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The Distortions of Civil Society in Modernized Social Formations

Egypt: A Case Study

by

Nivine-Riad El-Kabbag

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the degree of

Masters of Arts

Department of Political Science

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
April 1995
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THE DISTORTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN MODERNIZED SOCIAL
FORMATIONS: EGYPT -- A CASE STUDY

submitted by

Nivine El-Kabbag, B.Sc., M.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements

for the degree of Master of Arts

Chair, Department of Political Science

Thesis Supervisor

Carleton University
April 27, 1995
Abstract

The distortions of civil society in modernized social formations, such as Egypt, has gained increasing attention with the current wave of democratization. However, the literature over civil society is mainly ethnocentric, in so far that Western values and social relations are considered the base for comparison. It is also reductionist as it emphasizes either the "internal" or the "external" factors without articulating them. Finally, most of this literature provides more descriptions rather than explanations. This thesis identifies three dimension of the concept of civil society: the privacy, the organisation, and the hegemony of an ideology, all of which are distorted in the case of Egypt. These distortions, this thesis argues, are better understood in their relation to the historical interactions between Egyptian social forces, state and the world order. The integration of Egypt into the world order and the deformed shape its modernization took, generated dynamics that led to the current distortions of civil society. First, this integration permitted the modernizing state, and its allied social forces, to expand its authority and its control over society and its organized expressions. Secondly, the dissolution of traditional societal institutions and the "implantation" of modern ones under the auspices of the modernizing state-elites gave representational politics a neopatrimonial type and undermined the representational character of institutions. Thirdly, the incomplete change of the Egyptian historic bloc created a situation of permanent passive revolution, where conflict between modern and traditional ideologies prevail, without one being able to dismantle the other. These three dynamics of deformed modernization underpin the current distortions of Egyptian civil society.
For Ezz-Edine
Une société composée d'une poussière d'individus inorganisés, qu'un État hypertrophié s'efforce d'enserrer et de retenir, constitue une véritable monstruosité sociologique.

Émile Durkheim 1960, 32.
Acknowledgment

I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor John Sigler, for his support during my MA program in general, and during the writing of this thesis in particular. I have benefitted from his insightful remarks on my research as well as from his wide knowledge of the Middle East. Special appreciation and gratitude to Professor Rianne Mahon for her encouragement and for her very helpful comments and suggestions since the thesis was in its planning stages. I am substantially indebted to her advice and consideration. The shape of this thesis is influenced by the help of my husband, Ezz-Eddine Choukri. I deeply appreciate his instructive and intelligent comments, his preferring me an intellectual environment and a continuous emotional support as well as always providing his equal share of looking after our two children. For Valerie Pereboom, I have only many thanks for her friendly help and professional cooperation. I would also like to thank Brent Cowan for revising and editing the final version of this thesis.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
A brief chronology of the history of Modern Egypt

639 The Arab conquest of Egypt.

1250 The beginning of the Mamluks reign.

1516 Selim I, the Ottoman Sultan, conquers Egypt, which becomes an Ottoman province, governed by a Wali (viceroy), named by the Sultan usually for one year and assisted by Mamluks who controlled the day-to-day life in Egypt and administered its defense (with an Ottoman Brigade). This system remains unchanged for nearly three centuries.

1798 Napoleon Bonaparte, leading a French expedition, occupies Egypt.

1801 A coalition of British and Ottoman forces obliges the French to leave Egypt. The Ottomans regain their sovereignty over Egypt. Khessro Pacha is nominated Wali. Conflicts between the Mamluks and the Ottomans re-emerge, and the British, who kept their troops in Egypt, attempt to build coalitions with both parties. Muhammad Ali, who came to Egypt as an Ottoman soldier, appears as a political figure who has allegiances with the Egyptians and their Ulama (Al-Azhar leaders).

1802 Four consecutive Walis are eliminated (the first was imprisoned by the Mamluks, the second killed, the third driven out of Egypt and the fourth killed). In the same year, the British troops leave Egypt under pressure from the French.

1804 Khorsheed Pacha is nominated Wali. The residents of Cairo, led by Al-Azhar Ulama and supported by Muhammad Ali, declares insurrection. They besiege the residence of Khorsheed Pacha, the wali, declare general strike and abstain from paying taxes. Some confrontations take place between the Ottoman soldiers and the Cairoites, and tension prevails.

1805 Muhammad Ali is nominated Wali by the Ottoman Sultan, in response to the demand of Egyptians and their Ulama.

1807 A British military invasion is aborted by the civil resistance of the city of Rashid.

1811 Muhammad Ali eliminates the Mamluks leaders (The massacre of the Citadel) and starts building a modern army. The beginning of Muhammad Ali's expansionist wars which will lead, in 1831 and in 1839 to wars against the Ottomans.
The European Powers force Muhammad Ali to accept the "London Agreement", according to which Egypt becomes an autonomous province within the Ottoman empire, reduces its army drastically, and opens its borders to "free trade".

Ibrahim Pacha (Muhammad Ali's son) becomes wali. In the same year, Abbas Hilmi becomes wali after the death of Ibrahim. The modernization process, started by Muhammad Ali, witnesses various setbacks (schools are shut, industries collapse, etc.)

Muhammad Said becomes wali.

Ismail becomes wali, and in 1867 his title changes to Khedive. Ismail launches a wide ranging campaign of Westernization. Suez Canal is constructed and opened. The European influence increases as well as the Egyptian debt. Egyptian finances are put under Anglo-French supervision. Egyptian Parliamentarians claim their right to supervise the budget. Ismail, in 1879, declares his acceptance of the parliament's demands and dismisses the two European Ministers from the government.

Tawfik is nominated Khedive, at the request of the European Powers.

The beginning of Orabi revolt. Ahmad Orabi, an Egyptian officer from peasant background, leads the protest movement in the army and eventually, as the parliamentarians support him, his movement covers the whole country. After initial successes; in limiting the Khedive's power, in dismissing the pro-European government and reforming the military regulations, Orabi's movement goes into direct conflict with the Khedive. Tawfik, encouraged by the British, asks Great Britain to intervene to put an end to the "rebellion".

British troops occupy Egypt and put an end to Orabi's revolt. The British occupation lasts until 1956. During this period, the British, whose influence rises to unprecedented levels, restructure political, social and economic life in Egypt.

Abbas Hilmi II becomes khedive. After an initial period of sympathy and cooperation with the Egyptian nationalist movement, Hilmi ends up by submitting to British influence.

An "entente" between France and Great Britain ends French support for the Egyptian nationalists.

Egypt is declared British "protectorate", which ends the nominal sovereignty of the Ottomans over Egypt. Husein Kamel becomes the first Egyptian "Sultan".

Fuad I becomes Sultan (becomes King in 1923).
1919 Revolution in Egypt against the British occupation. After the British government refuses to negotiate independence with the Egyptian delegation (Wafd).

1921 Great Britain unilaterally declares, after many failed rounds of negotiation, the independence of Egypt, with some restrictions. Negotiations continue.

1936 Farouk becomes king. An agreement is reached between the Wafd government and the British that enhances Egyptian independence. Turmoil in Egypt continues and underground movements (religious, marxist, fascist, nationalist, military, etc.) flourish.

1942 British troops besiege the King's Palace and force him to nominate Nahas Pacha, the Wafd leader, as Prime Minister.

1948 Creation of the state of Israel. Tensions within the Egyptian army after the war in Palestine.

1952 The "Free Officers", an underground organization within the army, led by Muhammad Naguib, forces the king to abdicate in favour of his son and leave the country, while Naguib becomes Prime Minister.

1953 Declaration of the Republic: Naguib becomes the first Egyptian President. The "Free Officers" extend their influence in political and administrative life. Banning of political parties.

1955 Naguib is put in house-arrest. Nasser becomes the virtual leader of the "revolution". Royal family lands are distributed to peasants.

1956 Nasser becomes President. The World Bank withdraws its proposal to finance the High Dam. The British troops complete their withdrawal. Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal Company. The Suez War.

1957 A wave of nationalizations. Nasser confirms Egypt's role in the Non Alignment Movement and tightens its relations with the East.

1960 A second wave of nationalizations.

1961 Wide range nationalizations that confirm the "socialist" orientation of the new regime. A land reform restricts the ownership to 100 feddans. Reorganization of the "National Union", the political organization of the "revolution".

1962 The creation of the Arab Socialist Union, the new political organization in Egypt.

1967 Israel occupies Sinai after a seven-days war.

1969 A new land reform restricts the ownership to 50 feddans.

1970 The death of Nasser. Sadat becomes President.
1973 6th October war.

1974 Egypt launches the *infitah* policy (the open-door), which shifts the economic orientation towards the market and integration into the world economy.

1976 Multipartyism is restored. New legislative elections.

1979 Peace treaty with Israel and rupture with Arab states.

1981 Sadat imprisons leaders of virtually all political parties and movements in September. In October. An Islamist group assassinates him. Mubarak becomes President: the traits which emerged in the Sadat period continue: consolidation of the market economy and integration into the world economy, cooperation with the United States and the West in general, restructuring the state's role in accordance with the structural adjustment programmes of the International Monetary Fund, and persistence of the multipartyism.

This chronology draws on the following sources:


INTRODUCTION

This thesis analyzes the distortions of contemporary civil society in Egypt. In studying the interaction between the world order, the Egyptian state and the modernization process, we will argue that we can understand the origins and dynamics of these distortions.

After decades of focusing on state-formation and its nation-building role in "newly independent countries", research is now shifting to focus on the role of the so-called "civil society". The latter is increasingly considered both as a sign and a pre-condition of democratization and modernization. Yet, civil society in these social formations presents particular characteristics, which the dominant approaches fail to explain. In non-European social formations, civil society is usually dependent on the state and subject to its authoritarian interference, it lacks active participation, its internal organization is deficient, and the relations between its organs are rather conflictual. Thus, instead of mediating and articulating politics between state and individuals, civil society is itself subject to the general failures of the political system. As such, civil society arguably plays a different role than that presumed by modernization and democratization theories.

In fact, civil society in non-European social formations has, until recently, received little attention from political theorists. However, with the continuing spread of democratization in these societies, civil society is enjoying increased attention. The existing literature can be

1
regrouped in three categories: cultural approaches, developmentalist schools, and the analysis that focuses on the impact of political system features on civil society. While this literature does offer insight into the subject, the analysis it contributes, we will argue, is mainly ethnocentric, provides more descriptions than explanations, uncritically separates the national level from that of the world order, and is too general to apply to specific cases.

This research uses a theoretical approach that aims to overcome these shortcomings. This approach is based on two major contributions: historical sociology and critical political economy. The tradition of historical sociology stresses the particularities of social phenomena instead of the universality of history, the role of actors in forging their own history, and the importance of economic, political, social and ideological aspects of historical structuration. The other contribution comes from the critical political economy, which emphasizes the interaction between the world order, states, and social forces.

In this perspective, the distortions of Egyptian civil society are addressed in their relation to the multiple dimensions of the historical interactions amongst Egyptian social forces, the state and the world order. The objective of this research is, therefore, to explain the origins and dynamics of these distortions and their dynamics. The working hypothesis of this thesis is that distortions of the Egyptian civil society are the consequences of the integration of Egypt into the world order. Until the turn of the nineteenth century, Egypt was an autonomous
part of the Ottoman empire. Although it had contacts with the rest of the world, mainly through international trade, it did not constitute a part of the world order. Its production, its form of politics, its societal organization and its ideology, were all "self-centered", rather than a part of broader world arrangements. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Egypt was gradually integrated into the European-dominated world order. This integration, we argue, generated a dynamic that has led to the present distortions being experienced by Egyptian civil society.

The impact of the world order has been three-fold. First, it destabilized the state-society relation: by both strengthening the state apparatus and increasing its role in the face of increasingly subjugated social forces, this integration led to the structural dependence of the latter on the former. Secondly, it destabilized the relationship between social forces and societal institutions: it led to the dismantlement of traditional institutions and to the establishment of distorted modern forms. Finally, the incomplete modernization it generated put an end to Egyptian hegemonic ideology and created a permanent conflict between modern and traditional ideologies. Distorted modernization has opened the door for a permanent state of transition, or to use Gramsci's term, a permanent passive revolution. Passive revolution appears as a form of social relations where there is no one dominant historic bloc: the ruling group tries to universalize its own historic bloc without being able to dismantle the others (Cox 1983, 165-7). The absence of a consensual historic bloc perpetuates a state of conflict, whose consequences in turn, are crucial for the homogeneity and effectiveness of civil society.
This working hypothesis will guide our investigation of the Egyptian case. The choice of Egypt is not justified only in terms of personal interest, but is founded on theoretical and practical reasons. Egypt was among the first non-European countries, together with Japan, to import modern forms of politics and administration. By the end of the nineteenth century, a comprehensive program of modernization was already in place. A process that has continued without interruption. Secondly, pre-modern Egyptian society presents an ideal case of traditional society: in its form of economy, in its relation with religion, in its forms of governance and in its ideological referents. Thirdly, Egypt is an important instance of distorted state-society relations: society is either submissively incorporated within the state (state corporatism), withdrawing from the public sphere (non-participating majority), or acting outside the political system (radical Islamic groups).

To address our research question, the thesis will be divided into five chapters. A preliminary chapter will deal with the theoretical problems concerning the concept of civil society and the adopted approach. Subsequently, the second chapter will analyze the current literature and will detail the dimensions of the distortions exhibited by Egyptian civil society. The third chapter will examine the impact of the world order on the Egyptian State. To do so, significant historical events from Egyptian modern history will be analyzed, beginning with Muhammad Ali's state-sponsored modernization project, and following through to the British occupation, before concluding with foreign aid policy. The transformations that societal institutions have undergone during the modernization process
will be examined in the fourth chapter. This chapter will analyze the various dynamics that led both to the dismantlement of traditional institutions and to the deformation of the newly-established modern ones. Finally, the impact of Egypt's integration into the world order on the hegemony of its ideology will be the focus of the fifth chapter. This impact will be analyzed in light of changes both in economic relations and in the ideological discourse. A general conclusion will permit us to sum up our main arguments, to examine their pertinence in explaining the distortions of Egyptian civil society, and to explore the "spill over" effect of these same distortions.
CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The concept of "civil society" has given rise to multiple debates to the extent that some scholars contest its utility altogether (Giddens 1987). It is thus necessary to begin by examining these debates in order to emerge with a working definition of the concept before we employ it to address our own research question. Therefore, the first section of this chapter presents the debate over the concept of "civil society". The second section will specify the theoretical premises and foundations of the thesis.

1. THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY

There is a plethora of definitions for the civil society concept which vary according to different political theories and different historical periods. In fact, the connotation of the civil society concept has given rise to multiple debates. These debates are: 1) the distinction between civil society and the state as well as the nature of the relation between them; 2) the private/public character of civil society; 3) the relation between civil society and economics, politics and ideology. We will analyze each of these dimensions/debates. This will help us to adopt an operational definition.
1. Civil society versus the state

Political thought, since the seventeenth century, has been concerned with the distinction between state and civil society and the relation between them. Both social contract and Natural Law theory focus on this dimension. However, they do not provide a unified position in the matter. The perspectives vary from a complete identification between state and civil society to the emphasis of the distinctiveness of the latter. Similarly, their conceptions of state-civil society relation range from maximum of full state domination to a minimum of state administration.

Hobbes, Spinoza and Bodin equated civil society with the state: in their terms, civil society replaces the unstable pre-state condition. Consequently, the contract of domination is necessary to constitute civil society (or state). The first distinction between state and civil society begins with Locke, Pufendorf and Ferguson. They view the state as a mere instrument for conserving and regulating, but not replacing, the natural society. In contrast with Hobbes' absolutism, they emphasize the role of civil society in the face of the state: the contract which led to state domination is negated and rearranged according to the consent of the governed (Keane 1988b, 35). By the end of the seventeenth century, state administration was regarded as overgoverning society, and thus should be restricted and pushed back to its minimum. Tom Paine's Rights of Man (1791) contends that civil society is naturally given and automatically self-governed, and that state intervention mechanisms would corrupt and deform social life. Accordingly, the state should limit its interference to the minimum level, to what Paine calls "government", to ensure the
natural interaction of the various parts of civil society (Keane 1988a, 48-9). Here the distinction between state and civil society becomes more and more explicit. Moreover, it marks the first time that civil society is juxtaposed against the state, or as Keane expressed it "the state is deemed a necessary evil and natural society an unqualified good" (Keane 1988b, 35).

The definition proposed by Adam Ferguson constitutes a turning point in the conceptualization of civil society. For the first time, civil society was related to urbanization: it is conceived as a civilized (against primitive) society in which urban life and commercial activities flourish. Also, Ferguson distinguishes it from both family and the state: civil society is "pluralistic [...] with numerous private activities outside the family and not assimilated into the state" (Shills 1991, 5). Thirdly, he links civil society to the public realm. According to Ferguson, pluralistic civil society is bonded through "public spirit". The relation between state and civil society, in Ferguson's analysis, is not static, rather it is subject to constant change. Civil society's "independence" vis-à-vis the state is nevertheless apt to be lost due to an almost inevitable erosion of "public spirit". (Keane 1988a, 40-41). In a way, civil society itself prepares the way for the growth of state public administration, bureaucratic regulations and military force, i.e., it paves the way for despotism (Keane 1988a, 42). In his prescriptions against this potential for state despotism, Ferguson introduces an organizational dimension in the conception of civil society. He recommends that civil society should create and develop independent civil
associations or organizations which would negotiate and coordinate with the centralized state or its bureaucratic institutions.

Hegel drew the notion from Ferguson that civil society is the achievement of the modern world and the spread of its commercial activities. He characterized civil society as "a system of needs, which in turn, is a network of concrete social and economic relations" (Benhabib 1981, 156). In this sense, civil society is regarded as the sphere of economic relations while the state is held as that of political institutions, for economic relations constitute the fibre of pre-state society (Bobbio 1979, 27). In this perspective, Hegel has a state-centered approach, glorifying state power and justifying it for the ideal mission it bears. He considers civil society as the pre-political society, which cannot remain civil unless it is ordered politically and subjected to the surveillance of the state. He considers modern civil society as unfit to overcome its own fragmentation and resolve its inherent conflicts. It is the state which liberates civil society from its disorder, anarchy, and corruption, and regulate it from above by political means. Furthermore, he contests that the separation of civil society and the state through the independence of civil society should be restricted in favour of state prerogatives. The political state is therefore conceived by Hegel as the highest point which represents civil society in its unity (Keane 1988b, 47). In sum, Hegel conceives the modern state as the rational caretaker of the universal interest, and civil society as the anarchist "bourgeois society", one that is incapable of emancipating itself from its own conflicts and should therefore be subjected to the state.
The Hegelian idea of the civil "bourgeois society" was seized upon by Karl Marx. Both stressed that civil society is not naturally given, but is "the outcome of a long and complex process of historical transformation" (Keane 1988a, 50). But the civil society in Marx's view, and contrary to Hegel's, transcends the state. The following very well illustrates Marx's conception of civil society:

The form of intercourse determined by the existing productive forces at all previous historical stages, and in its turn determining these, is civil society [...] Civil Society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, in so far, transcends the State and the nation. Though, on the other hand again, it must assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality and inwardly organise itself as State. (Bobbio 1979, 39-40)

This citation shows clear opposition between Hegel and Marx over the state-civil society relation. Hegel, with his state-centered approach, views the political (state) as engulfing the social, and so, the latter will dissolve within the former. Politics comes from above, from the rational state which guarantees the interests of the whole. On the contrary, Marx, with his society-centered approach, claims that the social engulfs the political; in the sense that the form of the state is a reflection of the class configuration of a given society. This forms the foundations of the various Marxist theories of the state. In these theories, the relationship between state and civil society is viewed in terms of two main processes: the class conflict and/or accumulation of capita' (Mahon 1991). This role of the state explains its coercive nature. Once capitalism founders and class conflict comes to an end, the state will wither away in favour of a strong civil society. Thus, the
proletarian civil society is, to Marx, the social power which will abolish the division between civil society and the coercive state (Bobbio 1979, 23-24).

In fact, both Marx and Hegel present a unilinear vision of the relation between state and civil society. Marx, in his vision of a communist future, overstates the role of social power and is left with an idealistic vision in which the political is dissolved into the civil society. Adopting the contrary position, Hegel leads us to a complete abandonment of civil society which succumbs to the "universal and rational" state. In both cases, an idealistic perspective results from the initial unilinear vision of the state-civil society relation. Instead of analyzing the complexity of their interactions, both theorists overstate one of its aspects. In addition, they both abandon the dimension of contractual agreement between the state and civil society with which their predecessors were concerned. This absence can be attributed to their unilinear vision of the relation between state and civil society. Reduced to state domination or to social supremacy, the line of communication between them is lost. This explains the little importance given to - or the virtual absence of - the organizational aspect from their conception of civil society.

Thus, the basic difference between the approach adopted by Marx and Hegel on the one hand, and all their predecessors on the other is the varying emphasis they place on economics and on politics. If their predecessors used a "political" approach, Hegel and Marx have explicitly brought an economistic approach to regarding civil society. This brings us
to another perspective in the conceptualization of civil society, i.e. its analysis in terms of structure or superstructure.

2. Civil Society. Structures and Superstructures

This dimension is highly controversial. The contention is whether civil society is a part of the economic sphere (i.e., lies in the sphere of structure) or of the political and ideological spheres (i.e., lies in the superstructure). This debate goes back to the initial definitions given to the concept, and cannot be understood merely in terms of the opposing liberal/marxist ideologies. As indicated above, some classical liberal authors, such as Ferguson and Hegel, perceived civil society as a part of the economic life. Nevertheless, the dominant liberal thought analyzed civil society in the political sphere. This was a part of their quest to limit state despotism and to distinguish between individual rights and the might of the state. This was reflected mainly in the analysis of the "social contract" between state and society. On the contrary, Ferguson, and especially Hegel, investigate civil society in the sphere of economic relations. For Hegel, economic relations constitute the fibre of pre-state society (Bobbio 1979, 27). Nevertheless, Hegel's civil society, as Bobbio argues, "not only includes the sphere of economic relations and the formation of classes, but also the administration of justice as well as the organization of the police force and that of the corporations". However, his central argument was the prevalence of economic approach in analyzing civil society to the extent that he equates
it with the "bourgeois society". The existence of civil society itself is, for Hegel, an economic reality. State power is justified to resolve the contradictions of civil society which result from the contradictions of market competition and commodity production. Hegel's conception of civil society is relatively broader than that of Marx, but still it is considered a pre-Marxist one.

Similarly, the perception of civil society as a part of structure is dominant in Marxist thought. Nonetheless, some Marxist authors, especially the Gramscian-based, put civil society in the superstructure. Marx adopted an economic-centered approach in analyzing civil society. He considered civil society not as naturally given but as contingent upon certain historical transformations which are mainly economic. He also equates civil society with "bourgeois society", which will wither away once the working class establishes the communist society. Marx quoted Hegel in his 'Philosophy of Right' that "the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in the political economy". Nevertheless, Marx considerably reduced and restricted the concept to economic interpretation. This can be remarked in his famous quote ".. Civil society comprises the entire material interaction among individuals at a particular evolutionary state of the productive forces..". The term civil society emerged in the eighteenth century when property relations had already evolved from the community of antiquity and medieval times. Civil society, as such, only develops with the bourgeoisie (Keane 1988a, 63-4).

On the other hand, civil society is identified in the sphere of superstructure in the late eighteenth century. As Keane points out:
The late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century debate about civil society and the limits of state action was energized primarily by non-entrepreneurial social groups whose scientific, literary, artistic and religious pursuits placed them at odds with the accumulation of state power and the corporate practices and elite privileges it protected. (Keane 1988a. 65)

This superstructural version reaches its climax with Gramsci. The economistic interpretations of the emergence of civil society are replaced by an ethico-political approach. What he means by civil society is, "the political and cultural hegemony of a social group on the whole of society, as ethical content of the state" (Bobbio 1979. 31). Civil society, to Gramsci, reflects the sum of ideological-cultural relations including the spiritual and intellectual spheres. Thus, it has a clear normative dimension referring to ideology and specifically to hegemony. A civil society is cemented by normative consent; by a hegemony. Civil society is the place of hegemony, while the state is the place of coercion or domination (Thériault 1985).

It would be appropriate here to mention the famous contention over Gramsci's conceptual origin of civil society. Although Marx's interpretation of civil society is mainly economic, while that of Gramsci is mainly ethico-political, they have both derived their conceptions of civil society from that of Hegel. The possible explanation for that entanglement is that Marx adopted the narrow economic aspect of Hegel's conception of civil society, while Gramsci adopted the wider relatively superstructural one or, to use Bobbio's terms, Marx borrows the "initial" moment of Hegel's conception of civil society, while Gramsci uses its "final" moment. This can be traced in Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'
civil society includes not only the sphere of economic relations, but also their spontaneous or voluntary forms of organization (Bobbio 1979, 32).

Despite the fact that both, contrary to Hegel, emphasized the role of society over that of the state (Marx's universal society and Gramsci's regulated society), they diverge in their final analysis. The difference appears first in the identification of civil society in terms of structure or superstructure, and second, in the relation between them. Marx asserts that "...the economic structure of society is the real foundation on which rises a juridical and political superstructure". Gramsci asserts that "...it is not the economic structure which directly determines the political action, but it is the interpretation of it and of the so-called laws which rule its development" (Bobbio 1979, 33).

In fact, the Marxist approach is significantly reductionist in its economistic analysis of the historical transformation of societies. Marx overlooked not only the political moment, but also the ethical, the social and the institutional: all are subordinated to the economic. On the other hand, Gramsci's emphasis of the role of superstructure seems to underestimate the role of structures. Nevertheless, his subsequent levelling of the superstructure seems to be less idealistic. Gramsci has divided the superstructure to two major levels: civil society, which is comprised of the "organisms commonly called 'private'", and of the "political society" (or the state). The first level corresponds to the function of hegemony which the dominant groups exercise over the rest of society, while the second level corresponds to domination. Thus, civil society is composed of organizations which link it to political society (the state). This organizational dimension of civil society is a sign of
continuity between Hegel's conception and that of Gramsci: an aspect which was rather neglected by Marx.

In addition, this dimension shows how Gramsci, in opposition to Marx, emphasized the role of the agency over structure. He did not deny the role of structure, but analyzed it in relation to the role of the actor. This appreciation of the actor's role is tightly linked to Gramsci's analysis of ideology and the role of intellectuals/institutions in transmitting and/or transforming a given ideology.

3. The private/public character of civil society

In the debate over the private/public character of civil society, two meanings are given to privacy. The first is the opposite of "public" while the second equates privacy with autonomy vis-à-vis the state. It is the first meaning that is more relevant with respect to defining "civil society". The latter is not engaged in the private sphere, although it has its roots in it. Civil society, as Ferguson argues, is "...pluralistic [...] with numerous private activities outside the family and not assimilated into the state. [...] this pluralistic civil society is bonded through public spirit" (Shils 1991, 5). Thus, civil society constitutes the "link" between individuals and the state; between the private and the public. Nevertheless, civil society is an integral part of the public sphere and its efficiency is usually assessed according to its capacity to articulate public concerns. Whenever civil society is confined to the private sphere, it is regarded as marginalized. In fact, there seems to be
a contradiction between the concept of civil society and the "private" as an antonym to "public". We mean by the term "public" what is of common concern and communal affairs which matter or belong to the society as a whole. Consequently, both civil society and the state are engaged, on an equal basis, in public affairs.

Accordingly, the term "private" refers here to autonomy vis-à-vis the state. It is Gramsci who introduces this term in his definition of civil society: "the organisms commonly said to be private". It is clear that Gramsci uses the term to illustrate the relationship between civil society and the state. As Thériault puts it, the privacy of civil society distinguishes it from the state apparatus (political society), even if there are links between these two levels (civil and political society) embodied in the organizations (Thériault 1991, 68-71). The private also refers to civil society's institutions and organizations that work outside the channels and the space of the state. Briefly, the structures and concerns of civil society are public, but it acts through private channels. It interacts with the state, but it is not subordinated or incorporated into the state's power and control. If "civil society" is not private, it ceases to constitute a "link" between state and society and becomes a mere part of the state apparatus. Therefore, society becomes either dependent and incorporated or ignored and marginalized. In other words, civil society ceases to exist.

In conclusion, the definition of civil society this thesis adopts include three dimensions derived basically from the Gramscian analysis: the organizational, the ideological, and the private. Civil society is
defined here as the forms of association which lie between, and link, the level of the state and that of individuals. These forms should be bounded and cements by the basic features of a hegemonic ideology in the society at large. By hegemonic ideology, we mean the existence of consensus around the fundamental principles that found a discourse. That consensus does not mean the absence of diversity, it rather creates a common "language" through which different discourses can communicate and compete.

II. THE THEORETICAL APPROACH

This research applies an historical sociology approach to its problematic. It also draws from the contribution of Robert Cox's critical political economy, especially his emphasis on the interaction between state-civil society-world order.

Historical sociology is a tradition which entails an interaction between both history and sociology. In this thesis, history is intended to emphasize the sequences of events, and so helps us to identify the origins of the present societal configurations. As to sociology, it highlights the particularities of a given set of social relations and emphasizes the specific pattern of its evolution. Our use of historical sociology includes three main elements: a conception of history, the structuration process and the "holistic" approach.
Historical sociology rejects the universalist conception of history. This entails the rejection of the teleological vision according to which history is a continuous process with a determined beginning and an end (Fukuyama 1989). It also includes the rejection of the conceptions of history adopted by the evolutionists, the Modernization School and the structural-functionalists.

For the evolutionists, history is a unilinear and evolutionary process in which there are irreversible stages: the subsequent stages are more complex than the previous ones. The less advanced societies, which belong to anterior historical stages, follow the paths of the "advanced" ones. Human history is viewed by evolutionists, as Gellner contests, as a "world growth history", in which western history has a persistent forward direction (Gellner 1964). Other societies and other cultures should -and would- go through that evolutionary and unbreakable chain to "attain" the Western stage. Thus, western history is regarded, in this perspective, as the History of humanity (Fukuyama 1992).

As for the Modernization school, it has approached the study of history with a dichotomous model: traditional versus modern societies, where ideal-typical features of modern societies should replace traditional ones. Thus, they tend to generalize the specific experience of the modern West and reflect it on other societies and cultures. This reveals the modernists' ethnocentric vision of history, in which the Western experience is considered as a representative model without any consideration for the internal features of other societies and its compatibility with the suggested models.
Finally, the structural-functionalists rely heavily on transnationalism and interdependence on the level of the whole world. They dismantle the national society as a unit of analysis and replace it by the transnational world society in what is called the "cobweb model" symbolizing the highly integrated transnational world society (Groom and Taylor 1975). They also imply universalisation and transculturation of concepts and practices (Badie and Hermet 1992). Thus, all aspects of social life, as Parsons claims, regardless of time and place could be classified and supposedly explained in the same universal theoretical terms.

This conception of history is oversimplified. It denotes ethnocentrism and bias of the Western model and thereby fails to apprehend the particularity of any society's history. This universalism, as Elise Boulding puts it:

[...] universal values that bond all people have been based on a very imperfect knowledge of the actual cultural and civilizational diversity of the world. While the underlying feelings have been genuine, the resulting rhetoric has been painful for the non-Western world. This is because the empirical referents of Western-style universalism excludes history and experience of so much of the rest of the world. (Boulding 1991, 794).

The opposite conception of history is committed to analyze structures and events in specific times and spaces. As Badie and Hermet put it, histories are diversified, complicated, and independent from one another (Badie and Hermet 1992). Consequently, history is not considered, herewith, as an evolutionary, linear and universal process (Fukuyama 1992). Instead, more attention will be given to transformations, particularities and diversity.
The universalist conception of history has influenced the study of civil society, where "...the diversity of human species is encapsulated, and the very concept of civil society itself has been eurocentric" (Boulding 1991, 795). In the case of civil society in "Third World" countries, the universalist and evolutionary approach obstructs our understanding of the dynamics at work in these societies. In imposing an ethnocentric conception of "civil society", this approach fails to grasp the particular forms of mediation and representation at work in these societies. In addition, instead of analyzing the significance of its particular features, the universalistic-evolutionary approach directs our attention towards the "conditions of reinforcing civil society", i.e., of making it work in the same way it does in Western societies.

This approach has its foundations in Durkheim's analysis. Durkheim viewed societies as constituting "totalities" that should be approached as such. The basic meaning of "totality" is not to give societies an "autonomous life", it is mostly a refutation of reductionism. The idea of totality means "a social whole that provides the necessary context for grasping particular social dynamic" (Fred Block and Margret Somers 1984, 62). Viewing societies as constituting totalities thus means, at least to this thesis, studying them as being composed of different but interconnected facets. Therefore, this approach rejects the reduction of social life to its political component, or to its economic dimension. In the same time, it refuses to deal with social life as being independent from either political or economic conditions. Instead, the adopted holistic approach proposes to take into account the political, economic,
social, cultural and ideological dimensions of social reality. Of course, such an approach does not propose to deal with all these elements at the same time. Any research is, to some extent, an attempt to reduce "reality" to comprehensible dimensions. The holistic approach proposes to view a given phenomenon in its relation to all societal dimensions, and to regard these dimensions in their articulation with one another, without giving a determinant status to any of them.

To analyze social change, the "two sidedness" of society should be considered. This two sidedness is expressed by Abrams as

The fact that social action is both something we choose to do and something we have to do, and is inseparably bound up with the further fact that whatever reality society has is an historical reality, a reality in time (Abrams 1982, 2).

This vision of the linkage between structure and action challenges the structuralist wisdom according to which the actor is merely an agent, and therefore has no role except as a bearer of structures. Historical sociology presents a different version based on the idea of structuration. As Anthony Giddens puts it, structural constraints do not operate independently of the actors' perception, reasons and motives (Giddens 1984). Thus neither action nor structure is independent, but the interchange of their effects result in a process of structuration.

This is also the perspective adopted by Robert Cox. In his analysis of state/society/world orders complex, structures act as a framework for action. Structures are a combination of ideas, material conditions and institutions that have a coherence among their elements (Cox 1987). This is a definition which includes normative, materialist, and institutional dimensions. Thus, actions do not take place in a vacuum. They are
constrained, but not determined, by structures. These structures are, in turn, created by previous human actions, and are maintained, or challenged, by present actions. The role of that structural framework or of the actor depends on the force of either part, the time it occupies, and the space in which it takes place.

Robert Cox's critical political economy is the second source for the theoretical approach adopted by this thesis. Cox uses a three-fold level of analysis comprised of social forces, state and world order. These levels are interrelated in a non-unilinear relation (Cox 1986). Each affects the other and is affected by it in an ever-changing historical process. Accordingly, political phenomena are shaped by influences coming from these three levels all together. Thus, civil society is not to be examined as a separate entity. Rather, it has to be put in relation to the configuration of social forces, to the form of state, and to the world order. In this perspective, the disarticulation of civil society in "Third World" countries has origins not only within the prevalent configuration of social forces, but also on the state level and in the world order. The main idea here is that the world order, states and societies constitute one complex.

In a broad sense, world order is a configuration of power, economic, social and ideological relations across the world in a given historic period. This definition is based on Cox's "historic structures" that lay at the base of a world order (Cox 1986, 217-221). Power relations reflect the distribution of material capabilities, which "are productive and
destructive potentials" (Cox 1986, 218). Cox distinguishes between two forms of material capabilities. First, a dynamic form like the technological and organizational capacities, and an accumulated form as the case with natural resources. In the international realm, these material capabilities are not evenly distributed. This situation nurtures an unequal set of power relations between the international actors. This is responsible for the hierarchial nature of the international order. The ideological relations reflect a hegemonic ideology, which is "collective images of social order held by different groups of people" (Cox 1986, 218). This ideology encompasses the values, norms, roles of institutions, etc. It legitimizes the prevalent power relations colouring them with a universal and "neutral" character. International institutions are "particular amalgams of ideas and material power which in turn, influence the development of ideas and material capabilities" (Cox 1986, 219). Thus, they reflect power relations and are responsible for maintaining the hegemonic ideology. Although these institutions can become "a battleground of opposing tendencies" (Cox 1986, 219), still they conform to the basic components of the hegemonic ideology, and absorb the counter-hegemonic discourse.
CHAPTER TWO: THE DISTORTIONS OF CONTEMPORARY EGYPTIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

In this chapter, we will present a critical review of the literature dealing with the distortions of Egyptian civil society. The first section will scan the existing explanations of civil society in Egypt and in the Arab World in general. This literature provides valuable insights for the understanding of the distortions of Egyptian civil society. However, there are problems even with the best of these explanations. The second section, consequently, will analyze the characteristics of Egyptian civil society in order to address them in the subsequent chapters. In doing so, the second section will regroup these characteristics in the following meaningful categories: the pattern of participation in civil society, the relationships among its organizations, and its type interaction with the state. These categories cover the three dimensions of civil society as defined in this thesis: i.e. organization, hegemony, and privacy.

I. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section examines the literature on the civil society distortions in the Arab world in general and in Egypt in particular. It aims at identifying the insights this literature provides as well as its gaps. The latter constitutes the basis for our own argument which the next chapters will detail. This literature is divided into three groups. The first concentrates on religious, cultural and racial factors, the second
comes from developments schools, and the third is refereed to here as "political" explanations.

1. Religious, cultural and racial approaches

These approaches have in common their concentration on certain social characteristics to explain the distorted forms of civil society. They also share the same epistemological foundation in so far as they deduce causal relations from the concomitance of variables.

The first version of these approaches attributes to the Islamic religion an important role in the distortion of civil society. Islam is regarded as intolerant to dissent and not respectful of the rights of minorities. Samuel Huntington views Islam as being hostile to democracy (Huntington 1984). Elie Kadourie contends that Islam is unfamiliar with the founding principles of constitutional and representative democracy (Kadourie 1992). Bernard Lewis emphasizes the absence of "corporate intermediary bodies" from the history of islamic governments. Lewis attributes the absence of such bodies in Arab societies precisely to the advent of Islam. Islam, unlike the Roman Law, Judaism, or modern Western/culture does not offer the legal recognition of these bodies. He thus concludes that the historic foundations and practices of Islam are incompatible with the idea of civil society (Lewis 1992). Daniel Pipes goes in the same direction: he confirms that political participation was historically an alien concept to Islam (Pipes 1991).
This approach has at least two weaknesses. First, it subscribes uncritically to stereotypes about Islam. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that religion has been used in the Arab world to support and to oppose political liberties alike. Thus, religion does not suggest a unique interpretation or a prescription of the forms of political relations. More specifically, there are other interpretations of the relation between Islam and democracy:

Islam is inherently democratic not only because of the principle of consultation but also because of the concepts of ijtihad (rational interpretation of religion). Islam political thought is rescued from the charge of autocracy by the need of rulers to consult widely and to govern on the basis of consensus (Esposito 1991, 434).

Second, no political culture is solely determined by the religion of its majority. Reducing the political culture to one of its founding elements (religion) is clearly impoverishing the explanatory power of the concept itself. Taher Abdel-Hakim demonstrates the historical complexity of the construction of the Egyptian political culture. Transformations of Egyptian ecology, agricultural production, the historical role of the state, Coptic influences, the Egyptian church, Islam, colonialism, metamorphosis of private property and market economy, etc., all constitute elements of the Egyptian culture (Abdel-Hakim 1986).

The second version of these approaches emphasizes the effects of Arab political culture on civil society. Political culture, as used by this approach, usually means "the particular distribution of patterns of political orientations, attitudes towards the political system and its
various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system" (Almond and Verba 1963, 12-13).

Ibrahim attributes "the absence of civil society and democracy in the Arab world" to the impact of Arab culture. The latter is viewed as hierarchical and submissive inducing loyalty and respect to authorities. Arab culture favours conservatism rather than innovation, unity rather than diversity, dependency on the group rather than self-reliance (Ibrahim 1991, 11-12). More sophisticated versions of this approach use anthropological arguments where tribalism, kinship ties, etc., are used to explain the distortions of civil society in the Arab world. Tribalism and kinship ties are conducive to despotism, hence hinder the emergence of pluralist institutions. David Pryce Jones claim in his book The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs that:

The tribal legacy [...] has everywhere perpetuated absolute and despotic rule, preventing the evolution of those pluralist institutions that alone allow people to participate in the processes of the state and so to identify with it (Pryce Jones 1989, 26).

In this perspective, he argues that tribalism nurtures an incapacity to resist authority, to impartiality and neutrality, and that tribes are apt to resort to violence to resolve conflicts. He proceeds in his argument that in tribalism, violence is an essential ingredient in the decision-making process. It is indicative of serious intention, of the will to proceed in the group interest no matter what the right or wrong of it. In brief, he attributes the "non-existence" of civil society in Arab societies to their anthropological and cultural characteristics.

A similar argument is advanced by Bill and Springborg. They agree that, "Middle Eastern societies and political systems grew out of tribal
constellations, and the personalism that prevailed in the family and the clan has had a pervasive and protracted influence" (Bill and Springborg 1990, 161). They attribute to these characteristics the insignificance of associational and institutional groups in the Middle East.

The third version of these approaches is overtly racist. Explanations are introduced stating that Arabs are qualitatively different from Westerners. Hence, they will remain captured by their culture, way of life, and rhetoric. John Entelis is a good example of this approach. He examines the literature on the "Arab personality" and deduces from it that Arab characteristics are based on.

[...] suspiciousness, excessive hostility alternating with excessive politeness, negative individualism, efforts to keep conflicts suppressed or at least manageable, a high degree of mistrust and hostility towards others. (Entelis 1989, 27).

Indeed, these characteristics could be found within Arab and non-Arab societies alike. It seems peculiar to select a set of negative and deficient characteristics and apply them to a whole society. Springborg cites another racial explanation presented by an official in the economic section of the U.S. embassy in Cairo. The latter attributes the obstacles to liberalization in Egypt to,

[...] the inability of the Egyptians to grasp the seriousness of their plight and to comprehend that liberalization offered the only real hope for salvation was due to the deterioration of their racial stock as a result of generations of endogamous marriages and immigration of the more talented (Springborg 1989, 7).
It seems odd to attribute the existence of distorted forms of civil society in Egypt to endogamous marriages. We need not go into the details of these self-declared racist arguments, nor in the counter arguments about the scientific rigor of the concept of race. What is more important is the analytical poverty and superficiality of these "explanations". Analytically, they bypass most, if not all, the social, economic, historical, and political foundations of the present order; i.e., they bypass the social sciences at large. Epistemologically, these arguments are weak in so far as they invent a causal relation from the concomitance of two variables.

This epistemological defect is also present in the cultural approach. The tenets of this approach, as espoused by Badie and Ibrahim, search for the specific cultural characteristics of Arab societies, then attribute the specificity of these societies (distorted forms of civil society) to these characteristics. Yet, there is no epistemological foundation for the establishment of a causal relation between these two variables. Among other possibilities, both of them (culture specificity and distorted civil society) can be attributed to a third factor. Besides, the explanation this approach presents is based on a tautology: civil society is explicitly defined within the standards and characteristics of Western culture, then Arab culture is held responsible for hindering its "emergence". This tautology reflects a developmentalist and evolutionist bias. Its underpinning assumption is the superiority of Western culture. It is for this reason that the tenets of this approach serve to provide a list of characteristics as conducive to civil society that are derived
from the Western societal features. Since Arab culture is (by definition) at variance with these characteristics, the final step would be to demolish Arab culture and replace by a "civic" culture, i.e. patterned after the Western model. Finally, this approach is usually voluntaristic as it conceives of a wide ranging cultural transformation possible and dependant upon intellectual "social engineering" schemes. This is particularly clear in the case of Ibrahim who presents a "prescription" for "consolidating" civil society in Egypt through the introduction of cultural transformations led by, among others, intellectuals (Ibrahim 1991).

2. Development Schools

There is a major trend among political scientists to link the construction of a civil society to the process of development. This had been accomplished in two opposing ways. The disciples of the Modernization School determine the emergence of civil society to be an advanced step that comes later in the developmental process, while the tenets of the Dependency School hold "development" to be responsible for the distortion of civil society.

According to the Modernization School, political participation is directly related to development and increased economic liberalization. Seymour Martin Lipset is the leading proponent of this argument. According to him, there is a strong correlation between economic development, education, urbanization and democracy (Lipset 1959). More recently,
Lipset, Linz and Diamond link democracy to economic development, but also to moderate political culture (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1990). The basic idea is that differentiation of the political system, individualization of social relations and the consolidation of horizontal solidarities are consequences of the modernization process (Apter 1955, Pye 1962). In the case of Arab societies, this argument is best illustrated by Alan Richards:

Economic changes imply enlarging the role of the private sector, widening the scope of the rule of law, and more generally, restructuring the state's relations with its citizens. In short, political participation will be a necessary tool in the struggle to forge capitalism in the information age (Richards 1992, 218).

The problems of this argument are numerous. The empirical experiences of Arab societies bear witness to a different way of development. In spite of prolonged modernization, not a single Arab country can figure on the list of "democratic" countries proposed by the tenets of the Modernization school. At best, some Arab countries can be deemed pseudo-democracies, semi-democracies or tolerant autocracy in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset's categorization (1990). This is merely a different way of presenting the distortions of their civil societies and democracies. Precisely, Lipset describes the Egyptian case as a semi-democracy, although Egypt is the first Arab country to embark up on a modernization process. Moreover, liberalization, as such, is less related to the enhancement of civil society and democracy. In spite of their uninterrupted adherence to liberal economies, the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia can hardly claim a more democratic record than other Arab countries.
On the other hand, Dependency School adherents hold the development process to be responsible for the distorted forms of civil society in Third-World countries (the periphery). According to Paul Baran, the integration of the peripheral social formations in the international capitalist economy consolidated non-democratic forms of governance. As foreign capital (in the old International Division of Labour) was hostile to the enterpreunerial-industrializing local bourgeoisie, it found its alliances in feudal and merchant classes. The consequence has been the consolidation of despotic political orders (Evans 1979). In Amin's view, the integration of the periphery in the world capitalist system means an increase in the inequalities of the peripheral societies; as the transfer of the surplus to the center renders the "pie" smaller in the periphery. As inequalities increase, so too does social polarization and political positions become radicalized. Consequently, the local bourgeoisie cannot venture into democracy or popular representation. As this bourgeoisie is maintained in power by dependent relations, authoritarianism is perpetuated in peripheral societies (Amin 1989).

The economistic bias of this analysis is not less apparent than that of the modernization school. Both analyze the transformations in societies as consequences of economic developments. The Dependency School presents a sophisticated version of this analysis, yet it reduces social relations to its sole economic aspect, which is a classical critique. In addition, Baran and Amin's analysis of the internal transformations (caused by external interventions) is too general to account for specific phenomena like that of the distortions of civil society. At best, this analysis can shed a light into the necessity of focusing on the interaction between
international and internal levels, but it is of limited help in the concrete analysis of specific social and political phenomena. Finally, this approach leaves very little room for the apprehension of the role of the state in shaping political life in the periphery. Yet any empirical study of peripheral societies cannot but confirm the central role played by the state (Migdal 1988).

It is precisely these critics that Badie claims to avoid in his analysis of the "imported state" (Bertrand Badie, 1992). In fact, Badie's analysis is difficult to categorize. Although he is a self-proclaimed culturalist, his analysis has more in common with both Dependentists and Historical Sociologists. He focuses on the link between the international and internal levels while paying more attention to internal dynamics. The emergence of the modern forms of politics in non-Western societies is linked to both "exporting" strategies (of Western capitalist states) and "importing strategies" of peripheral elites. The imported products, i.e. modern politics, do not fit the importing social environment (Badie, 1992). Thus, the civil society is missing because of the persistence of communitarian loyalties, the primacy of primordial identification over citizenship, and the priority given to vertical solidarities at the expense of horizontal solidarities (Badie 1992, 24).

In spite of the richness of Badie's arguments, his analysis suffers from numerous weaknesses. First, he shares the cultural approach's epistemological problem: the infalsifiability. Second, he also shares their ethno-centric bias: as civil society is implicitly defined alongside the Western Socio-historical experience, non-Western societal
characteristics are, by definition, incompatible with the concept itself. Thirdly, Badie does not tell us why these social characteristics remain as strong as they are in spite of long and continuous efforts of modernization (or, in his words, Westernization). The underpinning assumption is that they are inherent to the culture of societies in question. Here, the essentialist perception of the culturalist takes precedence over the historical-sociologist Badie.

3. "Political" explanations

These explanations have two features in common: they explain the distortions of civil society in Egypt by the other dominant features of political system, and they all come from the "Middle-East" studies' literature.

3.1. Dependence on the State

Dependence on the state is one of the explanations which are given to the organizational weakness of civil society in Egypt. Kandeel attributes the weakness of the Teachers Union in Egypt to its dependency on the state. The fact that the State determines the work conditions of its members and have the keys to all their problems developed an absolute dependence on the state (Kandeel 1987, 12-14). Therefore, teachers are ready to support the state on all political issues in return for state approval of their demands. In opposition, Bianchi explains the influence of the business groups in Egypt by their independence from the state. The
fact that they constitute a "community of interest" with local chambers of commerce and industry, that they have strong relations with the world economy and that they control the black market in hard currency makes them a potent partner of the state (Bianchi 1988, 10-11). The argument can be summarized as follows: organizations that are "strong" are independent of the state while those that are "weak" are dependent upon the state. This explanation has at least two problems. First, it is tautological, it tells us that the Teachers Unions are weak because they are weak and that businessmen groups are strong because they are strong. It is not clear whether the dependence develops weakness or the vice-versa. Second, no organization in Egypt, even the strongest, is fully divorced from the state. Even the businessmen groups depend on the state for each and every step in the accumulation process. And their claimed "independence" did not stop the state from crashing *sharikat tawzif al-amwal* (investment companies), nor did it stop Nasser from bringing their whole universe to an end in less than a decade (1956-1962).

3.2. Patrimonial politics

Bill and Springborg have identified the distortions of Egyptian civil society' organizations as: the acquiescence of the members and the lack of their participation in the organization's life; the personification of organization politics; and the extensive roles of leaders. They attribute these distortions to the patrimonial character of Egyptian politics; a characteristic that enhanced paternalistic and clientalistic relationships between the leader and the members of organizations. Patrimonialism, as defined by Reinhard Benedix and used by
Bill and Springborg, means "an extension of the ruler's household in which the relation between the ruler and his officials remains on the basis of paternal authority and filial dependence" (Bill and Springborg 1990, 151). This pattern of patrimonialism "existed throughout Islamic history and can be traced to the days of Prophet Mohammad, himself the model par excellence of political leadership" (Bill and Springborg 1990, 151). Accordingly, the leader role becomes dominant at the expense of that of the group, and representation becomes based on informal relations. That is why, according to them, informal fragmented organization is the dominant mode of representation in the Middle East (Bill and Springborg 1990, 88-89).

To say that patrimonialism characterizes Egyptian (and Arab) political life does not, however, mean that it is the exclusive type of political relations in these societies, nor that it necessarily explains each and every characteristic of organizational distortion. The Lawyers Union, The Journalist Union, and business groups have experienced, in specific occasions, fierce competition over leadership that was drawn on ideological lines: i.e. Islamists versus Nasserists etc. (Arab Strategic Report, 1992). This means that "patrimonialism" is not a useful explanation when used in a general fashion. Any genuine explanation should be able to tell us when and how patrimonial relations prevail and they become secondary.

3.3. Socio-economic status

Kandeel uses the socio-economic status of certain professions to explain their lack of influence and their dependence on the state. This
explanation entails the exclusion of the have-nots from the realm of civil society. It thus condemns the lower classes to passivity and to be unrepresented. Therefore, they are supposed to remain forever dependent on the state because of their socio-economic status. Consequently, civil society is confined to those that have. Egyptian civil society, in this view, differs slightly from the Gramscian definition: it becomes the "ensemble of the (rich people's) organizations".

This argument does not fit into the empirical examination of civil society organizations in Egypt. During Nasser's period, workers unions had considerably more influence on the state (albeit through corporatist arrangements) than they do in the present time. Yet, their socio-economic status is unchanged. The Doctors and Engineers unions were (until the Islamists took them over) deeply incorporated by the state and showed no evidence of independence let alone the ability to challenge state authority.

II. THE DISTORTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY REVISITED

As shown above, the existing literature is basically descriptive. The explanations either cultural, political or developmentalist, are part and parcel of what is to be explained. For example, the prevalence of patrimonialism or of communitarian allegiances need themselves to be explained, instead of being considered as explanatory factors. The value of historical sociology tradition is precisely to account for the origins
of the present features of societal relations, i.e. the distorted forms of civil society. To do so, it is important to distinguish between the dimensions of civil society distortions and their genesis.

This section aims at identifying the dimensions of the distortions of Egyptian civil society. The organizations of civil society include: professional unions, such as those of lawyers, engineers, doctors, etc., business groups, workers' unions, agricultural cooperatives (abolished during Sadat's era) and unions, benevolent associations, and religious organizations. However, the existence of a good number of organizations in itself is not an indication of the existence of a civil society that integrates people and influences decision-making process. The power of these organizations, as well as their homogeneity, cohesiveness, and influence vary considerably. Some are corporatized by the state such as Teacher's Union, while others are allied with the state but use their own political power to influence its decisions, such as business groups. Most of the unions are acting midway, such as the Journalist Union. It should be noted, however, that the influence and cohesiveness of each organization vary also in time and depends largely on the respective internal situation and immediate working environment. The empirical survey of the dominant features of these organizations shows that they have problems on three different, but interconnected, levels: the pattern of participation; the relations between organizations; and the type of interaction between them and the state.
1. Pattern of participation and organization

This dimension includes three problems: the "inactive membership" syndrome, the rigidity of hierarchical relations, and the patrimonial-type of leadership.

1.1. "Inactive Membership" syndrome

The "inactive membership" syndrome refers to the considerable weakness of participation within the organizations of civil society, especially the unions. Union membership is high, but members hardly participate in politically-related issues. They do participate, however, in the demand for social services presented by their organization (Arab Strategic Report 1987). The weakness of participation is clear in union elections where the participation rate is generally very low. General Assemblies never convene in their first appointments due to the absence of their quorums, and many candidates win their seats by acclamation in default of rival candidates. In the 1987 election of the national executive board of the General Confederation of Workers unions, (17) candidates, representing (17) provinces, won their seats in this way (Arab Strategic Report 1987). This feature has been generally thought to be challenged by the mounting power of Islamic groups' within the unions. But the figures prove that this is far from being true. The Engineers Union elections of 1991 registered the highest level of participation ever known, yet only 25,000 out of its 193,000 registered members had voted. In the same year, the elections of the Commercial Employees' Union were deferred due to the repeated absence of its quorum (Arab Strategic Report
1991). The weakness of participation is also reflected in the high number of those who neglect or refuse to pay their annual dues and consequently lose their right to vote.

The main reason for this confusing situation is the compulsory nature of membership in professional and workers' unions. Thus, membership is not optional, and it is impossible to quit; if one drops out of a union, one automatically drops out of the profession. It is also impossible to form rival unions and there is only one union for each profession. In this sense, unions are imposed from above, which contradicts the very meaning of voluntary action in civil society and resembles more the traditional Guilds or the corporatist model. This contributes to heterogeneity and absence of cohesion among the members.

1.2. The rigidity of hierarchical relations

These organizations call for a democratic relationship with the state, however, they undergo a crisis of democracy in their own organizational life. This is illustrated in the divorce between the bottom and the top. Usually, the bottom has no impact on important decisions. In the General Confederation of Workers' Unions (GCWC), the leader is chosen only by the executive board (25 members) and the workers have no influence on most of its decisions (Arab Strategic Report 1986). Also, power is highly concentrated in the hands of the GCWC vis-à-vis the regional unions that compose it and the relations between them are remarkably undemocratic. The rigidity of hierarchical relations and the undemocratic nature of the leadership selection process, intensify the level of incohesiveness in these organizations and distort the dynamics of their
internal interactions. Participation of the bottom generally follows the
decision-making phase, especially when the leader is affiliated in one way
or another to the government. Clearly, this "participation" is limited to
execution matters. For example, the Secretary General of the GCWC is at
the same time the responsible for the commercial and industrial activities
in the ruling National Party. Hence, most of the decisions are taken
between him and the government, and then passed on to the bottom. The same
pattern took place in the Actors' Union in 1987, where a law extending the
mandate of the Secretary General was passed first in the parliament and
only afterwards were the members of the union "informed" of its content
(Arab Strategic Report 1987).

1.3. Factionalism

An important dimension contributing to the distortion of Egyptian
civil society is the widespread factionalism inside its organizations,
whether this factionalism finds a political, religious, or professional
basis. Factionalism is aggravated by the heterogenous nature of compulsory
membership. Espousing different ideologies in the same organization does
not seem to be possible, where there are incessant conflicts between
different political factions such as Nasserisis and Wafdist, Communists
and Islamists, Marxists and Liberals, etc. While these conflicting
factions are associated with antagonist leaders, conflicts also tend to be
personal. In fact, this occurs in most professional unions, where
divisions and conflicts inhibit the functioning of their organs, and where
political party allegiances interfere heavily in organizational life (Arab
Strategic Report 1989). Indeed, this intensifies the absence of cohesion
among members, and thereby undermines the ability of the union to achieve its main goals. In the Engineers Union, factions are multiple: such as civil versus military engineers, private and the public sectors' engineers, in addition to other ideological and patrimonial-type factions. This type of factionalism undermines the capacity of the organization to resolve its internal problems, and gives more impetus to state intervention. This is reflected in the electoral processes, where in 1987 only, the Egyptian Administrative Courts witnessed tens of cases associated with internal conflict in these organizations (Arab Strategic Report 1987).

On the other hand, encompassing extremely large numbers of members with the same organization contributes to its incohesiveness and heterogeneity. For example the Teachers' union, which is constituted of nearly three quarters of a million members, finds difficulty in harmonizing relations and managing the different and sometimes opposed interests of its members (Kandeel 1987, 15). The same situation is found in workers organizations where the differences separating workers (either on basis of class, sector, or professional basis) are oppressed under the official unity of their representative body. As Bianchi summarizes it,

\[
[...] there are growing doubts within many affiliates that the interests of all workers can be served any longer by one association, especially one whose shape and character are molded more from above than from below" (Bianchi 1986, 442).
\]

1.4. The patrimonial-type of leadership

Leadership in the organizations of civil society is characterized by a dual patrimonial relation. The first relates the leader (or the would-be leader) to key-persons and factions within the organization. This case is
best illustrated in both the Journalists' and Lawyers' unions where clientelist relations involve not only symbolic gratification and exchange of political benefits but also an exchange of material benefits. In certain cases, as in the Journalists' and Engineers' unions, patrimonialism is extended to virtually all members of the union.

The other aspect of this relation relates the leader to the state apparatus. Through specific arrangements and explicit exchange of benefits with the state, the leader takes control of the organization. Consequently, he plays a dual role; as a spokesman of the organization for the government, and vice versa. In this way, some leaders have managed to stay in their posts for more than ten years (such as Othman Ahmad Othman as a leader of the Engineers Union and Ahmad A-Khawaga of the Lawyers' union). On the other hand, other unions such as the case of the Commercial Employees' union remained without a leader for more than a year in 1986 because of acute tensions and confrontations between factions (Arab Strategic Report 1988).

In addition to its consequences for the internal life of the organization, this type of relation exhibits a basic contradiction. As Robert Bianchi (1989) puts it, this "dual allegiances" to the government and to their clients creates a tension that is difficult to manage:

Association leaders are torn by incompatible demands to defend the interests of their constituents while simultaneously serving as agents of the government (Bianchi 1989, 57)

That situation contributes to the distortions to organizational life. In addition to the legitimacy crisis that it creates for the leader (because of his identification with state policies), this tension intensifies the
heterogeneity and factionalism within the organization and increases the state capacity to interfere in its life.

2. The relations among organizations

The relations among civil society's organizations reflect yet another dimension of its distortions. These relations are complex and take multiple forms. Therefore we will concentrate here on two of their characteristics: intolerance and atomization. Both reflect weakness, or absence, of cohesion on the part of civil society at large.

2.1. Intolerance

In fact, the existence of rival ideologies and groups within the bounds of civil society is not an aberrant feature in itself. The idea of civil society permits diversity. Variations in political discourses and conflicting interests can be articulated within it. Nevertheless, as chapter one indicated, this diversity is usually bounded by a hegemonic link. This link does not mean a homogenization of political discourses and diverse interests, but it offers a common ground with which different discourses compete. This common ground not only defines the rules of the game, but also renders the antagonisms negotiable and solvable.

In the Egyptian case, this link is clearly lacking in the relations among civil society organizations. Antagonisms and differences are both fundamental and comprehensive, in the sense that they cover all issues of political relations and that they present different conceptions of the
world. This absence of consensus, even in its rudimentary forms, is responsible for the so-called "intolerance" which characterizes political behaviour and culture in Egypt. This characteristic is best illustrated by the confrontation between Islamist-dominated organizations and other political factions. The intolerance in this case is double-sided: stemming from and targeted against the Islamists. The Islamists have shown an extreme sensitivity and intolerance to any point of view they deem in contradiction with the teachings of Islam. Since they conceive the latter as covering all aspects of life, little room remains for compromise. On the other hand, other political groups have developed an anti-Islamist position that pushes them to accept measures they had been condemning for a long time. The 1993 Unified Law for professional unions, which is seen as an attempt by the government to stop the mounting influence of the Islamists by intervening directly in their internal elections, provides a good example of this relationship. This law was welcomed by both left and right-wing groups despite its authoritarian character that they had been fighting for decades (Arab Strategic Report 1994). This was also the case between communist groups and the others during the Sadat era, between Wafdist and Nasserists in both Nasser and Mubarak era. It also characterizes the attitude of the ruling-party advocates and the rest (Arab Strategic Report 1987). All these factions have failed to establish a dialogue or to set out rules for collective action. Instead, they have called upon the state to suppress their rivals.
2.2. Atomization

In spite of the diversity of interests articulated by the organizations of civil society, the coordination between these organizations would find them in a better bargaining with respect to the state. According to Al-Sayyid, "solidarity among such organizations is viewed as the best way for them to mobilize their common resources in order to expand their autonomy" (Al-Sayyid 1993, 238). However, organizations in Egypt rarely arrange and coordinate with each other, but rather work individually in a self-centered way. This absence of coordination makes civil society rather atomized and more susceptible to state manipulation.

Cooperation among organizations is also hindered by the intolerant nature of inter-group relations. Once a political faction gains control over an organization, it transforms it into a forum devoted exclusively to the propagation of its own discourse. Thus, during 1993, the Islamists-dominated professional unions have developed a network of communications and organized political rallies restricted to their adherents. Their contacts with other unions that are dominated by other political factions were either nil or antagonistic. These contacts were mere attempts to support Islamists in the other unions (Arab Strategic Report 1994). Moreover, organizations belonging to the same political camp, Islamists for example, do not constitute a network of "private civil society" as much as they integrate their organizations in the Islamic movement. Consequently, civil society organizations are transformed into fronts where total wars are fought to integrate them into this or that camp. The
mediation role is marginalized, and the relations among organizations are reduced to either state of war or to collective submission to the state.

3. Dependence on the state

The authoritarian character of the Egyptian state has often constituted a barrier in its interaction with civil society. The Egyptian state always been confronted with a dilemma since the beginning of nineteenth century, which is generalized by Moore as:

It (the authoritarian state) faces a virtually unsurmountable dilemma it tries to modernize society. It virtually lacks the organizational weapon needed to mobilize society and make it conform to its modernizing design; it is bound to be inefficient, and cannot expand its power much beyond that of its major instrument, a conventional bureaucracy (Moore 1974, 193).

The modern organizations of Egyptian civil society are a product of this dilemma. They are either incorporated into the authoritarian modernizing bureaucratic state or reject it. Such a rejection intensifies the dilemma of the state, as it "either makes compromises with existing social forces and organized groups which oppose the design or it must combat them and risk losing more support than its limited capabilities can bear" (Moore 1974, 193-4).

The above perfectly describes the Egyptian case where the interaction between the state and these organizations is characterized by the existence of a dichotomy between dependent-corporatism or independence-rejection. Most professional unions, workers unions, and
social-oriented associations are involved in a dependent-corporatist relation with the State. Independence gives rise to two types of relation: imposition or rejection. Business groups are the unique example of organizations that are independent from the state and able to impose their interests on it. The Islamic movements epitomize the other type of independence which is associated with antagonism and rejection.

3.1. Corporatism

The state in Egypt resorts to corporatism as a strategy for interaction with society at large. It seeks to incorporate the whole society in a single mass, an attempt that presupposes a shared interest in collective existence and cooperation expressed through strategic exercise of power by a strong central state (Held 1989, 64). To preserve that centrality and power monopoly, it penetrates society with its strategies, collects information, extracts resources, and distributes goods and favours according to its own policies and procedures. This model characterizes the interaction of the state and the organizations in Egypt. Philippe Schmitter refers to this situation as "corporatism". He differentiates between "state corporatism" and "societal corporatism".

What we are concerned with in this context is the state corporatism, and which is defined by Schmitter as

a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports. (Schmitter 1974, 93-4).
State corporatist arrangements were often introduced during emergencies such as: war, national mobilization for development, and the aftermath of revolution. It reached its apex in Nasser’s socialist transformations in the sixties. Sadat established controlled forms of pluralism which continued under Mubarak. These forms have not negated the corporatist nature of the Egyptian political representation. In fact, they were aimed at absorbing opposition to authoritarianism and garnishing popular support. As Robert Bianchi argues, these forms enabled the ruler to tame many of his opponents while isolating and hunting down his most dangerous enemies (Bianchi 1988, 2). In addition, this pluralism has been no more than a facade which the state has exploited in order to accomplish its policies in lieu of a more dynamic and uncertain interaction with its society.

Matching Schmitter’s definition of state corporatism, there is a symbiotic relationship between the Egyptian state and the organizations that constitute civil society. The state recognizes these organizations and grants them a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories. In return, it preserves the right to intervene in their life and to control the selection of their leaders. There is, thus, a dual and reciprocal benefit in this interaction where the state has the privilege of imposing upon the corporatized groups the mode of collective action it prefers. On the other hand, the corporatized groups guarantee a certain level of resource extraction under the corporatist umbrella. In addition, these groups build patronage networks inside the ruling circles and the state bureaucracy (Bianchi 1989, 91). Hence, very few organizations are willing to engage in confrontations with the state over
the question of their autonomy or any other matter, a fact which Al-Sayyid emphasizes for:

Their leaders view maintaining good relations with the government as the best way to ensure receiving government favours in terms of appointments in legislative or advisory bodies, obtaining facilities for their members, or simply escaping the wrath of officials, particularly security forces (Al-Sayyid 1993, 238).

Most, if not all, organized groups in Egypt maintain a certain kind of corporatist relationship with the state. The professional unions find in corporatist relations a way to manage their dependency on the state apparatus; a dependency that is manifested in their semi-official status and in their vulnerability to reprisals from government employers and bodies (Bianchi 1988, 6). This does not entail that all professional unions are corporatized all the time. The Lawyers' union has been the least corporatized organization in Egypt (Arab Strategic Report 1994). The Journalists' and Commercial Employees' unions have occasionally been open to a wider range of partisan forces (Bianchi 1988, 6), but were involved in corporatist relations at other times. Workers unions and Agricultural Cooperatives were corporatized mainly by Nasser (Bianchi 1988, 7). They have shown virtually no sign of distancing themselves from this model since then. Even collective actions taken by workers, such as the strike by railway workers in Cairo in 1986 and that by Steel workers in Helwan in 1989 were conducted outside the unions and even condemned by GCWI (Arab Strategic Report 1990). Religious institutions such as Al-Azhar, which has played a key role in the history of representation in Egypt is now under the direct supervision of the state. The latter considers Al-Azhar as one of its institutions changed with supervising Islamic Education and publishing, managing government-owned mosques, and upholding the position
of the "Ulama" (religious leaders) (Bianchi 1988, 12). The corporatist arrangements that link Al-Azhar's Ulama and the state contribute to the erosion of their credibility and thereby encourage the development of countervailing Islamic groups who feel malrepresented by these state-sponsored religious organizations.

State corporatism has provided fertile ground for developing clientelistic networks between the state and the corporatized organizations. Favours flow down the network and votes or support flow up (George Lencoowski 1975). This establishes personal connections which serve to dissolve the line that separates between the public and the private interests of the organizations' leaders. This is a situation that paved the way for corruption. Bianchi offers an example for a case of collaboration between a generous state and a privileged associational client:

The Engineer's union has become a prototype for restructuring corporatist professional groups into profitable business enterprises that are financed with public funds and managed by the private sector cronies of the National Democratic party (Bianchi 1988, 7).

3.2. Control

The other strategy adopted by the state is the direct control of civil society's organizations. This control exerted at the creation of the organization and keeps pace with it during its entire life time. It takes multiple forms ranging from administrative control and the manipulation of elections to overt repression.

Law 32 of 1964 concerning associations gives the Ministry of Social Affairs the right to deny registration to associations. Recognition or
denial is not based on constant or clear principles, but depends on the interpretation made by state officials. This interpretation varies in time and according to the case examined. Moreover, the rules can be modified by the State itself without prior consultation with the existing associations. For example, a condition for registration of an association is its commitment not to engage in political activities; a condition which is not only contrary to the basic idea of civil society, but which is also too loose. In practice, denial and acceptance has depended on informal arrangements between the founders of the association and state officials. The Arab organization for human rights, despite its observer status in the UN Economic and Social Council has not been approved as a formal organization in Egypt (Al-Sayyid 1993, 236). This control continues along the life of the association as it is obliged to deposit a copy of the minutes of all meetings with the Ministry of Social Affairs. The latter uses Law 32 of 1964 to intimidate other societies by threatening to suspend their activities if they do not conform to the preconceived conditions (Al-Sayyid 1993, 236). In addition, there are other means of control. Public meetings of organizations have to obtain prior authorization before being held, publications of certain organizations can be suspended or banned (as "Sawt al-Arab", the Nasseriste weekly), and election laws and procedures are constantly liable to government amendment.

Another means of control is state intervention in the electoral process of the said organizations. Names of the candidates must be approved by the "Socialist-Public-Attorney". The latter's authority is not just procedural. For example, he excluded fifty-nine candidates in the
GCWI's elections in 1979 (Arab Strategic Report 1988). So the state can exclude any candidate and promote others that it prefers. This intervention is systematically conducted, especially in the elections of the unions' leadership. The Journalists' union election of the Secretary-General in 1991 is only one example of this practice (Arab Strategic Report 1992). Once elections are over, the state control and intervention does not cease. Law 76 of 1970 gives the state a legal right to invalidate the decisions of the General Assemblies of unions, and also to dissolve the union Directing-Boards (Arab Strategic Report 1992). Once again, this "right" was used systematically by the state whenever the need to exercise it was felt. The elected Directing-Board of the Lawyers Union was dissolved in 1981 by a decision from the Minister of Justice and another temporary council was appointed (Arab Strategic Report 1992). The 1989 elections of the same union's Directing-Board were abolished by a court decision and a committee was appointed to supervise the elections. This same committee was invalidated by another court decision in 1993 and new elections were held despite the active protests by the lawyer members (Arab Strategic Report 1994).

One further measure in the state control of civil society organizations is dissolution. In 1980, Sadat threatened to dissolve the Lawyers Union and to convert it to a social club, as was the case of the Magistrates and the University Professors (Arab Strategic Report 1992).

Ever present in the background, and sometimes brought to the fore, is the overt use of force. The repressive capacity of the state against the civil society's organizations is defined by Al-Sayyid as the ability of the government to curtail the autonomy of a specific association if it
wishes through inacting other laws. Amending the penal code, for example, was justified as being indispensable in the fight against 'terrorism' (Al-Sayyid 1993, 237). In practice, the state has used its police to put an end to unions' action. Use of police force has repeatedly interrupted proceedings in several unions as happened in the Lawyers' union in 1986 and in 1989, and in the Actors' Union in 1987. These interventions have been usually accompanied by arrests. (Arab Strategic Report 1987).

3.3. Imposition and rejection

Both business and Islamic groups have a certain source of power with which they can bargain and keep their relative autonomy vis-à-vis the state. Yet, as pointed out earlier, they present two different types of autonomy, and two different perceptions of the relation with the state.

Business groups have sufficient political power to keep them relatively independent from the state apparatus. They have financial resources, networks of contacts with foreign investors, and political connections as most of their members are ex-ministers and prominent executives. Islamic groups have a different type of political power. They enjoy the capacity to mobilize large segments of the population. Both have an organizational advantage, in that they are more homogenous and less apt to suffer from the existence of factionalism and rivalries. They both reject the corporatist policies of the state and instead seek to influence the state's structures, albeit in opposing directions. Business groups seek to liberalize and rationalize state structures to make them more compatible with a full fledged market economy. An example of their
influence on state policy is the decisive role they played in defeating and removing the economic nationalists in Mubarak's government who sought to restore a degree of state control over foreign trade and the supply of money (Bianchi 1988, 11). On the other hand, Islamic groups seek either to replace the state structures altogether, to transform them fundamentally along ideological lines, or to leave the Egyptian state as is but to adjust it along Islamic lines. This is demonstrated in the difference between the Jama'a al-Islamiyya; southern Islamic movement and the Jihad movement; among other northern Islamic movements. While the Jihad seeks radical change and claim that those who rule Egypt are non-Moslems, the Jama'a believes that the Egyptian state can be left as is but only to be adjusted along Islamic lines (Fandi 1994). Nevertheless, the confrontation is clear between the state and the Islamic movements in Egypt, where it is hard to find a line of agreement between both sides.

Business groups have demonstrated a strong capacity to influence state policies. In 1985, the Prime Minister put forward a resolution for the creation of a joint committee composed of representatives from the government and business groups to study economic policies. This committee included two deputies to the Prime Minister, five ministers, and fourteen businessmen. In addition, conferences, mutual reporting and high level personal meetings are regularly conducted with businessmen groups.

While business groups deal with the state, Islamic groups prefer to confront it. This confrontation is conducted following two major strategies. The first works through the state's legal structures to transform them. The other mainly refuses to play within the system which it rejects as a whole, and tries to build an alternative. It is the first
strategy that concerns us more here, even if, in practice, both are interconnected. Bianchi, as to many observers, fails to distinguish between these two ideas within the Islamic groups. He states that:

They refuse to register with the government as official voluntary associations, they do not request state subsidization or recognition, and they call on Muslims to bypass the "Ulama" in developing independent interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunna (Bianchi 1988, 13).

In fact, it is the state that refuses to register any of the Islamic groups, as is the case with Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (Muslim Brothers) whose association was dissolved by Nasser and has never been officially rehabilitated. The registration laws specifically deny legal status to any association that is constituted according to religious beliefs. In addition, the state has portrayed these groups as "aberrant cults equipped and sustained by foreign funds", and as terrorists (Bianchi 1988, 14). As part of their alternative strategy. In 1987, Islamic groups began systematic efforts to penetrate the organizations of civil society. Especially targeted were the professional unions (Arab Strategic Report 1994). This strategy was fruitful as they succeeded in taking control of most of these unions by the year 1993, a situation that alerted the government and caused it to respond by enacting a new controversial law (the Unified Law for Unions, 1993) that aims specifically at reducing the ability of Islamic groups to promote their candidates.

In sum, the distortions of Egyptian civil society are multidimensional and take place on different levels. Taking into consideration the complexity of these distortions, it seems erroneous to concentrate exclusively on only one dimension. Therefore, arguments about the
"weakness" of civil society in Egypt can be falsified empirically as instances of "strong" moments of civil society can be found. Also, claiming that it does not exist altogether risks the same fate, as certain expressions of what can be called civil society can be found in the political process in Egypt. Still, no one can claim that the Egyptian civil society simply "exists" or that it is strong. In the internal organization of its components, in the relations between them, and in its relations with the State, it manifests considerable anomaly. The fact remains that civil society in Egypt is a melange of all of these claims: it has moments of existence and of disappearance, strong as well as fading expressions, but in all its moments, it presents symptoms of distortion.

Conclusion

The literature over the distortions of Egyptian civil society exhibits five main deficiencies. First, it presents descriptions of these distortions more than it explains them. This is particularly evident in the case of the cultural and "political" approaches. The former attributes the distortions to the culture without problematizing the culture itself. In a sense, these approaches present only a reformulation of the question. Both explanations are tautological: patrimonialism, dependence on the state and lack of consensus are all attributed, on the one hand, to a "patrimonial culture" that favours dependence on the state and is characterized by dissention. On the other hand, they are attributed to the patrimonial character of Egyptian politics, to the authoritarianism of the
state, and to absence of political pluralism. Both explanations fail to go beyond the description of the existing distortions, and fall into a pattern of a circular reasoning, where both A and B offer mutually causal explanations. This reasoning leaves us with the original questions unresolved.

The second problem is the static nature of the explanations given. Despite the insights his analysis makes, Badie remains unable to tackle the question of cultural transformation. Recognizing the contradiction between the principles of societal organization in Arab countries and the Western-like form of state clearly opens new horizons for the understanding of political phenomena in these countries. Yet, Badie's analysis does not help us understand why these societies have developed in these directions and not in others. This shortcoming also applies to the remaining cultural explanations as well as the "patrimonial" model.

The third problem is the latent or explicit ethnocentrism of certain explanations. The modernization school is the self-declared ethnocentric analysis. Civil society (and democracy) are defined clearly in Western terms. This is Badie's case where his analysis of the sociétés civiles introuvables rests, as indicated in chapter one, on an ethnocentric perception of this concept.

Fourthly, most of the literature treats the subject in a too general manner. This is to be explained, in part, by the currency of the debate on civil society and the fact that this literature was focuses on more general phenomena. The example of this sort of analysis is that presented by the Dependency school. It certainly sheds new light onto the political development of the peripheral countries, especially as regards
establishing a link between both "internal" and "external" political spheres. Yet, the dependency school model remains too general and hard to operationalize in order to tackle concrete situations. Another type of general analysis is that of the "patrimonial" model. It is presented as an explanation for all political phenomena in a patrimonial society regardless of the specific configurations of a phenomenon in time and space.

Finally, a large part of the literature explains the distortions of Egyptian civil society by reference to "internal" variables only. This is, in part, the syndrome of "area-studies" literature, but it is also found in the cultural approach as well as the patrimonial model.

Nevertheless, the literature offers insights that are crucial to any genuine explanation of the distortions of Egyptian civil society. Specifically, three approaches do present themselves as illuminating devices for understanding our subject. They include the Modernization and Dependency schools, as well as the cultural approach. The contributions of the Modernization and Dependency schools are two-fold. First, they emphasize the link between "internal" and "external" developments. Thus, they both, albeit in opposite ways, integrate the international dimension in their analysis of social transformations. Secondly, both schools stress the cleavage between modern/traditional in shaping the political, social and economic agenda in the peripheral (or modernized) societies. The Dependency school presents this cleavage in economistic terms, i.e., capitalistic transformations versus pre-capitalist modes of production. Yet, if we integrate the non-economic aspects of the Dependency analysis,
the results meet the modernity problematic. This cleavage will help us re-integrate the findings and statements of the cultural approach. The descriptions made by Badie and other "culturalists" can be best understood as explanations if we relate them to the dynamics of the modern/traditional cleavages. The integration of these three elements (the internal-external link, the modern/traditional cleavage and the cultural specificity) in the analysis will likely be more useful in explaining the distortions of Egyptian civil society.

To do this in a non-descriptive, dynamic, non-ethnocentric, specific and non-economistic manner is exactly what we meant by an approach of historical-sociology. Thus, the following chapters will focus on the specific dynamics by which the international order influences the societal transformations in Egypt. The ways in which the modernity/traditionality cleavage affected political, social, and cultural developments in Egypt will be examined. The distortions of Egyptian civil society then put in internal and external historical context.
CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPACT OF WORLD ORDER ON THE EGYPTIAN STATE

In studying the impact of the world order on the Egyptian state, two theoretical traps should be avoided: reification of the concept and a functional bias. The world order is defined here as the prevalent configuration of power, economic, social and ideological relations across the world in a given historical moment. This configuration does not exist in its own right; it is rather a set of social relations, i.e. constructed, maintained and challenged by actors. In this perspective, "pessimistic functionalism", according to which world order is designed to fulfil pre-determined objectives is to be excluded (Lipietz 1985). Historical events are not considered here as inevitable consequences of the "needs of capitalism", or the "needs of development in core countries". Such a functionalist approach ignores the role played by actors in forging their own history. Therefore, emphasizing the role of actors in the shaping of history reduces the risks of both reification and functionalism.

Egypt's integration into the world order began with the French occupation (1798-1801) at the turn of the nineteenth century and has continued ever after. Thus, this integration took place within two main configurations of the world order: "the coming of the liberal order", and the "rival imperialisms" (Cox 1987). Cox fixes the beginnings of the liberal order around the turn of the eighteenth century with the erosion of mercantilism (Cox 1987, 111). This order was basically the creation of the expansionist British, and then other European societies. It took shape through trade, emigration, and capital investment. This expansion was
served by various state actions (Cox 1987, 144). Thus, this order was based on the superiority in power capabilities and the technological innovation of first the British, then other European states. It was equally based on liberal ideology in its broad sense. The second phase lasting from the 1870s until the Second World War, was marked by dire competition between European imperialisms (Cox 1987, 151). The characteristics of this order are: redistribution of power capabilities among European states, the spread of industrialization in Europe, a significant increase in European expansion overseas which brought more social formations into an increasingly tight international division of labour, and the rise of nationalism as an ideology in Europe (Cox 1987, 151-157).

The change in the configuration of the world order, however, had little impact on Egypt's position. In fact, beginning in 1882, Egypt was under the direct British control. As French power rose, they attempted to challenge Britain's position in Egypt; an attempt that came to an abrupt conclusion in 1911 when both parties (France and Great Britain) agreed on the repartition of their zones of influence. British control, thus, remained unchallenged throughout the two periods, and the "rivalry of imperialisms" did not influence developments in Egypt in a significant way. It is only when the world order changed dramatically following the Second World War, that its impact on Egypt took new dimensions. The decline in British power, the emergence of bipolarity, the appearance of new international institutions, and the impetus liberalism had regained, especially in regards to the right of self-determination, all changed the way in which the world order influenced events in Egypt. Yet, this chapter
will argue, all three world orders intensified Egypt's integration of its structures, and thereby influenced its state-society relations in a specific way. All three orders strengthened the State in face of social forces, increased its role and its penetration, and hence integrated social forces in a neo-patrimonial type of relations with the state.

The first section of this chapter will summarize the means by which the Egyptian state became integrated in the world order. The second will develop the argument illustrated above, i.e. the consequences of this integration on state-society relations.

1. THE MECHANISMS OF THE EGYPTIAN STATE INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD ORDER

The Egyptian state has been integrated into the world order via three main mechanisms: intimidation, overt force, and internal transformation.

1. Integration by intimidation

The modernization of the Egyptian state began during the latter period of the Mamluks' reign, but it is only with the arrival of Muhammad Ali to power in 1805 that this process took full dimensions (Marsot 1984, 1). Modernization was initially motivated by the growing concerns about the fate of Egyptian cohesion in the face of a rising European threat.
Thus, Muhammad Ali's modernization project was structured with a single objective: building a strong, western-style army.

The concerns about the integrity of the Egyptian state had been rising in the late Mamluk period in the second half of the eighteenth century as a result of the technological revolution in Western Europe. Techniques of production were improving rapidly, especially in the military and textile industries. This constituted a two-fold threat for both Egyptian trade and sovereignty (Marsot 1984, 1). The Egyptian trade was increasingly undermined as its productivity lagged behind that of European which was benefitting from rapid technological innovation. Of course, there were other internal reasons for this stagnation, such as incessant factional wars among Mamluks, heavy taxes and political instability. Yet, the improvement of the competitive edge which the "industrial revolution" was providing Europe delivered a harsh blow to already stagnating Egyptian exports and even threatened the Egyptian position in its own internal markets. For example, middle-priced French cloth was cheaper than the equivalent Egyptian product on the Egyptian market (Marsot 1984, 16). This economic stagnation was associated with political decay and a concurrent rise in the European military threat, which culminated in the French occupation of Egypt in 1798. This moment represented a collapse in the legitimacy of the Mamluks, which had already been eroding, and a loss of confidence in their ability to defend public order and Egypt's territorial integrity. The sophisticated French army captured the attention of Egyptian elites and made them realize the consequences of their lack of a modern army (Marsot 1984, 21).
Muhammad Ali came to power on an agenda for change. He was brought to power by a popular revolt led by the Ulama and other notables. This popular support, which indicated a rupture with the Mamluk regime, was responsible for maintaining Muhammad Ali in power during the fragile first years of his reign. It defeated the attempts made by the Ottoman Sultan to oust him, paid the expenses of his new administration, and brought the 1807 British invasion of Rasheed to a halt when Muhammad Ali was still unable to build a new army (Al-Rafa'i 1989, 29).

Muhammad Ali's project was to establish a new, modern order in Egypt centered around a core furnished by a strong, European-style army. This became the framework of the country's drive towards modernization (Vatikiotis 1991). Muhammad Ali created European-style military schools staffed by Europeans and Egyptians trained abroad or locally by European officers and expert advisors. He also initiated military industries (weaponry and munitions) as well as warship building sites. The military build-up became the basis for all other transformations in the country. Every other innovation (administrative, industrial, agricultural, educational, etc) was designed to fill the needs of the military (Al-Rafa'i 1989, 321). Muhammad Ali's strategy to turn Egypt into an independent, modern and industrialized country moved it from its traditional channels and pushed it towards increasing integration with the modern European system.

The transformations that the Egyptian economy underwent are a good example of the role played by security concerns in the process by which Egypt was being integrated into the world order. The military build-up intensified Muhammad Ali's need for cash money, either to pay for the
imported technology and expertise, or to finance his growing army personnel with logistics and the military industries. As the existing Egyptian economy was at the time unable to provide the needed resources, Muhammad Ali had to generate deep transformations notably by the massive introduction of cash crops such as cotton. These transformations led to an expanding financial transactions and relations with the European financial markets (Marsot 1984, 17-18). In practice, this meant a gradual destruction of the traditional economic life and a re-orientation of production towards the export market. This integration of Egypt in the world economy, although initiated by security concerns, gradually developed its own dynamics, and continued even after the collapse of Muhammad Ali’s project. It became a means of integration in the world order in its own right (Issawi 1965, 18-9). This is equally true for the administrative and educational changes introduced by Muhammad Ali which were originally designed to support the military build-up but colaterally introduced political modernity into Egypt.

2. Integration by force

During Khedive Ismail’s reign, European influence in Egypt grew considerably. Following an increase in the Egyptian debt to European financial houses, this influence was institutionalized to manage the ability of Egypt to continue its debt repayment. European powers, mainly France and Britain, established a caisse de la dette to supervise the finances of the Egyptian government. This supervision meant in practice a
direct interference in the generation of the budget itself. This interference was further entrenched in 1878 by the entry of two European "Ministers", one French and the other British, into the Egyptian cabinet in what became known as the Mixed Government (Thabet 1992, 120). By 1882, British troops had occupied Egypt on the invitation of the Khedive Tawfik to suppress Orabi's "mutiny". After crashing the "mutiny", British troops remained in Egypt for more than seventy years (1882-1954). During this period, a wide range of transformations took place under the auspices of British power. In fact, the modernization of Egypt and its integration into the world order had started long before the arrival of the British. Yet, by their presence and the use of force or the threat of its use, the British mastered the situation and seized control of the integration process. A "veiled Protectorate" was established in Egypt, where the British were the de facto rulers behind a facade of Egyptian officials. The British "advisors" who were appointed in each ministry virtually directed policy while Ministers enjoyed, in reality, very little authority. Most high ranking officials, including army officers, were British, and the representative of the British Crown exercised wide ranging powers in Egyptian affairs (Goldschmidt 1988, 59-60).

The British organized a broad transformations in Egyptian social life. As early as 1883, administrative reforms, "proposed" by the British were introduced. They included a reorganization of the government and judiciary, the creation of national courts, the introduction of a civil code, a restructuring of the state's finances, and reorganization of the

1 Ahmed Orabi, Egyptian military leader led a revolt against foreign influence in the Egyptian army in 1882.
army and police forces. The pace of transformation was maintained during the entire the latter period of British Occupation. Lord Cromer, one of the most distinguished British High Commissioners in Egypt, literally transformed the face of Egyptian agriculture and the education system. He converted Egypt into a monocultural production (cotton) for export to British factories. As well, he turned Egypt to a great importer of grain to feed its population. Cromer also discouraged local industry on the grounds of the benefits of national specialization, and introduced a modern, Western-styled, educational system (J.C.P. Richmond 1977, 132-157). Thus, Egypt's integration in World market was intensified.

3. Integration by transformation

The transformation of Egyptian culture played an important role in its integration into the world order. Although it was the less apparent of the three mechanisms, in the long run, it proved to be of considerable importance. The westernization of Egyptian culture, although incomplete, was the guarantor of the irreversibility of its integration in the world order. This transformation took place in two ways. first, the fascination of Egyptian elites by the modern world motivated them to seek by themselves this westernization, while the West did not waste the opportunity thus presented to penetrate this Muslim society. Second, other transformations took place as consequences of the modernization process itself.
Fascination with the modern world, and its science and technology, began with the French occupation, and increased gradually through the Khedives' era. It has continued to influence and impress the Egyptian elites down to the present. The French occupation was the first European contact that brought new ideas and conceptions. Although regarded as aliens and abhorred by the Egyptian Muslims, the French were regarded as strong conquerors and a source of innovation and knowledge. Egyptians were impressed by French military prowess, science and technology, and the cultural renaissance they brought with them. Bonaparte's geniality, his attempts to gain their support and his religious tolerance made the liberal and modern ideas he espoused more readily accepted, or at least shook the Egyptians strict adherence to their traditional views. The establishment of an institute for Science and Arts, the opening of a theatre, the organization of an official press and an Arab printing press, etc., all shifted the attention of the Egyptians towards the power of European modernity (Vatikiotis 1991, 56-58). As Vatikiotis puts it,

The science and technology of post-Enlightenment Europe simply showed the Egyptians that there was another world, outside their own, which had certain things to offer that would make material existence better, and political life perhaps more powerful (1991, 46).

Although Egyptians were antagonistic to secular foreign culture, they were perplexed, dismayed, and had mixed feelings of fascination and curiosity about the modern world. For Muhammad Ali and his followers, their aim was to make Egypt a modern country. They were not only intimidated by the modern world but they were also fascinated by its capabilities and worked to incorporate it into the Egyptian state and society. Educational
missions were sent abroad and European technical and expert advisers were invited to assist in the modernization of Egypt.

In fact the modernization process that Egypt was undergoing generated its own consequences. The establishment and consolidation of a modern state, the initiation of a modern education system, the sending of mission to Europe, the appeal to foreign expertise, as well as the consequences of integration into the world economy, all generated new dynamics that contributed to the westernization of Egyptian social life. Gradually, Egyptian elites adopted European notions of a secular nation-state to replace the religious concept of "Umma" (community of believers). Political parties, the importance of popular debate over public issues, responsible government and an elected representative body, rights and obligations of citizenship—these ideas imported from Europe constituted the new referents for modernized elites (Vatikiotis 1991, 221). Also, these transformations resulted in the emergence of a nationalism that found parallels with religious and community allegiances. Egyptian nationalism became a guiding principle of political action alongside the supranational and universalist formula of Pan-Islamism (Vatikiotis 1991, 222).

In sum, the Egyptian state was integrated into the world order by three means. First: by intimidation, where the governing elites found it irresistible to seek themselves this integration in order to survive the rising European threats. The second mechanism was the actual or threatened use of overt force, where the British military occupation supervised a wide-range restructurating of Egyptian political life. Finally, integration also took place through the transformation of Egyptian society
and culture, where the fascination with modernity was gradually induced and internalized by succeeding generations. This mechanism, as a-political as it might seem, might prove to be the most successful of all: it renders the reversal of the integration process virtually inconceivable.

II. THE IMPACT OF EGYPT'S INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD ORDER ON STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS

The integration of Egypt into the world order destabilized the state-society relation in favour of the former. The modernization process gave the state a leading role vis-à-vis society and put the latter in a passive and receptive mode. It considerably strengthened the state apparatus in the face of an increasingly atomized society. Colonization and direct intervention made the state less responsive to society and more responsive to external demands. Finally, foreign aid policies put the state in a distributor position vis-à-vis society and confirmed its lack of responsiveness to the society. The next section will tackle these points in order.

1. The subjugation of society to State

The state, as leader of the modernization process, increased its control and penetration of the economy and political life. This began
during Muhammad Ali's era and reached its apogee with Nasser. The state embarked on a state-centred development programme, establishing manufacturing factories, introducing large scale industries, increasing trade and commercial capabilities, and revolutionizing agricultural methods and production. The Egyptian state also increased its control over society. The role of traditional intermediary organizations, such as Al-Azhar, gradually diminished in the political arena, while new institutions, such as the professional unions became mere platforms for state-centered modernization. Thus, the state came to monopolize both economic and political power, while undermining and even suppressing the role of the society at large (Vatikiotis 1980, 53-59, and Al-Naquib 1991, 177-185).

During Muhammad Ali's era, the state apparatus grew and increased its intervention in the social and economic spheres. All traditional elements of society were displaced: religious leaders, judges, teachers, craftsmen and artisans, and peasants (Vatikiotis 1991, 36). Nearly all were redirected by the modernization project and could be found serving in the military, in the factories, or as corvéé labour in agriculture. State monopolies dominated the economy. Financial and commercial services and enterprises were largely owned and operated either by the state or by foreigners who were protected by special "capitulations" (Vatikiotis 1980, 61). Indigenous financial and commercial classes did not emerge until the twentieth century (by the 1930s), and then usually they remained under state control. The enlargement of state powers took place at the expense of what we can call the "civil society" of that time: the Ilmama (Azhar intellectuals, headed by Omar Makram). Regarded as the leaders and
protectors of the community, the Ulama were indeed the core of the Egyptian civil society. It was they who enabled the accession of Muhammad Ali to power contrary to the will of the Ottoman Sultan. Paradoxically, it was Muhammad Ali himself who later organized their decline (Al-Rafa'i 1989, 95). As the modernization process went on, it accentuated the concentration of power in the person of Muhammad Ali, which gradually undermined the role of the representative body of society, i.e., Ulama and other intermediary institutions².

The characteristics of this modernizing authoritarian state are clearly apparent in Nasser's nationalist era, in which the state was actively involved in the homogenization of society and in increasing it control of all aspects of it. As Asad and Owen put it, the modernizing state during Nasser's era tried to transform, or at least to facilitate the transformation of, the total population along "rational lines". The modern conception of the "good life" had to be created (Asad and Owen 1983, 73). This objective necessitated, according to Nasser, an efficient manipulation of the population. As the state worked for the "public interest", i.e., to lead the population towards a modern life, the state had to intervene in social and economic development with all means. The state assumed the leading role in the economy that it had abandoned during the liberal years (1922-1955). This control over the economy was expressed by a commitment to central planning: national plans fixed the "economic and social development" as a primary objective for the state. This objective included the raising of capital investment, national production

² Chapter IV will provide more details on this point.
and income, heavy industrialization projects, and different rural
development schemes. This comprehensive approach meant that the state
monopolized the lead in social transformations. Once more, after Muhammad
Ali's initial push, the state put society at its disposal. The increase in
the penetration capacities of Nasser's state expanded the subjugation of
society to the state. From then on, no inner pockets or enclaves would be
saved from the comprehensive transformative modernization of the state.
Nationalization policy included not only foreign capital and business but
also the national as well. This led to the enlargement of state ownership
and management of the means of production. The public sector and the
state's bureaucracy penetrated all economic activities, and economic
investment became increasingly dependent on the state (Al-Naqiib 1991,
196-198).

However, society was incorporated rather than allowed to participate
in this modernizing nationalist project. The Nasserist political system
was based on the principle of mobilization, not participation. In fact,
'the advent of the "free officers" to power translated the weakness, if not
the absence, of powerful social forces other than the army. After a
century and a half of state-led modernization, the only social forces that
had some coherence and consciousness as such were those that constituted
the state apparatus: bureaucracy, military, and the semi-feudal
bourgeoisie. In the beginning, the military forged a coalition with the
bureaucracy and tried to incorporate all or some of the bourgeoisie
(landlords and businessmen). The latter were radically hostile to the
leadership of the military and refused to cooperate with the new regime.
Nasser, after a few years of hesitation, adopted in 1961 a comprehensive
set of nationalisation measures that destroyed the position of the bourgeoisie. Yet, the new military elite found itself in a political "vacuum". The military elite opted to mobilize the masses in order to fill this vacuum. Indeed, Nasser did not believe in the capacity of the Egyptian masses to exercise democracy or to participate actively in his modernizing project: people had to be taught how to participate, they were not yet ready to acquire the skill on their own (Balta and Claudine 1982). The political system Nasser established reflected this conviction. First with the National Union (NU), and then the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) were directed to mobilize the masses and incorporate them into state policies. The main task of these intermediary bodies was to explain to people the decisions already made and to guarantee their active participation in their execution. Any opposition that tried to challenge the primacy of the state was eliminated, as was the case with "Muslim Brothers" and the communists. Labour unions and agricultural cooperatives were put under state control and tightly bound to the government bureaucracy. The press was subject to official censorship, and the right of free assembly was restricted. As political freedom was suppressed and repressive measures were taken against opposition, public debate was diverted from politics into sports and other "safer" issues (Goldschmidt 1980, 114, 118). A system of tutelage dominated and the role of secret police grew. The only remaining coherent social force, that posed by large landowners and the old bourgeoisie, was too weak to oppose Nasser and his policies. The military and the bureaucracy continued to support the modernizing form of state that strengthened them, and the other social forces (especially the
emerging workers and the peasants) were either incorporated or silenced (Goldschmidt 1980, 118).

2. The Strengthening of the state apparatus and the atomization of society

For state officials, an efficient bureaucracy was central to the creation of a good government, which in turn was crucial for the success of modernization (Lenczozewska 1975, 81). The technocrats comprising the bureaucracy and the military were considered the basic elements of public administration. This was apparent in Muhammad Ali’s modernizing era; it continued in fluctuating phases and reached its apogee in Nasser’s “Free Officer’s revolution” in 1952 and continued thereafter. The bureaucracy and military were increasing their control over society, but this did not indicate they could exert much influence upon the power of the modernizing leadership. In fact, they were used by the state leadership to consolidate its power and to provide the needed order and organization. This situation is comparable to that which Marx described in his analysis of Napoleon’s centralized state:

This executive power, with its enormous bureaucratic and military organization, with its indigenous state machinery, embracing wide strata with a host of official. . . This appalling parasitic body enmeshes the body of society like a net and chokes all its pores (cited in: David Held 1989, 35).

This type of state-society relation began with, as previously shown, Muhammad Ali’s modernization process. Society was increasingly atomized, while the power of the bureaucracy and the military was enlarged. Intermediary social institutions, such as villages’ Shaykhs, artisans’
guilds, religious leadership, notables and local judges, etc., were dissolved and confined in the exercise of their limited functions to state bureaucracy (Baer 1969, 30-9). The introduction of modern institutions, such as unions and other representative bodies, took place under the auspices of state bureaucracy and was controlled by it (Baer 1969, 190-3).

Following the same route of transformation, Nasser and the Free Officers put in place a political system dominated by the military, and to some extent, bureaucracy. Vatikiotis describes this system as a stratiotocracy:

In declaring itself against 'politics', that's to say against the existence of political groups in society which at least purport an alternative to power, the military regime, by 1956, pre-empted all political activity in Egypt [...] the military junta had to man an administration which would not only permit them to govern, but which would also enable them to maintain effective political power over society. It is in meeting this requirement by recruiting their cadres from the armed forces that the junta gradually transformed their regime for the first five years into what I shall call here a stratiotocracy. (cited in: Tachau 1975, 85).

Militarization of the regime in Egypt was related to the emergence of a «professional army», built on modern lines (Al-Naqib 1991, 113). From then on, the military became the real social force in the political system and had the capability of penetrating political and social life. Military officers had strong representation in Egyptian cabinets and in the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) during Nasser's regime. They occupied 44% of the positions in Egyptian cabinets, and 57% of the senior ranks of the ASU, with especially strong representation in the Higher Executive Committee. No civilian sat in the General Secretariat of the ASU from 1962-1971. Military representation also constituted about 75-80% of the leadership in
provincial governments (Lenczowski 1975, 88-89). Al-Naqib shows an interesting relation between the emergence of military regimes and the widespread use of state violence and coercion, especially against the elements of civil society in the third world (Al-Naqib 1991, 120). There is a general tendency among the military to exhibit a fundamental concern with security, order and stability. In this "security" perspective, the absence of order and stability was attributed to the existence of different opinions, as well as to the diversity of organizations and parties which spawn divisions. Consequently, representative institutions, which were established during the liberal era, gradually fell under direct state control (Al-Naqib 1991, 125-126).

The state bureaucracy gained a similarly dominant position. The enlargement of the public sector, the bureaucratization of the agricultural sector, increased bureaucratic control over the provision of services and industrial production, all consolidated the position of Egyptian bureaucracy (Al-Naqib 1991, 196). Bureaucracy, in the Weberian sense, is supposed to epitomize technical superiority, precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of files, and reduction of friction and of material and personal costs (Held 1989, 41-2). All these characteristics were absent from the Egyptian bureaucracy. On the contrary, bureaucracy enhanced hierarchial control and passive obedience, but it proved to encourage a poor degree of competency. It failed to coordinate between its segments, and experienced an irrational increase in its numbers. Private interests were mixed with public interest; a situation which fostered personal connections, corruption, patronage and clientelism (George
Lencowski 1988, 90-1). Power accumulated in the hands of bureaucratic executives, and state institutions played a greater role in public affairs. At the same time, political participation was weak, if not absent, and intermediary organizations such as syndicates and trade-unions were manipulated by the bureaucracy (Al-Naquib 1991, 183-186).

In fact, the rise of power and authority of the military and bureaucracy changed the hierarchy of social forces. It created a state-centered "class", which some call "petit bourgeois" (Lenczewski 1975), and others call the "new middle class" (Morroe Berger 1957 and Milovan Dijlas 1957). This "class" was created during the industrialization period and the social transformation that took place since the fifties. It often occupies elevated positions in the state and highly benefits from the modernization process. It is constituted from two major cadres: the military which attained power after 1952, and the administrative, which includes bureaucrats, independent professionals, and small merchants (Thabet 1992, 139). This new social force did not constitute a "class" in the western sense in so far as it lacked a minimal degree of coherence, whether ideological, social, or professional. This "class" had significantly assisted in the continuing atomization of the Egyptian society. Workers and peasants were more and more alienated from the political system, and their organizations were manipulated by state officials. The old bourgeoisie (landlords and Businessmen) was destroyed with the successive waves of nationalization. Ulama and religious men were marginalized. According to Thabet, predominance was given to the technocratic bourgeoisie (military and bureaucracy) that managed the public sector in an irrational and deformative manner. However large, the
state-centered "class" was atomized and unable to act as a counterbalance to state influence (Thabet 1991, 139-42).

3. The reorientation of the State's responsiveness

The way in which the Egyptian state was integrated into the world order reoriented its responsiveness in a radical way. It shifted the state dependence and responsiveness from its own society to the external level. As a structurally dependent state, it became increasingly responsive to pressures coming from the external sphere instead of being responsive to and dependent on Egyptian society. This result of Egypt's integration can be identified as early as the start of the British occupation in 1882, and it has continued through the Nasser period up to the present time.

The British occupied Egypt in a background of a state-society tension. Their intervention was explicit in its support of the state, represented by the Khedive. Ever since, the British maintained an alliance with the Khedives and the state in general, and systematically ignored, or oppressed societal demands. In practice, state officials with the Khedives at the fore, became responsible to the British High Commissioner and his aids, while the link of responsibility (and responsiveness) to society and its bodies, was broken.

The tension between the state's head, the Khedive Tawfik, and the social forces was multidimensional, and became explicit by 1879. First, there was resentment in the army and in the civil bureaucracy over the
interference and dominance of European and Turkish officials. Secondly, there was a deepening frustration with social inequities: those borne by the Egyptian fallahin (peasants) through the continuing subordination of their fate to the power of foreign money-lenders and landlords were basic. There were also frustrations generated by the heavy taxes extracted by the state to pay for its host of European advisors. The inequities were at their peak in both the bureaucracy and army where native Egyptians faced pointed discrimination (Vatikiotis 1980, 154-159). The Orabi's revolt was built upon a complex of alliances between soldiers, notables, civil servants and the popular masses. This alliance translated the complexity of the social demands at stake. The Khedive's response was rigid, which aggravated the tension and turned it into an open conflict by 1882. When Orabi and his fellows succeeded in forcing the Khedive to accept their demands concerning the role of Parliament, the position of Egyptians in the army and in bureaucracy, etc., the latter turned to the British for help. The British invasion of Egypt was explicitly justified by the need to restore the Khedive's control (Goldschmidt 1988, 35-40). British intervention aggravated the conflict and gave it added dimensions. Had they not intervened, the state-society conflict would have been resolved within the structures of Egyptian social formation: "had it not been for the involvement of the European Powers, Tawfik could have become the head of an Egyptian national movement - or its victim." (Vatikiotis 1980, 157).

Egyptian society was not considered by the British as an eventual partner. Baring, the first British High Commissioner in Egypt, reported to his government that:
(Egyptian people) was totally incapable of self-government [...]. What they really needed was a 'full belly' policy which fed the population, kept it quiescent and allowed the elite to make money and so cooperate with the occupying power (Marsot 1985, 75-76).

According to this vision, the British (and the controlled Khedives) systematically ignored the demands emanating from society and/or suppressed them. As Baring put it, apart from the elite which was allowed to generate wealth and cooperate with the British, no other social force was incorporated into the political process. The "cooperating elite" of semi-feudal landlords, high-ranking officials, and some intellectuals monopolized access to the political process through the official parties. Elections were held regularly, but popular masses (peasants, workers, etc.) were unable to participate actively in them. Either because of the restrictions to suffrage, or because of the landlords' control of the peasantry. The outcome was a political system that excluded most of society from its processes and left them unrepresented (Abdel-Hakim 1986, 197). Consequently, social demands were articulated by those who opposed the entire system: leftist and Islamic groups as well as radical nationalist movements. The latter were the target of open repression by the British-backed police who either imprisoned or exiled them (Marsot 1985, 77). Thus, the representation of Egyptian society, other than the cooperating elite, was systematically undermined by the British occupation, which found the reinforcement of the state as the best way to enhance its control over the country.

In parallel to the marginalization of society at large, the British occupation, and the growing European influence in Egypt before it, reoriented the state's responsiveness through the control of the Khedives.
Before and during the British occupation, European states, especially France and Britain, supported the Khedives, who allies with them and overthrew those who opposed them. The case of Ismail's reign and its end (1863-1879) are equally significant in this regard. Ismail owed his glorious achievements and projects as well as his reputation in history textbooks to a mounting foreign debt to European financial houses and his submission to European states. This manner of running the country resulted in an unprecedented increase in European interference in Egyptian affairs, notably in the entry of two European Ministers (One English, the other French) into the Egyptian government headed by Nubar Pacha in August 1878, in what became known as the Mixed Government (Vatikiotis 1980, 124-134). The two Ministers, who controlled finance and the budget, exercised wide-ranging authority in Egyptian affairs. Until this time, Khedive Ismail enjoyed strong support from both France and Britain, which enabled him to challenge the remaining formal allegiances to the Ottoman Sultan. By 1879, the multidimensional social discontent was growing and culminated in an acute rejection of European interference in domestic affairs. The Mixed Government became the symbol of this interference around which different nationalist movements converged. The tension took a new turn when the National Assembly defied both government and the Khedive: it refused to be dissolved, continued to meet secretly, and insisted on its right to modify, or reject, the government budget proposal. In a spectacular shift, Ismail decided to ally with what became known as the "popular national party": he dismissed the Mixed Government, appointed a well-known nationalist as a new head of government (Sherif Pacha), and accepted the
"national project of reform" (al-La'i'ha Watania) proposed by the popular national party:

When on 22 April 1879 the Khedive decreed the financial arrangements recommended by the assembly, which was contrary to the one recommended by the European Commission, reaction in Europe was swift and forceful (Vatikiotis 1980, 140).

The European states, specifically Britain, France, and Germany, asked the Khedive to abdicate the throne in favour of Tawfik. By 26 June, the Ottoman Sultan ordered Ismail deposed and directed the accession of his son, Tawfik. The importance of obtaining foreign satisfaction was also true for government action. Egyptian authorities had to secure the prior approval of British (and Franco-British before) representative(s), to carrying on with their policies. Whenever they failed in this, they were obliged to "resign". This was the case, for example, of Sherif Pacha's government. Sherif Pacha was asked to resign when he opposed a British "recommendation" to evacuate Sudan in 1883. At the time, the British Foreign Secretary endorsed Baring's recommendation that in important matters, "as long as the provisional occupation lasts", Egyptian Ministers must follow the advice of her Majesty's government, or resign (Richmond 1977, 142). Hence, the entire executive was no longer accountable to Egyptian society and its elected bodies, but, in reality, to external powers.

This "external-oriented responsiveness" of the state was reinforced by its financial dependency on external more than on internal sources (taxes and credit). Ismail's reign was a turning point in the financial dependency of the Egyptian state. As mentioned earlier, Muhammad Ali's
need to extract financial resources from society (through taxation and lending) strengthened the role of civil society during the first period of his government. As his financial requirements were satisfied by the takeover of production by the state apparatus, this need diminished. Ismail's reign was characterized by the diminution of state control over production (as Egypt was increasingly integrated in the world market. Private property emerged, held mainly by Europeans capitalists. Ismail's huge debts were owed to European financial houses (located inside and outside Europe) upon whose backing projects depended. Accordingly, he did not have to seek internal financing, and participation. On the contrary, the relation between the state and society, as far as finance was concerned, was reversed: the state as represented by the Khedive, became the source of monetary wealth, and society's elites became the beneficiaries.

This trend continued with Nasser following independence and has carried forward to the present day. Regardless of the differences in ideological orientations between Nasser's rule and that of both Sadat and Mubarak, in all three cases the financial relation between state and society has remained similar to characteristic of Ismail's reign. The state is financially independent from Egyptian society. In Nasser's era, this independence was drawn from the transformative pattern of state policies and its take-over of production. In other words, Nasser reintroduced the late-Muhammad Ali's model, where the state controlled most economic production. It also used redistributive policies to enhance its control over society. In the time of both Sadat and Mubarak's, the Ismail model has prevailed, where external resources, in form of loans and
aid, constitute the core of the state's financial independence vis-à-vis the Egyptian society. Egypt is a major aid receiving country. As such it is second only to India. Its aid donors varied according to the prevailing political orientation. During Nasser's era, Egypt was a major recipient of Soviet aid. Between 1955 and 1975, it received $1,240 million from the USSR (Sullivan 1984, 95). It received $3.0 billion from Arab oil-exporting countries during the mid-seventies. The cumulative aid it received from multilateral sources (UNDP etc.) reached $3,585.5 millions by 1983. When it embarked on a rapid liberalization process in 1974, its major donor became the United States:

From 1974-1988, the United States committed fourteen billion dollars to the Egyptian government. Of that amount, $5.9 billion was for specific projects in areas like health, education, agriculture, or infrastructure development. $8.1 billion was used to import commodities to ensure adequate availability of food supplies, keep factories running, provide equipment for municipal services and meet other import requirements. (USAID, Washington 1988, 1)

Thus, the state has become a sort of bestower of financial resources upon Egyptian social groups. Moreover, it has become a supplier of financial resources through its control over the distribution of external aid, the allocation of foreign investment (both in sectorial and geographical terms), and the management of public resources, especially oil and the Suez canal. As Sullivan indicates, the decision to invest or not, and the sector in which the investment is intended, as well as its place, size, etc., is negotiated between the Egyptian government and the donor country. The idea for investment originates either with the government or the donor. Consequently, the foreign donors become a part of the domestic decision-making process (Sullivan 1984, 96). At any rate, the accountability of the state shifts towards the donors. Hence, the
financial state-society relation is the reverse of what had been the case during state formation in Europe, where the state had to seek the support of society, in both financial and political terms (Badie 1992, 24). As the Egyptian state seeks this two-fold support within the world order, its relation with its own society is inverted: the social forces seek the approval of the state, both in financial and in political terms.

Conclusion

The Egyptian state began to be integrated into the world order at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This integration took place through the three means of intimidation, force and societal transformation, and was not a pre-determined project carried out by some international conspiracy, be it capitalist or other. It was rather the consequence of choices made by specific actors in accordance with their own particular strategies. World order, at the close of the eighteenth century, was mainly characterized by the rising power of European states backed by its newly hegemonic social forces (merchant and industrial classes). This rise directly affected Egyptian security, both in military and economic terms. The Egyptian answer to this threat was characterized by interaction among its own configuration of internal social forces, which acted within the bounds set by the predominant state apparatus. This resulted in the arrival of Muhammad Ali to power and the launching of the modernization process which, in turn, led to a change in both the form of state and the configuration of social forces. At a later stage,
combinations of actors' choices, basically in a world order characterized by severe competition between Britain and France, resulted in the increasing pace of Egyptian integration, by force this time. Alongside these two modes of integration, the transformation of the Egyptian state and society was in progress. These transformations anchored Egypt more firmly, and perhaps irreversibly, in the world order.

The integration of Egypt into the world order has had a negative impact on the state-society relation in at least three ways. First, it enlarged the role of the state while subjugating society and making it more a passive receptor than an actor with respect to government policy. Second, it strengthened the state apparatus in the face of an increasingly atomized society. Finally, it reoriented the state's responsiveness: the Egyptian state became more responsive to pressures from the external world order than to those emanating from within its own society. This impact is not the result of a long term plan by some reified entity called the "world order". It is the ultimate consequence of social and historical structurations. For instance, the atomization of Egyptian society is a process in its own right, fuelled by both the leading role of the state and its external dependency. Ultimately, this atomization has become a social reality reflected in the absence of coherent and self-aware social forces acting as such. This situation has allowed other social forces, such as the military and bureaucracy, to monopolize the political arena and to bend the state apparatus to their favour.
Accordingly, the conclusions here are abstractions of much more complex social relations and interactions. As with every abstraction, a certain degree of simplification is unavoidable. The consequences of Egypt's integration into the world order are hardly separable: they merge one into the other and they are mutually responsive. That is to say, a change in one facet of state-society relation cannot be isolated as such; it is integral to the broader historical experience and influences in a myriad of ways many other aspects of the relationship between state and society.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF SOCIETAL INSTITUTIONS

Nineteenth century Egypt had witnessed deep social transformations that resulted from the integration of Egypt into the world order. This chapter shows how the response of the state to this integration engendered dynamics that led to the dissolution of traditional institutions. The interaction with the world order, we will argue, afforded the state the opportunity to centralize and to consolidate its power. That opportunity was seized by Muhammad Ali who used this power to initiate a comprehensive modernizing process. The centralization of state power and its penetration in almost all social spheres conflicted with traditional social institutions. That conflict was gradually resolved to the benefit of the state. Ultimately, traditional social institutions, such as the religious Ullama, the village community and the guilds, were dissolved. Egypt's integration in the world order was equally an integration in the world economy, especially after the London agreement of 1840. This integration accelerated the ongoing changes and gave a serious blow to the already weakened traditional institutions.

The dissolution of traditional institutions, as well as the impact of world economy penetration of Egyptian social life, made the newly implanted modern institutions incapable of functioning within the prevailing type of social relations. Ultimately, this inconsistency has been reflected in the distortions of the contemporary civil society in Egypt.
I. THE EROSION OF THE AZHAR'S ROLE

The ulama constituted an important group in traditional Egypt. They were the basic intermediary between the rulers and the people. They channelled the dissatisfaction and frustrations of the public, and by this means acted as barometers of public opinion. People were influenced by the religious status of the Ulama, and considered them to be the social and political leaders of the community. Accordingly, they were able to mobilize the people, or alternatively to stabilize the social scene. Thus, they were able to influence decision-making, limit the powers of the rulers, and in effect bestow upon them their legitimacy. Therefore, Ulama were not, as commonly believed, preachers of obedience and submissiveness to the ruler whatever his attitude might be. Certainly, Ulama contributed to the social and political stability by their emphasis on compromise and negotiations, but they also could instigate popular insurrection and rebellion. This was evident in their role during the period of the French occupation (1798-1801). Napoleon Bonaparte appealed to the Ulama and Al-Azhar, their organizational structure, for their support. They channelled demands and policies between the masses and the French rulers. Nevertheless, when the tension between the two was deemed irreconcilable, the Ulama organized two armed rebellions against the French (Al-Raf'ee 1989, 107). In the first rebellion, known in Arabic literature as the First Cairo Revolution, the popular resistance continued until Bonaparte crushed the Azhar itself and secured the submission of the Ulama. This was also the case when the Ulama engineered the civil strife that led to the overthrow of Khorsheid Pacha and his replacement by Muhammad Ali (1805).
Egyptians had been suffering from corruption, instability and overtaxation under Khorsheid's rule (Ismail Aly 1986, 124). Furthermore, under Mohammad Ali, they were the only group capable of mounting opposition when he imposed new taxes in 1808. In fact, this role was implicitly encouraged by the rulers themselves who used to turn to the Ulama whenever they needed to negotiate and reach a compromise with the people (Winter 1992, 109, 126).

One of the foundations of this intermediary role of Al-Azhar and its Ulama was their social status in the mainly Muslim Egyptian society. They were the guardians of norms, values, and rules; in modern terminology, they provided intellectual leadership. As most social activities, except for governance, took place within the framework of these norms, values and rules, the Ulama's influence extended well beyond purely religious matters. They maintained social unity, bridged many gaps and differences and hence consolidated social solidarity under their purview. The Ulama provided traditional Egyptian society with spontaneous leadership. Furthermore, this leadership was consolidated by their financial and organizational independence. Al-Azhar enjoyed huge revenues generated by religious trust properties (the "waqf") which were under its exclusive control (Ismail Ali 1986, 45). Its organizational matters were also independent of the state and not accountable to it. Al-Azhar was part and parcel of what we call the traditional civil society in Egypt: it was organized, independent of the state, intermediating state and society at large, and worked within the framework of a hegemonic culture.
The dissolution of traditional institutions in Egypt, which characterized Muhammad Ali's era, did not leave Al-Azhar unharmed.

Al-Azhar's role as an intermediating body, as the source of intellectual and social leadership, and as an independent organization was increasingly weakened by the ongoing state-led modernization process. The dismantlement of Al-Azhar as an institution of traditional Egyptian civil society marks the geneses of the current distortions that characterize modern civil society in Egypt.

The dismantling of Al-Azhar's role as an intermediary body began with the accession of Muhammad Ali, and has continued unabated ever since. At present, Al-Azhar has been reduced to a religious university and a state-sponsored religious agency.

The arrival of Muhammad Ali in power simultaneously marked the apogee of the representational role of Al-Azhar and the beginning of its end as a meaningful political actor. Muhammad Ali was carried to power by the Ulama and their intermediating role continued through the first years of Muhammad Ali's reign. During this time, his position in Egypt was constantly threatened by the Mamluk-British connection and their influence within Ottoman circles. This period was also characterized by the weak control that Muhammad Ali could master in Egypt especially with regard to the Mamluks' rebellions and disobedience. Through this period, the Ulama constantly sided with Muhammad Ali in his struggle for power both externally and internally. As champions of the newly expressed hope of Egyptians for a better life free from Mamluk oppression, the Ulama, with the Egyptian masses behind them, chose to rally behind him. From this
perspective, Muhammad Ali was well aware of the political power of the Ulama as the representatives of society at large, but was unable to establish other reliable alliances. Consequently, he placed a high priority on attaining their satisfaction. Hence, the Ulama were systematically consulted in government matters and especially those affecting taxation. It was the Ulama who averted a Mamluk-British attempt to depose Muhammad Ali in 1806. It was also they who led the popular resistance to the British invasion in 1807 at a time when Muhammad Ali and his tiny new army were absent in Upper Egypt (Al-Raf‘ee 1989, 84-7).

As the modernization process went on, the political structure changed radically. Starting in 1809, Muhammad Ali's political power was consolidated both internally and in relation to the Ottoman Sultan as his army began to organize. Furthermore, the state role expanded with the industrialization and the monopolization of external commerce and agriculture as well as the centralization of administration. Gradually, Muhammad Ali felt less constrained to rally the support of influential social forces and instead began to demand from his plans. In the same time, the Ulama increasingly opposed his policies as their negative social impacts became clear. The final clash between the two sides took place in 1822 when Cairo inhabitants demonstrated against new taxes imposed by Muhammad Ali and complained to Shaykh Al-Arousi, the head of the Ulama and Al-Azhar. Muhammad Ali's response was two-fold: taxes were collected by force, and the historical leader of the Ulama, Shaykh Omar Makram, was exiled. Thereafter, the decline of the Ulama's role had continued unabated (Al-Raf‘ee 1989, 100-1).
The end of the representative role of Al-Azhar was due not only to the change in political structure and to the choices made by actors to adapt to this change. It was also initiated by a change in the relationship between the Ulama and the people whom they represented. The first direct contact between the Ulama and the Europeans, which took place during the French occupation, sparked in some a sense an awareness of the deficiencies of their own system, and prompted a growing sense of contempt towards the common folk. This was manifested in the writings of Shaykh al-Sharqawi (one of the chief Ulama) in which he accused Egyptian society of being weak, backward, and inherently not serious. Shaykh al-Attar, head of the Azhar during Muhammad Ali’s era, was a leading figure in the campaign for cultural change. His strategy for change was to work with the French scholars in Cairo. The missions Muhammad Ali sent to Europe were first composed of Azharites. During their stay in Europe, they were exposed to modern thinking and teachings, which they brought back to Egypt. These Azharites were among the new intellectual leadership who sought to modernize social and cultural life (Vatikiotis 1980, 92-3). This does not mean that the alignment of Al-Azhar with modernisation thinking was complete. The division in the relationship between modernity and Islam remained important and shaped debate within its organization. The crisis Muhammad Abdou’s opinions initiated, and his ultimate expulsion from Al-Azhar, is an example of this division. Nevertheless, what concerns us here is that al-Azhar’s shift of interest and its associated contempt for the traditional culture of ordinary people was a break in the representational role of Al-Azhar. As the latter dissociated itself from the popular culture, it placed itself in a position over society, not within it.
that time on, Al-Azhar emphasized its role as a teacher of society, not as its representative.

Increasingly, Al-Azhar abandoned its representational role in favour of its activities as a religious university. This shift was also backed by the modernizing state officials. From 1908, under the auspices of Saad Zaghloul, by then the minister of Education, several laws were passed to define the role of Al-Azhar as a university organized along modern lines. Secular modernists justified these reforms by the need to modernize traditional institutions so as not to remain inferior to the secular institutions of the state. By this means, secular governments sought to bring the vulnerable center of Islamic learning in line with modern state education (Vatikiotis 1980, 300).

This trend continued during the liberal era and after. Nasser's modernizing efforts were meant to secure the mobilization of Al-Azhar within the confines of his comprehensive social project. In June 1961, the Egyptian government passed a law to reorganize Al-Azhar. It reaffirmed the vocation of the Azhar university as a modern state university. By the same token, Al-Azhar, the mosque and religious authority was put effectively under the government control (Vatikiotis 1980, 459). Since then, Al-Azhar has played two roles in Egyptian life: the first is its educational role as a university, the second is its role as a state agency acting in religious affairs.

The end of the representational role of the Azhar was accompanied by its growing subjugation to the state. As the modernization proceeded, the independence of Al-Azhar from the state, both financially and organizationally, came to an end.
Muhammad Ali was the first to attack the financial independence of Al-Azhar. From 1806, in his search for new revenues to finance his expanding army and bureaucracy, Muhammad Ali complained about the Ulama's control over the revenues of charitable and religious trust properties (waqf). In 1809, he deprived Al-Azhar of its share in tax surplus generated by the iltizam system, and then abolished the tax exemption on Al-Azhar's revenues (Vatikiotis 1990, 54). In the same year, Muhammad Ali deprived Al-Azhar of its control over the waqf and transferred its supervision to the state administration (Ismail Ali 1986, 133). The independence of Al-Azhar was also undermined at the organizational level with Muhammad Ali ousted some of the Ulama from their posts as happened to Shaykh Omar Makram and Shaykh Al-Tahtawi. In fact, the interference of Muhammad Ali in organizational matters of Al-Azhar took place through alliance-building within the Azhar's leadership itself.

The British occupation continued the process of the subjugation of Al-Azhar to the state. In 1915, the financial consultant to the Egyptian government (actually protectorate by this time) recommended a change in financial policy with respect to Al-Azhar, by which the government would secure the financial needs of the Azhar (estimated at this year at 5,000 L.E. annually) instead of its collecting its own revenue (which stood then at 3,000 L.E.). This amount was subject to annual increase upon request of the Azhar. In exchange, the supervision of the waqf would be transferred to the government. The implementation of this policy meant, in

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3 Which is the difference between what the notable (Multazim) collects as taxes and what he actually submits to government. This difference was distributed between the Multazim himself, al-Azhar's Ulama and the Ruler (Ismail Ali 1986, 131-2).
practice, the end of Al-Azhar’s financial independence and its subjugation to state administration (Said Ismail Ali 1986, 45-47).

The 1908 reform introduced by Saad Zaghloul, as mentioned above, was a step in the long decline of Al-Azhar as an independent institution. This reform was mainly organizational: it led to the reorganization of Al-Azhar as a university and as a religious institution according to principles prevailing in state administration. This law was seen, even in the time of its promulgation, as an extension of state control over religious institutions, and as eroding the independence and autonomy of Egypt’s religious leaders (Vatikiotis 1980, 300).

The end of the Azhar’s representational role and its progressive subjugation to state administration were accompanied by the loss of its intellectual leadership in Egyptian society. The growing modernization of Egyptian society ultimately marginalized Al-Azhar as a place of -and a partner in- contemporaneous intellectual debates. In the beginning, the Azharites were the first to carry modern ideas into Egypt. They assumed responsibility of translating European textbooks into Arabic. Besides books of military art, industrial techniques, medicine and history, this translation movement led to the inevitably spilled over into the world of culture and ideas (Richmond 1977, 114). Azhar scholars were also the first to be sent to Europe on educational missions, and upon their return, they brought with them new cultural inputs. In spite of this initially pioneering role, the Azhar could not maintain the pace of change as the modernization process expanded, and ultimately became itself a part of what modernists sought to reform. The forces for and against change were
both present within Al-Azhar itself, i.e. Al-Azhar became part and parcel of the wider movement of cultural change taking place across the social spectrum. Therefore, the Azhar was no longer in a position to exercise unitary intellectual leadership, which shifted to the new intellectuals in direct contact with modern European thinking. Changes in the Azhar were the direct result of the activities of this new leadership.

The evolution of Al-Azhar's place in intellectual life was determined by the outcome of debates between traditionalists and reformists. From this time on, the Azhar could not avoid the cultural fluctuations occurring in society. The establishment of modern secular educational institutions such as Fouad I University, State school of Shari'a judges, Dar al-Ulum College, etc., reduced the Azhar's authority in education, training and recruitment. Fearing discrimination in the area of state employment, reduction of job opportunities and poor competitiveness with the graduates of the state institutions, most of the Azhar Ulama allied themselves with the king to gain more concessions and to guarantee more jobs. In return, they were granted more posts in the central and provincial state administration (Valikiotis 1980, 299-302).

The king often used the Azhar as a lever against the Wafd, which had been the political party of the rising social forces since 1919. Al-Azhar did not hesitate to take the King's side in his struggle against parliament. It also backed King Farouk's candidacy for the caliphate in 1936 (Goldshmidt 1988, 69). This alignment with the King further eroded the leading position of Al-Azhar in Egyptian society.
II. THE DISSOLUTION OF THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY

The way in which the traditional village community was dissolved in the beginning of the nineteenth century led to the exclusion of the rural population from participation in the modern political system. As occurred in the eighteenth century England, the break up of the village community meant an end to its cohesion, articulation and social hierarchy. But unlike the English case, this dissolution was not associated with the emergence of individualism and representative politics (Polanyi 1944). On the contrary, the specific course that brought about the dissolution of Egyptian village community led to atomization of the rural population and increased its submission to the central state.

The village in traditional Egypt constituted a strongly cohesive social unit. Interests were organized in family and kinship networks. These networks were structured around the principle of solidarity. Clote Bey wrote in his Aperçu general sur l'Egypt that the village community was marked by "un rigoureux système de solidarité entre les habitants du même village, entre le village compris dans le même canton, entre les cantons dans les même département, etc." (Baer 1969, 23). Social life was based on a system of liability: the son was responsible for the debts of the father, the village for every one of its inhabitants, and ultimately the province was responsible for all its villages. This solidarity was enhanced by, and reflected in, the organization of economic life. The common tenure system meant that village lands were held in common and periodically redistributed among the peasants. Also, the village as a whole was responsible for any public works that were required, including
the provision of labour. Furthermore, the village was collectively responsible for the payment of taxes (Baer 1969, 17).

This solidarity, however, did not mean that village community was egalitarian, or free of economic exploitation and political domination. It is true that social differentiation was weak amongst the peasants themselves, yet the community at large was very organized in a strict hierarchy. The Multazim was at the organizational apex; where he was responsible for the collection of taxes and their transfer to the state. On this basis, he constituted the supreme political and economic power in the community. Second in importance was Shaykh al-balad (deputy governor) who served as the connection between the multazim and the peasants. As the Mutazim's "domain" included several villages, he depended upon the direct involvement and control exercised by Shaykh al-balad. The latter extracted considerable influence and economic gains from his position. He was generally as despotic as his master. The solidarity principle helped the peasants not only to administer their own social relations, but also to fulfil their obligations vis-à-vis Shaykh al-balad and the Multazim. Clote Bey, in his description of village solidarity, praised its role in facilitating tax collection in rural areas (Baer 1969, 23). This is also what Lisa Anderson calls a tributary mode of production in which the transfer of resources from producers to non producers was done through the noneconomic mechanisms of legal rights, ideologically imposed duties, and political control, rather than through the market (Lisa Anderson 1987, 19). In sum, village community was cohesive and articulate, yet it was based on hierarchical relations and direct control. If extant at all, representation of the peasants was no more than minimal.
The dissolution of the village community took a specific course that distinguishes it from Western European parallels: it was initiated by the state, as afforded to internal disintegration, and it was not associated with massive migration from rural to urban areas (Perry Anderson 1977). These differences made the dissolution of village community conducive to increased submission to the state on the one hand, and on the other led to the end of social cohesion without an associated rise of individualism. The ultimate result was an atomized and disarticulated rural population, dependent on and submissive to state authority.

Since its early beginnings, the dissolution of the village community was initiated by the state. A direct relationship was created between the central government and the village community. The socio-economic authority of the intermediating elements was gradually fading away, as was their political power. As P. Merau puts it, "[l]es cotes étant établies par avances et personnelles à chaque cultivateur, l'intermédiaire du chef de village est devenu inutile" (Baer 1969, 26). Accordingly, all of the Multazims were stripped of their privileges and responsibilities by Muhammad Ali and tax collection was put under the direct control of the central government and its appointed officials. By the turn of the nineteenth century, traditional features of the Egyptian village community were under attack. Egyptian agriculture changed gradually from subsistence economy to production of cash crops for market in order to feed Muhammad Ali's need for cash. Also, the system of common tenure of land was gradually abolished. First, Muhammad Ali monopolized all agricultural production in Egypt and put it under the direct state control. After the
collapse of his project and the intensification of Egypt's integration into the world economy, this state monopoly was abolished in favour of private ownership, which was also initiated by the state. In 1850, the practice of periodically redistributing village lands was discontinued, and in 1858, Khedive Said promulgated a law which considerably extended individual property rights. That law brought another significant change which dealt with the expropriation of land by the state for public purposes. At about the same time, Said abolished the collective village responsibility for tax payments and introduced individual tax assessments. In 1880, furnishing labour had become an individual responsibility of every villager (Baer 1969, 216).

Both closer connections with market and the introduction of private ownership of land accelerated social differentiation within the village population and put an end to its former social cohesion (Baer 1969, 29). Also, the gradual introduction of a modern westernized system of administration weakened the traditional hierarchy in the village (Baer 1969, 214).

The dissolution of village community was not associated with a migration to towns or a rise in wage labour as was the case with the English enclosures and the subsequent rise in the "free labour force" (Polanyi 1944, 33-43). Apart from the experience of state-owned industries established by Muhammad Ali, industrialization in Egypt did not begin until the 1930s. Muhammad Ali launched a wide-ranging program of industrialization in order to satisfy the needs of his expanding army and to reduce dependency on imports. This program consisted of building state-owned mass-production industries using imported technology. Nevertheless,
this program, as a by-product, had eliminated both the private industry and artisan production (Siam 1991, 108). Hence, once this program collapsed, following the London agreement in 1840, the demand for wage labour was minimal. This situation remained unchanged until the 1930s when a second industrialization program was launched; this time by private enterprise. Yet, the size of the labour force remained quite small. By 1952, a century and half after the beginning of the dissolution of village community, the number of urban wage earners came to merely 255,000 workers (Siam 1991, 129). Clearly, the dissolution of the village community did not lead to the "freeing" of a labour force that had been crucial in the rise of individual social relations in the West. Instead, peasants remained on the land and in villages. As H. H. Ayrout says, "le village egyptien n'est pas une commune au sens civique du mot, pas un organisme, mais une masse" (Baer 1969, 29).

At the same time, state authority increased within rural life as it was the state which determined changes in agricultural production and its associated social relations. This authoritarian mode of influence favoured the emergence of patron-client types of relations. The Khedive, himself in a clientelistic relationships with European powers and with the Ottoman Sultan, kept a wide network of similar relations with Pachas across rural Egypt. In the beginning, Pachas exercised full control over the rural population, limited only by their property lines. Nevertheless, small land owners had to keep the peace with their Pacha. Landless peasants were hired as labourers on the Pacha's land, either permanently or seasonally. These were even more vulnerable to the Pacha's influence. Gradually, as
the liberal political system expanded, Pachas needed the support of the peasantry in terms of votes. Therefore, a patron-client relationship began to emerge in rural areas, in which Pachas provided goods and services in return for votes and submission.

Thus, clientelism evolved from the nature of the power relations between social forces present at that time. Ultimately, it hindered the development of the universalistic, anonymous, contractual relations characteristic of the capitalist market and modern bureaucracy (Anderson 1977, 26-7). Emerging economic and political links with the state and the market were controlled by these new patrons, who acted as intermediaries and limited the independent participation of their clients in the wider networks (Anderson 1977, 29).

The introduction of new administrative arrangements into rural areas took place in this authoritarian context and reflected its clientelistic mode of functioning. Thus, modernization of the village and authoritarianism/clientelism were mutually supportive from the beginning of the modernization process. Peasants, who were excluded and subjected to state domination all along the process, were not at any moment represented through organizations of their own.

During the first years of Muhammad Ali’s era, villages were integrated in the new central administrative organization that replaced the old dispersed Multazim system. Relying on this new administration, the central government had ultimately increased its control of the villages through its own functionaries (Zayed 1981, 252-3). The village community was hence reorganized to the benefit of the emerging bureaucratic state that was seeking to achieve a monopoly of force in its territory. The new
administrative organization modified the hierarchy in the village while keeping the peasants in as weak a position as before. It replaced the Multazim by the Pacha, gave the Shaykh al-balad new chances for accumulation and social mobility, and created new strata: the state employees (Zayed 1981, 282). By the end of Muhammad Ali's reign, and in parallel to the intensification of Egypt's integration in the World order as well as the expansion of market economy in rural areas, changes were taking place in social hierarchy. Foreigners were allowed to purchase land, and increasingly occupied the higher echelons of the social strata in the village. Egyptian Shaykh al-Balad and other state employees, as well as the favourites of the Khedives, could become Pachas through accumulation and loyalty to the Khedive and his court (Zayed 1981, 28-5). Rural society was thus constituted of dominated peasants deprived of direct access to the modern polity, small employees running daily life, local notables constituted of Shaykh al-balad, mayors and middle-range owners, and Pachas representing the central state. Except for an incremental increase in the role of the state employees in village life, this scene remained almost untouched until Nasser's era.

Nasser's agrarian reforms destroyed this hierarchy and led to an unprecedented increase of state penetration into the village community. The Pachas disappeared from the social scene of the village, and the state bureaucracy gained the upper hand, in collaboration with Shaykh-al-balad and 'Umdas (governors). Their numbers increased as well as their influence as the state assumed various new social roles. Once again, as was the case with Muhammad Ali's modernizing project, the state had committed itself to radical social change. This was articulated in rural areas by the
mobilization of the peasants (Harik 1972, 288). Nevertheless, the entry of peasants into the modern polity was also marked by clientelistic relationships, domination and absence of direct organizational representation. The mobilization of the peasantry was not so much to recruit national leaders as much as to aid in the implementation of state policies (Harik 1972, 288). In addition, the political organizations created by Nasser's regime to mobilize the masses (peasants included), did not lead to the inclusion of peasants in the political process. "Liberation establishment" in 1954, the "National Union" in 1956, and the subsequent "Arab Socialist Union" starting from 1962, all depended on the old Shaykh al-Bald, Mayors and influential figures in the village at the expense of peasants (Zayed 1981, 361-2).

The exclusion of peasants continued under the new forms of "local administration". The reform of local government was introduced in 1960, which included the creation of municipal councils, "compound centers" and "cooperation societies". (Harik 1972, 296). Nevertheless, state bureaucracy maintained the upper hand in running these institutions. Cooperative societies and compounded centers were merely distribution centers of goods and services run by the Ministry of Provisions and controlled at the local level by state employees and party notables. The municipal councils were dominated by state bureaucracy both with respect to selection and managing daily life. Authority was clearly centralized: both in Cairo and in the governorate, while the local level was concerned only with implementation (Harik 1972, 295-6).

Compounded centers provided social services like health, education, sports and welfare in the village. The cooperative societies were -in practice- centers which provided basic goods.
In sum, the dissolution of the traditional village community and its integration in the modern bureaucratic state not only perpetuated the domination of the peasantry, but also restructured social relations in village in a manner that hindered their active participation in the modern polity. The state-sponsored dissolution of village community atomized social relations while preventing the emergence of individualist actors. As peasants remained dependent on the state and its representatives, a clientelistic type of relationship was consolidated by the increase of state intervention in rural life. Clientelism and the modernization process developed a symbiotic relationship and were mutually supportive. Therefore, whenever peasants were integrated in the modern polity, they were not integrated as individuals, but as clients. Their dependence on the state, the lack of organizational capacity and the absence of cohesiveness were part and parcel of state-led modernization.

III. THE DISSOLUTION OF THE GUILDS

The Egyptian guild is "a group of individuals exercising in one city the same professional activity under the authority of a shaykh" (Judith Tucker 1985, 107). The guilds in Egypt were, to a large extent, not autonomous, but dependent on the government and connected with its administrative machine. Yet, the role of the guilds was ambiguous. They assumed both administrative and intermediary tasks. On the one hand, they controlled and supervised the activities of their members, arbitrated disputes between them, and fixed maximum wages. On the other hand they
ensured the application of the government instructions and, when needed, supplied labour and services to the government. Furthermore, guild Shaykhs participated in governmental decisions concerning the assessment of taxes to be paid by the guilds, the collection of these taxes and also in fixing prices (Baer 1969, 150-1). Generally, Egyptian guilds exhibited a religious and ethnic homogeneity with some exceptions when professions were practised by different ethnic groups (Tucker 1985, 107). This homogeneity was accentuated by the weakness of economic and social differentiation within the guild itself. Almost all members shared the same social and economic status was almost the same for all members, and even the Shaykh did not enjoy a remarkably higher position (Baer 1969, 153). Egyptian guilds did constitute a cohesive and integrated unit. They played an important role in urban life. Until the nineteenth century, they acted as the predominant social, economic, and administrative organization for most of Egyptian city dwellers (Tucker 1985, 107). Their importance was enhanced by their numerical strength as well as their penetration into various social activities in urban life (which covered artisan production, commerce, services, and entertainment).

The organic relation between the Ulama and the guilds was a positive factor in the importance of the guilds. Ulama and guild Shaykhs together with the Sufi orders, coexisted in traditional Egypt forming a strong alliance and providing a social base for national leadership. Guild Shaykhs used to meet regularly with the Ulama to discuss guild affairs. They constituted a social alliance amenable to be a political partnership. The guild system, therefore, constituted an organic social institution that cemented and structured urban life (Abdel Hakim 1986, 111-16).
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the guilds began to lose their social and economic clout, and were gradually deprived of most of their functions. This can be attributed to two main factors: first, the influx of European goods and settlers in Egypt, and second, the modernization of state institutions which expropriated their functions and responsibilities.

The influx of European goods and settlers had started by the late eighteenth century and marked the beginning of Egypt's integration in the world economy as well as undermined the position of guilds in Egypt. Retail trade spread all over the towns and foreigners infiltrated into areas which had previously been monopolized by Egyptian merchants. The control of the guild Shaykh and his supervision over European stalls were virtually impossible. As A. Méchin contends in his book "La transformation de l'Égypte in 1903:

Les residents occidentaux se défient de Cheikh des domestiques, des portiers, des cochers, des cuisiniers: ils choisissent leurs servitudes par l'intermédiaire de leurs amis ou de placeurs européens. Pour tous ces raisons, les corps de métiers, bien qu'ils ressemblent encore superficiallement à ce qu'ils étaient un siècle auparavant, perdent peu à peu leur solidité et leur vie (292).

Thus, as the importance of foreigners in economic life grew, guild Shaykhs lost their authority and their control over labour. The exemption of foreign merchants from taxes (known as the capitulations system) had increased foreign imports, which consequently increased the competition between national and foreign industry. Industries which succumbed to European competition included the textile crafts, wood engraving, and copper vessels production (Abdel-Hakim 1986, 119). The situation was aggravated by urbanization, the growth of towns, and the expansion of the
service sector. Modernization of certain professions also undermined the role of the guilds. For example, a governmental decree in 1894 fixed the water price and the wages for its carriers in Alexandria. Those carriers were thus transformed into wage labourers dependent on the government. Hence, the role of the Alexandria Water Carrier guild faded and eventually disappeared. Accordingly, the number of "free labourers", i.e., those who were not guild members, increased. The control of the Shaykhs was weakened and it was difficult for the guilds to maintain their monopolies (Baer 1969, 155). The numbers of guilds continued to decrease until the end of the nineteenth century, especially after the British arrived in 1882. The British policy deepened and broadened the foreign penetration of Egyptian economy and in so doing delivered de coup de grâce to the already weakened guilds. In 1891, the guilds were officially abolished.

The state also played a role in the disappearance of the guilds. The intervention of the modern Egyptian state in spheres which were traditionally reserved to private and informal networks or associations undermined the role the latter played in social life. The state did not deliberately dissolve the guilds (at least until 1891), but did marginalize them with its modernization strategies. State strategy to create modern institutions to accomplish its new tasks and to enhance its control over the economy engendered pressures on the guilds that the latter could not withstand. Guilds, as all traditional social institutions, were gradually deprived of their authority and were limited in scope. Thus, the modern Egyptian state helped dismantle the guild system through two principle mechanisms. First, in the course of its
initiatives, the state imposed restrictions on small and traditional private industry. Thus, it was not large industry that dissolved the guilds in Egypt, but rather the state monopoly of production, pricing, and marketing. Second, the modern administrative system set up by the state assumed responsibility for the activities and services previously offered solely by the guilds.

The monopoly system developed by the absolutist state, specifically during Muhammad Ali's reign, rendered the industrial, as well as other sectors, a complete vassal of the state. This monopoly was extended to include not only new industries but also the existing traditional ones. In 1821, a law was promulgated by Muhammad Ali limiting private industrial production, and put a tight supervisory system in place to guarantee compliance (Abdel Hakim 1986, 117). Thus, guilds were gradually deprived of their authority to supply labour, to organize production, and to fix prices or taxes. Furthermore, guilds had not been able to protect their workers against the regulations and laws promulgated by the state. In short, they were losing their raison d'etre, i.e., the rights and duties for which they were established. Chronologically, Baer displayed the end of the guilds' Shaykhs authority, he says:

In 1881, the shaykhs were relieved of the task of tax collection. In the 1880's and 1890's, the government published a whole series of decrees providing for professional permits to be issued by official authority, and not by the guilds' shaykhs. Another group of decrees fixed wages for a number of public services, thereby curtailing the shaykhs function in this matter (Baer 1969, 155).

After the end of Muhammad Ali's monopoly (with the 1840's London Agreement) and the destruction of his industrial system by the Ottoman
Sultan and the European powers, rational private industries and crafts were not able to restore their vitality. In fact the agreement, with its "free-trade" clauses opened the door to the intensification of Egypt's integration in the world economy. The result was an acceleration of European settlement, European imports, and the integration of Egypt into the international division of agricultural output. Until that time, the government had kept the guilds intact, as it was unable to replace them with a new administrative system. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Egypt's administration was reorganized and the state could manage without the intermediate link of the guilds. Hence, it deprived them of their fiscal, administrative, and economic functions. These functions were taken over by government departments or new social and economic institutions by the 1891 decree (Baer 1969, 156). Some of the guilds had already disappeared. For example the slave dealers' guild ceased to be in 1878, and that of the weighers and measurers in 1889. The Cairo butchers' guild ceased operations in 1893, and the boatmen' guild followed between 1893 and 1896, that of shoeblack closed in 1894, the interpreters guild and that of Alexandria water carriers were closed by 1895, of porters in 1898, that of fishermen disappeared in 1903, and the brokers and auctioneers' guilds followed in 1909. From this date, nothing more was heard regarding the appointments of guilds shaykhs or of any function performed by guilds in the public life of Egypt (Baer 1969, 156-7). In this way, the Egyptian state itself played an important role in hastening the demise of the traditional guilds.
In 1912, the first modern form of professional organization appeared in Egypt with the establishment of the Lawyers Union (Baer 1969, 158). It remained the only professional union until 1940 when the Medical professions were unionized. From this time, other professions constituted unions successively: journalists in 1941, engineers in 1946, agricultural professions in 1949, education in 1951, artistic professions in 1955, scientists in 1955, commercial professions in 1955 and few other in the 1970s and 1980s (Arab Strategic Report 1992, 331).

As was the case with modern local administration, the new professional unions were emerging within a clientelistic network of relationships. In fact, this was a partial result of state omni-control of every aspect concerning these professions: their work conditions, their licenses, and even their union rights. In addition, these unions were not backed by significant social forces. They depended mainly on the outputs of the modern educational system which was dominated by the sons and daughters of the upper state-related classes. The membership of professional unions was weak from the beginning due to the limited number of graduates of higher education in proportion to the population. This does not mean that these unions were always supportive of state policies. On the contrary, they frequently criticized government initiatives and sometimes openly opposed the state. The Lawyers union, for example, contested the Council's elections as early as in 1933 and protested against a legislative motion concerning union life. The government retaliated by dissolving the union's council, suspending the syndical law, and appointed a council. Similar incidents occurred in 1954, in 1971, in 1981 and in 1993 concerning the same union (Arab Strategic Report 1993,
332). It is thus evident that professional unions could contest governmental policies, but in doing this, they could not mobilize significant social forces behind them, nor could they effectively confront the state which, in the final analysis, had the upper hand. Apart from the dispersed crisis, unions developed a symbiotic, clientelistic mode of functioning with the state.

The strategies that both state and professional unions have adopted during their half-century of existence, have perpetuated the structural distortions that had characterized the birth of the professional unions. Egyptian governments, during both the liberal and the Nasserist era and after, sought to prevent unions from playing a genuine role in political life. As the state remained the leader of modernization, and monopolizes control over who gets what, when and how, it succeeded in implementing its strategy. Through authoritarian dissolution of professional unions, the adoption of new laws that restricted their activities, interference in their elections, as well as co-optation, successive governments have succeeded in preventing the unions from acquiring any meaningful independent political power, let alone challenging its power monopoly. At the same time, the failure of the unions to build a social base for their action, and hence to acquire independent political power resulted in a vicious circle in which failures led to further failures. State manipulation of syndical elections, and its success in co-opting syndical leaders, especially the workers trade-unionists who became state officials in Nasser’s era and after, eroded the already shaky credibility of these institutions. Ultimately, the professional unions’ members themselves a clientelistic relationship with their own unions, in which the former
provided support or passive participation and the latter provided social services and privileges.

Conclusion

The transformation of Egyptian societal institutions, which started during the nineteenth century, was the output of interactions between various actors and their historical context. The world order of the early nineteenth century posed serious threats to Egyptian social organization. The expanding power of West European countries, especially those of France and Britain, and its associated "free trade" imperatives, put an end to Egypt's isolation. The latter's occupation by the French in 1798 convinced the active Egyptian forces that major changes were necessary if they were to avoid European domination. When the French were forced to leave in 1801, the active social forces in Egypt, led by their representatives, the Ulama, played a key role in the shaping of events. The Ulama, through their traditional institution, Al-Azhar, mobilized the society at large against the return of the Ottoman-backed Mamluks to power. They were helped in this by the social cohesion of the social forces in place and their determination to pursue the needed changes.

The choice made by the Ulama, which brought Muhammad Ali to power, was decisive. Muhammad Ali came on an agenda of change, which implied a state-led comprehensive modernization process. Ultimately, this project, which was supported by the forces inherent in the "civil society" of the time, would lead to its destruction. The Egyptian social scene was
constituted of dispersed social units: urban communities, guilds, the village communities, the bedouins, the "sufi" orders, etc. These units had a high degree of internal cohesion and solidarity, yet, they did not form altogether a single social unit. Therefore, there were no social forces able to act at the "national" level with enough strength to counterbalance the emerging state apparatus.

The state-building led by Muhammad Ali was influenced by both world order pressures and a continuous effort to transform the social sphere. On the one hand, state building aimed at confronting hostile forces in the world order, specifically the Ottomans, the French and the British. The course that the modernization process had undertaken reflected this priority. On the other hand, the expansion of state control and its penetration of societal spheres led to the dissolution of traditional institutions.

The Ulama were among the first victims: as Muhammad Ali's power grew and his dependence on the support they could rally diminished, their role as representatives of active social forces came to an end. Eventually, the Ulama, and the Azhar became themselves dependant on the state. Through constant attacks on its financial resources, the Azhar ended up by being a beneficiary of state support. In addition, the missions sent to Europe by Muhammad Ali and his successors, as well as the expansion of secular education, shifted the intellectual leadership away from the Ulama and Al-Azhar. The latter was gradually transformed, by successive governmental "reforms", to a University.

Similarly, the village community was dissolved by the expansion of the state role. In his search for resources to finance his military build-
Muhammad Ali introduced the monopoly system to agricultural production. Through this system, the central government became the sole owner and organizer of village production. It introduced new, mainly cash, crops to the detriment of the subsistence cultures. It was also the central government which collected and marketed the production. By the same token, the intermediary "Multazims" who occupied the top of the social hierarchy in the rural areas, were replaced by modern central administration. This two-fold change transformed social and economic relations in the village. The successors of Muhammad Ali abolished the monopoly system and introduced for the first time, during Ismail's era, the private ownership of land.

The role of the urban guilds were undermined by both the growth of European influence and the expansion of the state apparatus. European merchants, producers, and products did not abide by the guilds' rules. Their growing importance in the Egyptian economy was thereby paralleled by a decline in the guilds' control over the professions. At the same time, state-sponsored industries accelerated this decline. Finally, the expansion of state control over social life gradually deprived the guilds of any meaningful role. At the turn of the century, these guilds disappeared, and modern institutions began to take shape.

The dissolution of traditional institutions, and the birth of modern ones, took place under state auspices and in the absence of counterbalancing social forces. Therefore, the new institutions were embedded from the beginning in a clientelistic set of social relations. They were not an expression of social demands and its representation into
the state apparatus, but rather a new means by which the state "administered" the societal sphere. As influence flowed from the top to bottom, the lower levels offered submission in exchange for benefits. This model was generalized in rural areas, unions life and all other instances of intermediary organizations. Successive governments, on the one hand, made no effort to change this model. On the contrary, they suppressed any attempt by unions to challenge their absolute power. On the other hand, the dominant social forces were dependent on the state, and therefore could not modify this model. The failure of modern institutions to play a genuine representative role undermined their credibility and reinforced its image as a clientelistic means of gaining benefits, even among its members.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE END OF THE HEGEMONIC IDEOLOGY

The integration of Egypt into the world order, and its associated modernization process had radically transformed the social scene. This transformation, however, followed a distorted pattern both in economic life, especially in agriculture, and in ideology. This chapter will describe and analyze the ways in which distorted modernization had put an end to hegemonic ideology and opened the door for a permanent state of transition, or to use Gramsci's term, a permanent passive revolution. Passive revolution, as mentioned before, appears as a form of social relations when there is no one dominant historic bloc: the ruling group tries to universalize its own historic bloc without being able to dismantle the others (Cox 1983, 165-7). According to Gramsci, the structures and superstructures constitute a historic bloc (Ricci 1975, 193). He includes in this bloc both the material forces of production and the ideology (Ricci 1975, 208). The existence of a non-consensual historic bloc has its effect on the homogeneity and effectiveness of the civil society.

I. DISTORTED MARKET RELATIONS

In The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi shows how the advent and consolidation of a market economy was closely linked to the disembodiedness of the economy from social control (Polanyi 1944).
long process depended on numerous changes, among which included the commodification of land; money and labour. The latter took shape in various ways, and involved deep social dislocations and various forms of state intervention. Polanyi identifies two major strategies adopted by the state in this regard; the Act of Settlement which prevented the free movement of individuals, and the Speenhamland legislation which guaranteed everyone a minimum income. These two consecutive policies had hindered the constitution of a "free" market of labour for over than two centuries. They foundered under the pressure of the rising bourgeoisie which dominated parliament and won the struggle against the monarchy. Therefore, the consolidation of market economy is based on the prevalence of market relations within society, and depends on market autonomy from social control (concretized in state actions) (Polanyi 1944). Those two elements did not materialize in the history of market economy in Egypt: land and labour were prevented, in various ways, from constituting a "free market", and social (state) control over production was continuously high.

Agricultural production in traditional Egypt was organized according to two interrelated principles: subsistence and tribute. Subsistence was guaranteed to peasants who cultivated the land for their own consumption as well as for limited exchange in local markets. In return, peasants submitted tribute to the Mamluks and the Sultan through the Multazims. Thus, private ownership of land did not exist in traditional Egypt. Only the Sultan and Mamluks had a full control over land, where the property rights belonged to the state itself. Land was allocated to the Multazims, who were responsible for collecting taxes in their "domain". Peasants, who
had no rights of ownership or inheritance over land, farmed it as an inherited right as long as they paid the taxes due to the state and the tributes owed to the Multazims. The latter collected back and transferred the taxes to the government while keeping the tributes for themselves (Al-Raf‘ee 1989, 527). The tribute principle was applied in a two-step manner. Multazims, who rarely dealt directly with peasants, depended on village Shaykhs to collect the taxes and tributes. The latter, in turn, skimmed a part of these revenues for themselves. In this system, land was the permanent base of societal organization, it was not a commodity for exchange. It is only with the integration of Egypt into the world order, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, that the dynamics of land commodification, however distorted, made its appearance.

Labour was equally embedded in the social unit, i.e. the village community. As land rights were held inside the family, there was a family division of labour dependent on primordial sentiments between the family members (Zayed 1981, 89). In other cases there was a sort of "moving labour" but only within the village community and not outside of it. Labour was socialized inside the community and corporate groups in the village. However, there were other local villagers and landless peasants who worked the Multazim's land (al-wisiya), either as paid or corvée labour.

The orientation of production towards the market, and its associated commodification of land and labour, started by the outset of the nineteenth century. These transformations took shape in three phases:
Mohammad Ali (1805-1840), the liberal era (1840-1952) and Nasser and beyond (1952-).

1. The end of traditional production (1805-1840)

It was Mohammad Ali who started the reorientation of agricultural production towards the market. In fact, this reorientation was a central element of his modernization process. Under a program of massive development, he embarked upon the transformation of the Egyptian economy. He tried to achieve this aim by expanding agriculture, which was considered as a major source of Egypt's economic strength (Vatikiotis 1980, 55). Muhammad Ali adopted two main strategies, which would appear incompatible. First, he reoriented the agricultural production towards the market. Second, he built a system of state-controlled monopolies in order to finance his government expenditures and to protect his newly centralized power. These two strategies had their impact on land and on the emergence of market relations.

The first strategy led to the reorientation of agricultural production towards the market. Muhammad Ali was the first to introduce the cultivation of long-staple cotton into the country, for which there was a strong demand in Europe. Thus, he initiated the integration of Egypt into the world economy as a cotton exporter. To render production efficient, he introduced wide range of technical changes, such as the transformation of the entire irrigation system from basin to perennial. The basin system was structured around the custom of rotation in land utilisation, while the
perennial irrigation system permits a continuous use of land. This change led not only to an unprecedented increase in productivity, but also to a change in the relationship between Man and land, in which land was developing into a commodity. Although these changes led to a reorientation of production towards the market, Mohammad Ali's second strategy (state monopolization) hindered the consolidation of market relations. The state monopolized land ownership and virtually took control over the whole production system. Instead of "self-regulating market" mechanisms, government intervened to regulate production, pricing, and distribution processes. The abolition of Multazim system did not lead to the appearance of "free capitalists" in agricultural production. On the contrary, it was replaced by a state monopoly system which included both internal and external trade. The land, even when allocated to Pachas, Shaykhs and ultimately to peasants, remained the property of state. Their relationship to the land was nearer to that of the share-cropping, where the tenant supplied a fixed volume of crops to the government and kept the surplus for himself. Therefore, land was not entirely commodified, at least not prior to 1846 (Vatikiotis 1980, 55).

Labour was not an exception in the partial emergence of market relations. Labour was prevented from constituting a market in various ways. It was not "freed" as an integrated part of a "self-regulating market". First, due to state control over production, the government became the major employer of labour (Niblock and Murphy 1993, 34). Thus, the peasant changed his master from the Multazim to state officials without leaving the land. Thereby, labour remained anchored in the old social unit, i.e. the village, even if the upper hierarchical conditions
changed. Overtaxation and the state's oppressive policies led to the flight of some peasants to towns. That gave rise to a strata of landless, but other state policies prevented them from forming a nucleus of a free labour force. One of these policies was the "passing permits", which were introduced in 1827. According to this system, peasants could not leave their villages without a permit by the Shaykhs. In the same time, all Shaykhs were ordered to arrest and hand over all strangers who appeared in their villages. Military expeditions were also dispatched to arrest fugitives and bring them back to the land. Government was very strict in this regard, and the punishments were severe, including executions (Abdel-Hakim 1986, 120-121). Finally, the state resorted continuously to forced labour (corvée labour) for its public works and for military recruitment as well as to supply manpower to emerging industries. This meant that even industrial labour came into being under the auspices of the state and was subject to its tight control. Significantly industrial labour did not generate an emerging labour-market.

2. The liberal era (1840-1952)

During the second half of Mohammad Ali's reign, a middle class strata represented in the village by Shaykhs, Pachas, and bureaucrats, was emerging. It benefited from Mohammad Ali's late policy of land distribution. By 1830, he started to grant land to high officials of the states (ab'adiyya), to family and relatives (ciftlik), and to village headmen and Shaykhs who were tied with a tax liability system (uhda). This
in turn formed the basis of the coming private ownership of land (Abdel-Hakim 1986, 118).

The period from 1846 to 1883 was a turbulent one, by the end of which land was transformed into a full commodity. Pressures leading to this transformation were various. The monopoly system of Mohammad Ali had been on the defensive since 1836, when an economic crisis led to a severe decrease in state revenues. By 1840, Mohammad Ali was forced to accept the London Agreement, which put an end to his expansionist projects, restricted the army strength and opened Egyptian markets to foreign trade. This enhanced the difficulties of the state-led economy and increased the pressure towards more economic decentralization. In 1846, Mohammad Ali gave tenants the legal status as owners. This was formalized further by decree in 1854 decree. In 1858, inheritance of land became a recognized right (Zayed 1981, 265-7). The rise of European influence in Egypt, especially during the tenure of Ismail and Said, increased the pressure towards more liberalization and commodification of land. In 1870, a Khedive decree re-emphasized and extended land property rights and instituted a partial tax-exemption applicable to large properties. By the 1883, one year after the British occupation of Egypt, the newly established "civil code" recognized and organized the absolute right to land ownership and inheritance (Zayed 1981, 267).

This would appear to have given added impetus to the consolidation of market relations. However, the patterns of land ownership and tenancy worked in exactly the opposite direction. First, the small-scale landowners were virtually living at the subsistence level and were unable
to use their land for the purposes of capital accumulation. Those small
scale owners controlled around 22% of the cultivated land during the
nineteenth century. However, 70% of them possessed less than half a feddan
each. On the other hand, the middle and large-scale landowners, who
constituted more than 78% of cultivated land for the same period, were
extremely concentrated. For example, 1% of this category owned more than
550 feddan each, and only 0.1% of this category owned more than 2600
feddan each. Thus, about 0.5% of landowners controlled the same amount of
land as all the rest of the owners, i.e. 95% (Abdel-Hakim 1986, 191-2).
This pattern meant that the transfer of land ownership to small-scale
owners was very unlikely due to their lack of the required accumulation.
In the same time, the large estate ownership together with the orientation
of production to meet the demand of world markets held the social
relations of production much nearer to those of the eighteenth century
than to new, market-based social relations. Therefore, peasants were
basically held on land at a subsistence level, and their labour was
secured through non-market mechanisms, i.e. the "ezbah" and the "share-
cropping".

The ezbah, share-cropping, and cash rental were the three forms of
land cultivation and tenancy during the liberal era. Through cash rental,
land could be leased for a certain period of time, and the tenant was free
to plant what he wanted when he wanted. This system, however, was very
limited. In fact, as late as 1939, only 17% of cultivated land was leased.
The rest fell under the two other systems; ezbah and share-cropping (Al-
Naquib 1991, 219). The share-cropping system was based on an exchange of
benefits: the owner would give his land to small and medium-sized peasants
who cultivate it in return for a portion of the crop (Al Naquib 1991, 218-9). The owner imposed severe conditions on the peasant (called the cropper), renting him the land with no fertilizer or technical support, specifying the planted crop according to the proprietor interest and dictating the time of planting. Moreover, the share of the cropper was hardly enough to secure his survival. The share-cropping system guaranteed high revenues for the owners, but it slowed down the integration of land into the emerging market system. This is mainly because this system was non-competitive and unable to respond to price changes. It also discouraged the flow of both capital and credit (Al-Naquib 1991, 218).

The other system, the ezbah, was even more hostile to the consolidation of market relations. Peasants in the "ezbah" were of two sorts: those who were attached to the land and hired out on an annual basis, the tamaliyya, and those who were migrants and worked as daily wage-labourers, the tarahil. Tamaliyya workers were not "free", but were clearly embedded in the social unit, i.e. the ezbah. They exchanged working year round for the proprietor for cash payment or for a guaranteed subsistence plot. They were housed in the "ezbah", usually under very poor conditions. Although they theoretically had the right to move to other ezbahs, their stay on land was usually indefinite. Their "wages", i.e. the cash or subsistence plot, secured their subsistence needs. Therefore, we can hardly speak of labour commodification in their case. As for tarahil workers, they exchanged their labour force for a wage, and thereby would seem to be the clearest example of labour commodification in this period. It was be this category of peasants who went on to constitute the base of the coming industrial labour (Zayed 1981, 296). Yet, the "liberalization"
of the tarahil was incomplete. Tarahil workers were employed for only a part of the year, from two to six months. For the rest of the time, they avoided starvation from the charity of their better off relatives (Richards 1992, 63). Hence, the family played the role of "speenhamland" by sustaining the labour force and thus removing an imperative for its transformation into a free market.

Alan Richards describes the state of the Egyptian economy in this period as being disarticulated, where the rate of capital accumulation is maximized by minimizing wages (Richards 1992, 65, 104). This disarticulation masked a mix between a capitalist and a feudal mode of production and allocation of labour. Minimizing wages had its effect on the capacity of consumption, and, as well, on the capacity for investment. The market was prevented from regulating itself. Regardless of our reservations about the applicability of terms such as "capitalist mode of production" and feudalism, it is clear that market relations emerged only in a partial fashion. From the beginning, there were forces, actors, and constraints that made this emergence only partial. The pivotal role played by the state, and its control over production process distorted market functioning. So too did the orientation of production towards external markets. Landlords had no interest in enlarging the local market or in changing the orientation of the peasant's production from subsistence to exchange. Peasants, who were helpless in the face of the coalition between the state and the landlords, continued to cultivate their tiny share of land for subsistence, and even to secure, through familial ties, the minimum needs of the dislocated landless.
3. Nasser and after (1952-)

Nasser’s policies put an end to the liberal experience and reestablished the state leadership of the economy that had characterized Mohammad Ali’s era. The same contradictions that emerged with Mohammad Ali’s modernization process reappeared in an amplified manner during Nasser’s period and thereafter. The state’s control over production and over social forces, combined with the orientation of the production to the exterior, brought to the surface once again the contradictions between consolidating production to meet market demands and preventing the expansion of collateral market relations.

While Nasser’s economic programmes consolidated production orientation in a market orientation, market relations continued to be hindered by other state action. The “revolutionary regime” adopted two different strategies: modernizing the economy and enhancing social welfare. The economic modernization depended on the expansion of the national market through the stimulation of demand and a continuation of the process of integration into the world market through cotton sales. Both strategies succeeded in giving more impetus to direct the agricultural production towards the market. The industrialization programme introduced by Nasser’s regime, especially in the textile industry, depended on the expansion of cash crop production. The domestic demand for cash crops was added to the foreign demand. In addition, the state’s involvement in distributing basic consumer commodities such as sugar, flour, oil, rice, etc., disembedded their consumption from the local context. Peasants could now "buy" these commodities instead of
"producing" them themselves for their own use. This trend continued through Sadat’s and Mubarak’s era. The supply of these commodities is centrally managed through the Ministry of Supplies which has monopolized their production and distribution. Thus, a national market-distribution system was constructed for these commodities instead of their being based on subsistence basis.

At the same time, the need for establishing legitimacy and support for the military regime was closely related to the adoption of social programs. This happened through land reform, subsidization of consumption, and full employment policy. This was directed to absorb certain social forces (workers and peasants) upon whom the state depended for support. Land reform, however, hindered the commodification of land. The number of small owners, processing less than 5 feddans, increased to more than 57% of all landowners by 1965 and large properties (more than 50 feddans per owner) were liquidated. The increase of small owners undermined the already limited opportunities for capital accumulation. The middle-scale owners (between 5 and 50 feddans) increased to more than 30% by 1965 (Al-Naquib 1991, 225), which have led to an increase in capital accumulation. Yet, the social conditions that accompanied this increase produced just the opposite. Most of beneficiaries of the middle-scale ownerships were found among state officials and the bureaucracy as well as the other "new middle classes". Those owners manage their lands through the rental systems of share-cropping and cash rental. Although cash rental increased considerably, the new regulations introduced by the state to protect peasants led to a net reduction in productivity. These regulations, in practice, placed severe limitations on the possibility of selling the
land. The owner could not sell his rented, or share-cropped, land without the consent of the peasant. Moreover, the latter had the priority to buy it if he wishes so. In all cases, the tenant shares the owner in the land price. In addition, tenancy conditions under the two systems, such as the way in which rent is fixed or how the share of each is determined or the cost of improving productivity is shared, discourage both the owner and the tenant from investing in the land (Al-Naqib 1991, 219).

At the same time, the state’s control over agriculture undermined the consolidation of a self-regulating market. State monopolized production, importation and distribution of agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers, improved seeds and pesticides, and machinery. The Ministry of Agriculture, through “cooperatives”, issues a holding card to each farm stating the cultivated crop according to a rotation system determined by the Ministry. It also fixes the quota of fertilizer he takes, his access to machines or to credits, as well as the quota of the crop he has to provide by the end of the season. Thus, the state established a monopoly over production, distribution, fertilizers importation, as well as over pricing and marketing (Richards 1992, 184).

State policies also hindered the constitution of a labour market. This was the indirect consequence of two state strategies regarding full employment and social programmes. On the one hand, the state followed a wide ranging programme of subsidization. Education became free and universal from primary level through to university. a free and universal

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5 This system was not of cooperatives in the true sense of the word. It was the name given to distribution and control agency the state used to supervise agricultural production.
health care system was established and extended to remote rural areas. Direct subsidization of consumer prices were introduced, which included not only basic goods but also durable commodities. In addition, the state launched a housing programme which provided "social housing" to the poor and middle-range income earners and also included a strict rent. Together with the full employment, these social policies constituted a safety net equivalent to "spheenhüland". This situation, which had hindered the commodification of labour in England for about two centuries, prevailed in Egypt all along its experience with market economy.

On the other hand, labour was often allocated by the state rather than appropriated by market mechanisms. The state-led industrialization programme, the growth in public works such as the "High Dam", military expansion, and the growth of bureaucracy and public sector, all made the state the principal employer in the country. The full employment policy adopted by the state meant that each and every "graduate" was granted a job either in the bureaucracy or in the public sector. This strategy continued even during the "liberalization" of the Egyptian economy under Sadat and Mubarak. "Total public employment increased by four times, from 1.2 million in 1969-70, to 4.8 million in 1986". This increase is not due to an increase in the population. On the contrary, it represents an increase in the ratio of public employment/total population from 3.8% to 10% (Al-Naquib 1991, 160).

In sum, the production realm experienced a long process of passive revolution since the rule of Mohammad Ali. This process, however, was neither a long term plan, nor did it respond to "objective" needs and
imperatives. It was constructed through choices made by actors, such as European Powers, the Egyptian state and landlords or by the inability of other actors to act as such, such as the peasantry, in their interactions with their historical context. The transformation of Egyptian production from traditional subsistence-tributary basis to a distorted market-oriented one was the ultimate consequence of these interactions and choices. The long road towards modernity in Egypt, under the auspices of the state, and its consequent social relations created contradictory dynamics with respect to production. Both land and labour had undergone contradictory transformations that in some ways favoured market forces and in others opposed them.

II. DISTORTED IDEOLOGY

In our usage of the term "ideology", we broadly mean the main principles that constitute the foundation of people's conception of their world. Thus, we do not mean by ideology a specific political creed, such as marxism or liberalism. The history of the modernization of Egypt is that of ideological polarization between two fundamental standpoints: traditional and modern. This polarization has taken place on two levels. The first is that of discourse and practices. The expansion of modern ideologies such as liberalism and marxism has faced a strong resistance from traditional ideologies based on religion. The second level is that of social forces and societal principles that underpin ideological discourses
which individuals generally comply. They are either instrumental, i.e.,
y they state preferable forms of behaviour, or terminal, i.e., they define
ideal goals (unity, social justice...). Both of them guide, regulate social
relations, and define the meaning of human existence (Barakat 1993, 145).
The basic values that derive directly from these sources are patriarchal
relations asserting male responsibility and authority, identification with
the group or a community at the expense of individuality, conformity
rather than creativity, absolutism rather than relativism, and fatalism
rather than free will (Sharabi 1987, 146). To a lesser extent, Bedouin
heritage represented another source of the prevailing ideology in Egypt.
Its basic values share the same moral basis as that of the family and
religion. It asserts solidarity and ascription, manhood and dignity,
hospitality and generosity, and simplicity of life (Barakat 1993, 145). In
addition, traditional ideology was positively influenced by the idea of
resurrection and the day of judgement in which only the obedient faithful
will find salvation. Accordingly, there is an absolute need to abide by
Divine instructions in one's daily life. Consequently, the community of
believers is supposed to be united by a shared system of belief rather
than a pluralist and diversified system. As God is only one, and there is
only one Divine law by which the community must abide, "truth" is absolute
and diversity is negatively regarded. Nevertheless, traditional culture
was not exempted from divisions and conflicts. Intellectual leadership was
mainly assumed by the Ulama, judges and teachers who exercised spiritual
and moral control over the public (Vatikiotis 1980, 36-7). These leaders
were in conflict with leaders of Sufi orders who also exercised certain
ideological leadership especially over peasants. The latter were accused
of being superstitious and mystical. This conflict was dire, yet it took place within the same hegemonic ideology and used, more or less the same referent.

These cultural characteristics specifically communitarianism, divinity and fatalism are the expression of the principles around which Egyptian society was organized. The first refer to the precedence of community attachments over others. In fact, this principle is common to most, if not all, traditional society. Louis Dumont demonstrates, through a comparative study between modern and traditional ideologies how the latter is anchored in communitarian-type relations (Louis Dumont 1985). The second principle concerns the relationship between the individual and the divine. As mentioned above, the divine plays a decisive role in the traditional Egyptian ontology. Man is not free, neither is he the master of his life. In his daily behaviour as well as in his general orientations, man is bound by either religious or social meta-individual considerations. Acceptance of the world, including the social order as it is, and the belief in its inevitability are quite harmonious with the previous two principles. As the individual is placed into the community, which in turn is placed into the divine universe, and as human freedom of action is limited, fatalism relaxed the potential tension between expectations and outcomes and thereby cemented social order.

Egyptian culture progressed along these lines until the French Occupation. Contact with the French did not directly end the hegemony of traditional culture, but they initiated dynamics that led to its decline. The French occupation instigated an ambivalent feeling towards modernity.
Egyptians received with antagonism the French modern, secular and "infidel" ideology. Yet, they "sensed that the powerful ability of the infidel was made possible by some kind of new knowledge and efficacious pattern of attitudes and scale of values" (Vatikiotis 1981, 46). Such admiration for the "other" and uncertainty about the "self" constituted the nucleus for the belief in the need for change along modern ideas and conceptions.

Mohammad Ali's strategy of modernization reflected this ambivalent feeling vis-à-vis the modern culture. As a leader seeking to safeguard his independence, he resorted to the importation and the emulation of modern techniques. Yet, he systematically opposed the propagation of modern culture and ideas in Egypt. This was an attempt to implant modern techniques in traditional culture. However, this hybrid project proved impossible for various reasons. On the one hand, there was the role played by the European powers, who did not permit Mohammad Ali to complete his programme. The British, the French and the Ottomans had a clear interest, albeit for different reasons, to cause him to fail. The Europeans, while welcoming the modernization of Egypt, tried to shape it in a dependent form. Thus, Britain, while encouraging the expansion of market economy in Egypt, did all it could, and finally succeeded in 1840 to integrate Egypt into its "free trade" zone. It thereby suppressed all forms of independent modernization (national industries, schools etc.).

On the other hand, the hybrid modernizing project generated dynamics over which it rapidly lost control. The case of the educational missions demonstrate well this aspect. The missions sent abroad during the reign of
Mohammad Ali had a definite responsibility to study and record each and every aspect of modern technology. The intention was to implant this modern technology in Egypt. This effort was directed only towards the technical aspects of engineering, industry, and medicine, etc. It excluded copying any modern conceptions or ideas, especially those of democracy, liberal values, and modern administration. Mohammad Ali imposed a set of rules to be followed by the members of these missions which covered all aspects of their daily life abroad. On their return, they were often used as instruments to execute Mohammad Ali's orders, not as consultants who are supposed to influence the ruler (Abdel Malek 1983, 132-4). Yet, these missions constituted the nucleus of modern intellectual leadership. They opened the door wide for modern thinking; including the development of liberal values, secularism, equality, and women's liberation, democracy, nationalism, and socialism. This modern thinking was not incorporated in Mohammad Ali's system, but gained incremental momentum afterwards. A concrete example of the influence of modern thinking appeared half a century later in the Orabi's revolt against Khedive Tawfik in 1882 (Abdel-Hakim 1986, 132).

The first attempt to pursue a hybrid project that might lead to modernization without westernization had failed. The modernization process, by its own dynamics and by the interests of its actors, proved to be indivisible: modern technology is inseparable from its social relations and ideology. This was the judgement to which Khedive Ismail subscribed (1863-1879), and upon which he founded his new modernizing project.
Khedive Ismail, the grandson of Mohammad Ali, was obsessed with transforming Egypt into a European country. He was reported to have said, "my country is no longer in Africa, it is in Europe" (Vatikiotis 1980, 73). This explains the extensive modernization program he set which demanded high level of technical capabilities. These would not be found in Egypt at that time. Consequently, Ismail invited huge numbers of Europeans to participate in this program. Their numbers increased from a few thousand in 1860 to over a hundred thousand in 1876 (Vatikiotis 1980, 80-2). Besides other activities, Europeans were ultimately involved in the educational field, especially in the new European-modelled schools Ismail established. Hence, they were responsible for bringing up wholesale generations in the modern European ideology. These schools were part of Catholic missions, and were directly run by Europeans, who were mainly French. Contrary to Mohammad Ali who established Egyptian schools on the French model, Ismail permitted the Catholic missions to establish French schools in Egypt. The impact of these schools on Egyptian cultural life was immense. Although there are few empirical studies on this impact, two indicators give an idea of the depth of this influence. First, French influence in Egypt, which grew through these schools was deeply rooted in cultural life. Seventy-five years of direct British occupation was unable to eradicate this influence (Vatikiotis 1980, 81). Even now, French influence is traceable within the Egyptian elite, which permitted Egypt to become a full member of the Francophonie. Secondly, apart from the Azherites, almost all members of the Egyptian intellectual leadership came from one or another of these European schools (Vatikiotis 1980, 296-306).
In addition, Ismail promoted Western manners of life. For example, European dress was adopted in government circles, including its large bureaucracy. Cities were organized along western-style architecture. He also supported the propagation of modern arts and letters. He constructed an opera house which regularly invited European companies to perform in it, encouraged an emerging theatre and music production, and launched museums-building program. In the same vein, Ismail was the first Egyptian leader to allow the children of peasants into state-owned schools, and also the first one to encourage girls' education in public schools. These changes had a strong impact on the propagation of modern culture in Egypt (Vatikiotis 1980, 80-107).

Ismail's project of full modernization, however, did not succeed in transforming Egyptian culture into a modern European one. Although it had expanded the modern way of life and had destabilized traditional culture, the latter was not replaced by the former. Instead, a situation of duality and polarization among modern and traditional elements of society emerged. The changes in intellectual leadership offer a good example of this polarization and duality. The appearance of modern intellectual leadership undermined and replaced the role of the Ulama. Some of the Ulama were integrated into the modern elite, and others tried to revive traditional ideology by incorporating modern elements. Nevertheless, the Ulama and their heirs were no longer in a hegemonic position. Traditional ideology was regarded as a sign of "retardation" by the influential modernized elites. However, the modern intellectuals provided leadership that was hegemonic only within the modernized strata in the state bureaucracy and among other western-oriented elites. Modern ways of life were regarded by
the masses, especially in rural areas, as signs of decadence. This duality is highly demonstrated between northern and southern Egypt, where the southern areas were neither subjected to any colonial power nor penetrated by any modern way of life. Instead, the central government, especially from Nasser's era to the present time, depended on the traditional authority of kibar al-a'yan (wealthy local notables) to ensure order. This lack of penetration and the persistence of traditional institutions had its effect on accentuating traditionality and tribalism in southern Egypt while modernizing northern Egypt has led to marked differences in development between both parts. The dualism was even clear in the social structure of southern Egypt, where notables entered in a clientalistic relation with the state, which in turn, favoured the notables who acted as the intermediary class and were put under the state's modern umbrella, while the fallahin were marginalized and their traditionality was accentuated. Fandy has analysed the Islamists' reform and revolt in the south as informed by the fallahin's desire to rearrange the rules of social structure (Fandy 1994). Both discourses were embedded in society. They were both backed by certain social forces and intellectuals, and they responded to existing principles of societal organization. Thus, ideological confrontation met a deadlock, where neither side could replace the other. This deadlock continued through the liberal era and after. During these periods, ideological discourse was split, conveying two opposing cultures without articulating them, and thereby giving rise to a permanent confrontation between them.
2. The permanent ideological passive revolution

The end of the hegemony of traditional ideology gave rise to a permanent debate between three camps. The first advocates a replacement of Egyptian ideology (culture) with a modern, European-styled one. We will refer to this camp by the term "substitutive". The second camp, which is referred to here as "adaptive", seeks to build up and propagate a hybrid ideology derived from both traditional and modern ideologies. The third camp calls for a revival of traditional ideology in new forms, without integrating any of the modern culture's elements. We will refer to them by the term "revivalists". This section will sum up the positions defended by those camps in relation to their societal foundations, then identify the dynamics of their interaction.

The modern discourse in Egypt advocates a liberal, secular and rational ideology. Its adherents openly attack the traditional cultural package. They emphasize the need for emancipating Egyptians from their traditional "dead and useless" culture (Vatikiotis 1982, 306). This emancipation is possible only by the adoption of a Western-styled culture or, as expressed by one of its famous advocates, Salama Moussa, by introducing the elements of the "Western renaissance" into Egyptian life (Moussa 1962). The advocates of this discourse are generally radical, uncompromising, and reject half-way solutions. Culture, in their view, is taken as a package that can be accepted or rejected in toto.
The islam-traditional ideology, in the view of the substitutive camp, is not compatible with the age of science and modern technology. They attack the basic principles of traditional society and argue that these principles constitute impediments to the advancement of Egyptian society. Traditional culture is regarded as a sign of irrationality, despotism, and non-creativity, and hence it is responsible for the "retardation" of Egyptian society. They draw a dividing line between science and "progress" on one side, and spiritual beliefs on the other. Thus, Egyptians should be emancipated from their confinement to useless traditional spirituality. On the contrary, European ideology is regarded as superior and emancipatory. It offers political salvation for a decadent islamic community. Thereby, modern and liberal ideas of rationality, secularity and individualism should be embraced. The most prominent secular modernists are Taha Hussein, Salama Moussa, and Hussein Fawzi (Vatikiotis 1982, 229-39).

Salama Moussa is a good representative of this camp. He attributes the superiority of the Europeans to their industrial culture. This culture extols the use of empirical science and reason that led it to power and dominance. On the contrary, the agricultural milieu in which Egypt is anchored renders its people superstitious and submissive, and consequently unable to "advance". In order to get out of this stagnation and to "attain" the modern degree of "progress", Egypt should abandon its traditional and religious ideology and abide by that of modern Europe. This discourse is clearly embedded in the modern set of societal principles, namely individualism, rationality and secularity. Moussa was quite aware of the importance of transforming societal organization in
this direction to be able to implement his ideas. He relates this transformation to industrialization, which supposedly will bring about the European-styled social relations. In other words, Moussa advocated the destruction of the existing aspects of traditional life and to push modernization to the end. In addition, Moussa was conscious of the adverse consequences of a partial change, and this is why he advocated radical positions. According to Moussa, society cannot change without a complete transformation of its culture. A partial change would only create a dual society. Therefore, the change should be radical to bring about a meaningful reform, a modern polity and hence join the European progress (Moussa 1962, 117-24).

The revivalists made the opposite choice. They advocate the destruction of existing societal foundations of modernity and the consolidation of those aspects which revive the traditional ideology. This discourse is expressed in its clearest form in the writings of the theorist of the Moslem Brothers, Sayyid Qutb, which were eventually used by the fundamentalist Islamic groups.

Sayyid Qutb argues that Islam is an integrated set of norms, values and principles, and therefore, does not need to emulate or to borrow from modern ideologies. As such, Islam offers a solution to every problem, and responds to all needs of mankind. Islam, according to Qutb, is distinguished from modern ideologies by its balanced emphasis on both spiritual and material world. The universe, which is created by God, is a harmonious unified whole, and His rules for this universe, concretized in Islamic teachings, embrace its ethico-spiritual as well as its material
aspects. That is why Qutb denounces Western ideologies as being overtly material, denying the spiritual dimension of human life, and thus approaches the universe in a distorted manner. Marxism, on the one hand, concentrates exclusively on the material, and this reduces the human being to the status of objects. Similarly, liberalism has no counterbalance for the excessive importance capitalist system gives to its material gains. Thus, in spite of its material achievements, liberalism leads to a spiritual and moral vacuum. Qutb asserts that Islamic ideology has an independent vision of the world that is superior to materialist modern ideologies. It is sui generis, and needs to borrow nothing from the West. It reconciles the individual and the community in so far as its values and principles stress both individual freedom and social responsibility. Individuals, regardless of their race or sex, are equals and entitled to the same rights. At the same time, Islam preaches a mutual responsibility between the individual and the community. The individual should enjoy his freedom as long as he respects the community. And the community is responsible for its members (Butterworth 1982, 99-104 and Sayyid Qutb, 132-3). We can note here, that the Islamic values Qutb endorses are in perfect harmony with societal bases of the traditional ideology. Ernest Gellner argues that Islam offers an alternative and acts as a competitor to the Western civil society. He argues that Islam offers the "imaginary community" that the modern world of political and social life lacks. Islam, in Gellner's words, "is an exceptionally effective response to the spiritual and practical needs of a disoriented urban population in the throes of modernization" (Ignatieff 1995).
Nevertheless, Qutb accepts the introduction of modern technology and science, but rejects any influence of its associated ideologies. He conceives Islamic society as solely a product of Islamic ideology. Hence, Islamic political creed should supersede modern political institutions. In Qutb's view, God is the only legitimate ruler and the only legislator in an Islamic society. This is the principle of *al-hakimiya lillah*, i.e., that it is only God who has the right to govern. This clarifies two points in Qutb's analysis. First, he denounces the modern forms of states that were transplanted in Islamic societies. Second, he insists that the source of legitimate legislation, both for social and individual life, is Divine (Sayyid Qutb, 222-3). This position expresses clearly the traditional standpoint concerning both the limits to individual freedom and to rationality. Individuals are not "free", i.e., they are not the masters of their own destiny, but they are, and should be, subjugated to God's will and laws. Equally, individuals are not free to legislate according to "rational", future-oriented thinking, legislation should abide by Divine law. The only role of "rationality" lies in the interpretation of the sacred texts and in projecting their teachings to new situations (*ijtihad*).

Fundamentalist Islamic groups advocate the same position concerning ideology. They call for the rejection of modern values, and for the revival of Islamic ideology. They deem modern political systems to be non-Islamic and thereby illegitimate and should not be obeyed. They also denounce the Azhar as an official institution loyal to the state and collaborating with the corrupt modern political system. They believe that Al-Azhar was not strong enough to confront the "cultural invasion" which
induced modern ideas incompatible with the Islamic principles and
heritage. This invasion is responsible for the cultural decline and
consequently for social, political and economic decay. This situation is
similar, in their view, to the pre-Islamic era, the gahiliya, which
undermined human dignity. By adhering to modern ideology, Man is no more
than a numeric value rather than a human being (Abdel-Fattah 1989, 44-8).
The fundamentalist Islamic groups advocates, therefore, a "return" to the
Islamic source of traditional ideology. Yet, they are not traditionalists.
They seek to "revive" the traditional ideology, namely its Islamic component, in the present time. In so doing, they call for the destruction
of all social expressions of modern ideology as well as its foundations
(Abbdel-Fattah 1989).

The "adaptive" discourse is distinguished by its constant attempt to
intermingle traditionality and modernity. It encourages the continuity of
religion and the traditional social order, yet encourages their
accommodation with science. Its basic premise is that both science and
religion are important to the interests of humankind. Science improves
material life and religious ethics guidance provide morals (Charles
Butterworth 1982, 90-2). Science is essential to achieve power over
Nature, yet religion is the only guide that restricts that power and
indicates how it should be used. This trend proposes a harmony between
scientific materialism and religious ethics. In fact, this camp is not
quite homogenous. It includes intellectuals from opposing backgrounds and
advocating various projects. Two "schools" can be identified within this
discourse. The first stems from religious leaders attempting to introduce
modern ideology without abandoning the basic values of Islam. Mohammad Abdou is the outstanding example of this school. The second comes from a background of secular education, and usually rediscovers the importance of tradition through their frustrated efforts for full modernization. Therefore, they seek to introduce modern ideology in a way to supersede traditional practices and beliefs without abandoning them completely. Zaki Naguib-Mahmoud is the typical representative of this school.

Mohammad Abdou comes from a religious background, and then encountered and was influenced by modern culture. He graduated from Al-Azhar and was one of its Ulama. Then he left for Europe as a member of an educational mission sent by the modernizing state. He was deeply influenced by the two cultures. Thus, he was interested in reforming religious thinking, and aimed to liberate it from traditional interpretations. Abdou saw no fundamental contradiction between Islam and certain elements in the secular modern ideology. In fact, by opposition to Moussa, Abdou did not demonstrate an awareness of the societal foundations of ideology. In his writings, there is no evidence of such a relationship. On the contrary, Abdou's discourse is rather eclectic, in which elements from two universes are juxtaposed without an indication how they can be reconciled in practice. The impact of Abdou's ideas was confined to the religious institution. In his capacity as an official interpreter of Islamic rules (mufti), and as a member of the governing-council of Al-Azhar, Abdou applied his reformist ideas to the interpretation of the sacred law and to specific Islamic practices. His ideas also had, to a certain extent, some influence on religious education and the clerical judiciary (Abdel-Hakim 1986, 150-152).
Zaki Naguib-Mahmoud, almost half a century later, provides a more elaborate version of the adaptive camp. Contrary to Abdou, he came from a background of secular education, and then continued his higher education in Britain where he studied extensively in the history of Western philosophy and wrote his doctoral thesis under the supervision of Bertrand Russel (Zaki Naguib-Mahmoud 1985). Back in Egypt, he became an outstanding advocate of the substitutive camp. With books like Sun Rises from the West, and The Myth of Metaphysics, he established his reputation as a modernizing intellectual. By the end of the 1970s, Naguib-Mahmoud moved to the adaptive camp, declaring that substitutive discourse is both impossible and undesirable. Then he rapidly became a theorist of the adaptation camp, and gained a wide popularity. His books were reprinted, and his articles appeared regularly in Al-Ahram, the intellectual daily newspaper. In his book, The Rational and Irrational Elements in Our Intellectual Heritage (our translation), he details the foundations of his adaptive discourse. The basic idea is that the traditional culture is not homogenous. Through an analysis of classical Arab writings, Naguib-Mahmoud identifies two kinds of discourse: one is based on rationality and reason, and the other is mystical, superstitious and metaphysical. He proposes a selective revival of the Arab intellectual heritage; one that focuses on rational dimensions and writings and fights the irrational tradition. In a latter book, The Future of the Arab Culture (our translation), he implements this idea by drawing a framework for a future Arab culture that will be able to incorporate both its traditional heritage and modernity in an interactive manner. This proposal is distinguished from Abdou’s previous attempt by its coherence. It presents a non-eclectic
reconciliation: one that is based on elements already identified in traditional culture. Yet this proposal lacks any analysis of the societal foundations of culture and so remains basically wishful thinking. It does not tell how it can be transformed into a hegemonic ideology in a societal scene marked by a deep duality between modern and traditional principles.

These three positions constitute three separate universes among which no genuine contact takes place. The differences between the three positions are fundamental, and do not lend themselves to compromise. They constitute three different paradigms. Their referents are not the same, their set of values are opposed, and their ontology is different. Contrary to Western ideologies, such as Marxism and Liberalism, which, opposed as they are, share a minimal set of values, these three positions have no common denominator. That is why debates between their advocates, whenever they take place, are rapidly reduced to rhetorical "war" of mutual accusations. The substitutive position is damned by the other two camps as being either "infidel" or "clientelistic" to the West, or both. The revivalist position is regarded by the advocates of the two other as a call for "retardation" and obscurantism. The adaptive position has the luxury of being rejected on two different grounds. The substitutive advocates view it as an eclectic discourse doomed to failure, and the revivalist view it as a compromise that constitutes an avant-garde for the dissolution of authenticity into the imported ideology. Thus, debates are taking place within each paradigm, not among them. Intellectual leadership in Egypt is three-fold, each of which appeals to its own public and
rejects the existence of the others. Champions of each paradigm are waiting for the others to disappear, either by enlarging their own public, or, more often, by calling upon the state to repress their "others". In fact, the absence of tolerance is not the explanation for the weak ability of these positions to find a common language. On the contrary, intolerance itself is explained by the absence of a hegemonic framework in which different discourses may oppose each other.

**Conclusion**

The integration of Egypt into the world order had generated opposing dynamics within society. It has instigated the introduction of a market economy, yet it has strengthened the state to the point that market relations have been prevented from being consolidated. It has destabilized traditional ideology, yet it has not led to its replacement by another. In other words, the integration of Egypt into the world order led, through a complex of structural change and the reactions of actors to these changes, to the end of the homogeneity of the Egyptian historic bloc. Thereby, the traditional ideology, form of economy, and polity, came to an end. Instead, a situation emerged where different historic blocs, each of which represents a different view of the world (a paradigm), are in conflict. This conflict has not been temporary, as the modernization theory has suggested that modern historic bloc gradually transforms and integrates the traditional one. On the contrary, both historic blocs have remained influential, and are supported by active social forces. The passive
revolution situation proved to be permanent, and the absence of consensus
is now embedded in the configuration of all social relations.

The case of the absence of a hegemonic ideology is significant. As we mentioned before, we do not mean by ideology a specific political
creed, such as Marxism or Liberalism. Rather, ideology is referred to in
this chapter as the principles that found the discourse. As such, both
Marxism and Liberalism belong to the same ideology, that which defines the
discourse of modernity, namely: rationality, individualism, and human
emancipation. The discourse of modernity constitutes, therefore, a common
language which both marxism and liberalism can use. Although each of them
represent a different set of interests and choices, both address the same
issues with the same language. This is not the case with the ideological
divisions in Egypt. As mentioned earlier, each of the three discourses
uses its own language with its distinct referents, signs, and principles
and each discourse expresses an exclusive set of societal principles.

Revivalist discourse, commonly called Islamic fundamentalism, is
embedded in an anti-modern universe. It is based on three principles: the
economy should be re-embedded into social control and institutions, the
individual is a member of a group to which he is accountable, and the
Divine is supreme over human destiny. This discourse does not appeal to
specific social forces in the modern sense, i.e., the working class,
bourgeoisie, etc. It appeals to the traditional segment in the present
passive revolution. This segment does not have specific "bearers". It is
within the modern segment itself. Distorted modernization is not about
modernization of part of the society while other groups remain
traditional. In other words, distorted modernity is not like money,
distributed unequally. Distorted modernity resembles more a polluted environment, of which each and everyone breaths both air and pollution. Thus, revivalist discourse, exactly as substitutive discourse, appeals to a specific segment in each individual; either to air or to pollution, depending on one’s definition.

Adaptive discourse is in a weaker position. By its hybrid composition, it represents more the current passive revolution than its possible end. As it reconciles elements from both worlds, it does not constitute a refuge for the frustrated of any of the two sides. Revivalism, has benefited from the failures of the modernizing project to enlarge its base of support. Substitutive discourse, has benefited from the glare of modernity in both the liberal and the Nasserist era. Adaptive discourse was always associated with state officialdom, and was usually considered as "politically correct". However, it does not respond to any of the two societal universes between which most Egyptians are torn and thereby has remained marginalized.
CONCLUSION

This thesis has analyzed the distortions of "civil society" in Egypt. Our definition of civil society is based on the following three elements derived from the Gramscian analysis: organization, ideology, and privacy. Civil society corresponds to the different forms of voluntary association that lie between, and link, the state and individuals. From this perspective, to constitute a "civil society", voluntary associations should be organized independent of the state and cemented by a hegemonic ideology. By hegemonic ideology, we mean the existence of consensus around the fundamental principles that found a discourse. That consensus does not mean the absence of diversity, rather it creates a common "language" with which different discourses can communicate and compete.

The distortion of civil society in Egypt has been identified along these three dimensions. First, its associations suffer from organizational problems. Their internal relations are marked by factionalism, rigid hierarchy, limited participation and a patrimonial type of leadership. Second, they are heavily penetrated by the state. Most Egyptian voluntary associations maintain clientelistic relationships with the state, in which the latter has direct control over their activities in return for various favours. Associations which attempt to consolidate their independence enter into direct confrontations with the state, and thereby fail to assume their "intermediation" role. Third, relations among the different associations, and within its factions, are fundamentally conflicting, where a minimal level of consensus over basic principles is lacking. Their
views on state, society, and the role of individuals are anchored in opposed paradigms among which there is virtually no communication.

Our working hypothesis is that these distortions are consequences of Egypt's integration into the world order. The latter is supposed to have strengthened the state with respect to its society. Instead, it has introduced a dichotomy between modernity and traditionality, and thereby ended the national consensus. This hypothesis has guided our examination of the history of Egypt's integration into the world order, and of the resulting distortions inherent in its civil society. This examination supports the proposition that the integration of Egypt into the world order has had a distortive impact on its civil society. However, these distortions cannot be explained solely by reference to the world order. The role of local actors, especially the state, was crucial in this regard. The role of the state has been three-fold: it defined the modalities of integration into the world order, it mediated its impact on social forces, and through its policies, it shaped the route of this integration. Therefore, the integration of Egypt into the world order should not be understood in a dichotomous way, in which "national" level of analysis is separated from the "international". On the contrary, as Cox pointed out, the relationship between civil society/state/world order is a complex function and clearly not linear.

The impact of the world order was felt on Egyptian civil society through three main processes: its action on Egyptian state-formation, the consolidation of a market-economy in Egypt and its integration in the world economy, and through ideological change. These three processes,
however, were not isolated one from the other. We have dealt with each of
them separately only for analytical purposes. In fact, both ideological
change and commodification of the economy influenced the state formation
process. The latter played a key role in the two other processes, and
finally, ideological change was anchored in societal change in its broad
sense, i.e. in the modernization of both economy and state.

The modern state formation in Egypt was launched by Muhammad Ali as
a response to the threat emanating from the world order of the early
nineteenth century. It was also, at least in its early stages, backed by
specific social forces represented by the Ulama. The impact of the world
order, however, became more direct and detailed in the second half of the
century with the rise of increased European penetration of the Egyptian
State under Ismail; a process that culminated in the British occupation of
Egypt (1882-1956). The modern state formation resulted in a considerable
growth in the government's administration and increased its intervention
in all societal spheres. Subsequently, the central government, using its
newly established modern administration, increased its direct control over
social ictures.

State interventions displaced and eventually dismantled traditional
institutions. The first victims of the modern state formation were the
Ulama, who had helped launch it. The establishment of modern institutions,
such as professional unions, took place under the auspices of the state
and within its tight control. The new institutions, however, lacked the
support of influential social forces and thereby were dependent on the
state from their beginnings. These institutions represented a tiny portion
of the population, namely the outcome of modern professions, who were
unable to challenge state authority. In addition, these "new social forces" had a symbiotic relationship with the state: they were the result of both modern state-sponsored education, and the state-centered urban elites.

The state also played a key role in the commodification of Egyptian economy. Since Muhammad Ali, Egypt had various sets of interests all of which were related to the expansion of the market, and to its integration in the world economy, albeit following different modalities. However, the dissolution of the village community and traditional agricultural relations was incomplete due, in part, to state action itself. Both in land and in labour, the state adopted strategies whose outcomes had contradictory consequences on their commodification. Neither market relations, nor its forces emerged in a meaningful way, which in turn strengthened the dominance of state bureaucracy over production and agricultural life at large. In this context, clientelism was the preference of the social forces in place, especially the new land lords who acquired ownership through their submission to the state. This clientelism was generalized among peasants, local bureaucrats, Shaykhs and landlords.

Ideological change started with the French occupation (1798-1801), but gained momentum as apart of the state-led modernization process under Muhammad Ali and after. Through the sending of educational missions to Europe, the introduction of secular education in Egypt, including, eventually European education, arts and ideas, modern ideology penetrated Egyptian intellectual circles. However, this penetration could displace neither the neither the expressions of traditional ideology, nor its
societal foundations. In a society founded upon the precedence of the community over the individual, the sacred over the secular and fatalism over rationality, modern ideology could only deform the prevalent traditional ideology. As market forces (and relations) were present only in a deformed manner, principles such as individualism, rationality and emancipation were not hegemonic. Thus, modern ideology could not consolidate its positions except in a partial fashion. The ultimate consequence of the interaction between modern and traditional ideologies is the end of the hegemony of the latter. In its place, has emerged a state of passive revolution in which the old and the new are in permanent conflict, and which no side can transform or destroy the other. Also, no one can tolerate the other, and the society is fragmented between different and conflictual historic blocs which paved the way for "end of hegemonic ideology", and which explains the absence of consensus among contemporary Egyptian associations.

In sum, the impact of the world order on the different dimensions of civil society is distortive. Through complex structural changes and actor responses to these changes, including that of the state, the social scene has changed in a deformed way. Society is not "autodevelopping", and the changes it has undergone did not originate from its own dynamics. It has been subjugated to distorted changes in its institutions; its form of economy, and in its state-society relation. These changes were distorted in two ways. First, they were expressions of societal change that took place elsewhere, and that was copied and transplanted on a social scene whose founding principles were incompatible with their copied forms. Secondly, the dynamics of these changes have been introduced only in a
partial way, and thus have not been able to transform the social scene on which its expressions have been imposed. In other words, modernization has been neither harmonious with Egyptian societal features, nor strong enough to replace these features with more compatible ones. The result is a hybrid, disarticulated, distorted and immiscible blend of both worlds.

This thesis does not suggest that traditional social, political and economic life in Egypt was an example of the romantic *bon sauvage*. In fact, we think it is impossible to pronounce a normative verdict either on the traditional or the modern discourse. Each expresses a certain set of social relations, values and principles. The conclusion of this thesis, therefore, hence is not to identify the world order as "responsible" for some crime against humanity. Rather it demonstrates the *contradiction between modern discourse and social practices, represented, more or less, by the modern world order, and the traditional discourse and social practices that structured life in Egypt until the turn of the nineteenth century*. The modernization process ended not only the traditional forms of politics, economics and ideology, but also, and perhaps more importantly, imposed a unique route for change; that of modernity. As this route was in contradiction with the basic premises of Egyptian society, its pattern of change became distorted. Civil society presents a perfect example of this distortion. Traditional political life was clearly hierarchical and mostly despotic. Yet, it had its own mechanism of representation, such as that posed by the Ulama in cities and the Shaykhs in rural areas. This does not suggest that representation was "democratic". It only means that politics were articulated with social and economic organization at large. Whether
these forms would have developed into a more "emancipatory" forms is something we will never know in so far as modernization prevented these forms from autodevelopment. As modern representation did not emerge with the transplantation of modern forms of politics, for the reasons this research has identified, civil society in Egypt has become distorted.

The incorporation of the fundamental historical contradictions between modernization and traditional discourse and social practices into the analysis lead to two important "spill overs": one concerns democratization, the other concerns islamic revivalism.

The first spill-over is to reject the view according to which representative democracy is a universal, neutral, and ultimately inevitable form of governance. This perception leads to a "formal" approach to democratization, in which the establishment of democratic "forms" of government means democratization. From this perspective, the creation of the institutions of civil society, as well as the call for regular elections, entails the arrival of democracy. The Egyptian experience from 1974 until now, however, proves that this formal approach is fallacious. The societal foundation of democracy, in its institutional, economic, and ideological dimensions is a condition *sine qua non* for understanding democratization. Thus, in our view, the study of democratization cannot move beyond mere description if it fails to incorporate in its theoretical framework the contradictions between modern and traditional discourse and social practice.

The second "spill over" of this thesis concerns islamic revivalism. The introduction of modernity-based analysis is a necessary condition for
a better understanding of this phenomenon. The focus on the deterioration of socio-economic conditions and of living standards, and on the lack of dynamic education, or simply on the specificity of Islam, all fail to provide a convincing explanation for this phenomenon. These approaches do not explain, for example, why revivalism is concentrated in institutions of higher education, especially in those of the natural sciences such as medicine, physics, engineering. They also fail to explain the trans-class nature of the supporters of revivalism. Finally, they fail to explain why revivalism has risen in this specific time/space configuration if its origin is merely the specificity of the Islamic religion. We think that "putting the modernity into" the analysis promises of a much better understanding of these phenomena.
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