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IDEOLOGICAL PRACTICES AND WHITE-COLLAR DOMINATION:

A STUDY OF LABOUR CONTROL IN THE MONOPOLY SECTOR

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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December, 1981
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Ideological Practices and White-Collar Domination: A Study of Labour Control in the Monopoly Sector

submitted by Janet J. Mayer, M.A.,
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the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

IDEOLOGICAL PRACTICES AND WHITE-COLLAR DOMINATION:
A STUDY OF LABOUR CONTROL IN THE MONOPOLY SECTOR

The corporation is not only an economic apparatus within advanced capitalism. It is also a political and ideological apparatus. Surplus is generated and realized via the exploitation of labour within a system of work organization which obscures the nature of class domination. Various ideological practices supplement the economic and political domination which is built into the labour process. Together, the ideological underpinnings of work, the state, and education reinforce the hegemony of the capitalist class.

Within the context of recent theoretical and empirical work on the labour process and on classes within advanced capitalism, managerial practices are examined in four Canadian monopoly-sector corporations. Emphasis is placed on those practices which seek to control white-collar labour indirectly by harnessing previously socialized commitments to the dominant ideology of meritocratic individualism. The most important set of indirect-control practices are those connected with the "career." It is via individual career mobility that agents are recruited to the upper corporate echelons from the new middle class, but the career is also ideologically charged. By playing games of career-making, even proletarianized clerical workers are caught up in the logic which reinforces hegemonic domination and restricts workers' perceptions to narrow individualistic concerns.

Data gathered from 400 white-collar workers confirm the extent to which workers are caught up in the logic of this ideology. These workers
demonstrate an inability to make connections between practices of domination and their structural situation both in the workplace and in the wider society. Their limited vocabulary and imagery, which deny the class-divided workplace and society, are practical outcomes of hegemony.
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Other debts must also be acknowledged. Erik Olin Wright kindly consented to allow me the use (and modification) of his questionnaire on class boundaries. Michael Burawoy provided insights on the ideological aspects. Graham Knight drew my attention to literature unfamiliar to me. McMaster University provided the use of their computer facilities and Carleton University provided their keypunching facilities. Travel and research funds were provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Carleton University. Finally, although they chose to remain anonymous, the corporations admitted me at face value; much thanks is given to the workers who did not hesitate to co-operate in the research.

However, only the author is responsible for the ultimate fruits of the labour.
materials whereby the operation of the labour market will complete the class reproduction cycle. Labour market selection processes operate on educational credentials to translate class cultural differences into income inequalities and occupational hierarchies (Bowles, 1976). At the same time, the schools transmit elements of a common culture: values of individual responsibility, discipline and punctuality, the value of competition, and respect for private property. These are elements which find resonance in the general ideology and thus contribute to the maintenance of hegemony around valued aspects of liberal democracy and the "free enterprise" system; hence the educational system also contributes to political stability.

Those who successfully survive their schooling experience are already in effect "pre-selected"; they have proved they could function in a repressive atmosphere of regimentation and discipline. When they enter the work-world, they aspire to improving their lot, but most will be weeded out as failures; the rest will be convinced their rise is due to their own efforts, ambitions, and self-denial. Since engineers and technicians, for example, are trained for a definite place in the division of labour with little hope of becoming self-employed, the call of the corporate career is an attractive one. Upward mobility through corporate ranks becomes a substitute, yet still holds promise that they will better themselves over ordinary workers and perhaps their parents. Their acceptance of the game-rules of the career implies that "they are prepared to serve unquestioningly the goals and purposes of the ruling class" (Gorz, 1972: 37). They will presumably make themselves submissive to its authority while at the same time filling a place in the role of dominating the class below them as a natural and necessary part of their privileged status.
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CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION:

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL

The purpose of this study is to examine managerial practices of ideological control as they apply to white-collar labour in monopoly-sector corporations, and to draw out the implications of such practices for the perceptions and class orientations of proletarianized labour.

The "problem of control" is a pivotal issue in the politics of class domination at the workplace level. Control may be understood from several standpoints, all relating to the central contradiction of the capitalist mode of production: that between capital and labour. Ultimately, labour must be controlled because of the antagonism of interests between dominant and subordinate classes in the extraction and realization of surplus value.

Following the logic of the neo-Marxian (Althusserian) formulation of the nature of capitalism, domination and hence control may be conceived of as taking place at three levels: the economic (control of the means of production and control of labour-power); the political (subordination of the working class in relations of capitalist domination), and the ideological (control of the production of ideas). Analysis may proceed at the level of the state, at the level of various ideological apparatuses such as the educational system, or at the level of the economic (the level of productive relations).

The present study is pitched at the level of the economic, in large-scale corporations of the monopoly sector in Canada, and it is at this level that the problem of control is addressed.

However, the logic of the focal point, ideological practices, has its origins in considerations which take it beyond a concern merely with the workplace. The workplace may be understood as but one of many levels of
analysis, one "moment" within the structure of advanced capitalism. Essentially, that structure has as its context capitalist hegemony, understood in Gramsci's sense as a system of power which obtains a high degree of consent not by outright coercion but by the operation of ideologies transmitted to subordinate classes through various social institutions. The workplaces of capitalist monopoly corporations are viewed not only within such a context but as having a definite role in the operation of hegemony. That is, the corporation controls labour in ways which reinforce hegemonic domination by obscuring the mechanisms of domination, thereby removing them from direct challenge.

There are a number of strands in the literature from which this study originally drew its thematic and unifying materials: from studies of the Canadian corporate elite which provide data about recruitment to the highest levels of the capitalist system to the exclusion of the working class from institutional command posts; from studies on the labour process which are concerned with the organization of built-in controls on labour; from studies on the nature of and transformations in white-collar labour and its role within relations of domination; and finally, from studies on class consciousness and on the nature of the subjective orientations of workers. Each of these elements has been incorporated into the conceptual model which forms the theoretical context for the research, but in ways which transform the original strands into a new synthesis; hence the research makes a contribution, either directly or indirectly, to each of the areas from which it originally drew its insights.

The principal contribution of the study, however, is to the literature on the labour process as control strategies, especially towards an understanding of the special context of white-collar proletarian labour within
monopoly corporations and the implications these strategies have for hegemony as a result of the successful control of workers' ideological commitments. The study also makes a more limited contribution to an understanding of class imagery and consciousness and raises some questions regarding the role of ideology in class reproduction.

A brief outline of the history of the study and its theoretical assumptions will clarify these points. Studies of the corporate elite have shown that elites (representing the capitalist class) are drawn from a narrow stratum of recruits: the upper class and the upper levels of the middle class. Many of these elites made their way to the boardrooms of dominant corporations through long careers in the corporations after obtaining formal credentials from elite institutions of learning. Although findings on the corporate elite are not of direct concern here, they nevertheless sensitize the researcher to a number of important aspects about corporations:

1) The corporation is an important mediating link between the macrostructure (class structure within advanced capitalism) and the microstructure (the orientations and experiences of individual members of classes). It acts as a "clearing-house" for the selection and training of future representatives of the capitalist class and for the new middle class of administrative functionaries and technocrats who service it.

2) The corporation is a vehicle for the working-out of capitalist class relations at the economic level. The outcomes for various classes (for example, blocked working-class mobility) "feed into" the macrostructure and contribute to the maintenance of the logic of the class structure. Rights of private property translate at the workplace level into "managerial prerogative" and are concretized in the hierarchical arrangements of corporate bureaucracies. These arrangements in turn determine the nature of class experiences in the workplace.
3) However, corporate bureaucracies must also disguise the class-based logic of their organization in order that processes of class reproduction and surplus extraction may continue unchallenged. Just as at the level of the social structure, occupational, income and power hierarchies must not appear to be caused by class domination but rather as the "inevitable" outcome of "natural" inequalities, so the basis of workplace class domination must appear to flow from purely "technical" exigencies and from "neutral" demands of efficiency.

4) It follows that the corporation is not only an economic apparatus, but as well, a political and ideological apparatus. It is the apparatus within which surplus is generated and realized (economic function), class agents are distributed to places within the class hierarchy (political function), and relations of domination and subordination are obscured (ideological function).

Viewing the corporation in such a manner opens the door on a number of other issues. If some workers are systematically excluded from participation in corporate power structures, to what extent is the process of exclusion opaque to them? On the other hand, if they have come to the conclusion that they are the subjects of exclusionary practices, what kinds of interpretive frameworks do they use to analyse their situation, and what implications do these have for class orientations (that is, consciousness and action)? How do corporations control the perceptions of their workers, especially those in closer proximity to the offices of power—what ideological practices serve to effectively obscure and by obscuring, to control?

A brief summary of the "natural history" of the conceptualization which evolved for this study will demonstrate the route by which the point of ideological practices as control strategies was reached. Had the starting-point been the labour process itself rather than "blocked mobility", the
notion of the ideological may have had an entirely different conceptual status within the research. It may indeed have been buried as it has frequently been in studies which have begun with the labour process. An important example, since it has had such great influence on other studies, is Braverman's (1974) analysis of Taylorism. By insisting on the primacy of "objective" (that is, material economic arrangements) over "subjective" impacts, Braverman failed to examine the extent to which managerial control also contains elements of political and ideological domination. (This argument will be pursued in Chapter Two.) Hence, the starting-point of the research, as well as the theoretical modelling, will determine what aspects become highlighted and what aspects become downplayed.

In the present case, the conceptualization moved from a starting-point of concern with the blocked mobility opportunities of clerical workers. It then proceeded to concern with the labour process as a problem of control, thence to a consideration of the "career." It was the notion of the career which proved to be the door opening to a number of other issues which were to subsequently organize the research. By the completion of the research, the career concept had taken on a whole new status; it is now pivotal in the understanding of ideological control practices directed at white-collar labour.

Specifically, capitalist needs with respect to white-collar labour are to control indirectly, via ideological manipulation. Hence, ideological managerial practices control labour by harnessing prior socialized ideological commitments and by translating the meaning of control from coercion to consent. The context of control now becomes a seemingly non-antagonistic one which effectively obscures the origins of the controls in the needs of class domination. In such a context, the career is the outcome par excellence of managerial practices of ideological domination as well as being a control mechanism. In other words, white-collar careers are in part the creations of control needs—having a career is to be controlled by it and the organization.
Thus, control in capitalist enterprises becomes a two-pronged problem. The labor process involves the organization of technical arrangements for the control of effort. The other side of the coin is that managerial practices are also aimed at control of perceptions and orientations. At the level of white-collar labor, the problem of control is not only over effort and perceptions, however. It is also a problem of control over access to positions of power which will reproduce the structure of domination at the corporate level: the recruitment of agents to positions while excluding the working class. Due to the fundamental antagonism of capitalist relations of production, these control needs and their strategies must be accompanied by ideological disguises to obscure the class-based nature of differential treatment. That is, control strategies must operate in such a way as to confuse the issues and create conditions for the re-channelling of collective, class conflict into less threatening, individualistic forms.

It is a central argument of this thesis that managerial practices connected with the white-collar career represent an important control strategy which meets all of these various control needs.

At the objective level, careers of white-collar workers reflect the strategies of the capitalist class in given social and historical conjunctures in their attempts to deal with the problems of the production and reproduction of the conditions for control and deployment of labor. These strategies are to be understood both as outcomes of arrangements at the economic level (relations of production, the basis for the extraction of surplus value), and as an embodiment of political and ideological domination (including the obscuring of relations of production as being class-based and exploitive/oppressive). That is, careers are created as a consequence of the deployment of labor to places within the class structure.
The white-collar career also confirms the logic of capitalist class relations indirectly at the subjective level. It serves to mask the nature of class domination while simultaneously controlling the subjective conditions of labour, that is, orientations of workers and their ideological commitments. As such, the career is a method of social control. Conditions under which members of some classes may be said to have "careers" (in the sense of a logically related series of stages rising in responsibility, pay and status, that is upward class mobility), must include within those conditions some legitimation of the bases for the exclusion of the mass of lower-level office workers. These clerical proletarians do not strictly speaking have careers, even as manual workers do not have careers—both are excluded from the process of class mobility.

Hence, the career as objective reality (career trajectories of mobility outcomes) has a subjective counterpart in ideologies which trade on white-collar workers' commitments to principles of meritocratic individualism and achievement. These principles are not only widely accepted as part of liberal-democratic ideology, they are also available as rationalizations. In other words, the class system is viewed as "just" by workers when career mobility seems to be related to individual merit under conditions where opportunities to demonstrate merit are rationally distributed. Since many believe that the corporate structure is determined purely by the demands of technical rationality and not the demands of power and exploitation, selection on the basis of "merit", "aspiration to succeed," and "qualifications" confirms to workers the technical necessity of structuring work in a hierarchy of responsibility and authority. Agents are viewed as being in positions of power ("responsibility") because of the needs of the corporate system which demand that qualified experts take command of parts of the corporation, and because they are the competent ones who have survived the competition of merit.
Thus, "performance" and normative commitment become the basis of authority as class power undergoes ideological transformation: it becomes merely the demands of a neutral technostructure which all must serve.

An ideological commonplace in our society is the myth of equal opportunity for mobility, that ours is a purely achievement-based society where opportunity is theoretically open to all. As ideology, it is effective when it serves to commit a certain proportion of the labour-force to success-striving through career mobility, and when they see success or failure in individual rather than structural terms.

Competition for occupational success as upward mobility, however, may create some unintended consequences for control strategies. A problematical dialectic may develop wherein mobility ideology which serves to legitimate the system may itself become a source of conflict and present new problems for securing and obscuring conditions of domination. Having committed themselves to achieving mobility, many of the excessively large pool of aspirants begin to feel disenchanted, and counter-strategies are needed to offset the raised expectations which have proved to be unrealistic.

In this study, the personnel department of the large corporation is viewed as a "gatekeeper" whose role is to ensure that the proper kind and numbers of manpower are available to fill positions in the various levels of hierarchy, especially selecting, monitoring and "grooming" candidates for managerial ranks. At the same time, they must devise strategies for "cooling out" those who have strived to be considered for higher-level positions. Self-blame for failure in personal rather than class terms would be a desirable outcome, since it capitalizes on socialized values of individual achievement.

As an ideological practice, therefore, "career development" in corporate capitalism consists of a dynamic and volatile set of strategies which creates conditions for the reproduction and obscuring of conditions of domination, but
which also creates the potential for conflict to break out over conditions of career-making. The terms under which careers are to be defined and developed deflect class struggle into intra-class competition of an individualistic kind, but may also undermine morale among those office workers whose co-operation and good faith are essential to the administrative machinery of the firm. For example, the illusion of mobility is present in the incessant movement within similar levels and in the creation of fine gradations among jobs arranged in internal hierarchies of pay and status; this "divide and conquer" strategy may raise expectations of advancement. These expectations in turn create the need for further re-adjustments which may become new targets of challenge and conflict. Thus, the application of strategies affecting career mobility becomes a two-edged sword which must be handled cautiously by those who control it.

To sum up, managerial practices serve to control the expectations and perceptions of those whose commitment to the corporation and its work tasks is desirable. Obscuring the basis of control is a necessary part of the efficacy of strategies which are designed to recruit loyal and controllable agents for positions of importance in the chain of command: the "new middle class" who have a role in the control and surveillance functions of capital. Further, strategies must accomplish this to the exclusion of other classes while at the same time preserving the appearance of a meritocratic, graduated structure of occupations which appear to flow naturally and non-antagonistically into higher ones. Thus, managerial practices both control labour, in terms of its distribution and its political domination, its subjection in the labour process, and as well, mask its nature through ideological means. These two aspects of managerial strategies may prove to be contradictory, however, since legitimating a practice by ideological means may lead to feelings of injustice when subject groups follow through the ideology to its logical conclusion and find it wanting.
Thus, the central question at issue is the efficacy of the corporate control strategies under investigation, not only in terms of their success in obscuring the foundations of domination, but their success in avoiding unintended consequences.

II THE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

The study builds on the assumption that the structure of capitalism and the objective structure of the capitalist workplace do not impact directly on workers in monopoly corporations, but rather, that the relationship is indirect and mediated by the set of ideological practices which channel white-collar workers' previously socialized commitments to principles of liberal democracy. Corporate structures and practices are filtered through ideologically-tinged employee perceptions and produce outcomes generally desirable to corporations. These outcomes are: individual competition and striving for upward mobility, prevention of intra-class solidarity, and an interpretation of managerial practices as relatively benign and directed at individual striving rather than collective control. It is hypothesized, therefore, that ideological practices and the corporate environment ("atmosphere") in which they are located significantly obscure the structure of class domination and prevent workers from perceiving it and being articulate about it.

Only if there were a direct and unmediated link between class location and class orientation (consciousness) would the proletarianized workers be able to "see" that their experience of inequality of pay, opportunity and mobility was due to class location and discriminatory class-based practices. The thesis begins from the assumption that this theoretical model is incorrect. It views class situation and class consciousness as in a problematical relationship due to a complex of factors in the conjuncture; that is, that workers are either "falsely" conscious or only partly conscious of their (true) situation. The assumption is linked to an assumption about the
nature of monopoly capitalism: that it must rely heavily on capitalist class hegemony in the wider society.

At the concrete operational level, therefore, the study attempts to estimate how much workers' interpretations of their situation deviate from the pure unmediated model, and to surmise to what extent ideological practices at the corporate level contribute to this deviation. To this end, two questions will constitute the primary focus of this study:

1) What is the nature and impact of managerial practices of recruitment and selection of personnel on various kinds of white-collar careers (that is, on the structuring of occupations and their relationship to the control of labour in large corporations), and,

2) How does the experience of the career (both the outcomes in the objective sense and in the subjective sense of individuals' perceptions of these outcomes) affect class awareness and class orientations of workers in the proletarianized (clerical) and "new middle class" white-collar ranks.

The answers obtained are significant not only at the workplace level in understanding processes there, but also are significant at the macrostructural level, the structure of capitalism as a whole and how the various levels of domination reinforce one another. These relationships are diagrammed in Table 1-1 thus: Social relations of domination are inherent in the structure of capitalist society. They are expressed at various institutional levels in the society including the workplace, that is, are hegemonic. They result in various outcomes which are of benefit to the interests of capitalism, including outcomes of managerial strategies at the workplace level which reinforce domination at other institutional levels in society. The ultimate outcome is severe limits on the ability of workers to perceive their true interests and to act on them (and this of course, further reinforces hegemony).

(( table 1-1 about here ))
The study involves a sample of 400 white-collar workers from four monopoly-sector corporations operating in the Niagara Peninsula industrial belt of Southern Ontario. The corporations have been given pseudonyms in order to protect the anonymity of the firms; this protection was granted as part of the research bargain which was made in order to gain entry to the corporations. In the study, the firms have been named Alpha Steel, Delta Steel, Chi Gas, and Sigma Oil. The sample was divided into three categories representing proletarianized workers (clerical) and two varieties of "new middle class" workers (technical-professional and low-to-middle-level supervisory-managerial); this division was made on the basis of criteria derived from the recent neo-Marxian literature on class boundaries in advanced capitalism (as Chapter Two will discuss in detail). In addition to the four principal corporations who co-operated in the study, eight other firms from a representative variety of other dominant corporations operating in Southern Ontario provided data on their recruiting and other personnel practices. The sources and kinds of data used in the study are summarized here (a more detailed discussion of methodology appears in Chapters Four and Five):

1) Organizational demographics, supplied by the corporations,
2) Management personnel practices, supplied by the corporations, obtained through interview with corporate officials and through perusal of corporate communications and policy documents,
3) Corporate histories and (where applicable) union histories,
4) Survey questionnaire, administered to corporate employees,
5) In-depth interviews with corporate employees.

The research was conducted over a nine-month period from the autumn of 1978 to the spring of 1979.
The organization of the thesis follows the logic of the diagram above (Table 1-1). It moves through various levels of analysis beginning with a general consideration of the structure of advanced capitalism in Chapter Two. The workplace is considered in the context of recent theoretical and empirical work on the labour process, with particular emphasis on the ideological underpinnings of the organization of work in capitalist enterprises. Chapter Three deals with managerial practices in terms of theoretical considerations on the problem of control. Chapters Four and Five deal with the firms under study, detailing the characteristics of their white-collar structure and the practices which are used by corporate management in these firms. Chapters Six and Seven deal with workers' perceptions of their place in the opportunity-structure and their perceptions of the practices affecting white-collar careers. The last data chapter, Eight, discusses the findings which link perceptions of the workplace with perceptions of the class structure of capitalism, and deals with the question of class imagery and consciousness.

Thus, the chapters which follow advance through various levels of analysis, from the "macro" to the "micro" at the level of the theoretical, and from the "micro" to the "macro" at the level of the empirical. The most important linkage between these various levels is the focus on ideological practices as one important set of solutions to "the problem of control" in the capitalist workplace and social structure.
CHAPTER TWO

MONOPOLY CAPITALISM

AND THE LOGIC OF CLASS

This chapter will deal with transformations which have occurred in the course of capitalist development. Its main concern will be the implications which these transformations have had for changes in the class structure. The nature and definition of class in modern capitalist societies establishes the context for an examination of the role of various kinds of labour in corporate capitalism, and also sets the stage for a discussion of white-collar labour and the logic of managerial class practices which control it in monopoly corporations.

I TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE NATURE OF CAPITALISM

Friedman (1977: Ch. 3), following Hobsbawm, identifies the periods of capitalist development in Britain as follows. In the period between 1780 and the 1840's, the Industrial Revolution marked the transition from domestic industry to the factory system or the period of "modern industry." Between 1850 and 1870, the period of modern industry developed fully, marking the transition to monopoly capitalism in the 1870 to 1914 period. Between 1945 and 1970, monopoly capitalism reached its full maturity.

Carchedi (1975a) highlights three periods in the development of capitalism, each corresponding to an important change in the nature either of the proletariat or of the bourgeoisie.

The first is the period of private (or entrepreneurial, or competitive) capitalism in which the subordination of labour to capital was only "formal," not "real." That is, under the factory system, workers were drawn together into one place, with ownership of the means of production under control of the capitalist. There was, however, essentially no change in the nature of production during this period.
The second period, still within the entrepreneurial form of capitalist organization, is characterized by the real subordination of labour to capital. During this period, the capitalist also began to control the technical conditions of the labour process by turning tasks from simple into "scientifically" organized; tasks were then split into fragments according to the technical and not merely social division of labour. Each worker now contributed only a part to the whole, as part of the "collective labourer." This marked the beginning of a permanent technical revolution in the means of production.

In the third stage, monopoly capitalism, the function of capital itself changes. Ownership and control of production, which were formerly united within the same capitalist, are now divided. Within the form of the joint stock company, ownership becomes dissociated from day-to-day control, and functions of this control are divided among many within a hierarchical structure. Capital assumes a "global" function.

Drawing together a number of strands in the literature (Friedman, 1977; Noble, 1977; Burawoy, 1979), the most obvious features of monopoly capitalism may be summarized thus:

1) the growth of monopoly power among a few firms of very large size;
2) the increased use and increased complexity of machinery;
3) the incorporation of scientific theory and method directly into the operation of firms;
4) an increase in the need for white-collar labour due to the complexity of technical and other administration and the greater control needs of firms;
5) more ability to control conditions of the labour and the commodity markets and to withstand strikes due to monopoly power's greater resources and due to the restricted entry of competing new firms;
6) change in the nature of economic ownership and in the nature of the
deropitation of labour as a result of de-skilling and extreme
mechanization;
7) the shift in the politics of production from "despotic" to "megemonic"
domination of labour as the prevalent form, with consent playing a
central role.

The third, fourth and sixth points have implications for changes in
the class structure, which will be discussed in section II; the seventh
point will be developed in section III.

The foregoing are merely a catalogue of superficial features, however.
In order to understand both continuities and transformations within capitalism,
it is necessary to understand the significance of these features in terms
of the forces behind the development of monopoly capitalism out of previous
forms.

Monopoly capitalism was made possible by the fusion of bank capital
and industrial capital, creating "finance capital" as the basis for the
centralization and concentration of industry. Lenin in 1917 noted that
during the 1860 to 1870 period, the apex of competitive capitalism in Europe,
monopoly was only in its infancy. Only a few cartels existed in 1873 to
control pricing and supply and to divide the market among themselves, thus
controlling the conditions of competition in their favour. During the
crisis of 1900 to 1903, however, which was a crisis of competitive capitalism,
the cartels became the dominant force in the economy. In the United States
at the turn of the century, there were only about 185 trusts; by 1907 this had
increased to 250 and the numbers employed by giant trusts rose dramatically
(for example, United States Steel had 210,000 employees) (Lenin, 1970: 16-29).

As Poulantzas (1975: Ch. 2) points out, capital which forms the monopoly
is already a composite capital involving centralization of money capital
into a single productive capital in the form of the joint-stock company. Concentrated productive capital made possible the creation of banking monopolies. These in turn made possible the further expansion of capital in the form of larger enterprises, usually through the amalgamation of several formerly separate productive units under a unified economic ownership. Such concentration made possible the unified control of various phases of production—at the "upstream" end, control of resources, raw materials and research; and at the "downstream" end, control of labour processes previously part of separate productive units. (This process is usually referred to in the bourgeois economics literature as "vertical" and "horizontal" integration, respectively). A further consequence is the enhanced ability of the monopoly corporation to accumulate, as well as to self-finance further expansion and to subordinate commercial capital to expansion needs.

There are other consequences of monopoly capitalism. The organic composition of capital is altered as the proportion of constant capital or fixed capital (machinery) to variable capital (wage costs) increases. Since there is a relative decline in living labour in relation to dead (past) labour which would effect a fall in the rate of profit (surplus value can only be extracted from living labour), it is necessary to intensively exploit labour (Poulantzas, 1975). At the same time, the sheer number of workers controlled by a single productive unit has also increased, enhancing the ability of a few capitalist enterprises to control not only their own labour force but also the conditions of employment in the wider labour market, since more and more workers are dependent on fewer and fewer employers.

Monopoly firms have not only been able to capture resource and commodity markets but also have been able to monopolize skilled labour. This has contributed to their ability to restrict new competitive entrants into industry.
The more co-operative relationship between capitalists in the monopoly phase (the "socialization" of production for private appropriation), and the control of the conditions of capitalism on a worldwide scale, have made possible the exercise of more economic power in more pervasive ways by the bourgeoisie than at any other point in capitalist history.

Canadian capitalism has had its unique place in this process, closely tied to the development of foreign, particularly American, monopoly capital\textsuperscript{2}. Canadian industrial development historically has lagged behind American, due in large part to the reluctance of Canadian capitalists to give up the secure and lucrative niche they had carved out for themselves as mercantile middlemen in an economy based on staples production and the movement of Canadian resources to foreign markets controlled by economies external to Canada. The Canadian capitalist class' stay in mercantile pursuits, in the sphere of circulation rather than production, contributed little to the growth of industry, which remained small, local, and employing few workers. Even the banking structure, under the control of the dominant commercial interests, remained better suited to a mercantile economy than to secondary, manufacturing industry (cf. Clement, 1977: Ch. 3).

In the United States, following the American Revolution and particularly between 1830 and 1860, the basis for an industrial system was being laid. During this period, American capitalists increasingly made use of the joint-stock company form for organizing large projects such as canals and railways. This experience, Clement argues (1977: Ch. 3), contributed early to the ability of American industrialists to mobilize large sums of capital; it foreshadowed the fusion of bank and industrial capital which would propel American industry into corporate capitalism and the monopoly phase. By the 1860 to 1900 period, industrialists of the northern U.S. states had expanded rapidly and needed new markets. Financial institutions such as the house of Morgan
monopolized huge concentrations of capital which could be used to create industrial concentration. The time was ripe for industrial expansion into Canada.

Canadian capitalists had control of large amounts of capital due to their intermediary role and could have financed small local manufacturing which the architects of the National Policy of 1879 hoped to encourage (along with agriculture and mining). Instead, Canadian interests expanded into utilities and into spin-offs from the railway building boom such as the steel industry. Between 1890 and 1914, however, American branch manufacturing plants were established in Canada and took advantage themselves of the National Policy's tariff protection. They were to set in motion a pattern which would thereafter mark the principal features of the Canadian political economy: the dominance of foreign manufacturing firms and an outflow of profits to their foreign owners; a truncation of the economy between foreign interests in resource extraction and heavy industry on the one hand, and on the other indigenous dominance in such areas as finance, merchandising, steel and utilities; and a narrowly based economy unhealthily dependent on the export of resources (cf. Clement, 1977: Ch. 3-4).

Between 1900 and 1913, Canada and the United States had begun the shift to monopoly capitalism with the great merger movement of this period. Canadian financiers and promoters helped to lay some of the groundwork for corporate capitalism in Canada, drawing together formerly small manufacturing firms into larger units. Much of the American activity was initially financed out of retained earnings, which made them independent of outside power; once established, however, they became efficient and large units for the production of investment-seeking surplus as well as avenues of portfolio investment for Canadian financiers. As a consequence, Canadian finance became bound up with foreign-owned firms, which set the leading edge of the economy and allowed
foreign interests to acquire more and more control over Canadian resources and manufacturing with little direct foreign parent financing. The Canadian state has also had a vital role in this process, providing costly infrastructure and "incentive" payments as well as the control of the labour force. Canada reached industrial maturity after the Second World War in a subservient role, that of servicing foreign multinational interests as an island in the continental corporate system. The nature and composition of its enterprises and workforce, even its labour movement tied to American union "internationals," reflect its developmental history (cf. Clement, 1977: Ch. 4).

II CLASS STRUCTURE UNDER MONOPOLY CAPITALISM

A. The Determination of Class: A Theoretical Perspective

During the 1970's, much academic attention was focussed on attempts to tackle in a systematic and fruitful theoretical way the definition of classes as they have become elaborated within the development of capitalism in the monopoly phase, and to link these with their specific roles within the productive system and relations of production. Any attempt to define classes and to establish class boundaries relevant to the monopoly phase must take into account two important considerations: the changes in the nature of legal ownership within the joint-stock company form of organization which has given rise to a structure of class power with varying degrees of economic ownership and possession; and the creation of a "new middle class" intermediate between bourgeoisie and proletariat, which participates in some control over labour on behalf of the capitalist class. Changes have also occurred in the internal composition of the proletariat, notably the increase in the clerical component and the subsequent de-skilling and feminization of this component, but these cannot be understood without first having
an adequate understanding of changes which have occurred in the other classes. The most fruitful structural attempts at this understanding are contained in the work of Poulantzas (1974), Wright (1976) and Carchedi (1975a, b), which will be discussed and synthesized in this section to form the basis for the theoretical understanding of class used in this study.

In 1974, Poulantzas set out the guidelines for a set of criteria which would allow a determination to be made of the positions or locations of various classes in such a way that structural changes noted above would be taken into account. He was careful to distinguish between the positions or "places" in a structural sense and the actors or "agents" who occupied them. In this way he hoped to provide a structural basis for understanding the debates which had arisen over the political allegiances and orientations of class groupings "in the conjuncture" (that is, within the immediate situations and actions created by the social forces, strategies and counterrstrategies of class struggle as they were enacted by people).

Poulantzas' concern was not with the old debate of "class-in-itself" versus "class-for-itself" which had been sparked by the early writings of Marx; rather he was concerned with the structural determination of class at the economic, the political and the ideological levels, following Althusser's use. That is, the economic is the dominant aspect which is determinant of class "in the last instance" via the relations of production and exploitation, but the relations of political domination and subordination, and of ideological domination and subordination also have to be taken into account. This three-fold set of determinations would permit the structural definition of classes.

For Poulantzas, the fundamental criteria are, therefore, the economic, political and ideological structural determinations in the social division of labour, and the distinction between productive and unproductive labour.
At the economic level, what determines the proletariat is its role as productive labour; at the political level, it is its lack of participation in supervision and control; at the ideological level, it is its nature as manual rather than mental labour and its disqualification from any participation in "mental" aspects. The bourgeoisie, the class which has economic ownership and possession of the means of production and puts them into operation, now includes managers due to changes which have occurred in the transition from entrepreneurial to corporate capitalism. The "new petty bourgeoisie", unlike the traditional bourgeoisie, is non-productive labour within capitalist relations of domination and subordination; as such it participates in the domination of the proletariat on behalf of the bourgeoisie while selling its own labour-power to the bourgeoisie and being itself dominated by that class. The new and old petty bourgeoisie share many of the same ideological interests and orientations of non-proletarian classes—and this includes subordinate office workers.

For Poulantzas, the most important distinction between the proletariat and the lower strata of office workers is the prevalence of ideological domination of the proletariat in the form of the "mental-manual" split. It is the domination of the "mental" over the "manual" which determines the role and class locations of other, non-productive, forms of labour. Thus for Poulantzas, all non-productive labour is excluded from the proletariat. Even clerks, he argues, share even if only symbolically in the "secrets" of mental labour, while much of this mental labour is in turn fragmented and dominated by others. All those who share in the political domination of labour confirm and legitimate the prerogative of the capitalist class to control labour and to delegate aspects of its control to agents; political domination thus also implies ideological
domination. It is among the ranks of foremen, technicians and engineers who direct labour, and among supervisory and managerial positions, that varying degrees of control as political and ideological domination is exercised. These groups plus the clerks make up the ranks of the new petty bourgeoisie. (Poulantzas, 1974).

While agreeing with Poulantzas' insistence on regarding classes in structural terms, Erik Olin Wright (1976) disagrees with Poulantzas' elimination of all forms of non-productive labour from the proletariat, hence develops a new set of criteria for establishing class boundaries. Wright points out that three interconnected structural changes in capitalist development must be taken into account: the loss of control by the direct producers, the elaboration of complex authority hierarchies within capitalist enterprises, and the differentiation of functions formerly embodied in the capitalist entrepreneur. Wright's focus is on the progressive dissociation between formal legal control and real economic ownership. These result in a number of splits in the functions of capital centering around the control over investment and resource allocation and the ability to set in motion and control the means of production in the immediate labour process. Thus, these splits result in various roles and in degrees of control within management: full, partial, and marginal; these refer to the hierarchical place of senior, middle, and lower management respectively.

Control of labour-power (one's own or others'), control of the physical means of production (one's own or others'), and control of investments and resources, become the criteria for determination of classes, and result in a complex array within Wright's logic.

The bourgeoisie and the proletariat alone are unambiguous: the proletariat has no economic control and no legal ownership, while the bourgeoisie includes both the traditional capitalist and the top corporate
executive (full economic control and full or partial legal control, respectively). The traditional petty-bourgeoisie, on the other hand, has full economic control and ownership but only within simple commodity production--there is no control over the labour-power of others.

The balance are in what Wright terms "contradictory class locations", either between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, or between the petty-bourgeoisie, bourgeoisie and proletariat. That is, they are contradictorily located because they possess some contradictory combination of structural criteria from more than one class. Thus within the capitalist mode of production, the following are contradictorily located between bourgeoisie and proletariat: top managers, middle managers, lower managers (foremen), and "technocrats" (technicians and professionals in the corporate hierarchy). Those located between bourgeoisie, proletariat and petty-bourgeoisie have some control over their own physical means of production but only minimal control over their own labour-power: they are "semi-autonomous employees" such as teachers, professionals, craftsmen, and technicians.

This complicated and rather equivocal set of six classes produced a pointed response from Poulantzas: the notion of the "contradictory class location" implies that agents could occupy "different and changing class locations...a vacuum, a no-man's land" (1977: 118).

Neither approach seems to be a satisfactory theoretical way of dealing in structural terms with those parts of the class structure posing the problems. Poulantzas ignored the situation of non-productive workers who share with productive labour all the characteristics of economic domination, and office workers whose position appears to be somewhere between manual worker and management (clerks and technical-professional specialists). On the other hand, Wright may be guilty of misunderstanding the nature of "semi"-autonomy and ignoring the rôle of these workers in control. Each analyst,
however, did provide some insights into the complexities of class within advanced capitalism. Each dealt with the separation of ownership and control (the so-called "managerial revolution") connected with the emergence of the giant corporation, and with the increasingly important role and size of an element in the division of labour within capitalism which contributes to the ongoing development of the forces of production, which Andre Gorz (1972) has called "technical intelligence."

Carchedi (1975a, b) provides at least a temporarily satisfactory way out of this conceptual dilemma. While Wright places a great deal of emphasis on the ownership aspect in establishing the contradictoriness of positions located near the bourgeoisie, ownership is for Carchedi only one of three aspects of productive relations which serve as class-boundary criteria. Besides ownership, we must take into account two other roles in economic relations of capitalism: function performed (whether of capital or of labour), and productiveness (whether or not one extracts surplus value or exploits labour)3.

The proletariat is thus that group which is economically exploited or oppressed (productive or unproductive labour which does not own or control the means of production or control others' labour), and the bourgeoisie is that group which owns, extracts surplus, exploits labour, and performs only the function of capital. Those who act as agents of the capitalist class are the "new middle class" and are by definition contradictorily located between the two main classes because they combine within them both the function of capital and the function of labour. The new middle class participates in the "control and surveillance" of the proletariat on behalf of the bourgeoisie and also performs some of the functions of the "collective labourer" in the co-ordination and unification of the labour-process. There are, therefore, in Carchedi's schema, only three classes besides the
traditional petty-bourgeoisie: the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and the new middle class.

For Carchedi, the notion of contradiction is an integral part of the definition of the new middle class—it combines within itself the functions of the two major classes which are in contradiction with one another; but unlike Wright, the class location is unequivocal; there is no vacuum. Whether the subject is the economic apparatus or the state apparatus, moreover, workers who perform equivalent functions are structurally located in the same class, intermediate between proletariat and bourgeoisie, and exploited or oppressed at the same time that they contribute to the exploitation or the oppression of the proletariat.

The functional element in Carchedi's definition is extremely important and has its origins in his explanation of the nature of transformations which have occurred as capitalism has matured. Even as the ownership aspect of capitalist control has been divided and parcelled out among many agents of the bourgeoisie, so performance of the function of labour has been parcelled out, requiring new forms of control (the management hierarchy) and new forms for the unification and co-ordination of the labour process. As outlined in the previous section, these two changes have proceeded historically; changes in the one necessitated changes in the other.

Hence, within the function of the "collective labourer" are subsumed all those who make a direct contribution to the product as productive labourers, including those who contribute to product design and to control and maintenance of production, as well as those who contribute indirectly through non-productive forms such as bookkeeping. The manual worker, the engineer, the clerk, and the accountant would thus have to be included in the ranks of the collective labourer, the proletariat, if Carchedi proceeded no further.
But what of the status of that part of the global function of capital which concerns "control and surveillance"? While Carchedi intended this to mean "of labour" within the process of the extraction and realization of surplus value, it is clear that much capitalist activity is also concerned with control of other elements which ensure the growth of capital, from product and labour markets to finances. This too is "control and surveillance" and involves new technical innovations and new divisions of labour in elaborate hierarchies. Hence, administrative labour would seem to involve more than just control and surveillance of labour. In that case, the part of the labour force which would have been considered part of the "collective labourer" would seem also to be performing part of the global function of capital. Those who do are, in the terms of Carchedi's definitional criteria, the "new middle class."

The status of technical and professional workers in the areas of design, engineering, systems and accounting, and financial planning would appear to be problematical. Although Carchedi provides useful class boundaries, for the purposes of matter's investigated in this study the ambiguity of the status of technical-professional workers (are they proletariat or are they new middle class?) was problematical enough to warrant their being considered separately from supervisory and managerial employees on the one hand and from the group of completely proletarianized clerical workers on the other hand. Theoretically, however, the problem may be resolved by re-introducing the "ideological domination" component of Poulantzas' discussion of the mental-manual split. This matter will be returned to in the next section.

Even if the structural definition of classes is unequivocally established, does it follow from this that there can be any direct
"reading off" of class interests and therefore of consciousness? All that can be stated with any certainty is that the interests of the bourgeoisie are in extracting surplus value through control of labour-power and in expanding capital, and that therefore their class interests are defined as concerned with survival and dominance as a class. The class interests of the proletariat arise from their position as the economically exploited or oppressed class with no control of the means of production--objectively, their class interests are in overthrowing capitalist class domination. Objectively, the new middle class occupies an equivocal position in respect to class interests. Since they aid the bourgeoisie in the "securing and obscuring" of surplus value within exploitative class relations while themselves being subject to domination, their class interests are contradictory. Within the terms of capitalism, the new middle class can only control by being controlled in turn. They would seem to be at once both a conservative and a volatile force, as pointed out by Ross (1977) and others.

Even in objective terms, therefore, there can be no exact interpretation of the class interests and political allegiances of some classes. They involve subjective factors as well as conjunctural factors in the alignment of other class forces and in the ebb and flow of class struggle--factors which make any prediction about class alliances uncertain. There is a further complicating factor which must be added, however: as Althusser (1971) points out, political and ideological domination figure at all levels of analysis. Ideological state apparatuses have contributed much toward the making of "subjects" who would presumably fill their designated places in the class structure unproblematically and unquestioningly. What Althusser is referring to is essentially the operation of
hegemony, which has enormous implications for the development of class consciousness. (This topic will be developed further in Section III of this chapter and in Chapter Eight.)

B. The Role of Scientific and Technical Labour

It is significant that the period between 1880 and 1900 marks the emergence of professional engineers and the growth of technical and vocational education (Noble, 1977). They are coincident with the transition to the monopoly phase of capitalism and the capture of the nineteenth century scientific revolution for private gain, and required a recasting of the labour process to take advantage of it. (See Chapter Three for further discussion.) Changes in the size of enterprises, in the nature of work, including the massive introduction of mechanization and concomitant speed-up, and the shift from face-to-face relations between owners and workers to impersonal relations, mark the transition also in the nature of capitalist control needs. What was now needed was more precise control over the conditions of the generation, extraction and realization of surplus value at all stages in the process: over labour, over the separate elements in the far-flung monopoly empires, and over the scientific and technical revolution in the means of production.

The growth in the middle levels of employment—technical and scientific labour, and supervisory and administrative labour—was also in response to these control needs. On the one hand, since the role of the individual capitalist had been supplanted by a "global capitalist" (that is, many agents who contribute fractions of the function to the whole which is capitalist control), an elaborate hierarchy for control and surveillance of the labour process is created. The part of control which consists of the work of supervision and management becomes parcelled out
to foremen, supervisors and managers. This is due both to the complexity of co-ordination needs under conditions of collective labour and due also to the antagonistic relations between labour and capital. On the other hand, with the real subordination of labour to capital (that is, loss of control over the technical conditions of labour), no one worker is responsible for the final product. Under the conditions of the collective labourer wherein the production of use-values becomes a social product of the sum of workers' individual fractional operations, new co-ordination and integration needs for the unification of the labour process are created. The notion of productive labour becomes extended to include all those who themselves do not do manual work but nonetheless participate in the completion of the process, including technicians and other "mental" workers.

Many of these same workers, however, also participate in control and surveillance as a result of the extension of the function of capital, and as such, also represent capitalist control while contributing to the completion of the production process. They represent not only the co-ordination and unity of the production process but also its existence under capitalist control: that is, the economic, political and ideological domination of capital over ordinary (proletarian) labour.

Gorz' (1972) insight into the functions of technical and scientific labour reveal the importance of these workers as an ideological component in control. Scientific and technical labour is not only important to the creation of new outlets for the perpetually expanding process of surplus value accumulation, it is also important in ensuring maximization of control over the workforce by rendering the process of production "extraneous" to ordinary workers. These forms of knowledge are crucial in separating decision-
making from productive work, in removing scientific knowledge from
general culture and language and regarding it as the monopoly of
specialists. Specialists in turn monopolize it in the interests of
capitalist domination only with capitalist sanction. It is during the
monopoly phase that technical and scientific knowledge is responsible
not only for innovations in the productive sphere but also for creating
new administrative specializations wherein control becomes utterly and
permanently removed from workers' hands.

To a degree, then, Poulantzas' observation concerning the "secrets"
of capitalism is correct, but we must add Gorz's: as control has passed
to technical specialists and managers, the control function has been
further split between co-ordination of the labour process and control and
surveillance of the whole. Some control has been passed to technical
and other specialists and some to foremen and other supervisory personnel.
While specialists share both in the collective labourer function and in the
global function of capital (the combination of which defines them as new
middle class), they nevertheless share in capitalist functions in a way
which is different from direct supervisory personnel. The two elements
of the new middle class differ not only in the "mix" between the two
(Carchedi's definition of proletarianization being the amount of labour
time spent on the collective labourer function), but also in the nature
of the role they play in control and surveillance.

Here, "control and surveillance" would seem to have a broader meaning
than was intended by Carchedi. The "ideological" role described by
Poulantzas, when given new meaning by Gorz's analysis of technical and
scientific labour, shows the importance of including technical and
professional labour as a special case of new middle class. Their role in
Domination is more indirect than that of foremen and supervisors, and qualitatively different: it personifies the ideological domination of mental labour.

C. The Clerical Proletarians

Following Carchedi, the position taken here will be that clerical labour under monopoly capitalism is proletarian labour because it is part of the function of the collective labourer as it has been extended to include even "mental" labour within the unity of the production process controlled by capitalism. Labour is completely proletarianized when it does not also include within it part of the global function of capital. By this definition, although scientific and technical labour shares in control and surveillance as well as in co-ordination and unity of the production process (that is, it is new middle class), clerical labour does not. It has in effect been stripped of its role as "mental" labour in the sense that it is no longer part of the ideological domination of manual labour.

This is not a view universally shared in the literature. In the non-Marxist literature, researchers such as Lockwood (1958) argued that although clerical and manual workers alike "sell their labour-power", they are not both members of the working class; rather, clerks differ in their conditions of labour, in their "market situation", and in their "status situation" from manual labour. Even within the Marxist tradition there has been little consensus. Poulantzas has argued that clerical workers share in the ideological domination of the proletariat since they are on the "mental" side of the manual-mental divide and share in the "secrets" of capitalist control; hence are part of the new petty-bourgeoisie. Carchedi and Wright have disagreed.
At the same time, however, Poulantzas recognizes that within mental labour, the same process of fragmentation and dequalification has occurred as had previously befallen manual workers. On the other hand, Braverman (1974) has argued that it is precisely this fragmentation and dequalification (the "de-skilling" process) which represents proletarianization, the complete subordination of labour to capital.

"De-skilling", however, is not in itself evidence of a shift to proletarianized from non-proletarianized labour. As Carchedi (1975b) points out, proletarianization refers to the devaluation of labour, wherein devaluation may be of two types. The first type is due to increased productivity in the sector producing wage-goods (commodity production which goes to make up the subsistence basket of the worker); increased productivity, hence, lower cost, may have been achieved through the introduction of new technology or through reduction in the cost of skill training (as in the shift from private capitalist to state-supplied education). The second type, which is of more immediate concern here, is devaluation due to the dequalification of labour—that is, a downgrading of the nature of the work and a subsequent downgrading of the value of the labour needed to perform the work.

Braverman is concerned with one type of dequalification, that in which the technical requirements or content of a function are altered because the operation has been changed. Old agents who filled such positions before dequalification must be made to accept a lower wage than agents newly brought in to fill the devalued job. This may be made easier when there is a readily available substitute labour force—such as females or immigrants—and when competitive pressure is high; these are situations of extra-exploitation, of paying less than the value of the work. This kind of dequalification is evident in situations where formerly skilled
manual work is downgraded by fragmentation of tasks to the point where cheaper semi-skilled machine-operative labour may be substituted, examples of which abound in Braverman's work. An example which Carchedi adds is that of the substitution of technicians for the skills and type of position previously held by a graduate chemist.

Frequently, however, dequalification as in the latter example carries with it dequalification of another type: not only in the technical but in the social content, that is, in the function performed in terms of labour or capital. In this case, the split in new middle class positions between the "collective labourer" and the "global function of capital" is altered to the extent where the collective labourer function comes to occupy more and more labour time and the function of capital less and less; when the function of capital is completely removed, there is complete proletarianization of the position. Its value is then the value of proletarian labour.

There is a constant tendency in capitalism to devalue the labour-power of a class in order to reduce the wage component and enhance the portion available to the capitalist as accumulation.

There is evidence to suggest that present-day clerical workers are in a situation which represents "technical" dequalification, an ongoing process as technical innovations are introduced to further de-skill clerical work, and may also represent the end result of a process of "social" dequalification. Braverman (1974: Ch. 15) notes:

"If we view the evolution of those occupations called 'clerical' over a long time span, from the Industrial Revolution to the present, we are soon led to doubt that we are dealing with the continuous evolution of a single stratum. The clerical employees of the early nineteenth-century enterprise may, on the whole, more properly appear as the ancestors of modern professional management..." (p.293)

Braverman goes on to cite historical documentation which suggests that the early nineteenth century clerks, who were few in number and
compared with the manual workforce, relatively well-educated, participated in managerial roles and were predominantly middle class; an example is the British "clerk" or "chief clerk" which was the title given to the manager in some industries. As long as the resources of family-owned businesses were small, the numbers of clerks remained low and they occupied a position of trust, with good pay and tenure (the "hard-driven" copyists of the law offices were seemingly not in the majority). In Britain and in the United States before the turn of the century, less than one per cent of all workers were in clerical occupations, and almost all of these were men. Braverman believes that the shift in the male-to-female ratio within clerical, coupled with the low pay which female workers receive, is an indication that a new class of workers has been created.

This new class of proletarianized semi-skilled office workers is one whose labour is strictly and closely regulated by the "master craftsmen" of the offices, the head bookkeepers and chief clerks. The conditions of office work has become factory-like, the workers a class of white-collar proletarians who, like their blue-collar counterparts, have little control over their own labour and none over the labour of others (Braverman, 1974: Ch. 15).

In a study of white-collar labour in Toronto between 1895 and 1911, Coombes (1978) documents changing job conditions in five office settings: banks, insurance and merchandising firms, a utility, and the provincial government. His conclusion is that a marked deterioration occurred in the condition of clerical workers in the expansionary period from the beginning of the century, expressed as a decline in salaries relative to managers', an increase in regimentation (both on and off the job), and an increase in job specialization and division (which, he theorizes, contributed to their pay decline). By 1911, the only-characteristics
which these clerical workers shared with the labour of managers and overseers was their status as "white collar."

Braverman observes that the application of Taylorism to office labour is a complementary process to what had already been occurring within the ranks of manual labour. There was a separation of conceptualization from execution and a concomitant concentration of the functions of thought and planning in ever-smaller groups within the office. The office was now no longer the site of exclusively "mental" labour and the factory the site of "manual" labour. The lower levels of office labour had become co-extensive with the factory (1974: 315-316).

Over time, it has become increasingly evident that skills and knowledge are concentrated in the upper corporate levels, in management and in the ranks of scientific and other specialized labour. The profusion of special education and its accompanying paper credentials in these ranks, and the lack of it among clerical labour, would seem to be an indicator that a class barrier between mental and manual labour has been extended to exclude clerical labour from participation in the functions and privileges of the new middle class. The new middle class has come to dominate both manual and clerical work. As Gorz (1972) observes, the school system itself has helped to create this social hierarchization; it has rendered some socially and culturally superior to others, often via the acquisition of knowledge which is socially useless except as a certification that the person has the "proper" background. Proper background, of course, includes not only cultural content in terms of knowledge but also its accompanying ideological orientations and rationalizations in support of hierarchy and clerical exclusion from it. (This topic will be explored further in Chapters Three and Five.)
III CONSCIOUSNESS AND HEGEMONY

Hegemony may be viewed as the pervasive influence which permeates all aspects of society and makes it difficult for workers to "see" the class basis of ideological domination, whether that domination is in the economic base or in the cultural superstructure. It makes it difficult for them to challenge the claims of the dominant class that this hegemonic view of reality is "universal" or "neutral" of class interest—in other words, to challenge its nature as ideological.

But hegemony is not a vague something which emanates from the "superstructure", for this would be to deny the totality of social practices which together make up the concrete reality of the structure known as capitalism. These practices relate to each other within the "social intentions," as Raymond Williams (1973) puts it, which constitute the domination of a particular class, and which "express and ratify" that domination. Hegemony as used by Gramsci, Williams points out, "supposes the existence of something which is truly total," not something which is somehow only pasted onto a determinant economic base, something which goes beyond merely ideology. Hegemony bespeaks the economic, political and cultural ascendancy of a class over all of society to the extent that its ethos saturates society and limits vision in selective ways. In this sense, hegemony represents ideology as "lived," a pervasive presence dominating consciousness itself and continually adjusting with the dynamics of social reality.

It is this pervasiveness which Althusser (1971) has noted, of ideology "making subjects" for capitalism, in the double sense of subjection and subjective incorporation of ideology within the psyche of individuals, until it appears not to be ideology at all. In this sense, ideology as hegemonic
domination is capable of a totalizing effect. The operative word is "capable," since the notion of hegemony is not intended to replace the concept of class struggle—it does not nullify class struggle, but rather creates special problems and conditions for it. (Unfortunately, Althusser does not stress this point.)

That class domination is in constant need of rebuttressing is evidence of the problematical nature of this subjection. Gramsci noted the conditions under which hegemony rather than outright coercion was effective, and the apparatuses through which hegemony must operate. These are located in civil society, intermediaries between the economy and the state, that is in the means of production of culture and communication: family, church, media. These institutions together play complementary roles in maintaining stability and order, making the ultimate coercive force of the state unnecessary as a general rule. It was in this contrast between coercion and hegemony that Gramsci sought an explanation for the kind of stable order peculiar to Western parliamentary democracy, which produced not resistance but consent in the populace (cf. Anderson, 1976).

Hegemony, then, is a concept meant to capture the characteristics of a kind of domination in which domination as such appears to recede and consent becomes important in the prevention of total class war. Liberal ideology, which reflects the interests of a specific class, appears not to be class-based but an expression of the "general interest," based on and justified by principles of liberal democracy which most accept. It is in such a context that the moral and cultural direction of society appears to lose its linkage to particular economic and political interests.

The operation of hegemony is enhanced under monopoly capitalism. The separation of ownership from control and the creation of technostructures through which power is diffused means that the capitalist class becomes
less identifiable, less easy to blame.

As Friedman (1977: Ch. 7) points out, historically the changing nature of the industrial enterprise, with its large agglomerations of labour and increased technical sophistication, called for changes in managerial strategies. Increased size meant a need for more co-ordination of the various elements. At the same time, the potentially deleterious effects of industrial sabotage by resistant workers could grind the sophisticated technical mechanism to a halt. Together, size, complexity and vulnerability combined to create the need for experiments with various control strategies. The first of these experiments concerned the development of direct, fairly coercive methods using monetary incentives and Taylorism. These methods gained ascendancy in the 1870 to 1914 period. In the period between 1914 and 1945, they lost ground to various "human relations" and industrial relations systems. The latter represented a more indirect means of control via formal procedures and conciliation which took advantage of the rise of large unions organized along bureaucratic lines, co-opting workers and their representatives into the system.

Thus, indirect control using various procedural means could ensure some measure of industrial stability. Direct control strategies such as Taylorism worked better when combined with control strategies based on "responsible autonomy", motivational strategies which sought to appeal to the non-monetary interests of workers (Friedman, 1977: Ch. 7).

There were other outcomes of this phase of organization which further enhanced the control potential of management. One of these was the creation of the "internal labour market" (this will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three). By hiring and promoting from within, management could ensure a pool of readily available labour within the corporation. Ideally, such a workforce had been exposed for long periods of time to the corporate ethos
and to various policies which created competitive divisions within worker ranks. Workers dependent on the corporation for promotion from within may be assumed to be a malleable group whose co-operation is exchanged for promises of future reward for "responsible" performance.

Ultimately, however, as control became indirect, there was an increased need not only for the technical co-ordination created by the scale of operations, but also for increased recordkeeping, more supervisory personnel, and an industrial relations apparatus. The result was an increase in the number of white-collar workers, particularly clerks. In the period after the First World War, these clerks were mainly male, their skills in short supply, and their importance strategic to management due to their participation in managerial authority. Managers thus treated them with a strategy of "responsible autonomy." Such strategies and the roles of particular kinds of labour have changed with the changing needs of capitalism, but they have not eliminated the need for control. (Friedman, 1977: Ch. 7).

Hence, at one level, workers were kept divided by various strategies which detracted from collective concerns, while at the other level, they were united by an appeal to their autonomy and responsibility as part of a management "team." In controlling both kinds of workers, there were appeals to the sentiments of individualism and competition for benefits, which were very much part of a more general ideology stressing individual merit, social mobility, and competition. However, these elements in the general ethos of liberal democracy have led to competitive isolation among workers. Isolated workers who accept the philosophy are open to manipulation at the workplace level by management ideologies which trade on these themes.

It does not seem to matter whether these management appeals reinforce
a "normative acceptance" of the values of liberal democracy or merely a "pragmatic acceptance" by subordinate classes (cf. Mann, 1970), since the end result is co-operation exchanged for rewards. In fact, both the appeals and the response to the values can remain vague and even inconsistent and contradictory. This surely must explain the lack of any need for capitalist enterprises to produce general consensus to these principles -- they are already produced and reinforced elsewhere in the society. General consensus is the outcome of the workings of other institutions, particularly of education, the media, and the family. Rather, at the workplace level, strategies need be developed only to maintain control of "local" conditions. Hegemony has already done much to eliminate conflict and debate over broader principles by obscuring the need to discuss alternatives.

In general, monopoly capitalism has led to a situation of relative security and affluence among workers in the "metropolis" or "core" areas of world capitalism at the expense of the "hinterland" or "periphery" areas and at the expense of the industrial reserve army in the "competitive" sectors within the metropolis. There has also been a movement away from the intense and open hostility of management-labour disputes which marked the earlier periods; it is a state of relative tranquillity. Management-labour relations have evolved into a formalized system of bargaining using fixed rules which have succeeded in narrowing the field to economic issues; this narrowing of focus and acceptance of capitalist "game-rules" has allowed corporations the scope to "buy off" their relatively privileged workforce.

There has also been an increased role of the state in the co-optation of labour and labour leaders in the arbitration of disputes within the rules of the game well within acceptable limits of the logic of "free
enterprise." This further de-politicization of the workplace has elevated disputes to the level of the state and out of the hands of worker groups, reinforcing within workers the impression that they are two separate and unrelated spheres. The general climate of non-combativeness in the workplace, in politics, and in society in general has fostered the illusion that teamwork and co-operation work for the good of all equally; it has succeeded in keeping workers within the definitions of legitimacy and "fairness" established by the dominant order (cf. Hyman and Brough, 1975).

The de-politicization of management-labour disputes and the restriction of issues to economistic concerns has occurred during a period in which the occupational community of workers has been further eroded by the decline of working-class community and its absorption into an apparently homogeneous social world of housing, consumption, lifestyle and leisure. Community, leisure and work are no longer part of a seamless experience of class. Alt (1976: 75) points out that the separation of these spheres and their "commodification" have resulted in "The eclipse of class experience" and a reintegration around "new forms of exchange generally perceived as private, existential freedom and material comfort." It has been a change qualitatively in the cultural character of the working class and of working-class consciousness.

This change is exemplified in the "privatized" character of working-class as documented in the "affluent worker" studies by Goldthorpe et al. (1969). Goldthorpe argues that it is not work situation alone which accounts for this orientation, but social situation, particularly isolation in suburban housing estates. These workers regard work as simply the means to private ends of home and family and regard unionization not as a matter of ideological commitment but as a means of collectively organizing to attain private monetary gain--an orientation called by Goldthorpe "instrumental collectivism."
Lockwood's (1958) study of British clerks reveals this same instrumental orientation to unions. The clerks view unions as a collective means of preventing erosion of their material situation and not as an indicator of their proletarianization. Lockwood argues that their work situation has not led them to identify themselves with the traditional proletariat; they continue to view themselves as having more opportunity and as being better off in status terms.

Much has been written about the lack of collective solidarity of American workers. Aronowitz (1973) has argued that American workers are divided among themselves essentially because they experience division: it is built into the technical and social organization of work (as hierarchy and as fragmentation of tasks) and built into the socialization of workers through education for a competitive and individualistic society.

What results is that workers are unable to perceive or express the true nature of their situation. This is borne out in studies of British chemical workers (Nichols and Armstrong, 1976; Nichols and Beynon, 1977). Even workers with rudimentary class consciousness, the "politicals" and the "bloody-minded", had difficulties in analysing their situation. In case after case, these authors illustrate the way in which the organization and the experience of work enhance the tendency for workers to view work, society and politics as separate and unrelated domains. In these authors' view, it is not simply that workers are "instrumental", or "deferential," or characterized by any of the other over-simplified labels which have been used in the literature to describe their orientations; rather, their orientations defy neat categorization altogether. Workers' discussion of their situation is marked by inconsistency and inchoateness of expression, the inability to make connections or to locate causes within the taken-for-
granted world of managerial prerogative, hierarchy and class privilege
which appear to them as unalterable "givens:"

"...in order for workers to see politics and society in
a different way to that projected by the dominant
ideology...they have to negotiate their way through
existing ideological structures...[These] provide...
ready-made and well-trodden thoughtways...they represent
a conceptual miasma which it requires a very sharp knife
to cut cleanly through." (Nichols and Armstrong, 1976: 19;
emphasis in original)

The men in Nichols and Armstrong's study possessed no such knife--
no alternative world-view which would permit analysis to transcend the
compartmentalization of their lives. Under such conditions, the authors
feel it is perfectly reasonable for people to hold inchoate and con-
flicting views. In fact, as Mann observes (1970: 437), the cohesion of
liberal democracy may well depend on such lack of consistency; where
conflicting values are not brought to the situation, they need not be
debated.

Such studies have shown that workers' thinking is "falsely con-
scious" in the sense that the vocabulary is borrowed and inappropriate
for describing the reality of proletarianized workers struggling against
capitalist domination. The new conditions of life introduced during
modern times have resulted not only in "privatization," not only in the
division between workers socially and technically, they have also prevented
the development of an appropriate language of exploitation and class
struggle among many workers, which has impeded subsequent follow-through
in praxis. Such is the practical result of hegemony.
CHAPTER THREE:
MANAGERIAL PRACTICES AND THE CAREER:
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

The subsequent chapter, Four, contains a detailed examination of specific managerial practices which control white-collar labour in the four firms. As a necessary overview to that examination, the present chapter is intended in order to establish the historical and theoretical context in which the evolution of such practices is to be understood. In establishing this context, the significance of the practices will become apparent as they relate to the fundamental "problem of control" experienced by the capitalist class throughout its history.

Capitalists have never been without class practices of domination and control, simply because they have never been free of the necessity for dealing with class conflict; it is inherent in the nature of capitalism as the fundamental contradiction between capital and labour, exploiter and exploited. Whether explicitly or implicitly, systematically or unsystematically, class practices have as their strategic objective the survival of the class via the domination of the exploited class in order to maximize the accumulation of surplus value. Class practices therefore involve the notion of control.

However, historical evidence suggests that it has been only in the later periods of capitalism's development, from the mid-to-late nineteenth century onwards, that practices to control labour have been made more explicit, more systematically applied, and increasingly "scientific" in their basis (cf. Massie, 1965, Friedman, 1977). This date marks the transition to the monopoly capitalist phase.
The notion of control has been subject to some misunderstanding in much of the non-Marxist literature. Non-Marxists, such as the "logic of industrialism" school, tend to read the historical importance of control as being one of the technical exigencies of "industrial" societies; hence to them, control is neutral in content and intent, and seemingly inevitable in its progression. In the Marxist literature, however, control is generally understood as having a dual aspect, both parts of which are lodged in the very nature and contradictions of capitalism. These aspects are control of capital accumulation processes, and control of labour. It is capitalists who control and workers who are controlled—it is not a neutral process but a political one, hence it creates a further need to obscure the nature of capitalist control through ideological means.

On the one hand, there is the need to control and co-ordinate conditions for the accumulation of capital, which has fuelled changes in the means of production. These changes propelled development from pre-capitalist systems such as "putting-out" to the factory system, and ultimately led to changes in the organization of production from entrepreneurial to monopoly capitalism. As outlined in Chapter Two, this in turn led to the creation of new strata of workers corresponding to new divisions within the functions of labour and capital. On the other hand, there is the need to control the social relations of production—to overcome worker resistance and ensure the availability and malleability of a dependent labour-force. These two are, of course, not mutually exclusive control needs, since capitalists expand capital through the appropriation of surplus value from labour. The capitalist mode of production encompasses both means and social relations of production. At every stage of development, changes in the one provoke responses in the other, and new control problems in need of new strategies arise.
Hence, the factory system cannot be viewed as merely a technical advance over putting-out, but must also be viewed as a solution to the problems of subordinating labour to capital's needs and of wrestling control over conditions of production away from the producers in order to place it in the hands of capital (cf. Marglin, 1974). Similarly, the harnessing of science and technology is not simply in the interests of enhancing productive efficiency but is also a means of ensuring the physical and mental subordination of labour (cf. Gorz, 1972; Noble, 1977).

The emphasis on subordination as being not merely physical but mental as well is taken up in the literature by such writers as Burawoy (1978) in opposition to the somewhat earlier work conducted on the labour process by Braverman (1974).

Braverman believed that the adaptation of the worker to conditions of capitalism owed little to practical and ideological manipulations, particularly as expressed in the aims of the so-called human relations approaches to worker control and motivation (to be discussed in section II of this chapter). Rather, he believed that worker habituation originated in the socio-economic conditions and forces of labour-process organization, it was due to the fact that the capitalist mode of production had destroyed all former forms, thus leaving workers no alternatives (1974: Ch. 6). Yet Braverman acknowledged that worker hostility continued as a "subterranean stream" beneath the apparent habituation, renewing itself in each generation as "cynicism and revulsion" of workers towards their work. Resistance necessitated an emphasis on the "scientific" disciplines to study ways and means of motivating, selecting, and training workers for the best conditions under which workers could be brought to co-operate (:139). Braverman did not believe that these methods have worked too well, yet nevertheless implicitly
recognizes that workers do co-operate to some extent (particularly as far as appeals to worker self-interest are concerned).

Braverman's reluctance to admit the importance of ideological factors prompted Burawoy's (1978) criticism. He felt that Braverman had neglected the interplay between the ideological and the economic within the context of hegemonic domination, and instead called for a recognition of the domination by capitalism as a tripartite one: economic, political, and ideological. Following the Althusserian structuralists, Burawoy was insisting on an analysis of the economic level in such a way that the existence of other forms of domination would be acknowledged within it.

The inclusion of the ideological aspects of control makes sense in the context of hegemony discussed in Chapter Two, and also, at the level of the labour process, from another standpoint as well. As Aronowitz (1973: Ch. 2) emphasizes, subordination under advanced conditions of capitalism cannot simply be passive surrender. Workers (and as a pre-condition, future workers receiving formal education) must be made to incorporate or internalize within their self-system the ideas of co-operation with authority, competition for rewards and mobility, and the restriction of leisure in subordination to the demands of work and its deprivations. (Or, as Althusser put it, workers need to be "made subjects" by and for capital.)

Following Lefebvre's use in The Survival of Capitalism, Henderson and Cohen (1979) distinguish between two kinds of ways in which appropriate worker attitudes are generated and transmitted. The first is via "exterior conditioning," the explicit and overt strategies which are applied by capital to labour, including most importantly, technology, which sets the rhythms and parameters of work. The second is via "interior determination," the way in which reproduction of the social relations of production as domination comes to enter the culture of workers via education, the demise of
worker communities, ideologies of "classlessness," and so on. In short, as Aronowitz puts it, worker socialization must not produce resistance to the economic role assigned to workers, but must reduce both objective and subjective possibilities for alternatives (1973: 58).

These few references are sufficient to point out that the neglect of the ideological by Braverman due to his position is in need of correctives if labour is to be fully understood within advanced capitalism. Moreover, it will be argued that the ideological element in managerial practices is an integral and significant part of the control of white-collar labour in particular, and not only in other institutional contexts but also at the workplace level. (Although, as will be pointed out in Chapter Seven, this poses additional problems for capitalist control as it sets up the conditions for new grounds of conflict.)

Strategies to control labour will, therefore, be thought of in the present study as consisting of two aspects: control directly through the technical arrangements embedded in the labour process (that is, in the organization of work), and control indirectly through ideological means not immediately connected with the labour process (or at least, not seeming to be). These two kinds of strategies are not mutually exclusive of one another nor are they separated in time—rather, the labour process may be thought of both as strategic structure and as having an ideology, and by extension, of having an ideological impact.

For purposes of exposition, however, the two kinds of strategy will be dealt with separately in the two sections which follow, after which specifically white-collar control strategies will be discussed as a special case of ideological control. This discussion is by no means intended to be an exhaustive inventory of control strategies in capitalist history; rather, it is intended to highlight periods of struggle and strategy as they are significant to this study.
I MANAGERIAL PRACTICES AS LABOUR PROCESS STRATEGY

Following the American Civil War, conditions were ripe in the United States for a rapid expansion of industry, and with new technical innovations, new interests centering around the electrical and chemical industries began to develop. At that time, the steel industry was also beginning to expand and to consolidate into larger production units, but this progression was hindered by older forms of the organization of labour and the resistance which its traditional craft workers were able to muster against changes. The steel industry, therefore, provides a good example of how the dual problem of expanding accumulation and controlling labour was solved (Stone, 1974).

The early American steel industry had been a partnership between capitalist entrepreneurs and highly skilled steelmasters who not only had control over the production process but also had control over the hiring of contract labour and the training of apprentices; since about the 1870's the steelmasters were also protected by a powerful craft union. In order to expand production, capitalists needed to break the power of the steelmasters and their union (Stone, 1974).

Steel is the case par excellence where traditional forms of labour acted as a fetter on the introduction of new technology in the form of machinery to increase productivity and cut labour costs. The organization of its labour was a continuation of pre-capitalist "guild" forms, where the master-journeyman-apprentice system controlled production and their own labour. When capitalism began to expand, this system hindered accumulation and did not give the capitalist a unique position of control in the process. Even in early capitalism there had been a need to create a role for the capitalist through the centralization of the production process in factories. It was in the factory system that the capitalist first became the exclusive
co-ordinator and integrator of production, thereby guaranteeing his control not only over the workers' product but also over their labour. There is no evidence that the early factory system was technically superior to domestic production, since there had initially been no significant changes in weaving technology and workers themselves could acquire the same machinery. The capitalist later came to control conditions via the patent system and via legislation which supported his bid to create a free market in goods and in labour with himself as the controlling agent (Marglin, 1974).

This was so also in the later steel industry, where craft control had to be broken to create a new boss-worker hierarchical relationship. In this way, conditions for accumulation could be maximized for the capitalist at the expense of the craft workers. The task was accomplished via a new division of labour between workers, and by altered job definitions through which capitalists could control production and wage determination.

It was between 1890 and 1920 in the steel industry that much of what we recognize as the modern labour system took shape. Once the craft unions were broken, unskilled labour could be upgraded with capitalist-controlled training given to a new class of "semj-skilled" workers whose tasks and skill level were compatible with the new mechanization. They were a class of workers whose knowledge of the production process was limited and controlled by management, as were their piece-rate conditions of pay. A new stratum of managers was recruited from the colleges and universities and given on-the-job training by the corporations in order to guarantee that capitalist control would continue in a line of succession. (Management "apprentices" appeared in the steel industry as early as 1901.) At the same time, the role of foreman became one of direct authority over labour on behalf of management. Foremen,
themselves recruited from the more privileged ranks of skilled workers, were trained to maintain discipline and develop teamwork among workers while reinforcing a more rigid line between "hand" and "mind" work (Stone, 1974).

Between 1900 and 1910, methods of "scientific management" were introduced, taken from the ideas of Taylor, an engineer. Engineers had come to play an increasingly important role in new science-based industries. After 1880, and from then until 1912, their concern was with improving the performance of the human element in production, notably with extending the detailed division of labour into smaller and smaller components which could be completed by less skilled (and less costly) workers. Along with their role in reducing production costs through the substitution of dead for living labour (mechanization), they thus played a great role in the cheapening and deskilling of traditional forms of labour, removing knowledge and control over that knowledge to a new stratum of managers and technical specialists. The productive process was simplified and streamlined, and the labour-force regimented, its real and not merely formal subordination ensured. (Gorz, 1972; Braverman, 1975; Noble, 1977)

Stone (1974) notes that once this redivision of labour and its control within production were created, the presence of unions had little effect on changing the broad outlines of the relationship between labour and capital. (In fact, labour leaders like Gompers applauded it as providing the basis for more prosperity for all, through improved productivity.) Cloaked in the mystifications of science, this form of labour control, with the mass de-qualification of workers from role in knowledge production, would not be questioned in its fundamental assumptions. That is not to say, however, that labour was rendered totally passive. Indeed, the extreme authoritarianism of Taylorist methods provoked worker resistance which created further
problems: how to keep a relatively more homogeneous (in skill terms) labour force stable, quiescent, and internally divided in order to head off more extreme manifestations of class conflict. Much of the solution to these problems lay in systems which relied heavily on psychological manipulation and ideological appeals (they will be discussed in section B).

The new corporate giants which arose at the turn of the century were characterized by managerialism and scientificity. Control in these joint stock companies had been disassociated from ownership and was vested in a powerful managerial stratum representing the capitalist class. Science and technology were quickly harnessed and subordinated to this managerial stratum. These giant corporations were at the vanguard of innovation within capitalism, merging into single units productive units which during the phase of competitive capitalism had been separate and small. The new corporations were now large, complex enterprises which operated with huge agglomerations of labour and other resources.

This new form of organization did not eliminate all other organizational forms completely—these remained as a smaller but functionally useful fraction of capital which complemented the efforts of the large corporate giants. This fragmentation within capitalism into the so-called "monopoly" and "competitive" capitalist sectors produced a useful result: the segmentation of the labour force into a primary and a secondary market in labour.

The segmentation created by the advance of monopoly capitalism allowed large firms to apply different strategies of control to different segments of labour, both sectorally and eventually, within the same firm. The competitive sector labour market acted as a "sop" for the industrial reserve army thrown off by rationalization within the large firms. Within the primary sector, the labour force became relatively stable and affluent and
seemed to have little in common with the condition of workers in other sectors. Similarly, segmentation within the primary sector by race, by sex, and by skill further undermined the potential for collective solidarity among workers. (Reich, Gordon and Edwards, 1973)

This is not to say that older forms of control, sometimes called "simple" or "direct," disappeared with the emergence of monopoly capitalism, to be replaced by new forms of "bureaucratic" control such as exercised in the large firms. Rather, as Diamond (1979) suggests, the two strategies have come to co-exist and have been applied to be compatible with the type of work and the worker group. Generally speaking, strategies of direct control such as used in Taylorism are applied to low-level production and clerical workers, whose performance is basically guided by production quotas and by the clock—in this sense, conformity to bureaucratic rules of punctuality, accuracy and so on are not that distinguishable from earlier forms of "simple" control. Other, less authoritarian, forms of bureaucratic control became more appropriate with the growth of the multinational firms and their cadres of administrative and scientific labour whose work cannot be regulated by stopwatch or harsh foremen. Thus there developed a duality in control strategies, termed by Friedman (1977) "direct" and "responsible autonomy". After much experimentation, they came to be applied to different groups of workers within the same monopoly-sector firms, and contributed to keeping these two groups internally divided and heterogeneous.

There were problems with the coercive methods of direct-control strategies such as Taylorism or even the impersonal control vested in machines—especially when managers had to deal with organized worker resistance. Appeals had to be made to worker goodwill, since management could de-skill workers but not effectively rid them of independent will. Coercive methods unmoderated by any
other techniques could provoke resistance which would lead to sabotage and stoppages. The large, technically sophisticated workplaces were particularly vulnerable—workplaces where sheer numbers of workers in close proximity, experiencing similar conditions of work, could potentially become solidaristic and seek collective relief. Hence by the 1930's, the favoured place of scientific management was taken over by other techniques. These new techniques were an attempt to modify the coerciveness of direct control in such a way as to win workers' loyalty by treating them as though they were autonomous and responsible humans. (Friedman, 1977).

In part, management accomplished this by co-opting the union leadership and by taking advantage of the increasingly bureaucratic and procedurally-oriented character which unions had assumed. Such aspects as formal conciliation and bargaining became indirect means of maintaining managerial authority. Workers became "locked in" to the terms of the agreement and their union representatives were exhorted by management to ensure that they acted "responsibly" for its duration. This combination of direct control and responsible autonomy strategies developed in the 1920's and was later supplemented by experimentation with various "human relations" approaches (Friedman, 1977: Ch. 7).

There were other variations on the direct control and responsible autonomy mix, however, which were used with great effectiveness early in the twentieth century. The logic of many of these methods has altered little since that time, and were simply extended eventually to include white-collar labour. One of these, described by Stone (1974) was the creation of the "internal labour market," which in part developed as a result of management realizing the stabilizing effects brought by bureaucratic and procedural means.

As early as 1908 the steel industry management began creating these hierarchies of promotion with their limited ports of entry from the bottom
and their finely graded ranks of skill (largely artificially created). The internal labour market proved to be an excellent way of maintaining worker discipline while preventing the unification of workers. Since each worker was potentially in line for promotion to the rank above him and was in competition with other aspirants, workers could be kept divided by individualistic, competitive concerns. The strictly demarcated job ladders which linked jobs together in chains moving from lower to higher status and pay gave workers the illusion of vertical mobility; to receive its rewards they were forced to play by the rules. Along with the introduction of a bonus system linked to production norms, the internal promotion chain gave workers a "stake" in the well-being of the firm and acted as a disincentive to disrupt production. The policy of appealing to individual ambitions thus created psychological divisions among workers. It was supplemented by paternalistic policies of providing various welfare and recreational schemes which sought to encourage worker loyalty to the firm and decrease labour-force turnover (Stone, 1974). A stable corporate population was thereby created.

Although even today workers are "bought off," the appeals are not merely to their economism—the narrow view of human nature as being motivated only by money was found very early on not to be very effective, and from about the 1920's, concern shifted to ways of creating "contented workers" by paying attention to matters of morale and motivation. Firms like General Motors, General Electric, and Dupont were leaders in applying the insights of behavioural psychology (Noble, 1977). The role of the engineer was supplemented and finally supplanted by the role of personnel departments and industrial relations experts. Much of whatever efficacy was achieved by their approaches had been ideologically grounded, as will be shown in the next section.
II IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CONTROL

Taylorism and the later human relations approaches to worker control represent the first explicit and systematically applied theories of management. Before the monopoly capitalist phase, capitalist thought was no less "ideological" in nature, but it lacked much sophisticated theoretical elaboration. No doubt this was partly due to the fact that the capitalist class did not have active ideologists who could make explicit the rationalizations for capitalist activity vis-à-vis labour—this was to be the task of the engineers whom the capitalist class came to rely upon, first as private consultants and later as highly paid employees in the twentieth century (Whitaker, 1979).

This is not to say that engineers and other scientific specialists were aware of their role in ideological domination—on the contrary, historical documentation reveals that these early corporate consultants and employees were fervently convinced that their approach was not only "scientific" but as science, was neutral of any bias (Whitaker, 1979). Science was used to hide a multitude of ills, and moreover it was perhaps one of the most influential appeals to workers, for to challenge science was to be as irrational as to challenge progress. Both science and progress ostensibly worked for the "general good", but workers were disqualified from participating in scientific knowledge of production and from decisions involving knowledge; their participation in progress was relegated to the limited role of the "unqualified," the mere machine operative (cf. Gorz, 1972; Whitaker, 1979).

Thus the ideological appeals of advanced capitalism were characterized not only by much more sophisticated management theory than early capitalism, but also by "professionalism" and scientificity. The prevalence of such an
ethos could only be possible when the sciences and the professions were fully harnessed in the service of capital and their legitimacy as intellectual disciplines had already been accepted by the general public. Earlier, capitalists had had to justify their actions and their right to take those actions by other means, which ultimately were successful in dismantling a social and political edifice based on the traditions of religion and aristocratic privilege. As a new rising class, their challenge had been to the old order. Once that order was destroyed, however, the now-dominant class in a new social order had different conditions of challenge and conflict to overcome, and as Bendix (1959) points out, the nature of class thought changed with them.

At the time of the Industrial Revolution, an ideology of "traditionalism" had prevailed: a view of worker-capitalist relations in which the reciprocity of rights and duties of the feudal period was translated into a view of workers as incapable and dependent, as necessitating protection and direction by the rich. By the time capitalists were established as the dominant class, however, a "laissez-faire" attitude had come to symbolize the separation of economy and state. While the notion of consent and equal rights before the law had gained legitimacy, so did a highly individualistic philosophy of the rise of merit through personal effort, which excused the rich from any responsibility for the poor. By the late nineteenth century and the height of competitive capitalism, this attitude had become more entrenched as "social Darwinism," the law of the jungle applied to social classes. These ideas had to be modified with the development of the complex division of labour within the hierarchies created by managerial capitalism. A new ethic of worker-management relations and of work performance had to be developed, wherein the notion of co-operation would prevail. Moreover, as time went on, it became increasingly evident
that with the bureaucratization of work, the ideal behaviour of workers had to be somewhere between blind forced obedience and too much room for capricious factors to enter (Bendix, 1959).

In short, a "responsible" approach to work had to be cultivated, one which could draw on the "good faith" and ideas of fairness residing in the shared cultural history which had developed out of liberal democracy.

The principles of liberal ideology have a long and complex history of development within the context of the economic and political struggles of early capitalists against entrenched forces of tradition. In the process of struggle, these ideas have become solidified into a common cultural residue which most members of society today have difficulty challenging. They are based on the social organizational features of representative government within a nation-state framework, an economy run by private (not state) interests based on the institution of private property, and a legal system based on formal legislation. Out of these features have come beliefs which most still regard as fundamental: a belief in majority rule as just and democratic, the supremacy of the individual over the state, the belief in equality of condition of individuals vis-à-vis the government (which does not represent any single interest group over others), and finally, the belief in private profit through individual initiative and that these profits benefit all. The result of belief in these principles of liberal democracy is an ideology which stresses achievement, individualism, personal success, upward mobility, and an ultimate compatibility between private interests and the general social good (Marchak, 1975: Ch. 1).

Thus it is that the logic of class relations in capitalist society, based on forced labour and exploitation, becomes overshadowed by the individualistic ideology which the early capitalist class carried with it in its ascent to dominance. The promise of similar benefits to be reaped
by all is held out to subordinate classes today. The secret of capitalist class hegemony lies in this liberal-democratic historical perspective, buttressed by modern ideological apparatuses such as the schools. Even in its most glaring moments of contradiction, this common body of ideology must have severely limiting effects on the development of class consciousness and conflict. Out of it comes an acceptance of capitalist authority in the workplace as somehow natural and legitimate, since the accession to positions of authority is not hereditary but is an acquired status ostensibly based on merit; and merit in turn is ultimately based on the inviolability of the rights of private property.

This surely must explain the lack of challenge to managerial prerogative in modern labour relations, as well as the way in which the pseudo-consent of the working class may be manipulated. This is not to say, however, that there is no fundamental contradiction between liberal-democratic principles and particularly authoritarian work arrangements: in fact, this has led to tensions and to experimentation with various methods of control.

Taylorism, or "scientific management," provides a good example of the way in which a particular rationale of control carries with it an ideology which has control potential of its own, quite apart from the assumptions about human nature embodied in the strategy. Taylorism, for example, assumed a model of humans as "homo economicus," motivated by money; but workers did not respond well to its monetary incentives due to the authoritarianism of its methods. There was another side to Taylorism, however, which helped to "cool out" the conflicts.

In the case of Taylorism, the contradiction between principles of liberal democracy and authoritarianism was solved by appealing to the recognition of science as "neutral" even when it was harnessed to particular methods of workplace control clearly in capitalists' but not workers'
interests and hence not neutral at all. Before the twentieth century opened, many changes in the nature of work had already occurred, changes associated with increased plant size, the impersonality of the boss-worker relationship, and the speedup of work by the introduction of mechanization on a vast scale. Around 1900, there was a crisis of legitimacy caused by the militancy of the labour movement and the challenge inherent in the rise of the socialist party in America. Although engineers like Taylor had hard scientific solutions to material problems, employers as well as employees resisted his approach; those who did adopt it could not win control purely through technique (Whitaker, 1979).

What Taylor did offer was an ideological means of countering militancy: if society was to benefit by increased productivity, new scientific means would have to be found and substituted both for workers' and for managers' knowledge alike; science would have to replace rule-of-thumb methods regardless of whose they were. Only the technical specialist, it was argued, could understand the science behind the rudimentary knowledge the skilled worker applied — this legitimated placing responsibility for knowledge in the hands of the “intelligent” and the “educated,” those who could realize their potential. Scientific necessity thus seemed to transcend class conflict. Moreover, the rhetoric of bourgeois individualism helped to legitimate the isolation of workers from their solidaristic groups: it was in order for their “true” individual interests to develop. In short, scientific management was more effective as ideological justification for the monopolization of knowledge than it was as a scientific technique for increased productivity (Whitaker, 1979).

This analysis of Taylorism highlights a crucial consideration which might be missed if Braverman's (1974) account alone is taken: that control includes within it political and ideological aspects which help organize the
co-operation of workers as consciously willing, and thus contain resistance within acceptable limits wherein workers fail to recognize the true nature of their "co-operation." The process of securing surplus value is thereby ideologically obscured and workers play the game by the logic given to them without questioning its basis (Gurawoy, 1979a, b).

Stabilization of new conditions of work and a corporate workforce using such approaches as was discussed for the American steel industry probably made possible the shift in attention to more subtle methods. Certainly, methods of direct control have not been abandoned in later decades, but the ideological trappings have become more sophisticated. At first, managerial theory was concerned only with the more mechanical processes of efficiency and the accompanying assumption about human nature was that people acted rationally and were motivated by money, making consideration of personalities or of social networks unnecessary (Massie, 1965).

The Hawthorne studies of the 1930's, aimed at isolating physical factors affecting worker productivity, revealed a startling fact about worker resistance: shared group norms controlled production more than management did. Thereafter, management increasingly sought for ways to control or harness the "irrational" elements in the human personality, and various "human relations" schools of thought emerged. Concern had shifted to psychological and sociological means of motivating workers to perform in acceptable ways, to accept responsibility, to "participate" (Massie, 1965; Rose, 1975).

While these techniques have not eliminated class conflict, the rhetoric accompanying them has probably done much to confuse the issue among workers. The shift to "human engineering" and away from the more
mechanical approach of the past has become a way of appearing to adjust the realities of modern industry to worker needs, of seeming to present a more benign and liveable face of capitalism. As a consequence, hostility has been defused and the working class has become de-radicalized.

These approaches did not solve all of the contradictions and crises of capitalism—they were pushed to the level of the state where the efforts of the corporate "technostructure" were supplemented, from about the 1940's onwards, by economists and other non-technical professionals who sought additional stabilization through the formulation of political policy to manage the corporate economy (Noble, 1977). The net result has probably been the creation of yet another level of confusion at which workers become distracted from consideration of the true nature of their situation.

In the meanwhile, however, the swelling of the ranks of white-collar labour created more potential control problems within the firms, problems of worker motivation, as well as the possibility of using this group of workers to create a buffer zone between management and productive workers.

In the period before the First World War, the ranks of white-collar labour expanded. Much of the increase was in the ranks of scientific and administrative workers, who were needed to operate the large and complex systems. As the industrial relations apparatuses of large firms also became more sophisticated, the demand increased for those who could perform supervisory and recordkeeping functions. These workers were at first predominantly male, their specialized labour and education harder to come by than in the post-1940 period. Their role in the working order of the firm was also considered by management to be crucial. The nature of this section of the corporate workplace seemed to demand a strategy of "responsible autonomy" compatible with the role of "mental" labour, to harness the traits of dependability and commitment of those with a typically middle-class
orientation. Treating white-collar workers in this manner also ensured that they would be kept separated from the less fortunate production and other proletarianized workers and thus never realize common collective interests with them (Friedman, 1977: Ch. 7).

As Friedman (1977: Ch. 7) points out, however, such a strategy becomes inflexible, since any changes could be disruptive of ideological structures and generate resistance. Such problems of switching strategies when workers' skills become less scarce or when many are rendered redundant or de-skilled by cost-cutting drives would seem to account for the continued use of responsible autonomy approaches among white-collar workers whose work may now be controlled by more direct and impersonal means of machinery and the clock. In combination with the rhetoric of the "career" which is unique to white-collar workers, such an approach keeps even proletarianized clerical workers on the "mental" side of the mental-manual divide while at the same time the logic of the career within the internal labour market of the corporate office creates a subtle division between various levels of workers there.

The career, it will be shown in the next section, is an ideologically loaded mechanism for justifying the relative privileges given by management to the new middle class at the expense of clerical labour.
III A SPECIAL CASE OF IDEOLOGICAL PRACTICES: THE-CAREER

Definitions of careers in the conventional literature generally follow Wilensky's (1961) definition as "a succession of related jobs, arranged in a hierarchy of prestige, through which persons move in an ordered (more-or-less predictable) sequence." He goes on to state that the job pattern is socially recognized or sanctioned and persists over more than one generation of recruits (1961: 523-526). However, his data show that even in the so-called "middle mass," the relatively secure and affluent portion of the American population, only 30% experience half or more of their work histories as an orderly career (:523-526).

Nevertheless, because of the orderliness exhibited by careers, Wilensky is interested in their wider social implications: the way in which the workplace and the occupation affect the person by drawing him or her into the mainstream of social life. (It is a Durkheimian notion of social order via social integration.) Thus, even this "tiny slice" of the "middle mass" could be strategic for social order, in Wilensky's view. Indeed, his data indicate to him that those whose work histories are orderly (that is, those who have a career) exhibit stronger attachments to formal and informal associations and to the community than do those with disorderly histories. Participation in community life, he believes, is an extension of work-life participation; hence those with stable work lives might be more willing to train, to achieve, and to adopt a long time perspective and defer gratification for later benefits. It is in his view the "life-plan" created by the orderly career which spills over into social life and integrates the person into the community and the larger society.

The implications from a Marxist standpoint are obvious: modern capitalism needs an "integrated" workforce committed to personal advancement.
In the case of higher-level technical and managerial personnel, the smooth functioning of capitalism depends on their training and willingness to defer gratification in the long-run interests of private gain—their own and the corporation's—through a steady and predictable application of their talents to the business of the day, every day.

The career in this sense is the creature of the bureaucratic mode of organization, which makes possible a hierarchically ordered sequence of related jobs. Max Weber long ago recognized the importance of bureaucracy as a system for controlling behaviour, thus rendering it predictable. If the bureaucratic organization of advanced capitalism may be thought of as a structure which controls the objective conditions of labour, the career may be thought of as its counterpart controlling the subjective conditions: the expectations, orientations and commitment of individuals. The language of the career is also a substitute for the language of class and class conflict, serving to limit and focus concerns to individualistic rather than collectivistic issues. The conventional literature on careers unwittingly has provided much support for this interpretation of the significance of the career as a mechanism for co-optation and social control.

If the career is such a minority, elite phenomenon in the society, restricted to certain occupational types and levels (that is, more characteristic of middle to upper class experience than to working class experience), why has so much ink been spilled on it in the literature? Kräuse (1971) seems to provide an important clue: from an individual biographical standpoint, the notion of "career" encompasses past work history, present occupation, and plans or hopes for the future, and is very much rooted in the individual's perspective. In this sense, Krause suggests, the career is real enough in its meaning to a large section of the workforce so as to act as a "bulwark against radicalization" (1971:41).
In other words, if the focus is on the individual's perceptions and meanings, for the career to be a bulwark against radicalization it is necessary for the individual to define him/herself as having a career. Once so defined, the individual becomes manipulable by adoption of the career language which carries with it the imagery of individual striving, competence and ultimate upward mobility as a pursuit of excellence "for its own sake," for intrinsic and ego satisfaction, unlike the purely materialistic appeal of advancement for monetary gain.

The career is a control strategy for application to certain groups which are considered to be of strategic importance to the capitalist class in its control of other classes, and where alternative direct-control strategies would be inappropriate: among corporate managers, supervisors, and specialists such as scientists, engineers and accountants. The strategy is especially appropriate where the vocabulary of the independent professions lives on in the form of expectations of autonomy and responsibility based on an independent body of knowledge and standards of conduct: the ideology of professionalism.

The notion of professionalism within corporations, where there are no "free" professionals, is co-optive. A "professional" manager is one whose formal training and commitments are for a lifetime of systematic and dispassionate (in the sense of science) effort aimed at the competent execution of tasks sustained at a high level of performance--being a "professional" does not mean being a gifted amateur, a dilettante, or using "seat of the pants" methods; it also means that the "professional" has an obligation to his fellow practitioners and to their profession, in this case the corporation or the industry. Professional language also serves to obscure the real, class basis of the middle-to-upper level employee's existence.
The professional in the definitional sense intended by Wilensky has a career: he advances in skills and responsibilities, hence pay and status, in a logical sequence. By extension, the corporate employee at certain levels of responsibility also has a career. By further extension, the clerk or the routine white-collar worker could eventually have a career if the necessary training and demonstrated initiative and attitude traits were cultivated, but it is conceded that the "professional" employee, with credentials and a formally trained habit of mind, generally has greater career potential; his entry-level position is already on a recognized career path. Clerical employees, working their way upwards through their own job hierarchies, are excluded from participation in the career on the basis of lack of qualifications and because there are only so many careers available to be pursued.

The exclusion of certain groups from participation in the elite institution, the career, is legitimated and at the same time the worklife experiences of other groups are made to seem perfectly natural and appropriate to their station. The excluded, however, are not without hope: since their exclusion is not ostensibly as a group but as individuals, they may strive to compete as individuals, and their career prospects will largely lie in their success at competing. Success lies in individual competence and will, not in how far one must go to be considered eligible. The onus is forever on individuals to prove eligibility, since the existing structure is assumed to be natural, necessary, and accessible; with so much "professionalism" abounding, few would dare to challenge these assumptions.

The conventional literature on careers sheds some light also on the processes of individual commitment—psychological processes whereby individuals come to set a series of investments in motion which become too ego-involving
and costly to reverse easily. The commitment which results is usually
to an occupational identity, which becomes also a self-identity, evolving
out of the interaction between socialization experiences and the
evaluations of others significant to the person. Through various adjust-
ments to the institutional and organizational networks, that is to
various conditions external to the individual, the person acquires the
various internalized characteristics of the occupation, including
experiencing transformations in the self and in one's felt identity.

Such writers as Becker (1952), Goffman (1961) and Glaser (1968) point
out these transformations which occur in the course of preparation for
and entry into an occupational career. Thus, the career which draws its
being from the objective, structural conditions of the workplace, has
unavoidable consequences for subjective orientations and expectations.

The expectations of a person entering certain occupations which
have definite career outcomes such as mobility become built into the
process of occupational preparation and adjustment. The person also gauges
personal progress by the progress of others who have gone through similar
routes, and as a result, very structured career "timetables" develop, a
phenomenon noted by such writers as Roth (1963) and Sofer (1970). These
expectations, which act as motivating devices to the individual, can become
disincentives to further activity and conformity if they are violated. The
use of logical career progressions as a control mechanism, to act both as
reward for good performance and as sanction against unacceptable performance
and attitudes, is thus a double-edged sword which must be used with much care
and rational planning by management of corporations. Included in that
planning must be alternative strategies to "cool out" those who will not be
chosen to progress in the organization. These strategies must not result in
blame being placed on the corporations; individuals must be made to blame themselves and to alter their expectations in such a way that notions of legitimacy are not violated. One such approach, noted by Goldner and Ritti (1966) is the "dual career ladder," which grants equivalent status, reward and recognition as "professionals" to specialists who will not become mobile into line management. The strategy is intended to provide an alternative definition of success which will relieve any anxiety caused by a discrepancy between the original goals or expectations of professionals or specialists and the actual opportunities available.

Of course, as the authors point out, in defining a particular group as "professionals," the strategy also defines them as immobile in terms of the usual definitions of corporate careers. Whether or not these strategies work as intended, organizations nevertheless are recognized as providing crucial input into how careers are structured, who may have a career, and how people are placed in career lines or severed from them (Glaser, 1968).

The ultimate goal of much career management is undoubtedly "succession planning"—filling vacancies in the management chain with suitably qualified and loyal candidates—but not to recognize the ways in which they may be manipulated by management is to ignore the ideological component in careers. The career, with its well-known pathing and timing norms in organizations, becomes a way by which a system of meaning and interpretation may be provided for agents, to help canalize rather amorphous notions of ideological commitment to the "achieving society" into channels efficacious to the organization and to the dominant class.

The "career" is not only applied in an elitist and strategic way implying a structure of typical expectations which foster commitment to
organizational goals, it is also a mechanism of social control to ensure stability of the dominant value-system; the career as a managerial-class practice is thus a strategy which controls, channels, and co-opts by trading on socialized expectations and values. The compatibility between the language of careers and the socialized values of liberal ideology is the key to the success of this strategy. It can only be efficacious when individuals have value-systems which respond to the images evoked by the language of careers, and as such it is essentially a middle-class approach, since it speaks to middle-class ideological orientations.

Some of these petty-bourgeois orientations have been pointed out by Poulantzas (1975: 281-288). He notes, however, that this class does not have an ideology of its own, but rather a "sub-ensemble" drawn from both the dominant bourgeois ideology and also from the working-class ideology—consistent with the contradictory location of this group between the two major classes. Although classes share belief in the principles of liberal democracy, it appears that the situation of the middle class, with its relative privileges over the working class, reinforces the ideology of social mobility and its "competitive isolation"; thus the middle class is even less solidaristic than the working class. Although many of their conditions of work are similar to the working class in the impersonal hierarchical and authoritarian relations of the capitalist workplace, members of this class have nevertheless experienced more intergenerational mobility as well as what Poulantzas calls an "instability of occupation" due to the potential proletarianization of these places.

The apparatus—which is responsible for this greater mobility, he points out, is education, which trains and qualifies the class as mental labour. It is through education combined with the ideology of individual success and climbing upward that the illusions and hopes of the middle class
are fostered, both for themselves and especially for the future of their children. Thus, although they are hostile to the rich, they are not hostile to the logic of wage differentials. Though they wish to participate in decision-making powers and obtain greater recognition for the "true" value of their mental labour, they do not question either hierarchy or the mental-manual divide. And they aspire to promotion through having a career and eventually becoming bourgeois, through individual merit and the transfer of privileges to their children, which leads them to demand a "democratization" of selection apparatuses, but they do not question the structure of political power (the state to them is neutral, a technical apparatus which needs reform but not fundamental change). (Poulantzas, 1975: 281-288)

Although Poulantzas is writing about the middle class in France, there are many features of their general orientation which are the same in all developed capitalist countries. Moreover, much of this middle-class orientation is to be found among the most affluent and skilled levels of blue-collar work in North America (cf. Mackenzie, 1973), and among clerks (cf. Sykes, 1965), as a subsequent chapter will show for the corporations studied in Canada. Many of these workers, however, seem also to combine within their orientations elements of what Parkin (1973) has called a "subordinate" value-system characteristic of working-class subcultures, wherein "accommodative" responses to class inequality are produced.

The subordinate value-system, Parkin suggests, represents the degree to which the subordinate classes have endorsed and internalized the dominant values, creating various interpretations of and adaptations to, rather than outright opposition of, the fact of inequality and their place within the class structure.
The subordinate value-system, unlike the radical one, is an "uneasy compromise between rejection and full endorsement of the dominant order" (:91). The values which flow downwards from institutions upholding the dominant order, however, cannot be unproblematically accepted by the working class, since they represent interests and opportunities of privileged groups and hence are inappropriate to the working class situation without some modification. It could well be, Parkin suggests, that the subordinate classes have two levels of normative reference: the "abstract" and the "situational." In situations involving, for example, abstract questions of achievement, an abstract support of achievement values as expressed in the dominant value-system is given; on the other hand, in more existentially relevant situations, such as the subject of realistic job aspirations, a more modest expectation based on social knowledge of restricted opportunities will be used (:93-95). In this way, any inconsistencies tend to be by-passed in the shifting levels of reference, with the result that the dominant values are rarely de-legitimated.

Whatever the process, it seems to be apparent that the outcome in terms of the most prevalent working-class value system throughout most Western societies is the subordinate and not the radical, class-conscious one; its expression is limited struggles over "shares of the pie." Two of the prevalent ways in which accommodation to a subordinate class position is expressed, Parkin notes, are "fatalistic pessimism" and "instrumental collectivism" such as found in the typical trade-union movement. Neither view challenges the fundamental framework of rules established by the dominant order regarding distribution of power or income, but each accepts the assigned place as "natural" and inevitable, and works within the accepted framework to alter only the details (:90-91).

In this description of the value systems of classes within capitalism is accepted, that they are somewhat dissimilar but compatible and non-
antagonistic in nature, how do the class value-systems come to co-exist within a framework of liberal-democratic ideology which presumably provides the "glue" for the entire order? The answer must surely be: through the institutions of socialization, particularly the schools, which are not only instrumental in inculcating dominant values as though they were the only correct values but are also instrumental in reproducing social classes to fill places within the system. The educational apparatus accomplishes this by providing both "universal" and class-specific education. In effect, the schools programme for success or for failure, setting limits on the nature of the vision of success held by each class. In this way, stability of the class structure is assured in the next generation without undermining a belief in fundamentals such as individual achievement.

The educational system creates an individualized explanation when members of classes fail to achieve: personal failing through lack of intelligence, ability or drive. Those who do succeed in either the working class or the middle class are, of course, prime candidates for co-optation by the bourgeoisie, who harness the emergent talents in their own interests, and capitalist class hegemony is reinforced by the continuing abstract belief in its ordering principles.

At one time, formal schooling was the privilege of a few. In the late nineteenth century, however, it became apparent that universal mass education was useful both as a training and selection mechanism and also as a way of instilling desirable traits in the future workers of a highly regimented, bureaucratized system. Problems of how to preserve privilege while reproducing a docile workforce imbued with the appropriate values, became transferred from the workplace and the church to the educational institutions (cf. Cohen and Lazerson, 1972; Bowles, 1976). The task
was accomplished by the introduction of "streaming" or "tracking" by curriculum and by type of school: private and public, vocational and academic, higher and lower education—it was a system of class stratification reproduced within the schools. Universities, for example, encouraged the formation of a "critical intelligence" for work as free professionals, entrepreneurs, and teachers; while the technical institutes trained technicians for specific jobs as employees within corporate hierarchies. The stratification of education thus not only conveys knowledge and skills, but also shapes personalities to fit the particular level in the ordering of work; it reinforces the separation between "higher culture" of an elite, and technical work, while at the same time fostering the illusion that technical workers in turn are something of an elite themselves above an "inferior" working class (Gorz, 1972).

The schools as agencies of socialization and social class reproduction helped in the adaptation of workers to the social division of labour while at the same time classes came to accept the authority of the state as working in their own interests through education. Moreover, because some education was available to all, one's future place could be justified not as the result of birth into a particular class but as due to one's own efforts and abilities, or lack of them, thus introducing an aura of "voluntarism," a decisive element of ostensibly personal responsibility for one's future role (Bowles, 1976).

The social division of labour gives rise to distinct class subcultures based on differences in experience and place in the authority relations within the workplace. It is passed on to the next generation within the home as a vocabulary of expectations appropriate to past experiences, and is reinforced by education which complements subcultures by providing the
materials whereby the operation of the labour market will complete the
class reproduction cycle. Labour market selection processes operate on
educational credentials to translate class cultural differences into
income inequalities and occupational hierarchies (Bowles, 1976). At
the same time, the schools transmit elements of a common culture: values
of individual responsibility, discipline and punctuality, the value of
competition, and respect for private property. These are elements which
find resonance in the general ideology and thus contribute to the main-
tenance of hegemony around valued aspects of liberal democracy and the
"free enterprise" system; hence the educational system also contributes
to political stability.

Those who successfully survive their schooling experience are already
in effect "pre-selected"; they have proved they could function in a
repressive atmosphere of regimentation and discipline. When they enter
the work-world, they aspire to improving their lot, but most will be weeded
out as failures; the rest will be convinced their rise is due to their
own efforts, ambitions, and self-denial. Since engineers and technicians,
for example, are trained for a definite place in the division of labour
with little hope of becoming self-employed, the call of the corporate career
is an attractive one. Upward mobility through corporate ranks becomes a
substitute, yet still holds promise that they will better themselves over
ordinary workers and perhaps their parents. Their acceptance of the game-
rules of the career implies that "they are prepared to serve unquestioningly
the goals and purposes of the ruling class" (Gorz, 1972: 37). They will
presumably make themselves submissive to its authority while at the same
time filling a place in the role of dominating the class below them as
a natural and necessary part of their privileged status.
Thus is the career a strategic and ideologically loaded method not only of controlling middle-class labour by separating it from other forms of labour, but also of "calling out" in these workers the qualities and orientations which socialization in their class of origin and in the schools has created. It is efficacious as an ideological practice because it builds on prior ideological practices.

With this theoretical background, it will now be in order to proceed with an examination of the specific practices involving the management of white-collar labour in the four corporations under investigation, with particular emphasis on practices of creating and managing careers. This will be the concern of Chapter Four.
CHAPTER FOUR:
WHITE-COLLAR PRACTICES IN FOUR FIRMS

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the nature of practices in four firms from two standpoints: the organization of the labour process itself and what it implies for isolation and internal differentiation of white-collar workers from one another; and the organization of practices which control the more subjective aspects of work in large corporations connected with conditions for career-making. Chapter Five will go on to describe the white-collar workforce and to draw out practical consequences of these practices for the creation of class boundaries. Other chapters will explore the impact which these practices have on workers' perceptions. (Thus, subsequent chapters will deal with both "objective" and "subjective" consequences). First, however, some descriptive data on the four firms will establish the context within monopoly capitalism.

I CORPORATE CHARACTERISTICS

The four corporations which participated in the study are all by definition part of the set of dominant corporations in the Canadian economy, since they were drawn from the Financial Post 500 and are among the top one hundred industrial corporations in size (assets, sales and revenue). Although one corporation in the study is owned by a conglomerate, it like the others is one of the few firms in its industry--the firms are all part of the monopoly sector.

The corporations studied were approached along with others in the Financial Post 500 "Top 100" list and asked if they would participate in a study of white-collar careers in large corporations. Roughly half of the corporations approached did not respond to the query, and of the remaining half, most refused to participate for one reason or another. Some
firms agreed to supply information on their personnel policies but did not want to grant access to a sample of their employees. Nine corporations expressed at least some interest in the entire study and negotiations were conducted with these nine, resulting in agreement by four corporations. They are representative of the steel industry (two firms, one in specialty steel and the other producing basic or primary steel), utilities, and the petroleum industry. The eight corporations which supplied personnel-policy information were in chemicals, resources, food and consumer products, merchandising, and the electrical industry. Previous research in another steel company provided additional information.

Since officials in the four corporations were extremely nervous about their corporate identity being known to other participants in the study and also somewhat suspicious that the data could be misused to make them look bad, it was decided to use pseudonyms for the four corporate names. In the study, Company Alpha is the specialty-steel producer which is owned by the multinational conglomerate, Company Chi is the gas utility, Company Delta is the primary-steel producer, and Company Sigma is the oil company. Alpha and Sigma are branches of foreign multinationals, while Chi and Delta are Canadian-owned.

Company Alpha is the smallest of the four corporations. Although now owned by a Canadian conglomerate which is in turn owned 51% by a foreign multinational, Alpha is autonomous from the parent in its organizational structure and operations, with a somewhat truncated senior management—its topmost executive is a vice-president who reports to the parent company's president and board chairman—but in all other respects its organization structure is like that of other large corporations.
The assets and revenue or sales figures for Alpha were not available, but its Canadian parent's assets or sales are reported by Financial Post in 1979 to be a little under a million dollars, placing it about midway in the "Top 100" rank-ordering. The parent of Alpha is the smallest of the four corporations studied, while Sigma, the oil company, with over $2.5-million in assets or sales, is the largest of the four and is in the top ten in rank. The other two firms are about midway between Alpha and Sigma. Alpha is the largest company owned by the Canadian conglomerate, its population representing 40% of the parent's total of about 6,000 people. Alpha has also been dominant within the specialty-steel segment of the steel industry for many years, thus supplying much revenue to the parent; as well it receives investment funds from the parent for expansion and plant renovation.

The specialty-steel producer began its history as a branch operation of an American firm. It was supplied semi-finished steel by the parent for further manufacturing by the Canadian plant into tool and mining steels. In the late 1920's Company Alpha was purchased by an American steel company and by the next decade Alpha had expanded from its original 35 employees to 350 and was a fully self-sufficient steel producer with its own furnaces from which the semi-finished steel was produced. Alpha prospered from Second World War demand for special steels and grew to 3,000 employees; this growth continued through the 1950's. By the 1960's it was an industry leader with some of the most advanced facilities in the world for the production of stainless steel strip. The company built a second fully integrated plant, located in Quebec, to augment its Ontario-based production and sales operations. In 1963, Alpha was purchased by the Canadian branch
of a foreign multinational after the multinational had been chartered in Canada only three years earlier. The Canadian parent's five-year annual growth rate is slightly under 4% according to Financial Post; the growth rate for Alpha itself is not known, but the Alpha workforce has remained relatively stable in size since the beginning of its postwar growth period.

Company Chi, the gas utility, is a Canadian-owned firm which has been in operation since before the turn of the century, first as a producer and distributor of manufactured gas and then later, of natural gas. The company began its life as a Toronto gasworks with a staff of four in its offices: a president, a vice-president, a treasurer, and a company secretary-manager. It grew steadily until by 1954 it was a mature no-growth company with demand exceeding its facilities. The introduction of natural gas made 1954 a watershed in the firm's development, permitting growth beyond the limitations of the gas manufacturing facilities and propelling geographic expansion into high-growth urban areas in Ontario. Chi began taking over other smaller gas companies and also expanded vertically via real estate and gas appliance sales, and eventually bought into a western-based oil company. By the 1970's, Company Chi was comprised of what had been nine separate companies which it absorbed, and also was a participant with other dominant firms in many joint ventures in energy exploration and research. According to Financial Post, its five-year annual growth rate is almost 15%, the fastest growth rate of the four companies studied, although corporate officials state that it is again reaching a no-growth peak and needs further diversification.

Company Delta, a fully integrated producer of basic-steel and a diversity of finished steel made from this type of steel, was founded by two
American brothers who emigrated to Canada near the end of the great merger period in Canada during which time such giants as Canada Cement were being created by Max Aitken (Lord Beaverbrook) and other Canadian financiers. Delta was granted a Dominion charter in 1917 and has remained both Canadian owned and family controlled since then. It, like the other three major basic-steel producers in Canada, is currently engaged in a programme of major expansions to increase capacity. In its history it has also expanded both vertically and horizontally, buying into coal and iron-ore companies in Canada and the United States and buying out a western-based company which allowed it to take advantage of western development. According to Financial Post, its five-year annual growth rate is just under 13%.

The last of the four companies studied, Company Sigma, is a giant among foreign-owned giants in the field of oil exploration, refining, chemicals, and sales, with a network of production and distribution centres blanketing Canada. Originally part of an American gasoline company, it has been active in Ontario since 1911 and received a Dominion charter in 1925. The American and Canadian firms subsequently became part of a multinational operation directed by British interests. Since 1911, Sigma has steadily expanded through investment in new refining, storage and exploration facilities and also through acquisition of other oil companies. In the 1940's and 1950's, its distribution network was further enhanced by participation in the ownership of pipeline companies, and in the 1950's by diversification into the manufacture of industrial, agricultural and other chemicals from petroleum. In the 1960's and 1970's, the company began to participate in joint ventures with other dominant firms for further exploration and development, particularly in the Arctic and offshore, and
beyond petroleum to thermal coal, uranium and other minerals. According to Financial Post, its five-year annual growth rate is 6%. This is the second slowest rate of the four companies studied.

The other corporations which supplied additional personnel-policy information have growth rates ranging from 5% to 13%. As a point of comparison, the top ten industrial corporations in Canada--in autos, machinery, aluminum, transportation, communication, and oil--have rates ranging from 0% to 28.5%. The firms studied therefore represent this diversity of present-day growth.

Each of the four corporations in the study has fairly centralized control with a complex multi-divisional organization structure--that is, with substructures for the detailed control of individual aspects of the corporation: production or distribution, research and design, systems, sales and marketing, finance and corporate planning, all integrated into the overall structure via a complex hierarchy of departmental and divisional heads culminating in an executive group of vice-presidents, comptrollers and chief executive officer reporting to a board of directors.

Demographic features of the four firms will be detailed in Chapter Five.
II THE WHITE-COLLAR WORK SETTING

Any discussion of the nature of white-collar work within the context of recent research on the labour process should include at least two areas of importance: the nature of deskilling within the ranks of "mental" labour, and the nature of separations between workers. The first of these addresses the issue of proletarianization, the second the nature of strategies used by management to create internal differentiation within the ranks of workers who otherwise share a similar work situation but must be kept divided. It is not the intent of this section to discuss all of the features of work found in the white-collar settings of the four firms under study, but merely to highlight ways in which these two aspects are handled.

A. Deskilling and Control

Within clerical work, much of the process of proletarianization in the form of de-skilling had run its course by the 1960's with the introduction of computerized systems, particularly for handling payrolls, customer billings, and other kinds of financial and statistical documents, as well as for production control. During the 1960's and 1970's, further advances in computer hardware and software made possible even more extensive use of the computer, more rapid flows of information, and the ability to handle larger increments of paperwork without any corresponding increase in the size of the white-collar labour force needed to handle it. Certainly, the change from keypunching as a data-entry form to direct disc has made it theoretically possible for fewer data-entry workers to enter more data. Other changes have made possible the existence of remote terminals for the de-centralized entry of data from a variety of functional areas and locations into centralized computing services. Of the three corporations
studied, this process had advanced the farthest at Chi, Delta, and Sigma. Data processing workers at Delta and Sigma describe computer work at their firms:

"There are data entry areas all over the plant, where a person sits with a pile of tickets just entering them into the terminal, and say, down at the Shipping Office, does that for eight hours a day. About 12 of them, all fairly young, and most of them have applied for a transfer to get out...That's one of the things we in the computer department are trying to do--making things simpler, make it easier. Not trying to replace people, but just to prevent us from having to hire people in the future." (male systems analyst-engineer, Delta)

"We still have some use for the key-punch, like for smaller jobs, but that's changed from when everything used to come in on cards. Now everything's directly on disc...It's eliminated some jobs here, and created a lot everywhere else--people working at terminals entering the information...This has only happened in this company in the last two-and-a-half to three years." (male computer operator, Sigma)

With further technological changes, a female keypunch/data entry operator at Chi estimated that by 1989 operators for data entry could conceivably be obsolete, and noted that within her ten-year history on the job market, she believed educational requirements for data entry had been lowered. At Chi, Grade Ten high school was the educational minimum for keypunch; many firms hire inexperienced workers "off the street" and train them for their own needs and systems.

Routinization and fragmentation of work had also occurred at the more skilled levels of computer work. In place of the programmer who performed all steps from problem analysis to running the jobs in the 1950's, was a variety of computer specialties: operator, programmer, systems analyst. The systems analyst involves the most creative aspects of problem-solving, a great deal of autonomy, and the most direct contact with user-departments. Programmers and systems analysts are usually considered to be outside
clerical ranks, while the computer operator, like the data-entry operator, is considered to be clerical work.

As the work has become more routinized, it has usually also become more "feminized": the ratio of males to females shifts in favour of females. This process occurred within the computer room at Sigma, as well as in the payroll department of Delta. One worker from each of these two firms notes this change:

"When I first started here [10 years ago] there were only four girls because they always thought that girls weren't as good as the fellas with figures. But now the majority of us are all girls....I would say there's about 10 or 11 fellas [out of a total of about 32 workers]. (female payroll clerk, Delta)

"When I first went into the computer room [5 years ago] everyone had been there for a while, maybe 10 years. And there were no girls in there then--that was taboo. And the computer room used to be the showplace--they'd bring visitors in to show it to them...The older men were all phased out into different areas--semi-retired!"

Any further technological change in office work is almost certain to come from the application of new microtechnology, advances made possible by the development of the silicon chip. Automatic bank tellers is an example of computer automation of "mental work". Within the four corporations studied, this process is already underway in some production areas (for example, Sigma has designed a completely automated warehouse which uses robot labour). Another portent of the future is to be found in the area of "word-processing".

Word processing is the electronic-age equivalent of the typing pool: operators using automated typing equipment which stores and prints out the material on illuminated screens are connected electronically through telephone lines and recording equipment directly to user departments. The equipment is capable of storing, reproducing and rearranging textual materials
at rates many times greater than humans operating conventional dictating and typewriting equipment. When applied in thorough-going ways, the word processing system goes far beyond the steno-typing pool; it can be used to create sophisticated information-handling and retrieval systems to centralize typing, stenographic and filing for entire functional areas, thus eliminating the personal services of secretaries. The net effect is the creation of yet more hierarchy within clerical work. Such is the vision of the innovators at Chi, one of two corporations under study which is introducing word processing (the other is Sigma). An executive's secretary who is part of a team setting up an experimental programme describes it thus:

"This word-processing centre has a fantastic capability. It will almost eliminate the filing system--everything will be kept on disc-ettes. It will include a microfiche storage system...and we can tie in to area offices...They don't expect anyone to be writing anything--everything will be dictated by telephone; you can be hooked up from home as well....There will be different levels within word processing...the word-processing manager, the secretarial support team, the administrative support team...they'll have an administrative support staff in addition to the [word processing] pool, where they will do nothing but administration, like an administrative assistant, but this will not be one for each person, not one-on-one, but a group...to free up the boss's time from detail work and research, that type of thing....You must really have some kind of background in accounting, otherwise you're limited in what you can assist with."

The pilot study at Chi involves a finance-related functional area of several departments and about two hundred people who will be serviced by a small word-processing pool and its various "assistants". At Sigma, word processing has already been set up as a servicing department which carries out steno-pool kinds of work for a number of regions and for head office departments which have secretaries or typists of their own. Since word processing was introduced, the old steno pool of 30 people, which had been
reduced in numbers already by having some of its functions taken over by Sigma's Data Centre, was further reduced from 16 to 12 members. Ten of these members are operators on the equipment, and two are "assistants" who are responsible for training and co-ordination.

The routinization and fragmentation of white-collar work over the years and the increase in the sheer volume of work has swelled clerical ranks. In the early years of this process, it led to huge concentrations of clerical workers in single areas of corporations, whole departments devoted to clerical labour alone. In the past few years, however, there has been a shift away from these large concentrations; clerical workers have become an almost invisible part of the corporate paper assembly-line. Much of this was made possible by the decentralization of computer operations via the remote terminals described above, and by the reintegration of clerical work into its respective functional area. At least on the surface, it appeared to many observers that the army of clerks had disappeared, that their work had become less clerk-like and more "responsible".

An accountant at Sigma describes this phenomenon:

"When I first came to the Data Centre 10 years ago, there were 40 or 70 people in the room keypunching, and not really much different from an assembly line. But they're no longer there. For one thing, most of it isn't on cards anymore. You see a few of them here [at Head Office] connected with that group, and some upstairs with another group, integrated into the work groups. Before, it was terrible--stuck behind not a glass wall but one like that [solid]. But you see, companies like this one began to realize that that wasn't right...the stigma has disappeared. They report to the supervisor of the retail group or whatever group they're part of. It's far more meaningful as far as I can see." [Interviewer: But did the nature of the work change?] "No, not as far as I can see, except for more up-to-date machinery. And there are far fewer of them because of direct access to the computer through terminals."

There are still pockets within the corporations containing concentrations of clerical workers, but they tend to be the exception rather than
the rule: the computer room at Sigma, Chi, or Delta; the payroll clerks at Delta; the customer inquiry telephone operators at Chi. At the same time, it is in departments such as these that the message "proletarian" is given off in various ways. Lack of autonomy is built into the control systems and into supervision, the former more impersonal and indirect, the latter more authoritarian and watchful of even petty deviations, as the payroll clerk at Delta describes:

"Shorty's a funny type of man--sometimes he can be really friendly and other times he's just down your throat, no matter what you do. We have these meetings and we get hollered at...Last year they made up an exam or a test for us--the supervisors made it up because they thought a lot of people didn't know what they should know...They didn't really mark you, but if you had anything wrong, they showed you where you went wrong and how to correct it...some of the girls were really taken aback by it and felt it was insulting our intelligence..."

Control at Delta is also built in via a white-collar equivalent of punching in: the accumulator, which records hours spent on the job and is activated by a key. The accumulator was introduced as a result of the introduction of "flex-time", wherein employees are free to select their hours of work. Unlike the usual kind of atmosphere which prevails in offices, however, flex-time workers are not free to manipulate company time to their own advantage; such as by asking for (paid) time off to keep a medical appointment, to have the afternoon off, or leave early; the accumulator relentlessly records only the hours actually present in the office and forces employees to make up the time if they are short. On the other hand, if the employee puts in excess hours as sometimes occurs when they operate under the pressure of deadlines, the company refuses to give them equivalent pay for the time, insisting instead that they take time off. This situation made one accounting specialist irate and feeling cheated:
"To my way of thinking, we've regressed to punching a clock. I couldn't believe it--Rose and I were the only ones that didn't want the Flex-Time. The managers punch in too [voluntarily]--Eric said it would prove to people that I'm here long enough so that when I take an afternoon off, I've put the time in. These people who conveniently forget to take their keys out when they go to lunch...The system says take half an hour for lunch, well some days it's just not feasible, because my work is clustered, so in peak periods I can manage barely 20 minutes. But they're always watching. And they will only allow you to carry 10 hours. So if that's the system they want to run, fine, but I'm not about to lose the time that's coming to me. I used to be a very dedicated D[elta] employee...well, I guess I'm not a dedicated D[elta] employee anymore."

This control of time and effort is in marked contrast to the "honour system" under which exempt employees of Sigma operate. "Exempt" is the designation given to the non-clerical ranks, those who do not receive pay for overtime work but who are often expected to put in extra work as part of their higher level of responsibility. A system's analyst at Sigma unwittingly touches on a control aspect of the "responsible autonomy" strategy:

"Exempt can pretty well come and go as they please, within reason...When I used to work in the computer room I was non-exempt, and you had to be there from this to this [time], and I thought, when I'm exempt I'll be able to come and go when I feel like it. But I'm here just like then [laughs]--the novelty wore off. It's there but you never take advantage of it...Well, we put in a lot of hours at night to fix a problem...they don't pay you overtime, as exempt, but you can have time off...But it usually works out that the company gets more than they owe you...in my experience the company actually owes me time...but if I was to walk in to my supervisor with the hours of overtime it took to fix a system and asked for the afternoon off and he said no, then I would start keeping track of all the hours I worked overtime for an equivalent time off. But I'd have an attitude problem."

The "attitude problem" is the additional unspoken control aspect: those who are "responsible" in their autonomy are also "responsible" in terms of corporate commitment, dedication, and effort. They are expected to operate in an environment which has an assumed "trust" relationship
between employee and corporation, a coincidence of rather than an antagonism of interests. Herein lies the irony and the contradiction: proletarianized workers such as the payroll clerks are subjected both to assumptions of trust and responsible autonomy in contrast with blue-collar plant workers, and at the same time are highly subject to various kinds of controls which emphasize the line between themselves and the "exempt" or non-clerical technical-professional workers.

The work of the customer service inquiry telephone operator at Chi is an example of a work situation which has both built-in controls and an authoritarian atmosphere generated by close and unremitting supervision. Like many other forms of work, much effort is controlled by the flow of the work itself and the deadlines attached to it. As such, it is accepted by workers as a "given", simply part of the nature of the work and therefore no one is to blame for the conditions. If a worker cannot take the pressure of the job, the solution is to request a transfer.

The service inquiry operators number 15 full-time and 20 part-time workers handling service queries from the utility's many customers. The job requirements are simple: to be sympathetic, tactful and efficient, and to know something about the company's operations from a two-week training course. Like Bell System operators, Chi inquiry operators also learn on the job by observing experienced operators and then gradually handling calls themselves while an experienced operator listens in. Four supervisors, all ex-operators, walk around the board and listen in periodically at will without the operators knowing it; they check on call quality and efficiency and also act as "resource-people" in the event of technical questions which the operators cannot answer. The operators have no control
either over pressures which come from external sources (the frequency and nature of inquiries) or from internal sources (the hovering supervisors). In addition, the work-load has increased over the years, a source of intensification of labour; operators must now keep a record of the time they spend on each category of inquiry they handle.

Nevertheless, despite these factory-like conditions in the concentrated clerical groups, there is no collective action taken. At Chi, the operators do not complain to the union but instead request a transfer if they feel too pressured. At Delta, the payroll clerks complain among themselves and poke fun at the department head behind his back. At Sigma, the computer operators study programming in their spare time as a way of escaping through the narrow and rapidly closing upward mobility door.

B. Isolation and Internal Differentiation

Nichols and Armstrong (1976:28-42) note the kinds of separations between workers which lead to a lack of realization of the potential for collective solidarity among concentrations of workers. As well, they create fragmentation in the experience of work and perceptions of the workplace. There are six kinds of separations these authors have identified: temporal, as in shift-work; spatial (the physical separation of plants and work-groups); grading of jobs, which creates hierarchical separations; ethno-cultural; separations based on sex; and, finally, co-optive, as in promoting shop stewards to foremen.

All of these are present to some extent in the four corporations studied, but the first three—temporal, spatial and grading—are the most noticeable features of clerical work in these corporations.

Temporal separations (and isolation) are characteristic of computer workers. They work shifts and are also isolated in the computer room.
At Sigma, the data processing centre is also separated from the headquarters building in downtown Toronto - it is located in a suburban Toronto building devoted only to data processing and regional marketing. Computer people at Chi and Delta are not geographically separated from the main corporate operations, but are segregated from other departments by closed rooms, and in the case of Delta, by strict security measures. Data-entry and computer operators from one shift rarely see those from another shift. As one data-entry operator at Chi put it: "We know someone was there because of the cigarette butts and the empty coffee cups, but we never see them." A computer operator at Sigma said: "We have to work 24 hours--there's no end to it; when everyone goes home, that's when we do our work. Now that everything's become on-line, some jobs we can't start until all the data's in. I don't even think you can eliminate one shift."

Temporal separation is also in evidence in corporations which have introduced flex-time: Alpha and Sigma, and certain departments at Delta. In departments where work is not highly inter-dependent, it is possible that two clerical workers would spend only part of their day in the presence of the other worker. The most striking feature of a stroll through Sigma's high-rise headquarters building in downtown Toronto on an ordinary working day is the quiet and the seeming absence of people. Temporal and spatial separations combine their effects here.

Chi and Sigma workers are divided up by floors and by departments, and within departments, by partitions, tubs of plants, and offices. At Sigma, those who are not working may be in the cafeteria, but more than likely have taken their lunch-hour outside the building, yielding to the temptations of downtown Toronto. Chi's workers have a cafeteria and no
downtown distractions in their suburban Toronto location, but Alpha workers have no central places to congregate. Delta workers have fewer temporal and spatial separations than the other three.

Spatial and temporal separations would probably not have much of an effect on workers an and of themselves. More important are the separations created by internal differentiation within groups, the creation of job-grade hierarchies linked to an "internal labour market", as was discussed in Chapter Three. Such differentiation may be viewed from two standpoints: it creates competitive isolation by appealing to the individualism of workers; and it "manages" proletarianization by creating internal career ladders and the illusion of upward mobility. It would follow logically, therefore, that where hierarchies are elaborate and the time needed to work one's way through the hierarchy is extensive, workers would be expected to be pre-occupied with internal mobility and distracted from looking beyond the related cluster of grades.

An analysis was made of job grades and titles at the four firms. The ratio of employees to grades and titles was calculated, sometimes with bizarre results: only 12 people per clerical grade at Alpha. (see Table 4-1.)

(Table 4-1 about here)

Chi and Sigma, with proportionally larger white-collar populations, have many more workers per grade than do the two steel companies, Alpha and Delta. The range for the ratio of people to titles, however, is a
much narrower one: from 10.4 at Sigma to 11.1 at Delta's Finance Division, where almost every clerical worker has a title like no other clerical worker. In addition, within each job grade, both for clerical and for technical-professional, there are further gradations based on experience and merit. Alpha's unionized clerical workers must work their way through four salary classifications per grade, ranging from the training rate to the standard rate; Chi's clerical workers have five.

Between the complications of grade and salary scales, it is virtually impossible for a worker to know for sure where he/she stands relative to another worker, particularly where company service has been calculated into the salary scheme. Often, long service is also rewarded, creating further disjunctions between grade and pay such as at Sigma. Workers are not merely competitively isolated from one another, however, they are also, and probably as a consequence of other isolating factors, psychically isolated. Psychic isolation manifests itself in a variety of ways. A reluctance to discuss salaries and grades is common:

"I think I work much harder than the secretaries because they only have one man to work for. I assume they get paid more but it's never discussed. When the union publishes its rates they look at the rates for steno-typist with interest. There's some communication among the secretaries, but not much." (unionized steno, Alpha)

"I'm not sure [about rug-ranking]--people don't discuss this, the basis of grades, the logic, and if they do, I don't take coffee with them. And people never discuss salary, although I don't understand why." (secretary, Alpha)

Office arrangements also make it easy for workers to withdraw from the bickering and in-fighting they see around them:

"I don't think there's a day goes by that somebody does something that puts you off--you just wish you could go back home."
But I find now that I have my own office, I'm not really in
the centre of things and I don't see what's going on so it's
not as bad. It's still going on but I don't hear it...
[Executives] are stuck in an office, the supervisors are out
there, and not too much hassle's going on." (secretary,
Delta)

"I don't like working with a lot of women. There's too
many up there now and I don't need any hassles...I've
got my own office. My pay's all right...The trouble with
the union is that I've got my job, you've got yours, this
is what I do--they don't want to work together...if it
concerns everybody, if it's a raise or a benefit, but if
it has anything to do with your job--it's not, really, every-
one's not bound to one another." (unionized steno, Alpha).

The net result of isolation and competition is a reduction of the
potential for alliances because there is a lack of perceived similarity,
the lack of a firm basis for comparison of one's work situation, and lack
of communication.
III CAREER-MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

Although there are many practices currently in use by major firms in Canada, only a selected few will be examined. These few are specifically aimed at the process of recruiting, selecting, and appraising the performance of employees. These practices have implications for outcomes within the existing opportunity-structures. As such, they are practices which are of importance to those who are in charge of controlling the behaviour of white-collar labour within the existing organization of work - an organizational scheme which is already established and therefore basically considered as inherited "givens" to current management. Additionally, however, they are also the most visible and easily accessible features affecting long-range outcomes for employees as individuals, features which are the easiest for them to discuss with their vocabulary of everyday interests and experiences.

Managers who are in charge of devising and implementing policies having to do with selection, appraisal and "motivation" of employees also have their own vocabulary of rationales for their approaches. These rationales, however, are not outright expressions of class interests in controlling labour. (And if they were, managers would not consider it politic to say so.) More to the point, managers do not regard them as rationales justifying the class interests they serve, but rather, regard them as policies which are benevolent, meant to serve the needs of creating and sustaining a viable organization structure to meet the company's objectives now and in the future and at the same time serve the needs of employees. This vocabulary of "service" is one which has permeated the vocabulary of corporate people for some time. It speaks volumes for the
adjustments which modern capitalism has had to make to changes in external conditions since the nineteenth century, including the existence of public interest groups and the active role by the state as a seemingly neutral agent in handling relations between corporations, employees, and the public. The language of "service" suggests that the corporation is an organic structure with shareholders, managers and workers in "partnership" for the same ends, and serves to obscure the materialistic justifications ultimately given for the exercise of corporate power.

There is another reason for not regarding these policy statements as representing deliberately ideologically loaded rationalizations: middle-level managers may not be totally aware of the way in which their approach is imbued with the logic of class domination. (It is an observation drawn from a point which Lukács made regarding the nature of reified consciousness: intermediate classes may believe themselves to be "above" class antagonism.) Research in the corporations has confirmed, however, that what is clear in these managers' statements is an awareness that what they do is in the corporate interests of maximizing profits, whatever else they do or how it is justified. Typical is a personnel official at a food products corporation. He remarked that motivation of people is considered an important resource to them. Since motivation is defined as the need for achievement and recognition, it is a problem to stimulate motivation in routine workers. Nevertheless the farthest they would go in experimenting with work arrangements would be to use wages, benefits and job security as motivators. They were not willing to lose sales over motivational experiments which were too unusual, because after all, the "end goal is to maximize production, growth and profit, not happiness." There is no talk of sacrificing profits to humanistic ideals.
The rationales given by personnel managers and other kinds of managers, however, do provide a clue to the nature of control problems. These problems and their solutions have been worked out in the long history of dealing with a workforce in such a way as to contribute the maximum to the long-run benefit and survival of the corporation. The nature of the solution and how it is explained provide some indirect data on the complexity of the problem and the contradictions inherent in it. Because the sources from which this information is obtained are not wholly class-conscious agents, the data are "raw" and hence in need of "translation" and interpretation within a theoretical language of class relations and class conflict. Personnel specialists are themselves members of the new middle class like other specialists. Lost in the details of the parts, to them the whole becomes an apparatus designed for efficiency; their part in it is that of supplying neutral "technical" means of solving the problems of control and deployment of the apparatus's most important "factor of production", its human element.

Under the so-called "classical" management theory prevalent in the early part of this century (cf. Masse, 1965), management was concerned mainly with the formal features of organization, such as the structure of control, centralization or decentralization, span of control, and so on. Staffing was not considered part of the co-ordinative, planning and control functions of management. Efficiency was the measure of productivity, a mechanical process which was an outcome of rational human behaviour under strict supervision and direction which rendered personalities unimportant.

At least since the 1950's, however, there has been a change in how management functions are defined. Under the influence of such organiza-
tional behaviour theorists as McGregor, Likert and others, management has explicitly come to see part of its role as involving the motivation of the employees through which tasks are accomplished. The control function has been given new emphasis as a process measuring performance towards the corporation's predetermined goals, and co-ordination is understood to be the end result of proper performance of other functions (Massie, 1965).

Thus, the recent concern of corporations with performance of its members, the final product of the staffing function of management as arranging and filling positions aimed at goal-fulfillment, is understandable. Staffing positions and measuring performance are part of the extension of the meaning of control in management theory, a result of the recognition which began in the 1930's, of "psychological" factors and especially those factors in worker behaviour which may be rendered predictable and controllable.

An example provided by one Canadian corporation (in the food services and consumer goods industry) will illustrate how the ends of high-level corporate goals and one kind of means, manpower planning, become meshed in sophisticated modern corporate approaches. Corporate goals set annually by senior managers form the basis of a "strategic plan" for each functional division in the company (usually projected as five-year plans). These in turn are translated into a "manpower plan" consisting of various "tasks" in the language of management-by-objectives. For the Personnel Division, these tasks address questions of salary ranges, recruiting specifications and numbers, and job descriptions.

The Organization Development arm of the department supplying personnel services looks after the recruiting of new manpower outside the company, mainly in the universities and community colleges although some placement
agencies (called "headhunters" in the business) may also be used. This sub-department also identifies promotable talent already within the organization, the individual "people-resources", through assessment of performance. It is assisted by a Succession Planning Committee which indicates anticipated vacancies in the mid-to-senior management ranks and gathers information on potential successors. Individuals are given "goal-setting" reviews to establish strengths and weaknesses in their performance, identify training needs, get at personal aspirations, and assess their future potential. Individual aspirations and abilities and career-development plans for them are meshed in such a way as to meet corporate goals. The whole process thus feeds back into the strategic plan and the overall corporate goals.

The three principal elements of manpower planning typically are: the long- and short-range corporate goals and planning; the establishing of what manpower needs will aid in meeting these plans and what human resources are actually available; and the actual development and evaluation of personnel. This elaborate meshing of goals, plans and persons takes place at the level of the graduate recruit (to fill technical-professional jobs) and above. Although planning is applied to lower levels, it frequently is not nearly as elaborate or as individualized; nor does it involve high-priced talent in departments typically called "Organization Development" or "Organization Planning", which are concerned only with filling the higher levels of corporate decision-making.

There is no evidence to suggest that top management in today's corporations act in ways fundamentally different from their entrepreneurial predecessors: they are still concerned with maximizing production, profits and growth. However, over time, much of the business of management as "getting tasks done through other people" has come to be delegated to the
ranks of personnel and other specialists whose operative vocabularies include the notion that they are "developing people" and "meshing individual needs with corporate needs." It is they who produce much of the practice and ideology of developing and motivating employees on a day-to-day basis; these then come to obscure their origins in the more fundamental aims of the corporation, taking on a life of their own not only for the personnel specialists but also for the employees who become caught up in the rhetoric. Perhaps there is subconsciously a "need to believe" to avoid the reality of corporate worlds being at heart basically cold, uncaring, exploitive places to work. Nevertheless whatever the psychology of it, a great deal of time, effort and money goes into personnel programmes at this level; it becomes the "career" of making careers for those specialists involved.

These people have been referred to as the "gatekeepers" of the corporations, interpreting broader policies in ways which define who may enter and proceed under what conditions, creating standards of appraisal for performance, and creating conditions for the unproblematical integration of new members into the corporate fold.

These "gatekeeping" functions are the most easily accessible and visible for study, and are also the ones which in their results seem obvious to target groups of employees affected by them as well as to those ignored in the process. Generally, personnel policies, along with face-to-face interaction with work associates and superiors, represent the first line of contact between the employee and the inner circles of power within the corporation. They therefore provide a rich source of data and a useful avenue for exploring the methods and their perceived effects on those being controlled by them.
In the next sections, these methods and their expressed rationales will be examined as several major personnel-department functions: selecting and developing human resources; appraising and influencing performance; and making provision for the definition and "cooling out" of failures. Once these basic procedural realities have been established for the four corporations, it will be possible to approach the data obtained from the white-collar employees themselves and to assess the impact which these practices have and their significance (Chapters Five to Seven). In the final data chapter (Chapter Eight), the data will be extended further and interpreted to assess the impact such a lived reality appears to have on the formation of class consciousness.

A. Selection and "Development": The Bases of Career Formation

In 1977, in a survey of careers and job markets, Financial Post gathered data from representative Canadian companies on their recruiting patterns from post-secondary educational institutions. The Post commented that this mix of recruits has remained relatively unchanged for twenty years (that is, for much of the postwar expansionary period when monopoly capitalism has matured). The only change has been an increase in the demand for community college graduates, a recent phenomenon. The following table, 4-2, gives the recruiting mix from educational institutions for companies in major Canadian industries, drawn from Financial Post:

(table 4-2. about here)

Company Alpha has been hiring engineers since 1939, although probably did not have a formal system of recruiting at the universities until the
early 1960's. They now hire at the rate of about eleven graduates per year, 90% of whom are engineers. More than half of their technical-professional and supervisory-managerial ranks are filled by engineers, with the balance being filled from the sciences, accounting, business-related disciplines, and technology.

Similarly, a little over half of Company Delta's university recruits are engineers, with the balance coming from business disciplines (28%) and the Arts (16%). Its community college mix is 69% from technology and 23% from business. Delta has for the last few years averaged 30 to 40 recruits per year from the universities and community colleges, with emphasis on university (66% of their recruits are university degreed). Delta has had formal university recruiting since about 1957, the period during which their growth was rapid (they became a fully integrated steel producer only in the 1950's). Their middle management group (a younger cohort) is split fifty-fifty between degreed and non-degreed, while their senior management is almost all non-degreed, reflecting the differences in recruiting in the two cohorts.

Company Chi recruits only three or four candidates each year from the universities and community colleges in a fifty-fifty split, and is the only one of the four companies to still recruit from the high schools (6 to 8 per year), but this is dropping steadily as they hire experienced non-degreed people who have already been in the work-force elsewhere. Their programme began about 15 years ago when they recognized that increasing business complexity called for more trained specialists, but they do not go on campus every year. The community colleges supply technologists, while from the universities Chi recruits mainly engineers, the balance being from business disciplines (economics, administration) and accounting.
Sigma has had a formal recruitment programme the longest of the four companies, since 1947, and was probably one of the earliest companies in Canada to meet a steadily increasing demand for technically trained personnel by actively recruiting at the universities in the postwar growth period. It has, for many years, recruited between 60 and 130 new employees, 75% of whom have come from the universities and 25% from the community college technology programmes. Fifty per cent of Sigma's university recruits are engineers, 25% have science backgrounds, 20% have business, commerce or economics backgrounds, and 5% are from the Arts.

The other companies who supplied recruiting and other personnel policy information confirm the tendency among large corporations both to recruit mainly from the universities, in fairly consistent numbers every year, and to hire disproportionately from the engineering and other science disciplines. Only in merchandising does the emphasis shift away from technical subjects (with the exception of computer science) to business subjects. Everywhere else, company officials feel that engineers are necessary in large numbers due to the technical sophistication of the industry but also because engineering gives candidates superior mental discipline and training in logic, both considered to be valuable attributes.

This may be biased reasoning, but it is consistent with another bias, the preference for university graduates over community college graduates. Community college people are considered to be more limited in the scope of their training, and as a result, corporate officials note, have in the past been more limited in their upward mobility. There is a certain amount of self-fulfilling prophecy in this, since as long as the university or engineering bias is operating, university graduates or engineers will be perceived to be promotable and others will be bypassed. One official said:
"It's never been tested--maybe non-university can be used for many of these jobs but the department heads want university grads because they've had success with them in the past." Alpha's recruiter stated: "We'd hire community college for some of these, but in our experience, engineers only talk to engineers--and they certainly don't want to be supervised by a technologist."

Graduates are recruited not only to fill technical slots in the early stages of their careers, the corporate representatives stated, but also were considered to be future management potential--that is, part of a pool of available talent which would be cultivated and watched carefully. This handpicked group develops its competitive edge over clerical workers.

Their edge begins with the recruitment process itself. The first step is to identify manpower needs--department heads inform the recruiters of the numbers of technical-professional people they can use. Space is reserved at the universities and colleges, and recruiting literature, usually glossy illustrated publications with the description of the company and its career possibilities, is sent to placement offices at the institutions. Candidates' paper applications are given a pre-screening, then those not weeded out are given a face-to-face interview at the university by the recruiting team. After further weeding out, the remainder are invited to visit the company where they are interviewed usually by departments where they will begin their work. Those who successfully pass this final screening stage are offered positions in the company.

Graduate recruits are closely monitored by their supervisors and by Personnel for their first year while they are given special assignments and exposure to various aspects of the department or division; in some
companies for the first two to three years they are regularly rotated to special training slots reserved for them in various parts of the company. Monitoring includes frequent opportunities for dialogue in which the recruit has a chance to gain further feedback and to express preferences or discuss problems. During his first year or two, he is highly visible both to his immediate superiors and also to the Personnel Department.

The company officials interviewed all stated that graduate recruits are expected to reveal managerial potential within the first five years with the company even if the nature of the work does not involve managerial functions. They employ indirect indicators to judge whether this potential exists and can be developed via the appropriate experience in subsequent moves. Their two guiding questions are simultaneously, "does he have it?" and "can he fit in?"

Both questions must be answered in the candidate's performance before he is considered advancement potential. Many of the indicators used to assess management potential are the same ones used to judge graduate interviewees in the universities: performance, energy and drive (including interest and curiosity in areas beyond the immediate task), leadership, and interpersonal skills. (In the interview, rapport established with the interviewer, ability to communicate, and presentation of oneself represent interpersonal skills, and involvement in extracurricular activities especially in an elective office represents drive and leadership.)

All of these indicators may be too vague to be very "scientific" as a basis for selection, but corporate officials cite them frequently. Regardless of what they actually indicate, graduate recruits often are given low-level supervisory tasks within their first three to five years with the company, and their advancement over the next ten or twelve years to
middle levels of responsibility or authority and salary is much more rapid than that of the few atypical clerical workers who manage to obtain promotion beyond clerical ranks. Officials at seven of the twelve firms contacted made statements to this effect, although most were not willing to state that this gave clerical workers an outright handicap. An official at Sigma, commenting on the distinction between exempt and non-exempt employees (signifying different salary plans with respect to overtime but actually meaning clerical/non-clerical), stated: "but I won't go so far as to say we separate the sheep from the goats."

The corporate officials often stated that because university education was proof of intelligence, effort and dedication to a goal, clerical and non-degreed people had to "prove" themselves in other ways to be considered among the promotables. This "proving" was usually described as consisting of course-taking, expressed desire to do extra work and to learn beyond the immediate job, the initiative to speak up and draw attention to one's aspiration, plus observed enthusiasm and commitment to the company. Personnel officials generally acknowledge, however, that owing to the routine nature of clerical work, it was probably much more difficult for a clerical worker to demonstrate potential to his/her superiors than it was for a graduate recruit; but, they added, "if someone wants to get ahead badly enough and is willing to work, the opportunities are there." At the same time, they added, "but most clerical don't want to advance further"; they felt that clerical workers were not motivated to strive, and more often than not, those with degrees usually performed better than clerical workers in the long run because the degreed are motivated, intelligent, and have a broader base for thinking.
While corporate officials say they do not stand in the way of clerical ambitions, they also do not go out of their way to assist them. In all but two of the twelve firms, there are no programmes for selection and training aimed at clerical levels. In firms where these programmes do exist, higher levels are excluded including technical-professional recruits who begin at higher grades than clerical workers in the corporations (even though their initial training assignments may be quite "clerical" in nature). Clerical and non-clerical workers (usually called "non-exempt" and "exempt", respectively) in effect inhabit separate worlds of opportunity, treatment, and possibility of having a career.

Most large corporations have fairly elaborate programmes to aid in establishing and meeting manpower needs, including the way in which this is meshed with overall corporate goals and plans, as was already described in the previous section. These schemes usually include, besides the "strategic plan", university recruiting programmes to take in new manpower selected to meet technical and future management needs, usually accompanied by an orientation and training programme designed to give new recruits maximum exposure to the company in as short a period as possible. There is also usually provision for the further training of more senior people, either through "in-house" courses directed at specific skills and groups, such as first-line supervisors and marketing people, or by sending selected people at certain levels to management skills courses at universities.

In order to aid in the identification of likely candidates and also problem areas in need of further attention, the firms have some sort of data-base system stocked with useful employee information and career histories, an appraisal system whereby personnel are annually reviewed and performance
results for the period recorded and passed along in a formal way, succession planning committees for selecting likely successors to current management, and sometimes, the establishment of specific "game-planes" for individual careers to ensure that paths taken allow them to gain appropriate "broadening" experience. Occasionally, these programmes will be supplemented by psychological testing (not done in any of the four corporations under study but done by two others who provided information) and career counselling, skill assessment centres of skill inventories, and the hiring of management consultants to conduct studies related to personnel matters (Sigma conducted studies quite frequently).

The programmes outlined are to be found in the corporations under study as well as the others from whom policy information was obtained. There can be no doubt that they represent fairly routine approaches to the higher-level manpower needs and problems of most major North American companies, although with variation in their degree of sophistication and how systematically they are pursued. Further, by applying them more intensely to some and not other levels, or excluding certain levels such as clerical workers altogether, a "talent pool" of known dimensions is created and made controllable. An official in Chi's manpower planning describes the process as consisting of "a series of plateaus with pools and eligibles collecting for each one."

Members of groups selected and monitored in this way have "careers" in the narrow sense intended by Wilensky: some of them will progress at least somewhat in status, pay and (more or less) logical stages to reach middle and senior management ranks, the rare few to become members of the bourgeoisie as vice-presidents or the president, after a suitably protracted
period of time in which their experience will be developed and their loyalty tested. At each stage, the weeding-out process will have become more stringent, the survivors more closely watched, groomed and encouraged. The rest, the "also-rans" will be cooled out, their expectations lowered while their continued effort and loyalty is maintained at acceptable levels.

B. The Performance Appraisal: Controlling Effort

Recruitment and later selection processes create the conditions whereby careers may be formed and used as a method for channelling an ideological commitment to compete and achieve. The performance appraisal, on the other hand, may be used not only to control effort but also to communicate information on corporate norms and expectations and to establish which employees have the "drive" to compete further. In the process of interaction over the appraisal, negative information may also be conveyed: that the employee is not interested in striving further, or that the company is not interested in promoting the employee. How the review is designed, applied, and interpreted (both by the corporation and by employees) makes it a potentially useful but volatile control device.

That the review system is a double-edged sword is clear from statements made by the corporation as to the reasons for the existence of the reviews, the procedure followed, and what becomes of them. The rationale given by a steel company to its supervisors was: "To assist supervisors and managers to...help their subordinates develop, to let them know where they stand now and what specifically they will have to do to advance in the company." At Company Chi, the stated purpose is twofold; to "promote understanding and discussion between supervisor and superior about the job and ways to improve performance of it", and "to discuss and plan develop-
ment needs and opportunities beyond the current job." Sigma call their system a "work effectiveness/personal development programme" to highlight the dual nature, on the one hand intended to assess performance, set standards of work, and review the results to ensure business and performance goals are met; and on the other, to help plan an individual's career and supply input to the overall staff planning function in the company.

The procedure followed in conducting the review is roughly similar in many companies. On a regular basis (usually annually), supervisors and managers receive review forms and fill out their appraisal of the employee. The employee is given a chance to read his/her superiors' comments and often, is invited to supply personal comments in such categories as what the employee feels has been accomplished in the job, what areas are thought to need improvement, and what short- and long-term personal goals are. A discussion follows between the superior and the subordinate, during which they agree upon the accuracy of the assessment; the employee then signs the form signifying that the contents have been revealed and discussed and agreed upon (if the employee refuses, it is noted along with the reason). A copy of the form is sent to the Personnel Department and often, to the management level above the employee's superior for feeding into the local staff planning. At Chi, the employee may also request an interview with the superior's superior and may also request counselling by Personnel.

The system is co-optive, forcing the employee into a situation where disagreement with the superior's view might be taken as an "attitude problem" and where the employee must supply input in effect to "hang" himself. The review also has implications for financial wellbeing and advancement—salary grades usually run from entry-level base rate through to mid-point.
maximum, and merit pay levels, each move dependent on adequate to superior performance. Owing to the power differential between the superior as the representative of management and the employee, no review intended as "dialogue" can ever be conducted on an equal basis despite the fiction perpetuated by management; even during the review interview which is intended to judge past performance, the employee is being judged on current performance.

Areas covered in a typical corporate review usually begin with a summary of the job responsibilities and goals of the job, almost as a reminder of what is being judged, then proceed through an appraisal of job performance covering such items as skills and knowledge used on the job, results obtained, adaptability, self-starting initiative, ability to plan and organize the work, communication effectiveness, and interpersonal relations with peers, subordinates and superiors. If the person is at supervisory or managerial level (or equivalent in staff position), performance includes such areas as analytical and conceptual ability, innovativeness, the quality of decision-making, contribution to objectives, and ability to direct others. At Sigma, the latter is set out quite explicitly as various aspects of the ability to handle "human resources": their maintenance (use of skills, handling of conflict), their development (including delegating responsibility and providing training and opportunities to use skills), and their motivation. In addition, the Sigma supervisor or manager is judged on how well he uses the performance review system with his subordinates, which controls not only his own effort but checks the checker.

Lastly, the review contains an overall rating, employing a range of assessments varying in degree from "outstanding" to "unsatisfactory", and
the suggested outcome in terms of potential: for the person to remain at
the present level, be transferred to a more suitable area, be given a
lateral move for "broadening" experience, or be promoted to a specified
level. In addition, if the person's performance is found to be unsatis-
factory, the reviewer usually must state what remedial action should be
taken or what further training and development the employee needs.

The employee, through the foregoing exercises, is given in effect a
report-card on performance and attitudes and a chance to discuss the areas
which are problematical, as well as to ask questions regarding future
opportunities and what must be done to prepare for them—that is, if he/she
recovers sufficiently from the atmosphere of intimidation to ask. Through-
out the process, the message is conveyed that it is management's role only
to inform and to provide opportunities to use skills and to develop, but
that it is the individual's role to initiate changes, acquire further ex-
perience or training, and to take advantage of whatever opportunities are
available. Whether the employee is encouraged or has his knuckles rapped
through the review exercise, ultimate responsibility lies with the person.
The laying of responsibility at the feet of the employee for whatever hap-
pens in the present or the future is the escape-hatch by which corporations
may escape blame when opportunities fail to materialize; it is part of the
way those who will not advance are "cooled out" and come to blame them-
selves. At the same time, however, the employee is made aware that effort
is being monitored and compared with others' efforts at similar levels,
and if it does not measure up, benefits will be withheld, the person will
be left behind in the competition, or at worst, will lose the job.
C. Cooling Out the Clerks and the Also-Rans

Sofer (1970) is his study of British men at mid-career stages, noted that all appointments are simultaneously an implied communication about personnel policy; he also noted that there is a kind of reciprocity which builds up between the corporations and employees. The company lets it be known that it expects certain norms to be followed; employees try to meet these and if successful, there is an implied obligation on the part of the company to promote from within and reward those whose performance meets the corporate standards. These two observations help to explain why it is that managements must be careful in how they handle hopefuls who do not obtain promotion, without violating an implied trust and reciprocity relationship which would delegitimize the corporation or lead to a withdrawal of effort by disgruntled employees. Appointments of a similar type (age, background, level, or functional area) become a "trend" in the eyes of other hopefuls and build up their expectations. Since not all of them will find their way up the ever-narrowing pyramid, their expectations must be handled.

Some corporations elect to do this by keeping employees in the dark as to what plans they may have for them (thus never admitting that they may have no plans); other corporations, prefer to explicitly tell employees when their potential is limited. If these firms are representative of other large firms, the tendency appears to be the former -- a looser, indefinite approach which leaves much open to interpretation while at the same time produces some anxiety and a great deal of activity on the part of individuals to make themselves visible. All four of the corporations studied can be characterized by this lack of closure, although some are less so than others. Corporate officials at Delta pride themselves on being "very
informal" about career matters and Alpha is almost as "ad hoc" in their approach as Delta. Chi and Sigma are more systematic and communicate more than the other two.

While a clerical worker's bid for upward mobility may be rejected by corporate officials on the basis of lack of the necessary "paper" qualifications, the basis for rejecting the technical-professional workers must be something else, lack of some other personal quality: insufficient interpersonal skills or poor leadership qualities or problem-solving abilities to do a good job higher up. (The performance review is designed to tell him this very explicitly). If the person had made most of his career progress within a narrow specialist role, he could become labelled as a "staff" type and hence incapable of assuming "line" responsibilities: "line" and "staff" work are often defined as requiring different skills and outlooks which are viewed as being difficult to develop later. The solution commonly employed is the "dual career ladder" approach noted by Goldner and Ritti earlier in the chapter. The specialist is kept satisfied and his aspirations steered away from management positions by being given "equivalent" status, pay and job grade, by being frequently called in to render advice in decision-making sessions, and by having his ego fed in other similar ways. He eventually comes to regard himself as the staff person he has been labelled and as such, disinterested in crossing over into management. Often he is provided with disincentives to cross over, built into the corporate structure: to do so, he would need to leave his functional area, obtain experience and credibility in a new area, and start climbing all over again lower down, a costly course.

For those who still harbour desires to move up further in management ranks, subtle messages may be given off by the pattern of personal experi-
ences. A lateral move may be for "broadening" purposes, but when enough
lateral moves accumulate and others younger pass him by, the managerial aspirant
begins to reinterpret the significance of the lateral: it is now a "holding
position" because the company has bypassed him. Eventually, age will pro-
duce a change of perspective: having tasted sufficiently the fruits of up-
ward mobility as well as the increasing pressure, he comes to re-evaluate
his life and sees that other, "quality of life", considerations have become
more important, usually fulfilled outside the firm; he has mellowed and
is content to let the "young lions" take his place in what he now regards
as a rat-race.

For employees of every level, corporations have gradually come to see
the advantages in "sweetening the pot" via high salaries and good benefits
relative to others in the industry or geographic location, at a high enough
level to permit them to boast to their employees and to their shareholders
that they were "one of the industry leaders". Not only do such benefits
act as a binder, producing a security-conscious workforce aware of how "good"
the company is to them, but it has the capacity to buy off dissatisfaction,
within limits. Monopoly corporations have the advantage of being able to
provide such compensatory devices. Those who are paid well and receive
fringe benefits such as dental and drug plans not yet adopted by the rest
of the industry are not eager to unionize (this will be dealt with in
Chapter Seven), and they think twice about leaving the firm.

Informants in a number of large corporations have commented on the
relatively high salaries such employees as secretaries receive; at one
corporation, the differential between lower-level exempt and longer-service
non-exempt people had over the last few years become so eroded that it
prompted the respondent, a supervisor, to comment that clerical workers were being "bought off" to compensate for their lack of upward mobility. Increasing length of service with the same corporation also has its compensations not only in salary terms but in the build-up of pension funds. One technical-professional employee remarked that although he was dissatisfied with his progress and unlike clerical workers could easily take his skills elsewhere, he probably would not do so because it would mean starting at a lower salary level in another company; as well, he would lose the pensionable years he had built up and the corporate contribution based on this.

Many corporations state explicitly that they are "paternalistic" and desire to create conditions of secure employment for employees who are "suitable" (that is, who continue to perform acceptably). One corporation which has a pension plan into which employees do not contribute stated that employees knew they built up nontransferable equity if they stayed and that this "makes for security-consciousness and perhaps corporate commitment." It also creates a psychological dependency which can be manipulated.

The benefits approach, however, has a fairly limited cooling-out effect. Corporations seem to be more concerned with how employees accept individual responsibility both for daily performance and for career development. One personnel official admitted that motivation of people and handling of dissatisfaction was "a problem with no easy solutions", but added that "anyone can talk to Personnel--it's left up to the individual." This, then, explains much of the looseness present in corporate career development schemes. Although a few corporations like Chi and Sigma have recently
devised counselling schemes for clerical people in order to deal with their specific career situation (Chi's is conducted on an individual basis; Sigma's is a group "career and life-planning" series of sessions), most corporations feel that these kinds of approaches create the danger of raised expectations which cannot be met, hence exacerbating a problem which might already exist.

Most clerical workers, it may be assumed, are already fairly "cooled out" by their prior socialization experiences particularly in the schools, but false hopes may be raised in the corporate environment with its rhetoric of opportunity and achievement. The solution is to devise alternative programmes for clerical workers, make sure the existence of the programmes is well-communicated, and then make individuals responsible for the initiative required to take advantage of them; those who do not in effect dash their own hopes. It is at the clerical-nonclerical divide that corporations must distinguish between behaviour responding to "responsible autonomy" strategies with a career, and responsible autonomy without a career, if it is to retain control over the more privileged talent pool collected above clerical ranks without provoking clerical action.

One such solution is some sort of self-nomination system for certain ranges of jobs, usually a posting system. Such a system exists in the unionized companies Alpha and Chi, but Chi has extended the system to include low-level supervisory jobs outside the union range. Such a system is also in place at a non-unionized chemical company for its clerical workers. When combined with the profusion of grades within what is essentially similar work, the net result is the illusion of vertical mobility within the corporate internal job market, of "progress" through a hierarchy
of jobs. There are fifteen separate clerical grades at Alpha, eight at Chi, plus a range of salaries from training through to advanced (four at Alpha and five at Chi), to reward seniority in the job and satisfactory performance. Although posting removes some of the arbitrariness and places some control over expressing desires in a specific way in the hands of clerical workers, Personnel still decides who the winning candidate will be, and competition is still a reality. Research in these four corporations suggests that clerical workers have little knowledge of jobs beyond the clerical range; moreover, most express satisfaction with their progress and are willing to accept that non-clerical work is beyond their range of qualifications, hence not within the realm of legitimate aspiration. At any rate, they must first work their way through clerical ranks, and that is a sufficient task to keep most active for many years before they feel confident enough to compete for non-clerical jobs.

For those clerical workers who do feel that non-clerical work is within the realm of possibility, however, Chi has provided a supervisory-level posting system which covers only the lowest quartile of supervisory-managerial positions. Established in 1976 with the reasoning that "Employees whose career objectives can be satisfied will be more productive, which will in turn enhance the achievement of the organization's overall goals", this plan seems to be designed for lower-level employees who, like blue-collar workers who become mobile into low-level supervisory job, will not be considered qualified to go higher. One technical-professional specialist remarked in the interviews that the posted jobs were lower in grade than his present job and the supervisory postings did not therefore act as an incentive to him. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that most technical-
professional people would not want such jobs, especially if they were dead-end in career terms. Clerical workers who apply for them, however, must still be judged on their qualifications, and if they fail to compete successfully, the company would point out, it was not because they were not given a chance but because they did not have sufficient ability relative to others. Undoubtedly, self-blame and lowered expectations would be the result.

There is one other policy which has now become fairly standard practice in large corporations, and which would appear to carry similar implications: reimbursement for tuition paid for courses at recognized institutions of higher learning. The "Catch-22" is that companies will reimburse (usually all or half of fees) only if the course is deemed to be directly relevant either to the current job or to promotion anticipated or contemplated, and on successful completion of the course (a passing grade). Since most technical-professional people have at least one degree on entry to the company, a tuition programme seems to be aimed at the non-degreed clerical workers.

At Delta in the recent past, clerks in accounting departments were encouraged to take the rigorous five-year R.I.A. correspondence course for accreditation in accounting; promotion was dependent on registration in the programme and the company provided fee reimbursement. Most clerical workers interviewed in all four companies were quite aware of the prevalence of course-taking around them, and some made statements like "Oh, I guess I should take something, but I'm not sure what." Since there are no areas in clerical work requiring education of an advanced nature, and since most clerical workers were not aware of what qualifications were needed to be
considered for jobs in the exempt ranks (except "a degree") and were also not presently expecting promotion, they did not generally take courses. Those who did take courses usually took accounting or computer programming, two areas where clerical workers have experienced some mobility in the past. Since mobility for clerical workers tends to be blocked by the profusion of qualified technical-professional candidates already actively competing above them, embarking on a part-time degree course would be an arduous task.

Lacking hard evidence that obtaining a degree will lead to advancement, there is little incentive for clerical people to work at part-time degrees. (Indeed, the corporations take pains to point out that nothing is guaranteed by virtue of simply taking courses, since other qualities are involved and openings need to be available.) Those who have taken part-time university courses usually have done so out of intrinsic interest and because they needed mental stimulation not obtained at work— at any rate liberal-arts degrees do not carry much weight in companies which value technical and business education.

It would seem, therefore, that the existence of tuition reimbursement programmes has at least two hidden messages: that the company values higher education and is willing to reimburse those who will sacrifice to obtain now what they did not obtain earlier (which, it is implied, is the initial reason why they ended up in clerical work); and second, that it is up to employees to avail themselves of the opportunity, since educational cost is no longer a problem. If employees do not want to acquire the valued education as an attempt to make themselves into promotable material, it is their own fault—the corporations stated repeatedly that no one could be
"pushed" to advance, it had to be a matter of individual drive, initiative and willingness to sacrifice. Employees are constantly bombarded with information on what the company is doing to help employees help themselves, and research revealed that most clerical accept the reasoning that the rest is beyond the corporation: "Well, there's only so much they can do--they can't make openings, it's just the economy right now." But clerical workers are in a double bind: no degree means that they cannot compete with the degreed; a degree means they must still out-compete similarly qualified peers.
IV. CORPORATE ATMOSPHERE

One of the arguments which will be presented in Chapters Six and Seven is that employees' perceptions of the corporate structure and practices are important mediators between actual structures and practices and employee interpretations and actions. Often, their perceptions are affected by the nature of the corporate atmosphere in which they work, which affects the impressions employees have of their employing firm.

For the sake of convenience, the four corporations have been characterized by combinations of the following traits: "paternalistic", "authoritarian", "democratic-participative", "elitist" and "laissez-faire". Paternalistic corporations are highly oriented to employee welfare, providing a great number of benefits and treating their employees as in a traditional father-child relationship. (Japanese firms have often been said to be highly paternalistic and bound in a set of reciprocal obligations to their employees.) Authoritarian corporations have highly centralized decision-making and discourage the opinions and participation of lower levels. On the other hand, democratic-participative corporations encourage participation and input and have less highly centralized decision-making; they often also communicate with their employees more. Elitist corporations emphasize qualities considered to be superior (for example, education, social background), regard higher levels as being qualitatively superior to lower levels, and do not attempt to disguise differences in treatment. Laissez-faire corporations are difficult to define because they tend not to establish clear direction from the top but allow emerging qualities, needs and norms to set the direction on an ad-hoc basis.

Using these definitions, the four corporations in the study have been given the following labels:
Alpha - laissez-faire
Delta - authoritarian-paternalistic
Chi - democratic-participative
Sigma - elitist-participative

These characterizations have been developed through observation, assessment of statements made by corporate officials, and analysis of statements made by interviewees in the sample. Atmosphere differences among the four firms were sufficient enough to warrant hypothesizing that they might be important "local" factors in accounting for inter-firm differences in the data on employee perceptions of their situation.

A. Alpha's Atmosphere

Many employees at Alpha remarked about the easy, friendly atmosphere and the fact that the company seemed like a "big happy family", which would suggest paternalism. In fact, however, the company was not particularly paternalistic. The corporation did not do much for its employees or show too much concern. A situation of "benign neglect" is probably closer to the truth. Statements gathered from numerous interviewees reveal an uneven, contradictory pattern of characteristics, suggesting that the company was inconsistent and perhaps even careless about the impressions it created:

- "I guess the main distinction is senior management and all the rest—not including lower management, because they're treated like a big joke; most supervisors are clerks."
- "They've been pretty successful in the past and they just don't think about these things."
- "The supervisors really seem to care about us—so the company must, too."
- "The company bends over backwards for the union."
- "The company pays attention to the production and the exempt workers and our [clerical] pay has fallen behind."
- "The company gives vague promises and then leaves people to flounder—the company loses a lot of grads because of that."
- "It's a good company—it feels an obligation to its workers and it's been very consistent in trying to please the union and get new programmes a jump ahead of them."
- "The company isn't aware of workers' problems."
- "Management is inflexible in adapting to change they lack leadership, they don't motivate people."
In terms of its career policies and practices, Alpha is unsystematic. Yet management realizes that in 1980, a large cohort of workers will retire and leave a vacuum for which they have inadequately prepared in terms of succession-planning. Their record-keeping system is so unsophisticated that they were unable to state when they first began recruiting graduates. They have no master plan or a manpower forecast and "talent" inventory of a very sophisticated kind, although they are in the process of trying to develop a simple one. Part of their lack of sophistication seems to be due to the small number of people in charge of this area and the number of other duties they must perform—typical of a smaller firm, and possibly also due to the fact that they are now a branch of a multinational which leaves them to their own devices.

On entering Alpha's administrative offices, which are adjacent to its steelmaking plant, the first impression is of age and a certain off-handedness about appearances. The building is functional and plain to the point of drabness; there are few status symbols one usually associates the corporate offices such as differences in furnishings or an air of exclusiveness near the management areas. The entire atmosphere is one of casual, small-town unsophistication, with managers in shirt-sleeves and everyone on a first-name basis.

B. Delta's Atmosphere

Delta employees almost invariably use one or more of the following phrases in describing their corporation: "male-oriented", "old-school", "paternalistic", "non-participative", "rewards security and conformity", "won't listen to ideas", "not an industry leader", "won't change until it's 100% sure there's a better way". One of the stock phrases of both management and employees is "That's the D[elta] way".
The "Delta way" includes a high degree of decision-making centralization within a fairly old senior management group—a vestige of its origins as a family-run business. A technical-professional worker tells this story:

"There's Mr. ___ and Mr. ___, the V.P. and the Executive V.P., who should be retired. Mr. ___ has had a few heart attacks and Mr. ___ isn't well; his affliction is so bad some days that you can't talk to him, he's not able. And yet they make important decisions."

Another technical-professional worker refers to them as the "Old Boys":

"There's the Old Boys like our Executive V.P., with his position and wealth, who gets fast attention, versus people like me... Executives are above politics and infighting, they can afford to be kind. The managerial level is the jungle level."

The "jungle level", according to another worker, largely operates on the basis of a lot of "buck-passing", few decisions made, and ultimately, decisions imposed from the top down.

The "kindness" of the corporation consists of having given its employees a "profit-sharing" fund many years ago in lieu of a pension plan (there are no unions at Delta), paying its workers as well as or better than comparable unionized firms, having a good benefit plan, treating its employees to a gigantic Christmas party annually complete with a give-away of turkeys and gifts for employees' children, and sponsoring various events through the year. As a further sign of its paternalism, corporate management is proud of the fact that they have an "open-door" policy whereby employees are free to take up problems or complaints without fear of reprisal. "You can go right to the top", says one employee, "It wouldn't be resented. I don't see distinctions, it's not heavy-handed." On further questioning, however, it was found that only one interviewee had actually taken the corporation up on its policy; they remembered him and were amused by it, he said.
The paternalism and the "open-door" policy somewhat mask the authoritarianism and lack of participation, but more than one employee noted the control management exercised over the employees' own profit-sharing fund:

"In our fund we have for employees, the fund is run by a group of management people including Mr. [Executive V.P.], but a fund rep. is never able to tell you what decisions have been reached until it's been decided and issued from management. Now, I say if this is an employees' fund, it needs their voice...Oh, no! They're doing what they want with it!"

The first impression received on entering Delta's spacious, new office building, adjacent to its steelmaking mills but in marked contrast to Alpha's, is of modernity and taste. Status symbols in the form of differences in furnishings, size and location of executive offices, the presence of numerous art objects, and the deferential treatment by secretaries and staff, are quite obvious. The non-management floor areas are designed with an "open" concept, as are most modern corporate offices, to permit a free flow of people and create a more comfortable atmosphere. One technical-professional worker noted, however, that the "open" concept also makes workers highly visible when they stop to chat, and their conversations easily overheard.

This incongruity is only one: despite the modernity of the architecture and interior decoration, the message very quickly given off is one of solid "old-school" respectability, a bit stodgy and fairly inflexible and intolerant. Yet management insists on sticking to their interpretation of themselves: they are "just plain folks", they are unsystematic regarding careers, there is no "typical" career pattern, no overall plan, not even organization charts. Part of this may be due to the low priority given to the Personnel function: three people, relatively young, with little power and credibility and not much centralized career information, since this is controlled by senior management. And senior management thinks of
itself as an extension of the old entrepreneurial capitalist running the family firm.

C. Sigma's Atmosphere

The first impression one receives on entering Sigma Oil's corporate headquarters in downtown Toronto is of wealth, of being able to understate it and feel comfortable with it. Corporate offices are housed in a solid, older high-rise that has a quiet hum of efficiency, its staff friendly but not too informal. It is a slick, sophisticated corporation with a slightly "international" flavour; its middle managers exude an air of professionalism without being too "high-brow". Sigma management think of themselves as professionals, but they also pride themselves on communicating with their employees and treating them as "responsible" people who have some ability to participate.

In actuality, Sigma gives off contradictory messages; it is both pseudo-participative and extremely elitist. One of its Organization Development people recognizes that the corporation has tended to emphasize the degree portion of its white-collar population (the "exempt" or "professional" employees) and acknowledges that there are two separate streams and that they really are "separating the sheep from the goats" even if they don't like to publicly acknowledge it. There are mobility potential, educational and interest differences between the exempt and non-exempt workers, but they have also recognized the need to create alternative kinds of mobility for clerical people, to "give them new experiences". In the future, another Organization Development manager notes, they will delegate more responsibility to their support staff and "this may change the nature of work—we'd expect a flatter organization structure to result." Sigma's clerical job titles already reflect an attempt to blur the line between
the two: while most job titles have the word "clerk" in them, those closer to the exempt line tend to be called "assistant" and only by consulting the corporate job-family code is it possible to know that these employees too are part of "office support staff" (clerical).

Sigma is noted for its laborious and "roundabout" methods of decision-making and its penchant for conducting studies, including those under the auspices of its Employee Relations group. Many employees are also impressed with the regular information meetings Sigma has, in which employees may directly question the president. Sigma is a corporation which constantly communicates with its employees in various ways and tries to foster a "low-key" management style which takes employees into account. Yet one technical-professional worker commented that to the regional and refinery offices, head office is known as "The Temple", and the Employee Relations group as "The Dinosaur". Other interviewees supplied further descriptive phrases: "stifles creativity and reards a cautious style", "dislikes change, agitators and critics", "a middle-class company". At least three employees discounted the notion that Sigma was truly participative:

"Probably exempt-non-exempt is the most distinct line, the status. The other line [management-non] tends to be more subtle, but the authority is there; decisions are very centralized."

"They're very strong on the idea of participative decision-making but it's still in rhetoric—in the end it's the manager who decides after 'he's gathered all the information and opinions. I'm very cynical about it. It's just another method of feedback to managers."

"Despite what they think they are, they're really authoritarian."

The general impression, however, is not one so much of authoritarianism, certainly not in the same sense that Delta is authoritarian, but of elitism. Sigma's policies and programmes are almost exclusively directed at the
degreed level and the process is designed and fairly highly controlled by the high-profile Employee Relations group, which in turn reports to an old group of senior executives heavily influenced by British tradition. Sigma even retains the practice of having a separate executive cafeteria (tellingly located on the top floor, while the ordinary cafeteria is in the basement).

D. Chi's Atmosphere

The overall impression one receives from a visit to the suburban Chi Gas "working" offices (their executives are located in a downtown Toronto office tower, not in the suburbs), is one of informality and youth. Offices are modern but not overly decorated and status symbols are not that obvious (although one employee noted that one could tell who the clerical workers were by the colour of their desks). The atmosphere is one of casual efficiency; no one appears rushed, managers are often on a first-name basis with staff.

Chi has a new, young management team who are defined as having a "low-key" management style. The Manpower Planning manager is a young, female M.A. who exudes an air of enthusiasm mixed with efficiency and professionalism. She has a great deal of autonomy to develop programmes, and her MPP group is young, high-profile, capable of winning senior management's confidence in them. Their career planning approach is systematic and they have a great deal of control over centralized information, although they may be somewhat less sophisticated than Sigma. Like Sigma, they also believe in communicating a great deal to employees and employees seem to be impressed by it. They feel management is "progressive and competent", and that Chi is "on the lookout for people [careerwise]".
Nevertheless, as at Sigma, there are contradictory messages given off. If Chi's management group gives off the impression of encouraging a more "democratic" and participative atmosphere, it is picked up by employees with an undercurrent of elitism, although not as pronounced as at Sigma. Some employees have tuned in to this contradiction:

"I think there's very open communications between the Wory Tower [head office] and here, but I'd be very, very nervous if I had to go there...This company reminds me of England--it's very class-conscious...Clerical people are almost a number...it depends on the department, but rank has its privileges."

Clerical people, however, do not necessarily pick up a sense of distinctions based on the fact of their unionization. (Indeed, the Labour Relations manager suggested that the union has never been militant and that clerical "probably feel they're part of management" because posting of jobs is based on qualifications, not seniority, and employees "are very comfortable with this language"). It is a curious situation--on the one hand, most clerical workers are aware of distinctions based on educational differences and yet feel that their chances for upward mobility are not bad. Part of this muddying of perceptions could be attributed to the nature of their posting system: Chi posts not only union jobs but low-level supervisory jobs as well, a fact which counteracts the tendency for elitists messages to be given off. ("It doesn't bother me because this job is only a stepping-stone and one day I'll be up there," says a clerical worker).

To sum up, the four corporations could be placed on a number of continua, based on elements comprising the total image and atmosphere generated in each firm:

1) Sophistication of approaches and style:

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(2) Formality:

low   high
Alpha  Chi  Sigma  Delta

(3) Amount of employee communication:

low   high
Alpha  Delta  Chi  Sigma

(4) Visibility and power of Personnel function:

low   high
Delta  Alpha  Chi  Sigma

(5) Authoritarianism and paternalism

low   high
Chi  Sigma  Alpha  Delta

(6) Elitism (many, visible status distinctions)

low   high
Alpha  Delta  Chi  Sigma

Lack of correspondence or contradictions in messages given off along these various dimensions appear to be sufficient in some situations to cause employee perceptions to be considerably "muddled", as the data in Chapter Six will show.

These variations in atmosphere exist despite the gross similarities in general practices in the four firms. It is not being suggested that corporations have deliberately created such variations to "pull the wool over" workers' eyes. Indeed, they may be an unintended consequence of a
firm's ability to pay, to supply the staff who add the more sophisticated trappings to the practices.

Sigma and Chi can certainly afford sophisticated systems and have elaborate departments to administer them and study their effects. Moreover, the existence of an exceptionally large army of technical-professional workers seems to demand a more sophisticated "professional" approach. (As the demographic data in Chapter Five will show, both Sigma and Chi have a higher proportion of white-collar to blue-collar workers than does Alpha or Delta, undoubtedly making these firms more sensitive to the political significance of white-collar labour.) On the other hand, Alpha is too small a firm and too understaffed to justify elaborations on the basic practices, especially to its new masters, the multi-national conglomerate. Delta's senior officials believe their paternalism is an adequate substitute for sophistication and simply do not encourage empire-building by its small personnel staff. Thus, there are inter-firm differences which reflect a number of differences in size and wealth of firm, white-collar to blue-collar ratios, and size and professionalism of corporate personnel functions.
V SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Some aspects of the objective arrangements of work in the four firms were discussed as they reflected the deskilling and fragmentation of tasks of proletarianized labour. Paradoxically, at the point in time where work has been reduced to its simplest components and is highly regimented, there has been a reversal in the previous trend of the highly visible clerical "army" towards more integration of routine workers into their functional areas. Working alongside rather than in physical and functional isolation from non-clerical workers, the line dividing them is, however, subtly present. A number of sources of isolation and internal differentiation among white-collar workers was noted: temporal and spatial, sexual, and psychic.

Psychic isolation is probably the most important from the standpoint of ideological control, since it arises as a consequence of practices which emphasize competition between individuals rather than collectivistic solidarity. The most significant source of competitive (hence psychic) isolation is the elaborate job-grade hierarchy of the internal labour market.

As Stone pointed out for the case of steelworkers, workers who come in at the bottom of the hierarchy through limited ports of entry are highly dependent on the company for rewards—the installment-plan concept of striving now for rewards only to be gained by out-competing others and climbing to the next grade sometime in the indefinite future. The complexity of the grading scheme also makes it difficult for workers to compare themselves with others and to realize that differentiation has been artificially imposed on work which is otherwise similar in terms of class location. Such internal job hierarchies occupy the attention of workers,
both clerical and non-clerical alike, for many years, and create the illusion of upward mobility; since it is rare for workers to jump grades, mobility becomes a matter of individual perseverance within a rigid hierarchy. Each stage becomes a "test" for the one above, with the ultimate test and end-result of the selecting-out process being the ability to cross the line between proletarian and new middle class work and between new middle class and the ranks of the bourgeoisie. Individualized mechanisms for success or failure have thus been built into the system.

The internal labour market may be viewed as a practice which sets the objective conditions for opportunity but which has subjective consequences. At the level of objective arrangements, such practices have impact in terms of what Lefebvre termed "exterior conditioning", as opposed to "interior determination" (see Chapter Three).

The chapter has dealt with a set of personnel practices which personify management theory in the postwar period. The function of staffing is seen as an end-product of a management-by-objectives approach which begins with an overall corporate plan for profit and growth and is translated at lower levels into more specific activities, among them selecting and training the staff through whom the tasks will be accomplished. Corporations are thus concerned with two other aspects of staffing: measuring performance and "motivating." This means rendering aspects of worker behaviour predictable and controllable--both the objective performance of tasks and the subjective counterpart in appropriate attitudes and commitments. This, then, is the "problem of control" at the practical everyday level.

Managements address these practical problems via a number of inter-related practices. In order to create a pool of potential management
talent and also to provide staff for tasks set at the various levels, monopoly corporations in the postwar period have come to recruit technical-professional workers almost exclusively from the universities and colleges. This also creates a pool of eligibles, the clerical workers. The problem of gauging performance of the eligibles also becomes a problem of encouragement and discouragement. The performance review system accomplishes both tasks—it is designed to assess worker effort on a regular basis, to test workers' motivation to compete for rewards, and to give workers positive or negative feedback relating to the future.

If the "career" is thought of as setting in motion a chain of personal investments and as having implications for the self-system (as was argued in Chapter Three), then it can be seen that such information and the power of management behind it not only co-opts workers into agreeing with management or being considered an "attitude problem", but also has implications for the self. Those who do not "have it" in corporate definitional terms are failures; self-esteem is reduced and so are expectations. Technical-professional workers in particular are a problem since their aspirations are already primed through the educational system (an engineer at Sigma said "until you've tried the management role, to know you can do it, that has to leave a loss"). On the other hand, clerical workers have been socialized with lower expectations but they must not be pushed into apathy: the "good worker" is one who performs well and enthusiastically for the corporation.

The "cooling out" process, like the motivational process, is therefore politically charged and potentially destabilizing for corporate managements. The dilemma is partially solved by the provision of alternatives such as
"dual career ladders" and by paternalistic programmes such as pay and benefit schemes which are viewed as compensation for loss of mobility potential. Two kinds of plan present in many large corporations, educational reimbursement and self-nomination schemes such as job postings, are important ways of ideologically defusing the politically charged atmosphere of selection and exclusion—they transfer blame to the individual (those who do not take advantage of existing systems must be lazy or lacking drive or initiative).

To conclude, all of the practices examined in this chapter as addressing the two-pronged "problem of control" arising out of the fundamental antagonism between capital and labour, control effort and obscure the nature of control in order to minimize class conflict.

The argument was made that direct control strategies (those which are contained in the logic of the organization of the labour process and are expressed in the creation of authority hierarchies, mechanization and deskill) must be supplemented with specifically ideological control practices operating through presocialized worker commitment to principles of individualistic competition for monetary and mobility rewards. These ideological practices may be understood in the context of what Friedman has called "responsible autonomy" strategies, which depend upon worker goodwill and willingness to accept responsibility.

Practices connected with corporate "career development" are part of the logic of these strategies, since they not only create pools of eligibles and ineligibles for advancement into closely guarded upper management ranks, but also provide the ideological basis—individualism—for legitimating the exclusion of some workers. Moreover, they do so by shifting the ground
from collectivistic bases of exclusion to individualistic bases. They are in this sense consistent with the logic of meritocratic individualism by creating the conditions for individual self-blame when career expectations are not met. Thus do managerial practices translate potential collective and class conflict into narrower, individual-based issues connected with the white-collar "career", ultimately keeping workers divided.
CHAPTER FIVE:
THE FIRMS AND THEIR WHITE-COLLAR LABOUR

This chapter has a twofold purpose. The first is simply descriptive—to establish the context for the study in terms of demographic characteristics of each firm's white-collar population. This will include a brief history of the firms, and in the case of two of the four firms, a history of white-collar unionization. Methodology used to draw the sample will also be outlined.

The second purpose is to explore the "objective" consequences of some of the practices detailed in Chapter Four. That is, outcomes for white-collar populations are related to exclusionary practices of hiring and selection in terms of career and intergenerational mobility patterns. Chapter Six to Eight will then go on to explore the "subjective" outcomes of other practices, those related to career management.

I THE WHITE-COLLAR SAMPLE

The total white-collar population in the four firms numbered 9,071, ranging from 645 in one firm to 4,367 in the largest firm (these details are reported in Table 5-1b of the next section). It was originally intended to draw a 10% sample, or 900 workers, but two factors reduced the final sample to 600. The first was the high cost. The second was the reluctance of one of the four firms (Delta) to permit its entire white-collar population to be sampled. Since only one functional division of this corporation was involved in the study, the effective population of the four firms was reduced to 7,047. The sample of 600 represented 9% of this, or 7% of the total population possible.

The sample was drawn using standard procedures for a proportional, stratified systematic sampling—that is, proportional to take into account
the varying sizes of the firms' white-collar populations, and stratified on the basis of three occupational (class) categories: clerical, technical-professional and supervisory-managerial. (The content of these will be described at the end of this section.) A formula was devised to adjust the sample proportionally to company and category size differences, yielding the largest samples from the largest firms and proportionally smaller samples from the smaller firms. A formula was also devised to establish the systematic draw for each of the three categories in each of the four firms so that 50 workers from each resulted (50 times three categories, times four firms).

When every Nth worker from each firm and category was drawn, a check of the occupational composition of the sample against the composition of the entire population confirmed that the sample was highly representative; virtually every type of white-collar work had been included (see Section II of this chapter).

The corporations provided lists of names and job titles which became the basis of the sample. The content of the job-title lists was examined in order to determine the class location of various occupations, using the theoretical considerations outlined in Chapter Two. The lists were sorted into three class groupings: proletarianized clerical workers; new middle class technical-professional workers, representing ideological or indirect control; and new middle class supervisory-managerial workers representing direct political domination. Corporate job descriptions were used to clarify the content of any doubtful or unclear cases. An additional check was built into the questionnaire and the interview schedule: each worker sampled was asked to describe the content of work with regard to the nature of decision-making and supervision (a modified version of Erik Olin Wright's questionnaire.
was used, designed to establish class location). During the final coding
of the interviews and questionnaire returns, a few cases were found to
be in need of reclassification on the basis of this check.

The 600 names drawn in the sampling procedure formed the basis for
the research. Of this number, 100 were intended to be respondents for
the in-depth interviews, and the balance were to be sent the questionnaire.
(The questionnaire and related documents appear in the Appendix.)

Since there were considerably fewer interviewees than questionnaire
respondents, a separate strategy was employed to draw the interview sub-
sample from the larger sample. This was to ensure that a wide range of
representative occupations was equally represented in the sub-sample as
in the larger sample. The sampling lists were searched by job title to
yield a few of each specialty in each class category. (For example, with-
in the clerical group there were general clerks, typists, stenographers,
and key-punch operators. Within technical-professional, there were
engineers, technicians, computer specialists, accountants, etc. Within
supervisory-managerial, there was a variety of levels and departments.)
Thus, the interview sub-sample, representing various occupations and
functional divisions within each corporation, became a microcosm of each
firm's occupational and class structure. This group was kept separate
from the questionnaire sub-sample to prevent double-sampling, and each
corporation was requested to set up interviews with the selected in-
terviewees; a few were held in reserve in the event that there were refus-
als or absences during the research period (these problems did not mater-
ialize to any appreciable degree). Those included in the sub-sample were
given a letter written by the researcher explaining the purpose of the
study and assuring their anonymity.
The questionnaire portion of the research yielded 300 returns (an average of 60%, varying by firm). The interviews amounted to 91, yielding over 120 hours of taped interviews or five to ten pages of typed transcript each.

The logic of both types of research strategy was that respondents should be given as much scope as possible to develop their thoughts based on their own meanings and interpretations. Accordingly, many questions in the questionnaire were open-ended, and the interviews were only loosely structured around a few directive questions and probes. In both, the format was designed to establish the following:

1. background data on work history, training, content of present job, location in the corporate hierarchy
2. options and opportunities—perceived options and handicaps to progression and interpretation of workers' present and future situation in the work-world
3. perceptions of what the corporation was doing to "develop" its personnel and of preferential treatment for some groups
4. reaction to and interpretation of income and other hierarchies, authority relations, unions, and social classes.

Although a great deal of time and attention was devoted to the planning of the questionnaire and to its coding and processing, it was never intended to be the primary research tool due to the problems which any questionnaire has in reducing the richness of experience to rigid categories imposed on respondents. Even with numerous open-ended questions, this problem is more exaggerated in the more quantitatively oriented analysis of questionnaires than in the relatively unstructured interview situation. Hence the one research instrument was not reduced to the other; rather, the results of the two have been juxtaposed against one another in the discussion of findings which follows.
Since interviewees were allowed considerable latitude to develop their thoughts, categories are not entirely commensurable with one another between the two kinds of research instrument; for this reason, the interview findings have not been aggregated with the questionnaire data.

Questionnaire and interview findings are to be viewed as complementary to one another, with the richer content of the interviews providing the interpretive context and "court of appeal" for explaining the meaning of the questionnaire responses. The questionnaire is at its most precise in establishing objective class location of workers, and the most imprecise in establishing the relationship between career experiences and the extent to which the implications of managerial practices are transparent to respondents. It is at this point that the interview material complements and supplements the questionnaire in the discussion of findings which follows in subsequent chapters.

The sources and kinds of data used in the study are listed below:

1. **organizational demographics** - supplied by corporate officials, and consisting of the following (much of this is reported on in Section II of this chapter):
   - size of organizational population and ratios by sex, occupational composition, and education
   - lists of job-titles and grades, supplemented by job descriptions where needed
   - employee name-lists, cross-listed by job titles.
   - corporate organization charts and divisional charts
   - cross-section of middle to upper management career-history profiles (where available)

2. **management personnel practices** - supplied by corporate officials; consisting of the following (reported in Chapter Four):
discussion with corporate representatives regarding corporate policies on recruitment, manpower planning, career development, performance evaluation, and training;
- specific printed materials (where available) on corporate policy, corporation-employee communications, handouts designed for new-employee orientation, management manuals, capsule corporate histories, performance review forms

(3) clerical unions (where available):
- interviews with corporate and union officials regarding history and issues of unionization, union demographics, etc.
- printed copy of collective bargaining agreement

(4) "quantitative" data-gathering instrument
- questionnaire (see Appendix), findings discussed in Chapter Six to Eight

(5) "qualitative" data-gathering instrument
- in-depth interviews (see Appendix), findings discussed in Chapters Six to Eight
- content-analysis of interview transcripts to establish common patterns of response, and to supplement and interpret questionnaire frequencies and cross-tabulations

The following is a definition of the categories "clerical", "technical-professional", and "supervisory-managerial", based on their participation (or lack of participation) in control and surveillance functions of capital. (That is, they were classified as proletarian or as new middle class based on the theoretical discussion in Chapter Two concerned with the setting of class boundaries.)

Clerical workers were defined as including all routine semi-skilled workers whose main job responsibility is a paper-handling and/or "keeping track of" or office-machine operating function. These included machine operators such as typists, telephone operators, keypunch operators, multilith and mailing machine operators, and computer operators. Clerks included file and stock clerks and others who handle records or compile materials. Also included in clerical are staff support or service
positions such as stenographers, secretaries, and buyers or customer service correspondents. The second criterion was that they did not supervise any other personnel and did not supply input into decision making processes or have budgetary control. (There were items in the questionnaire designed to cross-check these aspects—see the Appendix.) Thus, this group was defined as one which was totally proletarianized in terms of the "control and surveillance" functions from which they were excluded.

Technical-professional staff included all varieties of specialists whose main responsibility is analytical or design work or information-gathering plus interpretation. Such activities often provide the basis for corporate strategy and decision-making in such functional areas as Finance, Marketing, and Production. These people may or may not be degree or certificated but all have some training in their technical or functional areas. They have no formal supervisory role, although they may function as "resource-people" or have senior staff responsibility for the training and guidance of more junior members. They do not control labour in any direct formal way but indirectly participate in "control and surveillance" both of labour (as in industrial engineering) and for other aspects of the surplus-generating and realization process (such as in production engineering, marketing, and financial planning), and as such, are also part of the ideological domination by capital, representing the domination of mental over manual labour.

Supervisory-managerial staff include all those who have formal responsibility for the direction, evaluation, and often hiring or firing of blue-collar workers. They also usually administer some administrative area or sub-area of the company, that is, have a
say in or decide on or implement goals and policies of the company rel-
ative to their areas, and may also have budgetary responsibility and
discretion. They carry out part of the function of capital in these
respects and thus represent direct economic, political and ideological
domination.

The occupational distribution of the in-depth interview respondents
was as follows: Of the 25 clerical interviewees, nine were general clerks
of various kinds, eleven were typists and other machine operators and
secretaries, in equal numbers, and five were other support staff. Of
the 37 technical-professional interviewees, six were engineering and other
science specialists, ten were computer specialists (divided equally
between programmers and systems analysts), ten were financial specialists
(mainly accounting), six were marketing specialists (some with science
and some with marketing degrees), three were technicians or technologists,
and two were other kinds of specialists (one librarian and one telephone
consultant). Of the 28 supervisory-managerial interviewees, four were
blue-collar and ten were white-collar supervisors, and the remaining 14
were managers from production or other technical areas, finance, and
marketing. The internal composition of the three groups was roughly the
same for the four firms even though Company Delta allowed access only to their
Finance Division. (Fortunately, a few computer and other technical people were
present in this division because of the way in which lines of accountability
are drawn in this fir

These occupations were also represented in the questionnaire portion
of the sample, although not necessarily in the same proportions. General
clerical kinds of jobs intended to predominate somewhat in the clerical
group for each company except in Delta where machine operators predominated;
the balance were distributed evenly over the other occupations named above. In the technical-professional group, engineering and science specialists predominated in Companies Alpha and Sigma due to their predominance in the population of those companies, while financial specialists predominated in the one Delta division. Financial specialists were also slightly over-represented at Company Chi, but followed closely by computer specialists. Otherwise, the occupational distribution was fairly even and similar to those listed above. White-collar supervisors predominated slightly over other supervisory-managerial personnel in all companies except Alpha, where production managers were slightly over-represented. The balance were distributed evenly over the functional areas listed above.

These distributions were thus representative in general of the occupational structure of the corporations studied, adjusted in the sampling to reduce the possibility of over-sampling from the numerically larger clerical and technical-professional groups (unfortunately, the actual clerical response rate turned out to be lower than anticipated and so the clerical group is now slightly under-represented in the questionnaire).

(Table 5-la and b here)
II THE WHITE-COLLAR WORKFORCE

A. Demographic Characteristics

Table 5-1a,b summarizes the main demographic features of the four corporations. As a rough comparison guide, it should be noted that according to the 1971 census 42% of the Canadian workforce was white-collar, of which 4% were proprietary and managerial occupations, 13% were professional and technical, 16% were clerical, and 10% were sales occupations.

In terms of relative size, Companies Alpha and Chi are the most similar to one another, both with a total workforce of just over 2,500, while Companies Delta and Sigma are the largest, with a total workforce of about 10,000 and 6,000 respectively. The internal composition in terms of the ratio of white-collar to blue-collar, however, varies from company to company, with the greatest resemblance being between the two steel companies on the one hand, and between the utility and the oil company on the other.

Company Alpha’s workforce has a 76% - 24% split between production workers and office workers, with production workers predominating. This is consistent with the split in the other steel company, Delta, where 78% of its workforce is blue-collar, and with another basic-steel producer (not included in the study) where it is 75% blue-collar. Alpha’s largest population of both kinds of workers is in Ontario (86% of their blue-collar workforce and 82% of their white-collar).

One quarter of Alpha’s white-collar population of 645 people are female and located mainly in clerical jobs within the unionized portion of the office staff. (There were only two female supervisors and four females in technical-professional ranks). Technical-professional and supervisory-managerial personnel combined comprise an estimated 61% of the white-collar population, while the remaining 39% was comprised of clerical occupations. Supervisory-managerial personnel by themselves represent 43% of the white-collar population or 10% of Alpha’s total workforce.
Company Chi has a total population of 2,650, of which 32% are in blue-collar occupations (mainly as gas-flow controllers, servicemen, fitters, meter-readers, and inspectors), and 68% (1,800 people) are in white-collar occupations. About 34% of this white-collar population are females, mainly in clerical unionized jobs. (The company did not provide exact information, but estimated that only one or two females were in supervisory or managerial ranks, and only a few in technical-professional). Supervisory-managerial personnel comprise 27% of the white-collar ranks or 18% of the total workforce. Clerical comprise 63% and technical-professional 10% of the white-collar workforce. About 600 white-collar workers are unionized (44% of the white-collar population).

Company Delta has a population of 10,000, of which 78% are blue-collar steelworkers and 21% are white-collar workers. One-quarter of these 2,259 white-collar workers are female. However, in their Finance Division which has an extremely high proportion of clerical workers, over half of the 235 workers are women. (Only five women were in supervisory-managerial ranks, and only 15 in technical-professional jobs.). Delta provided extremely sketchy population data, but estimated that about 40% of their entire white-collar workforce was clerical in composition. In the Finance Division, 24% of the white-collar population is supervisory-managerial (since the clerical composition of this division is very high, it may be assumed that the ratio of managerial to non-managerial is higher in the larger white-collar population). The supervisory-managerial portion of the total Delta workforce is assumed to be about 10%, consistent with other steel corporations.

Company Sigma's 6,400 population consists of 68% white-collar and only 32% blue-collar (mainly process workers, maintenance and distribution workers), and in this respect it is similar to the gas utility in proportions. Of the 68% of the population which is white-collar (4,367 people), 20% are
female, concentrated in clerical occupations (one only is in supervisory-managerial ranks and only 94 out of the 1,742 technical-professional people are female). Clerical work comprises 39% of white-collar occupations, and the balance are concentrated in technical-professional work, while only 18% of the white-collar workforce is supervisory-managerial (12% of the total Sigma workforce).

The four companies are very similar in their age and company service characteristics as well as by distribution of sex among the three occupational class groups. Information obtained from the corporations confirms that the distribution obtained for the questionnaire and the interview samples is representative of the larger white-collar populations from which they were drawn.

The mean age for all groups combined is between 30 and 35 years with the exception of Company Alpha where the mean is 36 to 39 years. This, however, hides differences and similarities among the three occupational class groups. In both the clerical and technical-professional groups there is a large proportion of the sample which is young, between the ages of 18 and 29. But there is also a fairly substantial portion, about a quarter of each group, which is age 40 or over; similarly, there is a substantial portion which has long service even among clerical workers. Forty-six and 47% of the clerical and technical-professional groups, respectively, are in the age 18 to 29 bracket, as compared with only 9% of supervisory-managerial. The main difference is in the over-40 skewing for the supervisory-managerial group: 56% of this group are 40 or over, as compared with 27% of clerical and 22% of technical-professional. This skewing represents the usual length of time it takes most white-collar workers to reach management ranks, the "long crawl" of the corporate career which averages 20 years even for degree people to attain middle-to-senior management positions.
Thus, the mean company service of 11 to 15 years for Company Alpha and of 6 to 10 years for the other three companies disguises this skewing, which reflects the tendency for people to make their careers largely within the same corporation and thus to be long-service and older than the mean by the time they reach supervisory-managerial levels. In the interviews, clerical workers averaged 14 years' service for all companies, technical-professional averaged 10 years, and supervisory-managerial averaged 18 years, although one or two men had had 25 to 30 years of service. While all four companies have their share of long-service employees, which reflects the relatively secure employment provided by large corporations, Company Alpha and Company Sigma were overloaded with men aged 40 or over in supervisory-managerial ranks, many of whom had spent their entire working lives with the one employer; these firms would shortly experience a crisis in the vacancy chain as many reached retirement age from the same cohort at once, creating massive succession problems. Company Sigma was in the process of solving this problem systematically by grooming a talent pool of younger men to replace the older management men and initiating an early retirement plan. Alpha, on the other hand, did not have the personnel planning resources to solve its problem as systematically, and its planning tended to be more haphazard (as was outlined in Chapter Four).

Thus, the sample reflects the dominant tendencies in these corporations--towards long service even within clerical ranks where little career mobility occurs--a tendency which holds despite a disproportionately large female population in clerical ranks.

The university-decreed population and mobility patterns will be discussed in the next section.

Despite all four companies being part of the monopoly sector, they vary widely in their overall population, in their relative proportions of
blue-collar and white-collar workers, and in the composition of their non-clerical white-collar labourforce. They share in common only the features connected with that portion of the white-collar labourforce which is clerical and female--here, there is a great deal of similarity. The overall proportion of the corporate population represented by supervisory and managerial personnel is also very comparable. The two steel companies are similar in the proportion of their total workforce which is white-collar (theirs is roughly one-quarter of the total), and the utility and the oil company are almost the reverse of this, with two-thirds of their population being white-collar and outnumbering blue-collar.

What appears to account for the differences is the nature of the industries represented by the four. The oil industry is the most highly automated at the production end, has fewer production workers, and also has the highest technical-professional content in its white-collar labourforce; utilities has the lowest technical-professional content but is highest in clerical content, while the steel industry is somewhere in between (this will become more apparent when the figures on university and community college recruitment are examined in a subsequent section of this chapter).

It will be recalled in the previous discussion on the nature and development of monopoly capitalism (Chapter Two) that one of the features which became characteristic of the concentration of industry with its increasing technical sophistication and the need for more precise methods of co-ordination, was an increase in "administrative labour"--the technical-professional and clerical components. The further rationalization which occurred as capitalism advanced led to the "deskilling" (cf. Braverman, 1973) of first directly productive labour and then in time, clerical labour. As clerical labour became fragmented and deskillred, resembling proletarianized manual labour in
its separation from participation in control, its ranks also became swollen with cheap and relatively uneducated female labour. At the same time, control became firmly lodged within the cadres of supervisory and managerial agents and technical-professional workers who took their orders from within this complex hierarchy. Some further erosion of skills and partial proletarianization has occurred within technical-professional ranks, however, particularly as their tasks could be fragmented and those requiring less skill parcelled out to less educated technicians—this phenomenon has been particularly marked as computerization became entrenched as part of the control system.

Thus, while that portion of the workforce represented by supervisory-managerial personnel has been relatively stable since 1901, technical-professional labour and clerical labour have both risen steadily in their proportion of the labour force. According to census data, between 1901 and 1971, managerial and proprietorial jobs represented 4.3% of the Canadian labour force. In the same period, the proportion representing blue-collar labour has declined somewhat, to be supplanted by white-collar labour. Technical and professional work rose from 4.6% in 1901 to 12.7% of the Canadian labour force in 1971, while clerical rose from 3.2% to 15.9% in the same period.) The proletarianization of clerical labour has now run its course and can go further only by the elimination of clerical jobs by further automation or by exploitation of the remaining clerical workers, but technical-professional labour has not yet suffered this fate; it remains highly variable in its internal composition and degrees of proletarianization. The highest levels of technocrat continue to be important and indispensable adjuncts to management as well as providing a highly educated and loyal pool of talent from which to draw future management potential.
At the lower levels, however, particularly in the areas of accounting and computer work, the tendency has been to fragment the labour process and to substitute less-costly labour for some tasks.

In the next sections, the four corporations will be examined in detail for a better understanding of the occupational composition of their white-collar labour force in terms of what it implies for one important objective consequence of control: career mobility.

B. Education, Occupation and Mobility: The White-Collar Population and the Research Sample

The white-collar population of the four corporations studied is a highly educated one—25% of Company Alpha's white-collar portion of their labour-force has university education (which represents only 3.8% of their total workforce). Similarly, 21.8% of Company Chi's (14.8% of the total population), 30% of Delta's, and 52.3% of Sigma's (19% of the total) have degrees. They are concentrated in non-clerical occupations, in the technical-professional and supervisory-managerial groups.

The composition of the degreeed portion of these corporations' white-collar labour varies, however, by discipline and by industry. In the steel company, better than 50% of the degree personnel are engineers, which is true for the steel industry in general, and also for the oil industry when combined with other science degrees. In the utility, on the other hand, while 14.8% of its management personnel have engineering degrees, there is also a large number of degree-holders in economics, commerce, and Arts, as well as community college graduates in technology. The split between engineering or science degrees and other kinds of degrees would, therefore, seem to depend on the nature of the industry and its technological needs. Where technology plays a large role and where large amounts of fixed capital are tied up in machinery—such as in the mining,
chemical, steel, electrical and other heavy industries--corporations hire predominantly from the engineering and science disciplines, whereas in areas such as merchandising and finance, graduates are recruited from business-oriented disciplines. (See Chapter Four on recruiting practices).

Two of the four companies studied, Chi and Sigma, were able to provide comprehensive data on career and mobility patterns for their middle-to-senior management groups. This distribution of educational backgrounds and disciplines confirms the preeminence of higher education, as well as shifting patterns in careers over roughly a twenty-year period, that is, for most of the postwar growth period during which these and other firms began and expanded their formal university recruiting programmes.

Company Chi provided a computerized printout of that portion of their white-collar workforce which had post-secondary education. From this, excellent data is available on the educational composition of all three occupational class groups, plus their executive. Of their white-collar population of 1,800, 381 or 21% had post-secondary education, distributed unevenly among the three groups. Of the 381, 25% were clerical workers, 40% were technical-professional, and 35% were supervisory-managerial (representing 16% of the clerical population, 38% of the technical-professional, and 17% of the supervisory-managerial population having post-secondary education; the figure was 92% for the executive group).

Within clerical occupations, however, university degrees did not predominate--only 32% of all post-secondary clerical education was university, mainly Arts degrees, while the other two-thirds consisted of community-college education, mainly secretarial and other commercial subjects. On the other hand, university degrees predominated among the technical-professional and supervisory-managerial groups: 58% and 70% respectively of all post-secondary education, and the community
college diplomas or certificates were largely in technical subjects.

The 212 university degrees held by the three groups were distributed unevenly also among disciplines: science degrees, including engineering, predominated (28%), while business degrees (economics, commerce, and business administration) and Arts degrees were tied for second (20%); accounting degrees were the third highest (14%). Computer science and mathematics degrees were last.

In Ch's twelve-member executive group (vice-presidents, comptroller, treasurer, and president), eleven men had university degrees and only one had no post-secondary education; no one had community college education. Among the seven for whom information on first job was available, only one had begun as a clerk, one had begun as a management trainee, and five began in technical-professional jobs. Of the 51 total senior management (that is, the group which includes senior or divisional managers and vice-presidents), only six began their careers as clerks; overall only 12 had no more than high school education. The balance began their careers as technical-professional personnel or as trainees at this level. The presence of high school education at all indicates changes in career patterns over time. Those with no post-secondary education are generally older men who began their careers at a time when university degrees were not as prevalent and when career mobility from clerical ranks was a more likely prospect. However, the greater proportion of non-postsecondary in non-executive management ranks indicates that even earlier, degreed people tended to rise to senior management in disproportionate numbers. This tendency is confirmed by studies of the Canadian "corporate elite" (cf. Clement, 1975: Ch. 5-6).

Company Sigma, due to its larger size, found it a ponderous task to provide data on all of their middle to senior management or on post-secondary
education for all of their white-collar population of over 4,000 people; they did, however, provide a cross-section of their middle management based on a random selection of 20% of about 300 of the entire 797 supervisory-managerial group. We may assume, therefore, that this cross-sectional sampling of 65 career profiles is fairly representative of the upper levels of Sigma.

The Sigma senior management and executive cross-section consisted of 26 people, the middle management group of 39 people. Within this group of 65, only four had high school education only, all but one of these in middle management. Only one out of 65 had a community college or technical school diploma or certificate—a technologist. Sixty (92%) of the 65 sampled had university degrees. Science and engineering degrees predominated in both management groups, representing 70 to 73% of all degrees. Second in the senior management group was accounting at 17% (it was third, at 11%, among middle management), and third were business degrees (commerce, economics, business administration) at 9%. (Business degrees ranked second in the middle management group, at 11%). In both groups, Arts degrees were held by only one or two people, and only one held a mathematics degree.

These figures reflect consistent recruiting practices over the past thirty years: Sigma hires predominantly from the universities and 70% of those recruits have technical degrees, while 20% have business degrees and Arts degrees. The only change over this period of time has been towards an increasing proportion of degreeholders with accounting and commerce backgrounds reflecting the increasing popularity of these degrees (a trend noted also by Clement for the Canadian corporate elite).

A study was also made of the career mobility of these managers and executives from their first job. First job was unknown for nine of the 65,
but of the remaining 56, most of whom had begun their careers at Sigma, only three began as clerks. These three who were mobile from clerical ranks were non-degreed when they began, although one had been working on a chartered accountancy degree. The remaining 53, all degreed, began their careers at the technical-professional level.

Technical-professional work was the overwhelming career route for executives and senior managers at both Company Chi and Company Sigma. Thus, in both of these companies as in other dominant corporations, upward mobility for the non-degreed and the clerical has been limited for some time due to management selection biases in their recruiting and promotion schemes.

With this background information as a checkpoint, it is now possible to examine the educational and mobility patterns for respondents in the sample, with a good degree of confidence that they are representative of the entire white-collar populations of these four corporations.

When educational background was examined, it was found that the interviewees and the questionnaire respondents in the technical-professional and supervisory-managerial groups were very similar. Those with post-secondary education (degrees or certificates) comprised 65% of the technical-professional sample, and 76% of the interview sample, while for supervisory-managerial, the figures were 52% and 61% respectively. There were considerably fewer clerical workers with post-secondary education—8% of interviewees and 37% of questionnaire respondents.

However, these figures conceal individual company differences and inflate that proportion of the white-collar workforce which is degreed. When the figures are examined by company and by occupational group separately, they more closely approximate the tendencies in the larger populations,
as Table 5-3 below shows (post-secondary education when all groups are taken together is slightly over-represented in all corporations except Sigma, according to the figures supplied).

(Table 5-3 about here)

The clerical sample reflects the low level of education which clerical workers in general have relative to other levels of white-collar labour; among clerical workers, high school education predominates. When post-secondary education is present in this group, it is generally of a non-university nature, as was already shown in the figures released by Company Chi for their overall white-collar population. In the two unionized companies, the proportion of clerical workers possessing only high school education is slightly higher than for the non-union companies.

The technical-professional sample, with its low proportion of those having only high school education, is typical of this specialist group of occupations, and reflects the tendency for firms to recruit those with post-secondary education into these ranks. Differences in the community college component reflect different hiring practices across the corporations; as Chapter Four has shown, Sigma hires fewer technologists than the other three firms.

What Table 5-3 does not show is the high percentage of those in Company Delta's Finance Division who have some university but not yet a degree (38%)--this reflects the tendency in the immediate past at Delta to promote internally from clerical ranks by encouraging clerks to obtain their R.I.A. and other accounting designations part-time.
The supervisory-managerial portion of the sample is polarized between two extremes--on the other hand, a high proportion of those with only high school education, and on the other, a high proportion of degree holders have community college education. Two factors appear to be operating. Among those with only high school education are older men representing career patterns from periods when degrees were not considered to be virtually mandatory (the previous demographic discussion confirms the older age distribution for supervisory-managerial). On the other hand, the high school component also represents former blue-collar workers who became first-line supervisors and former clerks who now supervise clerical departments, neither of whom have much upward mobility potential. Data previously discussed confirm the tendency for middle to senior management ranks to predominate in degree holders. The educational backgrounds present in this group thus represent lower-level non-degree supervision and higher-level degree management.

Questionnaire respondents were asked to supply information on their job history. Based on this information and the judgment applied in the placement of their present job in terms of occupational class group, a determination could be made as to whether or not their present position represented career mobility for these individuals. When the results from all companies were averaged, it was found that 85% of clerical, 60% of technical-professional and 0% of supervisory-managerial had experienced no mobility (that is, all of their job moves had been within the same occupational class group).

There was a little mobility from manual ranks into clerical and technical-professional—only 7%, representing very few cases, had been manual workers previously. This of course would have to be considered as
no mobility if both clerical and manual work are considered to be proletarian, which is the argument favoured in this study. That 29% of supervisory-managerial workers were mobile from manual into controlling ranks is a reflection of the existence in the sample of blue-collar foremen in Companies Alpha, Chi and Sigma who had been former steelworkers, utility workers or process and maintenance workers; their absence in Company Delta's Finance Division reflects the nature of this non-production division, where mobility was typically from clerical proletarian ranks rather than from manual. Previous data indicate that none of these manual workers had became mobile into middle management or higher levels, however. There was also some mobility into clerical ranks from manual (in Companies Chi and Sigma, usually from the ranks of meter-readers and distribution workers respectively into areas whose clerical work was related to their former functions).

There was also movement into clerical from self-employment (one or two cases of musicians) and one case each of self-employed draftsmen and small business owners, contractors or consultants who became technical-professional or supervisory-managerial personnel. Movement out of clerical ranks, however, tended to be into technical-professional and into supervisory ranks—25% of technical-professionals had been mobile from clerical work and 33% of supervisory-managerial had begun in clerical jobs.

The high degree of lack of mobility into technical-professional ranks reflects the tendencies of corporations to recruit directly into this group from the universities and community colleges, by-passing clerical ranks (only a quarter to a third of clerical workers were mobile into specialist work).
Technical-professional work also tends to provide an avenue of upward mobility into supervisory-managerial ranks—47% of all supervisory-managerial personnel were mobile from specialist work, that is a third to half of its ranks; the balance were ex-manual and ex-clerical workers in about equal proportions, who became under-represented at the higher levels of management while technical-professional backgrounds became over-represented.

It is clear, therefore, that the main barrier to upward mobility comes from being located in manual or clerical proletarianized positions. Technical-professional specialists on average are mobile at a rate 25% greater than clerical workers, and most started at higher levels in the corporations to begin with. Despite corporate peculiarities, the data show this patterning to be very consistent across corporations—the class barrier to upward mobility holds with some percentage differences only, as the following table, 5-4, shows:

(Table 5-4 about here)

When the occupations of respondents' fathers and their career mobility are analysed, it becomes apparent that more inter-generational mobility has occurred between technical-professional workers and their fathers and between supervisory-managerial personnel and their fathers, than between clerical workers and their fathers.

However, there was a high rate of career immobility for the fathers of all three groups, ranging between 82% (for technical-professional) and 89% (for clerical), regardless of father's occupation. The inter-generational mobility was nevertheless greater for non-clerical personnel. Forty-six per cent of clerical respondents were in the same class as their fathers (that is, proletarian, either white- or blue-collar), and 49% were actually down-
wardly mobile from their father's class. On the other hand, 64% of technical-professional respondents were in the same class as their fathers (old or new middle-class), and 35% were upwardly mobile over their father's (proletarian) class. This pattern was similar for supervisory-managerial respondents, 62% of whom were in the same class as their fathers (new or middle-class), and 37% of whom had advanced over their father's class.

Undoubtedly, much of clerical downward mobility is to be accounted for by the high rate of feminization of this group, but it is also notable that all groups tend to reflect not only the perpetuation of class inequalities and relative advantages or disadvantages, but also the tendency for those whose fathers were middle-class not to retain the attained class inter-generationally (usually, significantly, upgraded through technical-professional work, judging by the lower rates of career immobility experienced by fathers in this group; the explanation undoubtedly is the avenues created by the "correct" education).

One aspect of intergenerational mobility shared by all three groups is the prevalence of blue-collar fathers. 32% to 40% (when service occupations are included). However, clerical respondents' fathers experienced more career immobility than did blue-collar fathers of technical-professional and supervisory-managerial respondents. The second most prevalent occupation for technical-professional and supervisory-managerial respondents' fathers was supervisory-managerial work, while it was third for clerical, supplanted by self-employment. The other similarity between technical-professional and supervisory-managerial respondents is that the third most prevalent father's occupation is technical-professional, while only 5% of clerical respondents had technical-professional fathers. Fathers of respondents in
all three groups, somewhat surprisingly, did not tend to be clerical—only
6% of clerical fathers, 3% of technical—professional and supervisory—managerial
had been clerical workers. These patterns are detailed in table 5-5.

C. The Clerical Unions

Mel Watkins, in (Canada) Ltd. (1973), noted that the dominant features
of Canadian unionism were: larger rather than smaller workplaces tend to be
organized; more male than female workers are organized; unions are extremely
fragmented into small locals which in 1971 amounted to 10,056 locals with an
average membership of about 220; and that unions were "continental" in nature,
tending to be affiliated with large American-based unions coextensive with the
branch—plant nature of the Canadian political economy.

Two of these features are also characteristic of the clerical unions at
Company Alpha and Company Chi—fragmentation and continentalism. However,
Alpha's and Chi's clerical unions are highly feminized in their composition,
unlike blue-collar unions (60% of the members at Alpha and 72% at Chi are
female).

Fragmentation into separate locals is especially marked at Company
Chi, where, their annual report in 1978 noted, there are six locals in all,
representing blue-collar workers and white-collar workers, each corresponding
to what were separate corporate entities taken over by Chi in its history.
There are two locals for clerical workers at Chi, one for workers in the
Toronto Metro area and one for workers in the Ottawa Valley,
and there are two for Company Alpha's clerical workers, the largest in Ontario and the other in Quebec.

Until 1980, the two clerical locals at Company Chi were members of two different unions, the International Chemical Workers and the Independent Gas Workers. Following the attempted encroachment by another large union which was "raiding" smaller locals and the threatened affiliation with the Teamsters, the hourly (blue-collar) members decided to switch to an independent union, the Gas Workers, which was certified in 1977. Then the clerical workers, following an internal dispute with the International Chemical Workers and a brief period of trusteeship, joined with the other locals under the Independent Gas Workers umbrella. Although only one union now represents the 600 clerical workers at Company Chi, they are still split into two locals, each with its own executive structure drawn locally and tied into the national union's executive in a two-tiered structure. 6

At Company Alpha, the clerical workers are represented by the United Steelworkers of America, also an "International", but again, the clerical workers are not only separated from the blue-collar workers but their roughly 200 members are split between the Ontario and Quebec clerical locals. Each of these locals negotiates separately with the company only after the blue-collar workers' local, which is larger and stronger, has finished negotiating.

While 34% of the white-collar workforce at Company Alpha and at a Company Chi is unionized, not all clerical workers are included in these unions. Due to legislative loopholes (the Labour Relations Board's "confidentiality" clause), the companies have been able to exclude all workers whose jobs are in departments where confidential materials are involved, such as in Personnel, Industrial Relations, and Salary. As well, all those secretaries who perform services
for middle and senior managers and also deal with what the company considers sensitive material are also excluded.

Paradoxically, however, when Company Alpha's union was first certified, management attempted to win the exclusion of buyers and sales correspondents from the union. Its rationale was that buyers ought to be excluded due to the high dollar value of the commodities they purchased; and that sales correspondents ought to be excluded owing to customer contacts they maintained. In the process, a trade-off was achieved which resulted in the exclusion of buyers and the inclusion of sales correspondents and industrial engineers, much to the chagrin of the latter group whose ranks were filled with technologists certificated by community colleges (they considered unions beneath them). The industrial engineering group, which is responsible for time-and-motion studies used by the company for setting rates on blue-collar labour, suddenly found themselves shut out of the "status update" meetings held by departmental management on a weekly basis; they are still smarting from this "slight". One interviewee remarked that he was made to feel like a "second-class citizen" just like the clerks who were also not included in the meetings. Similarly, in Company Chi, programmers, many of whom were certificated, some degreeed, had originally been included in the clerical union along with other data-processing workers; they felt that it did them no good—being at the top of the clerical grade range, they felt the union concentrated on raising the salary rates of lower-grade clerical workers. The programmers were notably anti-union, one ex-programmer stated in the interviews, and had neglected to pay their dues; in time they were invited by the union to exclude themselves, which they did with little regret.

At Company Delta, where no union exists, data-processing workers surmise from the company security now surrounding the computer operations that even in
the unlikely event of a union being formed at Delta, not even semi-skilled computer operators and keypunch operators would be included within a union. Since computer operators are highly centralized at Delta and represent much of the control and processing of paperwork and even some systems related to production, there can be no doubt that Delta's management would fight for exclusion of computer-related jobs. This is, paradoxically, one of the areas of white-collar work where proletarianization can still proceed further, leaving these workers with little protection. The "trading-off" of one area for another appears to be a fairly common strategy used by managements to prevent the full inclusion in unions of all related work which should logically be included. Another strategy, noted by Company Alpha's union president, is for the company to create new jobs outside the union ranks where the union has no control, and thus to limit the growth of union jobs and union membership. Alpha's union membership has been in a no-growth position almost since it originated over ten years ago.

Company Chi's unions are relatively old. Its first blue-collar union dates to 1939, one of the first blue-collar unions to be organized in Canada. During the era of manufactured gas, manual workers were represented by the United Gas and Chemical Coke Workers; after 1944, they were then represented by International Chemical Workers. In 1947, the office workers had only an employee association. When negotiations with the association did not come quickly enough for the workers, a move to unionize began. In 1954, a new clerical local was certified, under the International Chemical Workers—it was one of the first clerical groups to unionize in the private sector.

Company Chi has known very little labour strife which has resulted in strike action. There were blue-collar strikes in the 1960's shortly after Chi took over smaller companies in the Niagara peninsula and Ottawa; Chi's officials pointed out that these strikes were probably a reflection of past
frustrations. In both, negotiations between the United Electrical Workers and Chi's management had broken down. There was also another strike at a Chi-controlled entity which was labelled by Chi's management as "frivolous", a show of strength over with a few days. In 1971 there was one more hourly workers' strike, this one lasting quite a few weeks and termed "major" and "quite militant" by the company; no clerical worker crossed the picket line. Earlier, in the 1960's Niagara peninsula strike, clerical workers had gone out in sympathy with the hourly workers when negotiations broke down and were warned by the company with notations on their files. This factor could have accounted for their reluctance to demonstrate sympathy the second time around.

In 1970, however, the clerical workers themselves struck, and this too, lasting several weeks, was termed "major" by Chi, but it was also not very successful in terms of clerical solidarity. Some of the computer people came in to work the very first day of the strike and other clerical workers drifted back a few at a time over its course. Supervisors were called in to keep the company running while the clerical workers, numbering 400, were out. The supervisors were called "scabs" by the striking workers; there was much name-calling and some damage done to cars. Chi's management claimed that the women were "the worst" of the strikers in those respects. Much of the bitterness remained a year later after the monetary issues which had sparked the strike action were resolved. Most of the "powder-keg" atmosphere was caused, management claims, by the ill feeling which existed between the clerical workers who had held out and those who had drifted back.

Only 100 of the original 400 strikers remain with the firm today; these have been described by Chi's management as "mainly long-service, non-militant people." One of these original strikers, a key-punch operator,
commented on the 1970 strike. She recalls the strike and the atmosphere thus: During the strike, the keypunch operators took their card-drums home so that no one could fill in for them, whereas the programmers, who had not wanted to be in the union in the first place, crossed the line. Her present supervisor was at that time a keypunch operator, had been fairly militant, and had both suggested and participated in removing the drums. After the strike, the company made her a supervisor and she became very pro-company and anti-union. The interviewee theorized that Chi did not want to lose this woman due to the value of the knowledge she had, and was thus "bought off" by being offered a place outside the union ranks, within management. On the other hand, a union steward in their department had been recently fired for reasons which were unclear, making this interviewee extremely suspicious of the company. She stated:

"If you have any brains at all you can tell that he's stepped on the wrong ground—like they say, do the best you can for the girls but whatever you do, don't do this, this and this. I guess it's a matter of playing a role, really."

She also noted that the few labelled as "radicals" in the union membership are the only ones willing to fight for what everyone else wants, while all the others remain marginal and let the activists "take the rap" while they look out for themselves. Union meetings are termed "disastrous" by her—attendance is low, there are few leaders with "pizzazz" to fire up the members, and most are more interested in other concerns and activities in their every-day after-work life which interfere with attendance at meetings. This interviewee believes that benefits for clerical workers are good at Company Chi "despite the union", since the union has "done a lot of bungling," including calling a strike which did little for them. By the same token, management at Chi feels that the relations between workers and management are good, that there are no
attitude problems or any lingering "us-them" feeling once the year after
the strike passed, and that the union is a "responsible" one, unlike the
troublemaking Teamsters.

The union at Company Alpha originated under circumstances much dif-
ferent from those at Company Chi, and much later. There was no employee
association pre-dating the formation of the clerical union. About 1965,
the stimulus to organize came from issues connected with arbitrary treat-
ment and favouritism, particularly from the high-handedness of a department
head and his relations with one particular group of workers. There was
also lack of a clear policy on promotion and no systematic salary system,
with the result that workers became blocked at their salary mid-point with
little between-job mobility. The small, discontented group approached the
Steelworkers and the United Auto Workers; jurisdictionally, since respon-
sibility to help organize belonged to the Steelworkers, it was they who
assisted the Alpha workers. The card-signing went quickly but not smoothly-
many signed up early and the company began sending out anti-union letters
threatening to take away benefits if workers joined. Despite these threats,
the clerical union was certified the same year and negotiated their first
contract (for only three cents an hour more over three years).

More important to the members than small salary increases, however,
was the fact that the job security and salary system issues were resolved
to their satisfaction with the implementation of new systems. A few years
later, the Quebec clerical workers organized.

Company Alpha's labour-management relations were extremely quiet over
its history, but the high-handed methods of the industrial relations manager,
who was called "a real stinker" by several of the office workers, continued
to be a thorn in the side of the clerical union. IN 1968 or 1969 they
attempted to negotiate their second contract and reached an impasse over monetary issues. A strike vote followed with resounding support by the members and the clerical union went out for eight weeks, during which period there was much animosity. The animosity lingered following the strike; the bitter feelings were reflected in the reluctance of non-union personnel who had suffered property damage to deal with or assist the clerical people beside whom they worked.

Soon after the 1970 strike, the Quebec local, faced with an unreasonable personnel manager, also chose to strike. The Ontario local offered their support but were harrassed by company officials and by the Quebec Provincial Police when they attempted to cross into Quebec.

Despite these difficulties, the collective bargaining pattern was eventually established and relations returned to normal. It became customary for the blue-collar union to negotiate with the company and settle its contract before the clerical union bargained. In this way, clerical people tended to benefit from the gains the hourly workers had won, which is a pattern typical in the large corporations. The "me-too" effect was cited by office workers in Delta and Sigma as making unionization unnecessary for them, since they got what was won in other companies by blue-collar workers in large, powerful unions.

The atmosphere at both Alpha's Ontario and Quebec offices is currently described as "calm", and relations as good. The troublesome personnel manager has since been replaced and the new manager is complimented highly both by clerical and other office workers as being reasonable, open to discussion, and possessing a "no-nonsense" approach. The union introduced an appeal system via a qualification test and have been able to get a lateral-move
entitlement introduced for those who are blocked in routine jobs for long periods.

Nevertheless, despite some gains, the clerical union managed to bargain away the posting system. What now replaces it is a system whereby members list their job preferences periodically and if an opening occurs, the Personnel department considers listees as candidates—a system which removes control from the members' hands and was called "Russian roulette" by one clerk. The union president wonders if the atmosphere is "almost too quiet" and despite what he terms a "fair us-them" attitude on the part of the membership, wonders if stewards have been letting things go by and if the company has been allowed to set precedents by creating jobs like that of "analyst" out of kinds of work formerly done by unionized workers. At the same time, however, he blames the low level of militancy on the change in the internal composition of the union. Men used to outnumber women in clerical ranks; women now comprise two-thirds of the membership and are, believed by the union executive to be less willing to act militantly, choosing to "go home and have a good cry" instead.

Most of the clerical people interviewed had little knowledge of union issues; did not know whether the job-listing system represented a bargaining away of the postings, and confessed that they did not attend meetings—a fact confirmed in the questionnaire for both unionized companies.

Unionism will be dealt with further in the final chapters of the thesis. This brief sketch will suffice for now, however, to establish the context in which two of the four corporations' clerical groups work—in an atmosphere which is largely non-militant, membership notably apathetic and unaware of the history of issues.
III SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Demographic data on the overall corporate white-collar populations as well as the sample drawn from it confirm the extent to which clerical work has been "ghettoized". Although clerical are by far the most numerous category of white-collar workers, the clerical background is badly underrepresented within the ranks of supervision and management. On the other hand, technical-professional backgrounds are over-represented. There is also a high degree of class reproduction: clerical workers have reproduced their father's class as proletariat, and technical-professional have reproduced theirs as new middle class.

The demographic data on educational background and career mobility confirm what has already been suggested in Chapter Four regarding the impact of recruitment practices intended to form strictly delimited managerial talent pools: the systematic exclusion of clerical workers as a class. The fact of feminization of clerical ranks coincides with this finding: few technical-professional workers are women, whereas most clerical workers are, and since clerical workers as a class do not rise, neither do the women who fill its ranks. These, then, are the practical consequences of selective and exclusionary recruitment practices over the past thirty or more years. The basis of exclusion, however, is not sex but credentials: those who do not possess valued educational credentials regardless of sex are not included within the ranks of relatively privileged labour, those who do stand to gain in terms both of immediate job features such as pay and autonomy and also of future ones in terms of larger pay increments and potential mobility.

The demographic data also reveal another important characteristic of life in monopoly corporations: very often, employment is permanent (little inter-
firm mobility and increased job security relative to the competitive sector. Workers enter an internal labour market through the ports of entry designated by corporate hiring practices at the bottom of appropriate job-grade hierarchies (generally, clerical ranks for the non-degreed and technical-professional ranks for the degreed), and must make their way over a lengthy period of time through the hierarchy. Even for those possessing degrees and starting in a higher job hierarchy, upward mobility to middle-to-senior management levels generally takes about twenty years (although many technical-professional workers are given the opportunity to experience supervisory or junior managerial positions within their first ten years with the corporation). Despite the seemingly incessant movement between job grades, however, little upward mobility in class terms occurs: the lines between clerical and new middle class are extremely rigid, the lines separating new middle class from the bourgeoisie slightly more permeable, but the narrowing pyramid of control prevents movement for many of either class.

The existence of a large group of the immobile, combined with emphasis on individual occupational achievement taught in the educational system as a result of liberal-democratic ideology, represents a potential control problem for the dominant class.

Part of the problem is solved in the case of female clerical workers: women have been assumed to be less ambitious than men in the past and at any rate prone to the "interrupted career pattern" which will, corporations hope, do much to eliminate them from the competitive race. Part of the problem also seems to be solved by class reproduction and the existence of a subordinate value system: the working class will reproduce in its next generation a fatalistic acceptance of their lot in life. Clerical workers
have additionally gone through a selection process via the school system and the personnel department: those who are employed in corporations have proven they can adjust to a life of steady employment, tedium and subordination within large-scale bureaucracies. To a certain extent they are a malleable labour force as well as possessing qualities valued by those selecting them: they are reasonably respectful, punctual and careful, well-mannered and enthusiastic. They will blend in with a middle-class milieu without being too disruptive in terms of demands. (In the past, this led to unionization at two of the firms and the other two wish to avoid the same fate.)

Data on corporate atmosphere in Chapter Four, together with the history of unionization in two of the four firms, suggest yet another feature of corporate office life: the climate is one dominated by middle-class norms of harmony, efficiency and decorum—it is an atmosphere not conducive to a militant world-view; to challenge that order is construed as challenging the professionalism of management.

As Chapters Two and Three have argued, however, the atmosphere within white-collar offices is one also saturated with the rhetoric of careers; corporations must maintain a balance between priming the aspirations pump unrealistically and having workers withdraw into apathy or resist efforts to control them. Workers must be united ideologically around the same orientations of competition for upward mobility and recognition of individual merit while being divided within their own ranks. The presence of clerical unions exacerbates the problem but may be circumvented by the application of other practices which downplay the union-nonunion line. Thus, the same practices which produce the ideological effect of uniting workers in commitment to meritocratic individualism and which also produces psychic
divisions as a consequence may come back to haunt their corporate designers, as the data in Chapter Seven will show.

The argument of this thesis is that managerial practices control labour via distribution into hierarchies and by political subjection, and mask the nature of this subjection through ideological means. These are contradictory tasks; asking workers, in effect, to participate in their own subjection in return for rewards and to take on personnel responsibility for success or failure in this implies that if they follow through the logic of the ideology, it will come into contradiction with the denial of their ability to control conditions affecting careers.

This chapter and Chapter Four have addressed one of the two questions raised in the introductory chapter: the nature and impact of managerial practices of recruitment and selection on careers (that is, in the objective sense of the class structuring of opportunity). The next three chapters will deal with the second question: how does the experience of the career (in the subjective sense) affect class awareness.
CHAPTER SIX:
ADAPTATIONS TO REALITIES OF THE
"CAREER": DATA FROM FOUR FIRMS

This chapter and the next are concerned with how white-collar workers perceive their immediate work-situation in terms of opportunity and relative advantages or disadvantages. The discussion in these chapters is cast in the language of the workplace familiar to workers—to speak of opportunity is to subscribe to a vocabulary of meritocratic individualism and not to question why it is (or even if it should be) the language of work. The extent to which the managerial practices contained within the particular ideological climate or atmosphere within each firm affects workers' perceptions will be assessed.

In Chapter Seven, the implications of the acceptance of such a vocabulary and its accompanying "muddying" of perceptions will be discussed in terms of the obscuring of the nature of domination within capitalist hierarchies and the way in which conflict potential is transformed. Finally, Chapter Eight, the last of the three chapters reporting on and interpreting the interviews and questionnaire data, will deal with the more general implications for class consciousness and class conflict.

In each case, workers' accounts of their situation require "translation" into the language of class analysis; its absence from workers' accounts says something significant about the workings of ideology at the "everyday" level and about the way in which various managerial practices contribute their ideological effects.
I PERCEPTIONS OF OPPORTUNITY

It will be recalled from the theoretical discussion in Chapter Three, concerned with the ideological significance of practices which manage careers and "develop" individuals, that the experience of the "career" calls out qualities and orientations which prior socialization has created. Even those workers who have "only a job, not a career," it is argued, respond to the careerist atmosphere because they are contained within structures wherein exclusion is couched not in class terms but in the language of individual merit deficiencies. Experience of the career via the opportunity structure and the practices connected with it has been internalized with positive or negative implications for the self, including self-blame for failure to get ahead. It could be hypothesized, therefore, that even clerical workers would be preoccupied with the opportunity structure and with conditions for "making it," the same as technical-professional workers are but to a lesser degree of success and optimism.

That workers feel comfortable with or have no difficulty understanding issues couched in career language is evidence of the efficacy of control through the indirect and ideologically loaded mechanism of career. This control is also confirmed by the lack of workers' ability to discuss issues in conflict language or to challenge the legitimacy of the dominant mode of discourse. The language of individualism and mobility, of course, represents the ideological power of capitalism and sets the stage for the resultant competitive isolation of workers. This, then, is the theoretical reasoning behind asking workers in interviews and in the questionnaires to talk about their opportunities. If workers readily and spontaneously discuss opportunity and promotion but are not easily led to discuss issues in the language
of class conflict, it is indirect confirmation of the pervasiveness of
the dominant ideology. The question may then be raised: to what extent
do managerial practices at the workplace level aid this process? The
first section of the chapter will be concerned with this language of
opportunity and with how realistically workers are able to interpret their
situation; the balance of the chapter will go on to analyse workers' per-
ceptions of the practices themselves.

Twenty-five of the 91 interviewees were in the clerical-support group.
More than half of these clerical interviewees had had aspirations before
entering office employment, but only four were currently in positions to
which they had aspired. Nine (36%) had originally aspired to non-clerical
work, but had been forced to modify their expectations due to personal
circumstances such as lack of finances or lack of education, or because
they were deterred when they weighed the costs of aspiring higher against
available job openings. The balance of those who mentioned having any
aspirations were not as specific—they expressed a vague desire to "get
ahead" but males and females alike were uncertain how this might come
about. In addition, females tended to be aware of the possibility of a
work history interrupted by childrearing, and they were also aware of the
handicaps of being female in a male-dominated corporate world.

Questionnaire respondents as well often expressed non-clerical
aspirations, usually within the corporate realm, such as the position of
supervisor or manager, or a position in a technical-professional area.
About 40% in all three groups stated that they aspired to a supervisory
or managerial position. Over three-quarters in all groups also did not
dislike anything about the idea of promotion. In other words, all were
"sold" on the value of upward mobility, at least in the abstract (although,
as will be shown in Chapter Seven, when asked to rank promotion opportunity as a reason for choosing a job, most ranked it lower than intrinsic interest and other non-monetary, non-opportunity items).

Interviewees were asked what they thought their opportunities were to advance beyond their present level and beyond clerical work. Most of the clerical interviewees either expressed their contentment at present with clerical work (often despite their original aspirations being thwarted), or expressed resignation that they would probably go no further. Thus, along with their abstract commitment to advancement went the situationally more realistic appraisal of their chances, a shifting of levels of analysis which Parkin (1973) argued was characteristic of the subordinate value-system (see Chapter Three).

Fourteen (56%) of the 25 clerical interviewees did, however, perceive themselves as having a few options of a kind which would require no further academic education and which (theoretically at least) could be achieved with on-the-job training and perhaps a related practical course or two. These options included supervision of other clerical workers and options usually labelled as generalist rather than specialist work: buying, personnel, traffic, and office services. Some also felt that computer-related work, accounting, or similar kinds of analysis and information-research work were also options which required little training; these observations were based on their experience of those areas through their clerical work.

Those who noted these "generalist" options, however, also noted that graduate recruits tended to be preferred for these kinds of positions and that management considered non-degreed people as unsuitable candidates. Clerical interviewees considered this a rather negative attitude on the part
of management, since in their own experience and based on what they
could see of these kinds of work, there appeared to be no reason why
clerical people with intelligence and sufficient company background could
not learn to do the work after some introductory job-related training.
To a certain extent, they questioned the legitimacy of this practice based
on their knowledge of what trainees did, but it was not a systematic
critique, nor, as Chapter Seven will show, did they connect it to class
disadvantage and their own subordination.

Nearly all of the clerical interviewees (20 of the 25, or 80%) believed
that opportunities to move out of clerical ranks were poor. There was little
variation in this feeling by individual company. Sixteen of the 20 felt
that the reason for this pessimism had to do with their education—their
lack of a degree or of a certificated specialty. Four of the sixteen felt
that they were handicapped because they were stereotyped as "female and
a secretary," a combination which carried with it the connotation that
they were contented to spend their lives in nurturant and subordinate
servicing roles. Two felt that their progress was blocked as a direct
result of corporate policies which favoured the hiring of graduate recruits.
On the whole, therefore, their pessimism was grounded in their perceived
failings as individuals and not in corporate practices.

In addition to expressing pessimism regarding present promotion
opportunities, ten interviewees (all over age 30 and with relatively long
company service) observed that opportunities for clerical advancement
had declined over time even within their own memory. This decline, they felt,
was due to a number of factors: increasing emphasis on degrees and
specialization; lack of new developments such as computerization into which
clerical people could work their way from the "ground floor";
the down-grading of some jobs which had previously been avenues of upward mobility such as the work of sales correspondent or sales representative or the firm's policy of reserving these for the training of graduate recruits. These clerical interviewees, due to their longer service, had become careful observers of the corporate upward mobility scene and had come to the conclusion that they had been by-passed because, among other reasons, the corporation had changed the rules of the game. On the whole, however, their observations were made with little resentment towards the company but with some regret that changes had occurred.

Despite their original aspirations, most clerical interviewees now thought of promotion only in terms of movement through clerical ranks. The existence of finely graded job and salary hierarchies within clerical work would certainly facilitate this kind of thinking when accompanied by the reality of limited upward mobility opportunities beyond clerical work. The result was a lowering of expectations, a limiting of vision, but workers continued to remain self-blaming, hence isolated as individuals from fellow workers who shared their plight.

It is instructive to compare the clerical interviewees with the non-clerical, since there are differences in orientations which appear to be accounted for by differences in experience of work situation and opportunity-structure.

Technical-professional and supervisory-managerial interviewees did not dwell on early career aspirations and did not seem to consider it relevant to their current experiences, since few interviewees broached the subject spontaneously. Its irrelevance for supervisors and managers was obvious: most felt they had reached their objective, which had been to go into management; this statement was made even by those who were at the lower levels of the management hierarchy, apparently as an adjustment of
expectations that they would go no further due to personal handicaps. Technical-professional people, on the other hand, had not yet "arrived"; at their career stage, with more youth and less company service than supervisors or managers, their pragmatism took a different form: if a route of future mobility seemed to be a viable one, the opportunity and their aspirations became synonymous.

Among these non-clerical interviewees, avenues of previously experienced mobility and individual background characteristics were related to their interpretation of factors affecting further mobility. For the non-degreed, those who had experienced mobility into non-clerical ranks from clerical or blue-collar work (32% of technical-professional and 60% of supervisory-managerial interviewees), the perceived handicap was lack of a university degree. For the others, who had had degrees when they entered the firm at non-clerical levels, the interpretive ground shifted to the effects of "pyramiding": too few openings for the number of aspirants as one approached the top. Although these were the most frequent explanations (38% in both groups); non-clerical workers' analysis of opportunity-restricting factors was more complex than clerical workers'. It often included mention of other factors along with education and pyramiding: streaming (including the labelling of specialists as "staff types" rather than "line types"); "parachuting" of outsiders into the firm into levels above them, age-grading, and the state of the vacancy-chain. Like clerical workers, a few long-service people also noted the changes which occurred to restrict the opportunity-structure over time.

Unlike clerical workers, however, all but a rare non-clerical case could think of at least one or two viable career-route options open to them despite perceived personal limitations. Nevertheless, a third of all technical-professional interviewees saw themselves as "dead-ended" in only one or two moves more, and a small minority of supervisory-managerial people
avoided discussing options entirely by expressing no interest in further promotion.

In the questionnaire, two kinds of questions were intended to draw out employees' perceptions of similar subjects of concern. They were asked to identify the qualities which they felt were necessary for advancement, and to assess which kinds of hiring practices they felt might have an impact on the advancement of people like themselves.

When asked which of the following qualities was the most important factor in promotion: education/certification; ability/merit; connections; or seniority, most respondents chose ability or merit. This response was chosen by 43% of clerical workers, by 54% of technical-professional workers, and by 65% of supervisory-managerial workers. The second most frequently chosen response was "connections" for clerical and technical-professional workers (24% and 26% respectively), whereas only 14% of supervisory-managerial chose it. For supervisors and managers, education/certification was the second most frequent choice (19%).

Responses were also analysed by individual corporations and it was found that the aggregated data had masked some inter-firm variability. In Companies Alpha and Chi, the two with clerical unions, the ability/merit choice predominated in all occupational class groups. But in Companies Delta and Sigma (where clerical workers were not unionized) it was not the overwhelming choice by clerical workers (although it was among non-clerical). Fifty per cent of clerical workers in Company Delta chose "connections" (ability/merit took second place), and in Company Sigma ability/merit was tied with education/certification (40% each). These differences appear to be related to differences in the character of each company. Education is played up in Company Sigma; interviews there confirmed the general awareness which clerical people had of the importance
of degrees. In Company Delta, most were aware of an "old-boy" network and of the tendency for one's relatives to also be employed in the firm, hence "connections" is an understandable choice.

With some variation in frequency, ability/merit tends to be the most frequent choice, indicating that despite modification of perceptions by experience in a particular firm, "meritocratic" thinking predominates as a generally shared social conviction and value. Those who would play the career game must first be convinced that liberal-democratic ideals are not violated in practice. Most respondents accepted these values, but many were also aware of the more "political" aspects of making a career, as will be discussed in subsequent sections. The co-existence of pure merit and "politics" tended to create some cynicism among clerical people, as it did among other groups, but most maintained their faith in meritocratic ideals.

What seemed paradoxical was that clerical people, the least well-educated of the three groups, did not choose education/certification with greater frequency. Interviews showed, however, that although clerical people perceived lack of education as being a handicap, they often went on to speak of their own prospects in terms of promotion within their own ranks, where education was not a factor. Interviews also showed that employees in all three occupational-class groups tended to view education as important to "getting a foot in the door" and that from this point, other factors became more important--both meritocratic as well as "political" factors. Supervisory-managerial people were the most consistent in their belief both in merit and in education--but then, they had experienced sufficient mobility that no dissonance was set up between ideal and real; for them, proof was in the promotional pudding.
It would be expected that where special hiring and promotion practices exist and are highly visible, such as a graduate recruitment programme or a posting scheme for filling vacancies, these would be identified as having an impact on opportunity. Questionnaire respondents were asked for their opinion about such practices, including the practice of hiring already experienced workers from outside the firm (a supposedly relevant consideration since the logic of the "internal labour market" is violated when bottom-up progressions are blocked).

The data partly confirmed these expectations. In Alpha and Chi, the two clerical-unionized companies, postings were very relevant to clerical respondents—53% and 69% of them, respectively, chose postings as affecting promotion. Interestingly, however, it was not completely irrelevant to clerical workers in Delta and Sigma where posting schemes did not exist—although not a predominant category, it was nevertheless chosen by 14% and 29% of clerical workers respectively.

Graduate hiring, however, was not necessarily identified as having an impact on opportunity—only 7% of Delta's clerical workers chose it, as opposed to 38% of Sigma's. It was in Company Sigma that graduate hiring has been "played up" and hence quite visible to clerical workers. Its visibility had the same effect on technical-professional workers, of whom 59% identified graduate hiring as having an impact on opportunity. With a few exceptions, however, non-clerical groups tended not to consider postings and graduate hiring as being relevant (at least in and of themselves)—non-clerical workers tended to choose "none of these" (see Table 6-1).

Interviews confirm that non-clerical workers consider background and the circumstances under which one entered corporate employment as being part of a complex of factors affecting opportunity and promotion, a complex which included being "visible" and establishing networks and connections.
Clerical workers, then, despite their awareness of their own lack of education, tend not to perceive the hiring of graduate recruits as affecting their opportunities. The solution to this paradox is suggested by the interview data. Lack of a degree is not considered to be a handicap under the following conditions:

(1) where postings exist and draw attention to a rational and systematic distribution of existing clerical opportunities;
(2) when sights are not raised beyond clerical ranks;
(3) where sights are raised, degrees are less visible and their existence is not emphasized by the corporation via such lines of distinction as union-nonunion or exempt-nonexempt employee groups.

Thus, corporate atmosphere and the availability of alternative practices would seem to account for inter-firm differences in clerical perceptions. Under such circumstances, it does not seem to them to be a hopeless exercise to play a less ambitious career game within the constraints of their limited resources. There is hope as well as cause for self-blame, thus reinforcing clerical workers' competitive isolation.

( Table 6-1 about here )

To sum up, examination of Table 6-1 reveals wide variation in responses to the issue of what practices have an impact on opportunity; these seem to be related to inter-firm differences in atmosphere and practices. Sigma, the most elitist company in its visible emphasis on graduate hiring, has produced the highest awareness of the impact of graduates with no countering policies such as postings. On the other hand, Chi has apparently "democratized" selection both due to its programmes aimed at counselling workers and due to its practice of posting jobs up to and including supervisory
ranks; Chi's management has effectively diluted the impact of elitist practices while continuing to be as elitist as Sigma. Paternalistic Delta management has also created conditions in which workers' attention has been redirected, but since it has no postings system and no union, workers attribute their opportunity problems to other factors—nepotism and the authoritarian control by the "old boys." Laissez-faire in style, Alpha's management practices have created some focus on graduate hiring but its impact has been somewhat diluted by the problems of the union and the postings which were bargained away.

Significantly, clerical workers in each firm tended to resemble that firm's non-clerical workers more than they resembled fellow clerical in other firms. It would seem logical, therefore, to interpret this to mean that neither class location nor the firm's managerial practices in themselves necessarily account for how clerical and other workers will interpret their situation of relative advantage or disadvantage. Rather, these are being mediated by stylistic differences in application of practices, a finding not readily predicted if managerial practices were viewed as having a direct and unmediated impact. They are part of a field of factors affecting perceptions.

A. The Relationship Between Ideal and Real

Questionnaire respondents were asked to assess the status of their present job in terms of its relationship to future ones to which they could conceivably advance; the response categories were: "dead-end"; "in training"; "holding position"; and "on the ladder. Respondents were also asked to assess the extent of opportunity which they perceived existing in their firm for people like themselves (many, few, better for those not at the bottom, and improving with education, which were later collapsed into two dichotomous categories, "optimistic" and "pessimistic"). The results were
cross-tabulated to determine the extent to which there was congruity between idealized beliefs in a system based on opportunity and one's real-life perception and experience of the work-world.

All three occupational-class groups rejected the view that one's opportunities were better if one did not start at the bottom (only 12-15% chose this response). The other pessimistic category, "opportunities are available only for a few," was chosen by 34% of technical-professional respondents and by 30% of clerical, but only by 18% of supervisory-managerial. There appears to be some dissonance-reduction involved. Those who are at the bottom cannot admit their opportunities are few and still harbour some hopes of upward mobility; those who have become mobile into management must sustain the belief that those like themselves may rise from the bottom even though circumstances which favoured past mobility have changed. The "way out" of recognizing the uncomfortable facts of limited mobility prospects is to believe that if one had more education it would be a different story—36% of clerical, 32% of technical-professional and 40% of supervisory-managerial chose the view that opportunities improve with education. It is a belief consistent with the view that education is a necessary part of the operation of meritocracy.

On the other hand, the most optimistic view, that there were many opportunities for all, unqualified by any other considerations, drew almost as little support among clerical and technical-professional workers as did the view that opportunities were better for those not at the bottom—22% of clerical, 20% of technical-professional, and 29% of supervisory-managerial respondents were extreme optimists. Thus, although there was some reality-testing, all categories of workers tended not to see the full, structured extent of opportunity inequality because their focal-point was individual advantage or disadvantage, not group or class ones.
When the response categories were dichotomized into "optimistic" (many for all, and improves with education), and "pessimistic" (not at bottom, and only a few), clerical and supervisory-managerial respondents tended to be more optimistic than did technical-professional (see Table 6-2). Technical-professional workers, midway between clerical and management in the corporate hierarchy, are not only aware of the limited opportunities clerical people have in relation to their own (interviews confirm this), but are also aware that superior education merely opens the door to yet another competitive field with new game-rules. Theirs seems to be the more realistic interpretation of reality, probably because their need for dissonance-reduction (at least concerning opportunity) is less than those closer to the extreme ends of the hierarchy.

( Table 6-2 about here )

When the responses were examined by individual firm, it was found that great variability existed, particularly within the clerical group (see Table 6-3). In all corporations, supervisory-managerial people were predominately optimistic (centering around the category "improves with education", rather than unqualified optimism); this optimism holds despite the fact that the vacancy chain will soon be opened by massive retirements in Alpha and Sigma but has just been closed in Chi by the succession of a relatively young management group, and in Delta there exists a fairly old and static management structure. The reasons for their optimism would appear to lie elsewhere, probably in acceptance of a liberal-democratic ideology for which supervisors and managers become both examples and "good-
will" ambassadors. Their vested interests in the belief have been rewarded and they in turn reward others.

The most optimistic clerical and technical-professional groups are in companies Chi and Sigma (that opportunities are "many" or that they "improve with education"). It is in these two companies that education is most emphasized publicly and there is also a great deal of visibility in activity on the part of the Personnel Department connected with career development. The difference between Chi and Sigma, however, is that Sigma also makes clerical people aware of the amount of attention given to graduates, whereas in Chi a more egalitarian atmosphere is conveyed--the degree-degreeless line is downplayed via the posting system extending into lower supervision. Employees there have more reason for believing that for them, ideal and real will coincide.

In Companies Alpha and Delta, the pessimistic view of few opportunities is shared by both clerical and technical-professional people. It is in these two corporations that career development is neither visible nor systematic, where there is no posting system, and where technical-professional specialists feel "stuck" due to the static vacancy chain and the existence of too many similarly qualified aspirants.

Thus, the corporate atmosphere surrounding career development would seem to be the factor which accounts for the most variability in the perceptions of clerical and technical-professional groups, while supervisory-managerial are optimistic regardless of climate.

( Table 6-3 about here )

Table 6-3 summarizes this variability. Again, the elitist management of Sigma has highlighted the exclusionary nature of its practices even as
it had highlighted its hiring of graduates; this, being the most visible, workers have focussed on its existence as an explanation for the extent of their opportunity. On the other hand, Chi's management has created a "democratized" atmosphere by de-emphasizing education as an overriding factor and emphasizing individual possibility with the help of other programmes such as postings. As education linked to the hiring of an elite is de-emphasized, it seems, pessimism decreases but only if opportunity is not perceived as being affected by other corporate factors. The managements of laissez-faire Alpha and paternalistic, authoritarian Delta have done little to ameliorate the effects on opportunity of a disorganized or rigid management structure, and workers have become attuned to this. Thus again, existence of certain exclusionary practices have had their effects mediated by other factors in the immediate work environment. Workers have "tested" the ideals of meritocratic individualism and found them in need of modification, but they have not abandoned the belief itself; instead, they have merely blamed the firm when the workings of merit are impeded. As long as they continued to subscribe to the belief even in modified form, they will not de-legitimize the system nor see common cause with others (at least as far as individual promotion is concerned).

Table 6-4 gives the results of cross-tabulation between the above question and the question wherein respondents are asked to identify the status of their position in the context of future opportunities. It reveals that only supervisory-managerial people continue to be optimistic regardless of whether they consider their job to be "dead end", whereas clerical and technical-professional who feel themselves to be dead-ended are more often pessimistic regarding opportunities. This tendency persisted despite corporate variability on other dimensions, and may be interpreted to mean
that for some workers at least, their opportunity situation "breaks through" and they are perhaps less influenced by the subtle nuances of individual corporate styles---being stuck is being stuck despite the fancy trappings; having defined themselves in this manner, to these workers nothing else is relevant. Nevertheless, as subsequent chapters will show, they remain individualistic in their interpretations and do not make connections to the class basis of the workplace. Pessimism often leads to apathy, not to class analysis.

(Table 6-4 about here)

About half of all clerical and technical-professional respondents felt that in terms of the relationship between their present and future jobs, they were in a "dead-end" position or a "holding" position, whereas only a third of supervisory-managerial respondents felt this way.

About one-quarter more supervisory-managerial respondents felt that they were "on the ladder" than did clerical and technical-professional. This is not surprising, since "the ladder" is generally thought to be the line leading to management and most in this group felt they had arrived even if they could go no further. What is surprising, however, is that slightly more clerical than technical-professional respondents also felt they were "on the ladder." Interviews reveal that since many clerical people restrict their focus to higher job grades only within the clerical ranks, any avenues open to higher clerical levels will be considered upward mobility; hence they are on one kind of ladder which ends at the ranks that would make technical-professional people feel very dead-ended indeed. On the other hand, since technical-professional people have as their reference-point
senior staff positions or management, interviews suggest that those who feel they have been labelled as "specialist" or "staff" types feel their mobility has been blocked.

Table 6-5 sets out the two response categories "dead-end/holding" and "on the ladder" by individual firm. For clerical workers who think of themselves as "on the ladder," there is very little inter-firm variability, whereas for technical-professional and supervisory-managerial who so regard themselves, the variability is considerable. Company Chi has the relatively young senior management structure—and it is in this firm that supervisory-managerial people "next in line" tend to feel blocked. Company Alpha has a relatively old management structure, as does Sigma, but Alpha's career development programme is felt by many employees to be haphazard, which would explain the extremely high number of technical-professional people (60%) who consider themselves dead-ended there. This variability within the non-clerical ranks suggests that perceptions of these groups are being affected by "local" factors in each company: the state of the vacancy chain and the confidence in career development policies to identify mobility eligibles. For clerical workers, however, the group which exhibits the least inter-firm variability, interviews suggest that when they see themselves as dead-ended they do so chiefly because clerical work is dead-end and the line between themselves and the potentially mobile is a fairly hard and fast one.

One would have to conclude from examination of the responses in Table 6-5 that although many employees accept to some extent the liberal-democratic rhetoric of opportunity and meritocracy, their circumstances within a particular corporate setting force them to be somewhat more realistic in assessing their prospects—but that this assessment does not cause them to
question the structures in which their career fate is worked out. Some tension nevertheless exists between the ideal and the real (the abstract belief and the situational interpretation).

( Table 6-5 about here )

The next section will deal with other aspects of corporate policies and employees' perceptions of them, and it will become more apparent why for the vast majority, neither ambivalence nor criticism of management practices leads to widespread cynicism or to de-legitimation of the logic of the system in which they are located.
II PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE CAREER POLICIES

In the in-depth interviews, employees were asked about their reaction to corporate career development policies in general and asked to assess from their own standpoint company-employee communications related to careers. They were also asked about their experiences with the performance review system and invited to make comments on what some had suggested as partial solutions to employee criticisms: job postings, career counselling, and job rotation.

Twenty-three clerical-support group interviewees had something to say on these topics. Eighteen of the 23 were critical of the corporation for having career development policies which did not adequately serve clerical people's needs. Thirteen of the 23 were critical of the performance review system. Seventeen felt feedback and communications between the corporation and employees was poor or inadequate.

In all but Company Chi, almost every interviewee was critical of clerical career development. Chi's management had tried to appeal to clerical workers by starting a career counselling programme and by posting job vacancies up to and including lower supervisory levels. Although Alpha also had a posting system, it did not post jobs beyond the clerical union levels and Alpha's management had been heavily criticized by all groups of interviewees for its "benign neglect" of career development needs. This neglect it shared with Company Delta's management. Examination of corporate management statements confirm impressions of the interviewees--Alpha and Delta were the least systematic; on the other hand, Sigma was systematic but excluded clerical people.

Six clerical interviewees mentioned that they were critical of corporate career development attempts because they did not have any way of knowing what jobs were opening up and what was needed in the way of training, qualifications or experience to fill them. Six more specifically
blamed their supervisors for the general lack of dialogue. Six also mentioned that there was no information given on what one's chances to progress were. Four felt that, like comparative salary and job-grade information, the corporation was secretive about letting employees in general know what the basis of promotion was and that consequently, one had to make a personal judgment about what qualities to cultivate.

Nine of the 23 clerical interviewees linked the function of the performance review to career development in terms of being the place where it was appropriate to have dialogue with supervisors about what one's aspirations were. These expectations were violated in their experience when only current job performance was discussed with them. In cases where aspirations had been dealt with verbally, four interviewees felt that the corporation did not follow up by responding to their needs and desires even after a long wait.

There were no positive comments about the performance review system even at Company Sigma, where the system had recently been overhauled to explicitly link "work effectiveness" with "development." However, despite the fact that three interviewees noted that the power differential between supervisor and employee was too great to make the review a meaningful and open dialogue, there was no de-legitimation of the review as being a weapon used against workers by corporations to control effort. Employees simply accepted the fact that management had to evaluate people and that salary level would be affected by good or poor reviews of them.

Four of the 23 did recognize, however, that opportunities for career development were too dependent on the immediate supervisor. Whenever difficulties were mentioned, the cause of the difficulty was often the personal characteristics and approach of the supervisor as well as his/her vested interests in retaining experienced people in the department--it
was never the fault of the "system." If the Personnel Department did not change things very much, the reason was attributed to their being in a weak position in the corporation, and this lack of power hindered their ability to direct the career development process, so workers were at the mercy of immediate supervisors career-wise.

Eleven of the 23 interviewees were annoyed that there was so much emphasis on hiring graduate recruits and on taking courses in their corporation. Graduate hiring was viewed as cutting off clerical opportunities because many clerical-like positions were "reserved" for graduate trainees. Encouragement of course-taking created a glut of aspirants with credentials acquired from part-time study (such as the R.I.A.--Registered Industrial Accountant) when there was a shortage of openings. While corporate Personnel Department management criticized clerical people for not being ambitious enough to take courses, clerical people criticized the corporation for not letting them know the extent of opportunity so that they could weigh the risks and costs of taking courses against the possibility of getting ahead.

Although most interviewees accepted that much of the responsibility for getting ahead lay with the individual, they felt that this self-development was handicapped by lack of information and lack of attention on the company's part. In other words, the corporation was not meeting them halfway in playing the career game, and they simply did not know enough about potentialities. Most felt, however, that if they did their work as competently as they could, the company would eventually "discover" them and give them opportunities to get ahead. Only those who had had some experience with this "discovery" system and had had time to observe the graduate recruits by-passing them were more cynical--but also more resigned to accepting their lot.

Not so surprisingly, 17 out of 23 clerical interviewees favoured some
sort of posting system, particularly if it extended beyond clerical ranks. Only two interviewees were opposed to the idea. The positive regard which these workers held for postings varied little by corporation regardless of whether or not the corporation already had such a system (between two-thirds and three-quarters of the interviewees favoured postings). Those in favour of it believed that more information would be available to them on what kinds of opportunities were available. Undoubtedly, knowing this information and being able to apply for a job within the internal job market of the corporation signified to them the ability to exercise some individual control over their own fate. Indeed, some interviewees explicitly stated that postings would partly make up for some career development neglect on the part of the corporation. When the system was extended beyond clerical levels, they felt it would facilitate their upward movement. Postings, then, represented a strategy aimed at individual initiative and the response to it was individualistic, despite postings having been originally won by collective action.

In addition to postings, five interviewees felt that a job-rotation system should be implemented between clerical jobs and clerical-oriented departments to relieve some of the monotony and mental stagnation as well as the problem of blockages created by clerical people who "sat" on their jobs with no desire to move. Two went further: corporations needed a centralized counselling system to assist those who needed information about logically related areas and what qualifications were needed for various jobs. Such devices tended to be viewed as ways of getting around low clerical career ceilings and of alleviating somewhat the handicap which clerical people had in competition with graduate recruits.
Clearly, most clerical workers accepted the necessity for competition and the value of upward mobility, and the basis of their disaffection with corporate policies or their approval of others was the assistance or handicap it presented for them as individuals competing against one another. The language of career development policies has found resonance with the already socialized value-orientations of workers and they form a seamless whole from which workers have difficulty extricating themselves.

In this respect they are similar to the non-clerical workers but reap none of the benefits. Content-analysis of the non-clerical interviews revealed that a number of similar themes ran through their discussion of corporate career-development policies.

Like clerical workers, the majority (two-thirds) of both technical-professional and supervisory-managerial interviewees were critical of corporate career development. Technical-professional people were particularly critical of company-employee communication and feedback on career matters. The one important difference between clerical and other interviewees was that for non-clerical, the performance review was used for communicating aspirations and chances for promotion; nevertheless, technical-professional people were still critical of the unclear relationship between the review and future outcomes, particularly when management was inconsistent and did not follow up. Like clerical workers, they did not question the power aspect of reviews, although they did note that individual supervisors could distort the review process and cause it to be less objective. Only supervisors and managers were not very critical of reviews (probably because they themselves participated in applying them to their subordinates).

Like clerical workers, non-clerical interviewees felt management over-emphasized formal qualifications such as degrees, thus over-inflating job
requirements. Most of these critics did not possess degrees, however; it was clear from other comments that they were aware of their competitive disadvantages. Only a small minority of technical-professional interviewees with degrees had mixed feelings about being an elite of sorts but at the same time, continued to be critical of their company for not going far enough to develop clerical people. A few went so far as to say that, in the words of one Sigma systems analyst, such people were not getting "the full treatment they would have gotten if they had had a university degree" (he was among the six cases, 18% of technical-professional interviewees, who were cynical regarding the company's treatment of individuals).

Most non-clerical interviewees tempered their criticism with a faith that if only companies could be more systematic and if Personnel Departments had more centralized control over career development in the functional areas, one's career could be less happenstance. About half of these interviewees mentioned some variation on this "rationality" theme, such as stated by another Sigma systems analyst:

"I think the one thing that is missing in this organization is delivering training to the appropriate level. We specialize in training for management...we are really lacking in plain-talk at the lower levels, the nitty-gritty, the nuts and bolts of being a first-line supervisor or working in a Joe-job and pulling yourself up by your bootstraps."

Non-clerical interviewees echoed clerical in the belief that responsibility for developing a career lay with the individual, but that this should be in conjunction with corporate programmes which would assist individuals in this personal task by supplying needed information and feedback.

A point of contrast between clerical and non-clerical interviewees was the confident and articulate manner in which particularly technical-
professional workers discussed career making. They were very self-consciously careerist and calculating, as the following representative quotation reveals:

"Every three to six months, I review where I'm going, I question in my mind if I'm going in the right direction... You've got to take control, the company isn't some sort of paternalistic entity... I'm telling you things I probably didn't know five years ago... To promote yourself, but you don't do it flagrantly. You have to have style as well as substance." (male, marketing representative, Sigma)

Nevertheless, regardless of the extent of their criticism of corporate career development and their self-confident careerism, most non-clerical interviewees came inevitably to the same theme of personal responsibility and self-blame:

"Now, if you're competing, and assuming all things are equal—driving force, intuitive abilities and things like that—if you're going to go against an M.B.A., you're the loser... Like, I've limited myself [by not obtaining an M.B.A.]." (male, accountant, Delta)

In all three occupational-class groups, it is a safe conclusion to suggest that the subject of upward mobility, career-making, and individual responsibility is one that may go challenged in its details but not in its overall logic. Many of the points of criticism raised were similar across employee groups, although the frequency of response varied. This patterning suggests a shared definition of reality, a sort of consensus, which crosses hierarchical lines and is shared even by those who have the least incentive for believing in it, the clerical workers. Not surprisingly, they were also the most critical of policies, the least articulate and knowledgeable about them, and the least confident about asserting themselves. Inter-group differences in the amount of criticism were greater than inter-firm differences (despite differences in the degree to which firms were systematic). Table 6-6 summarizes the interview material.
Questionnaire respondents also were asked how satisfied they were with the way their corporation handled the development of careers, and whether or not only management and not employees should have the say in career matters.

Half of the respondents in all three occupational-class groups stated that they were "moderately satisfied" with the way the corporation handled career development. About a quarter of clerical and technical-professional respondents chose the "very satisfied" or "very dissatisfied" extremes; on the other hand, 30% of supervisory-managerial respondents stated they were very satisfied and only 12% were very dissatisfied.

Of the three groups, technical-professional respondents had the highest frequency of dissatisfaction (29%) followed closely by clerical (23%). The dissatisfaction frequency for these two groups was roughly double that for supervisory-managerial, reflecting the fact that even if low on the management ladder, supervisory-managerial people had "arrived" and were therefore the most likely to feel that the corporation had done a few things in managing their opportunities. Although clerical respondents had the lowest rate of great satisfaction, their rate of great dissatisfaction was actually six percentage points below technical-professional. The group which should have been the most dissatisfied, judging from their objective situation, actually subjectively judged their situation less harshly than did technical-professional people, who started higher in the hierarchy and had higher personal expectations.

The level of dissatisfaction for all three groups was highest in Company Delta (25-43%) and lowest in Company Chi (6-19%). These findings
(see Table 6.7) suggest that inter-corporate differences in career development policies and the atmosphere in which they are carried out may account for differences in employee perceptions.

In Companies Alpha and Chi, there are posting systems and unions for clerical people (and the findings reported on previously show that these account for a great deal of satisfaction, since both affect perceptions of opportunity). These programmes do not exist in Companies Delta and Sigma, nor did there appear to clerical people to be much corporate interest in their careers; in fact at Sigma, corporate attention being so visibly directed at non-clerical graduate recruits would be a source of additional dissatisfaction (43% of clerical workers were very dissatisfied there).

Corporate career development practices were the most visible and systematic in Companies Chi and Sigma, while in Alpha and Delta they were less systematic and less communicated about by the corporations, thus it is not surprising that Alpha and Delta would have the highest levels of dissatisfaction for technical-professional workers. Supervisory-managerial also had a high frequency of dissatisfaction at Delta but it was very low at Alpha (8%)—undoubtedly due to their awareness that a very large older age cohort would soon retire almost en masse, creating very open vacancy chains in many areas. Although technical-professional workers at Alpha were aware of this fact, many of them felt that the company was not sufficiently aware of its talent-pool and was not cultivating it properly.

It would appear, therefore, that where corporate managements are active and visible in career development, it impresses employees as having a positive impact on their opportunities and hence leads to a high level of satisfaction even among clerical workers, who are considered
(and often consider themselves) as dead-end in career terms.

( Table 6-7 about here )

There is another side to this coin, however. Where corporations are visibly active, there is a possibility that clerical workers will come to the conclusion that the corporation is active more on behalf of non-clerical workers than on theirs and that consequently, they are more handicapped. Respondents were asked whether or not they agreed with the statement that "Special career development advantages are given to those who have special qualifications, and others are ignored or by-passed," in order to test this.

Thirty-eight per cent of clerical respondents agreed with this statement (the balance disagreed or didn't know in roughly the same proportions). When these results are analysed by individual firm, however, the greatest frequency of agreement to the statement occurs in Companies Alpha, Chi and Sigma (see Table 6-8). In Alpha, interviews show, clerical workers are very aware of the union-nonunion line and they see non-union people as having advantages simply because they are non-union (not necessarily because they have degrees). Companies Chi and Sigma emphasize the importance of degrees but are also highly visible in terms of career-development communication. On the other hand, Delta has neither a clerical union nor a highly visible graduate programme (interviews confirm that graduate recruits there complain about the lack of formal career programmes, which would also account for their disagreement that there are special advantages for some). Thus it would appear that it is not the practices themselves which are the most important determinant of perceptions of advantages, but rather, their visibility to clerical workers. That is,
they must first perceive the existence of special programmes before they can assess the impact on their own opportunities, and it is corporate communication which in large part creates the visibility. The high level of "don't know" responses seems to confirm this interpretation: clerical perceptions are being obscured to the point where they do not know with certainty exactly what they are perceiving with respect to impact on opportunities.

( Table 6-8 about here )

To sum up, despite corporate variability, most workers were dissatisfied with corporate efforts to develop their careers (with the exception of supervisory-managerial) at the same time that they accepted individual responsibility within the conditions set by corporate practices. On the other hand, the greatest source of corporate variability is accounted for by the extent to which practices which exclude some are visible or if visible, are modified somewhat by other practices such as job postings and consistency in application of policies.

Workers at laissez-faire Alpha showed the lowest rate of great dissatisfaction—management had less visible exclusionary practices. Management at elitist Sigma, although highly visible in their practices, also impressed workers as being "professional" and that they knew what they were doing, hence any fault must lie with individuals for not possessing qualifications which would ensure inclusion in their plans. Chi's programmes avoided elitism with the posting system, and their Personnel people were dynamic and "professional." Paternalistic Delta's programmes were not visible and the "father knows best" approach did not seem to go over well with many workers since it not seem to lead to systematic outcomes
for persons. Thus, the conditions at Chi and Sigma were sufficiently complex and contradictory to obscure workers' perceptions much more than was the case in the haphazard or authoritarian firms.

In asking respondents who they thought should have the say in career matters, there were two extreme answers: that management alone should, whose choice would indicate extreme passivity and presumably a belief in questioned managerial prerogative on the part of workers; or that all employees should have a say, indicating participativeness and a more democratic, less authoritarian ideal. Respondents were also given a middle-of-the-road choice, "employees should be told where they stand." The expectation was that clerical employees, who are generally passive, and supervisory-managerial, who generally endorse matters of managerial prerogative, would tend to support the notion that only management should have the say, and that technical-professional people would advocate a more active role for employees. The question was raised as to whether or not the existence of a union might tend to transform passive clerical workers into active ones.

In fact, it was found that an insignificant proportion in any group (2-5%) supported the "management only" view, and that overall, all three groups were evenly split between the view that all employees should have a say and all employees should be told where they stand. Only six percentage points separated technical-professional (55%) from the other two groups in supporting the active ideal. Breakdown of the results by individual corporation, however, revealed inter-firm differences as well as inter-group differences which were greatest for clerical respondents (see Table 6-9).

Among clerical workers, the fact of unionization did not account for greater advocacy of the active "have a say" position; while Alpha's clerical
workers had the highest frequency for this response, Chi's had the second lowest. Advocacy of the active view was highest in Alpha and Sigma. This view also predominated among technical-professional workers at Alpha, Chi and Sigma, and among supervisory-managerial people at Chi and Sigma. The active view did not predominate among any group at Delta, a company which was the most noticeably paternalistic and authoritarian in atmosphere and whose management described themselves as being very "informal" about career matters.

Generally speaking, the active view received the highest support in corporations which have a more participative atmosphere—despite its elitism, Sigma management subscribes to this rhetoric and its employees tend to regard the decision-making atmosphere as one of "group" decisions which make use of the information-gathering input of lower-level personnel. Less noticeably elitist and more egalitarian in rhetoric, Chi also promotes this kind of participative atmosphere and also tends to advocate "communication" (albeit one-way) with its employees, but its clerical group does not support the "have a say" position to the same degree as Alpha and Sigma clerical workers do.

The overall atmosphere of communication and participativeness may be a positive factor encouraging non-clerical people to advocate active roles in career decisions (there is a certain symmetry here), but does not seem to be the only important factor in accounting for clerical views. The fact that most employees view career development at Alpha as being treated with benign neglect may better account for the high proportion (63%) of clerical respondents who advocate having a say, whereas at Chi, because many perceive the company to be active and concerned about career matters, they are more willing to leave it to the company as long as they are "told where they stand."
Generally speaking, most employees may accept the appropriateness of managerial prerogative without questioning its ideological basis, and it is thus probably difficult for them to specify what form the active involvement "have a say" would consist of. Their usual expectation is that they at least will be "told where they stand," that is, receive feedback on their performance and career progress. That the overwhelming majority do not subscribe to the view that only management should have a say suggests that they are not totally willing to leave their career-fate in management's hands without at least some mutual dialogue in which they get a chance to talk about aspirations and receive information about their prospects. This much is confirmed by the interview data, which shows that many employees are unhappy about the poor feedback. To many employees, as the next section will show, being "active" in career matters consists of taking courses, making oneself visible in various ways, and in the case of performance reviews and posting systems, letting management know where they would like to go. It is consistent with their acceptance of individual responsibility which contributes to keeping them competitively divided; thus the content of their conception of "having a say" is nowhere near the ideal of "workers' control."

( Table 6-9 about here )
In the interviews, participants were asked to discuss what personal and background qualities or other elements represented factors which played some role in obtaining advancement. A number of items in the questionnaire were designed to tap various related aspects of this topic.

Most interviewees could name at least one factor which they considered the most important, plus a number of other factors which they assumed also had some importance. Technical-professional and supervisory-managerial interviewees were generally able to give very complex analyses of factors, while clerical workers tended to name only one or two elements and only 15 of the 25 were able to discuss the topic, contrasted with virtually all non-clerical interviewees. The manner in which clerical people expressed their opinions suggested that they were unsure of what elements were involved, and many had only a narrow basis of experience and observation on which to draw. Two clerical interviewees felt that promotion was a mysterious process, that they didn't know the basis for it, and that most promotions they had observed "don't make sense," particularly within non-clerical ranks. Unlike non-clerical interviewees, clerical people were unable to state the significance of the factors they cited. Non-clerical interviewees on the other hand had a great deal of confidence in their observations and demonstrated much "career sense." Clerical workers were less confident, more passive, and conveyed the impression that many aspects of promotion were fixed and not easily altered, hence beyond their control. A certain fatalism came through, indicative of the "subordinate value-system."

Despite the non-clerical interviewees' confidence in their observations and assessments, however, there was little unanimity concerning what factors carried the most weight in promotability. Nevertheless, some patterns did
begin to emerge. Altogether, interviewees in the three groups named 20 factors, with the following ten being the most frequently cited (13-60% depending on group). This list of factors could in turn be divided into two categories. In the first category are those factors which were relatively invariable by firm: performance on the job, higher education, attitude, being visible or having contacts, personality or "style," and good luck or good timing. The second category of frequently cited factors varied more by firm and by occupational-class group: conformity to organizational norms; knowledge, experience or seniority; taking courses and other kinds of self-betterment; and taking the initiative to push one's own career. Table 6-10 summarizes the interview results, ranked in order of frequency of citing by clerical interviewees.

(Table 6-10 about here)

In addition to these frequently cited factors, three clerical workers mentioned that those who were promoted tended not to be female or clerical. Non-clerical people mentioned the quality of decision-making, problem-solving and interpersonal skills, being able to accept geographic moves, the ability to plan, organize and present ideas, and similar kinds of factors, but these represented relatively few cases.

When the most frequently cited factors are compared by occupational-class group, the following predominate: education, visibility, performance, and self-promotion initiative. These four constitute the core of consensual validity across employee groups, an inter-subjectively shared assessment of their perceived role in promotability. It will be recalled from Section I that questionnaire respondents tended to identify ability or merit as being the most important quality making oneself promotable, followed closely by education and "connections."
Non-clerical interviewees often stated that education and other background qualifications were important in early career stages, as a short-hand expression for demonstrated learning, analytical ability and discipline, and as such, were considered to be significant in "getting one's foot in the door." After this stage, however, experience and performance become more important to them, but there was also an overwhelming awareness that all things being equal performance-wise, one had to have a competitive edge. Such an edge was provided by being "visible," having one's abilities recognized, having a "sponsor." This process was also recognized by clerical interviewees, but they also recognized that all things were not equal at the early career stages if they did not possess a degree.

Clerical workers were not alone, however, in recognizing that beyond possessing certain attributes and taking the initiative to draw attention to oneself, much of what occurred with one's career depended on factors external to oneself: chance, timing, the state of the vacancy chain, corporate developments and so on. Those who advanced into management ranks were the most conscious of how much chance had played a role in their careers. Paradoxically, clerical people gave "luck" the least attention of the three groups, yet their careers were viewed by many as so handicapped that they were lucky indeed if they could advance beyond clerical work. This focus on the knowable rather than chance factors would seem to be highly functional to clerical people who still want to hold out hope for getting ahead. By the same token the "reality principle" seemed to operate for supervisory-managerial people only when they were speaking of their own careers ("I was just lucky"), but when they were speaking of careers in general, the meritocratic rhetoric took over ("the cream will always rise to the top") even to the point of downplaying the role of "connections."
When the more "political" aspects of career-making were discussed, non-clerical interviewees tended to make more subtle distinctions than did clerical. They distinguished between what one did as part of having good career-sense (such as watching one's image, establishing contacts, being visible) and "playing politics" in the overt sense of apple-polishing or socializing with management. Clerical people tended to classify all of these as "politics" and to be critical of its use by non-clerical people. To clerical interviewees, being "visible" meant performing well in the hope of being recognized, whereas non-clerical felt this was too passive. They seemed more aware of intangible factors involved in promotion, and hence tended to be more active.

Clerical people also placed a great amount of emphasis on formal systems of recognition and career development, particularly on procedural aspects of what supervisors and the Personnel Department did or did not do. By contrast, non-clerical people stated that intangibles and informal processes, such as those which developed out of fostering personal contacts and word-of-mouth recommendations, probably played a greater role in who got promotions and why. Paradoxically, however, non-clerical people were just as critical of formal corporate career development programmes as were clerical (as was already discussed in the previous section). Evidently, the mere existence of bureaucratic procedures for managing careers causes employees to play the games appropriate to them even when they do not view them as the most efficacious.

Bearing in mind from the interview data that the more "political" aspects of career-making are subject to some differences in interpretation between clerical and non-clerical groups, the questionnaire respondents were asked to assess how much weight in career terms should be attached to the well-known statement "It's not what you know, it's who you know." Very few
respondents in any group said that it carried a great deal of weight in itself; conversely, few said that it did not matter. Roughly two-thirds of all three groups said it was "one of many factors." Clearly, then, what goes into making a career is viewed as a multi-dimensional process. Even where unions and postings systems exist (Companies Alpha and Ch1), clerical workers still view "who you know" as being part of that complex of factors. In all large corporations, there exists a fairly general anxiety about "getting lost"—size and impersonality not only make more bureaucratic procedures acceptable as a way of regulating careers, but in turn the very bureaucratic procedures that were set up to solve the problems of favouritism and other forms of irrationality in selecting people create impersonal vacuums where individuals may literally be lost in the shuffle. Employees thus seem to be caught at the intersection of two games, each serving as an antidote to the other.

If bureaucratic procedures are ostensibly set up to introduce as much fairness as possible into the selection system (as well as to control effort, an aspect which is not generally recognized by corporate employees), by the same token employees generally accept the rhetoric of individual responsibility for what happens within this framework. They have been socialized into believing that ultimately, their career-fate rests in their own hands—bureaucratic career management systems may identify "talent" but it is up to them to make themselves identifiable. When questionnaire respondents were asked if they had taken any of the steps usually identified by corporations as helpful in creating promotable eligibles (such as taking courses, getting to know the company, letting management know of their ambitions), the overwhelming majority of respondents in all occupational-class groups (between 80 and 90%) could be classified as being active on their own behalf in some sense.
Clerical respondents were generally the most inactive, particularly in Company Alpha, but all clerical people in Chi classified themselves as active. The fact of unionization and the existence of a posting system did not necessarily deter self-help activity. Even among non-clerical groups, in those firms where career development by the corporation was systematic and visible, levels of activity were high.

The most important variable appears to be how permeable the line between clerical and non-clerical workers is perceived to be. In another part of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to identify the kinds of divisions which were most apparent to them in their corporation. In those corporations where the "exempt-nonexempt" and "union-nonunion" lines seemed to be very hard and fast (in Companies Alpha and Sigma), employees are less optimistic that they can cross the line, and also perceive this line to represent the degree-nondegree divide. In these two firms, self-help activity is reported by fewer clerical respondents, especially in Alpha. The same phenomenon does not, however, seem to necessarily affect non-clerical workers the same way—technical-professional and supervisory-managerial personnel at Alpha are among the lowest in self-help activity but at Sigma, they are the highest. The existence of systematic career development may in fact lead to increased rather than lessened self-help activity to supplement the formal system, but for clerical workers, acts as a stimulant only when the dividing lines are seen to be more permeable. Chi, with its "egalitarian" atmosphere, and Delta, with its paternalistic one, appear to have had a "muddying" effect on clerical perceptions, since most play the individual responsibility game (see Table 6-11).

What this implies for lack of collective solidarity and competitive isolation is obvious: seemingly permeable lines only give the message to workers that "crossing the line" may be accomplished as an individual and
that other individual competitors also have a chance to do the same; those who have even a slim chance do not want to be "held down" by others. (It is the same interpretation given by many of unions: they destroy individual initiative and homogenize everyone.) Having accepted such a logic, they are drawn into seeing it through in individual terms, often feeling guilty if they are "lazy" enough not to be active in their own self-promotion. They come to see themselves as management does: saleable commodities, some more or less so than others.

( Table 6-11 about here )

That most employees are active in some way in promotion self-help, however, must be taken in the context of yet another finding. When asked if they agreed with the statement that special career development advantages were given by the corporation to those with special qualifications and the rest were ignored, over one-third of all respondents agreed, and, in the case of clerical workers, this response predominated. Making oneself potentially promotable by being active would appear to fly in the fact of the facts, since if in addition to being handicapped by lack of special qualifications and other attributes as compared to non-clerical groups, clerical workers are also discriminated against in terms of being ignored by career development programmes, there seems to be little hope that one could get ahead. The expected response should be to feel "turned off," to give up a lost cause and stop being active. In fact, however, when the results are cross-tabulated, this relationship does not exist in any clear-cut way (see Table 6-12). Regardless of whether or not one perceives the deck as stacked against people like oneself, the ethic of striving to "better" oneself appears to be taken on faith. Being active
in trying to make oneself promotable when the odds are against it becomes a sort of reflex action--an individualistic response to the ideology of meritocratic individualism.

( Table 6-12 about here )

To sum up both sets of data, workers' perceptions of the factors involved in who gets promoted are being affected by two types of phenomena: the operation of general ideology and the operation of "local" factors in the corporate environment, especially those connected with the climate surrounding various career practices. Let us examine these separately.

When workers identify education and "performance" as being involved in promotion, they are focussing on the operation of meritocracy. Visibility, personality, and luck or good timing are seen as modifications of the operation of pure merit (it then becomes merit mediated by individual "politics"). The extent of inter-firm and inter-group consensus is evidence for the degree of universal acceptance of such an ideology.

Here, the self-development activity is concerned with demonstrating "merit" or playing politics to supplement it.

Conversely, there are other conditions which differ greatly from firm to firm and which cause workers to identify them as additionally affecting promotion in ways that supersede the normal operation of merit or merit-plus-politics and which may deter them from self-development activity or prompt them to increase it: demands for organizational conformity, knowledge or seniority, or self-betterment. Alpha de-emphasizes degrees but is also haphazard in its career development--to compensate, workers need to work harder at taking the initiative; on the other hand, the union-nonunion line is highly visible and it represents the operation of the seniority principle as preceding merit. The line at Chi is not so rigid--they post supervisory jobs, seemingly attracting merit without
its collectivistic restraints, and seem to be more oriented to individuals rather than whole categories (they are "democratic" and justice is apparently blind, so working at individual development will be rewarded). Elitist Sigma emphasizes degrees as reward for past initiative and merit, and crossing the line seems to be a lost cause; but on the other hand, they also emphasize "participation" at one's own level in departments. Delta does not communicate much regarding the priority of degrees or about any other career matters, demanding unquestioning adherence to traditional, rigid patterns, yet management claims to reward hard work—the name of the game is unclear, even as it is at Sigma. At Chi and Alpha, workers seem to be able to define the game better—at one, they do so and are stimulated, at the other, turned off.

Workers are thus thrown hither and thither by the conflicting messages—a rhetoric supporting meritocratic individualism, application of politics which support or supersede them justly or not, messages to go forward and be slighted or remain as is and be equally as slighted for lacking initiative. Such workers must surely have much of their energies sapped trying to meet corporate expectations and have little left for conflict—which at any rate is effectively diverted, as Chapter Seven will show.
IV SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Clerical and non-clerical workers alike had aspirations to advance, a general and positive orientation (at least in the abstract) to liberal-democratic values of achievement and upward mobility. Clerical workers, however, tended to have less knowledge of or hope for non-clerical opportunities; they felt themselves to be restricted to "generalist" non-clerical work and were pessimistic about their opportunities due to relative lack of education in comparison with graduate recruits. Perception of relative lack of opportunity appeared in part to account for clerical resignation and limiting of aspirations. Limited mobility through clerical ranks was also the structural reality encouraged by finely graded clerical job hierarchies.

Despite the awareness of competitive disadvantages connected with lack of educational credentials relative to graduate recruits, clerical workers were similar to non-clerical workers in their belief in merit or ability as being the most important factor affecting promotion. The belief in the principles of meritocracy was therefore strong despite perceptions of the opportunity-structure and relative handicaps. Interfirm differences in the strength of this thinking, however, seemed to be the result of differences in corporate "atmosphere": emphasis on education in Company Sigma and on "connections" in Company Delta; but these differences did not alter the overall belief in meritocracy.

Job-posting schemes were also seen as having an impact on clerical advancement, whereas graduate hiring was not viewed the same way, further indicating the limiting of focus which was characteristic of clerical thinking about opportunity. Belief in the benefit of postings also illustrates a general belief shared by clerical and technical-professional
workers alike that there ought to be rational and systematic methods of candidate selection for available opportunities without, however, questioning the underlying logic of opportunity structures or competition.  

On the whole, technical-professional workers were more aware of the complexity of factors affecting upward mobility and more calculating in their analysis of their personal career prospects and personal "game-plan" than were clerical workers. Despite their relative advantages, however, they tended to be as pessimistic as clerical workers about their chances for advancement, due both to the prevalence of numerous candidates with higher education and also to the effects of "pyramiding" (fewer opportunities and more competing aspirants as one rose in the hierarchy).  

Despite the pessimism regarding opportunity among both clerical and technical-professional workers, there was a widespread belief that opportunities improved with education, a view consistent with a meritocratic belief system and one way of reconciling the discrepancy between the ideal and the real, that is between the ideal of an open opportunity system based on meritocracy and recognition of differential access and limited opportunities to overcome one's class position. The greater the discrepancy the greater the need for dissonance-reduction: clerical workers were the most optimistic about the amount of available opportunity, particularly in corporations like Chi and Sigma which emphasized education greatly and visibly. The possible explanation for this is that universal access to higher education and education as being the key to upward mobility are congruent with the belief in meritocracy as prevailing over class origins. Such an interpretation is consistent with the finding that clerical workers in corporations where education is downplayed are less optimistic about opportunities, as are clerical workers in corporations where corporate efforts to develop the careers of individuals are not visible.
Thus, corporate "atmosphere" (what a firm communicates and does visibly in terms of career policies and practices) accounts for variability in perceptions about the extent of opportunity. Visibility of career development, or its lack, also accounts for whether or not technical-professional workers (but not clerical workers) feel their current position is a "dead-end" one in terms of mobility potential. On the other hand, regardless of belief in abstract meritocratic ideals and regardless of corporate atmosphere, clerical workers tend to feel their jobs are "dead-end," a reflection that their true structural situation is "breaking through" into their perceptions, that there is a real dividing line between themselves and more privileged strata of workers. Nevertheless, this accurate perception (and the ambivalence it generates) does not lead workers to question the structures of opportunity and work, nor to abandon their faith in abstract liberal-democratic ideals that "merit will out."

Corporate neglect of clerical careers was most evident in the statements and policies of corporate officials, and in clerical workers' experience of the performance review, in which (unlike the treatment of technical-professional workers) they were not given the opportunity to discuss career aspirations. Few clerical workers, however, made the linkage between the review and its use as a career-development device, nor did many note the power differential between themselves and those applying the review to them. On the other hand, few clerical workers regarded the review system positively. Even technical-professional workers were dissatisfied with reviews, but this had to do with their expectations: that they should deal with aspirations, and that when they did, the corporation often did not follow through, which was concrete evidence of corporate career-development neglect. The review was potentially the most problematical
managerial practice for manipulating the ideological commitments of workers, since it could convey negative information affecting salary, but in terms of dealing with aspirations, it caused expectations to be violated if the corporation did not respond with results addressing the aspirations. Nevertheless, like perception of opportunity, the presence and need for reviews remained unquestioned; it was simply another "given" of the work situation.

Another "given" which was accepted by workers was the need for competition. Competition follows from an individualistic and meritocratic interpretation of the work-world. Logically, therefore, it was not surprising that corporations were not criticized and challenged for providing few opportunities or differential access to opportunities, but rather, because their systems of developing individual career potential, identifying and selecting talent, were not rational or systematic enough. Since individual responsibility for career-fate was widely accepted, the role of the corporation was viewed as consisting of providing career information, counseling, job-postings, and "feedback" on individual potential and prospects. Although two-thirds of technical-professional and three-quarters of clerical workers were critical of corporate career development policies, the faith persisted that careers could be less happenstance if corporations were more systematic and if Personnel Departments had centralized control of the career process. Workers did not see the incompatibility between this kind of rationality, directed to the organization of conditions of individual career-making, and the rationality directed towards profit-maximization and labour control. There was a shared definition of reality centering around acceptance of the logic and necessity of corporate careers with no questioning of the basic structure but only of the details as to "who" and "how."
Dissatisfaction with corporate career development practices was greatest in those corporations where it appeared to employees that not much was being done by the corporation, whereas visibility of practices and corporate communication about them resulted in higher expressed satisfaction. Thus, where it appeared to clerical workers that the company "cared" about them, more felt positively about career development despite their low career ceilings. On the other hand, visibility of corporate career development ironically had the tendency to emphasize clerical and non-clerical lines of privilege and attention, but the full significance of this "divide" was not very obvious to clerical workers. In addition, where corporations had cultivated an atmosphere of "participativeness," clerical workers tend to feel that they should have more active "say" in career matters; by the same token, advocacy of an active role occurs even in corporations where clerical workers feel that the company is not doing enough career development (and if the company is seen as active and concerned on their behalf, clerical workers are contented just to be told where they stand in terms of their prospects).

This finding must be regarded with caution, however. Although few clerical or non-clerical workers are willing to concede that only management ought to be involved in career decisions, the meaning of having a "say" in career matters appears to be limited to activity on behalf of individual career development--that is, to "taking responsibility" for oneself. The content of self-help activity, and its prevalence even among workers who consider themselves dead-end, makes this clear: taking courses, making oneself "visible" and otherwise engaging in self-promotion. Such activity is consistent with employees' attitudes toward the role that visibility and "playing politics" (especially having connections) have in career-making;
they are part of a complex of ideas connected with competition among individuals for upward mobility, and although this violates principles of pure meritocracy, most workers can see no contradiction. They are simply ways of ensuring that one is not ignored or lost in gigantic corporations, a competitive equalizer and part of the multi-faceted career-making process.

Competition and individual striving as "givens" call for certain responses; those who successfully respond will get ahead. There is, in fact, a high degree of consensual validity among all three employee groups about what factors contribute to promotion (education, visibility, job performance, self-promotion initiative). Even when workers know the cards are "stacked against" them, they often continue to produce these responses almost as reflex actions to a continued belief in meritocratic individualism. The reflex is heightened in corporations where despite handicaps, clerical workers view the divide between themselves and non-clerical as somewhat permeable.

To conclude, it was hypothesized in the opening chapter that ideologically charged practices and corporate environment in which those practices are contained and applied, will obscure the structure of class domination, preventing workers from perceiving the true nature of that domination. This chapter has demonstrated the ways in which workers' interpretations of their structural situation (the objective situation described in Chapter Five) is distorted. Workers focus on the structure of opportunity in terms of individual ability to get ahead. As long as this individualistic interpretation remains and its language is used unquestioningly, they remain competitively divided, an isolated state which is open to a high degree of corporate manipulation.
The greater the number and contradictoriness of policies and communications in a firm, the greater is the attention paid to the details under which individual careers are perceived to be made, a further distraction and source of further obscuring the ideological basis of domination. The ability to make connections among all of the factors affecting opportunity would thus be expected to be significantly impaired. These findings sensitize one to the way in which playing the "career game" (preoccupation with the details) may deflect conflict from a collectivistic to an individualistic basis. This will be the argument of the next chapter.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CAREERISM AS A CONFLICT ALTERNATIVE

The Oxford dictionary defines a "careerist" as one mainly intent on personal advancement and success in life. As such, careerism would seem to be an enterprise more appropriate to the middle and higher levels of the corporate world. The argument can also be made, however, that those who accept the principles of the liberal-democratic ideology which has as one of its consequences belief in the value of upward mobility, or "bettering" oneself as an individual, are in effect subscribing to a careerist perspective.

The question may then be raised: are clerical workers as careerist as those in the middle levels of the corporation? Part III of this chapter will address that question, arguing for very definite limits which are imposed on careerism by the fact of alienation. First, however, it is necessary to ask what careerism implies about the consciousness of workers, within the framework of hegemonic domination and the managerial practices and ideologies which support that domination. It will be the argument of this chapter and of Chapter Eight that there are practical outcomes of encouraging a careerist orientation to the workplace: due to the language of individualism and the resulting competitive isolation, there is a limiting of perspective, a rechannelling of the potential for class conflict, and ultimately, a lack of connection between the conflicts of the workplace and those of the wider society.
MAKING CONNECTIONS: THE FINDINGS, CONTINUED

The findings discussed in Chapter Six indicated that clerical workers tend to resemble non-clerical workers in some important ways: acceptance of meritocratic individualism as the basis for promotion, acceptance of individual responsibility for "getting ahead" within the corporate structure, and at least in the abstract, valuing upward mobility. They tend to compensate for the disjunction between these ideals and their real situation (lack of opportunity) by limiting their aspirations to what was more likely to be attainable (and which often represented illusory mobility), such as mobility within clerical ranks. Further, they tend to accept corporate career policies as being directed towards individual career-making as a way of satisfying both corporate and individual needs, and hence as a legitimate and relatively benign exercise.

When workers expressed dissatisfaction with corporate policies, it was often because they did not feel the policies went far enough, that there were some irrationalities which remained, or that the corporation did not aid the relatively disadvantaged to get ahead. Their interests were couched in a competitive, individualistic vocabulary. Trapped in this logic, they could make few connections to others in situations like their own--except occasionally in terms of the non-degreed or women. (They also made few connections to class or authority relations, which is the concern of Chapter Eight.)

There can be no doubt that there was dissatisfaction and pessimism, but we may ask further: did these pattern themselves in any coherent way? That is, to what extent did the structural facts of their situation cause workers to see the reality of their situation, however limited in expression by the dominant individualistically-oriented vocabulary of
careerism. Within the limits of that vocabulary, the maximum amount of
connectedness would presumably be represented by some approximation of
the following statement: I see that corporate career policies actually,
create and reinforce inequalities between groups, that those like me
are not intended to get ahead regardless of merit or aspirations, and
that therefore I should de-legitimate the whole exercise as manipulative
and refuse to play their career game.

In reality, such a situation did not materialize, judging by both
the questionnaire and the interview data. The closest statement to the
connections outlined above was the one made by a female unionized steno-
ographer at Alpha, a young woman who was relatively "militant":

"Now, this place is a nice place to work, I like it here,
the atmosphere and the people are nice, but it's the
organization, you're fighting the organization of the
society... We [union] can try to get better wages, that's
about all. We don't have an incentive. There's no
reason for us to work extra-hard. I know I can't be
promoted... Management brushes people aside... I'm not in
management and I'm nothing. They don't praise you, they
don't train you, don't treat you as if you're worthwhile
or an important unit... There's lots of things I could
do if the company trained me. But they don't-- and why
should they when they can get someone with the speciali-
ization from outside?... There such a gap, they're creating
that gap. Like you don't get a Christmas bonus or they
don't take you out for lunch, they don't make you feel
important."

Those who were pessimistic about opportunities did not tend to
follow through to the logical conclusion in hiring practices (nor, of
course, did they connect these to class practices). On the other hand,
the optimists were also not totally consistent in the connections they
made.

With these interview results in mind, an attempt was made to establish
what the level of consistency of expression was in the larger questionnaire
sample. The items relating to career policies and opportunities were
cross-tabulated to determine what associations were present and what these represented in terms of clerical-nonclerical differences.

If clerical workers correctly perceive their structural situation as proletarianized labour, the expectation is that there would be consistency among the cross-tabulated relationships, that is, clerical workers would:

1. see themselves in "dead-end" positions at the low end of the opportunity scale,

2. would see themselves as relatively ignored by corporate career development and selection as a consequence,

3. would therefore be dissatisfied with corporate handling of opportunity, and accordingly,

4. would feel a low sense of commitment to the corporation,

5. would consider promotion self-help activity as futile, hence would be inactive; and finally,

6. would be inclined to advocate a greater role for employees in career matters at the corporate level as a way of exercising some control over conditions affecting unequal distribution of opportunities.

By further extension, full awareness of handicaps and inequalities might lead to increased advocacy of unions as a means of acquiring more control over conditions and hence might also lead to some awareness of inequalities in the broader society; hence they might develop a more oppositional view of the workplace and society. These latter items are the subject of Chapter Eight.

Generally speaking, the consistency to be expected under circumstances of complete awareness of the opportunity structure was lacking; clerical workers as well as the two non-clerical groups did not appear to make linkages among all of the various elements, although there was
greater connectedness among some logically related ones. It had to be concluded, therefore, that even within the terms of a liberal-democratic, meritocratic interpretation of reality, there was considerable inconsistency and lack of awareness of how various aspects related to one another. The following summary of findings suggests that corporate employees at all levels tolerate a high degree of contradiction among various aspects of corporate life without seeming to perceive it or to question it.

The relationships may be organized using a series of three perceptions and five consequences of those perceptions: that one is in a dead-end job with respect to mobility, that there is inequality of opportunity, and that promotion is not based strictly on merit. As a consequence of perceiving these conditions, clerical workers would be expected to have low commitment to the corporation, be pessimistic regarding the extent of opportunity, be dissatisfied with corporate handling of opportunity, be less active in promotion self-help, and advocate more employee "say" in career matters. If these relationships were present, it would indicate that workers were making logically related connections.

A. Consequences of Perceiving Oneself Dead-Ended

Half of all clerical workers felt that their position was either a dead-end or "holding" position (see Table 5, Chapter Six). It was found, however, that these workers were no different from those clerical workers who felt themselves to be in mobile jobs in terms of perceptions of commitment. Regardless of perceived status of job, roughly half of all clerical respondents felt that commitment to the firm was great to moderate, and half felt that commitment was low to none.

Perception of one's dead-end status, on the other hand, did correlate highly with perceiving that there were special career-development advantages
for some (for clerical and non-clerical respondents alike—see Table 4, Chapter Six). However, there was no relationship between viewing oneself as dead-ended and attributing it to the corporate practice of hiring graduates. (Feeling dead-ended only correlated with job postings as a factor affecting opportunity.) This latter finding supports the interpretation suggested by the interviews: clerical workers see themselves and technical-professional workers as occupying two separate worlds of opportunity, and it is postings, not hiring practices, which are seen as having the most immediate impact on the clerical "world."

For both clerical and technical-professional respondents, there was some relationship (but statistically weak) between perceiving oneself as dead-ended and being dissatisfied with corporate handling of opportunity. For both of these groups, the relationship between dead-endedness and being pessimistic regarding the extent of opportunity was stronger statistically.

There was a weak relationship between dead-endedness and inactivity in connection with promotion self-help (for clerical respondents only; for the others there was no relationship). However, there was no relationship between dead-endedness and advocating that employees have more "say" in career matters (nor for that matter did dead-endedness correlate with the view that employees should be "told where they stand"). In other words, while clerical workers who saw themselves as dead-ended tended to withdraw from playing the self-help career game, they did not connect their situation with being powerless.

Seeing oneself as occupying a dead-end job is a fair predictor of consistency among several logically related items connected with careers and opportunities, for both clerical and technical-professional workers, but does not predict the position they take on corporate commitment and
employee-corporation career participation (nor, for technical-professional people, does it predict self-help activity). Neither do clerical workers connect lack of opportunity with graduate hiring.

To sum up, clerical workers who saw themselves in a dead-end situation were slightly more consistent in making connections than were technical-professional workers; supervisory-managerial people were the most inconsistent, the most likely to subscribe to views that expressed ideological commitment to meritocratic ideals even when the ideals had been violated in practice.

B. Consequences of Perceiving Inequality of Opportunity

Thirty-eight per cent of clerical respondents agreed that there were special career development advantages for some and that the corporation tended to ignore others (see Table 8, Chapter Six). There is a slight statistical relationship between this perception and perceiving that graduate hiring has an impact on opportunity. As with perceiving oneself to be dead-ended, few clerical workers appear to trace the reason for inequality of opportunity to the practice of hiring graduates. This finding also confirms the interpretation already made: that clerical workers do not see themselves as inhabiting the same world of opportunity as graduates and non-clerical people.

There is a correlation between perceiving career advantages for some and feeling that others like oneself have little or no commitment to the corporation, but it is hardly statistically significant. There is, on the other hand, no correlation at all between perceiving special advantages for some and two other consequences: being dissatisfied with corporate handling of opportunity, and ceasing self-help activity. There is also only a slight tendency for those who perceive special career advantages to advocate employees having a "say" in corporate career matters.
Thus, on the whole, clerical workers as well as the other two groups, are fairly lacking in making connections between perceiving special advantages for some people and other corporate practices, and tend not to follow through in consequences which would logically be expected to follow: withdrawal of effort and commitment.

C. Consequences of Perceiving Non-Meritocratic Factors

Only 19% of clerical workers (and a similar proportion in the non-clerical groups) felt that "who you know" affected one's ability to get ahead (and another 66% felt that it was one of many factors involved). As discussed in Chapter Six, they were perceiving that non-meritocratic, "political", factors had some influence on careers.

For clerical workers only, there was a correlation between perceiving that "who you know" carried a great deal of weight in career matters and being pessimistic regarding the extent of opportunity in the corporation. There was also a positive relationship between this variable and agreeing that special advantages were given to some, and between it and being dissatisfied regarding the corporate handling of opportunity. Interestingly, for those who believed "who you know" has no impact at all, there was a correlation with satisfaction regarding corporate handling of opportunity, so there was an almost perfect inverse relationship between these two extreme views in terms of their correlation with satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

The middle-of-the-road view that "who you know" was but one of many factors involved in getting ahead, however, did correlate with many of these same items: being inactive in self-help, with advocating greater employee "say," and with expressing some optimism regarding opportunity. Why these relationships should be so was not readily apparent.
Another set of correlations provides a suggestive clue, however: "who you know" as one of many factors affecting promotion correlated with the perception that the corporate policy of job postings affected opportunity. Interviews suggest that all things being equal between two candidates, the one who is more visible or known to the selecting supervisor will win out, even when a posting system exists (visibility supplements merit when two candidates are otherwise similar).

There is considerable ambivalence among clerical workers about having "connections," making oneself "visible," and so on as part of making a career. A young female clerk-typist at Chi, however, was considerably more attuned to the career game than most clerical workers and more accepting of the role played by non-meritocratic factors:

"I really believe if you want to get ahead you have to take courses and say you're interested, not sit back and wait... And also, I think it's who you know, too. But I really believe that anyone who gets ahead must have stood out somehow, made himself known, impressed someone."

On the other hand, a male buyer at Chi reports the animosity expressed by some clerical workers when the seniority principle appeared to have been violated by a candidate for a posted job:

"Now, this one guy, he had very little seniority but he got the job over others. Now they're shunning him and saying he got the job because he was playing up to the supervisor. They feel they've been had. Where you have a large number of clerks at the same level doing the same job, there's politics."

Where postings systems do not exist, as at Delta and Sigma, clerical workers report receiving information through the "grapevine"—which usually involves networks of personal acquaintances. The "grapevine" and other kinds of personal connections, however, still exist alongside formal postings systems at Alpha and Chi, prompting one female keypunch operator to express her skepticism:
"How do you know you've been given a fair deal? How do you know they've gone over what you can do? At C[hi] it's not always what you know but who you know. There's a lot of politics. And a lot of families work together, they can get relatives in."

Thus, although clerical workers are more ambivalent about the existence of "politics" than are other workers, they appear to be living with the contradiction posed by "playing politics" in an ostensibly meritocratic system: one does the same as others in order to counteract the competitive edge which their various "political" games might have. The existence of the contradiction does not appear to have led to a de-legitimation of the principle of merit, any more than does the special hiring of graduates. They are simply viewed as variations on the theme that merit will rise—somehow.

( Table 7-1 about here )

Table 7-1 charts the relationships found. It is apparent from this that perceiving oneself in a dead-end job in opportunity terms, and perceiving the operation of "political" factors in careers, both account for pessimism regarding opportunity and for dissatisfaction with corporate career policies. However, neither of these, nor the perception that some receive special advantages, are connected in any coherent way. Clerical workers do not appear to be linking the existence of these kinds of situations to their situation as proletarianized labour. Nor, as Chapter Eight will show, do they make connections between their structural situation in the workplace and the class structure of the society. The limited connections made are all individualistic in their interpretive framework: how I will rise or be impeded in my rise as an individual, what competitive disadvantages other individuals have, why I as an individual am in a dead-end position.
D. Evidence from the Interviews

The reason why statistical manipulation of questionnaire items has unearthed only incomplete linkages among items is that workers are not making any other kind of linkages. At best they may link causes and effects only partially, and this inchoateness of expression is a reflection of their experience with a reality which is "papered over" by ideological rationalizations which are readily available but which in themselves are riddled with contradictions. The following material from the interviews illustrates typical thinking among clerical workers. It can be seen that often, the speaker is close to "calling a spade a bloody shovel" but most seem only half conscious of what they are in effect "really" saying.

The first example is of an older male clerical worker who is about fifty years of age, is a former blue-collar worker in the same company, Alpha, and is now a sales correspondence clerk:

"I told them [Alpha management] after the War that I wanted something where I could get ahead. There was big money in the rolling mills, but it was hard work and all nights, so I went into an office job...You always want your kids to do better...I mean, it's the responsibility of each generation in building up the country...you've got to make opportunities yourself, do something for yourself...you have to go after it...if you're going to get anywhere, you have to learn to keep pace with what's going on...and that's what you're supposed to do, you're supposed to work...Of course, when I was 15 years in Billing, I saw young people do a bit of work and before too long they had lots better jobs than I did...we'd show 'em and teach 'em all we knew and the first thing you know, they'd buzz off...Oh, I've had my hard times and my good times...I don't feel hard done by, no. I have no animosity. I enjoy work."

The speaker had complained that he saw graduate recruits pass the clerical workers by after they received training, in effect, "picked the brains" of the older clerks and then "buzz off"—often, up the line into management. He also noted in another section of the interview that in
times past, his current job had been a route of upward mobility into other positions within the Sales Department; once graduates began to be hired in large numbers, they were no longer routed through the correspondence clerk's jobs and clerical people were bypassed. As with most other interviewees, any attempts to prod him into discussing the relationship between these experiences and the nature of the white-collar hierarchy failed. He simply attributed his problems to his personal failings--lack of education and being a bit "thick" and not seeing for more than fifteen years that one had to "push" oneself constantly before management in order to be given a chance to try something else.

Another interviewee, a female secretary at Delta, expressed more ambivalence than the man quoted above, but in her case she veered away from making connections at the last minute, shifted the ground to individual blame, and returned to her first theme without seeing the inconsistencies in her views:

"You look at people, like, even for secretarial, they pick a person who has a degree, they figure they're so much better. That's what I find so frustrating, we put in so much more time than they do and yet I'm still at the bottom of the ladder. Most of the time they bring in people because they have future ideas where they're going to put them. Others have to prove what they can do... But, well I guess it could just be a fault on the part of the persons themselves, they just lose interest... Some people have been here 25 years so why should they bother to look for new jobs, so they just put in their eight hours. What they'll do is bring in newer people with education and then the people that have been here 30 years, they kinda shunt them in a corner and these other people just move right in and take right over."

The third interviewee, a male clerk at Delta, relates his experiences with both a sense of resignation and a trace of bitterness; he is extremely ambivalent, vacillating between a semi-structural kind of analysis of his situation, partly making connections, and an individualistic kind of explanation in which self-blame figures:
"Huh! [ronic laugh], that's a bit hard to reach, actually [supervisor]. I think they'd bring somebody in with higher education. I don't feel I couldn't do any job in there, it's just that there are some jobs they wouldn't let you do anyway...I took the R.I.A. course in 1967...but I blew it...pretty well everybody in the department at that time was young and they were all looking for something, trying to get ahead, so I took it too...But now you see a lot of people who have it and aren't moving at all...whether it's a personality lack or something, I don't know. They seem to be level-headed people, but there's not enough opportunity for them, I guess...I'm not basically an outgoing person, I'm not aggressive, I guess...I think you have to be right under somebody's arm all the time, wanting to do something else, wanting to get ahead--that's not my style...Oh, I think I realized it was a dead end. But there were times when I thought I could get out of here...Nothing like that ever happens now--whether somebody put the lock on the door, or what. It could just have been that at the time the need was there...Basically the people who work with us in the department treat us fairly well--it's the upper class that look on us as lower-grade workers. a little more respect would be good."

The worker never completes his class analysis, but goes on to "personalize" his comments--some managers and executives are nice, others try to lord it over low-level workers. He wistfully looks back at the hope for upward mobility, regretting that he must put down on the census that he is a clerk, and at one point in the past a "group leader" who supervised only four clerks, equally as bad. "Somebody put the lock on the door"--but he is unable to do much speculating about the structural reasons behind it.

The structure of the white-collar world, with its emphasis on education and the "long crawl" to the board-room baffles a male computer operator at Delta. The "managerial revolution," the separation of ownership and control, is sufficient to obscure the structure from him, and he expresses his situation with both a sense of hopelessness and also of hope, without knowing the source of either:

"There's a guy out there is one of the plant offices that just shuffles paper around, and he applied for a
transfer. Different kind of paper [laughs]. Nothing ever changes... They always ask you what you'd like to do and how far you'd like to go. And I always tell them I want to go straight to the top! [laughs]. If you don't have education it's pretty limited... I imagine in 40 years if I worked hard enough I could get up there [executive level]; of course, they started higher than me. I think they're there because they worked for it, they weren't born into it or anything.

And finally, a female clerk at Alpha sums up the accepted faith in the value of upward mobility:

"To advance in my department, I'd like that. That would mean going into supervision... I'd take courses if I thought it would get me somewhere... There aren't that many jobs for them to be chasing us... it's up to us... I know if I was to get a promotion, I'd want a raise with it--isn't that what it's all about, though? To get more money and more responsibility."

These workers and others like them are isolated, both mentally and often physically, from workers who share similar structural situations and a similar blind faith in a system that excludes them from rewards but holds out vague promises in an ideologically charged climate. Most lack career-making know-how, are clumsy in articulating their desires based on that ideology--but articulate them they often do, in borrowed trappings that are ill-fitting, or else retire behind an apologetic and self-effacing smile:

"I guess I'm not ambitious. I'm quite satisfied where I am--the people here are so nice."

The limited connections which clerical workers make are related to a meritocratic and individualistic perspective on the workplace, in which one accepts the values of competition for upward mobility and material rewards even if it does not accord with the reality of one's own experience and structural location. It is this value-system which adds to their isolation from fellow workers and places blinkers on their perceptions, a value-system reinforced by the corporate climate and its policies.
In the next section, it will be argued that in addition, this acceptance of a "careerist" perspective by playing the game of career-making within rules established by the capitalist enterprise creates conditions which reinforce class domination; this in turn sets the limits and the tone of class struggle.

II CAREERISM AS LIMITING GAME

"The transformation of working humanity into a 'labor force,' a 'factor of production,' an instrument of capital, is an incessant and unending process... and since the workers are not destroyed as human beings but are simply utilized in inhuman ways, their critical, intelligent, conceptual faculties, no matter how deadened and diminished, always remain in some degree a threat to capital." (Braverman, 1974: 139)

Hence, suggests Braverman, the process by which workers are "habituated" to work under conditions of capitalist domination must be renewed in each generation. As discussed in Chapter Three, however, it is not sufficient to examine this process of habituation as involving merely the labour process;
...one must also examine the ways in which ideological mechanisms such as the "career" supplement the labour process and contribute to preventing the "subterranean stream" (as Braverman calls it) of worker hostility and resistance from surfacing in ways which will de-stabilize the system.

The conditions under which workers come to co-operate, however, also tend to establish the context in which conflicts arise and express themselves, and these in turn act back on management in dialectical fashion. For instance, the ideals of self-fulfillment and individual competition, the seeds of which are sown in the educational system (along with and in contradiction to acceptance of authoritarianism and tedium), find their counterpart in the corporate environment in terms of competition for material rewards and status on the one hand and on the other, in terms of the belief that white-collar work is intrinsically satisfying and fulfilling. These kinds of rewards and advantages are built into the motivational structures surrounding careers. Management must call out responses to these structures in such a manner as to avoid calling the hierarchical (class) basis of relative advantages and satisfactions into question. Clerical workers who refuse to play what is for them a no-win career game and resist via withdrawal of effort (that is, are not "motivated") are a problem if they stop performing satisfactorily; they need to be "cooled out" while motivation is left intact. Management is caught in a double-bind situation, for the pendulum may swing too far the other way and clerical workers may be "too" motivated and demand more equalization of the conditions of competition.

Management-worker "games" connected with careers thus have a limiting effect, in a similar way to limits posed by other kinds of worker games connected with resistance. Some interesting parallels may be drawn between
the two, without suggesting that careerism is a form of resistance (in fact, quite the opposite). Burawoy (1979) in his study of piecework machine shops in the U.S. and Hungary suggests that such worker games as "looting" or building a "kitty" (as well as games involving restriction of output) may be interpreted as forms of adaptation (habitation) as well as ways of absorbing hostility and frustration, but that they also enhance the power of the capitalist. This enhancement occurs because in playing various output games, workers accept the existence of the surplus-extraction process as a "given" (hence unchangeable) and shift attention to the amount of surplus-extraction, leaving its basis in capitalist exploitation unchallenged; and because the very act of playing an output game produces consent to the rules and outcomes established by the capitalist.

Playing the game as a form of adaptation creates its own ideological effects, which can then be used as an element in capitalist control. That is, the games become part of the experience of the reality and distract workers from an examination of the reality behind the surface phenomena—the games, in effect, take on a life of their own and can be utilized by controlling groups to organize conscious and willing participation while at the same time containing resistance.

Burawoy points out a number of consequences of output games which are of relevance in considering career-making as a game. First, workers in piecework factories came to co-operate in their own domination not only out of the need to survive, but also because there was built into the labour process a degree of uncertainty of outcomes ("will I make the quota today?") and the possibility of reducing the uncertainty through exercising some control over production (operating two machines at once, ignoring safety norms, etc.). As a consequence, workers tended to be aware of petty discrimination and injustices in the organization of production as they
affected pay rates and never looked beyond these to the broader framework of domination in which they were located. Thus, piecework effectively shackled the imagination. As well, the playing of the output game in turn generated a reality which made the workers aware only of the conditions for playing the game; the very actions that represented an attempt at some sort of control created their own obscuring effects. Secondly, the game-playing sharpened individual competition over factors which affected the game: distribution of good and bad jobs and rates, transfer and promotion, the guarding of output secrets, and so on. Thirdly, worker-management struggles remained limited to aspects of the work which prevented the men from building a "kitty," and to management attempts to end the game.

Under conditions of monopoly capitalism, two additional factors are noted by Burawoy as having an impact on the organization of consent, and hence on the possibilities for hegemonic domination: the firm as internal labour market, and the firm as "internal state." The internal labour market, with its job-grade, pay and skill hierarchies, creates for workers the opportunity (hence threat) of transferring to another job and of acquiring further skills which enhance bargaining power—while at the same time fostering individualism and inter-worker conflict. The firm is also an internal state in the sense that the institutionalization of bargaining and grievance procedures establishes workers as "citizens" with rights and obligations—but by the same token is defined by a set of laws which cannot be violated by anyone, including management. The existence of these two structural conditions thus both enlarges the scope for individual control and also places limitations on the form of struggle.

One could add to Burawoy's observations: once the rules are established, they take on a life of their own and establish new conditions for strug
should they be violated. There is a possibility for establishing new kinds of games which further obscure the foundations of the original structure.

Let us now apply these observations to the case of white-collar careers.

As was implied in Chapter Two, capitalist enterprises should be viewed not only as control structures for the economic, political and ideological domination of labour, but also as motivational (reward) structures—for pay and upward mobility.

Capitalists as well as workers get caught up in the logic of the game of providing for and responding to conditions for the pursuit of individual gain (the outer limits, of course, are provided by the needs of capitalist control and profit). We must understand career-motivational structures as operating as a result of ideological hegemony (coercion recedes in importance in Western capitalist countries, as Gramsci pointed out, and "consent" becomes more important)—that is, that the "carrot" is more important than the "stick" as a control mechanism, where the "carrot" equals the logic of pay hierarchies and mobility routes. Ideological justification for these structures is provided by the framework of liberal democracy (as was outlined in Chapter Three).

The reason why workers are caught up in the game is due to acceptance of this ideological framework with its apparent appeal to individualistic rather than class interests; the reason why capitalists are caught up in the game is because they have set up certain worker expectations and to violate these expectations would risk de-legitimation and unrest, that is, exacerbation of control problems. But it is also a situation filled with contradictions (for example, responsible autonomy versus the logic of
capitalist authority; meritocracy versus discriminatory hiring and treatment), and workers respond to these contradictions, albeit in inconsistent ways, as section I of this chapter demonstrated. One of their responses is to demand more rationality and more guidance in career matters, forcing capitalists to continue the logic of the game or risk forfeiting control. At the same time, workers caught up in the game do not look beyond its logic but accept the framework of the game as an unalterable "given" (for example, by striving for good "performance," cultivating desirable attitudes, striving to get ahead, taking courses to increase competitiveness and visibility).

Thus, the capitalist enterprise continues the logic of the motivational structures into which workers were socialized in the educational system. Included in these structures are the psychological mechanisms whereby system blame becomes personal blame for failure. At times, as the data discussed already show, the reality of the system "breaks through" but workers do not normally follow up on the alternative interpretation which would counter the logic of the ideology, and so retreat once more into the rationalizations which reinforce the dominant logic and which control their interpretations.

This lack of questioning "givens" is evident in the interview data. When asked to describe the nature, conditions and contexts of their work, interviewees rarely commented on the control aspects built into their work (control of pace and effort by machines or by supervisors, as for example described for computer operators, payroll clerks and telephone operators in Chapter Four). When interviewees did mention these aspects, they were usually accepted as a technical necessity and not as a control. In the context of workers given "responsible autonomy," they responded to the
constraints of their work situation as given: this task had to be done and it was their responsibility to ensure that it was done properly. If any aspects of their corporate employment disturbed them, they were often aspects connected on the one hand with the idiosyncrasies of particular supervisors or on the other, matters connected with advancement, pay grading, having their needs ignored, and so on. Having accepted the necessity for the existing structure (in technical and other non-antagonistic terms), one does not normally challenge it, although one might challenge the details and conditions of the games played within it. One either adapts to it and attempts to rise within it or one opts out of the game, but either option does not alter the individualistic interpretation of the outcomes or the choice: success and self-congratulations, or failure and self-blame.

Any antagonism expressed towards the external realities of such a system may, in some circumstances, be directed outwards, but here again it is not directed towards the logic of hierarchy and the nature of domination, but towards narrower and more restricting targets: the practice of hiring graduates and of giving them special training slots; the practice of "streaming" by specialization. And it is a struggle which tends to be highly individualized, as confirmed by the interview excerpts which will follow.

The ambivalence of clerical workers was demonstrated in the previous section in regard to the nature of the connections and explanations they made. This same kind of ambivalence is present when they discuss the possibility of getting ahead, and highlights the thin dividing line between corporate blame and self-blame, between activity and passivity in pushing their personal promotion case.

The large corporations usually can afford to "buy off" discontent and lack of mobility by paying their clerical people well—in fact, at Sigma,
length of service has been rewarded at all corporate levels and this, combined with relatively high clerical salaries, creates the possibility of clerical workers developing a vested interest in their corporate employment without disrupting the accepted status quo. In addition, however, it also provides another source of ambivalence for ambitious and dissatisfied clerical workers like the following female clerk at Sigma:

"I would think there is some possibility for Law Clerk-- but 'clerk' is always there in the title...I'd be willing to commute to Toronto if it meant better opportunity and better money...But I'm not a fool, I realize there's a lot more to it. It's kind of hopeless because it involves four extra grades, plus it's a training slot [for graduate recruits]...But they aren't really unfair to me here. I'm paid good and they kinda have you--it's hard to leave. If they treat me right I do my job well, but I'm to a blockage point and I don't see any way out of it...But by way of [pay for long-service] and the cost of living increases, you probably make close [to exempt pay-levels]-- but that's not the way to get somewhere...Yeah, I've heard that line before, we want a grad for that job. I've seen a grad sitting at one desk and I'm sitting at the other, and I seem to be doing more...I don't want to get anywhere because I'm the last choice."

Clerical workers are usually fairly passive in pursuit of their career interests, in comparison with technical-professional workers. Corporations expect that clerical workers will be relatively passive and unambitious, usually expressing it in terms of lack of interest in a long-term career, a rationalization which accords well with the reality of interrupted career patterns in the highly feminized clerical ranks. But it is precisely this assumption of passivity and the lack of provision for more systematic "cooling out" programmes for clerical that makes it difficult for management to deal with the ambitious clerical workers and those who are becoming ambitious because they suddenly realized they may be working for a long time after all, such as the stenographer at Alpha: "If I knew then that things weren't going to work out at home and I'd be alone, I might have been more ambitious."
At the same time that clerical workers realize how limited their opportunities are, they also realize that things in their work situation have changed. "They don't give merit pay any more, not since the union," says a steno-typist at Alpha, "There's no recognition for doing your best." A male buyer at Alpha expresses a similar sentiment: "They stress motivation in their pep-talks, but who's going to motivate me?"—and he desires to move into management levels because he wants more job satisfaction and a chance to use his full abilities which he feels are being wasted in his present job.

Those who have observed the mobility patterns around them and feel they know what they must do to make themselves promotable also express pessimism; even if they went through the motions, it might not be more than a waste of time: "To further yourself, you have to go to night school," says a female clerk at Delta, "You could ask for a transfer, but the thing is, you might end up in the same type of position someplace else." The female keypunch operator at Chi expresses it as the necessity to be willing to "prove" to management that one is serious about promotion: "You could get more options by taking courses, but you should do this first, and then have something to put in front of them, just do it, don't just wait and say I'm willing to, help me."

Clerical workers also play into management's hands; however. While recognizing that their opportunities are limited, they resent it when clerical workers in job grades above them "sit" on the same job for years with no chance of mobility and no expressed desire to rotate to another job. It is a form of "blaming the victim," expressed by a secretary at Chi thus:

"Those who don't leave will stay, become poorer employees, resigned, know their time has come and it's over--they've
been passed by. So now they'll opt for sticking with it and riding it to the end. Some have been here 20, 30 years and know only the gas company...but they're restricting younger people by holding down those jobs--there should be a way of shifting them aside."

In this way, discontent makes other workers in the same boat into scapegoats and draws off the fire intended for the corporation, but at the same time creates new arenas for intra-group competition and conflict. Turning their resentment on their fellow workers, however, as Nichols and Armstrong (1976) found in their study of British blue-collar workers, distracts from identifying the structural cause of the problem; workers end up blaming themselves and their class for failure instead.

Technical-professional workers express their dissatisfaction at the way the corporation handles the conditions of career-making at least to the same degree as clerical workers, but they are more engrossed in the career game and more sensitive to differences in treatment within their own ranks. One male contract specialist at Chi expressed his frustration thus:

"I can't say enough about the actual company as an organization and I can't see myself leaving, although I'm very frustrated...I don't have a degree but I did come up from the troops. And there's a lot of competent people within the organization who would have done a super job, with all the knowledge and background of a utility—but no degree...just come to a complete road-block...and myself, I'm in that same position...I'm handicapped...I feel like a time-bomb—one day I'll go off."

Both clerical and technical-professional workers keep their eyes on the corporation for follow-through on promises and anticipated results. When the corporation does not play their part of the game according to the accepted scenario, it violates expectations and frequently creates cynicism and less commitment to playing the game. This is expressed well by a male metallurgist at Alpha:
"I thought I'd get the job of mill superintendent, but they cleaned house totally, and I got moved back to the Met. Lab., which left a bad taste in my mouth...everyone was housecleaned out of there, they drummed up reasons why they couldn't give me the superintendent job...and yet two weeks earlier the superintendent told me I was doing very well...That's an example that made me kind of cynical...it sort of opened my eyes to stop and question a lot of other things."

The sore point is often corporate inconsistency in the performance review, which is proclaimed by the corporation to be a career-development device, wherein a good report holds out promise of better things to come.

Says a male engineer at Alpha:

"Once a year the evaluations have come back in. And it doesn't generate the kind of response I'd kind of figured it would. You go through the gymnastics, and good, bad or indifferent, it doesn't go any further than right there...it doesn't seem to carry any weight...I know of two opportunities that have come up and they were both filled by other graduate engineers...On quite a few occasions I felt like rattling my cage, but never did."

Had the engineer "rattled the cage," it probably would have consisted of challenging the next level in the hierarchy over his boss's head, or of complaining to the Personnel Department and raising some potentially embarrassing questions, as one accountant had done. Another engineer, this time at Sigma, began to be disappointed in the kind of results obtained career-rise in proportion to the amount of uprooting he and his family had had to experience in accepting geographic moves to advance his career. He had come to dig in his heels and to question the tried-and-true linkage between geographic and upward mobility: "I'm not going to be willing to uproot again unless there's—some sort of guarantee."

The "ultimate weapon" of the technical-professional workers, however, is the potential for taking their fairly portable skills elsewhere. Said a male systems analyst at Sigma: "I'd raise questions, and if I didn't get results, I'd go elsewhere." If the corporation does not play the career
game by the established rules, the solution is a highly individualistic one connected with their greater bargaining power than clerical workers. As long as market demand remains high and skills remain portable, inter-firm mobility becomes the cooling-out mechanism for frustrated technical-professional workers, not unionization.

There is, however, another reason why collective action seems more remote for this group of non-clerical workers: they perceive themselves to be part of management and as good candidates for upward mobility within management. Aronowitz (1973: 317) suggests that the preservation of professional distinctions has "helped to preserve prevailing authority relations and suppress the potential for united consciousness and action." This certainly appears to be true for the technical-professional workers interviewed. "It all depends on your background," said a Sigma systems analyst, "maybe a clerical person would be more interested in a union." Another said, "When you're a professional you're pretty well working for yourself. It doesn't seem professional if you're not able to stand alone."

Almost every technical-professional worker but not one clerical worker expressed confidence in inter-firm mobility as being the solution to blocked mobility within one's present firm. As long as these workers perceive this alternative avenue as being open to them, and as long as they do not interpret their blockage as being due to any debasement or dilution of their skills, there is every reason to believe that the mechanism of self-blame for failure will continue to operate even as it does for clerical workers. They will also continue to interpret their mobility problems as being a result of corporations tending to "pidgeon-hole" or stream specialists too narrowly, because there are too many eligibles for too few positions up the line, or because of a lack of
competitive qualifications. Thus they will continue to perform the balancing act between individual and corporate structural kinds of explanations which stop far short of questioning the basis of capitalist organization of work.

It is these kinds of issues which set the conditions for conflict between management and workers and transform class struggle into struggle over conditions of individual career-making. The career game is thus a limiting game which not only distracts from the issues behind the superficial external realities, but also sets up its own internal dialectic of worker-management struggle, creating new problems of control at that level and new potentialities for destabilizing the system. It is conceivable, for example, that if the erosion of conditions experienced by graduates were to proceed to an intolerable level, to the point where identification with management became problematical, workers who would normally be opposed to unions for themselves might consider their adoption as a threat and as a way of preventing further erosion of individual advantages. This in turn would set the tone of union-management struggle even as it does for clerical workers now: collective solidarity for individualistic purposes, that is, as Goldthorpe et al. (1969) termed it, "instrumental collectivism".
III ALIENATED LABOUR: THE LIMITS OF CAREERISM

It has generally been supposed in the literature on workers that they are "instrumental" in their orientations (see for example, Blauner, 1964; Goldthorpe, 1969)—that is, that work is the means to other ends, particularly pay, and is not in itself intrinsically satisfying or fulfilling. The lack of intrinsic satisfaction is usually contrasted with the work of "higher participants" in the organizational and occupational order, particularly with professional and managerial work. On the other hand, job satisfaction, high involvement in work, and commitment to the organization and to building a successful career are usually associated with professional and managerial work and not with blue-collar and low-level white-collar work.

The difficulty with such attempts at dichotomizing work orientations is that they have tended to ignore an important aspect: that all workers are involved in wage-labour, are employees, and as such, represent alienated labour. The feature which technical-professional workers and the low to middle levels of management share with clerical workers is that they are also controlled by capital and as such, partly proletarianized. They share the situation of proletarian labour in the sense of having to sell their labour-power in order to survive. That being so, one would logically expect that "instrumentalism" in some form would be characteristic not only of clerical and blue-collar workers, but that non-clerical workers would exhibit it to some degree as well.

The necessity of having to strike a balance between the realities of alienated labour and the illusions of careerism, that is between lack of autonomy and control and the ideology of personal responsibility for one's career-fate, could in part account for the ambivalence of both clerical and
non-clerical workers alike. Making a career, striving for upward mobility, becomes not only a response to a corporate environment whose ideology resonates well with the ideology socialized in pre-work settings like school, it is also a compensatory response to deprivation. The worker may be expected to rationalize: if my present situation is not satisfying, my future prospects may after all be better tomorrow when I will have more pay, more status and more autonomy as I climb the corporate ladder. Seen in this light, careerism is a variety of instrumentalism, but one which needs both active commitment and continued hope for improvement. Hope abandoned spells the lowering of expectations, less intense involvement in career-making—and being identified by corporations as more narrowly instrumental.

Careerism and instrumentalism indeed appear to be opposite sides of the same coin: they are modes of adaptation or worker habituation. Careerism is the active side, which corporations can manipulate ideologically; instrumentalism is the passive side, which poses a "motivational problem" to corporations.

Technical-professional workers, according to the evidence gathered in the present study, appear to play the career game more intensely and for longer periods in their work histories than do clerical workers—possibly because they tend to identify with management and also because they have greater chances for upward mobility. With increasing years of service in the workforce, with age, and with less than the anticipated amount of upward mobility, however, they too experience a lowering of expectations and a refocussing of life-priorities despite any initial differences in expectations between themselves and clerical workers. A male systems analyst at Sigma says: "When I was younger, I wanted to get out of the computer room, so I worked all the time—I had motivation."
An engineer at Sigma says: "Not everybody can get to the top so somewhere along the line you begin accepting things...and those higher positions are not all that rewarding except maybe in ego satisfaction." An engineer at Alpha is even more skeptical:

"I don't think life is for that sort of commitment. Sure I still think that salary and monetary rewards, recognition for a job well done are important...Well, a lot of people get sucked into any plan--they think that at the end of the day there's going to be something good, but there are a lot who are 50, 60 years old who haven't made it yet, and you've got to look hard and say, well, that could be me in 20 or 30 years' time...they've been given the role of go-getter, the man of action who's going to the top, and then suddenly they're stuck in some grubby little office somewhere...but he's committed then, he's made his choice...In a big company like Alpha you've got more security--you've also got family commitments, a house--so you back off."

Just as there seem to be limits on instrumentalism--the clerical worker who is "bought off" by high pay as compensation for lack of mobility is frustrated over the fact that it doesn't have the same meaning as being chosen for promotion--so there seem to be limits on careerism.

Despite a great deal of talk among the two non-clerical groups about career options, sometimes involving extensively thought-out career plans and scenarios for themselves, only one out of 65 interviewees described himself as unequivocally careerist. Nor did any say they were totally committed to their corporations with no reservations, although some expressed a sense of gratitude for having been given opportunities to progress. Almost all felt that commitment to an organization usually consisted of people becoming "locked in" beyond a certain age or career stage because of the attendant risks of leaving and the relative benefits of staying, including security of employment and pensions. Twenty-eight per cent of technical-professional and 32% of supervisory-managerial interviewees of all ages tempered their career commitments with the following
kinds of remarks: upward mobility does not spell success if one is unable to do the kind of work one finds satisfying; one must balance pay, prestige and ego-satisfaction of upward mobility with "quality of life" considerations such as health, stress, one's family, and other aspects of life and ask if it will be worth it.

The other side of the coin is that clerical workers, who generally have lower expectations for themselves while expressing belief in the value of upward mobility, are not all purely instrumental. Twenty percent of the clerical interviewees (all female) mentioned that while they were fairly satisfied with their station in life and with their pay, it was still important to them to be able to develop their abilities, try for more challenging work with more opportunity and independence, and avoid mental stagnation.

Such findings violate the expectations in the conventional literature sufficiently to raise a question: how similar are clerical and non-clerical workers in terms of instrumentalism? That is, what evidence is there that suggests a practical limit to careerism under conditions of alienated labour? The questionnaire provided some suggestive data.

Respondents were asked to rank-order eight aspects of work in terms of personal importance: content of work; location; work associates; recognition; promotion opportunity; chance to use one's abilities; independence; and monetary benefits. If the item was ranked in the top four, it was considered to be of high importance, if in the bottom four, of low importance. It was found that in all four firms and among all three occupational-class groups, the following items ranked low in importance: location, work associates, recognition, and promotion opportunity. They ranked the following high in importance: job content, use of abilities, independence, and monetary aspects. The inter-firm and inter-group
consistency was remarkable, suggesting that neither corporate atmosphere nor policy differences played much of a role. Table 7-2 summarizes the results for the "careerism" and "instrumentalism" items.

(Table 7-2 about here)

The usual expectation in the conventional literature, that clerical workers would be more instrumental, was not supported. It is interesting to note, however, that for all three groups, there was considerable ambivalence as indicated by the lack of a clearcut spread; almost as many respondents in any group ranked each of these items high as low, which would seem to suggest that the value of promotion and the value of monetary aspects are in a state of uneasy tension. Alienated labour cannot afford to dismiss either aspect too readily, pay and promotion being bound up together within finely graded hierarchies, as one systems analyst at Sigma recognizes:

"I don't think there's anybody that doesn't want to get ahead, and not only that, but if you stay in the same salary grade, sooner or later you're going to peak on your salary and they won't be able to give you any more money...I just want to get from grade to grade, that's the secret...if I get to the next grade, I know my salary won't peak, even if I have the same job title but I get to the next grade."

On the other hand, when it comes to ranking the value of job content (and in another questionnaire item, choosing "interest and variety" over other aspects of work), clerical and non-clerical workers alike are far less ambivalent: about three-quarters chose items which are related to intrinsic satisfaction. Of course, intrinsic satisfaction is not only variable in its content by group (a key-punch operator and an engineer both declared their work to be "interesting"), but is also conditioned by socialization, by the knowledge of work and expectations of work formed within capitalist institutions. They are accepted as "givens," just as the
necessity for wage-labour is. What appears to be more open to individual control and responsibility to workers is precisely those aspects which are the subject of competition: pay and promotion—the point where instrumentalism and careerism intersect, and where the capitalist firm is capable of creating motivational structures which enhance the illusion of control and responsibility for workers socialized into responding in individualistic terms.

Not so curiously, value of promotion (whether high or low in respondents' ranking) did not correlate with any of the items relating to opportunity and recruitment or career practices discussed in section I. If workers accepted the value of promotion it appeared to be a matter of faith, acceptance of the ideology of upward mobility apparently kept compartmentalized from any reality-check with the nature of the opportunity structure. The only correlation found (for all three occupational-class groups) was with promotion self-help activity: those who placed a high value on promotion were also active on their own behalf, whereas those who ranked promotion were inactive. "Playing the game" apparently means both seeing promotion opportunity as a good reason for working and also as a good reason for taking responsibility for oneself in active terms, and not valuing promotion provides perhaps the only legitimate excuse for inactivity within corporations.

A check of associations between instrumentalism and the same opportunity and career items was more revealing. Clerical and technical-professional workers who perceived themselves as dead-ended in their present jobs tended to place a higher value on monetary aspects, as did those who were dissatisfied with corporate handling of opportunity (the latter association held for supervisory-managerial respondents as well). Among clerical workers,
more pessimists in respect to extent of opportunity tended to be instrumental than were optimists. (This association was reversed for technical-professional and supervisory-managerial respondents: optimism and instrumentalism were related, possibly the effect of "deferred gratification," the hope that eventual mobility would bring more pay). Thus, in particular for clerical workers, high pay now was compensation for not being certain if promotion would eventually come and bring higher pay later, whereas non-clerical workers who did not see themselves as dead-ended could hold out hope that monetary compensation would come via upward mobility. Hence it would appear that valuing upward mobility is in part a disguised form of instrumentalism.

Instrumentalism and careerism are both responses to conditions of alienated labour, and as such, are part of the complex of behaviours involved in adaptation and habituation of workers to a capitalist world. Ultimately, when upward mobility is blocked and the message comes home to workers that what they have experienced thus far in the work-world is to be the general shape of their future work-world as well, they have already come to accept it. It is a process so gradual that the same "militant" clerical worker quoted in section II as seeing partial connections is also the exception to the rule of being unable to describe what has occurred:

"When I first started working I was wearing rose-coloured glasses, but not now. I was sheltered in university from the whole routine of work. I had these expectations when I was in school...I was really lowered. You've got a degree, you have to start at the bottom. I can do a lot more than I'm doing now, but I got used to it. At first I felt like a wild animal, being caged--but you tame down after a while. You say the heck with it, if that's all they want me to do...When you go home, that's the important thing, do things you want to do and forget about it...You have to accept it...My whole lifestyle changed, I matured, my outlook...I know quite a few people who aren't doing anything. Well, I'm getting good experience...So it's not been a waste. I felt really great at first but now I feel I'm going downhill."
IV SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Chapter Six showed that clerical workers (and technical-professional workers as well) were often pessimistic regarding their mobility prospects and were dissatisfied regarding corporate efforts to develop the careers of individuals. Data in the present chapter has indicated that workers tend not to see the reality of their situation in any coherent, patterned way. A maximum amount of connectedness among various issues would have allowed workers to "see through" the practices to the underlying logic of proletarianized work in terms of the inequalities generated by their location in the (class) structure and to realize the economic and political power behind corporate practices which controlled them, even if their language would have been one limited by the vocabulary of meritocratic individualism.

In actual fact, only limited connections were made, and as a result, inconsistency of interpretation and lack of follow-through to advocacy of more militant solutions to problems of unequal distribution of opportunities was the norm. There was only limited awareness of the interconnectedness among the following items:

1. Although clerical workers often felt themselves to be "dead-ended" in terms of the relationship which their present job had to future ones, they did not always see that mobility potential was affected by selection practices which largely excluded them (that is, that special selection practices violated meritocracy by establishing a stratum of relatively privileged recruits). Although half of all clerical workers felt "dead-ended," they attributed their limited prospects to lack of personal attributes such as education (as discussed in Chapter Six), or lack of corporate practices such as
job-postings which would rationally and systematically manage opportunities.

(2) It was, in fact, lack of a more rational corporate approach to career structures which led to some dissatisfaction with corporate handling of opportunity, suggesting that clerical workers accepted graduate hiring and promotion as a "given" located in an opportunity-world separate from their own.

(3) Recognizing oneself as being in a dead-end position caused some clerical workers to be pessimistic regarding the extent of opportunity in the firm (or vice versa). Some of this pessimism was connected with perceiving that factors like having "connections" was important in getting ahead.

(4) Although half of all clerical workers felt they were "dead-ended," these clerical workers did not necessarily believe that those in situations like their own were uncommitted to the corporation. By extension, they themselves did not withdraw commitment (whatever the reasons for that commitment). In other words, feeling dead-ended, pessimistic or dissatisfied did not lead to a sense of injustice and alienation from the corporation.

(5) Dead-ended, pessimistic and dissatisfied clerical workers do not consistently advocate having more of an active role in corporate-employee career decisions (or in any other role workers might conceivably have). Nor did such workers overwhelmingly declare themselves inactive in career self-promotion, which would have been an indication of the withdrawal of effort connected with ideological commitment to individual advancement.

However, while making connections among the various factors creating clerical career handicaps (that one is dead-ended because others have
special advantages and play "politics") may lead to dissatisfaction with corporate career policies and thus create pessimism regarding opportunity, workers do not de-legitimate the ideals of meritocratic individualism. Part of the explanation for this seems to lie in a "will to believe," an abstract commitment to liberal-democratic principles, as discussed in Chapter Six; part of the explanation may lie also in the fact that consequences of the existing opportunity and career structures have not been completely linked together causally. The explanation for this lack of linkage in turn would seem to lie in the ways in which perceptions may be obscured within the environment of the workplace. Interviews confirmed the existence of an inchoateness of expression such as was found among British blue-collar workers by Nichols and Armstrong. Use of the dominant vocabulary of competitive individualism reinforces acceptance of existing power-structures and leaves workers with no other way of expressing disillusionment and discontent; hence most retire inwards to a state of self-blame.

Acceptance of the "givens" of a work situation in which competition for individual rewards and mobility draws workers into active involvement in the career-making process implies that workers are co-opted. As long as they are acting to fulfill the expectations and outcomes of a "careerist" perspective on the work-world, they limit themselves (their interests, actions, and interpretive vocabulary) to playing a game by capitalist game-rules and consequently place limits on the extent and form of conflict.

The form which struggle could conceivably take is over the conditions of career-making, particularly directed at corporate policies and practices which workers believe ought to be made more systematic and rational so that the operation of meritocracy is maximized. These conflicts are thus
a logical outcome of the operation of hegemony in advanced capitalism. That is, that under conditions of domination where the motivational "carrot" becomes more important than the coercive "stick," struggle will evolve connected with the carrot: pay, status, and upward mobility. Thus, if corporations were to violate worker expectations regarding these motivational aspects, de-legitimation and an exacerbation of control problems would follow.

Data have shown that in fact, workers individualize their encounters with corporate systems (a particular supervisor is the problem, or a particular department ignores non-degreed technical-professional people), or else blame others who are similarly located (unambitious clerical workers are blocking my mobility)--all of which distract from identification of the true, structural causes of their "career" problems. Such encounters, however, frequently also cause cynicism regarding corporate inconsistency and duplicity in career matters, which sets up a potentially de-stabilizing dialectic at the career-games level.

As long as technical-professional workers perceive themselves as having portable and highly marketable skills, their solution will simply be inter-firm mobility. Even if conditions favouring this solution should change and unionization result, their collectivization of struggle would surely be in keeping with their individualistic orientations and interests, even as it is now in the case of clerical workers, "instrumental collectivism." As long as workers play the "career game" and as long as the mechanisms of self-blame continue to operate, the form of struggle will remain limited. Both the limiting and individualistic nature of careerism reinforce corporate power in the context of hegemonic domination. That is, workers "consent" to play the career game and are thereby controlled by the logic of career structures.
Ultimately, however, careerism itself has practical limits connected with the reality of life under capitalist domination. Employees are alienated labour. Evidence from the study shows that technical-professional workers play careerist games more intensely, for longer periods in their working lives before disillusionment sets in, and with greater know-how than clerical workers, consistent with their more privileged position and closer proximity to management. Nevertheless, both categories of workers have limited psychological commitment to their employing corporations and even the ardent "company man" tempers his commitment to a career with considerations of stress, health, and needs in the "outside world." Data show that technical-professional and clerical workers alike believe in the value of upward mobility but do not consider promotion opportunity as the most important factor should they be in a position to have free choice of jobs. Use of one's abilities and intrinsic interest are valued more (evidence of orientations under conditions of non-alienation), as are monetary rewards (evidence of orientations under conditions of alienation). Thus, clerical workers are more "careerist" than the conventional wisdom allows, and technical-professional workers are more "instrumental."

It may be concluded that the way in which work is organized, both in terms of the labour process and in terms of the ideological underpinnings, have important implications for the expression of conflict. The notions of fairness and reciprocity (I as worker do the work, you as management supply the rewards and opportunities) which are socialized expectations, become internalized into the self. Workers do not in this sense passively surrender; rather, they participate actively in their own subordination, with consequences both for the self and for the nature of conflict, thus reinforcing their dependency on the very structure that dominates.
To recall the theoretical discussion in Chapter Three, the corporation supplies the specific context in which "exterior determination" becomes "interior conditioning" in an active and ongoing way--subordination is a lived, everyday experience. Seen in this context, workers' adaptations such as careerism are rational if self-defeating.

In the final data chapter, Eight, some other practical outcomes of this "conditioning" and the corporate context in which it occurs will be explored in terms of the nature of the connections which workers make between work and the larger society outside work.
CHAPTER EIGHT:
IMAGES OF CLASS AND CONFLICT:
PRACTICAL OUTCOMES OF HEGEMONY

It will be recalled that in Chapter Seven it was argued that the ideology of careerism affects the nature of conflict in the workplace and by logical extension, should result as well in an interpretation of workers' class situation in the wider society which reflects the extent to which they are caught up in these ideological structures.

The present chapter goes beyond the lack of connections made by white-collar workers within the opportunity structures of corporations and considers the way in which they describe and account for the larger society outside the workplace. It explores the imagery of class, conflict and society and the nature of the vocabulary used by white-collar workers. The outcome, that workers cannot in any comprehensive way describe that world in conflict terms, is a further consequence of competitive isolation and of socialization into acceptance of the dominant ideology. As was pointed out by Nichols and Armstrong (1976) for British blue-collar workers, the practical outcome of hegemonic domination is the lack of a counter-ideology. The same hold true for the Canadian white-collar workers in this study.

Before this part of the findings is discussed, however, some elaboration of theoretical issues raised in the final section of Chapter Two is in order.
I WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS: CONSCIOUSNESS
AND THE CONJUNCTURE

What do other studies tell us about conditions for the development of class consciousness? The question cannot be answered without first bearing in mind that most of the studies conducted on various kinds of workers in North America and in Britain have not been entirely clear on what class they were dealing with in objective, structural terms. There has been a general lack of specification of class criteria in structural terms at the level of production relations. As well, there has been little attempt to distinguish between structure and conjuncture (that is, the immediate situations of class struggle as they work themselves out in the "lived" experience among certain groups of workers at specific points in times and in specific industries and countries). In the past, many researchers appear not to have been too conscious of these factors, and have tended to take the expressions and orientations of the particular group of workers studied as representative of all workers in similar class situations, and hence as pointing to a particular new trend developing in the orientations of classes and class actions. An examination of a number of studies will illustrate.

The Goldthorpe et al. studies of the Luton automobile workers (1969) dealt with the question of whether the working class had become "bourgeoisified." The researchers found that the embourgeoisement thesis was not upheld because workers' lifestyles, norms and so on were not middle class and that in addition, their work situation had not changed—they still sold their labour for wages. They were not, however, traditional working class in terms of their orientations and lifestyle: instead of being solidaristic and collectivistic, they were "privatized," conservative, and individualistic.
The task for Lockwood (1958) in studying British white-collar clerical workers was to establish whether class consciousness indicated a convergence with manual workers. Lockwood came to the conclusion that there were still pronounced differences in the "work situation," status situation" and "market situation" of clerical workers which distinguished them from manual workers, and since in Lockwood's theoretical scheme, these situations determined class consciousness, as long as they persisted there would be no convergence with proletarian consciousness.

On the other side of the coin were studies by Marxists such as Mallet (1975) who in the heat of the Paris uprisings of the late 1960's, saw the development of a new vanguard in class struggle, a "new working class" of white-collar technical workers from highly developed sectors of the economy. These workers were threatened by proletarianization but responded to the work situation in non-traditional ways: their struggles were over autonomy rather than money; they were also workers who were highly class conscious.

In a critique of the "new working class" thesis, Aronowitz (1971) pointed out that many of these studies took as indicators of the creation of a vanguard class such items in work situation as emphasis on mental rather than manual work, the increasing technical complexity of work and the workers' increased educational levels, and the autonomy of the work and the workers. There was a lack of clarity or explicitness in the use of the term "new working class," such as for example a failure to differentiate between "technocrats" and "technicians" in terms of the locus of control.

What is missing in "new working class" theories is an adequate definition of class within class relations at the level of production.
Class is a relational concept. Productive relations involve control as part of the function of capital, not the function of labour. Such studies, therefore, have often subsumed within their "new working class" elements of both the proletariat and the new middle class. This has made class analysis a confused enterprise focussed on surface phenomena such as "market situation." These studies all demonstrated an inadequate understanding of the intermeshing of levels of analysis: the structural level of class as "position," the objective conditions in the immediate situation or "conjuncture," and the subjective orientations of class actors or "agents." Here, new theoretical literature such as was outlined in Chapter Two provide the guidance for sorting out these levels of analysis.

The starting-point for any analysis of class action must not be the old debate of "class-in-itself" versus "class-for-itself" initiated in the early writings of Marx, but rather, must be with the way in which class formations are altered historically by changes in the functions of labour and capital and what these mean for the structural determination of class places.

Neo-Marxian class theorists such as Poulantzas and Carchedi draw attention to an important consequence which follows from the separation of the objective and subjective levels (the distinction between "places" and "agents"): there can be no direct "reading off" of agents' class interests and hence consciousness from their structural situation. All that can be stated is that their objective interests as a class arise from their structural location (for the proletarist, for example, that of exploitation), but whether or not individual agents express and act out this interest consciously depends on factors
in other levels of analysis, particularly in the conjuncture. Consciousness becomes confounded by such elements as the impact of a particular history of political economy as it develops in a particular country, but also by the continued hegemonic influence of the ideological apparatuses whose role is in the creation of agents as "subjects" to fill designated places unproblematically. These two aspects may act back on one another in the conjuncture and radically alter the development of consciousness. On the other hand, to examine only apparent changes in actors' orientations or political activity without taking into account real or apparent changes in the structure of capitalism is to misinterpret surface phenomena and hence confuse two distinct levels of analysis which need separate but intermeshing analysis, not merging ones.

The focus on surface phenomena which characterizes the Goldthorpe and the Lockwood studies is a case in point. "Selling labour for wages" is not an adequate description to allow for distinctions to be made between manual and white-collar workers and managers—all "sell their labour" (are employees), but this does not make them all members of the same class. This is the same sort of error which is fallen into by those who are not careful to distinguish technocrats and technicians on the basis of control in productive relations. (And of course, "control," such as in Carchedi's usage, is not synonymous with "autonomy"). By the same token, when Lockwood speaks of "proximity to management" as affecting the status of clerical workers, this must not be interpreted to mean "sharing in control" or sharing in ideological domination; Lockwood is unclear on this.

Class analysis must be adequately grounded in a definition which involves class relations or else analysis contributes little to
clarification. Even if it is unwittingly a conjunctural analysis, it may still only be an analysis of surface phenomena. Studies such as the ones cited sought answers to the question of class orientations and class actions only in the work situation and in the lifestyle and political orientations of workers without, however, telling us anything much about what these meant for changes (if any) in the class structure at the level of productive relations. They "read off" class from work and market situation (Lockwood), or confused and confounded a number of items in the class structure, conjunctural situation at work or in society, and subjective orientations by trying to "read off" one from the other (Goldthorpe).

A further problem which arose in studies such as Blauner's and Mallet's was that there was an attempt to read off worker orientations and political significance directly from workplace technological arrangements in an unmediated way, just as Lockwood tried to read off class consciousness directly from work situation. For Blauner, advanced technology produced consensus and harmony in management-worker relations; for Mallet it produced a vanguard of workers with revolutionary consciousness. Each also tried to extrapolate from these arrangements and actions to a general, emergent trend in worker orientations.

By 1978, Duncan Gallie, still searching for the "new working class," noted that what the 1960's studies had taught us was not to seek "metaphysical" notions of the working class as a homogeneous social entity but rather to attempt to understand its internal differentiation (1978: 317). His study avoided any obsession with the "embourgeoisement-proletarianization" debate and also showed that technology was not the key to understanding orientations, since similar technical arrangements could be shown to be connected with
different worker orientations. His study, however, dealt only with blue-collar workers in French and British refineries and avoided the problem of class definition.

In a 1978 study, Low-Beer made theoretical errors similar to those made in the studies of Mallet and others: his "new working class" was a predominantly "middle class" group of technicians and highly skilled blue-collar workers in technologically advanced sectors of Italian industry. Class was never specified in structural terms but was simply "read off" directly from education, skill, and income levels, and from the work situation with its emphasis on autonomy and predominance of mental over physical labour. He argued for a blue-white collar convergence which ignored all attempts to differentiate classes at the level of their role in capital-labour productive relations.

An advance had been made over other studies, however. Both Gallie and Low-Beer emphasized the differences between the socio-cultural and political environments of Britain, France and Italy which accounted for differences in responses by workers who otherwise shared similar work situations. Low-Beer commented that while the impact of work situation on political attitudes was not that clear, "the impact of politics on industrial behaviour is very strong", and in Italy, the link between industrial relations and political parties was "very close" (1978: 205). In the same way, class imagery seemed to be tied to political attitudes, he found. What he was getting at was the unique social, cultural and political climate of Italy—what was to Gallie "the critical importance of the wider cultural and social structural patterns of specific societies" (1978: 317). These were conjunctural analyses despite their deficiencies.
Gallie proceeded a step further than Low-Beer, however. He argued that while worker attitudes at the workplace level (such as normative assumptions, expectations, interpretations of and attitudes to management relations, and the legitimacy of making explicit links between work and wider political issues) had much to do with the broader cultural and social structural factors which were variable between societies, there were also important mediators at the workplace level. He listed such mediators as managerial ideology, the structure of institutional power, and the ideology and mode of action of the trade union movement. Taken together, these produced different outcomes, the distinctive social situation for each country's working class (1978: Ch. 12). Thus, whether workers were going to be socially "integrated" as Blauner suggested, or were to become the vanguard of class action, as Mallet suggested, is very much conditioned by all of these variables. This was a superior conjunctural analysis, since it not only sought differences at the workplace level and at the societal level, but suggested mediating linkages.

In a Canadian study of construction workers, Leggett (1979) also recognized the importance of conjunctural factors, although he did not link them up in the same comprehensive way. Despite the lack of conditions which would propel consciousness forward to revolutionary activity in advanced capitalist countries (Mann's (1973) "explosion of consciousness"), Leggett suggested that "uneven development" was involved. Some groups and conditions foster class consciousness and action better than others: proletarianized ethnic groups who have been uprooted, are involved in economically insecure occupations, and have membership in unions in communities where unions have taken the lead in confronting employers and the state, are likely candidates (1979:242).
Clearly, none of the above conditions hold for the white-collar workers who were the subject of the present study. In the interests of furthering research, the broad features of the conjuncture in Canada must be taken into account, as well as the situation of specific groups of workers such as in the monopoly sector.

These features include the peculiar way in which the political economy of Canada has developed, as outlined in Chapter Two. Despite the differences between the United States and Canada (including the lack of any revolutionary break between Canada and its colonial past and the absence of civil war), these two countries share many features of their socio-political climate. They both lack a strong and enduring tradition of socialism. They have political systems which are notably bereft of any radical left-wing parties; and there is no explicit and formal linkage between those parties which profess to be more "social democratic" and the labour movement.

The lack of politicization of labour is one of the most striking features of labour unionism in North America (nor, as Gallup polls recently revealed, do Canadian workers even desire a union-party connection). Canadian workers, like their American counterparts, have not overcome their socialization—they are on the whole hostile to socialist movements. Even though there has been a rapid increase in the unionization of white-collar workers and semi-professionals, particularly in the public sector, it has not been accompanied by radical militancy despite some bitter strikes. Workers do not generally organize because they are class consciousness, but under the right conditions they could become so—in the case of North America, however, unionization has not done much to develop class consciousness.
On the contrary, unionization has only succeeded in emphasizing compartmentalization and economism among North American workers (cf. Mann, 1973). With the possible exception of Quebec, with its late-blooming union radicalism and its upsurge of nationalist sentiments, there has been little to disrupt the pervasive rhetoric of liberal democracy. Class identity and consciousness have remained at a relatively primitive level of development.

If the term "uneven development" can be applied to consciousness and action, North American is relatively underdeveloped. Thus it is not surprising that the white-collar workers in the study presented here resemble those in Mackenzie's 1973 study of American blue- and white-collar workers, as the data in section III will show: in class imagery and in the downplaying of "colour of collar" in favour of emphasis on lifestyle and consumption. These findings may be interpreted as indicators of the success of hegemony in North America.

In the section which follows, it must be remembered that the search for the nature of class consciousness, if indeed any does exist within the ranks of proletarianized white-collar labour, will not be in terms of the classic "class-for-itself" kind of imagery. The case would indeed be hopeless, for this kind of revolutionary consciousness is not to be found in the most advanced areas of capitalism where contradictions seem to workers not to exist, and where even militant workers rarely move from trade union consciousness to an "explosion of consciousness" (cf. Mann, 1973). What the research has attempted to elicit was something much more fundamental: workers' images of the structure of society as they experience and interpret it. Moreover, considerations covered in previous chapters should alert the researcher to the vocabulary of expression and the way in which connections
are made between class structure and workers' experiences, recognizing that these expressions will probably lack any fully articulated linkages. The operative question is: to what extent do those in proletarian class locations express the situation of being proletarianized and identify its causes?

Clearly, workers' consciousness of structures, whatever their mode of expression, would be almost impossible to capture, since class consciousness is not a "thing," is not static, but is part of the dynamic of the as-lived situation which in the absence of on-going class action the researcher must get at in the abstract. Consciousness stimulated by a strike involving these workers, for instance, might exhibit some different features. At the time of the study, however, corporate life proceeded normally and placidly with no collective expressions of discontent.
II THE FINDINGS: WHITE-COLLAR ORIENTATIONS TO CLASS ISSUES

The findings which will be discussed in this chapter originate in the relatively short but cohesive portion of the questionnaire and the interview schedule dealing with class images and the other class-workplace related items. Throughout the research, the guiding concern was: what does this mean to the employees, how does it relative to their objective placement in the class structure, and what does it tell us about their awareness (or lack of awareness) of the workplace and societal political and ideological arrangements? The purely descriptive data of the questionnaire were subjected to the greater explanatory power of the in-depth interview material which, while lacking in relative quantity, was superior in bringing interpretive quality (workers' meanings) to the analysis.

It became apparent very early in the study that interviewees could not be led easily into a discussion of class, or even a discussion of authority and hierarchy within the workplace. Since a number of related issues in the schedule did not produce a natural transition to a discussion of class and class relations among the interviewees, deliberately worded questions were injected. Two kinds of questions were used alternately: after a discussion on unions, interviewees were asked to discuss whether or not they thought the existence of unions had contributed to decreased class differences in society; the other question was "Some people have said that ours is now a more middle-class society; what do you think of this statement?".

Regardless of the way in which the question was worded, most interviewees needed much prompting because the question appeared to them to be a strange one. The usual remark was that they did not think
in those terms, had not given the subject much thought in the past, or that class was not a relevant issue to them. Often they were uncomfortable with the word "class," preferring to substitute "strata," or else stating that it was not a "nice" word since it implied "looking down" on some group or being looked down on in turn, some sort of personal evaluation. This kind of discomfort was expressed by 20% of the clerical, 19% of the technical-professional and 29% of the supervisory-managerial interviewees. (Altogether, there had been time to discuss the subject of class with 63 out of the 91 interviewees.)

That in their minds class was a "social" category implying superiority and inferiority in terms of the groups with whom one socialized was evident in the distinction which some interviewees made between "income class" and "social class"—they would point out that everyone was equal in human terms and would then go on to discuss classes in income terms.

The other notable feature of the interviews was that even when interviewees could be kept on the subject of class, there was no hint either in their attitude or in their choice of words of any conflictual view of classes, nor of any structural linkage between authority relations in the workplace and class relations in the wider society. Of the 63 interviewees, only one spoke in oppositional terms, made an explicit linkage between workplace hierarchies and capitalist control in society (via "old wealthy and powerful families who own corporations"). This former draftsman, now a drafting supervisor, came from a British working-class background and was highly class conscious. Other interviewees were neither class conscious nor could be articulate even when using "everyday" vocabulary about the significance of arrangements in the workplace and in society, although the "militant" unionized clerk
quoted in Chapter Seven came close to doing so. In fact, most interviewees could not even understand some rather conventional questions until they were repeated and reworded with much prompting.

Clerical workers were the least articulate and the least able to relate together even items usually considered part of a conventional or "mainstream" view of work and society. Technical-professional workers were the most articulate, often giving explanations at length and making statements reminiscent of classical economics texts. Supervisory-managerial people were occasionally articulate, but most tried to evade the question unless given very directed and insistent prompting.

That which did emerge was a conventional view of society with conventional explanations for why things were as they were, such as could be found in editorials in conservative newspapers, speeches by corporate executives, or at best, "mainstream" sociology texts on stratification. In other words, what they repeated, often with great conviction, was the "conventional wisdom" which forms part of the general mythology found in capitalist society. What follows is a more detailed description of the way in which these responses were patterned, both in the interviews and in the questionnaire.

A. Images of Class

The interviews revealed a fairly consistent majority view of society among the three occupational-class groups. Their image was of a society which is graduated principally in income and consumption terms into three main classes; upper, middle, and lower, with the middle class further graduated into upper-middle, middle, and lower-middle. There was no dichotomous model of an oppositional kind, although a two-class model was described by two interviewees from each
occupational-class group, who believed that society was divided between "a rich class and a middle class," and in one case between "employees and the independently wealthy."

There were no supervisory-managerial interviewees who were unable to describe a model of society in class terms, and only 12% of the technical-professional interviewees could not. However, 40% of the clerical interviewees were unclear on what society looked like, which is an indication of their general inability to discuss class-related topics.

In response to the discussion-stimulating statement regarding whether or not we are now a more middle-class society or what we now have fewer class distinctions, almost half of the clerical interviewees believed that society was predominantly middle class, as did a similar proportion of technical-professional and supervisory-managerial interviewees.

Thirteen per cent of the clerical interviewees disagreed that ours was now a more middle-class society, as did 7% of technical-professional and 10% of supervisory-managerial interviewees. Roughly a quarter of each group was too uncertain to assess the statement, and a tiny minority (one or two cases in each group) could not see society in class terms at all.

Most interviewees went on to say that the middle class, with its various gradations, was now the largest class in society, and that the upper class and lower class were both now very small. Three technical-professional and one supervisory-managerial interviewee were able to specify the size of the middle class in relative proportions, one stating that it constituted about 80% of our society's population, and two others indicated by gestures roughly the same size. One interviewee
described society as "diamond-shaped," with a large bulge between middle and lower-middle class. Interviewees gave a number of reasons why they believed this class was now the largest: the "levelling" effects of unions and of government income redistribution; shifts in skill and income levels between lower white-collar and skilled manual workers; and inflation.

As these interpretations are all income-related, it is reasonable to assume that these interviewees see the basis for their class model as being income. When the interviewees were queried as to what the basis of class in society was, 47% of clerical, 44% of technical-professional and 38% of supervisory-managerial interviewees stated it was income, consumption, and related items. Another 30% of technical-professional and 29% of supervisory-managerial interviewees stated that it was a combination of occupation and other factors including income, consumption and lifestyle. These constituted the vast majority of the responses except for clerical, where the basis of class was unclear for 53% of the interviewees. A small minority stated a diversity of items such as values and attitudes (personal attributes); another small minority stated that class was based on responsibility or decision-making, job autonomy, or prestige.

Thus it is apparent that typically, stratification-theory items are relevant to most interviewees, who introduced them voluntarily as part of their personal meaning-systems. These items are part of an occupation-income-consumption complex of meanings.

This view of society was also prevalent in the larger sample. Questionnaire respondents were asked to choose which of the following descriptions came closest to their view of our society: "There are no
important class distinctions any more", or "There are many different layers, but the most important are the lower, middle and upper classes", or "The most important class division is between those who own or control business and those who do not." These are circumlocutions for a "classless," "stratification," and "dichotomous" model of society, respectively. The results are detailed in Table 8-1.

With a spread of only four percentage-points, there is very little difference among the three occupational class groups; the stratified view of society prevails. Little difference was revealed between the response frequencies of unionized and non-unionized workers. What is being tapped here apparently is the dominant ideology in the society at large.

When the responses other than for the "stratification" model are examined, however, some important inter-firm differences appear in the degree to which clerical workers subscribe to a classless versus a dichotomous model, probably reflecting differences in ideological climate in the four firms.

The fact of unionization prompts a few workers at Alpha and Chi to see society dichotomously (unions are oppositional forces); yet even here, individual firm differences come into play. At Chi, nearly ten per cent more clerical workers than at Alpha have accepted a stratification view—probably because Chi's management has tried to create a participative atmosphere, which is lacking at Alpha. Similarly at Delta, authoritarianism has reinforced an oppositional view among a few clerical workers, analogous to the impact of unions, but paternalism may have made a few others interpret the firm and society at large as being classless. The impact of fostering participativeness on the job at Sigma seems to have been to ameliorate the effects of elitism: a few "deviant" cases pass up the dichotomous model for a classless one (23% of clerical respondents
and 25% of all three groups). The classless choice at Sigma is the highest of all four firms; as one technical-professional worker commented: "This is a middle-class company" (in a middle-class hence classless society).

There thus appears to be a "spillover" effect—workers are somewhat influenced in their assessment of the nature of society by their experience of life in a particular firm (indeed, some have experienced only the one workplace and that experience is more likely to reinforce their prior socialization than to overthrow it). This says something significant about the way in which class disadvantages are experienced and interpreted, and why hardship relative to other classes may not in itself necessarily produce class consciousness: the immediate conjuncture is decisive.

( Table 8-1 a, b about here )

A class-conscious group of clerical workers would have been expected to overwhelmingly choose a model of society describing some sort of polarization; those who are near the bottom of the exploitation order should be more aware of the basis of their exploitation if objective conditions directly determine consciousness. This view has been rejected. Significantly, while some clerical workers who did not choose the stratification model chose the dichotomous rather than the classless model, so did supervisory-managerial respondents in almost exactly the same proportions.

Thus, even among clerical workers who saw society in dichotomous terms, we must suspect that there is little in their perspective to distinguish them from supervisors or managers, those who control them in the workplace. The only difference between the questionnaire res-
pondents and the interviewees is that given an unstructured format, clerical workers are less articulate in describing their society, but when given the pre-packaged vocabulary of the questionnaire, they recognize and choose the image which is prevalent in society and do so to a degree remarkably consistent with the choices of workers in other class locations. What this means is that experience of exploitation and handicaps is not interpreted as such by most workers.

A further questionnaire item was designed to allow respondents to describe what kind of information they would need to have in order to assign a person to a class. This open-ended question, in which respondents filled in blanks, drew a diversity of answers which were then grouped into categories to capture their essential similarities. These yielded seven categories: (1) occupation-related items, (2) responsibility, (3) education, skills or qualifications, (4) income and consumption items, (5) personal or family attributes, (6) combinations of several of the single items above, (7) unclassifiable. Table 8-2 documents the results, including the equivalent data summarized from the in-depth interviews.

( Table 8-2 about here )

The items which predominated were those related to occupation, income, and consumption, together accounting for over 50% of the responses in all three occupational-class groups. Although more clerical respondents chose occupation than income or consumption (34% versus 28% in other groups) and more technical-professional and supervisory-managerial respondents chose income-consumption items (39% and 28% respectively), the results are so similar and capture such a large percentage of the diversity of items
cited that it is safe to say there is not much difference between the clerical group's and other groups' perceptions of what forms the basis of class. The items are all connected with something "economic" in nature.

In the interviews, the income-consumption items predominated, but since interviewees were able to discuss the subject in an unstructured way, they tended to be more complex and multifaceted in their analysis--occupation was not mentioned by itself but in combination with other factors. Interviewees also expressed uncertainty more frequently. The differences in results would therefore be attributable to format differences as well as sample size differences. Nevertheless, when the income-consumption and combination items are taken together, the interviewees resemble the questionnaire respondents in the prevalence of the occupation-income-consumption complex.

In addition, both questionnaire respondents and interviewees were asked to give examples of what sorts of occupations they would place in each class. There was little naming of classes as prompting in the interviews, but some names of occupations were given to interviewees to help begin the process; on the other hand, questionnaire respondents were given class names and asked to fill in blanks. These differences in format seem to account for slight differences in data from the two sources. Questionnaire respondents were asked to give examples for the following classes: upper, middle, working, and lower; interviewees, however, tended not to use the term "working class." Despite these differences, there was a great deal of similarity in the response patterns of the sample groups. The most frequently cited items from both sources are listed in Table 8-3 with the interview results in brackets.

( Table 8-3 about here )
In all three groups of respondents, upper class examples included corporate owners, executives and senior managers, and professionals. Professionals were also often mentioned as being part of the middle class along with middle-level managers, clerks, and skilled manual workers. There was considerably more overlap of examples between middle and working class: clerks, tradesmen and other skilled workers were also called working class. The lower class, however, was almost exclusively defined as containing only unskilled labour and the unemployed except in the view of a very few non-clerical respondents who believed that clerks were also lower class. Curiously, with the exception of a rare case or two, no respondents mentioned farmers or small businessmen, which suggests the degree to which the old petty-bourgeoisie has declined in importance and visibility in our modern "employee-society."

The overlapping placements indicate that respondents had difficulties with examples which represented some ambiguity in their minds. Interviews confirm that on the basis of income and consumption, skilled trades are often said to be middle class, along with white-collar workers, but that on the basis of status, all blue-collar workers are often considered to be lower class.

When respondents speak of professionals, they often do not speak of them as a homogeneous category; doctors and lawyers are usually considered to be upper class by income but as having suffered some erosion of income lately which makes them about the same level as engineering and accounting professionals in corporations—that is, middle to upper-middle class. Self-employment in and of itself is not a significant source of class differences to these respondents.

That the basis of class is income-related to these employees accounts for much of the ambiguity, since they must reconcile recent shifts in
relative income positioning with commonly accepted status positioning, and find that these do not match any longer. That the overlapping occurs in the same examples by all three groups of respondents would seem to indicate that the ambiguity is felt to some degree by all occupational-class groups in the study.

In contrast to these overlapping placements, there are others which are cited by all three groups of respondents for only one class. Corporate owners or directors (or in the interviews, "old wealth") are cited exclusively as upper class, as are corporate executives. Middle managers are identified exclusively as middle class. Welfare and the unemployed cases are cited as exclusively lower class. In addition, no clerical or manual examples appear in upper class placement. These therefore would appear to be unambiguous cases to respondents.

When both the ambiguous and the unambiguous examples are considered, despite variations in the frequency of citing among the three groups studied, there is a core of consensus or consistency with which key occupations are viewed in class terms. It is a consistency which prevails over differences in class position of the respondents doing the placing, and would therefore seem to indicate a shared reality which transcends experience in one's own class. This shared reality is one which would appear to originate in the common images located and transmitted in the wider society. They highlight a view of society as stratified and whose basis is essentially non-antagonistic in class terms and based on meritocratic, individualistic principles. Examination of other elements in the research will confirm the extent to which these latter points appear to be valid, particularly in the search for any possible latent oppositional view.

A good place to explore this further is in the perceptions shared
by all three groups, about their own class identity and the nature of comparisons they make with other groups in the workplace.

In both the interviews and the questionnaires, the majority of respondents identified themselves as "middle class," although clerical workers who spoke of gradations in the middle class usually added that they would probably be considered "lower middle" by some, whereas professionals and managers were "upper middle." In the questionnaires, 54% of clerical respondents identified themselves as middle class, while 86% of technical-professional and 80% of supervisory-managerial respondents did so. The balance of replies to this question on class self-ascription fell to "working class" (chosen by 45% of clerical, 13% of technical-professional and 14% of supervisory-managerial respondents), while only 7%, 1% and 6% respectively called themselves "upper class."

It would thus appear that most respondents, despite the much lower proportion of middle-class identifiers among clerical people, "buy" the myth of this being a predominantly middle-class society which includes them within those ranks. There is, however, one fact of clerical life which alters clerical impressions of their station in society somewhat: unionization. Among clerical workers at Alpha and Chi, the predominance of middle-class identification gives way to working-class identification. In the unionized firms, 60% of all clerical respondents call themselves working class and only 40% regard themselves as middle class. It would appear that when white-collar unions are present, they draw attention to the similarity with manual workers who are also unionized, and help draw the line in a much more pronounced way for clerical workers between themselves and the "exempt" or non-union non-clerical groups above them.
In this case, the fact of unionization has accounted for all the cases which deviate from the middle-class myth. At Delta and Sigma, firms which have no clerical unions but which stress one's "place" in some way (Delta via paternalistic authoritarianism and Sigma via elitism), only 30% of clerical workers identified themselves as working class—here, one's "place" is not interpreted as a class/place as it is when unions are present, but rather, one determined by education or by traditional structures.

This does not mean, however, that clerical workers who view themselves as working class also view themselves as proletarianized in the sense of resembling manual workers. In the questionnaire, respondents were asked if they agreed with the statement that in recent years, clerical and manual workers have come to resemble one another more. They were given three choices: "quite true for nearly all clerical", "not true at all", and the moderate, escape-hatch reply "somewhat true for most clerical".

For all three occupational-class groups, the dominant response is the moderate reply, that is, partial recognition of the clerical-manual resemblance (it was chosen by 61% of clerical, 63% of technical-professional and 42% of supervisory-managerial respondents). What is even more revealing is that in those firms where clerical unions exist, the response rate of clerical workers to the choice granting full recognition to the proletarian resemblance does not differ in any significant way from clerical workers in the non-union companies. (In the two union companies, 17% and 15% of clerical workers chose the full-recognition statement; this is exactly the same percentage for clerical in the non-union companies). In all cases, whether clerical workers were unionized or not, they granted only partial recognition to the possibility
of proletarianization. The second-highest choice was not full recognition but denial of the resemblance—ranging between 22% and 42%. (In the non-union Sigma, in fact, the clerical response rate for this statement was tied with that for the moderate statement "somewhat true for most"). Thus, with the exception of Sigma, inter-firm differences in ideological atmosphere did not account for differences in perceptions of proletarianization. (Sigma was the firm characterized by some respondents as "middle class").

Seeing oneself as working class and seeing oneself as similar to manual workers are not necessarily related. Whatever resemblance is seen, therefore, does not appear to have anything to do with the structural similarity of the blue- and white-collar parts of the working class, that is in terms of their objective situation within economic domination. Nor do workers see the resemblance in terms of more superficial features like working conditions and nature of work as semi-skilled. In interviews, only when prodded did some clerical workers agree to the suggestion that their work resembled a "paper assembly-line" comparable to a manual assembly-line. However, they neither initiated the comparison nor added anything further to it. They could only see themselves as being the lowest paid and least-educated part of the white-collar hierarchy. What white-collar proletarians did see were resemblances outside the workplace: lifestyle and consumption patterns, and some diminishing of non-work status differences. Some typical clerical statements in the interviews illustrate this:

"When we're dressed up out on the street Saturday night, you can't tell the difference."

"We're all middle class now, not poor. My fiancé just started working at a factory and I make more than he does—but with our two incomes, we'll be able to afford a house and go out now and then, so we're middle class. It's not based on your job or status or being better than someone."
"What's the difference between white and blue collar? 
It isn't based on class—we're all one class. It's just that the work is different and some people prefer factory work or outside work and some prefer inside work."

Altogether, 53% of clerical interviewees agreed that manual workers and clerical workers resembled one another in terms of class, income, consumption, and the skill level of the work. A slightly lower percentage of non-clerical interviewees also agreed (41% and 48%). On the other hand, 7% of clerical, 4% of technical-professional and 24% of supervisory-managerial interviewees felt that while that may be true, white-collar people had more status and a different value to their work than blue-collar. A few also felt that the trades had more status and income now. The balance of interviewees did not deal with the topic (32%, 55% and 23% respectively).

The issue of white-collar and blue-collar resemblances, like that of class, did not seem to be a relevant issue to these employees when they looked around at residential patterns familiar to them and at workers within their large and affluent corporations. One technical-professional interviewee summed it up: "Well, we're all alike. Only when he [the plant worker] goes to the supermarket, he buys steak while I buy hamburger."

Questionnaire respondents were asked to choose which of four groups they felt most similar to: manual workers, clerical workers, skilled specialists, or management. No clerical worker chose "manual" (nor for that matter did any other respondents except one blue-collar foreman). In fact, in all companies including the two unionized ones, clerical workers either identified with their own type ("clerical") or saw themselves as resembling "skilled specialists" (70% and 19% of clerical respondents, respectively). Table 8-4 shows the extent to which clerical respondents identified with their objective location.

(Table 8-4a, b about here)
It is understandable that some technical-professional workers, who serve as adjuncts to the decision-making processes and as designers and monitors of various kinds of control systems, should feel similar to management; by the same token it is understandable that some supervisors and managers, especially those in departments oriented to "operations" and to technical design, should feel like skilled specialists who also happen to have some supervisory duties over others performing similar technical work to their own. It is less understandable that they should identify with clerical workers, although interviews confirm that many accounting specialists at Delta regard their work as routine, fragmented, and with great clerical content.

There is little in the objective situation of clerical workers, however, which would justify their identifying with skilled specialists, particularly in firms where clerical unions or strict exempt-nonexempt lines (degree-nondegree) underscore their separation from specialists. It is almost bizarre that some clerical workers should feel similar to management (yet 11% did).

Examination of Table 8-4(b) shows the degree of inter-firm variability in these "deviant" ascriptions. There is so much variation within the clerical group that it is clearly "local" factors which are affecting the perceptions of a few. The highest proportion of clerical respondents who feel like skilled specialists occur in Companies Chi and Sigma (20%, and 25% respectively)—the two firms which foster a participative atmosphere (interestingly, Chi has effectively ameliorated the effects of the union-nonunion divide). At Alpha, little attempt has been made to affect the atmosphere; clerical workers there, interviews confirm, see the union-nonunion divide as one difficult to cross and skilled specialists
are on the other side of it. At Delta, authoritarianism and paternalism have combined to make clerical workers "know their place"; Delta's management is notorious for its anti-union sentiments--interestingly, their paternalism strategy has worked just as effectively as any union-nonunion divide in reinforcing a worker's place but without as much antagonism.

Nevertheless, despite such "deviant" ascriptions, it appears to be much easier for clerical workers to identify with their appropriate occupational group than it is for them to identify with their objective class location. What these two kinds of data indicate, therefore, is the inability to link situation in the workplace to class structure of the workplace, and in turn to link these with class in the society. It is a linkage which would be foreign indeed to these workers and is consistent with life in settings where they are competitively divided. Again, as with the subject of opportunity, the language of meritocratic individualism and the dominant value-system it represents make it seem natural to workers to discuss relative advantages and disadvantages in terms of individual differences rather than in terms of antagonistic classes, as the next section will show.

B. Class and Authority in the Workplace

When asked about class and the corporate hierarchy, most interviewees appeared puzzled. Clerical workers in particular often made statements such as "There mustn't be much class difference because my supervisors don't look down on me", and even technical-professional workers, when asked if a vice-president was a member of the upper class, would reply "It depends on who it is, what his style is, if he acts human or
not", or that due to similarities in education and social background, most employees in that company including management were "middle class".

While these kinds of statements suggest that workers are having difficulties articulating what they think they are seeing in the workplace, it also suggests that there is something about the authority relations of class which is breaking through in disguised ways--so disguised that very rarely would an interviewee even use the word "authority" in talking about differences between management and non-management groups. A young female clerk from Sigma is typical of the difficulties encountered by employees in explaining what they mean:

"Maybe a personal division. I don't know how to explain it. Like, if you know somebody who's in a union and you're not, they may--I don't know...I don't know how to say it. [drums with her fingers on the table]. I think there would be a greater distinction, he's a manager, a higher position, he's getting paid more, and the lower non-exempt people would be aware of that...Sometimes you can tell. Just by the way they dress."

In the interviews, when discussing careers and opportunities, it soon became evident that most employees were aware of the differences in salary ranges, opportunity ceilings and even corporate attention paid to searching out promotable talent between clerical workers and technical-professional workers. In unionized companies, this difference is often seen as being based on a union-nonunion line, and in the other companies, as being a clerical ("non-exempt") and non-clerical ("exempt") line. A question was therefore placed in the questionnaire to capture the extent to which these differences were evident and important to workers of all occupational-class groups, and if there were any other differences of relevance to them.

Respondents were asked if among office employees in their firm, any of the following were important ways of characterizing differences among
types of employees: management versus non-management, exempt versus non-exempt, unionized versus non-unionized, specialized versus un-specialized, and males versus females. They were allowed to choose two of these sets if they so wished, rank-ordering them. (Since the second-ranked items yielded too few cases to be significant, Table 8-5 details the first-ranked items only.)

(Table 8-5a, b about here)

The dominant first choice of all three occupational-class groups was the management-nonmanagement difference (41% to 48%). When the results for the second-ranked item were examined, it was found that 57% of clerical, 47% of technical-professional and 46% of supervisory-managerial respondents chose male-female differences. In each case, a supplementary question determined that these choices were moderately to very important to 80% of clerical, 86% of technical-professional and 67% of supervisory-managerial respondents.

When inter-firm differences are examined (Table 8-5b), it becomes clear that the management-nonmanagement line is uniformly important to clerical workers in all firms except Sigma. Sigma clerical workers identify the exempt-nonexempt line instead. It is this line which at Sigma represents the separation of degree and non-degree people, reflecting Sigma's elitism. When combined with the rhetoric of "participation" at the everyday work level, the effect is to render the line of management authority almost invisible. (Significantly, however, for those Sigma respondents who chose to rank-order a second item, management-nonmanagement was more important than male-female differences). That the
line should be pronounced at Delta is obvious in the light of their authoritarianism—management likes to consider itself a sort of "pater familias." At Alpha, on the other hand, the presence of a union has created some distraction, undoubtedly aided by the laissez-faire management climate; even among those who rank-ordered a second choice, union-nonunion predominated over sex differences. At Chi, surprisingly, the management line is almost as pronounced as at Delta despite the presumed "democratizing" effect of some policies—possibly due to the union presence.

Despite inter-firm differences, these results show a remarkable unanimity centering around two kinds of structural differences among employees: hierarchical (authority) differences, and sex differences. The order in which these were chosen among those who chose more than one is also highly significant: hierarchy first and sex differences second. A class analyst would be highly tempted to conclude that what is inadvertently being highlighted is an awareness of exploitation of classes originating in the central contradiction of capitalist society and translated at the "micro" workplace level into an awareness of authority relations, and that only secondarily do workers point to the exploitation of sex differences within the larger reality of class.

This, however, would be reaching far beyond the surface reality of everyday workplace life, and certainly, far beyond the narrowed focus of white-collar workers and the limited vocabulary in which they express their perceptions. What these perceptions "mean" to a Marxist class analyst and what they "mean" to workers within the reality of the workplace as it is seen and experienced by them are akin to describing two separate worlds. An examination of some of the interview material will illuminate this.

In the context of a discussion on unions (which will be dealt with in section C), a question was introduced to stimulate interviewees'
thinking. When asked "Do you think that unions create divisions within the company, or were there some divisions before unions?" six interviewees out of 91 believed that unions create divisions (no clerical workers thought so), while 20 from all three groups felt that divisions of some kind had been present before or even without unions, even if unions now accentuated existing divisions. The balance of the interviewees did not express an opinion or did not view differences as "divisions." Many of this latter group of interviewees saw differences in very individualistic and personalized terms, such as differences in ambitions or attitudes; supervisory-managerial interviewees in particular saw employee differences in non-status, non-authority, very egalitarian, terms, as in "We all work for the same ends." Those who did see differences in terms of divisions were encouraged to discuss their views in order to draw out the reasons for their perceptions.

Those who saw divisions in "structural" terms fall into three categories. The first relates to the peculiarities of the corporate internal organization and will not be dwelt on--these were differences in power, status and authority between head office and field offices or in the office-plant association. The other two types of structural divisions seen were those related to:

(a) union-nonunion or exempt-nonexempt (i.e. clerical-nonclerical) divisions--career "streams" based on differences in education, pay, perquisites, opportunities, and overall treatment; and,

(b) divisions based on authority and power, often expressed in terms of a sense of managers' in-group solidarity ("they stick up for each other"), or as a line between those who decide and those who supply input to decision-makers.
The first set of divisions, clerical-nonclerical, was the most frequent. The results have been tabulated in Table 8-5(b).

( Table 8-5b about here )

Some interviewees stated that divisions of both Type A and Type B were important sources of differences to them. Altogether, 60% of clerical interviewees identified one or both of these divisions, as did 51% of technical-professional and 36% of supervisory-managerial interviewees.

These aggregated results, however, mask individual differences in expression as well as difficulties and incompleteness of expression many interviewees experienced. Even within the group of interviewees who could see these differences as representing management-nonmanagement divisions, there were few who could state what their significance was; while a few pinpointed it as 'authority differences, many could see it only in terms of pay, status, and "responsibility." Often, they expressed their ideas only indirectly, with inferences left highly subject to interpretation, as the following quotations illustrate:

"It's [attitude differences] just something I pick up--at times. There's people like us, mainly girls, grade twelve education, and then there's the big guys...You can tell who the big guys are because you can have coffee with them and they're really nice but then after one of them has walked through the department, we'll get a memo saying we're not keeping our listings up to date...With some supervisors you know you may be right but there's nothing you can do about it. It depends on the manager--some you can get along with and some you can't."
(female clerk, Chi)

"You can tell who's in authority by the way they carry themselves and the way people react when they phone to request something...but I think it's an individual thing, their attitude, although you notice it more on the fourth floor [executive offices]."
(secretary, Delta)
"I don't know about asking for that--you walk softly up there--it's hallowed ground [executive offices]." (male clerk, Delta)

"Well, they have a pretty low-key style of management here, but it's still obvious--at least with this one fella: stand up and salute! That's what he wanted." (female clerk, Sigma)

There were, however, interviewees even among the technical-professional and supervisory-managerial groups who had difficulties pinning down the nature of authority relations:

"There's a feeling that the executive area's an ivory tower and some people can feel very intimidated in dealing with them." (Technical-professional worker, Chi)

"V.P.'s are out of sight salarywise, not in the same league. But some can be very human, go out for drinks with the service men. I think it's hilarious the way people hit the panic button when a request comes in from a V.P., just because of his position, regardless of what he's like as a man." (technical-professional worker, Chi)

"It's not harmonious between management and the rest--it's a tug-of-war over shares of the pie." (technical-professional worker, Chi)

"I've always felt management was there to help me. I never resented it. And back then, when the plant was a lot smaller, the--I guess you could call them--hierarchy didn't seem to exist. It was like a happy family. Now, with the younger workers, you have to have a different style." (blue-collar supervisor, Alpha)

"I guess the main difference between vice-president material and the rest of us is a motivation to reach the top, drive, a love of power and an occasional ruthlessness in getting there." (white-collar supervisor, Alpha)

These examples are more than sufficient to demonstrate that even when a sense of authoritarianism exists, it tends to become individualized and personalized--it is the behaviour of only certain men or certain "styles" of management: "It depends on the person," says a female clerk at Sigma, "There are some managers I can get along with and some that won't give the time of day". Often, there is just a vague sense of being
intimidated or in awe (or of poking fun at those who are), as the quotations illustrate. Regardless of the extent to which authority is recognized, there is no sense of injustice and little resentment. The rare exception is the militant unionized clerk who declared, "They can do whatever they like." Most employees are very complacent and accepting, summed up in the statement of one white-collar supervisor: "There are natural divisions of pay, authority and responsibility—that's just the way most organizations are."

At the workplace level, there is also the occasional attempt to explain the apparent lack of blatant management-nonmanagement divisions:

"Well, I guess hierarchy is there, but it's not heavy-handed. It's just the basic respect you give for that level." (Technical-professional worker, Deltd)

"The old image of corporate fat cats with cigars and scurrying flunkies is gone and there's a more professional image now. The structure is so finely graded that people have to have status symbols—there's such a mass of managers in one place and everyone on a first-name basis. Of course, Head Office is still stuffier than the field—it's called 'The Temple' by field people." (Technical-professional worker, Sigma)

These are quite valid explanations as far as they go—but they neither go beyond the workplace level nor get at any sense of class relations and the ways in which they have become muted. Workers lost within large corporations could not be the source for such explanations because they are neither aware of them nor have the alternative vocabulary of class conflict with which to express them. Full explanations must be sought elsewhere, in empirical evidence about the larger institutional contexts of capitalist society and in theory about capitalist society—workers do not generally possess these, either in theory or in praxis.
C. Justice and Injustice: Unions, Pay Hierarchies and Opportunity

There are other indicators which may be examined for some sense of the ways in which any oppositional thinking or sense of injustice could be present even if merely in disguised or muted forms. A few of these indicators were explored in the study: the attitude of white-collar workers to unions; their view of pay hierarchies and the reasons they give for them; and how they view industry-employee relations. These were dealt with both in the interviews and in the questionnaire. A search was also made for any possible statistical association between items which could indicate potential oppositional thinking and between these and workers' attitudes on concerns of more immediate relevance to them: promotion and opportunity. These findings will be discussed in turn.

When asked in forced-answer format for their opinions on the benefits of unions, 62% of clerical respondents felt they were beneficial "for some," as did 57% of technical-professional and 59% of supervisory-managerial respondents. This was by far the dominant response, although there was some variation between unionized and non-unionized clerical workers. In the two unionized companies, 74% and 63% thought unions were beneficial for some, while in the two non-unionized companies, the response rate for clerical dropped to 57% and 54%. On the other hand, the two extreme views, "unions are of little benefit" and are beneficial "for most" generally attracted few respondents. The second most frequently selected view was that unions "create bad feelings," and here again, there was a difference between clerical workers in unionized versus non-unionized companies--only 16% and 8% of clerical workers in the unionized firms felt this way, contrasted with 29% and 33% in the non-unionized firms.
Table 8-6(a) gives the overall results, with the union-nonunion company figures in brackets for the two dominant response categories. The unionized companies resembled one another more than they resembled the non-union companies. Although support in principle for unions does not necessarily demonstrate oppositional thinking, it does suggest that some groups are less prejudiced towards unions than others, hence more inclined to entertain the idea of unions as vehicles for protection of their interests.

(Table 8-6 a,b about here)

Although the view that unions "create bad feelings" is the second most frequently chosen response, it is chosen with much greater frequency among all groups in firms which have no white-collar union. It would seem that experiencing the presence of a union does not affect perceptions of its benefits as much as the lack of a union encourages the common fear that a union could change the atmosphere in the workplace, that it would imply less "personalized" interaction. This does not necessarily mean, however, that employees in non-union companies are completely hostile to the idea of unions.

Interviews confirm that regardless of whether or not unions are present, there are many "mixed feelings" about unions but little decision anti-union sentiment. The interviewees' comments were summarized in three categories representing the general tone of their feelings. These appear in Table 8-6(b) as "pro-union" (which includes those who did not object to the idea of unions in principle although they also had some negative comments mixed in with the positive ones), "anti-union" (those who were unequivocal in rejecting the idea of unions in principle), and
"noncommittal" (those who made unclassifiable general comments and could not be pinned down to committing themselves to a more definite opinion). Almost every interviewee who was able to say something in support of the general idea of unions could also state some negative features; consequently the list of advantages and disadvantages in the table should not be considered as summarizing two necessarily mutually exclusive lists (see Table 8-7).

(Table 8-7 about here)

The most frequently cited advantages in all three groups were those concerned with the way in which unions could enhance bargaining over pay and working conditions for disadvantaged groups and protect individuals against abuses of management power and arbitrary treatment in performance review, promotion and grievance cases. The most frequently cited disadvantages had to do with the way in which unions disregarded individual differences (for example, incentive and ability), depersonalized relationships between unionized and non-unionized people, and were too rules-oriented. Clerical and non-clerical interviewees alike also noted that many unions were becoming too powerful, making excessive demands which could ruin the economy. Consistent with their experience of work in the monopoly sector, they also often noted that unions were unnecessary for them because they received benefits bargained for by powerful blue-collar unions in their industry.

Most of the reasons given are consistent with the commonly accepted philosophy of individualism within a society organized by ostensibly meritocratic principles. In this respect, clerical workers share with the other two groups a similarity which would not appear to be in their
best interests as members of a proletarianized workforce. And just as frequently, their focal-point is limited to monetary issues centering around job classifications with absolutely no questioning of the logic behind pay and job-grade hierarchies; when union members have complaints, it is usually about the details of the already existing grading system within clerical ranks.

When asked what they thought the ideal role of unions should be (questionnaire, forced-choice format), clerical as well as non-clerical respondents chose the response which demonstrates this narrow instrumental focus: unions should be involved only in issues related to pay and working conditions. Although only 46% of clerical respondents chose this response as compared with 56% of technical-professional and 68% of supervisory-managerial, the balance of choices did not go to the view that unions should have a "wider say" in decisions affecting the corporation and the society; rather, for every respondent who chose this progressive view there were as many who chose the opposite, reactionary one: that unions should be "made illegal or at least strongly controlled."

( Table 8-8a, b about here )

Examination of clerical responses by individual firm (Table 8-8b) shows the extent of support for the two extreme views. Not surprisingly, anti-union views were greatest at Delta and Sigma, the two non-union companies which also have managements concerned that they remain that way. Sigma's workers, however, show a much greater polarization between the progressive and reactionary views than Delta's--32% advocating a wider say and almost as many (28%) believing that unions ought to be controlled.
The participative atmosphere at Sigma could be feared by some workers to be jeopardized in the presence of a union (interviews confirm this interpretation), but it is clearly not the case at authoritarian Delta. At Delta, whose management is notorious for its anti-union sentiments, these workers seem merely to be echoing management's sentiments in believing that paternalism will serve them better than a union, regardless of the role a union might assume.

Anti-union feeling is lowest at Chi, a firm which saw militant action far enough in the past that most clerical workers who might remember it have since departed; its "democratizing" policies, especially postings to supervisory level, seem also to have made it unnecessary for many to advocate a wider say for their union. At Alpha, however, the balance not only swings towards "wider say," but those advocating a limited role for unions are nearly polarized with those believing that unions should be controlled (32% versus 21%)—a surprising finding in a unionized company. On the one hand, Alpha management's "ad hoc" approach and the bargained-away postings must be influencing the climate of opinion supporting a wider say. Yet on the other hand the union is said by some to have a moderate "us-them" feeling, which combined with the rigid union-nonunion line may be the misplaced target of blame for almost as many other workers. There are thus some important differences between firms that reflect the existing ideological climate in each of them.

In the two unionized companies, less than 10% of those who belong to the clerical union call themselves active members who attend meetings. When clerical workers from all companies were asked the extent to which they discussed issues relating to unions, only 12% said "quite often," and 30% said "never." These frequencies were similar to those obtained
for the other two groups. For all, the dominant response was "once in a while" (58% for clerical, 64% for technical-professional, and 66% for supervisory-managerial respondents). The proportion discussing union-related issues "once in a while" was, surprisingly, no higher in unionized companies. Nor did the proportion of those who discussed union issues "often" increase much for clerical workers in unionized companies (although it was 21% at Alpha, it was offset by the 16% who reported "never;" and at Chi, only 19% discussed often, a rate actually slightly below that for all companies).

It would therefore seem to be a rather obvious conclusion that regardless of whether or not unions are present, monopoly sector corporations do not have a surplus of militant unionists among their proletarianized white-collar workers. Those "militants" who are present have their effect negated by a similar proportion of "reactionaries" and the apathetic. Moreover, "local" factors in each corporation affect the interpretation of unionism, as does the ideological climate, resulting in considerable confusion among workers and reliance on the corporate version of reality bolstered by media interpretations.

The balance of the findings reveals nothing which deviates from these expectations. Despite some inter-firm differences, clerical workers tended to resemble non-clerical workers. The differences which did exist, however, suggest the operation of some important "local" factors and the ideological climate on workers' perceptions of both the societal and of the workplace level.

When asked about pay differences between various groups in the workplace, questionnaire respondents from all three groups, by a wide margin, chose the view that manual-clerical differences were "about right"
(frequencies ranged from 60% to 68%), as were pay differences between office employees and management (62% to 68%). The frequency with which "about right" was chosen was double the response rate for the view that manual workers and managers received too much (although supervisory-managerial people did not share this view with the others). These results were similar to those obtained in the interviews, where 55% of clerical, 47% of technical-professional, and 50% of supervisory-managerial interviewees felt that pay spreads in their firm were about right in general. In all cases, when asked what justified large pay spreads at work and in the wider society, the dominant response was "responsibility," with "qualifications" coming in second. These results were similar for both the open-ended questionnaire item and for the interviews.

But did respondents feel that large pay spreads in the society were justified? When questionnaire respondents were given two diametrically opposed statements, "Pay differences in society should be large in order to act as an incentive...to reward successful people," and "Large differences are unjust and create economic hardships not justified by the few opportunities," 51% of clerical, 74% of technical-professional, and 80% of supervisory-managerial respondents chose the view that differences in pay should be large. Although clerical frequencies were considerably lower than the other two groups and almost equally divided between this and the "egalitarian" opinion, there was no reversal of the overall tendency to choose the view prevalent in society. However, the lower frequency for the clerical group suggests that some ambivalence exists, since it is clearly not in the interests of proletarianized groups to advocate wide pay differences.
As Table 8-9 shows, however, unionization does not necessarily account for a growing sense of injustice. At Alpha, the view does in fact prevail that pay differences in society are unjust. The wording of the question is suggestive: "not justified by the few opportunities."

Alpha clerical workers are very aware both of the union-nonunion line and also of management's unsystematic (laissez-faire) approach to developing individual career opportunities. At Chi, however, there is a fifty-fifty split between the two views. Unionized clerical workers in this firm are made aware of opportunity differences but are also influenced by other elements in the corporate atmosphere: Chi has "democratized" participation in the opportunity-structure, so clerical workers cannot blame management for the number of openings, yet they are still aware of relative disadvantages. At non-union Delta, there are no factors which appear to ameliorate authoritarian control over careers, no "system" and no input from workers or their representatives; here, clerical workers support the "unjust" view in similar proportions to those at Alpha. Only at Sigma does the view prevail that societal pay differences should be large—undoubtedly in response to the elitist yet professional climate in which those who had the "initiative" to obtain degrees are rewarded.

Thus, the interpretation of inequalities at the societal level seems very much to be conditioned by the experiences of workers at the immediate workplace level—the experience of the dominant ideology concretized every day, modified or buttressed by the presence or absence of unions and by corporate rhetoric.
One last question was placed on the questionnaire to elicit any possible oppositional view. Two contrasting statements, adapted from Gavin Mackenzie's *Aristocracy of Labour* study (1973) were given to respondents to choose between: the view that a firm is "like a football team because teamwork means success and is to everyone's benefit," and the view that teamwork in industry "is not possible because employers and employees are on opposite sides and employers always benefit more."

The harmonious, "teamwork" view of industry was given an almost clean sweep: it was chosen by 81% of clerical, 90% of technical-professional and 98% of supervisory-managerial respondents. When individual firms were examined, the only notable difference was that the "teamwork is not possible" view was given more support in the unionized companies than in the non-unionized (35% versus 6%), but the "teamwork" view still prevailed.

While unionization would seem to be a factor accounting for the higher proportion of clerical workers who feel that teamwork in industry is impossible, it does not necessarily mean that these respondents are seeing management-employee relations as oppositional in any fundamental sense. Interviews suggest that workers in unionized companies feel that unions exaggerate divisions. The reason for this is that in their experience, there has been internal "bickering" within union ranks and an "every man for himself" attitude on the part of some members; this, combined with their feeling that they were treated differently than non-union people, would account for their lack of seeing teamwork in industry. It was these sorts of observations which account for problems which some respondents had in seeing a "team" at work, not that they felt that teamwork was impossible because of anything remotely resembling class antagonism.
In order to test this interpretation, a number of related items in the questionnaire were cross-tabulated for any possible statistical association which would suggest the nature of areas of opposition. The findings were disappointing, but consistent with other findings.

The following items were examined in association with one another for relationships: working-class identification, the dichotomous class model, the view of large pay differences in society as unjust, the advocacy of a "wider say" for unions, the recognition of clerical-manual resemblances, the view of teamwork as impossible, and the identification of the management-nonmanagement line as the source of employee differences. In addition, the following items were introduced from other parts of the questionnaire dealing with careers and opportunities: the view that commitment to the firm was low, identification of one's present job as dead-end, dissatisfaction with corporate handling of opportunity, and the view that there were few opportunities in the company. In all of these cross-tabulations, the focus of attention was the clerical group, and the results discussed below are for this group.

First, examining the class-related questions, it was found that there was no relationship between identifying oneself as working class and seeing large pay differences in society as unjust (not just for clerical but for other respondents as well).

There was also no association between viewing society dichotomously and viewing one's present job in relation to future ones as "dead-end" (in this as well, clerical were similar to other respondents). There was also no association between viewing social classes in dichotomous terms and perceiving that there are few opportunities for clerical people.

In all of these cross-tabulations, the stratification model of society and the middle-class identification of oneself prevailed regardless
of how one viewed opportunities, pay differences, or chances for upward mobility from one's present job. Despite some ambivalence indicated by the slightly lower frequencies for clerical respondents, they did not perceive situations much differently than non-clerical people, nor did their situation cause them to make connections any better.

When views of societal and industry pay differences are examined, there is no statistical association with other potentially oppositional views. Those who see pay differences in society as unjust do not also believe that unions should have a wider say in decisions. It appears that those who identify pay-hierarchy differences as unjust do not link it to redressing the balance via union activity. Unions are not seen as instruments of workplace or societal justice except over narrow issues in the pre-established "game rules" of bargaining, a situation analogous to the one identified by Hyman and Brough (1975) for British workers.

Indeed, even when managers are perceived as receiving too much pay relative to other employees, clerical workers and the others as well adhere to the view that unions should be involved only in pay and working conditions issues, possibly a resistance to the politicization of unions that is prevalent in North America. Even when workplace differences are identified as "management-nonmanagement," pay differences between managers and others is still considered to be "about right."

Those who see pay differences in society as unjust do not see industry-employee relations as oppositional--the "teamwork" view prevails.

Curiously, however, those who see pay differences in society as unjust do identify the management-nonmanagement line as being a source of important workplace differences. Hence it seems that there is an inability to link micro- and macro-structures to the causes of group and
pay differences except in non-oppositional terms. For example, differences in "responsibility" are seen as determining pay differences, which for clerical workers translates at the societal level into "occupation" as being the main determinant of class within a society stratified along income and consumption lines.

Lastly, seeing oneself as "dead-ended" in the workplace, that is, as blocked in promotional terms, is not associated with viewing either the workplace or society in oppositional terms. Curiously, those clerical workers who identified themselves as dead-ended also tended to deny the clerical-manual resemblance (as was discussed in Chapter Six). Experiencing their situation has not caused them to blame the corporation or the structure of society for it. Blame turned inwards cannot be transformed into a sense of injustice and opposition; workers' interpretive frameworks, borrowed from the dominant ideology, do not facilitate these kinds of connections.

Similarly, when the extent of opportunity is considered, clerical and other respondents who feel dissatisfied with corporate handling of opportunities feel no sense of injustice regarding pay differences in society, nor do they view teamwork in industry as impossible, nor do they adopt a dichotomous model of class. They also give only partial recognition to clerical-manual resemblances regardless of whether or not they are dissatisfied with how the company handles opportunities. This lack of association holds regardless of whether or not respondents see opportunities as few or many, with the exception that clerical workers who feel that opportunities are few for people like themselves also tend to feel that large pay differences in society (but not in the workplace) are unjust. (The wording of the question, linking pay spreads with lack of opportunity, is suggestive, as was already noted: large pay spreads
are justified as rewards to merit only when there are sufficient opportunities for all to display merit. A meritocratic, individualistic interpretation of societal differences produces inconsistencies in logic which workers fail to see. As with their interpretation of opportunity in connection with managerial practices (discussed in Chapter Seven), they do not make linkages between their 'objective situation and the causes of it in class structure and class relations.
III SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Clerical workers are not much different than non-clerical groups in their perceptions of and explanations for workplace and societal arrangements. A non-oppositional view of society and of the workplace prevails despite arrangements being to the detriment of proletarianized workers--provided that no violence is done to the accepted views of meritocratic individualism, the dominant definition of "fairness."

Even when injustices are identified, there is little linkage between seeing injustices in the society and seeing their causes in workplace arrangements or vice-versa; that is, workers do not interpret their situation as being caused by economic, political and ideological domination. In the rare event of injustices being identified, they are expressed using non-conflictual language using categories of thought typical of a liberal-democratic value-system, but with few micro-macro links.

This lack of consistency appears to be common among workers who do not possess an alternative language of explanation--a finding noted also by Nichols and Armstrong (1976), and which argues against "sorting" workers into airtight compartments based on any single category of imagery about society (for example, a "money" model versus a "class" model). As these authors' study suggests, workers seem to have more than one model in their minds, possibly due to the fact that workers think of work and society as two separate spheres of reality with few causal connections between them.

The data on class-related issues revealed considerable inter-firm variability. It may be safely concluded that corporate "atmosphere," the ideological climate in which work is contained, represents an
important mediator of workers' perceptions: their experience and interpretation of work significantly affects their experience and interpretation of society. For many, it is almost the only source--they have experienced one workplace and one community. The outside world comes filtered to them by their contact with the corporate world and the media, both sources which systematically re-interpret the world in non-conflictual language.

Finally, a prognosis may be attempted. As work becomes more routinized and fragmented, even for technical-professional work where the proletarianized "collective labourer" component could conceivably increase in the future, the findings do not justify any optimism that further proletarianization will stimulate class consciousness within the ranks of monopoly-sector employees, although this does not preclude unionization in non-militant terms as their middle-class status becomes threatened.

In the present chapter and in Chapters Six and Seven, data have shown that the language of work promoted a focus on the individual as individual--in terms of the right to career information affecting competitive abilities, the chance to demonstrate and be recognized for merit regardless of social background, and so on. The workplace maintains the fiction of the abstract individual in isolation from any collectivity. Not even the union figures importantly in workers' perspectives except as a protection for that isolated individual.

Language itself has created a social reality which becomes self-perpetuating. With it, workers interpret situations such as lack of opportunity and managerial practices affecting opportunity and bring their own hopes and illusions to the situation. The interpretive consequences
are that when hopes are dashed, they are for the wrong reasons (theoretically speaking) and as a result, the incorrect interpretation continues to shore up the ideological structure. The language of meritocratic individualism learned in other social institutions concretizes this false reality through workers' experience in the workplace and through the career-management practices which control worker outcomes and affect their perceptions; together, they contribute to the division between worker and worker which language has facilitated. The divisive tendencies are amplified in some firms more than in others (in firms where the careerist mentality is encouraged and consistently rewarded and where management is seen as professional, for example), but regardless of inter-corporate variation, workers are similarly caught up in the ideological structures of work and society with little alternative reference-points outside the narrow sphere of work and home. They come to play an active role in maintaining these structures as lived realities. The consequences of acting out the ideology are predictable in the absence of any intervening factors: limits on language and on vision, compartmentalization of issues, limits on the extent and nature of conflict and on feelings of solidarity with other workers.

For these reasons, then, the lack of connectedness even among workplace issues, and certainly between workplace and general societal issues, speaks volumes about practical outcomes for the operation of hegemony. Where there is no connectedness, where there is inconsistency and inchoateness of expression, and where the language of meritocratic individualism prevails, there can be no class conflict. Conflict remains restricted to the playing of career games which trap workers in a logic
that does violence to their experience of workplace life without much possibility of looking beyond the games to the structural underpinnings of exploitation and ideological domination. Hegemony has thus placed limits both on language and on vision.
CHAPTER NINE:

CONCLUSION: THE EFFICACY OF CONTROL

I. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

In the study, the most obvious practices used by corporate managements in handling the specific problems of controlling white-collar labour have been placed in the context of the history of practices used to control blue-collar labour in the course of capitalist development. These practices arise out of the nature of class relations under capitalism, out of the need not only for the capitalist class to control accumulation but also to control labour and at the same time disguise the nature of control, undercutting class conflict.

Control may be thought of in basically two ways: first, to control directly through the labour process by creating hierarchies in the division of labour and by the application of various controls through the actual work done, such as by mechanization and de-skilling; and second, to control through ideological means. Control through the labour process is also ideological control, of course, since it incorporates various notions about human behaviour within it to manipulate that behaviour and convince those subject to mechanization and de-skilling that they are not qualified to participate in control. Control itself appears to those subject to it as neutral and "scientific," and the necessity for control as being in the general interest. Other strategies are more specifically aimed at the manipulation of worker perceptions and motives, such as those involved in the "human relations" approaches, and in the application of pay and benefit schemes which trade on workers' self-interest and keep them divided through individual competition.
As capitalism has developed, the influx of white-collar workers into the corporations as assistants in the control of production and other labour created additional problems of control. It was necessary to maintain these workers' co-operation and commitment to corporate goals of profit-making while they were being used in the exploitation of other groups. Needs were met by the use of strategies of "responsible autonomy" which built on the good-will and middle-class orientations of workers, many of whom had been socialized to expect a fair degree of professional-like autonomy and satisfaction in their work. Although clerical workers over the decades since 1900 have become completely proletarianized and have lost any participation they once had in control, it is in the corporations' interests to keep them on the "mental" side of the manual-mental divide at the same time that they have been barred from the ranks above them.

The prevalence of university education and credentialism has created a more limited pool of eligibles above the proletariat from which managements may choose loyal successors. The creation of special recruiting programmes and career-lines for technical-professional workers, from whose ranks eventual successors for the managing arm of the bourgeoisie will be chosen, has separated the two white-collar groups in a hierarchy of increasing privilege. At the same time, corporations have kept them united ideologically around values of meritocratic individualism and upward mobility. Firms have used such ideological appeals to control effort, behaviour and perceptions in such a way that the system is not de-legitimated and individuals blame only themselves when career expectations have not been met. The same ideological appeals, which resonate well with the dominant value-system, have also kept workers competitively divided among themselves.
Management has the problem of controlling white-collar labour in such a way that conflict does not develop into recognizable class conflict; it must be channelled away from fundamental issues of exploitation and re-translated into narrower, individualistic concerns such as over advancement and pay advantages. These concerns may be manipulated in ways which reinforce the value-orientations of the dominant liberal-democratic ideology and the middle-class aspirations and illusions of white-collar workers.

Conclusions may be drawn from the research at two levels. The first level concerns the data specifically relating to the ideological practices at the workplace. The second concerns the data which extends the analysis to the level of society in general, concerned with class imagery and class orientations. It is this second level of analysis which highlights the limitations of the present study and draws attention to how inconclusive any conclusions must be concerning the direct impact which ideological practices at the workplace level have on worker orientations. Let us, however, draw the conclusions from the data presented first, and leave for the final section the limitations of the study.

Chapter Five examined the educational backgrounds and mobility patterns of white-collar workers in the four firms. Those who occupied clerical positions in the white-collar hierarchy of increasing privilege generally experienced barriers to upward mobility in disproportionate numbers compared with those workers possessing technical and professional backgrounds. Educational attainment was the key to upward mobility and the method by which class background becomes translated into differential access to rewards. Corporate practices of graduate recruitment into non-clerical jobs assure a pool of eligibles from which potential talent may
be selected for entry into positions which lead to the corporate elite. Data confirm that the clerical-nonclerical line is a class line, dividing proletarianized white-collar workers from the new middle class of technical-professional and supervisory-managerial workers. These are the objective consequences of corporate practices of recruitment and selection.

Corporate practices connected with selection for career mobility and corporate attitudes towards clerical workers indicate that in terms of opportunities, clerical and non-clerical workers occupy two separate worlds within the hierarchy of privilege. University recruits are a hand-picked, specially groomed and carefully watched group intended for the managerial talent pool; at the same time, they occupy positions which contribute to various control functions needed for the day-to-day and long-term operations and planning of the corporation. As a result, their positions have a dual significance within the control structure of the firm.

Although clerical and non-clerical workers occupy two separate opportunity worlds in terms of the objective conditions of work, they cannot also occupy two separate subjective worlds if their ideological commitments are to be utilized in the control process. They must continue to be united ideologically around the values of meritocratic individualism and upward mobility. The control needs of corporations have been viewed as directed towards two ends, the control of "productivity" and the control of perceptions and orientations as a means of obscuring the essentially oppressive nature of control in the social relations of production. The "career" is the crucial hinge-point in the analysis, mediating between objective conditions and subjective perceptions of conditions, and as a method of control which builds on the ideological commitments of workers.
The language of the career drives a wedge between workers in terms of intra-class solidarity while at the same time recomposing solidarity in inter-class terms around commitment to individual gain.

Hence, managerial practices connected with career-making were examined extensively in Chapter Four as the most appropriate strategy for controlling white-collar labour, supplementing other control strategies. Career-related devices such as the performance appraisal, counselling systems, and job postings were viewed as devices for involving individuals in their own development; in keeping with this logic, they were also devices which involved the elements of personal responsibility and blame for failure which is at the heart of the ideology. As such, it was hypothesized that these practices would have an effect on worker perceptions and expectations.

By the same token, any strategy which manipulates perceptions and expectations is a potentially dangerous strategy, since it must deal with raised expectations in ways which "cool out" workers while containing and redirecting possible conflict. The system of appraising on-the-job performance is thus possibly the most volatile control device, since it not only attempts to control worker effort but also to communicate career information. The performance review is also the most co-optive of managerial devices, since workers must agree with the logic of work and co-operate in their own control if they are to get ahead in monetary and career terms.

The "cooling-out" process is a necessary part of control strategies which ideologically prime employees to strive. Striving concretizes their abstract commitment to meritocratic individualism and competition. There is also an implied reciprocity between employer and employee regarding provision
of opportunity by management and giving an acceptable level of work performance in return, which also helps to explain why the manipulative exercises of building and dashing career hopes are potentially volatile practices. For all of these reasons, improperly applied strategies may lead to worker disenchantment, withdrawal of effort, even de-legitimation of the corporation and its policies. The "dual career ladder" is one solution to the corporate balancing-act problem, wherein narrowly streamed specialists who are blocked in upward mobility terms are given parallel bases for rewards and recognition. Horizontal movement and upward movement through finely graded job hierarchies are the equivalent solutions for clerical workers, particularly combined with job-postings systems or other equivalent self-nomination systems wherein workers appear to have a hand in designing their own career-fate. Such schemes attempt to accomplish what high pay and generous benefits do: to "buy off" dissatisfaction and draw fire away from the corporation. Unlike the direct monetary buy-off, however, they work by shifting the blame to individuals for lack of success.

These practices are made possible (and necessary) by a "responsible autonomy" strategy of control, which is less coercive and hence risks less resistance than direct-control strategies like Taylorism, which are in any case less appropriate for highly educated "professional" employees. Direct-control strategies are also not desirable if management wishes to treat clerical workers as though they were on the "mental" side of the mental-manual divide. It is management use of responsible autonomy approaches which translates the language of exploitation/oppression into the language of individualism by building on the middle-class orientations and aspirations of both of these categories of "mental" labour.
Data in Chapter Six showed that, to put it in a negative sense, managerial practices of career development in the four corporations have done nothing to disturb workers' belief in meritocratic individualism. This may be considered a partial success. From a more positive standpoint, the practices were efficacious because workers brought ideological structures with them to the work situation and interpreted their experiences using them, thereby amplifying the ideological effect of the practices. From this standpoint, the practices were efficacious because they involved workers in their own domination.

Clerical and non-clerical workers alike had aspirations to advance and believed that ability on merit was the basis of advancement. Clerical workers, however, had adjusted somewhat to their objective situation as relatively disadvantaged; consistent with their acceptance of the ideology, they expressed the cause of their handicap in individualistic terms: lack of educational credentials and other personal attributes. As a result, they realistically modified their aspirations for advancement to correspond with their interpretation of the causes of their mobility handicap, limiting their vision to clerical ranks and the lowest non-specialized levels of non-clerical ranks. They had "received" the corporate message of exclusion but had interpreted it to mean exclusion on the basis of lack of "technically" not class-defined qualities; an individual lack could be corrected at will by taking individual responsibility for the necessary upgrading. Where meritocracy ostensibly operates, there lies hope that the "way out" of career blockages will come through individual effort--credentials--and this becomes the method for reconciling the discrepancy between the meritocratic ideal and the structural reality.

Those who experienced some movement within clerical ranks regarded themselves as having advanced at least a short distance--suggesting that
the practice of creating a hierarchy of grades within otherwise similar kinds of work satisfied the individualistic commitment to advancement. The internal labour market was an effective practice in keeping workers divided. Accordingly, clerical workers tended to focus on those practices which related to their immediate advancement prospects as individuals, such as job postings, and to ignore the exclusionary recruitment practices as being inapplicable to their level. In this way, the ideological framework of meritocratic individualism, as interpreted by workers, guides their active participation in re-defining the class-structural reality of the workplace into one of separate opportunity worlds wherein individual differences in merit are simply packaged in bundles which differ in valued characteristics.

Although clerical and non-clerical workers alike were able to see that the amount of opportunity actually available was less than that theoretically available in liberal-democratic ideals, their pessimism regarding the extent of opportunity had more to do with their perception of "local" factors (such as the state of the vacancy chain, too many competitors, or lack of visible attention to career development within the firm). In fact, visibility seemed to be the key to employee perceptions about their situation and the reasons for it: corporations which played up the importance of educational credentials as a kind of merit and to emphasize their own role in "developing" employees had a "muddying" effect on employee perceptions; employees were less sure of what they were perceiving and what to make of it relative to themselves. Playing up career development also seemed to reinforce the belief that if only such schemes were applied in a more rational and systematic way, individuals could overcome handicaps and develop their "self-limited" potential as far as possible. The existence and visibility of such schemes, therefore, reinforced processes of self-blame for lack of career success.
A system based on competition for individual rewards calls out the appropriate socialized responses. Corporations which appear to employees to be encouraging competition and striving are perceived to be operating within the technical necessity of such "givers" and workers follow through in terms of playing the appropriate games which will give them a greater competitive edge over others within that logic (thus, they play at making themselves visible over others, being interested and "motivated," and so on). Even when workers feel they are dead-ended in their present job, they continue to take responsibility for their career fate by defining themselves as active in career self-help; it is a sort of reflex action which sustains an abstract belief in the system. Moreover, where firms do not appear to be doing much to develop careers, the level of activity on one's own behalf intensifies, even among clerical workers. This is consistent with the individualistic ideology of workers, which is reinforced at the workplace level as the value and the need of taking individual initiative and career responsibility.

The logic of such a system, however, along with the "muddying" effect created by the corporate atmosphere of career-development visibility and communication, as Chapter Seven showed, was responsible for the inability of workers to make "connections" among the various aspects affecting their structural situation. Moreover, acceptance of careerism, that is, playing the game of career-making within the system of capitalist game-rules, creates conditions which reinforce class domination. This in turn sets the limits and tone of class struggle: it remains a struggle for individual gain at the expense of collective solidarity and worker community. The close relationship between worker values and workplace ideology make it difficult for most workers to correctly interpret even practices which are clearly exclusionary and not in their interests.
The conditions under which workers come to co-operate tend to establish the context in which conflicts arise and express themselves; these act back on management in dialectical fashion. Frustration over the conditions of upward mobility may, for example, lead workers to come into conflict with management, but the struggle is now redefined: instead of class struggle, it is now struggle over conditions affecting individual career-making within the logic of meritocratic individualism. The conflict may intensify management-worker struggle but without challenging the system of hierarchy and existing power relations.

Since competition for material gain and psychic rewards like status is built into the motivational structures of corporate careers, workers who have been conditioned by prior socialization in the educational system to respond to such motivators may feel their ambitions frustrated and may demand more rationalization of corporate policies and opportunity-structures to allow their ambitions to be realized. Both workers and management may be caught up in the dialectic of setting and overcoming career limitations, but this is a typically middle-class kind of conflict.

Capitalist must control even this limited form of struggle without allowing the pendulum to swing too far in the direction of unrealistically raised expectations, or, for the sake of class alliances, too far in the opposite direction towards withdrawal of effort and de-legitimation. They must, in other words, "cool out" workers while leaving their motivation to strive intact. Such games and their rules, however, come to take on a life of their own and to further obscure the foundations of the original structure of domination. While setting up new potential control problems, they also reinforce the "technical" necessity of controls which are built into the very organization of work by diverting attention to the details of the career-making processes in a specific firm. The structure of work itself remains unchallenged.
In this context, careerism as the hope of one day rising in the corporate structure is a response to a life of alienated labour, and as such, may be re-interpreted as a kind of instrumentalism, an adaptation to alienation which stresses the active but equally alienated response to domination. It is therefore not surprising that many white-collar workers were found to be careerist to some extent. Passive instrumentalism is defined by corporations as a "motivational problem." Careerism as its active mode signifies that workers have responded to management's "carrot" by playing the career game, which co-opts them psychologically through their ideological commitment—that is, they come to "act out" their abstract commitment, thus giving the ideology life and legitimacy.

Chapter Eight has shown that there is a great deal of similarity between clerical and non-clerical workers in terms of the images of class and authority both in the workplace and in the wider society. Statistical results for the clerical group have indicated, however, that there are specific issues which produce more ambivalence than is present among non-clerical workers. More unionized than non-unionized workers tend to identify themselves as working class, yet would not acknowledge the clerical-manual resemblance. Unionization has also led more clerical workers to believe that unions are somewhat beneficial. However, it has not contributed to their radicalization, nor has it led to a belief that existing pay spreads in society are unjust. On the contrary, unionization has led a few to believe that disharmony in the workplace has actually been created by unions. Clerical workers who feel they are in dead-end jobs also do not tend to view themselves as a kind of proletariat. All of this would seem surprising were it not for the strength of the dominant ideology. The ideology is lived every day, not only through workers' socialization but in the mass media and in the workplace, making it the dominant interpretive
framework available to workers in explaining their situation.

Clerical and non-clerical workers share a view of the workplace and the wider society which is very much in the interests of the dominant class: it is a non-oppositional view of a system characterized by simple gradations in pay, status and responsibility. When injustices are identified in the system or in one's structural situation, there is rarely any connection made between this and the nature of a class-based society, nor do employees possess a vocabulary adequate to identify such contradictions and to articulate their causes.

It is this lack of a counter-vocabulary which indicates the success of capitalist hegemony, reinforced at the specific workplace by the managerial practices which build on the dominant ideology. As Burawoy (1979) put it, there is a general failure of employees to examine the conditions of domination, an inability to link superficial "appearances" to their more fundamental causes--and the resulting tendency to accept the inevitability and necessity of the "givens" of the workplace and the society.

Although there are real differences between clerical and non-clerical workers at the objective level in terms of conditions of work, and there are also real differences at the subjective level in terms of experiences and expectations of work, nevertheless both fully proletarianized (clerical) and partly proletarianized (new middle class) workers are responding in similar ways to the ideological contexts in which work is contained. The same ideological structure has called out socialized responses which vary only qualitatively by class group. This is not to say that class in the sense of objective location in the structure is unimportant; rather, it is mediated. In this analysis, emphasis has been placed on the mediators between objective class location and both subjective outcomes (such as orientations) and objective outcomes (such as the form of class struggle).
II THE MICRO-MACRO MODEL REVISITED

The findings of the study are significant from two interrelated viewpoints. The first concerns the general level of analysis of the four firms as representative of the monopoly sector and the typical practices utilized by large corporations. In this sense, the four corporations are a single case study and what is concluded for one may be repeated for the others: workers are contained (both physically and psychically) in a closed world of work that is in some essential ideological features palpably "middle class." The implications are similar in all for the language of the workplace: meritocratic individualism de-rails class conflict. In all four firms, there were practices to recruit, to select for upward mobility, and to communicate performance information—all of which had an inherent potential for co-optation.

The second viewpoint emphasizes corporate differences rather than similarities, summarized in the study as differences of corporate "atmosphere"—the specific way in which managements apply practices and communicate about them. The latter may be considered as a "second-order" level of ideological impact, and in this respect no firm is quite like any other firm, each possesses a unique blend of "local" factors which, in analysing the differing results at various points in the exposition of the data, were found to be the following:

1) Management "style"—whether a corporate management was well-organized and dynamic, rational and systematic, versus traditional or haphazard. (Along this dimension, Company Chi and Company Sigma were found in the process of research and in worker perceptions to be "progressive" or "professional," whereas Alpha's was haphazard and Delta's was traditional, both authoritarian and paternalistic.)
(2) Visibility of exclusionary practices—how corporations "managed" the impact of practices which created a hierarchy of privilege, and whether there existed "countervailing" practices which had the effect of seeming to reduce exclusivity. (Along this dimension, Sigma was the most elitist and emphasized the degree-nondegree line, Chi was less so due to its posting system which blurred the line somewhat; on the other hand, Alpha and Delta appeared to have no particular systems which performed this function.)

(3) Encouragement of worker responsibility ("participation")—whether management made a conscious strategic attempt to involve workers in the work of higher levels. (Along this dimension, Chi, Sigma and even Delta all had employee communications systems but only at Chi and Sigma were they accompanied by a rhetoric of encouraging employee input: Sigma had its "meet the president" sessions where employees could raise questions, and Chi had a glorified version of the employee suggestion plan; additionally, Sigma was beginning to ostensibly "broaden" the role played by lower-level employees by expanding the scope of their responsibilities in a work-team concept. Delta, however, communicated only in an authoritarian way, and Alpha not at all. Thus, Chi and Sigma corporate atmosphere has been labelled "participative."

(4) Presence of clerical unions—Clearly, unions will place certain constraints on what management may do, and present problems of controlling the atmosphere of management-worker relations. (Along this dimension, both Alpha and Chi were union companies, but Chi had downplayed the union-nonunion line by using the same posting system to extend worker "control" over candidacy for non-union positions; consequently, Chi's clerical workers appeared less ghettoized than Alpha's.)
(5) The state of the vacancy chain—a factor largely beyond the control of the corporation, it will affect the perceptions of opportunity and career timing, but mainly for technical-professional workers. (Along this dimension, all four firms had vacancy-chain problems but they differed—Alpha's was ready to open up in five to ten years but they had not yet planned for it; Chi's had just closed as younger managers moved up; Sigma's and Delta's were blocked by a cadre of old managers but only Sigma was encouraging early retirement at senior levels.)

These five elements that together make up the total "atmosphere" of each firm account for complex variations within the data, in some instances producing combined effects and in others, contradictory effects. They appear to interact in complex ways to affect worker perceptions of the workplace and interpretations of workers' own experiences.

If the study had revealed no significant inter-firm differences, it could be assumed that practices were uniformly impacting on workers' perceptions in straightforward and predictable ways. In fact, this did not prove to be the case and the analysis has been advanced by highlighting one or the other aspect as these impacts have converged or diverged in their effects. Looking back to the diagram of levels of analysis in Chapter One (see Table 1-1), it can readily be seen that the existence of so many "local" factors introduces another level of mediation between the objective structures of capitalist domination (the macrostructure) and workers' perceptions at the workplace level (the microstructure). This, the, is the "conjuncture"—the unique set of as-lived relations and responses which is variable and dynamic. (It could be surmised that had the study been conducted when a strike was in progress at one of the firms,
the various elements would have interacted, in some rather different ways.)

For some issues—for example, the interpretation of opportunity structures—workers' attention was being redirected by the specific features and ideological context of their workplace, whereas for other issues—for example, making connections to structures of domination or analysing the basis of classes in society—workers were responding to other currents which were not significantly altered by specific ideological contexts. That is, workers were responding using meaning-systems generated in the socialization process prior to entering the workforce, especially the general ideology of liberalism as it is interpreted in the school system and in the media, and it is the same story told essentially everywhere including at work—it is hegemonic. There were, then, both general and local ideological elements, and they were interacting.

The almost seamless continuity between workplace and general societal domination, as hegemonic, poses a problem for research and highlights the limitations of the present study. A very obvious and unquestionable link may be made between exclusionary practices in the workplace in the form of recruitment and selection and their outcomes in terms of career mobility—that is, objective consequences. However, the linkage between these practices and subjective consequences (workers' perceptions) is less clear. That is, to what extent workers' perceptions of their situation are obscured by ideological practices at the workplace level can only be suggested. The reason for this goes beyond complexity in the conjuncture, such as the factors cited above. What the study has shown is that ideological practices in the workplace "muddy" perceptions, not cause them. The cause is elsewhere—in other agencies of worker socialization.
Aronowitz (1973) has pointed out that the very conditions which produce a sense of injustice also obscure the sources of injustice—they are obscured both because of the nature of the labour process and also because of the conditions affecting the production of consciousness. The link between ideological practices in the workplace and consciousness is unclear because of the nature of hegemony: the causes go beyond the workplace and prior to it, in the production of consciousness as socialization of future workers in the other major institutions of capitalist society, particularly the familial and the educational. This interweaving of effects is the true significance of hegemony, that through the consistent ideological theme running through various institutions, capitalism is able to produce consciousness in its own image and so blunt the potential for alternative language and imagery.

It must be apparent from the foregoing study of monopoly-sector white-collar labour within the non-militant context of North America that there has been a concatenation of conjunctural elements combined with the widespread influence of hegemonic factors which are complications not easily sorted out. Yet the interplay between socialization and situation must be sorted out if class analysts are to fully understand not merely outcomes, but processes. Clearly, the present study, with its limiting focus on the workplace, cannot do this; it can describe and attempt to account for manifestations only at the workplace level. It has had to bracket, to the detriment of the understanding of process, the effects of hegemony in other agencies of socialization within capitalist society which have made the workplace practices of ideological domination so efficacious.

Much more work must yet be done by scholars of capitalist arrangements on worker habituation or adaptation—studies which go beyond the politics of de-skilling and hierarchy at the workplace level which have heretofore been the focus of research on the labour process.
Reference Notes

Chapter One

1. See Clement, 1975, for an analysis of the Canadian corporate elite and avenues of mobility.

Chapter Two

1. Braverman (1974: Chapter 3) provides a good understanding of Marx's distinction between the "social" and "technical" (or detail) division of labour. In precapitalist societies, although a division of labour by crafts exists, there is no subdivision within each craft among producers in terms of separate operations (except perhaps in large capital projects such as houses or canoes, a temporary arrangement which does not negate the competence of each worker to perform the other functions). Each worker minimizes within him/herself both the conceptualization and the execution of the task. In the detail division of labour, however, conceptualization is lodged not in the worker but in the capitalist or his agents and the worker executes only a small portion of the whole required to produce the product. The worker is rendered inadequate to complete the production process, since it is not society which is divided but also the human. Thus the labour of individual workers is cheapened and devalued by this "deskilling." The structure is polarized into those whose time is "infinitely valuable" and those whose time is "worth almost nothing" (p. 83), the capitalist and the scientific or technical specialist working on his behalf, and the detail worker, respectively.

2. Source for Canadian political economy: Clement, 1977 (chapters three and four), which draws together and interprets a number of related strands in the political economy literature on continental capitalism in North America.

3. Following Marx, productive labourers are "exploited" because they directly produce surplus value; unproductive labour are those who contribute to the realization of surplus value and are said to be "economically oppressed." The terms exploitation and oppression distinguish the two forms of labour, productive and unproductive respectively.

4. See Burawoy (1978): "secure" in the double sense of "extracting" and "making secure" the conditions for that extraction of surplus, and "obsuring" in the sense of rendering obscure the basis of that appropriation in exploitative class relations.

5. Taken by itself, a misleading criterion, since even the new middle class sells its own labour-power.

6. Value of wage-goods here is culturally determined--by the skill needed to perform the work and the amount of labour-time needed to acquire that skill. (cf. Carchedi, 1975b).
Chapter Three

1. Morrie (1965) points out that management as a separate discipline emerged with Taylor but its principles were not formulated into a single framework until the work of Fayol, in 1916.

2. See, for example, studies such as the early post-war one by Form and Miller ("Occupational Career Pattern as a Sociological Instrument" in American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 54 No. 4, 1949) in which they showed that both intergenerational mobility and occupational security were associated with white-collar employment, and that professionals, managers and proprietors had the highest number of years spent in the "stable" period of work history. Changes of job rather than upward mobility (occupational class change) is, on the other hand, characteristic of blue-collar workers. These findings suggest that those who have a career also experience stability of occupational conditions, permitting the time and opportunity to develop careers and structures in which careers are found. These are often associated with employment in large corporations and, except in periods of recession, with white-collar jobs.

Chapter Four

1. The conglomerate which was Alpha's owner agreed to allow study of one of its firms, subject to that firm's agreement. The largest and most accessible in turn was approached and agreed (Alpha). In the case of the primary-steel producer, Delta, permission was granted to study only its Financial Division; which included in its jurisdiction computer services and systems as well as accounting. The four firms all had some interest in the topic of career development, succession planning and motivation of white-collar workers, hence the reason for their agreement to the study.

2. Source for Alpha's corporate history: brochure produced by the firm on its fiftieth anniversary. Information on its conglomerate parent from Financial Post.


4. Source for Delta's history and other information: Eldon, American Influence in Canadian Iron and Steel, University of Rochester Press, 1954; Financial Post; company annual report.

5. Sources for Sigma corporate history and information: company brochure; company annual report; Financial Post.

6. The information is difficult to come by. Computerization appears to lead to labour savings but it is counteracted by the demand for more information, which eventually calls for more clerical workers—cf. Glenn and Feldberg in Zimbalist (Ed.), 1979. Certainly, in the four firms studied, the white-collar labour force size has remained stable, and indications were that as workers left in the process of natural attrition, they were not replaced.
Chapter Four, continued

7. For a complete description of changes as a result of micro-
technology, see Kraft in Zimbalski (Ed.), 1979. For a de-
scription of microprocessors and "telenation", see Goldhater, "Politics and Technology", in SOCIALIST REVIEW 52, 1980.

8. See Theo Nichols, 1975. He points out that managers' behavior
cannot be interpreted as the straight fulfillment of their personal objectives, since managers adopt strategies in the interest of other groups. These restrain their own value-system and limit their behavior, although their normative orientations, through socialization and social interaction, are probably similar to those of the groups they serve. He goes on to say that writers such as C. Wright Mills were correct in identifying both owning and non-owning managers as part of the same class (the bourgeoisie) in contradiction to the so-called managerial revolution exponents.

9. Source: the Organization Development manager of the food
products firm referred to.

10. See Nichols, op cit. (footnote 8).

11. This statement, made by one personnel official, was typical of
the views of personnel managers and other managers.

12. This tendency was noted among numerous interviewees 40 years of
age and older. Their statements were made without bitterness,
and they expressed "gratitude" to the corporation for having
been able to advance. The company had been "good" to them,
they said; if they had any regrets, it was that they had not
pursued more education or had not organized their pursuit of
a career earlier.

13. Company Delta, for example, has had a "profit-sharing" plan
in lieu of a pension plan since 1938, which it feels gives
employees a powerful stake in the success of the company--so
powerful that they do not wish a union if it means they must
give up their percentage of the profits.

Chapter Five

1. The return rates for the questionnaire were: (total, all groups)
   Alpha: 69%; Chi: 53%; Delta: 65%; Sigma: 61%. Before re-
classification of deviant cases, the return rates for each
group were (all companies): clerical, 46%; technical-profes-
sional, 77%; supervisory-managerial, 61%. Return rates appear
to have been affected by whether or not the corporation sent
a letter to supplement my own (Delta and Sigma) and by whether
or not the union was consulted (Alpha did, Chi did not).
As a result, clerical were somewhat under-represented and
technical-professional somewhat over (reclassification of cases
did not alter this). Nevertheless, it was felt that weighting
might introduce some imponderables, so this was not done.
Final N's were as follows (all firms): Clerical N=75; Technical-
Professional N=125; Supervisory-managerial N=100.
2. Sources for demographic data: Financial Post (total population figures); the corporations, from their records, including either actual or estimated breakdowns by sex and occupation, plus data on educational and career paths where available (Alpha and Delta did not have this systematized, while Chi and Sigma had computerized data banks).


5. Respondents were asked to give their father's principal occupation when the respondent was about age 16, the usual approach in inter-generational mobility studies such as Blau and Duncan's. A subsequent question asked if the father had ever occupied a position higher than this. It was from comparing the two questions that a determination could be made as to whether or not the father's occupation represented career immobility.

6. Sources for all information on the unions, unless otherwise noted, are the Labour Relations Manager for Chi, and the Industrial Relations Manager and the clerical union local's president for Alpha. Owing to the jurisdictional dispute at Chi, no union president could be contacted during the time of the research.
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1974


1973

1979

1961

1973

1976

1979
APPENDIX:
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE

Typical directive questions and probes used in the interviews:

1) Person's work history (and years of service)

2) Background training.

3) Content of present job (including: supervision, autonomy, decision-making, place in the hierarchy immediately around the respondent)

(areas handled more informally and conversationally, leaving room for respondent to react and interpret from his/her meanings and relevance):

4) Options and opportunities the person expects to have (Probe: limitations, disadvantages, reasons for thinking so; person's interpretation)

5) What people do to get ahead in this company—"career-games" etc.
(Probe: personal observations, anecdotes, interpretations, etc.)

6) What the person sees the corporation doing in the area of "career development"
(Probe: topics: job postings; performance reviews; job and salary grading; feedback and corporate communication--interviewees' responses, interpretations, anecdotes, etc.)

7) The person's reaction to and interpretation of income and other hierarchies and explanations for relative differences within the office ranks.
(the "fairness" question; often led without prompting to #8:)

8) White-collar unions (need for, advantages of; if unionized: role this union plays; related issues) (attempt at lead-in to #9; if no natural flow, introduced as a separate issue):

9) Class structure, imagery (connections between work and society, identification of classes in the company's hierarchy, attempts to link income, status etc. to class; this question was approached using various kinds of "openers" and probes)
42. Some people have argued that due to changes in the conditions and qualifications of work in the past few years, many office workers such as clerks have come to resemble manual workers more than higher-level office personnel. To what extent would you say this statement is true, in your opinion?

1. Not true at all.
2. Somewhat true for most clerical workers.
3. Quite true for nearly all low-level office workers.

SECTION FIVE

IN THIS THE FINAL SECTION, YOU ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE SOME BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON YOURSELF AND YOUR WORK HISTORY.

43. Age: __________

44. Sex:
   1. Male ______ 2. Female ______

45. Place of birth (name country, or if Canada, province):

   ________________________________

46. Formal education. Check which educational level you have attained:

   1. High school (some or all)
   2. Community college (some or all)
   3. Some university
   4. University (Bachelor's degree)
   5. University (Master's degree)
   6. University (Doctoral degree)

47. If you are a community college or university graduate or have some other "certificated" specialty (e.g. R.I.A.) indicate which specialty, faculty or area your degree or certificate was in (list all if more than one):

   ________________________________

48. At which of the educational levels in question 46 did you join this company as a full-time employee?

   1. Same as above
   2. Other (specify): __________

49. How long have you been in the labour-force full-time? (no. of years): __________

50. How long have you been with your present employer? (no. of years or months): __________

51. How long have you been in your present position? (no. of years or months): __________
8. On your present job, what are the main kinds of decisions you can make yourself? (Check some or all of the following. If you "decide" rather than just "have a say in", circle the word "decide" in the checked statement).

1. Decide or have a say in the pace of your own work and how it is to be done.
2. Decide or have a say in the pace, timing, or content of other people's work.
3. Decide or have a say in the nature of contacts with other departments in the course of completing your own or the department's work.
4. Decide or have a say in matters relating to the budget of your department or area.
5. Decide or have a say in matters affecting department policies, strategies, or objectives.
6. Decide or have a say in matters affecting the allocation of manpower or other resources in your department or area.
7. Make decisions or make recommendations which have a direct impact on overall corporate objectives.

SECTION TWO
THIS SECTION REQUESTS YOUR OPINIONS ABOUT WORK IN GENERAL.

9. If you had to look for a job all over again, which one of the following would you put the most emphasis on as being important in your choice of jobs?

1. Interest and variety
2. Good work associates and work atmosphere
3. More of a say in decisions affecting work or career
4. Good pay and benefits
5. Opportunity for promotion
6. Good supervision
7. A strong and active union

10. From which of the following areas does your greatest satisfaction in life in general come? (check one only):

1. family
2. work or career
3. hobbies or other extracurricular activities

11. Place the following items in order of importance to you as valued aspects of your work. (number them one through 8 in the squares): A The content of the job (i.e., what I actually do) B Geographical location C The people I work with or meet D Recognition I get from others for what I do. E Promotion opportunities. F Chances to use my abilities fully. G Amount of independence I have in doing my job. H Pay and other monetary benefits
11. What degree of commitment do you believe people in similar positions to you have towards this company? (check one):

1. A great sense of commitment to this company
2. A moderate sense of commitment
3. Very little commitment
4. Are quite cynical about the company
5. Are indifferent except for their money or seniority

SECTION THREE

THIS SECTION REQUESTS YOUR OPINIONS ON MATTERS RELATING TO CAREERS AND ASPIRATIONS.

12. Which of the following categories best describes how you feel about your present job in terms of the relationship you think it has to others you might have in the future? (check one)

1. This is a routine job that is fairly dead-end in terms of leading me to higher-level ones.
2. This job is a "holding" position because the company probably doesn't have a higher position open for me at present.
3. This job is primarily one of training in preparation for more responsibility later in my career.
4. This job is already on the "ladder" in terms of making me potentially eligible for further promotions.

13. Is there anything you dislike about the idea of promotion for yourself? (specify below or answer "nil"): 


14. Which of the following qualities or qualifications do you believe are the most important to possess in order to advance in a company such as this one? (check one only):

1. High education and/or some "certificated" expertise.
2. Demonstrated ability or merit on one's present job.
3. Having the right connections; knowing the right people, or making oneself "visible".
4. Seniority either with the company or one department.

15. How do you feel about the following statement: "Special career development advantages in this company are given to those who have special qualifications, and others tend to be ignored or by-passed". (check one)

1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. Don't know

16. How do you feel about the way this company acquaints employees like yourself about opportunities for advancement and training?

1. I am very satisfied everything possible has been done.
2. I am moderately satisfied.
3. I am very dissatisfied and believe the company has done little.
17. Have you taken any of the following steps in making yourself promotable? (you may check more than one):

1 making courses
2 getting to know more about the company or other jobs
3 letting supervisor or Personnel staff know of your desires
4 nothing specific
5 not interested
6 other (specify): ___________________________ 

18. When you first came to this company, to what position or level did you aspire? (specify):

19. Do you now feel that you can reach that position?

1 yes ___ 2 no ___

20. If you have answered "no" to question 19, check which of the following you believe has contributed to your not reaching that level or position: (if you check more than one, number them in order of importance to your situation)

1 past a promotable age
2 unable to accept a geographic move (if applicable)
3 lack of education and/or specialized training
4 too much competition
5 too few openings in your line of work

21. What do you believe is the extent of opportunity for people to advance in this company? (check one):

1 many opportunities are available for all
2 better opportunities are available for those who did not begin at the very bottom of the company
3 opportunities are available for only a few
4 opportunities improve with amount of education obtained

22. Which of the following do you think has the most important impact on how much opportunity is available to people like you?

1 company policy of hiring experienced people from outside rather than training and promoting from within
2 company policy of hiring graduates directly from colleges and universities
3 a company policy of job postings and/or career counselling
4 none of these

23. Choose from the following statements the one which best expresses your feelings:

1 Management or my superiors should be the only ones to decide what happens to people in their careers.
2 All employees should have a say in what happens to their careers.
3 People should be told whether or not they have a chance to advance in their careers.
24. In your organization, do office employees use any of the following as important ways of characterizing the differences among types of employees? (you may choose two, but number them in order of importance):

1 management versus nonmanagement employees
2 exempt versus non-exempt employees
3 unionized versus non-unionized employees
4 specialized versus unspecialized employees
5 males versus females

25. How important do you think the differences you have identified in question 24 are in terms of people's ability to get ahead?

1 very important
2 moderately important
3 not important or relevant

26. How do you feel about the well-known statement "It's not what you know, it's who you know"?

1 In this company, who you know carries a lot of weight.
2 In this company, who you know is one of a number of factors involved in a person's success.
3 In this company, who you know doesn't matter.

SECTION FOUR

THIS SECTION REQUESTS YOUR OPINIONS AS AN EMPLOYEE AND A MEMBER OF SOCIETY.

27. What do you think about the differences in pay between manual workers and clerical workers in this society generally?

1 They are about right.
2 Manual workers receive too much pay in comparison to clerical.
3 Manual workers receive too little pay in comparison to clerical.

28. What do you think about the differences in pay between office workers and management people in our society in general?

1 They are about right.
2 Managers receive too much pay in comparison with other office workers.
3 Managers receive too little pay in comparison with other office workers.

29. What would you say is the single most important aspect of work that determines differences in pay among various kinds of employees? (specify):
30. Which one of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion about pay differences in our society in general?

1. Differences in pay among various kinds of people in our society should be fairly large in order to act as an incentive for people to get ahead, and to reward successful people.

2. Large differences in pay are unjust and create economic hardships not justified by the few opportunities there are for most people to get ahead.

31. Here are two opposing views about industry in general. Check the statement with which you agree more:

1. Some people say that a firm is like a football team because good teamwork means success and is to everyone's benefit.

2. Some people say teamwork in industry is not possible because employers and employees are on opposite sides and employers always benefit more.

32. There is a wide range of opinion on unions. Read the statements below and check the one which comes closest to your own:

1. Unions are beneficial in protecting certain groups of workers who might otherwise be taken advantage of.

2. Unions would probably benefit most employees regardless of who their employer is.

3. Unions create bad feelings between employees and employers and therefore impede co-operation and progress for all.

4. Unions are of little benefit in protecting employees.

33. There is mixed opinion about what the role of unions ought to be. Check the statement which comes closest to your view:

1. Unions should only be concerned with the interests of employees regarding pay and working conditions.

2. Unions should be concerned not only with pay and working conditions but also about getting employees a wider say in the corporation and its effects on society.

3. Unions ought to be made illegal in this country, or at least strongly controlled and limited.

34. How often do you discuss issues related to unions or labour disputes with your fellow employees?

1. Quite often

2. Once in a while

3. Never
35. Are you a member of a union?

1. Yes, an active member and attend meetings.
2. Yes, but am not too active and don't often attend meetings.
3. No.
4. No, not now, but I was at one time in my working history.

36. People view social classes in this society in many different ways. Which of the following views do you believe best describes classes in Canadian society? (check one)

1. There are no important class distinctions any more.
2. There are many different layers, but the most important are the lower, middle and upper classes.
3. The most important class division in Canada is between those who own or control business and those who do not.

37. How would you describe your own social class membership?

1. Working class
2. Middle class
3. Upper class

38. How would you describe the social class to which your father belongs?

1. Working class
2. Middle class
3. Upper class

39. Using the names of classes in questions 36 to 38, give one or two examples in the blanks provided of occupations or types of people you would place in these classes:

1. Lower class: (example:)
2. Working class: (example:)
3. Middle class: (e.g.):
4. Upper class (e.g.):

40. Which of the following groups do you feel most similar to?

1. Manual workers
2. Clerical workers
3. Skilled technicians and other specialists
4. Management people

41. What is the single most important thing you would need to know about a person in order to decide to which social class he/she belonged? (specify):
Some people have argued that due to changes in the conditions and qualifications of work in the past few years, many office workers such as clerks have come to resemble manual workers more than higher-level office personnel. To what extent would you say this statement is true, in your opinion?

1. Not true at all.
2. Somewhat true for most clerical workers.
3. Quite true for nearly all low-level office workers.

SECTION FIVE

IN THIS THE FINAL SECTION, YOU ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE SOME BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON YOURSELF AND YOUR WORK HISTORY.

43. Age: __________

44. Sex:
   1. Male   2. Female

45. Place of birth (name country, or if Canada, province):

46. Formal education. Check which educational level you have attained:

   1. High school (some or all)
   2. Community college (some or all)
   3. Some university
   4. University (Bachelor's degree)
   5. University (Master's degree)
   6. University (Doctoral degree)

47. If you are a community college or university graduate or have some other "certificated" specialty (e.g. R.I.A.) indicate which specialty, faculty or area your degree or certificate was in (list all if more than one):

48. At which of the educational levels in question 46 did you join this company as a full-time employee?

   1. Same as above
   2. Other (specify):

49. How long have you been in the labour-force full-time?
   (no. of years): __________

50. How long have you been with your present employer?
   (no. of years or months): __________

51. How long have you been in your present position?
   (no. of years or months): __________
52. Were you recruited to your present employer in any special way? (check one):
   1 University recruiter from the company
   2 Placement agency or similar
   3 Came here with special qualifications or expertise from another employer
   4 Other (specify): _____________________________

53. How many employers have you had in your work history? (specify number): ______________

54. Have you ever been self-employed? (if "yes", specify nature of work):
   1 yes (specify): _____________________________
   2 no

55. In the space provided (or attach additional paper if needed), briefly outline your fulltime work history, particularly of those positions which you feel represented promotion for you. (Place them in chronological order, beginning with the earliest) (If other than present firm, place a * beside each)

56. What was your father's principal occupation, and in what industry or field, when you were about age 16? (specify:)
   _______________________________________________________________________

57. Was your father ever self-employed? (if "yes", indicate nature of work):
   1 yes (specify:)
   2 no

58. Did your father ever occupy a position that was higher in pay, status, or responsibility than that specified in question 56? (if so, specify what position, for what length of time, and his approximate age when he occupied this position):
   1 yes (specify:)
   2 no

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND CO-OPERATION.
### Table 4-1

#### Clerical Job Hierarchies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>No. of Discrete Job Grades</th>
<th>No. of Discrete Job Titles</th>
<th>No. of Employees</th>
<th>Ratios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>15 (union)</td>
<td>83 (union)</td>
<td>181 (union)</td>
<td>12 people/grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2:2 people/title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical-Professional</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8/grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2.2/title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>8 (union)</td>
<td>129 (union)</td>
<td>596 (union)</td>
<td>74.5/grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.6/title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical-Professional</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>14.3/grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>129</td>
<td>2/title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>10/grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.1/title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical-Professional</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20/grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>121</td>
<td>3.5/title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>181/grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.4/title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical-Professional</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>116/grade</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>5.9/title</td>
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*titles and ratios for Finance Division only
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree/Field</th>
<th>College</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Engineering</th>
<th>Science</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Arts</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Computer, Geology, Chem.</td>
<td>224%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>224%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electrical Engineering</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Industry Recruited</th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-W</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Recruited</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2

Source: Postsecondary Recruiting Mix

Footnote 1 (IBM) Machine

Footnote 2 (J.D. Bank) Finance

Footnote 3 (I.B.E.W) 611
**Table 5-1a**

Corporate Demographics -
Total Population (1978)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Total Workforce</th>
<th>White- and Blue-Collar as % of Total Workforce</th>
<th>Clerical and Managerial as % of Total Workforce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>2,662</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>24% =100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>2,650</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68% =100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>10,300</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>22% =100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>6,439</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68% =100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5-2**

Corporate Demographics -
White-Collar Population Only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Total White-Collar</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial</th>
<th>Technical-Professional</th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Females and Unionized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>as % of All White-Collar</td>
<td>as % of Total</td>
<td>as % of Total</td>
<td>as % of Total</td>
<td>As % of All White-Collar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>39% =100%</td>
<td>25% 34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>63% =100%</td>
<td>68% 44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>2,259 (Finance) 235</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>24% 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>4,367</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40% =100%</td>
<td>28% 0</td>
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</table>
Table 5-4
Upward Career Mobility (Questionnaire Item No. 25)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Kind of Mobility</th>
<th>Occupational Class Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From manual</td>
<td>Clerical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From clerical</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From self-employment</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From technical-professional</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No mobility</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>From manual</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From clerical</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From self-employment</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From technical-professional</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No mobility</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>From manual</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From clerical</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From self-employment</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From technical-professional</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No mobility</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>From manual</td>
<td>16.0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>From clerical</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From self-employment</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From technical-professional</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No mobility</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=60   N=79   N=88

*Other: insufficient information to classify, usually 1 case.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's Occupation</th>
<th>Clerical (N=65)</th>
<th>Technical-Professional (N=118)</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial (N=95)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>Immobile</td>
<td>Total %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collar; service</td>
<td>40  .95</td>
<td>32  .80</td>
<td>34  .88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor; manager</td>
<td>22  .--</td>
<td>23  .--</td>
<td>22  .--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed (except farm)</td>
<td>15  .90</td>
<td>17  .90</td>
<td>13  .92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical-professional Clerical</td>
<td>5  100</td>
<td>14  65</td>
<td>18  80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming, fishing etc. (self-employed?)</td>
<td>8  60</td>
<td>9  100</td>
<td>9  89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4  .--</td>
<td>2  .--</td>
<td>1  .--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Per cent of all fathers immobile:</strong></td>
<td><strong>89%</strong></td>
<td><strong>87%</strong></td>
<td><strong>85%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Others included occupations such as the military and police, considered unclassifiable due to lack of information on rank.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Clerical N=73</th>
<th>Technical-Professional N=124</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial N=96</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Graduate hiring</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postings</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of these</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(balance of responses: Outside hiring, 9-15\%)
Table 6 - 2

Perception of Opportunities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clerical N=73</th>
<th>Technical-Professional N=124</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial, N=99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Optimistic</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pessimistic</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 - 3

Perception of Opportunity by Firm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clerical N=73</th>
<th>Technical-Professional, N=124</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial, N=99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(improved with)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(balance of responses: "Better if not at bottom")

*Based on Questionnaire item 21
Table 6-4

Relationship between Perception of Opportunity and Status of Job

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Technical-Professional</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Optimistic</td>
<td>Pessimistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deadend</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Dead-end included the responses "dead-end" and "holding position", while Other included "in training" and "on the ladder".

Table 6 - 5

Relationship of Present to Future Jobs

(response categories "dead-end/holding" and "on the ladder" only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Clerical N=72</th>
<th>Technical-Professional N=126</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial N=97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deadend/</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding</td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All firms</td>
<td></td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Ladder</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All firms</td>
<td></td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(balance of responses: "in training")

*Based on questionnaire item 12
### Table 6-6

**Summary of Interview Data: Career Development**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clerical N=25</th>
<th>Technical-Professional N=37</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial N=28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Critical of overall</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corporate career</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical of performance</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reviews in career</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favouring job-postings</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6-7

**Satisfaction with Corporate Career Development**

(Questionnaire item No. 10)

#### a. All companies (N=298)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clerical N=74</th>
<th>Technical-Professional N=126</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial N=98</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately satisfied</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very dissatisfied</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### b. Individual companies, very dissatisfied

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Alpha</th>
<th>Chi</th>
<th>Delta</th>
<th>Sigma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6 - 8

Perception of Special Advantages
(Questionnaire item No. 16)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Alpha</th>
<th>Chi</th>
<th>Delta</th>
<th>Sigma</th>
<th>All Companies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tech. Prof.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supr. Mgr.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tech. Prof.</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supr. Mgr.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(balance of responses: "Don't know" - Clerical only:
32%  27%  43%  24%  30%)

Table 6 - 9

Who Should Have a Say in Careers
(Questionnaire item 23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clerical N=74</th>
<th>Technical-Professional N=124</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial N=99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have a say</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All firms:</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Told where they stand. All firms:</td>
<td>46  44  47</td>
<td>37  44  54</td>
<td>56  44  41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clerical N=15</td>
<td>Technical-Professional N=32</td>
<td>Supervisory Managerial N=25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education, special qualifications</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visibility, contacts</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance, ability</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¹Initiative re self</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>²Experience, knowledge, seniority</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude, ambition</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>³Self-betterment, course-taking</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality, &quot;style&quot;</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luck, good timing</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity to norms</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

exceptions – not cited by:

1. ¹Supervisory – managerial at Sigma.
2. ²Clerical at all but Alpha; supervisory-managerial at Sigma.
3. ³Clerical at Chi, Delta; tech.-prof. at Delta; Supr.mgr. at Sigma.
Table 6 - 11

Promotion Self-Help Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Clerical N=74</th>
<th>Technical-Professional N=125</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial N=97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All firms</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(based on questionnaire items 15, 17)

Table 6 - 12

Relationship between Perception of Special Career Development Advantages and Self-Help Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree there are special advantages for some</th>
<th>Promotion Self-Help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech.Prof.</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supr.Mgr.</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech.Prof.</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supv.Mgr.</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7-1
Chart of Relationships Among Perceptions and Consequences
(Clerical workers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dead-end job</th>
<th>Low corporate commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Advantages for some</td>
<td>Pessimism re opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate hiring</td>
<td>Dissatisfaction re policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who you know</td>
<td>Self-help inactivity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Advocating employee "say"

*see also tables 7, 9, 11, 12 in Ch.6
Table 7-2
Valued Aspects of Work: (Questionnaire
Monetary vs. Promotion item 11)
(all firms)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clerical N=74</th>
<th>Technical-Professional N=86</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial N=98</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monetary ranked high</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion ranked low</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8-1(a)*
Model of Society - All Firms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Clerical N=70</th>
<th>Technical-Professional N=123</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial N=95</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classless Stratification</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dichotomous</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) - By Individual Firm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Clerical N=70</th>
<th>All Groups N=288</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classless Stratification</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratification</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dichotomous Alpha</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*based on questionnaire item 36
Table B.2
Basis of Class - Questionnaires and Interviews * ( ) interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Technical-Professional</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=64 (N=15)</td>
<td>N=121 (N=27)</td>
<td>N=91 (N=21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>34% (0%)</td>
<td>24% (4%)</td>
<td>25% (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>3 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualifications</td>
<td>3 (0)</td>
<td>4 (0)</td>
<td>13 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income, Consumption</td>
<td>28 (40)</td>
<td>39 (44)</td>
<td>28 (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values, Personal Attributes</td>
<td>14 (7)</td>
<td>16 (19)</td>
<td>9 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassifiable</td>
<td>14% (13)</td>
<td>11% (4)</td>
<td>11% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combinations of above</td>
<td>6% (13)</td>
<td>7% (30)</td>
<td>11% (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain (Interviews)</td>
<td>27% (0)</td>
<td>20% (18)</td>
<td>100% (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*questionnaire item 41
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Placement</th>
<th>Lower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executives</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Owners</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Placement</th>
<th>Upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executives</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Owners</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some did not give examples: for every class:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lower Class</th>
<th>60 (7.7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>15 (2.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lower clerks, office work: 12

Middle managers, professionals, semi - 20 (7.7)

In interviews: "old wealth, independently wealthy":

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Upper Class</th>
<th>10 (1.2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper Class</td>
<td>2.2 (24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Upper
cent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H=88</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8-3

Interiew percentages
Table 8-4(a)
Self-Ascribed Occupational Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feel similar to:</th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Technical-Professional</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=73</td>
<td>N=126</td>
<td>N=95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Specialists</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8-4(b)
"Deviant" Ascriptions
By Individual Firm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feel similar to:</th>
<th>Feel similar to:</th>
<th>Feel Similar to:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Specialists</td>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Skilled Specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>Technical-Professional</td>
<td>Supervisory-Managerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Chi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Sigma</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(questionnaire item 40)
### Table 8-5(a)
Employee Differences (First-Ranked Items)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Technical-Professional</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>N=70</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management-non</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exempt-non</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union-non</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized-non</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male-female</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 8-5(b)
Employee Differences - by Individual Firm (First-ranked items only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employee difference:</th>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Technical-Professional</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management-non</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exempt-non</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union-non</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized-non</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male-female</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 2 categories of response censored by Delta on the grounds that they had no unions and did not use the exempt-non distinction

(questionnaire item No. 24)
### Table 8-5c
Employee Differences
Nature of Divisions - Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Technical-Professional</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=25</td>
<td></td>
<td>N=37</td>
<td>N=28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type A Division:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical-non</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type B Division:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management-non</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(balance of interviewees did not address topic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 8-6a
Views on Unions (questionnaire item 32)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clerical N=73</th>
<th>Tech.-Prof. N=122</th>
<th>Supv.-Mgr. N=97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Union/non-union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficial for some</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>69/56.6</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficial for most</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creates bad feelings</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11/31</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of little benefit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 8-6b
Views on Unions - Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clerical N=20</th>
<th>Technical-Professional N=30</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial N=14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pro-union</strong></td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-union</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Noncommittal</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(balance did not comment: 5 clerical, 7 tech.prof., 14 supr-mgr.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8-7

Advantages, Disadvantages of Unions (Interviewees)

Benefits (advantages) of unions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Tech.</th>
<th>Supr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) in negotiating for pay and benefits</td>
<td>$\frac{5}{2}$</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) in increasing overall bargaining power, security, protection from abuses of power</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) as a check against arbitrary treatment in reviews, promotion, grievances</td>
<td>$\frac{10}{(of\ 25)}$</td>
<td>$\frac{7}{(of\ 37)}$</td>
<td>$\frac{5}{(of\ 28)}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disadvantages of unions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Tech.</th>
<th>Supr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) attitudes to unionized by non-unionized may be hostile, less personal, more demanding</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) unions stifle individual merit and incentive, homogenize groups, protect weak or incompetent</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) unions are now too powerful, make excessive demands, ruin the economy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) unions are too rigid, rules-oriented, bog people down in negotiations, grievances</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) unions are unnecessary because advantages are obtained without them, bargained for in union firms and passed along to be competitive</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) unions create divisions in the workplace - worker-worker, or worker-management, and stimulates grievances</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) unions have too much power over members, force unwanted strikes, use bad judgment, serve own instead of members' interests</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) unions may have benefitted people in past, but have now outlived their usefulness</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{(of\ 25)}$</td>
<td>$\frac{4}{(of\ 37)}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{(of\ 28)}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Some cited more than one of these.
### Table 8-8(a)
**Ideal Role of Unions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Technical-Professional</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>N=74</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay, working conditions</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider say</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal/controlled</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 8-8(b)
**By Individual Firm**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Role</th>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Technical-Professional</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pay, working conditions</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider say</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal/controlled</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (questionnaire item 33)
Table 8-9.

Max Differences in Society*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>View</th>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Clerical N=73</th>
<th>Technical-Professional N=122</th>
<th>Supervisory-Managerial N=97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should be</td>
<td>All (N=292)</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>large</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large is</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unjust</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*questionnaire item 30