LESS THAN HUMAN:

INFRAHUMANIZATION AND FORGIVENESS WHEN AN 

OUTGROUP HARMS THE INGROUP

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Master of Arts

by

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Abstract

Following intergroup transgressions, forgiveness may lay the groundwork for restoring positive intergroup relations (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). This thesis examined Canadians willingness to forgive Afghans as a function of the emotions attributed to and expressed by the Afghans for harms committed against Canadians. In Experiment 1, Canadians were forgiving of the harm committed insofar as they perceived Afghans as experiencing secondary (uniquely human) emotions but not primary (non-uniquely human) emotions. This effect was mediated by empathy toward Afghans. Although forgiveness stemmed from the attribution of secondary emotions to the outgroup, the expression of secondary emotions by the outgroup may have the opposite effect (reduced forgiveness), as secondary emotions are considered the domain of the ingroup. In Experiment 2, the expression of secondary emotions by Afghans following a transgression against Canadian soldiers resulted in less forgiveness than when primary emotions were expressed. This relationship was also mediated by empathy toward Afghans.
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Introduction

The al-Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon that occurred on September 11th, 2001, set off a chain of events, the consequences of which endure to this day. Less than a month after the attacks occurred American and British forces invaded Afghanistan, and successfully brought down the Taliban leadership that had supported the attacks. However, the situation in Afghanistan has far from stabilized, and military actions continue there to this day. In 2006 Canada took over control of the multinational force in southern Afghanistan (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation [CBC], 2006b). Canada’s role in Afghanistan is the subject of much controversy, particularly as the Canadian death toll continues to rise (CBC, 2008). The Canadian government has argued that the mission is necessary, both to ensure that Canadians will not have to live in fear of terrorist attacks, and also to help the people of Afghanistan rebuild a secure, democratic nation (Government of Canada, 2007). However, a recent public opinion survey shows that half of Canadians now view the mission not as a peace operation, but as a war (AngusReid, 2007). Defining the mission as a war implies viewing the participating parties in terms of Canadians versus Afghans, Judeo-Christian values versus Islamic Fundamentalism, “us” versus “them.” As over four decades of research on intergroup relations has shown, this ingroup-outgroup distinction can have a significant effect on perceptions of and reactions to groups involved in conflict.

One of the inevitable consequences of Canada’s presence in Afghanistan is violent altercations between Canadian troops and Afghans. Both sides have been responsible for the deaths of many members of the opposing group. In such a context, intergroup forgiveness may be an important factor in improving the situation in
Afghanistan, both domestically and internationally (see Tutu, 1999). Yet, there is currently a paucity of empirical work on the subject (for exceptions see, Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, McLernon, Niens, & Noor, 2004; Staub, 2005; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). From the interpersonal literature, forgiveness involves letting go of anger and the desire for revenge and moving towards feelings of warmth and compassion towards a transgressor (McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). Similarly, the benefits of intergroup forgiveness are unmistakable. For example, Wohl and Branscombe (2005) found that Jewish people who were forgiving of contemporary Germans for the Holocaust reduced intergroup social (e.g., being friends with Germans) as well as symbolic distance (e.g., buying Germans products). Indeed, there is a growing recognition that forgiveness may be vital at the intergroup level, where conflict between groups has resulted in a great deal of damage to all groups involved, both physical and psychological (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005; Tam, Hewstone, Cairns, Tausch, Maio, & Kenworthy, 2007). Unfortunately, forgiveness does not come easily, and particularly in violent conflict a number of factors may decrease the willingness of group members to forgive an outgroup that has caused them harm.

This thesis will examine intergroup forgiveness in the context of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. Previous research on intergroup forgiveness suggests that an important predictor of intergroup forgiveness is infrahumanization (Tam et al., 2007). Infrahumanization refers to the tendency to view outgroup members as less than fully human by attributing to them a reduced capacity to experience uniquely human emotions (Leyens et al., 2000). In other words, people tend to think that everyone experiences non-uniquely human emotions (e.g., anger, fear, pleasure, pain, etc.), but only the ingroup is
Infrahumanization is negatively related to intergroup forgiveness (Tam et al., 2007), but the mechanisms by which this occurs have not yet been studied. I propose that intergroup empathy will help explain this relationship. Infrahumanization may decrease forgiveness by making it more difficult to empathize with the group that has harmed your group. Moreover, this research will examine the differential effects on forgiveness of attributing emotions to the outgroup versus expressions of emotion by that same group. Previous research has suggested that people will react more negatively to an outgroup that expresses secondary emotions compared to one that expresses primary emotions (e.g., Vaes et al., 2003). However, to date no research has been done that examines emotion attributions to and emotion expressions by an outgroup using the same context, nor has the effect of emotional expressions by the outgroup on intergroup forgiveness been studied. Thus the purpose of this thesis is to broaden our understanding of the mechanisms by which infrahumanization affects forgiveness in intergroup conflict settings.

Social Identity Theory

According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) a person's sense of self is composed of an individual identity and a social identity. Individual identity refers to those aspects of the self that derive from the individual's characteristics and traits, such as personality features like extraversion or need for achievement. Social identity, on the other hand, refers to those aspects of the self that are based in the social categories or groups to which the individual perceives him- or herself as belonging. In other words, people tend to categorize the social world into groups, and categorize themselves as
members of some of these groups. These group memberships then become a part of the individual’s identity, and the individual defines him- or herself partly in terms of group memberships. In intergroup interactions, this social identity becomes salient and people will act in terms of the group (Turner & Reynolds, 2004).

Importantly, people strive to maintain positive self-concept, and thus a positive view of the groups to which they belong (Tajfel, 1982). This is accomplished through the process of social comparison with relevant outgroups. In intergroup settings, people are motivated to enhance the position of their ingroup relative to that of the outgroup. This tendency to favour the ingroup is known as ingroup bias and it is one of the most pervasive features of intergroup relations (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In situations where one’s positive social identity is threatened by an outgroup, people will attempt to restore the perceived superiority of their group over the threatening outgroup. This can be accomplished either by enhancing their group’s image on the relevant dimension or by denigrating the outgroup (Turner & Reynolds, 2004). For instance, people generally ascribe more positive traits to the ingroup but do not necessarily attribute more negative ones to the outgroup (e.g., Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000). However, when the ingroup is threatened by an outgroup, and there is no other means by the which the ingroup can bolster its image, outgroup derogation will emerge (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). It is argued that derogation can manifest as infrahumanization. That is, group members may fail to ascribe human emotions to the outgroup as a means of coping with group threat.
Infrahumanization has its origins in the drive to maintain a positive social identity. People are generally inclined to positively favour their ingroups over outgroups, but may also engage in outgroup derogation to protect their group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), particularly when one’s social identity is threatened (Branscombe & Wann, 1994). When people infrahumanize, they deny the capacity of outgroup members to feel uniquely human emotions. As the term *uniquely human* implies, the ability to feel uniquely human emotions is one of the characteristics that sets human beings apart from animals. Denying the capacity of a group to experience uniquely human emotions indicates that one implicitly views the outgroup as less than fully human and therefore inferior to the ingroup. Infrahumanization is thus one means through which people simultaneously maintain a positive view of their group and denigrate threatening outgroups.

**Subjective Essentialism**

People not only organize the world into social groups, they also ascribe different essences to those groups. This concept is known as *subjective essentialism* (Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 2006), and together with social identity theory forms the basis for understanding infrahumanization. Subjective essentialism is a term used to describe lay beliefs and theories concerning the underlying properties of social groups. Subjective essentialism refers specifically to the lay belief that members of a given group “share with one another deep, underlying features that characterize them and differentiate them from members of other groups” (Demoulin et al., 2006, p. 25). In other words, people tend to view all members of a group as sharing some fundamental property, and this
property makes them distinctive from members of other groups. Leyens and colleagues (2000) have demonstrated that this extends to the "human" essence – that because people are motivated to maintain a positive image of their ingroup, and because people tend to attribute different essences to their ingroup and outgroups, people tend to reserve the human essence for their ingroups. Thus, people tend to believe that their ingroups possess the human essence, while (some) outgroups are characterized by an infrahuman essence.

This naturally poses the question of what precisely constitutes the human essence. There is no single characteristic that defines the human essence, but rather it appears to be a combination of features. The most commonly cited are intelligence (reason, thinking, etc.), uniquely human emotions, and language (communication) (Leyens et al., 2000). Ample research has demonstrated that people discriminate on the basis of intelligence and language (for reviews, see Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998, and Giles & Coupland, 1991, respectively), but only recently have emotions and emotion attributions come under serious study as a form of ingroup-bias (Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003).

**Primary and Secondary Emotions**

The basis for using emotions as a distinguishing factor between ingroups and outgroups is found in the more general area of emotions research. The search for biologically based emotions has resulted in the creation of a number of emotion taxonomies (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1977) which distinguish between primary and secondary emotions. Primary emotions are generally considered to be basic, appear early in life, are quick in onset, brief in duration, and felt by non-human species as well as human beings. For instance, emotions such as pain, fear, surprise, and pleasure can be
seen in very young children and animals as well as human adults, and have strong biological underpinnings (Ekman, 1992). On the other hand, secondary emotions, such as guilt, hope, sympathy, and resentment, are thought to be products of social learning and felt primarily by humans (Averill, 1980). Recent research suggests that lay people also make such distinctions between different types of emotions, and use them to differentiate between the ingroup and outgroup.

Demoulin and colleagues (2004, Study 1) conducted a normative study in three countries (Belgium, Spain, and the U.S.) utilizing four different languages (French, Dutch, Spanish, and English) to examine lay ratings of emotions on 13 characteristics derived from the emotion literature and hypothesized to differentiate emotions on the basis of their humanity. They found that across all samples participants differentiated emotions along a primary-secondary factor. Secondary emotions were rated as less visible, more moral, involving greater cognition, and being more internal in cause. They were also considered to be longer in duration, appearing later in life, and influenced by culture. Moreover, they found that the higher an emotion’s score was on the “primary-secondary” scale (i.e., the more secondary the emotion was), the more uniquely human it was perceived as being. In a subsequent study (Demoulin et al., 2004, Study 2), participants reacted faster to secondary emotions when they were presented in a human context than in an animal context. The opposite effect was found for primary emotions. These results indicate that secondary emotions are strongly associated with mental representations of humans but not animals. Thus the primary emotions can be considered to be non-uniquely human, whereas secondary emotions are more uniquely human.
Infrahumanization and Reactions to Outgroups

The distinction between primary (non-uniquestly human) and secondary (uniquestly human) is implicit and is spontaneously used in an intergroup context (Rodriguez-Torres, et al., 2005). This distinction is also used as a basis for intergroup discrimination. Leyens et al. (2000), for example, found that people attribute a greater capacity for secondary emotions to ingroup members than to outgroup members. Importantly, people also implicitly denied secondary emotions to the outgroup. In other words, people not only attribute the ability to feel more uniquely human emotions to the ingroup, they also specifically deny the outgroup such an ability.

People tend to infer a decreased capacity for secondary emotions to outgroups, but to the extent that they do attribute uniquely human emotions to outgroup members there is a beneficial impact on responses to the group (e.g., Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Tam et al, 2007). For instance, Cuddy et al. (2007) examined willingness to provide aid in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. They presented participants with an article describing a woman, identified as either an ingroup or outgroup member based on ethnicity, who had lost her child in the confusion following the hurricane. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they believed the woman was feeling 14 emotions, seven primary and seven secondary, and then indicate whether they were planning to donate time to help with the relief effort. They found that overall participants’ attributions of primary emotions did not differ, but that inferences of secondary emotions were significantly lower when the victim was of a different race than the participant. More importantly, when the victim was of a different race than the participant, higher inferences of secondary emotions were positively related to intentions to volunteer.
There was no relationship between helping intentions and inferences of primary emotions, nor was there any relationship between helping intentions and inferences of secondary emotions when the victim was of the same race as the participant. Thus, people not only tend to infrahumanize members of an outgroup, but doing so is negatively related to helping behaviour.

People tend to reserve the human essence for their ingroup, and this is reflected in attributions of uniquely human emotions to the ingroup versus the outgroup. Research has shown that inferring secondary emotions to outgroup members has a beneficial effect on reactions such as willingness to help outgroup members (Cuddy et al., 2007). The present study seeks to extend these findings to the concept of intergroup forgiveness. Of particular interest are the mechanisms by which infrahumanization can impede intergroup forgiveness in the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Given the recent push towards forgiveness as a means of resolving intergroup conflicts (e.g., Tutu, 1999; Staub, 2005), it is important to examine how inferences of secondary emotions to outgroup members influence intergroup forgiveness. First, however, it is necessary to examine what precisely constitutes forgiveness, and what it means in intergroup contexts.

Forgiveness

Forgiveness has been the subject of increasing attention from researchers over the last 20 years (see Worthington, 2005). Although the majority of this attention has been focused at the interpersonal level, in the last decade there has been a growing recognition that forgiveness at the group level may be vital in promoting peace and reconciliation following protracted intergroup conflict (Tam et al., 2007; Tutu, 1999). A widely accepted definition characterizes forgiveness as a series of motivational changes on the
Infrahumanization and Forgiveness

part of the victim, in which anger and the desire for revenge gradually decrease, while feelings of warmth and compassion towards the transgressor increase (McCullough, Worthington, and Rachal, 1997). Forgiveness is not the same as condoning or excusing the transgression, but rather involves letting go of one’s legitimate anger towards an offending other.

Interpersonal forgiveness has been found to have positive effects for the victim of a transgression. Forgiveness following a transgression has been associated with decreased rumination and psychological distress (McCullough, 2000), as well as the restoration of positive self-esteem (Holmgren, 1993; Scobie & Scobie, 1998). Moreover, people who are generally forgiving of others score higher on positive affect and satisfaction with life, and lower on vengeance, hostility, anger, anxiety, and depression (Thompson et al., 2005). Forgiveness has also been associated with overall physical and psychological health, as measured by a number of physiological indices (Seybold, Hill, Neumann, & Chi, 2001). As well, forgiveness appears to be related to a general prosocial orientation, as people who showed high levels of forgiveness also reported greater levels of relatedness to others, and were more likely to donate money or participate in volunteer work (Karremans, Van Lange, & Holland, 2005).

In addition to the benefits to the victim, forgiveness also has a positive effect on the relationship with the transgressor (see Wohl, Kuiken, & Noels, 2006). Specifically, forgiveness has been related to closeness and commitment in interpersonal relationships (McCullough, 2000), as well as relationship duration and satisfaction (Thompson et al., 2005). Moreover, Fincham and Beach (2002) found that unforgiveness in marriages was associated with patterns of reciprocal negative behaviour that lead to psychological
aggression, whereas forgiveness was predictive of constructive communication.

Forgiveness at the interpersonal level is thus associated with restoration of a positive relationship following a transgression (e.g., McCullough, 2000), suggesting that forgiveness at the intergroup level may have similar reconciliating effects following intergroup conflict.

**Forgiveness at the Intergroup Level**

Given that forgiveness helps victims recover from transgressions and promotes the restoration of positive relations between victim and offender at the interpersonal level, it is not surprising that there has been growing interest in the application of forgiveness at the intergroup level. Where groups have been involved in protracted, often violent conflict, forgiveness may be invaluable in enabling people to recover from the physical and psychological damage they have suffered, facilitating peace and reconciliation between groups. However, forgiveness at the intergroup level faces a number of barriers that may be more difficult to overcome than those that exist at the interpersonal level.

Although quite similar, there are a number of ways in which intergroup forgiveness may be expected to differ from interpersonal forgiveness (Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, McLernon, Niens, & Noor, 2004). Hewstone and colleagues described four conditions known to facilitate interpersonal forgiveness that may not exist or may hinder forgiveness at the intergroup level. First of all, it is held that people find it easier to forgive interpersonal transgressions if the consequences diminish with time. But in the context of protracted violent conflict, where consequences include death, personal injury, and loss of livelihood, the effect of such outcomes is unlikely to fade. Moreover, religion
is positively associated with forgiveness at the interpersonal level, but intergroup conflict is often marked by some degree of religious conflict, making it doubtful whether religious identification would promote forgiveness. Thirdly, forgiveness is often considered a private, personal, and nonpolitical act, but the reverse is frequently true at the intergroup level. In such an environment, intergroup bias seems likely to make it more difficult for “us” to forgive “them.” Finally, one of the strongest predictors of forgiveness at the interpersonal level is apology offered by the transgressor (e.g., McCullough, 2000). In intergroup settings, however, collective apologies seem to be met with a more cautious and cynical attitude (Hewstone et al., 2004). These four conditions demonstrate that factors that promote interpersonal forgiveness may not always be successful at promoting intergroup forgiveness.

*Infrahumanization and Forgiveness*

Infrahumanization is another potential barrier to forgiveness at the intergroup level. Indeed, infrahumanization is likely to impede the forgiveness process by sheer virtue of its pervasiveness in intergroup interactions. It has been suggested that seeing the humanity in others is a necessary condition for forgiveness (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005; Tutu, 1999), and infrahumanization, by definition, precludes this possibility. Tam et al. (2007) used the conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland to examine the relationship between infrahumanization and intergroup forgiveness. The conflict in Northern Ireland has been long and bloody, with more than 3,600 people killed in sectarian violence over the last 40 years. Although steps have been taken to begin to resolve the conflict, many people believe that forgiveness on both sides will be a necessary precursor to full reconciliation. Unfortunately, infrahumanization may serve as
a potent barrier to intergroup forgiveness. Across two studies, Tam et al. (2007) found that infrahumanization was negatively related to forgiveness of the outgroup.

It has been established that infrahumanization is negatively related to intergroup forgiveness (Tam et al., 2007), however the mechanisms by which infrahumanization influences forgiveness have not yet been studied. Intergroup empathy may elucidate the connection between infrahumanization and forgiveness. Empathy has been widely recognized as one of the strongest predictors of interpersonal forgiveness (McCullough, 2000). Trait empathy has been positively associated with forgiving others (e.g., Macaskill, Maltby, & Day, 2002), and it has been demonstrated that empathy mediates the relationship between apology and forgiveness (e.g., McCullough et al., 1997). Moreover, it has been suggested that empathizing with the offender is a necessary step in the forgiveness process (Enright, R.D., & The Human Development Study Group, 1996). At the intergroup level, empathy is likely to be just as important in erasing the “us” versus “them” distinction and creating the human-level categorization that is vital for forgiveness (Oliner, 2005; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). In other words, empathy is necessary to undo infrahumanization, but infrahumanization is likely to interfere with the ability to empathize with the outgroup. Empathy requires understanding and sharing a person or group’s emotional experience (Eisenberg, 2004). Empathy is elicited partly by perceiving another as similar to oneself (e.g., Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein, 1995), but infrahumanizing highlights the differences between groups. Thus, when one does recognize the humanity of an outgroup by denying their ability to feel secondary emotions, they should be similarly unable to identify with the emotional experience of that outgroup. Infrahumanizing may decrease forgiveness of outgroups in part by making
it more difficult to empathize with that group, a possibility which has not yet been examined.

**Overview**

Across two studies I examined the relationship between infrahumanization and forgiveness for a serious intergroup transgression, using the Canadian mission in Afghanistan as a backdrop. Specifically I examined how infrahumanizing influences forgiveness of Afghans responsible for killing Canadian soldiers in a friendly-fire incident. This study sought to expand on the findings of Tam et al. (2007) in a number of ways. Most importantly, they examined infrahumanization as a mediator of the relationship between outgroup contact and forgiveness, whereas I was interested in exploring how infrahumanization influences forgiveness. Empathy was thus included as a potential mechanism by which infrahumanization affects intergroup forgiveness. Moreover, Tam and colleagues (2007) measured trait-level emotion ascriptions (i.e., how much people believed members of the outgroup generally felt secondary emotions), whereas the focus of this thesis was on event-specific emotional attributions (i.e., how much people believe outgroup members are experiencing secondary emotions in response to a specific event). In a context such as the mission in Afghanistan, where conflict is ongoing, event-specific emotion attributions are a more appropriate predictor of event-specific intergroup forgiveness than dispositional attributions. Furthermore, Tam et al. (2007) created an infrahumanization score by subtracting the amount of secondary emotions a participant attributed to the ingroup from the amount of secondary emotions they attributed to the outgroup. However, my methodology was more similar to that used by Cuddy et al. (2007), where participants were asked to ascribe emotions to either the
ingroup or the outgroup. Cuddy et al. (2007) showed that it was not the relative difference between emotions attributed to the ingroup versus the outgroup that predicted intergroup helping, but the amount of secondary emotions attributed to the outgroup that was important. I am arguing that this will also be the case with event-specific intergroup forgiveness.

In Experiment 2, the effect of expressions of primary versus secondary emotions on outgroup forgiveness was examined. If attributing secondary emotions to an outgroup is associated with increased forgiveness of that group, intuitively one might expect that expressions of secondary emotions by that group would also positively predict forgiveness. However, research by Vaes et al. (2003), suggests that people actually react negatively to an outgroup expressing secondary emotions. Thus, the purpose of Experiment 2 was to assess whether the expression of a secondary emotions by an outgroup undermines, rather than supports, intergroup forgiveness.

Experiment 1

In Experiment 1, participants read news briefings describing a fictitious friendly-fire incident between Afghan National Police Officers and Canadian soldiers. The article contained no emotional content, but presented a straight-forward, factual retelling of the event. Participants were then assessed on attributions of emotions to the transgressing group, empathy and forgiveness. Experiment 1 had three main goals. The first of these goals was to replicate Tam et al. (2007)'s finding that infrahumanization decreases intergroup forgiveness, using a different intergroup context, particularly one in which the conflict is ongoing. It was thus hypothesized that participants would attribute significantly less secondary emotions to the Afghans than to the Canadians, but that
attributions of primary emotions would not differ between groups. Participants were also expected to be less forgiving of the Afghans and experience less empathy for the Afghans than the Canadians. It was further expected that attributions of secondary emotions would be significantly and positively related to forgiveness of the Afghans, but not the Canadians. Attributions of primary emotions were not expected to relate to forgiveness of the Afghans. Finally, this experiment included empathy as a potential mediator of the relationship between infrahumanization and intergroup forgiveness. In other words, I expected that participants would be willing to forgive the Afghan officers for killing Canadians only insofar as they believed the Afghans were experiencing uniquely human emotions. Moreover, this relationship was hypothesized to be mediated by empathy, as infrahumanization was expected to lead to less empathy, which in turn would decrease forgiveness.

Method

Participants

A total of 75 students were recruited from introductory psychology courses (PSYC 1001 and PSYC 1002) at Carleton University. In order to qualify for the experiment, participants had to be born in Canada, report an ethnicity other than Middle Eastern, and identify with a religion other than Islam, in order to ensure that the sample consisted solely of Canadians and would not be contaminated by any potential cross-identification with the Afghan group. Identification with Canada was assessed using four items, each rated on a 7-point scale, from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. Participants in the Afghan transgressor condition \(M = 6.08, SD = 1.13\) did not differ significantly from participants in the Canadian transgressor condition \(M = 5.95, SD =\)
on level of ingroup identification, $t(73) = .50, p = .621$. One participant was removed from the sample for having an ingroup identification score of 1.25 (out of a possible 7), which was more than 4 standard deviations below the mean and thus an extreme outlier. Such a low identification score indicates that this individual does not identify with the Canadian ingroup and thus did not meet the requirements for participation in the experiment. Thus the final sample consisted of 74 participants (26 Male, 48 Female). Participants ranged in age from 17 to 56 years, with a mean age of 21.5 years ($SD = 6.00$). Participants received .5% in grade-raising credit for their participation.

**Procedure**

Participants were recruited using an online sign up system. The experiment was described to potential participants as being interested in people's opinions about various world events. After granting consent (Appendix A), participants were randomly assigned to one of two webpages that corresponded to either the "Afghans as transgressor" or "Canadians as transgressor" condition. The condition where participants attributed emotions to Canadians was included to establish that infrahumanization of the Afghans was occurring, as this is determined by a lower attribution of secondary emotions to the outgroup relative to the ingroup (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2007; Demoulin et al., 2000). It was also necessary to have a condition where Canadians were the transgressors to demonstrate that infrahumanization, and not just attribution of emotions in general, predicts forgiveness of the outgroup. Consistent with Cuddy et al.'s (2007) finding that secondary emotion attributions were related to helping outgroup members, but not ingroup members, secondary emotion attributions should only be related to forgiveness of
the outgroup transgressor. Forgiveness of the Canadians should not depend on attributions of secondary emotions.

Participants first completed a measure of identification with Canada after which they were sent to a webpage that had the appearance of a news brief section of a national newspaper. The news brief described an altercation in Afghanistan in which Afghan National Police Officers [Canadian soldiers] killed and injured several Canadian soldiers [Afghan National Police Officers] in a friendly-fire incident (Appendix D). The incident was based on real events that occurred in the summer of 2006 (CBC News, 2006a). After reading the article, participants completed a series of likert-type measures to assess infrahumanization, empathy, and forgiveness. Participants also completed a brief demographics survey. After completing the questionnaires participants were provided with a debriefing that explained the purpose of the experiment, the manipulation, and provided them with the appropriate contact information to use if they had questions or concerns about the experiment (Appendix B).

**Measures**

*Infrahumanization.* To assess infrahumanization, Cuddy et al.'s (2007) methodology was adapted to suit the present context. Participants were presented with a list of 8 emotions, and asked to rate on a 7-point scale, where 1 = *not at all* and 7 = *extremely*, to what extent they believed the transgressing group is feeling these emotions. Three emotions are primary and negative (confusion, fear, and panic), and five are secondary (grief, sorrow, anguish, guilt, and remorse). Both subscales demonstrated acceptable reliability, with Cronbach’s alpha = .89 for the secondary emotions, and .80 for the primary emotions.
Forgiveness. To assess forgiveness of the transgressing group we used 4 items adapted from Wohl and Branscombe (2005). The scale measures forgiveness for a specific transgression committed by a group, and was modified to refer to the transgressing group (either Canadians or Afghans, depending on the condition). Participants were asked to rate, on a 7-point scale (where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree), how much they agree with four forgiveness statements. These are, “I forgive the Canadian soldiers [Afghanistan national police officers] for the harm done to the Afghans [Canadians],” “I don’t hold any negative feelings toward the Canadians [Afghans] for their actions,” “I forgive the Canadian soldiers [Afghan national police officers] for their role in this incident,” and “It is possible for me to forgive the actions of the Canadian soldiers [Afghan national police officers].” Higher scores indicate greater levels of forgiveness. The scale was acceptably reliable, with Cronbach’s alpha = .92.

Empathy. Participants were asked to respond to two questions assessing empathy felt for the transgressing group, “I feel compassion for (transgressor)” and “I am moved by the thought of what the (transgressor) is going through.” Participants responded on a 7-point scale, where 1 = not at all and 7 = very strongly. These items were adapted from a study by Miron, Branscombe and Schmitt (2006), which also used a two-item measure of intergroup empathy. Cronbach’s alpha for these two items was .80.

Results

Preliminary analysis. A two-way between-participants ANOVA (Transgressor group X Participant gender) was performed on all dependent variables to test for possible gender differences. Because the main effect of gender was not significant for any of the
dependent variables, \( ps > .24 \), nor were the interactions, \( ps > .08 \), all subsequent analyses collapsed across participant gender.

**Effects of Outgroup Harm-doing**

*Infrahumanization.* A series of two-tailed independent samples t-tests were performed to test for mean differences between conditions. Participants attributed significantly less secondary emotions to the Afghans (\( M = 3.41, SD = 1.31 \)) than to the Canadians (\( M = 4.77, SD = 1.39 \)), \( t(71) = -4.32, p < .001, d = 1.01 \). Attributions of primary emotions, however, did not differ by transgressor group, \( t(73) = -1.14, p = .26 \). Participants attributed the same amount of primary emotions to Afghans (\( M = 3.80, SD = 1.50 \)) as they did to Canadians (\( M = 4.20, SD = 1.54 \)).

*Forgiveness.* Independent samples t-tests indicated that, as expected, participants were significantly more forgiving of the Canadian transgressor (\( M = 4.93, SD = 1.25 \)) than they were of the Afghan transgressor (\( M = 3.84, SD = 1.69 \)), \( t(73) = -3.15, p = .002, d = .73 \).

*Empathy.* Finally, an independent samples t-test also showed that participants felt significantly less empathy for the Afghan transgressors (\( M = 2.95, SD = 1.40 \)) than they did for the Canadian transgressors (\( M = 5.16, SD = 1.34 \)), \( t(72) = -6.91, p < .001, d = 1.61 \). Overall, all of the hypotheses concerning differences between the groups were supported.
Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations for Measured Variables by Condition, Experiment 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canadian Transgressor</th>
<th>Afghan Transgressor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Emotion</td>
<td>4.77 (1.39)\textsubscript{a}</td>
<td>3.41 (1.31)\textsubscript{b}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Emotion</td>
<td>4.20 (1.54)\textsubscript{a}</td>
<td>3.80 (1.50)\textsubscript{a}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgiveness</td>
<td>4.93 (1.25)\textsubscript{a}</td>
<td>3.84 (1.69)\textsubscript{b}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>5.16 (1.34)\textsubscript{a}</td>
<td>2.95 (1.40)\textsubscript{b}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Comparisons in a given row with different subscripts are significantly different at $p < .05$. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

**Correlations**

Correlations were then computed to test the hypothesis that attributions of secondary emotions would be significantly related to forgiveness of the Afghans, but not the Canadians. Forgiveness of the Canadians was significantly related to empathy for the Canadians, $r = .61$, $p < .001$. However, as expected, forgiveness of the Canadians was not significantly related to attributions of secondary emotions, $r = .26$, $p = .13$. For the Afghans, forgiveness was again significantly related to empathy, $r = .70$, $p < .001$. Moreover, as expected, forgiveness of the Afghans was significantly related to attributions of secondary emotions, $r = .32$, $p = .05$. Thus, the more people believed the Afghans were experiencing secondary emotions, the more forgiving they were of the Afghans. Importantly, forgiveness of the Afghans was not significantly related to attributions of primary emotions, $r = -.05$, $p = .78$. 
Mediation Analysis

To determine if empathy mediated the relationship between secondary emotion attributions and forgiveness, Baron and Kenny’s (1986) regression procedure for testing mediation was employed. Because we know from the correlations that the attribution of secondary emotions (the independent variable) is significantly associated with forgiveness of the Afghans (the dependent variable), and the relationship between secondary emotions and empathy was also significant, \( r = .35, p = .03 \), I proceeded to test for mediation. Attributions of secondary emotions and empathy were thus included in a regression equation with forgiveness of the Afghans as the dependent variable, \( R^2 = .48 \), \( F(2, 35) = 15.91, p < .001 \). Empathy significantly predicted forgiveness, \( \beta = .65, t(35) = 4.99, p < .001 \), however, secondary emotions were no longer a significant predictor, \( \beta = .09, t(35) = .72, p = .48 \). Thus the relationship between attribution of secondary emotions and forgiveness of the Afghans was perfectly mediated by empathy for the Afghans. The bootstrapping procedure outlined by Preacher and Hayes (2005) was employed to test whether the indirect effect of secondary emotion attribution on forgiveness of the Afghans, via empathy, was significantly different than zero. The 95% confidence interval for the effect ranged from .01 to .56. Because the confidence interval does not include zero, the effect is significant. Thus, as expected, empathy significantly mediated the relationship between secondary emotion attributions and forgiveness, such that people who attribute more secondary emotions to the Afghans experience more empathy for them and are in turn more forgiving of the harm committed against their ingroup.
Figure 1. Infrahumanization Mediation Model, Experiment 1. Coefficients with an asterisk indicate significant beta weights. Coefficients in parentheses indicate the direct effect of infrahumanization on outgroup forgiveness, after controlling for outgroup empathy.

Discussion

The results of this experiment support the hypothesis that infrahumanization would negatively predict forgiveness of the Afghans, and that this relationship would be mediated by empathy. Participants infrahumanized Afghans who harmed Canadians by ascribing Afghans less secondary, but not primary, emotions than they did Canadians who harmed Afghans. Participants also reported greater empathy towards, and forgiveness of, the Canadians than the Afghans. Moreover, infrahumanization of the
Afghans was negatively related to empathy and forgiveness, such that participants were less likely to experience empathy or forgive the Afghans when they attributed fewer secondary emotions to them. As expected, attributions of secondary emotions were not related to forgiveness of the Canadians, nor were attributions of primary emotions related to forgiveness of the Afghans. This supports the notion that it is not belief that the Afghans are generally experiencing emotions about the transgression that predicts greater forgiveness, but secondary emotions in particular that are important. Finally, empathy mediated the relationship between secondary emotions and forgiveness, such that people who indicated that they believed the Afghans were experiencing more secondary emotions were more likely to empathize with the Afghans and in turn were more forgiving of the harm committed against their group.

The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with previous research which has shown a link between infrahumanization and intergroup forgiveness (e.g., Tam et al., 2007). This experiment expanded on these findings by demonstrating that intergroup empathy mediates the relationship between emotion attributions and forgiveness. However, in the articles that participants read describing the intergroup conflict the transgressor did not express any emotions over the incident, and this is rarely the case in real world reports of violent altercations between groups. Thus, it is important to also ask what impact expression of primary versus secondary emotions by an outgroup has on forgiveness of that group for harm committed against the ingroup. Intuitively, one would suppose that if attribution of secondary emotions is positively related to forgiveness, expression of secondary emotions should also have a similar effect. Yet previous research has suggested that expression of secondary emotions by an outgroup is actually
associated with a more negative reaction to that group, compared to when they express a primary emotion (Vaes et al., 2003). Therefore, a second experiment was conducted to explore the relationship between expression of different types of emotions by an outgroup and forgiveness of that group.

Experiment 2

Given that attributing secondary emotions to an outgroup is associated with prosocial reactions to that group, one would expect a similarly positive effect when an outgroup expresses secondary emotions. However, previous research indicates that the opposite is true, and people react negatively to expressions of secondary emotions by an outgroup. Across four studies designed to assess the behavioural consequences of infrahumanization, Vaes et al. (2003) found that while expression of secondary emotions by ingroup members had a positive effect, identical expressions by outgroup members had a negative effect. They found that participants responded more favourably to pleas for help from ingroup members who expressed a secondary emotion than outgroup members who used the same emotion, while there was no difference in responses to groups when a primary emotion was expressed. Moreover, expression of secondary emotions by ingroup members increased perceived similarity with that person, but expressions by outgroup members increased the need to differentiate the self from that member (and by association, that group). Finally, they found that people were quicker to both approach an ingroup member and avoid an outgroup member who expressed a secondary emotion (again there were no differences when a primary emotion was expressed). Overall, these studies demonstrate that people not only act more positively towards ingroup than outgroup members who express secondary emotions, they also act
in a more negative way when it is an outgroup member who has used a uniquely human emotion. This finding has been explained in terms of a differential activation of the humanity concept following expressions of uniquely human emotions by ingroup versus outgroup members.

Expression of a secondary emotion by an ingroup member causes that person to be seen as more human, but an identical expression by an outgroup member causes that person to be seen as less human (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2006). Characteristics unique to human beings were activated to a greater degree when ingroup members expressed secondary emotions (e.g., adoration, compassion, resentment, etc.), than when they expressed primary emotions. Thus, people viewed ingroup members expressing a secondary emotion as more human. On the other hand, when an outgroup member expressed a secondary emotion, activation of the human concept was actually lower compared to when a primary emotion was expressed. It has been suggested that this occurs because an outgroup member who expresses a secondary emotion is seen as trying to usurp the human essence that is supposed to be characteristic of only the ingroup (e.g., Vaes et al., 2003). The outgroup is therefore seen as threatening one’s social identity, and people cope with this threat by implicitly denying the outgroup’s claim of humanity and engaging in outgroup derogation. Overall, it appears that outgroup members who express secondary emotions are responded to more negatively than those who express primary emotions.

It is hypothesized that expressions of secondary emotions by outgroup members are likely to impede intergroup forgiveness by inducing negative responses from ingroup members (Vaes et al., 2003). Collective apologies, for instance, as well as statements in
the media by the groups involved in a conflict, are likely to be filled with uniquely human emotion words, such as “sorrow,” “grief,” “remorse,” and so on. If people tend to react negatively towards outgroup members who use secondary emotion terms in pleas for help, it is reasonable to suspect that the use of such terms in apologies or other statements would produce a similar effect. In conflict situations, people are already inclined to view the offending outgroup negatively, and any attempt by that group to claim the human essence for themselves seems likely to engender a strong negative reaction. Although a negative relationship between infrahumanization and forgiveness has been demonstrated (e.g., Tam et al., 2007), there has not yet been an attempt to address the effect of expressions of secondary emotions on intergroup forgiveness. A second experiment was thus conducted to assess the relationship between forgiveness and the expression of secondary emotions by an outgroup that has committed harm against the ingroup.

Experiment 2 expanded on Experiment 1 by manipulating expression of emotion by the Afghan outgroup. Whereas in Experiment 1, participants simply inferred uniquely human emotions to the Afghans in the absence of any emotional content, here the transgressing outgroup expressed either primary emotions (anger and sadness) or secondary (ashamed and sorrowful) emotion over the event. These emotion terms were selected as they were approximately equidistant from the mean of humanity ratings in the normative study by Demoulin et al. (2000) for primary and secondary emotions, and differ primarily in terms of their perceived humanity. Given past research on the expression of secondary emotions (i.e., Vaes et al., 2003), I expected that expression of secondary emotions by the Afghans would lead to lower levels of forgiveness compared to expression of primary emotions. I also sought to replicate the finding that
Infrahumanization and Forgiveness

Infrahumanization would influence forgiveness via empathy. It was thus expected that empathy would mediate the relationship between emotion and forgiveness, such that participants would experience less empathy when the Afghans expressed secondary emotions, and in turn be less forgiving.

Method

Participants

A sample of 49 students was recruited using the web recruitment system from introductory psychology courses (PSYC 1001 and PSYC 1002) at Carleton University. Once again, participants had to be born in Canada, and not identify as Middle Eastern or Muslim to qualify for inclusion in the study. Participants did not differ on their level of ingroup identification across the two conditions, $t(36.96) = 1.81, p = .08$. Participants on average were highly identified Canadians in both the primary emotion ($M = 6.29, SD = .47$) and secondary emotion ($M = 5.88, SD = 1.01$) conditions. Two participants were removed from the sample, for having an ingroup identification score of 1.00 (out of a possible 7), which was more than 5 standard deviations below the mean. These individuals did not identify with the Canadian ingroup and thus did not meet the requirements for participation in the study. A final sample of 47 participants was obtained (18 male, 28 female, 1 gender unreported). Participants ranged in age from 17 to 33 years, with a mean age of 20.13 years ($SD = 3.42$). Participants received .5% in grade-raising credit for their participation.

Procedure and Measures
The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1, except for
the replacement of the ingroup-outgroup dichotomy with the primary-secondary emotion
condition in the scenario in which the Afghans were responsible for the deaths of
Canadian soldiers. In Experiment 2, once the participant had indicated his or her consent,
he or she was randomly assigned to either the primary emotion or secondary emotion
condition (see Appendix D for all articles). Participants completed all the same empathy,
forgiveness, and demographics measures as in Experiment 1.1

Results

Preliminary analysis. A two-way between-participants ANOVA (Emotion
expressed X Participant gender) was conducted on all dependent variables to test for
possible gender differences. Because the main effect of gender was not significant for any
of the dependent variables, ps > .09, nor were the interactions, ps > .47, all subsequent
analyses collapsed across gender.

Effects of Primary versus Secondary Emotion Expression

Forgiveness. In order to determine whether forgiveness of the Afghans was lower
when secondary emotions were expressed, an independent samples t-test was performed.
As expected, participants were significantly more forgiving when the Afghans expressed
primary emotions (M = 4.54, SD = 1.24) over the incident than when they expressed
secondary emotions (M = 3.75, SD = 1.29), t(45) = 2.12, p = .04, d = .62.

Empathy. Independent samples t-test indicated that participants also reported
feeling significantly more empathy for the Afghans when they expressed primary
emotions (M = 3.60, SD = 1.24) rather than secondary emotions (M = 2.83, SD = 1.29),
t(45) = 2.07, p = .04, d = .61.
Table 2

Means and Standard Deviations for Measured Variables by Condition, Experiment 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary Emotion</th>
<th>Secondary Emotion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forgiveness</td>
<td>4.54 (1.24)ₐ</td>
<td>3.75 (1.29)ₐ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>3.60 (1.24)ₐ</td>
<td>2.83 (1.29)ₐ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Comparisons in a given row with different subscripts are significantly different at p < .05. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

Mediation Analysis

Forgiveness was significantly correlated with empathy, \( r = .52, p < .001 \), thus I proceeded to test the hypothesis that empathy would mediate the relationship between emotional expression and forgiveness. Condition was coded as a categorical independent variable, with the primary emotion condition assigned a value of “0” and the secondary emotion condition assigned a value of “1”. Thus a negative relationship with condition indicates that empathy and forgiveness are lower in the secondary emotion condition. Condition and empathy were included in a regression equation with forgiveness of the Afghans as the dependent variable, \( R^2 = .29, F(2, 44) = 9.16, p < .001 \). Empathy significantly predicted forgiveness, \( \beta = .47, t(44) = 3.56, p = .001 \), however, emotion expressed was no longer a significant predictor, \( \beta = -.16, t(44) = -1.23, p = .23 \). Thus the relationship between condition and forgiveness of the Afghans was perfectly mediated by empathy for the Afghans. Bootstrapping was then employed to test whether the indirect
effect of type of emotion expressed on forgiveness of the Afghans, via empathy, was significantly different than zero. The 95% confidence interval for the effect ranged from -.01 to -1.05. Because the confidence interval does not include zero, the effect is significant. Therefore, as expected, expression of secondary emotions predicted lower levels of empathy relative to expression of primary emotions, and this in turn predicted lower levels of forgiveness of the Afghans.

*Figure 2.* Infrahumanization Mediation Model, Experiment 2. Coefficients with an asterisk indicate significant beta weights. Coefficients in parentheses indicate the direct effect of infrahumanization on outgroup forgiveness, after controlling for outgroup empathy.

Discussion

The results of this experiment support the notion that expressions of secondary emotions by outgroup members induce negative reactions, and extend this effect to
include intergroup forgiveness. People were less forgiving of the Afghans for harming Canadians, and also felt less empathy for the Afghans, when the Afghans expressed secondary emotions compared to when they expressed primary emotions. This experiment also replicated the finding from Experiment 1 that empathy mediates the relationship between infrahumanization and intergroup forgiveness. Expressions of secondary emotions were associated with decreased empathy relative to expressions of primary emotions, and lower levels of empathy subsequently predicted lower levels of forgiveness. Thus, consistent with previous research (e.g., Vaes et al., 2003), participants responded negatively to outgroup members who expressed secondary emotions by exhibiting decreased empathy and forgiveness relative to when they expressed primary emotions. Possible interpretations and implications of this finding are presented in the General Discussion.

General Discussion

The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that infrahumanizing an outgroup by assigning them a reduced capacity to feel uniquely human emotions is negatively related to forgiveness of that group when they cause harm to one’s ingroup. In Experiment 2, it was shown that when an outgroup that has harmed one’s ingroup expresses uniquely human emotions over the incident this also has a negative effect on forgiveness of that group. In Experiment 1, participants were more forgiving of the transgressing Afghans the more they believed the Afghans were experiencing secondary, uniquely human emotions. Conversely, in Experiment 2, participants were less forgiving of the Afghans when the Afghans expressed secondary, as opposed to primary, emotions about the incident. In both studies, the relationship between emotion and forgiveness was mediated
by empathy. In the first experiment, attributions of secondary emotion *positively* predicted empathy, which in turn predicted forgiveness of the Afghans. In the second experiment, expression of secondary emotions by the outgroup *negatively* predicted empathy (relative to an expression of primary emotions), which again predicted forgiveness. Taken together these studies provide support for the notion that while attributing secondary emotions to an outgroup has a beneficial effect on reactions to that group, such as empathy and forgiveness, the reverse is true when an outgroup expresses secondary emotions.

These studies are the first to examine both attribution and expression of primary and secondary emotions by an outgroup in the same intergroup context. Although somewhat counterintuitive on the surface, the finding that attributions of secondary emotions would have a positive effect on forgiveness while expression of secondary emotions would have a negative effect is consistent with previous research (e.g., Vaes et al., 2003). This has been explained in terms of differential activation of the humanity concept and distinctiveness threat. Research has shown that expression of a secondary emotion by an ingroup member causes that person to be seen as more human, but when an outgroup member expresses a secondary emotion they are actually viewed as *less* human compared to when they express a primary emotion (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2006). This latter finding is likely attributable to the fact that people perceive an outgroup member expressing a secondary emotion as violating expectancies about the less than human character of their group and as posing a distinctiveness threat to the ingroup (Vaes et al., 2003). Therefore, it seems that when an outgroup member expresses a secondary emotion they are perceived as trying to commandeer the human essence, which people
generally think of as being a characteristic that is reserved for the ingroup (e.g., Demoulin et al., 2006; Leyens et al., 2000). This activates social identity concerns related to group distinctiveness, and outgroup derogation emerges to protect the distinctiveness of one’s ingroup from the threatening outgroup. The present research adds to the literature by demonstrating that these effects extend to empathy and forgiveness, such that people experience less empathy and are less forgiving of an outgroup when they express secondary emotions.

The finding that expressions of secondary emotions by an outgroup has a negative impact on empathy and forgiveness of that outgroup for harming the ingroup has important implications for post-conflict reconciliation. Intergroup conflict generally takes place in a public forum, and statements made in the media by all groups involved affect how people’s perceptions of the conflict. The Canadian mission in Afghanistan, for example, has been the subject of much controversy, as the costs both financially and in human lives continues to grow. Moving forward from protracted intergroup conflict will require the cooperation of all groups involved, but the findings of these experiments suggest that groups must be careful in the kinds of language they use to discuss reconciliation efforts, as the expression of secondary emotions by an outgroup seems to cause a negative reaction in ingroup members.

The results of these experiments also have implications for collective apologies. It has been argued that an apology by the offending group is a necessary precondition to intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation (Oliner, 2005). This is likely true, however a collective apology is almost certainly an insufficient condition for forgiveness, and may inadvertently increase rather than ameliorate intergroup hostility (Hewstone et al., 2004).
Collective apologies are likely to be filled with uniquely human emotion words, such as “sorrow,” “grief,” “guilt,” “remorse,” and so on. However, if people tend to react negatively towards outgroup members who use secondary emotion terms, and be less forgiving of outgroups that use such language, it is reasonable to suspect that the use of such terms in an apology would produce a similar effect. The results of Experiment 2 demonstrate that infrahumanization is a potent barrier to forgiveness, not only because people attribute less secondary emotions to outgroups, but also because they react negatively to expressions of secondary emotions by outgroups.

These studies are valuable for demonstrating that intergroup empathy is one mechanism by which infrahumanization influences forgiveness. Participants who attributed more secondary emotions to the Afghans also experienced more empathy for that group, and subsequently were more forgiving of the Afghans for causing the deaths of the Canadian soldiers. Empathy was again related to forgiveness of the Afghans in Experiment 2, but, as was the case with forgiveness, participants experienced less empathy when the Afghans expressed secondary emotions about the violent incident than when they expressed primary emotions. These findings indicate that infrahumanizing an outgroup makes it more difficult to empathize with that group. This is unfortunate, as it has been suggested that empathizing with the offender is a necessary step in the forgiveness process (Enright, R.D., & The Human Development Study Group, 1996) and the results of these studies certainly support the argument that empathizing with an offender will be a necessary precondition for intergroup forgiveness. It has also been argued that seeing the humanity in others is essential to intergroup forgiveness (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). The findings of the present studies are troublesome, as they indicate...
that not only are people inclined to view outgroups as less than fully human, but doing so also decreases their ability to empathize with those outgroups. Attempts at intergroup forgiveness following conflict will thus require encouraging people to both view their former enemies not as an outgroup but as part of the broader human category to which we all belong, and by association, feel greater empathy for the plight of the other group. Forgiveness it seems will only be possible insofar as groups are willing to recognize their shared humanity and shared suffering. Attempts at reconciliation must keep these factors in mind, and seek ways to combat the detrimental effects of infrahumanization.

**Limitations and Future Directions**

The present studies have a few limitations that need to be considered. Firstly, participants in both studies were first-year University students, which may not be the population best suited to study when the focus is on intergroup conflict, due to a potential lack of knowledge or interest in the conflict in Afghanistan and connection to the Canadian identity. However, it is worth noting that participants on average were highly identified with the “Canadian” ingroup, and all the effects were significant in the expected direction. Nevertheless, it would be valuable to replicate this experiment with a community sample to establish the generalizability of these findings.

Second, the current experiments only considered one mechanism by which infrahumanization affects forgiveness, namely empathy. Empathy is clearly an important factor, but there are almost certainly other means by which infrahumanization influences forgiveness. Anger towards the outgroup and intergroup attitudes are potential mechanisms that should be addressed in future studies. Furthermore, this experiment only examined Canadian students’ perceptions of the conflict. This was necessary to establish
a common "ingroup" identity, in opposition to the Afghan "outgroup." In a multiethnic society such as Canada, however, studying people of different ethnic backgrounds would be an important step in uncovering the conditions under which infrahumanization emerges. For example, it would be interesting to perform a similar experiment with participants of Middle Eastern descent living in Canada, to see the effect such cross-identities on perceptions of the conflict in Afghanistan.

Moreover, these studies focused on a single conflict, and although the findings were consistent with those from previous research done in different settings (e.g., Cuddy, et al., 2007; Tam et al., 2007; Vaes et al., 2003) there is certainly more room to examine infrahumanization and forgiveness in different intergroup conflicts. Intergroup conflicts are complex situations, and no two conflicts are identical in terms of the circumstances that cause them, the way they are perceived and the outcomes they produce. Studying a broad range of conflicts, both those that have been resolved and those that are ongoing, will deepen our understanding of how groups cope with and move forward from violent conflict. Examining conflicts in which groups were able to successfully reconcile will provide valuable insights into ways in which infrahumanization can be overcome and empathy and forgiveness promoted. It may also be possible to uncover suggestions as to how politicians, diplomats, and the media in general can tailor their statements about the conflict so as not to undermine the reconciliation process by activating infrahumanization through use of secondary emotions.

Finally, future research should attempt to determine whether there are any conditions under which expression of secondary emotions by an outgroup will have a positive rather than negative impact. It is possible that there are perhaps some secondary
emotion terms that will have a positive reception when used by an outgroup, such as "remorse" and "guilt". It may also be possible to frame the statement of emotion in a way that overcomes the negative impact of the emotion content. An apologetic context seems the most likely candidate for a context that could overcome the infrahumanizing effects of secondary emotion term usage by an outgroup, though the finding that collective apologies are often met with hostility and scepticism (Hewstone et al., 2004) suggests that this may not be the case. However, it is unlikely that intergroup forgiveness will be possible without an admission of responsibility and apology for harm done being issued by both groups. It is therefore necessary to determine what, if any, contexts for presenting such statements will counteract infrahumanization brought on by the use of secondary emotion language.

Conclusion

These studies make several important contributions to the literature concerning the relationship between infrahumanization and intergroup forgiveness. It was demonstrated that not only are people less forgiving of an outgroup that has harmed the ingroup when they infrahumanize the outgroup by attributing them less secondary emotions, they are also less forgiving of the outgroup when that group expresses secondary emotions. This is the first set of studies that has looked at both attribution and expression of secondary emotions using the same intergroup conflict setting. These studies both confirm earlier findings concerning the negative effect of secondary emotion expressions by outgroups, and extend this effect to intergroup forgiveness. Moreover, these studies demonstrated that empathy is a mechanism by which infrahumanization influences intergroup forgiveness. Given the current state of the world, with conflicts
occurring involving Canada and Afghanistan, the U.S. and Iraq, civil wars in the Middle East, and violence taking place all over the globe, research on intergroup forgiveness is invaluable in pointing the way for groups to restore positive relations following violent conflict. By better understanding the processes by which infrahumanization impedes forgiveness, we can hopefully begin to develop ways to offset these effects. Only by recognizing our shared humanity can we hope to forgive those who harm us, and move away from violence to peace and reconciliation.
1 In Experiment 2, participants did not complete the emotion checklist used in Experiment 1. In the current experiment, I was interested in looking at the effects of expressed secondary emotion, and thus did not measure the extent to which participants attributed secondary emotions to the groups, as this may have had the effect of counteracting the expression manipulation.
References


APPENDIX A: INFORMED CONSENTS

The purpose of an informed consent is to ensure that you understand the purpose of the study and the nature of your involvement. The informed consent must provide sufficient information so that you have the opportunity to determine whether you wish to participate in the study.

Study Title: Perceptions of World Events

Study Personnel: Dr. Michael Wohl (Faculty Sponsor, michael_wohl@carleton.ca )
Shannon Bennett (M.A.Candidate,

Should you have any ethical concerns about this study please contact Dr. Avi Parush, Chair of the Carleton University Ethics Committee for Psychology Research, at 520-2600 ext. 6026; avi_parush@carleton.ca For any other concerns about this research or how the study was conducted, please contact Dr. Anne Bowker, Chair of the Department of Psychology, at 520-2600 ext. 8218; anne_bowker@carleton.ca

Purpose and Task Requirements: In this study, we are interested in looking at people’s perceptions of world events. You will be asked to read a brief newspaper article online from cbc.ca, and then complete a series of questionnaires asking you about your opinions and reactions to the article as well as some demographic information about yourself. The study should take you about 20-30 minutes to complete, and you will receive .5% in grade-raising credit towards your PSYC 1001/1002 course for your participation.

Potential risk/discomfort: We can anticipate no physical discomfort to you as a result of your participation in this study. You may, however, experience some stress when thinking about the world event described in the study. Your participation is solicited but is completely voluntary. The information collected in this study will be used only by the study investigators. Questions about this study should be directed to either of the researchers listed above.

Anonymity/Confidentiality: All information collected in this study will remain confidential. All questionnaires collected by the researcher will be kept secure and confidential, and will be used only by the study investigators. We will be asking you for your name and student number, in order to assign your credit for participation. However, your name and student number will not be associated in any way with your data, and all your responses will be anonymous.

Right to Withdraw: Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. If at any point you feel uncomfortable, you may decline to answer a question or withdraw entirely with no penalty.

I have read the above description of the study entitled “Perceptions of World Events.” The data collected will be used for research and/or teaching purposes. By clicking the “Yes” link below, I indicate that I am at least 18 years of age and that I agree to participate in the study, and this in no way constitutes a waiver of my rights.

Yes – I grant my consent. No – I do not grant consent.
APPENDIX B: DEBRIEFINGS

B1 – Study 1 Debriefing

Thank you for participating in this study! We greatly appreciate your participation, but we ask that you refrain from discussing this study with potential participants (i.e., other PSYC 1001/1002 students) because their responses may be influenced. This post-survey information is provided to inform you of the exact nature of the research you just participated in.

What are we trying to learn in this research?
The purpose of this research is to look at how attributing uniquely human emotions to members of groups to which you do not belong (an “outgroup”) that has harmed members of a group to which you do belong (an “ingroup”) influences forgiveness of that outgroup. We are also interested in the impact of forgiveness on practical outcomes. We did this by using the Canadian mission in Afghanistan as the context for harm-doing between groups. We did not mention the Canadian mission in Afghanistan in the informed consent because doing so may have activated opinions and beliefs you already possess concerning the mission. This can interfere with the effectiveness of the articles in creating the hypothesized reactions (described below), thus weakening our results. It was therefore necessary for us to be vague about which specific world events we would be examining in this study.

Past research has shown that people tend to attribute more uniquely human emotions (i.e., emotions that are felt only by human beings and not by animals) to their ingroups than to outgroups, and that the extent to which people attribute uniquely human emotions to an outgroup influences reactions to that group in a variety of areas (e.g., Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003). Uniquely human emotions include things like shame, grief, sorrow, compassion, and so on, while non-uniquely human emotions include anger, pain, fear, pleasure, etc (Demoulin et al., 2004). For instance, Cuddy, Rock, and Norton (2007) found that people who believed that an outgroup member who had lost her child in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was experiencing uniquely human emotions such as grief, sorrow, anguish, etc., were more willing to volunteer for hurricane relief efforts.

In our study, some participants read an article in which Canadians were described as having harmed Afghan police officers in a friendly-fire incident, while other participants read an article describing the same incident but with the roles reversed (i.e., Afghans harmed Canadian troops). The articles were created by the researchers, to look at the differences in forgiveness of an outgroup (Afghans) versus an ingroup (Canadians) for the same harmful incident. We wanted to see whether people would attribute more uniquely human emotions to the Canadian soldiers than the Afghan national police officers, and whether how much uniquely human emotion was attributed to the outgroup would influence forgiveness of that group for the harm they had done. We were also interested in how forgiveness of the group influences support for the Canadian mission in
Afghanistan, and willingness to participate in humanitarian relief efforts for the people of Afghanistan.

Was the incident I read about real?
No. As noted in the above section, neither of the events described in the articles actually occurred. The articles were created by the researchers specifically for the purpose of this study. Although the incident described in the articles was fictional, it was based on a similar event that occurred in Afghanistan in the summer of 2006. You can read the article we used as a template, describing the 2006 incident at: http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/08/26/afghanistan.html.

We would also like you to note that sometimes people who take part in psychology studies continue to believe that the information provided in the session is true, even though they have been told that the information provided was false. Psychologists have found that the best way to eliminate this possibility is simply to make participants aware that this might occur. In this study, some participants might continue to believe that the information we provided about the events in Afghanistan is true. We want to remind you again that the researchers composed the article you read and the contents of that article are not based in fact.

What are our hypotheses and predictions?
We expect that people will report high levels of forgiveness for the Canadian harm-doers, but that when the Afghans committed the harmful act, forgiveness will depend on attributing uniquely human emotions to that group. In other words, we expect that people will be willing to forgive the Afghan officers for killing Canadians only insofar as they believe the Afghans are experiencing uniquely human emotions. We are further hypothesizing that when the ingroup (Canadians) has committed the harmful act, forgiveness of the ingroup will increase support for the mission and decrease willingness to provide aid. However, we expect the reverse pattern when the outgroup (Afghans) are the transgressors. Finally, we also investigated a number of variables that may influence the forgiveness relationship, selected on the basis of past research in this area. These include ingroup identification, intergroup emotions (such as collective angst, anger, and empathy), and social dominance orientation.

Why is this important to scientists or the general public?
This research will contribute to psychologists' knowledge and understanding of intergroup relations. Specifically, findings from this study will shed light on how people react to harm committed against their group by members of groups that they do not belong to, what affects their willingness to forgive groups that harm their group, and how forgiveness influences real-life outcomes.

What if I have questions later?
For any questions or concerns relating to the research itself, please contact either the Principal Investigator, Shannon Bennett, or the Faculty Sponsor, Dr. Michael Wohl, 520-2600 ext. 2908; michael_wohl@carleton.ca.
For ethical concerns regarding your treatment as a participant during this study, please contact Dr. Avi Parush, Chair of the Carleton University Ethics Committee for Psychology Research, at 520-2600 ext. 6026; avi_parush@carleton.ca. For any other concerns about this research, you may contact Dr. Anne Bowker, Chair of the Department of Psychology, at 520-2600 ext. 8218; psychchair@carleton.ca

_**Is there anything that I can do if I found this experiment to be emotionally draining?**_

We realize that the articles or some of the questions about them may have produced feelings of anxiety. If as a result of participating in this study you are currently feeling any anxiety or distress, or if you experience any such feelings in the future, we suggest that you make an appointment with the Carleton University Health and Counseling Services, 520-6674.
B2 – Study 2 Debriefing

Thank you for participating in this study! We greatly appreciate your participation, but we ask that you refrain from discussing this study with potential participants (i.e., other PSYC 1001/1002 students) because their responses may be influenced. This post-survey information is provided to inform you of the exact nature of the research you just participated in.

What are we trying to learn in this research?
The purpose of this research is to look at how expressions of different emotions by a member of group to which you do not belong (an “outgroup”) that has harmed members of a group to which you do belong (an “ingroup”) influences levels of forgiveness for that outgroup. We are also interested in the impact of forgiveness on practical outcomes. We did this by using the Canadian mission in Afghanistan as the context for harm-doing between groups. We did not mention the Canadian mission in Afghanistan in the informed consent because doing so may have activated opinions and beliefs you already possess concerning the mission. This can interfere with the effectiveness of the articles in creating the hypothesized reactions (described below), thus weakening our results. It was therefore necessary for us to be vague about which specific world events we would be examining in this study.

Past research has shown that people tend to attribute more uniquely human emotions (i.e., emotions that are felt only by humans and not by animals) to their ingroups than to outgroups, and that the extent to which people attribute uniquely human emotions to an outgroup influences reactions to that group in a variety of areas (e.g., Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003). Uniquely human emotions include things like shame, grief, sorrow, compassion, and so on, while non-uniquely human emotions include anger, pain, fear, pleasure, etc (Demoulin et al., 2004). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that people view an outgroup member who expresses a uniquely human emotion more negatively than one who expresses a non-uniquely human emotion (while people view ingroup members who express uniquely human emotions more positively) (Vaes et al., 2003).

In this study, some participants read an article in which Canadians were described as having harmed Afghan police officers in a friendly-fire incident, while other participants read an article describing the same incident but with the roles reversed (i.e., Afghans harmed Canadian troops). The articles were created by the researchers to look at the differences in forgiveness of an outgroup (the Afghans) versus an ingroup (the Canadians) for the same transgression. Moreover, in half the articles, the group that had committed the harm expressed a non-uniquely human emotion (“angered”), while in the other half the group expressed a uniquely human emotion (“ashamed”). We wanted to see whether people would be less forgiving of an outgroup for harming the ingroup when the outgroup expresses a uniquely human emotion over the event, as opposed to a non-uniquely human emotion. We were also interested in how forgiveness of the group influences support for the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, and willingness to participate in humanitarian relief efforts for the people of Afghanistan.
Was the incident I read about real?
No. As noted in the above section, neither of the events described in the articles actually occurred. The articles were created by the researchers specifically for the purpose of this study. Although the incident described in the articles was fictional, it was based on a similar event that occurred in Afghanistan in the summer of 2006. You can read the article we used as a template, describing the 2006 incident at: http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/08/26/afghanistan.html.

We would also like you to note that sometimes people who take part in psychology studies continue to believe that the information provided in the session is true, even though they have been told that the information provided was false. Psychologists have found that the best way to eliminate this possibility is simply to make participants aware that this might occur. In this study, some participants might continue to believe that the information we provided about the events in Afghanistan is true. We want to remind you again that the researchers composed the article you read and the contents of that article are not based in fact.

What are our hypotheses and predictions?
We expect that people will report high levels of forgiveness for the Canadian harm-doers, but that when the Afghans committed the harmful act, forgiveness will depend on the emotion expressed. We expect that people will be more forgiving of the Afghans when they have expressed a non-uniquely human emotion compared to when they express a uniquely human emotion. We are further hypothesizing that when the ingroup (Canadians) has committed the harm, forgiveness of the ingroup will increase to support for the mission and decrease willingness to provide aid. However, we expect the reverse pattern when the outgroup (Afghans) are the transgressors. Finally, we also investigated a number of variables that may influence forgiveness, selected on the basis of past research in this area. These include ingroup identification, intergroup emotions (such as collective angst, anger, and empathy), and social dominance orientation.

Why is this important to scientists or the general public?
This research will contribute to psychologists' knowledge and understanding of intergroup relations. Specifically, findings from this study will shed light on how people react to harm committed against their group by an outgroup member, what affects their willingness to forgive groups that harm their group, and how forgiveness influences real-life outcomes.

What if I have questions later?
For any questions or concerns relating to the research itself, please contact either the Principal Investigator, Shannon Bennett, or the Faculty Sponsor, Dr. Michael Wohl, 520-2600 ext. 2908; michael_wohl@carleton.ca

For ethical concerns regarding your treatment as a participant during this study, please contact Dr. Avi Parush, Chair of the Carleton University Ethics Committee for Psychology Research, at 520-2600 ext. 6026; avi_parush@carleton.ca. For any other
concerns about this research, you may contact Dr. Anne Bowker, Chair of the Department of Psychology, at 520-2600 ext. 8218; psychchair@carleton.ca

*Is there anything that I can do if I found this experiment to be emotionally draining?* We realize that the articles or some of the questions about them may have produced feelings of anxiety. If as a result of participating in this study you are currently feeling any anxiety or distress, or if you experience any such feelings in the future, we suggest that you make an appointment with the Carleton University Health and Counseling Services, 520-6674.
APPENDIX C: MEASURES

For each of the following scales, please READ THE INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY, and answer as truthfully as you can. Remember, you are free to stop at any point, or skip any questions that make you uncomfortable.

**C1 – Ingroup Identification**

Please rate each of the following statements, as they apply to you, from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.

1. I feel Canadian.
2. I am proud to be Canadian.
3. I identify with Canada.
4. I feel a connection with other Canadians.

**C2 – Infrahumanization**

Please rate, on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 = not at all and 7 = very strongly, the extent to which you believe the Canadian soldiers (Afghan National Police Officers), are feeling each of the following emotions:

1. grief
2. confusion
3. sorrow
4. anguish
5. fear
6. guilt
7. panic
8. remorse
C3 – Empathy for the Transgressor

Please rate each of the following statements, as they apply to you, from \(1 = \text{strongly disagree}\) to \(7 = \text{strongly agree}\).

1. I feel compassion for the people of Afghanistan (Canadian troops in Afghanistan).
2. I am moved by the thought of what the Afghanistan people (Canadian troops) are going through.

C4 – Forgiveness

Please rate each of the following statements, as they apply to you, from \(1 = \text{strongly disagree}\) to \(7 = \text{strongly agree}\).

1. I forgive the Canadian soldiers/Afghanistan national police officers for the harm done to the Afghans/Canadians.
2. I don't hold any negative feelings toward the Canadians/Afghans for their actions.
3. I forgive the Canadian soldiers/Afghan national police officers for their role in this incident.
4. It is possible for me to forgive the actions of the Canadian soldiers/Afghan national police officers.
C5 - Demographics

Age: _____ Gender: _____ Year of study: ________

Country of birth:
- Canada
- Other

Ethnicity:
- Caucasian/White
- African-Canadian
- Indigenous or Aboriginal
- Asian
- Middle Eastern
- Hispanic
- Latino
- Other
- Prefer not to say

Religious affiliation:
- Catholic
- Protestant
- Jewish
- Muslim
- Buddhist
- Hindu
- Spiritual / agnostic
- Atheist
- Other

Political ideology:
- Please place yourself on the following scale according to the position that best represents your political views:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extremely Liberal</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

0 - None

Political Party Identification – Please select one:
- Liberal
- Conservative
- NPD
- Bloc Quebecois
- Green Party
In order to assign you credit for your participation, we require your name and student number. This information will be separated from the rest of your questionnaire data, and will not be associated with your responses in any way. This information will be held in strict confidentiality, and will not be used for any purpose other than to assign you credit for participating.

Name: ________________________________

Student #: ______________________________
APPENDIX D: ARTICLES

Study 1 Article Manipulation

Please read the article on the next page carefully. You will be asked for your thoughts about this article but you will not be able to return to it. When you are finished reading, please click the button directly beneath the article.

D1 – Canadians (ingroup) as transgressor

Canadian soldiers have killed three Afghanistan National Police officers and injured two others in a friendly-fire shooting incident that took place early on June 14th. The Canadians fired on a group of armed men while conducting manoeuvres outside of Kabul NATO commander and Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff Gen. Ray Henault told reporters. "Without a doubt there was a misidentification of the Afghans," Henault said. An investigation is currently being conducted by the Department of National Defense.

D2 – Afghans (outgroup) as transgressor

Afghanistan National Police officers have killed three Canadian soldiers and injured two others in a friendly-fire shooting incident that took place early on June 14th. The Afghans fired on a group of armed men while conducting manoeuvres outside of Kabul Afghan Defence Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak told reporters. "Without a doubt there was a misidentification of the Afghans," Wardak said. An investigation is currently being conducted by the Department of National Defense.
Study 2 Article Manipulation

Please read the article on the next page carefully. You will be asked for your thoughts about this article but you will not be able to return to it. When you are finished reading, please click the button directly beneath the article.

D3 – Afghans as transgressors, primary emotion expressed

Afghan National Police officers have killed three Canadian soldiers and injured two others in a friendly-fire shooting incident that took place early on June 14th. The Afghans fired on a group of armed men while conducting manoeuvres outside of Kabul. Afghan Defence Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak told reporters. "Without a doubt there was a misidentification of the Canadians," Wardak said. “Nevertheless, our government and military are angered and saddened that such a tragic event has occurred.” An investigation is currently being conducted by the Department of National Defense.

D4 – Afghans as transgressors, secondary emotion expressed

Afghan National Police officers have killed three Canadian soldiers and injured two others in a friendly-fire shooting incident that took place early on June 14th. The Afghans fired on a group of armed men while conducting manoeuvres outside of Kabul. Afghan Defence Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak told reporters. "Without a doubt there was a misidentification of the Canadians," Wardak said. “Nevertheless, our government and military are ashamed and sorrowful that such a tragic event has occurred.” An investigation is currently being conducted by the Department of National Defense.