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PARADIGMS:

THE LATER WITTGENSTEIN'S VIEW OF MEANING

by

© Christine M. Koggel

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Abstract

Standard interpretations of the later Wittgenstein's work and in particular, of the first 100 remarks of the Philosophical Investigations see 'criteria' as Wittgenstein's positive contribution to an account of meaning. This thesis re-examines the first 65 remarks of the Investigations.

Here, Wittgenstein evaluates the Augustinian, Lockean-type and Tractarian simple referential accounts of meaning. He demonstrates that a simple referential theory cannot account for universals, speech acts, purposes and kinds of words -- features that are necessary to an account of the meaning of words. The critique, however, is not a complete rejection of referentialism. This is where my interpretation deviates from the standard ones. There needs to be some account of how language is tied to the world in a definite way. Paradigms emerge from the critique of simple referentialism and provide these connecting links. Wittgenstein then introduces criteria in the remarks following 65 as linguistic devices secondary to paradigms.
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There are other friends who helped in many ways. The following people, in particular, deserve mention: my parents and my brother Tony for providing secluded and quiet workplaces when they were much needed, Janet who proofread the long final copy and Christine Wirta who typed the thesis.
List of Abbreviations

References to the works by Wittgenstein are incorporated into the text itself. The works and the precise quotations are abbreviated according to the following conventions. The full bibliographical information is contained in the Bibliography.

Notebooks 1914-1916 as NB followed by the page number.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as TLP followed by the proposition number.
"Remarks on Logical Form" as "RLF" followed by the page number.
Philosophical Grammar as PG followed by the page number.
The Blue and Brown Books as BB followed by the page number.
Philosophical Investigations as PI followed by the paragraph number.
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics as RFM followed by the section and paragraph number.
Zettel as Z followed by the paragraph number.
On Certainty as OC followed by the paragraph number.

For the most part, all other authors each have one major work that is used. In these cases, the footnotes cite the author and page number of the text. The full bibliographical information for these texts can be found in the Bibliography. In those cases in which an author has more
than one work, and in those cases in which I refer to articles, the footnote generally gives the full bibliographical data.
Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1

CHAPTER 1

Introduction .......................................... 7
I. Augustine: *Confessions*, Book 1, Chapter 8 .... 9
II. A Lockeian Theory of Meaning ................... 15
III. The *Tractatus* Theory of Meaning ............ 23
IV. Language-Game 2 .................................. 32
   a) Universals ................................... 35
   b) Purposes ................................... 38
   c) Speech Acts .................................. 42
V. The Expansion of Language-Game 2 .............. 47

CHAPTER 2

Introduction ........................................ 53
I. Ostensive Definition ............................... 56
   a) Absence of Ostensive Definition in
      Language-Game 2 ............................. 58
   b) Evaluation of Robert Arrington's
      Argument for Ostensive Definition ....... 63
II. Ostensive Teaching and Training ................. 67
   a) A Kind of Word ............................. 69
   b) A Universal ................................. 75
   c) The Role of Ostensive Definitions ....... 80
III. Summarizing and Looking Ahead ................. 85
CHAPTER 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. The \textit{Tractatus} and Initial Reactions to It</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) The Word in the Proposition</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) The Referentialism of the \textit{Tractatus}</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Philosophy Versus Psychology or Metaphysics Versus Epistemology</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) The Shift From Metaphysics to Epistemology</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Wittgenstein's Criticism of the \textit{Tractatus}</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Words as Names</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Simples: An Incoherent Notion</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Conclusion</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Remark 50</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) The Standard Metre: An Analogous Case?</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) The Nature of the Paradigm</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Simples to Samples</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Remark 50 in Perspective</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Definiteness of Sense - Retained?</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Recapitulation of Traditional Accounts</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) The \textit{Investigations}' Approach</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Definiteness of Sense in the \textit{Investigations}.</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Definiteness of Sense With Openendedness</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b) The Common Appeal of Criteria . . . . 158

c) The Realism Versus Conventionalism
   Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

d) Definiteness of Sense Secured By
   Paradigms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

IV. Remarks 51-59: The Nature of the Connection
   Between Language and the World . . . . 173

   a) The Mental Image as Sufficient? . . . 175

   b) Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
INTRODUCTION

'What is meaning?' is a question that has gained tremendous importance in modern philosophy. Although issues that can be considered relevant to the question of meaning are present in even the earliest philosophical works, these issues were not regarded as of central philosophical importance and were mostly considered to be interesting sidelines to the real substance of philosophical inquiry. Plato talks about names in his later dialogues, Augustine describes how he learned to speak in his Confessions and Locke and Hume's concern about ideas led to some discussion of concepts. It is less important to be clear about when the direct examination into the question of meaning became a major concern than it is to be aware that even the very first philosophers take it for granted that all words are names and that the familiar relation between a thing and its name makes it natural to hold that the meaning of a word (a name) is the object to which it refers. The very first steps taken into the philosophy of language show the unquestioned acceptance of this model of meaning. Frege, Moore, and Russell are familiar philosophers who work with this model in their theories of meaning. The early Wittgenstein, the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, is another such philosopher. The question of meaning, we shall see, is one with which Wittgenstein was
consistently preoccupied. The later Wittgenstein's rejection of the traditional accounts of meaning is the starting place for this study of meaning.

The later Wittgenstein has been generally viewed as a critic bent on destroying prevalent and traditional conceptions of meaning. The opening remarks of the *Philosophical Investigations* tend to give support for this view. It commences with an evaluation of Augustine and soon thereafter embarks on a devastating criticism of the Tractarian theory of meaning. I do not deny that the *Philosophical Investigations* shows a Wittgenstein who is unsympathetic towards traditional theories and pictures of meaning and, in particular, towards his earlier self. My objection to this portrayal of the later Wittgenstein is simple. I do not think that the opening remarks of the *Investigations* are purely destructive. There are many positive observations contained in the first 65 remarks of the *Investigations* which when pieced together form a very coherent and cogent account of meaning. In essence, my work is the piecing together of these observations.

The legitimacy and importance of this project depends on a clarification of a few misconceptions about Wittgenstein's claims concerning his own work. In apparent support of the common interpretation of the later Wittgenstein is the following remark:

*Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.)* (PI 118)
In addition most philosophers familiar with the later Wittgenstein are quite aware of his remark that philosophy "may not advance any kind of theory ... it must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place." (PI 109) In combination, the two comments seem to justify the predominant tendency to see the later Wittgenstein as some one who simply destroys traditional pictures and theories of meaning without reconstructing a more adequate and correct account of meaning. Wittgenstein emphasizes the critical side of his work because he is battling against some very dominant theories and ideas in the history of philosophy. This does not mean that this is his sole preoccupation in the Investigations.

In order to capture both the negative and positive dimensions at work in the first 65 remarks of the Investigations, the two currents of criticism of traditional accounts and of observations on the meanings of words in our language will be simultaneously presented. In general, this study matches the ordering of the first 65 remarks of the Investigations, but sometimes evaluative discussions will make use of remarks that appear in later sections of the Investigations and even in some of Wittgenstein's other major works. The procedure of following the ordering of the first 65 remarks will single out and highlight issues from both dimensions so that the later Wittgenstein's account of the meaning of words will be presented. As this study unfolds, it will become clear that my discussion deviates radically
from the common interpretations of the later Wittgenstein's account of meaning.

It is important to note that Wittgenstein opens the *Investigations* by presenting a picture that symbolizes the crucial and dominant tendency towards pure referentialism. In the first chapter, I will show the strength of this tendency to see the meaning of a word as some entity of which the word is the name by giving quick previews of Augustine's very simple and pure referential picture, of Locke's more sophisticated yet essentially pure referential theory, and of the very sophisticated Tractarian referential theory of meaning. From this base, I admittedly draw out of Wittgenstein's response to Augustine, the builders' example, more than is apparent. The reasons for this are as follows. I want to present a convincing case for viewing Wittgenstein as a reconstructive philosopher and this necessitates explicating and highlighting the ideas that issue from the attacks on simple referentialism. Without doubt, the builders' example is designed to present essential features that are absent from traditional theories and pictures of meaning. The second half of Chapter 1 is meant to highlight these features, namely, universals, speech acts, kinds of words and purposes. Their individual and collective importance in an account of meaning is given detailed discussion in Chapter 2 where I supply accounts of how we might learn the meaning of a few words. Essentially, this second chapter provides descriptions of Wittgenstein's use of the notions of ostensive teaching and
training that strongly suggest the centrality of paradigms in Wittgenstein's account of the meaning of words.

In Chapter 2, the 'theory' of paradigms can only be given in bare outline; for its development and full expression depends on the evaluation of some parts of the Tractarian theory of meaning. In Chapter 3, I examine the Tractarian issues and arguments that are directly relevant to the thesis that paradigms are necessary in the structure of our language. These include most of the main Tractarian doctrines against which the later Wittgenstein levels his somewhat unsympathetic and apparently unfair attacks. Keeping in mind the observations gleaned from the remarks on the builders and on ostensive teaching and training while also carefully following the critique of the Tractatus from remarks 39 through to remark 50 makes it obvious that the concept of a paradigm, which is formally introduced in remark 50, needs to be considered one of the later Wittgenstein's central contributions to an account of meaning. Chapter 3 prepares the way for Chapter 4's full description of the paradigm model as Wittgenstein's central and primary solution to the problems inherent in pure referential theories and pictures of meaning.

This very general overview of the project is designed to prepare the way for an escape from the mold of interpretation that most commentators have created. By making it clear that the remarks in the Investigations are ordered in such a way that positive comments come out of critical evaluations of pure referentialism, I want to make room for
a re-examination of Wittgenstein's account of meaning.

Focusing on the remarks on language-game situations in which the referring gesture is made indicates that Wittgenstein does not eliminate referentialism (this is the tie between language and the world). Seeing the centrality of paradigms is recognizing that Wittgenstein criticizes the pure referential theories and pictures of meaning in order to reformulate the ideas that underlie this basic and natural tendency.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The *Philosophical Investigations* opens by presenting a traditional and natural picture of the meaning of words. I will start with Augustine's description of how he learned to speak, both in recognition of the importance of Wittgenstein's ordering of his remarks and also as the point of departure for a discussion of two other theories of meaning. Together the three accounts of meaning will set the stage for the unveiling of Wittgenstein's positive observations on the meaning of words in our language.

This chapter is divided into two major areas of study, each of which serves specific functions in the thesis as a whole. In the first half, I will introduce three traditional pictures or theories of meaning, namely, Augustine's, Locke's and the one found in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, as being representations of simple referential accounts of the meanings of words. In brief, a simple referential account is one in which the meaning of a word is taken to be the entity to which it refers. After each summary of these three accounts, I will give a preview of a few of the immediate and obvious problems that face each of them. This task will not only reveal the common tendencies in these pictures or theories of meaning, but it will raise suspicions relevant to the different accounts. Because the three accounts together
constitute most of the ideas and theories against which the attacks in the first 60 remarks of the *Investigations* are directed, the study in the first half of this chapter will provide a background against which Wittgenstein's negative and positive observations can be understood. For the more restricted purposes of this chapter, however, the initial evaluations of the three pictures and theories of meaning will introduce the positive observations that emerge from Wittgenstein's evaluation of Augustine.

The positive observations form the substance of the second half of this chapter. There, I will explore in some detail Wittgenstein's comments concerning the builders in remarks 2 and 8 of the *Investigations*. These remarks on the builders are both destructive of the traditional tendency to accept a simple referential theory of meaning and instructive in their observations on what traditional pictures of meaning leave out of account. In the course of the evaluation of remark 2, three different and important features in the structure of our language will be highlighted: that the majority of words in our language are universals, words that have numerous cases subsumed under them; that the purposes for which a word is invented are a determining factor in the meaning of a word; and that words get their meanings from being used in speech acts. A separate discussion of remark 8 will reveal the additional observation that an acknowledgement that there are different kinds of words that fit into different parts of speech acts is necessary. A description of how a few different
kinds of words are understood also reveals that words project onto reality in different ways (have different modes of projection) and that this is evident in the particular rules connected with each kind of word. All of these features are either glossed over in the traditional pictures and theories of meaning in the interest of a generalized view of words or they are improperly and inadequately dealt with as a result of the tendency to focus on the undifferentiated projection of a word onto a particular 'object'.

I. Augustine: Confessions, Book I, Chapter 8

A preliminary note: whether or not Augustine actually held the views that have since been attributed to him will not be an issue here. I am using Augustine simply as a vehicle for exposing certain traditional tendencies in theories of meaning and for getting at the real substance of Wittgenstein's positive observations on the structure of our language; in particular those that are contained in his description of the builders and the games that they learn to play. Augustine was not trying to develop a theory of meaning in his somewhat innocent autobiographical description of how he learned to speak and he might have disavowed much of what Wittgenstein and others have since attributed to him.

The quotation that I use to expound Augustine's picture of meaning is longer than the one given by Wittgenstein in remark 1. Some of Augustine's thoughts surrounding the description of the view that the meaning of a word is the object to
which it refers bring out his assumptions concerning the nature of man. An evaluation of these assumptions not only aids in an understanding of the total picture of meaning that Wittgenstein attacks in his description of the builders in remarks 2 and 8, but it reveals some of the assumptions that traditional pictures and theories of meaning are forced to make.

... later on I realized how I had learnt to speak. It was not my elders who showed me the words by some set system of construction, in the way that they taught me to read not long afterwards; but, instead, I taught myself by using the intelligence which you, my God, gave to me. For when I tried to express my meaning by crying out and making various sounds and movements, so that my wishes should be obeyed, I found that I could not convey all that I meant or make myself understood by everyone whom I wished to understand me. So my memory prompted me. I noticed that people would name some object and then turn towards whatever it was that they named. I watched them and understood that the sound they made when they wanted to indicate that particular thing was the name which they gave to it, and their actions clearly showed what they meant, for there is a kind of universal language, consisting of expressions of the face and eyes, gestures and tones of voice, which can show whether a person means to ask for something and get it, or refuse it and have nothing to do with it. So, by hearing words arranged in various phrases and constantly repeated, I gradually pieced together what they stood for, and when my tongue had mastered the pronunciation, I began to express my wishes by means of them.¹

Augustine's reminiscence seems to contain what I shall call a simple referential theory of meaning. Augustine describes how he 'noticed' that the people who taught him to speak would point to an 'object' and utter a sound as they pointed. What

he claims to recall is that he came to grasp that the sound
they uttered was the 'name' of the 'particular thing' that
the adult wanted to direct his attention to. Because Augustine
describes the meaning of words in terms of learning what
'name' to associate with a particular 'object', he has been
taken to have held that all words are names (in the sense of
proper names) and that these names are rather like labels for
objects.

In the quotation cited above, there is evidence for
the suggestion that Augustine was not so naive as to suppose
that learning a language consisted merely in 'guessing' the
object of the pointing gesture. Augustine speaks of 'wishing',
'attempting', and 'expressing' as innate inner states that
helped him to grasp what the adults were pointing to. He
claims to 'remember' 'attempting' to 'express' what he 'wished'
for and 'discovering' that the sounds and movements that he
used to express those wishes were not always understood by
others. The description indicates that Augustine assumes
that he already had and understood the purposes for the pointing
gesture because he was self-consciously aware of his inner
states. Acquiring a language consisted in being able to link
names and objects.

The child is innately aware of the intentions and
wishes that he has and he knows that he needs to attempt to
express these things. It is in having the attempts frustrated
that he comes to put the words that his elders use for the
concepts to the things that he wishes for. The child in
Augustine's picture has everything but the actual words. Curiously, he must even learn to give 'names' to the intentional and inner states that he is already aware of. An earlier translation of the *Confessions* emphasizes more radically the notion that these intentional concepts were already within (a kind of private language) and that the first step in making these innate ideas known to others consisted in practising the sounds already stored in memory prior to the ability to speak: "But I myself, when I was unable to communicate all I wished to say to whomever I wished by means of whimperings and grunts and various gestures of my limbs (which I used to reinforce my demands), I myself repeated the sounds already stored in my memory by the mind which thou, O my God, hadst given to me."\(^2\) Augustine's conception of man as possessing innate abilities and capacities gives the child all the linguistic skills and abilities except for the ability to pronounce the words. The child is made to be already aware of the purposes for and the functions of words in speech acts. Augustine sums up how he learned to communicate by writing in the quotation cited at the beginning of this section that he "pieced together what they /names/ stood for".

The immediate reaction to this simple referential account of the meaning of words is to deny that each and every object is individually named -- that all of the words in our

language function like proper names rather than like concepts. Augustine's description of the connection between a word and its object makes it seem as though he was not aware of the fact that the majority of words in our language are concept words that 'stand for' or 'name' many 'objects' of the 'same' kind. However, even if he just failed to make this clear in his description, his propensity to describe the acquisition of language in terms of learning the 'names' of objects cannot account for our use of universals. Even if we assume that the child is born with the linguistic apparatus to permit him to grasp what words 'stand for', this does not describe how the child is able to extend the use of a universal to cover new cases, to imagine new cases that are possible extensions for a universal, or even to doubt particular cases that another person puts under a certain universal. I will show in the subsection on universals in the section "Language-game 2" that the abilities to doubt, judge and imagine cases are aspects vital to a description of our use of universals. For now, it is sufficient to remark that Augustine's picture cannot accommodate this feature of universals.

Other initial objections to an account like Augustine's revolve around his idea that the child has innate linguistic skills that enable him both to grasp what a word stands for...

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3For the most part, I use the words 'concept' and 'universal' interchangeably throughout the thesis. It should be noted, however, that I use 'concept' to capture the idea that most words stand for more than one 'object' or case. The word 'universal', on the other hand, is used to draw out the implications of the question of boundaries for concepts.
and to place that word in the appropriate places in speech acts. Showing that this idea is ultimately incoherent will reveal the need to discuss the features of kinds of words, speech acts and purposes. It would be too generous to say that Augustine's description of intentional concepts accounts for a child's ability to handle different kinds of words and to be aware of the purposes for which the word is used in speech acts. The distinctions among different kinds of words and the multiplicity of purposes related to the function and aim of a word will be discussed in the latter half of this chapter. There, the extent to which purposes determine the meaning of a word as well as the fact that purposes vary from one linguistic community to the next and from one language-game to the next will be made manifest. In addition, the description of the language-game context in relation to remarks 2 and 8 will reveal how important it is to be aware of the differences among kinds of words and of the primacy of the speech act in an account of meaning. From these glimpses of what the description of language-games is meant to reveal, it is already evident that it is impossible to expect that the child's innate repertoire of purposes and intentions corresponds to the purposes and intentions of those in the language-community that he is born into.

The need for a discussion of the language-game situation will become more evident in the description of the builders. It is remarkable that Augustine failed to recognize the importance of purposes in an account of meaning. He merely
assumes that the pointing gesture in isolation from particular language-games and language communities unambiguously determines the meaning of a word. Because Augustine focuses on a simple referential account of meaning as it is exemplified by the ostensive gesture, he can only account for the acquisition of a language, the communication achieved by speech acts, by making the knowledge of the distinctions among kinds of words and of the purposes of language-users innate. There is, therefore, no real explanation of the acquisition of language. In the last half of this chapter and in Chapter 2, the details of these initial objections and attacks on an Augustinian account will be given.

II. A Lockean Theory of Meaning

Peter Hacker in Insight and Illusion, makes the claim that Locke's theory can be considered as representative of much of what Wittgenstein attacks in the Investigations:

Locke's theories ... are an exceptionally good example of the kind of conception of language and thought that Wittgenstein was criticizing. None of the great classical empiricists was so self-consciously concerned with a theory of meaning and language as Locke. None of them so explicitly advocated a theory of the relation between language and the world which so exactly fits Wittgenstein's conception of a private language.

There are two separate but related ideas contained in this quotation. First, Locke was openly and explicitly concerned with a theory of meaning and secondly, his theory of the

'Hacker, p. 217.'
relation between language and the world led to particular explanations of man's ability to speak a language. A study of the first issue will reveal why Locke has almost universally been taken to be another simple referential theorist of meaning. The second issue develops from his arguments concerning the first and has been taken to be an obvious description of a private language. In this section, I will discuss the two issues in turn. I delay a detailed discussion of the implications of the second part, however, until the final chapter, for this issue is directly relevant to Wittgenstein's anti-private language arguments.

I noted in the last section that Augustine seems to be describing all words as proper names, but that this may have been no more than his failure to verbalize his awareness of the fact that the majority of words in our language are universals or concept-words. Early in his explanation of the meaning of words, Locke observes that the greater part of words in our language do not name particulars, but are words that represent classes of things. Whereas Augustine did not make this observation clear in his description, Locke acknowledges the absurdity of holding that each and every object has a particular name:

The use of words then being to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular idea that we take in should have a distinct name, names must be endless. To prevent this, the mind makes the particular ideas received from particular objects to become general ... this is called ABSTRACTION, whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the
The kind and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas.\(^5\)

This quotation is also useful because its explanation of the use of words as "outward marks of our internal ideas" is typical and symptomatic of Locke's ideational referential theory of meaning. It will be recalled that Augustine held that the meaning of a word is the object in the world to which it refers. Locke supports the conception of a word as a name (he refers to the 'names' for ideas in the quotation above) but for him, the meaning of the 'name' is the idea to which it refers: "the mind having got an idea which it thinks it may have use of either in contemplation or discourse, the first thing it does is to abstract it, and then get a name to it; and so lay it up in its storehouse, the memory, as containing the essence of a sort of things, of which that name is always to be the mark."\(^6\)

I call Locke's theory of meaning an ideational referential theory because the meaning of a word is taken to be the idea to which it refers. However, a full description of the theory as Locke presents it is not without complications. In the first quotation cited above, Locke says that the names are "applicable to whatever exists". This does not alter the basic conception of meaning as the reference to ideas, but it does correct some misconceptions about how these ideas are generated. Locke is a realist and he also professes to be

\(^5\)Locke, II.xi.9.

\(^6\)Locke, II.xxxii.7.
opposed to the notion that there are innate linguistic abilities.' The objects in the world impress themselves upon the mind and ideas are formed in this way. As Locke writes in the quotation cited above, in the case of concept-words (Locke writes 'names'), the mind performs an act of abstraction in making the ideas gathered from particular objects general.6 According to Locke, this abstraction and eventual storing of the ideas in memory sufficiently explains how one can use a word successfully. Memory, the "storehouse of ideas" produces the correct exemplar as the speaker has need of it. Memory ensures that the speaker will use the same sign for the same idea.

This description of the way in which the meaning of a word is grasped connects with the private language problem. If memory is the storehouse of ideas and if these ideas need to be referred to in order to know what words mean, then it seems as though an individual can acquire a language privately. In fact, Locke acknowledges this when he admits that ideas for the same concept may vary from individual to individual ("if the idea that a violet produced in one man's mind by his

7Locke, II.i.1 and I.ii.1.

6There do seem to be exceptions to Locke's view that all words refer to ideas got from substances. In the case of words that name mixed modes, the words are made by a "voluntary collection of ideas ... independent from any original patterns in nature" (II.v.5) and the meanings of these words can be grasped before the ideas of them are had. (III.v.15) Although in this case it does seem as though Locke comes close to describing the convention of settling what a word means, at bottom, the word refers to the constitutive simple ideas which must be had to invent the word. The words that Locke calls 'Particles', however, are real exceptions to the ideational referential theory. Words of "connexion, restriction, distinction, opposition and emphasis" used in sentences do not refer to ideas as such. (III.vii)
eyes were the same that a marigold produced in another man's". Rather than seeing this as a problem for his theory of meaning as a whole, however, he merely notes that this is an inevitable consequence of the fact that one man cannot perceive what appears in another man's mind.  

According to Locke, therefore, the primary and major use of language is to record the individual's own thoughts: "The use men have of these marks being either to record their own thoughts, for the assistance of their own memory; or as it were, to bring out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others; words, in their primary and immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them". As long as the signs that are used by the individual are used consistently (a condition that Locke assumes to be satisfied by the reliability of memory), an individual can have his own meaningful language. That the private linguist also succeeds in communicating with others is a secondary function of language which is made possible by the private linguist's ability to let other speakers know what is going on in his head. The ability to communicate with others is parasitic on the individual's ability to consistently conjoin words and ideas, for once this is mastered,

9Locke, II.xxxii.15.  
10Locke, II.xxxii.15.  
11Locke, III.ii.2.  
the constant use of a word supposedly comes to excite in the hearer the same idea.

Both parts of Locke's theory of meaning have now been summarized: the notion that words are names and have particular referents and the notion that words refer to particular entities, namely, ideas for classes. Focusing first of all on Locke's theory as a referential theory recalls many of my initial objections to Augustine. Unlike Augustine, Locke does make his awareness of the importance of concepts clear, but like Augustine, his account does not explain our use of universals. Describing the fixing of ideas in memory through the experience of "external sensible objects" and through the "internal operations of the mind" does not account for the abilities to extend universals to cover new cases and to imagine new and merely possible cases to place under them.

In addition, even though Locke does differentiate among ideas through the differences in how they are acquired (simple ideas, ideas of mixed modes, ideas of substances, particles), he does not make the distinctions among the different kinds of words (colour words, object words, place and object indicators, numbers, etc.). I argued in the section on Augustine that Augustine's reliance on a simple referential account of meaning forces him to hold that the child is already aware of the different kinds of words as different. The notion that external objects impress ideas on the mind of the individual speaker also gives no account of the fact that different kinds of words project onto reality
in different ways. Presumably in Locke's account the projection functions in reverse, for it is the powers in external objects that impress ideas on the mind which are then given names (Locke speaks of colour, shape and object words all as names). Locke's description of how the child learns to speak by 'naming' the ideas that are caused by things outside of one cannot account for the different modes of projection connected with the different kinds of words. Partly as a consequence of this inadequacy but more fundamentally, Locke's account does not explain how the child is able to perform speech acts. Without an acknowledgement of the different kinds of words and of the rules of syntax, rules that give one the knowledge of the proper combinations for words or their proper places in sentences, it is difficult to imagine how the child is able to fit the word for the idea into the complex linguistic structure.

Part of the blame can be put on Locke's failure to recognize the importance of purposes and of speech acts in an account of meaning. This objection was also brought against Augustine. The tendency to generalize the case for all words by claiming that the meaning of a word is the object to which it refers removes any possibility of differentiating among different kinds of words and it makes one blind to the need to discuss speech acts. This is because in such accounts, all words are taken to function in the same way. The importance

\[13\] Locke, \textit{II}.xi.9 and \textit{II}.xxx.2.
of considering that there are different modes of projection and different syntactical rules for the meaningful combinations of words will be given substance in the section on remark 8 in this chapter and in the opening section of Chapter 2. Both Locke and Augustine will be criticized for assuming that a description of meaning in terms of the reference to particular entities can explain how a language-user in a linguistic community grasps the purposes for which the word was invented and masters the ability to perform meaningful speech acts with words.

Locke has these objections to contend with and more. As I mentioned in the introduction to this section, his notion that language is the recording of ideas contained in memory connects with the notion of a private language which Wittgenstein battles to destroy. Very early in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein singles out this type of referential theory when he questions whether or not the builders need to refer to ideas in order to know the meaning of the words. (PI 6) As the material in this thesis unfolds parallel to the remarks in the *Investigations*, it will become evident that Locke's argument that the reference to ideas is a sufficient account of the meaning of words in our language is ultimately wrong. It is important to keep in mind that the anti-private language argument is in the background of Wittgenstein's negative evaluation of traditional tendencies. In Chapter 4, in the section on Remarks 51-59, Locke's view of language is brought to the forefront. The criticism of it in that section is
instrumental in an argument which I will give there for the necessity of paradigms.

III. The Tractatus Theory of Meaning

Augustine’s description of how he learned to speak was presented as a very natural picture of meaning and Locke’s direct concern with a theory of meaning was shown to be an advancement on Augustine’s picture. I will introduce the Tractatus by describing it as a sophisticated theory of meaning that attempts to answer and solve the problems that these traditional pictures and theories of meaning encounter. One of the main projects of the Tractatus is to take the referential account of meaning to its ultimate conclusions. One of the aims of this section will be to demonstrate that the Tractatus theory is a sophisticated version of a referential theory and to show that it still falls prey to some of the same basic problems that confront traditional pictures and theories of meaning. Another task is to introduce Wittgenstein’s essay, “Remarks on Logical Form”, as a vehicle suitable for raising suspicions about the Tractatus architectonic. This essay presents the first doubts that Wittgenstein had about the Tractatus and serves to pin-point some of the more blatant errors contained in Wittgenstein’s early work.

It is important to keep in mind that this section is only meant to be a simplified summary of the Tractatus. I want to show the historical stronghold that simple referential theories and pictures of meaning have had on conceptions of
meaning. Summarizing the Tractatus will fit it into this tradition and make it susceptible to some of the same objections made against Augustine and Locke. I cannot give detailed discussions of the Tractatus or of the objections to it here because this requires an understanding of the remarks that lead up to remark 39 — the start of the anti-Tractarian remarks. Following the progression of the Investigations' remarks and revealing the positive observations that emerge from the evaluation of Augustine will show the kinds of arguments that Wittgenstein brings against the Tractatus. A discussion of these arguments will be given in Chapter 3. There, I will argue that the destruction of the putative need for simples is done with the use of very particular kinds of attacks. In Chapter 4, I will show how this destruction is a key step in Wittgenstein's argument for the central notion of the paradigm.

The early Wittgenstein can be said to have been concerned with answering the Kantian type question, 'How is a meaningful language possible?' Wittgenstein took his search for the conditions necessary for a meaningful language to be the task of explaining how language is tied to the world in a definite way. Performing this philosophical task could then show the limits of the sayable beyond which what appeared in propositional form was mere nonsense or a senseless combination of signs. According to Wittgenstein, the apparently vague propositions of ordinary language mask a system of propositions with definite sense. When the propositions of
ordinary language are individually analyzed, they will reveal
themselves as pictures of the particular states of affairs
that make up the world -- their definite sense will be
displayed. If Wittgenstein could succeed in formulating a
theory that would describe how the propositions of ordinary
language could be analyzed into propositions that mirrored
the facts in the world in a true or false way, then philosophy
would have the status of a science that could reveal the
essence of things in the world.

Wittgenstein sets out to perform this task by taking
note of the similarities between a fact and a proposition.
Facts are the existence or non-existence of states of affairs
which are composed of objects concatenated in a particular
way. Wittgenstein saw the propositions of ordinary language
as pictures of the states of affairs and he saw the elements
of the proposition as names for the objects in the states
of affairs. The latter view is a direct acceptance of the
simple referential model of meaning. Wittgenstein writes:
"a name means an object: the object is its meaning". (TLP
3.203) Fixing the proposition to a state of affairs requires
the determination of referents for the elements of the pro-
position, the names. The postulation of simples to which the
simple signs, the names, refer, is the natural extension of
the need to fix a word with an object to secure its meaning.
Arguing that the objects need to be simple (TLP 2.02),
unalterable (TLP 2.023), and necessarily existent (TLP 2.024)
ensures that a word will always have meaning: even in a world
in which ordinary objects disappear and are destroyed. Neither Locke
nor Augustine could account for what happens to the meaning
of a word when the referent disappears.

Another one of the things that differentiates this
referential theory of meaning from the traditional theories
and pictures, however, is Wittgenstein's insistence that
words have meaning only in the context of the proposition.
Propositions have sense because they picture truly or falsely.
Words do not picture, but they are labels for objects. Words
are the elements of propositions and it is by guaranteeing
that they label particular objects that the sense of the
proposition, a concatenation of names (TLP 4.22 and 4.2211),
is considered definite. By making it possible for each and
every proposition to have a unique analysis, the names in the
elementary proposition could be projected onto reality name
to object and the whole proposition could unambiguously
represent a particular state of affairs.

This summary of the Tractatus gives the bare structure
of one of the themes in the Tractatus architectonic. It will
be useful to make note of two sophistications in the Tractarian
theory before we turn to evaluate it. They can be taken as
warnings against viewing the Tractatus as a purely referential
theory.

The first concerns the suggestion that Wittgenstein
assimilated all words to the naming function model. The fact
that Wittgenstein states that propositions are concatenations
of names (TLP 4.22) does not mean that all words are names,
but rather than when a proposition is completely analyzed, the words that are not names (that do not refer to objects) will disappear. Wittgenstein writes:

The possibility of propositions is based on the principle that objects have signs as their representations.

My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts.

(TLP 4.0312)

Once each individual sign signifies, then the rules of logical syntax go without saying. (TLP 3.334) Presumably, this is an attempt to explain the grammatical structure of the proposition. The rules of logic permit certain combinations. At first glance, substituting a word from one logical category for a word in a proposition and yielding a nonsensical proposition does seem to allow for an account of parts of speech and grammatical categories, for the substitution will show the proper places for words in propositions. However, putting the onus on the language-user to decide whether or not the combination of signs makes sense introduces the possibility of giving the language-user a part in the determination of the rules of syntax. A detailed study of this possibility will be deferred until Chapter 3 where noting the absence of a description of the language-user is a key element in dismantling the Tractarian theory of meaning. In the paragraphs that follow the next, suggestions of such criticisms will be given, for Wittgenstein became aware of this problem as early as "Remarks on Logical Form".
The other preliminary warning regarding the evaluation of the *Tractatus* concerns the tendency to speculate about the nature of the 'objects' in the *Tractatus*. I have already listed a few of the things that Wittgenstein says about them. Wittgenstein deliberately chose not to characterize simple objects because by nature they are not the sorts of things that can be characterized. They are postulated to fill the demand for definiteness of sense. We will come to see in Chapters 3 and 4 that even the things that are said about them, paradoxically, cannot be said about them.

This point is important in an assessment of whether or not the *Tractatus* accounts for universals. It will be recalled that Augustine was not overtly aware of universals in his description and that his picture certainly could not account for our ability to extend classes to cover new and possible cases. Locke's theory was lacking in a description of the second point. The situation in the *Tractatus* is a bit more complicated. An immediate reaction to Wittgenstein's refusal to acknowledge the need to show what an object was actually like is to remark that this seems to miss altogether the possibility of thinking of them as either universals or particulars. A full development of this issue will be given in Chapter 3 where the absence of an account of universals and in particular of the possibility of extending universals to cover new and possible cases is shown to be one of the many flaws that start to make the *Tractatus* theory crumble.
An examination of Wittgenstein's essay "Remarks on Logical Form" will not only introduce a few of the other initial suspicions worth raising against the Tractatus, but it will also indicate the direction that Wittgenstein eventually saw that a theory of meaning had to take. It will suggest that the Investigations developed out of a growing awareness that the traditional approach or attitude towards the meaning of words in our language had to be rejected outright. The Tractatus ended with a picture that had language tied to the world by having a system of individual and independent propositions that mirrored independent states of affairs. In the "Remarks on Logical Form", Wittgenstein thinks of two cases that present a serious problem for this picture. Different colour words and number words cannot be thought of as appearing in separate and independent propositions, for the possibility of a colour word appearing in a proposition with sense is dependent on certain other propositions that exclude all the other colours. The same can be noted of numbers. Wittgenstein writes:

And numbers will have to enter these forms when -- as we should say in ordinary language -- we are dealing with properties which admit of gradation, i.e., properties as the length of an interval, the pitch of a tone, the brightness or redness of a shade of colour, etc. It is characteristic of these properties that one degree of them excludes any other. One shade of colour cannot simultaneously have two different degrees of brightness or redness, a tone not two different strengths, etc. ("RLF" pp. 166-7)\(^1\)

\(^1\)I should note that this objection in "RLF" can be considered unproblematic for the Tractatus. The Tractatus

...
With still some desire to save the Tractarian project, Wittgenstein did not actually incorporate an answer to these problems into the theory, but he made suggestions as to how this could be done. Rather than have elementary propositions completely independent of each other, a theory would now have to consider an account of systems of propositions. Colour words, degree words and number words would each belong to different systems that showed the exclusion and degree rules. But even a solution of this sort was soon rejected by Wittgenstein. The idea of formulating or at least acknowledging that there were constitutive rules for different kinds of words led Wittgenstein to have insights into the nature of our language that demanded nothing less than a complete overhauling of the Tractatus.

I mentioned in one of the preliminary notes in this section that the only distinction Wittgenstein made among words was the distinction between the words that referred to 'objects' and those that were non-referential because they were the logical constants. The recognition in the transitional work, "Remarks on Logical Form", of exceptions to the theory of independent propositions is one step on the way to admitting that the view of all words as referring to objects needs to be reexamined. Once the tendency to view all words as individual elements that project onto reality by being names for objects could be interpreted as accounting for the problem by saying that the propositions containing colour words are not elementary and that analyses of these propositions would still allow for the independence of elementary propositions. I side with Wittgenstein's reluctance to accept explanations that are not evident in the Tractatus, and like him, I see the exceptions as genuine problems.
is abandoned, then encouragement is given for considering that words function differently and that different kinds of words project onto reality in different ways. This is one of the insights that the Investigations starts with.

Examining Wittgenstein's transitional work allows for a convenient look backwards and forwards. The Tractatus has problems accounting for colour and number words. The problem is not insurmountable, but it does direct attention to other possible ways of looking at language. When words are examined in terms of different kinds that project onto the world in different ways, the need to bring in a discussion of the language-user who is aware of or who acts in accordance with the constitutive rules of projection becomes obvious. In Chapter 3, the change from the metaphysics and logic of the Tractatus to the epistemology and description of language acquisition in the Investigations, will be justified as a definite improvement in an account of the meaning of words in our language. I make this remark here because it is useful to keep in mind that the Investigations begins with a description of the language-game which is meant to replace the picture of independent propositions. Language-games are whole grammatical systems. They can also be described as expressive of Wittgenstein's decision to focus on the language-user who acquires a language and who learns to perform speech acts. In Chapter 3, I will show how the Tractatus' attempt to leave the language-user out of an account of meaning fails to account for the feature of the speech act as the basic unit of communi-
cation, even though it does account for the proposition as the basic unit of meaning (a word has meaning only on the nexus of a proposition, TLP 3.3). In the next half of this chapter, I will show how Wittgenstein utilizes the notion of the language-game to bring to the forefront the features of kinds of words, speech acts, purposes and universals.

IV. Language-Game 2

In the section on Augustine, I completed Augustine's picture of the meaning of a word as being the object to which it refers by showing that Augustine thought of the child in terms of a language-user already aware of the purposes behind the adult's pointing gesture. The child is born with a repertoire of internal states that correspond to the states of the people who already have a language. This enables the child to pick out the object of the pointing gesture with little difficulty. These observations on Augustine's picture will be more important in Chapter 2 where Wittgenstein's contempt for this account of meaning will be shown through his counter descriptions of the training that the child receives. The rejection of the need to put the linguistic skills and apparatus in the mind of the unborn child, however, is in the background of the description of the builders in remark 2.

Wittgenstein begins the evaluation of Augustine by characterizing the account of meaning contained in that picture in the following way:

These words ... give us a particular picture of the
essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects -- sentences are combinations of such names. -- In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands. (PI 1)

Wittgenstein's first concern is with the primitive tendency to account for meaning simply in terms of the reference to a particular entity. When Wittgenstein states that language-game 2 is a "language for which the description given by Augustine is right", he is concentrating on this tendency towards simple referentialism evident in Augustine's description. What I want to argue, however, is that concurrent with a negative evaluation of Augustine is a positive account of some features of the structure of our language. In this section, I will bring out these two aspects of Wittgenstein's evaluation. On the one hand, I will show Wittgenstein's attempt to take Augustine seriously and literally results in a demonstration that a theory which focuses merely on the naming function is impoverished and ultimately incoherent. More importantly, however, I will also show that the very primitive language-game that Wittgenstein imagines is designed to reveal the importance of considering the features of universals, purposes and speech acts in an account of meaning.

This section will be divided into three subsections, each dealing with one of these features. At the same time as a particular feature is highlighted and elucidated through the description of the builder's activity, the three accounts of meaning given in the first half of this chapter will be
singled out as failing to account for these features. The first subsection will discuss universals. The builders' activity is a bit foreign to us because it is considerably more primitive than ours, but even in their game, they display the ability to operate with classes of objects, universals. It will be recalled that Augustine did not even mention the fact that words in our language stand for more than one object. Even the builders' simple behaviour reveals certain aspects of human nature that go in the direction of illuminating how we operate with universals. The second feature, purposes, will be highlighted as evident in language-game 2 and as important in an account of meaning. I will show that the variety of purposes for which words are invented defies Augustine's acceptance of words functioning in the same way and it also destroys his belief that a child can be aware of these purposes by being acquainted with the object to which a word refers. Lastly, the speech act will be presented as a feature absent in the Lockean and Augustinian accounts, in which words are isolated and can have meaning outside of the sentences in which they occur. I will argue that even in language-game 2, it is obvious that 'slab', 'block', 'pillar' and 'beam' would not be words unless they were also used in speech acts. This is because the speech act is the basic and smallest unit of communication. I will close this subsection with some general remarks on Language-game 2.
a) **Universals**

In language-game 2, the words 'block', 'pillar', 'beam' and 'slab' constitute a language that is allegedly modelled after the Augustinian picture. The words are meant to be 'names' in the Augustinian sense, for they stand for, or name, the different building stones. If it is true that Augustine overlooked the fact that most words in our language stand for more than one object, as seems evident from his description, then it is interesting that already in language-game 2, this feature is clearly evident. The description of language-game 2 makes it clear that the words 'block', 'pillar', 'slab' and 'beam' are not labels for individual objects (the words are not proper names) because the builders must be able to continuously command and fetch the stones in order to build. It should be obvious that with each command, the trained assistant must be able to judge that the slab that is called for is similar to the sort of object he has been trained to associate with the word 'slab'.

Spotlighting the activity of judging one stone to be similar to another called by the same name is already an aspect that is lacking in the Augustinian and Tractarian accounts. Even in this simple language-game where stones are commanded and fetched, the aspects of negation and identity are operative. In order to successfully execute the command, 'slab!', the assistant must have the ability to exclude the three other kinds of stones and he must learn how to identify a 'slab' again when 'slab!' is called another time. This does
not mean that the builders are taught rules for identifying and excluding stones or even that they are aware that they are excluding and identifying, but rather that the training the children receive imparts to them the ability to make judgments of similarity and difference. Contrary to traditional pictures and theories of meaning, these abilities are integral to a description of universals.

Of course, the ability to see similarities and contrasts is not evident at first glance in the builders' behaviour. This is because the builders exhibit a very simple and simplified ability to see similarities and contrasts. From our point of view, the objects included under each universal in language-game 2 are exactly similar to each other and so it does not seem as though judgments of similarity and differences are actually made. Wittgenstein purposely set up the language-game in this way. The abilities that are obvious in our language are stripped out in order to show that even at the most simplistic and uncomplicated level, the aspects of seeing similarities and contrasts are essential to learning how to operate with universals.

In comparison to ourselves, it is obvious that the builders manifest the ability to see similarities and differences in a very simple way. The builders do not know of and would not be able to judge cases that were not exactly similar to the established cases. In other words, their language makes no room for aberrant or abnormal building stones and so they do not need to be able to doubt certain cases or to
extend the classes of blocks to include 'slabs' or 'pillars', say, that are not quite similar to the others. It is not only that they do not need to have these abilities, but also that these abilities display more sophisticated and developed language-games. In the following chapter, I will argue that these more developed language-games of doubting and deciding for new and possible cases are dependent on being trained to make the initial and established links between language and the world.

Even the builders, therefore, exhibit abilities not acknowledged in the Augustinian account or even in Locke's account in which he claims to be concerned with universals. In Locke's account, the speaker is somehow mysteriously able to abstract from the experiences he has of particular objects and form an 'idea' of what the word stands for. When the picture of language-game 2 is expanded to include the abilities to doubt and decide for new and possible cases, Augustine and Locke are left far behind. This observation has already been suggested in the two accounts. The training that the builders receive, however, includes an imparting of the ability to judge.\textsuperscript{15} It is not difficult to see that the builders could be trained to play the more developed language-games of doubting and deciding for new and possible cases. Their ability to see similarities and differences can be seen as a

\textsuperscript{15}In \textit{On Certainty}, in successive remarks, Wittgenstein writes: "From a child up I learnt to judge like this, this is judging. This is how I learned to judge; this I got to know as judgment." (OC 128-129)
good foundation or base for these more developed language-games.

b) Purposes

Wittgenstein begins the description of language-game 2 by announcing that the language he imagines is "meant to serve as communication between a builder A and an assistant B." (PL 2) This description of the language-game context brings the focus away from the solitary and naked act of naming an object or of referring to an object to the purposeful nature of language:

A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words 'block', 'pillar', 'slab', 'beam'. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. (PL 2) (my emphasis)

In the Augustinian and Lockean accounts, learning language consisted in learning to connect words with their referents. Their accounts give descriptions of the acquisition of names for objects in isolation from any influence of purposes. In the description of the builders' activity, by contrast, the fact that the stones have names at all is a consequence of the fact that they are used in the activity of building. Distinguishing among the different building stones by naming them has proven itself useful for the purposes of building. In fact, the description makes it easy to imagine that if the different stones did not have different functions, i.e., were not used for different parts of the building, the builders would not have differentiated the stones by giving
them different names.

This sort of description draws the attention away from a realist conception of the world as carved up prior to language. In the description of the builders' language-game, there is no separation between the referential apparatus on the one hand, and purposes on the other. The builders carve up and categorize things in the world for their purposes and do not find things already categorized or named. In Chapter 4, in relation to remark 50 and the examples of the 'naming' of the 'standard metre' and the colour 'sepia', this discussion of purposes will reappear. There, a development of the argument will show that purposes determine not only what will be named, but also what language-games will be played and what speech acts will be performed with the word.

Traditional theories and pictures of meaning not only fail to recognize that the purposes for which the word will be used determine the referents, but their tendency to separate an account of purposes from their purely referential theories of meaning also force them to ignore the fact that different purposes determine the meanings that a word will or can have. In other words, traditional theories and pictures not only miss the general point that we would not have referents if we did not have purposes for 'naming' the referents, but they also miss the more particular point that even for one word the meanings of that word can vary according to the purposes of those in the language community. In Augustine's account, merely pointing to an object and uttering a name presumably
makes it possible for the child to know the meaning of the word. All the child has to do is to learn the names of objects. When Wittgenstein writes that understanding a word involves being trained into behaving and reacting in a certain way, (PI 6) he is attacking the notion that the meaning of a word can be determined apart from the behaviour and purposeful activity of the language-users. Wittgenstein writes: "Don't you understand the call 'Slab!' if you act upon it in such-and-such a way? -- Doubtless the ostensive teaching helped to bring this about; but only together with a particular training. With different training the same ostensive teaching would have effected a quite different understanding." (PI 6)

The point of this quotation and its relation to the importance of purposes can be illustrated by an example. Suppose that instead of the builders using the stone names to construct a building and training the children to command and fetch the stones, there were people who used the stone names for religious devotion. In this case, the actual 'names', the outward marks, could be the same in the two language-games, but the words could not be said to have the same meaning. Further, the children in both groups are taught the names for the stones in similar ways (the same objects are pointed to in both cases), but it is obvious that the training they receive in their respective language-games would be different because the words function differently and reflect the different purposes of the language users.
The purposes for which the word is invented determine not only how the child will be trained, but also how the child will see the world. In the one game, the stones are given different names because of the particular positions and uses that they have in the overall construction of a building. In the other language, the stones are given different names perhaps because their particular arrangement or grouping represents spirits or gods. In language-game 2, the word 'slab' is called and a slab is fetched; whereas, in the other language-game, the command 'slab!' probably demands a particular religious response. Even though in both language-games the names are used as commands, the responses are different and the stones are seen differently. In language-game 2, each stone is seen in its particular role in the overall construction process. It can be imagined that the religious language-users see the individual stones only as part of a group of stones or only in a particular arrangement of stones.

There are definite differences both in the way the people in the two language-games are trained to perceive the stones and in the meaning of the stone names in the two games. These differences are glossed over in referential accounts in which it is assumed that the language-user can learn the meaning of the word by learning what it refers to. It is difficult to believe that a person could be said to know the meaning of the words in either game without being trained into the proper behavioural responses. It can be said that the training determines how the word will be understood and also that the
kind of training given reflects the purposes for which the word is used.

c) **Speech Acts**

The descriptions of the builders' language-game and of the religious language-game may give the impression that they cannot be called complete languages. It is difficult to imagine people who only build and perhaps even more difficult to imagine people who only perform acts of piety. There has been some speculation about what Wittgenstein could have meant by saying both that language-game 2 is complete and that it could be considered as part of a larger language-game. In this final subsection on remark 2, I will argue that Wittgenstein calls language-game 2 complete because the builders are able to perform complete speech acts. The language is complete because they are able to effect behaviour, communicate, by uttering words that are complete linguistic moves.

In the discussion on 'Purposes', I mentioned that in both language-game 2 and the imagined religious game, the stone names were used as commands. Wittgenstein writes that "in the practice of the use of language (2) one party calls out the words, the other acts on them." (PI 7) The builder calls out the word 'slab' and expects his assistant to fetch the stone that he has learned to connect with the word. The

16 In an article called "Wittgenstein's Builders", Rush Rhees finds it difficult to imagine a language consisting of giving and taking orders to be complete. Mosedale in a reply to Rhees in "Wittgenstein's Builders Revisited" says that Wittgenstein calls it 'complete' because it is a complete and accurate account of Augustine's picture. I argue that both interpretations are wrong.
commands in language-game 2 completely and unambiguously satisfy communication purposes. In that language-game, that the stone words function as names is inseparable from the fact that the stones are building stones. Again, this is because the stones would not have been given names were it not for their function as building stones. It is important to see that at the time at which the need or desire to build arose, the builders made certain agreements to differentiate among the blocks so as to use the 'names' in speech acts that would communicate to the assistants the overall purpose of the game, i.e., to build.

The concurrent act of naming the blocks and of giving them a role to play in speech acts does not imply that the words cannot be considered as mere names. Wittgenstein separates the use of the words as 'names' from their use as commands when he describes the instruction given to the child. Part of the initial teaching does consist in getting the child to associate the word with the object: "An important part of the training will consist in the teacher's pointing to the objects, directing the child's attention to them, and at the same time uttering a word; for instance, the word 'slab' as he points to the shape.... The ostensive teaching can be said to establish an association between the word and the thing." (PI 6) However, this ostensive teaching is given as part of the drills that will enable the child to use the words as commands.
It is difficult to imagine any purpose in merely teaching the children to link the word with the object. The children could neither be said to be communicating nor to know the meaning of the words. More radically, the children would not ever be put in a situation in which they were learning the referents of words, for there would be no words without purposes or speech acts. Wittgenstein writes: "the children are brought up to perform these actions, to use these words as they do so, and to react in this way to the words of others." (PI 6) The children become part of the community by learning to behave in acceptable ways. This necessitates learning to utter linguistic speech acts appropriate to particular behaviour. That an account of meaning needs to take the link between language and the behavioural responses seriously is evident from the differences between the language-game of the builders and that of the religious community. Even though the ostensive teaching in both games could be the same (children in both games learn to associate a word with an object), the training that they receive determines the responses that are appropriate in the different language-games.

Augustine's child does not acquire the ability to perform speech acts -- to communicate. More seriously, because Augustine misses a discussion of purposes, he does not even succeed in describing the acquisition of a language, for there are no words apart from the purposes they are meant to serve. Locke's account can be criticized with similar attacks. Locke
describes the child who receives impressions from the powers in things and is then able to give names to the ideas that are formed. But what purpose is served by this collection of ideas? It cannot enable the child to communicate with others -- to perform meaningful speech acts. What a word names and that a word names, the aspects that traditional theories and pictures of meaning focus on, presuppose that the words serve particular purposes by being used in particular speech acts. To separate the possibility of reference from purposes and speech acts is not to account for the meaning of words.

Before moving on to discuss the expansion of language-game 2, a few more observations on language-game 2 itself will serve not only to crystallize the reasons for its appearance at the beginning of the Investigations, but it will also eradicate a few misconceptions concerning the builders themselves. The latter discussion is not only interesting in its own right, but it pinpoints a very common tendency to judge and make observations from a too narrow and prejudiced perspective.

Wittgenstein describes language-game 2 as primitive. (PI 2, 5, 7) This does not contradict his claim that it is complete. What he wants to point out, however, is that he has deliberately imagined a language that is rudimentary and to a large extent artificial. The builders do seem more like automata or trained animals. This is how Wittgenstein wants us to see them. In Zettel, he writes that we wrongly assume that the builders think and that things other than commanding
and identifying the blocks must go on in their heads. (Z 98-99) Stripping down language to the point of having language-users that hardly seem like people is an important strategy in Wittgenstein's desire to highlight the features of the speech act, purposes and universals, for the importance of these features stands out. In addition, starting with a description that is so rudimentary encourages the reader to make no assumptions. The words in language-game 2 are words because they serve particular purposes. In the subsection on 'Purposes', I hinted at Wittgenstein's anti-realist view of the world. The world is not carved up prior to language. Further, the children in the builders' game have no pre-linguistic abilities. They need to be trained. In Chapter 2, the importance of training will be highlighted as this is an important part of the thesis that paradigms are necessary in a theory of the meaning of words in our language.

It is essential, therefore, that we see the example of the builders as Wittgenstein wants us to see it. The example is to be approached with no preconceptions of language and of meaning. And yet, the tendency to judge the builders from our perspective is strong.

Wittgenstein realizes this tendency when he warns against taking our richer and more structured language as a tool for evaluating language-game 2. In remarks 19 and 20, Wittgenstein argues that 'Slab!', 'Block!', 'Pillar!' and 'Beam!' cannot be seen as shortened or incomplete versions of 'Hand me a slab!' and 'Bring me a slab!' because these
distinctions are just not in language-game 2. The builders have no need to disambiguate and so have no need for such more complex linguistic apparatus. Their commands serve them perfectly and they need not have the apparatus for distinguishing among other possible speech acts. If Wittgenstein had added different and various speech acts, the importance of the speech act and of purposes in an account of meaning would not have been as obvious. Wittgenstein's strategy in the builders' example is exemplified well in his claim: "It disperses the fog to study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of application in which one can command a clear view of the aim and functioning of the words." (PI 5)

V. The Expansion of Language-Game 2

Remark 8 of the Investigations is a condensed version of the expansion of language-game 2 that is presented in The Brown Book. I will take a few quotations from the latter work because in many cases it emphasizes the importance of viewing different kinds of words as different instruments more than the Investigations does. From the two works, The Brown Book and the Investigations, the following kinds of words will be looked at: number words, proper names, colour words and place and object indicator words. I will use the descriptions that Wittgenstein gives of how the child first learns to use the different kinds of words because this will emphasize the fact that each kind of word projects onto the
world in a different way. Enlarging the vocabulary by using
primitive language-game 2 as a base enables the feature of
kinds of words to stand out.

In language-game 2, the children were taught not only
to identify the building stones, but also to fetch the stones
on command. When Wittgenstein adds number words to language-
game 2, the description of how the commands are executed
accentuates the difference between stone words and number
words: "On being given the order 'Five slabs!', he goes to
where the slabs are kept, says the words from one to five,
takes up a slab for each word, and carries them back to the
builder.... Learning the numerals by heart will be one of
the essential features of learning this language." (BB, p. 79)

In the paragraph that follows this quotation from
The Brown Book, Wittgenstein adds the proper name as a "new
instrument of communication" and distinguishes it from the
block names by saying that the proper name is given to a
particular object. Even though the proper name is not one
of the new kinds of words introduced in remark 8, that
Wittgenstein did not take the building stone names to be
proper names has already been exemplified. 'The next set of
instruments added to language-game 2 is the place and object
indicator words, 'this' and 'there'. Wittgenstein describes
their use in this way: "On being ordered, 'This slab!', B
brings the slab to which A points. On being ordered, 'Slab,
there! ', he carries a slab to the place indicated." (BB, p.
80) And finally, in remark 8, Wittgenstein adds colour words
and describes the importance of colour samples in relation to this kind of word. When the builder hears a colour word, he matches the colour of the block against that of the sample he has learned to associate with the word and brings the block of that colour.

The reason that Wittgenstein draws out the descriptions of what the builders do when they hear the words is to show that each kind of word has a very different use and role in the language-game. Each word is distinguishable from the rest because each represents a different aspect of things in the world. The differences in these instruments are exhibited in the various ways that the words are projected onto the world. Wittgenstein writes: "what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script or print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly." (PI 11) Emphasizing the behavioural reactions of the builders highlights the differences in modes of projection. The builders need to memorize the numerals, compare blocks with the samples, and learn that 'this' and 'there' are used in conjunction with the pointing gesture and serve to indicate particular things and places. I will call these differences in the way that the words project onto reality, the modes of projection, and will speak of the differences among modes of projection in terms of rules. In the following chapter, I will show that training imparts to the child some of the differences between kinds of words. This is because the child learns to do different things when it first learns
the meanings of the words.

It is important to note that although I describe the differences among the kinds of words in terms of rules, this does not imply that the child is aware of these rules or even that he is able to formulate the rules. The difference can be demonstrated by calling to mind the difference between acting in accordance with a rule (one that the observer or doer can formulate) and actually following a rule. Now although this distinction is apparent in much of Wittgenstein's work, I mention it here to escape the obvious counter claim that the child does not learn to differentiate among kinds of words by learning the rules connected with the different modes of projection. The observation will also be useful because my description of the differences among kinds of words in terms of a difference of rules is used in Chapters 2 and 4 to show how the concept of the paradigm allows for the differences by having the notion of a rule built into it.17

Remark 8 is designed to bring out kinds of words as a feature that is absent in traditional theories and pictures of meaning. I have already suggested in the summaries and initial objections to the three accounts that traditional theorists take for granted that all words function like names. The different modes of projection are glossed over and the child is made to be innately aware of the purposes behind the pointing gesture. Augustine takes the pointing gesture and

17The topic is dealt with explicitly in the subsection "The Nature of the Paradigm" in Chapter 4.
assumes that it can unambiguously determine what is pointed to. There is something right in this description. All words are taught or can be taught with the help of the pointing gesture. The adult points to a block and utters a word, he points to a number of objects and utters a number word, he points to a block or to a colour sample and utters a colour word and he points to things and places and utters the words 'this' and 'there'.

Wittgenstein destroys the idea that the pointing gesture by itself can be considered unambiguous. In the case of a blue jersey, he asks how pointing to the shape differs from pointing to the colour ([BB], p. 80) and he repeats this way of casting doubt on the reliability of the pointing gesture alone when he writes:

... all you need ... is to know or guess what the person giving the explanation is pointing to. That is, whether for example to the shape of the object, or to its colour, or to its number, and so on. And what does 'pointing to the shape', 'pointing to the colour' consist in? Point to a piece of paper -- and now point to its shape -- now to its colour -- now to its number. ([PI] 33)

The theory that pointing, and uttering a word (ostensive definition) will or can allow the uninitiated child to grasp what mode of projection is being used is developed and ultimately rejected in Chapter 2. At present, the questions that Wittgenstein poses to cast doubt on an Augustinian account only make the case for describing different kinds of words in terms of the training into the rules (appropriate behaviour) connected with each kind of word even stronger. Wittgenstein
sums up the case when he writes that the differences among kinds of words "does not lie in the act of demonstration, but rather in the surrounding of that act in the use of the language." (BB, p. 80) Chapter 2 will contain studies of ostensive definition and of ostensive teaching and training. The chapter will be a final attack on an Augustinian account and it will lay the groundwork for Wittgenstein's positive contribution to a theory of meaning.
CHAPTER 2

Introduction

Traditional pictures or theories of meaning have been shown to be wrong to place all of the emphasis on the reference to particular entities. Chapter 1 was largely a demonstration of the inadequacies and shortcomings of the Augustinian, Lockean and Tractarian accounts of meaning with respect to descriptions of kinds of words, purposes, speech acts and universals. After using the example of the builders' game to highlight the importance of these features in an account of the meaning of words, Wittgenstein then zeroes in on the notions of ostensive teaching, training and ostensive definition.

The ostensive definition is singled out as the teaching tool that traditional theories or pictures of meaning focus on to explain how one grasps the meaning of a word. Augustine's account of how he learned to speak is a representation of this type of explanation. I am not concerned with arguing for or establishing a particular theory of learning, but an evaluation of an Augustinian-type explanation of language acquisition will help to unveil Wittgenstein's account of the meaning of words in our language. The Investigations is not a study of language acquisition, but it is important to realize that the descriptions of the initial stages of language acquisition that Wittgenstein provides are exemplifications
of his account of meaning. For Wittgenstein, a theory of learning is not fused with a theory of meaning as it seems to be for Augustine, but a theory of learning can and must be able to display what has to be included in a theory of meaning.

Wittgenstein attacks the notion of the ostensive definition as it is conceived by those pictures or theories of meaning which give it a central role as an adequate initial teaching instrument or as he means to explain what a word means. By describing what surrounds the pointing gesture, namely, the language-game context and the details of the behavioural and verbal responses, Wittgenstein shows that the ostensive definition is itself a sophisticated game that is parasitic on the mastery of certain other linguistic skills. These more basic linguistic skills are acquired with the help of ostensive teaching and training. They are described as instruments that serve to relay basic information, a foundation, that enables the language-user to master more sophisticated language-games. Ostensive teaching and training provide the child with the initial and essential linguistic capacities that enable him to understand a linguistic move such as an ostensive definition. One of the main purposes of this chapter is to show the primacy of ostensive teaching and training as teaching instruments. This is important for three reasons: it destroys the traditional reliance on ostensive definition, it accounts for the features described in Chapter One, and it introduces the importance of the paradigm.
This chapter will be organized in the following way. I will start with an evaluation of the ostensive definition. By pitting Augustine's description of the ostensive definition against the picture of the builders, I will show that the builders are incapable of acquiring a language by being given ostensive definitions alone. I will argue that ostensive teaching and training are more suitable tools for enabling the builders to perform speech acts. This study will be followed by a subsection in which I will attack one commentator's attempt to argue for the adequacy of ostensive definition by using the observations gleaned from the builders' example and certain key remarks from the Investigations.

The section on ostensive definition will be followed by a study of ostensive teaching and training. In this section, I will provide what I hope will be plausible descriptions of how number words and universals are taught. It will become evident that these descriptions take advantage of the results of Chapter 1. The descriptions give support to Wittgenstein's arguments for the necessity of considering the features of universals, kinds of words, speech acts and purposes in an account of meaning. The descriptions also introduce the paradigm as a concept that Wittgenstein uses to accentuate the importance of these features in an account of meaning. The importance of the paradigm will be given substance in the concluding subsection on "Ostensive Teaching and Training" in which I will return to the notion of the ostensive definition. Explicating the real role of ostensive definitions will
exemplify the function of the paradigm in the natural surroundings of a language-game. This chapter will end by giving both a brief overview of the results of the first two chapters and preparatory notes for the detailed study of the Tractarian theory of meaning.

I. Ostensive Definition

The impression of ostension as an unambiguous determinant of what a word refers to has an intuitive appeal. Pointing to an object and uttering a word seems to be an activity that brings together a word and what it stands for. It is an act that attaches language to the world. Augustine took this very general conception of the ostensive gesture and made it central to his picture of how, as a child, he acquired the ability to speak. What Augustine describes in his picture of adults who point to an object and utter a word is the ostensive definition. Presumably, a child can grasp what is ostensively defined by being prompted into guessing what the adult is directing his attention to. For Augustine, guessing what objects are pointed to and attaching the proper label explains how language is acquired.

In order to understand Wittgenstein's apparent vehemence against Augustine's reliance on ostensive definition, it is important to expose the assumptions that underlie such a seemingly harmless view of the way in which a language is acquired. Augustine had to make the child innately aware of what surrounds the notion of the pointing gesture. The child
already knows that things have names, that there are different kinds of words and that there are syntactical rules for the employment of words. It is by taking for granted that this knowledge is innate that Augustine finds it natural to rely on ostensive definition as an adequate teaching instrument. Or perhaps more accurately, it is in ignoring the details of behavioural conditioning that Augustine is led to believe that the ostensive definition can accomplish so much.

Wittgenstein succinctly captures the error in Augustine's conception of the role of the pointing gesture when he writes: "Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already think, only not yet speak." (PI 32) In this section, I want to argue that this sort of objection to Augustine's account shows that Wittgenstein does not eliminate the ostensive definition as an instrument, but rather that he shows it to be a sophisticated linguistic move that is parasitic on the mastery of basic linguistic skills. Stating that Augustine's child must already have a language in order to understand the ostensive definition works to force the attention back to the initial stages of language acquisition. Wittgenstein attempts to show that traditional theories and pictures of meaning start with a too sophisticated linguistic tool. Wittgenstein uses the instruments of ostensive teaching and training to highlight the initial foundational acquisition
of linguistic skills.

The material in this section is designed to move attention from belief in the centrality of ostensive definition to seeing ostensive gestures as part of a complicated and complex mechanism. This task will be accomplished in distinct stages. I will begin by returning to the example of the builders to show that Wittgenstein argues that it is impossible for the builders to understand or grasp an ostensive definition and that the ostensive definition cannot possibly give them the ability to speak a language. In the second part, I will provide a summary of one commentator's argument for the adequacy of the ostensive definition as an initial teaching instrument. I will show that this account (by Robert Arrington) is typical of a common conception of meaning and of ostensive definition and that it misconceives Wittgenstein's attack on it. I will criticize both the view that Wittgenstein rejected the notion of ostensive definition outright and Arrington's view that Wittgenstein saw it as an adequate teaching instrument. The observations on the builders will help in these criticisms.

a) Absence of Ostensive Definition in Language-Game 2

In both the Brown Book and the Investigations, Wittgenstein characterizes the ostensive definition as a separate language-game consisting of the ability to answer the question 'What is that called?' and to say, while pointing to the appropriate object, 'That is called ...'. Wittgenstein announces that these linguistic moves are not present in
language-game (2) and (8): "In language-game (2) and (8) there was no such thing as asking something's name. This, with its correlate, ostensive definition, is, we might say, a language-game on its own. That is really to say: we are brought up, trained, to ask: 'What is that called?' -- Upon which the name is given." (PL 27, BB, pp. 81-82) What is it about the ostensive definition that makes it a separate and more developed language-game?

In a reference to the builders in On Certainty, Wittgenstein hints at an answer to this question:

Nor does a child who learns by language-game (No. 2) learn to say "I know that this is called 'a slab'."

Now of course there is a language-game in which the child uses that sentence. This presupposes that the child is already capable of using the name as soon as he is given it. (As if someone were to tell me 'this colour is called ...'.) Thus, if the child has learnt a language-game with building stones, one can say something like 'and this is called ...', and in this way the original language-game has been expanded. (OC 566)

The builders are concerned with training the children to fetch the blocks on command and to utter commands so as to effect a response from others. The meaning of the building stone words has been shown to be interconnected with this purposeful activity. The children learn to link the building stone names to objects as part of the teaching exercises, but they do not learn that the blocks have names.

The point of Wittgenstein's argument that the builders can neither understand nor be aware of what an ostensive definition would be meant to convey can be realized by trying
to see the builders as trained animals. I have already given
the quote from *Zettel* in which Wittgenstein advises the reader
not to think of the builders as *thinking* beings.\(^1\) The beauty
of language-game 2's simplicity and unadorned vocabulary is
that important details that are usually disregarded are magni-
fied and are, consequently, easily recognized. Comparing the
builders to trained animals makes it clearer that they need
not have the concept of 'name' or even the concept of a concept
in order to learn the language and to respond to commands.
The dog that is trained to fetch and return the stick does
not have the *concept* of 'stick' even though it can be said
to have 'established' a connection between the word 'stick'
and the object stick. The builders, therefore, do not learn
the meaning of the word 'slab' by learning that the word is
a name. They are concerned with commanding and fetching so
there is no need to play the language-game of asking for the
*name* of a building stone or of reporting that 'slab' is the
name for the object slab. The words are indeed labels for
objects, but they cannot be described to the uninitiated child
as being names. This is because the *initial* behavioural
conditioning that gives the child the ability to use words to
perform *speech acts* is mandatory and primary. In language-
game 2, the words 'slab', 'block', 'pillar' and 'beam' are
first and foremost commands. Wittgenstein's attack on

\(^1\)Chapter 1, "Language-game 2: Speech Acts".
ostensive definition can be summarized by saying that words
can never be just names of the sort envisioned by traditional
theories or pictures.

The claim should not appear radical or surprising
given what has emerged from the remarks surrounding language-
game 2. In Chapter 1, my discussion of language-game 2
showed that an account of meaning has to take into consider-
ation the features of speech act, purposes, universals and
kinds of words. A theory that relies on the naming function
has been shown to be incapable of describing the structure of
our language. All of the features in the structure of our
language come together and are conveyed to the child through
training. It is only in being trained to do things with words
and to respond to words as part of speech acts that a language
is acquired. Only after this initial training is given can
a child be taught and become aware of the role that words
play in the structure of our language. These thoughts are
evident in Wittgenstein's remark that "only someone who already
knows how to do something with it can significantly ask a
name." (PI 30)

Various remarks substantiate the claim that Wittgenstein
argued that the child can only learn to grasp an ostensive
definition after some training has been given. Wittgenstein
writes: "Naturally, the child who is just learning to speak
has not yet got the concept is called at all." (OC 536) and:
"A child must learn the use of colour words before it can ask
for the name of a colour." (OC 548) The point of these remarks
can perhaps be elucidated more fully by approaching the argument from another angle. The child who is just learning to speak does not have the concept 'is called', for it must learn the use of words before it can ask for or express the fact that the word is a colour word or an object word. In language-game 2, the builders learn to bring slabs and to order slabs. The way this language has been imagined makes it impossible for the builders, within their restricted language-game, to be aware of the fact that the words are object words or names for objects. Without the possibility of contrasting words, such as number words or colour words, there is no need for them ever to distinguish or disambiguate the building stone words by calling them object words.

The first step in making language-game 2 more sophisticated was to introduce the possibility of contrasting words. But even expanding language-game 2 does not necessitate adding the categories or concepts of 'colour', 'shape', 'object' or 'number' to the child's vocabulary. The builders are trained to focus on the proper aspects of things in the world and still need not be able to express the fact that different kinds of words project onto different kinds of things in the world. Their behaviour, behaviour that exemplifies their mastery of the different actions that are expected from them when they hear or see a kind of word, is the important revelatory aspect of their ability to speak and understand that language. Actually establishing the distinctions among different kinds of words by placing them under
different category words is an additional and more sophisticated language-game. Further, to have the particular awareness of the different kinds of words by being able to express that a word is a colour word or a number word depends on first being able to use the words in the appropriate language-games in accordance with the rules that differentiate the different kinds of words. Wittgenstein says again and again that acting is at the bottom of the language-game. (PI 1, OC 110, 204) In the section on "Ostensive Teaching and Training" that follows this section, much of what is involved in the acquisition of a language like ours will be made explicit through some examples.

b) **Evaluation of Robert Arrington's Argument for Ostensive Definition**

I will now look at Robert Arrington's assessment of Wittgenstein's evaluation of ostensive definition because this account contains many of the common misconceptions about Wittgenstein's criticisms of Augustine. In an essay in Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives, Robert Arrington attempts to justify the role of ostensive definition as a foundational teaching instrument. He claims that those commentators who have interpreted Wittgenstein to be arguing against a theory of language that "assigns ostensive definition a pivotal role in the learning process",² misunderstand

Wittgenstein's attack on Augustine. Arrington states that "the standard interpretation of Wittgenstein's investigation into ostensive definition takes him to establish that a definition of this sort is incapable of imparting or communicating by itself the meaning of any term whatsoever."³

Arrington, therefore, attempts to establish that the ostensive definition is an adequate tool in the initial stages of language acquisition. He tries to accomplish this in part through a series of what he seems to take as obvious and indisputable claims. Arrington writes: "there is nothing inconsistent ... in teaching a person what a name is and means by putting him through a series of ostensive definitions. He may pick these things up, and therefore use the word as a name or he may not."⁴ He quite confidently admits that the ostensive definition as a teaching tool works in a hit or miss way. He also admits that it may not give the use, the games that can be played and the speech acts that can be performed with a word, but he concludes by stating that it is still a useful and generally effective teaching instrument:

A single ostensive definition may succeed in engendering the correct use of the term defined ... If ostensive definition is being evaluated as a teaching instrument, then its adequacy is a function of its ability to achieve the desired goal, in this case correct use. And it can and often does, as a matter of fact, achieve this goal.⁵

³Arrington, p. 304.
⁴Arrington, p. 315.
⁵Arrington, p. 321.
Arrington argues that most commentators misinterpret Wittgenstein when they say that he rejects outright the adequacy of ostensive definition. By claiming that it is an adequate teaching instrument, even given its occasional failures, Arrington thinks that he has captured Wittgenstein's objection to Augustine. Augustine just did not acknowledge the fact that an ostensive definition does not guarantee that the meaning of a word will be grasped. With the help of the discussion in the last subsection, it is not difficult to attack Arrington's interpretation. First, the view that giving the uninitiated child a series of ostensive definitions can succeed in establishing the connection between a word and what it stands for, contains the assumption that the child is aware of the point of the ostensive definitions. In other words, it presumes that the child knows that it must 'guess' from the series of definitions what the adult wants him to focus on and what word is meant to stand for the 'objects' pointed to. Guessing, however, is itself a language-game that needs to be learned. Arrington, like Augustine, can be accused of having a misconception about prelinguistic abilities.

The second major objection to Arrington's account is that even granting that the ostensive definition as a teaching instrument works in a hit or miss way, the ostensive definition cannot succeed in conveying to the child what the word means. Arrington does admit that there are problems with explaining how the ostensive definition can "succeed in engendering the correct use of the term defined", but again he thinks that
given a few attempts, the use of a word can be learned from ostensive definitions. But it is difficult to imagine how a move like "That is called a 'slab'" can possibly convey to the child the purpose of the word or what he is to do with the word. Try to imagine whether or not the builders would accomplish anything by repeating to the potential assistant, 'That is called a 'slab'."

Arrington falls into the customary and familiar trap of thinking that pointing to an object and uttering a word can determine the meaning of a word. His only departure from Augustine seems to be in his notion that it does not or may not unambiguously determine the meaning of a word. It is a natural tendency to believe that the ostensive definition can at least give the child the capacity to name objects and to focus on the aspects that the adult wants him to focus on. The belief seems reasonable until one tries to imagine a language community in which children are only given ostensive definitions. The community would certainly be a very strange one. We would not see the familiar or expected purposeful behavioural responses to speech acts. The learners could not possibly be said to acquire language -- a means of communication.

The technique of imagining this situation can be looked at from another perspective. In the paragraph above, I said that this community would be very strange. A more fundamental criticism is that the possibility of imagining such a situation is dependent on the assumption that the language-users already have a language and that at some point
they stop speaking and acting and only use ostensive definitions. There could not be a language, or a world that is carved up, without the purposes of language-users. Part of the reason for it being easy to think of ostensive definitions as adequate rests on taking for granted the very mundane and familiar purposeful behaviour of language-users. This is what Wittgenstein is saying in one of his more cryptic remarks:

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something -- because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact at some time struck him. -- And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and powerful. (PI 129)

Ostensive definitions exemplify a referential account of meaning, but a child cannot acquire a language by means of them. In order to understand what meaning consists in, we must look at the most basic stages of language acquisition.

II. Ostensive Teaching and Training

The purpose of this section is to draw out of Wittgenstein's remarks descriptions of ostensive teaching and training as part of a complex background of purposeful behaviour. By imagining situations in which the finer details of purposes and speech acts are evident, I will fill in the void left by the last section in which the idea of the ostensive definition as an adequate initial teaching instrument was rejected. The imagined examples will also create the frame
for a discussion of the theory of paradigms.

I will divide this section into three subsections
two of which introduce and elaborate the ways in which two
particular words are taught and learned through ostensive
teaching and training. In these first two subsections, I
will speculate on reasonable methods for teaching a child a
number word and a universal or concept word respectively.
The descriptions are not to be interpreted as attempts at
theorizing about how words are learned, but they are meant
to draw out certain essential features integral to an account
of the meaning of words.

The example of a number word is used to show four
points not captured by holding that the ostensive definition
is an adequate teaching mechanism: that ostensive teaching
and training are suitable tools for making the differentiation
among different kinds of words; that these tools are also
suitable for conveying the purposes for the word in the
language-game as a whole; that the speech act potential for
the word can be accounted for by training; and that the
teaching and training are designed to impart rules for possible
extensions and future decisions concerning new and possible
cases. The description of the surroundings in which the
universal, 'book', is taught, is used to show the relevance of
all the points mentioned above with an emphasis on the
importance of the last point. The example of the teaching of
the word 'book' is meant to spotlight the feature, of universals
by showing the importance of abilities to doubt, imagine and
decide for new cases.

Describing how ostensive teaching and training can give the language-user these abilities displays the centrality of the notion of the paradigm in the first two subsections' examples. I will take some steps in explaining how the paradigm is important in an account of meaning in a concluding subsection in which I will return to the notion of ostensive definition. With the benefit of exposing the primacy of ostensive teaching and training, the real roles of ostensive definition can be explicated. These roles will be laid out not only in order to complete Wittgenstein's evaluation of ostensive definition, but also as a way of exemplifying the role of the paradigm. This concluding subsection will attempt to draw together some of the suggestions for the importance of paradigms and prepare the way for the more explicit arguments given in Chapter 4 for the necessity of paradigms in a description of the structure of our language.

a) A Kind of Word

Pointing alone cannot make what is pointed to unambiguous. The example of the 'blue jersey' and remark 33 showed this.\(^6\) I will utilize the case of number words to show that an ostensive gesture as part of a larger framework (ostensive teaching and training) can succeed in teaching a child to use number words. There are various ways in which ostensive teaching and training condition the child not only to respond

\(^6\)Chapter 1, "The Expansion of Language-game 2".
automatically to various stimuli, but also to utilize the information that it has acquired as a guide for judgements and decisions that need to be made in novel cases or situations.

Arranging objects in the world in particular ways can highlight salient features. By creating a situation in which the child's attention will be drawn to the particular mode of projection, the child learns that number words do not refer to shapes or colours of things. The child is aided in understanding what number words refer to and how they project onto things in the world by being told, for example, that a particular group of three apples is 'three' and another group of two books, say, is 'two'. The child is trained to pick out the salient feature of number by having its attention drawn away from the shapes and colours and to the similarities between different groups.

Once the child's attention is captured, particularized training is used to enable the child to act in the appropriate way. At the same time that the child is made aware that 'number' is a different kind of word with a unique mode of projection, it is also being trained to exhibit the differences in the use of this kind of word, through behaviour. Various exercises are designed in accordance with the purposes in the language community in order to have the child respond appropriately. The importance of purposes was discussed in Chapter 1 with the example of the religious language-game. The same urgent need to consider 'purposes' as a determinant of the meaning of a word can be shown with the teaching of number
words. We are familiar with training children to memorize the series of numbers. The shopkeeper in remark 1 counts from one to five, taking an apple for each number that he recites to himself. It can be imagined that in another language-game, the child is trained to look at different groups of objects as 'three' or 'six' or 'two'. The objects are taken in at a glance and memorized as groups rather than counted. In this language-game, large numbers would probably not be a part of the vocabulary and they would not associate 'number' with the idea of a series.

Wittgenstein captures the conjunction of the acknowledged purposes of the language-users in a community and the part that training plays, in the following quotation:

> ostensive teaching can be said to establish an association between the word and the thing. But what does this mean? Well, it may mean various things; but one very likely thinks first of all that a picture of the object comes before the child's mind when it hears the word. But now, if this does happen -- is it the purpose of the word? -- Yes, it may be the purpose .... But in the language of 2 it is not the purpose of the words to evoke images. (P4 6)

The purpose of the words in remark 2 is to have the assistants command and fetch blocks. The purpose of the words in the religious language-game is to have the people perform acts of worship. The training given to children in the two communities is designed to elicit these responses and the children are taught that the appropriate responses can be effected by performing certain speech acts.
Making the ostensive gesture part of a larger mechanism in which training is essential, allows for a natural description of the importance of purposes and of how purposes determine the speech acts that will be performed with the word. It is not that the ostensive gesture as part of the surrounding scene supplies the knowledge of the purposes or a list of the sensible speech acts into which a word fits; but rather that this basic training with the ostensive gesture works to establish the initial connections between language and the world and gets the child to behave in accordance with the rules for appropriate behaviour in that community. When Wittgenstein writes: "I cannot describe how (in general) to employ rules, except by teaching you, training you to employ rules" (§ 318); he is saying that it is not only natural, but necessary to describe the acquisition of a language in terms of a training into behaviour and verbal responses. The child who does not yet know how to speak cannot be taught the rules first. It needs to be able to act in accordance with rules before it can be aware of what following a rule is. The builders act in accordance with the rule that when 'Slab!' is called, a slab is fetched. They do not explicitly follow that rule in the sense that they are able to put into words what they are doing.

With respect to the builders, Wittgenstein writes: "I am using the word 'trained' in a way strictly analogous to that in which we talk of an animal being trained to do certain things. It is done by means of example, reward; punishment
and such like." (BB, p. 77) In language-game 2, the child is trained to respond to commands and to make commands. Repeating the exercises in which the words are used as speech acts or in speech acts conveys the use of the words to the child. Rewarding the child when he succeeds in using the word in the appropriate situation and punishing him when he does not eventually conditions him to make automatic responses. The initial training gives the child a repertoire of familiar and automatic responses both to objects in the world and to words. Traditional theories and pictures of meaning typically lack any characterization of initial training. As a result, purposes and speech acts are either ignored or the child is assumed to be innately aware of these features. In the next few paragraphs, I will multiply the difficulties inherent in traditional theories and pictures that ignore the importance of training by showing how the foundation of information that is supplied by ostensive teaching and training can account for the language-games of doubting, imagining and deciding. These language-games are descriptive of our abilities to deal with new and possible cases.

In the case of our number words, the child is not only taught to focus on the aspect of 'number' and trained to memorize a series of numbers, but it also learns how to continue a series of numbers. In the section on "continuing a series" in the Investigations (PI 143-152), Wittgenstein refers to the established rules and cases as determinants of or standards for whether or not someone has grasped the series.
If there is doubt about the answer to be given to a question asked in a novel situation, then the child is taught to refer back to the number system and the rules for continuing the series that it has been trained to grasp. Wittgenstein sums up in three points exactly what the training must achieve in order to enable the child to use number words in our language: "giving him a training ... which experience teaches us, will make him pass tests ...; creating a disposition in the same man's mind, or brain, to react in that way; supplying him with a general rule for the construction of numerals." (BB, p. 95)

In all of these points, the importance of succeeding in giving the child the ability to make decisions on his own is brought to the fore. The ostensive teaching and training that is given in the language-game situations gives the child the apparatus for learning to play the more sophisticated language-games of doubting, deciding, and imagining. Wittgenstein goes in the direction of describing these games that we play by speaking about rules that are conveyed at the same time that the links between language and the world are first taught with the help of the pointing gesture.

The description of learning a number word by acquiring the ability to count and by learning to treat this rule connected with the mode of projection as foundational for more developed language-games, is the description of the paradigm model. Giving a detailed study of the function and nature of the paradigm model is the aim of Chapter 4. At
present, I want to introduce the importance of acquiring a foundation or base of indubitable information connected with a concept. This initial teaching and training into the established and unambiguous connections between language and the world makes possible the natural description of the more sophisticated abilities to doubt, decide, and imagine with respect to new and possible cases.

b) A Universal

The importance of considering the abilities to extend the range of cases fitting under concept words can be better demonstrated by describing the teaching and learning of a universal. This discussion has two aims. By presenting a common and ordinary description of our use of universals, the inadequacies of traditional pictures and theories of meaning with respect to certain important aspects of universals will be revealed. Secondly, the description will make room for the argument that Wittgenstein did indeed provide a positive account of the meaning of words in our language. The description of the teaching of a universal will be shown to be evident in the Investigations in the example of 'games'. It is important to keep in mind that the observations made in this subsection are crucial to the arguments for the necessity of paradigms. These arguments are given in detail in Chapter 4. Providing plausible descriptions of how ordinary words are learned is convincing because it merely describes what we are all familiar with. Showing the features that underlie the description is another step in the argument that Wittgenstein
does provide an account of meaning.

In the first chapter, in the section, "Language-game 2: Universals", I argued that the disposition to see similarities and differences is exhibited even in the builders' game. I suggested that recognizing this predisposition goes in the direction of describing the more complex ability to pick out the similarities and differences among cases for a universal that are not 'exactly' alike. I also suggested that more complex abilities could be seen to follow naturally from this very basic predisposition. It is not difficult to imagine the builders being able to expand their language to include the language-games of doubting and imagining.

Wittgenstein says that ostensive teaching establishes an association between a word and what it stands for. (PT 6) The training is designed to enable the child to use the words in speech acts. I will take the example of the word 'book' to show how much the ostensive teaching and training must convey. A child who is taught the word 'book', will have different sorts of books of different sizes and colours pointed out to him. This ostensive teaching will reveal that 'book' is an object word and that it 'stands for' more than one object, i.e., that it is not a proper name. By having the connection between the word 'book' and different books made on different occasions, the child learns to exclude other objects by noticing differences and to include different kinds of books by noticing similarities. Concurrent with the ostensive teaching, the child is also trained to do things
with books, to hear the word 'book' being put into particular speech acts and to perform these speech acts on his own. The child learns what books are used for by having books read to him and by learning to read books. The training that conveys the purposes for and the speech acts into which the word fits teaches the child the use and function of the word 'book'. Before it acquires some knowledge and some mastery of this use, it cannot question or doubt the information that it is given about the concept.

There is no clear line that can be drawn between this positive ostensive teaching and training and the information that allows the child to doubt and to make judgments autonomously. The child's predisposition to see similarities and differences is a base that allows for a quick reception of the information that gives the child the ability to make decisions to include and exclude cases. Training supplies the connections between language and the world and these connections are treated as unambiguous and certain. They serve as guidelines in the event of the presentation of novel cases and situations. The child's ability to make judgments about whether or not he would call something else a book is tested by presenting new cases and encouraging the child to make a decision. If the child responds in the wrong way and calls a magazine a book, for example, he is trained to refer back to the familiar and established cases of books, the initial connections he was taught to make, and the relevant differences are pointed out to him. In this way, the child
learns not only the relevant similarities between different sorts of books (these are physical similarities as well as similarities of purpose gleaned from what he has been trained to use books for), but he is also encouraged to point out the similarities in order to justify his judgments to others. Being able to cite these similarities is knowing the criteria or the rules that provide a control on acceptable inclusions under a universal. In this description, the language-games of doubting, judging and imagining are seen to be parasitic on the mastery of the initial and obvious connections between a word and what it stands for. In our language, we rely on this initial training to form a foundation of information for further linguistic abilities.

Evidence for Wittgenstein’s support of this kind of description of the acquisition of the meaning of universals can, for example, be found in the famous ‘games’ example. This example is heralded as an indisputable case of a universal for which neither an essence nor a complete list of instances can be given. In that section of the Investigations, Wittgenstein is directly concerned with attacking essentialism and realism, but here I would like to use the example for what Wittgenstein has to say about how a universal is learned. He writes that the child is given examples and is told that

*I merely want to introduce the concept of criteria here. A full description of the role of criteria as it relates to paradigms will be given in Chapter 4 and in particular in "The Common Appeal of Criteria".*
"this and similar things are called 'games'." (PI 69) In other words, the child is initially taught the established connections between the word 'game' and the 'things called games and he is trained into playing the language-games and performing the speech acts related to the word. This provides him with a linguistic capacity from which he can be encouraged and discouraged in the decision making process. The established and unambiguous cases and usages of the word are the paradigms for the concept. The child is trained to treat these paradigms as reference points or standards that are referred to when he needs to decide for new cases or when he doubts a case that he is confronted with.

Claims for the dependency of certain language-games on the language-user's possession of a minimal mastery of indubitable information, paradigm cases, abound in On Certainty.8 Realizing the primacy of the acquaintance with paradigm cases with respect to the ability to master the language-games of doubting, imagining and judging indicates the importance of the notion of paradigms in an account of our use of universals. The detailed portrayal of the games of doubting, imagining and judging give a natural and familiar description of what happens when new and possible cases are confronted. The paradigm cases are treated as reference points. More importantly, the discussion of the actual playing of these games suggests the natural openendedness of universals, for it is not difficult

8Remarks 115, 446, 560, 563, 624-630 in On Certainty are examples.
to imagine that for the language-user who has been trained to play the more developed language-games, opennessedness is not a problem. Being able to doubt, decide and imagine in the face of new and possible cases suggests that one has the ability to think about or imagine cases that have not yet been publicly established as fitting under a universal.

The descriptions of the universals 'book' and 'game' should be thought of as everyday counterexamples to the theses that the boundaries for concepts need to be closed. In Chapters 3 and 4, the issue of opennessedness will be discussed at greater length. Before I do this, I will use the concluding subsection to this section to describe the concept of the paradigm, which is Wittgenstein's encapsulation of the idea of a foundation of established cases and usages. The real role of ostensive definitions is a neat portrayal of the role of paradigms.

c) The Role of Ostensive Definitions

In the section on Ostensive Definition, I argued that Wittgenstein demonstrated that ostensive definitions could not be an adequate teaching instrument in the initial stages of language acquisition. In the section on Ostensive Teaching and Training, I supplied a few descriptions that showed how ostensive teaching and training is designed to equip the language-user with capacities that enable him to learn more sophisticated language-games. The ostensive definition is one such sophisticated language-game. The key to the role of the ostensive definition is captured by the notion of familiarity.
The ostensive definition is a particularly good linguistic move for demonstrating what a language-user knows. The language-user who is able to understand and use ostensive definitions displays his familiarity with the role and function of a word in the language.

In remark 30, Wittgenstein writes: "the ostensive definition explains the use -- the meaning -- of the word when the overall role of the word in language is clear." (PI 30). In both language-game 2 and its expansion in remark 8, the language-user must first be conditioned to behave appropriately and to make the appropriate responses. Only then can he be taught to remark upon or learn from others' remarks upon what the words refer to. Only then can he be made aware of the fact that in our language, things are named, language is tied to the world; and of the fact that in our language there are different kinds of words each of which project onto reality in a different way.

This is not to say that the acquisition of the ability to use ostensive definitions follows automatically upon some mastery of basic linguistic skills. Ostensive definition, like any other language-game, needs to be learned. The ability to say 'that is called a book' seems to, and for the most part does, display the language-user's familiarity with the use of the word 'book'. The utterance of the statement does not, however, exclude the possibility that the language-user is wrong or that other language-users will disagree. Just as the child is trained to make the acceptable connections
between a word and what it stands for, so the child is trained to use ostensive definitions only in cases in which there is general agreement about what is ostensively defined. This aspect of the ostensive definition makes it a good language-game for showing the centrality of paradigms in an account of the meaning of universals.

It is not that the use of an ostensive definition guarantees that one knows the general use of a word or that one who hears an ostensive definition will grasp the meaning of a word. Wittgenstein tells us that "an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case." (PI 28) It is rather that taking into consideration that some basic linguistic skills must be acquired both in order to use and to understand ostensive definitions makes its role as a device for clearing misunderstandings and doubts evident. Someone who is told "that colour is called so-and-so" is already familiar with the use of colour-words and is either adding another colour word to his colour vocabulary or is being made aware that the word in question is a colour word as opposed to a number word. There is no guarantee that the person will grasp what the ostensive definition is meant to convey, but the repetition of the definition in various contexts together with the language-user's basic linguistic abilities eventually does succeed in conveying the purpose of the ostensive definition.

Wittgenstein writes:

"We can prevent misunderstandings by saying: "this colour is called so-and-so", "This length is called so-and-so", and so on. That is to say: misunder-"
standings are sometimes averted in this way. But is there only one way of taking the word 'colour' or 'length'? Well, they just need defining. -- Defining, then, by means of other words! And what about the last definition in this chain? (PI 29)

"Explanations must come to an end somewhere." By directly linking a word to an object or objects, the ostensive definition can and does succeed in explaining the use of a word. But if the ostensive definition is to be an adequate tool for clearing away doubts and misunderstandings about the role or function of a word or about what a word refers to, it is imperative that what is pointed to is an unambiguous case for a particular concept or universal. Someone who attempts to dispel a language-user's doubt about what a book is by pointing to a magazine, say, and uttering, "that is called a 'book'" will encounter disagreement from those around him who will correct him. The key to the success of the ostensive definition in particular instances is contained in the possibility that there is general agreement that what is pointed to does indeed represent a clear case of the word. Without this possibility, doubts or misunderstandings cannot be eliminated, but are multiplied by making ambiguous or doubtful connections between a word and what it refers to.

However, linking paradigms to the use of ostensive definitions is not meant to imply that paradigms appear only at this level. Of course, the ostensive teaching and training into the paradigm cases in the beginning enables the language-user to use ostensive definitions with confidence. The examples of the teaching and learning of the words 'book' and
'number' revealed the importance of beginning with the relaying of unambiguous cases for words which are taken as reference points in the more developed language-games of doubting, judging and imagining. The paradigms are conveyed and learned in ostensive teaching and training and when the language-user learns to judge and doubt when confronted with new cases, he is trained to refer to the unambiguous and established cases as reference points. The child's ability to use ostensive definitions not only shows that he has mastered basic linguistic skills, but it also displays the mastery of the initial and unambiguous or paradigm cases for universals particularly clearly.

The importance of treating what is pointed to as paradigms for a word is perhaps even more obvious in the discussion of the introduction of a word into an already existing vocabulary. Wittgenstein writes: "Of course an ostensive definition of a word sets up a connection between a word and 'a thing', and the purpose of this connection may be that the mechanism of which our language is a part should function in a certain way. So the definition can make it work properly." (PG, p. 190) Introducing a word by an ostensive definition like "that will be called a 'bleep'" is possible because language-users are aware that things have 'names' and that a word has a use in the language-game as a whole. "That will be called a 'bleep'" implies that what is pointed to is an unambiguous case of a bleep, a paradigm case. It also shows that there are purposes for introducing the
word -- purposes that will determine how the word is used in speech acts.

In Chapter 4, this sketch of the introduction of words into language will be developed in greater detail with the discussion of remark 50. There, the centrality and importance of the paradigm model will be shown with the detailed description and evaluation of Wittgenstein's comments on the introduction of the words 'metre' and 'sepia'. The introduction of these words is done with the establishment of a 'thing' in the world that is the paradigm for the word. At the same time as the paradigm is established as the link between language and the world, the word is given a role in the overall communicative process. There would be no point in setting up a paradigm if there were no specific purposes for introducing the word into the language. This means that the way the word projects onto reality (rules connected with the mode of projection for the word) and the ways in which the word is fitted into speech acts that express the purposes for the word, need to be made. These ideas will become clearer in Chapter 4.

III. Summarizing and Looking Ahead

A backward look at this point would help not only to justify the particular ordering of the material thus far, but also to indicate some of the ways in which the notion of the paradigm can be said to encapsulate the ideas that come out of the description of the builders and of the language-game.
In Chapter 1, the positive observations that emerged particularly from the criticism of Augustine showed how descriptions of kinds of words, speech acts, purposes and our use of universals need to figure in an account of the meaning of words. These observations left Wittgenstein in need of some sort of description of how one could possibly come to know the meaning of a word if so many complex factors are involved. Chapter 2 started with a criticism of traditional accounts of the acquisition of language by focusing on an evaluation of the ostensive definition. Out of this discussion came the need to consider a more basic or fundamental account of language acquisition. The descriptions of the primacy of ostensive teaching and training not only revealed the real role of the ostensive definition, but more importantly, they showed how these instruments can succeed in conveying to the uninitiated child the information that is relevant to the meaning of a word. It was here that the importance of teaching paradigms, unambiguous cases, appeared in full force.

The descriptions of the language-game contexts, the aspects that surround the use of an ostensive gesture, gave expression to how paradigms provide the child with a foundation that enables him to acquire the more developed and sophisticated language-games that we play. Learning to treat the initial connections that are made between language and the world, the paradigm cases for words, as reference points is a necessary step in the acquisition of our abilities to doubt, judge and imagine. And these more sophisticated language-
games are expressive of our ability to operate with universals; for we learn to judge cases, to doubt existent cases and to imagine new cases for words on the basis of our mastery of the reference points or paradigms for the words. Thus far, the necessity of paradigms in a description of the acquisition of a language with a structure like ours has been given only in bare outline. In Chapter 4, the details of the aspects given with the teaching and learning of paradigms will be explored in order to show how the paradigm model can account for how purposes, speech acts and kinds of words are important to the meaning of a word.

This indicates what lies ahead in this study. However, before I can show fully how paradigms are central to Wittgenstein's answer to what is deficient in traditional theories of meaning, I need to consider the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in a little more detail. There are a number of reasons for this. As we have seen, the Tractatus is another theory that adopts a purely referential account of the meaning of words. However, it is an improvement on the Augustinian and Lockeian type views in certain respects. What motivates the Tractatus architectonic is something that traditional theories and pictures lack, namely, a conviction that definiteness of sense has to be satisfied in order for words to have meaning. It is the search for the conditions that meet this requirement that sets the Tractatus apart from traditional pictures and theories of meaning. First, it leads to the belief that a theory of meaning has to eliminate the language-user as an influencing
factor on the meaning of words. The early Wittgenstein's work must ultimately contain the assumption that allowing the meaning of a word or the sense of a sentence to depend on the different thoughts of individuals infects sense with indeterminacy. Secondly, the demand for definiteness of sense leads to peculiar and particular arguments for a substratum of eternal and indestructible entities to which the words in propositions must ultimately refer.

The ideas presented in these forward looking paragraphs are admittedly undeveloped and dogmatically introduced. This forward looking strategy can be justified in terms of Wittgenstein's ordering of the remarks in the *Investigations*. After having displayed rather than explicitly described the importance of the paradigm in the comments related to the builders, the language-game situation, ostensive definition and ostensive teaching and training, Wittgenstein turns to examine the *Tractatus*. In the following chapter, I will follow the critique of the *Tractatus* through remarks 39-50 of the *Investigations*. This discussion will reveal that Wittgenstein's decision to adopt a particular method of criticism is designed finally to make explicit the necessity of the paradigm in a language like ours. Only certain aspects of the Tractarian architectonic are singled out for evaluation; in particular, the Tractarian solution to the demand for definiteness of sense in the simples. The later Wittgenstein sees that the requirement that sense be definite is a valuable insight, but the conditions for satisfying that requirement
are now met with the notion of the paradigm. The necessity of the paradigm flows out of the critique of the Tractarian simples.
CHAPTER 3

Introduction

In Chapter 1, I introduced the Tractatus as another example of a pure referential theory of meaning, but one that contained certain sophistications not contained in traditional theories and pictures. The Tractatus adopts the referential model. However, it recognizes some of the problems inherent in the traditional models and offers sophisticated solutions. In this chapter, I will be less concerned with the particular sophistications than with highlighting some of the important motivating factors behind the creation of the Tractatus architectonic, in particular, 'definiteness of sense'.

There are two potential problems not recognized by the Lockean or Augustinian accounts. These traditional theories that ground meaning in the reference to physical objects or to mental entities fall prey to the objection that a word would then have no meaning if the referent ceased to exist. The Tractatus recognizes this as a problem and so postulates simples that are eternal and indestructible. Secondly, traditional theorists do not worry about the possibility of a fluctuation or change in the range of reference for a word. Augustine failed to comment on the importance of concepts or universals altogether and so the question of boundaries never arises. Locke, on the other
hand, focuses on the ability of the mind to abstract from the class of objects included under a universal in order to form a general idea. He pays no attention to the question of the boundaries for universals. Whether the boundaries are fixed or whether a re-abstraction naturally occurs when other objects are added to or taken from the class, is left unanswered. The Tractatus is partially (but importantly) concerned with finding the conditions for securing definiteness of sense and so it adopts the Fregean conviction that a concept has to have closed boundaries in order to have a meaning.¹ For the early Wittgenstein, Frege's assumption is part of the solution to the second problem -- the proposition has a definite sense only if the referents for the words, the elements of propositions, are fixed and definite.

In part, the Tractatus is a response to these two problems. It saves the idea of pure referentialism and secures definiteness of sense by fixing the possible meanings for all possible words unambiguously and for all time. In the Tractatus, a proposition has sense by being a picture of a particular state of affairs. Words in the proposition have meaning by corresponding to the objects in the state of affairs, element for element, name for object. Ultimately, the analysis of the propositions of ordinary language into elementary propositions could reveal this picturing and determinate naming.

¹The evidence for and a greater discussion of this claim will be given in Chapter 4.
The material in this chapter is centred around the notion of definiteness of sense, for it is a main motive for the system as a whole and it generates the particular and peculiar arguments and claims that Wittgenstein sets out to attack in the Investigations. Exposing some of the central issues and concerns in the Tractatus will show the extent to which the demand for definiteness of sense leads the Tractatus. It will also set the stage for a criticism of the demand as ultimately unnecessary and actually inadequate as an account of the meaning of words in an actual language.

In general, the first section of this chapter is designed as a preparation for the exposition of the Investigations' criticisms of the Tractatus which is contained in the last section of this chapter. In the first section, the material will be organized in such a way that the focus will be shifted from the Tractarian metaphysical view of the nature of language to the epistemological perspective of the Investigations. This will be accomplished in the following way.

In the first section, a summary of the Tractatus will discuss three issues: sense as linked to the proposition, the necessity of simples, and the absence of the influence of the self on the meaning of words. I will give initial negative responses to the last two Tractarian views. The first section will close with a subsection that provides justification for the shift from the Tractarian absence of the influence of the self on meaning to the Investigations' view of the language-user as an essential component in an account of meaning.
With this justification, I will launch into the last section in which I discuss remarks 39-49 of the *Investigations*. In this section, it will be obvious that Wittgenstein makes use of the ideas of purposes, kinds of words, speech acts and universals that were presented through the discussion of the builders in the opening remarks of the *Investigations*. From this epistemological perspective, the Tractarian view that the requirement for definiteness of sense is met by postulating simples is reduced to incoherency.

I. The Tractatus and Initial Reactions to It

a) The Word in the Proposition

The *Tractatus* opens with claims concerning the nature of the world. The proposition, "The world is the totality of facts, not of things" (TLP 1.1) is crucial for an understanding of the way in which language is conceived as being tied to the world. The propositions are pictures of these facts that make up the world. The emphasis on facts rather than on things shows Wittgenstein to be in support of the Fregean dictum\(^2\) that "only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning." (TLP 3.3) The dictum is meant to be an improvement on the Augustinian and Lockean accounts, for these accounts could not explain our use of propositions. The dictum's resemblance to the description in Chapter 1 of the

\(^2\) Some of the explicit references to the dictum are found in Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, 60, 62, 106.
primacy of the speech act is obvious. The early Wittgenstein at least recognized that words are not used in isolation and out of the context of propositions.

But the resemblance between the Tractarian dictum and the speech act, we shall see, is quite superficial. The conceptions of the nature of language that underlie the two differ dramatically. The early Wittgenstein held that only the proposition had sense and that it had sense by being a representation of a possible state of affairs. The early Wittgenstein also held, however, that even though the propositions of ordinary language could be said to have sense, their sense was disguised by the form of ordinary propositions. Determining whether the propositions of ordinary language are true or false, therefore, requires some means of clarifying their sense. For the Tractatus, this clarification involves the analysis of the propositions of ordinary language. Performing this task could thereby reveal the propositions that are pictures of the possible states of affairs that make up the world. The limits of the sayable could then be revealed. The propositions with sense are the pictures of states of affairs and all else is nonsense or a senseless combination of signs.

b) The Referentialism of the Tractatus

In a set of propositions from the Tractatus, Wittgenstein makes the following assertions:

The simple signs employed in propositions are called names. (TLP 3.202)
A name means an object: The object is its meaning. (TLP 3.203)
In a proposition a name is the representative of an object. (TLP 3.22)

Unquestionably, the quotations show Wittgenstein's adoption of the referential model of meaning. Of course, the model is made to fit with the view that a word has no meaning in isolation from a proposition. Wittgenstein writes: "(Names are like points; Propositions like arrows: they have sense.)" (TLP 3.144)

The particular referentialism of the Tractatus develops not only from the view that propositions have sense and words have reference, but also from Wittgenstein's specific conviction that a proposition had to be shown to have a definite sense. The conception of sense being disguised by the propositions of ordinary language coupled with the view that sense has to be definite, finds expression in the argument that the propositions of ordinary language need to be analyzed into elementary propositions that are definite by having their elements, the names, refer unambiguously and determinantly to simples.

In the same context in which Wittgenstein tells us that the meaning of a word is its object, he also links the demand for definiteness of sense with the postulation of simples: "The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be determinate." (TLP 3.23) The requirement that sense be determinate leads the early Wittgenstein to argue that the sense of a proposition cannot be considered definite if any of the constituents do not refer
unambiguously to the objects that are their meanings. Securing
the meaning of the elements of the proposition, the words, by
the analysis of the words into simple elements, names, that
refer to simples presumably secures the sense of the whole
proposition. Those words that do not refer (logical constants
etc.) are analyzed out of the ordinary proposition; the
unique concatenation of names in the elementary proposition,
consequently, shows the definite sense of the original pro-
position.

The adoption of the referential model along with the
requirement that sense be definite not only necessitates that
there are simples, but it also necessitates that these simples
have certain characteristics. If the meaning of a word is
the object and a whole proposition can be infected with nonsense
if a word does not have a referent, then the referents, the
objects, must be simple, eternal and indestructible. The
objects must be simple, for if the referent of a name were a
complex, then whether a proposition containing that name had
a sense would depend on whether other elements in the complex
stood in a certain relation (a contingent fact). However,
the sense of a proposition cannot depend on the truth of
another proposition. (TLP 2.0211) The simples must be eternal,
for if they were not, then a proposition containing the name
of a non-eternal simple would have a sense when the simple
existed and lack one when it did not. This is because the
meaning of the word is the simple. And lastly, simples exist
necessarily, for if a simple could cease to exist, then a
proposition would have a sense only at the times when the simple did exist and not otherwise.

The demand for definiteness of sense is satisfied, therefore, with the possibility of analysis. Analysis is the reduction from the reference to complex objects (parts of the world that we can still describe) to the reference to simple objects (parts of the world that we can only name). Ultimately, the Tractatus asserts that each and every proposition has a unique analysis (TLP 3.25) that allows it to be a strict picture or representation of a unique state of affairs. This claim for independent elementary propositions introduces yet another question concerning the nature of the simple object. It seems as though the demand for definiteness of sense leads the Tractatus to argue for the one-to-one correspondence of name and simple object in the strictest sense. In other words, the elements that Wittgenstein calls 'names' can be taken to be proper names; that is, the elements refer to particulars. The Tractatus, however, does not make it clear that this interpretation is final.

The fact that the early Wittgenstein did claim that each object has a certain form that permits its combination in certain states of affairs (TLP 2.0121) can be taken as support for the view that the names refer to universals. The propositions in 2.0123 read:

If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs. (Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.) A new possibility cannot be discovered later. (TLP 2.0123)
The propositions in which an object can appear are determined by the nature of the object and all possible appearances must be "written into" the object. Viewing the objects as universals works in Tractarian terms under this schema only if the boundaries around the range of reference for a word are closed. Allowing the possibility of openness and, consequently, the proposition with indeterminacy, for in this situation, all the possibilities for the appearance of the object are not accounted for. This would allow the situation in which a word did not have a determinate reference and this, according to the Tractatus, allows for indefiniteness of sense.

Whether the names in the Tractatus refer to particulars or universals is not settled by Wittgenstein. The more important fact, however, is that the Tractarian conception of definiteness of sense demands that boundaries (whether for one object or a set of objects) be closed and fixed for all time. In Chapter 4, I will evaluate this strict view of definiteness of sense as linked to the need for closed boundaries. There, detailed criticisms of the view will be given with the help of the later Wittgenstein's comments about universals and definiteness of sense and with the benefit of a discussion of paradigms. For now, some of the disadvantages

3The early Wittgenstein did not think that this needed to be settled. A few commentators, however, have speculated on this question of whether the names refer to particulars or universals. Kenny wavers on this issue (Kenny, p. 79) and Hacker refuses to decide one way or the other (Hacker, p. 42). We will come to see that the later Wittgenstein thought that this question should have been answered.
and inadequacies of the view that universals have closed.
boundaries will be highlighted by bringing the first two
chapters' descriptions of universals against the Tractatus.
These comparisons will not destroy the Tractarian theory of
meaning because I have not yet shown that openendedness need
not be a problem for an account of definiteness of sense.
This discussion comes in Chapter 4. Here, I merely want to
advance the case for viewing universals as openended by
referring back to the descriptions of the language-user who
learns to use universals.

Augustine was criticized for not making the distinction
between common names or universals and proper names. His
description of the reference to an object made it seem as
though he did not recognize that words can be used to refer
to many objects taken to be similar. Even in the builders'
simple game, I demonstrated that the builders needed to have
the predisposition to see similarities and contrasts in order
to execute the commands. I also argued that this predisposi-
tion, manifested at a simple level, could easily be seen to
provide a foundation for more complicated language-games in
which the builders would be expected to make decisions about
including or excluding building stones that were less than
exactly similar to the building stones in the original classes.
But learning to play the more developed language-games of
deciding, doubting and imagining in the face of new and possible
cases also makes it easy to see that the builders would have
few problems dealing with openended universals. This important
observation was made at the close of the section "Ostensive Teaching and Training" in Chapter 2.

This review of the positive observations concerning our use of universals rejuvenates the idea that the ways in which we are trained to use universals makes openendedness a natural and unproblematic feature of universals. There are two reasons for recalling these descriptions from Chapters 1 and 2. They are meant to show that the Tractatus is a referential theory that cannot and does not account for our use of universals. The Tractatus, whether its names refer to particulars or universals, holds that the boundaries for universals must be closed. The second reason for providing reminders of the material on universals given in the first two chapters is related to the first reason. These descriptions of universals explicitly discuss the language-user as an influence on or active agent in an account of the meaning of words. Contrasting these descriptions with the Tractatus account is meant to show the sharp contrast between the two approaches. Juxtaposing the different approaches in a general way is also a good introduction to the evaluation that follows of the Tractarian absence of the influence of the self.

c) Philosophy Versus Psychology or Metaphysics Versus Epistemology

If it is for analysis to reveal the sense of the propositions of ordinary language and analysis does this by reducing the elements of the proposition to names that refer to simples, then there is no room for the self as having an
influence on sense in this picture of language. When Wittgenstein does consider the notion of thought in his Picture theory, he merely postulates that thought mediates between language and the world by being the receptacle of the pictures of the states of affairs. For Wittgenstein, this is not a fault, but an advantage. The early Wittgenstein is forced to say that the attempt to incorporate the 'I' into a theory of meaning as a factor or an influence infects language with indeterminacy.

Securing definiteness of sense through the theory of simples is meant to rid language of indeterminacy and to relegate to psychology explanations of what goes on in thought or how thought pictures. In fact, this is essentially what Wittgenstein wrote in a letter to Russell: "I don't know what the constituents of a thought are, but I know that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of Language. Again the kind of relation of the constituents of the thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of psychology to find out." (NB, p. 130) The world, language, and thought are related in a determinate way by sharing a common structure. Presumably, understanding a proposition consists in being able to picture the state of affairs that is being described. There is no need to consider beliefs, judgments or wishes as having any influence on the sense of a proposition, for this relativizes the sense of propositions and the meaning of words to the thoughts of the individual.
Both Locke and Augustine, it will be remembered, put the language-user on the centre of the stage in their accounts. How the meaning of words were taught and learned were important questions in their pictures. Their focus can be said to have been an epistemological one. By starting the Investigations with the evaluation of these traditional type theories and responding to their descriptions of the acquisition of language by providing more adequate ones, the later Wittgenstein takes the side of the traditional epistemological perspective.

When I refer to the *Tractatus* as a metaphysical theory, this is meant to distinguish it from traditional theories that recognize the influence and the centrality of the language-user in an account of meaning.

Referring to the *Tractatus* as a metaphysical theory in this sense initially escapes the objection that Wittgenstein denied that the *Tractatus* was a metaphysical theory. I will argue, however, that the explanation of the denial is unsatisfactory. The early Wittgenstein would not have approved of the appellation 'metaphysical theory' because he did not see the simples as metaphysical entities. The simples were largely postulated to satisfy the demand for definiteness of sense. Simples are the sorts of entities that can only be labelled. The characteristics of indestructibility, sempiternity, and simplicity follow from the particular demand for definiteness of sense. But even these characteristics cannot be attributed to the simples. Later, when I look at remark 50, we will see that calling the simples eternal and indestructible
is ultimately senseless because of the necessity that is linked to these claims.

The *Tractatus* is purported to be a theory of language and not a metaphysical theory. It is fair, however, to remark on whether Wittgenstein's denial is justified. The Tractarian theory can be contrasted with other theories of meaning for its insistence that the self has no influence on meaning. The theory of simples is specified a priori, independently of the awareness of the individual who miraculously pictures the facts. But referring to the postulated simples as the "substance of the world" (*TLP* 2.021) does seem to give conclusive support for the claim that they are metaphysical entities. The search for the conditions for satisfying the requirement for definiteness of sense is supposed to be strictly a semantic search, but the postulation of simples to satisfy the demand moves the theory into the sphere of metaphysics. This point is important because it will come out in the last section of this chapter, "Wittgenstein's Criticism of the *Tractatus*", that the later Wittgenstein interpreted the *Tractatus* in this way and, subsequently, rejected the conception of simples as incoherent.

d) The Shift From Metaphysics to Epistemology

I have shown the polarity between the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*: between the metaphysical perspective of the one and the epistemological perspective of the other. Within its own system, the *Tractatus* cannot be rejected for not holding that the self has an influence. This is a stand
that the early Wittgenstein and others saw as advantageous to an account of sense. I will use two techniques to criticize the strict metaphysical theory of the *Tractatus*. First, I will argue that proposition 3.263 of the *Tractatus* generates a paradox that puts stress on the *Tractatus'* absence of the language-user. Secondly, I will return to the transitional essay, "Remarks on Logical Form" to support this idea via Wittgenstein's own worries about the *Tractatus*. This short study will show why Wittgenstein let the strict metaphysical theory crumble. By the end, I will have demonstrated that Wittgenstein did shift the focus to epistemology and that this fact is apparent in the *Investigations'* attacks on the *Tractatus*.

In 3.263, Wittgenstein writes: "The meaning of primitive signs can be explained by means of elucidations. Elucidations are propositions that contain the primitive signs. So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already known." (TLP 3.263) Elizabeth Anscombe interprets this passage as one that "gives Wittgenstein the lie".\(^4\) Wittgenstein denies that philosophy should be interested in epistemology or psychology, yet to Anscombe it seems as though he explicitly confronts issues of acquaintance and knowledge in this particular passage.\(^5\)

\(^4\)Anscombe, p. 28.

\(^5\)In *Insight and Illusion*, Hacker takes a position similar to Anscombe's by interpreting the 'elucidations' to be like ostensive definitions. Hacker, p. 49.
In order to determine whether or not 3.263 exemplifies an inconsistency in the *Tractatus*, one should be clear that the *Tractatus* did not allow psychological or epistemological issues as subject matter for philosophical study. The passage of 3.263 does indeed generate a paradox. The meaning of words can be explained by elucidations, but these elucidations are understood only if the meanings of the signs are already known. Hide Ishiguro tries to explain what Wittgenstein means in this passage, but only succeeds in making the paradox even more evident. She writes: "Elucidations are propositions in which the Names are used rather than mentioned. I take it that in making an elucidation we are to assert the proposition containing the Name. When we catch on and understand what is asserted, we have grasped what the proposition is about and we know what the object is which is referred to by the Name."\(^6\)

The immediate reaction to this explanation is to wonder how the individual does "catch on and understand." But this is where the boundaries that the *Tractatus* draws for philosophical concern are relevant. Within the Tractarian architectonic, explanations of how the individual understands are the business of psychology. Philosophy can assert that this 'acquisition' or 'knowledge' takes place because we do know that the self can have thoughts that picture facts. Anscombe's claim that

Wittgenstein slips from the strict metaphysical theory is incorrect. The topics of 'knowledge' and 'acquaintance' cannot be said to be epistemological unless these topics are considered essential to an account of the meaning of words. Because the Tractatus places the self at the limits of the world as the mere receptacle of thoughts, it is not guilty of an inconsistency in merely asserting that the self somehow acquires knowledge of the meanings of words.

Yet, it is natural to expect that a description of the acquisition of the meanings of words is important in a theory of meaning. It is natural for one to want at least to solve the paradox generated by 3.263. The initial response is to say that the explanation of how the elucidations give one the knowledge of what a word means is no explanation at all. It is fair to interpret the escape from explanations as putting a strain on the Tractarian architectonic.

Wittgenstein came to recognize this tension between the strict metaphysical theory created by the particular demands for definiteness of sense and the natural inclination to view the self as a central part in a theory of meaning. The first step in dismantling the Tractarian theory of meaning is to find problems that are generated as a result of the strict metaphysical theory. Once these inadequacies are pointed out, then the descriptions of the language-user's influence on the meaning of words is a further step that reinstates the self in an account of meaning.
In Chapter 1, I introduced "Remarks on Logical Form" as a transitional stage that best exemplifies the initial moves away from the logical system of independent elementary propositions mirroring the independent states of affairs. The examples of colour and number showed Wittgenstein that the picture of independent elementary propositions had to be replaced by an account that considered systems of propositions. Wittgenstein left the problem introduced in "Remarks on Logical Form" for others to solve. He, himself, ultimately gave expression to the idea of systems of propositions not within the arguments supplied by the Tractatus system, but in the notion of the language-game. The idea of the language-game was not a working out of the problems with colour and number in Tractarian terms, but it represented a rejection of the belief that allowing the influence of the language-user infects meaning with indeterminacy.

The description of how colour and number words are different kinds of words belonging to different systems with particular rules is formulated not on the picture of logical rules written into the nature of the objects, but with the focus on the language-user who learns that they are different kinds of words with different modes of projection by learning to master the behaviour connected with each kind of word. The move is made from "Remarks on Logical Form," in which the meaning of a word is seen to be relative to the system to which it belongs, to the Investigations, in which the meaning of a word is relative to the language-game and the language-
game is relative to the purposes and conventions of the language-user. Once the self is admitted as a factor with purposes that determine agreements and decisions, then the influence of the language-user on the meaning of words is settled.

The later Wittgenstein realized that the problems with the Tractatus system of independent elementary propositions were best solved by shifting the focus to epistemological issues. Oddly enough, in her essay on the Tractatus, Ishiguro gives an overly generous interpretation of what the Tractatus allows and comes up with a description that is close to one that the Investigations would give:

> if 'm' is used to refer to a natural number, a person has to know how to go on counting and how to manipulate numbers in certain ways. He must in some way have a criterion of reidentifying the same number when he encounters it again and know how number words differ from other kinds of objects.\(^7\)

Descriptions of 'going on' and of being able to reidentify numbers are integral to the notion of the language-game and to the rules connected with the use of a word. I will argue in the next chapter that the notion of the paradigm encapsulates the idea of the conventionality of the bonds between language and the world as well as the descriptions of the abilities to reidentify and to go on in new instances. Even though Ishiguro does not substantiate the claims made in her passage with explanations or arguments, the whole description obviously

\(^7\)Ishiguro, p. 33.
could not fit the Tractarian architectonic.

Ishiguro's article displays the strain created by the Tractarian insistence that the self has no influence on the meaning of words. It is natural to give descriptions of kinds of words and of universals in terms of the purposes of the language-user and of the ability to follow rules. The later Wittgenstein started to criticize and evaluate traditional pictures and theories of meaning from the perspective of the builders who have purposes and whose purposes determine how they carve up the world. The justifications given in this section for the shift in focus are essential for understanding the reasons for Wittgenstein's impatience with the Tractatus in remarks 39-50 of the Investigations.

II. Wittgenstein's Criticism of the Tractatus

When Wittgenstein turns to evaluate the Tractatus in remarks 39-63 of the Investigations, he takes for granted that the reader is convinced of the need to shift the perspective from metaphysics to epistemology. The kinds of attacks that Wittgenstein levels against the Tractatus appear to be unfair and misdirected unless this shift is recognized. In this section, I will discuss in some detail the anti-Tractarian comments made in remarks 39-49 and in remark 59. I want to start with these remarks to show two things: Wittgenstein first attacks referentialism, that the meaning of a word is its object, and then he attacks the Tractarian referentialism, that a word refers to a simple. By assessing the use of
'simple' in the *Tractatus*, with the help of common and ordinary examples, he reduces the notion to incoherency. I will reserve remarks 50-58 for the next chapter. These remarks are separable because they evaluate the characteristics of the simples and it is from these remarks that the theory of paradigms emerges.

a). **Words as Names**

In remark 39, Wittgenstein is ostensibly concerned with portraying the Tractarian argument for simple objects. He characterizes what lies behind the Tractarian referentialism in a satirical tone: "For one is tempted to make an objection against what is ordinarily called a name. It can be put like this: a name ought really to signify a simple." (PI 39) Wittgenstein chooses an example of a word that most obviously refers to an object, Excalibur, and attempts to give the rationale of the Tractarian referentialism. He supposes that the object Excalibur breaks into pieces and no longer exists. If, under the referential model, the meaning of a word is the object, then it follows that the disappearance of the object would leave the name without a meaning. However, the proposition 'Excalibur has a sharp blade' does make sense whether Excalibur is whole or broken up. The *Tractatus* concludes that there must always be something corresponding to the words: "The word 'Excalibur' must disappear when the sense is analyzed and its place be taken by words which name simples." (PI 39)
The Tractatus claims that Excalibur is not a real name and that when it is analyzed it does refer to simples that are indestructible. In remark 40, Wittgenstein amazingly ignores this escape from the problem of the bearer ceasing to exist. He writes: "When Mr. N.N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if the name ceased to have meaning it would make no sense to say 'Mr. N.N. is dead.'" (PI 40) The Tractatus' answer to this counterexample is similar to that given by the Investigations in the Excalibur example. Mr. N.N. is not a real name and it needs to be analyzed into simple signs that have a stable referents, simples. Further, the proposition 'Mr. N.N. is dead' has a sense because the particular concatenation of the simples for Mr. N.N. with other simples to which 'is dead' refer would show this sense.

It is odd that Wittgenstein does not acknowledge this as the Tractatus' answer to the objection concerning the disappearance of the bearer, Mr. N.N.. I want to suggest that this is because Wittgenstein has more serious criticisms to make of the notion that the meaning of a word is its bearer. When he writes that the word 'meaning' is being 'used illicitly' if it is used to stand for the thing that corresponds to the word, he is levelling a commonsense objection to the Tractarian acceptance of the referential model. The Tractatus is equipped to handle the problems that 'Excalibur' and 'Mr. N.N.' present by postulating that analysis will reveal the
'real' name and the 'real' object to which the names refer, but the explanation is unnatural and inadequate. Wittgenstein shows this by providing natural descriptions of what happens when the bearer ceases to exist that bring in the notions of the language-game and of purposes.

If the bearer ceases to exist, then the language community may strike a new convention whereby they let others know that the bearer of the name is broken or lost. This may be the explanation for how 'no' or shaking one's head were given a role in the language-game. Another possibility is that the word would just drop out of the vocabulary. Depending on the importance of the object in the particular language-games, whether there are roles or functions for the object in the purposeful activities, different and new games or conventions can or may be initiated.

The natural descriptions of what can occur when the bearer ceases to exist reintroduce the importance of purposes in an account of meaning. This criticism of the *Tractatus* and of referentialism in general is not intended to destroy the notion of reference, but it makes the notion of reference and of the referential apparatus part of the larger context of the language-game. This should be familiar as one of the observations made in Chapters 1 and 2. The description in remark 41 of what happens when the tool 'N' is broken is directly and obviously linked to the builders example.

This explanation was supposed to take care of the problems inherent in the traditional models of Augustine and Locke.
Particular purposes may call for the introduction of a new word and decisions will be made concerning the use of the word in speech acts and in language-games. The one activity goes with the other. When Wittgenstein intimates in remarks 41-45 that not all words are names, he is not saying that words can never be described as names, that they do not refer, but he is saying that the meaning of the word is not just the referent. The differences between the builders' language and the tribe's language were given to show that a difference in purposes results in distinct meanings for what appear to be the 'same' words.

In remark 43, Wittgenstein writes that "the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer." (PI 43) The sentiment resembles closely the description of the restricted role of the pointing gesture given in Chapter 2. Pointing to the 'object' that a word refers to has limited power. Referring to the object succeeds in conveying the meaning of a word only if it is part of a larger mechanism in which the child is also trained to use the word in speech acts. And it is this training, behavioural conditioning, that conveys the kind of word being used and the purposes for the word in the communicative process. The importance of the features that are integral to an account of meaning lie behind the much misused and misunderstood dictum: "the meaning of a word is its use in the language." (PI 43) This dictum should not send philosophers rushing to discover a list of the rules for the use of a word, but it should make one aware of the
importance of purposes, speech acts, universals, and kinds of words in an account of meaning.

b) **Simples: an Incoherent Notion**

The use of commonsense counterexamples to the Tractarian claims emphasizes the importance of describing the larger framework of the language-game in which the purposes of the language-user show language to be a convention-bound activity. The use of commonsense counterexamples is also helpful because the familiarity of the descriptions presents a convincing case for rejecting the Tractarian metaphysics. The employment of these examples is especially effective in the reduction of the notion of 'simple' to incoherency. The examples give the ordinary usages of the word 'simple' and they show that the meaning of the word is language-game dependent. The Tractarian use of the word 'simple' as part of its metaphysical theory is thereby shown to be without meaning because it does not specify a language-game context for the use of the word.

In remark 47, Wittgenstein asks the reader to imagine what the simple parts of reality could be by asking what the simple parts of a chair are. He asserts that "it makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the 'simple parts of a chair'." (PI 47) Without a specification of a particular use that is to be made of the words 'simple' or 'composite' relative to a particular language-game, talk of simple or composite parts makes no sense. Wittgenstein shows this point in his attempt to imagine various possibilities for calling things simple or composite. (PI 47) What emerges as essential to all
discussion of the meaning of the words 'simple' or 'composite' is the fact that the use of the words must have been established in particular language-game contexts for the words to have sense:

If I tell someone without any further explanation: 'What I see before me now is composite', he will have the right to ask: 'What do you mean by 'composite'? For there are all sorts of things that that can mean!' -- The question 'Is what you see composite?' makes good sense if it is already established what kind of complexity -- that is, which particular use of the word -- is in question. (PI 47)

The argument that the meaning of a word is dependent on language-game context which in turn is dependent on purposes is captured by another example given in remark 47: "Asking 'Is this object composite?' outside a particular language-game is like what a boy once did, who had to say whether the verbs in certain sentences were in the active or passive voice, and who racked his brains over the question whether the verb 'to sleep' meant something active or passive." (PI 47) The boy has not yet grasped the senses of 'active' and 'passive' in the language-game in which the words are used to refer to two different kinds of verbs. Being acquainted only with the use of 'active' and 'passive' that describe doing and not doing, he is confused about whether 'to sleep' is an active or passive verb. As I pointed out in the last subsection, words can be viewed as referring to objects, but the reference is made within particular language-game situations in which the purposes of the language-users determine how the word is used in speech acts and how the world is seen. Witness the builders
versus the tribe example once again.

In remark 48, Wittgenstein somewhat deviously attempts to create a model of the Tractarian conception of simples. The coloured squares could most naturally be called the simple elements, but Wittgenstein points out that this is not unambiguous. It can be imagined under different circumstances that the simple elements are the rectangles each consisting of two squares or that they are particular combinations of colours. (PI 64) What the simples are conceived to be depends on the purposes for calling them the simple elements. If the language-users have concepts for combinations of colour and so always perceive colour in combinations, then the simples will be taken to be combinations because this is uppermost in their minds.

There are no absolutely simple elements. By asking commonsense questions about what the simple elements can be in quite ordinary examples, Wittgenstein shows that there is no search for ultimate answers (PI 64) in the form of primary elements. Against the view that there need to be 'metaphysical' simples the nature of which remains unknown, Wittgenstein says that analysis is merely assumed to reveal the simple elements. With reference to language-game 48, Wittgenstein asks: "In what sense do the symbols of this language-game stand in need of analysis?" (PI 64) The examples of the use of 'simples' in ordinary language-game contexts bring the focus to what is said in everyday speech and to what is seen in the world.
In a remark that exemplifies the later Wittgenstein's tone of ridicule for his earlier self, he shows that he considers it a fair criticism that the *Tractatus* postulates entities that are not observable or known: "A name signifies only what is an element of reality ... But what is that? -- Why, it swam before our minds as we said the sentence! This was the very expression of a quite particular image: of a particular picture which we want to use." (PI 59) As a metaphysical theory about the nature of the universe, the theory of simples is incoherent. The shift from metaphysics to epistemology demands that descriptions of the structure of language are of what can be seen, learned and known. When in remark 59, Wittgenstein asks what the element is that cannot be destroyed, he answers that "experience does not show us these elements." The component parts of a chair are the leg, the back and the bits of wood. It is really these that "are the materials from which we construct that picture of reality." (PI 59) That picture of reality, according to Wittgenstein, is ultimately incoherent.

c) **Conclusion**

The particular image or picture that Wittgenstein speaks about in the above quotations is the result of the tendency in the *Tractatus* to think that the meaning of a word and, consequently, the sense of a proposition, is indeterminate if the objects are allowed to change or disappear. By destroying the tendency to view meaning entirely in terms of a reference of a word to an entity, Wittgenstein shakes the hold that this
once powerful notion of meaning had. Room is then made for considering the idea of reference as part of a larger framework in which purposes, kinds of words, universals and speech acts can be accounted for.

Once the spell of the pure referential model is broken, the Tractarian arguments for the necessity of simples start to crumble. If the meaning of a word is not the object to which it refers, then there is no need to secure a permanent and definite link between a word and its object by postulating simples. In the next chapter, I will see if anything remains of the Tractarian system. The particular requirement that sense be definite was satisfied with the referential model. I will argue, in the next chapter, that the basic sentiment that underlies the requirement is sound, but that the search for conditions that satisfy this demand needs to be made from the epistemological perspective.

A theory of meaning should be able to describe how we do succeed in understanding one another and how we do manage to acquire the ability to speak effectively. There has to be some account of a foundation or of stability that allows the meaning of a word to survive and to be passed on. In the next chapter, I will start with an examination of the characteristics that the early Wittgenstein gave to the simples. The idea of the indestructibility and sempiternity of simples has its counterpart in the notion of the paradigm. Chapter 4 will start with this very important observation made by Wittgenstein in remark 50. Here, Wittgenstein finally assembles the pieces
left from the criticisms of traditional theories and pictures of meaning and reconstructs his positive account of meaning. The notion of the paradigm is introduced as the essential element in a description of the structure of language that recognizes the features of universals, kinds of words, purposes and speech acts.
CHAPTER 4

Introduction

This chapter will begin by returning to the Tractarian claims for the indestructibility, sempiternity and necessary existence of the simples. It is curious that Wittgenstein chose to evaluate the characteristics of simples in remark 50 after having reduced the notion to incoherence in the remarks immediately preceding this remark. I will argue that remark 50 is unquestionably designed to present an analogue to the Tractarian simples which is Wittgenstein's solution to the problems inherent in the simple referential theories and pictures of meaning. Remarks 50-59 have been customarily interpreted as a continuation of the destructive criticisms of the Tractatus. That they are anti-Tractarian remarks is not to be denied. What I want to draw attention to, however, is the fact that in all of the remarks from 50-59 Wittgenstein juxtaposes the destructive criticisms with explicit and implicit descriptions of the paradigm model. In this chapter, I will show that these descriptions that are ordinarily passed over or ignored as having little significance, actually reveal Wittgenstein's central contribution to a theory of meaning.

Revealing that paradigms are this central contribution will be done both descriptively and argumentatively. In the
first section, I will be mostly concerned with outlining in
detail the following comments and notions in remark 50: the
remark that the standard metre neither is nor is not a metre
long, the addition of the example of the colour 'sepia' as
another means of representation, a paradigm, and the remark
that what had to exist in the Tractatus is now a paradigm in
our language. Elucidating these remarks will give a full
description of the function and role of the paradigm model.
In addition, linking paradigms to the simples of the Tractatus
justifies the need to examine in fine detail the topic of
definiteness of sense, for this issue is one of the main
motives behind the Tractarian creation of simples. This,
examination is contained in the second section where I explore
the possibility that remark 50 is meant to tell us something
about the Investigations' attitude towards definiteness of
sense. In this section, I argue that the Investigations'
epistemological perspective demands a different account of
the sense of definiteness of sense from that given in the
Tractatus. I also give some of the advantages to considering
that the Investigations retains an account of definiteness of
sense.

But arguing that the later Wittgenstein thinks that
there is still a need to talk about definiteness of sense
and to show how it can be satisfied goes against the grain of
most interpretations. In the third section, I justify my
argument that Wittgenstein is concerned with giving the condi-
tions for definiteness of sense in the ordinary sense by
discussing two topics that usually influence commentators' positions on this issue. First, I remove the idea that openendedness in the *Investigations* entails a rejection of definiteness of sense by supplying quotations in which Wittgenstein shows that definiteness of sense is compatible with openendedness. Secondly, I examine commentators' (exemplified by Hacker's) resultant interest in criteria and pin-point problems with relying on criteria as Wittgenstein's account of the meaning of words. This discussion returns the focus to paradigms and forces the consideration that they are Wittgenstein's solution to meeting a requirement for definiteness of sense. Arguing that definiteness of sense is secured by paradigms provides the first explicit argument for the necessity of paradigms. In the fourth and final section, I will make use of much of the information already given about paradigms in order to provide a second argument for their necessity in our language. In this section, I will evaluate the Lockean account of meaning by pitting the descriptions of paradigms and of the nature of this connection between language and the world against Locke's view of the necessity and sufficiency of ideas. This contrast will show both the necessity of public samples and the kind of necessity that is linked to paradigms.
I. Remark 50

a) The Standard Metre: An Analogous Case

The sentence, "the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need" (PI 108) appears in the context of an attack on the "preconceived idea" of the crystalline purity of logic presented in the *Tractatus*. I refer to it here because it reaffirms the need to shift the focus from the metaphysics that the *Tractatus* was forced into to the epistemological issues evident in the *Investigations*. This reminder makes it easier to understand the purpose of remark 50. In the previous chapter, I argued that the shift in perspective is noticeable in the commonsense counterexamples that Wittgenstein gives to the Tractarian arguments. In remark 50, however, the situation is a bit different, for the example of the standard metre is imagined as a (correct) analogue to particular (incorrect) claims and arguments in the *Tractatus*. This suggestion indicates that Wittgenstein thought that there was something buried in the Tractarian system that needed some reformulation in the *Investigations*.

Remark 50 opens by examining a few of the consequences of the assumption that the meaning of a word is the object to which it refers. I demonstrated how the acceptance of this model with the tenet concerning definiteness of sense led inevitably to the position that the referents were simple, indestructible, eternal and that they had to exist. In remark 50, Wittgenstein gives voice to the objection that characterizing
the simples ultimately generates paradoxical statements. To say that the simples must exist not only makes it impossible to speak of their non-existence, but it also makes it nonsense to speak of their existence. Wittgenstein writes: "existence cannot be attributed to an element, for if it did not exist, one could not even name it and so one could say nothing at all of it." (PI 50)

Of course, Wittgenstein recognized this problem in admitting at the end of the Tractatus that the Tractarian propositions were nonsensical and that they needed to be transcended. (TLP 6.54) He reintroduces the issue in remark 50 in order to introduce the example of the standard metre. In the same vein as the simple objects could neither be said to exist nor not to exist, Wittgenstein asserts that the standard metre can neither be said to be a metre long nor not to be a metre long. Apparently, in the 'same' way that the question of existence with respect to the simple objects cannot arise because the objects exist necessarily as the entities that hold the meanings of words in our language, the question of the length in metres of the standard metre does not arise because the standard metre is the length by which all other metric lengths are measured.

Commentators such as Hacker and Stuart Brown¹ display an understanding of what Wittgenstein means by the puzzling claim that the standard metre neither is nor is not a metre

long. Because the standard metre is established as the length from which all other metre lengths are to be compared, it makes no sense to compare this standard against itself to determine its length. The fact that the standard metre is the means of representation, or the object for comparison, makes it impossible to speak of determining whether or not the standard metre is a metre long. The standard metre just is the length that it is and there is no independent check or ultimate reference that could be used to say that it is a metre long. But there is a natural tendency to object to the claim that Wittgenstein makes in connection with the standard metre. The tendency comes from the desire to separate the object, the standard metre, from the concept of the length of one metre.

Kripke is one philosopher who exemplifies the inclination to differentiate between the phrase 'one metre' and the phrase 'the length of the standard metre at a certain time'. In "Naming and Necessity", he argues that the first phrase is meant to 'designate rigidly' a certain length in all possible worlds. The second phrase does not designate anything rigidly because in certain counterfactual situations, the standard metre could be longer or shorter than that which is rigidly-designated. Kripke, in other words, thinks that it is not only possible but also permissible to say of the standard

metre that it is one metre long at a particular time in comparison to that which is 'one metre' in all possible worlds.

The claim that there is a length that is rigidly designated in all possible worlds which is the length that the standard metre now has emerges from the belief that the concept 'one metre' would otherwise not necessarily refer to a specific length, since the length of the standard metre could change. In order to preserve the concept of one metre in a world that contains the possibility of change, Kripke postulates that there is a higher standard of appeal that is not subject to change. Kripke's argument depends on his conviction that sense can be made of the concept 'one metre' apart from the particular exemplar or exemplars of that length in this world. His separation of the notion of rigid and non-rigid designators indicates that he holds semantics to be separable from epistemological issues. For Kripke, there is a sense to 'one metre' apart from our knowing or being acquainted with the standard or standards for the metre.

Of course, this separation should be familiar as a feature of the Tractatus that the later Wittgenstein battled to destroy. What underlies Wittgenstein's vehemence concerning this approach and his solution to it in the notion of the paradigm can be shown in a quotation in which Wittgenstein compares establishing a proof as a proof with settling what something will be called: "The proof puts a new paradigm among the paradigms of the language; like when someone mixes a special reddish blue, somehow settles the special mixture
of the colours and gives it a name." (RFM II, 31) Suppose someone were to call such a mixture 'bluid'. There can be no question as to whether or not the colour is or is not 'bluid' because this has been settled by naming it. The decision to call the mixture 'bluid' is the creation of the concept 'bluid'. Deciding to call a sample in the world 'bluid' makes it impossible to drive a wedge between the correct application of the concept 'bluid' and the actual sample that is established as the paradigm.

The argument that establishing something as a means of representation, as a paradigm, leaves no room for questions about whether or not the paradigm does or does not have the particular property that makes it the means of representation will reemerge again as a fuller description of the details intertwined with the notion of the paradigm is given. At present, more doubt can be cast on Kripke's position by asking him to answer the question, 'What length is this length that is rigidly designated?'. In the end, Kripke can only answer the question by pointing to an object that is this length. He needs to produce an object, to ostensively define the name, that is the standard in this world. (The importance of ostensive definitions in a critique of Kripke reaffirms the interconnectedness of the notion of ostensive definition and the paradigm as it was described in Chapter 2.) To this description of how the paradigm is displayed in the use of ostensive definitions, I will now add the definitional aspect related to the origination of a paradigm. The con-
current introduction of a word and the thing or things in the world established as paradigms joins semantical and epistemological issues. Being able to point to the standard or paradigm is knowing the meaning of the concept.

These claims about the creation and establishment of the links between language and the world as the vital aspect of the paradigm model will be given more substance in the course of this chapter. For now, an outline of the objections to Kripke's claims illuminates the reasons for the claim that the standard metre can neither be said to be nor not to be a metre long. In addition, the examination serves to introduce the role and the nature of the paradigm and to show how it is different from a Tractarian approach to the nature of language.

b) The Nature of the Paradigm

There are some aspects unique to the description of the standard metre that make it a good example for portraying the role and nature of the paradigm. First, the fact that remark 50 describes the standard metre in singular terms as the means of representation and as the object for comparison makes its regulatory role clear. In addition, the connection between the standard metre and the scientific world makes its institutionalization as a standard unambiguous. The standard metre can be appropriately described here as a paradigm of a paradigm. When Wittgenstein extends the analogy to cover a

3 Of course, this institutionalization of a standard was important in the beginning, but metre sticks are now taken as standards.
different example, the purpose of the creation of the analogy at this point in the *Investigations* is made manifest.

The idea of singularity is initially attached to the notion of the paradigm in order to make its function as a standard obvious. However, realizing how we play the language-game of measuring makes it clear that there is no need even to be aware of the fact that there is (indeed was) a standard metre preserved in Paris. In our language-game of measuring, a large number of metre sticks are taken as standards for measuring the length of other things. The initial institutionalization of a single standard was important, but as the language-game of measuring spread throughout language as a whole, metre sticks taken as standards in ordinary contexts were reproduced according to the recipe for the standard. Today, people who use metre sticks are satisfied with taking them as standards and, for the most part, are not aware that there is a final or ultimate scientific standard.

Realizing that the idea of a plurality of standards underlies even the standard metre example, makes the role of the paradigm in the *Investigations* more important than has hitherto been acknowledged. I hold that it was in the attempt to show the centrality of the notion of the paradigm in a theory of meaning that Wittgenstein introduced the additional example of the colour 'sepia' (also in remark 50). The request that we imagine samples of colour preserved in Paris in the same way as the standard metre was preserved is what connects the two examples, for again the notion of singularity
is attached to the paradigm. The differences between the case for measuring and that for colour-words, however, serves to create the impression that the paradigm model is meant to be taken as more vital than is customarily believed. It is more difficult to fit the notion of singularity into the case for colour words because our acquaintance with the use of colour-words opposes this view. In our language-games with colour, we do not learn to appeal to an ultimate standard, a sample that is hermetically sealed, but we learn to take unambiguous shades of a particular colour as paradigmatic for that colour word.

Arguing that the two examples of the standard metre and the colour sepia should be seen as linked in some respects and as emerging from Tractarian criticisms forces one to consider remark 50 as part of the answer to the question about the meaning of words in our language. Up to this point, Wittgenstein has concentrated on evaluating the traditional and persistent tendency in theories of meaning to view all words as names for objects. The description of the institutionalization or establishment of the paradigm that connects a word to an 'object' seems to fit the words 'standard metre' and 'sepia' into the naming function model. Wittgenstein asks us to think of a standard metre set in Paris and given the name 'one metre' and of a sample hermetically sealed and given the name 'sepia'. However, the choice of the examples of a measure and of a colour sample as well as the description of the surroundings for the way in which these 'objects'
function in a regulatory role sets Wittgenstein's account of the meaning of these words outside of and beyond the traditional view of words as names for objects.

By now, it is a familiar objection to traditional theories and pictures of meaning that they cannot account for our use of universals. The builders needed to have the predisposition to see similarities and contrasts. Recognizing this predisposition allowed for a natural description of how they would be able to deal with more complicated language-games in which decisions had to be made about cases to be fitted under a universal. I argued that this description exemplified our use of universals and that it is the expression of our natural ability to classify and categorize things in the world for particular purposes. Both the Augustinian and Tractarian accounts are incapacitated when it comes to accounting for this feature of universals.

The descriptions of what surrounds the examples of the standard metre and the colour 'sepia' are designed to substantiate Wittgenstein's portrayal of our use of universals. The rejection of the naming function model can only be complete if Wittgenstein can give an account of meaning that allows for a description of how we do operate with universals. What emerges from remark 50 is the realization that even when it seems most obvious that a word is a name for an object, the meaning of the word cannot be said to be just the object to which it refers. This is why it is crucial to recognize the importance of the description of the paradigm model.
This means that Wittgenstein wants us to be aware of the details surrounding the establishment of a paradigm, for these details form part of the paradigm model.

Giving the rod the name 'one metre' and the colour sample the name 'sephia' is not only pointless but impossible, unless the games that allow what has been named to function as a paradigm or standard are concurrently established. This settling of the 'object' in the world as the standard for comparison for whatever is thereafter judged or compared to it marks the difference between the function and use of the universal and that of the proper name. In a passage that illuminates this aspect of our use of universals, Wittgenstein writes: "If I were to see the standard metre in Paris, but were not acquainted with the institution of measuring and its connexion with the standard metre -- could I say, that I was acquainted with the concept of the standard metre?" (RFM II, 36)

If one were only acquainted with the 'object' standard metre and the name 'standard metre', then this acquaintance would be with a proper name. Such a person could not be said to know or understand the concept or universal 'standard metre' because he could not use the word in the appropriate language-game of measuring. He could only link the name with the object and use the name in the way that a pet name given to a plant, say, is used. In order to understand the concept of the standard metre, one must be acquainted with the language-game of measuring. The concept 'standard metre' has the notion
of comparison built into it. To grasp the meaning of the word is to understand the whole weave of activity that is built into the concept.

Describing the origination of a concept does highlight the importance of surroundings in an account of the meaning of concepts as distinct from proper names. I will now refer back to the example of the 'standard metre' in order to lay out the sorts of things that are given when a paradigm is established. This will sum up the importance of the paradigm model. Institutionalizing the metre bar as the standard was done for the purpose of having a standard against which other lengths could be measured to see if they were or were not a metre long. This means that at the same time as the bar was given a name, the rules for comparing other cases to the paradigm were decided. These rules are those which distinguish the kind of word being dealt with or the mode of projection that is used. With the standard metre, the implicit rule conveyed in training is that the metre stick is brought against what is to be measured. With colours, the implicit rule is to use the unambiguous samples first taught as standards for comparisons with colour shades.

This concurrent naming and determination of the category into which the word falls, the particular mode of projection or kind of word, is not sufficient to give the word a use. In order to have the word function in the overall communicative processes, the grammatical rules (rules that determine the grammatical categories into which words
fall in speech acts) for the use of the word must be given as well. Of course, the purposes behind the origination of the word will determine the sorts of speech acts into which the word will fit. In the case of measuring, for example, questions and answers as to the length of something are natural homes for the word 'metre'. It should be evident that the ability to perform speech acts in which the word has meaning depends on being trained to recognize what does or will count as being a metre long.

Except for explicitly placing the notion of the paradigm into the description of the meaning of a word, I have not said anything that has not already been said in the first two chapters. The descriptions of purposes, of kinds of words and the interrelated rules for the mode of projection and of speech acts and the interrelated grammatical rules for the employment of words in speech acts, are all familiar as part of the descriptions contained in the example of the builders. The builders had to be able to master certain behavioural and verbal skills before they could be said to know the meaning of the building stone words. It can now be said that the blocks, pillars, beams and slabs that the builders were first trained to connect with the building stone words serve as paradigms. Their role as a means of representation explains how the more complicated games of doubting, imagining and deciding are learned, for the builders learn to compare and contrast new cases with the unambiguous ones. The simple manifestation of the ability to compare and
contrast stones in language-game 2 is foundational for the ability to master the more complicated language-games of doubting and imagining in the face of ambiguous cases.

By bringing the notion of comparison into focus in remark 50, Wittgenstein completes the description of the ability to acquire and use words that stand for a range of cases. The paradigm is described as the means of representation, "something with which comparison is made". (PI 50)

It is described as the standard that serves to control or guide decisions that will be made concerning what other things are to be included under the universal. Finally, the description of the details that surround the notion of the paradigm, the rules connected with the mode of projection and the grammatical rules for the use of the word, account for the importance of purposes, speech acts and kinds of words in a theory of meaning. These things that are given with the introduction of a particular paradigm or paradigms are part of the nature and role of the paradigm model.

c) Simple to Samples

I temporarily left the discussion of the point of the analogy between simples and samples which started this chapter in order to describe the nature and role of the paradigm in the previous subsection. In that subsection, I described the very limited sense in which 'standard metre' and 'sepia' can be called names. Now, I will unravel the sense in which samples are said to replace the simples of the Tractatus. The description of the replacement made from the vantage
point of the new perspective of epistemology will give more information about the links between language and the world as the Investigations saw it.

Wittgenstein puts the finishing touches on the analogy with which he starts remark 50 by making a final allusion to simple objects: "And to say 'If it did not exist, it could have no name' is to say as much and as little as: if this thing did not exist, we could not use it in our language-game. -- What looks as if it had to exist, is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our language-game; something with which comparison is made." (PI 50) In the Tractatus, simples had to exist in order for the names, the elements of the elementary propositions, to have sense. In the quotation cited above, Wittgenstein sums up his rejection of the Tractarian simple referential model of meaning by claiming that what had to exist, the simples which were what words referred to, is now a part of the language. The suggestions and suppositions concerning the existence of metaphysical entities are viewed as unnecessary and incoherent. This was demonstrated in Chapter 3's evaluation of the remarks leading up to remark 50. The theory that a word ultimately has to be tied to an indestructible and eternal 'object' is rejected and replaced by the idea that words refer to ordinary objects. The need to have definite links between language and the world remains intact, but those links are established through paradigms. Wittgenstein tells us in remark 50 that paradigms should be considered as instruments of the language, "a part
of the language."

The paradigms are the links between language and the world, the case or cases that a word refers to unambiguously, but the paradigms, the definite links, are now not taken to be the whole meaning of a word. The paradigm functions within the larger framework of purposes, kinds of words, speech acts and universals. This means that the paradigm is designed to be the solution to the problems of simple referentialism. By explicitly replacing simples by samples, Wittgenstein undoubtedly sees the importance of the fundamental idea of tying language to the world and secures this referentialism via the paradigm. By spending the remarks previous to remark 50 criticizing and evaluating the inadequacies of simple referential theories and pictures, Wittgenstein, without doubt, makes the paradigm the encapsulation of all the features that are missed by traditional accounts of meaning. The installation of a paradigm with the essential, interconnected rules for the mode of projection or kind of word and with the grammatical rules, accounts for purposes, speech acts, kinds of words and universals. These rules and aspects were described as part of the paradigm model in the previous subsection on the nature of the paradigm.

The comment that samples replace simples placed at the end of the description of the paradigm model given by the examples of the standard metre and the colour sepia has all of these ideas underlying it. The most important reason for actually linking the role of simples to that of samples
is contained in the idea of definite links. Simples were ultimately and mainly postulated to fill the requirement for definiteness of sense. The connection between paradigms and definiteness of sense has yet to be examined. Before I go into the discussion of definiteness of sense, which takes up the bulk of the remainder of this chapter, I want to refer to a few commentators' accounts of the comment concerning the replacement of simples by samples. This will suggest some of the major problems with most commentators' interpretations of remark 50.

It is remarkable that commentators who discuss the quotation in question do recognize that it is a direct reference to simples and to the 'replacement of simples by samples or paradigms, but they do not attempt to explain the reasons for the analogy nor do they place this discussion within the general evaluation of the function of remark 50 in the first 100 remarks of the Investigations. Both Kenny and Hacker's interpretations are correct as descriptions of the replacement of simples by samples. Kenny writes:

In a well-known passage of the PI he [Wittgenstein] mentions the standard metre at Paris as an example of an object which looks as if it had to exist, as if it existed necessarily like the objects of the Tractatus. This is because of its special role in the technique of measurement. Any thing which looks as if it has to exist, he says, is part of the language -- it is something essential to our mode of representation, not something that is represented."

Hacker writes:

The eternal substance of the world, the indestructible objects of the Tractatus with which language

"Kenny, p. 110."
was connected by means of names are ... nothing but metaphysical illusion. These unalterable simples, lying beyond existence and inexistence, are merely samples incorporated into language. 'The connection between 'language and reality' is made by means of the clarification of words, which belongs to the learning of language, so that language remains closed within itself, and autonomous.'

Both passages indicate an awareness of the fact that samples are said to replace simples and both passages say that the sample is a part of language. However, this is where their interpretations and evaluations stop. I suggest that most commentators fall short of seeing the importance of the paradigm in Wittgenstein's account of meaning for three reasons. First, the anti-referentialist attacks that are the concern of the first 50 remarks are not linked to the claim that paradigms are a replacement for simples. Simples had to exist as a result of the combined acceptance of the referential model and the demand for definiteness of sense. The description of the paradigm emerges from the criticisms of the simple referential theories and pictures of meaning. Secondly, even though some commentators see why the paradigm is called a means of representation (something with which comparison is made) they fail to see that the paradigm is designed to answer the problem that traditional theorists had in accounting for our use of universals. In other words, they see the paradigm in a very limited role. Finally, they give inadequate discussions of the reason for the connection

5Hacker, p. 159.

that is made between the Tractatus and the Investigations. The paradigm in its central and essential role is the unambiguous and definite link between language and the world. Providing this definite link was the function of the simples as well.

The three general things that are missed by commentators cannot be fully explicated as yet. In particular, the last deserves separate consideration because it is directly relevant to the topic of definiteness of sense which follows this section. I have given some of the reasons for commentators' blindness to the importance of paradigms here for two reasons. The three reasons summarize, in effect, the issues presented in this first section on remark 50. Secondly, the reasons anticipate some of the more serious problems with commentators' accounts. In the section on "Definiteness of Sense in the Investigations", I will single out two particular accounts that demonstrate that commentators, in general, miss the most important points and that they are, consequently, led into discussions that are only tangential to the real substance of Wittgenstein's account of meaning. Evaluating Hacker's reliance on criteria and Specht's discussion of the details of realism versus conventionalism will demonstrate the importance of recognizing paradigms as the solution to what is insufficient and wrong in traditional theories and pictures of meaning.

These discussions are contained in the respective subsections, "The Common Appeal of Criteria" and "The Realism versus Conventionalism Issue".
d) Remark 50 in Perspective

My study so far of remark 50 has been centred around the consideration of paradigms in the context of a theory of meaning. There is no more obvious reason for Wittgenstein's placement of the description of the paradigm model in remark 50 than that it is meant to be taken as a positive observation about the nature and structure of our language. The purely destructive criticisms of the traditional accounts of meaning is replaced by imagining two examples that are meant to be the counterpart to certain ideas presented in the *Tractatus*. Actually asserting that samples replace simples is conclusive evidence for viewing the paradigm as Wittgenstein's positive contribution to an account of the meaning of words.

This section's detailed study of remark 50 serves to show why this remark is singled out as crucial to an understanding of Wittgenstein's positive observations concerning the meaning of words in our language. Three important things concerning the notion of the paradigm were revealed in the three previous subsections: the regulatory role of the paradigm; the nature of this regulatory role and the connection of the paradigm model to an account of universals; and the paradigm model as the answer to what is deficient in traditional theories of meaning. These subsections provide a base from which the arguments for the necessity of the paradigm in an account of the meaning of words in our language emerge.

In the three remaining sections, I will provide two separate arguments for the necessity of paradigms. Each
argument issues from a particular error that is contained in traditional accounts of meaning. The first argument branches out from the reformulated Tractarian notion of definiteness of sense. First, I will discuss the sense in which the *Investigations* retains the notion of 'definiteness of sense' and then in the next section, I will argue that the paradigm is designed to satisfy the new requirements for definiteness of sense. The second argument for the necessity of paradigms emerges from the evaluation and rejection in the final section of the Lockean type account of mental images as necessary and sufficient for meaning. This argument comes out of a discussion of remarks 51-59 of the *Investigations*.

II. Definiteness of Sense -- Retained?

a) Recapitulation of Traditional Accounts of Definiteness of Sense

That sense must be definite in order for language-users to be able to communicate successfully is an idea that has an intuitive appeal. Frege exhibits this intuition in his declaration that a concept without boundaries is not a concept at all. Frege holds that without the determination of all cases or objects to which a word not only does but may possibly apply, the occurrence of that indeterminate word in a sentence would infect the whole sense of the sentence with indeterminacy. Frege writes:

Would the sentence 'any square root of 9 is odd' have a comprehensible sense at all if square root 9 were not a concept with a sharp boundary? Has
the question 'Are we still Christians?' really got a sense, if it is indeterminate whom the predicate 'Christian' can truly be asserted of, and who must be refused it?\textsuperscript{8}

The belief that definiteness of sense needs to be secured is natural. Frege's dogmatic stand that there is no sense at all at the level of the proposition if a concept has open boundaries, an indeterminate range of reference, is really never justified by him.

In Chapter 3, I showed the ways in which the \textit{Tractatus} could be said to adhere to the Fregean demand for closed boundaries. The \textit{Tractatus} does not explicitly refer to the question of the boundaries for concepts. In fact, I argued that the \textit{Tractatus} does not explicitly talk about universals, but about names. Within the Tractarian system, Wittgenstein saw no need to specify whether or not the names referred to universals or particulars. The nature of the theory left such questions as irrelevant. Yet, it is fair to deduce that the Tractarian version of the demand for definiteness of sense could not have allowed for the openedendedness of concepts. According to the \textit{Tractatus}, allowing for indeterminacy of reference at the level of the word would infect the sense of the propositions in which the word occurred with indeterminacy. This is because in the \textit{Tractatus}, the meaning of a word is its object. Consequently, if the referents for a word are not unambiguous and determinate, the meaning of the word and the sense of the proposition in which the word

\textsuperscript{8}Frege, \textit{Philosophical Writings}, p. 159.
appears is not unambiguous and determinate.

b) The **Investigations' Approach**

One of the main reasons for my preoccupation in Chapter 3 with discussing the shift in focus from a logic that was ultimately tied up with a metaphysical theory to language that is ultimately tied up with the purposes and activities of the language-user was to lay the groundwork for the argument here that the way 'definiteness of sense' is understood by traditional theories and in particular by the *Tractatus* is as incoherent as the notion of simple objects. If the "axis of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need" (PI 108), then the kinds of observations on the structure of our language that were revealed in Chapters 1 and 2 need to figure in the *Investigations* treatment of 'definiteness of sense'. In this subsection, I will start by giving a rough indication of the sorts of observations that 'definiteness of sense' must now cohere with. I will finish by examining the advantages of considering that the notion of definiteness of sense is retained in the *Investigations* and by providing a short account of some of the ordinary uses of 'definiteness of sense'.

It is one thing to hold that the sense of a sentence is indeterminate if the words in that sentence cannot be connected with objects or cases in the world and quite another to hold that it follows from this that every word must have all the objects to which it refers determined for all time. In Chapter 2, the descriptions of the examples of 'book' and
'games' gave a natural home for the view that concepts have open boundaries. The descriptions of the language-games of doubting, imagining and judging suggested that openness is quite common (if not universal). (This does not mean that the ability to deal with new cases entails that concepts are open-ended. An account could describe the language-games of doubting, judging and imagining in terms of giving the child the ability to discover the cases that are already determined to fit under the concept.)

With the benefit of our detailed discussion of remark 50, it is easy to see that Wittgenstein would not support an account that viewed the cases to be fitted under the concept as predetermined. In the subsection "The Realism Versus Conventionalism Issue", I will look at an account by Specht who sees Wittgenstein as a realist. For Specht, paradigms and the cases that are similar to them are discoverable and recognizable in the nature of things. Both in Chapters 2 and 3 and in the subsection "The Nature of the Paradigm" in this chapter, I argued that the Investigations' view of language as a convention-bound and purposeful activity makes it natural to interpret Wittgenstein as expounding the view that boundaries for concepts are naturally open-ended. Substantiation for Wittgenstein's adherence to open-endedness will be given in the following section.

"Specht actually writes that Wittgenstein "holds a position similar to realism." (Specht, p. 81)
In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein does not explicitly argue for the openendedness of concepts until he arrives at the famous 'games' example, but his descriptions of the builders' predisposition to see similarities and contrasts as well as his description of the paradigm as a standard for comparison make a very natural home and a natural base for the view that universals are openended. If definiteness of sense is to be retained in the *Investigations*, then it is imperative that it cohere with the openendedness of concepts. In addition, however, the appeal of the view that sense be definite can only be satisfied in Wittgenstein's later work within the framework of the positive observations contained in Chapters 1 and 2. In other words, the notion of 'definiteness of sense' gets its sense from the epistemological perspective in which the *Investigations* description of purposes, speech acts, kinds of words and universals were made. If Wittgenstein can be said to keep a requirement that sense be definite in his later work, then the meaning of 'definiteness of sense' must be seen in a radically different way from that presented by Frege or by the *Tractatus*.

Arguing that the sense of 'definiteness of sense' is different in the *Investigations* avoids the debate in Wittgensteinian literature as to whether or not definiteness of sense is adopted in the *Investigations*. Hacker, for one, wholeheartedly accepts the view that definiteness of sense means that boundaries are closed. As a result, he is led to the position that the requirement for definiteness of sense
is obviously rejected in the Investigations for the simple reason that Wittgenstein explicitly argues for the openness of concepts. The argument that Wittgenstein relinquishes the demand for definiteness of sense leads to further mistaken interpretations. The later Wittgenstein, it is argued, must be propounding the view that there is a natural indeterminacy of sense in our language. I want to argue that the latter interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of the natural indeterminacy of sense is incoherent. Wittgenstein does give an account of definiteness of sense by looking at the ordinary usage of the phrase and then by finding the conditions for this requirement for definiteness of sense. This is a technique similar to that used in the evaluation of simples and again it indicates the new epistemological perspective.

In a critical appraisal of the Tractatus, Hacker sums up nicely how the Tractatus managed to use its key terms in a way that took away their meaning:

The preconceptions of the Tractatus, in particular the demand for determinacy of sense, forced an ideal upon language. Labouring under the illusion that this ideal must be found in language, the Tractatus had sublimed logic, twisted its central concepts of sentence, word, and meaning out of all recognition in order to meet the requirements of a prejudice.

Hacker, pp. 15, 22, 39-41, 140, and 189.

We have seen that the examination of the word 'simples' leads into remark 50 where Wittgenstein produces an analogue for this requirement in the notion of the paradigm.

Hacker, p. 122.
I would add that 'definiteness of sense' is another central term in the Tractatus that is "twisted beyond recognition". What underlies this sentiment concerning the Tractatus is the rejection of the metaphysical focus and the acceptance of the importance of speaking of purposes and of language-game contexts. Just as the meaning of 'simple' was shown to be incoherent in Chapter 3 because no language-game context was specified for the word, 'definiteness of sense' is used in abstraction from its home in the ordinary language-games in which it is used. Recognizing that there is an ordinary usage of the phrase 'definiteness of sense' makes it easy to see that the later Wittgenstein would naturally give some account of the ways in which sense is said or can be said to be definite.

Holding that because the later Wittgenstein viewed concepts as openended, he must have argued for the natural indeterminacy or vagueness of language is ultimately incoherent. It makes no sense to claim that all of language is indeterminate just as it makes no sense to claim that all of language is determinate. Without the contrasting states or situations in which parts of language can be said to be either 'determinate' or 'indeterminate', there would be no purpose and no content for the description of language as either indeterminate or determinate. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein saw that the forms of expression in ordinary language usually disguised the sense of the proposition (TLP 3.323, 4.002, 4.112), but this was a mere disguise and it did not mean that the senses
of ordinary propositions were not definite. For the Tractatus, there is no indefiniteness (language is all right as it is), but analysis is necessary for revealing the real definiteness of sense that is hidden in everyday language. If the later Wittgenstein thought that 'definiteness of sense' lacked meaning in the Tractatus because there was no contrast between definite and indefinite, then he could surely not be said to be propounding universal indeterminacy of sense in the Investigations.

Understanding that the contrast between 'definiteness of sense' and 'indeterminacy' is made in ordinary language-game contexts makes it imperative to see 'definiteness of sense' in a different way and to look for the ways in which the sense of propositions can be said to be definite by looking at how the phrase is used and understood. That there is a need for this sort of account of 'definiteness of sense' is evident in our use of the phrase and in our desire to be clear about what is said. Communication does break down when propositions are vague or indeterminate. There needs to be some explanation or some built in linguistic device that erases the vagueness and indeterminacy by clearing the doubt and securing definiteness of sense.

Before going on to discuss how paradigms are designed to secure definiteness of sense, I will give some of the ordinary uses or senses of 'definiteness of sense'. This will not only clinch the case for the claim that Wittgenstein still saw the need to secure definiteness of sense, but it
will also be a useful reference point in further discussions of this topic. There are at least three different but related senses of 'definiteness of sense'. 'The sense is definite' is used in contexts in which the application of a word or sentence is unambiguous or certain. In these instances, there is complete lack of ambiguity as to what the word or sentence refers to.\textsuperscript{13} 'Definiteness of sense' also means that there is complete clarity and lack of misunderstanding as to what should be done when a sentence is uttered. For someone who takes a sentence as having a definite sense, there is no question about how to act or respond to the speech act. Lastly, one who can make the sense of a sentence definite is able to disambiguate the sense of an indefinite sentence by making the reference unambiguous. For example, one could say, "Bring me the book from the shelf" and then disambiguate the command by narrowing it down to the particular book. It can be seen that in general, 'definiteness of sense' means lack of ambiguity or doubt, certainty and clarity in particular instances.

III. Definiteness of Sense in the Investigations

In general, it can be said that commentators commonly hold that Wittgenstein relinquished the notion of definiteness

\textsuperscript{13}It is not difficult to see that paradigms and paradigmatic propositions are free from ambiguity and are certain in this sense. This idea will be developed in the subsection "Definiteness of Sense Secured by Paradigms".
of sense because of their blindness to the importance of paradigms. In the first subsection of this section, I will show that Wittgenstein did not think that openendedness implied that sense could not be definite. By quoting his own words, I will give Wittgenstein's argument that indeterminacy in the range of reference does not affect the fact that sense is definite in particular cases. In the second subsection, I will demonstrate that commentators miss Wittgenstein's claim for definiteness of sense as it relates to the particular paradigm cases because of the common tendency to focus on criteria as Wittgenstein's main contribution. Replacing the discussion of criteria with the description of the paradigm model will emphasize the centrality of the notion of paradigms in Wittgenstein's account of meaning and it will lead to the consideration of definiteness of sense as it relates to the paradigm. With evidence from the text, I will show in the final subsection that Wittgenstein links the notions of definiteness of sense and paradigms. This discussion will hark back to the descriptions of ostensive teaching and training and will show how paradigms are necessary.

a) **Definiteness of Sense With Openendedness**

The observation that the descriptions of the language-games of judging, doubting and imagining are a natural home for the view that concepts are openended has been made in the context of the builders and of the examples of 'games' and 'book'. Here, I will delve much deeper into the case for openendedness by examining several of Wittgenstein's remarks.
on this topic. By showing that the tendency towards holding that concepts are closed is a matter of attitude (of viewing concepts as closed rather than of having closed boundaries for concepts) and is dependent on purposes, I will also show that our concepts are indeed open-ended. With this as a background, I will provide quotations that indicate that open-endedness is quite compatible with definiteness of sense.

We saw that Frege believed that concepts had to be closed to have meaning. However, Frege displays some awareness of the difficulty in demarcating the boundaries for concepts when he writes: "there must not be any object as regards which the definition leaves in doubt whether it falls under the concept; though for us men, with our defective knowledge, the question may not always be decidable." Yet, for Frege, the fault lies with our incapacities and the demand for closed boundaries remains intact. By attending to the purposes of language-users, Wittgenstein breaks the hold of this demand (of the sort it had on Frege and the Tractatus), and allows for a natural description of the open-endedness of concepts. The fact that some concepts appear to have very strict boundaries is made a function of the purposes of the language-users rather than a requirement or an ideal to which all concepts approximate.

In a direct reference to Frege in remark 71, Wittgenstein asks the rhetorical questions: "'But is a blurred concept a concept at all?' -- Is an indistinct photograph a picture of

1 Frege, Philosophical Writings, p. 159.
a person at all? Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the indistinct one often exactly what we need?" (Pl 71) Depending on the purposes for which the photograph is used, the indistinct one may be exactly what is needed in certain circumstances. In relation to the question of the boundaries for a concept, particular purposes may dictate that the language-community give sharp boundaries to a concept. Whether or not a concept is given boundaries is a function of purposes and is not determined by the nature of things or demanded by a particular requirement of definiteness of sense.

Openendedness is not treated as a defect in the Investigations, but as an aspect that is in harmony with the picture of the purposeful language-user who judges, makes decisions, imagines and has doubts. Consequently, even in the cases in which it seems most obvious that the concept has closed boundaries, this is explainable in terms of purposes that make it useful to determine the cases to be included under the concept. In such cases, criteria, rules for the application of a word, may be set down in order to determine what will be called by the same 'name'.

These concepts are most obviously used in the scientific world where certain specified features determine what cases will be included under a concept. The situation even for these concepts, however, is distinguishable from Frege's view of closed boundaries, for even when the cases are determined and the boundaries are closed, there is no
guarantee that the rules for the application of a word to a case, the criteria, will unambiguously determine all possibilities. This is the point that Wittgenstein makes when he imagines the disappearance and reappearance of a chair and asks: "Have you rules ready for such cases -- rules saying whether one may use the word 'chair' to include this kind of thing? But do we miss them when we use the word 'chair'; and are we to say that we do not really attach any meaning to this word, because we are not equipped with the rules for every possible application of it?" (PI 80) Cases are decided as they come up and when a case arrives that is not covered by the rules, new rules may be introduced to clear the doubt that the new case has presented.

Those concepts that are given boundaries for particular purposes may be considered different from other concepts because the language-user is taught to treat these concepts as bounded. The difference in attitude is captured by Wittgenstein in the following quotation:

Still, there's no doubt that someone who understands the examples as arbitrary cases chosen to illustrate the concept doesn't understand the same as a man who regards them as a definitely bounded enumeration .... but what does the first man understand that the second doesn't? Well, in the things he is shown he sees only examples to illustrate certain features; he doesn't think that I am showing him the things for their own sake as well. (PG, p. 271)

The two people are given the same examples, but in the case in which the person is taught that only these things are called by this word, the person need not be given the disposition in training to make decisions about other possible cases.
This person would be given even less than the builders were given, for the builders had to decide for new cases even though the decisions were very simple because the things included under each building stone word were 'exactly' similar.

In the situation in which the person is taught to treat the examples as "examples to illustrate certain features", however, the disposition and preparedness to make decisions about other possible cases to be confronted is given in the teaching and training processes. With each connection that is made between the word and an example, the person is made aware that this is yet another example to be taken as an exemplary case for the concept. The person is trained to treat the examples as paradigmatic and as controls for future cases to be confronted, for each example is meant to pick out certain relevant features that are to be focused on.

Making the question of the boundaries for concepts a question of the language-users' purposes for being strict about determining cases to be included under a universal, rather than a question of discovering all of the determined cases included under universals, destroys the Fregean conviction that the boundaries for concepts must be closed. For those concepts whose cases seem to be strictly determinate, this is a matter of attitude and of purpose and it is not written into the nature of the concept. Even here, however, new cases and borderline cases for the concepts can be imagined. For the most part, the ordinary and everyday concepts are openended. In relation to the openendedness of the concept
'plant' and in opposition to Frege's claim that our defective knowledge merely suggests that concepts are openended, Wittgenstein writes:

Rather, no end to which we come is really the end; that is, I could always say: I don't understand why these should be all the possibilities. -- And doesn't that just mean that it is senseless to speak of 'all the possibilities'? So enumeration doesn't touch the concepts 'plant' and 'egg' at all. (PG, p. 276)

But if concepts are naturally openended what about Frege's worry that this possibility infects all the sentences in which the word occurs with indeterminacy? In bold opposition to Frege's firm conviction that the boundaries for concepts must be closed for sense to be definite, Wittgenstein writes:

We are able to use the word 'plant' in a way that gives rise to no misunderstandings, yet countless borderline cases can be constructed in which no one has yet decided whether something still falls under the concept 'plant'. Does this mean that the meaning of the word 'plant' in all other cases is infected by uncertainty, so that it might be said we use the word without understanding it? Would a definition which bounded this concept on several sides make the meaning of the word clearer to us in all sentences? Would we understand better all the sentences in which it occurs? (PG, p. 117)

The fact that there are or could be borderline cases for a word does not affect the clarity of the sentences in which the word is used. Frege's belief that the possibility of the unboundedness of the concept 'Christian' would infect all the sentences in which the word appears with indeterminacy is ultimately ungrounded. Wittgenstein tells us in the quotation above that the sense of the sentences in which the
word 'plant' is used can still be certain, their senses can be definite, regardless of whether or not the concept itself is openended. This description of the use of the word 'plant' and the set of rhetorical questions given in the quotation does succeed in destroying Frege's conception that openendedness is incompatible with definiteness of sense.

In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein gives substantial support for the argument that the openendedness of concepts does not affect the usability of the word in particular instances. (PI 68, 69, 70, 71, 75, 77, 84) This is one of the uses to which the famous 'games' example is put. Wittgenstein writes: "'But if the concept 'game' is uncircumscribed like that, you don't really know what you mean by a 'game'. ' -- When I give the description: 'The ground was quite covered with plants' -- do you want to say I don't know what I am talking about until I can give a definition of a plant?' (PI 70) A definition that bounds the concept does not necessarily succeed in making the meaning of the word clearer in particular instances. In the next subsection, I will give evidence of the strong tendency in commentators' interpretations of the later Wittgenstein to view the control on cases included under a universal by criteria as Wittgenstein's substitution for determinate boundaries. Demonstrating the real role of criteria will highlight the more primary and necessary function of paradigms.
b) **The Common Appeal of Criteria**

Making the difference between concepts with closed boundaries and concepts with an open range of reference a function of purposes and of attitude removes the mistaken idea that it is a defect to have openedness and it shows the real role of criteria in an account of meaning. In the quotation from *Philosophical Grammar*, Wittgenstein argues that depending on particular purposes, some concepts can be treated as though the boundaries are closed, for the cases are all determined by criteria. (PG, p. 271) Other concepts can be treated as though there are always other cases to be confronted and they are decided as they come up.

One of the ideas that comes out of the description of the examples in remarks 65-88 is that even when it seems most obvious that a concept has closed boundaries, certain instances can arise which are not taken care of by the rules for use or which would defeat the rules for use. Wittgensteinian commentators thrive on this discussion of whether criteria are sufficient and/or necessary and whether or not they are defeasible. With as little involvement in the debate as possible, I want to show that an emphasis on criteria is responsible for the mistaken ideas about definiteness of sense. Taking Wittgenstein's positive contribution to be contained in the notion of criteria (remarks 65-100) misses the important connection that Wittgenstein makes between paradigms and definiteness of sense.
Hacker makes numerous references to the importance of criteria in Wittgenstein's later work. One such reference reads: "On Wittgenstein's later view, of course, stipulating a criterion of identity for a name constitutes an essential element in explaining the meaning or sense of the name, for indeed the criterion of identity is part of the sense of the name."\textsuperscript{15} And in another more dramatic pronouncement, Hacker writes: "The deep concern with the rules determining criterial relations is Wittgenstein's main constructive contribution to contemporary philosophy. The account of sense in terms of truth conditions which dominated the \textit{Tractatus} is replaced in Wittgenstein's later work (from the \textit{Blue Book} onwards) by an account in terms of criteria."\textsuperscript{16} But seeing criteria as Wittgenstein's central contribution to a theory of meaning forces Hacker to puzzle about what appear as exceptions to accounting for meaning in terms of the criteria for its use.

In the last chapter of \textit{Insight and Illusions}, Hacker considers the ways in which criteria can be said to be the foundation in Wittgenstein's later work. He admits that "a corollary of the contention that the sense of an expression is given by specification of its criteria is of course that an expression without criteria lacks sense."\textsuperscript{17} He ends by presenting problems for this theory:

\textsuperscript{15}Hacker, p. 56. Similar claims are made on pp. 105, 111, 153, 162, 253, 281\textsuperscript{2}, 283, 291-2, 295, 300-3.

\textsuperscript{16}Hacker, p. 152.

\textsuperscript{17}Hacker, p. 292.
Self-ascription of experience is criterionless. Yet it is far from obvious, especially if the doctrine of avowals should indeed be rejected, that first person, present tense psychological sentences lack sense. So an account must be given of the sense of such sentences. But it is clear that these are not the only kind of sentence asserted without grounds. For it seems that Wittgenstein thought that use of determinates of perceptual determinables involves no criteria but rather the criterionless exercise of a recognition-al cum linguistic capacity. One cannot justify one's assertion 'This is red' by reference to criterial evidence.\(^{18}\)

The attempt to secure a foundation for Wittgenstein's later semantics in the notion of criteria is unsuccessful. In the case of colour words, there are no criteria for the use of the words, but in acquiring the ability to play the language-games with colour words, the child receives a recognitional training that enables him to link a colour word with samples of various shades for the colour. Wittgenstein makes the notion of the paradigm primary here as is evidenced by the following: "Colour-words are explained like this: 'That's red'. (2 430) and "'It looks red to me.' -- 'And what is red like?' -- 'Like this.' Here the right paradigm must be pointed to." (2 420) The child learns to play the language-games with colour by learning that the paradigms are to be taken as unambiguous samples for the colour word and that other shades are to be compared to the paradigms.

\(^{18}\text{Hacker, p. 306. The problem is also mentioned on pp. 253, 263 and pp. 271-2 where he puts it succinctly: "The move from accounting for the sense of a sentence in terms of its truth conditions to accounting for its sense in terms of criteria which constitute its non-inductive justification opens a wide gap with respect to sentences which lack criteria."}
The 'similarity' between the shades and the paradigms is not determined by criteria, but rather the behavioural conditioning instills a capacity to recognize what counts as similar. It is not a matter of learning criteria, but of being trained to make statements that agree with the judgments of others: "If, pointing to patches of various shades of red, you asked a man "What have these in common that makes you call them red?", he'd be inclined to answer "Don't you see?" And this of course would not be pointing out a common element." (BB, p. 131)

The ability to recognize that a shade of colour is 'similar' to the sample or paradigm for the colour is not explainable in terms of criteria. The rule of comparison to samples is built into the paradigm model for colour words and this rule distinguishes colour words as a different kind of word with a unique mode of projection. The ability to say 'That looks red' displays one's acquaintance with the language-game with colour words or with the way the paradigm functions for this kind of word. Learning to master the language-games with colour involves establishing the initial connections between a colour word and a sample and realizing that these samples are to be taken as objects for comparison for other shades. There are no criteria for determining what shades will be taken to be sufficiently similar to the samples.

Bringing the focus back to the paradigm model in the case of colour words makes clear its central role in Wittgenstein's view of the meaning of words. Hacker and
others are driven by the desire to have an account of meaning that has the meaning of a word restricted or at least controlled by criteria. The meaning of a word is then explainable in terms of a list of criteria. They interpret Wittgenstein as propounding the case for openendedness and arguing for a control on this situation with the help of criterial rules. Rather than recognize the role of criteria as it relates to the paradigm model, they take Wittgenstein to be holding that the meaning of a word is now the list of criteria for the use of the word. The result is all the discussions concerning the necessity and/or sufficiency of criteria.\(^1\)

Wittgenstein is concerned to argue for openendedness, but explicit discussion of this topic only occurs after the paradigm model is introduced. The fact that the paradigm is introduced as the means of representation, the object for comparison, for further cases that are confronted makes its connection to the topic of openendedness certain. Criteria are subsequently introduced as further controls that are often used to determine what will count as similar to the paradigm cases for the concept. The notion that criteria are secondary to paradigms is missed in the literature.\(^2\) It is

\(^1\)A few of these discussions include articles by Gordon Baker, John V. Canfield, John Turk Saunders, W. Gregory Lycan, William Hasker and Paul Hazard. Check bibliography for full references on these articles.

\(^2\)In the next subsection, we will see that Specht is a (merely) apparent counterexample to this claim, for he does not see that paradigms are vital and necessary in an account of meaning nor does he acknowledge the relation of criteria to paradigms.
Hacker's emphasis on criteria that leads to the difficulties he encounters with respect to criterionless words. Criteria are not necessarily associated with a word, but are introduced if certain purposes or reasons for a stricter control on the cases to be included under a universal call for their introduction. The role that Wittgenstein gives to criteria shows that they are neither as important to nor as pervasive in our use of universals as is commonly believed.

One who can use a word appropriately and who knows the meaning of a word need not be able to list the criteria for its application. Wittgenstein tells us this in *Zettel* and describes the primacy of the paradigm once again:

One learns the word 'think', i.e. its use, under certain circumstances, which, however, one does not learn to describe. (Z 114)

But I can teach a person the use of the word! For a description of those circumstances is not needed for that. (Z 115)

I just teach him the word under particular circumstances. (Z 116)

"No one thought of that case" -- we may say. Indeed, I cannot enumerate the conditions under which the word 'to think' is to be used -- but if a circumstance makes the use doubtful, I can say so, and also say how the situation is deviant from the usual ones. (Z 118)

Being able to say how the situation is deviant from the usual ones, the undoubted cases, is a capacity that is given with the training into the paradigm cases for words.

When Wittgenstein describes how the word 'games' is taught, he indicates that the method is not an improvisation used in default of a better way, but that it does describe
how we do succeed in using universals with open boundaries. He writes: "One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way. -- I do not, however, mean by this that he is supposed to see in those examples that common thing which I ... was unable to express; but that he is now to employ these examples in a particular way." (PI 71) There is no list of characteristics essential to all examples of games. Wittgenstein says that what we have are unambiguous examples, paradigms, of games and that these paradigms guide decisions and judgments about whether something else is called or will be called a game as well. The fact that the child need not be and equally is not given criteria (let alone criteria that determine whether or not something is to be taken as similar to the paradigms) does not imply that the word has an indeterminate meaning or that there can be no account of meaning at all without either a nameable essence, determinate references or a specifiable list of criteria. In the next subsection, I will look at an account by Specht that accurately describes how the paradigm functions. I will show, however, that this description gets buried underneath other issues on which Specht focuses.

c) The Realism Versus Conventionalism Issue

In a book entitled The Foundations of Wittgenstein's Late Philosophy, Specht comes notably close to an accurate description of how the paradigm functions as a control on classifications:

in introducing a new linguistic sign and binding it
to a paradigm, one gives a regulative principle for the organization of a new group. The paradigm is the model in accordance with which all the phenomena similar to the paradigm are organized into a group, upon which a single name is imposed. Thus, at the same time as a new linguistic sign is introduced, and with it the mode of use indicated by the paradigm, phenomena in reality are organized into groups.21

The description seems to indicate that Specht is not guilty of Hacker's mistake of relying on criteria as Wittgenstein's answer to an account of meaning. In this quote, Specht captures the regulatory role of the paradigm as well as the paradigm's connection to the possibility of forming groups of objects. In other words, Specht seems to recognize the connection that Wittgenstein makes between the function of paradigms and our use of universals.

Specht's account, however, is only apparently insightful with respect to the function and role of paradigms in an account of meaning. First, although Specht does see the regulatory role of the paradigm, he does not mention why the description of the paradigm model appears where it does in the Investigations. This means that he does not take the paradigm to be the solution to the inadequacies and incoherencies contained in traditional theories and pictures of meaning. Specht does not see that the paradigm is designed to account for purposes, or speech acts: features that were missed in traditional accounts of meaning. This nonrealization of the centrality of the paradigm results in part from his failure

21Specht, p. 160.
to remark upon Wittgenstein's comment that samples replace simples and in part from his propensity to focus on the question of whether or not the cases to be included under a paradigm are determined by the nature of things.

Specht puts the emphasis on the power of the paradigm to determine what phenomena will be organized into a group. Once the paradigm is introduced, it is a matter of discovering what other things will be included in the class of phenomena. The realist overtones are evident in this interpretation of Wittgenstein's paradigm model. Specht sees the interesting aspect to be contained in the question as to how man can "recognize the identical moments in these objects".\textsuperscript{22} Focusing on the question of how similarities that seem to be written into the nature of things are discoverable or recognizable bypasses altogether the important features that Wittgenstein wants us to see in the paradigm model.

The description of the nature and role of the paradigm given in the last subsection emphasized the importance of recognizing the fact that the paradigm is introduced to serve specific functions in the communicative processes. At the same time as a word is introduced by linking it to paradigm cases, the rules that determine the mode of projection and the grammatical rules for the use of the word in speech acts are given. It is not a matter of discovering the 'identical moments' in the objects called by the same name, but rather a matter of receiving training that enables judging and

\textsuperscript{22}Specht, pp. 182-3.
decision making with respect to new and possible cases to be
guided by the paradigm or paradigms for a word. Wittgenstein
makes it clear in remark 50 that the setting up of paradigms
is the expression of the purposeful activity of language-
users. He says that he is commenting on our "language-game
-- our method of representation." (PI 50) The decisions and
judgments that are made in relation to new and possible cases
is an on-going and creative process. The similarities between
the new cases and the paradigms are not determined by the
nature of things.

It could be said that Specht's account is motivated
by the same sorts of worries that lie behind other interpre-
tations of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's adherence to the
view that concepts are openended seems to create fears that
this situation leaves no control on and no account of the
meaning of a word. Hacker recognizes openendedness and moves
to consider criteria as being the control on this situation.
However, he ends by expressing some doubts about a total
reliance on criteria as the foundation for meaning. Specht
sees the paradigm as a control, but not in the sense that
Wittgenstein saw it to be. For Specht, the cases that fit
under a universal are already determined by the nature
of things and it is a matter of discovering that these cases
are similar to the paradigms for the word.

For Wittgenstein, on the other hand, the language-
user decides what cases will be counted as similar to the
paradigms and paradigms are guidelines rather than controls.
This makes for a much more satisfactory account of openendedness.

Seeing Wittgenstein as a realist confuses and clouds over the main ideas that are related to paradigms. For Specht, there is no account of how particular purposes call for the establishment of paradigms that are conventionally and in a sense arbitrarily chosen as the definite or defining cases for a word. Rather, according to Specht, the puzzle is how we can and do manage to recognize the similarities already written into the nature of the objects included under a universal. If Specht had realized the importance that Wittgenstein gives to the purposes of language-users, he could have seen that the language-user is the active and creative agent in a theory of meaning. He could then have seen that Wittgenstein makes the paradigm central and essential because it serves to guide the language-users both in the teaching and learning of the meanings of words and in the ability to extend the range of cases to be fitted under a universal.

d) **Definiteness of Sense Secured By Paradigms**

The material in this final subsection is a gathering together of many of the ideas presented in this chapter. I suggested that the juxtaposition of simples and samples in remark 50 indicates that Wittgenstein thought of the sample, the paradigm, as a replacement of the incoherent requirement that simples are necessary to secure definiteness of sense.

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23 Specht, p. 160.
'Definiteness of sense' is what connects simples and samples, for both the simples and samples are described as definite referents for words. The definitional aspect related to the introduction of a paradigm makes the link between language and the world as definite as the simples made it. In Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein writes: "I deposit what belongs to the essence among the paradigms of language." (RFM I, 32)

This statement seems to contradict Wittgenstein's criticism of essentialism, but the point being made is that what is 'named' as the paradigm, is defined as expressive of the 'essence' of the concept. The decision to mark the 'object' in the world as the standard or paradigm is the decision to regard it as the case that is referred to when new decisions and judgments need to be made. The paradigm ties a word to the world in such a way that there is no room for indefiniteness and no room for doubt. It is only after the paradigm is settled (and with this the rules of projection and the grammatical rules for use are given) that questions concerning other cases to be included under the universal are possible. It is only when the question of whether or not something is like the paradigm or sufficiently like the paradigm that doubt is allowed in and that the possibility of removing the doubt is allowed for through agreements or through the use of criteria.

This point was made in connection with the example of labelling the reddish blue colour 'bluid' in the subsection, "The Standard Metre: An Analogous Case?"
This is one sense in which paradigms are foundational. They not only replace the simples as representations of definite links between language and the world, but they are necessary for the acquisition of a language like ours. Just as doubt cannot enter with the labelling of a paradigm, so too doubt must be absent from the training into the paradigm cases. Just as it is only possible for doubts to arise concerning the cases to be assimilated to paradigms, so too the language-user is incapable of doubting until he has a firm grasp of paradigm cases. Of course, these arguments should be familiar from Chapter 1's discussion of the impossibility for the builders in language-game 2 to express doubt from the start. Doubting was a language-game that they had to learn and it depended on the mastery of, the certainty with, the paradigm cases. Repeating this here serves to show how closely intertwined the account of meaning is with epistemological issues of doubt and certainty.

Doubt can enter only after a certain foundation is established; that is, when there is something to doubt. It is here that indeterminacy with regard to reference (borderline cases) enters, for doubt is exhibited about whether or not something is sufficiently similar to the foundational cases. I have shown in the subsection "Definiteness of Sense With Openendedness", that the possibility of openendedness does not affect the determinacy of the paradigm cases. In situations in which indefinite reference is a problem, decisions can be made to fix the case to a particular concept in order to clear
the doubt. When such decisions are institutionalized, the core of paradigms for a concept is expanded. But even leaving the case indeterminate does not mean that any other instance in which the concept or concepts are used will be indefinite.

Sense is definite where the paradigm cases for words and the paradigm situations for propositions are concerned. Where the application of a word or a proposition is in doubt, sense is indefinite and the application is uncertain in borderline cases. But even when sense is indefinite, it can be made definite in ordinary contexts by referring to a case or situation with which the person in doubt is very familiar. This method of clearing the doubt works because the person is being made to switch to information that he takes as indubitable. Wittgenstein gives a very good example of the notions of 'definiteness of sense' and 'indefiniteness of sense' at work in ordinary contexts.

In this example, he looks at the command 'Observe the particular lighting of this room' and says that it has a clear sense under certain circumstances: e.g., if the sun makes the walls of the room red. Here, the command is fixable to a state of affairs that is paradigmatic for the utterance of the command. However, if there is nothing striking about the lighting, the command is indefinite and someone told this would likely ask, 'What about it?' Wittgenstein contrasts the two cases in this way:

In the first case, when the room was lit a striking red, you could have pointed out the peculiarity which you were meant, though not explicitly told to
observe. You could, e.g., have used a sample of
the particular colour in order to do so. We shall
in this case be inclined to say that a peculiarity
was added to the normal appearance of the room.

In the second case, when the room was just ordinarily
lighted and there was nothing striking about its
appearance, you didn't know exactly what to do when
you were told to observe the lighting of the room.
All you could do was to look about you waiting for
something further to be said which would give the
first order its full sense. (BB, p. 176)

In the first case, the word 'particular' was fixable
to the abnormal appearance of the room, but in the second
case, there was no reference for the expression 'particular
lighting'. Until either an explanation is added to the
command to justify the statement about the particularity of
the lighting or until the situation suddenly changes and
allows the particularity to become obvious, the command does
not make sense and the person hearing it would not know what
to do. This example shows a more sophisticated version of
the paradigm model in operation. Here situations are paradigm-
matic for particular propositions and the proposition has
sense by being fixable to a state of affairs that one has
been trained to associate with the proposition. However,
the example does describe how sense can be definite in
particular propositions in which a word appears even if the
word is not fixable to a case in all instances. In the one
example, 'particular lighting' had a definite sense, while
in the other, it had no reference that could give it sense
in the command.

The samples replace simples as the definite referents
of a word. The description of the connections between
language and the world is now in terms of paradigms that are the definitional links established as a result of the purposeful activity of language-users. This purposeful activity makes the connections that are made between language and the world an on-going and creative process. But the expansion and change that occurs at the boundary lines for concepts need not imply that concepts are without meaning or that their meaning cannot be accounted for. We saw that Hacker's attempt to install criteria as the foundation of meaning failed both because we do use and know the meanings of words without being able to cite criteria and because not all of our concepts have criteria. The paradigms that are the links between language and the world provide the controls and regulations on the range of reference for a word and thus on the meaning of the word. However, these controls are not as strict as Specht would have us believe. In the next and final section, I will approach the topic of the type of connection that is established by the paradigm from another angle and conclude by giving another argument for the necessity of paradigms.

IV. Remarks 51-59: The Nature of the Connection Between Language and the World

After describing the nature of the paradigm model in remark 50, Wittgenstein turns to examine the type of connection between language and the world that is established by the
paradigm. In remarks 51-59, Wittgenstein directs fresh
criticisms against the Lockean-type account of words referring
to ideas. By evaluating this theory of the connection between
language and the world, Wittgenstein is able to reveal more
details about the theory of paradigms. The positive remarks
that emerge from this attack on Locke not only allow a fuller
description of the characteristics of the paradigm, but they
provide the second substantial argument for the necessity of
paradigms in an account of meaning.

In remark 51, Wittgenstein recalls language-game 48
and the words in that language-game. His concern for describing
the kind of connection that is established is evident in
certain sentences: "But what does this correspondence consist
in; in what sense can one say that in the technique of using
the language certain elements correspond to the signs?" (PI
51) The descriptions of the naming of the elements in remark
48, the naming of the metre bar and of the colour sample
sepia make it clear that the connection is conventionally set.
By arguing that Locke's account of ideas as the bearers of
meaning fails because ideas are neither necessary nor sufficient,
Wittgenstein succeeds in showing that it is necessary to have
public samples. But this necessity does not mean that the
bonds between language and the world are eternal or indestruc-
tible. Out of the evaluation of the Lockean-type view of
meaning, Wittgenstein develops the description of definiteness
of sense remaining unaffected by the conventionality of the
bonds between language and the world.
a) **Mental Images as Sufficient?**

The first commonsense objection to Locke's view that the meaning of a word is held by the idea to which it refers is that it is unnecessary to assume that a mental image must come before one's mind every time the word is used. In this section of the *Investigations*, however, Wittgenstein is concerned with tackling the more serious problem with the Lockean view of the mental entity as sufficient. In the section on Locke in Chapter 1, I outlined some of the difficulties of speaking of a correct application of one's use of a word if a person has only his private idea for the word. I indicated that this type of objection is directly related to the anti-private language section of the *Investigations*. Remarks 51-59 can be said to supply in quintessence the brunt of the anti-private language argument (though it is only developed in full in remarks 202-315).

If the connection between language and the world is established by the individual's ability to call to mind the image of the thing, then it must be possible to remember the idea for the word. In remark 56, Wittgenstein imagines a situation that casts doubt on the credibility of memory as the final arbiter. He writes: "Imagine that you were supposed to paint a particular colour 'C', which was the colour that appeared when the chemical substances X and Y combined. -- Suppose that the colour struck you as brighter on one day than on another; would you not sometimes say: 'I must be wrong, the colour is certainly the same as yesterday?'"
The point is that the individual's memory image of the sample counts for very little. If doubt arises, as is imagined in this case in which the colour seems to be brighter on one day than on another, then the individual's opinion will be taken as testimony, but unless there is general agreement that the colour has changed, the sample is taken as the highest court of appeal.

To be sure, we do use the colour words without having to refer to public samples in particular instances. The training we receive in the language-games with colour achieves familiarity with the colour words and with the ability to compare shades. Wittgenstein does not deny that part of the mastery of the use of colour words involves being able to compare public shades of a particular colour with memory images of a sample. For the most part, the decisions that the individual makes in these situations are in accordance with those that others would make. Memory is fairly reliable, but if there is doubt, then there must be some independent check that can clear the doubt.

That public samples are necessary is more obvious when one tries to imagine what would happen if all public samples for a particular word were to be destroyed. In remark 57, Wittgenstein has this to say in connection with the disappearance of all red things: "When we forget which colour this is the name of, it loses its meaning for us; that is, we are no longer able to play a particular language-game with it. And the situation then is comparable with that in which we
have lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language."

(PI 57) We cannot expect always to be "able to bring red before our mind's eye even when there is nothing red any more."

(PI 57) We could hang on to some memory image of red for a time, but even this possibility depends on the presence of samples of other colours with which the image could be compared. Eventually, the ability to say that red used to fall between two other colours would replace the need to recognize the samples of red.

When Wittgenstein says that the language-games with the colour 'red' would change, he is saying that without the public samples as independent checks, the regular use of the word 'red' would change. The use I envisioned for 'red' would be distinct from the use of other colour words for which samples still exist. It can be imagined that 'red' could be used in speech acts such as, 'Oh remember when we had the colour red?' and the criterion for remembering it right could consist in being able to indicate the place where red used to be in the colour spectrum.

It is important to imagine what would happen if all samples or paradigms for a word disappeared because this allows for natural descriptions of the destruction of the conventional links between language and the world. Meaning cannot be accounted for in terms of the individual's mental images, for this is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain how we do communicate. There need to be independent public checks that represent the agreements and decisions of
the language-users. However, the meaning of a word cannot be explained in terms of an immutable and eternal reference to an object or objects, for it is natural for the meanings of words to change and for some words to drop out of the vocabulary altogether. These phenomena need to be accounted for. Traditional theorists worry about the disappearance of the referent allowing the meaning of a word to die, but different purposes or a lack of use may allow for the intentional disappearance of the use of a word. Seeing that the links between language and the world are conventional, no longer makes it problematic for an account of meaning when the links are broken or rearranged.

b) Concluding Remarks

The completed picture of the necessity of paradigms in an account of meaning raises some interesting questions and in a sense can be considered a 'jumping off' point for further studies. This conclusion will not give an overview of the results of this project, for the select organization of the material has shown Wittgenstein's progression from the criticisms of traditional theories and pictures of meaning to the description of the paradigm model as the solution to the inadequacies and incoherencies inherent in these theories and pictures. Demonstrating that paradigms are one of Wittgenstein's central contributions to an account of meaning has implications for other major issues discussed in Wittgenstein's later work. This conclusion will give a brief overview of the ways in which paradigms are and can be related to these issues.
I finished the last subsection by indicating that the thrust of the anti-private language argument is contained in even the first 65 remarks of the Investigations. I argued that Wittgenstein's thesis that paradigms or samples (independent public checks) are necessary, is an important line of argument in his account of meaning. Understanding that paradigms are central to Wittgenstein's account of meaning has implications for the explicit anti-private language remarks from 243-315. There, it becomes clear that it is impossible to ostensively define a word privately and for oneself. Paradigms, unambiguous cases in the world that count as the definite meanings for words, are necessary. The possibility of 'defining' a word for oneself depends on already having acquired a vocabulary -- the language of the community one is born into. Further, even if one were to succeed in using a word consistently and according to criteria that are privately determined, this does not give the word meaning. (PI 257-8) Wittgenstein tells us that this would be no more than a ceremony (PI 258) because the use of the word would mean nothing in the language as a whole unless others agreed to use the word in the same way. (PI 261)

Indicating that the description of ostensive definitions and of the paradigm model already contain some of the ideas that are developed in the anti-private language argument section may suggest that the section on criteria is superfluous. Ordering the remarks so that a discussion of 'criteria' is followed by the anti-private language section makes it
necessary to work out the details of the interrelationships between paradigms, criteria and the anti-private language material. In particular, Wittgenstein's preoccupation in the anti-private language remarks with inner state concepts, such as pain needs to be examined. The function of paradigms seems clear in the case of ordinary concepts, for links are made with 'things' in the world. For inner state concepts, however, there seem to be only behavioural criteria for their application. Wittgenstein tells us that "an 'inner process' stands in need of outer criteria." (PI 580) Does this mean that there are no paradigms for inner states? A convincing case could be made for seeing the importance of paradigmatic pain behaviour, for when there is doubt about whether or not someone is in pain, there is doubt about whether or not the person is exhibiting what all would agree to be pain behaviour.

The importance of agreement and of the public determination of the use of a word by first setting down what cases are unambiguously taken as the correct application of the word also has implications for the issue of conceptual change. This topic was hinted at in the last subsection and in the "Definiteness of Sense Secured by Paradigms" subsection. The fact that the bonds between language and the world are conventionally determined does not make the connections any the less definite or any the more changeable. Once the agreements are institutionalized and the unambiguous cases and usages of the word are passed on in the teaching and training processes, the meaning of the word is as stable as
it should be or need be. Just recognizing this certainty with respect to paradigms makes it clear that the meaning of a word is definite where the foundational cases or core of paradigms are concerned. That the sense of a word becomes less definite at the boundaries is evidenced by the fact that justifications for how these cases deviate from the paradigm cases are normally needed. Examining the everyday contexts in which these justifications are given shows how frequent and general the technique of referring to paradigm cases is.

Wittgenstein strikes a balance between viewing the meaning of a word as unchanging and permanent and viewing the meaning of a word as without any control or stability. Having the bonds between language and the world determined conventionally allows for a natural description of how the meanings of words do and can change. However, from what has been said about foundational cases, paradigms, the meaning of a word is well insulated and protected from change by a long and established use. If for specific and important purposes, the language-community decides to let a word drop from the vocabulary or to change what will count as the paradigm cases for a word, then it is not difficult to see that this convention will take time to filter through and change the already established training into the use of the word.

The issue of the stability of the foundational cases also has implications for Wittgenstein's last work, On Certainty. In this work, Wittgenstein examines in detail the concepts of 'knowledge', 'certainty' and 'doubt'. The
general thrust of this work is clear. Before a child can doubt, the acquisition of a certain base of indubitable 'truths' is necessary. I used this argument, of course, as early as my comments on the builders. Wittgenstein's description of the child whose training into certain 'facts' makes it senseless for the child to doubt these 'truths' (OC 159-162, 341-343, 446, 449), is a sophisticated version of the paradigm model. The training into the unquestioned acceptance of certain propositions and of whole systems of propositions makes what is "swallowed" down in the learning process, the ground or base from which the notions of truth and falsity get their meaning or use. Like the unquestioned acceptance of the training into paradigm cases for concepts, the training into paradigm cases for states of affairs and for systems of beliefs establishes a certain and indubitable frame of reference from which other more sophisticated games can be learned. (OC 94, 108-112, 204, 205, 559) Developing and evaluating the very complex arguments and sophistications at work in On Certainty is definitely a promising area of study.

Examining the conventionalist aspect of Wittgenstein's later work brings out another topic relevant to the 'theory' of paradigms. The question of whether or not Wittgenstein is a complete conventionalist is one that needs some attention. An account of meaning and in particular, of definite meanings in terms of paradigms, implies, at the very least, that there is no foundation for meaning other than that of the conven-
tionally determined links between language and the world. From its beginning in the builders' example, my evaluation of Wittgenstein's positive remarks has displayed the importance of the fact that the kinds of beings that we are is linked to the kind of language that we have. The builders needed to have the predisposition to see similarities and contrasts (the natural ability to classify or categorize things) in order to grasp the point of the commands. The issue, however, is not entirely clear. Some remarks indicate that Wittgenstein is a complete conventionalist and that the only foundation is the establishment of conventions (PI 371-372, Z 320, 331, 357-358) and other remarks show a tendency to ground this conventionalism in the fact that we are the kinds of beings that we are (Z 183, 340-342, 351, 355, 371-372, 374, 389-390, 540-541, 545, PI 385) or even in the fact that there are certain normality conditions, or facts of nature. (Z 352, 364, PI 142)

Wittgenstein's multiple requests that we imagine beings different from ourselves seems to favour an interpretation that recognizes the interdependency between the structure of our language and the kinds of beings that we are. His descriptions of the ways in which we operate with universals indicate that without our predisposition to see similarities and contrasts, the language that may have developed would perhaps have consisted only of proper names. (Z 714-715, PI 44) Working out the intricacies of Wittgenstein's use of imagined cases (the meaning-blind man, Z.183, PI, p. 214, the
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aspect-blind man, PI, p. 213-214, and the tribe who can only calculate in the head, PI 385, Z 109) and the relation between these imagined cases and the concept of paradigms (in many of these remarks, Wittgenstein mentions paradigms) is another avenue for further study. This study may reveal that Wittgenstein did indeed think that we have the language that we do have because we have a certain foundational nature.

These are a few of the major areas of study that need development. I will close by referring back to my description in Chapter 4 of how we do refer to paradigm cases both in the teaching and learning processes and when communication breaks down. The importance of seeing that sense is definite where the paradigm cases are concerned cannot be overemphasized. For Wittgenstein, this description of our language-game and of the structure of our language weds an account of meaning to a description of the acquisition of a language. The interlocking of these descriptions has been an underlying issue throughout this project. Wittgenstein begins by drawing attention to the importance of examining the initial stages of language acquisition in order to observe the features integral to the meaning of words. He uses these observations against the Tractatus to destroy the Tractarian approach (while also salvaging the need for definiteness of sense). Throughout, Wittgenstein displays the importance of making an account of meaning compatible with general and intuitive ideas about how a child comes to grasp the meaning of words. For Wittgenstein, the real test for whether or not
an account is acceptable and correct is that it is consistent with the familiar descriptions of what does go on in ordinary language-game contexts.
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