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THE UNESCO CRISIS:

A Critical Examination of the U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO Based on State Theory Analysis

by

Joanne Marshall B.A.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Political Science

Carleton University OTTAWA, Ontario February, 1987
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submitted by Joanne Marshall, Hons. B.A.
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ABSTRACT

On December 31, 1984, the United States formally withdrew its membership from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). With its withdrawal the U.S. has taken 25 percent of UNESCO's revenue. The consequence of this action has threatened the economic viability of the agency, placing it within a crisis situation.

While a significant amount of material has been written debating the legitimacy of the U.S. withdrawal, little, if any significant work has been done on the events which led to this withdrawal and the resulting crisis. In order to understand the reasons behind the U.S. action and the theoretical implications this holds, it is necessary to move beyond a superficial discussion of the issues and address the processes which contributed to the emergence of these particular issues, in this particular UN body, at this particular time.

Drawing on the theoretical work of German state theorist, Claus Offe, this study attempts to establish the nature of the economic, political and social linkages, between the U.S. and UNESCO. This study attempts to demonstrate that the crisis in UNESCO, instigated by the U.S. withdrawal, is a manifestation of a contradiction intrinsic to the structure and function of the agency, a contradiction sharpened by the agency's attempt to address problems related to communication.
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On December 31, 1984 the United States formally withdrew from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). The reason for the American departure from the 161-member specialised agency of the United Nations was explained by Secretary of State George Shultz in a letter to UNESCO Director-General Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, dated December 28, 1983:

For a number of years, as you know from statements we have made at the Executive Board and elsewhere, we have been concerned that trends in the policy, ideological emphasis, budget and management of UNESCO were detracting from the Organisation's effectiveness. We believe that these trends have led UNESCO away from the original principles of its constitution. We feel that they have served the political purposes of member states, rather than the international vocation of UNESCO. (Shultz, 1984:82)

On December 31, 1985 the United Kingdom and Singapore withdrew from the organisation in support of the American position. While no other western capitalist states have withdrawn or announced an intent to withdraw, they have supported, in principle, U.S. criticism of the organisation. The withdrawal of the United States, the United Kingdom and Singapore has meant a 30 percent loss in revenue for UNESCO. The total contribution by the western states represents approximately 80 percent of UNESCO's budget. The organisation is now severely crippled. Any further withdrawals by western capitalist states could destroy the organisation.
The 'trends in the policy, ideological emphasis, budget and management of UNESCO' referred to by Shultz were elaborated upon by William Harley, Communications Consultant for the U.S. Department of State in a memorandum dated February 9, 1984. In the memorandum he states that the United States has longstanding differences with UNESCO over its programmes, basic orientation and budget growth:

It has taken on an anti-Western tone and become unwilling to defend the ideals of free thought and free expression upon which it was founded.

It has become a comfortable home for statist, collectivist solutions to world problems and for ideological polemics.

It has been generally unresponsive to U.S. efforts over recent years to change this orientation.

It rejects sound management principles in favour of self-serving and self-promoting procedures.

It continues to press for a so-called New World Information and Communications Order, which embodies elements threatening to a free press and free market. In particular, it is a way for governments to define 'responsible' reporting and control what is written about their nations and in their nations (Harley, 1984:89)

In response to the U.S. announced intent to withdraw in December, 1983, the western ambassadors to UNESCO setup an ad hoc committee to study the questions raised by the U.S. decision (the U.S. participated as a member of this committee). In March, 1984 this 24-member committee of the world's most industrialised states* presented Director-General M'Bow with a document entitled The Crisis in UNESCO. Although the precise demands were not made public, the document reportedly opens by describing the U.S. withdrawal as,

*The committee included the United States, Canada, the members of the European Economic Community, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Spain, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Portugal, Turkey, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
a symptom, to be taken very seriously, of tensions that have been building up within UNESCO over a long period of time, leading to disappointments and frustrations which wholly or in part are shared by a number of other member states (Johnson, The Globe and Mail, 31 March 1984).

The document requested that changes be worked out by the secretariat in time for the May meeting of UNESCO's 51-member Executive Board. It was believed that approval for such changes could be granted at the October General Conference, two months prior to the U.S.'s scheduled departure (Johnson, The Globe and Mail, 31 March 1984). At the Executive Board meeting in May, 1984 both the United States and the United Kingdom were vocal in their criticisms of both the administration and the substance of UNESCO's already approved Medium Term Plan and Program. As John Fobes, a former chairman of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO (1979-1981) reports, the U.S. and the U.K. proposed that the organisation confine itself to noncontroversial (his emphasis) projects mainly involving assistance to developing countries.

Ideas and questions about education, science, culture and communications or about the future of the world problems that are open to significant disagreement were to be eschewed (Fobes, 1984:166).

Although tensions, already evident at the meeting, were exacerbated by the inconclusive debate in the Executive Board a 13-member committee was formed to study possible reforms to the agency. At the 1984 October General Conference substantial efforts were made to initiate a reform process. Most evident was the new-found budget restraint. This endeavour was insufficient for the U.S. Reporting before two House Foreign Affairs' Subcommittees, Assistant Secretary of State Gregory Newell stated that although UNESCO had made 'a welcome effort' to change its management and operations, the reforms fell short of the proposed changes made by the United States.
The agency refused to accept two far-reaching U.S. proposals that would have required 85 percent of the member nations to approve the annual UNESCO budgets and would have guaranteed the protection of minority members' interests (The Ottawa Citizen, 7 December 1984). The lack of consideration given to western interests and the strength of Soviet influence in UNESCO (Newell reported that "some feel UNESCO is the strongest platform outside of the Soviet Union for the Soviets to project their views.") were the primary reasons for the U.S. withdrawal (The Ottawa Citizen, 7 December 1984).

Britain's announced intent to withdraw was also based on the inadequacy of the reforms presented at the October session. While acknowledging that some progress had been made, Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe noted that much remained to be done. Britain, he stated, cannot be confident at this stage that adequate reforms will necessarily have been made by the end of 1985 and it would be wrong not to safeguard its position (The Ottawa Citizen, 2 January 1985).

In marked contrast to the rigid stance assumed by the U.S. and the U.K. the other western states, in response to the reform initiative, modified their position, backing off from any threat of withdrawal. In fact, Britain's decision was severely criticised by Australia, Canada and New Zealand and all members of the European Economic Community. Given that a reform process had begun, the other western states believed more could be accomplished from within UNESCO than from outside. This opinion was shared by many Americans critical of the U.S. pull out. Several Democrats and Republicans sitting on the House Subcommittees urged the Reagan Administration to postpone the withdrawal for one year to see if changes were
made within UNESCO. As one representative noted, the U.S. had stated that it wanted to see major changes and then "dealt itself out of the game" so it "won't be around to vote for the changes" (The Ottawa Citizen, 7 December 1984)

Many U.S. organisations including the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO and a range of American scientists, social scientists and leaders of various research programmes also opposed the U.S. decision to withdraw (Mehan, 1984:125). Their opposition is based on the belief that the charges made against UNESCO by the U.S. have little relevance. Edmund Hennelly, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the 22nd General Conference of UNESCO (conference prior to U.S. announced intent to withdraw) reported to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees that the 1983 General Conference was the least politicised in recent memory; the UNESCO's communications sector was improved, noting that anyone looking for a reason to leave UNESCO would not find it in the communications programme adopted at the conference; that an appropriate distinction was made between traditional human rights and peoples rights; that the proposed budget for the years 1984 and 1985 was reduced by $10 million; that a resolution calling for a 'code of conduct' for transnational corporations was "reduced to a meaningless call for further study;" that the U.S. was elected to all five of the major UNESCO committees for which it was a candidate; and that the debate in most cases was largely free of polemics. Hennelly concluded with the statement that,

U.S. views were listened to with respect, our positions were recognised as legitimate, and our concerns were taken into account to a very large degree (Hennelly, 1984:177).
The U.S. National Commission at its Washington meeting, after the 22nd General Conference and prior to the U.S. announcement, voted (41 to 8) to approve a resolution urging the U.S. to remain within UNESCO (Mehan, 1984:125).

In addition to the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO two Reports to the Congress (February 1983 and 1984) concluded that none of UNESCO's activities posed any active, direct threat to a free press. The 1983 report stated,

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) is not, at this time, implementing any policy or procedure the effect of which is to license journalists or their publications, to censor or otherwise restrict the free flow of information within or among countries, or to impose mandatory codes of journalistic practice or ethics. Therefore, the Department perceives no grounds for withholding funding from the Organisation under the terms of Sections 109(a) and (b) of the Department of State Authorisation Act (1982-1983) (6,p.1), (Mehan, 1984:123).

Further to this, the U.S. State Department's U.S./UNESCO Policy Review released in February, 1984 came out with a quite positive judgment of the organisation's programmes. It concluded that,

On the whole, comments from the field are more positive about UNESCO performance, in terms of programme quality and effectiveness, than critical. UNESCO is covering a wide range of sensitive activities having long-term political and developmental importance and is discharging its development mandate fairly well (p.51) (Mehan, 1984:124-125).
As for budget reduction, in his letter responding to Shultz, dated January 18, 1984 Director-General M'Bow proposed to reduce the 1984-1985 budget, compared with that of the previous biennial period 1982-1983, by more than $56 million. At this same time the International Labour Organisation had increased its budget by 4 percent, the World Health Organisation by 12 percent, and the Food and Agriculture Organisation by 15 percent (Martelanc, 1984:120).

Since the U.S. indicated its intent to withdraw from UNESCO the agency has been engaged in an on-going reform process. The process, while not altering the policy objectives of the agency, has initiated a critical reevaluation of project and programme operation and management. Much of the reform emphasis has been placed on a rationalisation of programmes to meet budget constraints, constraints necessitated by the 30 percent loss of revenue. UNESCO has not abandoned its commitment to either a New World Information and Communication Order or peace and disarmament, two of its more controversial programmes (Major Programme III and XIII, 121 Session of the Executive Board). It is, not up to the Director General or the Executive Board to determine policy direction. It is as M'Bow stated in his reply to Secretary of State Shultz, the member states who decide on the lines of emphasis of the organisation's programmes and activities, and thus, up to them to respond to these particular criticisms (M'Bow, 1984:86).

The withdrawal by the U.S., the U.K. and Singapore has created a crisis situation within UNESCO. The loss of 30 percent of its revenue and the fear of further withdrawals motivated UNESCO to address the charges lodged by the U.S. and initiate reforms. However, despite the introduction of a reform
process, the pending retirement of the controversial Director-General, M'Bow, and the lack of support by its western allies, the United States and Britain have not reconsidered their position. This, coupled with the evidence which suggests that the conditions within UNESCO did not warrant the drastic measures taken by the U.S. and the U.K. raises various questions regarding the U.S. withdrawal: what motivated this action? what does the U.S. hope to achieve? and is it conceivable that UNESCO can accommodate U.S. interests?

It is my intent to address these questions through a critical evaluation of the UNESCO crisis, and in doing so attempt to demonstrate that the U.S. action which instigated this crisis is directly related to the communication activities of UNESCO. Further to this I will attempt to demonstrate that the UNESCO crisis is a manifestation of a contradiction inherent within the structure and function of the agency.

To facilitate my analysis of the UNESCO crisis I will draw on the theoretical work of the German state theorist Claus Offe. The utility of Offe's state theory lies in its power to illuminate the UNESCO crisis from the perspective of the capitalist state. Through this approach it is possible to establish the relationship between UNESCO and the advanced capitalist state. Specifically, Offe's approach allows for the clarification of the role of the United States in devising and designing UNESCO.

Although Offe does not directly address international institutions, his definition of the state allows for their inclusion within his analysis. According to Offe, the state is "a historically accumulated network of legal
and institutional formalisms covering and conditioning (almost) all of the processes and interactions that go in a society" (Carnoy, 1983:133)*. Those international bodies which were created by states and whose activities have real 'concrete' implications for states must be included as part of that "accumulated network of legal and institutional formalisms." These international structures cannot be abstracted from the state, but must be examined in terms of their relationship to the state.

To address the crisis in UNESCO it is necessary to establish the relationship, that is the economic, political and ideological linkages, between UNESCO and the United States. The structure and function of UNESCO, then, must be examined within the theoretical framework of the state in late capitalism. Offe's approach, which emphasises the administrative aspect of the capitalist state, allows for an analysis of UNESCO in terms of its function as an international apparatus of the state. The analytical tools which Offe provides for evaluating the activities of the capitalist state can, therefore, be applied to an evaluation of the activities within UNESCO.

Through the use of Offe's state theory, I have become sensitised to issues surrounding UNESCO which suggest that the conflict and current crisis within the agency are but manifestations of a contradiction intrinsic to its

* This reference is found in an unpublished article by Offe, 1976 "Laws of Motion of Reformist State Policies" (mimeo).
structure and function. This contradiction in UNESCO has become manifest within those activities specifically related to communication. It has emerged in the form of an ongoing conflict between the United States and the Third World states over access to and participation in communication structures. The current crisis in UNESCO, precipitated by the withdrawal of the U.S., demonstrates the inability of the agency to effectively respond to this conflict without heightening its own internal contradiction.

Offe's theory of the state in late capitalism is presented as merely one approach for examining the UNESCO crisis. I do not presume that this approach will answer all questions related to the crisis, but hope it will contribute to a more significant understanding of not only the crisis, but as well the relationship between the UN system and the advanced capitalist state.

This study is divided into four chapters. In chapter one I outline the fundamental tenets of Offe's theory of the state in late capitalism. Chapter two provides historical background on UNESCO, focusing on the role of the United States in the creation of the agency; the structure and function of UNESCO within the UN system; and the development and adaptation of the free flow of information principle within UNESCO's activities during the 1950s and 1960s. Chapter three presents an examination of the international relations of communication in an attempt to clarify both the position of the United States and that of the Third World states in the UNESCO conflict. Finally, in chapter four I outline the events within UNESCO during the 1970s and 1980s, drawing on the work of Offe to provide theoretical insight into the evolving conflict and resulting crisis.
CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: STATE THEORY

My objective in this chapter is to present a theory of the state in late capitalism. Based on the work of Claus Offe this chapter will identify the contradiction inherent within the state which restricts its effective and efficient management of advanced capitalist society. It is my position that the UNESCO crisis can be examined within the framework of state theory; that, in fact, the contradiction inherent in the structure and function of the state in late capitalism is evident within the structure and function of UNESCO. This chapter will begin with a brief introduction to the theoretical roots of state theory, to be followed with a detailed discussion of Offe's interpretation of the state in late capitalism.

A. The Theoretical Roots of State Theory

There has been a marked increase in the theoretical literature on the state since the 1970s, much of it in response to the problems currently confronting advanced capitalist society. Despite its contemporary frame of reference, state theory, in its various forms, is derived from Marxist fundamentals (Carnoy, 1984:45-46). It is commonly recognised that Marx did not offer a coherent theoretical analysis of the capitalist state. Rather, Marx's consideration of the state consists of a fragmented and unsystematic series of philosophical reflections, contemporary history, journalism and
incidental remarks (Carnoy, 1984:45). However, out of the 'fragmented and unsystematic series' of reflections, remarks and insights there is the basis for contemporary state theory analysis. Rather than attempt to discern the basis of state theory from the various works of Marx, I will simply present a summary of the 'fundamentals' as identified by Carnoy in his book The State and Political Theory.

Consistent with his historical materialist analysis, the state for Marx had to be located within an historical context, and subjugated to a materialist conception of history. Diverting from the Hegelian interpretation of the 'rational' state -- an external state, transcending society as an idealised collectivity -- Marx perceived the state not only within society, but determined by society. As society was shaped by the dominant mode of production and the relations of production, the form of the state was also influenced by these same forces.

Marx did not perceive the state as representing the collective will of the people, the common good, but rather as the political expression of the class structure inherent in the relations of production. Within the capitalist mode of production, the state became the political expression of the dominant class, the bourgeoisie. Marx viewed the bourgeois era as one in which civil society was split from political society, thus granting the state some life of its own separate from social power. Although he maintained that the state had its own particular interests, Marx continued to develop the notion of state as a class-bound institution. As Carnoy notes in his examination of the state and political theory,
According to Marx and Engels, the State arises out of the contradiction between the interest of an individual (or family) and the communal interest of all individuals. The community becomes the State apparently divorced from individual and community, but in fact based on connections with particular groups—under capitalism, with classes determined by the division of labour. All struggles within the State are 'merely the illusory forms in which the real struggles of the different classes are fought out among one another'—(Marx and Engels, 1964:78). The modern capitalist State is dominated by the bourgeoisie (Carnoy, 1984:48).

It is not to be inferred from this, however, that the organisation of the state is the result of a class-based conspiracy. The state, as an institution, evolves simultaneously with economic exploitation in order to mediate the contradictions between individuals and the community. As the community is dominated by the capitalist class, so too is the process of mediation by the state.

Another fundamental of Marx's theory of the state is that of the state as the repressive apparatus of the capitalist class. Expressed through armed force, judicial force and various coercive institutions, the repressive force of the state serves the interests of the capitalist class by maintaining an order that is functional to the economic dominance of that class. The state, however, cannot maintain order through repressive force alone. To ensure the acceptance of the state as a mediator of class antagonisms the repressive function must be balanced by a legitimation function. Within the capitalist system this function is performed by the democratic process. Through various democratic institutions the dominant class is able to create an illusion of mass participation in the operation of the state, without surrendering economic control.
The legitimate process compliments the repressive apparatus of the state and serves to ensure the reproduction of the relations between capital and labour in the production process. Within the capitalist structure, however, democracy has an ambiguous nature. On the one hand it contributes to the illusion of mass participation in the governing process, while on the other hand, it provides the means by which the masses can seize power. Marx recognised this when he noted that although the class character of society permeated every aspect of society, including democratic forms, it was not the forms that necessarily had class character. Rather it is the class conflict inherent in society that infuses the forms. According to the nature of class struggle those same forms could be a threat to bourgeois rule (Carnoy, 1984:51).

The autonomy of the state is yet another fundamental of Marx's theory, a fundamental that has been widely debated by contemporary Marxists. Carnoy identifies two levels of state autonomy as defined by Marx and Engels. In the first level the task of managing the political affairs of society is assigned by the bourgeoisie to a bureaucracy. The bureaucracy while not representing the bourgeoisie or individual capital, is subordinated to bourgeois society and bourgeois production. Although autonomous from the bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy is an institution which acts as an agent of the ruling class (Carnoy, 1984:54).

The second level of autonomy is achieved when the state is not dominated by any ruling class of civil society, when, in fact, the class struggle is 'frozen' by the inability of any class to exhibit its power over the state.
In this situation the state is not the instrument of the bourgeoisie, but continues to act in accordance with the class structure given its dependency upon the accumulation process (tax revenue) (Carnoy, 1984:55).

While introducing these various concepts and analytical assumptions, classical Marxist analysis does not develop a well formulated, coherent and sustained theoretical account of the capitalist state. It is this lack of clarity that has contributed to the diverse interpretations of the form and content of the state in the advanced capitalist society.

B. The State in Late Capitalism

There are various approaches one might adopt in undertaking a critical examination of the capitalist state. Rather than presenting a literature review of contemporary state theorists, this paper will focus on the work of Claus Offe. While adhering to the Marxist tradition, Offe is critical to two principle approaches in Marxist theory of the state, instrumentalism and structuralism.* Instrumentalism, which Offe refers to as 'influence theories' suggests that there is a "particular [instrumental] relationship between the ruling class (capital as a whole) on the one side and the state apparatus on the other side (his emphasis) (Offe and Ronge, 1975:139). This

* Offe's criticism of these two approaches is apparently in response to the works of Miliband (1973, Poulantzas (1974), and Domhoff (1967) (Carnoy, 1984:131; also see Editors' Note in Offe and Ronge, 1975:138).
approach ascribes direct control of the state to the capitalist class through the influence of corporations on the executive and legislative branches of government, regulatory agencies, the media and other social institutions (see Miliband's *The State in Capitalist Society*, 1969). The alternative view, which Offe identifies as "constraint theories", suggests that the state does not patronise certain interests, and is not allied with certain classes (Offe and Ronge, 1975:139). Rather what the state does protect and sanction is,

a set of rules and social relationships which are presupposed by the class rule of the capitalist class. The state does not defend the interests of one class, but the common interest of all members of a capitalist class society (their emphasis) (Offe and Ronge, 1975:139).

From this perspective the state is viewed as the preserver of a structure predetermined by a capitalist class society. As such, the activities of the state are determined or 'constrained' by the structure. In Offe's words, they (constraint theories) insist that there is factual evidence of a structural limitation to the possible courses of action, of the lack of sovereignty of political institutions and processes, and they point to the ineffectiveness of possible regulation and intervention measures (Offe, 1974:32). Both theories for Offe are inadequate as they deny the state any effective autonomy from the class structure of society. The influence theories which stress the strict instrumentalisation of the state apparatus in the service of accumulation interests, and the constraint theories, which structurally restricts the state from acting independent of capitalist class society, both present a perspective of the state which is class-bound. This perspective focuses on the external determinant of the state, robbing it of
any integrity and reducing it, more or less, to a neutral apparatus, an apparatus either controlled by class interests or at least reflecting class interests. Neither theoretical approach provides an adequate explanation of the class-character of the state (Offe, 1974:33).

Offe identifies two major problems with the notion of a class-bound state. His first objection refers to the confusion of empirical interest groups and the concept of class-interests. To adopt a class-bound interpretation one must assume that the particular interests and political strategies which constitute policy content do have a class-interest quality and are not simply the expression of particular and situation-bound special interests. Offe argues that because of the 'anarchy' of competition-geared capitalist production it is extremely unlikely that such a standardised concept of capitalist class-interest would emerge. The structural narrow-mindedness of individual capital prevents the development of a coherent and consistent class consciousness of the ruling class. Offe questions the possibility of the state functioning in the interest of the capitalist class, when that class is unaware of its class interest and acts in accordance with a 'false consciousness' based on a false perception of needs and interests, that is, based on the needs and interest of individual capital as compared to collective capital. Further to this, Offe points out that even policies which can be shown empirically to be functionally important for the conditions of capital accumulation "frequently cannot be genetically traced back to the interest-orientated influence of groups or authorities advocating them" (his emphasis) (Offe, 1974:34).
The second objection made by Offe relates to the concept of political power implied by influence and constraint theories. The assumption that capital has some form of control over the activities of the state (influence theories) or that the state functions in accordance with the class structure of society (constraint theories) implies the existence of a mechanistic power relationship. As Offe explains,

One can only have power over something which according to its own structure allows power to be exercised on it and responds to it, which for its part so to speak authorises the exercise of power. The sole relationship which is not bound by this condition of being complementary is that of direct physical force (Offe, 1974:35).

Therefore the assumption that the class-character of the state is class-bound rests on the assumption that there exists between the structures of the state and the production sector of society a minimum of reciprocity or complementarity. As Offe points out any proof of the capitalist, class-bound character of a state therefore stands or falls by whether it can uncover structural analogies between the state and capitalist economy (Offe, 1974:35). For this to be true the state would not only have to be structured analogously to capital, but at the same time would also have to be a structure which presents itself to the particular and narrow interests of individual capital. In order to do this the state would have to assume a supervisory position, as an alien and sovereign authority. It is only through the state becoming relatively autonomous in this way that the multiplicity of particular and situation-bound special interests can be integrated into a class-interest (Offe, 1974:35). However, this does not
provide any explanation as to how the political system is structured as to guarantee the interests of capital, or conversely, how it systematically excludes all opposing interests (Offe, 1974:36).

Offe's theory of the state in late capitalism avoids the confusion of special interests and class interests, and the mechanistic interpretation of power relationships by focusing on the internal aspect of the state. Offe seeks to explain the class-character of the state in terms of its internal organisation and operation, rather than in terms of external influences or constraints. He states,

the common interests of the ruling class are most accurately expressed in those legislative and administrative strategies of the state apparatus which are not initiated by articulated interests, that is 'from outside', but which arise from the state organisations' own routines and formal structures (his emphasis) (Offe, 1974:35).

The state apparatus is not manipulated nor restrained by class interests, but rather functions in accordance with its own class-specific selectiveness which corresponds to the interests of the process of accumulation (Offe, 1974:36). What guarantees the class-specific selectiveness of the state is its need to fulfill certain conditions in order to reproduce itself. Therefore, the state does not function in the interest of capital, rather it functions in the interests of its own institutional self-preservation.

By approaching state analysis from within, Offe adopts a political perspective which is capable of taking into consideration both the historical character within the social totality (see editors' notes, Offe and Ronge,
1975:137). By focusing on the internal condition of the state, Offe is able to demonstrate the way in which the institutional apparatuses, the bureaucratic organisations, and the formal and informal norms and codes emerge to regulate the public and private spheres of society. This approach stresses the relative autonomy of the state to the degree that bureaucracy becomes the 'independent' mediator of the class struggle inherent in the capitalist accumulation process (Carnoy, 1984:130). However, contrary to political theorists who maintain that 'mediating' role of the state has been a source of stabilisation and integration, Offe argues that it has been a source of dysfunction and crisis. The mediation of the contradictions of capital has led the state to expand its activities into areas previously managed by the private economic sphere. While this increased intervention into the economic sector may have been a necessary response to preserve the economic stability of the system, it has had the effect of exacerbating structural contradictions within the state which has ultimately led to fiscal crises and political and social conflict over state policy within late capitalist society (Editors' Notes, Offe and Ronge, 1975:138). By centering attention on the functions of the state and its relations to various actors in the political arena, Offe is able to identify the contradictions which arise from the various mediating roles of the state, making it the principle area of crisis and the place where the crisis is resolved or exacerbated (Carnoy, 1984:130).

The value of Offe's theory of the state to an analysis of the crisis in UNESCO exists at two interrelated levels. First it provides insight into the creation of UNESCO, identifying it as part of the 'historically
accumulated network of legal and institutional formalisms of the United States. Second, given this relationship between the U.S. and UNESCO, Offe's theory provides the analytical tools with which to critically evaluate the crisis, its foundation and its possible resolution.

C. Offe's Theory of the State in Late Capitalism

The concept of the capitalist state, according to Offe, describes an institutional form of political power which contains four major elements, elements which must be maintained if the state is to be preserved. First, political power is prohibited from organising production according to its own political criteria. It cannot order production nor control it. Production takes place in enterprises that are said to be free, in the sense that they are exempt from political control. Second, political power depends directly on the volume of private accumulation. The capitalist state is powerless unless the volume of the accumulation process allows it to derive the material resources (taxation) necessary to promote political ends. Third, since the state depends on a process of accumulation which is beyond its power to organise, it must realise its political power to promote those conditions most conducive to accumulation. This process results from an institutional self-interest of the state to preserve itself and not from an alliance with particular classes or pressure from classes with accumulation interests. The state must be interested in guaranteeing and safeguarding a healthy accumulation process upon which its power depends. Fourth, in democratic political regimes, political power is also dependent upon achieving and maintaining sufficient electoral support. To gain this support
the state must, through various institutional mechanisms, convey the image of an organisation of power that pursues common and general interests of society as a whole, allows equal access to the structures of power, and is responsive to justified demands. These mechanisms disguise the fact "that the material resources of state power, and the ways in which these are used, depends upon the revenues derived from the accumulation process, and not upon the preference of the general electorate" (Offe, 1975:125-127).

According to these four elements there is a dual determination of political power in the capitalist state. As Offe notes,

by its institutional form access to political power is determined through the rules of democratic and representative government, by its material content, the use of political power is controlled by the course and the further requirements of the accumulation process (Offe and Ronge, 1975:140).

This dual determination of political power represents, in fact, the dual function of the capitalist state. To maintain political power, thereby ensuring its continued existence, the capitalist state must simultaneously promote and preserve capital accumulation while remaining, or at least appearing to remain, legitimate to its citizenry. In order to do this the state must secure for every citizen participation in the commodity relationship. According to Offe,

As long as every owner of a unit of value can successfully exchange his/her value as a commodity, there is no need for the state to intervene in economic decision making; there is no lack of material resources needed by the state; there is no problem in maintaining a steady process of accumulation (which is only the net result of equivalent exchange between the owners of capital and the owners of labour power); and there is no problem in maintaining political support for a political party which manages to create this universe of commodities (Offe and Ronge, 1975:140).
The state cannot, however, guarantee this general equilibrium of the commodity form, for as Offe points out "the dynamics of capitalist development seems to exhibit a constant tendency to paralyze the commodity form of value" (Offe and Ronge, 1975:141). This tendency emerges from a contradiction inherent within the capitalist mode of production. Offe defines a contradiction as the tendency inherent to a specific mode of production to destroy those very preconditions on which its survival depends (Offe, 1975:246). Contradictions become manifest when,

a collision occurs between the constituent preconditions and the results of a specific mode of production, or where the necessary becomes impossible and the impossible becomes necessary (Offe, 1975:246).

Marxist analysis has identified various contradictions rooted in the capitalist mode of production. The law of the falling rate profit maintains that the introduction of labour-saving technical change while necessary for the accumulation process, in fact, undermines the process. This occurs through the decrease in the share of variable capital out of which surplus value, and hence, profit can solely be extracted. A related assumption is that of underconsumption, which maintains that while the reduction of wages is necessary to maximise profits it results in a decline in effective demand and subsequently in a decline in capitalist accumulation (Marx, Grundrisse, 1973). Yet another identifies anti-capitalist struggles undertaken by the working class as a direct consequence of the relations of production characteristic of the capitalist mode of production (Marx, Capital, 1962). These contradictions rooted in the mode of production have the effect of
displacing labour and/or capital, or in other words, throwing them out of the commodity form. The decline in the rate of profit will force uncompetitive capital out of the market; increase unemployment; require a further rationalisation of the production process which in turn dislocates, deskills and/or intensifies exploitation of living-labour; increases worker resistance which in turn will decrease profits, force increased rationalisation with a further dislocation of capital and labour (see Aglietta, 1979). The existence of these self-destructive tendencies does not guarantee any automatic 'break-down' or 'crisis' of the capitalist mode of production. The structural contradictions are not uniform throughout the history of capitalist development, but rather evolve within an historical process. Although they do become more pervasive as the accumulation process evolves their destructive and revolutionary potential can be controlled and kept latent, at least temporarily, by various adaptive mechanisms of the system.

Offe identifies three methods most commonly employed by the state to counteract the contradictions of capitalist development. The traditional strategy is one of 'inaction' on the part of the state. The rationale of this method lies in the anticipation that dislodged labour and capital will return to the market through the self-corrective mechanism within the system. This is based on the assumption that the owner of the exchange-seeking value, that is, the owner of labour or capital, will be forced either to lower the price, or to modify the good to increase its use-value and thus its demand. The logic of the self-corrective mechanism is dependent upon the belief that the owner of the displaced unit of value will
find unemployment unpleasant and will have no option but to reenter the marketplace. This method, however, overlooks the options of emigration, delinquency and political revolt (Offe, 1975:142).

The second mechanism is that characteristic of the welfare state -- subsidies and alimentation. This strategy ensures that owners of labour power and owners of capital who have been displaced from the exchange relationship are allowed to survive under conditions artificially created by the state. Their economic existence is preserved by state subsidisation, a procedure which is costly for the state as it diminishes, rather than increases, the basis of future state revenues (Offe and Ronge, 1975:142-143).

The third method of counteracting the tendency to paralyse the commodity form of exchanges identified by Offe is 'administrative recommodation'. It is this strategy which Offe argues is becoming "the more and more dominant, more and more exclusive strategy of the capitalist state" (Offe and Ronge, 1975:143). It differs from both the 'laissez faire' and 'welfare' techniques in that it creates the conditions under which values can function unsubsidised as commodities. Through specific public policy the state attempts to reorganise and maintain an environment which enhances the saleability of both labour and capital commodities. In effect, when the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production dislocates labour or capital, the state increasingly intercedes in a manner to ensure the recommodation of the displaced units of value.
There are three main areas in which the state actively intervenes to ensure the commodity form of exchange. They include measures to enhance the saleability of labour-power through education, retraining, regional mobility, etc.; measures to promote the marketability of capital and manufactured goods through internationalisation of capital and product markets, research and development, regional development policies, etc.; and support for market-generated and crisis-induced industrial restructuring rather than nationalisation and protection of weak industry (Jessop, 1982:110). Offe contends that the state cannot ensure the recommodification of the displaced units of value without sharpening its own internal contradictions between its accumulation and its legitimation function (Offe and Ronge, 1975:143).

The accumulation and legitimation functions of the capitalist state are rooted in the liberal and democratic traditions of western capitalist society. In his book, The Limits of Legitimacy, Wolfe identifies liberal democracy as "the symbolic political expression" of the two dichotomous imperatives of legitimation and accumulation (Wolfe, 1977:6-7). As Wolfe notes any important political theorist of the nineteenth century would have been puzzled by the expression liberal democracy.

As late as World War I, it was generally understood that there was one political tradition, liberalism with a unique set of ideas, a specific class to which it appealed, and appropriate historical traditions, and another tradition, democracy, with its own ideas, class, and history. One had to decide to which tradition he adhered, for it was extremely hard, if not impossible, to choose both (Wolfe, 1977:3).
Although the common usage of liberalism has come to indicate a belief in the welfare state, a political approach which stands in opposition to conservatism, classical liberalism is the ideology of bourgeois society. The writings of Hobbes, Locke and Smith became the basis of the liberal tradition which established a psychology and a politics requisite to a new order based on capitalist accumulation. Accordingly, Wolfe defines liberalism as the market-place ideology that emerged in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries to justify the capitalist mode of production. As he points out the opposite of a liberal is not a conservative, but defender of precapitalist social relations, on the one hand, and postcapitalist ones, on the other (Wolfe, 1977:4). The objective of the liberal state is: to facilitate the accumulation of capital by removing traditional obstacles to the market in labour power; to encourage a conception of man based on self-interest (individualism); and to create structures that facilitate control over the system by those with ability in economic affairs rather than social standing (Wolfe, 1977:4).

Democracy, according to Wolfe, was at one time a fairly thorough anticapitalist political ideology. Understood in its historical context, democracy, which stood for participation and equality, had a subversive quality. Consequently equality and participation in the political process in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was restricted in order to preserve the rigid class structure. Democracy was a political device reserved for the property owning class to ensure government responsibility. Macpherson identifies this rationale as the "protective case" for democracy (Macpherson, 1977:36). In this confined structure there was no obvious contradiction between liberalism and democracy. For the property class the free market
system with its class division was justified by its high level of material productivity, which they claimed maximised both economic and social welfare. The democratic process complemented the system by permitting those who controlled the economic structure to devise a compatible political and legal superstructure. Mechanisms such as elections allowed for the continual scrutiny of the governing structure to ensure this compatibility.

This early form of democracy which granted all property owners the means by which to protect their property and person posed no problem for liberal society. However, the contradiction between the objectives of liberalism and democracy emerged in the nineteenth century as the base of the democratic process was broadened in response to labour militancy. The expansion of formal political equality did not stem from any moral interpretation of equality and participation; rather the extension was a form of appeasement, a mechanism to defuse potentially volatile situations which threatened the production process. Through this concession, incorporating wage-labour into the political process, the contradiction between liberalism and democracy was introduced into the bourgeois state. It was a contradiction recognised by nineteenth century liberal theoreticians (most notably J.S. Mill) who were aware that there was no assurance that the working class, if granted the vote, would continue to support the bourgeois system (Carnoy, 1984:31).

The bourgeois fear of worker control and an overthrow of the capitalist system has never materialised. The contradiction between liberalism and
democracy has been submerged in what Wolfe terms as "the great compromise that has since come to be called liberal democracy" (Wolfe, 1977:8). Within the concept of 'liberal democracy', the traditional meaning of democracy has been modified. As Wolfe notes, democracy is no longer viewed as a subversive term, one that would make ruling classes shake, mostly because ruling classes adopted the term for their own use. In the West, democracy has come to mean bourgeois democracy; it is now defined, not by standards of participation and equality, but by the existence of certain formal political features such as elections, a constitution, and agreed-upon rules of political discourse. A system with a democratic structure is presumed to be democratic, whatever the degree of psychological health and equality experienced by its citizens (Wolfe, 1977:5-6).

However, the contradiction, although not manifest, remains. Liberalism as the ideological justification of accumulation denies the logic of democracy. Democracy as the political ideal advocating the maximum participation of all citizens "in order to create a community based upon mutual and respectful interaction of all toward commonly agreed-upon goals" denies the logic of liberalism (Wolfe, 1977:6-7). The two processes work toward contrasting goals. Consequently, as Wolfe points out, societies that proclaim themselves liberal democratic are in a sense announcing that they will be torn by conflict, replete with contradiction, under continuous pressure, and unable to face the future without substantial change (Wolfe, 1977:6). The conflict, contradictions, and pressures of the liberal-democratic system are becoming increasingly localised within the function of the state. In the advanced capitalist system as the contradictions inherent within the capitalist mode of production become more pervasive, both capital and labour, not to mention other sectors of society not directly involved in the production process yet
indirectly affected by it (seniors, students, the unemployed) are increasingly turning to the state for support. Consequently the state is being called upon to engage in the accumulation process to some degree, and to do so while taking into account the democratic desires of the citizen at large (Wolfe, 1977:6-7). The state, Offe argues, is incapable of fulfilling this task. It cannot intervene in the accumulation process in an efficient and effective manner without undermining its legitimation function.

The state is drawn into the accumulation process in response to the contradictions within the production process. While the state must intervene in support of the commodity form, it does not intervene as a regulator of the social process of development, nor in the general social interest of capital. As Offe points out the state must intervene to ensure its revenue source and hence its power base. It intervenes when the self-correcting mechanism fails to revive the production process. According to Offe the state intervenes as a 'reactive mediator' (Offe, 1975:133). In other words, the state does not intervene except in response to some fundamental crisis within the economic and social process of capital reproduction. The state is responding to contradictions within the mode of production which propels the system towards crisis and collapse. Offe provides a detailed analysis of the process by which the system tends towards crisis and collapse and the methods by which the state intervenes to develop countertendencies to preserve and to stimulate the commodity form of exchange.

The tendency for the rate of profit to decline is a consequence of the nature of the capitalist mode of production. The open-market structure of a
society, advocating the ideals of liberalism, supports and promotes competition among individual accumulating units. It is this competitive nature of capitalist accumulation which underlies the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. For an individual capital unit to survive it must extract surplus value, in other words, retain a profit from the production process. To ensure this profit it must protect its production process from the constant competitive pressures of other accumulating units. According to Offe,

Only those who are sufficiently immuned against the competitive pressure of the market (more specifically: the competitive pressure exercised on them by other accumulating units on goods markets, labour markets and capital markets) have a chance to continue their production/accumulation (Offe, 1975:131).

To preserve this production/accumulation individual enterprises must devise and deploy certain defensive mechanism. Such protective devices include labour-saving technology, price competition, advertising, product differentiation, market research, and cartelisation. However, once the mechanism becomes diffused and universalised it becomes 'dull and ineffective' resulting in a drop in profits and forcing individual accumulating units to either drop out of competition or to innovate, that is, adopt or devise additional protective measures. As Offe notes, a history of capitalist industrialisation could be written as a process in which competitive pressures force the development of defensive mechanisms which once universalised increases competitive pressure and further innovation of the production process (Offe, 1975:130-131). In this sequence Offe identifies
two levels. On the first level the dimension of countercompetitive or protective mechanisms remains unchanged throughout the sequence.

The events change, but the strategic dimensions by which the accumulating units keep themselves in the market remain identical over time. Innovation takes place within dimensions, (the dimension being, for example, the opening up of new markets, and the successive innovations being that one country after the other is made accessible to the market of a firm) (Offe, 1977:131).

The second level, Offe identifies as a 'meta-level' where innovation does not take place as an innovation within a dimension of competition and counter-competitive strategies, but as an innovation of the strategies by which accumulating units gain a relatively superior position vis-a-vis other accumulating units. The need to modify or significantly alter the strategies emerges as the protective devices of the initial level become exhausted. In other words, as innovations within established dimensions becomes over-exploited and ineffective, innovation of the dimension occurs, opening up new strategies of competition and new defensive mechanisms. Examples of a new dimension of competition includes opening a branch plant in a low-wage country, engaging in industrial espionage, bribing labour or government officials, or obtaining state support. The point to be made from this discussion is that at a certain point when the self-correcting mechanisms of market society can no longer renew the commodity form, new strategies emerge, and prominent among these strategies in the advanced capitalist system is state intervention.
Offe identifies two types of state activity: allocative and productive. Both activities are interventionist in so far as they "impose a certain order created by the state on an area of social and economic activity" (Offe, 1977:128). What distinguishes the two areas of intervention, however, is the method by which the state activity is designed. The allocative mode of activity creates and maintains the conditions of accumulation in a purely authoritative way. There is no element of production in this mode. The state simply allocates in an authoritative manner resources that are considered the property of the state (land, money, repressive force). Political power is the only criterion and determinant of allocation. In other words this strategy entails no process of policy making. The government of the day has the political power to allocate these resources at it sees fit (Offe, 1977:128).

In contrast the productive mode of state activity requires some physical input beyond the allocation of resources into production in order to maintain the accumulation process. Physical input is always needed in the form of human labour power, raw materials or fixed investment. Under normal circumstances these inputs are provided by the markets on which they appear as commodities. Within the advanced stages of capitalist development, however, the marketplace has, in many instances, been unable to guarantee the availability of input commodities.* When the individual accumulating units

* Offe identifies three factors which contribute to the failure of the market-place to provide these inputs: (1) the input commodities are so costly that individual capital cannot afford them; (2) there are risks and uncertainties involved which prevent the individual accumulation units investing in the input commodities; and (3) the technical nature of the input commodities involves externalities which prohibits the buyer of the input commodity from making exclusive use of the usefulness of the input good (Offe, 1975:130).
are unable or unwilling to provide the necessary physical input, the state responds to the situation by producing the material conditions that allow the continuation of accumulation. Input commodities produced by the state include education, skills, technological change, control over raw materials, health, transportation, housing, a structure of cities, physical environment, energy and communication services. All of these commodities function in some way to ensure the continuation of capital accumulation: the provision of an educated and skill labour force (as well as conditions to reproduce this labour); research and development to ensure technical innovation; necessary, yet costly, raw materials; an infrastructure to support the production process. In providing these inputs the state is not responding to demands from society, but rather to negative events such as the absence or disturbance of an accumulation process. In other words, the state is reacting to a manifest or, anticipated danger to the accumulation process. In such cases the state has no clear-cut course of action, but must devise decision rules or policies to avoid or deter any disturbance to the accumulation process. The state, however, is unable to generate a policy-making format capable of responding to these manifest or anticipated dangers to the accumulation process. This inability stems from the discrepancies between the functions attributed to the state as a capitalist state and its institutional mode of operation (Offe, 1975:135). To clarify this inability of the state to produce effective policy, it is necessary to clarify the process by which problems are identified and policies formulated.
Most studies of public policy focus on the content aspect of policy, analysing: the processes in the environment that lead to the recognition of certain problems as a matter of policy; the interests that determine the process of policy formation; and the material outcomes and distribution of tangible benefits resulting from policies. This approach sees the state as a 'problem-solver'. While not incorrect, Offe maintains that content analysis of public policy is incomplete and that an equally important step is an analysis of the formal procedures, or the institutionalised method of processing problematic state of affairs of the environment (Offe, 1975:134-135). When working on a problem, the state is involved in a dual process of organizing "certain activities and measures directed toward the environment" and adopting "a certain organisational procedure from which the production and implementation of policies emerges" (Offe, 1977:135). This means that the state must address itself to two problems simultaneously. It must deal with the problem issuing from the environment while dealing at the same time with its internal mode of operation; that is determining the best approach for solving the problem within the environment. The relationship between these two processes are interconnected in a circular way as Offe notes,

Social and economic problems, as items on the state agenda, may trigger off changes in the formal strategies according to which the state operates, and conversely these formal strategies may substantially determine both the ability of the state to perceive problems and the nature of the ensuing policies (Offe, 1975:135).
Consequently, the formal rules that give structure and continuity to the operation of the state apparatus are more than instrumental procedures designed to carry out or implement political goals or to solve social problems. They do, in fact, determine in a hidden and unexplicit way, what the potential goals are and what problems have the chance to come up on the agenda of the political system. In Offe's words,

it is not only true that the emergence of a social problem puts into motion the procedure dynamics of policy formation, program design, and implementation, but also, conversely, the institutionalised formal mode of operation of political institutions determines what potential issues are, how they are defined, what solutions are proposed, and so on (Offe, 1975:135).

The internal mode of state operation is vital to understanding the issues which emerge and the public policy produced to respond to these issues. Offe maintains that while the formal rules of the capitalist state and the problems inherent within the system are symmetrical in nature, there is a significant degree of discrepancy between the internal structure and the function of the state as a capitalist state. In other words, there is an imbalance in the relationship between the internal policy production rules and the functions relating to the accumulation process (Offe, 1975:135). The internal decision-making process while playing a significant role in identifying problems within the environment, is unable, given the contradictory function of the state, to produce adequate policy to address the problems. Offe maintains that there is not a mode of internal operation which can overcome the dichotomy of the liberal and democratic nature of the capitalist state. Subsequently, the policies emanating from the state lack
consistency in form and hence reflect the turmoil within the state as it attempts to grapple with the imbalance between its internal operations and the accumulation process.

D. Conclusion

The state in advanced capitalist society is characterised by contradictory elements. It is, according to Offe, defined by (a) its exclusion from accumulation; (b) its necessary function for accumulation; (c) its dependence upon accumulation; and (d) its need to conceal and deny (a), (b), and (c). Under the conditions of advanced capitalism the state, assuming a more active role in the accumulation process, experiences increased tension between its obligation to capital and its obligation to society as a whole. The contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production have drawn the state into a process which Offe identifies as administrative recommodification. While the administrative recommodification process allows the state to identify weaknesses in the commodity form of exchange, it fails to provide the state with a strategy capable of rectifying the problems and ensuring the maintenance of the system. Although Offe stresses that the structural weakness inherent in the commodity form of exchange and the policy process of the state does not imply any automatic tendency toward crises and collapse of capitalism, he does point out that it can "become the focus of social conflict and political struggle" within the system (Offe and Ronge, 1975:138).
My objective in this chapter was to provide a theoretical basis for a critical examination of the current tensions within UNESCO. Offe's theory of the state identifies fundamental contradictions inherent within both the capitalist mode of production and the subsequent form and content of the state which, if left unchecked, can result in social conflict and political struggle. The question to be addressed then is whether Offe's analysis of the dysfunction of the advanced capitalist state can provide any insight into the apparent dysfunction of UNESCO. In other words, is there evidence which would suggest that the tension with UNESCO is a result of conflicting obligations which has effectively paralysed its administrative process. If so, is it possible to conclude that there is no effective means of resolving the UNESCO crisis.

In attempting to discern a connection between the tensions in the advanced capitalist state and UNESCO it is necessary to note that UNESCO does not represent a replica of the structure and function of the capitalist state. Rather UNESCO represents a 'legal and institutional formalism' devised by the capitalism system within a particular historical conjuncture. Any attempt to apply a theory to the 'real' world must acknowledge and take into account the various determinants interacting at a particular time and place. The exercise is not undertaken to prove the validity of the theory, but rather to exploit the theory in order to gain a deeper understanding of the 'real' world. I do not presume that the use of Offe's theory of the state will lead to any profound statement on the outcome of the UNESCO crisis. Rather Offe's approach will, hopefully, provide theoretical tools with which to examine this particular conjuncture, elevating the analysis
beyond the 'level of appearances' to take into consideration the more
abstract determinations, such as power, tendencies and counter-tendencies,
that enter into the formation of this particular conjuncture.
CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

My purpose in this chapter is two-fold. First, I will examine the economic, political and ideological relationship between the United States and UNESCO through a review of the events which led to the creation of this UN agency. Second, I will attempt to uncover the roots of the UNESCO conflict and current crisis through an examination of related events both in and outside UNESCO during the 1950s and 1960s. In this chapter I hope to establish that the manner in which UNESCO was devised and designed, fulfilled a purpose related to the promotion and maintenance of the accumulation process of the United States. Within the process of identifying this link between UNESCO and the U.S., I hope to illustrate that UNESCO reflects the contradiction inherent within the form and function of the advanced capitalist state, and further that this contradiction has become manifest within the communication-related activities of the agency.

A. The Post-World War II International Environment

The United Nations Organisation, of which UNESCO is one of several specialised agencies, is very much a product of its time. It was designed
to fulfill a specific purpose in the postwar era, a purpose which it fulfilled quite adequately, if not successfully, until the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, the international environment has changed dramatically since the mid 1940s. This change is reflected, not only, in the functioning of the United Nations, but in many of its associated bodies and it has resulted in significant and apparently irreconcilable conflict. This is not to imply that the United Nations system is an outmoded institution. Rather, it is an institution created within a specific historical conjuncture, and as such, it maintains and reflects specific contradictions characteristic of that historical conjuncture. These contradictions remained latent within the structure as long as its environment remained consistent. A change in the international environment in the 1960s disrupted the original intent of the UN system and has resulted in heightening the contradictions inherent in its structure and function. To clarify the current conflict at the centre of the UNESCO crisis, it is necessary to first examine the international environment within which the agency emerged.

Prior to the Second World War the United States had maintained a policy of isolationism. The war marked a shift from this isolationist stance to one of internationalism. During the war the U.S. developed an unambiguous commitment to a more liberal international economic order (Krasner, 1977:656). In 1941 Roosevelt and Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter which called for equal access for trade and raw materials and full cooperation in the economic field. In 1942 the Mutual Aid Pact between Britain and the United States committed Britain to working toward an end to discriminatory trade practices (the Imperial Preference System). The idea for the
international economic structures agreed upon at Bretton Woods in 1944 originated in the U.S. Treasury Department in 1942. Two central instruments for international financial and monetary cooperation emerged from Bretton Woods: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The World Bank was to provide loans to assist postwar reconstruction, while the IMF was to be the regulator of currencies, preventing the disruption of exchange systems and the collapse of credit. In 1943, the U.S. initiated a project aimed at creating an International Trade Organisation (ITO). The objective of the U.S. in this attempt to reorganise the international economic structure was to encourage the development of international free-trade liberalism.

This endeavour to create a new international economic order was not, however, initially successful. The ITO was never brought to a vote by the American Congress.* The World Bank, funded a very modest level was unprepared for the task of postwar reconstruction. Its resources were nearly exhausted by the middle of 1947. As well, activity in the IMF rapidly dissipated after 1948. The reason for the near collapse of these postwar economic structures stemmed from the inability of the U.S. Administration to extract the financial resources necessary to sustain a liberal global order. As Krasner notes in his article on postwar U.S.

* The ITO sought to regulate commodity agreements and to make allowances for the weaker partners in the international economic system. Also, it would have allowed states to keep exchange controls and continue inflationary policies to avoid the recessions that might attend a return to full convertibility. According to Maier, U.S. business critics felt it had the disadvantage of committing the United States to free trade while allow escape clauses for less robust countries (Maier, 1978:39).
economic policy, international commercial and monetary policy was constrained by domestic political considerations in the U.S.

These constraints reflected the active role by Congress and Congress' sensitivity to the values of its members and to particularistic pressures. While central decision makers were committed to an open international system, many societal groups were not. A liberal order could not be established without the appropriation of funds. These funds were necessary to try to restore convertibility in international exchange markets, to coerce or entice European colonial powers to give up their system of Imperial Preferences as well as to enable reconstruction. The appropriation of funds required the approval of Congress. And many Congressmen did not share the goals and visions of central decision makers (Krasner, 1977:657-658).

Strong opposition to the Administration's liberal approach came from the midwest Republican isolationists. This opposition became a powerful force in 1946 when the Republicans won control of Congress. In order to extract the necessary funds the U.S. Administration had to alter its strategy. It dropped the free-trade liberalism image and adopted, in its place, an anti-communism image. This shift in strategy reflected the growing concern of communist expansion in Europe and hence, became an invaluable device for extracting funds for European reconstruction. As Krasner writes,

American leaders were not naive anti-communists. Many had a grasp of the realist view of international politics. But they felt that only by shocking the American people could they get the resources that they needed. The only sentiments strong enough to give such a jolt was anti-Communism. Truman harped on the theme in his presentation of the Truman Doctrine to Congress. The Marshall plan was also explicited in terms of a global struggle with an implacable and malevolent enemy (Krasner, 1977:659).
The strategy was effective. The World Bank rebounded and by 1953 it had made $1.2 billion in disbursements to Europe. Activity in the IMF picked up and by the end of 1958, convertibility had been restored for all major currencies (Krasner, 1977:660).

Although the U.S. Administration encountered domestic resistance to its new international economic structure, internationally, it was unrestricted in dictating the form and function of these global institutions. As Wolfe notes,

As part of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the United States demanded, in opposition to the British and Soviets, that all member states... would conduct their trade in conformity with the basic capitalist commercial standards (Wolfe, 1977:217).

This capitalist structure of the IMF and the World Bank were ensured by both membership and voting procedures. Although the bodies were open to all states, the Soviet Union did not join and after 1949 mainland China was not represented. With the voting system weighted according to contribution, the United States, as the major contributor, consequently retained (and continues to retain) a strong influence over the operation of the World Bank and the IMF.

Although the ITO had failed to emerge beyond the post-draft stage, a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed in 1948 and became the most important postwar institution dealing with commercial practices. This is not
meant to imply that GATT was uncontested by domestic forces. In fact, each time the Trade Agreements Act was renewed between 1948 and 1958, it touched off a domestic political struggle in the U.S. GATT succeeded, however, where the ITO failed because GATT was based on an Executive agreement rather than a treaty of a Congressional-Executive agreement. As well, it was an institution in need of few resources, thereby, not requiring the Administration to return to Congress for funding (Krasner, 1977:657).

Despite the domestic opposition, American foreign economic policy during the 1940s and 1950s was successful in promoting a liberal economic international system. However, as Krasner notes, the precondition for this success was both America's unchallenged international position in the non-communist world, and the decision to define U.S. aims in anti-communist terms (Krasner, 1977:661-662). Before proceeding on to an examination of the emergence of the United Nations system within this international environment, it is necessary to account for the dramatic shift of the United States from prewar protectionism to postwar international free-trade liberalism.

With the economies of all of the other major industrial states severely strained or destroyed by the Second World War, the United States emerged in a position of unprecedented international power (Krasner, 1977:636). Rather than 'strained' or 'destroyed', the U.S. economy was, in fact, strengthened by the war. The war had, not only, brought about an end to the depression of the 1930s, but it had expanded the productive capabilities of American industry. The advancements made in wartime technology, most notably electronic technology, were readily adaptable to peace-time industrial and
consumer production. In order to sustain the high levels of productivity after the war the U.S. required access to international markets and resources. While domestic demand for consumer durables (cars, televisions, household appliances, etc.) pent-up by the depression and the war provided a ready and accessible market, it was not large enough to sustain and expand American productivity in the long-term. The task facing the American state in the postwar period "was to fine tune aggregate demand to keep the economy running at full throttle" (Laxer, 1983:78). The reconstruction of Europe and Japan was one way to ensure aggregate economic expansion.

The European Recovery Programme served the interest of the American accumulation process in two interrelated ways. First, it reduced or eliminated the barriers to the movement of goods, services, technology and capital across international boundaries. The U.S. was in a position where it could furnish the war devastated economies with goods and services and between the late 1940s and the early 1950s Washington provided more than $20 billion in assistance. In return, however, the U.S. demanded policy compliance in the form of free-trade liberalism. Second, rather than merely relieving war debts, this assistance restored the capital accumulation process, providing the U.S. with not only markets for industrial and consumer goods, but as well, for capital investment. The purpose of this policy of productivity was to restore the commodity form of exchange to Europe and Japan within an international environment of free-trade liberalism. As Maier notes this policy of productivity was necessary in order to release the U.S. of assistance obligations,
Without capital formation, American aid might ease immediate balance-of-payment crises but would have to continue indefinitely, whereas the premise of the Marshall Plan as presented to Congress was that after four years Europe's self-sufficiency would be restored (Maier, 1978:45).

The success of this policy of productivity can be judged, Maier notes, by the fact that the 1950s and the 1960s turned out to be periods of unparalleled growth and capital formation for Europe and Japan (Maier, 1978:45). As for the United States, Krasner reports that,

During the 1950s, growing international trade and investment made the benefits of a liberal order a reality or an immediate promise for American business rather than a long-term and uncertain vision (Krasner, 1977:638).

B. The Structure and Function of UNESCO

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) is one of the several specialised agencies of the United Nations. Although as a specialised agency it has a significant degree of autonomy from the UN General Assembly, its structure and function must conform to the general principles outlined in the UN Charter. Therefore, any examination of the formation of UNESCO must be placed within the broader context of the founding of the United Nations organisation.

The international environment within which the United Nations emerged was one characterised by the efforts of the American state to construct a new
international economic order. The United Nations system became an important component in the organising and stabilising of this new 'order'. It was at Bretton Woods where the idea of a new international political institution was formulated. It had become clear to the central decision makers of the American state that international cooperation was essential to the "dream of a world-wide capitalist economy" (Wolfe, 1977:216). It was generally considered that in order to safeguard the operation of the World Bank and the IMF a compatible political structure had to be set in place. However, unlike the establishment of the World Bank and the IMF the United States was unable to dictate the form and function of the international political structure.

If an international political institution is to be effective, it must be regarded as legitimate. In other words, it has to be universally accepted. This, however, posed a problem, a problem which is also encountered at the state level, that of attempting to create a political unit to secure certain benefits for a particular group or class while remaining acceptable to the citizenry as a whole. As Wolfe notes;

When transnational political units are created, they are likely to face many of the same problems faced by national political units. On the one hand, their purpose is to preserve a structure in which some benefit from a particular economic system more than others, even though the system in this case is world-wide. On the other hand, that structure can be preserved only if all participants adhere to it, which they are likely to do only if they perceive its decisions as legitimate (Wolfe, 1977:215).

It was recognised that the existence of an international economic order required some sort of mediator. As the economic institutions at the international level were to function according to the basic capitalist
commercial standards, the United States maintained that the form and content of the political institution should reflect the compatible political principles. Consequently the initial design submitted by the U.S. was based on the classical liberal view of the state: a minimal transnational state that adjudicates among world powers by persuasion and, as a last resort, coercion (Wolfe, 1977:219). This plan, however, encountered opposition both internationally and domestically within the U.S. Internationally, the Soviets favoured a power-bloc approach which would facilitate meetings "among those who ruled the world so that their rule could continue" (Wolfe, 1977:218). Britain and France also opposed the plan recognising the self-interest behind the rhetoric of laissez-faire. They realised within such a structure they would be giving up sovereignty to an international body which could be dominated by one sovereign power (Wolfe, 1977:218).

Domestically, it was, once again, the midwest Republican isolationists who condemned the liberal model. This model, they argue, placed enormous faith in the ability of the United States to win all the struggles in a neutral organisation without "rigging the rules" (Wolfe, 1977:218-219). The Republicans maintained that "if the Soviets were as ruthless as was claimed they would rig the rules, and the only hope of America was to beat them at it" (Wolfe, 1977:219). It was the strength of the Republican position coupled with the fear of communist expansion which led the Administration to discard the classical liberal strategy in favour of an anti-communist approach. In rejecting the classical liberal model the U.S. Administration was not abandoning its mission of international liberalism, but rather subsuming it under the domestically more acceptable banner of anti-communism which ensured a United Nations structured roughly along the
lines of Stalin's idea of power-bloc cooperation (Wolfe, 1977:219). The liberal model, however, was not totally discarded. Rather it was modified to include a Security Council and the 'Great Power' veto. The old liberal dream of a 'Parliament of Man' was maintained in the form of the General Assembly. This combination of Security Council and General Assembly was necessary to ensure the universal legitimacy of the organisation.

Securing universal acceptance of the United Nations was essential to the United States for more than simply economic reasons. International cooperation was vital to the general well-being and productivity of all states. In other words, the U.S. was motivated, not only by economic self-interest, but as well ideologically by the vision of universal "peace and prosperity flowing from a free and open international economic system" (Krasner 1977:637). This image of universal peace and prosperity is strongly reflected within the structure and function of the UN system. The aim of the United Nations as stated in its Charter is:

- to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war;
- to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small;
- to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained;
- to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.

To fulfill the objectives of the United Nations, six principal organs were established: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC), a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat. Representation varied according to each organ. As the UN is based on the principle of the "sovereign equality of all its Members" (UN Charter, Article 2:1), the General Assembly consists of all the members of the UN. Admission to the UN is granted by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The Security Council consists of 15 members of the UN, five of which are permanent members: China, France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States. The non-permanent members are elected for a term of two years. ECOSOC consists of 54 members; every year 18 members are elected for a term of three years. Representation on the Trusteeship Council consists of those members administering trust territories, members of the Security Council and members from the General Assembly elected for a three year term. The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the UN and each member undertakes to comply with the decisions of this court in any case to which it is a party. The Secretariat consists of a Secretary-General and such staff as the UN may require.

Voting procedures in the General Assembly, the Security Council, ECOSOC and the Trusteeship Council are based on one member, one vote. In ECOSOC and the Trusteeship Council decisions are made on a majority of the members present and voting. In the General Assembly decisions on important questions* are made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

* Important questions include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of ECOSOC and the Trusteeship Council, the admission of new members to the UN, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions (UN Charter, Article 18:2).
voting. Decisions on all other questions are made by a majority of the members present and voting. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of nine members. Decisions on all other matters are made by affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members.

The United Nations is financed by assessments made each year by the General Assembly, based primarily on each member state's ability to pay (upper and lower limits are set). As the organisation does not have the power to tax or coerce, members undertake an obligation to pay their assessments, which are actually akin to contributions. While the UN began on a rather modest budget of $19.4 million in 1946, it has increased dramatically during the past 10 years from around $270 million in 1976 to over $800 million in 1986. Withholding contributions can severely cripple the operation of the Organisation. In 1964 the Soviet Union and France provoked a 'financial crisis' by failing to meet their assessments of the special peace-keeping budgets for the 1956 Middle East and the 1960 Congo crises (Grieves, 1977:296). Currently the UN is said to be confronting a "destructive" financial crisis "largely because the United States has chopped its contribution in half" (The Ottawa Citizen, 1986: A7). The U.S. is the largest contributor with an assessment of 25 percent of the total UN budget. The only recourse the organisation can take in reaction to members failing to pay their assessment is to invoke Article 19 which requires that states two or more years in arrears automatically lose their vote in the General Assembly.

UNESCO is one of 15 specialised agencies associated with the United Nations. Many of the specialised agencies were in existence long before the
United Nations was established. All specialised agencies operate under the auspices of ECOSOC which in turn operates under the authority of the General Assembly. ECOSOC was established in response to Article 55 of the UN charter which called for,

the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people...

The activities of ECOSOC and the specialised agencies, therefore, are generally related to:

. the promotion of higher standards of living,
. solutions to economic, social, health, and related problems,
. cooperation in educational and cultural matters,
. respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The constitution of UNESCO was adopted in London, the 16 November 1945. The purpose of the organisation is,

to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion... (UNESCO Constitution, Article 1:1).

To fulfill this obligation UNESCO is to,

. collaborate in the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples, through all means of mass communications and to that end recommend such international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image;
give fresh impulse to popular education and to the spread of
culture;

maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge (UNESCO
Constitution, Article I:2 (a)(b)(c)).

UNESCO fulfills its mandate through the function of three major organs:
the General Conference, the Executive Board and the Secretariat. The General
Conference consists of representatives of all member states and meets every
two years. The primary task of the General Conference is to determine the
policies and the main lines of work of the organisation. As well it
makes decisions on all programmes submitted to it by the Executive Board.
The Executive Board consists of 51 members elected by the General Conference
for a two year period. The Executive Board prepares the agenda for the
General Conference; examines programme and corresponding budget estimates
submitted by the Director-General; and executes programmes approved by the
General Conference. The Executive Board meets twice a year. The Secretariat
consists of the Director-General and support staff. The Director-General is
nominated by the Executive Board and appointed by the General Conference for
a term of six years.

As a specialised agency UNESCO has a certain degree of autonomy from
ECOSOC, based upon a membership and budget distinct from that of the General
Assembly. Although membership in the UN carries with it the right to
membership in UNESCO, states which are not members of the General Assembly
may be admitted to UNESCO upon recommendation by the Executive Board and by a
two-thirds majority vote of the General Conference. The voting process in
UNESCO was originally based on a one vote per state format, with decisions
made by a simple majority or two-thirds majority for important questions relating to international agreements. However since 1976 all major decisions in UNESCO require consensus (UNESCO Constitution, Article IV:8(a)).

Financial support for UNESCO's operations comes from two sources: budgetary and extra-budgetary. UNESCO's budget is based upon assessments made by the General Conference, and like the UN reflects the state's ability to pay (upper and lower limits are established). Until its withdrawal from the organisation the U.S. was the largest contributor at 25 percent of UNESCO's total budget. The extra-budgetary source of funding comes from the World Bank, another specialised agency of the UN, and the United Nations Development Programmes, a programme which reports to the General Assembly. Although its membership and financial base grants UNESCO a degree of independence from ECOSOC and the General Assembly, it is an organisation affiliated with the United Nations, and as such its programmes and projects must remain consistent with the general objective of the UN.

This brief outline of the structure and function of UNESCO and the UN system may be used to demonstrate the degree to which the international political system became imbued with the ideals of liberal democracy. The UN organisation and its associated bodies were designed to support the new international economic order. This transnational political structure was to ensure 'peace and security', or in other words a stable international environment which would allow for the uninterrupted flow of goods and services across territorial boundaries. The fact that the World Bank is a specialised agency of the UN illustrates the degree to which the UN system was to function in the interests of this new economic order. While the U.S.
could dictate the form and function of the new economic institutions, it could not coerce support for the political institutions. It had to gain support by designing a structure which would grant all states equal participation in the management of this new international system, with the notable exceptions of the Security Council and World Bank. It is the universal and democratic nature of the UN system which made it a legitimate international organisation. This legitimacy was essential to the American vision of a new international economic order founded upon free-trade liberalism.

Within this new international system UNESCO had a vital role to play. The stability of the international environment required international cooperation. International cooperation was dependent upon the ability of states and people to communicate. The development of the means of communication between states and between their peoples became the primary objective of UNESCO. The Preamble to its constitution states:

the States Parties to the Constitution, believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives (my emphasis) (UNESCO Constitution, Preamble).

Without structures of communication there could be no means of promoting 'collaboration' among nations in the areas of education, science and culture. However, apart from this, UNESCO had a function directly related to the new international economic order. It was to promote the 'free flow of ideas by word and image'. In other words it was to contribute to the
exchange of a commodity, the free trade of information. It is this particular role of UNESCO which is at the centre of the present crisis. To understand the relationship between its communication function and the crisis, it is necessary to examine the communication-related activities in UNESCO prior to the period of open conflict in the 1970s. This examination, however, must be placed within the broader context of an examination of the changes within the international environment during this period.

C. **UNESCO and the Free Flow of Information**

The free flow of information or freedom of information has been the subject of debate within the United Nations since its founding. During the drafting of the UN Charter, it was suggested by some delegates that the Charter include an elaborate declaration on human rights with the freedom of information recognised as a fundamental freedom. Some states, however, viewed this as international intervention into an area of national concern, that of mass communication. It was decided, therefore, that the Charter include a general obligation for members "to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organisation" to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion" (Ta Kung Wei, 1970:88). This action, however, served only to obfuscate the issue. The UN was still left with the problem of defining freedom of information and as human rights and fundamental freedoms are mentioned seven times within the Charter, the organisation was prompted to take some action. At the first session of the General Assembly freedom of information was declared as,
a fundamental human right, the touchstone of all the freedoms
to which the United Nations is consecrated ... an essential
factor in any serious effort to promote the peace and
progress of the world (Ta Kung Wei, 1970:89).

While this statement gave prominence to the freedom of information it did not
provide any clarification of the concept. To this end a United Nations
Conference on Freedom of Information was convened in March, 1948.
Representatives from 54 governments gather in Geneva to draw up a policy for
the United Nations in the field of information. Three draft conventions were
submitted to the General Assembly for further consideration: a convention on
freedom of information a convention on access to information and its
transmission from country to country; and a convention on the international
right of correction. However, after further discussion in ECOSOC and the
General Assembly, agreement was reached only on the right of correction.*

In 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was drawn up.
Although it dictates only moral principles, this declaration was proclaimed
by the General Assembly as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples
and all nations" (Ta Kung Wei, 1970:89). Article 19 of the Declaration
defines freedom of information as the

... right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers (Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Article 19).

* A convention on the right of correction was opened for signature in
1952. Adherence however, was slow and the convention did not enter into
force until 1962 and has so far been ratified only by a few countries
Although accepted by the General Assembly, this declaration was not acceptable to all states. The issue of gathering and disseminating information, remained for many states a national, rather than an international, concern. Despite this conflict, the UN continued throughout the 1950s to find an acceptable interpretation of the concept. In 1960 ECOSOC adopted a draft Declaration of Freedom of Information. This declaration which is merely an expansion of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has never been approved by the General Assembly. In 1973 partial approval was given to a Draft Convention on Freedom of Information. However, no further work has been done on this draft convention (Ploman, 1982:128).

While the concept of freedom of information was being debated within the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC, those agencies which engage in communication-related activities were proceeding in a pragmatic manner to evaluate the freedom of information. UNESCO, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the Universal Postal Union (UPU) conducted numerous studies regarding,

- the production and distribution of newsprint,
- postal and transport service,
- telecommunications press rates and facilities,
- radio broadcasting tariff and trade practices,
- copyright,
- access to news sources,
- status of foreign correspondents,
censorship on outgoing news despatches,

professional training and standards,

independence of news personnel and similar problems,
(Ta Kung Wei, 1970:88).

These specialised agencies did not engage in the ideological debate surrounding the freedom of information. It was within their mandates to facilitate the free flow of information. It was this practical application of freedom of information which dictated their activities during the 1950s and 1960s. While the obligation of the ITU and UPU to communications was obvious and of a more technical nature, UNESCO's obligation was somewhat obscure and, therefore, highly interpretive. In 1948 Rene Maheu* a UNESCO press counselor attempted to define the purpose of UNESCO's Division of Mass Communication,

... it is neither its aim nor its duty to develop and extend the press, radio, and films as such. UNESCO will use these media as channel to bring education, science and culture in the broadest sense of the words to the peoples of the world, striving to promote mutual understanding and knowledge of each other's lives (Maheu, 1948:157; footnote in Knight, 1970:219).

Although this indicates that it was not UNESCO's intent to develop the communication infrastructure, it soon became apparent that the agency could not facilitate the exchange of education, science and culture without contributing to the development of channels of communication. The two tasks became inseparable.

* Rene Maheu served as Director-General of UNESCO from 1962 to 1974.
In its first five years UNESCO set about to discover the technical, legislative and educational needs of the mass communication media in 126 countries. It was the findings of this study which provided the framework for UNESCO’s communication activities during the 1950s and 1960s. The project,

- identified shortages of communication-related resources such as newsprint,
- demonstrated the need for journalism education,
- identified the educational possibilities of audio and visual media,
- identified the need for international cooperation in the area of mass communications media,
- recommended governments recognise and help solve their own communications problems,
- produced numerous studies resulting from the original documentation of the project (Knight, 1970:220).

During the 1950s and 1960s UNESCO’s involvement in the development of communication to facilitate the exchange of educational, scientific and cultural goods included:

- the publication of a series of booklets under the title of Press, Film and Radio in the World Today focusing on the need of professional training of journalists and the role of radio and film in the educational process (published between 1949 and 1961).
- the drafting of agreements which exempt from customs duties such items as books, newspapers, periodicals, audio-visual materials, works of art, collectors’ pieces and scientific equipment. One is the Florence Agreement, proposed in 1950 and ratified in 1952 and the other, the Beirut Agreement, proposed in 1948 and ratified in 1954.
the sponsoring of the Universal Copyright Convention of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisation (dated 1961 and ratified 1964). This was to protect authors and performers while attempting to maintain a free flow of materials.

the publication of books dealing with the free flow of information during the 1950s: Transmitting World News, 1953 by Francis Williams; The Problems of Transmitting Press Messages, 1956, produced by UNESCO in cooperation with the ITU; Broadcasting Without Barriers, 1959, by George A. Coddington, Jr.; and Legislation for Press, Film and Radio, 1951, by Fernand Terrou and Lucien Solal, which included guidance for the revision of domestic laws to promote freedom of information.

the promotion of series of monographs entitled Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, many of which were practical reports outlining successful models of communication media used for a given purpose (education and rural development) or detailing the media needs in certain regions.

the establishment of four training centres for journalism: Centre for Higher Education in Journalism opened in 1957 at Strasbourg; another for Latin America in Quito in 1959; Centre for Studies in Mass Communication Sciences and Techniques at the University of Dakar, Senegal in 1965; and the Institute of Mass Communication at the University of the Philippines in Manila in 1965.

the establishment of international and regional organisations: the International Association for Mass Communication Research (1957); the International Council for Film and Television (1959); the Educational Film Institute for Latin America (1956); the South and East Asia Association of Journalism Educators (1961); and the Union of African News Agencies (1963).

a study of needs of 'underdeveloped' countries in the area of information media.

development of communication infrastructure in specific countries through extra-budgetary funding (World Bank and UNDP).

participation in space communication meetings conducted at the international level, most of them originated by the United Nations or its agencies;

the development of a world-wide literacy campaign.
All of these activities demonstrate the pragmatic approach adopted by UNESCO. UNESCO did not attempt to clarify the concept of freedom of information. It merely proceeded, during the 1950s and 1960s, in a manner which assumed the universal acceptance of the concept. To understand why UNESCO was unhampered in its practical application of freedom of information, while the major organs of the UN were unable to clarify the concept, it is necessary to remember that UNESCO and the UN maintain memberships independent of each other. Although the 51-member UN was dominated by the United States and its allies, the Soviet Union was an active force within the organisation. Not only did it have a veto in the Security Council, but it retained three votes in the General Assembly.* Its position was strengthened during the 1950s with its expansion into Eastern Europe and the inclusion of these states into the UN. Although significantly outnumbered, Soviet influence was able to prevent any unanimous acceptance of the freedom of information. In UNESCO, however, the Soviet Union was not involved in either the formation of the agency or its early policy-making years. In 1942 the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME) was organised by the eight ministers or acting ministers of education from Allied governments based in the U.K. CAME was created to address the problem of the reconstruction of educational systems following the anticipated end of the war. In 1943 both the United States and the Soviet Union participated in CAME as observers. Although the United States became a formal member in 1944, the Soviet Union, hesitant about participating in an organisation whose focus on education

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* The Ukraine and Byelorussia were granted independent membership within the UN in 1946.
could entail a "scrutiny of subject matter introduced in curricula of national schools," never joined (Sewell, 1975:62). When CAME was replaced by UNESCO, the Soviet Union did not participate in the drawing-up of the constitution, and did not become a member of the agency until April, 1954.

In the absence of Soviet participation there was no serious debate over the form and function of UNESCO. The agency was openly structured according to the ideals of liberal-democracy. By the time the Soviet Union became a member of UNESCO the principles of liberal-democracy had been firmly established in UNESCO's general policy. Why the Soviet Union chose to join the agency can only be speculated upon. There are probably various factors which influenced Soviet action, including the death of Stalin in 1953. Other factors which should be noted include American disaffection with UNESCO over the Korea issue,* the strong endorsement of Soviet membership by India, as well as the fact that Soviet membership came in a period characterised by decolonisation process in Africa and Asia.

Soviet involvement had little immediate impact upon the practical application on the freedom of information. In fact, it should be noted that the Soviet Union actively endorsed UNESCO's free flow of information activities under the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Programme, offering funds and technical experts to Third World states (Laves and Thomson, 1958:335). The entry of the Soviet Union into UNESCO did not

* American 'dissatisfaction' with UNESCO stemmed from the lack of UNESCO support for the Korean campaign. The U.S. had expected UNESCO not only to openly endorse UN involvement, but to become actively involved itself through the publication of material condemning communist expansion. UNESCO agreed only to aid refugees and reconstruction after the war (Sewell, 1975:149).
disrupt or alter the general policy direction of the agency. Rather its support of UNESCO's mass communication activities served to extend its influence to areas previously preserved for the western capitalist states. Soviet membership represented a challenge to the hegemony of the U.S., not a challenge to the free flow of information policy. It was not until after the membership increase, brought about by the first wave of newly independent African states, that the free flow of information policy was challenged with Soviet support.

To understand how the entry of these Third World states threatened the free flow of information policy, it is necessary to examine the changes taking place in the international environment, outside of UNESCO. The challenge to UNESCO's general policy on freedom of information emerged from an attempt by Asian and African states to avoid being drawn into the 'Cold War' hostilities between the Americans and Soviets. It had become apparent to the emerging Asian and African states that their attempt to address national problems through international support was conditioned by Cold War tensions. As one report notes,

They could only expect material assistance from the central powers in exchange for this or that position, for a yes or no vote at some U.N. meeting, or for proclaiming support for or rejection of a certain international policy (NACLA Report, 1982:9).

In response to this situation, India, under the leadership of Jawaharla Nehru, attempted to lessen Third World dependency on the power blocs by coordinating forms of contact and cooperation between Asian and African states. The initial step in this direction was the 1955 Asian-African
conference in Bandung, Indonesia. At this conference a resolution was passed to promote cultural cooperation between the two continents. Included among the recommendations was the exchange of knowledge, culture and information. The Bandung Conference represents the prelude to the creation of the Nonaligned Movement (NACLA Report, 1982:9). The formal establishment of the Nonaligned Movement did not occur until September, 1961. That month the First Conference of Heads of State or Governments of Nonaligned Nations was held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. It was attended by 25 member states, along with 35 delegates of national liberation movements, parties and other movements. They were representing approximately 750 million people on five continents (NACLA Report, 1982:11).

The impact of this mutual solidarity of the newly independent states was almost immediate within both UNESCO and the United Nations General Assembly. Membership in the General Assembly had nearly doubled by 1960 from 51 to 98. In UNESCO it had more than doubled during this 15-year period from 44 to 94. Attention became focused on the needs and the demands of the Third World states. One of the primary demands of these states called for improvement in communication systems. The UN and UNESCO responded with various resolutions programmes and projects dealing with information and communications during the 1960s, the UN 'Development Decade'.

- in 1961 ECOSOC passed a resolution calling for national development and international cooperation in the information field, in favour of the 'underdeveloped' countries.

- in 1962 the UN General Assembly called for an end to the communications deficiencies in the 'underdeveloped' countries and for the organisation of international aid for this purpose.
in 1960 UNESCO sponsored a meeting to develop the media in Asia and the Far East; in 1963 the Organisation of Press Agencies in Asia was created. In Africa, delegates of 29 countries met in 1963 and recommended the creation of an African news agency. In Latin America the first regional meeting on news agencies was held in Chile in 1961.

UNESCO conducted a study to evaluate information media in 'underdeveloped' countries. The study was conducted primarily through three meetings: Bangkok, January, 1960, for Asia; Santiago, Chile, February, 1961, for Latin American; and Paris, January, 1962, for Africa.

in 1964 UNESCO launched a six-year pilot project in Senegal on the application of audiovisual material and other media for adult education.

in 1965 UNESCO sponsored an initial meeting to discuss the implications for the 'underdeveloped' world of telecommunications and particularly the use of satellites for mass communications.

in 1965 and 1966 UNESCO interdisciplinary teams studies the ways in which the electronic media and films were being used in education.


The increase of Third World membership in the General Assembly and UNESCO had focused international attention on the needs of these states. However, at the end of the 'Decade of Development' it became apparent that in spite of this 'focused attention' the needs of the Third World had not been adequately addressed. The development projects, including the communication projects, promoted a type of development based on industrialisation, an industrialisation strongly oriented toward markets in the advanced industrialised states. The new international economic order designed by the United States in the post-war period was based on the assumption that a
certain type of labour-intensive industry could be established in the Third World, using their comparative advantage of cheap labour, which would allow them some participation in the international trade of manufactured goods. This would supposedly lead to both a higher and a more equitable distribution of national incomes. Many Third World states did experience an industrialisation process. It was, however, one that had a strong external dependence on the markets of the advanced capitalist states. This export-linked production model did not generate the kinds of improved economic conditions in Third World states that were expected. Rather Third World industry became part of the vertically integrated manufacturing structure of transnational corporations which generated "an unprecedented growth" in the advanced industrialised states with an increased "economic lag" in Third World states (Hamelink, 1982:90-91).

The failure of the 'development decade' raised many questions regarding the "validity of a model that was still based essentially on a colonial structure" (Hamelink, 1982:91). Out of these questions emerged a new model of development based on a new international economic order, a new order promoting concepts such as 'self-reliance' and 'basic needs'. Fundamental to this new order was the recognition that political independence granted or won through decolonisation did not ensure economic independence. Third World states realised that self-reliance could not be developed and basic needs could not be met as long as colonial economic structures remained intact. It became increasingly apparent to these states that the effective dismantling of dependent economic relations would require a restructuring of their relations of communication with the advanced industrial states. As Smith
notes in his book *The Geopolitics of Information* the depressing experience of the 'development decade' taught the leaders of the Third World...

that independence, political, economic and cultural, is the crucial prerequisite for all forms of satisfactory growth and change. Without independence in information and culture the gains of political and economic independence are rapidly eroded (Smith, 1980:66-67).

It is not surprising that UNESCO, with its emphasis on communications, should become the platform for the Third World states which now held a strong majority in all UN institutions.* While UNESCO continued to emphasis the need of communication infrastructures in Third World states, it began to stress, as well, the need of new international regulations which would guarantee all states not only access to, but more importantly, control over communication structures. Although this awareness of communication dependency and its relation to economic and political dependency emerged in the late 1960s, it was the mid-to-late 1970s before the Third World states, guided by the Nonaligned Movement, established a formal position regarding this concern. The expression "new world information and communication order" was first used at a UNESCO meeting in Montreal in 1969. However, it was not until the establishment of the UNESCO Commission for the Study of

* By 1970 UN membership had reached 126 states. Of those 126 states 88 represented Asian, African and Latin American states.
Communication Problems (MacBride Commission) in 1976, that the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) began to take form and develop substance.

A concept fundamental to NWICO is that of the 'right to communicate'. It is the interpretation of this concept which is at the centre of the UNESCO conflict. For the Third World states the concept entails not only the right of access to and participation in the means of communication, but as well, the right of sovereignty; that is the right of a state to protect and preserve this access and participation. For the advanced capitalist states this interpretation of the concept violates Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the freedom of information, by suggesting that states have the sovereign right to restrict the free flow of information. Restricting the free flow of information could have significant economic and hence, social and political consequences for advanced capitalist states, most notably the United States. It is this conflict which has heightened the structural contradiction intrinsic to UNESCO, that between its accumulation function and its legitimation function.

D. Conclusion

I will attempt to summarise this chapter by using Offe's theory of the state to highlight the theoretical significance of events during the immediate postwar period which have contributed to the current UNESCO crisis. This should provide additional insight into the creation of the
international system and the structure and function of UNESCO, as well as prepare the way for a detailed analysis of the conflict and crisis as it emerged during the 1970s and 1980s.

Prior to the end of the Second World War the U.S. state began to actively reconstruct the international system. In doing so, the American state was reacting to an anticipated threat to its own accumulation process. At this time there was no immediate danger to the accumulation process. The war had brought the U.S. out of its economic depression and had strengthened its industrial process to the extent that American production methods and its system of product development was "mythologised to the point of being virtually beyond criticism" (Laxer, 1983:12). To ensure this high level of productivity the U.S. state had to intervene internationally to produce the material conditions that would allow continuation of this accumulation process. The American state was not intervening in a manner Ofhe terms 'allocative'. It was not responding to demands from its environment for the allocation of state-owned resources (land, money, repressive force). Rather, it was intervening in a 'productive' manner, providing the 'inputs' necessary to sustain accumulation. The U.S. state was not responding to demands, but rather to unclarified, yet anticipated 'negative events', events which could disrupt the accumulation process. The negative events anticipated by the U.S. state were the loss of markets, areas for investment capital, and sources of primary resources. These events could be precipitated by postwar protectionism, communist expansion and general international instability in the postwar period. To avoid this situation the central decision makers in the U.S. assumed the responsibility of constructing an international
environment compatible with the dream of an American based world-wide capitalist economy (Wolfe, 1977:216).

In devising an international system compatible to the expansion of American accumulation, the U.S. state engaged in a process identified by Offe as 'administrative recommodification'. To prevent postwar protectionism, communist expansion and general instability in the international environment, the U.S. state had to reestablish the commodity form of exchange in Europe and establish it in Japan. The World Bank, the IMF, GATT and the European Recovery Programme became the instruments through which the U.S. state was able to recommodify both capital and labour and hence capital accumulation. This process alleviated the U.S. of its 'aid' obligations and provided growing markets for U.S. goods, services, technology and capital. In return for the reconstruction and recovery assistance, the U.S. state required total compliance with its objective of international free-trade liberalism.

Economic institutions designed to promote international free-trade liberalism were not sufficient to guarantee this new economic order. To promote the international stability essential to this new order the United Nations was established. All bodies associated with the organisation are to contribute in some form to international 'peace and security'. UNESCO, as a specialised agency, has a very specific role to perform in this regard. It is to promote international understanding and cooperation through the exchange of educational, scientific and cultural goods. To facilitate this exchange UNESCO is to promote and preserve the free flow of information. Although the free flow of information or freedom of information was
extensively debated in the General Assembly and ECOSOC, UNESCO, with its membership lacking any strong non-western capitalist states until the mid-1950s, was unrestricted in its practical application of the free flow of information policy. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the programmes and projects of UNESCO's Division of Communication were directed toward assessing and improving communication facilities throughout the world, with special emphasis placed upon Third World states after 1960. UNESCO made a major contribution toward the securing of international free-trade liberalism. Not only did it promote stability, but as well it promoted the establishment of a communication infrastructure, which is essential to the expansion of capitalism and a general policy of freedom of information, or in other words the free-trade of information.

The political and economic institutions of the international system established in the postwar period can be viewed as products of American foreign policy aimed at creating an international environment compatible to the expansion of the American accumulation process. This 'productive' intervention by the U.S. state was required to counter the tendency of the rate of profit of its domestic industry to decline due to the lack of markets for its goods, service and capital. The U.S. state was, in effect, attempting to overcome contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production. However, Ofie maintains that the capitalist state is unable to produce policies capable of overcoming or countering the self-paralysing and self-destructive tendencies of capitalism. The inadequacy of the capitalist state to correct these tendencies stems from its own internal contradiction. Efforts by the capitalist state to engage in productive intervention has the
tendency of sharpening the contradiction between its obligation to capital as a whole and its obligation to society as a whole. As a result the policies designed to overcome the contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production actually contain or reflect the contradiction inherent in the state. Hence the ability of state policy to reconcile emerging contradictions in production is limited, and eventually the contradiction will reemerge manifested in a form reflecting both the policy process and current concerns of the state.

It was not until the mid-1960s that the contradictions inherent in the U.S. policy which established the new international economic order in the postwar period became apparent. The most obvious manifestations of the 'recommodation' of labour and capital in Europe and Japan was the creation of a technically advanced industrial base in these regions which, after a period of time, was able to compete with U.S. goods, services and capital both internationally, as well as within the American market. As Krasner notes, protectionist sentiments began to emerge in the U.S. during this period as more and more domestic groups were negatively affected by imports and by foreign direct investment* (Krasner, 1978:662).

It was at this time in the 1960s that manifestations of the contradictions inherent in the United Nations organisation began to surface. The United Nations was a product of U.S. policy and as such inherited the

* By 1971, the U.S. merchandise balance showed a deficit for the first time since 1894 (Krasner, 1977:665).
tension characteristic of the capitalist state, that is the tension between accumulation and legitimation. Although the UN system does not replicate the capitalist state it does have both an accumulation and a legitimation obligation. While it does not engage in the organisation of production according to its own political criteria, its political power is indirectly dependent upon the process of accumulation. Its primary source of funding is from the advanced capitalist states and capitalist institutions such as the World Bank and private organisations such as the Ford Foundation (Holly, 1981:125). Consequently a key basis of its power is rooted in the accumulation process. If the accumulation process is disrupted this source of UN power is threatened. However, the UN, again like the capitalist state, has another source of power which is based in its democratic process. The UN system has survived for over 40 years because it is recognised universally as a legitimate international institution. Without this legitimacy the UN would not have any recognised authority or influence over the activities of, or interaction between, states. To exist without legitimacy the system would be dependent upon the use of coercion. In the late 1960s the tension between this dual determination of political power began to emerge as the majority of the states, which grant the UN its legitimacy, challenged a model of development designed by those states which assure the UN of its financial base. Suddenly the institution created to promote and support international conditions conducive to capitalist growth and expansion, was beginning to function in a manner detrimental to its original objective.

Within UNESCO this tension became focused within the area of communications. The majority of states, representing the Third World, were
suggesting an alternate approach to the communication development model
designed and implemented during the 1950s and 1960s. This new approach,
stressing self-reliance and basic needs was founded on the concept of the
right to communicate. Implicit within this concept was the restructuring of
international communication structures to allow equality in access and
control. The right to communicate challenged not only the existing relations
of communications, but as well the fundamental concept upon which these
relations were established, the free flow of information.

UNESCO was merely one of the many UN bodies to exhibit this self-
paralysing tendency. However, currently UNESCO is the only UN body
confronting dissolution as a result of this internal contradiction. To
understand why UNESCO is in the midst of a crisis it is necessary to
understand the importance of communication to both the United States and to
the Third World states.
CHAPTER THREE
THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF COMMUNICATION

My purpose in this chapter is to examine the international relations of communication, in an attempt to clarify the conflicting positions at the centre of the UNESCO crisis. Through a critical examination of the development and exploitation of communication technology I hope to establish first, the link between the free flow of information principle and the U.S. accumulation process, and second, on a more theoretical level, the link between the activities of the U.S. state in its attempt to preserve and promote the accumulation of U.S. capital and the conflict which eventually emerged in UNESCO in the early 1970s between the U.S. and the Third World states over the free flow of information. This examination of the international relations of communication should contribute to a more informed analysis of the conflict as it evolved during the 1970s, culminating in the current crisis in the 1980s.

A. Communication and the Capitalist Mode of Production

Central to the crisis in UNESCO is the issue of communications, its form and content in the international environment and its impact at the state level. To grasp the primacy of communication in the UNESCO crisis, it is necessary to understand the relationship of communication to state and society. Siegelaub, in his general discussion on the concept of
communication, defines communication as "nothing more, nor nothing less, than the articulation of the social relations between people" (Siegelaub, 1979:11). The mode of communications, in other words the means by which society transmits and receives information, reflects a social formation particular to a specific historical conjuncture. As Siegelaub explains,

How people communicate, where and when they communicate, with whom they communicate, and even to a certain degree what and why they communicate, in short, the way they communicate, i.e., their mode of communication, is in function of the historical process. Each different communication form produced by this age-old process has been closely tied to the conditions in which it first arose and was later elaborated and generalised (Siegelaub, 1979:11).

A product of the historical process, a particular mode of communication emerges as a result of the interaction between the 'mode of material production', that is the economic structure: the productive forces and relations of production, and the corresponding political and ideological production (Siegelaub, 1979:11). Thus the form and content of a particular mode of communication is conditioned by, and reflects a particular mode of production and its superstructure. Early forms of transmitting and receiving information -- speech, language, writing and basic modes of transportation (human, animal and water) -- are characteristic of precapitalist society. These modes of communication embody the economic, political and ideological requirements of primitive communal, ancient and feudal societies. Although characteristic of early societies, these modes of communication have not been totally destroyed by the transition from one social formation to another. As Siegelaub notes, they "are used in other ways, adapted, recombined, and given
new and different values and importance in light of the new dominant social
relations which imprint each successive epoch" (Siegelaub, 1979:11). With
the rise of capitalist society these former modes of communication were
modified according to the particular economic, political and ideological
requirements of industrial society. Communication is, however, more than a
mere product of society. It is, as well, a producer of society.
Communication can serve to reproduce the social conditions from which it
emerges. Yet conversely, it can, in combination with other forces in
society, serve to exacerbate contradictions latent within the social
relations, and contribute to their destruction (Siegelaub, 1979:11).
Communication is linked with society in a symbiotic relationship. It is both
an instrument reflecting the particular social conditions within the
historical process, as well as an instrument capable of reinforcing the
social condition or contributing to its demise.

Although the roots of 'contemporary' communication extends back to the
invention of the Gutenberg press in the mid-15th century, it was not until
the 19th and 20th centuries that means of transmitting and receiving
information underwent significant change. Early in the 19th century the hand
operated press, essentially unchanged since the mid-1400s, was replaced by
the steam powered press, providing a faster method of carrying out the same
basic operation. While steam power may have been the mechanism which
modified printing, it was the economic and political circumstances of the
period which instigated the modification. The process of capitalist
production and the social and political unrest which accompanied this process
were the impetus for rapid and significant changes in the means of
communication. Effective and efficient means of communication, that is, the
transporting of people, goods, information and money was essential to the
growth and development of capitalist society. Steam transportation, the
press, telegraph and later telephone were vital links in the production,
adovertising and distribution of goods and services during the 19th century.
These advances in the means of communication, most notably the press, were
also instrumental in modifying the social and political structures which
inhibited the development and expansion of capitalism (i.e. government and
education). Throughout the past two centuries as the competitive and
exploitive nature of capitalism modified the means of production, the means
of communication, given its link with the production process, were also
modified. Some of the more notable innovations in the means of communication
during this period include:

- further innovations to the process of printing,

- the development of photography (1822),

- the invention of the telegraph (1836), the telephone (1876),
  and the phonograph and disc record (1896),

- the discovery of electromagnetic waves (1888) which led to
  the transmission and reception of radio signals between
  England and France in 1896 and trans-Atlantic in 1901,

- the invention of the radio valve (1904),

- the transmission and reception of images via radio waves --
  television (1948),

- the invention of the transistor (1948),

- the development of the microprocessor (mid-1960s),
Not only have these innovations altered the means of production, marketing and finance, but many have become the basis of new industries: electronic, publishing, advertising, film, recording, broadcasting, telecommunications and computer. The development of these industries within capitalist society varies according to the conjuncture of economic, social and political forces particular to each capitalist state. However, in each situation the development and expansion of the means of communication during the 20th century can be closely linked to state activities.

B. **Communication and U.S. Hegemony**

During World War I radio technology was controlled by the state as a military technology. Because of its military significance, radio communication was associated with the notion of 'national security' and thus 'public interest'. However, in the post-war period the interpretation of 'public interest' reflected the specific historical conjuncture of each state and hence, influenced further implementation of radio technology. In the Western European states the development of radio was directly controlled by the state in the post-war period, utilised for the reconstruction of economic and political infrastructure destroyed by the war. During the 1930s radio technology was a natural instrument of policy for the Fascist states (Williams, 1974:34). In Britain the state was directly involved in the development of radio communication, but not to the same extent as the European states. British public interest was not focused on reconstruction. However, maintaining national security was still a priority. In 1920 when
the Marconi Company, a manufacturer of radio equipment, began broadcasting entertainment programmes on what was considered a commercial and transport-control medium, complaints from certain radio-telephonic interests and the Armed Forces resulted in a temporary ban of broadcasting. However, after complicated negotiations between the competing manufactures, the Post Office and the Armed Services Committee, a general agreement was reached which allowed the manufacturers to form a consortium, the British Broadcasting Company (later the British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC) to provide entertainment programme broadcasting. Granted a monopoly by the state in 1926 the BBC was guaranteed financing for its programmes through the sale of receiver licences (Williams, 1974:33). With the development of audio-visual technology the BBC's monopoly was expanded to include television broadcasting in 1936. In contrast to the European and British state the American state assumed an indirect, yet significant, role in the implementation of radio communication, a role which reflects a notion of public interest quite different from these other capitalist states.

In an effort to develop and effectively exploit radio technology during the war the U.S. state granted research and development contracts to electronic firms such as American Telegraph and Telephone (AT&T), General Electric and Westinghouse. At the end of the war these firms not only continued to developed voice transmission by radiotelephone for state purposes, but as well, pressured the state to allow them to adapt this technology for non-military uses. To create a general market for radio receivers the electronic industry developed broadcasting systems. The receiver manufacturers used radio programmes "to produce audiences to market
their own products, and ... those of consumer goods and service manufacturers" (Smythe, 1981:77). As Williams notes in his discussion of the technology and cultural form of television,

The early broadcasting networks were federations of prime manufacturers, who then acquired production facilities as an essentially secondary operation: secondary, that is, to the production and selling of sets. The finance for production, in this highly competitive situation, was drawn from advertising, in its two forms of insertion and sponsorship. More clearly than anywhere else, because all countervailing factors were less strong, the American institutions realised the pure forms of a simple applied technology (Williams, 1974:34-35).

Because there were no 'countervailing factors' in the U.S. as there had been in both Europe and Britain, American public interest became associated with market interest: what is 'good' for the market is 'good' for the public. Williams indicates that the more traditional non-market public interest was a secondary form of public interest,

The manufacturing institutions, both directly in the sale of sets and indirectly in the supply of advertising money, determined the shape of broadcasting institutions. Thus the broadcasting public was effectively, from the beginning, the competitive broadcasting market. The major networks, which began forming in 1926, became the characteristic institutions of both radio and eventually television. Public service in any other than a market sense developed within a structure already dominated by these institutions. As it eventually emerged it was a classic kind of market-regulatory control, into which were inserted, always with difficulty and controversy, notions of a non-market public interest (Williams 1974:35).
Intervention by the U.S. state into the area of broadcasting was only established after intense competition among the developing networks led to technical chaos on the airways. Between 1927 and 1932 the new Federal Radio Commission (now Federal Communications Commission, FCC) organised a system of allocation of frequencies. It was at this time that the airways were declared public property and competitors, licenced to use them under technical controls. Although attempts were made to prevent specific abuses, such as fraud, and to restrict the strong tendencies toward monopoly, it was not until the post-World War II period that attempts were initiated by the FCC to introduce standards of social usefulness, of political fairness, and of public morality (Williams, 1974:35). However, by this time not only were the networks too powerful to control, but as well, enforcement of non-technical regulations (non-market public interest) was complicated by the network/station relationship* (Williams, 1974:36).

Unlike Britain and Europe, U.S. state intervention in broadcasting was limited to indirect sponsorship, through the granting of contracts and the general support of an open and direct market. This process allowed the American electronic industry not only to establish national control over communications, but as well, international leadership in the area:

Under the leadership of General Electric, a cartel divided the domestic American electronic communications markets between a new entity created by General Electric (the Radio Corporation of America), AT&T, General Electric, Westinghouse Electric,

* The FCC could revoke a station's licence for regulation non-compliance but could not really control the networks to which some of the stations belonged and others were affiliated. For most programme production, the networks were responsible, yet the effective controls were on stations (Williams, 1974:35).
and the United Fruit Company. The same cartel agreements divided international markets between the American companies and British Marconi (Smythe, 1981:77).

It was during the 1950s and the 1960s that the electronic industry was able to expand their markets worldwide through their broadcasting networks. Nelson in her article on the economics of commercial television, records the international expansion of the three major networks during this period:

The late fifties and early sixties were busy times for the US networks. CBS signed a contract with the Italian Broadcasting Corporation (RAI) in 1961 to provide help with program production, news, public affairs and sales, and then went on to construct Israel's nationwide TV system. NBC assisted the TV networks of Portugal, Peru, Sweden and Yugoslavia, built stations in Egypt, Argentina, Hong Kong and Italy; designed the networks of Kenya, Sierra Leone, the Sudan, Uganda, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, and then, in 1966, built the national TV system for South Vietnam. Remember those long years when ABC was low dog on the ratings totem-pole? Poor ABC. Actually, they were quite busy elsewhere, buying up stock in the television systems of Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Japan, Australia and the Philippines. Also, ABC was into program production companies in Mexico, Great Britain and West Germany.... In 1960, ABC built Ecuador's first TV station, and later assisted both in the creation of the Philippine Republic Broadcasting System and in the formation of the Arab Middle East Television Network, comprised of stations in Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, Iraq and Jordan. Throughout the Sixties, ABC added stations and advertisers to its World division network. By the end of the decade, the network comprised 68 stations operating in 27 countries (Nelson, 1980:18-19; see also Schiller, 1973).

This was not, however, the extent of foreign penetration by the U.S. electronic industry. In the post-war period the U.S. electronic industry was, once again the recipient of U.S. state research and development contracts. It was this renewal of state patronage which helped to establish the U.S. electronic industry as the world leader in computer-communications.
With the development of the transistor in the late 1940s, the U.S. state poured millions of dollars into its research and development and in the first two years took the total world production for military and space projects (CSE Microelectronics Group, 1980:17). The electronics industry continued to benefit from state funding throughout the 1950s and 1960s as the 'Cold War' and the launching of the first satellite (Sputnik, 1957) by the Soviets initiated the 'space race'. As Murphy notes in his examination of the development of global communications, the electronics sector, since 1960, has consistently gathered 60 percent of its research and development money from government contracts, particularly from the Department of Defense (Murphy, 1983:21). Murphy points out that,

Corporations were quickly created and consolidated around the space race. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had eight billion dollars a year to spend ... and some of the largest firms in the world, like Hughes Aircraft, had 70 to 90 per cent of their production given over to the government. The boom lasted throughout the 1960s, and the race to the moon followed by the need to win in Vietnam, kept the corporations busy. The list of the main beneficiaries reads like a Who's Who of the fastest growing electronics corporations in the world, from IBM to Honeywell to Westinghouse Electric (Murphy, 1983:21).

It was during this period that computer-communication quite naturally evolved from the meshing of computer, broadcasting and telecommunication technologies. The most significant outcome of the blending of these technologies has been the communication satellite.

The merging of computer and communication technology was conducted under the auspices of the U.S. state. In 1962 the U.S. state created the Communication Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) to organise and commercially
exploit this new technology. Established as a private corporation, half of
COMSAT's stock was offered to individuals and the other half to 163
manufacturers of communication equipment. General Telephone and Electronics
(GTE), AT&T, International Telephone and Telecommunications (ITT), and the
Radio Corporation of America (RCA) bought more than 45 percent of the stock.
In 1964 under the administrative direction of COMSAT, the U.S. state proposed
the creation of an international network of communication satellites. The
International Telecommunication Satellite system (INTELSAT) was designed to
provide international telecommunication and broadcasting services for member
states. Established as a monopoly INTELSAT is largely American controlled,
with the U.S. state retaining approximately 38 percent of the shares, the
American aerospace industry obtaining four-fifths of construction contracts,
and NASA launching and monitoring the satellites (Mattelart, 1979:328-329).
Another satellite system developed by the U.S. state is the Land Satellite
System (LANDSAT). LANDSAT, administered by NASA, is a system of remote
sensing photo-satellites capable of collecting data regarding the climatic,
geography and geological conditions of the earth's surface. Although data
collected by this system is available to both states and corporations,
control over both the system and the data is maintained by the U.S. state.
The development of computer-communications by the electronic industry under
the auspices of the state has secured for the United States, not only
substantial control over international communication structures, but as well,
has prepared the way for the further expansion of U.S. based industries
worldwide.
The competitive nature of capitalist production has ensured that computer-communication technology has become diffused throughout the world. However, as it is an American developed, military-related technology, control remains predominantly within the United States*. As one report notes,

The USA, Western Europe and Japan possess most of the world computer population, though the dominating force is the US, which controls about 90 per cent of the computer sector in the market economy countries (Rada, 1982:47).

Although all major computer manufacturers have facilities in several countries and worldwide marketing and service networks, International Business Machines (IBM) is the unchallenged leader, maintaining 49 percent of the industry's total revenues in 1980 (Rada, 1982:47). Smith in his discussion of international communications elaborates on the domination of IBM:

It is responsible for 70 per cent of all computer installations in the entire globe. In 1978, its revenue from the rental of computers was $10 billion and profits from this sector accounted for half of its entire profits. Within the United States, IBM is not permitted to sell computer services such as data processing. However, it has a $1 billion a year overseas trade in selling computer services. It employs 130,000 workers in plants outside the United States. In nearly all of the developed countries IBM has at least 50 per cent of the total computer market. Even in Japan, which is well on the way to self-sufficiency in computer hardware, IBM still has over a quarter of the market. It is the power of the IBM which helps to explain the extraordinary predominance of the USA in the information field (Smith, 1980:134; see also Sobel, 1981).

* Given the nature of the technology control is easily maintained by a few transnational corporations. The industry relies heavily on 'trade secrets' and the fact that integrated circuit technology is based on 'intangible knowledge', difficult to 'unpack'. As well much of the state of the art technology is not transferable due to 'national security' regulations (Rada, 1982:51).
U.S. control over the computer market and the international communication links ensures U.S. control over the transborder flow of data, most of which is held in U.S. data banks. In 1980, the U.S. had nearly nine-tenths of the world's computerised data-bases, 46 million out of 52 million (Smith, 1980:134). This grants the U.S. control over tremendous amounts of information belonging to governments, industries, organisations and individuals outside the United States, as Smith reports:

Any information stored within America, even if it belongs to some other nations or to a foreign company, or affects the territorial rights of another nation, will none the less fall under American jurisdiction and could be 'extradited' or subpoenaed by an American court. The same argument might apply to computer data which was in the process of being bounced off an American satellite, even if the data were starting and finishing their journey on non-American territory (Smith, 1980:131).

Many states have taken steps to set up their own facilities in order to preserve control over their data*. While advanced industrialise states have the resources to provide domestic data-bases, Third World states lack this alternative, and remain dependent upon American, or other foreign facilities. Some states, most notably Latin American states (Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico) have passed laws to impose some kind of control over foreign data links. This control, as Smith notes, is merely notional or 'theoretical':

* The provision of national data-bases does not prevent transborder data flows of transnational or American-owned companies located outside the U.S. Menzies in her discussion of the Canadian situation notes that Canadian subsidiaries are vulnerable to a further truncation of autonomy as parent companies exploit the potential for centralising their information work, a potential enhanced by using services such as IBM's Satellite Business System (SBS). A worldwide operation SBS features facsimile transmission, audio and video teleconferencing, and all forms of data transmission (Menzies, 1982:102).
It [data] flits about the globe from computer to computer, 'packet switched' from destination to destination, depending on available routes and available capacity. It is not the case that all data has a final resting place like files on a shelf. It defies territoriality, however hard national governments may seek to pin it down (Smith, 1980:131; see also Rada, 1982 and Lenk, 1982).

The nature of microelectronic technology, that is, that it is based on intangible knowledge has contributed to U.S. domination of international communication systems and in some case domination of domestic communication systems of other states*. The U.S. electronic industry has been at the centre of the development and exploitation of this technology and has, as a result, been the primary beneficiary. Other industries, however, have also benefitted significantly from this technology. Not only has microelectronic technology resulted in the automation of virtually every aspect of the production process, reducing costs and increasing efficiency, but as well, it has contributed to the international expansion of the production process. As Smith points out, satellite-borne communication has the effect of greatly reducing the costs of administering transnational organisations. The transmission of orders, memos, internal invoices, etc. by computer-communications achieves significant savings in cost and time (Lenk, 1982:283, Smith, 1980:134). As well this effective and efficient means of communication enhances the fragmentation of production, encouraging corporations to exploit the free-trade zones, cheaper labour and availability of resources in other states.

* Smith notes that countries like Indonesia, with its Hughes Aircraft built 'Palapa' satellite, have already begun to realise how many of their national communication services (telephone, data, newspaper content, education) have come to rely on the satellite, which ultimately still remains in the control of U.S. companies.
Although the communication-related industries, ranging from broadcasting through to telecommunications, have benefitted from state sponsorship and state support of a market-oriented public interest, other factors have contributed to the international success of the U.S.-based communication industry. Two other interrelated factors must be examined, that of the U.S. domestic market and the international market. Radio communication technology was developed and first commercially exploited in Britain: radio broadcasting in 1920 by the Marconi Company and television broadcasting in 1936 by the BBC. Yet it was in the United States that the broadcasting industry developed and expanded to gain international domination of equipment and programme production. As discussed above government research and development contracts and limited state intervention in the form of regulation supported the competitive growth of the industry. The viability of this competitive industry, however, was established initially on the size and economic strength of the domestic market and then later the international market.

Although the technical basis of monochrome television had been laid during the 1920s and 1930s and, therefore, owed little to the research and development contracts of World War II, it was not until the postwar period that the television broadcasting industry 'took off'. Prior to World War II the possible market for television receivers had been undercut by the effects of the 1930 Depression. During the war years, when the possibility of a consumer market increased with war-time production, most consumer durable
goods production had been replaced, temporarily, with military production. Consequently the increased consumer income resulting from full employment went partly for consumer non-durables and consumer services*. The remaining disposable income went into savings, and to pay off consumer installment credits accumulated during the 1930s (Smyth, 1981:79). With the return to consumer durable goods production after the war these savings, along with full-employment and demand pent-up during the depression and the war provided a ready market for television equipment and programmes. Once the domestic market became saturated, however, new markets, international market, were required to sustain and expand the industry. The provision of international markets for the electronic industry and its broadcasting networks, as well as other communication-related industries such as advertising and publishing, was assured by the activities of the U.S. state in the postwar period.

To maintain the high levels of productivity achieved by the U.S. during the war, the American state was able to create an international environment to facilitate the further development and expansion of American industry. The European Recovery Programme, the World Bank and IMF contributed to the recommodification of Europe and Japan, restoring the accumulation of capital and hence providing markets for American goods, services, technology and capital. In return for this assistance the U.S. demanded that these states

* One consumer service which benefitted substantially from the restriction of consumer durables, especially televisions, was the film industry. As Smythe notes in his work on the Canadian communications industry, motion picture attendance reached an all-time peak in the U.S. during this period (Smythe, 1981:79).
function in accordance with international free-trade liberalism, and established GATT and the UN system to encourage compliance. The recommodification of Europe and Japan, and the establishment of international free-trade liberalism contributed to the domination of the communication-related industries by the U.S. It had the technology, the production facilities, the capital and no foreign competitors. The communication industry was launched in the late 1940s and early 1950s by the pent-up demand of the American domestic market. By the late 1950s/early 1960s this industry was ready to expand internationally, as is indicated by Robert Sarnoff who, in 1962, while he was Chairman of the Board for NBC, stated,

American television, having saturated time and priced itself to the top in the US, is on the way to conquering the Western Atlantic nations and Africa. Tomorrow, no doubt, the world (Nelson, 1980:17).

By the mid-1970s the American networks had expanded their interests worldwide, setting up broadcasting facilities and in the process creating a need for American programming and advertising. As Nelson reports in her article, by 1974 the U.S. annually exported 150,000 hours of TV material, as compared to 20,000 hours by the U.K., 20,000 hours by France and 6,000 hours by West Germany. As Nelson notes the U.S. annually exported three times as much programming as the other three countries combined, enough programme material to completely fill the broadcasting schedules of 22 networks operating 18 hours per day for an entire year. By 1976 there were only five countries in the world which did not broadcast any U.S. TV programmes: Mainland China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania and Mongolia (Nelson, 1980:17-19; see also Mattelart, Delcourt and Mattelart, 1984).
The primary beneficiaries of the expansion of the communication industry were the electronic companies. Not only did they benefit from the expansion of television broadcasting during this period, but as well from the development and adaptability of computer technology. The international demand for the goods and services related to computer technology contributed to the expansion and diversification of the electronic industry during the 1960s. Murphy reports that:

General Electric, the largest US electronics firm, increased its turnover from five to ten billion dollars between 1962 and 1972, scooping up 30 companies in the process. RCA diversified into anything from hire cars to soft drink firms. Xerox jumped its turnover from 33 million to 330 million between 1960 and 1965. Abroad, American electronics firms set up over 1,000 subsidiaries around the world in the 1960s, usually by buying out the 'locals' (Murphy, 1983:21).

Emphasis placed upon the development and expansion of the U.S. communication industry, is not meant to imply that the other western capitalist states are merely passive victims of U.S. domination in the field. During the 1970s Japan made significant inroads into the development and exploitation of microelectronics. Currently Japan is leading the way in the development of the 'fifth generation computer' based on artificial intelligence* (Malik, 1982:17). The European Economic Community has established the European Space Agency; developed its own launch facilities based on the Ariane rocket; and has created Eutelsat an organisation of 20 European telecommunication authorities. Not only is Europe competing with NASA but through Eutelsat is

* The first four generations of computers include the vacuum tube, the transistor, the integrated circuit and the very large scale integration (VLSI) semi-conductor.
challenging INTELSAT's domination of international satellite communication by providing service within Europe and proposing service links to the Middle East, Africa and possibly North America (Wheelan, 1984:40; InterMedia, 1982:3). Britain has well as a viable communication industry. Prior to the Second World War Britain dominated international communication through British Cable (Schiller, 1979:346). Although satellite communication has greatly diminished this dominance the U.K. still has significant international communication connections:

- Cable and Wireless, a wholly state-owned company until 1981, manages the telecommunication systems of a number of Third World countries (Murphy, 1983:149).

- Through the BBC, Britain has links with broadcasting systems throughout Africa and Asia (Murphy, 1983:123).

- British-based Reuters new agency is recognised as the most important current supplier of international news throughout the Third World, except in South America (Boyd-Barrett, 1980:10).

- Britain has a viable aerospace industry, building satellites for both the domestic and European market (Wheelan, 1984:41).

Although the other capitalist states, especially the European Community led by France, are making an effort to dismantle American domination in communication, there is no immediate threat to U.S. control. However, to ensure its future control in this area, the U.S. must be assured of the free flow of information.

Within the postwar environment of international free-trade liberalism, the development and expansion of U.S. control over communications was supported by the principle of the free flow of information -- the free-trade
of information. The free flow of information principle has supported the expansion of U.S. communication-related industries from publishing to electronics, the unrestricted transmission, reception and processing of data, the establishment of international communication links, such as INTELSAT and SBS, to facilitate the flow of information, and the data gathering activities of LANDSAT. The economic and political strength of the United States in the postwar period can be directly linked to its domination of international communications and the free flow principle upon which it is based. The maintenance of the free flow of information has become essential to the economic, political and social stability of the United States.

The development of communications throughout the 19th and 20th centuries has reflected and contributed to the development and expansion of capitalist society. Electronic based communication emerged along with industrialisation, extending out from Britain, Europe and the United States linking the entire world with the capitalist system. As a product of the interaction between the mode of material production and political/ideological production of capitalist society, electronic-based communication must be recognised as a capitalist mode of production. What this implies is that those states, industries and individuals which control access to and participation in the means of communication effectively control the economic, political and ideological production of society.

The electronic communication structures were effective instruments for establishing and maintaining colonial empires in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The communication links established by telegraph, cable and
radio-telephone became essential to the economic and political administration of distance colonies (see Smith's discussion of 'News Imperialism?' in The Geopolitics of Information 1980. The communication structures erected throughout Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America were not to facilitate communication within these regions, but rather between the major commercial and political centres in these regions and its colonial power (Britain, France, Germany and Portugal). The collapse of the colonial empires in the post-WWII period left these regions with external communication links, but no effective internal communication system.

With political independence these regions began to utilise the United Nations to gain international awareness of the lack of communication facilities throughout the Third World, facilities which were deemed essential to economic, social, and political development (see Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, 1958; de Sola Pool, 'The Mass Media and Politics in the Modernisation Process' in Pye (ed.) Communications and Political Development 1963). In response to these concerns of the newly independent states the United Nations declared the 1960s the 'Development Decade'. It is no coincidence that the 'Development Decade' should be announced by the U.S. dominated United Nations in a period characterised by intensified Cold War hostilities, the development of new, more effective and efficient means of international communication (computer-communication), and the saturation of the American broadcasting market. With the technology, capital, lack of foreign competition, and a compatible international environment promoting free-trade and the free flow of information, the United States became the primary benefactor of communication development throughout the Third World.
The 'development decade' ended without any significant development in the Third World. The introduction of communication systems accompanied an industrialisation process which contributed little if anything to the economic, social and political self-reliance of the region. The Third World states became aware that the new communication facilities: broadcasting, universities and training institutions using American texts and teachers, telecommunications, computers and satellite links, contributed to the development and expansion of U.S.-based industry and little to indigenous development. During the late 1960s the Third World states under the leadership of the Nonaligned Movement began to question the international relations among states which promoted and sustain dependent Third World development. Out of this process emerged a call for a New International Economic Order and a New International Information and Communication Order.

Central to the New International Information and Communication Order is the concept of the 'right to communicate' which stresses that to ensure equitable access to and participation in the means of communication there must be a decentralisation of control over communications. Such a decentralisation would allow other states and organisations, previously excluded from the development and management of communication structures because of their colonial history, greater say in the operation of communication systems both at the national as well as the international level. It is maintained that the decentralisation of control will secure for all states, organisations and individuals the right to communicate.
The New International Information and Communication Order and the right to communicate directly challenges the free flow of information principle which guided the activities of the communication-related bodies of the United Nations during the 1950s and 1960s and help establish the United Nations as the unchallenged leader in the field of communications. Decentralisation of the control over access to and participation in communication could have sever economic, social and political consequences for the United States. Its economic and political viability is dependent upon maintaining control over communications and ensuring the unrestricted flow of information. It is this debate between the right to communicate and the free flow of information which has led to the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO.

C. Conclusions

The role of the U.S. state in the development of communication technology can be interpreted as an attempt by the state to ensure the commodity form of exchange, and hence, the development and expansion of the U.S. accumulation process. During the First and Second World Wars the U.S. state intervened in the production process by directing vast amounts of government funds towards the electronic industry for the research and development of communication technology. In both postwar periods, the U.S. state encouraged the commercial development and exploitation of communication technology by supporting a market-oriented notion of public interest (Williams, 1974, 34-41).
This intervention by the U.S. state can be identified as a form of what Offe labels administrative recommodification. Through its sponsorship of the
electronic industry the U.S. state was reacting to a perceived or anticipated
threat to its own accumulation process. The development of communication
technology was essential to the defence of American and European capitalist
society. However, by intervening as a reactive mediator the U.S. state
contributed to the creation of a situation which required continued state
intervention in the post-World War II period.

U.S. support for the electronic industry, in combination with other
factors including the suspension of consumer durable goods production during
the Second World War contributed to the creation of a technically advanced
production process. Although the pent-up domestic consumer market continued
to support this production process, it was not sufficient to sustain it. In
order to ensure the continued growth of American accumulation of capital the
U.S. required international markets. However the U.S. confronted obstacles
to development of international markets: the destruction of European
markets; British and European protectionism; and the perceived threat of
communist expansion. To overcome these obstacles the U.S. state again
intervened in the production process. It established international free-
trade liberalism to counter the shift towards protectionism. It promoted the
recommodification of Europe and Japan through the European Recovery
Programme. The continued financial support for the development of
communication technology by the electronic industry was one state response to
the communist threat. All of these factors, in combination with the market-
oriented notion of public interest contributed to the virtually unregulated
expansion of the U.S. communication industry.
At the international level the U.S. market-oriented public interest notion became embodied within the free flow of information principle. As early as 1946 the U.S. state clarified its position on this principle:

The State Department plans to do everything within its power along political or diplomatic lines to help break down the artificial barriers to the expansion of private American news agencies, magazines, motion pictures, and other media of communications throughout the world... Freedom of the press -- and freedom of exchange of information generally -- is an integral part of our foreign policy (Schiller, 1979:347).

The United States defended the free flow of information in the General Assembly and ECOSOC throughout the 1950s and encouraged its practical application in UNESCO's programmes and projects. This action by the U.S. state not only promoted the growth of the U.S. communication industry but AFP directly challenged the monopoly control held by British Cable, Reuters and over international communication. The free flow of information principle became the mainstay of the continued expansion of the U.S. communication industry.

Otte notes, however, that policies designed to address a contradiction within the production process, in fact, replicate the contradiction. In other words, every corrective or adaptive mechanism designed to repress or reconcile contradictions are themselves involved in the contradiction (Otte, 1975:248). Rather than overcoming the contradiction these corrective or adaptive mechanisms merely circumvent the manifestation of the contradiction, that is, the problem or conflict. Eventually the contradiction will re-emerge in the form of another conflict or problem.
The action taken by the U.S. state in the postwar period temporarily solved the problem facing the production process. However, by the 1970s the contradiction once again emerged. Free-trade liberalism contributed to the recommodification of Europe and Japan which now are successfully competing with American industry. Under the auspices of free-trade liberalism and the free flow of information Britain, Europe and Japan are now competing in communication markets once exclusively controlled by the United States. While not posing an immediate threat to U.S. domination of communication, this increased competition among the western capitalist states has weakened U.S. economic and political hegemony.

The UN system has also contributed to the re-emergence of the contradiction inherent in capitalist production. The UN system was devised and designed to ensure an international environment compatible to the economic, political and ideological interests of the United States. However, since the early 1970s the system has increasingly functioned in a manner contrary to American interest. It has become a forum within which the nonaligned states have been able to 'morally' challenge U.S. economic, political and ideological hegemony. This situation has arisen as a result of the system's own internal contradiction.

In order to ensure an open and stable international environment, an environment essential to the U.S. accumulation process, the UN system had to be universally accepted. However, it became obvious in the 1960s that the system was functioning in the interests of the advanced industrial states at the expense of the Third World states. The Third World states, representing
an overwhelming majority within the UN system, began to force policy changes reflecting their interests within the organisation, interests which threaten U.S. economic and political hegemony.

Although evident throughout the UN system, this pressure on the U.S. has been most obvious within UNESCO. The agency once instrumental in the promotion of the free flow of information is now promoting the establishment of a New World Information and Communication Order, an order which questions the unrestricted flow of information. In challenging the free flow of information principle, UNESCO has threatened the U.S. accumulation of capital, and by threatening U.S. accumulation, UNESCO has threatened its own economic viability. To clarify this contradictory position of UNESCO it is necessary to examine its activities during the 1970s and 1980s which culminated in the U.S. withdrawal and the current crisis situation.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE CONFLICT AND CRISIS

In this chapter I will attempt to critically analyse the events in UNESCO during the 1970s and 1980s which led to the U.S. withdrawal from the agency resulting in the current crisis situation. My purpose in undertaking this analysis is two-fold. On one level I hope to clarify the reasons behind the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO. On a more theoretical level I hope to establish that the conflict and crisis is merely a manifestation of the contradiction intrinsic to the form and function of UNESCO, and further that although there may be a solution to the immediate crisis, there can be no effective resolution of the contradiction from which it emerged. This analysis will be divided into three phases marking the initial period of conflict, a period of accommodation, and finally the current phase of crisis.

A. The Period of Conflict

By the 1970s the lines of conflict between the Third World states and the United States were just beginning to emerge. However, within two other communication-related UN bodies the lines of conflict were already firmly established. Within the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the organisation which manages the development and exploitation of the radio spectrum and the geostationary orbit, the Third World states had begun, as early as 1963, to press for greater access to and participation in the
exploitation of these two finite, yet renewable, natural resources. Within the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), the Third World states represented a significant force in the debate on establishing international regulations on the development and exploitation of direct broadcasting satellites, a debate which began in 1965. Within both bodies, the Third World states were exerting pressure to change their international relations of communication, relations which promoted and sustained Third World dependency upon the advanced industrialised states, primarily the United States. The United States, on the other hand, wanted no changes to the international system of communication which could possibly undermine its leadership in the development and commercial exploitation of communication technology. Although the positions in the ITU and COPUOS were clearly defined by the early 1970s, they were just beginning to take form in UNESCO.

It was at the 16th General Conference in 1970 that UNESCO was first confronted with the question of formulating communication policy. At that conference a number of states expressed a need for guidance in developing a national communication policy. The Director-General was mandated by the conference "to help member states in the formulation of their mass communication policies (Heacock, 1977:26) As Heacock notes in his study of UNESCO and the Media:

Such a supervisory role is not always attributed to agency heads, and the fact that it was indicated, first, that UNESCO was at the time an organisation trusted by member governments, and certainly not the object of criticism and opprobrium by any group of states as it is today; second, that previous efforts by UNESCO to aid member states in dealing with various categories of problems were still considered successful and promising (Heacock, 1977:26).
In approaching the task of developing national communication policy UNESCO proceeded according to a form established in the late 1950s when it tackled the problem of national education policy. It is the practice of UNESCO to carry out cycles of conferences on a given question in its areas of competence, organising a series of expert meetings, and regional, and worldwide intergovernmental conferences to formulate resolutions and compromises based on the data and opinions culled in the process (Heacock, 1977:26). It was generally held within UNESCO that a series of conferences on the development of communication policy was an obvious extension of a process begun with education policy, followed by a cycle of conferences on science and technology and then cultural policy during the 1960s. Cautious in preparing for the series of conferences, the Director-General did not grant authorisation for the first regional conference until the 17th General Conference in 1972. At that time it was decided that the first regional intergovernmental conference would be held in Latin America on the grounds that "the communication systems there were by and large more sophisticated" than elsewhere in the Third World (Heacock, 1977:26). This first regional conferences is of primary importance in the evolution of the UNESCO conflict, for it was at this conference that the western press initiated the attack on UNESCO an attack which would eventually lead to the U.S. withdrawal from the agency.

The purpose of the Latin American conference, and all future UNESCO-sponsored conferences on communication policy, was:

to exchange experience on communication systems in relation to economic and social development and to consider the establishment of governmental administrative, technical, research and training infrastructures at the national and regional level for the formulation, implementation and evaluation of communication policies (Heacock, 1977:28).
The first preparatory meeting held in Bogota in July was attended by 16 participants from various communication-related institutions: the press, universities, government, etc. In addition there were observers from international and regional organisations: the ITU, the World Bank, the OAS, the UN Development Programme, the Inter-American Centre for Higher Studies in Journalism (CIESPAL), and the UNESCO Regional Book Development Centre for Latin America. This first meeting concluded that communication is an essential auxiliary to development, and that Latin America, despite the technological over-development of communication systems, had only partial, rudimentary, obsolete and commercialised mass communication systems that did not tie in with the development plans of various countries (Heacock, 1977:30-31). It was, however, the statement supporting 'national' mass communication policies which drew all the attention. As Heacock notes,

The notion that UNESCO favored government censorship of the media became common currency, and continue to be a basic assumption in the debate over communication policies (Heacock, 1977:32).

There were three main events following Bogota and leading up to the 19th General Conference in 1976, which the western press reconfirmed for the western press this notion of state control of the media:

- at the 18th General Conference in 1974 UNESCO adopted a resolution on the right to communicate. It stated:

  all individuals should have equal opportunities to participate actively in the means of communication and to benefit from such means while preserving the right to protections against their abuses (UNESCO General Conference Resolution 4.121, 1974).
the second Latin American preparatory meeting on communications held in Quito in 1975. The recommendations focused on the need to ensure an 'optimum and equitable' flow of information among Latin American and Caribbean countries, in order to 'safeguard their sovereignty' and 'to foster development of national identity and regional awareness'. The creation of appropriate structures was called for, such as the establishment of 'national news agencies' as well as an 'agency for the region as a whole' (Heacock, 1977:33).

the Latin American intergovernmental conference on communication held in Costa Rica in 1976. It concluded that there existed an imbalance in the international flow of information which tended to be a one-way process. It recommended the establishment of policies, plans and laws to redress the balance and produce a two-way flow, involving 'proper coordination with the private and multinational sectors of the information field' (Heacock, 1977:34).

The strongest protest aimed at the intergovernmental conference on communication policy, and hence, UNESCO for initiating and sponsoring the process came from those organisations which felt threatened by the establishment of national communication policies in Latin America: the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), the Inter-American Association of Broadcasters (IAAB), the Associated Press (AP), and the United Press International (UPI). These organisations were economically threatened by the idea of national policies in Latin America which might possibly restrict their control over the flow of information. American broadcasting which had expanded into Latin America during the 1950s and 1960s held interests in the broadcasting structures and dominated broadcasting content. The press, however, with its mass distribution was even more entrenched in the Latin American information industry, as Smith notes,
Fifty per cent of world news published in the papers of South America comes from the two US agencies and a further 10 per cent from Reuters and the modern successor of Havas*, the Agency France-Press. The total amount of news taken by the principal papers of this continent from new agencies owned by countries which are members of the Third World amounts only to a few percentage points (Smith, 1980:71).

The attack upon UNESCO began after the Bogota and Quito meetings, prior to the Costa Rica conference. At that time the major U.S. and U.S.-controlled Latin American news organs began lobbying against the UNESCO-initiated conference, attempting to enlist the aid of western governments and public opinion (Heacock, 1977:40). Two of the primary themes adopted by these organisations were the 'illegality' of the recommendations promoting government control of all news media, and the 'socialist' conspiracy, linking UNESCO initiatives to socialist governments (Heacock, 1977:40). UNESCO, in an attempt to defuse the issue, asserted that the recommendations, especially those from the Bogota meeting, did not represent the organisation's opinion, but simply that of the experts who participated in the meetings. In a further attempt to distance the agency from the Bogota report, the Director-General's representative stated in a press conference that UNESCO would not accept the conclusions of the Bogota report since the document was

* Havas was the first international press agency established in connection with the development of telegraph technology. Paul Julius Reuter and Bernhard Wolff, two Havas employees set up parallel structures in England and Germany. In 1870 the three systems 'carved-up' the world market, from which Havas gained the Latin American market. Associated with the Vichy Regime, Havas was replaced after the Second World War with AFP (Smith, 1980:82).
proposing "a course of action which we consider biased and disgraceful" (Heacock, 1977:41). As Heacock notes, this concession to the media by UNESCO was clearly a mistake which encouraged the media attacks:

It is from this period (mid-March 1976) that the press campaign was stepped up and found a prominent place in US papers as well. If (as was clearly the case) Unesco itself was not responsible for the report, then it could not issue either a denial or a retraction of its conclusions. Responsibility for the proceedings had to reside with the same persons or groups, and this break in logic was bound to provide an effective foothold for further criticism, and even to invite close investigation of Unesco's future behavior (Heacock, 1977:41).

The primacy of the free flow of information in the maintenance of a democratic society and its promotion through the preservation of free enterprise became the platform from which the western media launched their attack, as a statement made by the IAAB in response to the Bogota report indicates:

freedom of expression of thought is inseparable from the freedom of initiative ...the means of communication in private hands constitutes a guarantee for the exercise of inalienable rights for every human being in a democratic society (Heacock, 1977:41).

Although a variety of officials and journalists attempted to stress the fact that the governments, and not UNESCO would be responsible for any final decisions made on communication policy, this notion was refuted by a "spate of articles in the press, supported by the statements of various leaders in
the campaign" against the inter-governmental conference in Costa Rica (Heacock, 1977:44). It was stressed in the lengthy articles prepared by the press preceding Costa Rica, that even though the final recommendations of the conference would not have force of law, they could create an atmosphere of "moral agreement" which might be irrevocable (Heacock, 1977:46). It was this attitude which significantly influenced western press analysis of the Costa Rica conference and established the basis of the debate to erupt at the 1976 General Conference in Nairobi. The western press viewed the recommendations of the Costa Rica conference as "the opening wedge of concerted efforts to transform the media into obedient instruments of government policy" thereby, posing a real threat to the free flow of information, free enterprise and ultimately the economic interests of American-controlled media in the region (Heacock, 1977:54). Although attempts were made both at Quito and Costa Rica to moderate the tone and the proposals to achieve possible compromises, this had little or no effect on antagonistic media.

Prior to the Nairobi conference it was evident that the U.S. state would take a firm stand on what was seen as UNESCO's interference with international communication structures. In response to UNESCO activities, not only in the area of communications but also in its exclusion of Israel from the European regional grouping, the U.S. had suspended its contributions to the agency as of December, 1974. By the fall of 1976, the U.S. was in arrears by $38,945,000. At the Nairobi conference, the lines of conflict clearly emerged. Director-General M'Bow, in his introductory speech before the conference denounced,
. the 'systematic' campaign being carried out against UNESCO, on the part of outside forces,
. the mobilisation by certain countries of the mass media for the purpose of systematically distorting various measures taken, and
. the financial weapon being used to force 'UNESCO's hand' on certain issues (Heacock, 1977:59).

In addition to M'Bow's speech, which defended the communication policy project, a working document, entitled Draft Declaration on Fundamental Principles Governing the Use of the Mass Media in Strengthening Peace and International Understanding and in Combating War Propaganda, Racism and Apartheid (the Mass Media Declaration) was tabled at the Nairobi General Conference. Not only did this document support the General Assembly Resolution 3379 which condemns Zionism as a form of racism, but as well, included four articles calling for specific changes in the development and use of mass communications:

. Article 4 advocated giving support to 'the establishment and furthering of national mass media in the developing countries and to the training of their personnel, so as to correct the existing disequilibrium in the circulation of information from these countries and to make a balanced exchange of information a reality for the whole of the international community.'

. Article 8 called for aiding 'the voices of those struggling against apartheid and other forms of discrimination, colonialism, neo-colonialism and foreign occupation by aggression, and unable to be heard within their own territory', by giving them 'expression through the mass media of other countries'.

. Article 11 provided that 'it is the duty of professional organisations in the field of mass communication to define and promote standards of professional ethics on a national and international level and to support their members in the responsible exercise of their profession'.
Article 12 specified that "states are responsible for the activities in the international sphere of all mass media under their jurisdiction" (Heacock, 1977:56).

Although UNESCO was prepared to make concessions on the Israeli issue, it was hoping to maintain support for communication projects. However, as Heacock observes it was the communication issues rather than the Israeli issue which was of more direct concern to the U.S.

Proposals to reform the international mass communications system represented the prospect of material transformations in which Unesco could have a hand, and which might have a crucial bearing on global processes. Those regarding Israel, on the other hand, whether its verbal condemnation, its exclusion from a regional grouping, or the withholding of funds, could in no sense affect the interests or the positions of the parties in any fundamental way (Heacock, 1977:57).

The outcome of the Nairobi conference reflected not only the sensitivity of the communication issue, but as well the power over policy granted to the major contributor, the U.S. By denying its financial support for two years, and threatening to continue to do so, the U.S. was able to dictate its terms:

- Israel gained inclusion in the European regional group
- the draft document in the mass media was deferred to the next General Conference
- the process of consensus decision-making on all 'explosive' issues replaced the majority-rule decision-making process,
the Director-General was authorised to bring together experts, governmental and non-governmental; to draft a 'definitive' project capable of getting maximum support in the area of communications (MacBride Commission). This along with the policy on consensus signified the abandonment of all previous initiatives, and the renunciation of proposals for world wide reform (Heacock, 1977:59).

In return for these concessions made by UNESCO, the U.S. made a commitment to the further development of communication facilities in the Third World. The newly elected Carter Administration indicated it was prepared to cooperate with the 'developing' countries in the establishment of centres for journalistic training and in the teaching of personnel and the adaptation of the U.S. satellite programmes to Third World needs (NACLA Report, 1982:25).

The period between the 1970 and the 1976 General Conference marks the emergence of open conflict between the United States and UNESCO. This conflict is, in fact, a manifestation of the contradiction intrinsic to the form and function of UNESCO, reflecting its dual obligation, that is, its obligation to the U.S. accumulation process and its obligation to its membership which ensures its legitimacy as a universal institution.

In sponsoring the communication policy meetings and conference in Latin America, UNESCO was responding to the request of the majority of its membership to provide support for the development of national communication policies, policies essential to the economic, social and political development of these newly-independent states. The consequence of this action, however, threatened the free flow of information principle, a
principle vital to the economic and political hegemony of the U.S. Retaliating against these UNESCO-sponsored activities, the U.S. withheld financial support. In an attempt to remove the perceived threat to the U.S. accumulation process, and hence, a threat to its own economic viability, UNESCO initiated a policy of consensus and compromise.

B. The Period of Accommodation

The period between the 19th General Conference in 1976 and the 21st General Conference in 1980 reflected a general approach based on 'detente and consensus', "a stage of mutual accommodation in a spirit of compromise" (Hamelink, 1983:69). As Hamelink reports in his examination of the relations of global communications,

The 1978 UNESCO General Conference was a turning point in the debate on the New International Information Order (NIIO), insofar as at this meeting the hostile opposition of many journalists and politicians in the First World was softened toward the introduction of NIIO. There began to be almost unanimous acceptance that Third World countries had justifiable complaints and that concessions must be made by the First World (Hamelink, 1983:69).

The most prominent example of this 'spirit of compromise' was reflected in the Mass Media Declaration adopted by acclamation by this General Conference. While acknowledging the aspirations of the developing countries for the establishment of a 'new, more just and more effective world
information and communication order' the declaration also recognised both Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1946 General Assembly's resolution on the freedom of information in developing countries for the establishment of a 'new, more just and more effective world information and communication order'. All the offensive 1976 articles had been modified or removed, and the use of 'balanced dissemination of information' was countered with reference to a 'free flow of information' as is indicated in Article I:

The strengthening of peace and international understanding, the promotion of human rights and the countering of racialism, apartheid and incitement to war demand a free flow and a wider and better balanced dissemination of information. To this end, the mass media have a leading contribution to make. This contribution will be the more effective to the extent that the information reflects the different aspects of the subject dealt with. (My emphasis)

While acknowledging the rights of member states to administer communications it committed them in Article XI to ensure the free flow of information:

For this declaration to be fully effective it is necessary, with due respect for the legislative and administrative provisions and the other obligations of Member States, to guarantee the existence of favourable conditions for the operation of the mass media, in conformity with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966. (My emphasis)

The outcome of the consensus process produced, in effect, an ambiguous document which clarified little in the development and exploitation of mass media.
Two other events at the 20th General Conference in 1978 are worthy of note. First, an interim report of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems (the MacBride Commission), established in 1977 in response to the need identified at the 1976 General Conference, was received. A resolution was adopted as a result of this report, supporting the establishment of 'a more just and effective world communication and information order'. Second, the United States introduced the idea of a programme aimed at the establishment of communication infrastructures in 'developing' countries, an idea which led to the creation of the International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC) at the 1980 General Conference.

While attempts were made at the 20th General Conference to conduct activities in the 'spirit' of cooperation there was, in fact, no effective bridging of the gap between the Third World position on the right to communicate and the U.S. insistence on maintaining the free flow of information. By combining the two concepts in the Mass Media Declaration and in the resolution on the MacBride Report, UNESCO was establishing expectations which could not be effectively fulfilled, expectations which reflect the contradiction inherent in the structure and function of the agency. The ambiguity of UNESCO's position was demonstrated during the period between the 1976 and the 1980 General Conference by the various and numerous conferences, workshops and meetings convened to address the debate (see Hamelink, 1983:61-69). Gatherings held by international organisations representing western journalists and media policy-makers expressed concern over the possible regulation of the activities of transnational information
industries under the implementation of a new international information order. These meetings stressed the need to seek cooperative methods of improving Third World communications such as training and technical development, methods which would improve Third World communication facilities without restricting the existing flow of information. Gatherings of Third World organisations, however, continued to stress the need for the decolonisation and democratisation of information and communication structures. For example, in June, 1980, prior to the 21st General Conference, the Intergovernmental Coordinating Council for Information of the Nonaligned Countries recommended that the new information order be based on:

the right of every nation to develop its own independent information system and to protect its national sovereignty and cultural identity, in particular by regulating the activities of the transnational corporations. (The meeting also stressed) the right of every nation to participate in the international exchange of information under favourable conditions in a sense of equality, justice and mutual advantage (Hamelink, 1983:68).

This development of conflicting interpretations to the 'free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information' and a 'more just and effective world communication and information order' eventually erupted at the 1980 General Conference held in Belgrade.

The period between the 1976 and the 1980 General Conference is characterised by an attempt by UNESCO to overcome the contradiction inherent in the U.S. accumulation process by promoting consensus and compromise. This attempt by UNESCO to ensure its accumulation obligation without risking its
legitimation obligation merely created an illusion of accommodation. It led to the establishment of ambiguous agreements which, in fact, replicated the contradiction. While creating a 'temporary' pause in the conflict, this approach led to the sharpening of UNESCO's internal contradiction at the 1980 General Conference when attempts were made to clarify the agreements made during this interim period.

C. The Period of Crisis

The western states went to Belgrade in 1980 confident that sufficient effort had been made to convince the Third World states that the advanced industrialised states were committed to the development and improvement of Third World communication structures. Earlier in the year, the western states had "reluctantly but firmly committed" themselves to support the creation of the IPDC, hoping,

that rich and poor countries would set aside their irreconcilable differences about the role of the media in relation to the state, and concentrate on practical cooperation. It was, some believed, a matter of tact: help would be forthcoming on the unspoken understanding that Third World governments would not insist on spelling out what they wished to do with their strengthening media (Righter, 1980:iii).

This, however, was not to be the case. Although the final report of the MacBride Commission had come out in vigorous support of the principle of free reporting, it had also produced a series of recommendations,
encouraging state regulation of the media; saying that the reporting should serve a bewildering number of just causes, and inviting UNESCO to give priority to 'the elaboration of international norms' in its communications programmes (Righter, 1980:iii).

Most of the formal speeches on the MacBride Report were "carefully decorous" (Rigber, 1980:iii). Even Director-General M'Bow's own recommendations to the General Conference on the report "were calculated to allay fears that UNESCO would pick up the ideological gauntlet" (Righter, 1980:iii). Careful to avoid endorsing a single controversial proposal, he implored the delegates to set aside their differences. The nonaligned states were not, however, about to be modified.

In a strongly worded resolution on the MacBride Report the nonaligned states directly challenged the west's view that a new order should be a process to be worked towards and not a set of conditions to be met. Within the resolution the nonaligned states set out their conditions, conditions which they maintained were non-negotiable. A new order they asserted should be based on:

- non-interference in the internal affairs of other states,
- the right of people... to comprehensive and true information, and
- the right of each nation to inform the world about its affairs and to protect its cultural and social identity against the false or distorted information which may cause harm to itself or jeopardise friendly relations between nations (Righter, '1980:iii).
Despite the apparently inflexible position of the nonaligned states, a compromise was achieved. Within the final resolution (21 C/Resolution 4.19) the overtly restrictive sections were eliminated (i.e. non-interference... and the right of each nation to protect...). Included within the resolution was reference to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as direct reference to freedom of the press and information, and freedom of journalists and all professionals in the communication media (Article VI:14 a.v and vi). However, in addition to the recognition of the free flow of information in its various forms, there was also recognition of the right to communicate. Article VI included:

- the elimination of the imbalances and in equalities which characterise the present situation,
- the elimination of the negative effects of certain monopolies, public or private; and excessive concentrations,
- the capacity of developing countries to achieve improvements of their own situation... by making their information and communication media suitable to their needs and aspirations,
- the respect for the right of all people to participate in the international exchanges of information on the basis of equality, justice and mutual benefit, and
- the respect for the right of the public, of ethnic and social groups and of individuals to have access to information sources and to participate actively in the communication process.

This incorporation of both the free flow of information principle and the notion of the right to communicate may have permitted consensus to be achieved on this controversial issue, but it in no way resolved the fundamental conflict. If anything the resolution intensified the conflict
by authorising UNESCO in "its short-term and medium-term activities to contribute to the clarification, elaboration and application of the concept" of the 'new order' (Article VI:15). It soon became apparent that any attempt by UNESCO to define and implement the conflicting objectives of this 'order' would increase hostilities, polarise positions and threaten the future operation of the agency.

The first indication that the conflict had become intensified was in the press reporting about the 1980 General Conference. The U.S. National News Council, in a study of the news coverage of the 1980 Belgrade General Conference, reported that of 206 editorials from U.S. newspapers, 181 dealt exclusively with the communication debate, ignoring all other activities of UNESCO discussed at the Conference. In an examination of the 181 editorials, the News Council notes that,

Without exception, the editorials expressed apprehension about UNESCO's involvement in attempts to establish policy in matters affecting the worldwide flow of information. In 158 cases the editorials were strongly hostile, to the point in 27 papers of suggesting United States withdrawal from UNESCO if it persisted in moves deemed destructive of press freedom. The remaining 23 editorials, though critical of developments at Belgrade, were moderate in tone and endeavoured to explain why many developing countries felt changes in existing communications relationship were needed (Raskin, 1981:2).

The News Council notes that the news events that got the widest press use and the greatest prominence tended to be those that reinforced the fears expressed on editorial pages. The Council describes the general distribution of one particular article:
One AP story carried in fifteen papers (the largest total for any single article) appeared in differing versions for morning and afternoon subscribers. The lead for A.M. papers read: "Communist and Third World members of UNESCO overrode Western objections and pushed through several proposals to break what they consider the West's dominance of global communications and international news distribution." In the P.M. story the lead had been sharpened to read: "Communist and Third World nations used their majority in UNESCO to pass resolutions aimed at getting more control over international news reporting." This revision prompted headlines such as this one in The Helena (Mont.) Independent-Record, "UNESCO Votes to Muzzle Press" (Raskin, 1981:2).

This general 'apprehension' by the U.S. press, whether genuine or manufactured, came to reflect, as well as contribute to, the increased suspicion with which the U.S. regarded UNESCO activities, prior to its withdrawal. Further indications of this mounting hostility include:

- U.S. congressional hearings, conducted by two subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee through 1981 and 1982, reviewing U.S. participation in UNESCO.

- U.S. State Department intervention to ensure U.S. participation at, and press access to, UNESCO-sponsored 'Consultative Meeting on the Protection of Journalists' held 16-17 February, 1981. The State Department indicated that its contribution to UNESCO's Regular Programme might be at 'risk' if the meeting of experts (generally closed meetings) was not open to both the U.S. and the press (Howkins, 1981:44).

- A meeting in Talloires, France (15 May 1981) of 70 delegations representing the 'leaders of free journalism'. At this meeting, sponsored by the American-based World Press Freedom Committee*, UNESCO and the New World Information and Communication Order were attacked. The participants committed themselves to improving and defending the 'free flow of information worldwide' (NACLA, 1982:26; Mattelant, Delcourt and Mattlart, 1984:12).

- Vice President Bush, former UN ambassador (1971-72) speaking at a UN Association banquet, warned the UN that it should cease being 'a podium from which a radical nation or movement can make propaganda,' and advised UNESCO to put an end to its 'efforts to set guidelines for the press,' stating that efforts to establish 'international censorship' was a matter that had strong opposition from President Reagan (NACLA, 1982:149).
appointments by the Reagan Administration to the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, of new members strongly opposed to UNESCO and to American contributions to its programmes (Tehranian, 1984:149).

the suspension of government financial support by the Reagan Administration, for the National Commission, financial support upon which the Commission relies to operate a headquarters secretariat and fund essential activities (Tehranian, 1984:149-150).

at a Round Table on a New World Information and Communication Order, sponsored by the UN and UNESCO, held 14-19 September 1983, the American participant stated that his country opposed international norms for the media, but backed efforts to reduce inequalities in the information and communication fields. He also noted that the 'monopoly' charge levelled at the big wire agencies was not valid (UNESCO, 22 C/96 Add.).

With this growing animosity towards UNESCO, both from the media industry and the Reagan Administration, the U.S. delegation was sent off to the 1983 General Conference in Paris with a list of instructions,

- to ensure to the extent possible that the conference was non-politicised; that is, that debate focused on UNESCO's programme and budget for the next two years, the subject of the conference, rather than on international politics;

- to eliminate from UNESCO's communications sector programmes that would limit press freedom or the free flow of information throughout the world. Additionally, if possible, to introduce into UNESCO programmes western free press concepts and values;

- to bring the proposed budget down to acceptable levels, that is, to zero real programme growth with significant absorption of inflationary costs;

- to make a clear distinction in UNESCO programmes between traditionally recognised human rights and emerging peoples' rights concepts that need additional definition and study;

- to deflect the Soviet drive to increase the number of UNESCO programmes centered on peace and disarmament;

* The World Press Freedom Committee was established in May, 1976 by a group of international journalists to 'unify the free world media for major threats that develop'. It has, in its own words, 'united under one banner 32 journalistic organisations, making it a strong global voice against those who advocate state-controlled media; those who seek
to steer the organisation toward a more western orientation in a number of activities, including elections of individuals to leadership positions and elections of member states to the organisation's various boards and committees (Hennelly, 1984: 174-175).

The 1983 General Conference turned out to be, in the words of Hennelly, the Head of the U.S. delegation, "the least politicised in recent memory" (Hennelly, 1984:175). The Conference was marked by a significant shift away from any practical interpretation of the new information order. A "new and more liberal interpretation" of the 'order' was agreed to by the delegates (InterMedia, 1984:5). This included the rejection of Article VI:15 in favour of an 'evolving process'. While maintaining a commitment to establishing a New World Information and Communication Order, this process would ensure a slow development of the concept in place of a clarified list of conditions to be met. However, despite the attempts to accommodate western, primarily U.S., concerns the U.S. formally announced on December 29, 1983 its intent to withdraw from the agency the following year.

The withdrawal of the U.S. from UNESCO, signifies the inability of this agency to formulate policy capable of addressing accumulation-related problems in its environment without heightening its own internal contradiction. The attempts to establish policy based on the ideal of consensus and compromise, while temporarily defusing the tensions, heightened the frustration of the Third World states leading them to assume a far more aggressive stance at the 1980 General Conference. This in turn provoked the U.S. withdrawal and, once again, threatened the economic survival of UNESCO.

The withdrawal by the United States at the end of 1984 and the withdrawal of the United Kingdom the following year have forced significant
changes within the operation of UNESCO. Not only has the loss of revenue resulted in a reassessment of projects, but it has contributed to efforts to decentralise the activities, encouraging a regional approach to the development and administration of approved programmes and projects (Report to the Executive Board, 125 EX/20, 1986). Under the Communication Programme the New World Information and Communication Order continues to survive, although now with an orientation which emphasises practical action as opposed to conceptual elaborations. Under Major Programme III: Communication in the service of man the general line of emphasis is, to contribute to the establishment of a more equitable situation in the field of communication and the media, encouraging, inter alia, the growth of the developing countries' own capacities and a free flow and a wider and better balanced dissemination of a new world information and communication order seen as an evolving and continuous process (Executive Board, 121 EX/Decisions Corr.)

This general definition of the programme incorporates the conflict, yet under present constraints less emphasis has been placed on the study of the new order as an evolving process, and more on the technical application through the training of communication personnel; the establishment of appropriate infrastructures and facilities for the production, dissemination and exchange of news and programmes; and the strengthening of the IPDC. This is not to imply that the conflict has been resolved. Even if the action taken by the U.S. forces further compromises in the 'evolution' of the New World Information and Communication Order to ensure the survival of the agency, the conflict will merely be circumvented. It is a conflict which can never be effectively resolved within the existing structure and function of UNESCO.
D. Conclusion

As has been the traditional function of UNESCO, the agency has responded to the needs identified by its membership in areas related to education, science and technology, culture and mass communications. It has supported the development of policy (national, regional and international) in these specific fields by sponsoring intergovernmental conferences to formulate resolutions and compromises. In doing so UNESCO is fulfilling its mandate to "contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among nations..." (UNESCO Constitution, Article I:1). The issue of communication policy surfaced at the 1970 General Conference in response to the growing awareness of Third World states to the rapid changes taking place within communication technology and the serious economic, cultural and political implication of this technology. Until this time the contradiction inherent within UNESCO had not emerged. Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s UNESCO had functioned in accordance with free-trade liberalism, promoting the free flow of information, and hence, contributing to the expansion of U.S. capitalism and with it U.S. domination over the international flow of information.

During the 1960s, however, the UN underwent a significant transition with the influx of the newly-independent Asian and African states. No longer dominated by the allies of western capitalism, the UN began to function in accordance with the needs, expectations and ideals of a new majority. It was with the emergence of these new states that the tension between the free flow of information and the right to communicate began to
emerge within the communication-related bodies of the UN. As early as 1963 these new states began to challenge the established method of regulating the structures of international communication. In the ITU, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Asian and African states, along with growing support from the Latin American states, steadily gained recognition of their particular needs. Within COPUOUS the Third World states represented a significant force demanding the establishment of guidelines for the development and exploitation of direct satellite broadcasting technology. It was activities such as these which eventually brought the free flow of information and the right to communicate debate into UNESCO in the 1970s.

Until the early 1970s, UNESCO could fulfill its dual obligation to the accumulation process and to its membership without aggravating its internal contradiction. This is not to imply that the contradiction would have not emerged without the newly-independent states demanding access to and participation in the management of international flow of information. Rather it is possible to suggest that the contradiction would have eventually become manifest in another form, another conflict among the participating states. In fact, it is possible to suggest that the limited support for the U.S. position not only in UNESCO, but as well, in the ITU and COPUOS* indicates that conflict would have eventually emerged among the western capitalist states. This sudden increase in membership merely sharpened the existing contradictions, and by doing so, challenged U.S. hegemonic control.

* Within both the ITU and COPUOS the U.S. has increasingly been at odds with the other western capitalist states over the management of DBS technology (see Queeny, 1978 and Codding, 1980).
By the 1970s the Third World states, led by the Nonaligned Movement, began pressing for a New World Economic Order. Recognising the linkage between economic development and access to and participation in communication structures, these states pressured UNESCO to engage in a process of communication reform. UNESCO by responding to this pressure was, in fact, addressing a contradiction in the accumulation process of these Third World states; that is, their economic viability was dependent upon support (loans, grants, aid and investment) from the advanced industrial states, yet this support rather than contributing to economic, social and political development, was in fact, diminishing it. UNESCO through its sponsorship of intergovernmental conferences on communication policy was assuming a 'reactive mediator' role, responding to a perceived threat to the development of the accumulation process of the Third World states. It was this action, however, heightened the contradiction intrinsic to UNESCO's structure and function, by threatening U.S. accumulation process and as a result threatened its economic viability.

In attempting to examine the reactionary stance taken by the American press, the IAPA and IAAB to the 1974 Bogota recommendation of government established national mass communication policies, it is necessary to place it within a broader context and acknowledge other factors which might have influenced this reaction: Vietnam, Watergate, the OPEC oil embargo. The United States was in an extremely defensive position at this time. The recommendation from Bogota, Quito and Costa Rica calling for a closer examination of the international flows of information, along with the activities in the ITU and COPUOS were bound to elicit very strong reactions from the industry which dominates Latin American communication structures.
In order to preserve its control over the international flows of information, and thus, the economic stability of the industries structured upon the unrestricted flow of information, it was necessary for the U.S. state to intervene in, a 'reactive mediator' form. The U.S. state was forced to intervene in reaction to an anticipated threat to the U.S. commodity form of value, and hence, to its political power. Prior to the 1976 General Conference in Nairobi, the U.S. state intervened first, by suspending its contributions to the agency in December, 1974* and second, by sending two State Department officials as observers to the Quito meeting in June, 1975, thus signalling the importance it attached to the issues under debate. At the 1976 General Conference the U.S. continued to express its displeasure with both the UNESCO-sponsored conference on communication policy and the 1974 resolution on the right to communicate. Once again the U.S. state forcefully intervened, threatening to continue the suspension of its contributions if major concessions were not made by the agency in support of the free flow of information. It was this ultimatum by the U.S. which further heightened UNESCO's internal contradiction by forcing it to formulate policy which would appease the U.S. by not threatening its accumulation process, yet at the same time be acceptable to its membership.

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* Heacock notes that by the fall of 1976 the U.S. was in arrears by $38,945,000 for the years 1975 and 1976. Contributions from Nigeria, Yugoslavia and a group of Arab states amounted to slightly over $20 million attempted to compensate for that loss (Heacock, 1977:58).
According to Offe's analysis, when the state engages in formulating public policy, it confronts two problems simultaneously. It must deal with the problem issuing from the environment, while it attempts to determine the best approach for solving the problem. As Offe states the relationship between these two processes are interconnected in a circular way. The problem identified by the state may,

trigger off changes in the formal strategies according to which the state operates, and conversely these formal strategies may substantially determine both the ability of the state to perceive problems and the nature of the ensuing policies (Offe, 1975:135).

Offe maintains, however, that no matter what strategy the state adopts to formulate policy to address the problem in the environment, the contradiction internal to the state, that is, the contradiction between its dual obligation will be sharpened. In other words, there is an imbalance in the relationship between the internal policy production rules and the functions relating to the accumulation process (Offe, 1975:135). This same imbalance can be identified within the form and function of UNESCO.

Until 1976 the decision-making process within UNESCO functioned on the basis of one state, one vote-majority rule. It was this process which promoted UNESCO to address the communication-related problems in the Third World and led to the adoption of the right to communicate resolution at the
1974 General Conference. This formal strategy, not only identified the problem in the environment to be addressed and determined how UNESCO would respond, but as a result it determined the nature of new problems emerging within the environment. It was in response to the majority-rule principle, which instigated the process of communication reform in the Third World, that the U.S., with its accumulation process now threatened, suspended its contributions to the agency. This in turn, created a new problem for UNESCO. To ensure its economic viability, UNESCO had to preserve the U.S. accumulation process. In response to this problem, UNESCO again assuming a 'reactive mediator' stance altered its decision-making process. At the 1976 General Conference the majority rule process was replaced by a consensus format for highly sensitive issues. This, however, solved neither problem. It did not secure the U.S. accumulation process, nor did it enhance communication policy development in the Third World. It merely created an illusion of accommodation which only served to heightened UNESCO's structural contradiction.

At the 1980 General Conference when the MacBride Commission presented its recommendations, the conflict, which had been circumvented during the 1978 General Conference, resurfaced. The Third World states demanded clarification of the Commission's recommendations, calling for the establishment of specific principles which would lead to the creation of a New World Information and Communication Order. It was this action by these states which once again promoted the U.S. state to actively intervene to protect the free flow of information and the U.S. accumulation process.
Although indications of mounting U.S. resistance to UNESCO's support of the Third World position resulted in a more accommodating approach at the 1983 General Conference, it was too late to appease the U.S. state. In order to secure its institutional self-preservation, UNESCO must devise either a new policy or a different decision-making format.

Although a reform process has been introduced and significant concessions have been made to the American position (i.e. budget reductions and an abandonment of any attempt to conceptually define the New World Information and Communication Order or the right to communicate), this action has been insufficient to guarantee U.S. financial support, and thus, secure the financial base of UNESCO. Even if further concessions are made or the present U.S. Administration is replaced by a more moderate Administration, it is unlikely that any long-term resolution to the conflict will be achieved. Any resolution would require either the absolute abandonment of a New World Information and Communication Order or the willingness of the U.S. to accept a complete restructuring of international communication structures. Either possibility is unrealistic given the linkage between communication and the accumulation process. Only by eliminating the contradiction intrinsic to the form and function of UNESCO can this conflict be adequately resolved.
CONCLUSIONS

The focus of this study has been the present crisis in UNESCO. Within this study I have attempted to clarify the reasons for the U.S. withdrawal from this specialised agency of the United Nations. It was not my intent to enter into a debate regarding the legitimacy of the U.S. action. Rather, my primary concern was to move beyond a superficial examination of the issues to critically analyse the relationship between the U.S. and UNESCO. In other words, rather than focusing on the content of the issues, I wished to discern the processes which led to the emergence of these particular issues, in this particular agency, during this particular period.

To facilitate my examination of the UNESCO crisis from this perspective, I have drawn on the theoretical work of Claus Offe. Offe's theory of the state in late capitalism illuminates the UNESCO crisis in two ways. First Offe's interpretation provides insight into the economic, political and ideological relationship between the United States and UNESCO, insight which leads to the identification of this agency as part of the 'historically accumulated network of legal formalism' of the U.S. state. Second, placed within this context it is possible to identify within UNESCO the contradiction intrinsic to the capitalist state, a contradiction which has become manifest within the communication-related activities of UNESCO and has led to the current crisis situation in the agency.
By applying Offe's analysis to the United States in the post-World War II period, I have attempted to establish a link between the activities of the U.S. state and the crisis within UNESCO. In the postwar period the U.S. state actively intervened in the production process to ensure the high level of productivity achieved by U.S. industry during the war. The state intervened at two separate, yet interrelated levels. At the international level the U.S. state directed the creation of an international system to promote international stability and free-trade liberalism. Central to this new economic order was the free flow of information principle, a principle which promoted the unrestricted flow of U.S. goods, services, technology and capital throughout the world. At the national level the U.S. state, reacting to the perceived or anticipated threat of communist expansion, sponsored the research and development of computer-communication technology. Under the market-oriented notion of public interest this technology was quickly adapted and exploited for U.S. commercial interests. It has been the combination of these two forms of intervention along with other various economic, political and social factors which has contributed, on the one hand to the U.S. domination of international communication structures, yet on the other hand to the emergence of conflict and crisis within UNESCO.

Offe maintains that while efforts of the state to intervene in the production process may temporarily alleviate the effects of the contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production, eventually these contradictions will reemerge. By the mid-1960s the contradictions inherent in the U.S. postwar policy began to surface. Not only were Japan and the Europeans states beginning to effectively compete with their postwar
benefactor, but as well the institutions devised to ensure an international environment compatible to the development and expansion of the U.S. accumulation process, were beginning to function in a manner contrary to American interests.

In order to promote a stable international environment, the UN had to be universally recognised as a legitimate international organisation. However, to ensure its legitimacy the UN had to respond, or at least appear to respond, to the needs of its membership. Through the 1960s and into the 1970s the membership of the UN came to be dominated by newly-independent Third World states whose needs and demands challenged U.S. control of the international system. Although evident throughout the UN system, this conflict is most obvious within UNESCO.

Within UNESCO this conflict emerged as the agency, in response to its membership began to promote the concept of the 'right to communicate' a concept which directly challenged the free flow of information principle, and hence, the U.S. accumulation process. However, given UNESCO's economic dependency upon the U.S. and is accumulation process, UNESCO was threatening its own viability by supporting the right to communicate. This became evident first in 1976 when the U.S. threatened to continue the suspension of its contributions if certain concessions were not made. Confronted with this threat to its own economic survival, UNESCO attempted to formulate a policy which would respond to the contradiction inherent in the U.S. accumulation process. Although a policy based on consensus and accommodation was agreed upon in 1976, it merely served to heighten UNESCO's internal contradiction,
that is, its obligation to its membership and to the U.S. accumulation process. Conflict once again erupted at the 1980 General Conference, with the Third World states assuming a far more aggressive stance in their endeavour to achieve the right to communicate. In response to this overt aggression the U.S. withdrew from UNESCO in December, 1984.

The withdrawal from UNESCO by the U.S. has created a crisis situation within the agency. Seeking its own institution self-preservation UNESCO has embarked on a reform process to once again secure U.S. economic support. While not attempting to speculate on the outcome of this crisis, it is possible to suggest that given a combination of factors (the reform process, the retirement of Director-General M'Bow and the upcoming American presidential elections) a period of accommodation might, once again, be achieved. However, it must be recognised, that such accommodation would merely circumvent the conflict, without resolving either the contradiction inherent in the U.S. accumulation process, nor the contradiction intrinsic to UNESCO.

Although this study has focused on the relationship between the United States and UNESCO, in a more general way it provides insight into the relationship between the U.S. and the entire UN system. Since the 1970s the U.S. has been at odds with various U.S. bodies including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outerspace (COPUOS), as well as the General Assembly. While not implying
that Offe's approach is equally adaptable to an analysis of all U.S.-related conflict in all UN bodies, it is possible to suggest that, taking into consideration the particular circumstances and the various structures and functions these bodies present, Offe's approach could provide significant insight.

As well, Offe's theory of the state in late capitalism should be applicable to an analysis of the relationship between any advanced capitalist state and UNESCO. However, in order to understand the reaction of the other western capitalist states to the crisis in UNESCO, it is necessary to recognise that the stance assumed by each state reflects a historical conjuncture particular to that state. In other words, it is misleading to assume homogeneity amongst the western capitalist states. Any examination of the other western capitalist states and their relationship to UNESCO would have to proceed along a format similar to that used in this study to identify the economic, political and ideological linkages particular to each state.


"Britain, Threatens to Leave UNESCO," The Ottawa Citizen, 2 November 1984.


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