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B.A. University of New Brunswick, 2000

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acceptance of the thesis,

More than Meets the Eye?
Women's Leadership, Women's Organizations and Public Policy in Prince Edward Island: 1993-96

submitted by

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Abstract

This thesis studies the interaction of women's political leadership, women's organizations and public policy outcomes, and tests the impact of women's leadership in elected office after the 1993 provincial election in PEI where historic numbers of women were elected to the legislature, many in executive positions. The ability of women's organizations to engage the government in policies concerning women is considered using Sidney Tarrow's criteria of allies, access, and alignments.

Tarrow's three criteria are found to be useful in explaining the success of women's organizations on the Island to influence policy. In addition, the particular nature of PEI politics - its informal nature and small physical size - are critical factors in the capacity of Island women's organizations to influence policy. Finally, women's leadership in elected office plays an important role; in particular, Premier Catherine Callbeck was successful in advancing women's equality in a number of ways but did so quietly, without praise but also without backlash.
Acknowledgements

The two years taken to write this thesis have been an exercise in endurance and discipline, and I have many people to thank for safeguarding my sanity.

I must first of all thank my thesis advisor, Professor Pauline Rankin. Her patience, editing skills and guidance were absolutely invaluable to the success of the final product. Even in periods of absolute frustration, she was able to keep me positive and determined. My parents Melvin and Eunice Bernard deserve my heartfelt thanks, along with my six loving brothers and sisters. My family’s long-distance love and support throughout these past two years, even when I was not exactly the most attentive daughter and sister, is deeply appreciated.

My thanks are also extended to Shawn Murphy, MP (Hillsborough) for employing me as a research assistant at the mid-way point in my degree, simply for taking a chance with a M.A. student that had to balance work and academics. I learned an invaluable amount about PEI politics simply from osmosis in his office.

Finally, I am also indebted to my partner, Jonathan Bishop, for his role in these past two years. With first-hand thesis experience of his own, his ability to understand and support me was second to none. For keeping me laughing, for usually doing more than his share of the housework so I could write, and for cheerfully living with the horrible mountains of books, papers, and files throughout our apartment - thanks Jon.
Table of Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................................i

Acknowledgements ......................................................................................... ii

Table of Contents ............................................................................................... iii

List of Tables ......................................................................................................v

Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................ 1
  Introduction: The Research Problem............................................................. 1
  Theoretical Approach .................................................................................... 3
  Methodology and Scope ................................................................................ 6
  Chapter Outlines ............................................................................................. 9

Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................ 12
  Beyond Numbers – Representation in Politics ............................................. 12
  Social Movement Theory: Theorizing Collective Action ........................... 17
  The Political Opportunity Structure Framework ........................................ 19
  Women’s Organizations and Political Opportunity Structures ................ 26
  Summary ....................................................................................................... 29

Chapter 3 ............................................................................................................ 30
  PEI Political Culture ...................................................................................... 31
  The Numerical Representation of Women in Canadian Politics ................ 35
  Fashionably Late – Women’s Entrance into Provincial Politics in PEI .......... 37
  Behind Every Great Man: Women’s Organizations in Prince Edward Island ............................................................................... 41
  Summary ....................................................................................................... 46

Chapter 4 ............................................................................................................ 48
  Setting the Stage: 1989 And 1993 – Two Liberal Landslide Elections .......... 48
  Callbeck’s Government and The Advancement of Women ......................... 51
  Summary ....................................................................................................... 59

Chapter 5 ............................................................................................................ 61
  A Slow Awakening: Family Violence Comes to the Forefront ..................... 62
  Callbeck Takes the Helm: Family Violence as a Government Priority .......... 69
  The Premier’s Action Committee on Family Violence Prevention ............. 75
  The Victims of Family Violence Act ............................................................ 77
  Post 1996 ...................................................................................................... 82
  Summary ....................................................................................................... 85
List of Tables

**Table 1:** Interviews Conducted Between March and May 2002  
with Former MLAs and Representatives of Women’s Organizations ........8

**Table 2:** List of Women’s Organizations Active in Prince Edward Island  
1983-1993 ..................................................................................44

**Table 3:** Women elected to the PEI Legislature, 1993 Election ...............50

**Table 4:** Committees, Government Departments and Organizations involved in Family Violence Prevention or Awareness in PEI, 1988-1996 .......................64
Chapter 1

Introduction: The Research Problem

In the aftermath of the 1993 Prince Edward Island provincial election, NDP leader Alexa McDonough observed:

You don’t have to look any further than Prince Edward Island to see a good example of how it doesn’t make much difference when the women support the same policies as the men who came before them. If they’re not prepared to be feminists and activists, then I don’t really think it makes any difference. Sometimes I think it can actually be counter-productive, because if women are going to carry on the old boys’ traditions, then the system becomes hostile to progress that the majority of women really need. I don’t think there’s anything about PEI politics that I could point to as being progressive, with or without the women.¹

Between 1990 and 1993, women saw many firsts in Prince Edward Island politics. In 1990, Marion Reid was appointed as the first female Lieutenant Governor for Prince Edward Island, the same year as Progressive Conservative Pat Mella became the first female leader of a provincial political party. Three years later, the 1993 election saw Liberal Catherine Callbeck win the Premierships as the Island’s first female leader. But what was the impact of this dramatic acceleration in women’s leadership in Prince Edward Island? Did increased numerical representation facilitate women’s substantive representation? Was McDonough correct in her assessment of Callbeck and her government, or is there more than meets the eye?

One way to answer these questions is to examine the actions of the Callbeck government around issues of particular concern to women. Soon after the 1993 election, Premier Callbeck chose to act on the controversial issue of family violence, despite pressures on her government to follow a policy platform consistent with the neo-liberal agenda that increasingly defined Canadian politics at that time. Interestingly, the Callbeck government can be credited with adopting two major initiatives on family violence during their three-year term. First, the Callbeck government created the Premier’s Action Committee on Family Violence Prevention (1995), comprised of government officials and representatives of community organizations, to study the issue of family violence on the Island and report back to the Premier. The following year, the Liberals introduced the Victims of Family Violence Act (1996) that was designed to protect victims of domestic violence. It is noteworthy that this Act was only the second piece of legislation of its kind in Canada at that time.  

Given that these initiatives were consistent with what many women’s organizations on Prince Edward Island had advocated, I was curious as to why the government chose to focus substantively on family violence. Women’s organizations on Prince Edward Island had organized around this issue for many years before the Callbeck government’s election, and were particularly active in the years prior to 1993. To test the impact of women’s elite leadership in PEI politics, therefore, I decided to analyze the relationship between women’s organizations and female elected officials on Prince Edward Island.

2 The first piece of legislation introduced in a Canadian province relating to family violence was tabled in Saskatchewan in 1995.
during the Callbeck years to determine the extent to which the government’s actions on family violence indicated improved access to government for women’s organizations during a period marked by women’s elite leadership. This would allow me to examine the impact of women’s increased legislative and executive presence, and test whether responsiveness in policy terms to women’s organizations increased post-1993.

To probe these questions, this thesis focuses on policy initiatives around violence against women and presents a case study to determine why the issue of family violence was identified as a government priority, and the role of female MLAs and women’s organizations in this policy area. The hypothesis that guides the research is that while the government’s decision to act on family violence was heavily influenced by the pressure exerted from PEI women’s organizations, it was ultimately the leadership of Premier Catherine Callbeck and the increased presence of women in elite politics between 1993 and 1996 that was responsible for action around this set of issues.

**Theoretical Approach**

Questions of the impact of women’s electoral success on representational issues have preoccupied feminist political science in recent years. In Canada, Manon Tremblay’s (1998) research on the substantive representation of women by female legislators in the Canadian House of Commons found that issues primarily of concern to women were also of more concern to female legislators than to their male counterparts. Tremblay’s work on the 35th Parliament demonstrated that women were proportionally more likely to speak
out on such issues during debates and question period. Other feminist political scientists, such as Lisa Young (1997), Pippa Norris (1996), and Lynda Erickson (1997) all have interrogated the impact of women’s presence in elite politics. This thesis will build on this trajectory of ‘women in politics’ research, by examining women’s political leadership in Prince Edward Island.

The thesis also draws on literature devoted to the study of social movements, and is guided in particular by the political opportunity framework often employed to assess the potential impact of social movements. As I outline in Chapter 2, the thesis employs Sidney Tarrow’s work on political opportunity structures and, in particular, his three determinants of a social movement’s ability to successfully organize and influence change – access, allies and alignments. The thesis tests Tarrow’s criteria, and determines to what extent the use of these criteria can explain my findings on the ability of Prince Edward Island women’s movement to access decisions makers and influence policy changes in an era marked by women’s political leadership.

If the political opportunity structure did change between 1993-1996, the first assumption one could make is that this occurred due to the fact that there were more women in positions to make important political decisions. While this may indicate that women in power act or respond differently than men in power, it could also indicate that having more women in power encouraged women’s organizations to lobby more intensely on all elected representatives. Thus, the fact that women’s organizations might perceive a
change in the political opportunity structure may in itself be enough to encourage more activism. In perceiving increased opportunities, these groups may then work to bring about augmented pressure and, as a result, find that they have had an increased impact on the policy-making agenda. As Edwin Amenta and Yvonne Zylan note in their research:

[...] The policy “successes” of a challenger may be due not to its collective action, but to the circumstances that made it possible for the group to challenge in the first place. The concept of “political opportunity” can create a wedge, theoretically speaking, between the activities of a social movement and policies to benefit its constituents. The same opportunities that propel a movement may by themselves cause what are perceived to be victories won by the movement.  

Alternatively, it could be that the political opportunity structure began to change before 1993. In fact, one might say that it had been in transition since the 1980s, through the inroads women made in elected office. Having a female premier and a female leader of the opposition post 1993 was one more way in which doors opened up for women. I argue, however, that while the political opportunity structure may have been changing for the women’s movement prior to 1993, the fact that women were so well represented in the Prince Edward Island legislature after the 1993 provincial election, particularly in powerful roles, caused a significant shift in the political opportunity structure. Most importantly, women’s organizations on the Island were also cognizant of this opportunity, and were prepared to use it to their best advantage.

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Through this examination of the political opportunity structure on the Island after the 1993 election, therefore, the thesis considers the ability of women’s organizations to engage the government in policies concerning family violence and interrogates the influence of women’s organizations on public policy during a period of significant women’s leadership within the province. In short, the thesis contributes to the growing literature on the complex relationships between women’s formal and informal politics as well as addressing more broadly the paucity of existing research on feminism and political activity on Prince Edward Island.

**Methodology and Scope**

The evidence underpinning this thesis relies to a significant extent on qualitative research methods. More specifically, the thesis draws empirically from a series of interviews conducted with individuals who were either active in women’s organizations or in elected politics on PEI between 1990 and 1996 (Table 1). It is largely through their testimony that my analysis determines whether the election of female MLAs who held very powerful and prominent positions changed the political opportunity structure, making it more open to issues of specific concern to women’s organizations. The thirteen interviews conducted include former female MLAs, and representatives of women’s organizations active between 1993-1996. Those interviews with women activists probed whether they found the women in provincial politics more receptive to their initiatives and needs than male legislators. My interviews with female MLAs investigated their perspectives on their roles as legislators and how increased numbers of women in Prince Edward Island politics altered the political arena. These interviews were invaluable in
understanding the perspectives of women’s organizations toward the Callbeck government, how the MLAs at that time viewed the role of women’s organizations, and what the influence of the women’s community was on family violence initiatives tabled by the government.

My decision to rely on interviews derived in part from the paucity of recent literature on Prince Edward Island politics and the Atlantic provinces in general. Most of key secondary literature dates to the 1980s, and was of limited value in analyzing the period under scrutiny. One central research tool unavailable for this thesis was the provincial Hansard, which has only been in existence since 1997. Hence, the collection of primary information through the interview process was key. The research has been supplemented by relevant government publications relating to women during that period, most specifically, those related to the issue of family violence. Newspapers, magazines, and the Women’s Institute’s periodical Common Ground were additional sources information.

My decision to follow a qualititative research methodology is consistent with the parameters of the project. It would be difficult to measure the extent of change to the political opportunity structure using quantitative methods. For example, measuring how

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many new pieces of legislation were passed relating to issues primarily of concern to
women might indicate whether more attention was given to these issues. This type of
analysis, however, would not be able to draw significant conclusions as to whether said
legislation originated from the initiative and personal interest of a lone MLA, or whether
it came about due to pressure from women’s groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Catherine Callbeck</td>
<td>MLA, Premier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pat Mella</td>
<td>MLA, Leader of the Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Jeannie Lea</td>
<td>MLA, Minister responsible for the Status of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Libbe Hubley</td>
<td>MLA, Deputy Speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Nancy Guptill</td>
<td>MLA, Speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Marion Reid</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor (1990 to 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ruth Freeman</td>
<td>Coordinator of Women’s Centre at the University of Prince Edward Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Andy Lou Summers</td>
<td>Executive Director of East Prince Women’s Information Centre (1996 to present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Anne McCallum</td>
<td>Former Editor of Common Ground (mid-1980s to 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Dianne Porter</td>
<td>Former Chairperson of the PEI Advisory Council for the Status of Women (1986-1989); also continues to be involved with provincial Liberal party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Ellie Reddin</td>
<td>Provincial Manager of Victim’s Services, in the Office of the Attorney-General (1988 to present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Joanne Ings</td>
<td>Executive Director of PEI Transition House Association (1994 to present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Maria Bernard</td>
<td>Former Vice-President of the Association of Acadian Women, and also a volunteer on the board of the Rape Crisis Centre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1:
*Interviews Conducted Between March and May 2002 With Former MLAs and Representatives of Women’s Organizations*

This research does not extend to an examination of how the presence of women in Island politics differs from that of other provinces, nor does it draw extensive comparisons to
the situation in other Atlantic provinces. The particular dynamic in Prince Edward Island, shaped by geography and demographics, does not lend itself well to a comparison with any other province in Canada. Since the nature of PEI politics is inseparable from its physical size and small population, it will be difficult to compare the results of this research to that of other provinces, or draw broad generalizations about women in politics elsewhere.

Neither does this thesis attempt to chronicle the history of women’s organizations in the province, nor try to compare their effectiveness in Island politics to that of women’s organizations in other provinces. Either of these two research directions would require substantial original research that falls well beyond the parameters of this thesis. Furthermore, this thesis does not focus extensively on barriers which exist for women entering politics in Prince Edward Island or attempt to suggest ways to improve women’s numerical representation in the provincial legislature. This would shift the focus away from my central project of analysing the impact of women’s representation and the relationship between informal and formal politics.

*Chapter Outlines*

In Chapter 2, I review the literature on representation, and the impact of gender on politics. I then outline the concept of the political opportunity structure framework, and discuss its limitations. The political opportunity structure framework was chosen for this analysis as it is an appropriate way to examine the influence of women’s movements on public policy. This chapter also examines three criteria that Tarrow argues are crucial to
whether protest groups can successfully work within a political opportunity structure to influence change. Chapter 2 outlines how women’s organizations use political opportunity structures, and offers a brief history of the women’s movement in Prince Edward Island.

Chapter 3 discusses the numerical representation of women in Canada, and surveys women’s electoral success on the Island. The political culture of the Island is also examined, as well as its party system, in order to provide an understanding of how politics functions in PEI to best illustrate the type of environment that existed when Callbeck’s government was elected. Chapter 4 summarizes the 1989 Prince Edward Island provincial election, surveys the political period immediately preceding Callbeck’s election and then moves on to the 1993 election, and Catherine Callbeck’s election as premier. Her government’s engagement on issues of particular concern to women is examined, both in terms of how she and other female MLAs were viewed by women’s organizations, and what particular actions they undertook.

In Chapter 5, the emergence of family violence as a public priority is discussed, as well as the activities of women’s organizations relating to family violence prevention. Both the response of the Ghiz government and the Callbeck government on PEI will be examined, with a focus on two particular initiatives from the Callbeck government – *The Victims of Family Violence Act*, and the Premier’s Action Committee on Family Violence Prevention. This chapter provides the first detailed analysis of the policy area surrounding the issue of family violence in Prince Edward Island.
Chapter 6 discusses the major findings, and analyses the case using Tarrow’s three criteria to determine whether they were useful in explaining my findings. Finally, Chapter 7 offers final conclusions, discusses the contributions and limitations of the thesis, and suggests future directions for research.
Chapter 2

This chapter begins with a review of contemporary feminist accounts of representation and surveys the research interrogating the impact of gender in politics. I argue that while there is a lack of consensus on exactly how it makes a difference, the overwhelming majority of researchers do find that having increased numbers of women in political office does make a difference at least to some extent.

The chapter reviews major trends in social movement theory; specifically, it examines approaches to the political opportunity structure framework, and evaluate the limits of such a framework. This discussion situates my exploration of how the political opportunity structure in Prince Edward Island after the 1993 election altered such that women’s organizations could successfully influence policy and politicians. Finally, I describe how the thesis tests the utility of Tarrow’s three criteria – access, allies and alignments - in explaining the ability of women’s organizations to take advantage of the changed political opportunity structure during the Callbeck years.

Beyond Numbers – Representation in Politics

Numerical representation is in itself not the sole goal of those who advocate increasing women’s presence in national and provincial legislatures. Indeed, representation theorists distinguish between formal and substantive representation. In terms of formal representation, a community or group is represented only if one of them is present in an elected body. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, who is widely known for her work on
representation, examined this concept of descriptive representation, or "standing for" others. One way to understand representation, according to Pitkin, is to believe that a representative body must bear an accurate physical correspondence or resemblance to what it represents. This view holds that a legislature should be composed in exactly the same proportion as the nation as a whole, "an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large."¹ Arguing in this vein, a legislature that did not approximately mirror the different proportions of groups in its society (such as having disproportionate numbers of minorities or only a few women) would not be properly representative.

Substantive representation, in contrast, assumes that an elected officer not only represents a community or group physically or formally, but takes action and represents their specific interests and goals. Thus, this view correlates with another interpretation of "standing for" representation considered by Pitkin, who states that representatives may also act as an "accurate reflection" of the variety of interests in society and public opinion.² Also referred to as "acting for" representation, this understanding implies that anyone can effectively represent and speak for anyone else, even if the representative did not share anything in common with or understand the needs of those that were being represented. As noted by Jill Vickers, electoral representation is often grouped together with the concepts of majority rule in the "male model"³ of hierarchical, patriarchal

² Pitkin, 61.
³ As a challenge to the aforementioned male model, Vickers argues that a feminist theory of representation must contain three aspects. First of all, it must represent both women's diverse and shared needs, values, identities and interests in state institutions and civil society. Secondly, it must place high importance on the adequacy of representational practices. Finally, it must give meaningful consideration to those who "challenge the possibility of authentic representation and examine carefully alternative visions based on the democratization of all institutions, self-organization, and direct action." Jill Vickers "Toward A Feminist
political practices,” where representation is understood largely as individualism. Therefore, one could argue that the gender balance in legislatures is irrelevant because men can act as representatives for women (and vice-versa, according to the logic). Many academics argue that this is not necessarily true; they insist that only as more women gain political power and enter electoral politics will the political system, in turn, become more responsive to issues primarily of concern to women.

Pitkin concludes her research by determining that the concept of representation is best understood as the degree of responsiveness in government, judged by its long-term systematic arrangements – “by institutions and the way in which they function.” One might be tempted to argue that the focus of this thesis ignores Pitkin’s conclusion through its focus on substantive versus descriptive representation. However, Pitkin’s concept of representation in isolation cannot provide the sole framework with which to perform the political analysis presented in this thesis. I argue that it is not enough just to study institutions; research must also study what different groups bring to these institutions. Measuring representation is more complex; consideration must be given to the players involved, what role they play, and how their decisions have shaped and formed political and public institutions. This thesis holds that a change in the composition of decision-makers subsequently impacts on the way institutions operate to some degree, and also on how effective citizens, interest groups and other organizations view their potential to influence the political agenda. In order to probe the impact of a range of political actors

Understanding of Representation,” in Jane Arscott and Linda Trimble In the Presence of Women: Representation in Canadian Governments (Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Company, Canada: 1996) 44.


5 Pitkin, 234.
on the policy process, this thesis investigates how increased numbers of women holding executive roles in the PEI provincial legislature affected PEI politics, the relationship that women’s organizations subsequently formed with the provincial government, and how these two variables affected the emergence of public policy relating to family violence.

As Elaine Campbell and Lisa Young explain, there are two primary arguments underlying attempts to increase the number of women elected to Canadian legislatures:

First, the absence of women from representative institutions reflects their ‘second class citizenship,’ creating symbolic reasons for wanting more women holding office. Second, some observers argue that the diversity of women’s interests is better represented in public policy when women are present in legislatures in rough proportion to their presence in the population.\(^6\)

Research indicates that gender does make a certain difference, along with other factors, but researchers disagree as to exactly what degree gender has an impact on substantive representation. Pippa Norris, in her study of female MPs in Britain, argues that gender influences policy attitudes, priorities and legislative roles, and that women tend to give stronger support for issues of women’s rights, and social policy issues, as well as constituency casework. She also found, however, that party was the strong divider among politicians.\(^7\) In another study, using qualitative interviews with 39 female politicians from across England, Scotland and Wales at both the local and national level, Catherine Bochel and Jacqui Briggs found that a majority of MPs did not see issues primarily of concern to women as one of their special interests, but their research did find

that female representatives felt that they brought a different perspective to the political arena. The women interviewed felt that they behaved differently than their male counterparts – for example, in that they were more willing to co-operate and negotiate. Norris explains the background of this common argument, also expressed as claims that women acting as elected officials “speak in a different voice”.

First, in society as a whole most women’s and men’s lives continue to diverge sharply. Structural differences stretch from cradle to grave: from women’s upbringing and education, their primary roles as care-givers within the family, their marginalization and occupational segregation within the paid labour-force, and even their patterns of health and longevity. (...) It is assumed that these differences will lead to a distinctive women’s perspective on many major issues facing society.

In the Canadian context, Tremblay’s (1998) research regarding the substantive representation of women by female legislators in the House of Commons during the 35th Parliament seems to indicate that having more women in elected office would make a difference as well in that, again, issues primarily of concern to women were raised proportionally more by women than by male MPs. Lynda Erickson brings an interesting perspective to the debate with her study of gender, party and ideology. Like Norris, Erickson’s research indicates that party plays more of a role in explaining differences in ideology, but that gender still impacts opinions on issues, and that when differences

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9 Norris goes on to note that while this perspective is currently used in terms of gender and ethnic representation, in the past it was commonly used in reference to class interests. Norris 1996, 90.
10 It is important to point out that perceptions that female politicians are more collaborative, or compassionate, for example, may be based on traditional stereotypes that should be challenged rather than reinforced. Proving this one way or the other, however, would be very difficult. Norris 1996, 90.
occur, women tend to be more liberal.¹¹ Linda Trimble, in her examination of gender differences in the Alberta legislature, found that female MLAs from all parties were willing to cooperate across party lines; in contrast to Erickson, however, Trimble found that women within the Tory caucus supported their party’s neo-liberal economic agenda, and neo-conservative social philosophy, leading Trimble to conclude that substantive representation is indeed “more than an issue of numbers.”¹²

In addition to examining whether women’s leadership in PEI led to the substantive representation of issues of primary concern to women during Callbeck’s government, I examine how women’s organizations are able to influence public policy given the relatively high number of women in executive political positions. The following section reviews social movement theory, with an emphasis on the political opportunity structure framework.

**Social Movement Theory: Theorizing Collective Action**

The events of the 1960s prompted dramatic change in how social scientists viewed collective action. As Marc Edelman noted, “this prolonged decade of extraordinary upheaval in New York, Chicago, Berkeley, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Tokyo, Mexico City, Prague, Beijing, and elsewhere was the most intense period of grassroots mobilization

since the 1930s.”¹³ This was the decade where the world watched the rise of civil rights and antiwar movements, youth and student rebellions, mobilizations in defense of the environment and for the rights of women, gays and lesbians, the elderly, the disabled, among others. This increasing mobilization of so many different groups in developed countries, such as Canada and the United States for example, could not be explained by existing social theory frameworks.¹⁴

By the mid-1970s, however, two distinct perspectives emerged in an attempt to fill the growing theoretical vacuum: the "identity-oriented" or European paradigm (also widely known as New Social Movements) and the "resource mobilization" or American paradigm. Resource Mobilization Theory regards collective action mainly as interest group politics played out by socially connected groups rather than by those who were the most alienated or downtrodden.¹⁵ In this view, movements are led by “entrepreneurs” who mobilized resources and directed existing discontent into organizational forms. Instead of looking at the structural basis of social conflict, or changing relationships between the state or market on the private sphere, resource availability and preference structures became the central focus of this perspective.¹⁶ However, resource mobilization has been criticized for failing to explain situations in which social movements, usually of the very poor, emerge despite having few resources.

In contrast, new social movement theory focuses on struggles over symbolic, informational, and cultural resources and rights to specificity and difference, and, as Edelman states, “participation in NSMs is itself a goal, apart from any instrumental objectives, because everyday movement practices embody in embryonic form the changes the movements seek.”17 As Nelson Pichardo states:

The central claims of the NSM paradigm are, first, that NSMs are a product of the shift to a postindustrial economy and, second, that NSMs are unique and, as such, different from social movements of the industrial age. [...] It presents a distinctive view of social movements and of the larger sociopolitical environment, of how individuals fit into, respond to, and change the system.18

New Social Movements have resulted in the creation of new parties that break the rules regarding traditional political cleavages and party systems, in that they attract support that cuts across class, religion, and ethnicity.19

Efforts to understand collective action have combined aspects of both New Social Movements and Resource Mobilization Theory. The following section discusses this framework in greater detail.

The Political Opportunity Structure Framework

The political opportunity structure framework is linked to Resource Mobilization Theory, in that it views the rise of movements as the reasonable response of actors who take

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advantage of new political dynamics and institutional arrangements. The political opportunity structure is seen as a “filter” between the mobilization of the movement, its choice of strategies, and its capacity to change the social environment.\textsuperscript{20}

Kitschelt defines the political opportunity structure framework as follows:

Political opportunity structures are comprised of specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others. While they do not determine the course of social movements completely, careful comparisons among them can explain a good deal about the variations among social movements with similar demands in different settings, if other determinants are held constant. Comparison can show that political opportunity structures influence the choice of protest strategies and the impact of social movements on their environment.\textsuperscript{21}

Kitschelt describes three different ways in which political opportunity structures can affect the capacity of a social movement to mobilize and affect change.

Firstly, mobilization depends upon the coercive, normative, remunerative and informational resources that an incipient movement can extract from its setting and can employ in its protest.\textsuperscript{22} [...] Secondly, the access of social movements to the public sphere and political decision-making is also governed by institutional rules, such as those reinforcing patterns of interaction between government and interest groups, and electoral laws. These rules allow for, register, respond to and even shape the demands of social movements that are not (yet) accepted political actors. They also facilitate or impede the institutionalization of new groups and claims. Thirdly, a social movement faces opportunities to mobilize protest that

\textsuperscript{20} Herbert Kitschelt “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies,” British Journal of Political Science (Vol. 16, 1986) Pg. 56.
\textsuperscript{21} Kitschelt, 58.
\textsuperscript{22} Thus, the chances of a widespread mobilization within the social movement is increased if the movement a) can engage widely shared norms, b) compile adequate information about the nature of the issue around which they are mobilizing, and c) raise the money to disseminate their ideas and information. Kitschelt, 61.
change over time with the appearance and disappearance of other social movements.\textsuperscript{23}

The effects that social movements may have, also called movement impacts, are categorized by Kitschelt into three separate groups: procedural, substantive, and structural. Procedural impacts occur when new channels are made available to those within the social movement, and may involve an increased recognition as legitimate representatives of demands. Substantive gains are changes of policy that occur as a result of mobilization. Finally, structural impacts involve a transformation of the political opportunity structures themselves, as a product of social movement activity.\textsuperscript{24}

The degree of openness in a country's political opportunity structure can be a crucial explanatory variable in determining the fate of social movements from their origins to their failure or success at achieving their goals. McAdam writes that the concept of political opportunity structure has been used to explain the timing of collective action and the outcomes of movement activity.\textsuperscript{25} Furthermore, it is also used to explain the very emergence of social movements, the degree of access groups have to power, and levels of group mobilization. However, as Redding and Viterna point out, "Recent social movement theory views political opportunity structures or institutional factors as less

\textsuperscript{23} For example, the mobilization of one movement may have a 'demonstration effect' on other budding movements, encouraging them to emulate the first movement by taking action. Furthermore, the simultaneous emergence of multiple movements challenging the institutions of social control may provide the optimum opening to preserve the momentum of the movements, and change entrenched policies. Kitschelt, 62.

\textsuperscript{24} Kitschelt, 67

\textsuperscript{25} McAdam, D. "Conceptual origins, current problems, future directions," in McAdam, D., McCarthy, J.D. and Zald, M.N. (Eds.) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 29.
ultimate causes of political change than mediators between broader structural, demand-side changes on the one hand and political outcomes on the other.”

Sidney Tarrow has furthered the scholarship on the political opportunity structure framework by suggesting three factors that are key in terms of protest groups being able to (successfully) exploit such changes. These three factors are the existence of allies, alignments, and access. In my thesis, I use these three factors to test whether the political opportunity structure on PEI was such that it would allow women’s organizations on the Island to influence Prince Edward Island provincial politics successfully, given the dramatic increase in women’s political representation between 1993 and 1996.

According to Tarrow, the three key factors that are critical in understanding the success of social movements or protest are as follows:

1. Access - the openness or closure of formal political institutions
2. Alignments - the stability or instability of political alignments within the political system, and
3. Allies - the availability and strategic posture of support groups.

Regarding the openness or closure of formal political institutions, Tarrow’s view is that it is necessary to measure the different degrees of political openness, measured by “both the formal properties of local government and by the actual access to power by

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26 Redding, Kent and Jocelyn S. Viterna, “Political Demands, Political Opportunities: Explaining the Differential Success of Left-Libertarian Parties,” Social Forces (Vol. 78, No. 2) 491-510. 1999
The stability or instability of political alignments within the political system also plays a highly significant role for Tarrow, who hypothesizes that electoral instability, either due to real protest and public volatility, or simply a perceived fear among elites would lead to more tolerance and perhaps more access for marginalized groups to provide input and make changes. Finally, the allies that protest groups and social movements make are significant in successfully achieving policy change. These allies can be outside the system or within; however, allies with influence in the political system are distinguished from political parties or elites within the system itself.

There are certain weaknesses inherent in the political opportunity structure framework. It does not account sufficiently for context (for example the size of the population), the impact of geography, or the political culture, factors which I argue are pivotal in understanding the fortunes of women in PEI politics between 1993-1996. It has also been criticized for being too broad and imprecise - an all-encompassing framework that may explain nothing at all - and for not directing sufficient attention to the social construction of the political opportunity structure itself, or its local and international aspects. Further factors identified by Pauline Rankin and Krista Wilcox as not addressed by the political opportunity structure framework are the impact of women’s location vis-à-vis the political opportunity structure in terms of racialization, sexual

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28 Tarrow, 28-29.
29 Tarrow, 30.
30 Tarrow, 31-33.
orientation, class, disability, and the ideological climate within the which the political opportunity structure is situated.\textsuperscript{32}

This framework also neglects the ability of the organizations in question to be a primary force in causing change in the configuration of the political opportunity structures at hand. It views protest groups and social movements as at the mercy of external factors and unable to trigger change in the political opportunity structure itself, only to respond to changes if they occur. Cheryl Collier argues that in her opinion, the political opportunity structures in different political jurisdictions can change over time, and that women's movements can influence this change. Collier also notes that the political opportunity structure framework does not take into consideration that in a federal state, organizations and groups usually have to divide their efforts, and try to lobby multiple levels of government, even simultaneously at times, in seeking to obtain their goals. She states that "feminist activism towards the state can be weakened when it is split between two or among three levels of government [which] can have a dramatic effect on how successful women can be in obtaining gains from the state."\textsuperscript{33}

With these criticisms in mind, this thesis uses a modified version of Tarrow's three determinants of whether the particular configuration of the political opportunity structure in Prince Edward Island after the 1993 provincial election was likely to encourage or allow successful protest leading to change and reform. The original three factors are

examined in the context of the changing composition of the elected provincial government between 1993-1996. This thesis also tests the usefulness of these three factors as explanatory variables. Through a series of interviews with former female MLAs and former representatives of women's organizations during those years, this thesis determines how the relationship between women's organizations and elected officials changed after 1993 and what kind of impact women's organizations had on bringing forward the issue of family violence in the province, given the new presence of women in the legislature and the executive.

While I accept Tarrow's three factors - allies, access and alignments - I argue that a comprehensive analysis of the political opportunity structure framework must include a wider scope of factors, particularly important in this case study. Prince Edward Island's small size, and small but concentrated population has a significant impact on the ability of women's organizations (or any interest group) to influence their elected officials, and the manner in which this is done. In Prince Edward Island, most citizens know their elected officials personally. This is essential to take into consideration when assessing the changed political opportunity structure, and what the impact was for policy reform as advanced by women's organizations on the Island. This thesis shows that protest groups and organizations do not simply react to a changed political opportunity structure, but can cause the structure itself to change in their favour. In this particular situation, given the increased presence of women in executive political roles, women's organizations on the Island have caused change in the province's political opportunity structure in the

33 Cheryl Collier "A Tale of Two Provinces: Women, Parties and Governments in Ontario and Manitoba:"
province, and advanced the issue of family violence prevention through public awareness campaigns and educational outreach for elected officials. This is analysed in more detail in Chapter 5.

\textit{Women's Organizations and Political Opportunity Structures}

The configuration of a particular political opportunity structure can affect who has access to power, and subsequently, the potential to enact change. Tarrow's political opportunity structure framework suggests that if the dynamic of a political opportunity structure has transformed in some way, those attempting to influence the political agenda will find that certain doors that were previously closed will become open, and vice versa. In the case of Prince Edward Island, given that the 1993 election saw increased women elected to the provincial government and that women held very powerful roles such as Premier and Leader of the Opposition, I argue that this change in the gender composition of the provincial legislature, particularly the increased number of women in authoritative roles, spawned a political opportunity structure that was more open to the concerns of women's organizations in the province. Consequently, this change in the political opportunity structure increased the capacity of women's organizations to influence elected officials, and ultimately the legislative agenda.

Alan Rosenthal argued in his study of lobbying and lobbyists in the United States during the 1980s that the increase among women lobbyists during that period is positively correlated to the increase in female state legislators, allowing for increased access by
women’s organizations.\textsuperscript{34} Unfortunately, there has been limited research done that directly addresses the question of whether increasing numbers of women in politics results in more access to the state by women’s organizations. One notable exception is the research by Sandra Burt and Elizabeth Lorenzin on the NDP Government of Ontario, between 1990-1995. They found that women’s groups in the province that previously enjoyed strong relations with the provincial NDP registered a marked deterioration of their relationships with the NDP government, characterized by “broken friendships and disenchantment.”\textsuperscript{35} Therefore, while Rosenthal’s findings seem to indicate that increasing numbers and strength of women’s organizations and their access to the state happens as a result of having more women in elected politics, clearly evidence exists to the contrary. This thesis provides a much needed addition to this particular area of research, at the provincial level and offers an assessment of the relationships between women politicians, feminist activists and policy outputs.

Under certain circumstances, women’s organizations may act as a powerful force in terms of affecting public policy. This can be achieved through what feminist political scientists call “official politics”, which includes attempts to seek influence through legislatures, bureaucracies, courts and through the police but also through “unofficial politics”, which involves using public opinion, for example, to either directly or


indirectly affect the actions of state institutions.\textsuperscript{36} In terms of the contemporary Canadian women’s movement, some academics have noted the dominance of the “liberal feminist commitment to the ordinary political process”\textsuperscript{37} throughout the 1970s and early 1980s; this was the view that increased power for women was best achieved through the electoral route, through running their own individual female candidates and later through supporting female candidates within established parties.\textsuperscript{38} However, Young argues that after 1984, while certain aspects of the movement and party organizations continued to work towards increased electoral success, the rest of the women’s movement began to favor other ways of seeking influence;\textsuperscript{39} they became more skeptical about the results of electing more women to political office, and reacted to changes in the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) and the Mulroney government.\textsuperscript{40} This thesis addresses this issue as it tests whether and how women in elected office in PEI acted to advance women’s equality.

\textsuperscript{36} Pauline Rankin and Jill Vickers, Women’s Movements and State Feminism: Integrating Diversity into Public Policy. (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 2001) 4.
\textsuperscript{37} Jill Vickers, Pauline Rankin, and Christine Appelle. Politics as if Women Mattered: A Political Analysis of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).
\textsuperscript{39} Rankin and Vickers point out three issues that have been particularly problematic in terms of the relationship between feminist organizations and federal structures of state feminism, which they describe as “a major innovation in how women activists can access government decision making.” The first is that the women’s bureaucratic machinery at the federal level in Canada has been significantly altered in non-favorable ways from the original femocrat model of state feminism. Second, this women’s state machinery was developed with the assumption that other organizations decide upon the voice and needs of women, and then turn around and present their findings to government directly. Finally, they argue that increasingly, “feminist experts and gender-based or gender-sensitive analysis that is undertaken by academics or bureaucrats is the focus of state feminism and leaves less room for the role of women’s organizations in conveying their views to femocrats within the state.” Rankin and Vickers argue that developments in the Canadian political opportunity structure such as women’s increased activity in electoral politics at the federal level and their increased presence in senior bureaucratic positions has resulted in significant challenges to the relations between structures of state feminism, and women’s movements. Rankin and Vickers (2001) 6-15.
Summary

While the numerical representation of women has historically been a goal that was actively supported by women’s organizations, the results - in terms of advocating the goals of feminism or advancing issues that are of particular relevance to women - have been increasingly questioned in Canada by the women’s movement. While the exact effect of female politicians on politics remains in dispute, the research indicates that gender does make a difference. This issue requires further research, and in this sense, my thesis provides yet another piece of the puzzle that seeks to determine the impact of women’s leadership and the nature of the connection between women politicians, women’s organizations and public policy outputs.

This chapter has also discussed the research surrounding the political opportunity structure framework, and identified a number of problems posed by the use of this framework, such as the view that protest groups and organizations only react to the political opportunity structure. Nevertheless, the general concept of a political opportunity structure framework is still useful in predicting the ability of movements to be successful in achieving policy outcomes. Tarrow’s three determinants of whether a movement or organization will be successful in pursuing change – allies, access, and alignments – are of particular interest, and in Chapter 6, they will be revisited to determine whether they are useful in understanding the findings of this thesis.

40 Young (1997), 202-208.
Chapter 3

In this chapter, I outline the particular nature of women’s electoral presence in Prince Edward Island and the Island’s provincial political system. I also provide an account of when women became present in Prince Edward Island politics and discuss the province’s history of employing a dual member electoral system, and how its presence may have accelerated PEI women’s entrance into politics (after a late start). The Island’s relatively unique political culture is also an important focus for this chapter. I argue that the nature of the provincial legislature, geography and the small, relatively close-knit population affects how politics functions on the Island, and creates an informal relationship between constituents and elected officials. The ease through which constituents, and also interest groups and organizations, can access these political decision-makers plays a key role in their capacity to influence public policy, and I argue that in Prince Edward Island, this capacity is great.

Finally, this chapter reviews the contemporary women’s movement in Prince Edward Island, and shows that, given the informality of the political culture, feminists were able to organize effectively using subtle and private strategies, thus avoiding the backlash that many women’s movements experienced in other provinces throughout the mid-1990’s. These factors laid the foundation for the women’s movement to exploit successfully the new political opportunities that emerged in 1993.
PEI Political Culture

To place the electoral history of women in Prince Edward Island in context, understanding the province’s unique political culture is critical. Political scientist Ian Stewart, who has written numerous articles on Prince Edward Island, argues that PEI political culture is remarkably stable. He maintains that the Island’s political culture is mired in traditionalism and acceptance of established practices which influences the timing and often the content of legislative change; as a result, PEI generally only proceeds with reform after it has been well tested in other legislatures.\(^1\) Stewart further posits that it is this traditionalist mentality that prevents smaller parties from being successful in elections, giving the Liberals and Conservatives – the two long-established parties on PEI – *carte blanche* in the legislature. As he states: “Minor party nominees routinely lose their deposits and, in some recent instances, have been outpolled by the spoiled ballot category.”\(^2\)

Other political scientists have argued recently that while certain traditional aspects of PEI’s political culture have remained constant such as the acceptance of political patronage and high levels of political involvement, it has evolved somewhat. For example, the progression towards modernization and industrialization in the province since the 1960s, due to initiatives such as the Comprehensive Development Plan, has had

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\(^1\) For example, the Hansard was only introduced to the PEI legislature in 1997, although a written record of question period was kept and made available, and legislative proceedings were tape-recorded. Stewart cites one pre-Hansard PEI MLA as saying with wonder “‘I mean [...] you wouldn’t expect them to write all that down.’” Ian Stewart, “Prince Edward Island: ‘A Damned Queer Parliament,’” *Provincial and Territorial Legislatures in Canada*, ed. Gary Levy and Graham White (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989) 23.

\(^2\) Stewart, 17.
a significant impact on Island life. This Plan began in 1969 with an influx of millions of dollars in funding from the federal government targeted to modernize and develop the province’s economy and government, and constituted a major challenge to traditionalist values on the Island. John Crossley posits that this Plan acted as a catalyst and accelerator of development for Prince Edward Island:

Within half a decade, the province’s hundreds of rural, mostly one-room, schools had been closed, and their community-based school boards disbanded. Replacing them was a system of roughly 70 new, fully modern, consolidated schools to which students were bussed and in which they enjoyed the same quality and quantity of curricular and extracurricular opportunities as their urban counterparts in other parts of Canada. [...] At the same time, a single provincial university and a single modern community college replaced the province’s two post-secondary institutions. Money was made available to “rationalize” the agriculture sector by encouraging consolidation of small family-owned farms into larger, more economically viable, operations.\(^3\)

Crossley asserts that the changes enacted between 1969 and 1974 were “so numerous, dramatic, and fast that, twenty years later, citizens still talk about them with awe.”\(^4\) These dramatic transformations affected the everyday lives of citizens on Prince Edward Island and could not help but also induce evolution in the political culture of the Island. Even the provincial government structure itself was not immune to the Development Plan; as a result of this Plan, it was ultimately transformed to the point where it had all of the administrative apparati of a modern Canadian government, including a larger and more professionally trained public service.\(^5\) With all these alterations and challenges to the traditional way of life on PEI, it is difficult not to conclude that changes were also

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\(^3\) Crossley 1997, 286-287.
\(^4\) Crossley 1997, 287.
\(^5\) Crossley 1997, 286-287.
occurring with respect to women’s roles in Prince Edward Island politics, and may have been beneficial in terms of accelerating women’s foray into electoral politics.

In terms of the provincial legislature, Stewart argues that it can be classified best as non-professionalized, in that it rarely sits for more than six to ten weeks a year. The small, concentrated population of the Island often demands a level of casualness and informality between elected officials and their constituents that is unknown in many other provinces. Before MLAs had private offices (which did not occur until fairly recently in the Island’s history), they were forced to meet with constituents underneath the stairs in the legislature. Stewart also reports that when asked about the necessity of an ombudsman in Prince Edward Island, one provincial cabinet minister said that he did not think it was necessary since “Everybody knows everybody in this province, and they will come on a one-to-one basis if there is a problem. They can usually work it out.” Indeed, this is one aspect of the Island’s political culture that remains constant. Recent examples of the informal nature of PEI politics include an incident in May 2002, when the sole Liberal opposition MLA was ill one day, and the local media decided to take his spot in the legislature and appear as the Official Opposition.

The issue of informality in the formal political process arose in the interviews that I conducted with representatives of women’s organizations and former female MLAs from Callbeck’s government. Former editor of Common Ground Anne McCallum noted that many of the relationships that women’s groups built with the provincial government were

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6 Stewart, 18.
due to the small size of the province; knowing elected officials on a personal level made it easier to have contact with people in authority. Similarly, Ruth Freeman, Coordinator of the Women’s Centre at the University of Prince Edward Island, stated:

It never hurts to have friends in high places, and that’s a lot easier to do here in PEI than it is anywhere else, because your Minister responsible might be your next door neighbour, or your cousin. So it’s quite easy to have those cordial relationships, which makes it easier to broach these people when you have issues of concern, and I have always found all of the politicians here on PEI to be very approachable.  

Whether or not the political culture on the Island changed fundamentally in the last few years with respect to facilitating the election of more women the provincial legislature, the “old boy’s network” that determines access to power in Prince Edward Island politics, and that functions as an integral part of PEI’s political culture, has been more difficult to discard. The fact that PEI only elected its second female MP, Catherine Callbeck (Malpeque), in 1988 speaks to just how recently women have made inroads in Island politics. Crossley has argued that this network effectively excluded women from political office. In a personal interview, Dianne Porter, former chairperson of the PEI Advisory Council on the Status of Women, echoed this statement. Porter spoke at length about the difficulties women faced when running for office. In both the Progressive Conservative and Liberal party, for women to realistically have a chance to win

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7 Stewart, 21.
8 Personal Interview with Ruth Freeman, April 2002.
9 In that same year, the Island also appointed its first female judge, Madame Justice Jaqueline Matheson. Also worth noting is that Professor Frances Frazer, the first female academic Dean for the University of Prince Edward Island, became acting Dean of Arts for 1989-1990 while the former Dean was on sabbatical leave. In 1991, Marion Reid was appointed lieutenant governor of the province – the first woman to hold this position in Prince Edward Island history. Common Ground (Charlottetown, PE: volume 8, number 6, December 1989) 7.
10 Crossley 1997, 284.
nominations, they must have support from the “old boys network”, a group of male party insiders. The preferred female candidates for both parties were passive, quiet-spoken, and toed the party line. In other words, they could be counted on not to “rock the boat” as Porter stated. According to Porter, there was a clear distinction between “bad” women and “good” women. The “bad” women were those who had their own agenda and causes, and would not bow down to pressure from the party at every turn. They were more difficult for the party to control, and were not always willing to accept that certain issues such as family violence and child care were not being addressed.

Porter also illustrated how the male-dominated party machines would seek to silence active, outspoken female members of the party. Marion Reid, the Island’s first woman to hold the position of Lieutenant Governor, was appointed partially (according to Porter) as a strategy to keep her out of caucus meetings, thus saving the party from having to deal with an outspoken female insistent on discussing “women’s issues.” In much the same vein, Nancy Guptill’s appointment as Speaker in 1993 could be construed as equally strategic: Guptill had been described by a number of interviewees as very outspoken, and Guptill herself noted that through her position as Speaker, had been rather effectively “mummed.”

*The Numerical Representation of Women in Canadian Politics*

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14 Personal interview with Nancy Guptill, May 2002.
In 2000, France passed the "Parity" bill, legislation requiring parties to run an equal number of men and women in elections. At a time when the French Parliament was comprised of over 90% male legislators, it appears that the Parity bill was in response to embarrassment over the low numbers of women in elected office. Despite the fact that in the November 27th 2000 Canadian general election women were elected to federal office in record numbers – 62 in total – those numbers are not close to being representative of the actual population. While women comprise more than half of the population in Canada, they only hold 21%\(^{15}\) of combined federal, provincial and territorially-elected positions.\(^{16}\) It is incorrect, however, to assume that rising numbers of women in the House of Commons indicates a nation-wide trend towards the increasing presence of women in politics. Instead, it is necessary to examine the prospects of women on a province-to-province basis.

Studlar and Matland highlight the fact that while in most democracies women have consistently had greater legislative representation at lower levels of government, this has not been the case for Canada.\(^{17}\) The numerical representation of women in provincial

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\(^{15}\) Women tend to be better represented in the Senate, where they make up 35.4% of senatorial positions (34 female members) than in the House of Commons, where the 37th parliament is 20.6% women, much better than the 5.7% of seats held by women in 1980. Elaine Campbell, “Female Representation in the Senate, the House of Commons, and Provincial and Territorial Legislative Assemblies,” Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Legislative Research Service, Current Issue Paper 56 (February, 2001) 16. Available at http://www.ontla.on.ca/library/c56tx.htm

\(^{16}\) Campbell, 3.

\(^{17}\) They give two possible reasons for Canada’s aberration from the norm: the federal and provincial recruitment streams are separate, creating “dual political career tracks, and limits”, and provincial legislatures are significant in terms of their political power and prestige, thus creating just as much difficulty for women in terms of gaining entry and being nominated. Donley T. Studlar and Richard E. Matland “The Dynamics of Women’s Representation in the Canadian Provinces: 1975-1994,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, 29 (June, 1996) 272-274.
legislatures in general was slow to catch up to that of the House of Commons,\textsuperscript{18} although occasionally some provinces have surpassed the percentage of women at the federal level. In particular, the Maritime provinces have been slow to introduce women into their legislatures; while the situation has been improving, they have been among the last to elect women to office, and progress is at the pace of a slow crawl. Studlar and Matland have found significant differences in the presence of women in the Atlantic provinces,\textsuperscript{19} compared to the rest of Canada.

From 1984 to 1988, female representation rose a meagre 1 per cent in the eastern provinces (from 6.2\% to 7.2\%) while it showed strong growth in the rest of Canada (from 7.5\% to 13.5\%). [...] From 1988 to 1994 the gap between the East and the rest of Canada widens. Women increased their representation in the Atlantic provinces from 7.2 per cent to 12.9 per cent, but representation advanced even more quickly in the rest of Canada, from 13.5 per cent to 20.3 per cent.\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{Fashionably Late – Women’s Entrance into Provincial Politics in PEI}

After the 1993 election, “tiny PEI, with its population of 130,000, quietly became a laboratory for female political progress in Canada.”\textsuperscript{21} The election results saw PEI lead the country in terms of female representation in politics, with 25\% of the new legislature.

\textsuperscript{18} Studlar and Matland, 272.
\textsuperscript{19} They claim that lower levels of representation in Atlantic Canada are due largely to three factors: little viable NDP presence, that the provinces have a more rural nature, and a slightly greater tendency for incumbents to seek and win re-election. Studlar and Matland (1998), 128.
\textsuperscript{20} “For the earlier periods (1975, 1980 and 1984) the differences are substantively inconsequential and statistically insignificant. As the rest of the country showed marked increases in women’s representation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the Atlantic provinces lagged behind to the point that the differences are both statistically and substantively significant.” They argue that this regional phenomena results from three factors. First, the fairly weak showing of the NDP in the eastern provinces means that, given the NDP’s propensity to be the leader in recruiting female candidates, there will be fewer female representatives and less incentive for the other parties to be progressive in this sense. Second, lower turnover rates than in the rest of Canada mean that there are less seats available for new female candidates. Finally, the closed organizational structure of Atlantic political parties are reputed to be more centralized, traditional and patronage than in the other provinces.” Studlar and Matland (1996) 277-278.
composed of women MLAs. It should not be assumed that Prince Edward Island was laying the groundwork for women’s participation in the political system in the years prior to 1993. In fact, it was not until 1966 that either of the Island’s major parties even nominated a woman as a political candidate for a provincial election. That year, the Liberals nominated two female candidates. Jean Bell MacDonald ran for the Liberals in one of the Charlottetown area ridings, but was always referred to in the election advertising as B.E. MacDonald, the initials of her late husband, Benjamin Earle, former mayor of Charlottetown and MLA.\footnote{22} The other Liberal female candidate brought forth that year was Jean Canfield. She ran in the riding of First Queens, historically a solid Tory seat. Both women lost the election, but Canfield was only 122 votes behind her opponent. When she ran again in 1970, she defeated the same opponent by 271 votes, and became Prince Edward Island’s first female MLA.

Many researchers agree that “parties are the crucial gatekeepers to elected office,”\footnote{23} or at least play a significant role in determining representation. Previous research by Studlar and Matland indicates that party systems may have an impact on whether political parties recruit more or less female candidates, depending on the competitiveness of the parties present and which parties play a role.\footnote{24} PEI has consistently had an almost exclusive

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\footnote{21} Sharpe, 196.

\footnote{22} John Crossley suggested that having the same initials as her late husband was probably quite a benefit to Mrs. MacDonald’s campaign during this period. John Crossley “Picture This: Women Politicians Hold Key Posts in Prince Edward Island,” \textit{In the Presence of Women: Representation in Canadian Governments}, ed. Jane Arscott and Linda Trimble (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1997) 282.


\footnote{24} For example, research shows that the NDP often recruits more women than the Liberals or Conservatives. These actions often pressure other parties to moderately follow in their footsteps. Even when the NDP is not in a place to be a contender for provincial government, they lead by example through such actions as adopting affirmative action programs to recruit female candidates. As well, they are usually
two-party system, both federally and provincially, comprised of the Progressive Conservative Party and the Liberal party. 25 John Crossley states that “only in 1986, when the two major parties made a deliberate effort to recruit women as candidates for election, did the proportion of women in the legislative assembly rise […].” 26 While it is true that the NDP (as the most significant of the minor provincial parties) only once had a presence in the provincial legislature, 27 it can still be argued that the NDP played an important role in increasing the presence of women in politics. 28 Crossley also acknowledges that the NDP might have been significant in that, from the beginning, they were raising issues primarily of concern to women, nominating comparably high levels of women to run for office:

In the 1974 election, the NDP nominated four women (out of twenty NDP candidates), which was twice as many as nominated by either of the other two parties. While only the most committed NDP activists have ever expected the party to have even a small amount of electoral success in PEI, the introduction of more women into the electoral process could not help but provide positive examples to other women in the province and

more in line with the women’s movement agenda than other parties in terms of its issues. Thus, one could conclude that provinces with a competitive provincial NDP party might have a higher percentage of female legislators. Studlar and Matland (1996) 275. See also Lynda Erickson, “Making Her Way In: Women, Parties and Candidacies in Canada,” Gender and Party Politics (London: SAGE, 1993); Lisa Young Feminists and Party Politics (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000) 162-165; Sylvia B. Bashevin Toeing the Lines: Women and Party Politics in English Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 86-87. 25 During the last PEI election, the general consensus in the media suggested that former NDP MLA Dr. Herb Dickenson (also NDP party leader) was not reelected because, as a doctor, his patients wanted him to spend more time at his first profession, not because of any particular dissatisfaction with his performance in office.


27 One NDP MLA was elected in the 1996 election, the previously mentioned Dr. Herb Dickenson.

28 For example, in federal elections between 1972-2000, of the 18 times Islanders had the opportunity to vote for a female candidate, 15 of these cases were women running under the NDP banner. Nominations and results of these federal elections gathered from Elections PEI website, available at http://www.gov.pe.ca/election. The other three instances were as follows: 1980, where Kathryn Schmidt ran for the Marxist-Leninist Party and placed 4th out of 4 candidates, 1988 where Catherine Callbeck ran for the Liberals, placing 1st out of 3 candidates and winning her federal riding, and in 1997, where Paula Price ran for the Natural Law Party, placing last out of 6 candidates.
further legitimate the notion that electoral politics is a citizen’s, not a man’s, activity.\textsuperscript{29}

Other factors may also help to explain women’s entrance into politics. Cross-national research such as that advanced by Pippa Norris argues that women do best under multimember constituencies that have higher number of seats per district, and that the first-past-the-post system is the least favourable when trying to increase women’s representation.\textsuperscript{30} As well, it has been argued that “greater district magnitude” can explain increase women’s representation in legislatures. In the case of PEI, one factor that might help account for the increased numbers of female legislators at the provincial level during the 1989 and 1993 elections was the presence of a dual member electoral system. Prior to the 1996 election, constituents in Prince Edward Island voted for both an Assemblyman and a Councillor in every riding.\textsuperscript{31} Studlar and Matland (1998) state that when a party has to nominate two candidates, they often show a concern for balancing their tickets as a strategy to attract more votes; this, they argue, can result in more women being nominated and subsequently elected in dual member ridings, as opposed to single member ridings.\textsuperscript{32}

The arguments made by Norris, and Studlar and Matland seems to hold true when comparing the 1993 and 1996 results. In 1993, PEI jumped ahead of the rest of the

\textsuperscript{29} Crossley 1997, 288.
\textsuperscript{30} Among the reasons she lists as to why these types of systems help increase the pace of women’s entry into electoral politics, she states that: “In single member constituencies local parties peck one standard bearer. Therefore selection committees may hesitate to choose a woman candidate, if women are considered an electoral risk.” Norris, 315.
\textsuperscript{31} These dual ridings were initially created in PEI at the end of the last century expressly to ensure ticket balance with respect to religion. Rand Dyck, \textit{Provincial Politics in Canada}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Edition (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1996) 96.
eastern provinces and the rest of Canada with 25 percent female legislators. The general election of November 18th, 1996 was run under 27 new single districts, thereby ending the 16 dual member ridings that had been in existence since 1966; in this first election after the redistricting from 32 dual member districts to 27 single member districts, the percentage of women in the legislature fell to 14.8% and rose again to 22.2% in 2000. Of the 27 MLAs presently in office, 6 are women, all from the ruling Progressive Conservative Party.\(^3\) One cannot draw too many conclusions from these numbers alone: given the small number of MLAs in PEI, even the loss of one female legislator triggers a dramatic drop in percentage. The research literature on representation and electoral systems, however, would suggest that this significant change in the electoral system still should not be neglected. The existence of the dual member riding electoral system in the province might have played a factor in the speed with which women made inroads into politics, after starting off so late.

**Behind Every Great Man: Women’s Organizations in Prince Edward Island**

The experience of women’s organizations on the Island has always been somewhat unusual due to its political culture, the small size of both the province, and the informal nature of the legislature. Contrary to previous research by Catherine Cleverdon\(^4\) that suggested Prince Edward Island women were politically apathetic, Bonnie MacLean

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33 Pat Mella acts as Treasurer, Mildred Dover is the Speaker of the House, and Gail Shea is Minister of Community of Cultural Affairs.

34 She wrote that there was really no suffrage movement in PEI, since women were indifferent to politics. Catherine Cleverdon *The Woman Suffrage Movement in Canada* (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1950).
found that women on Prince Edward Island have always been politically active, in a wide variety of ways. For example, in 1899, the Local Council of Women of Charlottetown campaigning to allow women to be appointed to school boards, and in May of that same year, the group convinced a MLA to present a petition to the Legislature, “praying that one-third of the School Board be women.” They were successful in lobbying to change the law in order to allow women to be appointed to both the Summerside and Charlottetown school boards.35

Although groups such as the W.C.T.U. and the Women’s Institute actively campaigned for women’s suffrage in Prince Edward Island during the late 1800s, the Women’s Liberal Club was considered to be the institution most responsible for its achievement in 1922 after a six-year campaign.36 The strategy of the Women’s Liberal Club, for example, was to lobby quietly by speaking to various groups, individual women and legislators; specifically, they saw that converting the opinions of men was equally important.37 Suffrage advocates often advanced their interests in social reform by using their prominent social standing and family background to influence men in the government,38 and in 1922 were successful in obtaining the provincial vote for PEI women. It is quite possible that this laid-back, subtle strategy and use of informal

35 Bonnie MacLean Women’s Politics in Prince Edward Island, 1900-1950 (Master’s Thesis, Carleton University, 1992) 36.
36 MacLean finds little evidence of significant suffrage activities between 1885 and 1916 except for a W.C.T.U. Maritime Convention held in September 1913, and it was apparently an American speaker who spoke out on the issue. MacLean, 37.
37 MacLean, 37.
political networks was a large part of the reason that the suffragette movement on PEI did not endure an organized backlash.

While women continued to influence public policy through these informal channels throughout the century, the political organization of women into interest groups and feminist organizations began to increase markedly during the mid-1970s. The PEI Teachers Federation established a Status of Women Committee in 1974; the PEI Advisory Council on the Status of Women was created by the provincial government in 1975; and in 1980 a group called Women in Support of Agriculture was formed. The 1980s also saw the establishment of a home for battered women, a rape and sexual assault crisis centre, and the beginning of an influential monthly magazine focusing on issues primarily of concern to women called Common Ground.39

Like most other provinces, PEI went through a period of high deficits in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and endured many cutbacks in government agencies and spending. Dianne Porter, former Chairperson of the Prince Edward Island Advisory Council on the Status of Women indicated that as a result of these hard times and the decisions made by governing officials, many women’s organizations and networks that flourished in the 1970s and 1980s went “underground”; instead of trying to promote change through formal institutions, they acted more in a behind-the-scenes manner. Porter herself explained that although she left the Advisory Council in 1989, there has not been a day that has gone by where she was not doing something related to the advancement of

39 Its first edition was published in 1984.
women and their concerns. To show which women's organizations existed immediately prior to the Callbeck government, the following table lists women's organizations in Prince Edward Island that were in active during the previous decade. This table also shows the relatively high proportion of women's organizations dedicated to issues of violence against women or family violence that existed in PEI immediately prior to 1993.

| Table 2: List of Women's Organizations Active in Prince Edward Island, 1983-1993 |
|---|---|
| Transition House Association |
| Anderson House |
| Family Violence Prevention Committee of Southern Kings |
| PEI Chapter of the Ad Hoc Committee on Women and the Constitution |
| PEI Advisory Council on the Status of Women |
| Women's Immigrant Group |
| Rape and Sexual Assault Centre (later called the Rape Crisis Centre) |
| PEI Chapter of National Association of Women and the Law |
| East Prince Women's Information Centre |
| Childbirth by Choice |
| Disabled Women's Network |
| CARAL PEI |
| Atlantic Women Business Owners |
| PEI Women's Network (founders of Common Ground Magazine) |
| Women in Support of Agriculture |
| Mann House (serving women with additions) |
| Women's Entrepreneur Group |
| PEI Women's Institute |
| East Prince Committee on Family Violence |
| Young Women's Issues Committee |
| PEI Chapters of Canadian Federation of University Women (in Summerside and Charlottetown) |
| Lesbian Collective |
| Women in Support of Fishing |
| DAWN PEI |
| Women's Centre, UPEI |
| Association of Acadian Women |
| REAL Women |

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40 Personal interview with Dianne Porter, March 2001
Although Prince Edward Island is an Island with a small population, women’s organizations on PEI should not be viewed as isolated from the rest of the country, or from the international women’s movement. Even in the early 1900s, during the founding years of the Women’s Liberal Club, this organization corresponded with suffragists such as Nellie McClung in the prairies, and also communicated with some British activists.41 During the early and mid-1990s, a growing range of women’s groups interacted with a number of respected feminists and feminist organizations. In 1992, for example, the president of the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Glenda Simms, visited PEI to give a presentation to the Learned Societies conference at UPEI, and spoke on reclaiming feminism. This presentation was subsequently given substantial coverage in Common Ground.42 Another example was the final speech given by noted feminist Nancy Jackman at the “Winning Women PEI – Political Skills Forum” held in September 1992. Women’s organizations on PEI, in fact, have had a long and rich relationship with the national and international feminist movements, and PEI women had many opportunities to engage in feminist dialogue with women from feminist organizations domestic and foreign. It is clear that the Island women’s movement was not isolated or stunted, and that women’s organizations and feminists on PEI were active and involved, particularly around the issue of domestic violence, prior to the 1993 election.

41 Common Ground. (Charlottetown PE: volume 8, number 3: June 1989) 5.
Summary

This chapter has analyzed Prince Edward Island's political culture, where the informal nature of politics is expressed most frequently through casual relations between electorate and elected, and the legislature functions in a decidedly non-professionalized nature. These factors are key in that they reveal a great deal about how elected officials in the province communicate with constituents, interest groups and other political actors. Politicians are accessible and known to their constituents; equally important, constituents feel as if they are able to approach their MLAs and MPs, whether they are backbench politicians or the Premier.

This chapter has also reviewed the numerical representation of women at the provincial level in Prince Edward Island. My overview of women's electoral history makes it even more surprising to note that in the aftermath of the 1993 provincial election, women suddenly made up 25% of the legislature, a higher proportion than any other provincial or federal election ever. While statistically these numbers are slightly more impressive than they actually are, given that there are only 32 PEI MLAs, the impact of that high proportion of women to PEI politics is very significant particularly because of the small size of the legislature and the influence that those eight women subsequently had.

While measuring the activities of women's organizations may provide researchers with an indication of the strength of feminist activity or support in the province, this chapter
has illustrated that in some cases, such as in Prince Edward Island, the success of such activities per se may not always be easy to evaluate. As I have shown was the case in this province, some types of influence are not overt or easily visible. The problem for researchers seems to be that, given the low-key way in which women have attempted to influence provincial politics and key decision makers, even evidence of the fact that they tried to impose their influence is difficult to find. Thus, any research attempting to determine the strength or organizational ability of the women's movement based solely on, for example, a written record of official lobbying or activities may be incomplete, and may not accurately reflect the full extent of the strategy that was used. This has important implications for research on gender in politics because it means that previous research based solely on voting patterns and legislative initiatives may be incomplete, requiring qualitative evidence that offers a more holistic picture of the interconnections between women politicians, women's movements and public policy outputs.
Chapter 4

The previous chapter highlighted the informal nature of PEI politics, a finding that plays a major factor in my analysis as to the relationship between women's organizations and elected officials after the 1993 provincial election. I have also shown that research does find gender to make a certain difference in politics. This chapter provides a brief background of the 1989 and 1993 PEI provincial elections. The bulk of the chapter examines the Callbeck government's record in terms of the advancement of women's equality, with particular attention given to how Callbeck was viewed by women's organizations as opposed to members of her caucus and party.

Setting the Stage: 1989 And 1993 – Two Liberal Landslide Elections

The 1989 PEI provincial election was a massive Liberal victory. With 60 percent of the popular vote, Joe Ghiz led the Island Liberals to victory for a second time on May 30th 1989, taking 30 of 32 seats - the largest majority by an Island government since 1935. Six of the 30 Liberals elected were women, again making Island history as the highest number of women ever elected. In total, seven women were elected to provincial office during that election (one of the two successful Progressive Conservative candidates was also a woman). The overwhelming Liberal majority was largely a by-product of the recent Michael Wilson federal budget. This budget announced the closure of the Summerside military base, eliminating 1,200 jobs from a town that had at that time only 8,000 people. The federal budget also threatened to cut regional development assistance; this was of great concern to PEI given that in 1989, the provincial unemployment rate
was 14.0%. These circumstances led the Toronto Star to declare: “Canada’s smallest province bared its teeth at the federal government yesterday by giving Liberal Premier Joe Ghiz a smashing election victory.”

Following the election, the fortunes of the province began to fluctuate economically. In 1989 and 1990, the province reported balanced budgets; however, 1991 marked the beginning of deficits and large increases in the province’s net debt. Between 1990-1991, the province’s net debt increased by $7.9 million dollars. Interestingly, that same year, the provincial government still established a Women’s Secretariat, with $75,000 in funding for its first year. In the next year’s budget, the provincial government declared that it had registered an increase in net debt of $20.3 million dollars between 1991-1992.

Despite the economy’s performance under the Ghiz government, the PEI Liberal party won a staggering 31 out of 32 seats in the 1993 provincial election. One explanation for this victory was that the new leader, Catherine Callbeck, was coasting on the popularity of former premier Joe Ghiz and that the re-election of the provincial Liberals was largely driven by the desire to chastise the federal PC party. Other reports paid tribute to Callbeck’s slow and steady approach, and also highlighted the fact that the slate of candidates running contained many returning, experienced MLAs.

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1 That was only the beginning; the unemployment rate rose as high as 18.1% in 1993.
Significantly for this thesis, this election saw eight women – seven Liberal, and the lone Progressive Conservative elected on the entire Island - elected to provincial office. Table 3 provides a list of the women who were elected, their party, and the positions they held in the government from 1993-1996.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catherine Callbeck</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Premier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancy Guptilll</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Speaker of the Provincial Legislative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libbe Hubley</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Deputy Speaker of the Provincial Legislative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberta Hubley</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Minister of Labour and Minister Responsible for Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeannie Lea</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Minister without Portfolio; responsible for Women’s Advisory Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rose Marie MacDonald</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marion Murphy</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricia Mella</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative</td>
<td>Leader of the Official Opposition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At first glance, this does not seem remarkable. However, what stands out are the roles that these women held after the election – positions such as Speaker, Deputy Speaker, and Premier. Furthermore, when Liberal leader Catherine Callbeck, who was elected Premier in this election, ran against the Progressive Conservative leader, Pat Mella, never before in Canadian history had women simultaneously been at the head of 2 major parties in a province.
Callbeck’s Government and The Advancement of Women

In examining media reports leading up to the campaign, it is glaringly obvious that issues primarily of concern to women were not portrayed as key issues and that neither Mella nor Callbeck capitalized on their gender to garner the women’s vote. Equally interesting, the local provincial media did not focus significantly on the gender of the electoral candidates in the heat of the campaign. In fact, the Toronto Star commented: “Islanders, battered by high unemployment and economic uncertainty, are less interested in the next premier’s sex than whether she’ll be able to deliver jobs and security.” Islander seemed to be more than a little amused by the national attention they received during the campaign because PEI was deemed quite certain to elect a female premier.

While women were elected to the Island’s provincial government in record numbers in 1993 and led the rest of the provinces in terms of women’s representation in electoral politics, they were criticized by women’s organizations at home for their lack of action on issues primarily of concern to women. Journalist Sydney Sharpe stated “[Catherine] Callbeck does not bring what the Ontario New Democratic Party calls a ‘feminist analysis’ to politics. Her priorities are not driven by sexist language, male behavior in the legislature, or gender inequalities in society.” Before the election, a cross-party conference was organized on the Island to encourage women to run for office. “Winning Women PEI-Political Skills Forum” was held in September 1992 with approximately 150 women attending. Common Ground reported on this forum, and commented that after

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5 Sharpe, 198.
the speeches of Nancy Guptill, Pat Mella and Dolores Crane (NDP candidate), that “overall, the impression given was that women at this stage are more concerned with consolidating their positions in a man’s world than changing the face of politics.” \[6\] The *Halifax Daily News* reported after the election that Callbeck rejected criticism relating to her failure to address feminist issues during the campaign, noting that, as she stated: “I believe in fairness, equal opportunity and justice for all.” \[7\] Callbeck also claimed that there were no special expectations of her as the first woman in Canada to be elected as Premier, stating she did not feel that type of pressure. \[8\]

Pat Mella’s campaign likewise did not stray too far from mainstream economic issues such as unemployment and tax incentives for business, although she did also support publicly funded day care. \[9\] Mella’s campaign focused largely on job creation but also included the following key points: eliminating patronage appointments, introducing a freedom of information act, downsizing government, reducing politicians’ benefits (including the premier’s salary) and introducing kindergarten. Unfortunately for the Conservatives, this seemingly endless list of new initiatives may have done more harm than good, as she was roundly criticized among the province’s newspapers and by the Liberals for having grand ideas without consideration of their costs.

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\[6\] *Common Ground*, (Charlottetown, PE: volume 11, number 5, October 1992) 23.


\[9\] John DeMont, “An Island showdown: Callbeck is the favorite in the PEI vote” *MacLean’s* (Vol 106, Number 13, March 29 1993) 12.
During her tenure, Premier Callbeck and her Liberal government amassed a mixed record on issues primarily of concern to women. The Liberal government announced welfare cutbacks in May 1994 that affected housing and transportation allowances, and changed legislation to include GST credit as income for welfare recipients. Welfare rates were frozen in 1993, and cut twice in the following years. Common Ground reported that “During the election campaign, Premier Callbeck and other members of her party stressed that they could make no commitment to improving services for women. They blame our burgeoning debt load for this lack of commitment.” The magazine then noted that issues that women’s organizations had traditionally identified as important would likely be considered unnecessary frills due to the cost-cutting climate in the provincial government. In fact, Common Ground itself was eventually deemed an unnecessary frill. After fourteen years of funding, the provincial government severed its funding to the magazine in 1995. Common Ground managed to stay afloat for a few issues with a new editor and a different design, but eventually it could not sustain itself financially and ceased publication in 1996. This was a significant blow to the women’s movement on PEI: the cessation of this publication meant that one of the major vehicles for networking and communicating available to women’s organizations on PEI was lost.

The dire provincial economic situation discouraged the introduction of new social policy in general. This is reflected clearly in the stated objectives of Callbeck’s government,

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which were to promote economic development, education, and reduce the deficit. Between 1993 and 1994, however, the deficit had increased by $44 million dollars, resulting in a total deficit of $69.4 million dollars. While the North American and provincial economy recovered, the Callbeck government took action to avoid massive layoffs in the public sector in 1994 by announcing that as of April 1 1994, the non-salary operating accounts of all departments and agencies of the provincial government would be reduced by 7.5%. The salaries of the Premier, Cabinet Ministers, and MLAs would also be decreased by the same percentage. In 1995, however, PEI's economy began to recover nicely; in fact, it was leading Atlantic Canada in terms of growth and all economic sectors seemed to be doing well. In the meantime, the provincial government had gone through significant restructuring. The number of government departments had been reduced from 13 to 8, and the number of crown agencies downsized from 14 to 10. Approximately $29 million dollars had already been removed from government programs by this point, and $23 million dollars eliminated from public sector salaries and benefits. This was the last year the Callbeck government ran a deficit; as a result of the booming economy and massive cuts in government spending, 1995-1996 resulted in a balanced budget.

The interviews conducted with representatives from women's organizations, and former female PEI MLAs elected in 1993 shed more light on the challenges facing these women and the provincial government during this time, and reflect on whether elected women, particularly the premier, substantively represented women in an era marked by significant

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12 Common Ground (Charlottetown, PE: volume 12, number 2, April 1993) 5.
fiscal challenges. Some respondents argued that Premier Callbeck saw herself as a politician first and a woman second. As one interviewee stated “I think she’s almost sometimes divorced herself a little bit from the fact that she was a woman herself.”\textsuperscript{15} McCallum agreed, arguing that women politicians often felt that way and did not necessarily recognize that their political success could not have been achieved without the work of the women’s movement. She observed:

The fact that Catherine Callbeck is a woman I’m sure didn’t hurt, but I never once heard Catherine Callbeck say anything at all that made me think that she was a feminist. In fact I once did an editorial for CBC radio that was published nationally, right after she had been elected, and I argued that very point – she got elected despite the fact that she was a woman, but she didn’t use the fact that she was a woman to further women’s issues.[…] I always thought of her as kind of a Margaret Thatcher in PEI.\textsuperscript{16}

Then-opposition leader Pat Mella noted that the situation confronting women in the provincial government after the 1993 election was unusual because it was a historic election for women and expectations were high. As she reflected:

I think women’s groups probably exert a little more pressure on women to, you know, take their gender with them on the issues and try to do something, because that’s exactly why we hope that more women get into politics! So that some of these issues that are unique to women will be addressed.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{13} Government of Prince Edward Island, Budget Speech and Estimates, 1994
\textsuperscript{14} Government of Prince Edward Island, Budget Address, 1995
\textsuperscript{15} Personal Interview with Ruth Freeman, April 2002
\textsuperscript{16} Personal Interview with Anne McCallum, March 2002
\textsuperscript{17} Personal Interview with Pat Mella, April 2002
Mella also stated that she felt that women’s equality was advanced somewhat simply by the fact that she and Catherine Callbeck had risen to leadership positions, showing other women that barriers could be overcome.\footnote{18}

There was also pragmatic discussion about the political wisdom of a woman immediately supporting issues primarily of concern to women when first elected. McCallum argued that for women in politics, “coming on very strongly right away on women’s issues was shooting themselves in the foot.” She observed that female politicians wanted to be successful in the male sphere first and prove that they can do as well as their male counterparts; supporting issues primarily of concern to women would be easier to do once they were more established and secure.\footnote{19} Alternatively, a few interviewees suggested that the women’s community itself was partially to blame for setting high expectations and fell prey to thinking that the election of a woman to politics automatically ensured the substantive representation of women and the concerns of women’s organizations.\footnote{20} Substantive representation, however, does not always ensue.\footnote{21}

Other interesting perspectives emerged from the interviews in terms of how women in positions of power in the provincial legislature affected PEI politics. Ruth Freeman, Coordinator of the Women’s Centre at the University of Prince Edward Island, noted:

\footnote{18} Personal Interview with Pat Mella, April 2002
\footnote{19} Personal Interview with Anne McCallum, March 2002
\footnote{20} Dianne Porter noted in her interview that in terms of speaking for women, Pat Mella was in a unique situation. “[Pat Mella] had a very good position for women, she was the opposition leader in the house, she was alone and she could stand at any time in the house and ask questions, or she – as the representative for her party – could call a news conference, and spend her time on issues. There was one fault with that, in that she didn’t have to put any money to the public, to the problem because she wasn’t in gov’t, so she could say whatever she wanted to say.” Personal Interview with Dianne Porter, May 2002
\footnote{21} Personal Interview with Joanne Ings, April 2002; Personal Interview with Pat Mella, April 2002
I think they were struggling with some really interesting peer pressure going on within the government itself, with so many women there who made themselves admissible. For example, if [the Women’s Centre at the University of Prince Edward Island] had an event on campus that focused on women, we would invite members of government. The women showed up, and I think some of the men felt pressure to show up – to show some sort of tacit support, if nothing else. And I’m sure that that probably wouldn’t have happened without all those women in government.\(^{22}\)

A few interviewees suggested that Premier Callbeck’s approach was simply more cautious as a result of her long experience in elected politics. Porter stated:

> As far as public [advocacy] - I believe Catherine Callbeck’s philosophy on that was ‘I don’t want to tell them what I want to do, because I don’t want to have to defend it publicly.’ So I think she very quietly did what she needed to do, within her sphere of influence at that time.\(^{23}\)

As an example, Porter named off an extensive list of Premier Callbeck’s actions that had advanced the cause of women’s equality, including her support of women within the Liberal party itself. Porter praised Callbeck’s efforts to ensure women received appointments while at the same time naming many women to significant appointments in her own government. Furthermore:

> She also made sure that the women MLAs had important roles as chairs of government committees. She made major appointments of women to government boards and agencies, she advanced women in the party executive – in all the campaigns, she made sure that every district in the Island was co-chaired by a woman. There were more women in senior management under her government.\(^{24}\)

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\(^{22}\) Personal Interview with Ruth Freeman, April 2002  
\(^{23}\) Personal Interview with Dianne Porter, May 2002  
\(^{24}\) Personal Interview with Dianne Porter, May 2002
Callbeck herself stated “I made it a point, and I said it publicly, to promote women.”\(^{25}\) Jeannie Lea, former MLA and Minster Responsible for the Status of Women, noted that Callbeck also increased the number of female deputy ministers, saying that “at least half of the deputies were women when we were in there. See I think that probably – my guess is that this was a conscious decision made by Catherine Callbeck.”\(^{26}\) Both Reid and Lea also mentioned that Premier Callbeck was always seeking names of women to be appointed to boards and did her best to promote women to those positions.\(^{27}\) One of the ways that this was addressed was by creating a databank of women’s biographies or CVs and asking groups from all over the Island, including MPs and MLAs, to send them names. Through this, the government could make sure that every time an appointment came along, at least one woman’s name was considered.\(^{28}\) Lea added that she, as Minister Responsible for the Status of Women, hosted the first Atlantic provinces meeting of the Status of Women ministers (which continues today). Furthermore, the Callbeck government was involved in the PEI Women do Math and Science program, aimed at junior high girls, and also developed public education material on workplace safety related to women. Lea concluded that her government also helped to fund and create a program at the University of Prince Edward Island called the Management Development Program for Women which was designed to assist women in obtaining the skills to place them in management positions (which is also still in existence).\(^{29}\)

\(^{25}\) Personal Interview with Catherine Callbeck, April 2002
\(^{26}\) Personal Interview with Jeannie Lea, March 2002
\(^{27}\) Personal Interview with Marion Reid, April 2002; Personal Interview with Jeannie Lea, March 2002
\(^{28}\) Personal Interview with Jeannie Lea, March 2002
\(^{29}\) Personal Interview with Jeannie Lea, March 2002
Summary

Since the budget left behind by the Ghiz government seems to have had a significant impact on what the Callbeck government was able to do, it is difficult to hypothesize whether or not they would have acted differently, particularly in regards to issues primarily of concern to women, if the economic situation had been more favourable. The evidence seems to suggest that Islanders were not particularly concerned with gender when electing the first female premier in Canada, and that Callbeck was elected primarily because she was seen as a capable politician. PEI’s strong support of the provincial Liberal party appeared, in fact, to have acted as a vehicle for conveying an angry message to the federal Conservative government for its recent actions.

There is mixed opinion as to whether the women MLAs in Callbeck’s government and Callbeck herself were advocates for women. Mainly those who had been in government with Callbeck mentioned her achievements in promoting the cause of women’s equality. Only one respondent who was not in her government discussed these achievements, but this respondent was herself involved in the Liberal Party. The interviews also seem to indicate that women’s organizations were pragmatic and sympathetic to the special pressures of female politicians, recognizing that to focus too much on the advancement of women’s equality immediately would have been political suicide. However, women’s organizations seemed unaware of some of the subtle yet important actions that Premier Callbeck and her government had taken to advance women’s equality on PEI. This would seem to indicate that the general public as well was largely unaware of the ways in which Premier Callbeck and her government acted on behalf of women. Catherine
CallBack’s actions spoke louder than her words; although she may not have advocated the advancement of women’s equality in a public way, she actively worked towards including women in positions of power.

The next chapter continues this examination of women’s representation, and the ability of organizations to affect change. I discuss the issue of family violence, and examine the initiatives of the Callbeck government to respond to the issue. Specifically, it will examine the role played by PEI women’s organizations in advancing the issue as a priority for the provincial government. I use this issue as a case study with which to examine relations between women’s organizations and the provincial government after 1993.
Chapter 5

The previous chapter provided an examination of the Callbeck government’s engagement on issues related to women’s equality — both in terms of how the Premier and other female MLAs were viewed by women’s organizations and what particular actions were undertaken. I have shown that while Callbeck herself was not viewed as a person who spoke out on behalf of women, her behind-the-scenes efforts to place women in positions of power were quite significant.

This chapter details the emergence of family violence prevention as a high priority public issue. The activities of women’s organizations on PEI pertaining to family violence prevention is also discussed as well as a chain of events during the late 1980s — early 1990s, including the Montreal Massacre in 1989 and a series of murders and violent incidents on PEI that reinforced and increased the level of advocacy by women’s organizations on the Island around family violence and violence against women. The response of the Ghiz government to the issue of family violence between 1988 and 1992 is first outlined, and then I analyze the Callbeck government’s response to the issue between 1993 and 1996. My research concludes that the government’s quick and decisive action on issue was due both to the actions taken by women’s organizations and through the leadership of Catherine Callbeck herself. In particular, this chapter highlights Premier’s Action Committee on Family Violence Prevention, and The Victims of Family Violence Act (1996). Finally, I consider the issue of family violence prevention after
1996 and analyze the impact of the Callbeck government both in terms of family violence prevention and the increased legitimacy of women's organizations in dealing with the issue.

**A Slow Awakening: Family Violence Comes to the Forefront**

Despite the attention afforded by the international women's movement from the 1960s onward, the issue of family violence was slow to surface on the broader public agenda as a priority. According to Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, by the mid-1990s "[violence against women] had become the most important international women's issue, and the most dynamic international human rights concern."¹ In their analysis of international activism and advocacy positions, Keck and Sikkink provide three key factors to explain why the issue of violence against women emerged as a transnational social movement:

1. Practises that result in bodily harm, "especially where the causal chain between the perpetrator and the victim is short" are more likely to mobilize transnational networks;²

2. This particular issue allowed organizations to bridge cultural differences and attract allies; and

3. The issue contributed to international human rights discourse;³ and "Women moved away from the well-institutionalized frame of discrimination [...] toward the "rights" frame implicit in the language of violence against women."⁴

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² Keck and Sikkink, 195.
³ Keck and Sikkink, 172.
⁴ Keck and Sikkink, 180.
Mirroring international trends within the women’s movement, the issue of domestic and family violence came to the forefront on the Island in the late 1980s. In her research on gender violence in India, Mary Katzenstein found that when body politics (e.g. rape, dowry death, wife beating, and burning of widows) reach the public agenda, “the prerequisite appears to be the activities of autonomous women’s organizations as the initiators of public debate.” That was indeed the case in Prince Edward Island. It was largely women’s organizations who initiated action and education in relation to family violence and violence against women, rallying around these issues years before they were addressed by the provincial government.

Community organizations and committees seeking solutions to family violence became increasingly common on PEI by the mid-1980s. Table 4 serves as a reference guide to the established committees, Government Departments and organizations involved in raising awareness about family violence on PEI that will be referred to in the remainder of this thesis.

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6 Common Ground emphasised the establishment of Anderson House (a shelter for women and children who have been victims of physical or emotional abuse) as a partial causal factor for this increased awareness.
Table 4
Committees, Government Departments and Organizations involved in Family Violence Prevention or Awareness in PEI: 1988-1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anderson House</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transition House Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>Premier’s Action Committee on Family Violence Prevention</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Violence Prevention Committee of Southern Kings</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Prince Committee on Family Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community Consultation Committee on Family Violence Prevention</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partners for Prevention Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interministerial Committee on Family Violence (IMCFV)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEI Family Violence Action Group</td>
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<td>PEI Advisory Council on the Status of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aboriginal Women’s Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEI Health and Community Services Agency East Prince Committee on Family Violence (previously known as the PEI Department of Health and Social Services)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Prince Edward Island</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEI Rape and Crisis Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charlottetown Boys and Girls Club</td>
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<tr>
<td>Common Ground magazine</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEI Department of Justice</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In 1990, *Common Ground* commented on this growth in action and public awareness (since the early eighties) around family violence. For example, representatives from East Prince agencies met as early as the fall of 1986 to discuss the issue of family violence; an interagency committee was subsequently created. This committee then commissioned a study on family violence in the summer of 1988. The study showed that in 1987-1988, 140 women reported to service providers in East Prince that they had been subjected to physical abuse by their spouse, while reports for the same period to police contained only 47 cases.\(^1\) In spite of this available data, the provincial government did not allocate

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\(^1\) Common Ground, (Charlottetown, PE: volume 9, number 1, February 1990) 5.
enough money to open an emergency shelter in East Prince in their 1990 budget as was requested. Despite this setback, and still desperately in need of a shelter, the East Prince Committee on Family Violence in association with the Transition House Association forged ahead and initiated a program called Spousal Support Services which was aimed at women with abusive partners. Elsewhere in the province, the Family Violence Prevention Committee of Southern Kings produced and published a family violence report. A church response emanated from Summerside where seven local churches of different denominations collaborated on a family violence prevention project called “Fire In The Rose.” Also of importance to the province was the establishment of the Muriel McQueen Ferguson Centre for Family Violence Research at the University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, as it would interact with programs and personnel on PEI active around anti-violence initiatives.

The increased activity of women’s organizations on PEI around family violence derived from a combination of factors and events between the late 1980s and 1991, occurring both provincially and nationally. Some of the local incidents that helped bring this issue to the forefront included the following:

- A case where a Charlottetown lawyer had separated from his wife, and went to her home to collect some possessions. When his wife yelled at him, he punched her in the face, knocking her backward across the room. Charged with assault, he received an absolute discharge with no fine or jail term, and no criminal record.

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2 Common Ground, (Charlottetown, PE: volume 9, number 3, June 1990) 16.
3 This program concentrated on having staff available to provide information and listen to concerns. Common Ground, (Charlottetown, PE: volume 9, number 5, October 1990) 19.
4 Common Ground, (Charlottetown, PE: volume 12, number 1, February 1993) 18-19
• A case where a businessman shoved his wife against a wall, punched her and blackened both eyes. Then he dragged her outside, threw her to the ground and kicked her, threatening to kill her if she told anyone of the assault. He received a week in jail and a year's probation.

• The case of Kevin Kenneth McMurrer, who was under a court order to stay away from his estranged wife in 1989; he was also on probation after being convicted of threatening her. One day, he phoned the place where she worked in Summerside and sent her only co-worker on a wild-goose chase away from the office. Then McMurrer went to his wife’s office and shot her in the head, three times, with a bolt action rifle. The judge at McMurrer’s trial in 1990 gave him the minimum sentence for second-degree murder: life, but eligibility for parole after 10 years, but an appeal court lengthened the term to 12 years before parole in 1991.

These provincial cases, and the 1989 Montreal Massacre of fourteen women together led to increasing concerns relating to family violence and violence against women across PEI. While the federal response to growing demand for action on violence against women was to conduct an inordinate amount of surveys, women’s organizations were not particularly pleased with this focus. Following one federal government announcement regarding a new survey on family violence, the executive director of Transition House Association on PEI at the time, Yvonne Bradshaw, argued the need for action instead of yet another survey, saying: “[…] funding for the initial frontline services is either at zero increase or in some cases being cut.” 6 Over a year later, she stated that even on PEI, surveys and committees dealing with abuses women face far outnumber actual available services that could help deal with the issue. 7 It is clear that there was dissatisfaction with

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6 Carolyn Drake “Survey on violence pointless, women charge,” The Guardian. (Charlottetown: August 15, 1992)
the federal handling of the issue. The following sections will discuss how the PEI provincial government responded to the issue of family violence.


Prior to 1993, the PEI provincial government failed to do little of substance to address the concerns that were rising in relation to family violence. In the late fall of 1991, the McQuaid Report was submitted to Cabinet. This report was an inquiry into police and Department of Justice policies and procedures in cases of inter-spousal and intra-family violence (stemming largely from the previously discussed 1989 McMurrer murder). Common Ground commented that while Premier Joe Ghiz had hailed the latter document as the cornerstone for future public policy on family violence issues, more than two months since the release of the report had passed and that “to date, the only public announcement has been the creation of a new staff position to coordinate initiatives related to domestic violence.”

The province was active, however, in building committees and receiving consultation on the issue.

Provincial activity on this issue during the Ghiz government began in earnest in 1989 when the provincial government struck an Interministerial Committee on Family Violence (IMCFV). Between 1989 and 1990, the IMCFV developed Guiding Principles, and prepared a document entitled “The Prevention of Family Violence: A Community Response.” From 1990 to 1991, the IMCFV proposed a phase of community

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8 Common Ground, (Charlottetown, PE: volume 11, number 1, February 1992) 11.
consultations, held at six locations across PEI, and the Community Consultation Committee on Family Violence Prevention was established to steer the process. The provincial government asked this Committee to take one year to develop a long-term plan built on nine basic principles for the reduction and prevention of family violence. After consideration and consultation with various groups, in September 1991 the group submitted a report to the provincial government that outlined potential strategies to deal with family violence. This publication was entitled “Partners for Prevention: Islanders Talk About Family Violence,” and was followed with a public release of the document.

The Partners for Prevention report subsequently formed the basis of The Partners for Prevention Committee in June 1992 (this committee was officially invited to organize by the Minister of Health and Social Services). This committee was composed of eighteen people representing different sectors, groups and organizations on PEI who saw the need for solutions to family violence. They originally received a one-year mandate, which was subsequently extended. According to their report, the Partners for Prevention Committee was created as the third phase of a long-term strategy to reduce and prevent family violence.

This coalition between the provincial government and members of organizations across Prince Edward Island was given a threefold mandate:

1. To provide advice and assist in building stronger partnerships between government and community in the efforts to reduce and prevent family violence;
2. To continue promotion of the principles of a community development approach to the prevention of family violence; and

3. To work closely with the Family Violence Prevention Coordinator to establish priorities and to provide guidance on future prevention initiatives.  

After the release of the report, the province adopted a few of its recommendations relatively quickly, such as appointing a family violence consultant to develop a long-term strategy on various family violence issues. A “Child sexual abuse protocol” had also been developed; an Island-wide crisis/help line was created; and a provincial treatment program for sex offenders was implemented. As well, a “Nobody’s Perfect” parenting program for at-risk parents was also developed.  

A final provincial initiative relating to family violence was the establishment of a part-time Family Violence Prevention Coordinator in November 1991.

*Callback Takes the Helm: Family Violence as a Government Priority*

In 1996, Ann Nicholson, the former Chairperson for the PEI Advisory Council for the Status of Women made the following statement in reference to Callbeck’s achievements in the realm of family violence prevention during her reign as Premier:

> There is no question in my mind that having a female premier has meant that progressive initiatives in areas such as family violence have gone from being studied to being implemented.
How true was this statement? In my interviews, most respondents felt that during the mid-1990s the issue of family violence was no longer an issue that could be ignored, and public pressure had been mounting to take action. Many of the people interviewed for this thesis suggested that government action on family violence could be attributed partially to the women within and outside of government who had brought the issue to the forefront, combined with the fact that family violence was gaining ground as an international priority. McCallum stated:

I don’t think the government had a choice, I really don’t believe [the issue was raised by the government] because they were enlightened. [...] No matter who would have been in power, whether there had been no women there, I think these things would have still have happened, largely because of the more authority-seeking women’s groups, partly just changing times in Canada in general. 14

Both Marion Reid and Pat Mella added that the increasing numbers of cases in the court system definitely increased public pressure. 15 The Montreal Massacre was also mentioned as a cause, as women’s organizations held vigils and other events to which they would invite MLAs in order to raise their awareness of the issue of violence towards women. Dianne Porter argued that while this public pressure mounted, action on violence against women was chosen deliberately by the Callbeck government because even in those times of fiscal hardship, they knew they could make a difference in at least this one area.

Importantly, most interviewees emphasized that the premier herself had been personally interested in the issue of family violence and that her leadership went a long way towards

14 Personal Interview with Anne McCallum, March 2002.
prioritizing the issue for the provincial government. Joanne Ings, Executive Director of PEI Transition House Association, recounted how the staff at Transition House Association had been frustrated with the lack of attention given to the issue by politicians, and so they decided to invite Catherine Callbeck to visit the organization. Callbeck accepted; she came to the shelter and spoke to the staff for 1½ hours. During that visit, a women who was using the shelter wrote a letter to the premier explaining her situation, and Premier Callbeck was surprised to learn that she knew her personally but had never known about what had been going on in her private life. Ings said that this had a great impact, and that from that point on, Premier Callbeck became a public advocate of the issue.16 "I think it really came from the top with that group of MLAs [...] It was really Catherine Callbeck that said 'This is what I want to do, and make it happen.'" Lea and Callbeck both reflected that, since Callbeck's former role as provincial Minister for Health and Social Services, the personal stories she had heard campaigning, and her visit to Transition House family violence became an issue about which the Premier felt strongly.17

Ellie Reddin, Provincial Manager of Victim's Services in the Office of the Attorney-General, referred to another event that may have also influenced the willingness of MLAs to act on the issue of family violence. A group of women, including herself, decided in the early 1990s to arrange for women to meet with all the Liberal MLAs and the other parties to workshop an educational session about family violence. In her opinion, that

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15 Personal Interview with Marion Reid, April 2002; Personal Interview with Pat Mella, April 2002
16 Personal Interview with Joanne Ings, April 2002
17 Personal Interview with Jeannie Lea, March 2002; Personal Interview with Catherine Callbeck, April 2002.
seemed to be the turning point for the provincial government, causing them to view family violence as a more highly politicized political issue.\textsuperscript{18}

The issue of family violence was taken up by the Callbeck government between 1993-1996, therefore, due to a combination of factors. Women’s organizations had prepared the groundwork through their research and advocacy around the issue, and this awareness had started to infiltrate into the public by the mid 1990s, especially given the rising national and local incidents involving family violence and violence against women. At the same time, Premier Callbeck had empathy for the cause and felt strongly that action should be taken, largely due to her meeting with Transition House Association staff and through past exposure to the issue. Finally, outreach and education on family violence directed toward MLAs also helped reinforce the importance of the issue.

The government’s decision to move on family violence appeared to begin in earnest in 1994. After some restructuring of the Health Ministry under Health Reform, in January 1994 Cabinet recommended that family violence services and prevention be a priority of the new Health and Community Services Agency and that resources be allocated.\textsuperscript{19} In 1995, a permanent family violence consultant position was created in the health care system.\textsuperscript{20} In response, an article in The Guardian in the fall of 1995 stated “If the province’s new strategy to address family violence is a pre-election carrot, it’s a justifiable one.”\textsuperscript{21} Indeed, as the next provincial loomed in the horizon, the Liberal

\textsuperscript{18} Personal Interview with Ellie Reddin, April 2002
\textsuperscript{19} “Partners for Prevention,” 3.
\textsuperscript{20} Progress Report, 5.
Government sprang into action and began a whirlwind of new initiatives, announcements, and committee work in the area of family violence prevention. In 1995, Oct 16-20 was declared Family Violence Prevention Awareness Week in Prince Edward. The provincial government released a plan announcing a five-year strategy with a commitment of $250,000 per year to go towards new programs to prevent all forms of violent abuse in the home. The Guardian stated that “much of the strategy is a repackaging of the existing programs,” but did concede that there were a few new initiatives, such as hiring an outreach worker – at the expense of the province – for the Transition House Association. As well, the province appointed a committee of bureaucrats and community members to report directly to Premier Callbeck to turn the $250,000 and the five-year strategy into more new programs.

It was not only the Liberal government that saw the need for political action on this issue; family violence initiatives were supported to some extent by the opposition as well. For example, Pat Mella spoke out on family violence in May of 1995 and gave statistics showing how PEI’s rate of women experiencing violence was the fourth highest in Canada. This broad support was likely a reflection of overwhelming public attention to these issues, especially high in the aftermath of the Montreal Massacre of 1989.

In terms of the influence that PEI women’s organizations had on the provincial government’s decision to prioritize family violence prevention, Catherine Callbeck stated

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that women’s organizations had been as influential as any other group, but noted that family violence was certainly one issue that had generated a lot of interest.\textsuperscript{25} Most other respondents, however, felt that women’s organizations had been much more influential than Callbeck indicated. For example, Lea argued that women’s organizations were successful in keeping the pressure on the government by organizing a debate and “keeping a report card on how we were doing.”\textsuperscript{26} Guptill noted that groups of women such as the Advisory Council and the PEI Women’s Network had influenced government through their strong presentations and voice, particularly important because sometimes when politicians have not lived through a particular experience, a vocal group is required to push the agenda:

They were the ones that did the vigils, they were the ones that spoke up when the judicial system wasn’t doing its job properly, or when sentences were too weak. […] When you have an advocate group with loud voices representing a whole lot of people, people will listen.\textsuperscript{27}

Libbe Hubley, former Deputy Speaker, argued that particularly on the Island at that point, women’s organizations were of major importance, as they had good spokespeople whose voices were heard.\textsuperscript{28} Reid recalled that after the Montreal Massacre, “there was a big human cry […] all of a sudden, people looked at the whole area a little differently.” She stated that women’s organizations raised awareness by marching and holding vigils, doing what they could in a very visible way.\textsuperscript{29} Porter said that she felt women’s organizations had been very influential on family violence, and that the provincial

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{25} Personal Interview with Catherine Callbeck, April 2002
\textsuperscript{26} Personal Interview with Jeannie Lea, March 2002
\textsuperscript{27} Personal Interview with Nancy Guptill, May 2002
\textsuperscript{28} Personal Interview with Libbe Hubley, March 2002
\end{flushleft}
government sincerely wanted to act on the issue: “There were several years of all out action, public pressure […] And women's organizations made sure they didn’t forget that, with letters, and news releases, and activities.” McCallum agreed that women’s organizations had been very influential over a long period of time.

There just seemed to be an incredible group of women who were very dedicated, and on top of that, the more traditional women’s organizations had taken on these causes as well. [...] After a certain time, the issues that were at first controversial sort of became middle-of-the-road.

Maria Bernard, former Vice-President of the Association of Acadian Women and a volunteer on the Rape Crisis Centre board, stated that the influence of women’s organizations on the issue of family violence stemmed from the fact that they were in the field and they made the provincial government realize that there were women being abused. “We made them realize it was happening in PEI, not just something that you hear about in big cities.” She said that their influence was particularly timely because of the murders that occurred and because people in general were more aware that violence existed.

The Premier's Action Committee on Family Violence Prevention

In December 1995, a Premier’s Action Committee on Family Violence Prevention was announced, with the Honourable Marion Reid named as Chair. The mandate of this twenty-five member committee reporting directly to the Premier was: “To shepherd the

29 Personal Interview with Marion Reid, April 2002
30 Personal Interview with Dianne Porter, May 2002
31 Personal Interview with Anne McCallum, March 2002
32 Personal Interview with Maria Bernard, May 2002
implementation of the Family Violence Prevention Strategy, ensure integrity of community participation is maintained, ensure an evaluation component is in place, develop a work plan, establish resource allocations necessary for implementation and communicate initiatives to ensure a high public profile for family violence prevention is maintained across the province."

The Premier's Action Committee on Family Violence had four primary goals – to ensure safety and peace for all people; to ensure that all children, adults and families were valued; to ensure the respect and dignity for all people, and protect personal well-being, which is at the heart of healthy families and communities. The Committee was provided with an annual budget, gleaned from contributions of several departments, and was vested with the authority to use the resources towards the strategy. One of the key evaluations it performed was an evaluation on the effectiveness of its major financial allocations to direct service delivery. They also promoted an "increase in front-line services through Transition House Association and Rape Crisis Centre, increased political, societal and professional awareness, and the development of a model of best practices which demonstrates true community inclusion." 

A number of initiatives grew out of the Premier's Action Committee on Family Violence. For example, The Premier's Action Committee on Family Violence Prevention stated in

its *Progress Report, 1995-1996* that the Purple Ribbon Campaign in commemoration of the Montreal Massacre reached its high point in 1996. They noted that it had previously been a small-scale operation, but in 1996 the PEI Advisory Council on the Status of Women presented a proposal to the Premier’s Action Committee on Family Violence Prevention to endorse a partnership in an effort to reach more Islanders. As a result, an additional $1,000 was directed to the campaign – allowing it to reach an additional 2,000 Islanders than the previous year.\(^{36}\) In January of 1996, a PEI Mi’kmaq research proposal concerning family violence was approved by the Muriel McQueen Ferguson Centre for Research on Family Violence, with the participation of the Aboriginal Women’s Association, the Health and Community Services Agency, the RCMP and the University of Prince Edward Island.\(^ {37}\) In June of 1996 the Premier’s Action Committee directed $60,000 in additional funding to the PEI Rape and Crisis Centre.\(^ {38}\) Finally, the Premier’s Action Committee on Family Violence Prevention secured a formal commitment with the Muriel McQueen Ferguson Center for Family Violence Research, in Fredericton NB, that saw the Center expand its mandate to PEI, with two Islanders serving on its board of directors.\(^ {39}\)

*The Victims of Family Violence Act*

One important piece of legislation adopted by the Callbeck government was *The Victims of Family Violence Act* (1996). This was a legal mechanism to move perpetrators of violence out of the home, and allow victims to remain in their home. This act was

\(^{36}\) *Progress Report*, 27.

\(^{37}\) *Progress Report*, 22.

\(^{38}\) *Progress Report*, 12.
effective as of December 16, 1996\textsuperscript{40}; however, the actual implementation of this act was postponed until the completion of training that was held for police enforcement, Transition House Association, and Victim Services. Saskatchewan has enacted a similar act in 1995, called \textit{The Victims of Domestic Violence Act}. It is interesting to note that PEI was the 2\textsuperscript{nd} province in Canada to make it easier for victims of family violence to obtain legal protection.\textsuperscript{41} Also, \textit{The Victims of Family Violence Act} made PEI the first province in Canada to include emotional abuse as a form of violence.\textsuperscript{42}

PEI's \textit{Victims of Family Violence Act} states that its object is to reduce and prevent family violence and facilitate legal protection for victims by providing speedy civil remedies. Family violence is defined in the \textit{Act} as including:

- Any assault of the victim
- Any reckless act or omission that causes injury to the victim or damage to property
- Any act or threat that causes a reasonable fear of injury to the victim or damage to property
- Forced confinement of the victim, or
- Actions or threats of sexual abuse, physical abuse or emotional abuse of the victim

\textsuperscript{40} While this \textit{Act} was proclaimed in December of 1996, almost exactly one month after a provincial election held on November 18\textsuperscript{th}, 1996 in which Catherine Callbeck did not run, it is still fair to say that this particular piece of legislation can be wholly attributed to the Callbeck government.
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Progress Report}, 3.
The first of the civil remedies that the Act provides is an Emergency Protection Order (EPO). A justice of the peace, on the application of any person and without notice to any other person, may issue an EPO if he or she determines that family violence has occurred, and the seriousness or urgency of the circumstances merits such an order. The EPO takes effect immediately, and can last up to 90 days. The justice of the peace must consider the following factors in determining whether such an order is necessary: the nature of the family violence; the history of family violence by the respondent towards the victim, and whether it is more probable than not that the respondent will continue the family violence; and the existence of immediate danger to the victim, other persons or property. Finally, the best interests of the victim, or any child, or any person in the care of the victim are also considered.

If an EPO is deemed necessary, it may contain any of the following provisions:

- A provision granting the victim or other family members exclusive occupation of the family residence for a defined period, regardless of any legal rights of possession or ownership
- A provision directing a peace officer to remove the respondent from the family residence immediately, or within a specified time
- A provision directing a peace officer to accompany a specified person, within a specified time, to the residence to supervise the removal of personal belongings
- A provision restraining the respondent from directly or indirectly communicating with the victim or other specified person
- A provision requiring the respondent to stay away from any place identified specifically or generally in the order
- A provision awarding temporary care and custody or day-to-day care of a child to the victim or some other person
- A provision granting temporary possession of specified personal property
- A provision restraining the respondent from taking, converting, damaging or otherwise dealing with property
- A provision restraining the respondent from committing any further sets of family violence against the victim
- A provision prohibiting the publication of the name and address of the victim, and
- Any other provision that the justice of the peace deems necessary to provide for the immediate protection of the victim.

The second of the civil remedies that the Act provides is a Victim Assistance Order. Where, on application by a victim to a judge, the judge determines that family violence has occurred, the judge may make a victim assistance order containing any of the following provisions:

- Any of the provisions that may be part of an EPO
- A provision for access to children on such terms as the judge may determine, but in making such provision the court must give paramount consideration to the safety and well-being of the victim and the children, and
- Any other provision that the judge considers appropriate.

The Act states that a person commits an offence who does any of the following:

- Fails to comply with the provisions of an EPO or a victim assistance order
- Falsely and maliciously makes an application under the Act
- Obstructs any person who is performing any function authorized by an emergency protection order, or a victim assistance order, or
• Publishes any information in contravention\(^{43}\) of an EPO or a victim assistance order

Those found guilty of such an offence may be liable, in the case of a first offence, to a fine of $5,000 or less, or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three months, or to both. If there is a second or subsequent offence, the offender is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years, or both.

A recent review of *The Victims of Family Violence Act*\(^{44}\) by the PEI Department of Health and Social Services found that, by the end of 2000, approximately 115 EPOs had been granted since the act was proclaimed at the end of 1996.\(^{45}\) In November 2001, the Office of the Attorney General of PEI released its final evaluation report of *The Victims of Family Violence Act*, and concluded that there was a general agreement that EPOs were effective in helping victims of family violence. Furthermore, in almost 90% of the cases in which EPOs were requested, they were granted. 90% of victims surveyed said that the EPO had helped them personally, and 71% of the victims surveyed said they felt

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\(^{43}\) Provisions are made in the *Act* for keeping the victim's address confidential, upon request, and for excluding the public from a hearing in order to prevent an injustice, harm, hardship or adverse effect upon a victim or child. Upon request of the victim, the court may also prohibit publication of any matter connected with an emergency protection order or victim assistance order where, in the opinion of the court, such publication would not be in the best interests of a victim or a child, or would be likely to identify, have an adverse effect on, or cause hardship to the victim or a child.


safer as a result of the EPO.\textsuperscript{46} Reddin mentioned in her interview that after this review was published, the number of EPOs rose. She attributed this partially to the effect of the review on those working in the system; once police officers saw how many respondents felt helped by EPOs, and their effectiveness, they were encouraged to more carefully monitor situations which could require EPOs.\textsuperscript{47}

It is clear that this Act was a major initiative by the Callbeck government to assist victims of family violence; as only the second of its kind in Canada, and the first to recognize emotional abuse as a form of abuse, it is proof that the Callbeck government acted progressively on the issue of violence against women. Its recent review also provides evidence to support this, as the review proved that EPOs were requested and granted, and that victims saw the existence of EPOs as beneficial.

\textit{Post 1996}

By the end of the Callbeck government’s mandate, the message that family violence and violence against women was unacceptable had been widely distributed through the province, and largely embraced by the public. By this point, even mainstream organizations were collaborating to get the message across. For example, the Dating Violence Project began in the spring of 1996 through the Charlottetown Boys and Girls Club, Transition House Association and the RCMP. Focused on dating violence using

\textsuperscript{47} Personal Interview with Ellie Reddin, April 2002.
drama, this presentation was delivered to most junior high and some senior high schools across PEI.48

In the past few years, PEI women’s organizations have continued to organize around the issues of family violence and violence against women. The Coalition for Woman Abuse Policy and Protocol in PEI,49 formed in 1998, was founded to help develop better policies to respond to woman abuse and to ensure that women received safe and respectful responses from Island service providers.50 Not all agree that family violence and violence against women are still priorities on the Island, however. For example, in a letter to the editor, an organizational coordinator writing on behalf of the PEI Rape Crisis Centre Board commended Premier Binns for extending the mandate of the Premier’s Action Committee on Family Violence Prevention for another 5 years but expressed frustration over the lack of increased funding.51 At their recent first province-wide public forum, the Premier’s Action Committee on Family Violence Prevention was told that more funding and front-line workers were desperately needed to continue to battle family violence in Prince Edward Island. Transition House opened in 1981 to house women and children who were victims of domestic abuse situations, but in 20 years, they still have

48 Progress Report, 14.
49 This was a partnership of the Premier’s Action Committee on Family Violence Prevention, Transition House Association, Victim Services, the PEI Medical Society, Woman Abuse and the PEI Legal System Research Team of the Muriel McQueen Ferguson Centre for Family Violence Research, the Aboriginal Women’s Association, the PEI Nurses Association, the RCMP, the Learning Centre, the Family Violence Consultant for the Province of PEI, the PEI Inter-Ministerial Women’s Secretariat and the PEI Advisory Council on the Status of Women.
not witnessed any great reduction in clientele.\textsuperscript{52} Furthermore, despite all efforts, organizations that deal with family violence on PEI are still frustrated with how the issue is still treated by the criminal justice system. Joanne Ings, the executive director of Transition House Association\textsuperscript{53}, who served over 550 women in 2000, wrote an opinion piece in \textit{The Guardian} on July 7\textsuperscript{th}, 2001 stating that the Transition House Association was calling for a formal review of how the criminal justice system responded to abuse women. She stated that “if you assault a woman, the sentence is less than that for stealing baggage from a tour bus.”\textsuperscript{54}

On a positive note, most interviewees from women’s organizations working on issues of family violence and violence against women indicated that as a result of the Callbeck government’s interest and action on issues of family violence and the government’s recognition of these women’s organizations as valuable partners, these organizations began to be viewed as more legitimate by both the government and the public. Porter also noted that progress could also be measured by looking at the local media: “We’re now getting editorials in our local newspapers that we could have written ourselves 10 years ago, that we would never have expected to see in the newspaper, and they’re commonplace now – and that’s a good thing.”

\textsuperscript{52} “Action on family violence challenged at public forum: first province-wide session of Action Committee told more funding needed to cleanse problem for PEI” \textit{The Guardian}, (Charlottetown: November 6, 2001) A1

\textsuperscript{53} Transition House Association is a community-based, not-for-profit organization that operates Anderson House, the provincial shelter for abused women and their children.

Summary

This chapter illustrates how the issue of family violence had long been a priority for feminists and women's organizations both locally and internationally, but only caught the attention of the general public beginning in the late 1980s. The evidence suggests that women's groups on PEI organized, collected information and advocated for family violence prevention on PEI years before the provincial government began to pay it any heed. Overall, in terms of substantive, concrete actions or legislation relating to family violence prevention, little was done by the Ghiz government. One could certainly say, however, that the seemingly intensive consultations and research that did occur helped pave the way for the next government to take the next step beyond consultation alone.

Between 1993 and 1996, Callbeck's government prioritized the issue of family violence services and prevention; subsequently, a Premier's Action Committee was established and The Victims of Family Violence Act was enacted. The fact that the government was taking the issue of family violence seriously, combined with the fact that representatives from community organizations dealing with victims of abuse were working in partnership with the government on the Premier's Action Committee, ultimately led to greater legitimacy for many of the women's organizations involved.

The legislation that was passed was also well received by women's organizations, and effective. In particular, The Victims of Family Violence Act was progressive in that it identified emotional abuse as a form of abuse, and it placed the onus on the perpetrator of the violence to leave the home, instead of forcing the victim to evacuate. Its effectiveness
has very recently reviewed, and the government found that a high proportion of victims of family violence both feel safer and helped by the Emergency Protection Orders that arose out of this legislation.

While there were a number of different reasons given as to why Catherine Callbeck’s government chose to act on this particular issue, two main points emerge. Firstly, the work that women’s organizations had undertaken throughout Callbeck’s term in power put pressure on the government to act through its actions and public outreach. There were many women’s organizations all pushing for action on family violence prevention at the same time, and this action was forceful. Secondly, while many interviewees stated that the presence of high numbers of women in the provincial legislature probably made a difference in terms of working towards family violence prevention, most respondents gave the majority of the credit to the initiative of Premier Callbeck. Callbeck wanted to focus on this issue, and secured the support of both the public and her caucus to make it a government priority.

I argue, however, that one of the reasons Premier Callbeck was able to lead on this issue was precisely because of the immense work that had already been done by women’s organizations in preparing the research, and informing the public. Those organizations that were directly involved in working with victims of family violence were instrumental in educating the Premier, other MLAs, and other members of political parties on the Island as to the seriousness of the issue. Therefore, I conclude that both the ongoing pressure and strategy of the women’s organizations and the leadership of Catherine
Callbeck are explanatory factors as to why the issue of family violence prevention in Prince Edward Island was successfully raised and addressed by the Callbeck government within the three years that they were in power.
Chapter 6

Women’s Leadership and Influence: Findings and Analysis

One of the key questions examined by this thesis is whether there was a change in the relationship between the provincial government and women’s organizations as a result of the increased numbers of women elected to provincial office on the Island - and to powerful positions. Generally, almost all of the representatives of women’s organizations interviewed stated that they had good relations with the provincial government, both prior to and after 1993. While a small minority of interviews involving representatives from women’s organizations were unsure as to whether changes in this relationship had occurred, most interviewees saw at least some change, and in all cases except for one, the change was positive.

Many representatives of women’s organizations said that they felt that they were seen as more legitimate and that their opinions were more sought out than in the past, especially after the government began to take action on family violence. Andy Lou Summers, Executive Director of the East Prince Women’s Information Centre, stated “I think we’ve become much more credible. I don’t know if [having more women MLAs in government] was the only reason, but it certainly helped.”1 Reddin also stated that while there were few MLAs who stood out as being particularly supportive of issues primarily of concern to women, “still, it helped that they were there [. . .] I think that helped too to put women’s

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1 Personal Interview with Andy Lou Summers, April 2002
issues on the legislative agenda.” Freeman stated that governments realized that women have more clout than they previously thought, and that women’s groups tended to represent more mainstream women than in the past, so they now recognize that they are a force to be listened to. She suggested that this was a result of Catherine Callbeck’s actions, “because she showed that she was listening to a group that might have been considered a fringe group – Transition House Association is pretty mainstream stuff, but for some politicians, that would have been considered a fringe group.”

Ings reflected that having women like Pat Mella and Catherine Callbeck at the table who understood the value of the services meant that “you could come to the table without having to go through a whole lot of the song and dance.” Hubley suggested that there might have been a difference in how government viewed women’s organizations, but that this would have come about because the women in government themselves might have been more aggressive in getting input from these organizations on issues pertaining to family, women and children, and thus, women’s organizations might have been more of a partner to the government at that time than before. Mella argued that the relationship between the government and women’s organizations did change. As a result of Premier Callbeck taking on the leadership role to set up the Premier’s Action Committee, people began to take the issues more seriously. She stated that this was probably one of the indirect side effects of having women in leadership positions. Mella also noted that as a result of this Committee, the associated groups were given more legitimacy, and saw that

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2 Personal Interview with Ellie Reddin, April 2002
3 Personal Interview with Ruth Freeman, April 2002
4 Personal Interview with Joanne Ings, April 2002
5 Personal Interview with Libbe Hubley, March 2002
they were going to be recognized by government as groups that had a significant role to play.\textsuperscript{6}

Porter was the lone respondent to see a negative change. She stated that, as a result of having a high proportion of female MLAs, there was less consultation with women’s organizations on many issues.

After 1993, because there were so many women in caucus, I think that they felt that they didn’t have to consult as much – they relied on the expertise of the women that were there, and that was a mistake, because those women that were there were not necessarily involved in women’s equity issues, nor were they necessarily informed.\textsuperscript{7}

Porter’s concerns aside, overall this testimony would indicate that the changed political opportunity structure after the 1993 election, given the introduction of women into key positions of authority, resulted in a more legitimate, consultative relationship between women’s organizations on the Island and the provincial government.

\textit{Revisiting Tarrow – Access, Allies, and Alignments}

According to Tarrow’s definition of access and its importance in a social movement’s ability to influence the political opportunity structure, the informal nature of Prince Edward Island provincial politics illustrated in Chapter 3 would seem to indicate a good likelihood for the success of protest activity to have influence. I argue that the informal nature of politics on the Island allowed for more groups to influence politics, not so much through formal lobbying as through perhaps even more powerfully, informal connections

\textsuperscript{6} Personal Interview with Pat Mella, April 2002

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and relations, making it easier to be able to speak to someone with influence. The small size of the province as well facilitates social movement activity, as it is not difficult to travel across the Island to speak to elected representatives whether they are in their riding, or in their Charlottetown offices.

While there might be an argument made that the existence of a traditional two-party system in Prince Edward Island politics could be evidence of a closed formal political system to alternative or new parties, I disagree with such a claim. The formal political system is one that is relatively open to interest groups and the public. This system is a democratically elected system that allows the entrance of new parties, such as we have seen at the federal level as of late, with 5 political parties represented in the House of Commons. In fact, the election of the first NDP MLA in 1996 would indicate the possibility for change towards the future success of “fringe” parties in Prince Edward Island (albeit this is not likely to happen anytime soon). Therefore, I argue that Tarrow’s criteria of access is indeed useful in explaining the ability of protest or interest groups on the Island – in this case, women’s organizations - to influence political leaders and the public. The access that women’s organizations had to their elected representatives during the Callbeck government and the education and information they conveyed, particularly to the Premier herself, goes a long way towards accounting for their influence.

Another of Tarrow’s criteria – the presence of allies – is particularly useful in explaining the findings of my thesis. With record numbers of women being elected to provincial office (seven elected in 1989, and eight in 1993), women’s organizations found

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7 Personal Interview with Dianne Porter, May 2002
themselves with potential allies, particularly since in 1993, these women were holding positions such as Premier, Speaker, and Leader of the Opposition. While one cannot assume that all women elected in those years were feminists, most respondents said that they believed that the mere presence of these women, particularly in these executive positions, did positively affect the government's willingness to address the issue of family violence prevention.

The presence of more women also made a difference in that women's organizations often felt more comfortable approaching female MLAs because they were assumed to have a higher level of empathy for causes that were of particular concern to women, and thus were seen as allies. Even if that perceived higher level of empathy did not actually exist, the very presence of these women politicians sparked an increase in what women's organizations expected from them, in terms of advancing the equality of women. This perception of allies within the government resulted in increased lobbying by women's organizations; they believed that the Callbeck administration offered a golden opportunity to achieve results. The invitation issued by Transition House Association for the Premier to visit and meet with their staff is an excellent example of how one organization took advantage of this new political opportunity. Thus, the fact that women's organizations saw the female members of the Callbeck government as allies in some sense helped them approach female MLAs about the issue of family violence in the first place. Furthermore, as discussed previously, Catherine Callbeck herself had been active in pursuing women's equality from her quiet actions by placing more women in positions of power in the civil service, on boards, and in her government. Therefore,
Tarrow's concept of allies is useful in explaining the findings within this thesis. I will add to this concept by stressing that it is just as important that people who could be of assistance to organizations or movements are recognized as being allies – if they are not perceived as such, and not used in the most effective way, then their importance to organizations or groups is diminished.

The final of Tarrow’s criteria examined is that of alignments. Here, an analysis of the 1989 and 1993 provincial election results, as discussed in Chapter 4, might lead one to argue that the overwhelming Liberal majorities in both elections indicated that political alignments were stable in the province during this period. According to Tarrow, if political alignments were stable, the political opportunity structure for protest would be less opportune, as the government would not be in a precarious position and could be more selective of whose voices were heard. However, taking a broader perspective, it is important to note how the electorate on the Island shifts back and forth between the provincial Liberals and Progressive Conservatives on a regular basis; votes can swing away from the governing party very quickly. There is not one-party dominance, and this means that both major parties must be constantly on their toes, responding to the electorate; in essence, political alignments are not stable. Thus, I conclude that Tarrow's criteria of unstable alignments is useful in explaining the results I have found in my thesis, because the competition for votes between the two parties forces governments to remain receptive to protest groups and organizations to influence government. However, since political alignments are normally unstable on PEI, I would argue that this criteria
was less significant than access or allies in understanding the influence of women's organizations on the provincial government.

**Women's Representation**

The findings of this thesis clearly indicate that women do make a difference in politics. In this sense, this research contributes to the literature on women's impact in politics in a number of ways. This thesis particularly highlights the fact that when women are in executive positions it is easier to steer policy directions and government decisions in areas that might advance women's equality. While women's organizations played a critical role in bringing the issue of family violence to the attention of the public and elected officials, and maintaining pressure on government to take action, it was crucial that Catherine Callbeck herself showed a great deal of personal leadership on the issue.

Secondly, I have shown that when increased numbers of women are elected to office, and to key positions, women's organizations who recognize the changed political opportunity structure are likely to perceive these women as allies, and increase pressure for policy reforms that are in the interests of women. Finally, this research has illustrated that when women are in elected office, particularly in positions of substantial power such as Premier, they may be doing more to quietly advance the status of women than is publicly known, in order to avoid any potential backlash. Examining legislation that was passed, media coverage, or statements in legislatures, for example, certainly provides some indication of a government's record on advancing women's equality; however,
researchers who only look to these sources may be missing details that can dramatically change one's evaluation of a woman politician's activities and impact.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

This thesis has provided a study of the interaction of women’s political leadership, women’s organizations and public policy outcomes. The research has examined the political opportunity structure of PEI after the 1993 provincial election when a historic number of women were elected to the legislature, many in extremely powerful positions of authority.

Specifically, I have considered the ability of women’s organizations to engage the government in policies concerning women, using Tarrow’s criteria of allies, access, and alignments, while including additional factors such as the small size and relatively dense population of PEI. Tarrow’s three criteria – access, allies, and alignments – explain the ability of women’s organizations to influence elected officials on the Island, and of the three, access and allies seem to be the most significant. The particular nature of PEI politics – its informal nature and small physical size – are critical factors in the capacity of Island women’s organizations to influence policy.

Prince Edward Island’s political culture is an important variable in this thesis, as the informal nature of politics has affected relations between elected officials and their constituents, including interest groups and social movements. Politicians are accessible and widely known throughout the Island on a personal level; equally important, constituents feel as if they are able to approach their MLAs and MPs. This has allowed
for organizations to have a great deal of access to politicians and decision makers. In this thesis, I have shown that the access that women's organizations had to politicians, at least during Callbeck's government, was a key factor in that it provided education and awareness to the elected officials, and triggered what seems to have been a defining moment for the Premier herself in deciding to pursue family violence prevention. I have argued that one of the reasons that Premier Callbeck was able to lead on this issue was because of the immense work that had already been done by women's organizations in preparing the research, and informing the public. The ongoing pressure and strategy of the women's organizations, coupled with the leadership of Catherine Callbeck and her personal desire to prioritize this issue, are explanatory factors as to why the issue of family violence prevention in Prince Edward Island was successfully raised and addressed by the Callbeck government.

One of the key findings in this thesis is that Island women have successfully worked towards advancing women's equality in low-key, quiet ways. This was the case for women's suffrage, as Bonnie MacLean found, and as I have argued, this was also the case when Callbeck was elected Premier. Within her means, she advanced women's equality without any fanfare, avoiding both the praise and the possible backlash that would have ensued. Thus, future research in this area must be careful to look very closely at what women in politics are really doing to advance women's equality, for there might be more than meets the eye.
The research and analysis within this thesis contributes to the relatively sparse literature on Atlantic, and specifically Prince Edward Island politics, particularly in terms of women as elected representatives, and women's organizations. As well, this thesis is the first analysis of Prince Edward Island government initiatives in the area of family violence prevention.

There are a number of limitations to this thesis that must be acknowledged. While the interviews were extremely valuable, the fact that the respondents were being asked about a period almost a decade ago was sometimes problematic, in that details were forgotten, and impressions may have changed. Furthermore, given that many of the women that were interviewed continue to work in women's organizations, and/or are still active in politics, I suspect that at least to some degree, their answers may have been guarded, for fear of negative repercussions. This would be entirely possible, given how many respondents knew each other personally and professionally. The importance that I have placed on the informal nature of PEI politics as facilitating the ability of women's organizations to have such influence on the government and the public also means that it is difficult to generalize about how women's organizations can influence policy successfully.

Given the findings of this thesis, future research is required in the area of how women act in elected office. In particular, more attention should be directed towards whether women are perceived as advocates for women by their words and public support, and the comparison between this and what actions - either done publicly or privately - female
elected officials actually take to advance women's equality. Furthermore, when researching the impact of a specific female elected official, future research should strive to speak not only to the person in question, they should interview her peers extensively about her to obtain the most complete record. For many reasons, a female politician who was or is in the public eye may choose to be conservative in what is revealed about her actions towards the advancement of women, but her colleagues may be more likely to boast about her achievements and reveal actions. Clearly, future research on women in politics must examine numerous facets of their actions while in office, in order to obtain a truly clear picture of whether and how they acted on behalf of women.

I argue that this thesis also proves the importance of understanding political culture when analyzing politics, and how groups react to a changed political opportunity structure. The use of the political opportunity structure framework in subsequent research projects should take pains to integrate an analysis of political culture in any attempt to understand how organizations or groups perceive opportunities, and how they subsequently organize to best take advantage of these opportunities. Finally, future research on women in PEI politics might include attitudinal surveys and encompass the views of male politicians.

There is clearly “more than meets the eye” in terms of what Callbeck’s government had done to advance women’s equality during her tenure as Premier of PEI. One wonders what her government might have done given an improved fiscal situation, or if they had been in office for a second term. What remains to be seen in future research is exactly
how much more can be determined about how women act as politicians, and the conditions required for the women’s movement to affect policy outcomes successfully.
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