NAME OF AUTHOR/NOM DE L'AUTEUR: Michael D. Nelson

TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE: Teacher Militancy: An Exploratory Comparative Case Study of Four Teachers' Groups

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ: Carleton University

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE: Ph.D.

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE DÉGRE: 1981

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE: Dr. Dennis Forcett

Permission is hereby granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

DATED/DATE: April 24, 1981

SIGNED/SIGNÉ: Michael Nelson

PERMANENT ADDRESS/RÉSIDENCE FIXÉ: 4820 Nendoway

GLOUCESTER, ONTARIO, K1J 8T1
NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us a poor photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act., R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30. Please read the authorization forms which accompany this thesis.

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de mauvaise qualité.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30. Veuillez prendre connaissance des formules d'autorisation qui accompagnent cette thèse.

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE

NL 339 (Rev. 8/80)
TEACHER MILITANCY: AN EXPLORATORY, COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF FOUR TEACHERS' GROUPS

by

Michael Davidson Nelson, B.A., M.A.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

This research has received financial support from Labour Canada.
The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies acceptance of the thesis

Teacher Militancy: An Exploratory, Comparative Case Study of Four Teachers' Groups

submitted by Michael Davidson Nelson, B.A., M.A.

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

[Signature]

Thesis Supervisor

[Signature]

Chairman, Department of Sociology

Carleton University

April 6, 1981
ABSTRACT

The study attempts to identify factors and conditions which contribute to the development of militant teachers' groups. Militant teachers' groups are those which show a pattern of using coercive collective action (e.g., demonstrations, work-to-rule, strikes) to support contract demands in negotiations with school boards. Previous research almost invariably treats militancy as an attribute of individual teachers. By viewing teacher militancy as an attribute of a collectivity, the study aims to fill a gap in the existing literature.

The subjects of the study are four teachers' groups operating within the Ontario Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton. Two of the groups, the Carleton Board of Education's elementary teachers and the Ottawa Board of Education's secondary teachers, show a definite increase in militancy during the first half of the 1970's. One group, the Carleton Board of Education's secondary teachers, engages in coercive action in 1971, but shows no sign of militancy thereafter; and the remaining group, the Ottawa Board of Education's elementary teachers, fails to utilize collective coercive action throughout the 1970's.

An eclectic theoretical framework, developed from literature on social movements and on teacher militancy, is used to structure a longitudinal analysis of the increase in teacher militancy which occurred across Ontario in the 1970's. Next, the same framework is used to guide longitudinal and comparative analyses of the four local teachers' groups.
Longitudinal analyses of the Carleton elementary, and Ottawa secondary groups (covering the periods 1969 to 1974 and 1968 to 1975, respectively), and of the Carleton secondary group from 1969 to 1971, are used to identify factors and conditions associated with increases in militancy. Comparison of the Carleton elementary group with the non-militant Ottawa elementary group, and of the militant Ottawa secondary group with the Carleton secondary group (docile from 1971 on), are used to help identify spurious factors.

Data for these analyses come from interviews with approximately ninety teacher leaders and board officials, minutes of board's and teacher groups' meetings, correspondence and documents provided by teacher and board informants, statistical files of the Ontario Ministry of Education, newspaper articles, and a variety of published documents.

The study suggests that there is no single model of causation which applies to the development of militancy in all teacher groups. However, two factors are found to be especially important to the development of militancy among our local groups. First, breakdowns in school boards' traditional mechanisms of social control are found to be critical for militant groups to develop. The breakdown of social control releases resources — both human and material — for use by teacher leaders in mobilizing coercive action, opens the door to the development and spread of new, militant definitions of the situation by teachers, and removes key barriers to group mobilization. Second, the study suggests that feelings of status-deprivation have contributed to
coercive action on the part of the three groups which have displayed such behaviour. However, feelings of status deprivation appear to have been much stronger among secondary teachers than among elementary teachers.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures ......................................................... vii
List of Tables ........................................................ viiii
List of Frequently Used Abbreviations ......................... xiv
Acknowledgements ...................................................... xv
Chapter I Introduction ................................................... 1
  II  A Review of the Teacher Militancy Literature ........... 19
  III The Theoretical Framework ................................... 62
  IV The Rise of Teacher Militancy in Ontario ................. 92
  V  The Case of The Carleton Elementary Teachers .......... 251
  VI The Cool Cats: The Ottawa Elementary Teachers ....... 437
  VII  Ottawa and Carleton Secondary Teachers ............... 488
  VIII Conclusion .................................................... 524
References ................................................................... 554
Appendix A Interview Schedule .................................... 560
Appendix B Supplementary Tables ................................ 567
Appendix C Supply and Demand for Teachers .................. 571
Appendix D Exhibits for Chapter V ............................... 577
Appendix E A History of Ottawa `Secondary Teachers' Negotiations ........................................ 584
Appendix F The Future Scope and Direction of Teacher Militancy in Ontario ................................. 597
### LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Professional Role Deprivation Among OPSMTF Teachers</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>The Structure of Teachers' Federation In Ontario, 1976</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>The Formal Structure of the TFC, 1970-71</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>General Organization of the CBE, July, 1969</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>General Organization of the CBE, September, 1972</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6</td>
<td>WTAO Logo</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1  Mean Scores for Militancy and Elements of Deprivation ........................................ 41

Table 2  Correlations Between Teacher's Sex, Age of Students Taught, Professional Activity, and Militancy for Each Teacher Group .......................... 44

Table 3  Administration and Client Orientations of Teachers ................................................. 50

Table 4  Degree of Correlation In Descending Order Between Satisfaction Factors and Support of Teacher Strikes by Respondent Teachers ......................... 94

Table 5  The Incidence of Strikes Involving Ontario Elementary and Secondary School Teachers, 1970-78 .......... 94

Table 6  Listing of Strikes by Type of Teachers, Employer, Number of Workers Involved and Man-Days Lost, 1970-78 96

Table 7  Enrolment in Ontario Schools by School Type ........ 98

Table 8  Change in Enrolment from that of the Previous Year by Type of School, 1965 to 1977 ............ 99

Table 9  Mobility of Secondary School Teachers in Ontario, 1966 to 1975 .................................. 103

Table 10 Secondary Teachers by Sex and Position of Responsibility, 1966-75 ................................ 105

Table 11 Number and Percent of Principals and Vice-Principals Aged 34 or Less for Selected Years ............ 107

Table 12 Age Distributions of Secondary Male Classroom Teachers, Principals and Vice-Principals, and Male Secondary Teachers in Other Positions of Responsibility for 1965, 1970 and 1976 .................. 109

Table 13 Elementary Teachers by Sex and Type of Position, 1972-79 ........................................ 112

Table 14 Elementary Teachers by Age and Sex, 1976-77 ........ 113
Table 15  Comparisons of the Consumer-Price-Index With Average Salaries of Ontario Elementary and Secondary Teachers, 1963-75 ................................. 118

Table 16  Percent of Teachers near or at Maximum Experience for Salary Purposes by Panel and Year .................. 122

Table 17  Percent of Elementary and Secondary Teachers Holding University Degrees and Percent of Secondary Teachers in Top Category by Year .......................... 123

Table 18  Average Annual Wage and Salary Earnings in Selected Occupations as a Percentage of Average Earning for All Occupations, Canada, 1931-71 .................. 127

Table 19  Average Annual Wages of Teachers and Selected Occupational Groups as a Percentage of the Average Annual Earnings of All Occupations by Sex, Ontario, 1961-71 ................................. 128

Table 20  Average Income of Those Filing Taxable Returns as a Percent of the Average Income of All Employees Filing Taxable Returns by Occupational Grouping, Ontario, 1971-75 .................. 131

Table 21  Average Weekly Earnings in Dollars for the Industrial Composite and Teachers, Ontario, 1961-76 .................. 133

Table 22  Average Employment Income by Occupation and Schooling as a Percent of the Average Employment Income of Each Schooling Group by Sex, Ontario, 1971 .................. 134

Table 23  Median Salaries, Public and Separate Elementary and Secondary School Teachers and Principals, Ontario, 1944 to 1976 ................................. 138

Table 24  Percent of Elementary and Secondary Teachers with Degrees (Principals Included), Ontario, 1959-60 to 1977-78 .............................................................. 142

Table 25  Percent of Secondary Teachers Holding Master's and Doctorate Degrees, 1966-77 ................................. 144

Table 26  Number of School Administrative Units by Type of Unit, 1963-75 ................................. 147
Table 27  Distribution of Boards by Enrolment Interval, 1968 and 1969 ................................................. 147
Table 31  Pupil/Teacher Ratios (PTR) in Ontario by Type of School, 1945-76 ................................................. 154
Table 32  Number of Teachers by Type of School and Sex, 1945-77 .............................................................. 159
Table 33  Number of Withdrawals From Teaching to Resume Household Duties or to Marry by Teacher Group ...... 161
Table 34  Marital Status of Female Public Elementary, Separate and Secondary Teachers, 1967-68 ....................... 163
Table 35  All Elementary Teachers by Sex and Experience, 1972-74 .............................................................. 165
Table 36  Number and Percent of Secondary Teachers with Nine or More Years of Experience by Sex, 1966-75 ........... 166
Table 37  Percent of Male and Female Elementary Teachers with Four or More Years of Education Beyond Grade 12 by Sex, 1972-78 ............................................. 167
Table 38  Percent of Male and Female Secondary Teachers in Highest Certification Category (Category 4) by Sex, 1966-78 ........................................................................ 168
Table 39  Percent of Positions of Responsibility Held by Maleš, and Males as a Percent of the Total Teaching Group, 1972-75 ........................................................................ 172
Table 40  Percentage Distribution of Secondary Teachers by Age, 1966-78 ....................................................... 177
Table 41  Percentage Distribution of Elementary Teachers by Age and Sex, 1972-75 ................................................. 179
| Table 42 | Percentage Distribution of Secondary Teachers by Sex and Age, 1972-75 | 180 |
| Table 43 | Experience Distributions of Teachers by Teacher Group, 1972-73, 1975-76, 1976-77 | 182 |
| Table 44 | Experience Distributions of Elementary and Secondary Teacher Groups by Sex, 1967-68, 1972-73, 1973-74 | 183 |
| Table 45 | Percentage Distribution of Elementary Teachers and Principals by Years of Academic/Professional Training Beyond Grade 12 | 185 |
| Table 46 | Percentage Distribution of Male and Female Elementary Teachers by Highest Degree Obtained, 1967-68, 1972-73 and 1973-74 | 186 |
| Table 47 | Percent of Female Elementary and Secondary Teachers in Positions of Responsibility, 1972-73 to 1977-78 | 190 |
| Table 48 | Number of Vocational Type B Certificates Issued By Year | 192 |
| Table 49 | Turnover Rates (Number of Withdrawals as a Percentage of the Teacher Force) by Teacher Group and Year | 206 |
| Table 50 | Number and Percent of OECTA Leadership Positions Held by Males and Females, 1974 | 222 |
| Table 51 | Response to the FWTAO Survey on Amalgamation, 1977-78 | 228 |
| Table 52 | Number of Boards by Type, 1968 and 1969 | 233 |
| Table 53 | Number of Teachers and Principals in Ontario Elementary and Secondary Schools Who Received Their First Teaching Certificate in the United Kingdom | 241 |
| Table 54 | Ratio of Schools with Principals from the Nepean System of 1966 to the Total Number of Schools by Geographic Area and Year | 298 |
| Table 55 | Ratio of Schools with Principals of Vice-Principals from the Nepean System of 1966 to the Total Number of Schools by Area and Year | 299 |
Table 56  Ratio of Schools with Principals or Vice-Principals Who Were Highly Active In Local Federation, to the Total Number of Schools by Area and Year .......... 301

Table 57  CBE Schools Containing a Principal or Vice-Principal Who Was either from the Old Nepean System or was Active in Local Federation ......................... 303

Table 58  Comparison of the Age Distribution of Male Elementary Teachers in the CBE with the Age Distribution of all Elementary Teachers in Ontario, 1973-74 ................. 306

Table 59  Male/Female Representation in the TFC Executive and in TFC Council by Year ...................... 315

Table 60  Consumer-Price-Index (CPI) for Ottawa-Hull, 1969-76 321

Table 61  Salaries of Four Hypothetical Teachers for the Period 1969-75 ........................................ 324

Table 62  New Housing Price Indices for Ottawa-Hull ........... 326

Table 63  The Difference in Dollars Between Carleton and Ottawa Public Elementary Teachers' Salaries for Each Position on the Salary Grid, 1970-71 ............. 330

Table 64  The Difference in Dollars Between Carleton and Ottawa Public Elementary Teachers' Salaries for Each Position on the Salary Grid, 1971-72 ............ 331

Table 65  The Difference in Dollars Between the Salaries Offered by the Carleton Board to its Elementary Teachers for 1973-74 and the Salaries Already Established for Ottawa Teachers for the Fall of 1973 333

Table 66  Grid Positions Providing Incomes Below the Average Earned Income in Selected Localities, 1970 .......... 336

Table 67  Comparison of the Average Weekly Earnings for the Industrial Composite of Ottawa-Hull with the Salaries of Four Hypothetical Carleton Teachers, 1969-74 .... 339

Table 68  Salaries of Carleton Teachers at Maximum, Expressed as a Percentage of the 1969 Maximum, in Comparison to the Industrial Composite, Expressed as a Percentage of the 1969 Industrial Composite for Ottawa-Hull ... 432
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>CBE Elementary School Enrolments, 1969-77</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Estimate CBE Elementary Teacher Hirings by Year</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Carleton and Ottawa Elementary Teachers by Highest Degree Obtained, 1974-75</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Carleton Board Central Office Administrative Staff, 1969-77</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Distribution of CBE Schools by Enrolment, 1968-69 and 1973-74</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Age Distribution of Selected TFC Leaders, 1977-78</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Extent of Carleton Leaders' Agreement or Disagreement with Specific Statements Regarding Various Authorities' Goals and Motives, 1977-78</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Leaders' Approval and Disapproval of Coercive Action by Teachers, 1977-78</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Responses to the TFC Survey on Tactics, October, 1973</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Amount (in Dollars) by Which Ottawa Secondary Teachers' Salaries Exceeded Ottawa Elementary Teachers' Salaries by Grid Position, 1975</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Number of Elementary Pupils and Teachers by Board, 1969-70 to 1976-77</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Ottawa and Carleton Elementary Teacher Leaders' Attitudes Toward Coercive Action, 1977-78</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Changes in the Size of Secondary Enrolment and In the Size of the Teacher Force by Board, 1970-71 to 1977-78</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Number and Percent of OSSTF Teachers Resigning by Board, 1971-73</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Distribution of Ottawa and Carleton Secondary Teachers by Teaching Experience, 1973-74</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Percentage Increase in the Salaries of Ottawa Teachers at Maximum, the Ottawa CPI, the Average Earnings Reported in the Ottawa-Hull Industrial Composite, and Ottawa Per-Capita-Income, 1972-74</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEFO</td>
<td>Association des Enseignants franco-ontariens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFT</td>
<td>American Federation of Teachers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIB</td>
<td>Anti-Inflation Board</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCTF</td>
<td>British Columbia Teachers' Federation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBE</td>
<td>Carleton Board of Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEQ</td>
<td>Corporation des Enseignants du Quebec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIBO</td>
<td>Collegiate Institute Board of Ottawa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Carleton Principals' Association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Consumer Price Index</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>Economic Policy Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FW</td>
<td>Federation of Women Teachers' Associations of Ontario</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWTAO</td>
<td>Federation of Women Teachers' Associations of Ontario</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEA</td>
<td>National Educational Association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPSB</td>
<td>Nepean Public School Board</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTF</td>
<td>Nepean Teachers' Federation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBE</td>
<td>Ottawa Board of Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECTA</td>
<td>Ontario English Catholic Teachers' Association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QEMTC</td>
<td>Ottawa Elementary Men Teachers' Club</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OETC</td>
<td>Ottawa Elementary Teachers' Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPS</td>
<td>Ontario Public School Men Teachers' Federation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSMTF</td>
<td>Ontario Public School Men Teachers' Federation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSTA</td>
<td>Ontario Public School Trustees' Association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSSTF</td>
<td>Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTF</td>
<td>Ontario Teachers' Federation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Professional Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTR</td>
<td>Pupil-Teacher Ratio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMOC</td>
<td>Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFC</td>
<td>Teachers' Federation of Carleton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTAO</td>
<td>Women Teachers' Association of Ottawa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My greatest debt is to the Carleton and Ottawa Board of Education teachers and officials who, for the most part, gave freely of their time to help an "outsider" understand the "world of public education". Beyond supplying time, local educators and officials provided me with documents and statistics which proved invaluable to the study. Other actors in the Ontario educational system provided key assistance at various times. Provincial officers of OPSMTF, OECTA and OSSTF allowed me access to information held at their provincial offices, and in some cases, provided useful insights into the process by which teachers become militant. Also helpful were officials of the Ontario Ministry of Education who supplied much of the statistical data on Ottawa and Carleton teachers.

I especially want to express my appreciation to my wife, Dr. Susan Hess Nelson, who served as a supportive colleague while, at the same time, handling the demands of being a university professor, a wife, a mother and a primary breadwinner.

I also owe a debt of thanks to Grant Yoxon who served as my research assistant for approximately four months. Grant accompanied me to the majority of interviews and recorded them by hand. In addition, he conducted several interviews on his own. These activities made it possible for Grant to serve as a soundingboard which I could, and did use, to clarify my thinking.
I also want to thank my advisory committee, Professors Forcense, Frumhartz, Harg and Hatt, for their constructive criticism and comments, and for their encouragement at times when I felt incapable of finishing the study.

Cathy Thomas also deserves my gratitude for her competence and endurance in typing this thesis.

I want to thank my son, Chad, who has had to tolerate a thesis-obsessed father for more than half of his life. His tolerance has evidenced a maturity beyond his years. Finally, I want to acknowledge my daughter, Janet, who has had to put up with my thesis obsession for all of her life.
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

I. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The present study is an attempt to understand the contemporary phenomenon of teacher militancy. More precisely, the concern is to identify the factors, conditions and processes which have contributed to the transformation of relatively compliant and complacent teacher groups into militant collectivities. This concern is related, however, to a broader issue. The broader question is one of identifying the conditions under which subordinate groups take coercive, collective action to challenge authorities. This question is both explicitly and implicitly a focus of interest in many sociological studies in the fields of political sociology, social movements and collective behavior. The study of teacher militancy will not provide a full answer to this broad and timeless question; but it is hoped that this particular study, added to others, will provide some insight to the general problem.

Having stated the broad objectives of the study, it is necessary to deal with some conceptual ambiguities surrounding the dependent variable. At the most general level our aim is to understand the conditions which bring about a specific type of change in subordinate

1. Since authorities are generally defenders of existing structural arrangements our originating question encompasses attempts to change the existing social structure.
groups' orientations to authorities. Specifically, the concern is with shifts from compliant to combative/militant orientations. We define a militant group as one which is "willing" to utilize coercive collective action to force changes in authorities or in their behavior. A compliant group, on the other hand, may attempt to influence authorities but avoids the use of coercive action to force authorities. Our concern, then, is with increases in the "willingness" of groups to utilize coercive action against authorities. We will take behavior of groups as the measure of their orientation toward authorities. Groups which repeatedly use coercive action in their interaction with authorities will be viewed as militant whereas those that steer clear of coercive action will be viewed as compliant.

There are at least three problems attached to the above conceptualization and operationalization of militancy. The first concerns the fit of the above conceptualization with others found in the literature. The literature which deals with militancy, whether it be of teachers or some other group, often views militancy as involving more than a willingness or propensity to take coercive action. In particular, the goals of a group are frequently taken as indicative of the group's militancy. Those groups which aim to make radical changes to the status quo tend to be viewed as more militant than groups which only aim for minor modifications. As viewed here, the goals of a group are best kept conceptually distinct from its propensity to use coercion. The "radicalness" of a subordinate group's goals is an interesting area for investigation in itself (e.g., Under what
conditions do groups adopt radical goals?), but it is not the focus of the present study. To the extent that we are concerned with goals of subordinate groups, it will be from the perspective of determining their effect on the propensity to use coercion.  

A second problem relates both to the fit of our notion of militancy with the existing literature and to the operationalization of our concept. The existing literature often equates militancy with both the degree of coercion entailed in a group's action and the frequency of coercive action. Thus, when an author writes that the secondary school teachers are the most militant teachers in Ontario, s/he has in mind the fact that they have not only used coercive action more often than other groups but that they have also more frequently used the more extreme forms of coercion (e.g., strikes). While I have no difficulty in accepting this view of militancy in the abstract, it does pose problems for measurement. Difficulties lie in two areas. First, there is no calculus for creating a single measure of militancy from the frequency of coercive action and the degree of coercion entailed in particular actions. To illustrate the dilemma: Is a teacher group that engages in a single work-to-rule over a ten-year period more or less militant than one which continually threatens mass resignation, holds repeated demonstrations and campaigns to unseat antagonistic trustees? The second measurement problem which crops up when militancy

---

2. One might expect, for example, that the more radical a group’s goals are relative to the goals of authorities, the more likely it is that the group will find it necessary to use coercive action. This is simply because as goals diverge the room for mutually agreeable compromise diminishes.
is seen as a mix of the frequency and degree of coercive action is that the same action may reflect different degrees of "willingness" to use coercion depending on the circumstances surrounding the action. For example, a strike by Ontario teachers prior to 1975, when it was unclear whether teachers had the legal right to strike, would seem to indicate a much greater propensity to use coercive action than a strike after 1975 when the right to strike was clearly established for teachers.

A final problem also pertains to measurement. What does one do with a group which fails to utilize coercive tactics with any frequency or with great intensity but still manages to get its way in dealing with authorities? Our problem here is similar to that faced by students of community power structure who utilize the decision-making method to identify locus of power. Powerful individuals and groups may not be directly involved in decision-making but may still be seen to get their way because others fear the repercussions of making decisions against the interests of the powerful or because the value system and social structure of the community are such as to preclude consideration of outcomes unfavorable to the interests of the powerful. In the case of teacher groups, it may be that a group is very willing to use coercion but never needs to because the school board is willing to capitulate to the group's demands rather than risk the consequences of resisting.

I have raised the above problems not so much to solve them as to alert the reader to their presence. In any case, their importance is
significantly reduced by the design of the study. We will not be dealing with a large number of groups whose militancy must be precisely ranked relative to one another. Rather we will be concerned with changes in the propensity of four groups to engage in coercive action. A large part of the analysis is longitudinal, in which we look for factors associated with an increase in a group’s propensity to utilize coercion. Here all that is important is that we be able to determine the approximate period in which a propensity for compliant behavior was replaced with a propensity for coercive behavior. We will, however, be particularly interested in the groups’ use of more extreme forms of coercion and will take the use of more extreme forms of coercion as indicative of greater militancy.

Where difficulty will be greatest is in attempts to answer the question why one group is more militant than another. Here it is necessary to make a ranking of the groups’ militancy; and other indicators of militancy beyond the groups’ behavior (e.g., leaders’ attitudes, trustees’ perceptions of the groups’ propensity to coercion) will be used. This said, it must be stressed again that the main goal is not to account for one group being more militant than another but, rather, to understand the factors and conditions which lead any group in the direction of militancy. Thus, an imperfect solution to the problem of assessing the comparative militancy of the groups does not stand in the way of achieving the main objective.
II. THE CHOICE OF TEACHER GROUPS AS THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS

Given the breadth of the originating question it should be clear that other groups could have been chosen as the focus of this study. Teacher groups were chosen primarily for two reasons. First, I felt there was a good chance of obtaining the type and depth of information needed to attempt to trace a group's development from docility to militancy. Since teachers' salaries affect local ratepayers, and since the children of these ratepayers are affected by the sanctions teachers employ in conflicts with their boards, it seemed likely that local newspapers would contain a good deal of historical material on teacher negotiations and teacher/board conflicts surrounding negotiations. Further, it seemed probable that the boards and the local teachers' groups would have records of their own that could be tapped for information. Last, but by no means least, I felt I would have a better chance of getting interviews with, and information from, teacher leaders than from leaders of other groups that could have been chosen for study. Groups which were and are challenging the status quo of the entire society were, I thought, all too likely to view me as a representative of that status quo. With teachers I would run the risk of being seen as part of the public that teachers view as becoming increasingly hostile to them or as a board spy. This I thought I could handle by means of disclaimers in face-to-face interaction and by the fortunate circumstance that I had taught in a public school myself (albeit for only one year). Indeed my ex-teacher status was to prove quite
valuable as I was almost always asked by interviewees whether I had ever taught.

The second main reason for choosing to study teacher groups was that the groups which were readily accessible to me had displayed intriguingly different patterns of behavior. One group, the Ottawa secondary teachers, had a history of squabbles with its board (i.e., the Ottawa Board of Education) dating back to the beginning of the 1970's. The squabbling peaked in a long and bitter strike in the spring of 1975. In contrast, the Carleton secondary teachers, who teach in the heavily suburbanized area surrounding Ottawa and who up until 1969 were governed by the same board as Ottawa teachers, showed a different pattern. Like the Ottawa secondary teachers, Carleton teachers had some conflict with their board in the early 1970's and staged a work-to-rule in the spring of 1971. Since that point, however, Carleton secondary teachers have shown no significant sign of militancy whereas Ottawa teachers have continued to act in a militant fashion. In Ottawa the development of militancy appeared to have gone full course in the first half of the seventies, whereas in Carleton there was only a brief flash of militancy which went over faster than it came.

I felt that exploration of the development in Ottawa up to the strike could give me some clues as to the conditions which facilitate the emergence of a militant subordinate group. Investigation of events up to the 1971 work-to-rule in Carleton could lead to some confirmation of the factors identified; more important, comparison of the overall
development of Ottawa and Carleton secondary groups could help identify the critical factors which made it possible for militancy to fully take root in Ottawa.

More intriguing than either of the secondary groups was the Carleton elementary group. This group both defied pronouncements in the literature on teacher militancy and displayed behavior which was out of place in comparison to all other public school elementary teacher groups in the province. The literature on teacher militancy, as well as a number of well-accepted sociological generalizations would lead one to think that public school elementary teachers would never become militant. Not only is the group comprised predominately of women (many of whom are second-income earners), but it is also internally split into two groups by coinciding lines of cleavage in sex, federation membership and status within the schools. Women, who are almost all classroom teachers, belong to a separate federation from men, who in contrast are extremely overrepresented in positions of responsibility within the schools. Beyond this, elementary teachers work in relatively small, isolated schools, making communication and group mobilization difficult.

If we look at the Ontario public school elementary teachers' record it would appear that the prediction of compliance generally holds true. It was not until well after teacher strikes had become commonplace (1979) that public school elementary teachers used this tactic. Even the completely legal tactic of mass resignation was only used once by public school elementary teachers in the 1970's. The
group which used mass resignation, in 1973, was none other than the Carleton elementary teachers group. Since the mass resignation never actually came into effect (a settlement was reached, and the letters of resignation were destroyed, prior to the date they went into effect), one might question the militancy of the group. However, when one finds out that the Carleton group's provincial federations refused to support them in their resignation, when one finds them to be the first public elementary group to hold demonstrations to influence the board and when one finds they were the first of all teacher groups (including secondary groups) to take their board to court over an alleged violation of their collective agreement, it is hard to question their militancy.

As I saw it, exploration of the Carleton elementary group could not only provide an independent analysis to compare with my analysis of the Ottawa and Carleton secondary teachers, but it would also provide the deviant case which would point the way to a fuller understanding of the factors which retard other elementary groups in the development of militancy.

The final group is the Ottawa public elementary group. Unlike its secondary big brother or its elementary cousin in Carleton, it has shown very little tendency to use coercive tactics. By encompassing the Ottawa group in the analysis my intention was to provide a tangible contrast group which would help me identify what were truly critical factors in the Carleton elementary group's move to militancy.
III. The Method of Analysis

This study can be called an exploratory, longitudinal, comparative case study. The label exploratory is usually applied to studies which are aimed at developing knowledge of an area in which there has been little previous research or theorizing for the investigator to build upon. Further, exploratory studies often give more equal opportunity for theory and research to interact in producing the final outcome than is the case in non-exploratory studies. Where the majority of non-exploratory studies allow specific theoretical formulations to determine the variables to be studied, the exploratory study starts with a broad collection of plausible notions, hunches and working hypotheses. Where the non-exploratory study is often centrally concerned to test a specific hypothesis or set of hypotheses, the exploratory study aims to develop an understanding of a certain type of process or event. As a consequence of these differences, the exploratory analyst may discard and reformulate a number of hypotheses in the course of his work, whereas the "non-exploratory" investigator usually presents any ideas on reformulations of "theory" in his concluding remarks.

Probably no study, including this one, is purely exploratory or non-exploratory. However, most studies can be placed on a continuum with relatively unstructured exploratory studies at one end and strictly and narrowly focused hypothesis-testing research at the other. While the current study has elements which could lead it to be placed
at either end of the continuum, as a whole it fits best somewhere at
the exploratory end.

This study is exploratory in the sense that it is an attempt to
investigate a phenomenon which has received very little serious
attention in the literature. To be sure there have been a number of
publications on "teacher militancy". However, almost all of these
works either view militancy as an attribute of individuals or provide
very loose explanations of the general increase in teacher militancy
across North America. Put another way, the teacher militancy
literature fails to provide much by way of either theory or research
which bears on militancy as an attribute of real collectivities.
Instead it researches individuals and theorizes about aggregates.

This said, it should be made clear that the teacher militancy
literature does contain a number of suggestive hypotheses which can
serve to identify areas for exploration in the current study. However,
there is no single hypothesis or integrated group of hypotheses which
can be taken as the key focus for the current study. Moving up a
level, there are a number of theoretical formulations which bear on the
general question of when subordinate groups will move from docility to
militancy. Indeed, we will utilize a theoretical framework developed
from these formulations to help structure our investigation. However,
as will be seen when the framework is presented, it is very general and
allows room for the pursuit of a great number of different lines of
inquiry.

Ultimately, whether the study is exploratory or not is the
arbitrary choice of the investigator. I have chosen to emphasize developing an understanding of a particular type of phenomenon over testing specific hypotheses. This is not to say that my interest is confined to understanding the evolution of teacher militancy. Clearly I want to try to abstract from the study and relate its findings to existing hypotheses regarding teacher militancy and the broader problem of subordinate group "rebellion". The point is simply that the body of the empirical analysis follows the exploratory model more so than the hypothesis testing model.

Consistent with its exploratory character the study is a case study. Rather than attempt to examine a representative sample of teacher groups we concentrate on four groups which show interesting variations in their patterns of behavior. By narrowing the focus to four groups we increase the time and energy available to sift through alternative explanations and ferret out data to test their plausibility.

Longitudinal analysis is utilized to identify factors and conditions which are associated with increases in a group's militancy. Taken individually, the longitudinal analyses of the three groups which moved to militancy in the early 1970's (i.e., the Carleton elementary, Carleton secondary, and the Ottawa secondary groups) only identify potentially important factors in generating militancy. Here the comparative aspect of the study is important. If the factors and conditions identified as critical in any one longitudinal analysis are also identified in the other two analyses, we can have greater faith in
the importance of these factors and conditions in generating militancy. On the other hand, the failure of a factor to be identified as contributing to teacher militancy in all three longitudinal studies calls its general salience into question.

Comparative analysis involves more than comparing teacher groups which have become militant. It also involves comparison of one of our militant groups, the Carleton elementary, with a non-militant counterpart, the Ottawa elementary teachers. Here is assumed that the factors and conditions which were identified as key to the development of militancy in the longitudinal analysis of the Carleton group will be absent or present to a lesser degree in the Ottawa situation.

The combining of longitudinal and comparative modes of analysis in a study of four groups has made organizing the text difficult. Further, variations in the amount of data that were obtained on the four groups have forced a certain unevenness into the text and the analysis. Thus, something should be said about the way the analysis proceeds through the text in order to prepare the reader for what is to come.

The analysis of the case studies begins with a detailed longitudinal analysis of the Carleton elementary teachers' move to militancy. This is followed by a less extensive comparative longitudinal analysis of the non-militant Ottawa elementary group. Analyses of the two secondary groups are merged into one chapter following the discussion of the Ottawa elementary teachers. In the case of the secondary groups, comparative and longitudinal modes of
analysis are heavily intertwined, with the comparative analysis of the two groups being given somewhat heavier weight than the longitudinal analysis of either group on its own. Finally, in the concluding chapter an attempt is made to assess the salience and role of specific factors in the development of militancy by drawing on our knowledge of all four groups.

IV. DATA GATHERING PROCEDURES

The data for the study come from a variety of sources. Newspaper accounts, board minutes, board publications, minutes of teacher groups, teacher group publications and publications of the Ontario Ministry of Education are used to supply much of the data. Beyond these sources of information, close to ninety interviews were conducted with leaders of local teacher groups, leaders of provincial teacher federations, local trustees and local board administrators.

The sample of teacher leaders was a purposive sample. Leaders were taken to be teachers who had held executive positions in the local federations or who had served as members of the negotiating teams. With all groups I attempted to continue seeking out interviews until I had developed at least a plausible understanding of the group's evolution. Of sixty-six interviews with local teacher leaders, twenty-seven were with Carleton elementary leaders, twenty-two with Ottawa elementary leaders, nine with Ottawa secondary leaders and eight with Carleton secondary leaders. In addition, eight interviews were
conducted with leaders of the two local separate school groups in that I had initially considered incorporating these groups in my analysis.

In the interviews, teacher leaders were viewed as playing three different roles. First, they were key informants who had first-hand knowledge of their group's development. In this capacity they could supply insights into their group's evolution as well as serve as a sounding board for the various hunches I developed in the course of the study. Second, they were subjects whose own attitudes and behavior had had an influence on the group's development. Third, they were suppliers of documents and contacts. In most cases the same interview procedure was followed. First, a series of questions regarding the leaders' personal attributes and social background characteristics were asked—followed by three sets of questions aimed at determining the respondents' attitudes toward various educational authorities, their views of how much decision-making power the teachers should have, and their attitudes toward the use of coercive tactics. This was followed by an attempt to get the respondents to supply their own analysis of the development (or non-development) of militancy and, where appropriate, the causes of specific major coercive actions (i.e., strike, mass resignation or work-to-rule). From here I simply probed for information bearing on various hunches that were emerging from the field work. Finally, the interviews were ended by asking if the respondent had any written documentation in the form of minutes,

3. The questions asked in the structured portion of the interview are presented in Appendix A.
newsletters and so on which could be used to verify points arising in
the less structured portion of our discussion, and if he or she could
refer me to other key leaders to interview.4

More will be said about interview procedures in the main body of
the text, but there is one critical point to be made here. This is
that the information provided from the interviews is not taken as the
definitive data for the current study. Rather it is one source of
evidence, evidence which in most cases must be added to evidence from
other sources to provide a convincing argument. Throughout the period
of doing the field work my role was very much that of a 'detective-
taking' testimony of witnesses, looking for corroboration or
contradiction in the accounts of witnesses, going through the files
over and over again in search of some clue which would help me make
sense of what had happened, developing and checking out hunches and
ferreting out bits and pieces of hard evidence. Thus, as one might
expect, the conclusions or verdicts of this study are often reached by
the examination of mixtures of hard evidence and testimony.

4. It must be admitted that this request for referrals was a bit of
a ruse. I had compiled a fairly complete list of those I wished
to interview early on in the study. However, I soon found that
it considerably eased the process of securing agreement to be
interviewed when I was able to say "'X' told me you would be an
important person to speak with."
V. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE TEXT

Chapter Two reviews the literature on teacher militancy. In relation to the dissertation as a whole, the purpose of this review is to show the place of the current study in the context of the existing literature and to identify hypotheses which may be of use in the analysis of local teacher groups. Chapter Three draws on the field of social movements to provide a general theoretical framework to guide the analysis in ensuing chapters. In addition, an attempt is made to place hypotheses from the literature on teacher militancy within the general theoretical framework.

Chapter Four has two functions. First, it attempts to outline the broad extra-local parameters which may have had an impact on the militancy of local groups. Second, it attempts to demonstrate the heuristic value of the theoretical framework by applying it to the examination of the general increase of teacher militancy across Ontario.

Chapters Five, Six and Seven deal with the evolution of the four teacher groups. Chapter Five on the Carleton elementary group is the most extensive both because of the group's uniqueness and because there is more information available on it than on the other groups. Chapter Six on the Ottawa elementary teachers is basically provided as a check on the analysis of the Carleton elementary group. Presumably since the groups differ in their development of militancy, the factors which we identify as critical in Carleton will either not be present or will not
be present in the same degree in Ottawa. Chapter Seven focuses on the behavior of the two secondary groups. Chapter Eight pulls together the analyses from Chapter Five through Seven and relates the findings from the study of local groups to the literature on teacher militancy.
Chapter II

A REVIEW OF TEACHER MILITANCY LITERATURE

Recent years have borne witness to a change in the behavior of teachers vis-à-vis school boards and other educational authorities. Cap-in-hand docility has increasingly been replaced by a willingness to utilize coercive tactics such as strikes, mass resignations and work-to-rule in dealing with educational authorities. Underlying these dramatic instances of overt conflict is an on-going metamorphosis of the teaching occupation. Increasingly, we are seeing relatively compliant teachers' groups transformed into combative collectivities willing to engage in open conflict with educational authorities. The view that the educational system is one big happy family working toward common goals is being replaced by one in which the conflicting interests of educational authorities and teachers are seen to take precedence over shared objectives as guideposts for behavior. Teachers are increasingly recognizing and accepting the need for collective action to protect and/or further their interests.

The literature which attempts to deal with this newly-found teacher militancy can be roughly placed in three categories. First, there are attempts to account for the general increase in teacher militancy. Second, there are studies which aim at explaining individual teachers' acceptance of and participation in militant action. Third, there are studies which attempt to view militancy as a form of
organizational behavior rather than as an attribute of individuals. These studies are useful for suggesting some of the factors and processes which may be involved in the transformation of docile collectivities into militant organizations.

I. THE GENERAL RISE IN TEACHER MILITANCY

A. Re-organization of School Systems.

The existing literature suggests that the increase in teachers' use of coercive tactics can be understood as the outcome of several broad societal changes. The continuing urbanization of North America coupled with the post-war baby boom is seen to have had an effect on the structure of school systems. Schools and school systems experienced tremendous growth throughout the 1950's and 1960's as a result of the increased size and geographic concentration of the school-aged population.¹ These population changes in turn are seen to have spurred the growth of large school bureaucracies to administer the mass education enterprise that education had become.

This development of large-scale bureaucracies can be seen to have had at least two salient impacts. First, it has been argued that bureaucratization led to the alienation of teachers from the educa-

¹ This growth was further exacerbated by other factors. The increased importance placed on education in the 1950's and 1960's resulted in a larger proportion of the school-aged population staying in school. Further, in some areas (notably Ontario) governmental policies intentionally fostered the creation of large school systems.
itional system. As Brenton describes this alienation, it involves teachers becoming

...mass production workers on an educational assembly line, removed from the sources of power and alienated from the institution that employs them, somewhat in the way that a factory worker is alienated from the plant that pays his wages but with which he feels little sense of identification (Brenton, 1970:121).

Thus, one impact of bureaucratization has been hypothesized to be an increase in teacher discontent. Teachers are assumed to find alienation unpleasant and dissatisfying; and the spread of alienation, therefore, provides a broad motivational base for militant action directed at alleviating alienating conditions.

A second possible impact of bureaucratization on teacher militancy has to do with social control and teacher solidarity. The advent of bureaucratic authority signalled a change in the system of social control in the schools. Standardized, rational procedures for doling out rewards and punishments which accompany bureaucratization may be seen to have reduced authorities' discretionary power in sanctioning subordinates.² This development, coupled with the increased formality of relations between teachers and authorities, can be seen to have substantially limited authorities' flexibility in applying sanctions to keep teachers in line. Co-optation through promotion, the threat of demotion, dismissal or transfer, all of these control mechanisms had to be applied according to the rules, or at

2. Teachers themselves have contributed to reductions in authorities' discretionary powers by pushing for more and more "managerial rights" to be limited by collective agreements.
least had to appear to be applied according to the rules, as the school systems became more bureaucratic. There has been and continues to be a significant degree of variation in the extent to which school systems have in fact rationalized sanctioning procedures. However the key point is that, relative to the high degree of discretion allowed to authorities in the autocratic systems of previous years, the level of discretion in even partially bureaucratized systems is low.

One effect of reducing authorities' discretionary power may have been to create a milieu in which potential leaders of militant action could come out of the closet without being bought out or thrown out. However, there is another possible consequence of reduced discretionary power in regard to teacher militancy. Militancy in the form of a strike or other collective action requires that there be solidarity among the teachers. Before such militant action can occur, a large number of teachers must feel that their individual objectives can only be achieved by collective action. If individual action can bring satisfying results, there is no need to join with others in a common struggle (or to risk the consequences). To the extent that the discretionary power of authorities is reduced, so too is the utility of individual pandering to the powerful as a route to personal success.

3. It is interesting to note, that in a number of school systems, activity in the teachers' union or 'professional association' is seen as a positive attribute in evaluating candidates for promotion. Both school boards and teachers appear to agree to this, but probably for different reasons. For the board this may be a novel attempt at co-optation while for a union it helps encourage participation in the union on the part of energetic social-strivers.
Little is left for the ambitious teacher in these circumstances but to take the route of upgrading his or her teaching credentials or to join with others in pressing for collective benefits.

In sum, bureaucratization of education may well have weakened the hold of authorities over teachers by decreasing their discretionary power. Further, reduction in authorities' discretionary power may indirectly contribute to teacher solidarity by limiting the utility of some forms of self-interested action.

B. Supply of and Demand for Teachers.

Returning to broad societal changes that have been seen to be related to teacher militancy, the baby boom may have had a more direct impact on militancy than suggested above. However, the direction of this impact is hard to assess. In itself, the increase in the school-age population created a demand for teachers which far exceeded the supply of qualified personnel. There are at least three ways of relating this change in the ratio of supply and demand to militancy. First, it can be suggested that the increased demand actually lowered the probability of militant action in that the existence of multiple job opportunities made it possible for teachers to improve their salaries and working conditions by changing jobs rather than by utilizing militant tactics. On the other side of the coin, it can be

4. Undersupply of teachers also gave substance to teacher groups' threats, that the failure to match benefits and salaries in other school districts would cause a board to lose many of its qualified teachers. Thus in many cases the need for militant action may have been avoided by board compliance.
argued that the increased demand for teachers provided a safety valve for militants. Even if the consequence of militant action was the loss of a job, other employment was readily available. Finally, it can be suggested that the expansion of school systems resulted in increased rates of promotion which, in turn, led many teachers to expect promotions that were not in fact forthcoming and thus set the stage for strong feelings of deprivation.5

C. Increasing Importance of Education.

Another major change which has been hypothesized to have contributed to increasing teacher militancy is the increased emphasis that was placed on education as the key to individual and societal to individual and societal advance. While perhaps more pronounced in the United States than in Canada, the post-Sputnik period saw North Americans looking to education to create a core of knowledge workers who would lead society to higher and higher levels of technological advancement as well as to produce the leaders who would guide the country into "new frontiers". At the same time that education was assigned the vanguard role in creating a better society, it was also seen as the key mechanism for curing assorted social ills from

---

5. That high rates of promotion may be associated with dissatisfaction is hardly a new idea. Stouffer's classic study, The American Soldier, made this point long ago. In that study it was suggested that "A generally high rate of mobility induces excessive hopes and expectations among members of the group so that each is more likely to experience a sense of frustration in his present situation and disaffection with the chances for promotion." (Merton, 1968:237).
Inequality of opportunity to racial prejudice. 6

The increased stress on the importance of education had a number of impacts on teachers which, over the long haul, can be seen to have contributed to militancy. Education was seen to be the route to placement in occupations which required highly developed knowledge and skills, and it became evident that teachers themselves would have to be well educated. Whether teachers felt the need to improve their own academic qualifications or were forced to do so by others is unimportant. What is important is that the amount of academic training and specialization has significantly increased over the past two decades. There are at least three salient consequences that flow from

6. The increase in teachers' responsibilities which resulted from viewing education as the panacea for societal and individual problems is illustrated in the following quotes. "At the same time that modern teacher's alienation grows in intensity, the demands on him grow likewise. He is expected to make up in the classroom for bad housing, undernourishment, lack of stimulation at home, and self images warped by the gross injustices of society." (Bendiner, 1969:91).

"...schools and teachers have been saddled with a host of social problems and tasks, problems and tasks ranging from sex education to providing effective education for low-income youths to getting suburban students into the best colleges." (Brenton, 1970:124).

So important did education come to be seen that the failure to complete high school was viewed as a major social problem. Note for example the following quote from a book devoted to the dropout problem. "Today it is impossible not to see the problem of the school dropout as the keystone of a conglomeration of problems which threaten to overwhelm the stability of America's existence." (Schreiber, 1968:4).
this development.

Marcus (1973) has suggested that the upgrading of teachers' qualifications and, more importantly, teachers' increasing specialization exacerbates the gap between teachers and authorities. As teachers become more specialized it becomes more difficult for authorities and their functionaries to provide pedagogical assistance to teachers. In particular, school principals and superintendents find it difficult to play the role of fellow educators in communicating with teachers. Lacking the specialized expertise of their subordinates, they are forced into playing an administrative role in most of their interaction with teachers. According to Marcus, this results in teachers turning to one another for support in handling the day-to-day problems of classroom teaching. In sum, the heavy stress on education leads to teacher specialization which in turn limits the content of vertical communication in the schools to administrative matters and pushes teachers together in order to cope with the daily exigencies of teaching. With regard to militancy, these developments may be seen to contribute to greater solidarity among teachers.

The second consequence of teachers' higher educational qualifications has been mentioned more frequently in the literature on teacher militancy. Implicitly accepting Homans' theorem of "distributive justice", various authors have suggested that, as teachers' qualifications increase, teachers enjoy a higher status and are better able to resist the demands of the administration.

7. A flaw in this argument is that specialization is likely to hinder communication among teachers as well as communication among administrators and teachers.
qualifications increase, their expectations for rewards also increase. When these expectations go unfulfilled teachers get angry and are likely to support militant action to see that justice is done. Here the societal stress on the importance of education and the additional responsibilities that teachers feel have been heaped upon them legitimate their claims for greater rewards.

There are two main versions of this argument in the literature. In one version, the stress is on teacher militancy as resulting from status and power deprivation. Teachers are seen to feel deprived because they do not have the power and status of other professionals. In the second version, economic deprivation is emphasized. Teachers are seen as becoming militant because they see themselves as underpaid relative to other workers. Frequently tied to this second version is the observation that the proportion of teachers who are male has been increasing. This is held to be important because "unliberated" men and women tend to evaluate the fairness of their economic rewards by comparing them to the rewards received by members of their own sex in other occupations. For men, during periods when militancy has been on the rise, such comparisons tend to result in a negative assessment of the economic rewards of teaching. For women, however, wage comparisons with other women tend to result in a rather favorable assessment of teaching.

8. As Brenton puts it, "The point here, however, is that the more college a person has, the more value he seems to have both to himself and society, the greater his expectancy of rewards from that society." (Brenton, 1970:122),
The high importance attributed to education may be seen to contribute to teacher militancy in yet another way. As parents come to see their children's life chances tied to success in the educational system, they become increasingly likely to make demands on the schools and educators in order to insure their children's success. Similarly, as social reformers come to see the educational system as a key agent of socialization, they are likely to make demands on the system to change.

In response to increased pressure for change and for accountability from the outside community, teachers can be seen as attempting to limit their vulnerability by seeking detailed collective agreements which restrict management rights and thus the possibility of unwanted change. In sum, external pressure increases the importance of collective agreements and ties the teachers' interests together. Thus, while external pressures do not directly lead to militancy, they do contribute to conditions which are prerequisites for militant action.

D. Political and Economic Factors.

It has also been suggested that the upsurge in teacher militancy is at least in part a product of a change in the political climate of North America. It is hypothesized that the civil rights movement in the United States and the anti-war protests of recent years have contributed to the acceptance of organized group conflict as a normal means of resolving disputes. Aggressive collective action has come to be seen as a legitimate tactic for various groups which are pursuing

Change in the occupational structure may also have played a role in the development of teacher militancy, at least in the United States. Recent years have witnessed a growth in white-collar workers and a decline in blue-collar workers. One consequence of this has been a relative decline in the membership of unions. Labour leaders did not stand idle and watch their membership base decline. Rather they attempted to expand their membership by fostering the unionization of white-collar workers.

Through the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), the AFL-CIO attempted to recruit new unionists among the teaching ranks in the 1960's. Using traditional union tactics, the AFT was able to win significant benefits for teachers and to draw members away from the more conservative National Education Association (NEA) which had traditionally represented teachers. Eventually this resulted in a radicalization of the NEA which began to utilize militant methods in order to compete for members.

While competition for membership cannot be seen to underlie the development of teacher militancy among Ontario teachers - the teachers with whom we will be most concerned - the events in the United States have had an impact in Canada. If nothing else, the escalating use of militant methods across the border provided a salient alternative mode of behavior for Canadian teachers.

Broad economic changes can also be related to teacher militancy. Throughout the seventies high levels of inflation evoked demands for
high salary increases from teachers. In addition, the fact that the salary increases of teachers could be seen to be lower than those of many other occupations helped generate strong feelings of relative deprivation which could be channelled into militant action.

It can be suggested that feelings of economic deprivation have been heightened by other social trends. The increasing level of education required by teachers coupled with the tendency to specialization may well have contributed to teachers being psychologically locked into teaching careers. Having invested a substantial amount of time and energy in preparing for a career in education, teachers may have found it difficult to alleviate dissatisfaction with salary by pursuing new lines of work.

Finally, there has been a change in teachers' identification with the communities in which they teach. Increasing specialization of teachers, bureaucratization, and high rates of geographic mobility have worked together to reduce teachers' sense of membership in the community. Specialization and bureaucratization limit the hiring of home-grown talent, especially at the secondary school level. At the secondary level the tendency to large schools serving large geographic areas works to break the link between the school and community. Further, the geographic mobility of families creates a situation in which the community itself loses its identity. Teachers without roots in the community, servicing children from a multiplicity of communities and neighborhoods, find themselves significantly freed from informal community pressures which would inhibit the taking of militant action.
While the factors discussed above help to account for the development of a climate which facilitates the emergence of militant teacher groups, they are far too general to provide a full explanation of teacher militancy in specific settings. A more detailed understanding of the conditions leading to teacher militancy may be found in the second set of literature on teacher militancy.

II. MILITANCY AS AN ATTRIBUTE OF INDIVIDUALS

There is an old saw that it is unprofessional for professionals to utilize strikes and other tactics which might put clients' well-being in jeopardy. The acceptance of this view by self-defined professionals such as teachers provides a clear impediment to militancy. It is in this light that the work of Corwin (1970), Hennessy (1975), and Frie (1975) takes on special significance because each of these authors argues that teachers' desire for professional status is a cause of militancy.

Increases in teachers' educational qualifications and in specialized training, coupled with increases in the scope and importance of their responsibilities, are seen to lead to a strong desire for professional status. It is this increasing professionalization of teaching which is seen to give rise to militancy. As Corwin describes this process of professionalization:

[It] is a drive for status, it represents the efforts of some members of a vocation to control and monopolize their work. They will seek to wrest power from those groups that traditionally have controlled the vocation. Professional
associations were, of course, originally formed in order to free vocations from lay control; and the efforts of teachers to professionalize are no exception. The process of professionalizing publicly supported vocations, then is likely to be militant, representing a challenge to the traditional ideologies of control by laymen and their administrative representatives." (Corwin, 1970:8-9).

Those teachers who have come to see themselves as professionals are thus hypothesized to desire a greater degree of autonomy and control in education to go with their increased responsibility and expertise. When educational authorities refuse to relinquish power to these "professional" teachers, the result is seen to be frustration and consequent militancy toward authorities.

Efforts to verify the link between professional aspirations and militancy make up a large portion of the research on the causes of individual teachers' militancy. As we will see, however, the results of these efforts are far from convincing. To begin with, we can examine Corwin's well-known study, Militant Professionalism.

Drawing on a survey of close to 2,000 public high school teachers in 28 schools in Ohio and adjacent states, Corwin attempts to show that professionalism is associated with militancy. The strength of teachers' professionalism is measured by means of "... a 16-item 'Likert-type' scale consisting of four subscales: orientation to students, orientation to the profession and professional colleagues, a belief that competence is based on knowledge, and a belief that teachers should have decision-making authority." (Corwin, 1970:76). Militancy, on the other hand, was operationalized as the number of conflicts a teacher had in the school. More specifically, "Each
respondent indicated on a checklist of the names of faculty members and administrators in his school the colleagues with whom he had 'severe' and 'moderate' disagreements." (Corwin, 1970:84).

One of the core problems with Corwin's study lies in his conception of militancy. Militancy in Corwin's sense is hardly a new phenomenon, nor is it necessarily related to strikes and other forms of collective coercion which have kindled investigators' interest in teachers. In fact, to the extent that the disagreements which Corwin uses to measure militancy are among teachers, we might expect a reduction in the likelihood of collective militancy. High levels of conflict between teachers may hinder rather than help the mobilization and solidarity needed for collective militancy.

Furthermore, Corwin only found weak correlations between professionalism and militancy. When professionalism was run against the frequency of major incidents of conflict, a negative correlation was found. The less professionally oriented teachers were found to have higher rates of involvement in major disputes. This suggests that it may be the non-professionals who are most likely to become involved in collective militancy in that Corwin says most major incidents involved conflict with authorities rather than with other teachers. In any case, it would appear that increases in the numbers of "professional" teachers are hardly likely to underlie the development of collective teacher militancy. Indeed, Corwin recognizes this point. He reports that major incidents of conflict become less frequent with increases in the school teaching staff's professionalism, and he goes on to say...
This fact may indicate that more professionally oriented teachers police themselves, preventing conflict from getting out of bounds, or it may indicate that professionally oriented teachers accomplish what they want without needing to resort to major incidents. Whatever the reasons, 'militant' professionals themselves are more successful in resolving conflict in other ways or do not necessarily lead the most dramatic and belligerent forms of conflict currently associated with the teaching movement, except in the most bureaucratized schools (where it appears that professionalism may help to provoke major incidents (Corwin, 1970:296).

Corwin has not been the only person to see a link between professionalism and militancy. Focusing on Ontario teachers, Fris (1975) and Hennessy (1975) have independently investigated the relationship between professional role deprivation and support for militant tactics. Both argue that it is the gap between professional aspirations and actual circumstances that leads teachers to support the use of militant tactics. Teachers in their studies were asked series of questions to determine the strength of their aspirations for professional status and to obtain their perceptions of the degree to which these aspirations had been achieved.

In the case of Fris' study, teachers' aspirations and achievements were measured on six dimensions of professionalism. These dimensions are as follows:

1. Exercising control over working conditions.
2. Exercising self government.
3. Accepting responsibility for the nature of the learning experience.
4. Having a system of rewards that symbolize work-achievements.
5. Accepting responsibility for maintaining high standards of technical competence.
6. Having professional autonomy vis-à-vis lay members of the school board. (Fris, 1975:15).
A total professional role deprivation score for each teacher as well as role deprivation scores for each of the above dimensions was calculated on the basis of the gap between aspirations and achievements. Militancy was measured by asking teachers to indicate whether they "strongly support", "support", "are undecided", "disapprove", or "strongly disapprove" of a series of tactics which ranged from being highly coercive to highly accommodative in nature. A militancy subscale was then constructed based on individuals' responses to coercive tactics.

With responses from 599 members of the Ontario Public School Men Teachers' Federation (OPSMTF), Fris found that overall professional role deprivation scores were positively correlated with scores on the militancy subscale. However, while the significance level of the correlation is reported (i.e., $p < .001$), the correlation coefficient is not. Likewise, we are told that significant correlations were obtained between militancy and three dimensions of role deprivation (i.e., control of working conditions, responsibility for the nature of the learning experience, and autonomy from lay members of the school board), but there is no indication of the strength of these relationships.

Deficiencies in reporting aside, does Fris' work lend credence to the view that militancy is a product of frustrated aspirations for professional status? Fris clearly states that he sees the correlation between overall professional role deprivation and militancy as confirming this hypothesis.
This conclusion can, however, be challenged. First of all, this correlation hides the fact that role deprivation on three dimensions of professionalism is not correlated with militancy. At the minimum this fact points to a need to reconceptualize professionalism. The data only support the conclusion that frustrated aspirations for control over working conditions, responsibility for the nature of the learning experience, and autonomy from lay members of the school board are likely to be associated with support for militant tactics. On the other hand, teachers who feel deprived in their aspirations for self-government, for having a system of rewards that symbolize work achievement and for having responsibility for maintaining high standards of technical competence, show no special inclination to support militant tactics.

The picture becomes even more interesting when differences in the average amounts of deprivation on the six dimensions of professionalism are noted. Without getting into the explanation of Fris' measurement procedures, it can be noted from Figure 1 that the amount of deprivation experienced on two of the dimensions which are associated with militancy (i.e., learning experience and autonomy) is low relative to that experienced on the dimensions which are not associated with militancy. In fact in the case of autonomy it appears that, on the average, teachers have achieved more "professionalism" than they desire. Only deprivation on the dimension of working conditions is higher than deprivation on dimensions not associated with militancy. Thus it appears that the types of deprivation which motivate
Figure 1: Professional Role Deprivation Among OPSTIF Teachers

(From Fris, 1975, 27)
militants may not be as salient to the majority of teachers as are other types of deprivation. However, the fact that deprivation with regard to control over working conditions is both widely felt and correlated with militancy suggests that militants may be able to mobilize the majority on this issue.

It appears accurate to conclude that gaps between aspirations and achievements in relation to working conditions, control of the learning experience and autonomy from the lay board are associated with militancy; but it does not appear that professional role deprivation is associated with militancy.

Turning to the broader argument for professionalism as the cause of militancy, it will be recalled that teachers' professional aspirations are thought to rise due to increases in their educational qualifications. If the professionalization thesis holds, we would therefore expect that both deprivation and militancy would be highest among the more highly educated teachers. Fris finds, on the contrary, that there is no significant relationship between education and role deprivation. While more highly educated teachers do have higher professional aspirations than do less highly educated teachers, they also feel that teachers have achieved higher levels of professionalism. Teachers with high levels of role deprivation tended to have less experience, to have been less mobile (have taught in fewer schools) and to have been less likely to hold a high position such as that of principal or vice-principal.

Higher support for militancy is also associated with the above
factors. The more militant teachers tend to have less teaching experience, lower mobility and lower rank in the school. But equally important in terms of the professionalization thesis, militancy is inversely related to educational achievements of teachers. It is the less well educated teacher (not the more highly educated teacher) who is more likely to support militant action.

While it does not appear that the professional deprivation thesis is very useful for understanding the militancy of members of the OPSMTF, we should not reject the argument altogether. The OPSMTF membership differs significantly from that of other teacher groups. The statutory membership of the organization encompasses all male public school teachers of whom a large number are principals or vice-principals. Historically, elementary level men teachers have held the goal of becoming administrators, not career teachers. As a result, their deprivations and reasons for militancy may be quite different from those of other teachers for whom classroom teaching is viewed as a career.

Hennessy's study is quite similar to Fris' study, but there are at least two differences worth mentioning here. First, Hennessy's sample includes members of five different teacher organizations; and, secondly, Hennessy utilizes a slightly different set of dimensions of professionalism.

Hennessy's work casts further doubt on the utility of the professionalization thesis. He starts with the same general hypothesis as Fris - "The greater a teacher's professional role deprivation, the
greater will be his/her support for militant action in contract negotiation" (Hennessy, 1975:35). When he examines the data, however, he finds this hypothesis "... to be an oversimplification of an extremely complex set of forces at work" (Hennessy, 1975:46). The reader is, unfortunately, provided with very little information for independently assessing the strength of professional role deprivation's relation with individual militancy. The best information provided for assessing this relationship is that contained in Table 1 below.

While the bottom two rows of the table show that larger mean role deprivation scores are associated with larger mean militancy scores for each group of teachers, the differences are extremely small and probably not statistically significant. What is perhaps more important is the broad similarity in the patterns of deprivation between different groups of teachers and the lack of major variations in mean role deprivation. These points are important because the groups vary substantially in their actual use of militant action. At the time of the study, both Quebec Protestant teachers and Ontario Catholic teachers had utilized major sanctions in the course of contract negotiations while Ontario public school elementary teachers had not. Since there is very little difference in the average role deprivation of these groups it does not appear that role deprivation is related to actual militant action. Also interesting is the fact that the New York teachers surveyed in the study, who are members of the militant AFT, are less likely to support the use of militant action than any of the other groups. Apart from suggesting a significant gap
### Table 1. Mean Scores for Militancy and Elements of Deprivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Ont. Public Teachers</th>
<th>Ont. Cath. Teachers</th>
<th>Que. Prot. Teachers</th>
<th>New York Teachers</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy - deprivation</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service - deprivation</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competency control - deprivation</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal recognition - deprivation</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility for program - deprivation</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role deprivation - general</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militancy</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The mean scores reported in this table are shown according to a logit scale ranging from a minimum of -4.4 to a maximum of +4.4.

Source: Hennessy, 1975:40
between attitudes and actions, Hennessy's findings may be seen to point to the need to consider the possibility that situational factors may play a greater role in the genesis of militant action than does the psychological militancy of teachers.

Not only does Hennessy fail to provide convincing evidence of a link between professionalism and militancy, but he also gives evidence opposed to the more general explanation of the growth of professional role deprivation. As will be recalled, teachers are seen to have experienced increasing deprivation because with increasing educational qualifications their expectations have risen. However, as was also the case in Fris' study, there is no clear support for the hypothesis that more highly educated teachers have higher levels of role deprivation or militancy.

Having somewhat debunked the professionalization thesis once again, what useful information can be drawn from the Hennessy study? First, Hennessy does find some associations between social background characteristics and militancy. Male teachers, less experienced teachers and those who teach in urban centres over 100,000 population are more likely to support militant action. In addition, a positive correlation was found between professional activity (i.e., active participation in professional associations, involvement in teacher-board negotiations, etc.) and militancy. Finally, it can be noted that militancy tends to increase with the age of the students taught for groups which contain high school teachers.

Several qualifications are in order. First, no significance levels
are reported for the above mentioned correlations. Second, many of the correlation coefficients are quite small, as can be seen in Table 2 below.

The low correlations between sex and militancy and between professional activity and militancy found for Ontario public school teachers merit special comment. The Ontario public school teachers contain members of two teachers' federations - the Ontario Public School Men Teachers' Federation (OPSMTF), whose members were the subject of Fris' study, and the Federation of Women Teachers' Associations of Ontario (FWTAO). As we have already said, many of the men are likely to be principals and as such are likely to have developed loyalties to their school boards which reduce their propensity for militancy. Further, because the public school teachers' federations have both traditionally avoided more extreme forms of militant action in negotiations, it is not surprising that the link between professional activity and militancy is weak.

Hennessy does not present data on the relationship between role deprivation and individual teacher militancy, but he does provide data on the relation of professional achievements and professional aspirations to militancy. Specifically, he presents regression coefficients for positive and negative predictors of militancy respectively.

Although the strength of positive predictor variables varies from group to group, the most consistent predictors across all groups are the desire to control working conditions and the desire to control class size. Just what this means is difficult to say, for the actual
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Run Against Militancy</th>
<th>Teacher Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ontario Public Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Students</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Activity</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Derived from Hennessy, 1975
questions teachers were asked give no clear indication of the amount of control desired. Teachers were asked if they "should have a major control" over their working conditions and whether they should have a "strong voice" in setting norms for class size. The giving of a strong positive response to these questions may indicate a wish to be seriously consulted as much as a desire to actually control decision-making.

Turning to negative predictors of militancy, Hennessy points out that "The most consistent predictors of decreasing militancy were on the Competency and Public Service dimensions". (Hennessy, 1975:50). Desires for a professional code of conduct, an up-to-date pedagogy and a close working relationship with educational officials and the local community were associated with low militancy. Further, as one could expect, the receipt of individual rewards was associated with reduced militancy.

Our review of attempts to demonstrate a link between professionalism and militancy leads to several important conclusions. First, it appears there is no clear connection between professionalism and militancy. If anything, the evidence is only somewhat supportive of the view that attitudinal militancy is primarily a function of frustration over the control of working conditions. Fris' study shows quite clearly that gaps between aspirations and achievements on several key dimensions of professionalism do not relate to support for militant action. Hennessy, in turn, shows that several dimensions of professionalism are negatively related to militancy.
While all of these authors could claim some evidence for their "key" argument (i.e., that "militant" teachers are motivated by a desire for autonomy from non-expert trustees and administrators) the evidence is not unequivocal. Fris' study, for example, shows that on the average his teachers have more autonomy from trustees than they desire, suggesting that this issue is a poor one for mobilizing collective action. Further, neither Fris nor Hennessy finds militants to be very concerned about self-government or control over the classroom environment.

Perhaps even more revealing are Corwin's data on teachers' responses to questions about administrative authority and orientation toward clients (see Table 3 below). As Dreeban (1972:332) has pointed out, the patterns of response "... describe numbers of an occupation who are interested in the welfare of their clients but appear to be reasonably comfortable working under administrative guidelines and controls without a deep concern for the defense of professional autonomy, at least within broad limits."

These figures do not deny that "attitudinally militant" teachers, identified by surveys, may have become "militant" as a result of frustrated aspirations for control. However, they make it appear likely that the call for professional control of the schools will fall on deaf ears when attempts are made to mobilize the troops.9

9. Indeed a study by Wagenaar suggests that frustrated "professionally oriented" teachers are not especially likely to be involved in mobilizing the troops. In a study of teachers' activism in the AFT and NEA he finds no correlation between two measures of
Table 3. Administrative and Client Orientation of Teachers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of total Sample</th>
<th>Responding to Each Alternative (N = 1,485)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scale Items</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Teachers should adjust their teaching to the administration's views of good educational practice.</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The school administration should be better qualified than the teacher to judge what is best for education.</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Teachers should be obedient, respectful and loyal to the principal.</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. In case of a dispute in the community over whether a controversial textbook or controversial speaker should be permitted in the school, the teacher should look primarily to the guidance of the administration for guidance.</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Personnel who openly criticize the administration should be encouraged to go elsewhere.</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client Orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. It should be permissible for the teacher to violate a rule if he/she is sure that the best interests of the students will be served in doing so.</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Unless she is satisfied that it is best for the student, a teacher should not do what she is told to do.</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A good teacher should not do anything that he believes may jeopardize the interests of his students regardless of what the rules state.</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Corwin, 1970: 364, 370
The fact that more highly educated teachers are found to be less likely to be militant in Fris' study and no more likely to be militant than less educated teachers in Hennessy's study also poses a problem for proponents of the professionalization thesis. Militancy may be associated with a desire to obtain autonomy, but it appears that it is not the most "professionally" qualified teachers that desire autonomy. Moreover, militants' concern with autonomy is not even clearly indicative of professionalism. The professionalism measures which are the best overall positive predictors of militancy - "Desire for control of working conditions" and over class size - may be seen as indicative of unionism as much as professionalism. On the other hand, items which would seem to be much less ambiguous measures of professionalism, such as control over in-service training, control over the selection of textbooks, the desire for a code of ethics and responsibility for disciplining teachers either negatively predict militancy or fail to show any significant correlation with it.

The studies to this point appear to be primarily concerned with demonstrating that militancy and professionalism are not incompatible, rather than with identifying the determinants of individual teacher militancy. At least this is the impression one gets from the fact that no attempt is made in these studies to test the main alternative

footnote 9 cont.

professional autonomy and activism. (See Wagemaa, 1974:377) It should be noted that Corwin also failed to find "professionally oriented" teachers to be highly active in their formal teachers' organizations.
hypothesis - that militancy is primarily a response to feelings of economic deprivation. Fortunately, there are other studies which can provide us with some partial information on this alternative hypothesis.

In a study of 355 secondary teachers in eight Seattle schools, Hellriegel, et al. (1970) investigated the relationship between various types of satisfaction and support for teacher strikes. As can be seen from Table 4 satisfaction with salary and with status show the strongest negative correlations with support for teacher strikes.

It is important to note, however, that status satisfaction measures "... feelings about the prestige, security, and benefits afforded by teaching ... (and) ... the extent to which the teacher feels he is an accepted member of the community." (Hellriegel, 1970:390). Thus, we are not dealing with purely professional status concerns as discussed in the professionalization thesis. The above findings suggest that dissatisfaction with the traditional union concerns of salary, security and benefits may well be a significant contributor to attitudinal militancy among teachers.

Beyond examining the relationship between satisfaction and the support of teacher strikes, Hellriegel investigates the claim that militancy is the result of a drive for professionalism among teachers. Specifically, it is found that there is a weak but significant correlation between holding a professional role orientation and support for teacher strikes among males but no correlation for females. Professionalism is not found to be incompatible with strike support, but there is
Table 4. Degree of Correlation in Descending Order between Satisfaction Factors and Support of Teacher Strikes by Respondent Teachers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfaction Factors</th>
<th>Correlation between Support of Teacher Strikes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teacher salary</td>
<td>-.3639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher status</td>
<td>-.3073*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall satisfaction</td>
<td>-.2702*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community support of education</td>
<td>-.1903*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum issues</td>
<td>-.1898*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher load</td>
<td>-.1661*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School facilities and services</td>
<td>-.1663*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher rapport with principal</td>
<td>-.1614*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with teaching</td>
<td>-.1052*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community pressures</td>
<td>-.1009†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapport among teachers</td>
<td>-.0689†</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * indicates correlation significant at .001 level or better. † indicates correlation significant at .05 level or better.

From Hellriegel, 1970:393.
no strong evidence that professionalism underlies militancy.

Other factors which are found to be associated with strike support are sex, age and organizational affiliation. Support for strikes is greater among male teachers, younger teachers and teachers who are members of the AFT.

The fact that males are found to show a higher mean level of support for strikes is consistent with our previous discussion of economic deprivation - males are more likely to experience relative deprivation over economic rewards than are females; and males are, therefore, more likely to support militant action. Younger teachers may show greater support for strikes in that the political climate in which they have grown up has been more favorable to militancy while older teachers not only retain attitudes learned in a less politically favorable climate but are more likely to have reaped benefits from non-militant behavior in the past. Finally, the greater militancy of AFT members is consistent with the fact that the AFT has been more supportive of militant actions than has the NEA.

A second study (Fox and Wince, 1976) which bears indirectly on the relationship of economic deprivation and militancy is based on a survey of 499 public school teachers in a midwestern city of the United States. Drawing on previous theory and research, ten attributes of teachers were identified as potential determinants of teacher militancy and examined in relation to a measure of militancy derived from fifteen questionnaire items regarding actual participation in, and attitudes toward, participation in militant action. Six of the ten potential
determinants were viewed as independent variables: sex, age, ethnicity, religious preference, father's occupation, and family unionism. The remaining four variables - grade level taught, graduate study (whether or not a Master's degree is held), unionism (the teacher's attitude toward unions), and class identification were viewed as intervening variables.

Assuming that relative economic deprivation is likely to be greatest for males, we would expect sex to explain a greater amount of the variance in militancy than the other potential determinants. On the other hand, if the professionalization thesis has merit it might be expected that those teachers with higher levels of training would be among the most militant. Here graduate study would be expected to contribute to explaining variance in militancy. Finally, to the extent that family background characteristics are related to militancy, it may be that increasing levels of teacher militancy are the result of changes in the characteristics of persons entering the occupation.

Using a method similar to multiple regression analysis with dummy variables (i.e., Multiple Classification Analysis), the investigators find sex and age to be most strongly related to militancy and that these variables "... also account for almost the entire variance in militancy explained by all six antecedent variables" (Fox and Wince, 1976:57). Once again males are found to be more prone to militancy than are females and militancy is inversely related to age. One qualification must be made. In the relationship between age and militancy "... a significant departure from monotonicity occurs among
the very youngest teachers." The low levels of militancy among the
youngest teachers may well be a function of their job insecurity.
Young teachers are likely to be new teachers on probationary contracts
who can be dismissed with relative ease for "misbehavior".

While the results appear to lend more support to the view that
relative economic deprivation is more likely to underlie militancy than
is a motivation to obtain professional status, there is a second issue
which is stressed by the authors. This is the fact that they find
little support for the view that increases in teacher militancy are the
result of persons with backgrounds predisposing them to militancy
entering the occupation. Teachers who come from pro-union families or
whose fathers were in blue-collar occupations show no special tendency
to militancy. Before we accept this conclusion, however, it must be
noted that the teacher group from which the sample was drawn were
reported to have been involved in a strike six months prior to the
survey.

Quite possibly the strike itself effected a change in the
militancy of the teachers. Indeed, one would expect that, since the
strike is reported to have been well supported, many relatively non-
militant teachers were drawn into the fray and afterwards developed
more militant orientations if for no other reason than to avoid
cognitive dissonance. Thus, it could be that the initial move to
militancy was actually brought about by persons with predisposing
backgrounds but that their visibility in the survey is obscured by
their own success in winning converts. As a result, we cannot reject.
the possibility that a change in the background characteristics of teachers may have had a significant impact on the development of teacher militancy.

A third study by Nagi and Pugh (1973) provides some additional information bearing on the view that economic deprivation underlies militancy. Starting with the hypothesis that militancy derives from status inconsistency and the assumption that membership in the AFT is indicative of militancy, while membership in the NEA reflects a less militant outlook, the authors surveyed 300 high school teachers in Toledo, Ohio. Respondents were asked a series of questions to measure their satisfaction with teachers' prestige and teachers' salaries. Contrary to the authors' expectations, teachers who were low-status "consistents" (i.e., dissatisfied with both the prestige and economic rewards of teaching) were more likely to be members of the AFT than were either status inconsistents or high-status "consistents". However, it is noteworthy that status consistents who were dissatisfied with economic rewards (but satisfied with prestige) were more likely to join the AFT than were status inconsistents who were dissatisfied with prestige but satisfied with economic rewards. Thus, Nagi and Pugh conclude that "The data gave some support to our earlier expectation that dissatisfaction with economic remuneration is a greater motivation force for joining the union type organization..." (Nagi and Pugh, 1973:369).

Taken as a whole, the studies discussed in this section are of limited utility in helping us to understand the development of teacher
militancy. Three characteristics of the studies are primarily responsible for this limited utility. The first has to do with the way in which militancy is measured. With the exception of Corwin's study, all of those cited rely heavily on attitudes or organizational affiliation rather than behavior to measure militancy. That there may be a significant gap between words and deeds is highly probable in the case of militancy where acting on one's words may bring significant discomfort. Second, the studies do not provide convincing evidence of the temporal priority of their independent variables because they rely on survey data from one point in time. This is especially problematic when the study posits a causal link between some form of discontent and militancy. One of the key activities of unions and of militant leaders is to stir up discontent by making deprivations visible to the rank-and-file. Thus, it may be that an individual's discontent is a function of the mobilizing activities of leadership rather than a direct function of being in objectively depriving circumstances. Teachers who may be objectively deprived may not feel deprivation until it is pointed out to them. From this perspective, what the studies indicate are the types of dissatisfaction leaders have been successful in eliciting. This is useful information, but there is still no clear understanding of the dynamic interplay between discontent and leadership.

Further, in the case of professionalization studies, it may not even be that leaders have been successful in stimulating subjective dissatisfaction in teachers who are in objectively professionally-frustrating situations. Rather, it may be that they have been more
successful in spreading an ideology which provides a more publicly acceptable justification of militancy.

The third characteristic that limits the utility of these studies is their tendency to ignore or minimize extra-individual factors such as leadership in favor of some form of discontent as influences on individual militancy.10 As Hellriegel points out, "Studies have shown for years teachers were expressing dissatisfaction with their salary and their social status among other factors. But nothing happened!" (Hellriegel, 1970:396). When something did happen, it was not a uniform blooming of militancy across all teacher groups. There are differences in teacher militancy between states, between provinces, between school systems and, indeed, between individual schools which are difficult to understand on the basis of teacher discontent alone. Further, there are substantial numbers of teachers whose participation in militant activities cannot be accounted for in terms of their personal characteristics or their reported discontent.

In order to come to a more complete understanding of the conditions which lead to militant action both by collectivities and the individuals that comprise them it is necessary to examine extra-individual factors. In the next section, we will briefly discuss several studies which view militancy as an organizational attribute in

10. In support of the importance of examining extra-individual factors, Alutto and Belasco find that organizational factors "... may well be among the most effective predictors of attitudinal militancy among members of professional and semi-professional occupations." (Alutto and Belasco, 1974:225-6).
an attempt to identify extra-individual factors which may influence the development of teacher militancy.

III. STUDIES OF MILITANCY AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRIBUTE

In what follows, I will review the work of Coates (1972), Rosenthal (1969) and Cole (1969) with the hope of developing insight into the variables which play a role in teacher groups becoming militant.

Teachers' Unions and Interest Group Politics (1972). In this study of the organizational behavior of teachers' unions in England, Coates claims to present a theoretical framework for explaining interest group behavior which applies to groups beyond those he studied. It is this theoretical framework which is of interest at present.

Coates views interest group behavior as having two main components: strategies and tactics. According to Coates, "... strategy involves the choice of a power centre to be lobbied, and tactics are understood to be the means adopted to lobby the power centre chosen" (Coates, 1972:113). Coates argues that previous attempts to explain interest group behavior suffer from having too narrow a focus. Previous studies view interest group behavior as either determined by "environmental" factors (mainly the actions of authorities) or by organizational characteristics of the group itself. Coates' framework combines both sets of factors. Interest group
behavior is a product of both environmental factors and organizational characteristics of the group.

Four environmental factors are presented in the model: (1) the structure or the distribution of power among governmental authorities, (2) the politics of governmental authorities, (3) the accessibility of authorities, and (4) the pattern of other interest group activity. Complementing these four environmental factors are three organizational characteristics which are said to have an important influence on organizational behavior. These characteristics are organizational goals, leadership, and characteristics of the membership (Coates mentions size, occupational position, qualifications and training, and attitudes toward militancy). Presumably a group's goals relate to whether it will conflict or cooperate with other groups and authorities. Further, organizational goals determine what policies will activate groups and who will be lobbied. Leadership is seen to play an independent role in the formulation of strategies and tactics, as well as in the formulation of organizational goals; but it is constrained in these realms by characteristics of the membership.

Pedagogues and Power (1969). Rosenthal's study is an attempt to explain variations in the organizational influence of teachers' groups in four large American cities. Again, it is the theoretical framework rather than the substantive findings with which we will be concerned. Little needs to be said beyond Rosenthal's own brief statement of his framework:

The concepts I have developed and explored in this study of teachers' groups in school politics posit the importance of four
categories of interdependent variables: first, organizational strength, based largely on a group's internal characteristics; second, organizational opportunities, shaped mainly by the practices of public school government, and the dispositions of public school teachers; third, organizational behavior, determined primarily by strength and opportunities; and fourth, organizational influence, related to the combination of factors mentioned above (Rosenthal, 1969:1x).

Under the heading of organizational strength, Rosenthal concerns himself with the size of groups' memberships and the militant attitudes of leaders. Legislation, community political climates, the attitudes of authorities and of rank-and-file members of teachers' groups are discussed as affecting the attitudes of teacher leaders and their ability to convert their attitudes into organizational behavior.

The Unionization of Teachers (1969). Cole's work differs from the work of the previous two authors in that he is less concerned with accounting for organizational behavior than with explaining the unionization of New York teachers and the participation of teachers in militant action. Despite this divergence, Cole's theoretical framework shows a strong resemblance to the previous two approaches.

Cole views the unionization of teachers as equivalent to the development of a social movement. In order to understand the success of such a social movement, Cole suggests that we must study four conditions: (1) dissatisfaction, (2) channelling of dissatisfaction into an active movement: ideology and leadership, (3) rank-and-file predisposition, and (4) social control. Presumably these same factors, conditions, variables, or whatever we decide to call them, can be assumed to be relevant to the explanation of the development of militancy within existing non-militant organizations as well as to the
explanation of the emergence of a new militant organization.

Dissatisfaction is seen as a necessary condition for a militant social movement to emerge. In Cole's analysis of New York teachers, dissatisfaction was seen to be the result of increases in relative deprivation. According to Cole, dissatisfied teachers need militant leaders and a militant ideology to focus their energies on, as he puts it, to channel dissatisfaction into militant action. In discussing rank-and-file predisposition, Cole's argument is that dissatisfied teachers are unlikely to respond to the ideological urgings of militant leaders unless they have been previously socialized to view militant action favorably. Finally, Cole points out that the success of any militant movement is, by definition, a failure of social control. Thus the actions of educational authorities loom large in the analysis.

Taken as a whole, the above studies suggest that a group's strategies and tactics (and hence militancy) are a function of the actions of authorities and other groups, the characteristics of the group's leadership and various characteristics of the membership (e.g., dissatisfaction and receptivity to various strategies and tactics). That group leadership is influenced by the characteristics of the membership and leadership and by the actions of authorities and other groups is hardly an earthshaking suggestion. This literature would be more useful to us if it specified the relationships among the above factors and provided some empirical support for them. Unfortunately, the studies are very limited in what they can tell us about the effects of the above factors upon one another and upon militancy.
Rosenthal's cross-sectional study of the behavior of four teacher organizations lacks the longitudinal data necessary to analyze the interaction of factors in the development of militant organizations and also suffers from the fact that attitudes of teacher leaders are used to measure militancy. On the other hand, longitudinal studies such as those of Cole (1969) and Noone (1970) tend to focus on the development of militancy within a single teacher group. Thus they lack even quasi-control groups to help sort out spurious relationships; or, as in the case of Cole's study of the unionization of New York teachers, they focus most of their analytic work on the discussion of the impact of organizational factors on individual teacher's militancy.

The present study aims to fill a gap in the literature by means of a comparative, longitudinal investigation of four local teacher groups. By covering a period of approximately six years we hope to be able to illuminate the interaction among the factors involved in the development of militant groups. Second, by examining four groups which vary in their propensity to utilize coercive action we may be able to use one group as a control group relative to another to eliminate spurious relationships. Finally, by focusing on the actions of collectivities rather than the attitudes or behavior of individuals we hope to provide a missing chapter in the study of teacher militancy. However, before we begin this work we need to develop a more refined framework for analysis than is provided by the existing literature. This will be the goal of the next chapter.
Chapter III

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

While there is now a fair body of literature on teacher militancy, the literature review has revealed little by way of theory or research which can directly assist us in understanding the processes and factors which inhibit or enhance the development of collective militancy in teacher groups. Literature on the general rise of militancy, while useful for identifying societal changes which have influenced teacher groups, fails to deal with factors which may either mute or intensify the impact of broad societal changes on local groups. Hence it fails to provide much help in accounting for variation in militancy among groups of teachers. The studies of individual teachers’ militancy tend to make the assumption that militancy is a direct result of teachers experiencing one form or another of discontent. These "individual" studies often measure attitudes rather than behavior, and they also ignore the fact that participation in collective coercive action is only one of the many potential responses to individually experienced frustration. Despite their limitations, however, studies of individual teacher’s militancy do at least provide some hints as to sources of teacher discontent - discontent which might be channelled into militant action. Finally, the literature on militancy as an organizational attribute suggests that leadership, the compositional characteristics of the group, and actions of authorities play
important roles in the development of militant teacher groups.

In sum, the existing literature suggests some possibly relevant factors in the development of militant teacher groups but fails to provide a very systematic or precise theoretical framework for structuring our investigation. In order to fill this void and provide some semblance of order to our investigation, I have chosen to follow the example of Cole (1969) and the suggestion of Weller and Quarentelli (1975) and analyze the development of teacher militancy from a social movements perspective.

Students of social movements are concerned with the emergence of new collectivities and new forms of collective action aimed at bringing about or resisting social change. While the teacher groups we will be examining are not new, in the sense of never having existed before, they are new in the sense of having developed strikingly new patterns of action. Further, our militant teacher groups can be seen to be consciously attempting to bring about social change. They are intentionally striving to bring about a redistribution of power in the educational system.

What does it mean to say that the development of teacher militancy will be analyzed from a social movements perspective? It means, basically, that we will assume the key factors influencing the development of teacher militancy are similar to those influencing the development of social movements.

Students of social movements generally recognize a common set of factors as affecting the emergence of social movements and the shape
they take. First, it is generally accepted that some degree of shared discontent is necessary for a movement to emerge. Second, the quality of leaders and their mobilizing efforts (including the creation and propagation of the movement's ideology) are seen to be important for focusing, fueling and fomenting discontent as well as for providing solidarity. Third, the degree of social organization that exists among potential members of a movement can enhance or hinder the chances of a movement starting. Even if discontent is high, people are unlikely to form a social movement unless they are somehow linked into a social network. Fourth, the amount and type of resources (money, time, manpower, etc.) a movement's leaders have to draw on affects their success in mobilizing potential joiners and the tactics that will be utilized in pursuing the movement's objectives. Fifth, most students of social movements feel that social control is a factor to be analyzed because the emergence of a social movement can be seen to be the result of a failure of social control.

The above list of factors serves only to provide points of orientation in our exploration of teacher militancy. In order to obtain a more detailed conceptual map to guide our journey it is necessary to fill out the general framework with more detailed information available in the social movements literature and merge the result with the literature on teacher militancy. To this end each of the general factors in our framework will be discussed in more detail below.
I. DISCONTENT

The social movements literature leads us to expect that teacher militancy is most likely to emerge when there is a significant increase in teacher discontent. The problem with this formulation and others like it is that it is often difficult to obtain a measure of discontent which is independent of the phenomenon to be explained. Most students of social movements attempt to solve this problem by making assumptions about the conditions which give rise to discontent and then investigating whether those conditions are associated with the rise of the social movement in question. Usually it is assumed that discontent is a consequence of some form of relative deprivation. From the perspective of relative deprivation, individuals are likely to feel discontent when their actual situation fails to measure up to their expectations on some specified dimensions. For example, a poor person who expects to remain poor is thought to be less discontent than a middle income person who expects to be rich.

In order to determine whether a particular group is likely to be experiencing discontent, we first need to know the content of expectations. By content of expectations we refer to the rewards and costs individuals expect to accrue to them in a given situation. For example, in a work setting rewards might include such diverse things as wages, job security, status, autonomy or pleasant social relations with other workers. Costs might include such things as opportunities foregone by taking the job, the sheer energy consumed in work, and boredom.
Once the group's expectations have been identified, the problem becomes one of measuring the gap between the actual situation and expectations. Here it is the measurement of expectations which is usually most problematic. There are at least two general propositions which are useful for determining the level of a group's expectations. First, it can be hypothesized that people expect their outcomes in the present situation to be as "good" as outcomes they have experienced in the past. If a group of workers, has, for example, been used to getting salary increases which match the rise in the cost of living, then the failure to obtain such an increase could be expected to arouse significant discontent. Second, it can be hypothesized that people expect to receive outcomes similar to those of others they see to be like themselves in some way.

Of the two propositions, the second is the most problematic for retrospective studies of social movements. Unless data can be obtained on the comparisons the group in question actually made, investigators are forced to make assumptions about comparison choices. The accuracy of these assumptions can greatly affect the validity of assessments of discontent. For example, if we assume female school teachers compare themselves with other working women who hold similar academic qualifications, they are likely to find themselves at an advantage with regard to economic benefits, conditions of work, vacation periods and so on. However, if they compare themselves with workers of similar educational qualifications regardless of sex, the gap between expectations and actuality may be large in the direction of generating discontent.
Having engaged in a relatively abstract discussion of discontent, what can we develop from that discussion by way of guidelines for the study of teacher militancy? Because we lack adequate direct measures of discontent for our four groups of teachers we will be forced to investigate conditions which can be assumed to be associated with discontent. In order to follow this approach, we must, as we just noted, deal with the problem of specifying the content and level of teachers' expectations. For this purpose we must return to the literature on teacher militancy. Most students of teacher militancy see increases in teacher discontent as contributing to militancy. Further, the explanations offered of teacher discontent fit easily into our model of discontent as the product of gaps between expectations and actualities.

A. Professional Deprivation.

One of the most popular hypotheses concerning teacher discontent and militancy which we have reviewed has its roots in organizational theory. Here it is suggested that professional norms conflict with bureaucratic styles of organization and that this conflict leads to dissatisfaction on the part of professionals. Corwin, Fris and Hennessy, among others, feel that teachers' militancy can be understood as a result of frustrated aspirations for professional status and, more particularly, professional control over the workplace. With increased levels of education, teachers are thought to compare themselves with other professionals and to value the autonomy other professionals
enjoy. These aspirations conflict with the desires of educational authorities to maintain their control over the educational system as well as with rules and procedures which have been developed to run the school system effectively.

B. Teacher Alienation.

Martel (1974) and Brenton (1970) see teacher discontent arising out of alienation. This perspective is similar to that of professional deprivation in that control over work is viewed as one of the most salient outcomes for teachers. However, the process by which gaps between expected control and actual control come about differ. Those who hold the alienation perspective tend to emphasize a decrease in teachers' control in comparison to their past control rather than a rise in expectations as bringing about the gap. Here increases in educational qualifications only accentuate the loss.

- The alienation thesis goes beyond the professionalization thesis in its emphasis on the dehumanizing effects of mass education. Personal contact and personal control (as opposed to professional control) are seen as salient rewards for teachers. Secondary teachers in particular are seen to suffer from a loss of personal contact with their peers and superiors due to the increased size of schools and school systems.

C. Economic Deprivation.

Whether or not they hold the professional deprivation hypothesis
or the alienation hypothesis, most students of teacher militancy would agree that expectations for monetary benefits have played an important part in generating teacher discontent and teacher militancy.

One of the recurrent hypotheses which attempts to account for teacher discontent via economic deprivation suggests that increases in the number of male teachers have spurred increases in discontent. The argument is simply that male teachers tend to compare their economic outcomes with those of other males with similar educational qualifications and that such comparisons tend to uncover discontent-generating gaps. Similar comparisons for females are thought to have less dissatisfying results.

D. Blocked Mobility.

For men, teaching has often been a means to another occupational end. Teaching has often been viewed as a stepping stone to an administrative position or to a career outside education. More generally, Giddens (1973), has suggested that white collar militancy can often be the result of blocked vertical mobility. In the case of teachers, there appear to be ideal conditions for gaps to occur between expected and actual mobility. The rapid expansion of education during the fifties and sixties, in addition to a fairly open job market for those with a high school or university education, can be seen to have established high expectations for mobility on the part of male teachers. The more recent decline in job opportunities along with a curtailment of the growth of the educational system has, however,
resulted in a real decline in actual opportunities for mobility in comparison to past opportunities.

Changes in the opportunities for horizontal mobility may also have an impact on teacher discontent. As Becker (1952) pointed out long ago, one of the main desires of career teachers is to be placed in a "good" school. We would therefore expect shifts in opportunities for horizontal mobility to be associated with shifts in the aggregate level of discontent among teachers regardless of their sex.

E. Vulnerability to External Pressure.

Where the professional deprivation and alienation theses paint a picture of teachers struggling to gain power in order to realize their own potential (some say to self-actualize), Marcus (1973) posits the ironic hypothesis that teachers are attempting to change the educational power structure in order to prevent change in education. Teachers have traditionally been stereotyped as security-seeking, non-innovative and dull. What teachers have been seen to value is security and routine work. From this perspective, the call for teacher autonomy is not a call for the opportunity to innovate, but the opportunity to continue to do what has been done in the past without outside interference. The assumption with respect to teacher discontent is that the security and stability of teaching jobs has decreased in recent years creating a disconcerting gap between expectations and reality.

If increases in teacher discontent underlie the development of
militant teacher groups, then our teacher groups should have experienced conditions conducive to increases in discontent prior to their engaging in militant action. If discontent is the main factor in bringing about militancy, we would also expect variations in the militancy of our groups to be related to variations in discontent. Based on the foregoing discussion, we can now list some of the conditions which are expected to precede militancy.

1. Decreases in the rate of vertical mobility.
2. Decreases in the rate of horizontal mobility.
3. Decreases in teachers' classroom autonomy.
4. Increases in the impersonality of social relations.
5. Increases in the demands for change in the teachers' role performance from outside agencies.
6. Increases in teachers' desire for professional control of educational decision-making.
7. Increases in economic deprivation.

While an attempt will be made to examine all seven possible discontent circumstances, the most detailed analysis will be focused on relative economic deprivation. The reasons for this are fairly simple. The existing literature is seen to be most supportive of the view that discontent borne of economic deprivation plays a major role in teacher militancy. In addition, economic outcomes are more likely to be of salience to all teachers than are other outcomes, and discontent generated by economic deprivation is thus more likely to provide a
solid base on which to build collective action. Finally, economic issues are key issues in all board-teacher negotiations that our groups have been involved in and are therefore more likely to be the focal point of militancy.

II. LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY

It is difficult to make very precise theoretical statements relating leaders' actions and/or the content of ideology to the development of social movements because specific circumstances determine what actions by leaders will be effective and what ideological statements will "reach home". At best, one can describe the role that leadership and ideology can play in the emergence of a social movement and discuss some of the broad parameters which may influence the effectiveness of leadership and ideology.

A. Leadership.

In the initial stages of a movement, leaders are essential to focus and articulate discontent. They play an important role in translating individual discontent into a collective problem. Through the propagation of an ideology they may not only focus existing discontent but create new discontent. Whether or not there are individuals who are willing and able to play these roles for a group is a key factor affecting whether or not a social movement will occur. It has often been suggested, for example, that one of the reasons that extremely
deprived groups fail to mobilize is that they lack capable leadership.

Even when willing and capable leaders are available, their effectiveness in the initial stages of mobilization will be affected by a number of factors. At a minimum, if leaders are to be effective they must be heard. Anything which impedes the flow of communication from leaders to potential converts reduces the likelihood of a social movement. Analysis of mobilization thus requires particular attention to leaders' access to and use of communications channels.

Once a movement has started to germinate, leadership is needed to develop strategies and tactics, coordinate actions and to foster group solidarity. At this stage the success of a social movement may hinge on solving the problem of authority. Clark, et al. (1975:15) point out that "... most social movements are frustrated by a chicken-and-egg problem: leaders are needed to develop an authority structure, but leaders will not be obeyed until an authority structure evolves."

One way of solving this problem that has been cited repeatedly in the literature is to "... borrow authority structures from existing institutions, using leaders who have already established a base for their authority" (Clark, et al., 1975:15). For example, both the Social Credit movement in Alberta and the CCF in Saskatchewan can be seen to have been built upon pre-existing organizations and to have made use of leaders who had authority in those organizations.

A second way in which this problem can be solved is by the availability of a charismatic leader. Here authority is a function of the personal qualities of the leader alone. Charismatic leaders such
as Jesus, Hitler or Gandhi are seen to have special qualities and powers that elicit obedience in and of themselves.

Ultimately the success of leaders is affected by all the factors which affect the movement as a whole. There is, however, one attribute of leadership which deserves special mention. This is the degree to which leadership is united. Especially in cases such as ours where we are dealing with the transformation of existing organizations, there is a possibility that would-be leaders of social movements will have to do battle with counter-leaders. To the extent to which such counter-leadership maintains some degree of support, social movements will be less likely to emerge and less likely to persist for very long if they do emerge.

The above discussion of mobilization and leadership in social movements suggests that to understand variations in teacher militancy we must examine: (1) the availability of willing and able leaders, (2) communications channels available to militant leaders, (3) the availability and amenability of existing authority structures to potential leaders of teacher militancy, (4) the cohesiveness of teacher leadership and (5) the specific actions of leaders in building and shaping the teacher movement.

Because the existing literature contains relatively few longitudinal studies of teacher militancy and because those that have taken a longitudinal view have been carried out in the United States, there is really very little in this literature to help us in developing specific guidelines for the study of the role of leadership in the
development of local teacher militancy in Ontario.

In the United States support to militant leaders was available from the AFL-CIO. Even if willing leaders lacked developed leadership and organizing skills, they could rely on the union movement to aid them in developing these talents. Once the American Federation of Teachers in the United States won the right to negotiate for teachers in a school district there was also little problem of unity within the leadership. Non-militant leaders in the National Education Association were effectively cut off from formal power and had little access to information with which to counter the maneuvers of the AFT leadership. In contrast, Ontario teacher leaders have not had direct union support to draw on in developing teacher militancy. Further, because of the nature of the legislation governing Ontario teachers, it was not possible for militant leaders to rid themselves of "hold-me-back" counter-leaders by forming a new organization and getting it voted in to represent all teachers in negotiations. Rather than creating new organizations, militant Ontario teacher leaders were faced with transforming old ones.

8. Ideology

Ideology functions to provide potential members of a social movement with a common focus for discontent and with shared perceptions of how this discontent can be remedied. Without the common definition of the situation afforded by an ideology it would appear extremely unlikely that a social movement will occur. Whether or not an ideology
will be successful in providing a common definition of the situation undoubtedly depends on a large number of factors. Generally, however, we will posit that the success of an ideology depends heavily on its credibility. Credibility in turn is seen to be a function of the fit of the content of the ideology with the real life experiences and values of potential members of the movement, and the falsifiability of the ideology.

Any ideology is more likely to be accepted by an individual if it articulates and makes sense of situations s/he has actually experienced in a language which s/he understands. Clearly the success of a leader's efforts to develop a credible ideology also depends on the degree to which the group s/he is trying to mobilize actually shares common experiences and common discontents.

Finally, an ideology is more likely to be credible to the extent that it cannot be falsified by events. The ideal ideology can always be corroborated by events but never falsified by them. A movement which predicts the end of the world on a particular date is likely to be predicting the date of its own demise.

We expect some form of ideology to be associated with militancy. To the extent that a militant ideology develops within a teacher group we will expect it to build upon widely-shared experienced discontents of teachers and to make references to some values and beliefs which historically have been espoused within the educational system.
III. ORGANIZATION AND SOLIDARITY OF THE GROUP

While all students of social movements would agree that some degree of social organization and solidarity must be built up for a social movement to occur and persist, there is disagreement regarding the importance of pre-existing social networks among the potential movement members. Still reeling from the shocking rise of Hitler and reacting to rapid economic growth and social change, many post-war American writers began to reiterate de Tocqueville's fear that extreme stress on equality would trample individual liberty. Others, drawing on Durkheim, saw the specter of anomie flowing across the American landscape. The problem for writers of this period was not how to bring about social movements but rather how to prevent them. Mass society theory provided the answer to this problem in group membership. Multiple membership in primary and secondary groups was seen to integrate individuals into society and at the same time serve as a prophylactic against either a tyranny of the masses or a demagoguery of the elite. From this perspective, social movements were most likely to appeal to the unorganized marginal men of society. However, the fact that they lacked previous significant social ties was not seen to hinder their being forged into a highly organized social movement nor to lead them to have difficulty in submitting to the authority of social movements. Quite the contrary, the unintegrated were posited to have a desperate need for belonging - for a meaningful social identity. Numerous books published in the post-war period stressed man's
willingness to sacrifice his autonomy for the sake of a stable identity. Nisbet (1953), Fromm (1941), Riesman (1950) and Whyte (1956) wrote of lonely crowds of men questing for community and escaping freedom by becoming other-directed organization men, while Will Herberg (1960) attributed increase in religious affiliation to man's need for belonging.

In contrast, Pinard (1971), Lipset (1950), Coleman (1957) and others turn mass society theory on its head by pointing out that primary and secondary groups can actually serve to mobilize participation in a social movement. Pinard (1971:191) stresses that "... conformist secondary groups, under severe strains, can develop some degree of alienation, oppose certain aspects of the status quo and, if no other alternatives are opened, adapt a neutral or even positive orientation to a new movement." Put another way, groups are no more inherently conservative than are individuals. Under duress and faced with little hope of alleviating it, groups and individuals may be supportive of new and unconventional methods of obtaining relief.

Indeed, Pinard's study of the rise of the Social Credit party in Quebec, Lipset's study of the CCF, Irving's (1975) study of the Social Credit movement in Alberta and Coleman's analysis of community conflicts all point to the important contribution pre-existing social organization can make in the development of new change-oriented collectivities. Where a movement can build upon a pre-existing social network, problems of communication and authority may be significantly reduced. In analyzing our teacher groups it will, therefore, be
important to examine the degree to which teachers were integrated in a
social network prior to the emergence of militancy as well as the
receptivity of pre-existing networks to militancy.

To some extent, the contrast between mass society theorists and
others is overdrawn. The main thrust of the mass society theorists and
their pluralist cousins is that cross-cutting group memberships - not
membership itself - reduce the likelihood that individuals will join a
social movement. When an individual belongs to several different
groups which differ from one another in the characteristics of their
members and in their interests, s/he may find it difficult to support
any single group's attempt to bring about radical change. For example,
an inside postal worker who is a member of a strongly anti-union
kinship group is likely to find making the decision to support a strike
very difficult. Of course, the strength of commitment is important
here. Individuals are unlikely to be restrained from joining in a
social movement if their cross-cutting memberships carry little
psychological weight.

Where memberships coincide (i.e., when the same set of
individuals are the main constituents of a number of groups), mass
society theorists and pluralists are likely to agree with Pinard and
his compatriots that pre-existing membership groups can be a contribut-
ing factor in the genesis of a social movement.

What does all of this suggest for our study of teacher militancy?
Basically, it implies that we must look for and examine the groups
teachers are likely to be involved in. For example, it is important
that Ontario elementary teachers are members of two separate formal organizations. Beyond this, some "teachers" are members of principals' associations which may have interests contrary to those of classroom teachers. Teachers' feelings of membership in the community in which they teach can also be hypothesized to play a restraining role in relation to militancy. These and other possible cross-cutting or coinciding memberships will be the focus of significant attention in later chapters.

IV. RESOURCES

At the risk of taking an overly rationalistic view of man, we will assume that whether or not a social movement will emerge depends at least in part on potential participants' estimation of the likelihood of the movement achieving its aims. We also assume that the choice of tactics to be employed is heavily influenced by perceptions of the probability of success.

Group resources are one general factor which is likely to have a significant influence on estimates of the probability of success. What constitutes resources depends somewhat on the specific situation being faced by a movement. However, resources which are likely to be relevant to any social movement include money, time, the size of the group, knowledge and allies. It is assumed that analysis of all of these resources is useful for understanding variations in the militancy of our local groups. We expect that variations in the amount of
that Ontario elementary teachers are members of two separate formal organizations. Beyond this, some "teachers" are members of principals' associations which may have interests contrary to those of classroom teachers. Teachers' feelings of membership in the community in which they teach can also be hypothesized to play a restraining role in relation to militancy. These and other possible cross-cutting or coinciding memberships will be the focus of significant attention in later chapters.

IV. RESOURCES

At the risk of taking an overly rationalistic view of man, we will assume that whether or not a social movement will emerge depends at least in part on potential participants' estimation of the likelihood of the movement achieving its aims. We also assume that the choice of tactics to be employed is heavily influenced by perceptions of the probability of success.

Group resources are one general factor which is likely to have a significant influence on estimates of the probability of success. What constitutes resources depends somewhat on the specific situation being faced by a movement. However, resources which are likely to be relevant to any social movement include money, time, the size of the group, knowledge and allies. It is assumed that analysis of all of these resources is useful for understanding variations in the militancy of our local groups. We expect that variations in the amount of
resources may be related to variations in militancy between our groups and that increases in resources may help to stimulate militant action. Leaders' knowledge or access to knowledge of mobilizing tactics and negotiating methods clearly plays a role in militancy. To the extent that militant leaders appear knowledgeable, the troops are more likely to support them and the more effective leaders will be in creating support.

While less important in directly influencing the rank-and-file's perception of probable success, time is a critical resource to leadership. Time is needed to develop strategies and tactics and above all to work on mobilizing the troops. Here teachers can get caught in a "Catch 22" situation. The best time to contact teachers collectively is in the work setting. If leaders are classroom teachers they are, however, unlikely to have discretionary time available to contact other teachers during working hours. This is especially true for elementary teachers. Within our teacher groups those with the greatest amount of discretionary time are persons who have been rewarded with positions of responsibility (e.g., principalships, vice-principalships, etc.). As we saw in Hennessy's and Fris' studies, however, persons who have achieved positions of responsibility or who have received other rewards are not likely to hold militant orientations.

Both the size of the group and the monetary resources available to it clearly place limits on the effectiveness of militant action. Strikes, demonstrations or even campaigns to unseat antagonistic trustees are likely to require manpower and money to be effective.
All the above resources can be enhanced through the contributions of allies. Most important among the potential allies of our local teacher groups are their provincial federations. Consequently we will have to pay close attention to the role the provincial federations play in supporting our local groups in negotiations.

V. SOCIAL CONTROL

As has been suggested, the rise of a social movement can be seen in part to be due to a failure of social control. The actions of authorities can be seen to influence each of the other factors which have been identified as salient in the analysis of social movements.

A. Social Control and Discontent

While the discontent underlying social movements is often seen to stem from broad structural changes, the specific actions of authorities can often be seen to play an important role in generating discontent. For example, the decision to end military deferments for college students in the United States may have contributed to student unrest during the Vietnam conflict.

Perhaps the best that can be culled from the teacher militancy literature regarding the general influence of educational authorities on teacher discontent is that decisions to adopt bureaucratic administrative patterns have contributed to teacher dissatisfaction.
If we focus on Ontario teachers, however, more specific statements are possible. Various observers of the Ontario educational scene have suggested that the Minister of Education's decisions to create large school systems in 1968 and to place ceilings on boards' educational spending in 1971 served to heighten teachers' feelings of alienation and economic deprivation. On the local scene, a variety of day-to-day actions by trustees and administrators may serve to intensify and/or create teacher discontent. At a minimum, the behavior of the board in carrying out negotiations can be an important factor in either raising or lowering the tide of teacher discontent and thus must be considered in our analysis.

B. Social Control and Mobilization

Gamson's (1968) discussion of social control is useful for identifying the tactics authorities may use to counter or prevent attempts by subordinate groups to mobilize. Gamson is not, however, concerned with the development of social movements per se. His concern is with understanding the relationships between authorities and subordinates (potential partisans in his terminology) which occur in any social system. In the section of his work which we are drawing upon, his primary aim is to examine the ways authorities can prevent subordinates from "... trying to change the nature of decisions, the authorities, or the political system within which decisions are made." (1968:111). This definition of the problem would seem broad enough to incorporate the actions of authorities to counter the mobilization of a social movement.
Three general ways in which authorities can attempt to counter or prevent subordinate group mobilization are identified by Gamson:

They can (1) regulate the access of potential partisans to resources and their ability to bring these resources to bear on decision makers, (2) they can affect the situation of potential partisans by making rewards or punishments contingent on attempts at influence, or (3) they can change the desire of potential partisans to influence by altering their attitudes toward political objects (Gamson, 1968:116-7).

Gamson labels the first method "isolation." Here the key to success lies in keeping resources out of the hands of those who would use them to challenge authority. One way of doing this is simply to keep such persons out of the social system. Authorities in nation states, communities, and organizations all have some ability to control entry to their social systems. Where there is a high degree of control over entry, denial of entry to those who are likely to challenge authorities may be a useful means of preventing mobilization of subordinates. However, this tactic would seem to have significant limitations. It is not always evident who potential challengers are; and, secondly, conditions within social systems may generate discontent among those who were previously content. Should selective entry fail to prevent the development of challenges to authority, there remains the tactic of selective exit. Outspoken public servants who find themselves redundant or surplus know this method well.

Within any social system authorities can also attempt to prevent would-be challengers from having much success by limiting their access to information and blocking communication channels. Should isolation techniques prove insufficient, authorities can utilize methods of the
"carrot-and-stick" variety. Authorities can attempt to bring
challengers to bay through the application of negative sanctions while
encouraging docility by doling out rewards to the compliant.

The third general method of countering mobilization is labelled
"persuasion". Basically, this involves convincing subordinates that
compliance is in their own best interests. As Gamson points out,
however, attempts at persuasion depend on the trust subordinates have
in authorities. Where trust is low, attempts at persuasion are likely
to fall on deaf ears. What then determines the level of trust
subordinates have in authorities?

Gamson's discussion suggests at least two ways of gaining
subordinates' trust. The first is to surround authorities "... with
trappings of omniscience."

If the authorities are viewed as distant, awe-inspiring figures
of tremendous intelligence and prescience plus having access to
privileged information that is essential for forming judgements,
then the potential partisan may hesitate to challenge a decision
even when he feels adversely affected by it. (1968:126)

As an activist in the anti-war movement in the U.S., I recall having
run into the stone wall of omniscient authorities many times.
Repeatedly, potential converts would defend their docility by telling
me how much more the President and his advisors knew about the war than
I did.

The second approach to building a trust base for persuasion is
to reduce the social distance between authorities and subordinates.
Gamson says,
By personal contact and the 'humanization' of authorities, potential partisans may be encouraged to identify with them; this identification, in turn, produces a trust which makes influence appear less necessary. (1968:126).

A basis for trust beyond those suggested by Gamson lies in past experience with authorities. To the extent that subordinates have felt that their past treatment by authorities has been favorable they are likely to trust them in the future.

From this discussion it would appear that, for persuasion to be a viable mechanism of control, there must be continuity over time in the persons who fill authority positions. Awe or identification are likely to flow to people, not positions. Likewise, trust based on past experience is likely trust earned by the actions of particular individuals not by authority in itself. When one set of authorities is replaced by another they may well take a significant share of the power of persuasion with them, leaving new authorities the task of either rebuilding trust or utilizing alternative control mechanisms which do not require such a personal touch.

Shifts in authorities' use of control mechanisms can have important consequences for both trust and alienation of subordinate groups. Drawing on Etzioni's discussion of compliance in organizations, Gamson suggests that, where authorities shift from using persuasion to utilizing either of the other two general types of control, subordinates are likely to experience alienation and loss of trust vis-à-vis authorities.

The reason for bringing these points out in the discussion is that they have a great deal of relevance for our local teacher groups.
Significant turnover in authorities and concomitant shifts in control mechanisms can be found in the situations of several of our groups in the period to be investigated.

Gamson makes separate mention of two specific mechanisms of control: participation and cooptation. By increasing subordinates' participation in decision-making, authorities are seen to be working on the theory that participation "...in a decision process increases commitment and acceptance of decisions even if the outcomes are no more satisfactory" (Gamson, 1968:139). Cooptation, on the other hand, brings challengers inside the authority structure and in so doing makes them subject to a new set of control techniques. As Gamson puts it,

Representatives of the partisan group, once inside, are subject to the rewards and punishments that the organization bestows. They acquire a stake in the organization, having gained some control over resources whose continuation and expansion is dependent on the organization's maintenance and growth. New rewards lie ahead if they show themselves to be amenable to some degree of control; deprivation of rewards which they now enjoy becomes a new possibility if they remain unruly. (Gamson, 1968:135).

Both of the above techniques can backfire. Participation brings knowledge to use in challenging authorities and unimportant participation can bring greater discontent. Similarly, subjects of cooptation gain access to system resources which they can then use to promote subordinate group interests. Both of these techniques can be seen to have been utilized (although not necessarily with the conscious intent of exercising control) in the situations of our teachers' groups and will be the focus of discussion in later chapters.
C. Social Control and Organization

Many of the social control mechanisms just discussed can be wielded to hinder the organizational solidarity of a social movement. Clearly in preventing or hindering mobilization, authorities are preventing the development of organizational solidarity within subordinate groups. However, even once a movement has formed and developed some degree of internal structure, authorities may have an impact. Authorities can play up latent conflicts of interests within the subordinate group by offering special inducements for one set of interests at the expense of another. Further they can attempt to weaken organizational effectiveness of subordinate groups by cooptation of key leaders or blocking the groups' channels of communications.

D. Social Control and Resources

Apart from using techniques to limit challenging groups' access to resources, authorities can attempt to reduce the salience of resources a challenging group holds. Authorities may be able to deter action by a challenging group by amassing resources of their own and forming alliances with other authorities and outside groups.

In the realm of education, parents, students, other school boards and the Ministry of Education all constitute potential allies to boards (and in some cases to teachers). To the extent that a board can secure the support of these potential allies, it may be able to deter teacher groups from considering militant action. Consequently, analysis of local teacher militancy requires at least some attention to the resources and allies of the boards.
IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The theoretical framework presented in the foregoing pages is basically a checklist of factors and working hypotheses to be explored in attempting to account for the development of militant teacher groups. Drawing on the social movements literature, it has been assumed that leadership, discontent, group organization and solidarity, social control and resources are key factors influencing the development of teacher groups. It is assumed that discontent, resources, militant leaders, group cohesion and the breakdown of established mechanisms of social control are all necessary conditions for a militant teacher group to develop. However, no assumption has been made as to which factor or combination of factors is most important to explaining the timing of a teacher group's move to militancy. By leaving the question of the "triggering" factor or factors open to empirical solution, we have avoided choosing between two competing theoretical approaches found in the social movements literature.

While the majority of students of social movements would agree that the conditions we have cited as important for the development of teacher militancy are necessary conditions for a social movement to take place, there is disagreement over which factors are most important in precipitating a movement. On one hand, there is what Clark (1975) calls the discontent thesis which argues that social movements emerge as a result of increases in discontent brought on by one or a number of
structural strains. Here leadership, group organization and solidarity, resources and the failure of social control all flow as consequences of heightened discontent. The competing view, the mobilization thesis, places emphasis on the process of mobilization and views changes in factors which may facilitate or hinder mobilization as key to explaining the emergence of a social movement. Where the discontent thesis assumes mobilization to be relatively non-problematic, the mobilization thesis assumes that discontent is relatively non-problematic. Indeed some proponents of the mobilization thesis do not even assume that an increase in discontent is a necessary condition for a social movement to emerge. For example, McCarthy and Zald assume

...that there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grassroots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group' (p. 251). For some purposes we go even further: grievance and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations (1977:1215).

For such proponents of the mobilization thesis, it is necessary to explain why a movement emerges by examining the conditions which made mobilization possible and successful. In other words, the mobilization thesis stresses the examination of all the factors cited in our framework with the exception of increased discontent. The emergence of new leaders, the leaders' mobilizing activities, changes in the organization of potential members of the movement, changes in resources and changes in social control all can be seen to affect whether mobilization efforts will occur and if they occur whether they will be successful.
We will be concerned to explore both of the above theses to see how well they help us to account for the development of militant teacher groups, but we will not be confined to testing their validity. We will be equally, if not more concerned, with the interaction among factors, as with the validity of either of the above theses.
Chapter IV

THE RISE OF TEACHER MILITANCY IN ONTARIO

Having set out a framework for analysis in the previous chapter, we will use it to structure an investigation of the general rise of teacher militancy in Ontario. While this exercise delays our examination of the local teacher groups, it is a worthwhile delay. First, local groups have been affected by changes in extra-local conditions. For example, provincial educational policies, shifts in the supply and demand for teachers, changes in the leadership and ideology of the provincial teachers' federations are but a few of the extra-local factors which can be seen to have had an impact on the behavior of both local teacher groups and their Boards. Consequently some discussion of these factors is in order to lay the groundwork for our analysis of local teacher groups. A second reason for examining the general rise of teacher militancy in Ontario is simply that there has never been an extensive, empirically-grounded attempt to come to grips with the phenomenon.

I. THE GROWTH OF TEACHER MILITANCY IN ONTARIO

The period from the late 1960's to the middle of the 1970's bore witness to a significant increase in Ontario teacher militancy. Prior
to 1970 there had been no teachers' strikes in Ontario. As Table 5 shows, this relative quiescence in board/teacher relations was broken by a strike involving 152 teachers in 1970. By 1975, when there were 412,430 man days lost in 9 strikes involving 14,660 teachers; it had become clear that militancy was not merely a short-term anomaly involving a small number of "radical" teachers.

Strikes are but one of many forms of collective teacher militancy. While information on other forms of militant action is more difficult to obtain, there is general consensus that the use of other, somewhat less dramatic, coercive tactics was on the increase in the late sixties. For example, Downie (1978) notes that pink-listing (a tactic which involves a teachers' federation warning all its members not to accept jobs with a specific board where negotiations are designated as "in-dispute") increased in 1967. The early seventies saw the introduction of work-to-rule as well as strikes as weapons in the teachers' arsenal. In 1971 work-to-rule was utilized by secondary teachers in North York, Sault Ste. Marie, Carleton, Wentworth County and Frontenac County as well as by separate school teachers in Hamilton.

In sum, the new decade saw a significant increase in the number of serious disputes between boards and teachers as well as the teachers' use of new, more coercive tactics. However, it bears mentioning that conflict and militancy were notably more pronounced among secondary and separate school teachers than among public school elementary teachers. In fact, as of 1978, there had been

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Strikes</th>
<th>Number of Teachers Involved</th>
<th>Number of Man Days Lost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 1970</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27640</td>
<td>36820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2856</td>
<td>57040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14680</td>
<td>412430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>39030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>16600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2160</td>
<td>62740</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As of September 1, 1978.

no strikes by public elementary teachers although both secondary and separate school teachers had been involved in numerous strikes.

Judging from the more detailed strike-record provided in Table 6, militancy has not developed randomly among secondary and separate school teacher groups. In the early seventies militancy was spearheaded by secondary teachers and followed by a gush of activity by separate school teachers in 1975. Within both sets of teachers there has been a tendency for militancy to occur in urban areas and for the same groups to be involved in several confrontations. Thus the rise of militancy, up to 1978, was a selective rise which left many rural teachers and all the public elementary teachers untouched by strikes. Where militancy took strongest hold was among the urban secondary teachers who struck more frequently and for longer duration than other groups.

II. TEACHER DISCONTENT

Following our theoretical framework, it can be hypothesized that increases in teacher discontent will be associated with increases in teacher militancy. In the previous chapter we outlined a number of conditions which might be associated with rises in teacher discontent. Our task here is to determine whether any of those conditions are associated with the rise of Ontario teacher militancy. However, before we get down to specifics, it is useful to note one general pattern which may bear on many forms of teacher discontent.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Secondary Teachers</th>
<th>Separate School Elementary Teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>Teachers Involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Renfrew County</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary Schools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>North York Board</td>
<td>2200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Various School</td>
<td>1240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boards, Windsor,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Timmins and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Essex County</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Several School</td>
<td>26400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boards Province-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wide</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>York County Board</td>
<td>816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Education and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Huron Separate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>School Board</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Windsor Board of</td>
<td>661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lakehead Board of</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Ottawa Board of</td>
<td>1600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metro Toronto Board</td>
<td>8800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Board</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kent County Board</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Kent County Board</td>
<td>865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Stormont, Dundas,</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Glengarry Board of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Renfrew County</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Board of Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wentworth County</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Board of Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Essex Board of</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Huron County Board</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Labour Canada, Strikes and Lockouts.
Students of social movements have noted that social upheaval often occurs when a period of rapidly increasing prosperity is followed by a levelling-off or decline. Increasing prosperity is seen to result in a raising of expectations which go unmet when levelling-off or decline sets in - thus generating discontent. To a large extent the history of the Ontario educational system fits with this pattern.

Throughout the 1950's and 1960's the system was characterized by a boom-town atmosphere. Education was a high priority item on the agendas of both politicians and the public, and money flowed accordingly. Enrolments skyrocketed with the entry of baby boom kids, new schools were built, and a new technology in the form of educational media came into vogue. To give some indication of the growth that characterized this era we can note changes in enrolments. As can be seen from Table 7, between 1955 and 1969 enrolments in Roman Catholic separate schools and in public secondary schools more than doubled, while enrolment in public elementary schools increased by about 50%, from 676,246 in 1955 to 1,042,561 in 1969.

The transition from the sixties to the seventies marked the beginning of a new era in Ontario education. Concern with excessive government spending, inflation, shifting governmental and public priorities, and a decline in the rate of growth in school enrolments brought the end of the heydays of education. Again enrolment figures are reflective of the general scene.

As can be seen from Table 8, the rate of growth in enrolment dropped significantly for all types of schools in the late sixties and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public Elementary</th>
<th>Separate Schools</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>676,246</td>
<td>787,368</td>
<td>174,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>843,737</td>
<td>282,651</td>
<td>262,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>949,374</td>
<td>370,669</td>
<td>418,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>976,900</td>
<td>387,971</td>
<td>436,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1,002,555</td>
<td>402,497</td>
<td>443,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1,021,676</td>
<td>408,914</td>
<td>500,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1,042,561</td>
<td>413,556</td>
<td>530,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,047,055</td>
<td>418,433</td>
<td>556,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,034,703</td>
<td>418,433</td>
<td>556,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,022,935</td>
<td>422,166</td>
<td>583,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>998,668</td>
<td>424,217</td>
<td>585,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>977,545</td>
<td>427,294</td>
<td>589,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>961,625</td>
<td>427,853</td>
<td>605,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>937,292</td>
<td>422,793</td>
<td>613,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>907,777</td>
<td>421,619</td>
<td>613,830</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the Ontario Minister of Education
Table 8: Change in Enrolment from That of the Previous Year by Type of School, 1956 to 1977.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public Elementary</th>
<th>Separate Schools</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>30,073</td>
<td>18,209</td>
<td>11,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>25,857</td>
<td>18,855</td>
<td>25,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>24,306</td>
<td>17,264</td>
<td>23,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>27,526</td>
<td>17,368</td>
<td>17,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>25,655</td>
<td>14,526</td>
<td>27,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>19,121</td>
<td>6,517</td>
<td>37,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>20,885</td>
<td>4,642</td>
<td>29,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4,694</td>
<td>4,877</td>
<td>26,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>-12,352</td>
<td>3,704</td>
<td>17,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>-11,768</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>-24,627</td>
<td>2,051</td>
<td>2,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>-21,123</td>
<td>3,077</td>
<td>3,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>-15,920</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>5,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>-24,333</td>
<td>-5,060</td>
<td>7,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>-29,515</td>
<td>-1,174</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from Annual Reports of the Ontario Minister of Education.
early seventies. Most dramatic is the drop in the growth rate of elementary public school enrolments. Throughout the 1960's the elementary public schools had been gaining close to 20,000 pupils per year and in 1969 gained 20,885. In contrast, the gain between 1969 and 1970 was only 4,494 or about 16,000 less than the gain in the previous year. Even more striking, public elementary schools experienced a net loss in enrolment of 12,352 between 1970 and 1971. This was the first time since 1947 that any school-grouping had experienced a decline in enrolment.

The changes in separate school enrolments, while somewhat less sharp than those of the public elementary schools, follow a similar pattern except that the rate of growth showed significant declines a few years earlier, and actual decreases in enrolment did not occur until 1976.

The late sixties and early seventies also saw a reduction in the yearly growth rate of secondary school enrolments. Where 1968 saw an increase of 37,071 pupils in the secondary schools, the increase between 1971 and 1972 was only 8,493. By 1977, when the secondary enrolment increased by only 775, it appeared that the secondary schools were about to experience their first decline in enrolment in three decades.1

1. In large part these changes in enrolment simply reflect the impact of the post-war baby boom. However, they are somewhat influenced by at least two other factors. First, as more importance was placed on "getting an education" the proportions of the school-aged population attending school increased. This factor had its strongest impact on secondary school enrolments.
Recalling that it was in this period of transition from boom to bust that teacher militancy began to take root in Ontario, can we conclude that the boom-to-bust transition contributed to frustrated expectations on the part of teachers, which in turn, stimulated the growth of teacher militancy? Certainly it is tempting to suggest that this was the case, however, without more detailed data on the changes in the situation of teachers it is impossible to go beyond speculation. We now turn to the examination of specific conditions which have been suggested as generating teacher discontent.

A. Teacher Mobility

We have suggested that changes in the opportunities for vertical and horizontal mobility are likely to effect changes in teacher discontent. More specifically, we suggested that all teachers will have some tendency to experience discontent if opportunities for horizontal mobility decrease, and that male teachers will be especially likely to experience increased discontent if the opportunities for vertical mobility decrease.

Opportunities for Horizontal Mobility. The changes noted in enrolments may be seen to have set the stage for dissatisfaction with

footnote 1 cont.
While only 41.0% of the population aged 15-19 were enrolled in 1950-51, 77.1% of this age group were enrolled in 1968-69 (Fleming, 1971:98). A second factor which had direct relevance for elementary school enrolments was the increase in the number of schools which offered kindergarten classes. To illustrate, enrolment in public school kindergarten went from 75,057 in 1959-60 to 116,914 in 1969-70 (Fleming, 1971:100).
both horizontal and vertical mobility. With regard to horizontal mobility, the high rate of growth in enrolments during the sixties, coupled with a teacher shortage, made it relatively easy for teachers to move within or between school systems. With slowdown in growth (and actual decline in enrolment in the case of public elementary teachers), it undoubtedly became more difficult to transfer to obtain a more desirable working environment. While there is general consensus that opportunities for horizontal mobility were significantly reduced with declines in the rate of growth, supporting data are hard to find. Further, the data we do have are ambiguous. Table 9 provides figures on the mobility of Ontario secondary teachers from 1966 to 1975. It is not clear whether the figures pertain to mobility within school systems, between school systems, or both, but the data are adequate to support the argument that low growth-rates resulted in lowered opportunities for horizontal mobility since both types of mobility are likely to be highly correlated.

Given the fact that enrolments actually declined in public elementary schools, it might be expected that the decrease in horizontal mobility was even more dramatic for public school elementary teachers. However, before we accept this conclusion we must examine some important differences between the secondary and elementary teacher groups. First, where secondary teachers are predominantly males, females are the majority among elementary teachers. This is important because, in the past, females have been more likely to leave teaching for child-rearing and other pursuits. As a consequence, the rate of
Table 9: Mobility of Secondary School Teachers in Ontario, 1966 to 1975.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Teachers Who Transferred</th>
<th>Percent of Teachers Who Transferred</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2038</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1691</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2373</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1395</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

withdrawal from teaching at the elementary level and hence, the number of opportunities for movement within the school system, may have remained relatively high compared to the withdrawal rate and mobility opportunities at the secondary level. Second, because of the greater specialization of secondary teachers, they are more likely than elementary teachers to find it difficult to take advantage of the departure of a colleague. None of this is to imply that elementary teachers did not experience a relative decline in opportunities; however, it does suggest that the decline experienced by secondary teachers may have had a greater impact than that experienced by elementary teachers.

Secondary Teachers' Opportunities for Vertical Mobility. Figures on vertical mobility are also hard to come by. Again it is for secondary teachers that we have most complete information. Table 10 shows changes in the distribution of secondary teachers by sex and position between 1966-67 and 1974-75. The first thing to be noted in Table 10 is the shift in the percentage of males that are classified as classroom teachers. Between 1966-67 and 1971-72 this percentage dropped from 73.1% to 63.7% with the largest drop occurring between 1967-68 and 1968-69. In contrast, from 1971-72 on the proportion stayed within one percentage point of 63.0%. This indicates is that the proportion of male teachers in positions of responsibility increased by about 10% between 1966-67 and 1971-72 with very little change occurring from 1971-72 to 1974-75.

The majority of the increase was due to the creation of a new
Table 10: Secondary Teachers by Sex and Position of Responsibility, 1966-75.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Principal</th>
<th>Vice-Principal</th>
<th>Co-ordinator</th>
<th>Director</th>
<th>Department Head</th>
<th>Assistant Department Head</th>
<th>Subject Chairman</th>
<th>Master Teacher</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>73.</td>
<td>16728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>8395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>25123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>18779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>9396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>28115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>20534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>10088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>30622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>22160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>10820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>32980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>22838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>11006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>33844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>23363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>11233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>34596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>23537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>10768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>34305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>23607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>10515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>34122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>23797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>10594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>34391</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission on Declining School Enrolment in Ontario (1978b:209).
position of "Assistant Department Head" in 1968-69 rather than an increase in the number in previously established positions. In fact there appears to have been little change in the proportion of men in the top slots of principal and vice-principal throughout the entire period. One could take this to indicate that our broader boom-bust hypothesis has some applicability to secondary teachers' opportunities for vertical mobility into lower level positions but not for vertical mobility into the more prestigious positions. However, mobility is not merely a function of the number of new positions created. It is also a function of turnover - a phenomenon we cannot speak to from Table 10.

In order to get a better indication of the opportunities for advancement into top educational slots we can examine data on the age distribution of male principals and vice-principals in the secondary schools. Specifically, it will be assumed that fluctuations in the number of young secondary school principals and vice-principals reflect changes in opportunities for vertical mobility. Table 11 presents both the number and percentage of male principals and vice-principals, aged 34 or less, for selected years. The pattern shown in Table 11 suggests that even though there was relatively little change in the proportions of males who were principals and vice-principals between 1966 and 1978, there were significant variations in the opportunities for promotion during this era. Further, the pattern of variation is such that it could be expected to give rise to dissatisfaction among males who failed to be promoted. In sum then, the boom-bust pattern appears to apply to secondary teachers' opportunities for promotion into both
Table 11: Number and Percent of Principals and Vice-Principals Aged 34 or Less for Selected Years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data for this year are from the Interview Report of the Commission on Declining School Enrolments in Ontario (1978:274).
higher and lower-status positions of responsibility.

Up to this point we have been trying to determine whether there are grounds for arguing that secondary teachers experienced rising expectations for vertical mobility followed by a levelling off or decline in actual opportunities. Now we want to briefly explore a related possibility. Drawing on the notion of relative deprivation, we expect teachers to experience increased discontent when they find that others have received promotions but they have not. If it can be legitimately claimed that those who have received promotions are clearly different from those who did not, discontent is likely to be minimized. One of the key criteria for promotions in most work settings, including schools, is experience. Thus, it might be expected that teachers will find it upsetting to discover that others with the same work experience as themselves received promotions while they have not. Assuming age to be a reasonable proxy for work experience, we can examine Table 12 in order to evaluate changes in the likelihood that male classroom teachers would encounter others, with the same work experience, in positions of responsibility.

As can be seen from Table 12, there has been a definite tendency for the age distributions of male secondary teachers, male secondary principals and vice-principals, and male secondary teachers in other positions of responsibility, to converge over time. In 1965 the majority of male classroom teachers were young (63% were less than 35 years old) and the majority of male principals and vice-principals were relatively old (56.1% were 45 or older and 91.1% were 35 or older). By

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 25</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from Watson et. al. (1972b:55-60)
1970, the percent of male classroom teachers that were under 35 had declined to 55.3% and, in 1976, was down to 46.3%. While the classroom teacher group was aging the other two groups were becoming slightly younger. For example, in 1970 the percentage of male secondary principals and vice-principals aged 45 or older was down to 52.3% and, by 1976, had reached 48.0%. The effect of this on-going convergence in age distributions (and presumably in the distributions of teaching experience) was to increase the probability of male classroom teachers working in proximity to, or with, other men who were like them in experience but who had obtained promotions. In other words, the on-going convergence provided conditions in which discontent generating comparisons were likely.2

2. Several points should be noted with regard to this discussion. First, data on the distribution of experience are available for 1965 to 1970 but not beyond 1970. Consequently I chose to use age distributions to indicate experience. It should be noted however, that the experience distributions also show a tendency to converge between 1965 and 1970. Second, it could be argued that education is as important to the comparison process as is work experience. If those who achieve positions of responsibility are more highly educated than those who do not similarity in experience may not have any effect on discontent. Data for the period from 1965 to 1970 show no tendency for convergence in the distributions of educational achievement of classroom teachers, principals and vice-principals, and others in positions of responsibility. However, if the holding of a university degree is used to measure educational achievement it appears that a significant proportion of classroom teachers have qualifications as good as those of many in positions of responsibility. From 1965 to 1970 the proportions of principals and vice-principals with degrees remained around 99% while the proportions of Dept. Heads etc. hovered around 88% and approximately 72% of the classroom teachers had degrees. Thus while those in positions of responsibility were more highly educated as a group, significant proportions of classroom teachers were likely in a position to see their educational achievements as equivalent to those of their superiors.
Elementary Teachers' Opportunities for Vertical Mobility. Fewer data are available on opportunities for vertical mobility for elementary teachers than are available for secondary teachers. Table 13 provides numbers and percentages of elementary teachers (public and separate school teachers combined) by sex and type of position for the years 1972-73 to 1977-78. These data serve to document the "bust" period in Ontario education. Over the period there has been a slight decline in the number and proportion of teachers in all types of positions of responsibility, suggesting that there have been very few opportunities for vertical mobility in the 1970's.

Assuming that many males enter elementary teaching with the goal of becoming administrators, this apparent stagnation of mobility opportunities may have generated discontent. Further, such discontent should be heightened if stagnation was preceded by a period of high opportunity. Table 14 hints that this was the case. As can be seen, in 1976-77 the largest proportions of principals and vice-principals were aged 35 to 39. Unless an extremely large group of principals and vice-principals quit or retired, these 35 to 39 year olds must have obtained promotions in the period immediately preceding 1972 - 1977 for we know that there has been no expansion of the number of principalships or vice-principalships in that time span to account for their large number.

Evaluation of the Relationship Between Mobility Opportunities and Militancy. Enough has been said to support the argument that the boom and bust in Ontario education was associated with the development
Table 13: Elementary Teachers by Sex and Type of Position, 1972-79.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Principal</th>
<th>Vice-Principal</th>
<th>Chairman Dept. Head</th>
<th>Asst. Dept. Head Co-ordinator</th>
<th>Regular Classroom Teacher</th>
<th>All Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18.64</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>11,515</td>
<td>65.79</td>
<td>2,584</td>
<td>17,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>37,249</td>
<td>90.85</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>41,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.64</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>48,764</td>
<td>83.18</td>
<td>3,294</td>
<td>58,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>17.63</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>12,422</td>
<td>67.84</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>18,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>37,167</td>
<td>89.80</td>
<td>5.68</td>
<td>41,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>49,583</td>
<td>83.06</td>
<td>8.95</td>
<td>59,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>17.56</td>
<td>6.90</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>12,710</td>
<td>67.80</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>18,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>37,045</td>
<td>90.43</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>40,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>49,756</td>
<td>83.35</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>59,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>16.77</td>
<td>6.62</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>12,439</td>
<td>68.00</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>19,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>36,202</td>
<td>87.42</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>41,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>49,641</td>
<td>81.15</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>61,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>16.55</td>
<td>6.41</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>12,744</td>
<td>68.10</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>20,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>35,699</td>
<td>87.11</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>40,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>49,443</td>
<td>80.85</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>61,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>16.43</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>13,840</td>
<td>68.31</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>20,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>34,508</td>
<td>86.64</td>
<td>10.89</td>
<td>39,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>48,348</td>
<td>80.46</td>
<td>9.01</td>
<td>60,090</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14: Elementary Teachers by Age and Sex, 1976-77.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MALE Age</th>
<th>Princ.</th>
<th>Vice-Princ.</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Dept. Head</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 or less</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 29</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>5,166</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 34</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>3,641</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>4,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 39</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>1,415</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>3,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 to 44</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 49</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 to 54</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 59</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 to 64</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 or more</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,976</td>
<td>1,154</td>
<td>12,026</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>17,568</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FEMALE Age</th>
<th>Princ.</th>
<th>Vice-Princ.</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Dept. Head</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 or less</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,463</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12,966</td>
<td>1,049</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6,033</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>7,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 39</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3,925</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 to 44</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2,478</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 49</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1,894</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 to 54</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,304</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 59</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 to 64</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 or more</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>33,370</td>
<td>4,429</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>38,732</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission on Declining School Enrolment in Ontario (1978a:273).
of mobility conditions which could have resulted in teacher discontent. However, it appears difficult to make the link between presumed discontent over mobility opportunities and militancy. Elementary teachers apparently experienced as much of a gap between expectations for mobility and actual mobility as did secondary teachers. Yet secondary teachers have been more prone to militancy than elementary teachers. Equally disconcerting is the difference in militancy between public and separate school elementary teachers, given that enrolments and hence, mobility opportunities, dropped farther and faster in the public elementary schools than in the separate schools.

The first of these linkage problems is more apparent than real. There is simply a much larger number of secondary teachers who would be likely to experience discontent with declines in opportunities for vertical mobility. In 1968-69, 66.4% of the secondary teachers were males, compared to 26.7% of the elementary teachers. In order to translate their discontent into action male elementary teachers were faced with the problem of welding substantial numbers of female teachers to their cause. However, female teachers were less likely to be concerned with vertical mobility than were males. While concern about declining opportunities for horizontal mobility within school systems might have been focused on as a common concern, a substantial number of career teachers had probably found comfortable niches during the period of high mobility and were unlikely to get wrought up about the issue.

Apart from having to deal with female colleagues who did not
share their discontent with opportunities for promotion, irritated male elementary teachers differed from their secondary counterparts in having a substantial number of contented males within their ranks. To illustrate, in 1972-73 about one-in-four (26.3%) elementary male teachers held principalships or vice-principalships compared to about one-in-twenty (5.5%) of secondary male teachers.

The second puzzle is more difficult to solve. Why should separate school elementary teachers follow in the militant footsteps of the secondary teachers while public school teachers remain sitting in the garden? If the push to militancy was to be supplied by discontented males, the odds appeared to favour the public school teachers taking action if that a larger proportion of them were male - 28.8% as compared to 20.8% of the separate school teachers in 1968-69. There simply appears to be no way to relate the difference in militancy to differences in discontent over mobility among the two elementary groups with the data available.

This entire discussion of mobility requires at least one qualification before we move on to discuss other possible sources of teacher discontent. It is, that the opportunities for vertical and horizontal mobility undoubtedly varied from one locale to another. In particular, the process of suburbanization probably exacerbated the effects of the loss of enrolment due to the aging of the baby boom generation in some urban areas while relieving pressure in suburban areas.
B. Economic Deprivation

In Chapter II it was noted that broad economic changes might have an effect on both teacher militancy and teacher discontent. In this section we will consider the possible effects of inflation and changes in other occupational groups' earnings on teachers' feelings of economic deprivation. In addition, attention will be focused on differences between the economic rewards accruing to Ontario teacher groups as a possible source of relative deprivation.

Inflation and Teacher Discontent. Cole (1969) has argued that one of the main factors contributing to dissatisfaction and ultimately to militancy among New York teachers was relative deprivation brought on by inflation. In order to explore the possibility that inflation was a factor influencing teacher discontent in Ontario I have juxtaposed the consumer-price-indices and average elementary and secondary teachers' salaries\(^3\) for the years 1963 to 1978 in Table 15.

Unfortunately the salary data available is neither complete nor fully consistent for the period from 1963 to 1977. In the case of the elementary teachers, two different sources of information are used to supply average salaries for 1971-77. No data on average elementary salaries are available for 1969 and 1970. In the case of the secondary

---

3. There are of course problems involved in using averages to assess teachers' salaries. Most obvious of these is the failure of averages to reflect the distribution of teachers' salaries. In the case of Ontario teachers, however, the majority of teachers salaries appear to be fairly tightly grouped near the mean. See Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix B.
secondary teachers, average salaries are only given for 1967-75.4

While far from perfect, the data in Table 15 are sufficient to show that increases in teachers salaries have generally stayed close to, or have exceeded increases in the cost of living. However, one qualification is in order. Both secondary and elementary salaries increased at a much higher rate than the cost-of-living in the period up to 1971, but barely kept pace (and in the case of secondary teachers failed to keep pace) with rises in the cost-of-living from 1971 to 1975. In the case of the elementary teachers, the average salary increased by 38.8% between 1963 and 1968 compared to an increase of 19.4% in the CPI. However, between 1971 and 1975, the increase in average elementary salary was only slightly greater than the increase in the CPI (43.4% compared to 38.5%). In the case of secondary teachers, a salary increase substantially in excess of inflation between 1967 and 1971 was followed by an increase in salary which was actually less than the increase in the cost-of-living. Average secondary salaries increased by 37.2% between 1967 and 1971, and by 35.9% between 1971 and 1975, compared to respective increases of 15.6% and 38.5% in the CPI. In short, during the "boom" period in Ontario education teachers made real and substantial gains in buying power but

4. Average secondary salaries for the period from 1963 to 1968 are available from two sources, Watson et. al., (1972b) and the Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation's Economic Welfare Handbook: 1972/73. However the salaries reported by these two sources do not agree. Further neither set of averages agree with those reported by the Commission of Declining School Enrolment In Ontario (the source of the averages in Table 15) and hence are not reported here.
Table 15: Comparisons of the Consumer Price Index with Average Salaries of Ontario Elementary and Secondary Teachers, 1963-75.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Consumer Price Index, Canada (1941 = 100)</th>
<th>Average Salary of Elementary Teachers (1971 = 100)</th>
<th>Average Salary of Secondary Teachers (1971 = 100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>64412</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>4483</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>4657</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>4883</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>5347</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>6123</td>
<td>58208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>6123</td>
<td>9230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>10420</td>
<td>9711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>11258</td>
<td>10420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>104.8</td>
<td>11258</td>
<td>11258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>113.7</td>
<td>11777</td>
<td>11777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>125.0</td>
<td>11777</td>
<td>11777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>138.5</td>
<td>11777</td>
<td>11777</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Watson, et. al. (1972a:44).

in the "bust" period, they were lucky to avoid losing buying power.

Not only was there a levelling off of teachers real salary gains in the 1970's, it is also likely that if it were not for teacher militancy teachers would have experienced significant losses in buying power. Boards, used to matching yearly inflation rates of 3-4% throughout the sixties and early seventies, may well have dug in their heels when inflation hit rates of 7.5, 10.9 and 10.8% in 1973, 1974 and 1975, respectively. However, if militancy was kindled by discontent stemming from board intransigence on salary increases in these years, there remains the question of why public elementary teachers failed to catch fire while separate and secondary school teachers did.

Assuming, for the moment, that strong board intransigence was a factor in teacher discontent and militancy between 1973 and 1975; differences in teachers groups' behavior might be explained by reference to three factors: (1) differences in the sex composition of the groups, (2) changes in the utility of individual action as a way to increased economic rewards and (3) the organization of board/teacher bargaining. The first factor has been previously noted - a much larger proportion of secondary teachers are male and are likely to be main income earners for whom keeping pace with inflation would have been a high priority. Put simply, the presence of more males in the secondary group translates into a higher level of concern with economic remuneration within the group.

Economic discontent was more likely to beget a collective response among secondary teachers for another reason. From the late
sixties on, the opportunities for secondary teachers to better their incomes through individual initiative have been constricting at a higher rate than has been the case at the elementary level. All Ontario teachers are paid on a grid which rewards experience and education. At the end of each year of service teachers automatically receive a salary increment until the end-point on the grid is reached. By the early seventies the point at which increments stopped ranged from ten to fourteen years experience (depending on category) in many if not most boards. Teachers are rewarded for additional education by being classified in a higher certification category. Obtaining a university degree, taking university or Ontario Ministry of Education courses, all contribute to increasing a teacher's certification level. Thus a teacher who had the stamina to keep teaching would experience salary boosts for at least eleven years regardless of what happened at the negotiating table and a teacher who had the energy could work toward a higher salary by taking night courses or summer courses. However, for those teachers who had received all their salary increments for experience and were in the top certification category, salary gains depended on either vertical mobility or the outcome of collective bargaining. Since the opportunities for vertical mobility were slight, the attention of those who had reached the top of the grid was probably riveted on negotiations.

The data in Tables 16 and 17 can be seen to suggest that, compared to elementary teachers, an increasingly large proportion of secondary teachers were (and currently are) in a situation where
stamina and individual initiative could pay few economic dividends. As Table 16 shows, both groups of teachers show increasing proportions of teachers who are near or at the top of the salary grid in terms of experience, but the secondary group appears to have had a higher proportion in this category during the onset of high inflation (i.e., 1973-75). Perhaps more important, a high proportion of males, whom we expect to have been primary wage-earners for their families, had reached the top of the experience grid in the secondary group.

Table 17 shows that to attempt to increase salary by changing certificate level was less likely to be possible for secondary than elementary teachers. In 1972-73, over 80% of the secondary teachers held university degrees compared to 27.5% of the elementary teachers, and over one-third of the secondary teachers were in the top category (category 4). Equally striking, by 1975 more than half of the male secondary teachers had reached the point where collective action was more likely to result in economic benefits than further education.5

The third factor, the organization of board/teacher bargaining, provides a tentative explanation of why separate school teachers may have experienced greater discontent (and hence shown greater militancy) than public elementary teachers. With the reorganization of school boards in 1969 (of which we will have more to say later), most public elementary teacher groups became paired with a secondary teacher group

5. Strictly speaking, individual action could pay off in some boards where earning an M.A. or Ph.D. is rewarded by a one-shot salary increase.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent of Elementary Teachers with Ten or More Years Experience</th>
<th>Percent of all Secondary Teachers with Nine or More Years Experience</th>
<th>Percent of Male Secondary Teachers with Nine or More Years Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965-6</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-7</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-2</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-3</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-4</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-6</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-7</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-8</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These are percents for secondary teachers with ten or more years of experience.

Source: Derived from the Annual Reports of the Ontario Minister of Education
Table 17: Percent of Elementary and Secondary Teachers Holding University Degrees and Percent of Secondary Teachers in Top Category by Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% of Elementary Teachers Holding University Degrees</th>
<th>% with Degree</th>
<th>% in Top Category</th>
<th>% of Males in top Cat.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966-7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-3</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-4</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-5</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-6</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-7</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-8</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada, Catalogue no. 81-202; Commission on Declining Enrolment... (1978:206).
under a common board. By holding back and allowing secondary teachers to settle their negotiations first, or in some cases because of a board policy of granting both secondary and elementary panels the same increase, elementary teachers were often able to ride secondary teachers' coattails in salary matters. In the case of separate school teachers, there has been no aggressive sibling group to forge the way. Even when operating within the same geographic area as an aggressive secondary group, separate school boards could argue (with some justification) that their financial circumstances were more stringent than those of the public school boards; and, in any case, they could not be held responsible for the increases given to secondary teachers.

To sum up the discussion, it appears that near the turn of the decade both elementary and secondary teachers went from a situation in which they were able to obtain significant gains in "real" income to one in which the best they could manage was to maintain their level of "real" income. The difficulty in securing increases in "real" income was presumably due to increased unwillingness of boards to grant significant salary increases which in turn was probably a consequence of spending constraints imposed on the boards by the provincial government in 1971.

While all teachers faced a fairly similar situation, the secondary teachers can be seen to have been more likely to experience discontent, and to act on it, than the elementary teachers. This is because more of the secondary teachers were dependent solely on collective bargaining to increase their earnings and because a larger
portion of secondary teachers were male, primary-income earners. Further, it should be recalled that secondary teachers appeared to have actually experienced a slight loss in "real" income in the seventies while the elementary teachers appeared to maintain their level of "real" income.

The fact that the separate school elementary teachers have been more prone to take militant action than public school elementary teachers may be related to differences in the economic situations of the two groups vis-à-vis inflation. Unfortunately we do not have the data necessary to address this issue. However, the differences in the two groups' behavior may be partly due to differences in bargaining situations. Put simply, public elementary teachers could ride secondary teachers' coattails while separate school teachers could not do so.

In closing this section it should be said that we are not arguing that the threat of losing "real" income was the primary factor in stirring teacher discontent (or in bringing about teacher militancy). There may have been other conditions which contributed to teachers feeling economically deprived. Indeed the Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation points to another possible source of feelings of economic deprivation in its Economic Welfare Handbook of 1972/73:

"In the eleven years since 1961, the average "price" for teachers has risen 64% compared to a rise in consumer prices of 36%. This would suggest that there has been a considerable rise in real income of secondary school teachers. On the other hand, the real income of all Ontarians has risen in the same period of time. The question to be answered, therefore, is, 'How have secondary school teachers' incomes risen in comparison to those of other groups?'" (Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation, 1972:10)
Following the above lead, we now turn to the examination of teachers' salaries in comparison to those of other occupational groups.

**Teachers' Economic Status Relative to Other Occupational Groups.**

In addition to being threatened with a loss in "real" income in the seventies, teachers may have experienced discontent over economic conditions if other occupational groups made greater gains than they did. Data in Table 18 suggest that, at the national level, teachers have not fared as well as a number of other professional and service workers. Throughout the entire time-period covered in the table "professors and teachers" have had lower average salaries than policemen, firemen, and all established professions. More important, in the period in which Ontario teachers first began to give signs of increased militancy (i.e., 1961-71) the established professions experienced much higher rates of increase in salary than the "professors and teachers" category.

It is also important that prior to 1961-1971, teachers experienced rather mild variation in salary whereas most professional groups experienced significant declines in relative earnings. Thus, to the extent that teachers have been inclined to use professionals as comparison groups, the only period in which there could be expected to be a significant rise in teachers' feelings of economic deprivation was the 1961-71 period.

Having seen the national historical pattern for "professors and teachers" salaries, what can be said about the situation of Ontario teachers relative to other Ontario occupational groups? Table 19 gives
Table 18: Average Annual Wage and Salary Earnings in Selected Occupations as a Percentage of Average Earnings for all Occupations, Canada, 1931-71.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Occupations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Actual Average)</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td>3,170</td>
<td>5,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent of Total)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architects</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians &amp; Surgeons</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dentists</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurses, graduate</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optometrists</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges and Magistrates</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers and Notaries</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicists</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biologists</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economists</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professors and Teachers</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professors</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>215</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire-fighting Occupations</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policemen and Detectives</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from: Meltz and Stager (1977:81-83).
Table 19: Average Annual Wages of Teachers and Selected Occupational Groups as a Percentage of the Average Annual Earnings of All Occupations by Sex, Ontario, 1961-71.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th></th>
<th>Females</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Architects</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>+32</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountants</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians and Surgeons</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>+207</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dentists</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>+234</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>+113</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economists</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>-19</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firemen</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policemen</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>+17</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All School Teachers</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>-25</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurses, Graduate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stenos and Typists</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, 1971, Bul. 3.6-8, Cat. 94-766 (1975:72-80).
average wages of teachers and selected other occupations as a percentage of the average annual earnings of all Ontario workers, by sex, for 1961 and 1971. The breakdown by sex has been provided on the assumption that male and female teachers are likely to make same-sex wage comparisons. The occupations selected were chosen for a variety of reasons. Following from the professionalization thesis and the fact that teachers' salary briefs frequently make wage-comparisons with professionals a number of established professions were selected. The selection of firemen and policemen rests on the fact that their employers are public bodies which, like school boards, are faced with increasing taxes to meet high salary demands. Nurses, social workers and stenographers and typists were chosen to provide comparison groups which contained a large number of females and thus might be salient to female teachers.

In 1961, the average annual earnings of male teachers were higher than those of male policemen and firemen but lower than those of all the other selected groups. In 1971, only firemen averaged less than male teachers. More striking is the amount of change in the relative earnings of teachers and others between 1961 and 1971. In this time period, teachers' relative earnings dropped more than any other of the groups which experienced decreases, while the established professions made astronomical gains in relative earnings. These facts suggest that male teachers could have experienced relative deprivation on two counts. First, they were earning less in absolute terms than most of the comparison occupations and second, the gap between their
earnings and those of the other groups was increasing.

In contrast, female teachers, although experiencing a decline in relative earnings, were still averaging earnings well above the average earnings of all women and above those in the comparison occupations cited in Table 19. Further, there was no female comparison group which experienced large gains in relative earnings.

One of the problems with the data presented so far is that they only pertain to a period when teacher militancy was germinating. If the teachers' economic position improved substantially after 1971, it would be hard to see discontent born of economic deprivation as a key factor in the blossoming of militancy later in the decade. In order to explore the relative economic position of teachers after 1971 we can draw on Revenue Canada Taxation Statistics. In Table 20 we have reported the same measure of relative earnings as in Table 19 for most of the occupational categories utilized by Revenue Canada for the years 1971-75. While there has been some tendency for the gap between established professionals and "professors and teachers" to narrow, the magnitude of the gap has remained significantly large. Thus, it is unlikely that feelings of relative economic deprivation would have dissipated through the first half of the 1970's.

Up to this point I have generally stressed the consequences of teachers comparing their earnings with those of higher status occupational groups. Another way of approaching the problem is to assume that teachers' feelings of satisfaction with earnings may be a function of comparisons with lower-status occupational groups. One can
Table 20: Average Income of Those Filling Taxable Returns as a Percent of the Average Income of all Employees Filing Taxable Returns by Occupational Grouping, Ontario, 1971-75.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers and Professors</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Employees</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Employees</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Employees</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountants</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians and Surgeons</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dentists</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1976 and 1977 figures are available only for all persons filling returns not for persons filing taxable returns and are thus not reported here.

Source: Revenue Canada, Taxation Statistics.
hypothesize, for example, that teachers are likely to experience economic deprivation if blue-collar groups close the gap between themselves and teachers. In order to get a feel for the potential effect of such "downward" comparisons we can examine changes in teachers' salaries, relative to changes in average weekly earnings for the industrial composite.

As can be seen from Table 21, the average weekly earnings of elementary teachers have paralleled those reported in the industrial composite, both in absolute dollars and in the rate of increase from 1961-74. In the case of secondary teachers we have two conflicting sets of data on salaries. However, regardless of which set is examined, the same pattern is evident - a tendency for weekly earnings in the industrial composite to increase at a higher rate than those of secondary teachers. For example, between 1961 and 1971 weekly earnings in the industrial composite increased by 75.9%, from $81.30 to $143.04, while secondary teachers' weekly earnings increased by 63.9%. Further, between 1971 and 1976, the growth in earnings in the industrial composite was 59.9% compared to a 53.8% increase in secondary earnings. In sum, although the data indicate substantially higher wages for secondary teachers than blue-collar workers, they also suggest that secondary salaries failed to increase at as high a rate as blue-collar wages.

One other avenue of inquiry remains to be explored in this section. Underlying the argument that teachers experience relative economic deprivation because of the gap between their incomes and those
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average Weekly Earnings of Industrial Composite</th>
<th>Average Weekly Earnings of Elementary Teachers</th>
<th>Average Weekly Earnings of Secondary Teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>$81.30</td>
<td>$80.29</td>
<td>$143.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>83.65</td>
<td>82.56</td>
<td>149.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>86.22</td>
<td>84.85</td>
<td>151.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>89.82</td>
<td>86.21</td>
<td>152.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>94.41</td>
<td>89.56</td>
<td>153.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>99.40</td>
<td>93.90</td>
<td>161.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>105.86</td>
<td>102.83</td>
<td>$157.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>113.54</td>
<td>117.75</td>
<td>177.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>121.56</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>185.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>131.52</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>143.04</td>
<td>152.46</td>
<td>216.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>154.92</td>
<td>153.33</td>
<td>228.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>165.61</td>
<td>171.10</td>
<td>245.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>181.43</td>
<td>185.02</td>
<td>259.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>204.85</td>
<td>221.00</td>
<td>294.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>228.72</td>
<td>273.90</td>
<td>333.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:  
(1) Statistics Canada, *Employment Earnings and Hours*. Cat. no. 72-002 monthly.  
of established professionals is the assumption that teachers expect their salaries to be similar to others with similar amounts of education. Put in the lingo of the theorem of distributive justice, education constitutes an investment for which salary is part of the dividend paid back. When teachers find the rate of return on their investment to be lower than others', they are likely to experience discontent. Assuming that men and women will tend to make same-sex evaluations of their rates of return on educational investment, Table 22 provides salary data by occupation and education, separately for males and females.

In this table relative average incomes are calculated by dividing the average employment income of each cell by the average employment income of the entire group of workers falling in the educational category listed at the top of the table. Thus, the score of 110 for male university teachers with degrees indicates that male university teachers with degrees averaged salaries 10% above the average of all employed persons with university degrees.

The most important information in the table, from our perspective, is contained in the bottom two rows of the table. Here the

6. Relative salaries for other occupations (other than teachers) are reported to show that the low scores of teachers are not simply a result of inflated overall average due to the inclusion of some exceptionally highly paid occupational groups in this category. Clearly if some of the very highly paid occupations were eliminated from the calculation of the overall category average the position of teachers would appear better, but it would still be lower than many of the remaining groups in the university degree category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION (Census Code)</th>
<th>MALES</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>FEMALES</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level of Schooling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Level of Schooling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than Gr. 9 to 11</td>
<td>Gr. 9 to 11</td>
<td>Gr. 11 to 13</td>
<td>Some Uni.</td>
<td>Degr.</td>
<td>Less than Gr. 9 to 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Administrator (1113)</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Administrator (1133)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountant (1171)</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Engineer (2143)</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economist (2311)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Worker (2331)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer (2343)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Teacher (2711)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community College Teacher (2791)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians and Surgeons (3111)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurses, Graduate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firemen (6111)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policemen (6112)</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Teachers (2731)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Teachers (2733)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Any cell with less than 200 cases is excluded from the table.
Source: Calculated from Statistics Canada, 1971 Census of Canada, Bulletin 3.6-11, Cat. no. 94-769 (1975:71-80).
picture that emerges is one of an occupation which fails to pay males dividends for high educational investment. Male elementary teachers with university degrees averaged salaries 33% below the average of all employed persons with degrees in 1971, and male secondary teachers fell 18% below. Although moderate amounts of investment are well rewarded among secondary teachers, it must be remembered that the majority of secondary teachers are in the high investment category (i.e., they have university degrees).

Female teachers fare well relative to average female incomes although, as is the case with males, high investment is not as well rewarded as moderate investment in relative terms. Thus in both panels, and for both sexes, there appears to be a rather ironic phenomenon at work. Internally, by use of a salary grid which rewards education, school boards encourage teachers to obtain university degrees; however, once a degree has been obtained, new comparison groups become salient to the teacher, and the result of new comparisons is likely to be greater economic dissatisfaction.

To sum up this section, it appears that secondary teachers were most likely to experience increases in relative economic deprivation through the sixties and early seventies. Repeatedly we have seen that males found grounds for feeling deprived vis-à-vis other groups and males are a majority among secondary teachers. Further, data on weekly earnings of teachers and earnings in the industrial composite show that secondary teachers' earnings have failed to rise as rapidly as those reported for blue-collar workers. All of this, however, needs to be
qualified by the recognition that the sixties were years of growth and high turnover in the secondary teacher force; and, as a consequence, the salary data we have presented may somewhat underestimate the economic status of teachers, given that new teachers entering the occupation are likely to start at the bottom of the salary grid on the experience dimension thus lowering the group average.

While broad salary comparisons of the type cited here are utilized by teacher negotiators in arguing for salary increases, it is somewhat hard to believe that such comparisons are spontaneously made by most teachers. Rather, such comparisons are likely to be made by teacher leaders in order to stir up support for militant action. If a spontaneous upsurge in aggregate discontent provided the initial spark to teacher militancy, this spark was probably struck on the flint of local comparisons. We assume that strong spontaneous feelings of economic deprivation, and, hence of discontent, are most likely to be generated from comparisons with highly similar and highly visible groups within the local area. Teachers finding themselves less well-paid than other teachers in a neighbouring district are more likely to experience discontent than teachers who are underpaid relative to others at the opposite end of the province. If teachers are earning less than other teachers in their area, they are more likely to be upset than if they are earning less than some non-teaching occupational group in the area (and further they are more likely to know about other teachers' salaries than about the salaries of other occupational groups).
Examination of the propinquity factor on the provincial level is a study in itself and will not be undertaken here. What we can do, however, is to briefly examine differences in the salaries of our three groups of teachers in search of discontent-generating conditions.

**Salary Differences Between Teacher Groups as a Source of Discontent.** In the previous section evidence of increasing economic deprivation among secondary teachers was found, but not of increasing deprivation among the majority of the elementary teachers. Yet, as we noted earlier, separate school elementary teachers have acted as if they were experiencing deprivation of some sort. In this section we will suggest that one of the keys to unraveling separate school teachers' militancy lies in their economic status *vis-à-vis* other teacher groups. In addition, it will be suggested that across teacher group comparisons may have served to aggravate any feelings of economic deprivation secondary teachers may have felt.

Table 23 presents the data for this discussion. Examinations of public school and separate school elementary teachers reveals that the median income of separate school teachers has been consistently and significantly below that of public school teachers. Further, this gap has existed for both males and females (although the magnitude of the gap has generally been greater between groups of male teachers). Female separate school teachers may have stood in a relatively advantageous economic position relative to women in other occupations, but relative to other women teaching in the public schools, they have had clear grounds for discontent. Unfortunately, the only data on separate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public Males</th>
<th>Public Females</th>
<th>Public Total</th>
<th>Separate Males</th>
<th>Separate Females</th>
<th>Separate Total</th>
<th>Secondary Males</th>
<th>Secondary Females</th>
<th>Secondary Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-46</td>
<td>$1,746</td>
<td>$1,122</td>
<td>$1,176</td>
<td>$1,043</td>
<td>$879</td>
<td>$892</td>
<td>$2,607</td>
<td>$1,992</td>
<td>$2,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>2,543</td>
<td>1,979</td>
<td>2,001</td>
<td>1,797</td>
<td>1,387</td>
<td>1,426</td>
<td>3,382</td>
<td>2,941</td>
<td>3,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-55</td>
<td>3,463</td>
<td>2,806</td>
<td>2,940</td>
<td>2,407</td>
<td>2,005</td>
<td>2,023</td>
<td>4,718</td>
<td>4,187</td>
<td>4,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>4,881</td>
<td>4,044</td>
<td>4,197</td>
<td>3,465</td>
<td>3,149</td>
<td>3,182</td>
<td>7,298</td>
<td>6,579</td>
<td>7,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>5,527</td>
<td>4,745</td>
<td>5,915</td>
<td>4,466</td>
<td>4,141</td>
<td>4,191</td>
<td>7,792</td>
<td>6,787</td>
<td>7,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>5,759</td>
<td>4,879</td>
<td>5,104</td>
<td>4,886</td>
<td>4,338</td>
<td>4,442</td>
<td>7,956</td>
<td>6,798</td>
<td>7,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>7,204</td>
<td>6,087</td>
<td>6,268</td>
<td>6,306</td>
<td>5,706</td>
<td>5,812</td>
<td>9,389</td>
<td>8,074</td>
<td>8,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>7,749</td>
<td>6,249</td>
<td>6,549</td>
<td>6,349*</td>
<td>5,649*</td>
<td>5,749*</td>
<td>9,694*</td>
<td>8,269*</td>
<td>9,169*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>8,745</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>8,009**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>11,501</td>
<td>9,292</td>
<td>9,704</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>14,416</td>
<td>12,251</td>
<td>13,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>13,255</td>
<td>10,631</td>
<td>11,015</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>16,327</td>
<td>13,799</td>
<td>15,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>14,521</td>
<td>11,321</td>
<td>12,121</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>17,921</td>
<td>15,221</td>
<td>17,121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main Source: Commission on Declining School Enrolment (1978a:25).
school teachers' salaries beyond 1968-69, combine males and females. However, they are useful for showing that the differential between public and separate school teachers was still significant into 1972-73.

It is important to note that the gap between public and separate school teachers preceded the 1960's and early 1970's. Thus, while separate school teachers apparently had a reason to be militant during the period in which militancy developed, they also had this reason in a time period when militancy did not develop. It appears then, that increasing relative economic deprivation did not trigger separate school teachers' militancy, though economic deprivation may have been a necessary condition for militancy to occur. Another point that should be made is that if the lower salaries of separate school teachers contributed to their militancy, so too, may they have contributed to public school teachers' docility. Women public school teachers could not only see themselves to be relatively well-off compared to women in other occupations but in relation to their counterparts in the separate schools as well.

The situation of secondary teachers relative to public school elementary teachers also merits our attention. In particular, the changes in the salaries of men in the two groups are of interest. Between 1960-61 and 1968-69 the actual dollar difference between the median salaries of the two groups decreased from $2417 to $1900, reflecting the fact that public elementary men's salaries were growing at a faster rate than male secondary teachers' salaries. Where the
median salary of elementary men increased by 58.8%, from $4881 in 1960-61 to $7749 in 1968-69, the corresponding increase for secondary men was 32.2%, from $7298 to $9649. Data on average salaries presented earlier in Table 18 combine all elementary teachers but presents a similar picture. Between 1971 and 1977, the average salaries of all elementary teachers increased by 107.2% compared to a 83.9% increase in secondary salaries. In line with these trends, detailed data on salaries by experience and certification level show that elementary teachers with degrees earned salaries very close to those of secondary teachers in 1976-77. (See Table 3 in Appendix B.)

The importance of this narrowing of the gap between elementary and secondary teachers and particularly between men in the two groups lies in a point made by Cole in his study of New York teachers.

"Relative deprivation may result not only when comparisons are made with those who occupy a superior position, but also when those who occupy a superior position see their superiority being eroded (Cole, 1969:35-5)."

In fact, Cole feels that one of the key factors contributing to discontent and thus militancy among New York secondary teachers was a relative decline in their salary advantage over elementary teachers. We suggest the same phenomenon could have had an impact on Ontario secondary teachers.

C. Professional Deprivation.

As was mentioned earlier, a number of authors have seen teacher militancy to be primarily a function of rising expectations for professional status. Teachers have supposedly come to see themselves
as the people who know best how to provide for the educational needs of children and now demand the power to utilize their expertise without being encumbered by meddling from non-experts.

Because we have already found the link between professional self-image and militancy to be questionable, we will not spend a great deal of time on this topic. What will be explored are changes in the educational qualifications of teachers, on the assumption that the probability of holding a view of oneself as a professional and of experiencing professional deprivation increases with educational attainment.

Table 24 gives the percentage of elementary and secondary teachers with university degrees. Clearly a larger proportion of the secondary teachers have held, and continue to hold, degrees than is the case for elementary teachers. Thus, we could expect that to the extent that professional deprivation has been a factor in the rise of militancy, it is most likely to have been operative among secondary teachers. However, if professional deprivation was the triggering factor in militancy we would expect some sign of increase in the educational qualifications of secondary teachers during the germination phase of militancy. What we find is that no such upsurge occurred. In fact, viewed in the perspective of the period from 1960-77, the period in which signs of militancy started to become clear (i.e., 1968-71), was a low point in the educational qualifications of secondary teachers.

Of course teachers could have had higher qualifications than are indicated in Table 24. Perhaps the late sixties witnessed an increase
Table 24: Percent of Elementary and Secondary Teachers with Degrees (Principals Included) Ontario 1959-60 to 1977-78.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent of Elementary Teachers with Degrees</th>
<th>Percent of Secondary Teachers with Degrees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>87.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>88.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>93.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>85.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>78.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>79.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-71</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>80.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>83.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>85.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada, Salaries and Qualifications of Teachers in Public Elementary and Secondary School, Cat. no. 81-202.
* Commission on Declining School Enrolment (1978b:207).
in teachers with master's and/or doctorate degrees or in those with several years of courses which did not result in degrees. If so, there may still be grounds for arguing that professional deprivation triggered militancy. Table 25 provides us with at least part of the picture. As can be seen, between 1968-69 and 1970-71 there were only small increases in the proportions of secondary teachers with doctorates and master's degrees. If we look at the entire time period covered, it is noteworthy that the proportion of secondary teachers with master's degrees has doubled indicating, perhaps, that professional deprivation may be a factor in future militancy, but more likely reflecting the need for teachers to achieve higher qualifications in order to have a chance to win in competition for the diminishing number of positions of responsibility open to them. Regardless of which interpretation one chooses, it would seem likely that with almost one-in-eight secondary teachers currently holding master's degrees, and the trend being for this ratio to increase, salary comparisons with professionals will increase in their salience to secondary teachers. Further, the tendency to make such comparisons will likely be exacerbated by the inability of many of these highly educated teachers to work themselves into positions of responsibility.

In sum, we do not find the available data to be supportive of the professionalization thesis. The data can-not disprove the thesis alone, but when it is viewed in conjunction with the discussion of the thesis in Chapter II, the denial of the thesis is fairly convincing. It should be noted, however, that to deny the professional deprivation
Table 25: Percent of Secondary Teachers Holding Master's and Doctorate Degrees, 1966-77.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent with Master's Degree</th>
<th>Percent with Doctorate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission on Declining School Enrolments (1978b:207).
thesis is not to deny that autonomy may be a factor in job satisfaction and discontent. What is denied is that there was an escalation in the desire for autonomy among teachers which could account for the emergence of teacher militancy. The related, but distinct, hypothesis that discontent stemming from a loss of autonomy contributed to militancy remains to be considered in the context of the next section.

D. Bureaucratization and Teacher Discontent

In the first chapter we noted that one of the main themes in the literature on teacher militancy has been that militancy is, in part, a response to alienation brought on by the development of large bureaucratic school systems. This argument tends to blend together two separable issues: the impact of increased size of school systems on teachers' alienation and the impact of a particular type of authority structure (bureaucracy) on alienation. Further, the literature tends to refer to a number of different phenomena. Alienation may refer to teachers' dissatisfaction from not being treated as unique individuals (the cog-in-a-machine syndrome), teachers' inability to obtain intrinsic rewards from teaching, and/or teachers' feelings of frustration at not being able to influence major educational decisions. While these dissatisfactions may all be found in the same person, there is no logical reason to believe that they must occur together.

Having noted these ambiguities in the literature, what can be said about the impact of increases in the size and bureaucratization of Ontario school systems on various types of "alienation"? At the outset
It is necessary to note that we can only deal with bureaucratization by inference, for the only data we have are on the size of schools and school systems, not on the details of their administrative structures. Thus, we will tend to concentrate on the alienating impact of size throughout the discussion.

Accompanying the move from "boom" to "bust" in Ontario education was a clear growth in the number of large school systems at the expense of small systems between 1968 and 1969. While Table 26 shows that a trend toward consolidation of school systems was evident prior to 1968-69, the decision of the Minister of Education to consolidate about 1400 boards into 192 as of January 1, 1969, resulted in a dramatic administrative reorganization of the Ontario educational system. Where 1358 boards administered 5055 schools in 1968, 1969 saw 192 boards trying to come to grips with running 4923 schools. When the distribution of school boards by size of enrolment is examined in Table 27, the shift to larger boards is obvious.

Increased size of the system alone can plausibly be seen to result in an increase in how impersonally teachers will be treated by top administrators and trustees. Perhaps more important, however, is the way teachers are treated by administrative authorities with whom they have regular direct contact (i.e., principals). The principal is education's answer to the industrial plant's foreman. And like the foreman, how he/she plays his/her role and handles the conflicting expectations placed on him/her by management and teachers is believed to have a significant impact on staff morale.
### Table 26: Number of School Administrative Units by Type of Unit, 1965-75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Separate</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>1673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>1603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>1446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>1358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Less duplicates.

Source: Annual Reports of the Ontario Minister of Education.

### Table 27: Distribution of Boards by Enrolment Interval, 1968 and 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enrolment Interval</th>
<th>Number of Boards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-99</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-299</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300-499</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-999</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000-1,999</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000-4,999</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-9,999</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-19,000</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000-49,000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000+</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the Ontario Minister of Education.
No direct measures of the quality of principals' interaction with teachers are available, but we can examine one of the factors which would seem to directly affect principals' ability to treat teachers in a particularistic manner. Specifically, we can examine changes in the distribution of schools by size of school enrolment, assuming that the larger a school's enrolment is, the more likely a principal is to treat staff in an impersonal manner.

As can be seen from Tables 28, 29, and 30, there has been a significant shift in the distribution of schools by size from 1960 to 1975. If we focus on the period 1960-70, it is evident that the number of teachers working in large schools increased significantly prior to the rise of militancy in the early 1970's. In 1960-61, 25% of the public elementary schools and 41% of the separate schools had enrollments of 200 or more. By 1970-71, the percent of both separate and public elementary schools with enrollments of 200 or more had risen to 71%. The percentage of secondary schools with large enrollments also increased between 1960-61 and 1970-71. Thus in 1960-61, 20% of the secondary schools had enrollments of 1000 or more compared to 51% in 1970-71.

All three groupings of schools show a similar type of shift in their distributions, but the effects of these shifts are not necessarily the same. In the case of the two groups of elementary schools (i.e., public and separate), the shift toward larger schools did not necessarily imply a great increase in the impersonality with which principals treated their staff. In 1970-71, the modal enrolment level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-29</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-49</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-149</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150-199</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-299</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300-399</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400-499</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-699</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700-999</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000+</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1356</td>
<td></td>
<td>1422</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the Ontario Minister of Education.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-9</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-29</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-49</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-149</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150-199</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-299</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300-399</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400-499</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-699</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700-999</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000+</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5696</td>
<td></td>
<td>4285</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the Ontario Minister of Education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-9</td>
<td>27 6</td>
<td>11 2</td>
<td>5 1</td>
<td>10 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-199</td>
<td>56 13</td>
<td>29 6</td>
<td>19 3</td>
<td>24 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-299</td>
<td>43 10</td>
<td>41 8</td>
<td>28 5</td>
<td>35 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300-399</td>
<td>47 11</td>
<td>48 10</td>
<td>40 7</td>
<td>26 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400-499</td>
<td>35 8</td>
<td>36 7</td>
<td>29 5</td>
<td>23 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-599</td>
<td>64 15</td>
<td>54 11</td>
<td>62 11</td>
<td>69 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600-699</td>
<td>51 12</td>
<td>60 12</td>
<td>58 10</td>
<td>66 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700-799</td>
<td>20 5</td>
<td>37 7</td>
<td>41 7</td>
<td>48 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800-899</td>
<td>52 12</td>
<td>96 19</td>
<td>125 22</td>
<td>161 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>900-999</td>
<td>17 4</td>
<td>42 8</td>
<td>103 18</td>
<td>66 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1299</td>
<td>15 3</td>
<td>29 6</td>
<td>38 7</td>
<td>62 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1499</td>
<td>3 1</td>
<td>16 3</td>
<td>21 4</td>
<td>25 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-1899</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900+</td>
<td>430 100</td>
<td>499 100</td>
<td>569 100</td>
<td>615 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the Ontario Minister of Education.
for both separate and public elementary schools was 200-299 and very few schools had enrolments over 1000. Thus, even though the elementary schools of 1970-71 tended to be larger than those of 1960-61, they were still relatively small units, employing relatively small staffs.

In the case of the secondary teachers, the shift in the distribution of schools may be hypothesized to have had a much more significant impact on teacher-principal relations. The pressure of increased enrolments, coupled with public and governmental stress on providing students with a wide range of specialized courses, contributed to the development of very large schools with large staffs. Thus, in 1970-71 the modal enrolment of high schools was 1000 to 1299 and a significant proportion of schools had enrolments higher than this. Further, because the ratio of pupils to teachers is generally lower in secondary schools than in elementary schools, an increase in the enrolment of a secondary school was likely to result in a greater increase in the size of the teaching staff than would a similar increase in an elementary school's enrolment. Principals in secondary schools were thus much more likely than elementary school principals to be faced with large teaching staffs and, because of the diversity of courses offered in the schools, and the specialization of the teaching staffs, were less likely to be able to relate to staff members other than as administrators.

In sum, it does seem plausible that sheer growth in the size of school systems may have increased all teachers' feelings of anonymity vis-à-vis trustees and top administrators. However, feelings of being
but a cog-in-a-machine were more likely to be exacerbated in the secondary schools where the interchanges between principals and teachers were more likely to be infrequent and formal due to the size and organization of secondary schools.

Lortie (1975) has argued that one of the key factors contributing to elementary teachers' job satisfaction is their ability to obtain rewarding responses from their pupils. To the extent that the teacher is able to interpret pupils' educational performances as "caused" by his/her actions he/she is likely to experience satisfaction with teaching.

Several factors can be seen to limit a teacher's ability to achieve this type of satisfaction. If a teacher has very little control over the content and method of teaching he/she is less likely to feel that he/she has "caused" pupils to learn. Likewise, if a teacher is faced with a large class, much of his/her time may be taken up simply maintaining order in the classroom. Put generally, anything which a teacher perceives as limiting his/her ability to help children may lead to teacher dissatisfaction.

This said, is there any reason to believe that a decline in the rewards teachers receive in the classroom was associated with the rise to teacher militancy? The answer appears to be "no" on two counts. First, the development of militancy coincided with an increase in teachers' control over what they taught and how they taught it. According to Selby,

During the decade of the sixties, there occurred a gradually accelerating process of change which involved the reduction of
central control over the curriculum and the concomitant growth in local initiative (1977:472).

Teachers were encouraged to develop their own courses within broad guidelines and were given a greater range of textbooks from which to select. Part of what gave substance to this increase in teacher autonomy was the abolition of the provincial grade 13 examinations in 1967 and of the use of provincial school inspectors at the turn of the decade. At the secondary level the existence of provincial exams tended to lead teachers to follow a narrow curriculum geared to preparing students for the exams. Provincial school inspectors played the role of insuring that teachers did indeed keep their noses to the grindstone in following the provincial curriculum. The demise of provincial exams and inspectors, coupled with an official ministry doctrine of increasing local control of educational decision-making, would appear to have increased teachers' feelings of autonomy in the classroom and, consequently, their feelings of being in control of their pupils' learning.

A second fact going against the hypothesis that loss of classroom rewards is responsible for militancy is that conditions conducive to effective teaching increased. With amalgamation, teachers generally found themselves better supplied with teaching materials and equipment and better housed. Further, the pupil-teacher ratio declined throughout most of the sixties and early seventies as can be seen in Table 31.
Table 31: Pupil/Teacher Ratios (PTR) in Ontario by Type of School, 1945-76.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public Elementary School PTR</th>
<th>Separate School PTR</th>
<th>Secondary School PTR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-6</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-6</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-6</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-7</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-8</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-9</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-2</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-3</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-4</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-6</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the Ontario Minister of Education
E. Summary: Discontent and the Rise of Militancy

To a large extent, what we have been doing in this section is investigating the hypothesis that increasing teacher discontent precipitated teacher militancy. Since both secondary and separate school teachers have shown a greater propensity for militant action than elementary teachers, we expected them to experience greater increases in discontent in the period in which militancy was developing than did the public elementary teachers.

While we found evidence to support the view that secondary teachers experienced greater increases in discontent than public elementary teachers, we have not been able to establish that separate school teachers experienced a greater increase in discontent than the docile elementary teachers. For secondary teachers it has been suggested that the increase in discontent stemming from declining mobility opportunities and economic deprivation was likely to be more widespread and intense than it was for separate and public school teachers, due to differences in the composition of the groups. The high proportion of males among secondary teachers translates into a higher proportion of the group that is likely to be highly concerned with salaries and promotions, and who are likely to find salary comparisons with non-teachers upsetting. The high proportion of teachers with degrees further exacerbated feelings of economic deprivation by encouraging comparisons with professionals whose salaries increased by much greater rates and amounts than those of teachers between 1961 and 1971. Finally, the increasingly large
portion of secondary teachers who reached their salary maximums in the earlier seventies suffered intensified feelings of economic deprivation with the loss of their annual salary increments for experience.

Secondary teachers were also likely to experience greater increases in discontent as a result of the reorganization of school boards and from salary comparisons with other teachers than were the separate and public school teachers. Board reorganization, growth in enrolments, and the specialized subject matter taught in secondary schools conspired to increase the number of large high schools and, in so doing, served to depersonalize relations between teachers and board authorities. While the size of elementary schools increased, the majority remained relatively small, allowing the principal to serve as a personal link between the board and the teachers. Accompanying all of the above, the secondary teachers found themselves losing their advantage in salary over elementary teachers. In sum, the late sixties and early seventies did see the development of a number of conditions which could well have stimulated a greater increase in discontent among secondary teachers than among public or separate school teachers.

Turning to the separate and public school teachers it is hard to see much difference in the increases in discontent experienced by the two groups. In both, males are a minority. Males in both groups are more likely to hold positions of responsibility than are male secondary teachers. As a consequence, the proportions of the group likely to experience increased discontent stemming from declining mobility opportunities and changes in economic standing are relatively small.
Separate school teachers appear to have been less well paid than public school teachers, but this was not a new inequity which could escalate discontent. Further, it is balanced by the fact that public elementary teachers were affected by earlier and greater declines in school enrolments than were the separate school teachers.

What can we conclude with regard to the role of discontent in generating militancy? Our inability to differentiate separate and public school teachers in terms of increases in discontent suggests that increase in discontent is, at best, a necessary condition for militancy. However, this does not mean that a major increase in discontent may not be sufficient for militancy. Whether or not the magnitude of the increase in the discontent of secondary teachers was sufficient to trigger their militancy cannot be answered without an examination of other potential triggering factors. Thus, we now turn to the discussion of other factors suggested by our theoretical framework.

III. ORGANIZATION AND SOLIDARITY OF TEACHERS

Whatever the level of discontent, teachers are unlikely to take militant action unless they are organized and feel some sense of common identity. In this section we will explore the possibility that changes in the organization of teachers and in solidarity coincided with the rise of teacher militancy.
A. Solidarity and Militancy

The solidarity of any group will be affected by how homogeneous the group is (that is by the number of salient attributes members of the group have in common) and the extent to which members of the group are subject to cross-pressures from their affiliations with other groups. To the degree that group members have common attributes and are free of cross-pressures it is expected that group solidarity will be strong.

Because differences in sex and age are often related to differences in interests, needs, lifestyle and attitudes (in particular to differences in attitudes toward militancy), we will be interested in examining the age and sex composition of teacher groups. Beyond age and sex, it is assumed that teachers will differ significantly in their occupational concerns according to their educational attainment, their position within the school, and their experience. Finally, the homogeneity of teachers in marital status will be discussed.

Differences in the above attributes often relate to differences in the degree to which teachers will feel cross-pressures. However, there are at least two sources of cross-pressure which are unrelated to the above attributes. These are cross-pressures derived from community membership and from religious affiliation. Where appropriate these sources will be examined.

**Sex Composition.** Table 32 shows that the number and proportion of public and separate elementary school teachers that are male has been steadily increasing since 1945. However, it is still the case
Table 32: Number of Teachers by Type of School and Sex, 1945-77.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public Elementary</th>
<th>Separate</th>
<th>Total Elementary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>% Male</td>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-46</td>
<td>2521</td>
<td>12089</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>4152</td>
<td>13169</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>7407</td>
<td>20963</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>1144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>9479</td>
<td>23304</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>2338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>10463</td>
<td>27324</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>2970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>11931</td>
<td>29449</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>3178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>22173</td>
<td>10833</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>22848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>23373</td>
<td>11240</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>25379</td>
<td>12326</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>27350</td>
<td>13400</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>30324</td>
<td>15795</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>33324</td>
<td>17409</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>36324</td>
<td>19129</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>39324</td>
<td>20849</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>42324</td>
<td>22569</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the Ontario Minister of Education.
+ Commission on Declining School Enrolments (1976b).
that public and separate school elementary teachers are predominately female, and secondary teachers are predominately male, with the majority group in all cases making up about two-thirds of the total group.

Sex composition is only important to group solidarity if there are significant differences in the way the sexes view their work. Historically, there has been a strong belief, supported by empirical evidence, that women are less likely than men to make a strong career commitment to teaching. Teaching for women has been more likely to be viewed as a way to support oneself until marriage or as a source of supplementary family income. Although women's attitudes and behavior are changing, Table 33 makes it clear that the goal of becoming a homemaker held a great deal of attraction to many women teachers during the period that teacher militancy was beginning to make itself heard in Ontario.

Assuming that very few, if any, men withdrew from teaching to return to household duties or to marry, Table 33 suggests that many women teachers were not strongly committed to a career in teaching in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Unfortunately, we do not have the data to calculate the proportion of female teachers in each group that withdrew from teaching to pursue careers as housewives and/or mothers for all the years. However, it can be determined that 7.3% of the public school females, 8.3% of separate school females, and 8.8% of secondary females withdrew for this reason in 1968-69. Given that the teaching force has experienced little growth since 1968-69, it can be
than the proportion of females, the percentage of females in this
category (i.e., category 4) has never fallen more than 17 points below
the percentage of males in the category.

The main point in discussing teachers' experience and education
here has been to supply some support for the view that sex differences
relate to differences in occupational concerns and commitment. This is
important because it is assumed that these sex-related differences in
orientation may carry consequences for teacher solidarity. Let us turn
to these consequences now.

For the secondary group the differences in male and female
orientations may not have been as great as the differences between
males and females in the public and separate elementary groups and,
therefore, may have been less of an impediment to teacher solidarity. In the
secondary group. Certainly, by the 1974-76 period, when militancy was
peaking, there is reason to believe that some significant number of
females was coming to hold male-orientations. First, the number of
women leaving to take care of home or children had decreased substan-
tially by the mid-seventies. Second, the proportions of women who had
invested enough effort in education to obtain category 4 status,
reached 33.5% in 1974-75, and by 1975-76 was up to 37.6%. That secon-
dary females, as a group, had invested significantly more time in
obtaining an education is indicated by the fact that, in 1973-74, 82.6%
of the secondary females held B.A.'s or higher degrees compared to
18.4% of elementary females. Finally, it might be noted that the pro-
portion of secondary females who were single or "other" (i.e., widowed,
estimated that, between 1967 and 1973, the rate of female withdrawal to household duties and marriage fluctuated between 7% and 9%.

Female teachers have been seen to differ from males in the amount of stress they place on economic rewards and promotions, as well as in their career commitment. Lortie (1975) has found that female teachers view "getting students to learn" or, more broadly, rewards intrinsic to the classroom, as the main source of satisfaction with teaching. More frequently it is suggested that, because females are often second-income earners, the economic rewards of teaching are of lower salience to them than to their male counterparts. Finally, as we have noted repeatedly, female teachers are well-paid relative to other females.

Focusing on the second argument, Table 34 provides data on the marital status of female teachers in 1967-68 (the last year such data were reported). As can be seen the public school female teachers' group had the highest percentage of potential second-income earners (57.6%) followed by the secondary group (51.6%) and the separate school group (48.1%).

Taken together, the data on withdrawals and marital status suggest that a significant portion of the females in each group were not highly committed to teaching careers nor highly concerned with salaries and promotions. In contrast, large proportions of men are highly committed to pursuing careers within the education system and are likely to be very concerned with salary and promotion given that they are usually the primary wage-earners in their families.
Table 34: Marital Status of Female Public Elementary, Separate and Secondary Teachers, 1967-68.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Public Elementary</th>
<th>Separate Elementary++</th>
<th>Secondary++</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>9720</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>4055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>15436</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>3727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1751</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Classified</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27335</td>
<td></td>
<td>11910</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Numbers of female public school teachers in each category were derived by subtracting the number of female separate teachers from the total number of female elementary teachers in the category.
As evidence of the differences in commitment between males and females, differences in experience and educational attainment are relevant. Assuming that there is a positive correlation between experience and commitment, Tables 35 and 36 suggest that there is little difference in the commitment of male and female elementary teachers but a significant and increasing tendency for secondary males to be more highly committed as a group than females. Where the experience distributions of male and female elementary teachers in Table 35 are very similar in 1972-73 and 1973-74, the data on the experience of male and female secondary teachers (see Table 36) show that a clear tendency exists for males to be more experienced than females.

It seems plausible that the more time and energy one spends in preparing for an occupation, the more important pursuing a career in the occupation becomes. Thus we expect teachers' educational attainment to be related to commitment. Here the data indicate significant differences in the commitment of males and females at both the elementary and secondary levels. For example, from Table 37 it can be calculated that in 1972-73, 61.33% of elementary males had 4 or more years of education beyond grade 12 compared to 29.52% of elementary females. Looking down the line to 1977-78, the gap between males and females had changed little - comparable figures being 67.04% for males and 35.25% for females. The figures for male and female secondary teachers are not as dramatic. While Table 38 shows that the proportion of males in the top certification category has consistently been higher.
Table 35: Percentage Distribution of All Elementary Teachers by Sex and Experience, 1972-74.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Beginners</th>
<th>1-10</th>
<th>11-40</th>
<th>21-30</th>
<th>31-40</th>
<th>41+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>9.07</td>
<td>60.18%</td>
<td>22.60%</td>
<td>6.01%</td>
<td>1.95%</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>17,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>64.89%</td>
<td>18.06%</td>
<td>6.91%</td>
<td>2.33%</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
<td>42,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>59.28%</td>
<td>27.04%</td>
<td>7.03%</td>
<td>1.76%</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>18,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>63.63%</td>
<td>21.03%</td>
<td>8.00%</td>
<td>2.41%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>41,390</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission on Declining School Enrolments (1978b:212).
Table 36: Number and Percent of Secondary Teachers with Nine or More Years of Experience by Sex, 1966-75.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>4168</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>4502</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>4996</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>5401</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>6001</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>6959</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>7997</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>8970</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>10295</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 37: Percent of Male and Female Elementary Teachers with Four or More Years of Education Beyond Grade 12 by Sex, 1972-78.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent of all Males</th>
<th>Percent of all Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>61.33%</td>
<td>28.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>71.97</td>
<td>34.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>78.80</td>
<td>41.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>71.99</td>
<td>37.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>71.39</td>
<td>38.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>67.04</td>
<td>35.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 38: Percent of Male and Female Secondary Teachers in Highest Certification Category (Category 4) by Sex, 1966-78.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent of all Males</th>
<th>Percent of all Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

than the proportion of females, the percentage of females in this
category (i.e., category 4) has never fallen more than 17 points below
the percentage of males in the category.

The main point in discussing teachers' experience and education
here has been to supply some support for the view that sex differences
relate to differences in occupational concerns and commitment. This is
important because it is assumed that these sex-related differences in
orientation may carry consequences for teacher solidarity. Let us turn
to these consequences now.

For the secondary group the differences in male and female
orientations may not have been as great as the differences between
males and females in the public and separate elementary groups and,
hence, may have been less of an impediment to teacher solidarity in the
secondary group. Certainly, by the 1974-76 period, when militancy was
peaking, there is reason to believe that some significant number of
females was coming to hold male-orientations. First, the number of
women leaving to take care of home or children had decreased substan-
tially by the mid-seventies. Second, the proportions of women who had
invested enough effort in education to obtain category 4 status,
reached 33.5% in 1974-75, and by 1975-76 was up to 37.6%. That secon-
dary females, as a group, had invested significantly more time in
obtaining an education is indicated by the fact that, in 1973-74, 82.6%
of the secondary females held B.A.'s or higher degrees compared to
18.4% of elementary females. Finally, it might be noted that the pro-
portion of secondary females who were single or "other" (i.e., widowed,
divorced or separated) and hence, more likely to be providing their own incomes, was higher in 1968-69 than the proportions of public or separate school teachers. Assuming this difference held true over time, a significant number of secondary females may have been quite concerned with salary issues by the mid-seventies. Regardless of whether conditions facilitating cross-sex solidarity of secondary teachers increased through the seventies, it does not appear that there was a significant improvement in such conditions during the germination phase of militancy. However, the numeric superiority of males coupled with male overrepresentation in key positions of influence in the schools was probably enough to prevent any female counter-rebellion at this time.

Where sex composition has played the greatest role in hindering solidarity is in the public elementary group, where sex differences are reinforced by differences in organizational affiliation. Rather than belonging to the same teachers' federation, male public elementary school teachers belong to the Ontario Public School Men Teachers' Federation (OPSMTF), and female public elementary school teachers are members of the Federation of Women Teachers' Association of Ontario (FWTAO). The justification for the existence of separate federations for men and women rests on the assumption that the interests of men and women are different. In the past, the women's federation pushed for equal-pay for equal-work. More recently, concern has focused on getting women promoted into positions of responsibility.

This relatively recent stress on promotions hits at one of the
most evident barriers to cross-sex solidarity among the public elementary teachers - the extreme over-representation of males and underrepresentation of females in positions of responsibility. The tendency for sex and position within the school to coincide is shown in Table 39.

Table 39 suggests that three significant, and separable groups with quite differing interests may exist within the public school elementary group: (1) males in positions of responsibility, (2) males who are classroom teachers, and (3) female classroom teachers. The formal organization of the elementary teachers along sex-lines only helps to insure that the common interests of male and female classroom teachers are obscured as a basis for group solidarity.

A special point should be made here with regard to the tendency for the proportion of males among elementary teachers to increase over time. A number of authors have argued that increases in the proportions of male teachers contribute to militancy. Males are seen to be socialized to be more aggressive than females, more likely to be primary wage-earners and, thus, more likely to place high value on economic rewards; more likely to come from a working class background and thus it is assumed to be more receptive to the use of union-like tactics. While we saw earlier in Table 32 that the proportion of male public school elementary teachers has increased, the rate of increase is not dramatic, which is consistent with the lack of militancy on the part of public school teachers. However, if the increase continues along with the decline in opportunities for vertical mobility, one can
Table 39: Percent of Positions of Responsibility Held by Males, and Males as a Percent of the Total Teaching Group, 1972-1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Elementary Males as a Percent of:</th>
<th>Secondary Males as a Percent of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Teachers</td>
<td>Principals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>83.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>85.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

anticipate growing support for militant action among the elementary group. At a minimum, the tendency for principals and others in positions of responsibility to dominate within the local federations is likely to be challenged by male teachers who have little to lose once the gateway to promotions is closed.

Differences in status and position create division within the men's federation, but the key impediment to solidarity in the elementary group as a whole remains in the separate federation membership of the sexes. Recent years have seen the provincial office of the FWTAO latch on to the women's movement with support of feminists at OISE. By sponsoring assertiveness training, revealing inequalities in promotions and by generally pushing women to compete with men for positions of responsibility, the provincial federation has created a new rationale for its existence. Attempts by the OPSMTF to court the FWTAO into a formal union have been rebuffed by the FWTAO leadership. As has been suggested to me by several women teachers, the FWTAO suspects the men's intentions are not honourable. As they put it, "All they want is our money." Clearly with about 66% of elementary teachers being dues-paying members of the FWTAO there is a lot money to be had. Somewhat ironically, it appears that the development of a feminist militancy with regard to promotions among both provincial and local leaders of the FWTAO has helped to prevent a broader teacher militancy among public elementary teachers.

This said, it is noteworthy that the FWTAO appears to view amalgamation with the men as a threat rather than an opportunity.
Given their numbers, one would expect that such a merger would be to their advantage. The fact that the leadership appears to view merger as a threat suggests that the solidarity of the women's group itself is questionable.

In part, the effect of sex composition on the solidarity of the separate school teachers is difficult to assess because of a lack of data. The separate group appears to be like the public elementary group in several respects. First, males tend to be highly overrepresented in positions of responsibility. Second, females appear to be less committed to careers than males. They are less well educated and have been prone to withdraw from teaching to home life. Finally, a large number of female separate school teachers appear to be second-income earners. Thus, there are a number of conditions which would appear to support cleavage within the group along sex-lines. The tendency to cleavage between the sexes can, however, be seen to be broached by at least three factors which are not present among the public elementary group. Unlike the public elementary school teachers, separate school teachers are members of the same federations regardless of their sex. Also important is the fact that both males and females could be seen to be experiencing significant economic deprivation vis-à-vis same sex comparisons with public elementary teachers. Finally, separate school teachers are united by sharing the same religion and in many local groups this is reinforced by the sharing of a common ethnic background. It should be noted that the religious factor is double-edged. On one hand, it contributes to solidarity
which may help to further militancy, on the other hand, it creates cross-pressures in that it links teachers more tightly to parents who may disapprove of militant action. Moreover, the religious emphasis in separate schools has, in the past, been reflected in a fair number of "religious" teachers (i.e., nuns and priests) being part of the federation membership. For example, in 1967-68, 12.3% of separate school teachers were "religious" teachers. In recent years separate schools have become increasingly secular with the proportion of "religious" teachers declining. However, in the late sixties the presence of relatively large proportions of "religious" teachers could have provided a strong conservative influence within the schools.

Clearly it is impossible to provide a precise measure of the degree to which sex differences hindered solidarity within our three groups or of the degree to which cleavage between males and females increased or decreased over time. Nonetheless, some general conclusions are possible. Sex differences appear to be most important in the public elementary group where they are reinforced by separate federation membership. In separate and secondary schools it is less clear that cleavage along sex-lines had a significant effect on group solidarity. Within the separate group, several factors operate to override differences that might exist due to sex, while within the secondary group there appears to be a tendency for females to become more like men. More important within the secondary group is the fact that females are a numeric minority and subject to strong influence from male teachers who are in positions of authority.
Age Composition. Occupational concerns clearly vary with age. The youngster starting a career may be concerned with establishing job security, the person ten or so years into a career may be extremely concerned with opportunities for promotion and with achieving a salary high enough to support a family or buy a home, while a person nearing retirement may focus attention on pensions and retirement policy. Further, difference in age may relate not only to what individuals see as key concerns but to the standards they utilize in evaluating the "goodness" of rewards issuing from the work situation. The older teacher who has risen through the ranks may find it difficult to view things as bleakly as a younger teacher faced with few opportunities for mobility.

Because differences in age may relate to differences in occupational concerns and evaluation standards, cleavages in age structure of teachers may hinder group solidarity. Data for secondary teachers in Table 40 show that there has been very little danger of a generation gap splitting the secondary group between 1966-67 and 1977-78.

While age structure appears to pose no great barriers to solidarity, the fact that from 1967 to 1974-75 the largest concentration of teachers was found in the 25-29 and 30-34 age groups deserves mention vis-à-vis our general concern with militancy. Put simply, the point is that militancy developed in a period when a large proportion of the secondary teachers were at ages where their concern with income and promotions could be expected to be high.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Less than 20</th>
<th>21-4</th>
<th>5-9</th>
<th>30-4</th>
<th>35-9</th>
<th>40-4</th>
<th>45-9</th>
<th>50-4</th>
<th>55-9</th>
<th>60-4</th>
<th>65+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unfortunately, data are not available separately for the age distributions of public and separate school elementary teachers. Data which combine these groups reveal a picture similar to that found for secondary teachers (see Table 41). In fact, if anything, elementary teachers appear to be somewhat more homogeneous in age than the secondary teachers.

While the age structures of the groups appear conducive to solidarity there is the possibility that significant differences occur in the age distributions of the sexes which could hinder solidarity. For the elementary group there is a consistent pattern of difference over time - females are overrepresented in the youngest and oldest age groups and significantly underrepresented in the 30-39 age group. Although the differences in male and female age distributions are clear and consistent, they are not of such magnitude as to create a schism between males and females by themselves. However, they may reinforce existing schisms.

As an aside, it can be noted that the pattern of the female age distributions is perfectly consistent with our early discussion of female teachers' occupational orientations. It is a pattern consistent with young women teaching until marriage and then opting out for family life during their thirties with some re-entry after child rearing.

Data on the age distribution of secondary teachers reveals the same pattern between the sexes in Table 42. However, if we compare female teachers' age distributions with those of elementary females, we find two interesting facts. First, consistent with our earlier argument
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age in years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19 &amp; Under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>57.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>55.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>54.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>52.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>54.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>52.54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission on Declining School Enrolment (1978b:211).
Table 42: Percentage Distribution of Secondary Teachers by Sex and Age, 1972-75.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>20 or less</th>
<th>21-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>50-59</th>
<th>60-64</th>
<th>65+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

that secondary females are more likely to be caretakers than elementary females, we find that larger percentages of secondary teachers fall in the 30-39 age group than is the case for elementary teachers. Second, both groups of females show signs of increasing commitment as the percent of both groups in the 30-39 category has increased over time.

To conclude this section, we can say that while age does not appear to provide a strong, independent basis for cleavage within teacher groups by itself, differences in age between males and females may reinforce any existing tendency toward cleavage along sex-lines.

**Education and Experience Composition.** Differences in education and experience are also expected to be associated with differences in teachers' interests and concerns. With regard to experience, Table 43 indicates that, in the first half of the 1970's, all three groups of teachers had a high concentration of teachers with one to ten years of experience. More important *vis-a-vis* teacher solidarity, there is no sizable group of teachers with more than ten years experience.

Table 44 gives the distribution of teachers separately for males and females. Relative to males, females in all groups tend to be slightly overrepresented in the lower experience categories and underrepresented in higher categories. However, there does not appear to be enough difference in any of the pairs of distributions to argue that differences in experience significantly contributed to, or even reinforced, cleavage between the sexes.

Differences in education are another matter. By virtue of the fact that having a B.A. or its equivalent has long been a basic
### Table 43: Experience Distributions of Teachers by Teacher Group, 1972-73, 1975-76, 1976-77.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1-3</th>
<th>4-6</th>
<th>7-9</th>
<th>10-12</th>
<th>13+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Elementary 1972-73</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1-3</th>
<th>4-6</th>
<th>7-9</th>
<th>10-12</th>
<th>13+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Separate Elementary 1972-73</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>56.6%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1-3</th>
<th>4-6</th>
<th>7-9</th>
<th>10-12</th>
<th>13+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Teachers 1972-73</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the Ontario Minister of Education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0-3</td>
<td>4-7</td>
<td>8-11</td>
<td>12+</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0-3</td>
<td>4-7</td>
<td>8-11</td>
<td>12+</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>13486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>39223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>not available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>17217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>43184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>11322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>17860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>44348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>9945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

requirement for secondary teaching, the range of variation in the education of secondary teachers is limited. In contrast, a university degree was not required for elementary teachers prior to 1973-74. As a result there are still substantial numbers of elementary teachers who do not hold degrees. Table 45 reflects this fact in the number of teachers shown with less than four years academic/professional training beyond grade 12. While the most striking aspect of the table is the increase in elementary teachers' educational attainment since 1966-67, what is important to us is the emergence of a bi-modal distribution of teachers in the seventies. Although a significant number of elementary teachers appeared to have held degrees, a significant number did not and still do not. Whether or not this compositional characteristic acts as a divisive force within the elementary groups is open to question. On one hand, we saw from Table 22 that those elementary teachers who hold degrees are more likely to experience relative economic deprivation than those who do not, and hence may be more concerned with salary issues. On the other hand, teachers with degrees are more likely to have received promotions which may cool their concern with salaries, but at the same time, may serve to create a set of occupational concerns quite different from those of classroom teachers.

What is more clear is that cleavages in educational attainment do coincide with the sex-cleavage in the elementary group. As Table 46 demonstrates, over time, males are increasingly overrepresented in the higher educational attainment categories. Given that educational
Table 45: Percentage Distribution of Elementary Teachers and Principals by Years of Academic/Professional Training Beyond Grade 12.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Teachers</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>39264</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>41125</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>43075</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>44864</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>47647</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>52739</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>60719</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>38.63</td>
<td>15.35</td>
<td>11.76</td>
<td>10.63</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>59701</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>30.58</td>
<td>17.92</td>
<td>13.81</td>
<td>22.26</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>4.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>59093</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>24.94</td>
<td>17.31</td>
<td>14.60</td>
<td>26.11</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>5.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>61164</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>20.73</td>
<td>14.53</td>
<td>13.04</td>
<td>24.05</td>
<td>7.24</td>
<td>4.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>60090</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>22.64</td>
<td>13.92</td>
<td>12.38</td>
<td>22.31</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>4.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1972-78 Annual Reports of the Ontario Minister of Education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>1967-68</th>
<th>1968-69</th>
<th>1969-70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Degree</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>91.8%</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.A.</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.A. or Ph.D.</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>13494</td>
<td>39245</td>
<td>17254</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

attainment is associated with promotion, we would expect this same pattern of male overrepresentation to be found in positions of responsibility.

**Positions of Responsibility and Solidarity.** One of the recurrent points of debate between boards and teachers centres on the role of the principal. From the board perspective, principals should be viewed as management and thus excluded from the teachers' bargaining unit. On the other hand, teachers have argued that principals should be viewed as "principal-teachers" and remain part of the bargaining unit, although teachers themselves recognize that the role of principals differs enough from that of classroom teachers to justify the existence of various principals' associations within the structure of the federations.

The key point here is that principals and, to a lesser extent, other persons in positions of responsibility are caught in a situation of dual-allegiance. We expect that the tensions created by conflicting role expectations lead many principals to wish for a clear resolve to the issue of whether they are managers or teachers. Further, we expect that the direction of resolve is likely to depend to some extent on the degree to which those in positions of responsibility share attributes with classroom teachers. Conversely, the direction of resolve depends on the extent that those in positions of responsibility are different in their attributes from classroom teachers. Data already presented suggests that, for elementary teachers, potential cleavages based on sex, age, and education coincide with the potential for cleavage based on positions of responsibility.
Unfortunately, much of our data bunch public and separate elementary teachers together, making it impossible to distinguish the two groups. In order to examine the degree to which sex and holding a position of responsibility are associated in the two groups, I have first counted the number of male and female separate school principals by examining given names listed in the Ontario Ministry of Education's Directory of Education for the school year 1973-74. Of all separate school principals listed, approximately 402 can be clearly classified as female, 720 as male, and 160 cannot be classified with certainty. If we subtract the number of separate school female principals from the total number of elementary female principals reported for 1973-74 in Table 13, we obtain a generous estimate of the number of female public school elementary principals which is 184. In sum, the data from the directory suggest a much greater overrepresentation of males in public school principalships than is the case for separate school principalships. However, it should be noted that more than 3/4's of the female separate school principals were nuns in 1973-74. Their strong religious ties may have served to cut them off from both male and female lay teachers, but their presence prevented a clean cleavage between the sexes in positions of responsibility.

In the case of secondary teachers, there is no doubt that males have disproportionately occupied the top positions of responsibility, however, if all positions of responsibility are grouped together, it is clear that secondary females have been more successful in obtaining such positions than have elementary females. From 1972-73 to 1977-78
the percent of female secondary teachers in positions of responsibility
has hovered around 18% while the percent of elementary females in such
positions has stayed close to 3% (see Table 47).

Social Class Composition. Our concern with the social class
composition of teachers is twofold. First, differences in class
background, like differences in other attributes, may hinder group
cohesion. Second, and somewhat removed from the issue of solidarity,
we expect a relationship between social class and attitudes toward
collective militancy. Specifically, it is assumed that persons of
working-class origins will be more likely to be supportive of the use
of union tactics by teachers.

On the issue of solidarity there is some evidence to suggest
that teaching attracts middle and upper-middle class women and working
class males (Watson, 1972b:5). However, there appears to be a fair
degree of variation in the class backgrounds of both males and females.
Lacking any detailed information on Ontario teachers' socio-economic
origins, I do not want to pursue the relationship between class
composition and solidarity very far. However, there is one plausible
observation I do want to make with regard to separate school teachers.
Because of the tendency for lower-class status and Catholicism to be
associated and because of the tendency for persons of Italian and
French ethnic origins to be overrepresented in lower status occupations
it is possible that a substantial proportion of the separate school
teachers share a working-class background which would not only con-
tribute to the group's solidarity but its acceptance of militancy as well.
Table 47: Percent of Female Elementary and Secondary Teachers in Positions of Responsibility, 1972-73 to 1977-78.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent Elementary Females</th>
<th>Percent Secondary Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission on Declining School Enrolments (1978b:190,269).
Turning to our second concern, there is reason to believe that the secondary group experienced a significant increase in the number of teachers who were males of working class origin and who had previously been members of blue-collar unions during the 1960's. Largely due to the availability of money from the federal government through the Technical and Vocational Training Assistance Act, the Ontario government was able and willing to expand facilities for technical and vocational education in the secondary schools. The extent of this expansion is indicated by Donald MacDonald's observation that the number of secondary schools which provided vocational and technical education went from "no more than 72" in 1960 to "something like 237" in 1965. This expansion in facilities was accompanied by an increase in enrolments and an increase in the need for teachers able to teach vocational and technical courses. In other words, there was a sudden and strong demand for craftsmen and skilled industrial workers. This demand is reflected in Table 48 which reports the number of vocational teaching certificates issued by year. Although vocational and technical teachers did not come to constitute the majority of secondary teachers provincially, it is quite likely that they came to form a significant proportion of the teaching group in cities where a large portion of the school-aged population would likely be looking to industrial employment such as Windsor, Sudbury, Thunder Bay, Oshawa, Sault Ste. Marie and the urban core of Toronto. Vocational and technical teachers not only were more likely to have had union experience but may have been more likely to find the salaries of
Table 48: Number of Vocational Type B Certificates Issued by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Certificates Issued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>425 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

non-teaching industrial workers as highly salient in evaluating their teaching salaries.

**Summary.** If pressed to rank the teachers groups in terms of their potential for solidarity the secondary teachers would receive the highest ranking followed by the separate school teachers with the lowest rank going to the public elementary. In all three groups, sex provides a potential base for cleavage and is associated with differences in age, experience, education and position within the school. However, for the secondary group the differences between the sexes are less pronounced than is the case for the two elementary groups. The tendency for cleavage between the sexes in the two elementary groups is accompanied by the potential for cleavage within the female sub-groups. This is especially salient for public elementary females whose federation has been pushing women to make strong career commitments, but which contains a large number of women with low commitment.

The reason for seeing greater potential for solidarity among the separate school teachers rests primarily on the assumption that commonalities of religion, relative economic deprivation, single federation membership and perhaps class background and ethnicity may override differences in the sexes. Overall, probably the most important factor differentiating the two more militant groups from the public school teachers is their single federation structure. In all groups there is a potential basis for conflict between the sexes, but only in the public elementary group is there a clear channel for articulating women's interests apart from men's.
With regard to the role of solidarity in the development of militancy, our data on group composition provides no clear evidence of solidarity being a triggering factor. But it must be realized that compositional data is a crude indicator of solidarity. People with identical attributes, facing identical problems, are unlikely to be cohesive or to take any collective action unless they are organized. Thus we now turn to the examination of organizational attributes of the teacher groups.

B. Organizational Factors and Militancy

Ontario teachers have been formally organized for a long time. Solidarity, however, is not a necessary consequence of formal organization. In fact, in some cases, the pre-existence of formal organization may actually mitigate against the type of solidarity needed for militancy to emerge. Perhaps more important for the development of militancy than formal organization is the development of strong informal channels of communication which can carry information quickly and efficiently. In view of this, an attempt will be made to examine both the formal and informal organization of the three groups of teachers.

Formal Organization. The formal structure of the teacher federations to which our teachers belong can foster or hinder the solidarity felt by teachers in a variety of ways. Where the provincial federation is organized to provide a formal conduit for communication between local units as well as between local units and the provincial
office, the structure may contribute to solidarity across the province. Likewise, to the extent that the organization of the provincial federations provides formal mechanisms for local representatives to meet and to participate in provincial level decision-making, solidarity may be enhanced. On the other hand, if structures or procedures of the provincial federation limit cross-local participation and influence in provincial federation matters, alienation may be the result. In a moment we will turn our attention to the formal organization of the federations in order to explore its impact on solidarity. First, however, it is necessary to make it clear why cross-provincial solidarity is an important issue in the study of local teacher militancy.

The validity of a study of local teacher militancy rests to a large extent on the assumption that local bargaining units have some significant autonomy from their provincial headquarters. However, it must be admitted that the ability of a local group to take action, and more particularly, militant action is influenced by the resources made available to it from the provincial organization. Further, the ability of the provincial organization to support a local group in conflict with a board is often dependent on the solidarity of the full provincial membership. For example, prior to the passage of Bill 100 which recognized teachers right to strike, the success of a mass resignation depended upon the provincial organization's willingness and ability to keep other teachers from taking jobs with the board where the mass resignation was in effect. More recently, the provision of strike funds has depended on cross-provincial solidarity.
Vis-à-vis the development of teacher solidarity, one of the key historical events in the evolution of Ontario teacher federations was the passage of the Teaching Profession Act of 1944. What is critical about this act is that it required all teachers to be members of the Ontario Teachers' Federation (OTF). In turn, the OTF requires that "a statutory member of the OTF shall be a member of an affiliated body..." (i.e., one of the five affiliated teachers' federations) and specifies criteria for teachers' choice of affiliate. Sex, teaching level, religion and language are all factors in determining to what federation a teacher will belong. To be female and teaching in a public elementary school means membership in the Federation of Women Teachers' Associations of Ontario (FW). To be male and teaching in a public elementary school is to be affiliated with the Ontario Public School Men Teachers' Federation (OPS). At the secondary level, sex differences are replaced by language differences in determining membership. Francophone teachers who teach French-speaking students in French high schools, are members of L'Association des Enseignants Franco-Ontariens (AEFO), while the remainder of secondary school teachers pay their dues to the Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation (OSSTF). Finally, if a teacher works in a Catholic separate school, he or she can be a member of either the Ontario English Catholic Teachers' Association (OECTA) or of the AEFO, depending on the language of instruction. Again, AEFO membership is indicated if the teacher is French speaking and teaching in a French language separate school. Statutory membership significantly increased the power and legitimacy of the federations.
A second key historical fact is that the establishment of the OTF in 1944 did not result in a significant reduction of the autonomy of the five affiliates. The three following policy resolutions of the OTF illustrate its lack of control over affiliates rather well.

"It is the policy of the OTF that...

... where an affiliate has adopted a policy that may adversely affect other affiliates, such a matter shall be brought to the Board of Governors for discussion.

... that in a dispute between an affiliated body and a board of trustees, OTF takes action only at the request of the provincial executive of the affiliated bodies involved.

... that any conciliation in the event of salary disputes between trustees and teachers be in the hands of the OTF affiliate(s) concerned. (Ontario Teachers' Federation, 1971:27, 33.)

Even when affiliates step on each other's toes the best the OTF can do is discuss the incident - no official power is provided for resolving it. Negotiations are clearly the concerns of affiliates with the OTF only becoming involved at an affiliate's request. The OTF is an organization aimed at dealing with the affiliate's common concerns. The failure to provide the OTF with any serious power only goes to show how strongly the concerns of the affiliates differ.

The Structure of the Affiliates. Formally each of the affiliates is a federation of local units or associations. Figure 2 provides some rather basic, but potentially important information on organizational differences between the affiliates. What is key is the fact that the FW and OPS memberships are organized into many more sub-units than are the other affiliates' memberships. Where 51 districts of the OSSFT and 49 units of OECTA send representatives to
Figure 2: The Structure of Teachers' Federations in Ontario, 1976

ONTARIO TEACHERS' FEDERATION
Approximately 105,000 members five affiliated bodies

- Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation
  - Federation of Women Teachers' Associations of Ontario
    - Approximately 34,000 members
  - Fifty-One Districts
    - Divided into branches of one school staff each

- Federation of Men Teachers' Associations of Ontario
  - Approximately 33,000 members
  - Five Regions
    - Divided into 78 associations

- Ontario Public School Teachers' Federation
  - Approximately 14,000 members
  - Seventy-One Districts
    - Some districts divided into branches by geographical areas

- Ontario English Catholic Teachers' Association
  - Approximately 16,500 members
  - Forty-Nine Units
    - Divided into locals

- L'Association des Enseignants Franco-Ontariens
  - Approximately 5,200 members
  - Twenty-Eight Regional Districts

annual assemblies to elect provincial executives and vote on provincial policy, 78 separate associations of the FW and 71 districts of the OPS send representatives to their respective annual assemblies. One potential effect of the greater number of sub-units in the public elementary teachers' federations is to increase communication, participation and solidarity at the local level while, at the same time, hindering cross-provincial solidarity and identification as well as limiting the influence any single association may have over provincial policy.

It would be dangerous to take the differences in the number of sub-units as any more than a hint that cross-provincial solidarity is weaker in the FW and the OPS for many of the sub-groups may contain very small numbers of teachers. In order to go any further we must take a more detailed look at the organizational characteristics of the affiliates.

All of the federations regularly publish official journals and newsletters which, among other things, serve as a potential means of exchanging news and views among the membership. However, it would require a study in itself to determine the effectiveness of these publications in providing a communication link among the membership. Participation and representation are somewhat easier issues to deal with than formal communications. On the surface, each of the federations makes similar arrangements for local participation and representation in the provincial organizations' affairs. The constitutions and by-laws of all affiliates give ultimate formal
authority over the provincial organization to an annual general assembly made up of delegates from local units. The number of delegates any unit may send to the general assembly is basically in proportion to the number of members in the local unit (OECTA and FW allow one delegate per 50 members, OSSTF approximately one per 100 and OPS one per 131).

While ultimate power formally lies with the assemblies the fact that the assemblies meet but once a year necessitates some provision for delegation of authority between assemblies. In each federation two bodies handle the day-to-day concerns of the provincial federation and set interim policies. One body is the executive of the federation, usually made up of the past provincial president, president, vice-president(s), treasurer and several executive officers along with some appointed members from the head office staff. The other body, often called a Board of Directors, contains some members of the executive along with representatives of local units. It is this second body that is accorded the explicit power to make interim policy in the case of the OSSTF and FW. In the case of the OPS and OECTA, neither the executive nor the Board of Directors has explicit authority to set federation policy although the mandates of both groups are clear enough to suggest that they have significant policy authority.

Having mentioned broad similarities in organization, it is time to note one key difference. This difference lies in the way the federations select local representatives to serve on their Boards of Directors. In the case of the OSSTF, what we have been calling the
Board of Directors is the Provincial Executive Council. Here each district of the federation is required to elect one provincial counsellor to represent it. In addition to serving on the Executive Council, the Provincial Counsellor is constitutionally required to be a member of the local district executive and is responsible for liaison between the district and provincial organizations. Unique to the OSSTF, a counsellor's vote on policy issues is weighted according to the size of the district he or she represents.

In OECTA, as with the OSSTF, one representative is elected from each unit and is a member of the unit executive. The OPS is only slightly different from the OSSTF and OECTA. Here the president of the local district is automatically a member of the OPS Council of District Presidents which serves to represent local concerns at the Provincial Office.

The FW stands in contrast to the foregoing three affiliates in being the only organization that does not allow local associations to directly elect their own representatives to the provincial Board of Directors. Although each of the 78 associations has a complete complement of executive officers, each does not have a representative on the Board of Directors. The FW Board contains 31 voting Directors with 30 of the 31 being representatives of Regions (six directors being elected for each of the five FW regions). These "representatives" are not elected by local associations nor are they elected by the region. Rather, at an annual regional assembly, the regional membership makes "selections" of candidates to stand for election at the annual
provincial assembly. At the provincial assembly additional nominations may be received from the floor and the entire assembly votes on all Directors. Thus, it is theoretically possible for a region to end up with representatives it did not nominate and for whom it did not vote. The logic behind this procedure according to the FW handbook is that "... this practice allows directors to come from a region although each director serves the whole membership". In general, the concern with representation is much weaker in the FW than in the other federations. This is reflected in the fact that, while Directors are told that they should visit and communicate with local associations, they are not required to do so nor are they required to represent local concerns at the provincial office.

What we have said so far is enough to suggest that the organizational structure of the FW may be less conducive to solidarity than the structure of the other affiliates. Where other affiliates are careful to provide a direct channel of influence and communication between local units and the provincial office the FW provides only an indirect channel. There is another side to this coin. By choosing to represent large regions rather than local units with special interests, FW is able to show greater unanimity and solidarity among the provincial leadership than is the case for the other federations. But such solidarity at the top does not necessarily reflect membership solidarity.

In the case of the OSSTF the reverse is almost true. That is, because local units are represented directly on a policy-making body
and because representatives’ votes are weighted by the size of the local membership, the possibility of conflict and, equally important, change in organizational policies stemming from a local district or coalition of local districts is more likely. Put in another way, the possibility of a rebel group taking over or at least making use of the provincial organization is, and has been greater, in the OSSTF than in the other affiliates.

Informal Organization. One of the key factors affecting the strength of informal organization and hence solidarity, is the ease with which informal communication can take place. Here there are clear differences between secondary and elementary school teachers.

There would appear to be two factors which are conducive to greater informal communication at the sub-unit level in the secondary group relative to the elementary groups. The first is size and distribution of the schools. Historically, secondary schools have tended to be larger than elementary schools and to have larger catchment areas. Where elementary teachers tend to be grouped in little pockets across the region served by a board, the secondary teachers are concentrated in large numbers in a relatively small number of schools. For example, in 1973-74 the Carleton Board of Education operated 59 elementary schools with an average of 20.6 full-time teachers per school and 11 secondary schools with an average of 71.3 full-time teachers. Under the neighbouring Ottawa Board of Education the same pattern appears with 57 elementary schools having an average of 17.2 teachers and 25 secondary schools averaging 64.5 teachers. Clearly,
in the secondary schools the density of teachers is higher, making informal contact easier.

As an aside, the effect of the larger size of secondary schools' catchment areas on community cross-pressure can be noted. Because secondary schools draw students from a larger area which often encompasses a number of neighbourhoods, there is less likelihood that parents will form a unified interest group to bring pressure on militant teachers than is the case at the elementary level. At the elementary level the greater tendency for catchment areas to coincide with homogeneous communities, coupled with the fact that many of the elementary teachers are likely to be mothers who have chosen to teach in their own neighbourhoods, makes the possibility of strong cross-pressure against militancy more likely.

Turning back to the issue of informal communications, the role of the organization of work in elementary and secondary schools can be noted. In the elementary systems teachers have responsibility for the same small group of children for the entire working day. Only a few specialists (e.g., music teachers, art teachers) deal with all of the school's pupils. In contrast, secondary teachers teach their specialty to a number of different groups of students. Where primary responsibility for a child's education lies in one teacher's hands at the elementary level, a number of teachers share this responsibility at the secondary level. Unless one is extremely cynical, this sharing of responsibility at the secondary level is likely to beget greater teacher-to-teacher interaction.
To this point we have considered only factors which could influence communications (and by implication solidarity) at the local level. How this relates to cross-provincial solidarity is open to question. However, it is noteworthy that only the OSSTF formally recognizes the importance of the school as a vital unit in the organization of the provincial federation. By-law 14 of the OSSTF provides a detailed list of communications responsibilities for the Staff Representative of each school. Thus it would appear that the OSSTF has attempted to interface formal and informal lines of communication more than the other federations.

**Turnover.** Whatever the formal structure of the federation, the potential for informal communication and organization, or the homogeneity of the group, all our teacher groups may have difficulty in developing solidarity at both the local and provincial levels if turnover is high. As Table 49 shows, turnover has been, and continues to be, higher in the elementary groups than in the secondary group suggesting a somewhat more stable base for organizing the secondary teachers. But, it is also instructive to note that the separate school teachers have had, and continue to have, a higher rate of turnover than public elementary teachers. Since separate school teachers have been more prone to militancy than public school teachers it seems unlikely that turnover alone has been a very significant factor in either solidarity or militancy.
Table 49: Turnover Rates (Number of Withdrawals as a Percentage of the Teacher Force) by Teacher Group and Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public Elementary Teachers</th>
<th>Separate School Teachers</th>
<th>Secondary Teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the Ontario Ministry of Education.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP AND MILITANCY

One of the key factors which may either retard or stimulate the development of local militancy is the receptivity of provincial federation leaders to militancy. In this section our primary aim is to examine the evolution of the provincial federations' leadership through the late sixties and early seventies in order to determine the role such leadership may have played in the general rise of militancy and in restraining or encouraging local militancy. 7

A. The OSSTF Leadership.

In reviewing material on the OSSTF leadership one gets the impression that the development of militant leaders was as much a consequence as a cause of militancy among the rank-and-file. According to Downie (1978), there has historically been a strong conservative streak in the OSSTF leadership, with concern over tenure and superannuation outweighing concern with salaries and working conditions. Martell goes further, arguing that the OSSTF has been conservative in its orientation toward authorities as well as in its choice of concerns. As he put it, writing in 1974,

"... the leadership and secretariat of the OSSTF have helped build a very strong relationship between themselves, the Department of Education and the local school boards, based on the assumption of a shared community of interests. Those at the top of OSSTF came to think that the political officers and

7. Rather than analyze the leadership of all five federations, I have chosen to focus on the three largest federations (i.e., OSSTF, OECTA and FW).
administrative officials of these units were interchangeable, capable of moving from one part of the system to another."
(Martell, 1974:223-6).

The communality-of-interest ideology was a clear impediment to provincial leaders encouraging militant action. For old-timers among the provincial leadership who had friends and former colleagues in the Department of Education, the view that authorities were adversaries was undoubtedly hard to accept. However, the convergence of several factors in the late sixties and early seventies significantly reduced the power and credibility of the more conservative elements within the OSSTF leadership.

The factors and conditions which reduced conservatism and contributed to the growth of a more militant orientation at the provincial offices of the OSSTF may be placed in three categories. First, there were actions of educational authorities which were hard to reconcile with the view that teachers and authorities shared strong common interests. Second, there were changes in the provincial leadership structure which increased the influence of more militant elements on OSSTF policy. Third, there was growing pressure on the provincial leadership to become more militant from radicalized local districts. Beyond these three conditions, there was a broader factor which provided pressure for greater militancy on the part of leaders of all of the federations. This was the shift from under to oversupply of teachers which occurred in the early seventies. Under a condition of oversupply the utility of milder sanctions such as "pink-listing" was declining, pushing teachers to look for new and more effective sanctions.
In the early seventies there were at least three key actions of the Provincial Department of Education which undermined the one big "happy-family" image held by many within the provincial leadership of the OSSTF. First was the imposition of ceilings on school board expenditures in 1971. According to Hennessy, the spending ceilings were introduced

"... to ensure that 'rich' boards of education did not use their tax power to worsen inequalities of educational opportunity in different parts of the province. The ceilings were also meant to control spending for education at a time when other services were clamouring for more support, and Canadian society as a whole was trying to control inflation. In simplest terms, the ceilings set a maximum amount per school child that could be spent by the boards." (Hennessy, 1975:53).

Although the manifest intent of ceilings was not to penalize teachers, it was clear to many teachers that the decision to impose ceilings was made with little regard to their interests, nor (they claimed) to the interests of their students. Ceilings threatened both teachers' salaries and security, especially, in urban areas where boards were being forced not only to live within their means, but to live according to the same means as poorer rural boards. As a result, many boards became more tight-fisted in negotiating salary increases and began to push for larger pupil-teacher ratios to reduce staff and save money.

While the imposition of ceilings clearly strained relations between leaders of all federations and educational authorities, ceilings alone were not sufficient to push the leadership of the OSSTF to adopt a strong adversarial stance. However, ceilings did bring the possibility of the OSSTF taking such a stance into the realm of open
8. This is reflected in the articles and letters printed in the house organ of the OSSTF, The Bulletin. The early seventies saw a significant increase in the space devoted to the desirability of the OSSTF adopting a union structure and orientation as well as critical commentary on the effects of ceilings.
Living and Learning, H.S.1 provided for a credit system in which students had much greater freedom to choose what they would learn and in which reaching one's potential was valued much higher than jumping a standard set of educational hurdles. Further, H.S.1 threw the responsibility for developing new courses to meet students diverse learning requirements over to the boards and teachers.

Contrary to what one might expect from a group of supposedly frustrated professionals, the increase in their own power to decide what they would teach was not well received. Rather, the OSSTF complained that by adding H.S.1 on top of spending ceilings the provincial government was placing impossible demands on secondary teachers. At the same time that the new curriculum emphasized the needs of the individual student, the resources needed to facilitate attention to individual needs were seen to be reduced or underdeveloped due to the restraint on spending. The upshot of this was that the OSSTF recommended a return to a required core curriculum (OSSTF:1976).

If the problem was merely one of too few resources to do an adequate job, there was no need to press for a return to basics. The OSSTF argued that the problem involved more than this: that there was a core of knowledge students needed to obtain whether they liked it or not. Both Martell (1974) and Hennessy (1979) hinted that job security for core curriculum teachers was a serious motivating force in the OSSTF response. For those teachers who had taught required courses the implication of H.S.1 was quite likely "innovate or lose your job". With an increasing over-supply of new teachers whose services came
cheap and the presence of spending restraints, boards would clearly have found it advantageous to rid themselves of experienced teachers who couldn't attract students.

Perhaps more important in breaking the "happy-family" ideology than either H.S.1 or ceilings was a third action of the provincial authorities. This was the introduction of provincial legislation in the form of Bill 274 which would have the effect of nullifying teacher resignations. On November 30, 1973, 17 groups of teachers (11 separate school teacher groups, 5 secondary teacher groups and 1 public school teacher group) submitted mass resignations which were to become effective on December 31. Faced with the prospect of approximately 183,000 pupils being without teachers in the new year, Premier Davis' Progressive Conservative government introduced Bill 274 on December 10 to prevent the resignations from coming into effect and provide for compulsory binding arbitration to settle the disputes. Further, it should be noted that the legislation required the arbitration board to stay within the provincial ceilings in any settlement it might impose.

The teachers' response to Bill 274 was quick and dramatic.

The legislation instantly politicized and united the teachers across the province. In protest, they planned a mass rally and on December 18, approximately thirty thousand teachers marched on the provincial legislature in Toronto and, at the same time, almost all of Ontario's classrooms were left empty. (Downie, 1978:41).

Ultimately the dispute over Bill 274 and mass resignation was resolved by a trade-off between the Government and the federations of the teachers who had mass resigned (i.e., OSSTF and OECTA). Leaders of the federations were to push their local groups to postpone the date of
their resignations to the end of January and to submit their disputes to arbitration. In return, the third reading of Bill 274 would be postponed to the end of January and arbitrators would not be required to respect spending ceilings. Sixteen of the seventeen disputes were in fact resolved in relatively short-order and Bill 274 was withdrawn. However, the one dispute which was not resolved by the end of January was of special consequence for the OSSTF. This was the dispute between the York County Board and its secondary teachers. On January 31, the York teachers put their resignations into effect. Attempts by provincial representatives of the OSSTF, and the Ontario Public School Trustees Association and by the Minister of Education to resolve the dispute bore no fruit. The teachers were legislated back to work in mid-March and forced into binding arbitration. The events of 1973-74 made it clear to teacher leaders that new mechanisms were needed to provide the federations with the power to protect their members. The days of common interest and gentlemen's agreements were coming to a close.

Interacting with the antagonizing actions of educational authorities were changes within the leadership of OSSTF. Rapid growth in the membership of OSSTF through the 1960's brought pressure for change in the structure and policies of the OSSTF and by the late sixties this pressure was beginning to take clear direction. The large numbers of young classroom teachers who had entered the occupation in the sixties found themselves saddled with a provincial leadership composed of an older generation (many of whom were principals) and with
an organizational structure in which power was centred in the provincial office. The result was pressure for both a decentralization of power and structural change which would increase the power of elected federation leadership at the expense of the federations' paid functionaries in the the provincial secretariat.

The mood of the late sixties is captured in a 1968 article by a secondary teacher published in the Bulletin. The article, entitled "OSSTF - A Federation at the Crossroads", clearly shows dissatisfaction with the centralization of power within the OSSTF.

If we had to single out one particular ailment that threatens the health of OSSTF it could well be the lack of genuine democracy in its structure. Since this suggestion is sure to be hotly disputed, let us examine a few background facts. To begin with, every teacher is forced to join OSSTF, and to pay the annual fee, whether he likes it or not. And no other bargaining organization is permitted to compete for his loyalty, or his dues. Given this rather unique "closed shop" arrangement (with which few teachers would object, given adequate safeguards of democracy), we can hardly blame a teacher who argues that he must have some real and direct say in Federation affairs - that OSSTF should not only appear to be democratic, but should clearly be democratic. This same teacher might point out, for example, that he has no direct say in who is elected to Provincial Executive. Yet he looks around him at our three levels of government, where he not only has a vote, but also a choice of candidates, and even more important, a choice of platforms. And when any unusually controversial issue arises his own opinion may be invited by a plebiscite. Yet, when he proposed (in the accepted way) a membership plebiscite on the recent controversial fee increase, his resolution never even came to a vote at the Annual Assembly, and he was solemnly informed by the leadership that plebiscites are not desirable because most teachers are too "uninvolved" and "uninformed". This, in spite of the fact that the typical union must approve a fee increase by membership vote (imagine them being more democratic than us!) and that the same device was recently employed by Ontario's Association of Professional Engineers (Dalto, 1968:152).

Beyond calling for greater democracy within the OSSTF the author goes
on to question the dominance of "non-teachers" (i.e., principals) in provincial leadership roles, noting that half or more of the provincial leadership was composed of "non-teaching" personnel.

In order to break the hold of the established leadership some restructuring of the OSSTF was essential. Significant restructuring did take place in the late sixties. According to Downie, the period from 1966 to 1970 witnessed...

...dramatic and fundamental changes in the Federation's philosophy, leadership and organization.

The president in 1967 (Charles McCaffray) stressed communications within the Federation and pledged that during his term he would establish new lines of contact with OSSTF districts and try to get people involved. On January 1, 1969, R. Ward McAdam became President of OSSTF. Like McCaffray two years before, McAdam promised something different as President and, from the time he became third Vice President, it had been obvious that he was prepared to be militant. He stressed the need for teachers to achieve professionalism through the use of power. Further, he kept hammering at the need to rid the Federation of old ideas, lethargy and apathy. In a 1967 article in The Bulletin, "A Rejuvenated OSSTF", McAdam put forth a suggestion for the reorganization of the Provincial Executive and the permanent staff. There were several important proposed changes in it.

1 The Advisory Council which had up to then been composed of three past presidents, would be opened up to any qualified and interested member.
2 Rather than an automatic step procedure through three Vice Presidencies into the Presidency, the Executive should consist of a President, a Vice President, and two executive Officers, either of whom could run for the Vice Presidency and automatically become President one year later.
3 The function of the Secretariat and permanent staff should be decentralized throughout the province.

This proposed re-structuring would obviously limit the influence and power of members of the older, established group and the power they exerted through the advisory council and unofficially through control of the permanent "civil service". In addition, the change in the makeup of the Provincial Executive itself was an attempt to avoid the election of a weak president. On January 1, 1969, these changes were effected and,
as part of them, the term of office of the Provincial Executive was changed from January 1 – December 31 to June 1 – May 31. McAdam would serve for 18 months. (Downie: 1978:23-24).

Other developments which had an impact on the leadership of the OSSTF included the decision to have a full-time president and vice president and the decision to give provincial counsellors voting power proportionate to the size of their district's membership.

All of these changes resulted in greater influence over OSSTF policy by local districts and by rank-and-file members. This brings us to our third category of influences on the OSSTF leadership – pressure from local districts. Although the elected leaders of the seventies were undoubtedly more militant in orientation than their predecessors, it seems likely that they received a significant push to militancy from several local groups. By taking a militant stance at the local level, teachers in Toronto, Windsor and other areas forced provincial leaders to match their militant rhetoric with action, and at the same time, provided a counter-influence to any of the remaining conservative elements at the provincial offices. Further, some groups of local teachers helped redefine the leadership’s definition of militancy by pushing for affiliation with the labour movement. By taking more extreme positions than had been considered in the past, teachers in areas such as Simcoe and Windsor made the endorsement of strikes appear a more moderate position to the leadership and the rest of the federation membership.

It is hard to reach a definitive conclusion on the role of the provincial leadership in stimulating or retarding local militancy. On
one hand, staunch socialists, such as Martell (1974), view the provincial leadership as selling out local militants in Windsor and generally, restraining secondary teachers' militancy. On the other hand, Hennessy (1979) sees local militancy as orchestrated from the provincial offices in Toronto. These differences in perspective are in part a reflection of the authors' own ideological perspectives and of the time period in which they are writing. Martell is clearly hoping for teachers to become white-collar proletarians who will push for new socialist order in much the same way as their Quebec brethren. Judged against this objective neither the leadership nor membership of the OSSTF could be seen to be "militant". Equally important, Martell was observing the OSSTF in the early seventies - a period in which militant leaders were still in the process of solidifying their hold on the OSSTF. Consequently, it is likely that leadership were drawn into support of local militancy rather than fostering it. In contrast, Hennessy writes as if he were one of the old guard among the OSSTF leadership, deploring the negative consequences of teacher militancy. Actions which Martell sees as conservative, Hennessy is inclined to view as radical. More important, Hennessy is writing in 1979 after the more militant elements of the OSSTF had succeeded in solidifying their position within the OSSTF. Rather than view the provincial leadership of the OSSTF as a driving force in the development of local militancy or as a major roadblock to it, the view which seems most credible is that of strong interaction between local and provincial militancy, at least during the early years when militancy was in the developmental phase.
B. The Leadership of OECTA and FW

Less has been written about the leadership of OECTA and the other affiliates than has been written about the OSSTF leadership. Nonetheless some observations are possible.

Like the leadership of the OSSTF, the leaders of OECTA, FW and OPS have experienced pressure to take a more militant stance in response to actions of educational authorities. All three groups faced problems of salary and security due to the combined effects of ceilings, declining enrolments and an oversupply of teachers. However, there is reason to believe that the security issue was somewhat less critical for these three federations than for the OSSTF. The fact that voluntary turnover was higher among elementary teachers, coupled with the relative lack of specialization in the elementary schools, undoubtedly provided a cushion against layoffs. Further, in the case of the FW and OPS, the salary issue was probably muted by the ability of public elementary teachers to ride the coattails of secondary teachers. Lacking the aid of an OSSTF vanguard, the OECTA leadership probably experienced greater antagonism to ceilings.

Where secondary teachers were handed a new curriculum by the Department of Education, elementary teachers received the philosophy of Living and Learning. Parents, boards and elementary teachers appeared to accept the report's emphasis on individualizing education, even though there was no formal policy to encourage its acceptance. Like the secondary teachers, elementary teachers found the provincial ceilings to pose problems for implementing the new philosophy. But
unlike the secondary teachers, elementary teachers saw no clear threat to job security in the new philosophy itself.

OECTA leaders had an additional reason to reassess their orientation toward the Department of Education and the provincial politicians who had assumed increasing control over the Department as more public attention was focused on education. In the sixties, OECTA leaders had joined with other Catholic organizations to push for government financing for Catholic high schools and by 1969, had won the support of both the provincial New Democratic and Liberal Parties. However, the Progressive Conservative Party swept the 1971 election on a platform which refused to consider the funding of Catholic high schools. OECTA leaders might not be sure whether the Conservative government was opposed to the interests of teachers, but they were sure that the Government was opposed to the interests of Catholic teachers.

All teacher leaders were influenced by the introduction of Bill 274 in 1973 but, again, there were differences between the federations. OECTA teachers, along with OSSTF teachers, were direct targets of the legislation and their leaders were the prime instigators of the December 18 walkout. Interviews with members of the OECTA provincial leadership and with local teacher leaders who were involved in the events of December 18, suggest that, while the FW and OPS provincial leadership were concerned with the implications of Bill 274, they were hesitant to support the walkout.

Leaving aside the effect authorities may have had on leadership orientations, let us turn to a more direct examination of the role of
provincial leaders in local militancy. Starting with OECTA, two potentially important changes in the characteristics of OECTA presidents that coincided with the development of militancy among the province's Catholic teachers. First is the increasing tendency for lay teachers to occupy the presidency. Second is the increase in the proportion of presidents who are male. Selecting the year 1967-68 as an approximate starting point for OECTA's move to militancy, it can be noted that of the seventeen presidents serving in the relatively non-militant period preceding 1967-68, eight were members of the clergy and nine were female. Only four were male, lay teachers. In contrast, from 1967-77, only one of the nine presidents was a member of the clergy; and only two were females, while six were male, lay teachers. Thus, presidents during the period in which militancy was on the rise were more likely to have attributes which we can expect to be associated with militancy. One further point with regard to OECTA presidents is the fact that in 1968-69 the president was John Rodriguez who went on to become an NDP member of the federal House of Commons. Rodriguez has since shown himself to be strongly pro-union in his parliamentary role.

The shift toward greater male dominance of the presidency was apparently accompanied by an increase in the number of males in all leadership positions. The evidence for this shift comes from an editorial by Claudette B. Folisy-Moon in a 1974-75 edition of OECTA's News and Views. After noting that 73% of the OECTA membership was

9. OECTA Presidents are listed in the 1977-78 OECTA Handbook.
female in 1974 she provides figures which show that males were heavily overrepresented in OECTA leadership positions in 1974 (See Table 50).

While we do not have the data to pinpoint the time that the shift to male dominance occurred, it seems clear from comments made in the editorial that a shift did indeed occur.

All of this merely suggests that there may have been an increase in the receptivity of the provincial leadership to militancy in the late sixties and early seventies. Other data, however, suggest that the provincial leadership played an important role in stimulating and directing local militancy. Interviews with officials of OECTA's provincial office and with local OECTA leaders produced a clear consensus that the provincial leadership had been very supportive of local militancy and had helped nurture it. Further, several informants made mention of an "Irish Mafia" at the provincial office which was strongly committed to winning significant salary increases for the OECTA teachers and which was accepting of unionism.

The view that local militancy received strong stimulation from the provincial leadership is further reinforced by two other facts. First, the contents of OECTA's provincial newsletter reflect an aggressive, unionist outlook on the part of the provincial leadership. Where the late sixties and early seventies saw OSSTF leaders and teachers debating, in print, the compatibility of unionism and professionalism, such debate is notably absent from OECTA newsletters of the same period. In its place was information on local OECTA negotiations, recommended salary goals for local negotiators, and deprivation
Table 50: Number and Percent of OECTA Leadership Positions Held by Males and Females, 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OECTA Leadership Positions</th>
<th>Number of Positions</th>
<th>Males in Leadership Positions</th>
<th>Females in Leadership Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8 100</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Governors</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5 100</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairmen of Provincial Committees</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18 78</td>
<td>5 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidents of Units</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>36 75</td>
<td>12 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Assembly Delegates</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>244 62</td>
<td>156 38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

stimulating comparisons of OECTA teachers' salaries with those of other groups. Also indicative of the provincial office's orientation is the fact that news on blue-collar unions struggles and settlements is frequently reported in the News and Views of the late sixties and early seventies.

Second, it is hard to view the fact that eleven OECTA districts submitted mass resignations at the same time in November, 1973, as being due to coincidence. In all eleven cases, provincial office representatives had assumed responsibility for local negotiations prior to the mass resignation.

In the FW, as with OECTA, there is reason to believe that the provincial office has had a strong influence on the course of local negotiations. However the character of this influence has been to slow, rather than speed up the development of local militancy. Even though the leadership endorsed a call for giving Ontario teachers the right to strike in 1972-73, they did little to encourage the use of coercive sanctions at the local level.

Again, federation publications are informative. Until 1977, the FWTAO Newsletter is practically devoid of any critical assessments of teachers' salaries or of the state of local negotiations. Rather, the recurrent topic of discussion in editorials by the FW leadership is the importance of not amalgamating with the OPS. The impression that comes through is of an organization fighting for its own survival, not of an organization fighting to defend its members from the actions of antagonistic authorities. Initially the OPS used persuasion to push for
OPS/FW merger. However, OPS eventually turned toward more aggressive tactics. Specifically, by the mid-seventies OPS had opened their membership to FW members and one OPS member had gone so far as to appeal to the Minister of Education in order to get the FW to accept him as a member.

Pressure for amalgamation was not only from the OPS. Groups within FW were pushing for amalgamation although, as might be expected from our earlier discussion of the organizational structure of the FW, those who favoured amalgamation were unable to secure any significant representation within the provincial leadership. This did not stop resolutions for amalgamation being recurrently brought before the annual meeting of the organization. Perhaps more threatening, the lack of representation did not prevent local FW associations from becoming amalgamated informally with local units of OPS.

The extent to which amalgamation has preoccupied the provincial leadership is indicated by frequent arguments against amalgamation which are found in the FWTAO Newsletter. Over the years the argument against amalgamation has followed the same logic - OPS is made up of administrators and would-be administrators; the majority of FW members are classroom teachers teaching in the lower grades and have little motivation to become administrators. Thus, a separate organization for women teachers is necessary.10

10. The following excerpts are illustrative of the provincial leaderships' perspective on amalgamation:

(a) There certainly has to be some powerful reason for the concerted campaign to persuade women teachers to give up their
Pushed to defend the organization's existence by forces both within and outside, the FW leadership has responded by identifying itself and the organization as a self-proclaimed vanguard of the women's movement. What this ideological identification has meant in practice is strong interest in seeing women being promoted to positions of responsibility. Thus, dating back as far as 1970-71, FW has offered a leadership course designed to encourage and aid women teachers in achieving promotions. Also dating back at least to 1970-71, the autonomy to an amalgamated group, and that reason must be gain for OPSMTF. If FWTAO had nothing to lose in such an amalgamation, there would be no opposition. But FWTAO has everything to lose. Instead, of a strong, autonomous organization representing women who are mainly classroom teachers, we would be joining a group whose members are mainly administrators or on their way to becoming administrators and whose entire leadership in most years consists of school principals. Their interests are not the same as ours. (From an article entitled "Amalgamation Who Needs It" reported in the FWTAO Newsletter, no. 6, 1970-71.)

(b) In response to an open letter from the President of OPSMTF which called for amalgamation the 1975-76 President of FWTAO wrote as follows.

The letter argues that we waste a great deal of our potential because the two federations serve the same basic membership. FWTAO is an organization which represents women who are mainly classroom teachers, the majority of whom are working with primary and junior children. A large segment of the membership of OPSMTF consists of principals and vice-principals, and those working toward these positions. Our needs, in terms of nearly every service provided by a teacher organization, are different. (From the FWTAO Newsletter, no. 6, 1975-76 edition.)

11. Currently, women teachers who wish to take the leadership course must formally agree to apply for promotion and to continue applying, in order to be accepted into the class.
newsletter has had a standard practice of paying public recognition to women who have "made it" by publishing pictures and brief biographies of women who have achieved promotions.

This stress on promotion has important implications for the relationship between the leadership and the rank-and-file teachers. As members of the FW leadership are quick to point out, the majority of their membership are classroom teachers working in the lower grades. Further, as their own study of the membership found in the late 1960's "Only 1% of FW members have ambitions for administrative jobs" (Stokes, 1968:2). While specific encouragement from the FW leadership, coupled with general encouragement from the women's movement, may have resulted in an increase in the number of women interested in promotions, the data we saw earlier in this chapter suggest that a substantial proportion of the FW membership have relatively low career commitment. Thus, a situation exists in which the FW leadership argues against merger with OPS because OPS is not concerned with the needs of classroom teachers, while at the same time giving the appearance that it gives more attention to the interests of the minority of its membership that are interested in promotion than to the needs of classroom teachers. Put simply, there is reason to believe that the FW leadership's concerns are out of step or irrelevant to a large proportion of its membership.

There are several bits of information to reinforce the view that there is a schism between the concerns and interests voiced by the FW leadership and those felt by a significant portion of the membership.
The first bit of evidence comes from an FW survey of its membership, conducted in 1977-78. Presumably, in response to years of lobbying for amalgamation, FW decided to survey its membership to settle the question. The provincial office's interpretation of the survey results was that there was insignificant interest in amalgamation and that the majority of the membership were pleased with FW services. However, the data from the survey lend themselves equally well to an alternative interpretation. First, it is notable that 54% of the membership did not bother to respond. Rather than view this as a sign of contentment, as the FW leadership was inclined to do, it can be seen as a sign of the low relevance of FW to many members. Second, the figures in Table 51 suggest that a significant, rather than insignificant, number of women are interested in amalgamation of some type and that a majority are in favour of reducing the separation between the OPS and FW (40% wanted some form of amalgamation, 75% wanted either greater co-operation with OPS without amalgamation or some form of amalgamation, and only 25% wanted little or no change).

As an aside, it is interesting to note the fall-out from the survey. Basically the FW leadership took the results as a "no" vote on amalgamation and, as a consequence, proposed a moratorium on the discussion of amalgamation. As a result, there is currently a moratorium on the discussion of amalgamation within FW.

A second indicator of a schism between the leadership and general membership of FW is to be found in the background characteristics of the two groups. The majority of FW members are young,
Table 51: Response to the FWTAO Survey on Amalgamation, 1977-78.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options vis-à-vis OPSMTF/FWTAO</th>
<th>Responses*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retain FWTAO as is</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retain FWTAO as is with some modifications</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop greater co-operation with OPSMTF without amalgamation</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amalgamate FWTAO and OPSMTF at the local level only</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amalgamate FWTAO and OPSMTF at the provincial level</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amalgamate all five affiliates into one OTF</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondents were only allowed to choose one of the above responses.
Source: FWTAO Newsletter, no. 1, 1977-78.
married classroom teachers. In comparison to the general membership, the FW leaders are more likely to be relatively old, to be single, and to hold positions of responsibility or to teach in the intermediate grades (i.e., grades 7 and 8). Put in another way, the social background, work experience and career commitment of many FW leaders is such that it is difficult for them to share or clearly understand the perspective of many of their membership. To what extent the membership feel these differences between themselves and their leaders to be important is difficult to establish with certainty. In part this is because the FW newsletter provides no space for letters in which the dissatisfied might express their views. However, the newsletter does print resolutions proposed by local units and by individuals for consideration at the annual meeting. Examination of these resolutions suggests that at least some of the members are concerned about the over-representation of principals and others in positions of responsibility among the leadership. For example, the Toronto local association proposed the two following resolutions to the 1973 annual meeting:

"Be it resolved that appointees to any FWTAO Committee shall be actively engaged in teaching duties at the time of such appointment."

"Be it resolved that any FWTAO appointees to OTF Committees should be actively engaged in teaching duties at the time of such appointment."

12. The FW Board of Directors, up until recently, provided comments (including editorial comments) on resolutions from local associations at their own discretion. Here it is interesting to note their comments on the Toronto resolutions. In both cases their
Also relevant is a resolution proposed by the Peel Association in the same year:

"Be it resolved that Executive Assistants shall not be assigned to any elected, standing or ad hoc committees unless specifically requested by the committees, whereupon they would function in the capacity required by the committee members."

The resolution was accompanied by the following rationale. "An apparent general unhappiness among committees regarding their own effectiveness in determining and guiding the work of committees."

Together the above resolutions bespeak some clear dissatisfaction with both elected and non-elected FW provincial officials.

Other resolutions throughout the seventies indicate serious dissatisfaction with the provincial leadership. Repeatedly one finds calls for amalgamation, attempts to increase local associations' funds at the expense of the provincial office, and attempts to alter the system of membership representation on the Board of Directors and at general annual meetings so as to make representation proportional to membership. Perhaps even more important, locally-generated resolutions are devoid of pleas for more action to help women achieve positions of responsibility.

footnote 12 cont.

comments on the Toronto resolutions. In both cases their comment was "All members of our organization such as principals, vice-principals, consultants, co-ordinators, etc. are assumed to have teaching duties." Apparently when women achieve positions of responsibility they remain teachers in the FW leadership's eyes, while men, judging from quotes cited earlier, become non-teaching administrators whose interests are different from classroom teachers.
All of this reinforces the view that FW leadership has been involved in a consuming battle for organizational survival throughout much of the 1970's. The preoccupation with survival has made it unlikely that the leadership would spearhead or even stimulate local militancy in collective negotiations. To lead militant action would have been to risk the dissatisfaction of the substantial number of women who were fairly content with their jobs, while, at the same time, possibly contributing to local male-female teacher solidarity by focusing their attention on a common enemy. Further, even if the provincial leadership was motivated to promote militant action (and there is no evidence that they were), it is doubtful that they would have been very successful given the schisms noted above.

If anything, the leadership may have hindered the development of militant action by undermining the solidarity of local joint-bargaining teams. Men are not to be trusted, they have different interests, they want our money, they are all principals - these are the messages of the provincial leadership.

V. RESOURCES

Throughout the seventies all of the teacher federations made increases in their internal resources which could be utilized in negotiations with boards. All increased their negotiating expertise by training and specializing some of the provincial office staff in the area of negotiations. In addition, all developed strike funds. This
said, there were variations in the amount of resources the federations built up and the speed with which they did so. As might be expected, OSSTF and OECTA prepared themselves more fully and quickly for militant action than did either OPS or FW. Here strike funds are illustrative. According to Downie, in the summer of 1974,

The OSSTF apparently had a strike fund of $22 million in cash and IOU's; the OECTA was building up a fund totalling $16 million; the Men's Federation and the FWTAO had funds of $8.4 million and $1.3 million respectively (1978:51).

In addition to the internal resources that the federations were building up through the seventies, it appears that some support for teacher militancy was available from outside sources. For example, the December 18, 1973, walkout received support from the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Ontario Federation of Labour, the Canadian Labour Congress and various NDP and Liberal MLA's. More tangible, the British Columbia Teachers' Union gave $28,909 to support a strike by the Toronto secondary teachers in March, 1976.

Clearly, much more could be said regarding resources; however, it is doubtful that much would be gained by further discussion. The key points are simply that the OSSTF and OECTA were in a better position to support their locals in militant action than were the two public elementary teachers federations and that there was external support to help legitimate militancy.
VI. SOCIAL CONTROL AND MILITANCY

Within any social system the emergence of organized challenges to authorities can be partially attributed to a failure of social control. Within the Ontario educational system, the emergence of teacher militancy is, in part, attributable to the failure of school boards to effectively exercise control over teachers. While the effectiveness of authorities in controlling teachers undoubtedly varies from board to board, we will argue that several broad changes in the provincial educational system seriously limited the effectiveness of many, if not most, boards in controlling teachers. Specifically, two things will be suggested: (1) that the growth of the educational system, coupled with the reorganization of boards in 1969, weakened boards' traditional mechanisms of control and (2) that the rapid increase in demand for teachers throughout the sixties, coupled with a low level of supply of qualified teachers, made it difficult for the board to control entry into teaching.

A. The Failure of Persuasion

Ontario school systems have long had a tradition of filling top administrative positions with ex-teachers. In fact, it is still very common for superintendents and others at the board offices to be drawn from the teaching ranks over which they are to administer. When this system of recruitment was coupled with a relatively small school system, trustees were able to exercise a great deal of control through persuasion.
Growth and consolidation of school systems tended to cut off teachers' informal lines of communication to trustees and administrators and, in the process, hindered the latter's ability to control through persuasion. Consolidation threw together teachers, trustees and administrators who had no previous experience with one another and hence no basis for trust. Since trust is a critical element in the exercise of persuasive power, consolidation seriously weakened this mechanism of control.

In 1968, 1327 boards existed in Ontario with enrolments of less than 1,000 and only 31, or 2.2% of the boards, had enrolments of 10,000 or more. In comparison, after consolidation there were only 65 boards with enrolments under 1,000 and 56, or 29.2% of the boards, had enrolments of 10,000 or more.

Consolidation involved more than a number of secondary systems becoming one administrative entity or a number of elementary systems being merged. As can be seen from Table 52, it also involved the combining of boards responsible for different levels of instruction. This is evidenced by the fact that, while the number of boards operating only one type of school decreased, the number operating both public and secondary schools increased between 1968 and 1969.

Taken together the increased size of school systems and the merger of secondary and elementary boards into single administrative units substantially altered the character of teachers' relations with local educational authorities. Increases in the size and complexity of school systems created pressure for formal, rational administrative
Table 52: Number of Boards by Type, 1968 and 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Board</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boards Operating Both Public</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary and Secondary Schools</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boards Operating Only Public Schools</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boards Operating Only Separate Schools</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boards Operating Only Secondary Schools</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the Ontario Minister of Education.
procedures and for an expansion in full-time administrative staff. At the same time it became more difficult for trustees to stay informed and involved in many of the administrative decisions which were being made. More and more, trustees were forced to rely on hired administrative staff to supply them with information and to make decisions. In large systems management of school affairs was equivalent to managing a large corporation. Under these circumstances trustees who previously might have overseen the hiring of individual teachers were now lucky even to know the names of all their school principals.

In sum, large school systems increased the communications gap between trustees and teachers while at the same time fostering the delegation of authority to a growing administrative staff and the development of formal, rational administrative procedures.

It should be noted that many of the school systems which were merged in 1969 were large enough to require fairly large administrative staffs prior to consolidation. For teachers in these systems it might seem that consolidation would carry fewer consequences. Where the teacher from a small system was faced with adjusting to a new system of authority and developing new channels of communication and influence, the teacher from a large system already had a fair idea of how the system worked. However, there were other factors at work which made adjustment to the new environment difficult even for teachers who had experience in the more formal and anonymous setting provided by large school systems. Specifically, in cases where elementary and secondary boards were merged to form a single unit, there was a strong possibility
that one or both of the two groups of teachers would find its previous methods of communication and influence to be ineffective.

While the size of an organization may create pressure for some general similarities in administrative structure and procedure, there can be a great deal of variation between similarly-sized organizations. Even more important, every organization tends to develop its own unique system of informal communication. Within informal communication systems specific individuals play key roles in carrying information up and down the authority structure. Thus, a critical question for teachers was whether their own network of communication and influence would remain intact in the new consolidated organizations. Since, in most school systems, specific trustees and administrators served as key links in the informal flow of information and influence between teachers and the board, the failure of these individuals to make it into the new board structure would seriously impair the informal communications system and push teachers to seek new methods of influence.

Undoubtedly there was a great deal of variation from board to board in the extent to which previous informal networks were able to survive consolidation. However, if there was a predominant tendency it was probably for the informal network of the elementary system to survive at the expense of the secondary. Prior to merger, secondary school trustees were appointed to their posts by municipal councils, whereas elementary school trustees were elected. Given that the newly formed boards of education which combined elementary and secondary
boards were to have only elected trustees, the elementary trustees had a distinct advantage over secondary trustees. Elementary trustees, having already gone through the electoral process were more likely to do so successfully again, whereas appointed secondary trustees may have been reluctant to run and less likely to be successful if they did.

In sum, establishing trust in the new "bust" era was almost an impossible task for many boards. Barely had trustees and top administrators begun to deal with the job of creating new administrative structures to run newly formed systems, when they were handed down the provincial ceilings. Consolidation, plus spending ceilings, virtually forced boards to make decisions which would be aggravating to teachers.

This was especially the case where the new board had been formed from school systems which differed significantly in the level and quality of services and facilities they provided. With ceilings on expenditures in place, such boards had little choice but to reduce expenditures on services in the better off areas under its control, if it was to equalize resources across the system. Either this, or attempt to raise all schools to the level of the best in the system by holding down teachers' salaries. Whatever the choice, neither would endear teachers to trustees.

B. Control over Entry: Supply and Demand

As our discussion in Chapter III suggested, one way to prevent subordinates from taking militant action is to prevent potential militants from becoming part of the social system in question. During
the 1960's, Ontario school boards were faced with conditions which severely limited their ability to control entry to teaching; should they have been concerned to exercise control in this area. First, as has been noted repeatedly, education was expanding in the 1960's. As a consequence, large numbers of teachers were being hired yearly, making thorough screening of candidates difficult.\textsuperscript{13} Because the number of teachers required outstripped the supply of qualified applicants, there was a limit on the selectivity that could be used in recruiting. In addition, the expansion of technical and vocational training in the secondary schools further restricted selectivity. By expanding such programs, boards were virtually forced into hiring teachers who could be expected to be highly receptive to the use of union tactics.

On the other hand, the situation of undersupply which existed throughout the sixties clearly put the teachers in an advantageous bargaining position. Boards were placed in a situation of competing with one another to attract competent staff. Thus, the shortage of qualified teachers may have helped to insure that somewhat less disruptive tactics such as pink-listing would be successful, thus reducing the need for more extreme measures.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13} Of course, it is unlikely that boards were concerned with specifically screening out militants in the 1960's in that militancy was not a pressing reality to boards in much of that decade. However, almost all employers are likely to prefer docile employees who show little sign of challenging "the system" even in times of relative quiet.

\textsuperscript{14} Appendix C provides data on the shifting supply and demand for teachers.
In order to reduce the shortfall of qualified teachers, boards held recruiting drives in England in the fifties and sixties. Although using this method to increase supply may have helped to reduce Ontario teachers' advantage at the bargaining table, it may well have had the unintended consequence of recruiting militants to the system. As Downie points out "The largest teachers' union in Britain is directly affiliated with labour, and British teachers have had a history of militancy" (1978:25). Table 53 shows the numbers of educators teaching in Ontario, who received their first teaching certificate in the United Kingdom, increased significantly during the 1960's, when the teacher shortage was at its peak.

Having argued that boards had little control over entry in the sixties and that recruitment of teachers from Britain and from Industrial backgrounds (to staff the technical schools) may have led to the entry of many potential militants, one other point should be noted. This is simply that the generation from which many teachers were being recruited was the "protest" generation of the 1960's.

C. Summary

Comparing secondary, separate and public elementary teachers, it would appear that social control was somewhat more likely to fail with secondary teachers. Vis-à-vis persuasion, secondary teachers were more likely to find their traditional channels of communication and influence disrupted by the reorganization of school boards. This is because, unlike elementary and separate school teachers, many of the
Table 53: Number of Teachers and Principals in Ontario Elementary and Secondary Schools Who Received Their First Teaching Certificate in the United Kingdom, 1962-68.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Teachers and Principals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>1281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>1756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

high school teachers worked for boards made up of appointed trustees. When all trustees became elected officials in 1969, many of the appointed trustees retreated from the scene. Further, those appointed trustees who ran for election, and were successful, found themselves in a situation which forced changes in the way they dealt with teachers. On becoming elected officials, their direct accountability to the public increased as did the visibility of their actions. Trustees' ability to make informal agreements with teachers, to make exceptions, and more generally, to exercise discretionary power was reduced as a result of public scrutiny. Thus, secondary teachers not only were likely to lose key contacts among authorities, they were also likely to find that the contacts who remained had lost the power to deal effectively with many of the teachers' problems.

With regard to control over entry, the fact that there was a smaller pool of qualified teachers to choose from at the secondary level, coupled with the expansion of technical and vocational training in the secondary schools, insured that boards would have a more difficult time controlling entry at the secondary level than at the elementary level.

VII. CONCLUSION

In large part the impetus to teacher militancy can be seen to have been supplied by a combination of new provincial policies and demographic changes. Decline in the growth of enrolments, coupled with
the imposition of ceilings on school board expenditures, set the stage for teachers experiencing increased discontent over salaries, job security, working conditions and promotions. The liberalization of curriculum which occurred in the high schools and the promulgation of the Hall-Dennis report, Living and Learning, further fueled discontent in that it appeared to require teachers to do more with less and, in the case of secondary teachers, threatened job security.

The policy of consolidating school boards had impacts on teacher discontent, teacher organization, and the functioning of social control. In bringing elementary and secondary teachers together in large systems, consolidation contributed to teacher alienation. At the same time, it increased the size of teacher groups and so contributed to their becoming viable opponents of boards. Consolidation also tended to breakdown traditional lines of communication and influence between teachers and their boards, resulting in a weakening of persuasion as a means of social control.

The convergence of policy changes with demographic change supplied the initial impetus to militancy but these changes were not sufficient, in themselves, to beget militancy on the part of all teachers. The discussion in this chapter shows that the impact of broad changes in policy and population were mediated by teacher groups' membership characteristics, the formal organization of teacher groups, the organization of work and the historical characteristics of school boards.

*Vis-à-vis* membership characteristics, it has been suggested that
the high proportions of secondary teachers that were male, that held degrees, and that had reached the top position on the salary grid, contributed to intensified feelings of economic deprivation. In the case of separate school teachers, communalities of religion and possibility of social-class origins and ethnicity may have helped build solidarity when boards were consolidated; in contrast, public school teachers, lacking such communalities, and divided by differences between male and females (in age, experience, education and position) appeared unable to develop solidarity when thrown together in large consolidated boards.

The formal organization of teacher groups also serves to mediate the impact of more macro-level factors. Nowhere is this clearer than with public school teachers where the presence of two federations, with frequently conflicting interests, diverts attention from the impact of

In contrast to public elementary teachers, the majority of both local leadership (opinion-makers) into the provincial decision-making structure.

In contrast to public elementary teachers, the majority of both local leadership (opinion-makers) into the provincial decision-making structure.
separate and secondary teachers are unified in single federations. Further, the formal organizational structure of both OECTA and OSSSTF provides for on-going direct communication between local units and the provincial leadership by requiring that local leaders serve on provincial decision-making bodies which function throughout the school year.

The organization of work also mediates the impact of extra-local factors. The specialization of high school teachers puts them in a position to have their job security more threatened by curriculum changes and the slowdown in the growth of enrolments than elementary teachers. The fact that secondary teachers tended to be concentrated in large schools, that they have more preparation periods, and that they often deal with the same students, facilitates teacher-to-teacher communication. Further, the presence of large numbers of teachers in a relatively small number of schools facilitates the use of the school as an organizational unit within federation and reduces teachers' dependence on possibly co-opted principals for communication. Consolidation of schools generally weakened teachers ties to the communities. However, the fact that secondary schools have larger catchment areas than elementary schools serves to more greatly alienate the secondary teachers from the communities they serve and to reduce the possibility of effective cross-pressure to militancy stemming from community membership.

Finally, the historical characteristics of school boards mediate the effects of extra-local forces. In particular, the fact that many
high school boards had been composed of appointed trustees made failure of social control more likely for secondary teachers when board reorganization took place. It might also be noted that differences in the past history of boards' spending resulted in differences in the impact of ceilings. Boards which had been big-spenders prior to ceilings were generally forced to make greater cutbacks in spending. Thus, boards which had been among the most generous in the province vis-à-vis salaries, facilities, PTR and so on, suddenly became among the most niggardly with the imposition of ceilings, setting the stage for strong teacher discontent.

Having said that the impact of policy and population on militancy is mediated by characteristics of teacher groups, the organization of work, and the characteristics of boards, what can be said about the role of factors discussed in our theoretical framework in the development of militancy?

In the case of secondary teachers it appears that increased discontent, stemming from a variety of sources, played a key initiating role in the development of militancy. As discontent increased, discontented teachers put pressure on the provincial leadership to adopt a more militant outlook and succeeded in making some basic changes in the structure of the federation which reduced the power of more conservative elements among the provincial leadership. Once the change in leadership was under way the OSSTF began amassing resources for use in confrontation, and was on the way to becoming a union.

Separate school teachers appear to have experienced a less
significant increase in discontent than did secondary teachers. Certainly they differ from the secondary teachers in being more heavily composed of women, who we expect were less subject to strong feelings of economic deprivation than men. While discontent did increase, it seems plausible that provincial leadership played a key initiating role in developing discontent and in mobilizing militant action among separate school teachers.

In the early seventies, provincial OECTA leaders were showing a clear willingness to encourage unionism in the organization's newsletter and, in 1973, provincial leaders were actively involved in leading local groups to mass resign. In contrast, OSSTF publications of the early seventies reveal secondary teachers' leaders to be still struggling to reconcile professionalism with the use of union tactics. Further, Martell (1974) and others have described a number of instances where local OSSTF groups found their coercive actions hindered rather than helped by the provincial leadership.

Vis-à-vis the discontent thesis and the mobilization thesis contained in the social movements literature, we find that the case of the secondary teachers appears to support the discontent thesis, while the separate school teachers' case seems to lend support to the mobilization thesis.

Turning to public elementary teachers, their failure to become militant was due, in large part, to the presence of two conflicting organizations which serve to weaken the solidarity of the group and hinder communication and coordination of activities. However, probably
of equal importance in explaining the public elementary teachers' docility was the fact that most public elementary teachers were able to ride the coattails of secondary counterparts. This said, it is important to remember that public elementary teachers did take coercive action along with all other Ontario teachers in the December 18, 1973, province-wide strike. Their participation in this strike holds an interesting possible implication which is worth mentioning here.

The province-wide strike was clearly over a matter of principle - the right to resign. Lacking any legislation to govern teacher negotiations, teachers of the early seventies were unable to prevent boards from imposing settlements when negotiations broke down. Because teachers were uncertain of the legality of strike action, their ultimate weapon became the mass resignation. However in 1973, when seventeen teacher groups mass resigned, the provincial government threatened to take away teachers' right to quit their jobs. Male and female public school teachers were able to unite on this issue and show strength. What is interesting about this, is that the strike was clearly directed at the provincial government and that it was over a matter of principle. For elementary teachers the willingness to take coercive action at the local level runs up against cross-pressures from neighbours, friends and in some cases, spouses, and is viewed as action against children.  

15 However, on such a clear matter of principle, in the case of separate school teachers the inequities involved in the provincial system of tax support for separate schools and the provincial government's refusal to fund Catholic high schools may well have led parents, neighbours, friends and
directed clearly at provincial rather than local authorities, cross-
pressures may well become less strong. If so, it is possible that the
people who have been seen to slow down the development of militancy —
a broader and more radical form of teacher militancy, based on the
principles of a well-articulated ideology. While constrained from
taking extensive coercive action at the local level, the elementary
women could make use of a variety of strategies and tactics which do
not antagonize the local community, but which do impinge on provincial
political authorities (e.g., block voting, political education of the
electorate, etc.).

To conclude this Chapter, it should be stressed that we have
been dealing with aggregates or at best large organizations (i.e.,
federations), not the relatively small teacher collectivities that have
been the main actors in taking militant action. The OSSTF and OECTA
may, in some sense, be more militant federations than either the OPS or
FW, but not all OSSTF and OECTA local groups have taken coercive
action, and not all local units of OPS and FW have remained completely
docile. This variation within the federations reflects the fact that
local conditions play a key role in the development of militant teacher
groups. In order to understand the role of local factors, and to
obtain a better understanding of the process by which militant groups
evolve, we now turn to the analysis of our four local groups of

footnote 15 cont.
spouses to see the teachers various coercive actions at the
local level as being against the provincial government in the
aid of Catholic children and the Catholic community as a whole.
Ottawa-Carleton teachers. We will begin with the public elementary school teachers of the Carleton Board of Education.
Chapter V

THE CASE OF THE CARLETON ELEMENTARY TEACHERS

The Carleton elementary teachers' group came into existence on January 1, 1969, when 18 suburban and rural boards were merged to form the Carleton Board of Education (CBE). Of the 18 pre-existing boards, 13 were elementary boards. Since each of these 13 boards negotiated independently with their teachers, there was little in the past history of the elementary teachers to unify them as a group. The potential for fragmentation and disunity created by the diversity of the elementary group was further increased by two other factors.

First, the number of elementary teachers was increased by almost 20%, from 848 in 1968, to 1014 in 1969. Second, the jurisdiction of the new Board covered approximately 1,000 square miles with elementary schools dispersed across the area. The lack of pre-existing organization, a high influx of new recruits, and geographic dispersion - taken together these conditions could have contributed to the emergence of a relatively anemic teacher group. However, this was not to be the case.

Within a short period of time the Carleton elementary teachers were to become one of the most, if not the most, aggressive and persistently combative groups of public school elementary teachers in the province. To be sure, numerous separate school teachers and secondary school teacher groups exceeded the Carleton elementary
teachers in their militancy; but then, as was suggested in Chapter IV, separate and secondary teachers had more reason to be angry and had more support from their provincial federations in channelling anger into militant action. What is important is that the Carleton elementary group came to take actions which could be viewed as militant relative to both its own past actions and the actions of other public elementary teachers. Just what these actions were is the subject of the next section.

I. AN OVERVIEW OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE CARLETON BOARD AND ITS ELEMENTARY TEACHERS

This section draws on newspaper accounts to provide a brief history of negotiations between Carleton elementary teachers and their Board. It is not assumed that newspapers are fully correct or complete in their reporting of teacher board negotiations, however, it is felt that newspapers can be relied on to be reasonably accurate in reporting the occurrence of coercive action. Where inaccuracy is expected to be greatest is in the reporting of issues underlying coercive action. Thus, the "public view" given of negotiating issues is to be taken with skepticism until supporting evidence is provided from other sources.

1. The Ottawa Citizen is the main source of information for the review. All editions from 1969 to 1977 were scanned for information bearing on local teacher negotiations.
One point of clarification is necessary before beginning the overview. Like all public school elementary teachers, Carleton elementary teachers are members of either the FW or OPS depending on their sex. Although locals of these provincial federations exist in Carleton, the organization which has effectively represented the Carleton elementary teachers is the Teachers' Federation of Carleton (the TFC). The TFC cuts across sex lines uniting FW and OPS members in one independent organization. In our overview of negotiations we will be referring to actions of the TFC rather than the actions of a joint committee of the local FW and OPS organizations. This unified organization of the Carleton teachers will receive extended attention later, in that it is one of the key factors accounting for the Carleton elementary teachers' militancy relative to other public elementary groups. For the moment, all I want to do is to alert the reader as to why we will be referring to the TFC in the following discussion.

The Carleton elementary teachers negotiated their first two collective agreements without drawing any significant public attention. In fact the only mention of the negotiations found in the newspapers is a single sentence stating that negotiations had gone smoothly. Apart from the fact that negotiations went smoothly, it is interesting to note that, according to the report of the Carleton Board's negotiating committee for 1970, teachers showed little inclination to challenge management rights by pressing for the negotiation of working conditions. As the committee put it,

"It was gratifying to your committee to find that neither of the teachers' committees had any intention of bringing so-called
working conditions into the negotiations. In view of the conflicts on this point elsewhere in Ontario\(^2\) it is obvious that working conditions in Carleton are satisfactory to our teachers and that any discussions of such matters should be undertaken in teacher-trustee relations committee quite apart from financial considerations." (Report of the CBE Salary Negotiating Committee, 1970, p. 2)

The apparently amiable negotiating conditions experienced in 1969-70 and 1970-71 were not to last long. A contextual factor, provincial ceilings, emerged as an issue at the outset of negotiations for the 1971-72 collective agreement. As early as February, 1971, talks between the teachers and the Board had reached a deadlock. However, the comments of the President of the TFC which were reported in the press implied that the teachers saw their negotiating problems as stemming from the ceilings. In April, this view found expression in action as the TFC sent representatives to Toronto to protest budget cuts, launched a "massive" publicity campaign\(^3\) and participated in a public meeting to protest ceilings in cooperation with their counterparts in the secondary schools. Beyond the above, it was reported that the elementary teachers would vote on the use of work-to-rule and

---

2. What is being referred to here is a major skirmish over the negotiation of working conditions which occurred in 1970 between the Toronto Metro Board and its secondary teachers. This issue was undoubtedly on the minds of CBE trustees in that they, along with other trustees across the province, agreed to support the Metro Board by participating in a moratorium on the hiring of secondary teachers until the Metro dispute was settled.

3. The publicity campaign was to include newspaper ads, letters to the editor, mass meetings and telegrams to MLA's. Just how "massive" it was is open to doubt - I ran across little to suggest that the campaign was very visible in my re-reading of old newspapers.
walkout tactics if their publicity campaign failed to achieve results.

In May, the focus of animosity shifted somewhat from the provincial Department of Education to the Carleton Board of Education. Until May, board-teacher negotiations had taken place in secrecy, by mutual consent. By mid-May, the lid was coming off. The teachers' negotiating committee announced that the Board's salary offer of 2.5% (the teachers had asked for 5.6%) would be submitted to the rank-and-file for a vote. In addition, the committee announced that it would resign if the Board offer was accepted. Clearly the negotiating committee was intent on showing the Board that the rank-and-file were behind them.

The basis for the negotiating committee's stand was apparently that it felt the Board had more money available for teachers even with the ceilings in effect. More specifically, the chairman of the teachers' negotiating team estimated that the Board had 9.2% more available to spend on teachers than they had had the previous year. This figure contrasted rather dramatically with the 2.5% increase offered by the Board.

Apparently the rank-and-file had little difficulty in assessing the Board's offer as it was rejected by 97% of the teachers who voted on it. Next, the teachers' negotiating team chairperson charged the Board with "political wheeling and dealing". Specifically, it was suggested that the Board had cut programs like remedial reading from the budget (in response to provincial ceilings) in order to get public support and to get teachers to lower their salary demands out of sympathy. The
trustees' negotiating chairman didn't hesitate to strike back. She suggested that the Board might stop negotiations until a new teacher negotiating committee was formed because the current committee had misrepresented the Board's offer when presenting it to teachers for a vote. In addition, the Board as a whole asked for the teachers' negotiating team chairman to retract his statement regarding "wheeling and dealing" by the Board.

Apparently this flare-up was only temporary, for the next two reports on negotiations announced a new offer of 3.9% and its acceptance by the teachers.

While the Carleton elementary teachers can hardly be said to have jumped into militancy in 1971, their docility of previous years was on the wane. In fact, at one point in the discussion of ceilings, the teachers seriously considered work-to-rule and walkouts as tactical options. These options were shelved pending the success or failure of the publicity campaign and were not brought forward for reconsideration after the apparent failure of the campaign. However, perhaps more important for the future was the fact that the teachers had come to see the Board, and not simply the Department of Education, as a foe.

In May, 1972, the elementary group was once again in the midst of negotiations. This time the Board was offering a 4.5% increase in salaries - the same increase which had already been accepted by the Carleton secondary teachers - and the elementary teachers were looking for 6%. By mid-June negotiations had reached an impasse with both the Board and teachers holding to their positions of 4.5% and 6% increases
respectively. This time there appeared to be more than money standing between the teachers and the Board. As the teachers saw it, the problem lay in the Board’s refusal to negotiate the salaries of teachers and principals with university degrees. From the Board’s view the difficulty was in the teachers’ refusal to recognize the principle of equal-pay for equal qualifications and experience. Specifically, what was happening was this. The Carleton secondary teachers had already settled for a 4.5% increase. The Carleton Board, like the majority of other boards in Ontario, held to the principle that all teachers in their employ should be paid the same salaries if they held similar qualifications and experience, regardless of the level at which they were teaching. Thus the Board was determined to give elementary teachers with qualifications similar to the secondary teachers (i.e., those with degrees), the same salary increase. The elementary teachers, for their part, were adamant that they should be given some real ability to negotiate for the 23% of their group that held degrees.

The impasse over salaries and the right to negotiate for teachers with degrees led to an estimated 550-plus teachers amassing at the Board offices on June 19 to protest the lack of progress in negotiations. The protest did not effect an immediate resumption of talks but by July 11, teachers and trustees had agreed to a resumption of negotiations. During this time, the key issue was still reported to be the representation of teachers with degrees. After approximately four more weeks of negotiations it was announced that the executive officers of the TFC had rejected a new offer without a vote of the
general membership. What was new about this offer is not clear from the newspaper accounts in that the Board was still offering a 4.5% increase.

On August 22, negotiations started on a new path. First, the Board called in the Ontario Public School Trustees Association to send representatives to advise in further negotiations with the elementary teachers. Talks were kept secret until September 20, 1972, when 82% of the teachers voted down an offer of 4.51%. At this point the Board suggested that the teachers request their provincial federations to participate in the negotiations in an advisory capacity. A week later, the teachers complied with this request. With advisors from the provincial federations on hand, the teachers decided to ask the Board to submit their dispute to binding arbitration; however, this request was rejected by the Board. Following this, the local group announced, on October 24, that it was turning over full power to the provincial federations to carry out negotiations with the Board.

The provincial negotiators representing the elementary teachers fared no better than the local group did on its own. It is interesting to note that the provincial federations were criticized by the local group for their failure to get a better settlement.

While the Board would not budge in bargaining, in December they did unilaterally decide to give the teachers a 4.51% salary increase, retroactive to September, in order to prevent teachers from falling into a higher income tax bracket in the coming year. This concern for their welfare hardly won over the teachers. In fact they refused to
sign a new contract offering 4.51% and later hinted at mass resignation if the Board did not reopen negotiations. The hint remained just that, and the teachers worked under the previous year's contract - albeit with the 4.51% increase which the Board bestowed on them.

As might be expected, negotiations for the 1973-74 contract opened in a negative atmosphere. Having been unable to come to terms with the Board in the previous year, the teachers undoubtably felt some frustration. The 1973-74 budget brought down by the Board in April, 1973, did nothing to alleviate the teachers' frustration. After reviewing the budget, the president of the TFC expressed shock at the way the Board had apportioned the money. While it was admitted that provincial ceilings were part of the problem, the TFC president directed most of her criticism at the Board for shifting funds away from "... things directly connected with the educational process such as school supplies, professional staff, libraries, and textbooks..." and for raising the pupil-teacher ratio. This criticism was followed by a clear warning: "It is attitudes like those expressed in this budget that are making teachers reluctantly but surely militant." Thus the Board had been served notice that it, not the provincial government, would be the focal point for teacher discontent in the coming year.

Between April (when negotiations began) and September the only news of negotiations to reach print was that the elementary teachers were asking for a 16.5% increase in salary. However, events in September made it clear that Board/teacher conflict had not drained
away during the summer-break. Specifically, on September 19, it was announced that the TFC was taking the Board to court over what it alleged was a violation of the collective agreement. This move represented a departure from the teachers' previous pattern of dealing with the Board in at least two respects. First, the tactic itself was new. Never before had the Carleton elementary teachers or any other group of Ontario teachers been willing to put the legal status of their collective agreement to test in the courts. Second, the conflict centred solely on management rights. The Board had passed a motion which gave the Director of Education the right to deny teachers special leave, although a clause in the collective agreement stated that "Upon recommendation of the principal and on written application to the director of education up to three days of special leave shall be granted yearly for personal business without loss of pay." As the teachers saw it, the clause gave principals (who are members of the TFC) the power to grant leave while the Board's resolution denied principals this authority. Although the case was eventually dropped, it signified the development of a more forceful and militant orientation among Carleton elementary teachers.

While the news of the teachers taking the Board to court suggested that negotiations were not going well, little direct news regarding negotiations was reported until late November when the teachers threatened to resign en masse if no progress was made in the negotiations by November 30. At this point the president of the TFC was quoted as saying that the teachers and the Board were basically
only apart on money, with the teachers asking for an increase of 8.7% and the Board offering 5.5%. On November 30, the teachers began to follow through with their threat and started handing in resignations. On December 6, it was reported that 882 of 1080 Carleton elementary teachers had submitted resignations, which were to become effective on December 31.

At this point the local situation became intertwined with events taking place at the provincial level. As will be recalled the winter of 1973-74 was a period of high conflict in education throughout the province. Legislation to prohibit teachers from resigning and providing for compulsory arbitration was being proposed by the Minister of Education in response to the large number of conflictual negotiations taking place. With the threat of compulsory arbitration contained in the proposed provincial legislation threatening the teachers and the possibility of having teacherless schools haunting the Board, both parties were able to come to terms prior to December 31. Thus on December 22, it was reported that a new collective agreement had been signed. Not surprisingly, the salary settlement was a compromise. The agreement called for a salary increase of 5.5%, retroactive to September, along with a lump sum payment of $250 and $175 in May and November of 1974, respectively. In addition, the Board agreed to pay two-thirds of all health care insurance costs.

Perhaps more important than the size of the settlement was the fact that the agreement covered 16 months rather than 12 months as had been the case in previous contracts. To an outsider this feature of
the agreement may appear to be of little consequence, thus some explanation of its significance is in order. In all prior agreements, negotiations took place after the Board had drawn up its budget. If teachers' money demands exceeded the amount budgeted, the Board would have to shift money from other areas or raise taxes in the following year—neither of which could be done without risking considerable pressure from both the public and those working in the system whose budgets would be cut. With the introduction of ceilings the second option of raising taxes was virtually eliminated. Thus, after ceilings were introduced, the teachers were faced with fighting a zero-sum game in which all the players had already been allocated their shares. With the 16-month contract the teachers got in on the ground floor and left the others with the problem of dividing up the remainder of the budget.

A second important consequence of the 16-month agreement was that it extended beyond the period of the Carleton secondary teachers' agreement. Thus, in effect, the old issue of negotiating for degreed teachers had been won. Although there were indications that the Board wished to hold to its principle of parity between elementary and secondary teachers with the same qualifications, parity was not to be re-established.

In the next set of negotiations the Carleton teachers had a new face sitting across the table from them. Negotiations had become more complex than they were at the beginning of the 1970's. As a consequence, many trustees began to feel the need for greater expertise on their side of the bargaining table, especially when dealing with the
secondary teachers whose provincial office was now providing locals with relatively sophisticated advice, assistance and training. Thus, the Board hired a professional negotiator from Woods, Gordon and Company for the 1975 contract talks with both elementary and secondary teachers. Very little news was reported regarding the elementary teachers' negotiations and it appears that they went smoothly in that, for the first time since 1971, the teachers managed to get their new collective agreement signed before their old one expired. Further, the agreement was reported to be the first in 1975 between any Ontario board and its teachers.

It should not be assumed that the militancy that appeared in the previous set of negotiations had dissipated by 1975. Two facts mitigate against such an assumption. First, prior to the settlement, which was signed early in December, 1974, the TFC mailed out 12,000 copies of a list of school board candidates it supported in the up-coming school board election. The name of the trustee who chaired the Board's negotiating team during the mass resignation notably did not appear on the teachers' list. This list constituted a first for the TFC and served to indicate a more political orientation on the part of the organization. The second important point is that the teachers pushed for an expansion of the scope of negotiations and a reduction in management rights. Comparison of the previous year's agreement with that signed for 1975, reveals two changes indicative of this push. First, where the previous agreement provided teachers with a right to appeal any violation of the collective agreement to the Board, the 1975
agreement provided a grievance procedure in which the final court of appeal was an independent arbitration panel. Second, the 1975 agreement allowed teachers to grieve transfers if they felt the transfer would cause undue hardship. Beyond these changes in the collective agreement, it was reported in the newspapers that the settlement called for the establishment of Board-teacher committees to review the duties of educational consultants and speech therapists and to examine procedures for dealing with teacher layoffs, transfers and redundant positions.

It might be argued that the relative lack of visible coercive action surrounding the 1975 settlement was due to the fact that teachers did not need to utilize coercive action to get their way. In addition to modifications in transfer and grievance procedures, they also obtained a reported 16.5% salary increase over 12 months - the largest increase to that point. Further, there were conditions which could have facilitated the Board being more generous with the 1975 agreement. First, the provincial ceilings were raised by 17.1%, which contrasts with a rise of 8.9% in 1974, and average increases of 5.2 and 2.2% for elementary and secondary expenditures, respectively, in 1971, 1972 and 1973. Thus, 1975 saw the Board provided with the possibility of making greater expenditures than in the past. Second, school board elections were coming up. Incumbent trustees could hardly relish the

4. One could, of course, interpret the establishment of these committees as a ploy engineered by the professional negotiator to avoid discussion of the issues at the bargaining table.
thought of a major skirmish at a time when the electorate was about to make its decision on their capabilities. Further, the Board's previous negotiations with the TFC suggested that the teachers might just be willing to meet intransigence with disruptive action. Finally, the fact that several trustees publicly criticised the hiring of the "expensive" professional negotiator may well have provided those trustees who endorsed the hiring with motivation to insure than the negotiator was "successful" in order to vindicate their decision.

The agreement reached in the winter of 1974-75 expired on December 31, 1975. Prior to its expiration, two important events took place. First, the Carleton secondary teachers negotiated a collective agreement giving them a reported salary increase of 35% for the period from September 1, 1975 to December 31, 1976. In addition to the salary increase, the agreement called for the secondary teachers' salaries to be adjusted to match increases in the cost-of-living. The second event of consequence was the establishment of the anti-inflation board (AIB).

The first event - the secondary teachers' settlement - undoubtedly was a source of irritation to many elementary teachers, in that it created a significant disparity between the salaries of elementary and secondary teachers with equivalent qualifications. Although elementary teachers had previously fought hard to break parity with the secondary teachers, they were now in a situation where parity was something to fight for. As the Board had always claimed to be in favour of equal-pay for equivalent qualifications, it is perhaps not surprising that an agreement was reached on January 10, 1976, (only ten days after
the old agreement expired) which brought elementary teachers' salaries close to those of secondary teachers. Unfortunately for the elementary group, the 22% increase contained in the agreement was rolled back to 15% by the AIB. As several Board informants were happy to point out for me, the elementary teachers had done themselves in by fighting parity. This was because the AIB provided for exceptional salary increases where a "historical pay relationship" could be established between a group that had settled prior to the establishment of the AIB and one whose salary agreement came under the review of the AIB. While the TFC attempted to argue that parity in pay had historically existed between elementary and secondary teachers in Carleton, their successful effort to break parity with the secondary teachers weakened the "historical pay relationship" and hence, weakened the argument for an exceptional pay increase.

Negotiations for the next contract took place under the shadow of the AIB. Perhaps feeling that effort spent in fighting for salary

---

5. There was another source of irritation in all this for elementary teachers. In the past the elementary teachers were upset that when secondary teachers settled before them the Board strongly resisted any attempt on the elementary group's part to exceed the salary increases achieved by the secondary group. Further, when elementary teachers did manage to exceed the salary gains of secondary teachers, the Board would immediately seek to adjust the secondary teachers' salaries accordingly. However, when it came to the elementary group's turn to settle first (as in 1975) the secondary group was able to exceed their settlement and the Board made no effort to amend the elementary agreement to bring their salaries in line with those of the secondary teachers. In fairness, however, it should be mentioned that the Board did offer to make a lump sum payment to the elementary teachers which would have helped to close the gap between them and the secondary group.
Increases would be wasted, given the watchful eye of the AIB, the TFC negotiators pushed forward in other areas. Specifically, with the specter of declining enrolments hanging over the entire educational system, Carleton elementary teachers began to show a strong interest in negotiating items such as pupil-teacher-ratio (PTR) which would influence job security. Here they met with some success. In December, 1976, after six months of negotiations, the TFC managed to obtain a two-year agreement in which the PTR was specified. In addition, the agreement provided for a working conditions committee to be composed of two trustees, two teachers, one principal, and one superintendent.

The newly-formed working conditions committee was put to the test early. On May 14, 1976, the Board served notice that it would have to lay off 28 elementary teachers. Although the Board chairman indicated that most, if not all, of the teachers would probably be rehired, the TFC chose to show some of its old aggressiveness on the issue and, three days later, informed the Board that it would take legal action to counter the layoffs. With the threat of legal action

6. They also met with some temporary success in negotiating salary increases. The contract provided for a salary increase of 23% over two years, but this increase was rolled back by between 4 and 5% in March, 1976.

7. The basis for the action lay in the fact that the Board had sent letters of dismissal terminating the teachers' employment at the end of the school year, rather than simply notifying the 28 teachers that they were likely to be dismissed as was required by the collective agreement.
In the air, the working conditions committee appeared to function effectively. On May 31, it was announced that 24 of the dismissed teachers would be rehired and that the TFC had stopped legal action.9

Job security was to be a major concern of the TFC from 1977 on. Although elementary enrolments in Carleton were not declining rapidly, another factor was operating to threaten job security. This was the increasing popularity of the French-immersion program in Carleton. Increasingly, parents in the nation's capital were seeing bilingualism as a necessary quality to "make it" in the civil service - the main employer in the area. For their children's future, parents increasingly chose to enrol their offspring in French-immersion. The consequence of this was that, even without major declines in elementary enrolments, anglophone teachers found themselves losing pupils. Unilingual anglophones were being laid-off while bilingual teachers were being hired. This dynamic was repeatedly to lead the TFC into conflict in the years to come. In 1978, 14 full and part-time teachers were threatened with layoff. Again the TFC took legal action - this time filing a writ calling for a court injunction to prevent the teachers' dismissal. And again, the Board managed to rehire all the dismissed teachers, thanks to other teachers resigning or taking leave of absence, and the court action was dropped.

8. The TFC did serve the Board with a writ of grievance on May 18, but court action was delayed to give the working conditions committee time to find a solution to the layoff problem.

9. Three of the original 28 dismissed teachers were on short term contracts which expired and one resigned.
Spring of 1979 saw the same problem rise again, only this time 36 jobs were threatened. However, at this point the TFC was apparently unable to find a legal basis for action and, instead, held a demonstration at the board offices with about 500 teachers in attendance to protest the dismissals. By July, all of the dismissed teachers who wished to return (27) were reinstated.

Having completed this brief overview of board-teacher relations, we are in a position to focus our investigation more clearly. Our concern is with the factors which lead to the development of militant teacher groups. In the case of the TFC, this development took place in the early seventies, with the mass resignation in the winter of 1973-74 serving as a turning point in the collective-orientation of the TFC. From this point on, there was no returning to the view that the interests of teachers and the Board coincided. The Board and the teachers might share some broad common goals, but they clearly had different interests to protect on the way to meeting any such goals. Equally important, there was no hesitancy on the part of the TFC to take coercive action in defense of its members' interests. Since our concern is with understanding the development of militancy, our energies will be focussed on the period in which that development took place: 1969 to 1973-74. We now turn to the factors outlined in our theoretical framework to guide our analysis.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITANCY AMONG CARLETON ELEMENTARY TEACHERS: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS

What led the elementary teachers of Carleton to cast off docility in favour of militancy while other public school teachers remained reluctant to make such a move? On the surface, circumstances did not appear to favour the development of militancy in Carleton. As was previously mentioned, the Carleton elementary teacher group began as a potpourri of teachers drawn from thirteen different elementary systems. They were, and continue to be, spread out over 1000 square miles. Their number was increasing rapidly at the turn of the decade; and, organizationally, the group was formally split into two different provincial federations along sex-lines. Taken together such conditions would appear to impede the emergence of strong leadership and organizational solidarity at the local level and, hence, against the development of militancy as well. Furthermore, unlike the majority of elementary systems in Ontario, the Carleton system was still growing in the early seventies. As a consequence, it seems unlikely that certain types of discontent, such as discontent stemming from blocked mobility or from lack of job security, were very strong. How then, given this apparently barren soil, did militancy take root and grow?

Our theoretical framework suggests, among other things, that we examine discontent, leadership, organization, solidarity and social control in attempting to develop an explanation of the Carleton group's move to militancy. We will begin our investigation by focusing on
organization and solidarity because it is in this area that the Carleton group differs most dramatically from other less militant public school teacher groups.

A. Organization, Solidarity and the Development of Militancy

In the discussion of patterns of militancy at the provincial level it was suggested that one of the prime factors which hampered the development of militancy among public school elementary teachers was the fact that males and females belonged to different teacher federations. More to the point, the division of teachers' federation membership along sex-lines was seen to pose significant problems for local organization and solidarity. In Carleton, it has been suggested that conditions of geographic dispersion, rapid growth in the teaching force and the heterogeneous teaching experiences of the teachers who came to the CBE may have hindered the formation of a well-organized and cohesive teacher group, even if the group was not divided in its federation membership. Much of our work in the following pages will involve showing how the above barriers were overcome in Carleton.

Formal Organization of the TFC. One of the key characteristics which distinguished the Carleton teacher group from all other groups of Ontario public school teachers at the beginning of the seventies was that males and females belonged to a single, truly integrated, local federation - the TFC. It will be suggested that this feature of the Carleton group significantly increased its potential for taking militant action.
It is not difficult to discern the advantages that having a single organization to represent teachers provides as compared to any collective action, including coercive collective action. In negotiations teachers can speak with a single voice, concentrating their energies on developing strategies and tactics to influence the board. In contrast, where teachers are divided into two organizations, negotiating teams contain persons charged with the responsibility of representing their separate constituencies. Under such circumstances, negotiators are often forced to spend a great deal of time and energy negotiating with one another as well as with the board. In addition, where teachers are represented by separate organizations they are vulnerable to divide-and-conquer tactics being applied by the board.

Apart from reducing the potential for internal division, having a single local organization has a number of other advantages. First, having a single leadership group facilitates effective and efficient communication and coordination of the group, and, thus, the potential for mobilization. Second, a single organization provides leadership with a larger pool of local resources to draw on than is the case where the group is split. In the case of the TFC this had the further advantage of freeing the TFC from the more conservative and cautious leadership of the provincial FW and OPS. Finally, a single organization provides a basis for furthering the development of social solidarity within the group. Where elementary teachers are split into two organizations at the local level, the women and men tend to hold separate social events with women frequently falling into a "tea party syndrome"
while the men organize their social outings around sports. In Carleton, due to the lack of organizational separation, there has not been as strong a tendency for such stereotypical sex-role behaviour in teachers' social activities. Rather, many social events were, and are, designed to attract both female and male teachers (and certainly no events bar either sex from attendance as does occur with some FW functions).

In short, a unified organization lays the groundwork for stronger, more unified leadership, greater collective resources, better communication and coordination, increased group solidarity and greater ability to resist some of the social control tactics of authorities.

Having generally covered the merits of having a single local federation, let us briefly compare and contrast the structure of the TFC with the structure which characterizes most other Ontario public school teacher groups. Figure 3 outlines the organization of the TFC.

Figure 3 is derived from the first constitution of the TFC. First, it should be noted that the basic unit of organization is the school. Rather than utilize some form of proportional representation or at-large elections, each school staff elects a single representative to TFC council. In using the school as the basic organizational unit, the TFC ensured that Council members would have little difficulty in carrying communication to and from those they were elected to represent. In addition, the use of the school as the basic unit of representation makes it easier for classroom teachers to serve as Council representatives. Where one representative must represent
Figure 3: The Formal Structure of the TFC (1970-71)

**Comities**
- Counseling and Relations

**Positions**
- **THE EXECUTIVE:**
  - President
  - 1st Vice President
  - 2nd Vice President
  - Past President
  - Secretary
  - Treasurer
  - 5 Executive Members (Elected annually by the total membership)

**Economic Policy**
- Professional Development
- Public Relations
- Social Relations

**THE COUNCIL:**
- a) the executive officers
- b) a representative or alternate from every school
- c) a representative or alternate from supervisory personnel
- d) president(s) of the affiliate(s)
  (School representatives elected annually in the schools)

**Powers**
- The Executive shall:
  a) conduct the business of TFC between annual meetings
  b) advise and make recommendations to the Council
  c) carry out the decisions of Council
  d) authorize payment of expenses incurred by the Council
  e) appoint the members of the Counseling and Relations Committee after consultation with the Council
  f) formulate a budget for ratification by Council

- The Council shall:
  a) act upon the recommendations of the Executive
  b) make decisions in the best interests of the members of TFC
  c) authorize the expenditure of monies by the Executive and the Committees
  d) appoint members of standing and Ad Hoc Committees except the FWTAO and OPSMTF
several schools (as frequently happens in OPS units), classroom teachers' lack of discretionary time makes it difficult for them to communicate with all those they represent.

A second area which requires discussion relates to TFC committees. In 1970-71, the TFC had seven standing committees. The Counselling and Relations Committee which was responsible for helping teachers deal with any difficulties they might experience on the job - including problems of unfair treatment by one's principal or by board personnel - was appointed by the Executive. Of the six remaining committees, four were appointed by the Council - Economic Policy Committee, Professional Development Committee, Public Relations Committee, Social Relations Committee. The functions of these committees were as follows:

a) Economic Policy Committee
   To negotiate with the board

b) Professional Development Committee
   To provide a professional development program to suit the needs of the members of TFC

c) Public Relations Committee
   To promote communication between the general public and the TFC and to promote communication within the TFC

d) Social Relations Committee
   To plan social activities in the interests of the members of TFC

The remaining two committees - FWTAO and OPSMTF were, in fact, the remnants of the OPS and FW locals. Their status and function
within TFC is not made clear by the TFC constitution. In part, FW and
OPS committees appear to owe their existence to legal necessity. By
law, Carleton teachers are obligated to pay fees to the provincial FW
and OPS. The provincial federations then rebate a set amount of the
fees back to the local FW and OPS units. From here, the local FW and
OPS units turn over either all (in the case of the OPS) or a portion of
their rebates to TFC. Since TFC has no legal right to levy fees it is
forced to maintain FW and OPS units. Further, since these units had to
appear to be independent organizations, it was not possible for their
leaders (i.e., FW and OPS committee members) to be appointed by either
the TFC Council or Executive.

In May, 1972, several notable changes in the structure of TFC
increased its strength. First, the executive of TFC was expanded from
11 to 14 persons and given the power to appoint the members of all ad
hoc committees. The power to appoint ad hoc committees was particularly
important in that it was later to provide the executive with a means of
independently garnering human resources when attempting to mobilize the
troops. Second, the EPC became an elected committee of nine members,
with three being elected annually to three year terms. While this move
probably did little to alter the composition of EPC, it did assure
continuity in the negotiating team, and did give the negotiating team a

10. When the importance of TFC's control over mobility channels is
discussed later, this power to appoint ad hoc committees will
appear even more important. Many ad hoc committees and the
Counselling and Relations Committee put teachers in contact with
important authorities in the system and can be used as a vehicle
on the route to upward mobility within the school system.
higher profile with the general membership. In addition, this move probably resulted in the general membership being more supportive of their negotiators than if the appointment system had continued. A third change is probably more symbolic than anything else - all appointments to the chairmanship of standing committees were to be subject to ratification by Council (including the chairmanships of FW and OPS committees).

How does the structure of TFC differ from that found among other Ontario public school teachers' groups? While all other elementary groups are not identical in their structure, most of them probably share the following differences from TFC.

1. The most obvious difference is that other elementary groups are split into two separate local organizations.

2. Each organization runs its own social events, meetings, committees and so on. Each elects its own officers.

3. Committees may be set up to handle matters of joint concern such as negotiation with the board or professional development, but committee members are appointed separately by the Executives of each organization.

4. No formal guarantee of continuity in the negotiating team is made, although there is often an informal attempt to do so.

Clearly, the formal organization of the Carleton teachers is more conducive to effective collective action than is the organizational pattern which characterizes other elementary groups. The intriguing question is "How did the Carleton group come to have this unified structure?" It is to this question that we now turn.
Breaking the Sex Barrier: The TFC's Roots in Nepean. In order to understand how Carleton elementary teachers were able to form a unified federation it is necessary to examine the way teachers were organized in the Carleton area, prior to the formation of the CBE. Before the CBE was formed, all male elementary teachers in the Carleton area were loosely united in a single unit of OES and all female teachers were members of a corresponding district of FW. However, because both districts encompassed teachers employed by a number of different school boards, many separate units and branches of FW and OES were formed within the district organizations. Local units carried out the business of dealing with their respective boards, while the district organizations appeared to have functioned primarily as a vehicle for carrying information down from the provincial federation offices in Toronto.

Perhaps, as a result of seeing their provincial and district organizations as being of little use to them in dealing with local concerns, several groups of teachers in the Carleton area began (in the late sixties) to think seriously about crossing the sex-barrier and forming an amalgamated local federation in order to increase their strength in dealing with local issues. Most important for the future organization of the Carleton elementary teachers under the CBE was the fact that the two largest districts in the County went the farthest in pursuit of amalgamation. Thus, at the time that the decision to create the CBE was announced, the teachers of the largest pre-existing board - the Nepean Public School Board (NPSB) - had formed an amalgamated local
federation known as the Nepean Teachers' Federation (NTF); and the teachers in the second largest system - Gloucester - had established joint committees to deal with salary negotiation and professional development. The fact that the elementary teachers of the new CBE were to form a single federation is attributable, in part, to the critical mass of teachers receptive to amalgamation that had built up in Nepean and Gloucester. (Of the 981 teachers employed by the CBE in its first year of operation, approximately 450 were from Nepean and 140 from Gloucester.) However, other factors were no less important in laying the foundation for the TFC. In particular, the role that NTF and its leadership played in the birth of the TFC warrants our attention.\footnote{Many in the NTF felt that their organization had played the role of parent to the TFC as the following quote from the editor of the NTF newsletter illustrates: "Now we are called to a new roll [sic] particularly in the affairs of a baby, born of our dreams and greater than its parents - TFC. We congratulate all those whose "labor" made this birth possible." (NTF Newsletter, Vol.2, no. 3, p. 1.)}

The NTF came into being on March 13, 1967, at a joint meeting of local OPS and FW associations. By a vote of 186 to 28, the decision to form a united federation was made. In large part, the decision to form the NTF was the result of dissatisfaction with the provincial offices of FW and OPS. The nature of this dissatisfaction is revealed in the following excerpt from an NTF flyer sent out to local units of OPS and FW across the province in order to encourage their amalgamation.

\begin{quote}
We've always had active local associations of FWTAO and OPSMTF in Nepean. In fact we've had good representation on provincial committees including the executive. In spite of this there has been a growing feeling of dissatisfaction with our local
\end{quote}
associations. It occurred to many of us that perhaps we were really functioning as extensions of the provincial bodies and that we were not coming to grips with our own problems. We began to realize that if federation was to serve us, we had to turn things upside down (or, more correctly, right side up) and make sure that the local became the vital unit and that the provincial level was viewed in its proper position as an extension of the local group. (From NTF flyer circa 1968)

Why this dissatisfaction with the top-down structure of the provincial federations should surface in the late sixties and, more particularly, why it should become so strong in Nepean, is an interesting question in itself and worth speculating on here. As will be recalled from our discussion in Chapter IV, the sixties were a time of growth and change in Ontario education. Most important, the period from 1965 on witnessed the implementation of Education Minister Davis' program of decentralization. While it has been argued that Davis' 'decentralization' was really a program of centralization, in that it ultimately replaced over 2,000 small autonomous school boards with less than 100 large boards, there was a real transfer of power from the provincial Department of Education to those boards which emerged from the process of decentralization. Local community control over school boards might have decreased but the boards' power relative to the provincial Department of Education definitely increased.

Rather than have everything run out of Toronto, the Department of Education began establishing regional centres to provide services to local boards. Subject inspectors working out of such centres became program consultants "... with the responsibility of assisting individual teachers or groups, but not of appraising or reporting on teacher performance" (Fleming, 1972:83). Further "... the department
relaxed control over school programs and encouraged experimentation, usually asking only that variations from standard procedure be in the hands of competent people and conducted under acceptable conditions" (Fleming, 1972:84). In sum, the new, larger boards were being given greater and greater responsibility for development of the educational programs in their schools. At the same time, teachers were being encouraged to take responsibility for curriculum development and to try out new teaching techniques. More broadly, according to Selby (1977:475), the Department of Education "... propagated a view of education and of Canadian society which demanded innovation." - a view which reached its apex in the Living and Learning report of 1968. With the climate of innovation, in place and with boards obtaining greater and greater autonomy to initiate innovations, there was a danger that teachers would be left behind if their provincial federations didn't start to turn their attention to what was happening at the board level.

Elementary teachers across the province, and especially the relatively youthful teacher group in Nepean, appeared to welcome the call for teachers to innovate and to take an active part in curriculum building, many of them being part of the change-oriented generation of youth that emerged in the 1960's. With decentralization, change and innovation was focused on the local level. Local teachers were faced with trying to take the initiative before the Board took it for them. Thus, they wanted resources in Nepean in the hands of Nepean teachers, not in the hands of the old boys and girls in Toronto. Put in broader terms, much of the power of educational decision-making had shifted
from the Department of Education in Toronto to local school boards but teacher federations continued to act as if there had been no shift.

For those teachers who viewed the new era of innovation with favour, there were problems beyond being outdistanced by an innovative board. In particular, for elementary teachers, there was the problem that many of the school board authorities questioned their ability to make useful and innovative contributions to education. Many of the trustees in the new, enlarged boards had prior experience as trustees in smaller systems staffed by relatively unambitious teachers who were used to following the dictates of the Department of Education. Others, attracted by the political prestige or other benefits a trusteeship of a large system could provide, often came from a background which led them to look down their noses at elementary teachers. In any case, elementary teachers had hardly established a track record of being great educational innovators with which to convince anyone that they had the wherewithall to lead educational change. On the one hand, teachers were faced with hype coming out of the Department of Education meant to get them involved in the process of making educational change. On the other hand, they were often faced with local authorities who seriously questioned their importance and ability vis-a-vis innovation in education.

In Nepean these opposing tendencies appeared to come head-to-head. The fact that one of the main focuses of NTF energy was the establishment of NTF-run, professional development programs suggests that Nepean teachers were very interested in playing an active role in
changing the educational scene. Flying in the face of Nepean teachers' desire to become involved professionals was the treatment they received in their relations with trustees. While we do not have any evidence of the nature of this treatment prior to the formation of the NTF, it is doubtful that trustee attitudes were any more favourable to teachers prior to the formation of the NTF than afterward. Thus, it is worth noting the way Nepean trustees treated their teachers after the NTF was formed. Here a meeting of the Nepean Teacher/Board Relations Committee in 1968 is illuminating. At this meeting the NTF representatives requested a number of changes in fringe benefits. The response of the trustees was an almost complete rejection of the teachers' requests. More important, the trustees bluntly questioned the teachers' ability to be educational innovators and their basic integrity and competence as teachers. The following excerpts from the teachers' minutes indicate their view of the trustees' attitudes to teachers.  

It seems that the Board thinks teachers are all rotters.

It seems that the more familiar the Board is with a person's personal life, the less they are willing to humanize the relationship. We felt that we as teaching personnel, were merely a cost factor and a thorn in their backs.

We felt that we were approaching a Board which had a closed mind on these issues. They also were not interested in the human aspect of their employees. They most certainly felt that the teachers as a lot could not be trusted, they intimated that Mr. Rath was not doing his duty when he didn't fire a lot of teachers every year. (NTF minutes of the Teacher/Board Relations Committee, March 14, 1968).

12. More complete excerpts of these minutes are to be found in Appendix D.
To sum up the argument, Nepean teachers' dissatisfaction with the top-down structure of FW and OPS was probably the result of three factors: (1) the decentralization policies of the Department of Education which increased the power of local boards, (2) the presence of a solid core of young teachers in Nepean who wished to participate in the "educational innovation movement" being propagated by the Department of Education, and (3) the presence of trustees in Nepean who held teachers in low regard. Taken together, factors one and three brought forth the need for a strong local teacher organization. Factor two only increased the strength with which this need was felt and the vigor with which teachers would work to meet it.

Let us now return to the main issue - the role of NTF in the development of an amalgamated federation in Carleton. We have already noted that NTF teachers constituted the largest single group to come into the new CBE. However, there was more than numbers behind the NTF's success in spawning the TFC. The NTF was, in the words of its leadership, a movement to promote the amalgamation of all five Ontario teacher federations. Indeed one of the objectives stated in the NTF constitution was "... to promote the incorporation of all teachers under one federation." Nepean teachers were armed with a sense of mission which would fuel their efforts to create an amalgamated teacher organization under the new CBE.

The sense of mission was made stronger by the actions of FW. As one might expect, the provincial offices of OPS and FW were far from pleased with the formation of a local unit which desired their demise.
In fact, it appears that the provincial offices attempted to prevent the NTF from forming by issuing a number of threats of "retaliation" if the local amalgamation were to take place.  

While threats were not successful in preventing the formation of NTF, the provincial federations did not give up fighting the NTF once it was in place. It appears that, of the two provincial federations, it was FW that was most upset with local amalgamation in Nepean. While OPS might have taken issue with the NTF's goal of unifying all five of the provincial federations, it was favorable to amalgamating with FW. On the other hand, as we already know, the provincial office of FW was strongly opposed to amalgamation with OPS. For FW, the NTF (and later the TFC) was the camel's nose peeking into the tent of FW's existence. Consequently, it is not surprising that FW harassed the NTF rather than supported it. However, rather than weakening the NTF, harassment appeared to drive NTF men and women closer.  

12. On the night the vote was taken to form the NFT, John Jarrett (a Nepean principal and active promoter of amalgamation) enumerated threats emanating from the provincial federations and attempted to defuse them. Below is a list of threats he spoke to in his partisan speech:
   The provincial office will not recognize NFT.
   The provincial office will not make rebate of fees.
   The provincial office will deny us the right to send delegates to provincial meetings.
   The provincial office will insist that we continue to pay our fees - in spite of this lack of recognition.
   The provincial office will deny us the right of association with other locals.
(From John Jarrett's speech of March 13, 1967)

13. Perhaps the most important attempt of FW to weaken the NTF involved the withholding of fee rebates. The problem arose when one of the Carleton representatives to the FW annual assembly in...
Certainly the NTF showed no sign of backing off in its promotion of amalgamation. Flyers were sent across the province to all local OPS and FW units, telling the story of amalgamation in Nepean and encouraging others to write to the NTF for help in amalgamating. A major conference was organized, bringing together representatives of all five federations from the Ottawa-Carleton area to discuss amalgamation, and NTF women took resolutions in support of amalgamation to the annual FW provincial assembly. Thus, when it became clear that the CBE was to be formed, there was a strong, experienced group of teacher leaders in Nepean who were committed to seeing that amalgamation did not die with the disappearance of the Nepean Public School Board.

In order to insure that the amalgamation movement would continue under the new Board, NTF leaders first sought out teacher leaders in Gloucester and attempted to sell them on the merits of forming an amalgamated group under CBE. Once it was found that the Gloucester

footnote 13 cont.

1968 made a statement to the effect that FW did not exist as an independent organization in Nepean. When this member attempted to retract her statement at a meeting of FW Directors in December the Directors reacted by passing the following motion.

"That the Directors of Region 4 meet with the Executive of the Nepean Women Teachers' Association in Nepean, and to report their finding to the February 8th meeting of the Board of Directors of the FWTAO and that the second installment of fees be returned until this decision is made."

(NFT Newsletter, Vol. 2, no. 11, p. 6)

How the local unit managed to prove its independent existence is not clear, but they did manage to ride out this storm and get their fee rebate.
teachers were receptive to amalgamation, a decision was made to hold a meeting on the idea of an amalgamated Carleton elementary group to which all elementary schools in the area would be invited to send representatives. For an account of what ensued, we can do no better than to quote the description of events provided by the man who was president of the NFT at the time.

That meeting was held at Manotick Public School on January 15, 1969. Kay Stănley was elected chairman of the meeting and discussions lasted until 10:45 p.m. The key motion was moved by Bill Borger and seconded by Tim MacIntyre, "That we form a Teachers' Federation to represent all elementary teachers in Carleton." Unfortunately eleven schools were not represented at this meeting.

Armed with this unofficial mandate the meeting then elected a steering committee to design a constitution and a course of action to carry out the intent of the above motion...

When the steering committee was finally satisfied with its work, another meeting was called for April 9. The form and constitution of the proposed organization were explained to the delegates from the schools. This time all but two schools were represented. When the secret ballot vote was taken subsequently in schools the tally in favour of the proposed federation was:

Yes 842 (88.5%)  No 68 (7.1%)
Absent or abstained 42 (4.4%)

With this clear mandate the steering committee called a General Meeting at South Carleton High School for 3:45 p.m. on May 27. The turn-out was tremendous with all but a handful of Carleton teachers enthusiastically present. The Constitution was adopted with the name changed from "Carleton Teachers' Federation" to the "Teachers' Federation of Carleton." (Les Linden, "The History and Evolution of the Teachers' Federation of Carleton," from the 1972-73 TFC Handbook)

In sum, the fact that the Carleton teachers came to be organized into a single federation, relatively unencumbered by organizational jealousies of OPS and FW was due, in large part, to the activities of a core of highly skilled, experienced and articulate organizers from Nepean and the large number of amalgamation supporters who came to the
system from Nepean. The NTF leadership came into a relatively
unstructured situation armed with a clear game plan and with enough
manpower, energy and experience to put their plan in place. Except for
the Gloucester teacher group, none of the other teacher groups had
sufficient strength to challenge the NTF plan (if they were motivated
to do so). Further, other groups lacked the local communications
network to unite in opposition to the NTF.

The Development of Solidarity and Commitment to the TFC. The
fact that the Carleton teachers were formally unified in the TFC did
not ensure that divisive tensions between men and women would not
emerge to weaken the group. Certainly, the fact that the TFC, like the
NTF before it, found it necessary to maintain FW and OPS committees in
order to obtain fee rebates and to stay within the law, constituted a
continuing potential threat to organizational unity and strength.
Should women or men feel that the opposite sex was obtaining differen-
tial advantage under the TFC, the organization had no legally binding
power to prevent them from withdrawing and operating as independent FW
or OPS units. Further potential for a split between the sexes can be
found in the fact that in Carleton, as in all other public elementary
systems, males could be seen to have somewhat different interests than
females. Males in Carleton were more likely to hold university degrees
than females and were much more likely to hold positions of responsi-
bility. In fact, judging from the 1973-74 statistics on the CBE and
OBE elementary teachers, the differences between males and females in
Carleton were quite similar to the differences in elementary systems
where FW and OPS were not amalgamated. In 1973-74, Carleton had 76 male and 9 female elementary vice-principals and principals; and 62.7% of male teachers, compared to 28.7% of female teachers, held B.A.'s or better. In comparison, in the neighbouring OBE, there were 61 male and 9 female vice-principals and principals, while 67.6% of males, and 32.7% of females, held university degrees.

How the TFC managed to prevent the old schism between men and women from emerging while working to overcome other barriers to unity cannot be explained simply by noting the formal amalgamation of the group. In order to understand how TFC managed to survive and grow in strength, we must analyze more than the factors which led to its birth.

**Committed and Cohesive Leadership.** One of the keys to understanding how the TFC has been able to survive and develop strength lies in the fact that the organization has been blessed with a stable and cohesive leadership core which has consciously worked to build a strong and unified local federation in Carleton. As could be expected, a significant portion of the TFC leadership had been involved in the amalgamation of OPS and FW in Nepean. For example, the first Executive of the TFC contained the following list of NTFers:

President, Kay Stanley (formerly, president of NTF)
1st Vice President, John Jarrett (formerly, executive member of NTF and Chairman of the NFT's teacher/board relations committee)
Secretary, Les Linnen (formerly, president of NTF)
Executive Member, Mrs. Joan Pfeiffer (formerly, treasurer of NTF and chairman of NTF's professional development committee)
Executive Member, Winston Latourell (formerly, executive member of NTF and head of NTF's OPS committee)
Executive Member, John Minter (formerly, Secretary of NTF and chairman of NTF's working conditions committee)
The participation of "old" NTFer's in the leadership of TFC has continued up to the present. In the last ten years only one non-NTF teacher has been elected to the presidency of the TFC and even this person had ties with the NTF, in that he had been part of the steering committee which saw through the birth of the TFC. The important point here is that the TFC came into existence armed with cohesive leaders from Nepean who had well-developed organizational and leadership skills and who were well aware of the difficulties entailed in building a strong, unified local federation.

In one respect having a strong leadership core from Nepean could have been a curse as well as a blessing. Teachers from other areas could well have felt that they were being dominated by the ex-Nepean group and were having amalgamation shoved down their throats. Here, the TFC and its ex-Nepean leaders were fortunate in finding key opinion-leaders from the non-Nepean systems who found the philosophy of amalgamation to be attractive. By incorporating such opinion-leaders within the leadership, the TFC helped reduce the threat that geography and past histories posed for the solidarity of the organization.14

Another factor which helped build solidarity within the TFC, and among Carleton teachers as a whole, was the fact that there was a

---

14. Of particular importance was the inclusion of Gloucester opinion leaders within the TFC fold in that Gloucester was the second largest system next to Nepean to be incorporated under the CBE. Here the TFC was especially fortunate in obtaining Madeline Tufts to serve as 2nd Vice President on its first Executive and Tom Clowes to work on the negotiating team. Both were principals with significant influence in Gloucester.
significant core of energetic and capable women interested in assuming leadership roles within TFC. Of the eleven members of the TFC's first Executive, five were women. Further, from 1969 though to 1976-77, the position of president was held by only women, and, as we saw earlier, it was a woman - Ioma Kerr - who served as president during the mass resignation of 1973-74. The importance of women occupying the more powerful and visible positions within TFC should not be underestimated. One of the main arguments of FW against local amalgamation was that the women would be unable to stand up to males and, in particular, to male principals. Put simply, the fear had been that inequalities of power and authority, entrenched in the organization of the school system (and in society in general), would carry over into federation relationships between men and women. Were this very credible prophesy to have come true in Carleton, it might well have resulted in a severe weakening of women teachers' commitment to TFC and, hence, the strength of the organization. However, the fact is that Carleton women were not cowed by the men. Female classroom teachers such as Kay Stanley, Mary Hill and Barb Brundige did get elected to the presidency of TFC and, once there, did not hesitate to wield their power over males, regardless of whether they were principals or not. Indeed, Mary Hill, who served as president from 1971-73, is reported to have directly interceded on behalf of classroom teachers who had problems with their principals.
The Role of Principals in the Development of Solidarity. In part, the failure of the FW prophesy was due to the hard work of female TFC leaders to secure the commitment of other women in the system. However, in order for classroom teachers (female or male) to play highly demanding leadership roles in TFC, it was essential that their own principals be supportive of their activities and that the principals, as a group, not work to subvert the TFC. Support from principals was important because classroom teachers lack discretionary time, and what time they do have can be restricted by the principal through the scheduling of school duties. In order to carry on the business of building and maintaining the local federation, leaders found it necessary to carry out federation work during the day as well as during the evenings. Here, all of the female classroom teachers who served as president of TFC were fortunate to work under principals who were supportive of TFC. A supportive principal not only could reduce the time demands on a teacher leader through scheduling; s/he could also fill in for the teacher or arrange for another teacher to do so should the president be called away on federation business.

In the case of Mary Hill, during her reign as president, she was allowed to have a phone in her classroom and was able to have her teaching partner (who was later to become president of TFC herself - Barb Brundige) take over her class when called away. None of this could have happened had the principal not allowed it.

It was not an accident that female classroom teachers were able to secure support from their principals. Apart from the fact that
principals in Carleton chose their own staff, there was the fact that the majority of principals in Carleton were committed to the TFC and its philosophy of amalgamation. How it is that Carleton principals came to support the TFC and the role they played in building up the solidarity and strength of the organization is now the subject of our attention.

**Principals' Support for the TFC.** In large part, Carleton elementary principals' commitment to the TFC stems from the fact that the CBE (and the NPSB before it) were new and growing systems. From its inception, in 1969, to its incorporation in the CBE, the NPSB grew from having an enrolment of 6,873 to one of approximately 10,180. Likewise, the CBE experienced growth in the early seventies from an enrolment of 19,946 in 1969-70 to 23,437 in 1973-74.

In Nepean, one of the consequences of newness and growth appears to have been that principals were allowed a significant amount of power to run their own schools, including the power to hire their own staffs. Trustees, faced with the problems of handling multi-million dollar budgets and building programs without the aid of a large administrative staff, had their hands full coping with growth. Almost of necessity, the responsibility for overseeing teachers and the day-to-day operation of the schools fell to the superintendent of schools and his principals.  

15. The Nepean Public School Board employed only one Superintendent of Schools. Communication between teachers and trustees was mediated through the superintendent's office as was much of the communication between principals and trustees. However, face-to-face interaction between teachers, principals and trustees did occur on several committees including the negotiating committee, the board/teacher relations committee and the principals' association.
Thus, Nepean principals came to have significant power and influence over their teachers. In turn, because they were hired directly by their principals, teachers were inclined to have fairly strong loyalty to their principals. This is important because, on the whole, Nepean principals were strong proponents of amalgamation. Many were heavily involved in the development of the NTF and later in the birth of the TFC. Armed with influential positions, the power to hire and an ideology supportive of an amalgamated local teachers' federation, Nepean principals were in a position to ensure that those who would rise to positions of responsibility in the future would be supportive of the concept of a unified local federation. In order to understand this we must now turn to another consequence of newness and growth.

Rapid growth in Nepean resulted in a large influx of young and often upwardly-mobile teachers. Those just out of teachers' college were unlikely to have been committed to the FW/OPS split and were probably easily convinced of the merits of amalgamation by its high-status proponents within Nepean. Others, who came to Nepean to take advantage of the opportunities for promotion which the system offered, were especially likely to become supporters of amalgamation. In large, growing systems such as Nepean, and later Carleton, young ambitious teachers faced at least three hurdles on the way to promotion. They had to secure the endorsement of their principal, do something to demonstrate their leadership capabilities within the system, and, if possible, make themselves known to the Board and its top administrators. In most cases the easiest way to cross all three hurdles was
to jump on the amalgamation bandwagon. Indeed, once the NTF was in operation, there was virtually no other route to promotion. Most, if not all, of the Nepean principals were committed to amalgamation and, thus, would be most inclined to support "youngsters" who furthered the cause of NTF. Further, an ambitious teacher had little opportunity to "show his or her stuff" outside of NTF for virtually all of the leadership positions that existed were under the control of NTF. Thus, young men and women, on their way up, found themselves working side-by-side on NTF committees with members of the opposite sex in order to pursue their personal goals.

Again, largely because of growth, many young NTFers did in fact achieve promotions in relatively short-order both within the NPSB and the CBE. Having worked in federation with, and taught with, females of similar age as equals, young males who achieved positions of responsibility found it difficult to bully (if they were ever motivated to do so) their former colleagues. Put simply, communalities of age, experience and socialization mitigated against there developing any great social-distance between the young male principals of Nepean and the Nepean women who were active in the local federation.

In sum, the fact that Carleton principals supported the TFC and its female leaders was a result of the fact that many of the CBE principals were either old Nepean principals or young men who had been schooled by them, and the fact that many of the women who were active in TFC were former Nepean teachers.

To obtain a feel for the extent to which ex-NFTers were able to
rise to prominence in the CBE we can compare the 1966 Department of Education listing of NPSB teachers and principals with the listing of CBE elementary teachers compiled by the TFC for 1971-72. Of the 82 principals and vice-principals in the elementary schools of the CBE in 1971-72, 47 can be found in the 1966 list of 327 Nepean teachers.\(^{16}\) Also worth noting is the fact that all but one of the 14 Nepean principals listed in 1966 were filling principalships in the CBE in 1970-71.

In addition to the Nepean contingent that moved into positions of influence in the CBE, a number of teachers from other systems, who were involved in the formation of the TFC, and/or who served in leadership positions within TFC, managed to obtain principalships in the CBE. In total, 12 of the 40 principals and vice-principals, who had not been in the Nepean system of 1966, had connections with the Nepean contingent either through participation in the steering committee that set up TFC or by direct participation in TFC once it was established. Specifically, four held leadership positions in TFC, one served as staff representative to TFC Council, two were on the steering committee and five served both as members of the steering committee and as executives or committee members within TFC.

The success of ex-NFTers and fellow-travellers from other systems...

\(^{16}\) This is a very conservative measure of flow of Nepean teachers into positions of responsibility under the CBE. Teachers who came to Nepean after 1966 are of course not included in the 1966 list of Nepean teachers nor are Nepean teachers who were temporarily away from the system for various reasons.
systems in obtaining promotions, not only helped to prevent a schism between TFC and principals, it also had the positive effect of providing the TFC with a network of influential workers and communicators to help mobilize and solidify the teachers behind TFC. Most important in the early years, principals and vice-principals' support for and participation in the TFC, helped overcome the threats to organizational solidarity posed by the CBE's geography and the continuing influx of new teachers.

New teachers were more likely than not, to be working under a principal or vice-principal who was supportive of amalgamation and the TFC. As in Nepean, principals and vice-principals of the CBE were able to socialize new teachers to the local federation. Vis-à-vis the geographic dispersal of the CBE teachers, the TFC's solidarity received a boost from the transfer of ex-NTFers to principalships and vice-principalships in schools outside of Nepean township.

The Geographic Spread of TFC Influentials. Table 54 shows the spread and dominance of principals with roots in Nepean throughout the CBE. In 1969-70, only five of the 25 principals outside of Nepean township came from the NPSB of 1966. By 1972-73, 12 of the 33 principals working outside of Nepean were from the old Nepean system and 29 of the 54 schools in the total CBE system had principals from the NPSB.

Table 55 shows the proportion of CBE schools containing either a principal or vice-principal who was working in Nepean in 1966. As can be seen, by 1972-73, almost half of the CBE schools outside of Nepean
Table 54: Ratio of Schools with Principals from the Nepean System of 1966 to the Total Number of Schools by Geographic Area and Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepean Township</td>
<td>17/20</td>
<td>18/20</td>
<td>15/21</td>
<td>17/21</td>
<td>15/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucester Township</td>
<td>0/6</td>
<td>0/7</td>
<td>3/8</td>
<td>2/11</td>
<td>3/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Townships</td>
<td>5/19</td>
<td>9/19</td>
<td>8/19</td>
<td>10/22</td>
<td>10/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Areas Outside of Nepean</td>
<td>5/25</td>
<td>6/26</td>
<td>11/27</td>
<td>12/33</td>
<td>13/33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All CBE Schools</td>
<td>22/45</td>
<td>24/47</td>
<td>26/48</td>
<td>29/54</td>
<td>28/53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 55: Ratio of Schools with Principals or Vice Principals from the Nepean System of 1966 to the Total Number of Schools by Area and Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepean Township</td>
<td>19/20</td>
<td>19/21</td>
<td>20/21</td>
<td>19/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucester Township</td>
<td>0/6</td>
<td>0/7</td>
<td>3/8</td>
<td>3/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Townships</td>
<td>6/19</td>
<td>9/19</td>
<td>8/19</td>
<td>12/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Areas Outside of Nepean</td>
<td>6/25</td>
<td>9/26</td>
<td>11/27</td>
<td>15/33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All CBE School Area</td>
<td>25/45</td>
<td>28/47</td>
<td>31/48</td>
<td>34/54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
had a principal or vice-principal from the old Nepean system. Assuming that those who worked under the NPSB were likely to be supporters of NTF and its TFC offspring, this spread of Nepeanites to influential positions in areas outside of Nepean likely strengthened TFC considerably.

Table 56 bears both on the assumption that ex-Nepeanite principals and vice-principals supported the concept of a strong, amalgamated local federation and on the support given to the TFC by all principals and vice-principals, regardless of whether they were in the NPSB system. Specifically, the table shows the proportion of CBE schools in each area that had a principal or vice-principal who had been, or currently was, a highly active member of NTF or TFC or who had served as a member of the steering committee which established TFC. Here it should be noted that the criteria for being selected as highly active is: that the person had been on the steering committee, or had held an executive position or committee chairmanship within either TFC or NTF. Since virtually all principals and vice-principals in Carleton had served in some capacity within TFC or NTF by the year 1973-74 (e.g. as staff representative, alternates or committee members), our measure is a very conservative indicator of involvement in, and support for, TFC.

As can be seen, a significant number of schools in areas outside Nepean came to be staffed by principals or vice-principals who had demonstrated their loyalty to the concept of amalgamation through active involvement and who, in the process, had established lines of communication with other local federation activists. Most impressive
Table 56: Ratio of Schools with Principals or Vice-Principals Who were Highly Active in Local Federation to the Total Number of Schools by Area and Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepean Township</td>
<td>5/20</td>
<td>5/21</td>
<td>5/21</td>
<td>7/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucester Township</td>
<td>3/6</td>
<td>5/7</td>
<td>5/8</td>
<td>8/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Townships</td>
<td>7/19</td>
<td>10/19</td>
<td>10/19</td>
<td>10/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Areas Outside of Nepean</td>
<td>10/25</td>
<td>15/26</td>
<td>15/27</td>
<td>18/33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All CBE School Area</td>
<td>15/45</td>
<td>20/47</td>
<td>20/48</td>
<td>25/54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
is the fact that by 1972-73, 25 of the 95 principals and vice-principals in the CBE had played active leadership roles within TFC or NTF.

Table 57 pulls together much of what has just been said by showing the network of linkages provided between CBE schools through principals and vice-principals on the basis of their sharing a commonwork experience in Nepean and their active involvement in the local federation. Where 16 schools were unconnected by this network in 1969-70, only 9 of the 54 schools were not linked in 1972-73, thus showing the increasing strength of the TFC organizational base. Further, it should be noted that of those schools not linked by the above network in 1972-73, most were rather small schools with small staffs.

The power of the principals' and vice-principals' network to serve as a supportive mechanism for TFC should not be underestimated. Many of the young principals and vice-principals not only shared a common past in NTF and the NPSB, they also shared common mentors among the established principals of Nepean who were strong supporters of NTF and who were to become leaders in TFC. Two examples particularly stand out. First, there is the case of John Jarrett, principal of Sir Winston Churchill Intermediate School in Nepean in 1966. Jarrett served on the executive of both NTF and TFC. Of the 35 teachers on his staff in 1966, 13 had become principals or vice-principals in the CBE by 1973-74 and one (I.e. Ioma Kerr) became a president of TFC as well as a vice-principal. In an interview with one of those who came under Jarrett's influence, I was told (in 1978) that the group from Sir
Table 57: CBE Schools containing a Principal or Vice-Principal who was Either from the Old Nepean System or was Active in Local Federation (N indicates from Nepean, A indicates active in federation):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepean Township</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrhaven N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayside N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bessie's Corners N&amp;N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briargreen N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooklake N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Century N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City View N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crystal Bay N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.A. Moodie N</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher Heights N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graham Park N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenbank N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knoxdale N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakeview N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leslie Park N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manordale N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meadowlands N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merivale N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkwood Hills N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John A. Macdonald N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Winston Churchill N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucester Township</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blossom Park A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carson Grove -</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convent Glen -</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emily Carr -</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairfield N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glen Ogilvie N</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Munro A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.D. Billings -</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramseyville A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Hopkins A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitzroy Centennial N&amp;N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glen Cairn N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goulbourn N&amp;N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenley N</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huntley Centennial N&amp;N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Young N</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kars N</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manotick N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meadowview A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metcalfe N&amp;N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munster N</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Gower N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osgoode N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queenswood N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richwood N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rideau Valley N</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverwood N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roland Michner N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen Leacock N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stittsville A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torbolton N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Erskine Johnston N</td>
<td>N&amp;N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Winston still held annual social gatherings. This gives some indication of the strength of ties that were formed within the group.

The second case that should be mentioned is that of Glen Fossey, principal of Merivale public school in 1966. Fossey was an active supporter of NTF and TFC and served as chairman of the first two negotiating teams under the CBE. From his staff of 27 emerged 5 principals and vice-principals and and 3 female presidents of the TFC.

Other cases of common tutelage under a NTF/TFC-promoting principal could be cited; however, the point is simply that many of the future principals, vice-principals and TFC leaders had probably developed fairly strong ties while working together under common amalgamation supporters.

The Importance of Age. One factor which has probably not been stressed enough in accounting for the failure of coinciding differences in sex and authority to serve as a basis for schism within TFC is age and, more specifically, the age of the principals and vice-principals relative to their staff.

Even during the growth years of the sixties, most school systems maintained a significant core of relatively "old" principals. However, this was not to be the case in the boards which preceded the CBE, or in the CBE itself. Three factors account for Carleton's departure from the general pattern. First, there was extremely high growth in the school-aged population in Carleton County. For example, the population aged 5 to 19 living in Nepean and Gloucester Townships almost tripled between 1961 and 1971 going from 11,917 in 1961 to 22,436 in 1966 and
to 35,745 in 1971. Local boards were thus forced to recruit principals at a rapid rate at a time when there was a shortage of teachers. The second factor is that both the NPSB and Gloucester Board (and later the CBE) adopted informal policies of internal promotion. The third influence has to do with the fact that no large-and-old elementary system was to be found among those merged in the CBE. Thus, there was no core of older principals to be brought into the system.

Above and beyond the above mentioned factors, there is a fourth circumstance which is critical to understanding the relative youthfulness of Carleton principals. In the late sixties many elementary systems were already beginning to experience a slowdown in the growth of enrolments, and some systems experienced actual declines. By 1970, the tide had swung and there was an actual decline in elementary enrolments across the province. However, during this period, and on to 1973-74, Carleton area enrolments continued to increase. Relatively young men in declining systems saw their chances for advancement withering away and began to look for greener pastures. Carleton (and Nepean and Gloucester before it) provided such a pasture for many who saw their chances of promotion diminishing in other systems. That this was indeed the case is suggested by Table 58 which compares the age distribution of males in Carleton in 1973-74, with the age distribution of all male elementary teachers in Ontario (including separate school elementary teachers). While the differences are not dramatic, they are consistent with our argument in that Carleton males are overrepresented in the younger age categories. Further, we should point out that this
Table 88: Comparison of the Age Distribution of Male Elementary Teachers in the CBE with the Age Distribution of all Elementary Teachers in Ontario, 1973-74.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>CBE Male Elementary Teachers</th>
<th>All Male Elementary Teachers in Ontario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 and under</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-65</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66+</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Carleton data supplied on request by the Ontario Ministry of Education. Ontario data derived from the Commission on Declining School Enrolments (1978b:211).
comparison probably underestimates the differences between age distribution of male Carleton teachers and that of all male public school elementary teachers. This is because the separate schools, whose male teachers are included in Table 58, did not stop growing in enrolment until 1976. As a consequence, separate school teachers are likely to be younger than public school teachers. Merging the two groups likely overestimates the youthfulness of the public school males.

In systems where growth was not so rapid as in Carleton, or where internal recruitment was avoided or where an old, large and established system was merged with others, differences in formal authority between teachers and principals were likely to be reinforced by differences in the informal authority of age. In Carleton, the relative youthfulness of many of the male principals and vice-principals served to undercut the divisiveness inherent in authority differences.

The Effect of Social Control on the Development of TFC Solidarity. Taking a new tact, it can be suggested that Carleton principals' support for amalgamation was partly due to a failure of social control. By hiring from within the system, both the MPSB and the CBE helped ensure that new principals and vice-principals would be persons who had been socialized to support a unified teachers' federation and who would have difficulty in maintaining a status-differential between themselves and classroom teachers. Further, participation in NTF and TFC was encouraged by the Board in that it rewarded, rather than punished, most of those who were active in the local federations.
If participation and leadership in the local federation had been viewed as a negative attribute by either the NPSB or the CBE (or if either board had set up structures independent of the local federation which could have been utilized to demonstrate abilities necessary for promotion), it is doubtful that principals' and vice-principals' support for the TFC would have become as strong as it did.

Equally important as the CBE's policy of internal hiring and the failure to provide channels for promotion which were independent of TFC control was the fact that the Board did little to forge elementary principals into a loyal management group. Rather than treat elementary principals as a separate and distinct group, the CBE chose to group elementary and secondary principals together. Thus, principals of both panels met together with superintendents to deal with administrative problems and the implementation of Board policy. This approach was consistent with both the Board philosophy which emphasized the need for continuity in education (and, hence, a truly integrated kindergarten to grade 13 system) and the TFC objective of amalgamating all Ontario teachers' federations. However, despite its philosophical consistency, this policy of treating elementary and secondary principals as one group was to alienate elementary principals.17 Secondary principals,

17. Though they shared feelings of alienation vis-à-vis the Board, elementary principals apparently had no motivation to form a strong interest group on their own behalf. Indicative of the elementary principals' relative unimportance as an independent power block is the nickname several TFC leaders have given the Carleton Principals' Association (CPA). According to some, C.P.A. stands for the Carleton Pathetic Association while the initials of the vice-principals' association - C.V.P.A. - stand
charged with the management of very large complexes and staffs, were accorded more status than elementary principals - or at least this was the impression of a number of elementary school principals whom I interviewed. Certainly it did not help matters that the superintendent who was most actively involved with the principals' group in the early seventies was an ex-secondary principal (and ex-colleague of many of the secondary principals and teachers) and was not afraid to state his feeling that secondary teachers had a more difficult job than elementary teachers.

Elementary principals found other policies and actions of the Board objectionable as well. In the early seventies, complaints of poor salaries relative to Ottawa principals were aired in negotiations. Further, interviews with Carleton principals who were active in TFC revealed dissatisfaction with the large number of transfers they experienced relative to Carleton secondary principals.\(^\text{17}\) On this last

footnote 17 cont.

for the Carleton Very Pathetic Association. Both associations merge elementary and secondary staff; however, the secondary school principals have set up an independent group known as SSPIG - Secondary School Principals Informal Group - to deal with matters of mutual concern.

18. In part the high rate of transfer of elementary principals may be attributed to battles taking place between trustees. Several people interviewed - both at the Board offices and in the schools - stated that in the early seventies there was a battle over whether the CBE would model itself after the Gloucester or Nepean system taking place between trustees from the respective systems. In the Gloucester system, principals worked directly with trustees in the management of the system and reportedly developed strong loyalties to their trustees. In Nepean, meetings and direct interaction between trustees and principals were relatively rare with the superintendent of schools serving
point we have already noted that what was a source of irritation for elementary principals was a stroke of good fortune for the TFC, in that the high rate of transfer helped spread the influence of the Nepean contingent of principals across the enlarged system.

Leadership Activities to Strengthen TFC. Up to this point we have said very little about the activities of the TFC to strengthen the loyalty of Carleton teachers. Certainly, one would expect that the leadership of the TFC would have some awareness of the need to build solidarity, and support. Indeed, the TFC took an active role in building support of teachers and, particularly, the support of female teachers and teachers in the areas outside Nepean township.

Where certain schools failed to send representatives to TFC Council meetings, the executive of TFC arranged for a crew of influentials to visit the school and make a pitch for the TFC. More systematically, and perhaps more effectively in the long run, TFC put a great deal of effort into developing their own professional development programs. In 1969-70 and 1970-71, more than half of the TFC expenditures were on professional development; and in 1971-72, $12,000 of

footnote 18 cont.

as chief intermediary between teachers and trustees. The Gloucester trustee involved in the dispute was very concerned to keep a close working relationship between trustees and principals and teachers, whereas the Nepean trustee involved was in favour of a more formal structure. In the end, the Nepean model prevailed, perhaps due to the greater number of ex-Nepean trustees on the CBE. In 1971-72 the Gloucester trustees' "power base" was broken up by transferring three of her loyal principals to Nepean township schools and replacing them with principals from Nepean.
$25,000 in total expenditures went to professional development. At the start of the seventies, the Impact of Living and Learning and the Davis policy of decentralization were reaching maximum force in Carleton. CBE elementary teachers found themselves being called on to individualize their teaching in order to make education a continuous process where each child could proceed at his or her own pace and to take an active part in developing pedagogical techniques consistent with the new philosophy. While all CBE teachers faced the same demands, they were not equally equipped to meet them. In particular, teachers outside the suburban core of the CBE were less likely to be prepared for the challenge of change than either the ex-Nepean or ex-Gloucester teachers who had already been working to meet the challenge through their respective professional development committees. Teachers

19. The CBE clearly found the philosophy of Living and Learning attractive as can be seen from the following quotes from the CBE "White Paper on the Aims and Objectives of the Carleton Board of Education" published in the Spring of 1971.

Under the heading "General Philosophy" the Board stated: Our goal is an integrated system of education in which each individual proceeds through a continuum of learning experiences. These experiences recognize the uniqueness of the individual and his responsibility to the school, community and society (CBE, 1971:3).

Under the heading "Curriculum and Programme" was the following: Within the constraints of the family of schools concept, the philosophy and policies of the system, each school will be regarded as an autonomous body responsible for a statement of instructional aims and objectives. The system's approach must provide for a series of checks and balances. The principal has the prime responsibility for the level of staff involvement in the development of a systematic approach to curriculum.
from outlying school systems simply lacked the numbers, organization and resources to allow them to go far on their own in professional development prior to the formation of CBE. With the new board strongly endorsing the philosophy of innovation and individualized learning, these outlying teachers found themselves in a state of confusion. They were to change their teaching to meet the needs of pupils, rather than to meet the standards of the Department of Education and its inspectors. However, they lacked the training to make this adaptation on their own. The new Board, faced with all the problems associated with the merger of 18 distinct elementary and secondary school systems into a consistent whole, and lacking an established administrative staff, was hardly in a good position to help teachers adapt to the new pedagogy. As a result, when the TFC attempted to fill the void, it had little difficulty in securing the cooperation of the Board. In fact, the Board was convinced to provide funding to the TFC to help it carry out its professional development activities.

Of the various professional development activities undertaken, one of the most successful in securing outlying teachers’ support for

footnote 19 cont.

Programme developers must realize that children learn in many different ways and must not allow any single teaching method or learning situation to dominate the Carleton System. A balance and blending of methods must be the key. The school must lead in initiating change by design and avoid general acceptance of unproven innovations. Learning must take place within the context of organized and related knowledge and not in isolation from reality. To achieve this, the curriculum must be as flexible as possible, and include all types of programmes which consist of a basic core and optional learning experiences (CBE, 1971:4)
TFC was "Packaged Professionalism". Under this program, the TFC sent skilled teachers from within the CBE system out to the schools to teach teachers new approaches to a variety of subject areas. The fact that there was a real need felt for assistance, coupled with the fact that many of the "experts" who carried the packaged professionalism programs to the schools were TFC activists (the first two presidents of TFC, Kay Stanley and Mary Hill, were two such persons), definitely helped raise the credibility of the TFC among classroom teachers. Equally important, the success of "Packaged Professionalism" is that it helped break the umbilical cord to Toronto to which many women teachers were still attached. "Packaged Professionalism" basically showed teachers that a local, amalgamated federation could meet their needs as well as or better than the provincial federations, even without the aid of the provincial offices' experts in professional development.20

Whether the TFC leadership consciously developed "Packaged Professionalism" as a means of securing teachers' loyalty is open to question. However, it is clear that they did come to use this program

20. The severing of this umbilicus was of particular importance judging from the minutes of a TFC executive meeting held on May 11, 1970. Under the heading "Organizational Difficulties" one finds the following:

"A rather lengthy open debate and discussion centered around what seems to be a concerted counter-attack by the provincial FWTAO to discourage further amalgamations and to break up existing ones. Observations were exchanged and one fact seemed clear, i.e. female members of FWTAO who have hitherto remained aloof must become active if a true majority is to direct the actions of FW and in the end TFC. Members were invited to an informal gathering at ... to try to come up with a workable strategy."

explicitly as a means of securing support, in that one of the "packages" developed was basically aimed at extolling the virtues of amalgamation and the TFC.

The TFC took other actions which bore more directly on the problem of securing female teachers' loyalty to TFC. First, it was important that women be encouraged to participate and be seen to participate in TFC. Here it is notable that, in the first half of the seventies, male leaders did not compete with females for the position of president. Up until 1976-77 the position of president went uncontested to a woman, as did a number of other executive positions. More generally, encouragement from TFC leaders and support from TFC-supporting principals resulted in strong representation of women in leadership positions and in TFC Council, Table 59 shows the extent of female participation in both leadership roles and in Council up to 1973-74.

Perhaps as important as encouraging female participation in TFC was the fact that many female TFC loyalists actively sought out and obtained leadership positions within the local FW units. This helped insure against both local rebellion and/or the success of disruptive efforts from the provincial office of FW.

On a more positive note, the leadership of TFC continued the NTF drive for amalgamation of the Provincial OPS and FW. Requests from local units in other areas for assistance in moving toward local amalgamation were received and responded to by letter or in person by TFC leaders. Local FW units within the TFC sent representatives to the
Table 59: Male/Female Representation in the TFC Executive and in TFC Council by Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>TFC Executive</th>
<th></th>
<th>TFC Council</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Derived from Minutes of the Annual Meetings of the TFC.
annual FW assembly to present motions calling for amalgamation, greater fee rebates, admission of male members to FW and so on, in the aid of the amalgamation movement. This continued push for amalgamation, coupled with the fact that provincial FW saw TFC as important enough to fight against, gave Carleton teachers a strong and unique sense of identity and importance and the feeling that they were spearheading change across the province.

A final set of actions taken by TFC which helped build up solidarity lies in the realm of communication and social events. One of the first tasks of the TFC's Public Relations Committee was to put out a publication, "Carleton Corridors", to carry TFC news (later, the "Ink Well" served the same function). In addition, the committee obtained a regular slot on cable television to carry TFC news within the context of the TFC-initiated and produced T.V. program, "Know Your School System" (KYSS) in 1970-71.

On the social side, the TFC's Social Relations Committee organized a number of annual events, ranging from golf tournaments to dinners and dances. Particularly worthy of note is the Annual Dinner/Dance which follows the annual meeting in May. It was a slick planning to hold a dinner/dance immediately following the annual meeting in that it helped meeting attendance, but what stands out about this event is that it was, and still is, for TFC members only. Yet, despite (or maybe because of) the exclusion of spouses, attendance reached as high as 800 or about 80% of the membership in 1971, indicative of the growing interest and support for the TFC.
The Development of a Unified and Cohesive Organization in Carleton: Some Highlights. Clearly the development of a cohesive local federation in Carleton was a complex process involving the interaction of factors at both the provincial and local levels. At the risk of over-simplification, we can attempt to highlight some of the interactions which helped create a cohesive TFC. First, let us start with provincial and local demographics. Provincially, at the turn of the decade and through the early seventies, the shortage of elementary teachers was coming to an end as was growth in public school enrolments. However, due to suburbanization and continuing population growth in the Ottawa area generally, the elementary enrolment in Carleton County continued to grow until 1973-74. Thus, as the job market tightened for teachers in most other areas, the Carleton area continued to provide employment opportunities. More important, the Carleton system, and the Nepean system before it, offered good opportunities for promotion at a time when promotions were becoming more difficult to get in other systems. This situation served to attract a large number of young, ambitious men who found their prospects of advancement dimming in other systems. In addition, the increasing oversupply of young teacher college graduates stacked the cards in favour of the Carleton Board having a young teaching staff. This combination of young and ambitious teachers, coupled with a strong core of influential and skilled local teacher leaders and principals who were committed to amalgamation, provided one set of key ingredients needed for the rise and survival of the TFC. The second set of key
Ingredients involved the Provincial Department of Education's policy of decentralization. The giving over of more power to the boards and the accompanying establishment of large boards which would have the resources necessary to take on the responsibilities being decentralized resulted in teachers having to become more concerned with the actions of their own boards than with the Department of Education or its officials. The development of new, enlarged boards with greater powers required adjustments in board/teacher relations. More specifically, it required that new ties be established between local trustees and teachers. However, in most systems, other than Carleton, the newly-established boards contained a large core of trustees, administrators, principals and teachers who had a long history of working together. In Carleton, however, there was no such core to provide the framework for board/teacher relations in the new system. The largest system to be amalgamated in the CBE was, itself, only four years old when amalgamation was announced and, because of rapid growth, it was still in the process of establishing a stable system of board/teacher relations. This lack of any firm structure of relations created a void into which TFC leaders could move to establish their own organization as the vehicle for communications between teachers and the Board. By gaining control over communications channels to the Board, the TFC insured that the ambitious and energetic would channel their energies through TFC. By meeting teachers' needs for protection (through the Counselling and Relations Committee) and for professional development, the TFC secured the loyalty of classroom teachers.
The Relationship between Organization, Solidarity and Militancy. Clearly, having a single cohesive organization to represent any group increases the group's ability to take collective coercive action. However, it does not follow that unity and solidarity cause militant action, nor even increase the probability of its occurrence. Put in another way, it seems likely that some degree of organization and solidarity is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for militant action. The absence of a unified organization and of teacher solidarity may account for the lack of militancy outside of Carleton, but the presence of a single, cohesive organization in Carleton is not enough to account for the development of Carleton teachers' militancy. Thus, we must now turn to other factors suggested by our theoretical framework to fill out our understanding of the rise of militancy in Carleton.

B. Discontent and the Evolution of the TFC

What role, if any, did discontent play in the TFC's move to militancy? Were gaps suddenly generated between teachers' actual conditions and their expectations which could account for the move to militancy? In order to attempt to answer these questions we can begin by examining the salaries of Carleton elementary teachers in the late sixties and early seventies.

Certainly there is some reason to believe that discontent over money matters was involved in the rise of TFC militancy. As our review of negotiations showed, the first inkling of militancy within the TFC
coincided with the imposition of spending ceilings in 1971. While the TFC did claim that it was concerned with the impact of ceilings on the quality of education, it was the salary issue that occupied centre-stage throughout the negotiations of that year, not pupil-teacher ratios, retaining remedial classes and so on. Likewise, in the negotiations of 1972 and 1973, salaries were a key point of concern, along with the issue of the TFC's right to negotiate for its degree members.

Of course salary has always been a major issue in teacher/board negotiations. Thus, the fact that salary was a key point of dispute in negotiations during the early 1970's hardly proves that there was a significant increase in economically-based discontent. To explore this issue more fully, we must search for other types of evidence.

Inflation and Teachers' Salaries. Nationally, the early seventies witnessed the beginning of high rates of inflation, which were to continue through the seventies and beyond. As Table 60 shows, Ottawa was in no way immune to high rates of inflation.

Assuming that teachers are concerned that their real buying power not be eroded by inflation, we could expect that significant dissatisfaction with salaries would have been experienced if salary increases failed to keep pace with inflation. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine what actually did happen with teachers' salaries. Newspaper clippings report salary increases of 3.9%, 4.51% and 5.5% (with an additional lump sum payment) for 1972, 1973 and 1974, respectively. While these figures suggest that the Carleton elementary teachers were progressively losing in purchasing power, it
Table 60: Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Ottawa-Mutt, 1969-76, (1971 = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CPI</th>
<th>Percent Increase over Previous Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>94.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>104.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>111.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>123.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>135.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>146.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada, Consumer Price Index; Catalogue no. 62-001.
is not clear that this was the case. The increases reported in the press often reflect the percentage increase in Board expenditures on teachers' and principals' salaries, excluding increases in expenditure due to teachers' progress through the salary grid. Thus, increases in salary expenditure due to teachers changing qualification categories or due to the payment of annual increments for experience may not be included in the above reported percentages. Further complicating matters, increases are not necessarily distributed uniformly across the salary grid. One combination of qualifications and experience may be allotted a higher salary increase than another. Finally, it should be noted that the size of the increment allotted for experience varies from one qualification category to another and is re-negotiated from year to year.

All this makes examination of the actual salary increases experienced by teachers cumbersome and complex. In order to simplify matters, I have traced the salaries of four hypothetical Carleton teachers from 1969 to 1974. All four are presumed to have started teaching in Carleton in 1969 with no previous teaching experience. Further, each of the four teachers falls into a different qualification category. The categories chosen for our hypothetical cases are "D", "C", "B" and "A2" in that the majority of Carleton elementary teachers
were in these categories in the early seventies.\textsuperscript{21,22}

Table 61 presents the salaries of our hypothetical teachers from 1969-70 to 1975 along with index numbers showing all salaries as a percentage of the 1970-71 salary for each teacher. Examination of the index numbers contained in the Table makes it clear that our four hypothetical Carleton teachers received salary increases in excess of inflation throughout the period covered. Eyeballing the full grids for each of the years reported suggests that tracing through the salaries of other hypothetical teachers would result in a similar conclusion. Thus, it appears that when annual increments for experience are taken into account, Carleton elementary teachers fared quite well relative to

\textsuperscript{21} As of February 27, 1973 Carleton elementary teachers were distributed across categories as follows:
- Category D 23.7%
- Category C 26.3%
- Category B 17.7%
- Category A1 7.3%
- Category A2 16.7%
- Category A3 6.4%
- Category A4 2.0%

\textsuperscript{22} Basically the requirements for each category are as follows:
- Category D High School Graduation plus One Year of Teachers' College
- Category C Same as D plus 5 University or Department of Education Courses
- Category B Same as D plus 10 University or Department of Education Courses.
- Category A1 B.A. or Equivalent plus one Year of Teacher's College
- Category A2 Same as A1 plus Three University or Department of Education Courses
- Category A3 Honours Degree plus One Year of Teachers College
- Category A4 Same as A3 plus 5 University or Department of Education Courses
Table 61: Salaries of Four Hypothetical Teachers for the period '1969-75. (Salaries Indexed with 1970-71 equal to 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay Period</th>
<th>Category D Teacher</th>
<th>Category C Teacher</th>
<th>Category B Teacher</th>
<th>Category A2 Teacher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>$5000 88.5</td>
<td>$5400 89.3</td>
<td>$5800 89.9</td>
<td>$7100 92.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>6650 100.0</td>
<td>6050 100.0</td>
<td>6450 100.0</td>
<td>6700 100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-Dec, 71</td>
<td>6100 107.9</td>
<td>6500 107.4</td>
<td>6900 106.9</td>
<td>8370 108.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-June, 72</td>
<td>6200 109.7</td>
<td>6600 109.0</td>
<td>7200 111.6</td>
<td>8500 110.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-72</td>
<td>6750 119.5</td>
<td>7200 119.0</td>
<td>7600 117.8</td>
<td>9325 121.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept, 73-Dec, 74</td>
<td>7500 132.7</td>
<td>7900 130.6</td>
<td>8300 128.7</td>
<td>10350 134.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan, 75-June, 75</td>
<td>9150 161.9</td>
<td>9900 163.6</td>
<td>10600 164.3</td>
<td>12450 161.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
inflation. Where the cost-of-living went up by 12% between 1971 and 1974 (the year of the mass resignation), teachers' salaries increased by about 19%. Further, it should be noted that at no point in the period covered did our hypothetical teachers' salaries fail to keep pace with rises in the cost-of-living. This said, it must be noted that 20% of the 1972-73 teacher force was at maximum and, thus, would receive no annual increment, although many did have the option of upgrading their qualifications to increase their salaries. Consequently, although most Carleton teachers probably fared well vis-a-vis inflation, there existed, by 1972-73, a significant subgroup with feelings of economic deprivation.

There is one incongruous point that should be mentioned while we are on the topic of inflation. Teachers have long been noted to hold middle-class values and aspirations. One of the more compelling of the aspirations has been the desire to own a home. Without doubt, a large number of Carleton teachers were in the market to buy their first home in the early 1970's. However, as Table 62 suggests, house prices skyrocketed in Ottawa in the early 1970's. By 1974, house prices were high enough to exclude teachers from the market unless there was a second income earner in their household.

There is one point to be considered before we go on to examine Carleton elementary teachers' salaries in relation to those of other groups. This is the effect of the formation of the Carleton Board on teachers' salary satisfaction. The formation of the Carleton Board in 1969 resulted in a number of rural teachers having their salaries
Table 62: New Housing Price Indexes for Ottawa-Hull (1971 = 100).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>112.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>138.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>171.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>178.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>192.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada, Consumer Price Index, Catalogue no. 62-001
brought up to par with the salaries of the teachers in suburban areas. On the other hand, where teachers in the less affluent areas probably obtained significant economic benefits from amalgamation, the teachers in suburban areas likely found it difficult to achieve salary increases under the new Board that were as good as the increases they had been able to achieve prior to amalgamation. Put another way, the formation of the Carleton Board and the accompanying standardization of teachers' salaries probably had the effect of increasing the satisfaction of teachers from rural areas, but of decreasing the satisfaction of suburban teachers.

Carleton Elementary Teachers' Salaries in Relation to Those of Other Groups. Even though most Carleton elementary teachers' salary gains appear to have kept pace with inflation, Carleton teachers may have experienced increased feelings of economic deprivation if the salary gains made by other groups exceeded their own. To explore this possibility we must make some assumptions about who Carleton teachers are likely to compare themselves to in assessing the adequacy of their salaries. We will assume that one of the primary types of salary comparisons Carleton elementary teachers are likely to make is with other teachers. In particular, we would expect that comparisons with other public school elementary teachers and, especially, the neighbouring Ottawa teachers as well as comparisons with Carleton secondary teachers would be highly salient to Carleton elementary
teachers. Beyond assuming that other teachers constitute salient comparison groups, we will assume that the salaries of neighbours and other wage-earners in the Ottawa-Carleton area are likely to have an effect on how Carleton teachers view their own salaries.

Comparisons with Other Teachers. In the summer of 1972-73, one of the superintendents of the Carleton Board surveyed the salary grids of elementary teachers from 24 different boards across the province. Overall, the result of comparing these grids with the one being offered to the Carleton teachers at the time showed the offer to be generous. According to the superintendent's report, "The Board's maxima are the highest in the Province for Categories C and D with Category B being the third highest" (CBE, August, 1973). In addition, it was found that the yearly increments being offered by the Board were well above the provincial average of $200. A scan of grids reported in salary negotiation bulletins sent to boards by the Ontario School Trustee's Council between 1969 and 1974, also suggests that Carleton teachers generally had little to complain about in comparing their salaries to those of their compatriots across the province.

It may be the case that how Carleton teachers fared relative to

23. One might also expect that the separate school teachers would be salient comparison others for Carleton teachers. This does not seem to be the case. None of the TFC leaders I interviewed mentioned separate teachers as a comparison group. Further, the board minutes of negotiations show no sign that the teachers used comparisons with separate school teachers to buttress their arguments. In any case, were such comparison made, they would not be likely to stir discontent as Carleton teachers have, been consistently, better paid than separate school teachers in Ottawa-Carleton.
their brothers and sisters in Ottawa was more important than their position vis-à-vis more remote groups. Given this possibility, we will now examine the relation between Ottawa and Carleton elementary teachers' salaries in the early 1970's.

How do the salaries of Carleton elementary teachers compare to those of Ottawa elementary teachers during the period of transformation to militancy? In order to answer this question I have constructed two tables from the salary grids reported in the collective agreements of Carleton and Ottawa elementary teachers. Table 63 reports the amount (in dollars) by which Carleton teachers' salaries exceeded or fell short of those of Ottawa teachers in the 1970-71 school year. Table 64 reports the same information for the pay-period immediately preceding the Carleton teachers' mass resignation.

In interpreting these tables it is necessary to remember that Carleton teachers were concentrated in Categories "D", "C", "B" and "A2" in the early seventies. This is important in that the examination of the tables suggests that Carleton teachers in the above categories generally improved their economic standing relative to Ottawa teachers between 1970-71 and 1972-73. In fact, by 1972-73, the majority of Carleton teachers in these categories earned more than their Ottawa counterparts. Further, it is important to note that Carleton teachers in categories "A3" and "A4" also experienced a reduction of the deficit between their salaries and those of Ottawa teachers. "A3" and "A4" teachers might have experienced discontent over the fact that their salaries were still below those of their Ottawa colleagues, but any such

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience (in Years)</th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>A2</th>
<th>A3</th>
<th>A4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>+50</td>
<td>+50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>+150</td>
<td>+50</td>
<td>+50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>+150</td>
<td>+50</td>
<td>+50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>+100</td>
<td>+50</td>
<td>+50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>+50</td>
<td>+50</td>
<td>+25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>-50</td>
<td>-50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-200</td>
<td>-25</td>
<td>-50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-100</td>
<td>-25</td>
<td>-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+50</td>
<td>-25</td>
<td>-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>+100</td>
<td>+200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+350</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Derived from the 1970-71 collective agreements of OBE and CBE elementary teachers.
Table 64: The Difference in Dollars Between Carleton and Ottawa Public Elementary Teachers' Salaries for Each Position on the Salary Grid, 1972-73.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience (in Years)</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>A2</th>
<th>A3</th>
<th>A4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>+100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>+180</td>
<td>+80</td>
<td>+80</td>
<td>+60</td>
<td>+90</td>
<td>+50</td>
<td>+80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>+280</td>
<td>+80</td>
<td>+80</td>
<td>+30</td>
<td>+90</td>
<td>+55</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>+230</td>
<td>+80</td>
<td>+20</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>-120</td>
<td>-95</td>
<td>-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>+180</td>
<td>+30</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>+10</td>
<td>-95</td>
<td>-90</td>
<td>-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>+180</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>+10</td>
<td>-65</td>
<td>-90</td>
<td>-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-70</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-85</td>
<td>-90</td>
<td>-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>+30</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>+85</td>
<td>-80</td>
<td>-95</td>
<td>-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>+130</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>+90</td>
<td>-75</td>
<td>-100</td>
<td>-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>-70</td>
<td>+230</td>
<td>-60</td>
<td>+95</td>
<td>-90</td>
<td>-140</td>
<td>-140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>+30</td>
<td>+330</td>
<td>-50</td>
<td>+100</td>
<td>-105</td>
<td>-180</td>
<td>-180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>+430</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+103</td>
<td>-120</td>
<td>-240</td>
<td>-240</td>
<td>-240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>+10</td>
<td>+110</td>
<td>-135</td>
<td>-290</td>
<td>-290</td>
<td>-290</td>
<td>-290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>-100</td>
<td>-340</td>
<td>-140</td>
<td>-140</td>
<td>-140</td>
<td>-140</td>
<td>-140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Derived from the 1972-73 collective agreements of OBE and CBE elementary teachers.
discontent would be expected to have been less in 1972-73 than in 1970-71. Thus we find no evidence here to suggest that a sudden rise in economic deprivation occurred in the period immediately preceding the mass resignation in the winter of 1973-74.

It is possible, however, that the Board's salary offers preceding the mass resignation were such as to place Carleton salaries below those of their Ottawa counterparts, and, thus, created a sudden rise in teacher discontent. In order to explore this possibility, I have constructed a table similar to the two preceding ones. In this case, however, it is the difference between the Carleton Board's offer for the 1973-74 school year and the salaries of Ottawa elementary teachers for the period from September 1, 1973, to December 31, 1973, that is reported. It is important to note that the Ottawa salaries were known to Carleton teachers well before receiving their own Board's offer. This is because the Ottawa salaries for the Fall of 1973 were determined a year earlier — in the Fall of 1972. Thus, Carleton teachers knew where their Board's offer would place them vis-à-vis Ottawa teachers, prior to their mass resignation. As can be seen from Table 65, the CBE offer would have improved the salaries of Carleton teachers relative to those of Ottawa elementary teachers. Consequently, it does not appear that the Board's offer was likely to have contributed to increased feelings of economic deprivation vis-à-vis Ottawa teachers.

Given the previously noted Board policy of paying the same salaries to elementary and secondary teachers with similar
Table 65: The Difference in Dollars Between the Salaries Offered by the Carleton Board to its Elementary Teachers for 1973-74 and the Salaries Already Established for Ottawa Teachers for the Fall of 1973.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience (In Years)</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>A2</th>
<th>A3</th>
<th>A4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>+180</td>
<td>+20</td>
<td>+10</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-50</td>
<td>-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>+360</td>
<td>+90</td>
<td>+80</td>
<td>+370</td>
<td>+450</td>
<td>+430</td>
<td>+390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>+400</td>
<td>+30</td>
<td>+50</td>
<td>+230</td>
<td>+300</td>
<td>+280</td>
<td>+140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>+380</td>
<td>+120</td>
<td>+0</td>
<td>+190</td>
<td>+200</td>
<td>+70</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>+370</td>
<td>+160</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>+190</td>
<td>+250</td>
<td>+100</td>
<td>+390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>+360</td>
<td>+200</td>
<td>+30</td>
<td>+210</td>
<td>+280</td>
<td>+120</td>
<td>+140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>+250</td>
<td>+230</td>
<td>+70</td>
<td>+240</td>
<td>+310</td>
<td>+130</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>+260</td>
<td>+150</td>
<td>+350</td>
<td>+320</td>
<td>+140</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>+260</td>
<td>+240</td>
<td>+270</td>
<td>+330</td>
<td>+160</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>+350</td>
<td>+380</td>
<td>+280</td>
<td>+350</td>
<td>+150</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>+750</td>
<td>+570</td>
<td>+320</td>
<td>+410</td>
<td>+200</td>
<td>+30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>+760</td>
<td>+510</td>
<td>+480</td>
<td>+200</td>
<td>+30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>+750</td>
<td>+570</td>
<td>+320</td>
<td>+410</td>
<td>+200</td>
<td>+30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>+760</td>
<td>+510</td>
<td>+480</td>
<td>+200</td>
<td>+30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>+760</td>
<td>+510</td>
<td>+480</td>
<td>+200</td>
<td>+30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Derived from the OBE elementary teachers collective agreement of 1973-74 and figures reported in OBE Board Minutes of June, 1973.
qualifications and experience, it is hard to envisage any discontent over salary stemming from gaps between elementary and secondary teachers' salaries - at least, not in the period prior to the elementary group's mass resignation when the parity policy was still in effect. However, there is a sense in which comparisons with the secondary group could have evoked some feeling of discontent. As was noted in Chapter IV, a much larger portion of secondary teachers hold positions of responsibility than do elementary teachers. Since positions of responsibility are rewarded with additional pay, over and above the grid, elementary teachers are likely to earn lower salaries than secondary teachers, even when they have the same qualifications and experience. We will return to this point later in the discussion. For the moment we should simply note that, during the period of the Carleton elementary group's move to militancy, there did not appear to be a clear basis for their experiencing increases in economic deprivation relative to other teachers.

Comparisons with Non-Teachers. Regardless of how Carleton elementary teachers' salaries held up to inflation and the salaries of other teachers, there is the possibility that they had grounds for discontent when they compared their salaries to those of non-teachers in the area. In the late sixties and early seventies, the public service in Ottawa was expanding and salaries were increasing along with the expansion. Thus, it is plausible to suspect that teachers would have found salary comparisons with non-teachers somewhat upsetting in this time period.
Unfortunately, we lack data to explore this suspicion in much depth. What data can be offered are, at best, circumstantial. First, in Table 66, I have given the average salaries of persons who earned incomes in 1970 for the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton (RMOC) and for Nepean and Gloucester townships. To the right of these figures, I have listed the grid positions of Carleton teachers which provided salaries less than the locality average. Nepean and Gloucester averages are presented because the majority of Carleton teachers teach in these areas and, hence, are likely to have pupils whose parents' earnings are reflected in the township averages or are likely to have neighbours whose earnings are reflected in these averages.

What these data suggest is that a large number of Carleton elementary teachers were earning less than their neighbours and their pupils' parents in 1970. This is because a large portion of the teachers were concentrated in the lower-paying positions on the salary grid in 1970. However, just how many teachers were in this situation and how they felt about their low salaries is hard to determine. First, a large portion of the teachers in the low salary categories were female. If, as many have argued, female teachers compare their earnings with those of other females, the Carleton women all fared well in salary. In fact, all the grid positions provided salaries well in excess of the average female employment earnings in all three geographic areas cited in Table 66.

From the 1971 Census it can be determined that the average
### Table 66: Grid Positions Providing Incomes Below the Average Earned Income In Selected Localities, 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Average Earned Income, 1970</th>
<th>Grid Positions Providing Less Income Than the Local Average Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RMOC</td>
<td>$6510</td>
<td>Category D with 0 to 5 years experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Category C with 0 to 3 years experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Category B with 0 to 2 years experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(In total 13 of 79 grid positions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucester</td>
<td>$6851</td>
<td>Category D with 0 to 6 years experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Category C with 0 to 4 years experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Category B with 0 to 3 years experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Category A1 beginners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(In total 17 of 79 grid positions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepean</td>
<td>$7598</td>
<td>Category D all levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Category C with 0 to 7 years experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Category B with 0 to 5 years experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Category A1 with 0 or 1 year experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Category A2 beginners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(In total 24 of 79 grid positions)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

female earnings in the RMOC, Nepean and Gloucester were $3,948, $3,808 and $3,509, respectively. The lowest salary in the 1969-70 teacher grid was $5,000. In contrast, for men who compared their earning with non-teaching male wage earners, the picture was not so favourable. According to the 1971 Census, males' average earnings in the RMOC, Nepean and Gloucester were $8,267, $9,844 and $8,594, respectively. This places between one-third and one-half of the positions on the grid below the average male earnings, depending on what average is utilized. It should be noted, however, that this tendency for males to feel impoverished was counterbalanced by the fact that males are more likely to be in the better-paying grid positions and more likely to receive money beyond the grid for being in positions of responsibility. For example, in 1973-74, 76 or 23.2% of the 327 male teachers in Carleton held principalships or vice-principalships.

A second reason that it is difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding economic discontent in Carleton is that we lack good longitudinal data. Such data are clearly essential if we want to examine the possibility that increases in discontent-generating circumstances were associated with increasing militancy. The limited data that are available suggest no such association. First, utilizing Revenue Canada data and information supplied by the Ministry of Education, it can be determined that in 1973-74 at least 22.3% (73) of the male Carleton teachers, and 42.7% (294) of the female Carleton teachers, had incomes below the average income of all employees filing taxable returns in 1974 (i.e. below $9,310). In total, 36.1% or 367 of the Carleton
teachers were likely earning less than the County average. Looking back to 1969 and drawing on figures provided in the CBE budget summary of that year, it can be determined that 40.3% or 395 Carleton teachers earned less than the county average of $6,116. These data suggest that there was no worsening of teachers' salaries relative to other workers, between 1969 and 1973-74, but it also shows that a substantial number of teachers were in a position to feel relatively deprived in economic terms.

One other bit of longitudinal data that is available is presented in Table 67 which compares changes in the average earnings reported in the industrial composite for Ottawa-Hull with the changes in the earnings of our four hypothetical Carelton teachers. The average weekly earnings for the Ottawa-Hull industrial composite and the salaries of our four "teachers" are both indexed to the base year of 1969. While this is a crude test, it should be capable of indicating major changes in the relative standing of teachers' salaries to those of blue-collar workers in the area.

Although the time periods covered by the two sets of data in Table 67 do not coincide exactly, there is enough overlap to make crude comparisons possible. As can be seen from the table, there is a fairly close correspondence between the increases in the Industrial composite and in our "teachers'" salaries. Further, it should be noted that the majority of all real teachers were probably increasing the gap between their salaries and those of wage-earners covered in the industrial composite, in that the base salaries of most teachers in 1969 were...
Table 67: Comparison of the Average Weekly Earnings for the Industrial Composite of Ottawa-Hull with the Salaries of Four Hypothetical Carleton Teachers, 1969-74.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average Weekly</th>
<th>Teachers' Pay Period</th>
<th>Teachers by Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>108.0</td>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>113.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>118.0</td>
<td>Sept. 71 - Dec. 71</td>
<td>122.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan. 72 - June 72</td>
<td>124.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>129.1</td>
<td>Sept. 72 - Aug. 73</td>
<td>135.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>136.9</td>
<td>Sept. 73 - Dec. 74</td>
<td>150.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>149.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada, Employment Earnings and Hours, Catalogue no. 72-002 monthly
higher than the base of the industrial composite. This view is reinforced by the fact that the median salaries of male and female Carleton teachers were $11,583 and $9,108, respectively, in 1973-74, while a person earning the wages reported in the composite would have received $7,779 in 1974. Thus, at first glance, these data fail to indicate conditions likely to generate feelings of increased economic deprivation. However, there is one further possibility to consider.

Once a teacher reaches the maximum in his or her category, further salary increases depend on changing to a different category, obtaining a position of responsibility, or having the salary maximum increased through contract negotiations. Quite likely, many of the teachers at maximum found (and still find) the first two options difficult to utilize and depend upon negotiated increases. (After all, most teachers at maximum have been teachers for ten years or more and thus are likely to have attempted the first two strategies already or find themselves constrained by the time demands placed on them by their families and child-rearing.) Since teachers at maximum only receive the increase negotiated on the grid, and not the increase for experience, their situation in the early seventies may have been significantly different from our four hypothetical teachers.

As of July, 1973, 287 or 27.4% of the Carleton elementary teachers were at maximum and of these, 251 were in the non-degreed categories. As we noted earlier, the maxima paid in the non-degree categories compared very favourably with those of elementary teachers in these categories in other parts of the province. In addition, the
comparisons made earlier between Ottawa and Carleton elementary salaries show that non-degreed Carleton teachers at maximum fared significantly better than their Ottawa counterparts. Thus, there do not appear to be grounds for discontent of this group as a result of salary comparisons with other elementary teachers. However, if the salaries of Carleton teachers at maximum are compared with the earnings reported for the industrial composite of Ottawa-Hull, a potential basis for salary dissatisfaction is evident.

As Table 68 shows, teachers who were at maximum in categories "D", "C" and "B", for several years prior to the mass resignation, failed to obtain increases on a par with increases in the industrial composite. Unfortunately, we do not know how long the teachers who were at a maximum in 1973 had been there, but two things are clear. First, the number of teachers at maximum in 1973 was greater than the number at maximum in previous years (since reaching maximum is a function of time). Second, those non-degreed teachers who were at maximum in 1973 would have experienced lower percentage increases in salary than blue-collar workers if the Board's 1973-74 offer had been accepted.

Overall, the data presented to this point fail to reveal an unambiguous set of conditions which could be conducive to Carleton elementary teachers experiencing increased relative economic deprivation in the period preceding the mass resignation. Relative to changes in the cost-of-living, to the salaries of other teachers, and to earnings reported in the industrial composite, Carleton teachers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Industrial Composite</th>
<th>Teachers' Pay Period</th>
<th>Indexed Salaries of Teachers at Maximum by Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>108.0</td>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>101.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>118.0</td>
<td>Sept. 71 - Dec. 71</td>
<td>105.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan. 72 - June 72</td>
<td>105.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>129.1</td>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>110.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>136.9</td>
<td>Board Offer for</td>
<td>116.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>149.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada, Employment Earnings and Hours, Catalogue no. 72-002 monthly.
appeared to be relatively well-off. Further, female teachers who evaluated their economic status relative to that of other working women would have found themselves in a highly desirable situation. On the other hand, Carleton teachers could have experienced discontent if they looked to the soaring cost of buying a home, the higher salaries of secondary teachers due to the relative abundance of positions of responsibility in the secondary schools, or to the fact that a number of Carleton elementary teachers were making less than the average earnings of other white-collar workers in the area. In addition, specific subgroups - males without positions of responsibility and non-degreed teachers at maximum - could have perceived themselves to be at a particular disadvantage relative to non-teaching wage earners.

In part, the ambiguity in the Carleton teachers' economic situation stems from the fact that they teach in one of the most wealthy municipalities in Ontario.24 With some justification, it can be said that the areas in which Carleton teachers teach are the nesting grounds of a large number of well-paid public servants. This has contributed to the area having a healthy tax base to fund education. Prior to amalgamation, this situation made it relatively easy for teachers in the suburban systems to obtain salaries above the provincial norm. This situation of relative advantage appears to have been extended with the formation of the Carleton Board. While ceilings may have dampened Carleton teachers' advantage somewhat, they did not eliminate it.

24 In 1973, Carleton County ranked second among all Ontario counties in average income.
Thus, Carleton teachers continued to be able to find themselves well off relative to their colleagues in other systems. However, ceilings did have a significant effect on teachers' economic standing relative to their friends and neighbours.

The measures of non-teachers' earnings presented earlier provide a very conservative view of what Carleton teachers saw when they looked into their neighbour's yards. The industrial composite not only focuses on blue-collar workers, but also draws information from industries in Hull as well as from Ottawa industries. Since incomes are significantly lower in Hull, this makes the average earnings estimate quite low, relative to what would have been the case if only Ottawa industries were surveyed. In the case of the census and Revenue Canada data on average earnings, all persons who worked are included in the measure. If only persons who worked full-time throughout the year were included, these averages would clearly be much higher.

Public service expansion and salary raises, coupled with ceilings on school board expenditures, set up a situation in which teachers could readily find discordant comparisons in the course of daily living. Should they be happy because they were doing well relative to their colleagues elsewhere, or upset that they were not keeping up with the Jones? Clearly, what they did feel about their salaries and whether these feelings had a significant bearing on the evolution of militancy cannot be definitely answered from an analysis of objective conditions. However, two things are clear.

First, objective conditions which could provide a basis for
feelings of economic deprivation did definitely exist in the Carleton area. In particular, the imposition of ceilings, coupled with continued unchecked growth in white-collar public servants' salaries, insured a gap between the salaries of teachers and non-teaching white collar workers which could be utilized by teacher leaders to stir feelings of discontent in the early seventies. Second, it is unlikely that objective economic conditions alone are sufficient to explain the development of militancy in Carleton. Ottawa teachers, who were apparently subject to the same or worse conditions, failed to make a move to militancy while the Carleton teachers did.

In sum, our discussion to date points to the need to consider the mobilizing activities of the TFC in order to understand the development of militancy in Carleton. However, before we turn to mobilization there are some other potential sources of discontent to be explored.

In Chapter III, a number of potential sources of increased teacher discontent were identified. In addition to economic deprivation, it was suggested that reductions in the opportunities for mobility (both vertical and horizontal), increasing formality of social relations and accompanying alienation, decreased control over the classroom, increased desire to control educational decision-making and increasing pressure for change in teachers' role performance could all be sources of increased discontent which could contribute to the growth of teacher militancy. In this section we will briefly explore some of these potential sources of discontent. Again our attention will focus,
primarily on the period from 1969 to 1974, in that we are still interested in determining whether there were significant increases in discontent spurring the movement to militancy which took place in this period.

**Opportunities for Mobility.** In the earlier discussion of militancy at the provincial level, data were presented suggesting high levels of opportunity for mobility in the 1960's were followed by a rapid decline in opportunities in the early seventies. Our question here is to what extent this general pattern applied to Carleton elementary teachers' mobility opportunities. Let us first focus on opportunities for vertical mobility.

Available evidence does suggest that opportunities for promotion to the top slot of principal were significantly reduced in Carleton at the beginning of the seventies. In the Carleton area, as elsewhere, the probability of a strongly motivated male teacher obtaining a principalship were very good in the 1960's. As one informant who had taught in the area in the last half of the 1960's put it, "Anyone who wore pants and parted their hair could become a principal." The fact that the suburban area encompassed by Carleton County experienced substantial growth in this period created a demand for new schools and principals to run them. Supportive of this view is the fact that the school-aged population (i.e., those aged 5-19) in Nepean and Gloucester increased from 11,917 in 1961 to 35,745 in 1971. In the seventies, the high growth in CBE area enrolments slowed and came to a standstill in 1974, as can be seen in the CBE enrolment figures given in Table 69.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Enrolment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>19946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>21336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>22282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>22948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>23437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>23219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>23582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>23543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>23464</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the Ontario Minister of Education.
With the leveling-off of enrolments, there was no great need to build new schools or hire new principals. All of this suggests that the opportunities for promotion to principalships did indeed decline in the early seventies. However, we have yet to consider the effort of turnover on opportunities for promotion. Comparison of the names of CBE elementary principals listed in the Board's annual report for 1969-70 with the names listed in the Provincial Directory of Schools for 1973-74 shows that of the 49 elementary principals in Carleton in 1973-74, 41 were principals in 1969-70. Thus, there is no possibility that turnover in principalships served to maintain the high level of opportunity for promotion present in the 1960's.

It may be that the decline in the chances for promotion to principalships was compensated for by the provision of a greater number of lower-level positions of responsibility. There is some indirect evidence to suggest that the Carleton Board did open up such positions in the seventies. If one compares the number of elementary vice-principals and consultants in the Carleton system in 1973-74 with the number in the neighbouring Ottawa system, one finds that there were more vice-principals and consultants in Carleton. Specifically, the Carleton system, with a total elementary staff of 1016, had 36 vice-principals and consultants, whereas the Ottawa system, with a staff of 1120, had 17 such positions. How many of these positions were created in the earlier seventies is difficult to determine, but the fact that the number of vice-principals and consultants continued to increase after 1973-74 (by 1977-78 there were 52 vice-principals and consultants
in Carleton compared to 20 in Ottawa suggests that the creation of new lower-level positions of responsibility was a continuous process which encompassed the early seventies. Thus, it may well be that the effect of the lowering of opportunities for promotion to principalships was cushioned somewhat by the creation of new lower-level positions of responsibility.

Another factor which could have reduced teachers' frustrations over opportunities for promotion in Carleton was their comparative advantage relative to their Ottawa cousins. If upward mobility was hard to achieve in the Carleton system, it appeared even more difficult in Ottawa. For example, in Carleton, 8.3% of the elementary staff were in positions of responsibility in 1973-74, compared to 6.3% of the Ottawa elementary staff. By 1977-78, the figures were 10.0% of the Carleton staff and 6.8% of the Ottawa staff, suggesting some continuing opportunity in Carleton and almost complete stagnation in Ottawa. Because it is male teachers who traditionally have been concerned with promotion, it is also worth noting that slightly more of the male teachers in Carleton had obtained positions of responsibility by 1973-74 than was the case in Ottawa: 23.5% compared to 20.3% in Ottawa. As an aside, it can be noted that the relative advantage of Carleton males was to increase in the years to follow. In 1977-78, 25.9% of Carleton males held positions of responsibility compared to 19.0% of Ottawa males.

In summary, Carleton teachers did appear to feel the consequences of the "boom/bust" syndrome in relation to the opportunities
for promotions to principalships. However, this appeared to have been counterbalanced by an expansion of other avenues for mobility. Further, the fact that opportunities for advancement were greater in Carleton than in the neighbouring Ottawa system could have led Carleton teachers to view their opportunities more favourably than might otherwise have been the case. In other words, we once again find a rather ambiguous situation in Carleton. What stands out, however, is that the situation among the non-militant Ottawa teachers appears to have been worse than among the more militant Carleton teachers.

Turning to the issue of horizontal mobility, the picture is no clearer. On one hand, there appear to have been significant opportunities to move from one school to another throughout the early seventies. As Table 70 shows, significant numbers of new teachers were needed each year, between 1970 and 1975-76. Since the teachers already in the system could apply for the positions new teachers were hired for, the number of hirings serves as a crude measure of the opportunity for horizontal mobility in the system. On the other hand, the teachers felt the need to put a clause in their collective agreement to protect themselves from undesired transfers. Indeed, in Interviews, several Carleton teacher leaders suggested that transfers had been used punitively. Whatever the rate of voluntary transfer actually was in Carleton, it may not have been very important to the majority of teachers. In a larger, inner-city system with high concentrations of minority groups in particular schools, movement to a school which serves middle-class children may be highly desired. However, in the
Table 70: Estimated Hirings by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>New Hirings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from data provided by the CBSE personnel office.
early seventies the Carleton area contained no significant pockets of "problem" students to push teachers to seek new locations.

**Professional Role Deprivation.** As we have noted, one of the predominant theories in the literature is that teacher militancy is a response to frustrated desires for professional status. Viewing themselves as skilled professionals, teachers are seen to desire greater control over themselves and over their clients' "treatment". However, lay trustees and board administrators are seen to be unwilling to give up control to teachers. Hence, feelings of frustration result which provide fuel to militant action.

In spite of the fact that our earlier review of the professionalization thesis found little support for it, the popularity of this explanation makes it virtually impossible to avoid some discussion of its applicability to the case of Carleton elementary teachers' move to militancy. However, the nature of the current study limits the depth of discussion possible. Specifically, our discussion is hampered by the lack of survey data to identify gaps between professional ideals and the degree to which these ideals have been realized. At best what we can do is (1) make some general observations on the extent to which the Carleton elementary group was oriented toward winning greater professional status and the extent to which the Board resisted moves in this direction, and (2) explore the hypothesis that increase in the educational qualifications of Carleton elementary teachers was associated with the group's move to militancy (here it is assumed that the desire for professional status increases with increases in teachers' educational qualifications).
Since its inception, the TFC has shown a clear interest in developing greater teacher autonomy and control in at least two areas - teacher training and teacher evaluation. One of the first initiatives of the TFC (as we have already noted) was to develop local professional development programs to help train teachers in the development of new curriculum and pedagogy. The CBE appeared to be supportive of this initiative and provided funding to the TFC to help carry out its professional development activities. A second initiative of the TFC in the early seventies was to set up a committee to develop a self-evaluation mechanism by which teachers could evaluate their own job performance. However, there is no evidence that the TFC ever pushed hard for this self-evaluation program to do away with the evaluation powers of principals and superintendents. Certainly, the issue was never raised as a major issue in negotiations. More generally, throughout the seventies the Board encouraged teacher participation on a wide range of Board committees.25 Thus, while the elementary group (through the TFC) has shown a significant interest in matters related to "professional status", there is no clear evidence that such matters were fought over very hard, nor that the Board resisted teachers' involvement in a broad range of decision-making.

One issue which has been linked to the drive for professional status and which has been the subject of collective bargaining is the

25. This is according to the testimony of one of the most militant of the TFC leaders who has been a key leader in the TFC since its inception.
pupil-teacher ratio. However, this issue is directly tied to job security as well as "professionalism". Indeed, it is interesting to note that PTR did not appear in any of the negotiated settlements until job security was threatened after the mass resignation of 1973-74. Even after PTR had become a standard issue in negotiations it is not clear that it was as compelling an issue as salary. In fact, one of the TFC's leaders who has been repeatedly involved in negotiations said that he had often seen the teachers sacrifice PTR for salary gains.

These general observations are not meant to be definitive. It could hypothetically have been the case that the rank-and-file teachers were strongly desirous of gaining greater control over educational decision-making and that the TFC leadership simply channelled the discontent stemming from professional role deprivation in other directions.

Assuming that increases in teachers' educational qualifications are correlated with an increased desire for professional status, it would be expected that there was a significant increase in the qualifications of Carleton elementary teachers in the early-seventies (if the professionalization thesis is correct). While we lack the time-series data to test this hypothesis directly, two points bearing on its validity can be made. First, approximately 60% of the Carleton elementary teachers did not hold any university degrees in 1973-74. Second, relative to their less militant, and presumably, less professionally deprived brethren in Ottawa, Carleton teachers were slightly less highly educated in 1973-74. Where 40.6% of Carleton teachers had a
B.A. or better, 42.4% of the Ottawa teachers had a B.A. or better (see Table 71).

In sum, the limited information available provides no solid grounds for suggesting that discontent born of professional role deprivation provided an important impetus to militancy in Carleton.

**Alienation.** On the surface, one very plausible source of increased teacher discontent in Carleton can be seen to lie in alienation generated by increases in the size and formality of the system's administration. As will be recalled, the Carleton Board was formed out of 18 independent school systems, many of which lacked a significant administrative staff beyond school principals. Even in the larger of the pre-amalgamation systems such as Nepean and Gloucester, there was minimal staff outside of the schools. The creation of the Carleton Board marked a change in all the teachers' relations with local authorities. This change will be discussed in detail later, but for the moment it should be noted that the size and complexity of the new system virtually insured a decline in the amount of direct interaction between trustees and teachers and that supervisory personnel from the Board offices would be increasingly responsible for running the system.

By 1973-74, the Carleton Board had evolved to the point where it employed a Director of Education, a Superintendent of Finance and Administration, a Co-ordinator of Special Services, a Superintendent of Operations, a Superintendent of Planning, and four Superintendents of Schools to oversee the education of 23,540 elementary and 12,919
Table 71: Carleton and Ottawa Elementary Teachers by Highest Degree Obtained, 1973-74

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest Degree Obtained</th>
<th>Carleton Teachers</th>
<th>Ottawa Teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ph.D.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.A.</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.A.</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Degree Reported</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1016</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ontario Ministry of Education.
secondary pupils. When one realizes that only two of the pre-amalgamation elementary systems had over 2,000 pupils (i.e. Gloucester had 2,659 and Nepean 8,669) and that even these systems had minimal administrative staff, one can see how teachers may have come to feel part of an impersonal and foreign system. Certainly such feelings were reinforced by the sheer growth in the Board’s central office administrative staff. As Table 72 shows, this staff more than tripled in size in the early seventies - going from 58 in 1969 to 189 in 1973.

Another factor which may have been operating to heighten any feelings of alienation generated by the increased size of the system was the shift in the size of schools. Not only were teachers teaching in a bigger school system, they were increasingly likely to be teaching in schools with larger enrolments. While the shift in the distribution of schools by enrolment shown in Table 73 is not earth shaking, it is clearly in a direction which might be expected to exacerbate feelings of alienation.

Earlier, when changes in the distribution of schools by enrolment were discussed in Chapter IV, I linked such changes to changes in principals’ ability to deal in a non-bureaucratic style with their teachers. Even though there has been an upward shift in the distribution of Carleton schools, it is doubtful that the majority of principals were forced to adopt highly bureaucratic procedures or styles to function effectively. However, there is some reason to believe that the principals themselves may have felt an increasing sense of alienation under the CBE. In the pre-existing system,
Table 72: Carleton Board Central Office Administration Staff, 1969-1977 (as of September of each year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Staff*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Calculated from figures supplied by the CBE as follows

Total Admin. Staff = (Total Non-Teaching Staff) -
(Custodians and Maintenance
Workers and Office Workers in
Schools)

Office Workers in Schools = (1.5 x Number of Elementary
Schools) + (7 x Number of
High Schools)

(Method of Calculation supplied by T.D. Moore, CBE
Superintendent.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enrolment</th>
<th>Number of Pre-Amalgamation Schools, 1968-69*</th>
<th>Number of CBE Schools, 1973-74**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-99</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-199</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-299</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300-399</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400-499</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-599</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600-699</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700-799</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800-899</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>900</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Enrolments for several schools - probably small schools - are missing for 1968-69)

* Source: "A Brief to the Interim School Organization Committee" from the Advisory Committee of the OTF, 1968-69.

principals had a significant amount of prestige and power, largely due to the lack of any significant hierarchy above them. With the creation and growth of the CBE, two things happened to reduce elementary principals' power and prestige within the system. First, they found themselves to be increasingly subordinate to a growing corps of superintendents who put limits on principals' autonomy. Second, under the CBE, elementary principals were in a system which contained strong rivals for power and status in the form of the secondary principals. In a nutshell, elementary principals moved from being big fish in small ponds to being small fish in a big pond.

In summary, conditions which could nurture feelings of alienation did develop in the early seventies. Certainly the growth of the CBE administrative staff, the establishment of a large core of superintendents, the large size of the Board (17 trustees) and the incorporation of secondary teachers in the same system all contributed to Carleton elementary teachers feeling removed from the centre of power. However, whether this stirred feelings of discontent or merely weakened teachers' sense of commitment to the Board is open to question. In Gloucester, where teachers had a close and amiable working relationship with trustees, the formalization and complication of authority relationships may well have caused significant irritation. However, in areas such as Nepean, where trustee/teacher relations had been more autocratic, the development of a more bureaucratic set of relationships may not have been viewed with as much disfavour. Regardless of previous board affiliation, principals probably felt some irritation with the
new structure that was evolving, in that all were subject to a loss of influence and prestige. In total, however, the alienation thesis falls short of providing a very adequate explanation of the development of militancy for other elementary groups—experienced very similar conditions without developing into militant groups. Further, and perhaps more important, elementary teachers and principals were given greater control over the development of curriculum and pedagogy than was the case in many other systems. Thus, at one of the most basic and salient levels of control, the new system could be seen to lessen alienation rather than increase it.

TFC Leaders' Views on Discontent and Militancy. Up to this point our investigation of discontent has been guided fairly closely by the theoretical framework set out in Chapter III. This approach has the potential advantage of allowing our analysis to bear on the theoretical formulations and hypotheses existent in the literature on social movements and teacher militancy, but it runs the risk of blinding us to sources of discontent unique to the specific setting or not covered in the literature. It is here that the inductive approach, afforded by the case-study method, pays dividends.

In the course of interviewing TFC leaders, an attempt was made to elicit their own explanations of the development of militancy in Carleton as well as their explanations of the mass resignation of 1973-74. In both cases, the interviewer attempted to probe for leaders' assessments of the importance of various forms of discontent outlined in our theoretical framework.
Leaders had no difficulty in viewing their group as a militant group, especially in relation to other public school elementary teachers' groups in the province. In fact, many of those interviewed appeared to take a great deal of pride in the fact that they were more militant than their compatriots under other boards.

In their explanations of how militancy developed, four themes appeared repeatedly. First, leadership was defined as a critical factor. A small, strong, energetic and cohesive core of female teachers, supported by principals, was seen to lead (and manipulate) the teachers' move to militancy. In particular, two female Presidents of TFC - Mary Hill and Ioma Kerr - were credited (or in some cases blamed) for the development of militancy and the mass resignation of 1973-74. Second, the fact that the local group was amalgamated was cited as a key prerequisite for the development of militancy. Third, numerous respondents felt that there had been an influx of many young teachers to the system in the early seventies which contributed to militancy. The fourth theme was that militancy was at least a partial outgrowth of dissatisfaction over the way that the Board

26. Queries as to why this was important resulted in three potentially overlapping responses. Several respondents clearly saw the young teachers as part of a protest generation who came into the system already possessing a predisposition to militancy. Others saw the energy of youth flowing together with the freedom to innovate made available to teachers in the early seventies to produce teachers who were very proud of themselves and their work and hence willing to fight to defend their status. Finally, some made a point of young teachers being upwardly mobile and felt that it was upwardly mobile teachers who tended to become most militant.
treated elementary teachers, in comparison to the way they treated secondary teachers. The same key words "second-class citizen" and "the spoiled-child syndrome" came out in a number of interviews. The feeling that they were being treated as second-class citizens and that the secondary teachers were spoiled children likely did not start to take hold until 1972, as we will see in a moment.

While there were numerous examples cited to demonstrate the Board's favouritism to the secondary teachers, we will confine ourselves to two for the moment. First, and most frequently mentioned, was the fact that the most powerful superintendents (and most numerous) were ex-secondary teachers, many of whom came from the Ottawa school system. Since Carleton secondary teachers were Ottawa secondary teachers prior to the formation of the CB&I, Carleton elementary teachers felt that they had grounds for seeing favouritism. Second, the fact that from 1971 on, the Board always attempted to settle with the secondary teachers before settling with the elementary group contributed to strong feelings of second-class citizenship. Indeed, the fight to negotiate the salaries of degreed elementary teachers drew a large part of its impetus from these feelings of second-class citizenship. As one respondent put it, "What we were saying was, 'Hey! What about us? You've got to talk to us too!'." Repeatedly, Carleton elementary teachers found themselves negotiating in a situation where the amount the Board had budgeted for salaries was already set and where the salaries of degreed elementary teachers were set by a previous settlement with the secondary teachers. Under these
circumstances, about all the teachers could do was to argue about the distribution of the money remaining after degree teacher costs were subtracted from the total amount the Board was prepared to pay.

Independent of, but probably preceding and contributing to, the elementary leaders' views on the Board's favouritism to the secondary panel are their own feelings about secondary teachers. In line with the TFC objective of amalgamating all five teacher federations, the TFC leadership made a number of attempts to set up joint committees with the secondary teachers. While some cooperation was achieved in the early years in the area of professional development, the overall level of cooperation effected was low. Most dramatically, the local OSSTF refused to even attend joint meetings with TFC and Board representatives to discuss joint insurance programs; arguing that their provincial federation forbid joint "negotiations" with elementary teachers. The point at which cooperation reached its peak was probably in the spring of 1971 when the provincial ceilings were imposed and the TFC and local OSSTF engaged in joint actions to fight them. However, this was also the beginning of some strong feelings of animosity between the two panels. On April 1, 1971, the secondary teachers began a work-to-rule which theypitched as being, at least in part, a protest against provincial ceilings. The elementary teachers, while protesting ceilings and threatening strong action only supported the OSSTF with a publicity campaign. Not only did TFC fail to act strongly, some of its members actually offered to supply some voluntary services which the secondary teachers had withdrawn.
The above events led one of the secondary teachers I interviewed to describe the elementary group as follows: "They are weak-sisters, all they do is talk and nag, they never carry through." TFC leaders did not take kindly to such attitudes. They came to find several of the OSSTF leaders both "arrogant and insulting". Indeed feelings became strong enough for several TFC informants to suggest that the mass resignation of 1973-74 was largely motivated by a desire to "prove our strength to the secondary". While it is doubtful that such sentiments were initially widespread among the rank-and-file of the TFC, it is certainly possible that a large number of TFC leaders, proud of their accomplishments in forwarding the cause of amalgamation, might well feel this way. The concern with negotiating the salaries of agreed teachers makes a great deal more sense when viewed as an attempt of the TFC leaders to assert their organizations' integrity and independent strength, than when viewed as simply an attempt to win greater salaries than secondary teachers.  

27 Had salaries been the only critical factor in either the negotiations of 1972-73 (when no agreement was reached) or of 1973-74 (when the mass resignation occurred), the elementary group would have to have been totally blind not to strive for, rather than against, parity with the secondary. After all, the provincial OSSTF was clearly on its way to fighting for significant salary gains and, locally, the OSSTF had shown its teeth. Under these

---

27. In fact one informant who was involved in the 1972-73 negotiations told me that the TFC had offered to take less than secondary teachers in order to break parity.
circumstances, it clearly made economic sense to ride the secondary teachers' coattails. However, what made sense did not make moral or emotional sense to teachers whose mission was to spearhead change in the structure of Ontario teachers' federations.

Some TFC leaders also cited the following as causes of militancy in Carleton: (1) ceilings and the Board's setting the budget prior to negotiations, (2) breakdown in communication between the Board and its teachers, (3) the centralization of administrative authority and the accompanying loss of autonomy in the schools, (4) the loss of special programs and services in Nepean that occurred with the formation of the CBE, (5) antagonizing behaviour on the part of certain trustees and administrators.

At least two important points are suggested by this short review of leaders' views on militancy and discontent. The first is that militancy was not triggered by a single catalyst. Leaders who were heavily involved in TFC in the early seventies fail to show a common view of the key factors in the development of militancy, and there is definitely no consensus that a sudden rise in discontent was important. The diversity of leaders' views suggests a complex interweaving of factors and events with the most commonly-cited factor being leadership. Regarding discontent itself, again leaders show a diversity of opinion, and almost no one is able to identify one main source of dissatisfaction among the TFC membership. However, it is interesting that economic deprivation was not cited as a key source of discontent by anyone, although the right to negotiate independent of the secondary
group for salary increases was mentioned as key. This leads to our second point.

The interviews with leaders suggest the importance of "non-rational" motivations - at least among leaders - as a source of discontent and militant action. More specifically, they suggest the importance of empirically-elusive concepts such as pride, self-respect and sense of mission in explaining the development of militancy in Carleton. Here it is interesting to note that, when asked why mass resignation took place, several very cooperative informants were amazed to realize that they didn't know why they resigned. Others were only able to explain the resignations in terms of the "manipulative" actions of leaders and still others emphasized such things as the failure to reach an agreement in the previous year, the need to get the Board to quit treating them as second-class citizens and the general climate of militancy throughout the province.

Summary. In our review of objective conditions the analysis fails to show any clear change which could be expected to lead to a worsening of discontent over salary, mobility or professional control. Only with regard to alienation do changing conditions appear in line with increasing discontent; and, here, the connection between changing conditions and actually experienced discontent is questionable. Equally important, if we contrast the situation of Carleton elementary teachers with that of their Ottawa neighbours, we find Carleton teachers less likely to experience deprivation over salary and promotion. In other words, the more militant group appears less objectively
deprived. The point is not that discontent did not play a role in the
development of Carleton teachers' militancy, but rather, that if
increasing discontent was a source of militancy it was not discontent
caused by changing objective conditions in the areas investigated. If
discontent did increase, it was a result of changing expectations. For
example, it may well be that the female leadership of TFC, both by its
presence and activities, was able to shift female teachers' salary
comparisons, such that they compared themselves to men or the total
work force rather than other women.

Our discussion of leaders' views suggests that the more
important source of discontent lies not in deprivations of money,
mobility or autonomy, but in the deprivation of status and respect
relative to the secondary group.

C. Mobilization: Leadership, Ideology, Resources and Social Control

Two main arguments have been presented in the preceding sections
on the Carleton elementary teachers. First, it has been suggested that
one of the critical necessary conditions for the development of a
militant collectivity - the existence of a single, cohesive organiza-
tion uniting the group - was present in Carleton. Second, it has been
argued that changes in the objective situation of Carleton elementary
teachers vis-à-vis salary, mobility and autonomy were not clearly
sufficient in themselves to produce a rise in discontent which could
explain the group's move to militancy. To the extent that discontent
played an important role in the development of militancy in Carleton, our analysis suggests it was discontent borne either of heightened expectations or of feelings of being treated as second-class citizens in comparison to the secondary panel. It has already been suggested that leadership played an important role in building group cohesion. However, we have yet to say much about leadership's role in stirring up discontent or in mobilizing the group. Given that the majority of teachers interviewed saw leadership, and more particularly, the leadership supplied by Ioma Kerr and Mary Hill as a key cause in militancy, it seems plausible that leadership played a key role in shaping teachers' perceptions, expectations and actions.

In this section, the main focus is on the mobilizing activities of leaders. We start by providing a brief portrait of the TFC leadership based primarily on interviews. This is followed by a sequential review of leadership activities and ideology in the period from 1971-72 to 1973-74. However, it should be noted that the sequential review covers more than leaders' mobilizing activities. It also makes reference to factors beyond leadership which are included in our theoretical framework.

1. Leadership Profile

What follows is a crude descriptive profile of the TFC leadership, based on the interviews I conducted in 1978. Although 27 leaders were interviewed, only 21 provided information useful for the present profile, and within these 21 interviews, there are some items of
information missing in particular cases. On the positive side, all but one of the presidents of the TFC and all chairmen of the TFC negotiation teams (through to 1975) are encompassed in the sample. The remainder of the interviews are with persons who either served on the negotiating team in the early seventies or held an executive position in this time-period. Hence the sample is not systematically representative of all teachers who played leadership roles in TFC, but it does contain many of the key activists of the early seventies. The purpose of the profile is twofold. First, it provides a "feel" for the types of people we will be dealing with in discussing leaders. Second, it may provide some suggestive hypotheses which could be explored in other studies.

Attributes of Individuals

Age. The age distribution in Table 74 gives the ages reported by leaders in the Spring and Summer of 1978. Extrapolating backwards in time to the early seventies, it can be determined that the majority of these leaders would have been in their mid-twenties to mid-thirties during the TFC's turn to militancy.

The TFC presidents are concentrated at the lower end of the distribution with ages of 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 and 36 in 1978. These leaders' ages are close to the modal age of all the CBE elementary teachers. In 1977-78, the modal age category of Carleton elementary teachers was 30-39. In 1978-79, when a finer breakdown was available the modal category was 30-34.
Table 74: Age Distribution of Selected T.F.C. Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number of Teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8
From the age data, it is apparent that many leaders, and especially TFC presidents, shared membership in the "radical" generation of the sixties with a large number of the rank-and-file. This may have contributed to strong ties of loyalty between leaders and followers and to the acceptance of more militant orientations on the part of both leaders and followers. (It is worth noting that one of the TFC executives of the early seventies had been president of the Carleton University Student Association in the late 1960's.) It is also noteworthy that the majority of leaders were in their mid-twenties to mid-thirties during the rise of militancy. As we saw in our review of the teacher militancy literature, militancy at the individual level is inversely related to age with the important qualifier that very young teachers tend not to be militant. Militancy is most likely to occur in individuals who have achieved some security in the occupation, but who are still in the process of trying to move up the mobility-ladder within the school system (i.e., those in their mid-twenties to mid-thirties).

Father's Occupation. Previous literature suggests that teaching tends to attract upwardly mobile males from the working-class and females from middle or upper-middle-class families. While these generalizations apply to several of our leaders, other patterns are more striking and more interesting. First, the leadership group as a whole contains a large number of individuals whose fathers were self-employed. Of the 21 persons who were asked their fathers' occupation, six had fathers who were farmers, four had fathers who ran their own businesses and one had a father who was a lawyer. While none of the
farming-fathers and only one of the business-owning-fathers could be said to be highly successful, their children could be seen to feel some loss of status in becoming employees rather than self-employed. Loss of status might be hypothesized to contribute to desires for higher incomes to compensate for the loss.

Other occupations reported included three high-status business executives, one low-level manager, two armed forces officers, two foremen and a mechanic. If we add the three males whose fathers were executives and the two males whose fathers were self-employed, we find that nine of the thirteen males in our sample may have felt some loss of status in becoming elementary teachers. More generally, male elementary teachers have been found to experience some misgivings about their status as a result of doing what had traditionally been seen to be "women's work" (Zeigler, 1967). Perceived intergenerational downward-mobility coupled with the "femaleness" of elementary teaching, could be seen to place strong psychological pressure on our male leaders to enhance both their own status within the school system and the general status of elementary teachers.

The predominante occupation of female leaders' fathers is farming. However, three of the eight women interviewed made a point of stressing that their mothers actually supported the family. Since I did not probe into the mothers' occupation, it may be that other female leaders in this small sample had strong, independent female role models.

Education. One of the most striking things about our leaders' educational backgrounds is the fact that a large number of them were
pursuing university degrees throughout the seventies. In 1969-70, only 11 of the 21 leaders held B.A.'s. By 1978, when the interviews were carried out, 19 held degrees and 7 of these 19 held M.Ed. degrees as well as B.A.'s. Apart from the ambition this indicates, it is important in that it brought teacher leaders in contact with the university milieu. Although student radicalism was dissipating throughout the seventies, the university climate still contained a flavour of rebellion and change. Since university activists tended to be concentrated in the social sciences and humanities, it is important to note that all but two of the leaders who majored in these areas.28 (Of particular interest, given the TFC penchant for legal action, is the fact that three female presidents of TFC majored together in law and political science at Carleton University while serving as leaders of the TFC.)

Position in the School. In 1969-70, five of our leaders were principals and one was a vice-principal. Given what was said earlier about participation in TFC as a route to mobility and the ambition evidenced by our leaders' pursuit of degrees, it is not surprising that the number of our leaders who were in positions of responsibility was significantly higher in 1978 than in 1969-70. In fact, by 1978, seven of our leaders were principals and nine were vice-principals.

28. It is interesting to note that one of my informants felt that much of the TFC's militancy could be accounted for by the presence of young teachers who had been radicalized by taking sociology at Carleton University. According to this informant, the department of sociology at Carleton was full of socialists.
Geographic Origins. Where teachers teach in their home towns or areas, friends, neighbours and relatives are likely to exercise a conservative influence on their behaviour. In the case of Carleton teachers, the rapid emergence and growth of the suburban communities, served by the CBE, reduced the probability that leaders and rank-and-file teachers would experience strong restraint from community ties.

On the other hand, a teacher group may be "radicalized" by an influx of teachers and teacher leaders from areas in which militancy is viewed as acceptable behaviour for teachers. Thus, it was suggested earlier that an influx of British teachers in the sixties may have contributed to the general rise of militancy in Ontario. Examination of the Carleton leaders' reported "hometowns" (i.e., the areas, or communities in which they attended school) reveals little that is surprising. The majority of leaders give Ottawa and communities in the Ottawa valley as their hometown. Three come from the Kingston area, two from Toronto and three from other provinces.

The sketch from the background information is of a leadership group, composed of highly ambitious individuals who were near the make-or-break point in their career development at the time militancy was on the rise. Other systems undoubtedly had similar individuals among their teachers. However, what other systems lacked was a federation structure to channel the energy of the ambitious in a common direction.

Leadership Attitudes

Three sets of attitudes were investigated in the interviews: (1) attitudes toward authorities, (2) perceptions of the amount of
decision-making power the TFC should have, and (3) attitudes toward the use of coercive tactics. Before the results of this investigation are discussed two points must be made. First, since the interviews were conducted in 1978, the attitudes expressed may not accurately express respondents' views in the early 1970's. Second, the purpose of asking these "attitude" questions was as much to establish rapport with the respondent and develop new lines of enquiry to be probed later in the interview, as it was to develop hard and fast measures of leaders' attitudes. As a consequence, I was as concerned with why a particular response was given as I was with the content of the response.

Attitudes Toward Authorities. Leaders were asked to indicate whether they "strongly agreed", "agreed", "disagreed", or "strongly disagreed" with four statements regarding authorities. These statements were as follows:

1. In general, trustees and the TFC share the same goals of providing a high quality education to the students.

2. Supervisory personnel, meaning primarily superintendents, are more concerned with maintaining order than with enhancing the quality of education.

3. The decisions of provincial authorities are often used on political expediency rather than on what is best for pupils.

4. In general, the public is concerned that children in Cafileton receive a high quality education.

These questions were formulated with two objectives in mind. First, if the professionalization thesis was valid, I expected
responses which would show that leaders felt authorities were not strongly concerned with students’ welfare. Second, if authorities had played an active role in generating discontent and militancy, I expected this to be reflected in cynical attitudes about authorities’ motives.

Table 75 shows the pattern of response to the above questions. Clearly, there is no uniform distrust of all authorities. However, there is fairly strong distrust of the provincial authorities and some significant distrust of superintendents. This might suggest that provincial authorities and local superintendents contributed to the development of militancy in Carleton, but not that Carleton leaders were militant professionals bent on taking the management of the educational system into their own hands.

Probing leaders for the reasons behind their responses revealed that the prime reason for mistrust of provincial authorities lay in the combination of the provincial call for individualized teaching, the imposition of ceilings, and the return to basics which was taking place in the secondary schools. Regarding superintendents, two types of feelings emerged. First there was a feeling that the superintendents’ role in the system and the magnitude of their responsibility forced them into purely administrative concerns, resulting in their losing touch with the real needs of teachers and pupils. Second, a prevalent tendency was to see the supervisory staff as favouring secondary teachers and ignoring the elementary group. A number of respondents clearly saw both “good guys” and “bad guys” among the superintendents.
Table 75: Extent of Carleton Leaders Agreement or Disagreement with Specific Statements Regarding Various Authorities' Goals and Motives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Both Trustees and TFC share goal of providing high quality education</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents more concerned with maintaining order</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial authority base decisions on political expediency</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public is concerned with quality of education</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and, hence, had difficulty characterizing the group as a whole. (As might be expected "good guys" were usually ex-elementary teachers while "bad guys" were former secondary teachers).

Responses regarding trustees are somewhat deceptive. While a strong majority of leaders view trustees and the TFC as sharing the goal of providing high quality education, probing revealed that respondents saw significant differences in the way trustees and the TFC went about achieving this goal. Trustees were seen to value providing high quality education but, at the same time, were concerned to keep costs down. The TFC, in contrast, was seen to view low PTR and high salary as the means to high quality education. In short, agreement on goals did not preclude significant conflict over means between trustees and the TFC. In addition, it should be mentioned that specific trustees were seen as sources of antagonism, even by leaders who strongly agreed that trustees were concerned with the quality of education.

The question about the public's concern with the quality of education was asked because previous literature on teacher militancy suggested that the public was increasingly pressuring educators to respond to their demands. The question asked doesn't tap this issue directly, but the fact that public pressure was never mentioned as a significant factor directly effecting teachers suggests that public pressure groups had little effect on the evolution of the TFC.

Support for Coercive Action. To tap the extent of leaders' support for militant action, each was asked to indicate whether he/she
would "strongly approve", "approve", "disapprove", or "strongly disapprove" of the use of a series of coercive actions by teachers. Table 76 shows the pattern of response obtained.

The fact that all tactics received approval more frequently than disapproval suggests there was a significant group of militants among the TFC leadership. More interesting, however, is what came out in the process of interviewing. Over the course of interviewing it slowly dawned on me that my respondents were utilizing at least three different bases for giving approval or disapproval. Specifically, there were moral, legal and pragmatic bases being used. Those using a moral basis, judged tactics vis-à-vis their impact on children and their own felt responsibility to the children's welfare. Here a teacher often would oppose closing the school for a study session (because young kids could be suddenly left on their own), but would support a mass resignation since sufficient notice would be given to allow parents to make arrangements for the care of their children. Those using a legal basis for judgement might support a strike (after 1975), but oppose campaigning for or against elected officials because teachers are public servants. Finally, leaders using the pragmatic basis for judgement evaluated tactics in terms of their effectiveness. Here PR campaigns and work-to-rule (elementary teachers have few voluntary services to withdraw) got low support. Not only did different individuals utilize different standards of judgement, but the same individual would occasionally appear to shift standards in the course of responding to the list of tactics. The fact that the judgement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactics</th>
<th>Strongly Support</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>Disapprove</th>
<th>Strongly Disapprove</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P.R. Campaigns</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for or against</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected Officials</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold Study Sessions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work-to-Rule</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threaten Mass Resignation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat of Strike</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Resignation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
standards varied does not alter the fact that the majority of leaders supported militant actions, but it does help to account for anomalies in Table 76, such as why more leaders disapprove of campaigning against elected officials than of mass resignation and why more approved of strikes (clearly legal in 1978) than of study sessions (of questionable legality).

A second point regarding Table 76 is of relevance to our earlier mention of males using TFC as a route to positions of responsibility. Of the six leaders that indicated disapproval of strikes, five are males. In interviewing these men, one gets the impression that they are somewhat chagrined that their efforts had helped develop female leaders who were more militant than themselves. For those on the road to promotion, a vibrant, unique, amalgamated local federation was a real plus in providing opportunities to show leadership. However, when the TFC started to significantly antagonize local authorities, the personal gains made through local federation might be lost through it as well. This said, it should be noted that four of the five male leaders who disapproved of strikes in 1978 had participated in the mass resignation of 1973-74. Thus there appears to have been no substantial rebellion within the leadership of the TFC in the early seventies.

2. The Role of Leadership in the Development of TFC Militancy

The Stanley/Linnen Era. The period from 1969 to 1975 can be seen to contain two leadership eras. In the first era - The Stanley/ Linnen era - leadership energy was focused heavily on securing the
TFC's existence. From May, 1969, to the Fall of 1971, Kay Stanley reigned as president of TFC, assisted by her TFC secretary, Mr. Les Linnen. Both having previously been NTF presidents, they carried that organization's concerns with amalgamation and professional development into the TFC. But equally important, they worked vigorously and consciously to make TFC a visible and valued organization to Carleton elementary teachers. The level of activity displayed by these two leaders and their compatriots in building the TFC is more than mildly impressive. To illustrate the amount of activity it can be noted that, between January 23 and February 16 of 1969, Kay Stanley participated in 14 separate meetings in her role as president of the TFC. A review of TFC executive minutes shows that this level of presedential activity was normal throughout Stanley's presidency.

The leadership activities which took place under Stanley's reign are too numerous to detail here. However, excerpts from Kay Stanley's Annual Presidential Reports of 1970 and 1971 can be used to identify main areas of leadership concern and activity.

In her first report of May 21, 1970, Stanley listed the following highlights of the year:

- a greater feeling of unity prevalent among our teachers, the fading away of former township boundaries as evidenced by the absence of any talk about regionalism when discussing issues, electing officers, etc...

- increased professional outlook via the efforts of teacher organized professional development activities...

30. Exhibit 2 in Appendix D details Stanley's activities in this time period.
good rapport with our administration, enhanced by "Meet the Administrative Staff Meetings", and the close co-operation that exists between our PD committee and administrative staff.

Increased awareness on the part of the Trustees concerning our federation's activities, fostered by the Teacher-Trustee Liaison Committee and ad hoc committee that attends all Board of Education Meetings.

more teacher involvement in federation matters, witness the attendance at Council, Committees, our Annual Meeting and this Annual Dinner with 525 persons present.

- a spirit or the 'seeds' of co-operation is growing with our OSSTF colleagues through the efforts of the PD committee and the Social Relation Committee.

- the major social activities must be included in any list of highlights especially the Annual Ball.

- the publishing of teachers' views on a wide range of topics in our own newsletter has been most interesting. I hope Carleton Corridors continues to grow in the coming year ... a vehicle for teacher opinion.

- the interest shown by other teacher groups in the province concerning the operation of our local federation which precipitated discussions with the Ottawa Teachers' Council in January, meetings in Thunder Bay in February, speeches in Kingston to the Frontenac teachers in April, and a planned sojourn to Parry Sound next week.

- our salary is settled, need I say more ...

In addition to enumerating the above highlights, the president made mention of some remaining areas of concern.

"Naturally some areas of concern remain. One does not solve all the problems and make all the right decisions in one year. Difficulties with communicating with 1100 members persist. We invite your suggestions. Some schools do not participate to the extent that one would desire. There is a need for further clarification in relations between T.F.C. and the affiliates. Some teachers feel that the council "structure" limits the amount of teacher involvement ... again we encourage your recommendations.

The mention of unity, teacher involvement, social activities,
the newsletter, and the remaining problems of communication and participation, support the view that one of the main foci of leadership concern and activity lay in firming up the TFC's organizational base. Indeed, the closing sentence in Stanley's address is "Let's keep T.F.C. solid in the seventies". Another concern shown by the President's Report is the amalgamation movement as indicated by the mention of cooperation with OSSTF, and the list contacts with other teacher groups contained in the highlights and the mention of the continuing problem of working out TFC's relation with the affiliates. Although professional development receives only brief mention in the President's Report, it will be recalled that over half the TFC expenditures were in this area in the first two years of its operation.

Two further points are suggested from the President's Report and from reviewing TFC correspondence and minutes during the Stanley/Lingren era. The first is the relatively positive orientation of leadership toward local administrators and trustees. The second is the relative lack of concern with salary negotiations at least during the TFC's first year. Given that the TFC was struggling to its feet, while warding off periodic attacks from FW, it perhaps makes sense that TFC leaders did not take on local authorities or become involved in acrimonious battles over contract negotiations. Given the imperative of shoring up the TFC's organizational base, the leaders had reason to be thankful to their new Board for a number of helpful actions it took. Not only did the Board cooperate in the TFC's Professional Development Programs (to the extent of providing money and time off), but also
recognized the right of the TFC to speak for Carleton teachers. Had the Board insisted on dealing with OPS and FW representatives rather than representatives of the TFC, the organization's foundation would have been seriously undermined. Other factors contributed to relatively positive relations between TFC and the Board. Certainly of some importance was the fact that TFC leaders had familiar faces to deal with among the trustees and Board administrators.

Just as Nepean teachers were able to exercise considerable influence over the development of the TFC, so too, were ex-Nepean Board authorities able to achieve positions of prominence within the new CBE. For the first two years of its existence, the CBE was chaired by Doug Arthur, who was previously the chairman of the NPSB. Further, the Chairman of the CBE elementary negotiating team was Joyce Harris, who had served as a trustee-negotiator under the NPSB. Along with these trustees came Mr. Rath, the superintendent of the NPSB, to serve as superintendent of the Nepean area under the CBE. Later, in April, 1969, Rath served as special advisor to the newly-hired Director of Education. Accompanying Rath in moving from Nepean to the CBE were Ian Brown, former Secretary and Business Administrator of NPSB (occupying the same position under the CBE); A.L. Cassidy, a former NPSB inspector, made special advisor to the CBE's Director of Education along with Rath; Roger Ingall, former NPSB inspector, made Superintendent of western area schools under the CBE. Although the fact that the Director of Education was hired from outside the local area may have reduced non-Nepean trustees' feelings that they were being pushed to
adopt the NPSB system, the fact that the Director was supplied with two ex-NPSB special advisors to help him get his bearings suggests that the CBE would indeed be modelled on the NPSB.\textsuperscript{29}

What is important here is that the ex-Nepeanites among the TFC leadership had well-established contacts with Important Board authorities. As a result, informality and flexibility were possible in the Stanley/Linnen era while the Board and the TFC were establishing themselves. The relatively positive climate was enhanced by two related factors. First, according to several informants, Kay Stanley "... was chummy with Doug Arthur and had contact with Sid Handleman (also CBE trustee) through their mutual involvement in the PC party".

Second, ex-Gloucester teachers also had familiar faces at the Board offices. Perhaps most important was the presence of ex-Gloucester trustee, Louise McIntosh. A number of teacher leaders mentioned that McIntosh was a strong ally of teachers in the early years and credited her with doing much to raise elementary teachers' self-respect. In addition to McIntosh, the new CBE had another possible trustee ally of Nepean and Gloucester elementary school teachers - J.L. Wilson. Wilson had just retired from teaching in 1969 after having served as a principal in both Nepean and Gloucester elementary schools. Importantly, Wilson, McIntosh and Handleman, all served on the Board's Educational Policies committee which had the prime responsibility for

\textsuperscript{29} One of the ex-Gloucester trustees, Louise McIntosh, was reported to be quite opposed to the Nepean dominance of the CBE. She was quoted in the Ottawa Citizen of Jan. 7, 1969, as saying "All we've done is adopt the Nepean Public School Board so far."
the decisions directly affecting teachers on a day-to-day basis. Finally, it might be noted that I.C. Jones, previously an Inspector of Carleton County schools outside of Nepean, was hired by the CBE to serve as an academic superintendent.

The fact that negotiations generated very few visible sparks was partly attributable to the links between authorities and teachers mentioned above. However, another factor was probably just as important. This was the way in which negotiations were handled within the TFC. During Stanley's reign as President of TFC, the TFC and Economic Policy Committee (the teachers' negotiating committee) functioned much like independent entities. In part, this was because the negotiating committee (EPC) which secured the Carleton teachers' first agreement pre-dated the TFC. Prior to the formation of the CBE in January, 1969, representatives of all the pre-existing teacher groups in Carleton County had been brought together under Glen Fossey's leadership to work on a contract which would insure that none of the groups lost anything through amalgamation in the CBE. Put in another way, this negotiating committee had the job of negotiating a common proposal among themselves and then negotiating with the Board. By the time the TFC was formed in May, 1969, the Carleton EPC had already been involved in negotiations with the new Board. Further, it was the stated policy of this committee that it would "... not report to the teachers-at-large until the contract is signed or unless negotiations broke down" (Letter to all teachers from Glen Fossey, Chairman of the Carleton EPC dated Feb. 25, 1969). Final power of approval thus lay
with the committee, not with the general membership; and, not with the TFC. As a consequence, the first agreement was signed in October with little involvement on the part of TFC or the membership as a whole.

This separation of TFC from the EPC had implications for leaders' ability to mobilize teachers and the development of militancy. Elected leaders were put in a position of having popular support, but being unable to exercise much control or influence over some of the most salient issues to teachers (e.g., salaries and working conditions). On the other hand, those in charge of dealing with salient issues had no clear popular base among the rank-and-file teachers. Had this separation of TFC and EPC remained for long, there is a good chance that TFC would lose its relevance to many teachers and that negotiators would find themselves without adequate teacher support to bargain effectively with the Board. This separation was not to last long.

Although respondents reported that key leaders such as Kay Stanley and Glen Fossey preferred to keep TFC involvement in negotiations low, there were others within the organization who felt that EPC's accountability to TFC and the general membership should be increased. In fact, it appears that some significant distrust of the negotiating team was developing late in the fall of 1969.

Fossey's negotiating team was reappointed to negotiate the 1970-71 agreement at the September 24, 1969, TFC Council Meeting. However, at the next Council in October it was moved: "... that the question of the continuity of the Economic Policy Committee be referred to the schools for decision." (Council Minutes, Oct. 27, 1969).
Apparentlv what was at issue here was whether the negotiating team intended to negotiate for salary increases as well as attempt to "plug the loopholes" in the existing contract for, after Fossey explained that salary increases would be negotiated, the above motion was lost. Clearly some teachers suspected Fossey's team of being too docile.

The November Council meeting saw the first positive step toward intertwining TFC and EPC. After ERC's practice of sending its correspondence to principals was questioned, the Council recommended that EPC correspondence be sent to TFC school representatives. Communication between EPC and TFC became an increasing concern in the months to come. In his December report to Council, Fossey stated that his committee was upset over the allegations that it (EPC) was being secretive and not communicating with the schools. February saw more of the issue of secrecy and lack of communication. Specifically, the motion was put "... that the Economic Policy Committee submit the final contract proposal to the Council members for ratification and through them to individual staffs" (Council Minutes, February, 1970). The motion was lost by one vote, indicating that a substantial number of teachers were becoming concerned to find out just what the negotiating team was proposing to the Board on their behalf. Judging from the executive minutes of March 9, 1970, suspicion of the negotiating team was growing very strong. At the executive meeting Tim McIntyre, who linked the TFC executive and the EPC, suggested that "... there was some deep-seated misunderstandings festering which ought to be cleared up." To this end, he moved that the negotiating team be invited to the
March Council meeting. However, this motion was withdrawn "... since it was felt that this might precipitate a 'touchy' if not dangerous situation". Instead, the executive decided to meet with the negotiating team the day prior to the next Council meeting.

Whatever happened at that meeting, the result was that the entire negotiating team did attend the March 17 Council meeting. One revealing facet of this meeting is contained in the minutes' description of Fossey's presentation to Council.

Mr. Fossey distributed a written summation on the state of negotiations. He was not able to be specific because there is a mutual agreement between our committee and the Board's committee to make no public releases without the consent of the other party (Council Minutes, March 17, 1970).

Apparently, the committee's obligation to the Board (to refrain from "public" releases) was stronger than its obligation to communicate the details of proposals to the TFC membership. Later years would see similar agreements not to make negotiations public, but this would not mean excluding the teachers from knowing what was being presented on their behalf — only the exclusion of non-TFC members from meetings where proposals were presented to the membership.

The outcome of the March 17 meeting was somewhat of a compromise. It was agreed that "... a special meeting of Council be called when negotiations reach a conclusion, at which time the final proposal will be presented to the members of council who will return to their schools with the proposal and tabulate an affirmative or negative vote by secret ballot." In essence, the teachers would have to approve of the negotiating team's proposal and the final agreement at the same time.
The formal relationship between TFC and EPC remained relatively unchanged during Stanley's second term of office (1970-71), but the level of communication between the TFC executive and the EPC increased, largely because of the imposition of provincial ceilings in the Spring of 1971. Ceilings were seen to threaten both "professional" and economic concerns of Carleton elementary teachers. On one hand, the TFC saw ceilings directly undercutting their ability to provide students with a good education. On the other hand, ceilings clearly placed limits on the salary increases teachers could expect to obtain. As a result, both the TFC executive and several of its committees (i.e., Professional Development and Public Relations Committees) became heavily involved with EPC in fighting ceilings.

With the imposition of ceilings, the TFC was moving into a new phase where concerns with promoting amalgamation and securing membership loyalty, though still prevalent, were taking a backseat to a concern with protecting the membership from the impact of ceilings. The emerging concern with protection was still couched in terms of rhetoric of professionalism and the measures the TFC leadership were actually willing to use to protect its members stayed within the bounds of public acceptability.  

30. Kay Stanley's second Presidential Report of June 3, 1971, shows the high concern given to ceilings and at the same time illustrates the concern with professionalism which characterized the Stanley/Linnen era.

31. "As a basis for this report I refer to the aims of our Federation as recorded in the Constitution of the Teachers' Federation of Carleton. The first being 'to promote and advance
The Hill/Kerr Era. If the spring of 1971 saw the beginning of a change in organizational imperatives, it also contained the seeds of a new relationship between local authorities and the TFC.

Kay Stanley not only left the presidency of TFC in the spring of 1971, she also left the Carleton system to teach in Department of National Defense schools in Germany. Although Doug Arthur was to stay on as Chairman of the Board until December, 1971, the "chummy" connection between the TFC presidency and the Board chairman disappeared with Stanley's departure. Also, it might be noted that another of Stanley's

footnote 30 cont.

the cause of education." More than ever in 1970-71 TFC has attempted to meet this objective. The spending restrictions imposed by the Department of Education, the questionable priorities established by the Carleton Board of Education and the resultant effects on 'program and personnel' in our area create the greatest challenge this organization has met to date and will continue to meet in the coming years. ... Admittedly we were not successful in implementing all our plans or in gaining full re-instatement of our programs - this should provide a continuing challenge for this Federation in the coming year.

The elementary teachers in Carleton can be justly proud of their peers for the professionalism that has been evident throughout this crisis. According to another objective of TFC that being "to promote the best possible professional services for the children" I am reassured by the numbers of parents and students who have supported our position because they recognize that one of our prime concerns has continued to centre on the child in the classroom. As long as we maintain that concern, we can continue to rely on this public support when confrontations take place. Let us not forget that the child represents the main link between the home and the school, if we short-change the child via decreasing the quality of our work, we ultimately will ostracize the parents and thus negate the support that is so vital to our position. I trust that our experience this year has made us cognizant of this condition and that we will continue to work constructively within the established framework to bring about the changes that are essential (emphasis mine) to a growing educational system.
Board contacts, Sid Handleman, had departed from the scene in January, 1971. While Joyce Harris stayed on as the Board's elementary negotiating team chairman, she was joined by William Dakin, whose tendency to refer to Board offers as "Cast in concrete"31 would serve as a rallying cry for elementary teachers and who the TFC would later try to unseat through school board election campaigning. Other salient changes in the trustee group occurred just before the announcement of the provincial ceilings. A new set of trustees took office on January 1, 1971. Among the newcomers were one Ottawa high school teacher and one ex-local area high school teacher. Added to the one incumbent ex-local high school teacher who was elected, this made three trustees who may have been more attuned to the needs of the secondary panel than of the elementary panel.

Other changes in Board/TFC relations are indicated by what was happening to top administrators. Here the organizational charts shown in Figures 4 and 5 are useful. Comparison of the CBE organizational structure of July, 1969, with that shown for September, 1972, reveals that a number of the elementary teachers' key contacts had disappeared, been demoted, or had their contact with elementary teachers restricted. C.A. Rath, the former Superintendent of the NSPB, who was a Special Advisor to the Director in 1969, had retired in the spring of 1971.

31. This phrase apparently made a strong impact on teachers. Note the following excerpt from the introduction to the TFC Handbook published in 1972.

"This volume is not "Cast in concrete". It has room for your additions and scope for your modifications."
Figure 4: General Organization of the CBE, July, 1969.

CARLETON BOARD OF EDUCATION

Planning Officer
D.D. Andress

Director of Education
S.J. Berry

Assistant Secretary

Special Advisor
C.A. Rath

Special Advisor
A.L. Cassidy

Superintendent of
Academic Personnel
W.R. MacGillivray

Superintendent of
Student Services
I.G. Jones

Superintendent of
Program Development
J.C. Gardner

Superintendent of
Finance & Administration
T.D. Moore

Area Superintendent
East A.A. Carr

Area Superintendent
Central S.S. Katz

Area Superintendent
West R.E. Ingall

Controller of
Finance

Controller Maintenance & Operations
Figure 5: General Organization of the CBE, September, 1972.

THE CARLETON BOARD OF EDUCATION

Assistant Secretary P.A. Laverance

Director of Education S.J. Berry

Executive Assistant M. Curry

Superintendent of Operations J.C. Gardner


Superintendent of Planning R.E. Ingall

Superintendent of Administration T.D. Moore

Administrative Officers

Planning Officer

Planning Unit

Personnel Manager

Chief of Maintenance & Operations

Controller of Finance

Co-ordinator of New Construction

Transportation Officer

FAMILIES OF SCHOOLS

Bell, Borden, Carp Valley, Colonel By, Confederation Garneau, Gloucester, Merivale, Osgoode, S. Carleton, Crystal Bay
The other Special Advisor with roots in the elementary schools, A.L. Cassidy, had apparently been demoted to the position of Co-ordinator of Special Services. R.E. Ingall, a former School Inspector in the NPSB, went from being directly involved with teachers as a CBE Area Superintendent in 1969, to being Superintendent of Planning - a role which limited his involvement with elementary teachers. I.G. Jones, also a previous Inspector of elementary schools, was demoted from having charge over an Area Superintendent to being an Area Superintendent. Finally, the Superintendents who were most directly concerned with elementary schools (i.e. the Superintendent of Operations and the four Area Superintendents) were, with the exception of I.G. Jones, all recently promoted secondary school principals from the local area. Thus, some of the important lines of communication and influence between the Board and elementary teachers were severed or significantly weakened close to the time ceilings were imposed.

Also affecting the relationship between the Board and TFC was the fact that the Carleton secondary teachers were demanding attention from the Board, and the way in which the blame for the CBE's financial woes was shifted to the Board. By staging a work-to-rule in the Spring of 1971, the secondary teachers ensured that the Board would not take them lightly and set in motion the pattern of the Board settling with the secondary panel before the elementary. After a period of vacillation, the financial shortfall in Carleton came to be seen as at least in part due to local financial mismanagement. The provincial authorities contributed to this view by (1) pointing out that other systems,
similar to Carleton, had not suffered the same effects, and (2) sending
in an auditor to check the CBE's books after the Carleton secondary
teachers had suggested that the Board had "hidden money in the budget".
The effect of this was to direct animosity toward local authorities
rather than provincial authorities and to weaken ties between local
authorities and the TFC.

Added to the changes noted were two critical changes in key TFC
leadership positions. First, Mary Hill replaced Kay Stanley as
President of TFC. Second, Ioma Kerr became chairman and chief
negotiator of EPC. This combination was to last two years - 1971-72
and 1972-73. In 1973-74 Ioma Kerr would become President while Mary
Hill would remain on the TFC executive as Past President.

While there are limits to the impact any individual or small
group of individuals can have on an organization, there is no question
that Mary Hill and Ioma Kerr played key roles in moving the TFC to
militancy. Hill and Kerr consciously pursued the goal of mobilizing
teachers to secure a strong collective agreement. They also played a
key role in defining issues for the membership. Further, both Hill and
Kerr were committed to the view that one of the prime goals of the TFC
was to be protection of its members and they were willing to utilize
union tactics to do so. The fact that Kerr went on to become a labour
organizer for the Ontario Nurses' Association reflects her orientation
and skill. In Hill's case, it is instructive to read her 2nd annual
Presidential Report for the ideological orientation it displays.

Excerpt from the President's Report at the Annual Meeting of
Has T.F.C. fulfilled the needs of eleven hundred teachers in Carleton?

We have, I believe, made progress. There is no doubt that this is the most vibrant and active organization in this province (Pity the others, ladies and gentlemen!) The Executive had aspirations for the future when they came to office. In many ways we have seen success and been thrilled with our progress. In many ways we have seen our defeats and mourned our inadequacies. No one disagrees that at times we are disappointed with our progress, angry with decisions, bored by our reports, apathetic about our issues, but nevertheless in some quarters, we are respected for our opinions, feared for our strength, hated for our pigheadedness, and scorned for our so-called immaturity. But ladies and gentlemen, we have the means to become the most powerful voice in organized labour.

How often have you watched a fellow staff member be unfairly treated? Did you speak up? Did you call TFC? Did you encourage the member to call? or did you wait until it was too late for anyone to help? Were you afraid to call TFC?

How often were you too busy to contribute to TFC? Did you make one contribution to your professional organization?

You don't agree with decisions made by TFC or the provincial affiliates - Who did you tell? The guy in the classroom next door? A hell of a lot of good that's going to do!

How many of you committed the unpardonable sin - a sin so serious that expulsion from the organization should be demanded. When talking to Senior Staff, Board members and others not members of TFC you said you didn't agree with TFC? How's that for credibility?

But then, I'm being unfair. Those of you sitting in front of me today are not the offenders. You are the supporters, the workers and those that eleven hundred should thank! But, you must tell the others, spread the word.

What, then can we do to better our organization?

1. Stand up! Never criticize your professional organization to someone who is not a member.

2. Refuse to allow your fellow members to be treated unfairly.

3. Once a decision has been made by a majority of the members of TFC, support it! We cannot afford to have individuals who insist upon their right to disagree. Disagree, but keep quiet in the presence of the Board and Senior Staff.

4. Make your views known, but be prepared to take action. Give your executive some sticks and stones. Names as you know from childhood will never hurt.
5. Attend Board meetings. If each member went once a year, the gallery would never be empty.

6. Join a committee; run for office.

7. Question, speak up, come to Council as a staff, raise hell.

8. Insist your Executive carry out their duties. Form committees to react to pressures.

9. Join the PTA groups in your area. Listen and learn.

10. Encourage TFC to support a political party and Board Members. Get involved in political action. Make government realize they can be defeated by teacher groups.

11. Demand the use of press releases, newspapers and television to try to get parents concerned with education.

12. Forget about teaching nine to four. Go the extra mile or ... you're not going to have a job.

(End of meeting responded to the President's remarks with a standing ovation.) [Emphasis mine.]

Mary Hill differed from her predecessor in more than the style of her rhetoric. Where Stanley's reports stressed professionalism and amalgamation, Hill focused on protection, participation, and politicalization of teachers. Where both of Stanley's reports note, with pleasure, the development of good relations with the Board, neither of Hill's two reports place any value on developing good relations with the Board or senior staff. Instead, Hill's emphasis is on teachers presenting a united front to trustees and senior staff and on calling for ammunition to use in confrontation. Rather than encourage communications between teachers and Board authorities, Hill calls for teachers to "keep quiet in the presence of the Board and senior staff."

Hill's above speech was given in May, 1973, at the end of her
second term as TFC President. It is useful for illustrating her orientation, but it says nothing about the actions she, Ioma Kerr and the TFC Executive took in the preceding years to make the membership receptive to the above rhetoric. We now turn to examine the events of those two preceding years.

One of the key events of the first year of Hill's reign as President was her joining forces with Ioma Kerr. The story of their coming together is interesting in itself. Although Mary Hill knew Ioma prior to assuming the presidency, she did not, in her own view, know her very well. However, a fairly close working relationship was rapidly established. According to Mary Hill, the first meeting of importance for their future efforts to mobilize TFC members occurred after Ioma had been elected chairman of the EPC for 1971-72. According to Mary Hill,

I called Ioma up and tried to tell her what to do (as chairman of EPC). She hung up and appeared twenty minutes later with a bottle of scotch. We sat down and figured we had nothing to lose. We weren't that happy with our jobs, didn't need the money and that come hell or high water we were going to get teachers decent pay. Then over the bottle of scotch we made a five year plan.34

What was important about this meeting was not the specifics of the plan, but the fact that two key leaders in key leadership positions had made a commitment to mobilizing the teachers.

34. To prevent misunderstanding on the part of any local school officials who may read this, I want to stress that Mary Hill made it clear that neither she nor Ioma Kerr disliked teaching. Their dissatisfaction was with the way teachers were being treated, not with being teachers.
During the first year of Hill's reign a number of steps were taken which laid the groundwork for future militancy. First, a great deal of attention was placed on stirring up membership interest in negotiations and on securing the memberships' support for the negotiating team. Toward this end, Ioma Kerr, who was chief negotiator and chairman of the EPC, made a point of regularly reporting on negotiations to both TFC executive and TFC council. Further, Ioma's committee held meetings in the three CBE areas (East, Central and West) to receive briefs and recommendations from individuals and staffs before putting together a proposal. Unlike previous EPC reports, Ioma's reports contained facts and figures, not just general comments that negotiations were going well or poorly. Communication with the membership regarding negotiations and executive activities was also increased by the use of "cherry letters" (messages printed on cherry coloured paper) which were sent out to all schools to inform teachers of progress in negotiations. Finally, for the first time ever, the EPC presented its contract proposal to the TFC membership for approval at a mass meeting prior to presenting it to the Board.

Mass meetings were to be used a number of times in 1972 and 1973. They were important for increasing teachers' concern, involvement and sense of strength, and also because they afforded both Mary Hill and Ioma Kerr a chance to communicate forcefully and directly with teachers. Put another way, mass meetings provided a setting which was conducive to effective mobilization of the rank-and-file.

Other developments helped increase the Executive's and,
particularly, the President's ability to mobilize the rank-and-file.

In the Fall and Winter of 1974, a number of Executive actions were taken which, when viewed together, can be seen to increase the mobilization potential of TFC leadership. First, the Executive agreed to pay for a phone to be installed and maintained in Mary Hill's classroom. Second, an "in-service" program to provide TFC representatives with a better understanding of their role and how to play it was initiated. Third, arrangements were made for an Executive "road show" in which members of the Executive (as designated by the President) would go out to individual schools to explain the role and function of TFC. Fourth, the Executive gained tighter control over its committees and over communications with the Board. Committees were asked to forward all important communications to the Executive for review and recommendations before forwarding them to the Board. All committee funds were placed under the control of the TFC Treasurer. All Executive members were asked to attend all of one of the committee's meetings in order to provide effective liaison between the Executive and committees.

Finally, all communication to the Director and/or trustees regarding TFC matters was to be directed through the TFC Executive. On top of this, Mary Hill requested and got access to all executive correspondence and took on positions which ensured that she would have a chance to manage direct contact between trustees and teachers (i.e. she served as a

32. Three area meetings were held with representatives in which members of the Executive instructed them of their duties and how to carry them out. Incidentally, Mary Hill attended all three meetings.
member of the Trustee/Teacher Liaison Committee and as one of the TFC's two Board budget observers.

In sum, while negotiations were made a greater focus of attention, the TFC Executive was working to develop more centralized control over the organization and to increase direct communication between the Executive and the rank-and-file.

The actions of leaders created a situation which was more conducive to mobilization than in the past, but mobilization could not occur without an issue strong enough to break teachers' concern with their professional image. Here Hill, Kerr, and other leaders played a key role in developing the issues which could raise teachers' ire.

Negotiations for the 1972-73 agreement began in February, 1972, but there was little "campaigning" by the TFC leadership until after the secondary panel settled for a 4.5% increase in mid-May. Two points were developed as key issues in June. First, and perhaps most emphasized, was the "Board’s refusal to negotiate the salaries of degree elementary teachers". This issue surfaced clearly on June 6, 1972, at a meeting of the Board's and the TFC's negotiating teams. At this meeting the teachers' negotiators asked, "Are categories A1-A4 really cast in concrete?" An affirmative response from Board negotiators brought forth the following statement from the teacher negotiators.

"Then we shall tell the Elementary teachers in those categories that they do not have effective representation at the negotiating table and we were not allowed to speak on their behalf. These minutes become part of TFC records following negotiations, and we want the record to show that the TFC negotiating team strongly objected to this attitude and action on the part of the Board. Our stand shall be conveyed to the teachers." (TFC Minutes of Negotiation, June 6, 1972).
By June 13, the Executive was making plans to communicate the above issue and others to the membership. In a confidential executive meeting Mary Hill presented and secured approval for a detailed action plan for securing the membership's support for taking a hard-line against the board.36

Consistent with the action plan, a mass meeting was held on June 15, at which time the reasons for the breakdown - refusal to negotiate A1 to A4, low offer to principals, low offers to teachers relative to caretakers and the amount budgeted to other areas of the Board's operation - were communicated by Ioma Kerr, with Mary Hill providing the introductory statement to the membership. The Executive and EPC were now working closely in a joint effort to mobilize teachers. The close involvement of the TFC Executive with negotiations was to continue. On June 19, Mary Hill, backed by a demonstration of 800-plus teachers wearing black arm bands (TFC estimate), headed a delegation to speak to the Board regarding salary negotiations. The text of her speech (reproduced below) shows a strong emphasis on the right to negotiate for degreed teachers as well as a concern with obtaining a 6% increase rather than the 4.5% being offered by the Board. Vis-a-vis the right to negotiate for degreed teachers, Hill's speech suggests that she was playing on teachers' feelings of second-class citizenship in raising this issue "We wonder what action this Board and the secondary panel would have taken if the elementary panel had settled first and the secondary panel would not accept the settlement."

36. The details of this plan are provided in Appendix D as Exhibit 3.
A final point worth stressing from Hill's speech pertains to principals. Hill's mention of principals is important because of the key role of principals in mobilizing teachers. By showing a concern with principals' welfare, Hill helped secure their support in future efforts to mobilize teachers.

Mary Hill's Presentation to the Board, June 19, 1972, follows:

I am here as President of the Teachers' Federation of Carleton representing the close to eleven hundred elementary school classroom teachers, principals, vice-principals and consultants employed by this Board. Most of the people I represent are either in the building, or on the street outside, as an indication of their concern over the present situation.

On Tuesday, June 13, 1972, salary and fringe benefit negotiations between the negotiating teams representing the Board and the Teachers' Federation of Carleton were suspended. On Thursday, June 15, 1972, at Algonquin College, an explanation of the suspension and the last Board offer and grid amounting to a 4.5% increase were presented to our teachers. The classroom teachers, principals, vice-principals, and consultants unanimously supported the stand taken by the negotiators and the executive of the Teachers' Federation of Carleton. This followed a 97% vote rejecting a previous Board offer amounting to approximately a 4.1% salary increase.

We believe that at no time this year has this Board been presented with a salary and fringe benefit request that has been unreasonable or unobtainable. Indeed, our original request was for a 7-1/2% increase applied to the grid. At this point, the negotiating team would recommend to the teachers acceptance of a 6% increase applied to the grid.

In view of wage increases in other areas of the economy a 6% increase is quite reasonable. It compares, for example, with the Air Traffic Controllers employed by the Federal Government who received a 15% increase over two years, retroactive, excluding increments. Another comparison can be drawn to the Firefighters of the Township of Nepean who attained a 10% increase in the first year, and a 8% increase in the second year in a two year contract. Finally, it is a lot less than this Board has given its custodial staff.

It may be true that at this point in time this Board's offer is one of the highest in the province on a percentage basis. This should be looked at, however, in light of previous years' experience of lower than average increases. An additional factor is that Ottawa has a higher cost of living index than many places in this province.
As a profession, we feel that it is wrong for this Board or the Public to expect us to subsidize Public Education by accepting low salaries.

Although we are cognizant of the budget difficulties experienced by this Board, in fact, it is driven home to our classroom teachers every day, the Teachers' Federation of Carleton believes that a thorough review of a budget that is less than forty million dollars could produce the required amount to achieve a settlement. This may require an adjusting of priorities but should not cause a raising of the pupil-teacher ratio.

The most disturbing factor, however, and one of the major motives for the Teachers' Federation of Carleton suspending negotiations is this Board's refusal to negotiate for elementary teachers with degrees, in categories A1 to A4.

I would like to refer to Article III "Recognition", Paragraph One of the Salary and Fringe Benefit Agreement between this Board and the local Group of Public Elementary School Teachers Employed by the Board. The Paragraph reads:

"The Board recognizes the Negotiating Committee of the Local Group as the regular and official committee competent to represent all of the elementary teachers employed by the Board and to negotiate on their behalf."

The Teachers' Federation of Carleton states that the Board's refusal to negotiate for categories A1 to A4 is in direct contravention of this paragraph of the Salary and Fringe Benefit Agreement. A1 to A4 represent the categories in which teachers with degrees are placed.

It is not our concern that the Secondary School teachers have settled. Our disagreement is not with our secondary colleagues. They have worked hard to further the cause of education and better the education of our children. We recognize that they have their special needs and problems. But, the teachers in A1 to A4 in the elementary panel must be represented at the negotiating table. It is recognized that the Board places the money on the salary grid where the most teachers benefit. This is an agreeable practice, but will the bulk of our 235 teachers with degrees be at the same place on the grid as the bulk of the Secondary teachers. It is doubtful.

We can understand the Board's reluctance to establish two different grids for the A1 to A4 categories. On the other hand, we are sure that the Board is aware of other situations where one panel has arrived at a settlement higher than that of the other panel and the Board in those circumstances has increased the panel with the lower settlement to the level of the panel with the higher settlement. Indeed, this is what happened in the Ottawa Board last year. The secondary panel settled for a salary increase higher than the elementary panel's settlement.
In that case the settlement for the elementary panel was increased to match the secondary settlement.

We, therefore, do not feel that it is a valid position for this Board to say it cannot negotiate with the members of its elementary panel with degrees because it would produce different salaries between the two panels. If the Board feels such a salary difference is a problem, there is a solution to this problem that has been used in the past: We wonder what action this Board would have taken if the elementary panel had settled first and the secondary panel would not accept the settlement.

We are also concerned with the Board's attitude toward principals' salaries. Our principals are paid substantially lower salaries than the principals in many areas of the province. In fact, the last Board offer for principals' salaries is less than the Ottawa Board of Education is now paying their principals.

The reason for our delegation this evening is to bring to the attention of every Board member the matters which I have outlined which are of universal concern to all of this Board's employees in the elementary panel. We would also like to inform the Board that the Teachers' Federation of Carleton negotiating team is willing to resume negotiations if the Board will instruct its negotiating team to enter into meaningful negotiation with regard to the level of salary increases for the classroom teachers and principals and with regard to the elementary teachers in categories A1 to A4.

Madam Chairman, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to present to the Board the views and the position of the Teachers' Federation of Carleton. [Emphasis mine].

In response to Hill the Chairman of the Board, Louise McIntosh, made two alternate proposals for resuming negotiations.

1. Commence negotiations after July 1st. (i.e. start at the present salary agreement, not the latest Board offer). If by July 15th there is no package which you are prepared to present and recommend to the Teachers' Federation of Carleton, the matter is referred to the Ontario Public School Trustees' Association and the Teachers' provincial federations.

   The conditions of this proposal are:

   a) a 4-1/2 ceiling for the package - the Board will not accept a budgetary deficit: this would mean piercing the ceiling and risking the loss of grants;

   b) The Board will continue to endorse the policy of equal pay for equal qualifications and experience (i.e. will not negotiate for A1 to A4 teachers).
2. A second alternative would be to refer the matter immediately to the Ontario Public School Trustees' Association and the Teachers' provincial federations.
(Special Board Minutes, June 19, 1972.)

As the TFC Executive saw these proposals they were an affront and the Executive immediately organized a "road show" to communicate their displeasure to the membership. In the "road show", schools were assigned Executive members who personally presented teachers with an explanation of the steps that could be pursued in involving the provincial federations in the local negotiations and a standard message from the executive interpreting McIntosh's proposals as ultimatums and calling for solidarity (see below).

As things stand now, the Board's proposals read like ultimatums. Your executive has requested a meeting with the Board to seek clarification. No stone will be left unturned in order to resume meaningful negotiations.

This fight did not begin on June 13th when negotiations stopped. It began when the Board placed teachers' needs as a low priority item. Teachers of Carleton have always been reasonable - we are reasonable now.

This year the Board has offered a raise equal to 4.5% to be spread among 1,090 teachers. If we accept that offer, we are tying our own hands for next year. For 1973, the Board has budgeted the same amount of money for teachers' raises to be spread over more teachers with higher qualifications and more experience, resulting in a lower percentage for next year. We must make our stand this year.

A formal response to McIntosh's proposals was presented to the Board by Mary Hill at a private meeting of the Board and TFC representatives (i.e., Mary Hill and the negotiating team) on June 27. The gist of Hill's comments was that the Board had affronted the teachers by proposing that negotiations resume from scratch - no recognition of previous areas of agreement, by imposing "arbitrary time limits which
make ratification impossible by our teachers" and by refusing to negotiate either the total increase or the salaries of A1 to A4 teaches. Further, it was stated that...

The two ultimatums seem to indicate this Board's desire to negotiate with anyone else but its elementary teachers. This is, of course, the most serious ramification of the entire matter. The teachers elected and support their negotiating team and will continue to do so.

The point here was that both of McIntosh's proposals ultimately led to negotiations being turned over to the provincial federations. The first proposal allowed for continuing negotiations with the local group so long as no change was made in the percentage increase, or in the A1 to A4 teachers' salaries. In other words, the Board was prepared to negotiate with the local group only if the key issues were not negotiated. Failure of the local group to accept this would result in turning over negotiations to the provincial federations. On the other hand, key issues might be negotiated if the second proposal of immediately turning over negotiations to the provincial federations was accepted, in that no conditions were attached to the second proposal.

Ultimately, the TFC decided to keep negotiations in its own hands. The Board agreed to negotiate from its latest offer rather than start from scratch, but did not agree to alter the conditions contained in McIntosh's proposal. Since this concession did not allow the teachers to make any progress in negotiating key issues, it is somewhat surprising that they agreed to return to the bargaining table. What appears to have been going on was that the TFC was attempting to buy time. In its counterproposal the TFC requested that negotiations
resume in the second week of July and continue for a minimum of four weeks. While the Board saw no reason for a minimum time limit, it did not require its negotiating team to report back to the Board until August 14. The TFC leadership apparently needed time for two reasons. First, with the teachers on summer holidays it would be hard to use the membership to bring pressure on the Board. If negotiations could be stalled long enough, the local negotiators would still have control over negotiations when the teachers returned. Second, in line with the strategy enunciated at the confidential Executive meeting of June 13, time was needed to investigate the best way of involving the provincial federations and the possible use of work-to-rule in the Fall.

As might be expected, given the Board's conditions regarding the percentage increase and degree teachers, summer negotiation proved fruitless. On August 21, the Board called in the OPSTA to negotiate for the Board and so informed the TFC. This left TFC with the question of deciding whether to attempt to continue their efforts to mobilize the troops and retain control over negotiations, or turn negotiations over to the provincial federations. In September, it appeared that the local membership was still flirting with the idea of going it alone and bringing local pressure to bear on the Board. At the first Council meeting on September 7, Mary Hill attempted to rekindle the fire, which had been started in June, by calling on the membership to take a more
aggressive stance toward the Board. 33

Ladies and gentlemen, let's stop 'pussyfooting' around! Let's stop having our salary agreement tampered with by administration! Let's not accept a salary agreement which fails to reflect the rising cost of living! Let's not acquiesce in unfair decisions by those people at Thorncliffe! [the Board office] Let us fight for a guaranteed pupil-ratio that is acceptable and for planning time.

How? Last year our teachers started to show that they care about our profession, that they will resist, that they have come of age. The rest of the province is not ready - we know that. The provincial meetings I attended this summer have demonstrated to me that TFC is in the forefront of our profession. We have led the way before and we should not now be afraid of continuing that type of leadership. (Appendix B to TFC Council Minutes of Sept 7, 1972).

In a further attempt to stir the embers, the TFC Executive called a mass meeting for September 18, 1972, to hear a report from the EPC and to vote on the latest Board offer. Another "road show" was staged prior to the mass meeting to increase interest and attendance.

Part of the purpose of the meeting was also to lay the groundwork for the provincial federations taking over negotiations as the ballot to be

33. In addition to calling for teachers to take a more aggressive stance, Hill enjoined the members to contact her personally to deal with their problems. Such personal assistance would provide strong reciprocal support for the President in the months to come.

"Advise your school staffs to telephone me or any other Executive member when information, assistance or action is desired. I implore you to inform your staff of the need to contact me if there occurs a problem with Special leave, Maternity leave or any other matter connected with our salary agreement. If a teacher has a problem with his or her own contract, principal, fellow teachers, area superintendent or whoever (husbands and wives excepted) tell them to tell me. I often do not myself know the answer to problems. I always know someone who does. Do not be alone in worrying about professional problems. There is someone who knows how to help and keep their mouths shut."
utilized tied rejection of the Board offer to the authorization "... of
the Executive of TFC to take further legal steps they deemed necessary
including Step 3." (This neatly forced the membership to give the
local executive significant independent power, or to accept an
"unacceptable" Board offer). In addition, the executive assistants of
FW and OPS were invited to attend the meeting as a necessary prepara-
tory step toward provincial takeover.

Turning over negotiations to the provincial federations was not
likely to be viewed with happiness by the TFC leadership. Apart from
the fact that FW had shown no particular fondness for TFC, there was
the fact that local leaders felt fettered by the control and conserva-
tivism of the provincial organizations. (Here it is interesting to note
that when I asked one of the Board's administrative staff why the Board
wanted the provincial federations to take over from the TFC I was told,
"Because they weren't as militant as TFC"). The policies of the provin-
cial federations appear to have been designed to prevent any local
group from initiating a serious sanction. This is made clear by Ioma
Kerr's report to the Executive on September 6, 1972. During August,
Ioma had investigated the use of work-to-rule as a sanction. In
contacting the Toronto offices of the provincial federations she was
told:

1. Work-to-rule is not appropriate as Step 2 [i.e., when the
   local group is still in control of negotiations and provincial
   federations merely advise].

2. It is not appropriate at Step 3 unless sanctioned by the
   Joint Executive of FW and OPS [Joint provincial Executives]
   that
   is].
3. We can only go to step 3 by mutual agreement of teachers and joint Executives.

4. If we decide to go it on our own and we get into trouble we can expect no help from either Federation - in fact, we will probably not only be in trouble with the Board and legislation, but also with the Federations (Executive Minutes, Sept. 6, 1972).

For militant local leaders such as Hill and Kerr, who felt more militant action had to be taken, the provincial federations presented a road-block that had to be removed before serious local action could take place. While the TFC did turn negotiations over to the provincial federations in October, local leaders did not give up on militant action; they merely took some time to work on removing the provincial roadblock. Indeed, several informants suggested that turning over negotiations to the provincial federations was part of a strategy for weakening the restraining influence of the provincial federations. It was suggested that the local leadership knew that the Board would not, or could not, budge significantly on the key issues. Thus, when the TFC handed over responsibility to the provincial federations, they handed over a lost cause. Failure of FW or QPS to do any better than the local group would help convince local teachers that the big brothers and sisters in Toronto were no more skilled or powerful than their local negotiators, and would lend support to Mary Hill's claim that TFC was ahead of the rest of the province and should provide leadership.

Whether or not the above was consciously planned (I am inclined to believe that it was from my discussion with leaders), the result was as predicted - the provincial federations failed to get any significant
concessions from the Board. On January 15, seven days after the provincial federations notified TFC that they had been unable to reach an agreement for Carleton teachers, Mary Hill made a speech to TFC Council which was clearly aimed at undermining the provincial federations' credibility with local teachers. In her speech the following points were made:

1. The provincial federations had not kept the local negotiating team or TFC Executive informed of the course of negotiations. [FW and OPS had not ever responded to registered letters from Ioma Kerr requesting that Carleton teachers be kept informed nor did they consult the TFC Executive before calling a mass meeting of Carleton teachers on January 8].

2. The provincial federations misrepresented their own achievements at the mass meeting they called. "In spite of what was said at the meeting, the Teachers' Federation of Carleton did not request the Provincial Federations to conduct Step 2 negotiations. Miss Kay Dyson and Mr. Stan Hood attended a negotiating session with the TFC negotiators. It was their decision to attend even though the TFC negotiators insisted they be observers only."

The Board, and only the Board, was at Step 2.

The total percentage for the Elementary panel salary package was 4.51%. The 4.71% used by the Provincial Federation was for the teachers' grid only and does not include principals or any allowances. In June the total package was 4.5% and at the time of turning over our negotiations at Step 3 was 4.51% and the final package as you are being paid now is 4.5% (Council Minutes, Jan. 15, 1973).

Although it does not bear on the TFC leadership's effort to wean teachers from dependence on the provincial federations, there is another point in Hill's speech which should be mentioned. This is her explanation of the function of threats. On January 11, 1973, Mary Hill was quoted in the press as saying that teachers might mass resign on May 31. Apparently a number of members were fairly upset with this.
threat. Hill's explanation of the function of the threat reveals a clear view of the Board as an adversary who the teachers have the right to manipulate in any way possible. In addition, the fact that the threat was made without prior discussion by the membership shows Hill's aggressiveness in leading the TFC.

"Many of the teachers were concerned last Thursday when they heard through the news media that the Carleton teachers were 'considering' mass resignation. You must remember press releases are used for various reasons, none of which are to report to teachers. We will continue to use the cherry paper and the TFC reps. for that purpose.

The intent of such press statements is to alarm the Board and the Public. Apparently, a settlement with the elementary teachers is not of grave concern to the Board or its electors. It appears to the Executive that a stronger position, made known through the press is necessary. If this is not the wish of the membership we await your direction. (excerpt from "The President's Report on behalf of the Executive of the TFC", January 15, 1973).

The leadership of TFC did not rely on the failure of OPS and FW to secure an agreement as the only means of shucking off their restraining influence. Two other strategies were pursued in 1972-73. First, local leadership made an effort to radicalize the provincial federations. In the Fall of 1972, the Reveille Report came out carrying recommendations which would, in the view of teachers, considerably reduce their strength in negotiating with boards. In particular, the Report recommended that teachers be denied the right to strike. The TFC Executive created an ad hoc committee to respond to the Report and an effort was made to get the provincial federations to come out strongly in favour of the right to strike. Further, in the summer of 1972, Mary Hill became the first female member of OPS and
spent a great deal of time talking to provincial leaders in both OPS and FW in an effort to get them to support more militant action (and amalgamation). TFC also tried to strengthen its contacts and form alliances with other locals (such as Toronto and Peel) in order to bring pressure to bear on the provincial federations to support more aggressive local action.

The second strategy for removing the block to militancy posed by the provincial federation lay in developing independent resources. Here Mary Hill's husband, David Hill, was of key importance. David Hill was a young lawyer who had previously worked for the Ottawa Citizen. In the spring of 1971, his firm had prepared a brief on the legality of work-to-rule for the TFC, and in 1972, he is referred to as the TFC's associate lawyer, in TFC Council Minutes. His importance lay both in the legal knowledge he could supply, and in his knowledge of the media. Through David Hill the TFC was no longer dependent on the provincial federations for legal advice or for help in utilizing the media. (David Hill reportedly checked all TFC newsreleases for libel).

In addition to securing David Hill as a resource, the TFC Executive used its power to create ad hoc committees to supply itself with knowledge. Following the provincial affiliates' failure to reach an agreement with the CBE in January, the TFC struck a committee to investigate the manner in which the following course of action could be carried out: work-to-rule, study sessions, strike, booking in sick, mass resignation, withdrawal from all Board committees (Council Minutes of January 15, 1973).
Equally, if not more important in increasing TFC's independence, the Executive succeeded in getting the following motion passed by Council "... that Council approve by a staff vote a levy of $2.00 per month for each teacher beginning Jan., 1973. The monies received would be placed in a 'War Chest' for the exclusive use of the Economic Policy Committee" (Council Minutes, January 15, 1973). The levy was approved by a staff vote and by May, there was $5,176 in the special fund to be used by the new EPC headed by Bud Beach.34 This fund was to continue to grow such that, by January 1974, a total of $13,582 had been received from teachers. Without this special fund, TFC would have been financially vulnerable to the provincial federations since their funding through fee rebates could have been stopped by the provincial federations if local action were deemed improper.

It is important to note that teachers' willingness to contribute to the "War Chest" did not mean that they were ready to take militant action. The message that EPC was giving teachers in the Spring of 1973 was that they wanted to use arbitration as means of settling with the Board. As Beach explained it to teachers, the "War Chest's" function was to make the Board realize the TFC was serious about arbitration. (Arbitration would require expenditures by TFC). Had the leadership clearly sold the idea of the "War Chest" as a step toward stronger sanctions, it is questionable whether it would have received staff support.

34. In fact Beach became chairman of EPC in the Fall of 1972. However, because the previous year's negotiations were not completed, Iona retained responsibility for negotiations until a complete breakdown occurred in January, 1973.
One other development in 1972-73, which affected leadership's ability to lead the teachers to militancy, remains to be mentioned. This is that Mary Hill, Ioma Kerr, and the Executive continued to increase their control over communication between the Board and the teachers. Hill remained the TFC's budget observer and a member of the Trustee/Teacher Liaison Committee. Two new committees which brought trustees, administrators, and teachers face-to-face - the Quality Learning Committee (concerned with working conditions) and the committee to investigate overlap in elementary and secondary negotiations - contained both Mary Hill and Ioma Kerr as teacher representatives. Thus, both key leaders were in key positions to filter and interpret Board actions and attitudes to the TFC membership.

In sum, as the spring of 1973 rolled around, TFC leadership had managed to increase TFC's ability to take independent action by amassing independent resources and had also gained fairly strong control over Board/teacher communications.

Rather than continue negotiations for a 1972-73 salary agreement, the EPC began negotiating for a 1973-74 agreement in April, 1973. The EPC's proposal had been ratified at a mass meeting of teachers in February. This year the EPC, armed with a "War Chest" and David Hill's legal advice, initially aimed at using binding arbitration to reach an agreement. Although the Board refused to agree to binding arbitration, negotiations caused little stir in the Spring, although EPC continued to report regularly to both the Executive and to Council. The relative quiet surrounding negotiations did not stop the TFC
Executive from reminding the teachers of their discontents. In April, Mary Hill put forth a press release, in response to the Board's budget, which criticized the Board for raising the PTR, cutting supply teacher days, and generally taking funds away from "... the things directly connected with the educational process" (TFC press release, April 11, 1973). Later at the annual meeting/dinner, Hill made her strongly worded speech (cited earlier), calling for teachers to close ranks.

In June a new TFC Executive was in office with Ioma Kerr as President and Mary Hill as Past President. Meanwhile Bud Beach, who had worked with Ioma Kerr in attempting to negotiate the agreement for 1972-73, was still chairman of EPC. As in the previous year, each Executive officer was assigned a TFC committee to liaise with - Ioma Kerr liaising with the Counselling and Relations Committee which handled teachers' complaints and personal calls for help. In addition, Executive officers were assigned to be observers of all of the Board's standing committees.35

The Executive's concern through the summer focused heavily on a grievance case brought to the Executive by Mary Hill. Hill's call for

35. Ioma, like Mary Hill before her, was concerned that the Executive control the flow of information between the Board and TFC committees and that the Executive be on top of TFC committee activities. Thus in a June 20, 1973, meeting with all committee chairmen, she reminded the chairmen of the following points:
a) Committees are responsible to the Executive and Council;
b) Executive members, acting in liaison capacity, should be made welcome, active members of committees;
c) No Committee may go to the Board without going through the Executive; the same applies for going to Administration" (Executive Minutes, June 20, 1973).
sticks and stones to throw at the Board, coupled with her plea for teachers to seek her aid, had resulted in the Executive obtaining a case where legal action could be taken against the Board over an alleged violation of the collective agreement. Basically, the argument boiled down to whether a clause in the 1971-72 agreement should be interpreted as giving the principals the independent power to grant three days of paid special leave. The TFC Executive felt that the clause did give this power to principals, and that, the recent refusal of one of the superintendents (acting in the name of the director) to allow a teacher to be paid for special leave approved by a principal, was a violation of the collective agreement. When the Board, on a motion by Dakin, supported the Director's right to withhold special leave, the TFC Executive called in David Hill's firm to supply legal advice. On July 31, the Executive unanimously voted in favour of hiring Hill's firm to take legal action against the Board.

With the emergence of this law suit, the leadership had another issue to add to those already accumulated - the validity of their collective agreement. Not only could the Board be seen to put low interest in negotiating with elementary teachers (as evidenced by its previous refusal to negotiate degreeed teachers' salaries, the preference to settle with the secondary teachers panel first, and its "harmful" budgeting), it was now also seen to disregard agreements it had authorized with the elementary group. When the teachers returned in September, Ioma Kerr brought this last point home by citing three examples of where the Board had breached the collective agreement
The special leave case served to rekindle feelings of second-class citizenship and may have helped reinforce principals' support of TFC, In that part of what was at issue was the principals' autonomy.

While the TFC Executive was using the special leave issue to stir teacher discontent, the negotiating team focused on the failure of increases in teachers' salaries to keep pace with inflation. This issue did not arise without the Executive's knowledge, as the policy of EPC in negotiating for the 1973-74 agreement was not to indicate even tentative agreement on any items under negotiation without first consulting the TFC Executive. The issue of inflation became clearly visible in the June 9, 1973, Board/teacher negotiating session.

The teachers expressed some reservations that the average of the increase, approximately 4.75% did not match the increase in the cost of living, as in the teachers' view the increase last year also did not match the cost of living, and it was felt the teachers would reject the proposal" (Board Minutes, June 9, 1973).

At the next negotiating session, on June 14, the teachers' negotiating team informed the Board negotiators "... that the minimum increase that could be recommended to the teachers would be based on the June 15, Dominion Bureau of Statistics cost of living Index" (Board Minutes, June 15, 1973). In contrast to the "cast in concrete" stance of the previous year, the Board and its negotiating team made an effort to increase the total monies available for elementary teachers' salary increases by cutting back in other areas. On June 21, the Chairman of the Board's negotiating team reported to TFC negotiators that "The Board has agreed to an additional allocation to increase the elementary
teachers' package to 5.5%" (i.e. the increase in the cost of living over the previous year to June). On June 23, negotiations ceased for the summer on the understanding that they would resume again in September.

As matters stood at the end of June, it appeared that the major issue of keeping up with inflation was close to resolve. However, when negotiations resumed in September, the Board received an unwelcome message. On September 13, the Board presented teachers with a new offer which included a 5.5% increase and other adjustments in line with teachers' previous proposals (including a higher maximum for A1 to A4 teachers than had been won by secondary teachers). The teachers' negotiating team agreed to take the offer to the teachers for a vote, but they made it clear that rejection was likely, because of the "progressive trend in inflation, particularly over the summer months" and because the Ministry of Education had increased the ceilings for 1974. In other words, teachers now wanted a percentage increase which would take the rise in the cost-of-living during the summer into account.

The Board's offer was presented to teachers at a mass meeting on October 1 and rejected the following day by a vote in the schools. Of the 1074 teachers who voted, 74.6% voted for rejection - a rather low percentage compared to previous years. It is hard not to feel that leadership played a significant role in this rejection and in the mass resignation which followed later. The Board, for the first time, had agreed to negotiate the salaries of degreed teachers and also, for the
first time, had increased its initial allocation for teachers' salaries. Beach, the chairman of the TFC negotiating team, argued that an additional increase of about 2.5% was now needed in January to keep pace with the escalating cost-of-living (later the Executive was to set this "needed increase" at 2.91%). Whether this argument alone was sufficient to obtain a rejection is open to question. Beach's stress on inflation was accompanied by Ioma Kerr's emphasis on breaches of the collective agreement. Ioma continued this emphasis following the vote on the Board offer by citing a new "breach of contract" regarding federation fee deductions.

It is impossible to say exactly how much influence leadership had in maintaining and creating discontent for the mass resignation in November, but the low rejection rate, and the fact that the Board gave way on a number of previously non-negotiable items, leads one to believe leadership's influence was necessary to stir discontent. In particular, the influence of Beach and Ioma Kerr appears to have been important. As one respondent put it:

Ioma and Bud built up the feelings and fanned the flames, a one-two barrage at each Council meeting until the issue was formed. Any issue would have done. They would have gone out, no matter what the issue. Leadership emphasized the general - you're not being treated well - rather than specific issues."

To some extent the influence of local leadership in stirring discontent can be seen in the results of a survey conducted, in October, by the TFC "to gauge the attitude of all teachers toward alternatives to continued negotiations." The results of this survey are shown in Table 77. While significant proportions of the membership were willing
Table 77: Responses to the TFC Summary on Tactics, October, 1973.

If the present unsatisfactory salary negotiations continue, in what action are you willing to participate in order to influence the Carleton Board to present an acceptable salary package or accept binding arbitration? Please answer every question.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Would you go on strike for an indefinite period?

2. Would you walk out for up to two days?

3. Would you participate in a study session for 1/2 day or less?

4. Would you participate in a study session on a day set aside for Professional Development Activities?

5. Would you resign on November 30, 1973?

6. Would you call in sick on a designated day?

7. Would you withdraw voluntary services - i.e.: extra curricular sports, Christmas concerts, Meet the Teacher, Open House, Drama Clubs, etc.?

8. Would you withdraw from all Board Committees?

9. Would you support financially a massive public campaign for settlement - i.e.: radio, TV., newspapers?

10. Would you participate in a massive demonstration at the Board Office?

11. Would you write letters to Board members outlining your views on Salary matters?
to take fairly strong action, the important point is that only 30.2% of the teachers were willing to resign. Yet, by November 30, over 80% of the teachers did hand in resignations.

We have two sources of information to provide clues as to what happened in October and November to lead teachers to mass resign—TFC Executive Minutes and interviews with TFC leaders.

The minutes show a high level of mobilizing activity by the TFC Executive. As early as October 17, the Executive was planning courses of action in the event that the Board failed to agree to the teachers' minimally acceptable demand for salary increases of 5.5% for September to December, and 2.91% for January to June. Meeting at least once a week, the executive planned a PR campaign (including bumper stickers, buttons, newspaper, radio, and television ads, appearances on talk shows) to cost up to $5,000 and to be put in motion upon a breakdown in negotiations. Planning involved more than simply listing ideas; the costing and content of publicity was planned in detail. In addition, sample letters were written for teachers to use to communicate their concern and displeasure to politicians, trustees, administrators and the provincial federations. Cherry letters were sent out to keep up membership concern, and an effort was made to secure the support of new (probationary) teachers who would be most vulnerable in the event of any militant action, by calling them to a special dinner meeting with Executive members to explain the TFC and the new teachers' obligations as members. After much preparatory work had been done, the Executive
called a mass meeting to vote on the following motion.\textsuperscript{36}

All members of the Teachers' Federation of Carleton employed by the Carleton Board of Education shall submit their resignations effective January 1, 1974, to the President of the Teachers' Federation of Carleton on or before November 26, 1973, and the President of the Teachers' Federation of Carleton will deliver these resignations to the Carleton Board of Education on November 30, 1973, if:

(a) there is no satisfactory salary settlement or the Carleton Board of Education will not submit all items in dispute to binding arbitration; and
(b) 80% of the members of Teachers' Federation of Carleton have submitted their resignations as aforesaid.

The Carleton teachers passed the above motion on November 15, 1973, and put the process of obtaining mass resignations in gear. At the meeting, all of the Executive handed in their resignations as a stimulus to the membership. From this point on the main concern of the Executive was with getting 80% of the teachers to resign. To this end, an Executive "road show" was staged, the rate of resignation was monitored on a school by school basis to allow the Executive to focus on hesitant staffs, a meeting was held with principals to explain their role in the mass resignation and cherry letters were sent out telling teachers of the positive consequences of their decision to resign (e.g., the Board had rewritten the special leave clause to show principals' right to make this decision and the Board had agreed to mediation) and to encourage further resignations.

The flavour of the times and mobilizing issues are revealed to some extent in the following standard "road show" message.

\textsuperscript{36} A single Executive meeting was devoted almost entirely to planning this mass meeting.
The Executive wishes to thank all of you who have supported the motion passed November 15. Although it has been a very difficult decision for you, you have presented the Board with a very hard line, a line they can hardly refuse to recognize. Already, the number of mass resignations has caused the Board to pay more serious attention to our views and requests. November 20, your President and your Chief Negotiator held a meeting with the Chairman of the Board and the Board's Chief Negotiator. The meeting covered more ground and was more positive than any negotiating meeting over the past two years. The Board's people showed a willingness to co-operate. They mentioned the mass resignations a number of times, they expressed concern and they were reasonable. This meeting followed within 24 hours an approach to our lawyers by the Board's lawyers to settle the Court Action. We're not there yet but we're much closer now.

You people, by your action are going to see results. You are going to bring attention to your problems. At last. Some Boards in Ontario have already agreed to 8.5%. It is not a pipe dream.

Wednesday, November 21, a highly important meeting was held with our friends in O.E.C.T.A. They reported that their teachers had unanimously supported mass resignation. They expect 100% of the resignations will be submitted. They think that 100% of our teachers will join them in a massive campaign to bring the concerns to the attention of our Boards, the Government and the Parents.

An excellent P.R. campaign has been organized by a hard-working group - newspaper ads for every newspaper, radio ads, buttons and bumper stickers are on the way next week.

Some have decided not to resign. We need every single person's commitment, both to their fellow teachers and themselves. Unfortunately a few (a minority) may dictate to the majority. We must somehow point out to each of these people that we have tried to reach a fair settlement in every possible way. Last year we tried the Step 1, 2, 3. It didn't work. We have written letters, demonstrated at the Board office and voted innumerable salary offers down. Now we have to take this step. With our fellow teachers in Carleton we have to stick together. If we fail to bring in the 80% of the resignation, and we may, there is no possibility of a settlement. We will have to accept what the Board deems fit and proper. They will know that we have no power, no fraternity, no teeth.

I quote from an article by the President of the Nation Education Association, Dr. Helen Wise of the United States.
"History shows us that most of the improvements in the teaching profession have come about because teachers have fought for them. That teachers have not done better up to now has been the result of an ineffective power base."

Every teacher, consultant, vice-principal and principal "must convince the public that it is very right and very professional for teachers and teacher organizations to stand up for what is best for education and the children they teach. In fact, it is our conviction that to do otherwise is unprofessional.

80% will be effective. 100% will show that we are together and will remain together.

All of you have received a letter from F.W.T.A.O. or O.P.S.M.T.F. You will remember we are amalgamated, we recognize the hazards but we also realize that we have the strongest local group in the province.

Many of you have questions. I would like to answer any I can. If I can't, I will see that you receive an answer by tomorrow.

Also, don't forget the "Special Fund". If ever it was needed, it is now! If you haven't paid up your commitment do it now.

The message emphasized the general problem of getting the Board to take elementary teachers seriously and identifies teacher solidarity and militant action as the only effective means of achieving this. It is interesting to note that the Executive steered clear of stating specific discontents and emphasized the general problem of getting good treatment from the Board and standing up for what is best for education. As was said in the discussion of ideology in Chapter III, the ideal ideology is non-falsifiable. By treating the failure to get raises in line with the cost-of-living, and other issues, as symptomatic of a more general problem - second-class citizenship - the Executive prevented the Board from defusing militancy by making concessions on specific issues.

Whatever the effect of "road shows" and other Executive actions,
respondents suggested that one key to getting 80% of the teachers to resign lay in the use of "union hall" tactics at mass meetings. In particular, respondents made reference to the mass meeting of November 15. By all accounts this meeting was a highly emotional affair with school staffs sitting together for roll call, waving placards, and the air punctuated with calls to "Give Iona her 80%". But, according to at least three respondents the key to getting the resignations came when "an old war horse who no one thought would ever resign" handed in her resignation. After this resignation, others began to flow. Several respondents, who were on the Executive at the time, suggested that the "old war horse's" resignation was not accidental. Indeed, one of the key leaders of the time wryly told me that it was not above him/her to orchestrate such a thing.

No matter how well the mass meeting was managed (or manipulated), it could not result in getting resignations from those who did not attend it. Here respondents generally agreed that principals played an important role in getting reluctant and apathetic teachers to resign.

Despite all their efforts, on November 28, the leadership found themselves 50 resignations short of the 80% they had set as the minimum for the mass resignation to be put in effect. This put the Executive in a real bind, as November 30 was the last day teachers could legally serve notice of their intention to resign at the end of the fall term. The Executive's response to this bind was to plan a mass meeting for the following day, in hopes that the necessary 50 resignations could be
obtained at or before the meeting. Toward this end,

The Executive agreed to phone their contact schools telling them:
1) of the mass meeting - 4:30 p.m. at Sir Robert Borden
2) that mediation was unsuccessful and will be explained at the mass meeting
3) that we are 50 resignations short of 80%; we have 846 resignations in
4) resignations will be accepted anytime up to the adjournment of the meeting; if necessary, someone can pick them up.

Specific schools where problems exist were discussed briefly and special contact schools were assigned. (Executive Minutes, November 28, 1973).

By the time of the meeting, 23 resignations were still needed to achieve the 80% mark. The solution to this problem was found to lie in selecting the right denominator for calculating the 80%. Ioma Kerr informed the meeting that the CBE calculated there to be 1080 TFC members, while the TFC determined the size of its membership to be 1117. On a motion from the floor, it was decided to use the CBE's figure which resulted in the percentage of teachers who had handed in resignations surpassing 80%. On the following day Mary Hill, Ioma Kerr, and Bud Beach took the resignations, en masse, to the Board office and the sanction was underway.

The provincial federations did not stand idle as the mobilization took place. Indeed, they engaged in active interference with the TFC's action. Late in October, the FW directors once again announced their intention to investigate the constitutionality of the Carleton women teachers' fee dispersal. Later, on November 21, all Carleton teachers received letters from their provincial federations warning them that mass resignation was a serious matter and suggesting that
they contact the provincial office for advice and counsel. On the following day, the message was even clearer. Both OPS and FW communicated to the TFC "... that no support could be given to mass resignations in Carleton, since the Provincial Executives were not involved or invited to become involved in the situation." (Letters from Mary Hesser and Wilb Smalley to Ioma Kerr). This meant that OPS and FW would not provide funds and would not attempt to stop the CBE from hiring teachers to replace those who had resigned in Carleton. In sum then, the TFC leadership had to fight off the conservative influence of the provincial federations in order to mobilize Carleton teachers. Here their attempts to discredit FW and OPS, in the previous year, paid dividends.

The mass resignation marked the successful emergence of a new TFC from that which had existed under Kay Stanley. Any hope that the Board would benevolently guard the interests of teachers had been crushed by the conflicts of 1973-74. From this point on, it would be the TFC, not trustees, superintendents, principals, or the provincial federations that teachers would rely on to protect their interests.

D. Conclusion

The development of a militant elementary teachers' group in Carleton took place over a number of years and was influenced by all of the factors in our theoretical framework. However, one factor - leadership - appears to have been key to the development of militancy.

Militant leaders, such as Mary Hill and Ioma Kerr, consciously
worked to increase the strength and militancy of the TFC. Their efforts were aided by the organizational structure of the TFC and by the membership loyalty that had been built up in the Stanley/Linnen era. But Hill, Kerr, and others played an active role in securing the rank-and-file's support for the TFC and for themselves. By taking on the role of personally protecting individual teachers from principals, superintendents and others, Mary Hill secured the personal loyalty of a number of teachers. By skillful use of mass meetings, cherry letters, press releases, road shows, etc., leaders increased the visibility of the TFC as the representative of all teachers and encouraged rank-and-file support for the organization. Leaders of the Hill/Kerr era not only increased visibility and loyalty, they also convinced the rank-and-file of their competence as leaders. Here, David Hill was important. According to a number of informants the ability of leaders to provide legal opinions on issues and proposed actions, via David Hill, increased teachers' faith in their leaders. Also important in building a positive view of TFC leaders' competence was the leadership's own work to discredit FW and OPS in the 1972-73 negotiations. In sum, TFC leaders took a number of actions to secure their own legitimacy with the rank-and-file and, to this extent, were makers of their own destiny.

At the same time that militant leaders worked to secure their positions as leaders, they made a number of important changes in the organization of the TFC. First, both Hill and Kerr increased the flow of communication between EPC and the TFC Executive, thus ensuring that
the Executive would be in a position to act in support of EPC efforts at the bargaining table. Second, various devices such as mass meetings and cherry letters were developed to keep the membership involved in TFC activities and negotiations. Third, both Hill and Kerr made a number of successful efforts to control the flow of information between the Board and its elementary teachers. Taken together, these steps made it possible for 'leadership to create and focus teachers' discontent.

Over several years, Hill, Kerr, and others worked to define the situation of Carleton teachers as one of second-class citizenship. The fact that the Board appeared to prefer to settle with secondary teachers before elementary teachers, the Board's unwillingness to negotiate the salaries of degree elementary teachers, the Board's failure to respect the collective agreement, the Board's impugned preference to negotiate with FW and OPS rather than local leaders, the presence of ex-secondary teachers in key superintendencies, the failure to provide a salary offer which matched the rise in the cost-of-living, all these items and more were cited as evidence of the Board's low regard for its elementary teachers. At the same time that leadership built the view of second-class citizenship, they attempted to stir a sense of mission within the elementary group - the mission of amalgamation. While the ideology of amalgamation primarily helped TFC solidarity, it may have contributed to militancy as well. Because the Carleton teachers were amalgamated, and because they wanted to spread amalgamation, they had something to prove; namely, that elementary
teachers in a unified local federation could achieve goals that other elementary groups could not achieve. The TFC's development of "Pack-aged Professionalism" and of their own cable television show are reflections of this effort to prove amalgamation worked, but so too was the mass resignation and the action to take the Board to court over the interpretation of the collective agreement.

Leaders' efforts to stir feelings were capped by the sheer time and energy they put into mobilizing teachers. Judging from the range of activities reported in Executive minutes of the TFC, it appears that a number of leaders had no life outside of TFC in the early 1970's.

To say that leadership was key to the development of militancy is not to deny the importance of other factors in the TFC's evolution. Certainly, it is doubtful that the Carleton group would have moved to militancy without men and women being amalgamated in one local organization. However, local amalgamation did not necessitate militancy. An amalgamated group could channel its resources into the pursuit of professional development or some other activities, as easily as into combat with the Board. Increased discontent also played a role in the development of militancy, but not discontent stemming directly from changing objective conditions. In the case of the TFC, objective conditions were given discontent-generating-meaning through the interpretations provided by leaders. Leaders' success in getting their interpretations to be accepted depended less on how well they fit with the "facts" than on leadership's ability to monopolize effective communications channels to teachers. (As will be recalled, in the
Hill/Kerr era all communications from teachers and TFC committees which concerned TFC interests came to be channelled through the TFC Executive. In order to understand why the TFC leadership was able to monopolize communication to teachers, it is necessary to discuss social control.

As a key factor in the rise of TFC militancy, the failure of social control is second only to leadership. The main argument here is simply that the changes which occurred in the composition and power of CBE trustees and top administrators, coupled with the failure of the Board to effectively co-opt elementary principals, weakened the Board's ability to use persuasion as a means of controlling elementary teachers. More to the point, the Board lost the means to effectively interpret its actions to teachers in a way to counter the interpretations provided by militant leaders. As the next chapter will suggest, the failure to co-opt principals to serve as opinion-setters for the Board was probably more critical for the failure of social control than changes in trustees and top administrators. In the Carleton case, principals did not simply fail to serve as go-betweens for the Board; they actively supported the efforts to mobilize teachers and provided female leaders with the time and resources to take on leadership roles.
Chapter VI

THE COOL CATS: THE OTTAWA ELEMENTARY TEACHERS

I. NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR

The behavior of the Ottawa elementary teachers provides an interesting contrast to that of Carleton elementary teachers. As one Ottawa Board of Education (OBE) superintendent referred to them in 1977, the Ottawa elementary teachers had been "Cool Cats". Rather than become embroiled in conflict with the Board, the OBE elementary teachers chose to ride the coat tails of their secondary counterparts throughout the early seventies. In negotiating for both their 1970-71 and 1971-72 agreements, they negotiated only for non-degreed teachers. Degreed teachers were paid on the grid won by secondary teachers. This situation held true even when elementary teachers settled before secondary teachers. When this occurred degreed elementary teachers' salaries were simply adjusted to match what the secondary teachers later achieved.

Negotiations for 1972-73 saw an apparent end to coattailing, as elementary teachers negotiated for all of their membership and reached agreement prior to the secondary group. Unlike the Carleton Board, the Ottawa Board made no serious effort to prevent the elementary negotiating team from bargaining for degreed teachers. At the risk of being cynical, one might suggest that the Board welcomed, if not
encouraged, the elementary negotiators to bargain for degreed teachers. When the elementary teachers settled, the secondary panel had been working-to-rule for almost three months to back up their salary demands. By settling for less than the secondary teachers were demanding, the elementary group clearly undercut the secondary group’s bargaining position.

This departure from coattailing was only temporary, as negotiations for a 1974 agreement saw the secondary panel settle first, with the elementary panel obtaining a virtually identical grid for their degreed teachers a few weeks later.¹

Throughout these first four sets of negotiations the main issue of contention reported was always salary. The most severe action taken by the Ottawa group was in negotiating for a 1974 agreement. In this case, the provincial federations were called in to negotiate for the local group and reached an agreement in a few days. Here it is noteworthy that only 600 of the more than 1000 elementary teachers turned out to vote down the Board’s offer prior to calling in the provincial federations.

Negotiations for a 1975 agreement set the stage for the OBE elementary teachers’ only significant consideration of militant action in the ensuing year. In the winter of 1974-75, it became clear that the OBE secondary teachers were gearing up for a strike. In November,

¹ The only difference in the grids was that elementary teachers with no experience were paid slightly less than secondary teachers with no experience.
1974, it was reported that the secondary teachers wanted an average salary increase of 52% plus a cost-of-living allowance. In January, strike rumours were widespread (Windsor and Thunder Bay secondary teachers had already struck in the fall). As might be expected from their previous negotiating pattern, the elementary "Cool Cats" did not jump in to support the secondary teachers' push for a 52% increase. Instead, in November they asked for a 24.4% increase (the amount of the increase in provincial grants to the OBE). Later in February, a week and a half prior to the secondary teachers' strike, the elementary group settled for an 18.5% increase despite advice from the provincial OPS to delay settlement. Whether the elementary negotiators felt that the Board would pass on any gains made by secondary teachers or whether they simply wanted to avoid conflict, their early settlement resulted in a significant disparity being created when the secondaries won major salary increases.

It was this breaking of parity with the secondary panel that kindled thoughts of militant action among some of the leadership and membership of the elementary group in the following year. However, very little of these thoughts found their way into action. Newspaper accounts provide hardly any information on this period, which saw the potential for militancy reach its peak in the Ottawa group. Why significant action failed to materialize at this point is the focus of much of the following pages.

Why did militancy fail to develop among Ottawa elementary teachers? The general boom/bust climate in Ontario education,
declining enrolments, ceilings, the call for greater individualization of teaching, and the increasing growth of school boards' power and size make the failure of militancy to develop as problematic as its success. In attempting to account for the Ottawa teachers' relative docility throughout the seventies, we will once again draw on the theoretical framework presented in Chapter III. Put simply, we assume that group behavior, whether it be of a militant or compliant variety is largely a function of the factors discussed in our theoretical framework.

Although our analysis focuses on developing an explanation of Ottawa teachers' relative docility this is not its sole function. Part of our purpose is to provide a check on the analyses of Carleton teachers' militancy. If our analysis of the Carleton teachers has general applicability we would expect that some of the factors identified as critical for the development of militancy in Carleton would be either absent or at least not present to the same degree in Ottawa.

II. DISCONTENT AMONG OTTAWA TEACHERS

One possible explanation of the docility of Ottawa elementary teachers might be simply that they had nothing to complain about. As was noted in our discussion of the theoretical framework one particular hypothesis is that teacher militancy is a consequence of structural changes which result in increases in teacher discontent. Following the logic of this hypothesis, we would expect that docility would be associated with stability or decline in the level of teacher discontent.
Our study of Carleton teachers, however, calls this thinking into question. In the case of Carleton teachers we find little evidence that discontent, precipitated by structural change, had much effect on the evolution of teacher militancy. Rather, in Carleton, it appeared that it was leadership which created and developed teacher discontent. Of course, it may well be that we have underrated the importance of structurally-induced discontent in Carleton. If so, we would expect to find that the docile Ottawa group had less reason to be discontent than their Carleton counterparts.

In the analysis of discontent among Carleton teachers, evidence was presented to suggest that Ottawa teachers had grounds for experiencing as much, if not more, discontent than Carleton teachers in the areas of salary, promotions, and professional deprivation. Although opportunities for promotion will come in for more discussion later in this chapter we will not repeat the analysis of discontent presented in the discussion of Carleton teachers. Rather, we will focus on two previously unconsidered conditions which could well have stimulated strong feelings of discontent among Ottawa elementary teachers.

The first of these conditions has been alluded to in our review of the Ottawa group's behavior up to 1976-77. Having reached a salary agreement with the Board prior to the secondary group's strike in the spring of 1975, the elementary teachers found themselves suddenly economically disadvantaged when the secondary group succeeded in winning major salary increases. Degreed elementary teachers went from having parity on all but 4 of 54 grid positions in the previous year,
to having salary gaps as much as $2,480 between their salaries and those of equivalently experienced and educated secondary teachers. Table 78 shows the amount by which elementary teachers' salaries fell behind those of secondary teachers following the secondary settlement.

As well as creating substantial disparities in the salaries reported in the grids, the secondary teachers' settlement shortened the years it took to reach maximum in all categories and provided a cost-of-living allowance equal to the rise in the consumer-price-index to be added to secondary salaries in September, 1975.

These disparities might not have caused much anger had the Board given the elementary teachers a clear indication that it would act to re-establish parity. Judging from the contents of the letter from the chairman of the Ottawa Elementary Teachers Council (OETC)² to the Board chairman in May, 1975, the teachers felt that when they settled in February, they had had an understanding with the Board that parity would be re-established following the conclusion of secondary negotiations. Further, the letter indicated that the teachers were far from happy with the Board's failure to renegotiate the 1975-76 salary agreement. As reported in the Executive minutes of the Women Teachers' Association of Ottawa (WTAO) of May 7, 1975, the OETC chairman expressed the view that in failing to discuss disparities with teachers the Board "broke faith with the OETC" and made the teachers feel that they were

---

2. The body empowered to speak for all OBE elementary teachers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience (Years)</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>A2</th>
<th>A3</th>
<th>A4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>1370</td>
<td>1380</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>980</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>890</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>850</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>870</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>1070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>1190</td>
<td>1290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>910</td>
<td>1290</td>
<td>1340</td>
<td>1510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>920</td>
<td>1365</td>
<td>1490</td>
<td>1710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>920</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1640</td>
<td>1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>910</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>1770</td>
<td>2100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>880</td>
<td>1590</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>2300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>780</td>
<td>1650</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>810*</td>
<td>1270*</td>
<td></td>
<td>1760*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>450*</td>
<td></td>
<td>1030*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>440*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Calculated by subtracting elementary salary from maximum reached by secondary at 11 years of experience.

Source: Collective agreements of OBE secondary and elementary teachers.
used (presumably to weaken the secondaries' bargaining position).³ The Board's action (or failure to act) was seen as proof that a "showdown" was more productive than negotiations and, hence, served as an invitation to militancy on the part of elementary teachers. Although the Board did approve a lump sum of $500 to be paid to each elementary teacher in September, 1975, as a sign of its "... desire that its elementary teachers be treated in a just manner" (Letter, R.L. Beatty to R. Lynch, July 10, 1975), the issue of parity with secondary teachers remained at centre stage into the spring of the following year. As can be seen by subtracting the Board's $500 gift from the salary gaps in Table 78, the Board's gift left considerable disparities between degreeed elementary and secondary teachers' pay. In any case, the cost-of-living allowances secondary teachers had won provided them with an increase over the $500 bonus, hence, eliminating any equalizing effect the elementary bonus might have had.

In sum, 1975 saw the development of a salary situation which had the potential to stimulate strong feelings of discontent. In addition to the salary issue, there was a feeling in some quarters that the Board had betrayed the elementary teachers by failing to reward their early settlement with a quick reinstatement of parity. Illustrative of this feeling, I found the words "Nice guys finish last" scrawled in dark ink across the back of a set of teacher minutes from 1975-76.

³ According to one informant, "The Board used us as the good guys, trying to pressure the secondaries to settle. It did not work for the Board or for us."
The loss of parity in 1975 was not the only issue which could have spread the seeds of discontent among Ottawa elementary teachers. A second source of discontent, which preceded the loss of parity, was the decline in OBE elementary enrolments. Declining enrolment, coupled with the development and expansion of French Immersion programs, posed a threat to anglophone elementary teachers' job security and restricted horizontal mobility in the school system. Although cuts in the teaching staff were able to take place through attrition until the late 1970's, it is likely that the decline in enrolments helped create a climate of restlessness and dissatisfaction. In any case, the potential for dissatisfaction appears to have been greater in Ottawa than in Carleton. As Table 79 shows, the decline in enrolment and in the size of the teacher force was much more pronounced in Ottawa than in Carleton throughout the first half of the 1970's. Examination of the net change in the size of the teacher force and enrolment between 1969-70 and 1976-77 shows that there was an increase in the number of teachers and pupils in the Carleton system but a decrease in the number of teachers and pupils in Ottawa. In this time-period, the number of teachers in Carleton increased by 40, while the number in Ottawa decreased by 228. Where the Carleton enrolment went up by 3597, the Ottawa enrolment went down by 5595.

Clearly the foregoing discussion has not provided an exacting measure of teacher discontent in Ottawa. However, the evidence is supportive of the view that the Ottawa teachers had grounds for feeling increased dissatisfaction through the seventies. Further, the evidence
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Elementary enrolment OBE</th>
<th>Elementary enrolment CBE</th>
<th>Elementary Teacher Force OBE</th>
<th>Elementary Teacher Force CBE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>25976</td>
<td>19946</td>
<td>1233</td>
<td>981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>26318</td>
<td>21336</td>
<td>1278</td>
<td>1036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>25119</td>
<td>22282</td>
<td>1199</td>
<td>963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>23866</td>
<td>22968</td>
<td>1107</td>
<td>1013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>22946</td>
<td>23437</td>
<td>1046</td>
<td>1003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>22414</td>
<td>23219</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>1032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>21438</td>
<td>23582</td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>1074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>20381</td>
<td>23543</td>
<td>1005</td>
<td>1021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net change
69-70 to 76-77 -5595 +3597 -228 +40

Source: Annual Reports of the Ontario Minister of Education.
suggests that Ottawa teachers had as much, if not more, reason to experience discontent as Carleton teachers. Thus, it does not seem possible to attribute Ottawa teachers' docility to a lack of discontent-generating circumstances. As we will soon see, other factors were operative which effectively blocked and/or redirected teachers' frustrations from being shown in collective coercive action against the OBE.

III. ORGANIZATION AND SOLIDARITY OF OTTAWA ELEMENTARY TEACHERS

In this section we will argue that the docility of Ottawa elementary teachers was not due to their being content with their lot. Rather, the docility of Ottawa teachers is the result of a lack of teacher solidarity and, relatedly, the absence of an effective organizational structure which militant leaders could use to mobilize teachers.

The lack of teacher solidarity becomes evident when one interviews OBE elementary teacher leaders. Men tell you of unconcerned second-income earners and of promotions of "undeserving" women at the expense of "deserving" men. Women leaders make you aware that you're male - not by batting their eyes at you, but by being defensive, suspicious and tightlipped. Occasionally you hear the men referred to in derogatory terms - "a bunch of, weak-kneed sheep". Finally, both men and women are likely to complain about the dominance of conservative principals. Of course not everyone airs their group's dirty linen,
some plead ignorance of any in-group conflict and others simply keep
their mouths shut, but what hits home to you as an interviewer is that
no one in Carleton showed any sign of stereotyping the opposite sex,
nor of setting the principals aside as a separate interest group.

One of the prime characteristics of the Ottawa elementary group,
which differentiates it from the Carleton group and which helps account
for the lack of solidarity in Ottawa, is the local federation structure
of OBE teachers. Where Carleton teachers went against the grain and
formed a single, amalgamated local federation, the OBE elementary
teachers have always maintained clearly independent OPS and FW
organizations. However, this is not to say that attempts to create an
organization representative of all elementary teachers have not
occurred.

In 1965-66, the first permanent joint salary committee was
established for Ottawa Public School Board teachers, with local FW and
OPS associations separately appointing their representatives. This was
followed in January, 1969, by the establishment of the Ottawa Teachers' Council (later to be renamed the Ottawa Elementary Teachers' Council (OETC) when the Ottawa elementary and secondary teachers were incorporated under the same board in 1970). On paper, the OTC was given considerable power and freedom of action as can be seen from the following terms of reference set down in 1969.

(a) The Council is to speak for and act on behalf of public elementary school teachers in the City of Ottawa with particular reference to the following areas:

1. Relationships with the Board in all matters except those relating to salary.
2. Relationships with the public and press in all matters
except those relating to salary.

3. Communication with other teachers' groups.

Later, in 1974, the exclusion of Council from speaking on matters of salary was removed and the new terms of reference simply stated "The Council and its Committees are to speak for and act on behalf of all elementary teachers of the Ottawa Board of Education."

While this broad mandate suggests that a powerful unitary body did develop in Ottawa, the reality was that the OETC was a fragmented organization with little independent power to act. In part, the reason for this is to be found in the way the Council was composed. Teachers' Council had the right to speak for all teachers, but not all teachers were members of Teachers' Council. Rather, the Teachers' Council's membership was defined as encompassing only the four table officers of each of the two local teacher federations (i.e. the Past-Presidents, Presidents, first Vice-Presidents and second Vice-Presidents of the local OPS and FW organizations). Thus, though empowered to speak for all teachers, the eight Teachers' Council members achieved their positions by virtue of being elected to look after the separate interests of either male or female teachers, not by being elected by all teachers to represent all teachers. In essence then, Teachers' Council was little more than a joint committee of the local OPS and FW organizations. Where strong common interests existed, Teachers' Council provided a forum for planning joint-action. But equally, Teachers' Council provided an arena for conflicting interests to surface and generate animosity.
One might expect that with a number of major common problems facing teachers in the early seventies (e.g., ceilings, the pressure to implement Living and Learning, Bill 274, and large increases in the cost-of-living), a spirit of cooperation would predominate over conflict within OETC. Indeed, there were some signs that effort was being made to forge Teachers' Council into a more powerful and unified organization between 1973 and 1976. However, in the end, these efforts failed to bridge the differences between OPS and FW and, in the opinion of some, the interaction which took place within Teachers' Council actually served to drive the men and women farther apart. Finally, in

4. For example, in 1973-74, Teachers' Council put out a newsletter focusing attention on Bill 274 and keeping teachers aware of the activities of the Council. The new terms of reference for OETC developed in 1974 provided for OETC to have five standing committees which were to be directly responsible to Council and in 1975-76 the Council became deeply involved in the activities of the EPC.

5. The OETC chairman of 1976-77 provided the following history and observations regarding OETC which show her perception that interaction in OETC was divisive rather than unifying.

"Several years ago when the Ottawa Elementary Teachers' Council was formed, it was seen, no doubt, as having a number of possible aims and outcomes. Basically it was a working body of the table officers of the two elementary teachers' federations at the local level. Its concerns were matters of mutual interest and equal importance to both groups - salary negotiations, fringe benefits, professional development to name a few. Possibly, it was seen by many to be the beginnings of an amalgamated group with gradually increasing responsibilities. Indeed, this is exactly how "amalgamation" has occurred in many areas. Whatever the reason, this has not been the thrust in our group. Indeed, often in the past it has seemed that our exchanges broadened rather than narrowed the gap between the two groups. There certainly has been communication but amalgamation has seemed no closer, our differences no fewer (Kirby, 1976)."
1977, the rift between OPS and FW leaders reached its apex when the OPS decided to withdraw from Teachers' Council — effectively ending its existence.

Why did conflicting interests win out over common concerns in the relations between the men and women's federations in Ottawa? In part the answer is to be found in the examination of the two local federations. Let us first take a look at the local women's federation in Ottawa.

A. The Women Teachers' Association of Ottawa

All female Ottawa elementary teachers are statutory members of the Women Teachers' Association of Ottawa (WTAO). The WTAO is an organization with a long history, having celebrated its seventieth anniversary in 1977. As early as 1950, the WTAO had 356 members in 34 Ottawa schools. By 1956, there were 534 women in WTAO teaching in 40 schools, and by 1966-67, the membership had grown to 864 in 51 schools. Thus, it is clear that by the time the DRE was formed in January, 1970, the WTAO was a sizeable and well-entrenched organization within Ottawa schools.

With the coming of the 1970's both the WTAO and its parent organization were faced with a significant challenge to their existence. With more and more power being given to the newly created "superboards", the imposition of spending ceilings, declining enrolments, and an increasing oversupply of elementary teachers, the need for strong unitary local teacher organizations was becoming clear to
many elementary teachers. Having fought and won the major issue of equal pay for men and women in the fifties and sixties, the WTAO and provincial FW faced the problem of organizations which achieve their goals - that is, they either had to develop new organizational goals and causes or face extinction.

Fortunately for those women whose lives had become deeply entwined with FW, the solution to the problem of organizational survival was not hard to find. All that was necessary was for FW and its locals, such as WTAO, to take up the banner of the broader feminist movement which was growing across North America. Under this new revitalized feminism, FW and its locals not only had the goal of protecting women teachers' interests, but also the goal of raising women's consciousness. Women elementary teachers needed a separate organization not simply to defend their interests, but to make them aware of what their interests were. Merger with the men at either the local level or the provincial level could not be endorsed, despite women's numerical dominance in the elementary schools, because too many women were plagued by false-consciousness or were unable to participate as equals with men due to years of socialization in a sexist society. As a concrete step to consciousness raising, FW put energy into encouraging women to compete with men for positions of responsibility by developing leadership courses and assertiveness training - a move which clearly created the potential for conflict with promotion conscious male elementary teachers. With declining enrolments the opportunities for promotion were declining while, at the same time, competition for
promotion was being increased by women throwing their hats into the ring.

One can speculate that, with the long history of WTAO in Ottawa, many local leaders were as desirous of maintaining their organization as provincial leaders were of maintaining FW. Indeed, many WTAO leaders found the FW's new feminist solution to organization survival attractive and, in fact, helped develop the solution. At the dawn of the seventies, the WTAO had had a long history of close relations with its parent organization. And as recently as 1966-67, the provincial president of FW was a WTAO member, who had previously served as the president of WTAO. When the OPS began a strong push for amalgamation at the outset of the seventies and other circumstances were making amalgamation seem desirable, WTAO maintained its connections with the provincial body - providing four provincial FW officers (including two directors) and three regional officers in 1970-71. Of special importance is the fact that in 1970-71, WTAO women held the positions of provincial status convenor and regional status convenor. Status convenors, in more conventional language, are chairmen or rather chairpersons of status committees - the committees concerned with enhancing women's status in the schools and society. More concisely, status committees are concerned with encouraging women to compete for positions of responsibility within the schools. Thus, as the revitalized feminism of FW was building up steam, WTAO women were in key positions to help stoke the fire.

It is important to note that WTAO participation in the
provincial organization did not stop in 1970-71. Other WTAO members were elected to key positions throughout the seventies and in 1973-74 the provincial status convenor was once again a WTAO member.

The ideology being developed in Toronto with the aid of WTAO participants had no trouble reaching the local leadership of the WTAO; for the women who served as provincial officers had invariably held a number of key local positions before serving at the provincial level and had helped break in the new local leaders who replaced them. Further, the fact that the two women who served as provincial status convenors (one in 1970-71 and one in 1973-74) were principals probably helped them in convincing women that competition with men could result in success, and that women could indeed handle a "man's job".

The acceptance of FW feminism among local WTAO leaders was shown in both words and deeds in the early and mid-seventies. For example, the 1972-73 president of WTAO told the membership at the 1973 annual meeting that one of the most important responsibilities of the president was "To be a fearless spokeswoman for women teachers' rights" and when the OPS provoked a vote on local amalgamation she spoke out against it. She argued, among other things, that women would be dominated by ultra-conservative, promotion conscious men and that women needed their own organization to provide them with opportunities for leadership experience and encouragement in seeking promotions. In 1974-75, the woman who was to become the 1976-77 WTAO president initiated a local leadership training course, which is still in operation, in order to help train women for taking on positions of responsibility.
Also in 1974, action by the WTAO member, who had served as Provincial Status convenor in 1973-74, served to stimulate the formation of a Board Status of Women committee to investigate possible sex discrimination in promotions and other inequalities based on sex within the school system. Finally, in 1974-75, the feminism of WTAO was given symbolic representation with the adoption of a new logo shown below.

Figure 6: WTAO LOGO

The key point in all this is that the leadership of the WTAO adopted an ideological perspective which led them to view their male counterparts as adversaries. Not only did the FW variant of feminism enjoin women to compete with men, it also led them to be suspicious of males. As we saw in Chapter IV, the FW’s view of males was that they all wanted to be principals and that their organization was primarily
concerned with principals' interests - not those of the predominately-female classroom teachers. Within WTAO, this rhetoric was underlaid by a suspicion that principals and would-be principals were lackeys of the Board, willing to sell out teachers' interests for the sake of being in the good books of trustees and superintendents. How is it that FW feminism, and the accompanying distrust of males, became entrenched in the WTAO is something we should now consider.

We have already covered some of the key factors which account for the acceptance of the feminist ideology. For example, it has been noted that Ottawa women teachers had an old, well established local FW organization, with strong ties to Toronto. Where the formation of the CBE threw fourteen autonomous FW units of varying sizes into one new unit lacking a common history, the formation of the OBE simply saw a relatively small number of teachers from the municipalities of Rockcliffe Park and Vanier absorbed into a large established organization. Where the WTAO had a historical legitimacy, the Carleton Women Teachers' Association did not. Where the WTAO was a functioning organization with a real social existence to defend, the Carleton Women Teachers' Association was a "paper" organization with little social reality to Carleton teachers. Thus, when pressure for FW/OPS amalgamation came to be felt in Ottawa, there was an organized group of women leaders with a personal investment in WTAO survival ready to fight back.

In sum, the lack of major disruption accompanying the formation of the OBE, along with the presence of a core of FW loyalists within
the WTAO, helps explain why the WTAO went hand-in-hand with the provincial federation in accepting the new feminism. However, other factors were important as well. First, the Board contributed to the vitality of WTAO feminism by creating its own status of women committee. Second, the OPS men took actions which hurt their own cause of creating an amalgamated local group. For example, in 1973, the men invited WTAO members to become associate members of the local OPS organization for the nominal fee of $1.00. As the WTAO leaders saw it, this was simply an underhanded tactic, designed to produce an amalgamated federation and, as such, it did little to endear men to the WTAO leaders. Beyond this, the men were not always free of sexism in their words and deeds. For example, a 1974 edition of the local OPS newsletter, The Pointer, carried the following editorial.

Enough of this mister nice guy. Since you girls have cast off your bras, it's time we got a load off our chests too.

It wasn't so very long ago, I remember well, that the female teachers of Ottawa were parading, frothing at the mouth, behind the Banner of Equal Pay For Equal Work. And after a well fought battle you won your right to equal pay. The men of Ottawa were as happy as you were. Every teacher who worked their 8:30 to 4:00 deserved to be paid equally. And so it is today when men and women are doing equal work and getting equal pay. Right? Wrong!

How often do you see a petite grade 2 teacher refereeing a boys' flag football game or breaking up an altercation in a floor hockey game? Now tell me how often you see her picking up the same pay stub as her male confrere. Now don't get us wrong girls, we love our work. There's nothing we enjoy more than flooding a rink at 7:30 on a January morning. Right fellas? So what's the beef? Women are quick to point out that their time is also well spent, preparing materials for their class. We do not contest this, but here is where our bone of contention lies. While the women are preparing material for their own class we are supervising extra-curricular activities, not working for our class. Our preparation must either be done at school whenever the time permits or else at home on our own time.

Where is the equality in this? Should we have to carry the
weight of the school as well as our class? C'mon girls, give us a break. This winter go out and referee a hockey game and see how that proverbial brass monkey felt. (Ottawa Elementary Men Teachers' Club, 1974).

A third condition which helped build the feminist perspective in WTAO was that the feminist image of FW served to draw women, who saw themselves as feminists and/or who were interested in promotion, into active participation in the local organization. In this regard, it is interesting to note that, of the nine WTAO executive officers who served in 1977-78, four had completed the provincial leadership course, and four others were employed at the same school under the leadership of a female principal who was well known for her efforts to encourage women to seek positions of responsibility and who had previously served as WTAO president and FW provincial status convenor. Further, it might be noted that the 1974-75 and 1975-76 presidents of WTAO were members of the Ottawa Women's Centre (a well known local feminist organization), prior to assuming the presidency.

All this helps to account for the development of feminism in the WTAO leadership, but it fails to clearly explain why many WTAO leaders were suspicious of men or why there was a fear that males would sell out to the Board.

In large part, the reason such suspicion surfaced was because it had a basis in fact. In order to make this basis clear, we must turn to examine the male Ottawa elementary teachers' federation.

B. The Ottawa Elementary Men Teachers' Club

The name of the local male teachers' federation is revealing in itself. Men teachers belong to the Ottawa Elementary Men Teachers'
Club (referred to as Men's Club by its members). In talking to men who taught in Ottawa during the sixties one gets the clear impression that Men's Club was indeed a club in the sixties and early seventies.

As one respondent put it, "Men's Club meetings were social events to meet friends first, only secondarily to conduct business". However, Men's Club did serve a very serious purpose for many of those who attended its meetings. Put simply, Men's Club participation was the route to promotion in the Ottawa system.

According to virtually all informants, Men's Club was dominated by a clique of principals - principals who had strong formal and informal contacts with Board authorities and who reputedly formed the most influential group of "teachers" in the Ottawa system. To get involved in Men's Club was to become visible to key influential who could help in the quest for promotion.

It should be stressed that the Ottawa principals' influence with the Board was based on "good relations" which existed between themselves and the Board. Undoubtedly contributing to these good relations was the fact that a number of Board administrators were ex-elementary principals who maintained informal involvement in the social activities of Men's Club. Put in other words, a well-established "old boys' club" linking principals to Board officials developed in Ottawa in the 1960's. New, promotion-oriented men joined Men's Club and sought leadership positions within it as a means of getting membership in the "old boys' club" which underlaid Men's Club. As one informant put it, "Men's Club involvement was a way of exposing yourself to principals
and superintendents". And according to another informant, "It was very obvious that anyone on the executive of Men's Club was being groomed for promotion".

Vis-à-vis female leaders' distrust of Men's Club leaders, the key point is not only that Mens' Club participation was a vehicle for promotion, but also that successful admission to the inner circle of the Club and, hence, success in promotion, required a fairly conservative pro-management outlook since the Ottawa principals who controlled the club were loyal to management. As one informant described the principals in Men's Club, they had "... two functions - as federation members and as management. There would be a fine line between the management decision and a federation decision". As a result of this situation not "rocking the boat" and being a "good Joe" became key qualifications for admission to the Club and, in turn, for promotion.

This co-optive promotional system survived with little change despite sizable turnover in the principals' group. The survival of the system appears to have been due to two main factors. First, formal and informal-linkages between Board authorities and principals were maintained and enhanced in the seventies, despite the reorganization of the school system which accompanied the formation of the OBE in 1970. Prior to the formation of the OBE, the majority of Ottawa teachers were working under the Ottawa Public School Board (OPSBB). By 1966-67, the OPSB already had 1190 teachers and principals working in 51 schools, under the direction of one superintendent and seven inspectors. Thus, when the OBE was formed, it contained a large, well-established
elementary system within it. Unlike its sister Board in Carleton, the OBE was not faced with making major changes in the size of administrative staff or in administrative practices in order to run the new elementary system. More important for the retention of the co-optive promotion system was the fact that many of the Board authorities that principals were used to dealing with in the OPSB obtained key positions in the new OBE. Of the eighteen trustees elected to the OBE in its first year, six were previously OPSB trustees, and for the first three years of the OBE's existence, it was chaired by ex-OPSB trustees. Further, it should be noted that in the Board's inaugural year, at least five of its superintendents and one assistant director were ex-OPSB inspectors. Thus, it seems that the principals' lines of influence remained intact, at least in the early years of the OBE. However, the continuing loyalty of principals to the OBE was not due solely to the maintenance of old relationships. Probably of even greater importance were actions of the Board and particularly, its director, who worked to increase principals' adoption of a management perspective. The OBE, unlike its Carleton counterpart, recognized and dealt with its elementary principals as a separate group from secondary principals. Going along with recognition was a delegation of power to the principals. To a large extent this delegation of power was engineered by the Board's Director of Education, D.S. Lawless. That Lawless played an

6. Ottawa elementary principals have their own association known as the Ottawa Elementary Principals' Association which is not accountable to WTAO or Men's Club.
Important role is shown in the following quotations from three different OBE principals:

Lawless changed the system and made principals accountable for their schools. A lot of power was taken from supers and given to principals who wanted it and could handle it.

Lawless wanted principals involved in decision-making. He brought more autonomy to the principals, more than anywhere else in Ontario.

He [Lawless] significantly increased principals' power. He gave them control over school budgets which were centrally controlled before. He set up a Board Executive committee with an elementary principal as chairman.

In a nutshell, the Board, following the Director's lead, encouraged principals to adopt a management outlook by giving them an increased role in management. This contrasts neatly with the Carleton case, where principals appeared to lose rather than gain autonomy with the formation of the new Board. Where Carleton trustees and administrators were forced to reduce principals' autonomy in order to standardize and equalize educational services, facilities, and practices across the remnants of fourteen widely-varying systems, OBE authorities with an already highly centralized elementary system had room to decentralize power.

The second main reason that the principals remained pro-management and the promotional system co-optive was that most of the younger principals had received their promotions via the "old boys' network" and hence had been rewarded for their conservatism. Thus,
although there was great turnover in principals in the late sixties,\textsuperscript{7} new recruits did not vary greatly from the men they replaced in their willingness to cooperate with the Board.

Men's Club continued to be dominated by pro-management principals in the early seventies. The main purpose of participating in Men's Club apart from enjoyment of its social activities\textsuperscript{8} was to win favour with the "old boys' club" in order to get promotions. Thus, there certainly were grounds for female leaders to suspect men of selling out or at least of not pushing too hard in negotiations with the Board. In addition, the Board made the temptation to sell out quite strong by rewarding "reasonable" male negotiators with promotions.

\textsuperscript{7} It is impossible to determine the turnover on a year to year basis. However, it can be determined that only 26 of the 51 principals in the OPSB of 1966-67 were principals in the OBE in 1973-74. Judging from the comments of respondents, most of this turnover took place in the late sixties rather than in the seventies.

\textsuperscript{8} After having investigated and discussed the TFC it is very difficult to understand the nature of Men's Club. In particular what is hard to accept is that Men's Club really was a club - one in which the focal activities were baseball, hockey, touch football, curling and elbow bending at the Maple Leaf Tavern. Even when a group of angry young men attempted to remake the Club into an effective federation in the mid-seventies one finds a heavy emphasis on sports in the activities of the Club. It is tempting to try some amateur psychiatry and suggest that the jockitis of Men's Club is a defense mechanism of men occupying a traditionally female role. However, there is a more sociological explanation of this sporting behavior in Men's Club. According to several informants a large number of those promoted in the sixties were Physical Education teachers. The reason being, that Physical Education teachers had more time to get involved in hoo-knobbng and federation activities. Once in principalships and once linked into the "old boys' network" they helped maintain the sports emphasis in Men's club.
In the sixties and early seventies. Whether or not male negotiators ever sold out, there is no question that women saw them as unwilling to risk their chances for promotion by rocking the boat. As one woman put it:

The men felt that radical federation activity would lead to a lack of promotional opportunities. ...men are too busy trying to get ahead - they don't want to step out of line or else, curtains.

This respondent further pointed out the negative side of militancy by noting that several principals who had gotten too "uppity" "had their wrists slapped" (i.e., they were transferred to smaller schools). In addition, she noted that she had feared being fired for becoming too militant.

It might be expected that, with declining opportunities for promotion in the 1970's (between 1973-74 and 1977-78 there were only six promotions to principalships and three of these went to women), the "old boys' network" would lose its hold on Men's Club as unpromoted men and young ambitious principals found their opportunities for advancement almost nil. Once the promotional opportunities dried up, there was simply was little to gain via docility or by buddying up to the "old

9. Here it is interesting to note that one of the men who had served as chairman of the negotiating team during one of the more uneventful sets of negotiations, told me that when Teachers' Council was voting on giving honorariums to members of the negotiating team, it was half jokingly suggested that he not be given one, because the Board would reward him with a promotion. By the way, he got his reward from the Board and from Teachers' Council.

One of the presidents of WTAO expressed it more bluntly: "If you chair EPC you get a promotion."
boys". Indeed the mid-1970's witnessed an internal rebellion in Men's Club in which senior principals retreated from the organization. While it is difficult to determine the exact date, it appears that the palace revolt began to take place sometime in 1973-74. As one of the "young bucks" who was involved in the revolt recalled the period:

"Everybody was pissed off at the principals. They were into everything, negotiations and the Executive. Teachers felt they weren't getting back to the teachers to tell them what was going on. Principals were dominating, powerful and influential. Through the principals was the only way to get things done."

While the dominance of principals wasn't new, it was reaching a new peak in response to Board efforts to draw the principals more fully into the ranks of management. Male teachers began to feel alienated from power as well as frustrated over the lack of promotional opportunities. According to another "young buck", the combination of powerlessness and frustration led a number of male teachers to "use negotiations to attack the Board". Certainly the time was ripe for conflict with the Board. 1973-74 was the year of Bill 274 and the one-day closure of schools across the province. It was also the year which saw local separate school teachers and Carleton elementary teachers mass resign. Undoubtedly the general climate created by these events played a contributory role to revolt within Men's Club.

The period from 1973-74 to 1976-77 saw the "young bucks" attempt to remake Men's Club into a strong, more aggressive and vital.

10. The term "young bucks" is used by Ottawa Elementary teachers to describe the male teachers who attempted to remake Men's Club. It is not my invention.
organization. In addition, the same period saw the "young bucks" make repeated attempts to get women to amalgamate with them in hopes of building a stronger local federation. Toward the goal of revamping and strengthening Men's Club, a new organizational structure was adopted to encourage grassroots participation by providing for an elected men's federation council. Previously, the Club was run only by an Executive; there were no provisions for representation of individual schools or groups of schools. Further, the Executive was seldom if ever elected. Selection of Executive officers was by informal decision on the part of key Club members. Other actions taken by the "young bucks" included the development of a regular newsletter, The Pointer, and the EPC chairman's attempt to lead the teachers to support militant action in 1975-76.

Unfortunately for the "young bucks", their efforts were not strong enough to overcome the conservative power of the "old boys" nor to overcome the apathy of the majority of the membership. When the senior principals left Men's Club they took their power and influence with them. When the "young bucks'" initiatives would go too far "The old boys would call a staff meeting and say, 'You can't do this; this is the way it should be'". Lacking a strong grassroots support, having their membership spread out in small pockets in the schools, and lacking the discretionary time of principals, the "young bucks" had a difficult time overcoming the face-to-face persuasive power of principals in the staff rooms. In the end, after three or four years of effort, the revolt to revitalize Men's Club fizzled out. The old
constitution and structure of Men's Club was readopted and principals began to come back into the organization.

C. Summary

The discussion of the WTAO and Men's Club serves to reinforce the main argument of this section - that the OBE elementary teachers were too fragmented and factionalized to take militant action against the Board. While the women's organization latched on to the feminist movement and fostered a view of men teachers as adversaries, Men's Club remained primarily a social club in which the ambitious could meet with and become known to the "right" people for greasing the way to promotion. With both groups being highly promotion conscious during an era of declining opportunities for promotion, it is not surprising that conflict frequently erupted between them.

Probably just as important as competition for positions of responsibility in creating disharmony between men and women was the fact that, up until the mid-seventies, Men's Club was dominated by relatively conservative principals. Women, quite understandably, felt that merger with the men would result in giving the men, who already controlled the schools, control over the local federation as well. In sum, the reality of principals' dominance within Men's Club served to reinforce women leaders' arguments against amalgamation.

One point which has not yet been emphasized in our discussion should be mentioned before we leave the issue of teacher solidarity. This is simply that neither WTAO nor Men's Club had large-scale support
from their memberships. Thus, even when leaders agreed on issues it was difficult, 'if not impossible, to get strong membership support. That leaders of both groups were well aware of, and frustrated by, the memberships' lack of interest in federation activities is shown in the following quotes.

"The majority of our members are very apathetic, 10-15% actively involved, 25% wish to be informed, and 60% don't give a damn. FW is much the same. Decisions are made by the 57 people who happen to get the job of school rep. - not necessarily concerned people (a "young buck")."

"Women teachers are not interested in making it [WTAO] a strong federation: "Got to go home and cook dinner now," they say. They would give me their support but not their enthusiasm. It is very difficult to open teachers' minds - like beating your head against a wall. They're very conservative. (an ex-WTAO president)."

Both organizations are very cliquish. Men's Club tends to revolve around the same seven or eight people with one or two additions and deletions each year (another "young buck").

In support of the above the following facts are worth noting. First, with regard to participation in WTAO, two surveys undertaken by WTAO in 1973-74 can be noted. In the first survey, questions regarding professional development needs were sent to 61 key teachers (the teachers who serve as WTAO representatives in the schools and who compose WTAO Council). Only 33 of the 61 returned the questionnaire. The second survey, regarding the use of a fund for retired teachers, was distributed via key teachers to 58 schools. In this case, only 27 schools responded. With regard to Men's Club participation, it is revealing that only 50 of its more than 300 members attended the May 27, 1975, annual meeting of the organization. Remember that just a few months earlier the elementary teachers fell far behind secondary teachers in salary.
It is not difficult to guess why participation in WTAO and Men's Club has been low. In the case of WTAO, the ideology of the organization is likely irrelevant to many of the members. The majority of women are classroom teachers and they are, in all likelihood, content to remain classroom teachers. Local leaders of WTAO, like provincial leaders of FW, differ from the general membership by being much more concerned with promotions than rank-and-file members. Further, leaders are more likely to hold positions of responsibility or to teach in higher grades than the rest of the membership. The gaps between leaders and followers in WTAO have been increased by leadership activities. Unlike the TFC, WTAO has done little to directly meet the needs felt by classroom teachers. Rather than develop local programs to aid teachers cope with the curriculum changes brought on by Living and Learning, WTAO leaders have stuck to the big-event approach to professional development, in which big name speakers are brought in to talk at teachers. Leaders have been especially inclined to bring in female speakers to speak about "women's issues" rather than cross-sex teacher issues. Instead of viewing their role as involving direct face-to-face intervention to protect classroom teachers from unfair treatment by principals and administrators, WTAO leaders have seen their function to make women teachers into principals and administrators.

In contrast, Men's Club participation has suffered, to some degree, from the organization being too narrowly focused on the strong personal needs of males for promotion. By serving primarily as a vehicle for promotion, the organization lost its attractiveness when
promotions dried up.¹¹ Lacking any other functions, apart from the
social and promotional, the club never developed any significant power
to affect the course of local education. (Because of the strong power
and influence of the principals' association, there appears to be little
possibility of Men's Club developing into an effective organization).
Also limiting support for Men's Club was the simple fact that, up to
1975, the Club had made no provision for membership representation.
Eleven Executive members effectively ran the professional business of
the Club on their own. Men's Club did not even have representatives in
the schools to carry communications.

Whatever the reasons behind the low level of participation in
the local federations, the main point is that the local federations
were not only in conflict with one another (and in the case of Men's
Club suffered from internal conflict as well), but they suffered from
organizational anemia as well.¹² Faced with a powerful principals'
association interested in "keeping the lid on" local leaders who wished
for a strong, united local federation to take on the Board were doomed
to failure.

¹¹ Men's Club also lost its attractiveness to many of those who
received promotions. According to one respondent there was a
"resignation syndrome": "Teachers would come into the
organization, make big waves and then quit. They were riding
the federation to promotion and then getting off. People were
in for a quick shot."
IV. LEADERSHIP AND DOCILITY

As developed to this point, the argument is that the failure of militancy to emerge in Ottawa is due to a lack of teacher solidarity. In opposition to this argument, it could be suggested that the docility of Ottawa teachers was the result of a lack of skilled, militant leaders. This counter-argument will be explored in the current section. First, we will take a brief look at Ottawa teacher leaders of the 1970's and compare their willingness to express approval of the use of coercive tactics with that of Carleton leaders. Second, we will focus on the words and deeds of Ottawa leaders who served in the period from 1973 to 1976. 1973-74 was the year in which teacher militancy peaked across the province and the remaining years to 1976 saw the development of a strong potential basis for local militancy (in the

12. Perhaps the clearest evidence of the federations' weakness comes from the leaders themselves. Both Ottawa and Carleton teacher leaders were asked to indicate whether they "strongly agreed", "agreed", "disagreed", or "strongly disagreed" with the following statement:

"Without action by the [name of the local federation(s)] the quality of education in (Ottawa, Carleton) would be much less than it is today."

The patterns of response shown in the table below clearly indicate that Ottawa leaders placed less value on their organizations than Carleton leaders placed on the TFC teachers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action of the Local Federation</th>
<th>Carleton Leaders</th>
<th>Ottawa Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
development of salary inequalities between Ottawa elementary and secondary teachers). Thus, it would seem that if militant leaders were to emerge in Ottawa, it would be in the period between 1973 and 1976.

If one of the important factors in the development of teacher militancy is leadership, we would expect the relatively docile Ottawa teachers to have less militant leaders than their Carleton counterparts. While we cannot claim to have any definitive measures of either Ottawa or Carleton leaders' militancy, we do have some suggestive data. Like Carleton leaders, Ottawa leaders\textsuperscript{13} were asked to express their approval or disapproval of teachers' use of a variety of coercive tactics. Table 80 juxtaposes the responses of Carleton and Ottawa leaders on this issue. As can be seen, Ottawa leaders appear to be less willing to express approval of all tactics (save publicity campaigns) than are Carleton leaders. However, a clear majority of Ottawa leaders did approve of mass resignation and strike, and about half approved of demonstration and work-to-rule. Thus, although as a group, Ottawa leaders appear to have been less inclined to approve of

\textsuperscript{13} Again, as in the Carleton case, the Ottawa leaders interviewed constituted a purposive sample of key leaders rather than a random sample of all those who played leadership roles in Ottawa federations. Specifically, an attempt was made to interview those who had occupied the position of president within the local federation and/or the position of chairman of the negotiating team during the seventies. While the final sample includes a few informants who did not meet the above criterion, all those interviewed had occupied executive positions in the local federations. In the end, the sample contained six WTAO presidents, seven Men's Club presidents, four chairmen of negotiating teams and ten persons who had served on negotiating teams in the 1970's.
Table 80: Ottawa and Carleton Elementary Teacher Leaders' Attitudes Toward Coercive Action.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coercive Action</th>
<th>Ottawa Leaders</th>
<th>Carleton Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>Disapprove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.R. Campaign</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaigning for and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>against Trustees</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Sessions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work-to-Rule</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Resignation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
militant action than Carleton leaders, it appears there was a significant number of leaders who would have approved of strong action. Also clear, however, is that the actual taking of militant action in Ottawa would likely have met strong resistance from some Ottawa leaders. In sum, the data in Table 8Q may be taken to suggest that there were a number of Ottawa leaders who might have been willing to take militant action under provocation, but that any mobilizing efforts by such leaders would have run the risk of being countered by action from more conservative leaders. Of course, whether or not militant leaders will be successful in mobilizing the troops depends on more than their numbers vis-à-vis opponents. Just as important are such things as how cohesive the militants are, how much influence they have over the membership compared to less militant leaders, how skilled they are at mobilizing, and what resources they have at their disposal.

Unfortunately, we do not have enough information to speak to all these issues, although later some informed speculation may be possible. A more immediate problem is that we have yet to supply much convincing evidence that any of the Ottawa leaders were actually receptive to militancy in Ottawa. Toward this end, we now focus on the activities of some of the leaders of the period from 1973 to 1976. We can begin by looking at the leaders of the WTAO. Among the WTAO leaders of this period, one in particular, stands out as having appeared to have made an effort to move teachers to greater militancy. This is Sue Newell who served as president of WTAO in 1972-73 and as the chairman of Teachers' Council in 1973-74. As president of WTAO, Newell initiated
and virtually singlehandedly put out a publication—*WTAO Output*—to keep teachers informed of WTAO activities and to stimulate women teachers' involvement. As president of Teachers' Council she, with the help of others, continued her efforts to reach the membership by developing a regular publication which supported strong teacher action and by putting the following motions before WTAO.

... that the members of WTAO give their full moral support to the membership of the Teachers' Federation of Carleton, the Ottawa Elementary Teachers' Association, the Carleton Elementary Catholic Teachers' Association, and AEFO during their present negotiation difficulties and that and expression of this support be forwarded to them through the chairman of OETC on behalf of the WTAO and OPSMTC members.

... That the membership of WTAO be asked for a voluntary contribution of up to $10.00 per member in support of the Elementary Teachers working for the Carleton Board of Education and the teachers working for the Ottawa Separate School Board and the Carleton Separate School Board (WTAO Council Minutes, December 4, 1973).

Perhaps as interesting as the above, Newell's husband, who was the President of the OSSTF in Ottawa in 1974-75, played a major role in leading the secondary teachers' strike. If nothing else, the WTAO likely had access to whatever tactical knowledge the OSSTF had to offer.

The fact that Newell's motions were passed suggests that she was not alone in being receptive to militancy. Other actions, which indicate that female support for militancy extended beyond Newell, include a WTAO vote to ask the membership to make contributions to support Ottawa secondary teachers' strike and a decision by WTAO to present a motion calling for the establishment of a FW strike fund at the FW annual provincial assembly of 1973-74. Also of interest are the
responses of female leaders to the questions concerning their approval of coercive tactics. In total, six women leaders were interviewed—all of whom had served as WTAO presidents in recent years. Of these six, three indicated that they would approve of teachers' use of a strike and one indicated strong approval.

Stating approval of coercive action, passing motions in support of others' militancy, and calling for a strike fund, is not the same thing as taking strike action. Whether the women leaders would have led a strike in Ottawa and whether the WTAO membership would follow such leadership is open to question. Data from interviews go both ways. On one hand, one female leader of the era suggested that the women were more militant than the men in that "WTAO supported the secondary strike with more per capita dollars" and because on the day of the provincial walkout in 1973, "The OPS club had not okayed walking out and FW walked". On the other hand, several males indicated that the women, while willing to threaten strong action, would never have taken it. The truth of the matter is hard to determine. However, it seems that, while WTAO may not have had leaders who were hell-bent on strong action, they did have leaders who were at least receptive to the notion and could probably have been convinced of the necessity of actually taking strong action.

Turning to the men, there is little doubt that a leadership group composed primarily of "young bucks" was ready to roll into action, following the loss of salary parity with the secondary teachers in the spring of 1975.
In particular, the male chairman of the elementary negotiating team for 1975-76 appeared to be strongly motivated to take a hard-line with the Board. The fact that he had served as chairman of the negotiating team which had undercut the secondary strike opened him up for charges of having sold out the elementary teachers for the sake of winning a promotion. When the secondary settlement resulted in a breaking of salary parity, one can imagine that suspicion of his integrity intensified. As a consequence, he was put in a position of feeling strong pressure to prove his integrity to teachers. As one of the members of the 1975-76 negotiating team put it, "he [the chairman] was going to show that the negotiating team had not sold out - he was on a crusade."

To help ensure that he could present a strong front to the Board, the EPC chairman asked for and got significant changes in the EPC. Instead of having a membership of ten\textsuperscript{14} as in the previous year, EPC was restructured to have five members (only four members were actually selected). Instead of having EPC members appointed by the local federation Executives, the chairman of EPC was given the power to chose his negotiating team. Finally, the chairman was placed on a half-time teaching timetable with half of his salary being paid by donations from the teachers.

That the EPC chairman was serious about the possibility of taking strong action to restore parity can be seen from some of the

\textsuperscript{14}. Five from Men's Club and five from WTAO.
recommendations contained in his annual report to Teachers' Council of May, 1975. For example, he recommended:

A "TIME LINE" should be established for Contract 1976 by Teachers' Council in conjunction with the E.P.C. This "Time Line" would provide for
(a) the negotiation process (including mediation)
(b) the use of sanctions (including mass resignations)
Note: Perhaps each teacher should be directed to establish his/her personal 'strike fund' as 'showdown tactics' may become necessary to achieve predetermined goals".

Teachers' Council should continue to work at the provincial level to bring about: (a) a strike fund
(b) a strike and arbitration policy
(c) negotiation legislation.

The willingness to take strong action was not confined to the EPC chairman. The "young bucks", who had established full control of OPS in 1974,15 were strongly supportive of strong action as well. As one of this group recalls the period, "He [the EPC chairman] manipulated us very well, but it was all right because I agreed with him. The Executive should have been in the driver's seat but the Executive liked what was happening too." Further, a male who was outside of the "young buck" group observed that in 1975-76, "There was a large minority that wanted to strike and rattle a few bars."

From the fall of 1975 on through to the spring of 1976, the EPC chairman churned out regular negotiation bulletins to be posted in the schools (ten between September and November, 1976). These bulletins not only informed teachers of the progress in negotiations, but also were designed to stir up discontent by focusing on the disadvantaged

15. In 1974-75, only one of the Men's Club eleven executive members was a principal.
salary situation of Ottawa elementary teachers vis-à-vis other groups. The goals of the negotiation team were to obtain parity with the secondary teachers as of January, 1976, and to get a cost-of-living allowance similar to the secondaries'. At the end of December, 1975, the Board had still not agreed to either of these major items. Under the legislation contained in Bill 100 (passed in June, 1975), a fact-finder was appointed to investigate the dispute. In his notice informing the teachers of the fact-finder's appointment, the EPC chairman made it clear that:

> IF THE PROCESS OF FACT-FINDING CANNOT BRING ABOUT A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT THEN YOUR NEGOTIATING TEAM AND YOUR TEACHERS' COUNCIL WILL CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO BRING ABOUT THAT REASONABLE SETTLEMENT AND WILL DEMONSTRATE THE NECESSARY LEADERSHIP TO BRING ABOUT A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER THE FINAL DECISION WILL BE YOURS.
> 1. BOARD OF ARBITRATION
> 2. FINAL OFFER SELECTION
> 3. STRIKE

The fact-finder's report failed to recommend parity with the secondary teachers as of January, 1976, and, consequently, was rejected by teachers. True to their word, the negotiating team and Teachers' Council investigated the options listed above and decided to push for arbitration. However, they were willing to back up their call for arbitration with a "Media/Political Action Campaign". Thus, on April 7, 1976, a mass meeting of teachers was called to vote on the Board's final offer. At this meeting the negotiating team recommended rejection of the Board's offer and moved that the teachers vote in favour of sending the dispute to arbitration. Further, the teachers were informed, prior to the April 7 meeting, that...
In order to counter the possible refusal of the Ottawa Board of Education to arbitrate, it is the intention of the executive to use public relations and political action programmes to inform the public of our position in this dispute and through public pressure alter any refusal by the Ottawa Board of Education to arbitrate.

Included in these plans for this PR campaign were examples of radio commercials which clearly contained the threat of strike.

Another Board of Education Strike?
Who wants it?
- not parents!
- not teachers!
But the Board won't negotiate, mediate or arbitrate.

Nice Guys finish Last or so it seems.
We've asked for negotiation
Mediation, arbitration
The Board wants Confrontation
Do you want a Teachers' Strike?

The outcome of the April 7th meeting was that the Board offer was rejected and the call for arbitration supported. It also appears that the plans for the "Media/Political Action" were approved, but they were never put into operation. Rather than refuse to go to arbitration, the Board agreed to arbitrate, but only for a twenty-month contract. This action apparently befuddled the elementary teachers' leadership. They could no longer mobilize around the issue of arbitration. Instead, they would have to focus specifically on the failure to get parity as of January, 1976. While this issue could stir
elementary teachers, there were good reasons for believing that little public support would be forthcoming on the issue.16

In the end, the Board and the teachers were able to reach a tentative agreement in May, which provided for parity with secondary teachers, but it failed to include a cost-of-living allowance. However, this agreement did not stand. The AIB rolled back the elementary teachers' pay increase in the fall.

This brief review of leadership actions in 1975–76 shows that there were some leaders who were willing to consider militant action. It is tempting to see these more militant leaders' failure to lead the teachers to take coercive action in 1975–76 as due to external factors that came into effect in 1975, rather than as due to internal schisms within the teachers' group. In 1975, both the AIB and Bill 100 came into effect. For teachers the presence of the AIB raised the serious possibility that battles won through militant action against the Board would be lost in an ensuing battle with the AIB. For its part, Bill 100 ensured that local leaders could not strike while the iron was hot. Bill 100 legalized teachers' strikes, but also prohibited teachers from

16. The main problem in getting public support for parity as of January, 1976, was that the Board could easily prove that elementary teachers' pay for the period from January, 1975, to August, 1976, was actually higher than that received by secondary teachers in the same period due to the secondaries' loss of salary during the strike. Further, the Board could point out that it was in agreement on the issue of parity, but simply lacked the money to achieve it prior to the fall of 1976.
taking action prior to the expiration of existing agreements. One could guess that teachers' discontent was building significantly just prior to the summer break of 1975. However, when the chairman of EPC tried to rekindle the teachers' anger in the fall, he found himself prevented from mobilizing any strong action because the existing agreement extended to December, 1975.

The Board also helped defuse teachers' support for militant action by repeatedly stating its agreement with the principle of parity between elementary and secondary teachers. Rather than disagreeing with the teachers on a matter of principle, the Board simply disagreed on when the principle should be re-established. Similarly, when arbitration appeared to be emerging as an issue, the Board avoided confrontation on the principle of arbitration. Intentional or not, these were sharp moves; preventing teacher leadership from using appeals to matters of principle in mobilizing teachers.

Undoubtedly these "external" factors did affect the course of teacher action in 1975-76. However, it is by no means clear that the militants within the Ottawa leadership would have been successful in

17. Bill 100 also prohibited strikes until 30 days after the fact-finder's report had been released. No strikes were to be taken without fact-finding preceding them.

18. It is interesting to note that the Board left the leaders with one unequivocal matter of principle on which to fight. This was the principle of good faith. As was noted previously, a number of leaders appeared to feel betrayed when the Board did not reward them for undercutting the secondary strike. Clearly, however, mobilizing around this issue was untenable. Leaders simply could not say that the Board betrayed them by not rewarding their own betrayal of the secondary teachers.
mobilizing strong action in the absence of the above factors. The
group of "young bucks" pushing militant action simply lacked the power,
influence, and teacher loyalty necessary to mobilize teachers. Lacking
the support of principles and vice-principals, and encumbered by the
distrust of female leaders, they lacked any effective means of
carrying convincing messages to teachers.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In Ottawa we have found that elementary teachers' docility
cannot be attributed to a lack of discontent-generating conditions.
Declining enrolment, declining promotional opportunities, and salary

19. According to one informant, "The young men did try to push for
strong action but couldn't get any backing from principals and
vice-principals. They had no wind behind their sails.
Principals who would have supported strong action felt they
shouldn't get involved or associate with active teachers for
fear of getting their wrists slapped." Further, it should be
noted that according to one "young buck" at the April 7, 1976,
meeting... "senior principals publicly abused the 'young bucks'
over one of their motions".

20. Judging from the comments of respondents the "young bucks" did
not have smooth relations with WTAO leaders. For example, in
response to the question - "Weren't you worried that you would
hurt your own chances in the system by confronting the Board?" -
one of the male leaders of 1975-76 said; "It was the sell out
[by WTAO] behind me that I was worried about." Another of the
male leaders of 1975-76 characterized his relations with WTAO
leaders in the following way: "I had nothing but frustration in
dealing with FW. Teachers' Council was the big mixmaster. It
couldn't make decisions. It made bad decisions or bad
compromises. I had contempt for FW leaders. There were very
few I liked. They couldn't make decisions on their own or
courageous decisions."
disparities were all present to stimulate discontent, but significant action never materialized. We have also found that docility cannot be fully explained by a lack of militant leaders. Granted, it is not clear that WTAO leaders were ever strongly interested in taking militant action into Ottawa, but neither did they reject it as illegitimate. They did after all, show support for other teacher groups' militant action. With regard to male leaders there is no doubt that the male teachers who took over Men's Club in the mid-seventies were seriously interested in leading the teachers to take militant action. Finally, the docility of Ottawa teachers cannot be accounted for by a lack of resources. To be sure, the lack of either a local or provincial strike fund put a damper on striking, but this did not prevent other actions such as P.R. campaigns or demonstrations - neither of which materialized.

One of the factors that does appear to help account for the Ottawa teachers' docility, and clearly distinguished them from Carleton teachers, is their lack of solidarity.

In Carleton, conflicting interests between men and women were minimized through the establishment of a single organization to represent and meet the needs of all teachers. In contrast, in Ottawa conflicting interests were reinforced and sharpened by the presence of three different organizations (i.e., WTAO, Men's Club and the Ottawa Elementary School Principals' Association). In the case of one organization - WTAO - its very existence depended upon emphasizing the conflicting interests of men and women teachers.
A second factor can be seen to help explain both Ottawa teachers' docility and their lack of solidarity, relative to their Carleton counterparts. Specifically, it is suggested that Ottawa teachers' docility and fragmentation was due, partially, to the success of Ottawa Board authorities in co-opting elementary school principals. In contrast, the development of militancy in Carleton was, to a large degree, made possible by the failure of the CBE to co-opt elementary school principals.

Because elementary teachers work in small, geographically separated groups, it is difficult for them to form a strong organization without support from principals. By virtue of their greater discretionary time, control over school resources, and status within the school system, principals can more readily play a key role in the development of a strong local federation than can classroom teachers. However, these same attributes give principals the potential to be very effective in preventing militant action if they desire to do so. In sum, the elementary school principal is in a key position to either hinder or help the mobilization of teachers. In Ottawa, they hindered.

There are two basic reasons why Ottawa principals tended to become more strongly loyal to management than did Carleton principals. First, the mobility system in Ottawa was controlled informally by management, via the "old boys' club"; whereas in Carleton, the TFC exercised a significant amount of control over opportunities for promotion. In Carleton there was no strong informal "old boys' club"
linking principals to top management. To get a promotion in Carleton one certainly did need to get the support of senior principals, as in Ottawa. However, to get such support, and to become visible to top administrators and trustees, one also had to make a contribution of the TFC. This was because senior principals were strong supporters of TFC. Thus, new principals and vice-principals came into their positions having developed strong contacts with, and loyalty to, TFC leaders.

The second reason for differences in Ottawa and Carleton principals' orientations is simply that the Ottawa Board had done more to win elementary principals' loyalty than had the Carleton Board. For example, although both the OBE and CBE were committed to creating an integrated, kindergarten-to-grade 12 system, the OBE continued to recognize elementary principals as a distinct group from secondary principals, but the CBE did not. Where Carleton elementary principals found themselves to be second-class citizens within the Carleton Principals' Association, the Ottawa elementary principals communicated directly with superintendents without the presence of secondary principals. Perhaps more important, elementary principals in Carleton found themselves to have lost power and autonomy when the CBE was formed. Coming from relatively small school systems, where they had a great deal of autonomy and influence, Carleton principals undoubtedly perceived a loss of influence and autonomy with the development of a large group of superintendents and administrators in the CBE. In contrast, in Ottawa, the formation of the OBE saw a highly centralized and paternalistic system give way to a more decentralized system.
Further, if our informants are to be believed, superintendents actually lost power to Ottawa elementary principals. Thus it appears that the failure of militancy in Ottawa was primarily due to social control and the lack of teacher solidarity. It should be clear, however, that this conclusion does not deny that leadership was important in the development of militancy in Carleton. Rather, it simply points to the importance of building solidarity and weakening social control as preconditions for leaders being effective in leading a group to militancy,
Chapter VII

OTTAWA AND CARLETON SECONDARY TEACHERS

I. ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY GROUPS IN CONTRAST

The Ottawa and Carleton secondary groups have a number of common characteristics which set them apart from their elementary counterparts and which, at the same time, can be seen to facilitate their taking militant action.

First, the secondary groups have had much easier access to resources to support local coercive action than their elementary counterparts. Where the elementary groups' provincial federations showed little inclination to support or stimulate militant action at the local level, the UETF's provincial organization became strongly supportive of local militancy in the first half of the seventies, supplying information, advisors, and money (including strike funds) to local groups involved in coercive action.

Apart from having stronger support for coercive action from their provincial organization, the secondary groups can be seen to have been better organized for taking coercive action than the elementary groups. Where elementary teachers were spread out in a large number of small schools, the secondary teachers were concentrated in a relatively small number of large schools. This facilitated leadership communication
with the membership and also made it possible for the local federation to develop a very effective organizational structure.

In both local OSSTF organizations, the school is the basic building block of the local federation. Each school is defined as a "branch" of the local district organization. Each branch (school) has its own executive body composed of past president, president, vice-president, secretary-treasurer, district councillor, CWQE representative, and at least one representative for each of the district's standing committees. With the exception of the past president, all of these positions are filled by a staff vote.

The president and district councillor from each branch serve as the school's representative on the District Council - the district's legislative body. The remainder of the District Council is made up of the District Executive.

The District Executive contains seven officers (past president, president, first vice-president, second vice-president, secretary, treasurer, and communications officer) as well as a principals' representative and the chairmen of all standing committees. With the exception of the past president, all District Executive officers are

1. CWQE stands for "conditions of work for Quality Education. Each CWQE representative is responsible for gathering statistics on his/her school (e.g. workload, size of classes, qualifications of teachers, etc.) and forwarding them to the provincial CWQE committee.

2. In Ottawa there is one representative from each branch to each of the district's standing committees. In Carleton there are two from each branch.
elected at an annual meeting of all district OSSTF members. The principals' representative is elected by principals and the chairmen of standing committees are elected by their committees.

The distinguishing features of this organizational structure are that: (1) it provides a significant number of federation activists in each school to help keep the federation visible to members and to carry communications effectively from the branch and the district leadership, (2) it provides for coordination of the activities of committees with those of the executive by placing committee chairmen on the Executive, (3) it provides a basis for membership support of committee activities in that each school elects a representative to each standing committee. Most important, in view of our concern with militancy, is the way the Relations Committee (the committee which handles the district's negotiations with the Board) fits into this structure. As a standing committee, the Relations Committee contains elected representatives from each school, and its chairman is a member of the District Executive. Coordination between the Executive and the Relations Committee is further enhanced by the fact that, in Carleton, one of the vice-presidents and, in Ottawa, both of the vice-presidents are appointed members of the Relations Committee.

Related to our discussion of organizational structure is the fact that the secondary groups are not subject to the same internal conflict between males and females as the elementary groups. Secondary women are underrepresented in positions of responsibility in both secondary systems, but the federation structure of the local groups
does not facilitate this inequality being a source of conflict.
Secondary teachers in Ottawa and in Carleton are either members of the
OSSTF or the AEFO depending on whether they teach in English or French,
not depending on their sex. While this split in the federation member-
ship of the Ottawa and Carleton groups might appear to provide a poten-
tial basis for conflict between French and English-speaking teachers,
no such conflict has arisen in either secondary group. In the case of
the Carleton group, the number of AEFO secondary teachers simply
appears to be too small to create much difficulty, even if AEFO
teachers were at loggerheads with their OSSTF colleagues.3 In Ottawa,
where close to 20% of the teachers were AEFO members in 1975-76, there
appears to be little, if any, inequality in the anglophone and franc-
ophone teachers' representation in positions of responsibility. This is
due to the fact that the majority of AEFO members teach in all-French
schools where all the positions of responsibility go to francophone-
teachers.

Another similarity between the two secondary groups which
differentiates them from their elementary cousins is to be found in
membership characteristics. Males constitute approximately 30% of each
of the two elementary groups, but they make up almost 70% of the member-
ship in both the secondary groups. Assuming that the previous research
which shows males to be more inclined to support militant action is
valid, this high proportion of males among the secondary groups should

3. In 1975-76 it was estimated that there were only 52 AEFO members
in Carleton or about 6.3% of the entire secondary group.
Increase their propensity to take coercive action. The secondary groups not only have a higher proportion of males than the elementary groups, they also have a higher proportion of males who hold university degrees. As was argued in Chapter IV, male teachers with degrees are likely to experience discontent from viewing their salaries in relation to those of similarly-educated males in other occupations. In 1973-74, 86.7% of Carleton secondary males and 83.5% of Ottawa male secondary teachers held university degrees, compared to 65.7% of Carleton elementary males and 68% of Ottawa elementary males. In sum, there is reason to believe that both secondary teacher groups had a higher proportion of members who were willing and motivated to take coercive action than did their elementary counterparts. Further, the secondary groups were better organized for taking coercive action and had greater resources to support them in taking such action.

II. PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR

The above similarities would appear to be conducive to militancy on the part of both secondary groups. However, the Ottawa group has shown a much greater propensity to become involved in coercive action than has its Carleton neighbour.

In the spring of 1970, the Ottawa teachers broke new ground by staging a three-day work-to-rule to get the CBE to improve its salary offer. 1971 saw the group seriously threaten to work-to-rule again, when the teachers voted to give their negotiating team the power to
declare a work-to-rule at its own discretion. What was only threatened in 1971 was put into action in 1972. Specifically, the Ottawa teachers worked-to-rule from September to December in 1972 in order to back up salary demands. Further, in 1972, the Ottawa teachers became highly active in school board elections\(^4\) and four schools staged a one-day walkout to protest a trustee's statement that meeting the teachers' salary demands would necessitate reducing the secondary teaching staff by sixty teachers. In 1975, the Ottawa group's militancy reached its apex in one of the longest teachers' strikes ever staged in Ontario.\(^5\)

In contrast to the pattern of increasing militancy found in Ottawa, the Carleton teacher group showed some early aggressive behavior in the form of a one-month work-to-rule in the spring of 1971. This was followed by apparently continuous docility. Indeed, all negotiations after 1971 resulted in settlements within a few months of their starting dates. Further, the newspapers carry no news of any serious conflict between the CBE and its secondary teachers after the 1971 work-to-rule.

Given the similarities in the two groups' resources, organization and membership characteristics, how can we account for the apparently greater militancy in the Ottawa group? In what follows it

\(^4\) Teachers' activities included developing, publicizing, and distributing a list of preferred candidates and attending all-candidates meetings at which the teachers made their negotiating problems a central issue in questioning candidates.

\(^5\) A detailed review of the Ottawa secondary negotiations is provided in Appendix C.
will be argued that the greater militancy of the Ottawa group can be largely understood to be the result of differences in (1) the impact of provincial ceilings, (2) the nature of teacher/Board relations, and (3) the economic situation of teachers.

III. BOARD/TEACHER RELATIONS IN OTTAWA AND CARLETON

Up to the summer of 1969, the majority of Ottawa and Carleton area secondary teachers came under the common administrative authority of the Collegiate Institute Board of Ottawa (CIBO). Further, all of the OSSTF teachers, with the exception of those employed in one school in the Carleton area, were members of the same federation district - District 26. All were to remain members of District 26 until 1972.

According to informants, the director of education and the superintendents virtually ran the CIBO. The appointed trustees of the CIBO reportedly followed senior administrators' advice in decision-making. Part of the superintendents' role in the CIBO was seen to serve as protectors of teachers' individual and collective interests. In sum, the CIBO could be characterized as a paternalistic system in which appointed trustees relied on the advice of ex-teacher administrators in making decisions. The restructuring of the Ottawa area boards which took place in 1969 and 1970, seriously altered this paternalistic system and, in the process, opened the door to increased militancy on the part of both newly-formed groups of secondary teachers.
Since the trustees of the new CBE and CIBO were elected rather than appointed to their posts, they were directly accountable to the public. As a result, trustees became more inclined to take an independent and aggressive role in board decision-making than CIBO trustees. In addition, ex-elementary trustees, who were never appointed to their posts, rose to power and prominence in the new boards and showed little hesitancy to exercise their decision-making power.

A. Relations in Carleton

The first CBE chairman, C.D. Arthur, had previously been chairman of the NPSB. Arthur was a strong, independent chairman faced with the problem of creating a secondary system where none had existed before without the assistance of an established secondary administrative staff. Even if Arthur and other CBE trustees had desired to rely on administrators to run the system, they would have been unable to do so.

For former CIBO teachers, the formation of the CBE resulted in a loss of both key contacts at the board offices and protection that was previously provided by superintendents. These losses set the stage for the Carleton secondary group's one fling at militant action in 1971.

According to all CBE teachers interviewed, there are two interlinked keys to the Carleton work-to-rule. First, Carléton teachers felt that the CBE had "broken promises" and "betrayed them." Prior to the secondary teachers becoming part of the CBE, Carleton trustees
reputedly went to the high schools and promised secondary teachers that they would never lose anything by joining the Carleton system. However, from the teachers' perspective, this promise was not kept, as the following quotations from the Carleton secondary leaders show.

Negotiations were difficult in the first few years with the new Board. Verbal agreements with the Board were not kept and Carleton teachers were falling behind Ottawa in most everything, including salary.

There was a psychological feeling of betrayal. "Why am I earning $300 less than if I were in Ottawa?" The sense of betrayal was more important than tangible issues.

Arthur had promised nothing would be lost by joining the CBE then the Board offers nothing while the OBE secondaries get an offer of a salary increase. The broken promise was key.

The above quotes suggest that the main motivation for the work-to-rule was the failure of the CBE to offer salaries as good as those being offered to Ottawa secondary teachers. However, there is more to

6. The promise was, in fact, put in writing. The CBE minutes of February 17, 1969, report the following motion to have been passed by the Board.

...BE IT RESOLVED that this Board do now undertake with the members of the teaching and maintenance staff employed by the Ottawa Collegiate Institute Board of Carleton High Schools, and each of those, who notify this Board on or before the 31st of May, 1969, that they wish to continue at a Carleton High School, to engage such members and each of them on terms of employment at least equal to all those under which such persons were employed at the time of notification of termination or agreement to terminate such Agreements.

AND this Board agrees to recognize all credits and advantages acquired by each such member while employed by the Collegiate Institute Board of Ottawa, to the intent that no member of the staff shall be under any disadvantage by reason of employment with the Carleton Board as opposed to continued employment with the Collegiate Institute Board of Ottawa.
the notion of "broken promises" and feelings of betrayal than this. Carleton secondary teachers were upset by the CBE's attempt to renegotiate the fringe benefits they had received under the CIBO and by the Board's unwillingness to provide a grandfather-clause which would protect teachers who were over-classified in a qualification category from having to upgrade their education to retain their category standing. Both of these points require elaboration.

The Board's effort to renegotiate fringe benefits (the amount of the Board's payment toward health insurance and a cumulative sick leave arrangement) was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to bring the fringe benefits provided to elementary and secondary teachers into line. Toward this end, the Board encouraged the two groups of teachers to join together in the negotiations of fringe benefits. The secondary teachers refused to do this even though the elementary group was quite willing to negotiate jointly. Unable to get the two panels to negotiate together, the Board chairman attempted to match up the fringe benefits of elementary and secondary teachers by getting the secondary teachers to give up some of their benefits. (The elementary group lacked the fringe benefits of the secondary group). This issue arose in 1969 and 1970 negotiations, but was settled in the teachers' favour (i.e. no loss of benefits) without the teachers resorting to sanctions. However, even though the teachers didn't lose this battle, they were greatly angered that the Board had attempted to renge on its promise.

The classification issue arose because the CIBO had been very generous in classifying teachers. In the late sixties and early
seventies, the Provincial OSSTF and AEFO pushed for boards to utilize a certification system that they had developed—presumably to prevent unscrupulous boards from underclassifying teachers. However, when the new Ottawa area Boards adopted the federations' classification system in 1970, they were forced to deal with a legacy of overclassified teachers from the CIBO. In Ottawa this was handled by means of a grandfather-clause which allowed all former CIBO to retain their category classifications. Further, ex-CIBO teachers in Ottawa were allowed six years to upgrade themselves to the top category, as it was defined under the generous CIBO system of classification. In contrast, ex-CIBO teachers who came to Carleton could only remain immune to the new classification system if they were 55 years old; all others had until September 1, 1972, to bring their qualifications in line with the new category requirements or face reclassification. According to one informant, the adoption of the new classification system only affected two teachers, but again teachers felt betrayed. In one way the fact that only two teachers were affected may have made teachers more upset than if a larger number had faced reclassification. The money saved from reducing the category classification of two teachers simply was too small to be of much consequence to the Board. Thus, from the teachers' perspective, the Board was willing to break promises with them for very little reason; and, thus, had little concern for teachers' welfare.

The issues of fringe benefits and category classification arose in the negotiations the year prior to the work-to-rule and helped set
the stage for it. In 1971, the past betrayals were capped by the Board’s refusal to offer any salary increase, while the Ottawa teachers were offered a three percent increase. Throughout these early years a key individual - the Board Chairman, C.D. Arthur - was seen by the teachers to be the central source of broken promises and betrayal. According to teacher leaders, Arthur’s abrasiveness and low regard for secondary teachers exercised an independent influence in stirring teachers to action in 1971. The following quotes help to show the importance of Arthur in stirring Carleton teachers’ militancy.

In 1969 we had an official legal document promising the Board would honour our old contract. But Arthur wanted to negotiate the hospital pay even though the Board lawyer said they were bound to the old contract. That Arthur would try [to renegotiate fringe benefits] was enough to anger the teachers. He became incensed with the secondaries and would try to anger them. For example, he attempted to advertise positions of responsibility outside of the system. Trust had been lost so the teachers wanted a formal contract. They knew they would have to match up with the elementaries [in fringe benefits] sometime, but were not prepared to hold back or fall off just to please Arthur. Arthur was a bigger issue than the fringe benefits or money.

In 1971 he said he couldn’t negotiate with the secondaries and asked to be left off the negotiating team but he controlled the team from behind the scenes. Further, he opened the negotiations by saying “There’s no use negotiating with you secondary bastards, you’re going to sit on your hands until Ottawa settles”.

Money was not a major issue: Arthur was. The offer of 0% compared to 3% in Ottawa simply symobilized C.D. Arthur and his method of operation.

The number one and most important issue in the work-to-rule was C.D. Arthur. He functioned by confrontation and made mobilization easy. The teachers hated him. He was Hitler - a bad guy who could do no right.

Clearly increased teacher discontent was a key factor in the 1971 work-to-rule. However, it was discontent that probably would not have
developed had the teachers been dealing with the more gentle, appointed CIBO trustees, or if Arthur and other trustees had had old and respected superintendents to advise them and to interpret the Board's intentions to the teachers. In sum, the loss of teacher channels of influence and communication, coupled with the emergence of a forceful ex-elementary trustee as Board chairman, created the conditions that led to teacher discontent and militancy. In turn, the Carleton group's lack of militancy after 1971 was due, in large part, to the teachers' regaining influence, and Arthur's loss of power within the Board.

At least three factors can be seen to have contributed to the secondary group's regaining influence after 1971. First, the secondary teachers made a conscious and successful effort to get trustees elected to the CBE who would be more favourable toward them and who could, and would, challenge Arthur's power. Specifically, Carleton secondary leaders reported successfully supporting an Ottawa secondary teacher and an ex-CIBO secondary teacher in the 1972 Board election. In one of the above cases, the chairman of the teachers' negotiating team is reported to have helped run the candidate's campaign. Second, many of the trustees appeared to be upset by Arthur and the confrontation he fostered with teachers. When given a chance, in January 1972, they elected a new chairman—Louise McIntosh. Like Arthur, McIntosh was an ex-elementary trustee. However, McIntosh had fought with Arthur over the organization of the Board from its very beginning. Coming from the more liberal Gloucester Public School Board, McIntosh favoured closer relations between teachers and trustees than did Arthur. Upon
becoming chairman, she attempted to increase elementary and secondary teachers' input to Board decision-making. Here quotes from several informants are useful for showing McIntosh's role in improving teacher/Board relations.

McIntosh tried to heal the wounds created by Arthur and created a number of joint [teacher/Board] committees.

Louise McIntosh was instrumental in reducing militancy. She was amazed at what Arthur had done. People respected her and she brought teachers around creating a trusting relationship.

Louise McIntosh eased tensions - got teachers on committees and involved in policy changes.

Along with electing a chairman who was interested in involving teachers in decision-making the Board began to give their young superintendents some greater influence within the system. Thus according to one informant...

After Arthur left the Board [in the winter of 1973 -74] a feeling of mutual trust was established. It was the superintendents who were responsible for this by demonstrating the Board's good will and good intentions in their actions.

Here it is important to note that the superintendents who appeared to achieve the most influence within the system were ex-secondary teachers and that four of them had been CIBO secondary principals immediately preceding the formation of the CBE. Thus Carleton secondary teachers had old colleagues occupying key posts and gaining influence in the new Board.

Finally, there is some reason to believe that part of the reason that the Carleton secondary teachers regained influence was that the Board feared the consequences of not according them more influence. The 1971, one-month work-to-rule was, at the time, a fairly radical
action for teachers to take. As one teacher put it "The work-to-rule was seen at the time to be horrendously radical". It is likely that the trustees perceived their secondary teachers to be capable of taking serious action in the future, if no accommodation was made with the group. Further, the militancy of other secondary groups in the years to follow 1971 set examples for the Board as to what they could expect to happen if their secondary teachers were antagonized.

In sum, a combination of factors - Arthur's loss of power, the rise of cooperative trustees, the increased influence of previous colleagues in top administrative posts and perhaps fear - helped secondary teachers to regain influence and trust with their Board. As an aside, it might be noted that at the same time that the Board was working to develop better relations with the secondary group the elementary teachers were building up anger over their perceived "second-class citizenship" and the spoiled child syndrome.

One further point needs to be made before we leave the discussion of Board/teacher relations in Carleton. Part of what created teachers' anger was the secondary teachers' loss of status as well as of influence with the demise of the CIBO. As was mentioned in Chapter IV, loss of status can be seen to have been a major contributory factor to the rise of secondary teachers' militancy across Ontario. In Carleton and Ottawa the loss of status that resulted from being placed under a common-elected Board with elementary teachers was exacerbated by the fact that both of the new Boards were initially dominated by ex-elementary trustees who failed to hold the secondary teachers in high-esteem.
and who saw little value in providing differential treatment to the two panels. In Carleton, it appears that secondary teachers managed to regain a status-differential between themselves and the elementary group, but in Ottawa, as we will see, the loss of status was permanent.

B. Board/Teacher Relations in Ottawa

Like the secondary teachers who went from the CIBO to the CBE, those who became employees of the OBE found themselves without effective means of communication and influence under the new Board. Like their Carleton counterparts, OBE secondary teachers found their superintendents unable to effectively protect their interests under the elected Board which was chaired by ex-OPSB trustees for its first three years. One Ottawa teacher informant described the change which came with the formation of the OBE as follows:

Under the CIBO the role of protection went to superintendents. Appointed board members acted on the advice of superintendents. With the elected Board there was a take over of decision-making power from superintendents. The superintendents' protective role became ineffective. The Board wanted and did take power from professional educators.

Regarding the fate of superintendents, other informants gave more colourful descriptions. "They [the elected trustees] treat them like dirt." "The trustees have made the superintendents into messenger boys."

In short, Ottawa secondary teachers, like their Carleton cousins, went from having their interests well-protected by the superintendents and the director to having very little influence or protection within the system. Not surprisingly, the secondary teachers came
to view the new Board as insensitive to their interests and concerns. A number of actions by the Board and Individual trustees led the teachers to feel their Board held them in low regard. For example, when the Board decided to have administrators handle negotiations in 1972, the teachers took this as a sign that the trustees placed a low priority on negotiating with them. In a similar vein, the decision to put a junior personnel officer, who the teachers saw as "small-minded, unprofessional and less well-educated than teachers", in charge of key secondary personnel matters and in an advisory role in negotiations was cited by several leaders as a major irritation which "became a rallying point and built teacher solidarity". Also of importance in making teachers feel like second-class citizens was a Board decision, in 1964, to forbid teachers from even discussing school board elections among themselves in staff rooms. Perhaps more important than the specific actions mentioned above was the Board's general pattern of negotiating with its secondary teachers. Frequently the Board's negotiations with its secondary teachers were long, drawn out affairs which saw Ottawa teachers go through months of negotiations only to achieve salary increases which were basically the same as those won by their Carleton counterparts without any serious delay or conflict. In other words, the Ottawa teachers could readily see their former colleagues in the suburbs receiving much better treatment than themselves, especially after 1971, when the CBE was attempting to improve relations with its secondary teachers.

Not only did Ottawa teachers find the collective actions of
their new Board to degrade them, but they were faced with their own version of C.D. Arthur in the form of Roy Bushfield. Bushfield was an ex-OPSB trustee who served on the OBE from its inception until the late 1970's, when he attempted to move into municipal politics. Unlike Arthur, Bushfield did not become a kingpin within the Board. Rather, he utilized the press to play directly to the public in criticizing fellow trustees and, more frequently, teachers. Bushfield's antagonizing actions are simply too numerous to mention, however, his message was basically the same - teachers were overpaid and underworked. Publicizing this view did little to endear him to the secondary teachers who took the brunt of his criticism. The failure of his fellow trustees to silence or effectively counter him, in the press, did little to build positive relations between the teachers and the Board as a whole.

Unlike the situation in Carleton, relations between the OBE and its secondary teachers showed no sign of improving in the seventies. Trustees either made no effort to improve relations or were not perceived to make any such effort by teachers. Superintendents apparently continued to lose, rather than gain influence within the Board. Thus, as the seventies progressed, Ottawa secondary teachers found themselves facing ceilings, curriculum changes, and an increasingly critical public, without trustees or administrators able or willing to run interference for them. As a result they were increasingly forced to rely on their own resources and collective coercive action to protect and further their own interests.
Differences in Board/teacher relations only provide part of the explanation of why the Ottawa group became more militant than the Carleton group. Equally, if not more, important to the explanation of the differences in the groups' militancy are differences in the impact of provincial ceilings on the two Boards and their secondary teachers. Indeed, differences in the impact of ceilings may partially account for the differences in Board/teacher relations just discussed.

IV. THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF PROVINCIAL CEILINGS

Almost every discussion of teacher militancy in Ontario makes reference to ceilings as an important source of teacher militancy in the seventies. More specifically, it is usually argued that the imposition of mandatory provincial ceilings put pressure on boards to keep teachers' salaries down and to lay off teachers, which, in turn, angered teachers. What often is not noted is (1) that the impact of ceilings varied from board to board, and (2) that where the impact was strong, it led to declines in working conditions beyond the commonly-mentioned increase in class-size. While all boards were subject to the provincial ceilings, their impact varied depending on whether enrolments were increasing or declining, and on the board's level of spending prior to the imposition of ceilings. The ceilings stipulated a fixed amount that could be spent on operational expenses per secondary and per elementary pupil. In boards, such as the OBE, where enrolments started to decline in the early seventies, the value of increases
In the ceilings was reduced by a loss in pupils. This resulted in the system having to cut services to stay within the ceilings. In Ottawa the problem was aggravated by the fact that, prior to the introduction of mandatory ceilings, the OBE (and the CIBO before it) was one of the highest spending boards in the province – spending well in excess of the non-mandatory ceilings which were in effect prior to 1971. Thus, even if Ottawa enrolments were not declining, the Board would have had great difficulty in staying within the ceilings without cutting services, supplies, and salary increases. In actuality, boards, such as Ottawa, which had spent in excess of non-mandatory ceilings in 1970 were allowed to slightly exceed the new mandatory ceilings until 1973. It was expected that all boards would come into line by 1973. Thus, in the year that the OBE experienced its first significant decline in secondary enrolment – 1973, it also had to fully comply with the ceilings for the first time. (See Table 81).

In contrast to the Carleton Board, which had not previously been as big a spender as the OBE, which had growing enrolments, and which had not built up extensive services; 7 the OBE was faced with a very

---

7. The table below compares selected per pupil secondary expenditures of the CBE and OBE for 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Expenditure</th>
<th>1970 Per Pupil Secondary System Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OBE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>$30.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Services</td>
<td>10.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Services</td>
<td>41.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: calculated from data in the annual reports of the OBE and the CBE
Table 81: Changes in the Size of Secondary Enrolment and in the Size of Teacher Force by Board, 1970-71 to 1977-78.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ottawa Board of Education</th>
<th>Carleton Board of Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change in Enrolment</td>
<td>Change in Number of Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>+1520</td>
<td>+59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>+1135</td>
<td>+107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>+687</td>
<td>+30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>-928</td>
<td>-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>-382</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>-63</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>-788</td>
<td>-51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>-480</td>
<td>-38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the Ontario Minister of Education.
difficult financial situation. To cope with financial constraint, the Board not only fought hard to keep teachers' salary increases down, but were also forced to reduce the amount and quality of supplies and services to the schools. Thus, teachers went from working under a board which in the sixties was seen as a "lighthouse" board providing a high-level of support for teachers and educational innovations, to working for a board where the purchase of new books had become a luxury. A vicious circle was created in which declining working conditions fueled both teachers' dissatisfaction with their jobs and the anger behind demands for higher pay, while success in winning salary increases led to further deterioration of working conditions, fueling increased militancy in the next round of negotiations.

Perhaps the crowning blow in all this was what happened between 1973-74 and 1974-75. In this period, the Board reduced the number of positions of responsibility from 394 to 355 to cope with the financial constraint imposed by ceilings. As we will see in the next section, this end of promotional opportunities coincided with the growth of a large body of Ottawa teachers who had little hope of obtaining significant salary increases without promotion and, thus, helped fuel the fire of economic deprivation which leaders lit in order to bring about the strike of 1975.
V. DIFFERENCES IN THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF OTTAWA AND CARLETON SECONDARY TEACHERS

In the foregoing pages, I have suggested, among other things, that changes in Board/teacher relations and the imposition of provincial ceilings, contributed to a greater increase in teacher discontent in Ottawa than in Carleton. In this section it will be suggested that changes in the composition of the Ottawa group resulted in greater feelings of economic deprivation in Ottawa and, hence, served to further heighten discontent among Ottawa teachers. However, before preceding with this argument, it will be interesting to examine one crude, general indicator of teacher discontent in Ottawa and Carleton - the rate of resignation.

Table 82 presents the number and rate of resignations by year, for Carleton and Ottawa secondary teachers who are members of the OSSTF. At the outset, it should be noted that these data are limited in their utility for indicating teacher discontent. First, "resignations" include persons who have left their jobs involuntarily (e.g., due to death, firing, retirement, etc.) as well as those who left voluntarily. Second, those who left under their own volition may not have been very discontented. They may simply have been offered better opportunities in other employment. This said, however, it seems fair to assume that the rate of involuntary "resignations" is fairly constant over time and between boards. Hence, differences in involuntary resignation rates probably do not account for the variations in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ottawa Board of Education</th>
<th>Carleton Board of Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 82. In addition, since Ottawa and Carleton teachers have access to the same job market, differences in the two groups' resignation rates are likely to be related to differences in discontent rather than to differences in employment opportunities. In sum, while the data are far from perfect, they seem adequate to provide a general indication of the level of discontent in Ottawa and Carleton.

Turning to Table 82, it appears that while teacher discontent rose among both sets of secondary teachers between 1971 and 1973, the level of discontent has been consistently higher in Ottawa than in Carleton. In fact, the Ottawa rate has been high relative to almost all other secondary teachers' groups in the province. Of the 79 OSSTF groups in Ontario, only eight had higher rates of resignation than the Ottawa group in 1973. Further, five of the eight groups with higher rates than the Ottawa group had less than fifty members, and all eight had less than 200 members. Thus, the Ottawa group had the highest rate of resignation of any large OSSTF group in 1973. Indeed, in 1973, the highest resignation rate among comparably-sized groups (i.e., those with 1000 or more members) was 12.7% or about nine percentage points below the Ottawa group's rate. Thus, there is some evidence that discontent has been substantially higher among Ottawa secondary teachers than among the majority of Ontario secondary groups, not just higher than Carleton teachers' discontent.

Contributing to this apparently exceptionally high level of discontent in Ottawa have been disconcerting changes in the Ottawa secondary teachers' economic situation. Relative to other groups,
Ottawa secondary teachers can be seen to have been paid relatively well. Comparison of Ottawa and Carleton secondary teachers' salary grids of the seventies reveals no major inequalities between the groups. Further, no one, including teachers, denies that both groups had fared well, relative to other teacher groups outside the Ottawa area. In fact, the 1974 Ottawa grid was reported to make Ottawa teachers the highest-paid teachers in the province. But the most convincing evidence that Ottawa teachers were doing well, relative to other teachers, is the fact that the leadership did not stress comparisons with other teacher groups in attempting to stir feelings of economic deprivation in mobilizing for the 1975 strike. Rather, they stressed the failure of teachers' salaries to keep pace with inflation and the salary increases experienced in non-teaching occupations in Ottawa.

As we will see later, leadership's comparisons of teachers' salaries with those of non-teaching groups and changes in the cost-of-living were very effective in gaining teachers' support for the strike. However, if Ottawa teachers were actually experiencing discontent on these grounds, prior to the leadership's mobilizing efforts, so too should have the Carleton teachers, since their salary grid had stayed very similar to that of the Ottawa teachers in the seventies. Yet, the resignation data suggest that Ottawa teachers were substantially more discontent than Carleton teachers in the early seventies. Given these facts, it can be hypothesized that Ottawa teachers' anger over reputed salary losses relative to other groups stemmed not from changes in the
objective economic situation, but from other sources of discontent. For example, the strong push for higher salaries might be seen as a way of compensating for deteriorating working conditions and for loss of status within the school system. Since it appears that both of these sources of discontent were greater in Ottawa than Carleton, such an explanation makes sense of Ottawa teachers showing greater discontent than Carleton teachers.

Although the above interpretation appears to have some validity, it would be incorrect to assume that Ottawa teachers did not have greater objective grounds for experiencing economic deprivation than did Carleton teachers. The key difference in the Ottawa and Carleton teachers' economic situations is not to be found in a comparison of salary grids, but in the comparative placement of the two groups on their grids.

In the first half of the seventies the Carleton secondary system continued to grow while the Ottawa secondary stagnated and eventually shrank. Growth required hiring new teachers; and, ceilings dictated that less experienced teachers, who commanded lower salaries, be hired by the CBE. As a consequence, it could be expected that Carleton secondary teachers would tend to be less experienced than Ottawa teachers. Table 83 shows that this was the case. In 1973-74, 76% of Carleton secondary teachers had ten or less years of experience, but only 63.2% of Ottawa secondary teachers fell in this relatively low experience category. This is important because it indicates that higher proportions of Ottawa secondary teachers were likely to have hit
Table 83: Distribution of Ottawa and Carleton Secondary Teachers by Teaching Experience, 1973-74.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of Experience</th>
<th>Ottawa Secondary Teachers</th>
<th>Carleton Secondary Teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 or less</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 20</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20+</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1676</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data supplied on request by the Ontario Ministry of Education.
their category maximums during the years in which the Ottawa group's militancy was increasing.

It can be argued that the majority of Ottawa teachers actually experienced salary increases in excess of both the rise in the cost-of-living and the increases obtained by non-teaching occupations in Ottawa during the first half of the seventies, but the same cannot be said of Ottawa teachers at their category maximums. As Table 84 shows, the increases experienced by all teachers at maximum between 1972 and 1974 were less than the increase in the Ottawa consumer-price-index, the average per capita income in Ottawa, and the average wages reported in the industrial composite for Ottawa-Hull.

From 1971-72 to 1973-74, the percent of Ottawa secondary teachers at maximum increased from 14.7% to 30.0%. As has been noted, once a teacher reaches maximum, increments for experience cease and further salary increases, beyond those provided by negotiated changes in the grid, depend on promotion or upgrading qualifications. For those Ottawa teachers at maximum in 1973-74, the chances for promotion

8. Due to the receipt of increments for experience individual teachers received percentage increases in salary that are in excess of those shown in the salary grid. Between 1969 and 1974 the average salary of Ottawa OSSTF teachers increased by 52.3% from $10,303 to $15,695. Over the same period the Ottawa CPI and the average earning reported in the Ottawa-Hull industrial composite increased by 32.8% and 49.8% respectively, while per capita income in Ottawa increased by 51.1% from $6,159 to $9,304. Further, it should be noted that the average income of Ottawa teachers in 1970 - $11,169 - was well in excess of the 1970 average income of Ottawa family heads - $9,552.

9. All figures on secondary teachers at maximum are derived from grid distributions supplied by the OBE and/or the CBE.
Table 84: Percentage Increase in the Salaries of Ottawa Teachers at Maximum, the Ottawa CPI, the Average Earnings Reported in the Ottawa-Hull Industrial Composite and Ottawa Per Capita Income, 1972-74.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage Increase from 1972-74</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salary of Ottawa Category 1 Teachers at Maximum</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary of Ottawa Category 2 Teachers at Maximum</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary of Ottawa Category 3 Teachers at Maximum</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary of Ottawa Category 4 Teachers at Maximum</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa CPI</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Earnings Reported in the Ottawa-Hull Industrial Composite</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa Per Capita Income</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: OBE Secondary Teachers Collective Agreements; Revenue Canada, Taxation Statistics; Statistics Canada, Catalogue no. 62-001-monthly; Statistics Canada, Employment Earnings and Hours, Catalogue no. 72-002-monthly.
were virtually non-existent. Upgrading was also unlikely for many teachers at maximum, in that 48% of those at maximum in 1973-74 were already in the top certification category. Confined mainly to the increases won in the grid, teachers at maximum experienced real losses in income relative to inflation, and to the wages of others in the community. There, thus, appears to have been a substantial and growing minority of Ottawa secondary teachers who had personal grounds for being highly dissatisfied with their salaries in the early seventies.

Compared to the Ottawa group, the Carleton secondary group appears to have had a smaller proportion of teachers at maximum in the first half of the seventies. For example, it can be determined that, in 1972-73, only 12.7% of Carleton secondary teachers were at maximum compared to 23.4% of Ottawa secondary teachers. It might also be noted that, although opportunities for promotion were bleak in Carleton after 1973-74, they were not so bleak as in Ottawa. Where 39 positions of responsibility were lost in Ottawa between 1973-74 and 1974-75, only two positions were lost in Carleton. In sum, it appears reasonable to suggest that the greater militancy of the Ottawa group was partially due to the larger proportion of teachers at maximum, who could readily see themselves to be suffering a deterioration of earnings, relative to the cost-of-living and the wages of similarly-educated persons in the community.
VI. Summary

No one factor fully accounts for the Ottawa secondary group being more militant than the Carleton group. However, some factors appear to have had a broader impact than others. Specifically, it appears that the OBE’s financial difficulties—created by the combination of provincial ceilings, past high levels of spending, and declining enrollment—set the stage for escalating teacher militancy in Ottawa. Faced with severe constraints on expenditures, Ottawa trustees could hardly avoid irritating teachers. Failure to resist teachers’ salary demands would result in the need for other money-saving actions, such as reducing supplies and services, increasing PTR, and reducing the number of positions of responsibility—none of which would please teachers. Both teachers and trustees were caught in what might be called a negative-sum game—a game in which all players lose no matter what actions they take.

Faced with a common foe in the form of the provincial government which had imposed the ceilings, both Boards might have formed a common front with their secondary teachers had it not been for the shake-up that had taken place in Board/teacher relations. The loss of influential protectors and representatives at the Boards’ offices made it easy for both groups of secondary teachers to view their Boards as opponents. In addition, the change in the structure of Board/teacher relations made it hard for both Boards to convince teachers of their good intentions. In Carleton a variety of factors worked to rebuild
trust between secondary teachers and the Board. However, in Ottawa no
effective efforts were made to improve communications with the second-
ary teachers. Further, the fact that the Ottawa trustees showed no
inclination to give secondary teachers preferential treatment, relative
to Ottawa elementary teachers, served to enhance feelings of status-
loss that were hitting all secondary teachers across the province.

Having to fight for every penny, while their elementary counter-
parts sold them out and while their cousins in Carleton achieved
similar salaries with little conflict, added to Ottawa secondary
teachers' general frustration. These circumstances, coupled with the
loss of their privileged position under the CIBO, the deterioration of
working conditions, and the growth of a large subgroup who had hit
their salary maximums, provided a growing potential for strong coercive
action - a potential which was tapped in the 1975 strike. Since the
strike was a major unprecedented collective action by the Ottawa group,
we now turn to discuss some of the key factors which led the growing
discontent of Ottawa teachers to be channelled in this direction.

VII. THE OTTAWA STRIKE

High levels of discontent do not necessarily lead to collective
coercive action. There is almost always the option of simply opting
out - an option which many Ottawa teachers took, judging from the
resignation rates. In order to understand the Ottawa strike, it is
necessary to look beyond the rise of discontent to the role of
leadership in focusing and fuelling discontent.

According to Ottawa informants, there is no doubt that leadership played a critical role in developing and focusing teacher discontent. Here it is informative to quote some of the leaders of the strike period.

We wound them [the teachers] up - put together a brief which would force the Board to break the provincial budget restrictions and went to all 26 schools over two months. At staff meetings teachers were told that we intended to push it to the limit. Staff meetings were well prepared with research, audio-visual techniques etc. which showed similar groups e.g. nurses, engineers - people with comparable qualifications had made great gains in purchasing power compared to teachers.

In the fall of 1974, the negotiating team felt we weren't doing well enough in contracts. In comparison with industrial wages we found we were phenomenally out of line. This information was taken to the executive and they accepted the proposal that we actively inform the membership. This was a turn around in the 'tact normally taken i.e. leadership took the initiative. "Here's what we're worth and why!" Previously teachers submitted briefs to the negotiating committee outlining what they wanted. Now leadership is telling membership what they should want and selling it to them.

In order to allow them time to "educate" the rank-and-file, the Ottawa OSSTF district federation paid half of the salaries of the District President and the District's Chief Negotiator. Armed with charts, graphs, and statistics, designed to convince teachers that their salaries had failed to keep pace with increases in the cost-of-living and the wages paid in non-teaching occupations, the President and Chief Negotiator went out to the schools to stir teachers' anger. Pointing out that the salaries of beginning secondary teachers were below the poverty-line and below the salaries of OBE janitors, the
leaders called for "professional salaries for professional teachers". 10

By all accounts the leadership's messages were very effective in stirring teachers' anger, and quickly generated strong support for strike action. Consistent with this view, the OSSTF 26 Executive Minutes of 1974-75 give no indication of there being any opposition to the leadership's efforts to stir up support for strike action.

Part of the reason that leadership efforts were effective was simply that the teachers were already discontented. However, at least three factors helped leaders to mobilize the rank-and-file. First, the District President had managed to win the teachers' trust and respect by taking on the protective role that had been fulfilled by superintendents under the CIBO. Individual teachers were encouraged to bring their problems with administrators and others to the President for his personal attention. Also one informant described the President:

He talked individually to teachers at local meetings - established visibility and credibility. The teachers needed protection and the federation leadership supplied it, winning respect in the process.

It should be noted that 1974-75 was the President's second year in office and that he had worked half-time in the previous year, while developing the leadership's protective role.

A second factor that was important in making the rank-and-file receptive to leadership's mobilizing efforts was that the leadership managed to secure the support for strong action from the provincial

10. There had been virtually no beginning teachers hired since 1971 and after one year of experience salaries in all categories increased by more than $1,000.
OSSTF, prior to the strike. Thus the rank-and-file knew they had the resources necessary for strong action. In the end, the provincial OSSTF supplied; strike pay to the tune of 40% of salary, funds for public relations and other strike related expenditures, and the services of a professional negotiator.

The third factor which helped in mobilizing the teachers to strike was that Windsor and Thunder Bay secondary teachers had won major strike increases by means of strike, just prior to the Ottawa strike. The Windsor strike established the legality of teacher strikes and the success of both the Windsor and Thunder Bay strikes demonstrated that strikes could be effective for achieving major salary increases.
Chapter VIII

CONCLUSION

In this chapter the primary concern is to bring material from the study to bear on the question of what causes teacher groups to become militant. In addition, the study's implications for the existing literature on teacher militancy will be discussed. (Appendix F contains a broader and more speculative discussion of the future scope and direction of teacher militancy in Ontario.)

One of the most obvious generalizations that emerges from the study is that the development of militant teacher groups is a complex process involving a multiplicity of factors. This might seem like a rather trivial observation were it not for the presence of a number of studies which attempt to pin the development of militant groups to one or two factors or groups of factors. The studies which focus on the professionalization thesis particularly stand out as examples of monocausal myopia. Not much better are other studies based on surveys. By focusing on individuals' attributes and attitudes in attempting to account for teacher militancy, survey studies imply that the whole is no more than the sum of its parts. At the same time, they tend to ignore the role that "the whole" may play in shaping its parts. The fallacy of assuming that collective militancy flows directly from
Individual attributes and attitudes is most dramatically shown in the case of Carleton elementary teachers. Only a month and a half prior to the group's mass resignation 66% of the membership said that they would not participate in a mass resignation. This shows the weakness of attempting to predict collective behavior from attitudes of the membership. It also indicates the important role that leadership, coupled with an effective organizational structure, may play in shaping the attitudes and behavior of individuals.

Having said that a multiplicity of factors are involved in the development of militant groups, what can be said about the role and relative importance of specific factors?

Some would probably argue that changes in what we have called extra-local factors made it virtually inevitable that Ontario teacher groups would become militant. Declining growth in enrolments, ceilings on expenditures, and rapid changes in curriculum interacted to contribute to increases in teacher discontent in the early seventies. The sudden restructuring and amalgamation of school boards in 1968-69 may have further contributed to discontent, while disrupting established patterns of board/teacher relations and weakening traditional methods of social control. In addition, the consolidation of boards increased the power base of local teacher groups by increasing their size. The lack of any bargaining legislation and the increasing oversupply of teachers made many of the teachers' traditional methods of pressuring boards obsolete. Boards, faced with declining enrolments, a need to cut expenditures, and with an oversupply of job applicants, had less to
fear from blacklisting or teachers' threats that they would "vote with their feet" than did the boards of the booming early 1960's. With no legislation to force them to reach bilateral agreements with teachers, boards could and did unilaterally impose settlements. Imposed settlements only exacerbated teachers' frustrations and encouraged teacher groups to search for more effective means of getting boards to bargain to a satisfactory conclusion. Finally, in the fall of 1973, frustration was fanned to a peak by the provincial government's attempt to take away the teachers' right to resign. The result was a province-wide strike which can be seen to serve as a watershed in the history of relations between teachers and authorities in Ontario.

While the above changes in extra-local factors were clearly conducive to the development of militant local teacher groups, they were not sufficient to lead all local groups to militancy. Public elementary teachers, who could ride secondary teachers' coattails, and who were divided in their federation structure, showed little inclination to militancy. Indeed a number of secondary and separate school teacher groups showed no sign of local militancy in the 1970's. Thus, in order to fully understand the development of militant teacher groups, it seemed necessary to examine local conditions and factors. Using the theoretical framework to structure discussion, let me now draw out the results of the case studies.
I. SOCIAL CONTROL

As I see it, one of the main insights which emerges from the case studies regards the importance of social control in the evolution of teacher groups. More specifically, the case studies suggest that the weakening of local authorities' persuasive power is an important contributory factor in the development of militant groups.

In all three of our groups, which showed some increase in militancy in the seventies, a significant weakening of the Boards' persuasive power preceded the rise of militancy. In the case of the Carleton elementary teachers, key contact persons among the CBE's administrators left the system, were demoted, were overshadowed by ex-secondary teacher administrators, or were put in positions where they had little contact with elementary teachers. Further, Carleton elementary teachers lost contacts among the trustees in the early seventies. While the majority of Carleton elementary teachers probably never had much contact with top administrators or trustees, important opinion-makers such as principals and federation leaders did. In failing to re-secure the loyalty of these opinion-makers the CBE opened the door to the growth of militant orientations.

The Carleton elementary group went from having a number of influential contacts who could be trusted to be concerned with their interests to having virtually none. In contrast, the Carleton secondary group started out under the CBE without any trusted and influential contacts but soon developed them following the work-to-rule in
1971. Coming from the benignly paternistic CIBO, Carleton secondary teachers suddenly found themselves faced with an influential antagonist, C.D. Arthur, rather than with paternalistic protectors of their interests. However, with the departure of Arthur and the election of trustees sympathetic to secondary teachers, a relationship of trust was able to be established between the CBE and its secondary teachers. In particular ex-secondary teachers' rise to prominence in the CBE helped secure a positive link between the Board and its secondary teachers. Ironically, in working to establish positive relations with its secondary teachers, the CBE exacerbated elementary principals' feelings of alienation and played into the hands of the militant TFC leaders, who developed and propagated the view that elementary teachers were being treated as second-class citizens.

In Ottawa, the secondary group retained some contacts among top administrators; but, these administrators experienced significant losses of power and influence within the Board and were unable to play their previous role as protectors of teachers. Similarly, some CIBO trustees were elected to the OBE, but were overshadowed by ex-elementary trustees from the OPSB.

The CBE more effectively won the trust of its secondary teachers than of its elementary teachers, but the reverse seems to have occurred in Ottawa. By providing greater influence and autonomy to elementary principals at the expense of superintendents, the OBE's Director of Education secured the loyalty of key opinion-makers among the elementary teachers, while reducing the effectiveness of secondary teachers' previously most trusted contacts - the superintendents.
The breakdown of authorities' persuasive power was likely involved in the development of militancy in groups beyond those studied here. In the late 1960's, several forces were operating to weaken all Ontario boards' ability to control teachers through persuasion. First, the massive reorganization and consolidation of schools which took place in 1968-69 can be seen to have weakened boards' persuasive powers. In one quick stroke, many teachers and teacher opinion-makers found themselves faced with new board authorities and without any significant, well-established channels of formal or informal communication to the board offices. Since most agreements and understandings between boards and teachers were not put to paper prior to the 1968-69 reorganization, teachers had to rely on the goodwill of new authorities to protect informal agreements made in the systems predating the reorganized boards. In the CIBO, for example, the only printed document coming out of salary negotiations was the salary grid, sans text. Where a large number of boards were merged, it was probably impossible to respect all of the pre-existing norms and understandings which had guided board/teacher relations in the past.

Even when the majority of teachers found their new board to contain trusted authorities, it was likely that such authorities would have little influence in the newly formed boards. To understand why this was the case, it is necessary to say a few words about the relations between teachers and board authorities prior to the late 1960's. As best I can determine, from discussions with informants, and the examination of old minutes and publications, most Ontario school
systems were run by ex-teachers, who had become superintendents or directors, along with the assistance of principals and of provincial inspectors. Ex-teacher administrators represented the teachers' needs and concerns before the trustees and were the persons to whom teachers developed feelings of loyalty and trust. Because decisions regarding curriculum, teaching methods, evaluation of teachers and students and equipment were heavily controlled by the provincial Ministry of Education; trustees had little involvement in the day-to-day operation of the schools. Rather, trustees' main concern lay in keeping school taxes within reason and providing linkages between the school system and the community. For example, CIBO trustees attempted to keep the schools aware of local 'businesses' manpower needs and to encourage local businessmen to hire CIBO graduates.

All of this changed as the Davis program of decentralization grew throughout the late sixties. As boards were consolidated, they were given greater and greater responsibility to run and regulate their schools. Curriculum was made more flexible, local innovation encouraged, provincial inspectors and grade 13 exams eliminated. This increase in the local boards' ability to make real educational-decisions, coupled with the fact that large boards were handling large amounts of taxpayers' money, put trustees in a position of feeling strong pressure to take a highly active role in local decision-making. This pressure was further increased by the fact that trustees were all elected officials after 1968-69, and the fact that they began to be paid substantial salaries. The result was that trustees began to place
their administrators in a more subordinate, and more truly administra-
tive role, in which their power to protect and represent teachers was
considerably reduced. When mandatory callings were introduced, in
1971, trustees had to make decisions which would hardly inspire
teachers to trust them.

The case of Ottawa elementary teachers suggests that boards'
powers of persuasion did not uniformly diminish across Ontario.
However, it seems reasonable to assert that some reduction in this
power occurred in the majority of Ontario school systems, helping to
open the doors to persuasion by militant teacher leaders.

One point which doesn't come out as strongly as it should in
this discussion is the importance of principals as key agents of
persuasion within school systems - particularly within elementary
systems. The fact that principals have face-to-face contact with
teachers puts them in a particularly advantageous position for shaping
teacher opinion. Further, principals are in a position to exercise
control by means beyond persuasion. If necessary, they can wield a
variety of positive and negative sanctions within the school to get
teacher compliance.

What does this discussion imply for the existing literature on
teacher militancy? I would suggest that the most important implication
relates to the way previous studies have dealt with bureaucratization
and growth of school systems. Previous attempts to link increasing
size and bureaucratization to teacher militancy argue that teachers
experience a loss of autonomy and/or influence as the size and
bureaucratization of school systems increase. In turn, loss of
autonomy and influence is seen to lead to increased teacher discontent
and militancy. While I cannot prove this interpretation wrong, its
validity can certainly be challenged. This interpretation seems to be
based on a nostalgia for a past that never was and/or an Idealistic,
but naive view, of the importance of autonomy and "meaningful work" for
job satisfaction. Whether teachers have lost influence or autonomy
with the emergence of large bureaucratic systems is debatable on objec-
tive grounds. Teachers may think they have lost autonomy and influ-
ence, but the broad history of the occupation is clearly one of
increasing independence and power. Not very long ago, teachers were
subjected to very restrictive regulations governing their behavior both
in and out of schools. Teachers' dress, grooming, church attendance,
sexual behavior, alcohol consumption - in short, their entire lifestyle
- were seen to be the legitimate business of board authorities. Within
the schools, provincial directives, monitored by provincial inspectors,
clearly limited teachers' autonomy in the classroom. At the bargaining
table, teachers were denied the right to negotiate (and hence to signifi-
cantly influence) fringe benefits as well as working conditions, up
until the early seventies. If anything, the advent of large systems
made it more difficult for authorities to rigorously monitor their
teachers. Increasing size, plus the decentralization and liberaliza-
tion of curriculum, provided teachers with unprecedented opportunities
to specialize and innovate, as well as with a wealth of supplies,
services, and facilities not previously available.
Those who see loss of autonomy and influence to be the result of size and bureaucratization seem to make one of two assumptions. Either they assume that the youthful call for meaningful work which was heard in the heydays of the 1960's, reflected a basic need of modern man, or they accept the Marxist assumption that control over one's products in the work situation is vital for job satisfaction—indeed, vital for being a full human being. While having control over one's work, or doing work which is "meaningful," may well make one a happier and, in some sense, more full human being; the failure to obtain control over work does not necessarily produce job dissatisfaction or rebellion. The cases of productive and compliant Japanese workers in large paternalistic corporations, clearly suggest that autonomy and influence in the work situation may have little importance for job satisfaction relative to such things as the structure of social control.

Teachers are different from many other workers in having a higher level of education, which might be associated with stronger desires for autonomy and influence. However, teachers, and especially secondary teachers, have long been highly educated relative to the rest of the population. If control over work, autonomy, and influence were really of high salience to teachers, they should have rebelled under the more restrictive school systems of the 1950's and the early 1960's, if not before.

In sum, increasing size and bureaucratization did not increase teacher discontent, but broke down the paternalistic system of social control which characterized many Ontario school systems. Paternalistic
systems did not give teachers great influence or ability to control their work; but, instead, protected teachers from unwanted intrusions into their routine world, and provided authorities with the means for convincing teachers that compliance was in their best interests. Board consolidation and the formalization of administrative procedures led to the disappearance of many trusted authorities, and to a loss in the discretionary power of those who remained. Decentralization of educational decision-making, coupled with the advent of high profile elected trustees, ensured that the remaining past protectors of teachers would lack the power to play their old role. Thus, the stage was set for militant teacher leaders to provide new definitions of the relationship between teachers and authorities — definitions which might well stir discontent and militant action.

II. TEACHER DISCONTENT

Most of the literature on teacher militancy posits increasing discontent to have been a key factor in the development of teacher militancy. Where there is disagreement is on whether this discontent is a result of economic or professional deprivation. Only Jessup (1978) has seriously attempted to demonstrate that both types of deprivation are involved.

In the case of Ontario teachers, militant action has been surrounded by talk about professionalism, but has taken place in support of salary demands. However, the fact that salary has been the
focus of action does not prove that teacher militancy has been fuelled primarily by feelings of economic deprivation. To illustrate, one dedicated adherent of the professionalization thesis has argued that teachers' focus on salaries is due to their having to sublimate their urge for greater autonomy and professional control because of boards' refusal to give way in these non-monetary areas (Glandomenico, 1973). While the reverse argument fits better with the facts in Ontario (when the AIB made major salary increases impossible in 1975, teachers began to focus more heavily on class size and PTR in negotiations), the general point is reasonable. There is no reason to assume that action will be rationally focused on the source of frustration. With this in mind, what do our case studies tell us about teacher discontent and militant action?

In all cases where militant action occurred, there appear to have been significant increases in discontent. In Ottawa, the secondary teachers' strike was mobilized around the issue of economic deprivation relative to non-teaching occupations. However, other factors were important in building up Ottawa's secondary teachers' discontent in the years prior to the strike. On the economic front, the low salary increases of teachers at maximum produced feelings of deprivation prior to the strike mobilization. Declining promotional opportunities and deteriorating working conditions, brought on by ceilings, provided an additional source of irritation. Finally, Ottawa secondary teachers can be seen to have suffered a significant loss of status within the school system in the early seventies as a result of the Board's
unwillingness to provide them with preferential treatment relative to elementary teachers.

In the case of Carleton secondary teachers, their brief fling at coercive action appears to have been stimulated by strong general feelings of deprivation, resulting from the Board's unwillingness to keep its promise to treat them as well as their ex-colleagues in Ottawa.

Finally, the rise of militancy among Carleton elementary teachers was preceded by a rise in dissatisfaction over being treated as second-class citizens.

In all three cases, there is a common denominator in feelings of status-deprivation. TFC leaders worked hard to develop the general feeling that the Board held elementary teachers in low regard. In both groups of secondary teachers, leaders did not have to work hard to develop feelings of status-deprivation. Coming from a paternalistic and pompously named, Collegiate Institute Board, with appointed, prestigious members of the community at its head, secondary teachers were suddenly thrown into the less distinguished world of mass education.

Going beyond the data in this study, I would now like to suggest that one of the most basic and important sources of the discontent, which contributed to secondary teachers' militancy across Ontario, was status-loss brought on by the "massification" of secondary education. To some extent all Ontario secondary teachers suffered a loss of status in the late sixties and early seventies. The Davis program of school
board amalgamation put all secondary and elementary teachers together under the same school boards. This had important implications for secondary teachers' prestige. The presence of separate boards for secondary schools had tended to help maintain the view that high school teachers were a higher-status group than their elementary counterparts. The merger of the two groups, under common boards, tended to blur the status distinction. More concretely, the amalgamation of elementary and secondary boards resulted in the closing of salary gaps between degree-deprived elementary teachers and secondary teachers, and often in secondary teachers having to deal with ex-elementary trustees who failed to see the special status of secondary teachers.

At the same time that the amalgamation of elementary and secondary boards was working to reduce the prestige of secondary teachers, so too, was the growing importance of post-secondary education. As university or community college training came to be more and more essential for occupational advancement, high school education lost its independent importance. As the value of a high school education declined, so too did the prestige of the secondary teachers who supplied it. From being key agents in sorting out the population into the "right" social strata, secondary teachers came to find their role being to prepare students for post-secondary education while babysitting the "dregs" who now remained in school longer as the qualifications for lower-status jobs were escalated. Things might have been different if secondary teachers had strong control over entry into
post-secondary education. However, the elimination of grade 13 exams, the implementation of a liberal credit system in the high schools, and the relatively lax admission standards of Ontario post-secondary institutions, prevented secondary teachers from being effective gatekeepers. This inability to play the gatekeeper role, and the fact that fewer pupils were dropping out of high school helped to further lower secondary teachers' status. Although they lost a great deal of control over the quality of their products, teachers continued to be held responsible for the quality of education. As universities began to complain about high school graduates who were illiterate, and parents found their teenagers unable to do basic mathematics, the blame was directed at secondary teachers. While secondary teachers might deny the validity of the criticism of their performance, the fact that they were publicly criticized was a new blow to their status. In the more elitist system of earlier years, the teachers may have been no better (or no worse) than those of the sixties or seventies; but, they could avoid criticism by flunking out those students who would cast a black mark on their teaching abilities, should they emerge as high school graduates.

Increased criticism of teachers was not simply a result of more students going on to university, nor a liberal credit system that allowed students to avoid studying what many parents thought were basics. At the same time that the Ontario secondary schools moved

1. Teachers did not mark grade 13 exams; but, they played an important role in determining who would pass or fail through the quality of their teaching.
toward the mass education model of the U.S., the philosophy of Living and Learning was placing greater responsibility on teachers for students' success and failure. The view that a student's failure to learn was due to his lack of effort or interest was replaced by the view that, it was due to the teachers' failure to make the material relevant and interesting. That the criticism directed at teachers was felt and angered teachers is nicely shown in the following excerpts from two editorials written by Ottawa secondary teachers during the strike.

... The teachers are the brunt of all the criticism when anything goes wrong in the Ontario educational system. Parents don't like what they teach, they don't like what they don't teach, they don't like the fact that principals won't let students out for extended holidays when they, the parents, want to take holidays. Let's face it, nobody likes what the teachers do. And we all know that the teachers control the educational system in Ontario from the top to the bottom (expletive deleted).

Why don't the people of Ontario wake up? Teachers are no more responsible for the policies in education than the man in the moon. Teachers don't regulate the length of the school year and they don't always have a completely free hand in deciding what will be taught in certain courses. As far as going out on strike is concerned, well, why not?

For years the Ministry of Education has played political football with the entire system. When teachers were needed the Ministry lowered requirements for certification; when the popular thing to be was liberal they liberalized the system with the Hall-Dennis report, and when the popular move was back to real, honest-to-God basic skills Tom Wells jumped on the bandwagon and cried out for core programs in the schools in English and Canadian studies. And now he wants a return to the "three R's" which his predecessor, and present boss, Bill Davis had all but banned.

Where were all the teachers during all this? As always in the classroom taking all the (expletive deleted) they could stand from the ministry and the public and trying to do a tough job at the same time. Well, teachers are getting fed up with being underpaid overworked and treated as scapegoats.

If teachers are becoming militant, it's not all over the size of the paycheques. They expect to be treated as the
professionals they are, allowed more say in the classroom procedures and paid for the work they do.

How many of the rest of us bear the criticism, unjust though it is, the puny salary in comparison to the hours worked night and day, and the abuse of the very people they helped to get where they are today?

At one point during the '60's it became politically expedient to keep as many young people in high school as possible. If they couldn't pass English or math they could take something else. If they couldn't master the basic skills we could create a course that didn't require those skills. So the kids who were not academically inclined, who under normal circumstances would have dropped out and pursued those things in which they were interested and potentially proficient, those kids survived the system and even went on to post-secondary education. Their parents felt they had a budding brain surgeon on their hands and the rest of us knew that we had coddled another semi-literate through high school (Ottawa Citizen, March 5, 1975).

Secondary teachers could be seen to experience a loss of prestige from another angle as well. The same stress on education which led to the educational boom in the sixties led to a devaluing of university degrees in the seventies. When the person who held a university degree was a rarity in Ontario communities, the secondary teacher's degree earned him/her respect from his/her neighbours - a respect which might compensate for low income. However, as the proportion of the populations holding university degrees increased through the sixties and seventies, the prestige that accompanied holding a degree decreased.2

2. As an aside it can be argued that secondary teachers in the Ottawa area experienced a greater loss of status than teachers in many other Ontario communities. First, there is the fact that compared to other areas, the Ottawa area contains a disproportionate number of highly educated people. In 1970, 11.3% of the population aged 15 years or more residing in the Ontario portion of the Ottawa-Hull CMA held university degrees and 9.4% had some university education. In contrast, two years later, in
At the same time that teachers' prestige in the community was decreasing so too was it decreasing in the schools. The late sixties and early seventies were times of student rebellion in which secondary teachers' authority was questioned and undermined by student activists. Challenges from students, coupled with the philosophy of tailoring education to the interests of students, made it difficult for teachers to retain control in the classroom and lessened the deference they received from pupils.

Finally, it should be noted that the imposition of provincial ceilings contributed to teachers' feelings that they were losing status. What the ceilings told teachers was that the government no longer put a high social value on education and teachers. Further, the fact that the elementary ceilings were raised by higher percentages than secondary ceilings between 1971 and 1975 could be interpreted by secondary teachers to mean that they were not valued as highly as elementary teachers.

Assuming it is correct to stress the loss of status as a key source of discontent underlying secondary teachers' militancy in Ontario, the conflicts over money take on a new meaning. From this perspective, teachers have demanded major salary increases as a means of compensating for losses in prestige and status. Battles over pay

footnote 2 cont.
1972, only 6.4% of the Ontario population aged 15 and over held degrees and only 3.5% had some university education. Thus, in Ottawa, the secondary teachers' educational qualifications were less likely to turn heads than in many other Ontario communities.
are battles over social status. They are not reflections of teachers' desires to have the autonomy of professionals, but of teachers' desires to have prestige which is closer to that of professionals. Nor are salary battles a sign of a new working-class consciousness among teachers. Ontario teachers want more money to show that they are not the same as other workers, especially blue-collar workers.3,4

Whether this speculative argument applies to teachers outside of Ontario is open to question. Of all the provinces in Canada, only Ontario has separate federations for elementary and secondary teachers. Since the OSSTF has jealously guarded its independence from the elementary federations, it might be expected that Ontario secondary teachers' experienced greater feelings of lost prestige in being merged under the same boards with elementary teachers than did secondary teachers in other provinces. Further, it is noteworthy that Ontario is the only province to offer a secondary education to grade 13. All others offer secondary education to grade 12. The fact that grade 13

3. According to OBE secondary teacher informants one of the most effective salary comparisons for stirring strike support was the comparison of changes in the industrial composite with changes in teachers' salaries.

4. In the past various semi-professions (teachers, nurses, social workers, etc) can be seen to have been compensated for relatively low pay by the receipt of social honour. The demise of small community-based services and the development of large government operated service organizations both weakens the restraining influence of the community membership and reduces semi-professionals' feelings of prestige within the community. Without this compensating prestige, all semi-professionals can be expected to experience increased discontent as government spending constraints increase and other occupational groups close the gap between themselves and semi-professionals.
is seen to provide instruction at a level equivalent to the first year of university might well contribute to Ontario secondary teachers feeling somewhat superior to their elementary colleagues and resentful at not being treated accordingly.

Returning to the implications for the existing literature we have found little evidence to support the view that professional-deprivation underlies teacher militancy. The results with regard to the economic-deprivation hypothesis are less definite. To be sure, the overt goals in all the disputes in which our local groups showed coercive action were economic. However, in all cases monetary demands appeared to grow out of discontent stimulated by feelings of being treated without proper respect by the Boards. Whether the same economic conditions would have contributed to militant action without local treatment as second-class citizens and without the more general loss of status incurred by secondary teachers is open to question. What does seem clear is that strong feelings of economic deprivation are not a necessary prerequisite for a group to move to militancy. The case of the Carleton elementary teachers makes this point quite clearly. The tangible issue of getting a salary increase commensurate with the increase in the cost-of-living was but one small part of an active leadership's repertoire of mobilizing issues. What is clear is that a significant increase in economic deprivation is not sufficient, on its own, to bring about militant action. When the Ottawa elementary teachers fell well behind their secondary counterparts, the result was anger without effective action.
III. LEADERSHIP, IDEOLOGY AND MILITANCY

One of the key things I have learned from this study is just how great a role strongly motivated individuals can play in shaping the behaviour of collectivities. For many, one of the consequences of studying sociology is cynicism regarding the ability of men and women to consciously shape the groups and institutions which encompass them. Having become an unwilling cynic myself, I have found some refreshing hope that men and women can play vital roles in shaping their collective destinies from the case of the Carleton elementary teachers.

In Carleton, the sociological odds were stacked against the development of militancy among elementary teachers. Men and women were members of different provincial federations. Both provincial associations were unwilling to support coercive action in Carleton. Men were overrepresented in positions of responsibility. The majority of elementary teachers were female. Teachers were geographically dispersed and lacked a history of working together. The Carleton system continued to grow while others shrank; thus, it was able to provide greater job security and greater opportunities for promotion. The Board encouraged teacher participation on joint committees and paid salaries which compared favourably with those of other teachers. All these conditions, and more, would appear to have been more conducive to continued docility than to the development of militancy.

The only conditions which appear to have been conducive to the development of militancy were that the teachers had formed a local,
amalgamated federation, and the teachers' loss of key contacts at the Board offices. However, local amalgamation and the Board's loss of persuasive power by no means provided an impetus for the group to move to militancy - an opportunity yes, but not an inducement. In any case, leadership can be seen to have played a key role in ensuring both that the local, amalgamated organization would survive, and that the Board's powers of persuasion would diminish.

Propagating an amalgamation ideology, Les Linnen, Kay Stanley, and later Mary Hill, consciously worked to secure the amalgamated TFC's survival through the early seventies. With Hill's assumption of the TFC presidency, the leadership made a successful effort to control communication between the Board and its elementary teachers. Having obtained the sole effective power to interpret the Board's actions and motivations to teachers, leaders set to work on three fronts. First, they consciously attempted to weaken the provincial federations' influence over teachers. Second, they worked to convince teachers that the Board was treating them like second-class citizens. Third, the leadership garnered resources which were independent of FW and OPS. Overall, TFC leaders played a major role in creating discontent, weakening social control, solidifying the membership, garnering resources, and directing the actions of the elementary teachers.

In the case of Ottawa secondary teachers, leadership also appears to have played a role in the development of militancy (and particularly in bringing about the strike), but not as critical a role as in the case of the Carleton elementary teachers. Where TFC leaders
created new discontent among teachers, OBE secondary leaders only focused and intensified existing discontents. Beyond focusing teacher discontent, Ottawa secondary leaders' main role lay in securing resources in the form of support from the provincial OSSTF.

In both of the above cases some common factors may be seen to have been involved in leaders' success in leading the rank-and-file. Both groups had active, militant presidents who made attempts to secure the loyalty of teachers by personally defending individual teachers in their conflicts with local authorities. Put in another way, both groups had militant leaders who took over the protective role vacated by superintendents. As a result, the loyalty and respect which used to flow to top administrators began to go to teacher leaders. Also, leaders of both groups made the local federations visible to the membership by getting out to the schools. Finally, in both groups, key leaders managed to obtain the discretionary time to do the above. In the TFC, principals provided female leaders with extra time and resources to carry out their leadership roles. In Ottawa, the local OSSTF provided funds to allow the president and the chief negotiator to teach half-time so that they could concentrate on mobilizing the troops.

The Carleton secondary group contrasts with both the Ottawa secondary and Carleton elementary groups in that leadership seems not to have been very important to the group's brief move to militancy. The Carleton work-to-rule seems to stem almost directly from broadly felt anger over C.D. Arthur's "broken promises". The fact that the
Carleton secondary group was small and that C.D. Arthur was visible and outspoken may have reduced the need for leaders to sell teachers on coercive action. Further, the sanction chosen - work-to-rule - required no amassing of resources to be effective.

It is interesting to speculate that the failure of leaders to play a major role in Carleton may account for the secondary group's relatively quick return to docility. Assuming that effort and action lead to commitment, the relative lack of effort and action on the part of Carleton secondary leaders may have saved them from being committed militants who would be willing to mobilize strong action in the future.

The OBE elementary teachers' case is interesting for pointing to the limits that may exist on individuals' ability to change collectivities. Specifically, the Ottawa elementary teachers' situation suggests that breakdown in social control mechanisms may be a necessary prerequisite for leadership to develop and play a major role in shaping the behaviour of a collectivity. It seems quite likely that successful TFC leaders would have been unsuccessful in Ottawa. With principals co-opted, militant leaders such as Hill and Kerr would have had a hard time developing a monopoly on communications between teachers and the Board; and, hence, would have found it difficult to stir teacher discontent.
IV. ORGANIZATION AND SOLIDARITY

Difference in organization and solidarity is one of the key conditions accounting for the difference in the behaviour of Ottawa and Carleton elementary teachers. Some degree of solidarity, coupled with an organizational structure which directly links all teachers in a single unit and which builds upon existing social units (i.e. school staffs) seems to be a prerequisite for the development of a militant teacher group.

V. RESOURCES

The prime importance of resources for teacher militancy appears to lie in the type of coercive action a teacher group will take. For example, the TFC appears to have shown a preference for legal action as a result of their access to a lawyer. Likewise, the Ottawa secondary group's decision to strike was probably influenced by the fact that it had access to strike funds from the provincial OSSTF. The nature and amount of resources a group has shapes the form coercion takes, but does not prevent coercion by teachers. Of all the factors discussed, resources are the most readily subject to change by conscious acts of human beings and hence are the least likely to inhibit collective behaviour.
VI. REFOCUSBING RESEARCH ON TEACHER MILITANCY

One of the functions of an exploratory study is to provide guidelines for future research. At present, the predominant method of analysis, characterizing studies of teacher militancy, begins by assuming that militancy is a direct outcome of increases in teacher discontent. To the extent that there are differences in analyses of teacher militancy, they usually lie in what the investigator hypothesizes to be the source of discontent. Some emphasize loss of professional status, some economic deprivation, some alienation, and so on. Once the source of discontent is identified, militant action is seen to flow rationally as an attempt to alleviate the particular type of discontent being experienced.

The current study suggests an alternate mode of analysis may be more appropriate; especially, when the concern is with collective coercive action by teacher groups. At the outset we assumed that a more eclectic approach, which included discontent, organization, leadership, resources, and social control as factors contributing to the development of teacher militancy, would be more appropriate for the study of collective teacher militancy than an approach which emphasized individual discontent. While this eclectic approach has helped to provide insight into the phenomena of collective teacher militancy, it fails to provide very focused guidelines for future researchers. Thus, the question that arises is whether our study does suggest any more specific guidelines for future research.
The most central recommendation for future research on teacher militancy which emerges from this study has to do with social control. Teachers differ from the members of many groups investigated by students of social movements in that they are subordinates within a highly institutionalized system of social control. Farmers, peasants, women, blacks, gays and other categories of people who have provided the foundation for social movements are less clearly subject to control than are teachers. Further, authorities generally have less direct and compelling control over people in the above categories, and frequently lack control of opinion-makers through who they can exercise persuasive power. Indeed, some "subordinate" groups may lack any significant number of opinion-makers prior to the movement's mobilization (which is why some students of social movements feel the need to place a heavy emphasis on the availability of new leadership, and changes in social organization, in explaining the development of movements).

For teachers and other publicly employed semi-professionals some breakdown in social control appears to be imperative before significant development of militancy can begin. More specifically, it appears vital that there be some weakening of intermediate authorities' (e.g. principals and other lower level administrators) loyalty to top authorities and/or some reduction in intermediate authorities' effective power over subordinates.

The importance of intermediate authorities lies partly in the way the work of semi-professionals is structured, and partly in the system for vertical mobility that exists in most semi-professions. As
a result of being service providers, semi-professionals tend to find their workplaces located so as to facilitate access by client populations. Generally, this means that semi-professionals are geographically distributed in relatively small pockets. Not only do semi-professionals tend to be geographically decentralized, they also tend to be isolated from one another by the nature of their work. For example, teachers, nurses, and social workers are all expected to be responsible for independently servicing a specified group of clients. This results in what Lortie (1975) calls a "cellular" form of organization which limits interaction.

Decentralized and "cellularized" semi-professionals come to rely upon intermediate authorities to carry communications across the group, and to aggregate and represent the group's interests. Reliance on intermediate authorities makes semi-professionals vulnerable to control and manipulation. Thus, when intermediate authorities are committed to the status quo, they are in an ideal position to help maintain it. Further, their power to use persuasion to insure subordinates' support for the status quo is high as a result of the way vertical mobility is achieved in semi-professions.

In most semi-professional service organizations, administrators are recruited from the ranks of the semi-professionals. This gives administrators legitimacy when attempting to persuade front-line semi-professionals to accept the status quo. Intermediate authorities are perceived as colleagues who have paid their dues, and who understand the trials and tribulations of front-line workers. Finally,
Intermediate authorities can be particularly persuasive because they often have a key say in who will be promoted. The "professional" nature of semi-professionals mitigates against decisions on promotions being made by remote, higher level non-professionals. The fact that semi-professionals are employees goes against collegial decisions on promotions. The result is that semi-professional administrators frequently have the critical say in determining promotions. This, in turn, provides motivation for upwardly mobile semi-professionals to "butter-up" their immediate superiors and hence, aids intermediate authorities' ability to control the "troops".

All of the above suggest that students of militancy among semi-professionals would do well to begin their analyses by looking for changes in the power, role, and orientation of intermediate authorities. Changes in objective conditions which would appear to foster increased discontent should not be ignored. But, researchers should not be surprised if conditions favourable to increased discontent fail to generate action when there is no preceeding or simultaneous change in the power, role, or orientation of intermediate authorities.

In focusing on intermediate authorities, investigators would be well advised to look for changes in the relationships among top-level and intermediate authorities, as well as for changes in the organization of work which may lower subordinates' dependence on intermediate authorities. None of this is to suggest that analysis of the structure and mechanisms of social control can lead to a full understanding of the development of militancy in groups of semi-professionals. Our
study has clearly shown that analysis of discontent, leadership, resources, and of the organizational structure of teachers' groups is important to understanding the evolution of teacher militancy. However, our study also suggests that changes in the structure and mechanisms of social control may be just as important as changes in other factors for moving a group to militancy. Further, it has been suggested that changes in social control can indirectly influence the level of discontent felt by teachers (by allowing discontent-generating ideologies to take hold) and can directly influence the mobilization resources a group has at its disposal. In sum, it is suggested that future investigations of teachers and other semi-professionals should focus on changes in social control as a primary, rather than as a residual factor, in the analysis of militancy.
REFERENCES

Alutto, Joseph and James A. Belasco

Becker, Howard S.

Bendiner, Robert

Brenton, Myron

Carleton Board of Education

Carleton, Patrick W.

Charbonneau, Yvon

Clark, Samuel

Clark, Samuel and J.P. Grayson and Linda Grayson

Coates, R.D.
Cole, Stephen

Coleman, J.S.
1957 Community Conflict. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press.

Commission on Declining School Enrolments in Ontario

Commission on Declining School Enrolments in Ontario

Corwin, Ronald G.

Cox, Harold

Dalsto, C.E.
1968 "OSSTF - a federation at the crossroads." The Bulletin: Toronto: OSSTF.

Downie, Bryan M.
1978 Collective Bargaining and Conflict Resolution in Education. Kingston: Industrial Relations Center, Queen's University.

Dreeben, Robert

Fleming, W.G.

Folsy-Moon, Claudette B.

Fox, William S. and Michael H. Wince

Fris, Joe
Fris, Joe

Fromm, Erich

Gibson, William
1968 Power and Discontent. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey.

Glandomenico, Lawrence L.

Giddens, Anthony

Harp, John and C. Betcherman
1977 "Contradictory class locations and class action: The case of school teachers' organizations in Ontario and Quebec." Unpublished paper, Carleton University.

Hellriegel, Don, Wendell French and Richard B. Peterson

Hennessy, Peter H.

1975 Teacher Militancy. Ottawa: Canadian Teachers' Federation.

Herberg, Will

Irving, John A.

Jessup, Dorothy K.

Kirby, Carol
LeBlanc

Lipset, S.M.

Lortie, Dan C.

Marcus, Phillip

Martell, George

McCarthy, John D. and Mayer Zald

Meltz, Noah and David Stager

Merton, Robert

Moskow, Michael H.

Nagii, Mostafa H. and Meredith D. Pugh

Nisbet, Robert A.

Noone, Donald J.

O'Connor, James
Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation

Ontario Teachers' Federation
1976 We the Teachers of Ontario. Toronto: Ontario Teachers' Federation.

Pinard, Maurice

Repo, Satu

Riesman, David

Rosenthal, Alan

Selby, J.

Smelser, Neil J.

Stokes, Shirley

Wagenaar, Theodore C.

Watson, C., Saeed Quazi and Russ Jones
1972a The Elementary Teacher. Toronto: OISE.

Watson, C., Saeed Quazi, and Joy Poyntz
1972b The Secondary Teacher. Toronto: OISE.

Weller, Jack M. and E.L. Quarantelli
Whyte, William H.

Zeigler, Harmon
Appendix A

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
Appendix A

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Name: ____________________________

Background Characteristics

A. Age __________________________

B. Father's Occupation _______________________

C. Hometown _________________________

Degrees Held | Specialization | Date of Graduation
--------------|---------------|-------------------
B.A.          |               |                   |
Honours       |               |                   |
Other         |               |                   |

Career History

Year | Name of School or System if Outside of Ottawa Area | Position
-----|---------------------------------------------------|---------
      |                                                    |         |
      |                                                    |         |
      |                                                    |         |
      |                                                    |         |

Other Jobs Held - Memberships in Unions or Associations

__________________________
Positions Held in the Local Teachers' Federation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now I would like to ask you to indicate whether you would "Strongly Agree", "Agree", "Disagree", or "Strongly Disagree" with a series of statements concerning key factors in the local education system.

1. In general, trustees and the (name of local federation) share the same goal of providing a high quality education to students. (Probe - ask for evidence of their choice).
   SA
   A
   DK
   D
   SD

2. Supervisory personnel, meaning primarily superintendents, are more concerned with maintaining order than with enhancing the quality of education. (Probe)
   SA
   A
   DK
   D
   SD
3. The decisions of provincial authorities are often based on political expediency rather than on what is best for pupils. (Probe)

SA
D
DK
SD

4. In general, the public is concerned that children in (name of system) receive a high quality education. (Probe)

SA
D
DK
SD

5. Without action by the (name of appropriate federation) the quality of education in (name of system) would be much less than it is today. (Probe)

SA
D
DK
SD
Now I want to ask you how much say in decision-making you feel your federation should have in a number of issue areas. More specifically, I would like to know if you feel the local federation should have more say than the Board, the same say, be consulted, or merely be informed.

1. Personnel Decisions - decisions about recruitment, appointment, promotion and dismissal of teachers.
   - More
   - Same
   - Consult
   - Inform

2. Curriculum and Instruction (decisions about the content and method of teaching).
   - More
   - Same
   - Consult
   - Inform

   - More
   - Same
   - Consult
   - Inform

4. Working Conditions - class size, amount of supervision duty, hours of instruction, preparations periods, etc.
   - More
   - Same
   - Consult
   - Inform
Now I'd like to ask you for your general feelings toward the use of a number of tactics by teachers to achieve goals in contract negotiations. In general do you Strongly Approve, Approve, Disapprove, or Strongly Disapprove of the following tactics being used by teachers.

Publicity Campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Campaigning for and against Trustees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Demonstrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Closing Schools for Study Sessions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Work-to-Rule

SA
A
DK
D
SD

The Threat of Mass Resignation

SA
A
DK
D
SD

The Threat of a Strike

SA
A
DK
D
SD

Mass Resignation

SA
A
DK
D
SD

Strike

SA
A
DK
D
SD.
Appendix B
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>$5,999 or less</th>
<th>6000-7999</th>
<th>8000-9999</th>
<th>10000-11999</th>
<th>12000-13999</th>
<th>14000-15999</th>
<th>16000-17999</th>
<th>18000-19999</th>
<th>20000-21999</th>
<th>22000-23999</th>
<th>24000+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>33.49</td>
<td>30.94</td>
<td>13.30</td>
<td>7.45</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>18.89</td>
<td>31.42</td>
<td>18.59</td>
<td>9.01</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>10.20</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>34.08</td>
<td>25.08</td>
<td>14.86</td>
<td>7.83</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>18.18</td>
<td>25.69</td>
<td>19.86</td>
<td>10.44</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>2.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission on Declining Enrollments (1978:214).
Table 2: Percentage Distribution of Ontario Secondary Teachers by Salary Interval, 1966-67 to 1975-76.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>$5,999 or less</th>
<th>6000-7999</th>
<th>8000-9999</th>
<th>10000-11999</th>
<th>12000-13999</th>
<th>14000-15999</th>
<th>16000-17999</th>
<th>18000-19999</th>
<th>20000-21999</th>
<th>22000-23999</th>
<th>24000+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission on Declining Enrollments (1978b:208).
Table 3: Average Salary Schedules of Public, Separate and Secondary Teachers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Public Elementary</th>
<th>Separate Elementary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Calculated, Average Salary Schedule</td>
<td>Calculated Average Salary Schedule</td>
<td>Calculated Average Salary Schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certification Level</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>11,579</td>
<td>12,113</td>
<td>13,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>12,326</td>
<td>12,900</td>
<td>14,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>13,263</td>
<td>13,879</td>
<td>15,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>14,010</td>
<td>14,665</td>
<td>16,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>14,762</td>
<td>15,450</td>
<td>16,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>15,513</td>
<td>16,241</td>
<td>17,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>16,448</td>
<td>17,217</td>
<td>18,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>17,200</td>
<td>18,012</td>
<td>19,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>17,595</td>
<td>18,304</td>
<td>20,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>18,663</td>
<td>19,552</td>
<td>21,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>19,359</td>
<td>20,311</td>
<td>22,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>19,627</td>
<td>20,675</td>
<td>22,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>19,664</td>
<td>20,742</td>
<td>23,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>19,660</td>
<td>20,758</td>
<td>23,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>19,681</td>
<td>20,759</td>
<td>23,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>19,681</td>
<td>20,759</td>
<td>23,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>19,681</td>
<td>20,759</td>
<td>23,188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission on Declining Enrollments (1978a:253, 254, 256).
* Categories 4, 5, 6 and 7 are the equivalent of secondary categories 1, 2, 3 and 4 in respective order.
Appendix C

SUPPLY OF AND DEMAND FOR TEACHERS
Appendix C

SUPPLY OF AND DEMAND FOR TEACHERS

Table C1 provides some indication of the change in supply and demand for teachers over time. Columns 1 and 2 contain, respectively, the number of teachers acquired by elementary schools and the number of persons enrolled in elementary education institutions. Columns 4 and 5 report the same type of information for secondary schools and secondary teacher education institutions. Enrolments in teacher education institutions give a rough indication of the supply of new teachers that would be available for employment the following year. By comparing the total number of teachers acquired in a given year with the enrolment of the previous year we can obtain a crude indication of the under or oversupply of teachers. Making this comparison suggests that the teacher shortage was no longer a major problem by 1969-70 for elementary schools. In 1969-70 the enrolment of the previous year was just slightly less than the total number of elementary teacher acquisitions.

Following the above method it would appear that there was a glut of qualified elementary teachers in 1970-71 and 1971-72, followed by a return to undersupply. However, such an interpretation fails to take into account the supply of qualified elementary teachers from outside of teacher education institutions. It can be estimated that, by the early seventies, there was a fairly considerable supply of qualified
Table C1: Number of Teachers Acquired, Enrollment in Teacher Education Institutions and Letters of Permission Issued for the Following Year by Teaching Level, 1964-77.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Teachers Acquired</th>
<th>No. Enrolled In Elementary Teacher Ed.</th>
<th>No. Letters of Permission</th>
<th>No. of Teachers Acquired</th>
<th>No. Enrolled In Secondary Teacher Ed.</th>
<th>No. Letters of Permission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>7920</td>
<td>6462</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>4504</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>1022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>9322</td>
<td>5913</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>5036</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>1089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>10414</td>
<td>6534</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>5870</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>1013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>11043</td>
<td>6853</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>6140</td>
<td>1093</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>11297</td>
<td>9277</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>5619</td>
<td>2116</td>
<td>1144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>9946</td>
<td>7896</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>6105</td>
<td>2874</td>
<td>689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>6835</td>
<td>2751</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4214</td>
<td>2766</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>7079</td>
<td>4250</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3353</td>
<td>3110</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>6208</td>
<td>3139</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>3270</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>7423</td>
<td>1780</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3123</td>
<td>3036</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>8630</td>
<td>2229</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>3150</td>
<td>3512</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>6337</td>
<td>3327</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2851</td>
<td>3762</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>4818</td>
<td>3311</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2264</td>
<td>3639</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual reports of the Ontario Minister of Education.
elementary teachers available to re-enter the teaching profession. Elementary teaching continues to be a heavily female occupation and there has been a tendency for females to move out of the occupation to rear children and to return later. By the seventies, many of the vanguard on the baby boom generation who were qualified as teachers had had their children and were ready to re-enter teaching. This coupled with the fact that there was an absolute decrease in the number of teachers employed in elementary schools suggests that the oversupply of teachers was continuous throughout the seventies.

The case of the secondary teachers is much clearer. From 1965 to 1971-72, the number of teachers needed exceeded the potential number being produced. In 1972-73, however, the tide turned to where the total demand for teachers could be met from the supply of new teachers alone.

A second indicator of supply and demand is the number of "letters of permission" issued. Letters of permission enable persons not qualified, to teach in Ontario schools but are only issued if qualified teachers cannot be found. Thus a decline in letters of permission indicates a reduction in the teacher shortage. As can be seen in Table C1, there was a significant decline in the number of letters of permission issued at both the elementary and secondary levels in the late 1960's and early 1970's.

A final indicator of supply and demand is the number of graduates of teacher training institutes that are able to find employment as teachers. Table C2 provides this measure for the period from
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>1,723</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>1,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>1,786</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>1,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>1,825</td>
<td>1,139</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>1,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>1,895</td>
<td>1,214</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>1,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>1,976</td>
<td>1,277</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>1,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>2,062</td>
<td>1,352</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>2,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>2,118</td>
<td>1,416</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>2,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>2,173</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>2,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>2,233</td>
<td>1,509</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>2,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>2,293</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>2,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>2,356</td>
<td>1,623</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>2,356</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>2,421</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>2,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>1,728</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>2,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>2,558</td>
<td>1,786</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>2,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>2,626</td>
<td>1,845</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>2,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>2,695</td>
<td>1,904</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>2,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>2,765</td>
<td>1,963</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>2,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>2,836</td>
<td>2,022</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>2,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>2,908</td>
<td>2,081</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>2,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>2,981</td>
<td>2,141</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>2,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>3,055</td>
<td>2,202</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>3,055</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>3,131</td>
<td>2,263</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>3,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-95</td>
<td>3,209</td>
<td>2,325</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>3,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>3,289</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>3,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>3,370</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>3,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>3,453</td>
<td>2,513</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>3,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>3,538</td>
<td>2,576</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>3,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-00</td>
<td>3,624</td>
<td>2,640</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>3,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-01</td>
<td>3,712</td>
<td>2,705</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>3,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-02</td>
<td>3,802</td>
<td>2,770</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>3,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>3,896</td>
<td>2,835</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>3,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>3,992</td>
<td>2,901</td>
<td>1,091</td>
<td>3,992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C1: Active and Inactive Teacher Graduates of Colleges and Universities in Ontario, 1972-77.
1971 to 1977. While employment opportunities appeared to improve somewhat in 1973-74 and 1974-75, the overall picture is consistent with the view that there was an oversupply of teachers in the seventies.
Appendix D

EXHIBITS FOR CHAPTER V
Exhibit 1

NTF Minutes of the Nepean Teacher/Board Relations Committee, March, 1968.

MEETING WITH THE PUBLIC SCHOOL BOARD, MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
Thursday Evening, March 14, at 8 p.m.

Board Management Committee:
Mrs. Harris
Mr. Arthur
Mr. Hubbley

We met in the staffroom of Parkwood Hills Public School at 7 p.m. to go over our strategy. We all took our part of the brief and went over our arguments. Mrs. Ardern summoned us at 8:00 to the Board Room.

In Mrs. Harris's opening remarks she intimated that all the answers would be NO. Mr. Arthur was completely emphatic that the teachers were asking for a great deal and that it would be impossible for the most part to give us any assurance that the Board cared for our welfare. Indeed they could hire any amount of teachers that they would need from the teacher's college if need be. The Board were concerned about rising costs and of course did not feel that category 4 teachers were such an asset.

Sick leave claims were spoken for by Mr. Linnen. It seems that the Board thinks teachers are all rotters. They would surely find the loophole and would not do their duty. Mrs. Harris said that now a teacher could possibly be away one-third of the teaching year. Much
too many days were available. We signed a contract, and that should be binding. They agreed that they would change the wording so that a certificate would be needed only after a total of ten occasional days and days that one was sick and had produced a certificate for would not be counted in this said 10 days. This was a deterrent to the teacher who misuses her sick leave which according to the board seems to be all of us. (Mr. Arthur)

Mr. Linnen introduced the Leaves of absence clauses. There was no question raised on page 6 except that it should read in any one yer. The big discussion was on page 7 when we asked for two days for reasons that the teacher could not in any way foresee or get out of. The Board felt that this was compassionate leave and they absolutely would not bend in this area although we argued at great length. This again was too expensive, and because it was a loop hole the teachers would jump in and they would benefit. NO. The next big hurdle was the Maternity Leave. Mr. Arthur is in the dark ages. He doesn't think a teacher should get married. Although there are approx. 188 married teachers on the Nepean Staff, he still felt that they could reapply. He felt that no one was so valuable to the Board that they could not be replaced. He felt that there would be more than enough problems when the teacher tried to teach with a baby at home, and he was quite sure that the Board really didn't want them. If a person applied who had not taught with this Board, they probably had a better chance of being hired than the one who had broken contract to have a baby. This even though they may quit another Board for the same reason, even a mere 6 monthss
previously. It seems that the more familiar the Board is with a
person's personal life, the less they are willing to humanize the
relationship. We felt that we as teaching personnel, were merely a cost
factor and a thorn in their backs. It was certain that although Mr.
Arthur thinks that Nepean has a good system, he is willing to fill it
with first year teachers, Administrators for Principals, etc.

Mrs. Moore made a good plea for the Gratuity scheme. However
the Board feel that there is no reason to reward good service. Indeed
they would prefer if there were no Category 4 and up teachers. Again
the threat of filling the rooms with personnel from teachers college.
The estimate that this would cost another 11 mills was made. They will
produce figures which will give a total if all 10 year teachers
resigned and took their gratuity. This would never happen and so the
figures are not totally correct. However they tend to pull the wool
over the eyes of many people.

Mr. Jarrett explained the sabbatical and it was accepted.

We felt that we were approaching a Board which had a closed mind
on these issues. They also were not interested in the human aspect of
their employees. They most certainly felt that the teachers as a lot
could not be trusted, they intimated that Mr. Rath was not doing his
duty when he didn't fire a lot of teachers every year. They gave in on
as little as they could. They did not give us a cent. We certainly
feel that this was truly an unacceptable and unproductive meeting.
Where do we go from here?
Exhibit 2

Kay Stanley's Presidential Activities,
January 23 to February 16, 1969

Kay Stanley's President's Report of February 9, 1969
from TFC executive minutes of the same date.

President's Report

Mrs. Stanley reported her activities as president of the organization as follows:

Jan. 23 - represented T.F.C. at the official opening of the Mr. Erskine Johnston School and had an opportunity to talk with the Minister about T.F.C.

Jan. 26 - attended Board Meeting.

Jan. 28 - convened the "meet the Administrative Staff Meeting" at Sir Winston Churchill School. Jan. 29 - attended the meeting of "reportarar" of the Public Relations Committee at Barrhaven School

Jan. 30 - participated in the "Paint-in" at the Minters

Feb. 2 - convened the Credit Union Meeting at Greenbank School

Feb. 2 - attended Educational Policies Meeting of the Board

Feb. 3 - met with members of the ad hoc committee which attends Board meetings.

Feb. 4 - convened the 2nd "Meet the Administrative Staff Meeting"

And in the future

Feb. 9 - Executive Meeting of TFC

Feb. 10 - will act as a judge at the public speaking finals at Graham Park School

Feb. 11 - 3rd. "Meet the Administrative Staff Meeting" at the Erskine Johnston School

Feb. 12 - F.W.T.A.O. association Executive Meeting at C.F.B. Uplands

Feb. 16 - TFC Council
Exhibit 3

Mary Hill’s Action Plan of June 13, 1972

**Executive Meeting, Pineview Golf Club - 4:30 P.M.**

If it is agreeable to those people present the following events could take place:

**PLAN I**

1. Tonight, the negotiating team will probably attempt to break down negotiations. If successful, the following events will take place.
   (a) The executive will meet at a designated place at 10:00 P.M. to implement necessary action.
   (b) A press release will be prepared by Tom Clowes, Iona Kerr, Les Lipinen and Mary Hill to be released to the news media on Wednesday, June 14, 1972; therefore effectively breaking negotiations.
   (c) Wednesday, June 14, 1972, the President and Chairman of E.P.C. will meet with the C.P.A. and explain the reasons for breakdown, and the role of the principal in the future steps of this plan will be stressed.
   (d) A mass meeting will be held Thursday, June 15, at ____________
   (e) At the mass meeting we will present the stand of the E.P.C. and the executive.

**THE REASONS FOR BREAKDOWN**

1. The Board will not negotiate A1 to A4. It is cast in concrete.

2. The Board has placed a sum of money aside for principals and refuses to further negotiate in this area. Our principals deserve a better break.

3. Caretakers have received a 6%-22% raise.

4. 6% was added to every other area of the Budget, i.e., maintenance, library books, office supplies, etc.

5. T.F.C. has gone back to the teachers. The negotiating team of the Board has not gone back to the Management Committee.
6. The teachers have directed the E.P.C. to get a fair settlement. This is not possible.

The peripheral issues which leave a bad taste in my mouth are:

1. Senior Administration has interfered.
2. We are expected to settle now that the secondary has settled.
3. The last three days leave elementary school teachers holding the bag again.

WHY WE MUST TAKE THIS STAND:

1. If we do not take a stand this year after being confronted with crisis year after year, we can expect that the elementary teachers in Carleton will remain in this position for at least the next ten years.
   1. loss of programs
   2. lack of autonomy for our principals
   3. poor salary settlements
   4. preference for secondary panel
   5. expectation that we can be manipulated to conform
   6. interpretation of our contract

STEP 7

At the mass meetings the teachers will be asked to:
1. Support our stand by:
   (a) Attending Board meetings
   (b) Planning to support strong measures to be taken by T.F.C. in September

You are asked to:
1. Get the people out to a mass meeting

We want to know if the teachers are with us.

FUTURE PLANS: 1. Delegations by Pres. at Board
                2. Possible work to rule
                3. Any other suggestions will be gladly received by me.

It had seemed before Monday night that the wisest plan was to prolong negotiations through June, trying to keep from going to the teachers. Then, in September, accelerating our agitation and peaking in the Fall. The results of the Ministry's decision to keep the schools open to June 30 is another slap in the face. I, therefore, feel that since the morale is so low it is necessary to react. Our teachers need to know we are working on their behalf, that we are not willing to lie down and die but rather will rise to the occasion and insist that our demands be met. (Executive Minutes, June 13, 1972).
Appendix E

A HISTORY OF OTTAWA SECONDARY TEACHERS' NEGOTIATIONS
A HISTORY OF OTTAWA SECONDARY TEACHERS' NEGOTIATIONS

Prior to the formation of the Ottawa Board of Education in 1970, Ottawa area secondary teachers negotiated with the Collegiate Institute of Ottawa (CIBO). While negotiations with the CIBO failed to produce any significant coercive action they were not without conflict. For example, the negotiations of both 1967 and 1968 saw teachers reject two Board offers and in 1968 the use of work-to-rule and mass resignation was considered. Unrest was also present in 1969 as is indicated by the fact that a reported 80% of the secondary teachers had indicated their willingness to resign in order to get a settlement. In spite of their actions, it does not appear that Ottawa secondary teachers obtained very satisfying settlements in the late sixties. In 1967, only 70% of the teachers voted in favor of the final settlement, and the teachers' negotiating committee was reported to have been split on accepting the Board's offer. In 1968, a settlement was imposed by the Board as the teachers failed to approve of any of the Board's salary proposals. Finally, the threat of mass resignation in 1969 achieved a settlement which provided a lower grid than the teachers had proposed late in the

1. There is an exception to be noted here. Those secondary teachers who taught in four of the CIBO's 29 high schools negotiated with the CBE in 1968 as these four schools came under the jurisdiction of the CBE in that year.
negotiations of the previous year. In sum, the final years of the CIRO bore witness to increasing willingness on the part of secondary teachers to consider taking coercive action. As we will see, dissatisfaction with salary was to continue to be an issue under the new OBE and the willingness to take strong action was to increase.

Negotiations with the new OBE for a 1970-71 agreement first reached the press in February, 1970, when the teachers were reported to be asking for a 13% salary increase, a new system of awarding annual increments in which the size of increments would increase with experience, and a reduction in the number of years to maximum salary. Within seven days of the announcement of the teachers' pay proposal, trouble was brewing over the fact that one of the trustees (one who had previously been an OPSB trustee) had broken the "established negotiating procedure" by telling the press that the teachers' salary request was too high. However, this was to be a minor irritation compared to

2. On May 14, 1969, the secondary teachers cut their salary proposal to the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category I</th>
<th>Minimum Salary</th>
<th>Maximum Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category II</td>
<td>$6850</td>
<td>$11750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category III</td>
<td>7200</td>
<td>12100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category IV</td>
<td>7950</td>
<td>13650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category IV</td>
<td>8500</td>
<td>14300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast the agreement reached in April, 1969, provided the following grid:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category I</th>
<th>Minimum Salary</th>
<th>Maximum Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category II</td>
<td>$6700</td>
<td>$11500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category II</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td>12200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category III</td>
<td>7900</td>
<td>13500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category IV</td>
<td>8400</td>
<td>14400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the offer the Board was to make to teachers. Rather than granting the requested 73%, the Board offered a 2.5% salary increase. This, coupled with a Board flip-flop on calling in a conciliator, led to the teachers breaking off negotiations on March 10, 1970. On March 16, it was reported the Board was now willing to offer a 6.5% increase (with annual increments included in the 6.5%) but "not a penny more" as this was the total increase already built into the Board budget. Since the teachers had received a 6.5% increase, excluding increments, in the previous year this "final offer" was not received very favourably. With both sides holding firm to their positions, they agreed to bring in a conciliator from the Ontario Department of Labour to help break the deadlock in April.

Conciliation efforts collapsed toward the end of April with the teachers complaining that the Board's offer was 1% below the increase in the cost-of-living over the previous twelve months. By April 30th, the local OSSTF president let it be known that the teachers were so upset with the Board's offer that they might stage a spontaneous strike despite his advice that they not strike. Whether or not teachers were actually angry enough to strike they did not choose to do so. Instead, on May 4th, they began a work-to-rule.

The work-to-rule was short lived - lasting only three days. Apparently the Board agreed to make a new offer in exchange for an ending of the work-to-rule. Indeed both sides appeared to be softening and a settlement provided for a 9% salary increase (including increments) and the new increment system was reached in a few days following the end of the work-to-rule.
Although the secondary teachers had by no means pushed the Board to the wall in 1970, they had found that coercive action could get the Board to move and break its budget restrictions.

In 1971, there was to be an additional opponent for teachers to test their strength against as this was the year the provincial government imposed mandatory ceilings on educational spending. Indeed, in 1971 there is reason to believe that much of the local conflict which occurred across Ontario was stimulated by the provincial OSSTF's battle with the provincial government over ceilings. That there was a provincial level fight going on is indisputable. For example, on March 27, 1971, it was reported that the provincial OSSTF was "considering a province wide strike to protest the provincial government's restrictions on educational spending" and that 300 OSSTF delegates to a special meeting of the OSSTF provincial assembly had authorized the provincial executive to call a strike on May 3, pending approval by the membership. Although the strike never materialized, it is clear that opposition to the provincial government and its ceilings was running high in 1971.

Local actions in Ottawa like the actions of the provincial OSSTF went from hot to cold in 1971. The heat came in June when the teacher negotiators broke off negotiations, sent a bulletin to teachers saying that the Board's offer was ridiculous, and informed the press that "all

---

3. The membership voted down the province wide strike (23812 to 5078) and a province wide work-to-rule (46975 to 13004) (Ottawa Citizen, April 26, 1971).
hell could break loose" if the Board salary offer was not increased. These actions were followed by a mass meeting on June 22 at which it is reported that 95% of the teachers voted down the latest Board offer and the negotiating team was given the power to decide on a course of action without calling a general meeting.

Following the start of summer vacation the negotiating team announced its plan of action - a work-to-rule to start in September. Further, the negotiators made it clear that they had the backing of the provincial office of OSSTF by informing the press that a representative of the provincial office had told them they would probably have to escalate their sanctions. Whether or not the Board or the teachers softened through the summer, September opened with the teachers dropping their plan to work-to-rule and on September 14, a new agreement was ratified providing for a 4.55% salary increase in 1971-72.

While negotiations for the 1971-72 agreement ended quietly, this was not a sign of things to come. When news started to come out about the negotiations for the 1972-73 agreement in May, 1972, the key issues were reported to be salaries and fringe benefits. Specifically, the teachers were requesting a 7% salary increase and that the Board pay two-thirds of the cost of fringe benefits. For its part, the Board was offering a 2.5% salary increase. These issues were not new but something else was. This was that the Board had decided to have five of its administrators handle all negotiations in 1972.

By June 15, both sides had moved on the salary issue with the teachers asking 6.75% and hinting they might take 4.5% (the percentage
increase that their Carleton counterparts had already accepted) and the Board increasing its offer to 3%. However, progress on the salary issue was accompanied by teacher complaints over having administrators negotiate for the Board.

Little progress was made during the summer months and when schools reopened in September, the secondary teachers were working-to-rule along with the OBE secretarial, technical and computer personnel who were having their own difficulties with the Board and who, like the secondary teachers, objected to negotiating with administrators.

As appeared to have happened in the previous work-to-rule, the Board suggested it was willing to improve its offer if the teachers would end their sanction. However, this time the teachers would not go along and instead threatened stronger action if the Board failed to improve its offer. Although the Board did come through with a new offer of 4.5% (over 16 months) the teachers refused to consider it as it was made through the media and not at the bargaining table. However, following a Board decision to have trustees become directly involved with negotiations the teacher negotiating team was willing to recommend to the teachers that the work-to-rule be stopped as a concession to the Board. According to the newspaper account, a strong majority voted to continue the work-to-rule at a mass meeting of 1200 teachers on October 20. As a consequence of this vote the teachers' negotiating team resigned.

Following the appointment of a new negotiating team in late October, the teachers suggested that if the Board increased its offer
by 1/2 to 1%, a settlement would be likely. However, on November 23, the Board announced that it would not increase its offer. At this point a new factor came into play – school Board elections. As might be expected, teacher negotiations became a major focus in all the candidates' meetings. Indeed, the teachers insured that this would be the case by attending all candidates' meetings and raising the issue of negotiations. Further, the secondary teachers produced and published a slate of preferred candidates. Thus, trustees wishing to be re-elected found themselves under pressure to bring about a settlement. Certainly teachers did not let the pressure off. On November 29, teachers in four schools held study sessions in protest of a statement by a trustee who suggested that sixty teachers would have to lose their jobs to meet the teachers' pay demands. Further, a flyer was sent out singling out this same trustee as a person who should be voted out of office. While the flyer turned out to be the independent work of one person, the trustees did not know this at the time. Undoubtedly trustees would deny that the teachers' campaigning had any effect on their decisions regarding negotiations, but it is interesting to note that just a few days prior to election day, the trustees voted to agree to a request of the teachers to bring in a conciliator. This appeared to turn the trick as within two days of the conciliator's appointment, a tentative agreement was reached giving secondary teachers a 5.25% salary increase over sixteen months (from September, 1972, to December, 1973).

The Ottawa secondary teachers' next set of negotiations took place during and after the tumultuous winter of 1973-74 in which
Ontario teachers held their one day province-wide strike. For their part, Ottawa secondary teachers participated in the strike and collected voluntary contributions for use by the two local groups of separate school teachers and the Carleton elementary group—all of whom had mass resigned.

Perhaps the fact that teacher militancy was running high across the province accounts for the fact that the Ottawa Board offered little serious resistance to their secondary teachers in the negotiations for a 1974 agreement. While negotiations were dragged out over five months and both sides called for their provincial organizations' assistance, no signs of major conflict appeared in the newspapers. On March 28, 1974, it was announced that an agreement had been reached which gave teachers an 8.7% salary increase and made them the highest paid secondary teachers in the province. Given that in February the teachers' demand was reported to have been for a 9.6% increase and the Board was said to be offering 3%, it appears that the Board did indeed give more ground than the teachers. However, if the Board was soft in 1974, it was not to remain so in the ensuing year.

Negotiations for a new agreement to come into effect on January 1, 1975, began in November, 1974. However, before negotiations even started there were at least two events which presaged teacher/Board conflict. First, in October, the teachers raised the issue of PTR and publically criticized the Board for having more than thirty pupils in 23% of its academic and commercial classes. Also in October, the Board approved a policy almost guaranteed to raise the hackles of teachers.
Specifically, the Board prohibited "any kind of political talk [regarding Board elections, etc.] among teachers or students even in staff rooms" (Ottawa Citizen, October 17, 1974). Further, teachers were forbidden from talking to students about trustee candidates.

Once negotiations had started it did not take long for it to become clear that teachers were ready for a fight. On November 29, 1974, the Board reported that the teachers were seeking an average salary increase of 52% plus a full cost-of-living allowance resulting in a total 63% increase in the amount of money to be spent on teachers. Although negotiations in December and most of January took place in secret, events were occurring in other Ontario cities which probably influenced Ottawa negotiations. On November 19, Windsor secondary teachers staged the first strike in the history of the Ontario educational system. The importance of this strike is that it provided the test case for determining whether teachers' strikes were legal. In late December the Supreme Court of Ontario ruled that Windsor teachers were within the law in carrying out their strike and thus the door to strike action was opened for other Ontario teachers' groups including Ottawa secondary teachers. The Windsor strike had a second impact for local negotiations in that it resulted in major salary increases which were used as "reasonable objectives" by Ottawa teachers.

4. This 52% probably included the costs of increments and fringe benefits as the salary demand cited later by the teachers was much lower than 52%.
That the quiet surrounding Ottawa negotiations was not a sign of good progress became evident on January 24, 1975, when the local teachers' chief negotiator let it be known that the Board and the teachers were still far apart on salaries and that a strike had now become a real possibility. Within a few days plans for a strike vote to be held on February 4 were announced. Events preceding the February 4 meeting could hardly have been more favourable for a positive strike vote. First, the Board broke off negotiations on the day preceding the strike vote, citing the teachers' failure to significantly alter their demands as the reason for the action. Second, the Thunder Bay teachers had just won a 28% salary increase plus a cost-of-living allowance as the result of strike action. Although it was not made public at the time, the teachers did give their negotiators the authority to call a strike on February 4. In addition, it should be noted that the mass meeting of February 4 resulted in the teachers voting to reject the latest Board offer and to give their chief negotiator the authority to call in provincial OSSF negotiators to handle the dispute. Within a week the chief negotiator exercised his authority and called in provincial negotiators to run the negotiations.

Shortly after the arrival of provincial negotiators the teachers raised their salary demands. At this point rumours that the trustees were considering resigning, in mass, started to circulate. In addition, it was reported that the Ontario School Trustees' Council was considering closing all schools across the province if Ottawa secondary teachers struck.
While the above actions never materialized, the OBE did manage to generate some pressure on the secondary teachers to settle by reaching an agreement with its elementary teachers on February 14, and offering the same settlement to the secondary teachers. However, this offer was quickly rejected by the teachers' negotiating team. On February 24, a provincial mediator arrived on the scene but after two days' effort failed to get negotiations back on track. February 26 saw a last ditch effort by the Board to bring public pressure on the teachers to settle without a strike. On that date the Board ran a 1/4 page advertisement informing the public that they would suffer a 60% increase in secondary school taxes if the teachers' salary demands were met. Further, the ad stressed that secondary teachers had turned down the 18.5% salary increase which the OBE elementary teachers had accepted. This Board call for public support failed to deter teachers and on the next day, February 27, the teachers were on strike and were to stay on strike until April 18.

While it is not necessary to detail all the turmoil of the strike period, some key points should be made about the events that occurred. First, the key local issue throughout the strike was salary. While the teachers ran some advertisements suggesting that class size was also a major issue, the final settlement left the setting of class size firmly in the hands of the management. The second point is that there was a provincial issue overlaying the local issues. As several observers saw it, Ottawa was simply the staging ground for a battle between the provincial OSSTF and the provincial government. Indeed,
the local teachers admitted in print, both individually and collectively, that their battle was as much with Bill Davis as with the Board. In particular, provincial ceilings were an integral part of the Ottawa fight for the OBE would have to pierce its ceiling and risk the loss of provincial grants if it was to meet the teachers' salary demands. In terms of the provincial OSSTF's objectives, one of the key goals in Ottawa was to burst the provincial ceilings in Ottawa. To this end the provincial office supplied approximately $40,000 a day in strike pay to Ottawa teachers as well as an experienced negotiator who had been involved in the Windsor strike. Third and finally, it should be noted that the strike helped to drive a permanent wedge between the Ottawa secondary teachers and their Board. While this was probably the outcome of other teacher strikes, particular actions by the Ottawa trustees may have driven the wedge deeper than usual. For example, the day the strike began the trustees voted to fire all striking teachers and later, after the settlement, the Board voted to withhold as much money as possible from the teachers who struck.

In the end, the Ottawa strike did result in breaking provincial ceilings (on March 21, the Minister of Education raised the ceilings by $50 per secondary pupil and $80 per elementary pupil), and in providing Ottawa secondary teachers with sizable salary increases (an average of 34%) and a cost-of-living allowance which was to be folded in a twenty-month agreement extending to September, 1976.
Appendix F

THE FUTURE SCOPE AND DIRECTION OF TEACHER MILITANCY IN ONTARIO
THE FUTURE SCOPE AND DIRECTION OF
TEACHER MILITANCY IN ONTARIO

This discussion does not flow directly from the analysis of Ottawa-Carleton teachers' groups, although what is said here carries implications for them and other local teachers' groups in Ontario. What is presented is an attempt to assess the future scope and direction of teacher militancy in Ontario. In assessing the future "scope" of teacher militancy I will be concerned with the potential for Ontario teachers to bridge the geographic, religious, organizational, and status differences which divide them, and form a unified group across the province. Further, I will be concerned with the potential for teachers to join with other public service workers in order to battle the Ontario provincial government's policies of fiscal restraint. Under the heading of "direction" I am concerned with the ideological orientation militant teacher groups are likely to develop. In particular I will be concerned with the possibility that teacher groups will develop an adherence to a working-class socialism, since several authors have suggested teachers and other semi-professionals may be destined to lead a new working class advance to socialism (for example, see O'Connor, 1973: 246-56).

To lay the foundation for this speculative attempt at futurology, I will begin by analyzing differences in the scope and direction of teacher militancy in three provinces - Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia. Here the work of Harp and Betcherman (1977) provides a
oseful starting point. In one of the few analytic studies of Canadian teacher organizations the authors attempt to account for differences in the political orientation and behaviour of the OSSTF and Le Centrale de l'Enseignement de Quebec (CEQ). As the authors describe the two groups, the OSSTF has "... remained allied with capital despite several confrontations with the state" (1977:31) while the CEQ "... became allied with the labour movement in that province" (1977:31). Rather than viewing teachers' objective class location as as determining the political orientations of teacher organizations,¹ Harp and Betcherman suggest that the direction of teacher organizations' political evolution is heavily influenced by the broad "... system of political and ideological relations which occur in a particular historical context."

In both Ontario and Quebec ceilings were imposed on educational spending. However, the two provincial governments differed significantly in the extent to which they made themselves visible as teachers' key opponent in bargaining. In Ontario, the impact of ceilings was lessened to some degree by allowing boards several years to come into

¹ Harp and Betcherman argue that teachers and other semi-professionals are in an objectively contradictory class location. On one hand teachers' relatively high level of control over their immediate work pulls them to identify with the petty bourgeoisie. On the other hand, teachers' lack of control over the means of production and investments and resources pushes them to identify with the proletariat. In a sense contradictory strains arising from teachers' class position cancel each other out, making it impossible to predict the direction of collective teacher action on the basis of class location alone.
line, and by the existence of weighting factors which took into account special expenditure needs of individual boards and allowed expenditures beyond ceilings in some systems. More important, however, was the fact that negotiations remained in the hands of local boards and their teachers.

In Quebec the government imposed ceilings on board expenditures and set the maximum salaries that boards could offer teachers in 1966. Where the provincial government in Ontario could, and did, deflect teachers' anger over salary negotiations by blaming boards' "poor budgeting,"² the Quebec provincial government could not escape responsibility for teachers' salary difficulties. The visibility of the Quebec provincial government as the source of teachers' frustrations became even more clear when teachers, who had just been given the right to strike, decided to exercise this option in 1967. The government response to teacher strikes was to pass Bill 25 which took away the right to strike for sixteen months, ordered teachers back to work, and made negotiations province-wide. Bill 25 appeared to supply the impetus to the CEO joining with other public sector unionists in Quebec, and to their forming a Common Front with the Confederations of National Trade Unions (CNTU) and the Quebec Federation of Labour (QFL). In 1972, the strength of the CNTU-QFL-CEQ Common Front was shown in a strike of over 200,000 public employees.

² The provincial government's attempt to shift blame to local boards was aided by the fact that consolidation of school boards had broken down the trust between local teachers and their boards.
In Ontario, the year in which all boards had to come within the government expenditure ceilings - 1973 - was accompanied by a large number of mass resignations in the fall of that year. As in Quebec, the Ontario provincial government's first inclination was to introduce repressive legislation which, if passed, might have gone a long way toward radicalizing Ontario teachers. However, the teachers' quick and dramatic province-wide walkout in December led provincial authorities to retreat from harsh legislation. Rather than moving toward greater formal centralization of teacher negotiations, the government began work on Bill 100 which would give teachers the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike. Where Quebec teachers went from having been granted the right to strike to having it immediately rescinded, the Ontario teachers went from a situation where the boards could unilaterally impose settlements and where strikes might be illegal, to a situation where they had the right to strike and could compel boards to bargain in good faith. Quebec teachers lost a right while Ontario teachers gained several. Where Ontario teachers found they could influence the government's behaviour, Quebec teachers found that their government would not be responsive to their interests without extremely strong action.

Harp and Betcherman cover much of the above discussion under the heading of "political relations" but avoid any attempt to specify general principals which might apply beyond the "particular historical context". Some general principles do seem to be able to be drawn from the study. However, these are principles regarding the general
tendency for subordinate groups to rebel. They do not aid much in understanding the ideological content of rebellion. For example, it appears that the structure of social control is more important than objective class position in determining the breadth of subordinate group rebellion. Where power is visibly concentrated in the hands of one set of authorities, the potential for broad-based rebellion is greater. In Ontario teachers sharing the same objective class position and the same kinds of deprivations have been unable to develop a strong common "class" consciousness, largely because they are not clearly subject to the same authorities. Even if, as some suggest, the provincial government really controls school boards, the nominal granting of autonomy to boards limits the visibility of the provincial government as the common opponent of all teachers. Putting this all more simply, the visibility of a common foe often determines the extent of "class" consciousness in a subordinate group. In the case of Quebec, the provincial government's centralization of control over the negotiations of a large number of public employees, coupled with a simultaneous attempt to tighten the pursestrings on the public coffers, contributed to teachers developing a consciousness of kind with other public employees. From this perspective, on-the-job proletarianization of service workers is unimportant to worker solidarity. What separates blue-collar and white-collar workers are not differences in the nature of their work, nor differences in their status. Rather, it is the fact that these workers are subject to different sets of authorities and different structures of social control. However, the
proletarianization of work and the elimination of status differentials may well be important to whether joint subordinate group rebellions will fizzle out into narrow interest group politics after common struggles are fought. Common struggles are fought not because bureaucratization and "rationalization" of work have made the colour of all workers' collars the same, but because they momentarily face similar problems from a common opponent.

The structure of authority and social control merely serves to structure the alliances that will be made among groups of workers; they do not determine the ideological orientation of such alliances, nor do they guarantee a continuing unity of workers. Here, what Harp and Betcherman call "ideological relations" are important. Unfortunately, Harp and Betcherman do little more than describe the ideologies of the two teachers' organizations - stressing the socialist content of the CEQ rhetoric. At best there is the suggestion that the CEQ's choice of socialist rhetoric was influenced by the general "... class struggle waged against the ideological and political power of Duplessis" (1977:30). In other words, the ideological direction of the CEQ was shaped by the broader ideological climate in Quebec.

Not being well informed as to the history of political and social relations in Quebec, I am hesitant to say much about the CEQ's adoption of a socialist outlook. However, a few speculative comments can be risked. First, the following points should be noted. The CEQ is composed of francophone, Catholic teachers. Protestant, and anglophone-Catholic teachers have their own organizations. CEQ members were
strong supporters of the Quebec independence movement in the sixties.

A detailed survey made by the CEQ about this time [1967] shows that more than forty percent of its members are "indépendantiste". A little after the founding of the Parti Québécois we find that professional teachers are the largest group in the PQ's membership (about one-quarter) (Le Blanc, 1974:157).

The CEQ actively fought Bill 63 in 1968 (a Bill which allowed parents the right to choose the language their children will be taught in) and in 1970, fought against the War Measures Act. Finally, it is noteworthy that the size of the Quebec francophone middle class, reaping benefits from employment in the private sector, is very small and that those employed in the private sector had to become anglicized to rise in the ranks.

What is the importance of these facts? I would suggest that taken together they suggest that the CEQ's ideological orientation does flow largely from structural conditions present in Quebec society. In Ontario and other anglophone provinces similarities of culture, language and ethnicity cut across the division between public and private sector employment. In these provinces when the State attempts to cut public service expenditures, private sector employees of the same linguistic, ethnic, and cultural status as public employees can be seen to benefit. Taxes may go up, but not as much as if public services were not cut. Further, money spent by the State to aid private corporations' profit-making is perceived to provide job opportunities and salary boosts in the private sector. In contrast, in Quebec, the fact that the groups which suffered most from the State's financial cutbacks shared communalities of religion, language,
ethnicity, and culture which were different from the communalities of those who were most likely to benefit from the way the State handled its fiscal difficulties. Helped place the struggles of public sector workers in a broader panorama of social and political relations. Deprivations stemming from being a public employee grouped together the same people who were grouped together by deprivation stemming from being French Canadian. The result has been that Quebec teachers and other public employees have opted for a narrow "nationalistic" form of socialism - a Quebec socialism - not an unfettered working-class socialism. For example, in a 1973 speech the President of CEQ concluded as follows:

... the time has come for us as for Quebec unionism to start building, on a unified base, a plan for Quebec society made by and for the Quebec worker (Charbonneau, 1974:198).

Assuming that the growth of socialist ideas in Quebec stems, in large part, from the exclusion of French Canadians from middle class occupational positions in the private sector, the recent efforts of the PQ to open up private sector employment to francophones may well result in the consequent withering away of the narrow socialist dream.

I have attempted to argue that the ideological direction of subordinate group rebellion may be seen to have a structural base in the case of Quebec teachers. However, I do not mean to imply that ideas or ideologies are always determined by objective structural conditions. The capitalist free-enterprise ideology persists despite objective conditions which make it factually untenable. However, I would argue that the development and survival of ideologies is heavily
influenced by the structure of social control and more particularly by the distribution of persuasive power. As we have defined persuasive power it is the ability to obtain compliance by convincing those we wish to comply that compliance is in their best interests. In short, persuasive power is the power of ideology. As work is rationalized in capitalistic societies, the power of intermediate level authorities to control resources and to utilize discretionary power to win the loyalty of subordinates is weakened. Without permanent "party members" in the school systems, the social work agencies and so on, top level authorities lose much of their power to effectively shape subordinates' opinions. Further intermediate authorities are likely to become angry over their own loss of power. As a consequence, when authorities find themselves pressured to make decisions which have a negative impact on subordinates they are unable to sugar-coat the pill. Equally important, the door is opened to new leaders putting forth, and promoting, new ideological interpretations. What new ideologies will emerge depends on a large number of factors including the education and social origins of subordinate group leaders, the degree of overlap in structured inequalities and the range of political ideas which have obtained some general acceptability in the society.

In the Quebec educational system the effectiveness of intermediate authorities as agents of social control was virtually eliminated with the centralization of negotiations and the imposition of expenditure and salary ceilings. At the same time, socialist thought had gained some legitimacy, at least within the francophone
intellegensia to whom teachers were exposed in their training. In addition, the rise of the PQ gave further credibility to socialist thought.

In Ontario the failure of the NDP to make a strong visible ideological commitment to socialism, coupled with the failure of its watered-down leftist perspective to have much success at the polls, reflects socialist thought’s lack of legitimacy in the province. What was legitimate was the narrow business unionism being promoted across the border by the American Federation of Teachers, and the popular "professionalism" justification of militancy being promoted by academics and U.S. teachers' unions. Internally fractured by a federation structure which fostered status jealousy between teachers, and blinded to their common problem of being victims of the fiscal crunch by the autonomy of school boards, Ontario teachers began an uneven march to militant economism. Those hit hardest by economic restraint and experiencing the greatest shake up in authority relations were the secondary teachers - were the first to move toward militant economism. Separate teachers quickly followed suit, but did show some greater ideological awareness. Indeed OECTA has shown the greatest concern with and willingness to forge ties with other unionized workers. As in the case of CEQ teachers, OECTA members feel deprivations as a result of their non-teaching status which overlaps with deprivations of work. OECTA’s teachers face deprivation not only because they are

3. By economism, I refer to the tendency of unions to be primarily concerned with bargaining for short-term financial gain.
publicly-employed teachers but because the provinces' system of funding makes Catholic school systems more impoverished than the public school systems. In short, the provincial government has made it clear to Catholic teachers that it, and not the local boards, is the teachers' real opponent. In contrast, Ontario elementary teachers' internal fragmentation and conflict, coupled with the retention of a more effective and less easily disrupted system of social control in the elementary schools has made them slow to accept even militant economism. Further, they have, to some extent, been bought off as a result of riding the secondary groups' coattails.

Standing somewhere between CEQ teachers and Ontario teachers in politicization are the British Columbia teachers. The B.C. teachers have the distinction of having openly worked to defeat the provincial Social Credit government in 1972. Though it was not formally stated, the B.C. teachers' federation supported the "socialist" alternative, the NDP, in the 1972 election. In B.C., unlike Ontario, socialism is taken seriously as a legitimate political perspective. However, it took strong repressive action by the provincial government, and the centralization of educational authority to push B.C. teachers towards a socialist perspective. As in Quebec and Ontario, the government in B.C. experienced the reality of the fiscal crisis of the State. In 1968, provincial grants to boards were equalized and ceilings set on expenditures. Boards could spend up to 10% above ceilings to meet special local needs, but any additional expenditure had to be passed by a property owners' referendum. In response the teachers' federation
campaigned for the repeal of ceilings in the 1969 election, but did not campaign against the Socred party. Following its re-election, the Socred government took further action which contributed to politicizing teachers. Here Repo's account of events is informative.

In 1970, during the FLQ crisis, while the War Measures Act was in force, the Bennett government passed an act making the teachers in the province subject to instant dismissal for saying or doing anything that could be construed to be in support of the FLQ. No other group in the province, or in the country, for that matter, was singled out for such treatment.

In 1971 the Public Schools Act was amended, making it no longer compulsory for the teachers in the province to belong to BCTF - the British Columbia Teachers' Federation. Labour unionists would say that the BCTF had been "decertified". Only some sixty-odd teachers resigned from the federation. But it was obvious to the teachers that this government move was designed to weaken the federation.

The most serious threat to the jurisdiction of the BCTF came in the fall of 1971. At this time, the Minister of Education attempted to intervene in the salary negotiations between local school boards and teachers' associations by imposing a six and one-half percent ceiling on increases in teachers' salaries (Repo, 1974, 204-5).

All of this was capped by the passage of Bill 3 in 1972. As a result of the Bill...

... the ceilings went down from 110 percent to 108 percent. The tenure rights of teachers were chipped away; it became easier for school boards to fire teachers who had "permanent" contracts. But the worst blow of all was the loss of collective-bargaining rights. Teachers, who already were limited by compulsory arbitration, now saw the remainder of their rights to negotiate salaries taken away.

From now on ministerial decrees would set increases in teachers' salaries (Repo, 1974:205).

Bill 3 was the final straw that broke B.C. teachers' hesitancy to become directly involved in the defeat of a government. However, whether the B.C. teachers really moved closer to a socialist-unionism rather than union economism can be questioned. The successful election
of an NDP government resulted in the teachers getting paid off with the repeal of Bill 3.

Rather than providing the stimulus for teachers to lead a broad working class movement, the consequences of the 1972 election involvement may well have been to weld teachers to the notion of interest group politics. Just how strong the ties were that formed with the NDP is open to question, as is the degree to which the NDP itself is committed to bringing about a socialist society. Not having forged strong ties with other unionists, the likelihood of union economism in the future of B.C. teachers seems high.

The purpose of the foregoing analysis of teacher militancy in Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia is to identify principles governing the scope and direction of teacher militancy in hope that such principles can be used in speculation about the future of teacher militancy in Ontario. What principles then, if any, can be drawn from this analysis?

In all three cases, actions of provincial governments appear to have played a major role in determining the scope of teacher militancy. Governments in all three provinces have been faced with a fiscal crisis, and in all three provinces, have attempted to hold back educational expenditures as a means of dealing with the crisis. However, the three provinces have differed in the degree to which their governments have made themselves visible as the party responsible for teachers' difficulties at the bargaining table.

In Quebec, the provincial government made itself highly visible
as teachers' foe by attempting to specify the maximum salaries that could be paid to teachers, and later by centralizing negotiations across the province. These actions appear to have helped teachers overcome geographic barriers to unity, weakened the power of intermediate authorities to use persuasion to "cool-out" teachers, and generally increased the scope of militancy. In centralizing the negotiations of other public employees, and in subjecting them as well as teachers to repressive action, the Quebec government provided the visible common for necessary to forge an alliance across occupational groups.

In British Columbia, teachers have shown significant solidarity, but have not forged as firm a bond with other public employees as have Quebec teachers. The fact that teacher militancy has yet to firmly expand beyond its occupational origins in British Columbia can be seen to be partially a consequence of the actions of the provincial government. Like the government in Quebec, the British Columbia Socred government took strong repressive action which clearly labelled it as the teachers' foe. However, the Socred government never fully centralized teacher negotiations. Even the repressive Bill 3, which proposed to strip teachers of their right to collective bargaining, failed to formally centralize the government's control over negotiations. This is important because the Quebec case suggests that centralization of both teacher negotiations and the negotiations of other public employees, coupled with the use of repressive action, contributes to cross-occupational collective action. In sum, the actions of the
Sacred government made it visible as a foe to teachers, but failed to push teachers toward an alliance with other public employees.

In Ontario, repressive government action never reached the heights that it did in British Columbia and Quebec. Although the Ontario government significantly increased its control over educational expenditures and pursued a policy of restraint, it skillfully countered this action by promoting an ideology of decentralization, by actually decentralizing some decision-making, and by creating "superboards" whose sheer size made them appear powerful. Further, the Ontario government has been careful to avoid centralizing negotiations of other public employees and thus, has reduced the likelihood of cross-occupational alliances occurring among public employees. Finally, by providing teachers with their own unique bargaining legislation, and by establishing a separate body - the Educational Relations Commission to oversee it, the provincial government has created an effective barrier against teachers forming alliances with other unionists.

To sum up, centralization of negotiations, coupled with harsh, repressive action, appears to contribute to teacher unity and militancy. When several groups of public sector workers are subjected to similar government action in the form of centralized negotiations and repressive government action, the probability of cross-occupational alliances is increased.

What does this imply for the future scope of teacher militancy in Ontario? If the foregoing analysis is valid, it appears that the future scope of teacher militancy in Ontario depends heavily on the
politics and actions of the provincial government. If as some have suggested, the State in advanced capitalist societies is faced with an unavoidable fiscal crisis (O'Connor, 1973), we can expect there will be increasing pressure for the provincial government to curtail public sector expenditures. This pressure, coupled with the fact that the province's population is rapidly aging, is likely to lead to a strong push for a decrease in funding education for the young.

How the government handles this possible pressure is likely to be key to the future scope of teacher militancy. Policies which increase local boards' responsibility for funding education and which reduce the province's visible control over education should reduce the probability of Ontario teachers uniting. Continued provincial recognition of the five separate teachers' federations and the continuing existence of separate bargaining legislation for teachers should have the same effect. In short, continuation of the past policies of the P.C. government are not likely to bring an increase in the scope of militancy. On the other hand, should the Liberal party unexpectedly come to power in the forthcoming election, its proposed policy of outlawing teacher strikes would be expected to increase the scope of teacher militancy.

In part, the actions any provincial government will take are going to depend on how strong the pressure for cutbacks in public service spending becomes. For years, Ontario can be seen to have enjoyed a much more favourable level of tax revenues than most other provinces as a result of the concentration of industry in the province.
With the current downturn in economic growth in Ontario, high unemployment, high energy costs, and projected phenomenally high growth in the cost of supporting the elderly population, the province's ability to avoid visible, harsh action may diminish. While the room for government to maneuver is likely to increase in resource-rich provinces of the west, industrially based provinces, such as Ontario, may run out of room. But, even if this happens, government can act to prevent broad-based militancy on the part of public sector workers by playing one group of workers off against another. Only if the government is forced to directly cut back all public sector employees in unison, can we be fairly sure that broad-based public sector militancy will develop.

Whatever the future scope of teacher militancy, there remains the question of "direction". The analysis of Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia teachers suggests that the direction of teacher militancy is influenced by the prevailing ideological climate in the province. We have already suggested that the ideological climate to which Ontario teachers are exposed is more conducive to militant economism than any other outlook. If negotiations of teachers and other public sector workers were centralized, or if the government began to take harsh action against teachers, the adequacy of economism might be questioned, but this is unlikely in the immediate future without a major turnabout in provincial policy.

Another possibility is that the Ontario teachers will be influenced by the ideas and actions of more ideologically "left"
brethren in other provinces. However, it is hard to see that Ontario teachers, who cannot see enough similarity among themselves to form one federation, will be able to see enough similarity between their situation and that of teachers in other provinces to accept the applicability of other teachers' ideological interpretations in Ontario. Certainly, the objective reality that Ontario teachers have faced, in dealing with their provincial government, would not appear to lend itself well to the interpretations that might be provided by Quebec or B.C. teachers. Since negotiations were centralized, Quebec teachers have learned that replacing a government does not solve their problems with the State. B.C. teachers have learned that they can help their own cause by replacing a particular government - the Sacred government. In contrast, Ontario teachers have learned that they can influence a government without even trying to vote it out of power. Until the Ontario teachers begin to experience clear failure in influencing the Progressive Conservative government they are unlikely to listen to B.C. teachers. Until they find that voting in a new party does not solve their problems they are unlikely to listen to Quebec teachers.

To close this discussion, and end the dissertation, let me focus on the prospects for teachers and other public sector semi-professionals playing a major role in leading a socialist movement. First, if socialism means more than simply a redistribution of wealth and a curtailment of private profits - if it implies a democratization of the workplace - then "professional" service workers are unlikely to be very supportive of its realization. Teachers who think through the
practical implications of providing parents and students with significant direct power in education decision-making are unlikely to like what they discover. Indeed, in New York, teacher unionists have been involved in bitter battles with parents and community groups over the control of the schools. The very nature of teaching and other "professional" service occupations presupposes inequality between the "professional" service provider and the client. When the public is able to judge how the "professional" should treat his/her clients, the very need to have "professionals" is called into question (as it perhaps should be in some cases). Professionals are not likely to want this to happen.

Focusing on the economic side of socialism, it seems unlikely that many teachers or service workers will be motivated to push for a reduction in income differentials among occupational groups. Our OSSTF teachers in Ottawa appear to have been strongly motivated to obtain incomes which would reflect their greater social worth than blue-collar workers. They want to be treated with the deference and paid the money of professionals, not to be treated and paid like wage workers. Even in the case of Quebec the prospects for a working class movement involving service workers is not great. As O'Connor and others note, public sector unionism which falls to prevent its own wage gains from resulting in a greater tax burden for private sector employees only serves to fragment the working-class. Quebec public service workers, however, have not reduced their salary demands and have not been successful in shifting the tax burden from individuals to corporations.
Access in forging a new working-class movement depends on first reducing the profits of the large corporations in the private sector if fragmentation is to be avoided. However, because the most visible antagonists of public employees are governments and government agencies, the immediate prospects for effective action against corporate giants being led by public service workers appear slight.
END
02 09 82
FIN