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FEDERALISM AND THE NAVAL CRISIS OF 1793

by

William Stewart Cormack, B.A.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Department of History
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May, 1985
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"Federalism and the Naval Crisis of 1793"

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
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ABSTRACT

In July of 1793, the French naval port of Toulon experienced a municipal revolution in which the Sections assumed control of the city and purged the local administration. Toulon's subsequent defiance of National Authority, in the context of the 'Federalist Revolt,' and its eventual surrender to British Admiral Hood have often been attributed to a 'Federalist,' or Royalist conspiracy. So too has the September, 1793, mutiny of the Brest Fleet in Quiberon Bay which broke out following the announcement of events at Toulon. The gravity of the situation led the Committee of Public Safety to dispatch its naval expert, Jeanbon Saint-André, to Brest. The Quiberon Mutiny, and the loss of the Mediterranean Fleet, which had surrendered at Toulon, collectively constituted the Naval Crisis of 1793. This study examines the validity of the 'conspiracy thesis' for both Toulon and Brest in regard to the situations of local conflict in both ports, and aboard the Fleets: conflicts which indicate a fundamental division among Revolutionaries.
The problems of sources for this study were considerable. Due to inability to gain access to French Archives, total reliance had to be placed upon Published Primary Sources, supported by appropriate Secondary works. However, since this investigation of 'Federalist Revolt' and Naval Crisis was much concerned with motivations and loyalties, published contemporary mémoires were extremely valuable. But these books are difficult to get hold of and, instead of an exhaustive survey of all pertinent mémoires and journals, this study focuses on a few of the most useful.

Louis Richaud's, Mémoires sur la Révolte de Toulon et l'Emigration, completed in 1809, is the account, not only of an eyewitness, but of an active participant in Toulon's revolt and 'treasonous' surrender to Admiral Hood. Richaud was a royalist, but the editors of the 1930 edition of his Mémoires claim that his narrative is sincere, accurate on details and relatively disinterested: unlike many Royalists, Richaud was not attempting to win favour from the court of the restored Bourbon Monarchy.

Another Mémoires useful for both its outline of events
and revelation of attitudes is M.Z. Pons' *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de la ville de Toulon en 1793* of 1825. Pons was a contemporary, if somewhat obscure, witness. Although he was also a moderate royalist by sympathy, his perspective differs from that of Richaud. Pons' *Mémoires* is extremely valuable for its rich *Pièces justificatives*, which include all the key documents concerning Toulon's revolt.

For the reactions of the Mediterranean Fleet to the events in Toulon, this study relied heavily upon the anonymous "*Journal d'un Ponantais de l'Apollon*," edited by Edmond Poupé and published in *Revue historique de la Révolution Française*, 1911. Poupé includes an excellent collection of supporting documents, which were extremely useful regarding the resistance of the Fleet to Toulon's surrender.

Turning to the situation in Brest and the Quiberon Mutiny, the key primary source is Jeanbon Saint-André's *Rapport sur les mouvements qui ont eu lieu sur l'Escadre de la République, commandée par le Vice-Amiral Morard-de-Galles, et sur sa rentée à Brest, fait au Représentant du Peuple auprès de l'Armée navale*. Not only is the Report a detailed description of events, but it is fundamental to discussion of the 'conspiracy thesis' interpretation of these events. Furthermore, Jeanbon included valuable supporting documents, among them the letters of Vice Admiral Morard de Galles to the Minister of the Navy. The investigations of the Revolutionary
Government's response to the Naval Crisis at Brest and at Toulon utilized the extensive collection of reports, correspondence and related documents in Aulard's *Recueil des Actes du Comité de Salut Public*.

Much of the material I needed came from the libraries of other universities and I wish to acknowledge the help and cooperation I received from the staff of the Inter-Library Loans Department of Carleton University Library. Furthermore, I must thank J. Palin of Special Collections for all his assistance. Finally I would like to thank Jane Harrison and Charles Trainor for all their help and support in its various forms, particularly in the final preparation of this text.

W.S.C.
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CHAPTER 1: PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION

In 1793, the French Republic, engaged in a life and death struggle with most of Europe, was confronted by the apparent ruin of its navy. The Naval Crisis, part of the broad picture of national emergency, was inextricably linked with the political situation. For beside the dangers from foreign invasion and Royalist insurrection in the Vendée, the authority of the National Government was threatened by a division of French Republicans. It has been generally accepted that during the spring and summer of 1793, there was widespread opposition to the Montagnard-dominated Convention in what became known as the 'Federalist Revolt.' Local Authorities, including many Departmental Directories and the municipal bodies of some major cities, expressed outrage over the May 31 - June 2 purge of the Convention. Committees of resistance were formed, often encouraged by outlawed or fugitive deputies, and the proposition was made to convene an alternative national assembly at Bourges. In some areas, protest led to armed revolt with the levy of Departmental Armies to march on Paris. The most dramatic manifestations of this revolt involved the cities of Caen, Bordeaux, Nîmes, Lyons, Marseilles, and the great naval base
of Toulon. Indeed, Toulon's defiance of the National Government became the most critical. In August, the 'Federalists' of that city surrendered the port and the French Mediterranean Fleet to the British. (1)

Toulon's 'treason' represented the climax of events begun in July when Toulon experienced a municipal revolution. The Sections, the city's electoral bodies, were convened in defiance of the Municipal Authorities. A Comité Général, elected by the sectionnaries, proceeded to close the Jacobin Club and purge the local administration. Having secured its position in Toulon, the General Committee of the Sections began to defy the National Convention, celebrating union with the rebellious Marseillais and finally refusing to comply with a decree from the Committee of Public Safety to cut off all assistance to that city. The events which followed are well known. (2) In August the Marseillais Departmental Army was routed by armed forces of the Convention under General Carteaux, and representatives of the Marseilles Sections entered into negotiations with


(2) For the classic account of the opening of Toulon's Sections and the subsequent development of the revolt, see Paul Cottin, Toulon et les Anglais en 1793, (Paris, 1898), pp. 40-41, 47, 79-94.
Admiral Hood, commanding the British Fleet cruising off shore and blockading the French Fleet in Toulon. The Toulon General Committee also began to negotiate with Hood and, with the fall of Marseilles, the Toulonnais accepted Hood's offer of military alliance and accepted the restoration of Louis XVII. The naval base was surrendered to the British and at one stroke the Republic lost the bulk of French Naval Forces in the Mediterranean.

The impact of the 'treason' of Toulon in Paris and throughout France was dramatic. (1) Moreover, the disaster sent shockwaves through the Atlantic Fleet. (2) Based primarily in Brest, which was also a scene of 'Federalist' protest, the Fleet was suffering from material deficiencies and insubordination. In September, when news of the events at Toulon reached the Fleet in Quiberon Bay, discipline collapsed. To prevent several men-of-war from sailing without orders, the commanding officer, Vice-Admiral Morard de Galles, held a council of representatives from all vessels aboard his flagship. In defiance of the Admiral the council decided to send two delegate's, one to the Convention and one

(1) See for example, M.J. Sydenham, The First French Republic, 1792-1804, (Los Angeles, 1973), p. 16: "Although coercive government was already developing apace, it was this event which led directly to the formal inauguration of the Terror."

(2) For a standard account of the Mutiny on Quiberon Bay, see E. Chevallier, Histoire de la Marine française sous la première République, (Paris, 1886), pp. 98-102.
to a *repré sentant-en-mission* ashore, to demand that the Fleet return to Brest. But the crews would not wait for orders, and even the arrival of the *conventionnel* Trehouart could not prevent the Fleet's return to Brest against the wishes of the Revolutionary Government. Since the Mediterranean Fleet had been surrendered at Toulon, Morard de Galles' squadron represented the mainstay of French naval force. Consequently, in deadly fear of a repetition of the events at Toulon, the Committee of Public Safety sent two of its own members, Jeanbon Saint-André and Prieur de la Marne, to Brest with orders to save the Republic's navy.

In dispatching its naval expert, Jeanbon Saint-André, to Brest, the Revolutionary Government seemed to believe that Breton 'Federalism' and the Quiberon Mutiny were part of the same problem. The connection was indisputable at Toulon where the loss of the Mediterranean Fleet was inseparable from Toulonnais resistance to the Convention.

The surrender of Toulon, as the coincidence of 'Federalist Revolt' and naval disaster, will be the primary focus of this study. However, it will be suggested that the entire Naval Crisis, which included the Mutiny of the Brest Fleet, was linked to political conflict ashore. Therefore it will be necessary to establish some understanding of the 'Federalist Revolt.' This phenomenon has not been easily

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explained by historians. Its complexity, and the problems in its interpretation, may become apparent with a brief survey of 'Federalism' as it appears in the mainstream of French Revolutionary Scholarship.

Histories of the French Revolution written in the nineteenth century tended to view Federalism in strictly political terms, and particularly in those sympathetic to the 'Girondin' deputies. The outstanding work in this school, and indeed the first attempt to examine Federalism on a national scale, was Henri Wallon's *La Révolution du 31 mai et le fédéralisme en 1793*. As the title implies, Wallon saw the revolt as a direct response to the rising of May 31 and June 2, when the Montagnards' opponents, conveniently referred to as the 'Girondins', were purged from the Convention.(1) The departments, which had opposed 'factions' and 'anarchy' in Paris, saw this as an assault against national sovereignty invested in elected representatives. Trying to group themselves together, often around urban centres, they sought to reestablish this sovereignty, demanding that the Convention answer to all of France, not Paris alone.(2) Thus Wallon felt that Federalism, though often weak, was animated by National, and not Provincial, sentiment.

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This interpretation was modified early in the twentieth century by the great republican scholar Alphonse Aulard. Aulard viewed the revolt in political terms, but favoured the Montagnards, particularly his hero Danton, as the staunch supporters of the Republic. Like most historians, he did not believe that the 'Girondins' and their supporters were federalists in the literal sense of desiring the creation of a federal system of government. (1) The difference separating them from the Montagnards, according to Aulard, was a differing conception of the role which Paris should play: the Mountain saw Paris as the ruling capital of a united republic; the 'Girondins' disputed its supremacy over the departments, even in time of war. (2) Therefore, the Revolt was inspired by fear of a Parisian dictatorship. Although Aulard did not equate Federalism with royalism, he did maintain that royalists were aided by parallel action and that they were able to turn the anti-Parisian movement to their advantage, as in the case of Toulon. (3) In discussing the relationship between Federalism and events in the Convention, Aulard suggested


(2) Ibid., III, pp. 54-55. Aulard uses citations from the speeches of various deputies to support his argument.

(3) Ibid., II, p. 309.
that May 31 - June 2 was a defensive reaction to what was preparing in the provinces. (1) Thus he reintroduced the concept of a Federalist Conspiracy, the existence of which had been proclaimed by the Mountain. (2)

This idea of a plot was prominent in the work of Aulard's former student, Albert Mathiez. If Wallon's interpretation of Federalism had been biased toward the 'Girondin' view, Mathiez reflected the interpretation espoused by the Jacobins. Mathiez was convinced that the revolt was, as Robespierre had claimed, the result of a conspiracy hatched in Paris by resentful 'Girondin' deputies. (3) In the provinces, it was the work of rich property-owners in departemental and district administrations, and received little support from the more popular communes. Indeed, as a Marxist, Mathiez termed the revolt an expression of bourgeois class selfishness. (4) Like Aulard, he did not see Federalists as royalists, but Mathiez was adamant that there was no room for a third party in Revolutionary France, and that the revolt's success could

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(1) Ibid., III, p. 108.


(4) Ibid., pp. 336, 340.
only have led to a monarchist restoration. (1) This reflected the Jacobin charge that Federalism equalled counter-revolution.

In the writings of Georges Lefebvre, perhaps the preeminent historian of the French Revolution, the emphasis in the interpretation of Federalism was shifted away from conspiracy and towards different conceptions of government involved in the conflict. He argued that the 'Girondins,' to oppose what they saw as the centralizing dictatorship of the Mountain, called on local administrative bodies and encouraged their passion for autonomy. For Lefebvre it was not literal federalism which was involved, but, even more reprehensible, particularism. (2) According to Lefebvre, the urge towards extreme decentralization led to the 'sectional movement,' in which local bodies declared themselves sovereign in opposition to national unity. (3) Although fundamentally connected to the political struggle between the Mountain and the 'Girondins,' Lefebvre claimed that Federalism attracted a wide spectrum of anti-Montagnard sentiment. This undermined the revolt's cohesion. Moreover, Lefebvre argued that the revolt lacked popular

(1) Ibid., p. 340.


(3) Lefebvre, The French Revolution: From 1793 to 1799, p. 56.
support because it was essentially a bourgeois movement of little interest to the masses. (1)

Lefebvre, like Mathiez, was a Marxist historian, but it was in the interpretation of his successor at the Sorbonne, Albert Soboul, that class struggle became the truly central explanation for the 'Federalist Revolt.' Although regional particularism remained an issue, according to Soboul the prime motivation for Federalism was the solidarity of class interests. The provincial bourgeoisie dominated departmental administrations and were concerned about threats to their property and the extreme democracy represented by the Revolutionary Government. (2) The revolt lacked popular support because the workers were unwilling to fight for the rich. Soboul did concede, however, that Federalist leaders were sincere republicans who were unwilling to follow reactionaries and royalists.

From this sketch of the evolution of the interpretation of the 'Federalist Revolt' in the mainstream of French scholarship certain themes have emerged. Beginning with Wallon and continuing down to Lefebvre, virtually all historians have tended to approach Federalism as merely a reflection of the political struggle between the Montagnards and their so-called 'Girondin' opponents. Related to this

(1) Ibid., p. 57.
was the theory, espoused by the Jacobins and given new vigour by Mathiez, that the 'Federalist Revolt' in the provinces was part of a sinister plot against the Republic. Finally, historiography which has recently dominated study of the Revolution has been Marxist and has dismissed Federalism as a manifestation of bourgeois class interests.

These themes have proved both controversial and unsatisfying to many modern historians. The Jacobin concept of a Girondist conspiracy must be seriously questioned, particularly since even the existence of a definable, coherent Girondin party has been convincingly disputed. (1) The conspiracy thesis has hindered understanding of Federalism generally, and particularly so for the revolt of Toulon, for which interpretations have relied heavily on the existence of a conspiracy involving Royalist machinations. As for viewing the 'Federalist Revolt' as an episode of class struggle, recent local studies have presented evidence suggesting a significant degree of popular support for Federalism which the Marxist interpretation has been unable

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to explain satisfactorily. (1) Although the class analysis cannot be dismissed, its explanation for Federalism would seem too simplistic to be accepted without serious reservations. Modern regional studies have also gone beyond interpreting the revolt simply in terms of an extension of the conflict in the Convention. But since they have focused on Federalism in specific locales, they do not offer a broad, national analysis to rival older accounts. The need to fill this vacuum was asserted in a recent article by Michael Sydenham. (2) Sydenham argued that Federalism should be seen to have arisen from a fundamental division of Republicans throughout France which had been growing since the fall of the Monarchy.

A recent attempt at a national synthesis was Bill Edmonds' article, "'Federalism' and Urban Revolt in France


in 1793,"(1) which appeared in 1983. In this survey, based particularly upon his knowledge of the situation at Lyons, he argued that royalism was certainly not a motivation for Federalism; nor was localism or particularism. Although the various forms of Federalism were an expression of outrage at the treatment of the 'Girondins,' this was not a cause, but rather a justification for resistance. Nor was Federalism a struggle of provincial bourgeoisie against Paris; indeed, it often had a broad social base. Instead Edmonds saw the movement as fundamentally a response to the imposition by the Mountain of enforced centralization and political uniformity. However, Edmonds differentiated between 'Federalist Protest,' and the actual violent revolts. Protest was widespread and had as its goal the restoration of the rule of law and regular administration embodied in the Constitution of 1791. When the leaders of the protest movement were faced with the fearful prospect of civil war, foreign invasion, and actual counter-revolution, they 'abandoned their principles.'

According to Edmonds, it was only where Federalism occurred in settings of deep-seated political violence and instability that serious revolt broke out. The intensity of resistance against Montagnard centralization related directly to the intensity of the local conflicts. The

combination of outside shocks, such as provocations by représentants-en-mission, and unusual local circumstances moved the 'Federalist Cities' to rebellion, and in the three principal cases, Lyon, Marseilles, and Toulon, the strength of revolt revealed the failure of local elites to control local conflict within the political framework formed by the Revolution.

Aside from stressing the impact of central authority on local antagonisms, Edmonds indicated that these local conflicts were between extreme Revolutionaries and more moderate individuals. This interpretation earned praise in a commentary by Michael Sydenham, yet with reservations.(1) Edmonds' confinement of real revolt to Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, Bordeaux, Caen, and Nîmes, with the last three dismissed as fundamentally too weak to be significant, was criticized by Sydenham as minimizing the importance of the revolt except where protest culminated in substantial military action. Rather, he stressed that the 'Republican Revolt' was a single conflict, with the Mountain's extremism arousing opposition in all parts of France. This argument for a fundamental division of Republicans in 1793 has particular relevance to the Naval Crisis and its connection with Federalism. Although the examination of Toulon's revolt will be central, this study will suggest that the

situation involving Brest and the Atlantic Fleet was part of the same phenomenon, its explanation holding national, rather than merely local, significance.

Just as any attempt to penetrate the Naval Crisis must take into account the problems surrounding interpretations of the 'Federalist Revolt,' some understanding must also be reached regarding the effect of the Revolution on the French Navy prior to the crisis. This subject, like Federalism, has not been free of historical controversy. To place this discussion in context, the importance of naval power in the event of war with Great Britain was recognized by Kersaint in his speech to the Convention on January 1, 1793:

Si le Cabinet de Saint-James vous déclare la guerre, vous découvrirez la coalition des puissances maritimes, et vous pouvez d'avance compter que vous aurez à les combattre toutes à la fois....(1)

The Revolutionary Government declared war on Great Britain a month later and France immediately needed an effective navy not merely for the ambitious project of launching an invasion of England,(2) or even to protect its overseas colonies. As long as the British and other Allied navies were unchallenged the Republic would have to fear the

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(1) *Le Moniteur*, 3 janvier 1793 (I, p. 11).
possibility of an enemy landing, possibly in support of internal rebels, and would face the reality of economic blockade. However by 1793, the French Navy was in a sorry state.

There has been general agreement among historians that the French Navy in 1793 was suffering from material and financial problems.\(^1\) A recent and detailed study of the Revolutionary Navy, particularly the mobilization of its material resources, was Norman Hampson's *La Marine de l'an II: Mobilisation de la Flotte de l'Ocean, 1793-1794*. According to Hampson, the Financial Crisis which helped bring about the Revolution in 1789 had seriously impaired activities of the French Navy. The Naval Budget was slashed in the first years of the Revolution, and the reduced construction was unable to maintain the Fleet's strength at peacetime levels.\(^2\) In comparison to the British Navy, Hampson claimed that the French Fleet was less imposing in numbers and combined weight of broadside than British historians have suggested.\(^3\) Moreover if French ships were superior in design, this superiority was negated by poor

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\(^1\) See Levy-Schneider, I., pp. 311, 323-324; Chevalier, pp. 50, 98; see also Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812*, 2 Vols., (London, 1892), Vol. I, p. 64.


maintenance. Indeed, Hampson argued that by the end of 1792, the French Navy had reached an exceptional level of decline. (1) This was aggravated by grave material shortages in Naval Arsenals when ambitious construction programs were initiated. (2)

Aside from the material and financial difficulties facing the Navy, Hampson maintained that work in the Naval Arsenals was hampered by general slackness and worker agitation; (3) moreover, the Fleet itself was affected by indiscipline. (4) Indeed it could well be contended that personnel problems were the most critical for the French Navy in 1793. All historians have commented on the erosion of discipline in the Fleet, but there has been controversy regarding the fundamental cause of the insubordination and its true significance.

One school of history, written primarily by naval officers, explains the Naval Crisis of 1793 by condemning the Revolutionary Government for failing to enforce discipline and for not supporting the authority of the naval officer corps. One of the best examples of a study in this

(1) Ibid., pp. 32-39.
(2) Ibid., pp. 39-43.
(3) Ibid., pp. 48-54; see also Norman Hampson, "Les ouvriers des arsenaux de la marine au cours de la Révolution française, 1789-1794," Revue d'histoire économique et sociale, 39 (1961), pp. 311-313.
(4) Hampson, La Marine de l'an II., pp. 46-48.
category was *Histoire de la Marine française sous la première République*, written by Captain E. Chevallier. Chevallier argued that since 1789, Revolutionary Assemblies had considered insubordination and mutiny in the navy as legitimate vindication of sailors' rights. Up until 1793, according to Chevallier, it had suited Jacobin purposes to destroy discipline in the Fleet. But when the Montagnard Committee of Public Safety seized the reins of executive power, it also inherited the legacy of years of disorder in the navy. (1) Toulon was part of this legacy. (2)

Furthermore, Chevallier insisted that responsibility for the Quiberon Mutiny did not rest with the Admiral, Morard de Galles, since he could not be expected to recall to their duty crews who had not obeyed orders for almost four years. (3)

Alfred Thayer Mahan, another career naval officer, also saw the Quiberon Mutiny as the direct result of the destruction of naval discipline. (4) The loss of the Toulon Fleet, according to Mahan, could similarly be blamed on the collapse of order in the service. (5) He believed that the Revolution had ruined the French Navy which had performed so well in the American War of Independence. The members of

(1) Chevallier, p. 103.
(2) Ibid., p. 66.
(3) Ibid., p. 110.
(4) Mahan, I, p. 62.
(5) Ibid., I, pp. 91-92.
the Revolutionary Governments, such as Jeanbon Saint-André, were, for Mahan, outsiders who applied theory with no appreciation of naval realities. (1) This was demonstrated not only in the neglect of naval gunnery but in the advocacy of the election of sea officers. (2) Indeed, Mahan insisted that the failure of the Revolutionary Assemblies to uphold and protect naval professionals had fatal consequences, and that the principal reason most naval officers resigned their commissions was not politics but the breakdown of discipline. (3)

Both of these historians saw the key to the Naval Crisis of 1793 in the breakdown of discipline. Chevallier saw this as the legacy of years of Jacobin agitation, while Mahan alleged it was due to the Revolutionaries' failure to protect and support naval officers. While these explanations merit recognition, it may be suggested that they do not provide sufficient analysis of the Revolutionary situation to place the naval problems in context. Such an analysis was attempted by L. Levy-Schneider, who presented a conflicting interpretation. His well-documented biography of Jeanbon Saint-André, which presented a valuable and perhaps unique discussion of the Naval Crisis, will be frequently referred to in this study. Levy-Schneider argued

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(1) Ibid., I, pp. 37, 39.
(2) Ibid., I, pp. 55-56.
(3) Ibid., I, p. 49.
that the anarchy in the French Navy was due to the lack of firm central direction which stemmed from the Incompleteness Revolution. (1) In this interpretation he was in full agreement with Jeanbon Saint-André. Furthermore, Levy-Schneider saw the insubordination in the navy arising from internal divisions between nobles and non-nobles, 'Girondins' and Montagnards. (2) This idea has important ramifications for the connection between the Naval Crisis and the 'Federalist Revolt.'

If Lévy-Schneider stressed the role of political conflicts in the navy, Jeanbon Saint-André blamed naval disorder completely on the presence of aristocratic, and hence for him counter-revolutionary, elements in the Fleet. As early as February 10, 1793, Jeanbon had prepared a report for the Naval Committee of the Jacobin Club in which he stated that the emigration of professional officers was actually beneficial since republican loyalty could only be found among privateers and officers from the Merchant service. (3) When asked in the Jacobins on July 31 to explain the Fleet's apparent weakness, Jeanbon blamed the decree which had allowed Ministers to appoint officers: "Ils sont nobles et par conséquent font le mal avec

(1) Levy-Schneider, I, pp. 319-322.

(2) For this explanation as applied to Toulon, see Levy-Schneider, I, pp. 421-424; for Brest, see I, pp. 477-481.

(3) Levy-Schneider, I, pp. 312-314.
l'intention de la faire." (1) Following the surrender of Toulon, he presented a vigorous reiteration in the Convention of his previous demands for a naval purge as an absolute necessity. (2) With the Mutiny in Quiberon Bay, Jeanbon's conviction became even more pronounced. As part of the conclusion of his "Rapport" on the situation in Brest, Jeanbon referred to naval officers who had claimed they would rather be sent to the front than serve beside certain officers whom they considered to be traitors:

Ces marins expriment en ce point l'opinion générale de la France entière, qui, lassée des complots éternels d'une caste qui n'a pas voulu s'honorer par la liberté, la condamne irrévocablement à la nullité politique sous tous les rapports.
La première mesure à prendre, doit donc être l'épuration de la marine, et la destitution pleine, complète, absolue de tous les ci-devant nobles qui servent sur l'escadre, ... (3)

Thus the Naval Crisis of 1793 coincided with Jeanbon Saint-André's call for a purge of aristocratic and counter-revolutionary elements from the navy. This has been partly responsible for the wide acceptance of what was the

(2) Le Moniteur, 2 septembre 1793 (I, p. 1041).
Jacobin assumption that the surrender of Toulon, and naval disorder generally, was an aspect of Federalist, even Royalist conspiracy. Certainly the shadow of Royalism falls across most historical accounts of Toulon's revolt. Therefore, this study will examine the validity of this conspiracy thesis, so obviously partisan in origin, to determine how far it applies to the reality of the situations which existed at Toulon and Brest, and aboard the respective Fleets. Certainly it is justifiable to ask whether the Naval Crisis, linked as it was to the 'Federalist Revolt,' might not be better explained in terms of recent interpretations suggested by Edmonds, Crook, and Sydenham. Since the Mutiny in the Brest Fleet was subsequent to the culmination of the crisis at Toulon, by which it was influenced, this study will be principally concerned with Toulon. Examination of the situation at Brest will be comparative and more concerned with how similarities, and differences which may appear, affect the interpretation. For as Lévy-Schneider implies, the Naval Crisis perhaps has wider implications than the military emergency of which it was a component; it may even be seen as a manifestation of the greater political situation created by the Revolution in 1793.
Revolt, which he saw as anti-national and anti-Parisian and which he associated with the 'Girondin' deputies. As proof of Toulon's involvement in a plot against the Republic, Jeanbon cited documents found in captured Marseilles which he claimed linked Toulon to Norman Federalism:

...mais l' honneur fait au manifeste de Wimpfen vous fournit au moins la preuve que Toulon et Marseille donnaient le main au Calvados, que le système était parfaitement le même, que Wimpfen était le général de l'armée du duc d'York, en France, comme Trogoff était le contre-amiral de sa flotte, ... (1)

The theory that Federalists or Girondins sought to place the Duke of York on the French throne was not uncommon among Jacobins, and Jeanbon certainly believed that Federalism was allied to, if not totally synonymous with, Royalism. He was adamant in the Report that Federalists were responsible for the Departmental insurrections, and that from the beginning they had been involved in machinations to deliver Toulon to the enemy. Jeanbon also stated that the three naval commanders in Toulon: contre-amiral comte de Trogoff, commandant d'armes de Chaussegros, l'ordonnateur civil

(1) Le Moniteur, 11 septembre, 1793 (I, p. 1079).
Revolt, which he saw as anti-national and anti-Parisian and which he associated with the 'Girondin' deputies. As proof of Toulon's involvement in a plot against the Republic, Jeanbon cited documents found in captured Marseilles which he claimed linked Toulon to Norman Federalism:

...mais l'honneur fait au manifeste de Wimpfen vous fournit au moins la preuve que Toulon et Marseille donnaient le main au Calvados, que le système était parfaitement le même, que Wimpfen était le général de l'armée du duc d'York, en France, comme Trogoff était le contre-amiral de sa flotte, ...(1)

The theory that Federalists or Girondins sought to place the Duke of York on the French throne was not uncommon among Jacobins, and Jeanbon certainly believed that Federalism was allied to, if not totally synonymous with, Royalism. He was adamant in the Report that Federalists were responsible for the Departmental insurrections, and that from the beginning they had been involved in machinations to deliver Toulon to the enemy. Jeanbon also stated that the three naval commanders in Toulon: contre-amiral comte de Trogoff, commandant d'armes de Chaussegros, l'ordonnateur civil

(1) Le Moniteur, 11 septembre, 1793 (I, p. 1079).
Puissant; had always been accomplices to counter-revolution. (1)

Not surprisingly, Toulon's revolt against the Convention was always referred to by the Montagnards in terms of treason or counter-revolution. The surrender to Admiral Hood was the climax of a well-laid plot, and Toulon's declaration in favour of the monarchy was final proof that previous statements of devotion to the Republic had been mere hypocrisy. (2) Yet it has not only been Toulon's enemies in the Revolutionary Government who have explained the revolt principally in terms of Royalist counter-revolution. Such an interpretation has also been fostered by historians sympathetic to the Toulonnais and hostile to Republicanism.

According to Oscar Havard, in his two volume Histoire de la Révolution dans les ports de guerre of 1911-1913, restoration of the French Monarchy was the motive of the

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(1) For a more in-depth analysis of Jeanbon's Report and its conclusions, see L. Levy-Schneider, Le Conventionnel Jeanbon Saint-André, 2 vols., (Paris, 1901), I, pp. 444-449. Levy-Schneider defends the Report from what he says was the excessive criticism it had received. He argues that if Jeanbon was incorrect on details due to incomplete information available, he was exact on major themes.

(2) In a report by Barras and Freron to the Convention dated July 26, 1793, the Toulon revolt was seen as counter-revolution, the stated loyalty to the Republic as hypocrisy, and covert Royalism was hinted at. F.A. Aulard, ed., Recueil des Actes du Comité de Salut Public, (Paris, 1893-), V, pp. 383-392. By September 6, Barras reported to the Committee of Public Safety that Toulon had become the rendez-vous for all émigrés. Aulard, ed., Actes, VI, p. 321.
Toulonnais revolt in July and of the alliance with the British Fleet in August. Havard's interpretation, which could best be termed 'ultra-royalist,' did not equate 'Federalism' with Royalism; nor was Toulon's struggle truly a manifestation of the 'Federalist Revolt.' The stirrings of outrage felt throughout France following May 31 were viewed by Havard as a tremendous opportunity for the monarchy to supplant the Convention and end its criminal regime. He felt that the national spirit had been aroused but needed to be coordinated to this end. Havard maintained that the liberal bourgeoisie, whom he saw as the leaders of the Federalist risings, could not break with "revolutionary superstition;" they could not give up the idea of a Republic:

Mais, moins dominés par le patriotisme que par l'orgueil, si les disciples résipiscents de la Gironde reprouvèrent les forfaits de la Révolution, ils n'eurent pas le courage d'en condamner les causes.(1)

Havard asserted that this unwillingness fully to repudiate the Revolution meant that France did not rally to their cause, and this was the fundamental cause of the Federalists' failure.

The instigators and leaders of the revolt in Toulon, according to Havard, had nothing in common with the "greedy

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and ambitious oligarchs involved in Federalism: from the beginning, the cause in Toulon was Royalist. The opening of the Sections did represent for him the defeat of the "party of anarchy," but, moreover, July 12 signalled the disavowal of the illegal Republican regime:

Ainsi sombre, dans le chef-lieu du Var, le 12 juillet 1793, le Gouvernement de la République, proclame, dix mois auparavant, par une Assemblée qui n’avait reçu de la Nation, ni le mandat de changer le régime politique de la France ni, surtout, la consigne d’assassiner le chef de la Race royale.(1)

Initial maintenance of republican forms by the new masters of Toulon was seen by Havard as merely a legitimate ruse of war to deceive the Convention until Royalist forces were prepared.(2) He dismissed charges that the negotiations with the English constituted treason, arguing that Toulon struck an honourable alliance against oppression based upon Admiral Hood’s promise of a monarchical restoration.(3)

Havard’s fervent assertion of the preponderance of

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(1) Ibid., I, p. 162.

(2) Ibid., I, p. 156.

(3) Ibid., I, pp. 188-189. Havard’s enigmatic argument for the legitimacy of Toulon’s appeal to the English has two sides: first, the Convention had no legal authority since, in abolishing the monarchy, it had been unfaithful to the mandate given to the Estates General by the cahiers; second, if America was honoured for its struggle against Britain in which it sought outside assistance, how could Toulon’s appeal be considered illegitimate? Ibid., I, Respectively, pp. 185, 184, 186.
Royalist sentiment was perhaps unique among historical accounts of Toulon's revolt. In Paul Cottin's study of 1898, *Toulon et les Anglais en 1793*, Royalism played a less dominant role. According to Cottin it was not the fundamental motivation for the Sectional coup of July 12/13: Toulon, like Marseilles, became counter-revolutionary in reaction to the excesses of local Jacobins. However, Cottin maintained that Hood's Fleet was able to take advantage of Royalist intrigues merely by appearing off shore.(1)

Despite the early protestations of republicanism, Cottin argued that Royalists gained control of the revolt.(2) They were able to use the threat of famine, which he claimed was without basis, to legitimize negotiations with the enemy and to deliver the port.(3) Furthermore, Cottin alleged that counter-revolution found willing allies among the naval officers in Toulon: Cottin was adamant that the French Fleet's commander, Admiral Trogoff, acted in accordance with secret instructions from the Bourbon Princes.(4)

In all of the three interpretations discussed above,

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the influence of Royalism figures to some degree. Jeanbon Saint-André, expressing the viewpoint of the Revolutionary Government and of the Jacobins, saw Royalism allied to a vast conspiracy against the Republic of which the 'Federalist Revolt' was a manifestation. For Jeanbon, Toulon's true Royalist sentiments were finally revealed by the city's declaring for Louis XVII and by its treasonous surrender to the enemy. Oscar Havard, whose sympathies were in complete opposition to Jeanbon's, also saw Royalism at the core of Toulon's revolt. Desire for a monarchist restoration, according to Havard, guided the Toulonnais from the beginning and made their cause honourable compared to that of 'Federalism' which he saw as vague and hypocritical. Historian Paul Cottin, although more balanced than either the conventionnel or the ultra-royalist, maintained that Royalism was crucial to Toulon's treason. His interpretation, that a Royalist coup followed the 'Federalist' rising, could be considered the standard explanation.

Yet it might be suggested that all three accounts force the events at Toulon into rigid and partisan conceptions of Revolution vs Counter-Revolution. Bias aside, in each case loyalties and motivations tend to become simplified and only discernible as 'for' or 'against.' Royalism acts as a smokescreen through which the local conflict which actually produced the Sectional revolt in Toulon can be seen only in
hazy or distorted form. What follows is an attempt, through the examination of available mémoires and documents, to determine the validity of these various interpretations in regard to the situation in Toulon. Only if the mist of Royalist conspiracy is lifted, and the local struggle and its interaction with the Naval Forces clearly seen, can the circumstances which led to the surrender to Admiral Hood be understood.

The key to the revolt of Toulon was an internal struggle for political control of the city. This argument was stressed in a recent article by M.H. Crook:

The withdrawal of recognition from the Convention in July 1793 was the consequence rather than the cause of a municipal revolution at Toulon which replaced one local faction with its bitter enemy. (1)

In Toulon, according to Crook, the Revolution of 1789 had installed in positions of local power an élite of notables, including wealthy property owners, merchants and lawyers. It was not long, however, before the influence of these notables was challenged by elements espousing more radical social and political ideas. Crook saw the opposing factions -springing from deep-rooted social divisions with individuals from the fringes of the élite, such as legal clerks.

surgeons and retailers, leading the 'radicals'. (1) In any case, if the notables initially controlled the Municipality and the Departmental Administration, their opponents' power was based in the Jacobin Club.

This division into two rival factions was stressed in the Memoires of a contemporary Toulonnais. Louis Richaud was a Royalist who became a member of the Municipality created by the Sections following the coup in July, 1793. Like most of his peers among Toulon's upper middle class, Richaud was sympathetic to the Revolution in 1789. However, he quickly became disillusioned, largely due to the violence of the clubist minority. (2) In his Memoires, Richaud wrote that tranquillity in Toulon ended with the establishment of the Club Saint-Jean in the spring of 1790. This was the Popular Society affiliated with the Paris Jacobins. The "honest people" of Toulon disdained the Club Saint-Jean and formed an alternate society, the Club Saint-Pierre. Richaud's description of the rivalry between the two clubs pointed to a serious ideological split within Toulon:

Les meneurs des deux partis se livrèrent

(1) Ibid., pp. 384-385. Crook employs the terms radical and conservative, finding them more convenient and less obscure than the contemporary Toulonnais labels 'blancs' and 'noirs', and less misleading than Jacobins and Royalists or Montagnards and Girondins.

In 1791, the evidence suggests that the Jacobins from the Club Saint-Jean took major steps towards gaining control of Toulon. Seeing the National Guard as an obstacle, the clubists demanded its reorganization, which resulted in the election of many Jacobin officers. Following the death of mayor Richard in March, the new mayor of Toulon, Hyacinthe Paul, delivered himself to the Club Saint-Jean, beginning the Club's domination of the Municipality. However, the Departmental Administration overruled the election of the radical Jean-François Escudier as justice of the peace in June: henceforth, furious clubists were determined to use violence to terrorize the population. According to Richaud, the King's September 14/15 Declaration of amnesty for all imprisoned for revolutionary activity made the honest Toulonnais lose heart, and the Club Saint-Pierre was abandoned.(2)

In 1792, Toulon's internal strife focused on the struggle between the Departmental Administrators and the

(1) Ibid., pp. 11-12.
(2) Ibid., pp. 13-16.
judges of the Tribunal on one side, and the clubists of Saint-Jean on the other. This conflict reached a frightful climax in July with the murder of several officials. In Richaud's account, the Jacobins gathered support from surrounding villages and, on the morning of July 28, besieged the hôtel du Département with an armed column of "brigands." He described the appalling massacre which ensued:

Les administrateurs fuient; le premier atteint fut M. Gazan, procureur général syndic, qui fut pendu au reverberé en face de l'hôtel; ces forcenés coururent après MM. Guérin, Robaud et Maure qui, par des issues secrètes, étaient parvenus à gagner les rues; ils les arrêterent, les mutilèrent à coups de sabre et les pendirent à divers reverberes. Pendant cette sanglante exécution, la générale battait; toutes les boutiques et les portes des maisons furent fermées; la moitié de la ville ignora pendant plusieurs heures les événements tragiques qui venaient d'avoir lieu; aucun citoyen, soit terreur, soit incertitude, n'avait osé sortir avec ses armes, ...(1)

The killings continued that night and the following day and other administrators and judges were murdered. Due to the vacancies created in the Department and Tribunal by the assassination or flight of members, the Municipality named provisional replacements. According to Richaud, these were all fervent Jacobins: thus the Club controlled all three

(1) Ibid., pp. 19-20.
On the evening of July 12, a large group of Toulonnais, fearful of imminent violence, gathered at the Church of Minimes. They decided that the best course of action was to demand that the Sections be opened, and a petition to that effect was drafted and signed. A leading role in this maneuver was played by master saddler Jean-Baptiste Roux who, far from being a counter-revolutionary conspirator, was a town councillor and clubist who had broken with the Extremists. (1) The petition was presented to the Municipality. (2) To the chagrin of the Jacobins, the Guard's support for the Sections' opening was virtually unanimous. (3) The Sections were constituted and declared themselves permanent, entrusting executive decisions to a central committee which soon took the name le Comité Général des Sections de Toulon. (4)

Richaud wrote that because of the support of the majority of the National Guard, happily, the Sections were

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(1) Crook, p. 386.

(2) Pons, pp. 18-19 suggests, that the Sections had begun to assemble without waiting for permission from the Municipality. This would suggest that the petition was a virtual fait accompli.

(3) Both Pons, p. 20 and Richaud, p. 36 state that National Guard battalions supported the demands of the petition. Crook, p. 386 suggests that it was mainly guardsmen who signed the petition in the first place.

(4) For a list of the names and occupations of the original members of the Committee, see Eugène Coulet, (13 juillet - 17 décembre, 1793), Le Comité Général des Sections de Toulon (Toulon, 1960), pp. 8-9.
In September, Escudier and Joseph-Christophe Charbonnier, whom Richaud referred to as "les chefs des assassins de Toulon,"(2) were elected deputies to the Convention and the radical Jean-Sébastien Barthélemy was elected president of the Criminal Tribunal. Also in September, the phalange marseillais(3) passed through Toulon en route to the Army of the Midi. Within the city, this force threatened to punish the inhabitants as 'aristocrats,' until the three administrative bodies ordered its withdrawal. Richaud claimed that the citizens had sensed the danger and constituted themselves in the Sections, warning the administrators that they would repel the phalange by force if its departure was not ordered.(4) This was the first use of the Sections to oppose the administrative bodies. But shortly afterwards, the Sections were dissolved and they did not assemble again until the following summer.(5)

On May 21, 1793, seventy-three notables including ex-nobles, priests, and many naval officers were arrested in


(2) Richaud, p. 27.

(3) In a footnote to Richaud's Mémoires, the editors write that Richaud confused the phalange with the Legion marseillaise, elements of which arrived in Toulon in September. Ibid., p. 28.

(4) Ibid., p. 29.

(5) Crook, p. 385.
Toulon as counter-revolutionary 'suspects.' However the administration was soon forced to release them, partly through pressure from the newly created Sectionary regime in Marseilles, and partly due to the outrage aroused in Toulon. Of those released, Crook wrote: "Many of these individuals were to play a prominent role after the municipal revolution in the naval port and no doubt their speedy release nourished hopes of a return to power."(1) Indeed, this appeared to lead to the manifestation of a desire to open the Sections of Toulon.(2) The profound example of Marseilles, where the Sections had closed the Jacobin Club early in June, reinforced the administration's determination to deny this political opportunity to its enemies. The Jacobins proclaimed death for anyone requesting the Sections be opened and, on July 12, the Club staged an armed procession, led by représentants-en-mission Baille and Beauvais, through Toulon to end such demands.(3) This march of intimidation proved to be the catalyst for the Sectional Revolt.

Violence, and arbitrary measures, for political ends had characterized the Extremist regime in Toulon and it was the threat of further violence which prompted the Jacobins opponents to act. Referring to the public intervention that

(1) Ibid., p. 388.

(2) Richaud, pp. 33-34.

(3) Pons, p. 13.
forced the release of the 'suspects' arrested in May, Cottin asserted:

Cette intervention des habitants montre à quel point les violences étaient impopulaires. Elles permirent à la reaction de relever la tête; c'est à partir de cette époque, en effet, que royalistes et moderers se coaliserent pour secouer le joug et prévenir le retour des crimes de l'année précédente.(1)

If he viewed the movement as reactionary, he did recognize in it a coalition opposed to violence. Pons' account also pointed to the formation of an alliance which feared being struck without distinction in a repetition of the horrors of the previous summer:

Les partisans de la monarchie, ceux que quatre années de malheurs n'avaient pas desabusés, et ceux qui croyoient encore à la possibilité d'établir une république, oubliaient leurs divisions passées, se reunissent pour conjurer le danger qui les menace.(2)

The evidence strongly suggests that it was a coalition of Moderates, both royalist and republican, who engineered the opening of the Sections. Their goal was to overturn the Jacobin Club and regain control of Toulon; it was not, as both Montagnards and ultra-royalists claimed subsequently, to achieve Royalist counter-revolution.

(2) Pons, p. 12.
On the evening of July 12, a large group of Toulonnais, fearful of imminent violence, gathered at the Church of Minimes. They decided that the best course of action was to demand that the Sections be opened, and a petition to that effect was drafted and signed. A leading role in this maneuver was played by master saddler Jean-Baptiste Roux who, far from being a counter-revolutionary conspirator, was a town councillor and clubist who had broken with the Extremists.\(^{(1)}\) The petition was presented to the Municipality.\(^{(2)}\) To the chagrin of the Jacobins, the Guard's support for the Sections' opening was virtually unanimous.\(^{(3)}\) The Sections were constituted and declared themselves permanent, entrusting executive decisions to a central committee which soon took the name *le Comité Général des Sections de Toulon*.\(^{(4)}\)

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\(^{(4)}\) For a list of the names and occupations of the original members of the Committee, see Eugène Coulet, (*13 juillet - 17 décembre, 1793*), *Le Comité Général des Sections de Toulon* (Toulon, 1960), pp. 8-9.
opened without bloodshed. (1) Indeed the Sectional Revolution was accomplished with remarkable ease. Crook argued that this was due largely to a dramatic loss of popular support:

The refusal to reopen the sections and the swing of opinion among the remaining rank and file guardsmen both point to the conclusion that the radical administration had become extremely isolated. (2)

When the Extremists took power in 1792 espousing ideas of popular democracy, they were supported by artisans, shopkeepers, sailors, and, most importantly, workers from Toulon's naval Arsenal. (3) However, the new regime soon began to suppress popular effervescence and to demand a return to strict discipline in the naval base to speed up mobilization of the Fleet. (4) A cooling of workers' sympathy produced by this attitude was not helped by a declining standard of living in Toulon. Inflation and shortages early in 1793 had doubled the price of bread from

(1) Richaud, p. 36.

(2) Crook, p. 386.

(3) Ibid., p. 385. Richaud, p. 17 says that in 1792 the Jacobins of the Club Saint-Jean, "avaient attiré à leur parti la basse classe des artisans et presque tous les marins et ouvriers de l'Arsenal."

(4) Crook, p. 387. In February, 1793, représentants Rouyer, Brunel, and Le Tourneur reported to the Convention that they were impressed with the spirit of the Club and the Administrative Bodies in Toulon, however, work in the Arsenal was unsatisfactory due to inadequate policing. Aulard, ed., Actes, II, pp. 77-78; II, p. 103.
the previous year. (1) Furthermore, beginning in May, workers were paid only in assignats, which led to discontent. On June 13, Baille and Beauvais reported that the Toulon Arsenal workers had submitted a petition demanding to receive payment in hard money. Although refusing this, the deputies felt that it was necessary to double workers' salaries to maintain tranquility. (2)

Economic alienation aside, the regime in Toulon had become politically isolated. It was critical of the Government in Paris but could not afford to break with the Convention. (3) Marseilles, to which Toulon's inhabitants had close links, had set a precedent dangerous to the Jacobins but encouraging to moderates. It would seem that by July 1793, the majority of the community were no longer willing to tolerate the Extremists' use of violence, or at least would not support it.

The initial acts of the Sectionary Regime were to consolidate its power and crush that of its opponents. Measures were immediately taken to suppress the Jacobin Club, including the destruction of its emblems and records, as well as the incarceration of several known Jacobins. (4) The National Guard was reorganized with comte de Grasset

(1) Crook, p. 387.
(3) Crook, pp. 389-390.
(4) Coulet, p. 10.
named commandant, and the Criminal Tribunal was replaced with a sixteen-man Tribunal populaire. (1) Furthermore, the Sections purged the Administrations in Toulon, naming a new Municipality and suspending the Departmental Directory. (2)

The thirty-two member (four from each Section) Comité Général could initiate action, but it received force of law from the sanction of the inhabitants assembled in the Sections: the moderates "carried the practice of popular sovereignty further than their opponents."(3) Despite a more conservative attitude towards religion, evident in a public Te Deum,(4) there was initial commitment to republican forms and institutions. There is no reason to suppose that this was hypocrisy, or a ruse of war as Havard alleged; much more probably it appears an acknowledgement of the alliance between moderate républicains and royalists:

Ils [the Royalists] n’avoient pu terrasser les clubistes qu’en s’unissant aux républicains. Ces derniers avoient une grande influence. On pouvait bien espérer de les ramener avec le temps; mais, pour le moment, la prudence


(2) Coulet, pp. 11, 14, 19. A Conseil General de la commune was created on July 18, and on July 27 the Departmental Directory was suspended and replacements named.

(3) Crook, p. 390.

(4) Coulet, p. 10. There is some controversy when this occurred and whether the arrested deputies, Baille and Beauvais, were forced to participate.
On July 16, the Sections of Toulon dispatched a deputation to Marseilles to inform the Sectionary regime there of the formation of the Comité Général. That same day Marseillais delegates arrived in Toulon to congratulate the Toulonnais and offer them their support. The bond between the two cities would be strengthened in the days to follow. Having already arrested représentants-en-mission Baille and Beauvais, the Comité Général sent agents to Pignans on July 17 to seize Barras and Fréron. However the two conventionnels escaped with General La Poype.

Although the arrest of Baille and Beauvais was an act of defiance, Toulon's break with the Revolutionary Government resulted from its mutual union with rebellious Marseilles.

This first became evident on July 18, when the Comité Général received a letter dated July 6 from the Minister of the Navy. D'Albarade stated that due to a decree from the Committee of Public Safety, he was giving secret orders to the naval commander at Toulon to place an embargo on all ships sailing for Marseilles. All vessels, French or foreign, would be conducted to Toulon and reported. Furthermore, agents of the Naval Ministry would submit

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(1) Pons, p. 24.
(2) Coulet, p. 12.
(3) Ibid., pp. 12-13. La Poype's pregnant wife, Thérèse, was found in Pignans and was held as a hostage by Toulon.
information to d'Albarade and to the Committee of Public Safety on the situation in Marseilles. In its session of July 19, the Toulon Comité Général decided that these orders to cut off Marseilles would be refused. (1)

The Comité Général considered the Minister's orders to blockade Marseilles to be "contraires à l'intérêt sacré de la république," (2) due to that city's meritorious struggle. It insisted that the Committee of Public Safety was unable to take such violent measures without the consent of the Convention; thus the orders were regarded as a crime against the People's Rights. Furthermore, the orders were to be executed secretly, suggesting a fear of the just disapproval of the People's constituted authorities. Most importantly:

... ces ordres sont arrivés au moment où la ville de Marseille et celle de Toulon s'étoient unies de sentiments, de principes et de résolution, pour concourir efficacement et de concert à sauver la patrie contre les atteintes des anarchistes; ... (3)

The Comité Général therefore decreed that all ships and convoys carrying supplies to Marseilles would be freed and would be protected by the navy. This decision was submitted


(2) Ibid., p. 214.

(3) Ibid., p. 215.
to the Sections and received their unanimous approval. (1)

This open defiance of the Committee of Public Safety placed Toulon in revolt against the National Government. The ideas manifested on July 19, including the demand for legitimate authority and the determination to save France from 'anarchists,' were common themes of the larger 'Federalist Revolt.' Moreover, these sentiments reflected fundamental motivations which produced the municipal revolution in Toulon.

These motives were also expressed in a letter of August 12 from the Comité Général to the Provisional Executive Council and Minister of the Navy d'Albarade. (2) The Comité Général justified the events of the previous month by denouncing the faction which had preached murder and pillage in the Club, assassinated administrators, and arbitrarily imprisoned those who opposed it. The letter further alleged that clubists had evil designs to deliver the port to the enemy. Threatened with new massacres, the honest Toulonnais demanded and achieved the opening of the Sections. Yet the Minister of the Navy offered no support or congratulations. The Comité Général accused him of becoming an accomplice to the Committee of Public Safety, that "organe d'une minorité

(1) Ibid., pp. 216-218.

(2) "Le Comité général des Sections de Toulon en permanence, au Conseil exécutif provisoire, et au citoyen d'Albarade, ministre de la marine, Toulon, 12 août 1793, l'an second de la république française, une et indivisible," in Pons, pp. 234-244.
qui répand la consternation et l'alarme sur toute la surface de la république!, 

"(1) and of conceding to the impulse of an assembly, "d'ont tout homme libre doit relever les lois, depuis l'attentat commis sur les représentants du peuple!" "(2) Thus, Toulon was repudiating the Revolutionary Government as illegitimate. The Comité Général went on to declare that d'Albarade and his colleagues must not support those who wished to reestablish anarchy or raise armies against Frenchmen, and reminded them of their sacred duty to supply Toulon. General Carteaux, Albitte, and Dubois-de-Crance were cutting off supplies needed for the defence, of the Republic. Responsibility for the garrison, Fleet and Arsenal, wrote the Sectionaries, rested with the National Executive. The letter concluded with a warning:

Songez enfin que deux escadres foudroyables, d'Angleterre et d'Espagne, embrassent toute l'étendue de nos côtes, et que, dans leurs calculs, peut-être elles se flattent d'obtenir de notre détresse et de nos besoins ce que la trahison devoit leur livrer. (3)

Further evidence of the motives behind Toulon's revolt, what might be termed its Federalist ideals, was contained in an "Address in the name of the Sections of Toulon to all

(1) Ibid., p. 240.
(2) Ibid., p. 240.
(3) Ibid., p. 241.
citizens of the French Republic," of August 13.(1) It was the Sections' duty, the Address stated, to inform Frenchmen of the true situation in Toulon. The city had been prey to anarchy, its government in the hands of the simple and the unprincipled. All civil and military authorities had been subordinated to the Jacobins, "ces ennemis des lois renoient en tyrans, sous le masque hypocrite du patriotisme."(2) The Address presented a tableau of crimes committed by the Jacobins culminating with their violent opposition to the reclamation by the citizens of their right to assemble in Sections. However the Toulonnais had rejoiced in a bloodless victory over anarchy.

The Address went beyond the local situation to demonstrate the Sections' repudiation of the Revolutionary Government by outlining their opposing program. They wanted to relieve their beloved country of oppression and to see France regenerated in accordance with law and customs, not excesses, license and irreligion. Furthermore, they stated their devotion to the ideal of a constitutional Republic:

Nous voulons une république une et indivisible, et l'on n'a jamais voulu l'organiser. Nous voulons une constitution, fruit de la sagesse et de la réflexion, et l'on ne nous propose qu'un fantôme de gouvernement qui doit propager les factions et l'anarchie, et

(1) "Adresse, au nom des sections de Toulon, à tous les Citoyens de la République française," in Pons, pp. 219-233.

(2) Ibid., p. 220.
laisser le vaisseau de l'Etat agité sans cesse par les flots orageux des insurrections populaires.(1)

The Sectionaries wished peacefully to enjoy their goods and property, but ceaselessly saw them becoming prey to those who, having nothing and wanting nothing through work, had adopted "la doctrine partage chimérique."(2) If this indicated the fears of propertyed conservatives about Revolutionary social policy, their opposition to the Montagnard Government was principally political, focusing on illegitimacy and the recourse to violence:

Pour faire fleurir la liberté, fallait-il donc arroser le sol appauvri de la France par le sang innocent? C'est la morale des tigres et des lions, ...(3)

The Convention, the Address stated, was not free, and had spread the plagues of anarchy, crime, famine and civil war across France. The new Constitution, rejected by the majority, could only be accepted out of fear or insincerity, and the Address decried the enforced conformity which would not allow free discussion of the Constitution. The Sections denounced the représentants-en-mission, in particular the four who menaced Toulon: Albitte and Crancé, Barras and

(1) Ibid., pp. 224-225.
(2) Ibid., p. 225.  *
(3) Ibid., p. 221.
Frenon. As in the letter to d'Albarade, there was a warning of the possible consequences if these deputies cut off supplies: "Veuilent-ils nous réduire a la dure nécessité d'implorer le secours de ces fiers ennemis, moins barbares qu'eux peut-être?" (1) The Address concluded with an appeal to all Frenchmen, above all to Parisians, to escape their chains and throw off the tyranny which enslaved them.

On July 27, the Marseillais Departmental Army was routed at Avignon by Republican troops under General Carteaux. This defeat shattered any illusions that forces raised by the Sectionary regimes in Marseilles and Toulon could long resist the Convention. Desperate for provisions and threatened by the approach of Carteaux, Marseilles dispatched deputies to Admiral Hood, commanding the British Fleet blockading the French ports. Ostensibly the delegation came to procure free passage for food supplies, but its true purpose was to negotiate an alliance for military support. (2) Aboard Hood's Victory on August 23, the Marseillais were surprised that commissioners from Toulon had not arrived. (3) Marseilles had contacted the

(1) Ibid., p. 229.

(2) J. Holland Rose, Lord Hood and the Defence of Toulon, (Cambridge, 1922), pp. 19-20. See also Pons, p. 62.

(3) "Hood to P. Stephens, Victory, August 25, 1793," in Rose, p. 124. This letter supports Rose's argument that all initiative for the alliance came from the shore. Rose, pp. 8, 12 maintains that the occupation of Toulon was an unforeseen opportunity and that Hood had no orders to negotiate for a restoration.
Comité General in Toulon on August 18 to propose an alliance with the British. (1)

While aboard the Victory, the delegation from Marseilles composed a letter to the Comité General, encouraging Toulon to open negotiations with Hood:

Comme parlementaires, nous avons eu l'accueil le plus satisfaisant; et, comme Français, désirant le retour de l'ordre dans notre patrie, nous avons trouvé dans la générosité de l'Angleterre, et les bonnes dispositions de l'amiral Hood, beaucoup de remèdes à nos maux. (2)

They also informed the Comité General that Hood wished to know Toulon's intentions, (3) which indicated that the Admiral saw the fate of the two cities as linked. (4)

As early as July 19, Hood had sent one of his officers, Lieutenant Cook, into the harbour at Toulon to negotiate a prisoner exchange. (5) At the approach of his vessel, Cook was ordered by the French warships to lower the white flag

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(2) Ibid., p. 259.

(3) Ibid., p. 260.

(4) Pons, p. 63. See also Richaud, p. 44.

of the Bourbons and raise a Tricolour. Cook's brief negotiations with the Toulonnais were confined to the prisoner exchange, but he was able to report to Hood on the naval strength in the port, which was his real mission.

Lieutenant Cook returned to Toulon late on August 23 or early on the 24th bringing a package for the Comité General which contained the letter from the Marseillais delegation, along with a Proclamation and Preliminary Declaration from Admiral Hood. Of the Proclamation, which was addressed to the People of the South of France, Hood wrote that it was intended to make an impression on the minds of the populace, who are the Government of France. The Proclamation described the situation in which France found itself, maintaining that it pointed to one solution:

Behold, then, the faithful picture of your wretched condition. A situation so dreadful sensibly afflicts the coalesced powers; they see no other remedy but the re-establishment of the French monarchy.

Hood held out his support to crush factions, to reestablish

(1) Rose, p. 18.

(2) Pons, pp. 63-64.

(3) "Hood to P. Stephens, Victory, August 25, 1793," in Rose, p. 124.

(4) "Proclamation, by the right honourable Samuel Lord Hood, vice-admiral of the red, and commander in chief of his Britannic Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean, To the inhabitants of the towns and provinces in the south of France," in Pons, pp. 262-265.
regular government, and to spare further bloodshed. However, this offer had the appearance of an ultimatum: 'Decide, therefore, definitively, and with precision. Be explicit, and I fly to your succour, ...' (1)

The conditional nature of Hood's offer of a military alliance was made clear in his Preliminary Declaration:

If a candid and explicit declaration in favour of monarchy is made at Toulon and Marseilles, and the standard of royalty hoisted, the ships in the harbour dismantled, and the port, and forts provisionally at my disposition, so as to allow of the egress and regress with safety, the people of Provence shall have all the assistance and support his Britannic Majesty's fleet under my command can give; (2)

The Declaration went on to guarantee the safety of all private property and to promise that the port, the forts and the warships would be held in trust and restored to France with the arrival of peace. It was clear that if the Toulonnais decided to enter into an alliance with Hood's

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(1) Ibid., pp. 264-265.

(2) "Preliminary Declaration," in Pons, p. 266.
Fleet they must declare for a restoration of the monarchy. (1)

On the night of August 24, the Comité General called an extraordinary session of the Toulon Sections to reach a decision on the proposition of Admiral Hood. A heated debate ensued with great resistance to the idea of an alliance with the English, as much from national antipathy as fear or distrust. (2) However, a number of factors seemed to have outweighed these sentiments and persuaded the Toulonnais to entrust themselves to the traditional enemy. Isolated by Republican forces, Toulon was experiencing shortages of food supplies and the city’s needs were augmented by the steady inflow of refugees from Marseilles and the surrounding area. (3) Cottin disputed that Toulon’s

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(1) Hood wrote that before he sent the Proclamation and the Preliminary Declaration ashore, the Commissioners from Marseilles had “clearly and explicitly declared their views in favour of Monarchy,” “Hood to P. Stephens, August 25,” in Rose, p. 124. It appears likely that Hood could not conceive of the option of moderate republicanism. However, he did not impose restoration of the Old Monarchy, as shown by his approval of Toulon flying the Tricolour, “Nouvelles Conditions présentées par l’amiral Hood,” in Pons, pp. 274-275. Harvey Mitchell, The Underground War Against Revolutionary France, (Oxford, 1965), pp. 33-35 argues that the British Government gradually came to see the restoration of some sort of reformed monarchy as essential to securing a peace settlement, but always wished to avoid imposing any form of government on the French people. This argument has been reiterated in Maurice Hutt, Chouannerie and Counter-Revolution: Puigay, the Princes and the British Government in the 1790s, (Cambridge, 1983), passim.

(2) Pons, p. 65. See also Richaud, p. 46.

(3) Pons, pp. 45, 66.
resources were exhausted when the appeal was made to Hood. He claimed that not only did the Naval Magazines hold sufficient provisions to feed the Fleet until the end of September, but stated that the substantial supplies in the State Magazines were not even considered until after the entry of the enemy. (1) Furthermore, he alleged that Toulon was not suffering from a lack of money, having seized community funds and expropriated five million of eight million livres sent to the Army of Italy. (2) Yet even if the situation was exaggerated, remaining food could have lasted no longer than eight weeks. (3)

Refugees from Marseilles, which would fall to Carteaux on August 25, were streaming into Toulon bringing stories of Republican atrocities. These confirmed for the Toulonnais what they could expect from a vengeful Convention. Richaud wrote:

Mais enfin le sentiment de leur faiblesse et la certitude de n'espérer aucune grace de leurs barbare concitoyens, l'emportèrent sur toute autre considération. (4)

But Richaud also stated that the danger to the city came from interior as well as exterior enemies and that alone,

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(1) Cottin, pp. 52-54.
(2) Ibid., pp. 55-56.
(3) Crook, p. 395.
(4) Richaud, p. 46.
Toulon could not defend itself against this combination.(1)

Perhaps the most influential arguments advocating the British alliance were those which stressed the danger of a Jacobin resurgence in the time of crisis. These were described by J.L. Panisse, general secretary of the Comité Général, in his account of the night session of August 24:

D'un autre côté, les moments étaient précieux. Ceux que l'on perdait par des réflexions étrangères aux circonstances, augmentaient l'espoir de la faction (jacobine) qui pourrait en tirer les plus grands avantages.
Il fallait agir donc, sans se permettre des disputes oiseuses que l'aigreur entretenait et enlever aux ennemis des Sections jusqu'à l'apparence d'un retour dont les maux seraient incalculables.(2)

Although subdued since July 12, the enemies of the moderates in Toulon had not been eliminated. The lingering threat to the Sections was evident in the events surrounding the execution of Jacobins Alexis Lambert and Antoine Barry.

Lambert and Barry were condemned to death on August 19 by the Tribunal Populaire Martial for: "Assassins et provocations à ces crimes avec attouplement armé exactions forçées de sommes indues."(3) The sentence invoked hostility from the Workers' Committee in the Arsenal, which

(1) Ibid., p. 45.
(2) J.L. Panisse, Histoire des événements de Toulon en 1793, 1815, (manuscript), pp. 55-, cited in Coulet, p. 31.
(3) Coulet, p. 27.
had been set up during the reign of Club Saint-Jean but continued to operate under the Sections. The workers demanded the release of the condemned and denounced the authority of the Comité General. On August 20, as the prisoners were being led to the scaffold, shots were fired and chaos ensued. Lambert was wounded and Barry killed while trying to escape. Only the firm stand taken by the National Guardsmen and marine troops frustrated armed insurrection by workers and sailors, and it was the strong personal authority of commandant d'armes de Chaussegros which eventually dispersed the workers. This episode illustrated Toulon's internal struggle when the city considered the threat from Carteaux's army: "Comment une ville dénue de tout, et déchirée par une guerre intestine, pourroit-elle soutenir un siège?"

The day after the workers' abortive uprising, a six-member security committee was appointed to take any measures necessary to public safety without the approval of the Sections. Crook argued that these defensive preparations advanced the reactionary influence of aristocratic officers and dedicated royalists. However

(1) Ibid., p. 27. See also Pons, pp. 50-54.
(2) Pons, pp. 55-58.
(3) Ibid., p. 67.
(4) Ibid., pp. 59-60. See also Coyle, p. 28.
the decision to agree to Hood's terms was arrived at by
democratic appeal to the Sections.(1)

The acceptance of Allied support and the proclamation
of the monarchy should not be seen as a successful Royalist
coup. Toulon was isolated and the resistance of its ally,
Marseilles, was collapsing. The Sectionary regime was
threatened from within by its extremist rivals, who were in
sympathy with the forces of the Convention marching against
the city. Adoption of the monarchy was conditional on
entering into an alliance with Hood, which was the only
option to submission to the Montagnard Government.

The acceptance of Hood's offer was expressed in a
"Déclaration de la ville de Toulon," dated August 24. The
first article declared to the Admiral:

Que le voeu unanime de tous les
habitants de Toulon est de rejeter une
constitution qui ne peut pas faire son
bonheur, et d'adopter le gouvernement
monarchique, tel qu'il ait été
organisé par l'assemblée constituante de
1789; et, en conséquence, ils ont
proclamé leur légitime Roi Louis XVII,
fils de Louis XVI, et ont juré de la
reconnaître toujours pour tel, et de ne
plus souffrir le despotisme des tyrans
qui gouvernent aujourd'hui la France.(2)

The Declaration went on to consent to Hood's other

(1) Panisse wrote: "Mais la réponse qui devait être fait à
Milord Hood dépendait moins des pouvoirs de ce comité
[general] qu'elle dépendait, en effet des sections."
Cited in Coulet, p. 29.

(2) "Déclaration de la ville de Toulon," in Pons, p. 269.
conditions, while demanding equal representation of French troops in fortress garrisons and the retention of civil and military officials in their posts. (1) However, the first article revealed that Toulon had not agreed to a restoration of the ancien régime monarchy advocated by the émigrés. The proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy suggested that it was not ultra-royalists who had prevailed, but rather the same coalition of moderates, both republican and royalist, who dominated the port after July 12:

Les republicains eux mêmes, qui depuis quelque temps, s'étoient unis aux royalistes, et penetres, en quelque sort, de leurs sentiments, repetent le cri cher aux Francais. La monarchie constitutionnelle, telle que l'Assemblée constituante l'avoit deceree en 1791, et que Louis XVI l'avoit approuve, en conciliant toute les opinions, reunit tous les suffrages. (2)

The municipal revolution of July 12/13 in Toulon resulted from the bitter local conflict between Extremists, based in the Jacobin Club, and a coalition of moderate republicans and royalists. The Moderates opened the Sections in defiance of Extremist authorities, took control of the city, and purged the local administrations. The victorious coalition went on to defy the Revolutionary

(1) Ibid., pp. 269-271.
(2) Pons, p. 69.
Government of France and finally, with no other option but submission, decided to enter into an alliance with Admiral Hood and the British Fleet. It was this situation of local conflict between Revolutionary extremists and moderate supporters of the Revolution, still unresolved when Hood presented his terms, rather than the shadowy spectre of Royalist conspiracy which explained the surrender of Toulon and the French Fleet.
CHAPTER 3: THE SURRENDER OF THE MEDITERRANEAN FLEET

Jeanbon Saint Andre's *rapport sur la trahison de Toulon* highlighted, unintentionally, the key issue in explaining the naval surrender. Jeanbon, referring to Toulon's *Comité General*, stated:

Voilà donc un Comité sectionnaire disposant du gouvernement, dirigeant à son gré les mouvements des vaisseaux, regardant comme sa propriété particulière la propriété nationale du port de Toulon, et soutenant la révolte de Marseille! (1)

For the Committee of Public Safety's naval expert, Toulon had committed treason by interfering in the operations of the navy. However, local interference in naval affairs had certainly not been confined to the Sectionary regime. Since the early period of the Revolution the ships of the French navy at anchor in Toulon's harbour, as well as the naval base ashore, had been an arena for the local struggle and control of the Mediterranean Fleet one of its highest stakes.

From the beginning, Revolutionary extremists in Toulon

had sought support among the sailors in the port, as well as with the Arsenal workers. Moreover, they saw the officers of the navy, most of them nobles, as enemies of the Revolution and supporters of their moderate rivals. This view hardened with the establishment of the Jacobin Club. Not only was insubordination encouraged among crews of the squadron, but more direct assaults were made against naval commanders.

In December 1789, the commanding officer at Toulon, comte d'Albert de Rions, dismissed two petty officers for involvement in the National Guard, which he had forbidden. (1) This resulted in the siege of de Rions' residence by a threatening crowd. Officials of the Municipality approached the officer, asking him to defuse the situation by pardoning the two sailors. However, de Rions' house was invaded and the National Guard arrested him along with several of his officers, including the then-major Chambon de Saint-Julien, who was wounded in defence of his commander. (2)

The incident was brought before the National Assembly

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which, although ordering the release of the officers, was ambiguous in its decree and refused to lay blame. (1) The Government had not upheld the authority of its naval officers against local dissent. This set a dangerous precedent in Toulon and de Rions' successor, Jean-Baptiste de Glandèves, was seized by extremists on May 3, 1790, accused of counter-revolutionary sentiments. (2) Although rescued by the Municipality, it seemed de Glandèves was bullied into releasing agitators by demagogues led by lawyer Barthélemy, a founder of the Club Saint-Jean. (3)

In 1792, following the massacre of Departmental Administrators, violence was directed against the naval officer corps. On September 10, the commandant d'armes succeeding de Glandèves, Joseph marquis de Flotte, was murdered along with other officers including Captain Jacques-François de Rochemore. (4) Using violent intimidation, the extremists came to dominate Toulon's naval establishment just as they had the civil authorities. The paralysis which gripped naval administration was evident in the September 23, 1792, letter of interim ordonnateur Thivénio to Minister of the Navy Monge:

Il est impossible que l'administration

(1) Mahan, I, p. 43.
(2) Richaud, p. 12.
(3) Cottin, p. 20.
puisse se soutenir plus longtemps dans le pitoyable état ou elle se trouve. Plus de chefs, les principaux subordonnés malades ou embarqués, les autres dans le découragement ou la crainte.¹

In February of 1793 certificats de civisme were introduced into Toulon. Even Cottin, who felt the measure was "excellente en principe," realized that it gave the municipal authority unhealthy control over naval officers. And it did not help the damaging insubordination among sailors. Crews of the Toulon squadron had formed their own popular societies aboard ship and, by 1793, were only obeying orders erratically. On April 8, the ship-of-the-line le Thémistocle was forced to sail without most of its crew.² Also in April, the crews of the frigates la Melphomène and la Minerve denounced their captains, Basterot and Feraud, to the Jacobin Club in Toulon and then refused a new order to get under way.³ Contre-amiral Truquet, who commanded the Mediterranean Fleet in its abortive campaign against the Sardinians, was recalled to Paris to explain the navy's failure. In a


³ Cottin, p. 30.
letter of June 28 to the Convention, Truguet called for severe regulations to end the fatal insubordination:

La discipline est la première des armes: l'armée navale et Toulon l'attendent, et son chef vous déclare qu'il peut rien sans elle.(1)

Discipline in the Fleet was undermined by those who saw the authority of naval officers as an obstacle to political power. Barthelemy, whose prosecution led to the execution of Captain Basterot, declared to French sailors:

Méfiez-vous de vos chefs! Lorsqu'ils vous mènent avec douceur et bonté, c'est pour vous séduire et faire de vous autres ce qu'ils voudront!(2)

The Extremists tried to control all aspects of naval operations in Toulon.(3) In June, Jacobins Barthelemy and Sevestre harangued crews, urging them to sail to challenge the loose Spanish blockade.(4) Contre-amiral comte de Trogoff, who had succeeded Truguet as commanding officer, opposed the sortie. He stated that the Fleet was in no state to confront the enemy, particularly since the English

(1) Le Moniteur, 5 juillet, 1793 (I, p. 800).
Fleet had been sighted at Gibraltar.\(^1\) This conflict seemed to illustrate the attempt to dominate naval commanders which was one of the crimes the Sectionary regime attributed to the Jacobins.\(^2\)

In the incessant conflicts which arose between naval authorities and popular societies, the Minister of the Navy always upheld the Clubs.\(^3\) Yet if the Government's action seemed to sanction local Jacobin interference in the navy, there were indications that the danger was perceived. In its Session of April 5, 1793, the Committee of General Defence heard a report submitted by Lacaze on January 25 which stated the necessity of preventing municipalities and administrative bodies from interfering in naval operations.\(^4\) *représentants-en-mission* assigned to naval ports were given complete authority over civil and naval administrations in the formal instructions of May 7, 1793, and were directed to discover the authors of all


\(^{3}\) Cottin, p. 27.

\(^{4}\) Aulard, ed., *Actes*, III, p. 82.
s opposed to a sion entrance... When Saint Julien gave orders to the squadron to be prepared to open fire on the city and fortresses when he gave the command, he addressed them especially to the four *Ponantais* ships-of-the-line, those from Atlantic ports: *le Héros*, *l'Entrepreneur*, *le Généreux*, and *l'Apollon*. Louis Richaud also stated that it was westerners, having nothing to lose, who persisted in their resolution to resist even when Toulon prepared to use force. 2. Sailors from the south, according to these accounts, were quicker to support the Sections since they had families ashore to take into account.

Admiral Hood described the situation in the French Fleet in his letter of August 26: "A captain of one of the ships of the line is now on board and tells me that 11 of the 17 great ships in the roads are commanded by violent democrats." 3. This suggested that the squadron was divided by political affiliation, with republicans pitted against royalists. Cottin, who described *Provençaux* opposition to Saint-Julien and the *Ponantais*, 4. claimed that with the exception of a few sincere republicans, all the naval...

1: Poupe, ed., p. 43.
2: Richaud, p. 51.
4: Cottin, p. 128.
the pattern. Toulon's decision of July 19 to defy the Revolutionary Government and prevent the quarantine of Marseilles was the principal example of the local interference condemned by Jeanbon's Decree of July 20.

When the Comité Général des Sections was formed, it was affiliated with the chiefs of the navy in Toulon: contre-amiral Trogoff, commander of the squadron; contre-amiral Martin-Benoît de Chaussegros, commandant d'armes; and l'ordonnateur civil Joseph-Maurice Puissant. (1) The Comité Général claimed, in its deliberation prior to the July 19 Decree, that it had received a response from the officers indicating that they would not comply with the orders of the Committee of Public Safety. (2) However, it would appear that the naval commanders were under pressure from the Sectionaries and that their correspondence, particularly that of the administrator Puissant, was being opened by the Comité Général. (3) The attitude towards the navy was further demonstrated in the letter to d'Albarade and the Executive Council of August 12 and the Address to Citizens of the


(3) Levy-Schneider, I, pp. 428, 430. See also Cottin, p. 104.
Republic of August 13, both of which warned that the port, and by implication the squadron, would be in jeopardy if Toulon was forced into desperation. (1)

The ultimate expression of local interference was Toulon's acceptance of Admiral Hood's offer of support and agreement to his conditions, which included the surrender of the Fleet. (2) Faced with a decision of critical importance, the moderate coalition had no qualms about dictating the fate of Toulon's naval forces. However, the Sections' negotiations with Hood encountered a formidable obstacle: resistance to the 'treason' from the Fleet itself.

The defiant opening of the Sections on July 12/13 was accepted by the French squadron. The navy stayed outside the movement; but by doing nothing, it implicitly supported the coup. (3) This was another indication of how isolated the extremist regime had become. Moreover, the Jacobin Club had been charged with plotting to deliver the Fleet to the enemy. Admiral Trogoff had claimed the existence of such a conspiracy in resisting demands for a sortie. (4) The

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1. Le Comité Général ... au citoyen d'Albarade," and Adresse ... à tous les citoyens de la République française," in Pons, pp. 241, 229.
3. Chevalier, p. 68. Lévy-Schneider, I, p. 427 also says that the initial impression in the squadron was supportive of the Sections.
anonymous Journal of a 'Ponantais,' a sailor from western France aboard the Apollon, demonstrated that this accusation was believed in the Fleet. The entry for July 13 referred to the arrests of several Jacobins:

On incarcérai les plus zélés clubistes qu'on soupçonnait d'intelligence avec l'ennemi pour lui livrer la ville de Toulon et l'escadre qui y'était en rade, projet infâme que la vérification de leurs papiers a pleinement justifié, ce devait arriver du 14 au 15 juillet. (1)

However, the crews were not, nor were all officers, solidly behind the new regime. There was suspicion regarding the Sections' denunciation of the Constitution, (2) and some sailors supported the Arsenal workers' abortive insurrection on August 20. Recognizing its tenuous hold on the Fleet, the Comité Général drew up an Address to the French squadron to try to head off resistance to Hood's offer. The Address stated that the squadron would be read the propositions of both the English Admiral and the Toulonnais: "vous les examinez; ils ont seulement adopté les principes de la nécessité d'avoir un roi." (3) It went on to assure those favoring royalty that they could count on the assistance of a generous friend, but promised those who

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(1) Poupé, ed., p. 37. See also pp. 35, 38.
(2) Ibid., p. 40.
(3) "Adresse des trois corps administratifs réunis au Comité général des sections de Toulon à l'escadre française," in Poupé, ed., p. 53.
opposed that they would be paid and returned to their homes.

The Address and the news that the Sections had agreed to surrender the Fleet to the English was received with shock. The proposals of the Comité Général created a furor aboard l’Apollon: "Cette proposition a soulevé l’équipage et le commandant n’a pu empêcher les murmures qu’elle avait excités." The crew drew up a petition demanding defense of the port which they sent to the entire squadron. When Captain Pasquier arrived aboard his command, Trogoff’s flagship le Commerce-de-Marseille, at the head of a delegation from the Comité Général, he was greeted by a sign which declared: "La Constitution ou la Mort!" The flagship’s indignation over the proposal to surrender the Fleet was such that Pasquier was forced to disembark the deputies to save their lives. (2) The reaction was similarly violent elsewhere and most ships began circulating petitions.

By August 25, there was a general manifestation of resistance to the Sections alliance with Admiral Hood. Trogoff had been ashore for several days conferring with the Comité Général and deputations from the squadron declared contre-amanal Saint-Julien, the Fleet’s second-in-command,

(1) Poupé, ed., p. 41.
(2) Cottin, p. 126.
as the commander in chief.(1) Saint Julien called a conference of his officers aboard his flagship, le Commerce-de-Bordeaux, and called for the capture of some of the key fortresses controlled by the Sections.(2) Alarmed at the escalation of resistance, the Comité Général responded with a proclamation to Saint-Julien and another to the entire Fleet.

The "Proclamation des sections de Toulon à l'escadre" expressed both the justifications for allying with Hood and the ideological motivations behind the moderates' break with the Convention. Toulon, it stated, would always hope to take the part of France:

Mais, citoyens, une partie de la Nation nous abandonne dans ce moment; on nous laisse manquer de vivres, de fonds, de secours de toute espèce; des armées nous menacent; et quelle serait la suite du succès de leurs attaques? notre retour sous le joug honteux des factieux et des assassins.(3)

The Proclamation went on to reassure the navy that the English did not wish to destroy French liberty, but rather to help the Toulonnais:

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(1) "Hood to P. Stephens, Victory, August 26,": "Trogoff is superseded in the command of the fleet, retired to the fort, and a St. Julien of a turbulent mind appointed in his room." in Rose, p. 125.

(2) Cottin, p. 120.

(3) "Proclamation des sections de Toulon à l'escadre," in Poupe, ed., p. 55.
Nous ne voulons pas reconnaître les Anglais pour maîtres; mais pour des alliés qui viennent nous aider à maintenir notre liberté, ramener la paix en France et parmi les Toulonnais qui veulent la constitution de 1789, la nation, la loi et le roi, vivre libre et mourir Français.

This appeal of desperation and idealism was dispatched along with a more threatening message for Admiral Saint-Julien. The proclamation to Saint-Julien began with the heading: "LA NATION, LA LOI ET LE ROI. 1789;" and informed the Admiral that Toulon had made peace with the English under honourable conditions for the good of the city and all of France. The Sections invited Saint-Julien, whose projects of resistance were well known, to return the Fleet from its error. The principles of honour which had always directed the French Navy and its officers were invoked, but there was also a direct warning:

... mais si ce projet horrible, si les obstacles qui ont été opposés jusqu'à présent aux vœux des sections que l'armée n'a pas le droit de maîtriser, viennent à avoir leurs effets, on leur annonce que Toulon est décidé à repousser la force par la force.

(1) Ibid., p. 55.

(2) "Copie de la proclamation faite par les sections de Toulon au citoyen Saint-Julien contre-amiral commandant l'escadre française, ainsi qu'à toute l'escadre," in Poupe, ed., p. 53.

(3) Ibid., p. 54.
Thus, the Sections claimed the democratic right to determine the fate of the squadron and were prepared to use force to uphold it.

Saint-Julien was outraged by this ultimatum, and threatened to hang the Sections' delegates if they returned. He declared that he would bombard the city if it attempted to impede his defence against the English.(1) Displaying his determination, Saint-Julien ordered the squadron to be anchored in line of battle during the night of August 25/26, positioned to sweep the harbour entrance.(2) In Toulon, preparations were made in deadly earnest for what appeared an inevitable confrontation.(3)

However the Fleet was deeply divided and, despite Saint-Julien's bellicose maneuver, was not firmly resolved to give battle. In its entry for August 26, the anonymous Journal from the *Apollon* alleged that division in the squadron had occurred along regional lines. The crews of warships from Toulon and Mediterranean ports, the *Provencaux*, had taken the side of the Sections even to the extent that, "*plusieurs même avaient résolu de favoriser l'Anglais et de faire feu contre les Ponantais s'ils*"

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(1) Levy-Schneider, I, p. 438.

(2) Poupé, ed., p. 42. See Cottin, p. 123 for a map showing the position of the French Fleet on August 26.

(3) Cottin, p. 121.
When Saint-Julien gave orders to the squadron to be prepared to open fire on the city and fortresses when he gave the command, he addressed them especially to the four Ponantais ships-of-the-line, those from Atlantic ports: *le Héros*, *l'Entrepreneur*, *le Génereux*, and *l'Apollon*. Louis Richaud also stated that it was westerners, having nothing to lose, who persisted in their resolution to resist even when Toulon prepared to use force. (2) Sailors from the south, according to these accounts, were quicker to support the Sections since they had families ashore to take into account.

Admiral Hood described the situation in the French Fleet in his letter of August 26: "A captain of one of the ships of the line is now on board and tells me that 11 of the 17 great ships in the roads are commanded by violent democrats." (3) This suggested that the squadron was divided by political affiliation, with republicans pitted against royalists. Cottin, who described *Provençaux* opposition to Saint-Julien and the Ponantais, (4) claimed that with the exception of a few sincere republicans, all the naval...

(1) Poupe, ed., p. 43.
(2) Richaud, p. 51.
(3) "Hood to F. Stephens, Victory, August 26," in Rose, p. 125.
(4) Cottin, p. 128.
commanders were royalists. (1) All ships were exchanging deputations, seeking mutual reassurance, and that from the Themistocle carried a message which indicated a scenario of republican crews in conflict with royalist commanders.

The "Avis du vaisseau le Themistocle à toute l'escadre," denounced the Sections' arbitrary acts regarding the Fleet, as well as the suppression of all discussion favoring the Montagnard Constitution. The Themistocle exhorted the crews to stay at their posts, with or without the sanction of their commanding officers, and thwart the crimes of the Toulonnais. (2) Furthermore, the "Avis" stated that it was crucial to achieve a Republican Constitution, no matter what the cost:

Amis de la liberté, vous avez dû sentir comme nous que le bonheur général depend absolument de l'acceptation d'une constitution vraiment républicaine et populaire. Hatons-nous donc de manifester notre voeu; ne craignons pas le hache de nos bourreaux communs. (3)

Yet it would seem that the divisions in the Fleet were not so clear-cut as many accounts have suggested. Despite the obsession of Jacobins and ultra-royalists with Royalist

(1) Ibid., p. 115. Those Cottin classified as "sincere republicans" were—Saint-Julien; Duhamel of le Themistocle, Cosmad of le Duguay-Trouin; Gohet-Duchesne of l'Artheuse; Gassin of la Topaze.

(2) "Avis du vaisseau le Themistocle à toute l'escadre, 26 aout 1793," in Poupe, ed., p. 57.

(3) Ibid., p. 56.
conspiracy, the situation did not involve a simple or clear-cut division between republicans and royalists. The schisms had been produced by Toulon's indigenous conflict and its continual intrusion into the squadron. Certainly the explosive situation produced moral anguish. Sailors and officers held secret conferences, reflecting this state of inner turmoil, and on August 26, a deputation and address were sent to the Comité Général. (1) This "Délibération de l'armée navale adressée aux Toulonnais" assured the city of the squadron's good will. French sailors desired to remain faithful to their oaths, chief of which was never to bear arms against Frenchmen. This being so, Toulon had placed the Fleet in a terrible dilemma:

Mais aussi jamais nous ne consentirons à nous déshonorer en livrant l'entrée de Toulon à nos ennemis, tant que nous serons présents. Pour concilier nos serments avec l'honneur qui nous est précieux et que nous voulons conserver sans tache au péril de notre vie, voici ce que nous vous proposons. (2)

The Délibération stated that if the Toulonnais were irrevocably decided, then the squadron should be given a safe conduct to another port by the Allies. Despite the stance taken by Saint-Julien, and rhetoric such as that coming from le Théistocle, it would seem that the really

(1) Levy-Schneider, I, p. 439.

(2) "Délibération de l'armée navale adressée aux Toulonnais, 26 août 1793," in Poupé, ed., p. 56.
divisive question for the Fleet was not that of acceptance or rejection of the Monarchy, but whether or not to follow Toulon in its planned surrender to the National enemy:

Que nous nous estimions heureux, frères, que nous cherchions comme nous-mêmes, si comme nous, vous preniez un parti tout autre que de vous livrer à l'ennemi.(1)

The Comité Général first issued the warning that it was heating cannon balls in the fortress batteries to use against the rebellious squadron on August 26.(2) The fear of red-hot shot, the most deadly threat to wooden ships, undoubtedly increased anxiety, if not created panic, in the Fleet. On August 27, preparations for battle were still being made, but there was some controversy as to whether the orders were being given by Saint-Julien or by the Ponantais captains. In any case, at this critical moment the squadron seemed to lack firm direction.(3)

This was sensed in Toulon and the Comité Général took advantage of the situation and issued an "Address to the Officers and crews of the French squadron." It proclaimed the fraternity which existed between the Toulonnais and the navy, stressing the need for all to unite to save themselves from the "brigands" and from the bloodbath which was

(1) Ibid., p. 56.
(2) Poupe, ed., p. 43.
(3) Levy-Schneider, I, p. 439.
occurring in Marseilles at that very moment. Although the Address claimed that Paris had crowned Louis XVII, its most powerful message was its denunciation of Saint-Julien:

Vous avez à votre tête un homme sans moeurs, sans patriotisme, sans probité qui a usurpé le commandant sic de l'escadre. Il a écrit plusieurs lettres aux sections dans lesquelles il vous fait parler la langue de la rébellion. Cet homme vous trompe et vous perd.

Saint-Julien sent a deputation ashore to reopen negotiations, which Cottin viewed as a great mistake, but the Comité Général was more determined on its course than ever. The Admiral knew that while most of the Fleet could be ordered to engage the English, few ships would obey a command to fire on Toulon. As a last expedient to preserve the squadron, Saint-Julien proposed that his ships demand that the Toulonnais issue them a safe-conduct to sail to another French port. It seemed that this was not unanimously accepted, and Saint-Julien spent the remainder of August 27 circulating throughout the squadron making speeches to inspire crews to fight to the death, rather than

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(1) "Adresse des sections de Toulon aux états-majors et équipages de l'escadre française," in Poupé, ed., p. 54.

(2) Cottin, p. 122.

(3) Lévy-Schneider, I, p. 439.

(4) "Dernière ressource que le général a proposée à l'armée pour la sauver," in Poupé, ed., p. 58.
allowing the enemy to enter the harbour. However, as Richaud stated, Saint-Julien's time was running out:

... des rixes et des voies de fait avaient lieu sur presque tous les vaisseaux et dans ce conflit d'opinions l'autorité du nouvel amiral perdait à chaque instant de son influence. 2

During the night of August 27-28, resistance in the Fleet collapsed. Desertion began on Provencaux ships but quickly became general so that by dawn, several vessels were almost completely abandoned. (3) The Allied Fleet off shore, acting on signals from Toulon, prepared to come into port. Within the inner harbour, Admiral Trogoff raised his command flag aboard the frigate la Perle and signalled the Fleet to rally inside la petite rade. (4) Meanwhile, Saint-Julien made his own signal, ordering the squadron to clear for action and prepare to repel the enemy. However the will to resist had evaporated and the warships soon obeyed Trogoff's signal. By mid-morning only three or four vessels, deserted by their crews, remained in the great harbour and Admiral Saint-Julien had abandoned the Fleet. (5) Hood's ships were


(2) Richaud, p. 51.


(4) Levy-Schneider, I, p. 440 claims that Trogoff was still ashore and that it was the frigate's commander, Lt. Wann Kempf, who made the signal.

(5) Poupe, ed., p. 47. See also Cottin, p. 129.
able to drop anchor without a shot being fired.

Contre-amiral Trogoff, commandant d'armes Chaussegros, and ordonnateur Puissant had all been suspected of counter-revolutionary conspiracy by the Committee of Public Safety since July 29, 1793.1 The Executive Council ordered them recalled and replaced with politically safe appointments on August 1.2 But this decree was suspended pending a report on the situation.3 It was not until August 19 that the Committee of Public Safety ordered their recall, along with Saint-Julien s.,4 and this proved to be too late. Jeanbon Saint-André certainly found all three guilty of treason, (he praised Saint-Julien's conduct), and in the Decree which followed his September 9 Report, Trogoff, Chaussegros and Puissant were placed outside the law.5

Paul Cottin agreed with this verdict which condemned the naval commanders as counter-revolutionaries. As stated above, he claimed that Trogoff was particularly guilty and obeyed secret Royalist orders. The evidence for this charge

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(2) Ibid., V, p. 442.
(3) Ibid., V, p. 507.
(4) Ibid., VI, p. 24.
(5) Ibid., VI, p. 377.
is questionable, and other evidence Cottin used seems to point in a rather different direction. He cited a letter of August 17, 1793, from Trogoff to d'Albarade. The letter suggested that the Government was losing control of the navy and the Admiral was desperate for direction from the Minister:

Je ne sais, citoyen Ministre, si vous avez le projet de jouer le même rôle avec moi que votre prédécesseur, qui le premier mois que j'ai commandé l'escadre, me a écrit qu'une seule lettre. Depuis votre lettre du 22 juillet, je n'en ai reçu aucune de vous ... Je ne tiens pas au commandement, comme vous le savez, puisque depuis plus de quatre mois, je vous prie de nommer un chef à cette armée. Mais je tiens et tiendrai, pendant que je commanderai, a tout ce qui est du a la place que j'occupe, ...

Admiral Trogoff had asked to be replaced, hardly the action of a royalist conspirator, but carried on in his command despite difficult circumstances and the threat of a superior enemy. Rather than intrigue, the letter points to the Admiral's sense of anguish regarding his situation.

Levy-Schneider acknowledged that the position of the naval commanders, caught between a rebel city and combined

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(2) "Trogoff a d'Albarade, 17 aout 1793," cited in Cottin, p. 98.
enemy fleets, was very difficult. (1) He cited Trogoff's letter of August 15 to d'Albarade, in which the Admiral tried to explain why he and his colleagues signed the August 12 Address of the Comité General. Trogoff beseeched the Minister: *considérer qu'une querelle d'opinion ne doit pas être une raison pour abandonner des forces qui appartiennent à la République tout entière.* (2) Indeed, Levy-Schneider alleged that Trogoff, Chaussegros, and Puissant acted in what they believed was the best interest of the navy, and that, until shortly before the treason, Trogoff was still dreaming of preserving the Fleet for France. (3)

The action for which Levy-Schneider did condemn the three commanders was their disobedience of superior National authority and submission to local insurrectional authority on July 19. (4) This, he argued, was the premier fault from which they were never able to turn back. However, as Chevalier pointed out, knowing where sovereignty resided was very difficult in Toulon. (5) The navy in Toulon had been largely unsupported, and the authority of its officers not

(1) Levy-Schneider, I, p. 430.

(2) "Trogoff à d'Albarade, 15 août 1793," cited in Levy-Schneider, I, p. 435.

(3) Levy-Schneider, I, p. 435.

(4) Ibid., I, p. 430.

(5) Chevalier, p. 69.
upheld by the National Government since 1789. As the Revolutionary Government's control over the Fleet slipped away, local influence increased. The squadron and naval base in Toulon became a battleground for the city's indigenous struggle between extremists and moderates. Reluctantly, naval commanders were drawn in and, finally, forced to take sides in a conflict which had taken on National implications. It was this situation, rather than a sinister Royalist conspiracy, which led to the Fleet's surrender.

One of Levy-Schneider's principal themes was the need, recognized by Jeanbon Saint-Andre, to eliminate harmful rivalries in the navy and establish unity under the central control of the National Government. Therefore he acknowledged the fundamental importance of local interference to explain Toulon's 'treason.' (1) However, his was a national perspective. On a personal level, the continual local interference—by Toulon authorities in naval affairs had profound significance for the individuals in the Mediterranean Fleet. Pawns in a municipal power struggle, they had been deprived of any real focus for their loyalty. They were left in a vacuum of anguish and conflicting rhetoric, unable to unite. When the Fleet and Toulon faced their ultimate decision, the sailors' resistance was motivated by the same ideal which their 'treasonous'

(1) Levy-Schneider, I, pp. 320, 421, 443, 447.
commanders had hoped to maintain: a greater loyalty to France.
CHAPTER 4: FEDERALISM IN BREST AND THE QUIBERON MUTINY

The Government in Paris was still reeling from the impact of the surrender of Toulon and the Mediterranean Fleet to Admiral Hood when events occurred on the Atlantic that suggested the Republic was facing the total collapse of its naval forces. In September, when the official Address regarding Toulon's 'treason' was read to the crews of Vice-Admiral Morard de Galle's Fleet, on station in Quiberon Bay, a general mutiny ensued. Sailors demanded that the squadron return to Brest to preserve the ships for the Republic, and to thwart counter-revolutionary plots to deliver the port to the enemy. The Revolutionary Government also feared the possibility that Brest would follow the same course as Toulon and on September 30 the Committee of Public Safety decreed that two of its own members, Prieur de la Marne and Jeanbon Saint-André, would be sent immediately to Brest. Given virtually unlimited powers, the two conventionnels were to take all necessary measures regarding the navy as well as the constituted authorities. (1) This

decree, which followed that of September 22 ordering Jeanbon and Prieur to Morard de Galles squadron, (1) indicated that the Committee of Public Safety believed there was a sinister connection between Federalism ashore and the troubles in the Atlantic Fleet. (2)

The existence of a link between the Federalist Revolt and naval disorder was first suggested in the Convention by Barère on August 25. According to Barère, the people of the Department of Finistère had been misled by enemies of the Republic and he blamed their refusal to accept the Constitution on machinations of outlawed deputies in the department. Furthermore, he claimed that in Brest, "la politique infâme de Pitt a fait des tentatives:" (3) and that emigres in the Fleet were promoting indiscipline and sabotage: "On travaille les équipages à bord de l'escadre et dans les arsenaux." (4) Barère demanded a purge of the Brest naval base. Following the surrender of Toulon concern escalated and on September 11, prior to the Quiberon Mutiny, Carrier wrote a warning to the Committee of Public Safety from Rennes: "Une grande partie de Brest surtout est dans

(1) Ibid., VII, p. 2.
(3) Le Moniteur, 27 aout 1793 (I, p. 1017).
(4) Ibid.
les mêmes dispositions que Toulon; ..." (1) The parallel with Toulon suggested by Carrier was still more explicit in the Report resulting from Jeanbon Saint-André's mission to Brest.

Jeanbon's "Rapport, (2) completed on 1 brumaire, was presented to the Convention on January 31, 1794. It presented the same interpretation for the Quiberon Mutiny as Jeanbon had espoused for Toulon's surrender. He argued that the ships of the Atlantic Fleet represented a threat to the English enemy, as well as to Federalists and Royalists within France. Therefore, destruction of the Fleet became the object of a vast conspiracy:

Il fallait détruire, à tout prix, anéantir, livrer à nos plus cruels ennemis ce boulevard de notre sûreté; favoriser les communications avec les rebelles de la Vendée; doubler leurs moyens; fournir aux partisans de Rolland et de Brissot l'occasion et le prétexte de se réunir aux fanatiques revoltés, et de travailler de concert avec eux pour le renversement de la République. (3)

Pitt and his accomplices, Jeanbon alleged, used all possible means to mislead French sailors and the principal


(2) Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport sur les mouvemens qui ont eu lieu sur l'Escadre de la République, commandée par le Vice-Amiral Morard-de-Calles, et sur sa entrée à Brest, fait aux Representans du Peuple au lieu de l'Armée navale," (Brest, 1794).

(3) Ibid., p. 2.
agents of these evil machinations were none other than the fugitive deputies.\(1\) Through perfidious correspondence, these deputies were able to create divisions among the inhabitants of Brittany and to achieve the 'federalizing' of several cities. According to Jeanbon:

La contre-révolution était faite sur terre. Que manquoit-il si l'on parvenoit à la faire sur mer?\(2\)

Therefore, the conventionnel asserted, control of Brest was the plot's main objective. If Brest had contributed to the Departmental Force it was not because the 'People' were guilty, but rather because they had been misled by counter-revolutionary federalists who dominated the local Popular Society.\(3\) For Jeanbon, the conspiracy's influence on the Brest Fleet had created a situation identical to that which had existed in Toulon:

Les Federalistes donnaient la main à l'aristocratie, et la même remarque qui a été faite par rapport à la flotte de Toulon, s'applique à celle de l'océan. Le choix des officiers, en supposant qu'il ait été fait avec réflexion, ne peut être attribué qu'à la plus perfide malveillance.\(4\)

Thus Jeanbon maintained that it was through aristocratic and

\(1\) Ibid., p. 3.
\(2\) Ibid., p. 4.
\(3\) Ibid., p. 5.
\(4\) Ibid., p. 6.
counter-revolutionary sea-officers that Federalists and Royalists furthered their conspiracy against the naval forces of the Republic.

Jeanbon's "Rapport," with its classic conspiracy thesis, represented the Jacobin or ultra-revolutionary interpretation of Brest federalism and the Quiberon Mutiny. As was the case for Toulon, this view has similarities with the ultra-royalist interpretation, represented by the work of Oscar Havard. Havard also argued for the existence of a plot to deliver Brest to the English; however, its author was Jeanbon Saint-André. (1) In conjunction with such a plan, Havard alleged that Jeanbon sought to destroy the naval officer corps by defaming its best members. (2) Since his purge struck officers who were sincere Jacobins, Havard insisted that Jeanbon's campaign was not against Royalism but the French Navy itself:

Arrachons donc à Jeanbon son masque de farouche patriote et ne nous étonnons pas si, - sous le plâtre, - nous trouvons la face d'un traître, que la haine associe aux manèges de nos adversaires. (3)

The motivation for this treason, Havard maintained, was Jeanbon's fanatical Protestantism which had resulted in a

(2) Ibid., II, pp. 299, 307-308, 311.
(3) Ibid., II, p. 314.
personal vendetta against Catholic France. The evidence used to support this, or indeed the larger claim of such a plot, was extremely weak and the accusation can certainly be ascribed to Havard's strong prejudices against Jeanbon Saint-André.

Apart from these ultra-royalist or revolutionary accounts, the conspiracy thesis has been largely rejected in more moderate historiography of the events at Brest and Quiberon Bay. However, these analyses tended to focus on either Breton 'Federalism,' or on the Mutiny and the naval situation. Works falling into the first category include Armand Duchatellier's six volume *Histoire de la Révolution dans les départements de l'ancienne Bretagne*, and P. Levot's *Histoire de la ville et du port de Brest pendant la Terreur*. Both painted highly sympathetic pictures of the 'Federalist Revolt.' Duchatellier saw the struggle in terms of 'Girondins' vs Montagnards, with opposition to the Mountain manifested throughout Brittany.

As for the navy, Duchatellier seemed to accept some of Jeanbon's explanation for the Quiberon Mutiny, but he disputed that any blame lay with 'Girondins,' and he defended the accused

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The themes in this letter — hatred of factions and extremism, emphasis on legality, concern for property — strongly resembled the ideals expressed by moderates in Toulon.

Two représentants-en-mission, Sevestre and Cavaignac, who had arrived in Brest at the end of May, sought to force the District and Municipality to release the prisoners. (2) This was refused and on June 12, a deputation from the Club approached the District to demand the arrest of the conventionnels. Such were the feelings of anger that the Administration informed Sevestre and Cavaignac that if they remained in Brest, they could not be protected. (3) On June 13, the two left the city, and its threatening atmosphere, and traveled to Lorient. In conjunction with représentants Merlin and Gillet, they wrote an Address to the

(1) Letter to Minister of War, June 3 1793, in Levot, p. 86.
(2) Levot, p. 87.
(3) Ibid., p. 94.
counter-revolution nor conspiracy in Quiberon Bay. Rather, the crews were tired of the patrol and, after years of growing accustomed to imposing their will on officers, they mutinied when they encountered resistance. (1) Similarly, in The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812, A.T. Mahan denounced the Revolutionary Governments' failure to enforce discipline and uphold officers' authority. Mahan saw Quiberon as a microcosm of the larger anarchical situation in the French navy. (2) Concentrating on the navy, both of these studies presented severely limited or simplified analyses of the political situation ashore.

It might be argued that if the conspiracy interpretation is distorting, so too is isolation of the discussion of the 'Federalist Revolt' from that of the Quiberon Mutiny. Without accepting Jeanbon Saint-André's conclusion that Federalists were part of a sinister plot to destroy the Republic's navy and turn Brest over to the English, it can still be suggested that there were important connections between political developments in Brest and conditions aboard the Atlantic Fleet. The brief investigation which follows will indicate some parallels


between the situation at Brest and that which has been outlined for Toulon. In both cases, the Conspiracy thesis clouded understanding of what actually occurred. The 'Federalist Revolt' in Brittany generally, and Brest specifically, seems to have involved a conflict between moderate republicans and Revolutionary extremists similar to that at Toulon, and the moderates manifested analogous 'Federalist' ideals. For a number of reasons, the division did not produce the same degree of local interference in naval affairs. However, it could be argued that similar pressures led to an equivalent deprivation of a clear focus of loyalty in the Fleet, which was at the heart of the Mutiny. This chapter will not be of the same scope as the discussion of Toulon and the Mediterranean Fleet. Rather it is comparative and illustrative, suggesting possible avenues for further study; for the factors which produced and influenced the Naval Crisis on both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean seem part of a national, rather than strictly local, phenomenon.

The events which constituted the 'Federalist Revolt' in Brest might serve to demonstrate that Toulon was not a unique case. Indeed, Federalism in Brest appeared to support the interpretation that at the height of the Revolution divisions were exposed throughout France, with
moderates in opposition to Revolutionary extremists. (1) This opposition was perhaps first manifested in Finistère in October, 1792. In correspondence to the Department, Breton conventionnels, including Lanjuinais, impugned Marat, Robespierre and Danton. (2) Reflecting these sentiments, the Finistère Administrators drafted an Address to the Paris Sections, the Jacobin Club, and to other Departments condemning faction and anarchy, and denouncing dictatorship or the formation of a triumvirate in the Convention. (3) The Address also expressed respect for law and for National Sovereignty embodied in national representation. (4) On December 15, Finistère proclaimed the levy of an armed force, to be sent to Paris as part of a proposed Departmental Guard to protect the Convention. (5) In January, 1793, the newly-elected District


(2) Duchatellier, II, p. 353.

(3) Ibid., II, pp. 354-357.

(4) Ibid., II, pp. 360-361.

(5) Ibid., II, p. 361. In the same session, an Address to the Convention was drafted, pp. 363-364, which expressed Republican ideals and demanded that the Convention: "...faire taire les clamers ingénues et odieuses de ce rang de facteurs, stipendiés par un parti secret, et peut-être par les despotes étrangers pour troubler l'ordre de vos séances." Regarding the dispatch of the fédérés, see also J. Savina, "Les Fédérés du Finistère pour la Garde de la Convention (décembre 1792 - mai 1793)," La Revolution Francaise, LXV (1913), pp. 193-224.
Administration in Brest resolved, in concert with the Department of Finistère, to send a battalion to Paris to ensure the sanctity of national representation. (1) However, the sentiments which motivated this decree were not confined to the council chamber. At a January 6 session of the Committee of General Defence in Paris, the Minister of the Navy announced that many workers and sailors were abandoning the Arsenal at Brest to join the Departmental Guard. (2) The Committee decided to meet with deputies from Finistère to obtain their assistance in stopping the movement and in directing the workers' zeal toward their Arsenal duties. (3) This evidence suggests that there was significant popular support for protecting the legitimacy of the Convention and its representatives. 'Federalist' ideals, therefore, were held by others besides middle-class administrators.

In February, the Department of Finistère wrote to its deputies in Paris that fédérés would soon be leaving to march on the capital. (4) For Duchatellier, this signalled the start of a divisive ideological struggle among Republicans:

C'était donc la guerre, et de toute la plus terrible, la guerre civile, la guerre entre des patriotes qui

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(1) Levot, p. 62.
(3) Ibid., I, p. 406.
(4) Duchatellier, II, p. 364.
Despite his recognition of a fundamental division, Duchatellier stressed the response of Brittany to events in Paris. The Decree of May 24, which warned against impending insurrection against the Convention, provoked strong reaction in Finistère. There were more Departmental resolutions urging the levy of an armed force, addresses were drafted to the Convention and to the citizens of Paris, and commissioners were sent to other western departments suggesting the possibility of uniting the suppléants at Bourges if the Convention was attacked. According to Duchatellier, there was tremendous outrage over the news of May 31 - June 2, and a Central Committee at Rennes began to coordinate resistance for all Breton Departments. Although the Committee called for a Republican Constitution as the basis for Government, the Montagnard Constitution was denounced in a bulletin entitled, "Égalité, plus de Montagne":

Dans quel moment, en effet, cette convocation est elle ordonnée? C'est lorsque la France est évidemment divisée en deux parts, dont l'un reconnaît la Convention nationale, dont l'autre ne la reconnaît pas; dont l'un demande réparation de l'outrage fait à la

(1) Ibid., II, p. 365.
(2) Ibid., II, pp. 370-372.
(3) Ibid., II, pp. 379, 391.
souveraineté du peuple, dont l'autre
approuve cet outrage, ou du moins le
tolère.(1)

In Brest specifically, there was a great deal of
excitement during May, 1793. According to Levot, this was
created partly by correspondence from Finistère
conventionnels: Kervelegan, Blad, and Gomaire; who wrote
from Paris that they were not free and that their lives were
in danger.(2) On May 25, a representative from the Quimper
Popular Society arrived to engage the Society in Brest to
join in the campaign to send a Departmental Force to protect
the Convention. The motion was enthusiastically adopted by
the Brest Club and the opening of the Sections was called
for. With news of the May 24 Decree, the Popular Society's
demands for the Sections to be allowed to pronounce on the
dispatch of an armed force became even more vigorous.(3)
The Brest Municipal Council stalled, trying to limit the
action, and authorized only the drafting of petitions.
However this proved unsatisfactory and the demand was
renewed. The return on June 11 of Thomas Raby, a municipal
officer who had witnessed the events of May 31 - June 2 in
Paris, added fuel to the fire. Levot argued that the
Municipality, caught between the Popular Society, the organ

(1) "Égalité, plus de Montagne," cited in Duchatellier, III,
p. 75.

(2) Levot, p. 87.

(3) Ibid., p. 88.
of public opinion, and the Departmental Administration, could no longer resist. The Sections were opened and proceeded to elect the Breton contingent which would join the Departmental Force. (1) The situation poses an interesting contrast to Toulon in that it was the Club in Brest which, expressing outrage over the violation of legitimate national representation, demanded the return of the Sections.

However, the 'Federalist' sentiment was not found only in the Popular Society, and resistance was not confined to the election of fédérés. In May, the civil and military authorities in Brest, desperate for supplies and frustrated by seeming Government inactivity, were angered by the political agitation of two agents of the Minister of War. The two were recalled but their replacements, Caumont and Quincy, were also more intent on political activism than inspection of the port's magazines. (2) The agents were arrested and in a June 3 letter to the Minister the Breton explained their defiance of National Authority:

Croiriez-vous que vos délégués, sous le prétexte apparent de cette mission, cachaient l'intention perfide de troubler la paix intérieure qui règne dans notre ville en tâchant d'y inoculer des ferments de division et les germes de partis qui désolent la malheureuse vallé de Paris? Croiriez-vous que les propos les plus alarmants ont été

(1) Ibid., pp. 89-90.
(2) Ibid., pp. 84-85.
repandus par eux sur leur route; que leurs voitures ne renfermaient, pour ainsi dire, que des papiers dont les principes ne peuvent être tolérés dans un pays où l'on a juré de maintenir le respect pour les lois et leurs organes, la haine indestructible pour tous les anarchistes, et de faire les efforts les plus continuels pour le maintien des propriétés?

The themes in this letter - hatred of factions and extremism, emphasis on legality, concern for property - strongly resembled the ideals expressed by moderates in Toulon.

Two représentants-en-mission, Sevestre and Cavaignac, who had arrived in Brest at the end of May, sought to force the District and Municipality to release the prisoners. This was refused and on June 12, a deputation from the Club approached the District to demand the arrest of the conventionnels. Such were the feelings of anger that the Administration informed Sevestre and Cavaignac that if they remained in Brest, they could not be protected. On June 13, the two left the city, and its threatening atmosphere, and traveled to Lorient. In conjunction with représentants Merlin and Gillet, they wrote an Address to the

(1) Letter to Minister of War, June 3 1793, in Levot, p. 86.
(2) Levot, p. 87.
(3) Ibid., p. 94.
Convention, (4) warning the Government of the danger in Brittany. They claimed that there was little trust in the Convention, and that the authority of the représentants was not recognized and that their liberty was menaced. They attributed public indignation largely to the violent desecration of legality on May 31 - June 2:

Que ce mécontentement a été provoqué par les excès auxquels on s'est porté contre la Convention dans les journées des 31 mai, 1er et 2 juin; par la faiblesse qu'elle a montrée en accédant aux vœux d'hommes armés qui, entourant le lieu de ses séances, lui ont dicté des lois; ...(1)

Sevestre left for Paris with the Address and on June 21, the other three représentants wrote to the Convention, echoing the ideas in the Address. (2) They claimed that there was a general call to arms to deliver the Convention from oppression. Yet they stressed that the citizens were well-intentioned, if misled, and that the achievement of a Republican Constitution would save the situation. On June 23, Sevestre presented the Address from his colleagues to the Convention, and made his own report, which now had a less moderate tone. Stating that all departments he had visited displayed hostility to the Convention, he added that Brittany was not united in its resistance; the population was divided:

(1) Levot, p. 95.
Je tiens ces détails de plusieurs membres de ces conférences liberticides qui ont organisé l'anarchie dans l'occident de la France; car il existe des hommes purs qui gemissent des excès dont ils sont témoins, dont la voix est étouffée, et les représentations vaines dans ces moments de délire. (1)

The Federalist Revolt in north-west France collapsed rather quickly. On July 13, the Calvados contingent to the Departmental Army retreated in panic from Pacy-sur-Eure after an inconclusive engagement with Forces of the Convention. (2) Although this signalled the failure of armed insurrection, the Department of Finistère did not renounce resistance immediately. (3) But on July 19 the Convention decreed an Act of Accusation against the Administration:

Il y a lieu à accusation contre les administrateurs du département du Finistère, pour avoir tenté d'avilir la représentation nationale, d'usurper l'autorité du souverain, et comme coupables d'entreprises contre-révolutionnaires, ... (4)

(1) Sevestre's report to the Convention, June 23, cited in Levot, p. 97.


(3) Duchatellier, III, p. 80.

(4) "Décès de la Convention nationale du 19 juillet 1793, l'an 2e de la République française," in Duchatellier, V, pp. 295.
Following this decree, 'Federalism' in Finistère seemed to fizzle out rapidly. The Administrators not compromised in the Accusation tried vainly to divert the storm. They drafted a disarming and exculpatory decree on July 24 which recalled the fédérés, invited primary assemblies and military forces in the Department to examine the new Constitution and claimed the Departmental advice to communes not to accept the Constitution had been an unintentional error.(1) The document also denied that they had ever sought federalism in the literal sense and stated that Finistère's only goal had been, "d'obtenir l'unité et l'indivisibilité de la république, la liberté, l'égalité et le respecte des lois."(2)

As was the case for Finistère, which Duchatellier documented, resistance in Brest faded away after the July 19 Accusation. According to Levot, the primary assemblies were presented with the Montagnard Constitution and accepted it by a large majority.(3) Yet again there was sign of divisions. Several individuals opposed the acceptance, one of whom, Le Bronsart, said: "La France entière acceptât-elle la nouvelle constitution, seul je la

(1) Decree pronouncing the dissolution of the Finistère Departmental Force, in Duchatellier, V, pp. 296-298.

(2) Ibid., p. 297.

(3) Levot, p. 99.
repousserai parce qu'elle est la fruit du crime." (1)

On July 28 an elaborate fête was held to celebrate acceptance of the Constitution and general Republican fraternity and, on July 31, the Brest Municipality wrote to the city's fédérés to hasten their return. (2) Despite these manifestations of loyalty, the Convention called four municipal officers to Paris. (3) And on August 25, Barère's report to the Convention was followed by a decree dispatching two représentants, Bréard and Trehouart, to Brest. (4)

By the time the two deputies arrived at Brest on September 11, Toulon's surrender had significantly increased the Revolutionary Government's suspicion. However, the représentants' initial impressions were highly favorable. In a letter of September 13 to the Committee of Public Safety, they reported that they had received a good reception and that even these misled Frenchmen were outraged at the treason of Toulon. (5) They reiterated this on September 14, adding that the spirit of Brest had improved itself. (6) The Bretons' proclamations of loyalty to the Republic should not

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(1) Cited in Ibid., p. 99.
(2) Levot, p. 100.
(3) Ibid., p. 103.
(4) Le Moniteur, 27 août 1793 (I, p. 1017).
(6) Ibid., VI, p. 484.
Be seen as hypocritical. If fear of reprisals lent incentive to statements of self-justification,(1) there was never any real evidence of a plot to surrender the port or of any sympathy with the English or with Royalist counter-revolutionaries. If the moderate republicans in the Brest Popular Society had demanded resistance to a Government they considered illegitimate, they seem to have been genuinely shocked by Toulon’s surrender to the National Enemy. Even following the Mutiny, Bréard and Tréhouart defended the inhabitants’ patriotism.(2) On September 30, they reported to the Committee of Public Safety that a deputation from the Popular Society and from the military was aboard the returned Fleet, stating:

...ils y deployerent l’énergie qui convient aux amis de la liberté, et nous ne pouvons qu’applaudir au patriotisme qui dans ce moment enflamme les cœurs des habitants de Brest; ils ont jure de sauver la marine en se secondant tous nos efforts, et nous croyons à leurs serments, car ils se sont prononcés avec l’énergie qui caractérise les vrais republicains.(3)

(1) See "Copie de la déposition au Citoyen Belval, sous-chef d’Administrartion de la Marine, faite aux Representans du Peuple près les côtes de Brest et de l’Orient," in Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport ...," pp. 49-53. Belval, who had been compromised by aiding the escape of Kerbrelegan and other ‘Girondins,’ claimed, on the one hand, that he had been deceived by them, and, on the other hand, that he had felt it was vital to rid France of their presence to prevent civil war.


(3) Ibid., VII, p. 138.
Although Breard and Trehouart were impressed with Breton patriotism, the fact is that the city had displayed more or less open opposition to the Montagnard Government in the spring of 1793. Outraged over the violation of legitimate national representation on May 31 - June 2, Brest had levied a contingent to the Departmental Force formed in Brittany and Normandy to liberate the Convention. Having arrested Government agents for extremist agitation, the authorities expelled the représentants-en-mission. The question remains: why did resistance in this great port collapse so rapidly? Part of the answer may have been, as Duchatellier suggested, that the threat from Royalist insurrection in the Vendée diverted western patriots from their struggle with the Convention. (1) Certainly this was one of several conditions which made the situation in Brest quite different from that which existed in Toulon. Some historians have no hesitation in suggesting that Breton resistance collapsed because it was exclusively a bourgeois movement from its inception. (2) The evidence is inconclusive, but the enlistment of Arsenal Workers in the Departmental Guard suggests a significant degree of popular

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(1) Duchatellier, II, p. 366; see also Norman Hampson, A Social History of the French Revolution, (London, 1963; rpt. Toronto, 1979), p. 172, who writes that municipal politics in Nantes during this period were dominated by a universal concern to defend the city against the Vendeans.

(2) Hanson, passim.
support in Brest for the 'Federalist' demands that the Convention be defended against extremist violence.

It might be contended that Brest's crucial difference from Toulon was the absence of a bitter local conflict for control of the city. Moderates in Toulon had been forced as much by internal enemies as the army of the Convention into escalating their resistance to the point at which they sought alliance with Hood. In Brest, it would seem that moderates dominated both the Popular Society and local administration and faced no strong challenge in their acts of rebellion against the Revolutionary Government. However, with the disintegration of the fragile Departmental Force and the Accusation against Finistère Administrators, it appears that the Brestois moderates felt they had nothing to gain by continued resistance. Although it is impossible to be positive until more research has been done on the social structure of the city, it seems that without the fear of imminent extremist resurgence within Brest, prudence may have dictated accepting the Mountain's victory.

However, despite the moderates' seemingly secure position, divisions did exist in Brest. Levot argued that when Jeanbon and Bréard demanded arrests as part of their repression, they were able to rely on prompt and faithful execution of their orders. (1) He alleged that the developments between Bréard's initial impression of Brest

(1) Levot, p. 142.
and Jeanbon's use of the "scalpel du patriotisme" on the Popular Society in October represented the ascendancy of demagogues. (1)

Perhaps more telling is a letter of August 14 to the Committee of Public Safety written by six junior naval officers. (2) Although resistance in Brest had clearly faded, they stated that it was their sacred duty to address the Committee so it could thwart the evil plots to foment civil war. Furthermore, they claimed that several of their comrades had been suppressed or humiliated by the 'Federalists,' of whom they wrote:

...ils osent même nous montrer au doigt dans la rue, prêcher publiquement et hautement une sainte insurrection, et contre qui? contre nous qui avons toujours reconnu la souveraineté du peuple dans la majorité de ses représentants; contre nous qui avons applaudi à l'insurrection du 31 mai; contre nous qui avons éclairé une grande partie du peuple sur la constitution, et même beaucoup contribué à son acceptation; contre nous qui avons blâmé, désavoué le federalisme, ... (3)

Although there was a high degree of opportunism in this letter, it did indicate division and the existence of opposition to the moderates. Significantly, it was written

(1) Ibid., p. 143.


(3) Ibid., p. 46.
by naval personnel and this may suggest that it was in the navy that an extremist power base existed. If the conflict between moderates and extremists was not bitter or pronounced in the city of Brest, it was aboard the Atlantic Fleet. Indeed, it was principally this conflict which brought about the crisis in Quiberon Bay.

When Federalist resistance in Brest was at its height, insurrection aboard warships in the harbour demonstrated the chronic disorder and tenuous authority of officers in the Fleet. On June 13 the crew of la Bretagne refused to leave harbour. Captain Richery was forced to call upon local administrators, including Thomas Raby, who harangued the sailors and delivered a patriotic sermon. This proved unsuccessful at restoring obedience, as was the visit of a deputation from the Popular Society. Finally the ship was surrounded by armed chaloupes and forty-two instigators were arrested. This triggered mutiny aboard le Terrible which also required marine troops to suppress. (1)

This episode appeared to reveal an alliance of sentiment between moderates in the Brest Administrations and Club, and certain naval officers. However, the Atlantic Fleet was not bottled up in Brest's harbour by British blockade, and thus the moderates controlling the city could not exert the same degree of local interference as had

(1) Levot, pp. 90-94.
occurred at Toulon. Yet the squadron's personnel were embroiled in the political quarrels ashore and, according to Levy-Schneider, there was no truce when the ships left port. (1) He described the navy as deeply divided, with sailors mostly supporting the Mountain with its promises of equality and the officers, disunited themselves, favouring the Girondins: defiance of central authority. (2) Even Jeanbon's "Rapport," upon which Levy-Schneider heavily relied, claimed that officers were split: "Deux partis étoient très-prononcés dans les Etats-Majors de l'Escadre; ils n'attendoient qu'une occasion pour éclater." (3) Jeanbon, of course, saw the division between patriotic republicans and nobles or other officers connected with the old navy. (4) But it could be suggested that the conflict among officers, indeed that which cut across the entire Fleet, was not one simply of revolutionary vs counter-revolutionary. Rather it was between moderate and extreme supporters of the Revolution.

Since March, 1793, a division of the French navy commanded by Captain Villaret-Joyeuse had been patrolling

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(1) Lévy-Schneider, I, p. 479.
(2) Ibid., p. 478.
(3) Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport ...," p. 11.
(4) Ibid., pp. 6-7, 11, 14.
the waters of Quiberon Bay. (1) By June, this station had been reinforced by the bulk of the Atlantic Fleet under the orders of vice-amiral Morard de Galles. The squadron had a double mission: to sweep the approaches to favour the arrival of a French convoy from the West Indies; to patrol the coast and prevent the English from reinforcing or making contact with Vendean rebels. According to Lévy-Schneider, these two operations were contradictory. Moreover, Morard de Galles was placed in a difficult position, off a hostile coast, and facing the very real possibility of being driven aground if attacked. (2)

Jeanbon's "Rapport" claimed that stationing the Fleet in Quiberon Bay was harmful both politically and militarily, (3) and historians have generally agreed. (4) Not only were supplies difficult to obtain but Jeanbon alleged that the royalist and 'fanatical' population ashore continually tried to seduce the sailors. Crews would have been far better employed on an active cruise; he believed that the idleness eroded discipline and led to moral rot in

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(2) Lévy-Schneider, I, p. 484.


(4) See Levy-Schneider, I, p. 484, also Troude, pp. 288-289, cited in Levot, p. 114. Chevallier, p. 98, asserts that crews were unlikely to stand for a patrol where they were forbidden to go ashore.
the squadron:

Mauvaise enfin, sous le rapport de la discipline, puisque des hommes utilement occupés de leurs devoirs, ne songent qu'à devenir meilleurs chaque jour, tandis que l'oisiveté mine sordemment toutes le vertus, et conduit à l'erreur ou à l'égarement les âmes mêmes les plus fortes.(1)

A clear signal of the smouldering discontent in the Fleet came on August 6 when persons unknown sabotaged the Northumberland by cutting its rigging.(2) On August 11, the Captains and Flag Officers held a council, deciding to request that the Minister release the squadron from his August 4 decree ordering the ships to keep on station until the end of the month.(3) However, in their August 15 session, d'Albarade and the Executive Council held firm.(4) On September 4, the Minister ordered Morard de Galles to dispatch five ships to intercept a Dutch convoy which he had learned would be on route to Portugal. The approval of this action by the Committee of Public Safety showed, Lévy-Schneider argued, that Jeanbon knew nothing of the 'moral anarchy' which reigned in the squadron.(5) The

(2) Ibid., p. 9, see also Report of Inquiry, pp. 60-65.
(3) Lévy-Schneider, I, p. 485.
(5) Lévy-Schneider, I, p. 486.
Admiral informed his Captains, and news of the division spread throughout the Fleet, dramatically raising the already high levels of anxiety and mistrust.(1)

Morard de Galles wrote to the Minister on September 15 that he was unable to carry out the order to intercept the enemy convoy because his crews were demanding to return to Brest. He reported that they were so suspicious of the plan to separate the division from the Fleet that they raised cries of treason and refused to obey his orders.(2) The crews had apparently been frightened by earlier reports that a Russian Fleet of forty-four sail had been sighted off La Manche.(3) Yet it was the news of events in Toulon which triggered the Mutiny.

On the evening of September 12, Morard de Galles had an Address from the Convention on the 'treason' of Toulon read to the crews of his squadron in compliance with the Minister's orders.(4) According to the Admiral, it was this which led to the demands that the Fleet return to Brest and prevent similar treason.(5) On September 13, a deputation

(1) Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport ....," p. 12.
(2) "Morard de Galles à le ministre, a bord du Terrible, en rade de Quiberon, le 15 septembre 1793," [Letter #13, in Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport ....," p. 70.
(4) Levy-Schneider, I, p. 489.
(5) "Morard de Galles à le ministre, a bord du Terrible, a Quiberon, le 15 septembre 1793," [Letter #23, in Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport ....," p. 70.
from l'Auguste, contre-amiral Kerguelen's flagship, presented themselves to Morard de Galles aboard le Terrible. The deputation was led by aspirants Crevel and Baron, who insolently demanded that the Admiral order the Fleet back to Brest. (1) Morard de Galles, having tried to reassure them, was indignant, stating that he would act only on Government authorization. Moreover, he accused the two midshipmen of counter-revolution in leading such insurrection. (2) However this first deputation was followed by others from the squadron. (3)

On September 14, deputations were followed by several ships of the line setting topsails in preparation for getting under way. In response to this open rebellion, Morard de Galles, accompanied by contre-amiraux Kerguelen and Landais, proceeded to visit the mutinous vessels, an episode somewhat reminiscent of Saint-Julien's tour of the Mediterranean Fleet. The Vice-Admiral went aboard the ships and, having listened to the demands, displayed courage in chastising the crews for opposing the will of the Convention and abandoning their duty, and he pressed them to obey his

(1) Lévy-Schneider, I, p. 489.

(2) "Morard de Galles à le ministre, le 15 septembre 1793," [Letter #21], in Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport . . .," p. 70.

(3) Ibid., p. 71, see also Levy Schneider, I, pp. 490-491.
commands. (1) However, to restore a degree of calm and prevent the Fleet's disintegration, Morard de Galles was forced to agree to an Assembly aboard his flagship.

Although Jeanbon praised the Admiral for his personal visit to the squadron, the "Rapport" damned him for convoking the Assembly:

La force armée ne peut pas délibérer essentiel, sans l'observation duquel il n'y a plus de liberté. Si le Gouvernement cesse de diriger un moment l'action de la force physique, ou si celle-ci ne lui est pas constamment subordonnée, le despotisme le plus effrayant, le despotisme militaire, s'établit avec toutes ses horreurs. (2)

It would seem highly unjust to criticize the Admiral for conceding a council to crews whose political activity had long been encouraged by the Revolution, particularly since Morard de Galles did not intend the Assembly to deliberate the Government's order not to return to Brest. (3) More importantly, aboard a Fleet blanketed in mutual suspicion and torn by ideological strife, where government authority

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(1) "Morard de Galles à le ministre, le 15 septembre 1793," [Letter #2], in Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport ...," p. 72.

(2) Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport ...," p. 21. Mahan, I; p. 62, while not blaming the Admiral, also sees the Assembly as disastrous: "This formality did not hide the fact that power had passed from the commander-in-chief appointed by the state to a council representing a military mob."

(3) "Morard de Galles à le ministre, le 15 septembre," [Letter #2], in Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport ...," p. 75.
lay was not at all clear.

It might be suggested that the key to the Mutiny in the Brest Fleet was not simply the final breakdown of discipline as Chevallier alleged. (1) Rather, the general insubordination was the result of something more fundamental. A bitter conflict between moderates and extremists, which both reflected and drew its antipathy from the political struggle ashore, seemed to have created an atmosphere of animosity and mistrust aboard the ships in Quiberon Bay. Moreover, extremists were prominent among those agitating to force the Admiral to take the Fleet back to Brest.

Perhaps the best example of extremist involvement was that of Corporal Beaussard of la Côte-d'or. Jeanbon described him as, "un homme doué d'une ame ardue, d'un caractère impétueux et fortement prononcé." (2) The marine led the deputation from la Côte-d'or on September 14, stirring insubordination aboard the flagship in the process. (3) He demanded the return to Brest and claimed the commanders did not merit the squadron's trust because they

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(1) Chevallier, p. 98.
(2) Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport ...", p. 18.
(3) Levy-Schneider, I, p. 491.
were evil aristocrats. (1) Levy-Schneider, who referred to him as a fanatic, (2) maintained that Beaussard was responsible for a revolt on September 21 which forced the decision to immediately sail for Brest. (3)

Extremists were not found only among sailors and marines. Contre-amiral Landais, whose testimony regarding mysterious signals contributed to the dismissal of Morard de Galles, (4) could well be classified as such. He was of common birth and hated the noble officers in the Fleet, but could not get along with crews either. Although praising his 'patriotism,' even Jeanbon recognized that his extremist suspicion was dangerously paranoid:

On ne sauroit sans imprudence confier le commandement en chef de nos forces navales à un homme dont la tête est déjà assobbie, qui croit que tous les actes d'incivisme sont autant de conjurations particulières, dirigées personnellement contre lui, comme le prouve le mémoire qu'il nous a remis. (5)

A more in-depth study of the personnel, officers and

(1) Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport . . . ," p. 19, see also pp. 91-96, J.B. Beaussard, "Relation de la conduite tenue par les chefs du vaisseau La Côte-d'or, ainsi que celle de l'équipage, depuis son départ de Brest, jusqu'à ce jour."

(2) Levy-Schneider, I, pp. 510,511.

(3) Ibid., I, p. 493.

(4) Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport . . . ," pp. 24, 26, 31, see also pp. 124-129 extract from Landais' Mémoires.

men, could better analyze the pattern of moderate vs extremist conflict in the Fleet. However it would seem safe to claim that Morard de Galles was a moderate and thus a target for ultra-revolutionary antipathy. The ci-devant noble desperately tried to steer a course through the dangerous political shoals, but his correspondence to the Minister of the Navy revealed the anguish of his failure:

...les insurrections qui viennent d'avoir lieu, prouvent évidemment que j'ai eu le malheur de perdre leur confiance, quoique je puisse affirmer avec vérité toujours ferme dans les principes d'un bon citoyen, je n'ai rien fait pour mériter de la perdre, c'est ce qui me détermine à vous réitérer avec instance la demande que je vous ai déjà faite plusieurs fois de quitter le commandement de l'Armée navale.(1)

This plea to be relieved of command echoed that made by Admiral Trogoff, and Morard de Galles went on to warn the Minister that if he were not relieved the Fleet would be lost to "desorganisateurs" who would turn it against the good of the country. He added that the chance of his birth had furnished villains with a pretext for corrupting the crews' trust in him.(2) Describing his September 14 tour of the mutinous ships, Morard de Galles wrote that, "...mon coeur etoit dechire lorsque je voyais mes exhortations

(1) "Morard de Galles à le ministre, le 15 septembre," [Letter #1], in Jeanbon Saint-Andre, "Rapport ...," p. 68.

(2) Ibid., p. 69.
instructueuses..." (1) yet he defended the crews, claiming they had been motivated by patriotism.

On September 14 and 15, the Assembly of commanders and representatives of each crew was held aboard the flagship. After heated debate, it was decided to send a deputy to the Convention to request a return to Brest, and send another ashore to make contact with a représentant-en-mission. However, the Admiral feared that the squadron would not wait for orders. (2) Indeed by September 19, the desire to return to Brest was so strong that the wretched Morard de Galles could not hope to resist and keep the squadron together:

Les Marins ont poussé l'oubli de leur devoir à un tel point, que si je persiste à tenir la mer, en supposant que l'équipage du Terrible ne me forçât pas à rentrer, la plupart des vaisseaux m'abandonneroit, l'obéissance n'étant actuellement qu'un mot dans la bouche des marins. (3)

The last passage of this letter indicated Morard de Galles' agony over receiving no direction from the Minister. (4) As was the case prior to the surrender of


(2) Ibid., p. 77.

(3) "Morard de Galles à le ministre, à bord du Terrible, à Quiberon, le 19 septembre 1793," in Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport . . .," p. 82.

(4) Ibid., pp. 83-84.
Toulon, the National Government appeared to be exerting little control: internal conflict was to determine the fate of the naval forces. This was clear following the arrival of Trehouart on September 20. Discovering the Fleet getting under way, the représentant ordered it to Belle Isle, where a council of Captains was called. Morand de Galles hoped the presence of the conventionnel would restore discipline, but Trehouart was unable to do anything more than authorize the return to Brest. Perhaps nothing demonstrated more clearly that the Atlantic Fleet no longer possessed any focus of loyalty.

The evidence Jeanbon presented in his "Rapport" to prove that a 'Federalist' plot was at the root of the Quiberon Mutiny was questionable and weak. However the "Rapport" appeared, unwittingly perhaps, to support the interpretation that the Atlantic Fleet was torn by an

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(1) "Morand de Galles à le ministre, à bord du Terrible, sous voile, le 2 septembre 1793," in Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport . . .," p. 85.

(2) Lévy-Schneider, I, p. 493.

(3) Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport . . .," pp. 14-16 presents two supports for the conspiracy charge. Firstly, in the Assembly aboard the flagship contre-amiral Le Large, an officer of the old navy, proposed that the deputy sent to contact représentants should go on to Brest even if he found them in Lorient. Secondly, the petition carried by the deputation from la Côte-d'or had supposedly been inspired by a letter from a woman in Brest which announced the false dismissal of Brest Authorities and the squadron's commanders. Jeanbon interpreted this as a Federalist appeal for the Fleet to come to the rescue.
Toulon in revolt against the Convention. In an August 12 letter to the Minister of the Navy, the Comité General denounced the violence of local Jacobins but also repudiated the Revolutionary Government as illegitimate because of the June 2 purge of the Convention. The ideals of the Toulonnais moderates were further emphasized in an 'Address to all Citizens of the Republic' of August 13. This Address again condemned the Jacobins for promoting violence and anarchy, but went on to denounce the Revolutionary Government in the same terms. The Sectionaries proclaimed their devotion to the ideal of a Constitutional Republic, but insisted that the Montagnard Constitution was illegitimate and could not be accepted. Thus, Toulon's defiance of the National Government arose from the same concern for legitimate authority and opposition to violence that prompted the Sectionary coup.

Toulon's declarations of republicanism should not be seen as hypocritical. They indicated the strong influence of sincere, but moderate, republicans. Furthermore, if the moderate coalition in Toulon included monarchists, it embraced principally constitutional monarchists rather than ultra-royalists desiring the return of the Old Regime. When Toulon's Sectionary regime proclaimed in favour of Louis XVII on August 24, it was in response to the ultimatum from Admiral Hood. Hood had made his offer of a military alliance against the Convention conditional upon Toulon's
Jeanbon Saint-André, the member of the Committee of Public Safety most concerned with the navy, attributed the revolt of Toulon which culminated in the surrender of the Mediterranean Fleet to the workings of a vast and sinister conspiracy. In his September 9, 1793, "Report on the Treason of Toulon,"(1) the powerful conventionnel linked that city to the 'Federalist Revolt.' He associated this movement with the outlawed 'Girondin' deputies, but Jeanbon also believed that Federalism was allied with Royalist Counter-Revolution. This idea of a Federalist, even Royalist conspiracy, which was the contemporary Jacobin explanation, has had great influence on subsequent historical accounts of Toulon's revolt. Even the ultra-royalist interpretation, represented by the work of Oscar Havard, placed Toulon firmly in the context of Royalist Counter-Revolution.(2) Despite Toulon's early

(1) Le Moniteur, 10 & 11 septembre 1793 (I, pp. 1075-1076, 1078-1080).

proclamations of Republican loyalty, Havard insisted that, from the beginning, its revolt was Royalist in sentiment and leadership. Indeed, the conspiracy thesis, in some form or other, has been incorporated into the standard accounts of Toulon's surrender. (1)

However, the evidence presented in this study suggests that it was not a conspiracy which determined the events in Toulon, but rather a bitter internal struggle for control of the city. This local conflict was not between republican revolutionaries and royalist counter-revolutionaries; instead, it pitted moderate supporters of the Revolution against Revolutionary extremists. These factions were not divided by their views of the role Paris should play, nor fundamentally by their social background. If the extremists espoused far more radical notions of democracy than their more conservative opponents, they deviated from the moderates primarily on the issues of legitimate authority and the recourse to violence.

Initially, the division was manifested in the formation of rival popular societies in Toulon. But with the abandonment of the moderate society in 1791, conflict in Toulon focused on the struggle between the Jacobin Club, the extremist power base, and the Departmental Administration and Tribunal. The extremists' willingness to resort to

violence was shown in the murder of Departmental officials in July, 1792, an episode which gave the extremists control of Toulon. Yet it was fear of the repetition of such a massacre, and opposition to continued political violence, that forged a coalition of moderate republicans and constitutional monarchists against the extremist authorities.

The defiant opening of Toulon's Sections on July 12-13, 1793, represented the victory of this moderate coalition over its extremist rivals. The extremist regime had become isolated and its popular support, particularly among workers in the Arsenal, had fallen dramatically. Therefore the opening of the Sections had wide approval and received critical support from the National Guard. A Comité Général des Sections was formed and the new moderate regime consolidated its power by suppressing the Jacobin Club, purging the local administrations and arresting prominent extremists.

The same ideals which motivated Toulon's municipal revolution of July, 1793, led to the Sectionary regime's break with the National Government. On July 19, the Comité Général refused to comply with orders to cut off all supplies moving into the rebellious city of Marseilles, with which Toulon had united 'to save France from anarchy.' The Sections claimed that these orders from the Committee of Public Safety were illegal, and this open defiance placed
Toulon in revolt against the Convention. In an August 12 letter to the Minister of the Navy, the Comité General denounced the violence of local Jacobins but also repudiated the Revolutionary Government as illegitimate because of the June 2 purge of the Convention. The ideals of the Toulonnais moderates were further emphasized in an 'Address to all Citizens of the Republic' of August 13. This Address again condemned the Jacobins for promoting violence and anarchy, but went on to denounce the Revolutionary Government in the same terms. The Sectionaries proclaimed their devotion to the ideal of a Constitutional Republic, but insisted that the Montagnard Constitution was illegitimate and could not be accepted. Thus, Toulon's defiance of the National Government arose from the same concern for legitimate authority and opposition to violence that prompted the Sectionary coup.

Toulon's declarations of republicanism should not be seen as hypocritical. They indicated the strong influence of sincere, but moderate, republicans. Furthermore, if the moderate coalition in Toulon included monarchists, it embraced principally constitutional monarchists rather than ultra-royalists desiring the return of the Old Regime. When Toulon's Sectionary regime proclaimed in favour of Louis XVII on August 24, it was in response to the ultimatum from Admiral Hood. Hood had made his offer of a military alliance against the Convention conditional upon Toulon's
declaring for a monarchical restoration.

The acceptance of the alliance with Hood was not the result of royalist intrigue, but rather an act of desperation. With the imminent fall of Marseilles, Toulon was isolated and the horror stories related by Marseillais refugees confirmed Toulonnais fears regarding the vengeance of the Convention. However, the greatest factor in persuading Toulon's moderates to enter into the alliance with the British was the internal threat of an extremist resurgence in support of the besieging army of the Convention. The reality of this danger was suggested by the abortive uprising in Toulon on August 20, which was triggered by the execution of two prominent extremists.

In the light of these explanations, it would appear that the classic conspiracy thesis should be rejected in regard to Toulon's revolt and alliance with Admiral Hood. The other broad interpretations of Federalism suggested by the mainstream of French scholarship also seem unsatisfactory when applied to Toulon. The revolt of Toulon was not a manifestation of anti-Parisian particularism, nor simply a reflection of the conflict in the Convention which culminated on May 31 - June 2. Furthermore, the struggle between moderates and extremists cannot be explained in terms of a division strictly along class lines. The nature of Toulon's local conflict, and its central importance to the city's subsequent defiance of the National Government,
suggest the validity of the recent interpretation of the 'Federalist Revolt' proposed by Bill Edmonds, (1) at least when applied to Toulon.

However this study addressed the entire Naval Crisis, which included Federalism in Brest and its connections to the Mutiny of the Atlantic Fleet in Quiberon Bay. Jeanbon Saint-André, in the "Rapport" which resulted from his mission to Brest, insisted that both the disorder in the Fleet and the 'Federalist Revolt' ashore were primarily the results of a counter-revolutionary conspiracy. (2) Yet the examination of the situation at Brest in this study suggests that again the conspiracy thesis should be rejected.

Brest defied the National Government in the spring of 1793 by arresting agents of the Minister of War and by 'expelling' représentants-en-mission who had demanded their release. The Brestois also denounced the Montagnard Constitution and, perhaps most importantly, elected and dispatched a contingent to the 'Federalist' Departmental Army which was to march on Paris. Federalism in Brest was not inspired by any conspiracy against the Republic. The decision to levy an armed force was principally motivated by


(2) Jeanbon Saint-André, "Rapport sur les mouvements qui ont eu lieu sur l'Escadre de la République, commandée par le Vice-Amiral Morard-de-Calles, et sur sa rentée à Brest, fait aux Représentans du Peuple auprès de l'Armée navale," (Brest, 1794).
the outrage that Brest shared with the Departmental Administration of Finistere over the violation of national representation. Indeed, représentants-en-mission attributed public indignation in the region to the violent desecration of legality on May 31 - June 2. The Authorities in Brest arrested the government agents for extremist agitation and their justification for the action expressed hatred for factions and anarchy, as well as concern for legitimate authority. Thus, 'Federalists' in Brest espoused similar ideals to those proclaimed by the Sectionary regime in Toulon.

Moderate republicans appeared to dominate the Administrations and the Popular Society in Brest without strong opposition. Indeed, there were suggestions that the defiance of the Revolutionary Government had a wide social base. When the 'Federalist Revolt' in Brittany was collapsing, there was no fear of a violent extremist resurgence within Brest to urge moderates into escalating their resistance to the Convention. Yet there were signs of divisions which suggest the presence of Revolutionary extremists in Brest. Jeanbon and the other deputies received support within the city when they carried out repressive measures against 'Federalism' in the autumn of 1793. Moreover, six junior naval officers at Brest wrote to the Committee of Public Safety in August, claiming that they had opposed the 'Federalist' Authorities there from the
beginning. It would seem that there was a division between moderate republicans and Revolutionary extremists, and if it did not lead to bitter conflict in Brest, it did so aboard the Atlantic Fleet.

The Quiberon Mutiny cannot be satisfactorily explained by the theory of a Federalist or Royalist conspiracy. Nor was the insubordination merely the result of the breakdown of discipline in the French Navy. The official news of Toulon's surrender led directly to the demands for the Fleet to return to Brest to prevent similar 'treason.' Above all, the mutiny revealed the high levels of mistrust and anxiety which existed in the squadron. Deep political divisions cut across the entire Fleet. These were not between patriotic revolutionaries and treasonous counter-revolutionaries, but rather between moderate supporters of the Revolution and Revolutionary extremists. Certainly extremists were prominent among the officers and crewmen instigating the insubordination against the authority of Vice-Admiral Morard de Galles, whose letters reveal him to be a moderate unable to cope with the violent political conflict.

Therefore the situation in Brest and particularly aboard the Atlantic Fleet point to a conflict between moderate and extreme revolutionaries comparable to that which existed in Toulon. Furthermore, 'Federalists' in Brest expressed the same opposition to violence and concern for legitimate authority espoused by the Toulonnais. This
parallel suggests the need for some modification of Edmonds' interpretation of the 'Federalist Revolt.' While this study supports the argument that the intensity of resistance to the Montagnard Government was directly related to the intensity of the local conflict, it raises questions regarding the validity of Edmonds' separation of 'urban revolt' from 'federalist protest.' Sydenham's recent articles suggested that Federalism might be viewed in terms of a 'fundamental division of republicans.' (1) It could well be contended that the resistance of moderate Revolutionaries, the 'Federalists,' at both Toulon and Brest was part of the same national conflict with extremism; a conflict which led directly to the Naval Crisis.

Yet at the heart of the Naval Crisis was an aspect of the 'Federalist Revolt' which has been given too little attention: the deprivation of a focus of loyalty. Just as the conspiracy thesis should be rejected for the Quiberon Mutiny, so too conspiracy does not account for the surrender of the Mediterranean Fleet. Like Morard de Galles' squadron, the Fleet at Toulon was racked by political divisions. These had been created by the continual intrusion of the violent struggle for control of Toulon into

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the squadron. This conflict, in which both factions interfered in naval operations, forced officers and men to take sides. However, it was not the Sections' declaration for the monarchy which motivated the Fleet's resistance; the truly divisive question was the planned surrender to the enemy. It was loyalty to the Nation that prompted French crews and Admiral Saint-Julien to resist, if unsuccessfully, the entrance of the British. But Admiral Trogoff, who was allied with the Comité Général, was not a treasonous counter-revolutionary. With no direction from the Government, which had lost control of naval affairs, Trogoff acted in what he felt to be the best interests of the French Fleet. Thus the dilemma for the navy at Toulon, as well as on Quiberon Bay, was to reconcile a sense of National Loyalty to the absence of a consistent or recognizable governmental focus for this loyalty.

This confusion of loyalties sprang from the divisions which prompted the 'Federalist Revolt.' In order to end the conflict which these divisions brought to the Fleet, Jeanbon Saint-André demanded a purge of aristocratic officers and all others connected with the Old Navy. In his biography of Jeanbon, Levy-Schneider defends this and other such measures as being necessary to achieve National Unity:

Dans l'état des choses, le seul moyen d'empêcher la prolongation de la querelle et de l'anarchie qui s'ensuivait, c'était d'achever la victoire de la Montagne et de la démocratie puisque à elles appartenait
le gouvernement, puisqu’elles avaient assumé la tâche de conduire les affaires et de vaincre l’étranger. Le salut du pays était alors au prix de l’unité, l’unité n’était réalisable que par l’oppression des dissidents politiques.(1)

What Levy-Schneider is defending, and what Jeanbon Saint-Andre and his Montagnard colleagues acted upon, is the conviction that the authority of the National Government could not be questioned. This was despite the fact that this authority was no longer based upon recognizable legitimacy, and had become arbitrary in its use of violence. Therefore, Government was no longer based upon law, but upon naked power. It was this shift which alienated a great number of Frenchmen who had enthusiastically supported the Revolution from its beginning, many of whom believed in the goal of a Constitutional Republic. By rejecting legitimate authority, one of the ideals of 1789, the Revolutionary Government deprived France of a consistent focus for National Loyalty and this would be a tragic legacy that 1793 bequeathed to the Nineteenth Century.

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Amendment to pp. 11, 131:
