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PROGRAM EVALUATION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA:
A CASE STUDY OF THE
CORRECTIONAL SERVICE OF CANADA

by

SHEILA DOHOO FAURE, B.A.(Hon), D.P.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
School of Public Administration

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
June 1984

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A CASE STUDY OF THE
CORRECTIONAL SERVICE OF CANADA"
submitted by Sheila Dohoo Faure, B.A.(Hon), D.P.A.
in partial fulfilment of the requirement for
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ABSTRACT

The central theme of this thesis is that, although program evaluation is defined in the Government of Canada as a tool for decision-making at both the operational and strategic levels, it does not serve strategic decision-making.

The development of the program evaluation function at the central agency level illustrates how this definition of program evaluation arose and how the function met the conflicting demands inherent in trying to do social science research to serve the decision-making process within a bureaucratic context.

A case study of the program evaluation function at the Correctional Service of Canada illustrates how one agency has coped with these conflicting demands by placing more emphasis on organizational survival than on high quality research in order to serve the operational decision-making requirements of the deputy minister. The case study suggests that the function does not serve strategic decision-making because that is not where the information requirements of the deputy minister lie.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The 1960's have been characterized as the heyday of social programs,¹ a period when, to increase the social well-being of Canadians, government launched major social initiatives made possible by a buoyant economy. The 1970's, however, saw declining economic growth coupled with a growing belief that increased government spending was not the answer to social problems. It was also the heyday of "rational planning", which led to the development of organizations both within and outside government to provide greater input to the public policy process.² Part of that input was some assessment of how well government programs had responded to identified social needs. This spawned the development within the bureaucracy of a number of measures to assess the impact of programs - including the expansion of internal audit to encompass operational audit, the development of performance measurement systems and, finally, the establishment of a program evaluation function in the federal bureaucracy.

The purpose of this thesis is two-fold. Part I of the thesis traces the development of the current program evaluation function in the Government of Canada at the central agency level. Part II presents an analysis of how that function has been established and is operating in one federal government agency, namely the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC). Part III presents conclusions relating the experience of CSC to the development of the function at the central agency level.

Chapter 2 presents a general introduction to evaluation and its role in the public policy process. A discussion of the literature
will be used to develop the hypothesis that although program evaluation is designed to serve strategic planning, in the case of CSC it does not do so. Also in this chapter, some of the terms and concepts that will be used in the thesis will be introduced.

The first purpose of the thesis is addressed in Chapter 3 which traces the development of the program evaluation function as it is currently defined by the Office of the Comptroller General (OCG). It is important from both a theoretical and practical point of view to realize that evaluation in the federal public service was not born with the establishment of the Office of the Comptroller General. For the practitioner, an understanding of what preceded the establishment of the function provides a greater insight into the role of evaluation in the management process. Furthermore, an awareness of past successes and failures leads to more reasonable expectations for program evaluation. For the academic, this chapter presents an analysis of the factors leading to the development of a policy and of the conditions which affect organizational survival.

The Correctional Service of Canada is introduced in Chapter 4. The strategic and operational plans of the department are situated within the context of the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the overall justice system. A framework of departmental evaluative practices is used to analyze the kinds of evaluative information being generated at CSC.

The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the particular characteristics of a correctional setting and CSC, in particular, that affect the nature of the evaluative work done.

The case study of the program evaluation function at CSC
begins in Part II. The evaluation literature contains few studies of the impact of an evaluation process and product in a bureaucratic setting. This thesis addresses that gap. Analysis which identifies the strengths and weaknesses of both the process and the product is useful to the practitioner who seeks to improve the delivery of evaluations within a department. The academic importance lies in the suggestion of how such an assessment can be made and the identification of the important criteria.

From the literature, Chapter 5 develops the criteria which will be used to test the hypothesis. Three categories of criteria for the usefulness of evaluation are identified - organizational, technical and environmental. Those criteria which are specific to strategic planning are highlighted.

The analysis of the criteria begins in Chapter 6 with a review of the organizational arrangement of the program evaluation function at CSC. It develops, through the literature on bureaucratic analysis, an awareness of the impact of the process on the product. This chapter identifies the low technical but high "political" skills of the CSC evaluators and shows how these political skills have been necessary to the survival of the evaluation unit in a decentralized, high-profile agency.

The product of the evaluation process is examined in Chapter 7. Inventories of evaluation work done - including both evaluation assessments and studies - are examined to determine for whom they were done, why, how and what findings they present. A critical analysis of
the methodological approaches used by CSC in its evaluation work confirms the low technical skills of the evaluation staff. The evaluative work has relied heavily on weak data, poor methodology and journalistic analysis to draw conclusions about program impacts.

The environmental criteria are examined in Chapter 8 through case studies of selected evaluations and assessments. The impact of evaluation work is not amenable to categorization as are techniques, so the case study approach was used to allow for greater in-depth analysis. The chapter explores in detail why the evaluations were undertaken, the conclusions drawn, the impact that they had on the correctional community and the decisions which resulted from the reports. The studies chosen for this analysis were identified by CSC as either having been examples of "good" evaluative work or having had a significant impact on decision-making. The analysis will show that these studies had impacts despite being technically weak.

In Part III of the thesis, the final chapter draws together the findings of the first two parts. It relates the experience of the Correctional Service of Canada to the theory behind the development of the program evaluation function at the central agency level. It also draws conclusions about the usefulness of the criteria which were developed for the case study and relates some of the findings to the literature on evaluation and policy analysis.

2. For example, the Ministries of State, Cabinet policy committees and "think tanks" such as the C D Howe Institute (1973), Institute for Research on Public Policy (1972), and the Canadian Institute for Economic Policy (1976)

PART I

CHAPTER 2

Evaluation: Theory and Key Terms and Concepts

The term "evaluation" means different things to different people. Rodney Dobell and David Zussman suggest that under the general heading of 'evaluation' appeared to fall ex ante evaluation in support of decisions as to future policy action, retrospective ex post evaluation to appraise past decisions or to examine the continuing benefits of current programs, managerial evaluation for operational control of on-going programs, appraisal of feasible alternative program designs, appraisal of managerial performance as part of an incentive system based on executive accountability, provision of information to Parliament to guide decisions whether to vote supply and thus continue particular programs, and overall general accountability to Parliament and the public.

It is obvious that one evaluation function cannot fulfill all these uses for evaluative work. It is, therefore, important to be specific about the term "evaluation" and the public policy process which it serves. This chapter develops, through a review of the evaluation literature, the key terms and concepts to be used in this thesis.

Public policy is defined by Thomas Dye as "whatever governments chose to do or not to do". Peter Aucoin makes explicit what is only implied by Dye. His definition includes not only stated government objectives but also the actual activities and their impacts. It is important, for the purposes of evaluation, to separate the normative intent of government from government activities. Bruce Doern and Richard
Phidd identify three levels of normative content - ideologies, dominant ideas and objectives. Ideology, the broadest category of normative content, is "an umbrella of belief and action that helps provide political and social identity to its adherents and that serves to integrate and coordinate their views and actions on a wide range of political issues". Dominant ideas are the second level of normative content and Doern and Phidd identify seven ideas, some or all of which can pervade any particular policy field. Objectives, on the other hand, "reflect the existence of specific structures and organizations in the public policy system". The term "government policy objective", which will be used throughout this thesis, refers to Doern and Phidd's narrowest level of normative content - the "objective" - and it is identified with one or more structure or organization at the federal level.

The response that each department makes to identified government objectives is reflected annually, in the Canadian federal government, in a Strategic Overview presented to Cabinet. That Overview reflects the on-going strategic planning process of the department. The Guide to the Policy and Expenditure Management System identifies strategic planning as follows:

the establishment of the department's role, its long-term objectives and the departmental strategies, policies and programs which meet these objectives. It is concerned with ensuring that the department's planning contributes to the development of, and remains responsive to, government policy and direction.

The strategic plan of a government department reflects what the department does, or intends to do, to further the government objective. It conforms to what Benjamin B. Tregoe and John W. Zimmerman identify as
strategy - a framework to guide the choices that determine the nature and direction of the organization. The emphasis is on "what" the organization does. The strategic plan identifies the departmental programs which will promote the government policy. In operational planning, the emphasis is on "how". In the federal government, operational planning is reflected in the Multi-Year Operational Plan. The Guide to the Policy and Expenditure Management System defines operational planning as:

the development of program plans and the assignment of resources to carry out the strategies, policies and programs developed and approved in the strategic planning process. Operational planning, in its most detailed stage, specifies the results anticipated, the goals to be achieved and the associated costs.

It identifies how the departmental programs are to be implemented.

It is important here to note that Tregoe and Zimmerman stress the distinction between strategic and long-range planning. Long-range planning is not a substitute for strategic planning, largely because it is based on projections into the future of current operations, is usually set in financial terms and begins with certain assumptions about the environment and organizational strengths and weaknesses. At CSC, the Policy and Planning Branch develops, in conjunction with the Finance Branch, documents based on medium and long-range forecasts for inclusion in the Ministry's Strategic Overview.

An essential ingredient in the planning process for public policy is policy analysis. Dye defines policy analysis as "finding out what governments do, why they do it, and what difference it makes".
It involves "the systematic identification of the causes and consequences of public policy, the use of scientific standards of inference, and the search for reliability and generality of knowledge". The distinction which Dye makes between causes and consequences is an important one. The study of the causes of public policy, which Dye calls "policy determination research", is the domain of academics with their interest in explaining both the product and the process of public policy. The study of the consequences of public policy are the domain of the bureaucratic analyst whose interest lies in influencing future decisions on the basis of the likely impact of a given policy. Dye calls this "policy impact research". In making the distinction between the theory and the practice of the study of public policy, Doern and Phidd state that the "academic perspective wants to know if policy X is caused by factors a, b and c. The policy advisor and practitioner want to achieve policy result X by changing behaviour a, b, and c".

Evaluation is, therefore, a form of policy impact research. E.S. Quade emphasizes the role of policy analysis in providing information for better decisions. He states that "policy analysis is a form of applied research carried out to acquire a deeper understanding of socio-technical issues and to bring about better solutions". He identifies a range of policy activities extending from "research to illuminate or provide insight into an anticipated issue or problem to the evaluation of a completed program". Prescriptive analysis is concerned with the identification of the anticipated consequences of a given policy; retrospective analysis is concerned with the identification of experienced consequences of a given policy. Evaluation, as the term will be used in
this thesis, is retrospective analysis.20

Retrospective analysis relies heavily on the body of research techniques associated with social science disciplines. Carol H. Weiss in her various writings has addressed the problems of applying research methods to the evaluation of social programs. Her definition of evaluation, which reflects the importance of the link between research and decision-making, suggests that the "purpose of evaluation research is to measure the effects of a program against the goals it set out to accomplish". Thus, evaluation is "a means of contributing to subsequent decision making about the program and improving future programming".21 Weiss also states that although "evaluation uses the methods and tools of social research ...[it] applies them in an action context that is intrinsically inhospitable to them".22

Much of the evaluation literature addresses the problems of this difficult "marriage" between social science research and decision-making in a bureaucratic context. Social science research itself has limitations on its ability to provide conclusive evidence about program impacts.23 However, when evaluative research attempts to address questions of concern to bureaucratic decision-makers it must face all the political limitations inherent in this context. Yehezkel Dror illustrates the context of what he calls "practical politics" with the following metaphor:

Policy sciences theory states that one should not leave the problem of crossing a river until the river is reached; rather, one should survey the territory in advance, identify rivers flowing through it, decide whether it is at all necessary to cross the river - and if so, where
and how to cross it - then prepare in advance the materials for crossing the river, and design a logistic network, so that the material is ready when the river is reached. But practical politics will often say that not only should the problem of crossing the river be left until the river is reached, but one should leave it until one is already up to the throat in water - when imminent danger will result in complete agreement that the river must be crossed at once and in the recruitment of energy to do whatever is necessary to get through the river alive. By leaving consideration of the problem of crossing the river up until the last moment, so a partly correct claim may go, one is at least sure of reaching the river, rather than being bogged down through premature controversy on how to cross the river and on whether one should not stop moving so as to avoid the problem of the river altogether.24

To continue Dror's metaphor, it may be said that social science researchers face two dilemmas. Either they produce evaluative studies long before the river is reached, at a time when Dror's analysis would have us believe nobody is interested or, they wait until the client is up to the throat in water and then be called upon to evaluate how effective previous methods for crossing the river have been, at a point when the alternatives for dealing with the problem of the river are limited.

Attempts in the literature to deal with the issues at the intersect between government and social science are based on three assumptions.25 The first is that social science research for use in public policy-making is good. The second is that social science research, in the past, has not been well used by government. The third assumption is that it could be well used if some modest changes were made. Why are there limitations to the effective use of social science
research in government? Weiss conceptualizes the interaction between government and research in terms of three interlocking systems - one that produces social science research, one that sets the policy agenda and is likely to use social science research, and one that links the previous two systems and forms the communication path between them. The characteristics of the three systems are so different that, as Weiss concludes, "hurdles to effective research use can be identified at almost every point along the route from research to decision".26

Michael Quinn Patton, in his book Utilization-focused Evaluation, also reflects disappointment at the lack of ability of social science research to solve government problems:

Just as by the late 1960s we had discovered that poverty would not go away as easily as we had hoped, so the visions of government based on rational decisionmaking undergirded by scientific truth were beginning to fade. No sooner had the crises of Great Society social programs given rise to calls for greater accountability than scientists responded that their research was not being used. The utopian hopes for a scientific and rational society, so imminent in the early 1960s, had somehow been postponed.27

Patton attributes the underutilization of evaluation research to "a definition of utilization that is too narrow and fails to take into consideration the nature of actual decisionmaking processes in most programs".28 He identifies utilization as "a diffuse and gradual process of reducing decisionmaker uncertainty within an existing social context".29 On the basis of this definition, Patton develops a collaborative approach to evaluation which "brings together evaluators, decisionmakers, and information users in an active-reactive-adaptive process where all participants share responsibility for creatively shaping and
rigorously implementing an evaluation that is both useful and of high quality.\textsuperscript{30} Patton's ideas on a suitable methodological approach to this form of evaluation are developed in the analysis of evaluation works in Chapter 7.

The development of a program evaluation function in the Canadian federal government is an attempt to create what Aaron Wildavsky calls a "self-evaluating organization."\textsuperscript{31} It seeks to institutionalize this difficult marriage between social science research and decision-making. Program evaluation is the systematic gathering by a department of verifiable information about a departmental program and demonstrable evidence of its results for use by the deputy minister for the purposes of resource allocation, program improvement and accountability.\textsuperscript{32} In addition to the problems inherent in social science research and decision-making, the problems of the organizational context are now added. In Weiss' analysis, this is the "linkage system" which may include "staff groups in research and planning offices" as well as outside individuals or agencies.\textsuperscript{33}

As Weiss points out, the literature dealing specifically with this component is sparser than that dealing with the other two systems. The available literature deals with staff groups in general, rather than specifically with evaluation units which are still a relatively new feature in the bureaucratic context. However, it does provide a useful guide to the problems which an evaluation unit is likely to face in a bureaucratic setting.

Arnold J. Meltsner, in \textit{Policy Analysts in the Bureaucracy},
identifies four factors which affect the production of analysis in a bureaucratic setting - the analyst, the client, the organizational situation and the policy area. Given that evaluation is a form of analysis, Meltsner's framework of the analytical process will be used to analyze the kind of policy advice that emanates from an evaluation unit.

Michael J. Prince's analysis of policy planning and research units in Britain, in *Policy Advice and Organizational Survival*, presents further insights into the organizational factors which affect the production of policy analysis by analyzing the units' "origins, functions, staffing, structure and member's attitudes". Prince states that "the experience of planning and research units has been the product of a conflict between organizational survival and rational policy advice". In the experience of the British government, this conflict was resolved in favour of survival since Prince concludes that "considerations of organizational survival and legitimacy have inhibited the development of rational/policy analysis. Planners and researchers in these units have been preoccupied with intelligence projects and short term results at the expense of programme evaluation and long term planning".

This review of the evaluation literature illustrates the conflict which exists between rigorous social science research, the public policy decision-making process, and the organizational situation in the bureaucracy. This three-way conflict has been specified by Dobell and Zussman. They state:

the process of policy analysis (including policy and program appraisal, or evaluation) is subject to both procedural impediments, arising out of the fact that the work takes place in an organizational and political context, and to analyti-
cal limits arising out of the lack of analytical criteria or relevant information to guide the key choices to be faced.

Each of these conflicting components places different demands on evaluation work. These have to be balanced in the establishment of an evaluation function at the central agency level or a departmental unit.

Social science research calls for results which are methodologically valid and reliable; the decision-making process calls for results which are relevant and timely, appropriate and useful; and, the organizational context requires results which will enhance the position of the organization and its individual members. These three conflicting demands are illustrated in Figure 2-1. Each of these demands suggest criteria for assessing the success of an evaluation unit in achieving that successful balance and these will be developed in Chapter 5. The case study in Part II of this thesis will show how these various conflicts were resolved in the establishment of an evaluation unit in one Canadian federal government agency.

**Key Terms and Concepts**

It is necessary to define the key terms and concepts and specify how they relate specifically to the Canadian federal government's program evaluation function. These can then be used to develop the hypothesis which will be tested.

The Auditor General of Canada has identified three types of evaluative information - information about economy, efficiency and effectiveness - the three "e's":
FIGURE 2-1

The Conflicting Demands on a Self-evaluating Bureaucratic Organization

- requires objectivity
- stresses validity/reliability
- has methodological limitations
- geared to the search for knowledge
- takes time

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING ORGANIZATIONAL SURVIVAL

- requires timely information
- requires relevance
- is specific to program component
- is based on unclear/fuzzy objectives
- is non-rational

- requires conflict avoidance
- requires structural continuity
- promotes function
- enhances agency/individual members
- Economy refers to the terms and conditions under which the Government acquires human and material resources. An economical operation acquires these resources in appropriate quality and quantity at the lowest cost.

- Efficiency refers to the relationship between goods and services produced and resources used to produce them. An efficient operation produces the maximum output for any given set of resource inputs; or, it has minimum inputs for any given quantity and quality of service provided.

- Effectiveness concerns the extent to which a program achieves its goals or other intended effects.39

Evaluations differ not only on the basis of the kinds of information they provide but also on the management level which they serve. As a form of policy analysis, evaluation provides information to decision-makers to help in the decision-making process. This thesis is concerned with information for two levels of decision-makers - those who make decisions about strategic plans and those who make decisions about operational plans. Information about the extent to which program outcomes meet program objectives serves operational planning and is of interest to both the departmental deputy head and program management. Information about the extent to which program outcomes meet policy objectives serves strategic planning and is of interest to the deputy head in her or his role as senior policy advisor to the Minister and also to the Minister and Cabinet.40 Figure 2-2 suggests the relationship between the kinds of information generated by evaluation and the level of management served. Dobell and Zussman propose a similar evaluation system for government which identifies two kinds of evaluation to serve two different needs.41 Formative evaluation, involving "moni-
FIGURE 2-2
Evaluation in the Management Process

Policy
Policy level
Strategic planning

Program
Program level
Operational planning

Program
Program
Program
Effectiveness evaluation
Efficiency evaluation

Implementation
(resource input and resources transformation)

Output

Effect

Product

Process

toring and feedback activities which enable managers to improve performance by adjusting operation and redesigning programs" would provide the deputy minister and program management mostly with information about program efficiency. Summative evaluations would provide "comprehensive assessments of the degree of success achieved by programs" for the use of Cabinet and, ultimately, the whole community. Thus, Dobell and Zussman argue that summative evaluation should be a public and open process to serve political accountability. Hence they suggest that such evaluations should be done by "academics, journalists, parliamentary staff, [or] the community at large".

On the other hand, they accept the procedures proposed by the Auditor General and the Comptroller General for formative evaluation to be done within the bureaucracy. This formative evaluation is not sufficient to fulfill government's responsibility for accountability since

the only guarantee of any progress in establishing accountability of government to the public is open access to all relevant information. Public debate of government objectives and programs on the basis of unfettered critical scrutiny of program data as well as departmental program evaluation results is what's necessary to accountability. The key is to get the internal analyses into the public domain for review, and get the outside independent analysts into a position to conduct their own analysis of the facts relating to government programs.

This argument is based on two dubious assumptions. The first is that formative evaluation is of interest to the public and the second, that the information to do summative evaluation is available from within the department. With respect to their first assumption, more information
about detailed program operations is unlikely to be of much interest to
those beyond the department, with the possible exception of the interest
groups that are directly affected by the program and who may use the
information for advocacy purposes. The case study in Part II suggests
that even though evaluations are considered to be public, their availa-
bility, with all their faults, would appear to have led to little criti-
cal debate on the evaluations either publicly or in the parliamentary
forum. Dobell and Zussman's suggestion that parliamentary committees
need greater staff support to permit more searching scrutiny of evalua-
tion studies would seem to be well founded.

The case study will also suggest that Dobell and Zussman's
second assumption is unfounded, at least at this stage in the develop-
ment of correctional programs in Canada. Most attempts to do a summa-
tive evaluation were hampered by the lack of available data from inter-
nal sources. Outside analysts, either academics or journalists, would
have had no greater success in drawing conclusions about program effec-
tiveness than the internal evaluators.

The development of the program evaluation function in the
federal government demonstrates, among other things, that the function
as it is currently defined is designed to serve strategic planning.
That is, it must address questions about the link between departmental
programs and government policy objectives. In Dobell and Zussman's
terms, evaluation would have to be summative. The evaluation experience
of CSC will be used to test the hypothesis that even though the function
is designed to serve strategic planning it has not done so.
The Canadian Literature on Evaluation

Dobell and Zussman's article is one in a relatively small body of literature dealing with the Canadian experience in integrating evaluations into the management process. The field includes articles by both practitioners and academics but focuses largely on the theoretical perspectives of the function. For example, a former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Board, D. G. Hartle, has written extensively on the management process and on evaluation in particular. In 1973 he proposed a "conceptual framework which integrates and renders operational the governmental decision-making functions of policy and program evaluation, strategic planning, and priority problem identification." In his very theoretical treatment of the issues, Hartle proposes a list of the sources of well-being of Canadians with an outline of the goals to achieve this well-being. Hartle's argument is based on the assumption that to some extent, government goals can not only be identified but that statistical indicators can be specified to measure the degree to which the goals are being achieved. However, the problems of identifying and measuring such general goals have been widely covered in the literature. By 1976, Hartle had softened his position somewhat although he continued to be hopeful. In "Techniques and processes of administration" he states that "consensus on the 'right' way to measure the changes in the well-being of Canadians is not going to be easily reached...[since] it is difficult to reach agreement on the multiple objectives (effects) of programs". However, Hartle strongly believes "that as slow and painful as it may be likely to be, we must push on in this direction". Hartle never abandons his "rational actor" approach since
material from his earlier article reappears in his book Public Policy Decision-Making and Regulation published in 1979. Hartle and other practitioners have written in public forums about the various attempts to institutionalize different forms of evaluation in the federal government over the years. The literature covers the attempts to establish a program, planning and budgeting system, operational audit, performance measurement and, finally, program evaluation. The recent efforts of the Office of the Comptroller General have been documented in articles by Harry Rogers and others and also in speeches by the Comptroller General and the President of the Treasury Board.

Another corpus of literature about evaluation is that written by and for practitioners, including the numerous government documents written to support the various attempts to establish evaluative techniques in the federal government. The initiative taken by the Office of the Comptroller General to establish program evaluation is supported by the Guide on the Program Evaluation Function and Principles for the Evaluation of Programs by Federal Departments and Agencies as well as other documents designed to provide guidance in establishing an evaluation function.

There is a small body of academic literature on evaluation in the federal government. With the exception of one book, this literature is mainly theoretical. It presents descriptions of the development of the function, reviews of evaluation in other countries, analyses of the role of evaluation in the policy process and the organizational
The one piece of applied research was done by Leonard Rutman and Dick de Jong. They did an analysis of evaluative work carried out in selected government departments between the years 1972 and 1975. Their study was designed to identify the nature and scope of evaluation being done in the federal bureaucracy by looking at the purpose of the study (formative vs summative) and the methodology used. They concluded that while many studies were intended to be summative they did not meet the criteria for a summative evaluation and that the methodologies used produced results of questionable reliability and validity.

This thesis applies some of the theoretical perspectives, given in both the American and Canadian literature on evaluation, to a case study of the evaluative work that is actually being done in one agency − the Correctional Service of Canada. There is a wealth of published evaluations of correctional programs in both the United States and Canada. The literature covers the results of evaluations, the methods for and problems of doing evaluations in the correctional setting and the development of self-evaluating community residential centres but no analysis of evaluation of correctional programs done within the bureaucratic context.

Two of the correctional articles address the conflict between social science research and its usefulness to decision-making. In a 1982 article, Hugh Haley of the Ministry of the Solicitor General, takes issue with the traditional approach to evaluation, as done by outside researchers, which is insufficient as a tool for management accountability. The traditional correctional evaluations which are based on
measurements of the extent to which programs reduce recidivism tend to
downplay numerous positive results of correctional programs. Nonetheless, Haley argues that evaluation is necessary to hold management
accountable for the vast sums of money spent on correctional programs
and the problem is one of finding suitable correctional goals against
which to evaluate the programs. As Haley states:

Originally expensive correctional programs to
deal with a large number of offenders went un-
questioned because of the general popularity of
the rehabilitative goal. When there was general
optimism that correctional intervention would be
beneficial, correctional goals appeared to be
clear. More recently, soaring costs have been
accompanied by questions regarding both the
effectiveness of corrections programs and the
appropriateness of the rehabilitative ideal
itself. The consequential lack of consensus of
what constitutes appropriate correctional goals
causes difficulties in submitting any current
program to proper evaluation.69

Haley proposes two alternatives to recidivism as the goal for correc-
tional programs - cost efficiency so that "correctional programs would
thereby be evaluated in terms of their economic costs rather than by the
genral impact that they would have upon either the crime rate or the
genral good of society"70 or justice and humanity whereby the major
criteria for effectiveness would be "the manner in which the sentence of
the court is carried out".71 However, he does not suggest who should
evaluate correctional programs against these criteria. Is he suggesting
that, given a clearer definition of correctional goals, the outside
researcher is best suited "to legitimately defend the continuing expen-
diture of a significant proportion of the tax dollar" or is this not an
argument for the development of a self-evaluating capability within the
correctional agency?

James Hackler also finds similar problems with the use of traditional correctional evaluations in the decision-making process and he argues "against our continuing pretense at evaluation. It is dangerous to think that evaluations can somehow answer the questions in the minds of policy makers". Although Hackler deals specifically with experimental design evaluations he also feels there are problems with other research strategies. However, his concerns are not with the unclear goals of corrections but with the methodologies themselves. He suggests that the solution lies in "careful record keeping and the extended use of administrative data" and suggests that this is the road to establishing "a basis for ongoing interaction between researchers and program directors...instead of the cycle of dramatic action, antagonism, and disappointment that typifies so many attempts to introduce changes and assess those changes in our criminal justice system." Is this, too, an argument for a greater performance measurement capability within the correctional agency? Neither of these efforts to increase the usefulness of evaluative work to decision-makers deal specifically with the notion of evaluation done internally.

This thesis addresses that gap by applying the general literature on policy analysis and evaluation to the correctional setting. The literature has been used to define the key concepts and terms to be used throughout the thesis and to develop the hypothesis that program evaluation does not serve strategic planning. The review of the literature identified a three-way conflict between rigorous social science re-
search, evaluation results useful for decision-making, and the organizational imperatives of the evaluation unit in a self-evaluating organization. This three-fold set of demands will help to identify the criteria to be used for testing the hypothesis.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER 2

1. Rodney Dobell and David Zussman, "An evaluation system for government: If politics is theatre, then evaluation is (mostly) art", Canadian Public Administration, Vol 24, No 3 (Fall 1981) p. 409


5. Ibid, p. 51

6. Ibid p. 58

7. The seven dominant ideas which Doern and Phidd present are efficiency; individual liberty; stability, redistribution and equality; equity; national identity, unity and integration; and regional diversity and sensitivity. Of the seven, individual liberty and stability are the two most related to the justice system. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the specific objectives of CSC which relate to these dominant ideas.

8. Treasury Board of Canada, Guide to the Policy and Expenditure Management System (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services) p. 19


11. Tregoe and Zimmerman, p. 23

12. For example, a 10-year Accommodation Plan

13. Dye, p. 1

14. Ibid, p. 3

15. Ibid, p. 5

16. Ibid, p. 6

17. Doern and Phidd, p. 39

19. Ibid, p. 5

20. However, see also G. Bruce Doern and Richard W. Phidd who argue that, what they call ex-post evaluation and a priori analysis, are not as distinct as the theory suggests, pp. 528-31


28. Ibid, p. 20

29. Ibid, p. 34 However, more information may not always reduce uncertainty. See Martin Rein's position that "more knowledge, more equitably distributed, may produce more disagreement and make it more difficult for a government to act." *Social Science and Public Policy* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1976) p. 12

30. Michael Quinn Patton, p. 289

32. This definition is adapted from the discussion of program evaluation in the Office of the Comptroller General’s Guide on the Program Evaluation Function (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, May 1981) p. 3

33. Carol H. Weiss, Social Science Research and Decision-making, pp. 16 and 22.


36. Ibid, p. ix

37. Ibid, p. x


40. The term program evaluation is used even when the evaluation is measuring outcomes against standards set in the policy. The function is not policy evaluation, which would imply that the policy could be questioned. The policy is a given to the program evaluation function.

41. Dobell and Zussman, pp. 404-27

42. Ibid., pp. 415-6

43. Ibid., p. 416

44. Ibid., p. 422

45. Ibid.

46. Interest groups are part of the audience for evaluations. Their use of evaluation for advocacy purposes may be one of the costs of doing evaluation and making it public.

47. Dobell and Zussman, p. 423


51. Ibid., p. 29


56. Donald J. Johnston, President of the Treasury Board, an address given to the Annual Meeting of the North American Society of Corporate Planning, Vancouver, B.C., April 21, 1982

57. Earlier evaluation efforts were supported by documents such as Treasury Board of Canada, Planning Programming Budgeting Guide (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer for Canada, 1969) and Operational Performance Measurement, Vol 1, Treasury Board, January 1974.

58. See, for example, Treasury Board of Canada, Methods for Determining Program Outcomes: An Overview, Branch Discussion Paper, Office of the Comptroller General, March 1, 1983

60. See Rodney Dobell and David Zussman and G. Bruce Doern and Richard W. Phidd.


62. Leonard Rutman and Dick de Jong, Federal Level Evaluation (Ottawa: Carleton University Graphic Services, 1976). In addition, two applied research studies were carried out by the Treasury Board Secretariat - Study on departmental evaluation groups (Treasury Board Secretariat, 1974) and Departmental Evaluation Activity in the Federal Government (Ottawa: Treasury Board Secretariat, Planning Branch, December 1976)

63. The findings in Part II are not unlike the findings of Rutman and de Jong.


66. For example, Joe Hudson, Problems of Measurement in Criminal Justice (Ottawa: Evaluation Research Training Institute, Carleton University, June 1976); Paul Gendreau and Mary Leipciger, "The

67. For example, Sharon Moyer, Self-Evaluation in Community-Based Residential Centres Volume I: Guide and Volume II: Prospects and Pitfalls (Ottawa: Minist of Supply and Services, 1978)


69. Ibid., p. 206

70. Ibid., p. 210

71. Ibid., p. 212


73. Ibid., p. 40

74. Ibid., p. 50
CHAPTER 3

Development of the Program Evaluation Function in the Federal Public Service: From Accountability to Planning

It is important for the understanding of the program evaluation function as it currently exists in the federal public service to have an awareness of the historical roots of evaluation. This chapter traces those roots from their beginning in a desire to improve management accountability to the current role for evaluation as a tool for planning.

Departments and agencies of the federal government currently derive the authority to do program evaluation from a Treasury Board (TB) circular issued in 1977. That policy stated that:

Departments and agencies of the federal government will periodically review their programs to evaluate their effectiveness in meeting their objectives and the efficiency with which they are being administered.¹

Since that circular was issued, the Office of the Comptroller-General (OCG) has published a book entitled Guide on the Program Evaluation Function which is an "explanation and elaboration of the Treasury Board Policy (1977-47)".² However, this document defines program evaluation as

the periodic, independent and objective review and assessment of a program to determine ... the adequacy of its objectives, its design and its results both intended and unintended. Evaluations will call into question the very existence of the program. Matters such as the rationale for the program, its impact on the public, and its cost effectiveness as compared with alternative means of program delivery are reviewed.³

The key elements of the two documents are shown in Figure 3-1.
### Figure 3-1

**Key elements of Treasury Board Circular and Program Evaluation Guide**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Circular</th>
<th>Guide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DM is client</td>
<td>DM is client (but Cabinet/Cabinet committees may call for evaluations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review is done periodically and cyclically</td>
<td>Review is done periodically cyclically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review for effectiveness in meeting objectives and efficiency of administration</td>
<td>Review for adequacy of objectives and design and intended and unintended results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review questions achievement of program objectives</td>
<td>Review questions achievement of program and policy objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations should not consider alternatives</td>
<td>Evaluations may consider alternatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stresses need for evaluation in light of financial restraint</td>
<td>Stresses need for evaluation to aid in decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requires objective assessment</td>
<td>Requires objective assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May be done by evaluation units (mgmt audit, operational audit, program evaluation units), task forces, inter-departmental review committees, specialists from outside public service</td>
<td>Requires establishment of an independent evaluation unit, organizationally independent from internal audit, mgmt review, quality review etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance measurement is complementary function (review for compliance to perf. measurement and program evaluation policies are linked)</td>
<td>Performance measurement is a complementary function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBS can conduct own evaluations</td>
<td>OCG does not conduct evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBS reviews for compliance</td>
<td>OCG develop policy, provide assistance and comment on evaluation work</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A discussion of these will show that the policy on program evaluation has shifted over the period between 1977 and 1979 when the first draft of the Guide Document was circulated.

**Characteristics of the function**

In both the Circular and the Guide the client for program evaluations is the deputy head of the department or agency. The evaluations are designed to serve both the deputy minister's needs for information as the chief administrative officer of his or her department and also as senior policy advisor to the minister. The Guide focuses mainly on the use of evaluations by departments, but the discussion of the relations between program evaluation and the Policy and Expenditure Management System outlines the interest of central agencies in the departmental evaluation plans and findings. Cabinet or cabinet committees may, in fact, call for evaluations of departmental programs.

The second key element is that evaluations are to be done periodically and cyclically. Although departments are able to choose which of their programs will be evaluated, based on their information needs, the Circular and the Guide both require that all programs be evaluated over a certain period of time in order to ensure that all programs are eventually scheduled for evaluation.

The Circular states that programs will be evaluated for effectiveness in meeting objectives and efficiency of administration. The Guide, on the other hand, avoids any mention of "efficiency" and only uses sparingly the term "effectiveness". The Guide does, however, refer to the assessment of the adequacy of program "design". The OCG recognizes...
that program evaluations will, in fact, look at questions of efficiency but feels that the reference to efficiency and effectiveness is not useful since it leads to considerable overlap with the audit function. An article written by three members of the OCG argues that a more useful distinction to use when categorizing evaluation techniques would be "between those evaluative practices which focus on the results of programs as opposed to those which focus on program operations". This, program evaluation is primarily concerned with the assessment of results whereas other techniques (such as internal audit) are concerned with the assessment of operations. This suggests that evaluation is indeed intended to serve both strategic and operational planning by assessing the impact of program results on policy and program objectives.

In March 1978, just six months after the development of the policy on the evaluation of programs, the President of the Treasury Board, clarified the scope of the departmental evaluation of programs:

Management decisions require, and indeed demand, the provision of appropriate and adequate information on the effectiveness of current programs and the efficiency of their operations. It is the Government, however, that establishes and makes judgements on policies, objectives and priorities, and it is Parliament that judges the effectiveness of the program chosen to implement those policies, objectives and priorities in the interest of all Canadians.

This suggests that evaluations were to consider the extent to which a program met the objectives set for that program and that it is the role of Parliament to judge the extent to which the program responds to government policy. That is, the program is taken as a given. The guideline document, however, allows for evaluations to question the
existence of the program, taking only the policy as given. The evaluation can question "if the program is still needed for current government policy" and "whether the program continues to be accurately focused on the problem or issue it is addressing".8

It was the intent of the authors of the Treasury Board Circular that the program evaluation function not consider alternatives to the current program.9 They felt that to include the consideration of alternatives in the evaluation function would decrease the objectivity of the function since, in the long term, the evaluations would be called upon to assess the impact of alternatives proposed by the evaluation function itself. The Guide, however, explicitly states that program evaluation should consider the rationale for the program and the "cost effectiveness [of the program] as compared with alternative means of program delivery".10 This allows evaluations to consider both alternative programs to meet the same policy objectives and alternative means of meeting the same program objectives. The consideration of alternatives was included in the Guide in order to stress the use of evaluations as aids to decision-making.

The original Circular stressed the use of evaluations to increase the accountability and responsibility of public service managers to ensure that "programs are efficiently and effectively achieving intended results".11 However, the Guide stresses the use of evaluation as an aid to decision-making:

"Program evaluation is one means of providing relevant, timely, and objective findings - information, evidence and conclusions - and recommendations on the performance of government..."
programs, thereby improving the information base on which decisions are taken. 12

Both the Circular and the Guide state that the evaluation requires objective assessment and both specify that in order to achieve this the evaluation function be independent of line management and that appropriate reporting levels be delineated. 13

Although the Circular and the Guide agree that the evaluation function must be independent of line management, they do not agree on how the evaluation function should be carried out. The Circular leaves the selection of appropriate means for evaluation to the individual department and specifies that:

Appropriate means can include departmental or agency evaluation units, (management audit, operational audit, program evaluation units), task forces specifically established to review a particular program, inter-departmental review committees, specialists drawn from outside the public service, etc. 14

The Guide, on the other hand, requires the establishment of an evaluation unit independent of other management control groups:

The departmental program evaluation unit should have a close working relationship with internal audit and corporate planning units to ensure effective coordination among these activities, but a separate organizational unit for program evaluation should be formed. 15

The 1977 Circular specifies that program evaluation is a complementary function to the performance measurement function which had been the subject of a Treasury Board circular the previous year. 16

Program evaluation serves performance measurement in that "it provides for supplementary and more comprehensive data to be provided to managers" and "establishes that every program is subjected, from time to
time, to a more thorough and objective examination than is possible in the context of day-to-day management. The Circular also states that the Treasury Board will integrate their monitoring for compliance to the program evaluation policy with compliance to the performance measurement policy.

The Guide recognizes that performance measurement complements the program evaluation function but the OCG is no longer monitoring for compliance to the performance measurement policy. The definition of performance measurement used in the Guide indicates that it covers the measurement of the on-going performance of a program by, and for, managers and is principally concerned with economy, efficiency and the extent to which operational objectives are achieved.

The relationship between the central agencies and the departments over the responsibility for evaluation also changed from the Circular to the Guide. The Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), who were given the authority to monitor for compliance to the original policy, was also given the authority to "request that evaluations be moved forward in a departmental/agency evaluation schedule, conduct its own evaluation, or participate in joint efforts with the departments/agencies concerned." When the Office of the Comptroller General was created in 1978, the responsibility for the implementation of the program evaluation policy was transferred from the Treasury Board Secretariat to the OCG. The Program Evaluation Branch of the OCG is responsible for developing and promulgating the policy and guidelines, developing and maintaining working relationships with departments, advising
and assisting departments, and commenting on both the program evaluation function in departments and the resulting documents and reports. The development of these responsibilities was intended to "obviate the need for conducting formal compliance reviews as mentioned in the Treasury Board Circular (1977-47)". It is not intended that the OCG will carry out any evaluations of their own although they may "facilitate consultation...among departments and between departments and central agencies on evaluation related matters".

Program evaluation has largely been seen by central agencies as a management tool. In the early days of the original policy the function was designed as a means for measuring program effectiveness so that management would be held accountable for the use of public money on that program. In the later years program evaluation has become a management tool for measuring not only the extent to which a program has met its objectives, but also the extent to which the program met the overall policy objectives of the government with a view, not so much to increasing management accountability, as to improving both program design and delivery. In order to explain this shift from an emphasis on accountability to an emphasis on planning it is necessary to consider the conditions under which each of them were written. In looking at these conditions it is important to trace through some of the developments and changes to management processes over the past two decades.

Conditions leading to the development of the Policy

The Royal Commission on Government Organization (the Glassco Commission) has been the watershed for many of the management reforms in
the federal public service since the early 1960s. As a result of particular recommendations dealing with financial authority and accountability of departments the philosophy of the Commission has been characterized by the expression "let the managers manage". The Commission recommended that greater financial authority be delegated to departments who would then be held accountable for the "effective management" of those resources. The Commission also recommended that departmental Estimates be presented in a form that reflected the purpose of the expenditure rather than object of expenditure so that it is possible for Parliament to hold managers accountable for the results of their programs.

However, the "let the managers manage" characterization of the Glassco Commission only reflects the concern of the Commissioners for increased accountability. It does not reflect the concerns which they also expressed for better planning.

Wisely designed and accompanied by appropriate delegation of authority and responsibility, a system of budgetary control permits senior management to free itself of a mass of detail and devote its whole effort to major affairs. In this context, the present planning procedures of the government are seriously deficient.

The Commission proposed that Treasury Board should be less concerned with the details of departmental proposed expenditures then with overall management practices. The recommendation to organize the Estimates by purpose of expenditure would also make it possible for greater emphasis to be placed on the "desirability of continuing, modifying or enlarging specific programmes in the public interest". The Commission considered that the authority to evaluate departmental programs lay with the Treasury Board which was responsible for the "year-round evaluation of
programmes and of departmental performance [providing] the basis for its annual review of departmental estimates of expenditures." Yet, the Commission noted that neither senior departmental management nor Treasury Board staff had made much use of techniques for assessing government operations. Recognizing the differences between the public and private sectors, the Commission called for more systematic implementation in the public service of:

a wide range of management "tools": budgetary and accounting systems which permit better control over the allocation of financial resources and the assessment of performance; operational research and other techniques for evaluating alternative courses of action and for designing and appraising methods and systems.

These two trends of better accountability and better planning identified in the Glassco Commission report have dominated changes to the management process over the past twenty years and are reflected in the development of evaluation techniques over that period.

Many of the changes designed to improve accountability and planning in the management process, which took place following the Glassco Commission report of 1962, had an impact on the development of the program evaluation policy in 1977. To a great extent, these changes explain the direction which the policy took as they determined the conditions which prevailed at the time the Circular was written. These conditions include the political environment, the development of the audit community, the role of the Auditor General (AG), and organizational change and evaluation experience. It will be argued that the emphasis on accountability in the original policy was largely a result
of the conditions which prevailed at the time of the writing of the Circular.

Political environment

During the 1960s government experienced a period of rapid growth. The public demand for services grew and the nature and complexity of government intervention changed. With this growth of government services came a growth in the field of social sciences. The analysis of public problems was no longer only the domain of the traditional fields of economics and political science but now required a multi-disciplinary approach. With it grew a belief that the social sciences were approaching the kind of certainty that characterizes the natural sciences, and hence that their results could be implemented within public programs with the same kind of confidence that attends the use of a "hard" technology.

This belief that it was possible to quantify practically everything led to new approaches to planning in the public domain and to what Richard French calls "a new generation of technocrats" whose:

claim to involvement in the solution of public problems lay in their formal training and substantive expertise rather than in seniority and experience, [and who] saw in the planning movement an ideal instrument to speed the supplanting of the mandarinate and their own succession to power.

The advent of this group of technocrats led to a major restructuring of the central agency planning function. The period saw, among other things, the creation of the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning (1968) and a Plans Division with the Privy Council Office (1968), the establishment of staff groups to serve Cabinet committees and the re-
structing of the Treasury Board Secretariat to establish a Planning Branch (1969). 33

The enthusiasm of the sixties for quantitative analysis was to be tempered in the seventies by the experience of trying to do and use quantitative analysis in the public policy process. 34 However, the impact of this trend in public policy analysis, and its ensuing effect on planning, were to have an important influence on the development of program evaluation policy.

The economic buoyancy of the 1960s also came to an end during the 1970s. G. Bruce Doern and Richard W. Phidd characterize the period from the early 1970's to the present as "one in which there was a grudging and belated rediscovery of scarcity". As a result, "politics, policy and the allocation of resources became increasingly a zero sum game" 35 and, hence, more emphasis had to be placed on the enhancement of "the legitimacy of the priority-setting process among ministers and their officials, and the follow-up exercise". 36

The Growth of the audit community

One of the recommendations of the Glassco Commission had been that the federal government should make improvements to the departmental internal auditing capabilities. 37 A task force set up by the Privy Council Office and charged with the implementation of the Glassco Commission recommendations, recommended that the government establish internal operational audit units. The policy was announced by the President of the Treasury Board in 1967. The units would provide for the "systematic appraisal of operations" in order to evaluate "how the
machinery is running and how the resources are being used". A more complete definition of internal operational auditing was given by the Treasury Board President in 1970.

We in the present government are seeking to provide ministers and their departments with the authority and the machinery with which to better discharge their responsibilities to the Cabinet and to this House for the effectiveness of their programs and the efficiency of their administration. This means that they will be doing their own evaluation of the effectiveness with which their programs achieve the Government's objectives. They themselves will be applying the tests of efficiency with which their programs are administered. To this end the departments of the Government of Canada are introducing the internal operational audits which are required to support its operations.

Key elements of the policy on internal operational audit were that a small staff unit be established to report directly to the deputy head of the department, that this audit group be made up of highly competent senior people drawn from a wide variety of disciplines, and that the operational audit examine all aspects of an organization (the financial aspects often being examined by a separate financial audit program). The results of internal operational auditing were to serve both accountability:

the management audit provides an assessment of whether the officer himself and those who are accountable to him have fulfilled their duties, achieved their objectives, adhered to the terms of reference, and observed the limitations and restrictions imposed on them.

and planning:

[an] important benefit resulting from a strong operational audit program is that it will also
provide an independent answer to the question: "Are there any major problems that are not being adequately dealt with?"  

Groups under a variety of names - management audit, operational audit, internal audit, management review - were established in many departments. The groups did raise some fundamental questions about programs but the bulk of their work was related to questions of operational efficiency. By the early 1970's the focus of such groups had narrowed, having become "issue" oriented and in many cases problem-solvers for deputy ministers. A study of departmental evaluation activities, carried out by the TBS in 1976, described the role of management audit in effectiveness evaluation as follows:

The majority of [management audit/program management evaluation] units described include in their mandates the evaluation of how departmental programs are achieving departmental objectives....However, these groups generally operate as a control mechanism that functions by advising senior management as to the effectiveness and adequacy of other departmental control mechanisms.  

Financial audit techniques had developed into a well respected discipline over many years. Now the financial community was endeavouring to move towards systems audit, general management audit, and effectiveness evaluation in a very few years. The expectation was unreasonable. However, when the Treasury Board Circular on program evaluation was written in 1977, the financial community feared that their role in effectiveness evaluation was being overrun. The Circular tried to take into account the vested interest which the financial community had developed in effectiveness evaluation by including the departmental audit groups as one of the means for doing program evaluation.
Role of the Auditor General

At the same time as the role of departmental audit groups was changing so was the role of the Auditor General. During the 1970's the emphasis of the Auditor General's work expanded from financial auditing to value-for-money auditing. The Auditor General was influenced by developments in the international audit community and was pushing the Office's role to one of being concerned with the results of public expenditure as well as the narrower concern of the probity of expenditures. Concern over the expanding role led to the establishment, in 1973, of an Independent Review Committee on the Office of the Auditor General (the Wilson Committee). The Committee concluded that the Auditor General should take due account of the economy and efficiency in conducting his examination of expenditures. Since some confusion has arisen on this point in the past, it would be desirable that...new legislation provide a specific authority for him to report cases where, in his opinion, value for money has not been obtained through the Government's expenditure of public funds...The Auditor General should therefore take a great interest in the administration's activities in the area of effectiveness measurement, to the extent that he should monitor the program of such studies. In time, the Audit Office should develop sufficient expertise to identify those areas of government to which effectiveness studies could be applied and to assess the validity of any conclusions that result.

An additional recommendation of the Wilson Committee suggested that when the state of the art of effectiveness evaluation has developed sufficiently for the measurement of the effectiveness of some government programs, the Auditor General "has the right to report on such studies
and even to make his own evaluation of program results if there is not satisfactory way of obtaining this." This recommendation that the Office of the Auditor General be authorized to do effectiveness evaluations itself, was not accepted because it ran counter to the belief that Parliament is the ultimate judge of program effectiveness.

In 1975 the Auditor General reported in his annual report to Parliament that although the legal requirements for budgetary control systems were being met, these budgetary systems were incapable of reflecting the effectiveness of government programs in such a way that program managers could be held accountable for their use of public money in achieving government objectives. These findings served to fuel both the public and Parliament's demand for greater regard for how public money was being used to achieve government objectives. As a result of the findings of the Wilson Committee and the Auditor-General's reports, a new Auditor General Act was proclaimed in 1977 giving the Auditor General the authority to report to Parliament on cases where "money has been expended without due regard for economy or efficiency; or...satisfactory procedures have not been established to measure and report the effectiveness of programs; where such procedures could appropriately and reasonably be implemented."

This new Act was proclaimed in August of 1977 and in September the Treasury Board policy on program evaluation was announced. The Circular was hastily written to provide the necessary authority to departments to do program evaluation since the Auditor General now had the authority to monitor for the establishment of satisfactory procedures for measuring program effectiveness. The preparations towards the
development of the program evaluation policy at the Treasury Board Secretariat forestalled the possibility of the Auditor General doing his own effectiveness evaluations as had been recommended by the Wilson Committee. The emphasis in all the changes in the role of Auditor General has been towards improving accountability for the expenditure of public funds. The shift has been from concern for holding public sector managers accountable for the expenditure of public monies according to specific financial guidelines to one of holding them accountable for the results achieved from that resource allocation.

Organizational change and evaluation experience

One of the key responses of the federal government to the Glassco Commission recommendations was the development of a Program, Planning and Budgeting System (PPBS) which was announced by Treasury Board in 1969. This system was the first attempt to link the budgetary and planning processes in an effort to allow for more informed and critical debate on government programs both at the political and bureaucratic level. One of the main elements of PPBS was the integration of efficiency and effectiveness evaluations into the budgetary process. As the Program Planning and Budgeting Guide states:

[One of] the concepts common to all planning-programming-budgeting systems [is]...an information system for each program to supply the data for the monitoring of achievement of program goals and to supply data for the reassessment of the program objectives and the appropriateness of the program itself. 51

PPBS was just one of a series of management techniques that the TBS Planning Branch tried to implement during the late 1960s and the
1970s to improve the management processes of government. This array of techniques engendered some skepticism about their effectiveness and frustration on the part of practitioners faced with the demand for program evaluation seen as yet another change to management techniques.

Within the Planning Branch, two Divisions were created to respond to the need for more evaluative information about government programs - the Effectiveness Evaluation Division and the Efficiency Evaluation Division. It was the role of the Effectiveness Evaluation Division to begin the evaluation process by doing evaluations which would help the TBS Program Branch fulfill its challenge function in the management of the expenditure budget system and help ministers make resource allocation decisions. Hartle, then Deputy Secretary of the Planning Branch, saw a close link between evaluation and strategic planning:

> Evaluative and strategic planning are, it can be seen, inextricably related. Evaluation proceeds from the policy instruments to their effects on goals. Strategic planning proceeds from the desired attainment of goals to the selection of the mix of policy instruments best able to achieve them using the information produced through evaluation.

To serve this end, the Effectiveness Evaluation Division, made up largely of economists, carried out a number of evaluations of high profile government programs in areas as diverse as social programs, economic development programs and agricultural programs. The Division was at the leading edge of what French calls the "technology of evaluation". However, the attempt by central agencies to do program evaluation failed. In spite of the high quality of the analysis, it failed to take
into account the norms and expectations of the central decision-making process. French has described the evaluation efforts of the Planning Branch as "an intellectual tour de force without an audience to appreciate it". There was no demand for these macro-level evaluations.

After the failures of the Treasury Board Secretariat attempts at macro-level evaluation, the Privy Council Office did try to revive the enterprise of evaluation in 1974 with studies to support the Cabinet policy review exercise:

Five or ten cabinet evaluation studies were to be designated annually, with the department sponsoring each program to be responsible for the evaluation. Terms of reference were to be established by cabinet and monitored interdepartmentally. However, even the weight of Cabinet behind these evaluations failed to guarantee their success. As French records "they were launched in the fall of 1974, just as the Priorities Exercise of 1975-76 was getting under way, and they vanished without a trace in the midst of that larger and more elaborate enterprise."

At the same time as the Effectiveness Evaluation Division was involved in these macro-level evaluations, the Efficiency Evaluation Division, largely made up of statisticians, was developing an Operational Performance Measurement System (OPMS), which became Treasury Board policy in 1973. "The significance of [OPMS] can best be appreciated by examining the importance of its role in evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs". The development of OPMS was an attempt to encourage departments to identify program objectives and collect input and output data necessary to allow both the departments
and central agencies to apply rigorous scientific methods to the evaluation of programs. OPMS comprised a very sophisticated means-end hierarchy which could be used as a framework for evaluating program effectiveness. It attempted to provide

an information base with which departmental management, Treasury Board and Cabinet could evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency with which programs are carried out. A direct product of such evaluation would be an improved rationale for allocating resources within and among programs. 59

Even though some departments made large investments in OPMS, the system failed. While it was able to produce large quantities of data, OPMS failed to provide information suitable for use in the government-wide resource allocation process. It was unable to live up to the great expectations which had been built up for it. Like the macro-level evaluations being done by the Effectiveness Evaluation Division, OPMS was providing data for which there was no market. Writing in 1976, Douglas Hartle, who had been the Deputy Secretary of the Planning Branch at the time the original OPMS was developed, commented that, although OPMS seemed to be a useful advance:

There has been a tendency...to have the Planning Branch of the Treasury Board out flogging OPMS to departments while the Program Branch of the Treasury Board has found it expedient to make its recommendations to ministers as though the information were not available. 60

In 1975, a new Director of the Efficiency Evaluation Division was appointed and the OPMS policy was dismantled to be replaced the next year by a new Treasury Board Circular on performance measurement (Treasury Board Circular 1976-25). The 1976 Circular was touted as a reaf-
firmation of the earlier policy. In fact, it represented a shift towards a policy to provide information of more use to departmental management. The new Circular presented a more modest role for performance measurement as a tool for providing "managers with information to monitor how well their programs are operating".61 The policy states that

Departments and agencies...will, wherever feasible, regularly measure the on-going performance of their operations in terms of the effectiveness with which their objectives are being achieved and the efficiency with which they are being administered.62

The Treasury Board made three reports to Parliament on the use of performance measurement systems in the federal public service. In the final report in 1979, the President of the Treasury Board stated that the "Office of the Comptroller General will continue to promote the improved application of program performance measurement".63 However, by the early 1980's the OCG's interest in performance measurement was beginning to wane. Information about program operations was seen to be of interest to departments for the purposes of accountability and, as will be seen in the next section, the OCG was more concerned with improving planning capabilities.

In 1976 the Effectiveness Evaluation Division was disbanded and most of the officers left the Treasury Board.64 Those who remained joined with the operational efficiency people from the Efficiency Evaluation Division to become the Efficiency Evaluation Branch. In December 1977, a Program Evaluation Policy Division was created within this Branch to support the TB Circular on the evaluation of programs.65
With the rapid growth in the importance of planning in central agencies came also an increase in the number of policy groups in departments and agencies. French notes that

in the early Seventies, each department created its own policy-analysis unit, planning branch and/or program evaluation group, a process that was greatly aided by the fact that the Treasury Board Secretariat was leading the drive for planning and analysis and therefore more than well-disposed toward departmental requests for resources to be directed to such purposes.66

In 1974 the Organization Division of Planning Branch carried out a study of planning and evaluation groups in government to find out where those resources were actually being spent. They found that

most departments had not attempted to organize the program evaluation function, at least as a specialized function distinct from program management, even though man-years [sic] and in many cases executive resources had been allocated to departments for this function.67

In 1976 a follow-up study was undertaken just prior to the writing of the Circular on program evaluation. Given that the trend in central agencies has been to recognize a variety of management control techniques to be used at the discretion of the deputy minister,68 this second study was "to examine a larger spectrum of evaluation activity than that defined by "program evaluation" in the P&E report".69 The study found that although there was considerable variance in the deputy minister's perception of the need for evaluation, a wide range of evaluation activities existed in many departments. These activities covered the evaluation of policy, program design and implementation (program effectiveness) and program administration.70 Deputy ministers were
generally anxious to see a policy on program evaluation in place in order to give them a mechanism for getting some policy and program concerns onto the minister's agenda. The study findings indicated that deputy ministers were limited in the extent to which they could raise policy questions with the minister since "the degree of involvement by chief executives and departmental officers in support of policy development and evaluation is a function primarily of ministerial elicitation". 71

This second study on evaluation activities had been done in preparation for the writing of the Circular on the evaluation of programs. At this point it is important to summarize those conditions which prevailed at the time of writing. The Auditor General, influenced by the developments in the international audit community towards comprehensive auditing, was pushing for greater evaluation of program effectiveness in the government and had the authority to monitor for the presence of the necessary procedures to do such evaluations. The audit community within the government had been trying to develop operational audit in the direction of effectiveness evaluation and their concern was that they should be allowed a "piece of the pie". The rhetoric of the socio-economic planners of the sixties that had led to the efforts of the TBS to do program evaluations in the early to mid-seventies, had proven to be incapable of handling the complexities of the public policy process. The TBS was still developing and pushing operational performance measurement systems.

The departments were anxious to see a policy in place but were apprehensive of anything which would be too prescriptive. During the
previous nine years departments had witnessed the advent of operational audit, a much changed planning function, and two attempts to establish performance measurement. In order to preserve the eclectic nature of evaluation groups which currently existed in the departments and accommodate all the vested interests in evaluation, a Circular was written which was not too prescriptive but which formalized the deputy head's responsibility to plan and implement a coordinated approach to the evaluation of programs. The intent was to keep it simple. In light of the disastrous attempts in the TB Planning Branch to do evaluations in support of strategic planning, the emphasis was placed on evaluations as a tool for accountability for those things for which the deputy head could be held accountable; that is, the efficient and effective operations of programs. This, too, was clearly the concern of the Auditor General whose definition of effectiveness addressed the question of whether programs meet program objectives, not policy objectives. The Circular allowed for the continued use of audit groups and other established departmental groups in the evaluation process. Despite the failure of central agency attempts to do evaluations of departmental programs, the Circular still allowed for this possibility, although one of the authors of the policy indicated it was never intended that such evaluations be done by the Program Evaluation Division of TBS.

**Conditions leading to the development of the Guide**

Those factors which had an impact on the development of the original evaluation policy continued to have an impact on the development of the function in the federal government. However, the
emphasis was now on evaluation to support planning rather than evaluation to maintain accountability. To explain why the policy shifted, it is necessary to look at how the conditions which led to the development of the original Circular had changed. The division of the analysis into two parts might seem to suggest that there was an abrupt change in a number of these factors. This, of course, is not the case. Conditions changed gradually. However, for the purpose of the analysis, it is useful to draw some distinct lines.

Political environment

In the Throne Speech of April 1980, the Liberal Government argued that Canadians did not necessarily want less government but rather more effective government. The emphasis was placed on increased efficiency and this further stressed the role of rational planning, which had characterized the early and mid-seventies. It had helped to shape the development of the program evaluation Circular and continued to be of great importance. The direction which this growth took was towards the linking of planning and resource allocation in an attempt to increase the awareness of the cost of a program in relation to what it was expected to achieve. The introduction of the Policy and Expenditure Management System (PEMS) in 1979 was an attempt to establish a top-down expenditure planning system which involved the setting up of major expenditure envelopes to be administered by sectoral policy committees of Cabinet.

The establishment of PEMS was one of the key responses of the government to the report of the Royal Commission on Financial Management
and Accountability (Lambert Commission) which had been set up in November 1976 and produced a final report in March 1979. The Commission had been given the responsibility to address the concern expressed by the Auditor General, in his annual reports to Parliament in 1975 and 1976, that the government had lost control of the accountability for the spending of public funds. The Lambert Commission found that the wave of decentralization which followed the report of the Glassco Commission was not accompanied by a comparable degree of accountability. Although the Glassco Commission had recognized the need for increased accountability they had "provided no clear direction as to how such accountability should be rendered within government". What followed the Glassco Commission and the decentralization of authority was a massive web of detailed restrictions imposed on departments by central agencies in an attempt to control the delegated authority but which, in effect, prevented the effective management by the departments of their resources. The Lambert Commission concluded that:

Virtually no effort has been made to establish clearly defined objectives against which the performance of a department or agency can be measured either in total or in respect of particular programs or activities...little effort has been made to require the provision of financial and other information essential to measuring performance in relation to objectives, a prerequisite to making such an accounting meaningful.

The report recognized that the efforts to improve management efficiency in the federal government had had a limited impact and that any such effort would be wasted unless financial considerations
form an essential part of the entire planning process, the budgeting of resources to implement those plans, the control of subsequent expenditures, and the evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness with which any activity has been undertaken.

The Lambert report clearly places the need for accountability as a part of the overall management process. Their report led the way for the development of closer links between planning, resource allocation and the control function. Unlike the Glassco Commission report, the Lambert report is very specific about the mechanisms to be used for ensuring this management control. They reported on the general weaknesses of the internal audit function in departments as follows:

In only a few departments does internal audit go beyond these limits [of compliance auditing] to include some aspects of operational auditing, such as the assessment of the economy and efficiency with which programs are being conducted, an examination of the validity of performance indicators, and the review of compliance with administrative procedures.

Lambert recommended the consolidation and expansion of the internal audit function such that the internal audit responsibility "be based on a comprehensive approach to all financial, operational and management auditing, and that it therefore cover...the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which resources are used".

In reporting on the assessment of the program impacts, the report centered their recommendation on the role of Parliament. In the Speech from the Throne in October 1978, the Government had announced their intention to provide for the review by Parliament of the evaluations of major programs. Having observed that both the House of
Commons and the Senate were successfully involved in major program reviews through their committee system. Lambert recommended that "standing committees undertake, as the need arises or as time permits, in-depth studies of the impact of programs; and that these studies concentrate on reviewing the need for and the benefits conveyed by specific programs."  

In response to the Government's announced intention to allow for the review by Parliament of major evaluations, a White Paper on Program Evaluation was prepared. The paper was never published but a summary of the report was submitted in a memorandum to Cabinet. The recommendations called for the establishment of a joint House of Commons and Senate committee on program evaluation which could call for the evaluation of government programs. The committee would have a research staff to aid the committee in the development of the terms of reference for the evaluation, the identification of the issues for consideration, and the review of the report. The reason suggested by the OCG for the fact that the White Paper was never issued was that the notion of a joint House of Commons and Senate committee with a research staff implied a change to Parliamentary procedures and a more general movement was underway calling for the reform of Parliament. However, other reasons may also explain the disappearance of the idea that Parliament could call for evaluations of government programs. The Liberal Government was defeated in the general election in 1979 and the Conservatives came to power. A Conservative member of Parliament began the preparation of sunset legislation but it was not passed by Parliament before
the Conservative Government fell and the Liberals were returned to power in the 1980 general election. By this time the idea of evaluation for Parliament was not high on the political agenda despite the fact that the 1980 Throne Speech had stressed the importance of more effective government.\textsuperscript{88} The use by Parliament of departmental evaluations would increase the threatening nature of evaluation and returns us to the notion that it is a means for ensuring the accountability — in this case, of the bureaucracy to Parliament.

Two considerations emerge from the review of the political environment which existed after the original Circular on the evaluation of programs. The push for greater accountability which the Auditor General had spearheaded in the mid-1970s was now being linked to the requirement for an improved planning function. This is recognized in the report of the Lambert Commission and institutionalized in the development of the Policy and Expenditure Management System. The second consideration was the push for an increased role for Parliament in the use of program evaluations. The notion of accountability was expanding from that of accountability within the bureaucracy to that of the ultimate accountability to Parliament.

The recommendations of the White Paper calling for evaluations to be done for Parliament were never implemented. However, the government recognized a wider role for evaluations in their use by the cabinet committee system. In a progress report on management reforms and the implementation of the recommendations of the Lambert Commission, the President of the Treasury Board states that "ministers collectively should require an evaluation of specific programs that they may wish re-
viewed" but confirms that such an evaluation should be done by the department involved. This added dimension of Cabinet, or a Cabinet committee, as the client for an evaluation has been a further change in the scope of the evaluation function.

Further developments in the audit community

With regard to the internal audit function in the federal government, the Lambert Commission found that only a few departments had followed a comprehensive approach to operational auditing which would provide information of interest to senior management. Most were engaged in detailed compliance auditing which is a requirement of central agencies and the Auditor-General.90

The 1978 Standards for Internal Financial Audit in the Government of Canada state the TB policy on audit as follows:

Departments shall have an independent, systematic appraisal activity that examines the financial control framework, evaluates its adequacy, and reviews the organization's performance in relation to this framework for the purpose of advising management as to the effectiveness and efficiency of the financial function.91

The later version of these standards issued in 1982 - Standards for Internal Audit in the Government of Canada increased the scope of the audit function to include all systems and controls.92 The new definition of audit was outlined in a paper entitled "Internal Audit and Program Evaluation in the Government of Canada" that was produced by the Office of the Comptroller General in August 1979. In that paper, internal audit is defined as "the systematic review and appraisal of all
departmental operations, including administrative practices, [providing] an independent assessment to senior management as to the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of internal management policies, practices and controls.\textsuperscript{93}

The shift in the policy may have been partly pushed by the concerns of the audit community. Both the audit community and the program evaluation community were trying to delineate the boundaries of their respective functions in order to ensure their own survival.

In spite of the difficulties which had been encountered in trying to expand the role of internal audit to include effectiveness measurement, the audit community was still trying to develop the function in that direction at the same time as the program evaluation function developed. There was concern in the audit community, however, that they would be overrun by the program evaluation function which generally had a higher profile and higher classified positions.

The Policy on program evaluation had indicated that internal audit was one of the techniques used to evaluate programs. Yet, the program evaluation function, as described in the Guide document, is an evaluative technique independent of the audit function. The Guide, in presenting a careful elaboration of the differences between internal audit and program evaluation, argues that the difference lies in the subject matter which each treats. Although there may be some overlap between the two functions, audit deals with "program systems and management controls" and program evaluation with "program structures and results."\textsuperscript{94} An additional difference between them is that audit uses primarily internal information, whereas evaluation uses external infor-
mation to assess a program.

Role of the Auditor General

The role of the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) in establishing the Circular on the evaluation of programs has been outlined above. The Office continued to play an important part in the development of the function even after the Circular was written. As a result of the OAG's concern for the lack of accountability of the bureaucracy to Parliament, the Auditor General recommended the appointment of a Comptroller General as the chief financial administrator of the federal public service.

In spite of the reluctance of the TB, the Auditor General continued to push for the appointment in both the Public Accounts Committee and in the media. The Government had already established the Lambert Commission to investigate the breakdown in accountability within the public service. However, under public pressure from the AG, the government finally agreed to appoint a Comptroller General without waiting for the recommendations of the Lambert Commission. The government's decision to establish the position was announced in April of 1977 but the Act to create the office was not passed in Parliament until June of 1978. The Act provided for the appointment of a Comptroller General, at the senior deputy minister level, who would report to the President of the Treasury Board and, jointly with the Secretary of the TB, be responsible for ensuring "that the expenditures of the Government of Canada are well planned and controlled; and that the federal public service is managed economically, efficiently and effectively".
The new Auditor General's Act, which had been proclaimed in August of 1977, provided the mandate for the AG to ensure that public funds are spent economically, efficiently and that procedures are in place to measure the effectiveness of expenditures. In preparation for this new mandate, the AG set up a special project - a "Study of Procedures in Cost Effectiveness" (SPICE). The purpose of the study was to:

compile information on the 'state of the art' of management control systems in the public sector, in terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness; ...assess and report on existing procedures for planning, measuring and controlling activities...recommend to the Office of the Auditor General how this new mandate should be exercised in the future.98

The results of this study were reported in the Auditor General's annual report to Parliament at the end of 1978. One of the underlying functions of the study was the development of criteria to be used in the auditing for economy, efficiency and effectiveness in government programs.99 A review, based on effectiveness criteria, of programs in eighteen departments showed "few successful attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of programs".100 The evaluation activities were weak in terms of the amount of effort put into the evaluation exercise and the quality of the both the evaluations and the reporting of the study findings.101

The formal response of the government to the findings of SPICE was presented in a letter from the President of the Treasury Board to the AG and was included in the 1978 annual report. In that letter, the President announced that "a comprehensive review of [departmental] financial administrative and control activities...to include the opera-
tional planning and control activities" would be undertaken by the OCG. This review included "a careful examination...of the extent and quality of performance measurement and program evaluation activities carried out by Departments". 102

The traditional audit concern for accountability is reflected in the SPICE report, but so also is a concern for improving program planning. As the AG states, "although there may be some merit in doing the right thing badly, there is none whatever in doing the wrong thing well". 103 One of the audit criteria identified in the report relates specifically to the use of program evaluations:

"Evaluations should lead to improved understanding of the program and its impacts. Such insights may lead to decisions to modify aspects of the program or to add new elements to the process of program delivery. They are an essential input to decisions on the future of programs". 104

This concern for improved planning is reflected to a greater extent by the Office of the Comptroller General.

The role of the Office of the Comptroller General

The principal organizational change which influenced the program evaluation function was the creation of the Office of the Comptroller General. It may be cynical to accept the judgment of Hartle on the reasons for the development of new techniques and processes in government. He states that many "changes are the result of individuals searching around for some kind of gimmick, to displace the previous gimmick, in order to gain either promotion or greater influence". 105 In any case, the high profile of the OCG and the first incumbent of the
Office would seem to have contributed in large measure to the establishment of the program evaluation function.

The creation of the OCG, although much contested, became an indication of the commitment of the government to the idea of program evaluation. During the period prior to the appointment of the first Comptroller General in early 1978, the program evaluation was somewhat "in limbo". Following the TB Circular of September 1977, there was much pressure for a group to advise departments on how to interpret the policy and develop the function in departments. At this point the Program Evaluation Division was created in the Efficiency Evaluation Branch of TBS. It was, however, a "phantom group" consisting of a Director and only two officers who had come from the original Efficiency Evaluation Division of the old Planning Branch. When the first Comptroller General was appointed he inherited this group as the first staff of the Program Evaluation Branch. In November of 1978 the Comptroller General appointed his first Deputy Comptroller-General for the Branch. The first incumbent of this office had very specific views on the direction that program evaluation should take and played a large part in shaping the development of the policy particularly through the choice of staff members to appoint to the Branch. The intent was to choose people with backgrounds in research and experience in analysis in the public sector but also people with a clear understanding of the use of analysis in decision-making. By this time all those involved in the writing of the original Circular had left the OCG.

The President of the Treasury Board's response to the AG
report on SPICE outlined the initiative taken by the Comptroller General to review financial and operational planning and control activities within government. This program to work with departments to improve management practices and controls (IMPAC) was one of the first priorities of the Comptroller General. In designing this program, Directors of the OCG developed an integrated management framework which encompassed the full range of management functions. It was an attempt to fully integrate audit, evaluation and OPMS into the context of management control and though it was not meant to be prescriptive it served as the basis for consultations with all departments on ways for them to achieve greater integration of their management practices. The results of the review showed a general lack of meaningful management information and analysis, a lack of experience in, and commitment to, program evaluation and a narrow financial scope in the internal audit function. 

Complementary to this IMPAC review was the Task Force on Program Evaluability, set up by the OCG, whose objective was

the establishment of plans [for program evaluation] with each Department that will provide a detailed understanding for the ultimate extension of such procedures to all those operations and programs of Government where they may appropriately and reasonably be applied.  

The clear intention of both IMPAC and the Task Force was not simply a review but rather the establishment of plans with each Department to implement the findings of the review process.

The Task Force never produced an official report but the review confirmed the findings of earlier studies that most departments were not doing evaluation work. Reports were prepared for each department and
these formed the basis of the evaluation functions in most cases by developing the component profiles for evaluation and discussing the evaluable of each component. This formed the basis for the on-going liaison work of the OCG around which the functional role of the Office has developed. The emphasis has been placed on assisting and commenting on departmental evaluation work rather than on monitoring for compliance to the program evaluation policy in order to dispel the belief that program evaluation is more a central agency requirement than as an aid to deputy minister level decision-making.

The results of the Task Force led the way for the development of the Guide on the Program Evaluation Function. Past experience with evaluation in the public service seemed to indicate two things. Firstly, departments were unlikely to establish evaluation functions on their own without considerable push from central agencies. The original Circular was not intended to be too prescriptive in order to allow maximum flexibility in the implementation of the function in each department. However, it soon became clear that more guidance was necessary if the function was to become established. To develop a consensus on the direction that the function should take, the OCG established an interdepartmental committee which allowed fifteen to twenty departments to be involved in the process of developing the Guide. This reduced departmental concerns that the function was being imposed by a central agency while still providing important guidelines for the function. These guidelines were necessary to ensure that the function continued to look at "higher order" strategic questions and not become too "issue-
oriented" (operational) as had the experience with earlier attempts to establish evaluation. Guidelines were also necessary to establish the required infrastructure for doing program evaluation and so ensure the survival of the function. This push from the centre was necessary to establish the function. The prescriptive nature of the Guidelines was counterbalanced at the same time by a very realistic stance taken by the Comptroller General in speeches which outline the difficulties and limitations of evaluation.

The second lesson learned from past experience was that evaluation would be more marketable as a tool for planning than for accountability. In times of financial restraint, a government's desire to provide new programs can only be satisfied if resources can be found from existing programs. Evaluation can be marketed to politicians as a useful tool for the identification of areas where programs can be altered or replaced to better serve overall government objectives. Furthermore, evaluation as a tool for planning is less threatening to senior and program management than evaluation as a tool for accountability and hence, easier to implement. Finally, because the evaluation function does not benefit from the clear standards and techniques that are applicable to the audit function, evaluation cannot be conclusive enough for use as a tool for accountability.

The establishment of the OCG, the staff expertise of the Office, and the experience gained during the Task Force reviews have largely been responsible for the shift in direction from the original Circular to the current position of evaluation in the federal government. At the 1983 annual conference of the Evaluation Research Society,
a session was presented on "Evaluation Results in the Government of Canada", the theme of which was "that program evaluation benefits from a serious government commitment, a systematic implementation and an orientation geared more to decision-making than to accountability or research". This summarizes the three main concerns of the OCC's position on evaluation - the need for strong commitment from government, the importance of the infrastructure and the use of evaluation as a tool for planning.

Summary

This chapter has shown how the policy on program evaluation has shifted from an emphasis on accountability to planning. The shift occurred largely because of the actors involved and the past experience of doing evaluation in the federal bureaucracy. The original Circular took into account many vested interests and tried to develop evaluation as a generic function comprising all evaluative techniques which existed in federal government departments at that time. However, those involved in the writing of the Guide believed that since previous attempts to establish the function had failed, this attempt would have to be different to ensure a place for program evaluation in the long-term. More emphasis would have to be placed on the development of a unique function (with an organizational unit devoted to evaluation) and the marketing of evaluation results to both politicians and departmental managers. The original Circular remains the current mandate for the evaluation function and the Guide is an elaboration of that Circular. The existence and importance of the differences between the two is downplayed by the
OCC who take the position that the guidelines are a natural outcome of the Circular. This thesis suggests that the Guide is more than an "explanation" or even an "elaboration" of the earlier Circular. The current policy on program evaluation is different in terms of both what evaluation is intended to do and how it should be done.

The Guide is specific about the kinds of strategic level questions which an evaluation should address, whereas the Circular was less specific, based on the assumption that deputy ministers would identify the questions which were of interest to them and that these were largely at the operational level. The emphasis on operational level decision-making made evaluation a tool, at the central agency level, for management accountability. The emphasis in the Guide on strategic level decision-making made evaluation a tool for government-wide planning. The Guide specifies that evaluation will be done by an evaluation unit reporting to the deputy minister but independent of other staff functions, whereas the Circular identified an eclectic array of staff groups capable of doing evaluation work for deputy ministers.

How one interprets the reasons for this shift depends on whether or not one believes evaluation can fulfill its intended role in strategic planning. If one believes that evaluation can serve strategic planning, then program evaluation is a different function from the one described in the Circular. In order to ensure its survival it requires an independent staff unit devoted to evaluation and reporting to a deputy minister, it needs to be integrated into the overall management process of government, and the emphasis has to be placed on the use of evaluations for planning at the central agency level. However, if one
believes that evaluation cannot serve strategic planning, then these changes wrought by the OCG amount to "overkill" in order to ensure the organizational survival of a program evaluation function and the central agency responsible for it. This "overkill" may have been necessary to establish even systematic evaluation for operational decision-making. This may be a significant contribution but it may also raise high expectations which the function cannot fulfill. The inevitable question will be asked. Are the results worth the costs?

This somewhat tedious tracing of the development of program evaluation in the federal government is necessary to demonstrate the background against which to assess the current function. The next chapter reflects the background of evaluation at the Correctional Service of Canada and sets the stage for the assessment of their program evaluation function in Part II.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER 3


2. Treasury Board of Canada, Guide on the Program Evaluation Function (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), p. 16

3. Ibid., p. 19

4. The Circular is not explicit about what the evaluation of programs involves or how it is to be done. Thus information contained in the Circular has been supplemented by interviews with the authors about their intent for the policy and also with information contained in a draft copy of guidelines which were never published and are not related to the current OCG Guide document. See Treasury Board, "Program Evaluation in the Federal Public Service: Guidelines", Prepared for the Treasury Board Circular 1977-47, an unpublished document, 31 January 1978. Interviews were also held with the authors of the current Guide document. Information from other OCG publications and the writings and speeches of OCG staff have been used to further "flesh out" the current policy. The discussion, although touching on the similarities between the two documents, will focus mainly on the differences between them. A list of interviews conducted for the thesis is given in Appendix A.


9. This was the point of view expressed in interviews. The draft guidelines do, however, mention the consideration of alternative methods of program delivery as an issue in the measurement of program effectiveness.


11. Treasury Board Circular 1977-47, p. 8


16. Secretary of the Treasury Board, Circular No. 1976-25
17. Treasury Board Circular, pp. 5-6
18. Emphasis is on information on operational objectives for program managers, as opposed to information on strategic objectives for the deputy head.
19. Treasury Board Circular 1977-47, p. 6
20. Guide on the Program Evaluation Function, pp. 77-8
21. Ibid., p. 78
22. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 102
25. Ibid., p. 96
26. Ibid., p. 98 The TB as it is known today is a result of the Glassco Commission which recommended that the Board, which was then a part of the Department of Finance, be strengthened by the appointment of a presiding minister without departmental responsibilities.
27. Ibid., p. 100
28. Ibid, p. 54
29. Ibid. p. 46. Note the emphasis on improving operations rather than questioning policy
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 21
33. See Richard French's discussion of the three planning systems in the federal bureaucracy. French, pp. 18-58. See also Doug Hartle's interpretation of planning during this period, in Douglas
34. See the section "Evaluation Experience" in this chapter.


37. The Royal Commission on Government Organization, p. 111


41. H. R. Bails, Management Auditors and Better Government, an address to the Program Management Evaluation Directors' Seminar, May 15, 1973, quoted in Blair, p. 31

42. Blair, p. 32


46. Ibid., p. 35


49. Auditor General Act, 14 July 1977, Section 7(2)(d) and (e)

50. See S. L. Sutherland for a discussion of the influence of PPBS ideas on the Auditor General

51. Treasury Board of Canada, Planning Programming and Budgeting Guide (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) p. 8

52. See, for example, Douglas G. Hartle, "Techniques and Processes of Administration", Canadian Public Administration, Vol 19, No 1 (Spring 1976)


55. Ibid., p. 35. Doug Hartle specifies that Cabinet gave its approval for these evaluations only after much prodding and bargaining. The agreement with Cabinet required the Planning Branch to get departmental approval on the criteria for evaluation which restricted its ability to consider the implicit, as opposed to the stated, objectives of the programs. Douglas G. Hartle, "An open letter to Richard Van Loon", p. 88

56. Ibid., p. 53

57. Ibid.


59. Ibid., p. 2

60. Douglas G. Hartle, "Techniques and processes of administration", p. 27

61. Treasury Board, Performance Measurement A Report to the House of Commons by the President of the Treasury Board (Ottawa: DSS Publishing Centre, November 1977) p. 6


63. President of the Treasury Board, Program Performance Measurement 1979 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1979) p. 7

64. Richard French suggests that the Planning Branch's most important contribution was its role as a funnel into the bureaucracy of outstanding public servants. See French, p. 36

66. French, p. 26


68. Ibid., p. 10

69. Ibid., p. 1

70. Ibid., pp. 11-13

71. Ibid., p. 30.

72. With the exception of the personnel changes which, as will be seen in the section "The role of the Office of the Comptroller General" did occur very abruptly.

73. See G. Bruce Doern and Richard W. Phidd, p. 239 and pp. 250-2


77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., pp. 24-5

79. Ibid., pp. 27-8

80. Ibid., p. 261

81. Ibid., p. 262
82. The Commission's role was to examine structure and process of Parliament. See Peter Aucoin, "Public-Policy Theory and Analysis" in Public Policy in Canada, ed G. Bruce Doern and Peter Aucoin, p. 24.

83. Throne Speech, 4th Session of the 30th Parliament, October 1978

84. One of these reviews was of the penitentiary system, carried out by the Sub-Committee on the Penitentiary System in Canada. It will be discussed in Part II of this thesis.

85. Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability, p. 412

86. The committee could call for five evaluations annually, the evaluations were to be carried out by the department involved, and the President of the Treasury Board would be responsible for seeing that they were done.

87. Some background information from the White Paper was also used in the preparation of this legislation.


89. President of the Treasury Board, Accountable Management: A Progress Report to Parliament (Treasury Board of Canada, March 1981) p. 11

90. Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability, p. 261


92. Note that the word 'financial' has been dropped from the document title stressing the shift from purely financial audit to comprehensive operational audit.


94. Guide on the Program Evaluation Function, p. 19 This may amount to the use of semantics to try and establish a difference between two functions which, in reality, cannot be separated.

95. See "Ottawa abandons intent to delay spending reform", Globe and Mail, 9 December 1976, p 1-2 and "Profligacy and Mr. Andreas", Globe and Mail, 10 December 1976, p. 6
96. Interviews indicated that the Government was aware of the Lambert Commission's support for the idea of the establishment of a Comptroller General's position.


99. See S. L. Sutherland, "On the audit trail of the Auditor General; Parliament's servant, 1973-1980", p 632-7 for a critique of criteria used for SPICE.

100. 100th Annual Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, p. 83

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid., p. vi

103. Ibid., p. 79

104. Ibid., p. 83


106. Taken from notes of a Treasury Board presentation on IMPAC

107. 100th Annual Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, p. vii

108. Interviews indicated that the work of the Task Force was, at best, "spotty". The major contributions of the Task Force were the identification of a nucleus of staff for the Program Evaluation Branch of the OCG and the creation of a higher visibility for the function.

109. The initial concern of the OCG has been the establishment of an infrastructure for doing evaluations. Concern for the quality of evaluation work is expected to follow.

110. See, for example, Harry Rogers, "Comments on Program Evaluation in the Federal Government", pp. 10-15

111. For example, because of severe government restraint, the Department
of Fisheries and Environment in 1976 had not been granted by Treasury Board their full resource request for new programs. The department undertook a comprehensive A-base expenditure review in order to identify funds from within existing programs to meet expanding responsibilities in areas such as fisheries jurisdiction and environmental protection. See Treasury Board of Canada, A-Base Expenditure Review (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1978).

112. Douglas Hartle's appropriate analogy on this point is quoted by Harry Rogers in "Comments on Program Evaluation in the Federal Government", p. 11. Hartle is reported to have said "It is the rare dog that will carry the stick with which it is going to be beaten."

CHAPTER 4

Evaluation at the Correctional Service of Canada

Penitentiaries have been in existence in Canada for more than one hundred years. The history of corrections is long and marked by many changes both in the way of life within the institutions and in management style. However, 1978 was a watershed year for the Correctional Service of Canada. That year marked the end of the process of amalgamation of the Canadian Penitentiary Service (CPS) and the National Parole Service (NPS), which had been recently separated from the National Parole Board (NPB), to form an independent correctional agency. In 1976, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs began an inquiry into the penitentiary system, as a result of a period of upheavals in federal institutions in the first half of the 1970's. Its final report (the MacGuigan report) was tabled in Parliament in 1977. Also, late in 1977, the Commissioner of the Correctional Service died suddenly while in office and a new Commissioner was appointed in December of that year.

1978 was the beginning of a period of major reorganizations within the national headquarters and significant changes were made to the management style of the Service.

In his first year as commissioner, Mr Yeomans has concentrated on rebuilding the management of a service that members of Parliament found to be far and inefficient when they toured prisons in 1976 and 1977. The analysis, in this chapter, of evaluative work in the Correctional Service will focus mainly on work that has been done since 1978. Before
looking at the analytical work done at CSC, however, it is necessary to situate this work in terms of the planning function and the organizational structure of the Service.

**Strategic and Operational Plans**

The use of the terms strategic and operational planning was discussed in Chapter 2. This section applies the theoretical definitions to the Correctional Service of Canada and develops the strategic and operational plans from the objectives given for the Service.

The Correctional Service is part of the Ministry of the Solicitor General, which includes also the National Parole Board, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Solicitor General’s secretariat. The Solicitor General is part of the criminal justice system which also includes, at the federal level, the Ministry of Justice. The overall government policy objective for the federal criminal justice system is the protection of the public.\(^3\)

Over the years, the goal of the penitentiary service has reflected, to varying degrees, concern for several different objectives. These include the punishment of wrong-doers, the deterrence of potential criminals, the protection of the public by removing the criminal element from society, the treatment or rehabilitation of the criminal, and the provision of humane conditions for the offender to serve his or her sentence. In addition to these objectives, there has also been a concern for the effective management of the correctional service.

The officially stated objective of the Correctional Service of Canada is "to administer sentences imposed by the courts and to prepare
offenders for their return as useful citizens to the Community.\textsuperscript{4}

During the 1960's much emphasis was placed on the need to rehabilitate inmates to ensure that they not return to a life of crime upon release. In the late 1970's, the Service was influenced greatly by research in the United States which showed that, in spite of the rhetoric, there was no perceptible difference in inmates as a result of the programs offered to them.\textsuperscript{5} As a result, less emphasis was placed on the "rehabilitative model"\textsuperscript{6} and more on what was called the "opportunities model". The slight shift in the goal of the Service was a recognition of the fact that it was necessary for the inmate to want to change before any change could take place. The "rehabilitative model" (which has also been called the "medical model")\textsuperscript{7} implied that inmates could be cured even if they did not desire the change. Now the Service takes responsibility not for the rehabilitation of the inmate but, rather, for providing opportunities to inmates to prepare themselves for their return to the community. However, "providing opportunities" is not a strategy in itself. It is a means to achieving the end goal of the protection of the public.

The strategic plan for CSC, which responds to the overall government policy objective is the protection of the public through the incarceration of offenders during the period of their sentence and the provision of opportunities to offenders to prepare themselves for release in order to protect the public in the longer term.

This two-fold strategic plan is implemented through the overall operational plans of CSC. These have been divided into seven main objectives (or operational plans) which reflect the major activities of
the Service, including planning and management, custody of inmates, education, training and employment of inmates, offender case management, health care, technical services and administration. As an example, the objective for offender case management is as follows:

To prepare offenders for their return to the community as useful citizens, by providing counselling services and opportunities for social, emotional, physical and spiritual development, and by community supervision of offenders on conditional release. To ensure fair and humane treatment of offenders, including recognizing and protecting their rights while under the authority of the Correctional Service.

These operational plans are further broken down into more detailed operational plans for each activity. In the offender case management category a few examples of activities coming under this heading are:

To provide appropriate programs for specialized offender groups including long-term, female, native, extremely young, handicapped and sex offenders.

Or:

Expanding opportunities for private family visiting and increased citizen participation in correctional endeavours.

As an agency of the Solicitor General, CSC submits its strategic plan annually to the Cabinet Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs in a Strategic Overview which is prepared by the Ministry Secretariat to cover all its agencies. In the past few years, references to CSC in the Ministry's Strategic Overviews have been limited to one small reference to the operational objective to provide programs for special offender groups.
Organizational structure

There are three levels of management in the Service—national, regional and institutional/parole district office. National headquarters is responsible for policy development, program implementation, and planning and monitoring procedures (including the evaluation and audit policy). The five regional offices coordinate the implementation of programs at the operational level. Programs are implemented through forty-one institutions, nineteen community correctional centres and seventy-four parole offices.

An organizational chart is given in Appendix B. It shows a "flat" organizational structure. There is only one reporting level between the institutional wardens and the Commissioner. The current Commissioner places great importance on the close links between his office and those at the operational level. All line staff at Headquarters report to the Commissioner through the Senior Deputy Commissioner whereas, the staff functions report through two Deputy Commissioners.

The Commissioner is responsible for the overall management of the Service. The Senior Management Committee (SMC) is the vehicle through which he establishes policy and monitors its implementation. The Committee is made up of the Commissioner, the five Regional Deputy Commissioners and all headquarters Branch heads at the Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner or Director General level. SMC is very active in the day-to-day management of the Service. The Committee meets monthly and weekly conference calls are held between the monthly meetings.

The Executive Committee (ExCom) is made up of the Commissioner
and the four headquarters positions that report directly to him - Senior Deputy Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner (Policy, Planning and Administration), Deputy Commissioner (Communications) and the Inspector General. ExCom meets daily. SMC and ExCom are illustrative of the very consultative management style which the current Commissioner pursues.

The audit and evaluation functions report to the Commissioner through separate channels. The Inspector General acts as an independent watchdog for CSC and his responsibilities include the internal and financial audit functions. The evaluation function is the responsibility of the Director of the Evaluation and Special Projects Division. Although not indicated on the organizational chart, this Director reports to the Commissioner through the Deputy Commissioner, Policy, Planning and Administration.

The research function of the Ministry

A research function was first established within the Secretariat of the Ministry of the Solicitor General in 1973 in a Research Division which serves all agencies of the Ministry by developing, managing and conducting "social science research for use by the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the criminal justice system in general". During the early years, the Division was largely involved in planning the research program but few research activities were undertaken. Since the early 1980's the Division has been more active and the Corrections Research Section has been involved in research on "serious, persistent correctional problems", including prison violence, long-term offenders and determinants of penitentiary populations.
CSC does not do any pure research itself. Relations between the Policy Branch of CSC and the Research Division of the Ministry have largely been informal. A Research Coordinator position has existed in the Offender Programs Branch, but has recently been moved to the Policy, Planning and Administration Branch. This coordinator is responsible for informing the field of the research activities of the Ministry. The emphasis in the research function of the Ministry is on social science research on persistent correctional problems not on the measurement of the outcomes of current correctional programs.

Analysis at the Correctional Service of Canada: a history

From the early 1970's, the National Parole Service (and formerly the NPB) had a small research capacity. The Research and Planning Division of NPS had a nucleus of staff doing analysis and some applied research. At the formation of CSC in 1978, this Division formed the basis of the Planning and Analysis Division within Offender Programs Branch.

Little analysis or research was done at CPS prior to 1978. Some research was done in the mid-1970's by psychologists in the regions. This was largely of an academic nature and was published in academic journals. There was, however, no requirement or mechanism for this research to be sent to headquarters. In addition, there was a small research unit in the Pacific region doing mainly statistical analysis. At headquarters no analysis of any kind was being done. It was reported that, late in 1977, the Service was preparing to embark on a major construction program at a time when headquarters was unaware of how many
cells the Service had on a national level or how many vacancies there were. In an analysis by Leonard Rutman and Dick de Jong, of evaluation work done in selected government departments during the fiscal years 1972-73, 1973-74 and 1974-75, the Commissioner is reported to have stated that no evaluation work had been done but that plans are being considered for the future development within the Penitentiary and Parole Service of a permanent capability for continuous monitoring and appraisal of operations. In addition the OPMS team will be trying to develop new methodologies to measure the effectiveness of our programmes. Treasury Board is favourably disposed to this project, as four man-years have been approved for the 1976-77 budget.  

Although they were not identified by the Commissioner, a few studies to support the operations of particular programs were done by program management.  

In the 1976 Treasury Board study of departmental evaluation activities, five evaluation mechanisms were identified at CPS. The first was a Management Services Branch which was being established independent of line management to "provide a Planning and Evaluation Service, a comprehensive Management Information Data Base, and a management auditing function. The Branch is not yet fully operational, but will be by the end of the current fiscal year". During the research for this thesis no interviewees had any recollection of a Management Services Branch at CPS. Planning was one of the responsibilities of the then Organization and Administration Branch, however, no evaluation service was identified in the Branch. There was no management information available to senior management. The management audit function
identified as being part of the Management Services Branch was, in fact, the responsibility of the Management Review Division which was identified separately in the 1976 study.

The second evaluation activity identified in the study was a Quality Control process established at NPS. It is not clear if this function is the same as that of the Research and Planning Division identified in the interviews.

The third evaluation activity identified was that of the Management Review Division. In 1972, responsibility for the management review function moved from the Ministry to CPS, where a branch, later called the Management Review Directorate, was responsible for the review of "policies and operations, and audits of financial transactions, personnel matters and institutions' security". 24

The fourth evaluation activity is referred to as the "general coordination of policy matters" and covers:

an objective and goal setting procedure along the line of a "Management by Objectives" approach and to use it in association with Program Forecasting procedures... [A policy committee considers] the adequacy of objectives, policies, procedures, internal control, and operating standards. 25

This activity was carried out by both CPS and NPS and related specifically to the amalgamation of the two services. The policy process was not supported, during this period, by any quantitative analysis.

The final evaluation activity identified was that of the Operational Performance Measurement System (OPMS). In 1974 CPS and NPS had set up a joint steering committee to develop an OPMS capability for
the new correctional agency. The system was designed by, and for, operational staff with the intent that the data be aggregated for senior management use. The pilot project set up to implement OPMS became too complicated, and failed to provide any information useful for the measurement of program outcomes. However, information about program outcomes was necessary in light of the Treasury Board requirement that OPMS be used to support program forecasts. This "bottom-up" approach was abandoned late in 1977 just as the major reorganization of the Service was beginning.

As indicated earlier, 1978 was a watershed year for the correctional service. The appointment of the new commissioner began a process of reorganization at headquarters and changes to the management style. The MacGuigan report had identified weaknesses in the policy formulation process of the agency and problems with the relations between staff and line functions in the organization. One of the first acts of the new commissioner was to establish a Policy and Planning Branch at headquarters to strengthen the planning and policy formulation processes in CSC. Two Divisions within this Branch were of particular importance—the Evaluation and Analysis Division and the Special Projects Division. Given the lack of information available to senior management at the time and the fact that the Commissioner had no experience in corrections, it was essential that he establish mechanisms to inform him of what was happening in the field.

The Special Projects Division, at that time, had been alternately referred to as the "Commissioner's dirty laundry list" or the "Commissioner's Gestapo". The Division was created as a management tool
for the Commissioner and was intended to carry out, on an ad-hoc basis, special projects which did not fit anywhere else or crossed established Branch or Regional lines. The first director of the Division was appointed from the Temporary Assignment Pool of TB and the staff was small. However, the Division was able to contract out much of the work, or make use of people seconded from within CSC. A review of the activities of the Policy and Planning Branch during its first year of operation reflected the positive impact of the Special Projects Division in the statement that "the Commissioner has accepted the recommendations of the studies undertaken and has expressed satisfaction as to the quality of the work". An analysis of some of the work done by the Special Projects Division will be presented in Chapter 7.

CSC's first formal response to the TB Circular on policy relating to the evaluation of programs came with the establishment of the Evaluation and Analysis Division in the fall of 1978. The Division was created to:

provide coordinated program evaluation criteria and plans for CSC, performance measurement specifications, mathematical analysis as required to support Commissioner and SMC decisions, and statistical data to support Commissioner and Ministerial arguments before central agencies, parliamentary committees and Parliament itself.

The Evaluation and Analysis Division was in existence for only just over one year and during that time, the Division had but a skeletal staff. Of the ten staff positions identified only two were filled, and the Division had to rely on outside consultants for the bulk of the work.

On the analysis side, two major contributions were the estab-
lishment of the Project Review System (a system to allow for the review of projects on a regular basis by SMC), and the beginning of the Commissioner's Facts Book, providing data about the operations of the Service, aggregated for the use of senior management.

The major contribution on the evaluation side was the development of a policy and schedule for evaluation and the identification of program components. Late in 1978, consultants were retained to develop a framework for program evaluation at CSC and a plan for the implementation of the framework. Their mandate also included the development of a plan for a performance measurement system. Their goal was to establish:

- how a control mechanism can be developed in CSC that will provide top management with information, at suitable frequency, on the efficiency with which programs are managed and their effectiveness in meeting their own and other more general government objectives.

The consultants' report identified two ways to divide the operational programs of CSC into components for evaluation. The first, "vertical" programs, was based on the existing activity structure used for program- ming and budgeting. For example, program components would include: security, inmate employment, inmate affairs, and social and community programs. The second, "horizontal" programs, was based on categories of inmates; for example, female offenders, sex offenders, native offenders and drug offenders. The recommendation of the consultants was that CSC adopt a component structure that would be a combination of the two approaches. Some of the other recommendations of the report related to the organizational arrangements necessary for the program evaluation function. These included the establishment of an Evaluation Division,
independent of the program area, with a Director who, on evaluation-related matters, should report directly to the Commissioner.

At the time the report was completed, CSC was involved with the Task Force on Program Evaluability established by the Office of the Comptroller-General late in 1978. A consultant with the Task Force, working at CSC, developed component profiles based on the "vertical" programs identified in the consultants' report. This division of CSC activities was seen to be more practical since it was compatible with the existing planning components and, hence, cost units.32

The Evaluation and Analysis Division did begin some evaluation work but no studies were completed. The small staff of the Division spent their time coordinating the evaluation work being done either by the program branches or outside consultants. Evaluations of both Medical Services and Food Services were started but not completed.

An additional contribution to the evaluation process by the Division was the identification of CSC major objectives and performance indicators for use in the on-going monitoring of program outcomes.33 Unlike the earlier attempt to establish OPMS, this was based on a "top-down" approach and formed the basis of the current performance measurement system which supplies monthly information to senior management on the operations of the Service.

In addition to the two Divisions in the Policy and Planning Branch, the Division of Offender Programs was involved in evaluative work. The Planning and Analysis Division was responsible for management information on offender programs, and was doing some mini-evaluations,
or studies which were designed to be preparatory tools for evaluation.\textsuperscript{34}

In late 1979 and early 1980, a small reorganization took place within headquarters. The Evaluation and Analysis Division of Policy and Planning Branch was split. Analysis became the Program Analysis Division of the Finance Branch and evaluation was attached to the Special Projects Division. There appear to be two reasons for this move. The Special Projects Division, in its first two years of operation, had been involved in work which was evaluative in nature,\textsuperscript{35} whereas Evaluation and Analysis had not actually completed any evaluation work, nor did it have the staff capability to do so. The second reason was that the new Director, recently appointed to the Special Projects Division, was interested in evaluative work. As one interviewee suggested, it is always wise to put a dog into a house that likes dogs.

An additional reorganization involved the dismantling of the Planning and Analysis Division of Offender Programs. This was a recognition of the fact that evaluation was to cover more than the activities of one program branch and was intended to be a staff function, independent of line management. Two of the staff members went to the Analysis Division in Finance and the other two joined what was now called the Evaluation and Special Projects Division.

\textbf{Analysis at the Correctional Service of Canada: the current situation}

The current evaluation function at CSC can be fruitfully examined using the framework proposed by Rogers, Ulrich and Traversy on the state of evaluation in Canadian government.\textsuperscript{36} The implicit definition of evaluation used by these authors is the assessment of "proposed
and existing programs in terms of their likely or demonstrated performance and achievements so as to direct or redirect programs toward greater efficiency and effectiveness. Their framework identifies three classes of management issues in the federal government. The issues arising at the government-wide level are program design and resource allocation, and resource management and control. The third issue concerns program management in departments. Different evaluation functions are identified which serve each of these management issues by providing information either on program results or on program operations.

The eight evaluation functions which the authors identify are as follows: strategic planning, program evaluation, policy reviews and operational planning — all of which provided information on program results — and performance measurement, internal audit, A-base review and management review — which provide information on program operations. The classification of these functions is shown in Figure 4-1. With the exception of the program evaluation function, which is discussed in detail in following chapters, each of these functions will be discussed in terms of the definition used by Rogers et al. and the extent to which the function is carried out at CSC.

Strategic planning involves:

the delineation of alternative general courses of action and the selection of the one course of action to be followed...based on an analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency of current activities, the evolving social and economic context in which activities are conducted, and the evolving objectives and priorities of government.

Although not evaluative functions by the definition used for this
**FIGURE 4-1**

Evaluation Function by Level of Management (Federal Government)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Level of management</th>
<th>Evaluation functions</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Program results</td>
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<td>Program operations</td>
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Government-wide processes:

- Program design and resource allocation
  - Strategic overview
  - Program evaluation
  - Policy reviews*
- Resource management and control
  - Operational plans
  - Program evaluation

Program management in departments

- Strategic planning
- Program evaluation
- Operational planning
- Performance measurement
- Internal audit
- Management review*

* identifies those evaluative functions which are conducted as ad-hoc studies

thesis, both strategic and operational planning have been included in this outline of evaluation functions because Rogers et al. emphasizes the fact that planning involves the evaluation and selection of alternatives on the basis of expected results.

Strategic planning at CSC involves:

- the establishment of the department's role, its long-term objectives and the departmental strategies, policies and programs, which meet these objectives. It is concerned with ensuring that the department's planning contributes to the development of, and remains responsive to, government policy and direction.  

The annual focus of strategic planning is found in the Strategic Overviews prepared for the policy committees of Cabinet. CSC's input to the Strategic Overview of the Ministry of the Solicitor-General is prepared by the Policy and Planning Branch but, as indicated earlier, little evidence of CSC strategic plans has been included in the past few years. CSC, as an operational department, engages in little strategic planning because, as a result of both the mandate of the Service and the highly sensitive nature of its environment, there are few options as to how it can respond to the overall government objective of the protection of the public. Most of the alternatives it does have appear at the operational planning level.

As indicated in the framework, the Strategic Overview is concerned with program results and provides an input to the program design and resource allocation function on a government-wide level.
through the Cabinet Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs. The on-going function of strategic planning, which is also concerned with program results but serves program management within the department, focuses on what the characteristics of the service should be in the long-term. This function is reflected annually in a major planning document, *CSC Direction*, which "communicates the scope, spirit and thrust of CSC activities over the next five years". The document focuses on the identification of the operational plans (or as one senior manager referred to them, "sub-sets of the strategic plan") to carry out the strategic plan of CSC. One current "sub-set of the strategic plan", which is highlighted in the document, is the development of higher professional qualifications among staff within the institutions in the next five to ten years. Since alternative strategic plans are limited for CSC, the focus of strategic planning has been on what could be more correctly called long-term operational planning.

One mechanism created by CSC to provide input into strategic planning is the Strategic Planning Committee. This advisory committee, which was established in 1979, is made up of ten people from the correctional field outside CSC and has a mandate "to assist CSC in proactive planning by estimating the probability of future events and conditions in criminal justice and related fields and analyzing their impact on CSC on various time horizons up to 15-20 years." The Committee advises on both strategic and long-range planning. In its first report, the Committee identified four criminal justice models and evaluated each on the extent to which it met the overall goal of the justice system of the protection of the public and on the levels of intervention and resources.
required to operate the model. This is strategic planning by the
definition developed in Chapter 2. However, the Committee also engages
in long-range planning through its forecasting of the effects of changes
in the social and cultural environment on the current operations of CSC.

Policy reviews are "occasional studies carried out under

cabinet direction to assess the appropriateness of government objectives
and approaches to these objectives through programming". No Cabinet
directed policy reviews were identified at CSC. This is not surprising
because CSC is an agency of the Ministry of the Solicitor General, whose
responsibilities include policy review. Within CSC, an on-going policy
review process, for the use of SMC, is carried out by the Policy Divi-

dision.

Operational planning, as defined by Rogers et al., involves:
"the selection of particular targets to be achieved and outputs to be
produced". At CSC, operational planning is the responsibility of the
Operational Planning Division and involves:

the development of program plans and the assign-
ment of resources to carry out the strategies,
policies and programs developed and approved in
the strategic planning process. Operational
planning, in its most detailed stage, specifies
the results anticipated, the goals to be
achieved and the associated costs.

Although operational planning is an on-going function, the annual review
of this planning function is contained in the Multi-Year Operational
Plan which is presented to Treasury Board each spring. The Operational
Planning Division is in the process of developing, for all CSC activi-
ties, statements of anticipated results which it will then monitor.
Operational plans are concerned with both program results and operations and serve both the resource management and control function on a government-wide level, through Treasury Board, and departmental program management.

As indicated earlier, prior to 1978, there was no formal analysis at all being done at CSC headquarters. Since that time, it is the performance measurement function at headquarters which has developed the most. Performance measurement is "the regular collection of information on program operations, outputs and measures of efficiency." As noted above, the earlier attempt to develop a "bottom-up" approach to performance measurement failed. With the appointment of the new Commissioner, a "top-down" approach to performance measurement developed two distinct levels of performance measurement - information for program managers and information for senior management.

Information for program managers is collected regularly by program branches at headquarters. For example, the Offender Programs Branch has an Operations and Quality Control Division responsible for monitoring various aspects of the programs offered to inmates both within institutions and in the community. In some cases this information may be aggregated for presentation to senior management.

The preparation of performance measurement information for senior management is largely the responsibility of the Program Analysis Division of the Finance Branch. The Division is concerned with the measurement of economy and efficiency in the Service and to monitor these it develops indicators of performance which are reported monthly in an "Operational Information Report" to SMC and are used in the pre-
sentation of Part III of the Estimates for CSC. Much emphasis has been placed on cost per unit measures, through an Offender Based Cost Reporting System, but the information covers all aspects of the operations of the Service. More detailed information about costs is presented in the "Cost of Maintaining Offenders" report prepared by the Operational Performance Analysis Unit of Finance Branch.

Rogers et al. argue that since the collection of information does not, in itself, constitute evaluation, its importance as an evaluation function lies in the fact that "it is the primary source of information for most evaluative functions". At CSC, program analysis "provides for the linkage between ongoing operations and the setting and achievement of objectives and priorities". In this way, performance measurement serves the planning functions identified in the framework. However, the information aggregated by the Program Analysis Division has not been useful to the program evaluation function. Interviews indicate that this is largely because the information collected does not address questions of program effectiveness in meeting the CSC objective of returning useful citizens to the community.

The internal audit function at CSC has also developed considerably since 1978. Roger et al. define internal audit as a staff function which:

focuses on operations rather than programs and is concerned with assessing the extent of operational compliance with legislation and central agency and departmental directives...it examines the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of internal management practices and controls.

At CSC, internal audit is the responsibility of the Management
Review Directorate of the Inspector General's Branch. The position of Inspector General was established in 1978 as result of a recommendation in the MacGuigan report\textsuperscript{52} and since it reports directly to the Commissioner, it has a very high profile within the Service. Officially stated, the Inspector General's Branch manages an independent review program to determine the effectiveness of all CSC operational policies and organizational units...conducts functional and management reviews or audits to ensure compliance with Government and Service policies, directives and guidelines.\textsuperscript{53}

Reviews of all organizational units are done cyclically on a two to five year cycle and cover the efficiency and effectiveness of operations. An audit of an institution takes about five weeks to complete. In recent years, much of the compliance auditing has been delegated to the regions. It is important in the headquarters audit only in areas where it affects operational efficiency or effectiveness.

In the Rogers et al. framework, internal audit is concerned with program operations and serves only departmental program management whereas program evaluation addresses questions about program results that are of concern to both departmental program management and government-wide processes. There would appear to be some overlap between the internal audit and program evaluation functions at CSC. For example, the question of whether a service could best be provided by being contracted out or done in-house is a valid question for both the internal auditors and the program evaluators. Certain areas of overlap are recognized by the OCG.\textsuperscript{54} There has been some sharing of person-year resources between the two functions, but it has been a one-way flow from
the Evaluation and Special Projects Division to the Management Review Directorate.55

A-base review is "a one-time intensive overall review of on-going activities of a department or agency with the objective of freeing up resources assigned to low priority activities in order to reallocate resources to new demands".56 Only a limited number of A-base reviews have been conducted in the federal government in the last few years and none has been carried out at CSC.

Management review should not be confused with the Management Review Directorate at CSC which is, in fact, doing internal audit. Management review is part of a manager's job which involves "a wide range of monitoring and problem-solving activities designed to ensure that operations are functioning satisfactorily".57 It is described as an ad-hoc function addressing questions of program operations of concern to departmental program management.

At CSC, there are two activities involved in management review to serve senior management. One is an on-going function - the special projects component of Evaluation and Special Projects Division. The second is an ad-hoc function.

Since the creation of the Special Projects Division (later the Evaluation and Special Projects Division) in 1978, it has undertaken over two hundred projects which span all aspects of the Service's operations, concentrating largely on activities which cut across organizational boundaries. The projects, generally initiated by senior management,58 have considered such matters as inter-regional transfers, a
comparative analysis of regional headquarters, an analysis of workloads in institutions, the drafting of a contracting out guidelines manual and a regional transportation study. In addition to its evaluative function as a management review group, the Division has also been involved in the implementation of pilot projects which, if successful, have been taken over by the appropriate functional branch - for example, the private family visiting program and the development of a new inmate pay system.

Rogers et al. suggest that, although the need for management review will be reduced as performance measurement systems are developed, there will always be a need for some form of ad-hoc review. This view was expressed in a number of interviews at CSC. At one time it was felt that the need for the Special Projects Division would diminish once the Commissioner had been in office for a while and had been able to establish suitable performance measurement systems. Yet this has not proved to be the case to date. The Division continues to be a catch-all for analysis that does not appear to fit anywhere else. In addition, the Division has served as a pool of person-year resources, to be allocated by senior management, to other staff and operational areas of the Service.

The ad-hoc management review function is one that is used to deal with perceived problems which require greater independence or expertise than can be obtained within the staff branches. Recent violence in Ontario region institutions prompted the establishment of a special committee to prepare a "Study on Inmate Murders and Serious Assaults on Inmates in the Ontario Region." The committee is made up
of the Chairman of the Strategic Planning Committee, an institutional psychologist and a former member of the RCMP. Pressure from the public required the establishment of a committee that would be perceived to be more independent of line management than the permanent evaluation functions at CSC.

The framework proposed by Roger et al. appears to cover all the evaluation functions at CSC. It identifies functions to serve both government-wide processes and departmental program management. Policy and A-base review, as defined in the framework, are non-existent at CSC. The extent to which program evaluation serves either government-wide processes or program management in the Service will be the subject of subsequent chapters. Strategic planning is limited by the lack of options that CSC has to meet the overall government objective of the protection of the public. What is called strategic planning at CSC is really long-term operational planning for the use of the department. Operational planning, for the short term, and performance measurement are well-developed functions in the Service. Performance measurement, since it provides information on security incidents and escape rates, serves to evaluate the extent to which CSC is meeting the overall government objective of protecting the public through incarceration. As such, it serves government-wide processes. Limited information is available through the performance measurement function about the extent to which the Service is meeting the second part of its objective—preparing inmates for their return to the community as useful citizens.

Performance measurement, internal audit and the management review func-
tions provide evaluative information on the operations of programs for the use of departmental management. Little information is generated through internal audit and management review about the results of programs.

All the functions described above existed within the Service when the program evaluation function was established in 1980. From the analysis it is clear that the major gap in the information requirements of both the department and government-wide processes was, prior to 1980, in the area of the evaluation of program results with respect to the second part of the objective of CSC – the preparation of inmates for return to the community. An analysis of the extent to which program evaluation has been able to fill this gap is the subject of the rest of the thesis.

An interview with one member of senior management brought to light the expectation that evaluation would serve to identify problems within the Service which had not, as yet, been perceived. There are ample mechanisms for dealing with perceived problems – notably the special projects component of the Evaluation and Special Projects Division. The orientation for program evaluation, suggested in this interview, would steer it, not so much towards the measurement of program results for use at a government-wide level, but rather towards the measurement of program operations for use within the Service. The extent to which this orientation has had an impact on the development of the function will be seen in later chapters.
Constraints on evaluation in a correctional setting

Throughout the interviews with correctional staff, a number of characteristics of the organization and of the correctional setting were perceived to act as constraints on the ability to do program evaluation.

Correctional agencies are operations of long standing - in Canada federal correctional institutions have been in operation for over one hundred years, providing fundamentally the same service for that length of time. Many myths and much conventional wisdom about the Service, the inmates and the staff have developed over the years. The existence of these preconceived notions makes it particularly important to evaluate correctional programs from an independent perspective.

Since some basic programs have been in operation for a long time, it is often hard to convince program managers of the benefits of an evaluation of something which has "always been done that way".

The immediate client for correctional programs is the inmate and the choice of client is beyond the control of the correctional agency. Inmates do not volunteer to come to prison. The client is determined by the police and the courts and the correctional agency has no control over the type or number of inmates in institutions. The fact that a correctional program is imposed on the inmate may make the measurement of program impacts more difficult because the inmate is likely to be uncooperative.

Partially as a result of the length of time correctional agencies have been in existence and partially because of the development of social science in the sixties, the feeling arises that correctional programs are being "researched to death". This, combined with a feeling
that "nothing works" leads to a certain lack of enthusiasm for yet another evaluative mechanism.

The lack of "hard data" was perceived as a problem in the correctional setting although many people recognized that hard data could be collected given sufficient commitment to and resources for the evaluation function. However, the problem of attribution remains. Attribution is a problem in the measurement of any social program. However, given the fact that the correctional agency impacts on the whole of an inmate's life it becomes very difficult to attribute any impact to a particular correctional program. There are many technical difficulties inherent in the measurement of program impact in a correctional setting but these were generally not perceived by those interviewed at CSC.

CSC is a highly decentralized operation. Institutions, correctional centres and parole offices are spread over a very wide area. Within a decentralized operation it is more difficult to get programs implemented uniformly, a fact complicating further the evaluation process. In addition, CSC has adopted a very consultative management style to deal with the problems of decentralization. For the evaluation process to take into account the concerns of line management requires considerable time-consuming and difficult consultation. Since senior management at CSC is defined as being the Senior Management Committee, which includes representatives from all the regions, even the identification of the concerns of senior management involves a lot of consultation. This consultation, while it increases
the likelihood that the evaluation will provide meaningful information, slows down the evaluation process and makes it more difficult. Aaron Wildavsky states that "decentralization further deepens the potential conflict between evaluators and program managers. Decentralization... means that field officers diverge considerably in their ways of implementing national programs".64

The two-fold objective of CSC is made up to two inherently conflicting goals. Providing programs to inmates to prepare them for release into the community may jeopardize certain security aspects of incarceration. On the other hand, the conditions of incarceration itself may be a detriment to the inmate's ability to adapt to the community on release. This compounds the problem of finding suitable measures to evaluate the impact of any given program.

CSC is a very high profile organization. Security incidents are reported widely in the press. There are many interest groups which are associated with the correctional field at all levels - inmate associations, associations for offenders' families, groups to help inmates on release such as the Elizabeth Fry and John Howard Societies and citizens' rights groups, to name a few. It is indicative of the high profile of CSC that both the Inspector General, the "watch-dog" of the organization, and the Deputy Commissioner for Communications report directly to the Commissioner. This high profile has produced a reluctance to interview people outside CSC during the course of an evaluation. The feeling was expressed that if you start asking questions, lobby groups tend to assume that the program is going to be altered or cut and thus they react prematurely. This limits the ability of the
evaluation process to base its findings on external sources of information and, hence, limits the validity of the findings.

In addition to a reluctance to question outsiders about correctional programs, there has also been a reluctance to interview inmates. This arises partly from the myths about inmates and staff that were discussed above. Some expressed the opinion that inmates are unreliable witnesses of the impact of a program and that they are chronic complainers. An additional difficulty in interviewing inmates arises from the fact that lower level correctional staff and their unions object to inmates being asked to testify to the impact of a program unless they also are consulted. In other social programs, an evaluator can survey clients without surveying the lower level of program delivery staff but, because of the proximity of staff and clients, this is difficult to do in the correctional setting.

A reluctance was expressed to the use of experimental designs in evaluation which assign inmates randomly to experimental and control groups. This reluctance arises from the moral and political objections that it is both unfair, and perceived to be unfair, to fail to offer the same treatment to all inmates.

The final perceived problem in doing evaluations at CSC is related to the high profile of the organization. As a result of this high profile, a large number of inspection mechanisms have been set in place to ensure accountability within the organization. Staff feel that they are continually being scrutinized by somebody—from the Auditor General to the Inspector General, from Citizen Advisory Committees to
inmate committees, and from Regional management inspections to wardens' inspections. The distinction between all these processes and the program evaluation function is not clear in the minds of line management. Program evaluation is perceived as "just another person looking over your shoulder" and this impacts on the level of cooperation the function receives from line management. Line resistance to evaluation is a problem in many departments - at CSC it is compounded by the number of other inspection processes within the Service.

This brief summary of the perceived constraints of the correctional organization and setting provides background information for the analysis of the evaluation work that has been done at CSC. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will present an analysis of this work and show how the constraints have affected the evaluation process.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER 4

1. See the report of the Sub-Committee on the Penitentiary System for a detailed history of correctional institutions in Canada. Sub-Committee on the Penitentiary System, Report of Parliament (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1977) pp. 11-17

2. "Penitentiaries commissioner sees no benefits only higher costs in building smaller prisons", Globe and Mail, Toronto, 1 Jan 1979, p. 9

3. This corresponds to Bruce Doorn and Richard Phidd's "specific objectives". See their discussion of the three levels of normative public policy content. G. Bruce Doorn and Richard W. Phidd, Canadian Public Policy: Ideas, Structure, Process (Toronto: Methuen Press, 1983) pp. 50-9


5. See Douglas Lipton, Robert Martinson and Judith Wilks, The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment (New York: Praeger, 1975)


7. See Conrad's explanation of why this is a misnomer. Ibid., p. 11

8. Solicitor General of Canada, Solicitor General Annual Report 1982-1983 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1984) pp 57-8 An eighth objective - staff training and development is sometimes added. This reflects the current concern for improving the quality of correctional staff. See also Correctional Service of Canada, CSC Direction (Ottawa: Policy, Planning and Administration Branch, February 1984) pp. 50-1


10. Ibid., p. 64

11. Ibid., p. 65

12. All the information about the organizational structure is taken from Solicitor General Annual report 1982-1983, p. 57

13. The exception is the Inspector-General who reports directly to the Commissioner.


17. For example, a study of parole prediction devices and an inventory of community resources. The work did not have a great impact because of lack of senior level commitment to the activities of the Division.


20. For example, a cost benefit analysis of regional laundry operations (including a comparison with alternatives) was completed in April 1976. See *Study on Regional Laundries*, Project No. 74, CPS, 1976. Also, Thomas W. Whipple and James G. Goodale, Joyceville Industries Pilot Project Evaluation, Study conducted for the Canadian Penitentiary Service, September 1978


22. Ibid., p. 120

23. See the discussion in Chapter 5 of the problems experienced with "organizational memory".

27. Chapter 7 presents a detailed analysis of the organization of the Special Projects Division.
29. Evaluation Review of the Policy and Planning Branch, p. 15
30. Hickling and Johnston Management Consultants, Evaluation and Management Control in the CSC, 4 April 1979, p. 3 The report stresses the use of evaluation for the purpose of accountability in keeping with thrust of policy issued by the Treasury Board a year earlier.
31. In addition to the operational programs other areas of management concern, such as management and staff support functions, were also identified but are not discussed here.
32. A more detailed discussion of program components is presented in Chapter 6.
33. Evaluation Review of the Policy and Planning Branch, p. 17
34. For example, an inventory of all Branch services and programs and a review of the inmate community assessment process. See Solicitor General of Canada, Solicitor General Annual report 1978-1979 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1979) p. 156
35. A more detailed discussion of this follows in Chapter 6.
37. Ibid., p. 371
38. Ibid., p. 375
40. Correctional Service of Canada, CSC Direction (Ottawa: Policy, Planning and Administration Branch, February 1984) Preface
41. Ibid., pp. 50-1
42. The Committee has a full-time Chairman and one staff person who are paid by CSC.


44. Ibid., pp. 4-34

45. Rogers, Ulrich and Traversy, p. 377

46. Ibid.

47. Policy, Planning and Administration: CSC Planning Manual, Subject 8, p. 1

48. Rogers, Ulrich and Traversy, p. 377

49. Ibid., p. 378

50. Policy, Planning and Administration: CSC Planning Manual, Subject 14.2, p. 3

51. Rogers, Ulrich and Traversy, p. 378

52. Sub-Committee on the Penitentiary System in Canada, Report to Parliament, p. 81-2

53. Policy, Planning and Administration: CSC Planning Manual, Subject 14.1, p. 2


55. A more detailed discussion of the relationship between program evaluation and audit at CSC will be presented in Chapter 7.

56. Rogers, Ulrich and Traversy, p. 378

57. Ibid., p. 379

58. One former Director of the Division suggested that initially the Division was very proactive and anticipated problems for management, but that in recent years it has become more reactive. See Michael J. Prince and John A. Chenier, "The rise and fall of policy planning and research units: an organizational perspective" in Canadian Public Administration, Vol 23, No 4 (Winter 1980) for a discussion of the importance of initiative in establishing a policy unit's profile.
59. A number of the projects undertaken were evaluations by the definition outlined in Chapter 2 and will be included in the inventory of evaluation work in Chapter 6.

60. Rogers, Ulrich and Traversy, p. 379


62. See Lipton, Martinson and Wilks


65. For another perspective on the special characteristics of the criminal justice system, see Irvin Waller, p. 204-50
PART II

CHAPTER 5

Determining the Utility of Program Evaluation for Strategic Planning: a methodology

As we have seen in Part I, a central purpose of the program evaluation function as it is currently defined by the Office of the Comptroller General (OCG) is to serve strategic as well as operational planning. That is, it is intended to answer questions about the link between program impacts and overall government policy. The purpose of this case study of the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) is to analyze the extent to which evaluation at CSC has been successful in serving strategic planning. To do that, this chapter will present a methodology or conceptual framework to help analyze and assess the utility of program evaluation for strategic planning.

Michael J. Prince in Policy Advice and Organizational Survival, discusses the traditional meaning of the success of policy analysis:

The conventional view of the impact of research, evaluation and other forms of policy advice emphasizes a policy making or problem solving approach. Impact, according to this view, is the immediate and direct application of research study findings to policy formulation, programme implementation, or to solve a specific problem:¹

Prince goes on to point out that this view is inadequate for a number of reasons. It "overlooks the politics of the policy process", "contains unrealistic notions of the extent of rationality possible in policy research and advice" and "overlooks the gradual impact of research on the attitudes and beliefs of policy makers and administrators".²
were to look only for immediate impacts to measure the success of evaluation work, it is unlikely one would find many success stories.

It is necessary, therefore, to define more realistic criteria for success in evaluation. The literature review in Chapter 2 identified three conflicting components of evaluation in a self-evaluating organization and the demands which each made on the evaluation work. The influence of social science research methods requires that evaluations be methodologically sound, valid and reliable. The needs of the decision-making process require information which is timely, appropriate and useful. The imperatives of the bureaucratic setting require that results of evaluation work contribute to the survival and promotion of the evaluation unit. These suggest three categories of criteria for measuring the success of an evaluation unit—criteria about the technical competence of the work, criteria about the usefulness of the work and criteria about organizational survival. Prince, in his analysis of policy planning and research units in Britain, identified three similar categories of criteria—"criteria about the work itself" (technical); "criteria about the unit as an organization" (organizational) and finally "criteria that deal with the effect of a unit's work on its environment" (environmental). Each of these three categories of criteria is necessary, but not by itself sufficient, condition for success in evaluation work. In order to be successful, an evaluation unit must balance all three.

It is essential that the organizational criteria be met to ensure successful evaluations. Michael J. Prince and John A. Chenier stress the importance of organizational politics to explain the rise and
fall of policy planning and research units in Ottawa. Their analysis focuses principally on two aspects of organizational structure and behaviour - degree of initiative and visibility of the unit - whereas this analysis will also include a consideration of the organizational location of the unit, relations with line and other staff functions, adequacy of resources, and role perceptions and skills of staff. Arnold J. Meltsner, in his book Policy Analysts in the Bureaucracy discusses not only the importance of the bureaucratic context, but also its influence on the type of analysis that is produced. The impact of these organizational criteria will be reflected in the discussion of both the technical and environmental criteria.

Realization of the technical criteria is also a necessary condition for a successful evaluation. Unless evaluations are timely, relevant and methodologically sound, they are unlikely to be useful in that they are unlikely to provide "good" or "correct" advice. Michael Quinn Patton, in his book Utilization-focused Evaluation, states that "evaluation research is not useful because it is information. Government may well have too much irrelevant, trivial and useless information... in political practice, decisionmakers are anxious to have relevant information that will reduce the uncertainties they face".

Satisfaction of the environmental criteria is another essential condition for successful evaluation. The environmental impact of an evaluation may range from a major, measurable program change to an imperceptible change in attitude. Although having the results of a study translated into a program change is the conventional view of
impact, this is not always the case. Creating an awareness of other program alternatives or reducing programming uncertainty may not have an immediate impact but may bear fruit at some future date. Patton concluded from his study that "there are few major, direction-changing decisions in most programming, and that evaluation research is used as one piece of information that feeds into a slow, evolutionary process of program development." This concept of evaluation impact takes into account the political context of the evaluation process.

The organizational, technical and environmental criteria developed for the analysis of the evaluation function at CSC are given in Figure 5-1. Program evaluation may be called successful if it serves either operational or strategic planning. However, it is the contention of this thesis that, although the link to strategic planning is a key feature of the function as currently defined by the OCG, program evaluation at CSC has been more successful in serving operational planning than strategic planning. The criteria for success have been developed with this hypothesis in mind. It will be helpful here to highlight those criteria which can be considered indicators of the usefulness of evaluations to strategic planning.

Among the organizational criteria, a key criterion is the relationship of the evaluation unit to the client. For evaluations to be useful to strategic planning, the unit must have a direct reporting relationship and enjoy good access to the program manager responsible for strategic planning within the department. The relationship must be stronger than that existing between the unit and line management in order that the concerns of operational planning not outweigh those of
strategic planning. In addition, the evaluation unit must have good working relations and high credibility with central agencies. Strategic planning in government involves, in part, the "selling" of department programs to central agencies and Cabinet. The evaluation information necessary to support this must be credible to those involved in approving a department's programs. Sufficient resources, in terms of money and personnel, must be allocated to the unit to allow it to do the comprehensive evaluation necessary to demonstrate the links between program impacts and government policy.

Among the technical criteria, those relating to the nature of the evaluation are indicators of its usefulness to strategic planning. R. Dobell and D. Zussman\(^8\) make a distinction between evaluations that are formative - designed to provide feedback to the deputy minister and line management on the design and operation of a program - and summative - designed to assess the degree of success of the program in meeting given policy objectives. In order for an evaluation to be useful to strategic planning it must be summative since it must measure the program's effectiveness in meeting not only program objectives but also the overall government policy objectives. To do this, it must clearly articulate the program objectives, demonstrate a plausible link between them and the overall policy objective and discuss the underlying assumptions upon which the link is based.

The key environmental criteria are the nature of the study conclusions or recommendations and the impact that they have on the senior management of the department. In order to be useful to strategic
planning, the study conclusions or recommendations must address the link between program impacts and government policy. They must question the raison d’etre of the program. Even if the evaluation is unable to measure the effectiveness of the program in meeting government objectives, the findings should address questions of program mandate and objectives, the plausibility of the link between identified impacts and policy, program alternatives or program continuity. These issues are of interest to senior management and if the evaluation has an impact on decision-making at this level, and not simply at the level of program "fine-tuning", it is serving strategic planning.

The extent to which these three categories of criteria have been met at CSC, will be examined through an analysis of the organizational profile of the evaluation unit (Chapter 6), an analysis of the inventories of evaluation work done (Chapter 7) and finally, case studies of selected evaluation works (Chapter 8).

The profile of the Evaluation and Special Projects Division (E&SP) will focus on the organizational criteria. This analysis covers the period from January 1980, when evaluation became the responsibility of E&SP, until March 1984 when the research was completed. Information was obtained through structured interviews with current and former officers of the unit, including the directors and the project managers. Of the ten people identified by the Director of E&SP as having been involved in evaluation work, nine were interviewed. The interview guide which was used is given in Appendix C. In addition, unstructured interviews were held with three program managers, three of the five members of the Executive Committee, and the OOG liaison officer respon-
sible for CSC.\textsuperscript{11} Additional information about the organization of the unit was obtained from ES&P files and observations of the functioning of the unit.

Inventories of evaluation studies and assessments were compiled to analyze the extent to which the technical criteria had been met. The inventories cover evaluation work done in ES&P since January 1978 and, as such, they include work done under the rubrics of both special projects and evaluation.\textsuperscript{12} To be included in the inventory, a study had to have as its primary purpose the assessment of the impact of an intervention by CSC on inmates or on the community. The definition was constructed so as to be wide enough to include all the work recognized by ES&P and the OCG as being evaluations, without being so wide as to include all of the over two hundred analyses done as special projects.

The inventory includes only ex-post evaluations and therefore, excludes any analysis done of the impacts of a proposed program, for example, the analysis of a proposed decentralized classification system. Studies had to include some assessment of the impact of the program either by the identification or measurement of impact. Studies which were purely descriptive were not included; for example, a comparative analysis of regional offices was not included because it provided no assessment of impact. The impact identified had to be on either inmates or the community, not just on the organization. A study of the regional transportation was excluded because it measured impact on vehicle usage, not on the inmate.\textsuperscript{13} The term "intervention" specifies that the anal-
ysis had to be of something actually initiated by CSC, not just experienced by the organization. This excluded, for example, an analysis of self-mutilation in institutions.

The studies were identified through a review, with E&SP staff, of the list of current E&SP files. Where there was doubt about whether or not to include the study, the file was consulted and the report skimmed. The assessments were all done under the rubric of evaluation and all those identified by the evaluation unit were included. The extent to which the inventories of studies and assessments reflect all of the work done in the Division is discussed in Chapter 7.

Most of the information for the inventories was taken from the reports of the studies and assessments. However, this information was supplemented with information from E&SP files and from discussions with project managers. Throughout the research the problem of "organizational memory" was constantly experienced. Arnold J. Meltsner identifies this problem as one of the limitations of knowledge: "both organizations and their analysts have poor memories. They forget, ignore or do not take advantage of what has been learned in the past." The awareness of the analyst is restricted to both the content and the process of their current function. In the case of E&SP, the Division is relatively new and no current officer has been there for more than four years. Even those officers who had been in CSC for a long time have not been at headquarters for very long. It was evident in most interviews that staff, both in the evaluation unit and in program management, were not aware of events which, although they had taken place only a few years earlier, were not currently related to their sphere of activity.
Information about CSC programs was taken from published and unpublished departmental documents. In some cases, it was difficult to find copies of documents which were known to exist.

Case studies of selected evaluations were used to identify the extent to which the environmental criteria were being met. The choice of evaluations was based on the inventories, discussions with CSC staff and background knowledge of CSC. Information was obtained from E&SP files and the unstructured interviews with program and senior management.

We now begin the analysis with a look at the organizational profile of the Evaluation and Special Projects Division.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER 5


2. Ibid., p. 170

3. Ibid., p. 171


7. Ibid., p. 32


9. Not program delivery alternatives

10. One officer had moved to British Columbia. The list of possible officers for interviewing did not cover all staff of E&SP since some had had no involvement in the evaluation process.

11. A list of all interviews conducted for the thesis is given in Appendix A.

12. The inventories do not include the work done by the Evaluation and Analysis Division since no evaluation work has completed before the function became the responsibility of E&SP. One of the case studies will show how work on one program evaluation by Evaluation and Analysis led into work done later by E&SP.

13. There are two exceptions - the evaluations of two management support programs - *Evaluation Review of the Policy & Planning Branch* and the *Review of the Strategic Planning Committee*.

14. Meltsner, p. 272
CHAPTER 6

The Evaluation and Special Projects Division: An Organizational Profile

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the organizational arrangement of the Evaluation and Special Projects Division (E&SP) of the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC). The analysis will examine the organizational structure, staffing and interorganizational relations to assess the extent to which the Division has survived, developed and adapted to its environment.¹

To begin the analysis it is important to identify the goals established for the organization against which to assess its performance. The official goal for E&SP, as identified in the Commissioner's Directive which established the program evaluation function, reads as follows:

To ensure that all programs under the authority of The Correctional Service of Canada are subject to evaluation on a three or five year cycle in keeping with the policy enunciated by the Treasury Board....To periodically provide the Commissioner with objective and timely information....To ensure that evaluation study results will be used in the preparation of strategic overviews, multi-year operational plans and long-term evaluation plans.²

Although the official goal of the organization mentions the Treasury Board requirement to do program evaluation, this desire to fulfill central agency requirements would appear to be a very strong actual or operative goal of the organization. Much concern was expressed by staff that evaluations correspond to the guidelines laid down by the Office of the Comptroller General (OCG) and success would appear to be measured in terms of what the OCG would accept as a suitable evaluation. One
officer expressed considerable anxiety at the suggestion that something he had been teaching about evaluation did not, in fact, represent the current point of view of the OCG. Carol H. Weiss identifies this need to satisfy external requirements as one of the covert purposes of evaluation. 3

Organizational structure

CSC has never had an organizational unit solely devoted to the evaluation function. CSC's first response to the central agency requirement to do program evaluation was the creation of the Evaluation and Analysis Division in 1978. As seen in Chapter 4, the analysis component of this Division was more active and has had a more enduring impact on CSC than the evaluation component. The responsibility for evaluation was combined with that of the special projects and the Evaluation and Special Projects Division was created in 1980. The reason for the coupling of evaluation and special projects was short-term expediency. However, most of the officers interviewed expressed a desire to see this arrangement continue. The Special Projects group is a management consulting group for CSC with clients throughout the Service. Its "fire-fighting" role has allowed it to be helpful to both staff and line management at all levels of the organization. During this process, officers have gained a good knowledge of field activities. The work has been described as "heady" and definitely more interesting than the evaluation work. This is because the projects arise out of identified management needs and managers are, therefore, receptive to the results. This relationship with senior management allowed the unit
to establish an area of recognized expertise within the organization. On the other hand, the evaluation work has portrayed members of the group as interfering and threatening. The results of the work have not been as well received by senior or program management and their role is perceived to be one of keeping a central agency at bay. In commenting on the continued mix of evaluation and special projects, one officer argued that it would be unfair for the officers to be "tarred" with the brush of evaluation only.

At any given time, one function usually takes priority over the other. In the early 1980's, as the evaluation function was being established, it was reported to have taken precedence over the special projects function. However, now it is the special projects function which is the more active. This situation is likely to continue since, except for the initial setup period, the Commissioner is not actively involved in the evaluation function. He approves the evaluation plan and sees the results of evaluation work, which he describes as being of marginal benefit, but is not actively involved in the process. However, since he is directly responsible for initiating the special projects, he is more vitally interested in the results and is seen to be more actively supporting the process.

The Senior Deputy Commissioner, although he has no official responsibility for the evaluation function,\(^4\) takes a very active interest in the function. He is responsible to the Commissioner for the program branches at headquarters. Because much of the initial consultation with program management about the evaluation process occurs at headquarters, the Senior Deputy Commissioner has been able to play a
prominent role in the shaping of the evaluation function. Arnold J. Meltsner's distinction between the formal and the informal client is relevant here. "As the policy process chugs along, informal clients displace formal clients.... Who the analyst writes for, gets guidance from, and gives advice to is a surer clue for identifying the client than the formality of the assignment." 5 Although the Commissioner is formally identified as the client for evaluations, in reality it is the Senior Deputy Commissioner in his role as the senior program manager who, in spite of his professed skepticism about the function, is the client for evaluations.

The Evaluation and Special Projects Division reports to the Deputy Commissioner for Policy, Planning and Administration who, in turn, reports to the Commissioner. The Commissioner is identified as the formal client with responsibility for the evaluation plan, selection of programs for evaluation, and for taking action on the basis of evaluation results. In addition, a formal role is established for the Senior Management Committee (SMC). SMC constitutes the Senior Evaluation Committee "to oversee the planning and conduct of Program Evaluation and to review all findings and recommendations on behalf of the Commissioner" and "[to] advise the Commissioner on all program evaluations and plans in terms of their objectivity, adequacy and recommendations." 6

A belief pervades E&SP that evaluation reports are presented to SMC for "approval", not just for "information". Most officers interviewed expressed concern about the identification of such a large, diverse and busy group as the evaluation committee. An alternate prope
sal to identify the Executive Committee as the evaluation committee was rejected on the grounds that SMC would eventually become familiar with the evaluation process and that this arrangement was essential given the very consultative style of senior management at CSC. There are both advantages and disadvantages of having a collective client. The obvious disadvantage arises from the conflict which can be generated by such a diverse group, but this can work to the advantage of evaluators if they are able to build consensus among the different interests and, hence, achieve acceptance of their report as the work progresses. This is the approach that has been taken by E&SP, but the consultation with program management and SMC is very time consuming.

No formal role for the minister has been identified at CSC. The Solicitor General is made aware of the evaluation process when the Commissioner feels it is necessary. This has been particularly the case when an evaluation involves interviewing people outside CSC or when the evaluation recommendations lead to major policy changes.

A key to organizational survival is the allocation of sufficient resources, both monetary and personnel, to the unit. It is impossible to know the exact resources which have been allocated to the evaluation function. Prior to the 1981-82 fiscal year, the budget for E&SP was included in the Policy and Planning Budget. The resource allocations for the Division since that time are given in Figure 6-1. For the fiscal year 1983-84, the total operating costs for the Division represent approximately three percent of the total operating costs of CSC. For 1982-83, total budgeted operating costs accounted for just over seven percent of the total budget for planning and management at
FIGURE 6-1

Evaluation and Special Projects Division
Budgets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Person-years</th>
<th>Salaries</th>
<th>Other operating</th>
<th>Total operating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>17 (2)</td>
<td>$464,138</td>
<td>$849,875</td>
<td>$1,314,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>373,454</td>
<td>864,500</td>
<td>1,237,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>10 (3)</td>
<td>461,527</td>
<td>1,071,911</td>
<td>1,533,438</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Finance Division, Correctional Service of Canada, January 1984

Notes:
(1) Other operating expenses include principally funds available for contracting the services of consultants.
(2) The Evaluation and Special Projects Division records show that the unit never filled 17 person-year positions.
(3) The decrease between 1982-83 and 1983-84 was due to a cutback at CSC.
CSC and the person-year allocation to E&SP represented about four and a half percent of the person-year allocation to planning and management. The 1982-83 budget for the Planning and Management component is given in Figure 6-2. Included in the planning and management budget was an allocation of $2,050,000 and thirty-two person-years for the Inspector General Branch, responsible for financial, management and personnel audits. Even though the Inspector General had nearly two and a half times as many person-years as E&SP, their total budgeted operating funds were only just over one and a half times greater than those of E&SP. This reflects a fundamental difference between the two units - audit is done by CSC staff, whereas special projects and, particularly, evaluations are contracted out. Although the Division experienced a cutback in person-years in the 1983-84 fiscal year, their allocation of other operating expenses to cover contracts, increased. It is easily understood why both of the Director's interviewed indicated that the monetary resources had always been sufficient. They indicated however, that although person-year resources had been sufficient in numbers, they had not had staff competent in doing evaluative work. Staffing problems have, to a great extent, been responsible for difficulties faced by the Division.

Staffing

The importance of structural continuity in order to ensure organizational survival has been stressed by Prince. Not only has the responsibility for evaluation at CSC been moved from one organizational group to another, but there has been little continuity of personnel.
FIGURE 6-2

Planning and Management (Component Budgets) 1982-83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>000's $</th>
<th>Person-years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Commissioner</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Management</td>
<td>5,894</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy and Planning</td>
<td>4,926</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>2,340</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Secretary</td>
<td>1,468</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,320</strong></td>
<td><strong>292</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Staff shift frequently from evaluation to special project work and they are seconded by senior management to other functions, such as audit, or are requested to help in the field. This "interference" by senior management makes it very difficult to plan the evaluation activities of the Division. Even the shifting between evaluation and special projects is beyond the control of the Director given that he cannot control the workload of the special projects component. In addition, the Division is currently undergoing a major staff reorganization. Since the establishment of the evaluation function in the Division in early 1980, there have been two Directors, two chiefs and six project managers who have had some involvement in the evaluation function. Of the ten officers involved, five have left, currently leaving the Division with one director, two chiefs and two project managers. Support staff include one project assistant and a secretary. An organizational chart is given in Figure 6-3.\(^\text{12}\) The current director is a former institutional warden and has been in the position for just over one year. The previous director had been there for three years. The two chiefs in the Division have been at CSC, and in the Division, for four years. There are currently two project managers and the unit is in the process of hiring four more.\(^\text{13}\)

The original staff of the evaluation unit was inherited from the Special Projects Division when evaluation became a component of that Division. The restaffing became necessary when all the positions were reclassified in order to make them comparable to those of other federal department evaluation units. As a result of the reclassification, some of the existing staff did not meet the qualifications for the positions
FIGURE 6-3

Evaluation and Special Projects Division
Organizational Chart

Director

Projects Assistant    Secretary

Chief

Chief

Project Manager    Project Manager

Project Manager    Project Manager

Project Manager

Source: Evaluation and Special Projects Division, The Correctional Service of Canada, March 1984
and have either left CSC or been reassigned within the organization. As a result of the restaffing, evaluation activity within the Division has been virtually suspended.

In spite of a perceived lack of competent evaluation personnel in Ottawa, the unit has had no difficulty in filling their positions. The hiring process began late in 1983 and the unit received over fifty applications from within the federal public service for the four positions. Although the Division was initially looking for staff with some knowledge of the correctional field, more emphasis was placed on candidates having experience in doing evaluations. Due to the portable nature of evaluative and analytical skills, candidates were quite willing to move to CSC since the classifications of the E&SP positions allowed for salaries one or two thousand dollars higher than some other departments.

The restaffing can be expected to have important implications for the type of analysis which the Division will produce. Meltzer identifies the characteristics of the analysts as being one of the factors which influences the type of analysis produced in an organization. Analysts differ because "they come to their jobs with different incentives. They have different internalized standards of accomplishment and success, and even those with a common education rely on different skills or strengths in the performances of their tasks. Moreover, they have different views about policy analysis and its impact on policymaking." 15

One of the most readily identifiable characteristics of the E&SP staff has been their relative lack of experience in doing evalua-
tions. The nine officers who have been involved in the evaluation process have a total of nearly seventy years experience in the correctional field. They have, however, only forty-nine years of experience in evaluation related work. One officer, who has now left CSC, accounts for twenty-eight of those forty-nine years. If he is excluded from the calculation, the total experience is twenty-one years, or an average of just over two years per officer, most of this in the CSC Division.

Although there is not one type of analyst, Meltsner presents a possible framework for discussion, based on the political and analytical characteristics of policy analysts. See Figure 6-4. Those analysts with both high political and high analytical skills are "entrepreneurs"; those with high political but low analytical skills are "politicians"; and, finally, those with low political but high analytical skills are "technicians." How does this framework apply to the officers of the evaluation unit? Because the sample size is so small (total of nine officers), because the questionnaire used for interviewing the officers could not be as long as that used by Meltsner, and because there was relatively little variance between the responses of the officers, it is not possible to associate individual officers with any particular category. Instead the group of officers will be considered as a whole and the discussion will highlight those characteristics identified by Meltsner which were observed among E&SP officers. Characteristics of entrepreneurs, politicians and technicians were all exhibited to some extent.

Meltsner defines a technician as "an academic researcher -
FIGURE 6-6

Political and Analytical Skill Classification

Political skill

High
High
Entrepreneur
Technician

Analytical skill

Low
Politician
Pretender

an intellectual - in bureaucratic residence. No admirer of bureaucratic
folkways, he weaves around himself a protective cocoon of computers,
models and statistical regressions".18 This does not describe any of
the evaluation officers at CSC. Their experience in evaluation is weak
and limited to the period in E&SP. Although the group is not parti-
cularly young,19 only two officers had any work evaluation experience
prior to joining the unit. Some of the officers have academic back-
grounds in social work or criminology which have provided some exposure
to evaluation.

A technician, according to Meltsner, "often omits or is blind
to the political considerations in his analysis".20 This was far from
being true for the E&SP officers. All but one, responded positively,
and without hesitation, to the question of whether political considera-
tions were taken into account when choosing or presenting alternatives
in the evaluation process. Most suggested that an officer ignored those
considerations at his own peril. They would subscribe to Meltsner's
belief that "incentives in the bureaucracy...encourage the analyst to
anticipate his client's [judgemental or political] calculations".21

A technician "usually puts the quality of his work first".22

When asked what makes a successful evaluation, only three of the nine
officers mentioned technical soundness. Six identified utility as being
the primary consideration. However, when specifically asked which was
more important - being "right" or being "on time" - six of the nine
chose being right, two said that it would depend on the circumstances
and only one suggested that being on time was more important. This was
the only question on which any of the officers showed characteristics of
technicians.

A politician "is more a bureaucrat than an analyst... most of them see themselves as generalists... they want to be where the action is". 23 This role type is a better description of the officers in E&SP. When questioned about their future career plans, only two officers indicated that they had any intention to stay in evaluation related work in the long term. Seven of the nine saw the job as a stepping stone to something else. Four of the seven specified that they might return to line functions at CSC. This bears witness to the high level of commitment, within the unit, to the correctional field. Unlike Meltsner's politicians, however, the E&SP officers do not see themselves as always being in staff functions. Since so many officers are considering moving back into line positions, it is not surprising that they are concerned with being "tarred" with the brush of evaluation.

When questioned about the necessary background for doing evaluative work at CSC, only one specified that experience in a correctional field was necessary, one suggested a balance of both evaluation experience and knowledge of correction was required, two argued that it was necessary to know something about social science research techniques, while the remaining five suggested other more vague characteristics that were necessary. They suggested that E&SP officers should be "generalists", "bright and analytical", have an awareness of "technical and managerial matters", "have common sense and good academic backgrounds" or "logical and inquiring minds". These officers would seem to see themselves as generalists.
E&SP officers like to be where the action is. When discussing whether the evaluation and special project functions should be mixed, most expressed a preference for the "fire-fighting" activities of special project assignments. This work was described as "heady" - it has the attention of the Commissioner.

An entrepreneur is both a technician and a politician, who "engages with relish his political and organizational environment...he is technically competent...he sees the public interest as his client".24 Entrepreneurs also see themselves playing an advocacy role.25 In spite of the high level of correctional experience among E&SP officers, only one officer raised the question of the benefit to the inmate of the evaluation process. If an entrepreneur is there to "question the bureaucrat's stodgy premises, to shake the system, to take risks",26 then E&SP officers are not entrepreneurs. When asked about their influence on the policy process, responses were generally positive but reflected guarded optimism for the evaluation process. One felt that they had an influence on the way managers thought, one felt that they had had some influence on decision-making at CSC and yet others suggested that they had had a marginal but unspecified influence. There was no agreement with the belief that "if the client does not accept a study's recommendations. Somehow and sometime in the future, someone will".27 When specifically asked about the existence of "opportunity windows" that would allow study recommendations, which had not been accepted, to be raised again when the conditions were more propitious, one officer responded that if an idea was not politically feasible in the beginning it would never resurface because it would be completely
Like Meltsner's entrepreneurs, E&SP officers are "aware that analysis cannot stand by itself and must gain acceptance within and outside the bureaucracy, [they] try to develop a consensus model of analysis". When asked about relations with line management, many of the officers mentioned the necessity of consultation throughout the evaluation process with the program branches at headquarters. This consultation has been a feature of the management style at CSC.

The E&SP officers exhibit some characteristics of all three types of analysts identified by Meltsner. Clearly, they have higher political than analytical skills. Unfortunately, Meltsner's framework fails to take into account the high level of functional area expertise shown in E&SP. He refers in his book to a study by Dwaine Marvick which identified three types of bureaucrat: institutionalists who are "place-bound", specialists who were "skill-bound" and hybrids who were "free agents" and "operators". This framework, which includes the notion of being "place-bound", might reflect more accurately the situation at CSC.

The fact that most of the officers of E&SP exhibited more correctional experience than analytical experience, is reflected in the kinds of evaluative work that has been done at CSC, as will be seen in Chapter 7. The lack of analytical experience had two major implications for the organization survival of the Division. The need to virtually suspend evaluation work and to re-staff the unit has led to structural discontinuity and the lack of competent personnel has lowered the credi-
bility of the unit both within and outside CSC.

Interorganizational relations

Meltzner argues that conflict between staff groups, who are competing for the attention of the client, can "lead either to improving the quality of work and advice or to diminishing it." Within CSC, relations between E&SP and other the staff functions, such as policy and audit, have been good and there is little conflict.

Although evaluation is linked organizationally to the policy branch, there has been little contact at the officer level between the evaluation unit and the policy group. This may have benefits for the evaluation process since evaluations are designed to question the rationale of a program, a rationale which may have been originally established by the policy group. Formal contact between E&SP and the policy group takes place in a joint Policy, Operational Planning and Evaluation Committee which meets monthly to coordinate the activities of policy planning and evaluation. The group addresses, in a more informal way, concerns expressed at the weekly meeting of all Directors in the Policy, Planning and Administration Branch.

Contact between the evaluation group and the audit group is more informal than formal. Some officers see and read audit reports, whereas the audit officers interviewed had not read any of the evaluation studies. While there has been some sharing of resources between the audit and evaluation groups, all reported cases were of evaluation officers doing work for the audit group and not vice versa. The audit group has an established organizational unit completely independent of,
operational branches, a very high profile within CSC and assurance of the attention of the Commissioner. Evaluation officers do not feel the need to compete for this attention, since the E&SP organizational unit has the attention of the client through its work on special projects. The two units can afford to ignore each other. If the evaluation unit were organizationally independent of the special projects component it would have to compete for attention since, among auditors, there is no general agreement on the role for evaluation. As Prince points out, "a common reason for conflict in the interorganizational relations of policy units is that officials are not familiar with or have a clear understanding of the actual roles of the units" and, like policy units in general, evaluation units "are not identified with a single defined field but with many fields, bodies of knowledge and methods". As it is, relations between E&SP are characterized more by disinterest than by conflict or cooperation.

Relations with the program management have not been as good. In the early days of the evaluation function relations with program management were reported to be fairly good because the director of the unit was particularly suited for handling the "public relations" of the position and the function was still "full of promise". Prince suggests six basic roles for the head of a policy analysis or research unit - personnel manager, policy planner, research manager, representative, promoter and protector - and the way these roles have been fulfilled can be used to explain the state of relations between E&SP and program management.

The first Director of E&SP was well suited to the promotional
role involved in establishing a new unit and devoted much of his time to
fostering the use of the unit...; developing, building and maintaining relationships of trust
with officials; promoting the operation of related corporate management and policy planning
procedures and information systems; and, selling the unit's completed work in such a way as to
maximize its acceptance.33

In one instance, an evaluation study, which was causing considerable
conflict with program management, was "transformed" into an evaluation
assessment, to allow the unit to start again with a new and different
approach to the evaluation.

As we have seen in Chapter 4, the ability of the unit head to
fulfill his role as policy planner and to plan for the future in E&SP
was, and is, hampered, given the approach taken by senior management
that the unit is a personnel pool for other groups within the organiza-
tion. In fulfilling his role as personnel manager, which "concerned the
recruitment, training, staff development, morale and motivation of unit
members",36 the first Director put the emphasis on training rather than
recruitment. All but one of the officers had been on evaluation train-
ing courses offered by the OCG and two former E&SP officers, including
the first Director, had been instructors for the OCG. The lack of
emphasis on recruitment caused the unit to find itself, after three
years of operations, without the necessary competent staff to do evalua-
tions.

The credibility of the function suffered somewhat, despite the
large amount of correctional expertise in the evaluation unit. It has
produced little evaluation work of much benefit to line management and
relations have been tenuous with the program management at headquarters and are even less positive in the field. Headquarters is seen to be causing more work for the field level of the organization, rather than helping with their workload, and evaluation is seen as just an additional bother. This is in contrast to the Special Projects function which is seen as helpful since the program manager is the client, unlike the evaluation function where the Commissioner is the client. One officer indicated the differences in the attitude of program management to the two functions by saying that, if he phoned a program manager about a special project matter, the manager would find the time to see him straight away, but if he phoned about an evaluation matter, the manager would check his agenda and make an appointment for several days or weeks later.

As would be expected, this lack of cooperation at the program management level has made life difficult for the evaluation unit. Since much emphasis has been placed on consultation with program staff, any delaying tactics on their part delay the work of the unit. The delays experienced in completing much of the evaluation work to date have been attributed to the length of time required to get an accurate description of the program which is agreed upon by all concerned.

Even when any evaluation work is completed, further delays are experienced when the unit tries to plan the next step in the evaluation process. Responsibility for the implementation of evaluation recommendations, which have been accepted by senior management, is not formally specified. In some cases the evaluation unit has provided the follow up by contracting out further studies and, in other cases, the follow-up
has been left to the program management. However, there is no formal mechanism to monitor the implementation of these recommendations. This problem of knowing where analysis stops and operating begins was identified by Meltzner as one of the possible sources of interorganizational conflict.\textsuperscript{38} It can also be a further possible delaying tactic available to program management.

The Project Review System at CSC, which allows for the systematic review of all projects by SMC, does not cover all the activities of the evaluation unit.\textsuperscript{39} This means that SMC, with the ultimate responsibility for the implementation of recommendations, is not in a position to monitor in any systematic or on-going fashion staff or program management responsibilities in this area. The current low profile of the unit, during a period of restaffing, has further weakened their ability to put pressure to bear on line management to ensure that the required follow-up is carried out.

The main focus of the relations between the evaluation unit and central agencies has been with the Office of the Comptroller General. Relations were good and the unit had a high level of credibility in the early 1980's for several reasons. The unit was established in the policy and planning branch of the Service, reflecting the belief expressed by the OCG that evaluation should be a tool for decision-making as opposed to a tool for accountability; the unit was reported to have good support from and access to the deputy head; two of the officers of the unit had very high profiles in the evaluation community; and given the state of analysis at CSC headquarters in the late
1970's, the Service had gone from "nothing" to "something" very quickly. Also given that the OCG has been concerned mainly with the establishment of an infrastructure for doing evaluations, the unit established at CSC met, in most ways, the requirements of the central agency. However, the credibility has declined slightly since the departure of the two high profile officers because it became evident that the unit had not been suitably staffed for doing evaluations.

Relations continue, though, to be fairly good with the central agencies. In a speech to the Ottawa-Hull Program Evaluation Community, the Commissioner identified the tolerant attitude of the OCG as being one of the factors contributing to any success which CSC has had with program evaluation. The on-going consultative relationship, which the Commissioner also identified, is, however, largely between the OCG liaison officer responsible for CSC and the director and two chiefs in the Division. There has been little or no contact between the liaison officer and the project managers. Some officers feel that because of a reluctance on the part of the OCG to interfere in departmental activities, the OCG had taken a very "hands off" approach and provided little active support to the unit.

Summary

The evaluation unit in a self-evaluating organization forms what Weiss calls the "linking system" between those who produce evaluations and decision-makers. As such the unit needs a combination of both political and analytical skills. In the early 1980's the shell of an evaluation unit was established with staff inherited from the Special
Projects component, most of whom were "politicians". From the beginning, the unit has had to share staff with the special projects component and also with other groups within CSC. Only now does the unit have a director who, in his role as personnel manager, is putting emphasis on recruitment and is restaffing the project manager positions with people with more analytical skills. The existence of the shell of an evaluation unit gave the unit a high level of credibility outside of CSC. However, this level of credibility was not sustained within CSC. The evaluation process was perceived by some as simply an exercise to satisfy the central agencies but of no real use to the CSC organization.42

Even with the hiring of more analytically competent staff, the unit will still face difficulties in doing evaluations because of the close links of the staff to program management. Although the formal client for evaluations is the Commissioner, the informal client is the Senior Deputy Commissioner and, through him, program management. The officers use the mix of special projects and evaluation to establish credibility with program management. They are developing a "sweetheart" arrangement - in exchange for the help of the spécial projects component, the E&SP staff hope for greater cooperation from program management for their evaluation function.43 The credibility of the unit should lie more in its ability to do high quality, innovative evaluation work for the client than its ability to co-exist with program management. But, as Meltsner points out, "to be an innovator, by definition the analyst must break out of the prevailing bureaucratic consensus.... [however] the analyst's bureaucratic desire for influence and relevance
threatens to destroy his capacity for innovation.\textsuperscript{44}

The use of the E&SP staff, by senior management, as a "personnel pool", although a useful practice for senior management, portrays the impression within CSC that the evaluation process is expendable or can at least be delayed, and that it does not have the backing of senior management.\textsuperscript{45} The uncertainty about the availability of staff also makes it very difficult for the unit to plan activities to meet the agreed evaluation schedule.

Given the amount of correctional experience among E&SP staff, the continual consultation with program management seems more designed to promote the evaluation process than to inform the evaluation staff about the programs. There is a tradeoff between the promotion of the function and the independence of the unit which could be damaging, in the long run, to the program evaluation function. As the OCG expresses it:

\begin{quote}
 independence is not simply achieved by organizational separation...[it] also requires evaluators to be able to stand back from the everyday concerns of a program's operation and to look at what is going on in a detached, but not uninformed, way.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

There is skepticism among E&SP officers about the survival of the function. They believe that they have survived so far, in spite of lack of structural continuity and fluctuations in their credibility, because of the strong central agency mandate to do program evaluations, but they are uncertain about the future even of the OCG. They are unconvinced of the ability of any evaluation unit to take that independent position even though the OCG is expected to become more concerned with the quality of
evaluation work done in departments.

The quality of the evaluation assessments and studies is the focus of the next chapter.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER 6

1. In Policy Advice and Organizational Survival, Michael J. Prince identifies three measures of success which relate to the policy advice unit as an organization—survival, development and adaptiveness:

   Organizational survival means to obtain basic resource inputs, to achieve structural continuity, to gain credibility, to build support among officials in the political and administrative systems...development...involves the extent to which unit staff enhance their skills and services in particular areas...adaptiveness...involves the extent to which the policy unit responds to client requests, adapts to changing demands and clients, and anticipates relevant issues.


4. Except as a member of SMC


7. The Executive Committee is composed of the Commissioner; Senior Deputy Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, Policy, Planning and Administration.

8. See Meltsner's discussion of the collective client, pp. 212-3

9. The sensitivity of using external sources of information was discussed in Chapter 4.

11. Prince, p. 171

12. The term "officers" used to cover all non-support staff of the E&SP Division - directors, chiefs and project managers.

13. It should be noted that the Division is currently "over-burning" one person-year. That is, when the restaffing is completed they will have one more person-year than their allocation allows. They are able to do this by using the person-months which they have saved during the period from the time of the departure of the former staff to the arrival of the new staff.

14. One officer was promoted within CSC and one resigned.

15. Meltsner, p. 14

16. Meltsner, pp. 15-17

17. Meltsner found no analysts with both low political and low analytical skills. He would have called them "pretenders".

18. Meltsner, p. 18

19. Only two officers joined the unit immediately after graduation.

20. Meltsner, p. 22

21. Ibid., p. 219

22. Ibid., p. 27

23. Ibid., pp. 30-2

24. Ibid., pp. 36-7

25. Ibid., p. 45

26. Ibid., p. 38

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 47

29. Ibid., pp. 16-7; Dwaine Maryick, Career Perspectives in a Bureaucratic Setting, Michigan Governmental Studies, no. 27 (Ann Arbor: Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan Press, 1954)

30. Ibid., p. 190
31. The Committee is made up of the Director General, Policy, Planning and Systems; the Director, Policy; the Director, Operational Planning; the Director, E&SP; the Director, Planning and Analysis and the Chairman, Strategic Planning Committee.

32. Prince, p. 128

33. With the exception of the sharing of personnel resources

34. Prince, pp. 97-100

35. Ibid., p. 99

36. Ibid., p. 98

37. For example, Samir Naoum and Donald C. Moor, Definition of Target Outcome Achievement Levels (Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada, March 21, 1983)

38. Meltsner, p. 193

39. Initially all evaluations and special projects were included in the management review system. However, the habit began to slip when it was realized that some special projects were completed before they had time to be included in the review system.

40. Donald R. Yeomans, from an address given the Ottawa-Hull Program Evaluation Community, Ottawa, 22 November 1982

41. Most recently when the unit was trying to make a case for the reclassification of the project manager positions

42. See Michael J. Prince and John A. Chenier, "The rise and fall of policy planning and research units: an organizational perspective", Canadian Public Administration, Vol 23, No 4 (Winter 1980) p. 527. Prince and Chenier suggest that the creation of policy units in Ottawa illustrated the "Poyser Principle" that "when central agencies increase their capacity for control the departments will respond with capacity to cope with and perhaps neutralize the new demand from the central agencies."

43. Meltsner, p. 44

44. Ibid., p. 292

45. One officer suggested, as a competing hypothesis, that it shows a great respect by senior management for the broad skills and flexibility of E&SP staff. The fact that the evaluation process can be delayed reflects not necessarily on the skills of the evaluators but rather on the importance, or lack of importance, of the function.
46. Treasury Board of Canada, Guide on the Program Evaluation Function
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, May 1981) p. 54
CHAPTER 7

Inventory of Program Evaluation Work: A Critical Analysis

Introduction

This chapter applies the technical criteria presented in Chapter 5 to the evaluation work done in the Special Projects Division (later Evaluation and Special Projects) since January 1978. Two inventories have been compiled - one of evaluation studies and the other of evaluation assessments.

How were programs identified for evaluation? Prior to the establishment of the evaluation function as a part of Special Projects, the problems analyzed by the Special Projects Division were chosen by the Commissioner. Since the fall of 1979, evaluations have been done on an approved evaluation schedule and the topics are based on the evaluation components that were identified initially by the Evaluation and Analysis Division.

The Office of the Comptroller General's Guide on the Program Evaluation Function defines a program evaluation component as "a group of resources and activities, and their related outputs, which is suitable to the department or agency for evaluation purposes". During the first few months of 1980, the work of the evaluation unit focused mainly on the development of profiles to further flesh out the components identified for evaluation at the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC). As indicated earlier, these components were based on the vertical programs of the Service as opposed to horizontal programs. There were three reasons for this choice. Because the division constrains
each component to be within one estimate program and one functional branch, the components are compatible with the existing structures for fiscal and operational planning. Secondly, the compatibility between vertical programs and functional branches allows for greater ease in planning, managing, and conducting evaluation work. Finally, this compatibility permits the easy identification of the lines of accountability for program results and the implementation of evaluation findings. 3

The activities of each functional branch have been subdivided because the number and variety of activities encompassed by each branch are too great to allow all branch activities to be evaluated together. 4 Two types of programs have been identified – direct programs and service programs. Direct programs such as custody of inmates, offender programs, and education, training and employment are "expected to contribute directly to the achievement of corporate objectives". 5 Service programs such as technical services and planning, management and administration "are expected to contribute indirectly to the achievement of corporate objectives through providing services to the direct programs". 6 The evaluation plan does not include scheduled evaluation studies for the service programs because it was felt that the information needs of these programs could be equally served by performance measurement, operational audit and special management studies. However, evaluation assessments of service programs are included since the assessments can be used to identify the issues which need addressing and the best means for doing so. 7

A number of factors were taken into consideration when developing the schedule for evaluation work. 8 The first priority was the
information needs of the CSC senior management and the central agencies – Treasury Board and Ministry of State for Social Development. The second factor concerned other on-going activities of the Service – major implementation projects or audits by the Inspector General's Branch. A final concern was the perceived need to give priority to programs which would be easy to evaluate, given the developing nature of the function at CSC. Included were programs where program management had expressed an interest in, and understanding of the evaluation process.

Component profiles were developed for all the components identified and although these profiles were approved by program management they were to be subject to revision during the evaluation assessment stage. A profile includes the following information:

1. Mandate
   i. basis and role
   ii. objectives
2. Component description
   i. organizational context and scope
   ii. responsibilities and activities
   iii. relations with other programs
3. Component resources
   i. fiscal expenditures
   ii. capital resources
4. Component elements
   i. activities
   ii. outputs
   iii. impacts and effects

For each component category the elements are presented graphically in a program model. The evaluation work done after January 1980 reflects the use of these component profiles. The importance of such profiles lies in the fact that any evaluation exercise begins with a clear statement of objectives (albeit subject to revision) and a program model showing the linkages between program activities, outputs and
It should be noted here that the inventories of studies and assessments do not cover all of the evaluation work done in the Evaluation and Special Projects Division (E&SP) since they do not include other evaluation-related work done, or contracted out, by the evaluation unit. In addition to the development of component profiles and an evaluation plan which have been discussed, the OCG identifies an additional step in the evaluation process which is not included in this analysis - the evaluation framework. A framework is

the basis on which a future evaluation is to be built. It outlines what the evaluation is likely to entail and, more critically, describes the information and data that are to be collected prior to and during the evaluation. It is intended that a framework be developed for all new or renewed programs. This work is normally done by the evaluation unit, in close cooperation with the program management. Frameworks have been developed for a number of on-going CSC programs, even though they have not been substantially revised. This approach, as opposed to beginning with an evaluation assessment, has been advocated largely by program management on the grounds that even the existing programs are poorly defined and the information about the program to permit an evaluation to be carried out has not been collected. The conclusions of several of the assessments and studies in the inventories support this contention. Since CSC, has relied almost exclusively on internal sources of information for the evaluation process, the lack of a data base becomes a problem. However, the development of frameworks for on-going programs, with the
consequent delay in the evaluation process while program data is collected, will delay further the time when useful information can be obtained from the evaluation process.

A second initiative of the evaluation unit not included in the inventories is the use of reviews to provide follow-up to an evaluation assessment. For example, the unit contracted a private consultant to identify outcome targets for part of the technical services program.¹² The need for these outcome targets had been identified in the assessment (EAIX).

A third initiative not included in the inventories concerns documents produced to interpret evaluation studies or assessments. For instance, the unit was uncertain what use it could make of the evaluation assessment of the psychological services program. Another consultant was contracted to review the assessment document and identify "what is the most effective way a psychological services programme may be established to meet the needs of the inmates within CSC".¹³ This consultant produced a 148-page report and was again contracted to draw the two documents together and produce a Preparatory Report for a Program Evaluation and System Review of Psychological Services, CSC. In addition to work contracted to outside consultants, unit staff have produced summaries of evaluation work done, such as the "An Overview of Selected Evaluation Reports of the Inmate Employment Branch"¹⁴ and "Evaluation in Inmate Employment".¹⁵

A final initiative not included in the inventories is the preparation of literature or evaluation reviews that are often required even before reaching the assessment stage. For example, in preparation
for an evaluation of the social and recreational program, a private consultant was contracted to produce a preliminary report to "trace evaluation planning efforts undertaken thus far...to clarify and detail the nature of the problems encountered in this preliminary stage of the assessment." 16

Although no estimates of the resources spent on these initiatives, as opposed to the studies and assessments are available, they appear to represent a major portion of the unit's workload.

Inventory of evaluation studies

The characteristics of the evaluation studies done since January 1978 have been divided into three groups - general characteristics, techniques and results. The discussion will highlight a few points that are worthy of note with respect to each of these characteristics and discuss the importance of the characteristic in the development of the program evaluation function at CSC. The discussion of each characteristic will also highlight the extent to which the studies in the inventory meet the technical criteria for successful evaluations.

Information contained in the inventory has been taken mainly from the evaluation reports. However, in many cases, this information has been supplemented both by information contained in CSC files and that obtained during interviews. In the event that it was impossible to obtain the information, the space in the inventory has been left blank. Studies are identified both in the inventory and in the text by number only. Figure 7-1 contains a list of all the studies and their corresponding numbers and indicates which studies were done under the rubric
FIGURE 7-1

List of evaluation studies

I  Comparative Survey: Mission Medium Security Institution and Warkworth Institution, October 1978 (SP)*

II  Comparison Survey of Collins Bay and Mountain Medium Security Institutions, February 1979 (SP)

- comparisons of medium security institutions to look at the effect of institutional size on benefits to inmates and operational costs

III  Community Impact Study, October 1981 (SP) - analysis of the socio-economic impact of two British Columbia institutions on three communities

IV  Evaluation Review of the Policy and Planning Branch, March 1979 (SP)

V  Review of the Strategic Planning Committee, CSC, March 1983 (SP)

- reviews of two planning groups

VI  Evaluation study of the CSC communication program (E&SP)*

VII  Cost Benefit Analysis of Inmate Reception Program, December 1978, (SP) - cost benefit analysis of a reception program for inmates prior to transfer to the institution

VIII  Evaluation Study - Costing of Correctional Models, September 1983 (E&SP) - comparison of the costs and effects of four correctional models

IX  Evaluation Study of the Private Family Visiting Program - CSC, January 1983 (E&SP) - evaluation of a visiting program which allows inmates to have private visits, within the institution, with family members

X  Evaluation of the Team Concept, October 1978 (SP) - assessment of one correctional model

XI  Evaluation of Forestry Program, February 1983 (SP) - assessment of costs and impacts of inmate employment in forestry camps
FIGURE 7-1 CONT'D

XII. Evaluating Inmate Employment: Programs vs Job Markets, March 1982 (E&SP)

XIII. A Report on the Occupational Analysis of Inmate Employment and Training Opportunities in the Metalwork and Welding and Food Service Sectors, October 1982 (E&SP)

XIV. Evaluation of Inmate Employment: Needs-Placement Match, October 1982 (E&SP)

XV. Post-release employment studies

XVI. An Analysis of the Financial Contribution from the Employment of Inmates in Agribusiness and Automated Data Processing, August 1983 (E&SP)

XVII. Analysis of the Financial Contribution from Employment of Inmates in CSC Operations of Food Services, Maintenance, Utilities, Institutional Services, Administrative and Recreational Programs, (E&SP)

XVIII. An Analysis of Production Costs and Contributions of the Industrial Production Programs, March 1983 (E&SP)

- studies addressing some of the issues identified for an evaluation of the inmate employment program

XIX. An Analysis of the Provision of Dental Prostheses to Federal Inmates, July 1982 (SP) - evaluation of the provision of dental prostheses and an assessment of alternatives

XX. A Program Evaluation for Psychiatric Services in CSC, October 1982 (E&SP) - evaluation of the psychiatric services provided to inmates

* SP - studies done under the rubric of special projects
* E&SP - studies done under the rubric of evaluation
of Special Projects and which under the rubric of program evaluation.

The general characteristics of the evaluation studies are presented in Figure 7-2.

The client is not a very meaningful characteristic since it gives no indication of who instigated the study or who used the results. Generally the client for the studies done by the Special Projects Division was, by definition, either the Commissioner or SMC since the Division was established as a senior management tool. Also by definition, the Commissioner, as deputy head of the agency, is the client for the studies done as part of the program evaluation function. Most of the studies which were contracted out are not specific, identifying either the Correctional Service of Canada or the Director of the Division as the client. One Special Projects Division study identified a Deputy Commissioner (who is also a member of SMC) as the client and one study, which was identified as a "background paper" to the overall study of inmate employment, identified the Evaluation Steering Committee as the client. In any event, the identified client was not necessarily the first person to see the report.

The category of who instigated the work is more meaningful as it attempts to identify who was principally interested in the information from the evaluation study. This category has been left blank if no clear instigator was identified either in the report or in interviews. All of the studies were instigated by the Commissioner, with the exception of the series of studies on inmate employment, which were a result of a Cabinet request, one study instigated by the Solicitor General and one by the evaluation unit itself.
### Figure 7-2 Inventory of Evaluation Studies - General Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Planning and Management</th>
<th>Offender Case Management</th>
<th>Custody</th>
<th>Education, Training and Employment</th>
<th>Health Care</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission/SMC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Commissioner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Steering Committee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiated by</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet/Cabinet Committee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioner/SMC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solicitor-General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation unit</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conducted by</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation unit</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector consultants</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector consultants</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time to complete study</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in months)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program costs</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not given</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public document</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y = Yes</td>
<td>N = No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluate impact</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review implementation process</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review program structure</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review program costs</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss program applications</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss alternatives</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework for future evaluation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOOTNOTES TO FIGURE 7-2

§ Indicates those studies recognized by the OCG as evaluation studies

(1) The evaluation review of the Policy and Planning Branch (IV) does not meet the definition of an evaluation in Chapter 5. It has been included in the inventory because it was identified as an evaluation study by Evaluation and Special Projects Division.

(2) The review of the Strategic Planning Committee (V) does not meet the definition of an evaluation in Chapter 5 and the report itself specifies that it is not an evaluation as defined by the OCG. However, it has been included in the inventory because it was identified as an evaluation by the OCG.
Examining who the evaluations were conducted by reveals that few evaluation studies have been done solely by CSC staff. The five studies done by the evaluation unit include one background paper for the employment study (XIV) and the design of a study which was not completed (XV). The bulk of the work has been done by public sector consultants either alone or in conjunction with the evaluation unit. All but one (X) of the studies done by public sector consultants were done by the Bureau of Management Consulting at the Department of Supply and Services.

Most staff interviewed felt that there should be a mix in the Division between doing work in-house and contracting out. A few specified that the evaluation frameworks or assessments should be done in-house and that the study should be contracted out under the supervision of the officer who did the framework/assessment. A few would prefer to have even more work done in-house but recognize that this is a more expensive option given the need to maintain a large and varied staff to meet the requirements of a wide variety of CSC programs. The use of outside consultants allows the unit to tap a larger pool of skills, provides the perception of greater objectivity, and protects the staff of the evaluation unit when an evaluation is needed of a particularly sensitive program where there may be conflict with program management. One officer explained very succinctly that if some evaluations were done in-house, the evaluator would never be able to work anywhere else in the organization. However, outside consultants may not be as detached as one might expect. Consultants are very aware of the political consider-
ations of doing an evaluation since they are always concerned about the source of their next contract.

The issue of the length of time taken to complete some of the evaluation work is an important one. Unfortunately, the data collected for this characteristic are not very meaningful since the time frame has not been calculated in a uniform way for all studies. The time taken to complete a study is rarely available from the study report itself but when it is, it usually reflects the period from the date of the contract (for contracted out studies) to the completion date given on the report. Some time frames were available from the Project Review System. These, however, would reflect a start up date corresponding to the time at which work began on the project in the evaluation unit, as opposed to the actual contract date. For some studies it was possible to calculate the time frame using information about the start up date found in the file and the completion date of the report. When it was impossible to calculate a time frame the category has been left blank.

Though the data collected for this category may not reflect accurately the delays experienced in completing the studies, interviews indicate that delays were experienced in a number of studies. These delays have been documented in the notes accompanying the latest version of the evaluation plan:

 delays have been caused by longer delays than expected in getting project teams and terms of reference approved and by shortages in manpower to manage and conduct projects. The most significant cause of delay, however, is the length of time required to get a description of the program which is adequate for evaluation purposes - that is a refined and expanded component profile.
These delays are caused to a great extent by the extensive consultations undertaken with program management in order to achieve some consensus on the program description.

Three studies were not completed. One study (VI) was deferred at the request of the Minister, after proposals had been received from consulting firms to do the evaluation, because the study design involved interviewing members of the public—notably the media and members of Parliament—about the impact of the program. This was felt to be too sensitive an area and the possible problems inherent in doing the evaluation outweighed the possible benefits. The second study (XV) was postponed by a decision of the Executive Committee of CSC because of the amount of field work it involved. There was a reluctance on the part of field staff to doing the work themselves (even if the Evaluation and Special Projects Division covered the additional costs incurred) or to having it done by outsiders because of the sensitive nature of institutional documents. This study was the only one under the rubric of evaluation involving any form of experimental design. It included two sub-studies—a parolee employment survey and a release cohort follow-up survey. It is important to note that both deferrals were as a result of decisions beyond the control of the evaluation unit.

Although it is not reflected in the inventory, a third study has not been completed. All but one of the employment studies (XII through XVIII) are part of an overall evaluation of inmate employment programs requested by Cabinet early in 1981. The evaluation was to be completed by January 1982 but so far only six studies relating to parti-
cular issues have been completed. Because of the major reorganization taking place in the evaluation unit all work on the employment studies has stopped.

The category of program costs reflects the extent to which program costs are given in the evaluation report. It is difficult to obtain information about program costs from existing data at CSC headquarters because of an insufficient breakdown of cost units. Very few component resources are given in the component profiles and, even when they are given, there is not complete compatibility between program resources and the Main Estimates. For example, the entry for the Security and Intelligence Component in the evaluation component profile is as follows:

**Fiscal Expenditures (1982-83 Main Estimates)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operating</td>
<td>$114,641,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person Years</td>
<td>3,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>$155,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(NOTE: The above figures include Records Services and thus require adjustments to exclude this program. A full costing of security operations would require the identification of time spent on security tasks by institutional staff, and the identification of capital costs of specialized security facilities and equipment contained in the Technical Services budgets.)*

Because of this difficulty in determining program costs, only a few studies present such information. When they do, the information is not broken down into detailed costs. For example, in the comparative study of large and small institutions, total operational and maintenance costs are given, but the costs of operating the different correctional programs at each institution are not given. Consequently, the lack of
information in the reports about program costs makes it difficult for
the reader to appreciate the financial importance of the program being
evaluated or to equate the financial costs with the identified impacts.

A distinction is made at CSC between reports which are readily
available to the public and those which are for "limited distribution"
only. Documents in the "limited distribution" category are generally
intended only for people with a particular interest in the subject area.
However, since it is believed in the evaluation unit that under the new
Access to Information legislation, all evaluations are public documents,
CSC is willing to release the reports of all evaluation work. The
"limited distribution" label has been attached generally to reports
which are considered to be technically inadequate.

The OGG recently released, to the media, a list of all evalua-
tions completed in federal departments and agencies in 1982 and 1983.
Shortly afterwards, the evaluation unit received a request from an
opposition member of Parliament for all the CSC identified studies. The
request included both public and "limited distribution" documents and
was filled without any problem.

What have been the stated purposes of the evaluation studies?
By definition, all evaluations listed in this inventory include, in
their purpose, the evaluation of program impact. However, some of the
inmate employment series of studies evaluate impact in only a very loose
meaning of the term. Studies XII, XIII and XIV describe the match
between the program and conditions external to CSC. It is an essential
step in the measurement of impact to know if it is plausible to assume
that the program offered is having an impact on an external environment.
This addresses the evaluation question of the plausibility of a relationship between program activities and program objectives. Study XV was designed to measure program impact but the study has not been completed. Studies XVI, XVII and XVIII evaluate only the impact of the program on costs, but in the context of the overall employment study, these studies contribute to the evaluation of program impact.24

Half of the studies were also designed to examine program structure. This examination of program structure, necessary to determining what is actually happening, and the review of program implementation, was necessary because "almost all of the Services programs have evolved over time rather than having been planned, designed and implemented".25

Although the discussion of alternatives is an evaluation question suggested in the OCG Guide,26 not many studies included this question among their purposes. Seven studies were designed to discuss future applications of the program — either in light of a proposed expansion of the program (III, V, IX, X) or to present reasonable short-term targets for the program (XVI, XVII, XVIII). The discussion of the results of the studies will look at the question of whether the stated purposes of the studies were actually achieved.

The techniques used in the evaluation studies are given in Figure 7-3. As Douglas Lipton, Robert Martigson and Judith Wilks observed:

In evaluative research there must be some technique for measuring the effects produced in a reliable and valid way, and it must be possible to attribute these effects to the action ta-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
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FOOTNOTES TO FIGURE 7-3

(1) The structured interviews were carried out with members of the Strategic Planning Committee. The unstructured interviews were with outside experts.

(2) Used simulation and the Delphi technique.

(3) Used regression analysis.
ken... All evaluative research must have a research design. The research design is the plan of investigation conceived so as to obtain answers to research questions.

Very few of the evaluation reports specify a research design. It has to be pieced together from information throughout the report. This lack of information about the research design casts doubt on the technical validity and reliability of the report.

All the studies were postprogram-only designs - a fact which is not surprising given that all but one of the evaluations were of long-standing on-going programs. Only three studies attempted to identify experimental and control groups. Study III actually measured certain characteristics in communities with and without institutions in order to identify the impact of penitentiaries on community life. In the course of Study VII, evaluators visited institutions receiving inmates through a Regional Reception Centre as well as those whose inmates came directly to the institution. In Study IX a very small sample of non-participants in the program was interviewed. For four studies (I, II, VIII and XIX) the use of control groups would not necessarily be appropriate since they involved the comparison of two or more different programs.

Like the research techniques, information on the data collection techniques had to be gleaned from various sources in the reports. Many of the reports were not specific about how data were obtained. There are obvious gaps in this category. For example, some studies would appear to have been carried out without either a file review or a survey at headquarters. However, this seems unlikely, particularly for studies carried out by outside consultants. At a minimum it would be
reasonable to expect that the evaluators had interviewed the program managers at headquarters. Even when the sources of data were identified, the form of that data collection was often not explicit and these studies have been identified by an "X" in the inventory.

Most of the studies used natural observation as a technique for gathering data and most involved visits to institutions and a review of files at one or more of headquarters, regional offices or institutions. Fifteen of the eighteen completed studies involved surveys of CSC staff at one or more of headquarters, regional offices or institutions. However, in only eight of the eighteen studies were surveys carried out outside the institution. Most of the evaluation findings are based solely on internal sources of information. Correctional staff, although they may be considered "expert", can hardly be considered "objective". The use of internal expert opinion as the principal source of data is a very weak form of data collection. While it is a useful technique because it is both quick and inexpensive when other more objective data are unavailable, it raises serious problems of reliability.

This problem of reliability is compounded when the data are not obtained in a systematic fashion. Of the thirty-three surveys of internal sources (excluding inmates), only twelve were identified as having been structured - either through a structured interview or a questionnaire. The rest were either unstructured or the techniques were unknown.

The reluctance to interview inmates, which was brought out in discussions with staff, is apparent from the inventory. Only six of the
completed studies indicated that inmates had been surveyed. The argument was made in Chapter 4 that inmates could not be interviewed without interviewing the junior levels of staff in the institutions, thereby increasing the cost of data collection. In most cases the description of the data collection techniques was too vague to permit an identification of the level of staff interviewed in the institutions. Some studies, however, specified that, for example, shop foremen (XIII) and staff of CSC dental laboratories (XIX) had been interviewed.

The category of selection techniques reflects how individuals were chosen for interviewing or how files were chosen for review. More than one method may be indicated since most studies used more than one data collection technique. In the evaluation reports little information is provided about the selection techniques. For ten of the eighteen completed studies, selection techniques were not given. The remaining studies used combinations of random, representative or other selection techniques. Other criteria for selection include availability of staff (X), staff interested in being interviewed (X) and selection by senior management (VIII). Only two studies used random selection techniques alone and one of these studies (XV) was not completed.

The purpose of analysis, as the OCG states, is "to transform data into credible evidence on the program and its performance". 32 Three types of analysis are identified in the inventory. Many of the studies use a combination of two techniques. Fifteen of the eighteen completed studies used largely journalistic analysis which relies on "the application, by the evaluators, of subjective professional judge-
ment to whatever information they have". Some of these studies combine journalistic analysis with some statistical analysis. Of the five studies using some statistical analysis only two studies used inferential statistics (III, XII), the rest used descriptive statistics.

A third form of analysis is cost-effectiveness analysis which "requires quantifying program costs and benefits, but the benefits do not have to be converted to monetary units, only the costs...benefits are expressed in terms of real outcomes, not in monetary units". Using this definition, only one study can be classified as a cost-effectiveness analysis (I). The one study which was described as a cost-benefit analysis (VII) cannot be considered as either a cost-benefit or a cost-effectiveness study since it neither translated the benefits into monetary value, nor quantified them.

Given the weak data collection techniques identified in the inventory, journalistic analysis would appear to be the most suitable form of analysis since the key to the selection of an analytical technique is to choose one which is appropriate to the data, research design and issues being addressed. As the OCG states, "the major advantages of journalistic analysis is [sic] that many hard-to-quantify concepts can be addressed and a more wholistic [sic] viewpoint can be taken, normally in a relatively inexpensive fashion".

However, the use of journalistic analysis raises serious questions of reliability since, "in carrying out journalistic analysis, much depends on the experience and expertise of the evaluators" and it "depends on the ability and the credibility of the individual evaluator".
In light of the reliance at CSC on journalistic analysis, the question of whether to contract out an evaluation study or do it in-house becomes even more critical. The perception of the objectivity of the consultant is necessary to establish the credibility of the report outside the organization. However, for greater credibility within CSC, it is necessary for the evaluator to show a good understanding of the program – an understanding which some feel exists only when the evaluation is carried out in-house.

The results of the evaluation studies, given in Figure 7-4, have been divided into two groups – conclusions and recommendations. While most reports provide both types of results, the conclusions, in some cases, have to be teased out of the text of the report. One study presents no conclusions – all the results were presented in the form of recommendations. Two studies present no recommendations. The conclusions and the recommendations have been divided, in the inventory, on the basis of whether they relate to strategic or operational planning. In order to relate to strategic planning the result must, in some way, address the link between the program and overall government policy.

The first group of conclusions related to strategic planning. Twelve of the eighteen completed studies identify program impacts. Identifying program impacts is a useful exercise since it serves to make both senior and program management think that about what a program is doing. The six completed studies on employment evaluate program impacts only in the sense that they address the plausibility of the link between program effects and policy. As such, they are a step towards the iden-
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tification of program impacts.

Only four of the twelve studies which identify program impacts actually measure the impacts. Such measurement is necessary to demonstrate the link between program outcomes and overall government policy. Eight studies drew conclusions about program continuity and expansion. Two studies (V, XI) present alternatives to program delivery and one (XIX) presented an alternative to the program itself.

Conclusions drawn about program implementation and delivery relate to operational planning. Delivery refers to what actually is being offered by the program and includes program implementation. Conclusions about program implementation are useful for the "fine-tuning" of programs. Given that so many correctional programs have evolved, as opposed to being planned, designed and implemented, this is a particularly useful exercise for CSC. Fifteen studies drew conclusions of this type.

Implicit in many of the conclusions about program delivery are comments on the underlying assumptions on which the program is based. An explicit discussion of assumptions is found in Study XIV. Six studies drew conclusions about the lack of data which had hampered, to some extent, the ability to measure program impacts or about the need for further study.

Eight of the sixteen completed studies containing recommendations made proposals relating to strategic planning. Two made recommendations for the changing or clarification of the program's mandate. Four made recommendations about program continuity, recommendations ranging from the termination of the program (VII), the suspension of the
plans for expansion until certain conditions were met (III) to a recommendation for the continued expansion of the program (X, XI). However, in only one of the four was the recommendation based on the measurement of program impacts.

Twelve of the studies made recommendations relating to operational planning, covering areas such as program delivery, staffing, and the need for both better information and better communication. Six studies make recommendations for further study. Of these six, only two had the presentation of a framework for future evaluation as one of the purposes of the study. For the other four, the need for a recommendation for further study grew out of the study findings.

Generally speaking, the evaluations have fulfilled their stated purposes. However, one notable point is that the evaluation of program impacts has generally meant the identification, not the measurement, of program costs and benefits.

Inventory of evaluation assessments

As with the evaluation studies, the assessments have been identified by number (for the assessments, the number is preceded by EA) and the correspondence between these numbers and the assessments is given in Figure 7-5. There is no connection between the evaluation and assessment numbers. Most of the comments made about the characteristics of evaluation studies in the preceding section apply also to the evaluation assessment inventory. This section will note anything of particular interest in the characteristics of the assessments done at CSC.

An evaluation assessment is described by the OOG as a planning
FIGURE 7-5

List of evaluation assessments

EAI Evaluation Assessment of the Communications Program (CSC), March 1981 - assessment of the headquarters communications program

EAIi Living Unit System, October 1982 - assessment of the living unit correctional model

EAIii Evaluation Assessment of the Private Family Visiting Program, August 1981

EAIiv Evaluation Assessment of the Psychological Service, CSC, June 1982

EAV Evaluation Assessment Report: Security and Intelligence Program, November 1982

EAVi Issues, Options and Costs Related to the Evaluation of the Employment of Inmates Program, May 1982

EAVii Medical and Health Care Service - Evaluation Assessment, October 1982 - assessment of the medical and health care program excluding psychiatric services


EAVix Report of the Evaluation Assessment of the Engineering and Maintenance (Non-capital) Procurement and Stores and Institutional Services Program Components of CSC Technical Services Branch, October 1982
exercise which involves:

an identification of the program-specific evaluation issues to be considered in the assessment and an analysis of the nature and extent to which these evaluation issues can and, perhaps should, be examined in the subsequent evaluation study...[and a consideration of] evaluation options for carrying out the evaluation study. 30

Since the evaluation assessment is a feature of the program evaluation function as it has developed in the last few years, no assessments were done prior to January 1980 when the evaluation function was established in Evaluation and Special Projects Division. All but one of the evaluation studies carried out under the rubric of evaluation were preceded by an evaluation assessment. The exception is Study VIII. The assessment EAll addressed issues relating to only one correctional model and recommended that an evaluation study not be done. Nonetheless, an evaluation was undertaken and the study involved a comparison of four correctional models.

The general characteristics of the evaluation assessments are given in Figure 7-6.

By definition, the client for all the assessments is the Commissioner as the deputy head of the agency. It is interesting to note that only two of the nine assessments were conducted by the evaluation unit, six were conducted by private consultants and one by public consultants. The previous chapter had noted that some E&SP staff suggested that an ideal balance of in-house and contracted out work would see frameworks and assessments done in-house and the evaluation studies contracted out.

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**FIGURE 7-6 INVENTORY OF EVALUATION ASSESSMENTS - GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS**
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design and implementation and the need for better information.

Four of the assessments either recommended an ordered list of evaluation issues or selected certain issues from all those identified in the conclusions. Only two studies comment specifically on the eval-

uability of the program under consideration. One (EAI11) recommended that evaluation be undertaken41 and the other (EAI2) recommended against doing an evaluation.

Summary and Critique

All but one of the evaluation studies carried out under the aegis of program evaluation were preceded by an assessment. None of those done under the rubric of Special Projects were preceded by assessments. The evaluation assessment is useful to identify the relevant questions to be asked in an evaluation study and how these questions are to be answered. Given that special projects are initiated by a specific request for information there is less need for this planning stage and it may be a luxury which time constraints may prohibit. However, in one of these special projects (I), the lack of agreement prior to starting the study on which program impacts were to be measured, and how, resulted in a weak document. A follow-up study (II) presented a more thorough consideration of the important program impacts.

Only two individual studies and the series of studies on inmate employment have not been completed. In addition to considering whether studies, once initiated, are completed it is interesting to note the follow-up to the evaluation assessments. All but one of the assess-
ments recommended plans for an evaluation study; however, of the nine
assessments in the inventory, only four have been followed-up by studies. The evaluation plan is updated periodically to reflect delays in the scheduling of both assessments and studies. Several reasons have been identified for these delays. Firstly, the "fire-fighting" activities of the special projects component of E&SP takes precedence over the evaluation function. One officer indicated that a completed assessment had sat on his desk for some time before he was able to take any action on it. Secondly a follow-up study was then postponed because of the staff reorganization taking place in the unit— the reason for many of the delays currently being experienced by the unit. Thirdly, there is a lack of any formal mechanism for acting on the recommendations of the assessments. When recommendations require some action by the program management before an evaluation study can begin, the evaluation unit is at the mercy of line staff.

The one "success story" in terms of timing is Study IX. The assessment was conducted in three months and the study in six months. However, as will be seen in Chapter 8, there was a high level of commitment by senior management to this study, the program was new, the objectives were clearly stated and, since the Special Projects Division had been responsible for the implementation of the program, conflict with line management was minimized.

If it can be considered that the identification of program impacts constitutes the evaluation of impact, then the studies fulfilled their stated purposes. Only a few of the reports of the evaluations done under the rubric of Special Projects clearly express program objectives. The articulation of objectives has posed a problem for many of
the studies and assessments done as part of the program evaluation function despite much time and effort being spent in trying to reach agreement with program management. However, since the development of the component profiles, the evaluation work can at least begin with some agreement as to program objectives and the theoretical framework of the program.

The analysis of strategic and operational objectives in Chapter 4, showed that none of the programs offered by CSC have an impact, independent of other programs, on the achievement of the overall government policy of protecting the public. Hence, it would be very difficult to attribute any measured impact on the protection of the public to any given correctional program. However, only a few of the evaluation studies even attempted to measure program impacts. Only the plausibility of a link between the programs and policy has been demonstrated by the identification of program impacts.

The methodologies of the evaluations done at CSC have been weak. Very few studies have specified hypotheses, only six used any random selection techniques and, since few specify hypotheses, the question of the success of the operationalization and measurement of dependent and independent variables is meaningless. This supports the findings in Chapter 6 that E&SP evaluation officers are not "technicians". Their standards of success do not revolve around the high technical quality of their evaluation work.

The technical criteria developed for this analysis of the evaluation work at CSC suggest that what Michael Quinn Patton calls the
hypothetico-deductive paradigm is the ideal model of research methodology. Patton finds that this is the dominant paradigm in most evaluative work:

Evaluation research is dominated by the largely unquestioned, natural science paradigm of hypothetico-deductive methodology. This dominant paradigm assumes quantitative measurement, experimental design, and multivariate, parametric statistical analysis to be the epitome of "good" science.42

The prime example of the dominance of this paradigm is, according to Patton, the criteria developed by Ilene Bernstein and Howard E. Freeman for the assessment of the quality of evaluative work. Using their coding of indicators of quality (shown in Appendix D) for the ensemble of evaluation work in the inventories, CSC would not appear to fair very well. However, Patton develops an alternative paradigm derived from the tradition of anthropological field studies. Using the techniques of in-depth, open-ended interviewing and personal observation, the alternative paradigm relies on qualitative data, holistic analysis, and detailed description derived from close contact with the targets of study.43

In many ways the techniques used in the evaluation work at CSC fit closer to this paradigm. An analysis of the characteristics of this alternative paradigm will serve to illustrate this point.

The use of qualitative, rather than quantitative, data responds better to the concern, expressed by some evaluation staff, that it is hard to quantify some of the factors which affect the success of correctional programs. One officer recounted the story of one inmate whose "rehabilitation" was a result of two hard-to-quantify factors. The first was the attitude of the correctional officer who first inter-
viewed him upon arrival at the institution. The second was the fact that the outside instructors in the employment programs of the institution, who carried lunch pails and appeared to be very dull, also appeared to have slept the previous night, a fact which the inmate, who had not slept peacefully for many years, attributed to the presence of a clear conscience. The inmate decided that carrying a lunch pail and going to a regular job was not such a bad idea.

In contrast to the OCC’s emphasis on objectivity, Patton argues for greater subjectivity in evaluative research. Patton states:

A positive view of subjectivity - getting close to and involved with the data (i.e. program staff and clients) - makes it possible for evaluation researchers to take into account their personal insights and behavior.44

Interviews at CSC indicated a concern felt by some that outsiders, who brought greater objectivity to the research, were not, however, in a position to understand fully how or why correctional programs work.

The evaluation unit at CSC has yet to build up credibility within the Service, particularly among program managers. On this matter, Patton claims that "a personalized evaluation that takes the observer close to the data is the only evaluation research likely to be perceived as legitimate by program participants themselves".45 This suggests that evaluations should be based not only on surveys of management staff but also the junior levels of program staff and the inmates themselves.

In the area of correctional programs, where no one program has an independent effect on the achievement of overall government policy
objective and it is very difficult to control for external causal variables, Patton would argue that only a holistic approach to evaluation can provide evaluations that are "relevant and meaningful to the total context".46 However, this is not very feasible given the size of correctional programs and the cost of doing evaluation, even if the experience of the correctional field exhibited by E&SP staff is taken into account.

Patton also places emphasis on the dynamic, as opposed to static, nature of many programs. Since many correctional programs have evolved over the years and have been implemented differently in different areas of the country, the use of a dynamic evaluation is meaningful since it "focuses on the actual operations of a program over a period of time".47 Certainly this has been the case at CSC where many of the evaluations have been process-oriented as opposed to results-oriented.

Finally, Patton argues that the hypothetico-deductive paradigm places more emphasis on inductive reasoning aimed at making generalizations about programs, than on deductive reasoning which allows the researcher to identify the unique features of a given program. In correctional programs it is not enough to know that a program does or does not have an impact on the inmate population in general. To be useful it needs also to identify what has a positive impact on which inmates.

John G. Heilman48 suggests that the two alternative paradigms do not represent, as Patton suggests, "opposing and competing paradigms".49 Heilman argues that there is a middle ground which the eval-
erator must seek in designing an evaluation. One of the reasons Heilman gives to argue that the two paradigms are not mutually exclusive is the fact that even the hypothetico-deductive approach allows for evaluation to be based on the best evidence available. Just because quantitative data is not available does not rule out attempts to approximate the more rigorous techniques.

In addition, Heilman argues that "the logic of deduction and hypothesis applies to intuitive and subjective procedures as well as to pure experimentation". This pattern of the development and subsequent testing of a hypothesis is the same for whichever approach to evaluation is taken. The use of a more qualitative approach is not an excuse for less rigour in the logic of the evaluation.

The use of techniques allowing the researcher to get closer to the data in order to develop a better understanding of the program, can be used equally well in either paradigm. It does not preclude the ultimate use of more quantitative data to support the evaluation findings.

Patton's argument for the alternative paradigm is based on the belief that this interactive approach will lead to greater utilization of the evaluation results. Heilman suggests that this is not necessarily true and that, in fact, the choice of paradigm is more likely to be based on the availability of technical expertise than by a desire to make the evaluation more useful. This would appear to be the case at CSC. The degree to which selected evaluations have been used in the Service will be discussed in the next chapter, but the depth of tech-
nical expertise in the evaluation unit at CSC, as discussed in Chapter 6, would indicate that Patton's alternative paradigm has been particularly suitable.

Finally, Heilman argues that the choice of paradigm should be made on the basis of the purpose of the individual evaluation and that, in fact, there is a logical sequence in the use of the two paradigms. During the implementation stage of any program, the use of a more "formative" type of evaluation, using "softer" evaluative techniques, is more appropriate. "The necessary information is at this stage buried in the perceptions of staff and clients, and is most readily accessible to the subjective and qualitative approach Patton recommends". However, as the program matures and service delivery becomes routine, the evaluator's audience will shift from the management level to the policy-making level. Here, publicly accountable officials will want publicly testable findings on which to base decisions about a program's effectiveness, its social value, and its future status.

This would ultimately lead to the use of "summative" evaluations based on more objective, replicable and experimental designs.

Although many programs at CSC have been in operation for a long time, this does not necessarily qualify them as "mature". Many lack clear objectives and have not been implemented uniformly across the country. At this stage in the development of expertise in the program evaluation function at CSC, and given the state of many correctional programs, a more qualitative approach to evaluation would seem to be appropriate. However, as Heilmann suggests, there is a middle ground between the two paradigms and, as both the evaluation unit and the CSC
programs mature, a shift should be made towards a more quantitative approach to evaluation.

2. One horizontal program is included - Management Information Systems.


4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 2

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.


11. For example, the Education and Training component

12. Curries, Cooper and Lybrand, Definition of Target Outcome Achievement Levels For Three Program Components of the Technical Services Branch (Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada, March 21, 1983)


17. The discussion above of "other initiatives" has indicated some of the activities which have been undertaken by E&SP staff.

18. This is particularly important given the number of officers who indicated that they might return to positions in line management after working in evaluation.

19. However, they were not available for all studies. The limitations of the Project Review System were discussed in Chapter 6.


21. The difficulties of calculating the resources spent on evaluation were discussed in Chapter 6.


23. Study I, p. 27

24. It was noted in Chapter 5 that other studies which were designed to evaluate only the impact on costs were excluded.


28. The one exception was Study IX which was of a pilot project and, therefore, a pre-post design could have been used. This study will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8.

29. Even if the inmate is considered as the "client" of the program, and therefore an external source of information, the majority of the studies were still based on internal sources of information.


31. Study VIII used the Delphi technique to sample the expert opinion of correctional staff.
32. Methods for Determining Program Outcomes, p. 81 See pp. 81-101 for more information on analytical techniques.

33. Ibid., p. 97

34. Ibid., p. 90

35. Ibid., p. 99

36. Ibid., p. 98

37. The recommendations for better information are designed to enhance the operation of the programs, however in two studies (IX,XX) the recommendations for better information collection are for the purposes of further evaluative work.

38. One might suspect that this arises out of the analysts tendency to complain about insufficient data and inadequate methodological tools. See the discussion on the limitations of knowledge in Arnold J. Meltsner, Policy Analysts in the Bureaucracy (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1976) p. 270. However, the author feels that it is a legitimate complaint given that CSC programs have evolved over many years, with no established data base.


40. That is, the OCG Guide on the Program Evaluation Function

41. That recommendation is implicit in the other assessments which present evaluation options.


43. Ibid., p. 204

44. Ibid., pp. 218-9, text in italics in original

45. Ibid., p. 223, text in italics in original

46. Ibid., p. 224

47. Ibid., p. 226


49. Patton, p. 209

50. Heilman, p. 703
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 705
53. Ibid., p. 705
CHAPTER 8

Selected evaluations: Their Impact on Strategic Planning

This chapter looks at the extent to which selected evaluation studies have met the environmental criteria identified in Chapter 5 and assesses the extent to which those evaluation studies have served strategic planning. Measuring the impact of evaluation is less amenable to the cursory analysis that is possible through an inventory of evaluation work. Rather it requires a more in-depth analysis of the assessments and studies.

The studies and assessments which have been chosen are as follows: the two studies on institutional size, the assessment and study of the family visiting program, the assessment and study of the psychiatric program, and finally, the security and intelligence assessment.

These evaluations have been chosen for four main reasons. Firstly, the studies of institutional size and the study of the psychiatric program were identified by the Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) during a speech to the program evaluation community in Ottawa as having been useful in decision-making processes at CSC.1 Secondly, the psychiatric program evaluation and the assessment of the security program were identified in CSC Direction, a major planning document of the Service, as "...definite examples of what the evaluation process can bring to light".2 Thirdly, the assessment and study of the family visiting program and the security program assessment were identified by evaluation staff as their best pieces of work. And, fourthly, since the institutional size studies were done under the rubric
of special projects before 1980, it allows us to look at evaluative work being done before the formal responsibility for doing program evaluation became the responsibility of the Evaluation and Special Projects Division. This more detailed analysis will also be used to highlight some of the technical characteristics which were discussed in the previous chapter, particularly to the extent that these characteristics influence the use or non-use of the evaluation.

Institutional size studies

During the 1960's and early 1970's, federal penitentiary institutions constructed in Canada were designed to house between 400 and 450 inmates. In 1971 a report on the Design of Federal Maximum Security Institutions in Canada (Mohr report) recommended that no maximum security institution house more than 150 inmates, in living units of twelve inmates each. The five-year construction program of CSC, announced in 1974, reflected the recommendations of the Mohr report and outlined a plan to build smaller institutions. In 1977, the MacGuigan report supported the findings of the Mohr report in recommending that new institutions house no more than 200 to 250 inmates.

When the new Commissioner was appointed in late 1977, he found that CSC had embarked on this major construction program without adequate knowledge at headquarters of the number of cells in institutions across the country or the cell vacancy rates. Nor had any work been done on the relative capital and operating costs of small and large institutions or the effect of institutional size on either inmates or CSC programs. Concern was expressed, both at CSC and at Treasury Board,
about the high capital and operating costs of small institutions. In light of the severe economic constraints on government spending at the time, the Bureau of Management Consulting (BMC) was contracted to review the accommodation plan. One of the issues which they were required to address was the identification and measurement of relative correctional benefits of alternative scales of operation. The study to address this issue was contracted out to a firm of private consultants.

The study, *Comparative Survey: Mission Medium Security Institution and Warkworth Institution*, provided a comparison of the costs and benefits of two medium security institutions. The study findings were based on unstructured interviews with institutional staff and inmates during visits of no more than one week to each institution. Data were collected from institutional files and validated by comparing them with data available at headquarters.

The study was methodologically flawed. The findings can be attacked both on their lack of validity and reliability. Validity is concerned with the meaningfulness of the instruments used to measure program outcome. The choice of institutions for the study is open to question. The introduction to the report acknowledges that size is not the only fundamental difference between Mission and Warkworth. They also differ in age. Mission, at the time of the study, had been in operation just over one year, whereas Warkworth had been in existence for over ten years. This significant and potentially fundamental difference is not controlled for in the study. Given the two institutions, comparisons were made of institutional operations, inmate profiles, transfers and releases, compulsory work programs, industry programs and
community involvement. The choice of these instruments to measure program effectiveness was based more on what information was available that on what would provide a meaningful comparison of the two institutions.11

Reliability is concerned with the replicability and consistency of the findings. The use of natural observation and unstructured interviews is a very unreliable form of data collection, depending largely on the expertise of the evaluator. The reliability of the findings is also placed in doubt by the use of internal sources of data only. However, Michael Quinn Patton argues that the dominant paradigm in social research has been overly concerned with reliability while not being concerned enough with validity. Patton quotes Irwin Deutscher who states that "we concentrate on consistency without much concern with what it is we are being consistent about or whether we are consistently right or wrong".12 Patton concludes, though, with the belief that the ideal in both the dominant research paradigm and his alternative is high levels of both validity and reliability and that the difference between the two paradigms is one of emphasis and attention.13 Unfortunately in this study of medium security institutions attention was paid to neither validity nor reliability.

The presentation of the findings is also inadequate. No use is made of tests of significance although the authors attempt to "explain away" any observed differences in the two institutions as not being significant. Most of the graphs and tables can be criticized for, at least their sloppy and confusing presentation and, more seriously
their misleading and selective presentation of facts. Table H\textsuperscript{14} shows work positions filled by inmates at each institution and presents the numbers as a percentage of total inmate population. The conclusion drawn from the data that "compulsory work programs appear to be working equally well at both institutions" does not reflect the fact that the graph shows that at one institution twenty-six percent of inmates are employed in institutional services, designed to serve institutional needs, whereas at the other institution no inmates are employed in these positions. In addition, the table shows, in one institution with a total population of 403, 320 inmates employed and the text accounts for thirty-five inmates not employed. Neither the graph nor the text accounts for the difference of forty-eight inmates. This sloppy presentation does nothing to increase the credibility of the study. The study draws the conclusion that both institutions are "experiencing similar success in achieving...[CSC] objectives"\textsuperscript{15} on the basis of very weak evidence.

This study was followed by another entitled, \textit{Comparison Survey of Collins Bay and Mountain Medium Security Institutions,}\textsuperscript{16} and carried out by the same firm of private consultants. This second study was completed in February 1979. Less ambitious in its approach, it attempted to \textit{identify} rather than \textit{measure} the effects of institutional size. It was, therefore, more successful in identifying the principles which contribute to the CSC objectives. The evaluators used structured interviews with staff and inmates at both institutions and, at one institution, with the Citizen Advisory Committee. Data obtained from the institutions were used to describe operations only, not to measure
effectiveness. The findings of the report are, consequently, less definitive:

Overall the most significant difference that can be directly related to size is the variance in cost per inmate at the institution. While this report does indicate a difference in the level and quality of benefits achieved, such a large cost variance cannot be warranted.

The first study received wide circulation in the field when it was completed in October 1978 and the findings were attacked with regard to both their validity and reliability. Despite a statement in the Executive Summary that "the findings are confined to only two institutions and should not be construed as definitive statements on the differential effectiveness of institutions according to size", the report was used to buttress a decision taken to build larger, rather than smaller, institutions. In December 1978, the Solicitor General announced a cutback in spending on new construction at CSC, a cutback that would lead to the construction of institutions housing 450 inmates. This was done in spite of the recommendation of the MacGuigan report presented just over a year earlier. The Solicitor General supported his decision saying that "a study by the Canadian Correctional Service had found no difference in prisons with 200 men and those with 450." As no other studies measuring effectiveness have been identified for that time period, the study referred to by the Solicitor General must be the comparison of the Mission and Warkworth institutions. Given the economic constraints under which the Service was operating, the construction of small institutions was not a politically feasible option. This study was used to support a controversial decision which the client
had already made to build larger institutions. It can be the role of an analyst to provide "protection for a policy" and "more immediate protection for the policymaker". This is what this study did by providing a "sociological study" to support the client's position.

There is less evidence of the impact of the second study since the decision to build larger institutions had already been announced when the study was completed. However, the study served to address many of the concerns expressed by field staff that the earlier study had not taken into account all the factors which affect the success of a correctional institution.

Much later, the Commissioner identified the institutional size studies as ones which had a significant impact on decision-making. They served to challenge the "sacred cow" that smaller is better. When the studies are placed in the context of CSC in the late 1970's, their major impact seems to be that they alerted the organization to the fact that the Commissioner was serious in his desire to see more headquarters analysis of CSC operations. Arnold J. Meltser refers to this as a shift in environment and, hence, the expectations of the client. "As the environment of policymaking changes, new occupants take over old roles. With each new occupant, different expectations are set. The analysts are supposed to adjust, and so is their analysis."

Even though the decision to build larger institutions was a major one, having a long term impact and involving large expenditures, it was an operational decision. It did not involve any change to the strategic plan of CSC to protect the public by incarcerating offenders.
It addressed the question of how this strategy was to be carried out and, as such, was operational.

**Private family visiting program assessment and study**

The private family visiting program was initiated in 1980 through a pilot project carried out by the special projects component of the Evaluation and Special Projects Division.²⁵ It was designed to enable inmates to visit with family members in a private, home-like setting within the institution. The stated purpose is "to assist in the maintenance of family ties and to prepare inmates for positive reintegration into society".²⁶ When the program was originally announced it received much criticism from inmates on the grounds that it would be a source of frustration for inmates not able to participate and from guards who felt that the whole project amounted to the "mollycoddling" of inmates.²⁷ The experiment was initially established in one maximum security institution but, during the first year of operation and before the evaluation was completed, it was expanded to six more institutions. Senior management at CSC felt that the program offered, for minimal capital and operating costs, an activity which would appeal to the public and so the expansion went ahead without waiting for the results of the evaluation.

The evaluation assessment,²⁸ the purpose of which was to appraise the evaluability of the program and recommend an appropriate level of analysis for the evaluation, was completed within the first year of the operation of the project. It is a "textbook" example of an evaluation assessment in that it covers all the aspects of an assessment.
as identified by the OCG. The report recommends that an evaluation should be done when the visiting units had been in operation for one year and suggests which issues should be considered in the study. In addition, the assessment makes one specific recommendation for the development of an annual report on the program to share information with other program managers.

In June 1982, the Bureau of Management Consulting was contracted to do an evaluation study of the program on the basis of the recommendation of the assessment. It was felt an evaluation would "facilitate the proposed expansion of the program to other institutions".

The methodology outlined for the study indicates that it began with a literature review, the development of "a set of explicit hypotheses", the identification of available data, the development of "a preliminary set of hypotheses and a preliminary methodology" and finally a pre-test at one institution. However, no hypotheses are explicit in the report, nor are the results of the pre-test reported. The hypotheses, which are implicit in the study, are based on the program model developed at the assessment stage.

The section on methodology is very specific about the data collection techniques that were used. Interviews with headquarters staff, on-site observations, questionnaires to, and interviews with, operational staff, telephone surveys to parole offices, program records and statistics from headquarters and institutions were used to document program operations. A demographic and offence history profile of inmates was developed from data available at headquarters and in the
institutions, and structured interviews with participating inmates were used to validate these data and to assess their satisfaction with the program. Data about non-participants were obtained from the institutional files of inmates who had applied from the program but were refused. A very small sample of these inmates were interviewed. The study design called for the use of ten family case studies to assess the impact of the program on the families of participating inmates. However, the Solicitor General did not give permission for the evaluators to contact the families.

The study findings cover both an evaluation of program results and the program process. Among the "results" findings, the discussion of program rationale, draws the conclusion that the program design is "largely compatible with the principles of the opportunities model and the ultimate philosophical goal of rehabilitation". Using the data collection techniques identified, the study develops profiles of participating institutions and inmates. Finally, these data are used to draw conclusions about the impacts and effects of the program on participating inmates, non-participants, families and the institutions. The "process" considerations focus on an evaluation of the implementation of the program to help "in planning the expansion of the program". A detailed outline of possible future evaluation strategies is also presented. The study concludes with ten policy recommendations which cover such areas as the eligibility criteria, the policy of cost recovery and alternate uses of the family visiting units, and eleven operational recommendations relating to information reporting and accounting proce-
dures, the equipping of the family visiting units, and information sharing with families.

The study report is generally thorough, well-documented and well-presented. The evaluators are aware of, and state clearly in the report, the limitations of the study with regard to the long-term impacts of the program. However, the inability to interview the families of participants is a serious shortcoming in the assessment of the short-term impacts of the program and its ability to meet even the program's objectives. The decision not to interview the families was based on the fear that they might assume the program was being cancelled and start to lobby for the continuation of the program. In light of the professed belief throughout the evaluation that the program was going to be expanded and that its future was never in doubt, this seems to have been an unnecessary fear.

A few weaknesses mar this otherwise adequate report. No use of tests of significance is reported in the study even though the evaluators draw conclusions such as "the institutions studied have a significantly higher percentage of individuals incarcerated for offenses [sic] against the person and robbery". Non-participant data were collected from only those inmates who had applied for the program and had been refused. This limitation might introduce a negative bias to the assessment of the program. The sample size for the interviews of non-participants was also very small. There is also evidence of some sloppy and perhaps misleading presentation of facts. Institutional offences are the only concrete indicators, in institutional data, of inmate behaviour. Offences, prior to, and after, the program are com-
pared in the following table from the section on the impact of the program on participating inmates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Major offense</th>
<th>Minor offense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inmates with offenses</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>before first visit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inmates with offenses</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after first visit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following text is given below the table: "Individuals' records were checked for the last three years, but the time since their first visit was one year at the most. This difference in time frames introduces another element of uncertainty".37

The conclusion is drawn that "among participating inmates, the incidence of offenses [sic] after the first visit is lower than before the visit".38 If it can be assumed from the text below the table, that offences prior to the family visit were measured over a two year period and that the offences after the visit were measured over a one year period - a fact which is not obvious from the table - then the average annual number of major offences prior to the visit is approximately twenty-five and after the first visit is twenty-six. The average annual number of minor offences is fourteen prior to the first visit and nine after. This would hardly be evidence of any positive effect of the program on institutional offences. It is certainly more than "an element of uncertainty".

The evaluation study was submitted to, and considered by, SMC, and it also received wide circulation among program management both at
headquarters and in the field. Program managers in Offender Programs Branch (responsible for Offender Case Management programs) at headquarters found it to be a good and useful report. This was in contrast to an earlier attempt to evaluate an Offender Case Management program, the evaluation of which had been the subject of much controversy. The Offender Programs Branch prepared for SMC a response supporting the adoption of most of the study recommendations and SMC accepted all those supported by the program management. Offender Programs Branch is currently preparing a plan to implement the various recommendations.

The family visiting program is expanding rapidly. Program management felt that this expansion would have happened anyway and was in no way a result of the evaluation. However, the use of evaluation to reduce uncertainty or provide a better information base for program operations is recognized in the literature as a real impact of the evaluation process. The family visiting program evaluation has resulted in changes to program policy and operations. The study attempted to show the plausibility of links between program impacts and the overall policy of the protection of the public but was not able to demonstrate the extent to which causal relationships actually exist. In light of this and the fact that program continuity was not in question, it can be said that the evaluation's impact on strategic planning was minimal.

The fact that the decision to expand the program was taken before the evaluation results were known is an indication of the level of commitment at CSC to the program despite the initial negative reaction of both inmates and guards. The evaluation served as a public
relations tool to demonstrate the success of the program. Program management expressed agreement with the public nature of the evaluation report since it could be used to promote a better public understanding of the program.

It is important also to note that this evaluation is considered, within CSC, to be the most successful program evaluation produced by the evaluation unit. This is largely because it followed in the wake of a very controversial evaluation of another offender program and the goodwill generated among program managers was an additional benefit of this evaluation. It is important that a unit to do some quick and easy evaluations that demonstrate the usefulness of the unit to the organization. This had not been done during the first years of operation of the evaluation unit at CSC. However, "even units that have been in operation for several years still do quickies to develop and improve relations with other officials and demonstrate an ability to meet deadlines and work on timely issues".

However, the private family visiting program is not a "program" in the same sense as the other "programs" identified in the CSC evaluation plan but would be more accurately described as a project within the social and recreational program component. In proposing a plan for a future evaluation of the long-term impacts of the program, the study itself recognizes the difficulty of controlling for participation in other family visiting programs when trying to measure the effects of this particular project. The success of this evaluation study, even though it did not measure long-term effects, can be attri-
buted largely to the fact that it attempted to evaluate a small part of
the program component — a more "chewable chunk" than the programs iden-
tified in the evaluation plan. A consultant stated this fact succinctly
when he argued that the more you trivialize the program, the greater are
your chances of success.

Psychiatric services program assessment and study

One initiative of the original Evaluation and Analysis Divi-
sion was an assessment of the medical services program at CSC. The
Bureau of Management Consulting was contracted to design an evaluation
study that met the requirements of the OCG. The design that they recom-
mended involved the development of a profile of the health characteris-
tics of inmates as well as the identification of a number of operational
level issues for consideration. A firm of private consultants pre-
presented a proposal to BMC to do a pilot project based on this design.
This proposal was rejected by CSC because of the expense and because it
addressed fundamental questions about the program which CSC saw as
unalterable. The questions were considered inappropriate even though
they questioned program rationale and represented the types of questions
that the OCG liked to see considered in an evaluation, CSC shrinked
away from asking questions which would have addressed strategic con-
cerns. The proposal was finally dropped.

By this time, evaluation was the responsibility of the Evalua-
tion and Special Projects Division. The possibility of an evaluation of
the health care program, as it was then called, arose again and another
firm of private consultants was contracted to do an evaluation assess-
ment. This assessment was to identify issues and propose study methodologies and options for an evaluation. During the course of the assessment, the consultants were requested to postpone their work on the health care component as a whole, and work on an evaluation of the psychiatric services part of the component. The need for an evaluation of psychiatric services arose from concern at CSC as to whether to proceed with plans for the construction of a regional psychiatric centre in the Ontario Region. This construction program represented a major expenditure at a time of severe economic restraint.

It was agreed by program management and the Evaluation Liaison Committee that the evaluation would look principally at operational matters:

[The] primary purpose of the evaluation would be to provide information which would facilitate the optimization of the organization and delivery of psychiatric services, rather than the assessment of quality of care being provided.

The assessment was completed in October 1981 and it identified several major issues including the comparison of the existing regional psychiatric centres and a specific question about the proposed facility in Ontario.

The evaluation study was contracted to another firm of private consultants. The specific question about the Ontario regional centre was not considered to be a suitable evaluation question and was dropped from the issues to be considered. Instead, the study was designed to address the issues in more general terms - the needs of inmates, clientele for psychiatric programs, programs required, management and organi-
zational questions, staff requirements, program delivery alternatives and issues for further study in an attempt to bring the study into line with the OCG's approach to evaluation. The study's stated purpose was to meet the needs of the OCG, senior management and the Medical and Health Care Services Branch of CSC.49

According to program management, the issues in the delivery of a psychiatric service program proved to be more complex than the consultants had realized and they required an extension of time to complete the study. One senior manager described the process by suggesting that the evaluation unit had done all the work and the consultants were merely the scribes. But to be fair to the consultants they were under extreme pressure to produce recommendations which were acceptable to senior management and were closely monitored through the Liaison Committee and the Evaluation Steering Committee.50

The consultants finally produced a voluminous report containing much technical detail relating to psychiatric diseases and programs. They made twenty-six recommendations, most of which were related to program delivery in keeping with the purpose for the evaluation stated at the assessment stage. A few recommendations dealt with the need for more data, two related to changes necessary to the program mandate and objectives, and two related to changes in funding and program continuity.

The recommendations were based on interviews with headquarters, regional and institutional staff and the expertise of the consultants in the field of psychiatry. Data were collected mainly from CSC files. The evaluation contains no new measurement of the psychiatric
needs of inmates, relying solely on a theoretical discussion of psychiatric problems. No measurement was made of the impact of the current services on inmates or of the quality of the services offered. This is in keeping with the stated purpose for the evaluation. However, the study does draw conclusions about the kind of services that should be offered to inmates. One specific recommendation deals with the establishment of mental health teams at the institutional level to make assessments, recommend and coordinate treatment, make referrals to regional psychiatric centres, arrange follow-up and advise senior management.

The study does not deal specifically with the issue of the proposed psychiatric centre in Ontario but proposes three levels of care:

- ambulatory (primary) care to be delivered on an outpatient basis, largely by the mental health teams, in the institutions;
- in-patient (secondary) care to be delivered in institutional health care centres; and
- long-term (tertiary) care to be delivered in regional psychiatric centres independent of the institutions.

To avoid a specific recommendation on how the three levels of care should be developed, and in light of the lack of data about the specific requirements of inmates, the study recommended that a series of pilot studies be initiated by CSC to develop data to determine:

the feasibility of operating local psychiatric units in institutions, the requirement for tertiary psychiatric beds...[and] the demand for institutional psychiatric beds and outpatient psychiatric treatment.
The evaluation report was the subject of considerable controversy within CSC. It was generally considered to be inadequate and has not been given wide circulation. Program and senior management agreed to try to salvage as much as they could from the report. The recommendations have been "massaged" to back the decision taken not to build the regional psychiatric centre in Ontario. The evaluation study has been credited, therefore, with saving CSC $40 million in capital construction costs alone. The decision not to build was based on the recommendation to develop mental health teams, which CSC saw as a move towards more multidisciplinary community-based care, as opposed to purely psychiatric care. The consultants' recommendation for the establishment of a pilot project to determine the relative balance between the three levels of care has not been implemented. Many of the other recommendations were "motherhood issues" which were in the process of being considered, or have since been considered. A few, such as changes to staffing levels and pay of psychiatrists, had already been rejected in the past and have not been reconsidered.

In a speech to the Ottawa-Hull Program Evaluation Community in November 1982, the Commissioner identified this evaluation study as one of two studies which had had a major impact on decision-making at CSC. From the analysis of the study itself, it appears that the impact was not directly related to the study recommendations. Although the decision not to build was important in terms of money, it was an operational decision not a strategic decision. It does not address the question of whether or not the psychiatric services program responds to the
overall government objective of protecting the public. Even the shift in direction of psychiatric care to multi-disciplinary institutional units does not represent a shift in the strategy of CSC. It represents a shift in how the Service fulfills its operational goal of providing psychiatric services to inmates.

**Security and intelligence assessment**

The program component of CSC which is subject to the most "sacred cows" or myths is the security and intelligence component. An essential step in the evaluation process which is often not explicitly explored is the development of an understanding of the rationale and structure of a program by examining the underlying assumptions. The evaluation assessment of this component examines the underlying concepts and assumptions which form the rationale for the security and intelligence activities of CSC. In addition to this analysis of the program component, the assessment develops, in greater detail, the component profile and identifies relevant evaluation questions and options for answering them.

The assessment report\(^{59}\) is based on a literature review, a review of administrative files and extensive consultation with program management both at headquarters and in the regions. An early draft of the report was circulated to obtain feedback from program management on the program description, the analysis of assumptions, and the range of evaluation questions of interest to them. Serious delays were experienced throughout the assessment stage\(^ {60}\) due to the extensive consultation with program management and a lack of staff resources in the Evaluation Department.
tion and Special Projects Division which carried out the evaluation assessment.

The thirty-three assumptions that are discussed lead to the identification of twenty-three evaluation questions. An additional fifty-four questions are added relating to program results. A further fifteen questions were identified during the consultation with program management. These ninety-two questions are grouped together into fifteen options for evaluation studies on the basis of management priorities, the availability of data, and the data collection techniques required. Terms of reference for each of the options are outlined in an appendix to the report.

The assessment is a very thorough analysis of the program and the final report presents specific plans as to how an evaluation study could be carried out. As noted above, the assessment report received wide circulation during preparation. However, it seems to be perceived more as an "academic" exercise than a useful pre-evaluation document. One manager acknowledged that the impact of the assessment had largely been that it "made managers think" - it affected their perception of the problem of security. The usefulness of the assessment to CSC was identified in *CSC Direction* as follows:

For the first time, because of evaluation work, CSC’s oldest and most "myth shrouded" program, Security, has developed a comprehensive statement of underlying philosophy and operating assumptions. The "testable hypotheses" that have resulted mean that Senior Management can question and measure basic operating assumptions and hence program success.

In spite of the stated belief that the assessment resulted in "testable
hypotheses", no work has yet begun on an evaluation study. This is mainly a result of the restaffing process which the evaluation Division is currently undergoing.

We have seen from the evaluation studies analyzed in this chapter, that those identified as having had a major impact on decision-making arose out of a specific information requirement. It may be that the security and intelligence assessment was carried out more to satisfy central agency requirements than to respond to any particular information need of the client and that this is why an evaluation study has not been started to date. However, recent incidents of violence in the Ontario Region have pushed the issue of security even more to the forefront and it is expected that an evaluation of at least some part of the security and intelligence component will be a priority for the Division when staffing is completed.

Summary

Of the three studies that have been discussed in this chapter, two - the institutional size studies and the psychiatric services evaluation - have had major impacts on decision-making. Both impacts have been at the operational level and neither was adequately substantiated by the evaluation findings. The third study was reasonably well substantiated but it was done of a smaller analytical unit than the other two evaluations. Recommendations from this study were useful at the operational planning level but the decision about program continuity, which if substantiated in the study, would have reflected the impact on strategic planning, had already been made and was not influenced by the
Those evaluation studies which had a significant impact on planning - albeit at the operational level - arose out of a specific information need of senior management. In the case of the institutional size studies, it was the need for information about the effectiveness of alternative scales of operation to support a decision to build larger institutions. In the case of the psychiatric services evaluation, it was a need for information to support the postponement of the construction of a regional psychiatric centre for the Ontario Region. The reasons behind the initiation of these studies did not address questions of strategic planning. The primary information need was not for an assessment of the extent to which the program met overall government policy objectives but rather for information to support decisions on how to meet the operational objectives of CSC. This is the kind of information which senior management wanted from the evaluation process. The first study was carried out as a special project, the second study was part of the evaluation plan established for CSC in compliance with the central agency requirement to do program evaluation. Therefore, it is interesting to note that the difference between the two studies is only one of format. The psychiatric services evaluation report is structured to meet the requirements outlined by the OCG that an evaluation address one or more of the questions of rationale, impacts and effects, objective achievement and program alternatives without actually seriously addressing these questions.

The analysis of the organizational profile of the evaluation
unit in Chapter 6 indicated a high level of political skills among evaluation staff. These skills were necessary, particularly in the psychiatric services evaluation, in order to discern the real needs of the decision-maker while still producing a document which would be acceptable in terms of the central agencies requirements for program evaluation.

Two of the studies for the in-depth analysis were chosen because they were identified by CSC as having had an impact on decision-making. In this sense they are not typical of the other evaluation studies identified in the inventory. However, the techniques used in these evaluations are typical of those used in all of the evaluation studies. We have seen from the analysis of techniques in Chapter 7 and from the analysis of impacts in this chapter, that reports do not have to be technically sophisticated, nor even technically correct, to have an impact. It is more important that the study address a particular information need in order to ensure that it have an impact.

The conclusions of this chapter concur with those reached by Michael Patton and his colleagues in a study of twenty health program evaluations. They identified two major factors affecting the utilization of evaluation findings. The first - political considerations - they had anticipated and they come to the conclusion that in order for a study to be used, the evaluator must take into consideration the fact that "social science research rarely produces clear-cut findings. Findings must be interpreted, and interpretation is partly a political process - a value-laden process where truth is partially a matter of whose priorities are being reviewed". The second consideration - the
personal factor - was unanticipated. It is made up of "equal parts of leadership, interest, enthusiasm, determination, commitment, aggressiveness, and caring". Their findings emphasized the importance of the decision-maker being interested in and committed to the evaluation studies in order to assure their use. However, methodological quality was not found to be an important factor affecting the utilization of the evaluation. Quinn et al. conclude that "there is little in our data to suggest that improving methodological quality in and of itself will have much effect on increasing the utilization of evaluation research".

Chapter 4 identified characteristics of the correctional setting which are perceived to have an impact on the evaluation process at CSC. The importance of these characteristics is reflected in some of the findings of this analysis of evaluation work. The fact that programs have been in operation for a long time and have evolved rather than been planned and that the Service is a very decentralized operation has slowed down the evaluation process because of the need to undertake extensive consultations with all levels of program management. The lack of agreement on program objectives and the lack of uniform program implementation has led to a reliance on Patton's alternative paradigm of research methodology. This situation will continue during the "first round" of program evaluations at CSC. It is to be hoped that once program objectives are adequately specified the evaluation unit will be able to shift towards a more rigorous methodology.

Given the lack of rigorous methodology we can see why the perception of a lack of "hard data" in a correctional setting has not
been dispelled by the evaluation work done at CSC. Data collection techniques have relied heavily on secondary data and little effort has been made to collect primary data about program impacts. This is partly due to the lack of "maturity" of CSC programs. However, it is also due to the lack of commitment by decision-makers to ask questions which would require more sophisticated research techniques. Their commitment to knowing how effective correctional programs are is not strong enough to allow the expenditure of the considerable sums of money that would be required for this sort of research.

This also explains the marked reluctance at CSC to interview inmates or the public about correctional programs. The high profile of the organization makes it very sensitive to criticism from interest groups. Even the evaluation of the family visiting program which was designed, in part, to supply information to publicly justify the program did not question inmates' families about their perceptions of the program. Decision-makers do not want to know what external sources feel about correctional programs enough to risk "rocking the boat" to find out. Since there has been so little experience at CSC with interviewing inmates, it is impossible to tell whether or not they make reliable witnesses to the impact of correctional programs.

Though some of the constraints to evaluation inherent in a correctional setting may be overcome with time, some will not change unless there is a stronger commitment by senior management to the evaluation process.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER 8


3. For example, Springfield Medium Security, Nova Scotia; Warkworth Medium Security, Ontario; and Archambault Maximum Security, Quebec.


5. For a good discussion of the impact of institutional size, see David P. Farrington, Prison Size and Program Success (Ottawa: Communications Branch CSC, May 1981).


8. The other BMC studies addressed the issues of the identification of practical alternative scales of operation, their relative costs and recommendations for action.


10. The report is not specific about what data were used for the comparison and, given that the inadequacy of headquarters' data was one of the reasons for the study, this comparison would seem to be an inadequate way to validate study findings.

11. For example, the study showed the number of inmates released on parole or mandatory supervision as a percentage of total institutional population instead of as a percentage of total inmates eligible for parole under regulations affecting all institutions. (p. 20)

13. Patton, p. 230


15. Ibid., p. 30.


17. Ibid., pp. 1-2

18. "Prisons get larger as spending cuts hit reform plans", Globe and Mail, 13 December 1978, p. 8. See also "Penitentiaries commissioner sees no benefits, only higher costs in building smaller prisons", Globe and Mail, 1 January 1979, p. 9, in which Commissioner says "a sociological study of two medium-security prisons - a new one at Mission, BC, that holds fewer than 200 men and an older one at Warkworth, Ontario that holds 450 - found no substantial difference. In fact, the advantage if any was slightly on the side of Warkworth because you could offer a greater variety of programs in the larger institution."

19. The other studies carried out in the BMC review of the accommodation plan did not address questions of effectiveness. For example, the Cost Comparison of Institutions analyzed in more detail the operating and maintenance costs of the four institutions.

20. For an example of the controversy which this decision engendered, see "Editorial: Maximum Security Penitentiaries", Canadian Journal of Criminology, Vol 21, No 1 (January 1979)


22. It is interesting to note that despite the obvious flaws in the report, the study was not confidential. It was initially published by the Policy, Planning and Administration Branch in October 1978 and then reprinted by the Communication Branch in May 1981 and is readily available to the public.

23. Yeomans, "Program Evaluation - Within CSC"

24. Meltsner, p. 224
25. Neither the evaluators nor the program management questioned what could be a perceived lack of objectivity since the Evaluation and Special Projects Division was responsible both for the implementation and the evaluation.

26. Bureau of Management Consulting, Evaluation Study of the Private Family Visiting Program, CSC, (Ottawa: BMC Project No 2-3785, January 1983) Section II B. Note the pages of the study were not numbered. All references will, therefore, be made to the relevant Section numbers.

27. See "Prisoners vow to shut door on overnight visit program", Globe and Mail, 16 August 1980, p. 4.


30. Evaluation Study of the Private Family Visiting Program, CSC, Section I.

31. Ibid., Section III.

32. The report states that "10 selected inmates" were sampled. It is not specific about how the inmates were selected. Section III D.

33. This despite the fact that the study reveals that of the 63 individuals with whom family follow-up would be feasible, 57 gave us consent to contact their families", Section III, E.

34. Ibid., Section IV, A.

35. Ibid., Section VIII.

36. Ibid., Section V - underlining not in text.

37. Ibid., Section VII, A.

38. Ibid., Section VII, A.


40. Program management expect to have units in 20 institutions by summer of 1984.


43. Evaluation Study of the Family Visiting Program, CSC, Section XI, B, 2

44. Prince, p. 153

45. For example, inmates' right of access to medical services, treatment practices of doctors, and federal-provincial agreements on psychiatric services.

46. Regional psychiatric centres already existed in three of the five regions.

47. A sub-committee of the Medical and Health Care Advisory Committee, which reports directly to the Commissioner. The sub-committee included psychiatrists from across the country.


50. A committee made up of representatives of the evaluation unit, the policy branch and the program branch.

51. _A Program Evaluation for Psychiatric Services in CSC_, p. XIII-8

52. Ibid., p. XIII-8

53. Ibid., p. XIII-29

54. It was described as an attempt to use the "opportunities model" on the report in order to see what good could come out of the report.

55. It is evident that the study was not the only input into the decision not to build. The Medical and Health Care Advisory Committee was also against the construction of the centre.

56. _CSC Direction_, p. 12 Program management suggest that the study was, therefore, worth the over $178,000 spent on the study alone. (Cost figures were provided by the Evaluation and Special Projects Division.)
57. For example, a move to accreditation and maintenance of appropriate psychiatric standards.

58. Yeomans, "Program Evaluation - Within CSC"


60. The assessment began in April 1981 and was not completed until November 1982.

61 See Prince, p. 177-8

62. CSC Direction, p. 12

63. Although it did not have a significant impact on any major decisions, the evaluation of the private family visiting program is considered by both senior and program management to be a good evaluation because it responds to a particular need for information to publically justify what had been a contentious program.


65. Ibid., p. 151

66. Ibid., p. 155

67. Ibid., p. 151
PART III

CHAPTER 9

Program Evaluation: Conclusions and Lessons

The purpose for this thesis was two-fold – an analysis of the development of the program evaluation function in the Canadian public service and how this function has been established and is operating in one federal agency, the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC). These conclusions will relate some of the lessons learned from the experience of evaluation in one agency to the development of the evaluation function at the Office of the Comptroller General (OCG) and to the future prospects for evaluation in the federal public service.

The discussion of the literature on evaluation identified three conflicting demands on a self-evaluating organization – one was the pull towards rigorous social science research; the second, the necessity to make evaluations useful to a decision-making process; and the third, the imperatives of the bureaucratic setting within which an evaluation unit must function. It was argued that each of these demands had to be balanced when establishing an evaluation function either at the central agency level or at the departmental level. These demands often clash. Rigorous research is time consuming but, in order to be useful to a decision-making process, results must be timely. Rigorous research looks at all the alternatives but the decision-making process wants to consider only feasible alternatives. Rigorous research requires that the evaluator be independent of program management but, to ensure survival, the evaluator must avoid conflict with program manage-
ment. Organizational survival requires that the evaluators continually create a demand for their services but in the decision-making process, requirements may be sporadic. These represent but a few of the possible clashes between the three components.

The shift in the policy on program evaluation in the Canadian federal government can be explained as a shift in the balance between these three competing demands.

The Auditor General (AG), in his attempt to expand the role of his Office in "value-for-money" auditing, pushed the federal government to establish a formal effectiveness evaluation policy for government departments and agencies. The government responded with the Treasury Board Circular 1977-47 which proposed a policy to formalize and coordinate the various evaluative activities which were already going on in federal departments and agencies. Influenced by the failure of earlier attempts by the Treasury Board to do macro-level social science research evaluations, the authors steered away from presenting a policy which was too prescriptive, instead relying on the range of mechanisms already in existence for doing evaluations. These eclectic groups were to be encouraged to provide information on the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of departmental programs to deputy ministers for the purposes of operational decision-making and accountability. The emphasis was placed on measuring the extent to which programs met program objectives. This policy placed emphasis on the use of evaluation in the operational decision-making process in order that government departments might be held accountable for the management of their programs. Certain evaluation groups had already managed to achieve organizational survival and
had developed their own methodologies for doing evaluations. What was needed was a policy to formalize the role of evaluation for deputy ministerial decision-making.

Not satisfied with existing evaluation mechanisms in the federal bureaucracy, the Auditor General pushed for the appointment of a Comptroller General as the chief financial administrator of the federal public service to ensure the economic, efficient and effective management of government expenditures. Once the OCG was created, organizational survival became very important and the role of evaluation in the decision-making process changed. In order to ensure the survival of the OCG and evaluation it was necessary to establish program evaluation as a unique function, independent of those other staff functions upon which the original policy had relied, and with a recognized field of expertise.

Certain characteristics of the policy are designed to ensure survival by establishing an infrastructure for doing evaluation, developing training opportunities for evaluation staff, requiring that evaluation be done on a cyclical basis and integrating the function into the management process of government. The Guide on the Program Evaluation Function specifies that evaluation should be carried out by a special evaluation unit independent of other staff functions and line management; that it should address at least some "higher order" questions about programs; that it should be an integral part of the overall Policy and Expenditure Management System; and, that the OCG should play an advisory role in helping departments do evaluations. The development
of such an infrastructure created high expectations for the function as a mechanism for addressing fundamental questions about government programs. However, this begs the question of whether the idea of an evaluation function to serve the deputy head by asking these fundamental questions is a good idea—one for which it was worth ensuring survival.

Program evaluation was to be geared not only to measuring the achievement of program objectives but also the achievement of policy objectives. That is, it was designed to serve not only operational planning but also strategic planning. The policy, as outlined in the Guide, is more specific about the kinds of questions to be addressed in the evaluation process, how they should be addressed, and what use should be made of the evaluation findings.

Although not specific about research methodologies, the Guide emphasizes that evaluations should be "systematic," studies should be "verifiable" and present "demonstrable evidence" about program results. The emphasis on reasonable rigour has not been supported by the actions of the OCG to date. It has been preoccupied with establishing an infrastructure for doing evaluations. An emphasis on quality is expected to come later.

The conclusion to the chapter on the development of the program evaluation function suggested that how one interprets this policy shift depends on whether or not one believes evaluation can serve strategic planning. The case study in Part II suggests that the role for program evaluation in the strategic decision-making process is based on unrealistic assumptions about the information needs or wants of deputy ministers. The function is based on the assumption that deputy minis-
ters want to know if departmental programs are meeting overall government policy objectives. Even if it can be assumed that deputy ministers would like to know more about the rationale, impacts and effects, objective achievement of and alternatives to the program, is this a top priority, given the limited resources available for evaluation? Are not deputy ministers more fundamentally concerned with questions of program efficiency than program effectiveness? Since resource constraints require that they be selective about evaluation, would they not rather pay for information on immediate operational problems? Aaron Wildavsky argues that leaders of self-evaluating organizations must become selective evaluators. They must prohibit the massive use of organizational resources where they see little chance of success. They must seek out problems that are easy to solve, and changes that are easy to make, because they do not involve radical departures from the past.²

Thus leaders require information to make essentially incremental changes to programs and are not really concerned with strategic level questions. As Leonard Rutman expresses it:

There are...severe limitations in using program evaluation for budgeting, planning, and management decisions. The "ideal" of comprehensive rational decision-making...is rare in the "real" world. Instead, the process appears to be that of "muddling through" or disjointed incrementalism...From the management perspective, the emphasis is placed on fast feedback of information to facilitate improvements of currently operating programs.³

The attempt by the OCG to develop program evaluation into something more than a tool for operational decision-making is an attempt to redefine the information needs or wants of deputy ministers.
The analysis of the evaluation function in the Correctional Service of Canada has shown that those studies, which had a significant impact on decision-making were ones designed to respond to a specific information need about program operations. One was done under the rubric of a special project, prior to the establishment of the evaluation function at CSC, and the second was done as a program evaluation. Both of these studies provided input to a major operational decision. A third study, while not resulting in major decisions, provided information to improve program operations. Even without a formal evaluation function, those questions of importance to deputy ministers will be answered. The review of the application of various evaluative techniques used at CSC served to illustrate the scope of analytic work being done prior to the establishment of the program evaluation function. The department has progressed from little, or no, analytic work being done at headquarters prior to 1978 to having a well-developed internal audit function and performance measurement system which regularly supplies operational information to senior management. The major gap in the information requirements of both the department and government-wide processes was in the area of information about program results with respect to the Service's objective to prepare inmates for their return, as useful citizens, to the community. That is, information about the extent to which this strategy identified for CSC met the overall government policy objective of protecting the public.

When the program evaluation function was established by the OCG it was designed to fill this gap in management information needs.
However, the program evaluation experience at CSC indicates that evaluation has not served strategic planning. It has, however, been successful in having an impact on operational planning in the Service because this is where management information needs lie. The evaluation unit has adapted to the requirements of the decision-making process by providing information which the deputy minister, as the client, wanted for his decision-making purposes.

This does not negate the importance of evaluation. Thomas Dye's definition of public policy argues that policy includes both what government chooses to do and not to do. The two studies which had major impacts on decision-making were, in fact, providing information to support decisions not to do things which had been recommended in the Parliamentary Sub-Committee's report on Penitentiaries. This represents a significant use of evaluation to justify decisions taken in areas of controversy. In times of restraint perhaps this use of evaluation information is a more likely outcome of the evaluation process than the justification of cutbacks in existing programs.

Although this thesis focuses on the use of program evaluation to strategic planning, we cannot dismiss other possible uses of evaluation. Patton suggests the following epitaph for evaluation:

Didn't change the course of history,
But certainly I did live.
I was put in for input
And input I did give.

Other inputs have been identified in our analysis - the use of evaluation reports for public relations and for promoting the evaluation function itself. Perhaps the most significant input at CSC has been the
use of evaluation findings to "make managers think", to help them become aware of why they are doing what they do and how it relates to the overall objectives of the Service.

The evaluation unit at CSC has placed much emphasis on its own survival. Many officers feel that it continues to survive because of the central agency requirement for evaluations. Emphasis has not been placed on high quality work because the unit has not had the technical skills necessary to do so and, to date, this has not been a priority of the OCG. The CSC unit has been struggling with a lack of technically competent staff, difficult interorganizational relations with program management, and a lack of credibility within the organization. Like other policy planning and research units, the CSC unit has paid considerable attention to organizational survival and promoting and protecting itself in the organizational jungle. It has devoted much of its energy to getting along with program and senior management and less to the independent assessment of programs called for in the program evaluation policy.

Like the OCG, the evaluation unit at CSC has placed more importance on organizational survival than on the development of rigorous social science research techniques. However, the CSC unit has adapted to the decision-making requirements of the deputy minister for operational planning information and has largely ignored the requirements of the OCG to provide demonstrable evidence of the extent to which programs have met policy objectives. Leonard Rutman suggests that although the use of evaluation for operational decision-making rather than accountability has led to more emphasis being put on relevance than
methodological rigour

It does not make sense to put the relevance of information on the side of the management perspective and relate methodological rigor to accountability requirements. These are not polar extremes. Relevant information that has little assurance of being technically reliable and valid is of questionable value for management. Similarly, irrelevant information produced through rigorous methods is not suitable for accountability. The obvious resolution is to strive for methodologically sound evaluations that are relevant.

Analyzing the program evaluation function at CSC at this time can be compared to doing a program evaluation during a program's implementation phase. John Heilman has suggested that during program implementation, Michael Patton's alternative paradigm of research methodology which relies on "qualitative data, holistic analysis and detailed description derived from close contact with the targets of the study" is particularly appropriate. This was the approach taken to the research for this thesis. Through informal contact with the staff of the unit and the use of both structured and unstructured, open-ended interviews, an impressionistic view was obtained of the functioning of the evaluation unit. Yet, this research paradigm has recognized weaknesses since it stresses the validity of the research more than its reliability. The three categories of criteria for assessing the evaluation function were valid as a framework for the research. However, some of the specific questions in the technical criteria were not entirely appropriate since they were too sophisticated for the type of evaluative analysis being done at CSC. The three categories did cover all aspects of the work of the unit.
In order to generalize the hypothesis that program evaluation does not serve strategic planning in any department, it is important to speculate on whether or not the CSC program evaluation function is typical of the functions in other departments. The research was restricted to CSC, so any comments are purely speculation. Chapter 4 outlines some of the particular characteristics of the correctional setting for evaluation which would suggest that CSC may not be typical of other departments. Despite a general belief that there is a shortage of qualified evaluation personnel in Ottawa, some departments have, by reason of somewhat higher classifications for the working level positions within their evaluation units, been able in the early years to attract highly qualified personnel. In this too, CSC is not like some other departments. However, the findings of the Auditor General in his recent audit of the program evaluation functions in nineteen federal departments and agencies lead to the conclusion that CSC may, in fact, not be atypical. He found that the basic infrastructure for doing evaluation was in place in most departments, that evaluations were being done, but that they were methodologically weak, and there was a shortage of qualified personnel for doing evaluations.10

The evaluation function at CSC is still struggling to establish itself within the organization. Nevertheless, as the unit completes the first round of evaluations, and program objectives become clearer, and as the unit is staffed by people with more evaluation experience, the quality of evaluations should improve. Whether they will then address questions relating to strategic planning will depend
on the desire of senior management to know how well their correctional programs are responding to their overall policy of protecting the public.

The extent to which a deputy minister is likely to be interested in evaluation for strategic planning depends largely on external pressures put on him or her by central agencies, the Auditor General and ultimately Parliament.

In 1976, Douglas Hartle lamented the fact that while the former Planning Branch of Treasury Board was trying to convince departments to develop internal performance measurement systems to provide information for the government-wide resource allocation process, the Program Branch of Treasury Board was making recommendations on resource allocation without consideration of the given performance measurement information. The same problem may plague the program evaluation function unless the Cabinet policy committees and Treasury Board Secretariat require evaluation information to support departmental strategic planning. In his latest annual report to Parliament, the Auditor General noted that very few departments reported evaluation findings in Strategic Overviews. This was certainly the case at CSC. Until evaluations of strategic level questions are required for the government-wide program design and resource allocation process, they are unlikely to be taken seriously by deputy ministers.

The interest of the Auditor General in program evaluation is restricted by legislation to ensuring that the mechanisms for doing effectiveness evaluation are in place in federal departments and agencies. From the role which he played in shaping the function in the Canadian government, it is obvious that his emphasis has been on program
accountability and less on the use of evaluation in strategic decision-making. In 1983, the Auditor General reported on the status of program evaluation in the federal government in a guarded but optimistic way since the function has made considerable progress in establishing itself organizationally within the federal bureaucracy. He refrained from being too critical of the function since it had made considerable progress since his very critical audit of the function five years earlier. He found that deputy ministers generally reported that the evaluations were useful and that in most cases action had been taken on the basis of the evaluation recommendations. The continual monitoring of the function by the Auditor General will do much to shape the quality of the evaluations.

One of the Auditor General's major findings was that only one evaluation study has been tabled in Parliament, the institution ultimately responsible for program effectiveness, despite a recommendation from the Public Accounts Committee in 1978 that all effectiveness evaluations be tabled in Parliament within sixty days of their completion. It was the AG's belief that Parliament would be the chief beneficiary of program evaluation. However, as G. Bruce Doern and Richard W. Phidd point out "there was little thought given to the real dynamics of Parliament and its capability to absorb new information". Some might argue that Parliament is not interested in evaluations which address operational level questions. However, would not the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs be interested in the evaluations used to justify decisions to ignore recommendations of the Committee's own Sub-
Committee on the Penitentiary System in Canada? Presumably it would, if it had the research staff capability to read and critically analyze the evaluations. Under the Access to Information legislation, evaluations are public documents. However, until parliamentary committees have sufficient staff support to allow a close scrutiny of departmental evaluations which are being produced, pressure will not be brought to bear on ministers to answer in public for departmental activities either at an operational or a strategic level.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER 9


7. Leonard Rutman, p. 30


9. Patton, p. 204


13. The one input to the Solicitor General's Strategic Overview which the Correctional Service of Canada has had in the past few years was about correctional programs for special offenders - women, native and the disabled. We have seen in Chapter 4 that when establishing the program evaluation function at CSC, the agency chose to identify programs "vertically" so that they would correspond to existing planning components. It is interesting to speculate that had it chosen to identify the program components "horizontally" on the basis of different categories of inmates and that had it been successful in doing "horizontal" evaluations, the agency might have had evaluative information to support its input into the Strategic Overview.
14. The program evaluation function is linked to this government-wide process through the Policy and Expenditure Management System which is also not operating as planned. See Richard Van Loon, "A reply to Douglas Hartle", Canadian Public Administration, Vol 26 No 1 (Spring 1983) pp. 95-99

15. Ibid., p 124. The AG identified four broad categories of recommendations - changes in program size, changes in program design, changes in support operations and further effectiveness information. Like the findings in this thesis, the AG found that few studies recommended changes in program size, most made recommendations about program design and support operations and about one-third recommended that further effectiveness data be gathered.

16. Ibid., p. 129


18. For example, Rodney Dobell and David Zussman, "An evaluation system for government: If politics is theatre, then evaluation is (mostly) art", Canadian Public Administration, Vol 24, No 3 (Fall 1981)
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APPENDIX A

List of interviews

Unless otherwise noted, interviews were conducted face-to-face. They ranged from half an hour to, in one case, six hours but averaged about one hour each. In addition to the interviews listed, informal contact with staff at the Correctional Service of Canada also provided background information for the thesis.

Treasury Board of Canada:

Former staff: 5 (including 1 telephone interview)

Current staff: 3 (Office of the Comptroller General)

Others interested in program evaluation:

Former deputy minister: 1

Director of an evaluation unit: 1

Consultants: 2

Correctional Service of Canada:

Senior management: 3

Program management: 3

Evaluation and Special Projects staff:

Former: 5

Current: 6

Other staff groups:

Policy: 4

Audit: 3

Ministry of the Solicitor General: 2 (including 1 telephone interview)

Office of the Auditor General: 3
APPENDIX C

Questions for analysts

The following interview guide was used for the interviews with current and former staff of the Evaluation and Special Projects Division of CSC.

1. How long have you been involved in program evaluation? How long have you worked for CSC?
2. How did you get into the program evaluation business?
3. Is it more important to have experience in the correctional field or in social research (evaluation)?
4. Have you been on any program evaluation training since joining the unit?
5. What is the main purpose of evaluations?
6. What are the key steps in doing program evaluation?
7. One of the steps is the creation of alternatives. Where do they come from?
8. Are political considerations taken into account when choosing or presenting alternatives?
9. Would you prefer to have evaluations done in-house or contracted out?
10. What makes a successful evaluation?
11. Which is more important, being "right" or being "on time"?
12. Who are the clients for program evaluations? Who actually uses them?
13. Do you follow what happens to evaluations when they are completed?
14. Do you feel you have any influence on the policy process? Where?
15. What have the units relations been like with:
   a. line management?
   b. regional offices?
   c. central agencies?
16. What is the biggest difficulty in doing evaluations in a correctional setting?
17. Do you see yourself being involved in program evaluation for a long time or is it a stepping stone to other jobs in your career plan?
APPENDIX D

Coding of Evaluation Quality Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Measuring Some Aspect of Evaluation Quality</th>
<th>Coding Scheme (where higher coding number represents higher quality)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Process Procedures:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampling</td>
<td>1=Systematic random 0=Nonrandom, cluster or nonsystematic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data analysis</td>
<td>2=Quantitative 1=Qualitative and quantitative 0=Qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistical procedures</td>
<td>4=Multivariate 3=Descriptive 2=Ratings from qualitative data 1=Narrative data only 0=No systematic material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Procedures:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>3=Experimental or quasi-experimental with randomization and control groups 2=Experimental or quasi-experimental without both randomization and control groups 1=Longitudinal or cross-sectional without control or comparison 0=Descriptive, narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampling</td>
<td>2=Representative 1=Possibly representative 0=Haphazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measurement procedures</td>
<td>1=Judged adequate in face validity 0=Judged less than adequate in face validity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

END

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FIN