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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RECUE
AN APPRECIATION OF THE BIOGRAPHICAL STUDIES OF
GENERAL JEAN VICTOR MOREAU
(1763 - 1813)

with particular reference to his alleged
participation in the (royalist) conspiracy
against Napoléon I in 1804

by

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A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
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in

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ABSTRACT

The name of Napoleon is universally renowned and the amount of historical literature about him is vast. The same cannot be said to be true of the man widely acknowledged in his own day to have been the Emperor's greatest rival, General Jean Victor Moreau. The only work ever written about him in English appeared in 1814 and the most recent French biography was published in 1951. This relative neglect of Moreau is difficult to comprehend because in addition to his alleged involvement in the 'royalist' conspiracy against Napoleon in 1804, his name was also linked with three other important episodes: the coup d'état of September 4, 1797; the coup d'état of November 9, 1799 and the effort of the Allied powers to dethrone Napoleon in 1813. This thesis attempts to arrive at an appreciation of the relative merits of Moreau's biographers by examining, in the light of the sources, the interpretations they give of these critical occasions in the General's life.
PREFACE

The period of the French Revolution and Consulate is notoriously complex. One obvious feature of the time is the succession of drastic changes by violence and one obvious consequence of this turmoil was a legacy of deep and bitter political divisions. These irreconcilable views were held by ultra-royalists, constitutional-monarchists, constitutional-republicans, extreme democrats and, after 1799, by Bonapartists. The intensity of feeling on all sides made it impossible for any public figure to do (or refrain from doing) anything without incurring savage criticism or extravagant praise from one quarter or another. This appears to have been true of those who clearly committed themselves to one position, such as Robespierre and Lafayette, and of those who transparently shifted— their positions, like Carnot. It would also—and perhaps more particularly—seem to be true of those whose commitment to any particular position was less obvious.

As the abstract indicates, on four separate occasions between 1797 and 1813 the conduct of General Moreau exposed him to attack and invited defence. In 1797 his revelation of the royalist dealings of General Pichegru was made in close proximity to the Directorial and republican coup d'état of 18 Fructidor (September 4th); in 1799 Moreau assisted Bonaparte in the death blow he dealt the Directory in the coup d'état of 18 Brumaire (November 9th); in 1804 the General
was tried for conspiring to overthrow the Government of the day and in 1813 he returned to Europe from banishment in America in order to aid the Allies in their struggle against Napoleon. Moreover, since the divisions of the Revolution have proved an enduring feature of French history, accusations and justifications constantly being echoed by historians, an appraisal of the quality and value of the interpretations advanced by the biographers of Moreau appears long overdue. This thesis will attempt to rectify this omission.

Moreau's biographers were selected for examination on the grounds that these individuals had made the closest study of the General. This definition of the field of inquiry meant that none of the general histories, ranging from Mme de Staël's Considérations sur les principaux événements de la Révolution française written in the nineteenth century to La 1ère République 1792 - 1804 of Albert Soboul written in the twentieth, would be included. This approach also entailed the ruthless exclusion of the biographies of individuals whose lives were bound up with Moreau's, most notably studies of the Emperor Napoleon and General Pichegru. There have also been a number of books written on the

various attempts to overthrow Napoleon; Emile Marc Hilaire's *Histoire des conspirations et attentats contre le gouvernement et la personne de Napoléon*; Huon de Penanster's *Une Conspiration en l'an XI et l'an XII*, Henri Gaubert's *Conspirateurs au temps de Napoléon 1er* and the *Scourge of the Eagle* by Louis de Villefosse; and these works too have been largely and purposely omitted.²

Although biographical works on Moreau are easily identified through the standard bibliographical tools, they are nevertheless, rare. Material for this inquiry was obtained from second-hand book dealers in France and the Netherlands. Professor N.E.S. Griffiths kindly gave assistance by arranging to have photocopying done at the Bibliothèque nationale in Paris and Professor Sydenham reported on the contents of various documents in the British Library, London. The Bibliothèque nationale de Québec most generously made the eight volumes of the trial available over an extended period of time. My greatest debt however, is to the Inter-Library Loans Department of Carleton University Library under the direction of Mrs. P. Atherton, without whose untiring efforts this study would have been impossible.

An examination of the biographies as they arrived suggested that the most fruitful area of inquiry was not Moreau's military career, or the 'royalist' conspiracy, or even the legal aspects of the trial, but

rather the perceptions the various writers had of his conduct on certain critical occasions. Such a study is of its nature highly involved because of the number of biographies and the presence of four principal episodes. Furthermore, the biographers themselves must be considered, as well as the conditions under which they wrote. A certain amount of background detail is also essential in order to make intelligible the discussion of the individuals and events mentioned. This investigation likewise involves a great deal of reported speech, in addition to the consideration of sources and the summarizing of argument.

Nor at the end of what is necessarily a complex process can such an inquiry purport to the achievement of positive conclusions about the historical reality of Moreau's conduct, which would demand a systematic analysis of primary sources such as the transcript of the trial. It does however serve to suggest the inadequacy of existing accounts and to identify central problems to which further research could well be directed.

I should like to thank here, my colleagues in the library at Carleton, particularly the members of the Social Sciences Division, under Mrs. E. Ross, whose interest and encouragement are deeply appreciated. I am also indebted to Mr. R. Aksim, who took over the typing of the manuscript in particularly trying circumstances. This study has benefited greatly from the wise guidance of Professor M. J. Sydenham, for which I am very grateful. The debt I owe to the members of my family simply cannot be expressed.
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INTRODUCTION

"I have done nothing for which I can reproach myself." In this way General Jean Victor Moreau assessed a lifetime which spanned fifty years and the distance from Morlaix in Normandy to Lahn in Prussia. There he died the same day of complications arising from the amputation of both legs, a measure which had been made necessary by wounds he received six days earlier at the battle of Dresden on August 27, 1813.

Moreau had recently surrendered the security of his residence in America to become military advisor to the Allies in their campaign to end Napoleon's domination of Europe. In recognition of his services, Alexander I ordered a state funeral in St. Petersburg, an occasion on which his appreciation of Moreau was echoed in the eulogy delivered by Count Uvaloff. The Count clearly recognized the opportunity to assist not merely his audience, but the entire French nation, to achieve a better grasp of the contribution his success had made to their welfare, and above all, a sense of the great loss they had sustained by his death. Uvaloff's address thus merits careful consideration as the first succinct

1 Alphonse de Beauchamp, La vie politique, militaire et privée du général Moreau depuis sa naissance jusqu'à sa mort, (Paris: F. LePrieur, 1814), p. 124.
summary of Moreau's life and as one which placed an entirely favourable
collection upon all his actions.

Uvaloff began his account with the explanation that Moreau was
launched on a triumphant career by France's troubled condition (in 1789),
which drew him from the legal profession, and unleashed his military
potential and made possible his meteoric rise. More, however, than the
skilful use of opportunity earned Moreau renown in the Belgian theatre,
for the Count emphasized that the General's prowess in the capture of
Menin, Ypres and Ostende (in 1794) had been matched by his humane defence
of Nieuport's garrison despite the Convention's determination to refuse

To effect a rapid sweep of the General's career Uvaloff was forced
to pass over the prominent role the young Moreau played during the
opening days of the Revolution in Brittany. Contrary to the usual
practice of the law students at Rennes, which was to guard against
abuse of privilege by regularly replacing the leader, or Prévot, of
their association, Moreau was continuously re-elected to this post
from May 1788 until the spring of 1789. In this capacity he led them
in written and active protest against the Crown, whose May edicts attached
legal principles and arbitrarily suspended the parlement. Later, in
the winter, after the aristocrats failed to reciprocate by supporting
increased representation for the Third Estate in the États de Bretagne,
Moreau was at the forefront of the Association's efforts to mobilize
the youth of the province behind the 'patriots'. When the National
Guard at Rennes was formed in July, 1789, Moreau was acclaimed chief
of the second battalion and, although he resigned three months later
to be a junior officer in an artillery company, he was in command
by 1790. The next year he became Lieutenant Colonel of the First
Battalion of volunteers from l'Ile-et-Vilaine. Roger Dupuy, La
génomé natale et les débuts de la révolution en l'Ile-et-Vilaine
(Rennes: Université de Haute Bretagne, 1972) p. 48, 84, 89, 131.
quarter to the enemy. 3

This reputation was consolidated, Uvaloff believed, during the course of Moreau's next campaign in Germany. Here his victorious advance from the right bank of the Rhine came to a halt when the defeat of General Jourdan (in 1796) left him isolated in the face of the numerically superior Austrians. The Count, however, recalled that Moreau's subsequent retreat through the treacherous gorges of the Black Mountains to the Rhine became renowned throughout Europe, because he succeeded in snatching his army from the brink of disaster and preserving it intact to fight the battle of Schliengen and defend the fortress of Kehl. The next campaign on the Rhine, the Count maintained, promised even greater successes, but it was brought to a premature close by the peace preliminaries (arranged by Bonaparte) at Leoben in 1797. 4

A less pleasant interruption came in the wake of the coup d'état of 18 Fructidor (September 4, 1797), when the Directors recalled Moreau from the frontier. Uvaloff offered no explanation for this action beyond the suggestion that Moreau had become embroiled in (political) events through his nobility of spirit, which had made him perhaps too trusting. 5

3 [Count Uvaloff], Eloge funèbre de Moreau (St. Petersbourg, 1813) p. 7.
5 Ibid., p. 10.
Unsure of posterity's endorsement, Uvaloff argued that contemporary opinion overlooked Moreau's disgrace, and believed, when the war was renewed (in 1799), that only he could halt the triumphant armies of Austria and Russia. Indeed the Directors themselves soon relented and Moreau was given a subordinate post in the Army of Italy. Moreover, even this setback in rank was of short duration, for twice circumstances intervened so that he was made solely responsible for salvaging the remnants of badly-defeated forces. When General Joubert was killed at the battle of Novi (in August 1799), Moreau was left to direct difficult and prudent retreats, as he had done previously during the interval between the Commander-in-Chief Schérer's resignation and Joubert's arrival.  

At this point in the oration, Uvaloff reminded his audience that while France was experiencing set-backs in Italy, the government at home was on the brink of collapse. Moreau's refusal to accept power from the Directors' opponents was a disappointment to the Count, who believed that this inaction permitted the offer to pass to Bonaparte and resulted in the coup d'état of 18 Brumaire (November 9, 1799). Despite his unwillingness to govern, Moreau showed he was prepared to serve by accepting the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Rhine and by engaging in two more triumphant campaigns. The first, the Count remarked, was notable for a series of victories: the crossing of the Rhine at Reichlingen, the crossing of the Danube above Ulm and an armistice which seemed to promise peace. Although this truce proved to be only temporary, a second campaign opened with his decisive victory at Hohenlinden (December 3, 1800). These exploits of

6 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
Mörreau were brought to a glorious close by a convention signed at Steyer, the precursor of the Treaty of Lunéville.\textsuperscript{7}

The advent of peace brought with it Mörreau's decision to resign, and Uvaloff marvelled at the General's rapid adjustment to retirement. His enjoyment of civilian life was however unexpectedly cut short in 1804 by his arrest on a charge of conspiracy. According to the Count, a grim period of betrayal and persecution followed, and he rapidly reviewed the events of the crisis. Earlier the same year General Pichegru and Georges Cadoudal, the Chouan leader, had secretly landed in France, and their subsequent arrests, the Count believed, were deliberately used to revive the suspicion of royalism which had surrounded Mörreau after the coup of September 4, 1797. Uvaloff now compensated for his earlier brief allusion to that affair by supplying details which he claimed had emerged during the course of Mörreau's trial.\textsuperscript{8}

The Count explained that although correspondence implicating Pichegru in a counter-revolutionary movement had fallen into Mörreau's hands before the coup, he had postponed informing the Directory until the following day. This delay, to protect an old, though estranged, friend appeared justified to the Count since a year had passed from the date set for the outbreak of the conspiracy, and numerous engagements had been won by Mörreau with the army Pichegru was to have surrendered. This association with Pichegru, two subsequent interviews in 1804 and a few snatches of conversation Uvaloff

\textsuperscript{7}Ibid., pp. 10 - 13.

\textsuperscript{8}Ibid., pp. 16 - 17.
claimed, then formed the basis of the Government's accusation that Moreau was presently seeking to use the royalists to become dictator of France. Uvaloff believed that the Machiavellian motivation behind this unsupported charge, tried without benefit of jury, was a desire to discredit Moreau before the army and to eliminate the only man who troubled the Consuls' tyranny.  

Uvaloff concluded from the events of the trial that far from being a success, this plan almost brought about the Government's downfall. He felt that the respect and enthusiasm generated by Moreau's speech, and the poignancy of the memories his presence evoked, were such that at his word Bonaparte would have been overthrown. Nevertheless, the General refrained from giving the signal and submitted to a two-year sentence of imprisonment, which later was commuted to one of perpetual banishment. Not to have yielded, the Count insisted, would have been utterly foreign to Moreau's character and principles, for Uvaloff was satisfied that the General had been a stranger to intrigue, an opponent of civil war and a man so little desirous of supreme power that he had seen it pass to another without regret.  

Moreau terminated his nine years of exile and joined the Allies in exploiting Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign, the Count believed, from a desire to free Europe and to see a stable, moderate government established in France. Moreover, he seemed to have considered carefully how these general principles might be applied to the French situation after the fall of the Empire. Uvaloff felt that Moreau was prepared to set aside his preference for a republic and accept a Bourbon restoration provided

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9 Ibid., pp. 12 - 18.

10 Ibid., p. 19.
that this was the people's will and that civil liberty was properly safeguarded. Furthermore, the Count was convinced that Moreau's motivation in this matter was personally disinterested, because he had preferred an advisory post over an offer of high command. In the light of this evidence Uvaloff concluded that Moreau had obviously never been an enemy of France, but desired only her security and well-being. 11

However, the Count was not the only one to analyze Moreau's career and he found it necessary to warn the French against the General's detractors. In all probability, Uvaloff would have given pride of place among their number to one he considered Moreau's greatest enemy, the Emperor Napoleon. Certainly many fundamental elements of Count Uvaloff's interpretation were called into question by Napoleon's portrayal, subsequently dictated at St. Helena to the comte de Las Cases and to Generals Bertrand and Gourgaud. 12

In the Emperor's account, Uvaloff's brilliantly successful Moreau was replaced by a third-rate general who had no understanding of war and whose exploits in Germany and Italy Napoleon could not regard as proper campaigns. He supported this belief with the claim that Moreau's indecision in 1796 contributed to Jourdan's defeat by delaying reinforcements, precipitating his own recrossing of the Rhine and permitting the numerically inferior


Austrian army to recapture the whole of Germany. 13

Furthermore, Napoleon asserted that Moreau's retreats in Italy in 1799 did nothing to redeem the popularity he had lost through the Pichegru affair, which followed the coup of 18 Fructidor. In contrast to Uvaloff, who sought to excuse Moreau in his description of this incident, the Emperor was straightforward in his condemnation of the General's conduct as a crime. He argued that Moreau's silence had endangered national security and that his ill-timed revelation only served to increase the misfortunes of Pichegru, already under sentence of exile. 14

Moreover, Napoleon credited himself with having reinstated Moreau, when the first-rate army given him as a reward for support on the 18 - 19 Brumaire triumphed at Hohenlinden. 15 The real merit in this battle, the Emperor believed, belonged to the soldiers and generals of division, who fought like heroes and transformed into a victory a blundering enterprise, for which Moreau's vacillation and lack of imagination had been responsible. 16

Although Napoleon had scant respect for Moreau as a commander-in-chief, he felt that the General would have made him an excellent subordinate, since he possessed the necessary bravery and had the ability to command a corps of thirty thousand men. Much to the Emperor's regret this arrangement never materialized, not, he explained, through any fault of his own, but because

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13 Bertrand, v. 1, p. 117; v. 2, pp. 31 - 32, p. 220.
14 Las Cases, v. 1, p. 759; v. 2, p. 179.
15 Bertrand, v. 2, p. 231.
16 Las Cases, v. 1, p. 839.
of Moreau's vacillating nature and disastrous marriage. The General was a good man, Napoleon agreed, but unfortunately, one who was too easily led. He recalled how Moreau would leave the Tuileries completely satisfied with the Government and then return full of rancour. This transformation the Emperor had no hesitation in attributing to the ambition of both Moreau's wife and her mother, Mme Hulot. He recalled that on one occasion he believed that he succeeded in thoroughly reconciling Moreau, but when this state lasted only four days, he abandoned any further attempts as useless. The Emperor concluded that Moreau was destined for self-destruction. The events leading up to his trial as Napoleon presented them seemed to justify his prediction to the full.

In contrast to Uvaloff, who believed that Moreau was the victim, Napoleon emphasized how precarious his own position had been as the target of a conspiracy. He claimed that following the resumption of the war with England, France had been inundated with Bourbon agents and that their plans had been discovered through a combination of luck and intelligent, decisive action on his part. The arrest of one agent led to that of another, who included Pichegru and Georges in his confession, but cursed Moreau, in particular, for having lured men to Paris on the pretext that he had a following.

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18 Gourgaud, p. 62.
20 Ibid., v. 1, pp. 660 - 661; v. 2, p. 376; also Bertrand, v. 1, pp. 53 - 54.
Not only did the Emperor insist that he had uncovered the details of Moreau's involvement by accident, but he also maintained that he had withheld permission for the General's arrest until Pichegru's presence in Paris had been confirmed. Napoleon explained that his restraint was intended to allay public suspicion that Moreau was being prosecuted for personal reasons, since the General was a prominent figure whose opposition to himself was well-known. Furthermore, the Emperor claimed that his leniency had continued even after Pichegru was found to be in the capital and Moreau had been arrested. Napoleon professed to having informed him that all proceedings would be dropped if he acknowledged having seen Pichegru. The Emperor noted that a letter couched in submissive terms only reached him after Pichegru had been taken, when the time for an appeal was past. 21

Napoleon believed that Moreau's protestations became unimportant once the incriminating details were known of a conference he had with Pichegru and Georges. Moreau, the Emperor alleged, had outlined to the others the government which would be established, unopposed, once they had eliminated him. To fill his place, partisans in the Senate would immediately elect Moreau, he in turn would name an exonerated Pichegru as Second Consul, and together they would choose a third colleague. Georges Cadoudal demanded this position, according to the Emperor, and was furious when it was refused on the grounds that his flagrant royalism would almost certainly reduce support for the conspirators. 22

21 Ibid., v. 2, pp. 377 - 378 also Bertrand, v. 1, p. 54.
22 Ibid., v. 2, p. 379 also Bertrand, v. 1, pp. 55 - 56.
Napoleon recalled that during the course of Moreau's trial he was asked specifically whether such meetings had taken place and according to the Emperor, the General's disclaimer was accompanied by a deep blush of shame. In this supposed act of unconscious self-incrimination, the Emperor found incontrovertible proof of Moreau's guilt. His escape from the death penalty, Napoleon believed, was due only to the conspirators' refusal to incriminate each other and to the strategy of categorical denial urged by his lawyer.23

It was thus with some indignation that on May 30, 1816, Napoleon noted the Journal des débats' call for statues to be erected to Moreau and Pichegru. He exclaimed over the notion of honouring Moreau, whose intrigues he considered conclusively proven and who had died in 1813, under the Russian flag. The Emperor ridiculed as well the rewarding of Pichegru, whom he despised for having conspired with the enemy to defeat his own army. Napoleon blamed this misplaced enthusiasm for the generals on History, which he declared to be simply repetition. The sheer force of reiterating that Pichegru and Moreau were great men and deserved well of the country, the Emperor claimed, had naturally resulted in their passing for such, while their adversaries were seen as scoundrels.24

There could hardly be a greater contrast than that between these two accounts of Moreau's career, which are so different that they scarcely seem to relate to the same man. To Count Uvaloff, Moreau was both a brilliant soldier and a high-minded and patriotic republican who repeatedly sacrificed

23 Ibid., v. 2, p. 379.
24 Ibid., v. 1, p. 660.
his own interests for the sake of France and eventually realized that
the welfare of Europe was more important than either republicanism or
patriotism; to Napoleon, however, he was no more than a competent
subordinate who had ruined his own career and jeopardized the safety of
his country by conspiring with its royalist enemies.

Unfortunately neither account can be accepted at its face value.
Napoleon was clearly concerned with exalting his own record and
denigrating those of his opponents, this being part of the process by which
the Napoleonic legend was created. Uvaloff's account, obviously at once
more detailed and more dispassionate, was still influenced by the evident
desirability of portraying Moreau, the man who had finally realized that
all Europe must unite against Napoleon, as one whose example no Frenchman
need be ashamed to follow.

The difference of opinion reflected in these accounts may nevertheless
serve as a useful starting point for a consideration of Moreau's career.
There is the question of the calibre of his generalship, a matter on which
the Emperor was not permitted the final word. The distinguished General
Lamarche suggested that the strengths of Moreau and Napoleon lay in
different spheres: the former he considered unrivalled in retreat, the
latter a master of attack. 25 However, it is difficult to weigh the
relative merits of this or any other assessment without a fuller examination
of military history than will be attempted here. Yet even if this martial
element is excluded, there still remains the equally interesting subject
suggested by the argument over Moreau's character and political views.

25 Ibid., v. 1. p. 839.
This disagreement, which in itself is a manifestation of the deep division of opinion and loyalties caused by the French Revolution, opens up two avenues for study. One approach, an exploration of the historical validity of the assessments of Moreau by Uvaloff and Napoleon, requires proximity to primary sources, so that it is the other route, an appraisal of historical writing on Moreau's nature and politics, that will be taken. In this enquiry, the writers' comments upon the General's trial will be of particular interest since the interpretation of his political position is the principal point of contention.
CHAPTER I: THE CONTEMPORARIES

The caustic comments of the Emperor Napoleon were without precedent in three of the earliest biographies of Moreau studied, all of which were written before Moreau's death. These are: Karl Woyde's Moreau und sein Letzter Feldzug published in Germany in 1801 and unknown in France until 1814 when it appeared under the title Moreau et sa dernière campagne in a translation by Guillaume-Ferdinand Teissier; Cousin d'Avallon's Histoire du général Moreau jusqu'à la paix de Lunéville, published in 1801 and the Life and Campaigns of Victor Moreau: Comprehending His Trial, Justification and Other Events, Till the Period of His Embarcation for the United States by an 'Officer of the Staff', translated from the French by John Davis and published in 1806.¹

Woyde's admiration for Moreau stemmed from a close professional association which had lasted almost three years. He first became acquainted with the General while the latter was in Paris following his disgrace in 1797. The two met again in Italy, when Moreau was an inspecteur général

¹Woyde, Karl, Moreau und sein letzter Feldzug, trans. Guillaume-Ferdinand Teissier (Paris: Thomine, 1814); Charles-Yves Cousin d'Avallon, Histoire du général Moreau jusqu'à la paix de Lunéville, (Paris: Barba, 1801) and An Officer of the Staff, The Life and Campaigns of Victor Moreau; Comprehending His Trial, Justification, and Other Events, Till the Period of His Embarcation for the United States, trans. John Davis (New York: I Riley, 1806). Regrettably an inability to read German prevented the inclusion in this study of Bonaparte und Moreau (Germanien, 1804). A copy is available for consultation in the Napoleonic Collection, McLennan Library, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec.
d'infanterie and Woyde later served under him in the course of the same campaign. Shortly afterwards Woyde had joined Moreau's general staff for the campaigns of 1800 in Germany. Teissier explained that the appearance of this translation had been delayed until after the restoration of the monarchy in France because Moreau's name displayed in the title would have alarmed the government of Napoleon. In the light of the fact that Cousin's work was published, Teissier's next comment seems more to the point. He revealed that Woyde let drop a few phrases which revealed his dissatisfaction with the First Consul. However, Teissier was quick to comment that:

Dans le blâme, dans la louange, on ne peut douter que l'auteur ne parle suivant sa conscience et son coeur. Son langage n'est point apprêté; ce n'est point un rhéteur qui parle, mais un militaire instruit.

As a soldier, indeed as a participant, Woyde developed most fully his account of the campaigns of 1800 and their climax in the rout of the Austrians at Hohenlinden on December 3rd. Moreau's retreat from Germany in 1796 was given only brief mention and the campaign of 1798 in Italy received only slightly more consideration. However, the value of Woyde's work to the present study lies not in the accounts he gave of various military operations, but in his appreciation of Moreau's character and ability, and in the personal insights he was able to provide of the General when amongst his men.

2 Woyde outlined his connection with Moreau in the foreword to his book.
3 Guillaume-Ferdinand Teissier, Moreau et sa dernière campagne, Préface, p. 11.
4 Ibid., p. v.
Moreau's popularity and Cousin's financial need, in all likelihood dictated his choice of topic, but it is clear that he warmed to his subject. Posterity might be incredulous at the General's extraordinary success, but Cousin was convinced that reflection on Moreau's genius and the study of his character would dispel such doubt and leave only admiration. For his biography of the General, Cousin abandoned his usual practice, which was the piecing together of anecdotes and the publishing of them under titles which habitually ended in 'aina'; such as *Voltaireana*, *Moliéranana* and *Diderotiana*. Moreau was honoured instead with a quick-paced and meticulous account of his campaigns from June 1796 to the signing of the Treaty of Lunéville in February 1801. Cousin lacked the position and connections necessary to provide behind-the-scenes glimpses of the General's life, so that it was natural for him to focus on details of Moreau's campaigns where the information lay in the public domain. His adolescence was accordingly dismissed as being of minor importance and actions which had political implications received scant treatment. Cousin was also without a soldier's training and wisely wrote for other non-specialists like himself, carefully avoiding the intricate details of engagements and confining his comments to a few words of praise.

Cousin, called d'Avalion after his birth place, was apparently a man ill-served by the Revolution. Born in 1769, the son of an attorney, he followed in his father's footsteps and at the age of twenty was engaged by

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5 Cousin, Préface, pp. vi - vii.

a procureur du roi in Paris. Family financial reverses obliged him to leave the Châtelet and to try banking as a career. This attempt was also short lived, terminating after only eighteen months as a result of a decline in value of the assignats. At this point need drove him to join the editorial staff of the Postillon des armées and once more he suffered misfortune, for the fall of the monarchy on August 10, 1792 closed the paper and left him to pursue a literary career on his own. Although a prolific writer, only two of his books, Pironiana and La Guirlande des fleurs were well received and he died in conditions of extreme poverty around 1840.  

Just as Woyde and Cousin considered it timely to write a life of Moreau after the peace of Lunéville, so too did John Davis feel that he had undertaken a task acceptable to Americans by preparing a volume which exhibited the brilliant achievements of a great general who now lived among them. In an unusual turn of events Davis bore greater responsibility for the biography than did the anonymous 'Officer of the Staff' credited on the title page. "I am not the negative translator of the book that has been put into my hands;" Davis explained, "I have felt an ardour to supply a work that should gratify enquiry and where I found the original wanting in information I have made up the deficiency by laborious, patient and persevering research... Hence my volume will not suffer by comparison with the original whose characteristic is detail..." This biography

7 Ibid., p. 248.


9 Ibid.
was Davis’ only venture into military history, for, like Cousin, his principal interest lay in another direction. The greater number of Cousin’s works were compilations of incidents drawn from the lives of French literary giants. Davis shared this literary bent, but he was able to express himself with greater originality. A native of England, he emigrated to the United States and in that country found the inspiration he required for many poems and novels.\footnote{10}

Thus we have two writers both of whom apparently began their accounts of Moreau for material reasons, but both of whom became remarkably attracted to the General. Cousin found Moreau talented, prudent, skilful and modest,\footnote{11} while Davis summed up his admiration in a single glowing paragraph:

> If Moreau was not adorned with the stars and garters of his princely adversary the Archduke Charles, he was as good a soldier and fine a gentleman. His stature was good, resembling in graceful manliness the Apollo Belvidere\footnote{sic}. To an open and pleasing countenance he united soft and insinuating manners, and to the frankness of the soldier, he joined the becoming ease of a gentleman. He possessed the liberal grace and ability of a Turenne, and the vigor and patriotism of Henry IV: in his attacks he was a Gustavus Adolphus and a Condé, and in his retreats a Xenophon and a Belleisle.\footnote{12}

Their shared appreciation of Moreau’s military greatness was by no means the only point in common between these two writers, for their


\footnote{11}Cousin, p. xii.

\footnote{12}Davis, p. 22.
accounts of the German campaigns of 1796 and 1797 were practically identical. Such striking similarity raises the question of provenance, an issue which is further complicated by the fact that the same degree of resemblance was not sustained. From this point forward both works differed substantially in detail and emphasis. Davis's translation described more fully the action during the Italian campaign of 1798, while Cousin gave a more complete outline of the 1800 campaign in Germany. In the absence of an original edition of the staff officer's work for the purpose of comparison, the only certainty is that neither book is a copy of the other and that Karl Woyde is not the 'Officer of the Staff' in question.

When the focus is shifted to politics and to the coup d'état of 18 Fructidor (September 4, 1797) in particular, a comparison of the accounts of Woyde, Davis and Cousin reveals agreement on fundamental interpretation and a wide divergence of detail. All three writers believed that the Directory (reduced through the coup from five to three men, Barras, Reubell and LaRevellière-Lépeaux) had done Moreau a great injustice by relieving him of his command of the Army of the Rhine and Moselle long after the coup. Davis declared his responsibility for his account of 18 Fructidor with the words, "My slumbering original takes no notice of an event so intimately connected with his [Moreau's] biography. He may possess the coup d'oeil of war; but his historical coup d'oeil is not comprehensive."13 There is no cause to question this assessment of the 'Officer of the Staff' and it is a judgment which may be applied with equal validity to Woyde and

13 Ibid., fn. p. 147.
Cousin D'Avalon.

The former, Woyde, derived great satisfaction from Moreau's refusal to violate the Constitution and to involve his army in the internal politics of France in 1797, but he believed that ironically it was this detachment which cast doubt upon the General's loyalty: His army failed to follow the example of the others by sending a loyal address to the Government offering to declare war on its political opponents and when Moreau finally issued a proclamation to his men, Woyde argued that it came too late to satisfy the Directors. Furthermore, Woyde believed that Moreau suffered after the coup in Fructidor because of his connection with General Pichegru. The fall of this general was resolved on, according to Woyde, because of his prominence and anti-republican sympathies, and was encompassed through the skilful use of circumstantial evidence by members of the Directory. 14

Woyde provided no insights into the background and events of the coup. Cousin, too, was clearly out of his depth when he left the detail and precision of military campaigns for political intrigues. He lacked confidence in the sources he did possess and he attempted to camouflage their inadequacy by intimating that a search for additional sources would uncover nothing but materials tainted by partisanship. The net effect of his lack of information was to make his account terse to the point of unintelligibility.

Cousin related that the day of the coup (18 Fructidor, September 4, 1797) Moreau was sent an order summoning him to Paris and he told how he had

subsequently sent ahead three documents to herald his arrival: a letter to the Directors dated 24 Fructidor (September 10th) in which he disassociated himself from Pichegru, his proclamation to the Army of the Rhîne dated 23 Fructidor (September 9th) confirming Pichegru's guilt and his letter to the Director Barthélemy dated 29 Fructidor (a printer's error for 19 Fructidor, September 5th) alerting him to Pichegru's connection with the royalists.\(^{15}\) Cousin quoted the text of all three sources in full, but refrained from any analysis.\(^{16}\) In all likelihood Cousin avoided discussion because he was completely unaware of the connection between the contents of these documents, which might have served as a partial repudiation of any participation in a plot against the Directory, and the coup. He had no other sources to consult and the correspondence at his disposal had been called into question. The most he felt that could be claimed for it was that it had never been disavowed.\(^{17}\) This lack of explanation had the unfortunate result of making the central point, Moreau's disgrace, absolutely incomprehensible.

Hesitancy and vagueness concerning details did not however prevent Cousin from being unequivocal and eloquent in his interpretation. He saw the many proofs of patriotism that Moreau had given and the many services he had rendered France, and he was outraged that the General had been dishonoured by the Directory whose least defect was ineptitude. Cousin's

\(^{15}\) Cousin, p. 135.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., pp. 136 – 142.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., p. 143.
contempt for these men was eclipsed however, by his admiration for Moreau, who responded to their deep ingratitude not with bitterness, but with the firm resolve to provide further proofs of his zeal and attachment, should his services be required once more. 18

Davis, unlike Cousin d'Avallon and Woyde did have ample source material on which he could rely to build a detailed account of the coup of 18 Fructidor. In interpretation however, he was entirely his own master, for he believed strongly that the role of an historian was to reflect as well as to narrate. 19 He opened the chapter with a reference to Moreau's dismissal, which was an important consequence of the coup. Moreau, however, did not suffer alone, and Davis quickly shifted the focus to General Pichegru who was at this same time deported for attempting to restore Louis XVIII. 20

Since Moreau's career was indeed closely associated with that of Pichegru, and since both men were deeply affected by the political crisis which culminated in the Directorial coup d'état of 18 Fructidor 1797, some fuller explanation of the historical situation is necessary here. First, we may see how Pichegru (of whose biography Davis gives no details) became both a national hero and a man marked as one of the Republic's principal royalist enemies. After attending the college at Brienne, he enlisted in the artillery in 1780, served in America and attained the rank of Sergeant-

18 Ibid., p. 144.
19 Davis, p. 118.
20 Ibid., pp. 124 - 150.
Major in 1789. He supported the revolution and resigned the presidency of a popular society in Besançon to become Lieutenant-Colonel of a volunteer battalion in 1792. In 1793, he was rapidly promoted from général de brigade in the Army of the North to général de division commanding the division of the Upper Rhine, and finally he was named Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Rhine. 21 In co-operation with General Hoche, Pichegru reconquered Alsace, forced the lines of Haguenau and relieved Landau. Early in the next year he assumed command of the Army of the North and undertook three campaigns which resulted in the French occupation of the United Provinces in February 1795. 22 In March of the same year, he was made Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Rhine and he stopped in Paris on the way to take up this post. 23 In the wake of the popular disturbances on 12 Germinal (April 1st), the Convention took advantage of his presence in the capital to put him in charge of its troops and he acted promptly the next evening to scatter the sans-culottes, who had gathered in the hall of the Quinze Vingts Section. 24


22 Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed., s. v. "Pichegru".

23 Six, p. 310.

Davis claimed that the zeal the General showed on this occasion was never forgiven by the anarchist faction who deceived the Government and obliged Pichegru to resign. It was to rid themselves of a character so virtuous, Davis alleged, that the Directory in 1796 offered Pichegru the post of ambassador to Sweden, but he, penetrating their motives, declined to accept.  

This picture of the General as the innocent victim of the Directors' envy has been shown to be false by recent historical investigation. Financial need combined with dissatisfaction at conditions in the army were evidently responsible for causing him to welcome advances from the Prince de Condé as early as May 1795. Pichegru's campaign of 1795 was in fact disastrous: Mannheim fell to the Austrians and he signed an armistice for his front in December. However, on the whole his treason was distinguished for its ambiguity and inactivity. The Directors, through their agents,

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25 Davis, p. 126.

26 Two writers which have done much to clarify Pichegru's dealings with the royalists during the years 1795 - 1797 are: W. R. Fryer, Republic or Restoration in France 1794 - 1797, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1965) and Harvey Mitchell, The Underground War Against Revolutionary France, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965).


28 Mitchell, p. 62.

29 Ibid., pp. 118 - 119.
became aware of his royalist dealings and saw the ambassadorial posting as the means to eliminate a threat. Pichegru requested and received permission for a leave of absence to consider the offer and subsequently spent a year on his estate. 30 His retirement ended in March 1797, when, with English financial assistance, he was elected deputy from the Jura in the Council of Five Hundred. 31 At the first session of this body, as Davis was quick to point out, Pichegru was elected its President. 32 Yet his many supporters were destined to be disappointed, for his political career was notable for its inertia until the still more critical days of July. 33

The actual historical background to these events is that of what was called the 'Grand Design': Britain, despairing of defeating the Republic in the field, was subsidizing royalist agents who hoped to gain control of both the Legislative Councils of France (the Elders and the Five Hundred) in the elections of March 1797, at which one third of the deputies were to be replaced. The extent to which these elections really returned

30 Ibid., p. 121.
31 Ibid., p. 154.
32 Davis, p. 127.
33 Fryer, p. 233.
committed royalists to the two Councils is still a matter of controversy; but it is certain that the Directory sustained a tremendous vote of non-confidence: of the 216 Conventionnels who retired only eleven were re-elected, and of these it has been estimated that perhaps only five or six were Government adherents. Support for the Directors thus dropped to something less than a third of the Councils and their parliamentary majority would appear to have been completely eroded.

Davis's account of the events which led up to the subsequent crisis of Fructidor indicates that thisanimosity between the Councils and the Directory had risen to a considerable height, when the march of troops

34 For a discussion of the views of the principal protagonists see Sydenham, p. 124. Chapter five of this work, entitled "The Loss of the Middle Way, May 1796 - September 1797" has been relied on extensively to expand and correct the account of the coup of 18 Fructidor given by Davis.

35 Conventionnels was the name given to the deputies who had previously been members of the National Convention (September 1792 - October 1795). To protect the new Constitution of the year III (1795), the members of the Convention passed a decree, on August 22nd of the year, which declared that no less than two-thirds of the first Legislative Body should be elected from among its own members. After the first year, the Constitution provided for the annual renewal of a third of the members. The decree was rejected by a majority of the local electoral assemblies in Paris and when the official results became known in September, they were denounced as falsified. This circumstance, when combined with the presence of troops, the disfranchisement of 'terrorists' and the renewal of harsh measures against émigrés and priests, meant that some irresponsible constitutional monarchists had little difficulty in persuading a few Sections to join them in an assault on the Convention. The attack on 13 Vendémiaire (October 5th) was successfully repelled by the Army of the Interior under Barras, who was ably seconded by Bonaparte. Sydenham, pp. 69 - 80.

36 Sydenham, pp. 124 - 125.
towards Paris beyond the limits which the Constitution has prescribed. He did not explain how this antagonism had arisen, but he made it clear that he did not believe in the existence of a royalist plot aimed at overthrowing the Directory. In this it would appear that he was incorrect; but the threat, though genuine, was certainly greatly exaggerated by the Triumvirate to justify their use of force against the Councils. Sydenham's recent appraisal of the situation suggests that much of the difficulty really lay in the unwillingness of a majority of the Directors to depart from the strict separation of powers set forth in the Constitution and to let their actions be governed by the wishes of a parliamentary majority.

The importance of this factor is apparent in the events of the summer of 1797. According to Sydenham, the remaining Directorial Left Wing was opposed by a Right Wing group of approximately the same size; the exaggerated view that the Crown had won control of the Councils probably originated in the intensive propaganda campaign mounted by the Royalists during the election and the pronounced royalist sympathies of perhaps as many as eighty deputies. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that among those who favoured a monarchical system, opinion varied considerably over whether the restoration should be

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37 Davis, p. 127.
38 Sydenham, p. 125.
39 Ibid., p. 143.
unconditional or hedged with constitutional limitations, and about the desirability of finding a monarch outside the Bourbon line. 40

Moreover, it appears that located between the Left and the Right was an amorphous Centre slightly larger than either of the other two groups. These men were republicans like the Directors, but supported the desire of the Right to force the executive to end the war and the 'exceptional legislation' of 1795, particularly the notorious Law of 3 Brumaire. 41

The subject of the peace was preempted by Napoleon, who assumed personal responsibility for the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Leoben signed in April. However, in June, a motion was carried in the Council of Five Hundred to abrogate the Law of 3 Brumaire and, in July, to end the penal legislation against the priests. 42

There is every indication that accommodation with the Right reached a standstill at this point partly as a result of the alarming conduct of some extremists. Sydenham notes that the same day that Pichegru had been elected President of the Five Hundred, the flagrantly royalist deputies, who had been expelled from their seats for their part in the coup attempted in 1795, 43 were reinstated. Furthermore, this action was followed in June

40 Ibid., p. 126, 127, 132.

41 A measure passed in October 1795 by which all close relatives of émigrés were excluded from any form of public service and which also revived the harsh revolutionary legislation of 1792 and 1793 against non-juring Catholic priests. Sydenham, pp. 87 - 88.

42 Sydenham, p. 127, 128, 134.

43 fn. 35, p. 26 above.
by a proposal which would have effectively deprived the Directory of the power to govern, denying them fiscal control; and in another incident in the same month, further hostility towards the Directory was displayed in an attack on the conduct of foreign policy.  

There are signs that any resurgence of royalism filled the moderados with dread in anticipation that the Terror might be revived to quell it. Thus it seems likely that the influential deputies associated with Mathieu Dumas were seeking a better working relationship when they proposed that the Directors dismiss the ministers who lacked the confidence of a majority of the legislature and appoint others, more acceptable, in their stead. Their idea apparently received the support of two of the five Directors, Carnot and Barthélemy, but, in the event, they were outvoted by the other three: Barras, Réubell and Lépeaux. In Sydenham's view, these men, who became known as the Triumvirate, thus rejected both an opportunity for co-operation with the Councils and the idea that the ministers should in some way be answerable to the legislature.

Shortly after receiving this rebuff, the deputies learned of the proximity of the troops mentioned by Davis, to whose account we may now

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44 Sydenham, p. 134.

45 Dumas, Mathieu (1753 - 1837). A distinguished soldier, he had already served as a Deputy in the Legislative Assembly before his election in 1795 to the Council of Elders, where he was an influential moderate. Forced into exile after 18 Fructidor, he returned after 18 Brumaire and served Napoleon as a senior staff officer and Councillor of State. See also chapter 4, p. 150 below.

46 Sydenham, p. 132, 137, 138.
return. The Triumvirate had used the pretext of a new expedition to
Ireland to bring some ten thousand men belonging to General Hoche's Army
of the Sambre and the Meuse close to Paris.\textsuperscript{47} Davis related how the
Council of Five Hundred sent a message to the Directory to inquire by what
authority this infraction of the Constitution had taken place and
received only an evasive reply; and he told how the Council's only formal
response to the Directors' message had been to approve a measure which
marked out the precise limits of the constitutional radius around the
capital.\textsuperscript{48} Davis did not mention that Pichegru and Vaublanc, an avowed
royalist, had come to an understanding with Carnot that he would warn the
Five Hundred if there was a coup in the offing, but that he (Carnot) had later
learnt from Barras of Pichegru's treason and so had retreated, his change
of front being indicated by his signature of the Directors' message.\textsuperscript{49}

Davis described this contest as growing more heated by the day. He
told how news of it reached the armies and how it was echoed back in the
loyal addresses to the Directory that Woyde mentioned earlier, which
promised them support in any conflict with their opponents. These addresses,
Davis claimed, caused fresh alarm. He also recounted how messages were
sent to the Directory from the Councils to inquire into this new violation
and, he maintained that the explanation given by the Directory was as

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 136.

\textsuperscript{48} Davis, p. 127.

\textsuperscript{49} Fryer, pp. 252 - 253.
unsatisfactory as the preceding one. Although he did not say so, the directors acknowledged that the soldiers' addresses had the semblance of Irregularity, but justified their conduct in the light of the royalist peril.

Davis intimated that the contest was now reaching a critical point and could end only in the overthrow of three members of the executive, Barras, Reubell and LaRevellière-Lépeaux or in the defeat of Pichegru, Barthélemy and Carnot and others of the anti-Directorial party. It was a contest, he believed, that was obviously to be decided by force, because both parties had called in the aid of guards. Probably with the Commissions of the Inspectors of the Halls in mind, Davis deplored the dignity and indecisiveness of the deputies. He applauded the resolve of those who wished to impeach the Directors and he ridiculed the majority who could only agree to wait for a confirmatory report in the face of the Triumvirate's obvious preparations.

The Directors suffered from no such vacillation and Davis's account of the coup they organized appears to be accurate in its essentials. He described how, on the eve of 17 Fructidor, the Luxembourg palace was

50 Davis, pp. 127 - 128.


52 Commissions of the Inspectors of the Halls. The crisis in July prompted the two Councils to establish separate inspectorates, known collectively by this name, which would be responsible for security. The proviso that the membership of the Commissions would be subject to frequent renewals effectively ruled out the possibility of concerted action. Fryer, p. 294.

53 Davis, p. 128, 130, 131.
transformed into a command post from which Barras, Reubell and LaRevellièref Lépeaux directed events. He told how, on their orders, Barthélemy was arrested in his own apartments, while Carnot made good his escape. He then outlined the sequel to this action, which took place the next morning when General Augereau's troops surrounded the Tuileries, the seat of the Council of Five Hundred. The grenadiers met with little resistance from the Guard of the Councils and the quick transfer of command from Ramel to Augereau was followed by the arrest of Pichgru along with a few other deputies, who had gathered in one of the chambers.  

The decisive conduct of the Directors, Davis observed, determined the contest. He described the reaction of the citizens as follows:

There was no appearance of resistance in any quarter of the city; and the apprehension of the bloody struggle of 13 Vendémiaire (October 5, 1795) which was ever before the eyes of Parisians, gave way to other sentiments, when they were informed by numerous placards, stuck profusely on the walls in every street, that 'a vast royalist conspiracy had been discovered and defeated.'

The reality appears to have been much less formidable. In the face of the Triumvirate's display of force, D'André, one of the most prominent royalists, was able to muster only thirteen of his agents. Meynier, an historian of the Directorial coups, went straight to the heart of the matter when

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54 Ibid., pp. 129 - 132.
55 Ibid., pp. 133 - 134.
he wrote, "Il existait bien à Paris des bandes royalistes soldées et organisées: mais au moment du danger, elles fondirent comme la neige au soleil." 56

Davis related how the proclamation which announced the intended conspiracy was supported by justificatory proofs, which he plainly considered suspect. The principal document attested to Pichegru's disloyalty and the other piece linked Imbert Colomès, also a deputy in the Council of Five Hundred, with the prince de Condé. The Directors also offered as grounds for vindication Pichegru's proposals for a restoration in 1795 and the new plans he suggested in 1796 which were contained in a secret correspondence seized by Moreau on his most recent crossing of the Rhine (April 21, 1797). 57 Cousin had mentioned that the authenticity of Moreau's letters concerning these documents had been called into question when they were first made public. 58 That allegation now appears as the natural outcome of hostility towards the Directory after the coup. Davis, for his

56 Meynier, p. 146.
57 Davis, pp. 135 - 137.
part, appears to have considered them genuine, and like Cousin, quoted in full the text of Moreau's explanatory letter to the Director Barthélemy dated 19 Fructidor (September 5th). In view of the extensive use made of the letter by later biographers of General Moreau, the principal points in it are worth noting here. 59 Moreau had begun by reminding Barthélemy of a subject he had mentioned during his last trip to Bâle: the captured wagon of General Klinglin, containing two or three hundred of his letters. Most of them, he informed the Director, were in code, but he mentioned that the key had been found and that a lengthy decoding operation was under way. He went on to say that all the names employed were fictitious, making it difficult to identify many of the Frenchmen who were corresponding with Klinglin, Condé, Wickham, 60 d'Englène 61 and others. However, he reported that there were sufficient clues to identify a number of individuals.

Moreau told Barthélemy that he decided initially not to give the matter any publicity because peace was imminent and because of the

59 Davis, the text of the letter is given pp. 137 - 140.

60 Wickham, William (1761 - 1840). Although styled as minister to the Swiss Cantons, he was in actual fact the British government's principal intelligence officer in Europe. Dictionary of National Biography (London: Smith, Elder, Co., 1900), vol. 61, p. 177. A detailed study of his operations during the period 1794 - 1800 is provided by Mitchell in his work.

61 Englène, Louis Antoine Henri de Bourbon-Condé duc d' (1772 - 1804) served in the army of his grand-father Louis Joseph de Bourbon prince de Condé. See also p. 36 this work. Bernadine Melchior Bonnet, Dictionnaire de la Révolution et de l'Empire, (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1965) p. 138.
insubstantial nature of the proofs. However, he had changed his mind when he saw a man, deeply compromised in the correspondence and destined to play a great role in the recall of the Pretender, which was its object, at the head of the parties doing so much harm to the country and enjoying the greatest confidence in a prominent position. He felt that Barthélemy should be warned so that he would not be duped by Pichegru's false republicanism: Pichegru should be watched and a danger to the country eliminated, because civil war was his undoubted object.

Moreau confessed to the Director that this disclosure cost him a great deal because Pichegru had been his friend and would have been so still, had his true nature not been exposed. Moreau went on to say that Pichegru had been prudent enough to commit nothing to paper, communicating only verbally with those entrusted with the correspondence, who were party to his plans and noted his responses. Moreau emphasized that it was only his great confidence in Barthélemy's patriotism and wisdom that persuaded him to divulge this information. The proofs, he felt, were as clear as day, but he doubted that they would be considered judicial. He closed by asking Barthélemy for his advice in this delicate affair and reiterated that only the grave danger to the country prompted him to make this painful disclosure. He also mentioned that there were four others party to the secret: the generals Desaix and Régnier, an aide de camp and an intelligence officer.

The importance of this letter is obviously considerable, for if it could be shown that Moreau really wrote it and did so before he knew that the Directors had succeeded in consolidating their power, it would be positive proof of his republicanism at this critical time. In all probability, Davis.
was aware of the construction that could be placed on the letter's timing, for he ridiculed the notion found in a work entitled The Revolutionary Plutarch, that Moreau was goaded into action by a telegraphic signal which warned him of the Triumvirate's success.  

Davis, who did not comment further on this letter, next turned his attention to the passage of legislation which sentenced to deportation sixty-five people. Fifty-three of these were members of the two Councils, and the twelve others included the two Directors Barthélemy and Carnot. Pichegru was also one of this number, and Davis claimed that Moreau was recalled to Paris because his denunciation of the General was considered too tardy. Davis, like Cousin, also quoted in full the text of Moreau's proclamation and his letter to the Directors which preceded his departure. Again it is appropriate to mention the principal points of this here, because of the importance these documents assumed for later historians.

The proclamation dated 23 Fructidor (September 9th) was brief and to the point. Moreau stated that he had just received a proclamation from the Directory publicising Pichegru's disloyalty. He revealed that he himself had warned the Directors on 17 Fructidor of the existence of correspondence which left no doubt of the validity of the accusation. In

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62 Davis, fn. p. 140.
63 Ibid., pp. 141 - 144.
64 Ibid., p. 147.
65 Ibid., pp. 147 - 148.
his letter to the Directors dated 24 Fructidor (September 10th), Moreau explained that he only received the order to return on the evening of the twenty-second, at ten leagues from Strasbourg. He informed them that he required a few hours to prepare for his departure, in order to assure the tranquility of the army and to arrest a few individuals compromised in the correspondence. He renounced his friendship with Pichegru and emphasized that no one had been more critically situated than he, for the defeat of his army had been the foundation for all Pichegru's schemes.

Davis deplored the fact that Moreau's denunciation of Pichegru and his demonstration of patriotism had been rewarded only by his dismissal. Thus at the chapter's end, Davis upheld Moreau, but he had begun by extolling Pichegru. These conflicting opinions situated side by side created a tension in his work, which he made no attempt to resolve and which, in consequence, seriously weakened his account.

Our discussion of Woyde, Cousin and Davis focuses next on their accounts of the events of 1799, when the Directory -- now consisting of Barras, Sieyes, Ducos, Cohier and Moulin -- was overthrown by Sieyes and

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66 Ibid., pp. 142 - 150.
67 Ibid., p. 150.
and Bonaparte. Woyde clearly supported the coup of 18 Brumaire (November 9, 1799), considering it an essential measure to save France from the brink of chaos, but he gave no indication of Moreau's involvement beyond stating that he was in Paris at the time.

Cousin's outline of this coup was also as terse as his mention of 18 Fructidor had been. He began with a description of how friendship and confidence sprang up in October 1799 between Napoleon, newly returned from Egypt, and Moreau, back in Paris once again after an arduous campaign in Italy. In view of their relationship, it seemed entirely natural to Cousin that Napoleon as commander of the troops in Paris should have turned to Moreau for help on 18 Brumaire. The details of the journées of 18 - 19 Brumaire could be dispensed with, Cousin claimed, because they were sufficiently well-known. The significant point, he argued, was that Moreau had earned a new claim on the nation's gratitude through his co-operation with Napoleon. The coup of 18 - 19 Brumaire placed political power within Napoleon's grasp and whatever Cousin's inmost conviction may have been he had to write in a sense favourable to the government of his

68 The composition of the Directory underwent many changes between September 4, 1797 and November 10, 1799. After the coup of 18 Fructidor, Carnot and Barthélémy were replaced by François de Neufchâteau and Merlin de Doué. The former retired by lot in May 1798 and was replaced by Treilhard. The next May, the choice fell on Reubell and Sièyes took his place. The legitimacy of Treilhard's election was called into question on June 16, 1799 and he resigned. The next day he was replaced by Gohier. Merlin and Lépeaux declined Sisèys invitation to imitate Treilhard and so were subjected to intense pressure from Barras and the Councils until they finally gave way. Sydenham, p. 156, 180, 194, 195.

69 Woyde, p. 43.

70 Cousin, pp. 157 - 159.
day. Thus he described the coup as a blow struck for the re-establishment of order against the Revolution, which had left only a vacuum in the wake of its destruction.

Napoleon was held in equally high esteem by Davis, but he was conscious that Moreau might have become the ruler of the French instead, had he been more ambitious. Davis described how, in Paris, Moreau found the Director Sieyès in despair over the Government's weakness. Sieyès, Davis claimed, seemed convinced that everything in France would be lost unless there was a more energetic government, one "whose administration, being less divided, would be better calculated for the affairs of a great and extensive empire." 71 In his reading of this Director's position, Davis would appear to have been correct, for other sources confirm Sieyès determination to revise the Constitution of 1795 in a direction that would strengthen the executive power. 72 Moreover, his desire for urgent constitutional change would appear to have had its roots in a genuine need for good government. Despite some recent revisions of the history of the Directory 73 there can be little doubt that the administration of the

71 Davis, p. 220.
72 Sydenham, p. 197.
country had been brought almost to a standstill by the Government's penury; disorder was widespread and large segments of the population were the victims of oppression because of their birth, religion or political opinions. The ensuing events were summarized by Davis as follows:

Bonaparte arrives. Sieyès discloses the project to him. Moreau voluntarily assists to place Bonaparte in the situation which he had rejected when offered to himself. The eighteenth of Brumaire bursts upon us with all its splendor.

Davis candidly admitted here that he was unable to discover the exact nature of Moreau's assistance to Napoleon. This confession strongly suggests that Cousin made an additional attempt to disguise the deficiencies of his work when he implied that details of the coup were so familiar that repetition would be tedious. Actually, it was not until the twentieth century, with the publication of Bonaparte et Moreau by Lieutenant Colonel Picard, that Moreau's activities during this

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75 Davis, p. 221.
76 Davis, p. 194. Subsequently on p. 201, Davis noted that the speech given by Moreau's lawyer at the trial suggested in broad outline what the General's role had been. The absence of a scholarly approach in Davis's additions is apparent from the fact that he did not revise his work.
period were outlined with any degree of precision. Davis however, did not manage to provide as detailed an account of the coup as he could.

He described how, in a special early-morning session (November 9, 1799), selected members of the Council of Elders were informed of the existence of 'a vast Jacobin plot'. Their initial response, reported by Davis, was to exercise their constitutional right to transfer the entire legislative body to St. Cloud, where they would be able to deliberate, in safety; the measures required to counteract the crisis. It was further agreed that the move of the Councils would take place the following day and that Napoleon would be responsible for the security of the members. Davis did not say that Napoleon altered the Elders' decree so that he would command the Guards of the Directory in addition to all the troops in Paris and the surrounding area; but he did mention the alacrity with which Napoleon obeyed a summons to the Tuileries, where he swore an oath to establish a Republic based on civil liberty and national representation.

The Elders and Napoleon were by no means the sole participants in this affair, and Davis outlined the Directors' action as well. The departure of Sisyphes and Ducos for the Tuileries apparently caught Gohier

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78 Davis, pp. 188 - 190.
80 Davis, p. 191.
and Moulin unawares. Nor were they able to take any official action against the coup, because Barras's refusal to join them deprived them of a majority. At this point, Davis's sources betrayed him, for he was led to believe that Moulin fled, fearful of arrest, while Cohier went to the Tuileries. More dependable accounts indicate that Moulin accompanied Cohier to the Tuileries, where they found Sieyès, Ducos and Napoleon. The latter apparently urged Cohier and Moulin to imitate the example of all the other Directors, including Barras, and resign. Both men remained obdurate and were sent back to the Luxembourg under escort.

Picard, the twentieth-century biographer, learned from Cohier's memoirs that it was Moreau who was assigned the task of keeping them closely confined. Their resistance crumbled the next day, in the face of public disinterest, and they agreed to resign.

Moreau had no part to play in the next day's proceedings at St. Cloud which Davis described at length. He related how Napoleon's speech in the Council of Elders alienated rather than attracted support and how his efforts in the Five Hundred, whose members had just sworn to uphold the Constitution, provoked such a violent reaction that the day was only carried by driving.

81 Ibid., pp. 196 - 197.
82 Morton, pp. 234 - 235.
83 Picard, pp. 28 - 30.
84 Sydenham, p. 214.
the deputies from the chambers at bayonet point. 85

Davis had no word to say on the significance of the coup but confined himself to describing a meeting of the Rump of the Five Hundred held that night to sanction the proposals for the new provisional government. 86 He erred however, by suggesting that Napoleon was the only one to bear the title of Consul, for Sièyes and Ducos were nominally associated with him in this honour. Davis's treatment of this coup, as well as his handling of the previous one, shows clearly that he saw historical writing as a narrative to be embellished by picturesque language in order to invoke the spirit of the moment. His beliefs were not conveyed by means of reasoned argument, but through the adjectives he chose.

After mention was made of the coup d'état of 18-19 Brumaire our three writers, Woyde, Cousin and Davis, turned to a discussion of Moreau's actions as Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Rhine and the Danube, a post to which he was named in the same month. The campaign that ensued was brief, opening in April and ending in July, when the French victory at Marengo in June forced the Austrians to sue for peace at once in Italy and shortly afterwards in Germany. This armistice terminated in November and Moreau's decisive victory at Hohenlinden in December, and his pursuit of the Austrians to within striking distance of Vienna laid the foundation for the Treaty of Lunéville (February 9, 1801). On this high note, Cousin and Woyde brought their accounts to a close.

85 Davis, pp. 202 - 216.
86 Ibid., p. 217.
Cousin's work is not particularly noteworthy as a study of Moreau, his military knowledge was too slight and his sources too meagre for this, but his book nevertheless has interest as an obvious attempt to satisfy a current, popular desire to know more about the country's latest hero. Furthermore, Cousin's work illustrates the obstacles confronting a contemporary wishing to write such a history, for it seems reasonable to suppose that his reluctance to discuss political events stemmed as much from a desire not to offend either the Government or his readers, as it did from the difficulty he had in obtaining reliable information about two such controversial events as the coup of 18 Fructidor and the coup of 18 Brumaire.

Woyde's biography on the other hand, made an important contribution to the understanding of Moreau from the human as well as the military standpoint. In a single paragraph, Woyde illuminated the General as his close associates saw him:

Eloigné de toute fâche Moreau vivait à Augsbourg avec simplicité et de la manière la plus retirée; après la première suspension d'armes. Son existence était si tranquille et si bourgeoise, qu'on s'apercevait à peine de sa présence dans le palais électoral et moins encore dans la ville. Ennemi juré de toute égoute et de la contrainte de la mode, il hait et fuit une société où il faut s'assujetter à l'une ou à l'autre. Il écoute chacun avec franchise, avec attention, d'un air ouvert et sans vains compliments; il reçoit tous ceux qui ont à lui parler d'affaires, froidement à la vérité et d'un air réservé, mais avec politesse. Aucune société ne lui est plus agréable que celle de ces généraux ou des officiers qui sont attachés à son état-major. Ceux-ci ont accès près de lui à chaque instant de la journée; lorsque l'heure du travail de cabinet est passé, il reste le plus souvent avec eux, cause et rit avec confiance et aménité. Mais les affaires de service lui rendent, des qu'elles se présentent, sa gravité naturelle et lui fait
oublier et mettre de côté tout autre chose. 87

In addition to the virtues of simplicity and dedication, Woyde also believed that Moreau had a passion for justice which regulated his dealings with his own men and with the enemy as well. Woyde wrote of conditions in the Army of the Rhine:

On ne trouve point entre eux ces procédés durs et sévères que l'on regarde dans les armées étrangères et même dans nos demi-brigades comme une réserve nécessaire au maintien de la discipline. Le subalterne est soumis à ses chefs et obéit ponctuellement aux orders qu'ils lui donnent mais sa sujétion n'étend pas loin. Hors du service la différence des grades disparaît; tous les officiers vivent ensemble comme amis, comme camarades. 88

Woyde summarized his feelings in this way:

Moreau est un exemple bien rare parmi les plus grands guerriers. Ce ne sont point des vues privées, ni une fausse ambition, ni un vain désir de gloire que l'ont stimulé. Son âme est pure, noble et élevée comme ses conceptions. Il ne veut et ne désire que l'amélioration de sa patrie; aucun sacrifice ne lui coûterait pour y parvenir. Il n'a jamais considéré la révolution comme un moyen de s'élever. 89

On the basis of his knowledge of Moreau's character and temperament, Woyde made a prognosis for the General's future which is well worth repeating:

Je suis donc intimement convaincu qu'après la fin de cette révolution, la paix de sa conscience sera sa meilleure récompense d'avoir contribué à la grandeur de la France, et que, bien loin de chercher à prendre part au gouvernement de l'État, il cherchera, dans un cercle étroit d'amis, le bonheur et la tranquillité. 90

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87 Woyde, pp. 44 - 45.
88 Ibid., p. 49.
89 Ibid., p. 120.
90 Ibid., p. 120.
The third and final episode with which Davis alone was concerned, which indeed was one of great importance and significance both in Moreau's career and any assessment of it, occurred in 1804. On the twenty-eighth of May, ten days after the promulgation of the Constitution of the Year XII, which declared Napoleon Bonaparte to be Emperor of the French, Moreau and Georges Cadoudal, the notorious royalist guerilla leader, along with forty-five others were placed on trial for conspiring to overthrow the Government. Not only was this the first major event of Napoleon's reign, but it was also the most important state trial since that of Babeuf and his confederates in 1796 on a similar charge. In the light of Woyde's belief that Moreau would enjoy nothing better than a tranquil retirement, this development appears startling. Davis did his best to explain the sequence of events leading up to the crisis, but to be fully understood his narrative ought to be considered in conjunction with the Acte d'accusation and the report summarizing the conspiracy which the grand-juje Régnier, Minister of Justice, made to Napoleon on February 17, 1804, two days after Moreau's arrest.

Régnier informed Napoleon that in 1803, Moreau and Pichégru had become reconciled for criminal purposes. The police, the grand-juje wrote, had seized one of their agents just as he was on the point of embarking
on a second visit to England. Furthermore, this man had been detained and all the documents confirming the existence of the reconciliation had been confiscated. The connection between the two generals, as outlined by Régnier, was the basis for the first two charges brought against Moreau, which Davis gave as:

1. Not having denounced Pichegrue [sic.] in the year 5, at the detection of his criminality.
2. A reconciliation and culpable relation with Pichegrue, in England, through the agency of David and Lajolais—

Davis responded to the first count by quoting Moreau's lawyer:

Of what consequence in the year 12 (1804), to the Consular and particularly to the imperial government, is a conspiracy, real or imaginary, the object of which was to annul, in the year 4 (1796), the fragile constitution of the year 3 (1795), which

Escaping from French Guiana in 1798 Pichegru made his way to England and then to Germany where he acted as a royalist agent. Moreau wrote to Napoleon on January 21, 1800, warning him against the activities of Pichegru and William Wickham emanating from Augsburg. A facsimile of his letter may be found inserted between pages 604 and 605 of a collection of his correspondence entitled "Le général Moreau à l'armée du Rhin", Carnet de la Sabretache, 7 (1899) pp. 588 - 609.

By 1803, Pichegru was in England once more.


Davis, p. 269,
the 18 Brumaire so happily reduced to dust, amidst the general plaudits of the nation.\footnote{Ibid. p. 269.}

Although the words were accurate, Davis's attribution of them to Cheveaux Lagarde was not, for the General's counsel were MM. Bonnet, Bellart and Pérignon. The point itself is worth some consideration, for the suggestion is that the State was attempting to inflate the case against Moreau by introducing irrelevant issues.

Régnier insisted that the reconciliation of the two men could only be explained by a common illicit purpose, and the Acte d'accusation outlined in greater detail the basis for this conclusion. It was reasoned that after denouncing Pichegru in 1797 as a traitor and an enemy of the French people, Moreau could not fail to find him hateful and that Pichegru ought to loathe Moreau in return. If this seemingly insurmountable barrier had been overcome, the Acte implied that the cause had to lie in a sacred pact formed between them for the purpose of fermenting a conspiracy. The man held responsible for effecting this reconciliation was said to be the abbé David, the unnamed agent whose arrest Régnier had mentioned.\footnote{Procès instruit par la cour de justice criminelle et spéciale du département de la Seine..., vol. 1 Acte d'accusation, p. 208} Davis accurately related how this one-time curate of Pompadour had become acquainted with Moreau and Pichegru when he had lived with them at the headquarters of his nephew, General Souham, in the Army of the North, whence he had fled in 1793, to escape religious persecution.\footnote{Davis, p. 2546 This was confirmed by Moreau in his letter to Napoleon 17 Ventôse an 12 (March 8, 1804). Recueil des interrogatoires subis par le général Moreau, document no. 5, p. 16.} The substance of
David's dealings with Moreau and Pichegru in 1802, as outlined by Davis, may more conveniently be discussed in the next chapter; suffice it to say at this point that Davis did not believe that there was any conspiratorial intent. Nor did Davis find any trace of illegal activity in Moreau's relations with the ex-General Lajolais. Régnier on the other hand, declared that Lajolais, the friend and confidant of Pichegru, travelled furtively back and forth between Paris and London taking Moreau's thoughts to Pichegru and keeping Moreau informed of Pichegru's plans. It was allegedly during the course of one of these exchanges that the crime mentioned in the third charge took place, as Davis put it "...3. Having engaged to reestablish the princes of the House of Bourbon on the throne of France...."

Régnier informed Napoleon that the conspirators chose a remote place between Dieppe and Tréport (more precisely the cliffs of Biville, Normandy) where their colleagues brought over from England in English war vessels would be able to disembark unseen, and that arrangements had been made to have them met and escorted under cover of darkness from refuge to refuge until they reached Paris. Moreover, Régnier maintained that in the capital, hiding places were arranged in advance and trusted guardians installed. These sanctuaries, Régnier stated, were located in different parts of the city.

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97 Rapport du grand-juste..., pp. 11 - 111.
98 Davis, p. 269.
The first party to arrive, Régnier announced, was composed of Georges and eight of his cohorts. 100 Régnier omitted to mention the date, August 20, 1803, but there was no need for him to provide particulars concerning Georges Cadoudal, the man Napoleon considered to be "the most dangerous of enemies." 101 Davis described him as follows:

...one of the most noted of the insurgents in La Vendée.
In the Royal and Catholic army, which proposed to take possession of the kingdom in the name of Louis XVIII, he commanded all Lower Brittany, and chiefly the Morbihan.
He was invincibly hostile to every new mode of government since the dethroning of his unfortunate monarch... 102

Davis made no mention of the fact that in 1800, Napoleon had met with Georges twice in what proved to be a fruitless effort to reconcile him to the Consulate. 103 Furthermore, although it would seem that Georges was not personally involved, men known to be his associates had very nearly succeeded in killing the First Consul on December 24, 1800. 104

According to Régnier, one of the men condemned for his role in that plot, Coster Saint Victor, and ten others made up the next party set ashore (December 10 – 20, 1803). Although a fourth landing was expected, the last was actually the third, which took place on January 16, 1804. Pichegru and Lajolais were two of those mentioned as being included in the final

100 Ibid., p. iii.
101 Sydenham, p. 243.
102 Davis, p. 257.
103 Sydenham, p. 243.
104 Sydenham, p. 328.
group. They were met by Georges who accompanied them back to Paris where, according to Régnier, they lived in the same house surrounded by a band of thirty of Georges's men. 105

Régnier asserted next that Pichéru and Georges had seen Moreau; the date, hour and place of the first rendez-vous were known; a second was arranged, but the appointment was broken and the third and fourth meetings took place in Moreau's house. 106 These meetings formed the basis for the fourth and fifth charges against Moreau, as Davis wrote:

4. Having had interviews with Pichéru at Paris, and rejected certain overtures, but substituted others, which had for their object the overthrow of the Consular government.
5. Of not having denounced the conspiracy. 107

105 Rapport du grand-jeu..., p. iii.
106 Ibid., p. iii.
107 Davis, p. 269. The use of the word charge here requires some clarification. The Acte d'accusation, pp. 1 - 8 stated that Moreau along with thirty-two others, was guilty of contravening Article 612 of the Law of 3 Brumaire an 4 (October 25, 1795). In a letter to his wife, Moreau explained that this meant that he was "accusé de conspiration tendant à occasionner la guerre civile et à armer les citoyens les uns contre les autres et contre l'exercice de l'autorité légitime." Ernest Daudet, L'Exilé et mort du général Moreau, (Paris, 1909) p. 69. The Acte sought to establish Moreau's guilt on the basis of three main points: his reconciliation with Pichéru which also involved the question of his conduct at the time of 18 Fructidor; his correspondence with Pichéru, and the meetings, which involved the accusation that he aspired to be dictator. The suggestion was also that he ought to have denounced the conspiracy and during the course of the trial, testimony was given which implied that Moreau had given assurance to the French loyalists in England that he desired to restore the Bourbons. In their Mémoire justificatif (see note 110 below p. 35) Moreau's counsel grouped all the evidence against the General under these five main headings and it is this list that Davis used.
Davis’s account of Moreau’s contact with Pichegru will be dealt with at greater length in the next chapter, but here it is worth mentioning that he believed that only two meetings took place, both without Moreau’s consent, both without the presence of Georges, both revealing no conspiratorial intent on Moreau’s part.

Régnier’s report was made in advance of the arrests of Pichegru and Georges which took place on February 27th and March 9th respectively. Davis outlined the dramatic circumstances surrounding the capture of both men, but he erred in suggesting that their imprisonment preceded Moreau’s. His close confinement was also mentioned, along with the campaign against him, which Davis described as follows:

For four months General Moreau was denounced by the public reports of the Grand Judge, by placards printed and affixed to public places, by the orders of Generals to their armies, and by addresses from all the constituted authorities, and a great number of military corps.

Davis also pointed out that General Pichegru’s suicide (April 6, 1804) deprived Moreau of testimony which might have answered many questions concerning his conduct. However, Davis seemed to find sufficient proof of the General’s innocence in two sources which will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter — Moreau’s speech on his own behalf and


109 Davis, p. 267.
his lawyers' Mémoire justificatif. The quotation from Bonnet with respect to 18 Fructidor appears convincing in itself, but on the whole Davis's one-sided treatment of the trial was clearly unsatisfactory because it meant that he was fending off attacks, the true value of which his readers were unable to assess. He suggested that Moreau's dealings with David and Lajolais were harmless, but he could not allay all doubts without discussing the State's evidence to the contrary. Davis also maintained that Moreau's only contact with the conspirators consisted of two meetings with Pichegru and he made no attempt to refute the State's charge that a third rendez-vous had taken place. Furthermore, Davis did not make the best use of his sources. He took a piecemeal approach to the Mémoire and

110 Davis quoted Moreau's lawyer on pages 269 to 275 and Moreau's address from page 275 to page 282. In actual fact Moreau spoke first, followed by his counsel. Furthermore, Davis erred in treating the Mémoire as if it had been a speech delivered by Bonnet during the trial. It appears to have been privately printed and promoted by those concerned with the General's vindication. Marthièrè, an author who will be studied more fully in the next chapter and who witnessed the trial, wrote of the Mémoire: "On sait que ce mémoire fût dans le temps l'objet des recherches sévères de la police. Un libraire chez qui on en trouva quelques copies fut mis en prison. Un des banquiers les plus distingués de cette capitale, atteint et convaincu du crime d'en avoir donné deux ou trois exemplaires à ses amis dans l'enceinte du Palais, fut exilé. Ce mémoire composé dans le recueillement silencieux du cabinet, n'a point sans doute ces mouvements oratoires, ces belles inspirations qui distinguent éminemment le plaidoyer de M. Bonnet; mais rédigé avec plus de calme, il envisage sans tous leurs rapports les questions qu'offrait cette cause." M. Breton, de la Martinière, Proscription du Moreau..., (Paris: Mongie, 1814), pp. vi - vii. Signed by all three of Moreau's counsel, the Mémoire first itemized the counts against the General and then produced arguments based largely on testimony given during the trial to refute each charge in turn. For convenience it will be referred to as Bonnet's Mémoire.

111 Davis discussed Moreau's dealings with David, Lajolais and Pichegru between pages 251 and 261.
only used excerpts from much longer arguments to refute just three of
the charges: 18 Fructidor, mentioned above; Moreau's dealings with
Lajolais; and Moreau's alleged aspirations to dictatorship. Davis was
also not above deliberately distorting the Mémoire, as will be demonstrated
in the next chapter, in connection with Moreau's response to one of the
conspirators, Rolland. Furthermore, Davis's account is inadequate because
he ventured no comment on the apparent anomaly that Moreau could be innocent
and sentenced at the same time to two years in prison, later commuted to
exile.

Four others also received a sentence of two years imprisonment on
June 10th, as Davis correctly noted, and twenty, including Georges, were
sentenced to death. Davis mistakenly suggested that eighteen persons were
acquitted. 112 In actual fact twenty-one were nominally acquitted, sixteen
of these individuals being detained in prison until the end of the Empire
and five being kept under police surveillance. The name of one woman was
omitted from the list of those sentenced. 113 Davis indicated how the number
of those receiving the death penalty was reduced through intercessions by
relatives of the accused with the Emperor and members of the Imperial
family. 114 Six of the eight spared in this way were of noble blood. 115

112 Ibid., p. 283.

113 Procès instruit par la cour de justice criminelle et spéciale
du département de la Seine..., vol. 6, Arrêt de la cour de justice
criminelle, pp. 395 - 414.

114 Davis, pp. 287 - 288.

One peer not reprieved by Napoleon was the duc d'Enghien. Napoleon became convinced that this man was the prince of royal blood whose arrival Georges awaited before launching the final stages of the plot. On March 10th, the order was given to have him kidnapped from Ettenheim, in the neutral territory of the Margrave of Baden and brought to the fortress at Vincennes. There he was court-martialled and, despite the obvious ignorance of the plans of Georges, he was shot on March 20th. Davis mentioned that Enghien's death excited much interest all over Europe, but he gave no indication of the fear this murder aroused in France. Nor was Davis apparently aware that there were many who considered that Pichegru's death by strangulation was another murder, accidental or pre-meditated. Thus in May the Empire was born in an atmosphere of dread and anxiety caused as much by Napoleon's reaction to the conspiracy as by the conspiracy itself. Davis however, noted no more than the proximity in time between the elimination of d'Enghien and the beginning of the new era.

All three of the early writers shared the view that Uvaloff was to express later, that Moreau's greatness was both professional and personal. On the subject of the General's character, Woyde was perhaps the most

117 Davis, p. 285.
118 Sydenham, p. 293.
convincing because his words carried the authority of first-hand knowledge. However, he obviously lacked the sources which would have enabled him to give an accurate picture of the General’s conduct at the time of 18 Fructidor. While Woyde wrote about Moreau out of respect and at a time when it seemed likely that he would retire, Cousin and Davis chose the General as a subject because of his popularity and this factor naturally coloured their assessment of him. Cousin and Davis, like Woyde, did not succeed in reassuring the reader about Moreau’s actions at the time of 18 Fructidor, because they too were without the necessary documents to do so. Far more serious however, were the questions Davis left unanswered with respect to the trial. It remains to be seen whether this belief in Moreau’s ability and sterling character would be shared by future biographers and shown to have greater validity on the basis of a more thorough, more analytical, less partisan study.
CHAPTER II: 1814

When Bourbon replaced Bonaparte in 1814, the process of the General's vindication began by Davis and continued by Uvaloff steadily gained momentum, until by the year's end no fewer than nine biographies had been published. Historical writing on Moreau thus began at a high level: such intensity of interest never recurred and subsequent authors never made him the focus of sympathetic attention to the same degree. Although the evident partiality displayed by the biographers of 1814 may cast some doubt upon the validity of their judgments, their works should not be discounted by serious students of the General. A few of these early accounts provide valuable details of people and events, and all of them merit attention for the insights they supply.

Although all these biographers joined in paying tribute to Moreau's

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1 Woyde's work has already been discussed. In addition, two pamphlets were published at this time: Anecdotes inédits ou peu connus sur le général Moreau, (Paris: L. P. Sétié Fils, 1814) and Notice biographique sur le général Moreau, (Paris: Léon Foucault, 1814). The attribution of the latter work to Paul Swinemé would appear to be an ill-founded assumption, based solely on the fact that it accompanied his account entitled Quelques détails sur le général Moreau et ses derniers moments. Both the tenuosity of the connection and the just assessment of the British reviewer suggest that an anxious publisher, rather than Swinemé was responsible. The critic noted that "The work closes with a biographical notice of Moreau, which is below criticism and, apparently introduced only to swell the volume." Edinburgh Review 22 (1814), p. 373.
memory, each brought his own personal experience to this task and each had his own particular purpose in mind. The two writers who collaborated on Moreau et ses victoires felt that there was danger in revealing their sympathies so obviously, and they left the initials "G." and "P.C." as the only clue to their identities.² If, on the other hand, another author, the ex-revolutionary and Count of the Empire, Dominique Joseph Garat, had likewise remained anonymous, he might have been more successful in furthering his ultimate objective, which was the education of Louis XVIII. Garat, a moderate revolutionary, had been Minister of Justice at the time of the execution of Louis XVI and Minister of the Interior in 1793, and he had subsequently been Ambassador to Naples, President of the Council of Elders and Senator.³ In all likelihood, it was his consciousness of his past that made him approach his target indirectly, by dedicating his pamphlet to Tsar Alexander I and by outlining the forms of government supposedly favoured by Moreau. This roundabout tack did not obscure, however, the Count's intent. The new King was strongly urged to forego any notion of re-instating the 'ancien régime' and was encouraged to rule


³Nouvelle biographie générale, s. v. "Garat, Dominique Joseph", vol. 19, columns 429 - 441.
instead as a constitutional monarch, simply sanctioning and executing laws proposed to him by the elected representatives of a free people. 4

While Garat clearly thought that the Revolution had altered the principles of government for the better, P. J. Moithey de Vouziers took the opposite point of view. He intended his work entitled Moreau, général en chef de l'armée française, as a reminder to posterity of the disastrous consequences that inevitably ensued when longstanding institutions were repudiated. 5 His strong conservative sympathies were also reflected in the subjects he chose for his other biographical studies: the heroes of the revolt in the Vendée and members of the Royal Family. 6

Vouziers's preference for a monarchy which made few concessions to constitutionalism was also shared by Joseph Breton de la Martinière. However, he did have a unique distinction which set his book, Proscription de Moreau... apart from all the others. In his capacity as court reporter, he had attended all the sessions of Moreau's trial and thus was in an ideal position to convey interesting, first-hand impressions of this important event. Martinière was also a skilled translator and obtained his information on


5 P. J. Moithey de Vouziers, Moreau, général en chef de l'armée française (Paris: Tigier, 1814).

Moreau's private and military life from journals and works published in foreign countries, notably the eulogy delivered by Count Uvaloff.  

The General's only English biographer, John Philippart, was likewise able to bring specialized knowledge to his study, *Memoirs etc. etc. of General Moreau*. He emphasized the martial aspect of the General's career on which he was able to write with some authority, since, in addition to having been educated at a military academy and employed in the War Office, he was editor of the journal *Military Panorama* and author of a number of works on contemporary military subjects. While Martinière was able to write his account largely from memory and the court record, Philippart claimed that he had been forced to employ every exertion in collecting materials that might be depended upon.

The careful analysis of particular military exploits which characterized Philippart's book was absent from Agricol-Hippolyte Lapierre de Chateauneuf's *Histoire du général Moreau, surnommé le grand capitaine*.  

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In addition to translating English comedies, he specialized in writing both collective biographies of prominent military figures of the revolutionary period and works focusing on particular leaders, such as Lafayette, Napoleon and Championnet. His interpretation suggested, and the dedication of his book to Tsar Alexander confirmed, that, like Carat, Chateauneuf desired his work to serve in part as a reminder to the Allies that not all Frenchmen had supported Napoleon.

Henri Lemaire, playwright and prolific author of improving books for children, was also interested in Moreau, the soldier, but not for the reasons of either Philippart or Chateauneuf. He believed that heretofore the extent of Moreau's preoccupation with his profession had not been fully appreciated and that a more accurate understanding of his actions could be arrived at by considering him a man more prone to thinking in military terms than one whose conduct was governed by purely political considerations.

One writer praised for the wisdom and justice of his interpretations was Alphonse de Beauchamp, author of Vie, politique, militaire et privée du général Moreau. We had discovered an aptitude for historical inquiry...

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12 Ibid., vol. 93 columns 1216 - 1226.


14 Alphonse de Beauchamp, Vie politique, militaire et privée du général Moreau depuis sa naissance jusqu'à sa mort, (Paris: Le Prieur, 1814).
when employed as a clerk in the Ministry of Police. Although acclaimed for its impartiality and scrupulous attention to detail, his first work, *Histoire de la guerre de la Vendée*, cost him his post in 1806 on the grounds that the book contained confidential material. This censure did not diminish his desire to consult the sources, in so far as one can judge from his life of Moreau, for he appended to it a substantial collection of documents, along with the speeches of Uvaloff and Lanjuinais. Beauchamp had no cause to feel friendly toward Napoleon, for, in 1809, he was exiled to Reims and he was granted permission to return to Paris, in 1811, only after having given written assurance that he would not publish anything political. Under the monarchy, he obtained a sinecure and used the security of this position to write a good many historical works before his death in 1832.  

Of the seven of these eight biographers who can be identified, two (Garat and Martinière) and at least two others (Philippart and Beauchamp) have some claim to be considered scholarly historians. Moreover, the group as a whole, which may be best described as being composed of men of letters, reflected a broad range of liberal opinion, the ex-republican Garat being matched by right-wing constitutional royalists like Vouzières and Martinière.

The attitude which inspired them to write is perhaps best illustrated

by the speech which the veteran statesman Count Lanjuinais made to his fellow Senators on April 26, 1814. Lanjuinais, who had successively opposed the absolutism of the old monarchy, the terrorism of Jacobins and the growing tyranny of Bonaparte, felt it imperative to redress the injustice that he believed Moreau had long suffered, and he chose to press his case at a time when Mme Moreau's imminent arrival in Paris would lend poignancy as well as a certain urgency to his appeal.

The form of reparation that he sought was a declaration which would affirm that the General had always deserved the nation's esteem and gratitude. The Count supported this motion with arguments which emphasized Moreau's responsibility for the state of affairs the country now enjoyed. Lanjuinais,

16 Lanjuinais, Jean Denis (1753 - 1827). A friend of Moreau's and one of the most respected men in the country. He courageously opposed the Jacobin extremists while a member of the Convention. Forced into hiding by the Revolution of June 2, 1793, he was reinstated in 1795. He served as a member of the Council of Elders and became a Senator in 1800. Notwithstanding his vigorous opposition to the Consulat à vie and the Empire, he was made a Count in 1808. In 1814 he became a peer of France and spent the rest of his public life resisting the reactionary measures which followed the Restoration. Nouvelle biographie générale (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1857), vol. 29, columns 445-466.

17 "Proposition faite au Sénat, le 26 avril 1814, par le comte Lanjuinais, et renvoyé par le Sénat à une Commission, pour en faire son rapport sous un mois, lorsque le nouveau gouvernement constitutionnel sera en activité", in Beauchamp, "Vie politique, militaire et privée du général Moreau... Pièces justificatives, no. 13, p. 316.
like Uvaloff, regarded Moreau as a man of exemplary character and military genius who had been tragically killed in a cause which the Senator believed had recently triumphed: the overthrow of Napoleon in the interests of peace and a liberal, constitutional monarchy. Furthermore, Lānuinais reminded his listeners that the beneficial effects of the General's arrival in Europe had not ceased with his death, since the Tsar had transformed his regard for Moreau into goodwill towards France. 18

Although the Senators let the Count's motion die in committee, his arguments were reflected in the works of many of those who did pursue Moreau's exoneration. 19 The regime of Louis XVIII met with general approval among the writers of 1814 and all save three imitated Uvaloff and Lānuinais by singling out the enthusiasm they believed Moreau felt for a restoration as a point in his favour. Of those who stood apart, only one did so on the grounds that the General had a different political affiliation. Vouziers unhesitatingly proclaimed Moreau as a republican, though one whose conduct was inspired more by the ideals of ancient Rome than by the terrorism of 1793. John Philippart made no such attempt to identify Moreau's political persuasion and Lemaire considered any attempt to do so vain, on the grounds that the General ought properly to be considered a-political.

18 Ibid., p. 314 – 315.
19 Anecdotes inédits ou peu connus sur le général Moreau, p. 12.
Although the majority of these writers believed that Moreau was a royalist, their assessments of the precise nature of his sympathies differed considerably. Garat based his argument on a conversation he had with Moreau around the time of his trial. The subject had been the future destiny of France, and Moreau's position; Garat claimed, was that he saw little difference between a republic and a monarchy, when they were both well-constituted, but that if he had a preference, it was for a monarchy. Chateauneuf also seemed confident that Moreau was a royalist, at least from the time of his trial onwards. On the other hand, Beauchamp, like Count Uvaloff, intimated that during the course of his exile Moreau came to the realization that his ideal of a republic was not feasible and that only a wise monarch would suit France and restore freedom and peace to Europe. The writers "G." and "P.C." also indicated that this transition had taken place in the General's view while he was in America. When writing about Moreau's trial Martinière expressed dismay over the problem, for he reasoned that if Moreau was indeed a royalist, as his support for the Allies in 1813 suggested, then Napoleon might have been justified in treating him as a traitor to the State in 1804. He concluded that Moreau was in reality a passive royalist, one who in 1804 considered it better to endure the temporary ascendancy of Napoleon, than to run the risk of civil war. The other writers, who also considered Moreau a royalist at the time of

20 Garat, p. 34.
21 Chateauneuf, p. 135.
22 Beauchamp, p. 132.
23 G. et P. C., p. 102.
24 Martinière, p. 64.
his trial, shared Martinière's point of view. Chateauneuf did not believe that the General had plotted against Napoleon and Garat laid particular emphasis on Moreau's abhorrence of conspiratorial action. Martinière however, was not completely confident that he understood the situation and towards the end of his work he took part of Uvaloff's argument and weighed it against Garat's. He placed the idea that Moreau remained ideologically a republican, while recognizing the need for a monarchy, along side the notion that his first choice was a monarchy and concluded that final judgment ought to be reserved until more became known about the General's dealings with the French princes, whether during his stay in America or after he arrived on the Continent.

These writers' views of Moreau's return to Europe in 1813 are similarly varied, agreement being more common than sharp differences of interpretation. Lanjuinais's belief that the General's return favourably altered Tsar Alexander's opinion of the French was enlarged upon by "G."

25 Chateauneuf, p. 121. and Garat, p. 28. The author of the Notice biographique sur le général Moreau agreed that the General was reluctant to join Pichegru against Napoleon. However, this writer believed that Moreau's desire to effect a restoration gradually stemmed from his fear of alienating the many republicans he counted among his supporters, p. 103. The author's British critic was thus guilty of misrepresentation when he wrote, "He adds, that the General's plan was by degrees to prepare the way for restoring the Bourbons -- and how? -- By first restoring the power of the Republican party!" Edinburgh Review 22 (1814), p. 375. The anonymous writer proceeded to relate how Moreau sacrificed his scruples for his friend Pichegru and agreed to use his men to thwart any attempt of Napoleon's agents to be revenged, if the assassination attempt was successful. No proof was offered for any of these assertions and no attempt was made to reconcile the conclusion that Moreau was a great man, with a demonstration of his weakness.

and "P. C.", the comte Garat and Alexandre de Beauchamp. In view of the regard they believed the Tsar had for Moreau, these biographers considered him as a natural intermediary, through whose agency France had received generous treatment. 27 Moreau's mediation was only partially responsible for the interest he aroused in 1814. The major cause of his popularity would appear to have been the general desire, which he was believed to have shared, of seeing Europe delivered from the man they considered to be its most terrible scourge: Napoleon. Lanjuinais, G. and "P. C.", Garat, Beauchamp, Chateauneuf, Martinière, Vouziers and Philippart together praised Moreau's patriotism and love of freedom. 28 They considered the Emperor's removal not as a constraint upon France's triumphs, but as an essential measure to end her disasters and those of Europe.

There was however, a single dissenting voice amidst this general praise. No less an admirer of the General's skill than the others, Henri Lemaire rejected their interpretation because of his view that Moreau was first and foremost a soldier. This belief made Lemaire openly skeptical, in his La Vie impartiale de général Moreau, of all efforts to ascribe noble motives to Moreau's conduct in 1813. Lemaire conceded that the General might have been willing to make sacrifices towards Napoléon's

27 C. et P. C., p. 121; Garat, p. 40; Beauchamp, p. 132.

28 Lanjuinais, p. 315; G. et P.C., p. 102; Garat, pp. 37 - 39; Beauchamp, pp. 87 - 88; Chateauneuf, pp. 138 - 139; Martinière; p. 103; Vouziers, p. 103 and Philippart, p. 239.
defeat, but he felt that there was greater accuracy in his picture of an officer who had been driven by ill-treatment to adopt Russia as his new country, and who now wished to exercise his martial talents in her service. 29

In addition to his dispute with the other writers over Moreau's motivation, Lemaire found himself at odds with their overwhelming endorsement of the General's return. This disagreement stemmed from Lemaire's conviction that at the time Moreau left the United States, Napoleon's cause was still inextricably linked with that of France. Lemaire thus could find no words of praise for Moreau's actions against the Emperor, but neither was he able to go to the opposite extreme and brand the General a traitor, as Napoleon had done. Instead, Lemaire found Moreau guilty of imprudence, on the grounds that he had participated in the humiliation of his native land and had shed his compatriots' blood. The mildness of his criticism belied the keenness with which Lemaire felt the consequences of the General's action. So greatly in fact did Lemaire fear the loss of national prestige that he momentarily shed the role of biographer and as a Frenchman made a direct appeal to his readers never to imitate the General's example. 30

Lemaire, like all the other writers except Garat, depended on the work of Pavel Petrovich Yvinine entitled Détails sur le général Moreau et ses derniers moments, for their accounts of Moreau's life from the time he left

29 Lemaire, pp. 162 - 163.
30 Ibid., pp. 172, 175, 177.
America until his burial at St. Petersburg. Svinine was variously described by the writers of 1814 as an advisor to the Russian embassy, a member of the civil department of the Russian government, and Moreau's aide de camp. The truth was that Svinine gave no clue to his identity; as his British critic wrote,

Who, or what Mr. Svinine may be, he has left us to guess. That he is a Russian, we may indeed find in every page; that he was appointed to accompany Moreau, he tells us himself; but in what capacity, whether as companion, an attendant, or a superintendent, he has omitted to mention.32

The reviewer justly declared one of the work's principal defects to be its flagrant bias. He complained that:

It is all written to be read at court, -- and is crammed with fulsome compliments to the Allies, especially Russia -- compliments not only excusable, but laudable in the mouth of the author himself -- but wholly intolerable when put by him into Moreau's.33

Numerous examples were cited by the critic in support of his claim and one of the most telling was a statement that Moreau allegedly made after his first meeting with the Tsar. The reviewer conceded that Moreau might well have been moved by his warm reception, but he was openly skeptical that the General had expressed himself in the following manner:


33 Ibid., p. 364.
'He came to me,' says Mr. Svinine, 'with tears in his eyes, and with a faltering voice exclaimed, "Ah! mon cher S.... quel homme que l'Empereur! dès ce moment j'ai contracté l'obligation de sacrifier ma vie pour lui. Il n'est personne qui ne se fasse tuer pour le servir. Que tous les rapports flatteurs que j'avais entendus sur son compte, que toutes les idées avantageuses que je m'étais faites de lui, sont au-dessous de cet ange de bonté."'

John Philippart also had reservations about the authenticity of this outburst. He felt that "it was very different from the bold, animated and nervous language, in which General Moreau delivered himself on every other occasion."

The incredulity of the British writers was not shared by their French counterparts. Svinine's accounts of the extravagant praise Moreau showered on the Russian army and the Tsar were faithfully recorded, without reservation, by these writers, but Lemaire was the only one to base his conclusion entirely on these anecdotes. The others, as has been pointed out, placed greater emphasis on two other aspects of Svinine's narrative: Moreau's role as mediator and the desire he expressed in an unpublished proclamation, to aid the French, by freeing them of the terrible despotism of Napoleon. Thus it was only through distortion, by excluding information known to him that would have weakened his argument, that Lemaire was able to conclude that all Moreau's words, all his actions from the time of his return from America until the moment of his death showed him to be an officer essentially attached to the service of the Russian Tsar.

34 Ibid., p. 368.
35 Philippart, fn. 1, p. 211.
Lemaire's discussion of Moreau's return to Europe clearly reflected his belief that the General was driven solely by the desire to exercise his professional skill and was not spurred to action by political conviction. Unusual as Lemaire was in this interpretation, he was unique among the writers of 1814 in suggesting that political considerations had not been instrumental in bringing about the crisis of General Moreau's career, his trial for conspiracy in 1804.

The accusation then brought against the General, Lemaire believed, was the work of a blundering official, who wished to avenge his master Napoleon for various sarcastic comments which malicious gossip had wrongly attributed to Moreau. These anecdotes must have been given wide circulation at the time, for "G." and "P. C." made reference to them and Philippart, Beauchamp and Martinière included one or more in their works. Napoleon was said to have branded Moreau as the 'general of retreats' and Moreau, it was claimed, retaliated in kind by describing as 'cockle-shells', the boats Napoleon was readying to invade England. Moreau was also said to have mocked the 'swords of honour', the 'pistols of honour' and the other military distinctions of a similar kind which Napoleon established, by bestowing on his chef, after a particularly fine meal, the 'saucépan

36 Lemaire, p. 82.

37 G. et P.C., pp. 68 - 70; Philippart, fn. 1, p. 188; Beauchamp, pp. 63 - 64 and Martinière, p. 63.
of honour. Lemaire himself did not believe that Moreau was capable of insulting the French army in such a manner, but he felt that whether these remarks were true or false, they created the impression that a state of open warfare existed between Moreau and Napoleon.

Although the Emperor was not to be blamed for the inclusion of the General's name on the list of conspirators, Napoleon did not escape Lemaire's censure entirely. He considered that Moreau was guilty only of having listened to the conspirators and he criticized the Emperor for permitting the matter to be treated with extreme rigour, instead of personally handling the affair in private. The members of the judicial panel who heard the case were also chastised by Lemaire on the grounds that the majority had been less concerned with upholding the principle of impartiality and rendering justice than with calculating the Government's possible reaction to an acquittal. The imposition of a sentence of

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38 This story came to the attention of the police on February 5, 1803. "On prétend que ce général ayant donné dernièrement un grand dîner, fut si content de son cuisinier et des éloges qui lui donnaient les convives, qu'il le fit venir dans la salle à manger et lui dit 'ma foi, vous, vous êtes surpassé aujourd'hui; pour vous prouver ma satisfaction, je vous donne une casseroles d'honneur.' Ce propos circule dans plusieurs sociétés." Alphonse Aulard, Paris sous le Consulat, (Paris: LeCerf, 1906), vol. 3, p. 633.

39 Lemaire, pp. 79 – 80.

40 Ibid., p. 83.

41 Ibid., pp. 113 – 114.
death on Moreau was never a serious possibility in Lemaire's eyes, given the tremendous outburst of popular sympathy, bordering on revolutionary proportions, occasioned by the trial. Since Moreau's presence could only cause Napoleon acute anxiety, Lemaire had no difficulty in understanding why a request made on the General's behalf for permission to retire to the United States was so readily granted. 42

Lemaire's impression that the trial was the focus of considerable public concern was shared by all the other writers. Beauchamp, in particular, was struck by the openness with which the General was defended and he considered it unlikely that there was ever another period during Napoleon's rule when people spoke so freely or so boldly against the abuse of power. 43 This belief in the strength of Moreau's popularity led Beauchamp to join Chateauneuf, Martinière and Vouziers in arguing, as Lemaire had done, that a sentence of death would undoubtedly have jeopardized the Emperor's regime. 44

The common ground between Lemaire and the others is however, much less important to the present study than the beliefs which divided them. Basically, Lemaire had a completely different assessment of the state of relations between Napoleon and Moreau. He blamed gossips for creating the impression that the two men were at loggerheads, whereas the other

42 Ibid., pp. 114-115.
43 Beauchamp, p. 71.
44 Beauchamp, pp. 77, 79; Chateauneuf, p. 132; Martinière, p. 97 and Vouziers, p. 101.
biographers had no hesitation in proclaiming, as fact, Napoleon's wish to be rid of a general whose military reputation and popularity rivaled his own.

The majority of writers, unlike Chateauneuf, did not stop here, but proceeded to suggest further reasons underlying Napoleon's fear of Moreau. Vouziers believed that Moreau's republicanism was especially troublesome to Napoleon, while Martinière, "G." and "P. C.", Philippart and Beauchamp emphasized Moreau's hostility to the First Consul's growing despotism. Unlike Lemaire, these writers did not treat the General's sarcastic comments as gossip, but as genuine expressions of his feelings. Philippart and Beauchamp were joined by Garat in their contention that the attitude of the populace as a whole towards Moreau also caused Napoleon grave concern. In terms almost identical to those used by the other two, Beauchamp claimed that everyone, republican and royalist alike, looked to Moreau as the only man who could save the country from the rapacity of an ambitious and inhuman Corsican who contemplated making himself master of France by royal right.

Their notion of Napoleon's intent meant that these writers were poles apart from Lemaire when it came to a discussion of how Moreau's name came to be included on the list of conspirators. Philippart was convinced that the person responsible was no overzealous supporter, but Napoleon himself,

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45 Chateauneuf, p. 94.
46 Vouziers, p. 64; Martinière, pp. 62 - 63; G. et P.C., pp. 69 - 70; Philippart, p. 186, fn. 188 and Beauchamp, pp. 62 - 63.
47 Philippart, p. 205; and Garat, p. 25.
48 Beauchamp, p. 63.
who was bent on using the presence of a plot as a weapon to ruin Moreau. The remaining six writers however, credited Napoleon with even greater cunning and argued that to serve his purpose, he deliberately provoked the conspiracy.

Martinière charged that the plot was hatched by the police in order on the one hand to encourage suspects to incriminate themselves and on the other, to lure royalists to France. "G." and "P. C." and Chateauneuf affirmed that Napoleon had achieved the latter object by sending agents provocateurs to England for the express purpose of misleading the émigrés on the state of public opinion at home. Furthermore, these two writers believed that Napoleon's domestic strategy was to have Moreau watched in the confident expectation that he would see Pichegru. It would appear that this surveillance was also extended to members of the General's family, for Chateauneuf recounted how Moreau's mother-in-law had pointed out to him a lady who paid calls in order to betray her and how Moreau's brother had said that he saw spies even behind his carriage. Garat argued that indiscriminate use of the term 'conspirator' had camouflaged the existence of two quite distinct groups. One small body of men, he believed, had come to Paris with the intention of murdering the First Consul. The other much larger group was composed of devoted supporters

49 Philippart, p. 188.
50 Martinière, p. 64.
51 G. et P.C., pp. 70 - 71 and Chateauneuf, pp. 95 - 96.
52 Chateauneuf, p. 97.
of the Crown, Pichegru among them. Garat argued that these men returned to France, because they had been led to believe that with Moreau's support a republican-royalist coalition had been established to revive the monarchy on the basis of a constitution resembling that of England. Beauchamp shared Garat's view and included Georges's name among those duped. By omission or by design, Beauchamp did not however join Garat and Vouziers in arguing vigorously that Napoleon was never in any physical danger from Pichegru and his colleagues. None of these biographers produced evidence that their charge against Napoleon was other than speculation.

From this belief that Napoleon wanted Moreau brought to trial it was an easy step for these men to move to the view that no effort had been spared to secure the desired verdict. Vouziers, "G." and "P. C." and Beauchamp voiced suspicions concerning the replacement of jury trial by a special tribunal. Furthermore, the last two writers were joined by Chateauneuf in alleging that bribery and coercion were used to extract damaging testimony. Martinière confirmed that torture had indeed been used: 

In order to show how faithful was the record of the trial, he pointed to the fact that it included a young girl's agonized protest at being kept in irons and Picot's revelation of the methods used to make

53 Garat, pp. 21 - 23.
54 Beauchamp, pp. 65 - 66.
55 Garat, p. 22 and Vouziers, p. 66.
56 Vouziers, p. 67; G. et P.C., p. 79 and Beauchamp, p. 69.
57 G. et P. C., p. 72; Beauchamp, p. 69 and Chateauneuf, pp. 108, 121.
him divulge the hiding place of his master Georges. Moreover, it was in keeping with their view of Napoleon’s design that those who discussed the process by which the verdict on Moreau was reached argued that the Government had used intimidation and made plain that the intrusion of politics into justice was not, as Lemaire had intimated, mere venality on the part of the judges. "G." and "P. C." derived their account from Chateauneuf and the latter, like Beauchamp and Martinière obtained his information from an apparently unimpeachable source on this matter, a work entitled Opinion sur la conspiration de Moreau, Pichegru et autres, which was written by one of the judges concerned, M. Lecourbe. He revealed how seven of the twelve judges voted for Moreau’s acquittal and how, through pressure, this decision was reversed to a verdict of "coupable mais excusable" and a sentence of two years in prison, by a vote of eight to three with one abstention.

Moreau’s trial, it may be remembered, was not conducted solely on the basis of the conspiracy of 1804. In order to tighten the connection between Pichegru and Moreau, the Government reached into the latter’s past as far as 1797 and accused him of having possessed proof of Pichegru’s treason for four and a half months prior to the coup d’état of 18 Fructidor in that year and of making the denunciation only after the coup as a measure of averting suspicion from himself when he knew that Pichegru could not


59 G. et P. C., p. 80; Chateauneuf, pp. 128 – 131; Beauchamp, pp. 75 – 76 and Martinière, pp. 95 – 96.

60 M. Lecourbe, Opinion sur la conspiration de Moreau, Pichegru et autres, (Paris: Gabriel Warée, 1814), p. 75
be saved. 61

In their works Garat and Beauchamp suggested that at the time of the coup, Moreau was as much criticized for supplying evidence against a brother officer, as he was for having allegedly acted out of complicity to save a guilty friend. 62 There was good reason to believe that this had in fact been the case, for the point was made by the General's defense counsel in the Mémoire justificatif, a copy of which was appended to Beauchamp's work. 63 For the most part, however, the biographers of 1814 who discussed the General's behaviour in 1797 did so in their treatment of that year, not retrospectively in connection with the trial of 1804, and the emphasis of the arguments varied according to which of these two charges they were most anxious to refute.

Those biographers whose primary concern was to defend Moreau against the charge of complicity went straight to the heart of the matter and denied that he had shared Pichegru's political sympathies. Martinière and Vouziers in fact regretted that the General was not a royalist. Martinière quoted from the Klinglin papers and these excerpts supported Bonnet's contention that Moreau's name was mentioned by the royalist agents only three or four times and then to make either the point that Moreau had not embraced Pichegru's opinions or to warn that he was not a party

61 Procès instruit par la cour de justice criminelle et spéciale du département de la Seine..., vol. 1, Acte d'accusation, p. 27 and pp. 205-206.

62 Garat, p. 8 and Beauchamp, p. 35.

63 Bonnet, Bellart and Pérignon, "Mémoire justificatif du général Moreau", in Beauchamp, Pièces justificatives, no. 6, pp. 196-268.
to the plan. Vouziers, in particular, saw Moreau as a man whose every action, including warning the Directors, sprang from a whole-hearted devotion to the republican cause. Garat and Beauchamp also acknowledged the General's republicanism at this time, but they took his vindication a step further with the allegation that circumstances clearly beyond his control were responsible for his delay in informing the Directory of his discoveries, since the difficult and lengthy decoding operation required to make Pichegru's correspondence intelligible could not be completed before political developments made it unnecessary.

Philippart, Chateauneuf and Lemaire, on the other hand, were particularly concerned to free Moreau from the stigma of having betrayed a friend. The General's desire to suppress the incriminating letters was clear to Philippart, but he was unable to offer an explanation for the eventual exposure of Pichegru. Chateauneuf had definite ideas on this point: he argued that this course had been thrust on the General by the intention of others to include Moreau himself in a denunciation to the Directors. It would seem that this argument was closest to the truth, for Moreau stated plainly in his letter to Napoleon of March 8, 1804 that outside pressures had been the deciding factor and this admission was repeated in the Mémoire justificatif.

Chateauneuf was familiar with the letter to Napoleon

64 Martinière, pp. 13-26.
65 Vouziers, p. 41.
66 Garat, p. 8 and Beauchamp, p. 34.
67 Philippart, p. 187.
68 Chateauneuf, p. 47.
69 "Lettre du général Moreau au Premier Consul" in Recueil des Interrogatoires subis par le général Moreau, Document no. 5, p. 15 and "Mémoire justificatif..." in Beauchamp, Pièces justificatives, no. 6, p. 205.
and he also used one of Bonnet's arguments to show that the security of France had not been jeopardized by the delay. The restoration that the royalists planned for 1796 was contingent upon Austrian military success and, as both men pointed out, the General's invasion of Bavaria in that year and his second crossing of the Rhine in 1797 greatly weakened the Imperial forces. 70 On the basis of Moreau's letter to Barthélemy, Lemaire felt that it was Pichegru's desire to take over the country which finally led to the disclosure being made. True to his view of Moreau, Lemaire saw in the delay a soldier's as well as a friend's reluctance to turn informant. 71

None of these writers provided an account of the coup of 18 Fructidor. Indeed two of them did not even link Pichegru's correspondence with the coup, for Moreau's vindication was unquestionably their prime object. "C." and "P. C." set about this task by explaining the General's recall in terms of the Directors' selfish motives, and these writers did so without acknowledgment to Cousin d'Avalon—whose exact words they used. "Le directoire, qui gouvernait alors la France," he had written, "était capable de tout sacrifier, pour conserver le pouvoir qui tendait sans cesse à s'échapper de ses mains." 72

Beauchamp, still more particularly, argued that the jealous Directoire

70 Chateauneuf, pp. 46 - 47.
71 Lemaire, p. 42.
72 Cousin, p. 135 and G. et P.C., p. 44.
were not beneath reminding a successful general of his dependent position. All three of Moreau's papers: his letter to the Directors, his proclamation and his letter to Barthélemy, were appended to Beauchamp's work. It is interesting to note that he gave Cousin's reservation concerning these documents a more positive twist. He conceded that their authenticity had been called into question, but he emphasized the fact that they had never been disavowed. Thus he could with confidence derive his principal argument, as did Garat, from Moreau's letter to Barthélemy in which he commented on the lengthy decoding operation. The difficulty in deciphering the correspondence was also mentioned in the Mémoire justificatif, with which Beauchamp was familiar. In this document he had at his disposal a wealth of information concerning the General and the correspondence, which was all the more valuable because details could be mentioned in 1804 which were impossible to reveal in 1797. It would appear that Beauchamp chose to ignore this fact and to take Garat as his model once again.

Martinière also reproduced the three documents from 1797, Lemaire included two and the interpretation of Philippart, Chateauneuf and

73 Beauchamp, p. 35.
74 Ibid., Pièces justificatives, no. 2, pp. 185 - 189.
75 Ibid., p. 36.
76 "Mémoire justificatif...", in Beauchamp, Pièces justificatives, no. 6, p. 218.
Vouzières reflected an awareness of the letter to Barthélemy. Since the Acte d'accusation of 1804 charged that Moreau had written the letter on 19 Fructidor, after having been informed of the coup by telegraph the previous day, the date of the letter was as important to some of these biographers as its contents. Lemaire and Châteauneuf dated the letter 17 Fructidor. Martinière gave the date as 19 Fructidor, but from his knowledge of the proceedings of the trial he was able to add in a footnote the fact that Moreau had given his assurance that the letter was not of the 19th, but the 17th, and that only a poorly constructed seven could have given rise to this error.

Martinière went on to repeat other arguments advanced by Bonnet on the General's behalf. He pointed out that since Strasbourg had no telegraph, Moreau would have had no way of knowing the events of the preceding day and that if he had known the outcome of the coup, it was unlikely that he would have written to one of the proscribed Directors.

The scope of the trial in 1804 was also broadened by Moreau himself, for just as the Prosecution resurrected the past to help secure his conviction, so too did the General, in his address to the court revive the memory of his earlier conduct to strengthen his

77 Martinière, pp. 31 - 36; Lemaire, pp. 39 - 46; Phillippart, p. 187; Châteauneuf, p. 47 and Vouzier, p. 29.

78 Procès instruit par la cour de justice criminelle et spéciale du département de la Seine..., vol. 1. Acte d'accusation, p. 27.

79 Lemaire, p. 40 and Châteauneuf, p. 47.

80 Martinière, fn. p. 31. This view that Moreau warned the Directors in advance of the coup has been most recently challenged by the renowned scholar of the Revolution and the Empire, Jacques Godechot in his article, "Moreau et les papiers de Klinglin," Annales historiques de la Révolution française 9 (1932): pp. 309 - 324. Valuable as this work is for the insights it provides on the basis of documents from 1797, Godechot's interpretation would have benefited, if he, like Châteauneuf and Martinière, had consulted the record of the trial.
defence. The State claimed that he had attempted to persuade the royalists to make him head of state, if only temporarily.  

Moreau drew to the judges' attention the fact that he could have easily staged a coup after the battle of Hohenlinden when he returned to France at the head of an army of one hundred thousand. Furthermore, he hoped that the court would find proof of his personal disinterest not only in the failure of prominent deputies to persuade him to accept the leadership of a coup aimed at overthrowing the Directory in 1799, but also in the active assistance he had then given Napoleon.

Reaction among the writers of 1814 to Moreau's refusal of power in 1799 was predictably mixed. Lemaire treated this action as the natural response of a man who was uniquely and essentially a soldier. Others, such as Garat, Martinière, Philippart, Vouziers and Beauchamp, preferred to discuss Moreau's reaction in terms of the virtues they thought it exemplified: modesty, controlled ambition and noble simplicity. Moreover, this belief in the General's merit, when combined with the idea that his refusal had paved the way for the tyranny of Napoleon, moved "G." and "P. C.", Garat, Martinière and Beauchamp to eloquent expressions of regret.

Even more unflattering to Napoleon was the attitude of the writers

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81 Procès instruit par la cour de justice criminelle et spéciale du département de la Seine..., vol. I Acte d'accusation, p. 223.

82 Jean Victor Moreau, "Discours prononcé par le général Moreau, au tribunal criminel spéciale du département de la Seine", in Beauchamp, Pièces justificatives, no. 5, pp. 194 - 195.

83 Lemaire, p. 53.

84 Garat, pp. 14 - 15; Martinière p. 52; Philippart, p. 184; Vouziers, p. 41 and Beauchamp, p. 42.

85 G. et P.C. pp. 67 - 68; Garat, p. 15; Martinière, p. 53 and Beauchamp, pp. 42 - 43, 45.
of 1814 who discussed the coup of 18 Brumaire. No writer did so in any detail and none claimed any knowledge of Moreau's participation beyond the fact that he himself confirmed it. Some clearly considered the General's involvement an aberration which demanded excuse. Philippart pleaded that the General had regretted, but was unable to oppose the coup. Vouziers, on the other hand, pardoned the General on the grounds that Napoleon had concealed the full extent of his plans by pretending that nothing more was intended than the establishment of the well-ordered republic Moreau desired. Beauchamp also subscribed to the idea that this form of trickery had been employed, but he carried the General's defense further and argued that as soon as the deception became clear, Moreau attempted to make amends by voicing his disapproval of Napoleon's actions. A strong sense of ill-usage also permeated the accounts of the other biographers who passed over Moreau's role and discussed the coup in general terms. Both Martinière and Lemaire believed that the position of First Consul was a camouflage for royal power, which could not be openly revived. Chateauneuf was even more bitter, claiming that Napoleon had given the impression of grandeur, but then had treated the French like a barbarian chief.

Moreau's speech on his own behalf was included in the works of

86 Philippart, p. 185.
87 Vouziers, p. 41.
88 Beauchamp, p. 45.
89 Martinière, p. 55 and Lemaire, p. 55.
90 Chateauneuf, p. 68.
six of the eight writers under consideration, but it is clear that none of them personally required persuasion of this kind. They were in fact all predisposed to find him innocent, whether from a belief that Napoleon had used the trial to rid himself of the General, or from a conviction that he was being tried because of a vindictive courtier. Moreover, it was doubtless this bias that made these biographers consider it unnecessary to include a large amount of supporting evidence in their accounts.

The other fundamental source was the letter Moreau wrote to Napoleon on March 8, 1804. He began that with an explanation of his conduct at the time of the coup of 18 Fructidor, which has already been mentioned, and then proceeded to give the First Consul an account of his relations with the abbé David. Differences of detail and substance make it clear that Davis was unaware of this letter when he wrote his account. He believed that the abbé contacted Moreau to obtain an explanation of his denunciation of Pichegru and to effect a reconciliation of the two generals. Lemaire on the other hand used the letter and argued, more precisely, that Moreau had been approached (May 1802)

91 Beauchamp, pp. 71 - 72 and Pièces justificatives no. 5; Chateauneuf, pp. 100 - 102; G. et P.C., pp. 74 - 79; Lemaire, pp. 85 - 89; Martinière, pp. 51 and passim and Vouzier, pp. 70 - 77.

92 "Lettre du général Moreau au Premier Consul", in Receuil des interrogatoires subis par le général Moreau, Document no. 5, p. 16

93 Davis, p. 252.
because Pichegru was the only one of the fructidorisés prevented from returning to France and David believed that Moreau's opposition alone prevented Napoleon from giving permission. Moreau in fact supported Pichegru's case and the justification he gave for his position was quoted by Martinière from the record of the trial. Moreau had explained that:

'A la fin de la guerre, tous les proscrits de fructidor sont rentrés, excepté Pichegru et quelques autres que je ne connais pas. Six mois après que je suis revenu à Paris, j'ai vu dans tous les cercles l'armée de Condé que je venais de combattre.

C'est dans de telles circonstances qu'on vient me dire que je suis le seul obstacle à la rentrée de Pichegru; que si je veux faire quelque démarches, le général Pichegru rentrera en France. Il n'est pas un citoyen en France qui, dans ma position, n'ait fait ce que j'ai fait; il n'était pas plus coupable que les autres fructidorisés, que ceux qui avaient combattu dans l'armée de Condé.'

The basis for a reconciliation was established, Lemaître believed, when Moreau wrote to David denying the charge of obstruction and saying that he would make it a duty to further Pichegru's case, and when Pichegru replied via David that he never considered Moreau capable of opposing his return and conceding that Moreau had been placed in a difficult position by the Klinglin correspondence.

The belief that a reconciliation had taken place did not lead Davis and Lemaître to conclude that conspiratorial activity had ensued. Undoubtedly on the basis of the Mémoire justificatif, Davis argued

94 Lemaître, pp. 95 - 96.
95 Martinière, pp. 66 - 67.
96 Lemaître, p. 96.
that Lajolais, seeking employment and armed with a letter of recommendation from Pichegru, had visited Moreau (summer, 1803) only to be told to approach other generals with greater influence and to be refused money. Bonnet made much of the denial of funds in his plea for the defence and his words were included in the works of Davès and Châteauneuf. 97 The police practice was to interrogate two accused together in order to verify their initial statements. In one such confrontation between Lajolais and himself on April 12, 1804, Moreau admitted seeing Lajolais two or three times. 98 Lemaire argued that there had been more than one visit, but he insisted, as Moreau had done, that on none of these occasions had overtures been made on behalf of the French princes. Lemaire believed that this was either because Lajolais had not received Pichegru's authorization or because Moreau's behaviour made it clear that such advances would be unsympathetically received. 99

Both Davis and Lemaire argued, (the former on the basis of the Mémoire justificatif and the latter probably on the basis of the April 12th confrontation), that Couchery, the brother of Pichegru's best friend, had visited Moreau on his estate (at the beginning of winter 1803) to see if the General wished to correspond with Pichegru and that


98"Interrogatoire et confrontation de Lajolais et du général Moreau", in Recueil des interrogatoires subis par le général Moreau Document no. 9, p. 35.

99Lemaire, p. 97.
the General replied that he had seen Lajolais two or three times on his private affairs, that he had no message to give and that he had no desire to correspond with Pichegru who was in a country at war with France. Furthermore, both Davis and Lemaire believed that Lajolais, undeterred by Moreau's rebuff, went to England and informed the émigrés that the General eagerly awaited the signal to overthrow the Consular regime. The argument that Lajolais was responsible for fomenting the conspiracy might well have some foundation, for in the confrontation of April 19th., Moreau charged that Lajolais sought revenge because his reports and those of the general staff to the Government had led to the imprisonment of Lajolais for about twenty-eight months after 18 Fructidor. However, much more than simple assertion is required before the primacy of Lajolais's role may be accepted. Chateauneuf included in his work the ridicule Bonnet cast on the notion that Lajolais had acted as an intermediary between the generals to prepare a plot, because of the complete absence of letters and plans, and the lack of witnesses, other than Lajolais himself, who was one of the accused. Furthermore, to rebut the Government's claim that rumours flying around

100 Davis, pp. 258 - 259 and Lemaire, p. 97.
101 Davis, pp. 255 - 256 and Lemaire, p. 98.
102 "Interrogatoire et confrontation de Lajolais et du général Moreau", in Recueil des interrogatoires subis par le général Moreau, Document no. 9, p. 37.
103 Chateauneuf, p. 123.
London confirmed Moreau's promise to restore the Bourbons, Chateauneuf quoted again from Bonnet, as follows:

'Mais qui peut empêcher de pareils bruits? et qui en parle? Quatre des accusés; MM. du Corps, de Rusillon de Rochelle, Roger; quatre gendarmes qui prétendent l'avoir entendu dire à ce dernier. De braves militaires ne sont placés près des prévenus pour entendre leurs discours, pour les exciter à la confiance, pour leur faire des questions et rapporter leurs réponses. Une telle conduite serait indigne de leur noble profession. M. Roger nie. MM. du Corps, de Rochelle et de Rusillon les présentent comme des propos vagues en Angleterre. Lajolais les désavoue. On est allé jusqu'à dire, à Londres, que le premier consul même n'était pas éloigné du projet de rétablir les Bourbons.

After explaining to Napoleon that his contact with David had been infrequent and limited to the subject of obtaining official permission for Pichegru's return, Moreau asserted that he had not taken part in the conspiracy and that he had rejected the propositions he received both on principle and on the grounds that they were foolish. There is every reason to believe that it was from the Mémoire that both Davis and Lemaire took their accounts of the two meetings Moreau admitted having had with Pichegru. They argued that after a lapse of more than seven months (winter 1804) Moreau received a visit from Lajolais, who said that Pichegru was in Paris and wished to meet with the General on

104 Ibid., p. 124.

105 "Lettre du général Moreau au Premier Consul", in Recueil des interrogatoires subis par le général Moreau, Document no. 5, pp. 17–18.
the subject of obtaining official permission to return. Moreau refused, observing that Pichegru was in Paris illegally. Davis and Lemaire believed that Moreau considered the subject closed, when one evening at the beginning of January (1804) Lajolais, Couchery and Pichegru arrived at his house in Paris. Bonnet and the two biographers asserted that Moreau was annoyed and that the two men went into the library for a meeting which lasted fifteen minutes. 106 "Un quart-d'heure pour conspirer!" was Bonnet's point, which Châteauneuf incorporated into his work. 107 No political subjects were discussed during this reunion, only their mutual friends and Pichegru's desire to return. Moreau advised him to seek refuge for a while in Germany, if he desired amnesty, and then asked him to retire and not repeat his visit. 108

According to Davis and Lemaire, Moreau found the second meeting which occurred a few days later even more distasteful. This time he was approached by Rolland who had served under him from 1795 to 1801 as a superintendent of transport. He brought a message that Pichegru desired a meeting to communicate important information. Not to be disobliging, Moreau sent his secretary, Fresnières to learn the news, but Pichegru would not be deterred and arrived at the General's house. After some preliminary remarks, Pichegru steered the conversation towards

106 Lemaire, pp. 98 - 100 and Davis pp. 258 - 259.
107 Châteauneuf, p. 125.
108 Lemaire, p. 100 and Davis, p. 259.
politics. He spoke of the plan to invade England, the dangers posed for the state by the First Consul's absence and the changes which might ensue. Interspersed with these remarks he let fly a few words on the change in public opinion, disenchanted with republicanism, and on the Bourbons, their misfortunes and their aspirations. Without developing any fixed plan he seemed to be sounding Moreau's disposition towards a restoration in the event that a disaster befell the invasion and, in consequence, factional strife threatened to tear the country apart. Bonnet, Davis and Lemaire all argued that Moreau pronounced Pichegru's ideas to be sheer folly, being totally at odds with public opinion. 109

In his letter to Napoleon, Moreau stated that propositions of this kind had been made to him, but he did not reveal that the rebuff had to be repeated. 110 The day after the second meeting, Rolland returned and spoke to Moreau in the same vein as Pichegru. Davis, unlike Lemaire, included this visit in his work and once again used the information provided by the Mémoire. Bonnet reproduced in more polished form the version of the meeting the General had given Judge Thuriot, in an


110 "Lettre du général Moreau au Premier Consul", in Recueil des interrogatoires subis par le général Moreau, Document no. 5, pp. 17 - 18.
interrogation on March 30, 1804. However, it is worth noting that Davis removed the most contentious part from Moreau's reply to Rolland's question concerning his political aspirations. According to Bonnet, Moreau stated that:

...que, quant à lui, il n'était pas un insensé qu'il faudrait donc, pour qu'un simple particulier comme lui, rentré dans la retraite, isolé des militaires et de tous les hommes en crédit, pût rouler quelque projet ambitieux, que tout l'Etat fut boulversé, que le Consul, sa famille, tous ceux qui étaient alors saisis de quelque puissance, n'existassent plus; et que s'il avait été capable de vouloir du pouvoir, c'eût été quand il était à la tête des armées.  

In Davis's version, Moreau said:

He hoped he was not mad. For before a mere individual, like himself retired from the world, and isolated from all affairs, civil or military, could be animated by any ambitious project, he must be abandoned by his reason. That the time for him to have coveted power, had he possessed such a passion, was when he was at the head of great and victorious armies.  

It is clear from Rolland's version of Moreau's words why Davis left out all mention of the First Consul, his family and all those in authority.

113 Davis, p. 162.
In an interrogation on February 19, 1804, Rolland recalled that the
General had told him:

_Je ne puis me mettre à la tête d'aucun mouvement
pour les Bourbons. Ils se sont tous si mal conduits, qu'un
essai semblable ne réussirait pas. Si Pichegru fût agir
dans un autre sens, et en ce cas je lui ai dit qu'il
faudrait que les Consuls et le gouverneur de Paris
disparaissent; je crois avoir un parti assez fort dans le
Sénat pour obtenir l'autorité; je m'en servira aussitôt
pour mettre tout son monde à couvert, en suite de quoi
l'opinion dictera ce qu'il conviendra de faire: mais je
m'engagerai à rien par écrit._

Rolland's testimony was not ignored by all the biographers of
/1814. Martinière informed his readers that it was the only sign which
might have made Moreau suspect the presence of a conspiracy and then
referred them to the illuminating discussion of this evidence to be
found in the _débats_, the speech for the defence and the Mémoire
justificatif. Chateauneuf on the other hand, made a point of
including in his work Rolland's words and details which shed light
on his reliability as a witness. Undoubtedly on the authority of the
information found in the _débats_, Chateauneuf argued that Rolland had been
told that if he incriminated Pichegru and Moreau, he would be considered

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114 "Interrogatoire de Henri Rolland, du 29 Pluviôse an 12", in
Recueil des interrogatoires subis par le général Moreau, Document no.
13, p. 62.

115 The _débats_ were the proceedings of the trial proper held in
open court. The premier président, Hémart and the other judges
(infrequently) addressed questions to the accused based on their
declarations and interrogations, and they or their counsel responded.

116 Martinière, p. 95.
simply their confidant, but that if he remained silent, he would be viewed as a suspect. Chateauneuf also included details from the work of Judge Lecourbe which made it seem likely that Rolland succumbed to this threat. Lecourbe found that Rolland was granted unusual licence in the prison, that the other inmates believed he was a spy and that he boasted of friendship with both Real, minister responsible for the police and the juge-instructeur, M. Thuriot. Furthermore, Chateauneuf learned from the débats that Rolland subsequently altered his version substantially by withdrawing his claim that Moreau said, 'qu'il fallait faire disparaître les Consuls,' and claiming instead that the General had said 'qu'ils disparussent.'

Even if Rolland had not discredited himself as a witness Moreau could have been exonerated for, as Chateauneuf pointed out, the two had been alone. He was the only biographer of 1814 who made plain why there was no oral testimony against Moreau issuing either from his encounter with Rolland or from the two earlier meetings with Pichegru, which were similarly unobserved. Nor was there any written proof, not a line written by Moreau except two letters, one to David and the other to Napoleon, and Chateauneuf argued that Bonnet effectively demonstrated that these documents were more properly viewed as evidence for the defence than the prosecution. 118

Their personal belief in Moreau's innocence and their knowledge

118 Ibid., p. 121.
that there were no grounds to the contrary made the biographers of 1814 on the whole, negligent in their discussions of the background to the trial. "G." and "P. C." did no more than quote the letter to Napoleon and Moreau's speech, and declare that the thought of conspiring never entered Moreau's head.¹¹⁹ Philippart stated that there was no proof against the General and without further explanatory comment followed this assertion with the State's position as outlined by Régnier in his report to the First Consul.¹²⁰ Beauchamp was scarcely more helpful. "Moreau avouait qu'il avait vu Pichegru," he wrote. "Qu'en pouvait-on conclure?" "Il n'en résultait aucune charge sérieuse contre l'accusé...."¹²¹ Martinière referred his reader to the Mémoire, which he said gave a powerful demonstration of the innocence of Moreau's contact with Pichegru and the absence of the slightest grounds which would support the accusation of conspiracy.¹²² The Mémoire formed the basis of Lemaire's account, as indicated earlier, and he was the only biographer of 1814 who troubled to outline the Defence's version of how the meetings with Pichegru came about and to sketch what transpired. However, like the

¹¹⁹ G. et P. C., p. 73.
¹²⁰ Philippart, p. 188.
greater number, he did not state explicitly why there was no proof, but simply asserted that the evidence was vague, insignificant and insufficient to warrant even the General's arrest. 123

In practically the same words, Beauchamp and Martinière agreed that it was impossible to bring a serious charge against Moreau on the basis of his conversations with Pichegru. Furthermore, these writers believed that in order to carry the case convincingly, the State concentrated its efforts on establishing the existence of a meeting between Moreau and Georges, a much more damaging allegation. 124 In his work, Lemaire included the conspirators' accusation that Moreau had meetings other than the two he acknowledged: one in the evening on the boulevard, one in the Champs-Elysées and finally one at a house in Chaillot. According to Lemaire, the State claimed that Georges withdrew half way through the last rendez-vous uttering a parting shot at Moreau, 'Si vous voulez, je vous laisserai avec Pichegru: et peut-être finirez-vous par vous entendre.' All these charges, Lemaire declared to be improbable and ridiculous beyond belief, but gave no evidence to support his claim. 125 Beauchamp, like Lemaire, also gave no details. He argued that the embarrassment and incoherence of the witnesses showed how inconclusive and insubstantial was the evidence. Furthermore, he believed that the allegation that Moreau had sought to use the royalists to elevate himself to the position of

123 Lemaire, p. 93.
124 Beauchamp, p. 72 and Martinière, p. 73.
125 Lemaire, pp. 102 - 103.
dictator was supported only by vague and inadmissible statements of minor police agents.

Martinière also considered the proof extremely fragile and followed this assertion with a verbatim transcript of Moreau's part of the Acte d'accusation that dealt with his meetings. A comparison of the Acte with the account given by Lemaire shows that he did not trouble accurately to represent the State's charges. This section of the Acte was a succession of sentence-long summaries of evidence given by the principal witnesses: Lajolais, Couchery and Bouvet de Lozier on the first meeting, which was alleged to have taken place between Moreau, Pichégru and Georges in the boulevard de la Madeleine; Pólignac on the second meeting between the principals at Chaillot, maison no. 6; Picot on Moreau's failure to arrive at a meeting arranged to take place in the Champs-Élysées; Rolland, Lemaire, Lajolais and Bouvet de Lozier on the meeting at Moreau's house to which Pichégru had been fetched by Fresnières and Lajolais and Couchery on the final meeting at Moreau's house which lasted between fifteen minutes and half an hour. Martinière was obviously under the impression that his thumbnail sketch of the testimony against Moreau was sufficient to destroy the Prosecution's case, for he believed that it was unnecessary for him to point out the trifling nature of the charges and the insignificance of the rendez-vous, even supposing that they actually took place. The arguments, he believed, destroyed themselves and he encouraged his

126 Beauchamp, p. 73.
readers to consult the solid refutation prepared by Moreau's counsel.

Chateauneuf, like the previous biographers, was alternately reticent on details of the meetings and eloquent on the inadequacy of the evidence. He argued that not a single charge emerged from the testimony of the one hundred and forty-one witnesses heard. There were only four declarations, he intimated, which seemed threatening, but he argued that they had been obtained by force and had their usefulness destroyed when the witnesses contradicted themselves or issued retractions in court. At this point he did not name the four, but from what he had written previously it was clear that two of the men he meant were Bouvet de Lozier and Rolland. Chateauneuf's work also contained an excerpt from Bonnet's speech, from which it appears that the other two may have been Lajolais and Couchery. With respect to the meeting in the boulevard de la Madeleine, Bonnet stated that:

"Couchery prétendait tenir le fait de Lajolais qui n'était le lui avoir dit. Lajolais avait déclaré d'abord à l'audience qu'il croyait y avoir vu le général Moreau; ensuite qu'il se pouvait que ce ne fût pas lui. Couchery disait avoir appris de Lajolais que Moreau était venu trouver Pichegru sur le boulevard; mais que Georges étant survenu, Moreau s'était éloigné sur le champ. Ces oui-dires, ces démentis étaient autant d'incertitude dans les juges que dans le public."

The absence of evidence, according to Chateauneuf, did not mean

127 Martinière, pp. 73 - 86.
128 Chateauneuf, p. 121.
129 Ibid., p. 126.
that there had been no contact between Moreau and Georges. He wrote:

Je tiens d'une personne, dont le témoignage est irréécusable, qu'entre le général, ses trois conseils MM. de Bonnet, Bellart et Pérignon et deux autres personnes, il fut discuté la question de savoir s'il nierait son entrevue avec Georges. Il fut décidé qu'il ne l'avouerait pas. Ce n'était le temps, ni de confesser ce fait, ni de proclamer son désir de voir rentrer les Bourbons. Un tel aveu eût été un arrêt de mort. 130

Chateauneuf was clearly a royalist sympathizer, for he even removed from Rolland's testimony the words "Ils se sont tous si mal conduits, qu'un essai semblable ne réussirait pas," when used to describe the members of his own party and this bias in itself is sufficient to make his allegation suspect. 131

Chateauneuf was not alone in arguing that there was a side of Moreau that he did not wish to reveal in his letter to Napoleon. Vouziers believed that around the time of Pichegru's departure from England, Moreau realized that he had been duped into serving the ambition of a soldier like himself on the pretext of aiding the Republic. The General, Vouziers suggested, did not like to have his equal become his master and the Consulat à vie was sufficient portent of the future. Such thoughts, Vouziers felt, led to a reconciliation with Pichegru and to a plan of changing the government, which did not involve the assassination of the First Consul. Vouziers claimed that Napoleon himself added the suggestion of murder in order to become the focus of attention. 132

Sworn declarations, Vouziers argued, compelled Moreau to admit that he had

130 Ibid., pp. 134 - 135.
131 Ibid., p. 107. In his account Martinière also pruned these words from the Acte d'accusation, p. 83.
three meetings with Pichegru.  

The General, in fact, never acknowledged more than two and Couchery's testimony was the only one Vouziers quoted in support of his position that there had been three encounters. Vouziers believed, on the basis of a declaration made by Pichegru to several persons that dissension had arisen between the two generals because Pichegru discovered that Moreau had ambitions and wished to turn the projected revolution entirely to his own advantage. On the basis of such positive evidence as these meetings and George's statement that he had come with the intention of attacking the First Consul, Vouziers believed that it was difficult not to conclude that there had been a plot to overthrow the Government. He justified the attempt by claiming that Napoleon's government was no more legitimate than its predecessor and repeated his contention that the First Consul had brought the conspiracy upon himself to remove those he feared.

The charges against Moreau did not stop with his meetings, however many there were, and in his letter to Napoleon, Moreau moved from an outline of the manner in which he had repulsed Pichegru's overtures to an explanation of why there had been no denunciation. He wrote:

Une délation répugne trop à mon caractère; presque toujours jugée avec sévérité, elle devient odieuse, et imprime un sceau de réprobation sur celui qui s'en est

133 Ibid., p. 81.
135 Ibid., p. 81.
136 Ibid., p. 92.
rendu coupable vis-à-vis des personnes à qui on
doit de la reconnaissance, et avec qui on a eu
d'anciennes liaisons d'amitié; le devoir même peut
quelquefois céder au cri de l'opinion publique.  

Garat was outraged that Moreau's inaction should be condemned.

...Pichégru s'était présenté à sa porte: avait-elle
pu, avait-elle dû lui rester fermée? Il lui ouvrit.
Voilà le crime de Moreau; le voilà tout entier: car je
ne donne pas à examiner s'il fut coupable de n'être pas
allé dénoncer Pichégru à la police; qu'il paraît vil,
même de poser pareille question!  

While Garat took a position on the moral question involved, Chateauneuf's
work included a quotation from Bonnet on the law. "Il n'y a point de
loi dans notre code moderne qui condamne celui qui n'a pas dénoncé."
he stated. "Il existe, il faut que j'en convienne une ordonnance de Louis
XI; ..."  

Martinière's work also shed light on the legal aspect of the
case, for he included in a footnote Judge Lecourbe's important demonstration
that, in the eyes of the law, the plans of Georges, Pichégru and the
others did not technically constitute a conspiracy, because the action
had not been planned and agreed on by the participants.  

A study of the biographies of 1814 reveals a great deal of controversy
Surrounding Moreau's trial and the events leading up to it. There was
disagreement over the origins of the plot. Lemaire considered it
royalist inspired, while the majority believed that it had been fomented

137 "Lettre du général Moreau au Premier Consul," in Recueil des
interrogatoires subis par le général Moreau, Document no. 5, p. 18.

138 Garat, p. 23.

139 Chateauneuf, p. 127.

140 Martinière, fn. 1. p. 72.
by Napoleon himself. Moreover, Garat suggested that there was an element of truth in both these views because there were really two groups of conspirators. One of the rare points of unanimity was on the extent of popular support for the General in 1804. Martinière was the sweetest guide here since he had actually been present in court, but the others, as contemporaries, were in a position to have obtained an impression of public opinion. There was also agreement that justice had been perverted, but Lemaire believed that the fault lay with the judges, while the others on the solid ground of Judge Lecourbe's testimony, argued that pressure had been brought to bear on them by Napoleon. Lemaire ran counter to the majority once again when he denied both that Moreau had political ideals and that he opposed the First Consul. Vouziers agreed that there had been political grounds for Moreau's protest, but this writer hinted at the presence of more personal reasons as well, when he suggested that the General resented seeing an equal become a superior.

While there was disagreement over whether or not Moreau had opposed Napoleon and if he had, what his motives had been, there was no question in the minds of the biographers of 1814 that he was not guilty of having conspired to kill Napoleon. Indeed their belief in Moreau's innocence would appear to have precluded a thorough, scholarly discussion of the background to his trial. They viewed the proceedings as a sham and in consequence were unable to give the charges much serious consideration. Sources were not always identified, dates were not supplied and even the
sum total of the counts against Moreau was never given. These writers had more in common than their nonchalance, for the structure of their arguments was also the same. They began with an assumption of his innocence, which stemmed in part from their contention that external forces brought Moreau to trial. A few documents were then provided which were likely to sustain the belief that he was blameless and they were followed by an assertion that there was insufficient proof to establish his guilt. The approach was not entirely negative, or in other words, a presumption of innocence from a failure to convict. Some of the writers provided information from Moreau's defence which was convincing enough to eliminate some of the charges against him.

Bonnet's argument that the Klinglin correspondence showed that Moreau was not serving the Crown, his demonstration that the delay caused no harm to the Republic and his point concerning the absence of a telegraph at Strasbourg would seem effectively to dispel the charge relating to 18 Fructidor. Chateauneuf included in his work Bonnet's statement concerning Moreau's refusal to lend money to Lajolais and the lawyer's comment on the absence of documents, both facts which make it seem unlikely that Lajolais acted as an intermediary between the two generals. Chateauneuf also cited Bonnet's demonstration of how unsoundly based was the contention that the circulation of rumours in London signified that Moreau had pledged his support for a restoration. Furthermore, the information Chateauneuf obtained from Lecourbe and the proceedings of the trial concerning the unreliability of Rolland's testimony, together with Moreau's speech on his own
behalf, did much to destroy the claim that he had political ambitions. In the same way, Chateauneuf's quotation of Bonnet's declaration that there was no law requiring denunciation was sufficient to clear Moreau of that charge.

All the allegations were by no means so successfully refuted and the greatest cause for dissatisfaction would appear to have been, as with Davis's work, the failure to bring both points of view, the Prosecution's and the Defence's, to bear on the most important of Moreau's supposed offences, his dealings with the abbé David and his meetings with Pichegru and Georges. Lemaître's argument that Moreau's communication with David was limited to the subject of Pichegru's return would have been more convincing if the reader had been provided with the Prosecution's case as well, in order to weigh their relative merits. Chateauneuf claimed that there were only two documents in Moreau's hand, one of which was his letter to David. Instead of including in his own work a demonstration of why this document should be considered the property of the Defence, he referred his readers to the Mémoire justificatif. Martinière was guilty of using this tactic twice, both times in connection with the various meetings. These rendez-vous received the slightest treatment and the complaint was the old one. An idea of the Prosecution's case was required before the meetings with Pichegru could be written off for lack of evidence. Furthermore, it was not enough to dismiss the alleged contacts with Georges on the grounds that the Prosecution's case was ridiculous without stating the
arguments presented and convincingly rebutting them.

Vouziers was the only biographer of 1814 to take the position that Moreau had joined with Pichegru for the purpose of overthrowing Napoleon, but the arguments Vouziers presented to support his view were no more satisfactory than those of his contemporaries. He left Moreau's motive completely unclear when he stated, "On n'aime point à voir ses égaux devenir ses maîtres," which could be construed to mean either that the General hated tyranny or that he was jealous.¹⁴¹ Up to this point, Vouziers had emphasized the General's republicanism and had mentioned his lack of ambition, which seemed to lend weight to the first interpretation, but in an about face, he seemed to accept the hearsay testimony that Pichegru found Moreau ambitious. Furthermore, on no other grounds than the testimony of one man, Vouziers claimed that the General had three meetings with Pichegru. The biographers of 1814 thus left a cloud of ambiguity surrounding the conspiracy, the nature of Moreau's motive to oppose Napoleon (if he did), Moreau's dealings with the abbé David and his meetings, both acknowledged and alleged, with Pichegru and Georges.

Obviously to the questions they left unanswered, some of the biographers of 1814 went on to suggest that Moreau's conduct during the trial was an equally eloquent testimonial to his greatness. Garat found

¹⁴¹Vouziers, p. 66.
the virtues of antiquity in the General's refusal of two offers of escape. According to Garat, the eye of the verdict, members of the _gendarmerie d'élite_ offered to free Moreau and to carry him in triumph to the people. Garat maintained that this proposition was rejected with the noble words, "Non, je ne veux point qu'il puisse y avoir une seule goutte de sang versé pour sauver le mien." 142 The next opportunity arose after Moreau's sentencing. According to Garat, Moreau left the court, made his way through the crowd and suddenly found himself in the street. Garat argued that instead of fleeing, Moreau _leapt_ into a carriage and instructed the driver to take him to the Temple prison, where he had difficulty rousing anyone to admit him. 143 Both these accounts were used by a number of biographers: "C." and "P.C." quoted his description of the first incident, while Beauchamp included both anecdotes verbatim in his account. 144 Martinière on the other hand, only made reference to them in passing. 145 Chateauneuf had no difficulty in believing that _gendarmes_ had been prepared to assist Moreau's flight, but took Garat severely to task, for the second, admittedly fanciful account. 146 Their uncritical acceptance of these accounts casts doubt upon their judgement.

A late nineteenth-century writer, Leonce Pingaud, called more into question however than their discrimination. He branded the

142 Garat, p. 29.
143 Ibid., p. 30.
144 G. et P.C., p. 82 and Beauchamp, pp. 75, 77.
145 Martinière, p. 97.
146 Chateauneuf, pp. 109, 132.
writings of Martinière, Garat, Chateauneuf and Beauchamp as

...œuvres de circonstance et peut-être de commande
émanant d'une certaine catégorie d'historiens, de ceux
auxquels la police ouvre parfois généreusement ses cartons,
mais qui manquent d'autorité devant le public, ayant laissé
suspecter leur désintéressement. 147

The comment concerning their sources would appear to be one of the
least valid portions of this assessment. However, it cannot be
denied that a few of these writers possessed privileged information,
even if it was not of the kind Perret suggested, which gave them
an advantage over their predecessors. Garat claimed personal
acquaintance with the General. Martinière's position as clerk at
the trial has already been mentioned as has Chateauneuf's intimacy with
members of Moreau's family. Beauchamp had the opportunity to discuss his
work with M. Fresnères, Moreau's secretary, and from the documents
appended to the study, it would seem likely that he at least had access
to the police archives. 148

On the other hand, Pingaud's shaft about "œuvres de circonstance"
does not appear to be at all amiss. A biographical study of Moreau in
1814 was clearly an ideal vehicle for a writer who wished to vent his
hatred of Napoleon and an opportunity to explain its cause. The
international odium which the Emperor had brought upon France and the
distress he caused Europe could be deplored while Moreau's return was

147 Leonce Pingaud, "Les Derniers années de Moreau", La Revue
de Paris 6 (1899):

148 Beauchamp, Avis de l'éditeur, p. ii.
discussed. The General's involvement with the coup of 18 Brumaire was an opportunity to condemn Napoleon's insatiable ambition and the lengths to which he was prepared to go to eliminate potential rivals could be discussed in connection with Moreau's trial. Some, like Martinière and Vouziers even seized the opportunity to take a backward glance even beyond Napoléon to condemn the Revolution.

Moreau's life was also an appropriate topic for those looking ahead. Martinière was one to see the benefit to be derived from combining elements of past and future. "En effet," he wrote, "...n'est-ce pas faire sentir le prix du gouvernement paternel et des vertus héréditaires de Bourbons, que de relever les torts de Buonaparte..."

Moreau's trial was considered by Martinière to be one of the blots on Napoleon's rule. Garat used his pamphlet as an instrument to warn Louis XVIII that Napoleon failed because he turned his back on what Garat considered to be the fundamental principle of legitimate authority; the sovereignty of the people made manifest through representative government and a free press. Garat, Chateauneuf, "G." and "P. C." and Beauchamp were particularly aware that through a discussion of the General's return they could make plain that not all Frenchmen supported Napoleon and in this way facilitate their country's acceptance by the Allies. Far from promoting the idea of a common cause with Europe, Lemaître used his work to issue an appeal to future

149 Martinière, p. 1.
generations not to bring foreigners into the country to effect an improvement in the government and not to contribute to the weakening of France's position vis-à-vis her neighbours.

While it is true that these works reflect the contemporary situation it is inaccurate to suggest that they were "œuvres de commande." The biographers of 1814 appear to have been drawn to Moreau as a subject not only because he was topical, but because they were genuinely impressed by his many admirable qualities. Garat believed himself to be part of a growing movement to do justice to the General's memory and Martinière considered his work metaphorically as a scattering of flowers on the General's grave.\(^\text{150}\) Philippart perhaps best expressed the feelings of the writers of 1814, when he proclaimed his intention of "...rescuing from the aspersions of Bonaparte, the brave and virtuous character of Moreau."\(^\text{151}\) Furthermore, Philippart echoed the words of "G." and "P. C.", Garat, Martinière and Beauchamp when he wrote,

In early life General Moreau's conduct displayed the feelings of a pure and upright patriot; his enemies will not deny his shining talents as a soldier.... His character, as a military man, was the reverse of that of the other French Generals: there was less boldness and fire in his operations, but they betrayed more talent, method and science; and his morality as well as his political character, has added a bright and lasting lustre to his military achievements, and acquired him the

\(^\text{150}\) Garat, p. 2 and Martinière, p. 2.

\(^\text{151}\) Philippart, p. 237.
title, even among his enemies, of the Gallic Fabius. 152

These biographers expanded Uvaloff's conception of Moreau and argued that his greatness extended beyond the personal and professional, to include the political as well. They viewed Moreau as an opponent of the increasing tyranny of Napoleon. For his part, Lemaire carried forward Woyde's belief that Moreau was a-political. Vouziers on the other hand, left his position on whether Moreau opposed Napoleon for personal or political reasons entirely unclear. All, including Chateauneuf, however, were agreed that Moreau was an innocent victim either of circumstance, as Lemaire suggested, or of Napoleon, as the majority believed.

The biographers of 1814 gave Moreau's motives serious consideration which they had not previously received. Furthermore these historians' consideration of Moreau's conduct suggests that many of the charges against him at his trial were ill-substantiated. The crucial questions which remain, particularly those of whether or not Moreau opposed Napoleon, Moreau's dealings with the abbé David and the various rendez-vous, may conveniently be further considered relative to the writings of later historians.

152 Ibid., pp. 237 - 238.
CHAPTER III: THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Fifty years elapsed and another Napoleon was on the throne before the next work on General Moreau was published. The strong influence of external circumstances on the writers of 1814 has been shown and there is every indication that similar considerations contributed to the presence of this gap. Louis XVIII declared that "... il Moreau était au fond républicain, et sa mort n'est pas si fâcheuse qu'on le croit." In the light of this attitude it was not surprising that his supporters, or those of his successors Charles X and Louis-Philippe failed to consider Moreau a suitable subject. Nor, predictably, was this opinion substantially revised by the proponents of Louis Napoléon, who became President of the Second Republic in 1848 and Emperor in 1852. Moreover, these regimes could discourage the expression of contrary views through censorship of the press.

Just as the political climate caused writers to ostracize Moreau, so too did contemporary conditions shape the thoughts of the General's biographers writing in the late nineteenth century. Although the circumstances which influenced them varied, their reactions were

1Picard, p. 384.
surprisingly uniform. Moreau remained the ostensible subject of these works, while attention was subtly drawn away from him and focused on the Emperor instead. The change in attitude towards the General which brought about this shift naturally had tremendous bearing on the way in which his alleged participation in the royalist conspiracy was viewed. In a dramatic about-face, he was no longer perceived to be the innocent prey, because he had actively sought the First Consul's downfall. Some of the ideas of 1814 were retained by two of the late nineteenth century writers, but their attempts to marry conflicting schools of thought served to confuse rather than to enlighten. The difficulty that could arise when victim became villain is exemplified by the first work of this period, *Moreau, général en chef des armées de la république* written in 1869, while Napoleon III still reigned, by Émile Lambin, ex-commissioner of the Paris police and professor at the Trocadero.

Lambin borrowed much from the biographers of 1814. In his interpretation of Moreau's return, Lambin echoed Lemaire's nationalist viewpoint that there could be no theoretical justification for fighting against the fatherland, although he too declined to judge the

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General rigorously against this absolute standard. When Lambin discussed the General's conduct in connection with the Klinglin papers, he adopted Chateauneuf's position which was based on Moreau's letter to Napoleon of March 8, 1804. Lambin argued that Moreau overcame his reluctance to denounce his old chief when the secret became common knowledge and he was forced to choose between informing the Directors or being included in a denunciation himself. Furthermore, like so many writers of 1814, Lambin found nobility in Moreau's refusal to initiate action to overthrow the Directory; and with respect to Napoleon's coup that followed, he was confident that Moreau quickly regretted his part in this illegal and violent act.

Lambin gave the impression that he was fundamentally an enthusiastic partisan of the General. He considered Moreau to be a soldier of the highest order and a man whose character was distinguished by simplicity, great goodness and an absence of jealousy. Yet Lambin preferred to ignore these impressive qualities and to take instead the Napoleonic legend as his guide for the interpretation of the most important episode, Moreau's trial. This approach robbed his argument of internal consistency and severed his connection with the writers of 1814.

Napoleon's description of Moreau's attitude and his belief in the General's guilt were accepted wholeheartedly by Lambin. He argued

4 Lambin, pp. 31 - 32.
5 Ibid., pp. 9 - 10.
6 Ibid., p. 13.
7 Ibid., p. 29.
that Napoleon's rapid elevation aroused Moreau's jealousy and that this sentiment, fanned by his wife and supporters, caused the estrangement of the two men. This hostility, Lambin believed, when combined with Moreau's stature as the second most influential person in the state, explained how he found himself the leader of the republican opposition. Lambin argued that Moreau was also the focus of attention for the royalists, Pichegru and Georges Cadoudal, whose plans required the army's support. Pichegru came from England to Georges in Paris, Lambin believed, because Moreau had appeared to welcome the overtures he received, although he did not commit himself. The General's involvement in the affair, Lambin was quick to point out, came as a surprise to Napoleon. Lambin also accepted the charge, made in Régnier's report, that three meetings had taken place, and he considered that Georges's presence at the first one was sufficient proof of conspiracy. Furthermore, Lambin argued, as the State had done, that Pichegru and Georges regretted having approached Moreau when it appeared that he only wished to overthrow the Consulate in order that he might be dictator. Lambin admitted that the trial failed to uncover material proof of the General's guilt, but he insisted that there was no doubt of his moral complicity, on the grounds that if Napoleon's death was not actually discussed, this criminal act was understood.\(^8\)

Lambin was the first biographer to suggest that Moreau lacked true party affiliation because he was primarily concerned with the acquisition of supreme power himself. The value of this assessment

\(^8\)Ibid., pp. 17 - 23.
was diminished however by being asserted rather than proved. Lambin cannot be criticized for having failed to include a great deal of documentary material in his pamphlet, but the sources he did select ought to have been those which would have seemed to give substance to his argument. Moreau’s scornful response to the accusation of aspiring to dictatorship and his speech in his own defence contributed nothing towards Lambin’s position; in fact, they weakened it.9
Furthermore, he ignored matters raised by the previous writers such as the question of torture and the pressure applied to the judges. Lambin was in effect arguing the State’s case against Moreau and gave every indication that the need to bolster the government of Napoleon III in a year of parliamentary elections supplanted in his mind the need for a thorough, impartial re-examination of the evidence.

Just as there were similarities between Lambin and the writers of the 1814 period, so too was there common ground between them and the next writer, Edouard Perret, author of Le Général Moreau 1763 – 1813.10 His approach was to take some of the ideas belonging to the writers of 1814 and to expand upon them; at times he even went beyond the available

9 Ibid., pp. 21 – 23.
evidence, so that in his contempt for the need for sources he resembled Lambin.

Perret, like many of the preceding biographers, mentioned the difficulty of decoding the Klinglin papers and Moreau's reluctance to communicate the results to the Directors. Unlike any of the others however, Perret endowed the General with political acumen and argued that he had taken action because he had foreseen the outcome of the struggle between the Councils and the Directory, and also because Lajolais had pressed him to make the disclosure. 11 In his letter to Napoleon, Moreau went no further than to state that two officers who knew of the correspondence had urged him to inform the Government. 12 The possibility that Lajolais was one of these men can be safely discounted, because Moreau told Barthélemy that the Lajolais family was involved in the intrigue. 13

Similarly, in his description of the next important episode, Perret joined the many writers who mourned Moreau's refusal to lead the overthrow of the Directors, but whereas a majority of the writers of 1814 and even Lambin ascribed this action to praiseworthy virtues, Perret detected only a fatal lack of self-confidence in the opinion he believed that the General held that he was unable to govern a state torn by party strife. Any comment on Perret's part which indicated a reading of Moreau's

11 Ibid., p. 333.
12 "Lettre du général Moreau au Premier Consul," in Recueil des interrogatoires subis par le général Moreau, Document No. 5, p. 15.
14 Perret, pp. 335 - 336.
character was unusual, for unlike most of his predecessors, he does not seem to have had a clear, strong impression of the General's nature as a whole. When, for example, he wrote about Moreau's return to Europe in 1813, he left the reader to decide whether this act was intended as a blow for revenge or one struck against tyranny, although he did make plain that in his eyes bearing arms against France constituted a crime.  

There was no ambiguity whatsoever surrounding Perret's feelings towards Napoleon, which were unabashedly hostile. He believed that the triumphs of Austerlitz, Iena and Wagram had been more than offset by the defeats at Leipzig and Waterloo. With the reverses France was experiencing in the struggle against China for Tonkin before him, Perret asserted that were it not for the Emperor, the army in which he was an officer would now be enjoying greatness and respect. Personal and contemporary circumstances thus entered into his interpretation and once more Napoleon was described as being fiercely jealous of Moreau and desirous of removing him as a potential obstacle.

This dislike of Napoleon pushed Perret again beyond the biographers

\[15\] Ibid., pp. 357 - 359.

\[16\] Ibid., p. 336.
of 1814. He insisted that Napoleon deliberately kept Moreau without command, while the others argued that he had simply retired. Perret also believed that the General had been tricked into writing the letter of March 8th to Napoleon. The only one of the previous writers who mentioned the letter's origins argued that it stemmed from Moreau's desire to explain his conduct to the First Consul. The gap between Perret and the others narrowed however, when certain aspects of the trial were discussed, for he mentioned Napoleon's hatred of the General, the suppression of the jury system and quoted from Lecourbe's account of the attempt to influence the judges. Yet notwithstanding the similarities, Perret was unable to conclude, as the writers of 1814 had done, that Moreau was innocent. Nor had the General been in danger, for Perret believed that Napoleon intended to pardon Moreau after he had been sentenced to death.  

If Perret could not find the General blameless neither could he provide a convincing demonstration of Moreau's guilt. Because his account of the evidence was confused and self-contradictory. He expressed the view that Moreau was irrevocably compromised by Lajolais's confession; but then he revealed that this man had retracted his testimony.  

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18 Ibid., pp. 346, 348.
also repeated the assertion that Moreau had aspired to be dictator and yet be declared shortly afterwards that no serious charge could be laid against him. 19 Perret heightened the bewilderment of his readers by being as careless as he was unoriginal. The problem arose partly because he incorporated pieces from Émile Saint-Hilaire's *Histoire des conspirations et attentats contre le gouvernement et la personne de Napoléon* without acknowledgement and without troubling to reconcile their substance with his own statements. 20 In this way Perret's pronouncement that no serious charge could be brought against Moreau immediately followed by Saint-Hilaire's assertion that the General's guilt lay in his conferences and interviews with Pichegru, which were only too well proven. 21 The other difficulty was that Saint-Hilaire was not consistent himself. He quoted the position of M. Bonnet, the General's lawyer, that there was no law compelling the revelation of conspiratorial activity against the State, but then Saint-Hilaire diminished the significance of this point by suggesting that the lawyer had really saved his client by glossing over the first meeting in the boulevard de la Madeleine, as he was able to do because Moreau denied the rendez-vous, Pichegru was dead and Georges silent. Saint-Hilaire did not explain how, in the light of this situation, the meeting could be considered well-
substantiated and this portion of his work was repeated verbatim by the unquestioning Perret. Furthermore, it is important to note that he paid far more attention to describing the conspiracy, an episode which concerned Napoleon as much as the General and to creating a vivid impression of the First Consul, than he did to promoting a greater understanding of Moreau's life and character. The result of this approach was to tip the balance of Perret's work in favour of Napoleon, so that he and not Moreau was the dominant figure.

Lambin's ambivalent attitude towards Moreau's nature and Perret's ambiguity were not present in the last complete account of Moreau's life written in the nineteenth century, *Le Général Moreau 1763 - 1813* by J. Dontenville. At the time this work was published in 1899 a war of words was being waged between the supporters and the opponents of a revision of the sentence imposed on Captain Alfred Dreyfus for treason. Protestants, Jews, Freemasons and anti-clericals saw themselves as champions of the twin causes of justice and the Republic, which they felt were being jeopardized by the Army, monarchists, Catholics and Nationalists. The clarity and intensity of Dontenville's interpretation must be seen against the background of this national turmoil.

The approach of this biographer was to discuss the General as if

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he had two distinct facets; a military one, which all nationalists could applaud, and a civilian one which warranted the strongest possible censure. Doutenville argued that Moreau's bravery and unaffected manner made him one of the greatest captains of the Revolutionary era, although he fell short of Napoleon's brilliance. According to this writer, there were however serious flaws in Moreau's character. Contrary to the testimony of Moreau's staff officer, Karl Woyde, Doutenville believed that the General's great affability weakened his authority, and he reverted to Napoleon's contention that Moreau was frequently irresolute, although not, he added, in the face of the enemy. These weaknesses, Doutenville felt, were accentuated off the battlefield, so that Moreau the citizen was not worthy of Moreau the warrior. The image he presented of the General, when he was not on campaign, could not have been more damaging. Moreau, he argued, was egotistical, ambitious, envious and without either principle or character. He was, in short, a shifty intriguer who lent himself to the most vile actions and who fell because of excessive conceit and a vindictive mind.\footnote{Doutenville, pp. 5 - 7.} Doutenville's criticism exceeded even Napoleon's and placed this biographer at the opposite end of the spectrum from those of 1814.

Doutenville took this contemptuous view as his guide for the interpretation of the highlights of Moreau's life, and there is every reason to believe that this uncontrolled hostility originated-
in his desire to make a contemporary statement using the parallel he detected between Moreau, a soldier turned plotter and Dreyfus accused, falsely as it turned out, of having passed military secrets to the Germans. Those writers who believed that the General had withheld the Klinglin papers out of respect for Pichegru were mocked by Dontenville. He felt that they credited Moreau with generous feelings he did not possess, instead of realizing that he was linked with the royalists and had a vested interest in the suppression of the documents. Further, he even revived the allegation that Moreau was informed of the coup by telegraph on the morning of 18 Fructidor and antedated his letter of denunciation in order to secure his own position.

Dontenville also ridiculed the great historian of the Consulat and Empire, Adolphe Thiers, who found confirmation in the Klinglin papers that Moreau had no dealings with the royalists because Pichegru repeatedly cautioned them against making overtures to the General.

Dontenville's hostility meant that he was unable to interpret these warnings in other than an unfavourable light. He suggested that Pichegru did not wish Moreau to be contacted either because he was familiar with the General's equivocal nature and did not trust him, or because he did not desire a rival. Furthermore, Dontenville considered that it was reasonable to suppose that Moreau had suppressed or altered the letters most likely to compromise himself since the correspondence had been in his possession for several

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26 Ibid., pp. 71 - 72.

27 Adolphe Thiers, Le Consulat et l'Empire, vol. 9, p. 125, quoted by Dontenville, p. 74.
months. 28

Some of the writers of 1814 argued that modesty and controlled ambition prompted Moreau to decline the leadership of a coup to overthrow the Directors. Dantenville, on the other hand, believed, like Perret, that the General had refused because of a character flaw, the only difference being that he thought this to be lack of courage. Moreover, Dantenville believed that the General quickly regretted the assistance he gave Napoleon on 18 Brumaire, not because it led to dictatorship, but from motives of pure jealousy. 29 These feelings of regret and dissatisfaction were intensified, Dantenville argued, after the battle of Hohenlinden, by Moreau's wife and mother-in-law. 30 On the basis of the General's cutting epigrammes, his aloofness from the court, his knowledge of the 'conspiracy of the Generals' and his "involvement" with the conspiracy at Rennes, 32 Dantenville considered that Napoleon

28 Ibid., pp. 74 - 75.
29 Ibid., pp. 94 - 95.
30 Ibid., p. 141.
31 The historian Henri Gaubert argued that the so-called 'conspiration des généraux' was greatly exaggerated by the police and in reality amounted to nothing more than a number of verbal threats against the life of Napoleon uttered by a couple of officers at a small gathering of military acquaintances assembled by General Oudinot at his château on the eve of April 25, 1802 and similar indiscreet remarks made on a number of occasions by Captain Donnadieu, embittered by his enforced retirement. Gaubert felt that there was "bien peu de conspiration. Et bien peu de généraux...." No mention was made of any involvement on Moreau's part. Henri Gaubert, Les Conspirations au temps de Napoléon Ier, (Paris: Flammarion, 1962), p. 135.

32 In 1802 Napoleon contemplated an expedition to retake Santo Domingo and a large army was gathered in Brittany to await embarkation. Almost all the men were drawn from the Army of the Rhine, lately under Moreau's command and known for its ardent republicanism. General Bernadotte joined responsibility for this force to his command of the Army of the West and
was justifiably angered.33

The possibility that the First Consul sought Moreau’s condemnation and disgrace was acknowledged by DONTENVILLE. He was also well aware of the use of torture to extract damaging testimony and the suspension of the jury system. Yet he did not confront these facts, but rather skirted them with the illogical statement that history did not believe in the innocence of the General.34 Dismissing LECOURBE’s account, DONTENVILLE argued that the judges were privately convinced that Moreau was culpable, but were reluctant to impose a more rigorous sentence in the absence of the necessary formal proofs.35 The absence of concrete evidence DONTENVILLE attributed to the fact that Moreau’s

it was his chief of staff, General Simon, who was held responsible for one of the two seditious posters which were mailed from Rennes to supposed sympathizers in other towns of the north-west and in Paris. BERNADETTE’s protestations of innocence were readily accepted by NAPOLEON, who was not so easily mollified where Moreau was concerned. In May, Captain Rapatel, an intimate of Moreau’s received a package of the broad sheets concealed in a butter jar and the First Consul asked Fouche, Minister of Police, to obtain an explanation from the General. Guillon quoted Desmarets, a member of the police force and the only authority on the episode. According to him, Moreau treated the matter lightly and referred to it as the ‘conspiration de pot à beurre’. Fouché, Minister of Police, assuaged Napoleon’s anger and arranged a meeting in the Tuileries at which Moreau and he were outwardly reconciled. E. Guillon, Les Complots militaires sous le Consulat et l’Empire, (Paris: Plon, 1894) pp. 26–47.

33 DONTENVILLE, pp. 144–156.

34 Ibid., pp. 164, 165.

adhesion to the royalist plans was hedged about with reservations. Dountenville conceded that the thought of meddling in the assassination of the First Consul was probably repugnant to the General, but he maintained that Moreau did desire nevertheless to participate in Napoleon's downfall. Dountenville, like Lambin and Perret, believed that the General's contribution was contingent upon the gratification of his own ambition for supreme power. Moreau's self-defence expressed in his letter to Napoleon and in his speech to the court were dismissed by this writer with no other comment except that his pleas lacked dignity.

Dountenville echoed the admissions of Lambin and Perret that the evidence against the General was not legally conclusive, but after making this acknowledgment, all three biographers felt that there were sufficient grounds to form a strong and, in their own minds, conclusive case against Moreau. They suggested that his wish to become dictator gave him the required motivation to participate in a conspiracy. Furthermore, there was general agreement that he had the means to promote a successful coup. Perret believed that the General had the prestige necessary to win the backing of the army, while Lambin and Dountenville suggested that he already had more tangible resources at his command. Lambin believed the General

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36 Ibid., pp. 165 - 167.
37 Ibid., pp. 167, 181.
to be the leader of a sizeable opposition party and Dontenville considered that Moreau had a numerous and diverse political clientele, in addition to the support he could count on from the Army of the Rhine. 38

To their conviction that the General had both the motivation and the means to conspire, these late nineteenth century writers added their reasons for believing that he had actually seized the opportunity. Lambin suggested that the General had been the passive recipient of royalist overtures, towards which he remained non-committal until the first of three meetings in Paris. At this time, he reputedly informed Pichegru and Georges that the price for his support of the First Consul's overthrow would be the position of dictator for himself. Even the Prosecution did not claim that this demand had been made at the first meeting and Lambin quickly withdrew to the position that the mere presence of Georges at this rendez-vous was sufficient proof of a conspiracy. Lambin did not suggest outright what purpose the other two meetings might have served, but the answer was there by implication, because he admitted that murder was not discussed at the first and he considered this act an integral part of the royalists'

38 Perret, p. 341; Lambin, p. 17 and Dontenville, p. 167.
plan, which was to attack the First Consul and his escort on the highway, kill him and re-establish the Bourbons. 39 This view of the conspiracy in all probability stemmed from an interrogation of Georges which took place on March 9, 1804. He confessed that he had come to France with the intention of attacking the First Consul, that his men would use the same weapons as Napoleon's escort, and that he sought to put Louis XVIII in the place of the First Consul. 40

Perret agreed that Georges had put forward this plan at the first meeting, which took place between the latter, Moreau, Pichegru, de Rivière and de Polignac. Under the influence of Sainte-Hilaire, whose work he so shamelessly plagiarized, Perret found the meeting in the boulevard de la Madeleine particularly damaging to Moreau, but he did not specify which rendez-vous this had been. Perret suggested that there was more than one encounter when he revived Napoleon's contention that Moreau blushed when he denied that the interviews and conferences he was charged with had taken place. In any event, Perret claimed that the General had withdrawn at the last moment, declaring that he could not serve the Bourbons and wished to be dictator himself. Perret, unlike Lambin, did not suggest what the reaction of the other conspirators had been to this proposition. Nor with his usual vagueness did Perret mention whether or not the General had actually pledged himself to support the royalists. Nothing more was said than that the comte

39 Lambin, pp. 18, 19, 23, 24.

40 "Interrogatoire de Georges, du 18 ventôse an 12", in Recueil des interrogatoires subis par le général Moreau, Document no. 21, p. 116.
d'Artois (later Charles X) had acted through the abbé David to reconcile Moreau and Pichegru.  

According to Dontenville, two negotiators, Fauche-Borel and the abbé were employed to reunite the two generals, and that at the time of David's arrest papers were found on him which confirmed his activity. The reconciliation of the two generals Dontenville believed was a fundamental part of the royalists' plan. His conception of the conspiracy was obviously based on Régnier's report. He argued that Britain, the émigrés, and the Chouans were united to overthrow and if need be kill Napoleon, and then to restore the monarchy. The British furnished the funds, Pichegru and Georges were to make the necessary preparation and once these were complete, the comte d'Artois and his son the duc de Berry would arrive at the head of the French nobility to direct the revolution. The support of a distinguished personage like Moreau was sought to make success all the more certain. Dontenville also went beyond the other two writers when he stated explicitly what Régnier's report had only intimated, that Moreau actually played a part in launching the conspiracy by sending Lajolais to London with a guarantee of his support which brought Georges to Paris. Furthermore


This assertion involved Dontenville in a contradiction later on when he argued that Moreau's adherence to the conspiracy was conditional and that this was the reason why his guilt could not be established incontrovertibly.
Dontenville distinguished himself from his contemporaries by arguing that Moreau envisaged a situation where the restoration would be gradually prepared and he would be provisionally invested with supreme power. For Dontenville, as for Lambin, the most serious question to be asked about the General was whether or not he had seen Georges Cadoudal, whose very name was a byword for conspiracy.43

Dontenville's case for the affirmative rested in part on the testimony of the Government witness Bouvet de Lozier, who, he said, admitted to having been present at a meeting between Moreau, Pichegru and Georges which took place on January 26, 1804 in the boulevard de la Madeleine. Lozier never claimed to have been a party to the discussion as Dontenville suggested, but he did testify that this rendez-vous was the prelude to a further meeting at which time Moreau proposed himself as dictator, given the obstacles to a restoration. To bolster Lozier's contention that Moreau was ambitious, Dontenville had recourse to Rolland's statement. Both these witnesses, it may be remembered, had been discounted by Chateauneuf. Dontenville admitted that during the trial, Lozier modified his statement on the promises Moreau supposedly had made the royalists, but claimed that he held fast on his deposition concerning the interviews the General had with

43Dontenville, pp. 156, 157, 156 - 168.
Pichegru and Georges. 44

In connection with the meetings, Drontenville also quoted from
the notoriously unreliable memoirs of the Neuchâtel bookseller and
Bourbon agent, Fauche-Borel, 45 who sought to increase his stature,
among the members of his own party by claiming to be the sole confidant
of Moreau, allegedly a convert to the Crown. Drontenville drew as well
on the hearsay testimony of Chateauneuf, General Marbot, and on
the unsubstantiated claim of General Ambert that he had unwittingly
been a stone's throw away from the spot where the rendez-vous was taking
place. 46 Of a far more substantial nature were the memoirs of the veteran
statesman, Miot de Melito, which are generally praised for their
impartiality. However, on this occasion it would appear that his
conclusions were coloured by the records that he consulted, which were

44 Ibid., pp. 169 - 171.

45 One informed royalist agent reported, September 19, 1802, "Sans
pouvoir rien affirmer sur l'existence de quelques relations avec Moreau
et Pichegru nous penchons à les croire fabuleuses. D'après ce que nous
connaissons du caractère de Moreau, de ses principes ou plutôt de ses
habitudes, de la vie qu'il mène et de son extrême circonspection. Mais
si elles ont quelque réalité, nous pouvons bien répondre qu'elles ne
payaient point par un homme aussi décrédit de Louis Fauche." L. Remacle,
Bonaparte et les Bourbons: relations secrètes des agents de Louis XVIII

46 Drontenville, pp. 172 - 175.
the police reports, written by men who were anxious to show their zeal and attachment to the Government. According to Dontenville, both Rolland and Lozier testified that the plot collapsed because Moreau would not serve the Bourbon interests. Miot on the other hand, claimed that the General was clearly the man chosen by the conspirators to be the interim ruler between the fall of Napoleon and the restoration of the Bourbons, because of his renown and hatred of Napoleon, and because of his weakness of character and irresolution. Although Miot did not believe that the General had entered into the assassination plot, he was convinced that Moreau had made arrangements with Pichegru about what was to happen afterwards and how the benefits of the event were to be distributed. "Dontenville made no comment on the discrepancy between Rolland and Lozier on the one hand, and Miot on the other, for apparently all testimony against the General was grist for his mill.

When Dontenville discussed Moreau's return, he did so in a manner consistent with the rest of his work, which placed him at odds with his contemporary, Lambin, who argued that the General's return

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Miot de Melito, Mémoires, pp. 142 - 143 quoted by Dontenville, p. 176; Miot, André François, comte de Melito (1762 - 1841). Military administrator and ambassador during the Revolution and Directory, he was subsequently member of the Tribunate and Councillor or State under the Consulate and Empire. He was Minister of the Interior to Joseph Bonaparte in Naples and his counsellor in Spain. Nouvelle biographie générale, v. 35 columns 619 - 623.
sprang from a desire to emancipate France. Moreover, five of the writers of 1814 had made special mention of the General's reluctance to leave America: Martinière indicated that Moreau's scruples about fighting against France made him unwilling, while "G." and "P. C." Chateauneuf and Beauchamp all adopted Swine's argument that the General had acted only when there was no sign of a movement from within France. True to his hostile view point, Dontenville took the contrary position that Moreau was motivated solely by revenge and that he had responded to the promptings of baron Hyde de Neuville, Madame de Stael, Beradotte and Tsar Alexander because their pleas accorded so well with his own desires.


49 Martinière, pp. 103 - 106; G. et P.C., p. 102; Chateauneuf, p. 139; and Beauchamp, p. 88.

50 Hyde de Neuville, Jean Guillaume baron (1776 - 1857). One of the principal agents of the comte d'Artois, Neuville often served as an intermediary between the French Royal Family and William Pitt. Fouché, Minister of Police considered him a dangerous opponent of Napoleon and Neuville was offered an arrangement whereby the sequester of his property would be lifted, if he and his wife left for the United States. Neuville accepted and it was in America that he met Moreau also in exile. Nouvelle biographie générale, vol. 25, columns 694 - 698.

51 Stael, Madame de, Ante Louise Germaine Necker, baronne de Stael-Holstein (1766 - 1817). French literary genius whose criticism of French government and society earned her Napoleon's enmity and permanent exile in 1810. Subjected to continuous harassment by French police even in her Swiss refuge, she left secretly, in 1811, on a journey which took her from Geneva to Austria, Russia, Finland, Sweden and finally to England. In Sweden she urged her friend Bernadotte to join the struggle against Napoleon and wrote to Moreau from there on the same mission. J. Christopher Herold, Mistress to an Age (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, 1958).

52 Bernadotte, Jean Baptiste (1763 - 1844). French general who held the post of Minister of War from July 3 - September 14, 1798. He declined to help Napoleon on the 18 - 19 Brumaire, but accepted a place on the new
Dontenville agreed with those writers who held that the Tsar viewed Moreau as an intermediary, but he argued that the General had quite specific ideas about the nature of this position. According to Dontenville, Moreau remained persuaded that there would be an intermediate regime before the restoration and he hoped that he would be entrusted with the government during this transitional period. Dontenville thus believed that the General had an eye to the future and the sensibilities of his countrymen when he declined to assume any official position next to the Tsar. 54 Where a majority of the writers of 1814 found principle, Dontenville could see only political expediency.

The same year that Dontenville's work was published, an article entitled "Les dernières années de Moreau", by Léonce Pingaud appeared in the Journal de Paris. Pingaud's contribution to the study of Moreau's return will be discussed in the next chapter, but his introductory remarks are worth examining at this point because he was largely in agreement with his contemporaries on the origins of the discord which they all believed existed between the First Consul and

Council of State in 1800. From this time until 1809, he served Napoleon in a variety of capacities and in 1810 he was unexpectedly elected Crown Prince of Sweden. Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed., s. v. "Charles XIV".

53. Dontenville, pp. 199 - 200.

54. Ibid., pp. 202 - 203.
the General. His jealous hatred of Napoleon was emphasized, along with
his natural indecisiveness. Mention was also made of his epigrammes
and of the role played by the wounded vanity of his wife and
mother-in-law in fostering these verbal attacks. 55

Pingaud was not however, in complete agreement with his
contemporaries, for he did not believe that the General's words
sprang from jealousy and a desire for power, but from a need to avenge
personal and family wrongs. His ambition was exclusively military,
according to Pingaud, who resembled Lemaire in this respect. Since
Moreau lacked the desire to conspire, Pingaud felt that he was perfectly
innocent and had fallen into traps set for him by both the opposition
and by Napoleon, annoyed by his perpetual discontent. Pingaud's work
carried forward the belief in Moreau's political detachment and
freed him from blame, but this interpretation was associated with
the current unflattering view of the General's character. 56

In this way Pingaud acknowledged contemporary opinion while preserving Moreau
from the stigma of subversion. The circumstances leading up to the
trial were only accidental to Pingaud's subject and it appears that
rather than engage in personal study he borrowed elements from two
conflicting interpretations.

The absence of a scholarly approach in Pingaud's work highlights
one of the principal defects of the writers of the late nineteenth
century. An examination of these biographies makes plain the fact
that they provided a different interpretation from their immediate

55 Pingaud, p. 753.

56 Ibid., p. 753.
predecessors and ensured that Napoleon's view did not die with him in 1821. However, these writers cannot be said to have ensured that their arguments were soundly based, for there are no signs of an effort being made to compensate for remoteness in time through a more thorough examination of the documents. Lambin did not trouble to provide any evidence to support his case and Perret borrowed extensively and uncritically from a secondary source. Døntenville did seek out memoirs of the period, but he adopted an entirely uncritical attitude towards these highly partisan accounts. In his work, the Emperor's strictures on Moreau were actually surpassed and the hostile premise which guided Døntenville's account exemplifies another weakness of the late nineteenth century biographers. All the works of this period would appear to have been tracts for the times, sometimes repetitive of earlier arguments, especially Napoleon's and sometimes, particularly in the case of Perret and Døntenville, ingenious in speculative interpretation, but essentially more revealing of the author's reaction to events of his own day than of historical reality.

To criticize these accounts is not however to conclude that they contribute nothing to the study of Moreau, for despite their deficiencies they broadened the area of controversy. Døntenville did so by using new material like the memoirs of Miot de Melito and he was joined by Perret and Lambin in revealing more of the range and character of the royalist conspiracy. Pingaud's contribution was an attempt to
reconcile two schools of thought. Furthermore, these writers made significant modifications in Napoleon's interpretation. There was unanimous belief in the General's outstanding military ability and all except Lambin felt that the Emperor welcomed the opportunity to be rid of a rival. Nevertheless, the writers of this period generally focused their readers' attention on aspects of the evidence hostile to Moreau.

It was to be hoped that the historians of the twentieth century would take a fresh look at the documentary evidence and attempt to resolve some of the fundamental questions which remained without satisfactory answers. The biographers of the late nineteenth century agreed with a majority of the writers of 1814 that there had been genuine discord between Moreau and Napoleon, but they were poles apart on the explanation that they gave for the birth of this antagonism. Three biographers of 1814, Garat, Philippart and Beauchamp suggested that Moreau was looked on as a possible saviour by individuals of different political persuasions. Lambin and Don'tenville on the other hand believed that the General had a more concrete following. More light would seem desirable on these two points and on the origins of the conspiracy, since five out of the eight writers of 1814 believed that it was fomented by Napoleon himself, while the biographers of the late nineteenth century considered that it was royalist inspired. Furthermore, other matters were shown to require clarification, the reconciliation of Moreau and Pichegru, their correspondence and the
meetings that were supposed to have taken place. The details of the
witnesses' testimony would also seem worthwhile pursuing for a better
understanding of the reasons why the Government's case was considered
legally not proven.
CHAPTER IV: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Writing on Moreau in the twentieth century began inauspiciously. First to appear was an anonymous article from Paris dated January 25, 1900, which was included a short time later in the American magazine, *The Nation*. The opening sentence dismissed all the preceding efforts with the declaration that the General's life had never been written with the fulness found in modern biographies. However, instead of following up this condemnation by identifying the defects and suggesting remedies, the author gave only the briefest survey, which ironically relied heavily on the very biographies he had described so disparagingly.

Mention of the General's early life was limited to a rapid review of his military exploits in order to arrive more quickly at the principal point which was an explanation of how Moreau came to be tried. This writer, like many of the biographers of 1814, considered that Napoleon's military reputation was rivalled by Moreau's after the victory at Hohenlinden (1800) and that he attracted the attention of the First Consul’s opponents. These antagonists were divided into the same three groups Pingaud had described: Generals and officers

1"Moreau", *The Nation* (February 5, 1900); p. 107.
of the Army of the Rhine, ardent republicans and men hostile to the richer
and more popular Army of Italy; republicans, who thought to find in
Moreau the head of a genuine republic; and royalists who imagined that
the General could be tempted some day to support a restoration. Again
Moreau was believed to have lent an ear to all these factions without
giving satisfaction to any, and his dominant passion continued to be
viewed as hatred of Napoleon which was rooted in jealousy and fanned
by the wounded vanity of his wife and mother-in-law. All these factors
were blamed for having caused relations between the two men to deteriorate
to the point where Moreau was named as co-conspirator to the royalists
Georges and Pichegru. There was little doubt, in the writer's mind,
that Napoleon desired and expected the judges to condemn the General
to death. At this point the explanation of how Moreau and Napoleon came
to be at loggerheads showed signs of hardening into a formula and what
seemed to be required was not the greater amount of detail advocated
by this writer, but rather a rigorous, impartial examination of the
evidence.

Five years elapsed however, before such an investigation was
published and the appearance of Bonaparte et Moreau represented a
landmark in the study of the General. Lieutenant-colonel Jean Picard

Ibid., column 2.

Jean Jules Ernest Picard, Bonaparte et Moreau: L'Entente initiale,
did not attempt a discussion of the General's entire life, rather he
limited his study to what he considered was one of the most important
aspects of the Consulat, the rupture of relations between the two men.
Picard was aware that a substantial body of opinion existed which held
Moreau solely responsible. His jealousy, ambition and rancour were
blamed for the estrangement and it was accepted, on the Emperor's
authority, that the General had ultimately made the breach complete
at the insistence of his wife and mother-in-law. On the other hand,
the tributes which the government of the Restoration paid to the
memory of Moreau, the favours Louis XVIII was pleased to bestow on
his widow and other members of his family, and the royalist publications
 glorifying his unhappy end suggested to Picard the presence of another,
royalist, explanation for the existence of discord. The ambiguity and
uncertainty to which these conflicting elements gave rise could only
be dispelled, Picard felt, by an inquiry into the origin, progress
and final breach of the rapport which had existed at the time of the
coup d'état of 18 Brumaire. Thus Picard avoided both the pitfall of
a purely narrative approach and the danger of assumptions based on
parti pris, by phrasing the intent of his work in the form of a
question and seeking the answer in an extensive examination of the
documents.

Picard acknowledged his debt to the eminent historian of the

4 Ibid., préface, pp. i - ii.
French Revolution, Alphonse Aulard, who pioneered scholarly writing on the subject and whose maxims "Always use the sources; say nothing without producing the appropriate references..." he attempted to follow. His evidence on occasion might be slight — at one point he used a quotation from a single police report to support the view that the coup of 18 Brumaire was unnecessary, and he was forced to deduce a great deal — yet no writer on Moreau before or since displayed such an intimate, critical appreciation of the primary and secondary material on his subject.

He warned against the danger of believing that the cartons of the Archives nationales de guerre contained the complete correspondence between Napoleon and Moreau, because of the possibility that items had been withdrawn at the time of the latter’s arrest. Picard also had some important observations to make on the police reports in the Archives nationales. He urged that the information contained in them be used with the greatest caution because there were frequent inaccuracies, current gossip was often reported and the judgments passed were regularly those which the authors thought would please the First Consul. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, Picard felt that these


6 Picard, Bibliographie, p. vi.
documents had great significance because, whether their contents were true or false, he was confident that they left an impression on the First Consul. He was certain that as relations with Moreau deteriorated, Napoleon was more and more likely to accept each damaging accusation and to seize eagerly upon every likely pretext for grievance.

Moreover, Dantonville's trusting approach to memoirs was not imitated by Picard, who was considerably more circumspect in his handling of these works. He believed that there were few whose authenticity could not be questioned and felt that this difficulty was compounded by the fact that these recollections were generally written several years after the events described, for the most part during the Restoration, and by the problem that the authors were often much less preoccupied with the exact truth than with self-vindication. Picard was prepared to let their statements stand when they were corroborated by documents, but when they could not be verified in this manner, he made plain their doubtful validity.

The natural starting point of Picard's analysis was the first meeting of the two generals which occurred in the apartments of the Director Gohier on October 22nd, 1799 shortly before the coup d'état which took place on November 9th and 10th. Picard reasoned that Napoleon was moved by self-interest to follow up this introduction with efforts to attach Moreau to his cause or at least to secure his neutrality. From Napoleon's

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7 Ibid., p. viii.
8 Ibid., p. xiii.
point of view, as Picard saw it, there was the possibility that Moreau's refusal to lead a similar coup was not final, there could have been those who might consider him more malleable than Napoleon and there was the chance that Moreau might make use of his reputation and the partisans he had in the Army of the Rhine, in a joint attempt with Bernadotte to block the affairs. Conflicting sources left the date of Moreau's alliance with Napoléon unclear, but there was no doubt, Picard argued, that the two concurred in the coup for different reasons. 9

Picard was convinced from a study of Moreau's actions between 1788 and 1790 that he possessed a selfless attachment to the ideals of the Revolution. 10 This belief led Picard to conclude that Moreau had been one of many who supported the coup in the hope that it would save the Republic from the twin perils of Jacobinism and royalism, and restore order, toleration and justice to the country. Although at the time of the coup, Napoleon indicated that he shared these sentiments, Picard believed that there was greater accuracy in the confession he made on Saint-Hélina. In exile, he admitted freely that he had left Egypt to further his own ambitions by overthrowing the Directors. 11 In this way Picard's work lent support to the assertions of the two biographers of 1814, Beauchamp and Vouziers, that the generals had conflicting motives and that Napoleon had not hesitated to employ

9Ibid., pp. 1, 7, 8, 14 - 16.

10Picard demonstrated at a later stage that Moreau's republicanism remained unaltered during the period under intensive study, 1799 to 1803. However, the strength of the General's attachment to the Republic was called into question in 1797 by his delay in reporting the contents of the Klinglin correspondence and Picard could have strengthened his argument by responding to this challenge.

deception.

Vouziers also believed that more personal motives intervened to prompt Moreau to throw his support behind Napoleon. Picard agreed that the injustice the General had suffered at the hands of the Directors in 1797 played a part in his decision. No documentary support was provided for this assertion, nor was any proof offered for the far more damaging allegation that Moreau's irresolute temperament had yielded readily before Napoleon's will. Picard did however manage, through reasoned argument, to acquit Moreau of Dontenville's charge that he had joined in the coup in the expectation that active command of the Army would pass to him after Napoleon's elevation to the head of the civil power. It was not obvious on the day of the coup, Picard pointed out, that Napoleon was acting on his own behalf or that he would shortly become the Chief of State. Furthermore, from his study Picard was able to affirm that at no time did Moreau ever display the slightest jealousy of Napoleon and that such sentiments were entirely foreign to his character. Picard also dismissed Dontenville's claim that Moreau regretted his participation almost at once. On the contrary, Picard believed that the General had every reason to be satisfied: his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the

12 Vouziers, p. 41.

13 Picard, pp. 22 – 23.
Army of the Rhine was confirmed and the policy of the Consuls was in Picard's words, "toute républicaine."\(^{14}\)

Before Picard, no writer had studied the state of relations which existed between the two men during the next period from 18 Brumaire to the battle of Hohenlinden in 1800. The analysis of the correspondence which passed between Napoleon and Moreau from the time the latter took up command in December until the following April revealed that he possessed many admirable qualities. A lesser man, Picard believed, would have rebelled when faced with the same deplorable financial situation and the awkward position in which it placed him vis-à-vis his army. Instead Picard found evidence that Moreau had behaved with remarkable patience, dignity and reserve. He remained calm and showed that he know how to subordinate even the interests of his own command to those of the Republic.\(^{15}\)

In addition to providing fresh insights, Picard's investigation helped to correct some misleading impressions left by contemporaries, such as the belief that the origin of the breakdown of relations could be completely explained in terms of the disagreement which arose over how the campaign of 1800 would be conducted in Bavaria. It was true, Picard found, that Moreau declined to execute the manoeuvres suggested by the First Consul on the grounds that he could only wage war successfully with an army he personally deployed according to a plan of his own design. However, his offer of resignation was refused, he was left free to execute

\(^{14}\) Ibid., pp. 49, 408.

\(^{15}\) Ibid., pp. 100-101.
his ideas and Napoleon granted him a number of additional concessions. These conciliatory gestures, Picard felt, must have left their mark on Napoleon, but he showed no outward sign of resentment. From their correspondence, Picard concluded that by the end of April 1800 cordial relations between Moreau and the First Consul had been fully restored. 16

Although superficially this rapport was complete, Picard found undercurrents of discord in a letter written by the Minister of War, Carnot, who visited Moreau's headquarters in May. Carnot revealed that he had played the role of mediator, attempting to dispel misgivings about the government which others had sown in Moreau's mind and, in Geneva, performing a similar task with respect to Napoleon's feelings towards Moreau. In the absence of documents which shed any light on the cause of this mutual suspicion, Picard was forced to speculate. He believed that as far as Napoleon was concerned the explanation lay in the differences which had arisen during the current campaign. Moreau's thoughts on the other hand, Picard felt, were more difficult to determine. There appeared to be no military grounds for ill-feeling, so he concluded that the upsetting factor must have been the provisions of the Constitution of the Year VIII (1799). 17 which gave the First Consul great power. 18

16 Ibid., pp. 159, 179, 202 – 203.

17 Napoleon was named First Consul for a period of ten years. He was responsible for the promulgation of all laws and could appoint and dismiss at will all officers of state, civil and military, local and national. He was also to appoint all criminal and civil judges, except justices of the peace and judges of appeal, but could not remove them. The Second and Third Consuls were to have a consultative voice only, which gave Napoleon de facto control over the executive's principal functions: the initiation
According to Picard, not long after Carnot's revelation, General Leclerc sent letters to Napoleon professing to warn him against the jealousy and hatred of Moreau. In the light of his correspondence and more particularly his actions, there was no question in Picard's mind that these accusations were the purest calumny. He pointed to the fact that although Moreau had yet to win a decisive victory on his own front, he willingly deprived himself of a significant portion of his army to assist Napoleon in Italy. Furthermore, Picard noted that Moreau continued to further this campaign by the manner in which he conducted his manoeuvres around Ulm even though this action cost him his freedom of movement. The entry of the French into Milan removed this handicap and Moreau made a daring move which was completely successful and resulted in the armistice signed at Parsdorf, July 15, 1800.

There was every indication, Picard argued, that the entente between Napoleon and Moreau was never more complete or more cordial than of all legislation; the making of regulations and the direction of finances. The Constitution also called for a Tribunate of one hundred men and a legislative body of three hundred. The members of both these bodies were to be chosen by a Senate whose own membership would gradually be increased over the next ten years from sixty to eighty men. In addition to serving as a nominating body, the Senate was to determine the constitutionality of legislation in cases referred to it. Legislation was to be initiated by the executive, debated and voted upon by the Tribunes, three of whose members along with representatives of the Executive would make their views known to the Legislative Body which would vote acceptance or rejection without debate. John Bail Stewart, *A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution*, (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 770 - 773.

The Constitution was put into effect on December 25, 1799, although the results of the plebiscite were not known until February 7, 1800. Jacques Godechot, *Les Institutions de la France sous la Révolution et Empire*, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1951), p. 480.

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19 Ibid., pp. 249 - 250.
20 Ibid., pp. 237 - 239.
21 Ibid., pp. 252 - 273.
during the period between the armistice and the battle of Hohenlinden in December. General Decaen was told by Moreau that he could not have been better pleased with the Government. For his part, Napoleon greeted the General warmly upon his return to Paris in October and presented him with a magnificent pair of matched pistols encrusted with diamonds. The General became a frequent guest at Napoleon's château, Malmaison, and there were signs that the First Consul intended him as a husband for his step-daughter, Hortense de Beauharnais. Picard argued that Napoleon had every reason to strengthen his ties with Moreau because his name had been put forward as a possible successor to the First Consul in the event of his death while on campaign in Italy and because Moreau's already considerable reputation had been enhanced by his recent successes. Napoleon was certain to have been offended, Picard believed, when Moreau declared that he had no thoughts of marriage at the mention of Hortense, and then wed Mlle. Hulot a short time afterwards. Picard considered it might have been this failure to cement their alliance that led to the open break between the two men.  

If Napoleon was resentful, Moreau returned contented to the Army of the Rhine when the armistice expired in November. However, according to Picard, this feeling did not long outlast the General's rout of the Austrians at Hohenlinden on December 3, 1800. All the previous writers, Lemaire, excepted, noted a deterioration of relations

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22 Ibid., pp. 283 - 287, 293 - 295.
after this victory and they blamed the growing rift on the jealousy of either party. Picard's work showed how inadequate and, with respect to Moreau, how erroneous was this interpretation. He believed that it was impossible to know exactly what effect Moreau's triumph had on Napoleon. However, Picard felt that there was every reason to believe that the First Consul's elation at the proximity of peace must have been tempered by the realization, which had come to Miot, that the General's popularity made him an increasingly dangerous rival.23

The first blow to Moreau was Napoleon's failure to send any message of personal congratulation on the victory and this slight was followed by the refusal of the Minister of War to ratify Moreau's nominations for promotion, while showing leniency to officers whose acts of disobedience ought to have been punished. Picard found that Moreau was upset by the Minister's actions, because they undermined his authority. Furthermore, Picard considered it unlikely that Mme Moreau would neglect to inform her husband of the indifference Napoleon showed during a visit she made to Marmouzon shortly after the battle or the indignity she believed that her mother and she had suffered at the hands of Joséphine Bonaparte. Mathieu Dumas, who came to Salzburg in January 1801, noted Moreau's discontent and attributed his feeling to a combination of jealousy and republican resistance. Picard

23 Ibid., pp. 296 - 335.
eliminated envy, because of Moreau's previous conduct, but accepted the idea of his opposition. Picard also made the reasonable assumption that this antagonism was accentuated by the General's personal grievances.

Early in February, Moreau was joined by his wife at Lunéville and it was Napoleon's belief that under her domination and that of her mother, the General became a changed man. Picard did not dispute their influence, since a number of contemporaries were agreed on the matter, but he pointed out that Moreau's disenchantment ante-dated the arrival of his wife and was based on more substantial grounds than outraged vanity. A fresh grievance was added two months later when a couple of articles appeared with Napoleon's approval in the official journal Le Moniteur. It was alleged that the pay of the Army of the Rhine was seven to eight months in arrears and that money to cover this debt had been raised in France, because the Germans had not been treated with sufficient severity. Picard found that Moreau protested to the Minister of War in a letter dated May 19th. He maintained that conquered countries had been made to yield as much as could be decently expected and he gave an accounting of the funds for which he had been responsible. A copy of this letter was sent to all the journals, but Picard found evidence that they were forbidden to publish it. He concluded that whether innocent or guilty, Moreau must have been incensed at this treatment.

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24 Ibid., pp. 336 - 342, 344 - 345. Picard's belief that the wrongs the General suffered worsened his relations with Napoleon is only a supposition and as such it serves as an illustration of the degree to which the study of Moreau is hampered by the apparent lack of documents initiated by him during the period from Lunéville to his arrest in February 1804, with the exception of his letter to the abbé David, which will be discussed later on in this chapter.

25 Picard, pp. 346 - 351.
without deliberately seeking notice, Moreau attracted considerable attention after his return to Paris on May 23, 1801. This agitation and Moreau's derogatory remarks about the government, which though made privately soon became public, Picard felt were sufficient to cause Napoleon anxiety and there were signs that he attempted a reconciliation. However, his efforts were rebuffed, not out of jealousy, Picard contended, but because Moreau had become fully aware of the First Consul's authoritarian ambitions.  

Thé General had confided to Lafayette that '... il s'était subalternisé à Bonaparte dans l'espoir que celui-ci remplirait ses engagements patriotiques, mais le voyant manquer à toutes ses paroles, il s'était éloigné.' and there was, according to Picard, much other evidence besides to indicate that Moreau was an unshakable republican. Thus to the General's personal wrongs and exceeding them in importance, Picard believed, was his distress at Napoleon's measures of 1802 which eroded freedom and signalled a return to a monarchial form of government: the purging of the Tribunate in April, the promulgation of the Concordat the same month, the institution of the Légion d'honneur in May and the Consulat à vie in August. Nor, Picard found, was Moreau

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26 Ibid., pp. 355 - 357.
29 Picard neglected to mention that the Legislative Body was dealt with in a similar fashion. The Constitution of the Year VIII called for the annual renewal of one fifth of the membership of both the Tribunate and the Legislative Body. To accomplish the "purge", the principle of retirement by lot was abandoned in favour of having the Senate select twenty tribunes and sixty members of the Legislative Body who would be eliminated. Sydenham, p. 275.
one to suffer in silence, for he made his disapproval known both
publicly, by refusing to be present at a Mass celebrated to mark
the promulgation of the Concordat and by declining the Légion d'honneur
and privately, through his critical comments. 30

Picard's work made plain the impossibility of determining on the
basis of the available evidence what Moreau actually said. The sources
he used appeared to be of two kinds only, general statements by contemporaries
indicating that Moreau made critical remarks about Napoleon and his
administration, and statements attributed to the General recorded in
memoirs and police reports. Yet it remains an indisputable fact that
Moreau criticized Napoleon. Although Picard did not mention the
incident, the General freely admitted being outspoken in the speech
he delivered during his trial.

...mes ennemis n'ont jamais pu ni me trouver ni me
chercher d'autre crime que la liberté de mes discours: mes
discours... ils ont été souvent favorables aux opérations du
gouvernement, et si quelque fois ils ne l'ont pas été, pouvais-
je donc croire que cette liberté fut un crime chez un peuple
qui avait tant de fois décrété celle de la pensée, celle de
la parole, celle de la presse, et qui en avait beaucoup joui
sous les rois même? 31

Moreau's actions, the 'conspiration de pot à beurre' at Rennes
in May and his popularity reported by police informers, Picard believed,

30 Picard, pp. 367 - 372. Beauchamp and Lemaire suggested that there
had been an exchange of remarks. Picard made no reference to the fact that
Napoleōn was supposed to have called Moreau, "the General of Retreats", nor
did he indicate that any other disparaging comments had been made at this
time.

31 "Discours prononcé par le général Moreau, au tribunal criminel
spécial du département de la Seine", in Beauchamp, Pièces justificatives,
No. 5, pp. 195 - 196. Picard did however mention another part of the
speech in which Moreau emphasized the openness of his conduct. Picard,
p. 386.
were responsible for the orders issued placing the General under close observation so that his movements, correspondence and friends were all scrutinized. Picard showed that Moreau did have a motive to conspire, not jealous hatred as the writers of the late nineteenth century suggested, but indignation at oppression. However, Picard also found that Moreau was much less dangerous than Napoleon seemed to believe. On the surface, Picard felt that there could be some justification for viewing Moreau as the chief of the malcontents, but his study made plain that Moreau's leadership of an opposition party was an illusion fostered by the situation which a few of the writers of 1814 had outlined earlier; individuals, republicans and royalists alike, voicing their disapproval of Napoleon by praising Moreau and expressing hope that he would effect a change. Picard found evidence to show that the General had no time for the royalists and that while an ardent republican he was also a moderate, whose opposition though complete, was also entirely passive. This point had been demonstrated before the Pichegru affair of 1804 by Bernadotte's fruitless conversations with Moreau at Mme Récamier's.

At the root of this inactivity Picard suggested was the General's

32 Both Pingaud and the anonymous contributor to The Nation wrote of the Army of the Rhine as a bloc which supported Moreau in order to be avenged on the Army of Italy. Picard's work uncovered nothing to corroborate this assumption. Instead he found that a great many of Moreau's old subordinates had been depending upon his good offices with Napoleon to secure their continued employment and were accordingly highly displeased at his decision to keep himself apart from the "court". Picard, p. 354.

habitual ambivalence in political matters and his fear of plunging France into renewed internal strife. When Picard wrote of Moreau's political indecisiveness, he could only have been referring to the matter of proceeding from thought to action, because the General had been shown to have been a man of conviction. Picard gave no indication that Moreau's hesitation could have originated in respect for the popular will or in a reluctance to initiate illegal action. Yet earlier when discussing Brumaire, he quoted from the memoirs of General Bourienne, who suggested that it was sufficient for Moreau to know that Napoleon had been invested by the Government in his function as Commander-in-Chief, for him to be obeyed, and Picard also referred to another source, which claimed that the General '...n'avait pas le caractère qui fait sortir la marche régulière.' Moreover, although the General was censured by Picard for being passive, he himself did not hold out much hope for a successful coup, which suggests that such an attempt might well have been irresponsible. Picard pointed out that after the Treaty of Amiens (1802), Napoleon's popularity increased and many of the likely sources of opposition were silenced; the Tribunate was purged, the Senate was brought into subjection and many hostile generals assigned ambassadorial posts or remote commands. Picard noted that at the beginning of 1803 Moreau demonstrated a

friendship with emigrés and people known to be hostile to the government, particularly Moreau and Mme. de Stael, finally resulted in 1811, in an order to choose a place at least forty leagues from Paris and to reside there until her arrest was revoked. Nouvelle biographie générale, vol. 41 columns 809 - 814.

34 Picard, p. 417.
36 Ibid., p. 417.
desire to appear more frequently in society and to end his retirement in the country where he had spent the major portion of his time since returning from the front. He frequented salons and gave a splendid ball, which excited comment because no member of the Bonaparte family made an appearance. Picard learned from the memoirs of General Decaen that towards the end of February he had undertaken an attempt at reconciliation in the belief that only misunderstandings separated the two men. However, to Decaen's dismay, his audience with Napoleon showed that the break was complete and that even at this date, a year before Moreau's arrest, the First Consul was contemplating denouncing him on the grounds that a letter seized on the person of the abbé David proved that the General was in correspondence with Pichegru.

A majority of the biographers of 1814 had considered Moreau's letter of explanation to Napoleon sufficient refutation of this charge. Picard turned instead to the Acte d'accusation and other documents. According to the Acte, David wrote to Moreau (May 26, 1802) asking for an appointment, but gave no other reason for the request except that he had something of interest to communicate. When the brief meeting took

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37 Ibid., pp. 388 - 390.
38 Ibid., p. 343.
place, David was left unsatisfied because he found Moreau little disposed towards a reconciliation with Pichegru. Moreau informed Napoleon that David wrote him a letter which expressed shock that his opposition alone prevented the First Consul from granting Pichegru permission to return. Napoleon received only an outline of Moreau's reply to David, but the *Acte* contained the complete letter, which as Châteauneuf pointed out was the only other document the Prosecution had in the General's hand. Moreau had begun his letter by stating that he had no intention of justifying his conduct on 17 Fructidor and he had made plain his displeasure at Pichegru's dealings with the royalists. However, he said that Pichegru's present situation caused him pain and that he would welcome an opportunity to be of service. Moreau denied that he was opposed to Pichegru's return and stated that if the Government was claiming that he was the only obstacle, he would endeavour to have this calumny stopped.  

Picard recalled that Pichegru was considered by Moreau to have been no more guilty than any of the other *fructidorisés* who had been

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40 "Lettre du général Moreau au Premier Consul" in *Recueil des interrogatoires subis par le général Moreau*, Document no. 5, p. 16.

41 *Procès instruit par la cour de justice criminelle et spéciale du département de la Seine...,* vol. 1 *Acte d'accusation*, pp. 228 – 229, quoted by Picard, p. 394.
pardon. In Picard's view, Moreau's fairminded reasoning, though perhaps too lenient, did not constitute a reconciliation. Picard should perhaps have said, as Régnier did, "une réconciliation criminelle"; because even Moreau's counsel acknowledged a thaw, in the following words:

Il Moreau n'eut point été au-devant d'une réconciliation avec l'ex-général Pichegru. Mais quand celui-ci ou la demandait, ou la désirait, son cœur, plus fort que toute autre impulsion, lui défendait de la repousser.  

Picard's most telling point was the fact that no police documents supported Napoleon's statement to Decaen. From a bulletin issued by the Préfecture de police, Picard learned that the papers seized on David contained nothing concerning the Government. Two letters addressed to Pichegru were taken from the abbé, one coming from General Liébert and the other from Senator Barthélemy. If it was a crime to correspond with Pichegru; then these men were more guilty than Moreau, who only communicated with David. Furthermore, Picard argued that there was no mention of any letter from Moreau in the report of the préfet de police to the grand-juge Régnier. Yet the Acte d'accusation stated that:

A l'égard de la correspondance entre Moreau et Pichegru, de Paris à Londres et de Londres à Paris, par intermédiaire, elle est prouvée par les pièces saisies lors de l'arrestation de David, et par celles saisies lors de l'arrestation de Moreau.  

42 Picard, p. 394.  
43 "Mémoire justificatif. . .," in Beauchamp, Pièces justificatives, No. 6.  
44 Picard, pp. 395 - 396.  
Just as there were no details to be had concerning the papers taken at the time of the abbé's arrest, there were none supplied concerning those allegedly seized at the time Moreau was taken. On the basis of the Government's failure to supply supporting evidence, the charge brought against the General would appear to be without foundation. Picard had already suggested why Napoleon might seek to act against Moreau, but his explanation was neatly summarized by an authoritative source he quoted, who observed:

"Il devenait tous les jours plus urgent d'anéantir ou le crédit ou la personne de l'homme qui Bonaparte et l'opinion publique s'accordaient à regarder comme le centre de toutes les tentatives qui pouvaient être faites dans la nation ou dans les armées pour sauver la République du moins pour conserver quelques traces de liberté." 47

Moreau was by no means flawless in Picard's eyes, for without further specific evidence he described the General as being of weak character, sensitive nature and apt both to yield to suggestion and to trust in appearances. 48 In all probability Picard arrived at these traits because he was unable to forgive Moreau for what he considered was a gross error, namely his support for Napoleon on 18 - 19 Brumaire. 49 This disapproval:

48 Picard, p. 419.
49 Ibid., Préface, p. iii.
combined with Picard's belief in Moreau's "vertus civiques" made it impossible for him to believe that the General could have participated except under the sway of Napoleon, hence the conclusion that he was malleable. In his preface, Picard had boldly stated:

Nous avons cherché la vérité en toute indépendance, en toute impartialité, faînant abstraction de toute préférence, de toute sympathie, de toute opinion préconçue. Les faits seuls ont déterminé nos conclusions.50

His claim would appear to have been largely though not completely accurate.

This defect is, however, completely overshadowed by the magnitude of Picard's contribution to the study of Moreau. His work was the first to document the deterioration of relations between Moreau and Napoleon, and thus to establish it as fact. Picard's study gave credibility to those writers of 1814 who had argued that the alliance of the two men at the time of Brumaire had originated in the misconception on Moreau's part that Napoleon intended to maintain the Républic. On the other hand, Picard proved false Beauchamp's notion that within a brief space of time Moreau regretted his participation in the coup. Furthermore, in their haste to discuss the trial, the previous writers had created the impression that the

50 Ibid., Préface, pp. 11 - 111.
relationship had been static from 18 Brumaire to the Treaty of Lunéville. From an examination of the letters which passed between them and other sources, Picard was able to correct this view by showing that there had been fluctuations beneath the surface, which outwardly remained cordial. Picard also confirmed the belief of all the previous writers that the relationship had become poisoned after the peace of Lunéville.

Picard explained the rupture in terms of a fundamental incompatibility of character and beliefs. Napoleon, he found, was an opportunist, ready to sacrifice everything to his own ambition. Moreau on the other hand, was shown to be personally disinterested and a man of principle. Napoleon considered the Revolution as an instrument to be used for his own ends. Moreau, Picard argued, saw it as the dawn of a new era of freedom and resented the erosion of liberty and the steady progress along the road to personal rule. In addition to reversing Brumaire's view that the General was a-political, Picard also gave Moreau a motive to enter a conspiracy to overthrow Napoleon. However, this author demonstrated convincingly that at least until January 1804 the General remained vocal but inactive, having no organized body of support, taking no steps to create one and making no attempt to connect

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51 Ibid., p. 420
himself via David with Pichegru. Heretofore, Moreau had appeared to the critical eye in the unnatural light of either his supporters or his denigrators. Picard's work went a long way towards establishing a more authoritative appreciation of the General's character and convictions.

The book's moderate tone and the use of source material found favour with R. Reuss, its reviewer in *La Revue historique*. However, he remained unconvinced by Picard's principal argument and complained that:

*L'auteur ne nous donne pas, en somme, une bien haute idée de Moreau, homme politique; s'il fut plus longtemps républicain que Bonaparte, n'était-ce pas que son amour-propre blessé ne pouvait supporter de voir un autre à la tête de l'État?* 52

None of Picard's numerous quotations would appear to have influenced R. Reuss, not even the opinion of Baron Hyde de Neuville:

*On a été injuste envers lui [Moreau], en attribuant à de jalouses rancunes son inimitié croissante à l'égard de Napoléon... Il était assurément animé des plus nobles mobiles et l'indignation du citoyen vertueux dont on a froissé tous les sentiments, toutes les croyances, était ce qui le dominait.* 53

The Napoléonic Legend was obviously not one to topple at the sound of a single trumpet.

The process of chipping away at the Napoléonic view of Moreau...


was continued by the next writer Ernest Daudet. He deliberately chose not to duplicate Picard's study and took instead as the focus of his work, the General's exile and return to Europe. The details of Moreau's trial were pardonably excluded from Picard's work which concentrated on the origins of the crisis. Daudet's principal concern was also with a period other than 1804, but he gave the events preceding the trial lengthy consideration. The involvement of Pichegru and Georges in itself would have been enough to arouse Daudet's interest, for in addition to being a journalist and novelist, he was also an historian who specialized in the study of the émigrés and the royalist conspiracies. There was more however, to Daudet's desire to expand his study to include the trial than the fact that it touched on his area of expertise. He felt that a grasp of the strain Moreau had been under during his imprisonment and a feeling for the magnitude of the injustice he had suffered was a prerequisite for an understanding of the General's state of mind during the latter part of his life.

Dontenville, the late nineteenth century writer believed that Moreau's return could be entirely explained by his desire to be avenged

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54 Daudet, Introduction, p. vi.


56 Daudet, Introduction, p. vi.
upon Napoleon, which made him attentive to the pleas of the baron Hyde de Neuville, Bernadotte (now Charles-Jean, Crown Prince of Sweden), Madame de Stael, and later, in 1813, the promptings of Tsar Alexander I. Daudet agreed that to deny that a desire for vengeance entered into the General's thoughts was to endow him with a heroic and even super-human spirit. However, on the basis of Moreau's correspondence Daudet concluded that his dominant passion was the welfare of his countrymen. Thus, according to Daudet, the General sought to further his own ends, while at the same time delivering France from the scourge of Napoleon and protecting the country against the potential predatory attacks of the Allies.

Daudet's research revealed that the Russians had been interested in obtaining Moreau's support as early as 1805. Furthermore, this biographer found evidence that the General rejected their first overtures made in 1807, thus giving support to the view that he was not crying out for an opportunity to strike a blow at Napoleon. A letter written by Moreau in February 1813 to André-de-Daschkoff, the Russian envoy to the United States, was the first indication, Daudet found, that the General had changed his mind.

57 Ibid., p. 214.
58 Ibid., p. 122.
59 Ibid., p. 140.
60 Ibid., p. 173.
Apparently, at Daschkoff's request, Moreau followed this note with a statement of particulars in May. He decried any motives of personal ambition, declaring that his object was to bring peace to Europe and happiness to France, and that his wish was to enjoy the fruits of his work under the protection of a liberal government. This correspondence is important because it shows a broader purpose than Daudet suggested and it demonstrates that Moreau had signified his willingness to help long before he received his first message from Bernadotte in May, which was communicated to him indirectly via a letter Mme de Stäel wrote to a correspondent in the United States. In addition to correcting the impression left by Dontenville that Bernadotte's prompting was in some way decisive, Daudet's work also rectified the accounts of two 1814 biographers, Beauchamp and Martinière, who claimed that in 1812, Bernadotte made Moreau the most enticing offers in the name of the Tsar.

Daudet's study also made plain that baron Hyde de Neuville's cause was not Moreau's. He informed his wife, who for health reasons had left for France in June 1812, that:

M. Neuville, qui veut aussi s'en mêler, voulait me faire prendre des engagements avec les Bourbons. Je lui ai répondu que je croyais qu'on finirait par la, mais que je ne pouvais pas m'engager sous leur bannière, ne voulant pas faire la guerre civile, pour eux si la France

61 Ibid., p. 186.
63 Beauchamp, p. 88 and Martinière, p. 104.
n'en voulait pas et qu'au surplus, je n'engagerais jamais à les rappeler que sous des conditions telles que les biens nationaux, une certaine dose de liberté nécessaire au bonheur des hommes, l'oubli complet de ce qui s'était passé dans la Révolution et la sanction de tous les emplois occupés.

Possession of this piece of evidence would have put an end to Martinière's dilemma over having to choose between Garat's view that Moreau was a royalist by preference and Beauchamp's belief that the General had become a royalist when his ideal of a republic seemed no longer practical. Although Moreau appears to have been reconciled to the prospect of a constitutional monarchy, it was clear that he did not become a Bourbon supporter. The last letter Mme Moreau received before his departure in June 1813 revealed his desire to act as mediator. Moreau assured his wife that:

Les circonstances n'ont jamais été plus favorables pour rentrer dans notre pays; mais le désir d'empêcher que la France entière ne soit la victime de la vengeance étrangère, à la chute de Bonaparte, me fait désirer d'y contribuer.

In the next paragraph he informed her of the plans he had submitted earlier to the Tsar and Bernadotte, and it is interesting to note that none of the 1814 biographers was aware of these proposals. He wrote that:

J'ignore encore ce qu'on va faire. J'ai envoyé il y a deux mois, un mémoire où j'exprime le désir qu'on me forme une petite armée des prisonniers français en

64 Daudet, p. 204.

65 Ibid., p. 211.
In Daudet's opinion the repugnance Moreau felt towards marching at the head of foreign troops, his plan for forming a French corps from among the prisoners in Russia and the hope he had of playing an intermediary role were all signs of his goodwill and proof that he was no traitor. This was not to say however, that Daudet condoned the General's behaviour. A nationalist, like Lemaire, Perret and Dontenville, Daudet criticized the General for failing to see that the army he intended to form would be in the pay of foreigners and for being unaware that the first step could lead to his becoming an accomplice of the coalition, against which Frenchmen, many under his orders, had fought for more than twenty years. Daudet attributed Moreau's blindness to exile, which he felt had obscured the demands of duty and made the General ignorant of French opinion, which Daudet claimed was solidly behind Napoleon in the face of an external threat. 

The view that Moreau's strategy was a form of madness born of his exile had been espoused earlier by Pingaud. Furthermore, Pingaud believed

66 Ibid., p. 211.
67 Ibid., pp. 213 - 217.
that the General was drawn to the Continent by hatred of Napoleon and
the memory of his recent humiliation. Daudet, it will be remembered,
also believed that rancour played a part in the General's decision and
he was able to shed some new light on the treatment that Moreau received
in 1804 which could have given rise to this feeling.

Daudet owed the fresh insights he provided into the events
surrounding the trial to a previously untapped source, the letters
Moreau had smuggled out of prison to his wife. The information he
sent her to establish the innocence of his dealings with Pichegru
appears to be of the greatest value. On the basis of these documents
Daudet concluded that the fact that the General was charged at all
must have rankled, but this writer was also aware of another cause
for complaint, because the notes revealed that the Government actively
impeded Moreau's defence and these actions may appropriately be
mentioned here.

From the letters it would appear that Moreau was denied all
official communication with his family for at least three months and
was prevented from consulting with his wife on the choice of counsel.
It also emerges that he was imprisoned some time before he received
his mandat d'arrêt which stated the charge and there were further
delays, because he wrote: "Je voudrais bien également que nous ayons

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68 Pingaud, pp. 758, 766.
bien promptement nos actes d'accusation et que nous puissions communiquer avec nos défenseurs mais, il semble qu'on veut nous accorder le moins de temps possible pour notre défense." Moreover, it appears that it was only through his jailers that he had a vague awareness of the Law of 9 Ventôse (February 29, 1804), the third clause of which applied to him.

Ceux qui avant la publication de la présente, auront reçu Pichegru ou les autres individus ci-dessus mentionnés, seront tenus d'en faire la déclaration à la police dans le délai de 8 jours. Faute de déclaration, ils seront punis de 6 ans de fers.

It was thus only by the greatest good fortune that his letter to Napoleon, which could be considered as a gesture of compliance, happened to be written 17 Ventôse, the last day permissible. The importance of Moreau's notes makes it all the more regrettable for historians that Daudet was not more expansive in revealing their provenance, as his reviewer noted:

Comme toujours, l'auteur n'a daigné nous donner sur ses sources qu'une note sommaire de sept lignes où il nous renvoie en bloc à une série de dépôts publics et privés, mais il faut se résigner à ce procédé; c'est un pli qu'il a pris et qu'il ne changera plus.

The research of Picard and Daudet was used as the foundation for a greatly inferior work, Maurice Garçot's Le Duel Moreau-Napoléon.

69 Daudet, pp. 72 - 73.
70 Ibid., pp. 46 - 47.
71 Procès instruit par la cour de justice criminelle et spéciale du département de la Seine..., vol. 1. Acte d'accusation, pp. 44 - 50.
No acknowledgment was made of his debt to his predecessors and much of the value of the originals was lost because their analysis was carefully excised. Garçot evidently considered that history should be written as a narrative unaccompanied by interpretation and the little comment he did supply issued from his own preconceptions rather than from the facts that he presented.

Picard expressed regret that Moreau did not draw near to Napoleon and attempt to exercise a moderating influence over him. Garçot on the other hand, stated no preference. It was a matter of indifference to him whether Moreau was neutral, hostile or collaborationist, the important thing was that the General ought to have taken a stand and thrown off the unworthy sulkiness which Garçot believed kept him aloof.

In the conclusion however, there was a contradictory hint that the General represented something worthwhile, because Garçot argued that Moreau's return should be excused on the grounds that he had suffered proscription and exile in the defense of liberty. Yet, having said this, Garçot reverted to the nationalistic contention that by joining the Allies Moreau had been in error, but deserved pardon because his good offices with the Tzar had helped France keep her natural frontiers.

Curiously, the idea that Moreau had been dealt an injustice was never mentioned by Garçot in his account of the trial. Garçot showed that he was familiar with the principal sources, but unfortunately he did not draw together testimony on particular points of Moreau's case.

74 Picard, p. 354.
75 Garçot, p. 34.
76 Ibid., p. 138.
such as the meetings. Instead he took a purely chronological approach, beginning with a sketch of the General's interrogation, continuing with highlights from the trial and concluding with a summary of Lecourbe's account of the judges' deliberations. The deficiencies of this work arising from incomplete material and poor organization were compounded by the fact that the depositions of the participants were set down without comment either with respect to their plausibility or concerning the part they played in the trial. In short, Garçot had nothing to contribute to the debate on Moreau and as the last book written on the General in the twentieth century his work was a great disappointment.

Although Garçot's was the last full-length biography, interest in Moreau was by no means dead, for he was the subject of three periodical articles, the last one being published in 1972. To judge by the titles of the first two and the contents of the third, the General's life remained an attractive topic because of the element of conflict and the fact that one of the protagonists was the Emperor, or to borrow Garçot's phrase, the focal point was the "duel Moreau-Napoleon". The least substantial of the three articles, Fleuriot de Langle's "Moreau contre Napoleon" was the second to appear. De Langle's preference, for the inconsequential was simply reflected in his choice of theme, the domination of Moreau by women.  

a bust of Ida Sainte-Elme commissioned by Moreau, de Langle passed to
the General's pride in his estate and a completely erroneous assertion
that Napoleon offered to alter Moreau's sentence to banishment if he
renounced all rights to Grosbois. 78 Apart from mentioning the role
of Moreau's wife and mother-in-law in provoking the rupture, de Langle
specifically excluded from his work the differences which set the
two generals at loggerheads. He also purposely avoided the question
of whether Moreau's arrest was legitimate and the matter of whether
his sentence constituted a denial of justice 79

Moreau's exile, however, did capture de Langle's attention and he
considered that he was at one with Daudet in suggesting that the General
followed Napoleon's triumphs with rage in his heart and the hope of
revenge. 80 This contention was to distort Daudet's position by
presenting the view expressed in the preface and ignoring the more
moderate conclusion to be found in the body of the text. Daudet did
however resemble de Langle in so far as they both considered the
General's return as a cause for regret, but de Langle quite incorrectly
attributed this action to the evil influence of Mme de Staël and
devoted an entirely disproportionate amount of space in his article
to pillorying her. 81 The General's reception by the Allies and an
account of the circumstances surrounding his death brought the article
to a close.

The misreading of Daudet, the way in which the subject of the

78 Ibid., pp. 54 - 55.
79 Ibid., p. 53.
80 Ibid., p. 60.
81 Ibid., pp. 57 - 60.
trial was avoided and the anecdote about Moreau's sentence all reflect the inadequacy of de Langle's knowledge. His interest in the General was that of a dilettante who felt no desire to tax either his intellect or patience in pursuit of a deeper understanding. Assertion and a chain of anecdotes and sources were considered preferable to reasoned argument. De Langle had access to the J. B. Spalletti archives in Rome and his only claim to scholarship was to reproduce for the first time two letters of Mme de Stael, which conveyed her pleasure at Moreau's decision to join in the struggle against Napoleon. 82

The author of the first article to be published on Moreau after 1951 also had access to previously unpublished documents, for he was Joseph Bonnet, a direct descendent of Louis Ferdinand Bonnet, the General's principal counsel. Although he had new information relating to the defense for his article, "Moreau contre Bonaparte", Bonnet showed that he was unfamiliar with such a fundamental secondary source as the work of Picard. The estrangement between Moreau and Napoleon was attributed by Bonnet to the First Consul's jealousy of Hohenlinden and the General's indignation was blamed on the attempt he felt was being made to minimize his role and that of his generals in bringing about the Treaty of Lunéville. No indication was given of the political differences Picard had uncovered and contrary to Moreau's

82 Ibid., pp. 58 - 59.
own protestations he was once again believed to have been ambitious. Bonnet felt that Moreau was attracted by a vision of power, but wished others to place it in his grasp. Furthermore, Bonnet believed that the General's disenchantment with his present position prompted him to lend an ear to imprudent and even dangerous suggestions, but these were left unspecified. 83

Not only did Bonnet agree with the late nineteenth century writers that Moreau had a motive, he also suggested that the General had conspired. Bonnet left the nature of the plot vague, for his only comment was that Georges disembarked on the Normandy coast and succeeded in reaching Paris with a handful of proven confederates and some Chouans ready to risk all for the King. According to Bonnet, it was Pichegru who laid the foundation for a reconciliation by sending to Moreau, first the abbé David and then General Lajolais. Perret gave no indication of what passed between David, Lajolais and Moreau, and Dontenville only affirmed the result, that Lajolais took to England a guarantee of the General's favourable frame of mind. This obscurity was explained by Bonnet, who stated categorically that it would never be known what was hatched during the course of the mysterious proceedings. 84 Yet using the only concrete evidence produced by the Prosecution and other sources, Picard had been able to show that there was every reason to believe that the General's dealings, at least with David, were, as

84 Ibid., pp. 615 - 616.
Moreau and the abbé said they were, confined to the problem of obtaining official permission for Pichegru's return.

Bonnet's account of the meetings also differed from the descriptions given by the previous writer, but by failing to indicate the source of his information he only deepened the controversy. He stated that on January 28, 1804, Pichegru called on Moreau who received him coldly and made plain that he would not assume the leadership of a movement in favour of the Bourbons. At a second meeting in his house, Moreau revealed to Pichegru his secret aspiration to dictatorship. The third meeting was the nocturnal one in the boulevard de la Madeleine where Pichegru tried to bring Moreau and Georges together. Bonnet claimed that according to witnesses, Moreau had a fit of temper and stalked off taking Pichegru with him. According to Bonnet, Moreau told Pichegru, "Renversons Bonaparte et alors tout le monde sera avec moi. Je serai nommé consul avec vous." The tenor of this meeting, Bonnet believed, infuriated Georges and Pichegru, for Moreau showed himself ready to use them as stepping stones to his personal goal. 85

Yet in view of the detail with which Bonnet was able to describe this rendez-vous, it comes as a surprise to learn that no testimony was given that permitted valid charges to be laid against the General and Bonnet did not explain how this came about. 86

In this and other respects, Bonnet's interpretation resembled that of his late nineteenth century predecessors. Moreau retained his military greatness, but his character was believed to have been jealous.

85 Ibid., p. 616.
86 Ibid., p. 618.
vain and ambitious. In politics, Bonnet found the General an opportunist who wished to use the royalists to achieve his personal goals. Furthermore, like Perret and Dontenville, Bonnet suggested that Napoleon found the trial a welcome opportunity to discredit a rival.87 Daudet suggested various ways in which Napoleon's attitude affected Moreau's defence and the chief value of Bonnet's work was to shed more light on this matter.

He drew attention to the bravery and independence of spirit his forbearer had shown in accepting, without hesitation, a brief where the defence had undeniable political significance and furthermore one which had been declined by two other lawyers, Bellart and Pérignon, who would agree to act purely in a reserve capacity: Not only did handling the case require courage, it also required caution as well, for Bonnet, the lawyer confided later to a friend,

\[\text{Vous savez que le tout puissant Empereur était jaloux, dans sa gloire, de celle du vainquer d'Hohenlinden. Il fallait réprimer les élans oratoires; le salut de mon client était à ce prix.}^{88}\]

Nor apparently was the danger imaginary, for the day after the judges' decision had been rendered, Napoleon summoned his Council and berated Moreau's lawyers. Their arrest seemed assured, according to Joseph Bonnet, until the arguments of the Archchancellor Cambacérès and the Prefect of Police, Dubois, persuaded Napoleon to agree to a severe reprimand instead.89 Bonnet does not appear to have been aware that

87 Ibid., p. 612.
88 Ibid., p. 618.
89 Ibid., p. 620.
there were implications running contrary to his interpretation of Moreau's character in the fact that Bonnet, the jurist, was prepared to jeopardize his own well-being so severely by undertaking the defence.

Contrary to expectation the ethical problem posed by Moreau's return was not the principal object of the most recent article on the General, Edmond Ruby's "Moreau fût-il un traître?". His choice of title notwithstanding, the stated object of Ruby's work was to explain how the sympathy which existed between Napoleon and Moreau in 1799 became hatred a year later. Ruby claimed that there were obstacles in the way of such a study because the documents of the period were biased and historical writing had been dominated by the hostile views of Adolphe Thiers, author of Le Consulat et l'Empire. Dontenville's Général Moreau and Picard's Bonaparte et Moreau were cited by Ruby as two cases in point. Daudet's Exil et mort du général Moreau was considered less flagrantly biased. 90

Before asserting the primacy of Thiers, Ruby ought to have looked back further to the Emperor himself. An examination of the works of Thiers and Dontenville shows that a knowledge of Napoleon's version of Moreau's involvement in the conspiracy was the only bond between them. Furthermore, Ruby was entirely ridiculous in bringing this accusation against Daudet, for he had made plain his contempt for the

work of Thiers. He wrote:

Il l'a voulu coupable et, dans son récit incomplet et inexact en plus d'un point, tout est combiné pour le présenter comme tel.

Far from following in the footsteps of Thiers, Daudet championed the opposite view on the basis of information he found in Moreau's correspondence. So fantastic indeed is this notion that one would wonder if Ruby had consulted this work were it not for the fact that his entire account of Moreau's return was a summary of Daudet's research. No less absurd was the idea that Picard shared the unsympathetic view that Thiers had of the General—and despite Ruby's critical remarks he relied heavily on Bonaparte et Moreau.

Up to the point where the plot and the trial were discussed, Ruby's article was a condensation of Picard's work and there were occasions when even his phraseology was borrowed. The derivation became particularly noticeable in the discussion of the reasons behind the final rupture. Almost all the familiar elements were present: the absence of a congratulatory note upon the victory at Hohenlinden, the failure to ratify his promotions, the female grievances, the accusing note in Le Moniteur, the dispersion of the officers of the Army of the Rhine and Moreau's refusal to use his position as the rallying point of the opposition to take action against Napoleon for fear civil war... 

91 Daudet, Introduction, fn. 1, p. vii.
would result. Ruby mentioned Moreau's refusal to belong to the Légion d'honneur, but there was no strong indication of the beliefs which brought him into conflict with the First Consul. Most of the ingredients of Picard's argument were present but the same balance was not preserved. Picard argued that Moreau placed his dislike of despotism above the wrongs he suffered. Ruby had no comment to make in this connection, but by listing the personal and omitting the political he effectively tipped the scales the other way. It is conceivable that this imbalance was entirely unconscious; Ruby being so familiar with Picard's ideas that he assumed the point rather than making it.

Ruby did not stop here, as might have been expected from his statement of purpose, but proceeded instead to an account of the events leading up to the trial. He argued, like Picard, that Moreau's relations with the abbé David were limited to the problem of securing Pichegru's return and he claimed that the Government had no proof when it spread the news of a compact between the General and a Bourbon agent. According to Ruby, Lajolais, another agent from London, intervened and his intrigues resulted in a secret meeting between Pichegru and Moreau one evening in the Madeleine. This rendez-vous, Ruby believed, led to another at the General's house, at which Georges

92 Edmond Ruby, "Moreau fût-il un traître?" Écrits de Paris No. 316, pp. 61 - 63.
unexpectedly turned up. His plan of paving the way for a Bourbon restoration by murdering Napoleon on the road to Malmaison found no favour in Moreau’s eyes, Ruby believed, although he was prepared, in the event, to assume power temporarily. This self-serving attitude, claimed Ruby, drove Georges away, uttering the words, "Usurpateur pour usurpateur, j’aime mieux celui qui gouverne que ce Moreau qui n’a coeur ni tête!"  

Ruby, like so many of his predecessors argued that there was no formal evidence against the General. He explained that this situation came about because one of the witnesses retracted his testimony, Pichegru committed suicide and the principal conspirators denied Moreau’s participation. Judge Lecourbe’s description of the State’s successful attempt to overseat the acquittal was mentioned by Ruby, but he clearly considered that Moreau’s conduct was morally reprehensible, even if he was not technically guilty. Yet in his conclusion, Ruby stated that "Il [Moreau] ne fut jamais ni bas, ni vil, ni intéressé." At this point one might be led to believe that Ruby, like Napoleon and Dantonneville, made a distinction between Moreau the soldier and Moreau the man. However, Ruby scornfully rejected this notion on the grounds that such sharply drawn contrasts were the

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93 Ibid., p. 64.
94 Ibid., p. 66.
95 Ibid., p. 73.
property of men of letters. Moreau's vindication was Ruby's goal and his failure to achieve this end would appear to have originated in his misrepresentation of Picard's argument and his inadequate discussion of the General's involvement in the conspiracy.

An examination of twentieth century works on Moreau reveals a dearth of scholarly writing. Both the anonymous article in The Nation and Fleuriot de Langle's work were too slight to be of much note. Bonnet's article likewise contributed little, for his work contained much that was speculative and was heavily influenced by an earlier school of thought. The accounts given by Garçot and Ruby, far from being original, were largely the product of shameless borrowing from Picard and Daudet, the giants of the period. These two writers did much to show that there was documentary support for Uvaloff's contention that Moreau was entirely innocent of the charge of conspiracy and a victim of Napoleon's machinations. However, neither writer was principally concerned with the trial and none of their contemporaries undertook to examine, in detail, this critical episode of the General's life.

Garçot gave excerpts from the record, but attempted no synthesis. Bonnet's article emphasized the defence rather than the actions which produced the charge and Ruby's brief mention of the conspiracy was in keeping with his view that Moreau's connection with it was an aberration.

Nevertheless when a number of Moreau's biographers are considered together they indicate that a substantial number of the charges brought against him were inconsequential. Châteauneuf and Martinière showed

96 Ibid., p. 72.
that the issue of the Klinglin correspondence lacked substance and Davis included an argument which demonstrated convincingly that the subject was irrelevant in 1804. Furthermore, Chateauneuf provided information which suggested that the General's dealings with Lajolais were not political and Picard's findings demonstrated that the same was true of Moreau's relationship with the abbé David. Chateauneuf also supplied arguments which were sufficient to absolve Moreau of three further charges; having pledged to support a restoration, having aspired to dictatorship and having failed to denounce Pichegru. Only the subject of the meetings was not fully discussed and the most controversial of these rendez-vous would appear to have been the one that allegedly took place in the boulevard de la Madeleine. Beauchamp, Martinière, Chateauneuf and Garat argued that the evidence presented at the trial concerning this meeting could be dismissed. Subsequent writers affirmed that the rendez-vous had taken place, but differed in their accounts of its place in the sequence of meetings, who was present and what transpired. At this point it seems useful to put the knowledge and accuracy of these writers to the test by examining the record of the trial.
CHAPTER V: THE BOULEVARD DE LA MADELEINE

The first accused to reveal knowledge of the alleged meeting in the boulevard was Athanaze-Hyacinthe Bouvet de Lozier. Arrested on February 9, 1804, he was subjected to rigorous interrogation by the préfet de police before being sent to the Temple the next day. In the early hours of his fifth day in this prison, his attempt at suicide by strangulation having failed, he asked to be brought before the grand-âge in order to make an important statement. Thus on February 14th, Régnier was informed by Bouvet that he had seen Lajolais on January 25th or 26th, when the latter had come to take Georges and Pichegru from the carriage in which he (Lozier) was seated with them, in the boulevard de la Madeleine, to Moreau who waited a few paces distant. Bouvet declared that a meeting ensued, in the Champs-Élysées, between the three principals during which Moreau hinted at the proposals he would make to Pichegru at the next rendez-vous, namely that it was not possible to restore the King and that alternatively, he, Moreau, should be named dictator with the royalists as his agents.

The record of the trial shows that Bouvet's words lost much

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2 "déclaration spontanée de Bouvet de Lozier", in Procès instruit par la cour de justice criminelle et spéciale du département de la Seine », vol. 2, pp. 168 - 171.

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of their significance during the course of the proceedings.

When asked on the second day (May 29, 1804) by Hémart, President
of the Tribunal, if he adhered to his declaration, Lozier replied that
he had not seen Moreau and that he had only witnessed Lajolais coming to
take Pichégru and Georges from the carriage where he was seated. ³ Lozier
persisted in this statement when questioned on the matter again on
the eighth day. Moreover, at this time, he clarified the fact that he
had been misled by others into thinking that the meeting had occurred
in the Champs-Élysées, when in fact it had taken place in the boulevard.
Hémart asked him directly, if he knew whether Moreau had been at this
rendez-vous, to which Lozier replied that Georges told him that this
was the case. ⁴ Earlier, however, in the second session, Georges
formally denied that he had told Lozier that there had been conferences
between Pichegru, Moreau and himself. ⁵

The State's case concerning the meeting did not rest on Bouvet's
testimony alone, for there was also the declaration made by Victor
Couchery concerning information he received from Lajolais. 'He had

³ "Seconde séance. du 9 prairial," in Procès instruit par la cour
de justice criminelle et spéciale du département de la Seine..., vpl. 4, p. 115.

⁴ "Huitième séance. Du lundi 15 prairial," in Procès instruit
par la cour criminelle et spéciale du département de la Seine..., vol. 6, p. 329.

apparently been driven to the rendez-vous by Villeneuve who then left to pick up Pichegru and returned to the boulevard later on. Moreau arrived and Lajolais, Couchery claimed, had related how he brought Pichegru hurrendly to the General and how they barely greeted one another when Georges joined them, which made the meeting short and cold.\textsuperscript{6}

Just as the proceedings of the trial determined the extent of Bouvet's knowledge, so too did they clarify the reliability of Couchery's testimony. During the course of the third day (May 30th) he was asked by Hémart, if he had knowledge of the rendez-vous in the boulevard de la Madeleine, to which he replied that he had not been present and knew of the incident only by report. Hémart persisted in his questioning in an attempt to determine Couchery's source. Couchery responded that he could not say precisely, because he believed that the details came from Lajolais, but the latter had denied telling him in the presence of the juge-instructeur Thuriot. His confidence shaken, Couchery felt that he could not persist in his declaration. At this point the questioning of Couchery was interrupted by Villeneuve who denied the allegation that he brought Lajolais to the boulevard. Lajolais conceded that it was possible that he told Couchery this detail and requested permission to explain. Unfortunately he was cut short by Villeneuve who wished to

\textsuperscript{6}"Déclaration de Couchery au conseiller d'état Réal, "le dix germinal an douze," in Procès instruit par la cour criminelle et spéciale du département de la Seine..., vol. 2, p. 441."
clarify another point and the matter was not referred to again.7

The most important testimony was given by Frédéric Lajolais and the statement that he made in the presence of the Councillor of Staté Réal, on February 16th was read to the court by Hémart during the third session. Lajolais had affirmed that:

J'avais été chez le général Moreau le matin pour connaître l'endroit qu'il indiquerait pour rendez-vous; car, au premier moment que Pichegu était arrivé, j'avais été en prévenir Moreau. Il m'a indiqué le boulevard de la Magdeleine, depuis la rue de Caumartin jusqu'à l'église de la Magdeleine; il me dit qu'il y serait en habit bleu et en chapeau rond; qu'il frapperait la terre de quelque coups de canne; qu'il viendrait par le boulevard, du côté de la rue Caumartin.

Je n'avais qu'à venir du côté opposé.

Qu'en effet, à neuf heures précises, il l'avait rencontré au milieu de ce boulevard.

Qu'il avait prévu le soir même Pichegu, maison de Chailly, no. 6, que Pichegu lui avait dit qu'à la même heure il se trouverait, en fiaire, dans la rue Basse qui borde le boulevard.

Qu'une seconde avant que de rencontrer Moreau, quelqu'un qui l'avait reconnu lui avait dit: "le général est arrivé; il est dans ce fiaire-là."

en indiquant la voiture.

Qu'à l'instant il l'avait rencontré Moreau, auquel il avait dit: le général est arrivé; qu'alors Moreau lui avait indiqué l'allée du côté de la rue des Capucines, où la lune donnait moins, en le priant d'y faire passer le général Pichegu.

Qu'il s'était rendu à la portière; que Pichegu était précisément du côté par lequel il arrivait; qu'il lui avait semblé qu'il n'était pas seul.

Qu'à l'instant Pichegu avait ouvert la portière et lui avait suivi sur l'autre côté du boulevard.

que les ayant reconnus tous deux, il s'était retiré sans savoir si Pichegu était ou n'était pas suivi de ceux qui pouvaient être avec lui dans sa voiture.

Qu'il n'avait pas eu la curiosité de demander, soit à l'un, soit à l'autre, le résultat de leur conférence.8

After listening to his declaration, Lajolais commented:

7"Troisième séance, du 10 prairial," in Procès instruit par la cour criminelle et spéciale du département de la Seine..., vol. 4, pp. 373 - 375.
8Ibid., pp. 423 - 425.
The revelation that Lajolais had not actually witnessed the meeting so startled Hémart that he took Lajolais step by step through his statement and this procedure led to further clarification. Lajolais no longer remembered the cane signal nor the fact that Moreau had said that he would come via the rue Caumertin side of the boulevard de la Madeleine. However he reaffirmed that Moreau had specified the boulevard at precisely nine o'clock. When asked if it was true that he told Moreau of Pichegru's arrival at the meeting site Lajolais said that he thought so and recalled having spoken to Moreau. During the course of further questioning Lajolais explained that Moreau had indicated the alley beside the rue des Capucines not verbally but by crossing to the other side of the boulevard. A few minutes later on in the court proceedings, Lajolais admitted that he could not affirm that Moreau had suggested the meeting and that he, himself, might have done so. On the eighth day of the trial, Lajolais contradicted himself and said that he, not Moreau had specified the time of the meeting. To return to the events of the third session

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Ibid., p. 425.

Ibid., pp. 426 - 427.

Ibid., p. 429.

Ibid., p. 430.

Ibid., p. 436.

however, Hémart inquired whether Moreau was present at the rendez-vous. The reply Lajolais gave was an extremely guarded one, "Il me semble l'avoir vu, l'avoir rencontré." Another judge, Selves, pursued the point at once and stated that the vital question was whether or not Lajolais had personally seen General Moreau. To which Lajolais replied with a terse "Je crois qu'oui." After being so tentative, Lajolais became quite definite a few minutes later, when despite his previous statement he claimed that Moreau had said "Je vais passer de l'autre côté" to indicate the spot where Pichegru was to join him. Throughout the proceedings, Lajolais remained adamant that he had only seen Pichegru descend from the carriage and that he had not witnessed the meeting of the two generals. However, Lajolais's vagueness on the fundamental point of Moreau's presence in the boulevard and his frequent self-contradictory statements largely destroyed the credibility of his testimony.

Moreau, for his part, denied seeing Georges except when they were together in the Temple prison and this fact was corroborated by the latter. Furthermore, the General never wavered from his statement that:

M. Lajolais me demanda si je voulais voir Pichegru chez moi à la campagne. Je lui dis que non; alors il parla du boulevard des Champs-Élysées où je pourrais voir le général, et je m'y refusai constamment. Je ne sais pas si le général Pichegru a été à un

16 Ibid., p. 448.
rendez-vous, si une mauvais explication donnée dans ces caquetages a pu faire aller le général Pichegru à la Madeleine. Ce que je sais, c'est que je ne l'ai jamais vu au boulevard de la Madeleine, mais chez moi; deux fois. Quant au général Lajolais, je ne puis pas me rappeler également de l'y avoir vu; il y a cinq mois.  

In his plea for the defence, Bonnet culled from the proceedings the statements relating to this particular rendez-vous and demonstrated most forcefully that the subject was of no consequence to the trial. His first concern was to show that the existence of the meeting could not be proved. Neither Bouvet de Lozier nor Couchery had witnessed the event, which left Lajolais as the only other accused mentioning the incident and he had considerably modified his testimony. He had not seen the Generals together and he seemed even doubtful about Moreau's presence. Bonnet's second principal point was that nowhere in the Acte d'accusation, nowhere in the statements of the accused was the suggestion made that anything of moment took place at the meeting. Couchery was told, Bonnet pointed out, that Georges's advent caused the rendez-vous to be brief and cold. Furthermore, Bonnet argued that an examination of the proceedings of the trial would show that Moreau was in his own home when he received overtures from Pichegru during the course of his second visit. At no time, Bonnet insisted, was it claimed that the boulevard was the place where

18 Ibid., p. 433.
propositions were first put to the General. In the light of this evidence, Bonnet concluded that it was transparent that truthfulness and not vested interest prompted Moreau to deny that he had met Pichegru in the boulevard de la Madeleine.19

A study of the record of the trial exposes with great clarity the strengths and weaknesses of the accounts of this incident given by Moreau's biographers.20 Garçot was the only writer of the twentieth century who quoted the counsel's point that neither Bouvet de Lozier nor Lajolais actually witnessed the meeting in the boulevard. Unfortunately however, Garçot had no comment to make on the significance this information had for Moreau's defence. Ruby on the other hand, claimed, without any apparent reservations, that the intrigues of Lajolais resulted in a secret meeting between Moreau and Pichegru in the Madeleine. No mention was even made of the boulevard, so that the uninitiated might be led to believe that the rendez-vous was supposed to have taken place in the church of the Madeleine. Bonnet's account was no more scholarly; in fact, it was highly imaginative. Not even the State claimed, as he did, that the meeting in the boulevard was the third between Pichegru and Moreau. Bonnet also argued that according to reliable witnesses, Moreau was visibly annoyed by the presence of Georges and strode off at once, taking Pichegru with him. The absence of witnesses was well

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19 "Plaidoyer de M. Bonnet, pour le général Moreau," in Procès instruit par la cour de justice criminelle et spéciale du département de la Seine..., vol. 7, pp. 455 - 459.

20 The treatment that the following writers gave this incident has been mentioned previously and the references given then, but they are assembled here for a re-appraisal.
established and Couchery did not mention that he had heard that Moreau took Pichegru aside for a confidential chat. Furthermore, the words Bonnet put into Moreau's mouth -- "Renversons Bonaparte et alors tout le monde sera avec moi. Je serai nommé consul avec vous." -- are more reminiscent of Napoleon's version of the plan Moreau supposedly submitted to Pichegru and Georges, than of any details that were mentioned during the course of the trial.

The late nineteenth century writer, Perret, would also appear to have been highly inventive, for in his account the boulevard was a hive of activity. Georges, Moreau, Pichegru and MM. de Rivière and de Polignac were all present, according to Perret, at the initial rendez-vous. Lambin at least gave a more accurate representation of the State's case, for he maintained that Georges had been present at the first of three meetings that Moreau had with Pichegru. Bouvet's declaration was the only one of the three that Dontenville used. He conceded that in the course of the débats Bouvet modified his testimony, but insisted that he did so in part only. Dontenville argued that Bouvet never reversed himself on the existence of the intrigues and the interviews of Moreau with Pichegru and Georges, but on the point of the initiative taken by Moreau, his promises and his encouragement of the royalists. Dontenville was clearly guilty of misrepresentation here, to the extent that he avoided mentioning that Bouvet repeatedly stated that he had not witnessed the meeting in the boulevard.
The works reflecting the most accurate appreciation of the evidence would seem to be the 1814 biographers; Lemaire, Beauchamp, Martinière and Chateauneuf, for they insisted that the testimony was insubstantial. Regrettably however, these writers considered it sufficient to assert their case rather than making use of the information they obviously had to hand. Thus, of all the accounts of the alleged meeting in the boulevard given by Moreau's biographers over the years are considered together, one cannot discern any pattern of deepening understanding. Far from being a process of increasing penetration to new aspects of the truth, the general trend that emerges is one of increasing distortion through the perpetuation of myths and ingenious speculation.

The absence of a scholarly discussion of this episode by Moreau's biographers would appear to have made it possible for inaccurate versions to gain greater currency and thus increased credibility by being incorporated into works of a broader scope. An illustration of this problem is provided by Henri Gaubert's book, Conspirateurs au temps de Napoleon Ier which is a standard work on the subject. In a chapter entitled, "Un rendez-vous romantique: la première entrevue Moreau-Pichegru sur le boulevard de la Madeleine à neuf heures du soir," Gaubert gives a highly colourful account, one paragraph of which may be considered sufficiently representative in tone and substance. Gaubert described the scene as follows:
A l'heure convenue, Moreau -- dont l'hôtel particulier se trouve à deux pas, rue d'Anjou-Saint-Honoré, au numéro 122 -- débouche sur le boulevard par la rue Royale. Il est revêtu d'un habit bleu, coiffé d'un chapeau rond, la canne à la main: \l'air d'un bon bourgeois. Lajolais, qui guette sa venue, s'élançe vers lui et lui murmure: 'Le général est arrivé!' La lune éclairant à pleine cette partie de la voie publique, les deux hommes décident de passer sur le trottoir opposé, piongé dans une prénombre plus rassurante. A peu de distance de là stationne un fiacre, où attendent Pichégu, Cadoudal et Bouvet de Lozier. Dès qu'apparaissent les silhouettes amies, Pichégu et Georges descendent de voiture; mais, pour le moment, Cadoudal reste près de la portière, tandis que Pichégu s'avance délibérément vers les nouveaux arrivants.21

The collapse of the Prosecution's case is not only transparent, it is tremendously important. This meeting in the boulevard was the State's only prospect of linking the names of Georges and Moreau, and the declaration of Bouvet de Lozier also seemed to offer the prospect of a convincing demonstration that the General had political aspirations of his own. The State's failure and the calibre of the treatment that the incident has subsequently received at the hands of a great many writers strongly suggests that a thorough re-examination of the record of the trial as it relates to Moreau's other meetings and charges is long overdue.

21 Gaubert, pp. 182 - 183.
CONCLUSION

Relative to the vast amount of historical literature on Napoleon, the study of General Moreau would appear to have been sadly neglected. Furthermore, of the works devoted to him, there is none which could be described as a dispassionate and scholarly account of his entire life. This development completely contradicts the confident assumption of Count Uvaloff that the name of Moreau was so closely tied to France's military triumphs that the future could not fail to find his life described in the fulness it deserved.¹

The earliest biographical works clearly bear the marks of the personal circumstances of their authors. Woyde evidently lacked the sources necessary for him to accurately describe the General's actions with which he was not personally familiar. Davis unquestionably merits the title of co-author and the information he supplied was clearly shaped by the fact that he did not reside in France. The material available in the French and English Circulating Library of New York City was of a general nature and not related specifically to the life of Moreau. This kind of explanatory detail when applied to the original work meant that Moreau frequently slipped from the forefront of consideration. Although situated in France, Cousin was unsure of the information he possessed concerning the coup d'état

¹Uvaloff, p. 294.
of 18 Fructidor. Nor is it certain that a lengthy discussion of the coup would have been included in any case, for Woyde mentioned that the government of the First Consul wished to draw a heavy veil over this incident, the memory of which was likely to foment discord. Whatever his personal beliefs may have been, Cousin clearly had to write of the coup d'etat of 18 Brumaire in terms favourable to Napoleon. Moreau was also a highly popular figure at the time. Cousin and Davis wrote about him and their works were no doubt intended to satisfy public curiosity. Their commercial interest in the General evidently gave way to genuine enthusiasm for his personal and military greatness, a feeling shared by Woyde.

Moreau's popularity soared higher still in the wake of what was believed to be the Emperor's downfall in 1814. Not only were his biographers clearly influenced in their choice of subject by the events of the day, but their interpretations were strongly coloured by their preconceptions about Napoleon and France. However, in those instances where they possessed first-hand knowledge or where their prejudices led them to consult primary sources their works contribute valuable insights. Beauchamp most obviously made a deliberate effort to collect documents and to contact knowledgeable persons, such as Moreau's secretary. Philippart, too, made a serious attempt to locate reliable information and Chateauneuf consulted the record of the trial extensively. Lemaire also had
recourse to the transcript and Martinière wrote from this source as well as from personal experience.

The esteem previously accorded Moreau evaporated in the late nineteenth century. These biographers, like those of 1814, were swayed by deeply ingrained attitudes towards Napoleon and France, and by contemporary events. Unlike a majority of the biographers of 1814 however, Lambin, Pingaud and Perret did not seek confirmation of their beliefs by examining documentary evidence, rather they turned instead to secondary sources. Lambin and Pingaud borrowed from the biographers of 1814 and Napoleon. When not indulging in speculation, Perret relied heavily upon the Emperor and shamelessly plagiarized from the work of Saint-Hilaire. Although strongly influenced by Napoleon's reading of events, Döntenville did have recourse to other sources. Memoirs were used for the first time in his work, but he consulted them in an entirely uncritical spirit. Furthermore, his highly partisan approach to the transcript of the trial also seriously detracted from the value of his study.

While the biographers of Moreau's own day and those of 1814 favoured him, and those of the late nineteenth century were unsympathetic, writing in the twentieth century reflected no such uniformity. Furthermore, the best biographers of this period were of a kind not seen before. Picard and Daudet set aside their personal beliefs and sought a better appreciation of the General in hitherto unused
documentary sources. Although Bonnet reverted to the late nineteenth century school of thought and thus ignored Picard, his findings and those of Daudet formed the foundation of a book by Carçot and an article by Ruby. The deterioration of relations between Moreau and Napoleon was well documented by Picard, and Daudet investigated the motive of the General's return to Europe in 1813. The vital subject that did not receive detailed attention in this period was the question of Moreau's alleged involvement in the conspiracy of 1804 and serious study of this matter appears long overdue.

The investigation of one of the charges against Moreau, the meeting in the boulevard de la Madeleine and the generally low calibre of treatment it was given by his biographers writing after 1814 casts doubt upon the manner in which they discussed the remaining testimony. A study of this rendez-vous also reveals that it was not damaging to the General. A number of the biographers of 1814 produced sufficient information from the trial to suggest strongly that more of the allegations against Moreau were similarly unfounded and that the Government used extraordinary measures to secure a guilty verdict. Moreover, this impression was heightened by the discoveries Daudet and Picard made in sources other than the transcript.

Picard was much struck by the report of an audience which General Decaen had with Napoleon in 1803. Decaen defended Moreau, but to no avail. Napoleon maintained that there was but one course of action
for those who found themselves in opposition to government and that was to absent themselves from public life. After bemoaning the fact that Moreau was not ambitious like Bernadotte, the Emperor asked Decaen if it was money that motivated Moreau. The General emerged from Picard's work as an ardent republican and lover of liberty, and thus a man much misjudged by the Emperor. There is also reason to believe that Napoleon was not the only one to misunderstand Moreau. Further research and dispassionate study are clearly warranted. Napoleon was able to influence the legal decision against Moreau, but there is no reason why the verdict of history should rest also with him.

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2Picard, p. 398.
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Philippart, John, Memoirs etc. etc. of General Moreau. London: Colburn, 1814. (293p)


C. Late nineteenth century


D. Twentieth century


II. Book reviews


III. Primary Sources


This work has appended to it thirteen Pièces justificatives. The ones used most in this thesis were:

No. 2. comprised of Moreau's letter to the Directors dated 24 Fructidor an 5, his proclamation dated 23 Fructidor an 5 and his letter to Barthélemy dated 29 Fructidor an 5 (19 Fructidor an 5).

No. 5. "Discours prononcé par le général Moreau au tribunal criminel spéciale du département de la Seine."

No. 6. "Mémoire justificatif du général Moreau."

No. 12. "Eloge funèbre de Moreau, prononcé à Saint-Petersbourg."

No. 13. "Proposition faite au Sénat, le 26 avril 1814, par le comte Lanjuinais, et renvoyée par le Sénat à une Commission, pour en faire son rapport sous un mois, lorsque le nouveau Gouvernement constitutionnelle sera en activité."


Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur universelle No. 359 Nonid. 29 Fructidor an 5 vendredi 15 September 1797 column 3.


Receuil des interrogatoires subis par le général Moreau, Paris: Imprimerie impériale, 1804.


IV. Secondary sources


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