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DIRECT DEMOCRAT: W.C. GOOD AND THE ONTARIO
FARM PROGRESSIVE CHALLENGE, 1895 - 1929

BY

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
1991

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"DIRECT DEMOCRAT: W.C. GOOD AND THE ONTARIO FARM PROGRESSIVE CHALLENGE, 1895-1929"

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ABSTRACT

William Charles Good, 1876-1967, was the leading proponent of direct democracy in the Ontario farm progressive challenge of the 1920s. The class forms of his rural, small propertied direct democracy were expressed in demands for new economic and political institutions. Co-operation would preserve individual ownership of the means of production, while group government, on a non-partisan basis, would usher in a new harmonious political order.

These forms of direct democracy, the means to self determination, would be complemented by direct democratic strategies of change, or processes of self emancipation. Co-operatives were to be organised 'from below', by rank and file structures, within local societies, and from local societies to large federated co-operative bodies. Politically, voting, representation, and legislative decision making were to be restructured to permit the maximum participation by ordinary citizens. Economic policy was also to be based on direct democratic principles with indirect taxes, such as the tariff, to be replaced with direct taxes like the single land tax.

But the election of a Farm-Labour government in Ontario in 1919, with a large national Farm Progressive caucus elected in 1921 (including Good as member for Brant), did not lead to an experiment in direct democracy.
Instead the farm movement divided against itself, in a clash over methods of organisation, party versus group government proponents, in the face of a debilitating class sectionalism that overpowered both leaderships.

To explain the rise and fall of this populist moment in the struggle for direct democracy the career of W.C. Good is studied. This is done in three parts.

Part One examines debates on Canadian populism and sketches the Ontario farm economy. Part Two explores Good's leading role in the formation of the Ontario farm progressive challenge, the ideas of agrarian idealism, the rise and fall of farm lobbyism before 1914, and the development of an Ontario farm co-operative movement.

Part Three then puts Ontario farmers' demand for a non-partisan politics, into the context of war compulsion, their elevation to provincial power and federal influence, and their disintegration. Despite an effort to transform the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in 1933, Good, and the agrarian petit bourgeois tradition of direct democracy he represented, was finished as a serious political force.
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I wish also to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Ontario government through its graduate scholarship programme and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for grants during the research and writing of this thesis.
"For us [Marxists] the fundamental forces of the historic process are classes; political parties rest on them; ideas and slogans emerge as the small change of objective interests. The whole course of the investigation proceeds from the objective to the subjective, from the social to the individual, from the fundamental to the incidental. This sets a rigid limit to the personal whims of the author."


"We do not at all pretend to deny the significance of the personal in the mechanics of the historical process, nor the significance in the personal of the accidental. We only demand that a historic personality, with all its peculiarities, should not be taken as a bare list of psychological traits, but as the living reality grown out of definite social conditions and reacting on them. As a rose does not lose its fragrance because the natural scientist points out upon what ingredients of soil and atmosphere it is nourished, so an exposure of the social roots of a personality does not remove from it either its aroma or its foul smell."

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ABBREVIATIONS:

B.F.C.S.   Brant Farmers' Co-operative Society
C.C.A.    Canadian Council of Agriculture
C.L.P.    Canadian Labour Party
C.M.A.    Canadian Manufacturers' Association
C.S.L.    Canadian Socialist League
C.U.C.    Co-operative Union of Canada
D.G.      Dominion Grange
F.A.O.     Farmers' Association of Ontario
F.P.C.     Farmers' Publishing Company
G.G.G.C.  GrainGrowers' Grain Company
I.C.C.     Inter College Club
I.L.P.     Independent Labour Party (of Ontario)
M.G.G.A.  Manitoba Grain Growers Association
M.S.R.C.  Moral and Social Reform Council (of Canada)
N.P.P.     National Progressive Party
O.A.C.     Ontario Agriculture College
O.E.A.     Ontario Educational Association
S.G.G.A.  Saskatchewan Grain Growers Association
S.L.T.A.  Single Land Tax Association
S.S.C.    Social Service Council (of Canada)
T.L.C.     Trades and Labour Congress (of Canada)
T.M.P.A.  Toronto Milk Producers' Association
U.F.A.     United Farmers of Alberta
U.F.C.C.  United Farmers' Co-operative Company
U.F.O.     United Farmers of Ontario
U.G.G.     United Grain Growers'
I. INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the political tradition of direct democracy, that the majority can administer and plan their common affairs co-operatively, and in the most direct manner possible, to meet the needs of the majority.

This study of direct democracy in Canada is premised on a classical Marxist analysis. It uses biography as a way to identify the class character and dynamics of Canada's first direct democratic tradition, agrarian populism, as expressed at its height in the farm progressive revolt at the end of World War One.

From a Marxist point of view, the search for direct democracy is defined by two class approaches within modern capitalism, populism and revolutionary socialism. Populists advocate a 'people's' or non-class co-operative commonwealth by plebiscitary methods beginning from capitalist social relations and state forms. Revolutionary socialists argue for workers' power with an antagonistic class strategy for self emancipation, a break from the economic and political forms of capitalism, and the invention of new, more democratic, working class forms of self rule.(1) In North America, these two approaches to direct democracy have been popularly expressed in small proprietyd agrarian populism and working class communism.

Both traditions share an emphasis on change from
below and both, historically, have been challenged by varieties of politics from above (i.e., strategies of accommodation to the existing order) from within their movements, whether Stalinists versus Trotskyists or, among farm progressives, reformers from above or below. (2)

In Canada, the dominant class tradition of direct democracy is agrarian populism. This tradition has given rise to a variety of farm movements, from the revolutionary republicanism of the 1837 rebellion in Upper Canada to a succession of radical democratic groups such as the Dominion Grange, the Patrons of Industry, and the Farm Progressives. Radical democrats from the farm progressive movement, such as E.A. Partridge, founder of the Grain Growers' Grain Company, W.J. Irvine, of the Non-Partisan League in Canada, and W.C. Good, founder of the United Farmers' Co-operative Company, left a rich literature expounding direct democracy through such books as A War On Poverty, The Farmers in Politics, and Production and Taxation in Canada.

The tradition of workers' power, on the other hand, has left little in the way of a public record. Such debates took place in obscure socialist newspapers, among Socialist Party of Canada members over how to break with Second International Marxism, among the 1920s generation of Communists over the meaning and fate of the Russian Revolution, and within the Trotskyist movement at the end of World War Two, and then again at
the crest of the post-war boom in the mid-1970s.(3)

This study focuses on defining the strengths and failings of the agrarian populist tradition of direct democracy in Canada by an examination of the career of William Charles Good.(4) Good's career is used as a prism by which to observe the rise and fall of the farm progressive challenge when farmers captured three provincial governments (Ontario, Alberta, and Manitoba), and elected sixty-five members, the second largest group in Parliament, in the federal election of 1921.

Good, a founder of the United Farm movement in Ontario, was Eastern Canada's leading proponent of agrarian direct democracy. Yet, despite Good's prominence in galvanizing a radical farm movement by the end of World War One, his pleas for a decentralised co-operative movement, and for a positive form of non-partisanship, group government, were ignored when farmers captured provincial political power in 1919. Conventional methods of indirect parliamentary democracy were to be given one more try. But the failure to use these methods for non-partisanship meant that Good, as a federal M.P., returned to play a major role in the debate over how to consolidate the failing progressive movement in the mid-twenties.

The tragedy for agrarian direct democrats like Good is that the farm community was unable to rise above its sectional interests to actively support reform from above, crypto-Liberals who wanted either fusion with the
Liberals or a broad People's Party, or reformers from below who advocated a positive experiment in group government. To worsen matters, on questions of oppression like French Canadian national rights, nor could direct democrats like Good rise above their class sectionalism.

Instead Good would go on to play a valuable, but politically marginal, role in the development of the Co-operative Union of Canada, as President from 1921 to 1945, and in the restructuring of the Ontario farm co-operative movement in the 1940s.

Two concepts need to be briefly discussed to explain the chronological and thematic organisation of this case study. They are social class and populism. The basic category of analysis used is social class, to review previous literature, Good's intellectual roots as a Victorian humanist, and his work as a farm lobbyist, co-operator, and non-partisan politician.

Marxists define class in two ways, as an objective reality, one's relation to the means of production, and as a subjective reality, where class behaviour is intermittent. As Marx defined it, there was class in itself, the objective dimension, and then the far more uneven phenomenon of a class for itself. A class for itself, it bears repeating, is an indeterminate phenomenon. It is either divided and impotent as a result of class alienation, by separation from the means of production and competition, or it aspires to be the
subject of history through class organisation and struggle. (5)

The extent to which a class can be for itself is constrained by objective conditions, by its relation to the means of production and historical circumstances. This is why Marxists identify the working class as the potential class of social revolution, a class tending to have no objective interest in class society. This definition excludes the petit bourgeoisie who have a material interest in the private ownership of the means of production, i.e., the preservation of class society, if on radically different terms. (6)

Marx also defined capitalist society as one tending to two class poles, a minority bourgeoisie, who through their control of the means of production exploit and oppress the majority, and a working class who have only their ability to work (their labour power) to sell. (7) Marx, however, defined this as a tendency complicated by the remnants of social classes from previous modes of production, such as the French peasantry in France's 1848 revolution, and by the development of a capitalist petit bourgeoisie or middle class. (8)

Objectively, the single largest occupational group in Canada in the early twentieth century was the farm community. Farmers made up 40.1% of the economically active population in 1901. (9) Canadian class society, then, was characterised by a massive rural middle class,
a powerful urban bourgeoisie, and a small and inexperienced working class. (10) Why Canada should have this particular class formation lies in Marx's definition of North America as a 'Virgin Soil' colony, an area of mass capitalist settlement where the aboriginal population is successfully marginalised. (11)

But the presence of a large and politically powerful rural middle class was not a permanent feature of North American capitalism. As H. Veltmeyer notes, from 40.1% in 1901, Canadian farmers declined to 28.6% of the economically active population by 1931. By 1981 farmers were reduced to 4.1%. (12) Marx's prediction about the polarisation of capitalist class society certainly seems true with the decline of the rural middle class.

Subjectively, farm class behaviour is complicated by its intermediate class position, as a group pulled between bourgeois and proletariat. As Lenin argued, petit bourgeois behaviour is two sided. It can look forward politically yet be economically reactionary.

"What should be the attitude of the working class towards the petit bourgeoisie and its programmes? This question cannot be answered unless the dual character of this class is taken into consideration (…) It is progressive in so far as it puts forward general democratic demands, … ; it is reactionary in so far as it fights to preserve its position as a petit bourgeoisie and tries to retard, to turn back the general development of the country along bourgeois lines." (13)

Farm class behaviour, then, was rooted in a sense of identity and loyalty to the dominant social order. But as threatened small property owners, they expressed this
identification in a critical manner, by trying to reshape religion, patriotism, economic policies, and government forms to suit their class needs; from the social gospel, to Canadian autonomy from British imperialism, to free trade, to group government in a parliamentary setting.

As a social class with a vested interest in class society farmers were also subject to sectionalism, to a narrow and inward looking definition of class interest. The Canadian farm populists, in both populist moments (in the 1890s and 1920s) were a notoriously self centred group. They refused to look beyond agricultural issues (on the prairies identifying region with farm problems for a potent blend of regional sectionalism), refused to co-operate with labour, and refused to take any positive direction from their leaders on whether to be organised as a party or in a positive group government fashion.

Given farm populism's critical identification with Canada's social order, reform not revolution is the dominant impulse. But the constant threat of proletarianisation led some reformers to a politics of direct democracy, to a utopian vision of a small producers' democracy in economic and political affairs. There is, then, a spectrum of populist agrarian opinion, of reform from above (the crypto-Liberals) to reform from below (the radical democrats) in a context of intense class sectionalism.

A second concept we need is populism. Populism is
an amorphous term, covering an international range of radical experiments for social change. From a Marxist perspective, one common thread unites these diverse traditions, their marginal (usually middle) class nature as shown in the mix of radical democratic demands with the preservation of capitalist social relations. (14)

Peter Sinclair, a Marxist sociologist, identifies four common features of populist struggle: the worth and political supremacy of the the common 'people', a rejection of intermediate associations between members and leaders, a protest against groups outside local society, and the reform of capitalism, not social revolution. (15) Farm progressive thinking and demands in the 1920s fit these criteria: the superiority of the farm way of life as supported by moral and family oriented legislation (the 'people' as progressives define it), rank and file control of farm organisations, a fierce anti-partyism and mechanisms to enhance voter control of parliamentary representatives, and economic direct democracy by such means as free trade, the single land tax, and credit reform.

From these Marxist definitions of class and populism, two working hypotheses are suggested for this study. First, there was the obvious dialectic of reform from above versus reform from below, the battle between crypto-Liberalism versus Radical Democrat, over farm progressive methods.

Most farm progressives, including co-operative
officials and Members of Parliament, agreed with the reform from below critique of urban industrial Canada. But they would not fight for the structural changes demanded by direct democrats. The co-operative movement showed a disturbing tendency to be dominated by its paid officials rather than by ordinary members. Political leaders, like T.A. Crear and E.C. Drury, believed a change of measures, not institutional structures, would be sufficient to safeguard rural interests. Not surprisingly, they had a much less hostile attitude to party organisation, co-operation with the Liberal party, and trading off their voting power for grain and dairy sectional interests.

Despite the predominance of reformers from above in the leadership of the co-operative and political farm progressive movements, however, no common organisational strategy could be agreed upon after the initial political revolt between 1919-22. Direct democrats blocked reformers from above in carrying through the crypto-Liberal agenda to either fuse with the Liberals or create a broad based People's party. This balance of forces along the spectrum of Ontario farm progressive leadership led to paralysis and disintegration, a collapse with national implications.

A second dialectic, however, is not so obvious: the clash between positive and negative definitions of agrarian direct democracy, between two visions of non-partisan politics. There was an enormous tension between these two tendencies, between the impulse to a group
government of co-operating independents, represented in the west by William Irvine and the U.F.A. federal caucus, and in the east by W.C. Good, and a self limiting tendency to define the election of farmers as a legislative lobby.

Good argued throughout his career that no genuine solution to farm problems could be achieved without farmers freeing themselves in order to create new economic and political structures of self rule. Self-emancipation and self-determination were the litmus tests of the rural revolution. Farmers had to be organised in co-operatives 'from below' through active membership control, as had the parliamentary state by group government, and economic policy on the principle of direct taxation.

But farm organisers, like J.J. Morrison, Secretary of the United Farmers of Ontario, and H.W. Wood, President of the United Farmers of Alberta, who supported direct democrat criticisms of Drury and Crerar, did not support a positive definition of non-partisan government. Their fundamental concern was defensive occupational representation.

These two tendencies, of reform from above versus reform from below, which publicly emerged when Ontario's farm co-operative and political experiments became mass phenomenons at the end of World War One, and the dialectic of direct democracy versus rural class sectionalism, a more obscure phenomenon, underlie the following biographical narrative.
The narrative begins with contextual debates and contours, and moves on to trace Good's development as an agrarian idealist, the rise and fall of a farm lobby before 1914 (out of which a new farm leadership developed), and the turn to co-operation. One can also see the emergence of a politics of reform from above through farm lobbyism, and again when centralised co-operation is chosen for the U.F.C.C. at the end of World War One. Part Three then explains the impact of the war in radicalising farmers, the political choices facing farm progressives (resolved briefly in favour of crypto-Liberalism), and Good's efforts to pioneer direct democracy to consolidate a faltering non-partisan movement.

These two tendencies also explain the varying fortunes of Good the direct democrat as an accepted leading activist to 1919, his marginalisation at the height of the populist revolt between 1919 and 1922, and Good's revival as a leading farm spokesman as reformers from above lost confidence in any independent populist path to change. Yet this was a limited revival. Good could not overcome the rural petit bourgeois sectionalism of J.J. Morrison's leadership, who opposed Drury's broadening out, but who also denied support to any positive definition of non-partisanship.
ENDNOTES


2. For modern debates about tendencies to accommodation in the the socialist movement see J. Molyneux, *What is the Real Marxist Tradition?*, London, Bookmarks, 1985. Readers will note I use reform from above and below as interchangeable terms with crypto-Liberalism and Radical Democrat. I do so to show what unites both currents as well as what divides them.

3. On the S.P.C. see A.R. McCormack, *Reformers, Rebels, and Revolutionaries*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978. For Communist Party debates in the 1920s, Ian Angus, *Canadian Bolsheviks*, Montreal: Vanguard, 1981. There is no scholarly study of the Canadian Trotskyist movement but the debate on the nature of Russia which split the world movement in the late 1940s, and debates on the relation between class and social movementism in the 1970s, can be followed in the Trotskyist press which is on deposit at the National Library.


10. This class formation model of interpretation is used by A. Linteau et al, Quebec: A History, Toronto: Lorimer, 1983.


PART ONE:

CONTEXTS
II. DEBATING CANADIAN FARM POPULISM: REGION, CLASS OR DISCOURSE?

The study of farm populism in Canada has been divided between two disciplines: historians who emphasise region and political scientists using class analysis. Among the latter, two generations of class analysis have been offered. Left nationalists, in applying classical Marxism to the agrarian revolt, have debated whether to also extend the Marxist anti-imperialist critique to Canada and its regions. In a more recent social democratic generation, however, there is a move away from class to social movementism, away from historical materialism to idealist discourse theory.

In Canadian historical interpretations, the regional protest character of the Farm Progressive movement has been stressed. This is reflected in the relative strengths of the literature on the Progressive movement, a strong published tradition on the Prairie Progressives, a thesis literature on the Ontario Progressive challenge, and brief items on Maritime and Pacific Progressives. (1) Similarities between regional movements through a class interpretation of leaderships, ideas and strategies, the mass dimensions of the Canadian farm revolt, and the international debate over populism have been neglected. It is to the first and last questions that this study is oriented, with some suggestions as to the social contours of Ontario farm progressive support among local farm
systems and co-operative strategies.(2)

W.L Morton, in his classic The Progressive Party in Canada, argued the Progressives were both a class and regional movement. By class Morton meant the Progressive revolt was characterised sociologically by farmers as an occupational group. Far more important in Morton's estimation, the farmers' revolt was a prairie movement. The enduring feature Morton saw in the farm progressive challenge was its contribution to developing a genuine national politics that encompassed Western Canada as well as Quebec and Ontario.(3)

This dialectic of 'region and nation' led Morton to state the fall of the Progressives was conditioned by two factors. One, they were not able to develop a positive politics because of internal divisions, between party versus group government proponents, as expressed regionally between 'Manitobans' versus 'Albertans'. Secondly, farm progressivism as a regional movement did not have the political weight to redefine national politics on a class basis even if it had been unified.(4)

Despite an Ontario farm political revolt predating significant prairie progressive political activity, Morton focused his study on prairie settlement, grain farming problems, and a Crerarite reading of political events. As Morton himself stated in his concluding bibliographical essay, he had not looked for United Farmer of Ontario records.(5) Even Donald Creighton
stated this was too restrictive in any national survey of the Farm Progressives.\(^{(6)}\)

Certainly Morton's general conclusions showed that his concern was national unity from the perspective of western alienation. As farmers disappeared as the largest class in Canadian society, their political revolt in the 1920s, Morton asserted, had checked Central Canadian economic nationalism and forced recognition of Western Canada's national interests.\(^{(7)}\)

As Carl Berger, J. Granatstein and P. Stevens have all noted, Morton's interpretation of the farm progressive revolt has completely dominated modern historical work.\(^{(8)}\) John Kendle's biographical study of the Bracken non-partisan farm governments lies firmly within the Morton paradigm in equating the farm progressive revolt, in the Manitoba elections of 1920 and 1922, to the development of a provincial tradition of regional brokerage politics in its relations with Ottawa.\(^{(9)}\) Other book length treatments that touch on the farm progressive revolt, by John Thompson and Ian MacPherson, repeat this regionalist view.\(^{(10)}\) Even a social democrat like W. Young shares Morton's dismissal of the farm populist political tradition in its own class terms.\(^{(11)}\)

The only modern historical author who can be said to implicitly challenge Morton's approach is Richard Allen. Allen's book *The Social Passion*, a study of the rise and fall of the social gospel in conjunction with the
Progressive revolt, makes two interesting points through the structure of his study. One, the social gospel has to be understood in its international setting and two, this was a national movement, across all regions, involving farmers and workers. (12) But Allen's study remains an implicit critique, given its intellectual history paradigm.

What historians of Canadian farm progressivism seem to have forgotten is that Morton's regionalist interpretation was countered by two works published at the time, both of which had an international point of view, which can allow for a closer class reading of the farm progressive experience.

These studies are Paul Sharp's *The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada* (1948) and W.K. Rolph's biography *Henry Wise Wood of Alberta* (1950). Both Sharp and Rolph examined the prairie farm progressive revolt from the comparative perspective of the links between American and Canadian populism based on American ideas about the frontier and a sociological definition of class. This approach allowed them to give equal emphasis to the farm progressives' first forays into economic action and provincial government, rather than to put the burden of interpretation on the farm progressive national experience where the politics of national unity were emphasised by the King minority government. A farm oriented perspective could then show the agrarian impulse to direct
democracy received concrete co-operative and legislative form, and that there was a clash of farm opinion based on principles, often transcending region.

Sharp's survey began with a brief statement of prairie farm action in the fields of co-operation, land tax reform, and direct democracy, policies not normally discussed in modern studies. Sharp then goes on to chart the arrival of North Dakota's Non-Partisan League in Saskatchewan and Alberta. In Alberta, the League successfully encouraged a direct democracy current, resulting in the election of the first farm progressives, including Canada's first woman member of Parliament, in the provincial election of 1917.(13)

The prairie farm progressive revolt, with its own class agenda, in turn was stirred to greater action by the victory of Ontario farmers in 1919. As Sharp said, "The farmers' victory in Ontario revealed that Progressivism was far more than an expression of sectionalism, frontier ignorance, or the discontent raised by imported Populists or Socialists."(14) Indeed U.F.A. and U.F.O. delegates to the American National Board of Farm Organisations in 1920 tried to establish an International Committee with American populists.(15)

Sharp's emphasis on the local achievements of farm progressives, in the lead up to the national farm progressive challenge, was echoed by W.K. Rolph's biography of H.W. Wood, President of the United Farmers
of Alberta, and the power behind the Alberta Wheat Pool and U.F.A. governments in the 1920s. The key idea Rolph stressed was that Wood was not a positive proponent of group government but a conservative advocate of occupational representation.

By examining Wood's political experience with the Farmers' Alliance in Missouri, Rolph showed Wood had learned negative lessons about farm partyism (or fusion). Like J.J. Morrison, who had lived through the political disasters of Ontario Patronism in the 1890s, Wood realised farmers needed political representation as a group (or class). But they should avoid divisive partyism, which Wood also equated to class domination in legislation. Wood separated class representation from class legislative domination by asserting that farmers stood for the law of co-operation as opposed to the ruling law of competition. (16) The farmers in politics were not a party but a public lobby.

Rolph's sectional reading of what Wood meant by group government explains why Wood was not only an enemy of Manitoba's crypto-Liberals but also of direct democrats in the Non-Partisan League. This was shown in 1919 when Wood debated Irvine to deflect the N.P.L. into the U.F.A., and later within the U.F.A., when George Bevington's credit reform proposals were vetoed, and when Wood defeated an effort to have parliamentary representation based on occupation. (17)
This class reading of the progressive experience, made possible by Sharp and Rolph's international approach, explains two puzzles in Morton's own study. It shows why Wood could get the Canadian Council of Agriculture to break from the National Progressive Party in 1923 and rewrite the Farmers' Platform to delete any reference to the single land tax or the principle of direct legislation. At one and the same time Wood was anti-party, against the crypto-Liberals, and against the direct democrats. Nor, in another Morton paradox, did the Progressive caucus collapse when Crerar resigned. Despite a chapter titled, 'The Political Failure of the Progressives, 1921-1922', Morton admits the 1923 session marks the real height of an effective national farm progressive caucus, whose only common principle was defensive occupational representation.

It appears the dominance of Morton's study of farm progressivism, with its starting point of English Canadian nationalism, has cut off generations of Canadian farm progressive historians from the international debate on populism which was pioneered in Canada by Sharp and Rolph.

In political theory, however, class interpretations of the farm progressives as a radicalised rural petit bourgeois movement have been continuously offered. This tradition began with C.B. Macpherson's *Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System*, and was
continued in John Conway's 1979 doctoral thesis "To Seek a Goodly Heritage": The Prairie Populist Resistance to the National Policy.(20) These studies have led to an ongoing debate about the value of populism in the working class struggle for a socialism based on direct democracy by such authors as John Richards and Conway.(21)

Macpherson's main argument is to stress the class nature of Albertan politics. Alberta was a society dominated by a rural petit bourgeoisie that invented a unique populist tradition to deal with the vagaries of life as small commodity producers in a crisis ridden capitalism. As is well known, Macpherson concluded his study by stressing the 'quasi-party' response of Alberta's petit bourgeoisie, from the optimism of U.F.A. delegate democracy to the despair of Social Credit plebiscitarianism.(22) This spectrum of populist response, from left to right, has been quite fruitfully used by L.D. Courville to explain the complex internal politics of Saskatchewan Progressivism, from the United Farmers of Canada to Progressive support for the Klu Klux Klan in the Anderson Conservative government of 1929.(23)

There is, however, a broader argument that Macpherson and Conway develop to explain prairie populism that goes beyond class to imply that prairie populists are allies in the struggle for socialism. This is the contention that the prairie region is a colony of eastern Canada, and in turn, that Canada is a colony of the United
States.(24) As William Carroll has shown in *Corporate Power and Canadian Capitalism*, Canada can in no way be described as a colony of the United States. In terms of ownership, control, even the composition of industrial capital, Canada is an advanced industrial capitalist nation. It is a partner of American imperialism.(25) This reading of Canadian economic evolution is also born out regionally by John Richards and Larry Pratt in their *Prairie Capitalism*. Despite the authors' left nationalist position that the prairies are a colony of Ottawa, their own studies of provincial action on Alberta oil and Saskatchewan Potash show the region has undergone significant economic development and won a greater measure of political influence within confederation.(26)

The trajectory of economic development has not born out the linking of Marxist class analysis to Marxist anti-imperialism by left nationalists to English Canadian regionalism and Canadian-American relations. From a classical Marxist view, treating English Canadian regionalism as an expression of colonialism is a mystification and adaptation to intra class divisions, i.e. divisions among the Canadian bourgeoisie. This mistake leads to a seriously wrong conclusion, that prairie populism, whatever its petit bourgeois limits, has a positive legacy in being objectively anti-colonialist, and therefore anti-capitalist.

This mistake on the part of left nationalism has
been compounded in a new generation of social democratic analyses. Beginning from Ernesto Laclau's *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*, which repudiates the centrality of class for a focus on cross-class social movements (of 'people versus power bloc' politics), and moving on to embrace postmodernist 'discourse' theories of social reality, authors David Laycock and Jeffrey Taylor fudge the differences between classes to substitute petit bourgeois populism for the working class struggle for socialism. (27)

The chief expression of this new tendency is David Laycock's *Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies, 1910 to 1945*. Laycock's main achievement is to persuasively classify prairie populism into four schools: crypto-liberalism, radical democracy, social democratic populism, and plebiscitarian populism (Social Credit). Laycock then differentiates between each form of populism by examining six common dimensions: the 'people', participatory democracy, co-operation, the state, the 'good society', and technocratic decision making.

The point of this exercise in the name of socialism, however, is not just to challenge regionalist historians who define the populist challenge as 'a hinterland revolt'. Laycock also charges that 'neo-Marxist' students of populism, like Sinclair and Conway, can not deal with the complexity of the populist experience, and are to be condemned for trying to relate objective class relations
to class political behaviour (or base and superstructure in classical Marxist philosophical parlance). This is rather rich coming from an author whose book follows the thematic contours of Conway's thesis, which deals with the events as well as the ideas of these four populist traditions. In fact, Laycock's aim is to recover prairie populism in an uncritical class manner, to inject the 'best' of petit bourgeois forms of radical democracy into the dominant strain of New Democratic Party technocracy.

At the root of this new revisionism lies a collapse into idealism through theories of "how language itself forms reality". One can do no better than quote Taylor from his 'discourse' study of the United Farmers of Manitoba, first on Laycock, then his own view of how material reality and social consciousness are so mediated by language as to be virtually unconnected.

"(Laycock) avoids the problem of class reductionism by abandoning materialism to embrace discourse theory."(32)

"There is no direct relation between social being and social identity; rather, as discourse theory suggests, identity is shaped through intermediate languages and discourses."(33)

Ironically, for all the claims of theoretical sophistication to deal with the complexity of populism, both Laycock's *Populism and Democratic Thought*, and Taylor's article on Manitoba Farm Progressives, are little more than intellectual histories of farm thought.
Taylor's model of Manitoban farm discourse, for instance, from the radical 'non-partisan' discourse of the Patrons to the U.F.M.'s accommodationist language of 'citizenship', is still locked in a two dimensional definition of farm progressive currents. Yet at the 1923 U.F.M. convention, delegates rejected both a plea from R. Forke, the new national Progressive leader, to endorse broadening out, and calls for an positive provincial experiment in group government.(34) Like the U.F.O. and the U.P.A., U.F.M. delegates rejected both partyism and positive group government for a negative occupational representation, a 'complexity' of class behaviour the reader would never learn from Taylor's 'discourse'.

As Bryan Palmer convincingly shows in Descent Into Discourse, social historians are so anxious to not appear reductionist, to deal with legitimate criticisms of economism or mechanical materialism, that they have jettisoned class analysis for idealist theories of language.(35) As Palmer says, "What has been killed along the way is any appreciation of the complex interaction of economic structure and historical agency."(36)

With the decline of class struggle in the 1980s a new generation of social democratic analysis has arisen that fatally compromises the conceptual tools of historical materialism. The consequences have been a retreat into idealism and an accomodation to petit
bourgeois protest.

If the prairie literature on the farm progressives has generated sophisticated regional and class models of interpretation, such can not be said for Ontario. Until the 1950s the main sources of published information stood more as documents of the movement than carefully constructed narratives. From the 1920s there was Melvin Staples 1921 federal election compilation The Challenge of Agriculture and H.A. Woods' still useful A History of Farmers' Movements in Canada. (37) Much later, Good and Drury wrote their memoirs, with little in the way of editorial control (38), while Agnes MacPhail has been better served by Margaret Stewart's Ask No Quarter and Terry Crowley's Agnes MacPhail and the Politics of Equality. Both books on MacPhail, however, are more concerned with the struggle for women's rights than the farm cause, which leads to a certain glossing over of her farm sectionalism and nativism. (39)

A second generation of analysis consists of a thesis literature, dating from N.D. Farrow in 1938, Jean MacLeod's work in the 1950s, through more than a dozen theses in the 1960s and 1970s when the study of third partyism appealed to a new generation of students. The striking thing about this literature is the focus on narrow political narrative. Much useful work was done in defining what exactly happened between 1914 and 1923 to demystify some of the poorly remembered or self serving
memoirs of participants. Much also has been explained about the limits of farm policies in areas like rural hydro and education, and the volatile alliance with labour. But MacLeod is the only one to indicate the economic context of Ontario farming, while W.R. Young made a rare effort to examine the roots of mass farm discontent by documenting rural depopulation.

Another striking feature of the Ontario thesis literature is the lack of any debate on populism. Theoretically, what has been attempted are tests of liberal pluralism, how third parties arise by the mistakes of the dominant parties. In other words, political scientists studied the U.F.O. to see where the Conservatives and Liberals had gone wrong. This is very much the approach of conservative oriented historians like Brian Tennyson and Peter Oliver. In fact, one suspects if the Ontario government had not commissioned the Ontario Historical Studies Series, with C.H. Johnston's biography of E.C. Drury, it is doubtful whether there would be any modern published study of the Ontario farm progressive experience.

Even here, Johnston's able survey, E.C. Drury: Agrarian Idealist, is firmly within the Morton paradigm of the clash of two schools of rural organisation as supplemented by recent work done on the intellectual history of Victorian Canada. While Johnston extends our understanding of Drury's idealist sensibility, as 'a
Victorian humanist' rooted in a rural way of life, a socially responsible Christianity strengthening the family, and as a politician seeking to increase popular participation and control, he does not explain the class basis of Drury's 'tractarianism' in defence of free trade, of a small proprietied definition of direct democracy in the economy.(47) Nor does Johnston situate the early Drury in the co-operative experiments of the Ontario farm movement channeling the political revolts of 1919 and 1921. But then not a single historian of Ontario farm progressivism has ever studied the United Farmers' Co-operative Company.

On the other hand, Johnston's survey of the Farm-Labour government of 1919-1923 is insightful. Through a dialectic of development issues and internal party relations, Johnston explores the urban as well as rural tasks of government, and the increasingly tense relations between the farm movement and its' political leaders.

But in trying to explain the internal paralysis that brought down Drury after one administration, Johnston is caught in a dilemma. In his introduction Johnston explicitly states the Drury government fell as a result of the clash between the forces of 'broadening out' (the Druryites who wanted to create a 'People's Party') and those for group government (i.e. an experiment in direct democracy).(48) But when Johnston traces the growing internal clash from 1922 between Morrison, the U.F.O.'s
Secretary, and Drury, he has to acknowledge a different split. Druryites versus Morrisonians or 'rural fundamentals' who wanted only occupational representation. Actual group government proponents like W.C. Good and A. MacPhail had no formal presence or allies in the provincial caucus.(49)

One of the main concerns of this study is to remedy this paradox. Can Ontario farm progressive politics be neatly divided between two ideological schools or do we need class analysis to elicit a third, barely articulate, position; defensive class sectionalism grouped around the U.F.O.'s Secretary. To echo Lawrence Goodwyn's study of the American farm populist movement (to recover the 'real' populists of the 1880s in the southern co-operative experience as against the 'shadow' political movement in the North and mid-west of the 1890s), students of Ontario progressivism have still not situated their studies sufficiently from within the class nature and dynamics of the movement.(50)

These interpretive problems - missing dimensions of thought, co-operative action, and the complexity of farm divisions - indicate the international debate about populism needs to be applied to the United Farmers of Ontario.

In a 1978 article, John Conway began this task for Canadian populism by reviewing two traditions of populist interpretation: the American partisan tradition, of those
who are for and against the populist experience from within the context of bourgeois democracy, from John Hicks to Richard Hofstadter to Norman Pollack and Lawrence Goodwyn; and Lenin's class analysis of Russian Narodism. Conway's conclusion is to argue for a Leninist approach to populism, class analysis emphasising the two sided nature of petit bourgeois protest, being both against and for capitalism. Otherwise, Conway states, analysts will be trapped in a recurring cycle of emphasising the positive or negative features that appeal to them. All that will distinguish one generation of analysis from another will be a growing list of qualifiers.(51) Laclau, mentor of the 'discourse' school of populism, draws his arguments from a third school of interpretation, that of Latin American anti-colonialism, or what classical Marxists would describe as Stalinist influenced dependency politics where anti-imperialism is, quite wrongly, given a 'communist colouring'.(52)

Oddly, in the Ontario context, only the Patrons of Industry in the 1890s have been subject to the debate on populism, and then within the context of the American tradition. S.E.D. Shortt concluded, echoing Hofstadter, that the Patrons were a backward looking group incapable of dealing with capitalist change.(53) This was challenged by R. Hann in Farmers' Confront Industrialism, a short pamphlet stressing the Pollack-Goodwyn thesis about the democratic potential of agrarian populism(54), and by
R. Cook who approached the Patrons from the sympathetic perspective of urban middle class populism in *The Regenerators*. (55)

Regionalists in Canadian history have yet to provide a coherent overview of the Farm Progressive revolt. Political scientists have developed general theories of populism and the Canadian farm progressive revolt. But, if the first generation of Marxist analysis emphasised class, it linked class analysis to left nationalist nostrums that led them to define populism as anti-colonialist instead of situating agrarian populism in its own contradictory pro and anti-capitalist class traditions. A second generation has tried to address agrarian populism on its own terms. But they have done so in an idealist manner, adapting to a petit bourgeois class definition of direct democracy, and reducing socialist analysis to conservative intellectual history.

As the following narrative will suggest, classical class analysis can account for the complexity of populism as illustrated through the career of W.C. Good. Thus classical Marxism is applied here to agrarian idealism's contradictions, and to the co-operative and political experiments driven by a number of populist approaches, from crypto-liberalism to radical democracy, to plain petit bourgeois class sectionalism.


5. Ibid, 308.


10. J. Thompson, The Harvests of War: The Prairie West, 1914-1918, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978. As Thompson says in his introduction on page 10, "Because of this [regional] distinctiveness, the Great War left an imprint upon the West different from the one left upon Canada as a whole." And Ian Macpherson, Each For All: A History of the Co-operative Movement in English Canada, 1900-1945, Toronto: Macmillan, 1979. While Macpherson uses a three part typology to talk about pragmatist, reformist, and utopian co-operators(p.46), region is the concept organizing his chronological narrative. Macpherson also notes the tendency
towards bureaucracy but claims this is a feature of the 'mature' movement in the 1940s (p.213).

11. W. Young, Democracy and Discontent: Progressivism, Socialism and Social Credit in the Canadian West, Toronto: Ryerson, 1969, Chapter III 'The Progressives'.


15. Ibid, 134.


24. C.B. Macpherson Democracy in Alberta, (Toronto, 195 , 6-10 in the west's 'quasi-colonial' status,
and pages 249-250 re Canada's 'quasi-colonial' relationship to the United States. There is, of course, a much bigger debate here beginning in recent times with Kari Levitt's *Silent Surrender*, Toronto: Macmillan, 1970.


32. Ibid, 91 (footnote 1).
33. Ibid, 96.


46. Brian Tennyson, "The Ontario Election of 1919", Journal of Canadian Studies, Volume IV, Number 1, February 1969, 26-36 and Peter Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson: Ontario Tory, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977. Oliver develops a perceptive analysis as to why Drury lost in 1923 but can only explain farm victory in 1919 as 'the times were out of joint', 87.


48 Ibid, ix-x.
49. **Ibid., 189-190.**


III. The Ontario Farm Scene

The social forces behind the Ontario Farm Progressive leadership lie in obscurity. They do so for two reasons. The Prairie revolt was the national centre of the farm movement, in size, economic and political significance, and in a region where farmers remained a majority. The evolution of Ontario as an urban industrial society has also done much to divert attention away from its original rural character. For these reasons we need an acquaintance with some elementary facts about rural Ontario's setting, significance, its internal character, and the fortunes of farming in the period from World War One to the 1920s, to have a sense of the material context within which rival farm leaderships and traditions operated.

Physically, Ontario is two provinces. The larger portion by far is Northern Ontario as defined by the Canadian Shield and Hudson Bay Lowlands. But the vast majority of the population lives in the far smaller, fertile triangle of Southern Ontario. Here the western portion of the St. Lawrence Lowlands is divided into three smaller regions by geography and politics: Eastern Ontario by the Quebec border to the east and the Frontenac axis to its west, an extension of the Shield dipping south, Central Ontario, bordering Lake Simcoe to the east, with the Shield to the north and Lake Ontario
to the south, and Western Ontario, beyond the Niagara Escarpment in a pocket between Lakes Erie and Huron.

The St. Lawrence Lowlands of Southern Ontario, which contains over one half of the Class One farm land in Canada represents only ten percent of the province's area. Yet that ten percent held, and holds, nearly one third of the national population in the twentieth century.(1)

No one would dispute that Ontario is the economic heartland of Canada today. But what is often lost sight of is that, until 1901, Ontario was also Canada's rural centre in people and production. Canada became an urban nation in 1921, Ontario in 1911. But this change must be kept in perspective. In 1901 Ontario farmers represented nearly forty percent of the national rural population. Even in 1931 rural Ontario held twenty eight percent of the national farm community.(2)

This demographic weight was reflected in the distribution of Canadian farms. Of 511,444 farms in 1901, 204,054 were located in Ontario, forty percent of all Canadian farms. While this proportion fell in 1921 to twenty eight percent (198,053), the number of Ontario farms was second only to the prairies.(3)

Ontario also generated a major portion of Canadian farm values, over fifty percent of all farm receipts in 1901, thirty two percent in 1921, and over thirty four percent in 1931. Combine these receipts with Quebec, and nearly one half of all Canadian farm revenues were
produced in the St. Lawrence Lowland area in the period 1901-1931.(4)

Besides Ontario's important place in the context of Canadian agriculture, we also need to take some note of the structure of Ontario agriculture. In the nineteenth century Ontario was Canada's leading grain producing region. Due to American competition, and the relative advantages of livestock production, more stable prices, Ontario farmers in the latter part of the century diversified. They went into dairying, the single most important new sector, starting with cheese and butter and then the urban fluid milk market by World War One. A strong livestock industry, pork and beef, also emerged along with number of minor sectors like poultry, fruits, and other specialties.(5)

As Ontario developed as a region of mixed farming, a process of regional specialisation occurred. Despite a plethora of producers' commodity organisations, estimated at over five hundred (by both the Ontario Department of Agriculture and the United Farmers of Ontario)(6), four broad types of mixed production can be identified (once fodder crops are discounted).

In Southern Ontario three farm systems existed, dairying, specialties, and meat. Two dairy belts emerge from farm value statistics (see Tables I and II), a highly specialised one in Eastern Ontario, including much of the Ottawa Valley, and a smaller one centred on Oxford
County in Western Ontario. In four places farmers relied significantly on specialty crops, apples in Prince Edward County, mixed fruit in the Niagara peninsula, based on Lincoln, tobacco in Norfolk, and specialty field crops like beans and seed corn in far southwestern Essex and Kent. There was also a strong concentration on cattle production in the northern parts of Central and Western Ontario, from Peterborough and Victoria County in the east, to an area starting in the south from Middlesex, Wellington and Perth, stretching north to Grey, Bruce, Huron, and Dufferin. These were all strong U.P.O. political ridings in 1919 and 1921.

A fourth regional system of farming is Northern Ontario's agro-forestry pattern where forest products, and indications of subsistence food production, reveal a less commercially developed farm community. Though dairy production obviously made some contribution to farm income around Sudbury, the Lakehead, and Kenora.

Unlike American farm populism, where tenure could be an important factor in radicalisation, as farmers were driven into tenant status as sharecroppers, Canadian, and Ontario, farms were overwhelmingly owned by their operators.(7) If there was an inequity, or breaking point, in farm productive relations, it lay in the unpaid character of farm family labour. Three quarters of all farm labour was done by the family, with a major portion coming from wives and children. But one can generalise
little more than this as farm labour budgets were only systematically studied in the Census of 1931.(8) Still it is obvious that conscription in 1917-18 challenged the structure of farm work relations by threatening to remove at least a quarter of the work force.(9)

Another aspect of the Ontario farm scene was the impact of war inflation and post-war deflation on farm production and prices. While the national cost of living nearly doubled between 1914 and 1920, from index numbers of 79.5 to 150.4(10), farm production costs more than doubled. Even when living costs are factored in, farm production costs (including hired labour) rose from an index figure of 84.1 in 1914 to 180.3 in 1920.(11)

Yet farm wholesale prices also more than doubled, from an index number of 100 in 1913 to 258.8 by 1920, though livestock prices never kept up to this level (from 103.2 in 1915 to peak at 199.3 in 1919).(12) Some farmers clearly kept up with, and made money from, war inflation.

Few farmers made money in the early 1920s recession. The farm wholesale index plunged from 258.8 in 1920 to a low of 127.6 in 1923 before stabilising for the rest of the decade.(13) The galling feature of the recession for farmers was that production costs did not drop to the same extent. Including living costs, farm production cost index numbers only fell from 180.3 in 1920 to 129.3 by 1924.(14) In other words, while what the farmer sold had depreciated by fifty percent, his costs had only come down by one third.
The only sure point one can make about the market place in this period is its tremendous volatility. But this volatility may explain why the federal government's efforts to regulate prices by compulsion through the Board of Commerce became a second flash point, after conscription, for independent farm action, in co-operation and politics.(15)

Despite market pressure on the Ontario farm community, which resulted in rural depopulation and fewer, bigger farms, and the competition of a prairie farm region, rural Ontario was still numerically and economically significant provincially and nationally.

In 1919 these pressures led a majority of the Ontario farm community to vote as a class to elect the province's first third party government. But in 1921, as their leaders openly disagreed about partyism, occupational representation, or group government, Ontario farmers divided. They elected only twenty four Members of Parliament from a province with over sixty rural seats. Significantly, half of the Progressives came from the livestock belt. This area represented the one great economic success of the United Farmers' Co-operative Company, its multi-million dollar co-operative livestock shipping plan.(16)

But the main contextual point in this biographical study is that, when Ontario farmers did politically revolt, they represented real forces. Tens of thousands of
activists, some 60,000 U.F.O. members in 1920 (probably twenty percent of farmers), worked to elect those who had struggled for twenty years to give an independent voice to the Ontario farm community. (17) But that leadership was divided, in ideas, and strategies, whether in lobbying, co-operative action, or non-partisan politics. And it is to these problems in the tradition of agrarian direct democracy, as seen through the struggles of W.C. Good, we turn in the body of this study.
Table I: County Farm Production Values in 1920
by product percentage share

Key:

F.C.: Field Crops
V.F.: Vegetable and Fruits
F.P.: Forest Products
S.S.A.: Stock Sold Alive
S.S.: Stock Slaughtered
A.P.: Animal Products (includes dairy)

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Source: *Census of Canada, Agriculture, Volume 5, 1921*, Calculated from Table 79, 'Farm Expenses and Value of Products, 1920, by Counties', 109-118.
Table II: Ontario Farm Systems in 1920

1. **Dairy:**

Eastern (over 30% farm values)  
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<td>Russell</td>
<td>Northumberland</td>
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<td>Lennox</td>
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<td>Leeds</td>
<td>Peterborough</td>
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<td>Hastings</td>
<td>Haldimand</td>
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<td>Grenville</td>
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Western Dairy Belt:

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<th>Oxford</th>
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<td>Wentworth</td>
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<td>Norfolk</td>
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2. **Livestock:**

(More than 25%)  
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<th>Addington</th>
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<td>Dufferin</td>
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<td>Huron</td>
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(more than 20%)

3. **Specialty Areas:**

**Fruit:** Lincoln, Wentworth, Halton, Welland, Norfolk, Peel, and Prince Edward.

**Field Crops:** Kent, Essex.

4. **Agro-Forestry:** Muskoka, Parry Sound, Haliburton, Sudbury, Algoma, Nipissing, Timiskaming, Thunder Bay, Rainy River, Kenora.
ENDNOTES


2. For a breakdown of rural/urban population figures: Seventh Census of Canada, 1931, V. One, Table 5, 364.

3. Ibid, Volume 8, xxviii.

4. Ibid, Volume 8, lxxx.


7. On the American side see L. Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America, New York: Oxford University Press, 1976, especially Chapter Two on 'The Coming of the Farmers Alliance' with its explanation of the crop lien system. On Canadian farm ownership see Sixth Census of Canada, Volume 4, Table 3, p.4. On average eighty eight percent of Canadian farmers owned their land.


9. Ibid. In 1911 307,037 people (men) were defined in 'agricultural occupations' for Ontario. This fell to 295, 071 in 1921. Given 198,053 farm operators, roughly 100,000 additional people worked, a quarter of whom would likely be hired labour (see above footnote). That is why I give a conservative estimate of one quarter.


11. Ibid, Table M221-227.

12. Ibid, Table K33-43.

13. Ibid.

15. Ironically, Tom Traves calls the Food administration section of the Board of Commerce one of its few successes. As readers will see, food price controls led to a major provincial-federal confrontation between the Ontario Farm-Labour government and the Union in 1920. See T. Traves, "Some problems with price controls: The Case of the Board of Commerce, 1919-1920", *Canadian Public Administration*, Spring 1974, 17, 1, 85-95.

16. See M.H. Staples, *The Challenge of Agriculture*, Toronto: Morang, 1921, 88-92. The Livestock division was the single largest department, generated the most turnover, and virtually all the profits.

17. *Ibid*, 66. If one deducts farm youth and women membership, and that one out of three farmers were not owners, then we could estimate that at least 40,000 farm operators were U.F.O. members in 1920. This would represent twenty percent of all farmers.
PART II:

A LEADING ACTIVIST
IV. YOUNG IDEALIST

1919 saw not only the election of a Farm-Labour provincial government in Ontario but also the strengthening of prohibition. The Ontario Temperance Act was introduced in 1916 by the Conservative Hearst government as a progressive war measure to conserve scarce war materials and as a concession to those who blamed drink for poor social conditions. But it was primarily a gesture to the ideology of war sacrifices.

The post war period was marked by other moral reform campaigns like W.C. Good's attempt to ban race track betting as part of the Social Service Council of Canada's anti-gambling campaign. (1) More important, there was the consolidation of Protestant forces through Church Union. The result was the formation of the United Church in 1925 based on Methodists, Congregationalists, and a majority of Presbyterians.

If the political events following World War One promised a dramatic reworking of social relationships, there was a corresponding attempt by farm progressives to shape individual character and the family. (2) The class nature of this moral idealism, emphasising a rural, small propertied, and more direct democratic way of life, are clearly shown in W.C. Good's youth.

Growing up in southwestern Ontario exposed the young Good to both American populist currents and the
first Canadian farm populist moment in the 1880s and
1890s. These early contacts were translated at the
University of Toronto into an active interest in the
social gospel and the Canadian Socialist League. After
graduation in 1900, Good went through a difficult period
to end up as a lecturer at Guelph's Ontario Agricultural
College. But his real goal was to act as an educational
prophet to Ontario farmers. In 1903 Good returned home
to farm as a way to regain his political independence.

I

William Charles Good was born February 24, 1876 into
a family of Irish Anglican descent on a farm in Brantford
Township, three miles to the northwest of Brantford,
Ontario. His grandfather, Allen Good, had been a produce
merchant in Cork, Ireland. In 1836 Allen had moved to
Montreal to open the Bank of British North America but
lost his position when he refused to suspend specie
payment during the financial crisis of 1837. A major
turn in the Good family fortunes came as Allen Good and
his family moved out of the business world to a small
farm property near the Upper Canadian village of
Brantford in the spring of 1838.(3)

Allen Good was never just a wheat farmer, though
the Good farm expanded to six hundred acres by the 1850s.
He was also the salaried Secretary of the Gore District
Mutual Fire Insurance Company from 1847 to 1863. By the
mid-1850s Allen Good's fortunes had recovered. He was
active on the vestry of the Anglican Grace Episcopal Church in Brantford, elected Reeve of Brantford Township in 1855, and then County Warden. In 1857, when Brantford hosted the Provincial Agricultural Fair, he was President of the Brant County Agricultural Society and Chairman of the Financial Committee. Allen Good was less successful in his provincial political ambitions, losing a contest for District Councillor in 1845 and the Conservative nomination for East Brant in 1857.(4)

Another turning point for Allen Good came with the 1857 economic crisis. He was seriously overextended on his land purchases. A costly north wing had been added to the original 1837 Georgian house. Then in 1863 two blows fell. Allen Good lost his position with the Gore District Mutual Fire Insurance Company and a Brantford merchant defaulted on a credit note Allen had signed as a security. On November 9, 1863 a Sheriff's sale was held at Myrtleville farm.(5)

Fortunately, the Good women salvaged the embryo of a farm. Allen's wife Eliza kept twenty acres while his oldest daughter, Anne, purchased the home buildings and fifty surrounding acres. A further one hundred and two acres were leased in the spring of 1865. Tom Good, W.C. Good's father, came home from Buffalo to farm in partnership with his sister Anne in 1868. Allen Good, who became County auditor, died in late 1876.(6)

The Good farm in the 1870s was a mixed cereal-
livestock enterprise with a summer season devoted to grains and forage production, and winters to fattening beef cattle. Wheat and barley were the major income earners. (7) By the 1890s this included corn for forage and dairying for cheese. Later, after Will Good took over the farm, production shifted decisively to livestock, and away from wheat to certified seed production. There was as well a clear sexual division of labour between male field and barn work and the female farm household, which included dairying, poultry, tender fruits, gardening, and household chores.

While farm work was dictated by the seasons, Sunday was a regular day of rest with frequent holidays and outings depending on the press of farm work. Winter was the farm social season. Perhaps there would be a Christmas social at Moyle's School, vestry and Bible Society meetings. Farm business would also be conducted, the payment of annual taxes, the election of a township council, and meetings of the Ancient Order of United Workmen, a fraternal insurance society.

The educational feature of the winter season was the Farmer's Institute where lectures on horticulture, livestock husbandry and other farm topics would be given by local and government speakers. Tom Good was Secretary-Treasurer of the South Brant Farmer's Institute and a speaker on farm buildings in the 1880s. (8) By the 1890s he added other responsibilities as Treasurer of the North
Brant Dairy Association (for their Cheese factory) and as auditor for the Co-operative Binder Twine Company in Brantford. He was also involved in setting up a co-operative hog packing plant in Brantford in 1900. And Tom Good was a municipal councillor in the 1890s, becoming Township Treasurer in 1897.(9)

Tom and Anne Good did more than shift the composition of farm production to a mixed cereal-livestock system from Allen Good's wheat mining of the 1840s and 1850s. There were also two important ideological changes by the second generation: from high to low Anglicanism, and from Conservatism to free trade Liberalism.

The break with high Anglicanism, and Grace Episcopal Church, apparently began in 1892 when Anne Good rented a pew in the low Anglican St. Jude's. They moved in response to the liberal theology and richer liturgical practices of Grace's new rector.(10) It was a contradictory action. On the one hand, both Anne Good and Tom's wife Mary objected to any criticism of the bible's literalness, by what was called higher or historical criticism. This conservative reaction to new theological currents, though, was matched by a liberal protest against high Anglicanism's emphasis on liturgical practices which substituted a choir, vestaments, and lengthy service for active congregation participation. Religious self government, making Christianity a living force in people's daily lives, could
already be seen in the elder Goods' practice. For Tom Good was also an officer in the 1870s of the Paris Road Sons of Temperance and later President of the Brantford section of the Upper Canada Bible Society.(11)

Allen Good had not just been a high Anglican. He was also a Conservative election agent for John A. Macdonald. (12) Allen Good had been a loyalist in 1837 and participated in an 1842 campaign to resettle the Six Nations reserve, away from valuable farm land around Brantford to sandier, more arid land in the southern part of the County.(13) But Tom Good firmly crossed party lines to the Liberals in the 1880s as a prominent local member of the Dominion Grange. He was, in fact, Master of the Brantford Division in 1880 and had written to London's Farmer's Advocate in defence of Grange co-operative buying.(14) He also appeared before the 1896 Tariff commission hearings in Brantford as a farm representative for free trade and in opposition to Brantford manufacturers.(15)

Though his parents and relatives worried over Will Good's radical evolution at the University of Toronto, they had themselves pursued a class devolution from urban bourgeois to rural petit bourgeois within the more narrow confines of Brant County society. It is within these contexts of a financially pressed mixed farm, an applied and democratic Christianity, free trade economics, and Grange non-partisanship, that we can follow Will
Good's future evolution from low Anglicanism to the socially committed United Church, and from free trade liberalism to independent progressive.

The young Will Good began his education at home where his grandmother Eliza Good taught him to read at the age of five. In 1883, he began five years at Moyle's School. In 1888 Good wrote the entrance exam to Brantford Collegiate. Even though he was two years younger than the other entrants, Good placed fourth in a group of ninety four. Good took his Junior Leaving, an intermediate high school diploma, in the spring of 1893 and then the teacher training course in the fall at Brantford Model School. He was hired to teach the winter session at Howell's School, walking or riding the nine miles distance. Will Good resigned, however, in the spring of 1894 finding the pay too low. He returned to the Collegiate for a further two years to do the upper course work to graduate in the spring of 1896 at the age of twenty.(16)

At home, Will Good was part of a large family circle that emphasised daily readings from the Bible and practical farm work at an early age. He was gifted manually, building his own lathes, and interested in science. He had a microscope and a box camera whose pictures he developed himself.(17) With his father in 1892, Good had gone to see the electrical exhibits at Toronto's Royal Exhibition and in 1893 he travelled with relatives to the Chicago World Columbian Exposition. The young Good would usually spend
some portion of his summers with relatives, with the Jones at Homewood near Belleville or with his maternal grandparents, the Ballacheys, nearby. (18)

Within this wide family circle, farm and religious reading were prevalent. His family subscribed to the Brantford \textit{Courier}, London's \textit{Farmer's Advocate}, Canada's leading farm newspaper, the social gospel oriented Montreal \textit{Weekly Witness}, and the \textit{Evangelical Churchman}. (19) His Aunt Anne taught him the Church of England catechism. (20) The young Good was exposed to a wide variety of radical liberal opinion within his extended family.

It should not be judged then that Will Good became a radical at University. Rather, from a temperance essay he wrote after the Ontario 1894 prohibition referendum, and correspondence with his American uncle John Ballachey, about Bryan's populist run for the American Presidency in 1896, Will Good had already started out on the road of radical agrarian idealism in rural Brant.

In 'That the Liquor Traffic should be Prohibited by Law', Will Good traced the degenerative effects of alcohol on man's physiology, and liquor's ruinous moral and economic consequences. According to the young Good, alcohol inevitably led to an addiction destroying the nervous and digestive system by over stimulation. "As found in Arctic expeditions, total abstainers stand the intense cold far better than moderate drinkers". (21) Only parasitic employers and partisan governments could
tolerate such an evil. Instead of local option under the Scott Act, Good wanted Ontario to imitate the state of Maine where a general ban was in effect. And, in a final flourish quite characteristic of the mature Good, he took up and demolished, at least to his satisfaction, common arguments against prohibition. "Only the very ignorant or thoughtless could persist in opposition." (22)

When it came to broader questions of human society, the young Will Good also showed he had absorbed some radical populist assumptions about economic affairs and the political process. In a series of letters with an uncle in Sioux City, Iowa, Good and John Ballachey debated the causes of capitalism's ills and potential remedies.

Their debate began with Tom Good's complaints about the poor state of Ontario farming in the 1890s and the need for free trade. John Ballachey wrote back in the summer of 1896 to defend protection as a temporary measure of national self defence and to denounce the populist demand for the free coinage of silver. As Secretary of the Iowa Loan and Trust Company, he thought it was criminal for farmers to demand an inflationary measure that would rob capital by debasing the currency. Such monetary reform talk by 'unpatriotic cranks' could cause an economic crisis by undermining investor confidence. (23)

Will Good replied to debate his uncle's protectionist nostrums. Sketching out the 'natural' laws of supply and demand, where land (equated with agriculture)
was the source of all wealth, and the legitimate realm of government activity, Good challenged his uncle's defence of protection and his strictures against reform. Politics should be "the science of communistic government based upon natural, simple and God-given laws."(24) Politics was not about the clash of interests but activity directed to realise a religious ideal of economic organisation.

Protection had no place in this ideal order. "I consider it a violation of a natural and simple truth, that to divert trade from its natural channels is to waste human labour."(25) Such organised selfishness neither made sense economically, since most farm products competed freely, nor ethically, since it directly contravened the Christian injunction to work. The young Good agreed silver proponents were wrong but for radically different reasons. The free coinage of silver would only create another monopoly. The answer to currency abuses was to create a cheap, universal medium of exchange like the paper dollar.(26)

His uncle replied to agree that he too believed in the laws of supply and demand. Though he thought his nephew's ideas about how best to realise them, through a world agreement on currency and free trade, were utopian. Still, he gave young Will an interesting sketch of the religious communal experiment of the Amanites in central Iowa. Here people worked a three hour day, lived in
relative self sufficiency, and tried to arrange that members got back exactly what labour they put in. (27)

Good replied to deny his uncle's contention that free trade reform was impossible in the United States since Will believed America was run in reality by a monied aristocracy. Only through the common ownership of land, like the Amanites, was true democracy possible. (28)

By this point, Ballachey was reduced to arguing for protection and being Republican by appealing to human nature. People were just like a herd of cattle. Those with the longest and sharpest horns got the most. (29)

This drove young Good on to one final statement as to how people could regain control over the means of production through 'True Socialism' as based on a free exchange of labour products.

"I believe in Socialism in so far as it seeks to do away with all private monopolies and to put all natural monopolies under government supervision to be worked by the people for the people. ... But I do not believe in it in its idea of absorbing all individuality in a complex social machine. As long as man is fallen and has a wicked tendency, this machine would be sure to run amuck(sic) on account of the loss of some set screw or cog (faulty person). (30)

To check man's fallen nature the state could set the conditions of free exchange for use by eliminating monopolistic capital. It was up to pioneering social reformers to restore God's underlying design. (31)

Yet, as Good admitted, he had only begun to think about society as stimulated by Robert Blatchford's Merrie England and articles by Henry George in the Hamilton
The election of seventeen Patrons of Industry to the provincial legislature in 1894 may have also influenced the young Good as they were active in Brant. In a sense little recognised yet, the young Good, and older figures like J.J. Morrison, had already been shaped by the first North American populist moment.

II

In 1896, upon graduation from Brantford Collegiate, Will Good took the entrance exams for the University of Toronto. He did extraordinarily well, setting a provincial record by securing first class honours in all ten subjects. He won the general proficiency prize, the Prince of Wales award, and the Edward Blake scholarships in both mathematics and science.(33) In each subsequent year, until his graduation in June 1900, Good won an annual tuition scholarship as top science student in both Physics and Chemistry.(34)

The first two years of Will Good's university studies at University College were relatively tranquil as a Physics, Chemistry, and English major. Toronto was still a small city of some two hundred thousand with a campus of nine buildings grouped around King's College Circle.(35) Good's school year would begin in October, with exams at Christmas, a three week break, and conclude in late May with a final set of exams. These would be interspersed with weekly lectures and laboratory work, with Saturdays for study and Sundays to sample various
sermons. His summers were spent in Brant working at the harvest for his father.

Good was an active participant in the University's student clubs. He was chosen as a first year councillor to the Literary Society and led an inter-year debate, in the affirmative, between the 1899 and the Century class on whether there should be more access to higher education. They lost the debate. The Literary Society also sponsored the mock Parliament, which Good avoided because of its 'mobbish' behaviour. He was also a member of the Modern Languages Club where Ruskin was discussed.(36)

Among the sciences, Good was a member of the Natural Science Association, with a trip to the Natural History Museum, and a first year councillor to the Mathematics and Physics Society. Good continued as a representative to the latter throughout his university years, while also selected as an officer of his graduating class.(37)

At the science clubs Good was introduced to evolutionary thought. He read Darwin's *Origins of Species* and heard about Lyell's evolutionary principles of geology.(38) At one Natural Science Association meeting, in January 1897, he was present at a discussion on Herbert Spencer and his 'synthetic philosophy', a cosmic evolutionary theory extending natural selection beyond biology to all facets of existence including man's social relations.(39) Later, in September 1899, when Good read Benjamin Kidd's *Social Evolution*, he rejected Spencer's
Some aspects of university life shocked the young Good. He was astonished at his first Convocation when the students talked and sang through Chancellor Blake's opening speech. Nor did he think much of the extravagance of the annual University dinner or the 'conversaziones' of each yearly class with late night dancing. Even more unsettling was the hard drinking done by some Osgoode law students. As Will wrote home, "No wonder the government is corrupt with such people at its root."(41)

Off campus, Will Good boarded with two cousins, Fred and Panay Ballachey, who were in the Dental College. At first they lived on Major Street and then, from 1897, on Czar Street (now St. Charles Street West). It was at a boarding house on Czar Street that Good met John Martin, a Wycliffe graduate.(42) Martin, who had set out to become an Anglican minister, became a factory engineer instead. It was Martin who introduced Good to Toronto's radical community of social reformers, single land taxers, and socialists.

Life outside school revolved about religion. Soon after going down to Toronto, Good began to attend Sunday service and bible class at St. Phillips, a low Anglican church under the superintendence of Canon Sweeney. The young Good's weekly letter home invariably described that day's bible class and Canon Sweeney's sermon.(43) For variety Good sometimes attended other Anglican
services such as the 'very low' Grace Church or the high Anglican St. James Cathedral. (44)

Like many religious activists Good took an interest in such issues as sabbatarianism, being disappointed by the outcome of the May 1897 referendum endorsing Sunday tram cars (45), and temperance. In the latter cause Good attended an international convention of the Women's Christian Temperance Union in October 1897 at Massey Hall. He was rather unsettled by the W.C.T.U.'s aggressive female leadership, notably by an American woman who called for a collection of five thousand dollars after attacking Canadian society, and Torontonians, for their wealth. As Good noted, "I gave 5 cents, not acct(sic) of her behest, but because I thought the cause worthy." (46)

As time went on, Good found himself in growing disagreement with Canon Sweeney's emphasis on the hereafter as grounded in a literal interpretation of the Bible. (47) After one discourse on the perils of hell, he wrote home, "the devil business has always been a mystery to me and I suppose will remain so for this life." (48) Nor did he approve of Anglican exclusivity or ritual. (49) The young Good was for interdenominational co-operation and praised the Salvation Army for its street work to save society's outcasts. (50)

At the intellectual root of Good's growing estrangement from low Anglicanism was his view of the Bible as allegory, as a historical text from which one
inferred moral truths.(51) There were far too many internal inconsistencies emerging from archaeological, linguistic, and historical studies for a literal reading of the bible. But, since the Protestant denominations put great store on reasoning about the presence and purpose of God, they were forced to move from direct to indirect explanations. Instead of arguing for the proof of God in nature's apparent order, as in Paleyite theology, Protestant theologians were led to argue for the proof of God as based on man's experience as a moral being. Jesus as a positive role model played an important part in popularising this allegorical approach.(52)

The search for religious meaning led Good to attend Dr. Sheraton's student bible classes at Wycliffe College in his second year, and to attend the sermons of the Anglican evangelical, Dyson Hague, in the spring of 1898. (53) These stirrings of the new higher criticism had already led Good to publish a critique of an Anglican revival in Brantford.(54) Scenes like the hundreds of winter unemployed lined up outside the Telegram office for job advertisements, and J.W. Bengough's chalk talks on the state of society, demanded an allegorical Bible that could be reconciled to scientific and sociological advances.(55) In his last two years at University Good would go in search of a new Christianity beyond the Anglican faith.
For leisure, Will Good and his cousins would go for long walks, 'wheel' or bicycle rides, and skate at University College's outdoor rink. (56) They would also visit friends and relatives from the Brantford area who had moved to Toronto. Of course, given Good's active Christian temper, even his walks and visits served as subjects for his sermonising tendency. He was appalled at the waste of the Massey family mausoleum at Mount Pleasant Cemetary and the degenerate military life at Fort York barracks where the bar was open all Sunday. (57)

Good was not very comfortable in his social calls either. He was indirectly related to Premier Hardy and made a perfunctory call upon him in the fall of 1896, largely at the urging of his father to cultivate someone whose "influence may help you along a good deal at the University." (58) Good also called upon Professor Wrong, of the History department, at his family's insistence on some religious matter. He found the four dinner courses and two servants as "too much constraint and formality to suit me." (59)

In Good's third and fourth years we get some indication of his conservative Newtonian scientific education through the survival of an 1898 essay on Spencerian celestial mechanics and his B.A. thesis on inorganic chemistry. In 'Mr. Herbert Spencer and the Nebular Hypothesis', Good argued against Spencer's interpretation of cosmic evolution, that the sun could
begin as a gas nebula, give off energy, and yet return to its gas nebula state through the agency of an 'ether' carrying energy back to a dying sun. The Law of the Conservation of Energy implied progressive not cyclical inorganic development. But Good also denied the atomic theory of matter since it ran counter to his education in the laws of Newtonian celestial mechanics.(60) Within a generation, Einstein's relativistic universe and Max Planck's quantum theory of matter would radically modify the Newtonian science of the 1890s.

Good's conservative scientific education was further revealed in his B.A. thesis. The purpose of this work was to improve analytic techniques in examining the progressive decomposition of chemical compounds.(61) As a highly detailed study of the break down of Antimony, this was an essay on technical method not scientific theory. Of course, within the confines of undergraduate work, it could have been little more.

But both scientific essays show Good's firm grounding in Newtonian science and Baconian methods. What also seems true is that however well Good did in his scientific course work he was not an original thinker about the material world. Rather he sought to reconcile Newtonian and Darwinian materialism to a pre-conceived idealism about human affairs, particularly through his literary studies at University College.

In reality, it was Professor Alexander's lectures
on the English literary social critics that made the
greatest impact on Good's intellectual development on
campus during his last two university years. It was
Shelley, Carlyle, and Ruskin who spoke of an idyllic
rural past, and the need to check mankind's further
decline into urban industrial capitalism, that remained
in Good's mind outside class. Good often referred to
Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus* and Ruskin's essays in his
letters home to justify his critical evolution on
theological and social questions. (62) He avidly read
Alexander's biography of Shelley for the poet's passionate
denunciation of capitalism. (63) His mother was horrified
at this, while Joseph Flavelle also objected to Good's
interpolation of such an 'immoderate' in debating social
questions. (64) But it was probably Ruskin that most
influenced Good. For in Ruskin he found a moral critic
who argued for an alternative economy of rational
employment, and consumption for use rather than profit.

Good's most complete statement of the link between
literature and man's social relations came in a two part
literary review for the *Varsity* in November 1899. In
'The Social Aspect of English Literature', he summarised
and endorsed a literary sociological study by a Miss Vida
D. Scudder entitled *Social Ideals in English Letters*.

Miss Scudder's study was divided into two parts
on the evolutionary theme of how the literary imagination
had moved from the individual to social concerns as
society moved from simple tribal life to complex urbanism. Part one traced the Christianisation of the Anglo Saxons through the utopian writings of Piers the Ploughman, Thomas More, and Jonathan Swift. Part two dwelt on the development of a social conscience by nineteenth century writers, in the portraits of Thackeray and Dickens, to the social criticism of Carlyle and Arnold, to the developed social consciences of George Eliot and William Morris. Good also added his own socialist favourites, Blatchford's *Merrie England*, 'that great self-expression of the laboring classes', and *Fabian Essays*. To conclude, Good noted how the Church had developed a similar social conscience through the creation of new institutions like missions. Perhaps, Charles Kingsley's Christian socialism was a forerunner of things to come. (65)

In a follow up, Good contrasted the careers of Swift and Ruskin. Swift, Good stated, was a man of no ideals, as shown by his 'Modest Proposal', and died a mental degenerate (a rather literal minded reading). Ruskin, however, offered hope and inspiration in demanding a system of social ethics based on production and consumption for use, a simplified life, with an active devotion to social service. In a final bit of wishful thinking, Good asserted that Ruskin was becoming more popular, not less, since the great man's decline into depression (a fate not unlike Swift's). (66)

The young Good clearly saw Ruskin as a role model
for reform activity with the reformer as prophet or martyr convincing others by the very force and rationality of his fine example. A proposition Good repeated in the *Varsity* upon Ruskin's death in 1900. (67)

Good used these arguments as an active participant in Literary Society debates. In the school year 1898-99, imperialism was extensively debated. Should the United States be in Cuba? What about Imperial Federation? And was war progressive or not? The latter was carried in the nay by the Trinity College team. (68) Good even got into a debate in the *Varsity* over school patriotism, being firmly opposed to the uncritical support given to such hooligan customs as the annual 'hustle' of freshmen and the Halloween celebration where students often battled Toronto police. (69) Good's popular anti-imperialism in third year, however, was to receive a considerable check in 1899 when student and family attitudes changed with Canada's entry into the Boer War in South Africa.

III

Will Good's third year at University College was marked by a growing moral and intellectual restlessness. Often in the fall of 1898 he would complain to his family about the shallow routine of memorising facts for his courses. (70) He continued to turn to evangelical ministers like Dyson Hague and Reverend Milligan, a Presbyterian who conducted a mission to students, and joined the Wycliffe bible study class of Dr. Sheraton. (71) Good also
began to spend a great deal of time in extracurricular activities, joining the student Young Men's Christian Association (Y.M.C.A.) and attending Social Reform League meetings off campus.

University College Y.M.C.A. met Thursday evenings to feature public speakers and it sponsored Monday to Friday daily prayers.(72) Good seems to have come in contact with the Y.M.C.A. through its welcoming meeting of the year, an alternative to the traditional hazing dealt out to freshmen, and various talks on foreign missionary work. (73) He began to attend the regular Thursday meetings to formally join in December 1898.(74) The Y.M.C.A. made a strong impression. As Good wrote in his diary after one meeting, "I could not help thinking, as we were singing 'Stand up, stand up for Jesus' and 'Onward Christian Soldiers', of the immense possibilities that lay in the throbbing life around me. ... for everything is possible to him that believes.'"(75)

Good must have been viewed as quite a catch. He was soon attending Y.M.C.A. classes for 'personal workers', that is, training for Christian leadership, such as preparing the Bible Class Programme for the upcoming school year of 1899-1900.(76) A further sign of his growing prominence was Good's trip as a delegate to the International Y.M.C.A. Students' camp at Northfield, Massachusetts in the summer of 1899.

The site was upon the D.L. Moody boarding school
for underprivileged children.

"Our tents are right on top of a high bank along the Connecticut valley and below the hill there is a fine spring and spring creek where we wash in the mornings and also obtain all our water. ... We get up about 6.00 a.m., have breakfast and prayers at 7.00, and have to get to the morning session at 8.00. We are then busy till 12:30 when we go home, get dinner and have the afternoon free. 'Round Top' sunset meetings are held at 7:00 p.m. and are followed by platform meetings, at which Mr. Moody presides, in the auditorium. Then the delegates meet by delegations to talk over the work of the day and to prayerfully apply it to their own needs and needs of their colleges. These as a rule break up at 10:00 p.m., when it is bedtime."(77)

In the course of his ten day July stay, Good and the other six hundred student delegates received daily inspirational talks on foreign and home missions, such as Dr. Barnardo's work with orphaned children, biblical interpretation, and the call to the ministry. Good was also given advice on how to build a socially active religious group, through bible study groups, business methods of recording and accounting, and fund raising. He also received instruction in how to recruit new members, and how to develop the more promising as future leaders.(78)

One cannot help but be struck as to how important this religious training was in developing Will Good's future organisational skills. At best, the student clubs fostered one's publicist abilities, to present and defend one's views. But the student clubs did little to build an active orientation to life off campus. This the social gospel movement provided through the agency of the Y.M.C.A."
Fourth year, 1899-1900, saw Good continue his commitment to applied Christianity. He was again a regular in Dr. Sheraton's bible class and attended Presbyterian services to hear Dr. Milligan at Old St. Andrews.(79) By now Good saw the Bible in a completely new light, much to his family's alarm. "The Bible has never meant so much to me as it has since I have come to look at it in the historic way."(80) Good also remained active in the student Y.M.C.A. and was a college delegate to the annual Y.M.C.A. convention on February 6, 1900 in Woodstock where he spoke on 'The Student and Social Organisations'.(81) He then wrote an article for the Canadian Colleges' Mission on Northfield and joined the C.C.M. in March 1900.(82)

Good also struck out in a new direction in his fourth year to do mission work, from sorting books with his friend N.F. Coleman, to delivering a sermon on 'Sin and its Consequences' at the King Street mission in February 1900. By his own admission, it was 'a rum place', a dirty room with benches and an organ. There were about thirty present, mostly men, some asleep, others quite drunk. One was removed by a policeman for being loud. Good took this person for his starting point for how a belief in Christ could overcome temptation. He was rather annoyed when his brief talk was followed by a 'half-hour harangue of dry-bones theology' by the mission conductor. Good believed instead that "a little applied Christianity in
the shape of clean surroundings, abolition of the swarming Saloons, etc., might do much more for them than the 'unadulterated' gospel."(83)

Another outlet for Will Good's growing need for moral commitment was the Toronto Social Reform League. Toronto in the 1890s was populated by a wide variety of Christian radicals, theosophers, single land taxers, and labour reformers. By 1898, as Gene Hommel notes, "the newly established Social Reform League provided Toronto radicals with an opportunity to sift through tougher alternatives than anti-monopolism and Georgeism."(84) For the two years of its existence, 1898-99, the League served as a Friday night forum where radical panaceas could compete through debates led by speakers such as labour leader Robert Glockling and journalist Phillips Thompson.

It was Good's friend Martin who took him to his first League meeting in October 1898.(85) Good was soon a regular participant following discussions on stock sharing plans to encourage industrial democracy, as at National Cash Register, and arguments over the tariff and the principles of political economy. The role or irrelevancy of religion was also discussed in fostering radical social change.(86) Good took out a subscription to the League's Citizen and Country edited by former Knight of Labour, Patron of Industry, and current Single Land Taxer, George Wrigley.(87)
Will Good did not limit himself to passive observation. He led a discussion on the single land tax in January 1899 and in April gave a paper on 'Money Interest'. (88) As indicated earlier in his correspondence with his uncle John Ballachey, Good took up Georgeism as the secular complement to his religious beliefs. Georgeism would become a permanent part of Good's world view, shaping a course on rural economics Good gave to farm students at McGill's Macdonald Agricultural College in 1912, and a newspaper series on problems in the Canadian economy in 1916 for the Farmer's Advocate. This would be published as Production and Taxation in Canada in 1919. (89)

To many radicals in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, land, and by association agriculture, had a special quality in being the source of all economic value. This belief in land as value was perhaps only natural in a society where most people lived and worked in rural settings. But the consequence for radical economic thought was that critics of capitalism tended to seize upon one commodity as the cause and cure of all social ills.

The chief proponent of land's special character was Henry George. George was a Californian newspaperman who became a crusader for the right of all to property following the depression of the early 1870s and the civil strife of 1877. His first writings about social justice
had actually been about the labour competition between whites and Chinese. His call for Chinese exclusion, and other services to the Democratic Party, were rewarded by his appointment as State Inspector of Gas Meters. George held this position from 1875 to Republican victory in 1880. During this period George wrote *Progress and Poverty*, in which the special place of land in the economy was asserted and the panacea of the single land tax proposed.(90)

*Progress and Poverty* purported to show why great want could exist amidst the productive plenty of industrial capitalism. The cause George discovered was land monopoly and speculation. Land, George argued, was a unique commodity in that it was not a product of human labour but a God given gift of nature. Therefore, there could never be absolute private ownership of land. Land values, in fact, were a social product, set by proximity to population, transport routes, power sites, etc.,. But as population grew land became scarce. Landowners could then bid up and artificially inflate this vital commodity. This encouraged speculation and took productive capital away from industry. Land was the key resource out of which wealth was created. But the majority of people were denied access to it, while economic crisis was caused by the flow of capital into land speculation. Population growth and human greed had conspired to create poverty in the midst of progress.

George's solution was to tax unproductive land
speculation by the single land tax, a form of taxation based upon the market value of a piece of property minus its improvements. Not only would this tax remove the source of crisis, speculative investment, it would also change the class basis of taxation, from the consuming masses to the parasitic elite of finance capitalists. Free trade, George concluded, would be the ultimate result as the speculative pressures leading to monopoly would be eliminated. George believed if the worst form of speculation could be removed then capitalism could continue its exponential growth without crisis. Social stability would be assured as unemployment disappeared, while home ownership, giving everyone a stake in capitalism, would become universal.(91)

George's ideas had their greatest impact outside the United States, among Ireland's and west Scotland's tenants, and in Australia and New Zealand. All were regions of small rural property struggling to adjust to the pressures of a world capitalist market whether because of outmoded tenurial relations or sheer distance. Only in New York, where George twice ran unsuccessfully for Mayor, did his ideas find a mass audience in connection with the labour reform movement.(92) It is quite likely, however, that the municipal history of North America is full of local campaigns and experiments such as the single land tax petition in Toronto that Good's friend J.A. Martin was active in between 1904
George died in 1897 at the age of fifty eight. He left no coherent organisational legacy other than a loose collection of clubs and a few newspapers devoted to publicising the single tax. Among farm populists, however, George's ideas radicalised many to a direct democratic conception of taxation. Figures such as Thomas Crear, President of the United Grain Growers', Unionist minister of Agriculture, and National Progressive Party leader, George Chipman, editor of the Grain Growers' Guide, even E.C. Drury, appeared in connection with single land tax conferences and campaigns.

*Progress and Poverty* sold two million copies by 1900. Only the Bible had a wider circulation in the English language. The single land tax had a tremendous appeal for the petit bourgeoisie who believed it would correct the distributive problems of capitalism while leaving private property in the means of production untouched.

Will Good began to grapple with a petit bourgeois critique of capitalism in his talk 'Money Interest' to the Social Reform League on the evening of April 23, 1899. He began by consulting the influential marginalist economist Alfred Marshall's *Economics of Industry*. But Marshall only noted interest's existence. He did not define its purpose, especially as applied to land. Good considered this an act of political cowardice given the prominence of tenant rights in the Irish land question.
On the moral side matters were more clear cut. Usury was prohibited by the Bible.

This did not lead Good to deny any and all forms of interest. Rather he sought to distinguish between just and unjust interest. Just interest would recognise two types of compensation, one for depreciation and one for the loss of earning power if the lender had directly used the capital lent. Interest on capital which used the labour of others, however, was unjust. This kind of interest only led to monopoly and price fixing rings taking the labour of others through rent.(96)

'Money Interest' clearly emphasised the embattled position of small property against the power of finance capital to strip it of all control over the means and fruits of commodity production. Exploitation and a 'distorted' social order were not the result of a surplus taken from labour in the process of production by commodifying labour as labour-power but of a cheat in the sphere of exchange by those with a monopoly of land and capital. This single factor approach to economic ills, complemented by ethical criticisms drawn from Ruskin, was repeated by Good in a fourth year talk to the Literary Society on 'Wealth, Value and Money'.(97)

If these were Will Good's ideas about the economy, what did he see as the alternative? From a trip to Manitoba in the summer of 1899 and his involvement in the Canadian Socialist League in 1900, it was socialism.
However, Good, and many like him in this period, did not equate socialism with Marxism. Rather Will Good defined socialism in a small propertied fashion, as run like a mutual fire insurance company within the confines of the bourgeois state. New Zealand seemed to be on the right track by these standards. Edward Bellamy, Henry George, and Robert Blatchford, were Good's socialist authorities with their bright utopian vision of a reformed and harmonious capitalism.(98)

Will Good's utopianism received a major stimulus from a visit to an agricultural commune called Hamona in eastern Saskatchewan in the summer of 1899. One week after leaving Northfield, Good travelled by rail to Winnipeg with his cousins Frank Ballachey and Morgan Good to work as harvest labour for their uncle Will Doyle who had a farm near Beulah, Manitoba.(99) After the harvest was over in September, Will and his uncle took a buggy trip into Saskatchewan to visit Hamona.

"We went from Beulah to Fort Ellice, crossed the Assiniboine River there and proceeded westward up the Qu'Appelle Valley. There were practically no settlers there at the time, but the old [metis] ox-cart trails were most conspicuous. At the western limit of our journey, there was a settlement of three families, two of the Paynters, cousins of the Doyles, and another whose name I have forgotten. They called their colony Hamona, and had it organised as a sort of self-subsisting, with a common fund, and division of labour according to individual qualifications or tastes.(100)

What most impressed Will Good was the colony's system of direct labour exchange through time cheques (script)
noting the amount of monthly work done set within a colony agreed upon weighted scale. Single women were paid equal to men though married women received less as family members. This script could be redeemed at the colony's store for items like sugar. Otherwise, their own produce was sold to members for low fixed prices or, in the case of garden stuff, distributed free. Where items were scarce they were divided among families. Only those who had passed a probationary test could use this system. (101)

Good was quite impressed with Hamona and took care of some colony business in Toronto the following winter. He also got Will Paynter to subscribe to Citizen and Country and wrote a lengthy review for Paynter about the Millenial Dawn's religious texts, the precursors of the Jehovah's Witnesses. (102) Though Will Paynter later became an important Saskatchewan co-operative leader (103), Hamona dissolved only one year later in 1900. (104) Apparently the time cheques could not resolve the distribution of the colony's surpluses nor hold external competitive pressures such as cattle prices off. Good was quite surprised and disappointed.

At the same time as Good was enthusiastically touring Hamona, the Social Reform League transformed itself into the Canadian Socialist League. Both Wrigley and J.A. Martin wrote to Good to warn him of the League's joint conference with the Toronto Trades and Labour Council. As single taxers,
they were intensely suspicious of 'class conscious' socialists. (105) Will Good, whether more confident or naive, rapidly reinvolved himself at League meetings at St. George's Hall. (106) Good in fact began the new year of 1900 with a talk to the League on the reconciliation of theology and Darwinism. Phillips Thompson followed with a discussion about social evolution in the writings of Kidd. (107)

The dilemma Darwin's theory of natural selection posed for religion was its denial of the need for any direct divine intervention in the process of evolution. Good chose to resolve this challenge to Christian faith by taking up the arguments of Henry Drummond, an English clergyman, in his book The Ascent of Man. (108) Drummond, Good explained, claimed there were two principles in nature. One was Darwin's individual competition for survival. This Drummond called the 'egoistical' struggle for nutrition. The second principle at work in nature was altruistic reproduction, of struggle for the life of others. Altruism revealed the indirect presence of God in nature and thus reconciled evolution and religious belief. (109) Thompson, on the other hand, in presenting Kidd, treated religion in a materialist manner, as a tool of social order without inherent meaning.

If the Canadian Socialist League provided a new outlet for Good's reform energies, nonetheless his private dialogue with waste, partyism, and oppression
continued. "They murder by the thousands, perfectly unwittingly (...) while they save life, knowingly, by the hundreds, ... ."(110) Such was the contradictory, and implicitly hypocritical role played by Toronto's leading capitalist families, the Masseys, Gooderhams, Czowskis, and Mr. 'Biscuit' Christie. The Masseys came in for a number of barbed criticisms with their temples to family vanity, in their houses, mausoleums, and concert hall. As Good wrote in his diary, "What fills me with amazement is the apparent utter disconnection between religion and business in this world."(111)

Partisan politics also drew Good's ire and indicated a future commitment to non-partisan voting. At the University there were fiercely contested elections to the Literary Society in his fourth year. Good refused to vote by slate, but instead for the best individuals drawn from both sides.(112) The federal election of 1900 also brought out his cynicism as he watched Liberal jingoism over the Transvaal or listened to the empty platitudes of a Tupper election rally in October 1899. "Never before have I been so impressed with the humbugging of our politicians of both sides."(113) To Good the divisions of partisan politics were the product not of competing intra or inter class interests but throwbacks to primitive man's biological traits. "One can easily see the fighting instinct in these election tussles, ... ."(114)
PM-1 3½" x 4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

2
The height of political hypocrisy for Good, however, was reached in Canada's participation in the Boer War. The Boer War in South Africa lasted three years, from 1899 to 1902, with several thousand Canadians enlisted on the British side. Though puny by twentieth century standards of human carnage, the war engendered in the young Good a passionate anti-militarism that matured to oppose Laurier's Canadian navy proposal, both World Wars, and the cold war hysteria of the 1950s.

Will Good, like the older generation of Goods and Doyles, was against British intervention in South Africa. The Boer War in Good's mind was a struggle between independent yeomen and a corrupt, centralising imperial power. (115) He did not see that, while the Boers were nationally oppressed by British imperialism, the Boers proposed to establish a more oppressive racist society that could only strengthen imperialism.

Good's peers, his five sisters and Doyle cousins were pro-imperialist, as he discovered in a fierce exchange of letters with his sister Louie. (116) No compromise of views took place. His sisters welcomed the relief of Ladysmith in 1900 while his oldest sister, Mamie, mocked him over the peace celebrations with British victory in June 1902. (117) Good remained unrepentant, laconically describing Toronto's 'going all wild over the soldiers' return' in November 1900 and piously hoping Guelph's citizens would learn the lesson
of peace during the victory celebrations in 1902. (118) Good even made open anti-war statements. He refused to give to the Patriotic Fund. (119) He also kept his seat during Convocation at the University of Toronto in 1900 when the other students rose to cheer British troops. (120)

If naïve in arguing that the causes of war were the result of man's biological nature, and the ease of creating international peace through evangelical Christility, Will Good had the moral and physical courage to act upon his anti-militarist ideals. "If one will set my face resolutely against what I see going on around me, and if necessary be a voice crying in the wilderness." (121)

In his fourth year Good united his religious and social activism by founding the Inter-College Club. The I.C.C. was an interdenominational Christian reform circle bringing together student idealists from five colleges. It was clearly modelled on Y.M.C.A. forms and even met in the Y.M.C.A. parlors on Thursday evenings following the latter's regular meetings. (122)

The club was founded on January 27, 1900 by a dozen students meeting at Wycliffe College. That night they elected H. Munroe as President and Will Good as Secretary. (123) Two meetings were held in what remained of the school year with Professor DeLury, a single taxer, and Reverend C.H. Shortt of the high Anglican St. Thomas. (124) Shortt would later become a regular correspondent
of Good's as a missionary in Japan.

For Good the I.C.C. served two purposes. It encouraged full and rational debate on a wide variety of social questions and it fostered interdenominational co-operation. In a sense it was a hybrid of Good's radical experience, reflecting both the Y.M.C.A. and the Social Reform League. The I.C.C. was also significant in revealing a new and important feature of Will Good's radical persona, that of an organisational builder.

Will Good's fourth and final year at University College was marked by both triumph and disappointment. He continued to use his English studies, courses with Professor Alexander on Elizabethan literature and the development of English drama, as idealistic substitutes for social analysis. (125) Informally, he pursued social science debates through reading, such as Fabian Essays, and as a member of History Professor George Wrong's secret discussion club. This was made up of Professors Wrong, Alexander, and Hutton, with eight to ten fourth year students including Good's friend N.F. Coleman. (126) They discussed Greek letter societies and student social life and the merits of co-education. Good, with Hutton, was in favour while Alexander thought the strain of competition would physically injure women. (127)

Scientifically, Good pursued his specialisation in physics and chemistry. He gave a seminar on the physics of aerial navigation after corresponding with O.
Chanute, a Chicago civil engineer who pioneered glider research. (128) But his thesis dominated most of the school year as he worked in the Physics Laboratory with his apparatus of shaking boxes as "over at the Chemistry building they are so cranky that one has scarcely any liberties whatever." (129)

Good's thesis was being prepared for the Exhibition Scholarship of 1851. The award was for three years of graduate study abroad in the physical sciences. Good hoped to go to Germany for chemical studies if he won, which as top science student he could reasonably expect. (130) He was one of three official candidates, then, who delivered their theses on March 20. (131). But, much to their surprise, another student by the name of Paterson was selected. (132)

In an unpleasant case of departmental intrigue, it turned out Paterson had not even submitted a proper thesis. But he was a Chemistry major. This was the paramount qualification as Professor J.C. McLennan claimed it was Chemistry's turn to use the prize when the scandal broke in mid-April. The three contestants immediately launched a petition to the Faculty Council. The Council met in mid-May to consider the petition and the Council's own Examiners' report. The three students were disappointed. Instead of a review of the competitive process, the Examiners' report tried to slander the three candidates as incompetent. Paterson kept the Exhibition
Scholarship. A committee of students then interviewed President Loudon, but to no avail. As Good noted, despite the clear injustice of the case, time was in favour of Faculty Council since the scandal came at the end of the school year. (133)

Neither protest changed the outcome. But the Paterson case was revived when a similar episode occurred in the school year 1904-05 with the student editor of the Varsity, C.R. Jamieson. This time there was a provincial commission, before which Will Good appeared. A happier outcome resulted when the Faculty Council was brought more firmly under the control of the University President and Senate. (134)

Good wondered how he would fare in his final exams as McLennan, and another chemistry lecturer, Lash Miller, were the chief examiners. But he passed well up on the lists. (135) In late April Good received his Bachelor of Arts and bought a copy of his graduating year book, Torontoensis, with an apt description from Hamlet of the prickly young Will Good - 'the times are out of joint'. (136) On May 23, 1900 Good returned home to Myrtleville with few prospects at hand. His formal education had come to an end.

IV

Good passed the summer of 1900 at Myrtleville. In September Chancellor Brebner invited him to come to Toronto for a possible laboratory job. Such was not to be,
though Brebner tried to get him work with either the medical or dental students. (137) As J.A. Martin wrote to Good, "Your active radicalism has probably disqualified you from any employment at Varsity." (138) Good's student friends advised him to do some informal post-graduate work and apply to American graduate schools. (139)

Good took his friends' advice and moved to Toronto in November. Tutoring prospects were not good and he had to return to Brantford to write the new co-operative hog packing plant for some ready cash. (140) Then it was back to Toronto to write up an appendix to his thesis. The early winter months of 1901, however, proved to be as economically difficult as the fall. But he began to apply to American graduate schools, to Yale, Chicago, and Wisconsin. (141) Good was particularly interested in studying political science with Richard Ely at Wisconsin. Ely discouraged him. He recommended Good continue with his scientific work since he did not have undergraduate social science training. (142)

Good's ability to go to graduate school was conditional on getting a scholarship sufficient to pay for living expenses as well as tuition. None of the American schools could offer this. At best Yale offered a tuition scholarship. (143) At the same time as Good was trying to improve his academic prospects, he looked for work in private business, including the Davies pork packing company. (144)
Such a precarious economic existence with little formal academic structure took its toll on Good's mental health as he often complained about loneliness and even had a bout with insomnia. At such infrequent moments of depression, his friends Coleman and Martin got a chance to give Good some friendly advice to moderate his behaviour. Martin took the opportunity to tell Good that he had heard another student say 'that he [Good] possessed less tact than any man he knew'. Martin thought Good needed to develop patience with others and to not let his dislike of disorder make him impatient and dictatorial. In April 1901 Good went home after a frustrating winter.

Good's year as a private tutor, however, was not totally without issue. However frustrated in his career plans, he engaged in his usual round of religious and political activities that aided his development as a major farm leader. During the winter of 1900-01 Good pursued his evolution towards a more applied Christianity by attending regular Sunday Presbyterian services and the Y.M.C.A.'s Thursday meetings. As well, Good switched his religious reading from the Evangelical Churchman to the social gospel New York Outlook. Good's concern with an applied gospel, and the development of his propaganda and organisational skills, were furthered by the revival of the Inter-College Club. There were discussions on luxury, the single tax, public
ownership, private property in land, nationalism, Imperial Federation, university reorganisation, and the principles of political economy. Once more Good was elected Secretary. (149)

Good as Secretary played a leading role in publicising I.C.C. arguments through letters to Toronto newspapers like the Globe and the Telegram. Three subjects dominated the I.C.C.'s educational work in the popular press: luxury sports as waste, attacking balance of trade arguments in defence of protectionism, and the stultifying and corrupting effects of partyism to be remedied by direct legislation. (150)

Good also developed a lengthy critique of classical and marginalist political economy in a talk given to the I.C.C. on February 7, 1901. This effort was based on Ruskin's moral critique of man's economic activity and a detailed reading of Ely's Introduction to the Study of Political Economy. As usual Good drew from Ruskin an emphasis on consumption as the starting point for any economic inquiry and the small propertied view that exploitation occurred in the realm of exchange, rather than production. Good also disputed Ely's definition of socialism as more state power or 'state socialism'. Good held socialism was about more, not less, democracy. (151) Though he had not yet defined its co-operative form.

If Good was still groping about for the actual forms of economic democracy, he was clearer on the means to
achieve political reform from below through Direct Legislation as outlined in one final I.C.C. letter to the Globe in the spring of 1901.

Two great evils, Good argued, existed as a consequence of the party system, corrupt political administration due to economic self interest and the human 'fighting instinct', which was harnessed by the first element. Three possible reforms could be introduced. Direct legislation through the initiative and referendum and a fairer electoral system by proportional representation could be established. And the Hare-Spence system of balloting (a multiple choice preferential ballot) with grouped constituencies could be introduced to ensure minority representation. There were already, Good stated, partial examples of these reforms in operation, such as Switzerland, and the sooner the public was educated to these, the sooner real reform would arrive.\(^{(152)}\)

The Inter-College Club clearly served to advance Good's thinking by providing him with a regular forum on the topical issues of the day. But one contradictory feature stands out, his elitism. Despite Good's emphasis on popular control from below, the only mechanism suggested was the intellectual propaganda and moral example of a small elite of self appointed saviours.

Politically, Good continued his interest in the single land tax, attending a Carleton Street Tent Pavilion meeting to hear Louis F. Post, editor of a
Chicago Georgian newspaper. (153) And Good was again active in cheering on the independent reform candidates in Toronto's municipal election and the activities of the Canadian Socialist League. (154)

The Wrigleys, who were having financial troubles with Citizen and Country, even proposed Good become editor. (155) Though his parents and his friends Coleman and Martin advised against it, Good was inclined to accept. (156) But financial control of the paper passed to a new board of management dominated by organised labour. They would not even consider Good. Good was firmly against any combination to hold up the price of any commodity, including labour by unions. (157) As Good's friend Martin put it, the class conscious socialists had triumphed over the ethical socialists. (158)

Frustrated academically and politically, Will Good went home to farm on shares with his father for the rest of 1901. (159) Will and his father Tom did not get along as joint managers of Myrtleville as the younger Good pressed for expensive improvements that nearly drove his father frantic. (160)

Will Good's farming, however, was brought to a rapid stop by an invitation from Guelph's Ontario Agricultural College to work as a chemistry, laboratory demonstrator. Good hesitated until he was invited to come and discuss the offer in Guelph. Much to his surprise he was interviewed while both the federal and provincial
Ministers of Agriculture were present. On December 2, 1901 Good was appointed to the Chemistry Department of O.A.C. at a salary of nine hundred dollars a year.

The Ontario Agricultural College had been founded in 1874 to foster the application of science to farm production. At the turn of the century there were some eight hundred students taking either the Bachelor of Scientific Agriculture (what E.C. Drury held) or the two year diploma programme. There was a dairy course for women and in 1904 an all women's college, Macdonald Institute, was established. O.A.C. was also the centre of agricultural extension work throughout the province, offering 'short courses', and hosting an annual educational fall conference known as the Experimental Union.

Good worked in two areas for the College, coursework for students, teaching the use of insecticides, fungicides, and quantitative analysis, and research work for the provincial Department of Agriculture. In the latter area he did cheese, butter, fodder, and sugar beet analyses. What Good expected to be a seasonal job, with time off to help his family during the harvest, turned into a year round occupation. Both summers, in 1902 and 1903, were spent travelling about Wellington County inspecting sugar beet plots.

Good's private regimen in Guelph was simple. He boarded out for the first half of 1902 and then in September moved out to the new College residence. There
he lived a bachelor's life with other single members of the teaching staff, though he stayed out of their poker games. (166) Every day he went for a walk, reserving Sunday for religious services and private reading. He occasionally attended the theatre and joined the Athletic association. Each month he travelled home and, in good weather, Good would bike the thirty five miles. (167)

Religious life in Guelph was not as stimulating as Toronto but Good dutifully made the rounds in early 1902 to settle upon the low Anglican St. George. (168) His interest in biblical criticism and the social gospel continued. As usual he got into a dispute with his mother about the authenticity of the biblical deluge and praised the street corner spontaneity of the Salvation Army. (169) Good kept up his subscriptions to the Outlook and the Student Volunteer Movement and soon got into a debate with St. George's minister, T. Eakin, over the meaning of socialism. Good argued there was an ethical socialist alternative to materialist socialism. But Eakin was not moved. (170) Good also delivered a talk on Darwin's Evolution of Man to the O.A.C.'s student Panton Biology club. (171)

Because of the nature of his position as an appointee of the Liberal provincial government, Good felt himself to be under considerable pressure to not openly argue for independent reform. In fact, it seems he made a public statement about the 1902 provincial election
for which he was reprimanded. (172) In his private diary, of course, he could let go, commenting on the lessons of the South African peace 'after hundreds were ruthlessly slain', and on partyism in corrupting the spirit of those elected. (173) Good also kept up his political reading, with Spencer and James on psychology, and with subscriptions to *Scribners*, McGill's *University Monthly*, the American *Direct Legislation Record*, *Citizen and Country*, and his first farm paper, Toronto's *Weekly Sun*, owned by Goldwin Smith and edited by W.L. Smith. (174) He also took out a share in the Social Progress Company to fund *Citizen and Country*'s successor *Social Justice* in 1903. (175)

In February 1902, Good attended the Single Land Tax convention in Toronto. (176) Good also kept in touch with the Inter-College Club through his student cousin Alex Ballachey. He had Alex deliver a letter to the club on the need for public railways in January. (177) And Good's friend Martin continued to send a running commentary on the state of Toronto's radical community, especially the growing conflicts between single taxers and the socialists grouped around *Social Justice* and Simpson's *The Toiler*. (178) By the summer of 1902 the Canadian Socialist League had split into three warring groups, single taxers, labourists, and socialists. Single taxers like Martin left and the League and *Citizen and Country* collapsed. (179)

At first Good liked his work at O.A.C. But the
monotony of laboratory work, and an inability to save 
money to invest in Myrtleville, led him by the fall of 
1902 to want to take up farming full time at home.(180) 
His family was not pleased. Despite Tom Good's economic 
difficulties with Myrtleville, they would have preferred 
Will to keep working at O.A.C.. But Will Good had a share 
arrangement with his father while in Guelph. He paid for 
the hired help out of his salary and in the summer of 
1902 built a cement silo.(181) 

When Will Good seriously proposed to quit O.A.C. in 
the fall of 1902, after his father had a severe bout of 
pneumonia, a family storm broke. In October he wrote his 
father to state it had become clear he would leave Guelph, 
partly because he didn't care for the work, 'but above all 
for the conditions under which it has to be done'. He also 
believed the farm could be made to pay. But, Good stated, 
if he came home he expected to run the farm either by 
himself or by a foreman. Besides, "I have to consider 
myself as well as the family."

(182) 

Not surprisingly the Goods were up in arms over this 
ultimatum. His parents replied it would be absurd to rent 
to Will and go into town when Aunt Anne owned half the 
farm. His father advised him to work and have some 
savings before coming home. "If I die then you can have 
the place to yourself."

(183) 

Apparently Will Good persisted in his wish to return 
home, for it took a letter writing campaign by his sisters
to stop him even temporarily. (184) His mother Mary wrote "to see it from our view." (185) Apparently Good did not, for after the Christmas holidays he sent another ultimatum to his father about the potentially disastrous state of Myrtleville and the imperative need for him to come home. As he baldly stated, he could only manage the farm from Guelph if he had outright control for a cash rent by next spring before the difficulties of another harvest season. (186)

His family was not happy. His sister Ethel thought her brother "positively wicked to be so discontented." (187) But by February he had convinced them he was coming home. On May 5 Good handed in his formal resignation to O.A.C. to take effect on September 15, 1903. (188) He went home on August 22, after spending a busy summer buying farm equipment, stock, and looking for help. (189) Mamie fixed up his room and prepared to act as his housekeeper. (190)

If things were not smooth in Myrtleville, Good's decision to leave the Ontario Agricultural College freed his public political energies as he began to write letters to Toronto newspapers on partyism, direct legislation, trade unionism, and an article on 'Agriculture and Political Economy' for the Ontario Agricultural College Review. "Now that I don't have to toady to the powers that be, I feel freer to speak out my mind." (191)

Good's renewed burst of political writing began
with a critical analysis of the relation of scientific farming to the development of a prosperous and morally fit rural society in the February 1903 issue of O.A.C.R.

"It is by no means certain that instruction in Scientific Agriculture does everything to reconcile one to the farmer's life, or to fit one for it." (192) Science had certainly not stopped rural depopulation.

Farmers, Good argued, were really faced with two tasks, to raise productivity by the application of science to farming, and to combat society's moral defects due to the unequal distribution of wealth. Monopoly and waste in the social sphere had to be checked so the farm community would benefit from greater production. Rural depopulation would only stop when both tasks were faced. And that second task could only be taken up by martyrs for the farm cause, eloquent witnesses as to how producers could reorganise society. (193)

Good's growing sense of freedom led him back to the subject of partyism in two private communications with J.A. Macdonald, editor of the Globe, and in a public letter to the conservative but influential Toronto News under J.S. Willison about the 1903 Liberal election bribery scandal known as the 'Gamey Affair'. The one saving grace about this episode, Good argued, was it had finally brought public understanding on the need for electoral reform. (194)

The other major article Good published before
leaving Guelph was 'Some Problems of Unionism'. This essay had a stormy history since it was an anti-union article aimed at a labour audience. Wrigley refused to publish it in *Social Justice* since he thought Good did not appreciate the power of capital over labour. James Simpson offered the *Toiler* but apparently to attack him. Finally, it was printed in the June 1903 issue of London's *Industrial Banner*.(195)

To the young Good, in a classic bit of rural labour bashing, unions had many features which harmed the country's welfare. They harboured the lazy, held down production with shorter hours, restricted working practices, and violated individual rights by persecuting the 'scab'. Good could not see how such practices would lead to the reform goal of 'a juster(sic) distribution of wealth'. Unionists therefore should remember the national welfare, that they could not raise their status by monopoly in the labour market, and that 'the real interests of all classes are identical'. The antidote to labour and capital monopolies, Good concluded, lay in public ownership.(196) Little wonder Good had difficulty finding a labour publisher.

The renewal of Good's political activity, at a personal price, was marked by what would become a familiar petit bourgeois dialectic. On the one hand Good stressed farmers had to look for solutions beyond the farm to their problems, including a dose of direct democracy.
On the other hand, direct democracy had to be applied in a non-partisan manner within the antagonistic social relations of capitalism.

By the summer of 1903 Will Good's mind had long been off his teaching responsibilities at the Agricultural College. On September 9 he joined the one year old Farmer's Association of Ontario, and began to work on a series of articles for the Farmer's Sun on direct legislation, in preparation for his mission to act as educational prophet to Ontario's rural producers.(197)

As his friend N.F. Coleman wrote him in December 1903, "I shall take for granted that you are equally a fixture on the farm until I hear that you have been elected to the Dominion Parliament on an Independent ticket when I shall direct my letters, during the session, to Ottawa."(198)

V

Will Good had thought and experienced much between leaving Myrtleville in 1896 and his return for good in 1903. In these seven years he underwent a process of radicalisation, already begun in Brant, in social gospel forums like the Y.M.C.A., and in the radical political arenas of the Social Reform League and the Canadian Socialist League. He managed to bring these two influences together through the creation of a Christian socialist discussion circle, the Inter-College Club.

After the fiasco of the Exhibition Scholarship scandal, Good spent a difficult year and a half as a private tutor in Toronto and then briefly worked
Myrtleville on shares. Guelph seemed a heaven send, a permanent salaried position combining his scientific education gained at the University of Toronto, agriculture, and time off to help at home during the harvest season. Good found instead poor working conditions with constant demands on him to do government analysis work. At the same time, he felt politically constrained, that he could have no public political opinions in an era of partisan appointments to university posts. In frustration Good left the Ontario Agriculture College, after a major row with his family, to regain his political independence as master of Myrtleville farm.

One common theme that comes through Good's process of radicalisation is idealism, of posing how the world ought to be on the basis of abstract moral principles. But there were material contours to this idealism which explain it as a class phenomenon, in his attraction to Drummond's reconciliation of God and evolution, to the economics of Ruskin and George, and to the North American progressive tradition of Direct Legislation.

All of these ideas tried to reconcile petit bourgeois interests to an increasingly secular and monopolistic world. Georgeism, in particular, offered to do what Drummond had done for evolutionary science, to reconcile hard material reality with the small propertyed ideals of class harmony and progress on the most advantageous class terms, within a competitive capitalism
of free trade.

In practice, however, the young Good suffered from a major contradiction. In one respect he was a reformer from below in stressing direct democracy as the means to small property's self determination. But in practice young Will Good was an elitist, a reformer from above, in stressing the educative role of a self-appointed elite in witnessing, perhaps becoming martyrs, for the cause of social reform. Not until Good became immersed in the field of co-operation would he see a way by which ordinary producers could complement self determination with a method of self emancipation.

Will Good's class idealism, underlying the progressive emphasis on individual moral reform in the 1920s, grew out of the world view of a radicalised rural petit bourgeoisie. In reality the young Good had projected the experience of an insecure and declining section of the old middle class onto a wider capitalist world where competition and accumulation worked through monopoly and imperialism. Will Good certainly was, by the standards of an increasingly industrial and urban society, 'a voice crying in the wilderness'. But the wilderness of rural Ontario was still numerically, and therefore politically, important.
ENDNOTES

1. National Archives of Canada, Manuscript Group 27, III, C I, (herafter Good Papers), Volume 20, Minutes of the Executive of the Social Service Council of Canada (Standing Committee on Gambling), May 15, 1922, Toronto.


15. Good Papers, Volume 1, Will Good to Mamie Good, December 6, 1896, Toronto, Volume 29, and Mary Good to Will Good, December 3, 1896, Myrtleville.


21. Good Papers, Volume 34, 'That The Liquor Traffic should be prohibited by law' manuscript, 1895?.

22. Ibid.

23. Good Papers, John Ballacheay to Will Good, August ?, 1896, Sioux City, Iowa.


25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Good Papers, Volume 1, John Ballacheay to Will Good, September 6, 1896, Sioux City, Iowa.


29. Good Papers, Volume 1, John Ballacheay to Will Good, September 20, Sioux City, Iowa.


31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.


34. Good Papers, Volume 33, Account Book, 1896-1903, Good's annual scholarship tuition was for sixty dollars. It appears his father paid the more expensive living costs.


36. *Varsity*, Volume XVI, November 4, 1896, 38 re W. Good elected a first year councillor to the Literary Society. For other club activities see Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mamie Good, December 6, 1896, Toronto (re the mock parliament) and W. Good to Louie Good, January 31, 1897, Toronto (re the Modern Languages Club meeting on Ruskin).
37. National Library. Varsity, Volume XVI, October 28, 1896, 36, re W. Good elected as a member of the Century class executive. N.L., Varsity, Volume XVI, October 28, 1896, W. Good elected a first year councillor to the Mathematics and Physics Society. See also Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, October 17, 1896, Toronto (re giving a talk on 'The Influence of Mathematics on the Mind' to the Mathematics and Physics Society), W. Good to Louie Good, January 31, 1897, Toronto (re Natural Science club meeting on Spencer), and W. Good to Louie Good, March 7, 1897, Toronto (re visit to Natural History Museum and reading Newton's Principia).

38. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, March 7, 1897, Toronto (re Lyell) and Volume 29, Louie Good to W. Good, January 19, 1898, Waterford, Ontario (re borrowing Good's Darwin). It appears Good did not mention his evolutionary studies to his parents.

39. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, January 31, 1897, Toronto.

40. Good Papers, Volume 20 (Diary Three), September 14, 1899, Winnipeg.

41. Good Papers, Volume 29, W. Good to Louie Good, February 1, 1900, Toronto. For a study of the 'social significance' of University student hijinks see: K. Walden, "Respectable Hooligans: Male Toronto College Students Celebrate Hallowe'en, 1884-1910", Canadian Historical Review, Volume LXVIII, Number 1, March 1987, 1-34.

42. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, October 24, 1897, Toronto.

43. Good Papers, Volume 29, Mary Good to W. Good, November 5, 1896, Myrtleville.

44. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, February 21, 1897, Toronto and W. Good to Mary Good, March 28, 1897, Toronto.

45. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Tom Good, May 10, 1897, Toronto and W. Good to Mamie Good, May 16, 1897, Toronto.

46. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mamie Good, October 24, 1897, Toronto.

47. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Anne Good,
December 1, 1898, Toronto.

48. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, March 14, 1897, Toronto.

49. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, February 21, 1897, Toronto.

50. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, April 4, 1897, Toronto.

51. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, January 30, 1898, Toronto.


53. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, October 24, 1897, Toronto (re Sheraton Bible Class) and W. Good to Mary Good, May 15, 1898, Toronto (re Dyson Hague).

54. Good Papers, Volume 29, Mary Good to W. Good, May 11, 1897, Myrtleville.

55. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, January 24, 1897, Toronto.

56. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Anne Good, October 25, 1896, Toronto, W. Good to Louie Good, May 2, 1897, Toronto, and W. Good to Fanny and Carol Good, January 15, 1899, Toronto.

57. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, April 25, 1897, Toronto (re Massey mausoleum) and W. Good to Mamie Good, December 6, 1896, Toronto (re Fort York).

58. Good Papers, Volume 29, Tom Good to W. Good, October 11, 1896, Myrtleville, and Louie Good to W. Good, October 9, 1896, Myrtleville.

59. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, November 29, 1896, Toronto.

60. Good Papers, Volume 21.

61. Ibid.

62. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, January 30, 1898, Toronto (re Ruskin). See also on Carlyle: Volume 29, W. Good to Louie Good,
October 26, 1898, Toronto and Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, March 3, 1899, Toronto.

63. On Shelley see: Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mamie Good, October 14, 1898, Toronto and W. Good to Louie Good, March 3, 1899, Toronto. See also Volume 29, W. Good to Louie Good, October 19, 1898, Toronto ("Professor Alexander's lectures this year are simply grand. I would sooner miss my dinner then one of them.")

64. Good Papers, Volume 29, Mary Good to Louie Good, November 2, 1898, Myrtleville and Mary Good to W. Good, February 2, 1899, Myrtleville. And see Volume 1, J.W. Flavelle to W. Good, March 19, 1901, Toronto.


68. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mamie Good, October 29, 1898, Toronto (re U.S. in Cuba) and W. Good to Mary Good, February 26, 1899, Toronto (re Imperial Federation).

69. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mamie Good, October 23, 1898, Toronto. See also Varsity, Volume XVIII, November 2, 1898, pages 36 and 38. W.C. Good on 'College Sentiment'. Good and another student apparently made a statement to the Toronto press repudiating the Halloween 'rumpus' in his fourth year. See Varsity, Volume XIX, November 8, 1899, 45.

70. Good Papers, Volume 29, W. Good to Louie Good, November 29, 1898, Toronto ("My mind has been in somewhat of a ferment this Fall").

71. Good Papers, Volume 20 (Diary One), March 19, 1899 (re Dr. Milligan), Volume 29, Mary Good to W. Good, March 15, 1899, Myrtleville (re mother keeping an eye on the orthodoxy of Hague, and Dr. Sheraton's bible class, by their articles for the Evangelical Churchman), W. Good to Louie Good, October 26, 1898, Toronto (re Good's own impressions of the Y.M.C.A. bible class with Dr. Sheraton), and W. Good to Louie Good, November 19, 1898, Toronto (re Y cadre classes).

72. See Varsity, Volume XX, February 26, 1901, 263-4 for a historical sketch of University College
Y.M.C.A. Weekly meetings were advertised throughout this period in the *Varsity*. For Good's first impressions see Good Papers, Volume 29, W. Good to Louie Good, November 8, 1898, Toronto.

73. Good Papers, Volume 20 (Diary One), October 15, 1898.

74. Good Papers, Volume 33, Account Book, December 1, 1898.

75. Good Papers, Volume 20 (Diary One), February 19, 1899.

76. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, April 16, 1899, Toronto.

77. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, July 8, 1899, Northfield, Massachusetts.

78. Good Papers, Volume 20 (Diary 2), June 30 - July 8, 1899, Northfield, Massachusetts.

79. Good Papers, Volume 29, Mary Good to W. Good, October 19, 1899, Myrtleville, and W. Good to Louie Good, November 19, 1899, Toronto.

80. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, January 28, 1900, Toronto.

81. Good Papers, Volume 1, A.P. Misener (Y.M.C.A. Student Secretary) to W. Good, December 28, 1899, Toronto (to speak at Woodstock conference). See also *Varsity*, Volume XX, February 5, 1900, 175 re four University delegates, including Good and Coleman, and *Varsity*, Volume XX, February 12, 1900, 188 re W. Good spoke at Woodstock on 'The Student and Social Organisations'.

82. Good Papers, Volume 29, Louie Good to W. Good, December 12, 1899, Waterford, Ontario, and Volume 33, Account Book. Good joined the Canadian College Movement on March 15, 1900.

83. Good Papers, Volume 29, W. Good to Louie Good, February 25, 1900, Toronto.


85. Good Papers, Volume 20 (Diary One), October 7, 1898, and Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good,
December 9, 1898, Toronto.

86. Good Papers, Volume 20 (Diary One), October 7, 1898, (on profit sharing), and November 5, 1898.


88. Good Papers, Volume 29, Louie Good to W. Good, January 8, 1899, Waterford, Ontario (re Good leading a single tax discussion), Volume 20 (Diary One), January 13, 1899 (re S.R.L. discussion of 'The ABC of Political Economy').


92. H. George Jr., The Life of Henry George, (Toronto, 1900), see Part III 'Propagation of Philosophy'.

93. See Good Papers, Volume 2, J.A. Martin to W. Good passim, files 1-6, 1904-1910, for Toronto single tax activity.

94. One example of the reach of the Single Tax movement was the 1916 Single Land Tax Association conference held at Niagara Falls, with Good and Crerar present, and Mackenzie King as an endorser. For the circular see, Good Papers, Volume 3, July 1916, and for Good and Crerar's discussion, W. Good to H.B. Cowan, August 21, 1916, Paris.

95. H. George Jr., The Life of Henry George, (Toronto, 1900), 574.

96. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, April 23, 1899, Toronto, and Volume 17 for 'Money Interest'.
97. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, February 4, 1900, Toronto (re reading Wealth talk to Literary Society). The text is in Volume 17.

98. Good Papers, Volume 33, 'Social Notes - 1898'.


104. Good Papers, Volume 1, Clara Doyle to W. Good, September 9, 1900, Beulah, Manitoba.

105. Good Papers, Volume 1, J.A. Martin to W. Good, August 27, 1899, Toronto.


107. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, January 14, 1900, Toronto.

108. Good Papers, Volume 21, Notes on Drummond.


110. Good Papers, Volume 20 (Diary One), February 19, 1899.

111. Good Papers, Volume 20 (Diary One), October 27, 1898.

112. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, March 4, 1900, Toronto.
113. Good Papers, Volume 20 (Diary One), October 22, 1899.

114. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, March 4, 1900, Toronto.


116. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, January 14, 1900, Toronto and Volume 29, W. Good to Louie Good, February 1, 1900, Toronto.

117. Good Papers, Volume 1, Lily Doyle to W. Good, February 15, 1900, Beulah, Manitoba and, Volume 29, Mamie Good to W. Good, June 2, 1902, Brantford.

118. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mamie Good, November 8, 1900, Toronto, and Volume 20 (Diary Two), June 1, 1902, Guelph.

119. Good Papers, Volume 29, W. Good to Louie Good, April 8, 1900, Toronto.

120. Good Papers, Volume 1, N.F. Coleman to W. Good, June 10, 1900, Spokane, Washington.

121. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, January 14, 1900, Toronto.


123. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, January 28, 1900, Toronto. See also *Varsity*, Volume XX, January 31, 1900, 164 re founding of the Inter-College Club on Saturday, January 27.

124. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, March 4, 1900, Toronto.


126. Good Papers, Volume 29, W. Good to Louie Good, December 10, 1899, Toronto, and Volume 1, W.
Good to Louie Good, January 14, 1900, Toronto.

127. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, February 18, 1900, Toronto.

128. Good Papers, Volume 1, O. Chanute to W. Good, January 1, 1900, Chicago.


131. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, March 4, 1900, Toronto.

132. Good Papers, Volume 29, W. Good to Mary Good, April 29, 1900, Toronto.

133. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, May 20, 1900, Toronto.


135. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, May 20, 1900, Toronto.

136. Latzer, Myrtleville, (Carbondale, 1976), 220.

137. Good Papers, Volume 1, J. Brebner to W. Good, September 7, 1900, Toronto, J. Brebner to W. Good, October 9, 1900, Toronto, and W. Good to Mary Good, November 18, 1900, Toronto.

138. Good Papers, Volume 1, J.A. Martin to W. Good, September 29, 1900, Toronto.

139. Good Papers, Volume 1, J. McBean to W. Good, October 6, 1900, Toronto, and N.F. Coleman to W. Good, October 17, 1900, Spokane, Washington.

140. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, December 6, 1900, Toronto.

141. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, February 17, 1901, Toronto.

142. Good Papers, Volume 1, R.T. Ely to W. Good, February 25, 1901, Madison, Wisconsin, and
R.T. Ely to W. Good, June 1, 1901, Madison, Wisconsin.

143. Good Papers, Volume 1, A.W. Phillips to W. Good, May 9, 1901, New Haven, Connecticut.

144. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Tom Good, March 4, 1901, Toronto.

145. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, January 20, 1901, Toronto.

146. Good Papers, Volume 1, J.A. Martin to W. Good, January 9, 1901, Toronto.

147. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, November 18, 1900, Toronto.


149. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, November 11, 1900, Toronto (re starting up I.C.C. again). The programme for 1900-1901 is in Volume 33 (File 9). Apparently an average of six to eight students attended I.C.C. meetings. See Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, February 24, 1901, Toronto.

150. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, January 20, 1901, Toronto.


152. Good Papers, Volume 18, text of letter to Globe re direct legislation.

153. Good Papers, Volume 22, Card advertisement for Single Tax meeting, December 8, 1900 on 'Combinations of Evil Forces'.

154. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mamie Good, November 8, 1900, Toronto.

155. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, December 8, 1900, Toronto.

156. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good, December 16, 1900, and N.F. Coleman to W. Good, December 29, 1900, Spokane, Washington.

157. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good,
December 16, 1900, Toronto.

158. Good Papers, Volume 1, J.A. Martin to W. Good, January 9, 1901, Toronto.

159. Good Papers, Volume 33, Account Book (re leaving Toronto), and see, for farming on shares, Volume 1, Clara Doyle to W. Good, October 25, 1901, Beulah, Manitoba.

160. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mamie Good, February 11, 1901, Toronto, and W. Good to Tom Good, March 4, 1901, Toronto.


162. Good Papers, Volume 29, Mamie Good to Louie Good, December 2, 1901, Myrtleville.


164. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good January 21, 1903, Guelph, and W. Good to Mamie Good, May 2, 1903, Guelph.

165. Good Papers, Volume 1, N.F. Coleman to W. Good, July 19, 1902, Toronto, and W. Good to Mary Good, August 31, 1902, Guelph.

166. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Mary Good; January 19, 1902, Guelph, and W. Good to Mary Good, September 5, 1902, Guelph, and W. Good to Fanny Doyle, March 25, 1903, Guelph (re poker).

167. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, January 21, 1903, Guelph.

168. Good Papers, W. Good to Mary Good, January 12, 1902, Guelph ("At the rate of two [churches] a Sunday I shall soon make the rounds and see what there is").

169. Good Papers, Volume 29, Mary Good to W. Good, February 9, 1903, Myrtleville, and W. Good to Mary Good, July 12, 1903, Guelph.

170. Good Papers, Volume 33, Account Book (re subscriptions), and Volume 1, T. Bakin to W. Good, February 9, 1903, Guelph.

171. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, February 23, 1903, Guelph, and Volume 20 for text of 'Evolution of Language' talk.
172. Good Papers, Volume 1, C.H. Shortt to W. Good, August 11, Nayahata, Japan.

173. Good Papers, Volume 20 (Diary Two), May 30, 1902.

174. Good Papers, Volume 33, Account Book (re secular subscriptions, including on February 14, 1903 one to the Weekly Sun). For a comment on his reading see Volume 1, N.F. Coleman to W. Good, June 8, 1902, Spokane, Washington.

175. Good Papers, Volume 33, Account Book (one share in the Social Progress Company, April 14, 1902).

176. Good Papers, Volume 1, J.A. Martin to W. Good, January 23, 1902, Toronto, and Alex Ballachey to W. Good, February 24, 1902, Toronto.

177. Good Papers, Volume 1, Alex Ballachey to W. Good, January 8, 1902, Toronto.

178. Good Papers, Volume 1, J.A. Martin to W. Good, January 8, 1902, Toronto, J.A. Martin to W. Good, July 27, 1902, Toronto, and J.A. Martin to W. Good, November 25, 1902, Toronto.

179. Good Papers, Volume 1, J.A. Martin to W. Good, November 10, 1902, Toronto.

180. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, January 21, 1903, Guelph, Fanny Doyle to W. Good, February 23, 1902, Beulah, Manitoba, and N.F. Coleman to W. Good, July 19, 1902, Toronto.

181. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Tom Good, August 31, 1902, Guelph.

182. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Tom Good, October 12, 1902, Guelph.

183. Good Papers, Volume 29, Tom Good to W. Good, October 16, 1902, Myrtleville, and Volume 29, Mary Good to W. Good, October 16, 1902, Myrtleville.

184. Good Papers, Volume 29, Mamie Good to W. Good, October 27, 1902, Myrtleville, and Mamie Good to W. Good, November 3, 1902, Myrtleville.

185. Good Papers, Volume 29, Mary Good to W. Good, November 3, 1902, Myrtleville.

186. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Tom Good, January 1, 1903, Guelph.

188. Good Papers, Volume 20 (Diary Five), May 5, 1903.

189. Good arranged to rent the farm for five years. See Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, June 12, 1903, Guelph. For his farm preparations see Volume 33, Account Book, for the summer of 1903.

190. Good Papers, Volume 29, Mamie Good to W. Good, August 14, 1903, Myrtleville.

191. Good Papers, Volume 1, W. Good to Louie Good, March 29, 1903, Guelph.

192. Good Papers, Volume 22, text of O.A.C.R. article. The Review is also on file at the National Department of Agriculture Library.

193. Ibid.


195. Good Papers, Volume 20 (Diary Five), W. Good to G. Wrigley, June 16, 1903, Guelph, W. Good to G. Wrigley, July 10, 1903, Guelph, and Volume 1, J.A. Martin to W. Good, August 14, 1903, Toronto, and J.A. Martin to W. Good, November 29, 1903, Toronto.

196. Good Papers, Volume 12, text of 'Some Problems of Unionism' in the June 1903 issue of the Industrial Banner.

197. Good Papers, Volume 33, Account Book, September 9, 1903, joined the F.A.O., and Volume 20 (Diary Five), W. Good to J. Mavor, May 9, 1903, Guelph (collecting material for a series on direct legislation for the Weekly Sun).

V. FARM LOBBYIST

W.C. Good's first farming years were marked by a progressively important leadership role in the Ontario farm movement. But Good's evolution as a farm leader was marked by a qualitative break between his first efforts to pursue a lobby strategy to influence political elites and the launching of a strategy of self emancipation through direct co-operative action in 1914.

Good began his mission to rural Ontario as a local builder of the Farmers' Association of Ontario (F.A.O.) and came to provincial prominence as a propagandist for the Dominion Grange (D.G.) after the two fused in 1907. In 1909 Good helped draft the constitution of the first national farm lobby, the Canadian Council of Agriculture.

In the course of building the F.A.O. and the Grange, Good sought lobby allies among professional educators in the Ontario Educational Association (O.E.A.), by participating in the creation and work of the Moral and Social Reform Council of Canada, established in 1907 and renamed the Social Service Congress in 1913, and with the pre-1914 peace movement as defined by Toronto's Peace and Arbitration Society.

Good's prominence as a farm lobbyist leader was due to two strengths. He was a practical builder and he developed a critique of rural Canada's economic problems, to be remedied by the single land tax and direct democracy.
In practice, however, lobbyist methods led to failure. For a decade organised farmers pressed provincial Conservatives and federal Liberals for a variety of reforms, with little result and with sometimes embarassing consequences to the moral authority of a movement that claimed to be above class considerations. The one practical gain in the rise and fall of farm lobbying before World War one was the development of a new farm leadership in the persons of E.C. Drury, J.J. Morrison, and W.C. Good.

The turning point in overcoming the conservative reform experience of the pre-war period was the reorganisation of the fragmented Ontario farm movement around co-operation. The federal defeat of 1911 was a dramatic setback for reformers from above like E.C. Drury. But the failure of lobbying only confirmed Good's conviction that a new strategy of self emancipation was needed. In March 1914 this conviction would bear fruit in the organisation of the United Farmers' Co-operative Company and its offshoot, the United Farmers of Ontario.

Before Will Good could become a farm leader he had to make, Myrtleville a paying proposition. This was a considerable task. His father died in 1904 and Good was left responsible for a large family, his mother Mary and aunt Anne, his five sisters, and an Irish cousin, Charles
Good, who had come to live with them. To add to these obligations, Good married Jean McCormick in 1908 and had two children of his own by 1914, Beth and Allen. While his sisters trained as teachers and gradually moved away, one, Louie, suffered a nervous breakdown and had to be committed to the Ontario Hospital in Hamilton.(1)

Good, however, rose to the challenge. By 1914 he developed a successful mixed livestock operation with a herd of milking shorthorns, an orchard, and certified seed production. As the editor of Farm and Dairy described it, Myrtleville's 120 acres had been systematically improved through soil building, with productivity measures like bigger horse drawn equipment and pure bred bulls, and physical improvements like shelter belts, new barns, and a new house. Here too Good was a pioneer, building one of the first metal silos, and then one of the first truss roof barns, in Ontario.(2)

Good's economic success, doubling the farm's income (3), did not go unnoticed. In the winters of 1909-10 and 1910-11 he was a paid lecturer for the Farmers' Institute, and then taught rural economics at McGill's Macdonald Agricultural College for the next two winters.(4) The Farmers' Advocate, Canada's largest farm newspaper, frequently sought contributions on practical questions like how to grow better silage, alfalfa, breeding for dual purpose cattle, barn construction, and dairy feeds.(5) Good also became one of Brant county's regular reporters
for the **Weekly Sun** in its spring seeding and fall harvest provincial surveys. (6) Such practical advice and demonstration of his farm prowess gave weight to Good's arguments for collective organisation and change.

II

Rural Ontario at the turn of the century stood between two periods of mass organisation, between the Grange and Patrons of the nineteenth century and the future United Farmers of Ontario. The Dominion Grange in the 1870s and 1880s had flourished to number over 20,000 members through a variety of co-operative experiments and with a rich associational life. But the co-operative experiments, particularly the province wide Grange Wholesale Supply Company, failed. In the early 1890s Ontario farmers turned to an open political challenge with the formation of the Patrons of Industry. In 1894 seventeen Patrons were elected to the provincial legislature. But a lack of constructive development politics and a refusal to act in a disciplined way led to their destruction by Mowat Liberalism. By 1900 only one federal M.P., Jabel Robinson of Elgin, was left. (7) The Ontario farm movement, having tried co-operation and independent political action, retreated into itself.

By 1900 only the Grange remained. But since it persisted in its ban on political discussion, and what a new generation of farmers considered to be outmoded ritual, it appeared irrelevant. In reality, it was a
dwindling, self help group sustained by local buying clubs and the People's Salt Company. A persistent minority of farmers, however, still believed that Ontario's agriculture's interests, representing a third of the provincial economy and nearly half the population, should be protected by independent farm organisation. That tiny minority, sponsored by Goldwin Smith's *Weekly Sun*, created the Farmers' Association of Ontario.

In the summer of 1902 a number of former Patrons argued in the *Sun* for the creation of a 'Farmer's League' to represent Ontario farm interests provincially and nationally. (8) J.J. Morrison, of West Wellington and future United Farm Secretary, suggested the *Sun* sponsor a convention to establish such a group during Toronto's Canadian National Exhibition (C.N.E.) when many of Ontario's leading commercial farmers would gather for the agricultural exhibits. (9) The *Sun* was willing and on Tuesday, September 9, one hundred and fifty farmers met at the Foresters' Temple. Caleb Mallory, an ex-Patron from Prince Edward County, chaired while W.L. Smith of the *Sun* acted as Secretary. There was soon consensus for organisation.

The real debate was not on the need for a politically oriented farm movement but on the actual relation of the F.A.O. to politics. Would it try to influence politicians or pose as a political alternative? George Wrigley, founder of the *Sun* and inveterate radical
whether in the farmers or workers cause, argued for the F.A.O. to become a political party. Morrison spoke against this given the recent debacle of the Patrons, as did Goldwin Smith. The debate on strategy, however, was deferred as an organising committee was struck.

Early Wednesday morning the organising committee reported back. It recommended the F.A.O. meet in an annual September convention with two voting delegates per county with an executive to be headed by Mallory as President and W.L. Smith as Secretary, a position the latter would occupy until 1907. The executive in turn promised an organising campaign to establish local F.A.O. clubs and they moved five resolutions to be immediately presented to the Ontario and federal governments. They demanded an end to bonusing (i.e., subsidies) to private industry, equality of taxation in regard to railway property, the creation of a federal Railway Commission to regulate freight rates, no increase in the tariff, and for specific legislation to deal with municipal drainage loans and the provision of cattle guards at railway crossings.(10)

True to their promise the F.A.O. executive launched public meetings in rural Ontario to build local F.A.O. branches. These meetings largely took place in three locales: in old Patron areas, in the mixed stock belt across the northern portion of Western Ontario, and in the Eastern Ontario dairy belt.(11) One commodity organisation, the Ontario Fruit Growers Association, endorsed the
F.A.O..(12) By the fall of 1903 the F.A.O. claimed twenty eight clubs with a paid up membership of three hundred and forty one.(13)

The lobby character of the provisional F.A.O. executive was soon evident as they went on a joint delegation with the Toronto Board of Trade and the Canadian Manufacturers' Association (C.M.A.) in February 1903 to meet with Laurier and demand a Railway Commission. In response, a Board of Railway Commissioners was created and came into effect in 1904.(14) Encouraged by this prompt action the F.A.O. sent a separate delegation to meet with Laurier on railway policy and the tariff.(15) These efforts were supported by the classic lobby means of a petition demanding fair assessment methods in taxing private and railway property at equivalent levels.(16) This was soon followed by many other familiar lobby tactics, letters to one's Member of Parliament and formal club resolutions, often endorsed by sympathetic local bodies like township councils.(17)

By May 1903 the F.A.O. turned its attention to provincial matters when it appeared before a special legislative committee on assessment.(18) The topic of most interest was a private member's bill by R.J. Pettypiece from East Lambton to gradually increase railway taxation to private property levels. Premier Ross was quick to reserve the measure and head off any threat to Liberal development politics.(19) The place of
agriculture in provincial development politics soon came
to be defined as the fight for equality of taxation
between farm and corporate railway property, a constant
that would persist until the war.

The first annual convention of the F.A.O. met
September 8-9 in Toronto's Victoria Hall. F.A.O.
conventions were normally organised about three subjects:
the Presidential address and officer's reports, the
Resolutions committee, and debates with invited speakers
on topical issues. Each convention would be capped with
a mass delegation to Queen's Park to meet with the
premier and/or senior cabinet ministers. This often led
to some interesting exchanges.

The first annual convention opened Tuesday afternoon
with the Presidential address by Mallory who emphasised
what was now common F.A.O. practice. The principal means
of F.A.O. activity would be public education of the
existing political parties. The Resolutions Committee
then presented its report, showing the hand of Will Good
for the first time, with demands for structural change:
for public ownership of public utilities, the merit
system of civil service recruitment, and for direct
legislation through the Initiative and the Referendum.

The Resolutions report was followed by a major
debate over the dues structure of the F.A.O.. Good
argued to keep the one dollar membership fee. He reasoned
that a strongly organised minority had first to do good
work and then convince the majority to join. But the Dues committee recommended fifty cents. The majority of delegates approved the revision. They wanted a larger, if more passive, membership base for larger parliamentary influence. On Wednesday, when convention business was concluded, the delegates converged en masse on Premier Ross. They wanted the Pettypiece bill. Ross, whose government had reserved all railway regulation bills, both Pettypiece's and one on Cattle Guards, prudently agreed with the F.A.O. in principle.(20)

The object of F.A.O. lobbying in 1903/04 was railway regulation, whether it was Will Good denouncing Laurier's subsidy schemes to build two new transcontinentals or to demand the Ross government act on the Pettypiece bill. In the latter case, the F.A.O. brought considerable pressure to bear in building a united front of townships, the Grange, and the Ontario Fruit Growers, to demand equal taxation standards before the provincial committee on taxation.(21) By April 1904, however, the Pettypiece bill had been introduced and reserved three times. To placate growing farm opposition Ross resorted to that well worn escape hatch of a Royal Commission with Pettypiece in charge.(22) The F.A.O. took the bait and, with the Fruit Growers, spent considerable energy in representations to it on rate regulation and fair taxation.(23)

Good drew more radical conclusions from Ross's manoeuvres about the need to reshape the structures of
political decision making. In "How the People Could Secure Control", he argued it was time to diagnose the disease at the heart of repeated railway subsidies. To Good the machinery of parliamentary democracy was defective. The legislature had become a tool of business to thwart the public will. Direct democracy, Good stated, was needed in the shape of the Initiative and Optional Referendum. With these new methods, voters could directly legislate tax equalization. Voters would not have to depend on any member of the legislature nor be vulnerable to any mix of issues. Otherwise,

"The only possibilities for us now are two party hashes, made respectively of beef, potatoes, sauerkraut, mincemeat, tea-leaves and castor oil, and of salmon, moldy cheese, coffee, frog's legs, garlic, and assafetida. We must swallow one or the other, or remain hungry."(24) Rather unappetising fare.

The demand for direct democracy was repeated with force at the 1904 F.A.O. convention. Good was quick off the mark when the new President, Lockie Wilson, finished his presidential address by calling on farmers not to vote for M.P.P.s who had broken their word on railway regulation. Good argued for proportional representation.

"We have one independent member in the(federal) house out of a total membership of two hundred and fifteen. One representative in the house is altogether out of proportion to the number of independent men in the country. What is called for is the formation of grouped constituencies in order that independent men, by consolidating their votes in a number of ridings, may elect a fair share of the people's representatives, and so obtain in Parliament the voice to which they are entitled."(25)
The afternoon session turned to the practical question of how to hold the branches and members gained in the initial round of enthusiasm. W.L. Smith strongly recommended local clubs follow Will Good's example in building the North Brant club. Good had held a joint meeting with the Women's Institute, sponsored a public debate on rural telephones, and formed a Ruskin reading circle. (26) Smith moved a resolution each local club form a reading circle and establish a branch library with free government publications. Perhaps by offering local education, F.A.O. members at the bottom, away from restricted lobby work, would remain in the organisation.

For the first time there was an extensive discussion of co-operation based on successful local buying and marketing clubs. The Kent F.A.O. had organised a bean buyers joint stock company to break a private buyers combine. By marketing their own beans, and by bulk purchases of basics like flour and cement, the company made a large profit. J.F. Beam also gave a paper on England's Rochdale co-operative pioneers, while Mr. McCrae from the Guelph Retail Co-operative backed this with a working local example. But most delegates believed 'the central bolt of organisation was the betterment of people politically'. If there had to be co-operation it was better left to local organisations in response to local needs. (27)

I. the new ear, min to Good's and the F.A.O.'s
initial satisfaction, the Ross Liberal government was turned out at the polls. Over three decades of Liberal rule was ended as James Whitney and the Conservatives took over. North Brant went Conservative, a riding that had been Liberal since 1867. Railway taxation played a big part in the local Liberal's downfall.(28)

Despite this political turn of events provincially, the real focus of F.A.O. attention in 1905 was on federal affairs, on the appointment of a Tariff Commission.(29) When the F.A.O. met on September 5 and 6, 1905, the agenda reflected this new, in theory more accessible, political environment in preparations for the Tariff hearings and lobbying the Whitney government. There were as well fraternal delegates from the Grange. But union was once more rejected given the commercial dangers of wholesale co-operative buying.(30)

The Resolutions discussion began with the tariff. Good argued for out and out free trade. "Erecting tariff barriers along an international frontier is a species of warfare and, like physical warfare, is injurious to both parties engaging in it."(31) Free trade would lay the groundwork for tax reform, in moving from indirect to direct taxation. But the sense of the meeting was more moderate. Delegates voted to to oppose any increase, to endorse the Imperial Preference (freer trade with Britain), and to call for mutual "reciprocity with the United States. No revision upwards, not free trade, was
to be the F.A.O. position, a preview of the logic behind the Farmer's Platform.

This year a new president, James McEwing of Wellington, was acclaimed while lower down a new face appeared, J.J. Morrison as Auditor. The chief action of the executive was to make ready an F.A.O. tariff delegation. It was decided to send McEwing, Annis, and Smith before the first hearing in Toronto. Given their reception there, the Secretary would then coordinate a branch campaign before the Commission. (32)

The final touch to the 1905 F.A.O. convention was the executives's first lobby of Whitney. Nine F.A.O. delegates proceeded to the Legislature on Wednesday afternoon to meet with Whitney and his chief ministers, W.J. Hanna (Provincial Secretary), N. Monteith (Agriculture), and F. Cochrane (Lands and Forests). Annis led off on railway taxation with one F.A.O. speaker on each subsequent resolution. Good, who was 'one liberal who turned over last election', made clear his hopes in the new government, particularly on the subject of direct legislation.

Whitney's reply was a model of agreement in principle but no promises in substance. He told them he could accept nearly all the resolutions. He was, for example, against railway bonusing, though perhaps the railways needed some assistance. He did not agree with the Pettypiece bill but thought that railway property should be taxed equally.
Whitney also agreed there was a need to study hydro
rates, mineral royalties, and forest conservation. But on
direct democracy Whitney was unequivocal. The initiative
and referendum were 'entirely antagonistic' to the
British representative system. Good argued that direct
legislation had been proved in America, but Whitney was
not moved on the vital question of who controlled the
state.(33)

The fall of 1905 was a period of feverish activity
for the F.A.O. as it argued throughout Southern Ontario
before the Tariff Commission against any increase in the
tariff. The Southern Ontario hearings took place over a
two and half week span, from November 13 to November 30.
They opened in Toronto's Board of Trade Council Chamber,
an appropriate indication of the Commissioners' leanings,
and then wound through London, Windsor, Chatham, Hamilton,
Brantford (on Monday, November 27), Guelph, Berlin, and
finally Peterborough.

What started off as a modest push for increased
protection, as shown in the C.M.A. presentation in
Montreal, became to the Commissioners increasing
discomfiture the focus for a mass farm protest as
delegation after delegation in Ontario, and later the
praie west, deluged them with arguments against any
genral rate increase. The F.A.O. executive, with Ernest
C. Drury (Simcoe farmer, an O.A.C. graduate, and son of
the province's first Minister of Agriculture), led off on
Monday the 13th.

President McEwing first stated the farmers' case by saying if the tariff was to be revised it had to be done in the interests of all and not just one class. Since export agriculture was the greatest wealth producing sector, and employed a majority of the population, the tariff should be revised downwards with the maximum to be no higher than present rates. Industries that could not survive with twenty to thirty five percent protection should be let die.(34)

This tough logic of free competition was repeated by F.A.O. delegations throughout Western Ontario. Good and Thomas Brooks did their part when they appeared before the Commission to represent the North and South Brant F.A.O. clubs. Good began with a statement of official F.A.O. policy, that there be no tariff increase and the British preference be retained. He admitted the government needed to raise revenue with a tariff but there should be fair play. The farmers did not want any special tariff privileges nor did they want to be imposed upon. Having said this, Good raised some general points in support of a downward revision of the tariff.

Agriculture, he stated, was Canada's basic industry but farmers were among the most poorly paid occupations. The tariff worsened this state of affairs by discriminating against the farmer. To back up his critique, Good drew the Commissioners attention to the
discrepancy between the ratio of industry and farm capitalisation to profit returns, drawing on the 1901 census. If farmers paid their family wages, farm returns would show a deficit. To prove this Good looked at his own finances. On a farm of one hundred and twenty acres he had eight thousand dollars invested. At the present interest rate of five percent he should receive four hundred dollars a year. Yet after deducting costs he only gained one hundred and twenty dollars.

Chairman Fielding, however, challenged Good by asking what effect on the local farm market would there be if Brantford's manufactures were suspended? Good simply replied that such a calamity was not likely as the local industries were well established and had got along with a reasonable degree of protection. Good wanted an equitable revision of the tariff. He did not see any need to give special aid to rich manufacturing families while in hard work he made only an average of one hundred and twenty dollars a year.(35)

As the Tariff Commission travelled to Western Canada in the new year, another troublesome commission came to a close, the Pettypiece commission on Railway Taxation. Its report was not welcome. Pettypiece recommended the province levy a flat three percent tax on gross earnings. He believed this reflected a fair method of tax compensation. Whitney rejected the report completely, justifying his refusal to act as being beyond the
province's constitutional authority. Instead Whitney doubled the existing rate of railway taxation as a compromise. (36)

The *Sun* was soon full of surprised and indignant farm comments. Will Good was not alone in saying "here was a splendid opportunity for fixing an ad valorem tax and satisfying the almost universal demand for equalization of taxation". (37) He was disappointed to discover the Conservatives had fallen back on 'the do-nothing for fear of higher rates' argument of the Ross Liberals. To Good this was a failure of nerve, not yet an admission that both Liberals and Conservatives had an urban development agenda in mind. (38)

On Tuesday, September 4, 1906 the F.A.O. met once more in Victoria Hall. Delegates had mixed feelings about the past year. They were determined to keep up the pressure on Laurier over the tariff and to let Whitney know of their disapproval at his failure to act on tax reform. This general discussion was concluded by President McEwing's address in which he raised another divisive matter, the farm attitude towards a provincial bill compelling a pay raise to a minimum level of three hundred dollars a year for primary school teachers. (39)

Wednesday morning, the resolutions were put in formal shape. The tariff came first. A strong statement was drafted calling for a gradual revision downwards until the protective principle was eliminated completely. Many
saw the need for such a strong statement given a growing suspicion of Liberal duplicity. To give added force, the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada was solicited to jointly sponsor this message to the government.

On one subject, the legislated pay raise for rural teachers, there was no formal resolution due to the intense sectionalism the question engendered. Many of the delegates resented this provincial incursion into local affairs. It meant higher property taxes, since teacher salaries came out of township revenues, and the loss of rural trustee control. McEwing bluntly stated that rural school supporters should have the right to buy in the cheapest market. Though, as another speaker remarked, this meant hiring young, inexperienced school girls. Good (who was sympathetic to a pay raise) moved to table any resolution on the question. Eventually this reservation of the question was put through, but not without many interruptions.(40)

Ironically, rural taxpayers' outrage over higher teachers' salaries was settled by a provincial subsidy. In late January 1907 the Whitney government offered to pay forty cents of every dollar in excess of three hundred dollars per year.(41) This finally subdued a growing farm outburst. Though J.J. Morrison, repeal leader of the New School Act, organised a separate rural school trustees section within the O.E.A..(42)

The executive, unchanged except for the addition of
J.W. Kennedy from Glengarry as a director with Good, and twenty five delegates then marched up to Queen's Park. This time Whitney was absent but the same three ministers were present, Monteith, Hanna, and Cochrane. McEwing praised the Conservatives' hydro regulation and municipal telephone bill. "We have been told that this is a Tory government. I believe it to be a Radical government, and, as I am something of a radical myself, I approve of your radical legislation."(43)

But McEwing did feel there had been a mistake in refusing the Pettypiece bill. This line of thinking soon spilled over into a debate on subsidies. Frank Cochrane, well known Conservative fund raiser, argued Northern Ontario would never be opened up without public capital. And, just to spice things up, Cochrane stated if there were mineral royalties they would be needed to bonus smelters. Nelson Monteith, acting premier, thanked the delegation for pointing out their shortcomings, and promised they would try to profit from the F.A.O.'s resolutions. Nor was the cabinet through with tax reform he stated, as, one is sure, the relieved cabinet ministers ushered out the large F.A.O. delegation.(44)

One other potential change stood out in the 1906 convention with the presence for the second time of fraternal delegates from the Grange. Earlier in the year, in February, the Grange held its first public convention. It had done so to publicize its offer of union with the
F.A.O. But F.A.O. delegates would only accept a united front, a temporary alliance to act on specific issues. Still the example of strong co-operation before the Tariff Commission had exercised a powerful influence over the F.A.O. to see the Grange in a more favorable light. (45)

The fall of 1906 saw a final push by organised farmers to shape the new tariff. In mid-September Smith sent out a circular to raise funds for a F.A.O. tariff deputation to Ottawa. (46) To back up the delegation the executive called for branch petitions and individual pressure to be put on M.P.s. This strategy of a final tariff delegation was endorsed by the Manitoba Grain Grower's Association (M.G.G.A.), the first evidence of a practical alliance between eastern and western farmers. (47)

Much to the F.A.O.'s chagrin Laurier refused to meet their delegation. Smith through the Sun argued vainly against this. As the Sun stated, the Tariff Commission had occurred a year ago, the minister of agriculture and the premier had not personally heard the farmers' case, and the farmers wanted to air their view on a new matter, the practice of bonusing. Laurier, Smith said, could spare one afternoon since farmers could not afford a permanent lobby. (48) Laurier's refusal only served to draw farm organisations together as the F.A.O., the Grange, and the Manitoba Grain Growers issued a joint declaration against protectionism. (49)

Still the two year farm agitation had done its work.
When the new tariff was announced there was no overall rate increase. The duty on agricultural implements was lowered. (50) The burden of taxation on the farmer, Will Good stated in the Sun, had not been increased. But while Good congratulated the government for resisting the high protectionists, the real outcome had been a stalemate. But a stalemate imposed by the farmers and thus an incentive to extend the fight. (51) And extend it they did as both the F.A.O. and the Grange launched a campaign against bonusing, and then took steps to unite in 1907 after the success of their unity in action on the tariff issue.

Relative success in stemming a revision upwards of the tariff gave increased confidence to organised Ontario farmers to launch a petition movement against bounties, especially those on iron. Both the F.A.O. and the Grange used the petition as well to expand their organisations on the ground. In organisational terms, the Grange benefitted more from the anti-bounty movement as it could afford to place a paid organiser in the field, "Bros. H. Stewart". (52)

By mid-1907 both organisations were in competition with each other to organise farmers in the same western Ontario districts. Yet at the lobby level they had co-operated to the fullest extent in the tariff battle. This practical unity in action had to be consumated. The fall convention season would finally do that.
"I would suggest that this convention give some consideration to the question of taking the necessary action towards extending and strengthening the organisation. For if any class neglects to establish a strong organisation to present and protect, that class will suffer severely in industrial and commercial warfare." (President McEwing's Address)(53)

McEwing set the tone for a growing sense of farm outrage in dealings with Liberals and Conservatives. He noted both federal and provincial governments had endorsed the principle of fair taxation but repeatedly violated their promises, whether on the tariff or railway taxation. While the farm movement had prevented an upward revision of the tariff, the federal government had resumed iron and steel bounties. Rather than break with the two parties, however, McEwing's solution was to elect better representatives and to create a stronger farm lobby as the means to political accountability.

One step to building a stronger lobby was fusion with the Dominion Grange. A number of factors stood out this time in favour of the proposal. The Grange had been an active lobbyist on the tariff and, what many delegates also found appealing, the Grange had an ability to sustain local branches independent of the leadership's lobbying activity.

A minority of F.A.O. delegates still opposed fusion. They believed co-operation was an inherently unstable base for a political lobby group. And they continued to object to Grange ritual. But the majority of delegates, led by Drury, came down solidly for fusion. So when William
Slater moved for union, seconded by Will Good, it was carried unanimously. (54)

Now all that had to be done was to complete the details of fusion and ratify these at the next Grange convention. The call was not long in coming. When the delegates met on December 4 in Toronto's Victoria Hall, an enthusiastic W.L. Smith called it as the largest farm meeting 'since Patronism in flower'. But when the convention opened at three p.m. it was to F.A.O. protests against Grange ritual. Many F.A.O. delegates thought it too time consuming. A committee of five, with Good as a member, was struck to revise the constitution. When they reported back on Thursday subordinate granges were given the option of using the old ritual or a new condensed version. Only after this compromise were the remaining F.A.O. members inducted.

Having disposed of the ritual question, the delegates got on with the regular business of discussing resolutions. In the Grange these were presented by Legislative and Educational committees. The delegates began with the Legislative committee report with such familiar topics as the tariff, bounties, railway taxation, and increases in federal and provincial spending. There was an extensive debate on whether to abolish or reform the Senate. Reform was favoured as Good argued the British Parliament could amend the constitution to allow for elected senators. The Education committee then reported,
through J.J. Morrison, its approval of the subsidy for paying rural school teachers. But it protested the loss of local school board control over assessment and inspectors to county government.

The fusion convention completed its business with the election of officers and a delegation to meet Whitney. The new executive was made up of Grangers. J.G. Lethbridge remained Master (President) while the F.A.O. officers became executive members at large. It was at the secondary level of leadership that a new generation of F.A.O. men stood out with Drury as Lecturer, Good as Steward, and Morrison as one of two Auditors. Of the three Drury stood out most. Indeed he was the only young F.A.O. man on the senior legislative committee for 1907/08. (55)

Perhaps now with the best of F.A.O. educational work, Grange methods of local work, and in the context of a growing farm tariff protest movement, the basis for a truly influential Ontario farm lobby had been laid in the new Grange.

The fusion of the F.A.O. and the Grange in 1907 was the high mark for a short period in Good's formal leadership positions in the Ontario farm movement. He stood for no office in 1908, though he was a member of the Education Committee. When Good returned as a Grange officer in 1909 it was as an individual and not as a club representative. Part of this lay undoubtedly in his personal life. He married in December 1908, and
wife suffered a miscarriage in 1909. (56) But part also
was due to his failure to carry the Brant F.A.O.
branches into the new Grange.

Good's early leading role in the F.A.O. as a member
at large of the executive was due not just to his
publicist's abilities but also to his organising active
F.A.O. branches in Brant. The South Brant F.A.O. was
launched on September 5, 1903 on a Saturday afternoon
in the Brantford Court House. After hearing about F.A.O.
work to get better drainage legislation, railway cattle
guards, and freight regulation, the twenty five farmers
present elected a set of officers with Thomas Brooks as
President and Good as Secretary-Treasurer. (57) Then in
December, after the harvest, a series of small meetings
were held out of which the North Brant F.A.O. was
launched in January 1904. (58) The first season was
capped by a debate with T.H. Preston, Liberal M.P.P. for
South Brant, on fair property taxation. (59)

Once established, Good resigned from South Brant
and became the President of the North Brant F.A.O. for
1905 and 1906. The branch met fortnightly in winter and
featured discussions on agriculture, public affairs (such
as getting the telephone), and a social side with musical
numbers and literary readings. (60)

One regular meeting reported in the Weekly Sun in
December 1905 outlined a typical agenda. The meeting
started with a violin solo. The Secretary, R.J. McCormick,
read the minutes. There was a report from the branch
delegation before the Tariff Commission. A Mr. Whyte then
sang a song and the main evening discussion was on, in
this case Good on 'the history, principle and practice
of the Tariff'. The meeting closed with a resolution to
debate the liquor traffic in January and more
entertainment.(61)

For those who shared Good's ethics as well as his
social concerns there was also a reading circle, meeting
at least once a month, to discuss Ruskin. The circle was
quite large, with over twenty young people in 1905. One
can certainly catch the Ruskin influence upon the
presentation of a hand made chair to Good in April 1905
for being their study leader, "not for its intrinsic
value, but as a slight token of our deep respect and
esteem for your abilities both literary and social."(62)

Being a successful branch builder was also part of
Good's rise to farm prominence. But for some unknown
reason these clubs did not follow Good into the new
Grange. Instead the two were reconstituted as Farmers'
Institutes. Not until 1911 would Good revive independent
farm organisation, with the South Brant F.A.O. reborn as
the Burford Grange.

III

The revitalisation of the Grange through fusion
with the F.A.O. led to dramatic growth. Thirty new
subordinate granges were formed by December 1908.(63)
E.C. Drury was quite prominent in leading this drive with a speech, 'The Duties of Citizenship and Social Life on the Farm'. (64) Unlike Good, Drury emphasised how ideal the parliamentary system was. The real problem in its working was not structural but the indifference of the common citizen.

This reform from above message was a popular one. It did not pose the difficulties of structural change that Good pushed with such, probably at times annoying, moral fervour. To add to Drury's prominence, and popularity, he became a provincial speaker with Master Lethbridge on the Grange's annual picnic circuit, at the Whitby annual, the Welland Grange at Crystal Beach, and the Essex 'Monster'. (65)

The main concern of the new Grange in 1908 was elections, especially the provincial election on June 8 when Whitney renewed his mandate with an even greater majority. The new Grange's aggressive lobby strategy was to capture and radicalise the provincial Liberals from within. F.A.O. leader J.F. Beam took the Welland Liberal nomination, while Drury failed to secure nomination as an independent Liberal for North Simcoe. Beam was not elected. Two successes, however, were registered. Pettypiece was re-elected for East Lambton and James McEwing was elected as an Independent Liberal for West Wellington, a former Patron riding opened up by dissension within Liberal ranks. (66) Despite these successes, overall Liberal fortunes plummeted as they
were reduced to nineteen seats. As for the federal election in mid-October, the Grange took more of an interested spectator's role. They presented candidates with an election questionnaire to find the best candidate regardless of party on such issues as fair taxation, the 'salary grab', the tariff, subsidies, and military spending. (67)

The first fusion convention of the new Dominion Grange opened in Toronto on Thursday, November 26, 1908. As usual there was a call to gradually reduce the tariff to a revenue basis, extend the British preference, and demand an official investigation of bounties and combines. The most important outcome was a decision to have McEwing present a Grange drafted bill for local option in methods of taxation.

Secretary Fisher also reported two significant invitations, a proposal from the west to create a national federation of farm organisations, stemming from the prairie Inter-Provincial Committee of 1907 and, from Dr. Shearer of the Presbyterian Social Reform Department, a request for the Grange to affiliate to the Moral and Social Reform Council of Canada, organised in December 1907. Good, Joseph Moyle, and W.L. Smith were appointed Grange delegates. (68)

A new note of conservativism, however, crept in. Master Lethbridge cautioned delegates on the need for moderation as the Grange grew in size. This growing
conservatism, with club growth and one M.P.P. elected, was reflected quite strongly in Drury's Legislative committee report which for the first time attacked direct legislation. In noting three bills forwarded by the Direct Legislation League of Ontario, Drury stated, "it is our belief that, with good and honest representatives in Parliament, men desiring the welfare of the nation and willing to do the will of the people fearlessly, such a scheme is not necessary." (69) This open turn to reform from above was reflected in a major turnover of officers. Drury moved up to become Master, the first of the new generation to occupy such a leading position.

The second, educational day of the 1908 Grange convention, however, challenged Drury's cautious non-partisanship. Three speakers addressed the convention, Pettypiece on railway taxation, followed by Good on direct legislation, and Miss Hattie Robinson on the role of women and youth in building the Grange.

The address stimulating the most debate, and an experiment in legislative lobby action, was Good's on direct legislation. His talk centred on two themes, why direct democracy was necessary and what it could accomplish. Look, Good said, at the problems the Grange had had in trying to get better railway taxation or auto regulation. Why had the Grange failed so far on these issues? "Because it is impossible, under our present system, to obtain a direct declaration by the people,
at an election for the Legislature, on one specific question. Instead the voter tries to strike an average among a jumble of personalities and issues."(70)

There was a lively discussion at Good's challenge. McEwing worried about the expense of direct legislation in leading to more elections and petitions. But, despite his reservations, McEwing offered to make an experiment in the use of direct legislation by presenting a bill in the legislature. His suggestion was adopted. A committee, consisting of Pettypiece, Good and W.L. Smith, drafted a bill for municipal option in tax methods, in setting the assessment level for land and improvements and the ratio between them, to be enacted by a referendum at the next municipal elections.(71) Though the debate over direct legislation would go on, an important test of the parliamentary lobby strategy had been set in motion.

The year 1909 marked a new stage in the consolidation of the Canadian farm movement with the organisation of the Canadian Council of Agriculture, a federation of the Manitoba and Saskatchewan Grain Growers' Associations, the United Farmers of Alberta, and Ontario's Dominion Grange. The first formal steps came after a call for national federation at a joint Manitoba-Saskatchewan Grain Growers convention in January.(72) In a rather disingenuous move Drury penned an address in early February to the western farm groups to join the Grange rather than federate.(73) But when
Roderick MacKenzie, Secretary of the Manitoba Grain Growers, replied, it was to stick to the original offer of federation for joint lobby work.(74)

The Grange was in no position to haggle over terms. It agreed to federation with separate provincial organisation to deal with local problems.(75) This understanding was cemented by a personal visit by MacKenzie to Toronto in May when an Inter-Provincial delegation was in Ottawa urging the nationalisation of the Fort William grain terminals. There he made arrangements for a visit by western farm leaders to the next Grange convention.(76) Drury, still trying to broaden Grange membership, used the lure of a potential exchange trade of Ontario fruit for cheap western feeds to invite local fruit and apple shipping associations to attend the convention as well.(77)

These preliminaries to found a national farm lobby foreshadowed the organising strategy behind the founding of the United Farmers' Co-operative Company in 1914. Grange leaders would use the moral authority of the hugely successful prairie grain growers to draw in Farmers's Institutes and diverse commodity organisations for an Ontario experiment. But the prairie groups would not yet stake their moral authority to an economic proposal for east-west co-operation. For the moment political co-operation in creating a national farm lobby was sufficient.
There was as well the doings of J. McEwing, independent M.P.P. McEwing made his maiden speech in the provincial legislature on the subject of fair taxation, which Whitney promptly dismissed. (78) McEwing also tried to set an example of accountability by reporting back to the local granges in West Wellington. (79) But the biggest experiment, the Grange bill for a municipal referendum on tax methods, flopped miserably. The Speaker ruled McEwing's proposal a money bill and he was not even allowed a first reading. (80)

The other great topic in Grange circles in 1909 was Laurier's proposal to create a Canadian navy. Needless to say the cost and militarist values were opposed by the Ontario farm movement as an economic and moral threat to rural small property. In April the Grange executive issued a public declaration against 'the war scare'. Drury and Lethbridge argued the creation of a navy would only waste money, corrupt youthful ideals with school military training, and serve to direct attention away from social reform. (81) This was followed by a fierce debate, led by J.J. Morrison at the head of the rural trustees, against cadet training at the O.E.A. convention. (82)

The Sun soon began to carry coverage of Toronto peace meetings sponsored by the small Peace and Arbitration Society and to publish letters demanding a referendum on the naval question. (83) By late October there was a rising tide of local granges passing
resolutions and circulating petitions against any naval spending. (84) This grass roots campaign climax ed in a provincial protest meeting in Toronto's Zion Congregational Church (known also as 'The People's Institute'). Gordon Waldron, future Sun editor during the war and solicitor for the U.F.C.C., chaired with speakers from the Peace Society, Professor Hume of the University of Toronto, Drury for the Grange, who spoke on the criminal waste of twenty million dollars, and Jimmy Simpson for the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada. The meeting ended with a demand for a national referendum, a demand to be backed up with letters to M.P.s and petitions. (85)

It was in this context of a growing outcry at national war preparations and the chance to link up with the more successful western farm organisations that the Grange met in its thirty fifth convention in Zion church on November 24-25. The convention opened by taking the first steps to create the Canadian Council of Agriculture. From the west there were three delegates: D.W. McCuaig and R. MacKenzie, President and Secretary of the M.G.G.A., and E.A. Partridge from the Saskatchewan Grain Growers, and a principal founder of the grain growers movement. A committee of three, Partridge, MacKenzie, and Good were struck "to draft a scheme as a basis for the creation of a National Council of Agriculture." (86)

Article One of the draft constitution stated the
purposes and methods of C.C.A. work. The C.C.A. was to organise and educate the national farm population "for the study of social and economic problems having a bearing on the happiness and material prosperity of the people." (87) The C.C.A. would do this by presenting resolutions through its officers to Parliament and other legislative bodies, and encourage individual members to become politically active "according to individual predisposition" as a way to make both parties responsive. Many delegates, including Partridge, praised the lobby approach of the C.C.A., particularly its method of 'infiltrating' the old parties (88). A national program of reform from above would now be tried.

The presence of the western farm leaders sparked a debate on co-operation, a strategy now advocated for individual commodities by the Ontario Department of Agriculture. (89) The committee's report, however, was careful to endorse only limited provincial wholesale co-operative buying for bulk items like cement, fence posts, feed, and salt with a provincial officer doing this business on a commission basis.

Even limited endorsement drew fire from older members. Henry Glendinning, a future Master from Manilla, Ontario, was dead set against co-operation. In his view it had nearly destroyed the Grange in a lawsuit over co-operative barley shipping. Hattie Robinson also warned the delegates off with the history of the Grange
Wholesale Supply Company. But younger delegates such as Drury pointed to local successes in co-operative buying. Partridge then intervened to tell the story of the rise of the Grain Growers' Company to advise they at least test local co-operation. This was accepted and a consideration of provincial co-operation was reserved for 1910.

The task of organising the C.C.A. was followed by Drury's Masters Address. His topic was that familiar one of lobby politics, holding new members and branches attracted to a public agitation of short duration. Once a campaign was over, Drury noted, the Grange faced great difficulty in holding members "merely on educational lines." The fact that Grange lobby campaigns often failed didn't help matters, with the stifling of McEwing's bill, and the frosty reception the Grange delegation received before the provincial assessment committee during convention. (91) Perhaps, Drury suggested, membership turnover could be resolved by co-operative work 'as a bond of interest to hold our order together.' But, he hastened to add, this did not mean imitating the Grange Wholesale Supply when the Grange traded in many articles. Instead local granges could experiment with local co-operative bulk buying and selling, such as done by the apple marketing associations.

Drury concluded by condemning Laurier's naval proposal as adding to the national debt and a subversion
of national ideals. There should be a referendum. But Drury was not hopeful. Though organised farmers and labour were against a navy, "apparently the voice of a few jingoers and interested capitalists is more powerful than that of the real producers of the nation."(92)

1910 saw the organisational completion of the Canadian Council of Agriculture and its first great mass lobby, the famous 'Siege of Ottawa', when eight hundred from delegates descended upon Ottawa to demand freer trade. When Laurier toured western Canada in the summer of 1910 he was constantly pressed for some measure of free trade by scores of farm delegations. To make this message clear, western farm leaders proposed a great delegation go to Ottawa as soon as Parliament opened to remind both parties of the popular demand for tariff reduction.(93) The Grange executive, meeting September 7 at the C.N.E. to set next convention's agenda, agreed and arranged to meet in December so as to send its delegates immediately on to 'The Siege of Ottawa'.(94)

When E.C. Drury delivered the Master's Address on December 13 to the Grange back in Victoria Hall, the tariff and the impetus to further organisation offered by the C.C.A. agitation was his main theme. Co-operation, despite a few local grange buying reports, had been displaced by the promise of a national farm lobby action. But in the general state of rising euphoria Drury cautioned his audience to recognize that the mass Ottawa
lobby was likely to just be the first in an ongoing battle. (95)

The general focus on the tariff was reflected in the Legislative report when reciprocity with the United States was called for and a protest lodged against any export duty on cream. The report repeated its regret at the creation of a Canadian navy and still called for a plebiscite. The Education committee asked that higher education be extended to rural areas and that agriculture be a primary school subject to counter an urban business curriculum. And military drill had to go. Otherwise it would lead "to our young men ordered abroad to fight the battles of the Empire without having any say in the matter." (96)

The discussion was keenest on the legislative report in denouncing the tariff and combines. The outcome was a five part resolution on the tariff, later to become the basis of the C.C.A. resolution presented to Parliament. There was as well a serious reshuffling of officers as Drury stepped down to become Overseer, Morrison up to become Secretary-Treasurer, while Neil Burton, an obscure farmer from Elgin's Applegrove Grange, became Master.

One special topic arose when the Reverend J.G. Shearer from the Moral and Social Reform Council appeared to report on how the federal government had legalized race track gambling in the last session. Shearer also wanted a Grange resolution to demand the provincial
government shut down gambling houses and prostitution. While the delegates were willing to approve the sentiment of his request, they did not accept moral reformers' demands for the unrestricted exercise of state power. Grange delegates carefully amended Shearer's resolution to insert the necessity for search warrants and due legal process. (97) In the opinion of farm delegates, the elimination of vice did not carry with it the elimination of individual freedoms by a more oppressive state.

"The beggars have come to town, say our opponents, I say The Masters have come to town. The farmers have the power to say that their fair demands shall be acceded to, and you will be fools if you do not use your power, and end the curse of protectionism now and forever." (98)

From all across Canada farm delegates converged on Ottawa for what they believed would be a decisive confrontation with the Liberal party and, behind them, the class party of urban privilege nurtured by the tariff. By December 15, day of the 'Farmer's Parliament', over eight hundred delegates had arrived. Seven of the nine provinces were represented. There were five hundred farmers from the three prairie groups, three hundred from Ontario's Grange, Institutes, dairy and fruit interests, and small delegations from east of the Ottawa river.

The delegates met first to consolidate their demands, and to plan the order and content of their presentation to Parliament. A committee meeting of the various provincial executives was held and they prepared a draft five part resolution on the tariff. This was then
presented and debated before all the delegates in full plenary Thursday afternoon.

Drury, seconded by Partridge, presented the anti-Tariff resolution. It's demands were reciprocity with the United States in natural products, free trade in agricultural machinery by concurrent legislation, an extension of the British preference, with a gradual reduction over ten years to complete free trade. And, to compensate for lost revenue, the farm community would accept direct taxation. When discussion had been exhausted the question was called to be approved unanimously by a standing, cheering and applauding Farmer's Parliament.

The next morning the eight hundred delegates met at the Opera House and marched to the House of Commons. There they filled to overflowing the galleries and floor of the chamber to hear their leaders' presentations and the government's reply. McCuaig, President of the M.G.G.A. and the C.C.A., presided to introduce the several farm speakers. J.W. Scallion, Honorary President of the M.G.G.A., spoke first on western farm problems.

Then Drury followed with the tariff resolution. Drury asked the House whether agriculture was not prospering due to a lack of industry or because of the onerous conditions imposed by the tariff. To remedy the latter, Drury said, there should be reciprocity with America and a real test of the manufacturer's loyalty,
the extension of the Imperial preference. Parliament should also enforce its own combine laws.

Five other farm speakers, from across Canada, representing such industries as fruit and beef, spoke after Drury to show how representative the C.C.A.'s demands and delegation were. The presentation came to a close with Roderick Mackenzie on the economic impact of the tariff on farming operations and with an emotional plea by Quebec's Robert Sellars for the government to give justice, not favours.

Laurier responded by concentrating on the western farm group in saying he favoured reciprocity in natural products and thus tariff reform, but not abolition. Laurier, however, did not touch on other western concerns such as the demand for a Hudson's Bay railway, legislation to incorporate co-operative societies, the nationalisation of the Fort William terminals, nor amendments to the Railway and Banking Acts. Nor did Laurier acknowledge the presence of the large eastern farm delegation. It seemed clear to W.L. Smith that Laurier's strategy was to find some important but isolated item to agree upon with the west, ignore the rest, and divide eastern from western farmers.(99)

To some extent it worked for there were two separate indignation meetings afterwards, the westerners on the need for a Hudson's Bay railway, and an Ontario meeting to represent dairy producers. A little more satisfaction
was expressed when the C.C.A. executive and some western
delegates had a private conference with cabinet members
on Monday. This time there seemed to be a firmer reply
on tariff reform and the promise of an independent
commission on the Fort William terminals. (100)

But Drury had been right at the Dominion Grange
convention. The Siege of Ottawa was not the end but only
the start to building an effective national farm lobby
to pressure governments for economic change. And there
were to be serious limits to that lobby power as they
discovered to their dismay in the 1911 federal election.

In the aftermath of the 'Siege' the Grange went
through a burst of organising. H.B. Cowan, editor of
Peterborough's Farm and Dairy, suggested recognising
Farmers' clubs as a short cut and started a recruitment
drive in Peterborough County. (101) Good, however, had
first to settle some disturbing rumours that Brant
farmers favoured the tariff. He soon discovered that
M.P. Harris (Brantford) had privately sponsored a few
unorganised farmers to declare in favour of the tariff.
This was just one more subterfuge, Good commented, "to
represent Eastern agriculture as opposed to Western." (102)
Despite such misrepresentation, Good revived the South
Brant F.A.O. as the Burford Grange. (103)

When news of the Taft-Fielding reciprocity agreement
became known, announced by Fielding in the House of
Commons on January 26, the momentum grew. Drury went on a
speaking tour with Cowan as they toured Peterborough and Prince Edward counties. In Prince Edward five subordinate and one county grange were in place by the end of the month. (104) In the far west of the province Master Burton went on a tour of Lambton to add four granges. (105) In Brant and Oxford there was another burst as Good organised two granges, Innerkip in Oxford and Mount Pleasant in Brant. (106) By March the drive was on in Grey and Dufferin with Colonel Frazer and J.W. Pritchard, later a federal Progressive M.P.. There was even talk of sending Burton to Quebec. (107)

By April these gains were consolidated with county rallies. Drury spoke to a meeting of three hundred and fifty farmers in Oakland, Brant where no anti-reciprocity speaker would even dare to come, including M.P. Harris, and in Woodstock before the Oxford granges with Roderick MacKenzie. (108) In June the Grey granges held a county picnic in Varney before which McEwing and Thomas Crerar, manager of the Grain Growers Company, spoke. (109) These massed meetings of recently organised granges summed up the Grange's gains. But was it enough?

Many seemed to think so when a federal election was called for September 21 to be fought on reciprocity. In the course of the election campaign Grange leaders went all out to either support or capture the Liberal party. In North Brant there was a tremendous row as Grange farmers organised a petition to install C.W. Gurney as
Liberal candidate. (110) But when the election came it was a rout in seats, if not in the popular vote, for the proponents of reciprocity.

A divided Liberal party, in Quebec over the navy and in English Canada over trade policy, fell before a Conservative landslide headed by Robert Borden. In North Brant, despite Will Good's hard work in the Liberal cause, the riding fell by two hundred votes, from Brantford, to the Conservative candidate. (111) Even McEwing was defeated in the subsequent December provincial election. (112)

A shocked silence fell over the Ontario farm movement until Grangers gathered once more in the new year to assess their lobby strategy.

IV

In these farm lobby years Good pursued allies, educators, moral reformers, and peace activists, who might strengthen the agrarian cause. And Good worked to inject more fundamental ideas and tactics into the farm movement.

One of the first lobby allies Good targeted were his former University teachers and O.E.A. officials. In 1904 Good organised a meeting between influential academics, like Chancellor Burwash and George Wrong, and direct legislation proponents. Good had little success in converting these 'opinion makers'. (113) Then in 1907 a one day 'Anti-Political Corruption' conference was held at the University of Toronto campus with academics,
clergymen, and prominent farm leaders. Again, Good was disappointed. The best these educators would do was pass three resolutions on better public morality.(114)

Of more consequence was the organisation of the Moral and Social Reform Council (M.S.R.C.) in 1907 following the success in obtaining the Lord's Day Act in 1906. This initial victory encouraged the Protestant denominations, with organised labour and farmers, to establish a permanent lobby to fight for temperance, to improve the laws against gambling, and to enforce the laws on prostitution. Good became a member at large of the M.S.R.C.'s first executive.(115) And in 1909 he became the Treasurer for the Ontario Council.(116)

On rural questions, however, the Social Service Council (renamed in 1913), proved rather disappointing. The Presbyterian Board of Social Service and Evangelism did commission John MacDougall's *Rural Life In Canada* in 1913. But not until the first S.S.C. conference was held in March 1914 were 'Problems of the Country' discussed with E.C. Drury and Alphonse Desjardins on the economic dimensions of the rural crisis. Good, who also spoke, focused on 'Political Purity' through the agency of direct legislation.(117)

The one other lobby the Grange became involved in was the peace movement in response to Laurier's naval proposal of 1909. In typical reform from above fashion, Good first tried to influence Canada's elites and then
proceeded to a public campaign. Good's first step to winning 'educated' opinion was the submission of 'Shall Canada Have A Navy?' to McGill's *University Monthly*. In this essay Good argued against a deterrence theory of defence. (118) Andrew Macphail, the pro-imperialist editor, refused publication on the grounds that Good 'exaggerated the dangers of war'.

Good then appealed to Laurier on behalf of the Grange to stress international arbitration should replace war and there be a referendum on the Naval bill. (120) Laurier replied in that familiar vein of principled agreement, but practicalities first.

"I [Laurier] can assure you that I am no more in sympathy than you are with militarism in any form, but the question of defence cannot altogether be overlooked. ... Unfortunately our standard of civilization is not yet high enough for that ideal." (121)

In mid-November 1909 a public anti-navy campaign was launched with a Toronto meeting sponsored by the Canadian Peace and Arbitration Society, the Trades and Labour Congress, and the Dominion Grange. Drury spoke, and wrote, for the Grange to demand a national referendum. Regardless of these protests, Laurier introduced the Naval Service Bill in January 1910 in an effort to steer a middle course between pro-imperialists and neutralists. He was not to succeed as Borden managed to scrap the whole measure in 1912. But nor was Borden successful in getting a cash contribution through a Liberal Senate. In the end, by August 1914, Canada's lack of war preparations were
guaranteed not by a successful peace movement but by a division among the ruling class as to what form they should take.

What distinguished Good from other Ontario farm leaders was the depth and range of his theoretical criticisms. In particular Good debated the tariff, the parliamentary system, and demanded in both areas direct democracy. Good's most important theoretical statement in the pre-1914 period was his essay 'Tariffs, Bounties and the Farmer' in the October 1908 issue of McGill's University Monthly. Here Good looked at several questions: the Liberal tariff record, the challenge of indirect taxation posed to genuinely popular government, and the evil moral and political consequences of protectionism and subsidies. This was followed by Good with a three-part series in London's Farmer's Advocate on how the single land tax was the constructive alternative to protectionism.

But the method of Good's militant lobbying before 1914 was still abstract and subject to a reform from above reading. As Good stated in 1913 to the Single Land Tax Association conference, education was the method to realise the universal moral imperatives of 'Love and Faith'. But who, and by what means, was to educate the educators?

Contrary to the impression of progressive chroniclers...
in the 1920s, such as M. Staples and L.A. Woods, the Dominion Grange did meet in regular convention for 1911-13(126) The Grange met in January 1912 to assess the political defeats of 1911. The outstanding feature of this reassessment of lobby methods was the shift to reform from below as Will Good rose to prominence in developing such topics as direct legislation, the single land tax, and co-operation. To the minority reform from below leadership the election disaster of 1911 was not a wholesale defeat leading to demoralisation but a serious tactical reversal to be dealt with by more aggressive and thorough going strategies of structural reform.

Convention opened on January 24, 1912 with a debate on the reciprocity defeat. Most delegates blamed the mix of issues, particularly religion with economics, and the more effective propaganda work of the Canadian Manufacturers Association. To show their continued confidence that the tariff fight wasn't over they appointed a committee of five (including McEwing and Drury) to meet with any Conservative tariff commission. As revealing of a continued fighting spirit, Good organised three special lectures with himself on direct legislation, H.B. Cowan on the single land tax, and George Keen, Secretary of the newly organised Co-operative Union of Canada(1909), on co-operation.

When Will Good rose to speak on direct legislation this time there was no open objection to its necessity.
The confusion of reciprocity with sectarian and regional interests seemed to prove conclusively that means had to be found to disentangle issues so they would be judged on their individual merits. Good began with a historical sketch of direct legislation, from its origins in Switzerland to its export to the United States, and now experiments in Western Canada. To raise direct legislation as a serious subject, at Good's suggestion, "an article will be prepared by Mr. Good for submission to local Granges to the end that these may discuss the question."(127) In the end, two pamphlets, one on direct legislation and another on co-operation were sent out to serve as educational tools for local Grange meetings.(128)

For the first time there was a serious discussion of the single land tax, introduced by Cowan, and illustrated by the effects of the current Toronto land boom. These land values, he argued, had been created by the community and they, not the developers, should reap the benefits. Even Drury endorsed Cowan's call for a new system of provincial taxation and government spending, in reapportioning tax revenues from the great centres to the rest of the province. George Keen completed this radical trio of panaceas with a sketch of the Co-operative Union of Canada in showing how its nine consumer co-operatives were modelled on British Co-operative Wholesale methods of buying. But in discussion most delegates thought farmers should club
together only locally to buy in bulk, and definitely not imitate C.U.C. affiliates in setting up local stores. (129)

These special lectures were followed by regular convention business. Morrison as Secretary Treasurer reported for the Executive. The Executive, foreshadowing 1914 tactics, had sent out a circular to Farmer's Institutes to propose amalgamation. But, Morrison said, the costs of the C.C.A. and Ottawa lobby had stopped any practical work in this direction. There was some suggestion in discussion that this initiative was due to provincial agricultural representatives trying to set up Farmer's Institutes in rivalry to existing Granges.

The Legislative committee report, given by Good, presented familiar resolutions with the tariff and reciprocity getting priority. Not only was defeat on these issues due to a mixture with other issues, Good claimed, but the very narrowness of the Conservative victory, 660,331 to 616,948 votes, still gave hope that Borden would offer some trade reform, whether free trade in agricultural machinery with the Americans or an extension of the British preference. The committee also demanded Borden enforce the combine laws and end subsidies to the iron and steel industry.

The Grange also still wanted a referendum on the naval question and, in complete naivety, the committee reported the Whitney government finally looked as if it would accept equal taxation of railway property. To make
use of this opportunity a Grange questionnaire was created to circularize townships on assessment methods. This report by Good was capped by his election as Overseer with Morrison as Secretary-Treasurer and Henry Glendinning as Master. (130)

Despite the shift to reform from below in Grange discussion, in practical terms the emphasis in 1912 was on consolidation through the creation of county Granges. These regional bodies would hopefully spread what little local leadership, and the influence of stable branches, there was to hold and develop the weaker majority of branches. Perhaps this would also get around the expense and time of long distance travel by the provincial leadership just to keep branches in existence. By the time the Grange met again in January 1913, several County Granges had been created, in Elgin, Essex, Wellington, Lambton, Dufferin, and Simcoe. (131) Again provincial leaders tried to find an administrative solution to what was in reality a political problem in their method of work, how to break the lobby dynamic.

In terms of lobby campaigns, though rural depopulation came up as a subject of debate and a Grange delegation, Waldron and Drury, went before a Liberal Senate Committee on the topic (132), it was the naval question that stirred the Grange to launch 'a monster petition' in the fall of 1912. They had the help of the Protestant churches, the Trades and Labour Congress, and
the endorsement of the Manitoba Grain Growers and the United Farmers of Alberta. (133)

When Robert Borden introduced a bill in December 1912 to grant thirty-five million dollars to the British navy, Will Good leapt into the fray to deny British security was threatened or that it could not afford to make a unilateralist gesture. Britain provoked Germany by refusing to agree at the last Hague conference that private property at sea was immune from capture during war. The British, Good said, should show more Christian spirit at international conferences and make some sacrifices for the cause of peace and disarmament. He did not believe Britain's deterrent tactics 'to overawe the world into peace' would work. Instead the thirty-five million dollars would be an offensive taunt abroad and lead to increased taxes, chiefly through the tariff, at home. (134)

When the Grange met on Wednesday and Thursday, January 22-23, 1913 in Toronto, the naval question was foremost. To many delegates Borden had forsaken his promise of an election for the public to decide on the navy. Echoing Will Good's previous arguments, the delegates felt Britain's pursuit of a two power standard and its refusal to not interdict private property on the high seas had blocked an agreement to prevent a naval blockade. Rather British arrogance stimulated German Dreadnought building. While the delegates condemned both
sides, they continued to call for a referendum so that a majority could decide on such a vital national issue. Drury was virulent. There would only be peace in Canada when the jingoies were divided into two sections, 'to jail or the asylum'.

On a motion by R.J. Pettypiece, the first action of convention was that the Grange should seek pledges from federal candidates not to support any naval policy until a referendum and, if they refused, to put independent candidates into the field. Such an unusual step showed the depth of feeling the arms race engendered in threatening conscription and heavier taxation. It was not difficult to make the links between higher arms spending, the tariff, and rural depopulation. But they were saved from taking action when the Liberal Senate filibustered Borden's naval bill to a standstill in May 1913.

Henry Glendinning then gave the Master's Address. He paid particular attention to the Grange's survey work to get local option in taxation. Over two hundred township clerks had replied to the Grange questionnaire on township methods of assessment. Only a minority followed the provincial assessment act in valuing land and improvements at an equal cash value. A few assessed land only. "The average showed that land was assessed at about 75% and improvements about 40% of their cash value." Apparently a Grange lobby took these figures to the special committee on provincial assessment at Queen's Park
to demand the provincial government recognize in law what was in fact being done, that is, taxing land values to a greater extent than improvements.

In October 1913 there was such popular farm feeling for tax reform that a special Municipal Railway Tax Conference was held in Toronto with delegates from thirty County councils to press Whitney for action. Pettypiece and Morrison were prominent speakers in asking for equal tax principles to be applied. (137) Whitney was not moved.

Due to Will Good's growing prominence, he was chosen Master for 1913. Colonel Frazer of Brant became Overseer and Morrison remained as Secretary-Treasurer. Drury was a member of the executive committee and Grange representative to the C.C.A.. The United Farm leadership in Ontario was in place. But they still had to discover the means to transcend the Grange lobby cycle.

Morrison, who gave the organisation report, noted the county grange approach had worked to keep local granges alive. But this, he admitted, was only an interim solution, not a strategy for growth. To grow, a special collection of two hundred dollars was raised for a provincial organising campaign by Morrison. In the meantime, 'The Master, Secretary, and Ceres (Miss Robinson) were appointed a committee to consider the advisability of revising the constitution.' (138) In the summer of 1913 this mandate would be used by Morrison to approach the Manitoba Grain Growers for help. (139) The first formal
steps had now been taken to break the farm lobbyist mould.

Two important events took place within the Ontario farm community to hasten Grange reorganisation. They were Morrison's failed membership drive, the first province wide recruiting campaign since 1908, and the creation of the first provincial co-operative marketing association, Ontario Fruit Growers Limited.

The development of Ontario Fruit Growers was a crucial ingredient in the creation of the United Farm Co-operative. Co-operative apple shippers were the one pool of large scale co-operative experience and leadership the Grange could draw on when the western farm groups made a serious offer to establish an east-west barter trade in the fall of 1913.

The first step to practical organisation by apple shippers was taken at Guelph in late January 1913. A number of leading growers had just finished an O.A.C. short course on fruit growing. They used the opportunity to strike a committee to consolidate their local shipping associations into one marketing business with a central sales manager to get better returns from bulk handling. On the committee were a number of future United Farmers, Colonel Frazer and C.W. Gurney from Brant, and Elmer Lick of Oshawa. The result was the formation of the Co-operative Fruit Growers of Ontario Limited in June.(140)

The other local factor in the spring of 1913 was Morrison's recruiting drive. In February he went to Essex
to revive a number of locals and a County Grange to consolidate these gains. Then it was on to Oxford while R.J. Halbert, a future President of the United Farmers of Ontario and first Ontario federal Progressive M.P., conducted a recruiting drive in Dufferin.(141) In March, for the first time in years, Morrison travelled to Eastern Ontario. He put together a new grange at Roseneath in Northumberland and revived those in Prince Edward. Morrison then retraced his steps to a Fruit Institute gathering in Orono (Durham) to link the Grange with the growing co-operative apple shipping movement. But there he was struck down by smallpox. By late March Morrison was back in Wellington and out of commission until the summer.(142)

In a bad sign, Good had to take over the recruitment drive by falling back on newspaper propaganda by sending a letter to the Sun to explain Grange objectives, work and gains. Good appealed to 'that independent and intelligent yeomanry' he believed to be out there to join. But he had to admit the Grange 'as it is presently constructed', faced a basic problem in keeping members.(143)

What offered hope was an offer of an east-west farm barter from prairie farmers. In the fall of 1913 the three prairie farm organisations met under the auspices of the C.C.A. to send another farm delegation to Ottawa. This time they would ask Borden to take up an American offer of free trade in agricultural products.(144) At the same
time they formally proposed a direct buying and selling arrangement between eastern and western farmers, offering to exchange western feed grains for Ontario fruit and dairy products with the Dominion Grange acting as an independent co-operative wholesaler. (145)

The origins of this barter offer can be traced to August 1913 when Crerar wrote to W.L. Smith, editor of the Sun, to ask if he could put the new Apple Co-operative in touch with the Grain Growers' Company for an east-west barter trade. (146) Somehow this enquiry reached Morrison and turned into a discussion about how the Dominion Grange could act as the Grain Growers' proxy in Ontario. (147) This western offer in turn explains that seemingly isolated decision by Good, Colonel Frazer, Morrison and Drury at Toronto's Kirby Hotel in October 1913 to push the movement onto co-operative lines. (148)

Morrison in his official capacity as Grange Secretary was sent to explore the offer at the annual meeting of the Grain Growers' Grain Company in Winnipeg on November 11. (149) He came back with a glowing report on the Company's size, efficiency, and use of profits for welfare and lobby purposes. And he came back with a promise that the G.G.G.Co. would send its leaders to the December annual and tour Ontario to press their proposal. (150) The Grange would never get a better chance to break the Ontario lobby impasse with the authority of the prairie grain growers behind them.
The big push began with a C.C.A. lobby of Borden in Ottawa on Tuesday, December 16. Here western and eastern farm leaders united to demand the British preference be raised over five years to full free trade, Canada accept an American offer of free trade in agricultural products, that farm machinery, cement and lumber be made duty free, grain inspection by the Board of Grain Commissioners, and Borden pass legislation for the better organisation of co-operatives.(151)

Then the joint delegation travelled to Toronto for the Grange convention on Wednesday and Thursday to launch a new relation between eastern and western farmers, a relation demanding qualitative change from the Ontario farm movement.

"It is admitted by all students of sociology that the country is the seed bed of the whole population. It, therefore, becomes a question of prime national importance to maintain the quality of this seed bed. ... Otherwise, social and national disaster is immanent."(152)

Good as Master led off the final independent Grange convention with an address on rural depopulation, a thematic address stressing the agrarian ideal and how the methods of self emancipation, idealism, co-operation and direct democracy, could salvage both the future of farming and the nation.

As Good noted, in the last census period from 1901 to 1911, the national rural population had grown by seventeen percent, the urban by sixty two percent. But
these figures obscured eastern farm losses. Perhaps, Good estimated, twenty percent of rural Ontario had left the land. To worsen matters, the average size of the farm family had declined to four, and farm women, more than men, were leaving for the cities. This depopulation put tremendous strains on rural social life and institutions, as could be seen in the closure of rural schools and churches. It also upset the fundamental structures of the economy.

"Normally the economic life of a people may be represented by a pyramid at whose broad base are the primary industries (chief among which is agriculture), with the secondary industries built upon them. In Canada we have stimulated our secondary industries to such an extent that the fundamental industries are tottering beneath the load. Our pyramid has become unstable and threatens to fall in ruin."(153)

This unhealthy and immoral situation, Good went on to say, was encouraged by an antiquated political system which turned parliamentary representatives 'into the tools of special interests', tools of trusts dependent on tariff protection. This state of affairs produced a class of wealthy "enervated and miserable specimens of humanity who rush about the country in great cars, flaunt their wealth in our faces, tear up our roads and cast their dust upon our fields."(154) Such a class of idlers had turned women into no more than consumers and corrupted the tastes of youth and workers. A regressive tax system, and the corruption of public ideals, had fostered rural depopulation. Good concluded by calling on the
organised farm movement to save Canada from internal decay. What the farmers wanted was not just in the interests of their occupation but in the interests of all.

It was an impressive performance. One that secured Will Good's re-election as Master for 1914. It was an address meant to deeply impress upon the delegates the enormity of the problems facing them. But it was also meant to show them, through radical structural reforms, the opportunity to gradually transform society altogether.

The western leaders made their proposal Wednesday night at the Grange banquet. Crerar and Thomas Henders, President of both the Manitoba Grain Growers and the Canadian Council of Agriculture spoke. Crerar told the story of the largest farmer run business in Canada while Henders outlined the dual lobby/co-operative structure of the Manitoba farm movement with its division of labour between the Grain Growers Association and the Company.

"Some time since I(Crerar) found one of those dividends framed in the home of a western farmer. He said it was the first time he had ever got anything out of an investment in a farmers' company and he was going to keep this to look at."(155)

Crerar sketched in detail the rise and rules of this great co-operative marketing business. He told of the battles with the Grain Exchange and the Elevator monopolies. How, regardless of the numbers of shares held, every investor got only one vote. And, how in their very first year they had been able to pay a fifty cent dividend, a rarity in the farm co-operative field.
He ended by telling his audience that he looked forward to a national federation of farm co-operatives. If Crerar showed the potential of large scale co-operation, Henders outlined how the provincial farm lobby was immeasurably strengthened by the Company's economic work, a major point in meeting Grange criticism that economic and political work were antithetical.

The Grange executive committee of 1913 struck to look into constitutional change recommended the Manitoban model. Ontario farmers should create a broad educational lobby group resting upon a strong farm co-operative movement. A committee of five was struck to study and act upon these two aims, with J.J. Morrison, H. Glendinning, Elmer Lick, H.B. Cowan, and E.C. Drury, to which Will Good was later co-opted(156)

The main campaign to promote a provincial co-operative came in February 1914 when Morrison and Crerar made a tour of south-central Ontario to revive dormant granges and to speak to newly receptive audiences among Farmer's Institutes and commodity groups. (157) By mid-March this round of local meetings had paid off. Two hundred delegates, representing one hundred and fifty local farm groups, gathered in Toronto's Labour Temple.(158)

Morrison had done his work well. His tour with Crerar and the lure of trade with the west had led to the convening of the first organisationally representative
farm convention in Ontario since the Grange heyday of the 1880s. As W.L. Smith remarked, association with the successful prairie farm groups "seemed to awaken a line of interest altogether new."(159)

When the founding convention of the United Farmers movement in Ontario opened on Thursday, March 19, 1914, it heard a series of speakers on the local Ontario and Manitoban provincial co-operative experience. Ten different local co-operative groups spoke on the gains possible from associated economic action. There were speakers on co-operative marketing, on apple and cream shipping, egg circles, and seeds, production co-operation in Holstein breeding, service co-operation with the introduction of rural phones, and distributional co-operatives with buying clubs from Durham and Grey.

Roderick Mackenzie, of the M.G.G.A. and a director of the Grain Growers Grain Company, spoke in the late afternoon on the history and dual structure of the Manitoba farm movement as 'the farmers' Boards of Trade'. He was followed in the evening by George Keen on the international co-operative movement and W.L. Smith on 'Why the time for organisation is ripe now'.(160) Late that Thursday night, Good finally rose to present the Grange's organising report summing up the obvious conclusion.

"That as a representative gathering of farmers we should proceed to organise along the two lines recommended, affiliating all the local farmers organisations and

Carried Unanimously"(161)

The glowing testimonials of Thursday set the stage for Friday's practical work of drawing up the constitution and by-laws for both new arms of the farm movement. Following the example of the M.G.G.A., the new movement was divided into two complimentary centrals, one lobbyist, through internal and public education, the other exclusively commercial to act as a central clearing house for local co-operative buying clubs.

To join the United Farmers of Ontario, headed by Drury, affiliates paid fifty cents per member annually and were free to set up their own local dues structure. To join the United Farmer's Co-operative Company affiliates could buy stock at twenty five dollars a share. The U.F.C.C. had already been incorporated by Good and fellow Brant farmers in February.(162) The provisional board of directors was dissolved for an elected board from across the province with Good chosen as the U.F.C.C.'s first President.(163) Will Good now had the job to put a firm material base, through a provincial co-operative, to a potentially large and united farm movement.

Yet the U.F.C.C. was potentially divided from the start between reformers from above and below over its structure. Would it be a federation of locals controlling the central, an arrangement not recognised in the Ontario
Companies Act, or a farmers' joint stock company? The compromise arrived at, by a sceptical Keen, was to allow one vote per organisational member, as opposed to voting by individual investors, and a high patronage dividend of seven percent.(164)

While the development of a farm lobby, through the Farmers' Association and the Dominion Grange, had rebuilt an organisation core, lobbying had failed to deliver the legislative goods. Provincial equalization of railway and personal taxation at the municipal level, downward revision of the tariff towards reciprocity, and an extension of the British preference, were not attainable. At best the Ontario farm lobby movement had contributed to the 1907 tariff stalemate and, at worst, it had suffered ignominious defeat in the 1911 Reciprocity election, and the easy dismissal of McEwing in the provincial legislature. But the turn to co-operative self-emanicipation in 1914 was still combined with political lobbying for influence.

These two paths to social change, of reform from below versus reform from above, were reflected in the two presidents, Will Good and Ernest Drury. To what extent rural small property could transcend the lobby in its search for the co-operative commonwealth would soon be dramatically tested by the strains of a nation at war. Good, at least, was optimistic that a decisive break had been made with an exclusive lobby past.
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ENDNOTES


2. Farm and Dairy, July 22, 1915.


6. Weekly Sun, June 1, 1904, Weekly Sun, June 5, 1907, Weekly Sun, June 2, 1909, Weekly Sun, October 11, 1911, Weekly Sun, May 22, 1913, and Weekly Sun, July 9, 1913.


8. Weekly Sun, April 24, 1902, J.F. Beam of Black Creek, Welland to the Editor. For letters endorsing the proposal see Weekly Sun, July 23 and 30, 1902.

Readers will note a heavy reliance on the Weekly Sun. While Farm and Dairy and the Farmer's Advocate were consulted for this period, little more than summaries of annual conventions are given. Farm and Dairy does provide more information towards 1914 as the editor, H.B. Cowan, became interested in the Single Tax and the founding of the United Farm movement. Virtually no institutional records survive. There are none for the Farmers' Association of Ontario and only a few brief printed reports for the Dominion Grange (for 1907 and 1908 in the Ontario Archives). Of course there are dangers in
relying on one source but where it has been possible to check the *Sun* against the Good and Crerar papers it seems reliable.


11. Reports of local meetings can be found in: **Weekly Sun**, October 15 and 22, November 5 (for Glengarry), November 26 (for Frontenac), December 24 (for Wellington and Bruce), January 7, 1903 (East Simcoe), January 21 (Perth), January 28 (East Middlesex), February 4 (Welland), February 25 (Peel), March 18 (Northumberland), and April 8 (Waterloo).


15. **Weekly Sun**, April 1, 1903. Thomas Brooks on the tariff.


17. **Weekly Sun**, March 11, 1903.


19. **Weekly Sun**, June 3, 1903. The Lancaster Cattle Guard Bill was delayed, see **Weekly Sun**, April 22, 1903.

20. **Weekly Sun**, September 16, 1903. See also *Farm and Dairy*, September 15, 1903.


26. For Good's local branch building efforts, and the
only extensive record of the F.A.O. at a community level see: Brantford Expositor, September 8, 1903, and Weekly Sun, 1904-06. These branch reports are clearly a matter of self publicity as the Expositor made no effort to keep informed about F.A.O. activity.

27. Weekly Sun, September 14, 1904.

28. Weekly Sun, February 1, 1905.

29. Weekly Sun, August 30, 1905.

30. Weekly Sun, September 13, 1905 re Grange fraternal delegates.

31. Weekly Sun, September 6, 1905.

32. Weekly Sun, September 13, 1905.

33. Ibid. See also C.W. Humphries, 'Honest Enough to Be Bold': The Life and Times of Sir James Pliny Whitney, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985, see page 100 for a description of the business backgrounds of Cochrane and Hanna.

34. Weekly Sun, November 15, 1905.

35. Weekly Sun, November 29, 1905. Good Papers, Volume 2, J. Martin to W. Good, February 21, 1906, Toronto. Martin heard through J.W. Bengough, at the single land tax banquet, that "your little story had quite an effect on the Commissioners."


37. Weekly Sun, May 2, 1906.

38. Ibid. Morrison and Brooks also condemned Whitney, see Weekly Sun, May 9, 1906.


40. Weekly Sun, September 12, 1906. See also Humphries, 'Honest Enough to be Bold', (Toronto, 1985), 124-5.

41. Weekly Sun, January 30, 1907. See also Humphries, 'Honest Enough To Be Bold', (Toronto, 1985), 160.

42. See Weekly Sun, February 6, 1907 re subsidy and Grange convention endorsement Weekly Sun, February
27, 1907. See also *Weekly Sun*, April 3, 1907 on the formation of the Rural Trustees section within the O.E.A. and *Weekly Sun*, July 10, 1907 for organisation by Morrison of North Wellington Rural Trustees Association.


44. *Ibid.* See also Humphries, *'Honest Enough to Be Bold'* (Toronto, 1985), 161, re 1907 mining royalty.


46. See *Weekly Sun*, September 19 and October 3, 1906.


52. *Weekly Sun*, February 20, 1907 re hiring of 'Bros. Stewart'. For his organising campaign see *Weekly Sun*, May 1, 1907 (Huron) and June 26, 1907 (Wellington and Ontario).


57. *Brantford Expositor*, September 8, 1903.


59. *Weekly Sun*, May 11, 1904 and July 6, 1904. Smith
encouraged F.A.O. branches to model themselves on North Brant, see Weekly Sun, March 22, 1905.

60. Weekly Sun, October 26, 1904 and May 3, 1905.

61. Weekly Sun, December 20, 1905.

62. Good Papers, Volume 20, Ruskin Reading Circle, April 7, 1905.

63. Weekly Sun, December 2, 1908.

64. Weekly Sun, January 29, 1908.

65. Weekly Sun, July 22, 1908 (Whitby) and September 2, 1908, (Welland and Essex).

66. Weekly Sun, January 22, 1908 for Beam nomination. On Drury see Weekly Sun, May 27 and June 24, 1908. See also Weekly Sun, June 10, 1908 on Pettypiece's re-election and the election of McEwing for West Wellington in what had been Ross family territory. See also C.W. Humphries, 'Honest Enough to Be Bold', (Toronto, 1985), page 173, on the defeat of Nelson Monteith, Whitney's minister of agriculture, despite the Conservatives' massive provincial victory.

67. Weekly Sun, September 16, 1908.

68. Weekly Sun, December 2, 1908.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid. See also Farm and Dairy, December 2, 1908.


73. Weekly Sun, February 17, 1909.

74. Ibid.

75. Weekly Sun, March 10, 1909.

76. Weekly Sun, May 12, 1909.

77. Weekly Sun, September 22, 1909.

78. Weekly Sun, February 24, 1909.


88. *Ibid*.

89. See *Weekly Sun*, December 9, 1908 for the annual Experimental Union with President Brodie and W.L. Smith on co-operation.


91. *Ibid*.

92. *Ibid*. See also *Farm and Dairy*, December 2, 1909.


96. *Ibid*.

98. Ibid (Robert Sellars to the House of Commons). See also Farm and Dairy, December 22 and 29, 1910.


100. Weekly Sun, December 21, 1910.

101. Weekly Sun, January 4, 1911. An indication that Morrison's suggestion to capture Farmer's Clubs in 1914 had already been discussed. On the Peterborough drive, Weekly Sun, January 18, 1911.

102. Weekly Sun, January 4, 1911. See also Farm and Dairy, December 29, 1910 re an attempt by Quebec Liberals to mount a counter farm delegation to the C.C.A.'s Siege of Ottawa.

103. See Weekly Sun, January 25, 1911 (on Burford Grange). On Drury's organising see: Weekly Sun, February 1 (for a tariff debate in Beaverton), reported also in Farm and Dairy, January 26, 1911, and Weekly Sun, February 8, 1911.

104. Weekly Sun, March 1, 1911.

105. Weekly Sun, March 8, 1911.

106. Weekly Sun, March 1, 1911.

107. Weekly Sun, March 22, 1911.

108. Weekly Sun, April 12, 1911.

109. Weekly Sun, June 28, 1911. For Good's views see the Farmer's Advocate, March 16, 1911.

110. Weekly Sun, August 23, 1911.

111. Weekly Sun, September 27, 1911.

112. Weekly Sun, December 20, 1911.

113. Weekly Sun, January 4, 1905.

114. Weekly Sun, January 16, 1907.


118. Good Papers, Volume 2, 'Shall Canada Have a Navy?'

119. Good Papers, Volume 2, Dr. A. Macphail to W. Good, July 23, 1909, Montreal.

120. Good Papers, Volume 2, W. Good to W. Laurier, October 25, 1909, Brantford.


123. Good Papers, Volume 17, 'Tariffs, Bounties and the Farmer'.

124. Farmer's Advocate, August 19, August 26, and September 2, 1909.

125. Good Papers, Volume 18, 'The Reformer and His Methods', a talk given September 7, 1913.

126. Both M.H. Staples, The Challenge of Agriculture: The Story of the U.F.O., Toronto: Morang, 1921, pages 35-6, and L.A. Woods, A History of the Farmers' Movement in Canada, Toronto: Ryerson, 1924, pages 273-4 claim the Grange was so demoralised by the 1911 defeat they didn't hold a convention for 1913/14. This is simply wrong as this convention met in January 1913 as reported in the Weekly Sun, January 29, 1913 and Farm and Dairy, January 30, 1913.

127. Weekly Sun, January 31, 1912.

128. Weekly Sun, March 27, 1912.


131. **Weekly Sun**, January 29, 1913. The decision to focus on County Granges was probably the result of the Grange Executive's hope that a second Siege of Ottawa was to be mounted by western farmers with Borden. This, of course, did not occur. See *Farm and Dairy*, September 12, 1912.

132. **Weekly Sun**, July 10, 1912 (re delegation). This had been prefaced by an explanatory letter by Morrison in *Weekly Sun*, May 15, 1912.


136. **Weekly Sun**, January 29, 1913. For the questionnaire and specimen replies tabulated see Good Papers, Volume 18, 'Dominion Grange Assessment Survey-1912'.

137. **Weekly Sun**, October 15, 1913. See also *Farm and Dairy*, December 12, 1912 re formation of an Ontario legislative Select Committee to amend the Assessment Act and its rejection of municipal option in taxation, *Farm and Dairy*, February 6, 1913. See also Humphries, *'Honest Enough to be Bold'* (Toronto, 1985), 206-7, where Whitney rejected local option in taxation in early 1913.


139. **Globe**, September 2, 1914. (So Will Good claimed in an official U.F.O. interview with the **Globe**).


141. **Weekly Sun**, February 26, 1913.

142. **Weekly Sun**, March 26, 1913.

143. *Ibid*.

144. **Weekly Sun**, October 29 and November 5, 1913.


146. Queen's University Archives, Crerar Papers (hereafter Crerar Papers), Series IV, Box 152, T. Crerar to W.L. Smith, August 9, 1913, Winnipeg.

147. Crerar Papers, Series II, Box 15, J.J. Morrison to G.F. Chipman, September 22, 1913, Arthur, Ontario, re Grange to act as mediator for G.G.G. Co. and mentioning an early October Grange executive meeting to study the barter offer. (This is likely the Kirby Hotel meeting.) And see Crerar Papers, Series III. Box 152, J.J. Morrison to T. Crerar, October 20, 1913, Arthur, Ontario (re October 3 letter from Crerar with barter offer).


149. *Weekly Sun*, November 12, 1913.


151. *Weekly Sun*, December 17, 1913. See also *Farm and Dairy*, December 25, 1913.


157. See Crerar Papers, Series III, Box 125, Morrison File, for letters in December 1913 and January 1914.
outlining preparations for Crerar and Morrison's tour to promote an Ontario United Farm movement. And *Weekly Sun*, February 4 (Grey), February 11 (Northumberland and Hastings), February 18 (Norfolk, Simcoe, and Elgin), and February 25 and March 4, 1914 (Lambton).

158. *Weekly Sun*, March 25, 1914. See also *Farm and Dairy*, March 26, 1914. Cowan claimed the two hundred farm delegates represented ten thousand farmers.


162. U.C.O. Library: See Archive File 103 for copy of original charter of incorporation done at Moyle's School, February 3, 1914. Note not February 7 as reported in Good's, *Farmer Citizen*, (Toronto, 1958), page 100.

163. U.C.O. Library: U.F.O. Minutes, Friday, March 20, 1914. See also U.F.C.C. Minutes, Book One, for description of organizing meeting Friday afternoon, March 20, 1914 where Good was elected President by the new board of directors.

VI. FARM CO-OPERATOR

'The success of the farmers business organisation is the cement that holds the whole structure together'.

- T.A. Crerar - (1)

The bedrock of the farm political challenges of 1919 and 1921 rested on the development of successful co-operatives, the United Grain Growers on the Prairies, the United Farmers' Co-operative Company in Ontario, and a farmers' chain store operation in the Maritimes. These regional movements were complemented by a dense network of local co-operatives, in Will Good's case, the development of the Brant Farmer's Co-operative Society. At a national level there was the Co-operative Union of Canada to coordinate co-operative education and lobbying. It was headquartered in Brantford under the secretaryship of George Keen and, from 1921 to 1945, presided over by Good.

The key to co-operative development in Ontario was the United Farmers' Co-operative Company (U.F.C.C.). Between 1914 and 1921 the Company grew from a few score shareholders to twenty thousand doing over twenty million dollars business. The growth of the United Farmers of Ontario (U.F.O.) to over sixty thousand members in 1920 was closely tied to the commercial success of the Company, as well as political grievances such as the conscription crisis in the spring of 1918. From the steps of the provincial legislature down to the back
concessions, whether surveyed through the eyes of Premier Drury or from the surviving minutes of local UFO branches(2), co-operation lay at the heart of independent class organisation.

The U.F.C.C.'s development did not come easily. It almost failed at the peak of its first successes. In the first three years, as the Company established itself as a selective wholesaler dealing in bulk sales of farm staples, there was an intense battle behind the scenes to put the Company on sound organisational lines by instituting strict accounting methods and hiring professional managers. This struggle, led by Good and Drury, also aimed to reduce J.J. Morrison from Secretary of the U.F.C.C. and the U.F.O. to field organiser.

Beginning in 1918, the U.F.C.C. went through a dramatic expansion as a co-operative marketing agency, in livestock, small produce, and dairy products. Then, in 1919-20 a second phase of expansion began with the establishment of a chain store system under the management of T.P. Loblaw (of future grocery store fame). Within one year the U.F.C.C. had over thirty stores throughout the province.(3)

But in the summer of 1921 the previous year's drop in farm commodity prices caught up with an overextended U.F.C.C.. By December 1921 the Company faced serious losses in an atmosphere of political persecution. As the chain store system collapsed, two court applications were
made out against the U.F.C.C., one to dissolve and another preventing the December annual shareholder's meeting. By the early 1920s, from providing a base for independent class politics, the U.F.C.C. was engaged in a more elementary struggle for its own survival.

As well as the struggle over better business methods within the U.F.C.C., a clash developed over co-operative principles. In 1919 Good proposed the U.F.C.C. be reorganised on federated lines, with the Toronto office controlled from below by the co-operative's constituent societies. This direct democracy proposal went nowhere in an apparently healthy, expanding business. But it was a strategy Good was to raise at every major crisis until federation was achieved, with the founding of the United Co-operatives of Ontario in 1948.

When co-operation from below was rejected, marking a decline in Good's moral authority, Good created an alternative example through the Brant Farmers' Co-operative Society (B.F.C.S.). But the B.F.C.S. was attacked in 1917 as a dual, competitive organisation by U.F.C.C. officers. In 1921 the charge of dual organisation had more substance as Good, newly elected President of the Co-operative Union of Canada, held a meeting with Middlesex farmers about establishing another provincial co-operative wholesale.

At issue for Good was the nature of co-operation. Should the co-operative movement be built from the bottom
up, from strong self-governing locals to federated bodies serving these locals, or from the top down, with centrals like the Toronto U.F.C.C. office dictating the terms of co-operative effort? If the last, co-operation from above, the central office would reduce co-operation from self emancipation to a dependent service relation.

I

The first year for the U.F.C.C. established the finances, office and personnel for the Company to act as a farm staple wholesaler. To launch the company a share offering of $10,000 was authorized at four hundred shares of twenty-five dollars, to be paid for at $12.50 per share with the other 50% on call.(4) J.J. Morrison was hired as Secretary while C.E. Birkett, a former clerk with the Grain Growers', took care of office work.(5) By July space was loaned by the Sun in Toronto, replacing the cumbersome arrangement of Morrison working out of his Arthur home. On September 1, the U.F.C.C. moved to a dilapidated office at 100 Church Street, then to 110 Church in 1915, and, from 1917, at 2 Francis Street.(6) On October 1, 1914, the U.F.C.C. declared itself ready to take farm supply orders.

Once the infrastructure was set, the next task was to build a price list of staples farmers could order. A line of credit was opened with the Royal Bank and contracts were signed with private suppliers such as the Sarnia Fence Company for fencing and roofing materials,
and with the Belfast Rope Works for twine. (7) As H.B. Cowan reported in *Farm and Dairy*, manufacturers were reluctant to deal with the new U.F.C.C.. They feared antagonising retail merchants who complained about this new competition. (8) At savings of 25-30%, however, the Company's orders quickly grew.

Once a price list was in place, the U.F.C.C. worked to recruit customers. From Toronto, J.J. Morrison went out to organise United Farmer clubs, solicit farm club investment, and business with the U.F.C.C.. Like the Grange, the winter season would find Morrison on the road speaking to various farm groups with his efforts supplemented by occasional meetings by Good, Drury, and the U.F.O.'s wartime President, R.H. Halbert.

In the winter of 1914/15, Morrison travelled to Eastern Ontario's dairy belt, to Glengarry, Dundas and Leeds. He returned by Hastings to take orders from stock shipping clubs grouped about B.C. Tucker and the Minto Farmers' Club. Then it was on to Grey and Bruce to return by Waterloo. In the previous year at Waterloo, Good, Anson Groh (Vice-President), Drury, and F.C. Hart (the province's agriculture markets officer), had spoken on co-operation to an audience of nine hundred picnicking farmers. By the end of Morrison's two tours over one hundred local farmers' clubs had placed orders with the Company. (9)

To supplement the winter organising campaigns, H.B.
Cowan suggested in 1915 that summer district conventions be added.

"My impression is that the best move we can make is district conventions at strategic points throughout the province to be held possibly some time in June. We can have our best speakers attend these meetings and use them as a means of arousing enthusiasm among the local clubs, of educating farmers on public issues and to advertise the movement generally."(10)

Cowan's suggestion was taken up and a growing number of district and county conventions were held from 1916 to 1918 where U.F.C.C. business was encouraged and a link was made between U.F.C.C. business and independent farm politics.

When seventy five shareholders met February 24, 1915 for the first annual meeting of the U.F.C.C., the Board of Directors could report healthy growth. From a turnover of $800 in September 1914, business grew to $34,000 by January 1915. In January commissions overtook expenses and a profit was realised, while the cost of doing business was reduced from three to one percent of turnover. The Board believed such gains would lead to an early retirement of organising costs, an expansion of lines carried, and the start of co-operative marketing.

organisationally, Good stepped down as President to become a Board member while Anson Groh became both the new President and General Manager. C.E. Birkett was appointed Treasurer while Morrison was reappointed as Secretary only.

Constitutionally, one hitch developed on how to
represent group investors such as clubs. Club delegates, under the incorporation terms of the Ontario Companies Act, could not be elected to the Board of Directors. The new Board was directed to apply to the Provincial Secretary to amend the U.F.C.C.'s charter to allow for such representation. In reality the ideal of club representation became untenable. A significant number of clubs lacked stable leadership. The result was at least a quarter of clubs had no input into Company affairs. When the next stock issue came in 1917 individual subscriptions were emphasised. Finally, in regards to club-centre relations, the question of U.F.C.C. rebates to Club Secretaries on club orders was raised, a practice starving the central of needed funds. (11)

It was left to Will Good to deal with these pressing problems in his closing Presidential address. Though Good began with the need for a co-operative publication to educate farmers in co-operative principles, the crucial issue was better business methods for the central and the locals.

"Our staff must be so organised that everything is attended to punctually and accurately. It is a very different business from farming, and I think that possibly we have made a mistake in not having at least one or two men on our directorate of ripe experience in the organisation of large commercial enterprises." (12)

The central needed trained administrators and strict accounting methods, preferably monthly statements. One result of Good's suggestions was to invite H.B. Cowan to
Board of Director meetings, though in a strictly ex officio capacity. Groh and Morrison resented this as a slight to their abilities, and because Cowan was a powerful ally of Good.

The other dimension, in Good's view, to the Company's problems lay at the bottom. Local clubs faced two problems: finances and warehousing. The central needed to develop guidelines by which clubs could establish a line of credit and put up warehousing facilities. Otherwise the club secretary was put in the 'embarrassing situation' of personally paying for a bulk shipment while rail cars were tied up waiting for each member to come and collect his order. But the clubs, Good stated, also had a responsibility to support the central. There was a disturbing tendency to use the U.F.C.C. price list to strike deals with private companies.(13)

Good's resignation as President signalled the beginning of hostilities in his campaign to reform central office methods. The opening shot came at the first board meeting when C.E. Birkett, Good's man in Toronto, resigned. As Drury later remarked, Morrison feared he was being squeezed out of the leadership with Birkett as Treasurer. To Morrison's relief the Board reappointed him Treasurer while Anson Groh hired his brother as bookkeeper.(14)

Good, not to be put off, moved to table the
financial statement until an audit was done. Though his resolution was carried, the Board did not hold a new audit. From this point on, Good grew increasingly distrustful of the Groh-Morrison management team. Drury tried to calm Good by pointing out that it was not a question of either one's integrity. "The only thing I fear is that through lack of business ability the Company will fail to give good value to the Clubs, and so will fail to hold them". (15) By September Good had had enough and submitted his resignation to the Board. The Board was greatly disturbed by this turn of events. The sudden resignation of the Company's first president might have a considerable impact on its business. (16)

At the request of the Board, Drury wrote Good to reconsider. To Drury, while the Company had grown through the enthusiasm for a new movement, it now had to move forward on its own merits. At a minimum, Drury privately agreed, they needed a professional manager. Groh's personal integrity was no substitute for capable administration. He simply wasn't big enough for the job. But, Drury argued, Good had a responsibility to stay on the board and prove his fears. Otherwise he was harming the movement by quitting without a public explanation. (17) Morrison had already attacked Good in Guelph for his critical stance on Company affairs, a criticism Morrison later withdrew. (18)

Cowan also urged Good to reconsider, citing Drury's
moves to demand regular financial statements, Crerar's warning about how Good's resignation could be misread, and that Morrison privately agreed Groh had to go. Both Drury and Cowan were firm in stating that, while they were Good's friends, the movement was bigger than any personal differences, a fact Good should respect.(19)

By the next Board meeting in December, Good withdrew his resignation, but only until the next shareholders' meeting. Good's resignation had some positive impact. In December Drury introduced a motion to reconstruct the Company's management, which was accepted in principle, while Cowan worked behind the scenes to convince other directors like C.W. Gurney that management personnel changes were necessary.(20)

In the meantime, the Company began publication of a monthly price bulletin with weekly updates in the Sun, a plan of Groh's which, as he said to Good, would prevent the present stream of 'unpleasant correspondence' about frequent price changes.(21) The board also struck a committee in December on club rebates. As Groh noted in his 1916 Presidential address, while a seven percent dividend could be declared, the profits in reality had gone back out as rebates to the Secretaries. At the second annual shareholders' meeting, February 2, 1916, rebates were ended.(22)

For 1915/16 Morrison reported eighty two new affiliations after tours of Peterborough, Carleton, and
Dufferin counties. The Lambton Co-operative Marketing Association had affiliated immediately after the first annual. Then in July Morrison travelled to New Ontario, penetrating into fresh territory in Muskoka and Temiskaming. At Convention a model club organisation, of supply, production and social committees, was sketched as a way to take the burden off Club secretaries, and to justify ending rebates, by the young U.P.O. Secretary for North Oxford, L.H. Blatchford. Cowan marked Blatchford out as possible leadership material.

The keynote address of 1916's convention was Crerar on 'Business Organisation'. As usual, his text was taken from the Grain Grower's. This time Crerar was selling the Company's business methods. Crerar stressed that any large co-operative business needed professional, well paid management that was fiscally accountable. At the Grain Growers' the board expected a quarterly financial statement. The Board was also organised in two parts with an executive committee meeting frequently to oversee current business while the Board as a whole met to set general policy. (23) These arguments reflected some of Crerar's private thoughts about the state of the Company. After the 1915 meeting he had dined with Cowan to tell him he thought the Company's method of operation wrong - with a low two percent commission, club rebates, and an inordinate emphasis on each club secretary to carry a club's finances. (24)
Crear's talk created the right atmosphere for Druzy's reconstruction motion to split the offices of President and General Manager. Unhappily for the Board's reformers, Anson Groh continued as Manager while John Pritchard, an easy going farmer from Dufferin, was elected President. Still optimism ran high at the first meeting of the new Board of Directors. Good, Morrison and two other directors acted as a committee to define the officers' duties (from Good's perspective to define the President and Secretary as organisers and thus minimize their 'interference' with management) while, more importantly, a study committee (of Pritchard, S.A. Beck, and Cowan) was struck:

"to take immediate steps to investigate conditions in the Company (in consultation with the Manager and the Secretary Treasurer), find what lines are proving profitable and those unprofitable and define a policy for the Company, and report their conclusions by mail to all the directors at the earliest possible date, and that a special meeting of the Board and Directors be called to consider and pass upon this report."

1916 also marked an experiment with marketing co-operation as the U.F.C.C. began to handle some fresh produce and poultry. The impetus came not just from the booming example of the Grain Growers but also from local stock shippers such as the Minto Club in Hastings. Bruce Tucker told an appreciative audience that Minto had shipped $130,000 worth of stock in 1915, realizing up to twenty percent higher prices by pooling carloads of cattle and hogs direct to Toronto. In a taste of what was
to come, Morrison and Professor C.B. Sissons suggested the U.F.C.C. could coordinate local pools for even greater profits by regulating pooled shipments to prevent gluts and provide a cold storage plant for produce.(26)

All in all, the Company claimed a business of $311,922.90 for 1915, a seven percent dividend, and a surplus of $1455. But as Morrison, Good and Cowan privately noted, there was a disturbing fall off in orders in January 1916. Where $34,000 worth of orders had been done in January 1915 only $20,000 had been placed in January 1916.(27) Stagnation threatened. A nastier surprise was in store once they got the Auditor's report.

When the Company's auditor, A.O.C. O'Brien, presented his report in April, the Board of Directors were treated to both bad and good news. The bad news was the true turnover for 1915 was $225,000, not $311,000. The bookkeeper, S. Groh, had added up the monthly turnover wrongly. Of course, explaining how the Company had $86,000 of imaginary business would not be simple. But the Board was heartened by O'Brien's positive suggestions indicating the next steps to expansion.

O'Brien's twenty four recommendations touched on three areas. First, the Company desperately needed an infusion of cash to sustain expansion. The Company needed to clean up its current shareholders' list and expand its capitalization with a fresh stock selling campaign. Secondly, an executive routine had to be worked out. The
duties of the Board's Executive Committee, the General Manager and Secretary had to be clearly defined. To keep financial control, the Manager needed to prepare a monthly financial statement while a chartered accountant could present quarterly financial reports. Thirdly, the organising work of the Secretary in regard to the clubs had to be systematised with regular reports to the Board. Otherwise, the roots of the U.F.C.C. would wither as indicated by the large number of clubs which had let their stock lapse. (28)

The Board met on April 11 and 12 to consider the report. They passed virtually all the recommendations. H.B. Cowan resigned from his secret directorate. Good was asked to rewrite the bylaws to incorporate the new amendments for the next convention. O'Brien was hired to do the quarterly reports. As well, the Board voted to affiliate the U.F.C.C. to the Canadian Council of Agriculture. (29) But in typical U.F.C.C. fashion, what the Board voted upon had to be carried out by the offending party, inefficient management.

By the summer of 1916 no action had been taken on O'Brien's report. Neither Pritchard, Groh or Morrison had regularised the work of the Toronto office, while the Directors began to receive club complaints about poor service. Indeed Groh and Morrison, who obviously sensed the coming storm, tried to take the offensive by criticising Good's sale of original stock in 1914. (30)
In June Drury decided upon a coup.  

"The time has come when we must take sudden and drastic action if we are to save the movement and the whole future of co-operation in Ontario. Groh has shown himself utterly incompetent, and, more than that, utterly unable to learn and unwilling to take advice. Pritchard, who was I thought a good level business head, is I fear, too small a man for his job. I was able to size him up pretty well during a day he spent here with me last March. Morrison, whatever his faults, has the good of the movement at heart, but can do nothing. There is an utter lack of aggression, and the office management is chaotic. Golden opportunities are slipping by ungrasped. The number of complaints is growing, and the worst feature of it is that Groh will never acknowledge that he is in any way at fault. Under these circumstances, the only thing that will save the movement is an entire change of policy, and an accompanying change of management. I don't like to do it, but Groh must go." (31)  

The showdown came on July 10-11 when Drury, supported by Good, Cowan, Gurney and Crerar, demanded action on office reorganisation from the rest of the Board. Groh and Morrison were excluded from the meeting after the two traded insults. As Good wrote to Crerar, "I have never witnessed a more childish, disgraceful and disgusting exchange of personalities than was exhibited at the meeting on the 10th." (32) But the upshot was Anson Groh's resignation and the appointment of C.W. Gurney as temporary manager with the later addition of L.H. Blatchford as his assistant. (33)  

Drury believed the corner had been turned. The Company had managed to purge itself without shaking the confidence of the clubs (since the fight had come in the slack summer season when the Company had an operating surplus). Good, however, told Drury later at Crown Hill
that a greater threat still existed in the Toronto office, Morrison.(34)

Following July's dramatic events the Board got down to more mundane business. A produce marketing department was opened and, for Northern Ontario clubs, the U.F.C.C. developed a buying relationship with a wholesale house in Sault Ste. Marie. One serious clash developed when the Canada Grocery Company, a Hamilton grocery wholesaler, tried to sue the Company for claiming in a U.F.C.C. Trade Bulletin that the Canada Grocery Company ran a regional wholesale cartel. Good and Drury were instructed to deal with the Company in the press, and the suit was never brought.(35)

One policy question did preoccupy the directors in the fall of 1916. What to do about the clubs? Cowan reported in September about dormant club stock. "This is due entirely to the fact that there has been no inspirational educational work conducted. The organisation of the UFO has been practically a dead letter up to date."(36) Not until December, however, did Morrison begin to work on a standard club affiliation. As Good soon realised, from a demand by the Burgessville Farmers' Club (for information on club credit, profit redistribution, and complaints about U.F.C.C. marketing), the fate of the central hinged on good service and concrete business guidelines for the clubs. In turn, in Good and Cowan's view, the clubs' future depended on developing a strong
political commitment to co-operation only U.F.O. education could supply.(37)

When the Third convention opened on March 1, 1917 the U.F.C.C. had recovered quite successfully from the summer's disruptions. From $225,000 turnover in 1915 the Company generated $410,000 worth of business in 1916 with a net profit of $2675. Feed, flour, twine, and seed corn remained the staples of Company orders. One hundred and thirty six clubs now held stock out of a potential two hundred who placed orders. Authorization was given to increase the capitalisation of the Company to $250,000 (granted by the Ontario government in October 1917).

Two issues briefly darkened the Company's prospects, but only briefly. Anson Groh, still smarting from his unceremonious ouster in July, circularized the shareholders demanding the U.F.C.C. cut its links with the U.F.O. and the Canadian Council of Agriculture. The Company should be a straight business enterprise and nothing else. No-one was taken in by this line of reasoning. Groh's petition was rejected without a single dissenting vote. As A.A. Powers stated: "We were and are still of the opinion that the UFO propaganda was what brought business and caused the development of the trading end and still believe we must continue in so doing if we are to exist and grow."(38)

More difficult, was that perennial question of co-operative marketing. Many of 1916's complaints had nothing to do with bulk buying but with the inept
marketing of eggs, poultry, and large stock by private commission houses on contract for the U.F.C.C. Something the movement's leaders discovered from member complaints when the first district conventions were held in the summer of 1916. President Pritchard, in his outgoing address, announced the U.F.C.C. had switched commission agents. He also called for the future organisation of Company business by departments run by sales experts in each area. If Pritchard disagreed with an aggressive expansion of the Company's business, he at least recognised that expansion demanded a more sophisticated division of labour.

But it was his last address as the party of better business methods took over the Board with Bruce Tucker as President, Elmer Lick as Vice-President, Gurney as manager, and with Good and Drury among the Directors. As well, Crenar was confirmed as an Honorary Director to formalise his presence and advice at Board meetings. The Board was also cut down, from thirteen to nine, with Good moving to create the first active Executive Committee since his days as President. (39)

1917, however, proved to be a mixed year for better U.F.C.C. management. At the level of ordinary business the Company launched a stock selling campaign aimed at individual farmers rather than clubs. Discussions took place with the Ancient Order of United Workmen on a life insurance proposal and in August marketing study
committees were established for livestock, cheese and seeds. By December U.F.O. clubs had directly marketed seven hundred cars of stock onto the Toronto market. A study was also done on developing Montreal connections and a livestock outlet to service Eastern Ontario clubs.(40)

One new question arose about worker co-operation within the context of the farm co-operative movement. In June the Newmarket Workmens' Club applied to affiliate to get groceries wholesale. Then in November a joint committee was struck with the Toronto Trades and Labour District Council to establish a co-operative grocery retail outlet. Despite a decision by the U.F.C.C. Board to act with the Labour Council, it was not until after the war that a Toronto outlet for U.F.C.C. produce was opened on King Street. Large scale worker interest in co-operative methods had already begun with the failed attempt by Railway workers to develop a national co-operative wholesale in 1916-17. Obviously, Toronto workers believed one way to combat war inflation would be to connect with the rising farm co-operative movement.(41)

While the Company's business expanded in 1917, from $410,000 in the previous year to nearly one million dollars, a fierce struggle continued over management methods. In late March, after an Executive Committee meeting, Good revealed to Cowan and Drury the Company had lost twenty four hundred dollars. Equally troublesome, no monthly statements had been submitted since last summer,
i.e., since Gurney had taken over. As Good repeatedly stated, without regular statements the Board had no idea in what direction the Company was heading. (42)

On behalf of the Board, Good immediately wrote to Gurney directing O'Brien, the accountant, to review the books and get a statement out to the next Board meeting. O'Brien revealed the immediate source of trouble was S. Groh, who had just quit as bookkeeper. Groh had not bothered to organise the books on O'Brien's original suggestions in 1916. The result was that O'Brien had to completely redo the accounts for 1917. Despite an attempt by Morrison to blame O'Brien, it was clear to Good that Gurney was the source of trouble. As Cowan noted, while Gurney did his own job well, he did not seem capable of demanding that others under him do their jobs. (43)

Good's prompt action led to a major discussion of the Company's affairs at the next Board meeting on April 28. Both Cowan and Morrison reported good results. The Company was breaking even and Tucker made it clear he would insist on monthly reports in future. (44) But getting a financial statement from O'Brien did not solve the original problem, in what direction was the Company heading, towards continued losses or gains on earnings? This was a point Good had difficulty impressing on the Board, who seemed only to see the rise in orders not the rate of profit as the fundamental criteria of business health.
In mid-May Good returned to the offensive. He had not been able to go to April 28th's board meeting and only received O'Brien's statement afterwards. Good noted it only presented sales and expenses. There was no statement of earnings. As Good stressed to Cowan and Tucker, the Ottawa Civil Service Association, one of the first large scale co-operative consumer organisations, had collapsed precisely because it had not kept track of its earnings.(45)

Tucker, for one, grasped Good's argument and offered to meet before the next Board meeting. Tucker, however, did explain O'Brien couldn't present a precise record of earnings because of Groh's bookkeeping system where commissions were only entered after they had been received in the office (even this can be explained as a result of the Company's price policy with clubs only charged the original wholesale price). O'Brien estimated, however, that expenses were just being covered by earnings.(46)

With Tucker proving to be sympathetic, Good began a new campaign to make sure the original accountant's report on better office methods was acted on. It proved a short one. In early June, Cowan arranged a private caucus between Good, himself and Tucker before the Board met on June 21. Cowan cautioned Good to discuss his concerns with Gurney beforehand and, before the Board, to begin with the general needs of the Company before
getting to specifics (i.e. personal questions). Otherwise, Cowan believed Morrison would scuttle any reform program.(47) Regardless, Good pressed ahead and on the twenty first demanded a six month financial statement including earnings.(48)

Cowan's fears were justified. On June 27th in Brantford, at the district U.F.O. convention, O'Brien publicly attacked the Brant Farmer's Co-operative Society as 'a gang of pirates' undercutting the Company's development.(49) This unexpected attack on local co-operation threw Good onto the defensive. As Good wrote to Cowan, if the Company believed the B.F.C.S. posed a threat why had this not been raised privately? And how could a paid officer of the Company get up and make such comments? Good could only see the hand of Morrison scapegoating local co-operatives for 'his own incapacity and jealousy'.(50)

Good had to wonder how he could continue as President of the B.F.C.S. and a director of the U.F.C.C.. A suggestion Morrison probably intended to plant in Good's mind, especially if he had any inkling of Good's efforts behind the scenes to hire someone to replace Morrison as Secretary.(52) Cowan agreed how damaging such an attack was. But he also pointed out Morrison and the officers of the U.F.C.C. (including some members of the Grain Growers') genuinely believed County organisations were a threat to large scale co-operatives.(52) Whether O'Brien's stand
was motivated from behind the scenes, or based on principle, Good got no answer from the Board when he protested the stand of the Auditor and Secretary. (53)

Good did not resign from the U.F.C.C. directorate. But the Company officers' attack on the B.F.C.S. effectively silenced Good's private reform efforts to influence the directors to demand better methods and management. Ironically, when O'Brien reported to the next Board meeting he confirmed Good's fears. While the Company had made a profit in the first six months of 1917, earnings were below the same period for 1916. (54) This finding put the Board in a dilemma. Either they would have to cut expenses to reorganise or expand their stock campaign to offer more goods and services in a gamble to struggle out of their difficulties. Despite striking a policy committee and discussing office reductions, expansion would be chosen.

One major proposal turned down was to take over Medland's, a grocery wholesaler. The Board, with Good in the majority, rejected a proposed buyout. Gurney then announced he would take over the proposed franchise. And, of course, he resigned from the Company managership. (55) Just as Good had predicted, instead of planning for the introduction of skilled staff, the Company had to hire its top executive in another emergency situation. L.H. Blatchford became acting General Manager.

When the U.F.C.C. met in annual convention in
December 1917, marking a new meeting time and financial year, Morrison could report the Company had done $918,000 in business. The Company declared the maximum seven percent dividend and put seven hundred dollars into a reserve. Morrison did not mention November's financial statement which showed a loss of $673.14 on the year's business. Only by writing off ten percent of the original organising expenses could a surplus be declared. (56)

Tucker, in his outgoing address, stressed the need for more capital. The Company had done nearly a million dollars of business on only $6458 paid up capital and a very thin profit margin. More capital, Tucker stressed, would allow the Company to rent or buy warehouse space allowing it to buy goods when cheapest and to reduce borrowing costs. The delegates quickly responded, in the midst of the first conscription crisis, by buying three hundred shares in twenty minutes.

Tucker also reported on the expansion of U.F.C.C. club stock shipping by agents based on local railway shipping zones. To complement local pooling, clubs demanded the U.F.C.C. develop its own commission agency at the stock yards, a demand to be studied in the new year. Finally, Tucker raised for discussion the need to change the Company's price policy to save cash for the Company and lessen private business opposition. (57)

One discordant note was raised, war government intervention. The U.F.C.C. had increased difficulties
supplying orders due to Food Controller regulations, perhaps also, Tucker suggested, government obstruction. In one case, the Company believed it had received seventeen cars of mill feed, out of an order for one hundred and five, the rest going to private speculators for American export. The Ontario Department of Agriculture also seemed to be competing with the U.F.C.C. by giving away free seed under the war production campaign and promoting local co-operation as an alternative to the Company. But, Tucker said indignantly, they could not have a full discussion or on other questions as government detectives were present in the hall.(58) Instead, R.W.E. Burnaby, U.F.O. president and in charge of 1917's stock selling campaign, would have to contend with these difficulties as President of the U.F.C.C. for 1918.

The doubling of U.F.O. membership in 1918, from 12,000 to 25,000 as part of the anti-conscription protest movement, gave a tremendous impetus to Company business. This influx of new blood would build the U.F.C.C. in a powerful combination of market pooling and co-operative retailing until the collapse of farm prices in 1920.(59)

The first element of expansion was to develop pooling plans in livestock, dairy and fruit. A cattle pool was the first concern. This was made evident by a Toronto combine of drovers in July that tried to drive prices down. If clubs could market from the point of production, with
successful examples as Minto in Hastings and Omemee in Victoria, a need had also developed for collective marketing at the point of sale. In September the Company applied for a seat on the Toronto Livestock Exchange and in December a livestock expert from the United Grain Growers was hired to develop an integrated U.F.C.C. livestock pool. (60) Over the winter of 1918-19 the first tangible steps were also taken to establish a Dairy Co-operative with a U.F.C.C. committee chaired by H.B. Cowan and a study of Saskatchewan Co-operative Creameries Limited. The committee's initial concern was to market Ontario cheese to England. There was also a discussion about local club pooling for apple shipments. (61)

A major stock selling campaign raised the Company's capitalisation to nearly $100,000, which allowed for an expansion of U.F.C.C. bank credit to $10,000. (62) With this the U.F.C.C. finally purchased Medland's wholesale and retail grocery produce business on King Street in Toronto. The old premises were remodelled as a joint implement showroom and produce sales area. (63) And there was another management shakeup. President Burnaby, who was placed on salary in June, announced to the Board in February that the Company needed 'a big general manager to push the business'. Blatchford took the hint and offered his resignation in June, though he stayed on as feeds manager until his death from influenza in 1919. L.M. Powell of the Ridgetown Co-operative was hired as
Tucker's hints about war interference with Company business came to the fore in 1918. The Junior Farmers Improvement Society publicly attacked the U.F.C.C.'s undercapitalisation as the cause for the failure to secure its mill feed orders. Both Tucker and Blatchford explained in reply that the Port Colborne Mills had never raised the question of credit. Instead the Company had asked for two days to work out a shipping list to interested clubs across the province. It had been the Ontario Department of Agriculture who had denied this request and forwarded the mill feed to private dealers.  

War shortages in seed and dairy feed, blamed on fixing the price of wheat, led to an April protest by the Tilbury U.F.O. that the Department of Agriculture was deliberately taking orders away from the U.F.C.C. by supplying farmers below cost through the County representatives. A view Blatchford endorsed in a July report to the Board. In May even greater indignation was expressed when the Food Controller ruled no farmer could buy more than fifteen days flour or sugar. It appeared as if the federal government was sanctioning an open attack on club buying.  

All the same when Burnaby and Powell reported to shareholders at the December annual, they could show one and three quarter million dollars of business had been done and declare the maximum seven percent dividend.
Despite war shortages, losing coal, sugar, twine, and feed orders, the Company made a profit of $4102 and now employed thirty people. The chief debate, foreshadowing Good's demand for decentralisation in 1919, was actually over local versus district warehousing facilities. Burnaby, who continued as President, argued strongly against club warehouses and for U.F.C.C. district warehouses. This way clubs would be kept loyal while private businessmen would have physical proof of the wholesale power of the U.F.C.C..(67) As long as business expanded Burnaby's views would dominate, as Good would discover in the coming year.

If 1918 saw a sharp increase in U.F.C.C. business, the rise in volume in 1919 and 1920 would be dizzying, to eight million dollars in 1919, and then twenty million in 1920. Two elements fed the U.F.C.C.'s growth, co-operative livestock pooling and a chain of co-operative retail outlets.

1919 was the year of the livestock pool. In January the U.G.G.'s livestock expert, Mr. Duncan, reported favourably on a U.F.C.C. pool. In mid-February Charlie McCurdie set up shop in the Union Stock Yards. The U.F.C.C., however, met resistance. In the first week drovers tried to control local shipping yards by shipping the same day, while Toronto buyers tried to boycott U.F.C.C. car lots. But enough packer buyers' broke ranks that, from twelve cars in the first week, sixty to
cars were being handled by a staff of eleven in early April. By the end of 1919 the livestock pool, coordinated by fourteen hundred local shipping agents and thirty Toronto staff, represented the single largest aspect of U.F.C.C. business (twelve of twenty million dollars turnover).(68)

The second element of growth was co-operative retailing. The groundwork for a move into direct sales was laid in the spring of 1919 with a change in management. In March 1919 Burnaby fulfilled his wish to hire 'a big man' with T.P. Loblaw replacing Powell. Loblaw was a firm believer in volume buying and mass marketing. In April, in Northumberland, he announced a Board decision to go into retailing through a centrally administered chain store system. Loblaw promised the U.F.C.C. store system would supplement not replace club car orders. Though the Board enthusiastically took up the store plan, with the exception of Good (who had sat in on Loblaw's hiring committee and immediately distrusted a plan to downplay local organisation), the scale of Loblaw's purchases soon led the Board to set up a watchdog committee. Drury and Manning Doherty (a leading Peel milk producer and future U.F.O. Agriculture Minister), were appointed to oversee 'their new manager's proclivity for large orders.(69)

The terms of co-operative retailing were laid out as a centrally controlled experiment. Local stores would in finance, pricing and management be run from Toronto. If
clubs wanted a U.F.C.C. retail outlet they would have to raise the share capital by buying U.F.C.C. stocks (fifty percent of the estimated capital costs), the manager would be hired and supervised by the central office, and goods, largely grocery, would be priced at the centre. In return, the U.F.C.C. promised low prices, with volume buying, the absorption of overhead, and consistent management.(70)

Unfortunately, three factors would work against this experiment: price policy, the scarcity of management skills, and a downturn in the business cycle. At the same time as Loblaw announced the U.F.C.C.'s store venture, Burnaby secured a change in price policy, moving from a small commission fee on goods sold to clubs at wholesale prices to charging clubs, and store goods offered, full market prices. The saving would come at the end of the year when members would receive a rebate (i.e. a patronage dividend) in proportion to business done. As Burnaby said,

"The immediate cause of its adoption is the fact that the old policy of price splitting has antagonised the people from whom the Company have been buying their supplies, making it impossible for them to buy at the jobbers' price. Under the new system much more favorable buying connections will be possible."(71)

Some directors, like Halbert, were against the new system on parsimonius grounds. They did not believe this rebate form to be fair since pooled profits would not reflect each individual's purchases, i.e., the exact saving to each individual given various margins on each product. To the Company, however, the new price policy
had the merit of generating a cash flow, comparable to its private competitors, under the centre's direct control. The new price policy would also in theory obtain fair access to private wholesalers.

To individual co-operators the new price policy had one potential drawback. It now made co-operation's benefits indirect. Instead of buying at an immediate saving, consumers were asked to shop at U.F.C.C. retail stores as a matter of abstract loyalty, since store goods were not priced below private competitors. Indeed in 1921, the chain store price system, as administered by an overextended central management, made for a damaging inflexibility in the face of rapid deflation. Secondly, the question of a rebate was now left to the centre to decide, just like the U.G.G.. Even indirect savings could be lost if the centre could get the convention to forgo member rebates for head office goals, precisely what did happen in December 1920.(72)

But the store experiment remained for development in 1920. In the meantime, the U.F.C.C. increased its credit line to $125,000 and renewed its stock selling campaign, aiming to go from $100,000 to $200,000 (of a possible $250,000 capitalisation). Regional warehouses were established (at Kingston, Guelph, and Seaforth) and in the fall of 1919 the exact terms of allowing town investment were worked out.(73) Here the U.F.C.C. Board and Loblaw parted company in a revealing episode as to
where the exact boundaries of the farm progressive movement lay.

Loblaw proposed the U.F.C.C. be organised as a 'people's' joint stock company open to all. "This would be a move that in my mind would consolidate the interests of the masses of the townspeople with the U.F.O. movement. It would also take away any appearance of selfishness on the part of the U.F.O."(74) The Board, if it was willing to take Loblaw's advice on adapting to the private market place, would not dilute the sectional nature of the Company. In November, 'Associate Stock' Sharing Certificates were created for non-farm investors and consumers. Town dwellers could share in co-operative benefits but not in the U.F.C.C.'s administration.(75)

This brief skirmish over 'broadening out' the U.F.C.C. signalled what the limits of populism were among the reform from above farm majority. Like trade union syndicalists, the U.F.C.C. was not able to overcome its own class horizons. A sectional episode to be paralleled in the 1920s when Drury tried to politically broaden out the U.F.O. movement.

The quadrupling of Company business was reflected at the December annual when over three thousand delegates assembled at Massey Hall. While the general movement had grown to 48,000, there were over 5000 U.F.C.C. shareholders. Burnaby could report the Company had helped to launch the Farmer's Publishing Company, which had
taken over the *Weekly Sun* in April, a tremendously successful livestock commission, eight retail stores, and conversion to the patronage dividend. The Company planned to add a Montreal livestock branch and make the chain retail store system the focus of 1920 work as A.A. Powers replaced Burnaby as President.

Not all was rosy. An attempt to link hog marketing with the livestock commission failed and the federal government refused to build a grain terminal in Toronto, one more factor discrediting Union government and Crerar's brief tenure as Minister of Agriculture. But the Company, organised in three departments (Livestock, Commission, and Co-operative Trading) with sixty employees, boomed as it declared another seven percent dividend. (76)

Only one voice was raised against this exciting expansion, Will Good's. In 'A Forward Policy For The UFCC', Good called upon an unsympathetic audience to reverse Company policy, to move away from a centralised co-operative to a decentralised co-operative federation. To Good, the U.F.C.C.'s immediate purpose was to act as a wholesale buying for service not profit. Good agreed local Farmers' clubs were not suitable commercial units. But the real task of the U.F.C.C. central was to stimulate and support local co-operators to establish their own warehouses and stores. Partly because Good believed co-operation would be more economically stable with
gradual, small scale growth. But also because local co-operation was "the parent of industrial and commercial co-operation, of democracy in politics, and of a higher standard of intelligence and character in our citizens."(77)

In other words, Good believed if the Company persisted in centralism it would empty co-operation of any rank and file experience of self-emancipation or self-rule. Good asked for a vote on his resolution for a fundamental policy change. Burnaby, however, averted this with an amendment for the Board to study decentralisation and report back at the next annual. Good, as the last of nine, was elected to the Board to act on this mandate.(78)

1920 marked the apex of U.F.C.C. development. Loblaw mapped out an impressive plan of expansion: to get into new marketing areas such as fruit using the Department of Agriculture (a rather unusual suggestion for a group priding themselves on their class independence), add a grain terminal to the Trading Department, direct wholesale connections, develop club business on systematic lines, expand the store system (of which there were twenty four by July), and finally, to raise new share capital.(79)

In February the Board met to concretise these proposals. They decided to raise the capitalisation to one million dollars and the purchase limit from ten to forty shares. A resolution was passed to buy into General Wholesalers Ltd. and negotiations were begun to establish
a Montreal livestock office, and buy the Toronto Creamery Company. An Egg and Poultry marketing department was also added. Loblaw's efforts were so appreciated by the Board that he was paid a one thousand dollar bonus and promised a salary of six thousand dollars for the coming year. (80)

By the end of April these various resolutions had been acted on. The U.F.C.C. was set up in Montreal's east end livestock yards, and the Company bought both the Toronto Creamery and General Wholesalers. In March, a special shareholders' meeting authorised the one million dollar capitalisation drive. Loblaw even managed to create a co-operative store in Toronto, with worker investors as associate members, despite the opposition of coal and sugar wholesalers. (81)

But in May 1920 Loblaw surprised the Board by suddenly resigning. In a letter to Morrison on May 19, Loblaw claimed he was too discouraged, by the U.F.C.C.'s lack of capital and slowness to take advantage of opportunities, to continue. The Board, in Loblaw's view, didn't have confidence in him. They weren't acting quick enough on his expansion proposals. (82) Though Loblaw didn't leave until mid-July, it was the legacy of his agenda of rapid, multi-department expansion that would dominate U.F.C.C. affairs for the immediate future.

On the usual C.N.E. weekend, September 1, the Board met to consolidate Loblaw's expansion efforts. Already there was a sense of overexpansion. The Board decided to
discourage new store applications. An auditor, Mr. Low, was hired to report on central office finances and a 'systems man', a Mr. Alfred, was engaged to study the U.F.C.C. office's labour process. Elmer Lick was put in charge of the new Fruit Department, in which there had already been losses, and a survey was sent out to the U.F.C.C.'s store managers.(83)

Low's report indicated serious continuing weaknesses at U.F.C.C. head office. He recommended the establishment of an Audit department. The annual shareholders' audit was simply insufficient to deal with the scale of U.F.C.C. business. Low cited problems with poor filing, discrepancies between the Trading Department's ledgers and store ones, the lack of monthly department reports, even individual store reports. In particular, Low pinpointed three stores already in trouble, largely due to incompetent management, at Chrysler, Smith Falls, and the Toronto store. The last had a debt over $36,000, unrecognised since the manager had unilaterally stopped keeping the books after Low had shown him how.(84)

By November the pressures on the U.F.C.C. grew. Store stock remained overvalued as deflation took hold and the Company had to borrow $150,000 to cover an overdraft. Neither local managers or the centre's bookkeeping system had kept up to expansion. Yet the share drive had been oversubscribed. Over one million dollars was raised and the U.F.C.C.'s capitalisation
was raised to one and a quarter million dollars. H.B. Clemes, from Gunn Wholesalers Ltd., was hired as the new General Manager, a freeze was placed on new orders, while Burnaby and Good were instructed to get the Poultry Department back into shape. What had begun as consolidation measures following Loblaw's expansion plans turned into damage control.

Yet when the Board of Directors' report was presented in December the Company's problems seemed to have been stemmed. From a turnover of 8.5 million dollars in 1919, volume had risen to 19.5 million dollars in 1920, eleven million dollars just from livestock on consignment to the Toronto Yards U.F.C.C. office. Still, profits were lower. So while a seven percent dividend was declared for shareholders there was no patronage dividend. The one major source of loss had been in the Trading Department, responsible for the thirty-six U.F.C.C. local stores. (85) A.A. Powers was renewed as President with Colonel Frazer as his second. On December 22, the new Executive Committee ordered a complete store inventory. This would mark the transition from consolidation to a state of crisis in U.F.C.C. affairs in 1921.

The question of centralisation versus decentralisation remained in the background of U.F.C.C. affairs in 1920 despite Good's efforts. Decentralisation was raised at the first regular Board meeting in February. But Burnaby won the Board to a resolution against Good's proposal by
claiming decentralisation would turn branch stores over to local managers. As Good pointed out, apparently to no effect, his resolution had nothing to do with decentralising the U.F.C.C., but with establishing a federation of independent local co-operatives using the U.F.C.C. as a central wholesaler. Burnaby's conclusion, however, was that the U.F.C.C. would be glad to co-operate with local societies, perhaps with the Co-operative Union of Canada as coordinator, a suggestion Good and Keen would take up. (86)

Decentralisation was raised again in November with the Board but once more refused. However, as the U.F.C.C. slipped into a debt crisis, an interesting debate behind the scenes developed between Good and U.G.G. leaders Chipman and Crerar. Having lobbied for over a year to no effect with the U.F.C.C.'s leadership, Good forwarded his decentralisation plans to George Chipman, Guide editor, who in turn passed Good's comments on to Crerar. Both disagreed with total autonomy. Instead the New Brunswick Farmers' Co-operative was cited as an ideal mix of central control and local direction. The key to success or failure Chipman argued lay with the appointment and control of the managers in the hands of the Central. The role of individual members was to set policy and check big expenditures.

To Chipman, the U.F.C.C. suffered from three problems. They were competition between departments, as in the mail
order undercutting U.F.C.C. stores, a lack of leadership
talent (a handful of men were overloaded with a variety
of tasks preventing them from giving their best), and
finally, the Company lacked a general policy. (87) The
last criticism was in principle in agreement with Good,
but not with Good's remedy to reorganise as a federation
of self governing units.

Crerar was more sympathetic, or at least circumspect,
in his reply. He suggested that to reorganise as a
federation with a central wholesale, Ontario farmers would
have to incorporate a new Company. He also was for local
delegate representation to the Central, how the U.G.G.
functioned and a model imitated at the December 1920
U.F.C.C. Convention. As for local management, the problem
Crerar cited, from the experience of independent farmers'
elevators, was the lack of a proper accounting system.
Perhaps a system of inspection and advice run by the
central wholesale could offset this recurring malady.
Crerar concluded by suggesting Good use his plan to
stimulate discussion and strike a committee to report to
the Board. "Tact is the main requisite". (88) But Good had
already squandered that commodity in the previous year.
Otherwise, Crerar suggested, going into the Annual
threatening to resign would serve no purpose.

Crerar's reply did little to appease Good, or Cowan
who wrote to Crerar just before Convention about
Here again Crerar emphasised the importance of good managers, praised the hiring of Clemes and suggested hiring an accountant. And he counselled patience. Crerar had spoken to both Morrison and Burnaby and believed them to be sincere in developing the U.F.C.C..(89) The collapse of the New Brunswick store system at the end of December did not lead Crerar to re-evaluate Good's decentralist model but to more firmly insist that local autonomy could only lead to trouble.(90) Such divergent readings of co-operative affairs would be reinforced a year later when Crerar and Good would differ over the course of farm progressive politics.

Good's debate about the need for co-operation from below shifted in 1921 to a more sympathetic correspondent, P. Woodbridge, editor of Calgary's Farm and Ranch Review. Woodbridge explained to Good that the divisions in Ontario about co-operation's future existed to an even greater extent in the west (to culminate in the U.G.G.'s forced withdrawal from the Co-operative Union in 1929). Many local farm co-operatives were quite hostile to the U.G.G.'s centralism, particularly following Rice Jones' Committee on Co-operation report which, in their eyes, had either 'maligned or ignored successful local co-operative models internationally.

Instead Woodbridge cited the decentralised Citrus Growers of California as a model of local association built on contracts working from the bottom up. Because
the Citrus Growers was a selling agency it also showed that radical co-operative retail methods could work in marketing.

Two points for Woodbridge were central. One, the absolute autonomy of local districts in packing, shipping, and making contracts with individual farmers and the right to renew or opt out of contracts with the central selling agency.

"That is the basis on which the Okanagan United Growers are organised, and I see absolutely no difference fundamentally between that basis of organisation and the basis of the retail co-operative stores in Great Britain . . . ."(91)

Secondly, marketing co-operatives did not need subscribed capital to function. Indeed, by removing profits from the question of the private ownership of the means of production as represented by share ownership, one could remove the temptation "to exploit the organisation for the benefit of the leaders, as has been done on the prairies."(92) For Woodbridge, the central selling agency had more limited tasks in advertising to develop a brand name, to regulate exports to prevent glut, and to work for uniform international standards.

But if Woodbridge largely agreed with Good's co-operation from below prescription, he was pessimistic about their ability to implement it. Woodbridge expressed considerable bitterness against the U.G.G., citing how his 1913 proposal for decentralised farm elevators had been refused discussion, the recent absorption of the
Alberta Farmer's Co-operative Elevator Company, and how U.G.G. subsidiaries were organised from the top down, without share capital and thus control vested solely in the U.G.G.'s Board of Directors.

Events had reached such a pass, among the Woodbridge school of thinking, that dividends were being refused to members for the sake of the reserve fund. Such was the result of the U.G.G.'s delegate system of government. The Directors had only to win the small locals, since only one delegate per local was permitted regardless of size, with local annuals often directly influenced by the Winnipeg Secretary or U.G.G. officials. In the end, co-operation from above had created a bureaucratic machine beyond the control of the local members.(93)

Woodridge's pessimism was confirmed when Good raised decentralisation for a final time at the December 1920 U.F.C.C. annual. Waldron, the chair and Company solicitor, sharply dismissed Good's comments by saying federation was impossible under the present law. A state of affairs the U.F.O. government would do nothing to remedy. Though Good did favour the move to delegate representation, as the Company reached twenty thousand shareholders. But the U.F.O. government would frustrate even this hint of decentralisation when the Provincial Secretary refused to amend the charter for delegate representation.(94)

If 1920 marked the apex of U.F.O. development, 60,000 total members of whom 50,000 farmed (one in four
Ontario farm owners and family labourers), 1921 marked a dramatic decline to the point where the annual meeting of the U.F.C.C. had a court injunction laid against it, in the midst of the December federal election.

Deflation, which had begun in 1920, struck with a vengeance in 1921 as farm commodities dropped by more than a third in value. (95) For an overextended U.F.C.C. this had a near catastrophic effect. In March, Melvin Staples, the new U.F.O. Education Secretary, told the Board forty percent of notes given for shares were uncollectable. Then in June President Powers had to report signs of impending crisis. The Kingston store had collapsed and all thirty stores were losing money as private stores slashed prices.

In July the crisis began to bite. The Executive Committee reported a net loss of $136,000. Two more stores folded and it was necessary to close more. Powers noted that if any shareholder took them to court they would have to file for bankruptcy. The crisis intensified in August. Five more stores went down. Heavy losses were also reported for the Egg and Poultry Department run by R.H. Ashton. Clemes recommended the U.F.C.C. cut its losses by dropping orders, sell off General Wholesalers Ltd., centralise the remaining stores, and push a new club buying campaign. To some extent, Clemes suggestions were acted upon. General Wholesalers was reduced, store inventories repriced, and the Egg Department consolidated
with the Creamery at Toronto's Cold Storage Plant. In the last case, reorganisation led to a major political battle.

Apparently, R.H. Ashton did business for the U.F.C.C. on a contract basis. When he became overextended and couldn't pay a six thousand dollar note to the U.F.C.C., Ashton went to the Tories and the courts to save himself. In November, Ashton told the story of the U.F.C.C.'s financial difficulties to the Toronto Telegram and then in December, following his firing, managed to get an injunction against the regular shareholder's meeting by claiming insufficient notice.

A second charge against the Company, this time against President Powers and the Board, was brought by a Dr. Farewell from Hamilton who demanded the Company be dissolved. Farewell charged the President and Board had deliberately mismanaged the Company's affairs. He went to court to demand that U.F.C.C. financial information be released before the Auditor's report. This court application was refused. Powers had had enough and resigned in November.

When U.F.C.C. shareholders gathered informally on Tuesday, December 13 it was only to hear Manager Clemes deliver the Auditor's report, with the press present, and his own recommendations to downsize General Wholesalers and to urge a revaluation of Company stock to reduce the long term debt load. This last suggestion
would be a contentious point for farm stockholders in the coming years. Neither the Board or President reported for fear of court action. In the afternoon Dr. Farewell had a chance to repeat his charges of mismanagement. But when he revealed the rumours of financial troubles had come through the Telegram in an effort to defeat Progressive candidates like Burnaby, and to get rid of Morrison, Farewell was shouted down from the floor and then physically dragged from the stage. (99)

The shareholders recommended the re-election of the existing board, with the exception of Ashton, and put proxies in the hands of the U.F.C.C.'s officers for a later legal annual. Though the Board of Directors chose a new President, Burnaby, and Executive Committee, the leadership for 1922 was not confirmed until a Special General Shareholders' Meeting was held on January 10 to confirm the minutes of December 13th. (100) Now conscious retrenchment could start.

Between business overextension and Conservative political attacks, the U.F.C.C. was under a state of seige. It took years for the U.F.C.C. to recover. The last stores were not closed until 1923 and the first dividend, of three percent, was only declared in 1924. The long term debt was only solved by a 50% stock devaluation in 1926. (101) But when recovery came the majority still ignored Good, refusing C.U.C. offers to organise a broader federated provincial wholesale. (102)
II

If the United Farmers' Co-operative Company was resistant to the ideas of co-operation from below, Will Good sought another local forum. The Brant Farmers' Co-operative Society (B.F.C.S.) was the result. Planning began in the winter of 1914-15, a charter was granted in early 1917, expansion took place to 1921 and then, just like the U.F.C.C., disaster struck. Only this time there was no recovery. The B.F.C.S. experience revealed the same potential divisions, not just between local societies and co-op centrals, but among local farmers over co-operative methods.

The B.F.C.S. originated in response to the U.F.C.C.. Co-operation was the main item of discussion at the Brant Farmer's Institute annual in June 1914 when Keen and Good promoted the potential of the newly formed U.F.C.C.. Both North and South Brant Farmer's Institutes (the last reorganised as the first Brant U.F.O. club in 1915), and eleven newly organised Farmers' Clubs, placed orders with the U.F.C.C. in the winter of 1914-15. Business was so brisk that clubs demanded centralised receiving facilities. A three man committee was struck by the Brant County Board of Agriculture and recommended the establishment of a warehouse with a paid manager in Brantford. (103)

In June 1915 Will Good, with the help of George Ballachey and George Keen, chaired a Brantford public meeting to launch the Brant Farmers' Co-operative Society.
They stressed how a local co-operative warehouse could be founded on co-operative lines from below, citing American and Scandinavian examples. Sufficient interest was shown that an organising committee of seven was struck, among whom were Good and Ballachey, to work up a plan, raise capital, and ultimately apply for incorporation to do business. (104)

Despite initial strong interest, the minimum capital requirement of ten thousand dollars, divided into two hundred shares of fifty dollars each, took two years to raise. George Ballachey did most of the stock selling though Good brought in figures like Crerar, or tried to with Drury, to launch each season’s winter canvass with a public meeting. By mid-1916 they had raised $6000 and the final $4000 by early 1917. The personal canvass demanded great persistence. Ballachey, Good reported to one correspondent, visited some farm investors up to six times before selling a minimum fifty dollar share. But the personal canvass was the key to success in raising such a large sum of money. (105)

By early 1917 the financial means to establish the B.F.C.S. were in place. But the Society would face two major battles to get established, to be incorporated without provincial restrictions and as a comprehensive retailer despite the U.F.C.C.

In March 1917 Keen applied to the Provincial Secretary’s office in Toronto for incorporation. Keen
briefly summarized the by-laws indicating such co-operative principles as one member, one vote, no proxies, and no capitalist distribution of profits. Instead a fixed rate of interest on capital would be set with profits to be used for social purposes or membership rebates based on business done. The B.F.C.S., as stated in its 1915 prospectus, would be a complete business, with the right to buy and sell, with surpluses to be handled on Rochdale principles.(106)

The Prospectus and Keen's application indicated a substantial break from the original proposal of a distributional warehouse for U.F.C.C. orders in Brant County. A comprehensive local co-operative was instead proposed. The provisional directors even sent a letter to U.F.C.C. central offering to handle all U.F.C.C. business in Brant. Wittingly or unwittingly, this proposal would create trouble for the new Society with fellow co-operators.

In addition to the application for incorporation, Keen also stated the B.F.C.S. expected incorporation under the existing terms of the Ontario Companies Act in regard to co-operatives. The B.F.C.S. would not accept proposed changes allowing direct provincial supervision or strict rules preventing the use of co-operative funds for any government defined political purposes. Otherwise, Keen warned, the B.F.C.S. would simply register as a corporation under the general provisions and pay the
Keen's warning was not misplaced. The Provincial Secretary's office refused to process the B.F.C.S.'s application for incorporation. Instead Good had to contact Newton Rowell, provincial Liberal leader, to prod the Conservatives to get on with the B.F.C.S. application.

The sticking point Good suspected was F.C. Hart, the agriculture official responsible for provincial co-operative affairs. Hart had drafted restrictive regulations on the formation and functioning of co-operatives. Since these regulations did not yet have the force of law, it was likely the civil service was procrastinating until they did. As Good complained to Rowell, the delay had already forced the cancellation of a shareholders' meeting before spring seeding. Lobbying Rowell worked, Rowell questioned Hearst directly with the result that Hearst personally ordered the Provincial Secretary's Department to move on the B.F.C.S. application. By early May a charter had been received and the first election of a permanent Board of Directors took place.

If the first hurdle to getting established in 1917 was the provincial government, a second surprise awaited the B.F.C.S. in the response of the U.F.C.C. central office. On Saturday, June 27 the United Farmers of Ontario held a district convention in Brantford. The main speaker was A.Q.C. O'Brien, U.F.C.C. auditor. He was supposed to talk about the U.F.C.C.'s plan for co-operative livestock
marketing. Instead O'Brien delivered a stinging attack on the B.F.C.S. as a dual organisation threatening the very survival of the U.F.C.C.. The meeting broke up in chaos as central officials, O'Brien and Waldron, made charge after charge against the policies and leading individuals of the B.F.C.S., against Ballachey, Keen, and Sissons. Good, who had had to leave early for his sister Ethel's wedding, was left wondering to Cowan how paid officials of the Company could publicly attack a local co-operative society. (109)

O'Brien's attack was formally replied to by the B.F.C.S.'s Directors with a lengthy letter to the *Sun* in July. The Directors made five points. First, there had never been any conflict between the two bodies. On the contrary, the creation of the B.F.C.S. was always seen "as calculated to increase very largely the business of the provincial organisation."(110) Secondly, neither O'Brien, nor Morrison who supported him after the June 27th meeting, were speaking on behalf of the Board of the U.F.C.C.. A claim Good could legitimately make as a U.F.C.C. Board member.

Thirdly, the B.F.C.S. had sent a letter to the U.F.C.C. about doing co-operative business in Brant not to exclude the U.F.C.C. but to suggest how overlapping and wasteful competition could be prevented. But here the B.F.C.S. touched upon U.F.C.C. central office sensitivities. For the B.F.C.S. Board went on to say,
"Anyone who has studied the co-operative movement knows the value of a central wholesaler. But a central cannot intensively organise the local demand or fully satisfy the needs of the farmers."(111)

Because of this, the B.F.C.S. believed there should be a division of labour between the central and the locals, with locals like the B.F.C.S. handling virtually all of the business of the U.F.C.C. in its local territory.

Finally, the B.F.C.S. Directors defended the personal integrity of Keen and Ballachey. Keen had given his services free to obtain both the charters of the B.F.C.S. and the U.F.C.C.. Ballachey from the start had called upon local farmers to build up the business of the U.F.C.C.. What he also claimed was that without local organisation one could not get the full benefits of the provincial co-operative.(112)

The battle with the U.F.C.C. central office, despite the best efforts of the B.F.C.S. Directors, remained unresolved. There was no apology. Local co-operatives seen to be competing with the central continued to be singled out for attack at U.F.C.C. conventions. Nor were relations helped when the B.F.C.S. forced a partial repayment on a carload of Nova Scotia apples by threatening to sue the U.F.C.C. in 1918.(113)

There was in the end a fundamental misunderstanding between the two sides. What appeared as utopian and divisive from the perspective of central co-operatives was seen by local co-operators as a general model of
economic, even political, liberation from below based on
the principles of self-emancipation and self-rule.

Having weathered its encounters with the provincial
government and the U.F.C.C., the B.F.C.S. set up for
business. The Society began operations in November 1917
after securing a building at 267 Colborne Street in
Brantford, hiring a manager, George Ballachey, and opening
a line of credit with the Merchant Bank. Early business
consisted of selling farm operating supplies, like salt,
fence wire, and livestock feeds.(114)

The B.F.C.S. by-laws specified that the Society was
established to both buy and market farm necessities.
Maximum capitalisation was set at forty thousand dollars
with a maximum dividend of six percent, a reserve fund,
a patronage dividend after paying the share dividends,
and a half rebate to non-shareholders. Politically, the
Society was structured to be as democratic as possible.
There would be one man, one vote, and no proxies. The
Society would meet every six months, in June and December,
with a financial statement. At each semi-annual meeting
the Board of Directors, who in turn elected an Executive
Committee, were freshly elected with mandatory retirement
for two directors, though the two retirees were eligible
to be re-elected. All Directors were subject to recall
with every individual shareholder holding the right to
appeal. In return for these democratic rights members
were expected to raise and resolve any problems internally.
The B.F.C.S. was to be both democratic and centralist. (115)

The B.F.C.S. grew slowly at first as the Society discovered how to make contracts and do business as a co-operative retailer. In 1919 business dramatically rose with the addition of a seed cleaning plant and the marketing of seed oats to Western Canada. To meet this increase in turnover a new manager was hired, a Mr. Ball, and an additional $17,000 of stock sold for operating capital. (116)

In the spring of 1920 such were the demands placed on the B.F.C.S. that the Society decided on a major expansion, purchasing the Dominion Flour Mills building at 233 Colborne Street. This expansion was met by a Bond issue of eighty thousand dollars, sixty thousand for the building (fifteen down with five yearly installments of nine thousand) and twenty thousand for planned renovations. (117) The scene was set for a major debt crisis when devaluation struck in 1921.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>May 1918........</td>
<td>$19,481.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1919........</td>
<td>29,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1920........</td>
<td>80,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.1920.........</td>
<td>54,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1921........</td>
<td>105,458</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Good Papers, Volume 14, B.F.C.S. Bond Prospectus

As the above table indicates, the devaluation of farm
commodities in late 1920 had a considerable impact on the B.F.C.S. with a drop in turnover. The Merchant Bank reduced its credit line and demanded the rest of the stock be sold. Another stock campaign was launched and leading members had to make personal loans. In December the traditional six percent dividend was paid out. But it was drawn from the Reserve Fund. (118) By the spring of 1921, however, the Society seemed to have recovered. The real problem, accentuated by a new manager, A.J. Thompson, was not turnover but profits.

The Board obviously had some premonition that all was not well for, beginning in June 1921, they asked for monthly financial statements. Thompson's statements, however, seemed to indicate the corner had also been turned on profits, from a small margin in June to a twenty eight hundred dollar surplus by October. But when the Board ordered an inventory on November 30, the new financial statement in December showed a loss of forty seven hundred dollars. (119) Panic struck. What Thompson never told the Board was that the B.F.C.S.'s store stock had not been revalued over the deflationary period of 1920-21. Instead of recovery, with the rise in turnover, there had been a steady decline in the Society's profitability. Thompson, who agreed to be present at a special Board meeting called by Good for December 23rd, fled to the United States. News of Thompson's flight and the Society's precarious situation soon led to pressure
from Dominion Flour Mills about its mortgage. (120) 
Good, just elected Federal Progressive Member of 
Parliament for Brant, was landed with a crisis threatening 
to discredit co-operation from below.

Matters did not improve in 1922. The B.F.C.S. board 
through Good demanded the provincial government prosecute 
Thompson for fraud. The Attorney General's Department 
refused, despite a plea by Good to Drury.(121) But, as 
Keen stressed to Good, the real problem was not Thompson's 
accounting but overexpansion in the form of the Colborne 
Street property.(122) Keen was right. Despite a recovery 
in turnover and profits, the Society was forced into a 
desperate bond campaign in 1922 to meet the next mortgage 
installment(123), only to be faced with another in 1923. 
This was enough. At the June 1923 semi-annual the Society 
turned over the building to a Mr. J. Whitney, who had 
assumed the mortgage from Dominion Flour Mills, while the 
Society was reconstituted as a private joint stock 
company known as Brant Flour and Feed.(124) Ontario's 
leading example of co-operation from below foundered on 
the same rock as the U.F.C.C., overconfidence.

III

The B.F.C.S.'s clash with the U.F.C.C. in 1917 
revealed a serious division within the farm co-operative 
movement over the methods and purposes of co-operation. 
These divisions consisted not just of Good's war of 
attrition with the U.F.C.C. about the need to redefine
it as a federation. They were also revealed on the local scene, in clashes between U.F.O. farmers, and with Good and Keen's abortive scheme to turn the Co-operative Union of Canada (C.U.C.) into a model federation of co-operatives run from below.

While the B.F.C.S. was the main farm co-operative experiment in Brant during the teens, it was not the only one. Older marketing co-ops like the Brant Fruit Growers continued (with Good on the executive) and a U.F.O. Hog Marketing scheme was begun. The latter showed that co-operation from above could also have local roots.

In 1920 Peter Porter, President of the Brant U.F.O., negotiated the first local Hog Marketing agreement with the Canadian Packing Company. If the U.F.O. could guarantee a certain number of good quality hogs, delivered to the factory door, hog sellers would receive Toronto fed and watered prices. The scheme was administered by the U.F.O. County Board of Directors, with one elected Director from each Township. The scheme ran into the mid-1920s.(125)

The notable fact about the Brant U.F.O. Hog Marketing Agency is that it was run by the one prominent Brant U.F.O. leader who opposed the B.F.C.S., Peter Porter. At the infamous 1917 meeting, Porter sided with O'Brien to question Keen whether the B.F.C.S. meant to prevent the Burford U.F.O. from dealing directly with the U.F.C.C. A clearer example cited by the Sun, in support of the U.F.C.C.'s definition of local co-operative societies as
service outlets for the central, was the political battle between co-operators from below versus 'loyal U.F.O. members' over the nature of the Chatham Co-operative Association in 1918. In Chatham co-operators from above won, keeping the association out of any direct retail competition with the central.(126) There is, then, some fragmentary local information indicating popular substance to the provincial clash between Good and Morrison (and Burnaby) over the future of the U.F.C.C.

If co-operation from above or below was episodically fought out in local experiments, to Good and Keen the only logical way to systematically develop co-operative methods from below was to provide a central wholesale operation through the offices of the Co-operative Union of Canada. By providing a service to autonomous local societies, in theory, a quite different co-operative movement could be built.

The Co-operative Union of Canada was founded in 1909 by Samuel Carter from Guelph (later a Liberal M.P.P.) and George Keen, an English bookkeeper in Brantford. Though Carter and Keen hoped that provincial wholesales would develop, the main task of the early C.U.C. was to act as a clearing house of information and advice to its affiliates. These affiliates, until the admission of the United Grain Growers after World War One, were largely urban retail consumer co-operatives. They were also few in number and usually capital starved.
Two potential bases of support existed, the farm marketing co-operative movement and Alphonse Desjardins' Caisse Populaire (Credit Union) movement in French Canada. Perhaps because of the language barrier, the C.U.C., based in Brantford with Keen as organiser and editor of the *Canadian Co-operator*, concentrated on developing links and attempting to influence the rising farm movement in the direction of co-operation from below.\(^{(127)}\)

In Ontario this would take the shape of an attempt to link up County co-operative societies. By 1919 there were seven Ontario farm county co-operative societies: Manitoulin, Lambton, Brant, Simcoe, Leeds, Dundas, Lennox and Addington. The B.F.C.S. went on record in 1920 to call for the unification of these societies and in 1921, when Good was elected President of the C.U.C., the Union declared it would develop a provincial buying scheme.\(^{(128)}\) Good and Keen went so far in October 1921 as to hold an exploratory meeting with Middlesex farmers in London.

"He (Keen) outlined a scheme whereby collective activities on behalf of independent units could be democratically organized, controlled and directed, and efficiently conducted, at little additional expense."\(^{(129)}\)

But nothing in the end seemed to come of this proposal though a Middlesex farm organising committee was struck to report back about this provincial plan. Perhaps Good's election in 1921, the growing difficulties of the B.F.C.S. and the U.F.C.C., and agriculture's poor market prospects cut off this alternative path of a provincially directed
co-operative from below.

The main job of the C.U.C. in relation to Ontario farmers before 1921 lay rather in the struggle to obtain better co-operative provincial legislation. Directly after the formation of the C.U.C. there had been an intensive lobby of the Federal government with the Caisse Populaire for national co-operative legislation. This lobby was countered by the Retail Merchants' Association in 1907/08 which effectively intimidated the Laurier Liberals to put such legislation on the shelf. In the aftermath, co-operators, whether French or English, farmers or workers, pursued provincial legislation.(130)

In Ontario, the battle for better co-operative legislation was initiated in 1915 by Peterborough's H.R. Cowan with unintended consequences. In September Cowan wrote to leading U.F.O. figures such as Halbert and Good, and to Keen at the C.U.C., to suggest a joint lobby for a provincial co-operative act. Cowan's strategy was to establish a joint U.F.O./C.U.C. committee to put together a model act and to detail the Retail Association's previous blocking efforts. Ideally, every club would endorse the proposal and send a delegation to their local M.P.P.. This would be followed by getting a Conservative cabinet minister to introduce the bill in December when the U.F.O. could mount a mass lobby of Queen's Park.(131) The practical result, however, was to focus their co-operative lobby on F.C. Hart, who returned with a set
of proposals in the winter of 1916-17 that threatened
to undercut co-operative independence.

On February 14, 1917 Premier Hearst introduced Bill
66, 'An Act to Amend the Ontario Companies Act'. While
Bill 66 offered to tighten up the use of the word
'co-operative', neither farmers nor C.U.C. members could
find much more to praise. Instead, as Keen outlined in an
official C.U.C. memo to the Provincial Secretary's Office,
Bill 66 introduced a degree of state direction over
co-operative affairs "unparalleled in any other country."(132)

Keen presented five major objections to Bill 66's
amendment of Section 152 of the Ontario Companies Act
(which dealt with co-operation). They were that Bill 66
limited the distribution of profits solely to the Rochdale
plan, limited contributions to the Reserve Fund, made
branch proxies equal, and demanded every branch have a
board of management. The last two objections dealt with
relatively straightforward problems, objecting to
cumbersome local management structures that had repeatedly
failed to work and making branches equal despite different
membership sizes. A more significant practical problem was
the limit put on reserve contributions. As Keen pointed
out, many co-operatives when they first started needed to
devote nearly all of their surpluses to the reserve for
financial stability. A twenty percent ceiling could
prove disastrous.

Keen, and Good's, main objection was to Hearst's plan
to channel all co-operative redistribution into Rochdale lines, i.e., redistribution on a capitalist basis deterred by share ownership or business patronage. As Keen noted, in many European co-operatives surpluses could also be devoted to community purposes. Distribution, the radical economic principle of those who attempt to reform capitalism from within, should be organised "with a view to the eventual evolution of a co-operative commonwealth."(133)

Keen also noted what could only be described as government paternalism, legal prescriptions for interest rates on share dividends, up to eight percent, and a limit on education or community funds to only five percent of the total surplus. The last seemed to be politically motivated as a means to block any significant financing of the U.F.O. by the U.F.C.C.

Having voiced their criticisms, Good, Keen and Cowan swung into action to try and prevent the passage of Bill 66 by meeting various officials; Good with Agricultural Commissioner Creelman, Keen with F.C. Hart, and Cowan with Mr. Dargavel, Conservative chair of the Legislature's Agriculture Committee. All of these reasoned protests were to no avail. Hearst was determined to pass new co-operative legislation and Rowell, despite Good's pleas, believed it better to wait for a year before attempting any amendments. By mid-April Bill 66 received its third reading and passed into law.(134)
Needless to say, Conservative determination to undercut co-operative independence, with Hart travelling the province to promote local co-operatives outside the U.F.C.C. (which explains some of Morrison's hostility to the B.F.C.S.), and Rowell's pusillanimous behaviour in defending the existing co-operative movement, did nothing to endear either party to radicalising farmers.

The one other role the C.U.C. played in Ontario was to promote education in co-operative principles. Good was often asked for co-operative advice by fellow Ontario farmers, and by O.D. Skelton for a Saskatchewan Livestock Marketing Commission study. Good and Keen were also active in publishing articles in the Ontario farm press explaining basic co-operative methods. On occasion, their efforts ranged beyond theory to such practical questions as the free production of oleo margarine, the defense of which set them off from the mainstream farm movement who saw in margarine a powerful threat to Ontario's dairy industry.(135)

IV

In the end, whether through the development of the U.F.C.C., the B.F.C.S., or the C.U.C., two points can be made about the Ontario farm co-operative movement in relation to the challenge of farm progressive politics in 1919 and 1921.

The first is the rather obvious but never made point that co-operative organisation was the backbone of the farm movement. Economic association on class lines laid
the basis for a break from the conventional two party
system. The origin of U.F.O. Clubs and Riding Associations
clearly lie with the development first of U.F.C.C. buying
and marketing clubs. In some cases, like Manitoulin or
Brant, the Progressive challenge originated from
independent co-operative societies pioneering more
radical economic experiments. (136)

The second point, running throughout the experience
of all three co-operatives is the fact of differing
arguments and strategies about co-operation. Was
co-operation from above, farm associations like the
U.F.C.C. run from the top down, treating clubs as service
outlets or market collection points, to dominate? Or
could there be a model of co-operation from below, based
on comprehensive local societies with a federated
wholesaler subject to the locals, organised in radical
populist structures?

In Ontario by 1921 the weight of argument within the
provincial co-operative movement was clearly against
people like Good, Cowan and Keen who argued for the
transformation of the U.F.C.C. into a decentralised
federation. When this became clear, they moved to set up
an alternative model of co-operation from below, first
through the B.F.C.S. and then, on a provincial scale, the
abortive proposal to develop the Ontario C.U.C. as a
federated wholesaler to county co-operative societies.

Despite their defeats, co-operators from below
believed to do otherwise would be disastrous. The very heart of co-operation to them was a social emancipation based on self-activity and self-rule, even if set within the partial experience of rural small property. As Will Good wrote in September 1921 on the future of the U.F.O., "like all paternalistic governments, all attempts to confer the benefits of cooperation from above, without training cooperators, are doomed to failure, ... ." (137)
ENDNOTES


2. See Edenvale U.F.O. Club Minute Book, Simcoe County Archives (Minesing, Ont.) or East Lambton, U.F.O. Minutes, 1919-32, University of Western Ontario (London, Ont.). There are two other sets of minutes as well, Crown Hill (E.C. Drury's club near Barrie, also Simcoe County Archives), and a minute book for the North Brant U.F.O., Good Papers, Volume 27, 1925-27. Undoubtedly, given there were 1465 clubs in 1920, some other club minutes will turn up.

3. The exact number of U.F.O. stores is difficult to judge. At the informal annual meeting for 1920, the new General Manager, H.B. Cleses, claimed thirty six. This was at the peak of U.F.C.C. development and just before the move to refuse to recognise any more locally initiated stores as U.F.C.C. affiliated. See U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, December 14, 1920. If one counts independent local farm and farm-labour stores, there were probably fifty such co-operative stores.


5. J.J. Morrison was chosen Secretary-Treasurer at the first board meeting on March 20, 1914 and C.E. Birkett hired in April. Gordon Waldron, war time editor of the Weekly Sun, was Recording Secretary at the first Board meeting and became the Company's Solicitor. See U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, March 20, 1914, and those for April 13, 1914. Salaries were voted through on November 12, 1914.

6. Apparently the early U.F.C.C. used the Peterborough offices of H.B. Cowan's Farm and Dairy as well as Morrison's home in Arthur. See U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, April 13, 1914 (move to Toronto decision), June 13, 1914 (re using Peterborough and moving into 100 Church), and see September 8, 1915 (move to 110 Church). For the move to 2 Francis see Good Papers, Volume 3, J.J. Morrison to W.C. Good, April 15, 1917, Toronto (moved in April 14, 1917). The U.F.C.C., which
became the U.C.O. in 1948, remained at 2 Francis until the 1960s when the U.C.O. Tower was built in Mississauga's Square One.

7. U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, April 25, 1914 (re line of credit). For contracts see Board Minutes April 30, 1914 (Sarnia Wire Fence) and December 31, 1914 (Belfast Rope, for binder twine). The Supply Department commenced business on October 1, 1914. See Board Annual Report, February 26, 1915.

8. *Farm and Dairy*, July 9, 1914.


16. U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, September 8, 1915, Good's resignation received and motion to reconsider.


32. Good Papers, Volume 3, W.C. Good to T.A. Crerar, July 23, 1916, Paris, Ontario. "I thought I could see the tail of the serpent and left Drury a warning note. It appears to me however that Morrison has again emerged victorious."


34. Good Papers, Volume 3, W.C. Good to C.E. Birkett, August 4, 1916, Paris, Ontario (after spending last
Sunday with Drury, 'he more hopeful'), and W.C. Good to H.B. Cowan, August 21, 1916, Paris, Ontario (re a discussion with Crerar about the U.F.C.C. at the Niagara Falls, Single Land Tax Conference, August 20th).


39. Ibid.


44. Good Papers, Volume 3, J.J. Morrison to W.C. Good, April 19, 1917, Toronto (notification of Board meeting on April 28), and H.B. Cowan to W.C. Good, May 1, 1917, Peterborough (re outcome of Board meeting). Interestingly, there is no official record of this Board meeting in the minutes.


49. Weekly Sun, July 4, 1917.


52. Good Papers, H.B. Cowan to W.C. Good, July 4, 1917, Peterborough.

53. U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, August 10, 1917. Good introduced the B.F.C.S. protest "criticizing the ground taken by the Secretary and Auditor at the Brantford Convention. The matter was left unsettled as Mr. Good left for the train."


55. U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, September 18, 1917, and Minutes, October 5, 1917, Gurney resigns and Blatchford is promoted Acting Manager.


57. Weekly Sun, December 26, 1917 and Farm and Dairy, December 27, 1917.

58. Weekly Sun, December 26, 1917.

60. **Weekly Sun**, July 10, 1918 (re Drovers' combine), U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, September 3, 1918 (bought Toronto Livestock Exchange seat), and December 17, 1918 (hired U.G. expert, Duncan).


62. **Weekly Sun**, July 17, 1918 (report on 1918 stock selling campaign). See also **Farm and Dairy**, September 12, 1918.

63. U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, February 28, 1918 (clearly the Board envisaged setting up a co-operative produce store with the Toronto Trades and District Labour Council). See also **Weekly Sun**, April 3, 1918 (indicated June 1 opening date).

64. U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, June 12, 1918.

65. **Weekly Sun**, December 26, 1917 (Tucker Address). For the debate between the Ontario Junior Farmers' Improvement Society and the U.F.C.C., see **Weekly Sun**, January 2, 1918 and January 9, 1918.

66. For the Tilbury U.F.O. protest, see **Weekly Sun**, April 24, 1918, Rationing Orders, **Weekly Sun**, May 1, 1918, and U.C.O., U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, July 20, 1918 (complaints re how war restrictions are harming the co-operatives business, perhaps even on purpose).

67. **Farmers' Sun**, December 18, 1918 and **Farm and Dairy**, December 26, 1918.

68. U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, January 10, 1918, Shipping Plan presented by Bruce Tucker and F. Sandy (Omemee stock shippers, elected as U.F.O. parliamentary representative in 1919 for Victoria South). See also Board Minutes for January 17, 1919 and the Duncan report endorsing the entry of the U.F.C.C. into livestock pooling. On the first few weeks of operation, see **Farmers' Sun**, April 2, 1919, and Convention report, **Farmers' Sun**.
Sun, December 24, 1919. (The Weekly Sun became the U.F.O owned Farmers' Sun in April 1919).

69. U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, February 19, 1919 (Powell's resignation), and March 27, 1919 (hiring of T.P. Loblaw). See also the minutes for September 5, 1919 noting that Burnaby had also been placed on salary.

70. U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, April 23, 1919 (setting out terms of affiliation for branch stores). For the public announcement see Loblaw's speech to the Northumberland U.F.O. in Farmers' Sun, April 30, 1919.

71. Farmers' Sun, April 9, 1919.


73. U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, January 17, 1919 (approval of regional warehouses), and Executive Committee Minutes, October 30, 1919 (re stock campaign).


76. Farmers' Sun, December 17 and December 24, 1919.

77. U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Annual Minutes, December 16, 1919 (for a brief report), Farmers' Sun, December 24, 1919, and, for a more sympathetic account, Farm and Dairy, December 25, 1919. In 1920 the United Dairymen Co-operative was organised on federated lines, Farm and Dairy, April 29, 1920.


81. U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board of Directors Minutes,
March 29, 1920 and for April 19, 1920. See also Farmers' Sun, July 10, 1920 (re opening joint Farm-Labour Toronto store).


84. Ibid, for Auditor's Report.


86. U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board of Directors Minutes, February 25, 1920. This rejection of federation was confirmed at a Board meeting on November 25, 1920.

87. Good Papers, Volume 4, G.F. Chipman to W.C. Good, November 9, 1920, Winnipeg.


91. Good Papers, Volume 4, P. Woodbridge to W.C. Good, April 18, 1921, Calgary.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.


95. A.E. Safarian, The Canadian Economy in the Great Depression, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970, (original 1959), 28. See also Farmers' Sun, December 18, 1920. President Burnaby claimed there was a 50% fall in the price of U.F.C.C. handled goods (which
appears to confirm the historical index series).


97. U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, October 6, 1921, November 25, 1921, and minutes for 'Special Shareholders' Meeting', December 13, 1921.

98. See Farm and Dairy, November 17, 1921 (re Farewell protest meeting in Toronto), Farmers' Sun, December 14, 1921 (re Farewell's treatment), and U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, January 10, 1922 (confirm Special meeting, elect executive, and note Farewell charges dropped).


100. U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, January 10, 1922. At the next Board meeting, January 30, 1922, a department by department review was ordered.


102. U.C.O. Library, U.F.C.C. Board Minutes, August 6, 1925. Keen proposed a joint speaking tour to launch a provincial federated wholesale. The Board decided to take 'no action'. Such was the low state of co-operators from below that Good was defeated in a bid to get onto the Board. See U.F.C.C. Annual December 8, 1925.


104. Weekly Sun, June 30, 1915.

106. Good Papers, Volume 3, G. Keen to F. Johns (Acting Assistant Provincial Secretary), March 5, 1917, Brantford, and, in Volume 14, The Brant Farmers' Co-operative Society Prospectus, June 19, 1915.


110. Weekly Sun, July 11, 1917.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.


114. Good Papers, Volume 14, B.F.C.S. 1920 Bond Prospectus (July 3, 1920) and Good Presidential Address (semi-annual), August 1921. For a brief report of the B.F.C.S.'s early business, see also Farm and Dairy, July 4, 1918.


118. Good Papers, Volume 14, Good Presidential Address, August 1921.


120. Good Papers, Volume 4, W.B. Wood to W.C. Good, January 19, 1921, Montreal and W.B. Wood to G. Keen, February 9, 1921, Montreal. See also Volume 14, Good's August 1921 Presidential Address on the Merchant Bank's credit reduction.

122. Good Papers, Volume 5, G. Keen to W. Good, March 20, 1922, Brantford.


124. Good Papers, Volume 5, W. Good to J.H. Dunsdon, June 18, 1923, Ottawa, and G. Keen to W. Good, August 20, 1923, Brantford.

125. Farmers' Sun, February 14, June 3, and August 7, 1920, and January 15, 1921.

126. Weekly Sun, April 17, 1918.


128. Farmers' Sun, March 17, 1920 (re B.F.C.S. provincial aspirations). For Good's election as President of the C.U.C. see Farmers' Sun, September 7, 1921, and exploring a provincial buying scheme, Farmers' Sun, October 8, 1921.

129. Farmers' Sun, October 22, 1921.

130. I. MacPherson, Each For All, Toronto: Macmillan, 1979, see pages 31-33 on how national co-operative legislation was blocked in 1908/09.


132. Good Papers, Volume 3, Copy of Bill 66 - An Act to Amend the Ontario Companies Act, and G. Keen to F. Johns, March 5, 1917, Peterborough.

133. Ibid.

135. On the margarine debate between Good and Keen for the C.U.C. and dairy farmers see Weekly Sun, January 3 and January 31, 1917. For Good as a publicist see Good Papers, Volume 2, J.R. Miller (Editor of Canadian Countryman) to W.C. Good, January 21, 1916, Toronto and W.C. Good to W. Toole, March 31, 1917, Paris, Ontario (both referring to commissioned surveys on co-operation by the Countryman and the Advocate).


136. Farmers' Advocate, December 30, 1915 for a lengthy report on the Manitoulin Marketing Association. Remarkably, there is no mention of this organisation in F. Griezic, "'Power to the People' ... The Manitoulin By-Election, October 24, 1918", Ontario History, LXIX, March 1977, No. 1, 33-54. The answer to Griezic's question as to why Manitoulin should lead the political revolt, since there were two other by-elections, could lie in the subjective factor of county co-operative organisation.

137. Canadian Countryman, August 27, 1921. Also held in Good Papers, Volume 24.
PART THREE:

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF NON-PARTISANSHIP
VII. WAR COERCION

World War One was the great forcing ground in developing farm class consciousness. The election of an Ontario Farm-Labour provincial government in 1919, the three cornered division of Federal representation in 1921, between Conservatives, Liberals, and Progressives, marked a fundamental break with the two party, cross class politics of Conservatives and Liberals.

The phases in the emergence of this class feeling mirrored the national government's war policies as it moved from voluntarism to compulsion. As the Borden government intensified war production and military recruitment, the Ontario farm community grew increasingly restive. Starting in 1916, the U.F.O. leadership protested a more centralised voluntary effort. By 1918, when military conscription was fully applied to farm families, and an extensive economic controls regime begun, there was an explosion of political protest.

One important point is that war coercion continued after the peace. While conscription lapsed at war's end, economic controls intensified. In the fall session of 1919 Meighen introduced the Combines and Fair Prices Act. This established the short lived Board of Commerce which set prices as a way to combat war inflation. In Ontario this legislation led to a major battle between the Board and dairy farmers, ending in a Federal-Provincial
confrontation in 1920.

Good and the U.F.O., sometimes against their better judgement, sometimes to their surprise, found themselves at the centre of these political storms arising out of the economic conflicts of war.

I

The political arm of the new co-operative movement, the United Farmers of Ontario, barely existed until called into being by the spontaneous action of farmers themselves. Though the U.F.O. was launched as a dual movement, the first priority was to establish the U.F.C.C. on a sound footing. Not until December 1915 were the finances of the U.F.O. separated from those of the U.F.C.C. (1) Only in 1917 as conscription and controls began to threaten did the U.F.O. develop as an active lobby in defense of Ontario farmers. Indeed until 1917 and the ratification of the Farmers' Platform, prepared by the Canadian Council of Agriculture, the chief form of U.F.O. propaganda was the work of individuals writing for the farm press. The chief propagandist was Good with articles, letters, and pamphlets.

In the first years of the war, farm debate focused on the federal government's Production and Patriotism campaigns. The first was launched in the spring of 1915 with the release of the War Book. Through farm press advertisements, production pamphlets, inspirational meetings, and by provincial schemes to provide seed and
voluntary farm labour, farmers were exhorted to ever greater levels of production. Since the federal Department of Agriculture transmitted this voluntary programme through provincial departments, there came to be a close identification between provincial governments and federal farm war production policies. To compound matters in Ontario, a provincial Organisation and Resources Committee was established in 1916 to coordinate and intensify the voluntary effort.(2)

At the outset of the war, the Canadian Council of Agriculture mounted a joint lobby with the Canadian Manufacturers' Association. Together they asked Borden to relieve producers of restrictive government taxes and policies.(3) The C.C.A. was soon disabused of any notion that pre-war class privileges were to be abolished. The first war budget in 1915 dramatically raised the general and intermediate tariffs by seven and a half percent, and a five percent charge was applied to the Imperial Preference.

Though the C.C.A. office in Winnipeg continued to organise joint farm-commerce lobbies to Ottawa, the U.F.O. became increasingly sceptical. In this context, of a heavier tax burden on farm production, the exhortations of the Production and Patriotism campaigns came to be seen as gross hypocrisy.

One sceptical delegate to Ottawa in November 1914 was Good. He did not share the western delegates confidence in asking Borden for a Royal Commission on farm production
costs. As Good stated before the Grange in the spring of 1915, tax reform and co-operative organisation were the only solutions, since farm exports were seen as the key to offsetting a growing war debt. (4) Good also moved quickly to advise the business community of U.F.O. scepticism about education without economic reform with a letter to the Financial Post demanding a free market, cheap supplies by duty removal, and lower land prices by introducing the Single Land Tax. Neither J.B. McLean, the Post's owner, nor Justus Miller, editor of the Canadian Countryman, who both replied, seemed capable of grasping Good's demand for a voluntary war effort on new policy lines. (5)

There was no misreading organised farm opinion when the U.F.O. held its first annual convention in February 1915. As the official minutes noted, the chief thrust of the Resolutions Committee was to demand free trade with Britain as the most effective way to raise war production. As well, there was praise for the Hearst government's direct war tax, based on municipal assessment, and condemnation of Federal controls on cottonseed meal and the embargo on horses to the United States. The only aspect of the Production and Patriotism campaign U.F.O. farmers welcomed was the sudden prominence given to rural problems. (6)

Organised farm criticisms grew in the fall of 1915 with revelations of corruption in the Shell Committee and Horse Purchasing Commission. A Good letter on the need to
conscript wealth to check abuses when abnormal profits could be made was published in *The Farmers' Magazine* and elicited a positive response from other U.F.O. members. (7) But revelations about the Davies pork packing profits in 1916, and what was seen as a government whitewash, the O'Connor report, reinforced a sense of alienation when the national government refused to guarantee farm profits. (8)

Nor did the lack of federal or provincial recognition of the organised farmer pass unnoticed. Despite Borden's promise to establish a Royal Commission on Agriculture, no such action was taken. (9) When Ontario Conservatives were challenged about farm policy in 1915, they cut off legislative debate. (10) Nor would federal or provincial agricultural department workers consult with farmers on the design of the Production and Patriotism campaigns. (11)

As an angry R.H. Halbert, U.F.O. President, said in 1917:

"Our organisation has, during the past year, been most outrageously ignored by the powers that be. As your President I have felt very keenly, and no doubt you all have, some of the slaps in the face which our organisation has received, especially when we are told by some of the men who are enjoying a fat living on our own money that we, 12,000 members of our organisation, are too small and insignificant to be recognized. Still a few millionaires in this city can name the men and have them appointed to the cabinet." (12)

But in the early years of the war, for all the criticisms of organised farmers, they thought the war just. The war was being fought to defend British liberty from German autocracy. The best evidence for this lay precisely
in the voluntary nature of the Canadian war effort. Even Good, for all his criticisms of munitions trusts as the cause of war, and ineffective government policies, saw the war as one waged in defence of democratic ideals. (13) He was upset when W.L. Smith saw the war as nothing more than a clash of rival imperialisms.

"The pretence that this is a battle for freedom (do not mention this however) became sheerest humbug in view of the fact that in one province of India 200 people have in the last few weeks been hanged or shot for endeavouring to give India the only just government, that existing by consent of the governed. The motives behind the war certainly are mixed, but the mixture is based on commercial and territorial greed of all the great powers involved." (14)

Only when voluntary methods threatened to become coercive, in recruitment drives, soldier attacks on any public questioning of war policies, and with compulsory economic controls, did Good and other U.F.O. leaders see merit in Smith's arguments.

Voluntary enlistments peaked in early 1916 and demands were heard for a more centrally coordinated and intensified recruitment drive. This pressure was clearly felt by Ontario farmers as 1916 U.F.O. convention delegates demanded a national survey of farm labour requirements with a badge exempting farm boys from these stepped up recruitment drives. (15) Otherwise, young farmers could be literally pressed ganged, as described by one U.F.O. delegate.

"Not far off a man 80 years of age, with 200 acres, has one son with him, and when this son went to Collingwood the other day a crowd surrounded him and tried to carry him into the recruiting office." (16)
The growing strains of the voluntary war effort led Good to offer a deeper analysis of the economy with the single land tax as remedy. Beginning in March 1916 the Farmers' Advocate published an eleven part series on 'Studies in Political Economy' by Good. Later, this series would become the basis for his book Production and Taxation.

The first half of 'Studies in Political Economy' presented an explanation of Georgite economics. The problem Good began with was the paradox for small property owners, that the desire for wealth was legitimate yet its distribution was unfair. A class of rich had arisen who increasingly monopolised the means of producing wealth. Good explained this process with a Canadian Robinson Crusoe. In the original settlement of the prairies the first farmers took the best land and reaped an unearned benefit, a ground rent. Out of this unearned income a class of rich developed. Since wages (or farm product prices) and interest on capital were just, i.e. earned incomes for individually created factors contributing to production, the source of inequality was ground rent for land values created as a result of 'accidental advantages' but owned individually.

To correct this anomaly a measure was needed to socially average land values. Specifically, the single land tax would equalize ground rents by applying a direct tax on assessment values. The higher the assessment value, the more tax an owner would pay with the consequence that
uneared income would be returned to the community. All producers, then, in Georgeite theory, would be placed on an equal footing. Rich and poor would gradually disappear and a society of relatively equal small producers would come into being.(17)

The second half of Good's series then applied this model, first to Western Canada where non-producers, such as Railway land companies, held title to a majority of arable land and secondly, to Eastern Canadian farmers, who owned the land but had their surpluses taxed away by the tariff.

The basis of national prosperity, Good stated, including the ability to meet Canada's growing war debts, was agriculture. But, by not dealing with ground rent, government policies were retarding farm production. The main burden on farm production was the tariff. To show this, Good drew upon the Census and private replies from figures such as R.H. Coats, Dominion Statistician(18), to illustrate the inequality of returns between farm and industrial investment and to locate this inequality in a tax policy that transferred rural surpluses to urban industry.

Good finished by showing how the single land tax would raise government revenue and dramatically lessen the tax burden on farm production. Citing the Dominion Grange's 1912 survey of rural assessment methods in Ontario, a 1914 study of urban Ontario land values, and the assessed
values of public franchises and natural resources, Good showed that farm land only constituted one fifth of taxable values. If the Federal government moved to a flat tax rate of four percent on all land values, the yield would be an estimated $240 million dollars (instead of the current $92 million dollars), while farm taxation would be dramatically cut.

The main problem with capitalism, Good concluded, lay in unearned ground rents. This was the source of class polarisation and parasitical economic policies like the tariff. If direct taxation of land values could be introduced, a gradual but fundamental structural reform would correct this cancer. The nineteenth century, Good stated, solved the question of production. The task of the twentieth was to obtain justice in distribution. Otherwise, farmers would reduce production, and inflation and scarcity would appear.(19)

Good's articles drew a warm response from farm leaders and the farm press, with numerous encouragements to republish the series as a pamphlet. Though his friend Drury cautioned him, "if there is a weakness, you are possibly a little too cocksure in the conclusions you draw from statistics".(20) Reaction beyond the farm community was mixed, if not hostile. His academic friends, Professor W.J. Alexander at the University of Toronto and O.D. Skelton at Queens', offered some trenchant criticisms about his agrarian sectionalism and theoretical reliance
With Gordon Waldron, war time editor of the *Weekly Sun*, a state of intellectual war was declared. Waldron refused to run any single land tax material and declared that Georgeism equalled communism. That there could be a communal interest in land, but not in man made things, was rejected. Though Waldron had to admit he found it surprising that so many farm leaders, including Chipman and Crerar, supported Georgeism.(22)

Good denied there was a connection between George and Marx. "George disclaims any advocacy of socialism, as do his followers. They are all jealous of the rights of property." If anything, Good considered that George had "ignored the truth of socialism".(23) This made little impression on Waldron. As far as he was concerned, George was 'an unconscious collectivist' and therefore a closet Marxist. Besides there was the practical question of a conservative Ontario farm audience, 'more devoted to property than England or Australia.'

"There are 250,000 farmers, there are all the town lot owners and there are powerful commercial and financial classes whose interest is identical. That you persuade all these great elements of the community to immolate themselves for the benefit and advantage of the few pitiful cases Joe Atkinson and Wesley Rowell see in their limited peregrinations, I cannot believe."(24)

In the end, however, it was Good who was closer to organised farm opinion. One of the few promises kept by the Drury government was local option in property taxation methods.(25)
By the fall of 1916 the economic strains of the war effort began to affect farm production with labour shortages and cost inflation. As Good wrote to W. Toole, Farmers' Advocate editor,

"Farmers are growing bitter at seeing so many idle men around the towns and cities and being unable to get any help with the pressing work on the farms. I have heard some say that they will not put in the crops another year. I have twice tried to get a soldier to help me. The first stayed four days but found life 'too slow' on the farm. The second stayed a day and a half. The Brantford officers do not disguise their objection to seeing their men go to the farms. Unless the situation changes very materially production will fall off still more another year." (26)

The Weekly Sun confirmed this by noting in its annual fall survey that a considerable drop in seeding was reported by its correspondents across the province. (27)

In February 1916 Ottawa released the High Cost of Living Report, originally commissioned before the War. It showed inflation had risen fifty percent since 1901. The Report blamed the high cost of gold. The farm press, including Good, blamed public policy not the monetary system. As Good put it in an article for the Canadian Countryman, the war's waste, big business combinations, and the tariff, lay at the roots of the developing inflationary crisis. Either producers would fight to establish a co-operative commonwealth or the Federal government would establish 'state socialism - a truly terrible prospect', i.e., state capitalism, a prediction of some accuracy. (28)

These dire warnings, and the single tax panacea, were
brought together by Good in an address to Toronto's Empire Club before a gathering of the city's business elite. Despite an invitation to speak on how to use science to raise farm productivity, Good insisted on speaking about 'Canada's Rural Problem' whose solution lay only in government policy changes. As J.B. Perry said, after the November 30 luncheon, "It is not too much to say that it made a distinct impression on your hearers and gave much food for thought along the lines suggested by you."(29)

Whatever the business community thought of Good's criticisms, the real debate among farmers centred in December on the Farmers' Platform, just issued by the Canadian Council of Agriculture. In it, the Council addressed three questions, tariff reform, alternative tax sources, and other economic and moral issues.

The tariff, the C.C.A. argued, was an inefficient source of government income holding back farm production, the basis of the Canadian war effort. To remedy this the Council demanded six changes: to immediately reduce the Canadian tariff by 50% for British goods, with free trade with Britain within five years; to accept the American standing offer of limited reciprocity; that all food, farm machinery and parts be put on the free list; that the tariff be reduced on 'all necessaries of life'; and that any tariff concessions made to others be automatically extended to Britain.(30) At the heart of these proposals it should be noted was the pre war demand for free trade
with Britain, a patriotic demand Laurier Liberals raised in 1916 in response to Borden's second war budget.(31)

Obviously, if the tariff was cut significantly, alternative sources of income would have to be found. Suggestions ranged from the newly established business profits tax, to the future inheritance and graduated income tax, to the Single Land Tax. Seven other reforms were suggested to deal with public resources, direct democracy, and moral reform, from nationalising 'natural monopolies' to direct legislation, automatic federal enfranchisement of women if provincially granted, to full provincial autonomy on liquor legislation.(32)

The Platform, before it could serve to channel public debate or be applied to political candidates, had to be ratified by the C.C.A.'s constituent groups. In the case of the U.F.O., the executive clearly were afraid some proposals were too radical. Much to their surprise the Platform was adopted unanimously at the February 1917 convention, with a standing vote in support of reciprocity. The executive was also instructed to cable Borden in Britain to protest his subordination of Canada's interests to British imperialism.(33) With a programme, publicised in a special edition of Farm and Dairy in June 1917(34), the U.F.O. was now in a position to present an alternative set of policies to the urban parties dominating both levels of government.

Behind the U.F.O.'s ratification of the Farmer's
Platform lay a serious attempt in 1916 to activate the U.F.O. as an organisation standing apart from the U.F.C.C., with considerable friction between Good and Morrison. At first considerable progress was made in developing U.F.O. propaganda work. Good, Cowan, and Drury were instructed to write articles publicising U.F.O. positions in the farm and city press, with Good to study whether the U.F.O. could establish a monthly paper. Cowan's suggestion for district conventions was taken up, and in April Good sat on a committee to develop a U.F.O. 'Programme of Action'.(35)

In September, at the usual C.N.E. Board meeting, the U.F.O.'s plan of action was presented. It began with the farmers' assessment of the Patriotism and Production campaigns as ineffectual, noting the continued exodus from the countryside, and low cash returns in comparison to urban laborers. "Neither party has a true conception of the situation. The farmers of Ontario must rise to and deal with the situation themselves."(36) Five practical suggestions were made. A Farmer's Platform was needed, district conventions on an annual basis, more permanent publications, perhaps a paper, that the Directors meet separately from U.F.C.C. meetings, and both United Farmer organisations join the Canadian Council of Agriculture.(37) By 1919 these ambitious proposals would be realised as government coercion supplied the motivation to rank and file farmers to act. But it was a realisation built on a
reaction to outside events, not conscious planning, much to Good's frustration.

To begin with, Good seemed able to use the U.F.O. in a pre-figurative manner, as a pioneer in the methods of direct democracy, with the successful passage of a preferential balloting system at the 1916 convention. He was also elected to the Board as Second Vice-President, a post Good remained in until 1918 when the Board was reorganised on County lines. But the preferential ballot was dropped at the February 1917 convention as being too complicated. (38)

Good also tried to remove Morrison as U.F.O. Secretary. If Good thought he had trouble with the single transferable vote, his attempt to demote Morrison to U.F.O. organiser with a young college man to act as Secretary, brought a personal attack by the U.F.C.C. office on the B.F.C.S., and Good's temporary resignation from the U.F.O. Board. Throughout 1916 Good argued with Morrison and the Board that the U.F.O. had to start some educational work. (39)

"What impresses me now is the extraordinary opportunity presented just now for the U.F.O. work. Great interest has been aroused and a vigorous campaign would line up the majority in the province." (40)

Morrison refused. Until, he argued, the U.F.C.C. could give adequate service there was no point in adding another job. (41) However, in March 1917, Good managed to convince the Board that Morrison's job should be split as a preliminary to an aggressive U.F.O. recruitment drive.
Despite correspondence confirming Good's interpretation (42), and an extensive correspondence by Good and Cowan to locate possible candidates (43), no formal motion to this effect was recorded in the minutes.

When the next board meeting occurred in May, Morrison managed to block any action, citing the poor state of U.F.C.C. affairs. As Cowan stated afterwards, this episode was like Morrison's clash with Birkett in 1914, when Morrison drove out a competent clerk rather than lose office control. (44) Then, once Morrison had isolated Good from the rest of the Board, O'Brien dropped his bomb in Brantford, attacking the B.F.C.S. as a dual organisation in competition with U.F.C.C. central. (45) Good had already resigned his Board position in disgust. But Morrison convinced Good to let his name stand so as not to publicly upset U.F.O. supporters. (46)

The ranks of the U.F.O. would grow instead in a spontaneous way with radicalisation in 1918 doubling membership from 12,000 to 25,000, to 48,000 in 1919, to a peak of 60,000 in 1920. (47) Few, however, were privy to this clash within the U.F.O. leadership, between Board members and co-operative officials. And Good remained the public voice of the U.F.O. in its growing disagreement with the voluntary war effort.

By 1917 it was clear to the U.F.O. that voluntarism was not working. In January Good issued an open letter to Martin Burrell, federal Minister of Agriculture,
challenging his address in the *Agricultural Gazette* calling for more farm production. Good stated flatly the government couldn't be serious when two hundred million dollars was being taken out of agriculture each year through tariff taxation. Labour and capital were being driven out of agriculture. Burrell's job should be to remove these 'artificial handicaps' instead "of applying the whip to those already working to the limit of exhaustion." (48) Needless to say, Burrell neither replied to the Open Letter or worked to reduce the tariff.

Broader signs of farm resentment against voluntarism were not hard to find. As the *Weekly Sun* reported, the Hearst campaign for farm production in the spring of 1917 was singularly unproductive. Of ten thousand war production questionnaires sent out to farmers, only one hundred and thirty replies were received. Mass production rallies elicited virtually no farmer participation. Apparently, not a single farmer attended a Whitby rally on the farm labour situation, while a province wide rally at Massey Hall saw farmers represented by Department of Agriculture officials. (49)

The contradiction of the voluntary war effort, between governments asserting the centrality of agriculture yet doing little about farm tax or labour policy, would emerge forcefully once men for the military were deemed more important than farm production, and when coercive market controls were applied systematically.
Before conscription was introduced in 1917, coercion existed, but in a sporadic manner. From the war's start there were incidents of patriotism that deeply disturbed farm leaders. C.A. Zavitz, Acting President of Guelph's Ontario Agricultural College and a Quaker, resigned rather than organise a student military corps. Guelph citizens demanded the province fire Zavitz, something Hearst refused to do.(50) Other 'Prussian' incidents remarked upon by U.F.O. leaders were soldier attacks on any public protest against war policies, especially conscription, and the renaming of Berlin as Kitchener in 1916.(51)

In 1915, to many farmers astonishment, the Federal government instituted controls on some farm products. A horse embargo prevented shipments to the United States as the Remount Commission was concerned to guarantee a pool of horses for the British and French Armies.(52) Hay also was embargoed and the Conservatives briefly embargoed wheat, at fixed prices, in the fall of 1915 as the Allies moved to centralised purchasing.(53) Of great concern to Ontario dairy farmers, with limited oil cake feed supplies, a replacement ration in the form of cottonseed meal from the United States was included in the new tariff duties. It should, the U.F.O. claimed, be placed on the free list for the sake of the war effort.(54)

Most of these measures, however, were temporary. It was the growing labour shortage and concern at
recruiters' methods that dominated farm concerns in the first stage of the war. In 1915 there were two major rows over voluntarism turning into compulsion. Farmers demanded at the annual Convention of Agricultural Societies the Federal government reaffirm its no conscription pledge. And when rural trustees met at the Ontario Educational Association conference, they bitterly denounced compulsory cadet training in the schools.(55)

Official U.F.O. attitudes to the voluntary recruitment effort, however, remained positive until Borden committed Canada to a half million strong Canadian Expeditionary Force in January 1916. The scale of such a voluntary effort, the recruitment of one in two men between the ages of eighteen and forty five, alarmed the farm community. Good argued for a more 'rational' method of selective voluntary recruitment with a national labour inventory(56), a measure Borden introduced on a voluntary basis in 1916 and then as a compulsory measure in 1918. From U.F.O. minutes, it appears the labour policy farmers wanted was Britain's where the farm sector had been singled out for selective treatment after the introduction of conscription in the spring of 1916.(57)

Borden's target was unrealisable by voluntary methods. Neither a national labour inventory nor more rational labour market policies could bridge the gap between Canada's commitment and the costs of trench warfare. By the spring of 1917 there were more casualties than
volunteers. On May 24 Borden announced compulsory service would be introduced. On August 28 the Military Service Act (M.S.A.) became law with the first draft commencing in mid-October.

Unlike the Militia Act, with its indiscriminatory call up of all men between the ages of sixteen and sixty, the M.S.A. was a 'selective' draft based on age and marital status, with loosely defined exemption terms applied by local Exemption Tribunals that were politically appointed. Appeals could be pursued through the court system to the Supreme Court of Canada. As J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman argue, the comprehensive nature of the M.S.A. draft and the political terms of the exemption process were a recipe for trouble.(58)

Laurier Liberals, and Farm press editors, demanded a referendum, as in Australia where conscription had been defeated.(59) Through the U.F.O., Good issued a four page pamphlet, 'Conscription of All Round National Service', calling for a referendum and demanding conscription of wealth as well as men. It even offered to endorse compulsory farm production controls, if the government would guarantee five percent returns.(60)

Despite a cautious farm response, to not directly oppose a compulsory draft, the number of exemption applications was enormous. Ninety three percent of those drafted appealed.(61) In November the Exemption Tribunals began to operate. Tribunal treatment of exemption
applications varied with the local elite's commitment to the war. While exemptions appear to have been granted generously in Quebec, in some parts of southern Ontario the Tribunals permitted no exemptions. A spontaneous grassroots protest movement emerged demanding Members of Parliament obtain redress. In Perth, Lanark County, not one of one hundred exemption applications was allowed. Over five hundred farmers held an angry march demanding the Tribunal reconsider its work. (62)

The Borden government was in a dilemma. By special arrangement with the Liberals, Parliament had been extended in 1916. No such agreement was forthcoming in 1917. An election would have to be held, one that might reverse the conscription decision. Borden sought a coalition with Laurier. When Laurier refused, Borden reworked the franchise with the Military Voters Act and the War Time Enfranchisment Act. Both were designed to maximise the voting strength of pro-conscriptionists, while disenfranchising 'enemy aliens' resident in Canada since 1902, and conscientious objectors.

Then in October a Union (i.e. coalition) government was formed with the aid of provincial Liberals from Ontario and the Prairies. Newton Rowell, Ontario provincial Liberal leader joined. So did Thomas Crerar, to become the Unionist Minister of Agriculture. Even so, as the December 1917 election neared, the prospect of electoral defeat was sufficiently real that a blanket exemption was granted to
farmers' sons by General Mewburn, Defence Minister, on November 24. This was put in statutory form as an Order-In-Council on December 2 and widely advertised in the farm press. It was a wise move as the Unionists then swept Ontario and the West.(63)

It was a policy of expediency that could not be maintained. In March 1918 the German army launched an offensive meant to deal a knockout blow to the Allied armies before significant American reinforcements arrived. Though the Canadian Corps was not involved in the fighting, the German offensive threatened to prolong the war for a considerable time. Borden, after a visit to the Front, decided that men not food was the Allies' greatest need. Farm exemptions were cancelled by Order in Council on April 20 and new censorship penalties were imposed.(64)

Despite these threats, a host of local farm protest meetings erupted. The Weekly Sun noted at least sixteen in the Toronto area while Farm and Dairy reported that Brant County Council had come out in opposition.(65) A delegation of three hundred eastern Ontario farm delegates, under the leadership of former Liberal M.P. C.J. Thornton (with A.A. Powers and C.J. Gurney to represent the U.F.O.), met with Borden, Rowell, Mewburn, and Crerar in Ottawa on May 3. Farm speakers questioned how production could be satisfied if young farm families and scarce farm labour were to be destroyed. Borden simply stated it was time for equality of sacrifice. It was left to Crerar to explain that
applying manpower coercion to farmers was caused by the Russian Revolution. Men not food had become the new priority of Canada due to external events. (66)

Though Borden had been quite firm, a mass farm delegation was organised under U.F.O. auspices to go to Ottawa and impress upon the Union government how ruinous the cancellation of farm exemptions was. Beginning with an assembly in Toronto's Labour Temple on Monday, May 13th of one thousand western Ontario delegates, three thousand Ontario farm delegates arrived in Ottawa on Tuesday, May 14. They were joined by over two thousand Quebec farm delegates led by the provincial Minister of Agriculture, J.E. Caron.

The meeting between Borden (who had with him Rowell and Crerar again) and the farmers in Ottawa's Russell Theatre Tuesday morning was electric. Manning Doherty chaired and introduced the Farmers' Remonstrance drafted in Toronto the previous day. Citing the Patriotism and Production Campaigns, Doherty stated the government was ignorant of the real production situation in agriculture. Those who had been called up should be given 'continuous leave' and other farm men between the ages of 20 and 34 exemption certificates. W.A. Amos then introduced petitions backing up these demands. C.L. Smith spoke on behalf of New Brunswick farmers and finally, J.E. Caron denounced federal proposals to use farm women and inexperienced city help to deal with the growing farm labour shortage. "I say HANDS OFF THE FARMERS would be a good, patriotic and useful
attitude for the Government to take."

Borden's reply only restated what had already been put before the Thornton delegation. Men were now more important than food production. There would, however, be a new compulsory national registration of manpower (begun in June) to compensate for conscription caused labour shortages. Exemptions in cases of 'extreme hardship' would be granted (with an Order in Council to this effect on May 25). To support his position Borden then read out a telegram from the United Farmers of Alberta supporting exemption cancellations. As the *sun* reporter described the scene, "When Premier Borden turned to sit down a noisy outburst of indignation was heard. Delegates in all parts of the building jumped to their feet and demanded attention." But Borden would not budge. It was left to Manning Doherty to conclude.

"'If the regulations are not changed', he said amid intense silence, 'we have done our full duty and the responsibility for the future will rest upon the shoulders of the Government'."

No more satisfaction was to obtained from Parliament. Despite an orderly parade and the example of 1910, farm delegates were not allowed to address the House of Commons. They had to retreat to Ottawa's Arena and read their memorial there to themselves. On Wednesday a small group of delegates, led by C.J. Gurney, met cabinet ministers and then General Newburn. But the U.F.O. had no more success in finding a sympathetic audience. U.F.O. policy,
to conduct a new national labour registration before implementing the new draft terms, had to be left with the Governor General.(70)

Farm anger at their cavalier treatment by the federal government, and Ontario's urban press, led to plans for a campaign to fight the new draft. Through the U.F.O. a mass meeting of three thousand delegates was held in Toronto on Friday June 7 to discuss what next to do. After heated debate, four suggestions were made. All owners or practical managers should be exempt, or, if called up, be granted extensive leave. The standard of exemption should be one skilled man per one hundred acres and a provincial Advisory (i.e. Appeal) Board be established with farm representation. And food production should be given the same consideration as the United States government did.(71)

There was a considerable contrast between the U.F.O. leadership and the rank and file. While U.F.O. officials proposed the Union be informed that farmers were losing confidence in the government, resolutions from the floor expressed no such passive stance. Delegates demanded the extension of U.F.O. organisation, a farm newspaper (with $27,000 pledged), and the end of all censorship. Good, for once reflecting majority sentiment, was scathing about the upcoming 'secret' parliamentary session. "The secret session was nothing but a piece of stage play to work upon the prejudices of our people".(72)

Delegates also demanded independent political action.
One strategy pursued in the aftermath of May 14th was a recall petition campaign, ignored by Unionist M.P.s. This open flouting of farm community demands led Good to predict a coming political Armageddon.

"They say we are fighting to make the world safe for democracy. The farmers must get into politics with a vengeance. ... It is a terrible thing when we have no means of regularly obtaining justice. We may have to resort to force. But before we have to resort to force let us use every other means.(73)

Though Good was in a minority among U.F.O. leaders in demanding independent occupational representation, rank and file members would soon act on this sentiment.

One practical result of the Massey Hall protest meeting was the creation of a United Farmers' newspaper. Good had argued from the start of the U.F.O. the movement needed its own publication. To begin with, Good suggested the U.F.O. develop a page in the Canadian Co-operator. But Board members delayed for the sake of building the U.F.C.C. first.(74) The experience of urban press discrimination in 1917 and 1918, however, led to the founding of the Farmers' Publishing Company (F.P.C.).(75) Arthur Hawkes, Toronto Star journalist, was commissioned to present a proposal for a farm daily. The costs of such an enterprise, one million dollars, alarmed the Board. Instead in December 1918 the F.P.C. obtained an option to buy the Weekly Sun. In April 1919 the Weekly Sun became the Farmers' Sun and in January 1920 it became a biweekly. By 1921 circulation, at 12,000 in 1918, had risen to 40,000.(76) Good, who had
participated in the organising discussions, was elected to the first Board of Directors in September 1919.\(^{(77)}\)

In response to exemption cancellations, U.F.O. membership doubled over the course of 1918, rising from twelve to twenty five thousand. But it was a growing movement facing threats and persecution. Toronto police stated if another meeting like June 7 was held they would break it up.\(^{(78)}\) A trial to overturn the cancellation of exemptions was defeated before the Supreme Court of Canada.\(^{(79)}\) And a Brantford farmer, R. Cross, was fined $500 for stating, in a private conversation, "We are no worse off than under Prussian rule."\(^{(80)}\) The U.F.O. tried, and failed, to appeal his fine. Delegates at the December 1918 convention collected the $500 and paid Cross's fine.\(^{(81)}\)

When U.F.O. farmers met in December 1918, the conscription crisis had been largely resolved by the end of the war. Halbert could report that farm representations had had some effect. Six hundred youth had been exempted in cases of 'extreme hardship' and twenty percent of those called up had been granted three month harvest and fall seeding leaves.\(^{(82)}\) Still the issue persisted. There was a motion to send no conscripts to Siberia, and in 1919 the Board of Directors were lobbying the federal government to not excessively punish draft dodgers.\(^{(83)}\)

As conscription showed, and controls would continue to demonstrate, farmers could no longer trust either Conservatives or Liberals. Suddenly Good had a mass
audience for his arguments about direct democracy as Ontario farmers joined the United Farm movement. But how farmers would develop direct democracy in a farm organisation that had not clarified a common position on non-partisan political methods was a mystery.

III

Conscription, and the cancellation of farm exemptions, was the most dramatic example of war coercion. But 1917 and 1918 also saw a fierce battle develop against provincial and federal compulsory economic controls, a battle that would persist until the fall of 1920, and would in part be blamed for the recession of 1920-23.

One aspect of the controls regime was the first farm production surveys. These were welcomed by both organised farmers and governments to dispel the urban charge of farm profiteering and to identify what needed to be done to raise farm production.

The first serious statistical survey of rural Ontario was John MacDougall's 1913 book, *Rural Life in Canada*. In it, MacDougall charted the fall in farm numbers in 'old Ontario', with some 100,000 leaving the land between 1901 and 1911. However, despite some treatment of the economic causes and co-operative solutions to this rural exodus, Macdougall's main concern was the social consequences of rural depopulation. Commissioned by the Presbyterian Social Service Board, the purpose of *Rural Life* was to focus on the moral quality of rural life in order to make
suggestions about a Rural Church movement. (84)

Organised farm leaders were quite aware of Macdougall's limits and called instead for studies of how production was actually organised on the family farm. Good made a strong plea for such studies at O.A.C.'s 1915 Farm Leadership Conference. (85) In 1917, Justus Miller, editor of Toronto's Canadian Countryman, received a grant from the Organisation of Resources Committe to do a survey of Caledon Township in Peel County (to the west of Toronto). Good frankly expressed ambivalence in any study done by the Ontario Department of Agriculture. But, at Miller's request, Good helped design the survey schedules. (86)

The purpose of the Caledon survey was to get an accurate estimate of the farmer's labour income and to identify where production could be qualitatively improved. Beginning in October 1917, Professor A. Leitch, of O.A.C.'s Farm Department, and District Representative R. Stark, began to collect the first statistics on how Canadian farmers organised production.

Their first task was to get the willing co-operation of Caledon farmers. Many suspected the survey was an undercover operation to assess farmers for the new federal income tax. Stark got the Township Council to endorse the survey, who in turned mailed a letter to each of the Township's six hundred farmers explaining the survey's genuineness. Once co-operation was secured, an initial survey was done of local leaders such as teachers,
ministers, and school trustees. Then a house to house canvass was conducted. In the end, the surveyors settled for an intensive study of two hundred farms with a questionnaire to the rest. (87)

By the spring of 1918 a number of answers emerged confirming many U.F.O. criticisms. The first was that the average annual income, less than one thousand dollars, was below that of the average manual urban worker. Economic viability was clearly linked to farm size. Farms less than eighty five acres, about one third of those surveyed, were poverty traps. The most important productivity variable was not feed quality but animal genetics. No matter how good the feed, grade cows for instance would never offer the same production gains as purebred stock. (88)

Subsequent farm surveys, of dairy farmers in Oxford and Dundas in 1918, and then livestock farmers in Middlesex, Dufferin, and Wellington in 1919, confirmed the Caledon findings. The Oxford survey, at the heart of Western Ontario's dairy belt and with the highest concentration of U.F.O. clubs provincially, showed an above average income, about $1200 each year, but at the price of a seven day work week and a twelve hour work day. It also showed the low profit rate on milk, two and half cents for every one hundred pounds, which became an important argument against price controls. (89)

Organised farmers wanted a provincial survey to test how representative these surveys were. At the December
1920 U.F.O. Convention Good helped move a resolution that the U.F.O. government do a provincial survey of farm production costs. But, though Manning Doherty, U.F.O. Minister of Agriculture, announced such a study would be launched in November 1921, in the lead up to the Federal election, no study materialised. Instead, under Howard Ferguson and the Tories, a more conventional provincial Royal Commission was held on farm marketing problems in 1924. Not till another war would governments look into the actual relations of production on the Canadian family farm.

But if organised farmers and governments could agree on the utility of farm surveys, they did not agree on the policy conclusions to be drawn from them as war production was subjected to the same compulsory pressures as manpower.

By the third year of the war the Borden government faced inflationary pressures that led it to systematise coercive economic policies in an effort to meet the needs of war production. Wheat, subject to a British buyers' combine in 1916, and the competition of an American government backed export company, was placed under one selling authority, the Board of Grain Supervisors, in 1917 at fixed prices. With a brief interruption in 1919, this arrangement lasted to 1920. Other farm commodities, cheese and bacon, were under British price price controls. Within Canada, the Conservatives established Food and Fuel Controllers, who employed a
variety of voluntary and coercive methods to regulate food and energy needs.(95)

In some cases state intervention took on more direct forms such as the Imperial Munitions Board and the nationalisation of the Canadian Northern and Grand Trunk railways, reorganised as the Canadian National Railway with hefty freight increases in 1919-1920.(96) The most detested state agency among Ontario farmers was the Board of Commerce. Established in the fall of 1919 by the Combines and Fair Prices Act, the Board had the power to set commodity prices on a national level, and, locally, by means of municipal Fair Price Committees.(97)

There was also provincial coercion in farm production. Farmers' Institutes were reorganised as County Boards of Agriculture while Hearst took over the Department of Agriculture in 1917. He introduced farm credit legislation, a veteran soldiers settlement scheme in Northern Ontario, and the infamous amendments to the Ontario Companies Act to block any political connection between farm co-operatives and the United Farmer movement.(98) Hearst was also the chair of the Organisation and Resources Committee which, despite the creation of an Agriculture Sub-Committee with U.F.O. representation in 1918, made sure the County Boards of Agriculture held compulsory Production and Patriotism meetings.(99)

While Prairie farm opinion was divided on the farm controls regime, U.F.O. opinion was uniformly hostile.
Morrison appeared before the Federal Grain Commission to oppose the creation of the Board of Grain Supervisors. (100) This opposition continued at the December 1917 U.F.O. convention, in 1918 against a C.C.A. request to add barley and oats to the Board's jurisdiction, and a provincial protest by Doherty against continued price controls in early 1920. All of this was in disagreement with the C.C.A. (101) Opposition to grain controls in Ontario lay in the fact that grains were not exported but locally consumed for livestock or dairy production, or sold to domestic millers for flour. From a home market point of view, grain price controls were a subsidy for urban consumers at the expense of rural producers.

As Good put it to the Ottawa Food Controller's office, "Admitting the propriety of price fixing it seems to me a most dangerous practice, one to be undertaken only with the greatest caution. Even now the fixed price of wheat is too small and the temptation is strong to feed it to livestock. ... My own feeling is that the state should concentrate on lessening waste and stimulating production and let prices alone." (102)

The Controller's office couldn't give much satisfaction, since the Grain Supervisors was a separate agency. (103)

Nor was there much support for the Food Controller, W.J. Hanna, appointed in summer of 1917. Despite evidence Hanna was trying to informally negotiate controls with food wholesalers and retailers (104), Good, with Cowan and Drury, met with Hanna in November to demand either broad controls or none. (105) The 1917 O'Connor report on Davies
pork packing profits, and the blunt refusal of Toronto manufacturers to release skilled farm laborers, created little confidence Hanna could succeed with compulsion for producers and voluntarism for big business.(106) Appeals to raise a hog in one's backyard, rationing bulk sugar and flour purchases, and a refusal to extend minimum price controls to farmers, like those that benefitted pork packers and munitions makers, only intensified U.F.O. alienation in 1918.(107)

In the absence of controlling input costs or guaranteeing returns, the U.F.O. saw food controls as class coercion. Farmers were being asked to absorb war inflation by taking lower than market prices, and to mobilise farm women and children to work in the fields as farm labour wages, despite doubling, remained below those of town workers.(108)

The selection of T.A. Crerar as Unionist Minister of Agriculture in October 1917 was welcomed by U.F.O. leaders like Good as a check on the controls regime. But they soon found Crerar would not renew the voluntary farm production effort with new policies. In January 1918 a closed federal conference was held on farm labour in Ottawa with Good, Cowan, Dr. Robertson, Federal Agriculture Commissioner, and C.A. Dunning, head of the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company. Robertson wanted a repeat of the Production and Patriotism campaigns for the 1918 seeding season. This didn't go over well with
his new collaborators. As Cowan stated, "It was another case of the poor ignorant farmer needing to be guided and lead (sic) to see his duty and told how to perform it."(109)

As Good summarised the discussion, the only quick way to raise production 'was by the wholesale importation of orientals'. This was not politically acceptable. The question then became, how could the government better organise the existing labour supply. Good ruled out any state intervention at the family farm level. The small scale of production couldn't be effectively regulated in an efficient way. The main task, Good argued with Crerar, was to rework federal policy so the farmer himself could raise production. The familiar triad of land, labour, and capital had to be helped by the single land tax, elimination of the tariff, and, if necessary, the forcible conscription of skilled farm labour from the cities.(110) Crerar, however, promised nothing in the policy realm. He did want Good's services in Ottawa. Good, who was tempted by Crerar's offer, refused. Unless farm policy changed, Good wrote, he would only be the executor of a 'speed up' campaign. "This would destroy my influence for good with my fellow farmers".(111)

The outcome of January's conference was the creation of the Canada Food Board in May under C.A. Dunning. As a glorified food controller, Dunning could show few results other than the temporary admission of Ford tractors, achieved over the objections of Canadian manufacturers.
only after Ford threatened to stop all shipments to Canada, and the infamous Anti-Loafing law threatening imprisonment for any man not gainfully employed. (112)

War's end did not ease farm resentment at controls. Daylight savings, begun in 1918, was repealed in 1919. But as the railways kept to it, to remain in synchronisation with the American railway system, it became a new and irritating feature of farm life. This was especially true for dairy farmers who had to get up earlier, ship milk, wait for the dew to come off before any field work could be done, and then watch their hired labour leave in the evening when there was still daylight. (113)

Worse than moving the clock ahead one hour, there was the intensification of price controls. In October 1918 Borden issued an Order in Council permitting the creation of Fair Price Committees on a municipal basis. At first, only a few towns like Sarnia and Guelph used these to control local food prices. (114) Following the establishment of the Board of Commerce, which imposed a provincial rollback of pork prices during the winter of 1919-20, Fair Price Committees were set up in Ontario's major cities, including Toronto. (115) Once Toronto began to set farm market prices, a de facto regime of provincial controls existed. The key commodity was fluid milk and a major battle developed that brought the Union and the new Farm-Labour provincial government to a state of open confrontation by the fall of 1920.
In the late nineteenth century Canada's chief farm exports were live cattle, bacon and dairy products from eastern Canada. (116) In Ontario the dairy industry lay at the heart of the farm economy and the beginnings of the organised farm movement. Even after the rise of prairie grains as Canada's leading farm export, for some Ontario dairy farmers exports remained a major source of income into the 1920s. In this changing export picture, a process of differentiation occurred with Eastern Ontario dairy farmers continuing to rely on processed dairy exports like cheese, while Western Ontario dairy farmers shifted towards the urban fluid milk market. This division was reflected in separate regional dairy associations. (117)

Despite the economic importance of the Ontario dairy industry, with governments prioritising aid for the dairy sector, dairy farmers showed a cautious attitude to government intervention. In one respect, dairymen could agree on negative regulation. In 1886 the Federal government banned the production of oleo margarine to protect domestic butter. This was strengthened in 1914 with the Dairy Industry Act. In November 1917, however, Hanna lifted the ban and oleo remained legal until 1923. Then the King Liberals prohibited margarine once more. This was clearly to restore their electoral fortunes among Ontario and Quebec dairy farmers. And banned margarine remained until 1948. (118)

Good was one of the few farm leaders who took a
neutral attitude to margarine's legalisation. In fact Good warned against the contradictory message Ontario farmers were sending. On the one hand, they demanded free trade. But, on the other, they were demanding protection for butter. (119) Policy consistency, however, was not high on the agenda of either the Eastern or Western Ontario Dairymen Associations. In January 1917 both condemned any move to legalise oleo. (120) This position was subsequently approved by the U.F.O. in February and, after legalisation, a large dairy delegation met with cabinet members in March 1918 to demand repeal. Crerar, who had to defend oleo, only lost further credibility. (121)

If Ontario dairy producers demanded negative regulation, positive intervention, whether by standards or price, was fiercely resisted. When such measures threatened to become reality dairy farmers collectively organised and threatened non-delivery strikes.

In 1916 the Hearst government amended the Dairy Standards Act to make the sale of milk depend on the proportion of butter fat. Beginning in April 1917, all commercial milk would be graded by the Babcock test for butter fat. (122) In Eastern Ontario major protests developed. There, herds had been developed for milk quantity for whey butter. A butter fat standard of sale would be economically irrelevant, they claimed, and, more to the point, cause an instant depreciation of their stock. (123) Western Ontario dairymen, however, welcomed
compulsory testing as a way to guarantee creamery sales for the urban fluid milk market. (124) Hearst reserved proclamation of the Dairy Standards Act. (125)

Dairy prices, however, were not so amenable to delay. Eastern Ontario dairymen were outraged by British cheese controls set in June 1917 and administered by the Canadian Cheese Commission in the form of a Montreal buying board. The U.F.O. wanted a federal study of cheese making costs and both regional dairy associations demanded a revision of the set prices. (126) To add to their anger, federal and provincial agriculture officials tried to block these demands at the 1918 association meetings. Even Hearst appeared at the Western Ontario meeting in Woodstock to attack the U.F.O. for 'farmer class consciousness'. (127)

No relief was offered in 1918 and where farmers could they diverted milk for cheese towards fluid, powdered, and condensed markets. But many in Eastern Ontario were trapped. There were only one hundred and twenty five cheese factories in Western Ontario, but eight hundred and forty nine in the eastern part of the province. (128) In 1919 a major protest movement emerged with a seven hundred strong delegation to Borden in August. (129) This did force the price up from twenty one cents per pound to twenty five cents. But at a political cost as cheese producers were attacked by the urban press for their 'disloyal' behaviour towards Britain. (130) Finally, in the summer of 1920, Britain disbanded the Canadian Cheese Commission, and Eastern
Ontario producers embarked on a new co-operative marketing strategy through the United Dairymen's Co-operative, just as cheese prices fell as part of the 1920 recession.(131)

The greatest struggle between dairy farmers and governments came over fluid milk prices. Rising inflation in 1916 led milk distributors to band together to maximise their returns. In response, several local milk and cream producers associations formed to collectively bargain milk prices. These included, in the Toronto area, the Peel Milk and Cream Producers Association and the Toronto Milk Producers Association. At least four thousand farmers belonged to these two groups serving the largest milk market in the province. At the head of the Peel group stood Manning Doherty and, for the Toronto group, E.H. Stonehouse, a figure later co-opted to some extent into federal efforts to cap rising milk prices.(132)

Milk contracts were set seasonally, on a summer and winter basis, with higher prices for winter contracts given the greater costs involved in getting cows to freshen out of season. In 1916 farmers in the Toronto area received $1.80 per eight gallon can. According to Doherty, only five percent of farmers could make a profit with rising inflation.(133) In the winter of 1916-17 the Peel group managed to negotiate a first contract raising the price to two dollars a can. In September 1917 they demanded $2.50. The city creameries at first refused to pay and on October 1 a non-delivery
strike began. But Peel's action was undercut by the Toronto Milk Producers Association and the non-delivery strike quickly collapsed. However, demand was so strong that farmers were soon paid $2.50 a can. (134)

In 1918 milk prices rose to $2.80 per can and the Canada Food Board carried out a study of market returns. The Board, it claimed, discovered Canadian dairymen to be receiving twenty five percent less than their American counterparts. (135) This and the township surveys of Oxford and Dundas dairy farmers had little impact on the federal anti-inflationary fight.

In the fall of 1919 the Peel and Toronto Associations demanded $3.25 a can. At this point a Toronto Fair Price Committee was established. W.F. O'Connor, the Cost of Living Commissioner, warned any settlement would first have to be approved by the new Board of Commerce. Doherty and Stonehouse's reaction was to call for a non-delivery strike to begin October 1. The new Board immediately imposed a new price of $3.10 and extended this as a permanent freeze until April 1920. (136)

There was an outpouring of farm protest. At the December 1919 U.F.O. convention attacks on the Board of Commerce figured as prominently as self congratulation at the election of a Farm-Labour government. Plans to bypass the controls regime by establishing a farm creamery were speeded up with the U.F.C.C.'s purchase of Toronto's largest creamery in May 1920. (137) More importantly, the
Drury government established a provincial Milk Commission to study production costs and to mediate milk contract negotiations. (138) These steps prepared the ground for confrontation in the fall of 1920.

In September 1920 the Toronto Milk Producers demanded $3.50 a can with $3.25 negotiated. The Board of Commerce wanted to veto the new collective agreements and the City of Toronto instructed the police to see whether the Toronto Milk Producers Association could be prosecuted as a combination in restraint of trade. (139) Though there was talk of a non-delivery strike, this time Ontario dairymen had a new card to play in the battle against price controls, the powers of their own provincial government. The Milk Commission issued a stay against the Board of Commerce Milk Price Probe. (140)

At this point the Board of Commerce retreated. The original Commissioners had all quit by August 1920 and the new civil service appointees had even less moral authority. (141) Combined with evidence the Board had artificially kept up sugar prices for the sake of the processing industry, Meighen pulled the plug. The Board was wound up in October. (142) The dairy industry was finally free of price controls. But dairy farmers were set free precisely when deflation hit. By 1921 the price of an eight gallon can of milk had fallen to $2.50. (143)

Unlike western grain farmers, who gained orderly marketing internationally with the establishment of the
Board of Grain Supervisors (and then the first Wheat Board), Ontario farm sales did not benefit from this kind of intervention. All Ontario farmers could see, between conscription and price controls, was an assault by the Union government, on family production relations on the farm, and the denial of a fair market return on what goods they did manage to produce. War coercion was to transform farm political consciousness.

What farmers did not realise, however, is that U.F.O. proponents of non-partisan politics were divided against themselves, over co-operation, partyism, direct democracy, and occupational representation.
ENDNOTES


15. Weekly Sun, February 9, 1916.

16. Ibid.

17. Farmers' Advocate, March 9 (1), March 16 (2), March 23 (3), March 30 (4), and April 6 (5), 1916.


19. Farmers' Advocate, April 13 (6), April 20 (7), April 27 (8), May 4 (9), May 9 (10), May 18 (11), 1916.


For Good's correspondence with Skelton about the manuscript see: Good Papers, Volume 3, O.D. Skelton to W.C. Good, December 21, 1916, Kingston, W.C. Good to O.D. Skelton, July 1, 1917, Paris, O.D. Skelton to W.C. Good, July 5, 1917, Kingston, O.D. Skelton to W.C. Good, August 1, 1917, Kingston, and O.D. Skelton to W.C. Good (with specific criticisms on Ricardo), January 9, 1918, Kingston.


34. *Farm and Dairy*, June 21, 1917. For Cowan's offer see Good Papers, Volume 3, H.B. Cowan to W.C. Good, March 16, 1917, Peterborough.


36. U.F.O. Minutes, Board of Directors, September 4, 1916, printed 'Programme of Action.'

37. *Ibid*.


44. Good Papers, Volume 3, H.B. Cowan to W.C. Good, June 2, 1917, Peterborough. Good should have known better. Drury had already warned him that Morrison was winning the battle with the board, see E.C. Drury to W.C. Good, April 15, 1917, Barrie.

46. Good Papers, Volume 3, J.J. Morrison to W.C. Good, April 8, 1917, Toronto.


49. Weekly Sun, April 25, 1917 and May 2, 1917.

50. Farmers' Advocate, November 9, 1914, and Farm and Dairy, November 12, 1914.


52. Farmers' Advocate, August 26, 1915.

53. Weekly Sun, December 1, 1915 (re wheat embargo) and Weekly Sun, December 22, 1915 (re hay embargo).


55. Weekly Sun, February 10, 1915 (re Convention of Ontario Agricultural Societies) and Weekly Sun, April 14, 1915 re Rural Trustees meeting at the O.E.A.).


60. Good Papers, Volume 31, 'Conscription of All Round National Service'.


64. *Farm and Dairy*, editorial, May 2, 1918. The *Sun* refused to print peace letters, *Weekly Sun*, March 20, 1918.

65. *Weekly Sun*, May 1, 1918 and *Farm and Dairy*, May 9, 1918.


68. *Ibid*.

69. *Ibid*.


71. *Weekly Sun*, June 12, 1918.

72. *Ibid*.

73. *Ibid*.


75. The U.F.O. leadership, Good, Drury and Cowan, held a conference with Toronto dailes, the *Globe, Telegram, Mail and Empire*, and *The World*, on November 8, 1917 to discuss their growing concern at unfair coverage. For reports on the conference see, *Weekly Sun*, November 14, 1917 and *Farm and Dairy*, November 15, 1917. This was to no effect. Until the election of the Drury government in late 1919, the urban press attacked farmers' for even questioning conscription and controls. See Granatstein and Hitsman for a brief discussion of press reaction to the May 14, 1918 mass lobby, *Broken Promises*, Toronto, 1977, 92-93.

76. *Weekly Sun*, December 18, 1918 and December 25, 1918


78. *Farm and Dairy*, June 20, 1918.


80. *Farm and Dairy*, July 4, 1918.

81. *Farm and Dairy*, December 26, 1918.


83. U.F.O. Minutes, Board of Directors (note Archives File 202), Wednesday February 19, 1919.


87. Good Papers, Volume 3, J. Miller to W.C. Good, October 18, 1917, Toronto. See also *Weekly Sun*, November 14, 1917.

88. See *Weekly Sun*, January 16, 1918, and *Farm and Dairy*, March 21, 1918 for discussions of the preliminary results of the Peel survey.

89. For a review of the Oxford survey see: *Weekly Sun*, January 15 and January 22, 1919 when it was discussed at the Eastern and then Western Ontario Dairymens' Associations, and *Canadian Countryman*, February 22, 1919. Good reviewed the Oxford survey before the
Holstein Breeders meeting in Brantford in 1920. See Farmers' Sun, March 20, 1920. For the Dundas dairy survey see Weekly Sun, September 24, 1919. The livestock surveys began with Middlesex, see Farmers' Advocate, April 17, 1919. Dufferin and Wellington were reviewed in 1920. See Farmers' Sun, April 21, 1920 and Farmers' Advocate, April 29, 1920. Printed copies of the six surveys are available in the National Archives of Canada Library.

90. U.F.O. Minutes, Seventh Annual Convention, December 15-17, 1920 (the resolution was moved on Thursday December 16). The Executive Committee met with Doherty about the resolution on January 19, 1921 and Professor A. Leitch spoke to the Board of Directors about the methods for a provincial survey on March 15, 1921. On November 21, 1921 the Board noted Doherty's promise.

91. Public Archives of Ontario, Record Group 18, D-1-29, Volume I, Ontario Agricultural Enquiry Committee Report, 1924 (printed 1925), 93p. The Conservative review began with the dairy industry and, in the Appendix, concluded with a statement from J.J. Morrison about the structural problems Ontario agriculture faced.


94. On cheese controls, see: Farm and Dairy, June 14, 1917, and Weekly Sun, July 4, 1917. On bacon controls, see Farmers' Sun, January 5, 1921.


98. For a review of provincial war agricultural policy
see, Farmers' Advocate, April 19, 1917.

99. Farmers' Advocate, April 11, 1918 (re O.R.C.) and Weekly Sun, June 9, 1918, re order to County Boards.


101. See U.F.O. Minutes, Board of Directors, September 17, 1917 and October 5, 1917, convention discussion in December 1917, Weekly Sun, December 19, 1917 and Farmers' Advocate, December 27, 1917. U.F.O. Minutes, Board of Directors, September 12, 1918 for resolution against the C.C.A. resolution to add barley and oats to the Board of Grain Supervisors, and Farmers' Sun, February 18, 1920 for the new U.F.O. government's wheat protest. There were no tears shed when the Canadian Wheat Board lapsed, see Farmers' Sun, July 22, 1920.


103. Good Papers, Volume 4, S.E. Todd to W.C. Good, March 14, 1918, Ottawa.


105. Weekly Sun, November 14, 1917.

106. See Weekly Sun, July 18, 1917 (re O'Connor report) and Weekly Sun, August 8, 1917 (re Hanna's abortive meeting with Toronto manufacturers) and Weekly Sun, August 15, 1917 (for a stinging commentary by J.J. Morrison).

107. For some sarcastic comments about the 'Keep a hog in your backyard' campaign see, Weekly Sun, November 14, 1918 and Farmers' Advocate, May 9, 1918. Farm resentment at war rationing, viewed as an attack on bulk co-operative buying, can be seen in Farm and Dairy, May 23, 1918. For the U.F.O. resolution condemning selective controls see Farmers' Advocate, December 27, 1917.

108. For an indication of farm anger on the use of farm women and children as substitute labour see the letter by J. McEwing in Weekly Sun, October 3, 1917.


113. See Weekly Sun, April 3, 1918, Farm and Dairy, April 25, 1918, Weekly Sun, April 2, 1919, Farmers' Advocate, April 10, 1919. For the U.F.O. resolution see U.F.O. Minutes, Board of Directors, February 19, 1919, and Legislative Committee, March 1, 1920.

114. Weekly Sun, December 19, 1918 (re Sarnia) and Farmers' Advocate, May 29, 1919 (re Guelph).

115. Farm and Dairy, November 13, 1919. See also Public Archives of Ontario, Record Group 3, Drury Papers, Box 18, File 14, 'Pork Packing and Cold Storage Board of Commerce Investigation, 1919'.


119. Weekly Sun, January 31, 1917 (Good), Weekly Sun, February 7, 1917 (reply by Professor H.H. Dean), and Weekly Sun, February 14, 1917 (Good's reply).

120. See the reports on the 1917 and 1918 Eastern and Western Ontario Dairymens' Association conferences (in that order) in Farmers' Advocate, January 11, 1917 and January 18, 1917 and, then, January 17, 1918 and January 24, 1918.

121. For U.F.O. opposition see the convention reports in Weekly Sun, March 7, 1919 and Farmers' Advocate, March 8, 1917. For the anti-oleo delegation in 1918 see Weekly Sun, March 27, 1918, and Crerar's reply,
Weekly Sun, April 19, 1918.

122. Farm and Dairy, April 27, 1916.


124. Farm and Dairy, September 14, 1916.

125. Farm and Dairy, March 1, 1917.


127. Weekly Sun, January 23, 1918.


129. Farm and Dairy, August 7, 1919.

130. Farmers' Sun, August 13, 1919 (re Globe protest).

131. On decontrol see Farmers' Advocate, June 10, 1920. For the operation of the United Dairymens' see Farm and Dairy, April 29, 1920 and June 10, 1920.

132. See Farmers' Advocate, December 21, 1916 on the development of an organised milk movement.

133. Farmers' Advocate, October 11, 1917.

134. Weekly Sun, October 17, 1917 (re non-delivery strike) and Weekly Sun, November 7, 1917 (re $2.50 a can).

135. Farm and Dairy, February 20, 1919.

136. For the 1919 battles see Farm and Dairy, September 25, 1919 and November 13, 1919, and Farmers' Sun, September 17, 1919, October 1, 1919, November 19, 1919, and December 10, 1919.

137. Farm and Dairy, December 2, 1920.


139. Weekly Sun, August 28, 1920 and September 1, 1920. See also Farm and Dairy, September 16, 1920.

140. Farmers' Sun, September 8, 1920.
141. Farmers' Sun, October 9, 1920.


143. Farmers' Sun, October 30, 1920 (Toronto Milk Producers' voluntarily drop their prices) and Farmers' Sun, April 23, 1921 (when milk is selling at $2.50 a can).
VIII. NON-PARTISAN CHOICES: REFORM FROM BELOW, ABOVE, OR CLASS SECTIONALISM?

War coercion led to a spontaneous political revolt in 1919 by Ontario farmers. This revolt, to the surprise of the U.F.O., resulted in a Canada's first Farm-Labour government. Ontario was soon followed by a U.F.A. victory in Alberta in the summer of 1921 and then, in Manitoba in 1922, by the formation of an U.F.M. non-partisan government under John Bracken.

War coercion also led to a national farm political revolt. The budget of 1919 repealed the war tariff increases. But no further tax reform followed. Crerar, as Unionist Minister of Agriculture, resigned and a caucus of nine Farm Progressives emerged. Matters were not helped in 1920 when recession struck, railway freight rates rose, the Canadian Wheat Board disbanded, and Arthur Meighen, an avowed protectionist, replaced Borden as Prime Minister.

In 1920 the independent farm caucus was endorsed as the political arm of the farm movement by the Canadian Council of Agriculture. The caucus, now known as the National Progressive Party (N.P.P.), grew to fourteen members through by-elections. Then, in the December 1921 general election, sixty five Farm Progressives were elected, twenty four from Ontario, including Will Good for Brant.(1)

War coercion sparked independent farm political action but the organisational character of farm representation and
government remained to be decided. Would farmers choose to govern, or sit in opposition, in a party or group government manner? Or would they choose a sectional class compromise, a form of non-partisanship balanced between the two?

In Alberta and Manitoba, where provincial society was relatively rural and homogenous, a sectional class compromise was possible. The language and forms may have been different, but both prairie provinces followed the path of non-partisanship. This compromise was a successful one for the prairies, where both the U.F.A. and Manitoban 'Brackenism' provided lengthy, stable governments.

But rural petit bourgeois non-partisanship was not a realistic choice to govern Ontario or sit in Ottawa where society was more diverse in occupation and nationality. Class sectionalism was to be the Achilles heel of the farm progressive challenge nationally. And it was to be revealed in all its limitations in the Ontario farm progressive challenge.

The three way political struggle between reform from below, demands from Good for an experiment in group government (or group opposition federally), reform from above, the decision in 1919 to form a coalition government with Labour, and to refuse to become the official opposition nationally in 1922, and class sectionalism, expressed in a rising tide of internal resistance by J.J. Morrison to Drury's urban, as well as rural, development
agenda, and to Drury's plan to 'broaden out' the Farm-Labour coalition into a People's Party, reached its apogee in Ontario.

Good was Ontario's leading direct democrat and one of the U.F.O.'s most articulate spokesmen in chanelling the spontaneous revolt of 1919. He published a book, *Production and Taxation in Canada*, outlining the agrarian direct democracy critique of monopoly capitalism, and spoke before various government bodies studying reconstruction. He also helped to draft the U.F.O. provincial political programme in 1919 and argued hard, but without success, for an experiment in group government.

After Good lost the argument for group government in 1919, and then in 1922 to become the federal official opposition, he was marginalised by reformers from above like Drury and Crerar. Instead, Good was commissioned by the sectional wing of the movement to act as U.F.O. commentator, on Canadian-Imperial relations, to expose Canadian Manufacturing Association propaganda, and to prepare for the 1921 election by sketching the history of the U.F.O., and the causes and remedies (by national tariff reform) of the 1920 recession.

Good's marginalisation was not permanent. He partially recovered his political authority in 1923 in the debates over how to consolidate and renew a failing movement. But the recovery of direct democratic ideas was set by sectional resistance to the crypto-Liberal agenda,
not by a positive commitment to the principles of direct democracy.

Reformers from above may have deflected Good's arguments for group government. But the U.F.O. meeting that decided on a farm coalition government in 1919 also rejected partyism. When it became apparent that Drury's administration would reflect urban and party method pressures, the civil service pension bill and Drury's first musings on 'broadening out' in 1920, Morrison circularised the U.F.O. to warn the members of these deviations. (2) From the start, class sectionalism, partyism, and direct democracy, were locked in combat in the Ontario farm progressive revolt.

But class sectionalism also existed in Good's own brand of non-partisanship at the critical moment of political choices in the period 1918-1922. When it came to questions of oppression, about gender, and Franco-Ontarian and Six Nations aboriginal rights, and the class alliance with labour, no current of farm opinion could or would respond to these issues, including radical democrats like Good. Even the most radical current of agrarian populism was unable to transcend its class horizons of non-partisanship.

I

From 1914 to 1916 the United Farmers of Ontario barely existed as an entity independent of the U.F.C.C. What actions it did take were of a lobby character, presenting
the annual convention resolutions to the appropriate level of government and passing on petition initiatives. Citing the negative lessons of the Patrons and Grange, leading figures like Drury repeatedly stated the U.F.O. was not a political movement.(3) Behind the scenes, faith was still expressed in the Liberal Party and Laurier.(4) Though Good, when solicited by Cowan about what Ontario farmers needed in an upcoming interview with the former premier, replied "I fear Sir Wilfrid is too much of an opportunist for us to expect very much."(5)

Despite U.F.O. caution, as the limits of a voluntary war effort became evident in 1916, preliminary steps were taken to build a political presence. Both the U.F.C.C. and the U.F.O. affiliated to the Canadian Council of Agriculture to participate in framing the Farmers' Platform.(6) Then in the summer of 1917, one section of the U.F.O. leadership began to speak out for independent occupational representation regardless of past history. Repeatedly, Morrison and R.H. Halbert, at summer picnics and the December Convention, advised farmers to vote their own class interests. "We're like the label on the beer bottle", Halbert warned, "on the outside".(7) Conscription, economic regulation, and circumscribed civil liberties, created a new sense of urgency in political affairs overriding the many negative lessons of past farm political action.

The federal election of December 1917 threatened to politicize the farm movement in a decisive fashion as the
Military Service Act was applied. While organised farmers in Western Canada supported Borden's Union coalition government, U.F.O. members tried to use the Laurier Liberals as an anti-conscription vehicle of protest. Drury ran as an independent Liberal in Simcoe. Even Good was solicited as a candidate, first for Labour in Brantford and then for the Liberals in Brant. Good, however, would only run as an independent, declining the Independent Labour nomination and being refused terms by those looking to Brant Liberals.(8)

The preservation of the illusion of voluntarism, at least for farmers by conscription exemptions, delayed a growing conclusion for occupational representation. Unionists swept rural Ontario, despite U.F.O. warnings of 'plutocratic absolutism'.(9) But Borden's application of conscription to farmers in May 1918 finally brought home the necessity for independent occupational representation to the rank and file.

Beginning with provincial by-elections, farmers demanded candidates endorse the Farmers' Platform, a key factor in the selection of two independent Liberals for Oxford North and Huron North.(10) The real turning point, however, was the election of Beniah Bowman in October 1918 for Manitoulin. Facing a Conservative candidate, aided by a personal appearance by Hearst, Bowman, a Mennonite, managed to overcome the loyalty cry and become the first U.F.O. M.P.P..(11) Bowman's election was no accident. In
February 1919 a second U.F.O. member, John Widdifield, was elected for Ontario North.(12)

Encouraged by these victories, the U.F.O. leadership decided early in 1919 that only independent, i.e., non-party, farm candidates would receive backing.(13) This decision to fight for independent class representation was concretised in a U.F.O. platform drafted by Good, Drury, and M. Doherty in preparation for the 1919 provincial election. The platform itself stressed economy, an end to patronage, prohibition, local rural development measures, and direct democracy mechanisms.(14)

Farm political radicalisation in 1918-1919 was seen by Good as a historic opportunity to raise, and act upon, the ideas of direct democracy. In one respect Good changed his views about direct democracy. He now advocated farm class consciousness. As Good told an O.A.C. correspondent, "There is nothing to which I have been for twenty years more opposed, but at the same time I am rather coming to the conclusion that our rural problem will have to be solved by the development of class consciousness."(15)

Good expressed his new class consciousness in a variety of authoritative post war forums, at the Social Service Congress, before Ottawa's High Cost of Living Parliamentary Committee, in debate with the Canadian Manufacturing Association, and in the publication of his Studies in Political Economy manuscript as Production and Taxation in Canada.

From the printing of his studies in the Farmer's
Advocate in 1916, Good redrafted the series into a book length study. Numerous friends were canvassed for criticisms, while others, like Reverend Shearer and Professor Alexander looked for a publisher. Though Oxford University Press refused in 1917, J.M. Dent agreed, after C.B. Sissons intervened, and the Garden City Press was secured in 1918. (16) By then, Good's arguments were accorded a new importance with the farm electoral revolt and his book appeared in August 1919.

Production and Taxation in Canada was an economic treatise on the crisis facing Canadian agriculture. It was divided into three parts, a statement of Canada's rural problem, the problem of distribution, and suggested remedies. Good's main concern was to pose the question as to how farmers could get a fair return on their labour and capital.

Good's study began with a statement of comparative profit rates between farming and manufacturing. While farmers barely broke even, as shown in the O.A.C. farm surveys, industry showed return rates of twenty percent. Yet, Good argued, if one subtracted tariff protection, which added some thirty percent to the prices of manufactured goods, profit rates would be nearly equivalent. This was a particularly sore point with the farm community since they paid over one half of tariff taxes. As price takers, given the high level of competition in the farm sector, farmers could not pass
on the tax burden to consumers. (17)

Besides the burden of indirect taxation, Good identified two other sources of urban discrimination against rural producers. They were natural monopolies, like hydro or transport, which required state regulation or ownership, and inequities in the appropriation of ground rent. If the tariff was a policy form of class discrimination, 'natural monopolies' and the 'unearned increment' of ground rents were structural features of an imperfect world. These last two problems demanded action.

To achieve a fair distribution of wealth, judged by the returns on one's labour input, there had to be, Good stated, free exchange and free competition to realise the ideal conditions of a 'natural economy'. The tariff should be abolished, if gradually, selective public ownership and regulation introduced, and a new direct tax of four percent on land values established. If these fundamental reforms were acted upon, farm production, the basis of the national economy, would be set free, the national war debt would be liquidated, and a more balanced and morally healthy social order would be assured with a stronger rural Canada. (18)

While much of Production and Taxation is an implicit plea for producer political action at a national level, with an introductory preface by Crerar just before his break with the Union government, Good was careful to stress co-operative self emancipation as the first task
facing farmers.

The central assumption of Good's study, however, is the principle of direct democracy from a small propertied point of view. Replace indirect taxation with direct taxation, take legislative measures to end monopoly, and a new co-operative commonwealth would be founded. Good admitted that the long term logic of his position led to communism, the end of all forms of private property in the means of production. But his practical task, if a contradictory one from a Marxist view, was to propose a lengthy, gradual, and peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism fitting the needs of rural small property.(19)

Production and Taxation was extensively reviewed in the fall of 1919 in the Ontario farm press. While all paid tribute to Good's diligence in assembling the statistical side of his analysis, there was a good deal of selection in which remedies were presented to their readers. Much was made of Good's arguments for tariff reform, little of his proposal for a national land tax, and none of Good's direct democracy principles.(20) Only Keen in the Canadian Co-operator seriously entertained Good's main proposition that a co-operative commonwealth was possible by beginning with the socialisation of ground rents.(21) Later, in 1921, the U.F.O. bought up the remaining stock of Production and Taxation and distributed copies to local clubs in preparation for the federal election.(22)
Production and Taxation in Canada, aimed at a national farm audience and sympathetic urban progressives, was one of a number of agitational book length treatments of the farm problem at the end of World War One. There was Hopkin Moorehouse's Deep Furrows, a popular history of the Grain Growers', circulated by the U.F.O. to club secretaries to promote the U.F.C.C.(23), William Irvine's The Farmers in Politics, M.H. Staples collection on the U.F.O., The Challenge of Agriculture, and E.A. Partridge's utopian A War on Poverty. In this company Good's book stands out as the most theoretically consistent and coherently argued case for national economic reform in the interests of rural Canada.

The appearance of Production and Taxation in 1919 coincided with Good's emergence as U.F.O. spokesman on national affairs on a variety of reconstruction topics, on the tariff, inflation, labour relations, and group government.

In May 1919 the Brant U.F.O. sponsored a debate with Good and Drury against John Harold, Unionist M.P. for Brantford. In a fierce exchange, Drury cited Canada's 4.3 billion dollar debt and the need to stimulate farm exports, while Good focused on the duplicity of Unionists in circulating a phony Farmers' Platform, and how the Canadian Manufacturing Association was secretly sponsoring the Canadian Reconstruction Association. Harold ignored these criticisms. Instead, Harold predicted ruin from
American competition if tariff barriers came down.(24)
It was a stark demonstration of rural-urban differences
in Southern Ontario as both sides talked past each other.

Later, Good sent a direct message for tax reform to
the C.M.A. with an open letter in the farm press(25), and
by speaking before the C.M.A.'s annual convention. Good
expounded the classic farm case against the tariff as to
how it diverted labour from self sustaining to parasitical
industries, created artificial scarcity by restricting
exchange (as in the absurdity of destroying crops to raise
prices), and the need to meet the war debt. Good also
warned Canadian industrialists, as the Winnipeg General
Strike went on, that unless peaceful means were found to
introduce industrial democracy, there would be bloody
revolution for a coercive state socialism. The United
States had fought a civil war to end slavery, Good
thundered, would Canada have to do the same to introduce
industrial democracy?(26)

This frontal attack was followed by a thirteen part
series in the Canadian Countryman on 'Canada's Fiscal
Policy'. Largely an exposition of Henry George's
Protection or Free Trade?, Good argued 'natural' or free
trade was inherently co-operative and led to international
peace. Tariffs, and other trade barriers, only led to war.
Should such barriers, Good asked rhetorically, even be
extended between provinces and municipalities?(27)

Growing recognition of the Ontario farm movement was
signified by the Unionist government with an invitation to send a delegation before the 1919 Mathers Commission on Industrial Relations. Good appeared for the U.F.O. in Toronto in May and then, with Drury, went on to Ottawa to appear as expert witnesses for the House of Commons Committee on the High Cost of Living.

Neither were impressed by Ottawa's hearings. Though Good offered to advise the High Cost of Living Committee on needed fundamental reforms, the M.P.s doggedly stuck to personal farm production questions on prices and labor shortages. (28) As the Sun later commented, the exercise was worse than useless as the old Production and Patriotism policies for more thrift and production were resurrected. (29) The days when recognition and consultation would have mattered to farmers had passed. One positive result did come of Good and Drury's visit. They had the satisfaction of sitting in the Visitors' Gallery on June 6 to see Crerar resign from the Union. (30)

Then in October 1919 the unthinkable happened, a Farm-Labour government was elected. With only twenty two percent of voters, farm candidates took forty percent of representation by seats. The U.F.O.'s aim was occupational representation. What it got was forty five farm M.P.P.s. Combined with the eleven labour members, one of whom was a Soldier independent, and a Liberal Speaker, a slim majority U.F.O./I.L.P. government came to power. So unexpected was this outcome that Drury, who became premier
by being selected leader after the election, and leading cabinet ministers like Manning Doherty and W.E. Raney, had to find seats afterwards. (31)

Among the proponents of independent farm representation Good had also pioneered the concept of direct democracy. He had been quick to praise the election of the Manitoba Norris reform government in 1915 and the first to publicise the 1917 election of a Farmer's Non-Partisan League state government in North Dakota. (32) But familiar arguments about the methods of direct democracy, with proportional voting, recall, and legislation by the initiative and referendum, met with mixed results at United Farmer conventions and in the letters columns of the weekly farm press. (33)

Provincial political victory in October 1919, however, forced consideration of group government. Following election victory on October 20, 1919, U.F.O. members, candidates, and officials met in a two day caucus to debate their next step. The first decision was to take political power and prevent a Liberal minority government under Hartley Dewart. Under no condition would the farm caucus allow, or participate in, a Liberal or Conservative party administration. Non-partisanship was to be the new guiding principle of Ontario politics. (34)

But what form would non-partisanship take? Good proposed an experiment in group government. Parliament could function as a Committee of the Whole where each
member decided on measures and leadership as an individual. The cabinet and premier would be elected in a vote by all members. Or the premier could be selected by an elected cabinet. This common leadership would be assisted by standing committees. Like a municipal government or a private company, a structure of non-partisanship would operate. As Good stated, let the shareholders meet and elect the Board of Directors.

This experiment in direct democracy would have to be consolidated by two measures, a change in the rules of the House, so that not every measure was treated as a matter of confidence imperilling government stability, and by the introduction of proportional representation, the recall, the initiative and referendum, for voter control of their delegates. (35)

Good's proposal for group government was turned down. Instead, a non-partisan coalition with Labour was decided upon. For the next two years, Good's criticism that coalition was incompatible with non-partisanship was censored by both the Globe and the Sun. (36) From a political leader in the first ranks of the U.F.O., Good was marginalised to be the Sun's commentator for the U.F.O. outside provincial politics.

Between 1920 and 1921 Good's role in the U.F.O. was redefined as a national farm progressive critic on Canada's place in the British Empire, and to prepare the ground for the Ontario Progressives' challenge in 1921 with articles
exposing Canadian Manufacturing Association electoral sabotage, a review of the history and aims of the U.F.O., and, building on the reputation of Production and Taxation, prescribing solutions to the deflationary crisis of the early 1920s.

Borden's demand that Britain consult Canada about the war effort, leading to the establishment of the Imperial War Cabinet and the Imperial War Conference in 1917, with the latter's resolution IX recognising Dominion autonomy, alarmed farm organisations. While constitutional historians cite Resolution IX as the first step to the Statute of Westminster formally recognising the independence of the self-governing settler Dominions, Borden's intent was rather different. As his biographer R.C. Brown has stated, "He (Borden) clearly meant equal nationhood within the Empire".(37)

Borden, then, saw increased Canadian consultation and British recognition of Canadian autonomy as the means to a larger international role for Canada as a leading member of the British Empire. This may not have been Imperial Federation but that was the implication to Canadians who resisted a compulsory war effort.

Good was among the first to raise the alarm with an article to the Farmers' Advocate in 1917 about the danger of becoming a formal partner of British imperialism. Was Canada to remain autonomous of Britain or to introduce Imperial Federation through the back door? If the latter,
Good warned, it meant the loss of Canadian self government. There would also be an obligation to uphold a political order that was racist and anti-democratic. For, "how much more unstable would be an Imperial Federation in which the minority, professing allegiance to democratic principles, governed the majority without their consent!" (38)

Good's practical advice in 1917 was for Borden to leave over Canada's formal relation to Britain to war's end. But when the war did end, events indicated Borden was still set on Canada securing a formal place in the British Empire. Active in carrying out British policy interests, with Borden's participation in setting Balkan boundaries, continuing compulsory controls aiding the British economy, and curbing civil liberties at home, Unionist policy created a profound sense of unease in a farm community whose loyalties were increasingly defined in terms of North American realities.

Good gave expression to these fears, about global instability and Unionist repression, in 1920 with an essay 'Democracy, Free Trade and International Peace', published in The Canadian Nation and then serialised in the Farmers' Sun. The first goal of nations who wanted peace, Good argued, had to be tariff abolition. Otherwise the new League of Nations could never work. As usual, in confusing one form of capitalist competition with all forms, Good appealed to man's reason and idealism to overcome the base human instincts which originated such forms of class
selfishness. "It is pitiable to hear people talk of stemming Bolshevism by force of arms, by deportation, by suppression that will not work. Freedom of thought and discussion is the only thing that will discover and disseminate the truth."(39) But the war, Good declared, had done one valuable thing for popular education.

"Millions of people will have learnt how closely our basic institutions touch their lives. Hard personal experience will have taught them what an instrument of destruction and oppression a State may be."(40)

Good's chief role as U.F.O. national spokesperson, however, was to advance the cause of farm progressive political action. In the fall of 1920, following a Farmers' Publishing Company Directors' discussion, Good wrote a series for the Sun exposing a Paris, Ontario newspaper called Rural Canada.(41) Good discovered this paper was a front for the C.M.A. to whip up rural protectionist sentiment, while putting out as many falsehoods about the U.F.O. it could safely manage. At one point, Good even managed to confront Rural Canada's editor in a train carriage, much to the latter's consternation.(42)

Of more substance, Good authored two important newspaper series in 1921. One, 'The Future of the U.F.O.' appeared in the Canadian Countryman. It briefly explained the origins of the U.F.O. as an economic movement that had spontaneously developed into a vehicle of political protest with conscription. Good also used the series to promote the cause of federated co-operation as a model for economic
self government.(43)

The second series, 'The Economic Crisis and the Way Out', which ran over the summer in the Sun, emerged directly from a committee set up by the U.F.O. directorate. (44) As usual, Good began with the self evident truths of the agrarian view of protectionist capitalism. This time Good focused on the absurdity of the form the 1920 crisis had taken, overproduction.

Besides workers taking lower wages 'to increase efficiency', Good put forward two structural solutions. In the short run, Good suggested the federal government extend credit, by bank regulation, so the provinces could fund additional public works. But only on work for welfare terms, otherwise the unemployed could starve. In the long run, Good argued, only co-operation could create a rational capitalism by giving each individual a vested interest in private ownership of the means of production and, by balancing co-operatives between producers and consumers, prevent any monopolistic or state privileges from emerging. By these means the 'law of the jungle' would be eliminated. (45)

While much of this was familiar, one new element stood out, the need to study credit. The example of how the state mobilised capital under emergency war conditions exercised a powerful pull on reform imaginations.

II

Czerar's break with Borden in June 1919, and the
election of Ontario's Farm-Labour government in October, put independent farm politics on the agenda of the C.C.A. The Farmers' Platform of 1916 was an exercise in lobbying. Its' radical ideas were meant to influence Conservatives and Liberals, particularly the latter. It was not meant as the starting point for a farm party. But Ontario's success altered organised farm perceptions.

In 1920 the new year opened with a decision by a special C.C.A. political conference in Winnipeg for farmers to take political action as an independent occupational group. In February, when Parliament resumed, Crerar and ten others sat as representatives of the 'National Progressive Party' (N.P.P.). In December the C.C.A. endorsed the N.P.P. as the farmers' political party and agreed to coordinate Crerar's national speaking tour for the coming election. R.W.E. Burnaby, Halbert's successor as U.F.O. President, was elected President of the C.C.A. and the Farmers' Platform was revised once more, updating the economic analysis, remedies, and adding the single transferable vote to the direct democracy demands. (46)

The decision to enter national politics for Ontario farmers, however, had a rider. At the December 1920 U.F.O. Convention, J.J. Morrison won delegates to the idea there would only be riding organisation. There would be no provincial party or campaign fund. Constituency autonomy, that a member was responsible only to his or her electors, embodied in the signed recall, was to define how organised
farmers would intervene in the national political field. (47) So strong was Morrison's sectionalism, one suspects the only reason there was even riding organisation was because Meighen had amended the Dominion Elections Act to forbid contributions from non-political organisations, i.e., farm associations. (48)

By 1921 the National Progressive Party caucus numbered fourteen. Four came from Ontario. In 1919, J.W. Kennedy, a dairy farmer for Glengarry-Stormont, and R.H. Halbert in Ontario North, were elected. Then in 1920, Angus McDonald, a Labourite for Timiskaming, and S.J. McDermund in East Elgin, triumphed. (49) But in 1921 Progressives failed to win by-elections in the Maritimes, Quebec, and Ontario. In Peterborough West farmers and workers divided to let a Liberal triumph. (50) In September, Arthur Meighen announced there would finally be a federal election. Perhaps the Progressive wave had crested.

The formal campaign began in early October with the release of Meighen's election manifesto. Meighen took the offensive and came out supporting protection and attacking the Progressives as a class party. (51) At the outset of his campaign, launched from Brandon, Crerar replied the Progressives wanted an end to protection through a gradual downward revision of the tariff. (52) As he wrote to Good, "What I have in mind, of course, is the entire elimination of protection as a principle in our fiscal policy". (53) Nor were Progressives a party of agrarian class selfishness.
Crerar cited the example of the Drury government as one responsive to the people as a whole. (54) Crerar then headed east, crossing through Northern and Eastern Ontario to the Maritimes, to return for a Toronto rally and tour of Western Ontario in mid-November.

All three parties realised Ontario was the key. Only here was the electorate sufficiently large and divided to offset the certainties of a Progressive West and a Liberal Quebec. Morrison was Crerar's organiser for the Ontario speaking tours. As Crerar's correspondence indicates, he relied on Morrison to draw in Drury and other provincial speakers, including a visit to Brantford to assist Good's campaign. (55) Crerar also used Morrison to contact MacKenzie King, (apparently through Clifford Sifton) as to whether the two groups could avoid three cornered contests. But as Morrison reported, King would neither refuse nor commit himself before December 6. Still, King would learn nothing from Morrison about Progressive strategy. "He won't draw me out" (56), much to King's irritation. (57)

Good had been selected for the Brant federal nomination in 1919 when H.C. Nixon had been chosen to run provincially. Good's campaign in 1921 showed a mix of the quixotic and pragmatic as befitted a non-partisan approach. Good believed the elector should make his or her decision by listening to or reading about the various candidates in an atmosphere free of party pressure. He openly said in 1920 he would not personally canvass for any elector's vote. (58)
Instead, when the campaign began in 1921, Good challenged Dr. Reid, the Conservative candidate, to a public debate so voters could independently judge the merits of each. Reid declined. He must have decided there was nothing in it for him after Good denounced Conservative hecklers at one meeting as 'heelers with advertising money'.(59)

As Good soon discovered, such non-partisan methods would not do. Canvassers were found. Peter Porter, Brant U.F.O. President, mobilised the young men of the county U.F.O. baseball league.(60) And the Brant U.F.O., with the Brantford labour group, bought a full page of advertising each week in the Liberal Brantford Expositor.(61)

Though Good began to campaign shortly after Meighen's London election announcement, the Brant contest got fully under way when Crerar and Drury spoke on Good's behalf at the Brantford Opera House in mid-November. While Crerar reiterated the Farmers' Platform, and denied farmers were a class party, it was left to Drury to mollify urban Brant. Given the strength of protectionist sentiment in Brantford, home to Canada's farm implement industry, Drury tried to soften farm tariff demands by promising no immediate free trade. Likely for years, Drury stated, there would be a revenue tariff.(62) This was really the Liberal position.

From then on, Good appeared at two to three meetings a day throughout Brant.(63) An election flyer was distributed giving a brief personal profile, emphasising the gradual reform approach of the Progressives, and a brief summary of
the Farmers' Platform or, as it was now called, the 'New National Policy'. (64) The U.F.O also supplied a brief pamphlet for federal candidates, written by W.L. Smith, on regressive tariff taxation as graphically expressed in its title, 'One Dollar in Revenue: Four Dollars in Cost'. (65)

Good gave two campaign speeches. One was a straightforward exposition for independent farm representation in national politics. It began with a brief statement of the poor situation of Ontario farmers and then presented the New National Policy. Both parts were structured to make a link in the audience's mind between the individual farmer's welfare and that of the community. (66) This last was probably an important consideration since most meetings were held in rural villages. Good's other speech was meant for a committed farm audience, where the 'sins' of the Great War were denounced with the motivational message that now was the time to act politically to stop the urban tendencies leading to a collapse of civilisation. (67)

On December 6, Good won the riding of Brant. Like the other twenty three Ontario Progressives, however, victory came at the price of a town-country polarisation. Between the rural townships, especially Burford and Dumfries South, and enfranchised native people, and a Brantford suburb and the manufacturing town of Paris, there was complete disagreement. Ironically, for someone who preached the
virtues of proportional representation, Good won with a plurality of voters. (68) [See Table IV.A.]

On a national level, sixty five Progressives were elected, thirty five from the Prairies, twenty four from Ontario, five in British Columbia, and T.W. Caldwell of New Brunswick, lone representative from the Maritimes. In Ontario's eighty two seats, one third of the nation's total, Progressive candidates ran in sixty one of the sixty two rural ridings. In an indication of organised labour's weakness, only fourteen labour candidates ran in the province's twenty urban seats. (69)

Of Ontario's twenty four Progressive M.P.s, a few cautious generalisations can be made from farm production and co-operative patterns. (70) Twelve came from counties where live stock production predominated. Ten of these were located in an east-west band across the top of Western Ontario. The other two ridings were Ontario North and Victoria, a small stock finishing belt on the eastern side of Lake Simcoe. Only one livestock county, Perth, whose two seats were taken by Liberals from manufacturing town votes, was excepted.

Another six seats came from the Eastern Ontario dairy belt, with a concentration on three seats from the four easternmost counties (Prescott, Dundas, Stormont-Glengarry). No Progressives were elected in the Western Ontario dairy belt. Oxford was actually split between Conservatives and Liberals. This seems to indicate a
division between dairy farmers by markets. Far Eastern Ontario Progressives appear to have been concerned about cream exports to the United States, which were threatened by the new American Fordney tariff. In the western dairy belt it appears once Board of Commerce controls were lifted, political support for the Progressive cause eroded. In 1919 U.F.O. provincial members were elected here, including S.J. McDermund in a 1920 federal by-election for East Elgin. But, alone among sitting Ontario Progressives, McDermund was defeated in 1921.

Three more seats, Muskoka, Timiskaming, and Port Arthur-Kenora were secured in Northern Ontario. Here a unique farm production system, agro-forestry, created electoral conditions quite different from those of the southern part of the province. (71) Frontier settlement problems, subsistence agriculture, labour party co-operation, and ethnicity, dictated issues other than the tariff as the focus of campaigning. Timiskaming was really a labour riding based on Cobalt, while the Muskoka member deserted to the Liberals after the first session. Only William Kennedy representing Dryden cattle producers in the far northwest fit the southern mould.

Finally, there are three mixed farm ridings that defy any easy characterisation, Waterloo South, Brant, and Norfolk. These ridings do run in a north-south band from cattle country in the north to the traditional cattle country of Long Point in Norfolk on Lake Erie's shore.
The one common factor binding these three together is that they were different from ridings to the east and west. To the east, in the suburban band known today as the Golden Horseshoe, lay a Tory group of dairy and fruit ridings, and to the west, a band of farm ridings on Lake Erie's north shore, divided between Conservatives and Liberals, specialising in field market crops, especially seed. What distinguishes the three Progressive ridings in the southern portion of Western Ontario is their relative backwardness, of a mixed farm area as opposed to more specialised (and protectionist home market) counties.

The Liberals, who captured twenty two seats, took all six seats in the Ottawa area, a reflection perhaps of self interest. At least eight were based on the dominance of a local manufacturing centre, as in Brantford, and a further eight were a mix of farmers and minorities, Franco-Ontarians and the German Canadians of Waterloo North.

The Conservatives, who took thirty six seats (of a national total of fifty), held the core of the national economy. All major urban seats, with their associated county areas, remained Tory. Only York North broke this pattern with the election of Mackenzie King (the President of the U.F.O., R.W.E. Burnaby came in third). The Tories also took a scattering of seats dominated by local manufacturing centres (like St. Catherines in Lincoln) and Northern Ontario ridings dependent on national east-west transport links, such as Sault Sainte Marie
and Fort William. The Conservatives also took fourteen rural ridings, the majority from the Eastern Ontario dairy belt who specialised in cheese production.

Contrary to W.L. Morton, the Ontario results show the Farm Progressives were a national movement. U.F.O. candidates had significant electoral support, though not as much as Crerar hoped for to exercise a balance of power with a minority government. (72) U.F.O. members were also divided between crypto-Liberals and radical democrats, 'Manitobans' and 'Albertans', by principle as based upon the internal dynamics of Ontario's farm economy.

But the Ontario Progressive phenomenon was different in that the farm movement was divided, at least by 1921 as opposed to 1919. That division appears to have had material roots, intra class divisions over the priorities of foreign or home markets among dairy farmers, and support among livestock producers for the U.F.C.C.'s co-operative shipping plan. Such divisions, in a province with a large urban population, and a significant Franco-Ontarian minority, played havoc with any common non-partisan definition of farm politics.

In the aftermath of the December 1921 returns, Crerar wrote to Morrison he couldn't understand the Ontario outcome. (73) That is how it would appear to someone from a rural, monocultural, and Anglo Canadian dominated, farm region.
The rise of the Ontario Progressives drew to the movement other oppressed groups, and the working class through the Independent Labour Party. A United Farm Women's group was organised in 1918 and a youth section, modelled on Brant(74), in 1920. Franco-Ontarions flocked to join the U.F.O. after the anti-conscription protest in 1918. Even native people looked to the U.F.O. for help in solving their national oppression. Last but not least, there was the rise of labour politics, making possible a non-partisan coalition government in 1919. But the Progressives, including reformers from below like Good, proved unable to comprehend these forms of oppression, or to overcome their petit bourgeois class sectionalism in joint action.

In June 1918 a small gathering of Ontario farm women took place in Toronto at U.F.C.C. headquarters. Assisted by Violet McNaughton, President of the Saskatchewan Women Grain Growers, they formed the United Farm Women of Ontario (U.F.W.O.). By 1921 the U.F.W.O. had 6000 members in one hundred and thirty clubs.(75)

The U.F.W.O. arose like the U.F.O. in reaction to government interference in farm affairs. Many, such as President Mrs. G. Brodie and Secretary Emma Griesbach, mentioned war political interference in the Womens' Institutes.(76) But these women also wanted to find economic and political solutions to the unique burdens
they faced in the farm home and in a society where women lacked elementary civil rights. While the U.F.W.O. platform smacks heavily of maternal feminism, of the purifying role of women in public affairs(77), in practice the U.F.W.O. was Janus faced, reinforcing gender roles, yet challenging them. In the aftermath of 1919, besides U.F.O. mothers' allowance legislation, communal laundries and bakeries were also organised to socialise private family tasks.(78)

Farm women also demanded political equality. At the December 1918 U.F.O. Convention women were admitted as full members, i.e., they were entitled to dual membership in the farm movement, a form of affirmative action to guarantee women's equality.(79) And, while the Conservatives granted the franchise federally and provincially, the Drury government secured for women all municipal political rights.(80)

Yet the U.F.O. was slow to recognise farm women leaders in the mainstream movement. Not until 1920 were women permitted to become Directors, the first being Agnes MacPhail.(81) And, if there was a clash between U.F.O. and U.F.W.O. interests, as in the 1922 firing of Miss Greisbach as the Sun's women's page editor for being too political, and not feminine enough, the limits of U.F.O. support for farm women's liberation was there to be seen. Not even Good would defend her to the Sun's board.(82)

One other question of oppression arose, the national
oppression of Franco-Ontarians and native people. The fight against conscription attracted a rural Francophone audience to the U.F.O.. Co-operation with Quebec Liberals at the May 1918 Ottawa delegation, and subsequent French speakers at Toronto's follow up conference, created a new confidence among some Franco-Ontarians that a solution to their oppression, particularly in regard to Regulation 17 which virtually banned French language schooling, could be found in uniting with fellow Anglophone farmers. As R. H. Halbert said to a Simcoe U.F.O. picnic,

"May 14th did more to wipe out racial and religious strife in one day than all the legislation enacted by governments would accomplish in years."(83)

The first practical steps to a potential alliance between English and French farmers were taken in 1918. Morrison, who was sent to help organise the United Farmers of New Brunswick, also toured the English Townships, the first steps in establishing Les Fermis Unis de Quebec.(84) Then in December 1918, J.A. Caron, speaking on behalf of Prescott farmers and a score of francophone delegates, gave the first bilingual address ever heard at a U.F.O. Convention.(85) In 1919 a French U.F.O. organiser, J.H. Lemieux, was hired and convention delegates resolved to produce U.F.O. literature in French. (86) By 1920, of an estimated 60,000 members, some five thousand were Franco-Ontarians and in the federal election, a Francophone, Joseph Binette, was elected Progressive member for Prescott.(87)
But in 1921, following the publication of a U.F.O. pamphlet endorsing bilingual education, and passionate pleas by Caron and J.B. Levert for racial unity on terms of equality, the U.F.O. retreated from dealing with Franco-Ontarian oppression. The U.F.O. leadership repudiated the pamphlet 'Public Schools in French Speaking Districts of Ontario' and the Drury government broke off negotiations with Senator Belcourt to tackle the education issue. Good, who deplored the English-French division, and who was among the first at conventions to extend greetings to Franco-Ontariens, was silent.

Then there was the national question about the place of native people in Canadian society. In 1921 Moses Elliott, a Six Nations farm leader and war veteran, appeared at Convention to ask the U.F.O. to lobby the federal government for local economic development, especially reserve roads, and for full political rights. Elliot's request was just the tip of an iceberg in a major battle between Indian Affairs and the Six Nations over land and self government.

As would become clear when Good became Brant member in 1922, the federal government managed to provoke both native tradionalists and modernisers by setting aside reserve land for Indian veterans under the Soldier Settlement Act, and then in 1924 imposing an elected band council by an R.C.M.P. occupation. The traditional band council refused to recognise federal land decisions and
there was a riot when County bailiffs tried to evict a
council's tenant for an Indian veteran. This clash between
the national government's view of native people as wards
of the state, and the majority of the Six Nations,
including the veterans, who saw themselves as a sovereign
nation in association with Canada, ended in a federal
inquiry and a fruitless visit to England to appeal over
the head of Ottawa. Good, who was sympathetic to Indian
farmer attempts to better their condition, simply couldn't
comprehend the Six Nations position, that they were an
oppressed nation. (92)

The one other group the U.F.O. worked with was labour.
Here farmers were dealing with a fellow exploited class,
not oppressed groups across classes. Because of this, the
dynamics of their relation were different. Oppressed
groups tended to be relatively powerless as expressed in
a dependent relation with the U.F.O.. With labour, however,
farmers were dealing with an independent class. Even if
urban workers were a smaller group, and suffered from
their own divisions, between reform and revolution, between
free trade and protectionist reformers, their potential
relation to the U.F.O. was one of allies. This was a
potential the U.F.O. would squander.

Good with his university education, his interest in
formal political theory, and his continuing association
with urban progressives, was the chief U.F.O. link to
labour until 1919, which included negotiating an electoral
pact. Then Drury as premier of a coalition government dealt directly with labour's different elements, though Good maintained his link, as a delegate to the I.L.P. conference in 1921, and in 1924 to the Canadian Labour Party. But at the start of the Ontario farm-labour relation, Good was invariably U.F.O. delegate to labour party conferences and farm publicist on labour questions.

One of the chief inflationary pressures on Ontario farmers during the war was the doubling of farm wage labour rates. While wage labour made up the lesser portion of farm labour, it was the largest cost item in farm budgets. (93) The largest portion of farm labour was unpaid family labour, which explains the virulent reaction to conscription. But farm anger also extended to the waged portion as scapegoats for broader economic pressures.

A maverick on many issues, Good on the labour question was a true representative of rural small property. Like the vast majority of Ontario farmers, Good thought voluntary government farm labour programmes a farce. (94) This may not have been true. But the farm solution to labour shortages was to end protectionism to force urban workers back into the rural sector. (95) These views were often harshly expressed. Good, for instance, opposed minimum wage legislation, even for veterans. (96) In 1921 when the Drury government faced an unemployment crisis, U.F.O. policy makers were divided over whether there should any grants for public works. (97)
In 1919 at the height of one Canada's greatest strike movements, Good gave expression to the U.F.O.'s jaundiced view of organised labour on two occasions, in a panel discussion for the Social Service Congress (with S.R. Parsons of the C.M.A. and Tom Moore of the T.L.C.) and as the leading U.F.O. witness before the Mathers Commission.

"I have no commendation for Bolshevism, ..., but I have sufficient insight to recognize its prime cause in the selfishness of the privileged classes".(98) To the surprise of his S.S.C. listeners, Good included organised labour among the privileged classes. The solution to post war industrial reconstruction, Good asserted, lay not in combinations to raise wages but in implementing policies leading to a co-operative (i.e. rural and small propertied) economy.

In May 1919, Good, with Powers and Lick, repeated this contradictory message before the Mathers Commission in Toronto. Good, who opened, stressed the sectional agrarian view that the farm labour question came first in setting national labour market policies. The job of the federal government was to lower wage rates so farmers could compete with urban employers. To be fair to Good, he did expect that if the tariff was abolished the cost of living would also decline substantially.

As Good summed it up, however, a harsh logic showed. There was no unemployment problem. There were lots of farm labour jobs available, if urban workers would only lower
their expectations. Public works were harmful. They just provided manufacturers with a subsidised work force. Nor was strike action a solution to the workers' dilemma. What workers really needed, Good lectured, was compulsory arbitration and consumer co-operatives. These views were quite unrealistic. Even the Trades and Labour Congress opposed King's Industrial Disputes Investigation Act with its compulsory mediation.

As George Keen expressed it,

"you (i.e. Good) have always seen the labour question from the capitalistic and profit-making viewpoint rather than the securing of adequate compensation for the values created. Until the farmers see this from the workers' perspective, they will get no political relief."

These prophetic words from 1916 only too well described Good's role as chief U.F.O. delegate to the Independent Labour Party of Ontario (I.L.P.) and the Canadian Labour Party, the national federation of labour groups, and the Brant U.F.O.'s inability to work with labour.

Because organised labour feared military conscription presaged industrial conscription at home, the T.L.C. encouraged labour candidates to run in the December 1917 federal election. C.L.P. candidates did poorly. But significant provincial and municipal gains followed until 1921. In Ontario, in March 1918, as a step to consolidate this new labour movement, the founding conference of the Ontario section of the Canadian Labour Party was held in Toronto.

As Waldron of the sun described the setting,
"W.C. Good of Paris (with R.H. Halbert) was one of the U.F.O. delegates and on occasion gave frank expression to the views probably held by most of the rank and file of the U.F.O. members when he took exception to certain Socialistic ideas being posed by others". (103)

Good, in fact, blocked the C.L.P. from endorsing public ownership of all major means of production. Ironically, it was Jimmy Simpson, a free trade laborite and one of those politically closest to the U.F.O., who was rebuked for imitating the British Labour Party's platform.(104)

However, as Good himself reported in the Sun, revealing once more the two sided class character of the farm movement, he believed farmers had good reasons to co-operate with labour. To begin with, farmers were workers as well as employers. "Just as Grit and Tory farmers should get together and discuss their common problems so also should city and country workers get together." (105) R.H. Halbert, in a typical Irishism, for him, went further to declare to hearty applause, that farmers and workers were only 'the doormats of the capitalists.' (106)

Secondly, Good argued with his farm audience, the U.F.O. had a legitimate interest in shaping a potentially important labour party. Because organised farmers represented both capital and labour, they had a privileged position in leading both sides to see where Canada's real interests lay. (107)

As obviously arrogant, and contradictory, as Good's intervention in the labour movement appears, his opinions
with labour reformers carried considerable weight. As the formally designated liaison between the larger U.F.O. and the smaller C.L.P., Good's presence dampened labour's political militancy over the conferences from 1918 to 1921, as he deflected labour reformers towards small propertied solutions to the crises of the post-war economy.(108)

The potential antagonism between farmers and workers, and the division between reform laborities, between free traders and protectionists, did occur in Brant. The Brantford I.L.P. was solidly protectionist and it proved impossible for the Brant U.F.O. to run a joint candidate for the city in 1921. Nor did the Brantford I.L.P. co-operate with the provincial I.L.P., M. McBride, a former Conservative and mayor of the city until 1921, sat as an independent I.L.P. member after his election in 1919.(109)

The Farm Progressive revolt clearly acted as a magnet to the oppressed and the urban workers. But the U.F.O., as can be seen in Good's blindness as to how the oppressed and workers saw their problems and potential solutions, was unable to rise above the class horizons of rural small property to seriously address, and hold, these other audiences for fundamental change. But the oppressed and organised workers did briefly look to the U.F.O., a fact often forgotten in the subsequent debacle of the twenties.

IV

The years from the founding of the U.F.C.C. and the U.F.O. saw dramatic changes in Good's personal life. By
1921 there were five children, Beth, Allan, William (who died in 1929), Norman, and Harold. One more child, Robert, would be born in 1923. Anne Good, Myrtleville's matriarch, died in 1918. (110) Will Good was now head of the Good clan.

On the farm, despite having to sell off stock in 1917 due to the war's labour shortage, Good managed to expand Myrtleville by fifty acres. (111) He installed hydro for his new farm house and, in a long drawn out experiment, to the barn to run a thresher. (112) For all his complaints, Good's personal fortunes improved. C.B. Sissons even came and worked as his hired man in 1917, while C.E. Birkett worked Myrtleville in 1918 on shares. (113) In 1922, however, with his election as the member for Brant, the farm was leased out. (114)

The years 1914 to 1921 were ones of feverish activity for Good and the U.F.O.. But it was activity that finally met with a mass response in co-operation and politics. Good played a critical role in laying the infrastructure to channel the spontaneous revolt at the end of the war as first U.F.C.C. President and then as a leading U.F.O. propagandist.

But at the first test of power in 1919, the new tradition of non-partisanship showed considerable confusion. U.F.O. leaders rejected any farm party government. But they also rejected an experiment in group government, a positive non-partisanship. Instead they chose a negative form, coalition government. Unlike Alberta or Manitoba, this
choice would not prove sustainable. Questions of oppression and the relation with organised workers were not marginal issues in the more socially complex province of Ontario.

The immediate consequence for Good was to diminish his moral authority, both in the co-operative movement and farm politics. The test of federal representation would see whether this was to be permanent.
### Table IV: 1921 Election Returns

#### A. Brant County

**Candidates:**
- Liberal: R.J. Aitkin
- Conservative: W.H. Reid
- Progressive: W.C. Good

**Distribution of Riding Vote**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eligible Voters</td>
<td>11229</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual Voters</td>
<td>8134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good (Elected)</td>
<td>3309 (40.7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reid</td>
<td>3150 (38.7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aitkin</td>
<td>1645 (20.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoiled ballots</td>
<td>30 (.4)</td>
<td></td>
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**Distribution of Vote by Municipality**

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<th>Poll Area</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>Prog.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Brantford: Three Polls, Reid 3.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number:</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage:</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>19.6</td>
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| Brantford Township: Fifteen Polls, Good 9, Reid 6. |         |       |       |
| Number:                    | 272     | 620   | 812   |
| Percentage:                | 15.6    | 36.3  | 47.6  |

| Burford Township: Fourteen Polls, Good 10, Reid 4. |         |       |       |
| Number:                    | 226     | 527   | 1026  |
| Percentage:                | 12.7    | 29.6  | 57.7  |

| Onondaga Township: Four Polls, Good 4. |         |       |       |
| Number:                    | 11      | 66    | 341   |
| Percentage:                | 2.6     | 15.6  | 80.8  |

| Tuscarora (Indian Reserve): One Poll, Good. |         |       |       |
| Number:                    | 2       | 20    | 34    |
| Percentage:                | 3.5     | 35.1  | 60    |
Paris (Town): Thirteen Polls, Reid 9, Aitkin 4.

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<tr>
<td>863</td>
<td>1137</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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Dumfries South Township: Ten Polls, Good 8, Reid 2.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


B. Ontario Results

Conservatives: 36  
Progressives: 24  
Liberals: 22  
Total: 82

Conservative Ridings:


Progressive Ridings:

Brant, Bruce South, Dufferin, Dundas, Frontenac, Glengarry, Grey South East, Huron North, Huron South, Lambton, Lennox and Addington, Middlesex East, Middlesex West, Muskoka, Norfolk, Ontario North, Peterborough East, Port Arthur and Kenora, Prescott, Simcoe North, Timiskaming, Victoria, Waterloo South, Wellington North.

Liberal Ridings:


14. Farmers' Sun, August 13, 1919. For the platform see, Staples, Challenge of Agriculture, Toronto, 1921, 147-150.


19. Ibid, Part II 'The Problem of Distribution', 57-91, (re communism, page 87). Though Good's correspondence with Single Land Taxers petered out by 1917, see Good Papers, Volume 3, passim, Good still carried a radical Single Tax message among farmers. See Farmers' Sun, June 6, 1920 where Good spoke before a large farm/town audience in Alliston on how the single land tax would revolutionise society.


25. Farm and Dairy, July 10, 1919. For Good's criticism of the Canadian Reconstruction Association see, Weekly Sun, March 26, 1919.
26. **Farmers' Sun**, June 18, 1919.

27. **Canadian Countryman**, September 6, 1919 to December 6, 1919. Good also publicized the Farmers' Platform when the F.P.C. took over the Sun, see Farmers' Sun, April 9, 1919.

28. **Farmers' Sun**, June 18, 1919.

29. **Farmers' Sun**, July 9, 1919.


34. **Globe**, October 23, 1919. Good gave a brief description of this initial U.F.O. meeting in Farmer Citizen, Toronto: Ryerson, 1959, 121.

35. Ibid. Good's letter for group government. Good had already declared for a positive form of non-partisanship. See Farmers' Sun, September 10, 1919, 'Now is the Time for a New Conception of Government'.

36. **Farmers' Sun**, January 12, 1921.


38. **Farmers' Advocate**, April 5, 1917.


42. **Farmers' Sun**, October 6, 1920 to December 4, 1920. Good's personal encounter with the editor of Rural Canada is in article VI, Farmers' Sun, November 27, 1920.
43. Canadian Countryman, July 23, 1920 to September 3, 1920. The seven parts are also in a clipping file, see Good Papers, Volume 24.

44. U.F.O. Minutes, Book II, Executive Committee, June 27, 1921.

45. Farmers' Sun, June 8, 1921. The rest of the series ran on June 15, 22, 29, and July 6, 13, 20, and 27, 1921.


47. Farmers' Sun, December 18, 1920, 'Special Convention Issue'.

48. Ibid. There was a discussion later among the Board over establishing a central election fund. See U.F.O. Minutes, Book II, Board of Directors, March 17, 1921.

49. Morton, Progressive Party, (Toronto, 1950), pages 96 and 104. For the McDemord contest which focused on the Board of Commerce, and with an appearance by Crerar, see Farmers' Sun, November 10, 13, and 20, 1920.

50. Farmers' Sun, February 9, 1921.


52. Farmers' Sun, October 8, 1921.

53. Good papers, Volume 17, T.A. Crerar to W.C. Good, January 6, 1921, Winnipeg.

54. Farmers' Sun, October 12, 1921. See Crerar's speech with Drury in Toronto, Farmers' Sun, November 16, 1921.


56. Q.U.A., Crerar Papers, S. III, Box 125, J.J. Morrison to T.A. Crerar, October 27, 1921, Toronto.
57. Mackenzie King Diaries, Sunday, October 23, 1921, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973, Micro-Form Manuscript 53.

58. Farmers' Sun, August 28, 1920.

59. Farmers' Sun, November 9, 1921 (Good's challenge). For Good's attack on local Conservatives see Brantford Expositor, November 5, 1921, report on the Grandview school meeting.


61. Good Papers, Volume 23, Brantford Expositor, clipping file, November 19, November 26, and December 3, 1921.

62. Brantford Expositor, November 15, 1921.

63. Brantford Expositor, November 19, 1921 (Scotland meeting on the 22nd with Mrs. J. Wallace, President, U.F.W.O.), and Brantford Expositor, November 26, list of daily meetings to December 5.

64. Good Papers, Volume 31, Election Flyer, 'The National Progressive Party in Brant'.

65. Good Papers, Volume 17.


68. The Brant returns can be found in Canada. House of Commons. Sessional Papers, Volume LVIII, No. 5, 1922, Sessional Paper Number 13, Fourteenth General Election, 5-6. Good won with 40.7% of the vote. His narrow margin of victory depended on not just farmers but also enfranchised Indians.


70. The following generalisations are based on a calculation of farm production systems from the 1921 Census. See Tables I and II, Chapter Three 'The Ontario Farm Scene' of this study and Census of Canada, Agriculture, Volume 5, 1921, Table 79, 'Farm Expenses and Value of Products, 1920, by Counties', 109-118.

71. See N. Séguin, La Conquête du Sol au 19e siècle, Montreal: Boréal Express, 1977, and his Agriculture et colonisation, Montreal: Boréal, 1980, for a
discussion of 'agro-forestry'.


73. Q.U.A., Crerar Papers, S. III, Box 125, T.A. Crerar to J.J. Morrison, December 9, 1921, Winnipeg.

74. Staples, Challenge of Agriculture, (Toronto, 1921), 127-132 (on the U.F.Y.P.O. as modelled on the United Farmers' of Alberta Youth Section). For the local Brant model see: Farmers' Sun, December 14, 1921. Brant farm youth were organised in a summer baseball league and winter debating contests. See also Farm and Dairy July 17, 1920 for the Middlesex U.F.O. baseball league, another youth experiment.

75. On the origins of the U.F.W.O. see Staples, Challenge of Agriculture, (Toronto, 1921), 115-127. For numbers in 1921 see U.F.O. Minutes, Board of Directors, March 15, 1921.

76. Weekly Sun, June 19, 1918.

77. Staples, Challenge of Agriculture, (Toronto, 1921), 121-122.

78. Farmers' Sun, May 29, 1920 (re communal laundry at Hensall, Ontario). For a broader discussion of communal laundries and bakeries, see Farm and Dairy, December 23, 1920.

79. Farmers' Advocate, December 26, 1918 and Farm and Dairy, December 26, 1918.


82. Good Papers, Volume 5, W.C. Good to E. Griesbach, April 1, 1922, Ottawa. Good as the 'left' on the F.P.C.'s Board of Directors was asked to reinstate Miss Griesbach after the Board fired her for being 'too serious'. Good really couldn't grasp why the U.F.W.O. was so upset as the Sun turned the Womens' Page into a consumers' guide to recipes and fashion.

83. Weekly Sun, June 12, 1918. R.H. Halbert at the Lorelta U.F.O. picnic, Simcoe County.

84. U.F.O. Minutes, Archives File 202, Executive Committee, March 29, 1918 (re organising in New Brunswick and
Quebec). See also *Weekly Sun*, April 21, 1918.


88. 1920 seems to have been the year for English-French farm co-operation. The first joint English-French U.F.O. picnic is reported in *Farmers' Sun*, August 21, 1920. There was a report on Franco-Ontarian organisation by J.A. Caron at a Board of Directors meeting in the spring of 1921. See U.F.O. Minutes, Book II, Board of Directors, March 16, 1921. The Executive Committee decided to release the bilingual schools pamphlet in early September. See U.F.O. Minutes, Book II, Executive Committee, September 6, 1921.

89. All of this was soon abandoned. See U.F.O. Minutes, Book II, Executive Committee, September 22, 1921 for the withdrawal of the pamphlet. There was then a full scale debate on bilingualism among the Board of Directors, October 31, with no resolution. See also C.M. Johnston, *E.C. Drury*, (Toronto, 1986), 88-89.

90. *Farmers' Sun*, December 18, 1920 (re Good's welcome to Francophone delegates).

91. *Farmers' Sun*, December 14, 1921. See also U.F.O. Minutes, Book II, Ninth Annual Convention, December 15-17, 1921.

92. There is a brief account of Reserve disturbances in *Farmers' Sun*, May 18, 1922. The *Brantford Expositor* has almost daily coverage in the spring of 1922. See also Good Papers, Volume 5, G. Keen to W.C. Good, May 11, 1922, Brantford and Colonel J.Z. Fraser to W.C. Good, June 7, 1922, Burford. Good's response was incomprehension. See W.C. Good to G. Keen, May 12, 1922, Ottawa, where he tells Keen he finds it hard to see how the federal government can meet "the provisions of some obsolete treaties."

93. See Brown and Cook, *Canada: 1896-1921*, (Toronto, 1976), 233. Male summer farm labour rates rose from thirty six dollars a month in 1914 to seventy eight dollars in
1919. Annual farm labour wages rose from $323 to $764. And see Census of Canada, 1921, Volume 5, p.xxxvi-xxxvii re Farm Expenses, and see Census of Canada, 1931, Volume 8, p.lxxv re Farm Expenses. Not until 1930 did the Census survey farm labour ratios. In 1930 the figures revealed over 75% of farm labour was unpaid. Given exaggeration due to the onset of the Depression, this still shows how important unpaid family labour would be to farmers during the war. See Table VI 'Number of Farm Workers and Weeks of Hired Labour, 1930, by Size of Farms, 1931, by Provinces, xxxliii-xxxiv.


95. Farm and Dairy, March 4, 1915 (Drury speech).

96. Good Papers, Volume 18, W.C. Good to the Ottawa Citizen, February 24, 1917.


98. Canadian Countryman, August 9, 1919.


100. P. Craven, 'An Impartial Umpire': Industrial Relations and the Canadian State, 1900-1911, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980, 311-317.


103. Weekly Sun, April 3, 1918.

104. Robin, Radical Politics, (Kingston, 1968), 144.

105. Weekly Sun, April 17, 1918.

106. Weekly Sun, April 3, 1918.

107. Weekly Sun, April 17, 1918.


111. Good Papers, Volume 3, W. Ker to W.C. Good, April 23, 1917, St. George (re stock sale), and Volume 2, C. Smith to W.C. Good, January 3, 1916, Toronto (re land sale).

112. Good Papers, Volume 3, W.C. Good to Brantford Township, June 2, 1917, Paris (re hydro hookup), and Volume 4, W.C. Good to W.T. Goodison, October 2, 1918, Paris (re thresher).


IX. NON-PARTISAN LIMITS: CO-OPERATING INDEPENDENT

The years 1922 to 1926 marked the apex and eclipse of the Farm Progressive movement. As the tenets of non-partisanship were put to the test, rural petit bourgeois sectionalism proved too strong. The first test of this dialectic was T.A. Crerar's attempt to effect fusion with the King Liberals. Both Alberta and Ontario Progressives were adamant that no party compromise was possible. Not surprisingly, Crerar resigned 1. November 1922 and the more accommodating Robert Forke, another Manitoban, became national Progressive leader.

Despite this setback to the 'crypto-Liberals', Forke, with a majority of Progressives, proved over time to put sectional class interests ahead of a consistent strategy to consolidate the Progressive breakthrough. In practice, this defensive sectionalism was to lay the ground for capitulation to the Liberals by 1926. Struggles to change the rules of the House of Commons, the alternate vote and proportional representation, were consistently sacrificed on the altar of Liberal free trade gestures, as in the 1924 budget, and for sectional concessions such as the partial restoration of the Crow freight rate subsidy, a brief attempt to reconstruct the Canadian Wheat Board, and a renewed ban on oleo margarine in 1923.

Despite Crerar's betrayal of non-partisanship in 1922, Good and the Progressive caucus clearly felt they
could influence the King Liberal minority government. All this began to change with the defeat of the Drury U.F.O. government in June 1923. This defeat had its roots from the first session in 1920 with a persistent division between party and occupational approaches as to why farmers were in politics. Good mounted a desperate effort to get the Drury government to carry electoral reform at the last moment to secure the non-partisan experiment in the 1923 election. Good's efforts failed. Drury was not sufficiently convinced of the need for new methods to risk a confrontation with the more sectional elements of the U.F.O. caucus.

The collapse of the Ontario U.F.O. government, and the constant fudging of Liberal-Progressive differences federally, generated pressures from left and right to differentiate the Progressive caucus. J.S. Woodsworth split the Progressive caucus in 1924 on the budget debate, fourteen voting with Woodsworth and Irvine. Ten direct democracy Progressives withdrew from the caucus and became known as the 'Ginger' group. Good became chief whip.

To add insult to injury, as the group government proponents drew off in one direction, another group around chief whip J.F. Johnston betrayed the Progressive caucus in 1925 to vote with the Liberals on the budget. For this action Johnston was expelled from the Progressive group. But the damage was done. Any hope the Progressives could set the agenda for the coming election
was gone.

Good, from the start, was in the forefront of the non-partisan struggle. He argued hard with Crerar against any alliance with the Liberals, and for the Progressives to become the official opposition. Good repeatedly fought to introduce the principle of direct taxation into the budget and to develop a planned approach to credit through his work on the Banking Committee in 1923. He also repeatedly fought to introduce political methods of direct democracy with proportional representation, the alternate vote, and, with Alberta's William Irvine, reform of Parliament's rules to allow more freedom for the individual member. And he pioneered the Social Services' Council campaign to ban racetrack gambling.

The collapse of the Progressive political experiment was confirmed in the federal elections of 1925 and 1926 as the Farm Progressives declined from sixty five to twenty four, then twenty three, M.P.s. Only two Ontario members were returned, J.W. King and Agnes Macphail. Good declined a second nomination and returned home to farm in 1925. Good's reason for withdrawal from the political scene lay in the lack of farm support for structural political reform. But Good continued to campaign for direct democracy until 1927 when the farm bureaucracy, Morrison and the Sun's editor A.G. Bridger, blocked any further debate.

The ability of the farm bureaucracy to impose an end to the U.F.O. political experiment in populism rested on
the inability of U.F.O. members to rise above their own narrowly defined class interests. While the majority of organised farmers rejected Drury's argument for a Progressive party, they also rejected Good's argument for group government. What U.F.O. members repeatedly confirmed from 1922 to 1926, in convention after convention, was their class sectionalism. They wanted neither party nor group government but occupational representation. Even when Morrison in 1924 wanted out of politics altogether, members insisted on the right of the U.F.O. to stand candidates for the purpose of local representation. This was a purely negative strategy, one neither Drury nor Good, with Agnes Macphail, could win members from.

By the late 1920s, class sectionalism had won the day, condemning any farm inspired direct democracy experiment to the attic of producers' history in the struggle against capitalist class society.

I

The Progressives elected sixty five members in December 1921 and held a balance of power. The King ministry, the first minority national government, was vulnerable to any concerted Progressive demand for structural reform, whether economic or political. But King's vulnerability remained a theoretical question when the opportunist nature of Progressive leadership was revealed, and when it proved possible to woo the majority of Progressive M.P.s on sectional issues.
Even before election day, there were rumours of Liberal-Progressive negotiations for a fusion government with Crerar and other Progressives in a King cabinet. These negotiations came to nothing, though they were an important indication of Crerar and Forke's leanings. (1) The Progressives held two post-election caucuses to determine their future policy. The first, in Saskatoon on December 20, saw a clear majority willing to trust Crerar in offering to King "all reasonable co-operation and support" before the session had even begun. (2) Only U.F.A. members protested. Three days later in Toronto, Ontario's twenty four Progressives firmly rejected any formal relation with the Liberals. (3) Good, who was ill and had to miss the first Progressive caucus when Parliament opened on March 8, wrote to Crerar to warn him off the fusion course. Good advocated, like the U.F.A.'s Robert Garland, the Progressives become the official opposition to take advantage of the rules of the House of Commons which only recognised a second party in moving amendments.

"To allow the Conservatives to move the Budget amendment forces the Progressives to vote either with the government or with the Conservatives. This would be a fatal tactical mistake." (4) Instead, the Progressives, Good argued, should both use the rules and declare they would not be bound by treating every government measure as a vote of confidence. The aim should be to force an election to split the Liberal party.
Otherwise, Good warned, the Liberals held the whip of calling an election on their terms over Progressive heads.(5)

Prescient as Good's comments were, and he insisted Crerar read his arguments out to the caucus, they were to no avail. Despite a hard debate, the majority of the Progressive caucus were inclined to trust Crerar's judgement and their own sectional definition of looking for immediate benefits to agriculture. They rejected a balance of power strategy where they held the initiative.(6)

The first session of the fourteenth Parliament instead was dominated by King's agenda to actively consolidate the Canadian National Railway and present a budget with minimal tariff reductions to bolster his own tenuous hold on the Liberal leadership. In the case of the Progressives, it was a classic case of divide and conquer. In particular, King tried to appease prairie Progressives by passing enabling legislation to re-establish the Canadian Wheat Board, a failed project, and to begin the lengthy process of restoring a modified freight subsidy (the Crow), secured by 1925 on the export of grain and flour. As well, a Royal Commission on Grain marketing was established in 1923 and the C.N.R. engaged in an active programme of branch line building. Eastern Progressives were also wooed in this manner. While they successfully resisted farm sectionalism in 1922, voting as a bloc against banning margarine, they reversed themselves in 1923 for farm protectionism.(7)

Good's prediction about the untenable strategic
position the Progressive group had placed themselves in soon came true. William Irvine, Labour M.P. for Calgary East, attempted early in the 1922 session to raise the issue of reforming House rules, separating votes on measures from matters of confidence and allowing for amendment to amendments to recognise the presence of a third group in the House. (8) No relief was offered.

It was no surprise then, in May, when Crerar tried to move an amendment to the Conservative amendment to the budget, he was ruled out of order. (9) Denied their own voice, Progressives were forced either to vote with the protectionist Conservatives, which most did, or, as a few did, with the Liberals. Though, as the Sun's parliamentary reporter, J.A. Stevenson, pointed out, they could have imitated Woodsworth and Irvine in abstaining from unrepresentative votes. (10)

Good believed in using Parliament as a means of public education. Good spoke to three issues he would persistently raise until 1925 and dissolution. They were electoral, economic and moral reform, all premised on the principle of direct democracy.

To start, Good introduced a resolution endorsing the joint principles of the single transferable vote and proportional representation. Both Crerar and Mackenzie King spoke in favour. But Good's resolution, introduced with a speech touching on virtually every Canadian and global example, was talked out without coming to a vote. One
disturbing feature of the debate, one Good did not perceive, was French Canadian opposition. As they made clear, developing a plebiscitary democracy without addressing the question of national oppression, to safeguard the interests of minority groups, only threatened to increase English Canadian racism against French Canadians. They were opposed to an abstract exercise in direct democracy. The one subject Progressives and French Canadian Liberals did agree upon was cutting militia spending. But the Progressives never used this as a bridge to the French community.(11)

On the budget, where one half of the Progressive caucus spoke, Good presented a lengthy historical indictment of Liberal duplicity in promising tariff reform and delivering protection. He also sketched out the elements of the single land tax as an alternative form of taxation.(12) As well, Good, who was acting in concert with the Social Service Council, presented an anti-race track gambling resolution. This too was talked out. Later in June, Good tried to move an amendment to the Criminal code to ban pari-mutuel race-track betting.(13) But the Speaker ruled his amendment out of order since Good's resolution was still standing.(14) This was Good's first introduction to how the rules of the House could be used against independent M.P.s.

Though the Progressives had tactically compromised themselves in a serious way, and no real progress was registered by Good, enough verbal agreement had been
expressed by Liberals that even the proponents of group
government felt optimistic. On July 1, at the post-session
caucus M.P.s agreed that they would continue to function
as an independent group.(15)

Good clearly enjoyed his new national prominence and
sought to increase his understanding of the country by
travelling to its eastern and western extremities. In
September 1922, he travelled to Nova Scotia, to visit his
cousin Charles Good, who had a farm near Truro. Though he
visited Halifax and met with H. Taggart, President of the
Nova Scotia United Farmers and one of the eleven farm-labour
legislative members(16), the high point was his visit to the
British Canadian Co-operative Society (B.C.C.S.) in Cape
Breton.

B.C.C.S. was the largest consumer co-operative in
Canada, the jewel of the Co-operative Union of Canada.
It had over two thousand members and was worth one million
dollars. Officials were paid a modest wage and any capital
invested could be withdrawn quickly. The last was a vital
mechanism. The United Mine Workers' Union bureaucracy cut
off strike funds during the great labour unrest of the
early 1920s. Co-operative funds gave the local unions a
financial independence to continue the struggle against
the British Empire Steel Corporation. Good, as the new
President of the C.U.C. was given a big welcome by the
Directors in Sydney Mines and did a public meeting.(17)
Later, in 1925, Good would speak for federal relief in
Cape Breton based on the pleas of the B.C.C.S..(18)

In the fall of 1922 it became increasingly clear
Crerar was still looking for a mandate to enter into a
fusion agreement with the Liberals.(19) But both the U.F.A.
and the S.G.G.A. took no fusion positions.(20) So too did
the U.F.O. executive.(21) Crerar called for a conference
in Winnipeg on November 10 to resolve the actual character
of the Progressive movement. Was it a party, in fact the
'true' Liberal party, or did the movement represent the
new principle of group government by occupational
representation? The outcome was a defeat of the fusionists
or 'crypto-Liberals'. Crerar resigned as national leader
and Robert Forke, Manitoba whip, became the new leader.(22)

Or had he? As Good saw it, in a report to Sun readers,
Forke had only been elected as chair of the Progressive
Executive Committee (E.C.). He may have become house leader,
since the rules of Parliament demanded such a creature,
but Forke was not a new national leader. Nor Good suggested
was there a need for a formal National Progressive party.
(23) While the new parliamentary E.C. would replace the
C.C.A., which formally withdrew from politics in March
1923(24), the E.C. was only a coordinating, not directing,
body. This reading of events was confirmed by the failure
to hold a national progressive convention. The U.F.O.
refused to attend any national convention in 1923.(25)
Only a Manitoba committee was organised in 1924, broadened
to include Saskatchewan in 1925.(26)
What already existed in the West, the division between the Manitoba leadership and Albertan M.P.s over the methods of Progressive organisation, emerged also in Ontario with Good, Agnes Macphail, and the U.F.O. executive clearly aligned with the Albertan group. Good, however, played down these differences. In a characteristic fudge, he emphasised Progressive unity on the principle of agrarian representation. And, since Crerar was gone, it looked like the politic thing to do.(27)

This positive reading of the events of 1922 was summed up by Good in a survey of the Canadian farm progressive movement for the Dalhousie Review. The industrial revolution, Good stated, had led to the emergence of class groups in society that only now were seeking political representation and new forms of government appropriate to co-operative group government. The farmers pioneered this process to fulfill the 'Co-operative Law of Life'. So optimistic was Good, he was led to make the rash statement that "in fact, there is no necessary conflict of interest anywhere. Harmony is possible among all groups and all nations. We can harmonize the liberty of the individual with the sovereignty of the state. Though discord is still frequent, the ideal harmony is in the making."(28)

But, by the end of the 1923 session, Good, Macphail and the Albertans, were to be rudely brought to their senses. Crerar may have gone but Forke and, chief whip, J.F. Johnston, were still firmly committed to the
'crypto-Liberal' agenda. As Forke wrote to Crerar just before Crerar stepped down,

"I only wish the idea you had at Saskatoon and recently could have been carried out. But the movement is a little premature for the present state of opinion amongst Progressive supporters."(29)

Unbeknownst to his own caucus, Forke still took his political lead from Crerar. Crerar's defection, however had one immediate known consequence. Two Ontario Progressives, W. Hammill of Muskoka and J. Binette of Prescott, crossed to King in December.(30)

Parliament opened in February 1923 with a Throne Speech emphasising the Bank Act and electoral redistribution. The Progressive caucus, which met on January 31, decided to focus on sectional questions, on the western grain trade and rural credits.(31) Forke in his reply to the Throne Speech made this clear in stressing they wanted an experiment in proportional representation limited to the cities.(32) This, Good warned, would only consolidate Liberal and Conservative opposition to any experiment in direct democracy.

The Progressives were in a more combative mood in 1923. J. Hoey, Manitoba whip, surprised the Liberals by moving an amendment to the Throne Speech demanding a serious downward revision in the tariff. The Liberals had to secure an adjournment to avoid defeat.(33) William Irvine moved a resolution to separate votes against bills from votes of confidence in the government. This was
decisively defeated by a joint Tory-Liberal vote. But the Liberals did refer Irvine's resolution to study credit to the Banking and Commerce Committee, a significant concession when the Bank Act was coming up for its decennial revision.

The other controversies before the Easter recess were all of W.C. Good's making. First, he introduced a motion banning commercial gambling at race tracks. Citing the exemption of race track associations in 1910 from the Criminal code, and Ontario's taxation of pari-mutuel betting introduced by the U.F.O.'s Attorney General W.E. Raney, Good pressed the House for a definite statement on 'the gambling evil'. Despite a two day debate, the resolution was lost by seventy six to ninety six, with British Columbia Conservatives and French Canadian Liberals leading the opposition.

Later, in March, Good presented one resolution endorsing the single transferable vote and another for an experiment in proportional representation. Despite advice from F.J. Dixon and S.J. Farmer in Winnipeg not to split the two, Good hoped he could introduce direct democracy by gradual means. The preferential ballot, Good noted, had already been studied by the House in 1921 with a recommendation to use it in a future federal election. Again King supported Good, ironically, on the grounds that electoral reform would strengthen partyism, and the resolution was referred to the Redistribution Committee.
without a division. The proportional representation resolution, however, was defeated. In a vote of seventy two for and ninety against, urban members turned back what they considered an unfair proposal. Urban minorities would get representation, like labour in Vancouver and Winnipeg, but not rural minorities.(38)

After Easter, despite debates on excluding Asian immigrants, which Good questioned(39), and the upcoming Imperial Conference in Britain(40), the main issues were the revision of the Bank Act and the Budget. As the session dragged on the Redistribution Committee did not report. Instead the Liberals focused on economic business.

The Banking Committee began hearings in April and functioned with two agendas, Fielding's proposed Bank Act revision and Irvine's credit investigation. U.F.A. members, with Good, aired a number of theories about the basis and functioning of credit and subjected Canada's banking elite to an unprecedented cross examination. U.F.A. members concentrated on currency reform. Irvine brought George Bevington, a self educated Albertan farmer, who proposed a rural credit scheme based on a land bank, and Major Douglas, the inventor of Social Credit.(41) Good had to admit to an academic correspondent, while he found Douglas' critique striking, he couldn't follow the proofs of social credit in fact. Douglas assured him it could all be proved with calculus!(42)

Good pursued a different strategy from the Albertans.
He brought in an academic expert, Professor Irving Fisher of Yale, to discuss how government action could 'stabilise the purchasing power of money'. In particular, Fisher talked about what a federal reserve bank could do to stabilise the business cycle, based on the American experience, and the need for international mechanisms, such as a gold standard based on commodities besides the dollar and an international rediscount agreement as had been discussed at the Genoa conference. Unlike the hostile reaction of Liberals and Conservatives to Douglas, Fisher received a vote of thanks from all parties. (43) Good also introduced a model bill to ease the establishment of credit unions, though this was talked out as being in violation of a number of provisions in the Bank Act. (44)

The group government people from Alberta and Ontario, with Woodsworth and Irvine, worked hard to show how little was understood about Canada's finances, especially by bankers. Indeed, Liberal and Conservative committee members united to prevent a presentation by the General Manager of the failed Merchant Bank. (45) The Progressives also tried to show the need for fundamental reform in the direction of a federal reserve bank with the exclusive authority to issue Canadian currency, set interest rates, and work for an international monetary agreement. To these ends, the Progressives proposed a one year extension of bank charters to frame a truly revised Bank Act in 1924. This motion, and four others dealing with interest rates, rural credits, a
moratorium on farm mortgage debt, and the right of bank
workers to organise in unions, were lost. (46) The question
now was, what strategy would the Progressive caucus pursue
when the Bank Act returned to the House for a third and
final reading?

As the Bank Act was debated in committee, Fielding
presented his last budget in May. It was a perfunctory
affair, offering a few tariff reductions, a small drop in
the federal sales tax rate, and a rather empty standing
offer of reciprocity to the United States. This time the
Conservatives waived their right to move the amendment as
the official opposition. But Forke's amendment, condemning
the Liberals' repeated failures on tariff reform, was
defeated by a joint Liberal-Conservative vote, of sixty
one to one hundred and sixty two. But, on the main motion,
to pass the Budget, the Liberals barely mustered a
majority as it passed by one hundred and fourteen to one
hundred and six. As W.L. Morton has noted, this was perhaps
the highpoint of Progressive opposition to the Liberals. (47)

But when a farm protection issue arose, whether to ban
margarine, this time a majority of Ontario Progressives
voted with Liberals to restore the ban. Good tried to delay
this protectionist precedent by asking King to first bring
in specific legislation. King ignored him. (48)

By this point, in early June, the outstanding question
was the revised Bank Act. In the Progressive caucus a
fierce debate broke out over whether to filibuster the
revised Bank Act. It soon became clear the Forke forces, in Manitoba and much of Ontario, were against a filibuster. They hoped a co-operative approach to the Bank Act would be reciprocated in 1924 with legislation for a federal rural loans programme. (49) Many, like Crerar, even George Keen, saw the discussion of economic theory as irrelevant. (50) Good, Spencer, Bird, Coote, the Bank Committee activists, were 'very indignant', when the caucus decided not to filibuster. This was a humiliating climb down after committee activists had gone to Fielding threatening such action. (51)

When the Bank Act reappeared in the House on Wednesday, June 20, the Progressives moved the same five resolutions as they had moved in Committee, with the same result. A. Speakman presented the main motion, for a one year delay in Bank Act revision, and lost. (52) By the end of the day, the chartered banks were secure for another ten years, though in 1924 the Liberals conceded government inspection after the Home Bank failed in August 1923, and compensation to depositors in 1925. (53)

Despite these defeats Good felt optimistic that the Progressives were slowly impressing their principles on the House and throughout Canada. The single transferable vote had been accepted in principle and, for the first time ever, an extensive public debate had been launched on the need for credit reform in tackling one of the great sources of economic instability. Despite warnings from
Czerar, that the Progressives were a finished force, Good replied that the role of pioneer called for a degree of patient explanation and example before any results could be hoped for.(54)

In retrospect, after two sessions, Good wrote in the Sun, the main business of Parliament was the political economy of the nation. To be precise, there was a need to study and devise strategies to deal with 'property ownership, currency and finance, and international relations'. But the methods of Parliament were outdated in relation to the new problems posed by economic life.(55)

One measure Good could offer was a further study of Canada's financial system and problems. In late August 1923, Good left for a railway tour of Western Canada, the Pacific Northwest, and the American Midwest. Good, beginning in Winnipeg with references from Czerar, travelled to Saskatoon and Regina, through Alberta (meeting George Bevington again), to Vancouver, and south to Washington state. Then it was back across the southern prairies to Winnipeg and south through North Dakota, interviewing Non-Partisan League activists, through Wisconsin, Iowa, and Illinois. By the end, in September, Good interviewed one hundred and forty two bank officials and farm leaders on the question of finance.(56)

Good turned his western tour into an eight part newspaper series, run across Canada, on 'What Shall Be Done With Our Banks?'. The series focused on defining why
inflation and deflation occurred, by an unstable medium of exchange, and went on to a number of practical suggestions as to how the monetary system could be stabilised and improved by active government regulation. A federal reserve bank could be set up and a rural credit union system started to address the scarcity of rural credit and lay the basis of group democracy in the financial sector of the economy. (57)

If Good had run into some serious difficulties in his first two years as a Progressive M.P., against the bias of parliamentary structures and the sectional divisions within the Progressive caucus, this, in Good's view, was only to be expected. Pioneers had to expect difficulties in introducing fundamental change. But it had been Crerar who had quit, and Forke who had to respond to the actions' of the group government M.P.s, even if he had not supported a filibuster over the Bank Act. As well, the federal Liberals had been largely passive, reacting to the pressures of a conservative French Canadian M.P.s around Sir Lomer Gouin, and English Canadian Liberals sympathetic to prairie sectional demands like the restoration of the Crow subsidy. It was at the provincial level where disaster first loomed for Ontario federal Progressives with the defeat of the Drury administration in June 1923.

II

Though Good had argued in 1919 for an experiment in group government, which was defeated, he remained largely
removed from provincial politics. Drury had used Good's services on a confidential Unemployment Committee in the winter of 1921-22(58), and had appointed him to the University of Toronto's Board of Governors in 1922 as part of the province's effort to make the University more accountable to its main benefactor. Good, however, found he could rarely attend Board meetings, between Ottawa and home commitments, and had to content himself with arguments for economy at a distance with such imposing figures as Vincent Massey.(59)

Good also found himself drawn into the conflict between H.B. Cowan's United Dairymen's Co-operative and Manning Doherty's 1922 proposal to create a state sponsored United Dairymen Co-operative by the Sapiro pooling method. Good opposed the pooling principle as a form of compulsion from above. But he was careful to stress to Doherty the more common sense point of adjusting his pooling proposal to the interests of the dairy co-operative already in the field so the two would not compete.(60) Doherty, who saw only the business end of his proposal, ignored Good's advice, and a public clash between Eastern Ontario dairymen and the U.F.O. government did come about. In characteristically blunt fashion, Doherty said, "The industry is too important to be allowed to stagnate to satisfy even a few."(61) But in all these matters, such as passing on provincial agricultural requests(62), Good was reacting to demands for help or advice from those
involved in the provincial scene.

Good's involvement with the provincial U.F.O.-I.L.P. government underwent a radical change in 1922. The one thing the Drury government could do to aid federal Progressive efforts was to introduce direct democracy, to act as an example to the nation, and thus consolidate the break from partyism that occurred across the country in 1921. Though Good carried out a major intervention in the spring of 1923 in the provincial U.F.O. caucus, he was to be disappointed. Class sectionalism would prove to be more powerful than an act of class altruism that might threaten rural political influence.

The struggle between balancing agrarian needs and managing the province of Ontario led to a serious division between the U.F.O. and its parliamentary wing from the first session in 1920 when the Drury government raised the possibility of a civil service pension bill. Morrison issued a U.F.O. circular against this, which in turn led to a storm of criticism in the urban press that a class movement outside Parliament was dictating to the government. (63)

The pensions battle was merely the opening shot in a growing civil war within the U.F.O.. The main issue, in a persistent running battle between Premier Drury and Secretary Morrison, was over the form of Progressive organisation. Should the U.F.O. caucus function as a party, in coalition with the I.L.P., the Drury or 'broadening out'
view. Or should it act as a sectional group, representing agrarian interests exclusively, to only influence legislation? The last was the Morrison view, a purely negative definition of the U.F.O. in Parliament as an occupational lobby. This was not, it is important to stress, Good's view. Good saw the U.F.O. as a class movement acting in a positive manner to establish a new co-operative, group government within modified parliamentary forms.(64)

The Druzy-Morrison clash heated up in 1922 when a U.F.O. caucus committee attempted to engineer a Sun takeover. Morrison managed to fend this off at the annual meeting in September of the Farmers' Publishing Company by the use of proxy voting, a measure Good did not approve. (65) Then in December at the U.F.O. Convention Morrison slipped an anti-broadening out resolution through, by questionable means, before Drury could speak to the delegates.(66)

Good's concern with the direction of provincial politics lay more in the direction of electoral reform than in the Morrison-Druzy clash. In 1922, at the same time that Good introduced his resolution for the single transferable vote and an experiment in proportional representation in Ottawa, he wrote Drury to encourage him to introduce actual legislation.(67) Drury was cautious but willing to try the preferential ballot. The caucus, however, was divided. Many, including such sectional critics of Drury like Andrew Hicks, thought the single
transferable vote would only strengthen the old parties. Drury dropped electoral reform, much to Good's disappointment.(68)

As the fourth session of the U.F.O. government neared, traditionally a pre-election session, Good moved to publicly pressure the Drury government into electoral reform. At the December 1922 U.F.O. convention Good secured resolutions endorsing both the single transferable vote and a test in proportional representation, with the U.F.O. to use such methods in future internal elections.(69) The failure of 1917 to consolidate direct democracy within the movement was remedied.

Then in January 1923 before the session started, Good engaged in an extensive correspondence with Drury to convince him to introduce legislation.(70) Drury hesitated to act. While he agreed on the necessity of electoral reform, he believed a majority of the caucus thought the methods of direct democracy would harm farm representation.

"You were wrong in thinking that a third of my supporters in the House are opposed to the measure. As a matter of fact, when when I talked to you, practically all the Farmers, including those in the Cabinet, were opposed to it and the Labour members of the Cabinet were in favour of it."(71)

This view of caucus opinion was reinforced by a survey by the U.F.O.'s Education Secretary, M.H. Staples. Staples was pessimistic that Drury on his own could carry a caucus majority in the face of the resolute opposition of eight M.P.P.s.(72) Good acted at once to bring pressure to bear
on the U.F.O. provincial caucus. Despite Morrison's hesitation, Good pressed the U.F.O. to issue a province wide circular endorsing electoral reform before the session began.(73) However, once the session started, the U.F.O. caucus repeatedly defeated I.L.P. electoral reform resolutions, to eliminate plural voting on municipal referendums on money issues, and to introduce proportional representation in municipal elections.(74)

Good decided on a personal intervention. Through his contacts with the Toronto Progressive community, a public meeting was organised at the Foresters' Hall with Good as the featured speaker on direct democracy. On the evening of Wednesday, March 7, Good spoke to an overflow crowd. He attacked Andrew Hicks, outlined the problems of representation with the 1919 and 1921 elections, and the positive example of labour gains in representation in Manitoba where proportional representation was in use. A resolution was then drafted endorsing electoral reform and a delegation saw Drury later.(75)

On Thursday morning Good personally canvassed the U.F.O. caucus. Apparently he was successful in rallying the majority, and isolating the Hicks minority, for Drury wrote subsequently that he was much more hopeful about the situation.(76) With the aid of Ronald Hooper, Secretary of the Proportional Representation League of Canada, who had been sent from Ottawa to Toronto by Good, draft legislation was prepared for the preferential ballot and a test of
proportional representation. (77)

But the seeds of destructive sectionalism had grown to a degree beyond a one-off effort by Good. When Drury introduced the 1923 budget and his bills for electoral reform in April, the U.F.O. caucus had to fight off a motion of non-confidence in the budget by one of their own members, H. Casselman, and then face a Conservative filibuster against electoral reform. Drury lost control in the face of these attacks from within and without. In response to Hicks, Drury suddenly announced the House would be dissolved on May 4, with an election to follow on June 25. Then in the fifth day of the Conservative filibuster, without the aid of closure, Drury abandoned the direct democracy measures. (78)

As Good warned, without electoral reform, a Conservative victory was likely. (79) On June 25, Howard Fergusson swept to power with seventy-five seats. Good largely abstained from the provincial campaign. He did help to arrange a peace pact between Morrison and Drury before the election with an agreement to hold a post-election conference on the future of the U.F.O. in politics. (80) This was held on July 26, with Good as one of the six U.F.O. delegates. Drury at this point wanted to forge ahead with the creation of an Ontario Progressive Party. The U.F.O. delegates refused, claiming they were bound by the 1922 anti-broadening out resolution. Both sides agreed to delay further political organisation until
the December 1923 Convention.(81)

In December, after a confused debate between party proponents and those for sectional representation, a compromise resolution was worked out. The U.F.O., it stated, would refrain from politics 'as a party'.(82) This, it was soon clear, was completely unsatisfactory. On the one hand party proponents believed the U.F.O. had vacated the parliamentary field, while U.F.O. activists took the resolution as a confirmation of constituency autonomy, to act as sectional representatives or as co-operating independents, working either as an occupational lobby or as proponents of co-operative group government.

A fierce debate broke out in the pages of the Sun between Good and Drury on Progressive political methods after a January meeting of the Ontario Progressive Political Committee in Toronto. Good, with the support of Leslie Oke in the Ontario legislature, argued a return to party methods would mean fusion with the Liberals, and the fragmentation and loss of farm occupational representation in politics.(83) Drury replied to denounce group government by holding a balance of power. The goal, he stated, was to hold power by winning a majority, and that meant winning urban progressives and labour, a task best met by organising a People's Party. As Drury said, "If we want reforms in this generation we must be prepared to work with the tools already in our hands, not wait for the creation of new ones."(84) The debate ended inconclusively
with Good stating 'Four Leading Questions' to be debated at the founding convention of the Ontario Progressives. (85)

In November 1924, three hundred and fifty proponents of forming a new People's Party met in Toronto to launch the Ontario Progressive Party. Though Good was present and opposed the return to party methods, he was completely isolated. (86) As became clear at the following U.F.O. convention in December, the sectional wing of the movement had boycotted November's convention. For at the U.F.O. convention, against the opposition of Drury and Doherty, delegates amended the 1923 resolution to state the U.F.O. was 'still in politics'. (87)

1925 finally brought out the fundamental split between U.F.O. members over political methods. The U.F.O. executive had clearly reached a point where they believed the organisation should get out of electoral politics altogether. The U.F.C.C. had launched major pool campaigns in 1924, to culminate in the establishment of the Ontario Wheat Pool in 1926. Politics, U.F.O. Directors believed, was holding this new co-operative initiative back. (88)

But at Convention, when Morrison presented the Executive's resolution to leave politics altogether, it was lost. Good moved an amendment to reaffirm constituency autonomy in an effort to bridge the continuing divisions. By 1925 no one wanted a false compromise. A Mrs. Darville instead moved an amendment to the amendment stating not only was the U.F.O. still in politics, but members be
'encouraged' to stand candidates with a resurrection of the U.F.O. political coordinating committee in Toronto. Much to Morrison's dismay, and against the pleas of Drury and Doherty, Mrs. Darville's resolution was carried.(89)

The Darville resolution clarified in a dramatic way where U.F.O. activists stood. They were against any form of party organisation and for the U.F.O. to continue in politics as a purely sectional movement. U.F.O. members were not to be organised as a caucus, not to become the official opposition, not to have a leader, and definitely not to propose co-operative group government. A purely negative agrarian sectionalism stood triumphant in the ruins of Ontario's first third party government. Good could only lament the failure to have carried electoral reform.

III

The defeat of the Drury government set the stage for federal disintegration. Without at least one secure bastion of progressivism in Eastern Canada, regional sectionalism could now come to the fore. The very fact the Farm Progressive revolt had begun as a national movement imposed questions of principle as a means to unity. These could now be forgotten.

In 1924 the first fracture was between the moderate Forke majority and the proponents of group government, a group of ten, half from Alberta but including as well, Agnes Macphail, Preston Elliott and W.C. Good from Ontario. Then in 1925 the crypto-Liberals would betray what was
left of the Progressive centre. In the confusion, Good's
demands for a positive non-partisanship would be
marginalised and lost.

The Ontario defeat led to radically different
conclusions about how to revive Progressive fortunes. In
December 1923 the federal Progressive Executive Committee
met in Winnipeg to plan strategy for the 1924 session.
Their goals were bank inspection, rural credits, a serious
measure of tariff reform, and for 'broadening out' the
national Progressive movement by holding a national party
convention sometime in 1924. (90) These goals were at
variance with those who became known as the 'Ginger'
group. Good, in his annual report to the Brant Progressive
Association, stressed instead the need for structural
change, with a reform of the rules of the House of Commons,
further credit study, and the establishment of a permanent
Tax Advisory Board. (91)

The 1924 session opened on Thursday, February 28 with
a Liberal Throne Speech stressing tariff reform and
electoral redistribution. Forke, who had already been
briefed by Crerar on what King intended, was in friendly
agreement. (92) Group government proponents also spoke at
some length, including Good. This was a break from previous
practice. It indicated a growing conclusion among group
government people they had better use every opportunity
to argue for structural reform since the Progressive
moderate majority would not.
Good took the occasion to stress tax reform, going back to the single tax, which he had raised in 1922, the need for a Tax Advisory Board, national co-operative legislation, and a reform of House rules.(93) But the Progressives were largely in agreement with the Throne Speech's commitment to lessen protection. It passed with the largest majority yet, with one hundred and sixty seven Liberals and Progressives in combination against forty six Conservatives.(94)

Despite this expression of Progressive goodwill, matters began to go badly awry. On April 2, Good once more introduced resolutions endorsing the single transferable vote and for a test of proportional representation. This time he spoke at some length to answer the criticisms of British Columbia Conservatives, particularly H.H. Stevens, on the functioning and repeal of proportional representation in Vancouver. Lapointe, Liberal Minister of Justice, replied for the government to say that while the preferential ballot would see legislative form, proportional representation would not. Both resolutions were talked out with the expectation voting reform would come back to the House from the Redistribution Committee.(95)

Redistribution was carried without the Liberals even making a gesture to electoral reform. It was rumoured the Conservatives had threatened a filibuster and the Liberals had cut a deal to secure redistribution by dropping electoral reform.(96) An increasingly worried Good
questioned King as to the fate of electoral reform, with no satisfaction. In the end Good and G.A. Brethen, Progressive M.P. for East Peterborough, moved electoral reform amendments to the Redistribution Bill. Both were defeated in the closing moments of the session in July. (97)

The same fate met Good's attempt to raise race track betting. This time the Liberals moved to choke off the time for private members' bills early in the session. This effectively precluded Good from introducing the S.S.C.'s draft bill. (98) The main question of moral reform in 1924 was the bill for Church Union, introduced by Forke. Good was carefully neutral in reply to outraged Presbyterians who opposed union. Parliament, Good replied, was only facilitating a decision made elsewhere. But Good was not happy about Forke having identified the Progressive cause with the pro-Union forces. (99) Forke, however, hadn't consulted the caucus. Here was another black mark against the Progressive caucus's operations.

The main business of the session was the budget. In 1924 the new Minister of Finance J.A. Robb presented the first balanced budget since 1913 and a plan to cut tariffs on primary production industries. This largely affected agriculture with a substantial reduction on farm equipment duties. There was a tremendous outcry from Brantford manufacturers, including a number of memorials to Good which he deflected by stating he was against a downward revision discriminating against any one industry. (100)
King softened the blow by eliminating the federal sales tax on reduced items and, through the back door, attempted to amend Canada's anti-dumping regulations, through Customs Circular C-321, to offer increased protection to primary industries. This last manoeuvre came to the attention of the Progressives and Forke threatened to defeat the government. The circular was suspended. (101)

At this point in late April the majority of Progressives felt pleased with this start on tariff reform. But J.S. Woodsworth managed to introduce an amendment condemning the Liberal budget for not reducing tariffs on 'the necessities of life' (for consumers) nor introduce better methods of taxation. Despite initial Progressive confusion, only sixteen members voted for the Woodsworth amendment. Forke deflected Woodsworth's arguments by objecting to the single land tax. (102) However, the future Ginger caucus, including Good, was beginning to take shape.

What really brought the split between Progressive moderates and the group government people into the open, however, was J.F. Johnston. Johnston, an ex-Unionist Liberal representing the Saskatchewan riding of Last Mountain, was the Progressive's chief whip. He had replied to the Robb budget in Forke's place to endorse it as recognising the principle of tariff reform. (103) Then it was discovered Johnston had deliberately sabotaged the Progressive speaking list in the House and arranged an electoral pact with the Liberals for the coming election.
As J.A. Stevenson, *Sun* parliamentary reporter, put it,

"But the climax came this session when the Progressive whip was discovered engaged in a subterranean conspiracy with leading Liberals to arrange the adjustment of seats with a view to the improvement of the Government's fortunes at the next election."(104)

For his efforts, Johnston was awarded a trip to Britain by the Liberals to help organise the Canadian pavilion at the Wembley exhibition.(105) Yet he remained chief whip.

This was the last straw, four U.F.A. members, M.N. Campbell from Saskatchewan, and Agnes Macphail, withdrew from caucus on June 14. They were soon followed by four more at the end of the month, Good, Albertan C.G. Coote, Manitoban J.W. Ward, and another Ontarian, Preston Elliott. Forke tried to smooth things over, saying the Progressive caucus did respect constituency autonomy and reminding the seceeder that the failure to filibuster the Bank Act in 1923 was a majority decision.(106) However, things had gone too far in practice. Group government people were supposed to respect caucus discipline but not crypto-Liberals.

As the Good group put it,

"In the first place, we should like to say that we are in large measure in agreement with the statement of principles and viewpoint issued by the seceding Members. ... For the remainder of the Session, therefore, we think it better to discontinue our attendance at the Progressive caucus. We believe further, that a proper reorganisation of the Group would result in increased harmony and efficiency and might bring about reunion. We sincerely hope that such a desirable reorganisation may take place, before the work of another Session begins."(107)

Such was not to occur. Forke forced the Ginger group to
seek representation in the House in 1925, on speakers' lists and in committees, as a fourth group with the two labour members. A development J.S. Woodsworth welcomed.

As Stevenson remarked in retrospect, when the Session ended in mid-July, the Progressive movement was in disarray, with two thirds of the talent with the break-away minority. (108) Even Good's personal fortunes went into decline. His tenants from 1922 gave up the lease and he had to go home to salvage the farm. (109) There would be no travelling to educate the nation in his final year as M.P..

The sectional and reactive strategy of the Progressive leadership finally caught up with it in 1925 as the Progressive caucus disintegrated, this time in a split to the right by seventeen M.P.s to join the Liberals on the budget.

Parliament opened on Thursday, February 5 with a Throne Speech emphasising Senate reform and transport policy, a settlement of the contentious Crow, carried in June, and an initiative on ocean rates. The last, King's proposal to take up a plan by W.T.R. Preston to break the North Atlantic Shipping Conference combine, began as an ideal pre-election issue. An external enemy, representing no votes, could be attacked, perhaps to some economic gain by farm and other producers. By the end of the session, however, the Preston plan was in tatters and Sir W. Petersen, who was to provide an alternative Canadian shipping service, dead of a heart attack. (110) Still transport policy, not
Progressive issues, was to be the focus of the last session of the Fourteenth Parliament.

One concession, a committee on reforming the rules of the House was made on an Irvine motion. Good was delegated to study ways to improve the committee system. A questionnaire was sent to the provinces with Good proposing changes in committee sizes and quorum. (111) In May the Rules Committee reported in favour of amendments to amendments, granted in 1926, to abolish all night sittings, and have smaller committees. (112)

On the budget in April, the Liberals made virtually no tariff changes. Robb actually raised coal duties and only repeated the promise of a Tariff Advisory Board. The Board was clearly an election proposal. If the Liberals were re-elected then, in theory, the tariff would be removed from the immediate realm of partisan interests. Good was disgusted that no broader commitment to tax reform was discussed. Worse, the Liberals once more tried to amend anti-dumping legislation to restore the level of protection on tariff reduced items for 1924. Again, the Progressives had to threaten revolt to get the Liberals to drop their backdoor manoeuvre to keep protection. (113)

To cap this poor Liberal effort, the budget debate itself was structured to preclude any Ginger group contributions unless they were willing to speak after midnight on April 30. As Good, who spoke for two hours in the early hours of April 31, said later to the Brantford
Expositor, sometimes one had to speak over the heads of Parliament to address the real audience for Progressive ideas in the outside world.(114)

On the budget vote on the morning of April 31, another surprise lay in store. J.F. Johnston led sixteen Progressives to vote with the Liberals. Two days of caucus meetings followed. The result was Johnston's expulsion and the resignation of the Executive Committee. All of them had gone with Johnston on the budget vote.(115)

This split to the right did not mend fences between the Gingerites and the Progressive majority. Forke refused committee representation to the group government people on the Ocean Rates Committee. Good, who was designated whip for the Ginger group, had to publicly plead in the House for representation after being refused co-operation by all three parties in private negotiations.(116) Whether Good liked it or not, the independents were being forcibly redefined as a fourth party.

The disintegration of the Progressive caucus in the face of Liberal duplicity and the betrayal of their cause by an opportunist section of the Progressive leadership, was mirrored in the fate that met Good's resolutions on moral, economic and political reform.

Early in the Session, on March 2, Good once more forced the issue of banning commercial gambling at race tracks. There was a bitter all day debate which saw four divisions and ended with the Liberal crumb to ban racing
handbooks, but not pari-mutuel betting. (117)

Economically, Good singlehandedly forced the reference of two resolutions to continue the study of credit and of the income tax system, the first to the Banking Committee and the second to the Public Accounts Committee. (118) But a Woodsworth motion, seconded by Good, for public regulation of currency and finance was defeated. Robb described the resolution as 'nothing but Bolshevism'. (119) Good did manage to secure a recommendation from the Banking Committee for an international monetary conference, which the King government ignored. (120)

In the Public Accounts Committee, Good waged a lonely battle to secure information on how the Income Tax Act worked. Finally, a majority of Liberals and Conservatives boycotted the Committee, making quorum and Good's efforts null and void. Then, when Good tried to raise the need for a reform of the Income Tax Act in the House, the Speaker ruled him out of order. (121) It was a Catch 22 situation. Without a Committee report, members could not discuss committee business in the House. And there was no intention of submitting a report.

Finally, Good tried to force the issue of electoral reform. In May the Liberals gave first reading to a bill for the preferential ballot. But as the session wore on, with no sign of the bill's reappearance, Good, Garland, even Crerar, pressed the Liberals for action. Finally, King stated all he had promised in 1924 was that a bill
would go before the House. Not that one would be passed.

(122) As Good later stated about Mackenzie King,

"One of my friends who was in Mackenzie King's Cabinet for several years told me that King had an extraordinary capacity for self-deception. Sitting right across from him for four years I came to the same conclusion."(123)

When Parliament adjourned on Saturday, June 27, Good had had enough. Myrtleville farm had declined and he had a young family of six. And the political movement he had fought so hard to establish was in chaos. In August, in Paris before the Brant Progressive Association, Good announced 'with regret' he could not accept renomination, ostensibly for personal reasons.(124)

When Good reviewed his period in parliament, the first subject to come up was Progressive factionalism. A people's movement could be built, Good stated, but only with gradual non-party methods.(125) Good's language indicated there was more to his retirement than personal reasons. In 1925 there is evidence to suggest the Brant Association executive did not agree with group government. (126) It may be Good simply realised he didn't have the local support to continue as a group government proponent if he wanted to stand in Brant again. Certainly in 1926 when a joint Liberal-Progressive candidate stood federally, Good abstained from the local campaign. As he privately wrote Keen, while the local situation demanded independent action, only Alberta had stood solid.(127)

Whatever political pressures underlay his decision,
Good, conscientious to the end, gave a report on his period as Brant M.P.. He reviewed his effort to introduce electoral reform, passed on to the need for tax reform, in administration and principle, Progressive efforts to raise credit and financial reform, to end with the failure to ban race track gambling. In gloom, Good had to sum up:

"Now, in regard to actual accomplishments or legislation, I have to confess that my efforts of the last four years have been largely barren. A number of things have been begun, but very little has been brought to a conclusion".(128)

IV

If Good had to step down from Brant Progressive politics, he continued to fight elsewhere. It was still vital to generalise the lessons of the federal Progressive movement in the election battles of 1925 and 1926, a period that saw one provincial and two federal elections.

The chief conclusion Good drew from from his four years in Parliament was that the methods of government had to be changed. In 'What's Wrong With Parliament', which ran in the Sun, the Winnipeg Free Press, and the Montreal Witness, Good developed a systematic critique of parliamentary government to arm independent farm candidates for the federal election on October 29.

Many people, Good stated, believed the present form of Parliament offered an adequate form of representation to be a defense against discontent. Yet the extension of the suffrage, male and now female, had not ended civil discord. More democracy had to be introduced on two
principles. One, the most direct form of democracy would be for each specific piece of legislation to be voted on by the electorate. This Good believed was a long term goal of the movement, though Manitoban direct democracy legislation had been ruled unconstitutional in 1919 by Britain's Privy Council.

In the short run, the task facing democrats was to make Parliament truly representative and responsible. This could be done by the single transferable vote within grouped ridings and by the abolition of partyism by electing independent M.P.s. Otherwise, elections would consist in no more than 'the appointment of a governing oligarchy'. New parties and new platforms, Good said, were no answer if there was no new method of democratic government.(129)

The federal election on October 29 was inconclusive. While Liberal representation fell, and Conservatives gained in the Maritimes and Ontario, neither had a majority. The Progressives were reduced to twenty four M.P.s, almost evenly divided between moderates and radicals. Good had spoken on behalf of Agnes Macphail, praising her "high ideals, unusual moral courage, and absolute reliability."(130) King, who had lost his seat in Ontario and had to find a new one in Saskatchewan, decided to risk another Liberal minority administration.

On January 7, 1926 Parliament met to hear a Throne Speech emphasising legislation aimed at western farm
interests, to establish a Tariff Advisory Board, rural credits, farm immigration aid, completion of the Hudson Bay Railway, and the transfer of prairie natural resources to the provinces. Much of this was acted upon between 1927 and 1929. But in 1926, it was a struggle for the survival of the administration. The Liberals battled to rebuild their Cabinet, adding Saskatchewan Premier Charles Dunning, pass the Throne Speech, and then a budget, which offered a moderate drop on the Canadian auto tariff and the income tax. (131)

Both the Progressives and the Labour group went into the Session in an optimistic mood. Holding a real balance of power, as compared to the Fourteenth Parliament, the Progressive caucus presented a fourteen point programme to both Conservatives and Liberals demanding specific reforms. But, true to form, when later in the session Forke moved an amendment to the Elections Act for the single transferable vote, western Progressives dropped it for a sectional deal, amendments to the Grain Act guaranteeing farmers could make Pool grain deliveries to non-Pool elevators. (132) Forke was clearly acting on Crerar's advice, to "Sit tight, say nothing. The west can gain out of the situation." (133)

Woodsworth, however, managed to negotiate an agreement with King for old age pensions as the price of Labour's support. As he wrote to Good,

"Two of us can now turn the Government out.... The Labor men will stand out for Provisions for the Unemployed and Old Age Pensions - not a very harsh dictatorship!" (134)
In June, however, the Progressive balance of power strategy collapsed. The Conservatives, sensing an election issue, forced an investigation into the Montreal Customs House. The Committee's Report showed there had been extensive corruption. On Friday June 25, H.H. Stevens' motion to censure the government was to be voted upon. The defeat of the King minority government looked likely. Woodsworth tried to salvage the situation with an amendment to the amendment for a Royal Commission on the whole episode. This would have implicitly censured the government without actually defeating it. Progressive confusion was so great that in the end Woodsworth's face saving strategy was lost by two votes. (135)

The defeat of Woodsworth's amendment led to what Mackenzie King described as a constitutional crisis and what others have described as a political manoeuvre allowing Liberals to deflect the issue from corruption to Canadian sovereignty. King asked Governor General Byng for a dissolution. Byng, rightly or wrongly, refused. He believed Meighen should have a chance to form an alternative government. Rather than face defeat on the Stevens' motion of censure on Monday, June 28, King resigned. Meighen then agreed to form a government. It only lasted three days before the majority of Progressives once more coalesced with the Liberals to defeat the Tories on the question of whether a cabinet could be formed without standing down for by-elections. A new election was
scheduled for September 14.(136)

Good, who had remained in touch with both the U.F.A. caucus and Woodsworth, was scathing as the crisis gathered. Party methods, Good argued, had rendered parliamentary practice bankrupt. Once more, the voters faced an election where the choice was between 'insincerity or instability'. Fundamental changes had to be made to the parliamentary system. This time Good offered a number of practical suggestions to reform the House of Commons by extending non-partisan committee methods, so as to separate governments from specific legislative measures, and to make the Cabinet an elected body, representative of, and accountable to all groups in the House.(137)

Good backed these sentiments by speaking for independent Progressive candidates in southern Ontario. On July 2 Good spoke on behalf of Agnes Macphail and her protegé F. Oliver at a joint federal-provincial U.F.O. nomination meeting for South Grey.(138) Then in August Good was the main speaker for the Progressive nominations in Haldimand and North Grey.(139) As Good had advised U.F.O. supporters earlier in the year, the job of voters was to get M.P.s elected who were committed to the representative's independence from party. But he had to make his argument for direct democracy in a sectional context. "My preferences are for independent political action, then U.F.O., then Progressive, then Liberal, in the order named."(140) Some fine distinctions, but ones
present in farm audience minds.

The election result on September 14 swung this time in the Liberals' favour. While in theory the Liberals were still in a minority situation, standing at 116 M.P.s in a house of 245, there were now eleven Liberal Progressives grouped around Robert Forke. Forke had resigned as Progressive leader at the end of the 1926 session. When the new Parliament opened Forke was to be found on the Liberal benches as Immigration minister, later to be joined by Crezar as Minister of Railways.

Political sanity, by the old two party system's standards, had returned. The Farm-Labour caucus was reduced to an effective strength of twenty, plus an occasional maverick, in a majority government context. A new strategy to preserve class representation would have to be debated with the establishment of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in 1932-33.

Provincially, matters in Ontario were even more confused than the federal course of events, where only two independents, Macphail and J.W. King, survived. The U.F.O. executive refused to activate the political coordinating committee in 1926 for either election and declared in November that U.F.O. members should vote provincially on a non-partisan issue basis, on whether a candidate was for or against prohibition. (141) In December, the Fergusson government increased its majority while the farm vote fragmented into a variety of Independent Liberals,
Liberal Progressives, Progressives, and U.F.O..(142)

The disintegration of U.F.O. political aspirations did not take place quietly. Foiled at the 1926 U.F.O. Convention, Drury openly attacked the U.F.O. leadership, particularly Morrison, from a Liberal platform in a North Huron by-election in 1927. Then in November Drury resigned as Ontario Progressive leader.(143) Mitch Hepburn, Elgin U.F.O. leader and future Liberal premier, even went so far as to personally attack Morrison for hiring relatives at the December convention in an underhanded manoeuvre to break the Darville resolution. Hepburn failed.(144)

The scale of the U.F.O.'s retreat and its organisational erosion could not be hidden. For the first time in a decade the 1927 Convention was not held at Massey Hall. This was a reflection of falling numbers, from 20,000, in 1926 to no more than 14,000 by 1929.(145) Many of these were members only by compulsion. Beginning in 1926 the U.F.C.C. required all pool members to take out U.F.O. membership.(146) While this slowed the decline, it could not hide political demoralisation. Despite the 1925 Darville resolution, the U.F.O. executive increasingly acted only in a lobby capacity. Good became a member of the Legislative Committee and was present on every subsequent lobby of Fergusson from 1926 to 1929.(147) The U.F.O. was back to the days of the Dominion Grange.

Good, while active as the Secretary-Treasurer of the local Central Brant U.F.O. club(148), and President of
the Farmers' Publishing Company(149), put his creative energies into the Co-operative Union of Canada. The C.U.C. was in the midst of a major expansion on the prairies, particularly in Saskatchewan. Here the message of co-operation from below found more fertile ground and led to the creation of a co-operative wholesale from below, Saskatchewan Co-operative Wholesale in the 1930s and, then in World World Two, the regional based Federated Co-operatives Limited.(150)

V

In December 1927, Morrison spoke of 'the great calm' that had descended on the U.F.O. in 1926 and continued into the following year.(151) In one sense this was true but in another it was not. The U.F.C.C. had recovered. The U.F.O. was effectively out of politics, electing only two provincial members in 1929, and only Agnes Macphail federally in 1930. The Farmers' Publishing Company was on the edge of bankruptcy from 1925 on, with Good finally overseeing the sale of the Sun in 1931-32.(152)

But in 1927, bitter political recriminations were still made. Drury and Good proposed twice to redebate the whole matter of party versus group government.(153) But A.G. Bridger, Sun editor, blocked both this and the publication of a U.F.A. resolution calling for a renewal of national Progressivism on a group government basis.(154)

In reality, the great calm was more a state of paralysis which Morrison and U.F.C staff imposed rather
than let a positive debate continue.(155) As Bridger stated to Good, in refusing a debate on Drury's terms, of party versus group government,

"All the organisation has endorsed is direct representation for agriculture and the selection of the Cabinet on a proportionate basis."(156)

What had really produced the great calm, after the storms of provincial government, and federal minority Liberal governments, was farm sectionalism. In the end, a majority of farmers could not be won for either positive solution, either a new Liberal party, or an experiment in co-operative group government. Only a negative non-partisanship was tolerable. In the face of this class paralysis, the farm bureaucracy imposed its solution, a retreat from politics to co-operation from above.

A rural middle class movement for reform, whether from above by conventional means, as embodied by E.C. Drury, or reform from below by co-operative, direct democracy, of which W.C. Good was the leading Ontario proponent, was channelled in defeat back into rural economic sectionalism within the mainstream of bourgeois politics.
ENDNOTES


2. Queens' University Archives (Q.U.A.), Crerar Papers, Section III, Box 132, 'Saskatoon Declaration', December 20, 1921.

3. Morton, *Progressive Party*, Toronto: 1950, 135-137. See also Farmers' Sun, January 21 and January 28, 1922, the columns of J.A. Stevenson, Parliamentary reporter. Stevenson appears to have been most in sympathy with the advocates of group government. He was to pay a price for such support in publicly detailing caucus divisions. In 1923 the Guide refused to take his column and the U.F.O. bureaucracy squeezed him out of the Sun in 1925. See U.C.O. Library, U.F.O. Minutes, Book II, Executive Committee, January 2, 1923 (re Stevenson's repudiation by the Guide and the U.F.O.'s continuing endorsement) and Good Papers, Volume 9, J.A. Stevenson to W.C. Good, January 5, 1926, Ottawa (re the U.F.O. turning on him as well).

4. Q.U.A., Crerar Papers, Section III, Box 110, W.C. Good to T.A. Crerar, March 6, 1922, Brantford.

5. Ibid.

6. Farmers' Sun, March 11, 1922.

7. R.M. Dawson, *William Lyon Mackenzie King*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950, Chapter 14, 'First Administration, 1921-22'. Much to Good's surprise, there was a considerable demand for tariff protection from milk, fruit and vegetable producers. See, for example, Good Papers, Volume 4, J. Weld (Farmers' Advocate) circular to Progressive M.P.s to ban oleo, May 23, 1922, London.

8. Farmers' Sun, March 25, 1922.


10. Farmers' Sun, June 15, 1922.


2429-2445, June 2, 1922.

13. Farmers' Sun, April 18, 1922. See also Good Papers, Volume 5, W.C. Good to Charlotte Whitton (S.S.C. Secretary), April 19, 1922, Ottawa, J.G. Shearer to W.C. Good, April 22, 1922, Toronto, J.G. Shearer to W.C. Good, May 4, 1922, Toronto, W.C. Good to J.G. Shearer, May 9, 1922, Ottawa.


15. Farmers' Sun, July 8, 1922.

16. The eight part series, ' Impressions of Eastern Canada', ran in the Farmers' Sun from October 10 to November 2, 1922. The interview with Taggart was in No. 6, October 24, 1922.

17. Farmers' Sun, 'Impressions', No. 7', October 31, 1922.

18. Good Papers, Volume 8, W.C. Good to C.R. Fay, March 10, 1925, Ottawa. See also Good's correspondence with W.C. Stewart, B.C.C.S. Manager, Volume 9, W.C. Stewart to W.C. Good, February 24, 1925, Sydney Mines, N.S., W.C. Good to W.C. Stewart, February 27, 1925, Ottawa, W.C. Good to W.C. Stewart, March 7, 1925, Ottawa, W.C. Stewart to W.C. Good, May 27, 1925, Sydney Mines, N.S., W.C. Stewart to W.C. Good, June 6, 1925, Ottawa. The Stewart correspondence confirms Ian Macpherson's reading of the growing conservative nature of the B.C.C.S. See I. Macpherson, Each For All, Toronto: Macmillan, 1979, 82. All Good could offer as a comment on the great labour unrest of Cape Breton in the 1920s was that the miners should try to take over Besco on 'a co-partnership basis' (Good to Stewart, February 27, 1925).

19. Farmers' Sun, October 14, 1922.

20. Farmers' Sun, October 21, 1922 re U.P.A. opposition. The Saskatchewan opposition to fusion developed from below and thus in some confusion. But see Farmers' Sun, October 21, 1922 re S.G.G.A. Locals' opposition (including the Last Mountain group at Nokomis in J.F. Johnston's riding), Farmers' Sun, October 24, 1922 re Saskatchewan Progressive opposition, and then an official S.G.G.A. position against fusion, Farmers' Sun, November 4, 1922.

21. Farmers' Sun, November 9, 1922.
22. Farmers' Sun, November 14, 1922. The Sun report also noted that C.C.A. coordination would be replaced by the new Executive Committee.

23. Farmers' Sun, November 30, 1922. W.C. Good on 'The Issue of Organisation'.

24. Farmers' Sun, March 30, 1923 re the C.C.A.'s formal decision to leave politics.


27. Good Papers, Volume 23, Brantford Expositor, December 11, 1922. The whole broadening out controversy nationally was exaggerated, Good claimed, before the Brant Progressive annual meeting.


29. Q.U.A., Crerar Papers, Section III, Box 107, R. Forke to T.A. Crerar, November 1, Pipestone, Manitoba. Crerar kept up a correspondence both advising and directing Forke as Progressive leader until Forke stepped down in 1926.

30. Farmers' Sun, January 6, 1923.

31. Farmers' Sun, February 1, 1923.

32. Farmers' Sun, February 6, 1923.

33. Farmers' Sun, February 10, 1923.


39. Canada. House of Commons Debates. 1923, Volume II, 1116-1120. Though Good questioned the Asiatic Exclusion Act, his main concern was with Canadian out migration to the United States. This didn't stop Crerar writing him to say, "The other point I wish to comment upon is your suggestion that the Japs and Chinks should be invited to come to Canada, I think this would be most unwise." See Good Papers, Volume 5, T.A. Crerar to W.C. Good, March 17, 1923, Winnipeg.

40. Canada. House of Commons Debates. Volume 5, 4660-4666. Good consistently took a position with J.S. Woodsworth that the British North America Act be repatriated with an explicit amending formula. This would allow Canada to amend the constitution for economic and political structural reform regardless of past court rulings. Few Progressives were interested and French Canadian members opposed both for raising constitutional change without addressing guarantees for national minorities within Canada.

41. Canada. House of Commons Standing Committee on Banking and Commerce, Minutes, 1923. The Committee sat from March 9, 1923 to June 20, 1923. Bevington was heard on April 11-12 and Major Douglas from April 24-26. Both were recalled on May 3.

42. Good Papers, Volume 6, W.C. Good to Professor G.E. Jackson (University of Toronto), May 1, 1923, Ottawa.


44. Ibid, 1031-1040. Good introduced the bill for national credit union legislation on Tuesday, June 12 and then withdrew it on Wednesday, June 13.

45. Farmers' Sun, May 26, 1923.

46. Canada. House of Commons Standing Committee on
Banking and Commerce, Minutes, 1923, 55. The Speakman motion, and others, were voted upon and defeated on Wednesday, May 23, 1923.


49. Q.U.A., Crerar Papers, Section III, Box 107, R. Forke to T.A. Crerar, June 5, 1923, Ottawa. And see Box 117, J.F. Johnston (chief whip) to T.A. Crerar, May 29, 1923, Ottawa.


51. Q.U.A., Crerar Papers, Section III, Box 107, R. Forke to T.A. Crerar, June 20, 1923, Ottawa.

52. Canada. House of Commons Debates. 1923. Volume V, 4078-4103, and 4141-4159. The debate on Fielding's Bank Revision Act lasted three days, from Monday June 18 to Wednesday June 20. Speakman's amendment was moved Monday, 4066, and lost on Wednesday, forty six to ninety five, 4147.

53. Good Papers, Volume 8, W.C. Good to I. Fisher, February 23, 1925, Ottawa (re concession of bank inspection) and, Farmers' Sun, June 4, 1925 re Home Bank Depositor's Relief Bill.


55. Farmers' Sun, 'Impressions of Parliament' by W.C. Good, three part series, August 15, August 18, and August 22, 1923.

56. Good Papers, Volume 17, File Two, 'Banking and Credit Investigation 1923' for itinerary. This includes a personal interview with Bevington and an address Good gave on co-operation to the Winterburn U.F.A. local.

57. Good Papers, Volume 17, 'What Shall Be Done With


59. Good Papers, Volume 20, Copies of University of Toronto Board of Governors Minutes, 1922. Normally an appointment was for six years. Good was appointed in 1922, but seems to have been inactive after 1923.

60. Good Papers, Volume 4, W.C. Good to M. Doherty, May 2, 1922, Ottawa.


64. Ibid, Brown's main argument is that Morrison was the leading proponent of group government against Drury. This just doesn't square with the facts. Morrison, as will be seen, was also against Good and Macphail in their advocacy of group government. Morrison was the leading proponent of a negative agrarian sectionalism. For example, not only was Drury denied access to the U.F.O. mailing list, but so was Macphail. See U.F.O. Minutes, Book II, Executive Committee, May 18, 1922.

65. U.C.O. Library, Farmers' Publishing Company Minutes, Third Annual Meeting, September 6, 1921, Toronto (re proxy voting). The U.F.O. caucus approach is noted in the Board minutes for February 1, 1922, with their defeat at the Fourth Annual Meeting, September 5, 1922. There was also a battle over editors with J.C. Ross being replaced by J. Hamm in the spring of 1922. See Good Papers, Volume 5, J.J. Morrison to W.C. Good, April 25, 1922, Toronto.

66. Good Papers, Volume 4, E.C. Drury to W.C. Good, December 28, 1922, Toronto. The resolution was put through in the late afternoon of the first day of convention before Drury could speak to the delegates.

68. Good Papers, Volume 4, E.C. Drury to W.C. Good, March 22, 1922, Toronto. See also Farmers' Sun, May 26, 1922 (preferential ballot dropped).


72. Good Papers, Volume 6, M.H. Staples to W.C. Good, February 20, 1923, Toronto.

73. Good Papers, Volume 5, W.C. Good to E.C. Drury, March 9, 1923, Ottawa (to explain the circular was done at Good's request and not at Morrison's initiative).

74. Farmers' Sun, February 3, 1923 and Farmers' Sun, March 1, 1923.

75. Farmers' Sun, March 10, 1923.

76. Good Papers, Volume 5, E.C. Drury to W.C. Good, March 27, 1923, Toronto.

77. Good Papers, Volume 6, W.C. Good to E.P. McCallum, April 17, 1923, Ottawa.


79. Good Papers, Volume 6, W.C. Good to J.J. Morrison, February 1, 1923, Toronto. And see W.C. Good to J. Hamm, May 9, 1923, Ottawa.

80. Good Papers, Volume 5, W.C. Good to E.C. Drury, April 24, 1923, Ottawa.

81. U.F.O. Minutes, Book II, Executive Committee, July 25, 1923. See also Farmers' Sun, July 28 and August 1, 1923.

82. U.F.O. Minutes, Book II, Tenth Annual Convention, December 12, 1923. Resolution 36 passed at 12:30 a.m. after a lengthy discussion.
83. Farmers' Sun, W.C. Good, 'Objections to a Political Party', a three part series, January 12, January 19, and January 26, 1924.

84. Farmers' Sun, February 9, 1924.

85. Farmers' Sun, March 22, 1924.

86. Farmers' Sun, November 20, 1924.

87. U.F.O. Minutes, Book III, Eleventh Convention, December 17, 1924.

88. U.F.O. Minutes, Book III, Executive Committee, August 31, 1925.

89. U.F.O. Minutes, Book III, Twelfth Convention, December 10, 1925.

90. Farmers' Sun, December 22, 1923.

91. Good Papers, Volume 32, Brantford Expositor, February 20, 1924.

92. Q.A.A., Crerar Papers, Section III, Box 107, T.A. Crerar to R. Forke, January 29, 1924, Winnipeg and R. Forke to T.A. Crerar, March 6, 1924, Ottawa.


94. Farmers' Sun, March 22, 1924.


96. Farmers' Sun, July 17, 1924.

97. Farmers' Sun, July 24, 1924.

98. Good Papers, Volume 8, W.C. Good to E.P. MacCallum, April 1, 1924, Ottawa and W.C. Good to J.G. Shearer, July 17, 1924, Ottawa.


100. Good Papers, Volume 7, F.W. Billo (Mayor of Brantford) to W.C. Good, March 12, 1924, Brantford, and W.C. Good to F.W. Billo, March 14, 1924, Ottawa.

101. Farmers' Sun, May 3, 1924.

103. *Farmers' Sun*, April 16, 1924.

104. *Farmers' Sun*, June 26, 1924.

105. Ibid, A. Macphail on 'The Recent Split'.

106. O.U.A., Crerar Papers, Box 132. R. Forke to Miss Macphail and Gentlemen, (Two Memos), June 20, 1924, Ottawa.


108. *Farmers' Sun*, July 31, 1924.


111. Good Papers, Volume 8, Copy of Committee Questionnaire, February 20, 1925, Ottawa. At least six provinces replied as well as the Clerk to the United States House of Representatives, all in Volume 8.

112. *Farmers' Sun*, May 21, 1925.

113. O.U.A., Crerar Papers, Section III, Box 107, T.A. Crerar to R. Forke, April 6, 1925, Winnipeg.

114. Good Papers, Volume 8, W.C. Good to the *Brantford Expositor*, May 6, 1925, Ottawa. Good was the penultimate speaker for the Ginger group in the early hours of April 31. See Canada. House of Commons *Debates*. 1925. Volume III, 2722-2737. Good's subject was protectionism, once more.

115. *Farmers' Sun*, May 7, 1925 (re caucus showdown) and *Farmers' Sun*, May 14, 1925 (Johnston's expulsion).


118. Farmers' Sun, April 2, 1925.

119. Canada. House of Commons Debates. 1925. Volume I, 752 (Woodsworth). Good then spoke to, 764-765. For Robb's reaction, see Farmers' Sun, March 12, 1925.

120. Farmers' Sun, May 7, 1925.

121. Canada. House of Commons Debates. 1925. Volume V, 4504-4506, June 19, 1925. For the battle in the Public Accounts Committee, see Farmers' Sun, April 23 and May 14, 1925.

122. Lapointe originally introduced Bill 149, on the preferential ballot, separate from other amendments to the Dominion Elections Act on May 26, 1925. Forke finally pressed the matter on June 19 and got as clear an answer as he could get from Mackenzie King. See Canada. House of Commons Debates. Volume V, 4511.

123. W.C. Good Farmer Citizen, (Toronto: Ryerson), 1958, 197.

124. Good Papers, Volume 23, Brantford Expositor, August 17, 1925.

125. Farmers' Sun, August 20, 1925.


127. C.U.C. Papers, Volume 38, W.C. Good to G. Keen, July 22, 1926, Brantford.

128. Farmers' Sun, August 20, 1925.

129. Farmers' Sun, September 3, 1925.

130. Farmers' Sun, September 17, 1925.


137. Farmers' Sun, W.C. Good, 'The Failure of Party Government', a three part series, June 3, June 10, and June 17, 1926.

138. Farmers' Sun, July 8, 1926.

139. Farmers' Sun, August 12, 1926.

140. Farmers' Sun, May 20, 1926. A position Good explained in more detail in his 'Will The Progressives and Liberals Unite?', Farmers' Sun, April 22, 1926.


142. Farmers' Sun, December 2, 1926.

143. Farmers' Sun, September 15, 1927. Drury followed up his blast against the U.F.O. and Morrison in three subsequent Sun issues, September 29, October 6 and October 13, 1927.

144. Farmers' Sun, December 8, 1927.

145. Farmers' Sun, December 5, 1929, Morrison report to Sixteenth Annual Convention.

146. U.F.O. Minutes, Book IV, Fourteenth Annual Convention, December 6, 1927, Morrison report.

147. For reports on the annual provincial legislative lobby see: Farmers' Sun, February 4, 1926, Farmers' Sun, March 24, 1927, Farmers' Sun, March 8, 1928, and Farmers' Sun, February 23, 1929.

148. Good Papers, Volume 32, Minute Book of the Central Brant U.F.O. Club, 1925-1927. The Club met each winter, often at Myrtleville, and featured social, educational and co-operative work, like the pre-1914 local.

149. U.C.O. Library, Farmers' Publishing Company Minutes, Board of Directors, January 26, 1927. Burnaby
resigned and Good became President.


151. U.F.O. Minutes, Book IV, Fourteenth Annual Convention, December 6, 1927.

152. There had been a discussion to sell the *Sun* as early as 1925, see F.F.C. Minutes, Board of Directors, November 13, 1925. But the paper was finally disposed of to G. Spry (and the C.C.F.) See U.F.O. Archives File 706, F.F.C. Board of Directors Minutes, January 9, 1932.

153. Good led off by attacking Drury for trying to overturn the Darville resolution at the 1926 convention. See *Farmers' Sun*, January 6, 1927. Drury didn't reply but Bridger (really Morrison) was afraid of the impact on the U.F.C.C. See Good Papers, Volume 9, A.G. Bridger to W.C. Good, February 28, 1927, Toronto, and A.G. Bridger to W.C. Good, October 22, 1927, Toronto. By the fall, when Drury was attacking the *Sun*, Good was ready to reply but again the Toronto officials refused.


155. See *Farmers' Sun*, February 17, 1927 for Morrison's repudiation of party and group government.

X  EPILLOGUE: FARMER CITIZEN

Will Good would go on in farm politics. He was a U.F.O. delegate to the founding convention of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Regina in 1933. Good opposed the new group's party methods and its programme of 'state socialism'. He even tried to block the development of a Canadian social democratic current by proposing an alliance with the U.F.A. to reshape the C.C.F. as a populist non-partisan movement. (1) But the U.F.A. was a waning force and Good was alone in opposing ratification of the Regina Manifesto. William Irvine, Good's non-partisan ally of the 1920s, abandoned his defence of direct democracy and attacked Good as a political anachronism. (2)

Good replied to these criticisms with a pamphlet, Is Democracy Doomed?, in which he restated his non-partisan philosophy as based on the Progressive experience. The assertion of individual liberty over collective organisation and struggle was fiercely debated by Frank Underhill, one of the authors of the Regina Manifesto, in Canadian Forum. (3)

"The really dangerous part of Mr. Good's pamphlet is his advocacy of individual independence in the House of Commons. ... Mr. Good thinks (and Mr. Woodsworth in years past has seemed to share his opinion) that there is something dishonest in a member voting with his party on a particular issue against his own convictions. What he fails to recognise is that this may not be due to dishonesty at all but simply to the feeling that for the achievement of its major purposes the party must sink minor differences." (4)
While the substance of Underhill's critique focused on the need for party discipline to fight for structural change in the midst of the Great Depression, his underlying motive was different. Labour may have sponsored the founding of the C.C.F., but the condition for a mass appeal lay in making connections with middle class populism. The problem for labour oriented social democrats was to connect to this milieu without making concessions to the self-destructive sectionalism of agrarian populism. Good, as agrarian populism's leading theorist, had to be combatted. (5) Though Underhill, as a proponent of urban middle class technocracy (the promotion of planning experts over Parliament), had his own weaknesses in consistently defending democracy, as Good pointed out.(6) Not surprisingly, Good welcomed the 1956 Winnipeg Declaration which saw the C.C.F. retreat from the aggressive nationalisation proposed in 1933.(7)

What the Underhill-Good debate reveals is the dual class nature of the origins of the Canadian social democratic movement, what Walter Young in his study of the C.C.F. identified as the tendencies, often in conflict, to movementism as well as partyism.(8)

Alone in Regina, Good was not so in Ontario. Within a year the U.F.O. disaffiliated from the Ontario C.C.F. in response to pressures for state intervention by the party's labour section.(9) True to their radical petit bourgeois interests the U.F.O. endorsed H.H. Stevens'
Reconstruction Party in 1935 instead. (10) This was the U.F.O.'s last political hurrah. In 1935 the farm movement was reorganised as a conventional lobby, the Canadian Chamber of Agriculture, later known as the Canadian Federation of Agriculture. The final act came in 1943. The U.F.O. disbanded to leave politics to the new collection of producer lobbies, the Ontario Federation of Agriculture. (11)

By the 1940s, Good was reduced to political commentator for the local League of Nations Society and the United Church press. (12) He wrote two pamphlets on post war problems, one on the industrial unrest of 1946, repeating his advice for voluntary conciliation before the Mathers Commission, and Which Way Peace? on the threat of global nuclear war. (13) While Good may be fairly criticised for his idealism, in not coming to grips with the new forms of industrial and global competition, he continued to defend direct democracy. But by now Good spoke from a declining class point of view, the old middle class of rural Ontario.

But if politics was a closed field to rural non-partisanship, Good went on to a long productive career as a farm co-operator. He remained President of the Co-operative Union of Canada until 1945. Though George Keen did the groundwork, as organiser and dispenser of practical advice, Good served as a valued propagandist. He continued to preach the virtues of control from below,
and warned against letting co-operative officials assume leadership of the movement.(14)

Perhaps Good's finest co-operative moment came in the 1940s. In 1945 Good led the C.U.C. in a successful defence of co-operative federal tax privileges.(15) Then, between 1946 and 1948, Good oversaw the fulfillment of his 1919 plea for co-operative organisation from below in Ontario. The U.F.C.C. was reconstituted as the United Co-operatives of Ontario (U.C.O.), amalgamating local farm co-operatives with the U.F.C.C. on the principle the U.C.O. would be a co-operative wholesaler controlled from below by its constituent members.(16) The U.F.C.C. would not go the way the B.F.C.S. had gone, as a farmers' joint stock company.(17)

With the achievement of the U.C.O., Good formally retired from any active link with the farm co-operative movement in 1948. Paradoxically, for Good, co-operative organisation was now identified as the conservative mainstream of the farm movement. As Good rather critically noted, a new farm union movement had arisen based on a fight for parity pricing by state intervention.(18)

When Good returned home to farm in 1925, Myrtleville was transformed from a mixed farm into a specialised dairy operation. In 1948 the Good family received a Master Breeders' Shield from the Holstein Association of Canada in recognition for their contribution to improving the breed.(19) Good's surviving family of five went on to
distinguished careers. Three became teachers, Allen, a high school art instructor, and sons Norman and Harold, university scientists. Beth, an English graduate student, married an American lawyer and moved to St. Louis, Missouri. Robert, the youngest, went to O.A.C.. He took over the farm in 1951 when, after a bout with prostate gland surgery, his father retired.(20) Good was seventy five.

In retirement in the 1950s Good remained active, as a proponent of adult education, President of the Canadian Temperance Federation, and farm memoirist. In 1958 Toronto's Ryerson Press brought out his autobiography, Farmer Citizen. Then in 1959 his wife Jennie died, after fifty years of marriage. William Good spent his remaining years moving back and forth between his daughter in St. Louis, in the winters, and Myrtleville in the summer. Finally, however, in 1963, in his eighty seventh year and suffering from arthritis, he entered the Victoria Nursing Home in Paris. In his last two years he suffered a series of strokes and died there on November 16, 1967. W.C. Good was in his ninety second year.(21)

W.C. Good's farm progressive career sheds a good deal of light on the complex class conditions and dynamics of farm progressivism: about agrarian idealism, the rise and fall of farm lobbying, the turn to co-operation, the impact of war coercion, and the direct democratic promise and frustrations of non-partisan farm politics in an urban, industrial, and nationally divided Canada.
Good was a sophisticated advocate of agrarian idealism. In his case it was a complex mix of applied Christianity, through biblical criticism and the social gospel, Georgeism, and the North American tradition of direct legislation. This complexity, and the degree to which he drew on the American populist experience, indicate why he was a more sophisticated and radical proponent of non-partisanship than his friend and rival Drury.

Good's progressivism had its contradictions. At bottom, the laws of competition and co-operation were defined in small propertied terms. It was not a world view that could easily accommodate urban or working class Canada. Production And Taxation in this sense is a backwards looking book, in stressing that Progressive economic policies were to restore a rural, small propertied past by free trade, public ownership of 'natural monopolies', and the single land tax. And, until Good discovered co-operation, he was an elitist in practice, preaching self rule without offering his audience the means to self emancipation.

Nor was Good himself free from flaws. His return home in 1903 was not welcome and, for someone who became known later as able to 'pour oil on troubled waters', he was inflexible and insensitive to many of his fellow Progressives. He was clearly perceived to be as much a threat as a builder of the U.F.C.C. and the U.F.O. in both Drury and Morrison's experience.
But it also has to be recognised how important Good is as a builder of the Ontario progressive movement, moving from lobbyist to co-operation in 1914, and as a prism by which to see the complex class dynamics of non-partisan politics. Good lost the arguments for a positive experiment in non-partisanship in 1919 and 1922. But, in the losing and the effort to consolidate the farm progressive movement in the 1920s, the twofold class character of the movement emerges.

From the beginning there was the clash between crypto-Liberalism and radical democracy, reform from above or below, whether in lobbies, co-operation, or the form of non-partisan government. But what also emerges is the paralysing force of rural class sectionalism, the refusal to act in a positive way when political power was theirs. Neither party nor group but representation, that was the aim of the Morrisonian majority. This was not an aim that could find expression in Ontario, and Ontario's failure was the failure of agrarian populism nationally. It was the end of Canada's first class tradition of direct democracy.

At the outset of this study two questions were posed. Can the internal dynamics of farm progressive behaviour be better explained by class analysis, and can we refine this by taking note of the international debates on populism?

Despite the dominance of W.L. Morton's interpretation of the farm progressive challenge as an expression of
western regionalism, the scale and complexity of the Ontario farm progressive revolt indicates the need for a class interpretation so we can appreciate that the farm progressive moment was genuinely national in scope, economic in character, and that negative farm sectionalism was as important in progressive behaviour as the clash of rival schools of reform.

Internationally, what I would also suggest is that Marxist analysts need a historical conception of class behaviour, specifically Trotsky's model of petit bourgeois politics and the place of the populist moment in capitalism's trajectory.

"To understand the dialectic of the relationship between the three classes [bourgeois, petit bourgeois, and proletarian], we must differentiate three historical stages: at the dawn of capitalist development, when the bourgeoisie required revolutionary methods to solve its tasks; the period of bloom and maturity of the capitalist regime, when the bourgeoisie endowed its domination with orderly, pacific, conservative, democratic forms; finally, at the decline of capitalism, when the bourgeoisie is forced to resort to methods of civil war against the proletariat to protect its right of exploitation.

The political programmes characteristic of these stages, Jacobinism, reformist democracy (social democracy included) and fascism are basically programmes of petit bourgeois currents. This fact alone, more than anything else, shows of what tremendous - rather of what decisive - importance the self-determination of the petit bourgeois masses of the people is for the whole fate of bourgeois society. Nevertheless, the relationship between the bourgeoisie and its basic social support, the petit bourgeoisie, does not at all rest upon reciprocal confidence and pacific collaboration. In its' mass, the petit bourgeoisie is an exploited and oppressed class. It regards the bourgeoisie with envy and often with hatred. The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, while utilising the support of the
petit bourgeoisie, distrusts the latter, for it very correctly fears its tendency to break down the barriers set up for it from above."(22)

Within the Canadian class tradition of populist interpretation, the ideas of Lenin and Trotsky pose serious challenges. Do left nationalists have to accommodate English Canadian nationalism to explain the radical democracy of the rural petit bourgeoisie? Do proponents of 'discourse' theory have to jettison class analysis to explain the complexity of farm progressive behaviour?

Recovering the direct democratic challenge in Canadian agrarian populism is important. But Marxists must be able to differentiate between class traditions of direct democracy as well as to recognise their commonality. Otherwise, in the name of socialism, populism will replace the working class struggle for a more democratic, classless order.
ENDNOTES

1. Good Papers, Volume 9, W.C. Good to A. Speaman, September 29, 1933, Brantford, A. Speaman to W.C. Good, November 1, 1933, Red Deer, Alberta, and W.C. Good to A. Speaman, November 10, 1933, Brantford.

2. Good Papers, Volume 9, W.C. Good to A. Speaman, July 31, 1933, Regina(?).

3. This debate is reprinted in W.C. Good, Farmer Citizen, (Toronto, 1958), 184-195.

4. Ibid, 189-190.


13. Copies of these pamphlets are held in the U.C.O. Library, Archives File 503, and in the Myrtleville Library.

Three on the 1930s. Some of Good's Presidential addresses are printed in Farmer Citizen (Toronto, 1958), 259-275. Good was also a delegate to the 1942 conference of American Co-operators, 275.


17. Ibid., 238-244. There were two campaigns, one in the 1930s and another at the end of World War Two to turn the U.F.C.C. into a joint farmers' stock company.


20. Ibid., 299.

21. Ibid., 299-301.

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