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BUREAUCRACY'S ROLE IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA:
THE EXPERIENCE OF BENDEL STATE

By

John Besiru Idode, B.Sc., M.P.A., M.A.

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Carleton University
OTTAWA, Ontario
Canada
July, 1979
The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies acceptance of the thesis
"Bureaucracy's Role In Rural Development in Nigeria: The Experience of Bendel State"

submitted by John Idode, M.A., M.P.A.,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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September 1979
ABSTRACT

Not infrequently, the development plans of many African countries have emphasized the importance of rural development and in particular agricultural development. But in practice, there is a great discrepancy between the promulgated goals of development and the actual results of implementation efforts. In their development efforts, these countries have generally favoured the urban as against the rural areas. Even in their minimal efforts at rural development, most of these countries have emphasized the role of the public bureaucracy and down-played the potentials of mass participation. This approach, coupled with the capitalist development which many of them pursue, has brought about little actual rural development, despite the official pronouncements.

It is argued that because of their colonial legacies and the historical class content of the bureaucracies of many African countries, they are not likely to be the principal agents for the achievement of meaningful rural development. In instances where mass participation has been relegated in favour of bureaucratic involvement, we showed that effective rural development did not occur. Our study of the agricultural development, the co-operative movement, and the self-help movement of Bendel State of Nigeria leads us to the conclusion that administrative reforms and the strengthening of the capacities of the public bureaucracy alone will not bring about improved rural income, equitable distribution of the output of the economy, improvement in rural life and thus effective rural development.

Only bold and decisive action by the political leadership, resulting in the shift of emphasis from urban to rural development, a national ideology capable of mobilizing the people for mass participation, mass education and mass involvement in the planning and execution of development projects, and a radical restructuring of the socio-economic set-up will provide the propelling force for effective rural development. These conditions are clearly beyond the bureaucracy to provide. In the presence of the right type of political leadership, the bureaucracy will be induced to provide the technical advice needed for effective rural development.
To my parents,
who taught me the importance of personal effort and hard work.

To Felly,
who ably took care of the kids for the years this work was in making.

To the memory of Idoye,
who was denied his father's comfort in his losing fight against death.

To Qmoarşêqêxovha, Anamiqkhai, Emile and Idenôbe,
who were deprived of adequate fatherly care and love for too many years.
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including the provision of shelter, food and transportation during my field research in Nigeria.

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While I remain greatly indebted to the individuals and institutions mentioned above, any errors or omissions that may exist in this study are not theirs. They are entirely mine, and I accept full responsibility for them.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA: Agricultural Assistant
ADO: Assistant District Officer
AG: Action Group
AO: Agricultural Officer
CDD: Community Development Division
CI: Co-operative Inspector
DO: District Officer
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GNP: Gross National Product
IRDP: Integrated Rural Development Programme
LGI: Local Government Inspector
NISER: Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research
PMP: Produce Marketing Board
RDO: Rural Development Organizer
SLG: Secretary to Local Government
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the development policies of many African countries have shown increasing emphasis on the agricultural sector and rural development generally. In East Africa alone, Tanzania's *ujamaa vijiini*, Kenya's special rural development programme, and Zambia's independent development zones, point to the new emphasis. In West Africa, the Third Nigerian National Development Plan, 1975-80, also ranks rural development high in its policy objectives. According to the Plan,

"...it is necessary to recognise that about 70 per cent of the Nigerian population live in the rural areas and have benefited relatively little from the rapid economic growth of the past few years. The improvement in the welfare of the average Nigerian will therefore require a substantial increase in rural income. Accordingly, in the allocation of scarce resources in the course of plan implementation priority will be given to programmes and projects directly benefiting the rural population, particularly projects to increase the income of small holder farmers and to improve the economic and social infrastructure in the rural areas. (Underlining mine)."

There is, therefore, reason to believe that the question of how to accelerate expansion in the agricultural sector and how best to improve welfare for the masses of the people in the rural areas is now the focus of considerable attention. But a great disparity exists between the promulgated goals of development and the actual results of implementation efforts.

The arguments for giving increased attention to rural development in Africa are powerful and widely accepted. Robert Chambers identifies four main reasons: First, and most obviously, the majority, and usually the overwhelming majority, of the people live and find their livelihoods in the rural areas. Second, the drift to the towns (rural-urban migration) is a matter of concern, because of the increasing rate of urban unemployment, housing problems, increasing crime rates and other attendant social evils. Third, it is in the rural areas that most of the poorer and most disadvantaged people are to be found. Fourth, there is a cluster of now orthodox economic arguments for giving priority to rural, and particularly, agricultural development. These reasons include the production of raw materials for industrial

purposes, the feeding of growing population,¹ and the productivity of capital²—the expected return of invested capital in agricultural production.

A government which accepts these arguments has many choices of strategies for improving rural life, but in the final analysis, the choice generally came down to one of three basic strategies: individual capitalism, macro-socialism and micro-socialism.³

By individual capitalism, we mean a continuation of the colonial practice of encouraging the "progressive" (capitalist) farmers to expand their productive capacity. This increase is expected to result from the profit-maximizing calculations of individual farmers, and the role of the government in the process is restricted to providing infrastructure, marketing facilities and sometimes freehold rights in land.⁴ For the co-

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1. Ibid., pp.12-13. Although Chambers's study is restricted to East Africa, these reasons could be said to apply to most African countries.

2. For elucidation of this concept, see Bruce F. Johnson and Peter Kilby, Agricultural and Structural Transformation, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975). This study applies to developing countries.


4. Ibid., p.379.
ordination of agricultural production, the basic devices are the impersonal laws of the market operating on a whole host of independent individual producers.¹

The "macro-socialist" strategy rests on the premise that the state must "own" the means of production, for state ownership abrogates private property and is, therefore, "socialist". In practice, this strategy supports the existence of state farms or state-managed settlement schemes, where agricultural production is organised according to a national development plan and not according to the capitalist criteria of profit maximization.² Under this strategy, which is also referred to as "state capitalism", all the crucial decisions are taken at the national level by the ruling class of the central state or their representatives in the production units.

The "micro-socialist" approach looks at the problem beyond the mere ownership of the means of production and deals with what the relations between producers are to be like in the rural sector. The strategy aims to bring


² Quick, op.cit., p.380.
producers together and give them effective control over the process of production through a democratic system of group decision-making. Producer-managed farming co-operatives are the main institutions used by this strategy, and while the state is still expected to have some role in co-ordinating economic activity, its power does not extend all the way to the co-operatives themselves.1

Most African countries eventually adopt a mixture of these strategies, but generally, one received most support and attention from the ruling class. However, in their attempt to bring about socio-economic development in the rural areas, most African countries spotlight the public bureaucracy as the engine of change. The role of the bureaucrats in the planning and execution of development efforts is heavily relied upon and the contribution of the people themselves is generally played down. Much emphasis is placed on improving the performance of the public bureaucracy.

The administrative reform exercises embarked upon by numerous African states since the 1960s express the desire of the ruling regimes to make their

1. Ibid.
public bureaucracies "development-oriented". In these countries, a development-oriented bureaucracy is one considered to be capable of bearing the major responsibility for promoting economic and social change. But judging by the prevailing realities in most of these states, it does not appear that the administrative reform exercises have produced the desired results. Development has turned out to be a much more complicated problem than had been thought. In the beginning, it was thought that the solution lay in merely transplanting the administrative techniques and knowhow that were thought to have been the key to progress for most of the Western world, accompanied by enough technical aid to allow these vital techniques to take root in their new environment. However, the transplants have not worked. If we have learnt nothing else about the development process, we have learnt that development cannot be exported. It is a process of change that must be sustained by the government and the people within each country; a process that should work to the benefit of all.

This study is concerned with the political and administrative dilemmas associated with the process of bringing about socio-economic change in the rural area of Bendel State of Nigeria through the public bureaucracy. The study seeks to answer the following questions:

Can the public bureaucracy be a vital instrument for development? What role does the bureaucracy play in the process of development? How adequately does it perform this role? If an efficient bureaucracy is necessary for purposes of rural development, is it the main ingredient? To what extent do the rural masses participate in the process of their own development?

An argument basic to this study is that the prior development of the rural areas (where a majority of the people live) is central to the development of Bendel State of Nigeria, and indeed the entire country. Since the 1960s, a widely accepted theory has been that by adopting the superstructure of a technological society, a "developing" country could be modernized and the benefits would "trickle down" to the community. In practice, this form of "development" has left a majority of the people as poor as before and their
basic needs unmet. Current adaptations of Western development strategies in African countries lack the dynamic capacity to link national development with rural transformation because the sectors given priority in investment allocation are those which emphasize aggregate GNP growth rates as the key indicator of economic progress. This encourages the promotion of projects that bias resource allocation and income distribution in favour of foreign investors and the affluent few, including the political and administrative ruling class, and favour the urban at the expense of the rural areas. Abour 70 per cent of the people of Bendel State live in the rural areas. Therefore, it is argued, meaningful or effective development must be directed at the rural population.

3. These figures are the 1977 estimate obtained from direct inquiry in the Ministry of Economic Development, (Statistics Division), Benin City, in June, 1978.
4. Spotlighting the development gap in Nigeria as a whole, Olatunbosun writes: "The total percentage of expenditure in the rural sector represents only about 20 per cent of the government total expenditure between
However, in the light of the centrality of administrative reforms and the public bureaucracy in the development efforts of African countries, this study focuses on the reform of the public bureaucracy and the role it has played in the process of rural development. The central hypothesis we test is the conventional view that the bureaucracy can be the principal agent for effective rural development. The contrary stand is that other factors are more important. One vital factor is mass participation, which enables the people to participate fully in activities intended for their own development. Our own view is that the bureaucratic approach to rural development, apart from inhibiting mass participation, is a means of distributing resources in favour of the affluent few and does not serve the real interests of the rural people who form the overwhelming majority of the population. If development is to be meaningful and benefit a vast

majority of the people, then the full and effective participation of the people themselves is a necessary and vital criterion. Undue dependence on the bureaucrats is not the solution to rural development; it is part of the problem.

We have so far outlined the argument which will be explored throughout this thesis. We must also discuss the methodology used in the thesis. The case study approach is used. We are aware of some of the methodological problems associated with this particular approach. It is often thought of as a kind of intuitive approach, derived from much participant observation and using all sorts of documents such as diaries, letters, files, autobiographies and so on, without adequate sampling design or check on bias. Thus, the case study approach has been accused of being "unsophisticated". It is true that much case study research has failed to follow good sampling design and has often come to conclusions with no explicit description of the operations which led to such conclusions. Nevertheless, this is true for most social research. Other problems associated with the case study approach are: empirical orientation, focusing on
narrow areas, and making generalizations based on the study of one area.

Despite these problems, the case study approach has its own advantages. A student using the approach will ordinarily not be able to generalise safely from one or small number of cases, but it is often true that the depth of insight afforded by the study will yield fruitful hypotheses for testing in later studies. The case study approach also cuts research expenses by focusing on a small area for study and permits a much deeper probing into social reality. More important to this thesis, however, is that, although the study of a case does not permit firm generalizations based only on that case, a single case can disprove a generalization if the findings go against it. We hope to disprove in this thesis, the frequently stated generalization that in "developing" countries, the public bureaucracy can be the key agent for effective rural development.¹

1. The theoretical arguments on this assertion are treated in chapter two. Of particular interest here is Chambers's study, op.cit., of East Africa which sees the lack of official will on the part of the bureaucrats, and the strengthening of administrative capacities, as the main problems hindering rural development.
In this thesis, we will use materials from Bendel State of Nigeria to test this central hypothesis that the bureaucracy can be the principal agent for effective rural development. The decision to focus on Bendel State is based on three considerations. First, for a country as large as Nigeria, so culturally and historically diverse, and with no completely uniform pattern of rural development, a study based on the whole country would be unwieldy and incoherent. Second, concentration on Bendel State alone has permitted much more detailed research, which has undoubtedly added to the quality of the study. Thirdly, being a native of the state and having participated in its administration for several years, the author has been exposed to the problems of rural development there and also was placed in a position to get access to valuable documents relating to the topic. Apart from the fact that examples will be drawn freely from other states in Nigeria, broad Federal Government policies, as they affect rural development will also come under treatment. Although a lot of historical evidence will be drawn from the Nigerian political and administrative scenes since 1914
(the year the Southern and Northern Protectorates were amalgamated into one country now called Nigeria), Bendel State was not created until 1963. The study, therefore, will focus mainly on the period between 1963 and 1978.

In order to test the central hypothesis that the bureaucracy can be the principal agent for effective rural development, we will examine the measures (administrative reforms) taken to strengthen the capacity of the bureaucracy, and the performance of the improved bureaucracy in the areas of agricultural development, and co-operative and self-help movements:

(i) **Administrative Reforms.** The improvement of the capacities of the bureaucracy to be able to serve as the principal agent for effective rural development is attempted through administrative reforms. To test the central hypothesis, it will be argued that, rather than increase efficiency and effectiveness in rural development, administrative reforms in Bendel State have largely resulted in more centralization and bureaucratization, the consequent impotence of local government institutions, and hence little actual rural development.
(ii) **Agricultural Development:** Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy of Bendel State, and a majority of the people who live in the rural areas find their means of livelihood in agriculture. Thus, in order to promote rural development, agricultural development is a *sine qua non.* The sole bureaucratic organization for purposes of agricultural development is the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. So as to further test the central hypothesis that the bureaucracy can be the principal agent for effective rural development, a subhypothesis is submitted: The role of the bureaucracy in agricultural development has improved peasant agriculture in Bendel State.

(iii) **Co-operative and Self-Help Movements:** We have noted that the emphasis of this study is on rural development. Co-operatives and self-help movements are vital areas of rural development efforts in which the rural people have demonstrated their potentials for mass participation. To further test the central hypothesis, we will demonstrate that abundant local human resources exist in the rural areas of Bendel State, as shown by the activities of the co-operatives and self-
help movement, and consider how the bureaucratic approach to rural development affects the utility of these resources. We propose to gauge the bureaucracy's role from studies of the activities of the Co-operatives Division of Bendel's Ministry of Trade, Industries and Co-operatives, and the Community Development Division of the Ministry of Local Government.

This dissertation embodies the following structural framework. Chapter two presents an overview of the theoretical issues relating to the role of the bureaucracy in rural development. The review treats the concepts of bureaucracy and development, the relationship between the two concepts, and the historical role of the bureaucracy in the new states of Africa which were once under colonial rule. Chapter three gives a general historical survey of Nigeria, with particular reference to Bendel State. The common historical evolution of the Nigerian state, the yawning urban-rural development gap, and the characteristics of rural life as well as the problems of rural development are treated.

Chapters four and five deal with administrative reforms. They examine some of the attempts which have been made to reform the Bendel State bureaucracy and the
Nigerian bureaucracy in general, and thus, improve their capacities to shoulder the burden of development. Chapter four treats central and field administrative reforms, while chapter five is concerned with the reform of local administration. In chapters six and seven, we see how the reformed bureaucracy treated the question of agricultural development. The chapters argue that the peasant farmers did not receive the benefits of the agricultural policies implemented by the bureaucrats, and that these benefits went to the progressive farmers. Chapter six takes on the question of bringing about rural development through the establishment of agricultural settlements/projects. Farm settlements, school leavers' farms and community farms are covered. In chapter seven, the contribution of agricultural extension and state mechanized farms to rural development is critically assessed.

Chapters eight and nine discuss instances (the co-operative and self-help movements) in which the local people have united to pursue development activities beneficial to their community. It is argued, in these chapters, that the role of the bureaucracy has not been very beneficial to the encouragement of local
initiative and participation. Chapter eight treats the co-operative movement, while chapter nine is concerned with the self-help movement. Chapter ten is the conclusion to the study. It summarises the major findings and expresses some thoughts on possible solutions.
CHAPTER TWO

BUREAUCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

The introductory chapter underscored the centrality of the public bureaucracy as the principal means by which the rulers of many African States hope to bring about rapid socio-economic development in the rural areas. This chapter sets out to define the two key concepts in this study, namely, bureaucracy and development, and to trace the relationship between them. In doing so, we will undertake an overview of some of the extensive literature on the concepts. The chapter will also discuss the historical role of the bureaucracy in the colonial and post-colonial states and argue that because of the class position of the bureaucracy, it is not likely to represent the true interests of the rural masses and become the best means for effective rural development. Rather than continue to embark on the strengthening of administrative capacities, on the assumption that an efficient bureaucracy per se would bring about effective rural development, we would argue in this chapter, and the rest of the thesis, that an approach to rural development which reserves a larger
role for the people themselves in the process of their
development is more likely to penetrate the rural
areas.

One may wonder, at this stage, why we have decided
to dwell extensively on a discussion of the major
concepts involved in the thesis. Since the amount
of literature on these concepts is extensive, it is
only by overviewing some of the major contributions
can we arrive at our own meaning of the concepts.
Also, the theoretical overview is necessary because
without a proper understanding of the concepts
involved, we would not be in a position to proceed
with the task of proving or disproving the central
hypothesis that the bureaucracy can be the principal
agent for effective rural development.

On Bureaucracy:

Having noted the extensive nature of the literature
on bureaucracy, it is only possible to review some of the
most important works. One of the leading discussants
of the concept of bureaucracy is Max Weber.¹

¹. His most important works are, The Theory of Social
and Economic Organization, Translated by A.M.
Henderson and Talcott Parsons, (New York: The Free
Press, 1964 Edn.); and From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology, Translated by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright
Weber's conceptualization of bureaucracy is based on his political sociology which rests on the theory of domination. He distinguishes three principles of legitimation - each corresponding to a certain type of apparatus - which define three pure types of domination. Under traditional domination, legitimacy is claimed and believed in on the basis of the sanctity of the order and the attendant powers of controls as they have been handed down from the past. Under charismatic domination, the charismatic leader justifies his domination by his extraordinary capacities and deeds. Legal domination is exercised on the basis of the rightness of law. The people obey the laws because they believe that these rules are enacted by a proper procedure. Power is exercised by virtue of and within the limits set by legally sanctioned rules.\(^1\) Although a specific form of administrative apparatus is linked with each form of domination, bureaucracy is generally referred to as the form of administrative apparatus corresponding to the legal type of domination. Here, bureaucracy in its ideal form, has the following characteristics:\(^2\)

2. For a detailed discussion of these characteristics, see Max Weber (1958), *op.cit.*, pp.196-224.
(i) clear cut division of labour and a high degree of specialization; (ii) offices are hierarchically organised; this hierarchical authority structure is coupled with limited ideas of command and responsibility; (iii) operations are governed by abstract rules and regulations; duties, procedures and organizational relations are clearly set out in these rules; (iv) formalistic impersonality is followed in the conduct of official duties; this amounts to equal treatment of all clients; and (v) recruitment of officials is on the basis of ability and technical qualifications; the service constitutes a career and officials are paid a salary, in money, in return for their services. Weber believed that an administrative apparatus structured along these lines is more likely to promote efficiency in the achievement of desired ends.

One of the limitations of bureaucracy specified above is that the tasks to be performed must be clearly defined and routine - they must be predictable. It is precisely a lack of predictability, however, that is characteristic of development tasks. Weber saw the
bureaucracy as a machine in which all personal contingencies were eliminated. But Weber wrote about an ideal type bureaucracy - a conceptual construction of certain empirical elements into a logical and consistent form, a form which, in its ideal purity, is never to be found in concrete reality. As Mouzelis puts it:

...for Weber, the ideal type is a conceptual tool which helps us to understand better social phenomena, by analyzing the discrepancy between their ideal form and their concrete state.1

Weber's bureaucracy and the political sociology which gives birth to it could be more useful in understanding a society at the macro level - it could be used in the study of all sorts of societies, ranging from the traditional, through the charismatic to the legal types. In trying to use the model to understand intra-organizational relations, however, problems are encountered, because the hierarchical pathologies, the impersonal attitudes, and the rigid rules and regulations

do not give us a useful insight into organizational reality. Thus, one can safely conclude that bureaucratic organizations do not fully realise the requirements of the ideal type.

In their relations in concrete bureaucratic organizations, bureaucrats develop irrational behaviours of their own, such as adherence to rules and hierarchies even if such adherence stands in the way of achieving the larger goals of the organization. While the requirements of the ideal type cannot be realised in concrete reality, it is necessary to note the way in which irrational behaviour originates in public bureaucracies. For example, by undue adherence to rules and hierarchies, public bureaucracies develop irrationalities which are dysfunctional to development. This point is well made by Schaffer in respect of Third World countries:

Yet, the unhappy paradox remains that the bureaucratic style and the administrator so expensive and so unsuitable for the

ex-colonial states in process of development, are highly respected by them as a result of their colonial heritage.1

Conscious of the pitfalls of the concept of bureaucracy, a student of modern organizations has observed that the concept, at least in the manner formulated by Weber, does not seem adequate for the empirical and detailed investigation of concrete organizations. Moreover, as there is no way to judge which of the many modern uses of the concept is more appropriate, its further utilisation could only bring more confusion and ambiguity.2 The suggested solution to this terminological difficulty is to use bureaucracy as Weber did, that is only as an extreme type useful for broad historical comparisons, and for all other purposes to employ the term 'organization'.3

But this compromise solution is not shared by some scholars as we shall find out later.

Michel Crozier4 is another contributor to the concept of bureaucracy. According to Crozier,

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3. Ibid., p.54.
bureaucratic organizations are organizations which cannot learn from their past mistakes. By bureaucratic phenomenon, he refers to the maladaptations, the inadequacies, or the "dysfunctions" which necessarily develop within human organizations.1 Bureaucracy is here used to refer to the slowness, the ponderousness, the routine, the complications of procedures, and the maladapted responses of bureaucratic organizations to the needs which they should satisfy, and the frustrations which their members, clients, or subjects consequently endure.

Based on a study of two French organizations, Crozier tried to show that professional training and distortions alone cannot explain the rise of routine behaviour and dysfunctional vicious circles. The role of various bureaucratic systems, he argues, appears to depend on the pattern of power relations between groups and individuals.

Comparing the competing claim of the different individuals and groups within an organization, one can state that, in the long run, power will tend to be closely related to the kind of uncertainty upon which depends the life of the organization.¹

Crozier's findings led him to the view that bureaucratic structures form a necessary protection against the risks inherent in collective action, since he believes that systems of protection are built around basic cultural traits. The author then presents a French bureaucratic model based on centralization, strata isolation and individual effervescence. Crozier concludes that bureaucracy is not a modern disease resulting from organization progress but rather a bulwark against change.

In his own contribution to the continuing debate on the meaning of bureaucracy, Martin Albrow² reviewed the various uses of the concept and broadly categorized them into seven. According to him, bureaucracy is seen as (i) rational organization, (ii) organizational inefficiency, (iii) rule by officials, (iv) public administration, (v) administration by officials, (vi) the organization and (vii) modern society.³

1. Ibid., p.164.
3. Ibid., pp.84-105.
Albrow's contribution is not intended to reconcile the differing opinions on the concept. He seems to concede the fact that there is no agreement among scholars on what bureaucracy precisely means.

Several alternatives and modes present themselves. If one wished to highlight the fragmentation of the literature, it would be sufficient to present concepts of bureaucracy according to the disciplinary affiliation of the authors. Historians, political scientists, economists, management scientists, sociologists and social psychologists have, in general, preferred to discuss differing concepts of bureaucracy within their own discipline rather than to seek for similar concepts in other disciplines.¹

The above discussion has shown the confusion and uncertainty in the way bureaucracy is used in modern social theory. In the light of this controversy, we, on our part, would refer to bureaucracy as the civil service organization and its methods of operation. By the civil service, we mean the array of administrative and professional staff employed, on permanent and pensionable basis to established posts, by the State to advise on and carry out its policies. The group includes the Permanent Secretaries (Deputy Ministers) and their chain of assistants, ranging from the Deputy Permanent Secretaries to the office messenger.

¹ Ibid., pp. 84-85.
However, in this study, special attention will be paid to Nigerian officials occupying positions in Grade Level 08 and above because it is this group that is specially charged with the task of advising government and carrying out its policies. At the higher level of the hierarchy professional and administrative officials perform both administrative and political functions. They contribute to the initiation, formulation and execution of government policies. Bureaucracy will also be used interchangeably with public administration, especially when we refer to it as a means of realizing the goals of development.

Having reconciled the issues of bureaucracy, as we intend to use it in this study, we must now turn our attention to another key concept - development.

**On Development:**

Like bureaucracy, development is a problematic concept. There are as many views on the meaning of the concept as there are scholars. Put simply, development is a normative concept, almost a synonym for "improvement"; it is value loaded. Development has been used in many senses, including political, economic and social. In this study, however, we will be concerned with development in its socio-economic aspects. We will be concerned with the productive capacity of the economy and the appropriate social relations which facilitate the equitable distribution of economic benefits.
Some writers have seen economic development as the adoption of the Western model, which, it is argued, provides the countries of the Third World with the shortest road to economic progress.\textsuperscript{1} Although now largely discarded as ahistorical, the impact of this model on the development outlook of so many African countries can perhaps be fully appreciated if it is placed in the matrix of another theoretical perspective which assumes that economic development is tantamount to urban industrial growth and/or high statistical aggregate growth measured in terms of gross national product or income per capita. This approach also assumes that balanced growth is the most appropriate strategy for realizing the objectives of economic development.\textsuperscript{2} In practice, however,

\begin{enumerate}
  \item W.W. Rostow, \textit{The Stages of Economic Growth}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), is a leading proponent of this view.
  \item Albert O. Hirschmann, \textit{Strategy of Economic Growth}, (New Haven, 1958), pp. 50-75, gives an excellent analysis of the 'balanced growth' approach and the alternative strategy of 'unbalanced growth'.
\end{enumerate}
development, so conceived, leaves a large majority of the people very poor because the wealth produced through the process of economic growth is not proportionately distributed among the generality of the people. It is concentrated in a few hands. For example, Colin Leys noted that while the Kenyan economy expanded during 1963-69 at an average annual rate of 6.3 per cent in real terms, with an increase of 75 per cent in the share of the monetary sector, there was virtually no change in the structure - the share of manufacturing, agriculture and trade remained exactly as before.¹

In Ghana, the highest salary received by civil servants in 1966 was calculated to be 20 times that of the GNP per capita.² In 1965, about 20,000 rich planters owned nearly three quarters of the land, employed two thirds of the paid workers and had an average income of


around 400,000 francs in Ivory Coast. All these examples indicate "growth without development".

In search of a more acceptable definition of development, some students have directed attention to the conditions of human beings rather than the building of nations. Dudley Seers gives a clue as to what to look for in a country's development:

What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have become less severe, then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems has been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result "development", even if per capita income had soared.2

Thus, economic development must refer to both the qualitative improvements in the general standard of living of the whole population, and to structural changes in the distributive input and output systems of the economy. The utility of this approach to development lies in its rejection of per capita income and gross national product as the only indicators for measuring development. The determination of a complex socio-economic phenomenon like

development by means of statistical indices may lead to very superficial or even false results. The calculation of this statistical index is particularly difficult in most countries of the Third World as it comes up against almost insuperable difficulties in the assessment and evaluation of the output of the traditional subsistence sector and often there are only unreliable census data at hand.¹ Suffice it to say that the use of such indices is bound to result in arbitrary subjectivism.

Samir Amin sees socio-economic development in terms of a self-centred system and a peripheral system. Development is equated to "a fundamental difference between capital accumulation and ... economic and social development characteristic of a self centred system and that of a peripheral system."² This difference is both fundamental and crucial. Amin illustrates the difference between the two systems in the following diagram:³

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3. Ibid., p.10.
Samir Amin explains that sectors 2 and 4 of the diagram represent the main features of the advanced (self-centred) economy, while sectors 1 and 3 represent the features of the underdeveloped (peripheral) economy of Third World countries. The former economy is developed, the latter is not.

One essential ingredient of this diagram is that it presents the main characteristics which are responsible for the underdeveloped nature of the peripheral economy. The economy produces not for domestic consumption, but for export, and its products are mainly primary goods. In addition, the mass consumption of luxury goods (which it does not produce anyway, but imports from the self-centred economy), reinforces its dependence on the developed economy. Samir Amin's presentation is also important because it enables us to introduce the concept of class analysis to explain the behaviour of the peripheral economy. For example, its amazing capacity for luxury goods consumption is solely to satisfy the high taste of the ruling class.
One may ask, at this stage, why the peripheral economy came into being. The peripheral economy is a product of the demand imposed on it from the outside - the supply of primary products. The consumption pattern which followed on this development of an export economy was principally consumer-oriented and generated by import-substitution industrialization. Instead of promoting the importation of intermediate and producer goods which would have been beneficial to the peripheral economy, the importation of consumer goods to meet the high taste of the ruling class is promoted. Moreover, industries are not oriented to tap the vast natural resources in some of the peripheral countries, instead, they rely heavily on imported raw materials and machinery. This process of industrialization consolidates rather than undermines dependence on foreign suppliers, since production, as well as consumption, now depend on foreign imports and tailored to meet the needs of the ruling class. "Development" in this sense,  

means production for the rich few. It left the majority of the population out of the stream of development, so conceived, and without the means of subsistence.¹

Having dealt with the complex issue of development, we should now select our definition of the concept. Development will be used in this work to mean,

a change process characterized by increasing productivity, equalization in the distribution of the social product and the emergence of indigenous institutions whose relations with the outside world, and particularly with the developed centres of international economy, are characterized by equality rather than dependence and subordination.²

Similarly, by rural development, we mean the restructuring of the economy in order to satisfy the material needs and aspirations of the rural masses, and to promote individual and collective incentives to participate in the process of development. This involves a host of multi-sectoral activities, including the improvement of agriculture, the promotion of rural industries, the creation of the requisite infrastructure and social overheads, as well as the establishment of appropriate decentralized structures in order to allow mass participation.³

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1. Ibid.
Rural development in Africa has been the subject of a large amount of published literature, especially since the "development decade". Some of these studies deserve our overview.

In his study of Tanzania, James Finucane focuses upon attempts by the government to introduce a form of "development administration" in one rural area. Primarily concerned with popular participation, Finucane argues that in spite of public pronouncements to the contrary, and conscious efforts to create a more community-oriented administration, the central bureaucracy continues to dominate rural policy-related decision-making. The idea in Tanzania has been to encourage the people to become intimately involved with, and to participate in, local development projects. TANU's stated objective was to build an egalitarian society. The Arusha Declaration and the TANU Guidelines or Mwongozo were the means through which the government hoped to achieve increased popular participation in development. In reality, however, Finucane finds that administrators have continued to impose themselves

in rural decision-making situations much as they had in colonial times. As Finucane observes,

... during the time of this study, there was no sign that this 'political education', as it is called in Tanzania, was achieving this objective. From the innumerable actions of officials whom I observed, it could be concluded that the approach of the bureaucracy was in no way different from that of the colonial officials in the 1950s.¹

The government's solution was to introduce Regional and Area Commissioners as checks on bureaucratic excesses. But this failed because the Commissioners lacked sufficient powers of sanction to control civil servants, and most of the time of the Commissioners was spent in exhorting peasants to support central policies. Finucane argues that the dissatisfaction with bureaucratic domination led to the introduction, during 1972-73, of a more areal and prefectoral form of administration with emphasis on party membership of local development committees. The author suggests that even this will not improve conditions much, and is reminiscent of the district-team approach of the colonial era. He concludes that although these measures

... go a long way in removing difficulties derived from too much centralization ... they do not attack the basic structure of bureaucratization and its colonial logic.²

1. Ibid., p.62.
2. Ibid., p.186.
Finucane's argument is that more and better bureaucracy is not the solution to the problem. But unfortunately, he does not suggest a clear alternative. This study will complement Finucane's and adopt the participative stand, but we propose to go beyond him and venture some thoughts on an alternative solution.

Another study worthy of mention is Robert Chambers's study of the problems of managing rural development in East Africa.¹ Chambers's purpose is to propose a prescription aimed at correcting the shortcomings of those policies which exacerbate rural inequalities. He contends that this elusive goal can be achieved by devising more effective management procedures; too much attention is devoted to the planning function in rural development and not enough to programming and implementation procedures. He advocates central planning, but says that this must be coupled with improvements in the amount of discretion and flexibility possessed by field officers. Although Chambers discusses popular participation, he does not consider it essential, because much of it is rhetoric instead of reality.² Participation by the local people in planning will also

2. Ibid., pp.84-113.
widen regional inequalities. Moreover, participation in planning is equally likely to mean "plans drawn up either by civil servants or by civil servants together with a few members of the local elite."  

According to Chambers, increased efficiency of the field staff is the basic answer to the alleviation of rural inequalities. Chambers's principal mechanism for achieving this goal is the Programming and Implementation Management (PIM) System used for Kenya's special rural development programme. The system involves a simplified model of Management By Objectives (MBO) and includes the initial setting of a programming exercise by central planners and field administrators, several stages of co-ordination and free exchange of ideas. The co-ordination stages are followed by an action report - a document which identifies and communicates the responsibilities of everyone involved in the project.

The studies by Finucane and Chambers are interesting and provocative, with rich insight into rural development in East Africa. Apart from the fact that Finucane does not offer any clear alternative, his study does not show a true appreciation of the factors which influence.

1. Ibid., p.108.
2. Ibid., p.109.
political and economic policy-making in the system he studied. For example, one would like to know why there has been so much controversy over the full implementation of the *mwongozo* (TANU GUIDELINES). Factors which could explain this and many other aspects of Tanzanian decision-making process are of a class conflict nature.\(^1\) Finucane does not consider these factors. In the same manner, had Chambers not focused upon organizational structures and behaviour alone, he might have recognized potential difficulties (over and above the lack of official will) which are likely to be encountered should the PIM system be attempted beyond the experimental stages. Moreover, Chambers's absolute confidence in the bureaucratic approach obliterates the vast potentials of mass participation in the task of development.

These are the main East African studies. We now turn to consider some studies on rural development in West Africa. Nigeria is the centre of our attention. Since 1966, when Onitiri\(^2\) drew attention to the relative neglect of the

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problems of rural development by both policy makers and academic social scientists, the literature¹ on rural development in Nigeria has been impressive. The main works deserve a brief overview.

Dupe Olatunbosun's volume² is an indictment of both the colonial and independent governments not only for neglecting the majority who live in the rural areas, but also for "milking them dry" for the benefit of the British metropolis and the urban minority in Nigeria. Nigeria's development financing has been derived mainly from direct and indirect taxation of rural people who have benefited little or nothing from economic development activities.³ The author argues for a radical change in priorities and in attitudes towards the rural sector, as an economic and social necessity. There is need for improved social amenities, emphasis on agriculture and increased income and agro-based industries in the rural areas of the country. Towards this end, Olatunbosun


2. Olatunbosun (1975), op.cit.

draws up an integrated rural development strategy which, he hopes, would help to link the rural farm with the rural non-farm sub-sectors. But his elaborate prescription rests on political and administrative will:

We need a strong dedicated leadership with a sense of internal direction; a leadership that is committed to rural welfare and backed by informed and articulated public support. It is to such a leadership, and indeed to all those who are to assist this leadership in formulating and implementing a conscious, sustained and co-ordinated rural programme, that I now leave the other half of this battle in the fight against rural neglect and decay.¹

Regrettably, the author does not discuss the political and administrative fuel of rural development. This study will try to do this.

The commercialization of agriculture is the theme of Martin Igbozurike's work.² The author argues that Nigeria's agricultural problems can be meaningfully studied only within the framework of a critical analysis of her overall economic development and underdevelopment - problems derived basically from the country's distorted economic structures inherent in her history and in the interaction with the contemporary world economic and political systems. He notes that this statement is in

1. Ibid., p.4.
2. Igbozurike, op.cit.
contradistinction to other theoretical positions which suggest that Nigeria's agricultural problems stem mostly from traditionalism, resistance to change, and use of outmoded techniques. Igbozurike asserts that while some of these charges and claims may be partly true, they are based not on empirical findings about the Nigerian farmer but on Western-biased extrapolations from anthropological works which are themselves of questionable validity. In addition to the commercialization of agriculture, the other problem-generating structure discussed is rural-urban relations. On the basis of elaborate field data analysis, Igbozurike suggests that the Nigerian planners and policy-makers should work consciously to change the content of our agriculture in such a way as to take care of the subsistence needs of the people. Gradual agro-industrialization and co-operatives based on kinship institutions are the other reforms advocated by the writer. On our part, we would express some doubt whether co-operatives formed on the basis of kinship institutions, and not on the basis of a definite political ideology, will sustain the great strains of development as we have defined it in this study. Like Olatumbosun's work, Igbozurike's study does not examine the political

1. Ibid., p.13.
2. Ibid., p.126.
and administrative dilemmas associated with the problems of rural development. We seek to fill this gap.

So far, we have carried out a theoretical overview of the two main concepts in this study. At this stage, it is appropriate to deal with the relevance of bureaucracy, as we have seen it, to the problems of development, as we have defined it.

Bureaucracy Versus Development:

The study of public administration in the new States of Africa, and indeed most of the Third World countries, has emphasized the developmental role of the bureaucracy. Two basic theoretical approaches command attention in the literature. One is a social theory, emphasizing the underdeveloped nature of society as a determinant of and brake on administrative performance. The other is an organizational theory, emphasizing institutional development, especially administrative reforms. The social theory, school (or "ecological" approach) views the

constraints to development in the form of a catalogue of phenomena that themselves need to be explained. Not infrequently, one reads that political instability, corruption, lack of trained manpower, lack of institutionalized administrative process and the absence of a "market" economy are the major obstacles to development. In his major work,¹ Riggs sees administration in these countries as characterized by the "sala model," "poly-communalism," the "bazaar-canteen model" and "poly-normativism". In the way in which these characteristics are discussed in the book, they merely describe what "is". It is not explained why these characteristics exist.

The forcible imposition of a foreign culture upon a traditional one, the effects of the slave trade, the consequent devastating effects of the dual nature of the economies of these states with their distorted structures, the unequal nature of international trade, the continuing effects of colonial legacies and the potent forces of neo-colonialism, do not form part of Rigg's analysis. Yet, no useful explanation of the constraints on development in these new States can ignore these historical factors. The literature on public administration in the Third World countries conspicuously ignores historical

1. Riggs (1964), op.cit.
factors. It cannot, therefore, satisfactorily answer the problems of development in these countries.

The institutional development school ("development administration" approach), points to the need to evolve new, more appropriate ways of conducting administration in situations of "underdevelopment" which are usually characterized by rising expectations, limited organizational capabilities, and severe shortage of resources required by public administration. A fundamental issue of this school is whether the classical bureaucratic model is the most appropriate type of public organization for contemporary new States hoping to use the administrative arm of government as a primary instrument for initiating and guiding the processes of development. ¹ The approach seeks ways of improving the performance of public administrative structures and personnel through reforms, training and the injection of new administrative technologies.

The inference one draws is that "development administration" is a means by which public administration in Third World countries could be equipped to ably shoulder the strains of development. But then, the proponents of "development administration" are not agreed

on the meaning of their concept. For example, Riggs
gives two definitions: First, development administration
refers to the administration of development programmes,
to the methods used by large scale organizations, notably,
government, to implement policies and plans designed to
meet their developmental objectives. Second, develop-
ment administration involves the strengthening of
administrative capabilities.¹ Weidner had earlier seen
development administration as

the process of guiding an organization towards
the achievement of progressive political,
economic and social objectives that are
authoritatively determined in one manner or
another.²

The administrative capabilities definition of
development administration is adopted by Esman who
places much confidence on improved administrative
performance as the key solution to problems of social,
economic and political development. According to him,
in his study of the Malaysian administration,

... externally induced cultural transformation or
political change were out of the question;
strengthening the administrative apparatus appeared

1. Fred W. Riggs, ed., The Frontiers of Development
   Administration, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1971),
   p.6.

2. Edward Weidner, "Development Administration: A New
   Focus for Research, in Ferrel Heady and Sybil L.
   Stokes, eds., Papers In Comparative Public Administra-
   tion, (Michigan: Institute of Public Administration,
to be feasible and to offer early and assured return in governmental effectiveness; attention to participative institutions ... was secondary in time and importance and would not be feasible until the capacity of the administrative system to guide change process was greatly strengthened. 1

Development administration puts all the emphasis on the strengthening of administrative capabilities and neglects the utility of politics in the process of development. Even in the overt confusion surrounding their concept, the proponents of development administration sacrifice politics on the altar of administration. This is very clear in the definition of Weidner cited above. If, according to Riggs, development administration is concerned with the administration of development and the development of administration, the concept (development administration) becomes a misnomer because public administration everywhere is concerned with these issues.

Perhaps, development administration was not really intended to serve the purpose of development in the new States to which it was addressed; it was an ideological crusade, disguised in the name of development. The ideological basis of the Comparative Administration Group of the American Social Science Research Council is ably demonstrated by Loveman, who sees the process as

capable of bringing about antidevelopment.¹ The strict emphasis on administration which Loveman finds to be the focus of American academic literature on development administration² is not accidental. The point is not that American writers have failed to distinguish between politics and administration. It is rather that they have frequently compromised politics in the search of stability and order.³

The historical conditions in which the administrative approach to development gained ascendancy must be constantly borne in mind. It all started in the early sixties when the majority of the colonies were on the verge of independence. To keep communism away from the Third World states was the battle cry in the Western world when development administration came into vogue. Thus, the marriage between administration in 'developing' countries and American foreign policy is understandable.⁴

2. Ibid., p. 617.
4. Loveman, op.cit.
Emphasis was on supporting the status quo in the new states. Everything else was secondary; even the development of the new states themselves was. Thus, it is not surprising that the proponents of the concept of development administration are so confused.¹

We must now explore further the relationship between politics and administration, politics and development and administration and development.

According to Mannheim, we deal with administration when “current business is disposed of in accordance with existing rules and regulations”. On the other hand, we are in the realm of politics when envoys to foreign countries conclude treaties which were never made before; when parliamentary representatives carry through new measures of taxation; when an election campaign is waged; when certain opposition groups prepare a revolt or organise strikes — or when these are suppressed.²

Administration is "rationalised and ordered"; it is the realm of certitude — the contours of the land are already known, and only need to be traced to locate a

1. This confusion is reinforced by Dwight Waldo, "Scope of the Theory on Comparative Public Administration," in James C. Charlesworth, ed., Theory and Practice of Public Administration, Scope, Objectives and Methods, (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1968), Monograph 8, who confessed that: "I don't know what I mean by 'development' (p.23). He also agrees that development administration remained vague. (pp.23-24):

particular spot. Politics is the realm of "irrational forces"; it is a process the outcome of which cannot be determined until it comes to an end.\(^1\) While behaviour in administration is regularised, behaviour in politics cannot be regularised to the same degree. In politics, one should expect the unexpected; not so in administration.

We should accept the fact that the distinction between administration and politics is not clear-cut. Some aspects of politics are regularised and administration is itself not totally devoid of elements that may be political. A logical solution is to look at the two as being different points in a continuum.\(^2\) But to recognise the flexibility of this distinction is not to dismiss it; the distinction is very important both conceptually and for ideological purposes.

Decisions in a community are made through the political process. Participating in this process are social classes or fractions of classes. The process is characterized by struggle which is sometimes acute.

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1. Ibid., p.115.
2. See Peter Self, Administrative Theories and Politics, (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1973).
and violent. Each class or fraction wants to gain ascendency over the others. Where one has gained complete hegemony over others and is able to hold this position, the political process becomes largely administration. The ascendant class or fraction simply proceeds to implement its programme. So, the degree to which any ruling class alters what programme it wishes to implement would be a reflection of the strength of forces working against it.

But before we proceed with our argument about the relationship between politics and development, it is first necessary to settle the issue of social classes. What do we mean by social classes? The concept of social classes, although very crucial to Marxist theory, is not adequately treated by Marx himself.1

1. One explanation for this inadequacy is that Marx had just begun the discussion of classes in Volume III of Capital before the manuscript broke off. He thus has this to say on social classes: "The owners merely of labour power, owners of capital and land owners, whose respective sources of income are wages, profit and ground-rent, in other words wage labourers, capitalists, and labourers, constitute the three big classes of modern society based upon the capitalist mode of production." See Karl Marx, Capital, (Moscow: Foreign Language Press, 1972), Vol.III, pp.863-864.
Because of this inadequate treatment of the concept, different meanings have been given to social classes. For example, social classes have been seen as

the basic groupings of individuals in society, opposed to one another by virtue of the role they play in the production process, from the point of view of the relations they establish among themselves in the organization of labour and in respect of property.¹

Most of the discussion of social classes have tended to emphasize the economic criteria to the detriment of the political and ideological criteria. Because of the importance of political and ideological factors in the determination of social classes, Poulantzas prefers to define social classes as

"groups of social agents of men determined principally, but not exclusively, by their position in the production process, i.e. in the economic sphere."²

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Although the economic sphere is dominant, the political and ideological sphere are also necessary in the determination of social classes. Thus, while bureaucrats may not own the means of production, those of them who play political and ideological roles in the organization of labour and governmental activities are placed in a distinct class from those who do not occupy such positions. Based on their relationship to the means of production and their political and ideological positions, classes are divided broadly into two: the dominant (exploiting) class - bourgeoisie, and the dominated (exploited) class - proletariat and peasantry. We will return to this point later when we examine the historical role of the bureaucracy.

Having explained the concept of social classes, we should now proceed with a further exploration of the relationship between politics and development. Politics, like development and unlike administration, is based on struggle. Development occurs when individuals or societies confront their problems and
attempt to solve them and become able to control their environment. Through struggle some social classes gain ascendancy over others. Without it individuals or societies cannot adequately respond to their environments; without it they cannot solve their social, economic and political problems. Development occurs in an attempt to solve conflict between social classes or between a society and its environment. Politics is the process of solving this conflict. It now becomes clearer why politics and development are inseparable.

If we accept the above argument, we can see why it would be futile to expect to bring about development by using the public bureaucracy. Thus, it is emphasized once more that administrative reforms (development administration) themselves cannot guarantee a development role for the public bureaucracy. Indeed, many administrative
reforms in Africa have not been successful. The experience of Kenya (the Ndegwa Commission) and Nigeria (the Udoji Public Service Review Commission) readily comes to mind. In fact, the poor record of administrative reforms in Africa recently drew the comments of a student of public administration who notes that "development-oriented" bureaucracies have eluded Africa because of the absence of a combination of three variables: (i) strong political will, (ii) committed bureaucracy, and (iii) permanent administrative reform machinery. It is not easy to understand why Adamolekun insists on talking about development-oriented bureaucracy when he favourably mentions, among others, China and Tanzania, and when it is obvious that the most important of his three variables is the political. This point is even more relevant when it is noted that two decades of improving administrative capability in Third World states have not brought about development.2

1. Adamolekun, op.cit.

It has been argued that present-day African bureaucracies still carry colonial legacies. These legacies make the bureaucracies antidevelopmental.\(^1\) As Nellis notes in answer to the developmental role of the Kenyan bureaucracy,

> If one means by development the provision of a basic security in which the market mechanism is allowed to work without great hindrance, then the Kenyan bureaucracy would ... rank high. If by development one means efforts at income distribution and the provision of participatory mechanisms for the citizenry, the present Kenyan setup ranks considerably lower.\(^2\)

Colonially-inspired bureaucracies, such as those described above, which were originally designed for the maintenance of law and order, and which have not changed for the better since independence, have not proved to be adequate in realising the administrative needs of rural development.

The following reasons are generally given for the inappropriateness of our bureaucracies in stimulating rural development. Firstly, since centralization is generally emphasized, the best men aspire to be at the centre where decision-making powers reside and higher salaries and better conditions of service are obtained.

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\(^1\) See Schaffer, *op.cit.*

Secondly, bureaucracy appears to be inadequately structured for encouraging and supporting innovative peasant farming patterns. Thirdly, problems arise from the bureaucracy's distorted information flow pattern. Peasant farmers are not consulted on major decisions in such areas as pricing and marketing. Fourthly, the bureaucracy is rarely effective in gaining the support and co-operation of "the people" for its programmes. Rural development in Africa is chronically short of materials and "mobilizing" capacity. One would expect the co-operation of the local people for the achievement of administrative goals which are intended to be in their interest to be a natural process. But the bureaucracy seems to inculcate in the people a feeling that what the administration is trying to do is peculiarly the work of the bureaucracy; people develop a dependency syndrome. Fifthly, the exclusion of the "clients" from the organizational structure leads to the view that failure is caused by the failings of the clients.

1. Victor Thompson, Bureaucracy and Innovation, (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1969) is a notable exponent of the uninnovative nature of public bureaucracy. As applied to a developing country, see Taub, op.cit.

themselves.¹ The blame is usually chiefly accredited to the actions of the clients - they are too traditional, too lazy, drink too much, or some such rationale is given.

Some of these explanations are relevant to the problems of rural development in Africa. They must, however, be considered secondary. With the right type of strong political will, they can easily be remedied by drastic reforms. But the prime explanation for the problems of bureaucracy in rural development in Africa ought to be sought in the historical class content shaping Nigerian and other African bureaucracies.

The Historical Role of the Bureaucracy:

It is becoming increasingly recognised that only through the historical approach and the analysis of colonialism in particular, can one begin to understand the issues of development in the underdeveloped parts of the world.² The historical context in which the Western bureaucracy was introduced into the Third World

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is our principal concern.

Bureaucracy was introduced into the Third World under colonialism. Colonialism, by its very nature, was essentially an administrative process. In Africa, for example, the blacks were seen as too immature to participate in the complicated affairs of politics. Therefore, their affairs were looked after through "essentially administrative apparatus."1 Any local political institutions were for white settlers or local representatives of European trading firms. In all cases, whether of direct or indirect rule, political power lay with the District Officer, Commissioner or Resident. In effect, 'civilization' was to be administered to the colonised. No conflict was seen or allowed to develop between the economy of the colonial territory and that of the metropole. By this token some of the fundamental issues in any society were settled for the colonised by the coloniser. The coloniser would gain access to raw material and cheap labour. The colonised would gain economic 'development' and 'civilization'. Hence, when administrative structures were created, they were simply to facilitate the maintenance of law and

1. Brett, op.cit., p.66.
order, and for collecting taxes and generally to service the economy. They facilitated the business of the foreign firms. The economic exploitation of colonies had the establishment of administrative structures in these territories as one of its sine qua non.

Apart from their obvious role as mechanisms of domination and exploitation, the administrative structures were also an apparatus through which the ideology of the coloniser was transferred to the colonised. Brett had argued that in Britain, ideology exists and operates in institutions. So does it in every society, including the colonial societies where political, economic and social institutions promoted the colonial ideology. The colonised, who made their way into these institutions, were thus indoctrinated into the world view of the colonial master. They came to accept the status quo. The bureaucracy and the bureaucrats were products of these institutions.


In order to fully appreciate the role of the bureaucracy in the new States of Africa, it is pertinent to discuss the theory of the post-colonial state. A central theoretical basis for the understanding of the post-colonial state was put forward by Alavi,¹ who talks of the 'over-developed' post-colonial state. According to him, the post-colonial state was not internally evolved. A foreign dominant-class-acquired a particular territory as a colony and subjugated its indigenous classes or other social formation. Alavi's argument is that because the colonial state did not have the support of any of the indigenous social classes, the 'superstructure' of the colonial state can be said to be 'over-developed':

It might be said that the 'superstructure' in the colony is therefore 'over-developed' in relation to the 'structure' in the colony, for its basis lies in the metropolitan structure itself, from which it is later separated at the time of independence. The colonial state is therefore equipped with a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus and mechanisms of government which enable it through its routine operations to subordinate the native social classes. The post-colonial

society inherits that over-developed apparatus of state and its institutionalized practices through which the operations of the indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled.\footnote{Ibid., p.61.}

Even at independence, the position has not changed much. It is only the direct control of the colonial state by the metropolitan class that has ended. The influence of the metropolitan class over the state is by no means brought to an end.

Alavi does not see the post-colonial state as an instrument of a single class.

\footnote{Ibid., p.61.}

It is relatively autonomous and it mediates between the competing interests of the three propertised classes, namely the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie, and the landed classes.\footnote{Ibid., p.61.}

The economic role of the post-colonial state, with the military-bureaucratic oligarchies playing major parts (as has been the case in Nigeria since 1966) is also important in Alavi's scheme. The State in the post-colonial society directly appropriates a very large part of the economic surpluses and deploys it in bureaucratically directed economic activity in the name of promoting economic development.\footnote{Ibid., p.61.}

John Saul\footnote{John Saul, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania," Socialist Register, 1974, pp.349-372.} has demonstrated the applicability of
Alavi's theory of the 'over-developed' post-colonial State in his study of Tanzania. Saul generally agreed with the idea of the overdeveloped post-colonial state, but says that overdevelopment was not so much in response to the need to 'subordinate the native social classes' as a need to subordinate pre-capitalist, generally non-feudal, social formations to the imperatives of colonial capitalism.

Towing the line of Alavi, Saul concedes that the State in Tanzania is relatively autonomous because of its central economic role.

In his own contribution to the theory of the post-colonial state, Colin Leys\textsuperscript{1} observes that the concept of overdeveloped state has no clear meaning. Driving his point home, Leys argues that the concept is misleading if it means that the coercive apparatus of the post-colonial state is "weightier or more rarified"\textsuperscript{2} than it would have been had not the colonial State been an imposition of the foreign bourgeoisie. Leys concludes that even if it were true that the colonial state apparatus was more powerful militarily and administratively than it would have needed to be, this does not

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., p. 41.
mean that the force at its disposal would necessarily be excessive for the tasks of domination in the situation which existed by the time formal independence was achieved. By that time, the capitalist mode of production had been introduced, and made effectively dominant.¹ In consequence, Leys sees little evidence to necessitate the conception of the post colonial state as having overdeveloped bureaucratic-military apparatus.

Leys seems to have missed the main thrust of Alavi’s concept which does not refer to the structure of the State. The clarification is made by Langdon who recently stressed that one should view the ‘overdevelopment’ of the post colonial state with reference to the functions it performs in society which (function) is one of “a particularly wide range…”² What is important for our purpose here is to note the political and economic consequences of colonialism which are essentially the same for most post colonial societies.

Thus, to arrive at any theory of the post-colonial state, one has to pay much attention to the consequences

1. Ibid.
of colonialism (a) for the economy of the colonial state and (b) for the nature of social classes that evolve from it. Alavi hardly paid any attention to the first point. As a result, his view of the social classes seems rather mechanistic. He does not explain why it is automatic that the 'post-colonial state inherits' the structures of the colonial state at independence.

The consequences of colonialism for the economy of the post-colonial state have been touched upon here and there in the preceding discussion and need not detain us here. Suffice it only to mention that they included the incorporation of Africa and other colonised regions into the world capitalist system, the evolution of an export-oriented and luxury goods consumption economy, the alienation of African land and pauperisation of the peasantry, taxation and forced labour. Colin Leys has well documented this process for Kenya.2


One vital question which remains to be answered is whether there are classes in Africa. Because of the deceptive nature of Africa's pre-capitalist social structure, it has been argued by African nationalists\(^1\) that African societies are "classless" and that class analysis has no validity for the study of African politics.\(^2\) This argument is contested by other scholars\(^3\) who state that the extent of social differentiation in Africa is considerable. It is present in some form or another in nearly all traditional societies;\(^4\) it was modified and assumed new forms as a result of foreign incursion, and it is seen clearly in the social and economic distinctions of the post-colonial state.\(^5\)

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1. Leopold Sengor of Senegal is a leading proponent of this view.
4. In his study of Ugandan politics, Mahmood Mamdani has shown that even in the traditional Bugandan societies, classes existed. See his *Politics And Class Formation in Uganda*, (London: Heinemann, 1976), especially chapter 2.
Classes exist in any society where there is a mode of production and the type of classes is determined by the existing mode of production in a society. We do not have, as of now in Africa, the classical types of class divisions into bourgeoisie and proletariat with the "middle class" on the indeterminate fringes as was the case in Europe. Europe and Africa have had different socio-economic formations. Classes in Africa are still in the process of formation. Shivji's work on Tanzania has been one of the most rigorous analyses of the evolving class structure in Africa. His broad categories include the metropolitan bourgeoisie (foreign capital), "commercial bourgeoisie" (Asian), the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" (the ruling sector of the African petty bourgeoisie), kulak (rich farmers), workers and peasants.

Using their access to state structure to advantage, leaders of the independence movement fully graduated into the petty bourgeoisie. The stamp of colonialism

1. Shivji, op.cit.
2. Ibid., pp.44-54.
is visible in all the African social classes. The petty bourgeois ruling class is heavily concentrated in those institutions of the State which the metropolitan bourgeoisie relied on to effect the exploitation of the colonial societies - the bureaucracy (which collected taxes, kept records and executed decrees) and the military (which maintained stability). It was into these apparatuses that Africans were admitted, though only to the lower echelons. It is because the petty bourgeois class in the post-colonial state is concentrated (though not confined) in these apparatuses that Alavi writes of the disproportionate powers of the 'bureaucratic-military oligarchy' or that Shivji writes of the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' in Tanzania.

We will argue that there is no need to designate any oligarchy or 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' because the military and the bureaucracy are different fractions of the petty bourgeoisie and this latter class extends beyond these two institutions. Members of the class are to be found in political parties and the commercial sector. Despite these difficulties, a rudimentary class structure will be used, where necessary, to give direction to our discussion. This structure
revolves around the metropolitan bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, workers and peasants. The earlier two classes are the exploiting classes; the latter two are the exploited classes. African societies are essentially class societies because they display a fundamental cleavage between the great majority of people who own little or nothing beyond their labour power, and the small class who either own and/or effectively control the means of production.¹ In Africa, much of the exploitation is done not by individual capitalists, but by the state acting as a powerful entrepreneur, establishing businesses, hiring wage labour, and extracting surplus value from its subjects. Many of those who exploit the workers and peasants do not themselves own the means of production, but they control the power of the state which is used to control the means of production and to carry out exploitation. These characteristics constitute what Ake calls a 'statist economy'.²

The focus of attention is the petty bourgeois class. It is this class that actively manipulates the statist

2. Ibid., pp.1-4.
economy for the greater benefit of themselves. Politics is reduced to a struggle between the various fractions of this class, for the control of the state apparatus. What has been happening in Nigeria since 1966 is a reflection of this inter-class conflict. Since then, the military fraction of the class has gained ascendancy over the other fractions. Apart from diverting scarce resources into unproductive investment and thereby retarding development, the large security spending reinforces the dependence of the peripheral economy on the self-centred economy. By this process of dependence, scarce foreign exchange reserves are used in the purchase of military equipment and ammunition produced by the advanced economy. Little or nothing is available for solving the real problems of the nation — large scale poverty and rural stagnation. Most capital projects are concentrated in the urban areas, where members of the ruling class live. The relationship between the bureaucratic fraction of the class and the Nigerian political economy is one of exploitation; not direct, but mediated by the State. The bureaucracy inherited the constellation of economic and material privileges previously associated with colonial officials — high pay,
state-subsidised housing and transportation, free medical care, part-paid holidays, huge pension, the security of tenure and the prestige of segregated public facilities. The four salary review panels and the three public service review commissions since Nigeria's independence in 1960 are supportive of some of these views.

The main thrust of this argument is that the bureaucrats and a majority of the rural dwellers belong to different social classes and that their interests are not identical. Measures to fully involve the rural people in their own development and to aim at an equitable distribution of the national output are not seriously considered by the ruling class. Since independence, the petty bourgeois class has virtually succeeded in depoliticizing both the workers and peasants.\(^2\) Having rendered the masses

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1. \text{Some of these panels and commissions are discussed extensively in Chapter Four.}
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2. \text{Ake, op.cit., discusses the process of depolitization in detail.}
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irrelevant except as payers of tribute, the process thereby excludes the possibility of mobilizing them and releasing their energies for development. This is perhaps the greatest setback to development: the fact that circumstances do not permit the tapping of the most valuable resources of the country, the energy of its people. All the talk about mobilization of the peasantry and of primary emphasis on the development of the rural areas, "where most of our people live" leads nowhere. Not because the leaders have no interest in rural development. Indeed, this study opened by noting the shift of emphasis to rural development in many African countries. Nor is it entirely because of shortage of capital, lack of technology and the conservatism of the peasants.

It is mainly because the wrong approach is adopted in solving the problems of rural development. Instead of tapping the vast resources which the full and effective participation of the people would have provided, the ruling class neglect these resources in favour of the bureaucrats' input. The mobilizational approach to rural development would recognize the people as worthy partners in the development process. Where they become a part of the decision-making process, they would be committed
towards ensuring that such decisions are fully executed. The mobilizational approach would also enable the government to easily elicit the support of the people on rural development efforts. Moreover, where the people's participation yield fruitful results, they would be encouraged to contribute more to ensure the further success of their collective endeavour. Effective mobilization of the people would entail public, political and co-operative education. It would also require the radical restructuring of the socio-economic set-up to encourage mass participation. These actions would enlighten the people and intensify the class conflict.

Successful mobilizational approach to rural development would, therefore, threaten the political base of the ruling class. Thus, the mass participation of the people is downplayed and the role of the bureaucrats is highlighted. But this particular approach leads to rural development of a certain kind - minimal improvement in rural life and the implementation of policies which benefit the petty bourgeois class in the rural areas.

It is, therefore, clear that the choice of the bureaucrats, rather than the mass of the people, to play the principal role in rural development is not accidental. It is deliberate. Our discussion has shown that the bureaucracy
in the new states of Africa, is conducive to the development of capitalism, a development which does not benefit the overwhelming majority of the people.

Conclusion:

In order to lay a sound theoretical foundation for the testing of the central hypothesis that the bureaucracy can be the principal agent for effective rural development, we have, in this chapter, overviewed some of the leading concepts of "bureaucracy" and assigned a particular meaning to the concept. We have also examined many concepts of "development" and focused on rural development as we intend to use it in the study. The burning issue of whether the public bureaucracy can bring about rural development was examined. Given some of the constraints which African bureaucracies inherited from their colonial past, and given the historical class content of these bureaucracies, we have argued that mass mobilizational approach to rural development is more likely to yield better results for the rural areas. However, rather than embark on effective and full participation of the people in their own development, the governments of the new African states put much
emphasis on strengthening the bureaucracy for purposes of rural development. The strategy for the strengthening of administrative capabilities is administrative reforms. But before we deal with administrative reforms, let us first present some background information on Nigeria, in support of our selected case study.
CHAPTER THREE

NIGERIA: THE BACKGROUND

In chapter one, we explained the adoption of the case study approach in this study and why we selected Bendel State of Nigeria as the unit of analysis. But Bendel State is only one of Nigeria's present nineteen states. In order to provide appropriate background information for the understanding of our selected unit of analysis, this chapter will present the historical evolution of the Nigerian state. It will also dwell, in some detail, on the characteristics of rural Bendel state. It is hoped that this information will put us in a better position to test the central hypothesis that the bureaucracy can be the principal agent of effective rural development.

History:

Nigeria is a creation of British colonialism. Before 1914, when the Northern and Southern Protectorates and the Colony of Lagos were amalgamated into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria,¹ the geographical area now called

¹. See F.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1923) for details of the amalgamation.
Nigeria was composed of numerous kingdoms, emirates and city states, each of which was completely independent of the other. For example, the Kanem-Bornu empire, the Hausa-Fulani emirates, the Oyo, Ile-Ife and Bini kingdoms and the city states of Igboland, each had the status of a sovereign state. The head of each of these sovereign states had the power of life and death, conducted war and contracted peace treaties. They also engaged in international diplomacy with remarkable skill and ingenuity.¹

What is today known as Bendel State was a part of the Bini kingdom whose first contact with Europeans was in 1472 when Portuguese traders visited the Bight of Benin. By 1553, the Portuguese had opened a prosperous trade link with the Binis from whom they bought pepper and ivory.² This pattern of trade was soon

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replaced with a more prosperous type of trade: trade in human beings. The Portuguese and the Spaniards started to buy slaves, first to meet the need of labour at home and second to open up the mines and plantations of the "New World" (The Americas). Thus, for about three hundred years, the slave trade devastated the west coast of Africa, by the large-scale export of human cargo.

The discovery of the river Niger in 1788 and the fight against slavery opened a new chapter in Euro-African trade. Merchant companies came to the limelight, as the British assumed a direct role of conquering, colonising and "civilizing" the native peoples of Nigeria. The Royal Niger Company was the first to emerge in the merchant business. By 1870, the company had established effective control of the trade and local administration of many parts of the coast and some hinterland kingdoms. In 1900, the company's charter was

1. Ibid., p.92.

revoked and its territory in the north were consolidated and named the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. In the Niger Delta of the south, the Oil Rivers Protectorate was established in 1885. The Protectorate was further extended inland and renamed the Niger Coast Protectorate in 1893. When this territory passed to the control of the British colonial office in 1900, it was amalgamated in 1906 with Lagos Colony to form the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. It was the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates, as we have noted, that gave birth to Nigeria in 1914.

The colonial state, as we have seen above, was imposed by the British ruling class to protect its imperial interests against rivalry from other European national capitals. Until competition from other European national capitals (Portuguese, Spaniards and Germans) forced its hand, the British state was content to secure the interests of its ruling class, within what later became Nigeria, through informal arrangements with British national capitalists. The Royal Niger Company played an important role in subjugating the Nigerian

pre-capitalist social formation to foreign capitalist interest by the monopolisation of trade and commerce, establishment of plantations, employment of wage labour, control of local administration, and encouragement of peasants to produce cash crops which the company bought at cheap prices for marketing at huge profits in Europe.¹

Having established effective colonial domination over Nigeria, the British proceeded to mould the country along its own image. With the appointment of Lord Lugard as the first Governor-General, he set up a Legislative Council in 1922 to form the basis of future Westminster model of parliamentary democracy. The Richard Constitution of 1946 provided for a central legislature for the whole of Nigeria and three Regional Houses of Assembly (North, East and West) with only advisory legislative powers. Increased regional autonomy came with the Macpherson Constitution of 1952 which extended to Nigerians a fuller share in shaping policy and in the direction of executive government action. Ministers with limited responsibility were appointed at both the central

¹ Ikime, op. cit., elucidated on the activities of the Royal Niger Company.
and regional levels. However, a truly federal system of government was not introduced in Nigeria until the 1954 constitution was promulgated. The new constitution granted full autonomy to the three regions while, at the same time, retaining federal authority over matters (railway, harbours and banking) of common interests to the regions. The unitary Nigerian civil service was also broken up into four civil services (one each for the Federal, Northern, Eastern and Western Governments). In 1957, the Eastern and Western Regions formerly attained the status of self-government; the Northern Region became self-governing in 1959.

The Post-Colonial State:

The pattern of development in the post-colonial state in Nigeria was not going to be significantly different from that of the colonial state as Nigeria attained her independence from Britain on October 1, 1960. Bi-camera legislatures, which were established at both the regional and federal levels of government in 1954, were retained. At the federal level, the Prime Minister remained the head of government while the Governor-General represented the Queen at head of state.
The regional governments were headed by Premiers and the Governor played the ceremonial role of head of state. This structure remained until 1963 when Nigeria became a republic. The Governor-General was replaced by the President who assumed the role of head of state, and the Prime Minister continued to be the head of government. Also in 1963, the Midwest Region (later Bendel State) was created out of the then Western Region in August.

In January, 1966 however, the military intervened in Nigeria's politics. This intervention changed the structure of the state apparatus. A Military Governor was appointed for each of the Regions to perform the functions of the Premiers and Governors. The commander-in-chief of the armed forces assumed the title of Head of State (of the Federal Republic of Nigeria) in place of the Prime Minister and President. Legislatures, at both the federal and regional levels were abolished, and the new leaders ruled by decree. Ministers lost their positions; bureaucrats assumed enormous powers and responsibilities in both policy formulation and execution.

1. Because our emphasis here is on the evolution of the Nigerian State, detailed discussion of government at the grassroots level is reserved for chapter five.
The political crisis which followed the two military coups of 1966 (January and July) led to the creation of more states (regions)\(^1\) in 1967 to bring the total to twelve. In 1976, seven more states were created to boost the number to nineteen. (See map.) The former Midwest Region was renamed Bendel State.\(^2\)

So far, we have discussed the historical evolution of the Nigerian state and the political changes which have taken place in the post-colonial state. We should now turn our attention to the economy of the post-colonial state. The post-colonial state in Nigeria differs from the colonial state only in respect of its relative autonomy.\(^3\) Whereas the colonial state was

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1. Until 1967, the word "Region" was used to describe the autonomous political unit (within the Fédération of Nigeria) later called "State". It does not refer to the state at the federal level. In Canada, the word "Province" is used instead of state.

2. The word "Bendel" was coined from a combination of the first three letters in "Benin" and "Delta" which were the two administrative provinces that were grouped as the Midwest Region in 1963. Today, Bendel State covers an area of 39,737 square kilometres and has a population of more than 2.5 million.

largely a direct instrument of the British metropolitan bourgeoisie, the post-colonial state mediates on the one hand between the interests of metropolitan bourgeoisie and the emerging national bourgeoisie and, on the other hand, between those of the latter classes and other classes of the Nigerian social formation. As one of the means of mediating between the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the emerging Nigerian national bourgeoisie, the post-colonial state in Nigeria retained the domination of the national economy by multinational corporations. At the same time, the state allows the emerging Nigerian national bourgeoisie to play a comprador role in the national economy. Thus the emerging national bourgeoisie undertakes a manipulative role in

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Claude Ake notes that although the Nigerian indigenization decree attempted to put selected businesses in Nigerian hands, the decree does not bring under Nigerian control the really big enterprises and multinational corporations which dominate the economy. For example, large companies which include Whiteheads, (a Lonrho subsidiary), Unilever, Tate and Lyle, Turner and Newall, John Holt, (another Lonrho subsidiary), Barclays Bank, Standard Bank, G.B. Ollivant, United Trading Company, K. Chellarans etc., do not only dominate the economy, they are also profitable. In 1974, the United African Company made a profit of 22 million pound sterling. See Claude Ake, Revolutionary Pressures in Africa, (London: Zed Press, 1978), p.48.
that it serves as a clearing house for the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Since it does not own the vital means of production and distribution, it acts as an intermediary between the owners (foreign capital) of these means, on the one hand, and the workers and consumers on the other. In the process of performing this role, the emerging national bourgeoisie receives economic benefits by sharing a part of the surplus accumulated. The indigenization decree was thus designed to enable the state to regulate relations between foreign and indigenous capitalism within the neo-colonial economy.¹

The post-colonial state's mediation between Nigerian indigenous classes is done through the adoption of the "ideology of development" and "mixed economy" mentality. Successive Nigerian national development plans since independence have emphasized economic growth as a means of achieving an egalitarian society. Thus, indigenous capitalism is deliberately encouraged.²

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2. Sayre P. Schatz, *Nigerian Capitalism*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), calls the Nigerian pattern of using state funds to deliberately strengthen the otherwise weak indigenous capitalist class "nurture capitalism."
But to appease the masses, the state executes projects here and there. This approach, however, does not seem to have helped the state push significantly towards the creation of an egalitarian society. In the post-colonial state's role of enhancing capitalism, it becomes an indispensable mechanism by which the bourgeoisie evolves, out of certain strata of what was, under the colonial state, the petty bourgeoisie. Therefore, the post-colonial state is no less an instrument for expanding and consolidating the horizon of capitalist production than was the colonial state.

Aside from the fact that the economic policies of the colonial and post-colonial states concentrated emphasis on achieving economic "development" through the promotion of capitalist production, the policies also neglected the rural areas in favour of urban areas.

There exists a striking similarity between the colonial policy that exploited the resources of the colonial territory to develop the metropolis and the Nigerian national policy that now exploits the resources of the countryside to develop the urban cities.¹

The nature of rural life in Nigeria will now be examined in order to provide a firm foundation for the

¹. Olatunbosun (1975), *op.cit.*, p.69.
understanding of the problems of rural development and the urban-rural development gap.

Rural Life:

The word 'rural' could assume economic, sociological, ethnic and racial connotations. As used in this thesis, 'rural' is limited to spatial and occupational contexts and the degree of disaggregation of social services. Rural Nigeria is measured by a spatial index, indicating the percentage of population living in the rural areas, and by an occupational index which shows the percentage of the labour force in agricultural occupation. 1

It has not been possible to clearly identify which proportion of Nigeria's population of 55.6 million 2 (1963 census) is urban and which is rural. 3 The 1952


2. The census has always been a highly politicised issue in independent Nigeria. Three national head counts have been conducted since 1962 and none has been conclusive. The country in 1977 was estimated to have a population of about 70 million, but the 1963 figures of 55.6 million are still used for planning purposes, since they are less controversial.

census used 5,000 people or over to demarcate an urban area. In other words, where a town was populated by 5,000 people or over, it was called an urban area and where less than 5,000 people live in it, it was classified as a rural area. The size of the town was immaterial. But Nigeria's Second National Development Plan, 1970-74, estimated that about 20 per cent of the total population can be described as urban dwellers. To further compound the problem, the Bendel State Government designates all divisional headquarters as urban areas, irrespective of population! The 1963 census used towns with a population count of 20,000 and above to mark off urban centres and the remaining part was classified as rural areas.\(^1\) In this case, Nigeria's urban population, as estimated by the 1963 census, is 10.7 million or 19.3 per cent of the country's total population. Conversely, its rural population would be 44.9 million or 80.7 per cent of the total population.\(^2\) Bendel State, with a population of 2,536,000, recorded an urban population of 284,000 and a rural population of

1. Olatunbosun (1975), *op.cit.*, p.6
2,252,000. On this basis, the rural population, as a percentage of the total population in Bendel State, was 88.8 per cent in 1963.

In Nigeria, the individual homes are generally grouped into compact hamlets, quarters or villages. In the northern part of the country, there are some nomadic groups who graze their cattle from place to place according to the dictates of the weather. The dominant settlement form in Bendel State is the compact village, many of which are large with a population running into several thousands. The village head is called the 'chief'. He sits in Council with his lieutenants and is responsible for the good government of the village. One of the most important social institutions at the village level is the age grades. The grades, which are comprised of men only, are categorized into several sections, according to age and initiation time. Children below the age of 16 are not normally initiated into age grades. The main

1. In Nigeria, all villages are regarded as rural areas, but if a village grows to attain a population of 20,000, it is upgraded as an urban centre, in accordance with the 1963 population census.

2. For further discussion of age grades, see R.E. Bradbury, The Benin Kingdom and the Edo Speaking Peoples of South-Western Nigeria, (London: 1957). See also chapter nine for the role of age grades in the self-help movement.
physical assignments for the conduct of self-help projects rest with the age grades. Among the Etsako and Ishan people of Bendel State, the age grades impose certain sanctions, ranging from seizure of property to be returned upon the payment of a ransom to the denial of certain rights and privileges, on their own members who fail to turn up for development assignments without valid reasons. These sanctions are built into the socio-political lives of most of the people of Bendel State and other states in the southern part of Nigeria. The towns and villages in most parts of Nigeria are linked at the clan level under the clanhead, who is a superior chief. In Bendel State, the clanhead is called the Onogie, Obi, or Ovie.

The rural sector of the Nigerian population can be distinguished from the urban sector in terms of the volume of non-agricultural activity within the two sectors. Economic activity in the rural sector depends directly or indirectly on the exploitation of land. It centres principally around farming, animal husbandry, poultry, fishing, forestry, food processing and cottage industry. Agriculture is still the mainstay of the economy of the country, despite the oil revenue. In terms of export products, Bendel State supplies annually
about 85 per cent of Nigeria's rubber, 3.2 per cent of cocoa, 19 per cent of palm oil and kernel, 70 per cent of forest products, and cotton is produced on a small scale. Apart from cash crops, the people produce various food crops such as yams, cassava, rice, beans and maize. Fishery is widely practised among the Ijaw people of the riverine areas of the State. Poultry farming is also widespread. About 80 per cent of the working population of Bendel State are engaged in agriculture.¹

The shifting cultivation or rotational bush clearing system is still practised by the majority of the farmers in rural Nigeria, especially in Bendel State, and the Eastern States (Anambra, Imo, Rivers and Cross River). The system is characterized by a rotation of fields rather than of crops, by short periods of cropping, alternating with long fallow periods. The length of the resting period of any particular piece of land is governed by the amount of land available and the degree of restoration of fertility as indicated by the plants it supports. The farmers use simple tools such as hoes and cutlasses.

Some of the critical factors which affect the development of peasant agriculture in Nigeria, however, are rural labour shortage, poor prices for farmers' products and transportation bottlenecks. We will now briefly examine these factors. First, rural labour shortage. Before the advent of colonial rule, the extended family system played a significant role in the lives of the people. Unity was the guiding word. Members of the extended family lived together and worked together because that was how they understood life, and how they reinforced each other against the difficulties they had to contend with. The results of their joint effort were divided unequally between them, but on the basis of well understood customs, which ensured that every member of the family had enough to eat, adequate clothes to wear and assured shelter, before any of them had anything extra. The family members thought of themselves as one, and all their language and behaviour emphasized their unity. But colonialism brought in its train the Western mode of living. The extended family started to lose some of its advantages.

1. For examples of the existence of this extended family pattern in other African countries, see Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism, (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968).
People were taught to marry one wife, wage labour was introduced as a means of getting quick money to pay colonially imposed taxes and levies, the land became commercialised, private property replaced collective ownership, and educated Nigerians developed a deep taste for Western luxury goods. Capitalism became entrenched.

In consequence, the towns began to attract young men in large numbers since it was in the cities that better social services, and jobs, were to be found. The drift of the population to the cities had begun and so also the decline in rural labour. As the peasant farmer grew older, he was no longer able to work long hours; economic conditions forced many of them to marry few wives. The rural-urban migrants turned their attention against the need for labour in their departed homes. Some of the strategies to be examined in this thesis were intended to encourage the youth to return to the land: But, as we will find out, the strategies were not successful.

Apart from rural labour shortage, the peasants (especially cash crop producers) receive inadequate payment for their products. This is another critical factor affecting the development of peasant agriculture.
A chain of middlemen and monopolistic state marketing boards\(^1\) play exploitative roles in produce marketing in Nigeria. As Igbozurike puts it,

> the marketing boards have now become an instrument for widening the gap between the rich and the poor farmers, for appropriating the products of the farmer by the upper class and for taxing farmers and therefore causing disincentive to productivity.\(^2\)

In theory, the marketing boards were supposed to pay the farmers reasonable prices for their crops. The boards were to sell crops overseas and to keep a surplus for the improvement of agriculture and for paying the peasants a stable price if world market prices decline. In practice, however, the boards paid farmers persistently low rates during many years when world prices were rising. As Table 1 shows, the marketing boards, since 1948, have been paying the producers of cocoa, palm oil, palm kernel, and groundnut much below the world prices for these commodities. For example, the mean producer prices, as percentage of world prices for 1963-67, were 64.3 (cocoa), 44.4 (palm oil), 50.2 (palm kernel), and 67.8 (groundnut).

\(^1\) Marketing boards were controlled by the state governments until 1977, when commodity marketing boards (one for each commodity) controlled by the federal government, were created. But the monopolistic and exploitative tendencies in produce marketing remain.

\(^2\) Igbozurike, \textit{op.cit.}, p.24.
### TABLE 1

Nigeria: Producer Prices as Percentage of World Prices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cocoa</th>
<th>Palm Oil</th>
<th>Palm Kernel</th>
<th>Groundnut</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean 48-52</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean 53-57</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>64.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>59.5</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>56.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean 58-62</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>53.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>46.7</td>
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<td>64</td>
<td>62.5</td>
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<td>65</td>
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<td>66</td>
<td>47.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>54.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean 63-67</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>67.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Marketing boards buy only from licenced agents, to whom they ensure monopolistic profits. In this way, the state governments accumulate money at the expense of farmers and control the distribution of the
private profits derived from produce trading.\textsuperscript{1} For example, the Western Nigeria Marketing Board's accumulation of trading surpluses stood at N33.86 million in September, 1962, but by September, 1968, it had risen to N110.04 million. In addition, export duties on marketing board controlled products accounted for about 96 per cent of Nigeria's total export duties between 1964 and 1971.\textsuperscript{2}

A third factor detrimental to peasant agricultural development is transportation problem. The absence of good feeder roads in large areas of Nigeria has created problems for rural development. In Bendel State and many parts of southern Nigeria, the movement within rural areas are made on foot and by bicycle along foot paths and at best narrow roads. The distances of travel are relatively short, and carrying things on the head is still the traditional form of cargo transportation in many rural areas. Loads of about 30 to 50 kilograms can be transported to a distance of 16 kilometres or more to meet the road points where motor or bicycle transport are available. In the riverine areas, small water craft and


\textsuperscript{2} Olatunbosun-(1975), \textit{ibid.}, p.22.
canoes are used instead of lorries and motor cars. In
the northern part of the country, animal (horse and camel)
transportation is widely practised. In order to make
rural-rural and rural-urban mobility much easier and thus
facilitate the evacuation of produce as well as feed the
rural areas with essential commodities, there is a dire
need to improve the transportation system in rural
Nigeria.

As we have stated in chapter one, the rural
communities in Nigeria are neglected in the expenditure
of government funds even though they contribute about 50
per cent of government's revenue. Also, the preceding
discussion has shown how some of the mechanisms (for
example marketing boards) of extracting revenue from the
rural people work.¹ Yet, in the provision of social
services, the rural communities are not so favoured.
The inadequacy of rural services in Nigeria is discussed
below, with particular reference to Bendel State.

1. See V.P. Diejomaoh, "Rural Development in Nigeria:
The Role of Fiscal Policy," in Rural Development in
Nigeria, op. cit. Diejomaoh notes that rural
communities pay a large proportion of personal tax
revenues and contribute to state shares of import and
excise duties to the extent that they contribute to
the consumption of these items.
Good water supply is a problem which confronts many parts of Nigeria. Although the standard of rural water schemes in the southern part of the country has been relatively impressive, the problem of poor rural water supply has reached a crisis level in the north where wells and scattered rivers are relied upon. In Bendel State, the pipe-borne water supply schemes are aimed at providing an easier source of water than wells, streams and rivers, and at reducing the transmission of disease through unimproved source of water supply. Since 1963, the Bendel State government has spent considerable amount of money in water supply schemes in pursuance of its objective of extending pipe-borne water to every village in the state.¹ For example, in the 1977/78 fiscal year alone, the government budgeted the sum of ₦36.8 million for water supply.² The government's fiscal efforts have also been supplemented by the fund-raising activities of the rural communities through self-help. Through these concerted efforts, many rural communities have been provided with pipe-borne water, but many more communities, an overwhelming number of them, still remain without adequate water supply. The Water

¹ Midwestern State Government, Rural Electrification And Water Supply, (Benin City: Ministry of Home Affairs and Information, n.d.), p.16.
² Government of Bendel State of Nigeria, "1977/78 Budget Speech by His Excellency, Commodore Husaini Abdulahi,"
Board, the executive arm of the government in the translation of budgetary measures into concrete reality, has not been able to cope with the demands made on it. Inadequate release of budgeted funds, shortage of materials, and limited technical personnel are some of the difficulties faced by the Board.¹

In addition to adequate water supply, the provision of electricity in the rural areas of Nigeria is necessary in order to accelerate the rate of rural development. Rural electrification scheme will lead to the setting up of rural industries and promote better living conditions in the rural areas. Unfortunately, rural electrification has been undertaken at a slow pace in Nigeria. But a breakthrough has been made in Bendel State where plans to electrify all rural communities, during the 1970-74 Second National Development Plan, period commenced in 1972. For the 1972/73 financial year, the Bendel State government set aside the sum of ₦20,000 out of a total of ₦1,093,160 recommended for

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¹ Interviews with a top official of the Bendel State Water Board, Benin City, Wednesday June 7, 1978.
rural electrification projects. The whole scheme, during the plan period, was estimated to cost N7.4 million.\(^1\) Since 1972, the Rural Electrification Board (REB) has brought electricity to many villages and communities in the state. An overwhelming number of villages still remain without power supply, despite these pioneering efforts. One recurrent problem is that the completed REB projects are far from being efficient. They operate on a part-time basis - supplying power for only a few hours per day, particularly between 7 and 11 p.m. In addition, most of the generators are old and prone to breakdown. The staff usually complain of shortage of oil and other operating materials.\(^2\)

In the circumstances, rural industries cannot be promoted. During the current development plan period (1975-80), the government intends to expand REB facilities and thus improve its services. To this end, some of the existing functioning REB stations which fit into the National Electricity Power Authority (NEPA) grid are being


2. This was the consensus opinion of most of the REB field personnel to whom I talked at Ayogwiri, Uromi, Agbede, Afuze, Agenebode and Igbanke during my visits to these areas between March and May, 1978.
handed over to the NEPA. According to the policy, this will enable government to concentrate its resources in the more remote areas of the state. The REB stations at Igarra, Ole, Orerokpe, Kwale and Bomadi are being extended by constructing overhead networks to link neighbouring villages. Consequently, the old and small generators are being replaced with bigger and more powerful ones. Since the pioneering move by the government of Bendel State, some other state governments in Nigeria have established their own rural electrification schemes. It is hoped that in the near future, the rural areas of Nigeria will enjoy improved supply of electricity.

While adequate supply of pipe-borne water and the electrification of the rural areas will improve the nature of rural life, the availability of adequate health and medical services will further enhance the process of rural development in Nigeria. At present, health and medical services in rural Nigeria are certainly inadequate. Medical officers in the country are quite few in number and have frequently been responsible for very large areas. In 1971, the population per medical practitioner in

Nigeria was 23,000 to one, and with respect to the rural areas, it was about 30,000 to one.¹ Service in the rural areas does not attract most of the medical officers. Health centres and dispensaries are set up in most of the rural communities to serve the immediate needs of the localities. These medical posts are staffed by staff with limited training but are often called upon to perform usually difficult tasks for which they are inexperienced and unqualified to perform. These poor medical facilities enable the patent medicine dealers and quasi-chemists to deliver 'treatment' at prohibitive costs.

In 1963 (when Bendel State was created), there were 9 general hospitals with a bed capacity of 609 in the state. Urban health centres were 7. By September 1974, there were 24 general hospitals with 1,949 beds. Urban health centres numbered 11 and there were 163 maternity homes and 137 dispensaries. The number of dressing stations was 42 and the state government employed 78 doctors.² In March, 1978,


the number of operative general hospitals was 39.\textsuperscript{1} A majority of the diseases in rural Bendel State, and indeed in the entire country, are leprosy, malaria, cholera and other water-borne diseases. An adequate strategy for eliminating such diseases would have been a balanced combination of improvement in rural health services (good water supply, sanitation and health education) - preventive medicine - and improved medical services - curative medicine. Instead of this approach, the Bendel State government's policy places much emphasis on curative medicine. This has resulted in the building of many general hospitals which are inadequately staffed and poorly equipped. Although it was the specific objective of the Ministry of Health, during the 1970-74 plan period, to develop and expand the state's health and medical facilities, it is worthy of note that during the implementation of the plan, much less emphasis was given to the preventive measures than to health care both in capital outlay and physical achievement.\textsuperscript{2}


\textsuperscript{2} The implications of this policy are discussed in John B. Idode, Staff Development in the Civil Service of Midwestern Nigeria, Unpublished M.P.A. Thesis, University of Ife, Nigeria, 1975, Chapter VI.
Education is another social service which is equally capable of facilitating the process of rural development. Much of the education that has penetrated rural Nigeria, and Bendel State in particular, has been due to the activities of the early missionaries. While missionary activities were especially effective in the southern part of Nigeria, in the north, Islamic teaching attracted popular following. Most mission schools were of the primary type, though many mission and government secondary schools sprang up in many parts of rural Nigeria a few years following independence. In the past, government secondary schools had been located in the urban areas; only missionaries competed among themselves for the location of secondary schools in the rural areas. The contribution of the rural people, through self-help projects, has also helped to increase the number of secondary schools in the rural areas. The rural people, especially in the southern part of the country, build schools and turn them over to the government for operation.

There have been some impressive developments in the field of education in Bendel State since its creation. Although only a few educational institutions existed in the state in 1963, the number of institutions was
quite high in the first decade. By 1973, there were 1,707 educational institutions, 538,158 pupils and 18,148 teachers in the state.¹ These consisted of 1,556 primary schools with 474,159 pupils and 15,565 teachers; secondary schools, teacher training colleges and trade schools numbered 248; they admitted 62,969 students and employed 2,523 teachers. There was only one technical college (Auchi Polytechnic) with a student population of 634 and 26 teachers. An advanced teacher training college was at Abraka with 287 students and 26 teachers. The headmaster institute at Benin City had 111 students and 6 teachers.² Primary school education has been free in Bendel State since 1964, but the launching of the nation-wide Universal Primary Education (UPE) scheme in 1976 has helped to boost the number of primary schools in the state to 1,548 with 19,898 pupils and 676,373 pupils. The number of secondary schools rose to 147, with 95,330 students and 2,946 teachers in 1977.³

² Ibid.
It is true that the number of educational institutions during the years has been impressive, but there is still a lot to be done in the rural areas. Many pupils of secondary school age still go without secondary education because the number of schools available is not enough to admit the eligible pupils. Even many pupils in dire need of education still travel many miles from home to live in other towns where such schools are available. Rural secondary schools are also inadequately equipped and poorly staffed. Because of the existence of better social services - housing, transportation, health and medical facilities, water and electricity supply - in the urban areas, many qualified teachers still prefer to work in the urban instead of the rural areas. The schools board authorities also give preference to the urban schools in the provision of school equipment. These trends have not only resulted in better results from urban schools, but many students compete vigorously for the limited spaces in such urban schools.

Despite the improved educational facilities, rural Bendel State is still largely illiterate; the same is true of other parts of Nigeria. In 1973, the Institute
of Continuing Education, Benin City, decentralised its operation to all divisional headquarters. Underlying this scheme was the desire to provide opportunities for people outside the normal school system to obtain the General Certificate of Education (GCE) at both the ordinary and advanced levels, or the West African School Certificate (WASC) and the Higher School Certificate (HSC) in the sciences and arts subjects and in other fields. In 1977, the Extra-Mural Studies Department of the University of Benin was established to provide a similar service. The University's scheme penetrated more into the rural areas than the sister institution. But these schemes are specially drawn for people who are already minimally literate. No provision is made for people who could neither read nor write, and a large majority of the dwellers of rural Nigeria fall into this category. In order for education to really penetrate the rural areas, there is need for a mass literacy campaign. It is only in this way that the rural majority can enjoy the full benefits of modern education and be in a better position to fully participate in their own development.
Inadequate services in the rural sector have led to a hinderance in the transformation of rural life in Nigeria. The rural areas constitute a reservoir for the generation of surpluses due to untapped resources, and there is substantial room for efficiency if the problems of lack of social services, poor roads, disease, inadequate education and poor rural income can be eliminated. This calls for a drastic change in the present policy, in which the benefits of government expenditures are distributed in favour of urban communities. Nigeria should make reasonable use of her petroleum revenue to provide these benefits in the rural sector and help improve the quality of life in the rural communities.

Having presented the historical evolution of the Nigerian state and the nature of rural life, we are now in a better position to test the central hypothesis that the bureaucracy can be the principal agent for effective rural development.
MAP OF NIGERIA SHOWING 19 STATES


Bendel State
CHAPTER FOUR
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT:
CENTRAL AND FIELD ADMINISTRATIONS

In chapter two, the theoretical arguments relating to the role of the bureaucracy in the process of socio-economic development in the rural areas of the new states of Africa were examined. But if the bureaucracy is to play the central role assigned to it by the proponents of the development administration theory, it must be equipped with the adequate tools. One of the most important tools for increasing the capacity of the bureaucracy is administrative reforms. With the rich background information supplied in chapter three, we are now in a better position to examine the issue of administrative reforms in Nigeria, where it was hoped that through administrative reforms, "the bureaucracies will be transformed from systems of authority, inherited from the colonial administration, to instruments of modernization." 1

In this chapter, attention will be focused on the administrative reforms which were introduced prior to independence in 1960, with the aim of erecting a sound foundation for development. These reforms will be traced through the post-independence period to the intervention of the military in Nigeria's politics in 1966. The new reforms introduced by the military administration will also be analysed. Two levels of analysis will be followed. At the central level (State and Federal Administrations), we will discuss the breakdown of the secretariat system, following the 1954 Constitution and the integration of the departments into ministries. We will also take a look at the most important public service reform exercises conducted since independence in 1960. At the field level, the reforms introduced in field administration from the immediate pre-independence period to the present time will command our attention.

One may ask why we have taken the historical approach in our discussion of administrative reforms in Nigeria. Our answer is that it is only by so doing can we adequately depict the roots of the colonial legacies which still dominate our bureaucracies.
We will also lay more emphasis on structural changes in the Nigerian bureaucracies because the country's administrative reforms have often focused on structural changes rather than the policy impact of the reforms on the bureaucrats and the public.

We seek to know in this chapter whether administrative reforms in Bendel State have largely resulted in centralization and bureaucratization and the consequent impotence of local government institutions, instead of promoting effective rural development. In exploring this question, it is hoped that more light will be thrown on the key hypothesis that the bureaucracy can be the key agent for effective rural development.

From Secretariat to Ministry: The Reform of Central Administration:

During the governorship of Lord Lugard (1914-1919), a complex secretariat system was established to serve as the administrative machinery for Nigeria. Under the Lugardian system, each of the two Lieutenant-Governors (heads of the Southern and Northern groups of provinces) had a secretariat with the necessary
departments such as political, medical, education, police, prison and marines.¹ In addition, the Governor maintained a Central Secretariat with departments of common interest to the two groups of provinces - railways and colliery, audit, treasury, posts and telegraphs, judicial and legal - were centralised under the Governor. The three (one central and two provincial) secretariats were mutually exclusive.

A number of problems arose from the operation of Lugard's secretariat system. In the first place, the absence of a Chief Secretary at the central secretariat

created problems of co-ordination. In practice, the central secretariat was "central" only in name and each Lieutenant-Governor asserted and exercised the right to address his file direct to the Governor without submitting to what was considered the humiliating experience of having his recommendations to the Governor routed through, or commented upon by, the comparatively junior officer in charge of the central secretariat. As Sir Hugh Clifford, who immediately succeeded Lugard, described his experience with the central secretariat,

The result... was that the governor found himself... to be undertaking simultaneously the duties of the governors of as many separate colonies as there were secretariats, and to be doing this not with the aid of a regular secretariat but by means of his own unaided memory.

Another weakness of the tripartite secretariat system was that each of these secretariats did not know what the other was doing in tackling basically the same problems. The system made it difficult to secure continuity since there was no single secretariat capable of briefing the


governor's deputy on all problems of administration.¹
A third weakness was that, under the system, the lieutenant governors possessed inadequate knowledge on such central departmental affairs as those of railways, customs, harbours, public works, etc., outside their own provinces. And yet those matters were basic to efficient administration and impinging on the policies of those departments which were organised on a purely regional basis.² Finally, the existence of the three largely autonomous secretariats caused endless confusion since members of the public were generally uncertain which secretariat to correspond with in vital matters concerning them.

To solve some of the weaknesses of the secretariat system, Clifford introduced reforms which attempted to mould together aspects of the three scattered secretariats into one Nigerian Secretariat with headquarters in Lagos. The following diagram presents the organizational structure of the secretariat. The apex of the formal organization was provided by the Governor, and immediately subordinate to him, as the practical head of the administration, came the Secretariat under the Chief Secretary.³

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p.94
3. The Chief Secretary was designated to act for the Governor whenever the latter was on leave. He was the channel by which all matters reached the Governor. As the Governor's principal adviser, he was also a member of the Executive Council.
The secretariat was the heart of the administrative machine - formulating policy, directing the executive agencies and co-ordinating their activities. Of a subordinate status to the Chief Secretary came the Auditor-General, Attorney-General and Treasurer (Financial Secretary) each with their own offices and each with specified powers indicated by the titles they carried.\(^1\) Directly under the secretariat and still a part of the headquarters organization came the various departments.\(^2\)


such as Education, Health, Customs, Public Works, Posts
and Telegraphs etc. In 1952, there were thirty-one such
departments in Nigeria. All departments were headed by
officials of wide experience. The commonest title of such
officials was Director or Commissioner. Departments were
independent of one another, and their staff were usually
organized into headquarters and territorial units and
sub-units.  

Outside the headquarters, Nigeria was (since 1952)
divided into three groups of provinces - Northern,
Western and Eastern. The administration of each group
of provinces was headed by a lieutenant-governor who was
responsible to the Governor for his activities. Each
lieutenant-governor was given a small secretariat, staffed
by administrative staff, to assist him in the administra-
tion of his area. Thus, corresponding to the national
headquarters organization, were Lieutenant-Governors,
Secretariats under Civil Secretaries, Financial and Legal
Secretaries and heads of departments.  

In their head-
quarter towns, the Lieutenant-Governors had at hand
representatives of many of the headquarters departments,
who could advise them on local matters, and so save the

1. C.R. Niven, Nigeria: Outline of A Colony, (London:

problems of continuous consultation with Lagos. The control of the local people by the Nigerian Secretariat was extended to the villages through the administrative net-work to be discussed under field administration. Through this system of control, the colonial administration was able to maintain law and order in the entire country.

The Nigerian Secretariat played a leading role in the administration of the country until it was disbanded in October 1954. Even before this date, gradual constitutional and administrative reforms had brought elected Nigerians to the political headship of central departments. The Nigerianization policy enabled many Nigerians to be promoted or appointed to high positions in the service. The 1952 Macpherson Constitution, as we have noted in chapter three, extended limited ministerial rule at the central and regional levels. Thus, the transition to full ministerial rule had begun.

Ministries and Gorsuch's Reforms:

The Lyttelton Constitution1 which came into effect in October 1954, introduced a truly federal system into Nigeria. The new constitution gave the three regions (Northern, Eastern and Western) extensive autonomy over their affairs. Correspondingly, the constitution weakened

1. Lyttelton was the Colonial Secretary and the presiding chairman of the conferences that formulated the constitution.
the government at the federal level. One of the most important administrative consequences of the new constitution was the breakup of the Nigerian Secretariat and the creation of three Regional public services and one central (Federal) public service. Under the new arrangement, the unitary Nigerian departments of the previous system have been affected in one of three ways: First, some departments such as Railways, Customs, Police, Posts and Telegraphs, have become entirely federal. Second, some departments such as Agriculture, Education, Health, Veterinary and Forestry, have become regional, but have a federal counterpart. (But the research and training

1. The constitution did not provide for any representative chamber in the centre to perform the functions of participation in the formulation of the will of the Federal Government. Instead, there was a Council of Ministers consisting of the Governor-General (presiding), three officials (Chief Secretary, Financial Secretary, and the Attorney-General), and three Ministers from each region and one from the Cameroons, appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Regional Executive. Ministers in this council were not the leaders of their parties and so could not take decisions on their own, without directives from their party leaders who were based in the Regions. As Ezera puts it, "Another factor that was responsible for the weakness of the council was that none of the leaders of the major political parties was in the Central House and ipso facto in the Council of Ministers. The central ministers, therefore, tended to look elsewhere for guidance and instructions, as far as party strategy was concerned." Ezera, op.cit., p.201. In effect, the Governor-General and his officials dominated the Council of Ministers.
institutions in these departments remained mostly Federal). Third, some departments became solely Regional, for example, Co-operatives. Recruitment, transfer and discipline in the new Regional Services were to be in the exclusive control of the Regional Governors (formerly styled Lieutenant-Governors), advised by a Public Service Commission. The Federal Civil Service came under the Governor-General who was advised by the Federal Public Service Commission.

The old unitary service died unregretted. The senior civil servants' anxieties were assuaged by the proliferation of new promotion posts in regional ministries and departments, and by the new definite prospect of lump-sum compensation in a few years for overseas officers, with consequential promotions to take the places of those who would depart. There was also the prospect of ending the over-strained and cumbersome system of centralized control by the Civil Service Commission in Lagos. But for civil servants of all grades, one of the most favourable corollaries of the new measures was the appointment of salaries commission to report to all the governments on the "structure and remuneration" of the new civil services. It is to the findings of this commission that

2. The Gorsuch Commission.
we must now turn.

The terms of reference required the Gorsuch Commission to enquire into the structure and remuneration of the Public Service, with special reference to problems arising from constitutional changes proposed at the conference on the Nigerian Constitution (Cmd.9059).

Although the Commission was initially one of a series of attempts to respond to pressures for improved salaries and working conditions for civil servants, it soon became more than that. Instead, Gorsuch chose to focus his attention on the task of designing a structure which he considered appropriate to the development of an efficient, indigenized civil service.²

On the structural defects of the service, Gorsuch noted that the "junior" and "senior" services³ distinction encouraged inefficiency and discontent. This distinction into junior/senior categories is a follow up from the pre-1945 practice by which positions in the service were divided into "European posts" and "African posts". As Adú points out, Europeans filled all administrative, professional, managerial and technical posts, with local personnel restricted to posts in the clerical, semi-skilled manipulative grades.⁴ The racial bias of the

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2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., (paras. 75-78), pp.35-37.

service structure was abolished in 1946, as a result of the Harragin Salaries Commission.¹ The Harragin Commission had recommended the new categories of "Junior" and "Senior" services, with 'expatriation pay' for overseas officers holding senior service posts. In structural terms, this change in terminology merely perpetuated the old division in the service. But it did open the way for Nigerians to be promoted or appointed to the senior service, hitherto an exclusive British preserve.² Despite the 1952 salary revisions, Gorsuch asserted that the salary dividing line between the "junior service" and "senior service" still existed structurally.

The major defect identified by Gorsuch was "the lack of an adequate middle part"³ in the civil service. Middle-level management and technical functions were being performed mainly by officers who should have been concentrating on higher level functions. Gorsuch then listed the disadvantages which followed from these structural defects as three: First, the creation of attitude among ambitious officers in the lower grades (junior service) that performance in those grades was unrelated to their promotion prospects and that their energies should be concentrated on obtaining higher paper


qualifications or scholarships. Second, the inefficient use of high-level administrative and professional officers to do routine executive work. Third, the overgrading of certain type of posts, which fall between the levels of competence of the junior and senior services respectively.¹

Gorsuch posited a cure for the structural defects. He recommended the restructuring of the civil services into five main grades:²

1. Sub-Clerical
2. Clerical
3. Executive
4. Administrative
5. Superscale

Minor-Technical
Technical
Higher Technical
Professional
Superscale

These new structures³ Gorsuch thought, would lead to a properly integrated service, if operated according to certain fundamental rules. He wished to see the middle grades expanded, in both size and functions.⁴ Towards this end, the Commissioner recommended that recruitment, promotion, salary structure, training and duties should

1. Ibid., (paras.75-78), pp.35-37.
2. Ibid., (para.79), p.37.
3. All the salary review commissions and grading teams appointed in Nigeria since 1955 used Gorsuch's civil service structure. This structure was abolished only in 1974 by the Public Service Review Commission.
4. Fletcher in Murray, op.cit., p.147.
be operated in such a way as to enhance the advancement opportunities of young entrants. While the grade at which a young entrant comes into the service must be governed by his general educational standard, this should not set a rigid limit to his hopes of advancement. Such an officer should be able to advance according to his acquired experience and ability.\(^\text{1}\) In respect of the executive class, recruitment should be through the direct entry of candidates with requisite qualifications above the one required for the clerical class and by the promotion of serving members of the clerical class.\(^\text{2}\) On promotion, the Commissioner recommended the provision of avenues to enable officers to advance from one grade to another within the service. With the operation of the dual system of direct entry and promotion to grades, adequate incentives would be provided in the services. Gorsuch also recommended a new salary structure for the civil services. (See Appendix II to this study).

Of considerable interest in the new salary structure is the considerable overlap of the new Executive Class salary structure with the clerical scale. The salary structure recommended for the new Executive Class is set out at section C(Executive). Training 1-6 of Appendix II;

1. Ibid., p. 48.
the clerical scale is shown in section D1-5B of the same Appendix. The intention of the overlap was to enable a person clerical staff who was unable to obtain promotion to the executive grade to progress along the D scales without financial loss. In keeping with his emphasis on incentives, Gorsuch stressed the importance of "comprehensive in-service training facilities without which the best candidates may not be able to qualify for advancement." 1

Most of the major recommendations of the Gorsuch Report were implemented before the attainment of independence in 1960. Although the failures of the reforms have generally been attributed to problems of implementation, 2 some design faults also played a role. Gorsuch, for example, may be said to have borrowed too uncritically from the Whitehall model and did not take Nigerian conditions sufficiently into account. In particular, not enough attention was paid to the fact that the educational system was not equipped to meet the manpower needs generated by the reforms. In 1967 (twelve years after the reforms were introduced), a commentator on Nigerian public administration observed that

... the senior administrators are still poorly supported by the intermediate cadres since the intermediate skills tend to be the least well provided for in the educational system. 3

1. Ibid., (para. 79(iii), p.38.
However, the problems of the civil services' inability to generate development must be sought outside the inadequacy of middle-level manpower of the executive class grade.

Gorsuch's reforms were mainly designed to remove the distinction between "junior" and "senior" services. In practice, however, this distinction was replaced by a new distinction based on "classes". Over the years, the influence-wielding administrative class came to dominate the civil service. With the promotion from the executive to the administrative classes which was hard to come by, the administrative class became the envy of many members of the newly created middle-level class. The continuing influence of the elitist administrative class also created another type of inter-class rivalry (civil service politics) between the administrative and the professional classes. The post of Permanent Secretary (chief executive of Ministries) was the exclusive preserve of

* "Classes" here refers to civil service positions, not social classes.

1. For a brilliant discussion of "civil service politics" in Nigeria, see Adebayo Adedeji, ed., Nigerian Administration and its Political Setting (London: Hutchinson Educational, 1968), Part III, pp.68-90. T.M. Aluko's article on "Administration in our public services: A Professional Officer speaks up on bureaucracy," and the Symposium on "Bureaucratic Politics' in Nigeria - The Problems of inter-class and inter-departmental conflict in the public services," are quite insightful.
members of the Administrative Class. The professionals also wanted this post open to them, especially in professional ministries such as Works and Transport, Health, Lands and Housing and Agriculture and Natural Resources. These developments were to form the basis of later civil service reforms in the mid-sixties.  

It would appear that after independence, the new civil services of Nigeria were still unable to play effective role in the development process, despite Gorsuch's reforms. Fletcher put it more curtly when he wrote:

> Indeed, from the point of view of development administration, the bureaucracies did not show a great deal of development between 1954 and 1967.

Fletcher gave reasons for failure. According to him, the sanctions system, pattern of social status, morale of executive officers, lack of specialization at the middle levels, frequent transfers of personnel, lack of role clarity and absence of a strong and pervasive commitment to modernization all operated to limit the capacity of the bureaucracies to engage in energetic, innovative and flexible administration. While some of these reasons are plausible, one would like to argue and clarify the reasons for failure.

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1. The Elwood Grading Team resolved this problem in 1966 when it recommended that professionals could also be appointed to the grade of permanent secretary.


3. Ibid.
The historical role of the Nigerian bureaucracy seems to provide a better explanation for the failures of these reforms. The bureaucracy was a colonial apparatus intended for the sole purpose of maintaining law and order and sustaining the exploitation of the colony. It was not intended to serve as a tool for rapid socio-economic development of the generality of the colonized subjects. The bureaucracy which Gorsuch sought to reform was a colonial bureaucracy in the process of decolonization. Rather than break with the colonial system, which clearly was unsuited for development efforts, Gorsuch only reinforced these patterns. His sole innovation was to encourage the advancement of more Nigerians to senior service positions. This development, in its turn, created other problems. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Gorsuch reforms did not lead to a development breakthrough. Perhaps, they were not intended to do so.

The Gorsuch reforms also played a leading role in the development of the bureaucratic fraction of the Nigerian petty bourgeoisie. As we have noted in chapter two, a few of the Nigerians who were accepted into the colonial institutions saw themselves as being introduced into the world view of the colonial masters. The rapid progress in the Nigerianization programme, the breakdown of barriers to facilitate the promotion from "junior" to "senior" service, the maximization of personal wealth in the
form of civil service salaries and fringe benefits, and the deliberate preservation of the status quo civil service pattern, accelerated the development of this emergent class.

As we have observed in respect of Kenya in chapter two, the Nigerian bureaucracy could not be said to be developmental after the Gorsuch reforms. The only thing that had changed was the replacement of British officials by Nigerians. In the actual process of administration, the rural areas had continued to be neglected in favour of the urban areas (where the colonial masters lived and where the new class that took over from them now live), as they were during the colonial situation. The civil servants who took over from the colonial masters did not see themselves as pioneers bearing the torch of development and a new life for all, but merely as the "ruveau riche" upon whom the direction and control of the civil service now devolved.

The Consolidation of the Ministerial System:

The new ministries which sprang up from the 1954 constitutional changes and which were structured by the Gorsuch reforms had begun to make progress towards ministerial system after 1954. Between October, 1954 (when the constitutional changes were introduced) and
October, 1960 (when the country became independent), each of the four civil services had managed to transform and adapt itself to ministerial rule. Elected ministers at both the central and regional levels had taken over full control from colonial officials. Permanent Secretaries had been appointed to head the new Ministries. The Nigerianization programme had been fairly concluded in most of the civil services. It only remained for the new system to be consolidated. The process of consolidation was underway when the Midwest Region was carved out of the former Western Region in August, 1963.

As was the case in 1954, all civil servants of Midwest origin were repatriated to their home state. It was these 3,400 returning officers who formed the nucleus of the new civil service in 1963. Ten years later, the population of the service had risen to 15,000. By April, 1978, the Bendel State bureaucracy had developed into 17 Ministries and Departments and numerous Boards and Corporations. Out of a total of seventeen

2. The establishment of the Midwest Region civil service brought the number of civil services in Nigeria to 5 as at August 1963. At the time of the research for this study (February-August, 1978), the number of civil services had risen to 20.
Ministries, six, namely, (i) Agriculture and Natural Resources, (ii) Local Government, (iii) Health, (iv) Trade, Industry and Co-operatives, (v) Works and Transport and (vi) Education played direct role in rural development. The Boards/Corporations which participated directly in rural development efforts included the Water Board, Food Production Board, Rural Electrification Board, State Hospitals Management Board and State Schools Board. One of the problems which had faced these ministries and departments in their attempts to contribute to rural development had been lack of adequate co-operation among them. This lack of co-operation had resulted in duplication of efforts by mounting parallel administrative structures at the local level. In the process, the scarce resources needed badly for rural development were used inefficiently.¹

By 1972, it was evident that "result-oriented" (another terminology for "development-oriented") bureaucracies had not emerged in Nigeria when the Federal Government appointed a Commission² to examine, among


2. Public Service Review Commission (herein referred to as the Udoji Commission).
other things, "the organization, structure and management" of the Public Services and recommend reforms where desirable, having regard to the need to secure adequate development and optimum utilisation of manpower and to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the public services in meeting the challenge of a development-oriented society. The Commission reported in 1974, and at the time of the field research for this dissertation, some of the recommendations were yet to be implemented.

Udoji's prescription for the achievement of a results-oriented public service is the adoption of "a new style public service" based on project management, management by objectives (MBO) and "planning, programming and budgeting" (perhaps meaning Planning, Programming and Budgeting System - PPBS). The Commission thought that the absence of these modern management techniques had greatly hindered the ability of the civil services to achieve desired results efficiently, and that new techniques would help to maximize efficiency because

...they stress the importance of outputs over inputs; of achieving objectives rather than expending energy on copious and learned minutes; they help develop the professional civil servant and allow him to manage professionally.


2. Ibid., Chapter III.

On manpower planning and training, the Udoji Report re-echoed the recommendations of earlier Commissions. The recommendations called for the strengthening of the Manpower Planning Division of the Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction and the reconstitution of the National Manpower Board to serve in an advisory capacity to the Division. Like the Gorsuch Report, the Udoji Report noted the importance of training to the Nigerian civil services, but observed, with regret, that the gap between intention and accomplishment has been a noticeable feature of Nigeria's public service training.

The major structural recommendations of the Udoji Commission centered around the introduction of a unified grade structure which would embrace all posts in the civil service from the lowest to the highest and provide equal opportunities for every officer to advance to the highest post in the service irrespective of his or her discipline. The revised salary scales for the unified grade structure are presented below as Table 2:

1. Ibid., (para.62), p.15
2. Ibid., (para.67), p.19
3. Ibid., (para.129), p.34.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
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<tr>
<td>Salary Scales for Unipied Grade Structure (UFCU)</td>
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<td>TABLE 2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The direct recruitment of suitably qualified and experienced candidates from outside the service to fill high level positions, and the mode of selection of the administrative head of Ministries (Chief Executive)\(^1\) were also recommended by the Commission. Other recommendations made by the Commission concerned personnel management,\(^2\) financial management, planning and statistics,\(^3\) as they related to the successful operation of a new-style public service, based on the techniques referred to earlier in this section.


\* The Commission recommended that the administrative head of ministries be styled "Chief Executive", instead of the present designation of Permanent Secretary, and that he be selected by an ad hoc Committee made up of the Head of Service and the Public Service Commission, as against the present practice of appointment by the Head of Government on the advice of the Public Service Commission. It was also recommended that the present dual hierarchies of professional and administrative personnel be abolished by the introduction of a unified and integrated structure by which authority and responsibility for overall management is vested in the Chief Executive. The Government rejected all these recommendations, preferring to remain with the prevailing practice. See *Government View on the Report of the Public Service Review Commission* (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, Printing Division, December, 1974), para.16, pp.5-6. This publication is referred to in this study as *White Paper No.1 of 1974*.


Generally, compared with the previous commissions, the Udoji Commission provided a better means for the efficient management of resources (both human and material) in the public service. For example, the idea of a civil service based on management by objectives and planning, programming and budgeting system, sounds good. But problems of implementation were marathon. The colonially-designed "confidential report" system of performance appraisal was rejected and the government accepted the commission's idea of open reporting. Although new forms have been designed and brought into operation, open reporting is still far from being achieved. Personnel are only allowed to see comments made by their superiors on the first part of the form. The more substantial comments on the second part of the form, comments on which the promotability of the officer is based, are never released for his perusal. The new system is also not able to plot out clearly the goals an employee is required to achieve and how to achieve them. Yet, management by objectives posits that the subordinate and superior officers should meet to plot out the subordinate's duties, objectives and means for achieving them. They should meet often to review the progress made and the difficulties encountered. They should also meet to decide on what has been achieved and what has not been achieved. The final report of performance should be agreed upon.
and signed by both of them. It is this report that should constitute the assessment of the subordinate's performance. This has not been the case here. The colonial system of regulation and control through confidential reporting is still operated behind the scene.

In respect of PPBS, it is safe to conclude that the old system of object-of-expenditure (traditional budgeting) is still very much with the Nigerian civil services. No advance has been made towards the transition to the programme and planning budgeting system. The direct entry of outside candidates into the civil service would have injected new blood into the administration. But so far, the process is being carried out at such a slow rate so that its impact is insignificant. Perhaps, the failure of Udoji's much publicised management techniques in bringing about the development breakthrough in Nigerian public services underscores the futility of our reliance on techniques which were thought to be responsible for development in the advanced industrial societies. To reform the public services, they must first be liberated from their colonial mentality. It is only strong political action that can do this.

1. For example, since the introduction of the new policy, only two candidates have been recruited into the Administrative Group of the Bendel State Civil Service: one at Principal Level (Grade Level 12) and the other at Senior Level (Grade Level 10).
By far, the most successful aspects of the reforms were the introduction of revised salary scales and the enormous fringe benefits (pensions, housing allowance, leave bonus, vehicle basic allowance etc.) which public officers came to enjoy. The importance attached to the monetary aspects of the reforms is evidenced by the spate of industrial strikes which greeted the reforms. Both in the public and private sectors, workers demanded arrears up to 12 months. Others demanded upward grading of the posts they occupied.

In reaction to these agitations, the Federal Government reconstituted the Public Service Review Unit into a Review Panel under the chairmanship of Mr. Akintola Williams, "for the purpose of examining expeditiously the large number of petitions submitted to the unit" by public employee groups (associations and unions). The panel was required to receive and examine petitions and complaints against the gradings and salary scales which were approved by the White Paper No.1 in 1974 (on Udoji Report). It is, therefore, not surprising that the result of the panel was further increases in the salaries* of civil servants. Once more, arrears were involved. Table 3 shows the Williams' revised salary scales. Since the private


*For the scope of increases, compare Tables 2 and 3.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Grade Level</th>
<th>Step</th>
<th>1</th>
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<td>768</td>
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<td>834</td>
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<tr>
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<td>11,203</td>
<td>11,344</td>
<td>11,420</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,693</td>
<td>12,832</td>
<td>13,668</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+ 636</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
sector was also required to adjust its salary scales upward to compare favourably with the public sector, the only persons in the society who gained little or nothing were the non-wage earners. A majority of them are rural dwellers. The reforms brought about another negative result: sky-rocketing inflation. Before 1966, the average rate of increase in the general price level was about 1.5 per cent per annum. This rose to about 3 per cent during the Nigerian civil war (1967-70), but came down to the pre-war level of about 1.5 per cent in 1971-72. By 1974, when the wage and salary increases were announced, inflation rose to 12.6 per cent and in 1975, an all-time record level of 34.1 per cent was recorded.\footnote{See West Africa, No.3221, April 1979, p.614.} Consumer price index also rose astronomically from 5.5 per cent increase in 1973 to 25 per cent in 1974 and 75 per cent in 1975.\footnote{Sayre P. Schatz, \textit{Nigerian Capitalism}, op.cit., p.36.}

The thrust of the argument in this section is that although the Udoji recommendations represented the most daring attempt to improve resources management in the Nigerian public services, they too did not yield good results. By over-implementing the monetary aspects of the recommendations, inflationary currents overran the economy.
The Reform of Field Administration

In our discussion of the secretariat system, we noted that during the colonial period, there existed a long hierarchical organization from the national headquarters to the village level. We saw how the Regional level of administration was responsible to the National level. We will now consider the next level of administration - field administration.

Outside the headquarters, the regions were divided first into provinces and then into divisions. These units formed the basis of the field administrative system. In each of them, there were local chief executives - the Resident in the province and the District Officer in the division - and they each had a responsibility for their area which matched that of the Civil Secretary in the region and Chief Secretary in the country. Theirs was a general responsibility that covered everything in which government was interested in the province or division.\(^1\) For example, the District Officer had under his comprehensive administrative charge all functions starting with law and order, revenue, education, public works and health.

\(^1\) Murray, *op.cit.*, p.91.
The provinces and districts were also the units for the organization of services by functional departments. To a large extent, the district officers and field officers of functional departments were each the agents of the Resident, for it was the Resident who supervised and co-ordinated the activities of these other officials, and who either handled himself, or supervised the handling of, relations with the subordinate institutions of government. In the area of field administration, therefore, the Resident was the centre of activity.

It is appropriate to consider the changes which took place in field administration between 1954 (the creation of four civil services) and 1963 (the creation of Midwest Region). With the introduction of political ministers, the establishment of ministries and the integration of ministries and departments, the prevailing pattern of field administration was regarded as inappropriate. In 1955, field agents of functional departments were brought under the direct and undivided control of their departments and ministries. At the same time, the Residents and District Officers were transformed from local chief executives into field agents of the Ministry of Local Government.\(^1\) The titles of the officers were also changed from Resident and District Officer, first to Provincial and Divisional Advisers, then to Local

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1. Murray, *op.cit.*, p.126
Government Inspectors, and then again the junior grade of Local Government Adviser.¹ With the collapse of the Secretariat system in the Western Region, the eight Residents disappeared and in their places there were three Local Government Inspectors each operating from headquarters and in charge of a local government circle. The twenty four District officers were renamed Local Government Inspectors.² The provinces were abolished as general units of administration and although the divisions were retained, they only became areas into which the Ministry of Local Government grouped local councils.

The execution of these policies gave birth to a different pattern of field administration. The organization of functional ministries took one of different modes. As ministries were not limited to organizing their field staff by the existence of common area units, each ministry or department organized its own in a manner that best suited its particular interests. For example, the Public Works Department formerly organized on provincial and divisional basis was renamed the Ministry of Works and Transport in 1958, and reorganized its field administration into four areas, each divided into works divisions. The Ministry of Education was reorganized into four zones in 1964 for purposes of field administration. The Ministry of


Agriculture operated its field administration on the basis of different units.

These sweeping reforms in the field administration of the Western Region were designed to keep pace with the rapid process of decolonization and the need to create structures that reflected the political mood of the people. From the administrative point of view, the old system confused political and administrative roles (which were in the hands of colonial field officers). The system also interposed District Officers and Residents between field agents and their functional ministries. Moreover, the offices of District Officer and Resident epitomized colonial rule for most people, and for political reasons, it was important to demonstrate that the transfer of powers meant something at the local level where it affected the mass of the people. ¹ It is worthy of note how the Resident and Divisional Officer had fallen from grace to grass in the conduct of field administration. As Orewa observed,

The Divisional Officer was all but a shadow of his colonial self, only waiting anxiously to be called upon to retire from the field service for redundancy and return to the State secretariat. ²

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¹ The Duties and Functions of Administrative Officers in the Western Region of Nigeria, (Ibadan, Sessional Paper No.1, 1955), p.3.

The field administrative system described above was inherited by the Midwest Region (Bendel State) in 1963. Except for minor modifications, the system remained in operation until 1974 when the government abolished it. A leading modification during this interim period was contained in a government circular letter issued in July, 1973. The policy statement contained in this circular letter was a clear indication of where the government was moving in its field administration reforms: centralization. It approved the transfer of Divisional Officers from the Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs to the Military Governor's Office, noting that

... due to increasing complexity of Government activities in the economic, social and political fields, the field administrative officer now assumes greater responsibilities and faces new challenges; he is the representative of His Excellency the Military Governor in his area of jurisdiction.

But the circular letter did not state how the mere transfer of the Divisional Officer from one department to another would equip him with the capacity to meet the "greater responsibilities and new challenges". If anything, the new move was intended to increase the control of the Military

2. Ibid., p.1
Governor over the rural areas, since under the new arrangements the Divisional Officer will be directly responsible to the Military Governor, whose special representative in the field he was. This point is borne out by the amount of control of field activities the circular letter gave to the Divisional Officer:

...all local heads of departments/agencies wishing to travel out of their divisional headquarters, should first seek and obtain the prior permission of the Divisional Officer in charge of the Division before travelling out.¹

The co-ordination of the activities of Government departments or agencies was also the exclusive preserve of the Divisional Officer. Towards this end, he was required to hold monthly meetings with local heads of departments or agencies, receive the reports of the activities of such bodies and forward a comprehensive report on all the field organizations to the government.² With the withdrawal of Divisional Officers from the Ministry of Local Government, Local Government Inspectors were appointed to take responsibility for purely local government matters - the day-to-day business of advising and assisting Local Government Councils and Committees of Management. This interim arrangement was in force until the end of 1974 when the government introduced a new system of field

1. Ibid., p.4.
2. Ibid., p.2.
and local administration which it called "Development Administration". 1

The new system of development administration abolished the local government system inherited from Western Nigeria. Under the new arrangement, the whole state was divided into 14 administrative divisions and one urban centre. Development Councils were set up at the divisional level and below these were Development Committees, comprising a group of villages. The Resident re-emerged as the generalismo of field administration. He was the chief executive of the Development Council, personal representative of the Military Governor in his area of jurisdiction, and the co-ordinator of all the activities of ministries, departments and other agencies of government in the division. All government organizations in the field were responsible to the Resident in respect of all official matters. 2 The staff of the Development Councils and Committees were all civil servants and responsible to the Resident. 3


3. Ibid., S.112.
The Government's policy statement introducing the changes directed that all existing field organizations of the respective ministries, departments, government boards, corporations and other agencies, should be disbanded and reorganized on the basis of administrative divisions so as to bring them under the more effective control and supervision of the Resident. Also affected were some ministries whose functions were transferred to the new Department of Development Administration (headed by a Commissioner of cabinet rank) in the Military Governor's Office. For example, the Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs lost its local government functions to the new Department. The axe then fell on the Community Development Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Information which was transferred to the new Department of Development Administration. In 1975, the Department of Development Administration became the Ministry of Development Administration, independent of the Military.

2. Ibid., p.8.
3. Ibid., p.7. In chapter one, we noted how the functions of community development have been transferred from Ministry to Ministry since 1963. Local government was also a scapegoat of these transfers. But as the reforms progressed (in 1976), the Ministry of Local Government was to regain its responsibility for local administration and inherit the functions of community development. In the face of these frequent changes, unaided by a definite goal, rural development cannot be systematically undertaken.
Governor's Office.

The new measures came into effect in December 1974. Between 1975 and 1976, ministries, departments and other government agencies organized their field administration on a divisional basis. But a new type of inter-departmental conflict arose from the operation of the system. At the peak of the controversy was the refusal of some local professional heads of departments to submit to the control of the Resident. In a memorandum on the issue, the Secretary to the Military Government stated:

Reports reaching me from the field indicate that Residents are having a very difficult job... in attempting to contain the arrogance of some local (professional) heads of departments in their divisions and to supervise their work. The recalled Government's decision on the relationship between the Resident and the field workers, including local heads of departments, which states as follows:

(i) all the field workers of the Ministry of Works and Transport, including the Divisional Engineer, would, like their counterparts in other Ministries and Departments in the field, be part of the Resident's Office in the Division to which they were posted and that these would work under the directives of the Resident in the Division;

(ii) once an Engineer had been posted to a Division, there would be no question of the Ministry of Works and Transport exercising direct control over the Engineer;

2. Ibid.
(iii) all letters emanating from the office of the Resident would be signed "for" the Resident.¹

During the induction courses organized in November 1974 for the new officers appointed to serve as Residents, the Military Governor had told them (Residents) that...

... all civil servants in a Resident's area of authority would be required to obtain the Resident's permission before leaving their stations, and the Resident would render confidential reports on the officers to their departments for appropriate action... Official correspondence to the Division would be channelled through the Residents.²

In a survey of the views of the 14 Residents and one Administrator³ on the relationship between them and their local heads of departments, 8 replied that they did not receive any co-operation, 2 reported some co-operation, 3 received full co-operation, and there was no response from 2.⁴ Making a case for the professional staff at a meeting convened to discuss the matter, the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works and Transport, charged that the Residents had usually gone beyond their powers. He cited an example in Owan Division where the Resident had started

¹ Ibid.
² "Records of proceedings during the induction course organized for the officers appointed to serve as Residents in the Old Executive Council Chambers, Benin City, on Friday 29th November, 1974," in File PDS.100, Department of Development Administration, Benin City.
³ The 14 Divisions were headed by Residents. The urban municipality of Benin was under an Administrator, an officer of a Resident's rank.
⁴ "Minutes of a meeting held by the Secretary to the
to build a house before he suddenly realised that there would be an Audit query on the procedure he had adopted. When the Resident invited the Technical Officer's assistance, he did not receive any co-operation because the Resident was encroaching on the responsibilities of the Ministry of Works and Transport.\textsuperscript{1} In support of this charge, the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health, suggested that as professionals feel touchy when laymen issued instructions to them on matters of a professional nature, the Residents should be advised to avoid any pretence at teaching professional and technical officers their work.\textsuperscript{2}

Quite apart from the issue of instructions, another source of conflict was financial control. The White Paper on Development Administration system had envisaged the control by the Resident of the financial allocation for the field organizations in their area. Some Residents complained that despite this provision, each local head of department had continued to receive sub-allocations and incur expenditure without any reference to the Residents.

The questions of financial control and routing of correspondence through the Residents were very controversial

\textsuperscript{1} Military Government and Head of Service with some Heads of Departments and the Residents on Thursday, 19th June, 1975," in File S.170, pp.200-218, Ministry of Local Government, Benin City.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
issues in which headquarter heads of departments had vested interests. It seemed that the heads of departments were not happy about the increasing authority of the Resident over their headquarter staff deployed to the field. They considered that with the Residents allowed to write confidential report on field personnel, give instructions to such staff and control the expenditures of local heads of departments, a great deal of headquarter's control over field staff would be eroded. Moreover, the senior officers (Permanent Secretaries) heading headquarter ministries and departments did not like the idea of being made to take directives, even indirectly, from the Residents who were comparatively junior officers. The field administration reforms, which put too much emphasis on the centralization of authority in the hands of the Resident and which were too much concerned with regulation and control rather than development, could be held responsible for these conflicts. We will elaborate shortly on the disadvantages of these conflicts for rural development.

Other problems with the reforms relate to the gap between what was promised and what was really achieved. The State Government's inability (would I say unwillingness?) to provide the necessary resources inhibited development efforts. Personnel, equipment and funds were not readily made available.
The manpower complement of the administrative set-up of the Resident's secretariat envisaged 1 Resident (an officer of Deputy Permanent Secretary grade), 1 Principal Assistant Secretary, 3 Senior Assistant Secretaries, 3 Principal Executive Officers, 3 Assistant Secretaries, 3 Higher Executive Officers and 2 Executive Officers. Outside the secretariat, the development committees were to be headed by Higher Executive Officers, assisted by a small secretariat staffed by junior officers. All other Ministries and Departments were supposed to post officers of principal grade to head their field offices, assisted by numerous subordinate staff.

The staff complement of the field administration system was too ambitious, especially as they related to the Resident's secretariat. The activities of the development committees were no more than the recording of committee meetings and the briefing of the Resident's office. A senior clerical officer would have been able to undertake this assignment, instead of a Higher Executive Officer. Even at the Divisional level, there was an acute shortage of experienced senior officers in the administrative cadre. The result was that most of the vacancies in the

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* There were 220 development committees in the State. In effect, an equal number of Higher Executive Officers was required to man the committees.

approved establishment were not filled. Office accommodation and provision of equipment also became a problem for the new system of field administration. Residents complained about the late and inadequate release of funds. As one Resident put it, "The bulk of the grants expected from the government has not been paid. Therefore, insufficient money has been available for development." \(^1\)

The gist of this elaborate analysis of the field administration system is to spotlight the way in which the much needed resources for rural development were wasted in unnecessary conflict over authority and control. There was also too much dedication to bureaucratic development instead of rural development. While the conflicts lasted, the supervision of projects, the speedy release of funds for development activities and the effective co-ordination of field efforts were not achieved. By December 1975, some of the Development Committees had not been inaugurated. Yet, one of the specific objectives of the new system of Development

\(^1\) "Memorandum submitted to the Nwanwene Committee". The committee was set up by the state government to review the performance of the Development Administration system and to make proposals for its improvement. The committee submitted its report early in 1976
Administration in the state was

...to provide, within the general scope of public administration in the State, a framework for the effective co-ordination and execution of government programmes and services in each administrative division.

This objective does not seem to have been achieved as our discussion above shows. The system was abolished in July 1976, following the Local Government Reform initiated by the Federal Government that year.²

The 1976 local government reform has some implications for field administration. Once again, Residents faded from the field administrative scene. They were either recalled to the state capital or appointed secretaries to the local governments. Bendel State was divided into 19 local government areas and the organization of field administration took this pattern, instead of the divisional system, which was abolished. Local heads of departments returned to the control of their headquarter administration. Local government inspectors were once again appointed to supervise the new local governments.


2. These reforms will be dealt with in detail in chapter five.
Conclusion:

This chapter has surveyed the role which administrative reforms, at the federal and state levels, have played in the process of bringing socio-economic development to the rural areas of Bendel State.

In our analysis of central administration, we saw how the federal and state bureaucracies were transformed from the unitary colonial secretariat system to full-fledged ministries designed to play more potent roles in the rural development process. Unfortunately, the various administrative reform exercises which were intended to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of these bureaucracies merely produced counter results: emphasis on material rewards (salary and fringe benefits) of the reforms, conflict of interest between bureaucratic functionaries, and diversion of energies from rural development efforts to the struggle for control and authority.

The reform of field administration in Bendel State, we have seen, resulted in the extension of the state government's direct control to all aspects of administration (state, field and local). This extensive control gave enormous powers to the field administrative officer.
Here and there, it was the generalist bureaucrat masquerading in various bureaucratic roles (either as Resident, Local Government Adviser, Local Government Inspector, Divisional Officer, Sole Administrator or Council Secretary) who dictated the pace. Even in his relationship with his professional colleagues, the generalist administrator, a product of the colonial system, sought to interfere with professional tasks in the name of co-ordination. The local people, confused about the whole affair, merely watched with bewilderment. The consequent controversies left the key problems of rural development unattended to.

In the light of the above discussion, the central hypothesis that the bureaucracy can be the principal agent for effective rural development does not appear to have been supported. Indeed, our analysis in this chapter support our proposition that rather than increase efficiency and effectiveness in the conduct of rural development, administrative reforms in Bendel State, as in the rest of Nigeria, have largely resulted in more bureaucratic involvement, more centralization and the consequent impotence of local government institutions.

Although some aspects of local administrative reforms were mentioned in this chapter, it is necessary
to examine in greater detail the local administrative reforms which have been undertaken in Bendel State. This is the subject of chapter five.
CHAPTER FIVE

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT:

LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

Local administration is very important in the task of rural development in Nigeria. This is because the federal and state governments are considered by the local people to be too distant. The only government or administration they easily know is the one that interacts with them more often. Despite its nearness to the people, it would appear that local administration in Nigeria has not been able to effectively participate in the process of rural development since the beginning of the colonial situation. Like in chapter four, it will be argued here that rather than increase efficiency and effectiveness in rural development, local administrative reforms in Bendel State, as in other parts of Nigeria, have largely resulted in more centralization and bureaucratization, the consequent impotence of local government institutions, and hence little actual rural development. It is hoped that the argument which will be developed in this chapter will throw more light on the testing of the central hypothesis that the bureaucracy
can be the principal agent for effective rural development.

Local administration in contemporary Nigeria cannot be understood without a knowledge of what the situation was in the pre-colonial period and how the colonialists built their local administration on the traditional systems which they met in Nigeria. Thus, we will examine local administrative reforms from the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods.

Local Administration in pre-colonial Nigeria:

Local administration in many parts of Nigeria was conducted by traditional chiefs and/or village councils before the imposition of colonial rule. In the North, the well established Emirates flourished under the Emirs. In the West, the institution of Oba dominated the Yoruba kingdoms. In the East, populist village councils formed the basis for local administration.\(^1\) In what is now known as Bendel State, two types of system operated. In most parts of what was later called Benin Province, the Oba of Benin was a constitutional monarch who ruled on the advice of a council, members of whom were appointed by the

\(^1\) See Chapter Three.
Oba himself. The council was made up of chiefs who represented various parts of the Oba's domain. In respect of remote villages within the kingdom, authority was delegated by the Oba to village heads who were themselves advised by their own councils. In the delta areas (later to be known as Delta Province) of Bendel State, the absence of powerful Obas capable of maintaining authority in the whole area resulted in the Clan being the unit of government. The Clanhead was assisted by a council comprising elected or selected representatives of the people. We have, therefore, no reason to disagree with Orewa's assertion that

...in various parts of the Midwest, as in other parts of Nigeria, organised systems of government existed long before the arrival of the British, and that all the colonial government did was to modify these systems and use them as a basis for indirect rule.¹

Following the establishment of British administration, a new system of Native Authority was imposed on the traditional system. The Native Authority arrangement, which symbolised "indirect rule" meant that representatives (District Officers or Assistant District Officers) of British administration ruled the localities through the traditional chiefs. The Native Authorities were not independent units because they were an indirect arm of the central government and had a very limited sphere for any

action independent of the British administrative officers.\footnote{G. O. Orewa, Local Government Finance in Nigeria, (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp.1-27.} The primary function of the native authorities were the collection of taxes and the maintenance of law and order. Conspicuously missing in the system of "indirect rule" was the provision of popular involvement by the people through their free election of their own representatives. The heavy reliance of the native authority system on the traditional rulers explains why the system was very successful in the North, partially successful in the West and a complete failure in the East. The Native Authority system reigned, with minor modifications, in the country until the late fifties.

By the end of the Second World War, a firm foundation had been built for nationalist agitation against colonialism and the traditional rulers who supported indirect rule. The various constitutional changes we have already noted in this study also had useful consequences for local administration. In 1950, the Local Government Ordinance was promulgated to establish an English-pattern three-tier local government in Eastern Nigeria. In 1952, the Western Region introduced the Local Government Law, amended in 1957, for the establishment of democratic local government. In the Northern Region, "local government" was not
established until 1954.¹

Local Government in Western Nigeria, 1952-1963:

The 1952 Law, as amended in 1957,² provided for a three-tier structure of local government, as was the case in Eastern Nigeria. The three-tier structure consisted of Divisional Councils, District (Rural or Urban) Councils and Local Councils. In some areas, there were two-tiers - Divisional and District (Rural or Urban) Councils, or Divisional and Local Councils. Where only one tier existed, it was called All-Purpose District Council. The structure is presented in diagrammatic form below:

**DIAGRAM III**

**Structure of Local Government in Western Nigeria, 1952-1963**

Ministry of Local Government

1) Divisional Council

2) District (Rural or Urban) Council

3) Local Council

(1) All-Purpose District Council

(2) District (Rural or Urban) Council

(2) Local Council.


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In Benin and Delta Provinces (later to become Midwest Region), there were 3 Divisional Councils, 23 Rural District Councils, 4 Urban District Councils, and 24 Local Councils. There were no All-Purpose District Councils.

The number of the new local government councils as compared with the abolished native authority system is presented below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION</th>
<th>THE ABOLISHED N.A. SYSTEM</th>
<th>THE NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NO OF SUPE-</td>
<td>NO OF SUB-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RIOR N.A.</td>
<td>ORDINAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENIN</td>
<td>ASABA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BENIN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ISHAN</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KUKURUKU</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELTA</td>
<td>ABOR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>URHOBO</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WARRI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W/IJAW</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (1) Schedule to the Native Ordinance 1948, Revision.
Councils consisted of a president, traditional councillors and elected councillors. The number of elected members in any council must not be less than three times the number of traditional members.\(^1\) Councils were set up by instruments enacted by the Regional Government, and not by the Local Government Law itself. The Councils were given two types of functions - obligatory and permissive. The obligatory functions for which all councils were responsible were to assist in the maintenance of order and good government within their area of authority and to prevent crimes.\(^2\) They were also expected to maintain public roads, bridges and paths in their respective areas of authority. They were also required to maintain traditional offices.\(^2\) The permissive functions of councils included agriculture, livestock and veterinary services, schemes for planned rural development, medical services, public water supplies, housing estates, land and water transportation, education, forestry, prisons and maintenance of customary courts.\(^4\) The Government's policy statement on the reforms seemed to be indicative of its sincerity of purpose:

> It is the aim to establish **vigorous**, sound, and healthy local government institutions (that would) assume responsibility to the full extent of their powers in firm belief that opportunity breeds the man.\(^5\)

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But in the actual conduct of local administration, the local governments did not achieve the high aims set by the 1952/57 reforms. For their failure to deliver the goods, public opinion accused local governments of being intolerably corrupt, inefficient in the collection of rates and taxes, and of lacking adequate funds and personnel for development. Some local governments were actually guilty of some of these charges, but it will be argued here that the policy of the ruling party (Action Group) to introduce diversive partisan politics into the local governments helped to weaken their capacity to plan and execute development projects. We will also argue that the politicization of the local governments made them venues for political patronage rather than instruments of development. While, as Rowat suggested in respect of the Canadian municipal system,

...party battle would stimulate greater interest in local elections...it would perhaps also encourage a better choice of candidates...and parties could use municipal councils as a valuable training ground for representatives at the higher level of government.¹

this was not the case in Western Nigeria and indeed in the whole of Nigeria, where the Regional governments unduly interfered in the affairs of local governments. In the Western Region, councils were suspended in 1962 and

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"sole administrators" and/or "committees of management" were introduced to replace them. In the Eastern Region, after many years of political interference with local councils and their comparative failure, the Regional government in 1955 introduced the full authority of the Minister of Local Government and his administrative officers in local government affairs. In 1960, the three-tier system was abolished by the East Regional government and was replaced by a one-tier arrangement dominated by Regional government officials. In the Northern Region, local governments were relatively stabler and performed useful functions. But they too were starved of funds and personnel, and were not free from occasional political interference.

According to Fadahunsi, the politicization of local governments in Western Nigeria centred around three periods: (i) the period of elected councils 1959-62; (ii) the period of committees of management 1963-65; and (iii) the period of sole administrator 1966-68. During the first period, the tendency was towards the centralization of authority over the council's finance and membership. Thus amendments were passed to the Local

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Government Law to enable the government to extend political influence into the councils. For example, the Local Government (Amendment) Law No. 12 of 1960 strengthened the Minister's hands in the appointment of council presidents, the establishment of joint boards, the levying of special rates, and financial management. Another amendment empowered the government to name two or six members to a council. In 1962, another amendment empowered the government to set up committees of management in the place of elected councils. In effect, these committees, composed of selected persons, could replace any local government council which the government may decide to dismiss. The committee of management could perform all the functions of an elected council. It was during this period that the proliferation of councils started, as a result of government's desire to meet the political demands of its supporters. Small and less economically viable local councils were created indiscriminately. The thinking was that political office was a means of


acquiring wealth easily, and in order to benefit more political followers, more councils (and thus more offices) were created. Party supporters were easily appointed, either as councillors (who were no longer elected but appointed by the government) or officials.

The second period saw the trend towards the centralization of the institution of local government itself. A crucial development during this period was the virtual disappearance of elected councils. Almost all of them were managed by committees of management. By the end of 1965, the council was anything but the democratic local institution it was formerly meant to be.¹ Further to these centralizing tendencies, a major amendment in 1963 made the committee of management system a permanent feature of local government. Thus, government was empowered to constitute a council in the same way as the electorate could constitute a council.² Another amendment eroded the authority of the councils' chief executive over personnel and centralized it in the councils themselves, which were, at this time, no longer


2. Padahunsi, op.cit.
elected. These centralizing tendencies further placed the government in a position to manipulate the local councils. It was during this period that the Midwest Region was created in August, 1963.

As we shall see later in this chapter, the erosion of local government functions and their concentration in State Government organs, which was characteristic of the sole administration period (1966-68) in Western Nigeria, was also prominently featured in the new Midwest Region. But before we take a look at local administrative reforms in Bendel State, we should note that if the intention of the state governments was merely to exercise control or surveillance over local government councils, the existing regulations provided several modes of conducting such watch-dog activity. Budgetary controls required local governments to submit their budgets to the Ministry of Local Governments for consideration and approval. The budgets had to meet a series of requirements set by the Ministry. Control through administrative inspection was exercised by the Local Government Inspectors who were staff of the state government. Broad local government

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1. Under the 1952 Law, the chief executive was appointed by the Regional government. He had control over staff matters so as to eliminate partisan politics from personnel matters. But by putting staff matters in the hands of a selected council, partisan politics interfered with staff matters.

2. The Financial Memorandum sets out the procedure for preparing, submitting and approving the budget.
policies were also set by the Ministry for the local councils to follow.

Through audit inspections, the state government was also able to exercise considerable financial control over local councils. The Auditor-General conducted annual inspection of council books and records. Although this was a post-transaction audit carried out several months or even years after an irregular transaction had occurred, it could, nevertheless, discourage the recurrence of such irregularities. Offenders were subjected to lengthy queries, surcharges (asking an officer to pay the amount involved back to the government treasury or deducted from his salary) and disciplinary actions. For example, in 1965/66, 20 senior local government staff were disciplined by the Local Government Service Board. Of these officers, 16 were involved in audit surcharges and adverse financial reports. Seven were reported to the Board by the Local Government Advisers; the remaining 9 were reported by the Auditor-General. 1 Councillors also had reasons to fear audit surcharges, which were levied against officers or councillors for proved financial irregularities. Under the law, anyone who had been jointly or severally surcharged with a minimum sum of ₦200.00 ($360.00)* without winning.


* ₦1.00 = $1.80 (Canadian).
his appeal to the Minister or a High Court against the surcharge, could not stand for a local government election within five years of the surcharge.  

Grants-in-aid, in respect of certain services (health, education and water supply), was another way by which the government could exercise control over the affairs of local councils. For example, before the take over of primary education by the Bendel State Government in 1968, the local councils received 100 per cent grant in respect of salaries of primary school teachers, local education officers and supervisors. In addition to these controls, corrupt councillors and officials could face prosecution in the courts. Rather than tap these control mechanisms to their fullest, the state government, as we have seen above, moved decisively to directly control the councils and make them institutions of political patronage.

This was the pattern of local administration that the new Midwest Region (later Bendel State) inherited from the Western Region in August, 1963.

**Local Administration in Bendel State, 1964-1974**

Between August, 1963 and December, 1974, there was very little change in the pattern of local administration inherited from the Western Region. The process of centralization, as we have noted, continued unabated.

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By January 1966, all the local government councils in the state were managed either by Sole Administrators\(^1\) or Committees of Management\(^2\) whose members were nominated by the State Government. When the Military administration took over in January 1966, all the Committees of Management were abolished\(^3\) and Sole Administrators were appointed to manage the affairs of the councils. One Sole Administrator was to manage all the local government councils in his administrative Division. In 1967, the number of administrative Divisions in the State was increased to 14. In April, 1971, Committees of Management were again introduced to take over the management of local authorities from the Sole Administrators. According to an insider in the State bureaucracy,

> this was in keeping with the principle of having civilian commissioners appointed to advise the government at both the State and Federal levels; also in order to keep the Military Administration as far as possible in touch with public opinion.\(^4\)

The rapid transfer of local government functions to Ministries/Departments and Boards/Corporations of the State Government dominated this period. The following

1. A Sole Administrator was a senior administrative officer in the State Civil Service. Usually, he was the Local Government Adviser or Divisional Officer in charge of the particular division in which the local government councils he is to administer were situated. A Sole Administrator had all the powers of an elected council.

2. These Committees were nominated bodies whose members performed exactly the same functions as a local government authority is empowered to perform.


catalogue deserves presentation:

1957: Agriculture and veterinary services were taken away by the State Government on the ground that the Councils had neither the staff nor the funds to develop these services.

1964: Local Government Police Forces were abolished and their personnel were handed over to the Nigeria Police.

The total district and local road mileage maintained by local authorities in Bendel State was 3,161. In addition, the Councils maintained some provincial roads on agency basis. The provincial roads plus some of the district roads have now been taken over by the State Government for direct maintenance.

1966: Public water undertakings owned by the local authorities were taken over by the Government on the ground that the councils did not have the capacity to operate them effectively. The schemes were handed over to a newly created Water Board.

1967: Customary Courts were taken over by the State Government for political reasons and handed over to the Judicial Department.

1968: With the establishment of the State and Local School Boards by the State Government, the general administration of all primary and post-primary institutions became the responsibility of these Boards and not the local government councils.

1969: The planning functions of Councils were taken over following the establishment of the Bendel Development and Planning Authority.

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1. The bulk of the information in this chronological presentation is from Oyemike, op.cit., pp.38-40.

1971: Forest services, forest staff and forest revenue were taken over by the State Government and handed to the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

1972: The establishment of the State Hospitals Management Board and the Divisional Hospitals Management Boards further eroded the health and medical functions of local governments. In addition, the maintenance of dispensaries and maternity homes was taken over by the Ministry of Health.

1973: The centralization fever moved from the local authorities to the headquarter organization for local governments. The Ministry of Local Government lost some of its functions to the Military Governor's Office; the Divisional Officers were transferred to the Military Governor's Office as "personal representatives of the Military Governor," in their areas of jurisdiction.1

1974: The centralization trend was completed when local government, as an institution, was abolished. A new method of local administration, with its tap-root in the State capital, was introduced in Bendel State.2

By the time of their final abolition, the functions performed by local governments had become a shadow of those provided by the Local Government Law of 1952 and 1957.

In 1974, the Councils' only effective functions were sanitation, public works, motor parks and market and maintenance of traditional offices.* Even in some of these

1. Secretary to the Military Government and Head of Service's Circular Letter on Field Administration, op.cit.

2. The centralization tendency was national. In the East Central and South Eastern States of Nigeria, similar patterns of local administration had been installed. The Western State introduced the Council-Manager Plan (a modified version of the American City-Manager Plan) and the Northern States introduced far-reaching reforms in which the State Governments had a greater say.

* Payment of allowances to Enigie, Oba, chiefs and other traditional rulers. These allowances are fixed.
areas, the local councils were not free from the State Government's interference. For example, the Councils could not allocate market stalls:

Councils, that is, Sole Administrators, now have to make recommendations to the Ministry (of Local Government) on market stalls to be allocated. No stall allocation is deemed to be effective or made until it has received the prior approval of the Ministry.¹

But the approval took a very long time to come from the Ministry. In the meantime, the village market woman stayed without a stall.

The centralization of rural development functions in the State bureaucracy may not be said to have promoted efficiency. It may be viewed as a means to maintain control and domination over the local people and to hinder their effective participation in their own development. In the words of a Government statement,

The ideal of modern local government as a training ground for future leadership... was foreign and beyond the comprehension of the masses. The idea of an elected body for local administration did not take account of the low level of literacy and the lack of appreciation on the part of the majority of the people... of the concept of local self government.²

To sum up, it was assumed that the people could not rule themselves. They must be regulated and controlled. Thus, their effective participation was not important.


² White Paper on Development Administration, p.5.

In December 1974, the new system of Development Administration came into effect. Development Councils (at the Divisional Level) and Development Committees (at the Clan level) were set up to take over from the abolished Local Government Councils. There were 14 Development Councils and 220* Development Committees in the State. The 14 Residents were the chief executives of the administrations in their areas. But the lower-level bodies were managed by subordinate officers on behalf of the Resident. As we have already noted in this chapter, all the staff of the Development Councils and Committees (excluding members) were civil servants. So, the Local Government Service Board was scrapped. A Development Council consisted of a chairman, the chairman of each of the Development Committees in the Division and other persons considered fit for appointment. The Resident was the Secretary. All members of Council were appointed by the Military Governor. Development Committees were composed of a chairman and other members, all of whom were also appointed by the Military Governor.

1. Development Administration Edict, 1974, S.6(1).
2. Ibid., S.7(1).
* This number included 4 Urban Development Committees (Asaba, Warri, Sapele and Benin City).
3. Development Committees were the lower-level bodies.
The Ministry of Local Government ceased to exist. The Government's policy statement directed that
the functions of the Ministry of Local Government... should be transferred to the Military Governor's
Office where they should be placed under the Department of Development Administration.¹

Development Councils were charged with a wide range of functions. These included provision and management of
public transport, organization and supervision of community farms and co-operatives, initiation and implementation of
schemes for rural development, construction and maintenance of local roads and bridges and provision as well as control
of motor parks. The Development Councils were also to exercise general supervision over the Development
Committees.² Development Committees were responsible for functions some of which were identical with those performed
by the Development Councils. The functions of Development Committees included organization and supervision of
community farming and co-operatives, provision of motor parks, maintenance of local roads, control of sanitation and
maintenance of traditional offices.³ A full list of the functions of Development Councils and Committees is
included as Appendix IV to this dissertation.

2. Development Administration Edict, 1974, S.17(1).
3. Ibid., S.26(1).
An assessment of the new system of local administration is necessary. On paper, the development councils and committees were given a wide range of functions. In practice, they were not provided with the funds and other resources to perform these functions. Because of their heavy dependence on the Resident and his staff, central bureaucratic policies and control adversely affected the effective management of Councils and Committees. We have noted how funds which were provided for in the approved Estimates were either not released or the little that was released came too late. We have also examined the intensity of the struggle for supremacy between the Headquarter Departments and the Residents on the one hand and the field representatives of the Ministries and Departments and the Residents on the other. Moreover, we have seen how the inability to provide accommodation and equipment delayed the inauguration of the Development Committees and hindered their performance. In the face of these constraints, both Councils and Committees were not able to achieve much in the one year of their existence.

Membership flaws also worked against the Development Councils and Committees. Members were not elected. They were appointed.¹ Many of the members were absentee members.

¹ The political scene in Nigeria during this period was not conducive to representative institutions. Political activities were banned. Those who were selected got the appointments on the basis of their role in local affairs and their relationship to State functionaries.
who lived in the urban centres. Yet they represented the rural areas. These members were usually businessmen, professionals or retired civil servants. Because of their urban base and their business involvements, they were usually absent from meetings of the bodies they were appointed to. Moreover, a social distance separated the people from their representatives. The members were not familiar with the peculiar problems of rural life. They were, therefore, not able to appreciate the remedies which were needed.

The principle of matching grants was an important innovation brought about by the new system of local administration. Although grants had been made to councils in the past and local communities had been given token grants in appreciation of their self-help projects, there had never been a commitment, on the part of the State government, to pay to local communities 100 per cent of the funds which they (the people) raised for development efforts. In addition to matching grants, the Development Committees were to retain the community taxes collected in their areas. In the past, this tax had been retained by the local council based at the divisional headquarters. The matching grant promise encouraged the local people to mobilize all their resources for self-help projects in their own areas.¹

¹ I was present at the launching of Development Committees in Benin East Division in August and September, 1975.
But in the end, Government did not live up to expectation. During the 1975/76 fiscal year, Government promised to pay N400,000 as matching grants to each Development Council for distribution among the Development Committees in its area. The bulk of this money was not paid by Government. As one Resident explained the financial picture of his Council, all the grants expected from Government to enable the Council pay matching grants to the Development Committees were not received. Out of the total expected grants of N453,536, only N91,408 was paid.

During the 1975/76 financial year, only about 20 per cent of the promised grant was paid to the Development Councils in the State. This discrepancy between the promulgated goals of development and the actual results of implementation efforts leads one to speculate that lip service was paid by the Government to the need to develop the rural areas. Funds were freely diverted to projects which were considered more important and there


was not enough to fulfil the promises made to the toiling masses in the rural areas, 1

But the matching grants, itself soon ran into operational difficulties. It was soon discovered that while the rich Development Committees, who were able to contribute more towards self-help projects, became richer, the poor ones who were able to contribute much less became poorer. This imbalance would have been partly remedied by the payment of an equal amount to all Development Committees, or by a combination of the equality and need principles. But in a situation where the money already approved was not paid by the Government, no adjustment in the formula would have made much difference.

The large number of Development Committees was also seen as a problem. According to this view, the number (220) proved rather unjustified because some of the committees were for such small areas that they could not be viable in undertaking meaningful development projects without regular government subvention. It was then argued that such a

1. An example of the execution of a prestigious project was the intention of the Government to build a multi-million Naira second stadium in Benin City during the 1975/76 financial year. Benin City already had an ultra-modern stadium. This pursuit of prestigious projects was to continue in later regimes. In 1977, the Bendel State Government proposed to demolish a High School in the capital city and build a N200 million hotel. Benin City already had surplus hotel accommodation. For a bitter attack on this proposal by a concerned citizen, see "An open Letter to Governor Abdullahi," by Air Iyare, Sunday Observer, Benin City, April 3, 1977, p.4.
situation was not in keeping with the spirit of "development administration" which placed a high premium on self-help with minimum financial assistance from the Government.\(^1\)

The Government was conscious of some of the defects of the system. In November 1975, it set up a panel to review the whole system. The Nwanwene Panel had just submitted its report when the Federal Government announced its intention of carrying out a reform, on a national basis, of the system of local government in the whole country. We will now briefly deal with the new reforms as they relate to Bendel State.

**The New Local Government System, 1976:**

Under the new system of local government, all the statutory and public functions of local government in Nigeria were concentrated in multi-purpose single-tier institutions called "Local Governments" with complete and self-contained budgets.\(^2\) The new bodies serve populations of between 150,000 and 800,000, as the case may be.\(^3\)

In Bendel State, 19 local governments were established.


3. Ibid. In Bendel State, for example, the average population of a local government is 20,000.
The functions of the new local governments are similar to those given to local governments under the 1952/57 Law. Appendix V shows the functions of the new local governments. The affairs of the new units are administered by a Council composed of elected and nominated members who hold office for three years. Elections are on a no-party basis. The chairman of the Council is appointed by the State Government on the recommendation of the Council. Local governments were generally advised to operate a Finance and General Purpose Committee and an Education Committee. The political control of local government departments by Council is exercised through a number of Supervisory Councillors (not exceeding four) each of whom is a chairman of a small committee concerned with the political direction of a group of departments or a single department such as education. These chairmen are political heads of the department or groups of departments and are automatically members of the Finance and General Purpose Committee. This Committee is the "Cabinet" of the Local Government Council.  

The Secretary to the Local Government is the title of the chief executive of the Council. He is responsible for the execution of the policy as well as the day-to-day running of the affairs of the local government.  

1. Ibid., p.9
departmental heads of the local government are responsible to the Secretary. In Bendel State, the Local Government Service Board was re-established to take charge of the recruitment, promotion and discipline of local government staff. The Board delegates some of its functions, in respect of certain junior personnel, to the chief executive of local governments. The new local governments derive their revenue from three main sources: (i) internal collections (property rates, community tax, fees, licences, etc.), (ii) statutory allocations (from both the Federal and State Governments) and (iii) loans.

It is pertinent to ask what is new in these reforms. At a glance, the reforms are not radically different from what had obtained in the Northern Nigerian Emirates before independence. In fact, the "supervisory councillor" approach is closely tailored after the "portfolio councillor" which was popular in Northern Nigeria. In the allocation of functions to local governments, no innovations have been introduced. A comparison of the functions of local governments under the 1952/57 Law and the functions now assigned to local governments by the Federal Guidelines (both lists of functions are attached as Appendices) easily supports this view. Also, the committee system and the cabinet approach to local administration had been widely practised in the three regions of Nigeria prior to 1966.

1. Ibid., S.88.
The first striking new element in the local government reform is the intervention of the Federal Government in local government affairs. For a very long time, the Federal Government had folded its arms and looked with indifference at the manipulation of local administration by the State governments. Even in the area of local government financing, all attempts to convince the Federal government to pay grants to local governments did not yield any dividends. As a part of the reforms, the Federal government allocated N100 million to the State governments for distribution to the new local governments. The basis for the distribution of this money was 25 per cent shared equally among the States and 75 per cent shared proportionately to total population. The same principle was used in the distribution of the money among the local governments in each State.

In 1977, the Federal Government decided that 5 per cent of retained Federal revenue will be allocated as statutory payments to local governments. The State governments were also required to allocate 10 per cent of their recurrent revenue to the local governments. Table 5 represents both Federal and State allocations to Local Governments in 1977/78 and projected Bendel State allocations for 1978/79:

1. For example, the 1969 National Conference on local government dealt with some of these issues. See The Future of Local Government in Nigeria, (Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1969).

2. Conclusions and recommendations of the National Conference on Local Government, held at the University of Ife, September 19-23, 1977, p.27.
### TABLE 5

**LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN BENDEL STATE: SUMMARY OF GRANTS FROM FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1977/78 AND 1978/79**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Government</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>1977/78 Allocations</th>
<th>1978/79 Projections (State Govt. only)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Agbazilo</td>
<td>200,340</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>407,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Akoko-Edo</td>
<td>167,232</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>330,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Aniocha</td>
<td>152,808</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>269,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bomadi</td>
<td>130,744</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>246,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Burutu</td>
<td>118,979</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>707,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ethiope</td>
<td>344,592</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>400,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Etsako</td>
<td>196,623</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>438,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Ika</td>
<td>213,997</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>400,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Isoko</td>
<td>195,200</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>400,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Ndokwa</td>
<td>239,000</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>400,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Okpe</td>
<td>161,479</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>315,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Okpehiko</td>
<td>193,826</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>400,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Orhionmwon</td>
<td>258,144</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>530,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Oshimili</td>
<td>126,951</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>261,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Ovia</td>
<td>179,331</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>369,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Owan</td>
<td>123,198</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>269,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Ughelli</td>
<td>250,118</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>515,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Warri</td>
<td>245,502</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>500,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,758,242</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,695,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Compiled from records in the Accounts Section, Ministry of Local Government, Benin City.

*Population is based on projected estimates, not the 1963 figures.*

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Another innovation of the reform is the emergence of local government as a meaningful third level of government in the Federation. What this means is that local governments are given adequate powers, funds and human resources to discharge their functions and that such functions and powers are clearly spelt out. The relationship between the three levels (Federal, State and Local) of government have been entrenched in the New Nigerian Constitution which comes into effect in October, 1979.

The third new element in the reform is the exclusion of party politics from local government elections. This arrangement has worked perfectly in countries like Canada. But given Nigeria's historical political development, it is yet too early to see how the next civilian government will be persuaded to keep local government free from party politics.

The first elections into local government councils in Nigeria were held in December 1976. Some of them were direct, others were indirect elections. Although the local government councils have functioned for well over a year now, it is too early to carry out an effective assessment of their performance. However, if deliberations at national conferences, newspaper reports and government statements are anything to go by,
it seems that the new local governments all over the country face some problems and challenges.\footnote{1} These problems include personality clashes between political functionaries (chairmen and Supervisory Councillors) and the chief executive (Secretary), and between councillors themselves.\footnote{2} Relationships between local governments and the Ministry of Local Government on the one hand and the Local Government Service Board on the other, delays in the payment of approved grants, mobilization of the people for mass participation in local government activities, and shortage of certain specialized personnel also pose some problems.

Another interesting development is the resurrection of corrupt practices in some local government councils. The notion is still present in the councils, as it is in the entire Nigerian society, that public office is a means for the acquisition of personal wealth. This is because of the Statist nature of Nigeria's political economy discussed in chapter two. As at March 31, 1978, in the whole country, 4 councils had been suspended.

\footnote{1}{For details of these problems and challenges, see John B. Idode, "The new local government system in Nigeria: a preliminary assessment of performance, problems and prospects," Paper prepared for the Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Administration, University of Ife, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, May, 1978.}

\footnote{2}{In some Councils, the clash has been so intense that scheduled council meetings could not be held for several months. An example is the Abeokuta Local Government, Ogun State.}
4 chairmen removed from office, 2 commissions of inquiry set up to investigate council's activities, and 3 calls made for the probing of councils.\textsuperscript{1} In Bendel State, some councillors of the suspended Oredo Local Government Council have been found guilty of malpractices by a Judicial Inquiry.\textsuperscript{2}

The challenges of the local governments relate to the functions which they are called upon to perform and the resources which are placed at their disposal. We have noted that a historical breakthrough had been made in local government financing in the country because of the commitment of the two senior levels of government (Federal and State) to provide funds for the local governments. The amount provided is minimal, compared with the enormous sums which these levels of government spend on urban development. It is hoped that the commitment is the beginning of the realization of the importance of local administration in rural development. To help local governments achieve some of the goals of rural development, they need to be strengthened through the provision of more funds, greater involvement of the local people and regular as well as timely release of funds.

\begin{enumerate}
\item This information was collected from a survey of 11 Nigerian newspapers.
\end{enumerate}
Some Concluding Remarks:

It is evident from our discussion in this chapter that reforms in the area of local administration in Nigeria have not led to a developmental breakthrough. Each of the reforms we have examined had sought to correct the shortcomings of the prevailing system. But the intervening action itself ended up in further complication and confusion. The result has been an endless list of local administrative changes. Local administration reforms in Nigeria, were, perhaps except until very recently, both by law and practice, obsessed with the maintenance of law and order and thus more with the laissez-faire principle of regulating the behaviour and activities of citizens, than with any conscious attempt to radically improve the economic base of the rural communities. Local government has, hitherto, been seen merely as a strategy for maintaining partisan political power through political jobbery and not as machinery for achieving rapid socio-economic development of rural communities by official action. The result is that, after more than half a century's "experience" in local administration, Nigeria's rural sector remains one of the best examples of stagnation and rural underdevelopment throughout the Third World. It is hoped that the 1976 local government reform, with its decentralized administra-
tive structures, will be the beginning of a change for the better.

In the light of the discussion in this chapter, there is ample reason to believe that local administrative reforms in Bendel State, and in other parts of Nigeria, have resulted in more centralization and bureaucratization, and the consequent impotence of local government institution. This conclusion does not, however, seem to apply strictly to the present local administrative changes, which began in late 1976. Local administration in Nigeria has been hindered in its contribution to rural development in the country.

It should be noted that in chapter four and the present chapter, no detailed attempt has been made to examine how the reformed administrative structures specifically touched the lives of the rural people. If anything, our discussion of administrative reforms has shown how the problems of rural development cannot be solved by the mere strengthening of administrative capacities, without the full and effective involvement of the people themselves. The actual performance of the bureaucracy in the process of rural development will be examined in the next four chapters.
CHAPTER SIX

THE ROLE OF THE BUREAUCRACY IN AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT: AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENTS
AND RELATED SCHEMES

The current (1975-80) Development Programme* of
Bendel State of Nigeria sets out to achieve the following
objectives in its agricultural policy: (i) increased
production of food, raw materials and export crops;
(ii) fuller utilisation of the abundant land, water and
human resources whose productive capacities are currently
underutilised; and (iii) the removal of bottlenecks to
increased productivity and the application of improved
technology to major food and industrial crops.1

The measures by which the plan hoped to achieve
these objectives include organization of adequate and
timely supplies of improved planting materials, livestock,
fertilizer, chemicals and equipment; supply of adequate
and timely farm credit in kind and cash; improvement of
production techniques and management including the

* Except where otherwise stated, Development Programme
or Development Plan refers to that of Bendel State.

1. Midwestern State of Nigeria Programme (1975-80) of
The Third National Development Plan, 1975-80, (Benin

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introduction of mechanized farming; and promotion of co-operative group farms.\textsuperscript{1} The 1970-74 development plan\textsuperscript{2} as well as two previous development plans,\textsuperscript{3} since the creation of Bendel State in 1963, also named identical objectives of increasing agricultural productivity and various measures for achieving the goal. The Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the main bureaucratic organization charged with the responsibility of achieving the objectives stated in the agricultural policy.

We need to remember that the central hypothesis in this thesis is that the bureaucracy can be the principal agent for effective rural development. As we have noted in chapter one, this thesis argues that other factors, such as mass participation, are more important if rural development is to be effective and benefit the majority of the rural dwellers. One factor which should engage our attention in this chapter and the next is the peasant farmer. A sub-hypothesis to be investigated in these two chapters is that Bendel State's bureaucracy

\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid., pp.15-16.
\item These are Midwestern Nigeria Development Plan, 1964-68, (Benin City: Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1965) and Midwestern State Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Programme, 1968-70, (Benin City: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 1968).
\end{enumerate}
(the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources) has helped to develop peasant agriculture. In order to explore this argument, this chapter will first discuss the organization of the Ministry, with particular emphasis on the Agricultural Extension Division, since it is this division that goes deepest into rural development activities. Secondly, this chapter will examine specific measures which have been tried in the efforts to achieve rural development through agricultural development. The strategies to be treated are farm settlements, school leavers' farms and community farms. Finally, the chapter will draw conclusions as to whether or not the measures examined have benefited the peasant farmer in Bendel State.
Organization for Rural Development

In order to place the organization of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources in its historical context, the colonial approach to agricultural development deserves a brief summary. From 1900, when the British effectively colonized Nigeria to the end of the second world war in 1945, colonial agricultural policy aimed at the conduct of research for purposes of boosting the production of cash crops like cocoa, palm oil and palm kernels, which were in strong demand in Europe. In the words of a scholar of Nigeria's economic history,

The British government encouraged the establishment of agricultural plantations, sponsored or approved by the Nigerian government, for the purposes of introducing new crops and for the improvement of existing crops.¹

For example, cocoa was introduced into Nigeria from Brazil in the early thirties.

Between 1916 and 1942, the agricultural experimental stations established included Moore Plantation at Ibadan (1912-16), Agricultural Experimental Stations at Umuahia and Zaria (1923), the School of Agriculture at Ibadan (1927), the Agricultural Station at Samaru near Zaria (1934), and the Veterinary School at Vom (1942).\(^1\) In the post-war period, a number of specialized research bodies were established to attack particular problems, in addition to the research conducted directly by the Department of Agriculture in the experimental stations. These new research bodies included the West African Cocoa Research Institute, the West African Institute for Oil Palm Research, and the West African Stored Products Research Unit.\(^2\) In 1961, the faculties of agriculture in the then three Nigerian universities at Ibadan, Zaria and Nsukka, joined in agricultural research.

As independence approached in 1960, the agricultural policy shifted emphasis. There was the need to link research findings to agricultural production and extension services on a wide scale. This shift of policy enhanced the

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1. Ibid., pp.159-160.
role of the Ministries of Agriculture which were created at the regional (state) levels of government in 1954. The new agricultural policy took three major institutional forms: (a) the spreading of new techniques to peasant farmers through demonstrations, incentive schemes, credit facilities etc.; (b) the establishment of large-scale, relatively capital intensive plantations (or estates) using the most up-to-date knowledge of cultivation practices, seeds, fertilizer etc.; and (c) the establishment of large-scale co-operative schemes (especially in Eastern Nigeria) where farmers were required substantially to reorganize their way of life so as to maximize the possibility for the use of modern technology.¹

These developments necessitated the reorganization of the Ministries of Agriculture in Nigeria. Until 1965, agriculture was a State, and not a Federal, responsibility. Since 1965, the Federal government has created a Ministry of Agriculture to co-ordinate all agricultural activities in the country. The Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development now operates through a number of departments, amongst

¹. Ibid.
which are Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry and Fishery.\(^1\) Agricultural extension still remains the responsibility of the state governments. In the Western Region of Nigeria, the Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for the execution of the Regional Government's new agricultural policy. When the Midwestern Region (Bendel State) was carved out of the Western Region in 1963, the new regional government inherited the nucleus of its Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

The present organization of Bendel State's Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources is a result of the recommendations of a two-man committee appointed in 1972 "to familiarize themselves with the facilities in the Ministry, spotlight weaknesses and make recommendations"\(^2\) for the improvement of the research and extension services provided by the Ministry. Following the acceptance of the committee's report, the Ministry was reorganized into seven divisions: Research

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and Planning, Agricultural Extension, Produce Inspection, Forestry, Fisheries, Veterinary and Administration. The picture is presented in Diagram IV.

The professional functions of the Ministry are divided into two sectors - agricultural services sector and natural resources sector. Each sector contains three divisions as shown in Diagram IV. The Administration, Finance and Establishments Division (which is the seventh division and headed by an administrative officer of Deputy Permanent Secretary rank) provides support services. The agricultural extension division, which is our main interest, is headed by a Chief Agricultural Officer. He is immediately assisted by five Assistant Chief Agricultural Officers who are heads of branches within the division. The agricultural services branch deals with food and tree crops and livestock; the farm group branch handles the farm settlement schemes, community farms, school leavers' farms and farmers' co-operatives; and the liaison and information branch is concerned with the dissemination of information.1

DIAGRAM IV

ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND
NATURAL RESOURCES AS AT MARCH, 1978

Commissioner (Minister)

Permanent Secretary

Director of
Agric.

Director of Nat.
Resources

Chief Res-
arch & Plan-
ing Officer
(Research & Planning Div)

Chief Agric. Officer

Chief Produce Officer

Chief Ext. Div.

Chief Coms. of Forestry Division

Chief Fisheries Div.

Chief Vet. Div.

Chief Off-
cer

Chief Offi-
cer

Chief Offi-
cer

Chief Offi-
cer

Sec.for
Admin.

Fin. &
Estab.

(A.F.
& E.
Div.)

5 Deputy Chief
Agric. Officers
(heading 5 Branches)

19 Principal Agric. Officers (one
in each of the 19 Local
Government Areas)

Source: Constructed from the 1977/78 Bendel State
of Nigeria Estimates, (Benin City: Ministry
Outside the headquarters organization, the division is divided into 19 agricultural areas, corresponding to the 19 local government areas in the State. Each agricultural area is headed by a Principal Agricultural Officer. Some other divisions of the Ministry, such as fisheries, forestry and produce inspection, also have field officers (but of lesser rank to the Principal Agricultural Officer) posted to the field establishment. In the field, the basic extension unit is the agricultural assistant zone which covers a radius of about 25 kilometers. It is the Agricultural Assistants who interact more with the farmers. Before the new local government system, there were 133 agricultural assistant zones in the then 14 administrative divisions of the State. The number of zones has increased with the new local government reforms already discussed in chapter five.

The basic task of the Agricultural Extension Division is to teach the farmer advanced farming techniques with a view of improving his productivity.¹ This is done through a number of agricultural inputs which include bush clearing and tractor hiring, provision of improved seedlings and livestock, fertilizer supply, agricultural credits and advice to the farmers. As a means of arresting the drift of

1. Ibid.
population from the rural to the urban areas, the division is also engaged in operations designed to encourage people to live in the rural areas. These operations include the farm settlement scheme, community farms programme and the school leavers' farms.\textsuperscript{1} The agricultural extension division is also concerned, in varying degrees, with matters affecting farmers' unions and co-operatives, and government boards operating large-scale farms.

Having briefly sketched the organization of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources for rural development efforts, the stage is set for an examination of the actual activities of the Ministry in the task of rural development.

**Farm Settlements:**

The importance of agriculture in rural development has long been realised in Nigeria even before Bendel State was created in 1963. As early as 1959, various approaches (for example, farm settlements and school leavers' farms) aimed at improving rural income and welfare, were embarked upon by the Western Nigerian Government.\textsuperscript{2} Some of the farm settlements and school leavers' farms were inherited by the Midwestern Nigerian Government when the Midwest Region was

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{2} Dupe Olatunbosun, "Farm Settlements and School Leavers' Farms - Profitability, Resource Use, and Social-Psychological Considerations", (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Michigan State University, 1967), examines the operation of this policy in Western Nigeria.
created in 1963. It is not surprising then that in its
first Development Plan, 1964–68, the new region paid
considerable attention to farm settlements and school
leavers' farms in its agricultural policy.¹

The farm settlement scheme began in 1950/60 as a
part of an integrated rural and agricultural development
programme launched by the then Western Regional Government.
The Eastern and Northern Regional Governments of Nigeria
also adopted the scheme,² though in varied forms. The
thinking behind the scheme was that selected young men
should be trained and then established on the settlements.
They would develop their holdings under the direction
of the field staff of the Ministries of Agriculture.
Free tenure of holdings would be secured; high quality
planting materials would be used; supervision and
credit would be supplied.³ The settlements were
designed to show that farming could be both a
profitable and an attractive way of life and it was
hoped that the settlements would encourage young men
to consider farming as a way of earning their livelihood.

2. For further discussion of these schemes, see "Eastern
Nigeria Settlement Scheme", Supplement to Agricultural
Bulletin 2, (Enugu: Ministry of Agriculture, n.d.) and
Western Nigeria Farm Settlement Scheme, (Ibadan:
in A.A. Ayida and H.M.A. Onitiri, eds., Reconstruction
and Development, (Ibadan: Oxford University Press and
Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research,
The settlers in the Western Region were to be trained at the Farm Institute for a period of two years in practical farming before being accommodated in the settlements in their own areas. The settlers were to have at least primary six education.¹ In the Eastern Region, the educational qualification and long period of training were not required.

The integrated nature of the schemes envisaged that each settlement would consist of a village centre comprising a school, health centre, post office, co-operative shops, water and roads. This meant that other Ministries such as Works and Transport, Health, and Co-operatives, would be directly involved. The governments estimated that by 1967 there might be about three million unemployed school leavers in Eastern and Western Nigeria alone.² Farm settlement was seen as a way of arresting the flow of these young people to the towns. The settlements would also serve as model centres for demonstrating modern farming practices and the potentialities of farming.

When it was created in 1963, the Mid West Region (Bendel State) inherited from the Western Region, four farm settlements, located at Mbiri, Ekpoma, Utagba-Uno,


². Oluwasanmi, op.cit., p.150.
and Iguoriakhi. In 1975, the farm settlements consisted of 491 settlers, farming on 5,247 hectares of land.

The operation of the farm settlement scheme was faced with several problems. The government soon discovered that the lengthy training period (2 years) for the prospective settler, the removal of the farmers from their "traditional, conservative environment" to places where they would be more amenable to the advice of experts, and the dominant role of the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources made the farmers regard themselves as labourers working on government farms for low pay.¹

Because of the method of operation of the farm settlements, the farmers lost initiative to the bureaucrats. In the first decade of its operation, the farm settlement scheme operated as follows:

The farmer's land is plowed for him; he plants seeds given to him in prescribed rotation; he fertilizes and cultivates as recommended, and he hands over the crops for processing and marketing - all of which operations he is financially responsible. In addition, his house is built for him, and his farm labourers are hired and paid by the government - which expenses the Farmer must also repay. This extensive control has helped to reduce the farmer's status from that of an owner/operator to a labourer acting under orders.²

See also Table 5.
As a result of the farmer's feeling of powerlessness under this rigidly administered operation, conflict existed between the few officers who commanded and the many farmers who obeyed. The end product was lack of interest in the farm settlement and consequently desertion. For example, although there were over 800 settlers in the farm settlements in Bendel State at the time the state was created in 1963, the number had dropped to 472 by 1976, as shown in Table 6.

The direct control by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources's headquarters organization also adversely affected the operation of the farm settlements. Like all government departments, the Ministry operated on the basis of bureaucratic rules and regulations. Since the farm settlements were directly run as government projects, with all the related red tape and financial instructions and controls, undesirable delays and uneven flow of cash for development have resulted. The strong government role directed from the headquarters also rendered the farmers irrelevant in the decision-making processes in the farm organization. Direct control of expenditures and hiring of labour were effected, not on the farm, but from the distant headquarters. The field
officers merely carried out the orders on the farmers.

The farm settlement scheme was also very expensive. During the first development plan period (1964-68) of the Midwestern State government, an annual maintenance cost of N160,000 was approved for the scheme.¹ The State's reconstruction and rehabilitation programme of 1968-70 earmarked N480,000 for the farm settlements.² The 1970-74 Development Plan provided the sum of N746,680 for the consolidation of the four farm settlements in Bendel State.³ The current Third Development Programme, 1975-80, estimated a capital expenditure of N500,000 for the farm settlement scheme.⁴ Thus, the Bendel State government committed a total of N1,886,680* for the farm settlement scheme from 1964 to 1980. This figure does not represent the expenditure during the Western Region era - prior to 1964, when the first Bendel State development plan


* See Table 8 below.
was published. In the Western Region, it was estimated that it would cost between ₦5,000 to ₦6,000 to settle each farmer. The estimated net income of each settler was put at about ₦444 per annum. But results to date do not meet the estimated income from many of the farm settlements. The total cost of the scheme, during the 1962-68 development plan of the Western Region, was estimated at ₦60 million.¹

Another problem arose from the government's failure to live up to expectations in its promise to provide adequate amenities at the farm settlements. The lack of good access roads, health centres, pipe-borne water, electricity, markets and schools contributed to the lack of interest in the scheme. As an official reporting on the state of the farm settlements observed,

... the lack of these amenities, which we promised in the original set-up, has adversely affected progress) in the farm settlements, and contributed largely to the frequent desertions by settlers.²

As a result of the problems encountered in the operation of the farm settlement scheme, the Bendel

1. Oluwasanmi, op.cit., p.50.
2. Report on Farm Settlements, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Benin City, p.3.
State government set up a committee in 1965 "to examine the existing farm settlement policy, study the existing set-up and running of the settlements in the Region, review the policy... and make recommendations."¹ The Oyolu committee's recommendations, which included the reduction of the size of the holdings from 8.78 hectares to 4.88 hectares and the provision of more social amenities at the farm settlements, were not implemented by 1971.² In 1971, another committee was appointed to examine the farm settlement scheme and make recommendations. The Okpaise committee recommended the abolition of the scheme and the transfer of the control of the rubber aspect of the scheme to the Midwest Rubber Development Agency, the oil palm farms to the Oil Palm Company and the arable farms to the Midwest Food Production Company.³ These recommendations were not accepted by the government. On their part, the

2. Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Benin City, Direct Inquiry.
3. Ibid.
various companies considered the farm settlements uneconomical to operate. They were not, therefore, interested in the take-over bid.

The Government's reaction to these recommendations was the reactivation of the farm settlements along commercial lines. In order to remove bureaucratic bottlenecks, a Sole Administrator (a civil servant from the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources) was appointed to run the farm settlements without reference to the Farm Settlement Advisory Committee at headquarters. The sole administrator was to be assisted by a Unit Manager at each of the farm settlements.1 Social amenities were to be provided by the farm communities with assistance by the government. Other reforms included the intensification of the supply of various inputs like point-of-lay pullets, increased mechanization, short-term credit facilities and the exploitation of the unallocated holdings. Programmes for the installation of facilities for oil palm processing and the establishment of an organized marketing machinery for all farm products and inputs were also to be

carried out. The accommodation problem for the farm community was also tackled. Some 246 houses for settlers, community halls and four houses for unit managers were built in the four farm settlements.

Thus, as at October, 1976, the four farm settlements in Bendel State presented the statistical information supplied in Table 6. These re-organizations resulted in a total of 5,246.12 hectare of farmland, improvement of the poultry farms and a significant rise in the overall output of the farm settlements.

But while the scope of operation of the farm settlements increased, the number of settlers either declined or remained constant.1 Based on the population of settlers which was put at about 470, the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources estimated the average settler's income to be ₦300.00 per month in 1977.2

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1. We have already noted in this chapter that in 1964, there were about 800 settlers in the farm settlements in Bendel State. The population has declined steadily. Since 1971, the number of settlers remain in the neighbourhood of 470.

2. See "A resume of the activities of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources for the period April, 1976 to March, 1977," (Benin City: Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources - Memeographed).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTICULARS</th>
<th>UTAGBA-UNO</th>
<th>MBIRI</th>
<th>IGUORI AKHI</th>
<th>EKPOMA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. COMMUNITY POPULATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Settlers</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>2,866</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>4,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Wives</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Children and others</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Staff and labourers</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>1,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1,287</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. GENERAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Total Hectarage</td>
<td>546.4 Hec.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1880.0 Hec.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Roads</td>
<td>14.5 km.</td>
<td>40 km.</td>
<td>10.56 km.</td>
<td>11 km.</td>
<td>75.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Staff Quarters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Settlers' Houses</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Settlers' Dormitories</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Settlers' Comm. Hall</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. POULTRY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Poultry Houses</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Poultry Pop. layers</td>
<td>4,428</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,360</td>
<td>1,521</td>
<td>1,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Poultry Pop. broilers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Average Egg Production</td>
<td>48,708</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>36,960</td>
<td>18,252</td>
<td>163,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Month</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. OIL PALM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Oil Palm Hectarage</td>
<td>186 hec.</td>
<td>391 hec.</td>
<td>140.9 hec.</td>
<td>240 hec.</td>
<td>957.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Average oil Production</td>
<td>405 Lits.</td>
<td>6,356 lits.</td>
<td>935.5 lits.</td>
<td>1,530 lits.</td>
<td>1,530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## TABLE 6 (CONT'D.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTICULARS</th>
<th>UTAGBA-UNO</th>
<th>MBIRI</th>
<th>IGUORIAKHI</th>
<th>EKPOMA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. RUBBER:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Rubber - Total Hectrage</td>
<td>74 hec.</td>
<td>225 hec.</td>
<td>51.2 hec.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>350.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Rubber - Lump Production</td>
<td>187 kg.</td>
<td>600 kg.</td>
<td>100.0 kg.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Month</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. FARM MACHINERY:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Tractors</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Land-Rovers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Lorries</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
- Pop. - Population
- hec. - hectares
- lits. - litres
- kg. - kilograms
- km. - kilometres

**Source:** Compiled from farm settlements records in the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Benin City, Nigeria.
Despite these reorganizations, the farm settlement scheme has not proved to be an adequate solution to the problems of rural stagnation. Its effect on surrounding peasant farmers have been found to be insignificant. Out of the 200 farmers interviewed in Western Nigeria, only 15.5 per cent had adopted improved seed and/or livestock, and only 8 per cent had emulated the better layout and fuller utilisation of land followed by the farm settlements.1 Farm settlements have also not become important creators of employment. In mid 1964, for example, all the farm settlements in Western Nigeria employed only 1,170 farmers; yet over 50 per cent of 108,000 new primary six school leavers each year were unemployed.2 Table 6 indicates that in Bendel State, the four farm settlements provided employment for 1,840 persons, comprising 472 settlers and 1,368 staff and labourers. When compared with the massive problems of rural development, this record of the farm settlements is clearly unimpressive.


2. Ibid.
As a matter of fact, the farm-settlement scheme has not made any significant contribution to agricultural development in Nigeria. Almost two decades after their introduction, the farm settlements have become unpopular institutions. In Northern Nigeria, they were generally allowed to fade into oblivion as the new states that were created out of the former Northern Region did not make provision for the maintenance or expansion of the farm settlements in their estimates. In the Eastern Region, where they were relatively more successful, community plantations (another name for the farm settlements) have not been reactivated since the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970.\footnote{See Smock and Smock, \textit{op. cit.}, which gives an accurate picture of post 1970 situation of settlement schemes in the Eastern States of Nigeria.} In Bendel State and the former Western Region, the above discussion has shown that farm settlements were not effective instruments for rural development and that efforts to reorganize them have not been successful. Indeed, the population of settlers in the farm settlements in Bendel State dropped from 800 in 1964 to 472 in 1976, as we have seen in this chapter. It is suggested, therefore, that the farm settlement scheme, as practised in Nigeria,
offers very little hope of developing peasant agriculture. We will venture more thoughts on this issue later, after a discussion of the school leavers' farm project. This point is made because the farm settlements and the school leavers' farms are closely related.

**School Leavers' Farms**

The school leavers' farms project is similar to the farm settlement scheme in many respects, except that whereas the farm settlers were drawn from within 48 kilometers radius of the farm and lived on the farm, the school leavers lived in the village and were natives of the immediate community (not living within 48 kilometers radius of the farm) in which the farm was situated. According to the government's policy on the school leavers' farms, the project was

...in conformity with the integrated rural development programme which aimed at motivating the rural communities to participate in activities for the improvement of their standard of living and at the same time helping to reduce the fast growing unemployment problems resulting from the yearly increasing number of school leavers.¹

Under the project, young school leavers were to be trained to develop interest in agriculture and fishery and to create the means whereby they might most

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effectively practise what they had been taught. The communities provided the land and fishing sites and the government provided the funds.

Each school leavers' farm comprised about 900 to 1,000 acres and each participant was to have 10 acres for cash crops and 2 acres for food crops. The programme was started in 1964 and twenty farms were planned during the 1964-68 development plan period at a capital cost of N39,960. The number of farms rose from 4 in 1964 to 20 in 1967 (including 2 fishing projects). The number of participants totaled 800. By 1969, however, the number of participants dropped to 443. The population of the farms, the income from arable crops and acres of permanent (cash crops) already planted, are presented in Table 7 below.

1. Ibid.
### Table 7

**Scope of Operation of the School Leavers' Farms, 1968/69**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of School Leavers' Farm</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
<th>Total Income From Arable Crops</th>
<th>No. of Acres of Permanent crops Already Planted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Igieduma</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Obadan</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Onicha/Olona</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ebu</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Illah</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ogwashi-Uku</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ute-Ogbeje</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Oyomo/Ubajaje</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Ohordua</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. South-Ibie</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Warake</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Ikiran-Ile</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Jesse</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Omadino-Obodo</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Irri</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Ushie</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Utohi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Emu-Uno</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>443</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,576</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,200</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Appendix I to The 1968/69 Annual Report of the Community Development Division, Benin City, Nigeria.*
The school leavers' farm project operated under the Ministry of Economic Development until 1975 when it was transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. But at the time of the take-over, many of the participants had left and the scheme had been abandoned. The Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources has been considering attempts to revive the school leavers' farms within the new community farms programme. So far, these attempts have not yielded any dividend.

Some of the observations (such as lack of interest by the participants, rigid bureaucratic control and excessive cost of operation) made in respect of the farm settlement scheme also apply to the school leavers' farms. In addition to these observations, however, conflicting roles of bureaucratic organizations, also worked against the school leavers' farms. The Rural Development Organizer (RDO), based in the Community Development Division of the Ministry of Economic Development, was responsible for organizing the school leavers into the farms. But in the actual
operation of these farms, the division lacked the expertise for extension services and the provision of other agricultural inputs. This function belonged to the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources which had its own priorities in field administration and rural development. The Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources was in charge of the farm settlement scheme. The existence of these two parallel organizations and the operation of farm settlements side by side with school leavers' farms led to duplication of efforts and waste of scarce resources. It is not surprising that the school leavers' farms were later transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. But unfortunately, the school leavers' farms project had died a natural death before the much belated transfer. In Eastern Nigeria, conflict over bureaucratic roles and duplication of efforts by government Ministries also hampered the effective operation of the community plantations and farm settlements in that Region.1

The problem of duplication by the Bendel State bureaucracy in its efforts to develop the rural areas, was compounded in 1968 when the government introduced the farmers' crusade project. This was a special scheme intended to reduce unemployment, rehabilitate persons displaced as a result of the Nigerian national crisis of 1966-70, and orientate young people to improve farming.¹ We must note that this is the third in these chains of projects directed exclusively at the young farmer, particularly the school leaver. This is why the objectives of the farmers' crusade bear close similarities to those of the farm settlements and the school leavers' farms. Seven areas were opened for the production of swamp and upland rice, palm oil, maize, rubber and cotton. It was expected that during the 1968-70 reconstruction and rehabilitation plan period, 2,350 acres of farmland, worked by between 1,500 and 2,000 crusaders and supplementary labourers, would be established at a cost of N544,000.² These targets were not met by 1970

2. Ibid.
and in the 1970-74 development plan, production in the crusaders' farms was limited only to swamp rice, cotton and maize, at an estimated cost of \( \text{₦1,287,800} \) for the entire plan period.

It is now appropriate to return once again to our sub-hypothesis in this chapter. We seek to know whether these attempts by the bureaucracy to develop the rural areas, through agricultural development, have promoted peasant agriculture. The weight of our material seems to support the contrary view. The farm settlements scheme and the school leavers' farms paid too much attention to the problems of the school leavers to the neglect of the real issues in rural development - the problems of the peasant farmers, who form the overwhelming majority of the farming population. Because of the pre-occupation with the problems of the school leavers, educational qualifications (primary six certificate), which most of the peasant farmers do not possess anyway, and long training periods are stipulated for eligibility in these schemes. It is suggested that rural development efforts should be focused on making

\[1. \text{Development Plan, 1970-74, pp.19-20.}\]
farming adequately remunerative for peasant producers and village life sufficiently attractive. This approach would involve better prices for farm output, provision of adequate incentives for the average peasant farmer to improve his output, provision of good feeder roads, health and medical facilities, improved educational institutions and a host of other social services. If this were done, school leavers would be encouraged to remain in the field of agriculture rather than joining the ranks of urban unemployed. Urban migration in Nigeria is not as much a function of the comforts and excitement offered by city life as of the urban-rural differentials in wage and income potential. If a higher proportion of the export prices for such commodities as palm oil and palm kernels, rubber and cocoa went to the producer and less to the government, rural income could increase significantly and farming would become a more attractive occupation to young people.

1. In chapter three, we discussed the exploitative role of the marketing boards. We saw them as means by which the government expropriated profits from the farmers and directed such money to projects which did not benefit the rural people. As Heilleiner has estimated, taking all boards together, the sum of N726 million had been withheld by the marketing boards from the farmers by 1962 representing approximately 32 per cent of potential producer income. See Heilleiner, op.cit., p.163.
As practised in both Western and Midwestern (Bendel State) Nigeria, the farm settlement scheme and the school leavers' farms were preoccupied with the interest of the educated individual farmer, rather than the collective welfare of the generality of the farming population. Even for the few who participated in the schemes, bureaucratic control over the operations, we have noted, killed their enthusiasm and initiative. Perhaps, if the settlements were organised on purely co-operative basis and the co-operators given a large degree of autonomy and initiative in the management of their farms, the settlements would have performed better. In Eastern Nigeria, where settlement schemes were relatively more effective, they were organised on co-operative basis and the strict educational qualifications and long period of training (which favoured the school leavers only) which dominated the schemes in the Western Region and Bendel State were not known. Also in the Eastern Region, the co-operators were given some measure of autonomy in the conduct of farming activities. Perhaps, viable co-operative organizations in which the members were given the opportunity to plan and execute their projects, with technical guide from extension workers and free from immediate bureaucratic control of Ministry of Agriculture, would have committed the settlers more to the success of the scheme. In Nigeria, experience
in the Eastern Region from 1962-67 has shown that co-operative farming, in which the members were freer to own the means of production and participate freely and effectively in work planning and execution, holds immense potential for rural development. According to Smock and Smock,

"...despite the considerable operational problems facing the community plantation programme, this approach to the development of large parts of Eastern Nigeria's rural areas holds enormous potentials." 1

However, one significant (though minimal) advantage of the farm settlements and school leavers' farms has been the impact they had on the rural communities in which they existed. More rural farmers began to adopt modern farming techniques, such as use of fertilizer, improved seeds and livestock and adoption of better layout and full utilization of land. 2

The farm settlements also provided markets for the surplus produce of surrounding farmers, and enabled them to buy some of their needs in the form of seeds, eggs and fruits. 3

But these advantages are, by no means, worthy of the huge capital outlay* on farm settlements and school leavers' farms.

2. See Adegoye, Basu and Olatunbosun, op.cit.
3. Ibid.

*The cost of these projects has already been discussed in this chapter. See also Table 8.
Another ambitious and expensive agricultural project mounted by the Bendel State government in its endeavour to "modernize" traditional agriculture is the community farm project. A discussion of this project is now due.

**Community Farms:**

Like farm settlements and school leavers' farms, community farms were expected to serve as a medium for the rapid modernization of the traditional agricultural sector in Bendel State. The community farms scheme was launched in February, 1973, to encourage farmers to merge their farmlands into one contiguous area, in order to facilitate the supply of such inputs as mechanization services, fertilizer, improved seeds and intensive farmer training facilities.

The government identified a major constraint in rapid agricultural development as the high cost of bush clearing. To minimise the drudgery of human labour, the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources introduced subsidized mechanised bush clearing and tractor hiring services. Under the community farms scheme, bush clearing was carried out free of charge for small-scale farmers farming on a collective basis.
Each farmer in the group was entitled to 2 hectares. It was thus expected that farmers would be able to farm more hectarage.\textsuperscript{1} Medium and large-scale farmers paid 25 per cent of the cost of bush clearing. During the 1976/77 financial year, about 400 hectares of land were cleared in 12 locations in the State. It was hoped that 1,000 hectares in some 15 different locations would be cleared by the end of the 1977/78 planting season.\textsuperscript{2} During the current (1975-80) development plan period, it was estimated that 2,000 hectares of land be cleared annually. The estimated capital expenditure is N1.8 million.\textsuperscript{3} The revised plan increased this amount to N5 million; N1.8 million was appropriated for the 1976/77 fiscal year and N1.2 million was spent in the 1977/78 financial year.\textsuperscript{4} However, the targets specified in

\begin{enumerate}
\item Interviews with the Deputy Chief Agricultural Officer (Group Farms), Benin City, on June 22, 1978.
\item A Resume of the activities of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources for the period April 1976 - March 1977, (Benin City: Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, mimeograph).
\item Development Programme, 1975-80, p.22.
\end{enumerate}
the plan have not been met. Although the plan estimated that 2,000 hectares would be cleared annually, only 400 hectares were actually cleared in 1976/77.\(^1\) About 1,000 hectares were proposed for clearance during the 1977/78 planting year - 50 per cent of the estimate in the development plan.

At the initial stage in 1973, 42 community farms were cleared. As demand increased, however, government was not able to meet the request of more communities for farm clearance. There was a shortage of bulldozers and other farm machinery. For the farms that were cleared, the normal extension services, involving land preparation, fertilizing, planting and crop treatment, followed. But these extension services were not adequately provided by the extension staff of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. While the farmers complained that the Ministry's personnel were not able to reach them on time, the bureaucrats complained of shortage of staff and equipment. For the farmers, the planting season was usually past before extension workers showed up.

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Evidence of these shortages and delays which hinder development efforts abound in the operation of the community farms project. For example, in his situation progress report on the project in May, 1977, a reporting officer wrote:

At the Agenebode Satellite Farm, no clearing has been done. The Tiffany authorities promised once again yesterday, to move their machinery into the place today. The excuse given for not moving the dozers into the area earlier was that they could not obtain low-loader for the job... There are some 25 farmers forming the co-operative society that will operate this farm.1

Even where the bush was cleared and ploughed, appropriate seeds were not available, as was the case of the 100-member Agbede Satellite Farm.2

The idea of community farms, as introduced by the Bendel State government, does not seem to have penetrated the vast farming population of the State. At the beginning of the programme in 1973, about 40 communities took part, but by June, 1978, only 20 communities (50 per cent of the initial number) remained to participate.3 The number of farmers in

1. *Situational Progress Report up to 23rd May, 1977, on the community farm project*, (Benin City: Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, memo.)

2. Ibid.

each community farm project ranged from 20 to 120.1
Based on a very generous estimate, a maximum of 4,000
farmers must have participated in the scheme. Even
given the very conservative estimate of 300,000 bona
fide farmers in the State, by the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and Natural Resources,2 the number of farmers who
took part in the project could be said to be minimal.
In a majority of the cases, the farmers who participated
were organized and led by a few "progressive" farmers
who tried to use the peasants as a means of achieving
their personal economic ends. Studies3 in
rural development in Africa have shown the
enormous influence which these "economic activists"
("capitalist" or "progressive" farmers) have on rural

1. Interviews, op.cit.

2. In 1975, the Ministry estimated the number of farmers
in Bendel State at "about 300,000"; See "Briefs on
Agricultural Extension Services Division," op.cit.,
p.3. This appears to be the number of farmers
"registered" with the Ministry. These figures, how-
ever, are far from being accurate. In its Rural Econo-
mic Survey, 1975/76, the Statistics Division of the
Ministry of Economic Development estimated the number of
farmers in the State at 1,146,640. This seems to be a
more realistic estimate in a State which is vastly rural
and whose population is predominantly engaged in peasant
agricultural production. See Chapter Three.

3. For an example, see Mahassin Khider and Morag C.
Simpson, "Co-operatives and Agricultural Development in
the Sudan," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.VI,
No.4 (1968), pp.509-518; and John S. Saul, "Marketing
Co-operatives in a Developing Country," (Paper
co-operative organizations and their members. The thrust of this argument is that the community farm project did not serve the interests of the majority of peasant farmers in Bendel State. Under the project, the capitalist large and medium scale farmers were also able to clear large parcels of farm land at heavy (75 per cent) State subsidy. The capitalist farmers, because of their education and familiarity with the sort of agricultural inputs which the Ministry provided, were in a better position to attract the services of the few extension workers. Focusing on the general trend in African extension services, Uma Lele has argued that the use of the progressive farmers as the vehicle for generating mass support seems to result in undue concentration of extension efforts on the relatively better-off members of the community. Through such an approach, he further argued, the neediest members of the community may be frequently

overlooked in many programmes. While we have not shown in the case of Bendel State that the extension workers visit only the capitalist farmers, we have shown that the policies and projects selected for examination here (policies and projects which are parts of the activities of the extension workers) favoured the capitalist farmer rather than the peasant producer.

The farm settlement scheme, the school leavers' farms and the community farms approaches bear striking similarities to the "improvement" and "transformation" approaches which were tried and found to be inappropriate in the development of peasant agriculture in Tanzania. The Tanzanian improvement approach called for widespread use of modern agricultural techniques - extensive extension work, fertilizers, insecticides, improved seeds and education of the peasant farmers. The transformation approach, on the other hand, rested on "capital intensive, fully mechanized and carefully supervised village settlements". The present ujamaa scheme is a modification of these approaches. Both the Tanzanian and Nigerian strategies relied too heavily on the "modern" approach to rural development without any serious consideration of the realities of the countries' own environments. For example, there


was too much emphasis on the use of mechanization and associated agricultural inputs, despite the fact that experience has shown that the bureaucracy lacked the resources to sustain mechanized farming on a continuing basis. Warning on the problems of agricultural mechanization in Nigeria, Oluwasanmi writes,

...large scale mechanization schemes, such as the Niger agricultural projects in Northern Nigeria and the Upper Ogun and Irele farm projects in Western Nigeria, have shown that there are serious technical problems to be overcome before tractors and other mechanical implements can become a normal aspect of the agricultural system.¹

In spite of the failure of large-scale mechanization to boost agricultural development in Nigeria in the past, the Bendel State Government went ahead to introduce agricultural mechanization into the strategies discussed in this chapter. The three strategies (farm settlements, school leavers' farms and community farms) discussed in this chapter do not seem to have helped the development of peasant agriculture in Bendel State and other parts of Nigeria where they were tried. Indeed, they treated the peasant farmers as obstacles to development. Yet, we

have argued in chapter one that development cannot be imported, and that it is a continuous change process involving the government, the full participation of the people and the environmental factors of the country concerned. But development, according to these strategies, was to be brought from outside by the State and its bureaucratic experts. This belief still persists in Nigeria today, despite the failure of settlements and related schemes in the past, and despite the success of peasant producers since the nineteenth century in developing new crops, expanding production and introducing significant innovation in the organization of production.\(^1\) It is suggested, therefore, that future agricultural policy should direct attention to the improvement of village life and the peasant producer, if rural development is to be promoted through agricultural development. The full and effective participation of the peasant farmer is not only desirable, it is a pre-condition for meaningful development, since development is directed at the people themselves.

Conclusion

The hypothesis examined in this chapter is that the bureaucracy in Bendel State of Nigeria has helped to develop peasant agriculture in the state. To test this statement, we have examined the operation of farm settlements, school leavers' farms and community farms, administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Our findings show that these strategies did not benefit the generality of the farming population of Bendel State. Although certain advantages, such as increasing use of fertilizer by some farmers living close to the farm settlements, were identified, these advantages were considered insignificant. The strategies, we found out, generally benefited the capitalist farmers and the school leavers.

Aside from the direct involvement of the bureaucrats in projects intended to stimulate rural development through agricultural development, attempts were also made to boost food production by the injection of agricultural inputs possessed by the bureaucracy. It is to an examination of these inputs that we should now turn.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE ROLE OF THE BUREAUCRACY IN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT: AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND FOOD PRODUCTION

The production of food crops, in order to meet the ever-increasing demand for food, is one of the goals of the Bendel State government, and indeed, the other governments in the Federation of Nigeria in their agricultural policies. As a part of the overall rural development policy, various forms of assistance, such as agricultural credit, supply of improved seeds and fertilizer are provided for the farmers by the extension staff of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. As we have seen in chapter six, the work of the Extension Services Division of the Ministry of Agriculture involves teaching the farmers advanced farming techniques with a view of improving their productivity. This is done partly through a number of agricultural inputs, including those mentioned above. The extension staff also advise the farmers on planting, treatment and harvesting of crops. For purposes of reaching the village farmers, the Ministry relies heavily on agricultural assistants.

Towards the achievement of rural development and increased food production, the Bendel State government
also established a number of mechanised farms run by the Bendel Food Production Board - an extended arm of the bureaucracy. Some of these measures aimed at bringing about rural-development and increased food production will be discussed in this chapter, with a view of ascertaining if they have helped the development of peasant agriculture. We will be concerned with the examination of government policies and not with the detailed study of the agricultural extension workers. The effectiveness of the extension workers in reaching the peasant farmers will be gauged from the assessment of our selected policies. This approach has been necessitated by the fact that the bureaucrats implement agricultural policies determined by the government. A fuller understanding of the role of the bureaucracy, we think, would be achieved by the examination of the policies they implement. Policies on agricultural credit, seed multiplication programme, fertilizer programme, and mechanized farms will be covered. In this way, we will be in a position to prove or disprove the central hypothesis that the bureaucracy can be the principal agent for effective rural development.
Agricultural Credit:

Agricultural credit has been a part of the Bendel State's agricultural policy since its creation in 1963. In its First Development Plan, 1964-68, "a subsidy for planting of ₦40 per acre in kind and cash" was given to "small palm plantation holders." Credit was also proposed for progressive cotton producers. The 1970-74 Development Plan sought to encourage cotton production through the issue of seeds free to registered cotton farmers, supply of fertilizer at 50 per cent rate, and provision of mechanical services for land preparation at moderate charges to "farmers whose farms are suitable for mechanization." A number of other credit schemes existed for cocoa and rubber small holders. However, all these credit schemes were not intended for the benefit of the peasant farmers many of whom were neither registered farmers nor plantation owners with mechanizable farms.

Perhaps in an attempt to extend the credit scheme to the peasant farmers, the Bendel State Development Programme for 1975-80 introduced a new agricultural credit scheme for farmers and fishermen. The new scheme was supposed to be on a pilot basis.

In the words of the Development Programme:

A scheme is being devised with the Nigerian Agricultural Bank to provide loans for farmers who have individual holdings of 8 to 80 hectares. It is recognised that there are medium/large scale farmers or groups of farmers with demonstrable farm management ability but who lack the capital to establish larger and more economic farms. In this Plan period, the Government will provide loans yearly for one selected farmer or group farm in each of the fourteen Administrative Divisions of the State. In view of the increasing demand for edible palm oil and increasing food prices, emphasis will be placed on oil palm production among tree crops and on arable food crops - farming and fisheries projects. The estimated capital expenditure is N2 million.¹

A total sum of N20,500 was disbursed as loans to farmers during the 1976/77 financial year. This brought to N649,000 the total sum paid to farmers under the pilot loans scheme started in 1974/75.²

From the content of the policy statement on the loans scheme, its scope was too narrow to be of much benefit to the overwhelming majority of the farming population of Bendel State. Firstly, to select one farmer or group farm from each of the 14 administrative divisions in the State would mean the elimination of many other farmers who needed credit facilities. Secondly, the scheme was specially tailored to suit

"medium/large scale farmers...with demonstrable farm management ability but who lack the capital to establish larger and more economic farms". The peasant farmers do not fall within this specified category. Thirdly, the scheme was intended to serve the interest of "farmers who have individual holdings of 8 to 80 hectares". Again, this qualification excluded the peasant farmers who, on the average, had much smaller holdings.\(^1\) It is possible that the limited scope of the loans scheme might have contributed to the replacement of the scheme in 1977 by yet another credit scheme for farmers and fishermen.

The objective of the latest loans scheme is stated as follows:

To facilitate the flow of credit to farmers and fishermen, especially small-scale and, to some extent, medium scale farmers and fishermen in order that they may be better able to set up significantly the production of food and fish; consistent with the goals stated in the National Development Plan and the State's Programme of the Development Plan.\(^2\)

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1. In 1976, the Ministry of Economic Development estimated the average peasant holding at 0.87 hectares. See *Bendel State Rural Economic Survey 1975/76*, *op.cit.*

To be considered for a loan under the scheme, the farmers and fishermen were to fulfill several conditions which included experience in farming or fishing, possession of land or a fishing site set out in feasibility studies,\(^1\) and adequate security. A maximum of ₦10,000 was allowed as a loan, with 5 per cent interest rate.\(^2\) The guidelines stipulated an elaborate bureaucratic procedure for application, evaluation, approval and payment of loans. Prospective benefactors were required to submit applications on prescribed forms obtainable from the local office of the Credit Unit closest to them. Details of personal information stated under the eligibility conditions were to be supplied in the application forms. These applications were initially evaluated by the Local Government Area Loan Committee (composed of the Principal Agricultural Officer and other field officials) which submitted the applications with comments to headquarters where they were again considered by the State Steering Committee. The recommendations of this committee were again submitted to the Commissioner (Minister) for further consideration and approval.

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1. A feasibility study of a farm/fishing site should give details of size, suitability of project for capital investment, estimated expenditure and output, as well as other relevant information.

Successful applicants were required to sign a standard loan agreement with the loans officer at the local government area level. These agreements and guarantor forms were submitted to the Ministry of Justice for registration.

The implementation of the loan was in two ways. The farmer could ask for the disbursement by contacting the appropriate extension worker (when the loan is to be in kind) or the credit assistant by handing over a voucher (when the loan is to be in cash). The Guidelines noted that "the success of the scheme will depend on the efforts made to supervise and assist the farmers during the season and the readiness of the farmers to accept advice." It should be noted that since success is rigidly tied to the effectiveness of extension services, much emphasis has to be laid on the adequate provision of well trained, equipped and willing extension workers. But, as we have seen in chapter six extension services in Africa have not been effective.

1. Ibid., p.3.

2. Interview with the Deputy Chief Agricultural Officer, (Farm Credit), Benin City, June 27, 1978. I was informed that, in practice, loans were generally not paid in cash.

On loan repayment, the guidelines directed farmers to make payments at the places where they sold their produce or where they collected their inputs. Credit assistants were made available to collect the money and were also required, for this purpose, to pay regular visits to all participating farmers in their areas. The final payment should not be later than two or three months after the start of the harvesting period.

The credit scheme for farmers and fishermen, as it is currently operated, is clouded with many difficulties for the peasant farmers. In the first place, the conditions stipulated for eligibility for consideration for a loan are enough to disqualify the majority of peasant farmers. The farmers do not understand the idea of "feasibility studies", "guarantors" and "securities". The general attitude of the peasants to these and other conditions for eligibility was exemplified by the reaction of the Tiv Farmers Association to a similar loan scheme sponsored by the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. The farmers had asked a local government councillor: "Did your forefathers conduct feasibility studies to
plant yams and rice?¹ The scheme under reference is the nation-wide Federal Government guaranteed N400 million agricultural loans, whose stiff conditions, like those of the Bendel State scheme, naturally excluded the peasant farmers. Even before the controversial federal loans scheme, the Federal Government had operated agricultural credit schemes which appeared to have allocated resources in favour of the affluent few, and to the disadvantage of the peasant farmers. General Gowon, in his 1974 budget speech, announced that the Nigerian Agricultural Bank had given its first loan of N5 million to the Co-operative Union of the North Eastern State and also granted N1,280,000 to 12 individual farmers.² In his candid analysis of these loans, Gavin Williams writes:

Suffice it to suggest that the North Eastern State lacks a long tradition of co-operation and that private capitalist farming has not hitherto been used to assimilate investment on the scale proposed. It may be more profitable to divert credit on this scale to more lucrative commercial purposes.³

2. See Daily Times, (Lagos, April 2, 1974).
3. Williams, op.cit., p.137.
In the second place, the procedure for the Bendel State loans scheme is too elaborate. Appropriate authority should have been delegated to the officials at the local government level to process and approve applications for loans. The tough conditions laid out for qualification and the elaborate procedure for approval might be responsible for the small number of applications approved since the introduction of the scheme. As at June 1978, only 68 farmers had been recommended for the loans and the legal documents had not been completed by the Ministry of Justice as at that date. Consequently, no payments had been made under the scheme. In a State where 90 per cent of the farmers are peasant producers, the scheme does not go far enough.

In the third place, the repayment terms are not favourable. The two or three months' period does not seem to have put into consideration the consequences of a bad harvest and the problems of extension services. In the fourth place, the scheme is, like the other strategies discussed in this chapter, obsessed with the

1. Interviews, op.cit.
2. Asked about the relevance of these problems to the repayment terms, the DCAO (Credits) said that the policy was under review.
idea of mechanization and the injection of agricultural inputs. For example, even though the policy states that part of the loans would be paid in cash, there is a deliberate pattern of implementation which emphasizes payment in kind (agricultural inputs). Under the loans scheme, which is a package, the Ministry pays direct to private foreign firms which clear and prepare the land and supply the seeds and fertilizer. The Ministry also reimburses itself, from the loan approved for the farmer, for the services rendered to the farmer by the Ministry's extension staff. The idea underlying this action is the so-called conservatism of the peasant farmer - that he would marry more wives if he gets the money in cash:

To conclude, the Bendel State credit scheme for farmers and fishermen does not serve the interest of the peasant farmers because the conditions for qualification and the procedure for approval are beyond the compre-

1. Interviews, op.cit.
2. People who hold this view miss the point. The peasant farmer is a rational economist. If he marries more wives, it is because he wants more hands to work on his farm. The role of women in rural agricultural development had often been neglected by agricultural planners in Africa. In the words of Uma Lele, "Agricultural extension programmes have frequently overlooked the importance of women, both as major contributors to the farm labour supply and as significant family breadwinners," Lele, op.cit., p.??.
hension of the poor farmers. Perhaps, a liberalization of eligibility qualifications, reduction of the numerous processes for considering and approving applications, part payment of loans in cash to enable the farmers to plan and execute his own production techniques and a radical improvement in the quality and regularity of the extension services provided by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, could lead to some encouraging improvement in the credit scheme. The seed multiplication programme comes next for discussion.

Seed Multiplication Programme

The seed multiplication programme is an on-going project whose basic objective has been the multiplication and supply of improved planting seed and cassava cuttings to farmers to enable them increase the yields of crops.¹ Originally, the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources itself produced seeds and distributed them to farmers. But, according to the government, experience has shown that the Ministry alone cannot satisfy the ever-increasing demand for improved seeds and cassava cuttings.² Under the present

1. See Development Programme, 1975-80, p.20.
2. Ibid.
arrangement, the Ministry is concerned mainly with the multiplication of foundation seeds for distribution to selected farmers. These farmers are expected to remultiply the seeds for subsequent distribution to other farmers.

The seed multiplication programme started under the 1970-74 Development Plan, with an estimated cost of N320,000 and a planned target of 1,750 short-tons of rice, 1,750 short-tons of maize and 450 acres of cassava planting materials during the plan period.\textsuperscript{1} The intention, under the current (1975-80) plan, is to increase the area under maize cultivation from 80,000 hectares in 1976 to 112,000 hectares in 1980. Similarly, the area under rice cultivation will be increased from 14,000 hectares in 1976 to 22,000 hectares in 1980, and cassava hectarage would increase from 72,000 in 1976 to 88,000 in 1980. The estimated total cost of the programme, during the plan period 1975-80, was N2 million.\textsuperscript{2}

The seed multiplication programme works in cooperation between the Unit at Headquarters, the Principal Agricultural Officers in the field and the farmers. Liaison work is done with the farmers by the

\begin{enumerate}
\item See Development Plan, 1970-74, p.17.
\item Development Programme, 1975-80, pp.20-21.
\end{enumerate}
Principal Agricultural Officer who recommends the farmers to be selected for the multiplication project. On the basis of the feedback from the field, seeds and cassava cuttings from the National Cereal Research Centre and the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, Ibadan, are distributed to the field officers for planting by the selected farmers.¹

The targets set for the seed multiplication programme during the two plan periods mentioned above, have not been met. For example, in the first year of the 1970-74 plan, only 100 tons of maize and 150 tons of rice, as against a target of 250 tons each, were produced and distributed. Commenting on the state of the programme during the current (1975-80) plan period, a government statement confessed: "Currently the Ministry has only 326 hectares of both maize and rice seed farms. This represents only 20 per cent of our target."² Factors affecting effective implementation have been given as delay in releasing sufficient funds for operation, inadequate manpower and lack of equipment.

¹ Interview with the Principal Agricultural Officer, (Seed Unit), Benin City, June 19, 1978.
² "Briefs on Agricultural Extension Services Division, 1975/76", op. cit., p.4.
The seed multiplication programme was supposed to be run by the Seed Multiplication Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture on a semi-autonomous basis, with sufficient powers to run its own finances, and to purchase, process and distribute its products to the farmers. Financial autonomy has been partially granted, but the Unit has not been provided with sufficient funds by the Federal and State Governments for its operation. The approved staff complement both at the headquarters and the field has not been recruited. Transport difficulties have also hindered the distribution of available products.

The distribution mechanism of the programme seems to support the view that the improved seeds do not reach the peasant farmers. For example, of the 100 bags of rice delivered to the Ekpoma project in 1977, 20 were used for replanting at the project plot, 5 were returned to headquarters, 30 went to group farm projects, 5 were delivered to secondary schools, 10 were sent to farm settlements and 30 were distributed among "other farmers". It is inferred that the distribution mechanism in other stations followed a similar pattern.

1. Interviews, op.cit.
2. Ibid.
Fertilizer Programme:

The distribution of fertilizer is one of the means by which the bureaucracy attempts to develop agriculture. In this section, we want to know whether the fertilizer programme has benefited peasant agriculture or not. In order to do this, the genesis of the programme needs to be discussed first.

Like the seed multiplication programme, the fertilizer programme is an on-going project. Since the creation of the state in 1963, the use of fertilizer has been a part of the State's agricultural policy. In its first development plan, the government introduced a 50 per cent subsidy for fertilizer and insecticides:

Experience in 1964 with sale of 25 tons fertilizer provided by F.A.O. is that the cost of fertilizer per acre (55s) is prohibitive for the farmers. The policy therefore is to subsidize fertilizer and insecticide by 50 per cent during the plan period. It is expected that the end of the plan period the benefit of the use of fertilizer, insecticide and adequate and scientific storage will be sufficiently apparent that their use will become universal. A capital sum of £50,000 is earmarked for this project.

The second Development Plan 1970 - 74, talked of the importance of subsidized fertilizer schemes for which a revolving fund already existed. But in the current (1975-80) Development Programme, the government proposes to supply fertilizer to farmers at subsidized prices. In the words of the plan,

A recent study has shown that increased consumption or widespread application of fertilizers will be achieved by introduction and the timely supply of high-yielding crop varieties, implementation of the National Accelerated Food Production Programme and more effective extension service.¹

The estimated cost of the fertilizer programme in the Plan period is N10 million. The fertilizer programme has also attracted a number of technical aids. As we have noted in the preceding section, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations supplied 25 tons of fertilizer for distribution to some farmers in the State. The German government joined the list of donors in 1966 by sponsoring the purchase and distribution of fertilizer to farmers in the State.

Because of the importance attached to the fertilizer programme, the expense involved and the difficulties which the State Governments experienced in finding the money to purchase and distribute fertilizers, the Federal Government agreed in 1976 to finance the subsidy. A National Fertilizer Advisory Committee was created in the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to co-operate with the fertilizer programme. The fertilizer imported into the country is fully paid for by the Federal Government, in the first instance, before the State governments pay their 50 per cent share of the cost. The Federal government is also responsible for the transportation of the fertilizer

¹ Development Programme, (1975-80), p. 21
to the State depots. The distribution within the State is the responsibility of the State Government.\footnote{Brief on Agricultural Extension Services Division 1975/76, p. 6.} The fertilizer is sold to the farmers at a subsidized rate of \textsterling 2.00 per bag.

In order to determine the utility of this programme for the generality of the farming population, we must answer the question: Who uses the fertilizer? Information on the type (whether large scale, small scale or peasant) of farmers who received the fertilizer distributed by the Ministry of Agriculture since the inception of the programme does not exist. But given the original idea behind the fertilizer programme - to help the small plantation farmers boost their output - and given the traditional methods still used by the peasant producers,\footnote{In chapter three, we discussed these traditional methods used by peasant agriculturists. In this chapter, we have discussed the failure of the modern agricultural "package" offered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, to penetrate the rural areas. In an interview with the Deputy Chief Agricultural Officer (Fertilizer) in June 1978, I gathered that "a bulk of the farming population is yet to get the message."} it is suggested that it was the progressive farmer conversant with the agricultural inputs of which the fertilizer programme was a part, who really benefited from the programme. It has
been reported\(^1\) that peasant farmers who live and operate their farm land not very far (i.e. within a two-mile radius) from farm settlements have been influenced in their adoption of practices such as mechanization, improved seeds, and fertilizer similar to those used by the farm settlers.\(^2\) On the basis of a representative sample of 200 peasant farmers, within this two-mile radius, it was shown that an average of 65 per cent of all peasant farmers interviewed had, through the direct influence of the farm settlements, adopted the use of fertilizers. Even in this case, the quantity of fertilizer used was very insignificant. For those crops in which fertilizer used has been shown to be profitable, fertilizer consumption was low, amounting to less than one pound of fertilizer per acre of cropped land per annum on the average, as shown in the last column of Table 8, whereas it should have been 20 pounds per acre. This low consumption was attributed to other attendant problems, including lack of credit, inadequate extension services, marketing and distribution bottlenecks.

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TABLE 8

FERTILIZER USE AMONG PEASANT FARMERS SURROUNDING FARM SETTLEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm Settlement</th>
<th>No. of farmers who applied fertilizers</th>
<th>Total Quantity of fertilizer used (lb)/annum</th>
<th>Average Quantity of Fertilizer used per farmer (lb)/annum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coker</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omishere</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogbomosho</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilora</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oyere</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oshogbo</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esa-Oke</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eruwa</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>129</strong></td>
<td><strong>123</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.95</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although there is no concrete evidence to prove it, farmers living far away from farm settlements are still generally not familiar with the use of fertilizer. Personal knowledge of the farming areas of Bendel State could be relied upon here. From my practical experience of living among the farming communities in Etsako, Akoko-Edo and Benin East divisions of Bendel State until 1975, I knew that the use of fertilizer was not widespread. During the field research for this dissertation in Nigeria between
February and August, 1978, I again visited many of these areas. To a majority of the farmers, the Ministry of Agriculture deals only with government farms (ime gomate). They are neither aware that the Ministry can render them useful assistance, nor do they know that there is fertilizer for improving agricultural productivity and that they can buy it from the Ministry or its representatives. It would appear, therefore, that the fertilizer programme has not benefited the peasant farmers who form the overwhelming majority of the farming population of Bendel State.

State Mechanized Farms:

The Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources has been the main bureaucratic organization for our discussion in this chapter. From 1963 to 1971, the Ministry was in charge of the food production activities of the Bendel State government. It operated small farms which were used both for demonstration and food production purposes. Since 1971, the Ministry has been relieved of its responsibility for direct food production activities. This function has been transferred to semi-autonomous boards/companies owned by the Bendel State Government. But the Ministry still retains some powers
to draw out broad policies for these production bodies to follow. The Ministry is also the link between the production bodies and the State Executive Council (Cabinet). Thus, in this section, both the Ministry and the Bendel Food Production Board form the basis of our discussion.

At the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970, the acute shortage of food in the country became a serious problem. The Bendel State Government, in its attempt to boost food production, established the Midwest Food Production Company in 1971. The company was to produce and market food. Some of the farms then under the direct management of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources were transferred to the new company. In 1972, the government established the Agbede Farm, a mechanized crop farm, which was run as a semi-autonomous body. In 1974, the Agbede Farm became a part of another newly established food production organization - Bendel Farms Management Board. The Food Production Company and the Farms Management Board existed pari passu until they were merged into a new organization known as Bendel Food Production Board.
in 1976.\textsuperscript{1}

One of the objectives of the new board is

...the establishment and operation, on a commercial basis, of a number of agricultural projects, including large-scale food crop farms as well as livestock farms. \textsuperscript{2}

In March 1977, the board operated two fully mechanized farms at Agbede and Warake. Its livestock projects consisted of cattle ranches, poultry farms, piggeries and feedmills,\textsuperscript{3} situated in several parts of the State.

The proposed expansion of the Agbede and Warake farm projects, which would increase the size of the farms to 4,000 and 5,000 hectares respectively, were to be completed at an estimated cost of N1,500,000 and N2,546,000 respectively, during the 1975-80 plan period.\textsuperscript{4} In addition, there are plans to establish three other farms covering a total of 42,000 hectares at an estimated cost of N12,500,000. As shown in Table 8,

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3. Ibid., p.6.

### TABLE 9

SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENT PLAN ALLOCATIONS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT RELATED AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS 1964-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DEVELOPMENT PLAN PERIODS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FARM SETTLEMENTS</td>
<td>N         N         N         N   1,886,680</td>
<td>160,000 480,000 746,680 500,000 1,886,680</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHOOL LEAVERS'</td>
<td>N         N         N         N   149,000</td>
<td>39,000 110,000  -     -     149,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARM.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSH CLEARING AND</td>
<td>N         N         N         N   2,160,000</td>
<td>-  -  360,000 1,800,000 2,160,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRACTOR HIRING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARMERS' CRUSADE</td>
<td>N         N         N         N   2,084,000</td>
<td>-  344,000 1,740,000  -     2,084,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FERTILIZERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRICULTURAL</td>
<td>N         N         N         N   10,100,000</td>
<td>100,000  -  -  10,000,000 10,100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREDITS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEED MULTIPLICATION</td>
<td>N         N         N         N   2,330,000</td>
<td>250,000 50,000 764,560 2,000,000 3,064,560</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECHANIZED FARMS</td>
<td>N         N         N         N   16,906,000</td>
<td>-  -  360,000 16,546,000 16,906,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>N         N         N         N   38,680,240</td>
<td>549,000 99,000 4,291,240 32,846,000 38,680,240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Figures in this column do not include the additional allocations in the Revised Plan.*
the resultant total capital expenditure on all the
farm projects during the 1975-80 plan period would
be ₦16,546,000.

In its 1977/78 Estimates, the Bendel Food
Production Board budgeted for a total expenditure of
₦14,204,031. This amount consisted of ₦9,582,635
for recurrent expenditure and ₦4,621,396 for capital
expenditure. Estimated revenue was put at ₦8,437,546.1
Thus, the board budgeted for a deficit of ₦4,766,485.

The size of the deficit points to the fact that,
contrary to the board's objective to run its farms on a
commercial basis, colossal losses are sustained in
the operation of the mechanized farms project.

Turning to the production aspect of the board,
an output of 698 tonnes of paddy rice and 296 tonnes
of maize was recorded during the 1976/77 production
year. Since 1974, the mechanized farms have produced
2,216 metric tonnes of rice and 1,771 metric tonnes of
maize.2 At both the Agbêde and Warâke farms, a total of

1. Bendel Food Production Board Estimates, 1977-78,
(Ennin City, Mimeograph 1977), p.?

* These figures are mere estimates. The final amount
approved for the board will depend on the recommendations
of the Ministry of Agriculture and the goodwill
of the State Executive Council (Cabinet) which is the
final approving authority.

2. These measurements are in metric, hence the spelling
of tonnes, instead of tons.
1,910 hectares for rice and 1,969 hectares for maize were planted and harvested since 1974.\textsuperscript{1} Work has continued on the establishment of three more mechanized farms in the State. According to the figures presented in Table 8, a total of ₦16,906,000 has either been spent or committed for the mechanized farms project in Bendel State since the 1970-74 development plan period.

It is clear from the picture painted above that the operation of government's mechanized farms is a very costly venture. The returns, in terms of total output of food production, do not seem to justify the huge capital investment in the farms. The projects provide fertile ground for foreign capitalist companies to earn huge profits from the supply of farm machinery, fertilizers, chemicals and other agricultural inputs.\textsuperscript{2} The government's policy even actively encourages direct foreign investment (in actual production activities) in Nigerian agriculture.\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{itemize}
  \item See the Board's Annual Report, \textit{op.cit.}, p.4.
  \item At the Agbede and Warake Farms, for example, helicopters have been hired from foreign companies to spray the crops.
\end{itemize}
The capitalist investment in agriculture and the government's mechanized farms would not displace peasant agriculture as the main source of food in Nigeria. It seems clear that, despite the existence of these mechanized farms, the bulk of the food and related agricultural output consumed in Nigeria is produced by the peasant farmers. The output from these farms has not contributed much towards the solution of the food problem in the country. It has been reported that the Federal Military Government of Nigeria spent an average of N2 million every month, during the last six months of 1977, on the importation of food. In the same year, a total of N200 million was spent on food importation. The effect of these shortages on the consumer has been serious. The consumer price index for the period 1968-75 has shown an astronomical increase as indicated in Table 10 below:

1. Although it is difficult to prove this assertion with documented evidence, anybody who has lived in Nigeria knows that the products of the mechanized farms are sold in government stores (which are very few) and distributed to a few important persons. In the market places where a majority of Nigerians buy their foodstuff, it is the peasants' products that are sold.

2. Nigerian Observer, (Benin City), March 24, 1978, p.5. The imported food items now include rice, palm oil and meat, which Nigeria used to produce in abundance.

3. Daily Times, (Lagos, March 20, 1978), p.11. It was estimated that in 1978, the cost of food importation may jump to N300 million.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index (1960 = 100)</th>
<th>Percent Change in index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>120.3</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>132.3</td>
<td>+10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>150.6</td>
<td>+13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>174.7</td>
<td>+16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>179.6</td>
<td>+2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>189.3</td>
<td>+5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+20 to +25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+75.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The promotion of capitalist investment in agriculture and undue concentration of resources on state mechanized farms have disastrous consequences for the development of peasant agriculture. In the first place, farmers will be forced, having been denied material support by the state, to seek wage employment in capitalist and state farms. Secondly, some of the capitalist and state farms that have been established are on parcels of land on which peasant farmers once lived and worked. The two factors outlined above would, in the long run, create a landless peasantry and hinder the productive capacity of the rural sector of the economy. Thirdly, the productivity of capital is a factor underlying the capitalist investment in agriculture. Where foreign capitalists are given incentives to invest in Nigerian agriculture, the huge profits that will accrue from the venture will be repatriated abroad. This will lead to the loss of

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1. In Bendel State, peasants petitioned against the seizure of their land for mechanized farming in some parts of Benin East Division. In reaction to the government's action, some of the peasants attacked bureaucrats who were sent to these areas for some rural economic survey. As some of the farmers put it, "The government has taken our land, now they want to take our houses and wives by counting how many of us live in one house." Personal information obtained while serving in Benin East Division in 1975.
more foreign exchange, extend foreign capitalist control of Nigeria's economy to the agricultural sector, and thus, increase Nigeria's dependence on foreign capital.

It is suggested, therefore, that since the grant of state loans to capitalist farmers, the expensive operation of mechanized state farms and the encouragement of foreign capitalists to invest in agriculture, have not helped to boost food production in Nigeria, a more realistic policy would be the introduction of far-reaching incentives for peasant farmers to enable them increase their output.

Concluding Comments:

Like in the previous chapter, the hypothesis investigated in this chapter has been that the Bendel State bureaucracy has helped to develop peasant agriculture in the state. The administration of farm credits, seed multiplication and fertilizer programmes, and state owned mechanized farms was used to test the hypothesis. We found that these programmes were more directed to satisfy the needs of the affluent farmer than the peasant producer.

However, one question which remains to be answered is: Why does the bureaucracy pursue these agricultural
policies which do not seem to serve the interest of the overwhelming majority of the farmers of Bendel State in particular, and Nigeria in general? As we have argued in Chapter Two, the Nigerian bureaucracy has no independent stand on policy issues, aside from what has been decided by the politicians (whether they are civilians or soldiers). Although the bureaucrats play important roles in the formulation and execution of policy, they certainly have no independent political base on which to evolve and implement their own policies. We also noted in Chapter Two that the relationship between the bureaucrats and the politicians is a very close one - both groups belong to the petty bourgeois class whose interests in development are different from those of the peasant producers. It is for these reasons that no attempt has been made in this chapter and the preceding one, to lay a strict distinction between the bureaucracy and the government, or between bureaucratic bungling and wrong government policies. This distinction, for our purpose mere, is unimportant because both the politicians and the bureaucrats (members of the ruling class) are agreed on the use of the bureaucracy as the principal agent for achieving capitalist development. It is, therefore, not surprising that the agricultural policies which the
bureaucracy sought to implement reflected what the ruling class in Nigeria considered to be the problems of agricultural development, and the solutions it thought were required.

The logic behind the present agricultural policies needs some amplification. As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, the colonial agricultural policy emphasized the need to modernize the "traditional" agricultural sector and thus increase the production of cash crops which were in great demand in Europe. Since independence in 1960, this policy has continued to be adopted, but in varied forms. This is evidenced by the orientation of the various development plans and programmes examined in this chapter. For example, in the Third National Development Plan (1975-80), of which the Bendel State Development Programme, 1975-80, is a part, the Federal Government blamed rural stagnation first on "shortage of qualified manpower in key areas," followed by "inadequate supplies of agricultural inputs," and third by "inadequate extension service". Poor rural feeder roads only came fourth, followed by lack of

credit and marketing facilities, with the central issue for peasant farmers - low prices - relegated to ninth place, ahead of land tenure problems and diseases. Rural labour shortage came only eighth. Thus, the major hindrance in agriculture is thought to be the lack of expert advice and services by the bureaucracy rather than of the resources and incentives by which the peasant farmers can develop agriculture themselves.

In order to solve what is assumed to be the major bottleneck in agricultural development, the guidelines to the Third National Development Plan "seek to bring improved practices to farmers through a co-ordinated inputs package approach closely supervised by trained officials". Alongside the improvement of peasant farming by State direction, the government plans the "transformation" of farming on large-scale settlements:

It will be the policy of the Federal Government to acquire large areas of suitable land to be leased out on uniform terms to farmers as in the case of industrial estates. It will be much easier to provide extension services, agricultural inputs, etc. on such estates.

1. Ibid., pp.65-66.
These guidelines of the Federal Government are the bedrock on which the current agricultural policies of the other Nigerian governments are based. The agricultural policies presuppose state direction of production, rather than encouragement of peasant initiative which cannot be adapted to such precise and ambitious planning targets. Apart from the direct state participation in agricultural production and establishment of settlements, the agricultural policies encourage capitalist farmers, both indigenous and foreign, to invest in agriculture.

If, as we have argued in this chapter, the central issues in rural development are the widespread improvement of rural income and rural life, and if we accept the argument that development is a change process involving the government, a vast majority of the people and their interaction with their environment, the policies examined in this chapter do not seem capable of bringing about effective rural development.
CHAPTER EIGHT

BUREAUCRACY'S ROLE IN THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

The theme which has echoed throughout this thesis is that the full and effective participation of the rural people is a vital criterion for effective rural development, and that the bureaucracy should not be relied upon as the principal agent for such development. In this chapter, the co-operative movement will be examined in order to further explore the central hypothesis that the bureaucracy can be the principal agent for effective rural development. The co-operative movement is one of the key areas of rural development efforts in which the local people have demonstrated their potentials for mass participation. Thus, the counter-position in this chapter is that abundant human resources exist in the rural areas of Bendel State, but that the bureaucratic approach to rural development has undermined the utility of these resources.

In this chapter and the next, which deals with the self-help movement, no attempt will be made to effectively separate the role of the bureaucracy from that of the government. This approach is merely for purposes of
convenience, because given the very close relationship between the bureaucracy and the government in Nigeria, the bureaucracy is seen as executing the policies of the government, even though the bureaucrats contribute immensely to the formulation of such policy. In other words, I do not consider the bureaucracy possessing the strong political base to enable it to originate and implement its own policies outside the broad framework of governmental policy.

Our discussion of the co-operative movement will embrace the nature of indigenous co-operation and the effects which colonial intervention had on it, the bureaucratic control of the co-operative movement and the performance of the co-operative movement. Diving into history in order to explain the present is in line with our general style in this thesis. The historical approach is necessitated by the need to explain how the spirit of co-operation is a part of the rich tradition of Bendel State and how colonial intervention hampered the full direction of this spirit to the solution of present-day development problems. An examination of the controlling role of the bureaucracy will show that excessive

1. See chapters two, four and seven where aspects of this close link are discussed.
bureaucratization steals initiative from the people who, in turn, look upon their movement as an extension of the bureaucracy.

**Indigenous co-operation and colonial intervention:**

In chapter three, we saw how the traditional African society emphasized communal relationships and self-reliance, but in this chapter the communal mode of production will be examined more closely. Before the advent of colonialism and money economy, the usual unit of production was the compound family, comprising several households. As we have seen in chapter three too, the family did not exist only for purposes of production; it formed part of a total community with which the individual was identified. The safety of the village was a collective affair. In the production function, a member of the family gave his labour as part of his general social role, and he was rewarded by hospitality and recognition which he also shared in the consumption of the product of the joint communal effort.¹ All able-bodied men and women participated actively in the production process, while the family jointly cared for the young and the old who could not contribute.

Land was the most important resource in the indigenous economy and it belonged to the community, not the individual. The extended family was the most important land-holding group; individual members were granted permission to use the land; but never to own it.

The production unit in traditional African society was built around the extended family. Men, women and children all had their roles to play in the production process although a greater part of the responsibility devolved on the able-bodied young men. These work groups were responsible for small tasks and the provision of subsistence for the family. But where fairly large tasks were involved, work organization called for larger groups comprising people from other families. Under this system, a group of voluntary farmers in a village worked on each others' farms in turn. During the time that his farm was being worked, the beneficiary was expected to provide food and drinks. The working group moved to another member's farm, on the appointed date, until all the members had been helped. Among the Edo-speaking people of Bendel State of Nigeria, the work group was also organised on the basis of age grades. Both men and women had their separate groups. These work groups are still important production units in many rural areas of Bendel State.
The production function was not the only important aspect of the economy of the extended family. As we have seen in chapter three, the distribution of the social product of labour was also important. It reinforced the oneness of the people. The distribution mechanism functioned as a method of reconciling the individual's total interests with those of the community. Sharing was more concerned with the problems of ensuring subsistence for all, and while no individual accumulated excessive wealth, no man was allowed to suffer undue deprivation.¹

Indigenous co-operation was not only for the production function and the equitable distribution of what was produced. Co-operative organizations also provided credit in the traditional African society. The best example of an indigenous co-operative organization is represented by the esusu (the rotating credit association of the Yoruba, Edo and Ibo people of Nigeria, and generally found in most West-African countries). Members of the esusu association united strictly on a commercial basis; contributions were collected periodically (once every four days or on bi-monthly basis as the case may be) and the sum total was given in

¹ Migot-Adholla, op.cit., p.23
rotation to one of the members.\textsuperscript{1} The co-operation ended as soon as each member received his own contribution, but the process may be started all over again. The esusu is still widely practised in West Africa.

Indigenous co-operation was also used for the production of cash crops, such as cocoa. Prior to the introduction of Western-European co-operative organizations in Nigeria in 1935, indigenous co-operative groups undertook the fermentation and marketing of cocoa in the then Western Provinces of Nigeria.\textsuperscript{2} These early co-operative groups included the Agege Planters' Union (1907), Igbba Farmers' Association (1910) and Ibadan Agricultural Society (1904).\textsuperscript{3} The aims of the farmers were to provide members with loans, to circulate knowledge on methods of improving the quality of cocoa, to build and improve roads, and to export their products directly. The farmers were reacting to the colonial arrangement by

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
which cocoa and other cash crops were bought by British private firms which marketed them in the world market.

The above discussion supports the view that before the encroachment of colonial administration into the traditional African society, indigenous co-operation played a vital role in the economic and social affairs of the people. As Adeyeye neatly puts it,

"... with what is now known of the farmers' unions and other private co-operative endeavours of the early decades of this century, one cannot regard the Nigerian co-operative movement as a gift from the colonial government."

We should now examine the impact of colonial intervention on indigenous African co-operation. The position could be summarized thus: "One of the most important effects of colonialism is that it undermined the structural bases of indigenous egalitarianism." Colonialism introduced individual ownership of land (which could now be bought and sold like any other commodity), individual economic reward and maximization (instead of collective societal good), wage labour, the tax system, Western education and above all, the imposition of a capitalist mode of production. Some of these developments deserve further comments. In order to pay the cost of colonial administration, taxes paid in


cash, not kind, were introduced by the colonizers. This new form of taxation, which was foreign to the traditional society, forced the peasants to abandon their land and seek jobs in colonial projects such as railways and cash crop plantations. Colonialism also led to the progressive incorporation of the peasant economy into the world capitalist system. The farmers were encouraged, as a part of this process of incorporation, to produce cash crops (such as cocoa, palm oil, palm kernel and cotton) solely for export. Thus, the farmers had become primary commodity producers. The cash crops produced by the peasants were bought by private foreign companies and later by the state marketing boards and sold in the world market at high prices. In return, the farmers were paid token prices, much at variance with the world prices for the produce.


2. See Hellmeler, op.cit. See also H.M. Onitiri and Dupe Olatunbosun, eds., The Marketing Board System, Proceedings of an International Conference, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973). For a comparison between the world market prices and producer prices, see Chapter Three, Table 1.
By 1931, it was clear that peasant production of cash crops, especially cocoa, was inadequate to satisfy the demand for the crops in the world market. Thus, development companies for the production and marketing of cocoa were established throughout the Western Provinces of Nigeria in 1931. The establishment of colonial private plantations opened a new chapter in the development of co-operatives in Nigeria. In 1934, the colonial government appointed C.F. Strickland, a former Registrar of Co-operative Societies in India, to report on the possible "introduction" of co-operatives in Nigeria. Strickland noted the "fitness of Nigerians for co-operation" and submitted a draft of a "Co-operative Societies Ordinance", based on the Tanganyika ordinance and that of several British colonies and dominions. In 1935, a Co-operative Societies Ordinance, based on the Strickland recommendations, "introduced" co-operatives into Nigeria where both the traditional and modern economies had already produced so many forms of co-operative organizations.

1. Nigeria: Report on the introduction of Co-operative 
   Societies into Nigeria, (Lagos: Government Printer, 

2. Ibid., para.49, p.28.
The main features of the co-operative ordinance should now be examined. The law subjected the co-operatives to the central control of a Registrar of Co-operative Societies, who is a bureaucrat. Secondly, the law forced on small, socially integrated groups an elaborate system of formal democracy and an equally elaborate system of book-keeping by double entry. Members of the co-operatives were required to attend general meetings regularly, appoint several committees to run the affairs of the society, and a secretary who functioned as the chief executive of the co-operative society. A special accounting procedure was forced on co-operatives who wished to be registered under the law. This accounting procedure, which used the double entry method for book-keeping, enabled the registrar and his staff to check and audit the accounts of the co-operatives periodically. These practices were certainly not within the understanding of most of the co-operative organizations that existed before the passing of the ordinance. In effect, those economically viable co-operative organizations which were well known in the Western Provinces of Nigeria were generally not qualified for registration under the law. Thirdly, the ordinance reduced the complex beginnings of the production and marketing co-operatives, as we have seen in this chapter, to the single function of marketing.
The co-operatives which were registered under the ordinance were mainly cocoa marketing co-operatives and even in the fifties, cocoa marketing co-operatives still dominated government's thinking on co-operative development.\(^1\) Other forms of co-operatives, such as production, thrift and credits were not encouraged. Finally, the new law took away from the co-operatives the chance of organizing the export of their products themselves, and it made them mere suppliers of European business concerns.\(^2\) In 1947, however, the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board assumed responsibility for the external marketing of cocoa. But the co-operatives remained suppliers of the marketing board.

The reasons for the initial imposition of bureaucratic control on the co-operatives should now be discussed. As we have noted above, the demand for cash crops in Europe had motivated the colonial administration to encourage cocoa producing and fermenting private organizations. This encouragement had resulted in what the colonial administration called the "unco-ordinated growth of co-operative type societies," especially in the Western Provinces.\(^3\)

---

ordinance of 1935 and its bureaucratic controls were needed to check the exploitation of the peasant farmer by sub-buyers. But as we shall see shortly, the new law did not succeed in the elimination of the sub-buyers. Also, the colonial government in Nigeria was influenced by the efforts made in other colonial territories (especially in India and Tanganyika) to regularize co-operative societies under the law and to bring them further under government influence and supervision.1

While the 1935 legislation succeeded in regulating the operation of the co-operative movement and bringing it under close bureaucratic control, it did not succeed in serving the interests of the Nigerian peasant producer by arresting "the exploitation of the peasant farmer by sub-buyers".2 Despite the law, only societies (mainly marketing co-operatives) favoured by the government were registered and the sub-buyers who were regarded as the exploiters continued to play a vital role in the produce marketing system.3 These sub-buyers are now appointed by the marketing boards and they have

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.23. See also chapter three above.
continued to act as the intermediaries between the producers and the marketing board. The board markets the produce in the world market. This produce marketing system still has adverse consequences for the Nigerian producer in the post-colonial period. As we have shown in Chapter Three (Table 1), the average percentage of the world prices for cocoa, palm oil, palm kernel and groundnut paid to the Nigerian producer between 1962 and 1967, was 64.3 (cocoa), 44.4 (palm oil), 50.5 (palm kernel) and 67.8 (groundnut). As we have also argued in Chapter Three, the Nigerian producer still gets much less than the world prices for his products. The only change is that the marketing boards are now controlled by the federal instead of the state governments. The difference between the world market and producer prices went, and still go, to the sub-buyers and the marketing boards.

Since we have discussed the nature of indigenous co-operation and the impact of colonial intervention

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1. For details of the exploitative nature of the produce marketing system in Nigeria, see Dupe Olatunbosun and S. Olayide, "Effects of the Nigerian marketing boards on the output and income of primary producers," in Onitiri and Olatunbosun, eds. (1974), op.cit., pp.1-49.
on it, the regulatory functions of the bureaucracy, which was necessitated by the colonial intervention itself, should now be discussed.

Bureaucratic control of the co-operative movement:

The Co-operative Societies Law (1953) strengthened the powers of the co-operative department by the granting of more powers to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The new law retained in the hands of the registrar the normal powers of registration, audit and inquiry, as was the case in the 1935 ordinance. In addition, the 1953 legislation increased the powers of the registrar to cover the control of profit disposal, and the day-to-day administration of the co-operative movement.


2. Ibid., S.35.
On the distribution of profits, a co-operative society can invest or deposit its funds only in specified securities or financial institutions or other registered societies approved by the registrar. The payment society makes to its members are as dividends (shares on capital investment) and bonus (proportion of member's contribution to the society's activities). In keeping with true co-operative principles, the member's services rather than his capital contribution are regarded as important. It is, therefore, contrary to those principles that the activities of a co-operative society should provide a return on capital.

This practice is business oriented and capable of enabling capitalists in the rural areas to merely invest money in the co-operative movement and sit back to wait for the sharing of dividend. In Nigeria, the co-operative societies have continued to emphasize the business aspect of co-operation and insist on paying to their members the same rate of interest on capital as paid by private capitalist enterprises; they have continued the distribution of profit through dividend instead of

emphasizing the social aspect of co-operation (living and
working together and striving to eliminate economic
exploitation of the many by the few). The co-operative
law sanctions the accumulation and disposal of surplus
purely on an economic basis, and the bureaucracy, through
the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, supervises the
distribution of such profit among the members of a
cooporative society:

No part of the funds of a registered society shall
be divided by way of a bonus or dividend or other-
wise among its members in any case . . . without the
sanction of the Registrar having been obtained in
writing.¹

We should now see how the day-to-day control of
the co-operative movement is conducted by the bureaucracy.
Hitherto, the day-to-day control of the co-operative
societies had been restricted to organizing the members
into the various committees required to run the society,
offering co-operative advice, auditing accounts and
submitting progress reports. But the 1953 law requires
the approval of the registrar before loans and investment
transactions are concluded by the co-operative societies.²

¹ "The Western Region Co-operative Societies Regulations,
1959," published as Supplement to Western Regional
Gazette, No.55, Vol.8, (Ibadan: Government Printer,
1959, S.53(1). These Regulations were drawn from the
provisions of the 1953 law.

² Ibid., S.34(1).
The law also empowered the registrar to force division or amalgamation on societies, thus over-riding the desires of the members. The powers to request a society to amend its by-laws, to dissolve a society and to dismiss the committee members and employees of a co-operative society were also conferred on the registrar by the law and the regulations. For example, the regulations state:

If in any society, in the opinion of the registrar, any member of the committee or any officer is unfit for the discharge of his duties, the society shall on the requirement of the Registrar have him removed. If the place of any person so removed be not filled by the society within thirty days of the date of the Registrar's request for his removal, the Registrar may appoint another person to fill the vacancy.

However, the law prescribed the procedure for appeal by any person aggrieved by a decision of the registrar, but there is no denying the fact that implicit in the operating principles discussed above is the nature and degree of government (and in this case bureaucratic) control over the activities of the co-operative movement. This control is extensive. We have seen how the registrar could refuse to register a society, amend its by-laws, dissolve its committees, dismiss its employees, set up

1. Co-operative Law, op.cit., s.52(3).
2. Co-operative Societies Regulations, 1159, op.cit., s.41.
his own committees and appoint his own officials, order compulsory amalgamation or division, cancel the registration of a society, make rules for the conduct of societies and exercise a host of direct controls over the finances of the co-operative societies.

One would ask, at this stage, why the law which conferred so much power on the bureaucracy was imposed. The reasons are political and economic. Politically, the mood in Nigeria was in favour of federalism and regionalism. The Macpherson Constitution of 1951 had made co-operatives the responsibility of the regional governments. The new Action Group (AG) government in the Western Region was eager to extend its influence to the grass-roots organizations. The official policy of the government was the consolidation of its control of the co-operative movement. The government opted for the provision of financial grants and loans to the co-operative societies for the carrying out of "approved objects" and increased the number of government's

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1. In Chapter Five, we saw how the same government extended its political control to the local government councils and the consequences which flowed from it.

supervisory staff. In addition, the policy encouraged the accumulation of surplus by the co-operative societies and the distribution of such surplus to the members. Surplus accruing to the co-operative societies was to be exempted from taxation.

Economically, the new regional government was eager to control the marketing of produce (this was why the marketing co-operatives remained the popular ones and cocoa was the 'king') so as to retain for itself a great proportion of the revenue. As we already saw in this chapter, the difference between the world and the producer prices was enormous. For the new government, it was necessary to control the marketing co-operatives so as to control the prices of the produce they marketed. Working in close collaboration with the marketing board system, the government was able to accumulate a huge amount in trading surpluses. For example, the Western Nigeria Marketing Board's accumulation of trading surpluses stood at ₦33.86 million in September, 1962, but by September, 1968, it had risen to ₦110.04 million. In addition, export duties on marketing board-controlled products accounted for about 96 per cent of Nigeria's total export duties between 1964 and 1971.1

In spite of the close control exercised by the bureaucracy over the affairs of the co-operatives, the government maintained that the legislation was intended to give a boost to the growth of "self-reliant"¹ and independent co-operative societies and "safeguard their (societies') interests".² It is clear from the above exposure of the provisions of the law that the co-operatives were not independent. Whether they were self-reliant or whether bureaucratic controls safeguarded their interests will become clearer as our discussion progresses.

A by-product of the enormous powers of the registrar is the expansion of the bureaucracy - the co-operative department. While in 1955, the co-operative administration of the Western Regional Government employed 443 co-operative officers, the

1. Ibid., p.2.
2. Ibid.
number rose to 2,081 in 1967; an increase of about 470 per cent. But the number of positions at the higher levels of the co-operative administrative hierarchy were not many, as shown in the following table:

**TABLE 11**

**Co-operative Administration Personnel, 1955 and 1967**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Officers</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registrar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Assistant Registrar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Assistant Registrar</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Registrar</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspectorate Grades</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operative Officers</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>2,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>596</td>
<td>2,253</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Koll, op.cit., p.43.*
The day-to-day supervision of the co-operative societies was done by the 139 inspectors assisted by the co-operative officers who were untrained high school graduates. Although the inspectors were trained for two years in co-operative activities at the co-operative college, they were not well paid compared with the attraction which the private sector offered them. Moreover, promotion prospects to high levels in the co-operative administration were not bright. The twenty senior assistant registrars had only two positions (which were probably not vacant) at the top to aspire to, while the 139 inspectors had no more than 43 positions to compete for. Because of these personnel problems, the co-operative administration frequently lost staff.

The nature of bureaucratic administration meant that the success of the co-operative organization depended on the registrar and his deputies. The hierarchical organization of the co-operative department demanded that every detail of the inspectors' reports be read and written comments added at various levels right up to the registrar. Usually months passed between the moment a report was written and the reception of the pertinent orders from above. Months in which the inspectors and the co-operatives they looked after were
unable to take measures concerning the problem in question.¹

In Bendel State, the bureaucracy which supervises the co-operative movement, is still haunted by manpower problems. During the 1977-78 financial year, each of the 19 local government areas in the State was supposed to have at least one principal assistant registrar, one senior assistant registrar and one assistant co-operative officer. There were supposed to be at least four co-operative inspectors in each area.² This complement of staff was not provided. And, having assigned so much power and control over co-operative societies to the bureaucracy, the officers needed to perform the controlling tasks were not available. In effect, the co-operative movement which had come to depend so heavily on the bureaucrats stagnated, as some of these reports indicate:³

¹ Ibid., p.40.
³ All the reports from the 19 local government areas complained of lack of finances, manpower and co-operative education. See File CD.1477, Ministry of Trade, Industries and Co-operatives.
Via local government area: There are no field staff in this area to cope with the growing population of the co-operative societies. At the moment, this office has only one Assistant Co-operative Officer and one Co-operative Inspector to handle the 57 units. The fear of establishing new ones is always there...the growth of the co-operatives is being militated against by inadequate staffing of the co-operative division of this Ministry.¹

Ethiopia local government area: There is acute shortage of staff which also hinders growth in co-operative organization;...there is only one co-operative inspector and one Assistant Registrar in the whole of this area.²

Since the bureaucracy played the leading role in the day-to-day affairs of the co-operatives and since the members obviously looked upon the bureaucracy to give them active direction, it followed that the development of the co-operative movement was hindered by some of the bureaucratic inadequacies we have identified.

It is clear from the above discussion that contrary to the general principles of a co-operative movement which emphasize the democracy, autonomy, initiative and self-reliance of the members, the co-operative law provided the basis for the serious compromise of these principles. Under the present system of running the co-operatives, initiative is

1. Ibid., p.4.
2. Ibid., p.6
stolen from the people and placed in the bureaucracy; the people become takers and not makers of decisions affecting their movement; they develop a dependency syndrome; and the co-operative movement becomes merely an extension of the public bureaucracy. The extent to which the present bureaucratic system of running the co-operatives has further affected the performance of the co-operative movement will now be dealt with.

Performance of co-operative movement:

The performance of the co-operative movement may be judged by the rate of its expansion, the extent of members' participation, the ability of the movement to achieve its ends, and the extent to which it contributes to the overall economic development of Bendel State and Nigeria in particular.
Let us first deal with the expansion of the co-operative movement. By the time the co-operative department (then a part of the national secretariat) was decentralized in 1952, following the introduction of the Macpherson constitution, there were only 128 co-operative societies in the Northern Region; the Western Region (including the Midwest and Lagos) had 438 societies. But by the time the Midwest Region (later called Ben del State) was carved out of the Western Region in August 1963, there were 327 co-operative societies in the new region.\(^1\) As at June 1977, the number of primary societies in Ben del State rose to 1,109 and membership stood at 474,120.\(^2\)

In Ben del State, the co-operative movement is organized at three levels. At the bottom of the hierarchy are primary societies which operate mainly in the rural areas. Individual members join these societies. Primary co-operative societies are formed to cater for the interests of their members in the particular area of


\(^2\) See Table 12 below. Although this number of co-operators appears significant when compared with the 1963 figures, it is less significant when it is remembered that the State has a population of over 2.5 million.
economic activity for which the society is registered. Although the present trend is towards multi-purpose societies, primary societies may be formed specifically for fishing, farming, thrift and credit, textile and shoe-making. Primary societies are usually of small membership; the law prescribes a minimum of 10 members as a condition for registration. As we have already noted, the number of societies rose to 1,109 in 1977 from the humble figures of 337 in 1963. But these figures, given by the co-operative division of the Ministry of Trade, Industries and Co-operatives, exclude a large number of indigenous type co-operative organizations which are not registered, since they could not fulfil the many bureaucratic requirements for registration. These unregistered societies include the esusu, village farm exchange programmes, and various forms of age grades.\(^1\) Although they contribute immensely to the economic life of the rural areas of Bendel State, these organizations are not recognized and do not receive any form of government assistance.

The second level of organization of the co-operative movement is the secondary level. Unlike primary societies which are open to individual members, secondary societies (Unions) are open only to primary societies which constitute the membership. The main function of secondary

\(^1\) For more elucidation on age grades, see chapters three and nine.
societies are to protect the interest of their members, give loans or information and represent them at the apex level - the headquarter organizations of the Bendel Co-operative Movement.

The highest level is composed of apex organizations at which mainly secondary societies (unions) are represented. At present, the apex organizations in Bendel State are the Bendel Co-operative Federation and the Bendel Co-operative Central Financing Society. The co-operative federation embraces all the various co-operative societies in Bendel State. The federation handles matters affecting marketing, financing, education and publicity for the entire co-operative movement. The co-operative Central Financing Society is the nucleus of the future co-operative bank of Bendel State. Its main function is to provide credit facilities for the co-operative movement. Through these three levels of organizations, the co-operative movement in Bendel State is linked together under the control of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The same pattern operates in the other states of Nigeria.

**TABLE 12**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-operative Society</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Primary Societies:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of societies</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>10,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shares</td>
<td>47,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Secondary Societies:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produce Unions</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrift and Credit Unions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Purpose Unions</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishermen Association</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Apex Organizations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bendel Co-operative Federation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bendel Co-operative Central Financing Society</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to ascertain the degree of members' participation in co-operative activities and the contribution of the co-operatives to the overall economic development of Bendel State in particular and Nigeria in general, it is relevant to examine some of the problems of the co-operative movement. The problems to be examined are financial, members' apathy, and effect of excessive bureaucratic control.

The principal sources of funds for the co-operative movement in Nigeria are members' contributions, retention of profits, bank loans and government financial assistance. Despite the availability of these sources, the co-operative movement in Nigeria has not been able to have sufficient funds for operation. Because of their financial inadequacies, the co-operatives have had to rely heavily on loans. Commercial banks charge a high rate of interest on loans. Even co-operative banks, which ought to provide the financial needs of the movement by granting soft loans, operate like other commercial banks. For example, the first co-operative bank in Nigeria - the Co-operative Bank of Western Nigeria - still does only 10 per cent of its business with the co-operative movement.¹

despite over 15 years of banking experience. In the Eastern States (Imo, Anambra, Rivers and Cross River), the Co-operative Bank of Eastern Nigeria does even less than 10 per cent of its business with the co-operatives. The position is the same in the Northern States.¹ Co-operative societies; therefore, have to rely heavily on loans from commercial banks and the government.

One would have expected that a central financing organization set up to cater for the financial interests of the co-operative movement would have actually worked for the benefit of the movement. This was not so, because the central financing organizations are not wholly owned by the co-operative movement. For example, on the face value, the Bendel Co-operative Central Financing Society is presented as an organization owned and controlled by the co-operative movement. From a detailed examination of the composition of the membership of the society and the distribution of its shares, it becomes clear that it is largely owned and controlled by a few individuals many of whom are not members of the co-operative movement. In 1977, the membership of the society consisted of 857 individuals, 278 societies and

¹. Ibid.
34 unions.1 This distribution of membership means that over 831 primary societies were non-members and that the membership of the financing society was solidly dominated by some 857 persons who had sufficient money to invest in the society. Out of the N88,918 internally raised capital of the society in 1977, N52,563 was obtained through "capital mobilisation fund" and N38,383 was from ordinary share capital. Only a meagre sum of N677 was realised through members' deposit; members' savings amounted to only N94.2 The revelation in these figures is that about 92 per cent of the internal capital of the central financing society was obtained through direct investment in the society and not through the contributions of the members. It follows that the individuals who invested their money in the co-operative stand to control the financial policies of the society and benefit more from any profits that might be made in the society. It is only in this way one can explain the insistence of the central financing society and other co-operative banks in Nigeria on operating like other commercial banks instead of emphasizing the interests of the co-operative movement. Table 13 presents the financial position of the co-operative societies in Bendel State in March, 1977.

2. Ibid., p.3.
## TABLE 13

QUARTERLY (AS AT 31ST MARCH, 1977) RETURNS (FINANCIAL) OF
CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES IN BENDEL STATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF SOCIETIES/UNIONS</th>
<th>LOANS INTEREST N</th>
<th>LOANS GRANTED N</th>
<th>LOANS REPAID N</th>
<th>LOANS OUTSTANDING N</th>
<th>LOANS OVERTUE N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Produce Marketing</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>19,848</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>12,385</td>
<td>12,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Thrift and Credit</td>
<td>57,559</td>
<td>670,797</td>
<td>245,838</td>
<td>453,594</td>
<td>1,568,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Consumers</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Multi-Purpose Societies</td>
<td>179,969</td>
<td>1,271,975</td>
<td>531,149</td>
<td>763,734</td>
<td>362,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Farmers Multi-Purpose</td>
<td>14,208</td>
<td>169,483</td>
<td>68,530</td>
<td>110,441</td>
<td>17,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Fishermen Multi-Purpose</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td>7,909</td>
<td>3,208</td>
<td>4,701</td>
<td>1,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Farmers' Thrift and Credit</td>
<td>3,604</td>
<td>113,044</td>
<td>45,115</td>
<td>67,929</td>
<td>20,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Fishermen Thrift &amp; Credit</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Thrift and Loans</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3,081</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>2,877</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Thrift and Savings</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Craft</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Oil Mill</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>3,125</td>
<td>2,105</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Rice Mill</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Transport</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Contractors</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td>1,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Poultry</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Building</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Textiles</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>8,084</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>1,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Produce Marketing Unions</td>
<td>14,720</td>
<td>49,871</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>49,836</td>
<td>49,836</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**TABLE 13 (CONT'D)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF SOCIETIES/UNIONS</th>
<th>LOANS INTEREST</th>
<th>LOANS GRANTED</th>
<th>LOANS REPAID</th>
<th>LOANS OUTSTANDING</th>
<th>LOANS OVERDUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20. Thrift/Credit Unions</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Industrial</td>
<td>15,230</td>
<td>204,735</td>
<td>96,231</td>
<td>128,004</td>
<td>22,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Butchers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Fishermen (C.F.S.)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Weavers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Fishermen Association</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>388,830</td>
<td>142,819</td>
<td>246,010</td>
<td>246,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Co-operative Federation</td>
<td>7,843</td>
<td>153,614</td>
<td>43,952</td>
<td>109,962</td>
<td>17,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>315,035</td>
<td>3,327,783</td>
<td>1,212,215</td>
<td>2,002,324</td>
<td>926,748</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Appendix I to the "Annual Report of Co-operative Activities", *op.cit.*
As Table 13 indicates, the sum of ₦315,035 was outstanding as loan interest to co-operative societies. Out of the ₦3,327,782 granted as loans, ₦2,002,748 was still outstanding; out of this amount, ₦926,748 was overdue for payment. However, these figures date from the early period (late fifties) of government's direct financial involvement in the co-operative movement when Bendel State was still a part of the former Western Region of Nigeria. It should also be noted that these figures represent the overall loans situation of the co-operatives from all sources - government, commercial banks, and the co-operative banks. Although no breakdown is available, we have seen that co-operative banks in Nigeria do not transact much of their business with the co-operative movement. If this fact is carefully considered, most of the loans outstanding are due to the government and commercial banks, not to the co-operative banks. The financial picture painted by Table 13 is misleading because it indicates that the co-operative banks pay a lot of money to the co-operative societies as loans and that the money is not usually recovered. Apart from the fact that the co-operative banks do only about 10 per cent of their business with the co-operative movement, the banks also succeed in
recovering the money paid as loans to the co-operative societies. In the 1976/77 financial year, the Bendel Central Financing Society granted loans totalling N120,662 to co-operative societies in the state. Out of this amount, N11,000 was recovered during the same year, leaving an outstanding balance of N109,662¹ to be paid over the years according to the various agreements. Also in the same year, cases of overdue loans involving 12 primary societies were successfully enforced in the law courts, and awards totalling N60,671 were made and recovered.²

The poor financial situation of the co-operative societies has far-reaching implications for the co-operative movement. Reporting from one of the 19 local government areas of Bendel State in 1975, a co-operative inspector wrote:

Many of the societies have become dormant as a result of overdue loans owed by members of such societies.³ Those co-operators who have not repaid their loans prefer to keep themselves away from the movement and encourage others to do the same in the hope that if

2. Ibid., p.8.
the movement dies, they will not have to repay the debts. It was this type of indifferent attitude that killed the Issele-Uku Credit/Multipurpose Co-operative Society which found itself unable to pay its loans.¹ Even where co-operative societies were eager to pay their debts, the high rate of interest became problematic.² Because of the high rate of interest (which is responsible for the huge N315, 035 recorded as outstanding interest in Table 13), much of the income of those co-operative societies was used for loan repayment. In effect, the co-operatives were merely working for the banks.²

It is clear from the above discussion that a large degree of indifference exists in the attitude of members towards their co-operative movement. This indifference is due, not to the "conservatism and individualism of our people",³ but to the government's policy towards the movement - a policy which emphasizes the

1. File CD.1, Ministry of Trade, Industries and Co-operatives, Benin City.
2. Ibid.

* As a matter of policy, the co-operative banks charged similar rate of interest with the commercial banks. In 1975, the rate was 6%, but this compares unfavourably with the 3% charged by government for its loans to parastatals.
co-operative movement as government business, enables a few people to invest money in co-operative financing and control the rate of interest, and de-emphasizes the importance of mass education as a prelude to mass people involvement in the co-operative movement. The role of the government, though important in the co-operative movement, is too extensive and makes it very difficult for members to realise that the co-operative organization is their own and that they can build it up by themselves. Because of the close day-to-day control of the registrar, the co-operatives are seen by the public as an enterprise which cannot exist without government's assistance and control. Speaking on the effects of such bureaucratic controls, the Bendel Co-operative Movement once declared:

Such control has given the co-operative members the impression that the movement is not theirs; that it is just another government organization. Commitment among the members and leaders is, therefore, low everywhere.¹

Since the co-operatives are seen as belonging to the government, most people consider their membership in them as a means of getting a fair share of the national cake.

The apathy of many genuine members of the co-operative movement is also due to the decision-making process of the co-operatives. According to the co-operative law, the executive management of the co-operative society is vested in a committee. The committee normally consists of at least nine members, including the President, Treasurer, Vice-President, and the Secretary of the co-operative society.¹ The annual general meeting of the co-operative society is virtually a ceremonial affair because the day-to-day management of the society devolves on the committee. Because many peasant members of the co-operatives are illiterates and are neither conversant with the "account," "auditing," "minuting," "inspection," and all the other bureaucratic jargon used by the co-operatives, in their interaction with the bureaucracy, they generally

¹ For an example of the composition of a typical committee, see Bye-Law of the Iyerekhu Farmers' Multi-purpose Co-operative Society, (Benin City: Ministry of Trade, Industries and Co-operatives, 1978), p.8, s.32.
lose interest in participation in committee activities. This membership apathy enables the few educated and influential members of the co-operative societies to dominate the management of the affairs of the co-operative societies. These educated members decide when meetings are to be held and what the agenda would be. They also prepare the income and expenditure accounts, assist the bureaucrats in inspection of books for auditing purposes, process applications for loans, and represent the society in all matters.

In various despatches to the headquarters of the Co-operative Division of Bendel State in 1975, the field officers were almost unanimous in identifying the domineering role of the few educated and influential members of the committee in co-operative affairs.1 Also in his survey of nine primary and secondary co-operative organizations in Ibadan and Oyo areas in 1971, Beer showed that 65.6 per cent of committee members had held office for more than five years; 43.6 per cent for more than ten years; and in one society,

1. See File CD.177, Ministry of Trade Industries and Co-operatives, Benin City. Of particular interest is the case of the secretary of the Agbon Credit and Thrift Society Limited. In the members' slogan, "Mr.... (the secretary's name) is Agbon CTSL and Agbon CTSL is Mr....(the secretary's name)".
the entire eleven member committee had been elected as young men, five of them in the early 1930s with the formation of the society, and they had remained in office ever since.¹

But co-operative movements ought not be run as we have seen above. The people ought not be mere passive participants (or do I say observers?). They ought to be active participants in the making of decisions and executing such decisions for the management of their movement. This is very important. As we have seen in the case of agricultural development, the rural masses and the "progressive" farmers and the bureaucrats have conflicting interests. In the absence of effective participation by the masses, the interests of the "progressives" would continue to prevail. If this trend is allowed to continue, it will, in the long run, lead to the creation of a privileged group among the rural peasants. Meaningful participation by the masses in the co-operative movement will infuse elements of egalitarianism in the production and distribution of wealth, and thus aim at blocking the development of capitalism and a petty bourgeois class in the rural

¹ Beer, op.cit., p.141.
areas. Participation will enable the rural masses to feed people-oriented inputs into the co-operative movement.

At present, there are serious obstacles to effective participation in Nigeria and many new states of Africa. A major stumbling block is the high rate of illiteracy in the country. As we have seen in Chapter Three, current educational policies neglect the adults who had never had the opportunity of formal education. Although the recently introduced universal primary education would reduce the illiteracy rate in about a decade from now (when the first two sets of graduates might have been turned out), concerted efforts should be mounted to eradicate illiteracy among the adults by a vigorous adult education programme. In addition to general literary education, meaningful participation requires a large dose of political education. There is need for a development-oriented national ideology (preferably socialist) around which the education of the people should be based. They need to be informed about the goals of the nation and its leadership, the importance of individual and collective participation, and an awareness of the various institutions (including the co-operative movement) which exist for such participation.
There is the need to impress upon the people as a whole, that fact that for purposes of equitable distribution of wealth, the attainment of "western" life style is neither feasible nor desirable in Nigeria's conditions and that the goal of meaningful development should be "to create a society in which financial income, advanced technical achievement and material goods are relegated in favour of economic and political equality and independence".¹

Some critics of rural development policies in Africa have questioned the usefulness of political education and mass participation and have argued that they are not conducive to economic productivity.

These problems are compounded by the national extension strategy, which is directed towards socio-political as well as productive goals. Ideological considerations impinge on extension effectiveness by leaning towards exclusive concentration on co-operative agricultural production and by causing extension agents to spend more time

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raising political consciousness and less time spreading technical advice.¹

We should, however, remember that since our idea of development is not only economic growth (productivity), but also the social relations involved in production and equitable distribution, political education and mass participation are necessary for these vital ends. Political education is necessary for effective mass participation because the political awareness of the masses, who form a large proportion of the producers, would constitute some degree of check on exploitative economic relations. A conscious populace would not only be able to feed better inputs into the political economy, but would also lessen the dependence on rural economic activists (rural capitalists) and the bureaucrats. The bureaucracy is ill equipped, because of the reasons identified so far in this study, to provide this political education. It is a matter of high political policy which only the state and its political leadership can decide upon.²

¹ See chapter ten for further discussion of political education.

² Lele, op.cit., p.74.
But if the bureaucracy is unable to provide political education, it can, at least, provide the right type of co-operative education. At present, the orientation of co-operative education in Bendel State, as in other parts of Nigeria, is towards the training of co-operative inspectors at the Co-operative College and occasional refresher/induction courses for secretaries and union managers of co-operative societies. Apart from the distribution of pamphlets on co-operative ideas to the populace, the bulk of the population, both ordinary members and non-members, of the co-operatives are not familiar with the activities of the co-operative movement.

The ambitious one-year syllabus designed for co-operative inspectors at the Co-operative College, is composed of book-keeping and accountancy, auditing, general economics, law and principles of co-operation, duties of inspectors, secretaries and committees, comparative co-operation, economics of co-operation, social psychology and rural sociology, commercial law, principles of communication, statistics, and business

1. Until 1977, co-operative inspectors were trained at the Co-operative College, Ibadan in Oyo State. A Co-operative College has now been opened in Benin City in Bendel State.
management. The syllabus makes little provision for giving guidance on the complex problems involved in handling produce and other merchandise for bulk purchasing units, or supervising agricultural credits. Although credits and farming co-operatives have been handed over to the Ministry of Agriculture, the agricultural assistants who now perform these functions are, themselves, not trained in co-operative principles and management. The syllabus also gives little time to courses on committee training, designed for members of the movement. This is a very vital area in the co-operative education of members which should be pursued with relentless vigour. Training of the members in committee system and small group participation would broaden their participative ability in the co-operative movement. In addition to mounting an elaborate campaign to educate the people on the usefulness of the co-operative movement for their overall economic development, the training and education in the co-operative movement should be broadened to include co-operative leaders, co-operative employees and improve the present courses for government's co-operative officials.

Education and training apart, other measures should be taken to lessen the control of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and his lieutenants over the co-operative movement. There is need to strengthen the Bendel Co-operative Federation to be able to take over some of the functions now performed by the Co-operative Division. The apex organization can play increased role in the provision of co-operative education for members and non-members of the movement, mount extensive publicity campaigns, organise courses for officials of co-operative societies and politically represent the movement before the government. Union level organizations should also be strengthened to provide more technical advice and assistance to primary societies as supplement to the services of the Co-operative Division. This move will involve more funds for unions' activities and the training of union employees in various specialised areas of the societies' operations.

The decision-making processes within the co-operative societies should also be improved. To this end, better provisions should be made for the occasional replacement of elected officers of the co-operatives. No committee members of primary societies should hold office for more than five consecutive years. The headship of union level organizations should change every four years. The
committee should meet more often as the executive organ responsible for the smooth running of the co-operative society. The secretary should be a full-time employee.

In order to ensure an adequate co-ordination of the activities of the Co-operative Division of the Ministry of Trade, Industries and Co-operatives, and the Group Farms Section of the Ministry of Agriculture, closer liaison between these two arms of the bureaucracy is called for. While the division is in charge of organizing and registering co-operative societies, the section deals with the operation of co-operative farms. At present, the co-operative inspectors lack any knowledge of agricultural services, while the agricultural assistants who handle the group farms project have no training in co-operative principles. Unless the co-ordination of the activities of these two organs are effective, the co-operators would not get adequate services from them. More thoughts will be expressed on how to improve the performance of the co-operative movement in the concluding chapter to this dissertation.
Summary:

We have shown in this chapter that the idea of co-operation was not introduced into Africa by Europeans and that co-operative practices, which were widely used in traditional African society, still operate in the production function of the villages in Nigeria today. We have also noted that potentials for the tapping of these resources exist, but that the current system of co-operative organization in the country is not appropriate for this purpose. We found that the co-operative movement is generally not able to serve the interests of most of its members and contribute to the overall economic development of the country. This is not because the people are not interested in the spirit of co-operation, but because the co-operative law, which forms the basis of co-operative organization in the whole of Nigeria, attributes so much power to the bureaucrats to control the co-operative societies directly. The law also makes it possible for the co-operatives to operate as purely business organizations to the detriment of the principles of participation.

Other problems identified with the co-operative movement include financial inadequacy, manpower shortage and members' apathy. Our findings led us to believe that
while some of these shortcomings could be eliminated through administrative reforms and the reorganization of the co-operative movement, the co-operative movement cannot be turned into an instrument of economic development in the rural areas of Bendel State, and Nigeria generally, without a large scale effort at mass education to eliminate illiteracy and to induce the people to participate in co-operative activities.
CHAPTER NINE

BUREAUCRACY'S ROLE IN THE SELF-HELP MOVEMENT

Like the co-operative movement, the self-help movement is an instance in which the local people unite together to pursue projects on which they are collectively agreed. But while the activities of co-operative societies are restricted to the participation of the members only, self-help efforts demand the participation of all the members of the community. No formal membership is required in a self-help movement.

Before we outline the argument to be developed in this chapter, let us first resolve the seeming controversy between "self-help" and "community development". Community development has been defined as

...a movement designed to promote better living for the whole community with active participation and on the initiative of the community.¹

Another definition tells us that community development is

...any action in a locality taken by any agency with the primary intention of bringing some benefit to such locality.²

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Although both definitions recognise the importance of improving the living standard in the community concerned, the latter includes actions by government, private corporations and the local people themselves, while the former pays more importance to the participation of the local people.

Three major approaches to community development in Nigeria have been identified: the extension approach, the project approach and the service approach. The extension approach involves directly teaching the local people improved methods and techniques of either farming, health care or how to read and write. The Ministries of Agriculture and Health use this approach. The project approach to community development is generally motivated by the government's desire to improve the economic conditions in the rural areas. It is, therefore, characterised by the establishment of economic ventures, such as a government farm or rural industry. The farm settlement scheme, school leavers' farms, and mechanized farms discussed in chapter six are examples of such projects. In the government circle in Nigeria, the project approach to community development is usually

1. Ibid., pp.153-165.
2. Ibid., p.154.
3. Ibid., p.155.
referred to as "rural development". The service approach to community development calls for the active participation and initiative of the local people. Used as the main strategy for community development in Nigeria, the service approach concentrates on the provision of social amenities such as postal agencies, maternity centres, pipe-borne water, dispensaries, electricity, and so on, in the rural areas.¹ The service approach to community development is usually called self-help in Nigeria.

For purposes of convenience, however, community development and self-help will be used interchangeably in this thesis to describe the service approach to community development. We have chosen this method because both terms are so used in the community development literature on Nigeria.² But self-help is particularly emphasized in this chapter because it enables us to caption as a movement the massive local involvement which has helped to popularise the initiative of the local people in efforts to develop their areas. Even today, this movement still attracts a

1. Ibid.
2. See the various development plans and programmes cited in this chapter, the publications of the relevant Ministries and the government files and papers used.
great deal of attention in the rural areas and is used by the people and the government as a sort of mobilizational force to induce the local people to work together for the common good of their local community.

Self-help effort is very useful in most rural communities of Nigeria for the provision of social amenities. Contrary to the argument of Ekong that no special development scheme is required for the rural areas and that no geographical distinction should be made between the rural and non-rural areas of Nigeria,¹ I believe that in the urban areas (such as Benin City, Sapele, Warri and many local government headquarters in Bendel State), the government provides the basic social amenities, while the rural areas are left to fend for themselves through self-help. The scope of such activities is the subject of this chapter. We seek to prove that abundant human and material resources exist in the rural areas of Bendel State, as demonstrated by self-help activities, but that the present approach to rural development does not tap these resources adequately.

1. Ekong, op.cit. Ekong goes further to argue that no part of Nigeria is so completely developed that it would not require some further concerted development efforts to make it even better. This argument misses the point. The development gap between the rural and non-rural areas is too wide; it is still getting wider. Thus, special attention should be directed to the rural areas in order to narrow this gap. This redirection of attention would require a realignment of present policies, and thus special schemes for the rural areas.
So as to prove this assertion, it is necessary, once again, to resort to the historical approach. The old and the new ways of conducting self-help projects will be discussed with the intention of spotlighting the interest which self-help has generated among the people and the government. The involvement of the government in the self-help movement brought the bureaucracy into the picture. The nature of this involvement and the role of the bureaucracy in it will be examined and conclusions drawn therefrom.

Self-Help: The Old and The New:

Self-help projects have been undertaken by the people of Bendel State from time immemorial. As we have seen in chapter three, the socio-political organization of several communities in what is now known as Bendel State, provided the basis for the planning and execution of self-help projects before the Europeans came to Nigeria. Some of these institutions were the age grades and village councils.\(^1\) The difference between self-help activities undertaken in the past and those prosecuted today are not hard to find. Differences exist in the scope of the operations, equipment used, and extent of

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government involvement.

In the past, self-help efforts in Bendel State mainly related to the construction of footpaths or roads, dredging of rivers and streams, clearing of public land and market places. Later the scope of operation included the building of schools and market stalls. Such major projects as pipe-borne water, road tarring, dispensaries, cottage hospitals etc. were not attempted. The equipment used was simple. Hoes, cutlasses, diggers and shovels were generally employed. The construction of walls did not follow any standard, measurements and the people used their own imagination to plan and construct their projects. Under the old approach to self-help projects, the planning and execution was the sole responsibility of the people. There was little or no government involvement. Where the government was involved at all, it was for purposes of taking over completed projects for operation or maintenance. In a number of cases, this responsibility devolved on the local government councils. But where neither the state government nor the local government councils were interested in such projects, the missionaries were. As a means of spreading their religious beliefs and inculcation of Western European culture, missionary schools, hospitals and dispensaries sprang up in many parts of Bendel State and other parts
of Nigeria.  

But the old approach to self-help projects was soon overtaken by circumstances. After the Nigerian civil war (1967-70), the need for massive reconstruction work further aroused in the people a revival of the spirit of self-help which is deeply rooted in the rich traditions of Nigerians. Although self-help grants to local communities rose from N18,000 in 1965/66 to N20,000 in 1966/67 in Bendel State, the first official support for self-help projects, as a deliberate means of encouraging local communities through planning, came with the 1970-75 development plan.*  

Local government councils and the various communities are given ample opportunities, for the first time, to initiate projects to be implemented with government support and local voluntary contributions.  

But this government's newly discovered deep interest in self-help projects was not borne out by the amount of grants paid to local communities during the first three years following the new policy in the development plan. As shown in Table 14, community development grants dropped to  

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1. For details of missionary activities in some parts of Bendel State, see F. Agboaye, "Missionary Activities in Ishal Division of Bendel State," (B.A. Thesis, Department of History, University of Ibadan, 1974).  

2. See Table 14.  


*Although token grants have been paid since the creation of Bendel State in 1963/64, it was only in 1970-75 that it became a development goal of the planners. Also for the
### TABLE 14


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Amount of Grant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964 - 1965</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 - 1966</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966 - 1967</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 - 1968</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 - 1969</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969 - 1970</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 - 1971</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 - 1972</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 - 1973</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 - 1974</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 - 1975</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 - 1976</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 - 1977</td>
<td>225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>899,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Calculated from records in the Ministry of Local Government, Benin City.

For the first time, local government councils and local communities were openly encouraged to initiate and execute development projects, with a promise that government would reasonable grants-in-aid.
N16,000 in 1968/69, and stagnated at that amount until 1970/71. During the period 1971-73, no grants were paid for self-help projects. It was not until 1973/74 (the last year of the development plan which introduced the new grant policy) that self-help grants were reintroduced. Only a total of N20,000 was paid that year; i.e., a return to the 1967/68 level. The meaning of these facts is that despite the official support for a self-help movement, only a total of N36,000 was paid as grants during the 1970-74 development plan period.

In spite of the non-payment of grants, the self-help movement gained popular acceptance throughout Nigeria. In Bendel State in particular, the contribution of funds for various self-help projects became a sort of competition among the people. Sons and daughters of rural parents, but who lived in urban areas, returned home to join their rural communities in the planning and execution of projects to improve life in the villages. In his congratulatory message to the 1,500 people of Igor in Ishan Division of Bendel State, who completed a pipe-borne water scheme through self-help, the then Military Governor declared:
It is gratifying to note that the different communities are responding to the call and are making their own contributions to the development of the State.¹

During the 1970-74 development plan period, the total cost of projects executed through self-help was over N30 million.² The number of self-help projects executed and their cost have continued to soar during the current (1975-80) plan period. In 1976 alone, a total of 980 projects were planned and partially executed at an estimated cost of N9.6 million, as shown in Table 15. The vigorous trend of self-help projects continued into 1978 when the field work for this thesis was conducted in Nigeria. As shown in Table 16, a total of 1,053 self-help projects were underway in March 1978. The estimated cost of the projects was N10.1 million and local contribution towards the projects was estimated at N5.2 million.


² Rough estimate obtained from departmental vote books, Ministries of Local Government and Information and Home Affairs, Benin City. Vote books are records of money in the approved estimates, and the actual expenditure of the sum approved.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Government Area</th>
<th>Number of self-help Projects</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Contribution by Communities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agbazilo</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>134,570</td>
<td>159,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Akoko-Edo</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>312,000</td>
<td>155,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Aniocha</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>308,400</td>
<td>151,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bomadi</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>700,985</td>
<td>350,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Burutu</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>800,060</td>
<td>400,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ethiope</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>814,700</td>
<td>429,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Etsako</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>962,100</td>
<td>434,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Ika</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>272,360</td>
<td>136,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Isoko</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1,037,000</td>
<td>689,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Ndokwa</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>199,100</td>
<td>185,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Okpe</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>120,600</td>
<td>60,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Okpeho</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>890,400</td>
<td>366,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Oredo</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>137,800</td>
<td>69,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Owan</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>562,300</td>
<td>276,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Ohrionmwon</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>598,600</td>
<td>299,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Oshimili</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>98,900</td>
<td>83,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Uvia</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>984,800</td>
<td>145,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Ughelli</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>780,500</td>
<td>546,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Warri</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>442,000</td>
<td>244,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,053</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,157,175</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,283,545</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: "Achievement of the Community Development Division for the period 1/4/77 - 31/3/78," Ministry of Local Government, Benin City, p.3.*
In the Eastern States of Nigeria, the self-help spirit equally proved its potency as age grades, improvement unions and other development-oriented institutions initiated and executed development projects. Nwosu describes the contribution of these development organizations thus:

...whatever development that has occurred in the respective community council areas...has nearly always been the handiwork of the indigenes of the area with their traditional organizations.

Three reasons are given for the success of the self-help movement in Nigeria. First, the development ventures enable the local people to decide which projects they want to spend their money and energies on. This decision is largely influenced by the prevailing local environment and what the people consider to be their pressing needs. Secondly, the people derive some satisfaction from projects which they plan and execute through communal labour. They see themselves as being a part and parcel of their local community and actively contributing to its development. They are also happy to see the practical fruits of their

collective endeavour. Thirdly, the high rate of embezzlement of public funds which characterized the failure of local governments in Nigeria is avoided in the self-help movement because the publicity given to the projects and the contributions reduce the chances of misappropriation.\(^1\) Moreover, local pressures and social sanctions are brought to bear on the people handling community funds; these pressures limit the chances of embezzlement.

The practical implication of these developments in the self-help philosophy is that vast local resources exist in the rural areas of Bendel State and Nigeria in general which could be mobilized for purpose of rural development. How these vast resources are or are not adequately encouraged and co-ordinated for these purposes will become clearer as we discuss the role of the bureaucracy in the self-help movement and the problems associated with its role.

**Bureaucracy and self-help movement:**

The Community Development Division, now attached to the Ministry of Local Government, is the main bureaucratic organization responsible for translating the governments' involvement.

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in self-help development activities into reality. The division is headed by a Chief Community Development Officer, assisted by several levels of community development personnel. In each of the local government areas in Bendel State, the community development section is headed by a Higher Community Development Officer. However, the field aspects of the self-help functions are performed by some lower-level staff, Rural Development Organizers (RDO), attached to the division.

Rural development organizers are men and women whose principal duties are to stimulate, organize and advise the local people about self-help activities. The work of the RDO involves the four stages of a self-help project. These stages are planning, launching, execution and opening.¹

At the planning stage of a self-help project, the RDO "sells" the idea of self-help to the people and assists them in arranging meetings to discuss any of the projects they wish to carry out. This is necessary

because bureaucratic regulations direct that self-help projects should be planned for a certain period and that the local people should brief the state government well in advance. The RDO is also expected to work closely with the local people on the establishment of a development committee for the project.

The launching stage of a self-help project is very important. The RDO assists the development committee in the preparations. Since he represents the official side, he ensures the attendance of the Minister or his representative at the launching ceremony. The launching stage is purposely to collect initial funds for the project. Invitations are sent to many people all over the State and indigenes of the area who live in other parts of the country are also required to attend. Much publicity is done at this stage and the role of the RDO becomes very important.

The execution stage comes next in the process of a self-help project. It may involve only the community or the government and the community. Where only the community is involved, they provide the labour free in the form of site clearing, blocks moulding and tree felling. For the other aspects of the project not requiring direct labour (such as work done by contractors), the local community pay for the project from their funds.
But where both the people and the bureaucracy are involved, the supply of communal labour is the responsibility of the people, while the appointment of contractors and the supervision of projects to ensure that the contractors do a good job, is the responsibility of the community development division and other government departments, such as Water Board and the Ministry of Works and Transport in the field. Today, most self-help development projects follow this pattern.\textsuperscript{1}

The opening stage is the last step in the self-help development process. Here the people rejoice and marvel at the final result of their collective endeavour in their bold determination to bring development to their area. It is usually a big occasion. As in the launching stage, much publicity is mounted and a lot of important people are invited to the village to watch the ceremony.

\textsuperscript{1} The government, through the community development division officials, usually warn local communities that the provision of communal labour is only one aspect of the work. In order for a project to be completed successfully, the contractor has to be closely watched and supervised. Thus, the local communities are advised to work in close collaboration with the RDD and other field departments. Imhanlahni-mhin, \textit{op.cit.}, p.32, reported the cases of Ubiaja and Ewossa communities who lost huge sums of money because they did not consult the Water Board before they purchased materials for water extension.
The local people also use the occasion to present series of demands to the government. It does not matter to the people whether it is the minister or his officials in the community development division that attend the ceremony; anybody representing the official side stands for the government. The shopping list for new social and economic projects is usually presented in a "welcome address". These requests are usually noted by the government's representatives, with a promise that they will be "referred to the appropriate quarters." Nothing happens.

Since the participation of the government in self-help projects is now the order of the day, the mode of participation calls for discussion. The two aspects of governmental assistance in self-help development projects are grants-in-aid and technical aid.

The self-help projects which may attract government grants-in-aid are categorized into three: Category I projects are those which would have normally been provided by government ministries direct, but because no provision is made for such projects in the development plan, local communities are encouraged to provide them through communal efforts. "Such projects as rural health centres, maternity homes, dispensaries, postal agencies
and water supply schemes come under this category, and may qualify for a grant of 25 per cent to 50 per cent of estimated cost of the projects.\(^1\) Category II projects "contribute to the economic progress of the people and include such...projects as access-roads, co-operative farming, fish ponds, markets and cottage industries."\(^2\) These projects may attract a grant of 15 per cent of the total cost. The last category of projects (category III) provide for the "socio-cultural improvement of the life of the people."\(^3\) Libraries, youth centres and town halls are covered under this category and the projects may qualify for a 10 per cent grant based on the total cost of their execution.

But the mere fact that projects fell under one of these categories was not a condition for the automatic payment of cash grants. The policy on grants further stipulated the following conditions for qualification for a grant:

(i) planning and execution must be brought to the notice of the community development worker at the initial stage;

2. *Ibid*.
3. *Ibid*.
(ii) work must be carried out under supervision of the field staff and reports on the progress of the work submitted according to schedule;

(iii) expert costing of the project by staff of a subject matter Ministry (a relevant government department in the field) concerned must be obtained;

(iv) clearance must be obtained from the appropriate Ministry and any voluntary agency interested, to ensure maintenance of the project after completion.¹

The classification of projects and the payment of grants deserve a close observation. There are conflict in the classification of projects by the "Self-Help" policy statement quoted above and the development plan, 1970-74. Whereas, maternity centres, dispensaries, and rural health centres are categorized as projects III by the development plan, they are classified as projects I in the self-help policy statement. Also, co-operative farming and cottage industries are in category I in the development plan, but they are placed in category II in the self-help policy paper.² Another ambiguity centers around the qualification for a cash grant. While the self-help pamphlet takes it that all projects would be grant-aided, the development plan states that category III

1. Ibid., p.15.

projects "will receive the necessary technical advice, but grants may not be forthcoming." Yet, another policy paper raised the percentage of grants to 50 for category I, 33 for category II, and 25 for category III, as against the 50, 15 and 10, referred to above.

But the problem with the payment of community development grants for projects completed through self-help did not arise from the conflicting policies discussed in the preceding paragraph. The fact was that the policy did not work. Although almost every project qualified for a grant, the amount paid did not reflect the percentages quoted in the various policy statements. This is because there was a wide discrepancy between the amount approved for grants and the amount eventually released by the government. In the 1976/77 financial year, for example, a sum of N500,000 was approved in the Estimates, but at the end of the financial year in March 1977, only N115,000 (a meagre 23 per cent) was actually released. 3 The inadequate release of funds is


3. Interview with the Senior Community Development Officer (Grants), Ministry of Local Government, Benin City, on May 22, 1978.
partly responsible for the low amount of grants paid in respect of self-help projects. As shown in Table 17 which follows, the amount paid to individual local communities by the government for self-help projects is very small compared with the efforts (local labour and finances) expended by the people on such projects. From the table, it is evident that the enthusiasm and encouragement of the people would not be highly motivated if, for example, they received only N800 for a four kilometer water extension costing a total of N8,000. Field reports on self-help grants point to the inadequacy of the amount paid all over the State. For example, the community development officer in Western Ijaw Division reported in 1974:

As regards the amount of grants awarded each project, one would still say that it is unsatisfactory because, for a road project like that of Egodor/Oviri estimated at about N25,000, the grant was only N400; that is 6% instead of 33%.1

1. See 1974 Annual Report on Community Development Projects in Western Ijaw Division, in file CDD.305, Development Administration Department, Military Governor's Office, Benin City. More reports on financial inadequacy exist in this file.
## TABLE 17

GOVERNMENT GRANTS TO SELF-HELP PROJECTS
IN ISHAN DIVISION OF BENDEL STATE, 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Grants Awarded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Egbioki-Igbeben</td>
<td>8 km. Water Extension</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Okalo</td>
<td>4 km. Water Extension</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Okuta/Oleghe</td>
<td>4 km. Water Extension</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Okpujie-ebelle</td>
<td>Prim. School</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Iruekpen-Ekpoma</td>
<td>10 Classrooms</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Uhumudumu</td>
<td>Cottage Hospital</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>1,600 (for 1st phase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Idumigun-Ekpoma</td>
<td>4.8 km. Road</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Iboere-Irma</td>
<td>20.8 km. Road</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Atuagbo-Irwa</td>
<td>Maternity</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Ochuida</td>
<td>Road/bridge</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Eguare-Ewatto</td>
<td>Market Stalls</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Ugun</td>
<td>8 km. Road</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Afuda-Igbeben</td>
<td>4 km. Road</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Udoneria</td>
<td>8 km. Road</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Ebudin-Ugbegun</td>
<td>9 Classrooms</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Okpo-Ewatto</td>
<td>Water Extension</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Eguare-Amahor</td>
<td>Market Stalls</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Ekekhen</td>
<td>6 Classrooms</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 17 (CONT'D.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Grants Awarded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19. Illushi</td>
<td>3 Classrooms</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Ewoyi-Uromi</td>
<td>Market Stalls</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>500 (for 1st phase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Iruele-Uromi</td>
<td>Water Extension</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Okenawale-Uromi</td>
<td>Water Extension</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Ojosalen-Opoji</td>
<td>4 km. Water Extension</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>458,500</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** File CDP 305, Development Administration Department, Benin City.
Even where projects have been inspected and grants recommended, the money due may not be paid at all. Table 18 below shows instances when no grant was paid because funds were not released.

The logical inference one draws from the administration of grants-in-aid is that the Bendel State government, and perhaps other governments in the country, are not sufficiently interested in the self-help movement. More attention is paid to the development of the urban areas, where members of the ruling class live, rather than the encouragement of the genuine development aspirations of the rural masses. In both the development plans and annual estimates of government, urban development gains the upper hand. In the current plan, only ₦11.5 million (1.7 per cent of total public sector capital expenditure) is for co-operative and community development.1 Urban housing received ₦26.2 million (3.9 per cent); sewage/drainage obtained ₦58 million (8.6 per cent); town and country planning scored ₦30.5 million (4.5 per cent) out of a total capital estimate of

TABLE 18
SOME GRANT-AIDED SELF-HELP PROJECTS IN ISHAN DIVISION
OF BENDEL STATE, 1972-74

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATIONS</th>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>ESTIMATED COST</th>
<th>AMOUNT EXPENDED</th>
<th>STAGE OF WORK</th>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>CASH GRANT %</th>
<th>REAL GRANT %</th>
<th>RECOMMENDED %</th>
<th>POSITION OF GRANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uzoa</td>
<td>48 Kilometre-Road</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Not Compe-</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Not Released</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udo-Efandion</td>
<td>11.2 -do-</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>lted</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>-120</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohordua-Onitoba</td>
<td>Ukwu</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obihi-Ekpoma</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Complete</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okhuaan-Ahia</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ewu-Agbede</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ujogba Bridges</td>
<td>6.4 Kilo.2</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Released</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usugbenu</td>
<td>4 Kilo. Extension</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25-50</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniele</td>
<td>4.8 Kilometre-Water</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Not Released</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illehe</td>
<td>6.4 -do-</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aare-Uromi</td>
<td>Market Stalls</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Not Released</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amedokbiau</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCATIONS</td>
<td>PROJECT</td>
<td>ESTIMATED COST</td>
<td>AMOUNT EXPENDED</td>
<td>STAGE OF WORK</td>
<td>CATEGORY</td>
<td>CASH GRANT %</td>
<td>REAL GRANT</td>
<td>RECOMMENDED %</td>
<td>POSITION OF GRANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibhiadan</td>
<td>Market Stalls</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Complete</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ihumudumu</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okpo-Ewatto</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogwa</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibere</td>
<td>Town Hall</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukpenu-Ekpoma</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Not Released</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iruua</td>
<td>Post Office</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>25-50</td>
<td>Released</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekpoma</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>25-50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obodoko-Anahor</td>
<td>Dispensary</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>25-50</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikheideu-Ekpoma</td>
<td>Maternity</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>25-50</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>63,600</td>
<td>57,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,586</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Imhanlahimhi, op.cit., p.57.
₦669 million for Bendel State.¹ At the national level, co-operatives and community development also attracted very little attention in the current development plan. As shown in Appendix VI to this dissertation, all the state governments in Nigeria estimated only ₦177 million for the sector while the Federal government planned to spend a meagre sum of ₦16 million by the end of 1980.² The thrust of this argument is that in the allocation of resources for development, the rural areas are neglected, and that the problem is even more serious when the meagre amount estimated in the plans is not released. This situation tends to retard the development of the self-help movement throughout Nigeria. We may, therefore, conclude that the governments of Nigeria hide under the "self-help" slogan to shelve their responsibility for the provision of better services in the rural areas. While the urban areas receive these services as a matter of course, the rural areas are asked to help themselves.

Let us turn to the other side of the assistance programme - technical aid. By technical aid here,
we mean the offering of advice and the use of government field personnel and equipment in the planning and execution of self-help development projects. Advice may be offered in several forms and by several bureaucrats in the field administration. For example, the role of the staff of the community development division, which has been extensively discussed in this chapter, constitutes a form of advice. Of more importance to the rural communities' self-help projects, however, are the services of the Ministry of Works and Transport, Ministry of Health and Water Board. The supervision of projects such as roads, maternity centres, schools, cottage hospitals and town halls, is conducted by the Area Engineer (there is one representing the Ministry of Works and Transport in each of the 19 local government areas in the State) and his team of assistants. As we have seen, the proper supervision of projects is one of the conditions necessary for the award of cash grants. Thus, in order to ensure that projects are well executed and also to qualify for the award of grants, the Ministry of Works and Transport plays a major role in project supervision. The Water Board comes into the picture when pipe-borne water projects are planned and executed by local communities. Since the provision of pipe-borne
water is one of the most important projects in many of the rural communities (water is very scarce in many parts of Bendel State) the Water Board also plays a big role in the technical aid programme. The board is responsible for the offering of advice on what type of materials the people should buy, how the pipe trenches should be dug by communal labour and the installation and maintenance of completed water projects. In Bendel State, maternities and dispensaries are run by the Ministry of Health. Thus, before such projects are carried out, the approval of the Ministry is required, since the Ministry must accept the responsibility of maintaining completed projects.

The use of government equipment is another form of technical assistance. Both the Ministries of Agriculture and Works supply bulldozers, graders and other road equipment to local communities, on application, for use in self-help projects.¹ A recent development in the government-community technical aid programme is the use of government's standard plans to build schools, hospitals and dispensaries instead of the communities spending their

¹. Imhanlahimhin, op.cit., p.53.
limited funds to draw up their own plans. Recent examples of this form of technical assistance are the cottage hospitals at Ekpoma in Okpeho local government area and Fugar in Etsako local government area. The use of government's standard plans for these projects has saved for the local communities the money they would have paid architects to draw the plans for them.

Technical aid for self-help development projects in Bendel State has created a positive impact on self-help efforts. In the first place, the local people are now able to get the advice of experts in the various projects in which they are involved. This advice now enables the people to have a clear idea of the estimated cost of their project and thus work towards achieving the set financial targets. Secondly, the offer of technical advice through project inspection now enables the people to conserve their meagre financial resources for the purchase of vital material needed for the project, instead of employing experts to inspect and evaluate their projects. Thirdly, the award of contracts for self-help development projects is now

1. Interviews, op.cit.
closely supervised by the various government technical
departments so as to eliminate some greedy contractors
who, in the past, duped the local people.

Having discussed the grants-in-aid and technical
aid aspects of self-help projects, two problematic
issues of the self-help movement remain to be touched
upon: perpetuation of rural inequalities and
inadequate co-ordination of projects.

The practice of leaving the rural areas to cater
for themselves through self-help tends to improve the
lots of the relatively rich communities who are able
to contribute more for the execution of self-help
development projects. The relatively poorer
communities, who are not able to so contribute,
remain poor. This was one of the main reasons that
led the Bendel State government to appoint the Nwanwene
Committee to review the matching grant principle under
the "development administration" system in 1975.1 The
recommendations of this committee were overtaken by the

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1. Under the "development administration" system
discussed in chapter five, it was agreed that
development grants would be paid to communities on
the basis of 100 per cent for local funds contributed
for development. The obvious inequality generated
by the proposal and the small size of the develop-
ment committees (local councils) were two important
factors that led to the appointment of the Nwanwene
Committee to review the system of "development
administration".
local government reforms of 1976\(^1\) which abolished the development administration system. In any case, the unpublished report of the committee called for a review of the matching grant principle. Since 1977, the principles of quota and equality have guided the award of grants-in-aid for self-help projects in Bendel State. Under the new arrangement, the estimated cost of a project may influence the amount of grant paid, but the overwhelming criterion is the principle of equality. As shown in Appendix VII to this thesis, almost all the self-help projects in 1977/78 attracted an equal amount (₦500) as grant; only projects costing ₦40,000 or above attracted ₦1,000 each in grant. We will argue that the mere introduction of a more equitable system of grant-in-aid will not solve the problem of inequalities among rural communities. The richer communities would still be able to contribute more towards self-help projects and thus widen the gap between them and the poorer communities. Government should, in addition to ensuring that adequate grants are paid to all communities to encourage them to work harder for the development of their areas, take appropriate steps to site some viable

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1. See chapter five.
projects in poorer communities as a means of improving the standard of living in such areas. Good roads, health centres, rural industries and agricultural projects are some of those that can be contemplated.

Self-help projects are badly co-ordinated in Bendel State. There is widespread evidence of lack of planning to make provision for the servicing and maintenance of projects completed through self-help. Although we have noted in this chapter that communities are required to brief the headquarter administration well ahead before they commence any project, and that they are required to obtain the assurance of the relevant government departments that the completed projects would be taken over for maintenance, it would appear that this information was not used for planning purposes. For example, dispensaries, hospitals and postal agencies completed through self-help efforts remained for years without offering any services because the Ministries concerned did not make provision for the men and equipment in the annual estimates. In Benin West division (now Orhionwon local government area) in Bendel State, the general hospital at Abudu, the postal agency at Igbanke and a couple of maternities in other villages
in the division, stayed dormant for years. To say the least, there is nothing in these practices to encourage the people to execute more projects.

The bureaucratic problems in the Community Development Division also affected the speedy completion of self-help projects. As we have seen, the central co-ordinating bureaucratic organ for self-help activities is the community development division. Since the creation of Bendel State in 1963, the location of this division has changed about ten times. In the face of this bureaucratic instability, the division was not able to effectively organize its headquarters and field machinery for a meaningful role in community development until very recently. Moreover, the

1. In 1963, the division was a part of the Ministry of Economic Development. In 1964, it was transferred to the Ministry of Finance. One year later, it became a part of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Information. In 1966, following the inception of a military administration, the division was transferred to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. After the Nigerian civil war in 1970, the division became a part of the Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction. In 1973, community development became a part of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Information. When the Development Administration Edict was enforced in 1975, the division rested briefly in the Military Governor's Office as a part of the Development Administration Department, and later moved to the newly created Ministry of Development Administration. Following the nation-wide local government reforms in July, 1976, community development was moved to the Ministry of Local Government where it resided in 1978 when the field work for this study was conducted.
relationship between the community development division and other relevant field departments was not cordial. Possessing no workshops and machinery of its own, the division had to rely on the Ministry of Works and Transport to supply bulldozers and graders for self-help projects. Most of the time, this equipment was not supplied at the time it was needed.¹ When the local people had been fully assured of this equipment, it lowered morale and enthusiasm when they could not be provided. Consequently, these developments adversely affected the self-help movement.

Concluding Remarks:

The importance of the self-help movement in the development of the rural areas of Bendel State, and Nigeria generally, has been established in this chapter. Resting firmly on the rich traditions of most of the people, the spirit of self-help has been directed to projects of mutual benefit to the entire community. We have seen how roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, maternity centres, pipe-borne water schemes, post offices and town halls, have been completed through self-help activities by the local people. This chapter has also reviewed the old and

¹ Information acquired through personal observation while serving as an Assistant Secretary in this division in 1975.
the new approaches to self-help projects. While in the past, the local people completed projects by the use of local labour and equipment, the new approach involves the participation of the government and its bureaucracy. But this participation brings in its train inadequacies which have tended to hinder the enthusiasm of the people in self-help projects. We have identified cases of gross insufficiency of grants and equipment contributed by government towards self-help projects. Placed in juxtaposition with the government's declared policy on self-help assistance, the insufficiency of the assistance actually received led us to the conclusion that the government pays only lip service to the self-help movement. While so much money is spent on the development of urban centres, where the ruling class lives, the rural areas are grossly neglected, and are asked to help themselves.

Apart from the obvious contradiction between the promulgated goal of self-help assistance and the actual results of implementation efforts, bureaucratic problems have also contributed to the uncoordinated nature of self-help projects and delays in putting into use projects already completed. In the midst of all these
shortcomings, the patience and enthusiasm of the local people wear thin. There is, therefore, reason to believe that abundant human and material resources exist in the rural areas of Bendel State, as demonstrated by the self-help movement, but that these resources have not been effectively tapped.
CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION

It is time to pull all the threads together. We should now summarise the major findings of the study and assess to what extent they have proved or disproved the central hypothesis, that the bureaucracy can be the principal agent for effective rural development.

Summary of Findings:

Chapter one outlined our course of action in the thesis. It sounded the warning that a concentration of development efforts in the urban areas, to the neglect of the rural areas where a majority of the people live, will not lead to meaningful development. The redirection of efforts to the rural areas, both in policy pronouncements and actual implementation efforts, coupled with the mass involvement of the people in development efforts, hold a brighter future for African countries. Thus, it is suggested that administrative reforms, and the increasing role of the public bureaucracy alone, should not be relied upon as the best approach to rural development. It is against this background that we formulated the central hypothesis that the bureaucracy can be the principal
agent for effective rural development. In order to prove or disprove this hypothesis we examined administrative reforms, agricultural development, co-operative movement and self-help movement. Finally, chapter one made a case for the use of the case study approach and why we chose Bendel State of Nigeria as the basis for the study.

Chapter two discussed the two main concepts in the study - bureaucracy and development. After an overview of the literature on these concepts, we assigned our own meaning to the concepts. The chapter then traced the relationship between bureaucracy and development, assessing the burning issue of whether the public bureaucracy is likely to bring about meaningful rural development. Our discussion led us to the conclusion that, given some of the constraints which African bureaucracies inherited from their colonial past, and given the historical class role of these bureaucracies, only very little rural development would be likely to take place if all emphasis is placed on the bureaucrats and the contribution of the mass of the people is played down.

Chapter three presented some background information on Nigeria in general and Bendel State in particular.
The chapter traced the historical evolution of the Nigerian State from the 1914 amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates to the present time. The political economy of Nigeria was discussed, with primary emphasis on the concentration of services in urban areas and the neglect of the rural areas. In order to show the widening urban-rural gap, the nature of rural life, agriculture, transportation, education and health facilities were discussed.

This background information provided us with a launching pad into a discussion of our main empirical studies. Administrative reform was discussed in chapters four and five. Here, we held a contrary view to some proponents of development administration theory and practice that the strengthening of administrative capacity is the most important factor in development. In the two chapters we argued that, rather than increase efficiency and effectiveness in rural development, administrative reforms in Bendel State, and in Nigeria generally, have largely resulted in more centralization and bureaucratization, the consequent potent of local

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1. The writings of Riggs, Weidner, Esman and Chambers already discussed in this thesis argue in favour of bringing about development by strengthening the administrative capacity rather than involving the people massively in the process of development.
institutions and hence little actual rural development.

In our examination of central administrative reforms in chapter four, we found how the colonial bureaucracies were transformed into modern large-scale organizations which, it was expected, would play a leading role in development. But unfortunately, most of the reform exercises which were intended to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of the bureaucracies merely produced counter results: emphasis on pay and fringe benefits, conflicts of interest between bureaucratic functionaries, and the diversion of energies to the struggle for control and authority. Field administrative reforms, we found out, resulted in the extension of the state government's direct control to the remotest corner of Bendel State, and enhanced the importance of the generalist administrator. In the inevitable conflicts between generalists and professionals, the pressing problems of rural development were left unattended.

Chapter five dealt exclusively with local administration. Our data showed that the elected democratic institutions which were introduced by the 1952 reforms did not pass the test of time. After independence in 1960, and until 1976, local government
institutions were overtaken by a wave of centralization policies. These policies, and the consequences which they produced, first weakened the effectiveness of, and finally eroded, local institutions. It was not until 1976 that local governments were re-introduced in Nigeria, and given increased autonomy, functions and funds for operation.

The role which the reformed bureaucracy played in agricultural development was the subject of chapters six and seven. We sought to know, in these chapters, whether the role of the bureaucracy in agricultural development helped to develop peasant agriculture or not. But the weight of our evidence was that it did not. Chapter six concentrated on policies which were aimed at bringing about rural development by the establishment of agricultural settlements and projects. Farm settlements, school leavers' farms and community farms were examined in the chapter. Evidence was presented to support the contention that the farm settlements, school leavers' farms and community farms did not benefit the majority of the farming population of Bendel State. Farm settlements and school leavers' farms: (i) were not pursued on a co-operative basis;
(ii) were directed at solving the problems of the school leavers only; (iii) neglected the problems of the peasant farmers and the deplorable conditions of rural life; (iv) were too expensive to operate; (v) relied too heavily on capital intensive measures; and (vi) stole initiative from the farmers and vested it in the bureaucrats. The community farms programme did not penetrate the vast majority of the farming population of Bendel State. They were few in number and membership; and were too oriented towards mechanization without providing the other agricultural inputs which were necessary for full mechanization. The community farms were also dominated by a few progressive farmers who used the bush-clearing assistance to expand their own farms.

In chapter seven, we examined agricultural credits, the seed multiplication programme, the fertilizer programme and state mechanized farms, to find out whether or not they have helped the development of peasant agriculture. Our evidence proved this answer to be negative. We found out that the agricultural credits sponsored by both the Federal and Bendel State governments and administered by the bureaucracy and some commercial banks favoured the progressive farmer. The distribution of fertilizer and improved seeds by the bureaucracy was
equally in favour of the capitalist farmer. Finally, apart from the fact that state mechanized farms were found to be too expensive to operate, the alliance between the government and foreign capitalists to invest in mechanized farming in the State, proved potentially disastrous for the peasant producers. They are being forced to seek wage employment in these farms, having been denied material support by the state. This will, in the long run, create a landless peasantry and hinder the productive capacity of the rural sector of the economy. Meaningful rural development will be jeopardised. We have seen, therefore, that the decision of the government to use the bureaucracy as the key agent for agricultural development was only conducive to the promotion of capitalist development. The overwhelming majority of the peasant producers did not come within the mainstream of the agricultural policies implemented by the bureaucracy.

In chapters eight and nine, instances (co-operative and self-help movements) of the collective involvement of the rural people in development activities were discussed. The central argument in these two chapters was that abundant human resources exist in the rural areas of Bendel State but that the bureaucratic
approach to rural development has undermined the utility of these resources.

Our treatment of the co-operative movement revealed that, contrary to the claim of colonial administration that it "introduced" co-operatives into Nigeria and other colonised areas, co-operative practices were widely used in traditional African society before the intervention of colonialism. They still operate in the production functions of the villages of Nigeria. But these village production co-operatives are not recognized by the co-operative laws because they do not fulfil the bureaucratically prescribed conditions for registration. Instead, the registered co-operative societies are those which understand the language of the bureaucracy - recorded minutes, auditing, accounting, book-keeping by double entry, capital and investment, and shares. Thus, educated, influential and rich members of the co-operatives are able to manipulate the situation and dominate the co-operatives. Only registered co-operatives get loans/grants from the government. We have also seen that the co-operative law gives too much power to the bureaucracy to control the day-to-day running of the co-operatives. Because of this control, the predominance of the role of the progressive members and the profit
motives of the co-operatives and their inability to contribute to the overall economic development of the country, large-scale apathy exists in the co-operative movement. Co-operatives have not been efficient, not because the people are not interested, but simply because the present methods of co-operative organization inhibit the capacity of the people to fully participate in them.

The self-help movement was discussed in chapter nine. Like the co-operative movement, the self-help movement in many parts of Nigeria rests on the rich tradition of the people. We found that local communities in Bendel State have been undertaking self-help projects from time immemorial. But the latest development in the movement is the partnership which the government now forms with the people. This partnership brought the bureaucrats into the self-help movement. After an examination of the policy and implementation of self-help development projects, we showed that despite the government's policy statements in support of the self-help movement, the amount of grants paid to local communities and the equipment placed at the disposal of self-help project executors do not measure up to expectation. The local people are encouraged to start projects,
only to be left on their own with promised grants not paid. We therefore concluded that the Bendel State government, like many other governments in Nigeria, hides under the self-help slogan to neglect its responsibility to the rural people. While social amenities and services are provided by the government in the urban areas, the local people are asked to fend for themselves. This seeming indifference of the government, we pointed out, is not conducive to the full utilization of the vast local resources exhibited by the self-help movement. One major finding against the bureaucracy, however, was the uncoordinated nature of self-help projects. In respect of the self-help movement, much of our material blamed failure on the government, not the bureaucracy. The bureaucrats, much as they were eager to get involved in the self-help movement, found their role rendered ineffective by inadequate support (in grants and equipment) from the central (state) administration controlled by the political leadership.

An assessment of our findings, in the light of the central hypothesis, is now necessary. Theoretically, we have rendered a negative verdict on the central hypothesis that the bureaucracy can be the principal
agent for effective rural development. This we have
done in chapter two. In that chapter, the nature of
administration (which emphasizes routine application
of rules and the implementation of decided policies)
and politics (which spotlights the struggle between
social classes and how this struggle brings about
shifts in policies) were compared. We concluded that
theoretically, the proponents of the development
administration theory neglect historical factors, the
importance of politics, and the class struggle in the
process of development. As we have argued extensively
in chapter two, it seems true that given some of the
constraints which African bureaucracies inherited
from their colonial past, and given the historical
class role of these bureaucracies, only very little
rural development would be likely to take place if
all emphasis is placed on the bureaucrats and the
contribution of the mass of the people played down.

As is already evident in the discussion, these
theoretical considerations are also applicable to
other African countries. This assertion is made
because African countries show similar characteristics of general underdevelopment, they are generally suppliers of primary commodities to the world economic system, and they all have the propensity to depend on the bureaucrats as the major generators of meaningful rural development. The problem of rural development is also very topical in current development practices in Africa, as we have noted in chapter one. A majority of the people in Africa live in and find their means of livelihoods in the rural areas. It should also be remembered that it is to African and other "developing" countries that the theory and practice of development administration were addressed, when these countries were on the verge of attaining their independence in the early 1960s.

Practically, we have also invalidated the key hypothesis that the bureaucracy can be the principal agent for effective rural development. In Bendel State in particular, and Nigeria in general, we adduced evidence to show that the class structure and the bureaucracy's incapacity to allow the people to play meaningful role
in their own development, resulted in very little actual rural development. In Nigeria, the governments regard the bureaucracy as the principal agent for rural development. This is why the presence of the bureaucrats is predominant in each of the areas we have examined. Whatever contribution the people have to offer is channelled along bureaucratic lines. In many cases, the people's contributions are regarded as obstacles to development. This is the case with the agricultural policy which attempts to rationalize peasant agriculture along the goals set in the development plans. Even where the local people's contributions are effective, as in the self-help movement, the government does not provide sufficient support to encourage local participation. A continuation of the present approach to rural development will not lead to an equitable distribution of wealth and income, full employment opportunities, and a qualitative improvement in the nature of rural life. Meaningful rural development can only be achieved by the inclusion of the people in the development process, rather than by undue reliance on the bureaucrats. Mass participation, rather than bureaucratic control is the key to effective rural development.
the co-operative, and benefit from the services provided by the co-operative organization. Surplus assets, after liquidation, cannot be distributed to members; but can only be used for public or co-operative purposes, as decided by the committee of the co-operative. Members who deliberately refuse to repay loans granted them by the co-operative society should be prosecuted in the courts. It is hoped that these measures will limited the business and exploitative tendencies that dominate the co-operative movement at present.

The unit of organization of the co-operatives may now be examined. If, through general, political and co-operative education, the people are convinced that it is in their best interest to come together and produce collectively for their own benefit, and that they can manage the co-operatives on their own with minimum state control and direction, they would be willing to form viable co-operatives societies. The village seems to be the most appropriate production unit. The village unit would provide more abundant human resources than the extended family unit.\footnote{See Martin Igbozurike, \textit{op.cit.}, who makes a case for the extended family as the basic unit.} It would also be a more receptive unit for purpose of spreading the type of
The creation of a Federal Ministry of Rural Development and another for Co-operatives and Supply, point to the new federal role. The Federal Government has also taken the initiative to spearhead some rural development policies – for example, the mass importation of fertilizer which was discussed in chapter seven. Moreover, the frequent meetings of ministers in charge of rural development and co-operatives provide central forums for policy guidance and appraisal. Fifthly, the fiscal role of the Federal Government in controlling and distributing oil revenue to the state governments and in paying grants direct to the state governments for the financing of specified projects is another source of central direction in rural development projects. Finally, in our discussion throughout the thesis, references were made to rural development efforts in other parts of the country. Examples are the farm settlements which were originated in the three regions of Nigeria prior to 1967 when more states were created, the nation-wide spirit of self-help, and the characteristics of the co-operative movement which are similar in the whole country.

1. Before 1966, 50% of the revenue from mineral resources was retained by the state government, while the remaining 50% was shared between all the state governments.
What Is To Be Done?

Having summarised and assessed the major findings of the study, it is now appropriate to ask a vital question: What is to be done? We will argue that the solutions range from piecemeal administrative reforms to a complete and radical restructuring of society to change production and social relations. Some solutions, as they would apply particularly to Bendel State and Nigeria as a whole, are discussed below:

Agricultural development: In order to avoid the present practice of using the bureaucrats to implement agricultural policies which favour mainly the progressive farmers and members of the commercial bourgeoisie, agricultural policies need a great rethinking. Since the peasant producers account for a large portion of the food and other agricultural products in Bendel State, and indeed the whole of Nigeria, emphasis should be shifted to this group. Conditions for the grant of loans and agricultural credits by the state and federal governments, as well as the agricultural development bank should be reviewed as well as the federal government. Under the present arrangement, the state of origin retains only 15%, while the remainder is either retained by the federal government or shared between all the state governments under a new formula heavily in favour of population and need. For details of the politics of revenue allocation in Nigeria, see Adebayo Adedeji, Nigerian Federal Finance, (London: Hutchinson Educational, 1968).
to enable the peasants to get such loans. We have shown in chapter eight that those who do not use agricultural loans for agricultural purposes are usually granted such loans. It should become a matter of deliberate policy to exclude from these loans and credits people who do not earn their living from farming. Even within this group, those who employ wage labour and adopt mechanization in agriculture should seek aid from the commercial banks. Government funds and those of financial institutions sponsored by government should be concentrated on peasant producers and agricultural co-operatives. The nucleus of viable agricultural co-operatives already exist in Bendel State and many parts of Nigeria. Generally referred to as Farmers' Multi-purpose Co-operatives, the agricultural co-operatives are mainly concerned with the production of food and cash crops. They also deal with the buying and distribution of fertilizer and market their agricultural products. A number of these new type of co-operative societies also operate their own farms. The number of Farmers' Multi-purpose Co-operatives has been increasing in recent years in Bendel State. Prior to the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970, there were only five of these co-operatives. In 1977, the
number had risen to 356 in the state. Out of this number, however, only 175 are registered. In addition to multi-purpose farmers' co-operative societies, the present farm settlements and community farms could be re-organised and turned into purely co-operative ventures. It is to these production co-operatives that emphasis should be shifted.

To make these production organs effective, the present policy of providing incentives (land, cheap labour, tax credits, etc.) for foreign firms to invest in Nigerian agriculture should be stopped. The goal should not only be the production of more food, but the development of the people themselves. Increased capitalist investment in agriculture, we have argued and we still emphasize, would lead to the creation of a landless peasantry, turn the peasants into suppliers of wage labour, and lead to the loss of more foreign exchange through profit repatriation. Therefore, efforts should move steadily towards the socialization of the agricultural sector by concentrating emphasis on peasant farmers and agricultural co-operatives and discouraging capitalist (both foreign and indigenous) investment in agriculture.

If these suggestions are accepted, improved agricultural production methods (such as use of improved seeds,
fertilizer and simple ploughs and other minor agricultural machinery) should be gradually introduced to the peasants and the agricultural co-operatives. This shift of emphasis will lead to a redirection of the attention of the agricultural extension workers to the peasants and agricultural co-operatives, rather than the progressive farmers as is the case at present. In this case, the bureaucrats would not be the centre of attention. They would be a part of the concerted efforts to liberate the will of the people and direct it to the overall development of the country. The bureaucracy, in this case, will play a more functional role in bringing development to a greater number of the population.

The Co-operative Movement: The problems of mass membership illiteracy, excessive bureaucratic control, corruption and shortage of capital which we saw in chapter eight as plaguing the co-operative movement in Bendel State, are characteristics of the general economic underdevelopment facing many African countries. Although we made some suggestions in that chapter towards solving some of the problems in Bendel State, it should be noted that the mere re-organization of the co-operative movement will not eliminate these problems.

1. See for example, Khider and Simpson, op. cit. and John S. Saul, op. cit.
They can only be solved through a radical restructuring of the society. In any case, in addition to the ideas already expressed in chapter eight, the following suggestions will help to improve the performance of the co-operative movement in Nigeria.

There are many areas in which the operation of co-operatives could expand. The potential for their development is unlimited. Co-operative activities may cover areas such as agriculture (including livestock and fisheries), consumer goods distribution, produce marketing, banking, rural savings scheme, insurance, transport and warehousing, small scale industries and housing. Because of the present decline in agricultural production and the much talked-about emphasis on rural development in Nigeria, co-operatives should concentrate on the following key areas for the moment: production and processing of agricultural products and raw materials, banking, rural savings and consumer goods distribution. As the revived co-operative movement expands, it could embrace the other areas mentioned above, and many more.

Agricultural co-operatives\(^1\) would help to boost food production and raw materials for local industries, if the present policy on credits and fertilizer

\(^1\) See section on agricultural development.
distribution are realigned to favour the peasant producers and agricultural co-operatives. In addition to the existing sources (federal, states and agricultural development bank) of agricultural credits, there is need for the creation of a Federal Co-operative Bank, with branches in the state headquarters and the rural areas. Both the Federal and State governments should heavily finance these banks, which would provide steady financial support for the co-operative movement. Rural saving schemes and members' contributions are other supportive financial sources which the co-operatives could tap to their fullest. Only co-operatives and individual peasants should be granted loans from these sources.

Governments and government controlled agencies may own shares in a registered co-operatives, through shared capital. No other organization (apart from government or another co-operative society) may be allowed to own shares in a co-operative society. Individuals may own shares in a co-operative society, but they must also participate in the activities of the co-operative society. Even in this case, no individual should be allowed to own more than a fixed maximum of the shares of a co-operative society. For their shares in the co-operative society, members are allowed to participate in the activities of
the co-operative, and benefit from the services provided by the co-operative organization. Surplus assets, after liquidation, cannot be distributed to members, but can only be used for public or co-operative purposes, as decided by the committee of the co-operative. Members who deliberately refuse to repay loans granted them by the co-operative society should be prosecuted in the courts. It is hoped that these measures will limit the business and exploitative tendencies that dominate the co-operative movement at present.

The unit of organization of the co-operatives may now be examined. If, through general, political and co-operative education, the people are convinced that it is in their best interest to come together and produce collectively for their own benefit, and that they can manage the co-operatives on their own with minimum state control and direction, they would be willing to form viable co-operatives societies. The village seems to be the most appropriate production unit. The village unit would provide more abundant human resources than the extended family unit.1 It would also be a more receptive unit for purpose of spreading the type of

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1. See Martin Igbozuriike, op. cit., who makes a case for the extended family as the basic unit.
education we have advocated. In case of large villages, however, production sections (within the village) could be worked out. While the state will still be expected to play some role in co-ordinating economic activity, its power would not extend all the way down to the direct management of the co-operatives themselves. The new type of supervision over the co-operatives would still enable the government to have full information about the co-operatives and to take effective and corrective actions to protect the public interest. Thus, the purpose of co-operative law and regulations should be to provide the basis for government and public scrutiny, and to stop the co-operatives from being used as a cover for only profit making by individuals.

The bureaucrats also have some role to play in the new system of co-operatives. Rather than direct and control rigidly, they would be expected to provide expert and technical advice to the co-operatives. The bureaucrats could also assist in spreading the new gospel of propelling rural development through the co-operative movement. To improve the performance of the bureaucrats in their new role, the Co-operative Division should be re-organized into a Co-operative Commission and removed from the mainstream of the civil service organization. Its
Director should report directly to the Cabinet. The Director of Co-operatives should have the following functions: supervision of compliance with the law and regulations by co-operatives; auditing of all co-operative organizations other than state and national apex organizations which should appoint qualified professional auditors; and provision of technical services to the co-operatives. The Co-operative Commission's decentralized organs at the grassroots level should be staffed with a new breed of rural animators. These animators would be required to spread both public, political and co-operative education.

In our discussion in chapter eight, we noted the importance of education and popular enlightenment in the new system we are advocating. We also stated that this education should, preferably, be built around a socialist ideology. Only a mass party is capable of achieving these goals.
But no mass mobilizational party exists in Nigeria at present. Elsewhere in this study, we have argued that the factors which will bring about the much-needed political will and change are outside our concern in this study. In any case, having declared a participative stance, the political leadership should set up a National Public Enlightenment Commission with branches in each of the states. All available human resources should be mobilised under this commission, to provide popular education. The hundreds of thousand graduates from the universities and collèges, who now serve in the National Youth Service Corps, could be deployed to provide the required type of education. High school students could also be mobilised to join in the war against illiteracy and mass ignorance. Some of these educational crusaders could be deployed to serve with the Co-operative Commission and other institutions to be set up for achieving mass education and participation. The federal government should finance these measures.
The self-help movement: Two main problems were identified in the operation of the self-help movement: the inadequacy of governmental grants and the unco-ordinated nature of self-help projects. A workable tripartite arrangement between the state and local governments and the local communities is called for:

**DIAGRAM V**

**INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS IN SELF-HELP DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS**

- Local Government
  - Supporting
  - Maintaining

- Local Community
  - Initiating
  - Planning
  - Executing

- State Government
  - Policy-making
  - Technical Assistance

- Community Dev. Div.
  - Stimulating
  - Advising
  - Organizing

Self-Help Projects
Both the state and local governments should have a large role to play in the smooth working of the self-help movement. If the state government's declared support for the self-help movement is to be meaningful, it is suggested that generous grants be paid to cover at least 60 per cent of the cost of projects. In order to evenly spread development projects in the state, both the state and local governments should directly establish some viable projects in the poorer areas of the state. In addition, both the state and local governments should have an adequate knowledge of the planning, execution and maintenance of infrastructural self-help projects like roads, bridges, health and maternity centres, and pipe-borne water supply. Other projects like schools and post offices involving long-term maintenance costs by the state and federal governments should be planned well ahead and the financial and manpower implications critically assessed. In order to make

1. It should be noted that self-help development projects are not the only avenues for rural development. The direct establishment of major projects by the federal, state and local governments also play a major role in rural development efforts. These projects by the three levels of government should consider the poverty of the rural areas when they are to be established.
the tripartite arrangement above work smoothly, the local communities should be encouraged to work towards five-year self-help development plans with a view of ensuring that the relevant levels of government make adequate plans for grants and maintenance. On their part, the other levels of government should ensure that the proposed development projects are financially provided for in the development plans and estimates of expenditure.

The co-ordination of self-help projects, and rural development policies generally, is necessary if rural development is to be integrated into national development. We noted in chapter nine that the absence of this co-ordination had resulted in duplication of efforts, waste of scarce resources and failure to put completed projects into use. In order to avoid these unpleasant occurrences, grassroot organizations should be involved in the planning and execution of development efforts. The planning function in Nigeria is a purely bureaucratic affair; the people are left out of it. Captioning this situation beautifully, Samuel Aluko writes:

There are no local planning boards, no effective and efficient administrative set up that can assume developmental responsibilities (at the local level), and all that the local areas
exist for is to line up, receive and dance for state governors and commissioners if and when they visit the local areas. 1

The restructuring of the socio-economic set-up along some of the lines we have suggested would bring the mass of the people into the limelight of participation in the development process. With co-operatives, and self-help movements, and local planning organs working closely with the three levels (federal, state and local) of government, development programmes would be better planned and executed. Planning organs at the national, state and local (government) and village levels are necessary. The present practice makes use of the first two stages. It is only in 1977 that the local governments were obliged to submit plans for integration into the national development plan. 2 The village level is still not recognized. Village development committees should be created as part of the planning organizational


structure. Membership should be made up of the chief and his lieutenants, representatives of various voluntary and self-help associations, youth organizations and representatives of the co-operative movement. This body should be able to determine the most critical needs of the village community and pass on relevant information to the local government planning committee to be fed into the overall rural development programme at higher levels of government.

From the seriousness of the problems of rural development and the encompassing nature of the solutions which are called for, it is clear that bureaucrats by themselves, no matter how effective, are not equal to the task. Administrative reforms and the strengthening of administrative capacities may be necessary to enable the administration to provide supportive services for rural development. But to assume that efficient bureaucrats would provide the propelling force needed for the breakthrough in rural development is to underestimate the seriousness of the problem. Development will occur only by a far-reaching shift of emphasis to the rural areas, both in policy pronouncements and actual implementation efforts. Development, in order to
seriously affect the people and change their standard of living for the better, must involve the people.

The force necessary to bring about development, as we have conceived it, is political, not administrative. It will be brought about by either the emergence of a leader who is determined to deliberately shift emphasis to the development of the rural areas and the involvement of the people in it, or an increasing awareness of the rural people which will shift the balance of political forces in their favour. However, the factors which will bring about this much-needed political will and change are outside our concern in the present study. Suffice it to note, once again, that this political will will not be brought about by development administration. It is clear, therefore, that only a radical restructuring of the society will bring about meaningful rural development. The present practice which relies heavily on bureaucratic input and capitalist development results in very little change in the rural areas. In the last analysis, we rest our case on the firm belief that far from being the solution to rural development, bureaucracy is only a part of the problem.
APPENDIX I

METODOLOGICAL NOTES

In chapter one, the choice of the case study approach as the methodology for this dissertation was explained in detail. In these methodological notes, we will not attempt to repeat the arguments for and against the case study approach and why we chose Bendel State as the unit of analysis. Instead we will be concerned with the sources of our material, the problems encountered during the field trip, and the suggested areas for further research.

Both primary and secondary sources were consulted for purposes of writing this dissertation. Secondary sources involved a general review of the relevant published literature and research papers in the fields of comparative public administration, "development administration", and political economy. Apart from the resources available at the Carleton University library and the International Development Research Centre (both in Ottawa), the specialized library in the Faculty of Administration, University of Ife, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, proved very useful.
APPENDIX I (CONT'D)

Primary sources for the study involved the reading of government reports, gazettes, files and face-to-face interviews with various participants in the process of rural development in Bendel State of Nigeria. I also drew heavily on my experience as an Administrative Officer in the civil service of Bendel State from 1970-1975. During this period, I had the opportunity to serve as a field administrator in Benin East Division (now Orhionmwon Local Government), where, as a "participant-observer", I encountered the massive problems of rural development at first hand.

The field work for this study was conducted in Nigeria from February to July, 1978. While in Nigeria, I received a great deal of co-operation from many of my former colleagues, and from the Permanent Secretaries (Deputy Ministers) in the Ministries of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Trade Industries and Co-operatives, and Local Government. This co-operation undoubtedly made my field research much easier. However, two problems which were encountered during the field trip deserve a mention.

First, the information storing system in the bureaucracy was defective. Apart from the fact that many of the bureaucrats did not know where vital information was kept, the system of preserving files
and reports was grossly inadequate. Closed volumes of files were dumped in various sections of the offices. Important documents were either destroyed or left unattended at will. It is suggested that an adequate filing system with proper indexing for closed and current volumes of files, should be set up in each ministry/department. This method would enable documents to be easily identified and made available when needed. The system, working in close relationship with the State Records Office, would make future research much easier for both scholars and practitioners of public administration.

Secondly, the lack of any research grant greatly affected my field research. There was no fund either to undertake extensive research tour of important development projects in Bendel State or to conduct elaborate surveys involving the employment of research assistants. Because of this financial limitation, much of the material collected and processed in this dissertation has been from bureaucratic sources - material on government policies and practices as they were directed to the improvement of rural life. It has, therefore, not been possible for me to examine
APPENDIX I (CONT'D.)

the other side of the coin - from the point of view of the residents of the rural areas. Whatever references that were made to the rural areas were from published literature, records kept by the bureaucracy, and brief interviews with some rural people involved in development projects.

In order to fully assess the impact of government policies on individual peasant farmers, co-operative societies and village self-help projects, more detailed research on the attitudes and views of the rural dwellers is needed. It is in this area that future research would find virgin ground.
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**Proposed Superscale Groups**

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Source: GORSUCH REPORT, APPENDIX V (pp. 119-121).
APPENDIX III

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS,*

1952-57

(1) Law and Order
   (1) Maintenance of Order and good government and prevention of crime.

(2) Power to provide works and services; Natural Resources
   (2) Improvement and protection of agriculture and livestock.
   (3) Schemes for planned rural development and settlement
   (4) Prevention of soil erosion.

Markets
(5) Markets and stalls,
(6) Public weighing machines and instrument for measurement.

Public Health and Housing
(7) Hospitals, maternity homes, dispensaries and institutions for lepers,
(8) Ambulance services,
(9) Drains, sewage systems, public latrines and wash places,
(10) Removal and disposal of refuse and night soil,
(11) Public water supplies,
(12) Extermination and prevention of the spread of tsetse fly, mosquitoes, insects harmful to health, vermin;
(13) Public slaughter houses,
(14) Abatement of nuisances and the prevention, control and isolation of infectious diseases,
(15) Cemeteries and burial grounds,
(16) Housing Estates and Urban lay-outs and settlements,
(17) Fighting and extinguishing of fire.

Roads and Transport
(18) Public roads, bridges and paths,
(19) System of lighting in public places,
(20) Parking places for motor and other vehicles,

* Functions performed by Divisional and All-Purpose District Councils.
APPENDIX III (CONT'D.)

(21) Transport services by land or water,
(22) Clearing, maintenance and improvement of water ways,
(23) Public piers.

Recreation and Welfare
(24) Public recreation grounds, open spaces and parks,
(25) Public libraries, public amusements and entertainments,
(26) Welfare services for children and young persons (including remand homes, approved schools and clubs),
(27) Institutions for the aged, destitute and infirm,
(28) Social centres and communal feeding centres,
(29) Rest houses,
(30) Information and publicity relating to the affairs of the Council,
(31) Watchmen for the protection of property during the hours of darkness.

(3) Works and Services Incidental
(32) To provide and maintain works and services incidental to any functions conferred upon them by or under the Western Region Local Government Law Cap.68 or any other enactment.

(4) Legislative Powers
(35) Powers to make bye-laws for all or any of the functions listed above.

(5) Rating Powers
(34) To be the Rating Authorities for their areas of authority.

(6) Power to engage in trade
(35) To engage in any form of trade, commerce or industry.

(7) Functions and powers conferred under other enactments

Chiefs
(36) To comment on and transmit declarations.

Dogs
(37) To make bye-laws for prevention of disease.
APPENDIX III (CONT'D.)

Education
(38) The powers and duties of Local Education Authority.

Forestry
(39) To constitute forest reserves,
(40) To convert forest reserves,
(41) To declare protected forests,
(42) To administer forest reserves,
(43) To declare communal forest areas, manage and control and make rules for council forest areas,
(44) To make rules for protection and management of forests.

Liquor
(45) To make bye-laws,
(46) Prescribing the fees to be paid in respect of licences, transfers or removals,
(47) Prohibiting, restricting, regulating or licensing the manufacture, supply, possession or consumption of country liquor.

Police
(48) To establish and maintain Local Government Police Force,

Public Health
(49) Powers of Health Officers to deal with nuisances,
(50) Powers of Council Medical Officers of Health to prevent infectious diseases,
(51) Power of Council Health Officers to condemn unsound food.

Customary Court
(52) Provision of buildings and payment of salaries, wages and allowances of members, officers and servants of customary courts,
(53) To receive all fees, fines and penalties arising from proceedings in the customary courts.
APPENDIX III (CONTD.)

Source: Compiled from the following sections of the Laws of Western Nigeria, op.cit:

1. Sections 62/63 of the W.R. Local Government Law, Cap.68
2. Section 66(1) - (31) of the W.R. Local Government Law, Cap.68.
3. Section 67 of the W.R. Local Government Law, Cap.68
4. Section 68 of the W.R. Local Government Law, Cap.68
5. Section 129 of the W.R. Local Government Law, Cap.68
6. Sections 425 of the W.R. Chiefs Law, Cap.19
7. Section 14 of the W.R. Dogs Law, Cap.33
8. Section 829 of the W.R. Education Law, Cap.34
10. Section 51 of the W.R. Liquor (Licensing) Law, Cap.65
11. The W.R. Local Government Police Law, Cap.70
12. Section 34 and Part II of the W.R. Public Health Law, 1957

W.R. means Western Region (of Nigeria).
APPENDIX IV

FUNCTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS AND COMMITTEES (DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM, 1974).

Development Councils:

(a) Inspection of the accounts of the Development Committees other than those of Urban Development Committees for which the Resident has responsibility;

(b) supervision and support of the Development Committees other than Urban Development Committees for which the Resident is responsible;

(c) provision of public transport services in their respective areas of authority, including, in this connection, the take-over of the present Local Government Bus Service;

(d) undertaking schemes for rural development and settlement;

(e) the prevention of soil erosion;

(f) establishment and control of markets and stalls in places other than markets;

(g) provision of drains, sewage system, public latrines, wash places and dykes;

(h) construction and maintenance of public roads and bridges;

(i) provision of public slaughter houses and abattoirs;

(j) establishment and/or control of places of public amusement and entertainment, for example, public parks and sports grounds;

(k) licensing of places for public amusement and entertainment;
APPENDIX IV (CONTD.)

(1) power to give information and publicity relating to the affairs of the council; and

(m) power to make bye-laws to regulate their respective services.

Development Committees:

(a) Organisation and supervision of community farming and co-operatives;

(b) organization and supervision of approved community projects such as:

(i) provision of public slaughter slabs;
(ii) provision of parking places for motor vehicles;
(iii) provision of public recreation grounds, open places and parks in non-planning areas;
(iv) provision of community centres such as town halls and public feeding centres;

(v) establishment and control of markets and stalls in places other than markets;

(c) provision of sanitation in their respective areas of jurisdiction;

(d) establishment, maintenance and control of cemetery and burial grounds;

(e) the prevention of soil erosion;

(f) maintenance of local roads;

(g) impounding of stray animals;

(h) power to give information and publicity relating to the affairs of the committee;

(i) power to make bye-laws to regulate their respective services.
APPENDIX IV (CONT'D.)

(j) provision of public transport services in the respective areas of authority of Urban Development Committees, including in this connection, the take-over of the present Local Government Bus Service.

APPENDIX V

FUNCTIONS OF NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 1976

PART A

Items which are the responsibility of Local Governments save under exceptional or temporary circumstances:

(1) Markets and Motor parks;
(2) Sanitary inspection, refuse and night soil disposal;
(3) Control of vermin;
(4) Slaughter houses, slaughter slabs;
(5) Public conveniences;
(6) Burial grounds;
(7) Registration of births, deaths and marriages;
(8) Provision of community and local recreation centres;
(9) Parks, gardens and public open spaces;
(10) Grazing grounds, fuel plantations;
(11) Licensing supervision and regulation of bake houses and laundries;
(12) Licensing, regulation and control of the sale of liquor;
(13) Licensing and regulation of bicycles, hand carts and other types of vehicles except those mechanically propelled, and canoes;
(14) Control or keeping of animals;
(15) Control of hoardings, advertisements, use of loudspeakers in or near public places, drumming;
(16) Naming of roads and streets and numbering of plots/buildings;
(17) Control and collection of revenue from forestry outside the 'Forest Estate' of gazetted Forest Reserves;
(18) Collection of vehicle parking charges;
(19) Collection of property and other rates, community tax and other designated revenue sources.

PART B

Items which should be regarded as Local Government responsibilities although State Governments and other organizations may also perform part or whole of these functions if Local Governments are not equipped to perform them initially:

(1) Nursery and primary and adult education;
(2) Information and public enlightenment;
APPENDIX V (CONT'D.)

(3) Provision of scholarships and bursaries;
(4) Provision of public libraries and reading rooms;
(5) Agricultural extension, animal health extension services and veterinary clinics;
(6) Rural and Semi-Urban water supply;
(7) Fire Services;
(8) Provision of roads and streets (other than trunk roads) their lighting, drainage;
(9) Control of water and atmospheric pollution;
(10) Control of beggars, of prostitution and repatriation of destitutes;
(11) Provision of homes for destitutes, the infirm and orphans;
(12) Provision of public utilities except where restricted by other legislation, specially including provision of road and inland water transport;
(13) Public housing programmes. Operation of commercial undertakings. Control of traffic and parking;
(14) Regulation and control of buildings. Town and Country Planning;
(15) Piped sewerage systems.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA:
CAPITAL PROGRAMMES BY GOVERNMENTS (CO-OPERATION AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT), 1975-80

<table>
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<td>26,565,960</td>
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<td>38,058,460</td>
<td>47,573,075</td>
<td>57,087,690</td>
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* Information based on the 12 states structure prior to 1976. In 1976, more states were created to bring the total to 19. Midwestern State was renamed Bendel State.
# APPENDIX VII

**BENDELS STATE OF NIGERIA: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT GRANTS**

**1977/78**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Local Contribution</th>
<th>Grant Paid</th>
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<td>2. 2 Classrooms and HM's Office</td>
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<td>3. 3 Classrooms</td>
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<td>500</td>
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<td>Location</td>
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<td>Local Contribution</td>
<td>Grant Paid</td>
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### APPENDIX VII (CONTD.)

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<td>Ogbe-Udu/Obege</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. 3 Classroom block</td>
<td>Owa Oyibu</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX VII (CONT'D)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Local Contribution</th>
<th>Grant Paid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NDOKWA LOCAL GOVT.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 4 Classroom/Headmasters</td>
<td>Okpae Obeze</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office</td>
<td>Umuachi-Afor</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Postal Agency</td>
<td>Akoko-Umuatu</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 4 Concrete bridges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| GRAND TOTAL                | N 50,000         |

**SOURCE:** Compiled from Accounts Books, Ministry of Local Government, Benin City.
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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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