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MAPPING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY:
BEYOND UNIVERSALISM AND OBJECTIVISM

by
EMIN FUAT KEYMAN B.S., M.S.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
May 1991
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MAPPING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY:
BEYOND UNIVERSALISM AND OBJECTIVISM

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

In recent years international relations theory has been replete with assessments of its paradigmatic status. There have been a number of theoretical efforts to analyze international relations by reference to alternatives to the dominant realist paradigm. The thesis provides a detailed, comprehensive and thorough account of the present multi-paradigmatic state of international relations theory, via a meta-theoretical mapping of international relations theory, in which existing theories of international relations are symptomatically read and critically assessed.

These theories are: the outside-in model, structuralism, the agency problematic, and the Critical Turn. They are located in the discipline of international relations as well as comparative politics, political sociology and social theory. The epistemological positions that form these theories are theoretically analyzed in a detailed fashion. The ontological nature of their conceptual frameworks are subjected to constructive criticism.

In its meta-theoretical mapping, the thesis makes the following arguments. First, to advance our understanding of social and global reality it is necessary to break with universalist and objectivist positions, such as positivism, a certain version of structuralism, and Habermasian critical theory. These positions seek totalizing knowledge about social and global reality, which cannot allow for the recognition of the very historicity of international relations theory. Second, to analyze properly the transformation of international relations theory it is necessary to broaden its scope in such a way as to include within it hitherto neglected paradigmatic positions as well as critical discourses of modern society. Third, a meta-theoretical examination of international relations theory, in order to be comprehensive, should involve not only epistemological concerns but also ontological ones, that is, an examination of not only epistemologies but also substantial concepts of international relations theory, such as "the international", historicity, totality, and hegemony. As the thesis argues, multiparadigmatism at the level of epistemology gave rise to the emergence of an essentially contested characteristic at the level of ontology. The thesis argues that it is these two phenomena that define the recent transformation of international relations theory.
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To my parents and my sister.


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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: WHERE ARE WE NOW?

Two hundred years after Jeremy Bentham gave the terrain a new name, and some two decades after Martin Wright articulated its resistance to theory, international relations is facing a variety of philosophical insurgencies. This is not to claim that international relations is in yet another "crisis": it is to recognize that international relations is undergoing an epistemological critique which calls into question the very language, concepts, methods, and history (that is, the dominant discourse) which constitutes and governs a 'tradition' of thought in the field (Der Derian, 1988:189).

Der Derian's call for the recognition of the fact that international relations is undergoing an epistemological critique constitutes a useful starting-point for a meta-theoretical examination of the current state of international relations theory (hereafter, IRT). The purpose of this thesis is to respond to this call. It starts from the understanding that IRT is indeed undergoing a transformation as fundamental as prior discipline-shaping debates, such as those between idealism and realism and between behaviouralism and traditionalism. The emergence of neo-realism as a reconstructed form of realism, the increasing popularity of the concept of "international regime", the incorporation into IRT of poststructuralist, postmodernist, and critical-theoretical discourses, the persistent calls for theoretical pluralism, and the resistance to the positivist mode of knowledge production, all have characterized such transformation. Labels such as the inter-paradigm debate (Banks, 1985), the Third Debate (Lapid, 1989a and 1989b), the Critical Turn (Linklater, 1989), the postmodern reading of world politics (Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989), and post-positivist international relations (Rosenau, 1989), have also given expression to this transformation.

It should be noted, however, that the transformation that IRT has been undergoing is by no means uncontested. While representing a shared dissatisfaction among scholars, the transformation

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1 The two major debates constitutive of IRT have successively been "idealism versus realism" and "traditionalism versus behaviouralism". At stake in these debates was the delineation of international relations, with emphasis on the question of how to adequately study world politics.
has also produced a proliferation of IRT, leading to a non-consensual pattern of interaction among
a number of paradigmatic positions. Each of them has its own explanation as to what international
relations is and how to produce knowledge about it.

More specifically, what has occurred in the domain of IRT is that the sustaining assumptions
of Realism about the nature of international relations have become objectifiable. They were "de-
naturalized" in the sense that they have become objects of contention rather than the taken-for-
granted frame. Thus, the supportive criteria that Realism had employed for its successful
performance have also been under interrogation, and this has given rise to a transformation of IRT.
Hence, using Terry Eagleton's terminology, "theory" and "transformation" have become logical
bedfellows (1989:22). According to Eagleton,

theory can then be deployed in one of two opposed political directions; either to
refurbish a failing practice, supplying it with a renewed set of goals and rationales;
or to put the skids under it entirely and suggest that an entirely different way of
behaving is now on the historical agenda (1989:23).

With respect to IRT, the first direction has been taken by what has come to be known as
"neorealism", which has both structuralist realist and modified structuralist realist versions. Neorealism
has attempted to refurbish the realist paradigm, reconstructing it with a renewed set of epistemological
and ontological premises. On the other hand, the second direction, while carrying with it an anti-realist
dressing, has produced the proliferation of IRT, in that there has been no consensus on the issue of
what "an entirely different way of behaving" involves, and of what characterizes "the historical agenda".

For this reason, I suggest that the transformation that IRT has been undergoing has to be
examined in a detailed fashion, the theoretical and political directions that take place within it have
to be submitted to interrogation, and the ways in which these directions have theorized international
relations have to be assessed critically. It is this task that the thesis undertakes. It provides a textual
reading, or what Althusser once called a "symptomatic reading", of the existing theories of

---

2 See Ashley (1984) and Banks (1985). It should be noted that the "de-naturalization" of the realist
principles also marked both the beginning of the process of the transformation of IRT and created
a theoretical space in the field of International Relations for alternative epistemological positions to
positivism.
international relations; it shows how these theories account for the functioning of international relations, and then it critically assesses the epistemological and ontological criteria they have used. In doing all this, the thesis aims to contribute to the development of IRT.

**THE ISSUE OF REPRESENTATION**

With respect to the issue of the crisis of theory, Terry Eagleton makes an interesting observation in his argument that an intensive outbreak of theory and its proliferation tend to arise in historical situations where, for one reason or another, certain traditional intellectual practices have come unstuck. When this happens, when the customary rationales for such practices break down or become discredited, those practices are then forced into new kinds of self-reflectiveness. In one sense, theory goes on all the time; in another sense, it speeds up dramatically at points where intellectual institutions enter upon a period of crisis (1989:23).

Underlying Eagleton's argument is that theory functions as a means by which social reality is "represented", and for this reason, the crisis of theory refers to that of representation. When reflected on IRT, Eagleton's argument means that not IRT itself, but realism as the dominant intellectual institution has entered upon a period of crisis and that such crisis is in fact one of representation, marking the inability of realism to create, in the scientific and academic community, a consensus on how to comprehend social and global reality. The transformation that IRT has been undergoing, in this sense, can be said to be directly related to the issue of representation, and the task that this thesis undertakes, therefore, concerns the problem of representation. It focuses on the ways in which international relations has been "represented" by the paradigmatic positions within the domain of IRT.

The matter of representation is of significance in IRT, since arguments, explanations, assumptions, and theoretical interventions about the relation of structures (social or global) and actors (agencies) crystallize around the issue of representation of the functioning of the international system. In this sense, representations can be said to be the point of juncture between structure and agency,
which may be variously perceived as distinctions between the social and the individual, domestic and international, or the mode of production and the mode of domination. These dichotomies involve, or are embodied in a space in which each component attempts to maintain its condition of existence, interacts with the other component, and yields an impact on the constitution of the domain we refer to as society. As Foucault (1970) has pointed out, this is why human sciences, since their inception, have been a specific mode of production of knowledge involving representation. The relation of the issue of representation and the constitution of social totalities occurs in three different but interrelated dimensions, each of which requires a special type of knowledge and a frame of reference specific to it.

(1) Ideology and the question of subject: In this context, the issue of representation is discussed in terms of how one element reflects, signifies, or influences the very condition of existence of the other. To put it precisely, the question of how the represented is related to the process of representation is the primary point of reference of the discussion (Cousins and Hussain, 1986:160-161). For example, in the work of Louis Althusser (1971) as well as Michael Pecheux (1975) this "relatedness" is conceived of as a process of "interpellation", whereby an agent is constituted as a subject. It is through the process of interpellation, in which the subject enters into an imaginary relation to the object of its experience, that the ideological "lived" relations are presented to the subject as if they were "real" and "true". Representations in this dimension therefore function as what Marx called a "camera obscura" (1970:47), and lie at the heart of the theory of ideology as a practice producing subjects. Central to this conception of ideology is the epistemological role it plays in the production of scientific knowledge. Althusser argues in this respect that an appropriate mode of knowledge of social totalities, which can be obtained with the epistemic subject's effort to break with the ideological realm, ought to be derived from the search for underlying structural determinants. For a knowledge based on observable facts and relations can only provide an ideological (ie, non-scientific) account of social reality, in so far as it corresponds to the realm of representation and imaginary relations (Althusser,1969:39). This position allows structuralists, notably Althusser, Piaget, Levi-Strauss, to
develop a scientific practice which operates with an anti-humanist epistemological discourse founded upon the primacy of structures over agents (subjects).³

(2) The question of determination: In this context, what is at stake is an analysis of "causal" relations that have been established in terms of representation. Here, "causality" indicates the way in which one element determines or "gives expression" to the functioning of the other as its representative. The classical Marxist theories of imperialism, which have been developed by Lenin, Bukharin, and Hilferding, the world-system theory of Wallerstein, and dependency theory provide an illustrative example for the functioning of representation within the realm of "causality" (Brewer, 1980:61-126). In these theories the key to the phenomenon of imperialism, or of dependency, is the law of capitalist development in which it is presumed that the economic level of a capitalist society conditions, determines, and represents its political, legal and ideological practices. Thus, the base/superstructure metaphor was constructed, and used to account for the causal relationship between the forces of production and the relations of production. In this sense, "representation" raises the question of determination. For in such a causality political forces and ideological forms lose their own specific condition of existence, and become merely epiphenomena of the economic base.

(3) The effect of "representations": In this context, what is under investigation is the way in which the discursive effect of the representation occurs within the realm whereby human agents are in a position to convey a meaning to the represented. Central to this type of investigation is the role "discourse" plays in the process of production of knowledge about the reality under representation. The effect of representations in this sense obviously raises the issue of the politics of epistemology.

Epistemologies are never without politics in so far as they provide us with a representation of reality. Edward Said's genealogical study of Orientalism offers a very illustrative example of the relationship between epistemology and discourse within the realm of representations. In his study, Edward Said describes the political character of an epistemological position by stating that:

³ With respect to IRT, the problem of representation in terms of ideology is discussed by the structuralist development theories to criticize both the dependency theory and the modernization discourse. For detail, see Chapter III and Chapter V.
Under the general heading of knowledge of the Orient, and with the umbrella of Western hegemony over the Orient during the period from the end of the eighteenth century, there emerged a complex Orient suitable for study in the academy, for display in the museum, for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoretical illustration in anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial, and historical theses about mankind and universe, for instance of economic and sociological theories of development, revolution, cultural personality, national and religious character. Additionally, the imaginative examination of things Oriental was more and less exclusively upon a sovereign Western consciousness out of whose unchallenged centrality an Oriental world emerged, first according to general ideas about who and what was an Oriental, then according to the detailed logic governed not simply by empirical reality but by a battery of desires, repressions, investments, and projections (1978:7-8).

Following the writings of Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault, Said concludes that the distinction between the Occident and the Orient, which has been made at the level of epistemology, manifests itself in the systematic objectification and discursive construction of the Orient as a subject "integral" to Western hegemony. It thus served to constitute the definitional character of the West, being "its contrasting image". The West thereby became - to itself - a rationally acting personality in a rationally progressing culture. That is to say,

the Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles" (Said, 1978:1-2).

Extrapolating from Said's attempt to unearth the discursive character of the epistemological distinction between the Orient and the Occident, it can be said that epistemologies operate

[i] with their own discursive practices:

[ii] their own "truth" claims (whether scientific or power oriented):

[iii] their own mode of representation of "reality" (whether historically constructed or ontological), and, therefore, have necessary political consequences.

In Althusserian language, they are theoretical ideologies that are "in the last instance" detachments of the practical ideologies in the theoretical field (1976:37). From the post-structuralist point of view, they are, in a conceptual idiom derived from the work of Michael Foucault, discursive modes by which either "human beings (in the case of Orientalism, even geographical spaces) are made
subjects" or a "critical stand" is taken against this subjection (1982; 208-214).

In the domain of IRT, what Linklater called the "Critical Turn" (1990:27-34) and what has come to be known as the "poststructuralist international relations discourse" (Ashley, 1989; Walker, 1989) have dealt with the problem of representation in terms of its "effect", and thus have attempted to demonstrate the political character of epistemology by deconstructing the realist and neorealist texts. In doing so, they in their own ways have shown how the positivist neorealist intellectual practice produced a representation of international relations in which IRT functions as a "problem-solving" technical knowledge about the world. As a result, IRT, it is argued, in its neorealist form, results in the subordination of economic, ideological, and cultural factors to political power, defined with reference only to the state, on the one hand, and the exclusion of crucial questions, such as development, democracy, difference, reflectivity, and emancipation, on the other.4

Throughout this thesis, these three dimensions of the issue of representation will be used to demonstrate that the transformation and proliferation, in recent years, of IRT, and its exposure to non-positivist epistemologies can be best approached with reference to the problem of representation. This is precisely because the problem of representation involves not only questions about knowledge production about social and global reality but also questions about concepts and categories, such as the state, structure, development, democracy, modernity, power, civil society, identity, historicity, to be produced to make sense of that reality, in so far as it is embedded in the realm of ideology, of causality, and of the politics of epistemology. The significance of the problem of representation to IRT thus lies in the fact that it, this thesis suggests, presents a new point of departure, which is more proper, and more comprehensive in its scope, than the recent meta-theoretical approaches to IRT, namely the inter-paradigm debate (Banks,1985), the Third Debate (Maghtoori and Ramberg,1982), and Viotti and Kauppi's text, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, and Globalism (1987). In this context, the thesis attempts to go beyond the inter-paradigm debate, with the intention of providing a more adequate and comprehensive account of the transformation and proliferation of

4 Chapter VII will provide an extensive discussion of the Critical Turn in IRT.
BEYOND THE INTER-PARADIGM DEBATE AS A "SITUATIONAL"
UNDERSTANDING OF THE TRANSFORMATION

Although an increasing concern about the present transformation of IRT has recently been expressed in the field of International Relations, regrettably, no rigorous and explanatory metatheoretical account of the nature of that transformation has been provided. One possible reason for this is that the transformation is perceived as methodological in nature. Recognizing the fact that IRT is at a major crossroads and that it has been experiencing rapid change and modification, many argued that the present transformation has arisen both from the crisis of positivism as the dominant epistemological position in IRT and from the inability of Realism to sustain its dominance in the field. Central to this sort of understanding is the idea that a transformation occurs when the epistemological position of the dominant paradigm (which was positivism) is no longer able to provide convincing knowledge about social and global reality. 5 As a consequence, the dominant paradigm enters into crisis, meaning that its mode of representation is no longer taken for granted, and thus, the paradigmatic positions previously subordinated to that paradigm begin to compete with each other via their own epistemological, ontological, and methodological devices.

Within the context of IRT, Mark Hoffman describes this movement by stating that after moving through the debate between Idealism and Realism in the inter-war period, between Realism and Behaviouralism in the Great Debate of the 1960s, through to the complementary impact of Kuhn's development of the idea of 'paradigms' and the post-behavioural revolution of the early 1970s and on to the rise of International Political Economy and neo-Marxist, structuralist dependency theory in the late 1970s and early 1980s, International Relations has arrived at a point that Hanks has termed the 'inter-paradigm' debate (1987:231).

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5 The concept of paradigm in IRT is derived from Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), where he defines the concept as a set of methodological, axiological and theoretical assumptions shared by a scientific community. It should be noted here that this thesis is not concerned with examining the utility of the concept of paradigm in IRT.
In other words, what we have had in recent years are the varied and conflicting processes of theorizing that have given rise to the "inter-paradigm" debate. The debate can be characterized as a metatheoretical one, in which the primary aim is to move beyond positivism by recognizing the other possible ways of theorizing international relations. It was designed as a "post-positivist enterprise", with a number of paradigmatic positions which aim to reconstruct IRT on the basis of their own methodological principles.

The labels attached to these positions are, according to Michel Banks, "behaviouralism", "pluralism", and "structuralism", each of which has its own conception of international relations (1985:15-20). As Rosenau has argued, the debate stemmed from

conflicting assumptions about the structure of international system, the nature of the order that underlies them, the operation of the causal processes that give rise to recognizable outcomes, the identity of the central actors, and the degree to which change and continuity are likely to mark the course of events. To an important extent, moreover, these differences are both a source and a consequence of diverse methodological premises (1982:1).

When considered in terms of the issue of representation, Rosenau's argument implies that the inter-paradigm debate is confined to the logic of epistemology - that is, the problems of determination and causality, rather than the politics of epistemology. As a result, the debate has been concerned with exposing methodological limitations of realism on the one hand, and with bringing into the domain of IRT the already existing epistemological positions in the name of theoretical pluralism on the other. However, such pluralism did not include critical modes of inquiry, such as critical theory, poststructuralism, or the structuralist development theory, whose epistemological characteristics are political and self-reflective (the third dimension of the issue of representation).

Instead, just as in the First and Second Great Debates, the "inter-paradigm debate" is conceived of as "situational", where the evolution of IRT has reached a point at which no paradigmatic position is dominant. Thus, following Kuhn's framework for The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1971), some commentators have argued that the present transformations of IRT corresponds to a situation which is best described as being the "pre-scientific state of all existing social sciences" (Keohane, 1986:2-23; Viotti and Kauppi, 1987:5-14). That is to say, within the general situation of
transformation a number of competing paradigmatic positions try to dominate the field. That being the case, transformation constitutes a pre-condition for the scientific stage, or the Kuhnian notion of "normal science", which will come into existence when its epistemological practice is accepted by the scientific community. Such a perception, of course, leads to an evolutionist view that the history of science is a continuous and unilinear process in which progress is achieved by epistemological ruptures that serve to transcend scientific practices.

The manifestation of the perception of the transformation as a situation, in this respect, is, or has been, an optimistic anticipation that an advance in IRT is likely if the scientific community admits that there could be different ways of theorizing the subject matter, each of which has its own strong and weak points. The second step would be to construct a "pluralistic synthesis" as an adequate epistemological ground for the study of IRT. This way, the transformation will be transcended, and the situation transformed into a "situation of normal scientific practice" (Banks, 1985:18-20; Alker and Biersteker, 1984:130-142). In this sense, the "inter-paradigm debate" can be seen as an attempt to establish a communicative interaction among different paradigmatic positions.

Just as Habermas optimistically asserts that the establishment of a speech-acting community that acquires a communicative competence is necessary for the emancipation of individuals from domination relations (1971:115-148), so does the "inter-paradigm debate" argue that the present transformation can be overcome through the production of communicative competence. Banks thus advocates the idea that an adequate synthesis can be established through communication among "behaviouralism", "pluralism", and "structuralism" that will help construct a framework within which attention will be given not only to state-centric phenomena, but also to structural variables and to non-state institutional factors (1985:12-20). Likewise, Alker and Biersteker propose an "archeological synthesis" which is to be founded upon a construction of a knowledge-cumulation process founded on an anti-parochial, pluralist, and dialectical mode of analysis (1984:121-142).

Despite its optimism and constructive treatment of the processes of learning, teaching, studying, and theorizing, what has been lost in the transcendental image of transformation as a
"situation" is a full consideration of epistemology itself. What will be the epistemological grounds on which such a synthesis rests? What type of conception of scientific practice will be employed in the process of knowledge-cumulation? What kind of epistemological status will be attached to the "knowledge" of global relations? To what extent will this knowledge be free from "power"? To what degree will this knowledge be separated from the "historicity" in which it is embedded? To what degree will the scientific practice of such a synthesis acquire an autonomy vis-a-vis what Foucault calls the "disciplinary society" and politico-economic relations that exist within it?

The inter-paradigm debate is not capable of providing a consistent answer to these questions. At least two points can be made about the sources of this incapacity. First, recalling the three different dimensions of the issue of representation, as noted, the debate deals only with the second dimension, the question of "causality" constitutes the primary point of reference. As we have seen, within the issue of representation the question of causality raises only questions about how "true" representations can be achieved. Consequently, the category of epistemology is accorded a potential autonomy, and science is thought of as an "objective" practice in so far as the term "true" indicates the objective character of representation (Foster-Carter, 1977:353-359 and Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983:253-265). The debate does not involve any recognition of the political character of representation, and therefore of an epistemological position from which important insights that would help advance IRT might be extrapolated. Hence, theoretical pluralism, advocated by the debate, turns out to be exclusionary.

Secondly, because the inter-paradigm debate is limited to the question of methodology - to a critique of positivism - and because it excludes the critical modes of inquiry, it does not deal with the substantial concepts of international relations, such as the state, order, governance, structure, system, power, and sovereignty. Nor does it pose questions about identity, democracy, difference, history, ideology, which are necessary to thoroughly examine the functioning of IRT as a theoretical practice (Keyman:1990b). In other words, it can be argued that if theoretical pluralism, as it has been envisioned by the inter-paradigm debate, is significant for the development of IRT, it has to be
identified not only as a methodological enterprise but also as a conceptual one.

These two problems, together, make it necessary to go beyond the inter-paradigm debate. This is what this thesis aims to do. In doing so, it suggests that the mode of production of concepts in IRT and the ontological status that they are accorded by different paradigmatic positions is as an important question as that of the mode of production of knowledge about international relations. This suggestion entails the recognition not only of the need to open up the domain of IRT to critical modes of inquiry, but also of the necessity to examine the ontological dimension of IRT.

THE ARGUMENT AND PLAN OF THE STUDY

This thesis argues that if it is necessary to open up the domain of IRT to critical modes of inquiry, then it is equally necessary to incorporate into the inter-paradigm debate epistemologies with which such critical modes are associated. Such epistemologies are those of structuralism, critical theory, and poststructuralism. Although these epistemologies provide a general critique of positivism, it should be pointed out that they radically differ in their own mode of knowledge production, and the concepts and categories they use to represent social and global reality. The thesis, therefore, attempts to indicate these differences and demonstrate how they have reflected upon the proliferation of IRT, that is, upon they ways in which the paradigmatic positions that employ these epistemologies have approached and represented social and global reality.

Embedded in this attempt are the following particular arguments, which the thesis makes in its meta-theoretical examination of the transformation of IRT. First, to advance our understanding of global reality it is important to break with universalist and objectivist epistemological positions, such as positivism, a certain version of structuralism, and Habermasian critical theory. Positivism and structuralism with their universalist and objectivist scientific discourses, and Habermasian critical theory, with its universalist nature, seek totalizing knowledge about social and global reality, which
cannot allow for the recognition of the very historicity of international relations.⁶

Second, the thesis argues that to analyze properly the transformation of IRT, it is necessary to broaden our understanding of international relation by including within it hitherto neglected paradigmatic positions such as the neo-marxist dependency theory (the articulation of mode of production problematic and historical structuralism), and international political economy, such as the world-system analysis and the regulation school, as well as consideration of recent developments in the theory of the state, especially with reference to the state-centric model in which the international context and geopolitics constitute the primary point of reference for the analysis of state power.

Third, the thesis argues that in the process of broadening our understanding of international relations, any attempt to provide a metatheoretical examination of IRT should involve not only epistemological concerns but also ontological ones. To make use of both epistemology and ontology, it is necessary to deal with both the question of the mode of production of knowledge and the question of the mode of production and functioning of concepts, both of which characterize the way in which paradigmatic positions attempt to apprehend their subject matters. This is why in examining the transformation of IRT, this thesis will be concerned with both epistemological and conceptual structures of the existing theories of international relations, by paying special attention to the ontology of the fundamental concepts with which they operate, such as the system, the subject, the state, society, history and the domestic/international dichotomy.

It is through a symptomatic reading of both the epistemological and the ontological structures of the paradigmatic positions within the domain of IRT that one may demonstrate, first, the weaknesses and strengths of these positions in their own ways of analyzing international relations. In this context, the thesis concludes that among the paradigmatic positions subjected to metatheoretical examination, those which attempt to break with universalism and objectivism offer a more adequate

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⁶ The definition of historicity used here is the recognition of the changing structure of international relations, which stems from the changing nature of the articulation between states, social forces, and world orders, each of which has its own condition of existence, and its own spatial and time dimensions.
analysis of international relations. Secondly, such symptomatic reading reveals that the recent transformation and proliferation of IRT has given rise to the emergence of the essentially contested nature of the substantial concepts of IRT, such as the international, historicity, totality, and hegemony. The thesis concludes that this in fact characterizes the current state of IRT and makes it necessary to take seriously the question of ontology which appears to have yet been neglected in the field of International Relations.

To substantiate these arguments, the thesis will move in carefully circumscribed steps. Chapter II provides a meta-theoretical examination of the current state of IRT. In doing so, it is concerned with the question of epistemology. It lays out the fundamental ontological and methodological premises of four epistemological positions: positivism, structuralism, critical theory, and poststructuralism. The chapter summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of each of these epistemological positions on the one hand, and the critical exchange between them on the other. It points out the significance to the development of IRT of abandoning the principles of universality and objectivity.

Chapter III addresses a number of new socio-economic and political phenomena which have led to the reorganization of the global system after World War II and concerns itself with the discursive representation of this reorganization by paradigmatic positions: the sociology of development, the sociology of underdevelopment, and the "realist" account of international relations. This step is necessary for two reasons. First, it locates the transformation of IRT in a historical context. Second, it shows that the recent proliferation of IRT, to a large extent, involves the reconstructed forms of these three paradigmatic positions, by, in fact, constituting "the inter-paradigm debate". Thus, the chapter offers a historical and theoretical account for the transformation and proliferation of IRT.

Chapters IV and Chapter V deal with structuralist IRT. They demonstrate the way the structuralist paradigmatic positions have theorized international relations. In the domain of IRT there are two different modes in which structuralism has been utilized: structuralism employed at the level
of ontology, and structuralism employed at the level of epistemology. Chapter IV is concerned with the structuralist outside-in model that conceives of international relations as a systemic structural totality, having its own history and ontological quality. More specifically, the chapter deals with the world-system perspective, structuralist realism, and the modified structuralist realism that use structuralism to explicate the ways in which international structure constrain, or limit, state behaviour. Interestingly enough, these models - this chapter will demonstrate - in their reconstructive attempts, produce a positivist, universalist, and objectivist mode of knowledge about international relations.

Chapter V deals with three paradigmatic positions that employ structuralism as their epistemology. These positions are the articulation of modes of production problematic, historical structuralism, and the regulation approach. These models take society, as a structural totality, as their unit of analysis and provide an analysis of international relations as an articulation of internal and external factors that together make possible the reproduction of society. The chapter concludes by offering a critique of these models, and structuralism in general, for being reductionist, formalist, and functionalist.

Chapter VI is concerned with the "agency" problematic as an attempt to analyze international relations in terms of its basic category, that of the state. More specifically, the chapter deals with what has come be known as "the state-centric model". What characterizes the model are its conception of the state as a potentially autonomous institutional actor, its understanding of international relations as an inter-state system, and its call for the need to break with positivism and structuralism. However, it will be argued that although providing important insights for IRT, the state-centric model presents a number of problems, stemming from its essentialist, objectivist, and analytical character.

Chapter VII turns our attention to the new departures in IRT, to attempts to incorporate into IRT non-analytical, non-objectivist, self-reflective epistemologies. It deals with three important categories - reconstruction, hegemony, and discourse - and the paradigmatic positions that have produced these categories: Habermasian critical theory, Gramscian critical theory, and poststructuralism. These positions, the chapter will suggest, attempt to locate IRT in a critical
understanding of modern society, or in the debate over modernity versus postmodernity, and thus constitute what Linklater calls the Critical Turn in IRT (1990). This turn also presents in IRT a shift from representation in terms of determination and causality (with which the structuralist models and the agency problematic are concerned) to representation in terms of its effects (or the politics of epistemology). In critically assessing this turn, the chapter will show the strengths and weaknesses of each of these positions, while pointing out the significance of their contribution to the development of our understanding of international relations.

In conclusion (Chapter VIII), the results of the meta-theoretical examination of the transformation and proliferation of IRT will be linked with the central arguments made in Chapter I. In doing so, the final chapter stresses the importance for international relations theory (i) of the concepts such as the international, historicity, hegemony, totality and society, and their essentially contested nature;
(ii) of breaking with the epistemological principles such as universalism and objectivity, and recognizing the utility of those of reflectivity and historical specificity, and;
(iii) of shifting our emphasis to ontological questions and their historical and empirical investigation - questions such as the state, political economy and identity, and their spatial and temporal articulation within an historical world context.
CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: A METATHEORETICAL DISCUSSION

If any discipline is to remain alive and well, then its general theory must be constantly undergoing challenge and modification (Banks, 1985:9).

In recent years IRT has been replete with assessments of its paradigmatic status. We have seen a number of theoretical efforts to analyze international relations by reference to alternatives to the dominant realist paradigm. The emergence of new paradigmatic positions within the domain of IRT have signalled a state of transformation, in which, as Banks has stated, at stake was the modification, or reconstruction, or the critique, of IRT (1985:8-10). These developments, in what has been termed the inter-paradigm debate (Banks, 1985) or the Third Debate (Lapid, 1989a), have been predicated on Thomas Kuhn's history of science, in the sense that his seminal concept of paradigm has been used as the medium for depicting the developmental progress of IRT as multi-paradigmatic. The call for multi-paradigmatism has meant that there could be, and must be, a number of ways of theorizing international relations, each of which has its own claims to reality, truth, and knowledge production. This call also meant the critique of positivism, and the need to incorporate into IRT non-(or post-) positivist modes of knowledge production.

For this reason, the question of epistemology, or in Lapid's terminology a meta-theoretical examination of IRT, occupies a special place in the current state of IRT (Waltz, 1979:10-22; Banks, 1985:7-13; Lapid:1989a; Der Derrian, 1989:3-5). As Waltz and Banks have correctly pointed out, the transformation of IRT is itself epistemological, insofar as the question of how to study international relations constitutes the very nature of such transformation. The epistemological character of the transformation is expressed in the questions posed by the participants about theory-building, that is, the transformation of a given raw material into scientific explanation through the application of scientific agents such as concepts and methods in the process of knowledge production.

In this chapter the primary concern will, therefore, be with both the paradigmatic and epistemological aspects of IRT. I will provide a meta-theoretical map of the epistemological positions
held by theoretical paradigms which underpin international relations. These positions are namely postivism, structuralism, and critical thinking (which includes both critical theory and post-structuralism). In doing so, my focus will be on crucial questions and issues to which these epistemologies attend - and thus presuppose - namely society, structure, social system, subject/object, universality, and history. These questions and issues permit both systematic comparison of epistemological positions and a critical assessment to their claims to validity. In doing so, my general argument is that if international relations theory is to gain an explanatory power it is essential, first, to break with positivism and structuralism especially with regard to their primary principles of objectivism and universalism, and secondly to recognize the reflective and historical character of epistemology. Herein lies the significance of critical thinking.

It should be noted, however, that critical thinking also present problems which I will assess in the conclusion of this chapter. In this respect, I will argue that although critical thinking correctly positions itself against any sharply drawn dichotomy utilized in objectivist-scientific positions between subjective and objective, it fails to recognize the difference between history without a transcendental subject and history without knowledgeable subjects (Giddens, 1982:222-223). In other words, by confusing one conception of history with the other, critical thinking remains at the level of meaning, or of interaction, which inevitably results in the denial of the very significant dimension of history and society, which is that of "production".

POSITIVISM AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE EPISTEMIC SUBJECT

In recent years it has become increasingly apparent that the outlook for positivism is no longer positive (Hall, 1990:329). Positivism has been under constant attack to the extent that, as Miller (1987) has put it, to attempt to criticize it has become to "beat a dead Trojan horse". Alexander thus suggested that to a large extent the debate over the question of epistemology no longer is about positivism; it is about postpositivism (1982:5-7). Nevertheless, one should admit the
fact that positivism is still important, in so far as its critique constitutes both the beginning and the parameters of the current state of epistemology. ¹

According to Rorty, positivism, which he terms the Cartesian attitude, is "the source of the traditional academic preoccupation with epistemology" (1986:44). Such an attitude results from the attempt to decompose culture into areas where we have "objectivity" and "rationality" (that is, the hard and mature sciences) and "softer areas such as religion, art and morals in which we have discourse which may not count as knowledge" (ibid.). This means that in positivism science is a study of general relations between statements and objects. Such relations are found in the hard sciences. The secret of their success is their correspondance to reality and that knowledge can be isolated from its socio-political context. From this it follows that "truth" exists because there is always a one-to-one correspondance between reality and its representation. Moreover, this struggle, which is aimed at eliminating from scientific activity all non-scientific (that is, non-objective) attitudes, necessarily entails an abolition of the active role of the epistemic subject in the process of obtaining knowledge.

Positivism maintains, then, that science is a particular way of producing knowledge, based on sensory experience, and that insistence on the fundamental significance of "facts" constitutes the foundation of any scientific enterprise. Moreover, central to the need for the abolition of the epistemic subject in the process of knowledge production is the predisposition that since science derives from the solid grounds of "facts", any critical and reflective attitude towards value-free science is pure philosophical speculation, with no scientific relevance, or merely an ideologically jargonized representation of social reality (Roderick, 1986:17-19; Johnson, 1984:29-32). To insist that theory must be founded upon substance (that is, upon the fundamentally significant "facts") is, therefore, to draw a sharp distinction between what is objective and what is subjective, with a concomitant rejection of a relationship between an object and a subject in the process of knowledge production.

Three epistemological assumptions, which all forms of positivism tend to share, can be drawn

¹ For detailed discussion of the dispute over epistemology, see Hall (1990), Alexander (1982), Hindess (1977). With respect to IRT, see Lapid (1989a, 1989b) and Higgott (1988).
from the distinction between the objective and the subjective.  

(i) There is an external objective world which poses questions and issues that can be illuminated and explained on the basis of experience of the senses as the primary source of knowledge;

(ii) all phenomena can be explained and scientifically accounted for in terms of natural causes and laws without attributing metaphysical significance to them, and;

(iii) in this sense, there is no difference between the natural and the social sciences, that is the unity between them should be acknowledged with the recognition that the former offers a scientific and privileged model of rationality.

These epistemological assumptions lead positivism to claim that statements about the contents and properties of the world cannot be taken to be true until they are subjected to empirical control. This means that questions concerning values and self-reflectivity should be abandoned as cognitively meaningless since they are not testable. Thus, positivism constructs its famous fact-value dichotomy. In this dichotomy, facts are privileged to the extent that they are regarded both as the ultimate base of science and as being ontologically distinct from other facts. This means that the fundamental units of meaningful statements in science must correspond to facts in so far as it is fact that determine the truth or falsity of observational statements.

It can be suggested, therefore, that positivism is concerned primarily with the epistemological foundation of scientific statements. As noted, such foundation is based upon the privileged status of facts, the conception of truth as correspondence (to the ontologically given facts) and the affirmation of the existence of the external objective reality. Positivism draws from this epistemological foundation its conception of science, that is, science is an objective rational practice. For positivism, science

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2 It should be noted that positivism contains in itself a number of research programmes and since Auguste Comte introduced the term positive philosophy in the mid-nineteenth century it has conveyed different meanings which have given rise to the different schools of thought, such as John Stuart Mill's inductive approach, the logical positivism of the Vienna circle and Carl Hempel, logical empiricism, and the falsification strategy developed by Karl Popper. For an introduction to positivism and its history, see Gibbon (1989) and Hindess (1977).

3 For an account of the functioning of facts in positivism, see Carnap (1967) and Keat and Urry (1975).
constitutes a rational, logical, and impersonal activity, which gives rise, in principle, to true and scientific knowledge, or what can be called "the absolute truth".

Once constructed objectively, scientific statement, then, establishes "generalizations" or "general laws" independent of any particular kind of cultural system, as well as of normative statements. Thus, knowledge produced by positivism has a universal character which means that it is not subject to the temporal and spatial dimensions of history. Instead, it is subject to empirical control, that is, theories and hypotheses are to be tested against "data". In other words, in order for theories and concepts to be scientific they have to be reduced to statements about data, or to the facts.

According to Hempel, the establishment of general laws and the reduction of theories and concepts to the factual statements mean that "all scientific explanation involves, explicitly or by implication, a subsumption of its subject matter under general regularities or laws" (1965:486). This allows positivism to assert that scientific explanation is able both to provide a systematic understanding of empirical phenomena and to show how they are causally or statistically connected with each other.

Hempel goes on to argue that:

an ideal explanation is deductive - nomological, involving universal laws which together with required initial conditions guarantee the logical necessity of the event to be explained or predicted. In actual research however, explanations are generally inductive and statistical, so that the conclusion is not logically implied by the premises (1965:488).

Thus, theoretical terms gain empirical meaning in that they meet the requirements of correspondence to the facts and of the empirical testing and validation. As a result, they become causal, general, universal, and lawlike.

What are, then, the implications of the positivist conception of science within the domain of IRT. One possible implication is a tendency to conceive of "social structures" as an observable given. As we shall see in Chapter III and Chapter IV, modernization theory, neo-realism, modified structural realism, and to a large extent, the Wallersteinian world-system perspective, examine international structures in a positivistic manner in which social structures are regarded as observable facts that can
be subjected to an empirical control.

Once regarded as an observable given, social structures operate as causal and universally applicable, rather than as being culturally bounded. The positivist conception of social structures relies on an ontological invariance between time and space, which ignores from the beginning the dialectical relationship between structures and their temporal and spatial construction. As for IRT, this means locating international structures in fixed time and space, dissolving the concept of "difference" in an ontologically fixed international system and theorizing international relations as an external, objective and factual reality.

In this respect, following Leach, it can be argued that social structures in positivism turn out to be 'species types' which must be analyzed by establishing a taxonomy based on comparative morphology (1981:30). Central to this method is a dichotomy posited between 'observable' empirical regularities and "theoretical concepts", the latter being inevitably founded upon an "abstraction" that requires a selection of essential and objective elements from so-called nonessential elements of social relations. Herein lies the "particularistic" structure of positivism. Parsonian pattern-variables exemplify this; they are considered "theoretical constructs" abstracted from observable reality that allow us to define, and at the same time distinguish one social structure from another (Parsons, 1966:192-219). They are the essential elements of social relations within a social structure, being "any set of relations among parts of a living system which on empirical grounds can be shown to be stable over a period of time" (Parsons, 1975:69). Particularism occurs, as the pattern-variables are regarded as mutually exclusive and universally applicable set of structures.

The crux of Parsons' notion of pattern-variables is that if social structure is empirically-observable patterns of interactions, then actors' choices in orienting their actions stem from within these observable patterns of interactions. When reflected on the concept of society, this implies that Parsons conceptualizes society as an empirically given ontological totality rather than a constituted one. In this sense, what is analyzed is not how a given society is constituted but how, given that society is an empirically-given totality, social interactions occur and produce regularities.
Such an analysis necessarily assumes, however, that society is an expressive totality. This assumption accounts for the way in which social interactions come into existence within the social domain wherein the pattern-variables are open to actors' choices. The implication is that the institutionalization of social interactions is the expression of a primary essence (Turner, 1985:187-191). This essence in positivism is, in toto, 'rationality' which in its own maturation yields modernity. Rationality refers to the conception of the intrinsic rationality of action. As Taylor points out, "this involves the fundamental elements of 'ends', 'means' and 'conditions' of rational action and the norm of the intrinsic means-end relationship" (1979:9). Thus, an increase in rationalization is thought to be the primary precondition for the attainment of modernity. This is because only calculating, goal-oriented, rational behaviour (as opposed to traditional and emotional motivations) leads to the rise of scientism, paralleling the consolidation of rational-legal authority and thereby modernization of any society (Weber, 1978:24-26).

Three closely connected developments have arisen from this conception of society as an expressive totality in which the unfolding essence is the rationality of the actors' actions. Firstly, society is considered to be different from and larger than a sum of the individuals. Moreover, out of this consideration comes a commitment to the view of the national society as the basic, primary unit of sociological investigation (Robertson, 1982:7). As a result, interactions among societies are eliminated from sociological investigation, and only characteristics that are internal to societies are taken into account. As we shall see in the following chapters, the elimination of characteristics that seem external to societies from an analysis of constitution of social and political relations makes it impossible to account for the very existence of unequal and uneven development in both national and global relations.

Secondly, society, with rationality as its inner essence, begins to play its master role, by becoming a constituting entity rather than an historically constructed space. For Weber, for example, in so far as rational-legal authority represents the structure of modern society, interactions in modern society are organized around and defined by the concept of rationality. This view coincides with
Durkheim's, as he contends that 'organic solidarity' is the defining feature of modern society and it determines the way in which individuals act and enter into relations whose conditions of existence are defined and secured by the society to which they belong.

At the level of epistemology, the constituting character of society is recognized in positivism through the establishment of a one-to-one correspondence between the theoretical order and the socio-empirical order. Having set out "empirical" social structures and interactions as the object of analysis, an abstractly analytical conceptual order corresponding to empirical observation is put forward. This is done to provide an adequate account of the ways an empirical social structure and interactions function according to the principal characteristic of society (Parsons, 1975:73). Needless to say, this abstract analytical conceptual scheme by definition is always congruent with the socio-empirical order. One can give several reasons why this is so. Following Weber and Parsons, it could be argued from the positivist standpoint that if actors' social behaviour were irrational, a science of society would be impossible, because there could be no meaningful correspondence between the "order of ideas" and the "order of things", there could be no laws and, thus, no possibility of scientific explanation (Kockelmanns, 1979:87). In addition, a particular conception of rationality is necessary to distinguish between typical and atypical behaviour. One might say that such a distinction implies that in the organization of the concrete life of a society "the germ of a system of types and typical relations which the social scientist will recognize in its full ramifications as the essential feature of scientific method" exists (Kockelmanns, 1979:88). It follows that rational typification provides the social scientist with the theme of explicit thematization which, in turn, produces the more refined types, on the assumption that the thematization provided is congruent with the socio-empirical order.

Thirdly, as long as society retains its constituting role, interactions among social structures remain 'functional'. Implied here is the assumption that for society to reproduce its rational organization there must be social institutions that exist solely to fulfil specific social needs. That is to say, social structures have their own functions through which they produce socially-useful effects, and social interactions create a harmony necessary for the functioning of the society (Swinewood,
Thus, it becomes possible to account for the ways social interactions create regularities.

As we shall see, the production of so-called "useful effects" constitutes one important dimensions of the conventional theories of international relations founded upon the positivist epistemology. The prevailing dominance of the Parsonian and Durkheimian influences in these theories is visible in the way they treat the concept of change. It should be noted here, however, that the fact that functionalism is one of the dimensions of IRT does not imply that positivism contains in itself, or requires, functionalist explanations. It does, however, allow functionalism, as Durkheim and Parsons as well as the modernizationist discourse of development demonstrate.

Durkheim provides a helpful example of the connections between change and the discussion of how functionalism works in the thematization of rational action. For him, "to explain a social phenomenon the efficient cause which produce it and the function it fulfils must be investigated separately" (1982:123). The need for separate investigation, however, does not mean that he conceives cause and function as 'mutually exclusive'; they are related to the specific end, social solidarity, or the reproduction of society as a whole. In this context, Swigewood argues that Durkheim's holistic functionalism aims to "explain social facts not solely by focusing on the cause on which they depend but by showing their function in the establishment of general harmony" (1984:227). Thus, in addition to increasing moral and material density as the efficient cause of the 'division of labour', Durkheim considers the integration of social interactions and the fact that the division of labour performs this function fundamental for an explication of the functioning of modern society.

This kind of functionalism is inclined to emphasize the "synchronic" dimension of society rather than the "diachronic" (the genetic and historical).

The concept of society as a differentiated and integrated whole, in which the various elements perform interdependent functions to sustain a complex unity, has the effect of separating 'function' from 'development' generating abstract, ahistorical social typologies such as mechanical and organic solidarity (Swigewood, 1984:228).

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4 The influence of Parsons and Durkheim on IRT can be easily observed in Waltz (1979), Wallerstein (1979), Krasner (1982), Keohane (1982), and as well as in the sociology of development literature (Chapter III).
For this reason, functionalism tends to prefer an understanding of change stressing regularities rather than discontinuities, evolution rather than radical historical ruptures. In this sense, it perfectly fits the "universalizing tendency" of positivism.

The elements of harmony and consistency replaces those of conflict and contradiction; the functional unity of a system is defined in terms of social order, implying that as everything within the system is necessarily functional for the whole then change, based on conflict, must be conceived as a threat to the basis of the system itself (Swingewood, 1984:229).

Consequently, by focusing on the synchronic dimension of society, functionalism builds a non-problematic or, in Durkheimian language, a "healthy" model of society which prevents any possibility of the emergence of "disease" (synonymous with social conflict) through mutually compatible functions performed by social structures. Thus, functions "regulate" unstable desires and appetites.

In the light of this discussion, it has become apparent that positivism consists of the following premises: first, the production of knowledge is based on the fundamental significance of facts, an assumption which contains in itself a distinction between the subjective and the objective, and which does not grant a role to an epistemic subject; second, society is viewed as an expressive totality in which social structures are observable, empirical entities whose analysis may or may not need an abstract, analytical conceptual scheme congruent with the socio-empirical order; third, a rationalist account of social interactions, usually complemented by functionalist explanations, is used to explicate the ways in which regularities emerge and define the synchronic structure of change.

Given these premises, positivism is subject to several critical reactions (Johnson, 1984:57-75). For the purpose of this study, of these reactions, the one that will be taken into account is "structuralism". The reactions of structuralists to positivism, it should be stated from the outset, stress the logic of the positivist epistemological position more than its objectivist approach to science. The structuralist reaction, which remains at the level of epistemology, derives from what is called the science/ideology distinction.

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Structuralists (for example, Piaget, Bachelard, Althusser, and Levi-Strauss) argue that scientific activity involves a conceptual "construction" that tries to reach the underlying structural causes of any kind of social situation. It logically follows, then, that scientific activity that sticks to observable relations and interactions is purely descriptive (Piaget, 1966:35). For Althusser this descriptive level corresponds to a realm where "givens" exist as "lived" social phenomena. Positivism, in this sense, is alien to the structuralist understanding of science because it relies only upon observable relations, and takes as its objects of analysis of society the observable givens, social structures and social relations. Thus, it does not meet the first requirement of structuralism's scientific activity, which is "to know is to produce in thought, in a way to reconstitute the mode of production of phenomena" (Piaget, 1966:36-37). Structuralism alleges in this context that the positivist epistemological position derives from "givens" rather than "constructs". Whereas givens are the expressions of the "appearances" of the social phenomena, "constructs" are the essence of them and, thus, define the way in which their conditions of existence are produced and reproduced.

As Marx pointed out, scientific activity would become superficial if it alleged outward appearances and the essence of things directly coincided (1970:42). Because positivism equates the outward appearances with the essence of things, it remains at the level of "perception" rather than "construction". In Althusserian language this means that Cartesianism is ideological (that is, non-scientific explanation based on appearances or givens) and non-scientific since it does not search for the underlying structural causes which would transform the explanations of appearances into science in such a way as to reconstitute the mode of production of phenomena (Piaget, 1966:36-37).

**STRUCTURALISM AND THE SUPREMACY OF STRUCTURES**

Despite its different usages in different disciplines of knowledge, structuralism can be characterized as an epistemological position according to which the reality of the objects of science
is "relational" rather than factual, that is, observable given. In this sense, structuralism constructs a method which involves an inquiry into, and the specification of, the set of relations (or structures) that constitutes the objects of science. Thus, from the outset, structuralism rejects positivism and attempts to demonstrate that knowledge must be viewed as a specific mode of production based on the construction of reality (Bethoud, 1970:127; Glucksmann, 1981; Taylor, 1979). In the process of the construction of reality, by recognizing the active role played by the epistemic subject, structuralism aims to go beyond the "lived" level of social phenomena in order to reach the underlying structural causes. This means the rejection of the subject/object dichotomy. In this way too, structuralism rejects positivism.

Nevertheless, structuralism is not opposed to "the scientific or experimental method but to the positivist interpretation of external and internal 'experience', that is, respectively, the behavioural and subjective aspects of social phenomena" (Rossi, 1981:63). Nor is it opposed to the principles of objectivity and universality. It claims to be "explanatory" rather than descriptive, and to operate at the level of "construct" rather than of "perception". Implicit in this position is the claim that structuralism gains explanatory power by focusing not on "given" structures but structures that exist behind observable relations.

Structuralism's concern with "constructs", in this sense, derives from its concept of structure, which is different from that which is employed in positivism. According to Levi-Strauss, "the social structure has nothing to do with reality but with models built after it" (from Blau, 1977:2). This means that for Levi-Strauss, there is a level of reality invisible but present behind visible social relations: "the logic of the latter, and the laws of social practice more generally, depend on the functioning of these hidden structures" (1974:45). If it is so, then, scientific practice ought to derive from a search for explanation based on the underlying, hidden structure. Herein lies the importance of the epistemic, or knowing, speaking subject for structuralism. Conscious thought is able to comprehend its own

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6 For the different usages of structuralism in sociology, philosophy, political theory, literary criticism, and anthropology, see Brockman (1974) and Caws (1988).
unconscious determination on the condition that "it becomes scientific, i.e., instigates a 'radical break' with lived reality (Sebag, 1974:228).

A radical break with lived reality requires, first, a relational understanding of the objects of explanation, and second, a distinction drawn between science and ideology, or science and non-science. As for the principle of relationality, in his famous Course of General Linguistics, Saussure argues that language should be considered a system of signs in which a holistic combination of two structural elements is at work, namely the signifier and the signified as the concept to which the signifier refers (1966:67-71). The relationship between the signifier and the signified is not fixed but social. However, this does not mean for Saussure that such a relationship cannot be epistemologically studied because of its social, infinitely variable, and arbitrary character. To study it, Saussure suggests that the study of language should be detached from its historical, cultural, psychological, or metaphysical matrix and shifts the analytical focus from such concepts as 'objects', 'reality', or the 'thing-in-itself' to the formal properties and the internal structural relations of sign systems (from Culler, 1977:25).

Recalling the first structuralist principle that epistemology begins with constructs rather than observable reality, one could see in Saussure's suggestion the construction of a structuralist model as a necessary requirement to go beyond positivism (or beyond the lived reality), and at the same time, to analyze scientifically facts not as observable givens, but as constructions. Thus, the structuralist model can be said to operate by producing formal distinctions and theoretical constructs in which the essence and content of object are linked to their relational identity, and their function within a given system (Heydebrand, 1981:82). As we shall see, in its operation, structuralism therefore assigns a central role to the concept of system as a structural totality.

As for the distinction that has to be sharply drawn between science and ideology, the structuralist move begins with the idea that ideology creates a lived reality which is the starting point for scientific inquiry. In other words, ideological knowledge becomes scientific when it is transformed into science via a radical break. Structuralists claim that positivism constitutes an epistemological practice within the realm of ideology. By breaking with ideology, structuralism goes beyond positivism,
and attempts to achieve scientific status. Here "achieve" indicates that science and ideology are not mutually exclusive but successive; scientific practice necessarily asks for a transformation of ideology into science.

For this reason Althusser, in his demonstration of Marx's abandonment of his own positivist past, divides historical inquiry into stages.

The truth of ideological history is in the 'facts' themselves, in that nodal constitution of ideological meanings, themes and objects against the deceptive backcloth of an 'anchylose' and unstable ideological word is itself in the sway of real history (1971:70).

The process moves from facts to problematic to ideological background to reality. In this process, the concept of problematic plays a crucial role since it constitutes the basic unity of or internal essence of ideological thought. It is through the problematic that ideological background is separated from material reality which can be analyzed scientifically. Doing so, asserts Althusser, requires three stages of scientific practice, namely Generality I, Generality II and Generality III (1971:168). Theoretical practice produce Generalities III by the work of Generalities II on Generalities I. 7

Here Generality I refers to the raw material of theoretical practice, which is ideological because it is deformed or inadequate in relation to its real object. For Althusser, positivism is ideological because it takes place within the realm of lived relations. Generality II involves a set of concepts "whose more or less contradictory unity constitutes the 'theory' of the science at the historical moment under consideration" (1971:178). They are themselves abstractions which do not exist or cannot be used to produce any specific Generality III. Nevertheless, it is by means of them that Generalities I are transformed into Generalities III. Generality III is therefore a product, a scientific knowledge or, in Althusserian language, the "concrete in thought", which defines the ontological status of the concept of "structure". That is, structure refers to "concrete' not as an observable reality, but

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7 For a detailed account of the movements between these three stages of Generalities, and the production of concept by structuralist from these movements, such as totality, the state, and the subject, see Jay (1984), Poulantzas (1975).
as a construct in thought which functions as a precondition for the knowledge of an observable reality.

Althusser exemplifies this structuralist movement towards Generality III with reference to Marx’s writings. For Althusser, in the course of his intellectual development Marx constructed his own scientific practice in three successive stages. The first stage (corresponding to Generality I) occurred when Marx, as an "inverted Hegel", was a humanist or positivist. The third stage (the production of Generality III through reconstruction of Generality I via Generality II) involved the construction of a theoretico-scientific problematic, which came out of the constitution of the concept of mode of production as a concrete in thought. As Heydebrand puts it, "a science emerges from pre-scientific and ideological elements by means of a theoretical breakthrough, a kind of intellectual mutation or 'epistemological break'" (1981:95). Bachelard developed the concept of epistemological break (Descombes, 1979:126-27). It defines the second stage (that is, Generality II) in so far as it creates a play with abstract concepts, making possible a transition to the scientific terrain. Althusser argues that this transition is consummated in Marx’s major work, Capital, where he breaks with humanism, historicism and positivism. In *Capital* Marx produced the scientific concepts (Generality III) that constitute concrete knowledge, "the result of transforming abstract, unformed, half-baked thought material into concrete, more adequately formed, more certain knowledge of the real world" (Heydebrand, 1981:97).

At the level of epistemology, Althusser’s demonstration of Marx’s intellectual move beyond lived reality through an epistemological break indicates that structuralism differs from positivism precisely over the issue of the validation of scientific explanation. For structuralists, theoretical practice is its own criterion with which to validate the quality of its product, that is, the careful move between the stages of Generalities (Althusser) or the scientific construction of formal models based on the relational character of structures (Levi-Strauss, Sasseur, and Piaget). Thus, Althusser proposes that

this is exactly what happens in the real practices of the sciences: once they are truly constituted and developed they have no need for verification from external practices to declare the knowledge they produce to be true. They themselves provide the criterion of validity of the knowledge - this criterion coinciding perfectly with the
strict forms of the exercise of the scientific practices considered (Althusser and Balibar, 1970:56).

Therefore, where positivism argues for the existence of external variables which verify or justify the validity of the knowledges produced, structuralists claim that science is a process within which scientific concepts are produced via a theoretical practice initiated by the epistemic subject.

Among the scientific concepts which have been produced by structuralists those of mode of production and totality are of significance for this study, in so far as they have provided the conceptual basis for the structuralist development problematic within the domain of IRT (Chapter VI). 8 The concept of mode of production, according to Althusser, designates an "abstract and formal object" which was the pre-condition for an analysis of concrete societies (which Althusser, the structural anthropologists and the structuralist development theorists term a concrete social formation). Just as Saussure's attempt to unify signifier and signified within the concept of sign, thereby overcoming the subject/object dichotomy, Althusser seeks to bring together the different practices of social life, namely the economic, the political, and the ideological, and their relational character with one another under the concept of mode of production (Heydebrand, 1981:99). In this way, Althusser claims to remove the subject/object dichotomy.

In this sense, like Saussure's concept of sign, the concept of mode of production constitutes a structural system, or what Althusser calls a structural totality. It should be noted here that this totality does not correspond to concrete reality (as in the positivistic conception of the social system as an organic totality), but constitutes "a totality of thought". In this context, Althusser proposes that:

the concrete totality as a totality of thought, as a thought concretum, is in fact a product of thought and conception: but in no sense a product of the concept thinking and engendering itself outside or over intuitions or conceptions into concepts" (1969:182-83).

For Althusser, this quotation indicates that the concept of totality operates in a non-positivist manner, since it is founded upon the separation of thought objects from their referents. This gives the concept

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8 In this respect, see Sober (1986), Kurzweil (1980), Kahn and Llobera (1981). Here Kurzweil's study provides an extensive mapping of the concepts produced within structuralism.
of totality a structural character not as an expressive unity but as a structural unity of relatively autonomous relations or instances:

It is a whole whose unity, far from being the 'expressive' or 'spiritual' unity of Leibniz's or Hegel's whole, is constituted by a certain type of complexity, the unity of a 'structured whole' containing what can be called levels or instances which are distinct and 'relatively' autonomous, and co-exist within this complex structural unity, articulated with one-another according to specific determinations, fixed in the last instance by the level or instance of the economy (1971:97).

According to Jay, this quote means that the structuralist totality is a decentered whole in which each movement or each contradiction is complex-structurally determined or over-determined (1984:407). It is decentered in the sense that it consists of a number of levels which are relatively autonomous and have their own condition of existence, and which act in relation to one another under the umbrella of the structural totality of which they are parts. In this sense, to make a totality a decentered one means to assign the ontological qualities of autonomy, specificity, and relationality to the constitutive units of that totality. ⁹

When reflected on the concept of production, this conception of totality alludes to a structured whole in which the economic, political and ideological levels are articulated with each other on the basis of the determining role played by the economic in the last instance. Here the crucial question is, how can the economic be given the determining role within a structured whole which is supposed to be decentred? Althusser explains this seemingly contradictory definition of mode of production by stressing the importance of "determination in the last instance", which indicates the existence of a structural causality (rather than factual causation) between the levels. For Althusser, to say that in different structures the economic is determinant is to say that it determines which of the levels of the social structure occupies the determining place. In other words, determination refers to "not a simple relation, but rather a relation between relations; not a transitive causality, but rather a structural causality" (1971:224).

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⁹ The principle of decentering is used by structuralists also to distinguish their epistemological positions from the Hegelian version of phenomenology, as well as from existentialism. Martin Jay, in his text, Marxism and Totality (1984), provides an explanatory account of this issue.
Jay suggests in this context that in order to make this type of causal analysis structural rather than transitive, Althusser and for that matter the structuralist epistemological position in general relies on "synchronic" rather than "diachronic explanation" (1984:408). Jay demonstrates the primacy that is given to synchrony over diachrony by looking at Althusser's conception of the functioning of the structure:

The structure is not an essence outside the economic phenomena which comes and alters their aspect, forms, and relations and which is effective on them as an absent cause, absent because it is outside them. The absence of the cause in the structure's "metonymic causality" on its effects is not the fault of the exteriority of the structure with respect to the economic phenomena; on the contrary, it is the very form of the interiority of the structure, as a structure, in its effects. It implies that the structure is immanent in its effects that the whole existence of the structure consists of its effects (1984:408).

The synchronicity and the interiority of the structure in this sense distinguishes structuralism clearly from positivism in that it is not an observable given whose unity is determined by its correspondence to reality, but, in Levi-Strauss's terminology (1967), the immanent deep structure, or that which determines observable social interactions (Althusser, 1971, and also, Godelier, 1970). This implies that if society (or social formation) is concrete, its knowledge and its movements derive from deep structures. This structure is not observable but 'deep' (Levi-Strauss), or that which determines observable social interactions (Althusser and Godelier). In other words, if society (or social formation) is concrete, its knowledge or its movement derives from deep structures which provide the necessary means for an analysis of it. Levi-Strauss describes the role of deep structure in the process of knowledge production by stating that "it is impossible to discuss an object, to reconstruct the coming into being, without knowing first what it is; in other words, without having exhausted the inventory of its internal determinants" (1967:11). Similarly Godelier emphasizes that "the study of the genesis of a structure can only be done if 'guided' by a priori knowledge of that structure" (1970:839). For Althusser, this is how one should study society, as well as history: "the problems of diachrony, too, must be thought within the problematic of a theoretical synchrony" (1971:307). Central to Althusser's argument is that society and history, although they involve a diachronic transition from one social
system to another, ought to be studied on the basis of a theoretical synchrony that refers to the concept of mode of production. Moreover, according to structuralism this method is what defines science, or what constructs an objective scientific explanation.

The implication of this conceptualization of the structure and its relation to the construction of scientific explanation for the structuralist understanding of history is that historical events and their meanings can only be understood in the light of the rational, universal and synchronic closure. This requires a move beyond outward appearances (at which positivism remains) by searching for the underlying structures. "Historical reality, in fact, is the concrete result of a transformational logic generated by the structure of the unconscious (Scholte, 1979:37). Thus, Levi-Strauss asserts that "economic history is, by and large, the history of unconscious processes" in the sense that historical reality contains in itself a deep structure "which underlines history's many manifestations and which remains permanent throughout a succession of events" (1967:21-23).

If the primary function of historical events is "to give to thought a content with which to think" (Godelier, 1970:385) and if this function indicates the role played by the epistemic subject in the knowing process rather than in the process of historical development, a certain conception of history as a process without a subject but with "structures is implied. The subject is decentered since structuralism is inclined to construct universal laws by proposing a synchronic essence which may be either a deep structure or a mode of production. This proposed solution to the question of historical development, or of "change" in general - a solution based on supposedly diachronic explanation which will be derived from a careful study of a synchronic essence - turns out to be no solution at all, because it leaves a most important question unanswered. It fails to assess the extent to which an epistemic subject is itself an intellectual product of specific historical circumstances.

Moreover, and more importantly, the argument that history is a process without a subject and that the structuralist understanding of history is an effort to explicate the governing structures of historical development reveals the assumption that there is always a universal rationality that determines the way in which societal relations occur and take a specific form. In other words, for
structuralism, the condition of existence of any social phenomenon depends on a universal rationality that governs the functioning of the social formation in which it comes into existence. As a result, the methodological search for unchanging, precise categories, which have been designed to account for ‘change’ in a diachronic way, turns into the formulation of theoretical principles "which impose a certain fixed ontological order on the 'real' object by means of a reified 'object of knowledge'" (Heydebrand, 1981:106).

Thus, like positivism, structuralism ends up failing to offer a theory of "change" capable of recognizing differences between and characteristics specific to different social formations, in so far as it attempts to deduce the concept of change from synchronic essences. With its concepts such as mode of production, deep structure, articulation, and history with structures, what is analyzed in structuralism is the process by which reproduction is secured, and therefore regularities. As a result, the process of change, or of historical development, is theorized without any a recognition of collective actors and their roles in making history, even if not under conditions of their own choosing. Instead of recognizing the importance of collective actors for the theory of change, and by treating them as supporters of structures, and thus by regarding history simply as a process with structures, structuralism seeks to replace the search for historical origins "by an analysis of the consequences of social patterns for the maintenance and reproduction of social structures and for the integration and adaptation of social systems" (Heydebrand, 1981:104).

This commonality between structuralism and positivism is present in both epistemological positions' tendency towards universalism and anti-historicism, as well as the tendency to conceive of society as a constituting totality. Hence, not only do some social units and interactions become universal and trans-historical features of all societies, but also their conditions of existence are conceptualized in terms of either direct or indirect reference to an internal synchronic essence. This internal synchronic essence assigns structures particular functions to perform, which are determined objectively by either structural characteristics of the capitalist mode of production or unfolding rationality in modern society. In such an analysis of society and history there is no place for human
praxis because for structuralism just as in positivism, historical development is analyzed via concepts with universal applicability.

Structuralism does not call into question the political dimension of epistemology: it holds an objectivist position on the question of science and does not deal with political conditions. This is precisely because for structuralists human behaviour is predetermined by unconscious forces beyond human control. As Kurzweil puts it "the issue of human equality is 'symbolically' solved before it is ever raised, so that structuralism's most radical components (the unconscious structures), in so far as they are beyond human control, are also its most conservative, formalist elements" (1980:27).

Scientific practice, isolated from its political context of power relations, neglects the political dimension of scientific enterprise and makes it impossible to search for the social and material existence of knowledge. It is this objective and universal conception of science that has been subject to criticisms within the domain of social and political theory. Among them, critical theory and post-structuralism have been the most influential and popular. It is these epistemological positions which will be elaborated next.

CRITICAL THEORY, POST-STRUCTURALISM: REFLECTIVITY AND THE BANISHMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF TOTALITY

Students of international relations in recent years have witnessed an upsurge of interest in "critical theory". This interest reflects a need both to think of epistemological issues in terms of their relations to "human interest" and to link the logic of epistemology with the political context in which it arises on the other. Those who have tried to incorporate such a critical understanding into IRT claim that an epistemological reevaluation of the field on the basis of "critical theory" is necessary and urgent (Ashley, 1985,1986; Cox, 1983,1986; Coate and Murphy, 1986; Walker, 1985,1986; Linklater, 1990). They suggest that the existing theories with their objectivist view of scientific practice are in the service of the hegemony of the dominant forces (pax americana and international capital) of the
global system. As Linklater has pointed out, they also use critical theory to develop a post-realist understanding of international relations which is to be founded upon an attempt to examine alternative paths of historical development and to create adequate prospects for a politics of an emancipatory practice and its epistemological construction (1990:27).

It should be noted here that in the theoretical efforts to rewrite the existing theories of international relations the term "critical theory" is used in a very broad sense. It includes not only the Frankfurt School and Habermas, but also Gramsci, and Foucault and Derrida as representatives of French post-structuralist thought. One of the reasons for this broad definition of critical theory is that, despite the significant differences among the above mentioned authors, they all share a concern with the political dimension of epistemology, and thus the historically material character of knowledge. In what follows, the intention, therefore, will be, therefore, to analyze the critical study of international relations by focusing only on its epistemological aspect, that is, critical theory and post-structuralism's response to the question of knowledge production.

CRITICAL THEORY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF REFLECTIVITY

According to critical theorists, any approach to the study of society based on the logic of epistemology rather than the politics of it necessarily leads to a view of science as "objective knowledge" (Adorno, 1976:76-83 and Horkheimer, 1976:205-209). Because it lacks attention to human interest, it inevitably ends up defending control of social relations in any society. It is for this reason that, for critical theorists, any theory must be capable of presenting itself as a guide for human action, first aimed at enlightening the agents who hold it, making them see what their true interests are. Secondly, it must be emancipatory. This requirement distinguishes critical theory from approaches in, especially, natural science, making it "reflective" rather than objective (Geuss, 1981:1-2).

To understand what critical theory means by the term, "reflective", it is necessary to provide
an account of the idea of critique. This is precisely because it is critical theory's understanding of "critique" that establishes a methodological foundation for its claim to reflectivity. Connerton argues in this context that if reconstruction (that is, the scientific reconstruction of statement in positivism, and the reconstruction of structural models in structuralism) is the basis of objectivism, criticism is the basis of critical theory (1976:18). To elaborate his argument, Connerton makes a threefold distinction between reconstruction and criticism (1976:18-23):

(i) reconstruction attempts to comprehend the system of rules which can be followed by any subject that has the requisite components. On the contrary, criticism begins to examine the shaping of that subject or its identity. Thus, criticism requires an explicit reference to a subject.

(ii) reconstruction is based on data (or the formal object as in structuralism) which are considered to be objective. "Criticism, in contrast, is brought to bear on objects of experience whose objectivity is called into question". Criticism supposes that there is a degree of distortion of reality, and attempts to remove this distortion. This implies that criticism entails a conception of emancipation.

(iii) reconstruction explains what is regarded as "correct knowledge" which is supposed to be objective. On the contrary, criticism tries to change the conditions of what is considered to be a false or distorted consciousness.

Connerton concludes that:

[...]thus reconstruction, by explaining rules which we follow implicitly, may lead to a broadening of the range and a greater sophistication in the possession of our theoretical knowledge. It may do this without necessarily changing our practical conduct. Criticism, on the other hand, renders transparent what had previously been hidden, and in doing so it initiates a process of self-reflection, in individuals or in groups, designed to achieve a liberation from the domination of past constraints. Here a change in practice is therefore a constitutive element of a change in theory (1976:20-21).

The idea of critique, articulated in critical theory, contains these three characteristics of

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10 The idea of critique can be said to be a product of the Enlightenment. First, it was seen as a symptom of the opposition between reason and revelation. Then, it has been employed by Kant and Hegel in that it meant the essential activity of reason. For a detailed account of the development of this idea of critique, see Connerton (1976).
criticism, and thus entails a conception of self-reflection as a reflection on the condition of possible knowledge. Such reflection also aims to provide a political programme based on both the analysis and the removal of constraints or distortions to which individuals and collectivities have been subject. Consequently, self-reflection means a rejection of objectivism at the level of epistemology, and a construction of an emancipatory practice at the level of the social.

The difference between reflective and objective theories can also be highlighted in the dispute over positivism, where Adorno attacks Popper with regard to his methodology characterized by the term "sophisticated falsification". For Adorno, such a "scienticism" is inherent in Popper in so far as his method views science as a supreme form of rationality which, in turn, brings about the "control of social relations by the technical experts" (1976:68-71). This objectivist treatment towards science, which includes the assumption that there is only one science, Adorno goes on to argue, must be abandoned in order to create the self-emancipation of people from domination; this can be achieved only through "reflective" knowledge. Reflective knowledge is designed to help in the making of history with will and consciousness (Held, 1980:250).

Critical theories would argue on this basis that positivism and structuralism are different sides of the same coin; they represent "objective" science in which, in Habermasian language, people are treated as objects, not agents. This issue is taken up by Habermas in Knowledge and Human Interests (1971), where he engages in a critique of positivism. As Held has correctly pointed out, in his critique of positivism, Habermas's primary aim is "to retrieve a dimension of the problem of knowledge which positivism had effaced", that is, the extent to which knowing subjects play an active role in constituting the world they know (1981:300). In other world, to what extent can the subject/object dichotomy be sustained in the process of knowledge production? Secondly, how can we determine the role of the subject and the object in that process? Habermas' answer to these questions derives from his attempt to link knowledge and interest, in which different kinds of interests give rise to different kinds of knowledge.

According to Habermas, there are three kinds of knowledge constituting interests, which he
calls "cognitive interests". These interests are the practical cognitive interest, the technical cognitive interest, and the emancipatory cognitive interest (1971:150-168). An interest in technical control, which manifests itself in positivism, (and in structuralism) pays scant attention to issues of will, consciousness, and the power of human rationality. It is an interest that privileges instrumental reason (the means-ends rationality based on mastering and controlling natural processes and rendering practical problems technical ones subject to empirical control). For this reason, the technical interest grasps reality with regard to technical and empirical control that is possible everywhere and at all times. As a result, the technical cognitive interest suffers from a lack of capacity to be critical and reflective.

The practical cognitive interest can be seen in historical-hermeneutic sciences and stems from an attempt to secure and expand the possibilities of mutual and self-understanding in the conduct of life. Habermas argues that the practical interest, in contrast to the technical one, emerges from "interpretations of reality with regard to possible intersubjectivity of action-orienting mutual understanding specific to a given hermeneutic starting point" (1971:195). Just as instrumental reason corresponds to technical interest, meaning, interpretation, and symbolic interaction corresponds to practical interest. For Habermas, although it is important to recognize that intersubjectivity constitutes a move away from objectivism through its functioning based on the hermeneutical interpretation of social practices and the meaning structures that those practices convey, it is not a sufficient epistemological gesture for the construction of self-reflectivity. 11 This is because intersubjectivity provides only the context in which human action is considered to emerge, and does not deal with the question of the production of the subject.

In addition to the concepts of technical and practical interests, Habermas posits that of an emancipatory interest which can bring together theoretical and practical reason as critical theory. Thus, for him critical theory founded upon self-reflection corresponds to an emancipatory interest.

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11 Habermas derives his critique of practical interest from his critical examination of Gadamer's hermeneutic. For an account of Habermas's critique of Gadamer, see Held (1980).
This interest aims at pursuit of reflection by offering the possibilities of resisting repressive social and political conditions (Habermas, 1971:167-170). In doing so, an emancipatory interest secures freedom from conditions of distorted communication. Habermas suggests that once distortion is removed from communication and the fact that history and society embody domination and ideological masking of action is acknowledged, a particular type of knowledge becomes necessary for the abolition of these conditions. Critical theory is capable of producing this knowledge through its reliance on self-reflection.

Habermas explains the nature of an emancipatory theory with reference to psychoanalysis (Kurzweil, 1984:273-89; McCarty, 1983:75-95; Thompson, 1984:279-303; Giddens, 1979:58-63). Psychoanalysis as a reflective rather than objective theory is thought to bring about the conditions by which individuals free themselves by coming to reflect on their determinations. As Giddens describes it,

if successful, psychoanalytical therapy translates unconscious processes, which cause the person to behave in ways not subject to his own voluntary control, into conscious modes of action which are subject to his rational mastery (1976:59).

By claiming that this procedure can be applied to whole societies, Habermas attempts to link the specific relationship between knowledge and human activity with what he labels a “communicative competence” which critical theory aims to elaborate and develop (Cashmore and Mullan, 1983:190). For Habermas, in every situation in which coercion yields consensus, the individual lives under the control of such a systematically distorted communication.

Given that the process of emancipation entails the transcendence of such systems of distorted communication which, in turn, requires engaging in self-reflection and criticism, it can be argued here that this is what positivistic, “scientistic” interpretations of human action undo when they take an “objectivist” position in their approach to science. They are inclined to stress the lawful regularities that explain the limits on human will, so that they lack a reflective capacity, a capacity that can be gained through establishing a relationship between knowledge and human activity.
Habermas' attempt to establish this relationship through the concept of communicative competence is derived from his reading of Marx's paradigm of production (Roderick, 1986:24-32). In this regard, Habermas claims that Marx's social theory rejects "the inner split between the subject as a representative of the universal and the bearer of an isolated egoistic individuality as an expression of the real split between the labourer, his product and his fellow labourers" (in Roderick, 1986:28). This also involves a rejection of German idealism and its Kantian Enlightenment view that the rational subject as an autonomous and self-dependent agent is able to analyze and examine everything by assuming its independence from authority and tradition by means of reason it, by its free will, employs.

For Marx, the "outside" (that is, the natural world) is, notes Habermas, a social and historical product, "the product of industry and the state of society", so that "the essence of human beings is, in reality, the ensemble of social relations" (Habermas, 1973:212). Habermas also notes that it is this view of the human subject as the ensemble of social relations rather than an autonomous agent that constitutes the foundation of Marx's concept of social rationality, which is the basic element of his paradigm of production.

The implication of these notes is that, for Marx, social rationality is not reason that takes place "above" history, nor reason which is acquired by the individual (that is, reason in history), but reason which is historically embodied in social and political practices. Unlike the objectivist position, reflective knowledge searches for explanation of social rationality in historical construction of reason.

According to Held (1982) and Roderick (1986), Habermas views "social practice" as composed of two categories, namely labour (purposive-rational action) and interaction (communicative action). Broadly speaking, labour refers to the sphere wherein the process of production and reproduction (that is, transformation of nature by means of technical rules and communication of needs and interests which are necessary for the process of production and reproduction). Here Habermas' intention is to overcome the one-sided notion of social rationality by dividing it into these two categories. Contrary to the objectivist position that tends to abstract scientific claims from their political functions and social conditions, an understanding of social rationality as historically
constructed reason emerging from the constitution of social practices in the spheres of labour and interaction allows for the acquisition of reflective capacity. This is what defines the critical dimension of social theory, permitting it not only to explicate social reality but also to criticize it in order to change it. For Habermas, this is the link between knowledge and human interest which enables a theory to gain "practical intent" (McCarty, 1983:16-40).

Consequently, Habermas' critique of objectivist understandings of science can be said to begin with an attempt to show the importance of interaction in the constitution of social reality and to conclude with the establishment of communicative rationality. For him, it is through communicative rationality that knowing subjects engage in argumentation to establish their claims to validity and truth. As a result, truth is established when a consensus is created between these claims. Thus, Habermas goes beyond objectivism by asserting that truth is not outside, or external to, the knowing subject, but takes place within the realm of intersubjectivity. In other words, it is not objective; it is socially constructed.

It should be noted here that implied in Habermas’s assertion concerning the question of truth are two epistemological propositions, namely foundationalism and universalism. Communicative rationality is regarded as the foundation for the construction of truth as well as for emancipation. Once constructed, truth becomes universal and gives rise to the universality of the emancipatory interest. Thus, communicative rationality attempts to "identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understanding" (Habermas, 1979:26). Consequently, while rejecting the criterion of objectivity, Habermas maintains the universalist dimension of epistemology by using communicative rationality as a foundation for it.

It is Habermas' claim to universality, as well as his affirmation of foundationalism, which pose crucial questions for the ability of critical theory to establish a serious alternative position to the objectivist epistemological positions. Moreover, once considered in terms of its claim to emancipation through the critique and the alteration of the existing social and political order, universalism and foundationalism present a number of serious problems that would make it difficult to regard
Habermas' critical theory as being capable of realizing its aim at being used as an epistemological guide for resistance against domination and distortion of social interaction. These two sets of problems are also of significance for the incorporation of critical theory into IRT, and Chapter VI will provide a detailed examination of them. What follows will deal with the first set of problems, the critique of universalism and foundationalism at the level of epistemology, and in doing so, it will focus on post-structuralism and its claims to truth and knowledge.

**POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND THE BANISHMENT OF TOTALITY**

Like Habermas' critical theory, post-structuralism is concerned with the question of the material production of knowledge and its ramifications in the realm of epistemology and of society. Post-structuralism agrees with Habermas’ critical theory in that it rejects the positivistic epistemological position that the value of science can be reduced to the effectiveness of its means of apprehending reality. It too calls into question the criterion of objectivity which is derived from the distinction between subject and object. However, as shall be seen, it differs from critical theory, as it also calls into question and consequently rejects, the principles of universality and foundationalism. In doing so, post-structuralism attempts to investigate the history of the relationship between knowledge and reason, to show that such history consists of discontinuities, and to demonstrate that the materiality of knowledge (its production and its functioning) rather than the scientificity of it is the basis of the functioning of epistemology.

Among poststructuralist positions, the works of Foucault and of Derrida are of importance for IRT, in so far as they have been the primary reference points within the process of the incorporation of poststructuralism in IRT. For this reason, It is their approach to epistemology that will be the focus of what follows (Ashley, 1988 and 1989; Walker, 1989; Der Derian and Shapiro, 1990).

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12 Poststructuralism does not have a fixed meaning, but is applied to a range of theoretical positions developed in the work of Foucault (1978, 1979), Derrida (1976), Deleuze and Guattari (1978), as well as in the psychoanalysis of Lacan, and in the linguistic theory of Kristeva.
In criticizing the objectivist mode of knowledge, Foucault searches for an epistemological space specific to a particular period (1970:56). As Miller points out, in his search Foucault’s aim is to reveal "a positive unconscious of knowledge", that is, a level at which a certain scientific discourse is produced, which gives rise to what Foucault calls "the rules of formation" which allow different scientific disciplines to define the object of their study (1987:160). Foucault suggests, in this context, that from the rules of formation that belong to a certain period emerge the concept of "episteme".

In Order of Things Foucault explores transformations in episteme and suggests that throughout Western history there have been three types of episteme: Renaissance knowledge, the classical episteme, and the modern episteme, or the emergence of human sciences, each of which occurred in a given time and space. 13 What is important here is, first, the modern episteme, since it gives meaning to the objectivist epistemological position, and second, the question of how Foucault discovered the emergence and the transformation of these epistememes.

As for the second, what Foucault terms "the archaeological method" explains the principal aspects of his discovery. Foucault’s archaeology is an attempt to find traces left by past civilizations and to reconstruct the succession of historical paradigms by stressing the significance of sharp demarcations that separate different historical periods. It is an attempt to discover the objects of knowledge and to investigate the processes through which human subjects have been made themselves into objects of knowledge. In his investigation, Foucault focuses on the functioning of "the discourses that exist before human subjects", act as a material manifestations of an episteme, and function to affect the way in which human subjects act and enter into relations (1970:67-75).

Two points are worth noting here. First, Foucault’s archaeological method indicates that the

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13. Foucault defines the episteme of the Renaissance as a mode of knowledge based on the absence of a distinction between objects and signs, between the existence of the world and signification, which means the absence of the subject/object dichotomy. The Classical episteme, on the other hand, is based of representation of things and the emergence of organic understanding. For a detailed account of these types of episteme, see Miller (1987:167-197).
history of epistemologies consists of discontinuities and ruptures. With respect to the objectivist epistemologies, this means that there cannot be an epistemology outside history and independent from social activities. Second, since every episteme operates with and through discourses, knowledge and power cannot be separated, due precisely to the fact that it is within the process of knowledge production human subjects take place not only as the knowing subject but also as the object of knowledge.

As for the modern episteme, this double functioning of human subjects is crucial. For Foucault, the modern episteme, which is the basis of the objectivist epistemological position, creates a new power/knowledge regime from which human sciences have emerged (1970:9). In this regime, human subjects become a two-sided entity. As Love has put it, there are three manifestations of this "two-sidedness", each of which is related to the subject/object dichotomy (1989:272). First, human subjects both constitute the world of empirical objects and are constituted by them. Thus, they become both transcendental and empirical entities. Second, human subjects both act as knowing subjects in that they know themselves to be determined by forces external to them, and are in fact determined by them. Thus, they involve the cogito/unthought two-sidedness. Third, "in the retreat-and-return-of-the origin double", human subjects both create history and are created by past events (ibid.). As a result, human subjects become both the epistemological object and the political subject of the modern episteme.

Given that this subject/object dichotomy is created with the emergence of the modern episteme, it can be argued that positivism's claim to objectivity is ahistorical and untenable, in so far as it ignores the historical construction of that dichotomy. However, what is important here is not simply to reject positivism, but to explain why positivism has remained as one of the dominant epistemological positions in human sciences. This question, once again, points out the significance of the power-knowledge relationship and the role discourses play in it.

Foucault explains his interest in power and knowledge by stating that when I was studying during the early 1950s, one of the greatest problems that arose was that of the political status of science and the ideological functions which it would
serve...a whole number of interesting questions were provoked. These can all be summed up in two words: power and knowledge (1980:109).

Power and knowledge constitute what Foucault calls a "discourse". The action of discourse upon the body, marks the point of entry to the Modern era. Foucault's approach to science is, then, historical in that the transition from the Classical to the Modern is characterized by a transformation from an episteme in which "soul and discourse are separate from bodies, and knowledge relates to bodies from outside through representation and direct repression" to another, organized on the basis of "the cementing of souls back onto bodies: its constitution, individuation and normalization of bodies, in the interests of the reproduction of society" (Lash, 1984:2). Thus, it would be mistaken to isolate power from knowledge, or to conceive of science separate from domination. Control of the human subjects in modern society is achieved through scientific discourses.

An examination of the relation of power and knowledge indicates that knowledge is power. As Hoy has pointed out, this relation was asserted by Bacon, but he meant that "knowledge leads to power". On the contrary, for Foucault, as for Nietzsche, that knowledge is power does not imply a direction of any sort, but instead indicates that "knowledge is not gained prior to and independently of the use to which it will be put in order to achieve power (whether over nature or over other people), but is already a function of human interests and power relations" (1986:124). This means that power and knowledge cannot be analyzed separately in so far as a will to knowledge is nothing but a will to power. Foucault proposes in this context that the relation of power and knowledge should be conceived of as a heuristic device, used to account for the impact of social and scientific practices that condition social life and human beliefs. Therefore, Foucault's usage of a power-knowledge "slash" is neither epistemological nor ontological but historical, in the sense that it offers "an interpretation of how what counts as knowledge and power has historically come to be so counted" (1986:124). The interpretation offered is "discursive" simply because "there is no knowledge without a particular discursive practice: and any discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it forms" (Foucault, 1977:183). Thus, Foucault claims to break with the objectivist approach to science and epistemologies that accompany it.

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As noted, both positivism and structuralism distinguish science from ideology and maintain that knowledge is possible where power relations are suspended. For them, objectivism necessarily entails a suspension of non-scientific (that is, so-called 'ideological') practices. Foucault's conception of power-knowledge relations, in this regard, cuts through the science/ideology distinction, by emphasizing that

there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations (Foucault, 1977:27).

According to Smart, once power and knowledge are inextricably and necessarily linked then there is no way to argue for value-freedom, neutrality, or objectivity. Thus,

those sciences in which human beings constitute both the subjects and objects of knowledge, investigators and investigated, namely the human sciences, are placed in particular jeopardy, for their claims to objectivity and detachment are fundamentally undermined (Smart, 1986:65).

In this context, the question of the subject is crucial for two reasons. First, it constitutes a fundamental difference between Habermas (or critical theory) and Foucault (post-structuralism). Secondly, it marks the structuralist background of post-structuralism. With respect to the first point, although both Habermas and Foucault reject any conception of objective science they differ in the way they conceptualize human beings. By viewing reason as embodied in historical practices, Habermas, following Western Marxism, sees a possibility of emancipatory interest established by the construction of a free-speech situation. This idea reveals Habermas' conception of human beings as able to constitute their own realm of existence under specific conditions. Critical theory, in his view, is necessary to arrive at an emancipatory interest, since its function is not only to explain but also to criticize so as to change existing social conditions. For Foucault, there can be no such thing as an emancipatory interest as long as power and knowledge are inextricably linked with each other. Moreover, human beings are not free agents, but are constituted as subjects.

The position adopted by Foucault is that if knowledge is power then the function of human sciences, especially those drawing on a conception of normality, is the constitition of subjects (1982:208). If so, then Habermas's thesis that psychoanalysis, as a reflective rather than objective theory, is capable
of creating conditions in which individuals free themselves by acting as agents, collapses. For Foucault, it ignores the very existence of the power/knowledge relation between analyst and patient, a relation that is "authoritarian" in nature (Cashmore and Mullan, 1983:190). Secondly, it gives us little clue as to how to connect the explication of human action with the properties of social institutions, or structures (Giddens, 1976:70). Therefore, Foucault stresses the importance of institutions like the "asylum", the hospital, the prison, and the psychiatrist's couch in order to illustrate the ways in which relations of power are formed and exercised, and also how bodies of knowledge cumulate about subjects (Smart, 1986:105).

Here Foucault's aim is to demonstrate that the human sciences dealing with issues of normality contribute to the development of technologies of power. In other words, his attempt to criticize any conception of rationality concentrates on the twin development of human sciences and technologies of power, out of which the individual is constituted as subject rather than agent.

Now one can recognize the structuralist foundation of Foucault's conception of the social role played by human sciences. In this respect, it can be argued that the Althusserian conception of ideology both as a practice constituting subjects and as the basic element of the process of reproduction of a social formation as a whole, provides the basis for post-structuralist understandings of the constitution of subjects. In Foucault, the notion of normalization is synonymous with Althusser's notion of reproduction. This commonality concerns the way they deal with the question of history and individuality. Both abandon any anthropological conception of individual that accords it autonomy and ability to constitute its realm of existence. This leads both to focus on the question of how individuals are constituted as subjects.

Whereas for Althusser, ideology functions as a practice producing subjects through the ideological state apparatuses, subjects are constituted for Foucault by the discursive practices exercised in or via social institutions. This commonality, stemming from the structuralism of both Althusser and Foucault, indicates that the label of post-structuralism attached to Foucault does not imply a discontinuity between structuralism and post-structuralism on the question of reproduction of subjects.
Rather, it exhibits the structuralist background of post-structuralism.

However, post-structuralism does distinguish itself from structuralism with respect to its epistemological position. Whereas for structuralism theory is considered a practice necessary for an analysis of actual, concrete practices, post-structuralism argues that theory cannot be separated from actual practical interests. It should be noted here that post-structuralism derives its understanding of theory as a practical interest from Nietzsche (Lowe, 1986; Smart, 1985; Rorty, 1986; Hoy, 1986). Nietzsche asserts that

theory and practice-fateful distinction, as if there were an actual drive for knowledge that, without regard to questions of usefulness and harm, went blindly for the truth; and then, separate from this, the whole world of practical interest...the so-called desire for knowledge can be traced back to a desire to appropriate and conquer. Morality is such a curious science because it is in the highest degree practical (1968:423).

From this assertion Foucault develops his genealogical analysis of discourse, designed to show the link between power and knowledge. For discourse analysis, knowledge can never be true or false for it is always contingent on power. And, conversely, there can be no power without a knowledge of it. Sheridan exemplifies the relation of power and knowledge in the following way:

Crime produced the prison: the prison the delinquent class: the existence of a delinquent class an excuse for the policing of the entire population. This policing led to the extraction of information about groups and individuals...The exercise of power over population and the accumulation of knowledge about it are two sides of a single process: not power and knowledge, but power-knowledge (1980:182).

Two points can be made here. First, by following Nietzsche and rejecting any distinction between science (knowledge) and practical interest (practice) Foucault, argues against the notion of 'objectivism', and takes power-knowledge as a device by which a constitution of any scientific practice can be analyzed. This also means that Foucault, by relying on the Nietzschean conception of will to truth as synonymous with will to power, rejects the concept of ideology.

To acknowledge the existence of ideology is also to believe in its opposite: truth. Ideology never appears in Foucault because, as he points out, "it always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth" (1980:118). For him, truth is always wrapped up with power relations; it cannot be neutral. Thus, poststructuralism takes as its starting point a
rejection of the duality so crucial to structuralism.

In epistemological terms, to reject the duality between ideology and science also means to reject an opposition between essence and phenomenon (Deleuze, 1979). Post-structuralism displaces this opposition by arguing that meaning is not an essence concealed behind phenomenon, but rather consists in its differential relations to other events and their meanings. The implications that follow are that firstly, as Derrida argues, both positivism and structuralism are "logo-centric", in that all forms of thought are based on some external point of reference, such as the notion of truth. Therefore, in these epistemologies, there is always an outside, external objective truth that a knowing subject seeks to investigate. Consequently, epistemology becomes a "representation" of an external object and is logo-centric, to the extent that it tries to represent whatever an essence is - or generally speaking, a centre - behind the so-called surface phenomenon.

Derrida arrives at this conclusion through what he calls the "technique of deconstruction". According to him, deconstruction attempts to investigate the nature and production of knowledge (1978). More specifically, deconstruction aims to criticize a conception of knowledge and meaning, regarded as the graspable essence that acts and proceeds independently from, and as the constitutive of, the text in which it is produces (1978:216). In opposition to such an essence, deconstruction considers knowledge as representation embedded in the complex, heterodox, relational, and even contradictory nature of language and interpretation. In this sense, just as in Foucault's archaeological method, deconstruction does not aim at arriving at an absolute truth. Nor does it involve any claim to universality.

It is through his technique of deconstruction that Derrida proposes as a replacement for logo-centrism the concept of "differance" (Ryan, 1982; Culler, 1983). This concept implies both "to deter, postpone, delay" and "to differ, be different from". The two senses of differance are needed to escape logo-centrism, in so far as they conceive of meaning as never being fully present. For "the meaning of an element depends on its association with other elements to which it harks back and refers forward" (Ryan,1982:47-55). Here the point is that the concept of differance abandons the
subject/object dichotomy with its emphasis on relationality, which, according to Derrida, also affirms the political character of epistemology.

In *Speech and Phenomena*, Derrida states that:

in marking out "differance", everything is a matter of strategy and risk. It is a question of strategy because no transcendent truth present outside the sphere of writing can theoretically command the totality of this field. It is hazardous because this strategy orients the tactics according to a final aim, a telos or the theme of domination, a mastery or an ultimate reappropriation of movement and field. In the end, it is a strategy without finality (1973:135).

Affirming the constitutive character of "differance" also leads to an identification of the social with an infinite play of differences in relation to which there is no privileged point of entry. That is to say, the social is a terrain of differences, a terrain whose discursive character is defined by an articulation of differences. All approaches to the social must consequently abandon the positivist myth of an absolute point of departure which would transform the ensemble of social relations into a transparent unity and recognize that difference is constituted (Laclau, 1983:39).

The discursive nature of the social is established in the following way, according to Derrida:

The event I call rupture presumably would have to come about when the structurality of structure had to begin to be thought, that is to say, repeated, and this is why I said that this disruption was repetition in every sense of the word. Henceforth, it became necessary to think both the law which somehow governed desire for a centre in the constitution of structure, and the process of signification which orders the displacements and substitutions for this law of central presence -- but as a central presence which has never been itself, has always already been exited from itself into its own substitute. The substitute does not substitute itself for anything which has somehow existed before it, henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no centre, that the centre could not be thought in the form of a present -- being, that the centre had no natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of non-focus in which an infinite number of sign substitutions came into play. This was the moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a centre or origin, everything became discourse -- provided we can agree on this word -- that is to say, system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, never absolutely present outside a system of differences (Derrida, 1978:280).

The conclusions, drawn from this quotation, are two-fold. First, the impossibility of the conception of society as a totality of any kind is found in the de-centered structure of the social, in which social relations claim their own specific conditions of
existence. Secondly, the discursive character of the social relations indicates that they can only exist as an discursive effort to constitute a centre, but this constitution always results from a process of overdetermination, not from an expression or structuration of social practices (Laclau, 1984; Ryan, 1983). With respect to the first point, it can be said that post-structuralism abandons not the concept of totality itself but any notion of society as a constitutive totality.

Post-structuralism is discursive analysis which starts with the recognition of the constitutive character of differences, which presupposes a concept of an historically constituted totality resulting from an articulation of plurality of efforts. This recognition accords primacy to "processes" over an ontologically posited order. Thus, unlike positivism and structuralism, post-structuralism conceives of society, social practices and social structures more as an endless process than an ontological order.

Post-structuralism's assertion of the constitutive character of differences necessarily leads to the recognition of the discursive character of social practices (Deluze, 1979; Derrida, 1978; Foucault, 1980; and Laclau, 1984). Herein lies the distinct character of post-structuralism, that is, a dissolution of reality into discourse, or locating knowledge in the realm of will to power. Love argues in this context that post-structuralism derives from a Nietzschean conception of history, in the sense that will to power rather than necessity to produce is what constitutes the way in which social practices operate in a given society (1986:25). History, according to Nietzsche, is "a succession of attempts by man to master nature, himself, and other men" (in Love, 1986:55). Thus, history is seen as a process which starts off with domination rather than production. For Callinicos, the primacy accorded to domination over production involves a subordination of actual historical practices to their meanings, since post-structuralist conceptions of social practice relies upon the construction of meaning (1983:91-96). Derrida argues, for example, that "history is not a privileged authority but part of the general text, which has no boundaries, meaning that history is a text consisting of historically determined meaning" (Culler, 1982:129). In other words, history is not a given nor a foundation but a construct.

Derrida explains the conception of history based on meaning rather than production by
asserting that:

we shall distinguish by the term 'differance' the moment by which language, or any code, any system of reference in general becomes 'historically constructed' as a fabric of differences. If the word history did not carry with it the theme of a final repression of difference, we could say that differences alone could be 'historical' through and through and from the start (1973:141).

This conception of history implies that history is an open-ended process, composed of meanings, which contains in itself an excess of meaning, that is, an undecidable element. It follows that any effort to subscribe to a concept of society as a constituting totality in which social phenomena are allowed to be transparent is abandoned. There is also a contention that "any totality is undermined by its lack of self-identity, that social phenomena have always already lost their putative transparency" (Parker, 1985:157). Poststructuralism thus argues that the concept of history is not a process of transformation of inner contradictions into universal truths, since there is no privileged entry into history. By opposing the production-based understanding of history poststructuralism proposes that everything is discursive (that is, social practices can only exist as a discursive effort to constitute and reproduce a totality). Thus, post-structuralism with its Nietzschean understanding of history gives primacy to the question of reproduction over that of production in its attempt to account for the emergence and existence of power/domination relations in a given social formation.

Central to the difference between the history as production and the history as reproduction is, as pointed out, the dominance of meaning over social practice, or the primacy of reproduction over production. However, it would definitely be mistaken to consider reproduction in isolation from production, in so far as both are historically embedded in the ensemble of social practices. Post-structuralism makes this mistake by drawing a sharp distinction between meaning and concrete social practices. As a consequence, it remains at the level of textuality and cannot go beyond the texts it reads. This is, in fact, reductive because it neglects the importance of economic and politico-class dimensions of social practices.

Unless production and reproduction are combined on the basis of their own specific conditions of existence such a formulation of social practices becomes reductive. The Reductionism
of post-structuralism can be overcome if the fact that production and reproduction derive from each other is recognised. This requires incorporating into post-structuralism the political, socio-economic and historical outlines which it lacks. Such a link between production and reproduction does not produce a view of history as a process with a transcendental subject. Rather it has knowledgeable subjects participating in the process of making history under certain conditions and limitations. One can combine production and reproduction with each other by conceiving subjects as knowledgeable subjects without falling into the trap of reductionism.

REFLECTION ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

This chapter has aimed at establishing an epistemological basis for the symptomatic reading and the critical examination of the paradigmatic positions that this thesis undertakes as its primary task. In doing so, it has attempted to provide a metatheoretical mapping of IRT with reference to four epistemological positions. It has also dealt with the fundamental concepts produced within these epistemologies.

From the metatheoretical mapping provided it is possible to extrapolate a number of conclusion which can be reflected on IRT.

(i) The incorporation into IRT of critical theory and poststructuralism poses crucial questions for the validity of the objectivist positions: positivism and structuralism. It calls into question the proposition of the externality of knowledge to human experience and the principle of universality which rests that proposition. Critical theory and poststructuralism argue for the contextuality and historicity of knowledge.

The contextuality and historicity of knowledge indicates that it is only with the emergence of modernity (or the modern episteme) that the subject/object dichotomy on which positivism has been founded has come into existence. If so, then neither the principle that there is an external objective reality nor the principle that the role of science is to provide a set of epistemological means of
apprehending this reality, for this matter, nor the principle of universality that stem from this understanding, is tenable. This is precisely because they correspond to a specific period of time and space. And, more importantly, the historical investigation (Foucault’s archaeology or critical theory’s principle of critique) of the coming into existence of these principles indicates that they operate with discourses that they are directly linked to a certain type of interest and rationality and that they are one of the constitutives of human subjects. In this sense, they are historically and materially constructed rather than objective.

Once granted, the contextuality and historicity of knowledge radically challenges both epistemological and conceptual validity of the positivist and structuralist international relations theories with which the Chapter IV and the Chapter V will be concerned.

(ii) The incorporation into IRT of critical theory and post-structuralism also calls for shifting our attention to a diachronic analysis of history. According to critical theory, this shift manifests itself in the study of social relations with respect to (a) interaction of human subjects with the material world, (b) interaction with other actors for the purposes of social coordination, and (c) interaction with the self, that is, the identification and reproduction of self identity through projection (Garnham, 1990:9). These dimensions of interaction constitute, respectively, culture, society, and identity, which are not reducible to one another. Nor are they reducible to the economic dimension of social relations.

Post-structuralism also designates the principle of diachrony by rejecting any unitary and totalistic understanding of society and by focusing on the historical and discursive construction of these three respective dimensions of interaction. As noted, this leads post-structuralism to argue for the plurality, contingency and indeterminacy of social relations.

This shift of emphasis on diachrony challenges the positivist and structuralist international relations theories in terms of the ability of their epistemological and conceptual structures to account for change and historicity in international relations.

(iii) Implied in this shift of emphasis is also a distinction, drawn both by critical theory and post-structuralism, between production and domination. For this thesis, this distinction, which is untenable,
indicates that neither critical theory nor post-structuralism can be taken as unproblematical. They present problems that should not be ignored. As shall be argued in Chapter VII, problems, such as critical theory’s claim to universality, its consensus based understanding of truth, the totalistic nature of its conception of communicative rationality, its blindness in its understanding of the reproduction of modern society to global domination relations, or post-structuralism’s neglect of the state and state power, and its failure to recognize the importance of production both for modern society and for international relations, should be addressed to determine the extent of their ability to theorize adequately international relations.

Given these conclusions extrapolated from the metatheoretical mapping of IRT, it can be concluded that there exist four primary points of reference which characterize the way in which the epistemological positions in IRT function and in relation to which they make their knowledge claims. These points of reference correspond to the four dimensions of social phenomena.

(i) the homeostatic-synchronic dimension which is related to the problem of social organization and stability;

(ii) the generic-diachronic dimension concerning the problem of the formation and change of social phenomena;

(iii) the dimension of relationality referring to exchange relations between the elements of society;

(iv) the communicative-constructive dimension pointing to the inter-subjective nature of social reality.

As has become apparent throughout this metatheoretical mapping, the epistemological positions of IRT do not systematically and in a well-balanced manner approach these dimensions. Positivism and structuralism focus exclusively on the first and the third dimensions and tend to reduce the second and the fourth dimensions to the first. Critical theory and poststructuralism place an emphasis on the third and the fourth and attempt to understand them with reference to the second.

14 These categories are developed and used by Strasser and Randall to examine the epistemological and the ontological structures of theories of social change (1981:23-24).
However, critical theory and post-structuralism tend to deny the importance of production in the construction of the first and the second dimensions of social phenomena.

What these dimensions mean for IRT is that theories of international relations differ in what they regard as the primary explananda: reproduction, change, interaction, or relationality. It is this difference that gives rise to the multi-paradigmatic nature of, or the proliferation of, IRT. This is precisely because of the fact that this difference consists of concepts, propositions, construction of the units of analysis, epistemological knowledge claims, and their theoretical implications, which, as a result, determines the way a paradigmatic position attempts to apprehend its subject matter.

This difference and its constitutive unit, the choice and the analysis of the primary explanandum, thus establishes an adequate criterion for a critical examination of the existing theories of international relations. Consequently, by looking at the way these theories deal with the four dimensions of social phenomena, one could discover the strength and weaknesses of their analysis of international relations and determine the extent to which they contribute to the development of IRT. It is this which this thesis undertakes.
CHAPTER III

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND WORLD ORDER:
INTER-STATE RIVALRY OR MODERNIZATION OR GLOBALIZATION

Chapter II argued that the epistemological position that operates by radically differentiating between facts and value, and power and understanding (knowledge) contributed to the emergence of objectivist and universalist understandings of social phenomena. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that it is this epistemological position (positivism) that determined the mode in which international relations had been analyzed in the post-world war II world order. More specifically, this chapter will provide a meta-theoretical mapping of that mode by focusing on the three paradigmatic positions that provided an account of that order: realism, the sociology of development, and the sociology of underdevelopment. The chapter will show that positivism established very clearly the epistemological foundation of the first two and that the third failed to provide an alternative to it.

In the concluding section, attention will be paid to the general theoretical deficiencies of these positions to analyze comprehensively the post-world war II world order and its dynamic and changing structure. It will be argued that such deficiencies resulted in the need for reconstructing these positions which marked the beginning of the transformation of IRT in the late 1970s.

THE POST-WORLD WAR II WORLD ORDER

Following the trauma of the Great Depression and World War II, two sets of politico-economic priorities were established to overcome the organic crisis of international relations. The first concerned the achievement of economic growth and full employment. This meant the Keynesian restructuring of national economies, increased government intervention in the economy, and the establishment of the welfare state in the North. The second priority was to construct a stable world order that would prevent a return to the inter-war period and its basic feature, the economic nationalism that had given rise to a "beggar thy neighbour" international economic policies
The inter-war period was characterized by the deterioration of world trade as a result of intensive economic nationalism. Economic nationalism was implemented through discriminatory practices, imposition of quotas, and increased tariffs. The intention in doing so was to force exports and curtail imports on the one hand, and to initiate bilateral economic relations on the other. Such intentions formed the beggar-thy-neighbour foreign economic policies, which in turn resulted in the collapse of international trade.

The inter-war period was also characterized by the absence of an hegemonic leader. In his study of the Great Depression (1973), Kindleberger suggests that the depth and duration of the depression resulted from the inability of Britain and the unwillingness of the United States to initiate sufficient leadership to stabilize the international economy by fighting against economic nationalism and protectionism. Modelski (1978), on the other hand, characterized this period as one in which British hegemony had lost its economic power, but the United States, although having economic power, had not enough political power to become a new hegemonic leader. ¹

Following the World War II and focusing on these two characteristics a new world order was called for. Thus, in 1944, the Bretton Woods system was founded to create a stable world order. This also meant the announcement of the United States as the new hegemonic leader. The main features of the system were organized around the idea that governments would have considerable freedom to pursue national economic objectives, yet they would follow the international monetary order based on fixed exchange rates and adopt currency convertibility for current account transactions.

The intention was to prevent a clash between domestic autonomy and international stability. It should be noted here that central to this intention were the two important consequences of World War II, namely the division of Europe and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a candidate for

¹ This argument, as well as Kindleberger's suggestion, comes from hegemonic stability theory. In making a reference to them, my intention is simply to point out the fact that the lack of leadership was one of the important features of the inter-war period.
super-power status, both of which required the economic unification and restructuring of the Western European economies. The principle of domestic autonomy in this sense was directly related to the economic problems of Western European societies.

Nevertheless, the Bretton woods system was represented as a universal compromise solution to the conflict between domestic autonomy and international norms. According to Ruggie, this compromise was meant to construct a world order based on the idea of "embedded liberalism" in the following manner:

It [the Bretton Woods system] attempted to avoid (1) subordination of domestic economic activities to the stability of the exchange rate embodied in the classical gold standard and also (2) the sacrifice of the international stability to the domestic policy autonomy characteristic of the inter-war period. This so-called "compromise of embedded liberalism" was an attempt to enable governments to pursue Keynesian growth stimulation policies at home without disturbing international monetary stability (1982:393).

In addition, the compromise of embedded liberalism was multilateral in character, so as to avoid discriminatory economic foreign policies. Herein lies the significance of international organizations in construction of the post-world war II world order. It was through these organizations that the stability and the multilateral character of that order was secured. It was through them that international liberalization and domestic stabilization were simultaneously achieved (Gilpin, 1987:132).

In this context, the Bretton Woods system led to the creation of a number of international organizations. The creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 was an attempt to maximize growth in world trade through a gradual reduction in trade barriers and to establish a nondiscriminatory conduct of trade through successive multilateral negotiations. The Bretton Woods system also included the International Monetary Fund with respect to the monetary relations. The fund was given the function of supervising the operation of the monetary system and providing medium-term lending to countries facing balance of payment difficulties. The intention was to make sure that countries adopted the principle of currency convertibility, which was the basis of the new international monetary system.

In addition to these organizations, to deal with the problem of the maintenance of peace and
security, the United Nations was created in 1945. The United Nations was designed on the basis of the concept of collective security as a mechanism for international conflict management. Collective security in this sense was meant to provide international regulation and the setting of international norms and standards concerning peace and security. Thus, the United Nations functioned as an integral part of the compromise of embedded liberalism.

The creation of these international organizations universal in character (and also the creation of other regional organizations, for example, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community) indicates that international organizations (otherwise known as interstate actors) were one of the most important characteristics of the world order. They were one of the constitutive elements of that order. Moreover, they were integral to the functioning of the United States hegemonic leadership in so far as their role was to regulate international stability, multilateral relations, and the adaptation by government of international liberal norms.

The other unique feature of the post-world war II world order was the emergence of politically independent post-colonial states in the Third World. Especially in the late 1950s and the early 1960s have witnessed most of the Third World states have become politically independent sovereign nation states. The crucial question was how to integrate these states into the world order. They were politically independent but economically underdeveloped. The proposals however were not derived from the recognition of the historically specific and peculiar characteristics of these states. Instead, the compromise of embedded liberalism implicitly included these states. As Gleditsch has correctly pointed out, the Keynesian developmentalist approach to economic growth and the acceptance of strong state intervention within the context of international liberalism determined the way in which these states were integrated into the world order (1990:107). Thus, the United States influenced not only Western European societies but also the Third World through the compromise of embedded liberalism.

To sum up, the post-world war II world order can be said to have contained the following features:
(i) the emergence of the United States as the new hegemonic leader;
(ii) the compromise of embedded liberalism as a solution to the conflict between domestic autonomy and international economic liberalism;
(iii) the creation of international organizations and their active role in the reproduction of the world order as a whole;
(iv) the economic unification and the restructuring of Western European societies;
(v) the emergence of the Soviet Union as a candidate for the super power status and the division of Europe, and thus the emergence of the East-West conflict;
(vi) the emergence of newly politically independent post-colonial states, and thus the North-South relationship.

From these features two conceptual categories have emerged - those of security and development - which have become particularly prominent and influential in the post-world war II construction of IRT. The former has given rise to the realist paradigmatic position. The latter has been employed by the sociology of development and the sociology of underdevelopment. In this context, it can be argued that these paradigmatic positions, which will be examined in what follows, should be considered in terms of their historical specificity, that is, as being embedded in the world order organized under the United States' hegemonic leadership.

INTER-STATE RIVALRY AND REALISM

As was noted, one of the significant politico-economic changes in the post-World War II era was the deepening of East-West conflict which reflected onto the politics of international relations as the Cold War between super powers, namely the United States and the Soviet Union. What has come to be known as the "realist study of international politics" based its account of international relations exclusively on the East-West conflict, and became the dominant paradigm in the field of international relations (Vasquez, 1981; Keohane, 1986; Sylvester, 1984). Its aim was to demonstrate that the correct
way of analyzing the global system started by accepting the system as it was in order to perpetuate the stability of the system.

As Smith correctly observes,

[1] The role of the United States in the post-Second World War period was not only central, but in many respects novel. As the Cold-War unfolded, all aspects of world politics seemed to involve the United States-Soviet relationship. Given the pre-war isolationist tendency in US foreign policy, this involvement was undertaken with little of the traditional European framework of an experienced and elite band of foreign policy specialists. In such a situation, national leaders were receptive to ideas to help guide them, and this is exactly what realism offered (1989:10).

Realism's emphasis on the recognition of the system as it is, in this sense, meant the rationalization of Cold War policies. Thus, the realist account of international relations was intended to provide a framework, consisting of concepts and categories whose function was not only to help comprehend international reality, but, more importantly, to define that reality in a certain way, so that it would correspond to the foreign policy objectives of the United States as the hegemonic power of the post-world war II world order.

However, to consider and understand realism only within the context of its linkage with the foreign policy of the United States would be reductive, in so far as realism was also intended to construct a theory of international relations which is universal in nature. It constructs a theory in that it offers a specific mode of theorizing international relations based on a certain set of epistemological and ontological propositions. The vision of international relations it constructs within its mode of theorizing is universal in that, as shall become apparent later, an essentialist, ahistorical conception of the human subject is used as the basis of that vision. What, then, are the constitutive units of the realist vision of international relations?

The meaning the label of "realist" conveys can be captured in the following presupposition by Morgenthau whose analysis of the politics of international relations is clearly and closely associated with the realist paradigm:

out of this everlasting and ever undecided struggle there arises the tragic sense of life, the awareness of irresolvable discord, contradictions and conflicts which are inherent in the nature of things and which human reason is powerless to resolve (1946:205-206).
Underlying this presupposition is the pessimistic view of human nature in which interactions among individuals refer to a realm par excellence of conflictual values. 2

Tetraault and Abel in their description of the realist mode of thought provide an adequate account of the reflection of the pessimistic view of human nature of this type on the realist study of international relations:

It is not the international system that is at fault, or obsolescent social and political institutions, a lack of knowledge or understanding, or the depravity of isolated individuals or groups; rather, human beings are kept from living in peace because of inherent failures in human nature. Humans are seen as naturally competitive, hungry for power and all the material and political benefits that power brings. Thus, to struggle for power, survival, and prosperity is inevitable (1986:6).

Following Foucault, two characteristic assigned by realism to human subjects can be extrapolated from this quotation: human subjects are enmeshed in competition and power and are acting subjects capable of making history in that they attempt to control historical limitations to guarantee their survival. 3 This human subject in realism functions as the centre, or as the privileged point of reference, according to which the nature of international relations are explained. As enmeshed in competition and power, it makes international relations historically fixed and universal, always and everywhere based on a struggle for power and survival.

This idea concurs with Reinhold Niebuhr, who contends that a will to live always directly leads to the will to power that enters most individual and collective action (1976:17). It follows that in so far as a struggle for power and survival is, and always remains, inevitable, any attempt to approach this struggle via normative or practical (or moral) intentions (in other words, by relying on "what ought to be" rather than "what is") is not a proper way of studying the politics of international relations. As Morgenthau put it, for the realist, to overcome the conflict inherent in international relations it is necessary to work with it by accepting the power basis of the international system as it is, not by taking

2 Morgenthau's conception of realism is shared by all realists. For a detailed account, see Walker (1989).

a position "against it" (1946:207-210). It can be said, then, that the label "realism" involves an understanding of politics as a power struggle which is potentially free from constraints and limitations imposed by normative judgements.

For Morgenthau this means the declaration of the autonomy of the political sphere. "The US science and economic productivity had won the war, and the atom bomb would secure the peace" (1966:11). In this context realism was especially attractive because it appeared to offer an alternative to ideological and moralistic analysis, an alternative based on "what is" and the potential autonomy of politics (Mansbach and Ferguson, 1986:7-16). If so, then what is proposed is a study of international politics which will assure the absolute autonomy of politics as historic force and discursive subject-matter and which will offer a picture of the world of people as they really are rather than as they ought to be.

This leads the realist discourse as international politics to look to theorists of sovereignty and apologists for "reason of being", such as Machiavelli and Hobbes. Thus, the genealogy of Cold War realism, although acknowledging antecedents as far back as Thucydides' study of the Peloponnesian War, cycles back to a thoroughly "what is" -based constituted discourse of politics most eloquently expressed by Machiavelli's Prince (that is, the sovereign power must exercise standards and calculations different from individuals in order to ensure the state's survival) and by Hobbes' conception of the state of nature as constructed by fear, force and instrumental calculation, and the state as a Leviathan, so unimaginably powerful that it hovers autonomously above its subject individuals.4

In turn, the conception of politics as an absolutely autonomous instrumental calculation provides an ahistorically constituted discursive space (that is, the nature of international politics has remained the same as it was in the time of Thucydides' study of Peloponnesian War) in which a justification for the priorities of power maximization and military security is achieved. In doing so, realism claims that in the international system in which the state of nature is alleged to be

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4 For a detailed account of this philosophical foundation of realism, see Walker (1984, 1989), and Ashley (1989).
characterized by the struggle for power and survival there exists a high-threat environment around which nation states interact with one another. Defending the national interest, for realism, is what constitutes the foreign policy behaviour of nation states, and is therefore the principal motivation in the "inter-state system".

The defence of national interest is dependent on the power - or military - capacities of nation states, meaning that sovereign nation states function as the protectors of national survival which is, in turn, defined as national interest. It is for this reason that the drive to maximize power is the organizational feature of the international system organized, according to realism, by the inter-state relations. In Morgenthau's terminology,

the sovereign states follow policies designed to preserve the status quo, to achieve imperialistic expansion, or to gain prestige, for their policies seek either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power (1946: 213-217).

It is, also, in this sense that power is for realism the central concept in the study of international politics, and refers either to the ability of the state to influence the actions of the other states, which stems from, especially, its "military capacities" but also its technological and diplomatic one, or to capabilities (again especially military) in relation to the capabilities of the other states. In each case, the proposed definition of power reveals realism's overriding concern with politics as a sphere of survival and influence, and therefore of "domination".

Two points appear to be worth emphasizing here. The first concerns the Weberian dimension of the realist discourse as international politics. Recalling the Weberian discourse of modern society, one can discern the place of Weber's conception of power in relation to the political in the realist account of international politics, particularly as articulated by Morgenthau. Following Weber, Morgenthau in his famous work, Politics Among Nations (1966), argues that politics is not "public reason" or "just government", as it seems to be, but is struggle waged by the nation state for power. He proceeds to argue that with this role, the nation state cannot be overcome because of it permanence for the calculable future which dictates international politics. Bringing these two arguments together, it becomes clear that what Morgenthau suggests is that the fundamental feature
of international politics in the inter-state system is such that no nation-state, no matter what goal it wishes to pursue, can ignore the inescapable necessity to organize its actions around the concept of power.

It is on the basis of this organization that nation-states are considered to act rationally. They are rational to the extent that they use necessary means to achieve the fixed end, which is "the pursuit of national interest". The state (or the political), in this respect, is an ontological "intrinsic" in international politics. The state cannot be overcome as long as it acts as a rational and unitary actor capable of both assuming monopoly of power over its own territory and defending the national interest. Therefore, the state, argues Realism, refers to an institution whose inspiration in its successful political actions comes from the principle of national survival (Morgenthau, 1966:5-27).

As Turner and Factor have pointed out, the way in which Morgenthau conceives of the state clearly resembles Weber's argument of the present inevitability and indestructibility of the modern democratic sovereign nation-state, "which was similarly designed to place 'empirical limits' around the discussion of political alternatives" (1984:174-175).

The second point is related to the realism's perception of the international environment. The international environment for realists consists of a realm characterized as a self-maintaining threat situation due to the absence of sovereign authority. Therefore it is "anarchic". It should be noted here that, for realists, anarchy, like power, has a "timeless" quality, being a universal law of motion of international politics. In this sense, the East-West conflict is seen by realists not as a phenomenon which requires an historically contextual explanation, but as a crystallized form of "security dilemma" in the anarchic international politics. It should therefore be accounted for within the context of state action aimed to maximize its power to defend its national interests. Thus, realists suggest that anarchy as an order without the presence of a central and regulating authority makes it necessary for nation states to rely on power or to maximize power capabilities in relation to the capabilities of other nation states (Viotti and Kauppi, 1987:48-49).

Having explained the principal features of the realist discourse, it is reasonable to make the following critical points:
(i) The realist study of international politics is determined by its overriding concern with "statist values", which functioned to legitimize the stability of, and recurrence in, the system. In other words, although the post-World War II world order dictates the existence of economic, political, and cultural diversity in the formation of international relations, realists argue that with respect to the national polity the "political monoculture of statism" define the operation of the system. As Sylvester puts it, statist values - power, security, prestige, leadership - are technically allocated at the interface of polity and society. More often than not, states are holding preponderant military, material, and normative power control distributive arrangements using standard realist tools of diplomacy, war, interventionism and threats thereof. Although the system is clearly hierarchical, Third World elites, no less than their counterparts in the North, adhere to statist norms (1984:373).

Thus, the statist global norms have been diffused, the North under the leadership of the United States's hegemony has manifested its superiority in the South, and the state has been granted the capacity to legitimize itself as the protector of the "national interest". These factors have all contributed to the justification of the realist perception that international are a realm par excellence of conflictual values, and that the state is the master noun of the contemporary political discourse.

(ii) This means that to speak of international relations is in fact to theorize about the material conditions of what is in effect an inter-state system engendering statist values and creating a monolithic political culture. This claim contains a presumption, which is of fundamental importance in the realist political discourse: that to comprehend the nature of international politics it is essential to make a distinction between, in Walker's terminology, the nature of life within sovereign states and interactions that occur between such states (1984:186). This distinction implies, first, that international politics is different from domestic politics in that it corresponds to a realm in which the principles of national survival and defending the national interest rather than those of modernization and democratization of public affairs are the primary point of reference, and second, that the international affairs of sovereign states are radically different from their domestic affairs in that they attempt to maximize their power capabilities rather than to regulate the conflicting interests and produce an harmonious life.

What is important here is the ability of the state to act as a rational and unitary actor in the
decision making process. As Morgenthau has stated:

We put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose, and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose. It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives meaning to the facts of international politics and makes a theory of politics possible (1966:5).

However, as will be elaborated in Chapter VI, this quotation does not provide any explanation as to what the state is or how to conceptualize it. Instead, it reduces the state to a decision making subject that has an ontological existence in the inter-state system (Ashley, 1988:235-243).

(iii) Parallel to the distinction that realism draws between international and domestic affairs, realism operates with an another distinction, but this time, between international politics and international economics. In other words, with its concepts such as power, security, and the state as the basic unit of analysis, the realist account of international relations clearly distinguishes the political from the economic in that the primacy or the determining role is given to the former over the latter. Realists tend to ignore the importance of the economic and cultural diversity in the formation of international relations on the one hand, and of international organizations in normalizing the problematic structure of the system that arises from that diversity on the other. This is the case despite the fact that these factors as well as the East-west conflict have been the distinguishable structure of the post war era.

This neglect is justified by the assertion that the global polity is a system of exchange in which the concepts of order and security, territorial rights, and stability have a more important epistemological status than does economics (Modelski, 1978:215). Underlying this assertion is that even if in the functioning of the world order, trade, industry and finance play a role,

if we look at the polities of these matters, the dominant fact would seem to be that the active focus for global organization so far has always been a world power and that the identity, values and resources of that power have shaped long stretches of world experience (1978:230).

In this view, political factors, therefore, are ultimately determinant in explaining the dynamics of the system characterized by order and stability, which, in turn, functions to justify the realist idea that in the functioning of the international system nation states play the main role. After all, all world
powers, since at least the Peace of Westphalia, have been nation states.

(iv) In making these distinctions, realism also claims that its understanding of politics is scientific since it directly corresponds to, or is derived from, international reality which has an objective existence and which contains objective facts. The realist argument that a statesman tests his or her selection among rational alternatives against actual facts clearly indicates the positivist nature of realism.

This can also be exemplified with reference to the concept of anarchy. Although anarchy appears to be an heuristic device with which to identify the structure of international relations, it meets two requirements of the positivist understanding of science. First, truth as correspondence: the concept of anarchy is regarded in realism as directly corresponding to, and contingent on, reality. Second, an ahistorical and universal nature of a scientific concept: in this respect, anarchy, as noted, functions as a scientific concept, since it assumes both ahistorical and universal characteristics.

However, Morgenthau’s methodology does not explicitly explore the question of science, and tends to deal more with the construction and elaboration of concepts and categories from which realism gains specificity. As shall be seen in Chapter IV, it is this problem which has given rise, within the realist paradigm, to the need to pose the question of science in such a way as to reconstruct realism as a truly scientific (that is, truly positivist) theory of international relations.

The foregoing discussion of the realist discourse of politics as international relations indicates that what is proposed is the *state-centric* account of global relations. One obvious result of this proposition is a drastically circumscribed vocabulary of concepts, one in which the most fundamental relations and concepts are derivative; the very notion of "international", for instance, is defined only in respect of what is not "national" or "domestic". The same is of course true of terms such as the system, behaviour, and inter-state. The lack of a sufficiently rich explanations poses, therefore, severe limits on the possibilities of an adequate thinking.

Within the realist paradigm, these limitations manifest themselves in three failures of realists.

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5 As Turner and Factor point out, this is partially because of the polemical character of Morgenthau’s *Scientific Man versus Power Politics*, where he argues against scienticism and liberalism (1984:172-179).
These are: first, to provide a thorough account of "anarchy" and therefore of "state behaviour"; second, to establish a scientific framework for an analysis of international relations; and third, to acknowledge the importance of trade and finance in the constitution of international relations, and thus international organizations and the principle of "interdependence". The modification of these limitations gives rise to what has come to be known as the neo-realist account of international relations. It is an account whose primary aim is to overcome these limitations, thus scientifically to reconstruct realism around so-called objective categories, and hence to enable realism to maintain its dominant position in IRT.

SOCIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT: MODERNIZATION AND TRANSNATIONALISM

Parallel to the emergence of realism as the dominant paradigm in IRT, the post-world war II world order has given rise to the sociology of development in which two paradigmatic positions have emerged, namely the modernization perspective and functionalism. Like realism, these discourses of development have been constructed with respect to the constitutive characteristics of the world order, and have been employed to secure the stability and reproduction of that order (So, 1990; Chirot, 1981; Kubalkova and Cruickshank, 1981). Moreover, like realism, both of them have come into existence as a historical product of the rise of the United States as the hegemonic power of the world order.

In this context, it can be suggested that both functionalism and the modernization school have been a response to the problems that the post-world war II world order aimed at overcoming. In the case of functionalism, the specific problem was that of the development and the maintenance of peace in international relations. More specifically, for functionalism the problem was to explain the economic unification and restructuring of war-torn Western Europe (Haas, 1968). It was argued that in order to maintain peace in Western Europe in particular, and in international relations in general, economic development and modernization were necessary conditions. Implied in this argument was the idea that economic development could be achieved through economic integration as the first step, which would then lead to political integration and peace (Mitrany, 1975:26-32). It is from this idea
that functionalism constructed its transnationalist and interdependence-based vision of international relations.

In the case of modernization, the specific problem was to understand the development process in the Third World, the newly politically independent but economically underdeveloped nation states, and how to integrate them into the world order without losing them to the Soviet bloc. Like functionalism, the modernization school was founded upon the idea that modernization at the level of national social formations would lead to integration and this was the pre-condition of the reproduction of the world order as a whole.

In addition to these similarities, as a paradigmatic approach to IRT both functionalism and the modernization perspective, like realism, shared a commitment to the positivist epistemology in the following way. Both attempted to provide an "objective" account of international relations based on the subject/object distinction; both operated with the principle of "truth as correspondence" (to objective reality); and both claimed that the concepts and categories employed by them to deal with their subject matters have been subjected to an empirical control, making them both verifiable and an abstraction corresponding directly to the empirical reality. For this reason, both functionalism and the modernization school, in Cox’s terminology, have constituted a "problem-solving" theory without any self-reflective content (1983). 6

A) FUNCTIONALISM: One of the significant problems in the process of the construction of the post-world war II world order was that of the unification and the restructuring of the Western European societies. Underlying both the creation of international organizations and the emphasis placed in the Bretton Woods system on the principle of freedom in the pursuit of the national economic objectives (that is, the welfare state and the Keynesian restructuring of the national

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6 Cox uses the notion of "problem-solving" to characterize the positivist epistemological basis of IRT.
A notion of problem-solving theory is derived from critical theory’s conception of positivism as a technical cognitive interest. Chapter II offered an account of that interest.
economies) was the need to restructure European national economies. This problem found its theoretical expression in that of integration and has led to the emergence of functionalism as one paradigmatic approach to IRT (Groom and Taylor, 1975). Functionalism believed that a solution to the problem lies in "collaboration" between states. David Mitrany, the founder of functionalism, suggests in this respect that successful collaboration in one particular field would lead to further collaboration in related fields (1975:27). The implication of Mitrany's suggestion is that such collaboration creates functional ties among states which would result in integration from which all states would benefit.

This integration was seen as inevitable and necessary in so far as international relations had already given rise to the growth of global ties as a result of the dramatic improvement in transportation and communication, as well as in scientific technologies. Thus, economic activities had spilled over national boundaries and the distinction between domestic policies and foreign policies had become blurred especially with respect to the economic activities. Hence, transnationalism had become the defining feature of international relations for functionalists.

Within this perspective transnationalism and integration defined the functional interdependency between nation states. Thus, functionalism attempted to theorize international relations by focusing on such functional interdependency. In this attempt, functionalism operated with a number of epistemological, ontological, and empirical propositions. At the level of epistemology, functionalism derived from the Parsonsian structural-functionalism that sees society as consisting of functionally compatible parts, each of which constitutes an objective reality. Thus, Mitrany established the primary epistemological proposition of functionalism that "form should follow function" (in Groom and Taylor, 1975:1). This means that the organizations exist to perform certain functions. It is

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7 Functionalism in this sense approaches international relations on the basis of the compromise of embedded liberalism.

8 Functionalism derives most of its epistemological and ontological features from the modernization theories. For this reason, in this section only unique features of functionalism will be elaborated.
through their functions that they express themselves and operate as a part of a larger system to which they belong.

Following Parsons, as well as Durkheim, functionalism tended to view history as a process of modernization giving birth to the modern society defined in terms of the emergence of both functional compatibility and a division of labour between its parts, namely the economic, the political, and the cultural levels. It can be argued here that functionalism in this sense was integral to the modernization perspective, in that it read history off from the specific experiences of modern societies.

At the level of ontology, functionalism with its emphasis on economic and technological development begins by criticizing the realist position that an account of international relations must start with the acceptance of the primacy of nation states (Groom, 1975:94). Functionalism stressed the importance of diverse actors that form the very fabric of the world order. Thus, non-state actors were considered at least as important as state actors, if not more so. Hence, the realist representation of international relations as the inter-state rivalry was rejected; the term "world society" was preferred to international politics; and integration was encouraged by a variety of functional ties whose conditions of existence were secured primarily by non-state actors.

As a result, functionalism constructed what has come to be known as the "cobweb model" which identified international relations as a process of integration in a transnational world society (Groom and Taylor, 1975). In this process, international organizations were regarded to act as an actor, non-state in nature. As Haas has suggested, the cobweb model moved the shift of emphasis "beyond the nation state" to the non-state actors (1964). This is an important ontological proposition because it gives international organizations the ability to possess autonomy vis-a-vis nation states. Thus, contrary to the realist idea that international organizations are the extensions of nation states, or the arena in which nation states attempt to maximize their power, functionalism conceives of them as functional units of world society.

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9 For detailed account of this argument, see Groom and Taylor (1975). Indeed, functionalism operated with a very euro-centric vision of history, which made its call for transnationalism and integration a justification and rationalization of the domination of the North over South.
The empirical level at which functionalism operates is therefore the study of international organizations. It is from the study of international organizations that functionalism extrapolates the idea that integration is the pre-condition for stability in the world order and that the creation of necessary international organizations is the functional pre-requisite to the reproduction of that order as a whole. These ideas can be seen in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950 as the basis of the European Economic Community in 1957, both of which, functionalism argued, contributed to the economic integration and the restructuring of the Western European societies (Groom, 1975:105 and Haus, 1964 and 1968). They should be therefore regarded as the agents of integration.

Although functionalism begins with the rejection of the realist representation of international relations, the cobweb model it constructs for IRT, however, does not appear to be powerful enough to challenge radically the dominant position of the realist paradigm in IRT. As Vasquez has correctly observed:

"[r]eviewing the literature of the 1960s, we find a number of schools which appear to challenge the Morgenthau paradigm because they use different concepts. However, all must be considered elaborations of the initial paradigm. In effect the international relations literature on [sic] the 1960s was a set of variations on the Morgenthau paradigm (in Smith, 1990:8)."

It can be argued in this context that functionalism would not constitute an exception. The reason for this is three-fold. The first concerns epistemology. Functionalism, like realism, has rested upon the positivist epistemology, and approached its subject matter on the basis of its methodological concern over objectivity. Thus, like realism, it regarded the existing problems of the world order in a "problem-solving" fashion by ignoring historically and culturally specific natures of nation states (especially the Third World post-colonial states) as members of world society.

The second reason concerns ontology. It can be suggested that although functionalism attempted to move beyond the nation state and pointed out the importance of non-state actors, it regarded these actors as ontological givens, just as Realism viewed the state. This means that functionalism was not inclined to theorize these actors. Thus, functionalism failed to recognize that
the reproduction of the world order through these actors was in fact the reproduction of power-domination relations embedded in that order. Nor did it recognize the capitalist nature of the world order organized under the United States hegemonic leadership, even though it pointed out the importance of economic factors to international relations.

Moreover, in rejecting the realist position that gives primacy to the nation-state, functionalism did not challenge the realist conception of the state as an ontological given. That is to say, although functionalism criticized the unitary/rational understanding of the state, this did not lead it to theorize the state. Like non-state actors, the concept of the state was not taken by functionalism to be a theoretical construct. All functionalism did was to replace one ontological given with another.

As shall be seen in Chapter IV, the result was not that functionalism challenged realism, but that it was used to elaborate realism. In fact, the neorealist international regimes theory as a reconstructed form of the realist paradigm integrated into realism the functionalist ideas that:

(i) economic factors are as important as political ones for the reproduction of the world order;
(ii) international organizations constitute one of the primary units of the world order; and
(iii) the unitary/rational characteristic of the state cannot be taken for granted (Keohane, 1984 and Krasner, 1982).

The third reason why functionalism was not powerful enough to challenge Realism concerns the question of development. Because functionalism failed to see the capitalist nature of the world order, it also failed to recognize the specific problems of the newly politically independent but economically dependent post-colonial nation states of the Third World. The recognition of this means seeing the asymmetrical relations in the world order which poses crucial questions about the validity of the concepts of transnationalism and integration. It also necessitates a theorization of international organizations rather than considering them to be ontological given actors.

What functionalism did was instead to see the world from the eyes of modern societies, to reduce IRT to the account of the specific experiences of these societies, and to provide a discourse of modernization without dealing with Third World societies.
B) THE MODERNIZATION PERSPECTIVE: When the study of non-Western societies became what Higgit called the "cutting edge" of post-World War II social and political theory as a result of a shift in interest from the national to the global society, positivism can be said to have begun to contribute to the shaping of our understanding of these societies (Higgit, 1983:10). This is particularly so, given the problem-solving character of studies which sought explanations for the difficulties that non-Western societies faced in the process of development (or of progress). However, as Higgit notes:

"disillusionment with the performance of the Third World (in more than one sense) has steadily increased since the period of heady optimism which abounded in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The expectations of the problem-solving social scientist that it was possible to plan for prosperity in the Third World, and that most of the problems were primarily technical in nature, was to be short-lived as problems not only endured, but in many cases increased, throughout the first United Nations Development Decade of the 1960s (1983:11)."

The idea that the problems that non-Western societies had faced were "technical" was the natural result of the tendency towards locating the problem-solving explanations at the level of descriptions rather than of "causes". As noted, the compromise of embedded liberalism was imposed on these societies as a solution to their economic problems, yet such imposition did not take into account the fact that colonialism was the characteristic feature of their histories. 10

The heady optimism, which has given rise to the emergence of a "sociology of development", in this sense, meant that development, progress, change in non-Western societies was highly likely due to the process of change towards those types of social, economic and political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth and then have spread to other European countries and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the South American, Asian and African continents (Eisenstadt, 1966:1). Given this history, it seemed reasonable to expect a profusion of rationalization, secularization, modernization and democratization within the formation of international relations under the hegemonic leadership of the U.S. Underlying

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10 This approach to the Third World was consistent with the United States's foreign economic policy whose objective was to establish a world economy open to goods and capital exporting
this expectation was the presupposition that international relations are nothing but the expansion of Western modernity throughout the world.

As a result, although the scope of social theory moved beyond the examination of national society in order to comprehend the cultural parameters and rationales of interactions and institutional patterning, and to analyze the epistemic and ontological status of the formation of international relations, the national society - or, to put it precisely, the Western society - as an ideal type remained as the primary point of reference in the modernization perspective (Robertson, 1982:6-7). In other words, the modernization school relied heavily on the sociological discourse of modern society articulated by Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tonnies and Talcott Parsons, and has operated with the models of traditional and modern forms of society and polity (La Palombra, 1963; Pye, 1963; Almond and Verba, 1963; Almond and Powell, 1966).

Thus, the modernization perspective established a "dichotomous" approach in which theoretical expositions have been derived directly from "comparisons of ideal-typical variables of tradition and modernity" (Higgott, 1983:16). It was thus maintained that the study of international relations should be organized around such a problem-solving socio-political understanding dealing with:

(i) "social development" to contribute to foster productivity of goods and services;
(ii) "political development", which brings about stable governmental and administrative structures as well as popular participation in the formulation of the activities initiated by the government;
(iii) "secularization", which leads to the absolute autonomy vis-a-vis traditional obligations such as religious groups and extended kin;
(iv) "rationality" in public decision-making as well as private pursuit of individual goals; and
(v) "individualism", which gives rise to the emergence of the purposive-rational action in the pursuit of individual goals and interactions (Varma, 1981:13-18).

The underlying discourse of this socio-political understanding was, as Turner correctly points out, the Weberian vision that the traditional society lacks a "civil society" as the basic indicator of
modernity (1985:11-13). Thus, the modern ideal type (the Western society) was referred to as a society whose inner essence contains in itself a dynamic process towards democratic industrial civilization due to its highly rationally structured civil society. And respectively, the traditional society was considered either timelessly stagnant or declining from its inception because of the absence of civil society within it, and defined with reference to a cluster of absences—the missing middle class, the missing city, the absence of political rights, the absence of bourgeois democratic revolutions. This cluster of absences, consequently served to account for why traditional societies fail to engender modern collective conscience, to generate modern personalities, or to convert themselves into a radical culture which defines civil-societal relationships.

For this reason it was essential for the modernization school to focus on such issue areas as social and political development, secularization, rationalization and individualism, and to study non-Western societies by relying on values, attitudes and social motives as "internal" features of societies (or of the sociological typologies as ideal-types). Development of civil society, or solutions to the problems the Third World societies faced was, thus, alleged to have been dependent upon the ability of those societies to integrate in their own social relations the Western social and political institutions whose analytical model was drawn by Parsons in his pattern-variables. International relations, in this respect, meant a study as to how to conceptualize the expansion of Western modernity throughout the international system.

This was, in fact, a theoretical effort to equate the study of international relations with that of progress defined as the development of the Western civil society in Third World.\footnote{This was also necessary in terms of the East-West conflict, because the development of civil society based on characteristics specific to the West was considered a way of preventing a possibility of losing these societies to the East.} International relations alluded to the process of progress which takes the form of a gradual evolutionary unfolding of some inner essence (rationality) and the maturation of that essence (modernity). The outcome of progress meant, therefore, the achievement of a stationary end-state which is a "faithful replica of the liberal democracies of Western capitalism" (Turner, 1985:19). For Rostow, this was a development
through a series of necessary stages: primitive, pre-modern, modern, post-industrial, which lead to an "end-state society" (1964:285-306).

The methodological implication of this teleological essentialism is that the process of knowledge production is grounded in the specific historical experiences of a few dominant societies that have constituted the concept of modern. Those specific experiences are used as necessary facts with which the universal laws of progress are developed. With respect to epistemology, this means that the modernization school operates via positivism, which marks its tendency to establish an ontological invariance between time and space. As a consequence it produces an ahistorical understanding of international relations.\textsuperscript{12} It is through the process of ahistorization that the modernization perspective established the universal laws of history, that is, the construction of ideal-types. In other words, in determining whether the already chosen so-called necessary facts exist within non-Western societies, such a "systematic observational technique" (which is one of the main constitutive elements of positivism) was employed, and international relations was studied on the basis of dichotomous typologies. Hence, the scientific discourse of the typological understanding of historical development, which was alleged to be value-free due to its observational technique and scientific selection of necessary facts without any practical intention of the epistemic subject, has been brought about to analyze the functioning of the world order.

Here there appear however at least two problems. The first arises from the epistemological position the modernization school employs. Operating (within the realm of positivism) with the assumption that society is a pre-given entity, that this e. \textsuperscript{12} is a functional totality, consisting of functionally interdependent parts, and that this functional totality is expressive in the sense that it contains in itself an internal unfolding essence (rationality), the modernization perspective fails to recognize characteristics that are external to societies, but nevertheless, once internalized, effect the constitution of societal relations in those societies.

\textsuperscript{12} Interestingly enough, this ahistorical understanding and the proposal developed from it for the modernization of the Third World societies was historically coincided with the United States foreign economic policy objectives. For detail, see Caffrey, 1990; So, 1990 and Higgott, 1983).
The modernization perspective’s neglect of external factors manifests itself in its failure to take into account the important dimensions of the politico-economic changes in international relations in the post-war era, namely the transnationalization of capital, the concomitant emergence of international organizations, and the operation of multinational corporations. These dimensions mark not only the complex structure of international relations but also the globalization of the capitalist mode of production (Cardoso, 1979:53-72). Moreover, once these dimensions and their effects on the Third World are studied, then it becomes difficult to take "political independence" for granted. For the meaning of independence remains at the level of appearances where non-Western nation states enter into "lived" relations in which they are represented as a part of a "legal" international system.

Basing its arguments on this level, the modernization perspective tends to disregard the process of decolonization as an expression of transnationalization of capital. Such a tendency (and a failure), however, is inevitable in so far as the conception of the economic in discourse of modernity is based on the Weberian account of capitalism as an institutional space in which a rational drive towards private investment (which occurs simultaneously with the emergence of rationally structured economic organizations) is the primary point of reference, rather than on the relations of production.

The failure of the modernization perspective to acknowledge the process of transnationalization of capital stems also from its tendency not to regard the state as a theoretical object of study. As Valenzuela and Valenzuela have correctly pointed out, although the nation state in the modernization perspective constitutes the primary historical category for modernization, just as in realism, the state is considered an atomistic ontological given without any reference to its relation to the capitalist mode of production in general, or to the process of colonization in particular (1979:36-38).

The second problem, in this respect, concerns the concept of the state, that is, its untheorized nature in the modernization perspective. As noted, the modernization perspective regards the state

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13 The notion of "a lived relation with reality" was first used by Althusser (1970) to explain the way ideologies function. For a detailed account, see Chapter II.
as an ontological given by dissolving it both into a society as an organic totality (that is, the state is an expression of collective moral conscience) and into a "sub-system" (that is, the equation of the state with the political system). Thus, the state is conceived of as representative of the political society, and therefore is associated with the concept of "sovereignty". It is maintained, thus, that if non-Western societies were to reach modernity, their political institutions ought to be reorganized on the basis of the political structures of modern societies. After all, for the modernization school, "the model of modern can only be derived from the most careful empirical and formal analysis of western politics" (Almond and Powell, 1966:14-15).

With respect to the restoration and reorganization of political institutions, Huntington noted, the modernization process must go through with the institutionalization of the variables of "the rationalization of authority, "the differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialized structures to perform those functions" and "political participation" (1968:54-68). It is through the institutionalization of these variables, it was argued, that such a rational basis on which the decision-making process is carried out by different corresponded units can be established. Non-Western societies thus become compatible with the rhythm of social change (modernity). This is of course an identification of the state with state bureaucracy and its reduction to an institutional space in which the process of decision-making takes place. It has little to say about the existing power-domination relations that arise from the contending social forces of capitalist mode of production. As Alavi put it:

it is rather striking to see how little thought is given to an examination of the nature of the state, its location in capitalist mode of production, and its relationship with existing social classes" (1982:289).

Hence, the state is regarded as a representative of the political society identical with "government" whose activities are to implement the objectives and programs of modernization. In this context, it can be asserted that this conception of the state derives from what can be called a "public policy problematic" of the state in which a crucial importance is attached to the role of "governing elite" in the course of societal development. For the modernization school, governing elites in
non-Western societies after their emancipation from colonial ties are *modernizing elites* acting to implement Western political technology and rationality, and standing above society.

Implied here is an a priori presumption that political society is potentially autonomous vis-a-vis the civil society (that is, it is detached from society) and operates on society in order to institutionalize a rationality of roles and behavioural patterns of society. For the modernization school, the state is not an historical product of historically constructed social relationships, but an institution which is sovereign and functions as an independent nation state. However, reducing the state to government presents several difficulties.

As for IRT, it tends to confuse international relations with the "foreign policy" behaviours of nation states. The identification of international relations with foreign policy, which is made by the modernization school because it applies the rational bureaucratic model, is misleading because it lacks attention to the structural imperatives of the world order, namely the process of transnationalization of capital accumulation and the corresponding relations of production in non-Western societies. By regarding society as an horizontally organized entity (that is, society consists of functionally interdependent roles and behavioural patterns), the rational bureaucratic model fails to see the vertical organization of society (that is, social relations of production and societal relations out of which arise unequal power-domination relations that are materialized within the realm of the state). It fails precisely because it suffers from ignoring both the importance of the economic and the political and their reciprocal relationships in non-Western societies on the one hand, and the impact of external factors (such as decolonization) on those societies on the other.

Analyzing international relations on the basis of the vertical organization of society and by looking at the ramifications of politico-economic changes in the world order on non-Western societies is a necessary condition to theorize adequately international relations. This is required first to question the meaning of "political independence" attached by the modernization perspective to the nation state in the Third World, second to pose the question as to whether or not it is possible to develop under the system of decolonization, and third to think of the state as a theoretical construct.
rather than an ontological given. From a response to these questions has emerged the "discourse of dependency" and its sociology of underdevelopment.

SOCIOLOGY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCY

Contrary to the idea that the establishment of Western capitalism as a rational organization engenders modernity in traditional non-Western societies, the sociology of underdevelopment gives priority to the view that the economic and political backwardness prevailing throughout today's so-called independent Third World nation states did not originate in their original social structures. Instead they were the natural product of the "same world-historical process" which made the development of modern-metropolitan countries dependent upon the "underdevelopment" of traditional (not independent Third World societies but) satellites (Frank, 1969, 1972, 1978, and Amin, 1980).

This view implies that just as the modernization perspective deals with the question of development from the viewpoint of the United States and the historical experiences of the Western countries, the sociology of underdevelopment examines development from the Third World perspective. In this sense, it constitutes "the voices from the periphery" whose aim is to challenge the intellectual hegemony of the modernization perspective in development studies (So, 1990:91).

In its challenge, the sociology of underdevelopment operates with its primary concept, that of dependency. It refers to a relationship between the North and the South and which represents an "asymmetry" (Kubalkova and Cruickshank, 1981:112). It is an asymmetrical relationship which defines both the dominance of the advanced industrial nations in the world order and the constraints operative in consequence on the internal developments of the Third World societies. Hence, dependency constitutes a "conditioning context" as the basic reason beyond the backward structure of these societies.

It is conditioning, it was argued, due to the fact that "the satellites have been subject to the logic of capital accumulation in the centres that have dominated them" since the establishment of the
world capitalist system (Amin, 1980:133). It is this on-going process of "domination", which has been derived from the metropolitan appropriation of economic surplus from satellites, that has caused the process of development of underdevelopment in those societies. A consequence has been the reproduction of underdevelopment in the Third World that has become capitalist in the course of colonial and decolonial capitalist penetration throughout the world order. As for international relations, this means that they have been capitalist in nature since the implementation of colonial practices by today's modern societies, and have been organized around the "monopolistic unequal exchange relations" between centre and satellite.

This approach asserted that "any part of the world which is affected in any fundamental way by capitalism (i.e., by monopolistic-unequal exchange) is to be regarded as capitalist" (Brewer, 1982:160). In formulating a "morphology" for underdevelopment, Baran notes that because of unequal exchange relations, capitalism in metropolitan countries is capable of producing for itself an internal market by destroying pre-capitalist elements (that is, by transforming commodities into exchange values, and thereby separating labourer from land and the means of production). In satellites as territories of Western penetration capitalism operates in contrast on the basis of commercial agriculture. It functions as "an appendage" of Western capitalism (1982:197-98).

There occur three types of distortion, argues Amin, as a result of the asymmetrical establishment of capitalism in satellites. The first has to do with the distortion of export activities, which soak up the capital transferred from the centre. The second concerns "the tertiary activities in peripheral capitalism" which stem from both unequal exchange (transfer of economic surplus to the centre) and internal contradictions that arise in satellites out of their colonial past. The third is related to the distortion in the selection of industrial activities, which results in organizing industrial production around light branches (1982:205-208). Amin proceeds to assert that

this threefold distortion reflects the asymmetrical way in which the periphery is integrated in the world market. It means, in economistic terms, the transfer from the periphery to the centre of the multiplier mechanisms, which cause accumulation at the centre to be a cumulative process. From this transfer results the conspicuous disarticulation of the underdeveloped economy, the dualism of this economy, and, in the end, the blocking of the economy's growth (ibid.).
Hence, not development but development of underdevelopment characterizes satellites (or otherwise called "peripheral societies") and explains how and under what conditions the problems of non-Western societies come into existence.

Thus, the concept of dependency explicates development and underdevelopment as aspects of the same phenomenon (international capitalist division of labour). Those aspects are historically simultaneous, functionally linked, and thus interacting and condition each other reciprocally (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1979:44-45). The relation of interdependency between two or more economies, and between these and world commerce, assumes the form of dependency when some countries (the dominant ones) are able to expand and self-propel themselves, while the other countries (the dependent ones) can only do so as a result of that expansion, which can act positively or negatively on its immediate development. Either way, the basic question of dependency leads to a general situation in the dependent countries whereby they are placed in a backward position in relation to, and under the exploitation of, the dominant countries (Dos Santos, 1970:45).

This definition of dependency together with the conception of capitalism as world-conquering mode of production led to the emergence of the sociology of underdevelopment as a paradigmatic approach to international relations. The sociology of underdevelopment proposed a study of international relations exclusively on the basis of the "asymmetrical dependency relations'rips" between Western capitalism and peripheral societies. In other words, a focus was shifted to "unequal exchange relations" to discover the very existence of domination relations in the global system. In doing so, crucial importance was attached to the way in which peripheral societies integrated into international division of labour characterized by the term, "decolonization". Thus, the unit of analysis was "external" relationships which were conceptualized from the point of view of peripheral societies, rather than of advanced (modern) capitalist societies.

In this conceptualization, the concept of unequal exchange (as an expression of dependency) was employed also to explain the power basis of the world order. For "exchange" was considered to have give rise to the power/domination relations. For the sociology of underdevelopment exchange was
a power relationship. Hirsh describes the power basis of exchange in the sociology of development by stating that

in dependency theories, power comes from a variety of sources: size, wealth, and concentration of skills or technology. It is assumed that actors can utilize their power to create exchange structures that benefit them to the greatest extent. Thus, the differences in the size and resource strength of actors affect the relative freedom of the market. In the economic theory, the workings of the marketplace will "naturally" limit the occurrence of monopolies and oligopolies, thus minimizing the potential for the use of power in the market. In political economic theory, actors will try to regulate the market to limit and minimize this "natural" occurrence. Regulation comes in the form of politically originated laws and rules dealing with exchange (patents, trade and capital flows, contract law, etc.). These rules and laws may not affect all actors equally. A basic hypothesis of dependency theories is that the more powerful benefit more from these rules and regulations than do the less powerful (1986:103-104).

This means, in the power-producing quality of exchange, international division of labour as a unit of analysis for the study of international relations involves a free entry only to the raw materials and resources of peripheral societies, rather than an equal entry to the circulation of resources within the world order. This one-sided entry indicates, asserts dependency, the power basis of exchange relations, and thus an uneven development which dictates the dominant position of advanced capitalist societies over the Third World.

As for IRT, although the sociology of underdevelopment provides useful insights with its insistence on the importance of external factors (decolonization process and institutionalization of international division of labour via an unequal exchange) and the power-producing characteristic of exchange relations, it however presents a number of theoretical deficiencies. Much has been said about the weaknesses from which it has suffered and which require a fundamental modification of the notion of dependency. It was argued by many that the notion of dependency, like the category of modern, is too broad so that it fails to recognize the specific historical features that a dependent society acquires with respect to its own particular societal organization. Thus, by assuming such an homogeneity in the Third World, the sociology of underdevelopment, like the sociology of development, tends to fetishize the development and underdevelopment dichotomy, and to subordinate historical reality to an analytical typology (Higgott,1983:45-74 and Randall and Theobald,
it can also be argued that the notion of dependency, due to its theoretical origin, exchange relations, fails to see the importance of the relations of production, and thus cannot provide an adequate alternative to the neo-classical understanding of the economy which defines the way in which the economic is viewed in the discourse of modernity (Brenner, 1982: 54-72; Taylor, 1979:71-101; Brewer, 1982:177-180; Bernstein, 1979:97-104). Central to this argument is the idea that the sociology of underdevelopment, because it bases its mode of explanation exclusively on exchange, suffers from having a rigorous definition of capitalism as a mode of production based on production and extraction of surplus value which dictates the primacy of production relations, and thus of production over distribution.

As for IRT, this point is of crucial importance for several reasons. The first lies at the level of epistemology. That is, although the notion of dependency attempts to abandon the discourse of modernization, it cannot completely break with positivism, since it focuses its attention on appearances (for this matter, exchange relations). In other words, it employs a methodology based on a selection of necessary fact via a technique of observation to justify its basic assertion that capitalist expansion creates underdevelopment and that it is impossible for peripheral societies to engender capitalist relations.

Two significant problems, both of which arise from this epistemological position. First, as Cardoso and Faletto pointed out, an analysis of development that is alleged to be historical turns out to be a-historical and circular, because peripheral societies are presented as having "static" societal features. No matter what happens, the perpetuation and reproduction of underdevelopment remain as a basic characteristic of those societies. At the level of epistemology, this ahistorization manifests itself in the fact that peripheral societies become detached from historical reality, and are constituted as a "sociological typology" just as is the category of modern in the modernization perspective (1982:112-128). Second, due to this typological understanding of history, the notion of dependency loses its "practical" quality, which is, it is not capable of providing an alternative strategic solution to
the problems of peripheral societies. It does not pay enough attention to the question of agency (collective actors, class and non-class identities); how they are historically constructed, what are their relations to the state, what kind of ideologies they articulate in their political discourses, their organization, and mobilization capabilities. These questions were not seriously dealt with in the sociology of underdevelopment.

This brings us to the second reason why it is crucial to have an adequate conception of capitalism in study of international relations. As Laclau correctly argued in his critique of Frank, the sociology of development, by identifying capitalism not as a mode of production, but as commodity production for exchange, tends to confuse the capitalist mode of production with integration into international division of labour (1971:19-38). Thus, the analysis of international relations is made at the level of world capitalism and national economies and national social formations are seen as an epiphenomenal forms of international division of labour. In other words, a peripheral society, for the sociology of underdevelopment, is a mere reflection of the place within the realm of world capitalism at which it is located.

However, this analysis of international relations has a little to say about the internal characteristics of peripheral societies, or to put it precisely, about the consequences of decolonization in those societies, except the underdevelopment of economy. In the work of dependency theorists, it is therefore evident that no specificity is given to political forces and ideological forms. As a result, both are regarded as instruments of the process of underdevelopment, and bring about the economic reductionist nature of dependency.

On the other hand, the role of the state is reduced to the point where it is argued that

the colonial class structure establishes very well defined interests for the dominant sector of the lumpen bourgeoisie. Using government cabinets and other instruments of the state, the bourgeoisie produces a policy of underdevelopment in the economic, social and political life of the 'nation' and the people of Latin America (Frank, 1972:13).

Thus, contrary to the modernizationist view that the state as a representative of political sub-system is a "neutral force" capable of taking initiatives to stimulate the process of modernization, the idea of
the "instrumentality of the state" is put forward, meaning that the state as an epiphenomenon of the economic level is an instrument of the ruling class, or an institution acting at the behest of the lumpenbourgeoisie. Moreover, since the practices of this class are determined by the metropolitan centres, not only does the state fulfill specific functions according to the interests of the ruling class, but it also represents the interests of metropolitan centres.

And finally, and more importantly, this instrumental conception of the state in the sociology of underdevelopment has not been derived from the thorough and detailed analysis of the state "in itself", but rather emerges from the discussion of possible consequences of unequal exchange relations in peripheral societies, although the course of politico-economic development of non-Western societies, as we shall see, indicated the phenomenon of the fortification of state power in terms of state-economy, state-political regime, and state-civil society reciprocal relationships.

By means of conclusion, the sociology of underdevelopment can be said to have proved to be unsatisfactory to comprehend the post-world war II world order, and needed a fundamental modification in order to be able to provide an adequate account of an historically constructed unity of external and internal categories that define the politico-economic ramifications of decolonization within peripheral societies. The shift toward a rigorous analysis of this unity, since the early 1970s, has been the focal point of the theoretical efforts which have undertaken the task of modifying the notion of dependency, and thus of rendering the dependency-based study of international relations comprehensive enough to analyse the subject matter in an historical way. It is to the theoretical validity of the modification of the notion of dependency to which Chapter VI will return.

CONCLUSION: THE ONE DIMENSIONAL REPRESENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

As we have seen, despite the differences between them, the paradigmatic positions under examination in this chapter displayed a commonality, that is, the representation of international
relations in the post-world war II world order on the basis of only one aspect of the
political-economic changes. Moreover, in this representation, that aspect was considered to provide
an objective reality on which IRT is grounded. Thus, a causal relationship between that aspect and
the formation of international relations was established. This also meant the dominance of positivism
in IRT in that the principles of objectivity, the subject-object distinction, and the truth as
correspondence constituted the epistemological basis for these paradigmatic positions. As noted, the
sociology of underdevelopment, although it attempted to break with the positivist vision of
international relations, has failed to do so.

Relying exclusively on the conflict between the East and the West, realism asserted that the
system is nothing but one in which the "security dilemma" as an expression of the inter-state rivalry
is pre-dominant. In doing so, realism argued for the need to separate international politics both from
domestic affairs and from international political economy, which meant the exclusion of economic,
ideological, and class (as well as the non-class) relations from IRT.

In the case of the sociology of development, the primary concern was modernization, which
was accounted for either in terms of characteristics internal to societies or with reference to functional
interdependence and integration that necessitates the active role of the non-state actors in
international relations. In the case of the sociology of underdevelopment, attention has been paid to
the unequal exchange relations between the North and the South. In doing so, the focus has been
exclusively on characteristics external to societies. As a result, the internal features of societies has
been ignored.

The obvious result of this one-dimensionality has been the increased gap between theory and
reality, one which dictated the subordination of historically constructed reality to the theoretical
models. In this sense, the tendency towards ahistorization of history was revealed as the principal
feature of the post-world war II study of international relations. Thus, what was provided was one
dimensiona,l partial, and more importantly, a very static account of the subject matter.

For realism, the inter-state system after the world-war II was not unique and acquires no
specificity in so far as it was organized once again around conflictual values which force nation states to maximize their power capabilities to guarantee their own survival. For the sociology of development, the teleological understanding of modernization was once again used to conceptualize history. For the sociology of underdevelopment, perpetual underdevelopment, as a product of the international division of labour, was once again reproduced in the post-world war II world order. Hence, the portrait of the world drawn was not "new". In a sense it was based on the "reproduction" of an old painting with new characters.

What was forgotten were, therefore, the concepts of "specificity" and "historicity". As noted, the course of international relations throughout the post-war era displayed both a dynamic structure and historically specific characteristics with which these approaches were not compatible. These characteristics are as follows:

(i) With respect to the Third World, the course of politico-economic history revealed the fact that it would be definitely mistaken to characterize the Third World as an "homogeneous" totality. In other words, there is no such thing as a "typical Third World society". Presenting it by according an homogeneity to it, as it is the case in both the sociology of development and the sociology of underdevelopment literatures, does nothing but ignore the diversity within it which results from the specific historical and societal experiences of societies. Once the study of the Third World is made by claiming that it is a homogeneous entity, the result would inevitably be to fetishize the models applied to it, to abstract it from history, and to ignore the contradictions that occur within and among nation states that take place within it.

The fetishization of the models, namely modernization and dependency, manifests itself in these models' incapacity to account for the dynamic political, economic, and social developments. At the political level, unlike the modernizationist optimism, most of the Third world societies displayed increased authoritarianism and frequent military interventions rather than democratization. At the economic level, unlike the underdevelopment thesis, there occurred a capitalist development whose conditions of existence was based upon what was called the "associated-dependent capitalist
development". As shall be pointed out in Chapter V, these two phenomena were circumscribed by the resistance of social groups inside and outside of the production process against state power, which indicated that the state is no longer capable of integrating into the dominant politico-economic discourse those groups which had once been integrated (the period between the Great Depression and the early post-war years).

Thus, it became more and more difficult to hold that capitalist development (modernization) leads to democratization of political and social spheres. On the other hand, given the level of capitalist development and the process of fortification of state power through military interventions, it became more and more necessary to take account of the state as an object of inquiry rather than as a representative of political system or as a mere epiphenomenal form of economic underdevelopment. The question of what sort of field of action the state (namely the post-colonial or the dependent or the bureaucratic-authoritarian state) furnishes in the process of capitalist development became the necessary pre-condition for the study of global relations. Hence, a crucial importance was attached to state/economy and state/society relations by focusing on the role and functions of the state.

(ii) With respect to the production and reproduction of the formation of international relations, it is evident that not only the politico-economic changes with which this chapter was concerned, but also the crisis-ridden tendency of capitalism has signified the dynamic character of the system in the post-World War II era. To say, there is a consensus among those, who have attempted to analyze global relations from different problematics, that world capitalism has been in crisis since the early 1970s, that the US-hegemony has been declining, and that the crisis has had its political, economic and social ramifications. Such crisis has created a situation in which it has become difficult to reproduce the compromise of embedded liberalism. This situation has been called "after hegemony" (Keohane, 1984) or "the lack of hegemonic leadership" (Gilpin, 1987) or "the crisis of global Fordism" (Lipietz,
1987) or "the crisis of late capitalism" (Mandel, 1975). In other words, since the world-wide recession of 1974-1975, the world order has been one in which the key organizational characteristic has been what has come to be known as the "restructuring of economy at the world scale under the lack of hegemonic leadership".

At the level of leadership, "after hegemony" meant the decline of the US economic leadership and the need to call for the pluralist cooperation and management of global political-economic affairs (Keohane, 1984). In this context, Gilpin correctly pointed out that this decline led the United States to use the system for its own political and ideological interests, which, in turn, served to perpetuate the crisis situation:

The hegemonic leader, however, must be willing to subordinate its short-term economic interests to its longer-term interests and to the larger good of the international economy. The United States tended to do this primarily for political and security reasons during much of the Bretton Woods era. Beginning in the late 1960s, however, the United States began to use the system increasingly for its own narrowly defined purposes. Many of the troubles of the world economy in the 1980s have been caused by this shift in American policy (Gilpin, 1987:365).

This meant that the United States, while becoming a declining hegemon, attempted to maintain its military and political hegemony by exploiting its position. In Weberian language, this was "the end of rational leadership" in the formation of global relations.

At the economic level, the phenomenon of internationalization of domestic production through the world-wide operation of international capital borne by multinational corporations, which was oriented around the export-led industrialization policy and capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive labour processes, has been the necessary point of reference in discussions centred around the question of how to restructure economic affairs in order to accelerate the capital accumulation process. This also implied the crisis of Keynesian mass consumption based and Welfare oriented economic policies (otherwise called the crisis of Fordism), and of the Welfare state in advanced capitalist societies.

Given this situation, there occurred three important phenomena:

(a) that international regimes - trade, monetary, finance - have become more independent, which,
without question, dictated the increased importance of international organizations as non-state actors; (b) that the diversity among so-called Third World societies in terms of the level of economic development, from which there emerged the label of the Fourth World or the newly industrialized countries (NICs) attached to, for example, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore. This also called for the need to construct a non-stagnationist and dynamic conception of dependency as a form of capitalist development (see Chapter V); and (c) that there appeared what can be called the "multiplicity of identities" which manifested themselves in the "new social movements" (notably, the feminist, the ecologist, and the peace movements) which, by questioning the modernist construction of the human-nature relationship, created a potential for accounting for the emergence of anti-statist discourses and resistance movements both in "core" and "peripheral" national societies (see Chapter VII).

The crucial point in these developments was that it became more and more difficult to analyze thoroughly the dynamics of capitalist development and capitalist expansion without having an adequate conception of capitalism and state power. On the other hand, these developments necessitated a focus on the reciprocal relationship between the internal structures of national societies and the dynamic structure of the world order (the external factors). It has become more and more imperative to examine the mode of articulation of the state, civil society, and international relations in a historical and comprehensive manner.

It is on the basis of this brief exposition of the politico-economic changes that it would be reasonable to argue that neither the sociology of development with its identification of capitalism with Western rationality nor the sociology of underdevelopment with its ill-defined conception of capitalism nor realism with its absolute ignorance of capitalism were capable of accounting for the dynamic structure of international relations. Hence, the gap between the paradigmatic positions and their subject matter increased due to these positions' lack of explanatory power.

Since the mid-1970s a number of theoretical attempts have been initiated to reduce this gap by reconstructing these paradigmatic positions, which, as shall be seen, have given rise to the world
system theory and the structuralist realism. Whether or not this reconstruction has been successful, however, is disputable. In what follows, the primary concern will be with these reconstructive attempts and their strong and weak points.
CHAPTER IV

THE OUTSIDE-IN MODEL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY:
THE WORLD-SYSTEM, STRUCTURAL REALISM, AND INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

As noted in Chapter III, the 1970s have witnessed the crisis of the compromise of embedded liberalism and the decline of the United States' hegemonic position in the world order. As a result, the questions of international governance and the reproduction of the world order as a whole have once again become crucial. Moreover, as it was argued in Chapter III, the paradigmatic positions, because of their one-dimensional quality, were not able to provide satisfactory solutions to these questions. As for IRT, what was more important was the inability of realism as the dominant paradigm to explain theoretically and adequately the question of international governance without a strong hegemonic state. Such inability, consequently, resulted in the crisis of realism, which, in turn, has given rise to the paradigm crisis in (or the beginning of the transformation of) IRT (Keyman, 1990a:7).

This chapter argues that it is around these questions and the subsequent crisis of realism that the study of international relations was re-organized in the 1970s and the early 1980s. The basic characteristics of this re-organization were the reconstruction of realism and the emergence of new paradigmatic positions in the domain of IRT. ¹ The reconstruction of realism was initiated first by Kenneth Waltz (1979). His initiative formed what has come to be known as "structural realism". Then, Waltz's structural realism has become subject to reconstruction, which has formed what Krasner (1982) has termed modified-structural realism.² Of the newly emerging contending positions, one which has drawn the most attention and which was considered to be a serious alternative to realism

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¹ As was pointed out in Chapter I, this organization of IRT was labelled the emergence of the inter-paradigm debate (Banks, 1984). However, it has also been pointed out that this characterization was not adequate in so far as it was not able to provide a comprehensive account of the transformation of IRT.

² These two positions together were identified as "neorealism" in IRT (Ashley, 1984). For the critique of this label, see Gilpin (1984).
was that of the world system theory.³

It would not be mistaken to suggest, therefore, that the beginning of the transformation of IRT in the late 1970s has, to a large extent, been determined by these paradigmatic positions. They have set the basic parameters for the study of international relations. They have provided a general framework for the analysis of the conceptual categories such as security, development, and stability. And they were the primary points of reference in the discussions about how to theorize international relations. The objective of this chapter is to assess critically these positions in terms of both their mode of theorization of international relations and their accounts of international governance and the reproduction of the world order.

In the course of its critical assessment, the chapter will make the general argument that despite their differences, these approaches show a number of important commonalities among them. The first concerns the way these positions have attempted to theorize international relations. In this respect, it can be argued that what can be called the "outside-in" model would define their approach to international relations.⁴ The outside-in model means a model founded on the concept of totality, whether organic (expressive) or structural, in which the unfolding principle is the primacy of structure. The outside-in model involves:

(i) taking the international system as the basic unit of analysis and providing a holistic account of international relations;

(ii) attributing, therefore, to the international system an ontological status in order to account for the constraints and limitations imposed by the system on national social formations;

(iii) representing reality by establishing a causal link between the concept of totality (the existing international system) and its parts, which entails seeking a determining essence to theorize international relations;


⁴ The term, "outside-in model" has been borrowed from Yalem (1982). Yalem uses the term to describe Waltz's structural realism only in terms of the category of the unit of analysis. Here it includes also a reference to history, civil society, and the conception of the economic.
(iv) explaining the internal features of those formations with direct reference to the international system;

(iv) as a result, dealing with the question of history within the context of the functioning and reproduction of the international system.

The second commonality concerns the mode of operation of these positions. In this respect, it can be argued that as a result of their basic unit of analysis - the international system - they all operate without paying attention to the state/civil society complex and with a certain understanding of history based on the questions of stability, reproduction, and recurrences. That is, they all affirm an understanding of history with structures.

This however does not mean that they employ a structuralist epistemological position.\(^5\) It is positivism that defines their mode of production of knowledge about international relations. This constitutes the third commonality among them. In this respect, it can be argued that structural realism and its modified version attempt to construct a positivist, problem-solving IRT and that, although it is associated with the marxist discourse, the world system theory fails to break with positivism, and more importantly, it contains in itself a number of positivist elements.

As for IRT, these three commonalities, as this chapter will demonstrate, indicate that in the beginning of the transformation of IRT, positivism was still the dominant epistemological position. It has determined the formation of international relations theory and the outside-in model was the very illustrative example of such determination. As will be pointed out in the concluding section, it is only with the emergence of theoretical responses to these paradigmatic positions that positivism has been challenged and structuralist, post-structuralist, and critical theoretical epistemological positions have been introduced into the domain of IRT.\(^6\) And it is only with that introduction that the multi-

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\(^5\) In Chapter II it was pointed out that the structuralist position regards history as a process with structures. However, structuralism differs from the outside-in model in that it constructs its conception of history by focusing on the question of subject.

\(^6\) This also means that the idea that the inter-paradigm debate has given rise to the post-positivist IRT is by no means accurate. For a detailed version of this critique, see Keyman (1990a).
paradigmatic and post-positivist structure of IRT has been actually constructed.

THE WORLD-SYSTEM THEORY AND THE CONCEPT OF TOTALITY

Designed both as a critique of modernization and as a modification (reconstruction) of dependency, "world-system theory" aims to construct a new theoretical paradigm for the study of international relations. It undertakes the task of accounting for a certain number of structural constraints, as the structural property of the international system, under which nation-states act and interact with each other. Such structural constraints are taken by the world system theory to be the foci of the new theoretical paradigm, and are used to demonstrate how the outside-in model can be utilized to analyze international relations.

It is in this context that this section will deal with and examine critically world-system theory. In doing so, the focus will be on the way in which it has been developed in the writings of Immanuel Wallerstein. It will be argued that with its outside-in model world system theory eventually both fails to break with positivism and provides a universalist (totalizing), reductionist, and essentialist account of international relations. Hence, it does not constitute a radical and satisfactory alternative to positivist and realist IRT.

As noted, the historical context in which world system theory has come into existence was the beginning of the decline of United States hegemony, and the crisis of the compromise of embedded liberalism, especially with respect the North-South relations. In this historical context, world system

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7 This critique of world system theory is related only to its mode of theorization of international relations. It does not deal with the specific problems that the theory contains, especially with respect to its account of the development of capitalism, of the emergence of classes, and of its neglect of the functioning of political regimes. These problems have been extensively examined in the literatures of development and international political economy. Szentey (1985), So (1990), and Bremer (1977), offer a detailed critique of the world system theory.
theory has been constructed to account for the global nature of capitalist development, which also meant the reconstruction of dependency and the critique of modernization (including the functionalist concept of interdependence).

In its construction, world system theory draws on two theoretical sources, the sociology of underdevelopment and the French Annales school. The former provides a critique of modernization by pointing to the significance of the unequal exchange relationship between the North (the core countries) and the South (the peripheral countries). The French Annales historians, especially Fernand Braudel, enable world-system theory to move beyond the sociology of underdevelopment through the conception of "global history". The following three arguments put forward by Braudel, makes this move possible:

(i) one should seek to develop global (or total) history; (ii) one should seek to develop a synthesis of history and social sciences through a special emphasis placed on "la longue duree" (the long-term), which helps reveal the totality and the continuing structures of history and which therefore help move historical analysis from and beyond eventism; and

(iii) thus, this understanding of global history would make it possible to pose and analyze large scale questions. For example in world-system theory, how to analyze the growing of capitalism to global dominance. 8

It is on the basis of these two theoretical sources that Wallerstein (1976) takes as the fundamental organizing principle of his study the idea that capitalism should be considered a global mode of production. However, this is nothing new to political economy, especially as articulated in the classical Marxist theories of imperialism. A number of theoretical and empirical works - among them, Lenin's theory of imperialism, Bukharin's theory of world capitalism, and Luxemburg's theory of capitalist expansionism - unambiguously state from the outset that in the course of its development the capitalist mode of production has become a global system that functions as an organic totality

8 These points have been extrapolated from Wallerstein, 1977 and 1978. So (1990) makes the same points in his examination of the world-system.
(Brenner, 1982:61-126; Szentes, 1985:294-297). Although this understanding of capitalism appears to coincide with that of Wallerstein's, there are, however, a number of differences from which world system theory would gain its specificity vis-a-vis the classical Marxist theories of imperialism.

Of those differences, the one that constitutes a basis for world system theory to present itself as a new paradigmatic position concerns the problem of "unit of analysis". In the classical understanding of imperialism, capitalism refers to a national economy which takes the form of imperialism as it is internationalized, so that the unit of analysis is the national economy and its internationalization. Following the sociology of underdevelopment, world system theory, on the other hand, has as its starting point the world capitalist system and argues that national and regional economies cannot be understood without reference to the whole - the world capitalist economy - of which they are parts. Moreover, this understanding of capitalism, world system theory claims, helps modify the sociology of underdevelopment, since it begins not by focusing on "interactions" (or "relations"), but by examining "the totality" (the longue durée) which determines the quality of those interactions.

In this context, it can be argued that the fact that the world system has to be perceived as the primary point of reference in the study of international relations is, for world system theory, first of all, an epistemological statement, and then an historical (or ontological) one. It is epistemological in so far as it provides an outside-in model for an understanding of capitalism based on the concept of totality which has been designated to resist and abandon the actor-based models of international relations. Hopkins and Wallerstein thus propose that:

the key difference between a developmentalist perspective and a world system perspective is in the point of departure, the unit of analysis. A developmentalist perspective assumes that the unit within which social action principally occurs is a politico-cultural unit - the state, or nation, or people - and seeks to explain differences between these units, including why their economies are different. A world system perspective assumes, by contrast, that social action takes place in an entity within which there is an ongoing division of labour, and seeks to discover empirically whether such an entity is or is not unified politically or culturally, asking theoretically what are the consequences of the existence of non-existence of such an entity (1976:345).

In other words, the distinguishing feature of world system theory is the primacy accorded to the
concept of totality (an ontological entity) over the units conceptualized with reference to juridical, political, and cultural criteria.

The "totality" that Wallerstein discusses is the totality of social systems, encompassing political subsystems and various cultural practices, all of which are brought together within a well-orchestrated and developed international division of labour. The existence within this totality of a division of labour indicates that various sectors or areas are dependent upon economic exchange with others. Wallerstein argues that such economic exchange does not need a common political structure nor a common cultural formation (1979:5). It exists as an international phenomenon whose form is determined by the international division of labour. Moreover, it is empirically observable since it has been constructed through historical expressions and territorial spaces. Wallerstein hence concludes that the world system is also an ontological and historical entity.

Wallerstein suggests that the modern world system came into existence with the emergence and development of capitalism in Western Europe in the course of the sixteenth century and that since then it has been formed and re-formed as a world capitalist system. It differs from previous "mini-systems" and "world-empires" (which are defined by Wallerstein as the political unity of economy along with an extreme decentralization of administration) with its basic principle organizational characteristics - a single market without a single political system (Wallerstein, 1979:13-17). Defining capitalism as a global mode of production for sale in a market in which the basic objective is to maximize profit, Wallerstein asserts that capitalism can exist in different social formations without requiring the creation of wage-labour relations and that it thus becomes a global phenomenon on the basis of the internationalization of trade relations.

In world system theory, "circulation" rather than "production" is therefore the defining feature of capitalism, which necessarily entails an organizational basis at the international level. Herein lies the significance of the concept of international division of labour. It involves three unique geographical territories - the core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery - and functions as "a coordinating conjunction" among these territories. In doing so, the main objective is to establish an
order in the system in such a way that makes the reproduction of the system as a whole possible. Wallerstein argues in this context that since such coordination is directly related to, and is also the functional requisite of the perpetuation of the operation of "unequal exchange", the existing international division of labour determines both the productive specialization of these territories and the modes of labour control in each of them (1979:17-19).

The extent to which the operation of unequal exchange is guaranteed has therefore to do with the transfer of surplus from the peripheral territories to the core territories through "the mechanism of trade, capital flows, migration, and intervention of the strong state machineries of the core areas", all of which are initiated in a legitimized way under the coordination of the existing international division of labour (Wallerstein, 1979:20). Wallerstein thus argues that there is in the world capitalist system a necessary correspondence between economic power and political power, which makes possible the creation and reproduction of unequal exchange.

Once we get a difference in the strength of the state machineries, we get the operation of "unequal exchange", which is enforced by strong states on weak ones, by core states on peripheral areas. Thus capitalism involves not only appropriation of the surplus value by an owner from a labourer, but an appropriation of surplus of the whole world economy by core areas (1979:19).

According to Chase-Dunn, it is for this reason that nation states must be seen as part of an unequal inter-state system wherein they struggle for economic and political advantages (1982:22). However, nation states cannot transcend the organizational principles of the capitalist world-system in so far as they act in accordance with the existing international division of labour that renders them capitalist nation states, necessary parts of the organic totality. Each and every nation state that has entered the world capitalist system acts as a capitalist state even if the social formation in which it is embedded involves non-capitalist activities and discursive forms. In other words, the condition of existence of every political entity, even social and discursive entities, is always formed and re-formed by the global capitalist mode of production as either a necessary part of or marginal to the world system, as soon as the process of the integration of that entity into the existing division of labour is completed.
At the level of epistemology, it follows that actors cannot be a unit of analysis, but have to be considered the parts or components of the organic structural whole. Structures determine action since an action practiced by a part can only be properly understood by reference to the whole (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1982:7-13). This is nothing but an announcement of the dissolution of the actor - or the subject - into structures and the signifiers of order. Implied in this announcement is the idea that the structure as an organic totality signifies and specifies the role and functions of actors in such a way that would make possible the reproduction of the system as a whole, and thus of the unequal exchange relations. Hence world system theory claims to be able to elucidate both the functioning of the system and the survival of Western industrial capitalism during a prolonged period of economic and political crisis and world wars that created physical destruction in the largest part of Europe.

However, such elucidation involves a difficulty. This is the problem of explaining the concrete mechanisms of "system reproduction". The dissolution of the actor accounts for system reproduction in a general way. But it would not say much about the way in which the reproduction occurs or the question as to how, given the existence of unequal exchange between the core and the periphery, the relationship between them is stabilized.

Wallerstein is well aware of this problem and in addition to his idea that nation states maintain their conditions of existence as capitalist states as long as they remain functional parts of the world capitalist economy, he develops a new category, a new geographical territory in order to explain how such stabilization and normalization is created and secured in the functioning of the existing international division of labour. By making an analogy with the role that the middle class plays in a capitalist social formation, Wallerstein asserts that there are social formations in the world capitalist economy which can be characterized as the semi-periphery and whose basic function is to prevent political polarization between the core and the periphery (1974:403-413). They are as functional as the core and the peripheral territories, and their function is to act as "system-stabilizers". Moreover, such a function, asserts Wallerstein, is assigned to the semi-peripheral territories by the world capitalist
Wallerstein elaborates the operation of the system-stabilizing function of the semi-periphery by stating that even if it appears to be economic the reason is definitely less economic than political. That is to say, one might make a good case that the world economy would function every bit as well without a semi-periphery. But it would be far less politically stable, for it would mean a polarized world system. The existence of the third category means precisely that the upper stratum is not faced with the unified opposition of all others because the middle stratum is both exploited and exploiter. It follows that the specific economic role is not all that important, and has thus changed through the various historical stages of the modern world system (1974:405).

Now one may clearly see how the outside-in model works in world system theory. The system as an organic totality that has already differentiated its parts as the core and the periphery has also created a third part called the semi-periphery. Moreover, it has assigned the semi-periphery a specific role, as a system-stabilizer, in order to reproduce the whole. Thus, the material condition of reproduction has become secured as a result of the ability of the world system as a signifying order to form the function, the role, and the quality of its parts.

In the light of the foregoing exposition of world system theory, it has become clear that there are four fundamental assumptions with which that theory operates. These assumptions are as follows:

(i) there is a system which acts as an organic totality, consisting of parts;

(ii) parts are mere "effects" of the system, and therefore cannot be understood without reference to the system;

(iii) the relationship among parts, as well as between the system and the parts, are functional in so far as they are coordinated by an international division of labour;

(iv) it is for this reason that it is only the system which constitutes an appropriate unit of analysis. The system, in this sense, would serve as the absolute criterion for the explanation as well as the formation of the concepts that are to be used to explicate the way in which its functioning is secured.

World system theory, founded upon these assumptions, presents a number of problems, and, as a result, has been subject to serious and powerful criticism. There is no need to reproduce these criticisms here (see footnote 7). Nevertheless, four critical points have to be directed at world system
theory since they are significant to IRT.

The first point concerns the outside-in model itself, that is, the quality of the concept of world system. It can be argued in this context that the concept as a totality is reified in world system theory, which creates the problem of essentialism. The reification of the concept occurs when it becomes a reality of its own. Moreover, such reality is given the ability to constitute both concrete historical processes and the conditions of existence of everything that takes place within it. The world system characterizes itself as a capitalist system, assigns functions and roles to itself and its territorial zones, the core, the periphery, and the semi-periphery. Thus, it differentiates itself into these zones, but yet creates a division of labour among them to reproduce itself and to stabilize interactions. Hence, it imposes itself on concrete historical processes and makes them fit its definitional characteristic that it is, and has been, a world capitalist system since the sixteenth century. As a result, the world system as an organic totality becomes the privileged entry into history, and functions as "the essence" of historical development.

In this way the reification of the concept gives rise to its essentialist characteristic. Essentialism refers to a mode of analysis in which one category is elevated to privileged status, is used as a privileged entry into history, and thus becomes the principal point of reference by which social relations and their reproduction are "read off". 9 The concept of the world system functions as the principal point of reference, reads off all social relations that take place within it, explains them, define their condition of existence, and as a result constitutes the unfolding essence of the history of global capitalism.

Such essentialism, however, does not appear to world system theory to be a problem. The Spring 1990 issue of Review, which is the journal of world system theory, exemplifies this. The issue's concern is "World Systems Theory Fifteen Years On: What Have We Learned?". Andre Gunter Frank's celebratory essay, "A Theoretical Introduction to 5,000 Years of World Systems History"

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(1990), despite its valuable research agenda, argues that the problem with the concept of the world system lies in the fact that it is confined to world capitalist history. In other words, it is not its reified and totalizing quality, but its time frame that causes a problem. Therefore, what has to be done, Frank suggests, is to extend its time frame to 5,000 years, that is, to read off almost whole human history from the concept of world system. This in fact means to make it more reified, more universal, more totalizing, and more essentialist. 10

However, the problem here is that the reification of the concept would not allow a number of questions to be raised, even if these questions are of significance. When they are raised, answers to them are directly deduced from, or reduced to, the world system, which gives rise to the second problem, that of reductionism. Of these questions, the one that is crucial, as far as IRT is concerned, is that of the state in regard to the inter-state system. 11

Drawing on the realist account of international relations (Chapter III), it can be said that world system theory is reductionist because it fails to account for the realm of strategic interaction (or, of geopolitics). However, as shall be seen later, this critique, although it is valid, is also reductionist, in so far as it fails to deal with international political economy. A more adequate explanation for the problem of reductionism in world system theory can be constructed by drawing on the historical-sociological account of international relations (which will be thoroughly examined in Chapter VI). That is, world system theory fails to recognize the fact that the inter-state system constitutes a separate transnational reality, interdependent with the capitalist world economy, but not reducible to it. 12 Indeed, both the state and the inter-state system in the world system theory, as noted, are determined by the world system, since their functions are assigned to them by that system. This reductionism can

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10 It should be noted that Frank’s attempt is welcomed by Wallerstein (1990), who sees Frank’s project as one of the future directions for world system theory.

11 The same argument can be made also with reference to the concept of class, the question of historical specificity, and the accumulation of capital. In this respect, see Brewer, 1980; Brenner, 1977; and Worsley, 1982.

12 This argument has been made by Skocpol, (1979) and Zolberg, (1981).
be found in the conception of the state developed by Wallerstein (1979). Such a conception does not give any specificity to the state and its organizational structure. Nor does it take into account the state’s bureaucratic-military structure which has a crucial role both in the maintenance of the internal order and with respect to geopolitics. Wallerstein underestimates the importance of the logic of strategic competition between the states, as well as of the state’s power to monitor and control the domestic affairs of its society.

The point here is that the inter-state system and geopolitics cannot be considered simply the functional part, or the superstructure, of the world capitalist economy. Nor can the state be regarded as an epiphenomenal reflection of that economy. To do so is to reduce the state to the world capitalist economy, and therefore to fail to see that the inter-state system and geopolitics play (and have played) an important role in international relations.  

The other reason why in world system theory the state and the inter-state system are not regarded as an independent of world capitalism or as an theoretical object of inquiry in its own right is the inability of Wallerstein to break with positivism. This is the third problem with the approach.

Despite his claim to the contrary, it would not be mistaken to assert that Wallerstein’s conception of the world capitalist system as an organic totality affirms the positivist sociological proposition that society and its unfolding essence constitutes the real object of analysis to the extent that it corresponds directly to reality. What Wallerstein does is to extent the concept of system governed by its internal logic to the world as a whole.

Indeed, the concept of world system can be associated with the structuralist-functionalist sociology of knowledge, founded on systems analysis as developed by such sociologists as Durkheim, Spengler, and Parsons (Worsley, 1980:298-303; Bergesen, 1980:3-11). As is well known, in spite of the differences among them, these sociologists all attempted to account for the emergence and

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13 This point will be elaborated in Chapter VI with reference to the historical sociological model of international relations developed by Skocpol, Halliday, Giddens, and Mann.
development of modern society with a systemic analysis in which the key organizing concept was that of division of labour. In their own discourses of modern society, these sociologists argued that modern society, unlike pre-modern traditional society, developed with the emergence of what Durkheim called "functional differentiation" and "specialization". However, such development did not give rise to conflictual relations and antagonistic political calculations that could result in the complete destruction of the existing order, due precisely to the fact that it had been coordinated by a division of labour capable of creating a functional compatibility among groups embodied within modern society (Keyman, 1988:11-12). The system thus reproduced itself by assigning the role of system maintenance to the division of labour.

It can be said within the context of the world system approach Wallerstein uses the same mode of reasoning in the course of his analysis of world capitalism. Just as with the above-mentioned sociologists' discourses of modern society, Wallerstein's conception of the world capitalist system contains in itself functionally differentiated and specialized parts, which are functionally interrelated with one another on the basis of the existing international division of labour. This implies that as long as the division of labour remains capable of coordinating or articulating the functions of the parts, the world capitalist system maintains its existence.

Consequently, recalling the problem of reification, it can be argued that Wallerstein's concept of world system meets at least three criteria required by positivism for scientificity: namely those of truth as correspondence, objectivity, and universality. The world system, like a positivist and structural functionalist conception of system, is claimed to correspond to reality, it itself constitutes an objective reality, and it provides a universal account of history. 14

One of the results of the positivist dimension of the world system theory is its problematic conception of change. This is the fourth difficulty with the approach. In the course of his analysis of world capitalism, Wallerstein tends to be concerned more with exploration of the regular patterns

14 The positivist nature of the world system theory is also pointed out by Bergesen, (1980), and Linklater, (1990).
and slow but inexorable transformations within the world capitalist system than with the question as to how "change" occurs in a given set of relations and practices. Viotti and Kauppi note that "Wallerstein may entitle one article 'The Rise and Future of the World Capitalist System', but he also refers to "The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the Capitalist World Order" (1987:414-415). The implication is that Wallerstein's understanding of change is confined to searching for the internal dynamics of the system with regard to the question as to how those dynamics may change over time, or to put it more precisely, how and under what conditions movements between the periphery and the semi-periphery, as well as between the semi-periphery and the core, would occur (1984:315-318). In Wallerstein's terminology, these questions involve asking how the spatial growth of the geopolitical expansion of the system would come into existence. However,

the spatial growth, the "geopolitical expansion" of the system and thereby its increasing globalization as a lasting, steady tendency on the one hand, and its cyclical movement; its subsequent waves of contradiction and expansion, acceleration and slow down, on the other, can hardly express the dialectic of the development of the system with contradictions and interactions between development in space and time, in quality and quantity, in its parts and entity, in width and depth. This dialectic is missing from the picture of the system even if Wallerstein incidentally releases the separation of the interrelated aspects of development by referring also to "the evolution of productive capacities and capital formation", the "deepening" of the world-wide division of labour, the "inner" process of expansion, the structure transforming effect of secular trends, the "slow but eventual transformation of quantity into quality" (Szentez, 1984:317).

The lack of attention to such contradictions and interactions thus leads Wallerstein to reduce the spatial dimension of the world system to the scope of commodity relations. That is, he reduces the political and the ideological (as well as the discursive) to the economic, and its time dimensions to the cyclical changes of contradiction and expansion, of expanded and contracted reproduction. Such reduction is, as noted, unquestionably the effect of a mode of theorizing, which relies exclusively upon the primacy of structures. And an account is made of the limitations and constraints imposed on the patterns of behaviour of agents, and of how these patterns are rendered regular in a given space and time. The implication of this is that the way in which world system theory comprehends change and history is synchronic rather than diachronic, derives from an analysis of regular patterns rather than of disjunctions that could result from the specificity and historicity of national social
formations based on their own internal politico-economic configurations. Thus, an account of change is reduced to, and derived from, that of stability and reproduction (system maintenance). As Wallerstein concludes, "we can only speak of social change in social systems. The only social system in this scheme is the world system" (1974b:7). Of course, defined in this way, change that can only take place within the system would not allow the recognition of differences—such as the state structure, political regime, the form of capital accumulation, the mode of regulation of the relation of labour and capital, and the mode of interactions between the state and civil society.

On the basis of these four problems, it can be concluded that world system theory and its outside-in model does not provide a satisfactory alternative to the positivist IRT. It offers a holistic, reductionist, essentialist, and universalist account of IRT, which also makes its attempt to reconstruct dependence and to provide a powerful critique of modernization unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, it should be taken seriously to the extent that it introduces the outside-in model and the issue of world capitalism into IRT.

**STRUCTURAL REALISM AND "THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS"**

Like world system theory, structural realism attempts to construct an outside-in model for the study of international relations. In doing so, its aim is to reconstruct realist IRT. At the same time, it distinguishes itself from world system theory by arguing strongly for the priority of the international polity over the international economy (Waltz, 1979:38). It is not the international capitalist system nor institutionalized international capital and trade movements but the international polity with its potential autonomy that defines and characterizes international relations.

In this context, the separation of international politics from international economics and the meaning that the potential autonomy of the international polity conveys together provide the basis for an outside-in model by which structural realism attempts to theorize international politics. Such an attempt, without any doubt, finds its expression, in Kenneth N. Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics*
(1979).

In this work, the primary task Waltz undertakes is to seek an adequate answer to the question of what international relations is, or put it precisely, what would make possible a proper understanding of international relations, and in doing so, to construct a general theory which is both comprehensive and explanatory. For Waltz, the field of International Relations needs such a theory because only a "small gain in explanatory power has come from the large amount of work done in recent decades" (1979:18). By "a general theory" Waltz understands a theory founded upon the notion of "system" which has an ontological existence and acts as "a constraining force" over the patterns of behaviour of nation states. In this sense, Theory of International Politics is a general theory in which the main objective is to account the ways how systemic factors constrain or impose limitations on nation states' actions as well as on the mode of interaction between them. However, as will become apparent in what follows, just as world-system theory, Waltz's general theory uses a reified conception of system and offers a universal and ahistorical account of international politics.

The epistemological position that underlies Waltz's general theory of international politics is very clearly positivism. Waltz states in this respect that

"Only a theory the significance of the observed is made manifest. A theory arranges phenomena so that they are seen as mutually dependent; it connects otherwise disparate facts (1979:9-10).

This means that for Waltz, theory comes into existence only after the observed fact. Moreover, this allows theory to be tested. This done, Waltz believes that it becomes possible to infer hypotheses from theory, and subject them to observational test again (1979:13-14). Thus, theory becomes objective, corresponds to the reality of observed facts, and gains scientifcity. Needless to say, central to this procedure is the separation of the subject and object, a procedure which establishes the objectivist feature of theory construction in the first place. 15 This happens because, for Waltz, the

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15 Waltz’s positivism in this sense uses both inductive and deductive techniques. For him, inductivism alone would result in reductionism and therefore has to be integrated into deductive techniques. This usage of theory coincides with the Popperian sophisticated falsification method and Parsonsian structural functionalism. For the Popperian connection, see Ashley (1984), and George (1989).
subjectivist process of theorizing is not capable of acquiring explanatory power, since it does not directly and necessarily correspond to objective reality.

Having established this positivist epistemological ground, Waltz begins to set the basic parameters of his outside-in model. In order to elucidate the construction of the Waltzian general theory of international politics, it is therefore necessary to recapitulate those parameters, namely the role of theory in the study of international politics and the nature of the international system. As for the former, Waltz suggests that international relations theory has long suffered from what he terms the problem of "reductionism". Implied in this suggestion is the idea that reducing the study of international politics to the nation-state level, and for that matter to the process of decision-making and the pattern of behaviour within it, is inadequate in so far as it inevitably disregards the impact of systemic variables on state behaviour. A more useful approach therefore must entail the system level of analysis, by which the effect of "causes" can be traced, assessed, and made subject to observational test.

Thus Waltz concludes that theories of international politics that concentrate causes at the individual or national level are reductionist; theories that conceive of causes operating at the international level as well are systemic (1979:23).

When defined in such a broad way, reductionism, as Brown has pointed out, characterizes virtually all existing theories of international politics, theories of imperialism and theories of politics articulated by realists, idealists, and behaviouralists (1981:174). However, Waltz's objective is to construct a holistic understanding of international politics rather than to offer a thorough critique of reductionism. Therefore, operating with a very broadly defined concept of reductionism is useful for him for two reasons. The first is that it provides Waltz with a point of departure, from which he makes his claim that a new theory of international politics is necessary. In this sense, reductionism can be said to have been used by Waltz not as a theoretical construct but as a strategic device with which to map the field of International Relations and to assert that the field has certain deficiencies. Secondly, the concept of reductionism helps Waltz to argue that his theory is not only new, but also
specific in that it is non-reductionist, systemic, and structural. In this sense as well, the concept of reductionism is less theoretical than it is strategic. It not only makes possible the claim that in order to remedy the defects of present theories non-reductionism has to be conceived of as "the end to be achieved", but also gives meaning to gestures which aims to achieve that end. Consequently, it can be said that it is on the basis of these two strategic uses of the concept of reductionism that Waltz's theory of international politics gains specificity vis-a-vis existing theories, which he accuses of being reductionist.

However, a call for a systemic theory constitutes, according to Waltz, only the first step to be taken, because not every systemic theory is non-reductionist. Here, Waltz takes on the systemic theory of international relations as articulated in Morton Kaplan's System and Process in International Politics. He states from the outset that

any approach or theory, if it is rightly termed 'systemic' must show how the systems level, or structure, is distinct from the level of interacting units. If that is not shown, then one does not have a systems approach or a systems theory at all (1979:78).

What this statement suggests is that the conceptualization of a system as a composite of interacting units is inappropriate for two reasons. First, it reduces the system to its interacting parts, so that it ends up taking as its fundamental concept not the structure of the system but the parts and the way in which they interact. In this case, it is as reductionist as any theory which operates only at the state-level of analysis. Secondly, because it would not perceive the structure of the system and the pattern of interaction within the system as distinct entities (or variables), it has nothing at all to say about the effects that the structure produces in the process of the constitution of a pattern of state behaviour. In this case as well, it is reductionist in that it sees the structure as an epiphenomenon of interaction. In Yalem's terminology, viewed in this way, the interactionist systemic analysis develops "inside-out" explanations that inevitably fail to account for "the impact of the international system on international behaviour" (1982:239).

To remedy this problem, and at the same time to render the theory non-reductionist and rigorous, Waltz opts for a systems theory based on "outside-in" explanations in which the structure of
the international system is elevated to primary importance as a causal factor. The principal elements of the "outside-in" mode of explanation can be stated as follows:

(i) A system consists of both a structure and interacting parts. That is to say that the structure of a system should be separated from the actions initiated by the parts of a system.

(ii) "The characteristics of the units of a system, their behavior and interactions are omitted from the definition of structure to insure a distinction between variables that operate at the level of the system and those that operate at the level of the units" (Yalem, 1982:243). Such a distinction is essential to demonstrate that even if variations or changes in the pattern of state behaviour emerge the system may persist and maintain its condition of existence as fixed variable.

(iii) It is for these reasons that a proper and non-reductionist theory of international politics should be founded upon an attempt to seek explanations as to how the structure of the system imposes constraints and limitations on international behaviour. In other words, its foundation has to be derived from explanations of the "outside-in" type.

Although these principal elements lead Waltz to announce that his theory is new and non-reductionist, it would be mistaken to consider it to be a unique theory of international politics. It is in fact an attempt to reconstruct realism as a whole. By reconstruction, Waltz appears to mean that although Realism with its basic operational concepts such as anarchy, power, national interest, and the domestic/international dichotomy is still capable of demonstrating how international politics functions, it needs to be modified due to its reductionist nature. What is needed, according to Waltz, is to insert into realism a proper means of theorizing, a means by which to conceptualize adequately the structure of the system. Indeed, this is what characterizes the Waltzian non-reductionist account of international politics: a holistic account founded upon the realist discourse.

How then does the articulation of the realist discourse and holism work? It has been pointed out that the primary concern in Waltz's outside-in model is with forces that are in play at the international level, not at the national level. These forces are referred to as structures. What Waltz means by structures is "a set of constraining conditions" (1979:62). Structures are invisible, in that they
do not act as agents whose actions can be seen and observed. "Such a structure acts as a selector", argues Waltz. Here, a selector is meant to be an indirect cause of the way in which agents act. That is say that structures are the determination in the last instance of an action, where they "limit and mould agents and agencies and point them in ways that tend toward a common quality of outcomes even though the efforts and aims of agents and agencies vary" (1979:63).

The determination in the last instance by structures of an action (or the outcome of an action) occurs as structures affect behavioural patterns of agents by producing effects in the constitution of those patterns. Waltz suggests two different but nevertheless interrelated ways in which effects are produced: "through socialization of the actors and through competition among them" (1979:63).

Socialization has two functions to perform. The first is that "socialization brings members of a group into conformity with its norms". In this sense, it creates a discursive realm in which the identity of each member is defined with reference to the identity of the group to which he or she belongs. Thus, socialization becomes the basic reproductive mechanism. Secondly, and as a derivative of its first function, "socialization reduces variety". It does so by establishing norms of behaviour within which the existing differences among members of a group are subsumed. In this sense, socialization becomes the basic mechanism by which a group presents itself as an organic and expressive totality.

The second way in which effects are produced is through competition.

In social sectors that are loosely organized or segmented, socialization takes place within segments and competition takes place among them. Socialization encourages similarities of attributes and of behaviour. So does competition. Competition generates an order, the units of which adjust their relations through their autonomous decisions and acts... Socialization and competition are two aspects of a process by which the variety of behaviours and of outcomes is reduced (Waltz, 1979:65).

What this statement suggests is that it is through socialization and competition that "a certain arrangement" among the units is constructed, and this arrangement is referred to as a structure, which in turn defines the arrangement. Thus, in a social space in which the defining structure acts as a selector, certain patterns of behaviour come into existence without a need for a visible ordering actor. That is to say that order can be reproduced without an orderer just as adjustments may be made
without an adjustor. Herein lies the significance of the structure of the system. It is as a result of the impact of the structure on behaviour that the reproduction of the system and of order within it is made possible. What Waltz suggests is in this sense nothing but a very reified conception of a social system, which is international in its operation. 16

In this context, Ruggie correctly argues that the Waltzian holistic theory of international politics is a "mirror image" of Durkheimian sociology in which the concept of organic totality is seen as the appropriate unit of analysis for the study of collective phenomena (1986:131-134). In his response to Ruggie, Waltz acknowledges the Durkheimian dimension of his theory by stating that his understanding of the international system is clearly intertwined with Durkheim's concept of "organic solidarity" (1986:324-325). For Waltz, the international system functions as an organic totality wherein the structure constrains as well as forms international behaviour. It is organic in that even though differentiation exists among the parts, they act alike in so far as their actions are regulated by the structure of the system. Here the Waltzian mode of reasoning appears to assert that recurrence is more likely than change, due to the ability of the structure to persist, and that it is for this reason that structures have to be accorded primacy over agents.

The concept of organic totality, in this sense, operates as a "self-help" system by which Waltz means a system in which the units co-exist and act in accordance with the existing structural imperative. Otherwise, they simply fail to survive. In other words,

a self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer. Fear of such unwarranted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power. Notice that the theory requires no assumptions of rationality or of constancy of will on the part of all of the actors. The theory says simply that if some do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside (1979:148).

Moreover, the reason why "some do relatively well" is not their ability to do well but simply that they

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16 This reification of the concept of the international system brings about the basic similarity between structural realism and world system theory. Both regard the system as a reality in itself which functions as an signifying order, determining the role and functions of its parts. It goes without saying that difficulties that face world system theory, which have been elaborated in the previous section, also apply to structural realism, therefore.
adjust themselves to the operation of the existing structural imperative. What is important for an analysis of international phenomena is therefore to account for the operation of the structural imperative.

How then does this reflect on the theory of international politics? According to Waltz, the structure of the system constitutes what he calls "the ordering principle" of the social organization (1986:81) Once the ordering principle is analyzed, Waltz goes on to argue, it becomes possible to deal with the other components of the system, namely "the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions" and "the distribution of capabilities across units". These three components together designate under the epistemological primacy of the first the outside-in mode of analysis of international politics.

The ordering principle is concerned with the question of how to think of order without an orderer, in so far as international politics alludes to politics in the absence of government, politics without a sovereign ruler. Herein lies the basic difference between the domestic and international affairs. The former with the presence of the sovereign ruler - that is, of an orderer - is hierarchically ordered. The concept of sovereignty refers to the hierarchically well-ordered political authority in a given society, whose basic functions are to govern and regulate political and socio-economic patterns of behaviour within its territorial domain. With respect to the state's external environment (or within inter-state relations) it means the responsibility of the state to formulate policies toward other states and international organizations as non-state actors in order to maintain its own territorial integrity and security. The conclusion to be extrapolated here is that domestic affairs are ordered vertically with an orderer, and thus involve an ordering principle - politics with the government.

Contrary to domestic affairs, international politics is ordered "horizontally" rather than "hierarchically" (or vertically). It lacks a sovereign authority, an orderer. Waltz considers this situation to be "anarchic" (1986:82-88). However, the condition of anarchy, which is derived from an analogy with the Hobbesian state of nature, does not refer to absolute disorder or perpetual chaos. Instead, it means an order without an orderer, a structural imperative which imposes limitations on state
behaviour. Anarchy is therefore the structure, the ordering principle that causes nation states to act alike, by making the maximization of power to survive and guarantee the security of the domestic affairs vis-a-vis external forces the basic motives of states' foreign policy formulations. Waltz asserts that anarchy creates a situation in which every sovereign nation state is compelled to rely on the capabilities it possesses to guarantee its own survival. As a result, anarchy brings about an arrangement among nation states, which is based primarily on security and the maintenance of national survival. Just as the competitive micro-economic market structure, international politics with its ordering principle, anarchy, is competitive but at the same time self-regarding and coordinative (1986:87-89).

As the ordering principle of international politics anarchy is therefore the constitutive essence of the self-help system. Waltz argues in this context that in an anarchic order there is no recourse to higher authority for protection against threats or for redress once externally imposed injury has been incurred; the survival of each state as an independent political and territorial entity is ultimately its own responsibility, a matter of self-help (1986:93).

Self-help thus amounts to maximizing power in terms of military capabilities, which have to be sufficient for self-defence and survival. It is for this reason that in anarchically ordered self-help systems the basic purpose of each and every sovereign nation state is fixed by the ordering principle - the maximization of power in order to guarantee survival and security.

If every nation state has the same purpose, what is it that differentiates them? Or, how can Waltz explain the second component of his systemic analysis, the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions? Waltz reaches the ultimate point of the outside-in model by asserting that the units of the system are functionally undifferentiated. "The states that are the units of international-political system are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform" (1986:87). The reason for this is quite simple, as far as Waltz is concerned. By requiring the condition of coordination and of relations of security-based cooperation among the systems' units, not only does anarchy constitute the sameness of the units, but also, it causes the units to remain "like units" as long as it maintains its existence.
What Waltz appears to be proposing here is that nothing can change in the system unless the ordering principle changes. Units remain the same, their functions remain the same, and the ordering principle remains the same. History repeats itself, recurrence becomes the defining feature of history, and the constant and fixed centre of history conveys meaning to every social and politico-economic phenomenon that has occurred in the course of historical evolution of a system. Hence, the units of the system perform functions that they have been assigned by the organizing principle, act in accordance with the organizing principle, and become like units even though they may have different levels of economic development, different cultural features, and different political and discursive forces. These differences cannot have any effect in international politics, because they are domestic in nature. That is to say that contrary to domestic affairs that may have changing historical patterns, international politics has an unchanging and already frozen historical pattern. Nevertheless Waltz has to answer the following question. If the units are functionally undifferentiated, what is it that makes some states strong and some weak? Waltz suggests that the only variety in international politics lies in "the distribution of capabilities" that distinguishes the units as they perform similar tasks (1979:92-95). The distribution of capabilities in this sense constitutes the third component of Waltz's theory of international politics. Moreover, it helps Waltz to develop his conception of power. It does so by explicating how the units stand in relation to one another. According to Waltz, "states are differently placed by their power". And "power is estimated by comparing the capabilities of a number of units" (1986:93). Having defined the concept of power in terms of capabilities, Waltz warns that such a definition should not be considered an agency-based definition. It is in fact structural, in so far as the distribution of capabilities across units is a system-wide concept and ought not to be attributed to states as agents. As Waltz argues, "variation of structure is introduced, not through differences in the character of and function of units, but only through distinctions made among them according to their capabilities" (1979:93).

By way of conclusion, Waltz suggests that in order to construct a proper systemic account of international politics a three-part definition of structure has to be developed:
(i) structures are defined, first, according to the principle by which a system is ordered. Systems are transformed if one ordering principle replaces another. To move from an anarchic to a hierarchical realm is to move from one system to another:

(ii) structures are defined, second, by the specification of functions of differentiated units. Hierarchical systems change if functions are differently defined and allotted. For anarchic systems, the criterion of systems change derived from the second part of the definition drops out since the system is composed of like units:

(iii) structures are defined, third, by the distribution of capabilities across units. Changes in this distribution are changes of system whether the system be an anarchic or a hierarchic one (1976:96).

However, conceptualized in this way the structure becomes reified, just as in world system theory. It becomes a reality in itself, defines international politics, and imposes itself on its units. Not only does it affect international behaviour, but also it forms and re-forms the inter-state relationship by superimposing constraints on nation states. Thus, like the world system, the structure in structural realism serves as the absolute criterion for the formation of every social and politico-economic phenomenon. Agents have no effect whatsoever in the constitution of international politics. They are ordered by the structure to perform specific functions, which makes them like-units and which secures the reproduction of the system as a whole. Consequently, the history of international politics is explained on the basis of the primacy of structure over agency.

Three criticisms can be made of the reified quality of Waltz's concept of structure. First, just as in world-system theory, the reification of structure, which Waltz thinks overcomes the problem of reductionism, gives rise to the problem of essentialism. Chapter III has argued that realism relies on essentialist conception of the individual. Waltz's reconstruction of realism preserves essentialism, but yet it gives the status of essence to the privileged concept of structure. 17 The problem arises when this essentialist structure takes on a life of its own and determines concrete practices of international

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17 Ashley gives a detailed account of the problem of essentialism in IRT by focusing on Waltz's Man, State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (1959). According to Ashley, Waltz's text exemplifies the essentialist nature of Realism. This means that an essentialist and universalist conception of man constitutes a logo-centric procedure that Waltz initiates in his attempt to reconstruct the traditional realist discourse (1989:287-292). Ashley argues, thus, that Waltz in Theory of International Politics (1979) does not break with essentialism.
relations. As a consequence, these practices are subordinated to and read off the structure and are regarded as being either important or marginal. Thus, security is privileged over development, international politics over international political economy, states over international organizations (inter-state actors), international relations over domestic relations.

The second criticism is that privileging one element over the other element, thereby operating with binary dichotomies, means reducing international relations to the privileged one, and as a result, ignoring the importance of the others to IRT. Waltz attempts to explain the reproduction of the inter-state system, but ignores all the state's characteristics except for its military capability. He also ignores the role that international organizations play in the process of reproduction. He argues that although states may choose to interfere little in the affairs of nonstate actors for long periods of time, they nevertheless set the terms of intercourse ... When the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate (1979:94).

The structural predominance of states over non-state actors is called for and the functioning of non-state actors is said to acquire meaning only within the context of the inter-state system. The justification of this position can only be made by privileging security over development, international politics over international political economy, which of course does not allow any question apart from security to be raised or taken into account in explaining the process of reproduction.

Lastly, such explanation based on security is problematic in itself, since it does not possess any historical quality. Instead, Waltz's conception of the history of international politics has a fixed, constant quality. For him, up until now history has always been governed by anarchy as the ordering principle. Ruggie argues in this context that Waltz provides an ahistorical account of international politics. By drawing on Perry Anderson's elaboration of the transition to capitalism, Ruggie suggests that the emergence of capitalist property relations has also had an effect on the way in which states relate to one another (1986:148-152). 18

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18 In Lineages of the Absolutist State (1974), Perry Anderson rejects the criterion of continuous and homogeneous temporality, and argues that the emergence of capitalism constitutes not a linear transformation but a disjunction in history.
Ruggie proposes that in addition to the concept of anarchy, the capitalist mode of production should be taken into account in analyzing international relations and that international politics and international economics should be seen as interacting and interrelated processes. In his response, Waltz argues that property relations would not affect the functional undifferentiation of units nor the anarchic nature of the system (1986:328-330). Moreover, since property relations operate within the realm of international economics, he argues that they cannot be part of international politics due to the potential autonomy of the latter vis-a-vis the former.

This response however proves unsatisfactory, however, for two reasons. The first is that by attributing a universal and ahistorical quality to the international structure, Waltz ignores completely the differences that exist among nation states in terms of their economic power, their location in the international system, their political structures, and their cultural formations. The interesting point here is that anarchy as an order without an orderer, when historically constructed, allows for the recognition of differences and of the pluralist nature of international relations. 19 This is because, unlike the role of the state in a given social formation, anarchy does not contain a central authority, a sovereign order having power over its own territory. However, for Waltz, anarchy acts as an ordering principle, it becomes reified, and it does not allow differences, since it makes nation states "like-units" under the umbrella of security and strategic interaction.

Thus, the concept of anarchy offers a totalizing knowledge about international relations by subordinating the difference to the likeness. Herein lies the significance of positivism. As noted, positivism requires the universal, law-like, objectivist account of social phenomena, which makes it both focus exclusively on order and conceive of change in a synchronic manner (Chapter II). Waltz's affirmation of positivism as the only scientific way of producing knowledge necessarily leads him to give primary to unity over difference, order over change. Waltz does not believe that differences are -

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19 In Chapter VII, this possibility that anarchy contains will be elaborated with reference to the post-modernist international relations theory.
or have ever been - important to international politics. Nor does he believe that there has been change in the history of international politics. Moreover, the essentialist, reductionist, and universal (totalizing) nature of his general theory of international politics is not considered to be a serious problem for the explanatory power of his theory.

However, following Ruggie, the crucial question that immediately arises, is "to what extent the perceived continuity is an artifact of the intellectual apparatus with which it is studied" (1989:21). The implications of this question will be extensively discussed in Chapter VII with reference to critical IRT. Here what is important is the insertion into the realist paradigm the question of change, which meant the critique within Realism of Waltz's preoccupation with continuity. What has come to be known as "the modified structural realism" suggested that a more proper account of order should take into account the changing structure of international relations. It should be noted, however, that in this suggestion change meant the decline of the United States hegemony and the problem was the possibility of "cooperation" among the units of the anarchic system, or that of international governance (Keohane, 1984:49-64 and Krasner, 1983:4-8). It was pointed out that a solution to this problem necessitates the modification within realism of the Waltzian structural realism, which has given rise to the international regimes literature, or of what Krasner calls modified structural realism (1983:1).

MODIFIED STRUCTURAL REALISM: AFTER HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

In his attempt to go beyond structural realism, Robert Keohane argues that although structural realism has the virtues of parsimony and clarity in its endeavour to systematize the realist discourse it needs to be modified due to its failure to attain closer correspondence with international reality (1986:190-191). Keohane believes that the behaviour of states is strongly affected by systemic
constraints and incentives and that changes in the international system would bring about changes in incentives and behaviour (1984: 26). However, as will be seen, such changes are used by Keohane to rationalize international order and international governance.

Like structural realism, Keohane thus advocates both the outside-in model and the international/national (or domestic affairs) dichotomy. However, he distinguishes his outside-in model from that of structural realism by stating that his vision of international reality consists not only of the distribution of power but also of international institutions and practices, that is, of international regimes. For Keohane, international regimes are of significance in understanding international reality, in so far as such reality is composed of the distribution of both power and wealth.

This approach involves taking international economics seriously, as well as considering international politics and international economics to be interrelated processes. In this sense, Keohane's outside-in model can be regarded as a political economic model of international relations taking place within the realm of the realist discourse. Drawing on Robert Gilpin's definition of political economy as "the reciprocal and dynamic interaction in international relations of the pursuit of wealth and pursuit of power" (1975:43), Keohane suggests that it is through analyzing international regimes that the concept of anarchy, which is the ordering principle of the international system, can be relaxed, thereby enabling one to see the possibility of cooperation under an anarchic order (1984:29-30). Such relaxation would also help the outside-in model gain more empirical orientation, which, according to Keohane, occurs as a result of the employment of what Lakatos calls "auxiliary hypotheses" that are to be used to protect "the hard core" (the category of anarchy) (1986:160-161). Moreover, it is by means of such auxiliary hypotheses that a closer correspondence with international reality can be reached. In this context, auxiliary hypotheses serve to account for changes in the international system, and thus enable structural realism to be historical, that is, to comprehend the particularities of the post-world war political and economic world order. 20

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20 In this context, it can be argued that the modification of Waltz's structural realism means also the modification of his positivism, which, Keohane believes, renders realism truly scientific (1986:167).
The first auxiliary hypothesis Keohane makes concerns the issue of "hegemony". Keohane's hypothesis is that although hegemonic leadership could provide a certain type of cooperation it would be mistaken to consider hegemony to be either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the creation of cooperative relationships among nation states (1984:31). Here Keohane's target is the theory of hegemonic stability initially developed by Charles Kindleberger as "a means of explaining why the international monetary disorder of the 1930s occurred and continued" (Gill and Law, 1988:46-47).

As noted in Chapter III, Kindleberger argues in *The World in Depression: 1929-1939* that although Britain was willing to keep the international monetary order stable, it was not economically strong enough to do so. On the other hand, the United States possessed massive economic strength but did not take the necessary initiatives to stabilize the system and become the new hegemon (1973:63-67). As a result, uncertainty was generated in the system which played a significant role in the outbreak of World War II. The conclusion, which Kindleberger extrapolates, is that hegemonic leadership is a necessary condition for the creation and reproduction of an order in international system.

Like Kindleberger, Robert Gilpin in *War and Change in World Politics* states that the Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, like the Pax Romana, ensured an international system of relative peace and security. Great Britain and the United States created and enforced the rules of the liberal international economic order (1981:144).

This statement contains two basic assumptions. The first is that the dominant power of an international system establishes order in that system. The dominant power thus becomes the hegemonic leader or the stabilizer of the system. Hegemony in this sense refers, argues Keohane, to the ability of the dominant power to have "control over raw materials, control over sources of capital, control over markets, and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods" (1984:32).

Secondly, the reproduction of the established order is dependent upon the continuation of hegemonic leadership carried out by the dominant power. That is to say, the creation of relative peace and security and of an international economic order serves to perpetuate hegemony. These two assumptions together lead the theory of hegemonic stability to assert, first, that power is defined in terms of capabilities, especially military capabilities. Second, the international polity must be accorded
primacy over international economics, since it is the basis of hegemony. And third, in terms of its military capacities and its ability to control the system, the hegemonic power is the strongest nation-state of an international system (Keohane, 1984:34-35).

Keohane concludes that the theory of hegenomic stability therefore rests exclusively on what he calls
"a basic force model", in which outcomes reflect the tangible capabilities of actors. However, given these assertions, a basic force model offers a determinist and reductionist account of international relations. According to Keohane, this is particularly so insofar as it establishes a causal link between power and interest. It thereby reduces hegemony to a purely political phenomenon based on military capacity, and it ignores the specific nature of each international political and economic order. On the contrary, Keohane believes that military force is not the most important element of hegemony since its creation in an international system is dependent more on economic than it is on strategic power. For instance, even though the Soviet Union achieved military parity with the United States, argues Keohane, this achievement did not threaten the United States' ability to "prevent incursions by others who would deny it access to major areas of its economic activities" (1984:40). This implies that hegemony rests not only on coercion but also on consent, that is, on an establishment of compromise or consensus between dominant powers and subordinate nation states.

At this point, Keohane's understanding of hegemony resembles the Gramscian conception of hegemony, inserted by Robert Cox into the study of international relations. Cox defines a hegenomic structure of world order as

one in which power takes a primarily consensual form, as distinguished from a non-hegemonic order in which there are manifestly rival powers and no power has been able to establish the legitimacy of its dominance (1981:153).

Keohane alludes to the Gramscian conception of hegemony by arguing that it explicates how a hegenomic power regulates international relations by supervising the interactions between nation states.

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21 Chapter VII will provide an extensive discussion of the Gramscian conception of hegemony articulated by Cox.
"through a combination of hierarchies of control and the operations of markets", rather than by superimposing its dominance on nation states (1984:35).

For Keohane, this conception of hegemony is, however, only useful to the extent that it explains the functioning of a pattern of order based on asymmetrical cooperation. In other words, it does not say much about what happens "after hegemony" especially in so far as the issue of cooperation is concerned. This question leads Keohane to move away from the Gramscian conception of hegemony and employ the concept of "rational self-interest" as a means of demonstrating why nation states continue to cooperate after hegemony (1984:131). This movement finds it clear expression in Keohane's second auxiliary hypothesis that cooperation is possible after hegemony. In this respect, "after hegemony" means the possibility of stability in the international system after the hegemonic power that functions as the stabilizer of the system begins to decline.

There are three factors that make possible the maintenance of stable patterns of cooperative relations in the absence of hegemonic leadership. The first factor concerns the concept of cooperation. In order to clarify his conception of cooperation, Keohane distinguishes it from that harmony. "Harmony refers to a situation in which actors' policies (pursued in their own self-interest without regard for others) 'automatically' facilitate the attainment of others' goals" (Keohane, 1984:51). A pattern of interaction based on harmony can be illustrated with the example of the classical economic understanding of a competitive market where it is assumed that the invisible hand ensures that the pursuit of self-interest by each contributes to the interest of all. This means that in an harmonic situation there is no need for communication nor for the exercise of influence. Keohane concludes that harmony is therefore apolitical (1984:58).

On the contrary, cooperation necessitates policy coordination, or a process of negotiation, by which the actions initiated by actors can be transformed into conformity. That is to say that for cooperation to be created certain adjustments in the process of decision-making have to be made in such a way that possible unfavourable consequences are to a large extent avoided. In this context, Keohane suggests that
cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination. To summarize more formally, intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination (1984:51-52).

Cooperation refers therefore to a situation which is highly political and in which certain patterns of behaviour are altered through a process of policy coordination involving both positive (promises and rewards) and negative (threats and punishment) inducements.

Viewed in this way, cooperation contains in itself both conflict and a reaction to potential conflict. Drawing on the game-theoretical perspective, Keohane proposes that actors possess a rational self-interest to respond to potential conflicts and to deal with each other under a cooperative pattern of interactions. It should be noted here that Keohane’s proposal is not only theoretical but also empirical in the sense that it is derived from an historical analysis of the post-war political and economic order, as the second factor makes cooperation after hegemony possible.

The second factor therefore concerns the nature of the American hegemony. Unlike structural realism’s (and also hegemonic stability theory’s) ahistorical account of stability and order, Keohane does not consider cooperation to be fixed throughout all time. Nor does he think that the world order established around American hegemony can be compared to previous hegemonies.

Instead he believes that

American hegemony, rather than being one more instance of a general phenomenon, was essentially unique in the scope and efficacy of the instruments at the disposal of a hegemonic state and in the degree of success attained" (1984:37)

The uniqueness of American hegemony lies in the fact that it operated with international organizations which provided a forum in which a pattern of international behaviour conducive to the existing order is created and institutionalized. The recognition of the uniqueness of American hegemony not only helps Keohane go beyond the basic force model of inter-state relations, but it also gives him freedom to explore how nation states interacting with one another within the post-world war II world order might engage in a stable pattern of cooperation.

The exploration of "how" derives from the third and most important factor for cooperation
after hegemony, that is, the existence of international regimes. Keohane follows the theory of international regimes in putting forward the idea that stability and order in the international system is not dependent exclusively on the exercise of hegemony, but may at the same time be the result of cooperation between nation states through the medium of international regimes.

Here the crucial concept is that of international regime. 22 Ruggie, who introduced the concept to the study of international relations, regarded it as a process of institutionalization of international behaviour (1975:559). This definition led Puchala and Hopkins to think of international regimes as patterned behaviour in a given issue-area such as trade, finance, monetary, and security. "A regime exists in every substantive issue-area in international relations... Wherever there is regularity in behaviour, a set of principles, norms or rules must exist to account for it" (1983:61-62). However, as Haggard and Simmons have pointed out, defining regimes only in terms of patterned behaviour can not easily account for how regimes mediate, constrain, or affect state behaviour (1987:453).

Krasner, in his definition, attempts to solve this problem by emphasizing the normative dimension of international regimes. According to him,

Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice (1983:2).

Keohane considers Krasner's definition to be a useful starting-point. However, he warns that it has important limitations which stem, to a large extent, from a lack of attention given to the nature of both regimes and actors. It is on the basis of this warning that Keohane defines regimes in terms of their functions, or to put it precisely, in terms of their effects. Defined in this manner, regimes refer to "functional" or "useful" means by which cooperation is made possible.

This means that regimes exist, or are created by nation states, because there is a "need" or a

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22 International regimes refer to international organizations, such as GATT, the IMF, The UN, OPEC, in which international behaviour is institutionalized. They also refer to specific issue areas such as trade, security, energy, and monetary policy.
"demand" for them. In other words, self-interested rational actors establish international regimes through mutual agreement due to increased issue density as one of the basic features of the international system. Moreover, according to Keohane,

the demand for international regimes will be in part a function of the effectiveness of the regimes themselves in developing norms of generalized commitment and in providing high-quality information to policy makers (1983:170-171).

Underlying Keohane's argument is the notion that, since the international structure is anarchic - that is, it lacks authoritative governmental institutions and creates a situation of pervasive uncertainty - there is a need for international regimes. This is because these regimes have as their principal function to facilitate the making of mutually beneficial agreements among governments, which makes it possible that the structural condition of anarchy will not lead to a total "war of all against all" (1983:148). It could be said here that Keohane agrees with Waltz that nation states operate within a "self-help" system, but goes beyond Waltz by asserting that such a system is coordinated by international regimes, which make cooperation possible.

Keohane's modified structuralism, based on an "outside-in" model which is aimed at relaxing the structuralist realist principles, makes an important contribution to realism by providing an account of world order that is not dependent on force to ensure stability. It also demonstrates how possible ways of establishing a pattern of cooperative interactions between nation states can be created which does not require the existence of an hegemonic power as a necessary condition for order.

However, Keohane's contribution cannot be taken for granted and should be evaluated in relation to his adoption of structuralist realist assumptions about the nature of the international system and the state. As for the international system, there is no doubt that Keohane's intention is to account for the maintenance of order and stability, although he argues that he wants to examine the possibility of "peaceful change" in the system. 23 Because he takes a realist position, his account of order would not ask a question of "order for whom", and tells a story of international relations in which every party has the same interest, that is, the maintenance of order. The only justification

23 For detail, see Keohane (1984, 1986, and 1988)
Keohane supplies for his account is that the world is anarchic, so that nation states have to choose between war and cooperation. Of course, this is a false dichotomy since it takes anarchy and order for granted and imposes it on national social formations. As a result, Keohane's account has nothing to say about the global power/domination relations, the uneven and unequal development of capitalism, and the "effects" international relations produce in national social formations which may result in the emergence of crucial differences among them in the ways in which they perceive and define international relations. It can be argued, thus, the expectation of cooperation among states does not involve a recognition of the different power capabilities of the nation states in terms of their different status and locations in the international system (for example, the North-South relations).

Keohane's argument for cooperation is in fact one which involves control of nation states and their different expectations. It is this control dimension of cooperation that makes it the key to international governance. That cooperation involves control can be explained with reference to the functioning of the concept of regime. The concept is used to explain the "course" of interaction among nation states, which is expected to lead to its a priori designation, cooperation. The concept of regime explains interaction through its definitional characteristics, that is, through a set of norms, rules, and procedures around which actors' expectations converge. In this respect, it functions as a means by which a pattern of behaviour is established which makes nation states change their perceptions of their interests and behaviour. As Strange has correctly pointed out, the basic function of an international regime is therefore its "equilibrating function" which is deduced from the need for system maintenance (1983:337). 24

However, no attention is paid to how nation states develop their interests and preferences, what creates differences among them, and under what conditions these interests and preferences

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24 This leads Strange to argue that regimes offer a static view of international relations which operates with functionalist assumptions (among which the fundamental one is that of system maintenance) and which does not provide any explanation for conflict and exercise of power in a given regime (1983:350-355). Similarly, Haggard and Simmons have argued that the international regimes literature does not explore how regimes may institutionalize inequalities in international relations (1987:510).
converge. It can be argued that these questions necessitate an attempt to theorize three crucial categories, namely those of the cognitive aspect of international regimes, the state, and the state/civil society relationship. However, with its positivist epistemological basis, the concept of international regime does not allow such theorization. 

In Chapter VI and Chapter VII, these three questions will be discussed. Here the point is that if actors expectations have converged, the cognitive aspects of regimes - that is, learning and the inter-subjective relations between actors - have to be taken into account and analyzed. However, as pointed out in Chapter II, positivism with its subject-object distinction does not consider subjectivity to be valuable for science and objectivity. The concept of international regime, developed in structural realism, disregards subjectivity. Instead, it takes norms and rules to be an apriori objective givens and imposes them on nation states to account for convergence. Thus, they become reified to the extent that they explain and determine actors' behaviour. More importantly, as a result, just as do the world system and the anarchic structure, the concept of international regime becomes reified when structural realism assumes that "regimes explain", instead of suggesting that "regimes themselves should be explained" (Rood, 1989:72).

Although the theory of international regimes takes non-state actors seriously, this does not challenge the realist premise that the state is the most important actor. In this sense, it can be said that the relaxation of anarchy still retains the state as what Ashley calls "the heroic principle" in the sense that

realists start from the premise that the world is to be understood not only in terms of the absence of a central agency but also in terms of the presence of a multiplicity of states, each understood as a sovereign identity presiding over its respective national society and making decisions in the interests thereof (1988:227).

However, no theoretical account in structural realism is provided for the state. The state is

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25 The specific reasons why positivism does not permit such theorization were dealt with in Chapter II. Chapter VI will also deal with the question of the state and why positivism leads to the concept of the state as a factual given.

26 Haggard and Simmons (1987) and Kratochwil and Ruggie (1987) characterize the cognitive aspect, respectively, as a learning process and as inter-subjective meaning.
regarded as an ontological given. Like early realists (for this matter Waltz too), Keohane simply presumes that the state is a rational actor or a unitary entity having an ontological existence. The conception of the state as a rational and unitary decision-making subject presiding over a domestic society cannot acquire theoretical value. This is because the theoretical account of the state requires a problematization of the state/civil society relations on the one hand, and an exploration of the effects that domestic forces produce on the decision-making process on the other. If the state is accorded a potential autonomy vis-a-vis domestic society, its autonomy must not be assumed, and instead has to be accounted for through the problematization and exploration of a social formation in which it is embedded.

However, such problematization and exploration is not considered by structural realism relevant to the concept of international regime. As Tereault has argued,

the internal organization of the individual state, the appeal of its political and economic discourse, and the aspiration of social groups and classes are all perceived as at best irrelevant and at worst detrimental to the determination and achievement of the goals of its foreign policy (1987:287).

It is assumed that every foreign policy decision the state takes is deduced from the concept of national interest which itself has to be kept insulated from civil society. At the heart of this problem lies the basic premise of realism that international affairs are unique and have to be studied separately from domestic affairs. Such separation in turn gives structural realism freedom to assert that nation states have potential autonomy vis-a-vis their own domestic affairs and social structures.

CONCLUSION: THE NEED TO MOVE BEYOND THE OUTSIDE-IN MODEL AND AWAY FROM POSITIVISM

This chapter has demonstrated the operation of the outside-in model in IRT. It has focused on the three paradigmatic positions - world system theory, structural realism, and a modified structural realism - which provided the critique and the reconstruction of dependency, modernization, and realism, and which have marked the beginning of the transformation of IRT. What has become
apparent throughout the critical discussion of these paradigmatic positions are the following features of - or, to put it more precisely the deficiencies of - the outside-in model:

First, the outside-in model approaches international relations through a concept of totality as an organic whole. Thus, it aims to provide a holistic account of its subject matter. This totality is the world capitalist system in the world system theory, the international anarchic system in structural realism and its modified version. Despite the differences among them, each position regards a totality as constituting all relations that take place within it. Central to this type of conceptualization of totality is the sociological (more specifically the structural functionalist) presumption that since the world expressed by the total system of concepts is the world as society represents itself to itself, only society can furnish the generalized notions according to which such a world must be represented. Since the universe exists only in so far as it is thought, and since it can be thought totally only by society itself, it takes its place within society, becomes an element of its inner life, and society may thus be seen that total genus beyond which nothing else exists. The very concept of totality is but the abstract form of the concept of society: that whole which includes all things, that supreme class under which all other classes must be subsumed (Dowling, 1984:42-43).

What these positions do is simply to replace this conception of society with the world (or the international) system. The concept of totality thus becomes the abstract form of that system; it functions as the inner essence, the "supreme class" under which all other classes (relations) must be subsumed.

Secondly, as noted, the problem however arises when this totality is reified, and becomes a reality in itself, because every relationship is subordinated to, and determined by, this totality. The outside-in model is founded upon a reified conception of totality and functions, as a result, as an essentialist model. Therefore, the inner essence of international relations serves as the absolute criterion for the formation of other concepts. As a result, these other concepts are denied specificity and are not considered as an object of theorizing. In this way, attention, for example, to the state disappears. For IRT, this means that the substantial concepts of the theory remain largely untheorized.

Thirdly, at the level of epistemology, this reified conception of totality is supported by
positivism. Throughout the chapter, it has been shown that positivism underpins the epistemological structure of structural realism and that world system theory contains a number of positivist elements. As pointed out in Chapter II, positivism offers an objectivist, universal, and ahistorical account of social reality. For this reason, it results in the dissolution of the specific, historical, and different features of social relations into the abstract, organic totality. In their positivist account of international relations, these paradigmatic positions appear to be universal and ahistorical, and as a result they fail to recognize the existence of differences stemming from the internal structures of national social formations. They dissolve such differences into either the world capitalist system or the international system (or, in modified structural realism, into the concept of international regimes). Given that the recognition of differences mandates a theorization of the state and an analysis of state/civil society relations, their positivist nature has become one of the basic reasons for the unauthorized quality of the state in the outside-in model of international relations. 27

Finally, another manifestation of positivism in these paradigmatic positions has been the tendency to privilege order, stability, and reproduction over change. They thus provide a synchronic and ahistorical account of international relations. The question of change has been either disregarded (structural realism) or subordinated to the synchronic dimension of history (world system theory and modified structural realism). Structural constraints and structural limitations imposed by the system on its parts are taken as the primary point of reference. Consequently, the outside-in model has become a model of order (or of international governance) and this is where its strength lies.

All these points together indicate that the outside-in model and its epistemological position, positivism, contain serious deficiencies and that it is necessary to move IRT beyond that model and away from positivism. In recent years, three paradigmatic positions have undertaken this task at three different levels of analysis. All three have made an important contribution to IRT.

27 When conceptualized, for example in the world system theory, the state is regarded in a reductionist manner, either as a sub-part of the system or as an epiphenomenal reflection of world capitalism (Wallerstein, 1979).
The first has attacked positivism from the perspective of a structuralist epistemology and has focused on the question of development and international political economy (Chapter V). The second has employed the historical-comparative method and has dealt with the question of the state and the inter-state system. The third has attacked positivism from either critical theory (in Gramscian or Habermasian versions) or post-structuralism, and has introduced into IRT the crucial questions of social theory, such as hegemony, modernity/post modernity, democracy, culture, and identity. The point here is that it is only with the emergence of these positions that the proliferation of IRT has occurred. IRT has thereby gained a multi-paradigmatic quality - termed alternatively, post positivism (Lapid:1989), or postrealism (Linklater:1990). It is these paradigmatic positions that will be critically discussed in the following chapters.
CHAPTER V
THE STRUCTURALIST CONTRIBUTION:
PRODUCTION, DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Chapter IV argued that the outside-in model, which takes as its basic unit of analysis the international system in order to provide a holistic account of the subject matter, fails to recognize both the specific conditions of existence of national social formations and the different effects that international relations have produced in these formations. It has argued that such a failure stems from:

(i) the reification of the concept of system as an organic totality; (ii) the primacy accorded to structures over agencies; (iii) the use of positivism, with its subject-object distinction and its appeal to universality and objectivity; and (iv) from the systemic unit of analysis. The latter factor has the effect that once the systemic entities as independent variables are elevated to the forefront of inquiry, by making a sharp distinction between the international system and national social formations, then it becomes more and more difficult, if not impossible, to account for change on the one hand, and the impact of domestic factors in the constitution of international relations.

In recent years there have been new theoretical efforts within the realm of international political economy to analyze international relations, which take as their unit of analysis the society, defined as a social formation. In this respect, these theoretical efforts are alternative to the outside-in model.\(^1\) Moreover, the nature and laws of capitalist development have been the primary point of reference in the way in which they have directly or indirectly approached international relations. In addition, in doing so, they have employed the structuralist epistemological position, whose basic characteristics have been elaborated in Chapter II. As a result, what has emerged is a structuralist

\(^1\) It should be noted, however, that considering them to be an alternative entails broadening the scope of IRT in such a way that it includes international political economy as one of its constitutive units. This thesis, of course, suggests such a broadening. The necessity of incorporating them into IRT has also been called by Linklater (1990) and Gilpin (1987).

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adequate conception of capitalism. This can be found in Marx’s concept of "mode of production". The argument that Laclau makes in his polemical article, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America" (1971), is indeed the main point of reference upon which the mode of production problematic rests. Laclau’s argument points out convincingly that the basic deficiency in Frank’s vision of the Third World as a geographical space constituted by the process of "development of underdevelopment" stems from the fact that Frank’s "world capitalist system" confused the realms of production and exchange, giving in effect causal primacy to the latter. For Laclau, this confusion was of significance, in so far as it provided a theoretical underpinning for an analysis of the development of underdevelopment which is not capable of accounting for certain significant aspects of capitalism.

The suggestion for overcoming that deficiency follows from the notion of the articulation of modes of production. Since feudalism and capitalism differ in terms of their relations of production rather than exchange, Laclau contends that the expansion of capitalism has been marked by an articulation of pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production, rather than by unequal exchange between centre and periphery. Laclau argues for the insertion of Marx’s political economy into the study of development. This is, moreover, an insertion based upon an Althusserian reading of Marx’s Capital.

Laclau’s argument runs as follows. He agrees with Frank that the modernizationist "dual economy" thesis - that is, that traditional societies have both modern and traditional social structures, and they will become modern as a result of linear and continuous expansion of the former - is misleading. But as opposed to Frank’s all-embracing and homogenous conception of capitalism as an unequal exchange relationship, Laclau proposes the concept of the capitalist economic system as a structural and differentiated totality (1971:198). In this economic system there are a number of modes of production, identified with particular relations of production. A mode of production, in this sense, refers to "an integrated complex of social productive forces and relations linked to a determinate type of ownership of the means of production" (Laclau, 1971:67).

To regard capitalism as an exchange relationship is therefore to have a non-definition of what
constitutes capitalism. This does not mean, however, that exchange relations are unimportant to
Laclau. They are important within the context of the process of integration of peripheral societies into
the world market, which explicates the way in which merchant capital is at work on the world scale.
Laclau warns, however, that integration should not be considered a sufficient condition for an
adequate definition of capitalism. Nor should it lead to a view of Latin American societies as having
capitalism as the dominant mode of production. The implication of this is that once integration and
production are confused with one another, or once they are treated as if they were the same processes,
then the result is definitely to utilize such a misleading conception of capitalism. Frank’s failure to
define capitalism properly stems therefore from his confusion of the process of integration into the
world market with the constitution of a capitalist mode of production in a given social formation.

Although Laclau's critique of Frank provides a valuable insight by which specific inadequacies
and limitations of the sociology of underdevelopment can be overcome, it presents one fundamental
problem. ² That is, in his conception of an economic system as a co-existence of different modes of
production he confuses "contradiction" with "co-existence". A relational characterization of modes of
production for Laclau refers to a number of relations of production co-existing in a capitalist
economic system. Thus, a contradiction between different modes of production never arises in his
conception of an "economic system" and this leads him to neglect the question as to how to account
for the process of movement from "co-existence" to "domination". Consequently, the problem of the
emergence of the capitalist mode of production, establishment of its roots, and its domination over
other modes of production in peripheral societies remains unsolved by Laclau’s suggestion that these
societies should be analyzed in terms of the nature and laws of the capitalist mode of production. It
follows that what is needed is a theory derived from an adequate conceptualization of the
contradictory unity of different modes of production.

In recent years, it has been claimed by many that the theory needed is, in fact, that of
"articulation", whose epistemological basis has already been provided by structuralism (Rey: 1979;

² For detailed critiques of Laclau, see Alavi (1975), Foster-Carter (1980) and Mouzelis (1980).
Taylor; 1979; Wolpe; 1980). It has also been maintained that to the extent that the concept of "articulation" helps understand where the specific problems of peripheral societies lie, and provides theoretical solutions for those problems, it must be regarded as not only a theory of development but also a theory of global relations (Blomstrom and Hettne, 1986: 180-182). Indeed, the articulation of modes of production, problematic has occupied a special place in recent politico-economic accounts of global capitalism (Forbes and Thrift, 1985: 110-134).

Before beginning to elaborate the articulation-based analysis of international relations, it seems useful to recall the structuralist nature of the concept. Even though Marx used the term articulation in his analysis of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, it was in Althusserian structuralism that it gained a theoretical status. As noted in Chapter II, articulation was employed by Althusser to conceptualize society as a social formation as a concretely determined totality of different modes of production (1970:204). For Althusser, articulation produces two levels of abstraction. First, together with the concept of mode of production it corresponds to a high level of abstraction. It is a structural-objective means by which a process of theorizing of a social formation is started. Second, together with the concept of social formation it corresponds to a low level of abstraction, involving an empirical basis for the "concrete analysis of concrete situations" (1970:206-208). Thus, the operationalization of the concept of mode of production (recall from Chapter II that mode of production is an abstract-formal category for Althusser) is achieved by a simultaneous operation of articulation at both levels. It should be noted, however, that due to an overriding preoccupation with objectivity and universalism, Althusser fails to take into account shifts between levels of abstraction and proceeds by subordinating the low level of abstraction to the high level of abstraction. As a result, he approaches social phenomena through ahistorical laws and holistic frameworks. As reflected in the mode of production problematic, Althusser's failure means the construction of a formal model of capitalist development, which renders operationalization difficult.

Let us elaborate these points by concentrating on the way in which the problematic deals with the question of international relations. Following Althusser, Rey argues that "contradiction" and
"co-existence" are the main features of an historical process which contains in itself a conflicting relationship between capitalism and pre-capitalist economic formations (1979:81-109). For him, it is this conflictual-relational historical process that establishes exactly what "articulation" is. As for the study of international relations, the centrality of the concept of articulation as an historical process, according to Rey, lies in, first, the fact that it allows us to go beyond the classical Marxist base/superstructure metaphor from which the problems of reductionism and economic determinism have arisen and have brought about the basic deficiencies of both the classical Marxist theories of imperialism and the Frankian dependency discourse (and, for this matter world system theory). Secondly, it helps us to recognize the multi-linear character of historical development since it accords primacy to contradictions in explicating the increasing dominance of the capitalist mode of production over other modes.

Foster-Carter explains the significance of contradiction in Rey's structuralist account of development by stating that

conflict is a form of socialization so contradiction among modes of production is a form of articulation. Each concept needs the other: articulation without contradiction would indeed be static and anti-Marxist, but contradiction without articulation (or transition without articulation) fallaciously implies that the waxing and waning of modes of production are quite separate activities, each internally determined, whereas in fact they are linked as are wrestlers in a clinch (1978:73).

In other words, articulation alludes to a reciprocal relationship between coexistence and contradiction, which means that in the process of articulation of modes of production, different modes not only "join together" but also they "give expression to " each other. Thus, unlike the Frankian homogenous conception of underdevelopment, it is argued that there could be no single dominant system. There is instead a totality in which interactions among different relations of production are at work.

Capitalism can never immediately and totally eliminate the preceding modes of production, nor above all the relations of exploitation which characterize these modes of production. On the contrary, during an entire period it must reinforce these relations of exploitation since it is only this development which permits its own provisioning with goods coming from these modes of production, or with men driven from these modes of production and therefore compelled to sell their labour power to capitalism in order to survive (Foster-Carter, 1978: 59).

It is from this interaction between capitalism and the other modes that a model of articulation
is set forth. This is a model in which (i) an initial link is forged in the sphere of distribution
(exchange) in which interaction with capitalism reinforces the precapitalist production relations; and
(ii) capitalism takes root in the sphere of production, consolidating its order and its role, and thus
begins to subordinate production relations (Rey, 1979:98). In the course of articulation as a
process, the relations of production and corresponding class alliances are therefore of great
importance. They dictate the way in which penetration by the capitalist mode of production of the
pre-capitalist mode occurs in the Third World (Corbridge, 1986:57-59). In conclusion, Rey's model
of articulation suggests that in dealing with the problem of development attention must be given to
contradictions and class alliances that exist in a given historically determined social formation.

This argument implies that analyzing international relations with respect to the emergence of
capitalism in the North and its concurrent expansion to the South can be read off by the history of
the articulation of different modes of production. The first stage of articulation marks the expansion
of the capitalist mode through colonialism and its penetration into the South. The second stage
characterizes the expansion and deepening of the capitalist mode throughout the South. In so far as
these stages are analyzed through the concept of mode of production defined as a structural totality
containing both co-existence and a contradictory relationship between political, economic, and
ideological practices, the process of articulation is said to be able to provide an encompassing account
of the globalization of the capitalist mode of production (Rey, 1979:96). Thus, international relations
is defined as a process of articulation of different modes of production. 4

However, in Rey's analysis the process of articulation does not contain a systematic exposition
of the structuralist mode of production problematic. John Taylor in his seminal work, From

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3 Rey adds to these stages third one which marks the total disappearance of the pre-capitalist
mode in every sphere of production, even in agriculture. However, he immediately notes that the
world history of articulation has not reached this point yet.

4 This definition has also been provided by Bergesen who argues that in order for world-system
theory to gain explanatory power, the world economy should be conceptualized as a world mode of
production that constitutes a structural totality (1980:10).
Modernization to Modes of Production (1979), attempts to do so. His aim is to demonstrate how structuralism helps break with both Parsonian modernization theory and Frankian dependency theory. Underlying his aim is to point out the significance of an Althusserian structuralist epistemology for an analysis of the Third World (and also of international relations). For Taylor, structuralism is of great importance first, in disclosing ideological (non-scientific) features of both modernizationist and dependency assumptions in the study of international relations, and, second, in offering an holistic and truly objective analysis of Third World social formations (1979:105-112).

Taylor's argument is that it is with a structuralist epistemological position that a number of theoretical prerequisites can be established for a more adequate understanding of development (1979:100-104). He argues that the notion of underdevelopment has to be abandoned to recognize the presence of capitalist development in peripheral social formations. This would constitute the starting point for rescuing the concept of development from its positivist characteristic. Secondly, capitalist development has to be analyzed by searching for its structural determinant, that is the separation of direct producers from their means of production and the reflection of this institutional separation in the political and the economic. This means that capitalism should be conceptualized as a mode of production based on the primacy of production relations over exchange. Thirdly, in order to understand the contemporary reality, it is necessary to provide a genealogical account of capitalism, demonstrating how a capitalist mode of production comes into existence and subordinates the previous dominant modes. This means examining the articulation of capitalism with the other modes of production. Fourthly, peripheral social formations can be characterized with reference to a process of capitalist penetration (or of articulation) which brings about the uneven capitalist development both in these formations and at the level of the international. Finally, the uneven character of capitalist

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5 The term, ideological (non-scientific), derives from the structuralist critique of positivism, which suggests that positivism with its claim to correspond to reality offers an ideological knowledge of reality, in so far as reality that corresponds to the level of appearances is not objective but ideologically constructed. For structuralism, true scientific knowledge is obtained through searching for structural factors that take place behind appearance, corresponding to the level at which the essence of appearances is located.
development can be analyzed with respect to the contradictions that appear in the process of articulation between the capitalist mode of production and other modes, and between different social classes that belong to those modes of production. Such contradictions therefore have political, economic, and ideological consequences in peripheral societies.

These theoretical prerequisites demonstrate in a very systematic manner how the mode of production problematic approaches international relations. It should be pointed out, however, that although these prerequisites provide important insights for the study of international relations, they also present fundamental problems, which have the potential to render the problematic stagnant as well as unpedagogical, such that "the momentum of this literature is in danger of being lost" (Forbes and Thrift, 1984:117). Several reasons for this danger can be deduced from the fundamental problems inherent in the mode of production problematic. Firstly, the literature suffers from an "epistemological formalism" which arises from the general tendency in the problematic toward fetishizing scientific objectivism by privileging a high level of abstraction (a formal conception of mode of production) at the expense of historicity. The result is the construction of universal and totalizing explanations for capitalist development. Even though it is claimed that articulation consists of both a high level and a low level of abstraction, dominance in of explanation is based on the dissolution of reality into a mode of production as a structural totality. By employing a structuralist epistemological position, Laclau, Rey, and Taylor claim to provide truly scientific accounts of development, accounts that have been derived from a conceptualization of mode of production on the basis of the Althusserian Generalities I, II and III. Unfortunately, as has been seen in Chapter II, the result is that not only does historicity become subordinated to a formal model, but also the problematic acquires no practical content, and approaches the question of agency on the basis of the primacy of the structures. Hence, while emphasizing the importance of production relations and class alliances, Rey and Taylor

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6 The problematic is universal and totalizing, in so far as articulation is used to account for every situation that is likely to occur in peripheral social formations. Thus, it is assumed that every peripheral social formation will go through the same stages and display same characteristics concerning the relations of production. As a result, historical variety and national specificity are subsumed into the concept of mode of production.
start their analysis of development with structures and conclude with structures. Actors and their conditions of existence are derived from structures, and as a result, they are taken into account only as the supporters of the structures to which they belong. 7 Thus, the problematic offers a structural, holistic account of global relations, which is formal in that it does not attempt to address the issues of historical variety, national diversity and the production of capitalist spaces in social formations.

Secondly, the problematic involves what can be called "de facto reductionism". That is to say that although it attempts to overcome the problem of reductionism in the sociology of underdevelopment, its conception of the mode of production also tends to be reductionist. Such reductionism appears to have resulted from deducing the conditions of existence of political forms and ideological practices from the movement at the economic level. It is apparent that the concept of articulation is heavily dependent on the economic level to the exclusion of the political. Mouzelis describes this tendency in his critique of Taylor's reductionist account of "determination":

By separating phenomena into those amenable to structural analysis and those amenable to a conjunctural one, Taylor presents a conceptual framework which, indirectly and subtly, excludes even the possibility of asking whether certain forms of Western capitalist expansion might be based on a predominantly political rather than economic dynamic (1980:370).

The tendency towards identifying capitalist expansion with the economic level of mode of production - which results in equating the study of global relations with the study of economic development - has therefore led to the subordination of political forces and ideological practices to the process of capital accumulation and industrialization. Thus, on the one hand, what Laclau calls the "specificity of the political" (1977) is ignored and almost no importance is attached to the role and functions of the state. On the other hand, although "articulation" is regarded as a process in a social totality, the problematic fails to escape the orthodox base/superstructure metaphor. This is because articulation begins from the movement at the level of the economic and is then reflected at the other levels. As a result, scant attention is paid to instances and practices other than the economic, resulting

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7 This conception of agency is derived directly from the Althusserian conception of ideology as a practice constituting individuals as subjects (1970).
in the conceptualization of the economic as the basic structure in the process of articulation. In other words, the base/superstructure metaphor is reproduced in the problematic.

Together with epistemological formalism, "de facto reductionism" in this sense explicates the ways in which the concept of articulation is used in structuralism to theorize international relations in a holistic fashion. Of course, as Wendt has pointed out, this is an explanation for only one dimension of the study of international relations, which is, how structures "condition" action (1987: 9-11). This means that once this dimension is used as a general explanation for the functioning of global relations, it becomes more and more difficult, if not impossible, to avoid reductionism.

Thirdly, the problematic suffers from the problem of functionalism. This problem, as has been pointed out in Chapter II, is unavoidable in any epistemological position which operates with the conception of history as a process of structures without agents. Whether structuralist or structural-functionalist, they all are governed by functionalist explanations. In Rey's and Taylor's accounts of the process of articulation the condition of existence of every element is determined by its functions. Functionalism occurs when explanation is deduced from and corresponds to consequences. It is very evident in the mode of production problematic that even the term "contradiction" turns out to be functional in the sense that it dictates the production and reproduction of a peripheral social formation as a whole, but never contradicts the needs of global capitalism. Why capitalism acts beyond its own territory, why peripheral social formations are penetrated by the expansion of capitalism, and how capitalism comes into being in those formations are questions simply "read off" by the needs of international capital. Thus, it is argued that the relations of production of the previous mode of production survive and remain dominant in the first stage of articulation, because they are "functional" for capitalism. If they do not then that too is evidence of capitalism's functional requirements.

Functionalism in structuralist epistemologies thus leads to the dominance of synchronic explanations over the diachronic ones. In a synchronic explanation, in which there is always a structural causality between the reproduction of articulation and the needs of global capitalism, there
is no room for discontinuities that occur from the participation of agents in the reproduction of the productive system. Hence, it can be argued that unless the structure is regarded in its relation to agency, there is always a danger of falling into the trap of functionalism, especially for epistemological positions whose objective is to construct a holistic account of international relations.

In the light of the above-listed criticisms, the Articulation of Modes of Production problematic can be said to have operated with (i) an apparent insensitivity to the question of agency (epistemological formalism); (ii) an exclusion of political forces and ideological forms (de facto reductionism); and (iii) a strong tendency both towards ignoring historical diversity and national/spatial diversity (a totalizing mode of reasoning) and towards functionalism. All these problems, as the recent developments in the study of development have indicated, have given rise within structuralism to different proposals not only aiming at advancing the utility of the concept of mode of production, but also providing a new political economic framework for the study of international relations based on the primacy of the relations of production over the concept of structural totality. Among those proposals the ones that deserve attention here are historical structuralism and the regulation school which will be discussed next.

HISTORICAL STRUCTURALISM AND DEPENDENT CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

The concept of dependency, constructed out of the development of underdevelopment thesis, needed clarification and extension for at least two reasons. First of all, it was too broad. By typologizing a geographical space in which peripheral social formations occur as a posited underdeveloped ideal-type, it failed to recognize the existence of "capitalist development" in those formations. Secondly, it failed to acknowledge specific features of peripheral social formations such as historically constructed social relations of production, culturally-bound identities, specific hegemonic projects, and particular forms of the capitalist state, which have distinguished these social formations from one another.
Yet, the incorporation of the concept of the articulation of modes of production into the study of dependency proved to be ahistorical and formal. As a consequence, the question of how to conceptualize international relations from the perspective of development remained unsolved and quite problematical. By the mid-1970s some Latin American scholars - notably Cardoso and Faletto, O'Donnell, and Munck - proposed a new conceptual framework capable of bringing together the concepts of dependency and mode of production within the context of articulation, a low level of abstraction which was historical in nature. They demonstrated how the globalization of capitalist development had produced unevenness and argued that there was a need for an analysis sensitive to what Cardoso calls the "unity in diversity of capitalist associated development" (1979:12).

Such an analysis was founded upon the proposition that peripheral economies are integral parts of a world capitalist system, but at the same time recognized the dynamic nature of that system which results from its openness to "reconstructions" based on historical developments in international relations. As Palma has pointed out (1978:910-912), since such historical developments arise from "a dialectical interplay of internal and external factors" in such a way that the former are "mere concrete effects produced by the latter", the analysis suggested should take as its basic unit of analysis a national social formation, and attempt to account for the emergence, evolution and crisis of capitalist development in it by employing an historical epistemological position. It is this position that forms "historical structuralism" and its account of "dependent capitalist development". 8

According to historical structuralism, what makes structuralism historical is the role the relations of production (conceived of as an agent) play in the process of production and reproduction of a capitalist mode of production in a given national social formation. It is not the mode of production per se but the relations of production embedded in that social formation that constitute the dialectical interplay between internal and external factors, make social change multi-dimensional and give meaning to the logic of capitalist development of a national social formation. It is argued,

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8 The term, historical structuralism, is used directly by Cardoso and Faletto (1979), Cardoso (1979), and Munck (1985), and indirectly by O'Donnell (1975; 1979; 1980) to describe the epistemological basis of their accounts of dependent capitalist development.
thus, that the view of social change embodied in historical structuralism explicitly rejects both the universal evolutionary orthodox economic paradigm of development and the simple Marxist perspective of a fixed, linear sequence of modes of production. It also avoids the forced simplicity of the dependency approach which theorizes that there is one and only one mode of production (Chinchilla and Dietz, 1981:143).

Viewed this way, social change, or capitalist development, alludes to a process whereby "unity in diversity" defines the nature of international relations. Diversity involves national diversity and historical variety insolar as it arises from the uneven and asymmetrical structure of capitalist development. Unity therefore refers to the points of articulation within such diversity. Moreover, these points of articulation are not given but rather "concrete effects" produced within the realm where the state and the relations of production are in reciprocal and conflictual interaction. In this sense, the most distinguishing feature of historical structuralism lies perhaps in its employment of the concept of mode of production. Contrary to Althusserian versions, mode of production is considered a totality constituted by the relations of production and the corresponding class alliances, both of which indicate the "specificity of the political".

It should be pointed out here that it is with this conception of mode of production together with the identification of international relations as "unity in diversity", which should be explained within the context of the dialectical interplay between internal and external forces, that historical structuralism makes an important contribution to IRT. Not only does it move IRT beyond the outside-in model and universal explanations without ignoring the significance of structural factors, but also it provides a powerful alternative to positivism with its conception of dependency which is both historical and dynamic. Having said this, this section will discuss historical structuralism's account of dependent capitalist development and point out certain problems that that account involves.

According to Cardoso and Faletto, the way in which the concept has been employed in development studies involves an ambiguity, because it encompasses at least three distinct connotations (1979:vi-x). In one, it refers to a form of production arising from a particular pattern of industrialization in a social formation. In a second, it means an interrelated set of forms of
production which constitute "progressive stages" implying a transition from one mode of production to another. In this sense, it is used to indicate that the secondary or previous modes of production can never be dominant. Lastly, it has been used to allude to a system that brings about a functional interdependence among national social formations, which, in turn, separates one totality (core) from another (periphery). In each of these usages, the mode of production is identified with the economic level, and is used to explicate how capitalism implements its dominance over the world system. Thus every social and political phenomenon becomes a logical outcome of the law of motion of capitalism. Such a deduction, of course, inevitably ignores the specificity of the political, the significance of the relations of production in the process of the historical transformation of structures (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979:x).

Cardoso and Faletto argue, thus, that there is still no systematic theoretical discussion of the political (politics and the state) in peripheral social formations, and that what is needed is a reconceptualization of the mode of production on the basis of an analysis of the relationship between the political and the economic. For them, such a reconceptualization allows for the recognition of the fact that the globalization of capitalism may have different impacts and consequences in different social formations, depending on specific historical characteristics of each national peripheral social formation. It is this recognition that leads Cardoso and Faletto to define international relations as a unity in diversity.

Three conclusions can be drawn from Cardoso and Faletto’s understanding of global relations. The first is that any analysis that conceives of global relations with reference only to the logic of capital accumulation must be rejected. Central to this idea is that it is necessary to elaborate concepts and explanations able to show how general trends of capitalist expansion turn into concrete relations among men, classes, states in the periphery (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979:xviii).

In other words, the relations of power, domination, subordination are not externally induced relations, but are those which always appear and reappear internally, or as concrete effects produced by the dialectical interplay between internal and external factors.
A second conclusion is that any analysis that aims to provide a general and universal understanding of international relations must be rejected. It inevitably fails to account for the existence of different levels of capitalist development, of different political regimes and state forms, of different modes of capital accumulation and corresponding industrialization strategies in global relations. Cardoso and Faletto conclude that an adequate understanding of global relations ought to rely on the "particular" rather than "general".

The third conclusion is that in so far as the "particular" refers to specific historical characteristics of each national social formation arising from a particular mode of social conflict, the state as a political arena whereby power/domination relations are materialized and concretized has to be located at the centre of the study of capitalist development and its globalization.

In the light of these conclusions, it is clear that historical structuralism emphasizes the significance of history, bringing the category of "agency" in the structuralist study of international relations. It does so by taking the process of integration into the world system to be a structural point of reference, but at the same time focusing on inter- and intra-class relations (and conflict) in order to show the dialectical interplay between these two phenomena that occurs in the politico-economic and social organization of a national social formation as a whole.

In analyzing the dialectical interplay between internal and external forces in a historical way, historical structuralism focuses on the significant aspects of dependent capitalist development - the state, the dominant industrialization project, and the political regime. As the fundamental agent the state becomes the political arena whereby that dialectical interplay takes its historical form and identifies the definitional feature of the dominant industrialization projects. On the other hand, the history of capitalist development marks the persistence of the authoritarian political regimes in Latin America (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; O'Donnell, 1975; 1979). Such persistence, asserts historical structuralism, refutes the basic proposition of modernization theory and for that matter of functionalism that economic development leads to political development and the establishment of a democratic political regime.
Having conceptually elaborated their understanding of international relations as a "unity in diversity", Cardoso and Faletto attempt to explicate the way in which the development of capitalism has taken place in Latin America. In doing so, they trace the course of capitalist development into three successive periods, each of which involves a particular form of the dependent state, a mode of industrialization, and a form of an authoritarian political regime. A brief explanation of the way in which historical structuralism has analyzed these periods is necessary to understand its conception of the state, of industrialization, and of political regime.

The first period is characterized as "oligarchic" where the production and export of raw materials was the pre-eminent sector of economic activity. The form the state takes in this period was oligarchic in that it represents the interests of the export oligarchy. It is argued, thus, that the state consecrated the supremacy of classes and class fractions linked to the world market, either as exporters of raw materials and foodstuffs, importers of manufactured goods, or bankers and financiers of international trade (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979:21-25). In other words, the oligarchic state was based on the ruling class and the exclusion of other classes from the political arena. Because the popular sector had not yet become politically active, the scope of political competition was limited, and thus the oligarchic class of the primary sector (the exporters of minerals and agricultural products) dominated the state and oriented public policy around its needs (O'Donnell, 1979:23-24). This also gave rise to the organization of the state apparatus around a particular form of the authoritarian political regime which was based on the exclusion of the popular sector from the decision making process.

The second period is characterized as "populist", beginning after 1929. Cardoso and Faletto argue, in this context, that the mode of industrialization and capitalist development changed fundamentally after 1929 and that this change was not simply because of the Great Depression per se, but rather because of the political pressures on the oligarchic state by the new social groups and class fractions, and responses and reactions by the existing dominant classes to those pressures. For them this implies that
the political consequences of the world depression depended on the prevailing
scheme of domination in each country... In the Latin American countries that
industrialized, as well as in those that did not and had a corresponding increase in
the relative importance of their export economy, the different courses taken by
development depended on the way in which the social classes - traditional or new-
activated their force. The level of complexity that was reached in the social division
of work by a country during the period of outward expansion also affected
development, because it placed structural limitations on the emergence of new social
groups and on their possibilities of action (1979:100-101).

It is this dialectical relationship between external and internal factors that marks the dynamic and
complex character of domestic industrialization, known as import substitution industrialization in Latin
America which started during the 1930s.

As for the social groups and classes, according to Cardoso and Faletto, the distinctive feature
of the domestic industrialization in Latin America "was the growing participation of the urban middle
classes and of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie in the system of domination" (1979:126). In
addition, the orientation of the masses toward participation and economic and social distribution, and
thus the integration of their demands and interests into the domestic industrialization projects was
achieved through nationalist ideologies and developmentalist discourses. The articulation thus
established between different social groups and classes signified the very meaning of the ideology of
"developmentalism populism".

This ideology expressed conflicting interests: expanded consumption versus
accelerated investment in heavy industries, state participation in development versus
reinforcement of the private urban industrial sector. An ideology like
"developmentalism populism", in which contradictory goals could coexist, was an
attempt to achieve a reasonable consensus and to legitimize the power system based
on an industrialization program offering benefits for all (1979:130).

The reorganization of societal affairs around the
"developmentalism populism" is said by Cardoso and Faletto to be necessary and functionally effective,
since the establishment of a domestic market demanded

(1) availability of capital to be reinvested within a country; (2) availability of foreign
exchange to finance industrialization; (3) possibilities of income redistribution, even
it limited, to permit some degree of incorporation of the masses; (4) public and
private managerial ability to expand the domestic economy; (5) a minimum of
efficiency and responsibility in state administration; (6) a political leadership capable
of reconciling the conflicting interests of the different groups in the interest of the
"nation" (1979:130-131).
These requirements and the extent of their actualization constitute both differences among national social formations in terms of the degree of achievement of domestic industrialization and the distinctive characteristics of industrialization policies, both of which have put the state at the center of societal relations while making the relationship between the role of the state and the relations of production the primary point of reference for an historical and theoretical account of the dialectical interplay between internal and external factors.

After 1929 the form the state took was "populist" in that the state performed specific functions concerning the politico-economic and discursive reorganization of societal relations. With respect to its political economic functions, the primary concern of the populist state was the creation of the domestic market and the promotion of domestic industrialization. Therefore, the populist state attempts

(1) to introduce a number of politico-economic measures, such as control over foreign trade, exchange rates, and money supply; (2) to establish departments for economic planning; (3) to create industrial complexes under direct government control; (4) to implement a strict tariff system; (5) to protect national industrial bourgeoisie; (6) to pursue a relatively limited income redistribution by means of price and income policies; (7) to increase government expenditures with regard to infra-structural activities (Boron, 1981:59-61).

In performing these functions, the main objective of the state was to regulate both the activities of the masses and the relationship between the dominant and dominated classes. Such regulation was realized through a populist authoritarian political regime whose objective was to legitimize the two seemingly paradoxical functions of the populist state. On the one hand, where import substitution industrialization was the dominant economic policy, the state attempted to increase wages to expand consumption in the domestic market. This meant that the regime included the

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9 The term populist authoritarianism is used to show that its inclusionary character does not mean democracy, in so far as it was based upon the primacy of the state over civil society. Stepan argues in this context that among the existing social groups, only those whose interests fit the needs of domestic industrialization have been included into the decision-making process (1975:30-40). This means, the state was still the fundamental agent of industrialization.

10 Where export-led industrialization was the dominant economic policy, authoritarian regimes tended to be exclusionary in that only a small portion of the dominated class, which was a part of the capital accumulation process, was included into the decision-making process. For an extensive study
masses and their interest representation in the political system. On the other hand, it placed limitations on the organization and participation of the masses in the political arena in order to control their mobilization and demands.

Here the "developmentalist populist ideology" is of utmost importance for the functioning of populist authoritarianism. It is through the implementation of that ideology that the state creates a discursive space in which it presents itself as the representative of not one group but of different groups of a social formation. Furthermore, it attempts to expand the base of support for more effective and direct governmental decision making by mobilizing, not on the basis of class, but on the basis of "citizenship", that is, the nation (concretized in the state) versus anti-nation (foreign capital and core societies) (Roxborough, 1979:108-109). Following the writings of Nicos Poulantzas, historical structuralism argues that to perform its regulative functions the populist state tends to create the "naked individual" or citizenship in such a way as to constitute the "people-nation" rather than a class-based formation.

The domestic industrialization (the import substitution industrialization), which started with the Great Depression in 1929, as well as with the political pressures by the new urban bourgeoisie, had entered into crisis, when domestic market was saturated. The crisis manifested itself in rising prices, falling growth rates, a decline in the flow of direct foreign investment, and social and political unrest (Kaufmann, 1979:190). This crisis was also the crisis of the populist state since it was concretized and materialized in the political arena wherein the state was the main actor. In O'Donnell's terminology, the crisis was, in his sense, a "political impasse" in which "no sector was able to establish a stable domination and the norm was the creation of coalition which, although unable to impose their own preferences, were able to prevent other sectors from imposing theirs" (1977:56).

The third period is characterized as bureaucratic authoritarianism, marked by the emergence of the bureaucratic authoritarian state from the political impasse. Canak describes the constitutive elements of this "political impasse" by stating that

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of inclusionary and exclusionary populist authoritarian regimes, see Stepan (1975) and Collier (1979).
a highly mobilized, but fragmented, populist movement - one linked to the
deterioration of an industrialized, but structurally poorly integrated, capitalist
economy - confronted a state that was unable to satisfy conflicting demands in a
highly pluralistic population... the emergence of a class of technocrats and
bureaucrats in industry, government, and the military who subscribed to an ideology
of stability and the rapid growth of economy - that is, "rational" social planning and
social control - became the catalyst for a "class coalition" among the petty
bourgeoisie, state personnel, and military... the populist alliance of working class
organizations was in disarray, but political mobilization was still great, the economy
was caught in a squeeze of high inflation, unemployment was high, and no access
existed to the capital required for industrialization beyond import substitution

Canak concludes that the problem of how industrial production could be expanded thus gave rise to
the emergence of the internationalization of the domestic market and the reorganization of the state
under the bureaucratic authoritarian political regime.

The reorganization of the state was a response to the political-economic crisis, and for this
reason, according to historical structuralism, should be understood as a "problem-solving" gesture. The
two crucial problems to be solved were the restoration of an order and the normalization of economic
conditions, both of which were to provide an adequate basis of the expansion and extension of
industrialization. In this context, O'Donnell asserts that in order for the state to solve these problems,
it had to be "more comprehensive" in the range of activities it controls and directly manages: "dynamic" in its rates of growth compared to those of society as a whole;
"penetrating" through its subordination of various private areas of civil society,
"repressive" in the extension and efficacy of the coercion it applies; "bureaucratic" in the
formalization and differentiation of its own structures; and "technocratic" in the
application of efficient techniques of formal rationality (1977:54).

Such a reorganization based on these characteristics gave meaning to what O'Donnell once termed,
"bureaucratic authoritarianism" as a political regime, and the "bureaucratic authoritarian state" that
materialized that regime.

With its bureaucratic authoritarian regime and its highly repressive, rational, and technocratic
organizational structure, the state endeavoured to eliminate all working class organizations in order
to provide a suitable climate for the direct investment of international capital borne by multinational
corporations. Since the internal economic factors that caused the emergence of bureaucratic
authoritarianism associated with the failure of import substitution industrialization based on consumer
goods production for the domestic market, as O'Donnell has pointed out, the solution for the
politic-economical crisis was inevitably the "vertical integration" or the deepening of
capitalist development. This was achieved through the production of intermediate and productive
capital, which necessitated large, more efficient, highly centralized enterprises, multinational
corporations, due precisely to the need for technology, managerial capacity, or expertise to rationalize
the economy (1979:285-289).

It is for this reason that international capital and multinational corporations were conceived
by the state as an indispensable part of the process of the vertical integration of capital accumulation.
Cardoso emphasizes, thus, that the deepening of industrialization, organized around repressive state
activities, involved close linkages between the national and international economy, between interests
of indigenous and international capitals, and between dominant internal forces and the moment of
integration into the international division of labour, all of which occurred within the context of the
internationalization of the domestic economy (1979:33-41). This meant "a highly transnationalized
pattern of economic growth characterized by a skewed distribution of resources" (O'Donnell,
1979:290).

According to historical structuralism, the principal social basis of the bureaucratic
authoritarian state is international oligopolistic capital. However, this does not imply that historical
structuralism in its analysis of international relations gives primacy to the external factors. What it
implies is that the dependent state possesses potential autonomy in crisis situations. O'Donnell
explains this in the following way. The autonomy meant the fortification of state power which
manifested itself, first, in the organization of the state apparatus under the dominance of the executive
branch; second, in the militarization of the state apparatus; third, in the implementation of a "national
security" ideology which drastically reduced, even totally eliminated, the mobilization and participation
of the masses in political and economic affairs (Munck, 1985:220-224). Although the
internationalization of the domestic market required highly repressive state actions, the degree to
which the bureaucratic authoritarian state became militarized, the extent of the exclusion of domestic
forces from the decision making process, and the level of subjugation of the masses to the state depended on the dialectic interplay between internal and external factors, which is nationally specific.

For instance, an historical survey of the bureaucratic authoritarian restructuring of industrialization reveals that despite the phenomenon of fortification of the state, restructuring policies in Latin America resulted in a variety of bureaucratic authoritarian political regimes and of state organizations (Collier, 1979). Whereas national social formations such as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile became subject to military coups and experienced the militarization of the state, other formations, such as Mexico, had an authoritarian political regime which did not give rise to a military takeover (Munck, 1985:221-304). 11

Having demonstrated the way in which historical structuralism has analyzed the history of dependent capitalist development, it has become certain that in that analysis the category of a dialectical interplay between internal and external factors has an important epistemological status. Not only did it reveal the basic characteristic of international relations as a unity in diversity, but it also demonstrated that the internal features of national social formations should be taken into account to understand the functioning of that unity. This also meant in historical structuralism the use of the concept of articulation as a low level of abstraction which, unlike the mode of production problematic, has incorporated into structuralist epistemology an historical analysis and a recognition of national variety and specificity. Moreover, the importance of the state and state functions in the constitution of the capitalist mode of production has therefore been emphasized.

It can be concluded in this context that the historical structural account of dependent

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11 It should be noted here that historical structuralism in recent years has begun to analyze the emergence of the fourth period, characterized as a "transition to democracy" in Latin America in particular, and in peripheral societies in general. This analysis has given rise to the three volume publication of Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, O'Donnell, G A and Semiter, P. (eds.) 1986. However, this analysis of the process of democratization did not change the basic features of historical structuralism. Its understanding of bureaucratic authoritarianism and of the bureaucratic authoritarian state constituted the basis of its analysis of that process. See, O'Donnell (1988). For this reason, this section does not include a discussion of that analysis.
capitalist development has definite merits and consequences for the study of international relations. Three points are worth emphasizing here. First, contrary to the modernizationist assumption that capitalism leads to the democratic organization of the state apparatus, historical structuralism shows that there is no necessary correspondence between the capitalist mode of production and democracy. As noted, in Latin America, for example, the course of capitalist development resulted in the emergence of different forms of authoritarian political regimes around which different state forms were organized: namely the oligarchic, the populist, and the bureaucratic authoritarian states. This means that the relationship between development and political regime should not be taken for granted, but instead it should be analyzed historically. Moreover, in that analysis, the criterion that has to be used is not capitalist development per se, but rather the moment of integration into the world system (external factors) and the internal political pressures. To put it more precisely, an analysis of the specific and historical articulation of these two phenomena is needed.

A second point is also worth emphasizing. Contrary to the idea that development is impossible in peripheral societies due to their integration into the world system, historical structuralism traces the course of capitalist development and demonstrates the way in which industrialization occurred and took different forms in different social formations. The historical survey of industrialization that historical structuralism has initiated revealed not only the static and stagnationist features of the sociology of underdevelopment, but also the methodological problem that results from regarding peripheral social formations as an underdeveloped ideal type or of studying them typologically. In other words, the dialectical interplay between internal and external factors, argues historical structuralism, always indicates that there is no typical peripheral social formation, and stresses unity in diversity.

Thirdly, contrary to the modes of production problematic, historical structuralism's use of the concept of articulation at a low level of abstraction makes it possible to explain why the relations of production are of significance in explicating the course of capitalist development. In this way, it also makes it possible to avoid epistemological formalism from which the mode of production problematic.
as noted, suffers. Moreover, it makes it possible to provide a systematic study of the political level (the state) that has marked one of the crucial deficiencies of the study of development. In this context, historical structuralism emphasizes that the state is the central actor in the dialectical interplay between internal and external factors, in so far as it is within the state apparatus that interplay is materialized and concretized.

It has to be pointed out, however, that while according the central role to the state historical structuralism operates with a relatively untheorized conception of the state. Indeed, although, as the discussion of the oligarchic, the populist, and the bureaucratic authoritarian forms of capitalist development clearly shows, dependent capitalist development is conceptualized by Cardoso and Faletto (and for that matter by O'Donnell) with reference to the state, nowhere in their studies do they put forward their understanding of the state. They provide a systematic account of the role of the political level in capitalist development. They argue for the importance of the recognition of the state as a central actor for avoiding the problems of economic reductionism and class determinism. However, this argument does not lead them to take the state as a theoretical object of inquiry.

Nevertheless, a careful reading of their analysis of capitalist development reveals that the concept of the state Cardoso and Faletto have in mind involves both structuralist and Weberian elements. The reason for this lies in the fact that in their analysis of the three forms of capitalist development Cardoso and Faletto attribute to the state the ability to act as a relatively autonomous institution. Such autonomy sometimes appear to derive from structuralism, in that it is considered a structural characteristic of the state. As such, the state has autonomy vis-à-vis social classes because its primary function is to reproduce the existing order.  

On the other hand, the autonomy of the state in Cardoso and Faletto seems to be Weberian in that it refers to the power of the state to act independently and to impose in a legitimate way limitations and constraints on social classes. The notion of the fortification of state power as a

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12 The structuralist conception of the state finds a clear expression in Poulantzas's Political Power and Social Classes, in which the state is regarded as a unitary factor of the social formation in which it is embedded (1973:23).
characteristic of bureaucratic authoritarianism, the imposition of the developmentalist ideology, the ability of the state to include or exclude popular sectors from the decision-making process concerning industrialization, and the extent to which the populist state has determined the basic features of domestic import substitution industrialization, all exemplify the Weberian aspect of Cardoso and Faletto's conception of the autonomous state.

The point here is that whether structuralist or Weberian, in each case the state is conceptualized on the basis of the state/civil society distinction. Not only do Cardoso and Faletto affirm this distinction, but also they use it to elevate the state to the forefront of their analysis of capitalist development. The state thus becomes the central factor of social formations in Latin America. This is nothing but an announcement of the primacy of the political level over the other levels of the capitalist mode of production. Thus, both the relations of production and ideological forces are subordinated to the political level. As a result, although historical structuralism stresses the importance of the relations of production at the theoretical level, the way in which it analyzes the course of industrialization (especially since the construction of domestic industrialization in the 1930s) dictates the primacy of the state over these relations. The state becomes the primary architect of the dominant ideological forms and discourses (for example, developmentalist populism, nationalism, national security) that correspond to the dominant industrialization policies.

As a consequence, the untheorized concept of the state results in the overestimation of the role of the political level and the simultaneous underestimation of the relations of production (the role of the class and non-class actors) in the process of capitalist development. The state thus becomes the privileged entry into the analysis of social formation under investigation, and therefore, plays a constituting role in the establishment of the form the dialectical interplay between internal and external factors takes in a given time.

However, what is needed is not to deduce that interplay from a "prime mover" but, as Palma has correctly pointed out, to explain how external forces, once they are internalized, turn out to be one of the internal features of a national social formation in a given time and space (1978:912).
other words, there is a need to go beyond historical structuralism and provide an account of capitalist development without giving a central role to one unit over the others. Within the domain of structuralism, what has come to be known as the "regulation school" has attempted to undertake this task and developed a number of categories to analyze capitalist development. It is these categories that will be discussed in what follows.

THE REGULATION SCHOOL AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE CONCEPT OF GLOBAL FORDISM

As noted, although the concepts of mode of production and/or articulation are useful theoretical starting points in accounting for unity in diversity, the ways in which they are employed and operationalized in structuralism present several difficulties, ones which stem from either the construction of holistic epistemological and ontological knowledge claims at a high level of abstraction or from the identification of one category or concept as a prime mover of capitalist development. These problems indicate that if the concepts of mode of production and/or articulation are to be used in a structuralist manner to analyze international relations, what is needed is an account of how different elements are articulated with one another in a given space and time and thereby constitute a totality. Instead of beginning with the concept of totality, an analysis should pose, first of all, the question of how such totality has been constituted.

It is this attempt that specifies the place of what has come to be known as "the regulation school" within structuralism, and constitutes a point of departure by which that school separates itself from both the mode of production problematic and historical structuralism. Such a departure manifests itself in the realm of epistemology, as well as of ontology. It will be argued in what follows that it is with this departure that the regulation school strengthens the suggestion (which this chapter has made) that structuralism contributes to IRT. It should be noted immediately, however, that the regulation school has problems, such as functionalism and a reductionist tendency, that cannot be
Within the context of epistemology, the regulation school argues for a methodological framework in which concepts are not introduced once and for all at a single level of abstraction. They are transformed by the characteristic interplay which constitutes the passage from the abstract to the concrete and enables the concrete to be absorbed within theory (Aglietta, 1979:15).

Similarly, Lipietz warns us against two common errors:

The first consists of deducing concrete reality from immanent laws which are themselves deduced from a universal concept (Imperialism, Dependency). The second is simply the other side of the same coin: analyzing every concrete development in terms of the needs of the said concept, or, to be more specific, analyzing the internal evolution of national socio-economic formations as though they were merely parts of a musical score conducted by a world maestro, even if we do admit that the maestro is not himself a (bad) subject (1987a:9).

The implications of these warnings are that instead of deducing the concrete from a totality, the very constitution of the concrete, and thus of the totality has to be investigated. It follows that it is not general patterns, but the specific conditions of existence of social and politico-economic phenomena that gives a proper historical account of capitalist development. When reflected on history, this means recognizing the role that actors play in the making of history. In other words, people make history but not in the manner of their choosing.

Such implications constitute the methodological ground on which the regulation school puts forward a number of suggestions as to how to study capitalist development. As Boyer has clearly stated, in doing so, the regulation school makes use of, or engages in a debate with, several social scientific traditions:

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13 I am indebted to Michael Dolan for the part of this argument concerning functionalism. In our discussions about the regulation school, he insistently pointed out the structural functionalist tendency in that school. Although I agree with him that the regulation school involves functionalist explanations, I still maintain that it is problematical to consider it to be structural functionalist. The critique of functionalism has also been provided by Simon Clark (1989). However, his critique presents two fundamental difficulties: first, he fails to see the significant epistemological differences between positivism and structuralism; second, he employs a highly (class) reductionist view of capitalist development which renders very problematical the ground from which his attack on functionalism has emerged.
Steadily developing since the 1970s, theories of regulation bring together elements from several scientific traditions. They begin with a critique of orthodox Marxism, since they reject the idea of general, eternal laws applicable to all socioeconomic systems. Instead they draw upon the contributions of structuralism, which offered new foundations for concepts such as relations of production, modes of production, etc. However, regulation theorists recognize that a given social relation can take different historical forms, which help shape the configuration of social classes and the dynamics of the economy. Since they take the historical character of capitalism seriously, researchers using these approaches find the work of the Annales school to be another source of inspiration. Reacting against the rather fossilized Marxism of the interwar years, its founding fathers showed how the dynamics of both business cycles and major crises depend upon the forms of productive structures and social relations (1990:vii-viii). (Emphases added)

This lengthy quotation clearly shows from where the regulation school and its suggestions for the study of capitalist development come. These suggestions concern, first the study of "regularities", second the examination of "crises", and third the analysis of "changes" (Lipietz, 1987:12). Regularities are structural factors that have been imposed throughout history and past struggles on actors. Crises refer to discontinuities and moments of ruptures that arise from contradictions resulting from interventions that actors make into the realm of regulative and reproductive functions performed by structures. Changes imply transformations that occur from the struggle-based interactions between structures and agencies.

For the regulation school, these suggestions have profound ontological implications. First, they lead to a certain view of history as a process consisting of social relations, reproduction, contradictions, crises, or a process whereby structures and actors enter into a dialectical interplay (Jenson, 1988:16). Such a view of history involves a different conception of society than one based on dichotomies such as the base/superstructure, articulation of different levels of a mode of production, or the state/society distinction. Unlike the latter, the former conception of society is not founded upon the primacy of one level or region over the other nor upon a "prime mover" as the constituting principle, but upon interactions among historically and spatially constructed relations. In other words, society is conceived of as a constituted totality in which social and politico-economic relations are reproduced in such a way that makes them subject to change.

According to the regulation school, the move from a dichotomous conception of society towards one which is constituted requires an account as to where the process of "constitution" comes into existence. In this context, Lipietz argues that it is not in the realm of mode of production nor in the relationship
between the state and civil society, but in a given space that the social is constituted (1980:60-64). By space Lipietz means "the material form of existence of the socio-economic relations which structures social formation" (1980:61). Such a conception of space coincides with the idea that any social formation appears as an articulation of the economic, legal-political and ideological levels, all of which define a totality we refer to as a mode of production. However, unlike the mode of production problematic, the regulation school follows historical structuralism in coming to terms with the fact that at the epistemological level the category of "articulation" constitutes a low level of abstraction by which regulations, crises, contradictions, and changes are not only theoretically but also empirically investigated. This leads to the idea that the actual conditions of the articulation are realized in "a process" in which the dominant mode dominates, breaks down and integrates the dominated mode in successive phases in which the working rules of the social totality are modified (Lipietz, 1980:60-61).

The conception of articulation as a "process" makes the concept of spatial structuration the focus of an analysis of both production and reproduction of capitalism and international political economy. This is because

concrete socio-economic space appears both as the articulation of analysed spaces, as a product, a "reflection" of the articulation of social relationships, and at the same time, as far as already existing concrete space is concerned, as an objective constraint imposed upon the redeployment of those social relationships. We shall say that society recreates its space on the basis of a concrete space, always already provided, established in the past (Lipietz, 1980:61).

Thus, following Lash and Urry (1988), one can assert that the investigation of space (in fact, time and space) intrudes at three different levels in any social analysis of national or global phenomenon under investigation. First, it is in a given time-space that empirical events either in the form of everyday practices or of particular politico-economic events are distributed. Second, social and politico-economic entities or relationships such as the state, the state/civil society relations and the relations of production are constructed around a given spatial and temporal structuring. Third, inter-relationships between those entities are spatial and temporal, they are reproduced spatially and temporally, and they change over time in accordance with the spatial and temporal structuration of the space in which they are embedded (Lash and Urry, 1988:84-85).
For the analysis of capitalist development, all these arguments imply that at the level of ontology, a social formation should be taken as the primary unit of analysis and must be understood not as a constituting totality but as a spatially constituted totality in which neither structures alone nor actors alone, but spatial interrelationships between them define the actual conditions of an articulation of different economic, political, and ideological practices. This is because, social relations of production and the politico-economic practices are therefore both space forming (materializing) and space contingent (materialized), in so far as they are "part of socio-spatial dialectic unfolding over time in a succession of created spatialities" (Soja, 1985:99). Hence, a social formation alludes to a spatial formation which displays a particular expression of the articulation of modes of production in time and space.

Lipietz thinks of this expression as a form of spatiality that establishes a correspondence between "presence" and "absence" in a geographical space on the one hand, and between "participation" and "exclusion" in the structure considered (1980:61-62). It is in this correspondence that the relation between structures (processes) and apparent empirical events come into existence, and produce spatial configurations. For Lipietz, implied in this abstract understanding of spatiality is the existence of a potential conflict between what he calls an inherited space in which an articulation of modes of production has been historically constructed and what can be called a projected space which emerges from the contradictions, crises, and struggles that take place during the process of the articulation. As for the capitalist mode of production, this means that the domination of that mode over the pre-capitalist ones requires not only an inherited space, but also a transformation of that space into a new one called a projected space. It is for this reason that the concept of articulation, suggests Lipietz, must be regarded as a process of production, reproduction, crisis, and change in a given national social formation.

It should be noted, however, that this transformation is not autonomous nor linear, but is embedded in the process of articulation consisting of production, reproduction, crisis, and change. In other words, it involves both regulation (production and reproduction) and contradictions (crisis and change). According to Lipietz, herein lies the significance of the capitalist nation-state in its fullest political sense. It is the state that regulates potential conflicts that occur within the realm of the relationship between the
inherited space and a projected space:

Faced with the uneven development of socio-economic regions, the State must take care to avoid sparking off the political or social struggles which would arise from too abrupt a dissolution or integration of archaic modes of production. This is what it does in a general fashion when it inhibits the process of articulation (protectionism) or when it intervenes promptly to remove social consequences (permanent displacement allowances). But as soon as internal and international evolution make it necessary, capitalist development assigns to the state the role of controlling and encouraging the establishment of a new inter-regional division of labour. This "projected space" comes into more or less violent conflict with "inherited space". State intervention must therefore take the form of organizing the substitution of projected space for present space (Lipietz, 1980:74).

Two conclusions can be extrapolated from this quotation with regard to the way Lipietz thinks of the state. The first is that Lipietz, in his understanding of the state, moves from the macropolitical view of the state to spatiality to account for the role the state plays in spatial politics and spatial regulation. This is an important move, because it allows for a concrete analysis of state action. For Lipietz, this is also a necessary movement, because the generative problem of the c-italist mode of production, which arises from the inability of private capital to reproduce itself, emerges from space, not at the level of society (1970:72). In Lipietz's view of capitalism, the central point is "the lack of an equivalent 'law of value in space', the absence of an autonomous mechanism of spatial self-regulation through capitalist competition and organized market relations" (ibid.). This means that because private capital is incapable of arranging its spatial efficiency for private accumulation, and also of mystifying its exploitive nature, the state in the course of the development of the capitalist mode of production becomes the main regulative mechanism, or indispensable part of the survival of capitalism, and one of the primary agencies that are of the utmost importance in the production and reproduction of territorial spatial formations. It can be concluded that the self-reproduction of capital, that is, the process of capital accumulation, is secured through the aegis of the state, which takes place in a given space.

However, this is a functionalist explanation. The second conclusion, in this sense, is that in his move to spatiality, Lipietz approaches the question of the state in a functionalist manner. In other words, he maintains the functionalist view that there is a functional necessity for the state to intervene in the economy to help private capital overcome the problems it is facing. To say that capitalist development
assigns to the state the role of controlling and encouraging the establishment of a new division of labour is to argue that the state has predetermined functions that exist external to it. As will be pointed out, such functionalism is also apparent in the meta-theoretical categories employed by the regulation school to analyze capitalist development.

It is on the basis of the spatial understanding of the development of capitalism, or of the process of the articulation of modes of production, a number of meta-theoretical categories are constructed in the regulation school. It is argued that it is through these categories that differences among national social formations, as well as specific features that they possess, with regard to the structuration of capitalist relations, can be discovered (Boyer, 1990; Lipietz, 1987; and Aglietta, 1979). These categories are those of "regime of accumulation" and "mode of regulation".

A regime of accumulation refers to "the fairly long-term stabilization of the allocation of social production between consumption and accumulation" (Lipietz, 1987:14). In other words, as Boyer has defined, it refers to

"[t]he ensemble of regularities that assure a general and relatively coherent progression of the accumulation process. This coherent whole absorbs or temporarily delays the distortions and disequilibria that are born out of the accumulation process itself" (1990:46)

In this sense, a regime of accumulation in a national social formation involves a correspondence between the production and the reproduction of the capital/labour relationship on the one hand, and certain modalities in which the capitalist mode of production is articulated with pre-capitalist modes of production. More specifically, a regime of accumulation defines a totality of regularities in respect to a given type of market organization, a certain type of relation between labour and capital, a certain mode of competition, certain type of industrial relations, and a certain composition of social demand. Lipietz argues that defined this way, a regime of accumulation refers also to "scheme of reproduction".

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14 It should be noted that Lipietz in his recent studies tries to avoid functionalism by making his account of the role of the state what he calls an historical (ex post) statement. For detail, see Lipietz (1988). However, as will become apparent, his attempt cannot rescue the concept of regulation from its functionalist character. In this respect, see Lipietz (1987b) and Jenson (1989).

15 Moulaert and Swyngedouw provide an extensive discussion of these characteristics (1990:330-331).
This does not mean, however, that reproduction is a unilinear and automatic process, or that a regime of accumulation is capable of stabilizing and maintaining its condition of existence. According to Lipietz,

there is of course no reason why all individual capitals should come peacefully together within a coherent schema of reproduction. The regime of accumulation must therefore be materialized in the shape of norms, habits, laws and regulating networks which ensure the unity of the process and which guarantee that its agents conform more or less to the schema of reproduction in their day-to-day behaviour and struggles (both the economic struggle between capitalists and wage-earners, and that between capitals) (1987:14-15).

In so far as individual capitals and agents do not necessarily act according to structural determinations, a regime of accumulation requires regulative networks which ensure approximate consistency of agencies' behaviours with the process of reproduction. 16 Lipietz suggests, in this context, that "this body of interiorized rules and social processes is called the 'mode of regulation' which involves a certain organization of wage relations, of competition, of the state's regulative functions, and a certain mode of integration into the world economy (1987:19).

Lipietz extrapolates from these meta-theoretical categories a methodological lesson for the study of capitalist development. Unless such meta-theoretical concepts, which will help recognize the specific conditions of existence of each national social formation, are developed a concrete analysis of concrete situations is impossible. The result would be to deduce reality either from the need of the said concept (Dependency, Imperialism) or from immanent laws (International Division of Labour), or from a universal concept (Mode of Production) (Lipietz, 1987:19-23).

Lipietz thus accuses both the mode of production problematic and historical structuralism of failing to see the significance of "internal factors", or to put it more precisely, the relations of production,

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16 It should be noted however that to say that accumulation requires regulative networks involves a functional explanation, because regulative networks are conceptualized - at the level of epistemology - in terms of functions that they are given to perform.
for the development of capitalism. 17

The development of capitalism in any given country is first and foremost the outcome of internal class struggles which result in embryonic regimes of accumulation being consolidated by forms of regulation that are backed up by the local state. Within these national social formations, it may be the case that relations with the outside world established long ago by certain agents (trading companies, military expeditions, etc.) proved not only acceptable but even useful to certain dominant groups, and that they became decisively important to the regime of accumulation in so far as the national social formation can no longer function without them because they resolve one or more of the contradictions inherent in its mode of reproduction (Lipietz, 1987:19).

Reflecting on centre-periphery relations, what this quotation implies is that the relation of centre and periphery is neither a direct relationship between states nor a relationship constructed out of unequal exchange relations but "relations between processes". Such relations are constituted as a result of socio-political struggles as well as of regimes of accumulation (Lipietz, 1987:25).

Although this understanding of international relations seems to be similar to that of historical structuralism in terms of the concept of the dialectical interplay between internal and external factors, it displays a number of fundamental differences. First, the regulation school gives primary to internal struggles in the process of the dialectical interplay between internal and external factors. It does not conceive of the state as the "prime mover", but rather as the basic regulative mechanism in which a resolution of class struggle is achieved with the establishment of such compromises (Lipietz, 1987:19).

Secondly, even though both historical structuralism and the regulation school recognize the specificity of national social formations, unlike the former the latter takes the internal determinants and their spatial configurations to be the primary criterion to define the term specificity. This difference becomes apparent in Lipietz's criticism of Cardoso and Faletto in which he argues that instead of establishing a functional correspondence between internal and external factors, we should study each national social formation in its own right, "using the weapons of history, statistics and even econometrics to identify its successive regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation", and also to see "to what extent external factors did or did not have a role to play" (1987:20). Internal factors are, therefore, determinant, at

17 It should be pointed out, however, that this accusation would take Lipietz only one step further. That is to say that Lipietz's understanding of capitalism presents problems in itself, which will be dealt with in the following pages.
least in the sense that they disprove from the outset the idea that the regime of accumulation and the mode of regulation in periphery is more or less the processes of the actualization of the needs of the centre, or of the international division of labour.

Herein lies the unique character of the regulation school's conceptualization of international: it is a process whereby national social formations (as the basic unit of analysis) internalize the politico-economic phenomena that exist as external to them, but the process of internalization takes place within the spatially constructed reciprocal relationship between a regime of accumulation and the mode of regulation. This is to say that if generalizations about international relations are to be made they have to be derived from the concrete analysis of concrete social formations with respect to regimes of accumulation that are "specific" to them. In this sense, an international division of labour is not the starting point, nor a constituting entity, but a "configuration" that has arisen from the interplay between internal and external factors. The regulation school defines as "Global Fordism" the configuration that has characterized the constitution of international relations after the Second World War. Global Fordism in this sense gives meaning also to the compromise of embedded liberalism which, as noted in Chapter IV, defined the basic principle of the post-world war II world order.\footnote{\textsuperscript{18}}

The term, Fordism, which the regulation school borrows from Gramsci, alludes to a specific regime of accumulation in which "the development of means of production sector of the economy went together with the modernization of the consumer goods sector, whose expansion was stimulated by an apparently unprecedented labour-capital compromise" (Boyer, 1990:ix). More specifically, it is a regime of accumulation which was centred upon mass production and mass consumption with polarization of skills, high productivity growth and full employment. As Lipietz has argued, this regime "incorporated both productivity rises and a corresponding rise in popular consumption into the determination of wages and nominal profits a priori" (1987a:35). Thus, the Fordist regime of accumulation was based on and

\footnote{\textsuperscript{18} It should be noted, however, that to what extent the term Global Fordism is global is questionable. Lipietz's study of the Third World - that is, peripheral Fordism - appears to be derived from the experience of Latin American societies, such as Brasil, Argentina, and Mexico. I am indebted to Michael Dolan for this point.}
marked by an intensification of concern over the control of the direct producers in the sphere of production. Consequently, it is on the basis of these principles that the Fordist regime of accumulation was produced and reproduced, and gave meaning to the mode of growth (or capitalist development) in which the scientific organization of labour was the organizing principle.

As pointed out, a regime of accumulation must be stabilized or regulated. Just as every accumulation strategy, the Fordist regime of accumulation needed to be regulated in order to secure its condition of existence which was dependent upon "the continual adaptation of mass consumption to productivity" (Lipietz, 1986:26). As Aglietta has suggested, the state must establish, maintain, and reproduce the requisite mechanisms of social regulation (1979:34). Such regulation was achieved through the policies initiated by the state which had taken the "welfare state" form (Jenson, 1989:60-64). As such, the basic aim of the state was to provide a suitable platform for the mass consumption of mass-produced commodities. The realization of this aim was achieved not in a national context, but through the intervention of the state in the spatial realm in which the Fordist regime of accumulation was produced and reproduced. It is through its spatially organized interventions that the state integrated into mass consumption norms non-capitalist elements which did not have as their specific mode of economic activity the Fordist regime of accumulation (Lipietz, 1979:72-75).

According to the regulation school, the Fordist regime of accumulation also marked the postwar economic growth with its extension as global Fordism (Boyer, 1990; Lipietz, 1987a; Aglietta, 1979, 1982). Its international regulation was achieved through the hegemonic position of the United States and the installation of the dollar as the accepted international unit of account. This also means that for the regulation school, the dollar was key to the United State's hegemonic position over the international system. In this sense, the Bretton Woods system, which was dealt with in Chapter IV, was essential to the establishment of necessary mechanisms for the extension of Fordism as global Fordism (Lipietz, 1987a).

The characterization of the postwar II economic growth as Fordism leads the regulation school to conceive of the decline of the United States's hegemonic position and the emergence of the crisis.
of global capitalism as a contributor to the crisis of Fordism. The current structure of global capitalism is thus seen as pushing the transition to post-Fordism. The crisis of Fordism is associated with the falling rate of profit and the problems of productivity (Boyer, 1990; Lipietz, 1987a). It is accounted for within the context of the regime of accumulation and the mode of regulation. It was therefore argued that at the national level, the contradiction between the need for productivity increases and the established capital-labour relationship, the need for market expansion, and the crisis of the Keynesian welfare state dictated the crisis of Fordism (Boyer, 1990:xi-xvi; Harvey, 1989; Jenson, 1989; and Jessop, 1989). At the level of the international, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the reemergence of protective trade practices, and the decline of the United States’s hegemony were the elements of this crisis.

What is important here is to point out that the concept of Fordism provided the regulation school with a primary point of reference by which to characterize and analyze the post war II world order and its crisis. However it should also be pointed out this status accorded to Fordism does not contradict the regulation school’s basic argument that historical variety and national specificity constitute the fundamental principles by which to analyze capitalist development. Lipietz thus asserts that although Fordism constituted a pattern of development in advanced capitalist social formations (and also in OECD countries), this however would not imply that each national social formation has had the same Fordist regime of accumulation. On the contrary, Fordism manifested itself in each of those formations differently in accordance with the specific societal features that each social formation possessed with its own relations of production. For example, the political economists, associated with the regulation school, discovered in their own studies that Fordism was organized in Britain as "flawed fordism", in Germany as "export-oriented fordism" (Jessop, 1989), and in Canada as "permeable fordism" (Jenson, 1989). Just as in those social formations, the manifestation of Fordism in peripheral societies was also different (Lipietz, 1987), and took a "peripheral fordist" form.

Peripheral fordism, which can be said to have occurred during the 1970s in certain Latin American social formations and in Korea, as well as in Southern Europe, was organized around both mechanization
and a combination of intensive accumulation and an organized market for consumer durables (Lipietz, 1987:78-79). However, it remained peripheral due to the fact that

in terms of the world circuits of productive branches, jobs and production processes corresponding to the 'skilled manufacturing' and engineering levels are still mainly located outside these countries. Its markets represent a specific combination of consumption by the local middle classes, with workers in the Fordist sectors having limited access to consumer durables, and exports of cheap manufactures to the centre. Growth in social demand (which means 'world' demand) for consumer durables is thus anticipated, but at the national level it is not institutionally regulated or adjusted to productivity gains in local Fordist branches (Lipietz, 1987a:79).

According to Lipietz, peripheral Fordism in this sense appears to be constituted by a specific articulation of import substitution and export-led industrialization policies. Lipietz singles out at least two different modes of operation of peripheral Fordism (1987:79-82). The first is that Fordism occurs as "an element of the internal regime of accumulation" in a peripheral social formation. In this case, one can talk about the role Fordism plays in the process of domestic industrialization, and of constitution of certain class alliances. The second is that it operates as "an element of the regime of accumulation which links the center to the NICs in terms of the overall production process and in terms of all markets" (Lipietz, 1987a:80). Lipietz goes on to argue that such a differentiation would arise from the particular combination of accumulation and regulation which emerges from certain internal class alliances.

The implications of such a differentiation, according to the regulation school, are three fold. First, it indicates that each social formation has its own specificity in terms of the regime of accumulation and the mode of regulation which it involves. Secondly, it demonstrates that the notion "global Fordism" does not designate a "structure" that conditions, defines, or constitutes the way in which global relations secure their condition of existence. And finally, it emphasizes the significance of the relation of production and of the nation state in the establishment of industrialization strategies. With respect to the regulation school's understanding of international relations, the conclusion which can be drawn from these implications is that concrete reality, whether politico-economic or social, should not be deduced from universal concepts. Instead, international relations should be understood as a totality constituted through the interactions between various national regimes of accumulation, whose condition of existence depends on the internal elements and characteristics of national social formations.
These three points distinguish the regulation school from the mode of production problematic and historical structuralism. They also indicate that the regulation school makes a significant contribution to the development of the structuralist understanding of capitalist development. However, this does not mean that the regulation school is without problems. Indeed, it presents several difficulties which should not be ignored.¹⁹ For the purposes of this chapter, two difficulties are worth emphasizing: (i) as noted, there is a tendency in the school toward functionalism. This is apparent in the explanation of the relationship between accumulation and regulation. In constructing its explanation, the regulation school makes use of a functionalist language, such as "accumulation requires regulation", "the capitalist development assigns a role to the state", (Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1980, 1987a). This means that the regulation school does not break with the structuralist view that regulation is necessary in order to ensure the reproduction of the totality as a whole. Thus, while criticizing the mode of production problematic and historical structuralism as being functionalist, the regulation school falls into the trap of functionalism when it deals with the question of regulation. ²⁰

Nevertheless, there are two ways in which the problem of functionalism can be overcome within the regulation school. The first is to think of regulation by broadening the definition of politics in such a way as to include the question of representation. Jensen argues in this context that thinking of politics in terms of the question of representation involves not only the question of the state, but also that of social construction of identities via the mobilization of interests (1989: 71-78). In other words, how interests get constructed, what is the role of the state in that construction, and why certain interests are articulated into the decision making process, while others are being excluded, all these questions,

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¹⁹ The regulation school has also been charged with economic reductionism and technological determinism. Economic reductionism is said to result from the tendency toward regarding the regime of accumulation as the starting point of analysis. Technological determinism is connected with the definition of Fordism which overestimates the role of technology on the one hand, and tends to view technology as being independent from the relations of production. For detail, see Harvey (1989), Moulært and Swyngedouw (1990).

²⁰ Jane Jensen’s interview with Lipietz demonstrates very clearly the functionalist use of the concept of regulation. In that interview, Lipietz’s account of regulation appears to be Parsonian (1987b:17-26).
argues Jenson, requires us to broaden the definition of politics. It can be argued that the broadened definition of politics helps overcome the problem of functionalism, in so far as it does not regard regulation as the principal mechanism of reproduction at the epistemological level. Instead, it attempts to demonstrate how regulative mechanism are constructed in a given time and space. That is to say that, the mode of operation of regulative mechanisms has directly to do with the specific characteristics of the social formation in which such operation takes place.

The second way of overcoming the problem of functionalism is to pay attention to idelogical and discursive regulative mechanisms. As Harvey (1989) and Albertsen (1988) have correctly pointed out, a number of ideological forms and discursive practices, such as the discourse of modernism, consumption norms, consumer reference system, have played an important role in the regulation of the Fordist mode of accumulation. The discourse of consumer society has always been integral to Fordism. For this reason, thinking of regulation also with reference to these forms and practices help overcome functionalism. However, these two proposed solution to functionalism has not yet been fully incorporated into the regulation school;

(ii) the regulation school's move towards a spatial-temporal level from the macro-economic level, while making adequate use of the category of articulation (as a low level of abstraction), would not result in ample consideration of the dialectical interplay between internal and external factors. For it is regarded by the regulation school as a process in which internal elements are accorded primacy over external elements. This primacy might not constitute a problem in the study of the development of capitalism in advanced capitalist social formations, but it would pose a problem within the context of peripheral capitalism in that it reduces the effects produced by external elements in peripheral social formations to almost zero. In this sense, one could wonder if the regulation school, especially as articulated by the writings of Lipietz, has a theory of imperialism. For Lipietz, in order for external elements to have an effect on the peripheral capitalism, the internal variables have to be facing a crisis situation, or unable to secure the reproduction of the internal regime of accumulation (1987a:19-28). And, for this reason, internal factors, argues Lipietz, ought to be regarded as the primary point of reference.
Such an argument is misleading in that it ignores from the outset the role external factors have played even in the constitution of internal class structures (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Palma, 1978; Alavi, 1985). This is why Palma insistedly emphasizes that external factors, once they are internalized, become one of the internal features of a national social formation in which they produce effects (1978:912). Nevertheless, one should not ignore the regulation school’s warning that such an account has to be derived from, or be located in, a spatial understanding of capitalist development in order to prevent the analysis from privileging a concept, or from using it as the "prime factor" of development.

CONCLUSION: STRUCTURALISM, DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

This chapter has demonstrated the structuralist reading of international relations. It has shown that structuralism does not constitute a homogenous realm, that it consists of a number of paradigmatic positions and that each position employs structuralism in a different way. The chapter has pointed out both the strong and weak points of structuralism through a critical discussion of the three paradigmatic positions. It has become apparent throughout the discussion that, as is, structuralism has serious problems. Its uncritical use involves tendencies towards formalism, reductionism, and universalism. The discussion of the mode of production debate illustrated this point. At the same time, the discussion of historical structuralism and the regulation school has indicated that the use of structuralism which is not formal nor universal, but sensitive to history, differences, and the role of actors in the making of history provides a better understanding of capitalist development.

It is this form of structuralism that, as this chapter has demonstrated, contributes to IRT in a number of significant ways:

(i) as opposed to realism, and the other versions of the outside-in model, it promotes an understanding of international relations based on the recognition of differences, that is, of historical variety and national specificity. In this sense, it provides a challenge to the universalist understanding of international relations;
(ii) as opposed to the outside-in model, it takes the national social formation as the basic unit of analysis. This helps analyze the relationship between international and domestic affairs, which has long been
ignored in the domain of IRT. In doing so, structuralism provides a specification of international relations as an interplay between external and internal forces in which the former, when internalized, become one of the internal features of the latter; and

(iii) structuralism brings into the domain of IRT the question of development, thereby indicating the importance of international political economy to IRT. This is an important move for two reasons. First, it provides an account of structural elements without reifying them. The recognition of differences and of the internal characteristic of national social formations prevents the reification of the concept of totality which is the case in the outside-in model. Second, it makes it clear that in the process of the reproduction of the international system internal factors play an important role. Indeed, reproduction is actualized and secured not only at the level of the international, but more importantly within national social formations, in so far as international relations refer to the process of internalization of external factors and their becoming of one of the internal features of these formations.

These contributions should not be ignored and have to be taken into account for a proper understanding of international relations. For this reason, the place of structuralism in the process of transformation of IRT is significant. This is because not the world system theory, but the structuralist account of development, dependency, and international political economy provides a strong challenge to the positivist and realist IRT. It should therefore be regarded as one of the necessary units of the post-realist and post-positivist IRT.

However, the question of development is not the only neglected aspect of IRT. As has been emphasized, the question of the state, more specifically its untheorized nature in IRT is as significant to IRT as that of development. As this chapter has demonstrated, structuralism does not provide a solution to this problem. The mode of production problematic, historical structuralism, and the regulation school do not operate with a theoretically developed conception of the state. Although they appear to take the state as a central factor in the process of development, they do not attempt to theorize the state. They do not consider the state to be a theoretical object of inquiry. As a result, the state remains untheorized in structuralism.
With its unauthorized nature, the concept of the state however presents a fundamental problem to IRT. In recent years, there have been theoretical efforts in the domain of IRT to take this problem seriously and to find a solution to it. These efforts will be critically discussed in what follows.
CHAPTER VI

THE PROBLEM OF THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY:

IS THE AGENCY PROBLEMATIC: A SOLUTION?

The objective of this chapter is to discuss the problem of the state in IRT. In doing so, the intention is not, however, to trace back all the components of this problem in IRT. Instead, this chapter will focus on two specific issues. The first concerns the theoretical nature of the concept of the state in IRT. In this respect, the chapter will argue that the state has remained untheorized in IRT. The implication of this argument is that with its untheorized nature the concept of the state has created what Halliday has called a theoretical "impasse", which is integral to, or constitutes one of the aspects of, the recent transformation and the proliferation of IRT.

The second issue this chapter will focus on concerns the proposed solution to that impasse. 1 A solution has been derived from the recent "rediscovery" in social theory of the state which, has given rise to the "state-centric" model of society. It was suggested that the incorporation into IRT of that model would help overcome the impasse, in so far as it provides a number of useful insights for a better conceptualization of the state. This chapter will argue in this respect that the call for such incorporation is in fact an attempt to construct an agency problematic and that its contribution to IRT, which should be taken seriously, should be critically discussed. Its strength and weaknesses should be pointed out.

THE STATE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

There is no doubt that one of the most problematic concepts within the study of international relations has been that of the state. The concept itself has always been regarded as "the key" to

1 This solution has been proposed first by Halliday (1987), and followed by Jarvis (1989), and Linklater (1986; 1990). The need for taking the rediscovery of the state seriously has also been expressed by Higgott (1989) and Rosenberg (1990).
It should be noticed, however, that the model and the agency-problematic it develops, while escaping functionalism and arguing for the necessity to recognize the specificity of the state, eventually constructs an institutionally essentialist theory of the state. As noted in Chapter IV, essentialism refers to a mode of analysis in which one category is elevated to privileged status, is used as a privileged entry into history, and thus becomes the principal point of reference by which social relations and their reproduction is "read off". In the state-centric model, the concept of the state as a potentially autonomous agency functions precisely as an essentialist theoretical construct. It becomes the privileged entry into the history of the emergence, development, and reproduction of modern societies. As a consequence, the model tends to be as reductionist as the society-centric theories of the state that it aims to criticize. With respect to IRT, this means that the state-centric model offers only a partial solution to the problem of the state in IRT, which in turn weakens the validity of the assertion that it is through the incorporation of the model that IRT's impasse can be overcome.

BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN: THE STATE-CENTRIC MODEL

Theda Skocpol characterizes her current work as a call to "bring the state back in", thereby making it possible to move beyond highly speculative theoretical debates concerning the autonomy of the state. Her intention is to convince the reader that state theory has to be developed from a particular vantage point, one that is historical and comparative. Her conclusion is that the state has to be conceived of as an institution, a social actor, and a set of bureaucratic apparatuses. State policy and structure should not be derived from social structures, but should be considered in their internal specificity, which stems from their historical and spatial dimensions.

If states should be regarded as distinctive structures with their own histories as well as in terms of complex global circumstances that provided the context for state action, how should the state itself be conceptualized? Probably one of the most striking features of the conception of the state as a distinct organization with its own specific history is that it very clearly bears the mark of Max Weber
comprehending the operation of the international system, its structure and its fundamental characteristics. In the realist paradigm, it was assumed in an a-priori fashion that the international system could not exist without the state, or nation-states, in so far as it was the nation state and interactions among them that constituted the system itself. Such an assumption of course stresses the unity of the nation-state and the concomitant development of a state system, initially in Europe and then on an international level, and this suggests that the state is the basic unit of analysis in the study of international relations. In the realist paradigm,

the state is viewed as the "essential actor" whose interests, power, decisions, practices, and interactions with other states define and exhaust the scope and content of international politics as an autonomous sphere...there is no political life absent of states, prior to states, or independent of states. Political interests that are not reducible to state interests enter the international political realm only insofar as they are mediated by state interests (Ashley, 1983:430).

This does not mean, however, that the state, or to put it more precisely, the conceptualization of the state, was the primary concern of international relations theory. As Walker has correctly pointed out,

[t]o speak of the state itself, however, is to confront a number of difficulties. For although the state has long been the central category of international political theory, its precise nature has remained rather enigmatic. The worst caricatures of it are well known: the billiard ball or black box operating within a determinist mechanical system; the proliferating categories of early decision-making theory; the identification of politics with the more or less formal institutions of government. At the other extreme, there are finely detailed analyses of the foreign-policy making processes of individual states in which the state, as state, is dissolved in particularities. Even apart from these extremes, it would be difficult to argue that international political theory possesses anything like an adequate account of the nature of the state (1984:531-532).

In other words, instead of taking the state as an object of theoretical inquiry, IRT has tended to conceive of it as the main-actor, as an ontological entity, as an observable given institutional entity.

The concept of the state has been used interchangeably with "nation", "power", and

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2 This argument has been made within the context of the general perception of IRT as being dominated by the realist paradigm. See Walker (1984: 1989), Higgott (1989), Ashley (1989) and Smith (1990).
"sovereignty" (Ferguson and Marchach, 1988:7). For instance, the realist paradigm viewed the state as the cornerstone of international politics, but yet never attempted to conceptualize it. Instead, it reduced the state to the decision-making process whereby the only objective was to maintain nation-interest defined as "the struggle for national power" (Morgenthau, 1966:2-3).

It can be argued in this respect that the equation of the state with the decision-making process constitutes the essence of the realist view of the state.³ It should be noted immediately that the decision-making process from which the view of the state is derived concerns only the external world, the inter-state system characterized by anarchy. As McKinnon and Little have noted, "the analytical tools of domestic politics are deemed by realists to be neither appropriate nor desirable for international phenomena" (1986:71). In this sense, the decision-making process is considered to be independent from the domestic society, which means the potential autonomy of the political sphere, characterized by state action and state power.

The autonomy from and the externality to domestic politics, which realism accords to the state, and its ahistorical primary function, the struggle for national power, makes the state an unproblematic entity, an ontological given, which is "exempted from scientific (falsificationist) or any other kind of critical inquiry" (Ashley, 1984:238). The state is viewed as a decision-making subject, "an external object, an untheorized fact, and ahistorical entity" (George, 1989:99). Viewed in this manner, the state represents:

an unproblematic unity, an entity whose existence, boundaries, identifying structures, constituencies, legitimations, interests and capacities to make self-regarding decisions can be treated as given (Ashley, 1984:23).

It can be concluded here that considered in this manner, the state does not need to be theorized, because it speaks for itself, just as the facts do in positivism. Thus, the state is taken for granted, no theoretical question is raised about its precise nature, as well as about the basic characteristics of the social formation in which it is embedded. While taking the state as its

³ For instance, Waltz (1959 and 1979), Aron (1981), and Bull (1977) share this view of the state, and tend to derive it from their realist understanding of the decision-making process.
cornerstone, the realist paradigm therefore ignores the complex conceptual question with which it appeared to have been concerned itself. Instead, the realist paradigm constructs a state-centric model, or what they have called the "billiard ball-model", of international politics without having a theory of the state.

Interestingly enough, when the realist problematic was challenged by functionalism - or the interdependence problematic - as well as by world-system theory, at stake was the problem of the unit of analysis, not the state as an object of theoretical inquiry. As noted in Chapter III, the functionalist critique of realism was based on the theory of interdependence and transnationalism, in which non-state actors, international governmental and non-governmental organizations were considered independent actors. What was suggested was that because the nature of the international system had already become transnational, characterized by the growing interdependency among nation states, the role of the state has begun to decline. This meant that, as functionalism has proposed, international organizations as the agents of transnationalism, as non-state actors, should be taken as the basic unit of analysis.

However, it should be pointed out that this proposal was not directed at the realist conception of the state, nor did it challenge that. It has been derived from the unit of analysis problem and has been based upon an effort to replace one unit with another. However, the problem of the state is not whether its role and its power have been declining, but whether it has any theoretical status in the realist paradigm.4

At the same time, the outside-in account of international relations provided by world system theory has challenged the realist paradigm by giving an epistemological primacy to "structures" or the structural features of the global system over state behaviour. As noted in Chapter V, world system theory did not take as one of its primary concerns the question of the state; instead it derived its understanding of the state from its study of international structures, which resulted in the employment

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4 As noted in Chapter IV, the functionalist critique of realism, because it was not directed at the theoretical nature of the state, did not pose a fundamental problem to realism. Moreover, it was integrated into realism, which has given rise to the concept of international regimes.
of the concept of the state only as "derivative". Thus, the state in world system theory was either dissolving into the system or reduced to an institution whose functions derived from, or were assigned by, the system. What was common to these challenges is, in fact, a replacement of the state with some other actor - either non-state actors or structures. Nowhere in these challenges was the question of how to conceptualize the state posed.

The conception of the state employed by historical structuralism and the regulation school might be considered to challenge the realist paradigm. One could argue that their attempt to locate the state in the process of industrialization, their understanding of international relations as an interplay between internal and external forces and the place they give to the state in that interplay, together challenge the two-fold distinction that realism draws between international politics and domestic politics and between the political and the economic. However, it is disputable whether their conceptions of the state can be used to overcome the problem of the state in IRT. The very obvious reason for this lies in the fact that, as pointed out in Chapter V, their conceptions of the state too are relatively untheorized. In the case of historical structuralism, the concept of the state appears to have both structuralist and Weberian connotations. In the case of the regulation school, it appears to be derived from the economic level. The state is regarded as one of the the basic mechanisms of regulation which accumulation requires for its reproduction. Thus, the specificity of the state, the sources of its autonomy, and the problematic nature of the state/civil society relationship all remain unresolved questions even in these paradigmatic positions.

The untheorized nature of the state therefore creates a problem area in IRT (Halliday, 1987; Higgott, 1989; Giddens, 1985; Caporosa, 1990). According to Halliday, this problem also indicates that modern international relations theory appears to have reached "a impasse" due to its failure to address the question of the state: a theory of the state, which, while being so central to the discipline, has long been ignored (1987:216). Ferguson and Mansbach have asserted that the concept of the state has become an "obstacle to international relations theory": (1989:2). Likewise, Krasner, who once stated that the state was to become a major concern of scholarly discourse, admitted that in his
attempt to think of the state as an analytical construct he failed to theorize the state not by "problematicizing the state/civil society relations" (1989:189).

While a theory of the state was being called, as Halliday has correctly observed, "the comparable trend within sociology has been to re-examine the state and to re-assert its centrality in historical and contemporary contexts" (1987: 217). Social theorists, such as Skocpol, Evans, Giddens and Mann were proposing new ways to develop a theory of the state, especially of the nation state.\(^5\)

Common to their proposals were the assumptions that a proper theory of the nation state should be historical, in that it has to be placed in an historical process that is both national and international in nature. In other words, a proper analysis of the emergence, the development, the role, and the functions of the nation state would necessarily entail taking into account the international dimension of state behaviour, state power, and state action.

At the level of epistemology, central to such an analysis is the rejection of the structuralist and instrumentalist understandings of the state that conceive of state action as a manifestation of societal patterns of conflictual relations between social collective actors.\(^6\) By doing so, it reintroduces the category of "agency", which makes the analysis take a historical form in which the state as an institutional agency is theorized through an historical analysis of interactions between structures and agencies. In this sense, what has been proposed is an historical sociological intervention in social theory via an institutional analysis of the state in its own specificity vis-a-vis other societal institutions.

This intervention finds its expression in Skocpol’s call for Bringing the State Back In. In doing so, Skocpol’s aim is not only to explain the potential autonomy of the state by means of historical sociology, but also to construct a "state-centric model" by which to read social and global relations within the context of the structure-agency doublet.

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\(^6\) For a detailed discussion of these theories, see Carnoy (1984) and Jessop(1982).
According to Fred Halliday, the interest in the state, which has been taking place in social theory, has considerable implications for IRT (1987: 217). It suggests a way to reassess the debate on the state within the field of International Relations by asking questions: what we mean by the state, how to define the state, and how to understand the autonomy of the state. Halliday is in fact proposing that if the debate on the state has already reached an impasse due to its failure to consider the state to be an analytical and theoretical construct, one way to overcome the problem is to integrate into IRT new developments in the theory of the state, to study them and in so doing to theorize the state in an adequate way. It is this proposed solution to the problem of the state in IRT which will be critically discussed in what follows.

THE AGENCY PROBLEMATIC AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE

The eighties witnessed various attempts to develop an adequate theory of the nation-state in contradistinction to earlier society-centred versions, all of which fell prey to various forms of structural functionalism. Notable among these are the works of Theda Skocpol, Michael Mann, and Anthony Giddens each of which provides a distinctive critique. Despite differences, which will become apparent later, all three can be said to offer a state-centric alternative that aims at elevating the concept of the state to the centre of contemporary political discourse.

The state-centric model is founded upon three basic theoretical propositions, which are derived from a critique of the society-centric model as a "reductionist" theory of the state. First, it is suggested, in regard to the ontological structure of the state, that the state should be viewed as a potentially autonomous institutional agency having its own life and history. This suggestion has two

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7 The state-centric model also involves corporatist and neo-institutionalist theories of the state. For a detailed discussion and critique of these theories, see McLennan (1989) and Therborn (1986).

8 The society-centric model involves all the theories of the state, whether liberal or marxist. Yet, the structuralist theories of the state, especially the one developed by Poulantzas, constitute the basic target of the state-centric model.
implications. On the one hand, it creates a similarity between realism and the state-centric model as far as the potential autonomy accorded to the state is concerned. On the other hand, it implies that the society-centric theories of the state fail to recognize the specificity of the state in so far as they have concentrated their attention almost exclusively on the societal determinants of state action - neglecting, as a result, the distinct institutional features of the state.

Second, the state-centric model insists that the theory of the state should take geopolitics seriously. Society-centric theories of the state tend to ignore the international dimension, which, the state-centric model argues, makes them unable to explore adequately the sources of state power. It is also on this point that realism and the state-centric model converge. Indeed, as Linklater has argued, the state-centric model derives its critique from the realist assertion that geopolitics is the primary point of reference in IRT and for a proper understanding of state power as well as state autonomy (1986:303-307).

Third, by conceptualizing the state as an institutional agency, the state-centric model claims to have re-introduced the category of "agency" into the domain of social theory as well as into IRT. Thus, it constitutes an agency problematic. The re-introduction of agency rescues social theory from its subordination to the structuralist and functionalist orthodoxies that have constituted the epistemological basis of the society-centric theories of the state. This rescue, the state-centric model contends, can provide a solution to the on-going sociological problem: how do social agents make history, but not in the manner of their own choosing? With respect to IRT, this rescue involves a non-functionalist theorization of the state (Halliday, 1987:210-217).

In what follows, the utility of the state-centric model to IRT will be critically discussed. It will be argued that the model offers important and useful insights which makes it possible to move IRT beyond positivism and the outside-in model. Moreover, by providing a non-functionalist theorization of the state, it helps question the concept of totality which gives rise to the problem of functionalism in the structuralist account of capitalist development. The state-centric model thus contributes to IRT and such contribution should be recognized.
It should be noticed, however, that the model and the agency-problematic it develops, while escaping functionalism and arguing for the necessity to recognize the specificity of the state, eventually constructs an institutionally essentialist theory of the state. As noted in Chapter IV, essentialism refers to a mode of analysis in which one category is elevated to privileged status, is used as a privileged entry into history, and thus becomes the principal point of reference by which social relations and their reproduction is "read off". In the state-centric model, the concept of the state as a potentially autonomous agency functions precisely as an essentialist theoretical construct. It becomes the privileged entry into the history of the emergence, development, and reproduction of modern societies. As a consequence, the model tends to be as reductionist as the society-centric theories of the state that it aims to criticize. With respect to IRT, this means that the state-centric model offers only a partial solution to the problem of the state in IRT, which in turn weakens the validity of the assertion that it is through the incorporation of the model that IRT's impasse can be overcome.

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If states should be regarded as distinctive structures with their own histories as well as in terms of complex global circumstances that provided the context for state action, how should the state itself be conceptualized? Probably one of the most striking features of the conception of the state as a distinct organization with its own specific history is that it very clearly bears the mark of Max Weber.
(within the context of the potential autonomy of the state and state power), and of the historian Otto Hintze (within the context of the significance of the inter-state system to the study of the state).

The idea that it is important to relate the state both to its national social formation and to the context of global conditions and pressures, according to Skocpol, involves an emphasis placed upon "the territorial basis of the state" (1987:222). Herein lies the significance of Weber for Skocpol's approach to the state. Weber conceptualizes the state as an organization claiming a monopoly of power and coercion in a given territory (1948:77-78). This means that states, especially national states, always function in relation to other territories, and are always concerned with their own boundaries with other states. This leads Skocpol to propose that the geopolitical framework of state action pre-existed capitalism, and allowed the state to act as an independent actor. It is the territoriality of state action that makes the state operate outside and above civil society, that makes it clear that it preceded capitalist development, and that gives the state its own history.

Skocpol also follows Hintze to hold by asserting that the structure of the state cannot be properly analyzed without taking into account the international dimension of state action. Hintze argues that there are two phenomenon that determine the real organization of the state. First, there is the structure of social classes, and second, there is the external ordering of states - their position relative to each other, and their overall position in the world. Struggles among social classes at home and conflict among nations have a dramatic impact on the organization and power of states. The "shape" of a state - its size, external configuration, military structure, ethnic relations, and labour composition, among other things - is deeply rooted in the history of external events and conditions (from Held, 1984:68). It is from Hintze's argument that Skocpol extrapolates the idea that the state constitutes a "dual anchorage" between socio-economic structures and an international system of states. States may be affected by capitalist development, but this does not mean that they are the products of that development: "Indeed, just as capitalist development has spurred transformation of states and the international state system, so have these 'acted back' upon the course of capital accumulation within nations and upon a world scale" (Skocpol, 1980:110).
According to Skocpol, recognizing the internal specificity of the state, one can see that, the state is fundamentally Janus-faced, with an intrinsically dual anchorage in class-divided socio-economic structures and an international system of states...the international state system as a transnational structure of military competition was not originally created by capitalism. Throughout modern world history, it represents an analytically autonomous level of transnational reality - interdependent in its structure and dynamics with world capitalism, but not reducible to it (1979:32).

That is to say, the international state system antedated the rise of capitalism, which provided an historical space for the state to gain autonomy, in fact, a potential autonomy vis-a-vis the social formation to which it belonged.

The recognition of the historical specificity of the state allows Skocpol to criticize the systemic understanding of international relations with reference to world-system theory. As noted in Chapter IV, world-system theory analyzes international relations through the outside-in model. Thus, it argues that since the sixteenth century, the world capitalist system has characterized international relations and that the inter-state system can only establish the political superstructure of that system. Following Hintze's dual anchorage thesis, Skocpol raises a crucial question: does the inter-state system constitutes a political superstructure or a distinct historical reality?

In this respect, world system theory can be said to fail to appreciate the independent efficacy of the state by reducing the state to the system. However, this problem is by no means restricted to world system theory. Skocpol's approach to the state incorporates a conception of history which is not unilinear, but consists of a number of processes, interdependent but not reducible to one another. Such a conception of history, with its emphasis on interdependency, is also a corrective to realism in so far as it points out the importance of elements apart from security. Finally, the Janus-faced characterization of the state allows Skocpol to stress the importance of the recognition of the specificity of the state. As noted, this mode of analysis does not necessitate functional explanations.

The recognition of the specificity of the state also allows Skocpol both to analyze state policy and structure through an historical-comparative sociological agenda and to construct the theory of the state as the basis of the state-centric model. Thus, the state refers to a set of administrative, policing,
and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority. Nevertheless, the administrative and coercive organizations are the basis of state power. Sakopecpol suggests that such a conception illuminates the ways the capacities of state organizations create state power; the ways state policies are formulated in relation to the interest of social and political groups and the existing global circumstances; and finally, how state personnel create their own operational modus-operandi, formulate policies through which the state regulates internal security and competes with other states. Consequently, "bringing the state back in" avoids an abstract theory of the state and allows study of how the state shapes and reshapes social and politico-economic relations in a given society.

THE INCORPORATION OF "BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN" INTO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: HALLIDAY'S CONTRIBUTION

According to Fred Halliday, IRT has reached "an impasse" due to the fact that it has never attempted to conceptualize the state, nor has it tried to go further than the description of the state that presupposes that the state refers to a national territorial totality:

Thus the 'state' (e.g., Britain, Russia, America, etc.) comprises in conceptual form what is denoted visually on a map - the country as a whole and all that is within a territory, government, people, society. There could be no better summary of this view than that of Northedge in the introductory chapter to his International Political System: A state, in the sense used in this book, is a territorial association of people recognized for purposes of law and diplomacy as a legally equal member of the system of states. It is in reality a means of organizing people for the purpose of their participation in the international system (1987:217).

Contrary to the a priori assumption that the state constitutes a national-territory totality, there exists in the realm of sociology an alternative approach to the state, which, by drawing on Max Weber and Otto Hintze, defines it as "a specific set of coercive and administrative institutions, distinct from the broader political, social and national context in which it finds itself" (Halliday, 1987:218). The

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9 This point has also been made by Held (1984).
latter definition of the state, suggests Halliday, saves the state from being 'a troublesome abstraction' and establishes a proper means by which to come to terms with 'real states' in all their complexity. Moreover, it helps explicate the way in which states gain sovereignty, control their own territory and create a mode of representation of their peoples. Finally, and more importantly, it appears to be more able to generate questions about "the effectiveness of the international dimension".

Halliday argues in this context that conceptualizing the state as a set of coercive and administrative institutions and also in terms of the very historical complexities of inter-state relations enables one to pose questions such as why and how participation in the international realm strengthens or weakens states, why and under what circumstances it permits states to gain autonomy and act independently vis-a-vis the social formations they govern, and under what conditions states become less or more responsive to, and representative of, their social formations precisely because of their international role.

The least that can be said, therefore, is that an alternative conceptualization of the state permits analytical questions and avenues of research markedly different from the totality approach. In the first place this alternative definition of the state opens up a set of conceptual distinctions that are often confused and conflated in literature on international relations, but which need to be separated out if the state-society relationship is to be more clearly identified (Halliday, 1987:219).

At this point, it becomes clear that Halliday's intention is in fact to introduce a problematic into IRT, based on the conception of the state as an institutional agency consisting of a set of coercive and administrative institutions and focusing on the state-society relationship. It is a problematic, asserts Halliday, which is able to contribute to the development of IRT, because it opens up a set of conceptual distinctions that are of significance in understanding state structure and state action and permits new analytical questions and avenues of research.

There are at least three distinctions upon which Halliday's assertion rests. The first is a distinction between state and society. It argues that the state constitutes an ensemble of coercive and administrative apparatuses and the access of social groups to them vary according to the power, wealth and political skills of these groups. The second distinction is that between the state and government. Contrary to conventional international political discourse that sees the state and government as
identical entities, the new problematic with its institutional conception of the state separates "the ensemble of administrative apparatuses" from "the executive personnel formally in position of supreme control" in order to refute the assumption that the state represent society as a whole, and also to show that in certain circumstances elements within the state may resist or actively oppose the policies of government (Halliday, 1987:219). The third distinction is that between state and nation. The term, nation-state, as it is used in the conventional international political discourse, refers to a national and territorial totality based on an assumption of ethnic homogeneity and political representivity, which, according to Halliday, does not apply, in empirical terms, to the structure of international relations. For, in that structure, states with different political regimes may have different modes of representation, there exists ethnic diversity, and there may be a gap between a mode of international conduct and national interest (1987:220). The distinction between state and nation therefore permits the question of how far the national state represents the nation, which would definitely entail perceiving the state to be something more than a national, territorial totality.

In addition to these distinctions, the problematic that Halliday develops consists of a number of research avenues that aim to examine the state in an historical way. These are at least four avenues that Halliday thinks are fundamental to an accurate understanding of the modern state. The first concerns the origin of the state. Here Halliday draws on Charles Tilly's text, The Formation of Nation States in Europe (1975) and argues that, as Tilly has shown through his detailed historical investigations about the emergence of the nation states in Europe, the origin of the modern nation state lies in coercion and extraction, "both against the populations subjected to states and against rivals" (1987:270). The state therefore should be referred to as an "instrument of subjugation" or as a "protection racket". Halliday's argument implies that the conventional understanding of the state as a national territorial totality understates the subjugation of the state in its origin, and at the same time overestimates the representational function of it, although the meaning of representation has
changed over time. 10

The second research avenue is related to the importance of the world-historical context in shaping the internal organization of the state. Here Halliday affirms the central argument of Bringing the State Back In, that geopolitics provides the context and formative influence for states, and adds that this is true not only for post-colonial states, but also for European states.

The third avenue of research is to show how states are formative of societies. By this Halliday means the ideological and organizational functions of states, functions having to do with the formation of national consciousness, of national ideologies, and of national economies (1987:221).

The fourth avenue concerns the question of state capacities, especially those that are central to the state's own internal composition and relation to society. As the agenda of Bringing the State Back In has suggested, an explanation for state capacities requires comparative and historical investigations through which one could explicate how states govern and administer their own populations and territories, impose control on societal relations, and produce effects in the constitution of those relations. Such investigations, according to Halliday, not only help go beyond the concept of sovereignty that presupposes that the state assumes a monopoly of power and legitimacy in its own territorial formation, but also demonstrate the significance of the international dimension for state capacitates.

Having outlined the basic distinctions and the central research avenues that his problematic emphasizes, Halliday concludes that they provide useful insights for the conception of the state as a set of coercive and administrative institutions. At the same time, they show the ways the state as an analytical and theoretical construct can affect, and also contribute to, IRT. They do so by pointing out the quality of the structure of the state not only as a domestic actor but also as an international one.

Although useful for analytical questions it raises and research avenues it develops, Halliday's

10 Here Halliday’s targets are realism in both its traditional and contemporary forms: structural realism and modified structural realism and Marxist political discourse in world system theory and structuralism, especially the Poulantziasian version of the theory of the state.
problematic does not do more than integrate into IRT the state-centric model constructed by Skocpol. Furthermore, such integration is not realized by Halliday through a critical examination of the state-centric model. Instead Halliday takes *Bringing The State Back In*, makes use of the concept of the state developed by it, and introduces that concept and its analytical and methodological characteristics to IRT. However, a mode of integration of this sort leaves unanswered, or unanalyzed, two questions that the state-centric model of Skocpol has not analyzed thoroughly: those of state power (the relationship of state and power) and the concept of modern society (the main features of the process of the constitution of modern societal affairs). As for the first question, it can be said that it is striking that even though Halliday's problematic is devoted to exploring analytical and methodological categories in such a way as to construct a theory of the state for international relations theory it dismisses or disregards the concept of power that has always been so central to any understanding of the state. The second question is also crucial if the construction of the state-centric model is not to be made at the expense of societal relations and their historical forms that have had definite effects on the formation of modern societies as well as of global relations.

Neither Skocpol nor Halliday provides deep and extensive explanations for these questions. Nevertheless, within the literature of historical sociology of the state there are attempts that aim at constructing a theory of the state on the basis of these questions and by employing the institutional conception of the state as a potentially autonomous agent. They also place a special emphasis on the international dimension and on geopolitics to conceptualize state autonomy. It could be argued, therefore, that like *Bringing the State Back In* and Halliday's problematic, they should be considered historical-sociological contributions to IRT, which constitutes at the level of epistemology an agency problematic. \(^{11}\) Since the principal concern of this chapter is to examine the quality of that problematic as a whole, a presentation of these attempts, Michael Mann's *The Autonomy of State Power* and Anthony Giddens's *Nation State and Violence*, should be provided before Halliday's

\(^{11}\) Likewise, Jarvis (1989), Rosenberg (1990), and Linklater (1986 and 1990) think of Mann and Giddens as integral to the agency problematic (based on a historical sociological account of states, societies, and geopolitics).
research agenda is critically assessed.

THE AUTONOMOUS POWER OF THE STATE

In what sense can the state be considered to have a distinct identity? It is this question that leads Michael Mann to undertake the task of exploring the links between states, societies, and geopolitics with the intention of seeking the sources of state autonomy. Although his conception of the state appears to be identical to that of Bringing the State Back In, Mann has a different research avenue, one which searches for the sources of state autonomy on the basis of the concept of power, and employs an historical and spatial understanding of society. Therefore, it can be said that Mann's attempt to analyze the sources of state autonomy broadens and deepens the boundaries of the state-centric model by integrating into it an historical-spatial analysis of power. The concept of power provides Mann with an analytical and theoretical device by which to sustain the state/society separation as the basis of the state-centric model.

In his research Mann states from the outset that the general tendency in contemporary political discourse has been to assume that the state acts in a society as a national and territorial totality (1986:2). For Mann, this tendency, which results from a 'unitary' understanding of national social formations, should be considered methodologically and historically untenable, precisely because state, culture, and economy almost never coincide historically. At the heart of Mann's statement lies the argument that societies do not constitute unitary and organic totalities. Once society is conceived of as an unproblematic, unitary totality, it becomes impossible to recognize the specificity of the state, because the totality-based conception of society results in either the equation of the nation state and society or the dissolution of the state into economy or culture. State, economy, and culture have their own histories, their own conditions of existence. None of them can be the basic unit of "society"; they only constitute different networks of society.

When reflected on the study of international relations, this means that like Skocpol and
Halliday, Mann conceptualizes the international system as consisting of a number of processes. Yet he adds to the agency problematic what Skocpol and Halliday lack, that is, the epistemological basis of such conceptualization. A non-unitary conception of society allows Mann both to analyze the interstate system in its historical and spatial specificity and to argue for its irreducibility to other processes. This conception of society contributes to IRT, in so far as it can be used to question the concept of totality from which, Mann believes, the problem of functionalism arises (1986:15-19). The way in which Mann claims to overcome the problem of functionalism derives from his understanding of processes that society consists of as intersecting power networks.

Mann extrapolates from this non-totality, or non-unitary, understanding of society a methodological proposition that "societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power" as institutional means of attaining human goals. These networks are defined as ideological, economic, military, and political power relations that constitute sociospatial and organizational means of social control of people, materials, and territories (1986:5). The organizational and sociospatial model of power, therefore, illuminates not only the way in which networks of social interaction operate in a given society and an historical context, but also how organizational and institutional means are used to attain power.

The political power network derives from the utility of centralized, institutionalized, territorialized regulation of many aspects of social relations. It consists of regulations and means of coercion centrally administered and territorially bounded which, Mann suggests, constitute state power (1986:16). Moreover, the exercise of power brings about the state's distinctive contribution to social life in so far as political relations concern one particular area, the "centre" or the state. Political power, for this reason, is located at the centre and exercised outward. In addition, political organization of the state is not delimited by the national sphere, but has an international dimension as well. As Mann puts it,

Domestically, the state is territorially centralized and territorially-bounded. States can thus attain greater autonomous power when social life generates emergent possibilities for enhanced cooperation and exploitation of a centralized form over a confined territorial area. It depends predominantly upon techniques of authoritative
power, because it is centralized, though not as much so as military organization...But states' territorial boundaries -- in a world never yet dominated by a single state -- also give rise to an area of regulated inter-state relations... Clearly, geopolitical organization is very different from the other power organizations mentioned so far. It is indeed normally ignored by sociological theory. But it is an essential part of social life and it is not reducible to the "internal" power configurations of its component states (1984:120).

There are three ways, Mann argues, in which the state appropriates its power. They are identified as the "necessity of the state", the "multiplicity" of its functions, and its "territorial centrality". For Mann, the necessity of the state is an historical fact. Simple historical observation shows that throughout history no complex, civilized societies existed without a centre of binding rule-making authority whose function is to implement rules and regulations necessary to create order and social cohesion. In addition, throughout history, complex societies have existed, and still exist, in a multi-state civilization which make necessary the creation of certain rules of conduct, especially with regard to the protection of life and property, which require the establishment and maintenance of a monopolistic organization that has been the province of the state. For this reason "necessity", claims Mann, is "the mother of state power".

The second way, in which the state appropriates power, depends upon the multiplicity of state functions: from the maintenance of internal order, military defence and aggression to the maintenance of infrastructures and economic distribution (which has both domestic and international dimensions). Mann suggests that such multiplicity leads the state to be involved in a multiplicity of relations with collective actors, which require it to perform multiple manoeuvres. And it is its manoeuvring ability that constitutes "the birthplace of state power".

The third basis for state power derives from the territorial centrality of the state. The reason Mann attributes significance to the territorially centralized nature of the state is two-fold. On the one hand, it provides a theoretical basis for Mann to criticize the society-centric understanding of the relative autonomy of the state vis a vis social classes and groups. On the other hand, it allows Mann to conceptualize state autonomy and state power within the context of geopolitics.

Consequently Mann suggests that the necessity, multiplicity and territorial centrality of the
state, together account for its autonomous power. By these means the state possesses an independence from civil society and acts as an actor with a will to power. Mann's suggestion, then, involves, (i) a critique of the society-centric model that derives state autonomy from "the means of power used in all social relations", (ii) the modification of the state-centric model, by elaborating the way in which the state acquires a potential autonomy, and (iii) the explanation of state power in terms of its socio-spatial and organizational nature.

THE NATION STATE AND MODERNITY

Anthony Giddens in his book, The Nation State and Violence (1987) provides an institutional understanding of the state (founded on the theory of modernity) which, according to him, is also a pre-condition for an analysis of "power". Central to Giddens' view of modernity is his interpretation of history as a non-evolutionary process involving a number of "discontinuities". It is a "discontinuous interpretation of modern history" which emphasizes the contrast between traditional and modern social formations as well as divergences and ruptures within the modernizing process (1987:433).

Giddens shares with Mann the view that any theoretical position that reduces the components of society to a single factor has to be rejected. The modern world, Giddens suggests, has been shaped through the intersection of capitalism, industrialism and the nation state system. Each component, although interrelated with each other, has its own dynamics and history:

There are four institutional clusterings associated with modernity: heightened surveillance, capitalistic enterprise, industrial production and the consolidation of centralized control of the means of violence. None is wholly reducible to any of the others (1987:5).

Giddens proposes that each component of modernity constitutes "an institutional clustering" that refers to both organizational and institutional dimensions of a location. A location has an institutional characteristic as it contains certain practices which have the greatest time-space extension within social totalities. It acquires an organizational capacity as it possesses an ability to use reflexively "knowledge about the conditions of system reproduction to influence, shape or modify that system.
reproduction" (1987:16). The nation state is, for example, an institutional clustering whose actions involve both an expression of its time-space extension and its ability to produce effects in the process of the reproduction of the system as a whole.

To account for both the specificity and the relationality of the institutional clusterings of modern society, Giddens makes two crucial theoretical distinctions. The first concerns the sources of power, the second the concept of history. Like Mann, Giddens considers the institutional clusterings to be both "configurations of power" and forms of domination. Power, however, is defined as a "transformative capacity": "the capability to intervene in a given set of events so as in some way to alter them" (1987:17). To be a social agent is to have power, that is, to have a transformative capacity. The transformative capacity derives from the resources that agents employ in the course of their activities. Such resources are both "allocative" and "authoritative". Allocative resources refer to "dominion over material facilities, including material goods and the natural forces that may be harnessed in their production". Authoritative resources, on the other hand, concern the means of dominion over the activities of human beings themselves (1987:18).

Giddens suggests that these resources have to be distinguished, because giving primacy to the former, which classical social theory and Marxist discourse tend to do, creates a reductionist image of society. Reductionism occurs when state power is deduced from actions of agents based on allocative resources, which inevitably ignores the fact that state power stems to a large extent from the authoritative resources. Taking the allocative resources as the prime mover for modernity means overestimating the role of capitalism and industrialization in the process of shaping modern society. Such estimates necessarily fail to recognize the importance of interactions between competing sovereign nation states in that process. For this reason, Giddens argues that it is important to explore the reciprocal interactions between the allocative and authoritative resources, between the three institutional clusterings of the modern world, making none the prime mover of history.

As for the concept of history, Giddens points out the significance of distinguishing industrialization from capitalism. For Giddens, industrialization refers to a process of controlling or
dominating the natural world, whereas capitalism constitutes a specific mode of production. This distinction leads Giddens to suggest that

the emergence of modern capitalism as a specific mode of production does not represent the high point of a progressive scheme of social development, but rather the coming of a type of society radically different from all prior forms of social order (1987:68).

This society is a capitalist society which has a nation state that indicates its sovereign character. Recognizing that modern society is a capitalist society which is also a nation-state thus allows Giddens both to emphasize the discontinuous character of history and to elevate the nation-state to the forefront of the analysis of modernity.

Having established the basic parameters of his understanding of modernity - the discontinuous interpretation of history, institutional power configurations, and the nation state as an institutional cluster - Giddens concentrates his attention on the question of the nation-state. Jessop accurately summarizes the principal features of Giddens' account of the nation-state in the following way:

For Giddens the rise of the modern state is associated with (a) a centralized legal order, (b) centralized administration, (c) a centrally organized taxation system, articulated with a rational monetary system, (d) major innovations in military organization reflected in the international state system and the separation of external military force from internal policing, (e) the development of the modern nation in conjunction with the nation-state, (f) the development of communication, information, and surveillance possibilities, (g) internal pacification through the disciplinary society, and (h) the development of democracy in the sense of a pluralistic polarchy and citizenship rights - as the reciprocal of the enhanced surveillance and the ideology of the general interest involved in the modern state (1986:216).

Among the above-listed features, (a), (b), and (c) refer to the territorial centrality of the nation state, and illuminate why a capitalist society is also a nation-state. (D) indicates the significance of the international context for the development of the nation-state system. (F), (g), and (h) concern the effective techniques that the nation-state employs in its involvement in the process of reproduction of its own national and territorially organized social formation. Thus, Giddens shares the view of the state articulated by Skocpol and Mann. By the state, Giddens means an impersonal and sovereign political order capable of administering and controlling a given territory. The state constitutes a sovereign political order with the capability of having sufficient primacy over social classes and
collectivities on the one hand, and of possessing sufficient power to monitor societal affairs through its surveillance techniques. 12

This power of the state - here Giddens also agrees with Skocpol and Mann - stems to a large extent from the international dimension of state action. For him, both the global consolidation of industrial capitalism and the global ascendancy of the nation state are processes which are intertwined but not reducible to each other. They have made the nation state "irresistible as a political form from the early nineteenth century to the present day" (1987:254). It would be mistake to conflate them as world system theory has done. Each component has to be analyzed in its own specificity.

That said, Giddens makes two propositions as to how to think of the inter-state system. The first is that nation states only exist in systemic relations with other nation states. This means for Giddens that international relations is coeval with the origins of nation states. The second is that the internal administrative coordination of nation states depends upon "reflexively monitored conditions of an international nature" (1987:4). This proposition is important for Giddens to establish a linkage between domestic politics and international politics. Thus, not only does Giddens offer a theory of the state to IRT in general and to the realist paradigm in particular, but he also places a special emphasis on the ability of the state to influence domestic policy. Hence, by locating the nation state as well as the inter-state system in an institutional conception of modernity, Giddens contributes to the state-centric model as well as to IRT.

CONCLUSION: BRINGING (CIVIL) SOCIETY BACK IN

The foregoing exposition of the state-centric model implies: (i) the rediscovery of the state through the critique of the society-centric model, (ii) the attribution of a separate and independent

12 This conception of the state appears to be one based on the Weberian idea of the state complemented by the conception of disciplinary society developed by Foucault (1977).
space to the state, (iii) the significance of both domestic and international dimensions to the autonomy of state action. At the epistemological level, these claims amount to (iv) the re-introduction of the category of agency and the construction of an agency problematic. In what follows, these four central aspects of the model will be critically assessed and it will be argued that each aspect, although it should be regarded as an important contribution to IRT, constitutes in a particular fashion, what can be called "the institutionalist essentialist nature" of the state-centric model. Such essentialism, as will be shown, results from the failure to recognize the relational character of the state-civil society distinction, and the accordance of "primacy" to agency over structure.

A) The Rediscovery of The State:

The state-centric model's attempt to reintroduce the state to contemporary social theory involves:

(i) considering the state to be a potentially autonomous actor;

(ii) analyzing the state through an historically grounded comparative method;

(iii) regarding internal organizational factors and international relations (the inter-state system) as co-determinants of state action;

(iv) viewing society as an intersection of a number of power networks in which the primary one is the political power exercised by the state; and

(v) locating the question of the state within a comprehensive account of modernity.

It is on the basis of these elements that the state-centric model can be said to have provided useful epistemological and analytical categories for the study of states. Although its rediscovery of the state must therefore be welcomed, the fact that such rediscovery gives rise to the construction of a distinct statist mode of reasoning reveals the essentialist nature of the model in a number of ways.

In constructing their own statist mode of reasoning, Skocpol, Halliday, Mann, and Giddens make two crucial assertions. The first is that, as opposed to the society-centric model, the state-centric model adequately explains the process of reproduction and the role of the state within it. However, in doing so, the model hardly touches on the connection between capitalist structuring and
restructuring of the economic and the nation-state (the political). Although the model argues that the institutional development of modern societies happens to be capitalist and that the nation-state is a state which is articulated with capitalism, it does not attempt to explore and account for how such an articulation has occurred in these societies. \(^{13}\) Instead, the model focuses on the state and its impact on the development of capitalism as a mode of production. Thus, Skocpol suggests that the state under certain circumstances shapes and reshapes social relations. \(^{14}\) Mann, while recognizing the irreducible character of power networks, accords primacy to the political power network. Likewise, Giddens regards the nation-state not only as a major institution, but also as the defining and integrating institution of modern societies. Hence, at the level of methodology, the political becomes the primary concern at the expense of the economic, which results in the emergence of the problem of "political reductionism" in the state-centric model.

Political struggles are not reducible to economic factors. Nevertheless they cannot exist without a spatial totality of their co-determinants, including economic practices. This means that political struggles are always articulated with economic factors and discursive practices in ways that bring about the time-space constitution of social totality which we call society. In this sense, political struggles, carried out by the state, are always embedded in a spatial totality. They project and inscribe themselves into that totality while producing it. For this reason, if the state and its power are to be examined adequately, such spatial totality has to be taken into account in so far as it constitutes a context for structural limitations on state capacities. Focussing on the operation of the political, or on political struggles in and of themselves, without due reference to the historical context in which

\(^{13}\) As has been seen in the previous two chapters, the post war II world order had a specific economic basis, which was also one of the defining features of the United States' hegemony. The compromise of embedded liberalism or the Fordist regime of accumulation and its extension were the concepts with which such basis was identified. Nowhere in the state-centric model is attention paid to the economic foundation of the inter-state system in that order.

\(^{14}\) It should be pointed out here that Skocpol's account of the ability of the state to reshape social relations involves considering the state-economy relations. Her analysis of the New Deal exemplifies this (1985:107-169). However, her analysis privileges the state over the economic, in that the latter is read off by the former.
they are initiated, inevitably "reduces" the complex character of the process of reproduction to state capacities.

For instance Giddens correctly defines modern societies as capitalist societies but does not give enough consideration to the role of the state in the expanded reproduction of capitalism. Mann points out the importance of the infrastructural power sources of the modern state for its autonomous power, but fails to see the connection between the state and the expanded reproduction of capitalism. When the economy is taken into account, it is considered a situation in which the political is primary.

Of course, to criticize the state-centric model for ignoring the welfare dimension of the nation-state does not mean to give primacy to the question of the expanded reproduction of capitalism. What it means is to stress the significance of seeking to link capitalism and the nation state at the level of both the national and the international. The second assertion concerns the definition of the state. Skocpol defines the state as an institutional actor having its own life and history. In the course of its construction, the definition has as its basis three assumptions: that the state contains a true essence, a homogenous structure; that the state acquires the capacity to act; and that state managers, or in Giddens' terminology the governing class, are able to form the state's policy and therefore constitute the personification of the state's capacities and powers. Two suggestions follow from these assumptions: that political power should be regarded as an independent organizational power specific to the state, and that it is the state that secures the process of reproduction. That is to say, it is possible, even proper, to read the constitution of social and political-economic relations and their reproduction via an analysis of the state. These two suggestions together not only reinforce the problem of political reductionism but also render the model an institutionally essentialist one in the following way.

Viewed within the context of the definition of the state as an institutional agency, state managers, or the governing class, are referred to as "historical subjects" able to constitute their own realm of existence. They also appear to act independently in their implementation of state policies. This means that the bureaucratic structures and administrative arrangements exist independently of
class contradictions, political controversies and ideological struggles. Such structures and arrangements are considered to have been constituted by a set of rules and procedures. However, the implication of such a consideration is to take the state as an unproblematic given, or, in other words, to reduce it to one of its multiple determinations, that is, the institutional organization of the state. By ignoring the importance of social classes, struggles initiated by social movements against the existing order that the state tries to secure, and the concrete ramifications of the expanded reproduction of capital, the state-centric model's attempt to specify the functioning of the political with its institutional definition again becomes subject to political reductionism.

The problem of reductionism gives rise to the emergence in the state-centric model of institutional essentialism, as the state is used to account for the process of reproduction. As has been noted, one of the principal aims of the state-centric model is to provide a reading of the functioning of social formations through its concept of the state as an institutional agency. At the level of epistemology, its aim to do so implies the call for a return to agency, or a reintroduction of agency in the structure/agency couplet. However, the resolution of the structure/agency problem is based on the primacy of the agent (the state) over the structure, which is as essentialist as the structuralist problematic. As implied in its title, the model takes the state as the center of its mode of operation, then makes it a privileged category by according political power primacy over the other forms of power, and finally employs it to read social relations without giving any consideration to constraining factors other than political and military ones.

Here the point is not that the theory of the state cannot constitute a way of accounting for the process of reproduction. Rather, it is that the model becomes essentialist when such a theory is postulated as "the way" of doing so. The problem of essentialism, combined with political reductionism, inevitably prevents the state-centric model from recognizing the impacts of structural limitations, apart from geopolitics, on state policies, limitations that are of significance in the constitution of modern society as a capitalist society. To argue that state policies should be regarded as a site of multiple determinations and structural limitations is not necessarily to affirm the
structuralist understanding of modern society and international relations. Instead it reaffirms the utility of truly considering the state within the context of the structure/agency problem.

B) The Independent Spatial Organization of the State:

Given the fact that in recent years the problem of the state-civil society distinction has been revitalized within the realm of political sociology, the state-centric model's designation of the state as a separate and independent space appears to be important. However, it proves unsatisfactory due precisely to the fact that it is purely analytical. This prevents the model from problematizing the relationship between the state and civil society.

The state/civil society distinction can be said to have been "rediscovered" in the realm of political sociology in general, and of European politics and social theory in particular. In the course of its rediscovery, as John Keane has correctly observed, three particular points of reference emerged in which the usefulness of the distinction was examined (1988:4). These points of reference are the analytical relevance of the distinction, its normative significance, and its political potential. In Civil Society and the State, Keane suggests that each point of reference also constitutes a distinct object of inquiry. The analytical distinction between the state and civil society involves a specific aim, which is to examine the origins, development and transformation of particular institutions. It therefore attempts to:

- selectively identify key institutions and actors, examine their complex patterns of interaction and attempt to reach some conclusions - based on theoretical distinctions, empirical research and informed judgements - concerning their origins, in that it is concerned only with constructing an explanatory understanding of complex socio-political realities (Keane, 1988:12).

The normative usage of the distinction, on the contrary, concerns the preservation of democracy and it has two complementary normative functions. It is used to show the possible undesirable consequences of the separation of the state and civil society as in the analysis of both the totalitarian and the authoritarian political regimes. According to Keane, this "precautionary function" does not lead to the rejection of the distinction, but instead "it supplements its advocacy function which consists in normative efforts to highlight the need for (greater) pluralism in the distribution of
social and political power* (1988:13). The normative usage therefore aims to promote critical understanding. On the other hand, the political usage of the distinction, although it can be associated with the normative usage, presents a unique approach with its focus on the political implications of the distinction and its historical time. It is intended to problematize the historical context in which the distinction has been revitalized. This historical context is often characterized as a late capitalist, post-modern condition articulated with the crisis of the welfare state, the rise of social movements, the emergence of neo-conservatism, and the crisis and restructuring of international capitalism.

Of these usages of the state-civil society distinction, the one with which the state-centric model is concerned is the analytical one. It seeks to shed light on the analytical relevance of the distinction by focusing exclusively on the state. It is true that the distinction between the state and civil society has an analytical relevance for the theory of the state. However, it is equally true that its relevance to the problem of civil society is more complex than it suggests. The state-centric model underestimates the complexity inherent in civil society by ignoring the dynamic character of it, which arises from its spatial organization based on class and non-class political struggles and calculations. If society is to be regarded as a formation which is historically emergent, non-unitary and constituted, then categories that have been developed to analyze the constitution of such a formation have to be political as much as they are analytic. Keane describes the complex character of civil society in the following way:

The rise and maturation of capitalism has not been synonymous with the universal influence of commodity production and exchange, the irreversible destruction of "community life", the general spread of class materialism and possessive individualism, or the growth of class conflict as the central social conflict. At one time or another, modern civil societies have comprised not only capitalist economies but an eclectic variety of non-economic organizations. Modern civil societies have comprised a constellation of juxtaposed and changing elements that resist reduction to a common denominator, or essential core or generative first principle. They have included capitalist economies and households; social movements and voluntary public spheres (churches, organizations of professionals and independent communications media and cultural institutions); political parties, electoral associations and other 'gatekeepers' of the state-civil society division; as well as 'disciplinary' institutions such as schools, hospitals, asylums and prisons (1988:14-15).

Keane's description of civil society indicates the importance of political calculations in so far
as it emphasizes both the organizational principles of civil society and political struggles embedded within these principles. Two points are worth emphasizing here. First, to recognize the complexity inherent in the organization of civil society means also to employ a more complex definition of politics than the state-centric model provides. As we have seen, Skocpol, Halliday, Mann, and to a large extent Giddens, tend to associate political power with state power, to consider politics in terms of the conventional definition of civil society, and to conceive of class power as an economic power. However, politics contains struggles over structures of meaning as well as over the process of construction of collective identities, both class and non-class. Neither of these is reducible to economic phenomena. Political struggle in this sense is not only economic or political (state power), but also ideological and discursive. To reduce political (class or non-class) struggles to economic phenomena, in order to determine the location of the state, is to deny the significance of the discursive and ideological character of those struggles which in fact constitute the very complexity of civil society.

Second, that the relationship between power and politics is crucial to the problematization of the state-civil society distinction requires a relational and a non-monolithic conception of power. The state-centric model, however, fails to do so. As we have pointed out, Mann and Giddens explicitly state that society is constituted by networks of power relations. It is, without doubt, important to conceive of modern society in terms of power relations. But it is also equally important to take into account the question of "the resistance to power" to understand both the relational character of power and the dynamic nature of the state-civil society relationship. Neither Mann nor Giddens provides an account of the resistance to power and, as a result, their conception of power becomes one-sided: the power of the state to regulate and control civil societal affairs.

Thus, by employing only the analytical usage of the state-civil society distinction, the state-centric model not only ignores the relational character of that distinction, but also makes use of it by regarding the former as the determinant of the latter. Civil society is subordinated to the state, its historicity is completely neglected, and more importantly it is not integrated into the process of
theorizing state action and state power. Consequently, the state becomes the essence of the analysis of modern societies, functions as an historical idealization of those societies, and also creates its own history by acting as an independent spatial organization.

C) The Significance of Both Domestic and International Dimensions of State Action:

Perhaps the most important contribution that the state-centric model makes to the development of the theory of the state is its focus on the international dimension of state action. The international dimension is crucial for two reasons. First, international relations was integral to the process of the very constitution of the modern state as the nation-state. It is argued by the state-centric model that both Marxist and liberal discourses fail to comprehend that the state is a nation-state. The former, by concerning itself almost exclusively with the role of the state in the process of the reproduction of capitalist social relations, fails to situate its national focus. The latter, where the national focus is investigated at all, defines it in historical and cultural terms. Consequently, both fail to recognize the institutional basis of the nation-state system (the international context) that makes central the territoriality of the state. Second, the international dimension gives the nation-state specificity. The formation of the nation-state has its own history and institutional organization which cannot be reduced to the emergence of the capitalist mode of production, although its development is obviously connected with the spread of capitalism. Thus, the state-centric model asserts that the nation-state system predates capitalism and constitutes what can be called the geopolitical transnational reality which marks the international dimension of state action -- one of the primary sources of the autonomous power of the nation-state.

By recognizing the significance of the geopolitical transnational reality, Skocpol argues that the nation-state is an organization-for-itself and represents an analytically autonomous level of transnational reality -- independent in its structure and dynamics from world capitalism, but not

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15 This critique of the Marxist and liberal discourses is explicitly made by Mann and Giddens. For them, the institutional conception of nation also makes it clear that the territorial dimension constitutes one of the defining features of the state and its sovereign power. For detail, see Mann (1986) and Giddens (1987).
reducible to it. Halliday follows Skocpol's argument in his suggestion that a theory of the state constructed through the recognition of its historical and spatial specificity is needed if IRT is to be advanced. In the same line, Giddens suggests that the nation-state system is a primary set of processes in which the world geopolitical order enjoys ontological parity. Mann appears to agree with Giddens that the nation-state's relation to capitalism is "contingent"; there is nothing in the capitalist mode of production which requires a multistate system. Thus, the nation-state cannot be treated as a single unity. It represents a duality in so far as its domestic life is separable from its geopolitics. And it is its geopolitics that reproduces and even increases its autonomy and its autonomous power.

Of course, the state-centric model's attempt to place a special emphasis on the reciprocal relation of constitution between nation-states and the contemporary world system is important for the study of the state and of international relations. As for the latter, it illuminates why it is necessary to conceptualize the state rather than take it as a given ontological reality. The reciprocity between the nation-state as the state of a modern-capitalist society and the constitution of international relations marks the coming into existence of discontinuity in the course of historical developments of societies as well as international relations. It also demonstrates why it is important to consider the latter as a set of geopolitical, economic, and social processes that produce impacts on the constitution of national social formations.

In this sense, the state-centric model can be said to provide a reading of international relations based on the concept of the nation-state as an institutional-socio-spatial organization. In doing so, it takes as its unit of analysis a national social formation, deals with it in a non-structuralist manner, and concentrates its attention on the structure, capacities, power, and policies of the state in that formation. Thus it offers an account of international relations by defining them as an inter-(nation)state system.

However, as the previous two chapters have indicated, the structure of international relations is so complex that it cannot be reduced to inter-state relations. It is important indeed to take seriously the question of how to conceptualize the state, in order to advance our understanding of
international relations. This should not lead, however, one to read off its functioning with reference only to the interactions between nation-states. For instance, the construction of the post World War II world order cannot be said to have been simply geopolitical, and therefore based on the primacy of the inter-state system. Such construction had as its economic basis a specific regime of accumulation, Fordism, and functioned as a compromise of embedded liberalism. This meant the regulation of specific industrialization policies, namely Keynesianism and welfare states in national markets (especially within the context of European societies) liberal internationalism in the world-economy. Such regulation however cannot be reduced to the inter-state system nor can it be seen as secondary to geopolitics.

Likewise, as will be seen in the following chapter, the ideological forms and discursive practices that play a significant role in the process of the construction and reproduction of the world order cannot be said to have been created only by nation-states. Cox argues in that context that international organizations were integral to the reproduction of that order under the United States’ hegemonic leadership. This is because it is through and within these organizations that the basic ideologies and discursive norms of the world order were produced and presented as universal (1981:238-241). In other words, even though geopolitics constitutes one of the defining features of global relations, it cannot be used as the foundation for those relations.

Although it is necessary to think of the state as a theoretical construct that should not be simply derived from structural determinants, in order to go beyond the structural deterministic theories of international relations, this should not lead one to take the state as the basic unit of analysis or the center of an analysis of those relations. But the state-centric model does so, and as a result, ignores the importance of global economic relations and ideological/discursive practices for the analysis not only of geopolitics but also of the international dimension of state action. Thus, the state-centric model’s attempt to incorporate the international dimension into the theory of the state, which, without any doubt, constitutes the model’s most important contribution to the contemporary political discourse, becomes subject to the problem of reductionism.
(D) The Structure/Agency Problem In Social Theory

As noted, the rediscovery of the state involves, epistemologically speaking, an introduction of 'agency' to the structure/agency question, and a solution based on the primacy of agency over structure. This introduction of "agency" into the domain of social theory, suggests the state-centric model, represents a substantial shift in theory away from the structural deterministic approaches. It does so by making the state an epistemological object that has to be studied in its own right. Moreover, it presents the state as an institutional actor capable of shaping and reshaping social relations. As a result, the introduction of agency pushes back the boundaries of the structure/agency problem in several important ways. 16

First, causality is displaced from structure onto agency, and thus an account of social phenomena is provided with pivotal reference to the role and functions of the state. The functioning of civil society thereby becomes the dependent variable that presupposes the existence of the independent one (the state), but not vice versa. In the state-centric model, while it is suggested that changes in civil society cannot be explained without due reference to the state, changes in the state are accounted for without taking into account civil society. At the level of representation, this means that civil society is "represented by" the state, but not vice versa. In the process of representation, the international functions as the primary causal factor. It makes it possible to explain both connections between the state and civil society on the basis of the primacy of the state and why the state should be accorded that primacy.

Second, contradictions are displaced from structure onto agency, in so far as agents are causal of social contradictions. In other words, social contradictions are regarded as a "quality of action" itself, rather than structures. Thus, contradictions are considered within the context of state action. This means that although modern societies in the state-centric model are seen as capitalist ones, the structural quality of capitalism is not integrated into the analysis of state action. Instead, as has been

16 Lash and Urry provide an interesting discussion of the structure/agency problem with respect to the question of the "social" (1986:95-113). I have derived these points from their discussion.
seen, state action, state capacities, and their relation to civil society are analyzed by the state-centric model with respect to the functioning of the state apparatus and state managers.

Third, structures are conceptualized only at the empirical level as "rules and administrative resources" deployed by actors. Giddens, for example, defines structure as "rules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems. Structure exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgability, and as instantiated in action". 17 That is to say that structures are not only "constraining factors" (as in structuralism), but also function as "enabling factors". Thus, Giddens speaks of "duality of structure", of structure as both a medium and an outcome of action. In the state-centric model, as we have seen, the international context (regarded as geopolitics) is conceived of as the main structure. However, the model does not regard the international context as a constraining factor. Instead, it is considered an enabling factor. It empowers the state, it gives the state a "transformative capacity", meaning that it enables the state to act as a potentially autonomous institutional agency, and also to reshape social relations. This, however, leads the model not to take into account the structural constraints apart from security that would place limitations on state behaviour. As pointed out, the model, while overemphasizing the role of geopolitical context, tends to underestimate the role of the politico-economic context in which the state acts as a capitalist state.

Fourth, resistance to power and domination is regarded not so much with respect to structural constraints but with respect to the characteristic of agency itself. As noted, for Mann power refers to an organizational ability, while for Giddens it means a "transformative capacity". In each case, power constitutes a foundational ground to be an agent; that is, to be an agent is to have power. Thus, Mann characterizes modern societies as "bureaucratic societies" in which the state exerizes its infrastructural power to influence social relations. Giddens argues that the state has power over its citizen subjects in the sense that it monitors social relations by employing the techniques of

17 In The Constitution of Society, Giddens develops and thoroughly analyzed this definition of structure (1984:16). Although Skocpol, Halliday, and Mann did not explicitly define it, the way they use it shows the resemblance between their conceptions of structure and Giddens'.
"surveillance". However, in this way, power/domination relations become one-sided because the model does not deal with the question of resistance to state power. Instead, it concerns itself exclusively with the issue of reproduction and the role of the state in it.

Consequently, the state-centric model's attempt to re-emphasize the role and importance of agency within the context of the questions of "causality" and "contradiction" on the one hand, and the concept of structure and of power/domination on the other, should be taken seriously. For its efforts to bring the category of agency into the domain of social theory. However, as the model proposes its own way of overcoming the structure/agency problem, it mirrors the failings of its own criticisms of structuralism. As for structuralism, the solution to the structure/agency question is posed in a dichotomous fashion. And just as within structuralism, a 'primacy' exists, this time, agency is accorded "primacy" over structure. 18 In a perfect symmetry, the state-centric model results in the dissolution of structure into agency. The state is viewed as a potentially autonomous institutional agency, the privileged point of entry into history, and the centre of analysis of social formations. The 'new' state-centric theories become as essentialist and reductionist as structuralism. And the old sociological problem remains: how do social agents make history, but not in the manner of their own choosing?

In conclusion, two points are worth emphasizing. First, at the heart of the problems facing the state-centric model lies its attempt to separate analytically the state from civil society, which, as demonstrated, results in the subordination of the latter. Therefore what is needed now is to bring (civil) society into the research agenda. This would entail posing questions about the political, the economic, the ideological, as well as the epistemological. Chapter V has dealt with some of these questions within the context of the structuralist account of capitalist development and has shown the deficiencies that account involves. It has argued for the importance of broadening the definition of the political as well as of paying attention to ideological forms and discursive practices to understand

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18 Although Giddens, in *The Constitution of Society* (1984), attempts to show the ways in which structure and agency are interrelated to each other and stresses the significance of analyzing such interrelation for the development of social theory, he, however, in *The Nation State and Violence* (1987), focuses exclusively on agency and ends up providing a dichotomous account of the structure/agency question.
the reproduction of society. The need to integrate into IRT an adequate conception of society (or social formation) has also been called for by what has come to be known as the "critical turn" in IRT. For this reason, and also to avoid repetition, the issue of how to conceptualize society will be dealt with in the following chapter where an extensive discussion of that turn will be provided.

The second point is that the state-centric model in its attempt to construct an agency problematic appears to contribute more to the realist paradigm than to IRT as a whole. That is to say that it fails to go beyond proto-realist obsession with the geopolitical dimension of international relations. It regards the geopolitical as the primary point of reference. It accords primacy to the state over civil society, as well as to the inter-state system over international political economy. It considers the state to be a potentially autonomous institutional agency capable of shaping and reshaping social relations. In doing so, it corrects realism in two significant ways. First, it suggests that the state cannot be regarded as an ontological given. As Giddens has explicitly it,

the actor-like qualities of modern states have to be understood in terms of specific characteristics of the nation state rather than being taken as a pre-given baseline for the study of international relations (1987:289).

To understand specific characteristics of the nation state it is essential to theorize the state, take it as a theoretical object of inquiry rather than as a given object. Thus, the state-centric model introduces a theory of the state without challenging the statist nature of realism. Second, the state-centric model suggests that to understand the importance of the international dimension, it is necessary to focus on and explain how the nation state influences, intervenes in, and thus shapes and reshapes its civil society. Thus, it corrects realism by pointing out the significance of the internal policies of the state for an analysis of the inter-state system. As the foregoing discussion has indicated, this suggestion too would not challenge the statist nature of realism, however instead, it shows how the statist image of international relations can be improved.

Thus, going back to Halliday's proposal that in order overcome the "impasse" which IRT has reached it is necessary to have a theory of the state, it can be concluded here that it would be mistake to do so by incorporating into IRT the state-centric model that operates with a statist image of
international relations and an essentialist conception of the state. If it is to be used to overcome "an impasse", what is at stake is not IRT but the realist paradigm and an impasse it has reached. Indeed, the significance of the state-centric model and its agency problematic to IRT lies in its contribution to realism, that is, its ability to provide a thorough historical and theoretical account of the state and the inter-state system (or of the geopolitical).
CHAPTER VII

THE CRITICAL TURN:

NEW DEPARTURES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY:

RECONSTRUCTION, HEGEMONY, AND POSTMODERNISM

Fundamental reconstruction of international relations theory and a simultaneous rise within it of what has come to be known as the "critical turn" have been characteristic features of recent years. ¹ The main objective of this chapter is to deal with the phenomenon of the critical turn and then to examine the way in which it has been operationalized in IRT. It will be argued that the critical turn in IRT is significant in two fundamental ways. First, it attempts to locate IRT in the discourse of modernity. This attempt both helps establish the historical context in which positivism has formed the epistemological structure of IRT and provides a powerful critique of positivism. Second, it introduces into IRT hitherto neglected concepts such as society, culture, and identity. This introduction helps problematize interactions between the international, the state and civil society. In these two ways, the critical turn plays a crucial role in the transformation and the proliferation of IRT, and therefore should be considered to be one of the constituents of postpositivist and postrealist IRT. However, like structuralism and the agency problematic, the critical turn is not without problems. It has its weak points that, as shall be apparent, stem from its one dimensional understanding of history.

THE CRITICAL TURN

At a very general level, the critical turn is the opening of IRT to epistemological positions which are concerned with a critical examination of the non-reflexive and analytical representation of

¹ The term, "critical turn" was first coined by Linklater (1986). It expresses the recent discovery of critical theory in the domain of IRT. In this sense, it can also be found in Cox (1981) and Hoffman (1987). In this chapter, the critical turn is to be used in such a way that it also expresses the discovery of poststructuralism and the emergence of the postmodern account of international relations.
social reality. The objectivist representation of reality, the subject-object duality, the potentially autonomous status accorded to epistemology are the targets in the critical turn. It is argued that these characteristics constitute a "problem-solving theory" which takes the world as it finds it, and regarding it as external to the subject and thereby constituting an objective reality. Thus, the question of how such reality has come about is not raised; instead only particular problems in that reality are effectively dealt with. In this way, problem-solving theory accounts for the reproduction of reality, instead of providing a set of categories by which it is possible to change it. For this reason, problem-solving theory does not pay attention to inter-subjective relations that are integral to that reality, and thus has no reflective dimension. In contrast, the Critical Turn focuses on the ways in which reality is historically and discursively constructed. This means that it deals with the issue of "representation" in terms of its discursive effects on our perception of reality. In doing so, the Critical Turn promotes selfreflective epistemologies capable of producing concepts and categories capable of helping comprehend the very historical and political construction of social relations.

In terms of epistemology, problem-solving theory is constituted by what Habermas calls "the empirico-analytical sciences" that regard the production of knowledge as a potentially autonomous activity independent of social relations and having its own laws of motion (1972:63). Positivism is the primary representative of these sciences. As noted in Chapter II, positivism offers an objectivist and universalist representation of reality. When reflected on IRT, this means the realist vision of international politics which extrapolates from anarchy the universal principle of security. However, this principle, according to critical theorists coincides with the interests of the dominant powers in general, and of the hegemon in particular. The recommended forms of political action, that is, national security and strategic equilibrium, do not help peripheral societies solve their particular development problems. Moreover, not only are the specific characteristics of these societies not recognized, but also they are subsumed into the world order. The Critical Turn in this respect argues

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2 The problem-solving theory, as shall be seen, is the term to which Cox attaches the positivist IRT, both in its realist and non-realist versions (1981:137).
that realism with its positivist epistemological position contains in itself a technical interest which "serves particular national, sectional or class interests which are comfortable with the given order" (Can., 1981:129). Implied in this argument is a call for exploring the possibility of moving beyond conventional strategies for maintaining national security and international order.

As has been seen in Chapter IV, a call of this sort was also initiated by the structuralist account of international relations (as well as the sociology of underdevelopment). The critical Turn differs from structuralism, however, in that it rejects the structuralist affirmation of objectivity, which means giving primacy to structures over inter-subjective relations. For this reason, in addition to the empirico-analytical sciences, any epistemological position that conforms to objectivity and the conception of reality external to the subject is criticized by the Critical Turn.

The Critical Turn in IRT thus makes two suggestions concerning the category of objectivity. First, that there is no extra-human and extra-historical objectivity, and second that knowledgable subjects play a crucial role in the making of history. A second suggestion implies that the human subject is not a given, but an historical becoming. It is therefore necessary to theorize the process of becoming and the factors that have a role to play in that process. Reflected on the first suggestion, this means that since the subject is becoming, knowledge and reality are also a becoming and so is "objectivity". That objectivity is a process of becoming puts into question the efforts of positivism to engage in objective analysis and value-free observation. For, although it does not categorically deny the existence of an objective world external to human subjects, an understanding of objectivity as a becoming implies that such a world can never be known by human subjects in so far as knowing (or cogito) requires a reciprocal and never-ending exchange between subject and object, that is between human subject and the reality in which they live, which necessarily involves inter-subjective exchange. The conclusion is that the only objectivity that human subjects are able to grasp is the objective reality that is also subjective since it is not external to them and is constituted and grasped through inter-subjective exchange between subject and object.

At the level of epistemology, this means the existence of an interplay (or of a union) between
objectivity and subjectivity. In this interplay, inter-subjective exchange functions as an integral part of seemingly objective social facts. It follows that neither can facts be separated from values nor knowledge dissociated from inter-subjectivity. To do so is to understand objective reality "in itself", which results in either the reification of objectivity (that is, the banishment of the knowledgable human subject in an epistemological inquiry) or the subordination of it to structures (that is, to regard it as the supporter of structures). In each case, as noted in the previous chapters, there is a problem in terms of an understanding of historical development in that extra-historical elements are privileged over inter-subjectivity, and as a result, history is understood in terms of primacy of synchrony over diachrony.

As opposed to the empirico-analytical sciences, the Critical Turn therefore advocates a mode of reasoning which is both reflective and critical in its attempt to link knowledge and the social context in which such knowledge is produced and used. As for the latter, it calls for a move away from analytical concepts through reflective reasoning, which results in the construction of concepts and categories that have both analytical and political characteristics. In Chapter II, this move was called a politics of epistemology. It can be said, therefore, that it is the point at which the production of knowledge and the production of concepts and categories becomes intertwined with each other in a critical and reflective way that defines the very basis of the Critical Turn in IRT as a politics of epistemology. And it is for this reason that it presents itself not only as an epistemological enterprise but also as a political project in so far as it bases its arguments on the critique of modern society and modernity and attempts not only to explain but also to alter the existing order by focusing on the inter-subjective exchange between subject and object.

The Critical Turn in IRT refers therefore to the incorporation into IRT of the reflective and critical mode of reasoning. It thus aims to locate IRT within the discourse of modernity in order to be able to show the linkage between the need for what it calls critical reconstruction (or deconstruction) of IRT and the crisis of the discourse of modernity. In doing so, it seeks not only to theorize international relations and their impact on the formation of national social formations, but
also to alter them, which marks the emancipatory capacity of the critical discourse it aims to advocate.

As Linklater has pointed out, the critical turn in IRT has to combine

philosophical, empirical, and practical concerns. At the philosophical level, it will have to provide an alternative world order grounded in concepts of freedom and universality that are historically derived. Empirically, it has to construct a sociology of constraints upon the realization of these concepts, and practically, it has to provide us with strategies of transition to bridge the gap between the two (1986:301)

These objectives, together, define the mode of reasoning that the critical turn in IRT carries in the course of establishing a paradigmatic position with which it calls into question the very language, concepts, methods, and discourse of international relations that have produced the dominance of the modernist mode of thought in the field of International Relations. It is suggested, thus, that if the study of international relations is "over-determined" by the discourse of modernity, its development necessarily requires the problematization of modernity, which would entail opening up the field to the critical discourses of modernity.

It should be noted, however, that although the problematization of modernity serves as the common denominator, the way in which it has been done does vary according to which critical discourse of modern society has been used as the primary point of reference. And it is the existence of this variation within the critical turn which gives rise to the emergence of different conclusions and propositions pertaining to the study of international relations.

There are at least three discursive positions within the Critical Turn in IRT. These are; Habermasian critical theory, Gramscian critical theory, and post-structuralist discourse. Each has its own propositions about how to think of international relations. The first attempts to reconstruct IRT through Habermasian critical theory that aims to complete the project of modernity. The second concerns the critique of realism through the concept of hegemony developed by Gramsci. Drawing on the texts produced by poststructuralists (Chapter II), the third suggests that the postmodern turn in culture and theory provides the historical ground upon which to construct a critical social theory of international relations.

These discursive positions all form part of the Critical Turn and share two objectives: locating
IRT in the discourse of modernity and attempting to go beyond realism by opening IRT up to critical discourses of modernity. Each of these discursive positions have strengths and weak points. By demonstrating the differences between them and by signalling the strong points and specific problems they involve, it is possible to discover the extent to which the Critical Turn in IRT helps advance our understanding of international relations.

**HABERMASIAN CRITICAL THEORY AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY**

The introduction of Habermas into IRT was first initiated by Ashley in his attempt to demonstrate the nuance between classical realism represented by Morgenthau and its neorealism reconstruction which began with Waltz's construction of an outside-in model to theorize international politics (1981:204-236). Drawing on Habermas's argument that each mode of production of knowledge corresponds to a specific interest, Ashley has asserted that neorealism involves a technocratic inte_ and its reconstruction of realism should be understood as an attempt to render the realist paradigm a truly problem solving theory of international relations.

As noted in Chapter II, in his text, *Knowledge and Human Interest* (1971), Habermas suggests that knowledge is historically rooted and interest-bound. This understanding of knowledge leads him to construct the concept of cognitive interest, or knowledge-constitutive interest, which helps differentiate the different modes of production of knowledge from one another. It is on the basis of the concept of cognitive interest that Habermas characterizes positivism as a technical cognitive interest with its technocratic consciousness and instrumental rationality, critical theory as an emancipatory cognitive interest with its communicative rationality and communicative action, and hermeneutics as a practical cognitive interest.

By adopting this classification of knowledge-interests nexus, Ashley characterized classical realism as hermeneutical with a practical interest. This led Ashley to argue that the realist suggestion
that to maintain peace in an anarchical environment, it is necessary to maximize power and focus on the problem of national security was a practical solution and that it did not involve the reification of the concept of anarchy and the conception of the state as an objective fact. What Waltz attempted to do in his outside-in model, according to Ashley, was to make classical realism truly positivist, eliminate the practical interest, and render it a problem solving theory (1981:220-227). Thus, realism has possessed a technical interest, regarded the world as it is, reified the international structure (anarchy), and imposed it on state behaviour. Hence, any practical, or self-reflective content, was excluded from the realist paradigm. The problems of the world were presented as being technical in nature, and an attempt was made to secure the reproduction of the world order as a whole.  

Ashley has concluded that in order to resist neorealism and its positivist, technical vision of international relations, critical theory has to be integrated into IRT, due to the emancipatory interest to which it corresponds (1981:230-232). However, Ashley, in his recent work to which we will return later, has realized that critical theory and its emancipatory interest is quite problematical because of its foundationalist and universalist nature and has turned his attention to poststructuralism.

The return to Habermas occurred in IRT with the publication of Mark Hoffman’s article, "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate" (1987:231-249). Hoffman’s article is significant for three reasons. First, it was written both as a response to the inter-paradigm debate and to point out the fact that the incorporation of critical theory plays a crucial role for examining meta-theoretically the functioning of IRT. This makes Hoffman’s response a point of reference in the debate about the transformation of IRT. Second, it presented itself within the terrain of IRT "a strategic move" aimed at reconstructing IRT on the basis of epistemological devices and theoretical concepts that have been produced by a "critical theory of Habermas". Third, it asserted that this reconstruction was the most powerful candidate for "the next stage in the development of international relations theory".

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3 This argument against Realism was also made by Coate and Murphy (1986:24-41). However, the concrete implications of the technical-cognitive interest that Realism possesses were analyzed by Murphy by means of the concept of supremacy developed by Gramsci, rather than through Habermasian critical theory. For detail, see Augelli and Murphy (1988).
Hoffman’s reconstructive attempt derives from the idea that to advance IRT it is necessary, first, to locate it within the hegemonic discourse of modernity, and then, to reconstruct it through critical theory as a critical discourse of modernity. As noted in Chapter II, critical theory, which has been founded on the Frankfurt School (as the representative of Western Marxism), running from Adorno and Horkheimer to Habermas, takes as its primary concern the critique of modernity, or of the process of Western civilization. It considers the process of civilization as a process of technical or instrumental rationalization which begins with the scientific and technological developments in the forces of production. As Adorno has put it, it is this scientific and technological development that defines modernity and places progress at the centre of it.

By rationalization, critical theory therefore means “the model of the domination of nature” based on the increase of the productive forces that give rise to the emergence of progress in the form of the intensification and extensification of technological and scientific reasoning. Critical theory argues in this context that this overriding process of rationalization perfects the technical means of social domination under the cloak of moral and legal emancipation and thus produces the modern, unified individual. As a result, the increase of domination and the formation of identity become the products of the process of instrumental rationalization.

Throughout his texts Habermas attempts to understand "the effects" produced by the spread of instrumental reason to many areas of social life. For him, the rise of instrumental reason, with its attempt to impose a technocratic type of consciousness on the formation of identity has been capable of influencing social life at two fundamental levels. At the level of the reproduction of social life, it has been capable of defining practical problems as technical issues, which threatens human life by subordinating it to instrumental rationality. He argues that if emancipation from domination is to remain as a project of humanity, it is essential to replace instrumental rationality with what he calls "communicative rationality" based on communicative action that aims to establish "an ideal speech situation" in the public domain in which validity claims are made and tested through argumentation. In this sense, communicative social action, as opposed to instrumental rationality and its technocratic
consciousness, constitutes an uncoerced discourse in which an ideal speech situation is anticipated, for as a result of the process of argumentation, only the claims that contain generalizable interests would be agreed upon. It is for this reason that Habermas regards communicative rationality as "the foundation of emancipation, and makes it the very basis of "the principle of universalizability".

As elaborated in Chapter II, at the level of epistemology, Habermas' intention is to examine and explicate the way in which instrumental reason has dominated the modernist mode of production of knowledge. He argues that with the spread of instrumental rationality, there was a dissolution of epistemology into positivism and the gradual decline of the significance of the epistemic subject and the capacity for reflection by the subject on his or her activities. Habermas goes on to argue that it is therefore essential to struggle against positivism and its discourse of instrumental rationalization, and to reaffirm the necessity of self-reflection for self-understanding.

Critical theory as an emancipatory cognitive interest thus constitutes the theoretical and epistemological foundation of the process of emancipation from domination. It is this alleged capacity of critical theory that leads Hoffman to assert that the incorporation into the inter-paradigm debate of the Habermasian critical theory of modern society is necessary if IRT is to be advanced. Following Ashley, Hoffman characterizes realism as positivism with a technocratic interest. Hoffman agrees with Ashley that realism functions as a theoretical devise by which the reproduction of the existing order is secured, and therefore the interests of the dominant powers are protected. It is for this reason that for Hoffman, IRT needs to embody an emancipatory interest that sees action and social conditions as being subject to change, and refuses both the existing hegemonic rules of society and the boundaries of knowledge and practice as natural and inevitable.

Instead it [critical theory] seeks to understand society by taking a position outside of society while at the same time recognizing that it is itself a product of society. Its central problematic is the development of reason and rationality that is directly concerned with the quality of human life and opposed to the elevation of scientific reasoning as a sole basis of knowledge. To this extent, it involves a change in the criteria of theory, the function of theory, and its relationship to society. It entails the view that humanity has potentialities other than those manifested in current society. Critical theory, therefore, seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent; it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an
expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions (Hoffman, 1987:233).

According to Hoffman, critical theory with its above-mentioned characteristics appears to be the most powerful candidate for the next stage in the development of international relations theory. There are two reasons for this. The first is that critical theory has the potential for rearticulating IRT into the broader traditions and concerns of social theory, which provides an adequate starting-point for reformulation and reconstruction of the field of International Relations. The second is that critical theory not only alters the way we look at the world, but also alters the world (Hoffman, 1987:244). It provides more than mere description and account of international relations. It shows theoretically and historically how the existing world order has come about and whose interests have been protected in such an order. As a result, critical theory thus helps IRT to be reconstructed in such a way as to influence the quality and constitution of international practices.

However, Hoffman's Habermasian critical theory of international relations presents a number of crucial problems. First, most important, Hoffman tends to take for granted Habermasian critical theory, which makes him unable to see the fundamental problems that such theory contains. More specifically, Hoffman's failure stems from not considering Habermasian critical theory as a whole. What Hoffman does is to integrate only Habermas's approach to the relationship between knowledge and interest into IRT. Doing so, it then serves only as a category with which to characterize the functioning of certain paradigmatic positions within the realm of IRT.

However, Habermas constructs the category of knowledge/interest to reconstruct the project of modernity on the basis of the communicative rationality. In his recent writings, Habermas characterizes modernity as an "incomplete project" and his project as an attempt through critical theory to complete that project which provides a foundational ground for emancipatory interest to emerge. 4 Habermas argues that the project of modernity was based on two fundamental objectives, those of progress and emancipation. That project has realized the first

without paying attention to emancipation. As a result, progress was conceptualized as an instrumental rationality and gave way to the positivist and technical constitution of subjectivity. Habermas then suggests that the unfulfilled promise of modernity, emancipation, can be realized with the replacement of an instrumental rationality with a communicative rationality (1987:293-301).

Nowhere in Hoffman's article is this aspect of Habermasian critical theory discussed, although it is the basis of the functioning of an emancipatory interests as a way of altering the existing world order. A careful reading of Habermas' ideas about communicative rationality reveals their very problematic nature, which, it should be pointed out, weakens drastically Hoffman's announcement that critical theory represents the next stage in the development of IRT.  

Two of Habermas's ideas are nevertheless worth emphasizing, in so far as they directly concern Hoffman's reconstructive attempt. The first is related to the universalist nature of communicative rationality. According to Habermas, it is through communicative rationality that it is possible to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of mutual understanding. Such conditions are achieved by creating an ideal speech situation in which, as noted in Chapter II, validity claims are discursively made and discursively tested through argumentation (1987:310).

Thus, a consensus is arrived at under an ideal speech situation; truth as an inter-subjective agreement is constructed through communication and becomes universal. What is important here is not the utopian nature of Habermas' communicative rationality, but its universality principle and its implication for IRT. The universalization of communicative rationality means in the realm of international relations an establishment of a consensus as an inter-subjective agreement between national social formations having different power capacities and different levels of economic development.

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6 Habermas defines the construction of an ideal speech situation as both universal and pragmatic (1987 and 1989). Both of them contribute to the functioning of communicative rationality which is in turn characterized as universal pragmatics.
The crucial question here whether these formations have the same motive of cooperatively searching for truth given the differences between them. As noted in Chapter V, international regimes were said by modified realism to function to establish cooperation. However, cooperation in fact meant the subsumption of specific interests of the Third World societies into the existing world order. When asked what critical theory and communicative rationality means in terms of the Third World, Habermas had no answer except for admitting the Euro-centric characteristic of critical theory (1986:78). However, if his critical theory is to be integrated into IRT, which Hoffman intends to do, the specific mechanisms by which a mutual understanding can be established between different social formations in equal terms and without power-domination relations should be identified. Hoffman’s reconstructive attempt does not contain any attempt to do so.

The point indeed is that Habermasian critical theory does not allow this not only because of its Euro-centric characteristic. More important is the fact that it lacks a theory of subject. In a very Parsonian fashion, Habermas thinks of communicative rationality at the level of society and as a functional prerequisite to emancipatory practice. The lack of a theory of subject (and thus a theory of ideology) in Habermasian critical theory makes it difficult to see existing power-domination relations in a given society (or in international relations), where they come from and how they influence communicative rationality. Habermas begins with inter-subjectivity and inter-subjective communication and assumes the potential ability of the (modern) subject to accommodate itself to communicative rationality on which truth is to be founded. This assumption, however derives the subject from communicative rationality, and as a result sees it as a derivative.

In the realm of IRT, Habermas’s attempt to derive the (modern) subject from communicative rationality has an important implication. That is, to pose communicative rationality as a universal principle means to pose inter-subjectivity based on the modern subject as a universal category. This, without any doubt, reaffirms the principle thesis of modernization that modernity has started in Europe and that in order for peripheral societies to be modernized they have to implement the basic

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7 The Parsonian nature of Habermasian critical theory has been pointed out by Giddens (1981).
characteristics of modernity (Chapter III). By failing to distance himself from the discourse of modernity, Habermas also fails to recognize both the specific characteristics of those societies and more importantly an historical specificity of modernity, which is, colonialism for the Third World. Instead of seeing the world as consisting of a number of cultures and arguing for many worlds, Habermas reaffirms the vision of one world with his acceptance of the principle of universality. This puts in doubt, first, the emancipatory nature of his critical theory, and as a result, Hoffman's assertion that critical theory is capable of playing an emancipatory role in international relations.

The other problem that puts in doubt the emancipatory capacity of Habermasian critical theory and its acceptance by Hoffman is that of foundationalism. As Rengger has pointed out, once critical theory is accorded the potential to alter the existing world order, it has to be assumed that there are identifiable criteria to allow one to say that world order x is conducive to the 'enhancement of human potential' while world order y is not, and that therefore one should - always remembering the constraints of history - attempt to bring about world order x. There must be, in other words, at least some sense in the claim that there are ideals that we should aspire to in terms of a possible world order but are not those of our present world order but that are rationally available to us (1988:82-83).

In this sense, critical theory holds a rationalistic view of choice and interest, which from the beginning affirms the foundationalism of modernity. As noted, communicative rationality is foundational before it is universal, in so far as it provides a foundational ground for an inter-subjective agreement and a consensus to be established. However, unlike Rengger, it should be pointed out that the problem in this respect is not only that it makes critical theory reaffirm foundationalism of a problem-solving kind, but also that it makes critical theory (especially its Habermasian version) operate with a binary distinction. This is a distinction, as noted in Chapter II, drawn sharply by Habermas between production and interaction.

Habermas' original aim in drawing that distinction was to point out the importance of interaction (discourse and communication) for an analysis of modern society. This, he believed, was lacking in Marxist theory. Thus, he attempted to reconstruct Marxist theory through a detailed analysis of interaction (Chapter II). However, when communicative rationality is elevated to the
forefront of inquiry and is regarded as the foundation for the emancipatory practice, the result would be to accord to interaction primacy over production. Thus, the capitalist nature of modern society is underestimated, thereby ignoring the role (in fact, a structural role) that the economic factors play in the constitution of inter-subjective agreements. The implication is that history is understood not as consisting of processes of production and interaction and their articulation in a given time and space, but as a process of interaction.

When reflected on IRT, this means that the alteration of the existing world order is to be realized within the realm of interaction and the communicative rationality will be the foundational ground for that alteration. However, as have been seen in Chapter V, such an order operated also with a specific regime of accumulation and a specific mode of regulation, which was called the compromise of embedded liberalism or global Fordism under the hegemonic leadership of the United States. In other words, the post-world war II world order should not be understood only with reference to interaction. For this constitutes a one-dimensional understanding of international relations. For this reason, Hoffman's idea that critical theory helps alter the existing order is problematical since it does not pay attention to the presence of the binary opposition in Habermasian critical theory between production and interaction with the foundational status of the latter.

All these criticisms advanced against Habermasian critical theory indicate that critical theory itself needs to be reconstructed before it is incorporated into IRT. Hoffman's use of critical theory does not give any clue as to the extent to which critical theory itself is open to reconstruction. Nor does he attempt to subject Habermasian critical theory to a serious and critical examination. Instead, he tends to take it for granted and establishes, without any critical attitude, his assertion that critical theory represents the next stage in IRT. However, unless the openness of critical theory and its foundationalist and universalist characteristics to reconstruction are pointed out, it always runs a risk of what Lapid (1989) calls being a "monistic theoretical reconstructing project".

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8 This problem has been extensively discussed in Held and Thompson (1982).
HEGEMONY AND THE GRAMSCIAN CRITICAL THEORY

In recent years, there has been an upsurge of interest in Antonio Gramsci and his concept of hegemony. As Gill and Law have argued, underlying this interest was the question of international order or of international governance (1988:76). Gill and Law go on to argue that there are two types of explanation of such an order in the realm of IRT. The first can be found in hegemonic stability theory, in which it is argued that a carefully managed balance of power by the dominant state in an anarchical international environment provides order. The second refers to the "after hegemony" thesis in which it is suggested that the rational self-interest of nation states in cooperation makes possible the reproduction of an international order even after the decline of the hegemonic power of the dominant state. Gill and Law conclude that these approaches are statist and that there is a third type of explanation of international order which is more useful than these explanations, for it pays enough attention to the existing power-domination relations in such an order and focuses also on the ideological dimension of power exercised by the dominant state within that order (1988:77). This type of explanation is constructed through an application of the Gramscian concept of hegemony to IRT and international political economy.

Likewise, Tooze argues that dissatisfaction with the realist state-centric vision of international political economy as well as its epistemological basis positivism and its so-called objective interpretation of international reality, has given rise to such an interest in the Gramscian concept of hegemony (1990:276).

Three examples of the application of the Gramscian concept of hegemony to international political economy - Angelli and Murphy's America's Quest For Supremacy and The Third World: A Gramscian Analysis (1988), Gill's American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (1990), and Rapkin's edition of World Leadership and Hegemony (1990) - clearly indicate that the concept of

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9 Chapter III and Chapter IV have provided a detailed discussion of these explanations of international order and have pointed out the problems they involve.

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hegemony is significant in three ways. These works first point out the importance of inter-subjective relations both for international governance and in the reproduction of the existing order. Second, they challenge the subject-object duality and the objectivist interpretation of reality, and in doing so, they give rise to self-reflectivity within the realm of international political economy. 10 Third, they question the concept of hegemonic stability, making it an "essentially contested concept" which in turn makes it possible to ask hitherto neglected questions about legitimacy, consent, learning, and socialization (Rapkin, 1990; Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990).

However, it should be pointed out that the importance of the Gramscian conception of hegemony goes beyond international political economy in at least three ways. First, it can be used to provide a critical theory of international relations in general. In this respect, it moves away from the problem-solving dimension of IRT, and rescues that theory away from positivism. Thus, it constitutes one of the fundamental aspects of post-positivist IRT. Second, it is a corrective to realism in a number of ways, making it integral to the construction of post-positivist IRT. Third, it is an alternative to Habermasian critical theory, in so far as it points out the importance of production and the power basis of claims to universality.

This said, it can be argued that the texts, produced by Robert Cox (1983, 1985, 1987, 1989), constitute a major attempt to explicate the way in which Gramscian critical theory can be used to develop a post-positivist and post-realistic analysis of international relations. 11 For Cox makes use of the concepts produced by Antonio Gramsci in such a way that makes possible "a revision of current international relations theory" (1983:162). Drawing on Gramsci’s critical discourse of modern society, in which the concept of hegemony functions as the key to exploring the production and reproduction of "order", Cox tries to account for "world order". This, he believes, is central to any understanding of the dialectical interplay between internal and external forces. In order to understand the

10 These books have been reviewed by Tooze (1990). I have integrated his point about the importance of Gramsci in the process of revising this chapter. The resemblance in using these books as an example of the Gramscian international political economy is simply coincidental.

11 Linklater (1990) and Rupert (1990) also think of Cox’s texts as an major attempt.
production and reproduction of world order, Cox argues, it is necessary to focus on the relationship between social forces and states, or to put it precisely, on "the state/civil society complex as the basic entity of international relations" (1986:205). 12

Cox's argument indicates that IRT should be founded upon an analysis of the articulation of the state, social forces, and the world order, in a given time and space. Important here is the methodological basis of such an analysis, and its constitutive elements. Herein lies the significance of critical theory. Not only does critical theory help explicate the historical coming into existence of an analytical articulation of the state, social forces and the world order. It also provides a basis for the alteration of the world order in so far as it keeps itself open to historicity. It is for this reason that critical theory as opposed to analytical thinking is always contingent upon political struggles, political calculations, and power configurations, which it attempts to explain and in which it is embedded.

Cox thus maintains that theory should not be based on theory "but rather on changing practice and empirical- historical study, which are a proving ground for concepts and hypotheses" (1986:207). That is to say that "theory is always for someone and for some purpose". This forces "theory" to attach itself to those issues and problems. This is particularly so, because when theory detaches itself from them it becomes metaphysical or so abstract that it loses its explanatory power.

In this respect, the state-civil society distinction would be an illustrative example. Such a distinction cannot be analytically sustained, for example as in the agency problematic. Cox argues that history has made the state and civil society so interpenetrated that they cannot be conceived of as analytically distinct spaces. Yet, an analytical or abstract theory, because it detaches itself from time and space, cannot account for the interpenetration between the state and civil society. For this reason, theory should always be time-space bound and be contingent on historicity.

Such theory is the defining feature of critical theory (Cox, 1986:205-207). That theory is embedded in social relations, according to Cox, defines two distinct purposes that it undertakes.

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12 From this point can be extrapolated the suggestion that Cox's critical theory and its key concept, hegemony, can be used to criticize the agency problematic and its analytical distinction between the state and civil society.
One is a simple, direct response: to be a guide to help solve the problems posed within the terms of the particular perspective which was the point of departure. The other is more reflective upon the process of theorizing itself: to become clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorizing, and its relation to other perspectives (to achieve a perspective on perspectives); and to open up the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world (1986:208).

It should be noted here that although appearing to be distinct, these two purposes should be intertwined with each other in that the former should be integrated into the operation of the latter. Otherwise, Cox warns, theory becomes purely problem-solving and always runs the risk of being simply analytical and ahistorical. For example, positivism with its technical interest exemplifies how problem-solving theory functions.

The reflexive purpose, which makes theory critical and historicist, should therefore, be given primacy in the process of theorizing, but at the same time, should be supplemented by the problem-solving purpose, which defines its problem-solving character. Cox concludes that critical theory, which has been constructed in such a way as to realize its problem-solving and critical purposes is required to understand the operation of international relations as an expression of the articulation of world orders, social forces and states, and also to alter that operation (1986:210).

Critical theory for Cox thus serves as a methodological ground or a theoretical starting point for the analysis of international relations, a ground which is to be operationalized with a number of concepts that have been derived from concrete historical social and political-economic practices. It is at this point that Gramsci's critical discourse of modern society becomes significant in the sense that it provides such concepts as hegemony, war of position, historical bloc, and organic crisis, all of which Cox believes are fundamental to IRT. It is through these concepts that Cox attempts to account for an historical articulation of world orders, social forces, and states.

As noted, among these concepts the one which is particularly valuable is that of hegemony. Before elaborating the concept of hegemony, its difference from the realist usage of hegemony should be noted. The concept of hegemony was employed in realism to explain the rise and fall of the world powers in general and the way in which they dominated global relations in a given historical period
economic) but also the political and discursive basis of hegemony.  

Thus, Gramsci stated that hegemony is attained if and only if one's own corporate interests, in their present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups, too. This is the most purely political phase, and marks the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of complex superstructures bringing about not only a union of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which struggle rages not on a corporate but on a 'universal' plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups (1971:181-182).

Gramsci's statement suggests that the process of the creation of hegemony is rather broad in the sense that it encompasses the whole range of activities, values, norms, practices that mark the multiple and complex foundation of the relationship of domination. Thus in that process structures (economic factors) and superstructures are joined together in a dynamic interdependence. To explain this interdependency, Gramsci uses the concept of "historic bloc", which refers to the ensemble of structures and superstructures, with hegemony being the construction of a dialectical reciprocity and interaction among them.

It should be noted that defined in this way, the concept of hegemony can be used to overcome at least three problems that, as this thesis has demonstrated so far, have confronted certain paradigmatic positions in IRT. First, it can be used to overcome the problem of economic reductionism that results from the base-superstructure metaphor. Hegemony indicates how the reciprocity between structure and superstructure is constructed in a given time and space without giving primacy to the former over the latter, or vice versa. Second, in the same way, it helps overcome the problem of political reductionism. The concept of hegemony allows a recognition of the specificity of the state and of the inter-state system without requiring an analytical separation of

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15 For a detailed account of these two aspects of domination, see Bocock (1986), Nemeth (1980), Anderson (1977), Simon (1982).

16 The paradigmatic positions that fall in this category are those of the sociology of underdevelopment, world-system theory, and to some extent the structuralist account of capitalist development.
the state from civil society, the inter-state system from international political economy. Third, with its historical nature, the concept of hegemony permits the recognition of the importance of the limiting and constraining aspects of structures without requiring the reification of the concept of totality, as occurs in the outside in model.

By employing the Gramscian conception of hegemony, Cox suggests that dominance by a powerful state may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for hegemony (1986:223). In other words, dominance by a powerful state may be the basis of the creation of an order, but it cannot be a sufficient condition for the reproduction of the established order.  

It is therefore necessary to go beyond the concept of domination based on material capabilities and focus on the question of reproduction in order to understand how hegemony functions in the construction of an ensemble of structures and super-structures - that is, an historical bloc. For Cox, hegemony alludes to the production and reproduction of a "system of order", which cannot be seen in separation from the existing power-domination relations. It consists of both coercion and consent, material capabilities and the political and discursive practices, creation of a consensual politics, in which consent in normal circumstances serves as the primary organizing principle of hegemony.

From the concept of hegemony as coercion + consent, Cox extrapolates the following propositions. The first is that every system needs to have an order to reproduce itself and that its reproduction is in fact the reproduction of power-domination relations. Order, in this sense, refers to the process of normalization and regulation of social and politico-economic practices. What makes such normalization and regulation possible is an hegemonic ideology that neutralizes the existing conflictual patterns within power-domination relations in a given order (national or global). It is

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17 Realism and the agency problematic exemplify the problem of political reductionism

18 This point implies also the critique of the hegemonic stability theory in particular, and of realism in general, by Cox.

19 These propositions can be found in Cox (1983, 1987).
therefore an hegemonic ideology that helps the system reproduce itself.

The second is that in the course of creating and manufacturing "consent", an hegemonic ideology implements a universal language (norms and ideas), according to which the interests and demands of the constitutive elements of the existing system are formulated. The third is that since the ideological formation of hegemony is necessary for the creation of "consent", the reproduction of hegemony is dependent more upon its ability to operate as a universal language - so that different interests belonging to different states are made compatible with one another - than the material capabilities that the hegemonic power possesses.

When these interrelated propositions are thought of in terms of world order, they indicate that both material capabilities and the creation of consent are the pre-condition for the production and reproduction of a world order by the hegemonic nation-state.

Cox thus proposes that to become hegemonic, a state would have to found and protect a world order which was universal in conception, i.e., not an order in which one state directly exploits others but an order which most other states (or at least those within reach of the hegemony) could find compatible with their interests. Such an order would hardly be conceived in inter-state terms alone, for this would likely bring to the fore opposition of state interests. It would most likely give prominence to opportunities for the forces of civil society to operate on the world scale of the sphere within which hegemony prevails. The hegemonic concept of world order to founded not only upon the reputation of inter-state conflict but also upon a globally conceived civil society, i.e., a mode of production of global extent which brings about links among social classes of the countries encompassed by it (1983:171).

Cox's proposal implies that the hegemonic world order cannot be separated from the internal dynamics of social formations, which are the constitutive elements of global relations. Cox's political theory conceives of order as embedded in a mode of production and its internationalization, as an extension of the state-civil society reciprocal relationship. And, hegemony becomes "a point of articulation" between order, social forces and states.

Consequently, Cox demonstrates the intertwined characteristic of the relationship between the production of knowledge and the production of concepts (hegemony) on the one hand, and points out the significance of the social and political context (modernity) in which that relationship is brought
It can be concluded here that Gramscian critical theory and its concept of hegemony allows Cox to contribute to IRT in general and realism in particular in five different ways. First, instead of regarding conflict as an aspect of the inter-state system or of the international system, it considers it to be one of the basic constituents of historical development. Such consideration, according to Cox, brings into IRT a dialectical understanding of history which pays equal attention to both structures and agents. Second, instead of regarding power as an horizontal relationship, it considers it to be both horizontally and vertically constructed. This brings into IRT an understanding of domination and dependence based on a dialectical interplay between internal and external forces. Third, instead of regarding the state as an potentially autonomous entity, it considers the state within the context the state-civil society complex. Thus, equal attention is paid to civil society via analyses of production, and social classes and their impacts on state behaviour. Fourth, instead of focusing on the inter-state system or on the international structure, it begins its analysis with production, which explains a construction of hegemony or how power is converted into hegemony, thereby giving rise to a world order. The identification of the linkage between power, the state and the world order also helps to identify the sources of change. Fifth, instead of regarding international reality as an objective given

20 The concrete application by Cox Gramscian critical theory and his concept of hegemony can be found in his book, *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (1987). There, Cox offers three historical illustrations of his approach. The first is the decline of Pax Britannica and its economic position based on the liberal trade system. Cox explains the constituents of Pax Britannica with reference to its economic and military supremacy as well as its dominant ideology, which was economic liberalism based on comparative advantage. Its decline found its expression in the collapse of international trade, protectionist mechanisms, and the rise of competitive powers. The second illustration is the rise of Pax Americana. Cox's explanation of Pax Americana combines elements of the compromise of embedded liberalism, realism (the inter-state rivalry) and Fordism. Yet, in doing so, he starts with production, that is, relations of production to account for the internationalization of the state. The third illustration concerns the counter-hegemonic position. Cox focuses on the Third World and deals with the nationalist and socialist forces in that social formation. He argues that the alliance between international capital and the peripheral bourgeoisie through the dependent state frustrates economic development in peripheral societies. He warns that because of the lack of a clear alternative view of development, the counter-hegemonic demand for a new international division of labour does not challenge radically the existing international order. What is important here is that in each illustration Cox begins his analysis with production and relates that to the state to understand the existing world order.
having an ontological existence before human subjects, it considers that reality within the context of inter-subjective relations between subject and object.

Cox's critical theory also contributes to the Critical Turn in IRT, by making (with its above-listed features) it a powerful alternative to realism. In doing so, it is corrective to Hoffman's critical theory in two ways. First, unlike Habermas' category of communicative rationality, which is both foundationalist and universalist, the Gramscian conception of hegemony is historical. It is constructed in a given time and space. Thus, it involves power-domination relations and is open to resistance. Hence, hegemony allows Gramsci to distance himself from the discourse of modernity, whereas communicative rationality locates Habermas at the centre of that discourse. Second, unlike Habermas' attempt to construct communicative rationality on the basis of the primacy of interaction over production, the Gramscian conception of hegemony starts with production and deals with the inter-subjective within the context of an articulation of hegemony and interaction.

All these points concerning the positive features of Cox's critical theory indicate that the concept of hegemony plays a crucial role in the recent transformation of IRT as well as in its postpositivist and postrealist reconstruction. However, attributing that role to the concept of hegemony should not prevent one from discovering one fundamental problem which Cox's critical theory contains. It tends to be class reductionist in its employment of the concept of hegemony. It takes the concept of mode of production defined in terms of the existing relations of production as "the essence" of the historical development of a society and of international relations.

To understand how a world order comes about, Cox starts with production. According to Ruggie, this starting point presents a problem. The priority granted to production implies the reduction of inter-subjectivity to production (1989:33). However, whether or not starting with production presents a problem depends less upon the priority of production than upon the definition of it. A priority can be given to a broad definition of production as production and reproduction of the material conditions of existence, which would not involve a tendency towards reductionism. The problem occurs in Cox's critical theory, due precisely to his conception of production defined in terms
of social classes.

When reflected on the concept of hegemony, class dominance and its relation to the state becomes the key to understanding the reproduction of the state/civil society complex. In this way, inter-subjectivity is reduced to production. In terms of consent, hegemony becomes inseparable from the notion of "false consciousness" with regard to the subordinated groups. With regard to the dominant classes, hegemony corresponds to the ideas, values, and consciousness of these classes. This creates two problems in the way Cox uses the concept of hegemony. First, when reduced to classes and class consciousness, the concept of hegemony implies that ideologies are produced by classes. This underestimates the power of the discourse of modernity. As noted in Chapter II and Chapter III, the concepts of rationality, nationalism, development, progress are not ideologies simply produced by certain classes. They are ideologies that have been produced through a number of practices including the philosophical, scientific, economic, technological, and cultural. This is indeed what Gramsci means by hegemony, when he refers to an order through which social practices are regularized not normalized. Hegemony does not directly represent the interest of the dominant classes but it secures and reproduces their interests in the long run.

Secondly and more importantly, when reduced to classes, the construction of hegemony within the context of the reciprocal relationship between structures and superstructures does not involve non-class identities whose role in the process of challenging and altering the existing world order may be at least as crucial as that of class identities. This point is also historical in that to exclude non-class identities from the concept of hegemony means not to recognize the changing nature of societies and the state-civil society complex on the one hand, and the role non-class identities play in that complex on the other. As shall be seen in the following section, this changing nature of society is characterized by poststructuralism as "postmodernity" whose emergence has been to a large extent marked by these

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21 This also contradicts the Gramscian conception of ideology as a practice that has no class belonging but is articulated by classes. Gramsci exemplifies this conception of ideology in his Prison Notebooks (1971) with reference to morality, nationalism, and collective will. For the Gramscian conception of ideology, see Laclau (1977), Laclau and Mouffe (1985).
identities. This makes poststructuralism consider hegemony in terms of question of identity, which, it will be argued, helps overcome the problem of class reductionism in Cox's critical theory.

POSTMODERNISM AND THE POSTSTRUCTURALIST DISCOURSE

By locating the field of International Relations within the territory of modernity, a number of international relations theorists - notably Richard Ashley, Robert Walker, and James Der Derian - have suggested that to advance IRT it is essential to free it as much as possible from the discourse of modernity that has long dominated the field. They have also suggested that a mode of reasoning, constituted by an articulation of "post-structuralism" and "post-modernism", would help to do so. Such a mode of reasoning, in turn, has constituted what has today come to be known as "the post-structuralist discourse of IRT", whose aim in its attempt to free IRT from the discourse of modernity is to integrate into IRT the post-structuralist and post-modernist propositions concerning the questions of modernity, identity, epistemology, ontology, and history.

In what follows, it will be argued that these propositions are significant for two reasons. First, they can be used to improve Cox's critical theory, especially with respect to his understanding of the concept of hegemony. Second, they strengthen the way in which the Critical Turn presents itself as a strong alternative to positivist IRT. However, it should be noted immediately that the post-structuralist discourse of IRT in itself presents two fundamental problems, namely those of its scant attention to production (or, to international political economy) and its underestimation of the role of the state in the reproduction of international relations.

In order to understand the operation of post-structuralist discourse of IRT, it is necessary to recall the fundamental features of poststructuralism and to clarify the concept of postmodernism.

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22 Ashley, Der Derian, and Walker are the main figures in the poststructuralist discourse of IRT. The Intertextual and International Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics (ed.) by Der Derian and Shapiro (1989) contains a number of postmodern interventions into IRT. De Ferro (1980) and Escolar (1984) provide a postmodern and poststructuralist critique of IRT with respect to the question of development.

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As noted in Chapter II, post-structuralism emerged from within structuralism, but yet goes beyond it by rejecting the objectivist and universalist conception of epistemology. That is to say, poststructuralism carries within itself certain aspects of structuralism, such as the constitution of individuals as subjects, the concept of totality, and the anti-humanist reading of social relations, but at the same time redefines these aspects by focusing on the political dimension of epistemology. In doing so, post-structuralism also attempts to gain specificity by drawing on the texts produced by Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger, texts whose purpose is to provide a radical critique of the discourse of modernity. It is on the basis of the Nietzschean and Heideggerian critiques of modernity and of Enlightenment that poststructuralism asserts that notions of unity and universality are inherently oppressive and that a strategic move to promote their disintegration. Such disintegration entails deconstructing the project of Enlightenment:

(i) by "decentering" its conception of the epistemologically autonomous and rationally acting subject;
(ii) by abandoning its aspiration to universality, unity, totality, and foundations; and
(iii) by defeating its oppressive regulatory regime based on universal truth and representational thought.

As a result, what is proposed by poststructuralism is a regime based on a plurality of unmediated and non-referential discourses and representations, and the principles of indeterminacy, contingency, historicity, specificity, and spatiality, as opposed to those of totality and universality.

Two currents of post-structuralism, whose foundations were laid by Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, have been prominent in IRT. In constituting his post-structuralist discourse, Foucault has dealt with three interrelated questions; (i) the intertwined characteristic of knowledge and power; (ii) the location and role of intellectuals; (iii) the subjugation of individual subjects to the regime of modernity.

These questions correspond to three fundamental concerns underlying Foucault's

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23 For a detailed analysis of this move, see Dews (1987), Smart (1985), Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982), and Descombes (1980).
investigations: namely truth, power, and individual ethics. The investigation of truth studies the constitution of individuals as subjects of knowledge; the investigation of power examines the articulation of individuals to fields of power; and, the investigation of ethics concerns the discourses of individual ethics making individuals into moral agents.

As noted in Chapter II, the mode of investigation that Foucault initiated is based on the idea that both the past and the present are the products of history, meaning that the ontological existence of individuals and their conception of what they are are always shaped by discourses that precede them, that have come into existence before they were born. That is to say that in so far as any cultural object or objectification is the outcome of a process that is fundamentally historical, "being" has to be regarded as "a function of becoming". What is needed is, therefore, a mode of investigation whose aim is to trace a lineage, to locate antecedents and to explain the emergence of cognitive entities. Such investigation is called "genealogy", a concept that Foucault borrows from Nietzsche. Foucault, however, immediately warns that genealogy differs from historical epistemologies in the sense that it does not attempt to trace a lineage, whatever it may be, by relying on such explanatory devices as cause and effect, foundation, origin, and destiny. Instead, it brings out the heterogeneous complexity and historically and discursively constructed forces that work to form and reproduce events.

It is for this reason that genealogy sees the construction of events as contingent, unexpected, nonlinear, and discontinuous in the field of discourses whose effects are thoroughly indeterminate. The significance of genealogy, therefore, lies in the fact that it clearly points out the insufficiency and arbitrary nature of the objectivist and rational understanding of epistemology that claims to be capable of explicating the purpose behind the history or the development of a society.

In his book, On Diplomacy (1987), Der Derian demonstrates how genealogy works in the domain of IRT. On Diplomacy is intended to provide what he calls "A Genealogy of Western Estrangement" in which he attempts to discover whether there are symptoms of diplomacy's crisis inherent yet hidden in the present depictions of its essential beginning and nearly seamless history; symptoms, as
Nietzsche said about moral prejudice, through which the present was possibly living at the expense of the future (1987:3).

Der Derian argues that the genealogical investigation of diplomacy allows him to deal with its origins and transformations and the attempt to mediate those conditions through systems of thought, law, and power (1987:7). Such an investigation reveals that the diplomatic discourse throughout history has taken different forms according to the time-space context in which it was constructed. Mytho-diplomacy, proto-diplomacy, diplomacy, anti-diplomacy, neo-diplomacy, and techno-diplomacy constitute different forms of the diplomatic discourse. What is important here is that in his genealogical investigation, Der Derian discovers that these forms are not successive nor transitory in the sense that one emerges from the previous one. Instead, they have their own time-space dimension, their own characteristics, and their own modes of operation. This means that they are contingent, particular, spatial, and non-referential.

Der Derian extrapolates two conclusions from his genealogical investigation of diplomacy. The first is that diplomacy does not have an historical origin, and therefore, it cannot be viewed in a teleological, a functionalist, or a universal manner. The different modes of such mediation give rise to the different forms of diplomacy, each of which has its own determinants, its own historicity, and its own spatial and temporal dimensions.

The second conclusion, which is more significant to IRT, is that the genealogical investigation of diplomacy introduces into IRT the concept of "alienation" which Der Derian uses interchangeably with that of estrangement. Der Derian argues that although the term alienation in international practices has been often used especially in regard to diplomatic matters, its theoretical basis has been ignored by the thinkers of international relations (1987:18). For Der Derian, this creates the need to reconceptualize the concept of alienation in reference to international relations (1987:11). Drawing on sociological and literary theories of alienation - notably from Marx to poststructuralists such as Foucault and Barthes - Der Derian suggests that alienation refers to the process of the discursive construction of the relationship between subjects (individuals or national social formations) and the existing order (national or international) in which the former is estranged from, or subjugated to, the
later (1987:198). The diplomatic discourse in this sense refers to an attempt to mediate through systems of law, thought and power the conditions under which alienation of subjects has occurred. Der Derian concludes that such reconceptualization could provide a better understanding of diplomacy, and thus could establish for itself a justifiable ground with which to present itself as a metatheoretical approach to IRT (1987:218-221).

The second current in poststructuralism, which has had enormous influence on IRT, is "the deconstructive post-structuralism", inspired by Jacques Derrida. As pointed out in Chapter II, contrary to the genealogical method, deconstruction, as articulated by Derrida, is concerned with the elusiveness of texts, with the relationship between literature and philosophy, and with the textual construction of the power-knowledge relationship. What deconstruction does is to investigate the nature and production of knowledge. It aims to criticize a conception of knowledge and meaning as "graspable essences" that independently precede or follow expression. In opposition to such essences, deconstruction contemplates knowledge and meaning as representations unavoidably enmeshed in the heterodox and contradictory nature of language and interpretation (Anderson, 1989:132). It should be noted, however, that although it represents a radical critique of essentialism, deconstruction does not arrive at an absolute truth. Instead, it attempts to unravel interminably the texture of power and authority at work in knowledge, meaning, and interpretation.

Thus, deconstruction asserts that knowledge and meaning cannot be separated from cultural, political, and discursive forces contending for power. This means that the relationship of power and knowledge comes into existence not outside the text, but within the process of the constitution of the text. It can be said, therefore, that deconstruction shifts the emphasis of analysis to textuality.

It is this textual practice which forms and gives meaning to Richard Ashley’s attempt to deconstruct realist IRT. As the leading figure in the realm of the poststructuralist discourse of international relations, Ashley’s deconstructive attempt is worth examining in detail. Ashley’s work involves three interrelated purposes, each of which is directly related to the “war of position” that he
has waged against neorealism. 24

The first purpose is to incorporate into IRT post-structuralism, which provides him with necessary concepts and categories to deconstruct neorealism. The second is to set the necessary parameters for the construction of a critical social theory of international relations. The third purpose is to emphasize the significance of the postmodern condition to IRT, especially with respect to the questions of emancipation and change. It should be pointed out here that while succeeding in realizing the first purpose, and thereby making an important contribution to IRT, the way Ashley approaches the second and the third purposes appears to be quite problematical, due both to his heavy reliance upon poststructuralism and to his unquestioned acceptance of the postmodernist discourse.

According to Ashley, incorporation of post-structuralism into IRT allows him to unearth the disciplining nature of neorealism. Only questions that fit the realist image of world politics (that is, the anarchy problematic) can be raised and others are necessarily disregarded (1984 and 1987a). Ashley deconstructs the texts produced by neorealists, which reveals first the positivist nature of realism and its technical approach to the problem of world politics (or its problem solving quality), second the existing hierarchy in the process of representation of world politics, and third the concomitant marginalization of issues in that process. 25

Ashley's deconstructive attempt begins with the basic principle, with which realism operates, that is, the inside-outside duality. This duality is used to characterize domestic politics as "good life" or "progress", while treating outside as the domain of "recurrence" and "repetition", in which survival and the struggle of power constitute the fixed and homogenous essence (1987a:413). This means that the inside assumes an existence of community, whereas the outside gives rise to and is in turn

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24 The term "war of position" is coined by Gramsci to indicate the importance of intellectual and cultural resistance to the hegemonic discourse. In his "Theory as War" (1984) Ashley uses the term to describe the recent transformation of IRT.

25 The main text under deconstruction is Waltz's The Theory of International Politics (1979) which, as we have seen in Chapter IV, is the first reconstructive attempt of realism. At the same time, the modified structural realism is also subjected to deconstruction.
determined by anarchy. Thus, anarchy becomes the ultimate origin of international politics, the governing principle according to which states act as "like units" whose primary function is to maintain their territorial survival. Anarchy does not contain in itself a community; it is horizontally ordered, and it does assume potential autonomy vis-a-vis the inside.

What is more important is that the potential autonomy of the outside originates from its fixed character, from its ontological ahistoricity and universality (Ashley, 1984:232). This means that historical development, change, or any process which requires an active role of the knowledgeable subject in the making of history takes place in the arena of the inside, where there is a community in which social relations are vertically ordered.

Ashley draws three fundamental conclusions from the realist appropriation of the inside-outside duality, which should be considered an important contribution to IRT. The first concerns the question of realism, or how one should characterize realism. Following Derrida's idea of the textual (discursive) construction of reality, Ashley argues that realism functions as a discourse whose function is to fix the principle of anarchy as an ahistoric governing essence of world politics, whereas world politics itself is a product of and subject to historicity (1987a:423). The ahistoric concept of anarchy textually constitutes world politics where power is the driving force of relations among the states and no value apart from security and survival could be taken to be the primary point of reference in international governance. For Ashley, this means that realism functions as both a discourse of power and a discourse of rule (1987:430).

In his "A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematic" (1988), Ashley clearly demonstrates how realism performs its double function. As defined in realism, anarchy means international governance without the governor, or order without the orderer. Ashley argues that one could read this definition in two ways - one historical, another ahistorical. If the definition of anarchy as an order without an orderer does not emphasize a universal purpose, then the definition finds its focus in a pluralist discourse, which that there may be a number of legitimate voices or subjects, not just one (1988:241). That is to say, anarchy does not require a central subject. Anarchy constitutes a discourse
which allows for the recognition of the legitimacy of the multiple ways of creating order on the one hand, and of the role that the multiple sovereign subjects play in the making of history on the other. Such recognition makes anarchy a process which is open to history and which is never complete, but subject to reconstruction.

The realist discourse, however, reads anarchy in a positivist manner as an objective reality which requires a central subject, that is the sovereign state, and a central purpose, that is, survival. Thus, it excludes all possible interpretations of how order is constructed, and detaches anarchy from history by reifying it. It is through this reading that the realist discourse functions as both the discourse of power and the discourse of rule. It is the discourse of power because it privileges power over all other kinds of purposes. It is the discourse of rule, because it normalizes relations and argues for recurrences by imposing anarchy on its central subject, the sovereign state.

The second conclusion, which derives from the first, is that within the context of the inside-outside duality, to say that the outside constitutes a problem area to be fixed is to celebrate the community which has been created by a discourse of modernity (Ashley, 1987a:419). In other words, Ashley argues that given the inside-outside duality, in order for realism to be able to present the outside as a problem area, it presents the inside unproblematic in the first place. Ashley concludes that this is precisely the case in the realist discourse, in so far as it derives the definition of the outside from that of the inside (1988:235-239, 1987a:421).

For Ashley, realist discourse affirms the concept of modern society as an expressive totality characterized by the progressive unfolding of universalizing reason and an harmonious order via the state, positive law, and technology. Ashley correctly points out that in celebrating the inside, the realist discourse attributes to the inside (community) a quality which is not historically valid (1987a:426-428). Following Foucault's conception of modern society as a disciplinary society, Ashley argues that such an harmonious order is in fact disciplinary in that it functions by privileging one

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26 Chapter III provided a detailed account of the concept of totality as an expressive totality with reference to the sociology of development.
identity (the state, the sovereign rational man or class) over other identities as well as one element, progress, over the others. 27

Modernity gives rise not only to progress but also to discipline. It is because of the disciplinary nature of modern society that order is not harmonious but has to be maintained and reproduced through the state and law. In fact, it is this reproduction that makes possible the discursive representation of the inside as unproblematic. According to Ashley, in the process of the reproduction of the inside, realist discourse plays a significant role by assuring and reassuring the centrality and the inevitability of the state as the central agent (1988:246-251). It does so by equating power with the national interest, by affirming the territorial centrality of the state, and by locating the state on the border between the inside and the outside. Ashley concludes that given the inside-outside duality, realist discourse functions as an ideological discourse of the modern sovereign state.

This is in fact a very important formulation, and constitutes Ashley’s major contribution to IRT. For not only does it provide an adequate conception of realism, but also it accounts for its prevailing dominance in IRT. Moreover, in doing so, it shifts the emphasis from outside to inside by pointing out the link between the discourse of modernity and realist discourse, which in turn demonstrates the significance of the concept of (modern) society, although it never appears as a visible object in realist discourse. 28 The implication is that a successful critique of realism should start with the inside and its problematization. Through the problematization of modern society, Ashley argues, one could resist realist discourse, could question its positivist and totalizing nature, and thus, could provide an alternative to its disciplinary force, in ways both sensitive to differences and open to historicity (1987a, 1987b, and 1989).

The problematization of modern society in this sense is the starting-point for the construction

27 Foucault (1971) characterizes modern society as a disciplinary society with reference to Bentham’s notion of panopticon. Panopticon refers to an architectural design of a prison which proposes a disciplinary technique through supervision from a central tower overlooking all the cells of the circular building which makes it possible to control the prisoners without imposing a physical existence of the controller on them.

28 This point has been explicitly made by Ashley in his “Living on Border Lines” (1989).
of a critical social theory of world politics. This constitutes the third purpose of Ashley's deconstructive attempt. It should be noted here, however, that although such problematization locates post-structuralism in the Critical Turn, Ashley's critical social theory differs from Habermasian and Gramscian critical theories in two fundamental ways. First, the way Ashley thinks of modernity derives directly from Foucault's conception of modern society based on discipline and social control. In other words, for Ashley, modernity does not involve a negative dialectic between progress and emancipation, but instead, since its inception, it has been organized around a specific mode of normalization of social relations based on disciplinary techniques. 29

The second way, which directly follows the first, is that if modernity does not involve both progress and emancipation, critical theory, in order to provide an emancipatory practice, should distance itself as much as possible from the discourse of modernity. The extent of its distance determines how powerful its problematization of modern society is. Here is the significance of post-modernity for Ashley's deconstructive attempt in particular and the post-structuralist discourse of IRT Post-modernism brings about a disjunction in modern society. Thus, Ashley argues that the recognition of the postmodern turn in modern society creates the historical ground for one to distance himself or herself from the discourse of modernity (1987:7).

The historical context, in which Ashley attempts to construct a critical social theory of world politics, is post-moderniy. It should be pointed out here that the recognition of postmodernity as the fundamental point of departure from the discourse of modernity characterizes not only Ashley's critical social theory but also the whole post-structuralist discourse of IRT. This implies that the problems within Ashley's critical social theory are also reflected in the whole post-structuralist discourse. 30 For this reason, what follows will provide a general critique of post-structuralist

29 For a detailed comparison of post-structuralism and critical theory with regard to the question of modernity, see Dews (1988) and Honneth (1986).

30 That does not mean that there is no difference between Ashley's critical social theory and the poststructuralist discourse of IRT. One difference that should be pointed out concerns the distinction that Ashley draws between traditional realism and neorealism in favor of the former. This has been criticized by Walker who argues that such a distinction is unnecessary and may lead one to fall to
discourse.

To do so, it is important first to discuss briefly what it means to characterize the current historical context as postmodern. At the very general level, post-modernism gives meaning to an historical circumstance from within which have emerged cultural forms that are both related and at the same time opposed to modernism. The terrain in which the emergence of these cultural forms takes place can, however, be differently analyzed: such differences give rise to the various descriptions of postmodernism. Following Patterson, one could discover five different terrains to which the term post-modernism has been applied (1989:72-75).

(i) Post-modernism could be described as "the cultural correlate" of late capitalism in which the accumulation of capital has already become completely internationalized.

(ii) It could refer to "the cultural correlate" of post-industrial society, in which knowledge replaces labour and becomes the new principal characteristic of the production process.

(iii) It might give expression to the form that contemporary cultural production takes.

(iv) It could be regarded as an aesthetic and philosophical discourse, which transcends periodization and is not shaped by any specific politico-economic determinant. In this sense, the aesthetic and philosophical discourse of Nietzsche can be said to be postmodern.

(v) It could refer to a sceptical and trivial attitude that threatens the humanism of modernist culture.

In the poststructuralist discourse of IRT, postmodernity is considered with respect to (iv) and (v). It refers to "a condition" in which it is possible to criticize the discourse of modernity of all kinds. This means that this condition also gives meaning to the exhaustion of the discourse of modernism which takes the form of the decline of the "grand narratives of legitimation". Here Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition (1984) is of significance. Lyotard argues that the postmodern condition

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permits a development of a critique of modernity with regard to its three fundamental characteristics—those of foundationalism, universalism, and essentialism. With respect to foundationalism, Lyotard suggests that modernism legitimates itself with reference to a meta-discourse which operates by making an explicit appeal to a grand narrative (1984:13). According to Lyotard, two such grand narratives are those of the Enlightenment and of emancipation. The former is based on knowledge, the second on the socialization of labour. Lyotard's aim is to criticize Habermas who uses the first grand narrative and Marxist discourse which employs the second one. However different, these narratives arrange and rearrange historical events as a process pointing towards the emancipation of humanity. They also concur in the belief that institutions and relations are legitimate only in so far as they contribute to this process of emancipation.

Lyotard considers the meta-discourse that makes an appeal to these grand narratives to be foundationalist, and argues that the postmodern condition delegitimizes that meta-discourse. Postmodernism moves beyond this foundationalism by defining itself via "an incredulity towards grand narratives" (1984:8).

It can be argued that this definition of post-modernity also includes the way in which modern society is problematized by the post-structuralist discourse of IRT. However, the material basis of incredulity in the post-structuralist discourse of IRT is the question of identity and takes what has come to be known as "new social movements", whereas for Lyotard the emergence of the postindustrial society gives rise to incredulity towards grand narratives.

Incredulity is said to refine our sensitivity to differences and to increase our tolerance of incommensurability. That is to say, it enables us to recognize the plurality of discourses, identities, and cultures. Ashley argues in this context that by acknowledging the multiplicity of identities and their specific conditions of existence, postmodern knowledge constitutes:

a specific counterpart, in the domain of social theory, of all of those social movements that have arisen in specific locales, and amidst the specific crisis of modern life, to resist the reigning practices of the regime of modernism. Feminist movements, environmental movements, peace movements, and popular movements of resistance against authoritarian regimes, these and many other movements have arisen, not to affirm and succeed within the dominant categories, interpretive
dispositions, and practices that are characteristics of participation in the modernist regime, but to resist those categories, challenge those dispositions, and engender alternative practices (1987b:5).

Postmodern knowledge about international relations extrapolates from such resistance to modernity its basic premise that any conception of epistemology based on "causality, universality, and objectivity" has to be defied. To do so is to historicize epistemologies and scientific practices, or to recognize the politics of epistemology. To abandon the objective character of epistemology, therefore, means to link it with the concepts of power and the reproduction of the existing order in a given society.

Walker's text, One World, Many Worlds (1988), clearly demonstrates how postmodern knowledge about international relations abandons the notion of "objectivity". Walker argues that "objective" has always meant historically subjective. In other words, objective would mean universally subjective, for actors can know objectively in so far as knowledge appears to be real for the whole social formation historically unified in a single and hegemonic cultural system (Western civilization or the Enlightenment).

This means that the modernist call for universality as well as the concept of totality as an expression of unity is historical rather than objective (Walker, 1988:24-26). To say that social relations can be understood via the concept of totality is to impose one discourse of international relations over the others. 32 The point is that the process of historical unification takes place through the disappearance of the internal contradictions that are not universal but are the concrete manifestations of competing ideological discourses and political practices. This is to imply that what is perceived as objective can only be objective when it is discursively constructed as an objective, and for this reason that objective is objective for a social group.

The concept of totality as both objective and universal involves therefore a political identity

32 Lyotard makes this point to criticize Habermas in that he argues that Habermas' consensual theory of language is in fact an attempt to impose one language game on the diverse range of language games (1984:14). Walker implicitly follows Lyotard in suggesting that totality imposes itself on the diverse range of discourses of world politics.
which functions as the essence of historical development. As a result, the discourse of modernity operates not only with the principles of universality and objectivity, but also with an essentialist conception of history. This identity can take different forms in accordance with the grand narrative in which it is embedded. In the discourse of modernity, the identity is the sovereign rational acting subject, which, in realist discourse, corresponds to the state, and in Marxist discourse, to the class (Walker, 1988; Ashley, 1987a, 1989).

It is the construction of objectivity and universality with essentialist conception of history that defines hegemony not as a class practice (as in Cox’s Gramscian critical theory) but as a discursively and historically constructed unified system according to which actors engage in practices. The implication is that the constitution of a counter-hegemonic discourse should not be based on a fundamental class, but instead has to begin with the recognition of marginalized identities. In other words, it has to be pluralistic, in order to be open to a number of voices and to their specific resistance to the discourse of modernity (Walker, 1988: 26-29).

Thus, Ashley promotes "the polyvalent, multi-cultural, and stratified nature of international relations" (1987a: 419). Likewise, Walker promotes "many worlds" as opposed to "one world", advocates the idea that it is essential to recognize the historicity and cultural specificity of different societies in order to struggle via critical social movements against the hegemonic world order (1988: 75-81). In each case, what is proposed is the significance of postmodern knowledge and the recognition of different voices (new social movements) that have long been marginalized and even dismissed by the modernist tradition within the terrain of IRT.

It can be concluded here that by attempting to problematize modern society, post-structuralist discourse of IRT constructs a postmodern alternative, which Ashley calls, "a critical social theory of international politics". Central to the postmodern alternative are: first the rejection of such modernist concepts as totality, universality, the autonomous character of epistemology, the rationally acting subject; second the promotion of such concepts as the discursive and textual construction of reality, meaning, identity, historicity, and the power/knowledge relationship; and third the privileging of
critical social movements as the new agents of social change.

However, in each of these three respects, the post-structuralist discourse of IRT presents several difficulties. The first concerns the unquestioned acceptance of post-structuralism. Following Foucault and Derrida, post-structuralist discourse suggests that if reality is not given, or objective (but referring instead to a discursively and historically constructed system), then international relations does not have an ontological existence but is a discursive construction. To the extent that it points out the importance of historicity of reality, such a suggestion helps problematize the concept of society. However, what post-structuralist discourse does is, in fact, to reduce the material to textuality. Drawing on Derrida's proposition that everything is textual and there is nothing outside the text, international relations are said to be discursively constructed, that is, that there is no international relations outside the texts (or discourses) about international relations.

However, as noted in Chapter II, Derrida's textuality, and for this matter the Foucauldian concept of discourse, faces a serious problem. That is, due to their preoccupation with the Nietzschean conception of history based on a will to domination, both Derrida and Foucault provide a discourse governed by one-dimensional logic. Their position does not permit any talk about domination other than in their terms. This means that relations of production, regimes of accumulation, modes of production, or realm of production in general, should not be seen as significant to understanding of domination, nor should they be located into the process of resistance to domination. 33

The unquestioned appropriation of Derrida and Foucault makes the poststructuralist discourse of IRT face the same problem. By arguing for the textuality of international relations, both Ashley and Walker underestimate the economic dimension of history and domination, and totally disregard power relations present in the process of globalization of capitalism. The problem that arises is that once history is read off only with reference to domination based on the will to power, domination

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33 For a detailed critique of Derrida and Foucault in this respect, see Callinicos (1989) and Crook (1990).
itself tends to be a grand narrative, a totalizing mode of discourse, which contradicts Ashley and Walker's attempt to abandon the principle of unity and universality. 34

This problem also puts into doubt the conception of historicity within the poststructuralist discourse of IRT. In this respect, the second problem concerns the concept of postmodernity with which the poststructuralist discourse makes its claim to historicity. For poststructuralism, postmodernity refers to the decline of the grand narratives of the discourse of modernity and the emergence of incredulity towards these narratives. Such emergence however expresses not only the importance of new social movements, but also changes in economic relations. In other words, the decline of the grand narratives is not completely independent from the decline of a certain economic discourse that formed and legitimized the dominant regime of accumulation in modern societies after the world war II, which, as noted in Chapter V, was identified as Fordism. It is for this reason that Jameson in his polemical intervention into the debate over postmodernism suggested that Lyotard does not see the relationship of the emergence of incredulity and global capitalism (1984:53-92). This led Jameson to define postmodernity as a cultural logic of late capitalism.

The point here is not to privilege Jameson's definition but to point out that the poststructuralist discourse employs a one-dimensional understanding of history. Neither Ashley nor Walker attempts to deal with the question of why, historically speaking, when the decline of the grand narratives have been declared, there was also a declaration of the crisis and the restructuring of world capitalism. 35 Harvey has argued in this context that poststructuralism and postmodernism are important to the extent that they help understand the current transformation of societies and of world capitalism (1989:327-355). The implication of Harvey's argument is that poststructuralist resistance

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34 Roy, for example, expresses his dissatisfaction with Ashley's critical social theory by pointing to its exclusionary character as far as the question of global domination is concerned (1988:77-83). He argues that such exclusion leads Ashley to ignore the question of colonialism, which is of significance in resisting the discourse of modernity. Likewise, Jenson and Keyman criticized Walker's understanding of politics with respect to its one-dimensional vision of history (1990b:141-159).

35 Such declaration gives rise to such terms as disorganized capitalism (Otte, 1985 and Lash and Urry, 1987), and post-Fordism (Lipietz, 1987 and Harvey, 1989).
to universality, foundationalism, and totality would help understand the increased globalization of capitalism. This does not mean that post-modernism is reduced to capitalism. What it means is that post-modernity exists in relation to the changes that have been occurring in societies in which it is embedded.

The post-structuralist discourse of IRT is not able to recognize this relationality due to its heavy reliance on Foucault’s and Derrida’s Nietzschean conceptions of history and modernity. On the other hand, such reliance leads the poststructuralist discourse of IRT to take new social movements as the historical and material agent of postmodernity. As noted, by relying on these movements, the post-structuralist discourse of IRT argues for sensitivity to difference. It is argued that such sensibility is non-totalizing and refuses traditional unifications on the one hand, and attentive to the singular and the particular on the other (Walker, 1988 and 1990). This implies a pluralistic political agenda which is based on the recognition of the specific condition of existence of each identity, or of each social movement. Contrary to Cox’s critical theory and Habermas’ consensual politics, it is an unconstrained pluralist agenda whose basic function is to reconstruct reason in pluralist non-totalizing terms through the delegitimation of the basic institutions (especially the state) of the modernist discourse. 36

Post-structuralist discourse, with its political agenda, is important to the extent that it points out the centrality of the question of identity/difference and of new social movements. In this respect, it is a corrective to Cox’s use of the concept of hegemony. However, when the unconstrained pluralism is privileged over any form of unification and once it is considered as the only way of resisting the grand narratives of the modernist discourse, two problems arise. First, in the process of the problematization of modern society, as noted above, the economic sphere is equated with the relations of production and therefore with modernity, and as a result it is not considered integral to the resistance to the discourse of modernity. Indeed, nowhere in their poststructuralist discourses of IRT do Ashley and Walker say anything about the capitalist nature of modernity or post-modernity.

36 This agenda is fully developed by Laclau and Mouffe in the name of radical democracy (1985). It should be noted however that although influenced by Laclau and Mouffe, Walker differs from them in that he rejects any attempt to articulate these movements.
Second, the role of the state in the reproduction of modern societies is underestimated. This creates a major paradox in the post-structuralist discourse of IRT. For, on the one hand, theorizing the state helps in the criticism of realism and its inside-outside duality. Yet, no attempt has been made in that discourse to theorize the state. Instead, in their postmodern political project, Ashley and Walker call for decentering the state, by which they mean that the focus has to be shifted from the state to the question of identity/difference. The state should be viewed with an incredulous attitude (Ashley, 1989 and Walker and Magnusson, 1988). However, such an attitude should not lead one to exclude the question of the state from the construction of a political agenda against modernity. As pointed out in Chapter V and Chapter VI, the fact that the discourse of modernity is a discourse of modern society which is also a capitalist society with the nation state reveals that the state plays a crucial role in the reproduction of that society. It follows that any attempt to problematize that society should provide an account of the state, its role and functions in that society rather than simply calling for decentering it both theoretically and philosophically (Jenson and Keyman, 1980:144-145).

All these problems indicate that just as in Gramscian and Habermasian critical theories, the post-structuralist discourse of IRT has limitations and weaknesses. As for its conceptualization and its critique of realism, the post-structuralist discourse makes an important contribution to IRT. With its call for the recognition of difference and identity, it is also a corrective to Gramscian and Habermasian critical theories. However, as a critical social theory of international relations, the post-structuralist discourse is one-dimensional, due to its conception of history based on domination, partial due to its failure to fully recognize the capitalist character of modernity, and reductionist (especially in the case of Ashley's deconstructive attempt) due to its preoccupation with textuality.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing discussion of the Critical Turn in IRT, it can be argued that thinking of international relations within the context of the discourse of modernity provides useful insight not
only for a powerful critique of realism, but also for the development of a more comprehensive and historical understanding of international relations. It does so by incorporating into IRT critical discourses by which it is possible to problematize modernity. In doing so, despite the differences among these critical discourses, the primary objective of the Critical Turn is to point out the significance of recognizing the political character of epistemology, historicity, power, culture and identity/difference, thereby help to resist and finally alter the existing order. Thus, the Critical Turn takes responsibility for casting light on the present possibilities of what Bourdieu has called creating democratic ways of "world-making", that is, "the vision of the world and the practical operations by which groups are produced and reproduced" (1989:23).

However, as has become apparent, Gramscian critical theory, Habermasian critical theory and the post-structuralist discourse of IRT present different ways of "world making", depending on their own mode of problematizing modern society. There is a crucial difference between Habermasian critical theory and post-structuralist discourse with respect to the question of modernity. By viewing modernity as a project involving both progress and emancipation, the former approaches history by seeing modernity as an incomplete project. Thus, it seeks alternatives to the existing order without distancing itself from the discourse of modernity. Hence, it promotes the idea of universal emancipation via communicative rationality as the basis of the democratic world making. However, such a universalist attitude, because of the reasons already elaborated, remains quite utopian and Eurocentric.

Post-structuralism, in contrast, sees modernity not as an incomplete but as an exhausted project. This view allows it to distance itself from the discourse of modernity. It therefore approaches history with its recognition of the postmodern condition and focuses on new social movements. Thus, poststructuralist discourse attempts to render IRT a critical social theory sensitive to differences and tolerant of incommensurability. However, such critical theory, because of its unquestioned acceptance of post-structuralism and its one dimensional conception of history based on domination, ignores the importance of the category of production in the process of the democratic world making.
Gramscian critical theory too distances itself from the discourse of modernity, without being trapped in the question of whether modernity is incomplete or exhausted. It attempts to problematize modern society via the conception of hegemony defined as a fit between social forces, states, and world order. Therefore, contrary to the other two critical theories, the category of production is taken to be the starting point both for an analysis of international relations and for the creation of the democratic ways of world making. However, Gramscian critical theory - because the category of production is defined only in terms of the relations of production - involves a tendency towards class reductionism. Nevertheless, the openness of the Gramscian conception of hegemony to historicity and therefore to reconstruction makes it possible to resolve the problem of reductionism. This can be done by integrating into the concept of hegemony the question of identity/difference and an understanding of postmodernism as a cultural formation of post-Fordism. It is to this issue which will be returned in Chapter VIII.

Thus, it can be said that each critical theory has its own limits and its own strong points, the recognition of which is important for an adequate examination not only of the phenomenon of the Critical Turn in IRT, but also of the transformation and the proliferation of IRT. Such recognition indicates that the Critical Turn is one of the ways of analyzing international relations, and thus affirms the multiparadigmatic nature of IRT.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION:

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1990s

This thesis began with the question, where are we now? What is the present state of IRT? Der Derian has argued in this context that international relations is undergoing an epistemological critique. The thesis has agreed with Der Derian in that it has argued that IRT is indeed undergoing a transformation as fundamental as prior discipline-shaping debates. However, the recognition of such transformation as well as the proliferation of IRT can only constitute a starting-point for a comprehensive and detailed account of the state of IRT. What is important is to provide a thorough and critical examination of that transformation by focusing on the ways in which paradigmatic positions have analyzed and theorized international relations. This step is important, because no satisfactory account of such transformation has yet been produced. Instead, what is called the inter-paradigm debate has been taken to be an adequate characterization of the present state of IRT. However, as it was argued in Chapter I, the inter-paradigm debate neither understands adequately paradigmatic positions in themselves nor explains again adequately the differences between them, nor touches upon a number of issues that are integral to the transformation of IRT.

For instance, while arguing that such transformation constitutes a move towards postpositivism and postrealism, the inter-paradigm debate does not give any clue as to how to go beyond positivism and realism; what kind of epistemological gestures are needed to do so; how such moves reflect on the substantial concepts of IRT; at what level the unit of analysis has to be located to critique realism; and more importantly, what are the limitations that alternatives to realism and positivism involve, and what can be learned from them. If the present state of IRT is characterized as multi-paradigmatic as a result of its transformation and proliferation, then these questions have to be raised and explanations for them have to be sought. With this argument, the thesis has undertaken the task of providing a meta-theoretical mapping through a textual reading (or what Althusser has called a symptomatic reading) of IRT in order to examine critically the
paradigmatic positions in such a way as to discover both what can be learned from them and to single out their own limitations.

In doing so, the thesis first has shown how positivism can be critiqued at the level of epistemology. Structuralism, critical theory, and poststructuralism that are now available in the domain of IRT have been presented as ways of criticizing positivism. Their specific modes of operation and their knowledge claims have also been critically discussed to provide a background for a metatheoretical examination of paradigmatic positions by which these epistemologies have been employed.

Then the thesis has demonstrated that the question of epistemology is important to critique realism and its reconstructed forms, by showing that world-system theory, which has been considered a powerful alternative to realism, is in fact no alternative at all. Two reasons were given for this. First, world system theory fails to break with positivism due to its universal, objectivist, and reified conception of totality. Secondly and more importantly, world system theory, like realism, is an attempt to construct an inside-out model for an analysis of international relations, which has very little to say about social formations and their specific characteristics. Just as realism's inside-outside duality which regards the inside as unproblematic, world system theory operates at the level of the outside, and proceeds by reifying it in such a way that it becomes the explanation of the inside. It has been argued thus that the similarities between world system theory and realism, at least in terms of epistemology and ontology, appear to be more than the differences between them.  

The failure of world system theory to present a powerful alternative to realism implies a crucial point. That is, in order to provide a powerful critique of realism and its positivist epistemological position, it is imperative to shift the unit of analysis to modern society in which realism is embedded, and at the same time to attempt to problematize that society. With this argument, the thesis has demonstrated that there are in the domain of IRT at least three ways of doing so. As Chapter V has shown, one mode is through the category of development. Such an attempt indicates

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1 This argument also implies the failure of the inter-paradigm debate to deal adequately with the problem of classifying the paradigmatic positions of IRT within the context of methodology.
that what realism sees as unproblematic (that is, domestic affairs) is in fact very problematic, in so far
as what is at stake is the capitalist mode of production and the consolidation of its power. The
emergence and development of capitalism in that attempt is analyzed through structuralism and its
organizing concept, the mode of production. Chapter V has also focused on different accounts of
capitalist development by different paradigmatic positions within structuralism, and has pointed out
the strength and weak points of each position.

Chapter VI has shown how modern society was analyzed by the agency problematic through
the concept of the state. Such an analysis was in fact an attempt to theorize the state in such a way
that its specificity is recognized within the context of geopolitics. The agency problematic attempted
to explicate the ways in which the state (and the inter-state system) acts as a potentially autonomous
institutional agency capable of shaping and reshaping social relations within its national society.
However, as it was pointed out, the agency problematic's attempt to analyze the linkage between the
inside and the outside through its conception of the state does more to help resolve the problem of
realism resulting from its untheorized conception of the state than advance IRT.

Chapter VII focused on the problematization of modern society within the context of the
discourse of modernity. In this mode of problematization the questions of identity/difference and
culture occupy a special place. The chapter dealt with the phenomenon of the critical turn in IRT,
with reference to Habermasian critical theory, Gramscian critical theory, and post-structuralist
discourse. It demonstrated how the discourse of modernity was problematized via such concepts as
communicative rationality, hegemony, and discourse, each of which approaches modernity with the
category of intersubjectivity. Thus, it was argued that what is objective is in fact historically subjective
and that what positivism takes for granted (that is, the sovereign individual as an autonomous subject)
is that which is most in need of explanation. As a result, each paradigmatic position in its own way
has endeavoured to explicate how modernity has been discursively constructed and has engendered
power-domination relations in modern society, as well as the way in which the discourse of modernity
has functioned to normalize such relations to reproduce modern society as a whole.
As developed throughout the thesis, these three ways of problematizing modern society are significant in a number of fundamental ways, despite their limitations. First, they indicate the need to abandon a universalist and objectivist vision of international relations. This is the basic argument of this thesis. Secondly, they show a need to critique realism and positivism by shifting the unit of analysis to society. Thirdly, they indicate also the need to make IRT a cross-disciplinary field of inquiry. This requires, first, the recognition of international political economy as integral to the process of theorizing international relations. Secondly, it requires the recognition of the importance of critical discourses of modern society in advancing our understanding of international relations. Thirdly, it requires rethinking the object of IRT by taking seriously the questions posed by the paradigmatic positions as they problematize modern society.

These requirements are also important within the context of the question of how to advance our understanding of international relations. In this respect, these three ways of problematizing modern society can be said to justify the validity of the expressed need in this thesis that the recent transformation and proliferation of IRT has to be examined by broadening its realm in such a way as to include international political economy and critical discourses of modern society.

In addition, the thesis has argued that the need to broaden the realm of IRT is also significant to discover that the question of ontology is as important as that of epistemology to examine adequately the recent transformation and the proliferation IRT. In other words, to say that IRT has been undergoing an epistemological critique should not lead to the exclusion of the question of ontology, as was the case in the inter-paradigm debate. As pointed out, the mode of production of knowledge about international relations cannot be taken to be independent from the mode of

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2 Chapter VII has also demonstrated that Habermasian critical theory with its affirmation of universalism fails to distance itself from modernity, which renders very problematic its incorporation into IRT as a powerful alternative to realism.

3 It should be noted here that the call by Lapid for the Third debate in order to create a postpositivist agenda in IRT does not differ from the inter-paradigm debate in that it remains at the level of epistemology and therefore does not allow ontological and philosophical questions to be raised in the debate. See Lapid (1989) and Biersecker (1989).
production of concepts and categories by which international relations is to be approached.

Throughout the thesis, the meta-theoretical examination of the paradigmatic positions of IRT, thus initiated in terms of both epistemology and ontology, has revealed the fact that the recent transformation of IRT has given rise not only to its proliferation but also to the emergence of what can be called the essentially contested nature of its substantial concepts. This means that the move beyond realism and positivism has also produced the contestation and the delineation of a number of concepts with which realism and its reconstructed forms operate. These concepts have been differently conceptualized and they have been accorded different ontological status.

THE ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED CONCEPTS

It can be argued thus that the recognition of the multi-paradigmatic structure of IRT leads also to the recognition that the fundamental concepts in the realm of IRT are essentially contested ones. According to Connolly, an essentially contested concept is "one that is widely shared but that lacks consensual agreement on its definition and rules of application". More specifically

[w]hen the concept involved is appraisive in that the state of affairs it describes is a value achievement, when the practice described is internally complex in that its characterization involves reference to several dimensions, and when the agreed and contested rules of application are relatively open, then the concept in question is an "essentially contested concept" (in Rapkin, 1990:3).

As the thesis has demonstrated, it is within the process of the transformation and proliferation of IRT that a number of fundamental concepts which had long been taken for granted and widely shared have become essentially contested. In this sense, the proliferation of IRT, or its multi-paradigmatic structure, has given rise to a lack of consensual agreement on its definition and rules of application. Throughout the thesis, it has become apparent that there are at least four essentially contested concepts in IRT that have been variously defined by different paradigmatic positions. These concepts are: the international; totality (society or system); historicity; and hegemony.

(i) The concept of the international: As noted in Chapter 1, embedded in IRT is the issue of
representation, in so far as both explaining and understanding international relations involve representing it. Chapter I also emphasized that the issue of representation is not a one-dimensional process; it involves at least three dimensions, depending on the epistemological position by which it is approached. In other words, what is represented can be approached within the context of either causality and determination, or the relationship between structure and agency, or discursive effects that the process of representation produces. The thesis has shown that these dimensions have given rise to different conceptions of the international, which in turn has rendered the concept an essentially contested one.

The dominant mode of representation of international relations conceives of it as an object external to national social formations. The international has been conceptualized, in a positivist manner, as an objective reality having an ontological existence outside national formations. The outside-in model has attempted to represent international relations by establishing a causal and determination relationship between the international and the national. Thus, expressions such as anarchy and world system were used to give meaning to such reality.

In his critique of world system theory, Agnew (1981) argued that the concept of world system derives from an attempt at "sociologizing a geographical imagination". This means that something which has no ontological status in itself is given that status when it is rendered a sociological concept. What Agnew argues with respect to world system theory also applies, without any doubt, to the realist version of the outside-in model and its concept of the anarchic international system as an ontological objective reality.

The thesis has demonstrated that the critique of the outside-in model derives from a different mode of representation of the international, which gives rise to its different conceptualizations. One could extrapolate at least three different conceptions of the international within IRT, all of which have been the product of an attempt to shift the focus from the international to national social formations. Such a shift is also an attempt to question the ontological status accorded to the international. It can be argued that there are two different modes of questioning which have led to three different
conceptions of the international.

One mode of questioning locates ontology in history and rejects the given and objective characteristics of the international. Attention is paid to how the international is articulated to the national in a given historical time and space. In other words, the international is represented in terms of the structure/agency relationship. In that representation, the focus is on the effects the international produces in the reproduction of national social formations. Consequently, contrary to the outside-in model, the international is conceptualized as a dialectical interplay between external and internal factors.

However, as the thesis has shown, two variations of that conception of the international are available in IRT. First, as in structuralism, the interplay between external and internal forces, in order to render historical the analytical split between them, is embedded in a process of the articulation of different modes of production. Thus, the concept of mode of production is employed to analyze how factors that appear to be external to national social formations, once internalized, become internal features of those formations. Second, as in the Gramscian critical theory of international relations, the international is embedded in a space called hegemony, which starts its account of an interplay between internal and external factors with the former defined in terms of the relations of production. Hegemony refers to an historical fit between social forces, states and a world order. Thus, the international is conceptualized as a process of the construction of an hegemonic world order. An analysis of such a process begins with social forces, proceeds with states, and ends with an account of an historically constructed hegemonic world order.

The second mode of questioning argues for the need to "deontologize" the concept of the international. This means representing international relations within the context of its discursive effects on perceptions, images, and languages, or on what is perceived as the international. As in the poststructuralist discourse of IRT, to deontologize the international results in the total rejection of

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4 This does not mean that structuralism constitutes a homogeneous model for an analysis of international relations. Chapter IV has demonstrated the different variations of the structuralist account of international relations.
its ontological existence and the rendering of it as a textual, discursive construction. The poststructuralist discourse argues that the space in which such discursive construction takes place is the modern sovereign state (Ashley, 1989; Walker, 1990). Thus, the international is conceptualized as a discourse of the modern state by which the normalization and disciplining of social and politico-economic practices are secured.

It can be said that thinking about representation provides at least three conceptions of the international which are alternatives to the version articulated in the outside-in model. These conceptions of the international, as the thesis has demonstrated, manifest themselves in the process of the conceptualization of the substantial categories of IRT. As a result, they lead to the emergence of alternative approaches to each category, thereby rendering each an essentially contested concept.

(ii) The concept of totality: This thesis, in its meta-theoretical examination of IRT, has also demonstrated that there are four different understandings of totality which correspond to the four different conceptions of the international. It should be noted immediately that since the concepts of society and system are produced from that of totality, different conceptions of totality mean different conceptions of society and system. 5 As noted in Chapter IV, the outside-in model in its attempt to provide an holistic and systemic account of international relations employs a concept of totality which derives from the Durkheimian and the Parsonian sociologies of modern society. This leads the model to conceive of the system as an organic and expressive totality. Thus, the concept of the international as an ontological objective reality is identified as an organic totality. As noted, this totality is reified by the model and becomes a reality in itself, expresses the functioning of its parts, and thus engenders regularities in itself, which secures its reproduction as a whole.

Likewise, in the structuralist account of international relations, the mode of production problematic and historical structuralism regard the concept of totality as an organic whole. Nevertheless, by drawing on structuralist epistemology (especially on Althusserian structuralism) they

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5 Chapter II has demonstrated how concepts of society and system are produced by that of totality at the level of epistemology. Throughout the thesis we have seen such production within certain paradigmatic positions of IRT.
attribute to the concept a structural characteristic. Thus, totality is conceptualized as a structural whole consisting of a number of relatively autonomous levels. As elaborated in Chapter IV, this conception of totality is not expressive (that is, it does not have an unfolding essence) nor reified (it is not a reality in itself). Instead, it is an abstract object for the analysis of concrete social formations. Like the outside-in model, it is used to explain holistically and systematically the reproduction of societies within the context of an interplay between internal and external factors.

The thesis has argued that the conception of totality as either an expressive or structural whole is strong in accounting for regularities, but weak in explaining particulars and thus change. This problem inherent in the concept has been very clearly stated by Jameson who suggested that it is certain that there is a strange quasi-Sartrean irony - a 'winner loses' logic - which tends to surround any effort to describe a 'system'; a totalizing dynamic, as these are detected in the movement of contemporary society. What happens is that the more powerful the vision of some increasingly total system or logic... the more powerless the reader comes to feel. Insofar as the theorist wins, therefore, by constructing an increasingly closed and terrifying machine, to that very degree he loses, since the critical capacity of his work is thereby paralysed, and the impulse of negation and revolt, not to speak of those of social transformation, are increasingly perceived as vain and trivial in the face of the model itself (emphasis added).  

This quotation clearly indicates the problem inherent in the concept of totality. Indeed, the employment of the concept of totality involves "a winner loses" logic in IRT. When an holistic account of international relations becomes more powerful, its ability to account for change simultaneously becomes weaker. Put differently, the more powerful an account of reproduction via the concept of totality, the more paralysed its ability to be open to change. Consequently, with reference to the "the winner loses" logic, it can be argued that the concept of totality wins in terms of explaining holistically the process of reproduction, yet to that very degree it loses in terms of the question of change.

However, this problem should not lead one to reject the concept of totality all together. What is needed is to render it capable of accounting for particulars by incorporating into the concept the principle of inter-subjectivity. From this proposal has emerged two different conceptions of totality in IRT. Both the Regulation school and Gramscian critical theory in their own analysis of

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6 This quotation takes place in the beginning of Kellner (1989).
international relations have been suggested a spatial and agency based conception of totality, that is totality as a constituted unity in a given time and space. Thus, instead of starting with a pre-constructed (sociologically or structurally) concept of totality, an account of international relations gives rise to that concept. Hence, the concepts of Fordism and of hegemony are used to explicate the way in which regularities have been constructed, and as a result, have created a unity (which is both spatial and temporal) in the system.

On the other hand, the post-structuralist discourse of IRT has drawn attention to the discursive construction of totality. It has criticized the objectivist and universalist conception of totalizing knowledge which functions as a transhistorical reference point to which the concrete and the particular are subordinated. Implied in this critique is the power-knowledge relationship embedded in the conception of totality as an organic or a structural whole, which subsumes differences into a predetermined unity. Thus, post-structuralist discourse has attempted to demonstrate how a unity of social relations is discursively constructed. As seen in Chapter VII, the international (anarchic) system is conceptualized by the poststructuralist discourse not as an objective reality acting as an organic totality, but as a discursively constructed unifying element functioning as a transhistorical reference point.

Like the concept of the international, these four conceptions indicate that the very concept of totality from which the concepts of society and system are constructed has become an essentially contested one. As the thesis has demonstrated, embedded in these conceptions of totality is the concept of historicity. In other words, the way the concept of totality is produced is directly related to how history is understood. It is to this question which will now be addressed.

(iii) The concept of historicity: "ALWAYS HISTORICIZE!" Jameson very boldly asserts in the Preface to his book, The Political Unconscious, and suggests that the principle of historicity should be regarded as "the one absolute and we may even say 'transhistorical' imperative of all dialectical
thought" (1981:9). Despite Jameson's call for the recognition of history as referential reality, the crucial question however remains: what does it mean to historicize? It is this question that renders historicity an essentially contested concept, in so far as it can acquire different meanings in different discourses in which it is employed.

Following Solomon, it can be said that to historicize can have at least three different meanings:

(i) it can mean to argue for the determinate reality of an objective historical process. In this respect, it is embedded in the subject-object duality and it is employed to analyze the object;

(ii) it can mean to argue for the discursive construction of the subject. In this respect, it is employed both to reject the subject-object duality and to provide a spatial and temporal understanding of history; and

(iii) it can mean to search for an elusive space in which the subject and the object meet in the same place (1988:244).

Within the context of IRT, as has become apparent throughout the thesis, these three different meanings of "to historicize" have been employed by the paradigmatic positions. For realism, the sociology of development, and the outside-in model, to historicize has meant to take the path of the object. Thus, the concept of anarch., modernization, world-system, and international regime have been presented, in a positivist manner, as corresponding to the determinate reality of an historical process. For structuralism and the agency problematic, to historicize has meant an elusive space in which the path of the subject and the path of the object meet in the same place. That place was the mode of production for structuralism, and the inter-state system (the geopolitical) for the agency problematic. In the Critical Turn, to historicize has meant to take the path of the subject. Thus, objective was said to be historically subjective and an inter-subjective relation between subject and object was located in the realm of a spatial and temporal understanding of history. Hence, concepts such as hegemony, communicative rationality, or discourse were used to historicize inter-subjective

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7 I have borrowed the idea of starting out this section with Jameson from Solomon (1988).
relationships.

The thesis has demonstrated that "to historicize" by taking the path of the subject is important in IRT to the extent that it clearly challenges the universalist and objectivist explanations of international relations. In doing so, it also helps understand why the concept of totality, once it is conceived of either as an expressive whole or as a structural whole, encounters limitations and difficulties in accounting for change. Thus it can be concluded that "to historicize in terms of the subject" renders the very concept of historicity an essentially contested concept in IRT.

(iv) The concept of hegemony: In his introductory chapter to World Leadership and Hegemony, Rapkin argues that the concept of hegemonic leadership in IRT has become an essentially contested one - "one that is widely shared but that lacks consensual agreement on its definition and rules of application" (1990:2). As Chapter VII has argued, the introduction of the Gramscian conception of hegemony into IRT constituted a powerful alternative to the concept of hegemonic leadership. This also meant that the concept of hegemony in IRT has become an essentially contested concept. Drawing on Gramsci, Cox has defined hegemony as an historically constructed world order that is "universal in conception, i.e., not an order in which one state directly exploits others but an order which most other states could find compatible with their interests" (1983:171). Embedded in such an order is not only domination but also consent. That is, hegemony is achieved not so much to the extent that it is able to impose a uniform conception of the world on national social formations, but to the extent that it can articulate different visions of the world in such a way that their potential conflict is neutralized. This understanding of hegemony clearly challenges the hegemonic stability theory and the modified structural realism with respect to their use of hegemony. As have been noted, these paradigmatic positions approach the concept via the Weberian conception of domination, and therefore in terms of the ability of the state to regulate relations within its territorial space.

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8 It should be noted that modified structural realism, as Rapkin has pointed out and as noted in Chapter IV, uses the concepts of hegemony, leadership, and hegemonic leadership interchangeably to analyze the role of the state role and international order (1990:3). The fact that modified structural realism focuses on international regimes does not affect the primacy of the state in international relations.
Following Cox, it can be argued that this conception of hegemony fails to recognize, however, the importance of ideological and discursive elements in the creation of consent to the hegemonic leadership of the state.

While presenting a powerful alternative to the concept of hegemonic leadership, the way Cox employs the Gramscian conception of hegemony becomes problematical as it reduces civil society to production, defined only in terms of the relations of production. However, there are two different paradigmatic positions within IRT that apply Gramsci in a different way than Cox's. The first is the post-structuralist application which thinks of hegemony in terms of identity/difference. As noted in Chapter VII, both Ashley and especially Walker think of hegemony without reference to the relations of production. Hegemony, like Foucault's concept of disciplinary society, refers to a discursively constructed order which privileges one identity over others, and thus creates unity either by subsuming differences into that unity or by marginalizing them. It is argued that Gramsci's emphasis on civil society as a political space in which hegemony is initiated should be understood within the context of how difference is subordinated to unity. With respect to international relations, Ashley and Walker consider the discourse of modernity to be an hegemonic project. Thus, Walker attempts to show how different worlds (the multi-cultural character of the international) have been subsumed via the discourse of modernity into one world in IRT. Hence, the concept of hegemony comes to be defined as integral to the discursive construction of identity/difference.

The second application of Gramsci is found in the Regulation school in which it is located in what Gramsci calls an historical bloc. It should be noted here that the Regulation school's conception of hegemony in this sense appears to be similar to that of Cox's because of its focus on the economic (Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1987; Boyer, 1990). Nevertheless, others who use the Regulation school's methodological framework, like Jenson (1989; 1990) and Harvey (1989), attempt to think of historical bloc within the context of a broad definition of politics, which leads to an

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\[9\] Ashley and Walker go beyond Gramsci in the sense that they reject Gramsci's insistence that hegemony in the last instance refers to that of a fundamental class. See Ashley (1987) and Walker (1984; 1988; 1990).
understanding of civil society in terms of both class and non-class identities. Thus, the mode of regulation of an hegemonic regime of accumulation is accounted for not only with reference to the state but also in terms of both cultural and discursive practices and the struggles within civil society over the issue of interest representation. Thus, hegemony is defined in terms of the creation of regularities within a spatially and temporally constructed relationship between a regime of accumulation and its mode of regulation.

These two definitions of hegemony can be used as complementary to Cox’s application of the Gramscian conception of hegemony in IRT. They help overcome the problem of reductionism in Cox’s account of the creation of an hegemonic world order. They also make the concept of hegemony subject to historicity defined in terms of the path of the subject, which is precisely what Gramsci has meant by absolute historicism: concepts have to be open to reconstruction which is to be made according to the spatial and temporal context in which they are embedded (1971:346-351). The growing complexity of civil society therefore requires the concept of hegemony to be reconceptualized in terms of both class and non-class identities.

These different conceptions of hegemony consequently render hegemonic leadership an essentially contested concept. Together with the concepts of the international, totality, historicity, they indicate that the multi-paradigmatic structure of IRT finds its expression not only in the realm of epistemology (that is, the mode of production of knowledge about international relations) but also in the realm of ontology (that is the mode of production of concepts). This thesis has argued that these two realms are not mutually exclusive, but they are interrelated to each other and they coexist (or should be considered to coexist) in the domain of meta-theory. Thus, the multi-paradigmatic structure of IRT means that the realm of IRT is one which contains essentially contested concept.

10 For instance, Harvey (1990) sees postmodernism as a cultural correlate of postfordism. Similarly, Jenson focuses on cultural and discursive practices, but within the context of interest representation. What is important here is that she defines interest not only with reference to the state but also in terms of identity. Thus, the creation of regularities (that is hegemony) involves both class and non-class identities and their inclusion into and exclusion from the historical bloc. Jenson warns that this process is subject to history as well as to struggle and resistance.
That is to say that pluralism at the level of epistemology means pluralism and contestation at the level of ontology.

ENTERING THE 1990s: PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This thesis has provided a meta-theoretical account of the present state of IRT. It has shown that IRT can be adequately characterized as a multi-paradigmatic domain surrounded by a number of essentially contested concepts. Such characterization is also an answer to the question of "where are we now?" As students of international relations, we are in the domain where there is no dominant paradigm. Instead there are a number of paradigmatic positions, each of which has its own knowledge claims, its own approach to the question of ontology, and its own analysis of international relations. What we have is a theoretical pluralism at the level of both epistemology and ontology. This is, as the thesis has shown, an important development, for it makes IRT more comprehensive in terms of explanation and more sensitive to differences in terms of understanding. It is for this reason that the recognition of the multi-paradigmatic structure of IRT helps advance our understanding of the subject matter.

However, in entering the 1990s the question that arises is what is the next step? There are two possible answers to that question. One answer could be to reconstruct IRT by bringing together these paradigmatic positions. Such reconstruction endeavours, first, to single out the strong points of each paradigmatic position, second to resolve the problems of one paradigmatic position with the other position's strong points, and third to go beyond them with the thus produced meta-theoretical account of international relations. The second answer could be to maintain the multi-paradigmatic structure of international relations, but yet to argue for the need to move towards ontological questions, that is, to identify the issue areas where there is a need for both theoretical and empirical research.
The first answer can be found in a recently produced text, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*, by Linklater (1990). In his text, Linklater’s intention is to reflect theoretically on international relations in such a way as to reconstruct IRT by going beyond both realism and Marxism. Linklater’s point is that both marxism and realism have their own strength and weaknesses. Furthermore, Linklater observes that where realism is strong marxism is weak and vice versa. The reason for this is that they “have analyzed particular dimensions of the modern world which exponents of the other perspective have tended to overlook” (1990:6). This leads Linklater to argue that

[s]ince neither perspective has developed a comprehensive account of modernity the question then becomes how to incorporate their most compelling observations within a more synoptic form of social and political analysis (ibid.).

In doing so, Linklater’s aim is that

[t]he argument for moving beyond realism and Marxism has emerged in sociology and in the study of international relations… What has yet to be constructed is a critical theory… which identifies the prospects for realizing higher levels of human freedom across world society as a whole (1990:7).

Linklater’s reconstructive attempt then runs in the following way. The strong points of these paradigms are incorporated in an analysis, and then such analysis is rendered capable of creating a political community conducive to human emancipation. What is important about Linklater’s attempt is the first process. Linklater devotes all his text up until to the last page to the question of incorporation. He fails to give an account of his understanding of political community and how such a community can be established.

Linklater argues that realism provides a comprehensive account of strategic interaction between states, geopolitics, and the modern state system. However, it is weak in dealing with questions of production, development, inequality, and class domination, and the Third world. This

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11 It should be noted that the way Linklater organizes his reconstructive attempt appears to be similar to the way this thesis is organized. In Linklater’s work Realism involves not only its traditional, structural and modified structural forms, but also the agency problematic of Skocpol, Mann, and Giddens. Marxism refers to critical theory including dependency, world-system theory, Gramscian critical theory, and Habermasian critical theory. However, the post-structuralist discourse of IRT is completely disregarded by Linklater.
is where Marxism is strong. Secondly, realism provides a positivist mode of explanation which is problem-solving. Therefore, it lacks self-reflectivity and normative claims. On the other hand, Marxism provides a critical theory of society which is both reflective and normative (1990:97-130, 162-173).

The reconstruction of IRT then refers to a process of incorporating these points into a critical theory which is both problem-solving and self-reflective. This is an important endeavour, but yet it presents several problems. First, in order to reconstruct IRT, Linklater should have provided a detailed, comprehensive, and adequate account of the transformation and the proliferation of IRT. Had he done it, he would have been able to see the problems of these positions other than those of the state and production, problems that have been dealt with throughout the thesis. Moreover, he would be able to recognize the importance of the poststructuralist discourse as far as the question of identity and community which in fact constitutes the main objective of Linklater's reconstructive attempt.

The second problem arises from the lack of attention paid to historicity. Linklater's reconstructive attempt to incorporate realism and Marxism, that is, of the modern state system and production into a social and political analysis, is not comprehensive nor adequate enough to account for the very complexity inherent in international relations pertaining to questions of the state/civil society, identity/culture, and development. Neither realism nor Marxism, nor Linklater's critical theory, is capable of (nor are they expected to be capable of) dealing with these questions all together.

It is for this reason that to maintain the multi-paradigmatic structure of IRT and analyze these questions in their own right is a better answer to the question of "what is next" than to attempt to reconstruct IRT. What is proposed here is a call for an ontological and historical investigation of these questions, each of which constitutes an issue area that has long been neglected, or has remained problematical, in the domain of IRT. For instance, the question of the state, suggests this thesis, should constitute one of the issue areas for future research in IRT. Throughout its meta-theoretical investigation, the thesis pointed out that the state has remained untheorized and that the agency
problematic's theorization of the state suffers from institutional essentialism. Unlike the essentially contested concepts listed in the previous pages, no adequate concept of, or alternative conceptions of, the state are available in IRT. In this respect, Linklater's text is important to the extent that it establishes a set of requirements as to how properly to theorize the state. Likewise, this thesis stressed the importance of the question of the state to IRT. It can be concluded here that in order to develop IRT, it is necessary to focus in a detailed manner on the question of the state.

The second issue area concerns the question of identity/difference as well as culture. With respect to comparative politics articulated by the discourse of modernity, Charles Taylor has argued that

the result of ignoring the difference in inter-subjective meanings can be disastrous to a science of comparative politics, viz., that we interpret all other societies in the categories of our own. Ironically, this is what seems to have happened to American political science. Having strongly criticized the old institution-focused comparative politics for its ethnocentricity (or Western bias), it proposed to understand the politics of all society in terms of such functions whose definition is strongly influenced by the bargaining culture of our civilization, but which is far from being guaranteed appropriateness elsewhere. The not surprising result is a theory of political development which places the Atlantic-type polity at the summit of human political development (1971:16).

What Taylor has pointed out about American political science goes without saying for IRT. The result of ignoring difference in IRT has been the subsumption of many worlds into one world, of differences into the modern identity, and of cultural differences into one culture, modernity. This, as Walker has argued, has brought about the ethnocentric and parochial characteristic of the study of international relations (1990:3-13). To study different cultures and to recognize their different and specific qualities on the one hand, and to analyze the historical and discursive construction of identities on the other, constitutes the precondition for what Linklater has called the realization of higher levels of human freedom across world society as a whole (1990:5-8). As Chay has argued, the cultural dimension of international relations is one of the most neglected topics in the field (1990:xi). Nevertheless, the poststructuralist discourse, the newly emerging feminist intervention into IRT, and
the studies of Orientalism are positive signs. Like the concept of the state, this issue area too has yet to be extensively studied.

The third issue area concerns the problem of development. Here the question pertains to recent alterations in the international political economy and its political and cultural ramifications in national social formations. As noted in Chapter II, the post-world war II world order has been constructed and organized around the compromise of embedded liberalism, or around what the Regulation school has called Fordism. In recent years that order has entered into crisis, characterized as the decline of the United States’s hegemony and the crisis of Fordism. The question of both what has been happening to global capitalism and whether or not a new cultural formation has come about is open to dispute. Some have suggested that what has been happening is the disorganization of capitalism, or the emergence of post-Fordism, which involve either a flexible regime of accumulation or the complete multinationalization of domestic economies. It has followed that as a result, a new cultural formation has emerged, which can be identified variously as post-modernity or as new consumerism. The role of the nation state in the operation and reproduction of world order was said to have declined. On the other hand, it has also been suggested that globalism has not changed so much that one can talk about the emergence of a new regime of accumulation, post-modernist culture, or the demise of the nation state.

The study of the present state of global capitalism and of the debate about it also reflects on the question of democracy, or the process of democratization taking place in different parts of the world. In other words, global capitalism can be said to constitute a politico-economic context for an analysis of the issue of democracy. How to account for the phenomenon of democratization, whether or not there is a need to rethink the concept of democracy, and to what extent the recent struggles

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12 For the feminist intervention, see the special issue of *Millennium. Women and International Relations*, 1988.

in the name of democracy are connected to global capitalism are questions that have to be raised and thoroughly examined within the domain of IRT.

Of many issue areas, these three - which are the state, identity and development - appear to be fundamental for the development of IRT, in so far as they are directly related to, or have important theoretical consequences in, three significant levels of IRT, namely those of the political, the ideological/cultural, and the economic. They are also directly related to the issue of representation - that is, how to represent the operation of international relations. This thesis suggests in this context that while entering the 1990s, an ontological and historical investigation of these issue areas would help advance our understanding of international relations. However, to deal with them, or provide an adequate answer to the question of "what is next", does not require a reconstruction of IRT. What it requires instead is to have as the first step a detailed, comprehensive, and thorough account of the present state of IRT, or of its recent transformation and proliferation. This thesis has attempted to provide such an account and this is where its contribution to IRT lies.


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