rights crisis, Hallward (2007: 155) calls our attention to the basic numbers: under the Duvaliers, perhaps 50,000 were killed; under the \textit{de facto} governments that followed between 1986-1990, another 700 to 1,000; and under the Cédras regime that overthrew Aristide the first time, at least 4,000. In contrast, few human rights organizations have estimated the total number of political killings committed under the watch of Aristide’s government, though Hallward puts the figure at around thirty between 2001 and 2004,\textsuperscript{147} most of which can be attributed to the \textit{Police Nationale d’Haiti} (PNH), whose political affiliation was often anti-government, or to pro-FL groups rather than the government itself.\textsuperscript{148} Following Aristide’s removal, the interim government oversaw another mass liquidation campaign with the complicity of the international community, killing as many as 8,000 (Kolbe and Hutson 2006).

 Opponents of Aristide allege, however, that his government armed urban gangs, or \textit{chimères}, from destitute areas like \textit{Cité Soleil} to act as shock troops against the opposition. While there is no question that many pro-FL gangs committed attacks against

\textsuperscript{145} FL will be used interchangeably with Lavalas throughout this chapter.
\textsuperscript{146} See Michael Deibert (2005) for a lengthy justification of Aristide’s overthrow. Deibert has criticized Hallward’s work for being partisan and factually inaccurate. Although Hallward (2008) apologizes for a few minor factual errors uncovered by Deibert, he provides a convincing point-by-point refutation of Deibert’s main arguments against his book. See Fatton (Fatton 2006) and Dupuy (Dupuy 2005) for a more interesting critique.
\textsuperscript{147} Hallward (2007) arrived at this figure by reviewing Amnesty International (AI) reports throughout Aristide’s time in office. He notes, however, that AI itself never risked an estimate of the total number of people killed under Aristide, which might have undermined its argument that a human rights crisis was unfolding.
\textsuperscript{148} Of the 300 people killed in February 2004 in the lead up to Aristide’s removal, most were Lavalas supporters (Dupuy 2005).
opposition members, it is necessary to contextualize the violence. Most of those who clashed with the opposition protestors in the streets were representative of the poor activist and normally-quiescent urban community sectors that constitute the Lavalas base; given their past experience, they had every right to act defensively to protect the only President who had ever vindicated any of their claims. Such gangs themselves are the victims of a violent class system that has never ceased to rely on force to maintain and reproduce systemic poverty in the interest of a tiny minority; their violence is the direct refusal to accept the domination of social forces that have criminalized them in the first place (Zizek 2008). Many were members of *organisations populaires* which increasingly developed ‘siege mentalities’ as political conditions deteriorated (Reding 2004: 56).^{149}

Second, there is no evidence that Aristide himself presided over a coordinated campaign to arm the *chimères*, which, as Hallward (2007: 171) points out, would have shifted the struggle to a military terrain on which he was bound to lose given the superior firepower of the paramilitary-backed opposition. According to Fatton (cited in Hallward 2007: 168), the most that can be said is that as the unreliability of the PNH became clear in the months leading up to the coup, members of Aristide’s security team may have handed out one hundred battered hand guns to sympathetic gang-members in Port-au-Prince. On the issue of corruption, a certain degree of petty cronyism existed among some Lavalas cadres, which was all the more obvious since many had come to office from the poorer sectors of society. Some high-ranking police officers and government officials were also involved in drug trafficking. Again, the corruption that existed was

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^{149} Residents of the Cité would never forget that in the aftermath of the 1991 coup, for instance, the entrance of the community was temporarily shut as the military proceeded to murder hundreds associated with the Lavalas movement. Their concerns were unfortunately proven well-founded as Lavalas activists and gang leaders were killed en masse in the aftermath of the 2004 coup (Griffin 2004).
nowhere near the official state-sanctioned piracy of the Duvalier or Cédras years, or the interim government after Aristide’s downfall, for that matter. Such patterns of accumulation were deeply rooted in the political economy of Haiti and the parasitic state form that Aristide inherited, explored in depth in the previous chapter.¹⁵⁰

If such criticisms were ideologically motivated, there is no question that the government made many strategic errors in its handling of the crisis. Perhaps the most important shortcoming of the Lavalas government and Aristide was their capitulation to neoliberal reform and opposition demands, which weakened and exhausted its social base. Instead of mobilizing peasants and workers behind an alternative project, they chose the road of appeasement. In the end, such efforts were futile as the opposition clung to its Option Zéro and repeatedly rejected compromise solutions, including a last-ditch effort by the CARICOM to broker an agreement between FL and the CD, which would have required Aristide to accept a prime minister from the opposition and hold new elections. Elections, however, were not the desired outcome. Rather, the opposition sought to generate a crisis of authority (in large part targeting the international media) that would make governing impossible, after which it could exploit the crisis through a temporary suspension of democracy. When the opposition eventually resorted to a war of manoeuvre through its alliance with the right-wing paramilitary faction, the Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction Nationale (FLRN), the recourse to coercion symbolized not so much a failure to win a war of position by articulating an expansive hegemonic

¹⁵⁰ There has never been any evidence that Aristide himself used his office for personal accumulation, despite repeated efforts to link him to corruption. Aristide was also regularly criticized for living in a mansion in Tabarre, a house that was actually built for him in 1990 by a benefactor (Hallward 2007).
ideology that incorporated the interests of Haiti’s destitute majority, but an acknowledgement that this was virtually impossible.\textsuperscript{151}

If Aristide’s human rights record was far less flawed than elite civil society contended, there was nothing ambiguous about the human rights fiasco that unfolded following the events that finally led to his ouster in February 2004. The brutality of the interim government in the coming months was well documented by several human rights reports, all of which cited eye-witness accounts of attacks by PNH and death squad forces against Lavalas partisans in the slums of Port-au-Prince, the remilitarization of the Haitian police, and the freeing of prisoners previously convicted of some of the worst crimes committed by the paramilitaries during the first coup years.\textsuperscript{152} As the undemocratically-appointed interim government headed by Florida-based businessman and former UN official, Prime Minister Gérard Latortue, pursued what the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (cited in Dupuy 2005) refers to as ‘scorched earth policy’ against Lavalas activists, a UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSTAH, stood-by and waged its own campaign against the so-called \textit{chimères} of the \textit{bidonvilles}.\textsuperscript{153}

Haiti had come full circle and an external intervention was once again required to break the class stalemate resulting from its polarized social structure. In Gramscian terms, the new international presence constituted a form of external Caesarism whereby a third party was needed to intervene above the competing social forces. As Latortue began

\textsuperscript{151} The ties between the \textit{Convergence Démocratique} and the FLRN were made clear through multiple public statements by FLRN leaders (Hallward 2007).

\textsuperscript{152} Reports were released by the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti 2004), the Quixote Center (Quixote Center 2004), the National Lawyers Guild (National Lawyers Guild 2004), the Haitian Accompaniment Project (Flynn, Roth and Fleming 2004), the medical journal the Lancet (Kolbe and Hutson 2006), and the University of Miami School of Law (Griffin 2004). The violence against Lavalas activists and the imprisonment of its leadership even prompted human rights organizations that had been highly critical of Aristide such as Amnesty International (2005) to denounce the turn of events.
implementing a new neoliberal plan approved by the international community little question as to whose interests the coup government represented remained. Although the victory of former President and Aristide’s right-hand man, René Préval, in 2006 marked the restoration of democratic rule, the decimation of the popular movement ensured that the new president would not budge from the straight-jacket imposed by neoliberal world order.

North American support

As the Aristide government came under attack during the first half of the period in question, both Canada and the United States implemented democracy assistance programs that reinforced the elite opposition. Despite official support to the government, moreover, both countries led diplomatic efforts to have Aristide removed behind close doors. Once Aristide was gone, democracy assistance programs began focusing on rebuilding the legitimacy of the state after they had spent years undermining it. This section will briefly summarize the evolution of the forms of democracy promotion and the main DAAs within the context of bilateral relations and the position of Canada and the United States in the regional order. Against this analytical framework, I will then explore the evolution of the forms of democracy promotion and specific tactics.

The United States has long enjoyed a substantial trade surplus with Haiti, which has one of the most liberalized tariff structures in the world. In 2000, U.S. exports to Haiti equalled $576.7 million while imports were $296.9 million; by 2008, exports had increased considerably to $944 million while imports also rose to $450 million (U.S.

MINUSTAH troops included contingents from a host of repressive countries, including Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and China – which provided a contingent of specially-trained riot police.
Census Bureau 2010c). That same year, Canadian exports to Haiti equalled approximately $51.4 million and imports $19.2 million (Government of Canada 2009d). Although both Canada and the United States have considerable investment in Haiti – the only two foreign banks operating in Haiti are Citibank and Scotiabank of Canada – the Haitian government does not keep figures on FDI breakdown by country (total FDI inflows in 2008 amounted to $19.3 million). Major U.S. companies operating in Haiti include Texaco (Chevron), Seaboard Marine, Continental Grain, Trilogy Inc., Spirit Airlines and Newmont Mining (U.S. Department of State 2009b). Major Canadian investors include SNC-Lavalin and Gildan Activewear.

Officially, both Canada and the United States supported a compromise solution between the government and the opposition. In reality, however, both countries worked steadfastly to undermine the government. The administration of George W. Bush led the way by suspending all aid after the disputed elections. With the IFIs following suit, the aid embargo significantly weakened the government and emboldened the opposition (Sachs 2004). Canada was one of the few donors that did not cut off aid flows to the country, dispersing over $18 million from 2000 to 2001. But this sum actually represented half the amount that was disbursed the previous fiscal year and most of it was redirected from the state to NGOs. If Haiti thought it had an ally in the Canadian government, it was badly mistaken; in 2003, the Secretary of State for Latin America, Africa and the Francophonie, Denis Paradis, organized a secret meeting of states and international organizations concerned with Haiti at Meech Lake which determined that

154 Latortue also issued a moratorium on income tax for three years and fired several thousand public sector employees who had benefited from job creation programs introduced by Aristide (Hallward 2007)
155 The Aristide government continued to pay arrears on its debt to the Inter-American Development Bank (most of it odious) despite the fact that the IDB caved to pressure from Washington and froze four loans
Aristide should be removed from power and Haiti placed under UN administration under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (Engler and Fenton 2005).\footnote{156}

Although the initiative did not come to fruition, a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) composed of troops from Canada, the United States and France did deploy to stabilize the situation immediately after Aristide’s forced departure. Soon after, a UN peacekeeping mission led by Brazil and Chile, the Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti (MINUSTAH), relieved the MIF of its mandate.\footnote{157} The timing of the mission leaves little doubt that Haiti’s partners were only interested in restoring stability after Aristide was gone.\footnote{158} While several states contributed troops to the mission, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) demanded an investigation into the events surrounding Aristide’s departure, refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the interim government, which was unconditionally supported by both Canada and the United States.\footnote{159}

If the foreign policy of the United States in the period under question may be explained in large part by the long-standing alliance between neo-conservatives representing the interests of U.S.-based transnational capital and the Haitian elite, Canada’s policy is perhaps less clear cut. Certainly, investigative journalists such as Fenton and Engler have highlighted important material interests linking Canadian

\footnote{156} The story was made public by an article published in l’Actualité by Michel Vastel. Haitian diplomats in Ottawa reacted with extreme concern when they found out about the meeting on the future of their country to which they had not been invited.

\footnote{157} With its experience in waging war on the poor in the favelas, Brazil has headed the MINUSTAH. See Flynn (2007) for an interesting analysis of how it has acted as a sub-imperial actor in the context of global capitalism.

\footnote{158} As Shamsie states, the point is not that Canada should have acted to protect Aristide the man, but rather that it “should have done much more within its power to support his office and position as a constitutionally-elected leader” (2006).
transnational companies to the Haitian elite. In October 2004, for instance, a Haitian-Canadian Chamber of Commerce was created when SNC-Lavalin and 11 other Canadian companies participated in a Francophonie Business Forum organized by Prime Minister Latortue. CIDA itself has awarded lucrative contracts to SNC-Lavalin, including a $20 million contract to build a new Canadian embassy in Haiti in 2004 (Fenton 2005). In addition to what Fenton refers to as the ‘Canadian corporate-state nexus in Haiti,’ however, Canada’s policy must be situated in terms of the ideological role that the Canadian state has increasingly played in regional (and world) order as a middle power. With its history as a non-colonial power and close cultural ties with Haiti, the Canadian state was particularly well positioned to provide a multilateral face through its image as an ‘honest broker’ (Zebich-Knos 2007) for an intervention that was in fact opposed by regional organizations such as the OAS and CARICOM as well as the vast majority of the Haitian population. Canadian state agents acted opportunistically to restore neoliberal order in a country long subjected to imperial dominance where Canada enjoyed a high level of cultural capital. As we shall see in the following chapters in Peru and Bolivia, Canadian democracy promotion was most imperialistic in a country where its material interests were actually quite modest.

According to Ginette Martin, the Director for Haiti at DFAIT during the time of the interim government, Canada was instrumental in convincing other Latin American countries to support the Canadian effort in Haiti.

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160 In June 2005, Canada took the lead in assembling donors at the so-called Montreal Conference to assess the results of the implementation of the neoliberal development framework adopted by the government.

162 Both of were part of the leftist Canada Haiti Action Network (CHAN), a group that actively criticized the Canadian government in the wake of the coup.

164 The president of the Chamber, Robert Tippenhauer, was later appointed by the interim government as Ambassador to Canada. His nephew, the wealthy industrialist, Hans Tippenhauer, was a key figure in the G-184. There are other direct links between Canadian commercial interests and the Haitian opposition. The primary sub-contractor of Gildan Activewear, for instance, was none other than the head of the G-184, sweatshop magnate Andy Apaid (Fenton 2005).
states to support the UN presence: “One of the driving forces for Canadian engagement in Haiti was that we would not be there alone. And Minister Graham at the time made I don’t know how many phone calls to his counterparts across Latin America because we felt that Haiti should be seen as a challenge for Latin America, that we should see as the Americas that if we do not help Haiti get out of the morass that it is in then we as a community have to recognize our failure.” Yet there is little question that this leadership role provided a veil of international legitimacy to a government that was both repressive and profoundly unpopular. Several years into the UN intervention, FOCAL’s Executive Director, Carlo Dade, more explicitly drew the link between Canada’s leadership role in Haiti and Washington’s political agenda: "the U.S. would welcome Canadian involvement and Canada's taking the lead in Haiti. The administration in Washington has its hands more than full with Afghanistan, Iraq....This is a chance for Canada to step up and provide that sort of focused attention and leadership, and the administration would welcome this" (2008).

In this political context, U.S. and Canadian democracy programs were configured to fit within the shared foreign policies objectives – official and unofficial – of both states. Table 14 summarizes the shifting forms of democracy promotion by Canada and the United States (the dates indicate the overall trend since the programs implemented by DAAs did not neatly correspond to a particular time-line). Table 15 summarizes the main DAAs and their programs, the local partners, the specific strategies associated with different phases and the objectives of each one. The total amount spent on democracy assistance by USAID and CIDA is listed, as well as the budgets for major programs

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162 Interview, Ottawa: October 30, 2008. When asked about the human rights reports which were critical of the interim government, Ms. Martin dismissed them as being partisan and reflective of the general climate
funded by each one. Although both aid agencies allocated considerable amounts to undermine the Lavalas government, they spent much more in legitimizing the interim government that usurped its authority. Indeed, in the three years leading up to the coup (fiscal years 2001-04), CIDA spent $11.5 million in democracy assistance compared to $81 million over the course of the next three years. Likewise, the United States spent $13.79 million from 2001 to 2003 and $66.209 million over the next three years. To put these figures into perspective, the cash-starved government of Aristide was operating on a budget of $300 million in 2003 (Farmer 2004).

**Table 14: The shifting form of democracy promotion in Haiti**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. / Canada</th>
<th>Elite mobilization Phase I</th>
<th>EM Phase II</th>
<th>Polyarchy promotion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coup</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

USAID’s democracy promotion program at the beginning of the period in question – introduced in 1999 under the title *More Genuinely Inclusive Democratic Governance* – provided the framework through which various American QUANGOs channelled U.S. resources to coordinate the elite opposition. Elite groups seized upon the contested electoral results to redouble their efforts to destabilize the government. The program purported to work with “organizations in all development sectors to build their advocacy skills so that they may positively influence government policies and oversee public institutions” (USAID 2000). As in the past, however, those organizations which were targeted for political training and coalition building were exclusively from elite sectors of society and opposition parties (with the exception of NDI).
After the coup, USAID’s OTI launched a *Haiti Transition Initiative* in collaboration with the International Organization for Migration (IOM). After years of cultivating instability, USAID designed the project to “support a peaceful stabilization and reconstruction process.” An evaluation of the project written in October 2006 boasts that “the OTI program clearly supported US foreign policy objectives by targeting communities with a history of conflict, generating greater community cohesion and establishing links to local governments that served as a means of both legitimating those governments and addressing community needs rapidly and effectively” (Management Systems International Corporate Offices 2006: 25). The focus also switched to strengthening state institutions (USAID-Haiti 2006). Soon after, USAID hired the development consultant, ARD, to implement a massive decentralization effort which ran from 2006 to 2009. With these programs in place, the United States shifted gears to polyarchy promotion.

Canada’s democracy promotion efforts followed a similar trajectory of shifting support from civil society to the state. Following the controversial 2000 elections, CIDA’s First Secretary in Haiti confirms that Canada and the U.S. have coordinated most of their democracy promotion efforts, and that there is hardly any difference between them.164 Funds established in the early 2000s were administered directly by the Embassy (CIDA 2009i) (CIDA 2009j) and provided resources to civil society groups aligned with the opposition. This was also the case for the program administered by Development and Peace, as well as, later on, Rights and Democracy. Once the interim government came to

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163 Note that U.S. amounts are given for each calendar year. See Table 1 in the introduction for sources on total disbursements of CIDA and USAID in democracy assistance.

power, CIDA played a major role in supporting the electoral council, the *Conseil Electoral Provisoire* (CEP), and in organizing and monitoring the flawed elections over which it presided (CIDA 2009h). In 2006, Canada established a *Country Development Programming Framework in Haiti* which allocated a total of $555 million to reconstruction and development efforts over a five year period (2006-2011).\(^{165}\) Within this framework, CIDA has also shifted its focus to supporting state institutions, including the CEP, the offices of the president and the prime minister, and the *Office de la Protection du Citoyen* (Ombudsman).\(^{166}\) In addition, a third fund administered by the Embassy was created, the *Democracy and Peace Support Fund* to support civil society organizations and government institutions in the areas of human rights and good governance (CIDA 2009k).

\(^{165}\) This made Haiti the second largest recipient of Canadian ODA after Afghanistan and Canada the second largest donor in Haiti.

\(^{166}\) Given the vast amount of democracy programs in Haiti, the discussion that follows is limited to the most notable examples.
Table 15: Actors, programs, strategies and tactics in Haiti
(Amounts in millions of dollars)

| United States: Total spent by USAID on democracy assistance (2001-09) $224.933 |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| IRI (2002-07): $4.277 |
| IFES, NDI, Haiti Democracy Project (budgets not available; similar to IRI) |
| NED grants (2000-02; 2004-present) (2009)*: $0.95 |
| USAID, Haiti Transition Initiative (2004-06): $13.4 |
| IOM, Revitalisation et de Promotion de l'Entente et de la Paix (2006 - ): $30.0 + |
| Local partners: NGOs (elite civil society), parties (only NDI provided support to Lavalas), the state after 2004 |
| Political orientation: Opposition |

| Canada: Total spent by CIDA (2001-09) $139.394 |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| CIDA, Justice and Human Rights Fund (2001-09) $5 million; Kore Famn Fund (2003-10) $5.0 |
| Haiti Country Program II (2006-11): $1.875 |
| RD, Strengthening the Participation of Haitian Civil Society (2005-09) (budget not available) |
| RD, Strengthening Democratic Governance and Promoting Human Rights program (2008-10): $5.0 |
| Local partners: NGOs (elite civil society), the state after 2004 |
| Political orientation: Opposition |

| Political context |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| United States |
| EMTs Phase I (2000-04) |
| Unite political opposition (CD); consolidate civic opposition (G-184); legitimize intervention at home |
| Phase II (2004-06) |
| Reinforce elite political parties to compete in elections; maintain war of position against Lavalas; begin reinforcing the state |

| Shared objectives of U.S. and Canada |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Phase I |
| Generate crisis of authority; regime change |
| Phase II |
| Legitimize interim government; transition to elite rule |

| Canada |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| EMTs Phase I |
| Reinforce ‘progressive’ NGO opposition; legitimize intervention at home |
| Phase II |
| Continue supporting NGOs; legitimize electoral process; begin reinforcing the state |

*The NED only provides full information on its grants for the most recent fiscal year

**II. Manufacturing dissent: the American QUANGOs take the lead**

If the United States and Canada both adopted an elite mobilization approach toward democracy promotion, they did not necessarily use the same tactics, nor did they target the same actors. Elite civil society remained differentiated and a certain informal division of labour between Canada and the United States occurred in the overall interest of creating a larger hegemonic bloc. This bloc was led by transnationalized fractions but also included elite social groups and NGOs critical of neoliberalism. This section will
summarize the different initiatives from 2000 to 2004, beginning with the contribution of the U.S. actors, which focused on traditional elite sectors. I will then look at Canadian programs during this period, which focused more on empowering leftist NGOs in civil society.

The U.S. effort to reinforce the elite opposition during the Aristide years was undertaken chiefly by the IRI and IFES with funds from USAID. IRI in particular had long established a pattern of meddling in Haitian politics against the interests of the Lavalasian government. After having been forced to close its office in Haiti in the late 1990s, the IRI's fortune changed with the return of Republican hardliners in Washington, including far-right operatives in the U.S. Department of State such as Otto Reich and Roger Noriega, both veterans of the democracy promotion-destabilization campaign against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. These key figures in the Republican administration provided unconditional support to the head of the IRI program in Haiti, Haitian-American Stanley Lucas, who played an instrumental role in uniting the disparate factions that formed the new opposition to Aristide.\footnote{Lucas hailed from a wealthy land-owning family with strong ties to the military. In June 1998, a relative, Remy Lucas, was arrested for his involvement as the ringleader of the Jean Rabel massacre in which armed gangs paid by local landowners slaughtered 140 peasants calling for land reform in the Northwestern region of Haiti (Hallward 2007).}

Lucas’ most important achievement in the late 1990s was the compromise brokered between different factions of the liberal elite and the ex-military, which led to the creation of a broad-based ‘macouto-bourgeois’ alliance against Lavalas in the form of the Conférence Haïtienne des Partis Politiques (CHPP) (Hallward 2007: 95-96). When the main political parties of the conference were decimated by FL in the May legislative elections, Lucas and the IRI helped to re-brand the opposition the Convergence
Democratique (CD) – an alliance of fifteen opposition parties led by the Organisation du Peuple en Lutte (OPL) with “diverse and incompatible ideologies, ranging from neo-Duvalierist, centrist, religious, and social democratic, to former members of the Lavalas movement and close allies of Aristide” (Dupuy 2005:190). From its new base at the Santo Domingo hotel in the Dominican Republic, the IRI soon launched a year-long series of conferences which began in December 2002 and which were funded almost exclusively by USAID. From 2002 to 2007, the IRI received $4.277 million in federal funds to manage its training program for civil society organizations and political parties and its civic education training program (IRI 2008b). With the hardliners back in power in Washington, the IRI quickly strengthened the old network between the Haitian and American Right, training a total of 600 opposition figures under political party strengthening program, which did not include a single member from the most popular party in Haiti.

According to an IRI web page designed to defend its controversial activities in Haiti, its training programs were directed at “weaker groups (political parties) and disenfranchised constituencies (women and youth)” as part of an effort to foster a level political playing field (IRI 2008b).168 Although the IRI itself has refrained from publicizing a list of its grantees, investigative journalist Anthony Fenton (2006b) found that funding was targeted to elite women’s groups and youth organizations such as Fondation Espoir, an organization headed by Hans Tippenhauer, a sweatshop magnate who was one of the most visible leaders of the opposition to Aristide. In an interview with this researcher, Tippenhauer situated the struggle against Aristide and liberation
theology within the larger struggle against populist democracy in Latin America. He stated: "of course, the people are enamoured by programs that are supposedly social but which really don’t benefit the majority but rather a few figureheads…the only way to counter this populism is to have a strong civil society which can serve as a counter-weight to the state." While Tippenhauer’s right to organize sectors of society to promote his views is not in dispute, the majority of the population did not see Aristide as a threat to democracy. IRI assistance thus helped alter the balance of power by empowering groups that were unrepresentative of popular sentiment. Likewise, a human rights delegation from the Quixote Center (Reeves 2004) that visited Haiti in April 2004 and interviewed several women and students from the political and civil society opposition found that numerous elite organizations such as Fédération des Étudiants Universitaires d’Haïti (FEUH), Solidarité Femmes Haïtiennes (SOFA), ENFOFANM, and Coordination Nationale de Plaidoyer pour les Droits des femmes (CONAP) boasted of funding from USAID, NDI and IRI (we will look at these organizations in more detail shortly).

New York Times journalists Walt Bogdanich and Jenny Nordberg broke the full story on the extent of IRI interference in supporting and emboldening the opposition against Aristide through its training programs and more covert behind-the-scene activities. According to their investigation, the controversial Lucas continued to work for the IRI Haiti program as a political trainer despite the protests of U.S. Ambassador Brian Dean Curran, a Clinton-appointee who found himself at odds with the Republican hardliners back in Washington. In interviews with Bogdanich and Norberg, Curran noted

\[168\] Training sessions typically lasted two days and included sections on a number of political strategies, from developing issue-based political party platforms to encouraging political coalition-building (IRI 2008b).

\[169\] Port-au-Prince: March 25, 2009 (my translation).
that he had repeatedly expressed his concerns about the activities of Lucas to both the IRI and his superiors in Washington in the Bush administration’s Latin America policy team, headed by Otto Reich, then Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American affairs. Curran, who sincerely believed that the U.S. should support Aristide while facilitating a compromise, reluctantly approved IRI funding for the conferences on condition that Lucas not attend the first 120 days, a condition which was subsequently violated (Bogdanich and Nordberg 2006).

Reich’s dismissal of Ambassador Curran’s concerns during the crucial period in question reflected the logic of a dualistic foreign policy that pledged support to brokering a compromise between Aristide and the opposition while simultaneously undermining the basis for negotiation through its ideological and material support to the opposition. While the IRI publicly trained the opposition in effective political tactics, Lucas operated behind the scenes to encourage the opposition to refuse to accept any sort of compromise that would resolve the crisis triggered by the 2000 elections. The agents of democracy promotion thus became the vehicle through which an informal foreign policy was delivered, providing the government with a shield of deniability from possible accusations that it was fomenting a coup.

There may have also been a more ominous connection between the actions of the IRI and the paramilitary violence that would soon lead to the overthrow of Aristide. As

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170 In a July 2002 cable, for instance, he wrote: "I continue to have grave misgivings about the participation of an individual whose questionable behavior could be to the detriment of U.S. interests. The USAID director shares my concerns." Despite the paper trail of cables, Reich responded to Curran’s allegations by claiming that "he never expressed any problems with Stanley Lucas to me, and I was his boss (Bogdanich and Nordberg 2006)."

171 The suspicion that IRI was encouraging the opposition to maintain the Option Zéro strategy of no compromise was substantiated by several of its moderate members. The current Prime Minister, Max Bellerive, an opposition member and official under Aristide, noted that Lucas said "there was a big plan for
the IRI trainings were being delivered, at least two of the main figures behind the armed insurrection that toppled the Lavalas government in 2004, Guy Philippe and Paul Arcelin, were staying at the hotel.\textsuperscript{172} Both of these individuals would later cross the Dominican-Haitian border to lead a rag-tag band of paramilitary members, former military, and dissatisfied former-Lavalasian gang members to terrorize parts of the central plateau and capture key northern towns such as Cap Haitien.\textsuperscript{173} While it is difficult to surmise the exact role of the IRI in inciting the paramilitary elements against Aristide, U.S. authorities most certainly knew that paramilitary factions were regrouping across the border and conducting military exercises.\textsuperscript{174}

Meanwhile, IFES played a crucial role in coalescing elite civil society groups to add a popular component to the political opposition.\textsuperscript{175} The democracy promotion projects implemented by IFES in the early 2000s were organized under the titles \textit{Civil Society Strengthening Project for Judicial Independence and Justice} and \textit{Victims of Organized Violence Program}.\textsuperscript{176} Both programs were premised on the assumption that the executive controlled the judiciary and that the government was deeply implicated in human rights abuses. This, in conjunction with a congressional ban on funding for work with the government of Haiti in the wake of the 2000 elections, provided the justification

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item[172] Arcelin was a former professor at the \textit{Université de Québec à Montréal}. He publicly boasted of his role in the coup in the Canadian media, claiming to have met the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Pettigrew, to explain "the reality of Haiti to him" in the month prior to the coup (Fonseca 2005).
  \item[173] Philippe was a former police chief who had been trained by the U.S. in Ecuador in the early 1990s and had known Lucas since childhood (Bogdanich and Nordberg 2006).
  \item[174] Stan Goff (2004), a Retired US Army Master Sergeant who took part in Operation Restore Democracy, maintains that paramilitary leaders such as Louis Jodel Chamblain were actually being trained by the Dominican military with the knowledge of the U.S. Embassy, and may have even received arms from the U.S.
  \item[175] Hallward (2007) notes that IFES personnel and priorities overlap considerably with those of IRI. See chapter two.
  \item[176] The budget size for these projects is not listed in the summary report available on the IFES web-site.
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for the unorthodox focus on civil society for a justice-reform project. The overreaching objective of the Civil Society Strengthening Project was to “strengthen the capacity of Haitian civil society to advocate for and participate in justice reform and to build broad coalitions across society to generate demand for reform (IFES 2004).” IFES set up the Reform of Law and Judiciary (CHREDEJ) as an umbrella organization for the legal sector and helped set up professional associations such as l'Association Nationale de la Magistrature Haïtienne (ANAMAH), and la Fédération des Barreaux d'Haïti (FBH) (Griffin 2004). It also worked with journalist groups and radio stations to publicize Aristide’s corruption and formed a student group, la Fédération des Étudiants Universitaires d’Haïti (FEUH), at the state university in Port-au-Prince. The creation of these organizations and their ‘sensitization’ was instrumental in forming the basis of the G-184 and the Plate-forme Démocratique (PD).

With funding from IFES as well as other funders such as CIDA, the business-led G-184 sought to counter Lavalasian popularity by unveiling a new ‘Social Contract’ at the Inisyativ Sitwayen in Cap Haitien, which gave the appearance of a coherent political alternative. Under the leadership of Apaid, the G-184 then launched a national caravan to build support for the Contract across the country. Although the turnout for the caravan was mostly weak, the initiative symbolized the effort to disseminate the anti-Aristide discourse and build a popular hegemony to legitimize its opposition to the regime. In the words of former Prime Minister, Yvon Neptune: “the strategy was to show that now all sectors of civil society were supporters of this idea of the social contract. Here again this

\[177\] Calling for a new national project that prioritized the wellbeing of the poor pursued on the basis of unity and dialogue, the Contract set out the pre-conditions for free and fair elections, demanding that the government cease its support to criminal gangs and allow basic freedoms.
was a farce. There is one social contract – it’s the constitution of 1987. It was the social contract to which the majority of the population continued to adhere.”

The extent to which IFES’ activities contributed to the mobilization of elite civil society is difficult to assess. By its own accounts, it played a fundamental role in bringing together a broad-based coalition to advocate for justice reform (IFES 2004). A University of Miami report (Griffin 2004: 22) notes that interviewed IFES administrators went so far as to claim that they would have liked to have taken full credit for Aristide’s eventual ouster but could not out of respect for the U.S. government. Whatever its impact, the elite character of the organizations that received funding certainly casts doubt on the claim that the G-184 represented a broad-cross section of society. Neatby’s (2006) research on ANAMAH, for instance, demonstrates that the association was hardly critical of the systemic injustices associated with Haiti’s overcrowded prisons and culture of impunity that mostly affect the poor. It also failed to respond publicly to human rights abuses committed by the interim government after Aristide had been overthrown. IFES also played a role in coalescing the Association National des Medias Haïtiens (ANMH), a network of 12 radio stations and three television stations which spearheaded the G-184’s anti-Aristide campaign. In a particularly revealing example of the interlocking-elite networks that constituted the foreign-funded opposition, the ANMH was dominated by conservative moguls such as Apaid himself, the founder of Tele-Haïti – one of the main television stations – and Reginald Boulos, the president of Haiti’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry and owner of the daily paper Le Matin (Sanders 2008b).

178 Interview, Port-au-Prince: July 17, 2008 (my translation).
179 The indiscretion of the IFES administrators seems to have led to a certain degree of paranoia on the part of IFES. Despite repeated requests, this researcher was unable to organize an interview with the new IFES representative in Haiti in the summer of 2008.
In terms of the student opposition, IFES and the IRI had little difficulty recruiting student leaders to form the FEUH given that the class background of most students ensured that the intellectual climate on the state campus tended to be highly conservative.\(^{180}\) Still, only a fraction participated in the protests against the government led by Tippenhauer. Even those organizations that seemed to be rooted in more popular sectors had tentative links with those they claimed to represent. The trade union contingent of the G-184, the *Coordination Syndicale Haïtienne* (CSH), is a case in point. Although the CSH was not funded by IFES, it did receive funding from the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (ORIT) and the International Confederation of Trade Unions (CCITU) and claimed to be a coalition of Haitian trade unions. As Sprague’s (2007) research on the CSN notes, however, the confederation was more like a small grouping of leaders than a labour central that engaged in collective bargaining on behalf of its member organizations.\(^{181}\)

IFES also played an important role in manufacturing a human rights crisis that significantly tarnished the image of the Lavalas government.\(^{182}\) The most controversial element of IFES programming was the funding of a human rights hotline administered by *le Comité des Avocats pour le Respect des Libertés Individuelles* (CARLI). IFES provided the group with $54,000 to create the hotline and provide monthly written reports detailing alleged abuses and their perpetrators to radio stations, the U.S. Embassy, the OAS, and various domestic and international organizations. Once IFES funding came to an end during the reign of the interim government, however, CARLI admitted to the

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\(^{180}\) According to Hallward (2007), many leaders were introduced to influential opposition members in the Dominican Republic by the IRI and were apparently offered visas to the U.S. and France.

\(^{181}\) On this point, Sprague (2007) cites Canadian CUPE research, Kevin Skerrett, who visited Haiti in early 2004 as a Canadian labour delegate.

\(^{182}\) Robinson’s (1996) work documents how this strategy was also used in the early 1990s.
human rights delegation of the University of Miami that it was under a lot of pressure by IFES to denounce Aristide, having gone so far as to publish names of perpetrators with little or no investigation (Griffin 2004: 28). Canadian activist, Richard Sanders (2007b), notes that both the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) and the Quixote Center published critical reports on CARLI, arguing that it contributed to a climate of fear and political persecution targeting Lavalas activists and supporters. The NLG reported that those who were condemned by the hotline were never contacted to respond to the allegations and that CARLI, with no full time staff and only two volunteer lawyers at its office, hardly had the capacity to investigate the 60 to 100 calls it was receiving a month.183

The partisan activities of IFES and IRI contrasted with the programs of NDI, which constituted one of the few examples of a more balanced approach to democracy promotion in the early 2000s. The NDI’s political party strengthening program, for instance, included participants from several political parties, including Lavalas. According to the NDI Resident Director of Haiti, Felix Ulloa, one of the main criteria NDI applied to determine eligibility to participate in its program was that interested parties be active on a national scale.184 In this regard, 10 national political parties were supported through its program, including FL, six parties associated with the CD, and three non-aligned parties.185 Despite its less partisan approach, however, the NDI program

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183 Sanders (2007) also pointed to the CIDA report on the Canada-Haiti Interim Cooperation Framework, which noted that Canada allocated $10 million to the OAS which listed CARLI as a beneficiary.
184 Interview with Felix Ulloa, NDI Resident Director of Haiti. Port-au-Prince: July 15, 2008.
185 The NDI also coordinated a Civic Forum Program designed to provide civic education and action program to encourage mainly youth to participate in public affairs. Although the program, which was launched in 1997, disallowed individuals engaged in partisan politics from participating in its activities, presumably many of those trained did indeed go on to engage in politics. By 2007, the NDI boasted of having trained more than 20,400 individuals through the program and having established a total of 180 initiative committees in communities across the country (NDI 2007).
served to further distort the political landscape by building parties which lacked popular appeal on their own terms.

As part of its strategy to monitor its program, USAID developed a highly suspect methodology which helped to legitimate its support of opposition forces. ARD – a private development contractor – gathered evidence to condemn the government for its alleged neglect of ‘civil society organizations’ through an analysis of articles appearing in the highly-partisan *Le Nouvelliste* from 2002 to 2003. Its report concluded that: “the recourse to direct action suggests that the government offers few formal mechanisms to channel grievances and to negotiate policy differences with different sectors of civil society. A review of the articles shows that the government rarely meets with CSOs to solicit their input or to negotiate policies directly affecting their sector (ARD inc. 2003: 1).” The report further goes on to discredit political actions undertaken by the *organisations populaires* associated with Lavalas and to present the G-184 as a strictly civil society affair with no connection to the opposition, despite its membership in the *Plate-forme Démocratique*.

The notion that Aristide’s government had generated a crisis of authority through its own incompetence and abuse of authority provided a convenient justification for the U.S. government to refuse him assistance as the Haitian state increasingly came under siege. U.S. policymakers and intellectuals on the Right realized the importance of reinforcing this perception at home to ensure that Democratic appeals to defend Aristide were marginalized in policy circles. To this end, the Haiti Democracy Project, a Washington-based research group which brought together former U.S. ambassadors and
influential members of the far-Right Haitian-American community such as Lionel Delatour from the Anti-Aristide group, *Centre pour la Libre Entreprise et la Démocratie*, was launched in November 2002.\footnote{The organization also promoted the G-184's Social Contract in academia. Former U.S. Ambassador James R. Morrell, for instance, made an impassioned plea for the Contract at the 2003 conference of the Latin American Studies Association (Morrell 2003).} The project provided another illustration of the proliferation of ‘democracy’ groups representing the same social sectors through an extended network of interlocking elite personnel. As Aristide came under siege, the project sent a delegation of former U.S. ambassadors to Capitol Hill to advocate that “the transition be allowed to run its course” (Haiti Democracy Project 2007). American democracy promotion may not have succeed at welding together a popular hegemony, but it did manage to coordinate the efforts of numerous elite in Haiti and the United States to trigger a crisis of authority that made it easier for the most reactionary elements of Haitian society to deliver the *coup de grace* against Aristide’s government.

**Popular civil society in support of Lavalas**

Although the political objectives of most U.S. democracy promoters could not have been clearer, one must consider the possibility that organized civil society was more or less unanimous in its opposition to the Lavalas government. This would have at least provided a greater degree of legitimacy for programs that were clearly intended to undermine the government. But such was not the case. Although virtually no empirical studies have been conducted on the organization and composition of Haitian civil society in the 2000s, my own tentative investigations substantiate the argument that – in the

\footnote{According to Hallward (2007), much of the funding for the organization during this period came from its founder, Rudolph Boulos, a wealthy industrialist and prominent G-184 leader, as well as the IRI. Its board of directors is a who’s who of reactionary U.S. diplomats and Haitian-American business leaders.}
words of one Lavalasian activist – civil society can be distinguished between its minority and majority component (société civile minoritaire versus société civile majoritaire).\textsuperscript{188}

In the former camp stood the opposition, including many progressive NGOs which received support from Canada (as discussed below); in the latter camp, there were the organisations populaires (also referred to as the organisations de base) which had always comprised the Lavalas movement, as well as most of organized labour. The largest labour federation, for instance, the Confédération des Travailleurs Haïtiens, supported the Lavalas government until the very end. According to a delegation with which I met, the federation represents over 65,000 members – a considerably larger social base than all of the opposition organizations combined. While its leaders were not uncritical of the decisions of the Lavalas government, they insisted on the right of President Aristide to complete his term in office. The Secretary General of the federation, Paul Loulou Chery, pointed to the hypocrisy that underpinned U.S. democracy promotion in Haiti: “One can never compare the amount of mistakes made by the Lavalasian government over its entire history to the amount made by George Bush in two mandates. Despite everything, he completed both of his mandates – despite all of the things he did to the entire world. In Iraq, they destroyed an entire people... But he finished his mandates. For us, this was not the case. And today, it is utter chaos.\textsuperscript{189}

In terms of the OPs, it is extremely difficult to determine the number of people that are actually active within these grassroots organizations. The OPs themselves number in the hundreds, providing various social services to the local population. There is no question that they are organizationally weak and often unable to mobilize politically

\textsuperscript{188} Interview with delegation from Réseau d'Organs National Multiplicateur de Fanmi Lavalas, Port-au-Prince: March 16, 2009 (my translation).
beyond the short term – factors which reflect, as argued in the previous chapter, the extreme precariousness of the class status of their leaders. But such organizations do possess organic intellectuals who help sustain a coherent organizational structure at the local, regional and national levels. Indeed, the OPs overlap with hundreds of small groups (*ti fanmis*) that occasionally mobilize at the regional level. There political program revolves around the three main themes that have long informed the Lavalas movement – justice, transparency, and participation. A member of one delegation with whom I met from *Réseau d’Organs National Multiplicateur de Fanmi Lavalas* argued that they were a much more legitimate expression of civil society than the opposition, whose ranks had been reinforced by external forces. He rhetorically asked:

> There was a minority civil society composed – composed of whom? The bourgeoisie, the political class united in the convergence and of course some organic intellectuals who always defend this privileged minority. And – you may laugh but it is true – one also has to place within this civil society the United States and its allies. I'm speaking of the government of George Bush, the government of Canada, and the government of Chirac, all of which supported the coup.¹⁹⁰

The same interviewee argued that international funders have used the lack of capacity and professional expertise of the OPs to deny them funding. But this has not prevented more progressive U.S. organizations, such as the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) and Partners in Health (PIH), from working in collaboration with the OPs from an approach that emphasizes solidarity and accompaniment. Although PIH has not worked directly on the issues of democracy and human rights, its approach to development in Haiti is notable since it has sought to empower local community organizations such as the OPs from a perspective that emphasizes the link between

¹⁸⁹ Interview, Port-au-Prince: March 16, 2009 (my translation).
¹⁹⁰ Interview, Port-au-Prince: March 16, 2009 (my translation). Such comments provide a very real empirical basis to the neo-Gramscian concept of a transnational hegemonic bloc.
sickness and socio-economic inequality.\textsuperscript{191} IJDH, for its part, partners with the public-interest law office, the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI), an organization which works directly with the OPs assisting victims of human rights violations receive legal compensation and defending those who have been falsely accused. In an interview, Mario Joseph, the head of the BAI and one of Haiti’s most prominent human rights lawyers, indicated how human rights organizations have worked against the poor by denigrating them as \textit{chimères} when in fact it was the elites and the NGOs that supported them who robbed the Haitian people of the most basic political right: “it is those who were supposedly for human rights who were the real \textit{chimères}. They committed a sort of violence – if I and others voted for the government and they do not respect our right to vote, is this not a violation of human rights?”\textsuperscript{192}

\textbf{The Canadian contribution}

Despite the ongoing popularity of the Lavalas government and its organized social base, however, Canada chose to reinforce the \textit{société civile minoritaire} over the \textit{société civile majoritaire}, including conservative business groups.\textsuperscript{193} CIDA added value to the destabilization campaign, however, by targeting funding at small organizations and coalitions representing seemingly progressive constituencies, including those with quasi-leftist credentials. Such funding, much of which was administered by normally-progressive Canadian NGOs and Rights and Democracy, helped to distort the perception of the social basis of the opposition to Aristide. CIDA’s direct contribution to this

\textsuperscript{191} The founder of PIH is Paul Farmer, an American physician and anthropologist who authored the \textit{Uses and Abuses of Haiti}, a chronicle of U.S. imperialism.
\textsuperscript{192} Interview, Port-au-Prince: March 23, 2009 (my translation)
\textsuperscript{193} A $334,000 grant to the Fondation Nouvelle Haïti (FNH), for instance, a think-tank associated with Andy Apaid, provided a Canadian contribution to 30 political parties seeking to raise awareness of the new social contract (CIDA 2006)
distortion was the funding of women’s organizations that represented themselves as the vanguard of a cross-sectoral opposition to Aristide, a strategy of elite-feminist mobilization. Between 2000 and 2004, CIDA provided funding to two women’s organizations, the Coordination Nationale de Plaidoyer pour les Droits des femmes (CONAP) and ENFOFANM, both of which issued regular statements denouncing alleged-human rights obligations being committed by Aristide’s government and calling for its immediate resignation. CIDA also provided funding to other women’s organizations which opposed the government including Kay Fanm, Solidarité Femmes Haitiennes (SOFA) and Fanm Deside through the Canadian NGO, Development and Peace, and, in the aftermath of the coup, continued to fund CONAP though a project implemented by Rights and Democracy.

Although such organizations engage in important initiatives denouncing violence against women and advocating for women’s rights, their leaders are French-speaking elites removed from the day-to-day struggles of the impoverished masses. This in itself does not discredit their actions, but the fact that they do not organize amongst the people nor show solidarity with the popular sectors of Haitian society in their political struggle with the dominant class demonstrates the divide between many NGO feminists and the class struggle in which poor women from the organisations populaires are engaged. Many feminist organizations retained a critical distance from the popular movement even after Aristide’s first return, when the movement would have benefited from their support to help offset external pressures. Although

194 Mohanty’s (2003) well-known analysis of feminism argues that power differentials between social minorities and majorities within the boundaries of nations and between nations may be captured through the concept of One-Third/ Two-Thirds worlds. In terms of their class and cultural positions, feminists in Haiti may be situated in the One-Third world, a concept that also resonates with the notion of société civile minoritaire proposed by many Haitian activists.
this reflects in part the failure of the Lavalasian leadership to create a wider popular movement, it also relates to the class position and vanguardist mentality of many feminist NGOs. Long-time feminist activist and speaker for *Kay Fanm*, Magalie Marcelin, for instance, stated in an interview that: “the whole social movement before and after 1987 that had led to the departure of the dictators never had an avant-garde to elaborate a social project. They would say simply that that we had to change the state, but it wasn’t to change the system, it was only to remove the *macoutes* from the public institutions.”

Marcelin and others were particularly critical of the Lavalas government’s support to the *chimères*, who, she argues, were responsible for using rape as a political weapon against opponents of Aristide. This is a claim that is often repeated with little documented support. In fact, one of the more visible leaders of CONAP and ENFOFANM, Danielle Magloire – herself an opponent of Aristide – carried out research on the political use of rape since the Duvalier years which did not substantiate such claims. In an interview, she stated: “the findings were that civil rape was vastly more important than rape in the political sense. This is not what we are supposed to say but I cannot deform the reality. The other rapes are more spectacular but no one has been able to show me that political violence toward women was higher” (during the Aristide years). Nonetheless, following the coup, Magloire lent her stature to a so-called *Conseil des Sages* (Council of the Wise) which named an illegitimate interim prime minister who quickly set about creating a government that

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195 Interview, Port-au-Prince: March 13, 2009 (my translation).
196 Interview, Port-au-Prince: March 18, 2009 (my translation).
was far more detrimental to women than the status quo under Aristide.\footnote{According to the human rights report issued by the medical journal, the Lancet (Kolbe and Hutson 2006), up to 30,000 women were raped during the coup regime, many the victims of the government-sponsored campaign to destroy Lavalas as a political force.}

CONAP then chose to continue denouncing the past actions of Aristide’s government while the interim government waged its campaign of repression.\footnote{Women activists in the Caribbean acknowledged the gap between feminists and the popular movement when one group issued a statement against the coup in March 2004. Peggy Antrobus, former General Coordinator of Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) and signatory to the statement, noted that the women’s movement in Haiti suffered the same class divisions of women’s movements everywhere. Antrobus went on to say how the case of Haiti demonstrated how certain sectors of civil society can be easily manipulated politically and co-opted to advance an elite agenda.}

CIDA funds to Aristide opposition groups were also channelled through a handful of left-leaning NGOs such as Development and Peace, Alternatives, and the QUANGO Rights and Democracy. The most active of these organizations, Development and Peace, played a role similar to IFES in mobilizing elite civil society opposition groups against Aristide’s government. As Anne-Catherine Kennedy, the Program Officer for Haiti, explained, the NGO’s activities in the lead up to Aristide’s “departure” were informed by the perspective that Aristide was arming Lavalas supporters who were committing human rights violations and repressing civil society. Specifically, it sought to strengthen “popular grassroots organizations” to make them “more democratic and more autonomous,” including members of the G-184 representing seemingly more progressive constituencies in the women’s and peasant’s movements, such as Kay Fanm, SOFA, Fanm Deside and the Mouvement Paysan Papaye (MPP), providing funding to over 70 organizations. Development and Peace justified supporting these sectors by reducing Lavalas to the chimères and dismissing – pejoratively and ethnocentrically – its popular support base.

Ms. Kennedy stated:

There has been a sort of contamination of what the term popular movement means. In fact, there were people who claimed to be part of the popular movement who were acting violently against local merchants and who were starting fires in the local...
markets. Just because a majority of the population is poor and, perhaps, illiterate and lives in misery doesn’t necessarily mean that they do good things or act democratically. One can buy votes from such people by offering simple favours and it is very easy to do – it does not cost a lot.\textsuperscript{199}

To coordinate its program activities, Development and Peace established an office in Port-au-Prince which was closed after Aristide was forced to flee. In addition to providing its partner organizations with capacity-building exercises and funds to facilitate their mobilization, Development and Peace supported intermediate organizations to encourage regional coordination and mobilization in ‘support of democracy’ (Development and Peace 2003). Throughout this period, it contributed to at least one national symposium, organized by the \textit{Institut Culturel Karl Lévesque} (ICKL), which sought to develop coordinated strategies against the government. It also provided funds to the human rights coalition, the \textit{Plate-Forme des Organisations Haïtiennes de Droits Humains} (POHDH), to consolidate a network of national human rights observers.

POHDH, for its part, was closely aligned with the National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR), a human rights organization which would go on to lead a campaign against the former Lavalas leadership during the coup years that would destroy its credibility as a non-partisan organization (discussed in the following section).

Despite the assertion that it was supporting the poorest sectors of society in a struggle against authoritarianism, the groups funded by Development and Peace possessed tiny membership bases and centered primarily on the personality of one dominant individual (hence the need to make them more democratic and autonomous).

One of the few G-184 organizations with a substantial, though purely regional, following,

\textsuperscript{199} Interview, Montreal: June 25, 2008 (my translation).
was the MPP. Over the years, its leader, Chavannes Jean-Baptiste, had managed to build a substantial peasant following in Hinche, sustained in large part by the steady flow of NGO patronage that passed through the MPP’s hands. Its grassroots activism, however, remained easily co-opted by its dominant leader. Indeed, in the 2004 presidential elections, Jean-Baptiste was able to use the MPP as a political vehicle to mobilize a support base for one of the most reactionary G-184 leaders, the far-right industrialist, Charles Baker, with whom he had created a close political alliance (Baker only received 8.24% of all votes) (Hallward 2007: 104). Jean-Baptiste’s opportunistic alliances were formed with little consideration as to what the consequences of his actions might be. In his own words: “we came to the conclusion that an extremely large alliance was necessary to overthrow Aristide…our objective was clear – overthrow Aristide, what ever might happen afterward.”

The anti-neoliberal Montreal-based NGO Alternatives cultivated similar alliances with seemingly-progressive groups opposed to Aristide. The Plate-forme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif (PAPDA), a small NGO which is Alternatives’ only official partner organization in Haiti and whose Executive Director, Camille Chalmers, sat on its board of directors, received a regular stream of funding to attend workshops and conference in Haiti and abroad. In the early 2000s, its participation in CIDA-funded workshops, including four that were organized in the Caribbean in the winter of 2002 around the challenges of economic integration, provided PAPDA with the opportunity to regularly criticize Aristide’s capitulation to the neoliberal program.

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200 According to Hallward (2007), Jean-Baptiste was an early ally of Aristide who split with Lavalas in the 1995 presidential campaign when it became clear that Aristide would support Préval rather than him as his successor.

201 Interview, Port-au-Prince: March 20, 2009 (my translation).
Likewise, in Montreal, *Alternatives* hosted numerous talks in which Chalmers repeatedly blamed the political and economic crisis on the policies of Aristide’s government. In an interview, Chalmers stated: “never once did the government explain to the population that we were suffering from multiple pressures associated with imperialism – that aid had been cut, that international finance had been cut – that we needed to mobilize around an alternative political project. The government never launched a clear political campaign of mobilization around an alternative project.”

While this may be true, PAPDA’s actual political stance certainly did not help create a popular bloc that might have countered ‘imperialist pressures.’ By December 2001, PAPDA had already publicly called for the resignation of Aristide’s government after some of his supporters had attacked opposition property in reprisal for an attempted coup launched by the *Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction Nationale*, a paramilitary group associated with the CD (Hallward 2007:184). Although not part of the G-184, PAPDA issued media statements denouncing Aristide as a dictator and demanding his immediate resignation as the government came under siege prior to the coup. Even more damning, one of PAPDA’s top representatives, Yves André Wainwright, was named Environment Minister by the coup regime once Aristide’s government was deposed (Sanders 2007a). As we shall see, the interim government was responsible for implementing one of Haiti’s most aggressive neoliberal programs.

**Building support at home**

While North American DAAs were undermining the Lavalas government in Haiti, Canadian DAAs such as *Alternatives* and Rights and Democracy played a similar role in

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202 Interview, Port-au-Prince: March 17, 2009 (my translation).
demonizing Aristide as the Haiti Democracy Project in the U.S. In addition to its anti-Lavalas conferences in Montreal, *Alternatives* regularly posted articles on its web-site attacking Aristide’s government for alleged human rights violations. The *Alternatives* web-site links to several articles published by *Alterpresse*, for instance, a Haitian NGO that served as one of the main vehicles for the dissemination of anti-Lavalas propaganda. Though it would be virtually impossible to measure the impact of *Alternatives* efforts in providing anti-Lavalas analysis to the Canadian public, it is certainly conceivable that, given its importance in providing critical political analysis in Quebec, it helped contain some of the criticism from the left of Canada’s role in stabilizing Haiti after Aristide had been forced to flee.

Although Rights and Democracy did not open an office in Haiti until after the coup, it marshalled its own credibility in Canada to discredit the Lavalas government. In 2004, for example, Rights and Democracy organized a delegation of two researchers to analyze the situation in Haiti during the year of its bicentennial. The report echoed many of the arguments advanced by IFES, depicting Aristide as a corrupt and intransigent ruler who repeatedly refused to make concessions to his opponents and was largely responsible for the country’s political impasse. The G-184 was portrayed as representative of “various sectors of civil society” “promoting a new model of governance in the form of a social contract” against the rising authoritarianism of the Haitian state (Rights and Democracy 2004: 7). Opposition demonstrations are credited with mobilizing thousands while pro-Lavalas demonstrators are tarnished by their association with militias and “special brigades” responsible for most of the country’s human rights violations. The openly militaristic CD, which, by this time, had repeatedly called for a return of the Haitian military and, at least on one occasion, a U.S. protectorate, goes unmentioned in
the report. The civil society opposition is thereby strategically separated from its less palatable political wing in the *Plate-forme Démocratique*, which is mildly rebuked for its inability to “capitalize on popular discontent and position itself as a credible alternative” (Rights and Democracy 2004: 13). As if entirely unaware of the sustained neoliberal assault against the Lavalasian program, moreover, Aristide is criticized for opening new export-processing zones (EPZs) along the border with the Dominican Republic and for neglecting health and education. Nowhere is it mentioned that the popular civil society movement vaunted by the same report was in fact headed by industrialists such as Andy Apaid, Charles Baker, and Reginald Boulos, all of whom were outspoken advocates of greater privatization and the establishment of EPZs (their names do not even appear in the report). Nor is it mentioned that Aristide himself had always been a vocal opponent of neoliberalism and that the international community had regularly frozen or stalled the flow of aid to ensure the implementation of neoliberal policies.

In the months leading up to Aristide’s forced departure, many Québécois NGOs even created an informal network to coordinate their actions, the *Concertation pour Haïti* (CPH), which brought together a dozen or so labour organizations and NGOs, including Development and Peace and Rights and Democracy. As the opposition attacks against Aristide escalated in February 2004, the CPH issued a statement demanding that Canada’s government call for his immediate resignation. Comparing Aristide to Duvalier, the CPH endorsed opposition demands to establish a *Conseil des Sages* to bring together different sectors of society to name a transition government, a proposal that was subsequently adopted once Aristide was deposed (Skerrett 2008).
Situating Aristide’s radical opponents

The involvement of NGOs in the opposition against Aristide both in Canada and in Haiti presents a central paradox. After all, why would normally-progressive organizations — both Canadian and Haitian — side with a U.S.-funded elite in its campaign to destabilize a popular government? The answer cannot be reduced to a single factor. Within Haiti — as we saw in the previous chapter — many of the most vocal opponents of the Lavalas government in Haiti were former militants frustrated by their exclusion from high office. Discontented petty-bourgeois leaders increasingly turned to marginal NGOs and political parties in the late 1990s and early 2000s as vehicles to advance their own ambitions. Transnational penetration and the ‘NGO-ization’ of Haitian civil society (Schuller 2007) facilitated this process through the proliferation of more than 10,000 NGOs over the past three or four decades; not surprisingly, many Haitians refer to their country as ‘La République des ONGs’ (Fatton 2010). The dependence of local organizations on foreign funding did not necessarily reflect imperialist co-optation, however, but signified the establishment of a mutually beneficial arrangement.

But certainly not all of those who opposed Aristide were acting out of a clearly-defined conception of self-interest and opportunistic calculation. Some raised legitimate critiques of Lavalas, particularly surrounding its failure to mobilize different sectors of the population against neoliberalism. To analyze the situation exclusively in terms of co-optation or self-interest overlooks both the agency of such actors and the structural position of NGOs. As Schuller’s (2007) research has demonstrated, organizations that receive funding in Haiti tend to reflect the priorities of their foreign donors and have access to cultural capital such as the French language, technology, foreign contacts, and money. They are inscribed in a logic of project development that marginalizes local
grassroots groups with less capacity. “Rather than organize with and among the people,” Hallward writes, “rather than work in the places and on the terms where the people are themselves strong, groups like PAPDA, SOFA, and NCHR organize trivial made-for-media demonstrations against things like the uncontroversial evils of neo-liberalism or the high cost of living.”

In systematically denouncing the actions of a popularly-supported government, however, such NGOs opened the way for highly reactionary forces to return to power and pursue an openly unpopular program that was in direct violation of the interests of the poor and marginalized they purported to represent. Since the actors on both sides of the divide were known to all, and the consequences of a return to elite rule easily predictable, even those who acted on the basis of principled opposition to Aristide acted with the same degree of recklessness as the most opportunistic leaders. Whatever their motives, such individuals undermined Haiti’s popular democracy by distorting the perception of the social base of the opposition to Aristide and providing it with a veneer of popular legitimacy.

In terms of the contribution of Canadian – mostly Québécois – NGOs in undermining Aristide’s government, Canadian activists in the Canada Haiti Action Network (CHAN) such as Engler (2008), Sanders (2008a), and Skerrett (2008) have explained this primarily in terms of NGO-dependence on CIDA funding. CIDA’s involvement in a Canadian imperial project has meant that development funds have been used to effectively co-opt NGOs (as well as the QUANGO Rights and Democracy) into supporting Canada’s agenda in Haiti.203 These activists have also pointed to cultural

203 One of the labour organizations involved in the CPH, the Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec (FTQ), had direct material interests in Haiti through its investment arm, the Fond de solidarité,
factors that bind NGO personnel to the Haitian elite, particularly the importance of a common language not spoken by the majority of the Haitian people.204

There is no question that such explanations go a long way toward explaining Canadian imperialism (and, as Engler notes, Québécois imperialism; 2008) in Haiti, which Canadian DAAs have deliberately obfuscated. Despite Rights and Democracy’s ongoing concern with the human rights violations committed by Aristide, for instance, its Regional Officer felt that it was time to move on from criticisms of the Canadian state.205 In particular, he dismissed Canadian activists for dwelling on the fact that Canada used a contingent of its troops in Haiti to secure the Port-au-Prince airport while Aristide was whisked away by American security. When informed of this statement, the Executive Director of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, Brian Concannon, responded with the Creole proverb: *Pote mak sonje, bay kou bliye* – the bearer of the scar remembers, the blow-giver forgets.206

But the NGO position likely represented a confluence of factors, including the split in Haitian civil society and the seemingly popular base of elements of the opposition, including those with legitimate concerns about the government. Haiti’s internal conditions thus helped shape the external response, a factor which critics such as those associated with CHAN completely overlook – as does the model developed by Robinson. Many NGOs were also susceptible to claims by elites – including part of the Haitian Diaspora in Canada – that Aristide was advancing a politic of class warfare and

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204 Engler (2008) also notes the conservative influence of Quebec missionaries in shaping the view of Québécois NGOs.

205 Interview with Nicholas Galetti, Regional Officer for the America, Rights and Democracy. Montreal: May 23, 2008.

206 Telephone interview: June 6, 2008.
dangerously veering off into authoritarianism. This perspective was reinforced by the limited contact of Canadian personnel with organizations such as the *organisations populaires*. Rights and Democracy’s mission to Haiti, for example, consisted of exclusive consultations with members of the G-184 (Sanders 2008a). One of the authors of the report (Rights and Democracy 2004), Madeleine Desnoyers, went so far as to claim that Haiti’s poor did not properly understand the political context since they were victims of Aristide’s propaganda campaign (echoing the comments made by the Development and Peace program officer cited earlier). The QUANGO-funded campaign to demonize Aristide in effect led to a master narrative in Haitian elite civil society which was easily adopted by Canadian DAAs with virtually no contact with popular civil society.

Though it may be tempting to view them as the victims of an IFES/IRI-led campaign, their willingness to perpetuate it demonstrates the arrogance and ethnocentrism that resides at the heart of democracy promotion. Moreover, these NGOs adopted an opportunistic double-standard by denouncing Aristide for promoting the neoliberal agenda while letting Canada entirely off the hook for its regressive support to the same agenda. As we shall see, all were silent about the campaign of repression waged against Lavalas partisans after the coup had occurred. The case of Haiti thus illustrates the extent to which even normally progressive Canadian DAAs are susceptible to advancing a political agenda through democracy assistance programs on behalf of the Canadian state.

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207 Given the certitude with which many Canadian NGOs denounced the Aristide government, it seems that they may have also had to convince themselves of the righteousness of their actions (see, for example, the scathing criticism of the Lavalas government by Development and Peace (2006) in its 2006 – 2011 program report.)
III. Re-disciplining Haiti: transitioning to polyarchy

In the wake of the coup, both Canada and the United States continued to support elite social forces in Haiti. In this phase of elite mobilization, the overall political objective switched from generating a crisis of authority to preparing the ground for a more permanent transition to elite rule. Taken together, these programs provided a four-pronged strategy to oversee a transition to polyarchy in a second phase of EMTs. The approach consisted of: 1) reinforcing the ability of elite political parties to compete in elections; 2) funding elite civil society organizations, including those sustaining the assault against Lavalas and diverting attention from the real human rights crisis then unfolding; 3) rationalizing Haiti’s social contradictions through state-capacity building and other governance programs (thus foreshadowing a switch to polyarchy promotion); and 4) legitimizing a flawed electoral process. While some tried and tested tactics remained part of the transnational repertoire – such as coalition building – other tactics reflected the new circumstances induced by Aristide’s ouster. At the same time, North American DAAs continued to provide legitimacy to the policies of their governments in Haiti in their home states.

Before we look at the second phase of democracy assistance programs, it is important to say a quick word about the nature of the interim government that took power after the forced departure of Aristide. As previously noted, a Conseil des Sages appointed the interim government of Haiti (IGH) that would govern for the next two years. This council received much of its legitimacy based on the notion that it was constituted by members of civil society. The government which it appointed in turn was widely seen as one which was comprised of non-partisan technocrats. Neither of these views conform to reality. In terms of the link to civil society, again, the council represented the minority
rather than majority sectors. Of its seven members, only one was supposedly from Lavalas – a minor figure in the movement named Paul Emil Simon. In an interview, Danielle Magloire, who was appointed to the council to represent the women’s sector, inadvertently acknowledged the fact in a contradictory statement: “one must understand that Lavalas was represented on the council. Because we often have the tendency to rewrite history…the profile of this person – it has to be said to be fully honest – was that he really wasn’t from Lavalas at all. This person – his name was Mr. Paul Emil – was absolutely not a member of the party but was close to a key figure named Mr. Voltaire.\(^{208}\) Thus, the most popular political party and social movement in the country effectively had no representation on a council that supposedly represented the interests of all of civil society.\(^{209}\)

As for the nature of the IGH, Pierre Buteau, an historian who represented the academic sector on the council, repeated the claim that it was selected for its non-partisan and technocratic credentials – a sort of modern day guardian. In an interview, he stated: “the individuals who formed this government did not come from the political parties – they were people known especially for their autonomy. They were technocrats who served the state but were not engaged in politics. Intellectuals, academics, notables, even business men.” Yet the man who was appointed prime minister by the council, Gérard Latortue, was indeed aligned with the opposition and was anything but apolitical.\(^{210}\) As previously indicated, he oversaw a campaign of repression against Lavalas while

\(^{208}\) Interview, Port-au-Prince: March 18, 2009 (my translation). Ms. Magloire was referring to the fact that the council was itself appointed by a tripartite council composed of one member from the opposition, one member of Lavalas, and one member of the international community. The member of Lavalas was Mr. Voltaire.

\(^{209}\) As Skerret (2008) notes, the commitment of the council to democracy was further revealed when it asserted that Lavalas should be banned from the next set of elections.

\(^{210}\) Hallward’s (2007) work explicitly identifies the connections between Latortue and the opposition.
implementing neoliberal reforms rejected by a majority of the population. Indeed, this campaign, according to Dupuy (2005), was the crucial factor in securing favourable conditions for the elections insofar as it ensured that the elite, if united, might actually have a chance at winning.

This was the political context in which a new round of democracy assistance programs was formulated. In terms of the U.S. DAAs, USAID continued to set the tone through its administration of grants to the usual actors. Integrating its activities into the neoliberal development framework, the Cadre Coopération Intérimaire, USAID allocated more than $4 million to its civil society strengthening program in 2005 designed primarily to bolster the capacity of civil society organizations and political parties to participate in the electoral process. Approximately $1.5 million was directly administered by USAID while the remainder was disbursed to the IRI, NDI, and Creative Associates International (USAID-Haiti 2006: 11). Such programs legitimized a compromised electoral process which none of the organizations publicly criticized. They were complemented by a “cross-cutting” Haiti Transition Initiative administered by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, designed to stabilize the situation through “quick, visible small projects to promote peace and community cohesion (USAID-Haiti 2006: 6).” One such project included a Play for Peace summer camp in the Port-au-Prince stronghold of Lavalas Party presidential candidate Father Gerard Jean-Juste, which a USAID report described as a success in drawing youth away from a political protest.

211 The NDI Resident Director acknowledged the repression in an interview, but the organization did not issue any public statements criticizing the IGH (Interview, Port-au-Prince: July 15, 2008).
212 As Canadian researcher Kevin Skerret writes: “The agency is organizing these play camps with the explicit intention of drawing youth out of political activities, reducing the size of anti-government demonstrations, and undermining the "legitimacy" of the protesters. In fact, they are boasting of their success in doing so” (2005).
After a three-year hiatus, the NED resumed its grants program in Haiti (NED 2005), encouraging youth and citizen groups to focus their political activity on small-scale technical initiatives while the IGH presided over its campaign of repression with full impunity. Grant recipients in 2004 – 2005 included Fondation Espoir, the youth group led by Hans Tippenhauer who, as we saw earlier, was active in the civil society opposition against Aristide (the grant was for $50,000) (NED 2004). Likewise, the NED continued to channel funds to civil society organizations which had opposed Aristide through two of its partner organizations, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), which received a $30,500 grant (NED 2004), and the American Center for International Solidarity (ACILS). The former implemented a project with the ultra-conservative Centre pour la Libre Entreprise et la Démocratie (CLED) to develop a National Business Agenda, while the latter provided a $100,000 grant to the marginal labour organization, Batay Ouvriye. Like many of the other small progressive organizations that opposed Aristide’s government, Batay Ouvriye stood by silently as the IGH waged a sustained assault against organized labour (Sprague 2007). During the crisis, Batay Ouvriye had advocated a sort of third way approach, denouncing both the G-184 and the Lavalas government as “two rotten cheeks in the same torn pants” (Batay Ouvriye 2003). In an interview, one of its main leaders, Didier Dominique, explained that “they had told workers, the popular masses, that they should not be part of either movements and that they should advance their interests autonomously.”

213 Tippenhauer gained notoriety for referring to the paramilitaries as freedom fighters, an appellation that was subsequently adopted by interim Prime Minister Latortue (Fenton 2005).
214 The CFED is led by Lionel Delatour, one of the driving forces behind the establishment of the Haiti Democracy Project.
215 See Sprague (2006), who details the many statements issued by Batay Ouvriye to deny its NED funding prior to the declassification of NED-project documents.
216 Interview, Port-au-Prince: March 24, 2009 (my translation).
organization remained alienated from the larger pro-Lavalas labour movement, the NED likely saw an opportunity to continue exploiting such divisions after the coup had taken place.

With more than $3.575 million in grants from USAID, the IRI, for its part, re-established an office in Port-au-Prince in April 2005 to oversee its activities in support of the electoral process before terminating all programming in the summer of 2007. The IRI launched a new political party strengthening program which channelled funds to a number of marginal parties, encouraging them to create coalitions and electoral alliances through various multi-party trainings and meetings. Youth groups such as Fondaton Espoir also received funds (IRI 2005b: 6). According to Fenton, the organization adopted a strategy of cooptation by facilitating a merger between Marc Bazin’s Mouvement pour l’Instauration de la Démocratie en Haïti (MIDH) and a fraction of FL (cited in Sprague 2006b). Although Lavalas had split into several factions and the majority of the party agreed to boycott the elections, Bazin positioned himself as the FL candidate in the 2006 presidential elections. The attempt to co-opt the Lavalas base into supporting Washington’s old neoliberal ally failed miserably, however, when Bazin ended up with 0.68% of the vote. At the same time, the IRI established the Haiti International Assessment Committee (HIAC), an international monitoring mechanism composed of high-level officials to support the ‘democratic transition.’ After more than a year of repression, the HIAC called upon the Haitian state and the international community to redouble its efforts in providing a more stable security environment, accusing Aristide
and his supporters of exerting a negative influence on the political process (IRI 2005b:13).  

In Canada, CIDA followed the pattern of international donors of integrating its activities under the CCI, allocating a total of $19.75 million to the first pillar of the framework, *Strengthening Political Governance and Promoting National Dialogue*. In addition to funding the *Conseil Electoral Provisoire* (CEP) to organize the elections, CIDA provided funding to several small civil society organizations as part of a process of engaging civil society, youth, and the media. Through its Judicial Reform Advocacy Project (FAJDH) and Southeast Civic Education and Action Project (FAJDH), for instance, organizations such as the *Institut Culturel Karl Lévesque* (ICKL), *Société d'Animation pour la Communication Sociale* (SAKS), the *Programme pour une Alternative de Justice* (PAJ), and the *Institut de Technologie et d'Animation* (ITECA) were invited to participate in various capacity-building workshops and initiatives. Larger organizations that had been active in the G-184 also continued to receive support, such as the MPP, which apparently formed 500 new groups at the grassroots level in the Central Plateau through a CIDA-funded project (CIDA 2006b).

While the impact of such scattered initiatives is difficult to gauge, the political impact of CIDA's support to human rights organizations providing cover to the IGH was much less ambiguous. Among the human rights groups that CIDA chose to fund was

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217 IRI's quarterly report for 2005 states that: "on the basis of various reports from Haiti, the committee is of the view that former President Jean Bertrand Aristide is exerting – through his supporters in Haiti – a negative influence on Haiti's current political process. HIAC is uncertain what the specific evidence is to support this assessment (sic), suggesting a need to probe the exact character of Mr. Aristide's engagement and its purpose" (2005). IRI's comments reflected the beginning of a new discourse in which Aristide continued to be blamed for political protests and ongoing insecurity despite his absence from the country, a view which credited with almost-supernatural powers. The supposed manipulation would become a dominant theme invoked by various elites and the international community throughout the electoral process to justify increased rounds of repression.
Haiti's most high profile human rights organization, the National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR), an organization headed by Pierre Espérance, a former Lavalasian and one-time radical critic of imperialism in Haiti who became one of Aristide's most vocal critics. NCHR's reporting was anything but objective, however. Almost all of its reports were directed against Lavalas partisans, and some of its most serious allegations were subsequently disproved (Emersberger January 19). In the weeks after the coup, for instance, NCHR accused Prime Minister Yvon Neptune of orchestrating genocide when a gang aligned with the G-184 clashed with the pro-Lavalas group, Balé Wouzé, in the town of St. Marc on February 11, 2004. NCHR claimed to have conducted an investigation days after the alleged massacre with a delegation of international reporters and members of the human rights coalition, the Plate-forme des Organisations Haïtiennes de Droits Humains (POHDH), another organization that received CIDA funds.  

As Skerrett (2007) demonstrates, however, the international press did not report on a massacre of 50 opposition members as NCHR had claimed, but rather on a clash between different gangs which led to at most five deaths. NCHR's evidence of genocide and Lavalas complicity was so weak that even its former Director, Anne Fuller, called upon the organization to publish an investigative report to substantiate its findings (NCHR was eventually forced to change its name to Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH) at the request of its parent organization in New York which sought to distance itself from its affiliate). An investigation by the

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218 ICKL and SAKS representatives were interviewed for this project; both were generally aligned with the opposition.
219 Although POHDH remained silent on the abuses of the interim government, it did begin releasing critical statements on the MINUSTAH. The Secretary General of the organization, Antonal Mortime, was highly critical of the MINUSTAH in an interview. He stated that they were suppressing the poor and that "they considered that Haiti has known a third occupation under its mandate." Interview, Port-au-Prince: March 20, 2009 (my translation).
UN Mission Human Right’s Division in April 2005 later dismissed the charges of genocide, condemning the interim government for failing to respect the rights of Neptune and former Interior Minister, Jocelerme Privert, in the handling of their cases (Neptune himself was not brought before a judge until 11 months after being detained). CIDA allocated $100,000 to NCHR to provide legal support to its alleged victims even though Espérance had failed to publish an investigative report and satisfactorily respond to questions raised by the international press.220

NCHR would play a leading role in legitimizing the interim government even after other human rights organizations released their scathing reports on the human rights violations being committed by the government in the aftermath of the coup.221 Indeed, NCHR’s position was that the actions of the government were justified since Lavalas partisans continued to commit acts of violence. Viles Alizar, a program officer at NCHR, summarized this position in an interview: “there were some violations by the Latortue-Boniface government, but listen, we were advancing toward a state of non-rule of law. The government tried to rectify this situation but they could not do very much because Lavalas partisans were still on the ground and very powerful.”222

Whether CIDA deliberately sought to keep the pressure on the Lavalasian leadership by funding NCHR, it most certainly knew that a campaign of repression was being waged. In addition to its involvement in several judicial and security-

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220 In its ruling on Neptune v. the State of Haiti, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights criticized the former and current government’s violations of Neptune’s basic human rights, exonerating him of all charges and ordering the government to pay him $95,000 in damages and costs.
221 According to Brian Concannon, Neptune’s attorney and Executive Director of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH), NCHR seemed to have an unofficial understanding with the interim government that it would pursue Lavalas militants denounced by it for alleged human rights abuses (Telephone interview: June 6, 2008).
reform initiatives, CIDA actually appointed and paid the salary of Deputy Minister of
Justice, Philippe Vixamar, who oversaw the illegal arrests and detention of the
Lavalasian leadership, as well as the release of notorious human rights abusers
(Griffin 2004: 24). Some of the human rights organizations that had aligned with the
opposition also began to speak out against the interim government. The *Comité des
Avocats pour le Respect des Libertés Individuelles* (CARLI), for instance, called
attention to the repression against Lavalas. The Secretary General, Renan Hedouville,
stated in an interview that: “events forced us to concede that there had not been an
improvement in the human rights situation. On the contrary, the cases of
assassinations and summary executions that were recorded during the Aristide years
continued unabated. This time around they occurred in the popular sectors against the
partisans of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.”

The $2 million CIDA project, *Media and Democratic Development in Haiti*,
channelled funds to anti-Aristide media groups which also failed to call attention to
human rights abuses by the interim government. The project, which was implemented by
*Réseau Liberté* – a Montreal-based organization that seeks to promote freedom of the
press in countries undergoing democratic transitions – in collaboration with *Alternatives*
and the CBC’s Canadian Institute for Training in Public Broadcasting (CITPB), sent
Canadian journalists to six electronic media to ‘strengthen the performance of their
newsrooms’ (CIDA 2006b). The beneficiaries of the project, however, were all part of
the *Association National des Medias Haïtiens* (ANMH), which, as we saw earlier, was a
crucial member of the G-184. Citing a World Press Freedom Review report, Sanders

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222 Interview, Port-au-Prince: March 13, 2009 (my translation).
223 Interview, Port-au-Prince: March 19, 2009 (my translation).
(2008b) notes that the editorial line of the media houses remained hostile to the poor population voicing support to the exiled President, deriding opponents of the interim government as ‘outlaws’ and ‘terrorists.’

CIDA also approved a $325,000 Rights and Democracy project, *Strengthening the Participation of Haitian Civil Society in the Transition toward Democracy* (CIDA 2006b) as well as a second phase of Development and Peace’s country program. Rights and Democracy established an office in Port-au-Prince managed by Danielle Magloire. Through this initiative, the organization engaged CONAP and another anti-Aristide coalition, *Forum Citoyen pour la Réforme de la Justice*, to coach and train civil society organizations on how to develop advocacy plans and public policy proposals. As such, the initiative reinforced the ability of elite civil society to influence the state rather than the poorest sectors represented by the *organisations populaires*. More recently, Rights and Democracy has launched a new CIDA-funded program, *Strengthening Democratic Governance and Promoting Human Rights program*, which has a total budget of nearly $5.5 million for 2008 to 2010. The initiative continues to provide funding to its main civil society partners and, for the first time, marks Canada’s official foray into strengthening political parties – a development that has occurred entirely off the radar screen. Rights and Democracy focuses on strengthening the *Convention des Partis Politiques Haïtiens*, a coalition of 12 political parties formed in 2005 with the co-opted faction of FL.

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224 As mentioned earlier, Danielle Magloire was appointed to the *Conseil des Sages*.

225 In an interview, one of the main leaders of the *Forum Citoyen*, Jean-Claude Bajeux, repeated the claims that Aristide’s government had become systematically repressive and that the interim government had respected human rights. Interview, Port-au-Prince: March 24, 2009.
According to Nicholas Galetti, the Regional Officer for the Americas for Rights and Democracy at the time, the program was conceived within the optic of protecting civil society from the sorts of abuses that had been committed by the state under the Aristide government. Despite his assertion that Rights denounced the abuses committed by the interim government, no public statements against the IGH were issued to that affect. Indeed, Rights and Democracy addressed a joint letter with other members of the *Concertation pour Haïti* to Kofi Annan demanding that MINUSTAH restore security in time for the elections even as the peacekeeping mission was being criticized for the casualties inflicted by its operations in *Cité Soleil* (Rights and Democracy and the Concertation pour Haïti 2006). Another recommendation submitted to DFAIT called for an end to human rights abuses and the culture of impunity on the very day that Haitians were going to the polls to elect a new president (as for Development and Peace, the program officer who was interviewed professed not to have heard of any allegations of human rights abuses).

**Legitimizing the interim government at home and abroad**

U.S. support to the IGH under the republican George W. Bush administration represented a lengthy tradition of American alignment with Haïti’s most right-wing elements. As such, its support for an openly repressive regime was not surprising. But any delusion that Canada might reverse its anti-Aristide strategy as the IGH stepped up its campaign of

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226 Interview, Montreal: May 23, 2008.
227 Annan himself had aligned with Washington’s cynical policy in Haïti, denouncing Aristide as a ‘failed president’ and supporting Secretary of State Colin Powell’s ultimatum that Aristide abrogate most of his constitutional authority in return for international peacekeepers. Annan was also an uncritical supporter of Latortue’s interim government (Long 2004).
228 Interview with Anne-Catherine Kennedy, Montreal: June 25, 2008.
repression quickly evaporated. Both DFAIT and CIDA worked in collaboration with several organizations to help build domestic support for their efforts in Haiti and to use Canada as a meeting ground for Haiti’s private sector elite. Though such activities did not constitute democracy promotion *per se*, they played a crucial role in legitimizing Canada’s activities in Haiti.

FOCAL was enlisted to host a series of conferences in North America on behalf of the Haitian private sector, including a conference entitled the *Role of the Private Sector in Rebuilding Haiti* in September 2005. With several high-ranking government officials in attendance, including Denis Coderre, Liberal MP and Special Advisor on Haiti to Prime Minister Paul Martin, the conference’s conclusions restated old mantras on the importance of privatization, enhanced security and the role of the private sector in reducing poverty (Rodolfo Alban Guevara. 2005). FOCAL’s Executive Director, Carlo Dade, argues that Haitian businessmen that participated in the conferences represent a more progressive business faction of the elite that can help resolve Haiti’s endemic poverty. But there is little evidence to substantiate this claim. The organizations associated with the most prominent participants promote the same export-oriented neoliberal policies that have been so detrimental, and all were amongst the most vociferous opponents of the democratically-elected Lavalas government.

Five CIDA-funded organizations, including Rights and Democracy and Development and Peace, were also invited to provide testimony to a parliamentary

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229 The Council on Hemispheric Affairs (2006), for instance, had hoped that the Harper government might reconfigure Canada’s approach to Haiti in a more progressive direction.
230 Interview, Ottawa: June 19, 2008.
231 Participants included prominent G-184 leader, Reginald Boulos, as well as his brother, Dr. Rudolph Boulos, an arch right-wing senator and founder of the American Haiti Democracy Project. FOCAL has also worked closely with Lionel Delatour, another HDP co-founder and secretary general of the G-184 member
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) on the political situation in Haiti as early as March 2004.\footnote{Sanders notes that Development and Peace also flew in long-time anti-Aristide activist, Jesi Chancy Manigat, who serves on the board of ENFOFANM and with the coordinating committee of CONAP, to participate in a series of speaking engagements on the political crisis in Haiti in Catholic dioceses in Ontario, Quebec and Manitoba.} Development and Peace’s Marthe Lapierre led the testimony, denouncing Aristide for arming and directing the chimères and arguing that the IGH represented a new source of hope for the Haitian people (House of Commons 2004). Despite the severity of her allegations against the Lavalas government and Aristide himself, the only source Lapierre cited to substantiate her claims was the highly-compromised reporting of NCHR. The SCFAIT on Haiti held additional hearings in May and June 2006, in which Canada’s role in Haiti in organizing elections was roundly applauded and the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for MINUSTAH was invited to speak on the security situation (House of Commons Canada 2007a) (the role of Canadian civil society organizations in building support for the IGH and legitimizing Canadian foreign policy offers a telling example of the recursive relationship between state agencies and civil society in which the latter can also promote government objectives within state institutions).\footnote{Annis (2006) notes that not a single Canadian parliamentarian denounced the human rights abuses in Haiti by the IGH, though the NDP did raise concerns and its leader, Alexa McDunough, began to speak of}

The most important way in which Canada contributed to the legitimization of the coup against Aristide and the subsequent reign of the IGH, however, was in its leadership role in organizing and coordinating elections. Rather than follow the lead of the CARICOM and the OAU in demanding the return of Aristide and an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding his removal, Canada chose to reinforce the impression that the...
IGH was actually interested in overseeing a credible electoral process. While CIDA’s technical and financial support to the Conseil Electoral Provisoire and the UNDP to organize the elections were not in themselves objectionable, Canada’s silence on the many shortcomings of the electoral process certainly was. Indeed, CIDA contributed $9.3 million to monitor the electoral process and observe the presidential, legislative, and municipal elections through an Elections Canada-led international mission, the Mission international d’évaluation des élections en Haïti (MIEEH). Although the mission deployed long-term observers across the country – many of whom expressed concerns about the repression against Lavalas – it failed to make public the internal reports it was compiling. As a coordinator for the MIEEH, I was privy to these reports as well as the discussions surrounding the decision not to publicly criticize the IGH, which was justified in terms of not wanting to discourage the government from moving ahead in what was seen to be a more or less fair process. Throughout the entire process, the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada and Chair of the MIEEH, Jean-Pierre Kingsley, issued only two official statements, one indicating that the vote for the presidential election was carried out with no violence, intimidation, or accusations of fraud (Kingsley 2006b), and another reiterating this position when allegations of voter fraud began to surface (2006a).235

Canada’s sponsorship of the mission helped bring together international partners which had split over the ouster of Aristide, an outcome which was not incidental. According to DFAIT official, Ginette Martin, “you have to give credit to Jean-Pierre

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234 The presidential election and first-round legislative elections occurred on February 7, followed by the run-off legislative elections on April 21, 2006.

235 Kingsley represents another example of the personnel linkages between U.S. and Canadian democracy promotion. After overseeing the MIEEH, he resigned and became President and Chief Executive Officer of
Kingsley, who was very cognizant of the need to make this an international as opposed to a Canadian mission. He went above and beyond in terms of giving a voice to other countries, despite the fact that they were not providing any money. Mexico, the Caribbean – Jamaica being the most important country. The intention again was to give that kind of legitimacy to the process by being not just Canada as the one who was driving the electoral process but a community of nations.” Of course, CARICOM and Jamaica in particular were opposed to the interim government. By bringing them into the fold, Canada once again used its status as a middle power to help bridge the political divide in the interests of elite rule.

As an impartial observation mission, however, the MIEEH should have called international attention to a number of issues throughout the electoral process, such as the imprisonment of Lavalas leader, Father Gérard Jean-Juste, to prevent him from registering as a candidate, the lack of voter registration centers and voting centers, and attacks being committed by pro-government forces at Lavalas rallies. Serious allegations of fraud began surfacing when René Préval, the former Lavalas President and close ally of Aristide who was poised to win the presidency again according to exit polls and the CEP’s own initial tabulations – ended up being 1.3% percent below the 50% mark needed to prevent a second round of elections. Suspicions were confirmed when television stations broadcast thousands of ballots – mostly for Préval – found in a dump near Cité Soleil and not far from the CEP’s tabulation center. In the face of massive

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IFES, whose own observation mission highlighted major organizational difficulties but made no mention of the more substantive issues that had plagued the electoral process (Ingalls 2006).

236 Interview, Ottawa: October 30, 2008.

237 As Amnesty International (2005) began providing more objective reporting on the situation in Haiti under the interim government, it called for an immediate release of Jean-Juste, whom it labelled a prisoner of conscience.
protests, the CEP, the international community and the various candidates began negotiating a compromise solution which apportioned blank ballots among the leading contenders, thereby granting Préval his victory by violating the rules of the game instead of upholding them (Concannon 2006).

The 2006 presidential results once again demonstrated the degree of fragmentation of Haiti’s political landscape. The CD, which had always tried to portray itself as an opposition with a coherent alternative to Aristide, dissolved as an electoral coalition in the aftermath of the coup. In the end, Haiti’s elite returned to its old pattern of interpersonal rivalry, with 35 presidential candidates appearing on the ballot. Préval’s nearest contenders were two of the leading figures in the *Plate-forme Démocratique*, Leslie Francois Manigat at 11%, followed by Charles Henry-Baker at 6% (Concannon 2006). Préval himself ran at the head of a loose political coalition called Lespwa which included members of the former FL government under Aristide, though the majority of FL itself boycotted the election.

**The current predicament**

Ultimately, the coup against Aristide and the efforts of the interim government and its international partners to consolidate a neoliberal polyarchy in Haiti were partially successful, despite Préval’s victory. The campaign of repression against Lavalas helped alter the balance of power between popular and elite social forces by disorganizing the Lavalas base and imprisoning its top leaders. Elite political parties were reinforced through democracy promotion efforts and a fraction of FL itself was co-opted through the

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238 Concannon (2006) notes that there were only 500 registration centers for the 2006 elections compared to 10,000 in the 2000 elections. Many were concentrated in richer areas and *Cité Soleil* did not event get one.

239 These results were increased slightly with the apportionment of the blank ballots.
IRI-sponsored merger with Bazin’s MIDH. But the elite once again failed to achieve a hegemonic position in popular civil society and win the presidency, or, for that matter, even a minimal hegemony within its own ranks to ensure an ideological and organizational unity against the popular masses. In both chambers of parliament, political parties are weak and fragmented and lack party discipline. Although most represent elites, there is little cohesion and those who are elected tend to represent particularistic interests.

Yet Préval’s presidency has proved to be a disappointment for those who hoped that his victory would mark a rupture with Haiti’s long troubled history. The neoliberal approach initiated in the 1970s by the American Plan and reasserted through the interim government’s CCI has once again been extended through a new IFI-sponsored National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (NPRSP). Despite the fact that nearly 60% of Haiti’s more than $1.4 billion debt consists of odious debt incurred by the Duvalier regime, the IFIs have continued to insist on debt repayment (Schuller 2006). Policy analysts Weisbrot and Sandoval (2007) warn that the NPRSP is unlikely to have a positive impact on the Haitian economy and that the public debt should be immediately forgiven since the IFIs themselves are partially responsible for the deteriorating state of the economy as a result of the aid embargo during Aristide’s years in office. Préval has also begun the process of privatizing the National Port Authority as well as the main telephone and electricity parastatals (Teleco and Électricité d’Haiti) (U.S. Department of State 2009b).

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240 The devastating consequences of this approach were tragically made apparent when rapidly increasing food prices led to starvation and food riots in the spring of 2008 – a direct result of Haiti’s loss of food sovereignty through the liberalization of its agriculture sector (Chinai 2008).
241 It should be noted that discussions to forgive all of Haiti’s debt are currently underway in the context of the devastating earthquake.
Unlike Lavalas, Préval’s Lespwa coalition has no organized connection to the masses and remains primarily a personalistic political vehicle. More than anything, Préval seems to fit the pattern of an administrator determined not to alienate Haiti’s donors or its powerful elite, though he is not entirely to blame given the fate of his predecessor. Nonetheless, he has not questioned the logic of the NPRSP and has repeatedly expressed his support for MINUSTAH. The mission may have succeeded at increasing stability in some of the poorest sectors of Port-au-Prince, but it has done so primarily by following a strategy of repression while the social structures that have caused instability in the first place are left intact. Indeed, the very fact that Haiti’s elite requires the ongoing presence of a massive foreign-occupation force to stabilize the country in the interests of its traditional patterns of accumulation points to the fragility of the country’s neoliberal polyarchy. The elite may have succeeded at temporarily suppressing and controlling Haiti’s social contradictions, but they remain as antagonistic as ever. At the political level, such antagonisms have manifested themselves in the incessant disputes over the office of the prime minister (the office has been occupied by three different individuals during Préval’s term) and the ongoing struggle to disenfranchise Lavalas (most recently, it was barred from participating in the senatorial elections scheduled for early 2010, allegedly for not having submitted its list of candidates on time).

In the new political context, democracy assistance programs have seized upon the weakness of the state to increase the legitimacy of Haiti’s fragile polyarchy. While state building has been a major objective of both CIDA and USAID since the coup, both have increasingly prioritized this area of assistance, with their respective DAAs following suit. Among other things, a CIDA-funded parliamentary capacity-building program with a budget of $5 million is being implemented by the Parliamentary Centre.
provides technical assistance to parliamentarians to help them develop legislative agendas with the objective of strengthening the legislature. USAID also hired the development consultant, ARD, to implement a massive decentralization effort which is supposed to strengthen local units of government. The focus once more seems to be on rationalizing social contradictions by improving the mechanisms of governance rather than promoting redistributive policies. This is not to say that all state-building governance initiatives are without merit. The point is that in the absence of redistributive policies, the state-capacity building exercises such as the one being promoted by the Parliamentary Centre stabilize neoliberalism by creating a more efficient polyarchy. They are also framed within a fragile state doctrine that completely overlooks the role that transnational forces have played in undermining state authority. Finally, both Canadian and U.S. DAAs continue to work with civil society organizations and political parties aligned with the elite, even if the co-opted FL rump in parliament is now typically engaged in political party strengthening initiatives.

At the time of writing, Haiti has once again experienced a tragedy of epic proportions which cannot go unmentioned. While its tragedies in the past have been caused by political factors, the devastating earthquake that decimated the city of Port-au-Prince in January 2010 resulted from natural disaster. Although it has led to an international outpouring of humanitarian assistance – including on the part of Canada and the United States – there already there are signs that the international community will respond by shoring up security forces at the expense of a more concerted attempt to assist the displaced victims (Hallward 2010). This seems to be the approach of the U.S. military, which has led the emergency relief efforts. At best, the event will cause the

242 Interview with Sylvain Côté, Assistant Coordinator of the Parliamentary Centre Haiti, July 16, 2008.
international powers to rethink the failed development recipes of the past - perhaps it may even serve to galvanize the organisations populaires to make new political demands in the struggle for social justice. At worst, it will lead to further state disintegration and subordination to the failed neoliberal policies of the past. Already, there is much chatter amongst development experts on the need to rebuild the country under some sort of protectorate. Given the role that such interventions have played in the past, it is not difficult to guess what social groups will be the primary beneficiaries.

Concluding remarks

Haiti’s experience with democracy assistance programs from 2000 to 2006 confirms that the interventionist model continues to be deployed to stabilize neoliberal world order in countries where elites are unable to govern hegemonically on their own terms. Both Canada and the United States contributed significantly to the campaign to undermine the Lavalas government despite its ongoing support by the majority of the population and the lack of evidence to support claims that it was systematically violating human rights. Indeed, local organizations that received funding from U.S. and Canadian DAAs were instrumental in fabricating such claims as part of a war of position intended to destabilize the state. With the stalemate between popular and elite social forces in civil society, the opposition eventually resorted to a war of manoeuvre to oust the Lavalas government. Thereafter, a new international presence intervened on behalf of the elite to once again reinforce the possibility of consolidating an hegemonic order under its leadership. As democracy assistance programs moved onto a second phase under the interim government, DAAs continued to channel support to elite groups, many of which legitimized the repressive actions of the interim government against the Lavalas partisans.
In cases where such groups exaggerated or fabricated claims, none were held accountable by their foreign funders. The fundamental lack of accountability of the ‘democracy promoters’ towards the people of the countries in which they operate speaks to the democratic deficit at the very core of democracy promotion.

Yet the interventionist model developed by Robinson is insufficient to capture the complexity of local civil society organizations and the factors that contributed to the adoption of a strategy of elite mobilization by both Canada and the United States. In effect, both countries supported different social sectors in the failed attempt at creating an elite-led hegemonic bloc that might counter the popularity of Lavalas. In the end, the class polarization and fragmentation related to Haiti’s polarized social structure of accumulation prevented the consolidation of these groups into a coherent social bloc advancing a hegemonic ideology with significant appeal. Haiti’s extreme peripheral location in world order rendered it a particularly vulnerable target for a campaign of destabilization. In terms of the Canadian contribution to this effort, the actions of the Canadian state reflected a combination of material interests and the special ideological function that it has come to play in the neoliberal world order. They illustrate how middlepowermanship has been deployed in a peripheral country where Canada enjoys significant cultural capital. At the same time, however, Canadian DAAs were in part reacting – no doubt opportunistically – to the polarization of Haitian civil society and the illusion that the opposition enjoyed a significant popular base.

There was thus a convergence of interests between the Canadian state and Canadian DAAs which facilitated the adoption of a strategy of elite mobilization. I will argue in the following chapters, however, that such a convergence did not occur in either Peru or Bolivia. One must therefore avoid premature conclusions on the extent to which
Canadian and U.S. democracy promotion fields of practice are integrated to advance the same strategic objectives – even if there is a tendency toward convergence at the macro level. As we move on to Peru, we will see that there are still marked differences in the approaches between Canadian and U.S. DAAs, underlying the importance of considering the configuration of factors that influence the approach that specific democracy promotion fields of practice adopt in specific countries.
Chapter five
Building inclusive neoliberalism in Peru

The abrupt fall from grace of Alberto Fujimori provided an opening for Peru’s political elite to re-position itself in favour of a return to democratic governance. In chapter three, we saw how the configuration of power leading up to Peru’s democratic transition favoured a continuation of elite political rule, particularly in terms of the inability of the left to counter the neoliberal project. Whereas in Haiti the dominant classes and political elite could not contest the popular movement in the new millennium without resorting to violence, in Peru, elite political coalitions have controlled the state democratically since Fujimori fled to Japan in 2000. Although democratic institutions were restored, the change in political regime masked the deep continuities between the neoliberal economic project initiated by Fujimori and taken up by his successors. Canadian and U.S. democracy promotion programs have thus encountered a very different political context in Peru than in Haiti, where neoliberal polyarchy was essentially imposed through coercive means. This chapter critically examines democracy promotion and assistance in a country where the internal conditions for the consolidation of neoliberal polyarchy have been more propitious.

Neoliberal polyarchy in Peru has not been without success – since 2000, Peru’s economic performance has been one of the most impressive of any country in Latin America. In the two years prior to the global recession of 2008, annual GDP growth stood at 8 percent (Economist Intelligence Unit 2007). Despite attempts to render neoliberalism more inclusive, however, the governments of both Alejandro Toledo and Alan García have failed to cement a new hegemonic order. Behind the impressive array of statistics lies the reality of growing political instability and social conflict – in 2007,
the office of the human rights ombudsman recorded a total of 154 social conflicts, 84 percent of which occurred in areas where the majority of the population lived below the poverty line (Defensoria del Pueblo 2008: 230). Since the democratic transition, however, the past decade has witnessed a rise in popular movements and ‘anti-systemic’ forces struggling to extend the democratization process beyond the political sphere. It is within the quest of the Peruvian state to consolidate neoliberal polyarchy in the face of these tensions that U.S. and Canadian democracy assistance programs must be analyzed and situated.

In this chapter, I argue that the majority of U.S. and Canadian democracy assistance programs in the Peruvian context are best understood from the point of view of polyarchy promotion insofar as they have sought to reinforce the ability of the state to create a hegemonic order – a project which has ultimately failed. Democracy assistance programs in Peru therefore differ considerably from those that were examined in Haiti, where they have focused on building elite coalitions. While such programs must be understood in terms of their political impact on hegemonic relations, Foucauldian concepts such as discourse and governmentality enrich our ability to theorize the more subtle mechanisms through which unequal power relations are stabilized in the interests of the state and elite civil society as a whole.

In Peru, Canadian and U.S. programs have been defined by a dual strategy of rationalizing and strengthening traditional institutions while supporting inclusive neoliberal governance. While these programs have positive dimensions, particularly in terms of the support provided to independent human rights mechanisms, they are often undermined by the economic policies of both Canada and the United States. In the case of U.S. policies, they are linked specifically to a political project of rebuilding the
legitimacy and credibility of state institutions and political parties as a means to contain social conflict and prevent the rise of ‘anti-systemic’ forces. While Canada has also manipulated its democracy assistance – particularly in terms of governance programs designed to advance Canadian mining interests – there is less evidence of a state-led strategic political project.

In the area of civil society, USAID programs have contributed to a discursive construction of democracy in the public sphere which frames political development in terms of human rights and corruption issues without addressing underlying economic structural issues. These programs are linked to technologies of power that measure popular perceptions of democracy to enable USAID to more strategically frame its democracy assistance. They also lead to the construction of new liberal subjects based on what Legoas (2007) refers to as the ‘watchdog citizen.’ While CIDA support to civil society has largely targeted mainstream NGOs, it has also included those advocating a more expansive notion of citizenship. Canadian DAAs, particularly Development and Peace, have also supported radical organizations with a social base that have mobilized against the neoliberal model. This demonstrates that the instrumentalization of Canadian DAAs that was observed in the case of Haiti is not yet indicative of a generalized pattern. The importance of distinct institutional legacies on the behaviour of Canadian and U.S. DAAs as well as overall bilateral relations is particularly apparent in the case of Peru.

State and civil society following the transition (back) to democracy

In order to analyze North American democracy assistance programs following the democratic transition in Peru, it is necessary to first situate them within the local political context. Since the transition back to polyarchy, Peru has been governed by presidents
who have remained committed to neoliberal reform, rendering it somewhat of an anomaly in a region that has largely shifted to the left. Despite the apparent success of a liberal-model of economic development, however, Peru’s elite has been unable to consolidate a hegemonic order. Over the past several years, the country has been marked by widespread, growing political and social instability rooted in the forms of exploitation and domination that continue to define the relations between social classes, ethnic groups, the state and society. In short, the return to democratic governance was characterized primarily by a change of regime rather than a process of state transformation, which would have been required to address Peru’s historical legacies of exclusion. The continuity in state form was assured by an alliance between political elites and business interests in the face of a weakly organized and disarticulated popular civil society. It will be recalled that Peru’s democratic transition was triggered by a crisis of legitimacy of the Fujimori regime rather than the emergence of a national-popular movement; although mobilizations were led by a vibrant urban human rights movement linked to progressive factions of the Church, they were not tied to an organized social base.

In the 2001 elections, a political outside, Alejandro Toledo, a U.S.-educated economist and quintessential technocrat, defeated former president Alan García on the APRA ticket. As Cameron (2008) notes, Toledo came to power based on the same coalition which had supported Fujimori – the majority of voters in the poorest regions such as the departments of the southern and central highlands and jungle regions, as well as the southern coastal departments traditionally opposed to the centralism of Lima. These votes were driven by the perception that Toledo would deliver new forms of redistribution through semi-clientelistic exchanges – a perception fuelled by populist
rhetoric and Toledo’s own identification with the indigenous population.\textsuperscript{243} Although the Toledo’s Perú Posible (PP) party presented little in the way of a coherent political program, the collapse of the party system in the early 1990s and the lack of an organized social basis for a reconstruction of mass parties enabled Toledo to fill the political void (Levitsky and Cameron 2003). Of particular importance was the lack of an organized working class and peasantry, which, as we saw in chapter three, reflected the disarticulation of popular civil society in the context of the civil war, the geographic barriers to re-mobilization (Yashar 2005), and the rise of the informal sector (Barr 2003).

Toledo’s campaign was backed by powerful business leaders, who had previously supported Fujimori until the very end (Durand 2002b; 2002a). Once in power, he followed an orthodox program of neoliberal reform intended to ensure macroeconomic stability and attract foreign investment (Cameron 2008).\textsuperscript{244} The government’s plan received strong backing from the IFIs, with the World Bank increasing its total lending envelope from $920 million to $1.6 billion in light of its strong economic performance (World Bank 2004). At the same time, Toledo introduced modest social programs, increasing social expenditures as a percentage of GDP from Fujimori’s last year in office by 7.5 percent in 2002. Toledo maintained a neo-populist style of governance not entirely dissimilar from his authoritarian predecessor’s that advanced the interests of big business and foreign capital while appealing to the poor through modest concessions (Barr 2003).

\textsuperscript{243} Toledo’s rise from humble indigenous shoe-shine boy in the city of Chimbote on Peru’s northern coast to PhD at Stanford University initially provided him with considerable popular appeal (Barr 2003). Among other things, Toledo held positions at the UN, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Labour Organization and was professor of economics at the Universidad del Pacífico in Peru.

\textsuperscript{244} Key business leaders and technocrats were named to the most powerful cabinet posts, including a U.S.-based investment banker, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, as finance minister and then prime minister until the end of his term.
By his last year in office, Toledo’s approval ratings fell to the single digits. As Weisbrot (2006) reported on the eve of the 2006 presidential elections, GDP per capita was about the same as it was in 1981 and the poverty rate had only marginally decreased from 54.5 percent in 2001 to 51.6 percent in 2004. In Lima and Callao, poverty had actually increased from 31.8 to 36.6 percent. Social protests rapidly increased in the wake of the democratic transition, increasing from approximately 250 in 1999, to 680 in 2000, and 810 in 2002 (Arce 2008: 42). According to the office of the human rights ombudsman, the Defensoría del Pueblo (2007), the majority of mobilizations (46 percent) have been against foreign direct investment, with communities protesting the social and environmental consequences of specific mining operations.

According to Arce (2008), many of the struggles that have proliferated since the early 2000s are territorially localized and led by indigenous groups like those in Bolivia. Early on in Toledo’s administration, one of the largest mobilizations occurred in Arequipa when the government sought to sell the city’s electricity production and distribution facilities to the Belgian multinational, Tractebel. The anti-privatization revolt, or the Arequipazo as it came to be known, led to the withdrawal of the government plan. Unlike in the case of the Cochabamba Water Wars, however, the regional movement against ‘accumulation by dispossession’ did not coalesce into a larger national popular force (Arce 2008).

In the 2006 elections, García again ran for the presidency, this time narrowly defeating a left nationalist candidate, Ollanta Humala, in a second-round vote. Humala’s support base came from the same coalition of voters as Toledo on the Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP) ticket. Humala has emerged as a key political figure in
recent years and a few brief comments on the PNP are in order.\textsuperscript{245} The basis of the party’s support largely comes from nationalist veterans, including many who were involved in the internal conflict. The party’s platform, \textit{La Gran Transformación} (the title of which pays tribute to Polanyi’s famous work), can be characterized as ‘neo-developmentalist’ (Calderón G. 2007), advocating economic policies similar to those favoured by General Velasco as well as new forms of participatory governance.\textsuperscript{246} It is similar to the program of the MAS, though it lacks its organized social base.

García’s solid approval ratings in the urban centres and parts of the countryside facilitated the APRA victory, thus marking the return to power of Peru’s main political party in 2006 after sixteen years of governance by outsiders (Cameron 2008). The support of organized business, particularly the \textit{Confederación Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas} (CONFIEP), was decisive in assuring García’s victory.\textsuperscript{247} While García’s campaign still paid tribute to elements of APRA’s traditional left discourse, he quickly moved to consolidate the alliance with big business – a process that was facilitated by the personalization of the party itself. Among other things, business leaders and technocrats from the Toledo government were kept in key government positions and a new public sector austerity package was introduced. García’s export-led approach benefited in particular from high mineral prices in the international market, which have...

\textsuperscript{245} The son of a radical labour lawyer, Humala is a former Lieutenant Colonel who fought in the internal conflict against Sendero Luminoso in 1992. In October 2000, he led an unsuccessful military uprising against Fujimori for which he was subsequently pardoned by Congress. Both his father and brother are prominent figures in the small indigenous-nationalist movement, the \textit{Movimiento Nacionalista Peruano} (MNP).

\textsuperscript{246} See Pentierra (2006) for a full analysis of the PNP’s platform.

\textsuperscript{247} Although business leaders were sceptical of one of Peru’s oldest centre-left political parties, the rise of Humala and the spectre of a return to the policies of the Velasco era – as well as the evident ideological transformation of APRA itself – led to a rapprochement between García and organized business during the campaign period.
led to significant trade surpluses, including a surplus of $3.6 billion in 2007 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2007).

**North American democracy promotion: actors and approaches**

For the United States and Canada, the Toledo and García governments have been important regional allies. Although the democracy assistance programs of both countries are generally inscribed within the attempts of their respective states to deepen neoliberalism, the United States has used its programs much more so than Canada. Both have sought to stabilize the political situation and reduce social conflict, but only the United States has located its program within the attempt to prevent the rise of 'anti-systemic forces.' This section will briefly summarize the main DAAs, their programs and their tactics within the context of bilateral relations and the position of Canada and the United States in the regional order. Against this analytical framework, I will then explore the evolution of specific strategies and tactics. In contrast to Haiti, where the form of democracy promotion went through different phases, the approach of both Canada and the United States has remained polyarchy promotion, with some Canadian DAAs also advancing a grassroots democracy promotion approach.

In addition to maintaining strong diplomatic relations, the Toledo and García governments significantly expanded trade and investment with the United States and Canada (Peru also remains an important ally in the U.S. anti-coca campaigns in the Andes). In 2008, the United States exported $6.183 billion while importing $5.812 billion in return. This represented a significant increase in trade relations from 2000, when U.S. exports equalled $1.659 billion and imports $1.995 billion (U.S. Census Bureau 2010a). U.S. direct investment in Peru reached $3.9 billion in 2008, making it the
second largest source of foreign direct investment after Spain (U.S. Department of State 2008a). Major U.S. mining companies include Newmont Mining Corporation and Phelps Dodge Corporation. Peru is currently Canada’s third largest trade partner in Latin America. In 2008, Canadian exports to Peru equalled $382.5 million while imports totalled $2.5 billion. However, the total stock of Canadian direct investment in the same year was estimated at $1.8 billion, most of it concentrated in extractive industries (DFAIT 2009a). Canadian mining companies are amongst the most dominant in the Peruvian mining sector, leading explorations and investment in gold-mining operations (Government of Canada 2009c). The Canadian based Barrick Gold Corporation – the largest gold mining company in the world – runs major operations throughout Peru.

Given the economic importance of Peru to Canada and the United States, it is not surprising that both countries have pursued bilateral free-trade agreements (FTAs) with García’s government. These agreements are linked to a deepening of the neoliberal process, including the deregulation of legislation in the areas of mining, timber and hydrocarbon, and the removal of restrictions on selling protected forests. Despite its rapidly expanding economy, however, Peru continues to be a major recipient of aid from both Canada and the United States. In 2007 – 2008 it received $53.5 million from USAID (Department of Commerce 2009) and $20 million from Canada in bilateral and multilateral development assistance (Government of Canada 2009b).

In terms of North American democracy promotion, both USAID and CIDA have coordinated the most important assistance programs and have provided funding to a range

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248 In addition to the FTAs signed with Canada and the United States, Peru has also signed agreements with China and Singapore, and is pursuing negotiations with Mexico and the EU (Economist Intelligence Unit 2009).
of QUANGOs, development contractors and NGOs. Table 16 summarizes the main DAAs and their programs, the local partners, and the specific tactics associated with the two forms of democracy promotion that may be discerned during the period under investigation. While the approaches of both Canadian and U.S. DAAs have not shifted significantly over the years, U.S. programs have contributed to the promotion of polyarchy from a much wider range of tactics.

\[249\text{ It remains one of twenty countries of focus for Canadian development assistance and likely figures amongst the unnamed priority countries for enhanced bilateral relations under the Harper government’s Americas Strategy.}\]
Table 16: Actors, programs, strategies and tactics in Peru
(Amounts in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States: Total spent by USAID on democracy assistance (2001-09): $62.501</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID-OTI, Transition strategy (2001-03): $11.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID, Country strategy (2002-06): $65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARD, Pro-Decentralization Project (2003-07): $20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRI, Promoting Political Stability (2004-05): $0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRI, Political party strengthening program (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(budget not available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NED grants (2001-present) (2009)*: $0.957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDI, Legislative Strengthening Program (2001-05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDI, Political party reform Projects (2006-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local partners: the state, main political parties (including PNP), diverse NGOs but strong focus on human rights and coalition building around issues of state accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada: Total spent by CIDA (2001-09): $38.284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA, Public Policy / Public Sector Reform (2003-09): $6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to the Office of the Ombudsman (2003-08): $4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andean Regional Gender Equality Fund (2004-09): $1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consortium, Reform of Mining Sector (2003-11): $13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD, Supporting CHIRAPAQ (2005-06) (budget not available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP Country Program II (2006-11): $2.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local partners: the state, more diverse set of NGOs but mostly mainstream, grassroots movements</td>
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<tr>
<th>Political context</th>
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<tr>
<td>Elite rule but lack of hegemony; social instability and rise of 'anti-systemic' party</td>
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<tr>
<th>Canada and U.S. PPTs</th>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthen and build state institutions to increase legitimacy; promote human rights mechanisms; restrict popular control over key resources through governance reform programs; support municipal governance</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additional U.S. PPTs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct process of state reform; manage public relations campaign on behalf of the state; popularize party platforms and promote inclusion; promote system-wide reform of political system; support inclusive neoliberal governance; discursively frame democratic discourse in public sphere, measure and manage popular perceptions; construct liberal subjects; develop new national identities through workshops and campaigns</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shared objectives of U.S. and Canada</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stabilize political situation and mitigate social conflict → counter crisis of authority/ passive revolution</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additional U.S. objectives</th>
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<tr>
<td>Prevent rise of anti-systemic forces</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Canada grassroots DP</th>
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<tr>
<td>Support grassroots organizations and progressive NGOs</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>→ Reinforce counter-hegemony</td>
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*The NED only provides complete information on its grants for the most recent fiscal year

USAID’s first program in the wake of the transition was implemented by the Office for Transition Initiatives. According to statements made by a Political officer of the U.S. Embassy: “US objectives in the post Fujimori period were to stabilize and facilitate the democratic transition and to recover the US image.” The final report of the USAID program noted that the “OTI was very useful politically to the Embassy because it had quick funds available for projects for public diplomacy and for projects of interest
USAID articulated a country strategy for 2002 – 2006 that continued to focus on democratic processes and institutions. Again, the emphasis was on stabilizing the situation and improving public perceptions of the governing system. According to the strategy: “Although recent polls show Peruvians are more supportive of a democratic governing system than their neighbors and have a higher degree of confidence that the government can help them solve problems, these trends will not be sustained if the new Toledo government is not able to dramatically change the way in which the government operates and relates to its citizens. (USAID 2002a: 1).” After Toledo announced plans to move ahead with a new decentralization scheme, USAID launched a massive program, Pro-Decentralization Project (PRODES), to build the capacity of key stakeholders (ARD inc. 2008).

The near-victory of Humala in the 2006 presidential elections provided USAID with a new sense of urgency, which translated into an increased focus on state accountability and rebuilding the political party system. Within minutes of meeting this researcher, USAID’s Chief of the Democratic Initiatives Office, Catherine Lott, produced a map of Peru which graphically portrayed the positive correlation between the poorest regions and electoral support to Ollanta Humala in the 2006 presidential elections, a development, she argues, that must be countered with a more strategic approach on the part of USAID programming. Mrs. Lott stated:

When you look at this map of who voted for whom, if you were to place a poverty map over this country, you would see almost a perfect match. Those who are in the poorest regions are voting for Ollanta Humala, the wealthy around the coast (they held their nose) and voted for Alan Garcia. That is the main challenge to this country, including the consolidation of democracy. Any time you have an election in this country, it is up

250 Interview, Lima: January 8, 2009.
for grabs; and the fear is that a populist candidate like Ollanta Humala comes along and says messages that resonate well to this 40 percent of the population that has really not seen their lives substantially improve over the last 20, 30, 40 years...I don’t think people really understand how close he came to winning this election; he could have easily taken this country and taken it in a dramatically different direction, one that would not be in anyone’s interest except his own.

USAID also supported the IRI to improve the image of the state and to implement a political party reform project intended to support the development of more issue-based and policy-focused political parties. NDI, for its part, launched a research project on pro-poor reform by political parties in 2004, which led to a series of grants by the NED for reform initiatives in that area.

Like USAID, CIDA has also focused its democracy assistance on supporting public institutions and good governance. Its programs are framed specifically in terms of creating an enabling environment for good governance by supporting democratization, public sector reform, and inclusive management in strategic resources. In terms of the second objective, the bulk of CIDA development assistance has been administered through the Public Policy and Public Sector Reform Fund (CIDA 2009e), administered directly by the Canadian Embassy. CIDA has also supported the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Defensoría del Pueblo and the Consorcio de Investigación Económica y Social in collaboration with IDRC (CIDA 2009f). Through the Andean Regional Gender Equality Fund, it has supported women’s groups and various governmental departments (CIDA 2009g). CIDA has provided considerable funds to democratic governance projects in the mining sector. In terms of Canada’s other DAAs, both Development and Peace and Rights and Democracy have also contributed to local civil society organizations, primarily through CIDA funds. Development and Peace in particular has advanced a grassroots approach working with many progressive
movements and NGOs.

Like their American counterparts, CIDA development officials have expressed serious concerns with the lack of social stability in Peru. The Acting Manager of the Peru Desk for the South America Division at CIDA, Pascale Thivierge, for instance, notes that social conflict has been a major concern for CIDA. While CIDA has not produced strategic policy documents on Peru in the area of democracy assistance, Mme Thivierge notes that the development agency links the rise in social conflict to the lack of social investment by the Peruvian state, something it has sought to counter by prioritizing education as one of its main areas of development assistance. At the same time, the CIDA Counsellor and Head of Aid in Lima, Rebecca Mellett, is wary of the U.S. approach to supporting democracy, which she argues can easily be perceived as partisan given its strong focus on rebuilding political parties and that U.S. democracy agencies are themselves often perceived as extensions of the CIA. Ms. Mellett argues that this is one of the main reasons why Canada has stayed away from supporting political parties through its development assistance programs.

While the Head of Aid undoubtedly overlooks the political significance of supporting the state and civil society organizations, the differences in the ways in which Canadian and U.S. development agencies frame and structure their activities are not insignificant. Most importantly, they indicate a manipulation of democratic aid on the part of the United States to counter 'anti-systemic' forces – particularly the PNP – in political society that is not present in the case of Canada. This translates into aid officials acting as

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252 Interview, Lima: January 22, 2009.
253 Despite Mellett’s comments, CIDA actually does indirectly engage in support to political parties through International IDEA, to which it contributed $97,239 for 2005 – 2008 (CIDA 2009).
political agents with clearly-defined political objectives. In Canada, the state has not strategically guided its democracy assistance to the same extent, thereby avoiding the high level of instrumentalization that was observed in the case of Haiti. This last point is of particular importance since it underlines the limitations of analyzing Canada’s growing imperial role in the Americas strictly from an economic lens. In both Peru and Bolivia, ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Gordon 2009) helps situate Canadian trade policy but offers limited explanatory power when it comes to understanding democracy promotion.

II. Reinventing political society
Fine-tuning the state apparatus

Despite such differences, both Canada and the United States have sought to improve the functioning of the political system according to certain rationalities of governance. In the area of state institutions and political parties (political society), North American democracy assistance programs may be interpreted according to the dual logic of a strategy of polyarchy promotion, which seek to rationalize and strengthen traditional institutions and parties as well as contribute to inclusive neoliberal governance. While this strategy contains progressive dimensions, they may also rationalize social contradictions exacerbated by the economic policies of both countries. This section will look at U.S. and Canadian approaches to strengthening civil and political rights, the functioning of Congress, the concertation mesas, decentralization, the regulatory framework governing extractive industry and political parties before turning to initiatives in civil society in the following section.254

In terms of reinforcing the basic institutional arrangements and values of polyarchy, U.S. democracy assistance programs in the area of democratic governance

254 Both Canada and the United States have also provided support to elections, including through the OAS.
have articulated in large part around re-establishing the credibility of the legislature. Through the OTI program, Congress received a total of $387,619 in assistance (the executive, for its part, received $197,899) (Hill, McBride and Diaz-Albertini 2003: 41). Such efforts have been framed specifically in terms of the inability of the political class to lead a process of congressional reform of its own volition (CONSODE 2003). To trigger this process, USAID played a key role in organizing and funding a coalition of organizations, the Consorcio Sociedad Democrática (CONSODE), which included five Peruvian NGOs as well as the NDI (funded by the NED at this stage) and lasted from 2001 – 2006 (the section on civil society will look at CONSODE separately).

Though various initiatives, CONSODE sought to enhance the link between congressional representatives and the citizenry in order to increase popular support for the legislature. The consortium warned that legislators are often perceived negatively as a result of the disconnect between their political agendas and the concerns of their constituencies, high congressional salaries and the general inefficiency of congresistas in dealing with legislative issues (CONSODE 2004). CONSODE took a largely technocratic approach in dealing with these issues, implementing workshops and publishing guides designed to socialize congresistas on the role of legislators in a representative democracy. A major focus has also been strengthening the flow of information between Congress and the public to ensure the accountability and transparency of the legislature.

The role of CONSODE in fostering liberal-democratic norms amongst legislators contains both negative and positive aspects. At one level, USAID's support to CONSODE enhanced the ability of NGOs to hold Congress accountable and ensure that legislators are acting on behalf of clearly defined political interests rather than personalistic agendas. This is an essential aspect of democracy, however defined. At another level, this type of intervention arguably helps stabilize elite notions of democracy by rationalizing the political system while the class relations that have traditionally excluded subaltern groups from the political system remain intact. While a more functional legislature may very well lead to a greater degree of responsiveness on the part of political elites in articulating the social and economic needs of electoral constituencies, the focus seems to be on stabilizing the political system in the here and now.

There is thus a strong emphasis on enhancing positive public perceptions of the legislature through public relations programs. Monitoring public perceptions has been an important aspect of CONSODE's work, which has focused on the need for the legislature to institutionalize mechanisms to disseminate legislative results to improve its image. USAID also funded the Center for International Development (CID) of the State University of New York to implement a program (Developing Skills of the Peruvian Congress) designed primarily to reinforce the link between Congress and the public. Among other things, the program contributed to the development of a public relations strategy by a congressional office charged with this responsibility (State University of New York, Center for International Development 2003).

A more glaring example of USAID's attempt to manipulate public opinion in favour of the political system was IRI's Promoting Political Stability by Improving Government Communications. The program focused specifically on enhancing the image
of the Toledo government. According to one program document: “Although Peru has experienced notable levels of economic growth in the past two years, the Toledo administration has not been effective in communicating the progress achieved, and is often labelled as politically ineffective and lacking a clear, long-term strategy. To address this issue, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) authorized IRI to deploy a specialized task force of political communications experts (IRI 2005c: 1).” IRI began its evaluation of the government’s communication strategy in April 2004, after which Toledo announced his approval of a plan for IRI to begin training activities with the government (IRI 2005c).

IRI’s program was implemented specifically in reaction to the indigenous mobilizations that led to the toppling of the government in Bolivia. According to the testimony of IRI board member, Richard S. Williamson, before the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives (House of Representatives 2004), the events in Bolivia presented a threat to political stability in the Andean region. Williamson stated:

The toppling of a democratically-elected government through the mass mobilization of citizens to the streets has left Bolivia in a state of crisis – and perhaps sent the message to others in the region, particularly in Ecuador and Peru, that legality is secondary to the perceived legitimacy of a government. In response to this emerging dynamic, IRI is working with civil society groups and political parties in Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador to improve their ability to educate citizens on their rights and responsibilities in a democracy. In Peru, IRI is working directly with the executive branch of government to restructure and improve its ability to communicate with citizens and strengthen a presidency that has weakened to the point of jeopardizing the promising democratic advances that followed the departure of former president Alberto Fujimori.

Both the CONSODE and IRI activities indicate a strong desire on the part of the U.S. government to contribute to a project of governance that contains social tensions by managing popular perceptions. However, both Canada and the United States have also sought to improve the functioning of the political system by supporting independent
human rights processes and mechanisms. Two notable examples are support to the Defensoría del Pueblo and Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission – the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR). Both constitute areas of democracy assistance that exemplify where such assistance is arguably best concentrated – on supporting democratic institutions and independent human rights mechanisms with considerable credibility that reinforce expansive definitions of citizenship. As such, they are examples of democracy assistance programs which require a more nuanced appraisal of their limitations. The issue here is not so much that they have contributed to a project of stabilizing neoliberal polyarchy – though this argument can certainly be made – but rather that their positive aspects are undermined by the economic policies of Canada, the United States, and the Peruvian state.

The Defensoría was established by the Fujimori government in 1993 as part of its limited project of reform. With 30 offices across the country, its primary role is to investigate complaints made by citizens against public authorities, mediate conflicts between both sides where necessary, and make recommendations to the state to rectify or prevent rights violations. Despite its inauspicious beginnings, Defensoría has managed to maintain its independence, enjoying a high level of public confidence since its establishment and earning a solid reputation as the ‘conscious of the state.’ CIDA and USAID support to the Defensoría is channelled through a donor basket fund. From 2003 to 2008, CIDA provided the Defensoría with an impressive $4.9 million in assistance (CIDA 2009c). Through the OTI program, the United States provided the Ombudsman with $178,231 in grants from 2001 to 2003 (Hill, McBride and Diaz-Albertini 2003: 42).

The United States also contributed significantly to justice reform through its 2002 – 2006 country strategy. Among other things, the program focused on building the capacity of key institutions, such as the
Defensoría has several specialized offices dealing with human rights, public utilities and the environment, women’s rights and social conflicts. It issues reports on whether the state is fulfilling its obligations in specific areas and partakes in campaigns against abuses such as state corruption. It is guided by a commitment to an expansive notion of rights, taking special interest in the state’s delivery of services in education, public utilities and health. As such, the agency has contributed to an expansive notion of citizenship that takes the state to task when it fails to meet its social obligations.

Although its role is limited to issuing recommendations, the stance that Defensoría regularly takes in defending the rights of citizens means that it does much more than contribute to social stabilization. It is this role that distinguishes the Defensoría from a watchdog on civil and political rights, or worse, an instrument to manage social conflicts on behalf of the state. The concern with the full spectrum of rights of citizens has translated into an understanding of social mobilization as a result of the failure of the state to fulfill its social obligations. In the words of Deputy Ombudsman for Constitutional Affairs, Fernando Castañeda, “if there is an empty space, someone will fill it.” This is significant given the tendency of the Peruvian government to increasingly depict dissent as a form of criminal activity (discussed below).

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257 In 2006, for instance, Defensoría conducted a campaign to monitor services at health care facilities in several regions, issuing a report entitled The Right to Health and to Social Security (Defensoría del Pueblo 2006).

258 Within the political science literature, critics such as Schedler (Schedler 1999) argue that agencies such as the Defensoría contribute to a quasi-voluntary version of ‘accountability light’ that diminishes the responsibility of the state. Not only do such criticisms overlook the ways in which institutions like Defensoría contribute to new forms of ‘social accountability’ that expose and denounce wrongdoings that might lead to legal action (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006), they fail to recognize the importance of the role of ombudsmen as institutional advocates.

259 Interview, Lima: January 19, 2009.
Canadian and U.S. support to the CVR has been no less important. Set up in June 2001 to examine atrocities committed during Peru’s internal war, the CVR has benefited from generous North American assistance: Canada was the first international donor to support the Commission and the United States provided the CVR with $1.031 million in grants – the highest amount awarded to a single recipient through its OTI program (Hill, McBride and Diaz-Albertini 2003: 42). Unlike many other commissions which have informed transitional justice processes, the CVR was notable for moving beyond an analysis of the atrocities committed during the conflict to addressing the socio-economic conditions that gave rise to it in the first place (Laplante 2008). The report of the CVR, released in August 2003, offered a fairly in-depth analysis of the historical context in which the conflict arose, referring to the ‘evident relation’ between poverty and social exclusion and the rise of political violence that ignited the war. Among other things, the CVR put forward a reparations plan and called for significant institutional reforms.

The CVR was linked to several important initiatives, such as professionalization of the military, justice reform and the restructuring of the intelligence agency. But these initiatives have fallen short of a process of state transformation and human rights abuses continue to take place. Canada and the United States are at least partially responsible for this state of affairs. Carolina Loayza, the Director of Human Rights for the Lima Bar Association (Colego de Abogados de Lima), notes that the government failed to follow up on the commission’s recommendations with policies that would lead to the genuine inclusion of the indigenous population by addressing their social and economic rights and holding the state accountable through reparations. She argues that indigenous peoples remain second-class citizens – a form of exclusion that has been exacerbated by

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neoliberal mining policies. Luis Lamas Puccio, a defence attorney at the Colego, goes one step further. He argues that the poor in Peru have effectively been criminalized and that judicial reform has floundered on the issue of social class. Human rights issues have been ideologically constructed in terms of issues that appeal to the middle class while the poor – particularly the indigenous population – are treated as threats to social stability.

The Peruvian NGO, the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH), has documented a trend towards the criminalization of social protest on the part of the García government, a process which it links to the state’s imposition of an unpopular economic model that has been rejected by the majority of the population.\textsuperscript{261} In recent years, the government has increasingly denounced indigenous protestors as ‘anti-development’ in an effort to dismiss indigenous concerns with the neoliberal development model. As Laplante (2008) notes, this is particularly worrisome given García himself presided over one of the darkest chapters in the internal conflict in the 1980s when the state waged a massive campaign of repression in the countryside.\textsuperscript{262}

Indeed, Canadian and U.S. support to human rights initiatives and mechanisms have been overshadowed by the commitment of both countries to the neoliberal programs of the Toledo and García governments and the ongoing liberalization of the mining sector – both of which have undermined the social and economic rights of the majority of the population. Dr. Max Hernández, the Technical Secretary of Peru’s Acuerdo Nacional, a national forum which brings together representatives of political parties and civil society

\textsuperscript{261} See APRODEH’s web-site at: http://www.aprodeh.org.pe/aprodeh2009/

\textsuperscript{262} To the great consternation of human rights organizations across the country, García also named Luis Alejandro Giampietri Rojas as his running-mate for the 2006 elections, a man who was deeply implicated in the notorious massacre of prisoners in El Frontón penitentiary in 1986. Giampietri – who is still the Vice President – was a high-ranking naval officer at the prison where authorities apparently staged no fewer than ninety extra-judicial killings to quell a riot initiated by captives of Sendero Luminoso (ADEHRPERU 2007).
organizations, has criticized Canada’s position on these issues. He argues that Canada has a lot to offer Peru based on its multicultural experience, but that so far its contributions to democracy in Peru have been limited. According to Dr. Hernández: “There are a number of things that Canadians have faced in some creative fashion that could be of use to Peruvians. But as long as Canada is only interested in its mines, it is not going to help us too much.”

The most notable example of the criminalization of dissent and its link to North American interests was the government’s response to a large-scale mobilization against a series of legislative decrees relative to the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States which also would have benefited Canadian mining companies. Among other things, the decrees deregulated legislation in the areas of mining, timber and hydrocarbon, making it possible to sell 64 percent of the forests of Peru to transnational corporations. Indigenous communities in the Amazonas responded with two months of protests, culminating in clashes with police and military forces and the deaths of more than 20 protestors in June 2009 (Zibechi 2009a). As the events unfolded, the Obama administration refrained from commenting on what was happening (Carlsen 2009).

In the aftermath of the government’s repressive response, three Canadian NGOs launched a campaign to protest the Canadian government’s intent to move ahead with the ratification of its own FTA with Peru. They noted that the legislative decrees will benefit Canadian mining companies enormously since half of Amazonian territories leased for petroleum exploration and extraction have gone to Canadian companies. The Alberta-

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264 The NGOs were: the Council of Canadians, Common Frontiers, and MiningWatch Canada.
based petrochemical firm Petrolifera is one such beneficiary, having signed an agreement with the Peruvian government recently to explore land inhabited by one of the world’s last uncontacted tribes.\textsuperscript{265} Despite concerns in both Canada and Peru, the FTA was ratified, with Canada staying silent on the massacre in the Amazon (The Council of Canadians 2009). Nonetheless, the indigenous protestors did manage to force the Peruvian Congress to respond to their demands by repealing some of the most contested legislative decrees (Carlsen 2009).

In the case of Canada, the tensions between its support to human rights instruments such as the Defensoría and the economic objectives of its multinationals are internalized in its democratic governance programming framework. Specifically, CIDA has contributed to a process of redefining the regulatory framework governing hydrocarbon and mineral extraction through several governance programs. For 2003 – 2008, CIDA provided an $8.75 million grant to the Canadian Petroleum Institute (CPI), a non-profit organization that provides management and technical training to international petroleum companies to implement a regulatory and capacity-building project. Among other things, the project implemented by the CPI was intended to promote potential oilfields to attract new investment by petroleum companies, including Canadian companies, which, according to one CIDA statement, were “already participating in the project and gaining a competitive edge in the process (CIDA 2006a).”

Likewise, a $13.6 million project implemented by the Canadian consortium of Roche Limited, Golder Associates Limited and the Association of Community Colleges of Canada over 2003 – 2011 provides technical assistance to Peru’s Ministry of Energy.

\textsuperscript{265} The decision by the Peruvian government is being appealed by the Instituto del Bien Común at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
and Mines on policy and regulatory reform issues related to the minerals and metals sector. The Peru-Canada Mineral Resources Reform Project (PERCAN) aims to improve the sustainable development of the mining sector through mechanisms to increase dialogue between local communities, municipal governments and mining companies and voluntary corporate social responsibility (Government of Canada 2009c) (Ministerio de Energía y Minas and CIDA). Among other things, the project led to the creation of ‘toolkits’ designed “to help communities and public institutions get a better grasp of the risks and opportunities of extractive industries and, in so doing, help mitigate social conflict” (Government of Canada 2009c).

The regulatory framework put in place by the Peruvian state, however, has proved wholly inadequate at mitigating exploitative practices in the mining sector (Salazar 2008). For its own multinationals, Ottawa has consistently favoured promoting voluntary standards of conduct in the framework of corporate social responsibility rather than subjecting them to enforceable legal norms. This has contributed to a new strategy of governance in which a liberalized regulatory framework coexists with loose environmental, health and safety standards.266 This has also been the preferred approach of the United States, which situates its support to the mining sector in Peru within the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) framework, of which Peru is not yet a member.267 Although the EITI rightly emphasizes the importance of transparent and accountable management of mining revenues by host governments, the EITI principles make no reference to the need to devise new international standards to regulate

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266 In terms of the regulation of Canadian companies in the extractive industry, Ottawa has consistently favoured promoting voluntary standards of conduct in the framework of corporate social responsibility rather than subjecting them to enforceable legal norms. See, for example, Canada's corporate social responsibility strategy for the Canadian international extractive sector (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada 2009).
transnational mining companies.\textsuperscript{268}

Canadian companies themselves have consistently taken advantage of lax regulations and are regularly criticized by Canadian NGOs for their involvement in mining operations that have violated community rights in both Peru and Bolivia (Mining Watch Canada 2005) (North, Patroni and Clark 2006b).\textsuperscript{269} The Peruvian NGO, CooperAccion, has been particularly critical of Canadian mining activities. In 2008, it argued that, in the region of Amazonas where new concessions were rapidly expanding, exploration conducted primarily by Canadian companies would most certainly lead to increased social conflict (Salazar 2008). In advancing the interests of Canadian-based multinationals in Peru, Canada has involved itself in longstanding struggles between political and economic elites closely aligned with the state against indigenous movements that have vigorously denounced exploitative mining practices. At the programming level, the term governance has provided a sufficiently elastic concept to link the management of key resources – an issue that should be determined according to internal policy debates – with the very notion of democracy.

\textbf{Creating inclusive neoliberalism}

If the record of the United States and Canada has been mixed in terms of providing support to democratic governance through traditional institutional arrangements and values associated with polyarchy, so too have been the results with regard to new forms of inclusion. The United States has been the primary supporter of such initiatives,

\textsuperscript{267} Interview with Catherine Lott. Lima: January 8, 2009.
\textsuperscript{268} See the 12 EITI principles listed on the initiative’s web-site: http://eitransparency.org/eiti/principles
\textsuperscript{269} In Peru, the most celebrated instance is the case of Manhattan Minerals, a Vancouver-based company that was asked to terminate plans for a mining project in the Tambogrande by the residents of the district through a referendum. In the end, the company did not back down until its buying option was terminated as a result of its failure to respect the rules of the consultative process (Echave 2005).
particularly in the area of decentralization. To situate the decentralization program, it is necessary to briefly comment upon the inclusive neoliberal project ushered in by the Peruvian state in the wake of the democratic transition. Under the interim government of Paniagua, the infrastructure for an inclusive neoliberalism began to take shape through institutional initiatives that created new points of access for civil society in the formation of state policy, as well as increased decentralization. Among other things, these included the Acuerdo Nacional as well as a forum designed specifically to discuss poverty-alleviation strategies, the Mesa de Concertación Nacional Para la Lucha contra la Pobreza. In the five years following the democratic transition, a total of 1,200 concertation mesas were established at all levels of government.

Drawing upon Dagnino’s conception of a ‘confluencia perversa,’ Panfichi (2007: 32) argues that the expansion of participation through the mesas was characterized by two competing democratic projects: on the one hand, a genuine commitment to a participatory project based on the notion of citizen’s rights; on the other, a view of participation as a means to increase the efficiency of public management, particularly in relation to social programs in the fight against poverty. The leaders of the first view consisted of former leftist militants – including those associated with progressive factions of the Church – initially invited by the Paniagua government to assume high-ranking positions on the mesas. The instrumentalist view of participation was associated with political elites – primarily the technocrats in the Peruvian government – and the IFIs which supported the new mesas and decentralization. In the end, Panfichi argues, the instrumentalist view prevailed as those committed to a more intrinsic view of participation did not have an organized social constituency to support their project. Once the Toledo government was
safely nestled into power, the state reverted to a policy of ignoring the new participatory mechanisms or using them in traditional clientelist fashion. The triumph of the instrumentalist view of participation was equally apparent in the process of decentralization sponsored by the Toledo government. In November 2002, Toledo announced an ambitious decentralization initiative, which included a constitutional reform and a series of organic laws passed throughout 2003. The process transformed the country’s existing 24 departments into regions with elected presidents. Prior to the reform, the departments had served as administrative units of the central government, which appointed prefects as governors. The decision-making prerogatives of regional, provincial, and district councils were expanded and new mechanisms for civil society participation at each level of governance were created (Arce 2008). But Congress opposed the most progressive features of decentralization, such as participatory budgeting. A compromise was eventually reached with the government – all regional and local levels of government would establish councils to debate the budget in which civil society was granted 40 percent of seats (Panfichi 2006).

The government’s support for decentralization seems to have at least partially been constructed based on what the Peruvian scholar, Isabel Remy, refers to as an ‘estrategia de recanalisation,’ that is, a strategy of redirecting social policy demands away from the central state to the regional and local levels to manage the social tensions. The ability of each level of government to implement such policies in turn reflects in large part their natural resource base. Decentralization was accompanied by a

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271 The World Bank supported the government’s effort through the Decentralization and Competitiveness Structural Adjustment Loan (DECSAL), which sought to promote greater control over public resources to lower levels of government and enhance competitiveness (World Bank 2004).  
modification of the law surrounding control over royalties generated from mining and hydrocarbon companies, the so-called canon. In the new arrangement, control over 100 percent of the royalties was transferred to the municipalities and regions where the exploitation of resources is carried out (see Poder Legislativo 2004). This has led to a breakdown in solidarity between regions as new ‘horizontal’ tensions have emerged, in addition to ‘vertical’ class tensions that have been relocated to the local territorial level (Remy S. 2008).^273

USAID has provided funding to many of the new participatory mechanisms, including the Acuerdo Nacional,^274 and is the most important international sponsor of the decentralization plan. USAID support to decentralization began with the OTI program and was significantly enhanced through the $20 million Pro-Decentralization Project (PRODES) implemented by ARD Inc. PRODES significantly contributed to the implementation of the decentralization scheme through a series of interventions at the national and sub-national level designed to strengthen municipal institutions and encourage popular participation. Its overall approach has been technocratic, focusing primarily on improving the administrative efficiency of different units of government through technical assistance and training and managerial workshops. Those governments which demonstrated ‘innovative public administration and good governance practices’ were rewarded in the form of co-financing for programs designated as priorities in the participatory budgeting process (ARD inc. 2008).

^273 A premonition of the difficulties associated with organizing class-based movements across fragmented territories may be found in the Federalist Papers, which advocates federalism as a means to pre-empt challenges to the rights of property (Wood 1995).
^274 The Acuerdo’s web-site lists USAID as one of its funders (http://www.acuerdonacional.gob.pe/index.html).
As the largest decentralization project in Peru, PRODES most certainly reinforced local mechanisms of participation with highly progressive features. Yet USAID’s role in the decentralization process seems to have largely been guided by the same instrumentalist preoccupations that led the Toledo government to launch the process in the first place – the high level of social conflict and the need to create new mechanisms of local inclusion in the context of regional disturbances such as the Arequipazo which challenged the authority of the central state (Arce 2008). USAID’s Chief of the Democratic Initiatives Office, Catherine Lott, acknowledges that the agency’s support to decentralization has been guided by a preoccupation with reducing social tensions and that the policy has faced difficulties in part because the issue of redistribution has not been adequately addressed by the decentralization scheme.275

If decentralization was intended to stabilize Peru, however, it has led to unintended consequences which have contributed to further destabilization (as was the case in Bolivia). According to one USAID official who agreed to be interviewed on condition of anonymity, USAID is particularly concerned by the rise of new ‘anti-systemic’ movements at the regional level which are inclined to form alliances with the radical PNP.276 Decentralization has certainly been a disaster for Peru’s main national parties, which are deeply rooted in personalistic agendas that usually ignore regional politics altogether. In the 2002 regional elections, Toledo’s PP only managed to win one region, though APRA did manage to win twelve regional presidencies; in 2006, however, APRA’s control was reduced to two regions with 25 different independent parties or movements gaining control of the rest of the country’s 25 regional governments (Arce

275 Interview, Lima: January 8, 2009.
276 Interview with anonymous official, Democratic Initiatives Office. Lima: January 8, 2009.
One of the goals of the IRI’s political party strengthening program is precisely to counter-balance the rise of ‘anti-systemic’ parties at the regional level by building stronger links between regional movements and national parties. Rather than push for a decentralization plan that addresses the issue of redistribution, USAID seems more concerned with finding tactics to enable traditional political parties to create stronger links with the regions to contain ‘anti-systemic’ forces.

If USAID has a clear political intent to alter the balance of power between organized political forces through its involvement in the decentralization process, there are also more subtle forms of power being enacted through its program. Legoas’ (2007) Foucauldian analysis of the discourses associated with the decentralization process calls our attention to the type of citizen being constructed through this initiative. According to Legoas, one of the main Peruvian organizations to be involved in USAID’s program is the Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana (GPC), a platform which brings together 11 NGOs working mostly in the area of popular education. Through initiatives such as Vigila Perú, a national campaign to encourage citizen oversight of regional and local governments as well as extractive industries, GPC promotes a particular notion of citizen participation and development. This vision fits well within the instrumentalist view of decentralization insofar as it reduces citizen participation to watching (vigila) over authorities to prevent corruption and inefficient use of resources, what Legoas refers to as the ‘watchdog citizen.’ This discourse is reproduced through workshops and various capacity-building initiatives sponsored by GPC, as well as other NGOs and consortiums involved in the decentralization process. Although Legoas does not consider the question of hegemony and democracy promotion, he argues that the notion of participation favoured by USAID is discursively linked to the smooth functioning of local and global markets. The focus
on the local also occurs at the expense of any meaningful participation in national decision making.

**Establishing multiparty democracy**

Political party strengthening programs have complemented U.S. and Canadian efforts at restructuring Peru’s democratic institutions. The main initiatives have been led by NDI and IRI, as well as IDEA International, which receives support from both Canada and the United States. While Canada does not officially engage in this area of democracy assistance, it contributed $97,239 to IDEA to support greater political inclusion of women from 2005 – 2008 (CIDA 2009d). IDEA’s approach to strengthening political parties has involved supporting legislative initiatives dealing with the political system and working with the parties themselves. It played an important role in sponsoring the Political Party Law which was passed in 2003, and has provided technical assistance and training to parties, particularly around gender issues. IDEA was instrumental in establishing a non-partisan caucus of women parliamentarians, the *Mujeres Parlamentarias del Perú* (MMPP), and has worked with parties across the political spectrum to incorporate gender-friendly bylaws and implement quotas for the representation of women. At the time of writing, IDEA is strongly supporting an electoral reform law that would place stricter restrictions on campaign financing.277

NDI began working on political party issues through a study in 2004 – 2005 on the political party system and pro-poor reform, funded by the British Department for International Development. The report, which led to a series of follow-up programs

277 Its Senior Programme Officer, Kristen Sample, however, notes that the executive is losing the momentum to move ahead with the initiative as the government continues to focus on its economic growth strategy at the expense of political reform. Interview, Lima: January 19, 2009.
funded by the NED, highlighted the need to build the policy capacity of elected officials and political parties to articulate and implement pro-poor policy reforms (NDI and Department for International Development 2005). The organization has also encouraged youth leadership in political parties, playing an important role in the establishment of a forum for young political leaders, the Foro Multipartidario Jovenen. More recently, NDI has sought to broker a compromise between different political parties, the Acuerdo de Partidos Políticos en Salud, in support of a universal health-care system. Although the Acuerdo has not yet been passed by Congress, the NDI Country Director, Luis Nunes, sees it as one of NDI’s most important regional accomplishments.

IRI’s Political Party Strengthening Program began in 2008 with the intention of fostering more accountable and transparent parties with more representative platforms and coherent strategies for reaching voters in collaboration with four civil society organizations. IRI’s program also includes a gender focus which has led to collaboration with IDEA in support of the MMPP, as well as a governance initiative designed to train local officials to better manage mining revenues.

Such programs have undoubtedly helped reinforce political pluralism and multiparty democracy. IDEA and NDI, in particular, have advanced important reform initiatives. But they have also provided traditional parties which have otherwise expressed little concern for the poor with the technical expertise and knowledge to appeal to this sector of Peruvian society, as well as to women and youth. In the case of the IRI, the goal of rationalizing and legitimizing the political party system is contained in the

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278 Interview, Lima: January 21, 2009.
279 They are Consejo Nacional para la Etica Pública (PROÉTICA), Asociación Civil Transparencia, Calandria, and Reflexión Democrática. The first two will be discussed in the following section.
very language of its programming. Lack of legitimacy is treated as a simple technical matter to be overcome through better channels of communication between representatives and constituents while the political dominance of elites is naturalized.

According to IRI's Resident Country Director, Gabriela Serrano, national political parties are unresponsive mainly because the political system does not provide sufficient incentives for them to build stronger ties with the regions. While this may be partially true, IRI ignores the fact that most parties are dominated by elites with little interest in advancing popular programs apart from their instrumentalist appeal. NDI also reproduces a technocratic approach to issues of poverty reduction that entirely overlooks unequal distribution of resources between different social groups. This discursive framing of political issues helps call attention away from questions of power while enhancing the capacity of parties to advance reformist programs that might stabilize patterns of elite rule. It reinforces a liberal rationality of governance that normalizes the distinction between political elites and those who are governed.

Despite the technocratic approach of such programs, moreover, they are anything but politically neutral. The comments made by the anonymous USAID official on the importance of the IRI program in countering 'anti-systemic' tendencies at the regional level – as well as the concerns of the Chief of the Democratic Initiatives Office regarding the rise of Humala – have already been noted. And while NDI funding has come from the NED rather than USAID, its political orientation is equally apparent. In a report before the Congressional Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs in March 2005, Kenneth Wollack, the President of NDI, described the political function of political party

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280 According to the previously-cited anonymous USAID official, even the slogan of the IRI program, Todo Hacemos Política, was focus-grouped for maximum public appeal. Interview, Lima: January 8, 2009.
strengthening programs in Peru and the rest of the region in no uncertain terms. Wollack (2005) noted that:

Civil society activism without effective political institutions quickly creates a vacuum. It sows opportunities for populists and demagogues who seek to emasculate parties and legislatures, which must serve as the intermediaries between the state and citizens and, therefore, are the cornerstones of representative democracy. This dangerous trend has already been seen in several countries in the Andean region – including Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela.282

At the same time, political party strengthening programs have not explicitly undermined the PNP like those of the IRI did to Lavalas in Haiti. In fact, both the NDI and the IRI have engaged in capacity-building initiatives with Humala’s PNP. According to Gabriela Serrano, the IRI works with all ‘responsible’ political parties, including the PNP. Likewise, Luis Nunes of NDI noted in an interview that “Although many people think that an organization like NDI, which receives North American funding, would not want to work with Humala’s party, we actually have no problem working with them.”283 Enrique Juscamayta, the member of the PNP’s political committee who coordinates the party’s involvement in such programs, states: “my personal view is that they favour a limited model of democracy which does not affect the underlying system like those in the United States and Europe… it is not a vision of democracy that is favourable to a social change that would benefit the masses.”284 That being said, Juscamayta notes that their programs have largely been beneficial to the party, and that he is generally in favour of North American funding to political parties and civil society organizations.

Given the explicit aim of USAID and NDI to counter anti-systemic and populist tendencies in Peru, the fact that political party strengthening programs have included the

282 Of course, it is a trend to which U.S. and Canadian democracy promoters greatly contributed in Haiti.
283 Interview, Lima: January 21, 2009 (my translation).
284 Interview, Lima: January 17, 2009 (my translation).
PNP represents a paradox. One plausible explanation for the incongruity is the need for such programs to be more cautious about accomplishing political objectives in light of the global backlash against U.S. democracy promotion and the public criticism of IRI’s activities in Venezuela and Haiti.

Another factor might be the nature of the PNP itself, which, unlike Fanmi Lavalas in Haiti or the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, lacks a grassroots social base. From a strategic point of view, inviting the PNP to participate in political party strengthening programs might serve the objective of bringing them into the political system through workshops that encourage a technocratic approach to dealing with policy issues. In this sense, threats to the system may be redirected through the imposition of discourses that do not challenge underlying class relations, a process that could be facilitated in the case of the PNP by its weak social base. Juscayanta’s comments on the IRI’s approach seem to indicate this possibility. Whatever the case, the inclusion of a radical nationalist party in political party strengthening programs explicitly designed in part to counter anti-systemic forces means that a critical approach to democracy promotion must consider the importance of more subtle mechanisms to deal with challenges to neoliberal dominance.

III. Civil society and support to NGOs
Framing democracy
As North American democracy assistance programs sought to reinforce the institutional mechanisms of polyarchy and inclusive neoliberalism, democracy assistance was also channelled to civil society organizations espousing values discursively in line with donor priorities. Many of these partners were selected from the growing army of urban-based
NGOs headquartered in Lima and staffed by middle-class professionals.\textsuperscript{285} Although elite-led and part of interlocking networks and coalitions, these organizations have not been aligned with any particular political force. As such, North American democracy assistance to civil society has not contributed to a process of elite political mobilization as it has in Haiti. Nonetheless, in the absence of a popular alternative, democracy promotion has reinforced the ability of certain organizations to discursively frame issues of democratic development without actually undermining others. While such programs reinforce the ability of dominant classes and the political elite to rule hegemonically, the enactment of power that underscore their intended political impact is best conceived of in terms of governmentality. Specifically, they contribute to particular discourses that deflect attention away from structural antagonisms and help construct liberal subjects through workshops and other interventions.

In the case of the United States, funding has largely been channelled to coalitions of civil society organizations advancing reform on specific public issues.\textsuperscript{286} These organizations have socialized citizens with liberal-democratic and have further contributed to the construction of the ‘watchdog citizen.’ USAID priorities in civil society are in turn linked to the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), which may be viewed as a technology of power that measure popular perceptions of democracy to enable USAID to more strategically frame its democracy assistance. Since the ultimate goal is to guide the behaviour of citizens according to liberal norms, it fits within a project of governmentality. Canadian support to civil society organizations has focused

\textsuperscript{285} Sanborn and Morón (2006) estimate that there were about 1,600 development NGOs alone in Peru by the early 2000s.

\textsuperscript{286} According to USAID’s 2002 – 2006 country strategy, “activities with civil society will generally involve advocacy by civil society or other governmental groups for changes, while work with public institutions will focus on the consideration, adoption and implementation of those changes.”
on a more thematically diverse set of NGOs, though they, too, have largely been urban-based and elite-led. Some organizations that have received funds have been part of the coalitions supported by the United States. Only in the case of the Canadian NGO, Development and Peace, has North American democracy promotion supported grassroots organizations with a popular base and alternative vision of democracy. This section will comparatively examine some of the main NGOs and coalitions that have received U.S. and Canadian support, as well as the thematic focuses of their interventions.

USAID’s support to civil society in the wake of the transition was initially focused on human rights issues. The most significant civil society protagonist in Peru’s struggle for a return to democracy throughout the 1990s was the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDDHH), a coalition of over 60 member organizations founded in 1985. In the late 1990s, USAID provided CNDDHH with a development grant of $250,000 (Management Systems International 2000: 13). Although the OTI program only provided the CNDDHH with grants of approximately $13,000 from 2001 – 2003 (Hill, McBride and Diaz-Albertini 2003: 38), USAID continued to provide funding to many of its member organizations throughout the 2000s, including the Instituto Peruano de Educación en Derechos Humanos y la Paz (IPEDEHP), which was involved in the implementation of projects that received nearly $3 million in USAID funds (these project are discussed below). Other member organizations received smaller grants, such as the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH), which received approximately $53,000 through the OTI program (Hill, McBride and Diaz-Albertini 2003: 37).

The CNDDHH emerged from Peru’s human rights movement, which, as we have already seen, was closely linked to the progressive factions of the Catholic Church. According to Drzewieniecki’s (2002) study of the organization, its member organizations
have traditionally been led by university-educated middle and upper class activists who have worked closely together since the early 1980s. While human rights organizations typically advanced a holistic approach to human rights issues in the early years of the movement, human rights discourse was increasingly narrowed to civil and political rights by the late 1980s as a result of the internal conflict. At the same time, grassroots organizations from rural areas that had contributed to the formation of the CNDDHH progressively dropped out of the coalitions as state repression and targeted violence by Sendero Luminoso led to the disintegration of popular organizations in the countryside (Youngers and Peacock 2002). The high-profile elite background of its leaders spared them the repression inflicted by the Fujimori government on more popular-based civil society organizations in the 1990s, such as unions and peasant organizations.

In this context, U.S. support to the human rights organizations represented a ‘convergence of interests’ between internal human rights concerns and the democratic discourse of North American donors. Although little research has been conducted on this topic, investigative journalist Jeremy Bigwood (2006) has alleged that this support came at a price. He notes, for instance, that CNDDHH sought to advance U.S. interests by undermining the candidature of Ollanta Humala in the 2006 presidential elections. According to CNDDHH allegations, Humala was responsible for war crimes, including forced disappearances, torture and attempted murder, which were alleged to have taken place when he commanded a counter-insurgency base in the jungle in 1992. Rather than investigate the merits of these claims, however, Bigwood simply assumes that because the

CNDDHH and its member organizations received grants from USAID throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s they are doing the bidding of the U.S. government.288

In fact, as discussed in the previous section, NGOs such as APRODEH289 – a member of CNDDHH cited by Bigwood as an example of a USAID recipient – have targeted the García government for its criminalization of social protest.290 As the Executive Director of APRODEH states: “As a result of legislation passed by this government against social movements, social leaders, social activism, there is an attack against freedom of expression in the widest sense of the term...and that is why so many leaders are accused of terrorism which has led to the criminalization of social protests.291” Peruvian NGOs have been highly critical of the Peruvian state, so much so that the García government passed a law establishing a state institution to regulate them – the Agencia Peruana de Cooperación International (APCI). Among other things, the law and its subsequent revisions require all NGOs to register with APCI and report on their expenditures to ensure that their activities are in line with the government’s development plan.292 In April 2008, APRAs also aligned with the pro-Fujimori bloc to announce a congressional investigation into the activities of human rights NGOs. Such organizations were criticized for supporting terrorism when APRODEH advised the European

288 Bigwood provides no further evidence suggesting a politicization of the CNDDHH’s activities other than a reference to a declassified State Department document indicating that its officers debriefed U.S. Embassy officials on their trips to conflict areas in 1993. As we shall see in the following chapter, Bigwood has uncovered much more convincing evidence of U.S. interventionism in the case of Bolivia.
289 APRODEH played a fundamental role in documenting state abuses throughout the internal conflict and advocates on behalf of victims of state violence before national courts, as well as through regional instances such as the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
290 To be sure, APRODEH’s report was issued after Bigwood’s comments.
292 A copy of the law and its revisions was given to me during an interview with Fernando Castañeda, the Deputy Ombudsman for Constitutional Affairs. According to Crabtree (2006), the law was initially promoted by the pro-Fujimori bloc in Congress and was favoured by APRAs, including García and the Vice President, Luis Giampetri, who has been criticized for past human rights abuses by the NGO Instituto de Defensa Legal (also a recipient of USAID funds).
parliament to remove the *Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru* (MRTA) from its list of terrorist organizations (Ramos 2008).

Bigwood’s argument is very much based on an interventionist reading of democracy promotion in civil society – a model that does not satisfactorily describe how democracy promotion actually operates in Peru. Human rights organizations – while certainly linked to urban-elite constituencies – have not advanced partisan agendas in the same way as they have in places like Haiti. From a cultural political economy perspective, however, we may appreciate the more subtle ways in which recipients of democracy assistance in Peru are linked to the imposition of a liberal vision of democracy through particular discursive constructions that are congruent with U.S. interests.\(^{293}\) Although these tactics affect hegemonic relations in the interest of stabilizing neoliberal polyarchy, this occurs at a more systemic level through the construction of citizen subjectivities.

The emphasis on liberal-democratic values likely reflects a confluence of factors, including the elite-orientations of the organizations themselves, a general process of professionalization on the part of those with more radical tendencies, and a natural reaction to the lived experience of state repression. As Panfichi argues, many of the organizations that were involved in the struggle for democracy responded to the competition for scarce donor funds throughout the 1990s by more pragmatically aligning with donor concerns.\(^{294}\) He states: “After the critical moment had passed, some agencies now said we want better projects, we want professionalization, we want records,

\(^{293}\) Although there appears to be no critical research on how USAID has contributed to a particular discursive construction of democracy in Peru, Laurie and Bonnett (2002) have argued that USAID has contributed to a re-framing of anti-racism struggles along the lines of a new equity discourses that resonate with the individualistic ethos of neoliberal capitalism.

\(^{294}\) Interview, Lima: January 19, 2009.
indicators of impacts...this was a hard time for organizations which were extremely important at the time of the transition, but when the moment had passed, they had to compete for resources internationally.” Drzewieniecki’s (2002) research on the member organizations of the CNDDHH also notes a general tendency towards the moderation of the political views of their leaders.

The case of two human rights NGOs with a more radical orientation – the IPEDEHP and Manuela Ramos – illustrates how even those which have traditionally been on the left have contributed to consolidating polyarchy. As one of the most prominent and politically radical organizations of the CNDDHH, IPEDEHP was established primarily by progressive educators on the left with the goal of fostering democratic values and respect for human rights through participatory teaching methodologies inspired by Freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed. IPEDEHP’s approach to democratic education is implemented by a network of human rights trainers who conduct workshops and other activities throughout the country. From 1997 to 2001, USAID provided IPEDEHP with grants totalling $754,195 to ‘train the trainers,’ the results of which were reportedly the dissemination of human rights materials among nearly 175,000 citizens (Management Systems International 2000). Through the OTI program, IPEDEHP received approximately $200,000 in grants (Hill, McBride and Diaz-Albertini 2003: 35). IPEDEHP was also one of the principal contractors of a $2.5 million project from 1999 to 2006 designed to improve the quality of life and increase the rights of the population along the border with Ecuador (USAID 2002b).

IPEDEHP’s president, Willian López, espoused a fairly radical reading of the barriers to further democratization in Peru in an interview. According to López, Peru’s transition to democracy must be accompanied by a radical transformation in its social
relations to guarantee the social and economic rights of the poor and oppressed. He argues that U.S. (and Canadian) support for human rights are often undermined by their economic objectives which reinforce unequal social relations. He notes in particular that this tension re-emerged after the democratic transition had passed: “For many years, particularly in the 1990s, there was a very strong republican and democratic initiative and the democratic discourse that we promoted did not collide with the liberal discourse of international donors. But when it came to economic, social and cultural rights, then there was a collision.”

As far as one can tell, however, IPEDEHP does not criticize the economic activities of its funders in any of its publications, nor has it contributed to a more radical project of popular mobilization. Instead, IPEDEHP, along with many other NGOs that have received U.S. funding, call attention away from the external dimensions of inequality and contribute to a national discourse on democracy and democratization that focuses primarily on basic human rights. To the extent that social and economic rights are discussed, these are abstracted away from the confluence of social forces that impede their realization, with the exception, in some cases, of transnational mining practices. Social and economic rights are framed in a more general sense as unfulfilled obligations on the part of the Peruvian state.

The case of the Movimiento Manuela Ramos (MMR) – a feminist organization established in 1978 as one of main organizations to emerge from the women’s movement – illustrates more specifically the trend towards professionalization and the pressures of conformity induced by donor priorities. Through the OTI program, MMR received a

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295 Interview, Lima: January 13, 2009 (my translation).
296 This claim is based on a review of the web sites of the more prominent NGOs to receive U.S. funding, including, CNDDHH, APRODEH, Movimento Manuela Ramos, Consejo Nacional para la Ética Pública (PROÉTICA) and its affiliated members such as Asociación Civil Transparencia (discussed below), as well as IPEDEHP.
grant of $85,812 for its work in strengthening democracy alone. The trend towards the professionalization of the feminist movement in Peru has been documented by Barrig (2002), who argues that feminist concerns were increasingly framed within a technical discourse on gender issues throughout the 1990s. Women’s NGOs which relied on donor funding began working with government departments, presenting themselves as specialized experts on questions that required technical solutions. In this way, feminism was increasingly depoliticized, migrating from the barrios populares to the corridors of ministries and Congress.

Although the MMR was never a member of the CNDDHH, it has long been one of USAID’s most important local partners. Led by middle-class women, MMR’s leaders, such as its founder, Gina Yáñez, were at one point associated with the left and have remained committed to empowering poor and marginalized women, particularly in the areas of health and reproductive rights. Throughout the 1990s, the organization underwent a process of rapid expansion, primarily as a result of the introduction of the REPROSALUD program, which couples training in reproductive health with a micro-credit program for handicraft production. With the introduction of the program in 1995, the organization went from a staff of 45 to 280 (Weiss 2000: 8). REPROSALUD is financed primarily by USAID, which became MMR’s main source of funds in the 1990s, accounting for $6.5 million of the organization’s $8 million annual budget in 1999 (Management Systems International 2000).

297 The generic name ‘Manuela Ramos’ pays tribute to the ‘regular woman,’ reflecting the organization’s concern with advancing the full-spectrum of rights of Peruvian women of different social classes and ethnicities. See North’s (1985) early analysis, which refers to MMR as an example of the emerging women’s movement in Latin America and its concern with issues of gender and class.
Among its more notable achievements, MMR has defended victimized women - including those abused by state agents - in ‘emblematic cases.’ It also serves as the national coordinator for the regional network of women’s organizations, the Comité de América Latina y el Caribe para la Defense de los Derechos de la Mujer (CLADEM), and has represented women through its legal aid program in the inter-American system. According to Patricia Zanabria, the national coordinator for CLADEM and a staff-member of MMR, the organization has had a transformative impact on the public discourse on gender relations, making violence against women unacceptable – even if abuses still occur behind closed doors. Zanabria further notes that this is an essential aspect of democratization, which must go beyond mere elections to address issues of gender equality. While this may be true, MMR has equally contributed to a restrictive notion of economic rights that fits perfectly well within the ideology of its main donor. Its focus on economic rights has been framed entirely in terms of supporting micro-financing initiatives, which arguably has the affect of calling attention away from class relations sustaining inequality and discursively re-constructs poor women as mini-entrepreneurs who simply require access to small amounts of capital to more effectively participate in the market. Seen from this perspective, MMR has helped disseminate an ideology of the liberal capitalist woman citizen.

298 Interview, Lima: January 16, 2009.
299 The organization has also been willing to modify its own commitment to reproductive rights, as demonstrated by its decision to drop its public advocacy of abortion rights as a result of the U.S. government’s ‘global gag rule.’ As Mollman (Mollman 2003) argues, the decision of the U.S. government to revoke funding by USAID for NGOs which advocate abortion rights weakened the struggle for the decriminalization of abortion in Peru, where it is estimated that 350,000 Peruvian women annually submit to illegal and often unsafe abortions. The Peruvian NGO, Promsex (Chávez and Coe 2007), argues that, beginning in the mid-1990s, USAID adopted a fairly progressive rights-based approach to reproductive health issues that focused on women’s needs and context rather than fertility targets. Under the Bush administration, the gag rule negated fundamental human rights, including the right to informed and voluntary decisions over one’s body, and led to a serious split in the feminist movement. The gag rule has since been revoked by the Obama administration.
Both IPEDEHP and Manuela Ramos were members of a coalition that received considerable U.S. support, the *Consorcio Sociedad Democrática* (CONSOLE) – discussed in the previous section in relation to its congressional capacity-building project. CONSODE also included amongst its member organizations Asociación Civil Transparencia, Calandria, and the *Comisión Andina de Juristas* (CAJ). In more recent years, CONSODE has largely been supplanted by yet another NGO coalition, the *Consejo Nacional para la Ética Pública* (PROÉTICA), which was established as a coalition of four civil society organizations dedicated to anti-corruption issues in 2001: Asociación de Exportadores (ADEX), CAJ, the Instituto Prensa y Sociedad (IPYS) and Transparencia. In 2003, the coalition was transformed into the Peruvian chapter of Transparency International, though the founding organizations continue to be involved in various campaigns with the NGO (all of them, with the exception of ADEX, continue to be represented on its board).

PROÉTICA has engaged in numerous anti-corruption campaigns over the years and publishes a monthly report on corruption issues. USAID support to the coalition began through the OTI program, which provided a total of $179,000 in grants from 2001 to 2003 (Hill, McBride and Diaz-Albertini 2003: 35). Most impressively, USAID provided PROÉTICA with an $850,000 grant to build the capacity of civil society organizations to fight against corruption in the context of decentralization (the project will last from 2008 – 2011). The coalition is also involved in the IRI’s political party strengthening program, for which it received a grant of $46,500 for 2008 – 2009, and is the implementing organization of a program sponsored by the NED to fight regional
corruption, for which it received an additional $59,000 (2007 – 2008).\(^{300}\) Finally, PROÉTICA has also received funding from Open Society Institute (OSI) to strengthen regional anti-corruption institutions and civil society monitoring (2006 – 2007).

Based in Lima, PROÉTICA is led by urban professionals who opposed the Fujimori regime. Among its founding organizations, *Transparencia* played a fundamental role in monitoring the electoral fraud that occurred in 2000, after which it assumed a central role in the OAS-led transition process through its support to the *Acuerdo Nacional*. Established in 1994 by a small group of ‘prestigious people,’ *Transparencia* has worked in a number of areas, including the promotion of institutional reform, citizen engagement, and elections observation. It has teamed up with IDEA, NDI and IRI on a number of political party strengthening initiatives. IPYS was established during the same critical juncture in 1993 by a group of journalists committed to defending the freedom of the press. CAJ, for its part, was founded in the early 1980s by lawyers concerned with early human rights abuses associated with the escalating internal conflict. Through the OTI program, IPYS received grants equalling approximately $130,000 while CAJ obtained $150,000 (Hill, McBride and Diaz-Albertini 2003: 35). ADEX is the oldest of the founding member organizations of PROÉTICA, established in the early 1970s to promote the export sector. During the Fujimori years, its membership was divided over its support to the regime as some of the older manufacturers associated with the ISI model were negatively affected by Fujimori’s reforms (see Durand 2002a). Although ADEX is not represented on PROÉTICA’s board, the private sector is represented by Juan Manuel

\(^{300}\) PROÉTICA’s board members, as well as its projects and international donors, are listed on its web-site: [http://www.proetica.org.pe/Index.html](http://www.proetica.org.pe/Index.html)
Varilias, the founder of Gandules Inc., a sectoral group that lobbies on behalf of the agro-export industry.

Despite the elite nature of PROÉTICA and its affiliated NGOs, none of these organizations have advanced anything like the elite mobilization tactics that we saw in Haiti which were so decisive in triggering the crisis of legitimacy that brought down the Aristide government. None of them, for instance, have aligned themselves with a specific political agenda in support of or against the government, nor did they openly speak out against ‘anti-systemic’ candidate Ollanta Humala during the 2006 presidential elections.\(^{301}\) Although it did not publish a report on its own observation mission, Transparencia’s findings were taken into consideration in the preparation of the OAS report (2009), which congratulated both Humala and García for their conduct throughout the electoral process. But PROÉTICA and its affiliated NGOs have certainly contributed to a limited vision of democracy that coincides with U.S. interests. Its political activism is defined primarily in terms of watching over public authorities at the expense of a more substantive notion of citizenship. Transparencia’s vision of democracy is also restricted almost exclusively to the political realm where it is concerned primarily with matters of efficiency. According to its Assistant Secretary General, Elsa M. Bardáez del Águila, the main impediment to further democratization in Peru is related to state mismanagement, particularly state largesse.\(^ {302}\) Ms. Bardáez states:

> Until we change the state, democracy cannot deliver...with an inefficient state that spends where it’s not needed and spends badly – that’s our main challenge. One of the main blocks is the fact that we have a civil service and we have too many public

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\(^{301}\) That being said, both CAJ and the Venezuelan chapter of IPYS have been vocal critics of Chávez, a position for which they have been denounced by the Venezuelan government as puppets of the Bush administration (Terra/AFP 2007). The IPYS Venezuela chapter was one of four recipients of the 2007 NED Democracy Award, presumably in part for its work in criticizing the government (see NED web-site: http://www.ned.org/press/releases.html).

\(^{302}\) Interview, Lima: January 15, 2009.
employment laws that have accumulated because of the political needs of the moment. You cannot get rid of those or you would have an uproar from public employees themselves. I think this is ridiculous – you cannot fire someone for anything. In the latest case, a constitutional tribunal reinstated a municipal worker who was found drunk at work.

U.S support to issues of transparency, moreover, reflects a particular reading of Peru’s social crisis and the rise of ‘populism’ framed by the USAID-funded Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), which released its first report on Peru in 2007 since 1998. The report called attention to growing signs of popular discontent as evidenced by the high-level of support for Ollanta Humala in the 2006 presidential elections, citing crime, corruption and problems of political representation as the main sources of this discontent (Seligson and Carrión 2007). The project measures citizen perceptions on a plethora of issues, drawing upon this information to more strategically focus on specific issue-areas within its overall agenda of supporting liberal democracy and free markets. As such, LAPOP is in many ways the quintessential technology of power designed to measure the effectiveness of governance practices. At a CIPE conference in Lima in September 2007, the USAID Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean, Paul Bonicelli, cited the dismaying results of recent Americas Barometer surveys, asking, rhetorically: “what do we do to win back citizen confidence in democratic institutions and free markets?” Among other things, Bonicelli emphasized the importance of countering populist appeals by dealing with those very issues emphasized in the LAPOP report. In this sense, USAID’s growing support to PROÉTICA reflects a discursive re-framing of the barriers to democratization away from
human rights issues to those of corruption in a responsive attempt to steer the public discourse on democracy in a non-radical direction.\textsuperscript{303}

In addition to its support to human rights and anti-corruption coalitions, U.S. agencies have provided considerable support to private sector associations. USAID support to the national business association, the \textit{Confederación Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas} (CONFIEP) – which, as already discussed, supported the Fujimori government until the very end – dates back to its establishment in 1984 (Morón and Sanborn 2006).\textsuperscript{304} Through the OTI program, USAID provided a grant of $287,000 to the Lima Chamber of Commerce to implement a legal aid program (Management Systems International 2000). Both the NED and CIPE have also provided grants to business associations dating back to the mid-1980s, including pro-business think tanks such as the \textit{Instituto Libertad y Democracia} (ILD), founded by Peru’s most famous neoliberal intellectual, Hernando de Soto. In the early 2000s, CIPE began providing grants to other private sector organizations, including CONFIEP itself. From 2002 and 2007, a total of $5.5 million was channelled by CIPE to pro-business groups, a transfer of funds which Minella (2009) argues contributed considerably to the hegemony of the private sector in economic policy debates.

\textbf{Canada’s (slightly) more inclusive approach}

Canadian support to civil society organizations has also been secondary to its primary focus on strengthening public institutions. On the whole, Canadian support to civil

\textsuperscript{303} To be sure, this reading is not externally imposed. In recent years, the \textit{Acuerdo Nacional} has also made corruption and transparency a central issue of discussion (see the \textit{Acuerdo’s} web-site: \url{http://www.acuerdonacional.gob.pe/index.html})

\textsuperscript{304} In 1998, USAID launched a Poverty Reduction Alleviation (PRA) program which sought to increase the linkages between poverty-stricken rural areas and markets in the urban centres. As the implementing
society organizations has largely targeted the same or similar types of NGOs as U.S. democracy assistance, albeit with some important distinctions. First, Canada has not situated its support to civil society within a clearly-defined diagnostic of the barriers to democracy and the need to enhance political stability. This has meant that Canadian support to civil society organization has been less focused on specific areas of democracy, encompassing NGOs working on diverse thematic issues rather than coalitions advancing democratic reform. Some of these organizations advance a more expansive notion of citizenship than organizations funded by the United States. Second, Canadian civil society support has not been channelled to private sector associations. Finally, Canadian development assistance through the NGO, Development and Peace, has empowered grassroots organizations associated with the Catholic Church that have a larger social constituency than most NGOs and which have articulated a cohesive economic alternative to neoliberalism.

One of CIDA’s most important civil society partners has been the **Consorcio de Investigación Económica y Social** (CIES), an umbrella organization that brings together over 30 social and economic research institutions in Peru to enhance the level of national debate on key economic and social policy alternatives. Through the Ottawa-based International Development Research Centre (IDRC), CIDA provided the IDRC-CIES with a $4.9 million grant from 2004 – 2009. Although the knowledge generated by the CIES does not feed back into the Canadian policymaking process like the LAPOP does for the United States, the consortium’s publications help shape the discourse on

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305 NGOs which have received both Canadian and U.S. support include IPEDEHP, which received a grant of close to a $100,000 for 2005 – 2007, and MMR, which received a grant of $96,000 for 2005 – 2006 (CIDA 2009))
democracy in the national public sphere. By all indications, this discourse is politically moderate as the consortium adopts a mildly critical approach to public-policy issues emphasizing themes such as poverty reduction that fit within the agendas of the state and international donors.\textsuperscript{306} IDRC has also supported a research project carried out by a small group of researchers in each of the Andean countries entitled \textit{Gobernabilidad Democrática en el Región Andina}. The focus of the project is to analyze the role of social movements in deepening democratic processes and to advocate for greater democratic participation by civil society actors. The reports published by the project are politically diverse, with many criticizing neoliberalism and supporting radical governments in the region and others vociferously denouncing leaders such as Chávez.\textsuperscript{307}

Gender equality and environmental issues have also been a major focus of CIDA programming and an important dimension of its overall support to democratic development (notwithstanding the obvious contradiction with its mining companies).\textsuperscript{308} Accordingly, some of the NGOs that have received support in these areas will be looked at as examples of Canada’s overall support to civil society. In addition to its support to \textit{Movimiento Manuela Ramos}, CIDA (2009a) provided a grant for $96,000 to the \textit{Centro de la Mujer Peruana Flora Tristán}, an NGO founded in 1979 and named after the nineteenth-century Peruvian feminist socialist. \textit{Flora Tristán} emerged from the same social sector of middle-class urban feminist activists associated with the left as its sister organization, MMR. According to its Executive Director, Blanca Fernández Montenegro,

\textsuperscript{306} This claim is made based on a sample review of CIES’s main publication, \textit{Economía y Sociedad}, published on a trimester basis. The review is available on the CIES web-site at: http://www.cies.org.pe/publicaciones/economia-y-sociedad?page=1

\textsuperscript{307} Again, readers are invited to review the project web-site, which lists multiple publications in its virtual library: http://www.gobernabilidadandina.org/biblioteca.php
the organization has always considered issues of gender, race, and class as intrinsically related. Among its many important activities, Flora Tristán promotes the full-spectrum of women’s rights, with a strong focus on reproductive and sexual rights, as well as gay and lesbian rights.

Like MMR, Flora Tristán has sought to transform social values surrounding gender, adopting a conscious strategy of engaging with the state. It has sought to introduce new concepts into the public discourse, including the notion of ‘feminicide’ to describe the murder of women in conditions of gender-based discrimination and violence. It has also linked this concept to neoliberalism and the commodification of women within the logic of the market (Meléndez López and Sarmiento Rissi 2008), though it does not criticize Canada or the United States specifically for their support of this model. Like other progressive NGOs, moreover, Flora Tristán has not effectively linked its social concerns with an actual strategy of popular mobilization. While it played an instrumental role in the creation of a national network of rural women in the late 1980s, the Red Nacional de la Mujer Rural (Deere and León 2001), its activities through the network have largely been confined to capacity-building exercises to implement development projects rather than their mobilization to affect social change. On the whole, neither Flora Tristán nor the Red has moved beyond a focus on single issues to situate their critique within a larger program of social transformation. While they may discursively contribute to a rights-based notion of citizenship with radical implications in terms of

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308 In the area of human rights, CIDA has also provided support to the Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (IDEHPUCP). For 2005 – 2007, IDEHPUCP was given a grant of $97,351 (CIDA 2009).
310 In 2006, one of its researchers, Susel Paredes, openly campaigned as a lesbian congressional candidate for the Partido Socialista (Bazo 2006).
gender relations, its activities fit within the developmental logic of NGO projects.

Canada has also supported the Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participación (CEDEP). CEDEP, a Lima-based NGO which has received grants from numerous bilateral and international donors, including USAID, is staffed by middle-class professionals who adopt a participatory approach to implementing development projects across the country with local grassroots organizations on a variety of themes. Canada provided the NGO with a grant of nearly $100,000 for 2005 – 2007 for a project promoting citizen participation in decentralized governance and gender equality (CIDA 2009d). While CEDEP in many ways resembles the typical NGO, it has taken a radical position on public issues through its publication, Socialismo y Participación, which regularly criticizes neoliberal policies and transnational corporations. Socialismo y Participación also publishes sophisticated analyses of political developments, in some cases criticizing Ollanta Humala for his lack of programmatic coherency, and at other times defending him against the demonization of the mainstream press (see, for example, Reyes 2008). Ultimately, however, CEDEP’s activities at the grassroots level focus mainly on capacity-building exercises rather than social mobilization. It too fits within the project-management logic of NGO development.

In the area of the environment, CIDA has supported Asociación Civil Labor (ACL), an NGO with a fairly comprehensive view of the linkages between economic and social justice and sustainable development. For 2005 – 2007, the organization was given nearly $100,000 by CIDA (2009d) to implement a project intended to strengthen

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311 For example, according to Fernández, Paredes is now working with the Ministry of the Interior on gender issues.
312 The CEDEP web-site lists USAID as the source of funds for three projects in the late 1990s and early 2000s: http://www.cedepperu.org
relationships between local communities, local government, and mining enterprises. Based in Llo in southern Peru, a city located in an important mining and fishing region, ACL was established in 1981 as a labour collective to defend labour rights and promote leadership among workers in the mining industry. By the 1990s, ACL was registered as an NGO and had expanded its mission to promote and defend sustainable community development and the rights of communities affected by extractive industries. While it has certainly put pressure on mining enterprises to respect the rights of communities, ACL’s actions can prove ineffective when mining companies or the municipal governments with which it works ignore its position. Sanborn et al. (2007), for instance, have provided a brief overview of one case in which a company called Enersur established a thermoelectric plant in a zone of Ilo vigorously opposed by the organization. Enersur then failed to implement an environmental management plan agreed upon by the company, ACL, and the central and local governments until six years after the plant began operations. ACL’s decision to oppose the location of the plant led to a rift with the municipality, which was deepened with the election of a new mayor in 2002 who preferred to work directly with private companies rather than NGOs. Although ACL went on to open several new offices in other cities facing environmental problems, the case illustrates some of the difficulties of NGOs seeking to affect social change through strategies of compromise.

A more mainstream NGO that has received Canadian support for its environmental work is Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental (SPDA), which also obtained nearly $100,000 for 2005 – 2007 (CIDA 2009d). Located in the Amazonian city

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313 Its principal researcher, Héctor Béjar, is a fairly well-known leftist intellectual who has consistently criticized the García government.
of Iquitos, SPDA is led by environmental lawyers who have taken on a very practical orientation towards progressive social change, focusing their activities on lobbying government for enhanced environmental regulations and implementing local sustainable development projects. Although it has not been the recipient of a U.S. grant, SPDA joined another NGO, the Instituto de Derecho y Economía Ambiental (IDEA), in the implementation of an anti-corruption project launched in 2005 with USAID funds (Casals and Associates Inc. 2006). The project was designed specifically to track cases of corruption in the environmental sector, with SPDA providing technical assistance to develop a methodology to track illegal logging and illegal trade of protected endangered species. While SPDA has often criticized the operations of transnational corporations, particularly in terms of intellectual property rights, they have not linked their concerns to a larger critique of Peru’s political economy.

In terms of Canadian DAAs, Development and Peace and – to a lesser extent, Rights and Democracy – have also contributed to local civil society organizations. Rights and Democracy provided support to human rights organizations such as APRODEH in the 1990s and was a major supporter of Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In more recent years, most of its support has been channelled to the Centro de Culturas Indígenas del Perú (CHIRAPAQ), an NGO dedicated to promoting indigenous culture and rights established in 1986. Among other things, the organization helped launch a

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314 The contract for the project was signed by IDEA, not SPDA.
315 In one study on the U.S.-Peru bilateral trade agreement written under the auspices of SPDA (García 2008), for instance, the focus is exclusively on what lessons developing countries might draw from the negotiation process to ensure intellectual property rights benefit local communities. Although such exercises are important, the discussion is uncritically abstracted from the power relations and interests that structure the agreement as a whole.
316 As mentioned in chapter two, Rights and Democracy also published a report (Rousseau and Meloche 2002) calling upon the Canadian company, Manhattan Minerals, to recognize the legitimacy of the
permanent forum for Andean and Amazonian women, the *Taller Permanente de Mujeres Indígenas Andinas y Amazónicas del Perú*, to promote the leadership of indigenous women. Its activities focus primarily around organizing workshops, though at times it also makes direct political demands upon the state. In the 2006 elections, for instance, CHIRAPAQ (2006) and the network of indigenous women called upon García and Humala to integrate eight demands into their platforms. These demands focused primarily upon cultural recognition issues and the inclusion of indigenous women in decision-making processes.

Development and Peace’s *Peru Country Program* contributed approximately $1.71 million to Peruvian civil society organizations in its 2003 – 2006 phase (Development and Peace 2006b), and has allocated an additional $2.67 million for its five-year program from 2006 to 2011 (Development and Peace 2006c). In both phases of the project, the same 14 grassroots organizations have received support. As in Bolivia, the main objective of Development and Peace’s program in Peru has been to strengthen the capacity of social actors to promote change. The organizations supported by Development and Peace include several who are aligned with the most progressive factions of the Catholic Church which have traditionally championed human rights and social justice issues, including the *Centro Amazónico de Antropología y Aplicación Práctica* (CAAAP), the *Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social* (CEAS), and the *Bartolomé de Las Casas Institute*. While Development and Peace also supports some fairly mainstream NGOs, it provides support to grassroots organizations such as the federation organizing the comedores, the *Federación de las Mujeres Organizadas en Tambogrande* municipal referendum which confirmed the overwhelming popular opposition to the company’s plan to develop a gold mine in the small town.
Centrales de Cocinas Populares (FMOCCP), as well as civil society networks that promote an alternative economic vision, such as the Grupo Red de Economía Solidaria del Perú (GRESP). The latter organization brings together several NGOs and religious groups with the primary purpose of advocating the social economy as an alternative to the neoliberal model. GRESP is a signatory of the Declaración de La Habana (RIPESS 2007), for instance, which denounces neoliberalism and supports alternative trade arrangements, such as the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas.317

Development and Peace’s support to the CEAS exemplifies its more grassroots approach compare to other North American actors that tend to support issue-based NGOs with weak social constituencies. As we have already seen, CEAS played an important role in the human rights movement that began in the late 1970s and was one of the main forces behind the establishment of the CNDDHH. As the social institution of the Catholic Church, CEAS is associated with liberation theology, which has its roots in the philosophy of the Peruvian priest, Gustavo Gutiérrez. The commission is composed of ‘social pastors’ from each of the country’s diocese to support local bishops on social and economic issues. Unlike many of the NGOs that were associated with the human rights movement, CEAS has always been closely linked to trade unions, peasant groups and social movements. In the 2000s, it was a driving force behind the creation of institutions like Acuerdo Nacional and the Mesa para Luchar contra la Pobreza. According to Rosell Laberiano, the head of the CEAS’s participatory democracy program, it played an essential role in organizing a national chapter of the anti-debt movement, Jubilee 2000

317 Development and Peace has been criticized by conservative forces in the Catholic Church in Peru for funding GRESP and FMOCCP, as well as another NGO, the Coordinadora Nacional de Radio, for their pro-abortion stance (Swan 2009).
(Jubileo Perú), which has called for a complete rupture with the neoliberal model.  

Through its support to Jubileo and other grassroots networks, including FMOCCP, CEAS has sought to mobilize disempowered Peruvians at the local level to promote an alternative social order.

Although Development and Peace’s approach to democracy promotion in Peru sets it apart from other North American actors, it is important to note that most democracy assistance from Canada and the United States has targeted issue-based NGOs which have not engaged in a process of mobilization to challenge the prevailing social order. In this respect, even those NGOs which have advanced a more radical agenda—including some of those supported by CIDA—have not deviated too far from the boundaries imposed by donor priorities and mainstream developmental thinking. Yet the space for public discussion is not finite, and social movements that have called for deeper forms of democracy have begun to organize and make their voices heard. The attempt to consolidate neoliberal polyarchy—whether at the initiative of North American actors or the Peruvian state itself—has not succeeded. Peru, like the rest of Latin America, finds itself at a critical juncture which will determine the direction of democratic development in the years to come.

Which way forward?

Throughout this chapter, I have made reference to a number of indicators of social instability, such as the growing increase in social conflicts tracked by the Defensoría del

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319 As an institution of the Church, however, the CEAS also confronts the resistance of more conservative forces, particularly those bishops aligned with the Catholic organization, Opus Dei, which has a strong following in Peru. Led by Cardinal Juan Luis Cipriani, the rightist faction has been an opponent of many progressive initiatives, including the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and has opposed the work of the CEAS.
Pueblo, the near victory of an ‘anti-systemic’ candidate in the 2006 presidential elections, the total defeat of traditional parties at the regional level, and the recent uprising in the Amazonas. To this we might additional indicators, including the extensive use of revocatoria at the municipal levels. If this mechanism could be used to recall congressional representatives and the president, it is likely that APRA’s numbers would be greatly reduced and García himself would be out of a job (Diez Canseco and Fernández 2008). García also failed to significantly raise the standard of living of the poor majority during a period of economic bonanza, a period that has already come to an end with a drastic decline in global commodity prices. Peruvians have been particularly hard hit by inflation, which reached a ten year high in December 2008, peaking at 6.7 percent (Economist Intelligence Unit 2009).

According to Crabtree (2008), Peru has increasingly been hit by cycles of protest, each one worse than the last. In August 2008, some 4,000 protesters seized a natural gas substation in the Northeast Peruvian pipeline at Imaza and captured some 20 members of the National Police Force (Polk 2009). In October 2008, García responded to a new cycle of protest – generated in response to bribery revelations – by reshuffling his cabinet and naming a prominent leftist, Yehude Simón, as prime minister. By August 2009, Simón had already been replaced in another cabinet shuffle brought about by the government’s unpopular handling of the Amazonas incident. The recent cycles of protest are marked by a cross mobilization of three social actors: trade unions, peasant communities, and regional movements (Crabtree 2008). Unions in the mining sector, which were severely

320 The Economist Intelligence Unit (2009) estimates that GDP growth in 2009 will be limited to 1 percent, but will bounce back up to 3 percent in 2010.
321 Simón spent six years in prison during the Fujimori years for allegedly serving as a publicist for the MRTA, a charge he has consistently denied. Since 2002, Simón has been the regional president of
weakened in the Fujimori years, have become more assertive over wages and working conditions. White-collar workers, particularly health workers and teachers – the latter which are led by the prominent socialist union, the Colegio de Profesores – have also become more militant. In the highlands, peasant communities have clashed with mining companies in defence of their land, water sources and traditional way of life. Communities affected by mining founded a new organization, the Confederación Nacional de Comunidades del Perú Afectadas por la Minería (CONACAMI), which has engaged in vigorous resistance to the mining activities of multinational companies (Zibechi 2009b). The federation of coca growers, the Confederación Nacional de los Productores Agropecuarios de las Cuencas Cocaleras del Perú (CONPACCP), regularly clashes with the government over its ongoing commitment to the U.S.-backed eradication plan. Regional movements have also formed to demand more autonomy and a deepening of the decentralization process.

As Panfichi observes, however, thus far these tendencies have not been fully articulated into a national popular movement. As the PNP matures and expands its social base, it may be able to serve this function. The party leadership is well aware that the prospects for social change and its own success depend upon its ability to create more effective linkages with popular forces throughout the country. According to Enrique Juscamayta, this is the priority of the PNP, which has established strong relations with peasant movements such as the Rondas Campesinas, cocaleros, and the Colegio de Profesores, as well as other leftist political parties. The PNP has also sought to build

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Lambayeque in northern Peru, where his administration balanced a pro-investment orientation with strong social policies.

323 Interview, Lima: January 17, 2009.
international alliances with progressive movements and parties through the formation of a
Comité de Apoyo Internacional.

At the same time, the party has begun articulating a coherent ideological
alternative to neoliberal democracy. In addition to its platform, La Gran Transformación,
Juscamayta notes that the party philosophically espouses a ‘Sistema Radicalismo Etico’
as a new form of democracy, combining a commitment to increased popular participation
and a complete rejection of corruption. Like the MAS in Bolivia, the PNP has articulated
an innovative democratic discourse that emphasizes redistribution and indigenous rights;
unlike the MAS, however, it has not emerged from a powerful indigenous movement that
has reclaimed traditional indigenous practices from the perspective of decolonization. As
Rodríguez (2007) argues, although the PNP has invoked symbols such the whipala, its
political project is in continuity with previous mestizo-nationalist movements that have
situated themselves within modernity.

For the time being, the PNP remains a party dominated by a charismatic leader –
one which may be facing, moreover, increased competition from the right. As Sanborn
notes: “Peru has been growing pretty steadily and we haven’t been redistributing as much
as we should in a bonanza period and now we’re definitely into a period that is no longer
bonanza and the conflicts and the demands are acute… I would not be surprised if an
authoritarian alternative emerges; it may not be successful, but there is still a significant
tendency towards that in Peruvian society.” Signs of an authoritarian backlash may be
seen in the recent massacre of indigenous protestors in the Amazonas. And although
García himself is constitutionally barred from running for a second consecutive term, the
most recent poll shows that the leading contenders for the presidential elections of 2001
are on the right, including Fujimori’s daughter, Keiko Sofía Fujimori (Angus Reid 2009). Should she win the next elections, it is possible to envisage a return to a softer form of neoliberal authoritarianism with clientelistic social policies of the kind pioneered by her father.

**Concluding remarks**

The case of Peru reveals the limitations of the Robinsonian critique of democracy promotion as well as the differences that continue to exist between U.S. and Canadian actors. Although both the United States and Canada have linked their programs to the objective of containing social instability in Peru, neither has activated a systematic policy of elite mobilization, nor have they undermined popular social forces. This reflects the specific social conditions in which democracy promotion has operated. In contrast to Haiti, where there has been intense political polarization, elite political coalitions have dominated political society with little organized opposition. In such circumstances, democracy promotion and democracy assistance have not been as ideologically driven. These conditions are in turn rooted in the historical background discussed in chapter three, particularly the configuration of power at the beginning of the new millennium which was characterized by the absence of a national popular movement with a clear democratic alternative and the ability of the state to frame its own strategy – however limited – of making neoliberalism more inclusive. Democracy assistance programs have sought to stabilize elite patterns of governance by improving the functioning of democratic institutions, rebuilding the political party system and supporting issue-based

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324 Interview, Lima: January 14, 2009.
civil society organizations largely divorced from any popular social base. In some cases, Canada and the United States have even supported NGOs demanding greater reform than the state is willing to concede, especially in the area of human rights.

Peru also demonstrates that many democracy assistance programs can accomplish exactly what their proponents claim to be doing – that is, contributing to the development and consolidation of essential democratic institutions. Canadian and U.S. support to the Defensoria del Pueblo and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission are cases in point – although these efforts have in part been undermined by the foreign policy objectives of both states. That being said, U.S. programs are much more strategically formulated in terms of the state’s political objectives than Canadian programs, a factor which means that they can easily be manipulated to take on a more interventionist approach depending upon the shifting balance of power. Such a shift has at least partially occurred with the rise of the ‘anti-systemic’ PNP and the near victory of Humala in the 2006 presidential elections, which threatened to destabilize the political scene. In these circumstances, the fact that USAID’s explicit concern with countering the PNP’s influence did not lead to a switch towards counter-insurgency style tactics of democracy promotion requires some explanation. While it is possible that the threat itself was not great enough for USAID to move towards a more interventionist approach given the lack of an organized grassroots base of the party, the shifting regional balance of power likely had a strong affect. For, as was discussed in chapter two, the crisis of legitimacy of U.S. democracy promotion was particularly acute in South America, where leaders such as Morales and Chávez publicly denounced U.S. programs. As we shall see in the following chapter, such public

325 With the support of 21.5 percent of respondents, Keiko Sofia Fujimori leads the race. Behind her is Lima’s popular centre-right mayor, Luis Castañeda Lossio, with the support of 20.4 percent of respondents.
denunciations seem to have put an end to a strategy of elite mobilization adopted by USAID in Bolivia around the same time. USAID may have therefore opted for a more cautious approach of bringing the PNP into the system rather than organizing the traditional political parties against it. In terms of the Canadian contribution, Canada has not developed an imperialistic approach to its relations with Peru that has conditioned its democracy assistance to the same extent as the United States. In these circumstances, the institutional legacies of its DAAs have conditioned the form of democracy promotion, with CIDA's mainstream approach to democratic development existing alongside the grassroots approach taken by Development and Peace.

A cultural political economy thus helps us conceptualize the configuration of international and national variables which condition the form of democracy promotion adopted by Canadian and U.S. DAAs. It also enables us to assess the power dynamics that continue to underpin democracy assistance programs, even when signs of direct interventionism are much less apparent. Such a perspective retains the central focus on the political intent of democracy programs and the ways in which they contribute to the possibility of stabilizing unequal social orders by reinforcing the hegemony of the political elite and the dominant class. The concept of a strategy of polyarchy promotion, which draws upon Foucauldian concepts of discourse and governmentality within a larger Gramscian approach, identifies a wider arsenal of tactics and practices that centre on more subtle forms of social control than the traditional Marxist critique of democracy promotion. In political society, these have included tactics to manage state-public relations, support limited forms of inclusion, popularize party platforms, and rationalize mechanisms of governance. In civil society, they have included the attempt to measure

Humala trails at a distant fourth place at 9.8 percent, behind former President Toledo.
and manage popular perceptions, discursively frame the democratic discourse in a way that does not fundamentally challenge international and national power relations, and contribute to the creation of liberal subjects through workshops and capacity-building exercises. Like development practices more broadly, this can lead to a de-politicization of political issues and serve as a palliative against radical social change as liberal discourses come to dominate the discussion in the public sphere.

If anti-systemic forces manage to gain ground in the next few years, the possibility that U.S. democracy assistance programs will take on a more aggressive approach cannot be dismissed. Certainly, USAID's unofficial position on the PNP is not encouraging. A strategy of polyarchy promotion may well give way to one of elite mobilization like that which was examined in Haiti, with Canada legitimizing such an approach through an instrumentalization of its own programs. At the same time, however, the shifting regional balance of power seems to have made this possibility less politically feasible. We now turn to the case of Bolivia, where a temporary manipulation of U.S. democracy assistance programs to undermine the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) was eventually abandoned as a result of this very shift.
Chapter six
End game in Bolivia

Over the past decade, Bolivia has been the scene of a political drama not unbefitting of its revolutionary past. The failure of inclusive neoliberalism to create a new hegemonic order provided the backdrop against which a militant indigenous popular movement led by the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) came to power in 2006 within the context of the 'pink tide' that has swept across the Americas. Canadian and U.S. democracy promotion in Bolivia has thus operated in a different political context than in Haiti and Peru. In Haiti, where the history of imperialism is more pronounced than any other country examined in this study, democracy assistance empowered a fragmented elite unable to contest the popular movement through legitimate means; in Peru, the dominance of the political elite enabled a less ideologically-driven approach; in Bolivia, democracy assistance has confronted extreme polarization in the context of a larger regional shift away from the neoliberal model. Although Bolivia adopted a new constitution that establishes the foundations for a more democratic order, it remains divided between two competing regional hegemonic blocs – an indigenous popular bloc in the west led by the MAS versus a predominately white oligarchy with middle class support led by the regional prefects in the east. Each side has appealed to the consent of the people through recall and referendum to advance competing visions of Bolivian society. The struggle to claim the mantle of democratic legitimacy paradoxically speaks to both the vibrancy of Bolivian democracy and its fragility.

The Bolivian government has also confronted the traditional imperial politics of the United States. While the Bolivian government has denounced U.S. democracy assistance programs as one facet of its overall interventionist foreign policy, Canada has
yet to suffer the same critique. In this chapter, I will argue that although both Canada and the United States sought to stabilize the neoliberal state in Bolivia through PPTs similar to those analyzed in Peru, Canada did not follow the U.S. example in transitioning to a partial strategy of elite mobilization to counter the rise of the MAS. For Canada, its growing commercial interests in the country have not yet led to a more interventionist foreign policy; for the United States, the shifting power dynamics in Bolivia and the region as a whole curtailed the degree to which an interventionist foreign policy was politically feasible. If the Peruvian case illustrates the hesitance of the United States to adopt an interventionist approach in the new conjuncture, the Bolivian case demonstrates how the attempt to use more sophisticated interventionist policies was thwarted by a new power bloc. In contrast to Haiti, moreover, democratic forces in Bolivia have not confronted a dominant class whose political rule has been underwritten by the interventionism of its external allies. U.S. imperialism has been an important force, but, as was argued in chapter three, not nearly as powerful as it has been in Haiti. This chapter thus reaffirms the importance of considering both national and international variables which condition the form of democracy promotion, as well as the evolution of strategies in response to the shifting configuration of power.

As in the previous chapters, I begin with an overview of the shifting balance of power and the evolution of the forms of democracy promotion in Bolivia from 2000 to 2008. I then explore the specific strategies and tactics of democracy promotion from an historical standpoint based on the theoretical concepts and typology used in the previous chapters. I argue that while both Canada and the United States initially sought to reinforce the legitimacy of state institutions, the U.S. also sought to reshape the public discourse on democracy and citizenship through technologies of power that reinforced the
possibility of creating an elite-led hegemonic order. The turning point to a partial strategy of elite mobilization by the United States occurred in 2005, when USAID used a decentralization program to empower regional prefects as a counter-hegemonic bloc. This strategy differed considerably from the interventionist approach in Haiti, the focal point of which was the creation of elite-led political party and civil society coalitions. I also argue, however, that critical analyses of U.S. democracy promotion in Bolivia (Allard and Golinger 2009; Beeton 2009; Bigwood 2008) overstate the extent to which an interventionist approach was adopted. I then explore Canadian and U.S. programs in civil society, where U.S. QUANGOs have supplemented the construction of the ‘watch-dog’ citizen with discourses that have appealed to democratic compromise and pluralism. The local agents which have adopted this discourse have been urban-based elite NGOs largely opposed to the MAS and its project of constitutional change. The section ends with an overview of how Canada’s Rights and Democracy and Development and Peace have supported popular social forces in the context of the constitutional process. As the only country explored in this study where a viable democratic alternative to neoliberal polyarchy is emerging, the final section will explore some of the challenges that Bolivia has encountered in its attempt at deepening democracy.

I. The new political context
Competing hegemonic projects

If the configuration of power relations at the end of the millennium in Haiti and Peru constituted unpropitious terrain for a deeper democratization of the social order, in Bolivia the rise of a national popular movement has opened up new possibilities for the establishment of a democratic hegemony. Although the Bolivian political landscape remains a polarized space, the victory of the MAS in the 2005 general and presidential
elections constituted a critical juncture defined by a radical shift in power relations, which has been further consolidated by the most recent elections of December 2009. A brief narrative of these events is required as the national dimensions of the political context in which democracy assistance programs have been deployed.

As we saw in chapter three, the Cochabamba Water Wars in the early months of 2000 marked the beginning of a new cycle of revolt that shook the foundations of Bolivia’s democracia pactada. The new mobilization occurred in the wake of the electoral victories of the MAS and other indigenous parties at the local level in the second half of the 1990s. Thereafter, indigenous groups, landless peasants, workers, cocaleros, women, teachers, and other popular sectors increasingly coordinated their activities and began forming a counter-hegemonic national popular. The popular revolt culminated in the Gas Wars of October 2003, when citizens from El Alto blocked the main highway to La Paz after the government announced plans to export gas to Mexico and the United States through a Chilean port. After violent confrontations between protestors and security forces which left at least 59 people dead (Assies 2004), President ‘Goni’ gave his resignation to Congress and was succeeded by his vice president, Carlos Mesa Gisbert. Mesa sought to deal with the protests through more consensual means, acquiescing to popular demands to establish a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution. Congress stalled the constitutional project, however, and Mesa eventually resigned over his inability to control the state’s increasingly repressive turn. Mesa had also faced the resistance of the IFIs and the United States, whose ambassador, David Greenlee, informed him that any reversion of the neoliberal economic plan and coca eradication could threaten U.S. support (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 179). In the end, the confrontation between civil society and the state only ended with the 2005 presidential and general
elections, which brought Evo Morales to power and gave the MAS a congressional majority.

The political crisis that afflicted Bolivia symbolized the failure of both the ‘inclusive’ neoliberal development model and the traditional party system. The popular movement led by the MAS has thus called for a complete rupture with neoliberalism and the legacy of internal colonialism. MAS leaders such as Chief of Party, Cesare Navarro, claim that they are synthesizing two distinct political traditions – liberal and socialist communal democracy. The process of decolonization entails a recognition of the plurality and diversity of Bolivian society in all of its economic, social, cultural, political, linguistic and territorial dimensions (Rojas 2009, 2010; Patzi 2004; Prada 2008).

Navarro, himself predominately of European descent, emphasized in an interview that: “this is a process of decolonization that does not signify a political and territorial rupture with the Bolivian state, but rather, as the President says, the complementarity – or the co-existence – of the western liberal tradition and its connection to the urban experience, including my own, and the recognition of the traditions of the native indigenous peasantry.”

The nature of the MAS project will be examined in depth in the concluding section. Suffice it to say that it has encountered the resistance of a right-wing regional opposition exemplified by the prefects of the media luna and the comités cívicos. As Luis Núñez Ribera, the new president of the Comité pro Santa Cruz, stated in an interview: “in this region, we don’t want anything to do with the government system practiced by the socialist movement. They want a centralist government, a totalitarian government, a

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326 Interview, La Paz: February 17, 2009 (my translation).
hegemonic government that is socialist and communist.” Ruben Costas, the governor of Santa Cruz, is more conciliatory toward the west, arguing that the MAS has taken advantage of the people with the help of foreign radicals. In an interview, he stated “it is not only a project of the MAS, but one that logically comes from a group of leaders on the continent like Chávez.” Hyperbole aside, such comments reflect the polarization of the political discourse in Bolivia, with white oligarchs and middle class mestizos in the media luna holding the balance of power against indigenous peoples. The urban middle class of La Paz has also criticized the government based on legitimate concerns surrounding its adherence to the rule of law (as we shall see).

The main mechanism through which the MAS has sought to consolidate its social vision is the new constitution that was approved by popular referendum in January 2009. Since the theme of constitutional change is perhaps the most important topic to be addressed by democracy assistance agencies and local civil society organizations over the past five years, a few comments on how the process played out are in order. A constituent assembly first convened in August 2006 in Sucre based on the direct election of representatives associated with the political parties. From the outset, the MAS was criticized by many popular movements for entering into negotiations with the opposition in the Senate – where it did not hold a majority. This precluded the participation of civil society and provided a new institutional space for the remobilization of the opposition (Webber 2008). Despite this concession, the assembly quickly polarized along party lines. To bypass protests against the MAS’s constitutional project on the streets of Sucre, the government moved the assembly to Oruro, which led to a boycott on the part of the

327 Interview, Santa Cruz: March 3, 2009 (my translation).
328 Interview, Santa Cruz: March 3, 2009 (my translation).
representatives of the opposition parties. In the end, the new constitution was passed by the assembly in December 2007 with only 165 of its 255 members present.

The prefects of Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz and Tarija responded in kind by organizing referenda on regional autonomy, all of which passed in May and June 2008. When the regional governments moved to implement the autonomy statutes, the central government organized a recall referendum on the mandates of eight of the nine regional prefects as well the president and vice-president. Morales and Linera won the recall with 67 percent while two of the prefects, both aligned with the opposition, failed to garner enough support to prevent new elections. The conflict between the central government and the departments came to a head in August – September 2008 as MAS supporters clashed with regional authorities and members of the comités cívicos throughout the media luna. In Pando, 20 peasants were killed in a massacre organized by death squads in support of autonomy (Hylton 2008). Morales then declared a state of emergency in the department, ordering the arrest of the regional prefect, Leopoldo Fernández. After tense negotiations, Morales finally reached agreement with the prefects to hold a referendum on the constitution in January 2009, at which point the new magna carta obtained a 61.7 percent majority.

**Shifting North American approaches**

As the neoliberal state came under attack at the beginning of the period in question, both Canada and the United States implemented democracy assistance programs that sought to consolidate polyarchy. With the radical shift in the relation of forces that began to occur, however, only the United States began to use its programs to mobilize the elite. This
section will briefly summarize the evolution of the forms of democracy promotion and the main DAAs within the context of bilateral relations and the position of Canada and the United States in the regional order. Against this analytical framework, I will then explore the evolution of the forms of democracy promotion and specific tactics from an historical standpoint that draws upon the Robinsonian critique while pointing out its limitations from the perspective of a cultural political economy.

Both the United States and Canada have growing economic ties with Bolivia, particularly in the mining and hydrocarbons sector. Bilateral trade relations with the United States have increased over the years, though they are still relatively small: in 2000, the United States exported $253 million to Peru and imported $184.9 million in return; by 2008, these figures had increased to $389.3 million and $511 million respectively (U.S. Census Bureau 2010b). The United States is the largest source of FDI in Bolivia, however, accounting for approximately one-third of net FDI inflows of $1.7 billion between 2001 and 2006. Over the last six years, U.S. companies have invested an estimated $750 million in the mining sector, USD $420 million in the hydrocarbons sector, $290 million in energy production and distribution, and $230 million in telecommunications (U.S. Department of State 2008c). Canada’s trade relations with Bolivia are modest: in 2007, for instance, exports to Bolivia totalled $15.2 million while imports equalled $106.4 million. At the same time, Canadian direct investment in Bolivia in 2006 amounted to $87 million (Government of Canada 2008) and Canadian companies held the dominant share of the larger-company mineral exploration market in 2007 (Natural Resources Canada 2009).

Eaton (2007) argues that the strategy of advocating for regional autonomy was a response to the fact that indigenous actors had permeated the other two levels of governing authority – the municipal and national.
As a strong ally of the previous neoliberal administrations, the United States has vociferously opposed the MAS government. This is of course not surprising given the MAS’s political base in the cocalero and indigenous social movements, which have consistently opposed U.S. coca eradication policies and the rights of transnational corporations. The conflict between the two governments came to a head in July 2008, when Morales backed demands by cocaleros to expel USAID from the Chapare region. As tensions between the media luna and the central government reached their apex in September 2008, U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg was asked to leave the country for allegedly supporting the opposition. In November, Morales announced the suspension of the operations of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

In contrast, diplomatic relations between Canada and Bolivia are generally cordial. While the Harper government has refrained from openly criticizing its Bolivian counterpart, Canadian officials, such as the Ambassador to the United Nations, Alan Rock, have been less discreet. In a lecture on reforming the United Nations, for example, Ambassador Rock (2006) warned that some countries have become impatient with the economic mandates of the international financial institution (IFIs) and impatient for democratic dividends. Rock noted that: “some of them have elected populist, socialist governments recently, as with Bolivia with Evo Morales, as in Venezuela with Hugo Chavez, and perhaps Peru, we’ll see what the election results produce. And together with Cuba, those socialist, populist governments can cause quite a bit of mischief.” Unlike the United States, however, Canada has not allowed its dislike of the socialist politics of the Bolivian government to tarnish its diplomatic relations. Following the presidential victory of Morales, Bolivia continued to be one of twenty priority countries for Canada’s bilateral aid efforts, though it did not figure amongst the countries in the region with
which Ottawa prioritized bilateral relations under its *Americas Strategy*. Such differences reflect the U.S. unique historical role in enforcing regional order, explored in chapter three. As we saw in Peru, Canada has yet to mobilize its status as a middlepower to pursue a more interventionist approach in the Andean region.

This means that, despite its mining interests, Canada has yet to subordinate its democracy programs with Bolivia to strategic-ideological considerations, once more indicating that democracy promotion cannot be seen as a product of strictly economic considerations (though, as we shall see, it has certainly advanced its mining interests through CIDA programming). According to the Counsellor and Consul Head of Aid, Alberto Palacios-Hardy, Canadian interest in Bolivia has traditionally been minimal.\(^{330}\) Democracy promotion has been carried out without significant interference from Ottawa, though Palacios-Hardy warns that the *Americas Strategy* of the government of Stephen Harper may lead to a more ideological approach, which he strongly cautions against.

Caricaturizing the mentality of the government, he states:

> I'm not going to put tax payer's money in a country that is proclaiming, you know, the opposite ideas of what I think should be democracy, etc., etc., such as Bolivia, such as Ecuador, such as Venezuela, such as Nicaragua...it didn't work with the Americans...who for practically 100 years the Americans have basically decided what kind of governance you are going to have in this part of the world; that they will not interfere with our leadership in the world; that our leadership is this and these are the recipes; Canada cannot repeat that – because it didn't work, it didn't work at all.

Although one may disagree with Palacios-Hardy that increased engagement is necessarily a good thing, his comments are relevant insofar as they indicate that, thus far, Canada has been more inclined to pursue a policy of relative disinterest rather than of strategic instrumentalization. Indeed, despite his concerns, the Conservative government seems to

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\(^{330}\) For instance, until 2000 there was only one CIDA representative in La Paz – the Head of Aid, who was also charged with consular affairs. Canadian staff increased to two in 2002 and a third member was added in 2006 (CIDA 2007).
be acting cautiously so as not to jeopardize its growing economic interests in Bolivia.

After visiting both Venezuela and Bolivia, for instance, the Minister of State for the
Americas, Peter Kent, spoke out against the government of Chávez while noting that
relations with Bolivia remained strong (Berthiaume 2010).

USAID and CIDA have coordinated the most important democracy assistance
programs in Bolivia and have provided funding to a range of QUANGOs, development
contractors and NGOs – as has been the case in Haiti and Peru. The strategic objectives
of Canada and the United States and the behaviour of their respective DAAs in Bolivia,
however, exhibit far fewer similarities than in the other two countries. Table 17
summarizes the shifting forms of democracy promotion by Canada and the United States.
Table 18 summarizes the main DAAs and their programs, the local partners, and the
specific strategies associated with the different forms of democracy promotion that may
be discerned during the period under investigation. As in Peru, both Canada and the
United States have mainly adopted a strategy of polyarchy promotion, with the U.S. also
contributing to the mobilization of elites and Canadian DAAs such as Development and
Peace and Rights and Democracy advancing a grassroots approach.

**Table 17: The shifting form of democracy promotion in Bolivia**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Polyarchy promotion</td>
<td>Polyarchy promotion / elite mobilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Polyarchy promotion / grassroots</td>
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During the cycle of revolt from 2001 to 2005, U.S. DAAs began shifting from the
promotion of polyarchy to the mobilization of elites, reflecting the U.S. government’s
extreme antipathy towards the MAS. USAID situated its Democracy and Governance
program in Bolivia from 1998 to 2003 within the strategic objective of obtaining ‘increased citizen support for the Bolivian democratic system.’ Activities focused on supporting Congress, justice reform and decentralization with the overarching objective of enhancing political stability. During this period of programming, USAID was particularly concerned by the rise of the MAS at the expense of Bolivia’s traditional political parties. Its program report lamented the 2002 electoral results, noting that they showed “a clear disillusionment with traditional political parties, and highlight an urgent need to restore confidence in parties as legitimate vehicles for democratic participation” (USAID/Bolivia 2003: 7).
Table 18: Actors, programs, strategies and tactics in Bolivia
(Amounts in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States: Total spent by USAID on democracy assistance (2001-09): $101.078</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID OTI, Transition Program (2004-07): $13.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>NED, (2001-present) (2009)*: $0.834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRI, Improving Citizen Perceptions of Political Parties (2003-05): $0.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUNY-CID, Support for Electoral Process in Bolivia (2005-08) (budget not available)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDI, Bolivia Political Party Development (2003-05) (budget not available)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDI, Constructive Citizen Dialogue (2005-06): $0.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDI-IRI-IDEA, Apoyo a Procesos democráticos (2007-08): $0.7</td>
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Local partners: the state, political parties (including the MAS), diverse NGOs, including many opposed to the MAS, strong focus on NGOs advancing limited reform, especially around issues of state accountability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canada: Total spent by CIDA (2001-09): $81.696</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIDA, Development Programming Framework (2003-07): $17.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP, Bolivia Country Program I (2003-06): $0.923</td>
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<tr>
<td>RD, Strengthening the Participation and Capacity of Indigenous Organizations (2006-present) (budget not available)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCM – International, Municipal Partnership Program (2002-present) (budget not available)</td>
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Local partners: the state, NGOs, grassroots movements

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Political context</th>
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<tr>
<td>Collapse of the neoliberal state; counter-hegemonic movement in power but regional opposition strong</td>
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<tr>
<th>Canada and U.S. PPTs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen and build state institutions to increase legitimacy; promote human rights mechanisms; restrict popular control over key resources through governance reform programs; support municipal governance</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additional U.S. PPTs</th>
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<tr>
<td>Direct process of state reform; manage public relations campaign on behalf of the state; popularize party platforms and promote inclusion; promote system-wide reform of political system; support inclusive neoliberal governance; discursively frame democratic discourse in public sphere, measure and manage popular perceptions; construct liberal subjects, develop new national identities through workshops and campaigns</td>
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<tr>
<th>U.S. partial switch to EMTs</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilize and increase popularity of regional prefects; support NGOs opposed to MAS</td>
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<tr>
<th>Shared objectives of U.S. and Canada</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stabilize political situation</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additional U.S. objectives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevent rise of anti-systemic forces</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Canada grassroots DP</th>
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<tr>
<td>Support grassroots organizations and progressive NGOs</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
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<tr>
<td>Reinforce counter-hegemony</td>
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*The NED only provides complete information on its grants for the most recent fiscal year

As the system increasingly came under attack, USAID called upon the OTI to implement a quick-fix program to “reduce tensions in areas prone to social conflict.”

From 2004 to 2007, the OTI program focused in particular upon strengthening the departmental prefects. The OTI’s efforts were complemented by the activities of the IRI
and NDI, which sought to rebuild the legitimacy of the political system. The NED began providing substantial grants to local organizations, including many which – although not specifically aligned with the opposition – were ideologically opposed to the MAS. U.S. democracy assistance programs during this period have elicited much critical analysis. While the case against such programs will be examined in detail shortly, it is important to note that the MAS itself has denounced U.S. democracy assistance programs on several occasions (Velásquez Espejo 2007). In the context of the shifting regional balance of power, such criticism has limited the extent to which the United States has actually pursued an interventionist approach.

Canada’s democracy programs were situated within its *Development Programming Framework*, which ran from 2003 to 2007. The framework praised Bolivia’s neoliberal reforms while recognizing that structural adjustment had had certain adverse affects, situating its governance reforms within the objective of countering the lack of state legitimacy. Expressing concerns over the fragmentation of the traditional party system, the framework notes that the near victory of Morales in the 2002 presidential elections and the rise of anti-systemic parties such as the MAS in the Congress represent “a very disconcerting trend to many Bolivians.” Consequently, the program allocated $17 million of a total envelope of $50 million to democratic governance, focusing primarily on supporting state institutions. As in Peru, Canada has also used its development programs to promote regulatory changes in the mining sector. Nonetheless, CIDA continued to provide funding to state institutions in the wake of the

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331 It should be noted that the Canadian QUANGO, FOCAL, has been critical of the MAS, though it has not carried out activities directly in Bolivia. The organization did, however, publish policy papers criticizing the Morales government, denouncing it as neo-populist, divisive and confrontational (Torres 2006), and arguing that anti-system challengers in Bolivia and Venezuela represent a serious threat to pluralism and representative democracy (Legler 2006).
MAS’s victory. It also continued to fund progressive civil society organizations and social movements in Bolivia through Rights and Democracy and Development and Peace, as well as municipal governance through a Canadian NGO we have not looked at thus far, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) – International. With this background in mind, I now turn to an historical analysis of the specific democracy promotion strategies and tactics of North American DAAs, beginning with Canada’s attempt to save the neoliberal state.

II. Inclusive neoliberalism under attack
Canada concedes

Canada’s approach to supporting democratic development in the realm of political society has been similar to its approach in Peru, focusing, in particular, upon supporting democratic institutions. This section will summarize such initiatives, which are much more modest in scope than their U.S. counterparts. The contribution of Canadian actors to supporting civil society organizations will be discussed in the final section by way of contrast with the approach of the United States.

The $17 million allocated to democratic governance through CIDA’s Development Programming Framework included $5 million to the Defensoría del Pueblo alone – making it by far the largest single recipient of Canadian democracy assistance.\footnote{Although the programming framework covered the period from 2003 to 2007, CIDA’s contribution to the Defensoría actually ran from 2002 to 2007.} The Defensoría is one of Bolivia’s most respected democratic institutions. Its mandate is twofold: defend the rights of Bolivians from abuses by state authorities and defend and promote human rights in the country more broadly.\footnote{Although the programming framework covered the period from 2003 to 2007, CIDA’s contribution to the Defensoría actually ran from 2002 to 2007.} Canada was the first donor to support the institution (CIDA 2009b). As in Peru, the Office of the Ombudsman has
played an important role in advocating for the rights of marginalized and exploited sectors of the population. Although it may be viewed critically as a mechanism intended to manage and defuse social conflict,\textsuperscript{334} this role does not preclude a more radical advocacy role. During the gas wars in the fall of 2003, the \textit{Defensoría} strongly denounced the actions of the state when a confrontation between demonstrators in the town of Warisata and security forces left seven dead – an event that triggered the national mobilizations that led to Goni’s resignation. Although the military maintained that they had been ambushed, an investigation by the \textit{Defensoría} and other human rights organizations found that there was no evidence of an ambush. This position contrasted with pro-government perspective of United States, which maintained that the actions of security forces in Warisata were justified.\textsuperscript{335} It should also be noted that former human rights ombudsman, Ana María Romero de Campero, joined in a hunger strike with intellectuals, human rights advocates and NGO workers that played a role in forcing Goni to resign (Assies 2004).

As the political crisis reached its apex and elections were scheduled for December 2005, Canada provided assistance to the national electoral commission, the \textit{Corte Nacional Electoral} (CNE), to organize elections (CIDA 2007b). Canada also committed approximately $50,000 to the OAS-led observation mission for the presidential, legislative, and provincial governor elections.\textsuperscript{336} The mission emphasized the overall integrity of the electoral process, concluding that “we believe, without the shadow of a

\textsuperscript{333} Interview with Rielma Mencias, \textit{Defensora del Pueblo, Defensoría del Pueblo} (La Paz: February 10, 2009).

\textsuperscript{334} For instance, the ombudsman intervened during the water wars to help negotiate a solution between the state and the \textit{Coordinadora}.

\textsuperscript{335} This position was stated by Ambassador David Greenlee during a ceremony in which the United States gave Bolivia $63 million in aid just as the government was on the verge of falling (Dangl 2007).
doubt, that the elections held in Bolivia on December 8, 2005 were peaceful, free, fair, and massively participatory (OAS 2006: 44).” The OAS report emphasized the fact that the elections witnessed the highest voter turnout (84.5 percent) since the transition to democracy in 1982 as well as the first absolute majority.

Thus, if Canada’s intent was to help counter-balance anti-systemic forces, its support to the Defensoría and the electoral process was not particularly well targeted. While this argument may be made on behalf of U.S. democracy assistance since it, too, supported both the Defensoría and the elections, U.S. democracy promotion has been much more multifaceted than Canada’s. Canadian democracy assistance in the realm of political society has focused primarily on these areas of intervention. The fact that Canada did not switch to a more targetted strategy to contain anti-systemic forces by reducing its support to the state and focusing its assistance on elite civil society organizations demonstrates that the Canadian state was less inclined to take on an interventionist approach to advance its ideological objectives.

Nonetheless, Canadian development programs have been manipulated to stabilize the political situation in the interests of Canadian mining companies. Although CIDA does not classify its programs in the hydrocarbon and mining sectors under the category of governance in Bolivia as it does in Peru, it is worth briefly commenting on them since they deal directly with strengthening state institutions. According to the 1996 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, Canada has been influencing hydrocarbon policy in Bolivia since 1989, when CIDA, Petro-Canada and the Bolivian government began working together to modernize the public oil and gas industry through the Bolivia Oil and

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336 Of a total amount of $600,000 allocated to the OAS from 2005 to 2007, 8 percent went to the observation mission in Bolivia.
Gas Project. The report notes that 22 Canadian firms received spin-off benefits from the project but does not question whether Canadian economic interests coincide with an inclusive development policy for all Bolivians (see Office of the Auditor General of Canada 1996 chapter 29, exhibit 29.11). In fact, the regulatory framework which CIDA contributed to has been even more of a focal point for popular mobilization than it has been in Peru. The gas wars that erupted in 2003 marked the culmination of popular discontent against this model.

In the same year, CIDA launched a $13.25 million *Hydrocarbon Regulation* project, whose main objective was to improve the regulatory framework to “ensure sustainable resource development while maximizing benefits to Bolivia” (CIDA 2009m). Although the program has largely focused on providing technical assistance to the *Ministerio de Hidrocarburos* and the state oil company, *Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos* (YPFB), the timing of the program indicates CIDA’s attempt to intervene on behalf of the state in opposition to the popular movements that were vigorously rejecting the way in which Bolivia’s natural resources were being managed. Specific areas of assistance included strengthening a hydrocarbon tax unit in the Ministry of Finance and implementing a Petroleum Information Centre to attract private investment. While CIDA’s lack of transparency renders it difficult to evaluate the affects of the program, it is clear that the implementing agency, IBM Business Consulting, favours a liberal

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337 This report was uncovered by Dawn Paley (2006) in a short exposé that appeared in *The Dominion*. Paley also cites Kohl and Farthing’s *Impasse in Bolivia*, which notes that a no-longer available CIDA report from 2004 refers to an 800 percent return to Canadian businesses in the hydrocarbon sector. 338 Very little substantive information is actually on the project website at: [http://www.boliviakanadahydrocarbon.com/partners.htm](http://www.boliviakanadahydrocarbon.com/partners.htm). The project description on the agency’s site is also vague and largely uninformative. An evaluation conducted by CIDA (CIDA 2007) on its programming in Bolivia refers to CIDA’s activities in the hydrocarbon sector as constituting the agencies ‘flagship achievement’ but offers little qualitative analysis of the actual program.
approach to resource management.  

In the wake of Morales’ victory, CIDA launched an $18 million Strategic Governance Mechanism which will run until 2012. The overall approach of the program is designed to strengthen the technical capacity of state institutions, including the National Institute of Statistics, the Auditor General’s Office, and the CNE. As in the previous phase of programming, the Defensoría continues to be the largest recipient of assistance. CIDA’s Gender Equality Basket Fund channels additional assistance to a government – multi-donor basket fund which provides institutional support to the Vice-Ministry of Gender and Generational Affairs. The Vice-Ministry promotes the inclusion of gender equality concerns in policies and governmental plans and programs. From 2005 to 2008, CIDA contributed $1.079 million to the multi-donor basket fund (CIDA 2007a). According to one specialist on gender issues in Bolivia, the Vice-Ministry has established a track record of acting independently and advocating strongly on behalf of Bolivian women. CIDA also contributed $500,000 to the OAS observation mission for the recall referendums in August 2008 (CIDA 2009), which upheld the overall integrity of the process (OAS 2009).

A final area of Canadian democracy promotion pertaining to political institutions consists of the assistance channelled to Bolivia’s two main municipal peak associations: the Federación de Asociaciones Municipales (FAM) and the Asociación de Concejalas de

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339 The project web site, for instance, notes that “IBM offers a range of services in the areas of exploration and production, refining and marketing; and provides advice on all aspects of industry restructuring, including regulation, liberalisation, private sector involvement and privatisation options.”

340 The CNE has been accused of being partial to the government by the opposition, though a U.S. State Department report on human rights (U.S. Department of State 2008) noted that it issued a number of decisions in 2008 that signalled its independence.

341 Through this mechanism, two Canadian experts were deployed through the NGO, Deployment for Democratic Development, to Bolivia in the fall of 2008 to conduct an evaluation of and provide recommendations for the national electoral registry.
Bolivia (ACOBOL). FAM was formed in 1999 as the national association representing all municipal governments; the following year, ACOBOL was created within FAM as an institutional mechanism representing women councillors and mayors. Through CIDA funds, Rights and Democracy and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) – International have implemented capacity building initiatives with these organizations both separately and in collaboration. Since 2002, FCM provides institutional-strengthening support to its counterpart, FAM, including expertise in policy development to enable it to act as a more effective interlocutor with the central government. Another important theme over the years has been strategic planning for local economic development. The program also couples Canadian municipalities with departmental municipal associations in Bolivia in similar capacity-building initiatives. In 2008, Rights and Democracy and FCM launched a joint program to support ACOBOL.

Given the strong centrifugal tendencies in Bolivia and the regional basis of political opposition, support to municipal associations may be susceptible to political manipulation. As was already discussed in chapter three, decentralization itself was the cornerstone of the inclusive neoliberal project launched by President Sánchez de Lozada in 1994. In this context, USAID was instrumental in establishing FAM.\(^{343}\) Yet the municipal associations are characterized by conflicting political tendencies and the question that must be asked in evaluating the contribution of Canadian actors is whether they have supported one political tendency at the expense of another. In this regard, FCM program administrators seem to be sensitive to the local political dynamics and have,

\(^{342}\) Interview with Ivonne Farah, Directora, Ciencias del Desarrollo de la Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (CIDES-UMSA). La Paz: February 11, 2009.

\(^{343}\) Interview with Michael Eddy, Director of the Office of Democratic Development, USAID. La Paz: February 17, 2009.
according to the Program Manager for Bolivia, Katherine Murillo, sought to “foster a spirit of non-partisanship to reinforce a national voice for municipalities in general.” According to the Program Manager for Bolivia, Katherine Murillo, sought to “foster a spirit of non-partisanship to reinforce a national voice for municipalities in general.”

FCM members have worked with regional associations of municipalities from both La Paz and Santa Cruz, though most program activities are carried out by FCM itself in collaboration with FAM. FCM has also organized three exchanges with FAM representatives in Canada, ensuring that those delegates who participated were representative of the various regional tendencies.

One of the delegates who visited Canada, Bertha Acapari, a councillor from El Alto and member of ACOBOL, notes that the women’s association is characterized by similar political friction. ACOBOL has received funding from a number of democracy assistance agencies, including the NED and CIDA. While ACOBOL may have emerged from within the liberal ‘gender technocracy’ that developed during the mid-1980s in contrast to more authentic expressions of the women’s movement (Monasterios 2007), it has served as an important vehicle for promoting the inclusion of women in the political sphere and has been the driving force behind important initiatives, such as a law against gender-related political violence (Ley contra el acoso y la violencia política razón de género). In an interview, Acapari – herself a supporter of the MAS-led project for social change – noted that ACOBOL has avoided political issues because “as women we want to increase our ability to be able to begin running things, we want an institution that can defend us, that can help train us.”

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344 Interview, Ottawa: October 6, 2009. Micheline Caron, FCM International’s Local Governance Specialist for Latin America and Caribbean, also participated in this interview.

345 The NED web site notes that the organization received two separate grants of approximately $50,000 from 2007 to 2009.

346 Interview, La Paz: February 11, 2009 (my translation).
While Acapari may be glossing over the ethnic and class divisions that divide ACOBOL, it remains a site of struggle in which indigenous women leaders are increasingly represented. In any case, the support that it has received through FCM and Rights and Democracy, as well as other donors, has largely served to reinforce the institutional capacity of the organization. As such, there is little evidence that one particular tendency has been supported at the expense of another.

Canadian democracy promotion in the realm of political society has thus avoided an interventionist approach. Although CIDA certainly sought to consolidate polyarchy as the neoliberal state increasingly came under attack, it did not strategically reorient its programs to mobilize elite social forces against the growing power of the MAS and the indigenous movement. Nor did its support to polyarchy necessarily undermine other visions of democracy – as we shall see later, Rights and Democracy and Development and Peace supported grassroots organizations rooted in popular constituencies. While U.S. democracy assistance has also had positive aspects, a partial strategic shift on the part of U.S. DAAs from polyarchy promotion to elite mobilization in response to the shifting balance of power contrasts sharply with the Canadian approach.

**USAID seeks to rebuild the state**

Investigative journalists and researchers such as Bigwood (2008), Beeton (2009), and Golinger and Allard (2009) argue that the United States began using its democracy assistance programs to undermine the MAS in the early 2000s. While the political intent of such programs was clear, democracy assistance programs prior to 2005 focused on rebuilding the state.

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347 Without providing any evidence, Indymedia Bolivia also alleged that NED programs were advancing the interests of the CIA on its web-site (http://bolivia.indymedia.org/node/4209). Although the allegations
mainly on reinforcing the inclusive neoliberal state and discursively reconstructing liberal notions of citizenship in civil society. Political party strengthening programs sought to legitimize elite parties, but also worked with the MAS. A partial strategy of elite mobilization only began with the OTI program in 2005.

Through requests made under the Freedom of Information Act, Jeremy Bigwood (2008) revealed that the U.S. embassy sought to undermine the MAS as early as 2001. In that year, talking points prepared by the embassy for a meeting between Under Secretary of State, Charlotte Beers, and then president Jorge Quiroga, chastise the government for halting its coca eradication plans, which would “have weakened the political base of Evo Morales even further.” A 2002 embassy communiqué laments the near presidential victory of “illegal coca agitator Evo Morales” and warns that “a variety of anti-systemic movements continue to demand changes to Bolivia’s democratic system, changes that would elevate group representatives...above elected representatives into decision-making roles.” Even more revealing, the document states that a planned USAID political party reform project “should dovetail with the MNR’s inclusiveness plank and, over the long-run, help build moderate, pro-democracy political parties that can serve as a counter-weight to the radical MAS or its successors.”

Additionally, Bigwood highlights NED project documents which demonstrate a political bias in the organizations that they fund, referring specifically to an indigenous NGO opposed to the MAS, as well as a NED grant to the Santa Cruz Chamber of Commerce, the Cámara de Industria, Comercio, Servicios y Turismo de Santa Cruz.

cannot be taken seriously since they provide no proof, I mention them since many NGOs which were interviewed in the course of my research referred to the web-site.

348 All of the declassified documents and project documents are available on Bigwood’s web-site, Bolivia Matters, at: http://boliviamatters.wordpress.com/
(CAINCO) as evidence of U.S. links with civil society opposition forces in that department. Bigwood also mentions an NDI document detailing the organization of workshops on regional autonomy and decentralization as well as additional signs of intervention post-2005 which will be discussed later on. While there is evidence that the United States may have sought to ‘penetrate and infiltrate’ indigenous groups, there is little indication of a systematic pattern of funding directed to anti-MAS groups. As the NED itself has emphasized in response to such allegations (Jacobsen 2009), its funding to CAINCO represented a ‘one-time’ grant in 2004; the other organizations which have received funding, all of which have been publicly disclosed, have not been linked to the opposition. Until further evidence is made available, there is little indication that they have empowered opposition groups or coalitions, as was the case in Haiti. That being said, the available evidence does indicate that U.S. programs have supported mainstream NGOs and coalitions promoting polyarchic values, though this has been secondary to the concerted attempt to rebuild the state.

USAID’s focus on rebuilding democratic institutions was linked specifically to the findings of bi-annual studies carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) from 1998 to 2004. As we saw in Peru, these studies serve as a technology of power which provide a frame for the objectives and focus of USAID programs. The 2004 LAPOP provided a Huntingtonian analysis of institutional crisis, noting that Bolivia was in a situation in which “the real participation, and the expectation of and desire for participation overwhelm the existing institutional channels (Seligson, Moreno Morales and Schwarz Blum 2004: 162).” This reading provided USAID with a rationale for supporting the state to counter the possibility of authoritarian regression. Indeed, the report warns that, given the political culture of the country and a “strong anti-democratic
predisposition among Bolivians,” such a possibility was not unlikely. From this strategic vantage point, USAID’s programs sought to strengthen a range of state institutions. Its justice reform initiative constituted, arguably, the agency’s most impressive contribution to genuinely reinforcing democratic institutions in Bolivia. Although motivated by a stabilization agenda, USAID sought to ‘democratize’ justice through reform of the criminal system. Among other things, it supported the implementation of a new Code of Criminal Procedures which replaced the inquisitorial system with a modern accusatorial one.

In terms of its support to Congress, however, USAID’s program more clearly bore the mark of its political objectives. The program, which had actually begun in the early 1990s, was re-launched in 2001 after a two year hiatus. The main objective was to improve communication between representatives and constituents through various technical assistance activities designed to institutionalize ‘outreach mechanisms.’ Such mechanisms included public hearings, forums and interactive radio programs designed to inform and consult constituents on key issues of local and national interest. Through the program, 145 outreach events were sponsored by USAID in the nine departments of Bolivia. USAID’s (2003: 3) own report boasted: “This increased communication may help to overcome the distrust many citizens harbor toward governing institutions, and can act to reduce the threat that anti-system misinformation campaigns can lead to further political instability.”

As in Peru, USAID was the most important international donor to support the decentralization process. Here again, we see how political objectives informed the
implementation of the program. From 1996 to 2003, Chemonics International implemented the $15 million USAID decentralization program, entitled Democratic Development and Citizen Participation. In the first phase of the project, Chemonics developed a series of municipal governance methodologies, collectively referred to as Modelo de Gestion Municipal Participativa, designed to enhance participatory processes by ensuring that citizens are involved in municipal government operations and investment plans. Another major program component has been the reinforcement of oversight mechanisms such as vigilance committees, or comités de vigilancia, in which citizens oversee the activities of the municipal government as well as the management and administrative capacity of the municipal governments themselves.

As we have already seen in the previous chapter, USAID’s support for decentralization in Peru has been analyzed by Legoas (2007) in terms of the discursive construction of the ‘watchdog citizen.’ Based on an analysis of program documents, Legoas concludes that in Bolivia, too, the notion of citizenship associated with the Chemonics project has emphasized the importance of citizen participation at the municipal level as a means to ensure the transparency of the state, particularly with regard to the financial management of budgets. This analysis resonates with research conducted by Nancy Postero (2007), who observed the ways in which local Bolivian NGOs involved in the implementation of the Law of Popular Participation carried out the work of the state by encouraging citizens to participate at the municipal level based on a discourse of

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349 The program also undertook activities designed to encourage greater representation of women in Congress, including the training of women candidates in leadership skills and the use of outreach mechanisms.

350 The project was subsequently extended from 2003 to 2006 under the lead of the consultant, International City/County Management Association (ICMA), in collaboration with a few other U.S.-based contractors.
'responsibilization,' which interpellated citizens both as political actors and self-reliant economic agents through concepts such as efficiency, effectiveness and ‘good money management.’

Such constructions did not occur in an ideological vacuum. If Chemonics contributed to the construction of a particular subjectivity, it is equally apparent that this construction served a systems-maintenance function. Chemonics was particularly concerned with presenting the image that democracy was working effectively through the decentralization plan, a concern which it too linked to the threat of ‘anti-systemic’ forces. Citing the LAPOP’s findings on the weak support for democracy amongst Bolivians, the report stated that “as USAID/Bolivia moves into a municipal election year, the campaigns to elect new actors over the bodies of the previously ineffective mayors and councils will offer up images that democracy doesn’t work – unless the right, new people are in place. Indeed, it can be expected that the MAS will use the 2004 municipal elections to bash “the system” in general” (Chemonics International 2003: 75). At the same time, USAID’s 2003 report indicates that the program adopted a strategy of co-optation of key MAS strongholds such as the Yungas region and Chapare. The report states that the “thrust of the program in these regions is to bring these municipalities in coca-producing regions into the national mainstream by focusing on their roles as mechanisms for peaceful and productive citizen participation in the political process and as conduits for

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351 As discussed in the previous section, USAID also played a key role in establishing the national association of municipalities, FAM, and has provided support to ACOBOL through its decentralization program.

352 Postero’s research examined the activities of the Bolivian NGO, PROCESO, and its activities designed to encourage the local participation of Guarani communities in the mid-1990s.
provision of basic public services sought by their communities (USAID/Bolivia 2003: 8).

Reproducing the Peruvian model

The attempt to reinforce the hegemonic ideology of neoliberal polyarchy by strengthening the state was complemented by civil society programs targeting mainstream NGOs, including some opposed to the MAS. These organizations helped reconstruct liberal notions of citizenship and democracy based on certain discourses and activities. As in Haiti and Peru, most of the NGOs that received support from USAID and the NED are run by middle class professionals based in the capital. Such organizations first proliferated in the 1990s as intermediaries between grassroots organizations in civil society, the neoliberal state and international donors (Gill 1997). One of the main coalitions to have received funding through USAID is the Red de Participación y Justicia (PJ), an alliance that brings together 41 NGOs, many of which work on indigenous issues. In fact, the coalition itself is an initiative of the U.S.-based Partners of the Americas (Compañeros de las Américas 2003), which has implemented various USAID projects in the area of justice reform. PJ was the main implementing organization of a $7.5 million project entitled Apoyo de la Sociedad Civil a las Reformas de la Justicia, which ran from 2002 to 2008. PJ has also received funding from the NED as well as several other donors.

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353 Dangl notes that these programs typically excluded cocalero unions such as the Six Federations of the Topics of Cochabamba, in spite of their “powerful infrastructure, constituency, and knowledge of the area and industry” (2007).

354 Partners of the Americas was founded in 1964 to advance the Alliance for Progress. Soon after, it shifted to the private sector and changed its name. The organization contains chapters across the United States and depends upon a combination of private donations, state funding, and the volunteer services of its local members. Although it is not a major player in the democracy promotion industry, Robinson (1996)
PJ's main objective is to promote citizen participation in the strengthening of the justice system and democratic institutions. With the inauguration of the Constituent Assembly in 2006, it began organizing workshops and forums with various sectors of civil society to discuss the issue of justice reform. Through this process, PJ claims that it reached more than 15,000 Bolivians. In the wake of the consultations, the coalition issued a statement summarizing the justice values which it endorsed, including recognition of communal justice on par with the regular justice system.\(^{355}\) PJ also played a leading role in organizing over 3,000 volunteers to observe the presidential and general elections of 2005.\(^{356}\)

Despite its support for communal justice, PJ is by no means a radical coalition. Its work revolves primarily around capacity building and technocratic initiatives such as the compilation of a database on key figures in the justice sector. Almost all of the nine directors listed on its web site have professional backgrounds, particularly in the field of law; only one member is listed as having emerged from the grassroots sector. In terms of its activities surrounding the 2005 elections, PJ framed its program to strengthen the electoral process as an initiative to restore citizen confidence in the discredited political system (Red Participación y Justicia 2006). Its activities included capacity building exercises to inculcate democratic values, the fostering of democratic debate and the organization of electoral observation. While there is no question that all of these

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\(^{355}\) See PJ's web site at: http://reDAArticipacionyjusticia.wordpress.com/about/

\(^{356}\) Another coalition similar to PJ is Bolivia Transparente, which brings together several NGOs and has received funding from the NED and International IDEA, as well as several western aid agencies. The NED has supported several civil society organizations which have focused on either electoral observation or promoting government transparency, including Iniciativa Ciudadana de Observación Electoral and Sayauri. See grants listed on the NED's web site at: http://www.ned.org/grants/08programs/grants-lac08.html#bolivia
activities are relevant to democracy – however defined – PJ’s approach may be seen as a form of governmentality designed to direct the behaviour of the population following a period of radical mobilization.

PJ is currently the focal point for an anti-corruption campaign in the justice sector, for instance, which frames the issue of justice reform in terms of institutional transparency and accountability. As in Peru, mobilization around this issue helps to frame the democratic discourse in the public sphere away from structural antagonisms while reinforcing the notion of the watch-dog citizen. While such constructions reflect priorities defined by local elites, they are also in line with the strategic objectives of U.S. donors. USAID has sought to reinforce PJ’s role as an anti-corruption coalition, though thus far it has not achieved the public recognition of its Peruvian counterpart, PROÉTICA. In 2005, USAID invited PROÉTICA and other Latin American anti-corruption coalitions to participate in a workshop in Bolivia to share their experiences with PJ and other local NGOs. The report on the event prepared by USAID (Berthin, Balcer, Zaner, Ryan and Portilla 2005: 5) emphasized the importance of generating a sense of outrage and urgency for forcing the government to address corruption, which is framed in terms of its pernicious effects on state efficiency.

It should be noted that Canada has also provided modest support to Bolivia’s anti-corruption network through the CIDA project, *Summit Follow-up by Civil Society - Phase II*. The projet, which runs from 2007 to 2011 with a total budget of $800,000, is being implemented by the Chilean-based NGO, *Corporación Participa* (CIDA 2010), which provides support to civil society organizations in 22 countries across the Americas. In
Bolivia, Participa works with Ciudadanos Trabajando por la Justicia, the initiative that was launched by Partners of the Americas that led to the creation of PJ (Compañeros de las Américas 2003). Participa’s notion of democracy is very much in keeping with a minimalist vision that emphasizes transparency and accountability at the expense of a wider conception of citizen rights. Through CIDA and NED funds, the Chilean NGO has sought to create a regional network of civil society organizations dedicated to promoting these issues. Although the amount of Canadian assistance that supports Participa’s work in Bolivia is minimal, CIDA’s role in creating this regional coalition illustrates how Canada has increasingly sought to frame democracy in terms that are congruous with its economic interests.

It is important to emphasize, however, that U.S. support to the coalition cannot be conceptualized as a traditional form of interventionism. While the coalition does discursively frame democratic development in a way that does not contradict the interests of transnational capital, it has not aligned itself with opposition social forces. The electoral observation report released by PJ (2006), for instance, notes that citizen conduct during the elections was exemplary and that support for Morales and Linera was overwhelming. PJ and many of its member organizations have also co-signed statements denouncing the actions of the regional-based opposition under the banner of Bolivia’s human rights movement.359

357 See Participa’s web site at: http://www.participa.cl/. A project web site is also available at: http://www.sociedaddcivil.net/.
358 CIDA’s disclosure of funding notes that only 4.5 percent of project funds cover activities carried out in Bolivia (CIDA 2010). The same amount is also allocated to activities carried out in Peru.
359 These include a statement issued against the opposition movement in March 2009 in the wake of attacks against the Centro de Estudios Jurídicos e Investigación Social (CEJIS), an indigenous NGO, in Santa Cruz and Beni (Capítulo Boliviano de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo 2009).
That being said, the PJ coalition does include NGOs working on indigenous issues which have opposed the MAS. Such organizations have no doubt been cultivated by U.S. DAAs to counter balance the hegemony of the MAS in indigenous civil society. The president of PJ, Eduardo Barrios Sánchez, is a founding member of the Instituto Politécnico Tomás Katari (IPTK), for instance, one of the largest rural development NGOs which was highly critical of the role of the MAS in the Constituent Assembly. The driving force behind the organization is Dr. Franz Barrios Villegas, who was also president of the political party, Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL), a leftist party that joined Goni’s coalition during his second administration. The IPTK has traveled down a similar road of moderation, focusing most of its activities on uncontroversial development issues. Its commitment to the market model is exemplified by its work with women’s organizations such as Mujeres Pobres Trabajadoras del Hogar, which focuses on capacity-building exercises such as improving and marketing their skills (IPTK 2007). Despite its technocratic approach, IPTK publishes an editorial, Punto de Vista, and broadcasts a radio program that features regular political commentary by Barrios. Through these forums, Barrios has been highly critical of the actions of the MAS, denouncing the behaviour of the party as divisive, intolerant and polarizing (see, for example, Barrios Villegas 2007).

Another member of PJ with anti-MAS credentials is the Instituto de Investigación y Capacitación Pedagógica y Social (IIPS), an NGO that engages in popular education. IIPS is particularly relevant since it has received a regular stream of grant funding from the NED, including approximately $38,000 in 2005 – 2006 (Bigwood 2008), nearly

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360 IPTK was formed in the late 1970s in the department of Potosí as a fairly radical organization dedicated to fostering alliances between peasants and miners.
361 According to the IIPS director, Mario Quintanilla, the organization emerged from the ranks of the radical teacher’s union movement in the 1990s. 362 Many of its members have been active in various social struggles over the years and have fought alongside indigenous parties, including the MAS. Quintanilla notes that U.S. funding has not come with strings attached. He states that “I have never felt that any organization that has worked with or works with the NED has acted as a mouthpiece or has attacked particular organizations or has benefited them. Thus, I suppose that things which have been said about the NED in Bolivia are things that may have happened before or simply reflect discourses from other countries which are assumed to be true in Bolivia. 363

Yet IIPS is one of the organisations that investigative journalist Jeremy Bigwood has identified as having received U.S. funds as part of a strategy of undermining the MAS. Bigwood’s allegations are not without foundation. According to an IIPS program description entitled Rural Leadership and Civic Participation for 2005 – 2006, 364 the organization sought to channel citizen participation through the municipal comités de vigilancia to counter balance radical elements. The background overview of the program denounces the “anti-democratic, radical opposition,” noting that “in the face of a lack of leaders who truly represent them, radical leaders such as Evo Morales and Felipe Quispe have risen to prominence.” Like many other programs that we have seen, this particular IIPS initiative was designed to construct new citizen subjectivities which defined

361 The two most recent grants were listed on the NED web site at: http://www.ned.org/grants/08programs/grants-lac08.html#bolivia
362 It has been associated in particular with the Confederación de Trabajadores de la Educación Urbana de Bolivia (CTEUB), which adopted an approach to popular pedagogy grounded in the theories of Paulo Freire and Antonio Gramsci (Carrarini 2005).
363 Interview, La Paz: February 10, 2009 (my translation).
364 The document is available at: http://boliviamatters.wordpress.com/
participation according to the comités de vigilancia at the local level. In this document, however, the political objectives behind the approach are made perfectly clear.

Given Quintanilla's assertions on the historic links between the IIPS and indigenous opposition groups, it is possible that the background narrative in the program description was simply a matter of political positioning to capture U.S. funds. From this perspective, the incident perhaps speaks to a larger flaw in the interventionist strategy of democracy promotion whereby local actors may sometimes manipulate the lack of knowledge of democracy assistance agencies of the local political scene to obtain funding. While this is certainly a possibility, it is equally apparent that the objectives of those programs which receive funding must fit within the priorities of donors. NGOs such as IIPS may strategically distance themselves from popular initiatives to secure such funding. As an organization devoted to popular pedagogy, for instance, it is curious that the IIPS has chosen to align itself with donor priorities instead of the mass literacy campaign, Yo Si Puedo, led by the MAS and endorsed by the indigenous movement. While EPS criticizes the campaign for not being sufficiently sustainable, it is telling that an organization devoted to popular education and literacy would turn down the state's request to participate in the country's largest-ever literacy drive.365 The dual discourse adopted by the IIPS does seem to indicate that indigenous organizations which position themselves as moderate alternatives to donors have to be careful about alienating their support base. IIPS has refrained from publicly denouncing the MAS, most likely as a result of the party's near-hegemonic position in indigenous civil society. U.S. DAAs may be trying to cultivate more moderate indigenous groups, but these organizations must tread cautiously given that they appeal to the same social sectors. It is interesting to note
that even the MBL – the party associated with Barrios and the IPTK – officially joined the MAS in the December 2009 elections (FM Bolivia 2009).

**Reconstructing citizenship and pre-empting radical change**

As the political system increasingly came under attack by indigenous groups, the IRI (2005) implemented *Improving Citizen Perceptions of Political Parties* from 2003 to 2005, which aimed to “assuage dissatisfaction with political parties and democracy in Bolivia by increasing civic understanding of the role of the citizen” to “help channel civic interest into more constructive avenues of communication and participation” (IRI 2005: 1-2). Over the course of the $550,000 project funded by USAID, IRI held 19 ‘informational forums’ on topics ranging from the Constituent Assembly and the referendum to the role of indigenous groups in Bolivian politics. In addition to the forums, IRI conducted 27 radio programs on the referendum and other issues and created a ten-part television program on youth and democracy. It also led a high school civic education initiative, developing a manual “exploring the civic concepts of responsibility and authority,” which complemented a new high school curriculum introduced by the Ministry of Education. In total, it trained 4,500 social studies teachers in the use of this manual – nearly 90 percent of the instructors in this subject area.\(^{365}\) Although the IRI portrayed its concepts of democracy in universalistic terms, its project was ideological insofar as it sought to stabilize the political system and elite patterns of governance by propagating discursive constructions calling for citizen restraint. Such constructions very

\(^{365}\) Interview, La Paz: February 10, 2009.

\(^{366}\) Other activities carried out by the IRI included the development of an instructional seminar in collaboration with the Bolivian Association of Political Science (ABCP) and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS). Seminar participants over the course of the project included 648 leaders from unions, political parties, farm groups, neighbourhood civic committees, and university groups, as well as locally elected officials, council members and prefects.
much follow the pattern of citizen ‘responsibilization’ identified by Postero (2007). The implication that the crisis of the state was embedded in political culture provided the IRI with the opportunity to socialize citizens with liberal democratic norms that reinforced the hegemony of the state. The development of the high school manual and the training of a vast network of social studies teachers demonstrate the scope and reach of the program.

As the balance of forces continued to shift, USAID launched a large-scale initiative under the auspices of the State University of New York’s Center for International Development (SUNY-CID) which complemented the IRI’s work, entitled *Support for Electoral Process in Bolivia* (PACER).\(^{367}\) In the first phase, SUNY-CID oversaw a comprehensive campaign to promote the concept of representative democracy in the context of national and regional elections. Among other things, the campaign sought “to clarify and enhance the role of the represented in their capacity as registered voters/citizens,” encouraging voters to “exercise a responsible choice and to accept electoral results” (USAID 2006a: 3). The mass media campaign was particularly wide in scope, with SUNY-CID boasting of having reached 15 million television viewers and another 15 million radio listeners through short spots. Summarizing the program activities, the final report states “the two phases of the media campaign sought to impact large numbers of Bolivians with short, emotive messages that afforded them striking moments to reflect on their current views about the nature and value of democracy. The goal of the messages conveyed in the jingles and images was for Bolivians to think about the conditions that are necessary to exercise a representative democracy.” (USAID 2006a:

\(^{367}\) The project lasted from October 2005 to September 2006, after which it was extended to 2008 under the title *Support to Democratic Systems and Governance in a Changing Environment in Bolivia Project* with USAID subcontracting the oversight of the project to Chemonics. The project also included a decentralization component, as well as a capacity-building initiative with Congress.
6). Through a ‘training the trainers’ program, local leaders and so-called ‘accountability and transparency promoters’ were encouraged to form a network called the Network for the Right to Be Well-Represented. By the end of the project, 430 trainers trained 7,383 intermediate leaders, who in turn trained 37,491 democracy promotion activists. SUNY-CID claims that these trainers and activists were able to reach nearly 1.145 million citizens through workshops and radio programs.

Like the IRI program, the messages sought to instil a liberal notion of the citizen based on respect for the legality of representative democracy and a disavowal of extra-parliamentary forms of political mobilization. Although the MAS were not specifically attacked, the attempt to create new liberal citizens in the context of what was happening can be interpreted as a strategy of de-radicalizing the MAS’ social base. The media campaign surrounding the Constituent Assembly, for instance, emphasized that the mandate of the institution was to “draft a new constitution without any restrictions, rather than to take on any attributions of the current government, which would be extremely risky for the peaceful resolution of outstanding regional and social conflicts.” The risk of the government dominating the assembly was portrayed through “a simple animated cartoon depicting an elected member of the constitutional assembly receiving a bomb with a sizzling wick, which another member eventually puts off (sic) and averts the expected explosion.” Another message sought to impress upon citizens that the Constituent Assembly would not be able to solve problems such as poverty or unemployment, “which were not part of its mandate and could not be resolved by anyone in the short-term.”

To deliver these messages, SUNY-CID partnered with various local civil society organizations, including IIPS. Another organization that was involved in the project to a
considerable extent was *Casa de la Mujer*, a women’s organization based in Santa Cruz. The NGO broadcasted democracy-education radio programs to an estimated audience of 300,000 persons four times per week for a total of 12 weeks. *Casa de la Mujer* is a well-known NGO that has been at the forefront of the women’s movement in Santa Cruz. Its activities revolve primarily around the struggle to end violence against women. The organization is also a member of PJ and has allied with many other NGOs in denouncing racist acts of violence against popular organizations in Santa Cruz (see Mokrani and Uriona 2008). In 2008 – 2009, *Casa de la Mujer* also received a small grant of $36,000 from the NED to promote peaceful conflict resolution. But *Casa de la Mujer* has retained its distance from organized political forces. While it may very well be concerned about guarding its autonomy from the state and political parties, such concerns do not extend to international donors. Its alliance with U.S. democracy assistance agencies illustrates how progressive NGOs dependent upon external funding have responded to U.S. interpellations to constrain the popular aspirations unleashed by the constitutional project.

Rebuilding the political system before and after the MAS

One of the central claims of the interventionist argument is that political party strengthening programs in Bolivia have been used to undermine the MAS. While the political intent of such programs is not in dispute, the way in which they have been portrayed by the interventionist argument is overly simplistic. In fact, from the beginning most of them have included the MAS as recipients and have focused primarily on reinforcing system-wide reforms, as has been the case in Peru. Both before and after the rise of the MAS, they are best analyzed from the perspective of polyarchy promotion
rather than elite mobilization. Before we look at the partial interventionist switch of 2005, a few comments on such programs are in order.

In addition to the activities of the IRI discussed above, the institute has implemented various political party strengthening initiatives that have overlapped with programs implemented by the NDI, as well multilateral actors such as International IDEA and UNDP. All of these actors began implementing their programs in 2003 – 2004 as the crisis reached its apex. As in Peru, the NDI launched two studies funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) on the political party system and pro-poor reform. These studies were complemented by a series of political party capacity-building initiatives from 2003 to 2009, as well as citizen dialogue initiatives bringing together political parties with civil society actors funded by USAID and the NED. The first program, *Bolivia Political Party Development*, which was funded by USAID and ran from 2003 to 2005, focused on strengthening outreach, communication, transparency and the participation of underrepresented sectors (NDI 2005). Through a second project funded by the NED, *Constructive Citizen Dialogue* which ran from 2005 to 2006 and received a grant of approximately $200,000, NDI hosted a series of workshops in three of Bolivia’s most contentious regions: La Paz, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba. Most of these workshops sought to bring together youth representatives of different political parties to breakdown ideological divisions and promote a common agenda. NDI and IRI also collaborated with IDEA in the implementation of a $700,000 USAID program, *Apoyo a*

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368 The first study, *Bolivia’s Political Party System and the Incentives for Pro-Poor Reform*, was released in October 2004; the second study, *The Political Party System in Bolivia 2004-2006: Opportunities for Pro-Poor Reform*, was published in 2007.
Procesos Democráticos, which ran from October 2007 to June 2008 and focused on rendering political parties more transparent and internally democratic.\textsuperscript{369}

As noted in the previous chapter, attempts to render political parties more open and accountable while promoting dialogue between them may certainly strengthen the political system. At the same time, they also have the perverse affect of empowering elite parties which have historically expressed little concern with the plight of the poor. They work against the interests of the MAS, the most popular and disciplined political party, by building up political forces that can contest its growing hegemony in political society. Indeed, there is little question that such efforts have been inscribed in a general attempt to reduce the appeal of the MAS. With regard to the Constituent Assembly, for instance, IRI's web-site states that "the entire process was tainted with illegalities and violence as the central government attempted to draft the constitution unilaterally…. In light of the social unrest and subsequent democratic crisis, enhancing capacity of all political parties and building local government capacity are all necessary for a transparent and effective democracy."\textsuperscript{370} There is also evidence that the gender-related activities of IDEA, IRI, NDI, and UNDP have reinforced a key political coalition against the MAS through their support to the Unión de Mujeres Parlamentarias de Bolivia (UMPABOL), which brings together women parliamentarians. By IDEA's own admission, UMPABOL is dominated by women from the opposition parties and has become a strong opponent of the government.\textsuperscript{371} Although it is unclear as to whether democracy assistance agencies have supported UMPABOL as a deliberate strategy of undermining the MAS, it constitutes yet

\textsuperscript{369} See USAID Bolivia web site at: \url{http://bolivia.usaid.gov/CurrentPrograms/DEM/06_NDI_IRI.pdf}

\textsuperscript{370} The comments of the President of NDI, Kenneth Wollack, concerning the dangerous rise of populist demagogues in the Andean region were noted in the previous chapter.

\textsuperscript{371} In one statement, UMPABOL (UMPABOL 2008) accused the government of Evo Morales with seeking to install a hidden dictatorship (dictadura camuflada) through violence and intimidation.
another example of how democracy assistance can alter the balance of power in political society away from popular forces.

That being said, there is no question that the MAS have strongly benefited from political party strengthening programs. While acknowledging the scepticism of certain MAS members, Alfonso Ferrufino, an advisor with International IDEA, states that not only does the MAS participate in its projects “but it actually has the highest quota since resources are assigned based on the representation of the party not only in parliament but also in the municipalities.” Although such quotas are not always in place for NDI and IRI programs, the MAS are almost always included. This likely reflects the fact that the MAS would simply not allow such program to continue existing if they did not. Yet there is evidence that a strategy of incorporation informed the activities of U.S. actors even before the party came to power. In a Conflict Vulnerability Assessment commissioned by USAID in 2003, for instance, the authors state that “the greatest challenge to Bolivia’s democracy in the foreseeable future would be to keep the MAS in the system...interviews with party leaders, however, suggest to us that there are significant sectors within the MAS that would like to work within the system and who believe that their party can achieve the presidency and consolidate its grip nationally through electoral means” (Gamarra 2003: 10).

In the case of the NDI, there also appears to be a gap between the anti-populist objectives of its President and the Resident Director of Bolivia, Michel Rowland García. In an interview, Mr. Rowland emphatically stated that he much preferred to describe the activities of the NDI in terms of democracy consolidation rather than democracy promotion since the latter connotes a policy of regime change. He noted further that NDI
only takes a position against a government when there is a serious threat to democracy, which is not at all the case in Bolivia. The position of the Resident Director also reflects the fact that U.S. positions are not monolithic and that differences exist both between and within the two main political parties.

Thus, as has been the case regarding political party strengthening programs in Peru, such programs in Bolivia reveal multiple tensions and contradictions. While democracy assistance agencies have certainly sought to stabilize the system and contain the threat of radical change, they have not been used to form political coalitions as they were in Haiti – with the exception, perhaps, of UMPABOL. Ultimately, however, these softer forms of democracy promotion in both civil and political society prior to 2005 did not succeed at stabilizing the political situation. As the crisis of legitimacy intensified and the indigenous movement marched toward state power, the USAID-OTI launched a much more aggressive form of democracy promotion through its decentralization program. The cornerstone of the new approach was a switch from support to the municipalities to the regional prefects, where right-wing forces throughout the media luna were preparing to resist the project of social transformation symbolized by the rise of the MAS.

III. Democracy promotion within the new constellation of forces
The OTI and the (partial) interventionist switch

In their recently-published critical exposé of U.S. democracy promotion, La Agresión Permanente, investigative journalists Jean-Guy Allard and Eva Golinger (2009) note that

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372 Interview, La Paz: February 19, 2009 (my translation).
373 Interview, La Paz: February 20, 2009. Mr. Rowland's apparent sincerity leads me to believe that agencies such as the NDI do not necessarily have a cohesive worldview and are likely to embody many tendencies at both the international and local levels. The reader will recall that the NDI Resident Director in Haiti was also not ideologically opposed to the Lavalas government, unlike his IRI counterpart.
the arrival of the OTI on the political scene marked the beginning of a much more aggressive attempt on the part of U.S. to undermine the MAS. Although these authors, like other investigative journalists, have failed to substantiate some of their strongest claims, once can easily see how the program represented a strategic attempt on the part of U.S. state to reinforce a regional hegemonic bloc that was contesting the legitimacy of the central state. This strategy coexisted alongside softer forms of democracy promotion as well as those intended to strengthen elite-led civil society organizations – most based in La Paz – opposed to the MAS and its project of constitutional change. Though not specifically linked to the eastern-based opposition to the MAS, they advanced an urban middle class perspective that has sought to contain the radical implications of constitutional reform through a discursive appeal to values such as compromise, dialogue, and citizen restraint. They have provided ammunition to the ideological battle being waged by regional elites, though they have not contributed to their mobilization.

In total, the OTI program – designed “to help reduce tensions in areas prone to social conflict and to assist the country in preparing for key electoral events” – disbursed nearly $13 million, including over $4.06 million through 101 grants intended to build the institutional capacity of departmental governments (USAID 2007a). The program was sub-contracted to the U.S.-based development firm, Casals & Associates. Such support included technical training for prefecture staff in the areas of strategic planning, budget and project management, financial management, transparent administration, communications, and outreach. Many grants also focused on reinforcing the efforts of prefectures to create jobs and further local economic development. Given the U.S.

374 It should be noted that Allard and Golinger’s book was published by the propaganda agency of the Venezuelan government, the Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y la Información.
government’s hostility to the MAS, the fact that the OTI launched a program of stabilization that focused on the regional level as the country prepared for key electoral events indicates a likely attempt to reinforce the popularity of prefects openly opposed to the MAS.\footnote{Additionally, $4 million was spent by OTI on ‘information diffusion and dialogue.’ Much of the support for this activity was channelled to the multi-donor Constituent Assembly Technical Information Center (CIEDAC) in Sucre, Chuquisaca, which was mandated to meet the technical needs of the Constituent Assembly. Very little information is available on the activities associated with this intervention.} Once the MAS had come to power, USAID continued to work closely with the regional prefects of Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, both of whom were key figures in the opposition to Morales (see Field Report, USAID 2006b). As Bigwood (2008), Golinger and Allard (2009) point out, OTI’s work explicitly promoted ‘sub-national de-concentrated’ models of government in resource-rich departments which were preparing to launch autonomy referendums against the opposition of the central government.\footnote{OTI also organized an exchange in which six of Bolivia’s nine prefects were invited to meet with governors in Washington D.C., Richmond, Virginia and Miami, Florida. Although Golinger and Allard allege that the prefects were from the opposition, USAID (2006) claims that all prefects were invited.}

Soon after the OTI launched its program, the former Chief of Mission to Kosovo, Philip Goldberg, consolidated a more aggressive approach against the Bolivian government as the new U.S. Ambassador.\footnote{Goldberg had been highly sympathetic to separatist forces in Kosovo where he had acquired experience in fanning regional tensions (Allard and Golinger 2009). Amongst the declassified documents obtained by Bigwood are a series of emails leaked from within USAID in 2007, which reveal the attempt of the U.S. Embassy and Ambassador Philip Goldberg to cultivate relations with indigenous groups opposed to the MAS in Chapare and the media luna. In discussing who to invite to a lunch between indigenous leaders and the ambassador, USAID staff write that the litmus test is “their stance toward the position of the MAS government, that they are our} Goldberg had been highly sympathetic to separatist forces in Kosovo where he had acquired experience in fanning regional tensions (Allard and Golinger 2009). Amongst the declassified documents obtained by Bigwood are a series of emails leaked from within USAID in 2007, which reveal the attempt of the U.S. Embassy and Ambassador Philip Goldberg to cultivate relations with indigenous groups opposed to the MAS in Chapare and the media luna. In discussing who to invite to a lunch between indigenous leaders and the ambassador, USAID staff write that the litmus test is “their stance toward the position of the MAS government, that they are our
allies.” The staff member went on to discuss the indigenous organizations that USAID programs fund in order to “strengthen them to confront the MAS.”

According to the interventionist argument, U.S. democracy assistance programs also empowered regional opposition groups like the comités cívicos (Allard and Golinger 2009). Beeton also notes that the line between the respectable opposition led by some of the regional prefects and violent racist youth groups, such as the Unión Juvenil Cruceñista in Santa Cruz, is in fact blurred. U.S. funding to the prefects may very well have funded campaigns launched by such groups. While this may be true, it is virtually impossible to substantiate or falsify such claims since USAID and OTI have operated with the utmost secrecy in Bolivia. OTI’s quarterly reports, for instance, mention total funds disbursed under a number of categories related to civil society without mentioning any of the groups that have actually received funding. From March 2004 to June 2007, we are told that OTI disbursed $365,900 in grants to enhance ‘Linkages between Indigenous Groups and Democratic Structures’ without any indication of which indigenous groups obtained grants. Likewise, $886,790 was disbursed on ‘Civic Education for Emerging Leaders’ during the same time period without reference to what organizations worked with OTI in this area (USAID 2007c).

The interventionist argument has also failed to address the fact that USAID provided support to the prefects of all nine departments, including the three departments aligned with the MAS at the time – Chuquisaca, Oruro, and Potosí. USAID’s Director of

377 The Embassy’s diplomatic mission was put into question when a Fulbright scholar in Bolivia announced to the media that he had been asked to spy on Venezuelans and Cubans. Similar allegations were made by Peace Corps volunteers.
378 My translation.
379 He notes, for instance, that U.S. funding has gone to the regional prefect of Pando, Leopoldo Fernandez, who was found to have led a ‘chain of command’ of perpetrators responsible for the massacre in September 2008.
the Office of Democratic Development, Michael Eddy, notes that the MAS prefect of Oruro, Alberto Luis Aguilar, has been particularly supportive of OTI-USAID's activities in his department.\(^\text{380}\) OTI's 2007 Field Report cites Aguilar satisfaction with the technical capacity-building activities of the project. Thus, if OTI sought to counterbalance the MAS and the central government by supporting the prefects, it adopted a more inclusive strategy to ensure that its activities were not viewed as being openly partisan. As was the case with the USAID decentralization program, OTI balanced its support to opposition forces with a strategy of co-optation. This is an important point that critical analyses such as those provided by Golinger, Allard (2009), Bigwood (2008) and Dangl (2008) fail to reckon with.

Nonetheless, the Bolivian government did eventually denounce U.S. democracy promotion in the context of the escalating conflict with Ambassador Goldberg. The most comprehensive critique was made by the Minister of the Presidency, Juan Ramón Quintana, at a press conference in August 2007 (Velásquez Espejo 2007).\(^\text{381}\) Although Quintana's exposé did not deal specifically with the OTI, research conducted by his staff revealed a striking pattern – USAID's democracy assistance programs employed no less than 20 former high-level officials from the Quiroga, Sánchez de Lozada, and Mesa governments. These officials were working in various capacities as consultants for USAID and Chemonics, as well as several local organizations contracted to implement democracy programs. According to Quintana, in the aftermath of the political crisis of 2003: “all of these bureaucrats found a secure refuge – those of them from the highest

\(^{380}\) Interview, La Paz: February 17, 2009.

\(^{381}\) Ironically, one of the best selling books in Bolivia, *Ciudadano X* – already in its fifth edition, alleges that Quintana is on the payroll of George Soros. As noted in chapter two, Soros is the head of the U.S.-based democracy promotion agency, the Open Society Institute. The book provides little evidence to substantiate this claim.
political and economic circles were contracted by USAID” (Tarija Libre 2008). More recently, Morales has accused USAID of conspiring against him by providing funding to the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, Leopoldo Fernández and Manfred Reyes Villa.

Allegations of U.S. interventionism led the progressive research and advocacy institute, the Democracy Center, to conduct its own investigation on the issue. Although the Center, which runs an office in Cochabamba, has been at the forefront of criticizing U.S. foreign policy in Bolivia, it did not, in the words of Dan Moriarty, the researcher who led the investigation, uncover a ‘smoking gun.’ Moriarty argues that criticisms of U.S. democracy promotion, including those advanced by the MAS, have thus far failed to demonstrate how such programs have supported the opposition. In an interview, Moriarty noted that, while funds may have been provided to opposition prefects, this in itself does not indicate a pattern of direct interventionism since all departments have received funding. Addressing the MAS criticism, Moriarty states:

There is a certain logical fallacy in the way that they just named names and the fact that they just worked for a previous government. They didn’t show what they were actually doing to use that money to promote the opposition...Nobody was allowed to talk about this in the government without direct permission from Quintana...we must have called his office 1 or 20 times, we wrote two or three memos to them and they just never ever got back to us.

Although he is highly sceptical of U.S. programs, Moriarty felt that the available evidence – which he readily admits was limited given USAID’s tendency to act secretively – was

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382 My translation.
383 Fernández is still in prison awaiting trial for the massacre in Pando. His candidature was rejected by the electoral commission.
384 Executive Director, Jim Schultz, was particularly sceptical about the claims that U.S. funds had empowered violent regional groups, inviting Beeton to further substantiate such claims on the Center’s site. Schultz also invited both the NED and the U.S. Embassy to respond to such allegations. To its credit, the NED posted a response (Jacobsen 2009), which noted that its programs have “aimed at averting conflict and trying to bridge the polarization that plagues Bolivia today.”
385 Interview, La Paz: February 26, 2009.
inconclusive at best. He noted further that a more interventionist strategy may not have been feasible given that IRI's work in Haiti and the activities of the NED in Venezuela were coming under fire.

The more cautious critical approach taken by the Democracy Center is an important antidote to claims that assume rather than prove U.S. democratic interventionism in Bolivia. Yet when we assess U.S. programs from an historical perspective, the political objectives to counter the growing popularity of the 'anti-systemic' MAS could not be clearer. The thematic switch in USAID's decentralization programs leaves little doubt that the U.S. strategically reoriented its approach from softer forms of polyarchy promotion to a partial policy of mobilizing elites. From the moment OTI re-focused USAID's decentralization efforts on the regional prefects until Goldberg was declared persona non grata and expelled from Bolivia in September 2008, U.S. democracy assistance programs contained both elements of EMTs and PPTs. Since the U.S. could not contest the growing hegemony of the MAS in the western part of the country, democracy assistance programs adopted a more geographically-focused policy of elite mobilization.

**Containing the constitutional project**

Another strategy which U.S. funders have deployed to undermine the MAS without openly funding the elite opposition has been to support urban-based moderate NGOs critical of the constitutional project. Such activities have indirectly affected the balance of power between different sectors of society even if they have been carried out by NGOs without specific political affiliations. This section will briefly review some of the main NGOs which have received U.S. funding and their activities surrounding the
constitutional process. The following section will then juxtapose such support against the approach of Canadian DAAs.

One organization which has received U.S. funding and has specifically opposed the constitutional process was the Fundación de Apoyo al Parlamento y a la Participación Ciudadana (FUNDAPPAC), an NGO comprised of former parliamentarians dedicated to public policy issues.\textsuperscript{386} Formed in 1996, FUNDAPPAC engages in capacity-building activities with Congress and works with civil society groups to promote citizen participation in politics. In 2008, it received a grant of $44,000 from the NED.\textsuperscript{387} According to its president at the time, Armando de la Parra Soria, FUNDAPPAC participated in many consultative events, or audiencias públicas, on the constitutional project. It also published a regular bulletin, the Constituyente al Día, on the latest developments surrounding the Constituent Assembly – a project that received NED funding.

Although the bulletins presented many diverse perspectives, including those put forward by MAS representatives, FUNDAPPAC published a scathing critique of the proposed constitution and the process which led to its adoption by the Constituent Assembly. The report, Hacia una Nueva Constitución (Antonio Rivera S. 2008), argues that the process violated numerous laws\textsuperscript{388} and that the proposed constitution failed to create a new social and political pact responding to the aspirations of all Bolivians. It notes in particular that important social sectors were excluded from the process, including

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\textsuperscript{386} The president of the organization is former vice president, Luis Ossio Sanjinés, who served under Paz Zamora from 1989 to 1993.

\textsuperscript{387} The organization has traditionally received most of its funding from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

\textsuperscript{388} Examples include decisions made by Congress on issues which it did not posses constitutional authority, including the decision that those articles which did not obtain a two-thirds majority in the Constituent Assembly would be put to a referendum, the prolongation of the mandate of the assembly, and the decision to change its location from Sucre to Oruro.
organizations representing the interests of the urban-based middle class and the comités cívicos. The president of FUNDAPPAC, Armando de la Parra, reiterated these sentiments in an interview. According to him, “the first characteristic of the constitution if you look at it strictly from a legal standpoint is that is absolutely illegal.” Commenting specifically on the new rights which it enshrines, he states further that “there is a hypertrophy of rights which render the constitution absolutely inapplicable – totally impracticable.” While FUNDAPPAC has not published any reports specifically denouncing the MAS, Parra argues that Bolivia is suffering from a ‘populismo caudillismo’ that is afflicting the entire region.

The NGO, Fundación Boliviana para la Democracia Multipartidaria (fBDM), took a similar position on the constitution. fBDM, an organization dedicated to political pluralism that seeks to strengthen links between political parties and civil society, has historically received most of its funding from the Dutch Institute for Multiparty Democracy. It was also an implementing partner of the USAID-funded Apoyo a Procesos Democráticos along with IRI and NDI. fBDM lamented the increased polarization afflicting the country and sought to bridge the divide between different political actors. “At that time,” the fBDM Executive Director, Guido Riveros Franck, noted in an interview, “very polarized positions emerged in Bolivian society. There were the neoliberals who had previously fallen and new emerging groups with practically no dialogue between them, no communication – they were like two separate worlds unknown to each other. In this context, we began our work.”

Among other things, it hosted meetings between different parties and civil society organizations, publishing

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389 Interview, February 20, 2009 (my translation).
390 Interview, La Paz: February 13, 2009 (my translation).
numerous booklets on the constitutional project, including one which identified proposals around which consensus might be built and others which were unlikely to obtain widespread support (fBDM 2007). Like FUNDAPPAC, fBDM published a lengthy critique of the constitutional project once the Constituent Assembly had released a final document. Among other things, the report, warned that the proposed constitution constituted a rupture with the language and traditions of republicanism, in effect undermining representative democracy and the rule of law. Like FUNDAPPAC, fBDM switched from a strategy of diluting the constitutional project through consultative processes to launching a war of position against it.

Another NGO to launch an offensive against the proposed constitution was the Fundación Comunidad, led by former President Carlos Mesa Gisbert. The Fundación is dedicated to promoting democratic development, human rights, and the rule of law. According to Mesa, the organization has received some funding from the NED. Mesa is also a key figure behind the Social Agenda for Democracy in Latin America, an initiative launched by the Global Center for Development and Democracy with funding from the NED. Mesa has taken a very public stance against the constitution, arguing that it “breaks with the basic principle of equality.” It should be noted, however, that Mesa is not aligned with regional opposition forces. In the December 2009 presidential elections, for instance, the Fundación characterized the choice between Evo Morales - Álvaro García Linera and Manfred Reyes Villa - Leopoldo Fernández as one between Sodom and 

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391 For example, the document argues that exclusive rights of representation and control over resources granted to indigenous peoples, defined by the term native indigenous peasants (pueblo originario indígena campesino), breaks with the tradition of equality before the law.
392 The Global Center is the brainchild of former Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo. The social agenda promoted by the Center’s Presidential Taskforce resonates with the post-Washington Consensus.
393 Interview, La Paz: February 18, 2009 (my translation).
Gomorra, arguing that neither side was committed to a genuine vision of democracy (Alarcón September 22).

NDI also worked with another NGO based in the capital, OBSERVANCIA Centro Interdisciplinario, to promote dialogue between different social sectors from 2005 onward. OBSERVANCIA’s shifting focus is of interest insofar as it reflects the evolving tactics of U.S. democracy promoters in Bolivia: prior to 2005, the organization focused on building the capacity of local municipalities; after that point, it began working with civil society actors to debate constitutional issues in collaboration with NDI. In the new conjuncture, one of the organization’s main activities has been working with youth associations and students across the country to help them formulate positions on key issues being debated by the Constituent Assembly. Although OBSERVANCIA did not publish a critique of the proposed constitution, its purported neutrality was betrayed by private comments made by its Executive Director, Edgar Antonio Rivero Buitrago, who noted in an interview that the constitution was not based on a consensual process. “It is an ethnocentric constitution, if you will, from the western provinces. It is linked to those whom the president represents – the president is bound by the Aymaras and Quechuas who form his electoral base.”

NDI, for its part, hosted various workshops and conferences in the departments of La Paz, Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, Oruro and Tarija which led to the publication of proposals by youth associations in each department. While it is difficult to critique an initiative designed to increase the ability of youth groups to contribute to the process of creating a new constitution, the effort must be situated within the larger objective of
affecting the terms of debate by U.S. democracy promoters. Youth groups are themselves fragmented according to political ideology and capacity-building initiatives that clarify the thinking and tactics of specific regional groups indirectly alter the balance of power between competing social forces. While such groups may not be specifically aligned to opposition political forces, many were explicitly opposed to the MAS’ vision of constitutional change.

Not all organizations which have received U.S. funding have opposed the constitution. One NGO, the Centro de Estudios Aplicados a los Derechos Económicos Sociales y Culturales (CEADESC), is in fact a supporter. Based in Santa Cruz, the organization focuses on promoting human rights and the defence of the environment. In 2008 – 2009, it received a NED grant for $40,000. While most of its work focuses on the extractive industry, it is an important advocate of the concept of *vivir bien* (live well), which emphasizes the importance of sustainable development, redistribution and social harmony. According to Prada (2008), the recuperation of indigenous values such as *vivir bien* is an important part of the process of decolonization. One of its researchers has praised the new constitution for incorporating this concept at its very core (Arkonada 2009). By all indications, however, CEADESC did not actually join the social movements in campaigning in its favour.

Indeed, most organizations which have received U.S. funds explicitly or implicitly opposed the MAS and its project of constitutional reform. In the name of democratic pluralism, support to civil society organizations has enabled urban-based groups often linked to political elites to voice proposals and counter proposals to those being debated

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394 Its municipal work continued through the NED, which provided the NGO with a grant of $52,000 in 2007 – 2008, and another for $57,000 in 2008 – 2009.
by the Constituent Assembly. While NGOs that have received funding have at times raised important concerns on the process and content of constitutional reform, the problem with such assistance is that it has indirectly affected the balance of forces on a crucial public policy question. The fact that the constitution was ultimately approved by popular referendum may point to the failure of U.S. democracy promotion to shift the balance significantly, but it does not diminish the strategic intent behind this form of interventionism. Although the ethnocentric assumptions of the democracy promotion industry typically forbid such comparisons, one can imagine the sense of scandal and outcry in the United States had the MAS (or the government of Hugo Chávez, for that matter) contributed funds to civil society groups engaged in the national debate on health care reform – an issue of far less consequence.

**Canadian DAAs and popular forces**

Although Canadian democracy assistance to Bolivian civil society is generally quite modest, both Development and Peace and Rights and Democracy have provided support to various civil society organizations, including progressive NGOs and social movements with a mass base. Amongst these movements figure some of the most important indigenous and popular organizations, most of whom supported the proposed constitution – albeit not without criticism of some of the actions MAS representatives in the Constituent Assembly. If many organizations which have received U.S. funding have been linked to urban middle class sectors that have opposed the MAS’ project of constitutional change, the same cannot be said of those which have received Canadian funds. As has been the case in Peru, Development and Peace has adopted a grassroots

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395 Interview, La Paz: February 13, 2009 (my translation).
approach to democracy promotion in Bolivia that differs considerably from the U.S. one; Rights and Democracy has also adopted a grassroots approach. The defining characteristic of this approach is that it has been based on solidarity with grassroots organizations and NGOs representing the popular sectors of Bolivian society.

In examining Canadian democracy assistance to Bolivian civil society, the most obvious trend is the near absence of CIDA aid to civil society organizations. Throughout most of the 2000s, CIDA assistance has been channelled primarily to state institutions. In 2007 – 2008, CIDA began providing significant support to women’s organizations, though all 10 grants that were awarded that year went to organizations working primarily on health and reproduction issues.\(^{396}\) In the area of democracy, the vast majority of Canadian democracy assistance to civil society organizations in Bolivia has been channelled through Development and Peace and Rights and Democracy. Development and Peace’s *Bolivia Country Program*—situated within its overall *Program of Support for Civil Society in Latin America*—contributed $923,724 to Bolivian civil society organizations in its 2003 – 2006 phase (Development and Peace 2006b), and has allocated an additional $2.56 million for its five-year program from 2006 to 2011 (Development and Peace 2006c).\(^{397}\) Initially, the program provided support to 13 grassroots organizations, though this was subsequently reduced to six in its second phase. The main objective of Development and Peace’s program has been to strengthen the capacity of social actors to promote change. Some of its partners, most notably the national federation of domestic workers, the *Federación Nacional de Trabajadoras del Hogar de*
Bolivia (FENATRAHOB), and the regional association of indigenous peoples in Santa Cruz, the Coordinadora de Pueblos Etnicos de Santa Cruz (CPESC), have been at the forefront of progressive struggles. Both of these organizations represent mass social constituencies. Development and Peace has also supported progressive NGOs which have acted in solidarity with popular movements, such as the organization Alas Yvi Avarenda. Although it did not continue supporting CPESC in its second phase of programming, Development and Peace has maintained its support to FENATRAHOB and Alas Yvi Avarenda, as well as other progressive NGOs.

Founded in the late 1980s, FENATRAHOB represents the domestic workers of Bolivia, the vast majority of whom are indigenous women who have migrated from the countryside to work in the urban homes of the wealthy and middle class. Over the years, the federation has led the struggle to regulate the salaries and benefits of domestic workers; it has also been a major force in the indigenous popular movement. One of its founders and leaders, Casimira Rodríguez, served as Morales’ first minister of justice in 2006, during which time the government passed a Declaration of the Rights of Domestic Workers (Romer 2008b). FENATRAHOB’s leaders situate their struggle to counter patriarchal racist relations between domestic workers and their employers within the overall struggle against the legacy of colonialism (Blofield 2009).

CPESC is the regional affiliate representing the indigenous of Santa Cruz within the national indigenous movement led by the Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia. Formed in 1992, Van Cott (2005) characterizes the association as a social movement organization which groups together multiple base community organizations. In the 1997 elections, the organization formed a strategic alliance with the MAS, which had no organizational structure in Santa Cruz. All of the MAS’ candidates were chosen
by CPESC communities or affiliates and the organization’s president, José Bailaba, ran on the party slate. CPESC has retained close ties with the MAS and was a key supporter of the constitutional project. Indeed, the organization helped galvanize the process through the March for the Constituent Assembly and Natural Resources in 2002, in which members marched for 37 days from Santa Cruz to La Paz. CPESC has repeatedly clashed with regional authorities and civic organizations which have supported regional autonomy. In September 2008, its headquarters were looted and nearly destroyed, an act it alleged was committed by vandals associated with the Prefect, Unión Juvenil Cruceñista, and Comité Cívico Pro Santa Cruz (CPESC 2008).

Although Alas Yvi Avarenda does not possess a broad social base like FENATRAHOB and CPESC, it carries out its work in solidarity with popular organizations in Santa Cruz. Established in 1991, the NGO focuses on building the capacities of popular organizations engaged in struggles surrounding land claims, control of natural resources and the protection of the environment. It carries out legal research on behalf of such struggles and also provides legal aid to organizations engaged in them. The organization has signed numerous declarations in support of popular causes, including land reform. It has also supported the Coordinadora Regional por el Cambio (CORECAM), the body linking regional social movements, in denouncing the project of regional autonomy as one which represents the interests of the regional elite rather than indigenous workers and peasants.398

Rights and Democracy, for its part, only established its Bolivian country program,

398 See Alas Yvi Avarenda’s web site for these statements, as well as other related documents: http://alasyvyavarenda.wordpress.com/category/documentos-y-pronunciamientos/
Strengthening the Participation and Capacity of Indigenous Organizations, in 2006. Its main objective has been to foster greater political participation of indigenous peoples and women, particularly in the current process of social change. Through this program, the Canadian QUANGO has provided support to CEADESC, which, as noted earlier, was one of the few U.S.-funded organizations not to oppose the constitution. More significantly, however, Rights and Democracy has supported an alliance of indigenous, peasant, and women’s organizations called the Pacto de Unidad, all of which are linked to mass social constituencies. The most politically significant of these organizations is the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), which, as noted in chapter three, was one of the first indigenous peasant organizations to emerge in the late 1970s. The Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas, Indígenas Originarias Bartolinas Sisa (FNMCIOB-BS) is also a highly significant inasmuch as it is the main popular organization bringing together peasant women. Although the Pacto was strongly in favour of constitutional change, it was at times quite critical of decisions made by MAS representatives in the Constituent Assembly that sidelined their proposals. The executive secretary of the CSUTCB, Isaac Ávalos, was particularly outspoken about the behaviour of certain MAS representatives, which he considered treacherous (La Razón 2006). Nonetheless, the Pacto did manage to ensure that most of its demands were incorporated in the proposed constitution, for which the CSUTCB campaigned strongly in

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399 It should be noted that the founder and president of the Fundación Boliviana para la Democracia Multipartidaria, Guido Riveros Franck, sits on the board of directors of Rights and Democracy.

400 The organizations forming the pact are the: Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB), Confederación Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia (CSCB), Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas, Indígenas Originarias Bartolinas Sisa (FNMCIOB-BS), Movimiento Cultural Afrodescendiente, Asociación Nacional de Regantes y Sistemas Comunitarios de Agua Potable (ANARESCAPYS), and Coordinadora de Pueblos Étnicos de Santa Cruz (CPESC).
favour (Bolpress 2008).

Canadian democracy promotion in the area of civil society has thus differed considerably from the U.S. approach. Those organizations which have received support from Development and Peace and Rights and Democracy have either been progressive in orientation or have actually been part of the popular movement, even more so than was the case in Peru. Again, this indicates that there are still considerable differences between Canadian and U.S. support to civil society through democracy assistance programs; the convergence around an interventionist model that was observed in Haiti thus far constitutes the exception rather than the rule. Nonetheless, there are still serious concerns on the validity of any form of democracy promotion that targets civil society organization given the susceptibility of Canadian DAAs to advancing the political agenda of the Canadian state. Although counter-factual speculations should not be pursued too far, one must wonder whether Rights and Democracy and Development and Peace would have focused exclusively on mainstream NGOs largely opposed to the MAS had Canadian foreign policy in Bolivia been more strategically in line with Ottawa’s ideological agenda.

The promise of a new Bolivia

This chapter has focused primarily upon providing a critical-empirical account of U.S. and Canadian democracy assistance programs in Bolivia. But before offering some concluding comments on the nature of democracy promotion in Bolivia, it is important to end with an assessment of Bolivia’s transformative project and the prospects for deeper democratization. For if both the United States and, to a lesser extent, Canada, are promoting polyarchy, then the question that arises once again is whether the current conjuncture offers the possibility of a more democratic alternative. Although Bolivia’s
democratic development will continue to reflect the hegemonic struggles between popular
and oligarchic social forces, the possibilities of consolidating a more democratic social
order are considerably more advanced than in Peru or Haiti. As Bolivia seeks to
synthesize different democratic traditions, however, one must ask whether it has turned its
back on liberal democracy – as many urban elites and the opposition continuously allege
– or has it actually abandoned the project of radical social transformation as some of its
former allies and leftist intellectuals maintain.

The liberal critique can be simplified to a few albeit central issues: the
government is centralizing power in the executive while violating the rule of law;
representative institutions are not being respected; the MAS refuses to compromise with
opposition parties; and the independence of the judiciary has been threatened on several
occasions. It is true that the government interfered – at times unconstitutionally, when the
Constitutional Assembly reached a political stalemate as a result of the deep seated
divisions between those elected representatives aligned with the MAS and those linked to
the opposition political parties. Evo Morales no doubt centralizes a considerable degree
of decision making in the office of the presidency and there is a widespread cult of
personality which surrounds his persona. On many occasions, the MAS has refused to
negotiate with opposition parties, in both the Congress and the Senate, where, until
recently, the opposition held the majority. The government has also come into conflict
with the judiciary, including on the appointment and firing of justices of the Supreme
Court.\footnote{By all accounts, however, Morales has instituted new forms of consultation
which allow the government to consult with a much wider range of social actors than}
most other governments in Bolivian history, including through the *consulta*, the *audencias*, and the creation of new ministries linked to different social constituencies.\(^\text{402}\)

The government itself has resorted to mechanisms of popular consent such as referenda on more occasions than any previous government. Those urban-based NGOs which have voiced criticism of the MAS are in part unable to concede that the process of decolonization implies at least a partial renouncement of the mediating role they have played between the state and civil society (Monasterios 2007).

The MAS has also negotiated with the opposition on a number of vital issues, including on the structure, conduct and content of the Constitutional Assembly, and has forsaken its own constitutional prerogatives to counter illegal acts of treason by the prefects and opposition forces (Webber 2008).\(^\text{403}\) The MAS counters claims of judicial intervention by noting that those judges who were fired were themselves linked to the political opposition and were acting unconstitutionally. It should also be recalled that the organization of the regional referendums for autonomy was deemed legal only by the regional electoral commissions against the constitutional authority of the National Electoral Court (Andean Information Network 2008). As for imposing a hegemonic project, there is no question that there are two competing social visions being vigorously, and at times, violently contested in Bolivia. These projects represent regionally-based

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\(^{401}\) The New York-based Human Rights Foundation summarizes the case against the President’s interference with the Supreme Court in a letter addressed to the Secretary General of the OAS denouncing the violation of the rule of law by several government in Latin America (Halvorssen 2008).

\(^{402}\) These mechanisms were explained to me in an interview with Gerardo García Mendoza, a representative of CONALCAM. The *consulta* refers to the MAS’ practice of meeting with social movements before raising key issues in parliament; the *audiencias* consist of the morning sessions Morales holds with representatives of different social sectors almost daily at 5:00am. Santa Cruz: March 2, 2009. See also Harnecker and Fuentes’ (Harnecker and Fuentes 2008) published interviews with members of the MAS on how the party functions as the instrument of the social movements.

\(^{403}\) For instance, when autonomists overtook the airport in Tarija to prevent a planned meeting between Morales and the President of Venezuela in August 2008, the government backed away from enforcing the
social forces, but they are not exclusively geographical: the indigenous population of the media luna is not negligible and it is increasingly supportive of the MAS. In the December presidential elections, Morales won 40 percent of the votes in Santa Cruz and managed to overtake the main opposition candidate in Tarija with 48.6 percent of the vote.\textsuperscript{404} It is also worth noting that some issues in the process of social transformation are zero sum (Webber 2008); there will always be losers when the prevailing distribution of economic and political power is radically challenged.

As we have seen from Bolivia’s history, the unequal social relations that have long characterized Bolivian society have depended upon the exploitation and exclusion of subaltern groups through violence and coercion. The elite’s attempt to create a new hegemonic order through inclusive forms of neoliberalism utterly failed to recreate the Bolivian nation along more equitable lines. The plurinational Bolivian state proclaimed by the current government has done more than any other in Bolivian history – if not all of Latin American, to recognize the cultural and political claims of indigenous peoples, complementing this recognition through different forms of redistributive justice. The recuperation of indigenous values and their enshrinement in the constitution as part of the ethical foundation of the nation is an important aspect of decolonization (Prada 2008). Representative democracy itself has been made more accountable through indigenous democratic concepts like manda porque obedece, which stipulates that representatives must lead through obedience to the community (Patzi 2004).

\textsuperscript{404} Overall, Morales obtained 63 percent of the vote compared to 54 percent four years earlier. The MAS won two-thirds of the seats in both Congress and the Senate, where it obtained its first majority. See the Democracy Center’s web blog for an excellent compilation of results and analysis: http://democracvctr.org/blog/2009/12/election-day-in-bolivia-and-oddities-of.html
If anything, Bolivia’s break with its past has been exceptionally remarkable for its adherence to democratic norms. As Harris (2007) states, the use of democratic means such as a constituent assembly to “fashion revolutionary institutional space” differentiates the Bolivian experience considerably “from twentieth-century socialist tactics that focused on the seizure of the existing state by armed struggle.” Few socialist governments in peripheral countries have shown such a strong commitment to democratic mechanisms—though there is no question that there is considerable room for improvement. Bolivia is one of the few places where the historic task of reconciling different democratic traditions is being attempted and it will likely take time before we can take the full measure of its successes and failures.

The radical critique of the MAS flips the liberal argument on its head, denouncing the government for having betrayed its base by going too far in appeasing the opposition and failing to radically confront the capitalist system. If the party regularly consults the social movements, many of these have been co-opted and do not deviate from the party line. Popular sectors have been marginalized, or worst, have suffered repression at the hands of the state. The MAS has turned its back on the project of radical democracy associated with the popular insurrection of the resource wars. In the words of Oscar Olivera, the secretary general of the Federación de Trabajadores Fabriles de Cochabamba and a key leader in the water wars: “I believe that, ultimately, the democracy that the people succeeded in practicing between 2000 and 2003 no longer exists. I believe that we have lost it. I would say that the government has created spaces such as the Coordinadora Nacional para el Cambio (CONALCAM) which are more like

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405 See Sweeney (2009) for a defence of how the MAS has acted democratically against a political opposition closely allied with violent extremist groups; McNeish (2008) argues that Bolivia’s process of
Feminist critics argue further that the MAS reproduces the hierarchical practices of patriarchal and union culture which indigenist discourses have concealed.  

Again, such critiques are not without foundation. Most government consultation is institutionalized through CONALCAM. There are more radical sectors such as those represented by Olivera which critique the MAS for not having gone far enough in nationalizing natural resources and redistributing land. At its worst, the government has failed to support state miners’ demands for nationalization and workers’ control against the competing claims of private co-operative miners aligned with transnational mining companies (Dangl and Howard 2006). If the MAS began as a militant social movement, by the mid 2000s it was already being led by the urban middle class and mestizo intellectuals who have emphasized the need to moderate the party’s radical profile; in the words of the president himself, full socialist transformation has been put on the back burner for another 50 to 100 years (Webber 2008).

In terms of its internal structure and relations with the social movements, it must be noted that the MAS has consistently increased the scope of consultation rather than narrowed it. Moreover, if the indigenous movement from which it emerged initially failed to confront patriarchal norms (even though women were central actors in this movement), the MAS has strengthened relations with popular women’s organizations such as FNMCIOB-BS from the Pacto de Unidad (Monasterios 2007). A full articulation between the struggles for the emancipation from patriarchy and the emancipation from social change has largely respected the constitutional order despite moments of insurrection.

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406 Interview, Cochabamba: February 27, 2009 (my translation).
407 This criticism was summarized during an interview with the feminist scholar, Ivonne Farah, Directora, Ciencias del Desarrollo de la Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (CIDES-UMSA). La Paz: February 11, 2009.
internal colonialism has not yet occurred but there is movement in that direction. Most impressively, the new cabinet of Evo Morales is composed of half women (AFP 2010), thereby demonstrating a commitment to gender equality and the democratization of the patriarchal state that few western states have ever matched.

Arguments that the MAS failed to seize the transformative opportunities offered by a revolutionary epoch perhaps overstate the actual balance of forces when the neoliberal state collapsed. The Latin American left has learned the lessons of the past, particularly the importance of maintaining democratic legitimacy against oligarchic forces that have historically had no qualms about using force to protect the status quo. Rapid radical change could have led to more violent confrontation. If it has not fundamentally challenged the rule of capital, it is most likely fearful of the ongoing possibilities of destabilization. The regional balance of power may be shifting quickly, but local oligarchs continue to exert tremendous influence with middle class support.

Nor have the MAS' accomplishments been negligible: despite tremendous regional opposition, the MAS has managed to mobilize the population in support of a constitution that upholds more rights than any other in Bolivia’s history, it has subordinated the state apparatus to civil society, it has broken with the history of economic and social exclusion of the past through a strategic policy of nationalization and generous social policies, and it has managed to maintain one of the region’s most impressive economic growth records while breaking with the legacy of imperial domination through the United States and the IFIs.\(^{408}\) This break is particularly

\(^{408}\) See Weisbrot et al. (2009) for a timely analysis of the Bolivian government’s successful economic policy, which has led to a higher average growth rate over the past four years than during any other time in the last 30 years. Among other things, the authors argue that government control over natural resources has led to an effective expansionary fiscal policy that has counteracted several negative economic and political shocks.
significant in a region that has suffered the disastrous consequences of the Washington Consensus for more than two decades. As the Bolivian sociologist, Eduardo Córdova, argues, this rupture signifies the recuperation of the notion of popular sovereignty – a notion that was entirely absent from the third wave of democratization – into the public discourse on the very meaning of democracy.409

The history of military dictatorship has also taught the left that representative democracy is more than a hollow shell. The MAS has waged a war of position that emphasizes the importance of democratic consent; it has sought to popularize a new value system based on a fusion of indigenous and socialist principles. In the long term, such a process of transformation offers considerable more hope than the Bolshevik model of socialist transformation under the leadership of a party vanguard. But it also remains within the revolutionary tradition insofar as the articulation of a counter-hegemonic bloc served as the backdrop for the contestation of state power as a sine qua non of transformation. It breaks with this tradition – in both its Leninist and Gramscian formulations – by recognizing that liberal democratic institutions are important features of a more progressive social order. While it is important to critique the MAS and learn from its mistakes and shortcomings – and there is no question that there have been many – arguments that dismiss its potential as a transformative agent have not progressed much further beyond a traditional socialist contempt for the institutions and practices associated with bourgeois democracy. The project for social emancipation led by the MAS is still very much a work in progress that points to the possibilities of a mass democratic transformation more inspiring and less centralist than any other country in the region.

409 Interview, Cochabamba: February 26, 2009. It should be noted that Córdova himself is not uncritical of the MAS, though very much supportive of the larger process of social change.
Concluding remarks

This chapter has argued that the United States and Canada have both sought to influence Bolivia’s process of democratic development, albeit from considerably different vantage points and with different degrees of strategic intent. For Canada, a more interventionist foreign policy in Bolivia did not develop during the period under consideration, though its democracy assistance programs did seek to stabilize the neoliberal state as it increasingly came under attack in the first half of the decade. Canada also used its development programs to a certain extent by seeking to influence the management of key natural resources. Nonetheless, it continued to support state institutions after the rise of the MAS while Canadian DAAs provided considerable assistance to progressive NGOs and social movements with large social constituencies.

Conversely, the United States did seek to influence the balance of forces away from the MAS through a partial interventionist strategy. At the beginning of the millennium, USAID and U.S. QUANGOs articulated discursive constructions of citizenship based on bio-technologies of power that reinforced the possibility of creating an elite-led hegemonic order. The turning point to a partial strategy of elite mobilization occurred in 2005, when the OTI launched a new phase in USAID’s decentralization program that focused on empowering regional prefects. At the same time, researchers and investigative journalists who have sought to explain U.S. democracy assistance programs exclusively in terms of their support to the opposition put forward many exaggerated (and at times unsubstantiated) claims. They overlook the ways in which the shifting power dynamics in Bolivia and the region as a whole curtailed the degree to
which an interventionist foreign policy was politically feasible and make no distinction between different democracy promotion strategies.

Even at the height of the tensions between different political forces, U.S. political party programs included the MAS. In civil society, U.S. DAAs pursued a strategy of supporting urban-based NGOs critical of the proposed constitution rather than openly supporting opposition civic organizations. Although these organizations provided ideological ammunition to the war of position being waged by the opposition, they did not form a coalition against the government. The case of Bolivia thus reaffirms the importance of a critical approach to democracy promotion rooted in a cultural political economy that conceptualize the configuration of international and national variables that condition the form of democracy promotion adopted by Canadian and U.S. DAAs.

The form of democracy that is emerging in Bolivia also provides the most promising alternative to polyarchy in the three countries that have been examined in this study. The fusion of democratic projects in Bolivia offers a new model which has yet to reach its full potential in a continent rife with democratic experiments. The popular excitement surrounding that project stands in sharp contrast with the moribund liberal democratic system of the United States, where the gap between the promise of liberal democracy and its actual practice is growing every day. Compared to the state of democratic discourse in that country, the Bolivian public sphere is alive with foundational questions that speak to the very definition of Bolivian society. The contrast exposes the shallowness of the cultural claims to superiority that justify democracy promotion as a legitimate enterprise. While there may nonetheless be a meaningful role that U.S. democracy assistance programs can play in strengthening democratic institutions in a place like Bolivia, the United States will have to accept that it can no longer use its
programs to alter the balance of power in civil society and the political party system. It
does not have the moral standing to do so, nor does its conception of democracy coincide
with the one espoused by popular movements in the countries where it operates. The
geopolitical and economic interests of the U.S. state and its transnational corporations
have already been rejected by the majority of Bolivian people who have reintroduced the
notion of popular sovereignty. Canada would do well to learn from the experience of the
United States to ensure that its own tradition of democracy promotion is not subordinated
to a U.S. model that has already run its course. Whatever form of democracy is
emerging in Bolivia, it is clear that it is not the right of democracy assistance agencies to
shape this process. It is high time that Bolivians, Peruvians, Haitians and the peoples of
all Latin American countries get to determine on whose terms the promotion of
democracy will be carried out on their soil.
Conclusions
New beginnings

This dissertation set out to explore the ways in which Canada and the United States go about promoting democracy in the Americas. It approached its object of inquiry based on the premise that promoting democracy is inherently a political enterprise. From this standpoint I sought, specifically, to explore the ways in which democracy assistance programs affect the balance of power between different social forces, to theorize the strategies, tactics and approaches of democracy assistance agencies in terms of these affects, and to uncover the similarities and difference between Canadian and US. approaches. Finally, I asked the question as to whether the approaches of Canada and the United States were undergoing a process of convergence. The remaining pages briefly review the findings of this project, its main theoretical contributions to a critical theory of democracy promotion, and its potential to open up new lines of inquiry in a critical research agenda. I end by assessing the implications of the analysis to orientate a practical strategy of engagement on the part of progressive civil society actors to contest the increasingly ideological direction in which Canadian democracy promotion is headed.

The theoretical point of departure in this research was the neo-Gramscian analysis developed by Robinson, which views democracy promotion as a form of interventionism designed to support the hegemony of transnationalized fractions of capital. The case of Haiti demonstrates the ongoing relevance of this model for both the United States and Canada. As the basis for a critical theory of democracy promotion, however, this model is inadequate on both empirical and theoretical grounds. Among other things, it overlooks how democracy promotion benefits various social sectors in elite civil society defined by culture and ethnicity as much as class. It does not provide a comprehensive
framework for analyzing shifting strategies of destabilization and stabilization, nor does it
differentiate between the different approaches that Canada and the United States continue
to advance. As we have seen, Canada and the United States have sought to stabilize
neoliberal polyarchy in Peru and Bolivia but with different degrees of strategic intent.
Canada’s support to neoliberalism and growing economic interests – particularly in the
mining sector – have conditioned its approach, but they have not led to a strategic
instrumentalization uniquely to accomplish political objectives. Canada has reinforced
polyarchy at a general systemic level, but Canadian DAAs have also supported grassroots
organizations. The United States, for its part, has adopted softer forms of democracy
promotion in both countries to accomplish its political objectives. In Bolivia, a more
aggressive approach was temporarily adopted but later abandoned as the Bolivian
government increasingly clashed with the United States.

This project has contributed to a critical theory of democracy promotion by
developing a framework that helps account for such variability in approaches between
core states and theorizes the more subtle ways in which democracy assistance programs
affect power relations. It has situated the form of democracy promotion within a larger
matrix of factors which includes the historical traditions of specific democracy promotion
fields of practice, shifting patterns in the regional system and world order, specific
bilateral relations, and the local political context in which programs are implemented. As
such, it contributes to theoretical debates in the neo-Gramscian literature on the nature of
neoliberal world order by reaffirming the importance of a Coxian approach that does not
dismiss the ongoing relevance of the nation state and national traditions on foreign policy
orientations. It has also contributed to a cultural political economy by demonstrating the
theoretical fruitfulness of incorporating Foucauldian concepts in a neo-Gramscian
framework of hegemony to assess the ways in which democracy assistance programs enact and affect power relations as a more general project of governance. Concepts such as discourse and governmentality help us to identify the more subtle ways in which democracy promotion contributes to neoliberal polyarchy at a systemic level – in short, the how of power. A cultural political economy also highlights the ways in which the very notion of democracy promotion is embedded in discourses of cultural superiority.

It is hoped that this framework may serve to orient additional investigations on the relation between democracy promotion and world order. This could include a larger comparative study on Canadian and U.S. approaches in the Americas as well as other regions. It could entail expanding or revisiting the typology of strategies here proposed in the interests of greater theoretical and analytical clarity. Given the overall lack of comparative investigation of approaches by other core states – especially EU members – it might also help situate investigations of the approaches of European actors at different geographic scales including in specific regions and countries. It would be interesting to see, for instance, if and to what extent EU members and organizations have used their approaches to advance neoliberal world order within traditional regions of influence such as Eastern and Central Europe and North Africa. Critical empirical investigations of international organizations, particularly those which – like the United Nations Democracy Fund – have just recently entered the field, are also required. What are the traditions, ideologies, and visions that inform the approaches of these actors? In what ways do they intersect with the U.S. model? Are there larger patterns of convergence to be discerned? These are the questions that a critical theory needs to ask.

In terms of the convergence of U.S. and Canadian approaches, this dissertation has argued that there are strong indications that the Canadian state is reorganizing the
democracy promotion field of practice along a more ideologically-driven model approximating the U.S. tradition. But this is a recent macro development which has affected Haiti much more than Peru and Bolivia. While it may indicate the beginnings of a common North American approach, democracy promotion is still not monolithic; a theory that homogenizes the foreign policy of core states does little to elucidate the continuities and discontinuities that characterize specific democracy promotion fields of practice. At the same time, the experience of Canadian democracy promotion does illustrate certain tendencies in Canadian imperialism and the ways in which state agents have increasingly sought to legitimize neoliberal world order. For there is little doubt that the Canadian state has promoted a neoliberal model of accumulation in the Americas as a regional dimension of world order and that this is increasingly reflected in democracy assistance programs.

Neo-Marxist accounts have captured the peculiar regional dynamics of this model through the concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession,’ which highlights the ways in which Canadian mining companies and the state have sought to dispossess indigenous peoples of their land and resources. A theory of Canadian imperialism, however, must also consider the unique ideological role that the Canadian state has adopted in advancing neoliberal world order through the reconstruction of its status as a middlepower. The case of Haiti indicates that the deployment of Canadian imperialism is motivated by ideological considerations as much as material ones – indeed, Canadian democracy promotion has been most imperialistic in a country where material interests are weakest.

The issue of Canadian imperialism and its growing influence on all levels of foreign policy and international development assistance brings us to a final ethical-political discussion concerning the future of democracy promotion. From a moral
perspective, democracy promotion as it is currently practiced by Canada and the United States violates the basic principles on which democracy – however defined – is based. Its only form of accountability is to those project officers and functionaries whose project frameworks structure its activities. Those who are affected by its programs – the citizens of the countries in which they are implemented – are often not even aware of its existence. They have no control or say over how it affects the development of their own societies. While the impact is sometimes positive – particularly in the area of institution building – it is clear that if there is to be any legitimate role for democracy promotion as a field of international development it can only be under conditions of accountability and respect for democratic sovereignty.

From a practical perspective, I have argued throughout this work that democracy promotion has ultimately failed to stabilize neoliberal polyarchy in Haiti, Peru or Bolivia. The more it becomes manipulated to accomplish this objective, the more wasteful and futile it becomes. The massive amounts poured into Haiti by Canada to stabilize its contradictory social order is a case in point. The new forms of democracy and social organization that are developing will continue to face challenges, but they indicate, for now, a tendency toward deeper democratization as well as a growing shift in the regional balance of power away from the failed neoliberal model. With the implosion of the neoliberal financial system and the steady decline of the United States, the Americas has emerged as a key region where a more equitable order is in the making. Given these tendencies, the deployment of a Canadian middlepowermanship in the service of neoliberal world order is costly not only in terms of the resources allocated to stabilize it but also in terms of its impact on Canada’s international standing. The creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CLAC) in February 2010 at the Rio
Group Summit symbolizes the diminishing credibility of both Canada and the U.S. in the region. Although the future of this organization dedicated to the defence of human rights, democracy and regional cooperation is unclear, the exclusion of Canada and the United States most certainly reflects a growing rejection by many countries of their political and economic policies (though of course they still have their regional allies).

Canadian civil society actors must engage with the state to redirect foreign policy on the right side of history, that is, towards respect and co-habitation with the different models of democracy and regional organizations that are emerging. The ALBA and UNASUR are two of the most visible examples of how the regional vision once embodied in the FTAA is increasingly irrelevant. For Canada, this means, as the work of Robert Cox (2002; 2005) has repeatedly emphasized, that the wave of the future lies in greater respect for cultural pluralism and regional diversity. In concrete terms, the hopes for a better world lie in the reconstruction of an effective state system as a counter-weight to U.S. dominance and its long-term trajectory of decline. Indeed, as Cox states, the realpolitik of a middlepower must be based on the idea that “recognition of sovereignty within a community of nations is a shield against the dominance of inherent in a one-on-one unequal relationship” (2004: 10).

As the Canadian state reorganizes its democracy promotion efforts in the context of a global backlash against U.S. democracy promotion, the field of international development constitutes one of the decisive terrains on which the battle for democratic sovereignty must be waged. With the increased media attention surrounding the possibilities of a Canadian Democracy Institute and the take-over of Rights and Democracy, Canada has entered a critical juncture that offers a unique moment for action and reflection. Civil society coalitions such as the Americas Policy Program (APG) of
the Canadian Council for International Cooperation which have criticized the Harper
government's Americas Strategy may serve as the catalysts for a broader consideration
and critique of the role of democracy promotion in foreign policy (although, of course,
the APG includes NGOs which have been criticized in these pages). Progressive actors
might follow the lead of U.S. organizations such as the National Lawyers Guild (NLG),
which have spoken out against democracy promotion and have called on the state to end
this form of interventionism.410

More radical groups that have been mentioned in this analysis – such as the
Canada Haiti Activist Network (CHAN), the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti
and the Center for Democracy in Bolivia – indicate that a small counter-hegemonic
democracy promotion tendency is also beginning to emerge. Defined by their solidarity
with popular movements, these organizations have exposed the undemocratic foreign
policies of their governments within a larger critique of North-South relations. They link
their support to democracy to larger political and social issues in the international
economy, such as the illegitimacy of Third World debt and unequal trade relations. They
have contributed intellectual and material resources to popular movements in the Third
World and have engaged in a war of position over foreign policy that is taking place in
their home countries. It is with these groups that progressive scholars and activists must
find common cause. Although their actions at times detract from the larger message (the
CHAN's direct action tactics, for instance, seem more intended to mollify their
perpetrators than to contribute to an effective strategy), they have undertaken important
research and practical work. The experience of such organizations indicates the need to

410 See NLG statement, Resolution on the Misuse of U.S. Government "Democracy Promotion" Initiatives
devise a repertoire of counter-hegemonic democracy promotion strategies that might
serve to orient future engagement.

At a minimum, progressive groups should call for a moratorium on additional
funding for democracy promotion and a thorough review – by parliament and civil
society actors representing diverse sectors – of all those programs currently underway.
No new funding should occur until a regulatory framework is developed that sets careful
conditions on when, where and under what conditions Canada will engage in democracy
promotion from a principled perspective that respects democratic sovereignty and is
conscious of how easily programs can be used as a form of interventionism by the state.
Democracy promotion is inherently susceptible to political manipulation and, in the end,
there may be no way to legitimately engage in activities designed to support civil society,
let alone political parties. Although it may appear paradoxical, supporting polyarchy in
the institutional sense – especially when it is channelled through basket-funds and similar
mechanisms – may be the most progressive form of democracy promotion since it avoids
the susceptibilities of the grassroots approach and its subjective emphasis on empowering
civil society actors. A truly democratic democracy promotion – if one is possible – would
support the institutions that regulate the rules of the game rather than the teams that play
it.

Indeed, despite the process of convergence, it is important to keep in mind that
the future direction of Canadian democracy promotion has not been pre-determined; the
Canadian state itself remains a site of contestation between nationally and internationally-
constituted social forces. This also applies to the U.S. state, however dim the prospects of

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a significant foreign policy realignment may seem in the current conjuncture. Critical activists and scholars in both countries must do their best to promote a more progressive foreign policy that prioritizes a genuine commitment to supporting democratic development based on solidarity with the peoples of the Third World in their struggles against different forms of domination and dehumanization.
Appendix
List of interviews

Montreal
1. Anne-Catherine Kennedy, Chargée de Programmes (Amérique Latine), Développement et Paix, June 25, 2008
2. Nicholas Galetti, Regional Officer for the America, Rights and Democracy, May 23, 2008
3. Nancy Thede, Professor, l’Université du Québec à Montréal, June 1, 2009
4. Payam Akhavan, Professor and former board member of Rights and Democracy, McGill University, February 10, 2010.
5. Brian Concannon, Executive Director, (IJDH), June 6, 2008. Telephone interview Montreal – Oregon

Ottawa
7. Ginette Martin, Mexico and North America Division, DFAIT, October 30, 2008
8. Kevin Skerrett, Researcher, Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), Member, Canada Haiti Action Network, October 31, 2008
10. Miriam Lapp, Senior Advisor, Research and Outreach, Elections Canada, October 31, 2008
11. Victoria Sutherland, Manager, Office for Democratic Governance, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), December 19, 2009
13. John Lok, Senior Development Officer, Bolivia Program, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), January 2, 2009

Haiti (Port-au-Prince)
17. Felix Ulloa, Resident Director, NDI Haiti, July 15, 2008
18. Lorraine Manognès, Directrice Adjointe, Fondation Connaissance et Liberté (FOKAL), July 17, 2008
19. Sohrab Farid, Second Secretary (Political), Embassy of Canada to Haiti, July 14, 2008
20. Sylvain Côté, Coordonnateur Adjoint, Centre Parlementaire, July 16, 2008
23. Sandra Charles, Première Secrétaire, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), March 12, 2009
24. Delegation from Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH), March 13, 2009
   - Alizar Viles, Responsable de Programmes
   - Rosy Auguste Ducena, Assistante au Programme de Monitoring
26. Sony Esteus, Directeur, Société d’Animation pour la Communication Sociale (SAKS), March 16, 2009
27. Delegation from Confédération des Travailleurs Haïtiens (CTH), March 16, 2009
   - Paul Loulou Chery, Secrétaire Général
   - Marie-Louise Lebrun, Secrétaire Adjointe
   - Paul Serge, Membre du Bureau
28. Dr Rudolph Prudent, Candidat au Sénat de la République d’Haïti, Kombit Pour Bati Ayiti (KOMBA), March 17, 2009
29. Camille Chalmers, Directeur Exécutif, Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif (PAPDA), March 17, 2009
30. Danielle Magloire, Directrice, Droits et Democratie, Membre, Enfofanm, March 18, 2009
31. Chavannes Jean-Baptiste, Directeur Exécutif, Mouvement Paysan de Papaye (MPP), March 19, 2009
32. Renan Hedouville, Secrétaire Général, Comité des Avocats pour le Respect des Libertés Individuelles (CARLI), March 19, 2009
33. Antonal Mortime, Secrétaire Exécutif de la Plate-Forme des Organisations Haïtiennes de Droits Humains (POHDH), March 20, 2009
35. Maître Mario Joseph, Avocat, Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI), March 23, 2009
36. Didier Dominique, Responsable à Batay Ouvriye, Batay Ouvriye, March 24, 2009
37. Jean-Claude Bajeux, Directeur, Centre Écuménique des Droits Humains (CEDH), Siège social du Forum citoyen, March 24, 2009
38. Ernst Mathurin, Responsable d’Appui Conseil, Groupe de Recherche et d’Appui en Milieu Rural (GRAMIR), March 25, 2009
39. Delegation from Fondation Espoir, March 25, 2009
   - Hans Tippenhauer, Directeur Exécutif
   - Florence Bellande Robertson, Fondatrice et Présidente
40. Marilyn Allien, Présidente, La Fondation Héritage pour Haïti (LFHH), March 26, 2009
   - Yves Pierre Louis, Porte Parole (Journaliste)
   - Daniel Florival, Porte Parole
42. Delegation from le Réseau d’Organs National Multiplicateur de Fanmi Lavalas (RONMFL), March 27, 2009
   - Promestil Pierre Melisca, Coordonnateur Général
   - Joseph Véroël St. Luc, Relation Publique
   - Chrisy Francilome, Coordonnatrice Adjointe
43. Delegation of various Organisations de Base, March 27, 2009
   - Oné Ronald, Coordonnateur Général, Organisation pour la Défense des Droits de Prisonniers
   - Deville Elysée, Délégué Général, Organisation pour la Défense des Droits de Prisonniers
   - Louis Wilder, Délégué Adjoint, Organisation pour la Défense des Droits de Prisonniers
   - Piard Jacques Fayal, Coordonnateur, Kolektif Arsyo pou Defann Anzlwaye
   - Robert Jean, Militant Socialiste
   - Hervé Jean Michel, Journaliste
44. Louis Deumeni Nkopipie, Responsable de l’Unité Accès à la Justice, Section Justice, Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti (MINUSTAH), March 30, 2009
45. Raoul Vital, Institut Culturel Karl Lévesque (ICKL), Responsable Programme des Droits Humains, March 31, 2009

Peru (Lima)
46. Catherine Lott, Office Chief, Democratic Initiatives Office, USAID, January 8, 2009
47. Anonymous USAID official, January 8, 2009
48. Carolina Loayza Tamayo, Directora de Derechos Humanos, Colegio de Abogados de Lima, January 9, 2009
49. Luis Lamas Puccio, Socio Principal, Bracamonte, Lamas Puccio, De Pierola, Clarke, Del Rosario & Abogados, January 12, 2009
50. Willian López Prieto, Presidente, Instituto Peruano de Educación en Derechos Humanos y la Paz (IPEDEHP), January 13, 2009
51. Cynthia Sanborn, Directora y Profesora de Ciencia Política, Centro de Investigacion de la Universidad del Pacífico, January 14, 2009
52. Dr. Max Hernández, Secretario Técnico, Acuerdo Nacional, January 15, 2009
53. Elsa M. Bardález del Águila, Secretaria General Adjunta, Transparencia, January 15, 2009
54. Patricia Zanabria, Coordinadora Nacional, Comité de América Latina y el Caribe para la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer (CLADEM), Responsable del Área Derecho a una Vida sin Violencia, Movimiento Manuela de Ramos, January 16, 2009
55. Enrique Juscamayta, Miembro del Comité Político y Director de PRODIN, Partido Nacionalista Peruano, January 17, 2009
56. Kristen Sample, Senior Programme Officer, International IDEA, January 19, 2009
57. Aldo Panfichi, Profesor Principal y Jefe del Departamento de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad Católica, January 19, 2009
58. Delegation from Defensoria del Pueblo, January 19, 2009
- Fernando Rafael Castañeda Portocarrero, Adjunto en Asuntos Constitucionales
- Edson Berrios Llanco, Comisionado, Adjunta en Asuntos Constitucionales
59. Gabriela Serrano, Resident Country Director Peru, International Republican Institute, January 19, 2009
60. Francisco Soberon Garrido, Director Ejecutivo, Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH), January 20, 2009
61. María Isabel Remy, Directora de Investigaciones, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, January 20, 2009
62. Luis Nunes Bertoldo, Director para el Perú, National Democratic Institute, January 21, 2009
63. Blanca Fernández Montenegro, Directora Ejecutiva, Flora Tristán, January 21, 2009
64. Delegation from Canadian Embassy, January 22, 2009
- Rebecca Mellett, Counsellor and Head of Aid
- Orietta Rodriguez, Programme Officer, Cooperation Section
65. Rosell Laberiano, Responsable Programa Democracia Participativa, Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social (CEAS), January 23, 2009

Bolivia (La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz)
66. Rielma Mencias, Defensora del Pueblo, Defensoría del Pueblo, February 10, 2009
67. Mario Quintanilla, Director, Instituto de Investigación Pedagógico y Social (IIPS), February 10, 2009
68. Alberto Palacios-Hardy, Counsellor and Consul Head of Aid, Embassy of Canada, February 11, 2009
69. Ivonne Farah, Directora, Ciencias del Desarrollo de la Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (CIDES-UMSA), February 11, 2009
70. Bertha Acarapi, Consejala El Alto, ACOBOL, February 11, 2009
71. Horst Grebe Lopez, Presidente, Fundación PRISMA, February 12, 2009
72. Armando Ortuno Yañez, Investigador, UNDP, February 12, 2009
73. Cesare Navarro, Jefe del Partido, Movimiento Al Socialismo, February 17, 2009
74. Edgar Antonio Rivero Buitrago, Director Ejecutivo, OBSERVANCIA Centro Interdisciplinario, February 13, 2009
75. Guido Riveros Franck, Director Ejecutivo, Fundación Boliviana para la Democracia Multipartidaria (fBDM), February 13, 2009
76. Antonio Aramayo Tejada, Director Ejecutivo, UNIR, February 16, 2009
77. Gonzalo Chavez, Director, Maestrías para el Desarrollo, February 17, 2009
78. Delegation from USAID, February 17, 2009
- Michael Eddy, Director, Office of Democratic Development
- Jessica Zaman, Deputy Director, Office of Democratic Development
80. Delegation from International IDEA, February 19, 2009
- Virginia Beramendi-Heine, Oficial del programa
- Alfonso Ferrufino, Asesor
81. Armando de la Parra Soria, Presidente, Fundación de Apoyo al Parlamento y a la Participación Ciudadana (FUNDAPPAC), February 20, 2009
82. Michel Rowland García, Director Residente, National Democratic Institute, February 20, 2009
83. Dan Moriarty, Researcher, Democracy Center, February 26, 2009
84. Eduardo Cordova, Sociólogo, Centro de Estudios Superiores Universitarios de la Universidad Mayor de San Simón, CESU-UMSS, February 26, 2009
85. Oscar Olivera, Secretario Ejecutivo, Federación de Trabajadores Fabriles de Cochabamba, February 27, 2009
86. Gerardo García Mendoza, Diputado, Coordinadora Nacional para el Cambio (CONALCAM), March 2, 2009
87. Luis Núñez Ribera, Primer Vicepresidente, Comité pro Santa Cruz, March 3, 2009
88. Rubén Costas Aguilera, Prefecto del Departamento Santa Cruz, Departamento de Santa Cruz, March 3, 2009


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