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UMI®
THE DETERMINANTS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SLOVAKIA

by

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A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Masters of Arts

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Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario

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Abstract

Civil society has become an important topic in the study of post-communist states. However, there are few studies which examine the factors affecting civil society. This thesis analyzes the impact of three factors on both the national aggregate numbers of civil society and the regional disparities in civil society numbers in Slovakia since 1993. Firstly, the extent to which political elite attitudes and the political environment have impacted civil society in Slovakia is examined. Secondly, this thesis studies the affects that political culture has had on civil society. Thirdly, and finally, this thesis explores whether socio-economic dislocation incurred by the transition process has influenced civil society in Slovakia. This thesis concludes that economic factors have had the most influence on the development of civil society in post-communist Slovakia. In particular, economic factors have been strongly correlated with the disparities in civil society activity throughout Slovakia’s regions and districts.
Acknowledgements

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Introduction

Civil society is certainly one of the key contemporary subjects in both academic and political discourse. In the academic arena, civil society has enjoyed renewed interest particularly since the developments of dissident groups such as Solidarity in Poland, and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. In the political sphere, civil society has become both a tool and a measurement of democratization. For these reasons, governments and international institutions have given great weight to the development of civil society in states in need of stabilization. Many institutions and governments currently fund numerous projects aimed at developing civil society. However, there is no consensus on what civil society means. Moreover, there are very few studies that examine the central question to civil society, that is, what factors influence civil society.

The first chapter of this thesis establishes the definition of civil society that will inform this study. There are numerous definitions of civil society with which to contend. This thesis employs both a relatively parsimonious definition and an empirical definition of civil society, and thus holds civil society to be the collective sum of autonomous, and voluntary civic organizations. Secondly, as this thesis is primarily concerned with what stimulates civil society, this study has employed literature dedicated to civil society, democratization and public participation to isolate three factors that scholars have postulated will affect civil society. Finally as its initial hypotheses, this thesis holds that a) political elite attitudes and the political environment, b) political culture and values, and c) the socio-economic dislocation incurred by economic transition will affect civil society. In specific this study examines the extent to which these factors have influenced civil society in Slovakia in its first decade of transition.
The second chapter focuses on the development of civil society in Slovakia. Although there is a historical tradition of civil society in Slovakia, throughout its history it has faced numerous disruptions. The obvious result is that Slovak civil society in effect has been formed in the last decade. This chapter specifically assesses the aggregate numbers and density of civil society organizations in Slovakia. Information maintained by the Ministry of Interior, the Slovak Statistical Office and the Slovak Academic Information Agency-Service Center for the Third Sector (SAIA-SCTS) has illustrated that throughout the 1990s the aggregate numbers of civil society organizations in Slovakia have dramatically increased. Distinctive features in the fields of activity, and the location of civic organizations have also developed. Slovak civil society has also conducted two very public campaigns in the 1990s and has attained a significant amount of public support. The qualitative and quantitative review of civil society in Slovakia presented in the second chapter will introduce the data which will be examined against political elite attitudes and the political environment, political culture and values, and socio-economic dislocation in Slovakia in the 1990s.

Political elite attitudes and the political environment in Slovakia in the 1990s are presented in the third chapter. Firstly, this chapter explores the political elite attitudes toward civil society prior to the 1998 parliamentary elections. From 1994-1998 Slovakia was governed by the ruling coalition under Vladimír Mečiar. In addition to its dubious adherence to democratic principles, the 1994-1998 government adopted a hostile and aggressive attitude toward Slovak civil society during its tenure. However, since the 1998 elections, the Slovak third sector has faced a far more positive environment under the new government of Prime Minister Mikulaš Dzurinda. This government has since
exhibited a more conciliatory approach to Slovak civil society. The parliamentary
elections of 1998, and the subsequent change in government provide the opportunity to
examine the effects of two greatly different political environments on the development of
civil society in Slovakia.

The fourth chapter will examine the second factor that this thesis holds will
influence civil society, political culture. Slovakia’s political history has only a weak
tradition of democracy. For most of its history the Slovak territory has been under a form
of repressive or authoritarian regime; as part of the Hungarian Kingdom, the Slovak State
during the Second World War, and communism. Slovakia is therefore not only a young
democracy, but also a young democracy with a weak democratic tradition. Through
various public opinion polls conducted by the Slovak Statistical Office and Slovak
scholars, this chapter firstly examines the national Slovak political culture in the 1990s.
Secondly, this chapter investigates the presence of district political cultures throughout
Slovakia. Due to the unavailability of public opinion polls conducted at the district level,
this thesis will employ electoral support at the district level to assess sub-national
political cultures. Based on the contention that a democratic political culture encourages
public participation, it is expected that low levels of democratic values, or consequently
high levels of authoritarian values will be reflected in the formation of civil society.

The fifth chapter examines the third factor that this thesis conjectures will affect
civil society, that is, the socio-economic developments in Slovakia during the 1990s.
Although the Slovak economy has revealed positive macro-economic indicators, it has
been plagued by a substantial unemployment rate. Unemployment rose to 19.2% in
March 2001. Furthermore, the loss of real wages, and increased long-term
unemployment suggest that the socio-economic costs of transition in Slovakia are significant despite positive macro-economic indicators. As this thesis expects to find a correlation between economic dislocation and civil society, the Slovak economy in transition is examined in this chapter. Due to the state of the inherited economy in 1989, the costs of transition in Slovakia have been sizeable. Moreover, the economic costs of transition on Slovakia have not been felt evenly throughout the country. For example, certain areas of Slovakia have unemployment rates over 30%, well above the national average. This chapter examines the economy during Slovakia's transition, and places emphasis on the geographical economic disparities throughout Slovakia.

The sixth chapter of this thesis will analyze the impact, if any, political elite attitudes and the political environment; political culture and values; and socio-economic dislocation have had on Slovak civil society. It firstly examines the relationship between political elite attitudes and the political environment, and civil society by examining both the qualitative and quantitative developments of Slovak civil society during the 1994-1998 and 1998-present periods. Secondly, this chapter examines the impact of political culture by both charting values throughout the 1990s with civil society formation, and also examining particular areas with higher incidences and areas with lower incidences of democratic values in relation to aggregate civil society data. Thirdly, this chapter also examines the relationship between regional economic disparities and Slovak civil society. In conclusion this thesis presents its findings and evaluates its initial hypotheses.
Chapter I: Civil Society

What is Civil Society?

Unfortunately, despite the proliferation of treatises dedicated to the concept of civil society, agreement on its components is elusive. Civil society has gained prominence in academic literature, as the presence of a strong civil society has come to signify for some the consolidation of democracy. For example, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan hold that a ‘free and lively’ civil society is a precondition of democratic consolidation. They argue that civil society is an essential indicator of democracy as it not only legitimizes and monitors the state, but also illustrates the level of civic participation.\(^1\) It is largely due to its role in the democratization process that civil society has gathered such interest. It has become an important factor in the assessment of the democratization processes in post-communist states. However, there are numerous and, often conflicting, definitions of civil society proposed in the current literature.\(^2\)

The contemporary paradigms of civil society have their roots in eighteenth century political theory. Prior to the eighteenth century civil society was seen as part of the state. John Keane argues that during the period of 1750-1850, “the language of civil society, traditionally used to speak of a peaceful political order governed by law, came instead to refer to a realm of life institutionally separated from territorial state institutions.”\(^3\) In addition to the separation of state and civil society, the component of civility as part of civil society also emerged during the eighteenth century. John Hall

\(^1\) Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*, eds. Larry Diamond, Marc E. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (Baltimore: John’s Hopkins University Press, 1997), 14-33, 16.


states that civil society at this time was seen “as a lively sphere marked by the spread of new codes of manners.” These traditions remain in many contemporary definitions of civil society.

Other themes that may be seen in the current debate on civil society are largely continuations of the Marxist interpretation of civil society. Civil society was interpreted as the realm in which the interests of the bourgeoisie were revealed. Krishan Kumar argues that Marx would have civil society as “a cockpit of competing individuals pursuing their private ends.” Furthermore, in this tradition, civil society was often subjugated to the interests of the social and economic elites. Gramsci extended this theme and described the sphere of civil society as occupied by “a struggle for material, ideological and cultural control over all of society, including the state.” In this tradition, then, civil society in the most basic terms is the arena for the competing interests that will dominate the state. These antecedents to the current debate on civil society remain important to both academics and practitioners. However, it is also important to note that some contemporary scholars reject the term civil society. For some it is too vague a concept, or civil society is simply a disguise “for greater citizen control over our collective lives.” Furthermore, for those that do see utility in the concept of civil society what constitutes civil society is often problematic.

Civil society is a contentious concept. Some argue that it fulfills its destiny as a normative concept, while others argue that it is an empirical reality. Or as John Hall

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states, "civil society is complicated, most notably in being at one and the same time a set of social values and a set of social institutions."\(^8\) Thus, the eighteenth century addition of civility is for many the essential component of civil society. Edward Shils postulates that civil society "is the idea of a part of society which has a life of its own, which is distinctly different from the state, and which is largely in autonomy from it." For Shils this idea has three components. The first is the 'part of society' that houses autonomous institutions, which may include economic, political, religious and intellectual institutions. The second component of civil society is that it both provides protection to citizens against the abuse of power by the state, and the citizen against abuse from his fellow citizen while seeking individual pursuits. The protection of citizens against one another is related to Shils' third and final component, civility. For him, "civil society is a society of civility in the conduct of the members of society towards each other." Civility in civil society, according to Shils, will insure the consideration of, "others as fellow-citizens of equal dignity in their rights and obligations as members of civil society," despite ethnic, political or religious differences. The virtue of civility as a component in civil society is to moderate competing interests and encourage those that focus on the common good.\(^9\) Many, however, are wary of the inclusion of civility in the definition of civil society.

Adam Seligman argues that civic virtue and civil society are different and arise from different political traditions. Civic virtue is based in republican theory that emphasizes the common good, whereas civil society has evolved from the liberal tradition, in which morality is initially found in the individual. Seligman argues that the difference between civic virtue and civil society is primarily in their means of protecting

\(^8\) Hall, 2. 
or projecting morality. He states, "the former (civic virtue) achieves this by rooting communal virtues in individual selves, the second (civil society) seeks to achieve this by restricting individual virtue to the public realm."\(^{10}\) It is clear that the emphasis on virtue and the common good may prove dangerous, particularly in societies in transition. In the post-communist region, one does not have to reflect too long on the rise of nationalism in some post-communist states to realize that interpretations of the common good or civic virtue may in fact prove dangerous.\(^{11}\) Thus the ideal of civic virtue or civility in civil society will be avoided in this thesis. Theoretically, it places the common good above the individual, which may lead to what some call "the tyranny of the majority." Practically, it places a moral dimension on participation, which remains empirically difficult to examine. This ideal as a concept remains difficult to examine, and will incorporate other factors that may be outside civil society, such as citizenship, nationalism and liberalism. Furthermore, the larger or more cumbersome the definition of civil society, the more the concept becomes so obscure and vague that it loses its usefulness for study.

Civil society is also often defined primarily as the arena or space in which the autonomous self-organization of society is allowed to exist. For example, Christopher Bryant defines civil society as the "space or arena between household and state, other than the market, which affords possibilities of concerted action and social self-organization."\(^{12}\) Linz and Stepan also define civil society as the, "arena of the polity where self organization and relatively autonomous groups, movements and individuals

\(^{10}\) Adam B. Seligman, "Animadversions upon Civil Society and Civic Virtue in the Last Decade of the Twentieth Century," in *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, 200-223, 206, and Hall, 7.

\(^{11}\) Seligman and Hall both point the dangers that the common good may imply, particularly in the form of nationalism.

attempt to articulate values, to create associations and solidarities, and to advance their interests.\textsuperscript{13} Similarly, Larry Diamond defines civil society in spatial terms. He states civil society is "the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by legal order or set of shared norms."\textsuperscript{14} Diamond argues that civil society is comprised of many types of organizations: economic, cultural, informational and education, interest based, developmental, issue-oriented, and civic. On the other hand he includes many organizations that are profit making and cross the divide between commerce such as publishing houses and film production companies. The latter types of organizations are included because they participate in the "ideological marketplace." Although spatial definitions of civil society include the space where autonomous self-generating societal organizations may exist, the focus on the space or sphere hinders an empirical examination of civil society. For example, the existence of a space in which the self-organization of society may exist does not guarantee that it does. Furthermore, at times these spatial definitions may also include all "social relations and communications between citizens."\textsuperscript{15} Although these definitions include the main attribute of the autonomous self-organization of society, they do not possess a reasonable or practical manner in which to assess the presence or frequency of such a phenomena. For this reason, an empirical definition of civil society will be employed.

\textsuperscript{13} Linz and Stepan, 16.
That civil society is composed of the autonomous self-organization of society is generally accepted. Most definitions of civil society include a vibrant voluntary associational life as a component of civil society. However, in order to assess the degree of participation, civil society will be accepted as an empirical reality. Several authors stress the empirical basis of civil society. For example, Ernest Gellner states, "the simplest, immediate and intuitively obvious definition, which also has a good deal of merit, is that civil society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to balance the state." ¹⁶ For Dietrich Rueschmeyer, associations that are, "large and small, persistent and ephemeral, that go beyond family and kinship and are not directly involved in governance or economic production and exchange," constitute civil society. ¹⁷ Charles Taylor also accepts the existence of organizations in civil society. Taylor has devised a three-tiered definition of civil society, holding that: one, civil society is present when there are free organizations, independent of the state; two, civil society may only exist when the whole of society is able to independently structure itself in this arena; and three, these associations must have the ability and aim of influencing state policy. ¹⁸ Although Taylor also includes qualitative conditions to civil society such as the right to organize, and the nature and internal agendas of these organizations, it is clear that the primary component of civil society is the existence of civic organizations. Indeed, autonomous and voluntary self-organization of society is considered to be the

central tenet of civil society. However, other studies hold that the collective sum of civic organizations is civil society.

This thesis considers civil society to be the collective sum of autonomous and voluntary civic associations. This thesis accepts this somewhat parsimonious definition of civil society because it is empirical, and thus quantifiable. Most studies that attempt any type of measurement of civil society employ such a definition. A good example of this is the *Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the NonProfit Sector* which adopts an empirical definition of "civil society or third sector" in order to accomplish cross-national comparisons.\(^{19}\) Thus, for example, they include groups like sports organizations and leisure clubs, etc. In his attempt to measure civicness in Italy’s regions, Robert Putnam employs a wide array of civic associations as an indicator of the civic community. Putnam reasons his very inclusive use of associations as "taking part in a choral society or a bird watching group can teach self-discipline and an appreciation for the joys of successful collaboration."\(^{20}\) Thus even participation in these organizations demonstrates engagement in civil society.

It is assumed that civil society exists when voluntary associations exist. However, it is important to note that there are many critiques to this approach. To be sure, there are problems in regards to which groups to include in definitions of this type. For example, broad definitions, like that proposed by Larry Diamond, incorporate many groups and associations that may be better considered part of economic or political society.

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\(^{19}\) For example, the studies of the third sector conducted at the John Hopkins Center for Civil Society employ a quantitative definition of civil society, see Lester Salamon, and Helmut Anheier, et al. *Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector* (Baltimore: John’s Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 1999).

Diamond's inclusion of publishing houses and film production companies as part of the "ideological marketplace" blurs the line between civil and economic society. Arato and Cohen argue that it is necessary to separate civil society "from both a political society of parties, political organizations, and political publics (in particular, parliaments) and an economic society composed of organizations of production and distribution, usually firms, cooperatives, partnerships, and so on." This differentiation is necessary as political and economic actors seek control of state power and economic production. Salamon and Anheir et al., dismiss any institution that is profit seeking from their criteria of civil society. This thesis will also exclude from civil society those institutions that belong and function in the market, as they are a part of economic society.

Political society is also not included by many authors who regard formal political institutions as outside of the scope of civil society. Linz and Stepan define political society as, "the arena in which political actors compete for the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus." This would then include political parties. To be sure, several interpretations of civil society include political parties. However, it is also often argued that political parties should not be included in definitions of civil society because of their aim to attain or usurp political power. For example, Philippe C. Schmitter states that although the presence of a civil society contributes 'positively' to democratic consolidation, its aim must not be to attain political power. Furthermore it must work within the legal framework provided and democratic norms. His definition of civil society holds that it is, "a set or system of self-organized

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23 Linz and Stepan, 17.
intermediary groups that are: relatively independent of both the state and private units
of production, are capable of deliberating and taking collective actions in defense or
promotion of their interests, do not seek to replace the state, and which agree to act with a
certain degree of civility. Thus, to Schmitter a clear emphasis is placed on the absence
of the aim of political power of civil society.

From this brief, and by no means extensive examination of civil society theory the
main points of contention and debate have been outlined. This study assumes that civil
society is an empirical reality, and that civil society is the autonomous self-organization
of society to address both social and political concerns. The implication of this definition
is that civil society is, then, quantifiable. Economic units will be excluded because they
seek profit, and control over the means of production. Political parties will be excluded
from study because their aim is to not only influence state policy but also attain control of
state power. The use of this parsimonious and quantifiable definition of civil society
allows for an investigation into factors, which may influence the manifestation of civil
society. As the basis of this definition of civil society rests on voluntary civic
participation, certain elements extricated from democratization, participation and civil
society theory will be examined. With consideration to the importance of civil society to
the democratization processes in post-communist countries, factors that may influence
the development of civic participation, and thus civil society, have become a key question
to scholars, and to many political actors. If civil society is the voluntary, self-
organization of society into groups that further their interests, civic participation and the
factors that may influence civic participation are central to civil society. Thus the

development of civil society and the factors contributing to this development are key questions.

**Determinants of Civil Society**

*Political Elite Attitudes and the Political Environment*

The relationship between the state and civil society is complex. John Keane argues that without an independent civil society, the state's democratization process will be hindered. He further argues that at the same time civil society “requires state power actively to defend its independence,” and that “funding and legal recognition are necessary for the survival and expansion of civil society.”

The state is, then, important to a vibrant civil society. The state is the guarantor of the rights that enable civil society to exist. Although some accept that civil society may exist in an undemocratic regime, this is only possible if the state is tolerant of civil society and allows it to develop. On the other hand, Schmitter argues that the state may foster civil society through specific means. These are legal recognition and immunity, special fiscal treatment, established areas of functional representation, access to decision-making process, protection from state interference, state subsidies, legal extension of contracts and responsibility in policy implementation.

The state’s ability to establish a “public sphere of political debate and political activity are the primary conditions for a thriving civil society of independent associations and civic life.” On the other hand, “when the state itself is lawless and contemptuous of individual and group autonomy, civil society may still exist-albeit in a

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27 Schmitter, 249.
28 Kumar, 391.
tentative and battered form."\textsuperscript{29} A thriving civil society is therefore dependent on the state's adherence to the rule of law, which protects basic civil liberties and allows for economic autonomy through amenable fiscal regulation.

The relationship between the state and the legal institutions governing civil society is essential. However, the attitudes of the political elites steering the state may also have great influence on the development of civil society. This is particularly important in transition countries where political elites are establishing new political institutions. Michael Bernhard has stated that despite the weakening of civil society in the initial transition period, civil society may be re-strengthened if barriers such as "political culture factors...state interference and a shortage of resources," do not hinder the development of civil society.\textsuperscript{30} The effects of hostile political elite attitudes toward civil society pose a potentially serious obstacle to civil society development, particularly in post-communist countries. As democratic institutions are established in post-communist states, it is the political elites who dictate the economic and legal terms under which civil society organizations may exist. Political elites who are hostile to civil society may establish institutional barriers to the development of civil society.

Samuel Huntington argues that the most serious threats to democratization will come not from external influences, but from those who have been elected by the democratic process to power positions. Huntington argues four potential threats to democratization that may evolve from these individuals or groups. The first two are the return to power of communist leaders and officials, and the accession to power of

\textsuperscript{29} Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society," 6.
individuals holding antidemocratic ideologies (mostly in the form of Islamic
fundamentalism). Throughout the 1990s the former has proven to be somewhat of a
straw man argument, and the latter is not relevant to many post-communist countries.
However, what Huntington deems to be the more serious threats to democratization;
"executive arrogation" or the concentration of power and rule by decree, and the
"abridgment of individual and civil liberties" have proven to be relevant to the post-
communist democratization processes. 31

Civil society, too, could be threatened by both the abridgement of civil liberties
and rule by decree. Essentially civil society is reliant upon the state (and thus many
political elites) to protect and guarantee its autonomy. It is also reliant on the state for its
institutionalization and the legal framework within which it exists. Linz and Stepan hold
that civil society requires the rule of law to "guarantee people the right of association, and
needs the support of the state apparatus that will effectively impose legal sanctions on
those who would illegally attempt to deny others that right." 32

In his literature review on the issue of civil society in Africa, Michael Bratton
argues that civil society does not have to be in opposition to the state. For example, he
states, "we need to leave room for engagement between state and society that may be
congruent as well as conflictual." 33 He also argues that the most important preconditions
for civil society will be economic development and the relationship between political
elites and civil society. Although Bratton states that civil society needs a state in order to
develop, he argues that the level of engagement or disengagement of civil society with

31 Samuel Huntington, "Democracy for the Long Haul," in Consolidating the Third Wave, 3-13, 8-10.
32 Linz and Stepan, 22.
33 Michael Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa," World Politics 41:3
the state or in the realm of politics, will rest not only on the willingness of civil society to engage with the state, but also on the actions of the state. A state may co-opt, ignore, reorganize or dissolve voluntary associations. In fact, Bratton also suggests that the relationship between political elites and civil society should be examined empirically instead of solely theoretically.\(^{34}\)

Scholars analyzing the development of political society in post-communist states have argued that political society has stunted the development of civil society as political parties have come to dominate the decision-making processes. It has been stated that this has often happened to civil society in Central Europe as strong states have evolved after 1989.\(^{35}\) Other scholars have noted, in particular, the effects of political elite attitudes on civil society. For example, in their study of civil society in Hungary, Ferenc Miszlivetz and Jody Jensen state that, "the anti-civil society attitude of the new elite contributed significantly to its paralysis."\(^{36}\) Miszlivetz and Jensen argue that for the most part the political elite in Hungary favoured certain organizations with funding, and thus created an arena in which competition and neo-corporatism existed instead of civil society.\(^{37}\) It can be hypothesized that political elite attitudes will have an effect on civil society. In practical terms it is important to investigate whether civil society is able to act independently of the state and is free from arbitrary state interference. It is also important to examine whether civil society is regulated by equitable legislation in both financial and

\(^{34}\) Ibid., 428.


\(^{36}\) Ferenc Miszlivetz and Jody Jensen, "An Emerging Paradox: Civil Society from Above?" in Participation and Democracy, 83-98, 88.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 95.
legal terms, and to what extent it is permitted to participate in the decision-making process.

**Political Culture**

In addition to political elite attitudes, the political culture and values of citizens may also effect the development of civil society. Although there have been many studies regarding the role of political culture in democratization processes, political culture and its effects on civil society development have not been extensively examined. Given the relationship between democracy, participation and civil society, it seems that such a study is both logical and warranted. For example, although the scope of their comparative study of emerging civil societies in post-communist countries does not examine the effects of political culture on civil society, Weigle and Butterfield hold that the institutionalization of civil society will be affected by political culture.\(^{38}\)

The concept political culture, like the term civil society, lacks a clear consensus on either its definition or the manner in which it should be employed.\(^{39}\) For the purpose of parsimony, this thesis will employ the definition put forth by Almond and Verba, that is, that political culture is, "the attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system."\(^{40}\) Because this analysis is not primarily concerned with the debate on the term political culture, it adopts the most generally used definition. However, this thesis also makes certain assumptions.

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Firstly, this thesis assumes that political culture is enduring. It is assumed, in order to test the hypothesis that political culture will affect civil society, that attitudes and values have been long-established and thus not subject to quick change or ‘rationalist’ interpretations. Secondly, it is also important to note that the definition guiding this study separates political behaviour from political culture. In contrast, scholars such as Stephen White have argued that political culture “both expresses and influences the patterns of political belief and behaviour within a given political system.” Since, political culture, here is posed as an independent variable to civil society, it is assumed that political culture will affect behaviour. Thus, the ‘subjectivist’ definition of political culture will be employed in this analysis. This definition has often been used in the literature that examines political culture in communist regimes. However, this approach is by no means uncontroversial, even within the communist studies camp. The debate over whether to include behaviour in the concept of political culture was particularly important the study of political culture in communist societies. For these scholars, the chosen paradigm would have greatly influenced the conclusions since public behaviour and public attitudes were often divergent.

The importance of political culture to democratization processes has been a focal question in the establishment of democracy in the post-communist states. The legacies of

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41 Many political culture theorists agree that political culture is learned, and more importantly it is learned at a young age, thus it is resistant to quick change. See Harry Eckstein, “A Culturalist Theory of Political Change,” American Political Science Review 82:3 (1988): 789-804. In this article, Eckstein reconciles radical political change and the continuity of political culture.


apathy, anomie and distrust left by the communist regimes have often been seen as potential threats to the democratization process. Democracy, it has often been argued, will be supported by feelings of tolerance, trust, and efficacy. On the other hand, certain values surrounding authority, such as authoritarianism or paternalism, may encumber democratization. Furthermore, the extent of popular support for a democratic system and the belief in its effectiveness, may also affect the consolidation of democracy.\(^{44}\)

The relevance of political culture to civil society formation rests on the values and beliefs that will encourage political participation. Attitudes that support democracy may also foster civil society. Likewise, attitudes that threaten democracy may also hinder civil society. For example, authoritarian values may discourage the development of civil society as they suggest a degree of passivity. These values inherently relegate decision-making to the elite level as opposed to supporting a strong participatory role for society. Thus, authoritarian values may affect civil society as they support civic disengagement from the political sphere.

Legitimacy, satisfaction and evaluations of the effectiveness of democracy may also affect the development of civil society. In the *Civic Culture*, Almond and Verba revealed that a participant political culture rests on feelings of self-efficacy, and the belief that the individual holds the possibility to affect change in the democratic process. They state that the "self confident citizen," that is, the citizen who believes that he or she may contribute to the political system (democracy) is the citizen most likely to be active. This citizen is also "more likely to express adherence to the values associated with a

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democratic system." In addition, Almond and Verba also illustrated that levels of trust influence democracy and participation.

Cross-national studies, which examine the correlation between these attitudes and levels of democracy, are numerous. This analysis supposes that these values may also directly impact the number of civil society organizations. The post-communist states provide an opportunity to test these assumptions. The democratic transformations transpiring in the post-communist states are extensive and require "mental as well as behavioural changes on the part of all actors-those occupying positions of leadership as well as those constituting the 'grass roots' of these countries." If the political culture in these countries is comprised of strong orientations that are not supportive of democracy, it is presupposed that a less stable democracy will exist or the democratization process will be stunted. Furthermore, it can also be supposed that prevalence of non-democratic values will also hinder civil society.

The relationship between trust and civil society has recently become a central topic to literature on both democracy and civil society. This has largely been due to Robert Putnam's study on democracy in Italy's regions. In an attempt to evaluate the difference in institutional performance between Italy's regions, Putnam explained that the more successful northern regions had longer and more entrenched traditions of the 'civic community' than their southern counterparts. His measurement of civic community rested on the evaluation of newspaper readership, electoral turnout on referenda and levels and density of civic associations. His results have deeply affected both the

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45 Almond and Verba, 257.
academic debate and policy implementation around civil society. Furthermore, he termed the phrase “social capital” and referred it to social trust, and norms of reciprocity.\textsuperscript{47} It is his argument that the civic community was more entrenched in regions that had inherited social capital. However, Putnam’s argument is cyclical in that he argues that social capital is both the facilitator and the result of civic engagement. He states that, “citizens in less civic regions feel exploited, alienated, powerless.”\textsuperscript{48} On the other hand, “citizens in civic regions expressed greater social trust, and greater trust in the law-abidingness of their fellow citizens than did citizens in the least civic regions. Conversely, those in less civic regions were much more likely to insist that the authorities should impose greater law and order on their communities.”\textsuperscript{49}

The importance of Putnam’s contribution to the civil society debate can hardly be overstated. However, it does have its critics. One of the critiques is the cyclical aspect of his argument. For example, Kenneth Newton argues that, “it is difficult to sort out the complicated cause-and-effect relations between membership of voluntary associations and trust.” He further states, “the relationship is likely to be reciprocal, but the strongest path probably runs from trusting to joining associations.”\textsuperscript{50} Thus, it is expected that levels of trust may be reflected in civil society. The post-communist countries provide a unique view into the effects of political culture on civil society, as it is possible to see 1989 as a tabula rasa for civil society. Civil society associations remained largely absent during communism, thus their growth since 1989 is significant. Furthermore, if one

\textsuperscript{47} Putnam, 167. \\
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 109. \\
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 111. \\
accepts the belief that political culture is slow to change, then an examination of political values and their relationship to civil society is relevant.

Socio-economic Dislocation

The correlation between economic development and democracy has long been argued. In 1960, Seymour Martin Lipset, in his Political Man found that levels of wealth, urbanization, industrialization and education were related to democratic governance. Furthermore, civic participation has also been correlated with levels of economic development. In studies of participation, wealth and social status have been positively correlated with participation in general, and in particular, membership in voluntary associations. However in his study of Italy’s regions, Putnam asserted that contrary to traditional wisdom, economics did not foster the growth of the civic community. Instead Putnam contended that the civic community and social capital, have in fact, remained constant throughout history in Italy’s regions, and thus social capital has influenced economic development. This assertion has been the impetus for many treatises on the causal effect of social capital on economic prosperity. It has also affected policy. Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce argue that Putnam’s study has had a great impact on policy implementation. However, in their critique of Putnam’s study, they charge that Putnam failed to examine the effects of colonial exploitation on economic development in Southern Italy. Similarly, applying the results of Putnam’s theory to post-communist states may not be appropriate. During communism economic development and planning was under the sole control of the party-state. For this reason, it would be impossible to

52 Howell and Pearce, 47-49.
conclude what effects an organic or traditional social capital has had on economic development. This is particularly true in Slovakia where the process of modernization was largely implemented during the communist regime. Furthermore, the impact of the dual transition to democracy and market economy embarked upon by post-communist states may prove to be a more influential factor for both democratization and civil society.

The following authors state that the transition to a market economy will affect, and more precisely hinder, public participation and civil society. For instance, Michael Bernhard postulates that the economic transition will affect civil society negatively as it disturbs all social interests. In other words, the interests of citizens are, at least for a short time, stunted as they wait for a new socio-economic structure to be established. It is assumed that when a new socio-economic structure is established, the new middle class will self-organize and articulate its newly developed interests. However, it is too soon to evaluate this theory in its entirety. On the other hand, one may hypothesize that the effects of economic transition, or more precisely the socio-economic dislocation incurred by transition, will impact public participation and civil society. Linz and Stepan hold that “disappointed popular hopes for economic improvement” may have a negative effect on democratic consolidation. However, more specifically, economic hardship may also effect political participation and civil society.

Undeniably, many individuals have incurred significant costs from the economic transition in post-communist countries. It has often been assumed that the effects of the economic transition will dictate that people concentrate on private concerns. Kopecky

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53 Bernhard, 315-322.
54 Linz and Stepan, 23.
and Barnfield have argued that this is precisely what has occurred in many post-communist states. They argue that social and economic difficulties unleashed by post-communist reforms have encouraged the ‘flight to the private sphere’.\textsuperscript{55} Furthermore, Kluegel and Mason argue, “people struggling to make ends meet lack the resources for political engagement.”\textsuperscript{56} In describing the loss of civil society after the revolutions, Aleksander Smolar cites many reasons for the ‘disappointing levels of social participation’ after the fall of the communist regimes. He states, the most influential factor has been the severe economic recessions of the early 1990s. Smolar states that, “people beset with joblessness and falling real incomes are preoccupied with survival and are unlikely to plunge into social, cultural, scientific, political, and philanthropic activities.”\textsuperscript{57} Daniel Nelson also argues that the growing economic difficulties and loss of financial security will have the greatest impact on the commitment to participatory democracy and civil society.\textsuperscript{58}

Despite the economic costs of transition, Bela Greskovits has observed that there has been a lack of social response to economic reforms in the post-communist countries. Furthermore, he argues that the protest that has occurred has been mostly in the form of elections, and that influence from social organizations or civil society on the transition process has largely been absent. He describes the post-communist environment in which civil society exists as being hostile, and dominated by “rivalry, struggle for legitimacy, exclusivity, and attempts to monopolize constituencies, rather than the solidarity and

\textsuperscript{55} Kopecky and Barnfield, 89. 
\textsuperscript{57} Alexander Smolar, “From Opposition to Atomization,” in Consolidating the Third Wave, 263-277, 272. 
cooperation essential for successful political action that is characteristic of relations among political parties, labour unions, social movements and other social actors.”

Greskovits further argues that the widespread dislocation incurred by the transition process has led to this competitive and hostile atmosphere.

If civil society is accepted as the existence of civic or voluntary organizations, then civil society rests on public participation. Due to the relationship between participation and civil society an examination into democratization, civil society and participation theory has resulted in the assumption that three independent variables will influence the development of civil society. This thesis will examine the extent to which the political environment and elite attitudes; political culture and values; and socio-economic factors have influenced civil society in Slovakia since 1993. This study works from the assumption that civil society is ‘ideally’ composed of a dense network of associations in which the public participates, is representative of a range of interests, and is engaged in political participation or political activities. Although it is not assumed that Slovakia will illustrate an ‘ideal’ civil society, unlikely to be found in any country, these dimensions will be assessed in order to establish the nature of Slovak civil society.

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Chapter II: Civil Society in Slovakia

The Development of Civil Society in Slovakia

Many scholars believe that historic traditions and, in particular, the legacies (and sometimes length) of the communist regimes are most likely to affect democratization and civil society in the post-communist states. In the case of Slovakia, this assumption would promise a very weak civil society. In comparison with the Czechs, the Slovaks have often exhibited lower levels of civil society throughout their history. Although the roots of this trend may be found in the different situations for the Czechs and Slovaks before 1918, the pattern continued throughout the shared history of Czechoslovakia. For this reason it could easily be assumed that a viable civil society would fail to develop in Slovakia after the Velvet Divorce in 1993. However, a historic legacy of civic organizations may be found in Slovakia.

Historic Roots of Civil Society in Slovakia

Slovakia is a very young state, and more importantly a young democracy. The effects of a state’s pre-communist experience and historical legacies are often cited as factors influencing the success and stability of democratic consolidation. Throughout its history Slovakia has had only a very brief experience with democracy, having spent most of its history under foreign dominance and authoritarian rule. Until 1918 the Slovak lands fell under Hungarian domination and were subject to intense Magyarization policies, particularly in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The Slovaks received their first experience with democracy in the first Czechoslovakia (1918-1938). However, its existence was short lived and ended with the establishment of the ‘independent’ Slovakia during the Second World War. A second reprise from authoritarian rule came
immediately following the Second World War. However, this too, was short lived and ended with the Communist siege in 1948. Like its political history, the historic development of civil society in Slovakia is perhaps best described as a series of ‘interruptions’.

Despite the lack of a democratic legacy, there have been several examples of civic self-organization in the Slovak lands. For the most part these examples remained largely in the spheres of religion and culture until 1918. For example, the earliest civic organizations, dating back to the Middle Ages on the territory of Slovakia were mostly connected with church activities and were usually in the areas of education, health and social aid. Organizations remained connected with confessions until the laicization of society in the eighteenth century. During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the most popular form of associations became academic and public education societies, which were cross-confessional. Most often scholars and clergymen founded these societies, which were aimed at disseminating enlightened ideals. Despite these early examples of association, Slovak historians mark the second half of the nineteenth century as the watershed in associational life in Slovakia.

Associations, societies and groups increased significantly during the late nineteenth century. In 1862, Magyar officials recorded 579 associations throughout the Kingdom of Hungary. However, during the next 16 years this number grew to 3995 associations throughout the whole territory of Hungary. Of these, 735 were located in the

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61 The most well known of these in Slovakia were the Slovak Learned Society, which operated in Trnava from 1792-1800, and the Malohont Learned Society which operated in Banská Stiavnica from 1808-1845, see Eva Kowalská, “Slovakia in a Period of Structural Changes 1711-1848,” in A Concise History of Slovakia, ed. Elena Mannová (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2000), 159-184, 176.
territory of Slovakia, and had a membership of approximately 700,000. Furthermore, associations and groups became more diversified. In addition to traditional associations, which worked in the realm of religion and charity, many new types of groups emerged. These included: commercial, social, sport and physical, educational and co-operative associations. However, this associational growth was tempered by the Kingdom of Hungary’s Magyarization policy.

Civic associations were among the many targets of the Magyarization policies employed after the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich. Following the Nationalities Act in 1868, associations composed of non-Magyar minorities suffered intense discrimination. To secure the ‘one nation-one kingdom’ policy of the Hungarian Parliament, the state systemically eliminated the cultural and associational progress that had been made by the Slovaks. Authority over associations fell under the Ministry of the Interior and regional state officials, which subsequently led to the closure of many organizations.

This period of growth and restraint for Slovak associational life also coincided with the birth of Slovak nationalism. As a result, many associations in Slovakia developed with the clear aim of raising national awareness and held political agendas for Slovak autonomy. Perhaps the best known is Matica Slovenská (1863-1875), which was committed to Slovak education, literature and arts, and the economic concerns of the

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63 Dudeková, 24-30.
64 These organizations were largely supported by the newly established Slovak national political parties, David Paul, “Slovak Nationalism and the Hungarian State,” in Ethnic Groups and the State, ed. Paul Brass, (Worcester: Billing and Sons Ltd, 1985), 115-160.
Slovak nation. Due to its focus on national goals, Matica Slovenská was deemed subversive and was banned in 1875. In addition, the Hungarian government seized its assets and awarded them to the Magyarization institute MTKE (Hungarian Regional Slovak Educational Society). However, despite the strict Magyarization policies, and in particular, the attempts of the Hungarian majority to arrest the development of minority associations, Slovak civil society was well poised to continue on the eve of the First World War, and prospered during the first Czechoslovakia.

Slovak society developed quickly in the first Czechoslovakia. During this period political parties were formed, education levels dramatically increased, and, most importantly, civil rights were protected and guaranteed. In addition to these developments, the democratic parliamentary system that was maintained in Czechoslovakia throughout the inter-war period allowed civil society and associational life in the Slovak lands to flourish. In addition to political parties, "trade unions, employers', tradesmen's and farmers' associations, numerous co-operatives, sports, gymnastic, charitable, social, educational and cultural associations arose, with various political and national colourings." By 1926, there were 8000 associations in Slovakia, and unlike the situation during the Kingdom of Hungary, 85 percent of these associations were Slovak. Many associations, which had been banned under Magyarization, like Matica Slovenská, were re-established. Associational life continued to grow and by 1932, the number had doubled to 16,033 organizations in the territory of Slovakia. This growth was fostered by the democratic conditions within Czechoslovakia, but also

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civil society activities were encouraged by the state, particularly in the field of social welfare. Consequently, during this time social and health associations were strongly represented. In 1935, there were almost 2000 social welfare associations in Slovakia.\textsuperscript{69} However, this period of associational growth came to an abrupt end with the establishment of the independent Slovakia.

On March 14, 1939, Slovakia was established under Nazi tutelage. During its existence, the newly formed Slovakia dismantled the liberal and democratic process attained during the inter-war period. In addition to revoking many civil liberties, most notably those of Slovakia’s minorities, the Slovak government impeded the development of civil society in the Slovak lands. For example, Gabriela Dudeková states that, “the constitution of July 1939 on the one hand, proclaimed the validity of civic rights, and on the other hand, immediately restricted them in the interests of traditional public order and Christian customs.”\textsuperscript{70} Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party established an authoritarian state, and seized power over civic associations. Existing organizations that received favour from the regime were forced to join central party associations such as the Hlinka Guard and the Hlinka Youth. Others who did not find favour with the regime were dissolved. In Bratislava alone, organization numbers fell from 700 to 276.\textsuperscript{71}

With the end of the war in 1945 many of organizations previously banned renewed their activities. Between 1945 and 1948, approximately 10,000 organizations were in existence. This, however, only lasted until 1948. The communist takeover eradicated independent associational life, or civil society in Czechoslovakia. Following

\textsuperscript{67} Lubomir Liptak, “Slovakia in the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century,” in \textit{A Concise History of Slovakia}, 241-307, 251.
\textsuperscript{68} Ondrušek and Zelenáková, et al., 51-64.
\textsuperscript{69} Dudeková, 31.
1948, all independent organizations were either liquidated or placed under acceptable
umbrella groups as part of the National Front. Through the National Front the
communist party gained control over all aspects of civil society. 72

*The Communist Legacy and Civil Society*

The renewal in civil society study is largely due to the independent civic
developments that began in the 1970s in communist countries. In particular emphasis is
often placed on civic initiatives in Poland and Czechoslovakia. However, dissent in
Slovakia paled in comparison to the developments in Bohemia and Moravia. While the
Prague Spring and later Charter 77 marked renewed civil society activity in the Czech
lands, civil society failed to manifest to the same degree in Slovakia.

During the Prague Spring many new civic associations formed in addition to the
renewed activity of organizations that had been previously banned. The new groups were
diverse and ranged from those with political agendas to those focused on leisure and
recreation. 73 However, it has long been noted that most organizations were located in the
Czech lands and that the Slovak lands illustrated a distinct lack of dissent and reform
minded organizations. This is mostly due to the distinct Slovak political aspirations in
1968. In opposition to their compatriots, the Slovaks were less concerned with reform or
pushing for democratic rights, and were instead interested in Slovak claims for more
autonomy. The Slovak reform activity that did occur was far less noticeable than the
Czech. For example, one of the most known civic organizations, K 231, an organization

70 Ibid., 35.
71 Ibid., 36.
composed of former political prisoners, was mostly active in Bohemia and Moravia. Although it had a sister organization in Slovakia (Organization for the Defense of Human Rights), its activities did not equal those of K 231.\textsuperscript{74} The strongest calls for 'social' reform in Slovakia came from the Catholic Church, which advocated religious freedoms and the renewed spiritual life throughout Czechoslovakia. Even though, Alexander Dubček, a Slovak, came to symbolize the Prague Spring, the reform movement in Slovakia during the Prague Spring was dominated by demands for federalization. In addition, a dissident society similar to that which evolved in the Czech lands failed to emerge in Slovakia.

Charter 77 was also mostly a Czech initiative. Among the original signatories there were only five Slovak signatories, all of whom were in Prague when they signed the Charter. Later, a few more Slovaks residing in Slovakia also joined Charter 77, but this addition failed to add a significant Slovak aspect to the Charter. H. Gordon Skilling stated that in comparison with the activity in the Czech lands there was "almost total lack of oppositional activity" in Slovakia.\textsuperscript{75} Furthermore, Slovakia failed to exhibit opposition to the communist regime comparable to the Czech lands. In an attempt to measure the level of dissent in Slovakia, Carol Skalnik Leff reports that only 4-5% of the dissidents subjected to state persecution in the late 1970s occurred in Slovakia.\textsuperscript{76} Unlike the process of dissent that stirred in the Czech lands for twenty years and erupted in the late 1980s with the establishment of numerous groups, civil society activity in Slovakia remained smaller and lacked the democratic character it had in Bohemia and Moravia.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, 267.
The seeds of civil society that emerged in Slovakia during communism and particularly in the 1980s mostly appeared in the religious and environmental spheres. 77

Civic concern over environmental issues began to be articulated in the late 1960s. In 1969 the Slovak Union of the Defenders of Nature and Landscape (SZOPK) was founded. Another ecological association, The Tree of Life, was established in 1979. Although SZOPK operated legally with the state's permission, it increasingly grew critical of the state's environmental policies. By the 1980s SZOPK was regularly publishing articles on the unpublicized harmful ecological practices of the regime. The criticism of SZOPK culminated in the 1987 publication of "Aloud" in which its criticism of the regime expanded to political issues. In 1989 many members of SZOPK became members of Public Against Violence. 78

The second area of dissent that materialized in Slovakia was in activities by the Catholic Church. Under communism, religious opposition in Slovakia was far more common than that which occurred in the Czech lands. From 1977 to 1984 most of the dissent activity that fell subject to state persecution was due to religious opposition. 79 Furthermore, it was the Catholic Church that organized the first mass demonstration in Slovakia. On March 25, 1988 over 10,000 citizens protested in Bratislava for religious freedoms. 80

It is often argued that the distinct national tradition of the Slovaks and their more favourable experience with the normalization period following Prague Spring, precluded

78 Dudeková, 43-50.
79 61% as found in Skalnik Leff, 265.
any type of ‘parallel polis,’ similar to that of the Czechs from developing under communism. Furthermore, observers believed that the lack of visible opposition to the communist regime and the subsequent political developments in Slovakia would negatively affect both the prospects of democratization and civil society. However, despite these criticisms many observers have praised Slovak civil society since its independence.

Slovak Civil Society after 1993

In what may seem a reversal of fortunes from the departure point of the Velvet Divorce, Slovakia has developed a third sector that is easily able to compete and perhaps surpass its former compatriots. In September 1999, Czech president Vaclav Havel stated that, “the Czech Republic could learn from Slovakia’s strong civil society.” Other observers have stated that Slovak civil society has, “developed into a flexible, unified, creditable, and highly effective mechanism of citizen education and participation that has made substantial contributions to democratic development in this country.” In order to assess the development of Slovak civil society an examination of the density of the existence of civic organizations, the extent of public participation, fields of activity most prevalent, and political activities of civil society will be addressed.

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80 Dudeková, 49.
81 The normalization period that followed the 1968 Prague Spring was a concerted effort by the Communist Party to eradicate anyone affiliated with the 1968 reform movement from positions of influence. For the remainder of the communist regime, normalization also included an attempt by the party to buy social passivity with increased living standards, for example, see Skilling, Charter 77, 54-58.
83 Salamon, Anheier, et al., 355.
Political Engagement

Ideally civil society is engaged in political participation. In this manner, Slovakia has revealed very high profile political manifestations of civil society since 1993. Most of these have been formed in opposition to policies of the Mečiar government and have been guided by the Third Sector Gremium (G3S). The Gremium is a representative advocacy group of elected NGO members for the Slovak third sector. It mostly works as an advisory board and intermediary group between Slovak NGOs and the government and business sectors. The Gremium was established in 1994 and has its roots in the third sector Stupava Conference. These annual conferences, which evaluate the development and needs of Slovak civil society, also elect Gremium members from different fields of activity. The Gremium has been at the heart of the two most visible NGO campaigns in the 1990s- the Third Sector SOS Campaign (1996), and the OK’ 98 Campaign (1998). The former was in response to the government’s controversial proposed amendment to the Law on Foundations in 1996.84

The second civil society campaign which had great prominence in domestic affairs was the OK’ 98 campaign, which preceded the parliamentary election in September 1998. Spurred by the attempts of the Mečiar government to thwart the elections, the OK’ 98 aimed at educating the public on the electoral process, encouraging voter turnout and working to attain monitors for the elections. Through a diverse and extensive campaign aimed at all segments of the Slovak population, and employing

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various media, the parliamentary elections saw a voter turnout of almost 85%. OK’ 98 has been credited with influencing this turnout.\textsuperscript{85}

In addition to these two very public campaigns in 1996 and 1998, several NGOs, most working in the spheres of environmental, democratic and human rights issues, have been politically active. For example, environmental NGOs organized a very public campaign around the construction of the Mochovce nuclear power plant in 1995 and, in a case that garnished a lot of international attention: many Hungarian groups executed public awareness projects and petitions around many of Mečiar’s language and education policies during his tenure. Furthermore, many government policies during the 1994-1998 period attracted opposition from democratic and human rights groups. These organizations have mostly organized protests, public awareness campaigns and monitoring.\textsuperscript{86}

\textit{Density}

Currently there are four legal forms of NGOs. These are civic associations, foundations, non-investment funds and non-profit organizations. Civic associations are governed and protected by the rights of citizens to associate provided in Articles 29 of the Slovak Constitution and the Act on the Association of Citizens, both enacted in 1990. Most of the NGOs in Slovakia fall under this legal form. For example, this legal form includes societies, clubs, associations, movements, trade unions, international non-governmental organizations and sports clubs.\textsuperscript{87} It does not include political parties,

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
religious associations or professional associations. Civic associations are bound by the least restrictive legal requirement for civil society organizations in Slovakia. For example, they need not serve "the public good" while all other organizations are required to serve this function. Furthermore, civic associations have no restrictions on engaging in profit-making activities or on their administrative expenses.

Foundations are the second largest form of NGOs in Slovakia. The Law on Foundations was enacted in 1996, and the Slovak government completed civil society legislation in 1997, with the Law on Non-investment Funds and the Law on Non-Profit Organizations Providing Generally Beneficial Services. These forms of associations are less numerous, and have stricter legislation. Foundations and non-investment funds are generally grant giving organizations, and are generally formed for specific causes. Non-profit organizations may provide public benefit services. These three types of organizations must serve "the public good".  

In Slovakia, throughout the 1990s, there has been a dramatic increase in the density of non-governmental organizations. In Slovakia there are two official bodies that record the numbers of non-governmental organizations, the Slovak Statistical Office and the Ministry of Interior. Despite variations in their data, both institutions have reported an increase in the density of civil society organizations. By 1993, there were 6000 NGOs registered with the Slovak Statistical Office. Most of these organizations were newly formed, as only a few traditional associations continued to exist. From a sample of 1056

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88 A Profile of the Third Sector, (Bratislva: SAIA-SCTS, 2000).
organizations in 1995, only 72 or 6.8% had been established prior to 1990.89
Throughout the decade the numbers of NGOs have continued to grow. In 1997, the
commercial registry of the Slovak Statistical Office held that there were 13,800 registered
non-profit organizations in Slovakia. In 1998, the same registry recorded 17,238
organizations and by 1999 this number had risen to 17,814.90
Civic association and foundations must register directly with the Ministry of
Interior, while non-investment funds and non-profit organizations must register with
regional administrative centres. In 1999, the Ministry of Interior reported that civic
associations comprised of 95.1% of registered NGOs. The remainder was made up of
foundations (3.2%), non-investment funds (1.5%), and non-profit organizations (0.2%).91
The latest data from the year 2000 stated that there were approximately 16,000 civic
associations in Slovakia. There were also 479 foundations, 281 non-investment funds,
and 105 non-profit organizations.92 This data reveals that there is one organization for
every 342 people in Slovakia. In comparison with its fellow Visegrad members there are
fewer civic organizations per capita in Slovakia. In the Czech Republic there is an NGO
per 230 people, Hungary one per 164, and Poland one per 290.93

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89 Sample provided by SAIA-SCTS as found in Zora Bútorová and Martin Bútora, “Mimovládne
Organizácie a Dobrovoľníctvo na Slovensku Očami Verejnej Mienky I,” Tretí Sektor a Dobrovoľníctvo
90 Vybrané ukazovatele za nethrové služby predbežné údaje, 1997; Vybrané ukazovatele za nethrové služby
predbežné údaje, 1998; Vybrané ukazovatele za nethrové služby predbežné údaje, 1999, (Bratislava: Slovak
Statistical Office, 1997-1999). However these numbers also include political parties, professional
chambers, churches and religious societies, which will not be considered in this thesis.
State of Society, eds. Grigorij Mesežnikov, Michal Ivantysyn and Tom Nicholson (Bratislava: IVO, 1999),
347-365, 348.
92 According to the Ministry of Interior, provided by SAIA-SCTS.
93 Data for Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary from Adrian Karamycky, Alexander Motyl, Aili Piano,
Although it is widely assumed that many of the organizations on the registries of the Ministry of Interior and the Slovak Statistical Office are not active, the continual increase in organizations according to the registries suggests that Slovak civil society is growing. However, the extent to which the population is involved in civil society organizations also illustrates the density of these organizations. In 1996, the Slovak Statistical Office reported that the non-profit sector employed 18,822 employees. This constituted approximately 1% of all Slovak employees. It is important to note that according to the Slovak Statistical Office the non-profit sector includes all four forms of civil society organizations (civic associations, foundations, non-investment funds and non-profit organizations), but also these totals also include work in political parties, professional chambers, and religious societies and churches. By 1999, the number of employees in the non-profit sector decreased to 15,739. In contrast to the decrease in employees, data for the same years shows a 5% increase in volunteer levels. In 1999, approximately 250,000 individuals volunteered in the non-profit sector. Public opinion polls conducted throughout the 1990s reveal a slightly different picture of volunteerism in the Slovak non-profit sector.

In 1993, 11% of respondents stated that they had “worked freely and without pay for an NGO.” By 1995, this number had risen slightly to 13%. From 1996 to 1998, this number increased significantly to approximately 19%. However, the percentage of respondents who claimed volunteer activity in 1999 and 2000 decreased to 13%. In

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addition to volunteer levels, NGO membership has also decreased in recent years. In 1997, 25% of respondents stated they belonged to a voluntary organization, civic association or club. By 2000, this number decreased to 15%. From these polls it appears that public participation in NGOs either through membership or volunteer activities has decreased since 1998. The years that show the highest percentage of engagement roughly coincide with very prominent third sector campaigns.96

*Fields of Activity*

The fields of activity that dominate Slovak civil society are largely those without a clear political agenda. In an independent assessment of Slovak civil society conducted in 1997 The Foundation for a Civil Society concluded that approximately 66% of the civic associations active in Slovakia worked in the fields of sports, agriculture and land, youth organizations and parental and school organizations. Thirty one percent were trade and professional unions, and the remaining three percent were active in social services, democracy, environment and economic development.97 Similar results are found in the sample provided by the Slovak Academic Information Agency-Service Centre for the Third Sector (SAIA-SCTS) database.

SAIA-SCTS maintains one the most reliable samples of NGO activity in Slovakia. The entries included on the SAIA-SCTS database are voluntary and initiated by the organization itself and then maintained by SAIA-SCTS. Thus, unlike the registries of the Ministry of Interior and the Statistical Office, these organizations are


known to be active. SAIA-SCTS has 2623 organizations in its database.\footnote{The database was accessed on 8.6.2001 at the Slovak Academic Information Agency-Service Center for the Third Sector hereafter referred to as SAIA-SCTS located at Ružová dolina, 820 05 Bratislava, Slovakia. More information can be attained at http://www.saia.sk.} According to this sample, most NGOs in Slovakia are working in the fields of education and sciences (22%), and health, social welfare and charity (22%). NGOs working in the field of sports and recreation constitute of 17% of organizations. To a lesser degree NGOs are involved in human rights (4%); democracy (2%); developing the third sector (2%), environment (5%), and arts and culture (8%).\footnote{SAIA-SCTS.} The fields of activity most prominently represented in the SAIA-SCTS database are exactly those most respected by the Slovak public. [Appendix 1: Table: 10]

In public opinion polls conducted in February 1996, citizens were asked to judge the utility of various types of NGOs. Respondents were given a range of responses from “NGOs are useful” to “NGOs are not useful.” NGOs working in the sphere of health and social welfare (83%) and working with the ill and handicapped (78%) received the largest share of respondents who stated that these NGOs “were useful”. Organizations, which worked with human rights, arts and culture, and supported study trips abroad, received a significantly lower share of this response, 27%, 24% and 20% respectively. The most recent polls, conducted by the same agency, noted that although the share of respondents who stated that organizations dedicated to health, social welfare, handicapped and needy people were “useful,” decreased to 65%, these organizations still commanded the highest percentage of “useful” responses.\footnote{Polls for 1996 in Bútorová et al., Current Problems of Slovakia on the Verge of 1995-1996, (Bratislava: FOCUS, 1996), 83; and polls for 2001 in Bútorová et al., Citizen's Participation 2001, 63-73.}
The Civil Society Development Foundation (NPOA), the second largest grant
giving organization in Slovakia, administers funds from the ‘civil society development
programme,’ provided by the EU Phare Programme.\textsuperscript{101} It has been active in Slovakia
since 1994. Through this programme, NPOA awarded 239 grants in total sum of over
48,000 million Slovak crowns in 1999.\textsuperscript{102} From information provided by NPOA, we are
provided with another tool of assessing the fields of activity of Slovak NGOs. However,
it is important to note that there is a possible selection bias in the information provided by
NPOA.

Firstly, the following percentages are based on the grants awarded to projects, and
not necessarily organizations. Secondly, it is important to note that NPOA devises its
own yearly criteria before awarding grants, thus certain types of groups are not included.
For example, in 1996 NPOA designated six fields of activity which it sponsored. These
were: the environment, health, human rights and minorities, social services, volunteer
development, and education. In 1999, there were eight fields of activity which NPOA
sponsored: environment, health, human rights and minorities, democracy, social services,
volunteer development, education, and culture. And thirdly, the following data is based
on grants issued only. Information on the application process of NGOs, and decision-
making process was not available. Therefore, the following percentages should be read
with these caveats in mind. Nonetheless the information provided by NPOA generally
concurs with the information provided by public opinion polls, the SAIA-SCTS database

\textsuperscript{101} The largest grant giving foundation is the Open Society Foundation (OSF) funded by George Soros.
However in addition to awarding grants to NGOs, OSF also awards grants to a variety of institutions which
are not considered part of civil society, therefore NPOA is the largest foundation dedicated solely to NGOs
and civil society development.

and the registry of the Ministry of Interior. Furthermore, the information provided by NPOA inherently represents active organizations.\textsuperscript{103}

Throughout the 1990s, NPOA has awarded the highest percentage of its grants to NGOs providing social services (18.2%). In 1999, the area of social services received 40 grants, or 17% of the total grants awarded by NPOA. For the most part, social services projects provided practical relief to members of society in need. Half of the projects worked with disabled members of society, most often mentally handicapped individuals. Organizations providing services to women and to Roma each received 10% of the total grants. For the most part the projects that received NPOA grants in the sphere of social services focussed on providing services to people in need. Less than 10% of the projects revealed any type of political agenda. The political agendas that were mentioned focussed on increasing women’s civic participation, raising civic awareness to the protection of democratic rights, particularly for youth, and a project aimed at influencing social laws and providing NGO services in all regions of Slovakia.\textsuperscript{104}

Environmental NGOs have received almost 14% of all NPOA grants since 1994. In 1999, they received twenty-four grants. Environmental NGOs in Slovakia are involved in all areas of environmental concern. The projects included education, research, sustainability and management, and conservation. Over half of the projects

\textsuperscript{103} The information from NPOA located at Ružová dolina 6, 821 08 Bratislava was obtained by the author in the summer of 2001. NPOA provided the author with both information on NPOA grants from its own records and its Annual Reports. For more see http://www.changenet.sk/npoa.

\textsuperscript{104} Political agendas have been ascertained by the author solely from the project descriptions included in the NPOA Annual Reports. Projects judged to possess a ‘political agenda’ were those that stated that their activities included lobbying, participation with government officials, public awareness campaigns, and monitoring. The author excluded projects that focussed solely on providing services to the public. Although this thesis assumes that any civic organization may become engaged in ‘political’ activities, this assessment was based on the self-stated aims of the NPOA funded civic projects as provided by the NPOA Annual Report 1999.
supported were executed at the local level. Not surprisingly environmental NGOs
participated in far more ‘political’ activities than those committed to social services.
Many projects included: advocacy, public awareness campaigns, monitoring, consulting,
and articulating environmental policies to both local and national governments.

In contrast, health and educational organizations remain largely ‘non-political.’
Health organizations have received 11% of the funding provided by NPOA since 1994.
The health organizations remain largely ‘non-political’ as they focus primarily on the
promotion of healthy living, providing relief or care to the ill, and supporting research.
NGOs working in the field of education have received 9% of NPOA’s grants. Most of
these focus on providing services to youth while others work in specific academic fields.
A clear exception to the ‘non-political’ nature of the 37 educational programmes
supported by NPOA in 1999 was the Slovak Council of Youth, which incorporated
advocacy within its activities.

Implicit within their definition, NGOs working in the areas of democracy, human
rights and minorities are generally ‘political’. That is, these NGOs are engaged in
monitoring, lobbying and advocacy. Although the field of democracy was conspicuously
only included in NPOA’s criteria for 1998 and 1999, they have received 7% of all grants
awarded since 1994. Not surprisingly, they received their highest number of grants in
1998 (31 grants or 19%). Projects participating in the campaigns aimed at voter
encouragement and education, and public awareness and information during the pre-
election period of 1998 dominated the grants awarded to ‘democracy’ NGOs. By 1999
grants awarded to this area decreased to 14%, and this project criteria was dropped in
2000. It is important to note that during the year 1998, NPOA was one of the major
donors of the OK’98 campaign, and thus funded many of the OK’98 projects. NPOA included human rights and minority projects in its criteria from 1994-1999. During this period they received 8% of the grants. In 1999 many of the organizations that were funded not only provided services for minorities, but also participated in counselling, mediation, advocacy and monitoring the adherence of the state to human and minority rights.\textsuperscript{105}

Through a quantitative and qualitative look at the NGOs functioning in Slovak society, it becomes apparent that associations without clear political aims are most prevalent. Most NGOs work in the fields of education and sciences; health, social welfare and charity; and sports and recreation. It is clear that NGOs with a specific political agenda and which are engaged politically are the minority. Furthermore, they are most often located in Bratislava. For example, according to the SAIA-SCTS sample, 50\% of the NGOs working in democracy are located in Bratislava.

\textit{Regional Disparities in Civil Society}

The location of the civic organizations active in Slovakia is central to the assessment of Slovak civil society as most organizations function at a local level. Almost half of the organizations registered with the SAIA-SCTS database (47\%) stated that they worked at the local level. Fewer organizations worked at the national (32\%), regional (15\%) and international (6\%) levels.\textsuperscript{106} In July 1996, the Slovak government

\textsuperscript{105} All NPOA information is gathered either directly from NPOA or \textit{NPOA Annual Report} (s) from 1994-1999. However, data from 1997 is not included. There are also many other fields that have been awarded grants not presented here, including: culture, youth, volunteer and third sector development, humanitarian aid; rule of law, community initiative and EU integration. These areas of activity have not been examined as closely because they have only been included in NPOA’s criteria sporadically and thus have not garnered a significant amount of NPOA grants.

\textsuperscript{106} SAIA-SCTS.
modified the regional and district administrative division of Slovakia. Prior to 1996, Slovakia was divided into four regions: Western, Central and Eastern Slovakia with Bratislava consisting of its own region. The new regional administration of Slovakia outlined eight administrative regions with a total of seventy-nine districts. Each region is named after its regional capital city, the largest city in the region. The eight administrative regions are from west to east: Bratislava and Trnava; Trenčín and Žilina (north central); Nitra and Banská Bystrica (south central); and Prešov and Košice (north and south eastern, respectively). [Appendix 2: Figure 1] There is a significant amount of diversity between Slovakia’s regions and their districts, which includes cultural, historical, social, economic, and ethnic diversity. For example, the Hungarian minority constitutes approximately a tenth of the Slovak population (9.7%) and is concentrated in the southern border areas of Slovakia. Furthermore, while northern areas have negligible Hungarian populations, the districts of Dunajská Streda and Komárno located along the southern border regions in Trnava and Nitra, respectively, have dominant Hungarian populations. The second largest Slovak minority, the Roma, reside mostly in the eastern areas of Slovakia. While the 2001 census reported that Roma constituted 1.7% of the Slovak population, the regions of Košice (3.9%) and Prešov (4.0%) had the highest concentrations. Furthermore, there is also a significant Ruthenian minority found in districts close to the Ukrainian border. For example, while Ruthenians constitute only 0.4% of the population, in the eastern Prešov district of Medzilaborce they constitute

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107 Critiques of this new law claimed that it centralized power in the hands of the HZDS-SNS-ZRS coalition, and that it threatened the political voice of the Hungarian minority by decreasing the areas which would have a clear Hungarian majority; it has also been argued that the new administrative divisions favoured those areas with high HZDS support, see Vladimír Krivý, “Slovakia and its Regions,” in Slovakia 1996-1997: A Global Report on the State of Society, eds., Martin Bútora and Thomas W. Skladony, 55-65, 56.
40% of the population.\textsuperscript{108} The significant divergences between Slovakia's regions are also found in the density of NGOs throughout Slovakia.

In an assessment project conducted in the early spring of 1997 by the Foundation for Civil Society (NOS), the results exhibited that from their sample of 203 NGOs; 43% were in Bratislava, 6.5% in Banská Bystrica and 8.5% in Košice. The remaining 42% were found throughout Slovakia.\textsuperscript{109} The registry maintained by the Ministry of Interior also reveals above average activity in Bratislava with 24.8% of all civic organizations.\textsuperscript{110} This is twice the share of the population of the Bratislava region. Not surprisingly the data provided from the SAIA-SCTS sample also reveals the highest percentage of NGOs is found in the region of Bratislava. While only 11.4% of the population lives in the region of Bratislava, it has 34.4% of the NGOs registered with SAIA-SCTS.

Furthermore, based on the four legal forms of NGOs in Slovakia, the Bratislava region has the highest number of civic organizations with 34%, 34% of the non-investment funds, 22% of the non-profit organizations, and 42% of the foundations.\textsuperscript{111} In contrast with Bratislava, the remainder of the regions exhibit a smaller share of NGOs than their populations. According to the registry of the Ministry of Interior, the greatest discrepancy between share of population and share of civil society organizations is in the

\textsuperscript{108} Although this thesis will not use ethnicity as a variable in the development of civil society, it is important to identify the diverse ethnic composition of Slovakia's regions. The data are from the 2001 Slovak census, "Trvále bývajúce obyvateľstvo podľa národnosti v krajoch a okresoch," (Permanent residents according to nationality in regions and districts), table 3 in \textit{Sčítanie Obyvateľov, Domov a Bytov 2001} at http://www.statistics.sk.

\textsuperscript{109} Assessment of Slovakia's Third Sector, 20 January 1997 to 20 April 1997.

\textsuperscript{110} The Ministry of Interior provides an online version of their registry through the \textit{Zoznam zaregistrovaných nadácií; Zoznam zaregistrovaných neinvestičných fondov; Zoznam zaregistrovaných neziskových organizácií} and the \textit{Zoznam zaregistrovaných občianskych združení}. This data was accessed at http://www.civil.gov.sk in October 2001. This data includes all four legal forms of NGOs, but excludes political parties, international organizations (for example foreign associations functioning in Slovakia) and government associations. The location was deduced by the address of the organization provided by the registry. Of the 15,835 total entries 49 did not include an address, leaving a working total of 15,786.
region of Prešov. While the Prešov region has approximately 15% of the population, it has only 11% of Slovakia's civil society organizations. These differences are higher in the SAIA-SCTS database of known active organizations.

In the SAIA-SCTS database, the regions of Trnava, Trenčín and Nitra have the highest discrepancies between population and NGOs. Trnava, which is located in western Slovakia, constitutes 10.2% of the population of Slovakia. However, it has the lowest share of NGOs with 6.3%, or almost four percent lower than its population. The region of Trenčín, which is also located in western Slovakia, is only slightly higher with 7.2% of NGOs for its 11.3% share of the national population. The south western region of Nitra has the highest discrepancy between its percentage of NGOs and its population, with a difference of 3.9%. [Appendix 3: Table 11]

An examination of NGOs which often engage in political activity demonstrates a further discrepancy between Slovakia's regions. Of the areas of work provided by the SAIA-SCTS database, perhaps the most implicitly 'political' NGOs are those which stated that they worked in the field of democracy. Almost half of these are located in Bratislava. The regions of Trenčín and Trnava have the fewest NGOs engaged in democracy with 2.5% and 3.4% respectively. Žilina also exhibits a very low turnout, with only 5.8%. Similar results are found with the calculation of NGOs working in legislation. Over half are found in Bratislava (52%), while Trnava (5.5%), Trenčín (7.7%) and Žilina (6.1%) exhibit the lowest levels of activity in this field as well. Other NGOs which often express political agendas include environmental NGOs, and NGOs working for the development of the third sector. In both these fields, Bratislava claims

111 SAIA-SCTS.
approximately a third of all activity throughout Slovakia. Furthermore, similar to the aforementioned results, the regions with the lowest amount of activity in these fields are Trenčín, Trnava, Nitra and Žilina.\textsuperscript{112} [Appendix 4: Table 12]

If one examines the density of NGOs, the discrepancies become even clearer. The Slovak average is one NGO for every 342 citizens. The region of Bratislava (and primarily the city of Bratislava) is the only region above the national average with an organization for every 158 people. The remaining seven regions fall below the national average to varying degrees. Banská Bystrica is just above the national average with one civic organization for every 349 people, followed by Žilina 1:386, and Košice 1:395. The regions of Trnava (1:406) and Nitra (1:431) have relatively low densities of civil society organizations, while Trenčín and Prešov have the lowest densities of NGOs with 1:444 and 1:450 respectively.\textsuperscript{113} Furthermore greater discrepancies exist at the district level. [Appendix 5: Figure 2] For example, while greater Bratislava has one organization for every 129 inhabitants, the districts of Bytča (1/650), Trebišov (1/669), Sobrance (1/703) and Námestovo (1/788) have significantly lower densities of civil society organizations. [Appendix 6: Table 13]

In order to evaluate the effects that the political environment and elite attitudes; political culture and values; and socio-economic factors have had on the development of Slovak civil society since 1993, it has been essential to examine aspects of the recent situation of civil society in Slovakia. Throughout the 1990s the numbers of civic associations have dramatically increased. The number of historic organizations that

\textsuperscript{112} SAIA-SCTS
renewed their activities after 1989 was very small meaning that the majority of organizations have been newly formed since the collapse of the communist regime. However, the density of Slovak civil society still falls behind its Visegrad neighbours, even though it has been heralded as a very engaged and matured civil society. Furthermore, most Slovak independent civic organizations are not guided by political motivations, and focus on providing services to their members and society. Politically active organizations do not exist as the norm, and those that are active are concentrated in Bratislava. Regional discrepancies exist between both the densities and fields of activity of NGOs in Slovakia. The most striking examples are Trenčín, Trnava and Nitra, which exhibit lower levels of politically engaged NGOs. Furthermore the range of the level of densities of NGOs significantly differs throughout Slovakia.

This thesis holds as its initial hypothesis that the political environment and political elite attitudes; political culture and values; and finally, socio-economic factors will impact Slovak civil society. Firstly, Slovakia experienced a significant change in governments after the 1998 parliamentary elections, which provides a manner in which to examine the effects of political elite attitudes and the environment on civil society. Secondly, Slovak political culture has often been argued to have strong streams of authoritarianism, and thirdly, Slovakia has endured significant social and economic costs since transition. The regional divergences in Slovakia, which include discrepancies in authoritarian values and socio-economic dislocation, provide a means of testing these

113 Author’s calculation based on population statistics from December 31, 2000 from Vybrané údaje o regionoch v Slovenskej republike (Selected Data on Regions in the Slovak Republic) 1/2001, Bratislava: SUSR, 66; and the data from the registry of the Ministry of Interior.
hypotheses. The following chapters will examine the impact these factors have or have not had on Slovak civil society.
Chapter III: Political Elite Attitudes and the Political Environment

Although civil society is understood as the autonomous self-organization of society and is differentiated in its purpose from political society, it is assumed that the relationship between civil society and the state is influential in the former’s development. Firstly the state provides the legal environment in which civil society may exist. It may also hinder or foster the development of civil society through additional legislation such as legal recognition and immunity, special fiscal treatment, established areas of functional representation, protection from arbitrary state interference, state subsidies, legal extension of contracts and responsibility in policy implementation. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly the state largely influences the extent to which civil society may participate in the decision-making process. \(^{114}\)

The attitudes of political elites steering the state will also be crucial for civil society, particularly in transition countries where political elites are establishing new political institutions, and where the legal institutions allowing for civil society have been newly implemented and have not yet gelled. Possible threats to civil society (and democratization) may arise from political elites who disrespect the rules of democracy and the rule of law. For example, Linz and Stepan hold that civil society requires the rule of law to “guarantee people the right of association, and needs the support of the state apparatus that will effectively impose legal sanctions on those who would illegally attempt to deny others that right.” \(^{115}\)

\(^{114}\) Schmitter, 249.
\(^{115}\) Linz and Stepan, 22.
It has been argued that political elite attitudes in the post-communist countries have affected the development of civil society. The post-communist development of political society has been charged with stunting the development of civil society as political parties have come to dominate the decision-making process, thus marginalizing social actors.\textsuperscript{116} In addition to the dominance of political parties, certain studies have noted that certain political elites have displayed hostile attitudes to the development of civil society. In Slovakia, civil society faced blatant hostility from certain political elites and specific attempts to limit its influence and independence throughout the 1990s.

Until 1998, the state of democracy in Slovakia was considered at best questionable. Several studies have included epithets such as “illiberal”, “dysfunctional” or “democratic deficit” in describing Slovakia’s democracy.\textsuperscript{117} The political style of Vladimir Mečiar, who has dominated the political scene in Slovakia since 1989, earned these comments. Although there have been four parliamentary elections and six governments, Mečiar led the Slovak government for roughly half of the transition period. Both the first parliamentary elections in June 1990, which resulted in the victory of Public Against Violence, and the second 1992 elections, which resulted in the victory of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), awarded Mečiar the position of prime minister. Furthermore, although he was ousted from the position of prime minister twice, in 1991 and 1994, Mečiar was able to reclaim that post in the 1992 and 1994 elections.

\textsuperscript{116} Kopecky and Barnfield, 77.
\textsuperscript{117} For example, Fareed Zakaria charged that Slovakia belonged to those nations that employed democracy in its structural sense, that is, free and competitive elections, but where the respect for the rule of law and the adherence to basic liberties of the population was not practiced. See Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 76:5 (November/December, 1997): 22-43; and Carol Skalnik Leff, “Dysfunctional Democratization?” \textit{Problems of Post-Communism} 43 (September/October, 1996): 36-50.
After the September 1994 elections, Mečiar remained prime minister until the dramatic parliamentary elections in September 1998.

The 1998 parliamentary elections halted the reign of Vladimír Mečiar and consequently radically altered the political environment in Slovakia. From 1994-1998, Mečiar led the government coalition consisting of the HZDS, the Slovak National Party (SNS) and the Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS), basically a right-center-left coalition. These four years were marked with a deep polarization in politics, which revolved around Mečiar and his opposition, and rested on the way a democracy should be governed and the domestic and foreign policies regarding the Slovak nation state.\footnote{Kevin Deagan Krause, “Dimensions of Party Competition,” \textit{Slovak Sociological Review} 1:2 (1996): 169-186, accessioned at \url{http://www.clawayne.edu/polisci/krausse/papers/susav.htm}. In his study, Krause, examines Slovak political parties along religious, socio-economic, post-materialist and urban-rural issues. He concludes, that although the former two are more often found to be divisive than the latter two in Slovak politics, none can be seen as dominant. However, Krause finds that attitudes toward democracy and the Slovak nation state are ‘always divisive.’} Prior to the 1998 elections, the political division that existed within Slovakia was “distinguished by their fundamentally antagonistic perceptions of democratic game rules and by their clashing rhetoric.”\footnote{John Gould and Soňa Szomolányi, “Slovakia: Elite Disunity and Convergence,” in \textit{Elites After State Socialism: Theories and Analysis}, eds. John Higley and Gyorgy Lengyel (Oxford: Roman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 47-69, 53.} The blatant disrespect for democratic rules and processes by the HZDS-SNS-ZRS government revealed itself in many forms and extended itself to a confrontational and hostile approach to Slovak civil society.

\textbf{1994-1998: The Mečiar Years}

A general disrespect for democratic values and the rule of law, and the centralization of power in the hands of the ruling coalition, and in particular, the hands of Mečiar marked the political scene of Slovakia from 1994-1998. Generally it was through the government’s attempts to centralize power that the disrespect for democratic rules
was manifested. The Mečiar government attempted to eradicate power and access to the decision-making process from its opposition and government critics. Immediately following the 1994 elections the government coalition of the HZDS-SNS-ZRS began to implement their monopoly over power structures. Firstly, the government excluded parliamentary opposition members from numerous decisions. In November 1994, the government coalition barred members of the opposition from participating in various parliamentary committees. Many of these committees were aimed at monitoring governmental actions such as privatization and internal security services. The parliamentary opposition was also denied any positions of chairmanship or vice-chairmanship, and the coalition also filled positions within the state bureaucracy with its supporters and eliminated any influence of the opposition in this procedure. The government coalition also ignored legislative proposals placed forth by the opposition for consideration during its tenure and thus effectively dominated the legislative agenda of Slovakia.\(^{120}\)

Secondly, the Mečiar government also attempted to weaken the power base of its political rivals. It disregarded and challenged the legitimacy of unfavourable rulings by the constitutional court throughout its tenure. The contentious relationship between Mečiar and President Michal Kováč is well documented. The most famous altercation was the questionable kidnapping of the latter's son. In addition to this scandal, the government continually took measures to discredit and undermine the power of the

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\(^{120}\) Grigorij Mesežnikov, “Domestic Political Developments and the Political Scene in the Slovak Republic,” in *Global Report 1995*, 11-31, 13; and Stephen Day, “Slovakia: The End of the Beginning or the Beginning of the End?” *Coexistence* 32 (1995): 261-274; and Gould and Szomolányi, 55. These authors describe in detail the disenfranchisement of the parliamentary opposition and specifically note that members of the opposition were excluded from the Supreme Control Office, the Special Control Body (internal security service), the General Prosecutor's Office and the National Monetary Fund (privatization).
Antagonisms and disrespect for the rule of law were characteristic of the HZDS-SNS-ZRS coalition throughout its duration. Its hostility and attacks also extended to non-political or non-institutional actors.  

The Mečiar government embarked upon many endeavors to eliminate critical, that is, independent media in Slovakia. One of the first actions implemented by the Mečiar government was to appoint trusted allies to executive positions in the Slovak Radio and Television Broadcasting Board, and thereby controlling the distribution of broadcasting licenses. It also dominated the Slovak Television Board and the Slovak Radio Board, which monitored and guided the broadcasts of state radio and television. Its various attempts to deal with independent media generally assumed the nature of undercutting the market competitiveness of independent sources of media in attempts to either force them out of business or adopt a pro-government slant. Furthermore, it also restricted access to government information to those media sources that were loyal to the government. 

Through its attempt to concentrate power the government weakened the institutions and power of its opposition including the presidency, parliamentary opposition, the constitutional court, and the independent media. It also created a clientelistic environment in which political loyalty dictated privatization and state funding processes. The manipulation of the political process to centralize power during this period was largely justified by rhetoric that used the threat of both internal and

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external enemies. Members of the government coalition often used labels such as “enemies,” “anti-Slovaks,” or “anti-state” to describe government critics.123

Gould and Szomolányi argue that the government coalition and the opposition forces during the 1994-1998 interim were significantly divided over their perceptions of the external world. Members of the government coalition often described themselves as protectors of the Slovak state from external enemies. Political elites within the Mečiar camp espoused the image that they were the protectors of the Slovak nation against the threats imposed by Czechs, Hungarians, and other countries and international bodies that sought to rob Slovakia of its autonomy, “and punish Slovakia for the Mečiar governments refusals to let foreign capital dominate the privatization process.” Furthermore, the government used this rhetoric to argue that the compromise of certain democratic rules was necessary in order to protect the nation.124 The labels of “anti-Slovak” or “enemies of the state” were eventually used by members of the coalition to describe members of civil society. The government coalition treated civil society like it treated its other opposition. It adopted an adversarial attitude toward civil society and made many attempts to thwart its development.

Civil Society from 1993-1998

At the time of Slovak independence, certain rights and laws governing civil society had already been established. For example, the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, which went into effect January 1, 1993, guaranteed the right of association and the right of free assembly in articles 28, 29 and 37. In 1990 and 1991 both the Law

124 Gould and Szomolányi, 53-54.
Concerning the Associating of Citizens, which provided citizens the legal right to form associations, and the Law Concerning Foundations, which provided for the legal existence of foundations and awarded these organizations the status of legal person upon registration with the Ministry of Interior, were enacted.\textsuperscript{125} Some of the pre-existing legislation was also not interpreted to be favourable to civil society organizations, particularly in terms of taxation laws. In 1995, civil society organizations were required to pay the same taxes as profit-making organizations. Although these laws had been established before 1993, both governmental and non-governmental participants regarded the legislation governing civil society to be insufficient, and that better taxation laws were needed.\textsuperscript{126} However, it was under the HZDS-SNS-ZRS coalition that civil society legislation was enacted, and was largely seen as an attempt by the government coalition to extend its control in Slovakia and thwart the development of an independent civil society.

The government employed tactics reminiscent of the communist regime to bring civil society under its control. Firstly, it embarked upon a public campaign to discredit Slovak civil society. Secondly, it proposed restrictive legislation that aimed at both placing civil society organizations under government control and restricting their independence through complicating their fiscal viability. Thirdly, the government also

\textsuperscript{125} Certain organizations are governed by specific laws that were adopted prior to 1989, these include the Slovak Red Cross, professional bars, non-professional chambers, Matica Slovenská, hunting and fishing associations, and international organizations, \textit{A Profile of the Third Sector}, (Bratislava: SAIA-SCTS, 2000).

\textsuperscript{126} In regards to taxation, non-profit organizations were also expected to pay the VAT on their purchases. Although certain charitable organizations were exempt from custom duties, there remained confusion surrounding these issues. See Martin Bútorá and Daniel P. Daniel, \textit{Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering in Slovakia} (Bratislava: FOCUS/SAIA-SCTS, 1995).
attempted to thwart the independence of the civil society sector by creating its own version of civil society organizations.\footnote{Dušan Ondrušek and Vladimir Labáth, “Conflicts in Transforming Society and the Nongovernmental Sector: The Slovak Example,” \textit{Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences} 552 (July 1997): 40-51, 47.}

In the summer of 1995, the government coalition began to apply its rhetoric to individuals active in Slovakia’s third sector, and thus began a public campaign to discredit many Slovak NGOs. A statement made by George Soros in July 1995 in which he criticized the Mečiar government for harming Slovakia’s interests precipitated the crusade against NGOs. Members of the government attacked these comments and Soros, and threatened to bar him from entering Slovakia. Ján Lupták of the ZRS referred to Soros as the "main enemy of peaceful life in the young Slovak Republic."\footnote{Sharon Fisher, “Slovak Ruling Party to Bar Soros,” \textit{OMRI Daily Digest} 1:133 (11 July 1995), and FBIS-EEU-95-133, “HZDS May Declare Soros Persona Non Grata,” \textit{Narodna Obroda}, 12 July 1995.} For example, in calls for a ban on the Soros foundation in July 1995, SNS member Anna Maliková stated that, “the SNS believes that the Foundation (Open Society Fund) is engaged in activities directed against the government and the Slovak Republic.”\footnote{FBIS-EEU-95-138, “SNS Urges Prosecutor to Ban Soros Foundation,” \textit{Pravda} 15 July 95.}

Consequently, the government began to extend their attack beyond the Soros foundation. In the same month statements made by members of the government coalition revealed the hostility toward NGOs, especially those affiliated with international donors. Because of the focus on international ‘financing’, the state began to orchestrate audits for all
Individuals in certain ministries were also directed to halt co-operation with members of civil society organizations. In the fall of 1995, the crusade against NGOs by the government coalition intensified. In September, Roman Hofbauer, a parliamentary deputy for HZDS, delivered a speech in parliament that assailed certain members of Slovak civil society, and questioned the legitimacy of Slovakia’s civil society organizations. In his speech, Hofbauer charged that the third sector was a “non-transparent jungle,” and condemned the fact that the numerous organizations that existed were not subject to law or review. He further condemned these organizations by alleging that they painted a picture of “political chaos in Slovakia,” that claimed that most Slovaks were “against Slovakia.” He further stated that, “it seems that our present democracy and plurality has acquired a grotesque and anarchistic character.” Hofbauer attacked specific individuals who attended a conference in Munich, at which Slovakia was portrayed as a racist state. He further argued that it was not a manifestation of a free society that individuals or groups may poison society, politics, and international relations, and that Slovak society needed peace. In addition to public slander, Hofbauer also argued the need for legislation on the grounds that foundations could be used for unregulated flows of money and money laundering. The Hofbauer speech marked the beginning of the controversial enactment.

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131 This was particularly true of the Ministry of Environment, which directed its employees to stop co-operation with NGOs, and the Ministry of Education, which cancelled an agreement with the NGO, SAIA-SCTS, see Bútorá et al., “Nonprofit Sector” in Global Report 1995, 230.

132 Hofbauer specifically charged Dušan Kováč, Martin Bútorá, Peter Zajac and Martin Simečka with hurting Slovakia’s image, the speech was delivered by Hofbauer on September 28, 1995 and published in part in Slovenská republika on September 29, as found in NonProfit, October 1995. Translation is author’s own. See also Pavol Demš, “Report on the Status of the Third Sector,” NonProfit, November 1996.
of laws governing civil society in Slovakia. Like its other opponents, the government coalition applied its anti-Slovak rhetoric to civil society, and also attempted to undermine its independence.

At the end of 1995, the government buttressed its campaign against the third sector in Slovakia with the proposal of a new law regulating foundations. Although a law on foundations was not included in the proposed legislative aims for 1995, work on the law governing foundations that began in the fall was said to have been precipitated by the questionable financial practices of foundations. Although these charges proved to be unsubstantiated, Hofbauer supported the adoption of a law on foundations due to the, “need to legally put in order the foundation sector and the need to control the flow of financial support from abroad which can be used for anti-Slovak aims, money laundering and tax evasion.”

Furthermore, the government coalition attempted to prevent civil society representatives from participating in the preparation of the law. It reneged on its obligation to contact the members of the third sector (represented by the NGO elected umbrella organization-Gremium of the Third Sector) and prolonged releasing information on the proposed draft to the public. Certain members of the Gremium were part of the Ministry of Justice appointed legislative group for the third sector. When the government released information about the proposed law in December 1995, it met with strong criticism from Slovak NGOs, and was clearly interpreted as a barefaced attempt to

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133 Roman Hofbauer, “Slovak Turmoil around foundations,” Slovenská republika May 20, 1996 as found in Bútorá, et al., “Nonprofit Sector,a” in Global Report 1995, 208. Bútorá et al also reported that the charge of tax evasion was found to be baseless since the Central Tax Office found that only 25 of the 331 foundations inspected had ‘marginal shortcomings, i.e. insufficient bookkeeping.
impede further independent development of civil society and seize control over its development.\textsuperscript{134}

The strongest objections to the proposed law were that it allowed the government to commandeer direct control over the registration, and thus the establishment of foundations. In its initial proposal the law advocated that a central authority must approve a foundation (as being beneficial to the public) before it could then register with the Ministry of Interior. There was also fierce objection to the law’s proposed increase in basic capital to a mandatory 10 million Slovak crowns for foundations. Objections to law came from both internal and external observers.\textsuperscript{135}

In response to the government’s proposed law, the Gremium of the Third Sector launched a campaign entitled Third Sector SOS in January 1996. Although it had openly criticized Mečiar and his government before, particularly when specific foundations were targeted for audits in the summer of 1995, the SOS campaign was its largest venture. The campaign used the media to publicize its strongest objections and place pressure on the government to co-operate with the civil society sector in drafting the legislation. In 1996, the campaign was the largest mobilization of civil society organizations that the independent Slovakia had experienced. Eventually more than three hundred NGOs joined the campaign. It also received significant support from the independent media, foreign diplomats and observers, and members of the government opposition, who although in vein, tried to amend certain aspects of the law.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 207-244.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 207-244.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 207-244.
Through the SOS campaign, NGO representatives gained limited access to the drafting of the law and managed to eradicate both the direct control of a central authority and to lower the basic capital requirement. However, the law, which was passed on May 22, 1996, was still considered to be restrictive and insufficient. For example, Klaus Neuhoff, who reviewed the law for the Council of Europe, commented that the law exhibited the state’s distrust for foundations and was obviously drafted by a state-centered government that vested significant power in the Ministry of Interior, and therefore the government.\footnote{137} The bill, although debated heatedly in parliament, was passed with 78 votes. Conspicuously, it was only members of the HZDS-SNS-ZRS coalition that voted for the law, while 52 members of the opposition including members of the Democratic Union (DU), the Christian Democratic Party (KDH) and the Hungarian Coalition (MK), voted against the law.\footnote{138}

As a result of the Law on Foundations, many smaller foundations were unable to meet the requirements the new law dictated, primarily that foundations had to have a basic capital of 10,000 Sk, which had to increase to 100,000 Sk within six months of establishment. The law stipulated that foundations had until the end of August 1997 to re-register with the Ministry of Interior. In September 1997, over half (51%) of those foundations active did not re-register or participate in the re-registration process with the Ministry of Interior. Furthermore, of the foundations that did re-register, only 30% of those applied to be registered as foundations. Many organizations changed their status to civic association, non-investment fund or non-profit organization. In the end, only 357 or

\begin{footnotes}
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13.5% of foundations active prior to the 1996 law re-registered (and fulfilled) the new legislative requirements.\[^{139}\]

Although, after the SOS campaign the government claimed to include civil society suggestions in the further civil society legislation, both the Law on Non-Investment Funds (May 1997) and the Law on Non-Profit Organizations Providing Beneficial Services (July 1997) were passed despite numerous amendments proposed by representatives of Slovak civil society and a boycott of the final vote by the parliamentary opposition. Both the parliamentary opposition and civil society representatives charged that the Law on Non-Profit Organizations interfered with the operations of organizations. It further specified strict criterion for “permissible activities” of non-profit organizations and also implemented confusing and strict financial requirements. A similar charge was made against the Law on Non-Investment Funds. Criticisms of this law centered on restricted investment possibilities, obligatory audits, and like the former law, limits to administrative costs.\[^{140}\] The laws were interpreted to be restrictive for the development of civil society.\[^{141}\] Although the adoption of restrictive legislative control toward civil society was completed in 1997, the Mečiar government continued to discredit certain aspects of civil society in the media, renege on agreements to allow participation and attempt to create a civil society based on loyal allies.

The pro-government umbrella organization the Union of Civic Associations and Foundations was established in February 1997. According to civil society observers, it


\[^{141}\] “Non-Governmental Organizations under Restrictive Control,” *SITA* 18 July 1997.
was an attempt by the governing coalition to establish an alternative and loyal segment in the sphere of civil society. Accordingly the union supported government policy, particularly its policy toward civil society. The HZDS-SNS-ZRS coalition attempted a similar endeavor when relations between the government and trade unions broke down.

The basis for tripartism was established during the last years of Czechoslovakia. In October 1990, the Councils of Economic and Social Agreement were founded at the federal and republic levels. The councils consisted of an equal amount of representatives from employers’, employees’ and government interests. The employees’ representation in Slovakia was dominated by the nation’s largest labour organization, the Trade Union Confederation (KOZ), and the Association of Employers Unions and Associations (AZZZZ) represented employers. At the beginning of January 1991, a General Agreement among the tripartite partners was established that allowed for the Councils to play a consultative role in the labour related legislation. Although the attempt of the trade unions to have agreements made in the tripartite structure legally binding inevitably failed, by 1993 the trade unions’ position in social dialogue and consultative role had been established.

Initially, due to the complimentary goals of the HZDS government and the trade unions, that is, restraining the social costs of transition, the tripartite system in Slovakia continued to function. However, the HZDS-SNS-ZRS aspiration to control all areas of public life eventually led to conflicts with KOZ. From 1993 to 1996, the government often disregarded agreements made by the tripartite partners when enacting legislation.

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Finally after numerous threats to leave the tripartite structure, KOZ finally abandoned the structure in 1997 after the government ratified a new wage control policy. KOZ was angered that the legislation had been adopted without KOZ consultation and despite its objections.\textsuperscript{144}

Like its response to Slovak NGOs, the Mečiar government replied to KOZ’s withdrawal with the formation of parallel or alternative trade unions that were loyal to the government. In 1997 the Trade Union Association (ZOZ) was established. Furthermore, the Mečiar government attempted to undermine the initial 1990 Council of Economic and Social Agreement by establishing the alternative Economic and Social Council in 1997, which would include members of the pro-government ZOZ. The government argued that the new council represented more plurality in social dialogue when in effect it attempted to undermine the primacy of KOZ in social dialogue.\textsuperscript{145}

The tenure of Mečiar and the HZDS-SNS-ZRS government coalition was marked with an aggressive and adversarial role toward any opposition. In addition to attempts to weaken the power of the parliamentary opposition, the presidency and the constitutional court, the Mečiar government also equally attacked oppositionist social actors, including the media, trade unions and civil society. From 1995, the government coalition embarked upon a campaign against civil society. Its efforts included attempts to discredit this sector, enact restrictive legislation, and build an alternative loyal civil society. Although third sector legislation was concluded in the summer of 1997, sporadic public attacks against civil society, and in particular the Gremium of the Third Sector, continued throughout Mečiar’s term. Furthermore, in 1998 public condemnation increased during

\textsuperscript{145} Malová, 121-136.
the parliamentary elections campaign. As a result of the Mečiar government’s antagonistic approach to its social and political opposition, the latter united during the pre-election campaign in an effort to defeat the government.

**The 1998 Elections: the Democratic Re-birth of Slovakia**

The 1998 parliamentary elections have been heralded as the democratic rebirth of Slovakia.\(^{146}\) The activities of civil society in the pre-election period were both spurred on by the style of governance of the Mečiar government and the looming risk that upcoming elections would not be free and fair. Insecurities about the upcoming elections were due to both the actions taken by the government in May 1997 to impair a referendum on presidential elections and NATO membership, and actions taken by the government in 1998.\(^{147}\) In the beginning of 1998, the ruling coalition took certain steps that illustrated its intention to maintain and strengthen its power base. After President Kováč left office at the end of February, the Mečiar government assumed presidential powers and immediately revoked a referendum on direct presidential elections set by the former president in one of his last speeches, and granted amnesty to individuals connected with the abduction of the president’s son. It also granted amnesty to individuals involved in spoiling the referendum of May 1997.\(^{148}\) However, the most threatening action taken in preparation of the September 1998 was the eventual amendments made to the parliamentary electoral law in May 1998. Proposed changes to the electoral law began to

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\(^{146}\) One need not look far to see the weight given to these elections by both external and internal observers, for example Martin Bútora, et al. *The 1998 Parliamentary Elections and the Democratic Rebirth in Slovakia* (Bratislava:IVO, 1999).

\(^{147}\) In May 1997, while preparing referendum ballots, the Minister of Interior, Gustáv Krajčí, disregarded a directive from President Kováč to include a fourth question on direct presidential elections. Because of the obvious attempts to alter the referendum, less than 10% of possible voters participated, resulting in a nullification of the referendum, RFE/RL, “Slovakia’s Referendum Declared Invalid,” *Newsline*, 27 May 1997.

be rumored at the beginning of 1998, after statements made by Mečiari, although confusion and contradictory statements ensued.149

The amendments to the law were finally announced to the public in February and passed in May 1998.150 The ruling coalition enacted amendments to the parliamentary law that aimed to eradicate the power of the opposition. Firstly, amendments to the electoral were interpreted suspiciously since they were implemented months before the elections. Secondly, the new amendments raised the threshold for individual parties within a coalition to 5%, thereby effectively eliminating pre-election coalitions. Prior to the amendment the electoral law required a 5% threshold for individuals parties, 7% for two-party coalitions, and 10% for three party coalitions.151 Finally, it introduced the restriction of transparency on voter lists, failed to safeguard against unauthorized voting, limited independent election monitoring, and restricted coverage and freedom of the media. Slovak political and social actors, and external observers immediately criticized the changes to the electoral law.152 The amendments to the electoral law also partially spurred on the civil society initiative Občianská Kampaň (Civic Campaign) or OK’98, which eventually played a significant part in the 1998 parliamentary election campaign.

149 For example, after allegations that the Ministry of Interior was preparing amendments to the law, representatives from the ministry denied the accusations on 19 January 1998. However, on 3 February 1998, Minister of Interior, Krajčí announced that the ministry had been working on the law for over six months, see “Slovak Ministry of Interior not Preparing Revision to Election Law.” SITA, 19 January 1998 and “Krajčí Says that the Ministry Working on Election Law for Over a Half a Year,” SITA, 03 February 1998.
152 In addition to strong criticism from the parliamentary opposition, the law received criticism from external observers. For example, the American non-governmental organization, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), published the report, “NDI Comments on the Proposed Amendments to the Slovak Republic’s Election Law,” (NDI: April 30, 1998), accessioned at http://www.ndi.org, which objected to the law’s lack of allowance for observers, insufficient transparency and protection against unauthorized voting, increased governmental control over electoral committees, intra-coalition threshold requirements, and restrictive media coverage.
The OK’ 98 campaign was opened in March 1998 in the central Slovak city of Zvolen. The campaign was an umbrella group consisting of over thirty NGOs from a variety of fields joined together with the express purpose of securing free and fair elections, increasing voter turnout, heightening voter education, and increasing the influence and awareness of voters on the electoral laws. In March the OK’ 98 campaign executed a petition against the amendments made to the electoral law by the governing coalition. It is important to note the role of international donors in the OK’ 98 campaign. The activities of the NGOs were financially supported by international organizations, a point that was not lost on the HZDS. Under the OK’ 98 campaign roughly sixty projects were executed by numerous organizations that focused on the goals of the campaign. Their activities mostly focused on a nation-wide information campaign, numerous discussion meetings between political candidates and citizens, television and radio programs encouraging voter participation, election and media monitoring, and specific projects aimed at youth participation including rock concerts.\(^{153}\)

For the most part, the public reception of the OK’ 98 campaign was very positive. In a May 1998 public opinion poll conducted by IVO, the majority of citizens supported the involvement of NGOs in voter education (62.8%), the actions taken by NGOs to encourage people to participate in the elections (62.3%), NGO organization of candidate forums in villages and towns where citizens discussed issues with the representatives of different political parties (60.6%), NGO monitoring of the electoral process (64.7%), and

the right that the NGOs push for a fair electoral law (65.7%). However, the OK' 98 campaign was quickly assailed by the ruling coalition.

The ruling coalition criticized the NGO activities as being political and partisan, and, due to their foreign funding, "anti-Slovak" and aimed at the destruction of the Slovak state. In general the HZDS daily Slovenská Republika was central to the struggle against OK' 98 throughout the election campaign. Beginning in August, Slovenská Republika published many stories attacking the civic campaign, and targeted specific organizations central to the co-ordination of the campaign. The daily continued to deliver the rhetoric that the HZDS-SNS-ZRS government was the true protector of the Slovak nation from internal and external enemies, in this case NGOs which were funded by foreign organizations. Furthermore, the daily claimed that the Hungarians were the puppeteers behind the campaign and the "sanctimonious game of non-partisan election preparations," and described these ‘Hungarian’ lead NGOs as “eggs from the hostile Anti-Slovak nest.”

In August the ruling coalition also attacked the civic campaign on a debate program run on the state run Slovak Television. Although the spokesperson of the OK’ 98 campaign was present and able to counter accusations, selected members of the ruling coalition inundated the civic initiative with accusations implying treason, partisanship and criminality. For example, Irena Belohorská, an HZDS member of parliament criticized the campaign as being “a political initiative with foreign donations.” The SNS

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154 The numbers are for respondents who stated that the above listed actions were “right” or “probably right”. Of the remaining percentages more citizens stated that they did not know while very few stated that the NGO activities were wrong, Zora Bútorová, “Development of Public Opinion: from the Discontent to the Support of Political Change,” The 1998 Parliamentary Elections, 195-219, 208.

155 “Non-Governmental Organizations are Worried about Concentrated Attacks by Government Media,” SITA, 21 September 1998.
chairperson Anna Maliková cautioned citizens against the information leaflets disseminated by the OK’ 98 campaign, claiming them to be clearly political, and that the NGOs involved were playing “a hypocritical game.” Further criticism came from the Minister of Interior, Gustáv Krajčí, who called the activities of non-governmental organizations 'subversive' and stated that “no group has the right to say that laws (passed by the Slovak Parliament) are undemocratic.” In response to the question of whether NGOs should participate as observers to the 1998 elections, Vladimír Mečiar stated that such an action would be “perversion” arguing the inequality of bestowing special rights on certain citizens. In furtherance to their hostile attitude to the NGO campaign, the ruling coalition refused to participate in any of the OK’ 98 organized discussions with citizens. Throughout the campaign period it continued to treat Slovak civil society as it had throughout its tenure. That is, as a treasonous enemy of the Slovak state funded by foreign interests groups, which had their sights on Slovak property. However, the democratic opposition took a markedly different approach to the activities of the civic campaign.

It may be interpreted that the adversarial style of government adopted by the ruling coalition led the democratic opposition forces to finally unite during 1998. Firstly, in response to the new electoral law, two loosely organized coalitions, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) and the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) changed

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their statuses from coalition to parties shortly before the elections.\textsuperscript{160} Secondly, in addition to their intra and inter party structural reorganization and cooperation, the parties of the democratic opposition (SDK, SMK, the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] and the Party of Civic Understanding [SOP]) also cooperated with the trade unions and civil society organizations.

The parties of the democratic opposition, particularly the SDK, were publicly supportive of the OK'98 campaign. During the pre-election period representatives of the OK'98 campaign with representatives from all the opposition parties, and political candidates of the democratic opposition parties readily participated in the discussion forums organized by OK'98. Furthermore, representatives of the Gremium of the Third Sector participated in ‘democratic round tables’ coordinated by the SDK. From June to September 1998, there were seven ‘democratic round tables’ that were attended by the political parties (SDK, SDL, SMK, and SOP), trade unions (KOZ), the Association of Towns and Villages, and the NGOs; the Gremium of the Third Sector and the Slovak Youth Council. The democratic round tables were initiated to secure free and fair elections and coordinate the activities of the democratic forces.\textsuperscript{161} The social actors that had been marginalized under the HZDS-SNS-ZRS government played active roles during the election campaign. In addition to the activities of civil society organizations, KOZ was also very active during the campaign period. Its primary goals were to encourage unionists to support political parties that advocated workers’ participation in social

\textsuperscript{160} The SDK consisted of the five parties; the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the Democratic Union (DU), the Democratic Party (DS), the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS) and the Greens Party of Slovakia (SZS); the SMK consisted of three parties; the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH), the Coexistence Movement and the Hungarian Civic Party (MOS).

\textsuperscript{161} Bútorá and Bútorová, “Slovakia’s Democratic Awakening,” 91.
dialogue. To that end, KOZ published several reports that analyzed the platforms, policies, and past actions of all political parties on workers' issues. Furthermore, according to Darina Malová, "the KOZ and the Gremium challenged the democratic political powers to cooperate in the elections campaign in order to win the elections."\textsuperscript{162}

The election results in September brought a dramatic change in government. Although Mečiar's HZDS gathered the most votes with 27\%, the democratic opposition forces combined seized 58\%, and were thus able to form a new government. The aims of the new government were primarily to correct the abuses of the HZDS-SNS-ZRS government and quickly place Slovakia on the path to western integration. Due to both the primacy of Slovak NGOs during the pre-election campaign (many credit the OK'98 campaign with the high electoral turnout of 84\%), and the cooperation between NGOs and the new government prior to the elections, the change in governments promised a more favourable environment for Slovak civil society. Furthermore the Programme Declarations of the Government of the Slovak Republic released in November 1998 stated that one of its basic goals was to "develop civil society in all aspects," and "the government will create legislative and organizational conditions for the strengthening and widening of citizen initiatives and will support the establishment of partner relations with the civil sector on all levels of public administration." The government programme also elaborated that it would create the conditions for increased participation of civic

associations, foundations and other non-governmental organizations, particularly in the fields of education, social services, culture, and youth.\textsuperscript{163}

**Engagement of Civil Society after the 1998 Elections**

In their yearly assessment of democratic developments in Eastern Europe in 2001, Freedom House reported that in Slovakia since October 1998, "NGOs have been able to develop their activities freely. Relations between the NGO sector and the current government are very good."\textsuperscript{164} Since the 1998 elections, many NGO leaders and observers have commented on an increased participation between the government and the third sector. In March 1999, a session between 80 NGO representatives and the Ministers of Education; Labour, Social Affairs and Family; and the Slovak parliament speaker occurred in which the government agreed to cooperate with NGOs.\textsuperscript{165} Throughout the year there were improved relations between certain ministries and civil society organizations. In particular, several advisory councils and committees invited NGO representatives to participate. Some of these included the committees on specific projects under the Ministries of Environment; Labour, Social Affairs and Family; Agriculture; and Education. NGOs were also invited to be members of the Ministerial Council for European Integration.\textsuperscript{166}

The new government has also enacted new legislation that governs social actors. In January 2000, the National Council amended the income tax law. The law stipulates that taxpayers will be able to designate 1% of their income tax to the support of public


\textsuperscript{165} "Governmental Organizations and Third Sector Agreed to Cooperate," *SITA*, 5 March 1999.

\textsuperscript{166} Demész, "The Third Sector," in *Slovakia 1998-1999*, 361.
interest activities, which became effective on January 1, 2002. In February 2002, 4042
civil society organizations had registered with the central tax directorate to be able to
receive this money. The law stipulates that private persons may donate 1% of their
income tax to an organization of their choice. It was predominantly civic associations
(85%) which registered, and approximately a quarter (23%) are located in Bratislava
while only 8% are located in Trnava. More recently, there have also been amendments
made to the previously controversial Law on Foundations. In December 2001,
parliament passed amendments to the 1996 Law on Foundations. The law aimed to,
“make conditions for establishing foundations stricter, but on the other hand, eliminate
bureaucratic obstacles to their functioning.” Interestingly, the law, in which the Third
Sector Gremium assisted in drafting, was again controversial. It raised the basic
endowment capital to 200,000 Sk from 10,000 Sk. The 200,000 Sk agreement was a
result of objections made by foundations; the proposed amount was 500,000 Sk to
1,000,000 Sk. In 2000, the government also implemented General Agreements
between the tripartite partners, after a three year absence of such agreements. However,
although social dialogue between the tripartite structure appeared promising in the fall of
1998, the social dialogue has been interrupted many times, and relations between the
trade union KOZ and the government is no longer friendly, largely due to the unpopular
economic policies of the current government.

In comparison with the situation of the trade unions, however, relations between
the government and civil society have generally improved and, certain organizations,

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168 "Parliament Passes Bill on Foundations," SITA, 18 December 2001; "Ekoforum Unhappy with the Draft
Foundation Bill," SITA 12 October 2001; and Norbert Brádza, “Civic Associations Declared that Recent
have participated in high profile activities. In research into the participation of MPs in the activities of the third sector conducted by SAIA-SCTS in December 1998, 56% of the members of the present coalition claimed that they were actively involved with NGO activities. Forty-six of the sixty-three members of parliament that responded stated that they participated in the activities of a non-governmental organization. Since 1998, the government has also established a Council of the Government for NGOs, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister. The Council serves as an advisory body and is composed of members of the third sector and all ministries.

Some civil society associations have been involved in very high profile political developments since 1998. For example, the new government has implemented an anti-corruption campaign, in which the NGO Transparency International has played a significant role. Non-government organizations were also active in the adoption of the Law on Freedom of Access to Information, which took effect on January 1, 2001. Over a hundred NGOs were involved in a public information campaign surrounding the law, and lobbied for the law. Furthermore many civil society organizations have participated in various projects at the request of the government. For example, non-governmental organizations have played a central role in implementing regional development programs financed by the PHARE program, as a part of the EU ascension criteria. They have

169 The research was conducted by distributing questionnaires to members of parliament. All fifteen MPs of the Hungarian Coalition Party returned completed questionnaires; while in total 61 of the 93 members of the government coalition participated in the research. In stark contrast, only 2 of the 43 HZDS MPs returned their questionnaires, while none of the SNS MPs returned their questionnaires. Nonprofit February 1999.


worked as equal partners with business entities and municipal governments in all spheres of the regional development program; they have written proposals, judged project proposals and overseen project implementation.\textsuperscript{173} Slovak civil society has retained a strong profile in political events since its primary role in 1998 elections.

**The Political Environment and Civil Society**

The 1998 elections brought a salient change in the political environment in Slovakia. The current government, under Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda, set out to effectively correct the abuses of the former government in all spheres; economics, international relations, social policy and democratic governance. For the most part, it has been successful. Slovakia has improved its relations and position in the Western integration process, and enacted difficult but necessary economic reforms. The new government has also established a more favourable environment for civil society.

Schmitter argues that the state may hinder or foster the development of civil society through the means of legislation, fiscal treatment, state subsidies, state interference, and accesses to decision making. From 1994-1998, civil society faced attempts by the Mečiar led coalition to attain power over non-governmental organizations, and after 1995, attempts to discredit and marginalize organizations that it did not find favourable. For example, under the HZDS-SNS-ZRS government subsidies and grants to civil society organizations were questionable. Non-governmental organizations that had values akin to those of the government, often received subsidies, particularly in the field of culture.\textsuperscript{174} In 1995, minority cultural groups and associations

\textsuperscript{174} Bútorá and Daniel, 20.
directly suffered from this type of policy. The Ministry of Culture decreased the amount of funding to minority cultures from 140 million Sk in 1994, to 58 million in 1995. In particular, subsidies to ethnic associations dropped from roughly 25 million Sk (1994) to 13 million Sk in 1995. In specific, the Hungarian umbrella organization for social and cultural associations CSEMADOK saw its government subsidy eliminated in 1996 after decreasing from 10.8 million Sk in 1994 to 4.11 in 1995. However, because the process of state funding of NGOs is insufficiently transparent, a direct comparison of funding decisions taken by the two governments remains difficult.

The parliamentary elections of 1998, and the subsequent change in government provide the opportunity to examine the effects of two greatly different political environments on the development of civil society in Slovakia. It is clear that since 1998 non-governmental organizations have not been forced to defend themselves as they did during the 1994-1998 period. Under the new government led by Dzurinda, civil society organizations have been able to participate in various projects, become active in advocacy and have maintained a relatively high profile in the political developments in the country. Civil society has also appeared to have gained relatively more access to the decision making process than it had previously. To be sure, representatives of civil society have criticized the government on various issues, but it has not been subjected to an assault similar to its experience during the HZDS-SNS-ZRS government.

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175 As a result the Hungarian cultural association CSEMADOK was reported to have decreased its employees from 53 to 3-4 by the beginning of 1996, Ondrej Dostál, “Minorities,” in Global Report 1995, 63-74, 67.

176 A current study of state financing was conducted in 2000, but did not examine state funding during the Mečiar government. Furthermore, it concluded that transparency was still significantly insufficient, see Marianna Belejová, Current State of Public Financing of Non-Governmental Organizations in Slovakia (Bratislava: SAIA-SCTS, 2000).
However, despite the attempts of the Mečiar government to thwart civil society, in the Slovak case it appears that civil society became incredibly unified and professional under the auspices of a hostile government. Because the HZDS-SNS-ZRS government put civil society on the defensive, it organized its most significant campaigns during the 1990s, the Third Sector SOS and OK’98. Furthermore, the OK’98 campaign has been heralded as being impressively successful, and has since served as a model for similar campaigns in Croatia and Serbia. However, although civil society appears to have strengthened and continued to develop under the Mečiar regime, the change in political environments has been used to examine only the development of civil society at the national level. Political elite attitudes and the political environment have not been examined in relation to the regional variations in Slovak civil society in this thesis. Furthermore, it should be interpreted that although certain NGOs have become successful in advocacy, and strengthened relations with the government, these issues remain concentrated to both a small number of NGOs involved in the politically active areas of democracy, human rights and the environment, and largely NGOs centered in Bratislava.
Chapter IV: Political Culture and Civil Society

Slovak Political Culture in Comparison

The fall of communism encouraged new interest in the political values of the societies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Political culture has often been used as a tool of explanation for certain successes and failures in the democratic transitions of these countries. Frequently, the omnipresence and pervasiveness of the communist system is thought to have left a legacy of apathy, distrust and alienation. Other repercussions of the socialist system have been a sense of civic hopelessness and rejection of politics. This situation is compounded by the weakness of democratic traditions in Eastern Europe. In this thesis it is hypothesized that political culture as the attitudes, ideals, beliefs, and values toward the political system and, in particular, the role of the self within that system, may have an effect on Slovakia’s civil society.

Throughout the 20th century the citizens of Czechoslovakia spent significantly more time under authoritarian than under democratic regimes. Furthermore, the difference between the political histories of the Czech and Slovak lands has lead to assertions that there is a difference between the Czech and Slovak political cultures. Brown and Wightman present various indicators to illustrate the difference of political cultures in the Slovak and Czech lands. For example, their study revealed that in 1968 far fewer Slovaks than Czechs chose the First Republic as the most glorious period of their history. This has been interpreted as significant since the First Republic was the single episode of political pluralism and democracy in the history of Czechoslovakia. The authors also illustrated that the Slovaks were significantly more likely to esteem
communist leaders than their Czech compatriots.\textsuperscript{176} To be sure the historical political tradition of Slovakia exhibits a stronger tendency toward authoritarianism than the history of the Czech lands.

During the nineteenth century the Slovaks endured strict Magyarization policies that worked to hinder a democratic political tradition similar to that of the Czechs during the same period. Furthermore, it has been noted that during the First Republic, "Slovak (political) parties were more hierarchically organized and generally dominated by single leaders."\textsuperscript{177} Perhaps the clearest manifestation of an authoritarian tradition in the Slovak lands prior to transition politics, was the independent Slovak state during World War II under the leadership of Monsignor Jozef Tiso. This authoritarian tradition coupled with the lack of opposition to the communist regime and greater satisfaction under normalization has often been cited as evidence that Slovak political culture is less democratic than that of the Czechs. More recently, cross-national studies of political values have also revealed differences in Slovak and Czech political culture.

The transformations ignited by the revolutions in 1989 have generated many studies of political values and attitudes in the post-communist states. In most of these studies political attitudes have been revealed as slightly different in Slovakia compared to other Central European post-communist states. In many comparisons, orientations and values supporting democracy have been shown to be less pervasive in Slovak political culture than the political culture of the Czechs. For example, Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch showed that Slovaks favoured the guarantee of material needs and social

\textsuperscript{177} David Paul, "Czechoslovakia's Political Culture Reconsidered," in \textit{Political Culture and Communist Studies}, 134-147, 139.
rights over the political rights provided by a democratic regime. The Czechs, on the other hand, valued the individual rights provided by democracy above the right to material provisions. These authors also illustrated that in Slovakia, throughout the 1990s, the term ‘politics,’ generally summoned negative reactions, and that in Slovakia, support for democracy was slightly lower than that found in the Czech Republic.\footnote{178}

Furthermore, in their examination of normative support for democracy, Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey Evans found that the Czechs were more supportive of democracy than Slovaks.\footnote{179} Other comparative studies have illustrated that there is a higher incidence of non-democratic values, such as authoritarian and paternalistic orientations, in Slovakia. In their examination of political culture in the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, Lawrence Rose et al., found that the communist legacy of paternalism remained in the East Central European states. Within Slovakia, however, respondents expressed, “paternalist and more anti-liberal value orientations to a degree which exceeds all that of citizens in all other countries involved in the research.”\footnote{180}

Further proof of weaker democratic values in Slovak political culture was shown in comparative research conducted by Miller et al. These authors found that fewer Slovaks agreed that there was ‘no real alternative to democracy’ than in Russia, Ukraine, Czech Republic and Hungary.\footnote{181}

\footnote{178 This was also true for Hungary, but less so for the Czech Republic or Poland, Fritz Plasser, Peter Ulram and Harald Waldrauch, \textit{Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 77-79.}


\footnote{180 Lawrence Rose et al., 96.}

The greater prevalence of anti-democratic values and the weaker tradition of democracy may prove to be a factor in the struggle with democracy during Slovakia's transition. In terms of civil society, Slovakia has been shown to have a significantly lower level of civil society organizations than its neighbours. Although this analysis will not compare Slovak political culture and civil society with that of its neighbours, political culture may prove to be a factor in the significant discrepancy of civil society among the Visegrad countries. Instead this analysis will observe whether political culture may prove to have influenced civil society within Slovakia. Firstly, this chapter examines the national political culture in Slovakia during the 1990s through public opinion polls. Secondly, this chapter will investigate the political values of political party adherents in order to examine sub-national political cultures.

**Political Culture and Values in Slovakia in the 1990s**

*Political Attitudes Toward Civil Society*

Attitudes toward civil society in Slovakia have not changed throughout the course of the 1990s. Annual studies conducted by the FOCUS agency under Zora Bútorová provide a comprehensive assessment of political values in Slovakia throughout the 1990s. Firstly, what do Slovaks perceive as the benefits of democracy? Public opinion polls illustrate that interpretations of the purpose of democracy mostly favour social and material rights over the rights to political participation. In 1994, the most essential guarantees of democracy for most Slovaks were "the guarantee to meet the basic economic needs of the people" (42%); the guarantee of "personal freedom, and the opportunity of one's self-realization" (21%); and "a justice system that treats everyone equally" (18%). In contrast, the freedom to criticize the government, the right to choose
one’s representatives in the elections, and the guarantee of two strong political parties each garnered 3% or less.\footnote{Zora Bútorová and Martin Bútora, eds. \textit{Current Problems of Slovakia: December 1994} (Bratislava: FOCUS, 1994), 54.} Likewise, the question should be asked what rights are important to Slovaks and to what extent do they value their democratic rights to participate. Clearly it may be assumed that the extent of importance of these rights might affect the level of civil society.

In Slovakia social rights are visibly more valued than political rights. From 1994 to 2001, the right to health care was deemed as ‘the most important civic right’. This was followed by, in order of importance, the right to equality before the law, the right to social security, the right to work, and the right to personal safety. In contrast, political rights to participation, such as the right to form an organization or an association, consistently received the lowest evaluation of importance. Interestingly the rights that are perceived as the most important in Slovakia are exactly those that Slovaks believe to be the least respected in society. For example, the right to work had the largest discrepancy between its importance to Slovak citizens, and the degree to which it was believed to be respected in Slovakia. In fact, almost all of the above rights were perceived to be important but not well respected in Slovakia. The only exceptions were the right to form an organization or association, and the right to form a political party. Respondents claimed that both these rights were more respected in Slovakia than their importance warranted.\footnote{Bútorová, Gyarfášová, et al. \textit{Citizen's Participation 2001}, 11-14.} These results compliment other studies that have claimed that Slovaks value social and material rights over political rights.\footnote{This was also true for Hungary, but less so for the Czech Republic or Poland, Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch, 77-79.} Nevertheless, the
importance of these results is that they illustrate the steady reverence for social rights over political rights in Slovakia. In Slovakia, the most important attributes of democracy are those that provide social and material benefits. In contrast, the rights that guarantee political participation have proven to be the least important to Slovaks.

Efficacy, Knowledge or Interest in Politics

Feelings of efficacy and knowledge or interest in politics belong to those values that are thought to be supportive of democracy and public participation. Arguably, individuals who believe their actions will be futile are less likely to engage in political participation, particularly the active type necessary in civil society. The same may be assumed of the level of knowledge and interest in politics. Knowledge and interest in politics have often been examined against the stability of democracy. More notably, it has been used to evaluate the strength of a civic culture.\textsuperscript{185} Given the expected communist legacies of apathy and civic hopelessness, these values may also influence participation in civil society.

Although, a public opinion poll conducted in 1998 found that 34\% of respondents stated that more citizen activity was needed to solve domestic issues in Slovakia, a feeling of inefficacy and civic helplessness has been dominant in Slovakia.\textsuperscript{186} In 1994, 74\% of respondents admitted that they would not be able to defend themselves if the government or parliament adopted decisions which harmed their interests.\textsuperscript{187} The same study for 2001 showed that only 19\% of respondents answered this question positively.

\textsuperscript{185} For example, Putnam measured newspaper readership and informed referendum voting to assess the level of political interest to differentiate the levels of 'civicism' in Italy's regions in \textit{Making Democracy Work}.
\textsuperscript{187} Bútorová et al., \textit{Current Problems} 1994, 35.
and stated that, "they would find a way to defend their interests if the government or parliament adopted decisions that would harm their interests."\textsuperscript{188}

The annual studies conducted by the FOCUS agency have also monitored interest in politics. Polls conducted in 1994 and 2001 show a slight decrease in the percentage of respondents who claimed to be 'definitely or rather interested in politics.' The percentage of those who claimed to be interested in politics decreased from approximately half of respondents in 1994, to below half (41%) in 2001.\textsuperscript{189} This amount correlates with a different poll conducted in the same year that measured the level of interest in political participation. In 1994, a poll conducted revealed that 49% of respondents claimed that they were interested in participating in solving public problems (at the national level). The interest was more pronounced at the municipal level (62%).\textsuperscript{190}

In January 1995, the then government published its political programme in the newspapers. Of the 55% of respondents who claimed knowledge of the program only 10% stated that they were acquainted with it in detail. Furthermore, fifteen percent stated that they were not interested.\textsuperscript{191} Thus, the levels of interest in politics or solving political problems have remained stable. Roughly half of citizens stated that they were interested in this type of behaviour. However, feelings of inefficacy might temper this interest. The belief that the individual may affect change has not increased despite ten years of democracy in Slovakia.

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid. 19-25.
\textsuperscript{190} Názory 5:1 (1994), 27.
\textsuperscript{191} Názory 6:1 (1995), 60.
Trust

The relationship between trust and democratization and, in particular civil society, has claimed a significant audience in the debate on civil society. In the *Civic Culture*, Almond and Verba related civic cooperation and the tendency to form associations with interpersonal trust.¹⁹² Robert Putnam revisited the relationship between trust and civil society in *Making Democracy Work*. In this study, he concluded that the civic community was more entrenched in regions that had inherited social capital. For the purpose of this study, it is important to note that one of the measurements that Putnam employed to assess the civic community was the density of civic associations. Furthermore, he correlated “social capital,” that is social trust, and norms and networks of reciprocity, with the density of civic associations. Although Putnam concludes that the relationship between social trust and voluntary associations is reciprocal, Kenneth Newton suggests that, “the strongest path probably runs from trusting to joining associations.”¹⁹³ Thus, it is expected that levels of trust may be reflected in civil society.

In their study of political values in East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, Miller et al. found that interpersonal trust was similarly high throughout their study area. Their results showed that in Slovakia, 78% of respondents stated that they had trust in ‘most ordinary people.’¹⁹⁴ Despite this poll, however, other polls indicate that the political and social atmosphere has remained strained in Slovakia throughout the 1990s. In early 1992, 54% of respondents disagreed with the statement, “today every citizen can express his opinion without fear of his existence.” Although in 1993 this

¹⁹² Almond and Verba, 284-300.
¹⁹³ Newton, 207.
¹⁹⁴ Miller et al., 101.
number decreased slightly to 46%, this trend has not continued throughout the remainder of the decade.¹⁹₅ For example, in 1994 52% expressed fear in talking about politics in public, and stated that “it was best not to do so, or only with a narrow group of people.”¹⁹₆ In 1998, the percentage of respondents who stated that they would not speak about politics to anyone, or only a narrow circle raised to 55%. A significantly higher amount (58%) stated that it was best to avoid politics because of the risk that you may get into trouble.¹⁹⁷ The fear to share one’s opinion in public should be considered to be significant as it inherently suggests a lack of societal trust.

In addition to the level of interpersonal trust, trust in institutions may also affect the levels of civil society. Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch argue that trust in institutions in addition to providing information on specific institutions, is also a measurement of widespread support for democracy. They postulate that, “if the level of confidence in predominantly hierarchic and authoritarian institutions (armed forces) differs greatly than that in institutions of political culture and/or pluralist politics, liberal-democratic consensus is likely to be shaky.”¹⁹⁸ Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer found in their survey that the highest levels of trust in the post-1989 regimes are expressed for the church and the army, non-political institutions. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer also correlate trust levels in the new political institutions with favourable support for democracy.¹⁹⁹ The most trusted public institution in Slovakia has been the Slovak army throughout the 1990s. In 1998 trust in the army was 74%. In addition to the army, the church has also commanded a

¹⁹⁸ Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch, 111.
¹⁹⁹ Richard Rose et al., 155.
consistently high level of trust throughout the 1990s. In contrast, trust in democratic institutions has been significantly lower. In March 1995, 39% of respondents stated they trusted the Slovak government.\textsuperscript{200} [Appendix 7: Figure 3]

Because trust in public and political institutions are subject to the public’s evaluation of their performance, it should be assumed that the levels of trust in these institutions are somewhat affected by political developments and the popularity or success of the economic reforms. This is particularly true in the post-communist countries, which embarked upon radical changes. However, the Slovak case reveals somewhat static levels of support for certain institutions despite the significant change in government brought by the 1998 elections.

\textit{Attitudes Toward Authority}

Attitudes toward authority are also often measured in political culture studies. Larry Diamond states, “dispositions toward authority drive to the very heart of what democracy is about.”\textsuperscript{201} The prevalence of values which prefer greater authority and rule with a “firm hand” and thus less plurality in the decision making process are interpreted to reveal a stronger affinity toward authoritarian rule.\textsuperscript{202} For example, in their examination of general value orientations in East Central Europe, Lawrence Rose et al., examine liberal versus paternalistic value orientations. They argue that liberal values support the idea that individuals are autonomous and should participate in the decision-making process. In contrast, paternalistic orientations mostly “assign most if not all social

\textsuperscript{200} Názory 11:3 (2000), 32; Názory 8:3 (1997), 26; Názory 5:1 (1994), 64.
\textsuperscript{201} Diamond, \textit{Developing Democracy}, 167.
\textsuperscript{202} Other authors have identified support for a strong leader as an ‘alternative to democracy,’ see Richard Rose et al, 113.
competencies and responsibilities to an elite."203 In the early years of independent Slovakia, Slovak scholars marked a clear susceptibility of Slovak society to strong leaders. Another trait noticed among Slovak scholars was the strong paternalistic values of Slovaks. Or, as one Slovak scholar noted, the Slovak political scene might best be characterized, "not as one dominated by a 'left' and 'right' divide, but as a political spectrum between the extremes of paternalism and liberalism."204 Given the noticeable historical tradition of authoritarianism in Slovakia, the extent to which authoritarian values are prevalent in Slovak political culture is important as authoritarian values might both inhibit democratization and participation in civil society.

Through the sociological studies conducted by the FOCUS agency, it is possible to assess certain values toward authority from 1994 to 2001. Bútorová et al., asserted that the level of a democratic political culture increased during the period 1994-1997, but has since remained fixed. On the other hand, the proportion of respondents supporting the statement, "decisiveness and the firm hand of a strong personality is important," was the same in 1994 and 2001 (26%). Although this statement received less support from 1995 to 1998, it has increased in the last few years. [Appendix 8: Tables 14 and 15] On the other hand, the FOCUS sociological surveys also revealed that certain democratic values have taken hold in Slovakia throughout the 1990s. For example, support for the statement, "a politician should never break the law," has increased from 66% in 1994 to

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203 Lawrence Rose et al., 52.
73% in 2000.\textsuperscript{205} [Appendix 8: Table 15] However, although the attitude toward the legal accountability of politicians has increased, strong leadership remains an important value.

The public opinion polls collected throughout the 1990s in Slovakia illustrate that many of the values and orientations that might inhibit participation in civil society can be found in Slovak political culture and that the prevalence of these values has largely remained constant. Social rights have continuously been favoured over political rights in Slovakia. Feelings of inefficacy have been prevalent since 1994. Interpersonal trust appears strained by the fear of sharing one’s political views in public. And finally, a significant proportion of Slovaks value a strong leader and firm hand rule. Slovak political culture, then, has shown both a significant tendency toward authoritarian values and a prevalence of values that would inhibit civil society. Moreover, these values have remained stable over the past ten years. However, several studies in Slovakia have also unveiled that values supporting authoritarianism are more readily found among certain party adherents.

**Political Values and Party Adherents in Slovakia**

As a method of examining sub-national political cultures, this thesis will firstly investigate the prevalence of authoritarian orientations among certain political party adherents in Slovakia. Several studies have argued that political parties in Slovakia have failed to evolve along a left-right spectrum. For example, divisions in economic policies are not always clear. Due to the economic difficulty, which ensued in Slovakia after 1989, many parties have adopted a protectionist stance to the economy, and thus

cleavages along economic lines are not the predominant factors influencing party
cleavages. Instead, many analysts have argued that the strongest political cleavages
among Slovak political parties are related to democracy, and the rule of law. Frequently,
the terms, “non-standard” or “non-democratic” were used to describe the parties of the
former coalition, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the Slovak National
Party (SNS) and their former coalition partner the Association of Workers of Slovakia
(ZRS).\footnote{See Gould and Szomolanyi; and Mesežníkov, “Domestic Political Developments,” in \textit{Global Report 1995}, 20.} Throughout its tenure, the coalition repeatedly took actions that placed its
commitment to democracy in question. Moreover, public opinion polls have illustrated
that the strongest cleavages in political culture occur along party adherents, and party
adherents of the HZDS, SNS and ZRS have exhibited an affiliation to authoritarian
values and less support for democratic values.

Secondly, this thesis will establish that distinctive patterns of party support exist
in certain areas throughout Slovakia. Thus it is likely, but not certain, that non-
democratic values are more prevalent in areas, which have exhibited continuous support
for the HZDS. This thesis will employ electoral results in order to establish the areas in
Slovakia where the HZDS has received strong and continual support. This method of
measuring sub-national political cultures is necessitated by the absence of public opinion
poll data at the district level.

Like many of Slovakia’s political parties, the political and ideological position of
the HZDS is difficult to ascertain. Members of the former Public Against Violence
(VPN) formed the HZDS in the spring of 1991. The party’s establishment was a direct
result of Mečiar’s ousting from his leadership position of VPN. Throughout the 1990s,
the HZDS has been the largest and the most popular party in Slovakia. It is a broad,
centrist, and populist party, which has avidly portrayed itself as a party for the ‘every’
man. Consequently, to its detractors, it has failed to announce an explicit platform and
has instead focused on maintaining power. Tim Haughton has argued that the HZDS
“has developed an ideology and support base grounded on managed economic reform, a
rhetoric and concern for those who lost out from the process of marketisation, a national
accent and the charisma and personality of its leader and founder.”

Consequently, the HZDS has attracted an above average support from voters with primary education, voters
over 55 years, and voters from more rural areas.

In contrast to the HZDS, the remaining two parties of the former government
cohesion, the SNS and ZRS, have appealed directly to smaller constituencies. The SNS
is the most nationalist party in Slovakia, and has exhibited the strongest nationalist and
anti-minority stance throughout Slovakia’s transition. Mesežníkov described the SNS as
a “single issue” party, that is, the Hungarian minority. The most discernible trait of the
SNS is its exclusive appeal to ethnic Slovaks. The SNS mostly attracted support from
younger followers (between 18-34). In terms of education, the SNS showed low-level
support from those with a university education. The ZRS also adopted a platform that
appealed to a smaller constituency. The ZRS, an extreme leftist party which split from
the SDL claimed to represent the interests of those individuals most affected by the

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207 Tim Haughton, “HZDS: The Ideology, Organisation and Support Base of Slovakia’s Most Successful
Party,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53:5 (2001), 745-769, 763; Haughton detailed study of the HZDS also
illustrates that it has been the largest party in Slovakia throughout the 1990s. For example, he notes that
while in 1999, the HZDS had 73 000 members, its counterparts; the SDL (21 223), the SNS (13 000) and
the KDH (27 348) had significantly fewer members, see table 759.

208 Zora Bútorová, Oľga Gyárfášová, and Marián Velšic, “Public Opinion,” in *Slovakia 1998-1999*, 137-
166, 147-149.

economic costs of transition. In 1995, it was reported that the ZRS received significant support from individuals with primary education.\textsuperscript{210} Although the parties of the government coalition from 1994-1998 had separate platforms, they generally exhibited, albeit to varying degrees, anti-western, anti-reform, and pro-Slovak positions. Furthermore, due to their actions while in government, their commitment to democracy and the rule of law became questionable.

In contrast the parties, which constitute the current government have often been labeled as the ‘democratic’ parties, and in comparison, party adherents of the current government coalition parties are significantly more oriented toward democratic values. The largest component of the current government coalition, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), which formed itself as a party in 1998 to counter changes to the electoral law imposed by the Mečiar government, is mostly a union of social and Christian democrats. The SDK consists of the Christian Democratic Union (KDH), the Democratic Party (DS), the Democratic Union (DU), the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS), and the Greens Party of Slovakia (SZS). Generally, these parties espouse a center-right orientation. As the opposition forces from 1994-1998, they generally criticized the government’s privatization policies, and its failure to adhere to democratic rules. Although the platforms of the KDH, DU, and DS vary in degrees of social liberalism, they promote economic liberalism. However, the SDSS, which espouses a social democratic platform, and the Greens Party, which advocates largely centrist values, are exceptions to the economic liberalism of the SDK. The odd union of

\textsuperscript{210} The ZRS failed to meet the threshold in the 1998 elections, and is thus no longer represented in parliament. For this reason, many of the more recent public opinion polls do not include the ZRS in their evaluations, Bútorová et al. Current Problems 1995-1996, 49-50.
the SDK was precipitated by the desire to defeat Mečiar in the 1998 elections. Despite their various political platforms, the parties of the SDK support western integration, and employed the rhetoric of adherence to democracy and the rule of law to justify their union. In contrast to the HZDS, the SDK attracted support from more educated voters. It was also more successful in urban areas, particularly in the Slovakia’s two biggest cities, Bratislava and Košice.

The remaining parties of the current government coalition are the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK), the Party of the Democratic Left, and the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP). The SMK, a coalition of three smaller Hungarian parties, is essentially an ethnic party, and therefore, the most dominant characteristic of SMK supporters is their Hungarian ethnicity. The SMK generally promotes the values of the SDK on most social and economic policies, and strongly advocates western integration and regional cooperation. The SDL, the former communist party, and the SOP are both left wing parties. Although their platforms advocate economic protection of the weaker social groups, these parties also support western integration. Like the SDK, the SDL has an above average number of university-educated supporters. The SOP on the other hand attracted above average support from younger voters (under 35).211 However, despite the various left, right and center orientations espoused by the present government coalition, their cooperation was reasoned in the shared desire to prevent the HZDS from seizing the elections in 1998. These parties also endorsed the rule of law and democracy, and western integration.212

Similar to the polarization of the political elites, several studies have illustrated that there is a significant distinction in attitudes toward democracy between party adherents. In 1994, Bútorová et al., found that "typical of adherents of all three parties of the ruling coalition (then SNS-ZRS-HZDS) is a rather low identification with democratic principles in politics." Among HZDS supporters, authoritarian values were particularly visible. Furthermore, the prevalence of authoritarian values among HZDS supporters has remained unchanging throughout the 1990s. In their study, Slovensko pred vol'hami, Bútorová and Gyárfášová, showed that SDK and MK supporters exhibited the strongest affiliation to democratic principles. In contrast, HZDS supporters revealed the lowest attachment to democratic values. For example, Bútorová and Gyárfášová found that approximately half of HZDS party supporters agreed with the statements, "a politician, when aiming for the good of the public, may sometimes disrespect the law," and, "every government should direct and control television, radio and newspapers."

Furthermore, almost 60% of HZDS supporters agreed that once a politician won the elections, he/she should have all the power in his/her hands. On the other hand, only 15% of supporters of the SDK agreed with this statement. These assertions are strengthened by various public opinions polls conducted at different times during the last ten years which demonstrate that these values are stable among party adherents.

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215 For example, Bútorová et al., who conduct yearly public opinion studies (often with the same questions) have continually revealed clear differences in political values between party adherents. In their 1995 study, the authors stated that the "key cleavage between parties of the ruling coalition (HZDS-SNS-ZRS) and the opposition parties is different understanding in political principals." According to their own calculations based on responses to the many of the questions mentioned above, the authors concluded that in 1995, only 25% of HZDS supporters identified with democratic principles. In contrast identification with democratic
In January 1999, public opinion polls conducted by IVO revealed the continuation of value differentiation between party adherents of the ruling coalition (SDK, SDL, SOP, SMK) and the opposition (HZDS, SNS). In a statement designed to assess authoritarian values, “patient negotiations are important to politics,” 60% of supporters of the ruling coalition agreed. In comparison only 35% of the supporters of the opposition agreed with this statement. In contrast, 37% of opposition supporters were in agreement with the second statement, “decisiveness and the firm hand of strong personality are important.” Significantly fewer supporters (14%) of the ruling coalition agreed with the second statement. Furthermore, significantly more supporters (28%) of the opposition (HZDS and SNS) than the ruling coalition (19%) agreed with the statement “in the interest of the people, a politician can sometimes break the law.” Opposition supporters were also less likely to agree with statement “a politician should never break the law.” Whereas 77% of ruling coalition supporters agreed with this statement, 65% of opposition supporters agreed.\(^{216}\) Furthermore, similar results were found in complimentary polls throughout the 1990s.

In March 1994, political party supporters were asked which traits, abilities and qualifications instilled their trust in politicians. Political attributes, which may be considered conducive to democratic governance (e.g., the willingness to negotiate, the ability to take into account differing opinions, and patience and tolerance) were rated significantly lower among supporters of the HZDS than the Slovak national average. For example, 18% of Slovak respondents rated the willingness to negotiate with partners as

an important trait while only 9% of HZDS supporters did. HZDS supporters were also below the national average with respect to the ability to take into account different opinions (HZDS-11% and Slovak Republic (SR)-18%), and patience and tolerance (SR-11% and HZDS-8%). Furthermore, 'stronger qualities' in a political leader were far more respected by HZDS supporters than the Slovak average. For example, HZDS supporters chose decisiveness (24%) and directness (27%) more often than the national average (16% and 15%, respectively).²¹⁷

The most recent FOCUS sociological survey demonstrates the continuity of values among party adherents. Although there are clear differences between the socio-demographic profiles of party adherents between the current ruling coalition (SDK, SOP, SDL, SMK) and the opposition (HZDS, SNS), the inter-party comparison of these factors are less distinct. For example in 2001, the shares of young supporters that the SDKU and the SNS attracted were comparable (38% and 35%, respectively). Furthermore the support from older citizens (over 55) was similar for the KDH and HZDS (42% and 44%, respectively). In terms of educational levels, the SDKU, SDL and KDH have the highest shares of supporters with university education (23%, 14% and 11%, respectively). However the KDH (45%) has a similar share of support from individuals with primary education as the HZDS (46%). Furthermore, the SMK has the lowest share of university-educated supporters (3%). The 2001 study showed that democratic values were most frequently found among political party adherents of the SMK and SDKU.²¹⁸ On the other

²¹⁸ The Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) is the successor party of the SDK. The latter was formed as a temporary arrangement and will cease to exist with the end of its mandate. The SDKU is a new political party, which has absorbed many of the center-right political forces in SDK. The
hand the lowest support for democratic values were found among adherents of the SNS (35%) and HZDS (30%). In addition the highest support for non-democratic values are also found among adherents of these two parties: SNS (13%) and HZDS (18%). Bútorová et al. repeated in 2001 that the, “crucial cleavage between supporters of the ruling coalition and the supporters of the opposition are determined by their political culture.” Moreover, public opinion polls have also revealed distinct party preference among Slovakia’s regions.

In April 1999, a regional breakdown of sympathies to political parties revealed that the HZDS was the most popular party in six of Slovakia’s eight regions: Trenčín, Nitra, Žilina, Banská Bystrica, Prešov and Košice. Of these regions, the HZDS received its highest percentage of support in the regions of Trenčín (26%) and Prešov (25%). In contrast, the SDK was the most popular party in the regions of Bratislava and Trnava. [Appendix 9: Table 16] A series of public opinion polls that measured the regional variation of party adherence from 1999 and 2000 revealed that the HZDS was the most popular party in the regions of Trenčín, Prešov and Žilina. In contrast, the HZDS received its lowest share of support in the regions of Bratislava, Trnava and Košice. These polls suggest continuous above average support for the HZDS in certain regions. The regions of Trenčín, Prešov and Žilina have shown above average support for the

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219 Bútorová et al., measured democratic values in Slovakia through the responses to questions concerning: economic prosperity and democracy; obedience of the law; disposition toward authority; pluralism; minority rights, the propagation of ethnic intolerance; and freedom of the media, *Citizen’s Participation 2001*, 27-30.
HZDS. For example, in April 1999, surveys showed that Vladimír Mečiar was the most trusted politician in the regions of Trenčín, Žilina, and Prešov.\textsuperscript{220} [Appendix 9: Table 16]

The regional composition of party support is reinforced by polls on trust levels conducted in 1998 and 1999. In January 1998, 33\% of those polled trusted the government of the Slovak Republic. The highest amount of trust in the government (the HZDS-SNS-ZRS government) was recorded in Trnava (41\%), Trenčín (41\%) and Prešov (35\%). On the other hand the lowest levels of trust were found in the regions of Košice (24\%) and Banská Bystrica (26\%). Similar levels of trust were found in the regions with respect to the National Council of the Slovak Republic. The region of Trenčín showed the strongest support with 41\%, while Košice (26\%), Banská Bystrica (27\%) and Bratislava (27\%) recorded the lowest levels of support. Interestingly, although the overall trust in the institution of president (36\%) was relatively low in 1998, the lowest percentage of trust for the institution of president among Slovakia’s regions was recorded in Trenčín (20\%). Given the openly hostile relationship between the Slovak Prime Minister and President, it may not be surprising that the lowest share of trust in the president came from Trenčín, a region which has continually showed above average support for the HZDS.\textsuperscript{221}

The illustration of distinct patterns of significant party support in Slovakia’s regions is strengthened by the significant change in the regional distribution of trust levels, which accompanied the change in government in 1998. Surveys in March 1999 revealed that 50\% of respondent had trust in the post-1998 government. The region of

\textsuperscript{220} Názory 10:1 (1999), 30.  
Bratislava (64%) displayed the highest support for the government, followed by Nitra (60%). In contrast, the lowest levels of support were found in the regions of Trenčín (36%) and Prešov (38%).\textsuperscript{222} The public opinion polls conducted at the regional level reinforce that, in terms of cleavages in political culture and democratic values, authoritarian values could be seen as more predominant in the regions with lengthy support of the HZDS. However, there is a lack of public opinion polls conducted at the district level. For this reason, election results will be examined in order to ascertain the prevalence of authoritarian values at the district level which will then be examined against civil society density in Slovakia’s districts.

To be sure, this type of measurement is not without its problems. Firstly, it requires the author to make an ecological inference based on assumptions on party adherents in Slovakia’s regions. For example, it is impossible to know whether those HZDS supporters who display authoritarian values are located proportionately throughout Slovakia, or whether they are concentrated in a particular area. Secondly, the most accessible manner in which to measure regional patterns of party support is through election results. Measuring voting results is also not without its problems. Citizens vote for many reasons, and for a variety of reasons individuals may not necessarily vote for the party with which they most identify or normally support. However, an examination of the Slovak 1994 and 1998 parliamentary elections, and the 1999 presidential elections, which posed Vladimír Mečiar against Rudolf Schuster, demonstrate significantly stable political preferences among Slovakia’s districts. In addition, Slovak scholar Vladimír Krivý has noted that, “the regional and local results of HZDS shows its long-term success

\textsuperscript{222} Názory 10:1 (1999), 12.
to be strongly connected with the past success of the Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party (HSLS) in the 1920s and 1930s.\textsuperscript{223} This suggests that political party support in certain regions is deeply entrenched in regional political cultures. Furthermore, in addition to the regional breakdown of public opinion polls that examine political support, regional variations in political trust and the admiration of certain political characteristics strengthen the assertion that political culture may be differentiated along Slovakia’s regions. For example, a January 1998 poll conducted in the region of Trenčín, where the HZDS has continually received above average, revealed that 33% of respondents believed that a strong leader would solve domestic problems best. In comparison, the Slovak national average of respondents who believed that a strong leader was needed to solve domestic issues was 23%\textsuperscript{224} Therefore, with these caveats in mind, this thesis will assess regional political cultures by the patterns of electoral support in Slovakia’s regions and districts. Furthermore, this thesis will also infer that those areas which have higher levels of support for the HZDS will have higher incidence of authoritarian values, which in turn, will impact civil society.

Although HZDS’ electoral support has slightly diminished throughout the 1990s- the most notable affect being the loss of the 1998 elections- Mečiar and the HZDS remain the most popular party in Slovakia. Despite the success of the Democratic Coalition, the HZDS was the strongest party in the majority of districts in the 1998 elections. At the regional level, the HZDS had the highest percentage of votes in the regions of Žilina, Banská Bystrica, Prešov, Trenčín and Nitra. An examination of the share of HZDS votes

\textsuperscript{224} Názory, 9:1 (1998), 17.
in relation to other political parties exhibits the unambiguous dominance of the HZDS in certain regions. [Appendix 12: Figure 12]

During the 1998 parliamentary elections, the regions of Trenčín and Žilina provided the strongest electoral support to the current opposition (HZDS and SNS). In the region of Trenčín, the HZDS received its highest percentage of support (40.65%). The combined electoral support of the HZDS and SNS was 53.26%. In stark contrast, only 20.01% of the votes in 1998 elections went to the SDK. The HZDS received its second largest proportion of support (37.7%) in Žilina. Furthermore, the HZDS-SNS combination of support in the region of Žilina actually exceeded Trenčín with 53.6%. Support for the SDK was significantly lower with 21.52% in the Žilina region. The third most successful region for the HZDS was Prešov with 30.56%. Furthermore, the overall electoral majority went to the HZDS and SNS in the regions of Žilina and Trenčín. In Žilina the HZDS and SNS received 53.6% of votes, while the coalition received 39.66%. [Appendix 9: Figure 9] Furthermore, in contrast to the districts and regions that have continually supported the HZDS and SNS parties, there have also been regions and districts that have continually shown relatively weak support for the HZDS. The lowest support for the HZDS and the strongest support for the government coalition in the 1998 parliamentary elections was found in the regions of Bratislava and Košice. All of the districts of the Bratislava region awarded more votes to the SDK than any other parties in the 1998 elections. Furthermore, the lowest levels of support for the HZDS and

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SNS and the highest support for the democratic coalition have been found in Bratislava and Košice.

An examination of both public opinion polls and the 1998 electoral results reveal distinct patterns of HZDS support throughout Slovakia. Public opinion polls have also illustrated a significantly higher prevalence of authoritarian values among HZDS supporters than supporters of the current government coalition. This thesis will infer that regions with higher levels of HZDS supporters will also have higher levels of authoritarian values. Through this assumption, this thesis is enabled to test its initial hypothesis, that is, that political culture will impact civil society.
Chapter V: Socio-Economic Dislocation and its Effects on Civil Society

The effects of economic and social dislocation on democratization and public levels of participation have often been studied. For example, Putnam states that, "empirically speaking, few generalizations are more firmly established than that effective democracy is correlated with socioeconomic modernization". Although, through his assertion that "civicsness" leads to economic growth and progress, Putnam, suggests that civil society organizations will influence economic development and not vice versa, this thesis will examine socio-economic factors as an independent variable to the development of civil society. Many studies have correlated the relationship between wealth and a participatory ethos in general, and civic associations in particular.

Furthermore, many authors have stated that the socio-economic dislocation caused by the dual transition in post-communist countries will have a direct effect on the level of civic participation, and thus the strength of civil society. In specific, Daniel Nelson has stated that the socio-economic effects of the transition to market economy will be the most influential factor in the growth of civil society. The economic hardship and dislocation incurred from transition will weaken commitment to participatory democracy and thus, civil society. This hypothesis rests in the assumption that individuals who have incurred significant costs from the economic transition in post-communist countries, and have suffered a loss of economic security will be less apt to be committed to participation, and thus civil society. Primarily, these individuals will be more concerned with private concerns. Furthermore, these individuals who have sustained considerable

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226 Putnam, 84.
227 See chapter I of this thesis for more discussion; Nie and Verba, "Political Participation..." 1-75.
228 Nelson, 345-368.
economic dislocation through the transition process may not possess the means to become publicly engaged.

Since 1993, the Slovak Republic has embarked upon economic reforms that have created economic hardships for many segments of the population. Like other post-communist countries, the legacy of the communist economic system left deep structural problems that have posed great difficulty and have had great effects on the citizens in transition. The Slovak economy has received positive evaluations from foreign observers recently, and has figured more positively than once expected. In 1998, the World Bank argued that Slovakia, "has registered one of the best macro-economic performances in Central Europe, in sharp contrast to the economic collapse predicted by many observers at the time of independence." In 2000, according to OECD data, Slovakia's per capita GDP was 11,400 USD. In comparison with other Visegrad countries, Slovakia's per capita GDP was higher than Poland (9,300 USD) and slightly below Hungary (12,200 USD) and the Czech Republic (14,000 USD). In addition, GDP in Slovakia has shown positive growth since 1994. The growth rate from 1992 to 2000 for Slovakia was 4.2%. In comparison from 1991 to 2000 the growth in Hungary was 2.4%, in Poland 3.8% and in Czech Republic -0.2%.

Furthermore, annual inflation in consumer prices has generally been lower in Slovakia than in Hungary and Poland. From 1999 to 2000 consumer prices in Slovakia increased 8.4% compared to Hungary (10.1%), Poland (8.6%) and the Czech Republic (3.9%). The Slovak Republic has been relatively successful in keeping inflation down throughout the 1990s. With the exception of 1991 and 1993, generally inflation rates in

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Slovakia have been lower in comparison with those experienced in Hungary and Poland, and in this regard they have remained closer to that experienced in the Czech Republic.\textsuperscript{231} That certain macro-economic indicators place Slovakia’s current economic status close to that of its Visegrad partners is optimistic. However, Slovakia still falls behind its neighbours in other areas. Due to its unstable political environment, Slovakia has failed to attract the foreign investment that its neighbours have. The most acute economic, and consequently, social problem has been unemployment.

In addition to having a higher unemployment rate than the Czech Republic (8.8%), Hungary (7.0%) and Poland (10.5%), Slovakia (16.3%) had the highest unemployment rate of all OECD countries at the beginning of 1999.\textsuperscript{232} Furthermore, the unemployment situation has been exasperated by the austerity packages and economic reforms introduced by the new government in the spring of 1999. By the end of 1999, the unemployment rate had grown to 19.2%. Moreover, unemployment rates are disproportionately dispersed throughout Slovakia. Whereas wealthy areas such as Bratislava and its surrounding areas had unemployment rates as low as 4.6% in 2001, other areas had rates well over 30%.\textsuperscript{233} Within Slovakia, then, the socio-economic dislocation has been felt unevenly throughout the transition period.

\textsuperscript{231} With the exceptions of price liberalization in 1991 and the introduction of the VAT in 1993, inflation has remained around 10% in Slovakia (similar to that in the Czech lands, whereas Hungary and Poland have experienced inflation rates in the early 1990s well over 20%, see the World Bank, Slovak Republic); and Karol Morvay, “Overall Macroeconomic Development,” in Economic Policy in Slovakia 1990-1999, eds. Anton Marcinčin and Miroslav Beblavý (Bratislava: INEKO, 2000), 19-61.
\textsuperscript{232} Data for Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland from OECD in Figures: 2001 Edition; data on Slovakia from Staťistická Ročenka Slovenskej republiky (Statistical Yearbook of the Slovak Republic) (Bratislava: SUSR, 2000), 37.
\textsuperscript{233} Vybrané údaje o regionoch v Slovenskej republike, 1:2001 (Bratislava: SUSR, 2001), 40-41.
Among Slovakia's regions and districts there are significant divergences in economic development after 1989. In this manner the regional disparities in Slovakia provide a direct method of examining the effects of socio-economic dislocation on civil society in Slovakia. Because this thesis assumes that individuals who have suffered more economically than others will be less likely to engage in social and public activities, it conjectures that there will be a correlation between districts which show extensive economic dislocation and the aggregate levels of per capita civil society organizations. Similar to its approach toward political culture and political values, this thesis recognizes its limitations and that it will infer from aggregate level data, individual level behaviour. However, the costs of Slovakia's economic transition and the considerable variations in economic indicators among Slovakia's districts warrant such an examination.

The Slovak Economy and the Nature of Economic Transition

The Slovak Economy in the Czechoslovak Economy

Slovakia's transition to a market economy has been particularly challenging due to the nature of its historical development. Slovakia was essentially modernized under state socialism. In 1918, when the first Czechoslovakia was established, there were great disparities between the Slovak and Czech lands. Although Czechoslovakia is distinguishable from other Eastern European states during the inter-war period because of its advanced industrialization and urbanization, the modernization process had not begun in the Slovak lands. Slovakia belonged to the Hungarian territory of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which itself embarked upon industrialization late. When the process of industrialization did occur on the territory of Hungary, it transpired predominantly in
Budapest.234 Although in the early 1900s industry within the Slovak lands had begun to evolve, it was limited to certain areas and involved enterprises such as textiles and cotton. However, “large parts of the rural areas remained remote and only marginally affected by the modernizing process.”235 Furthermore, the Slovak lands belonged to the agricultural periphery of the empire and were thus mostly agrarian in 1918.

Education and literacy levels were significantly lower in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. Due to the intense policies of Magyarization, it was impossible to attain secondary and higher education in the Slovak language.236 This resulted in a relatively high illiteracy rate of 15% among Slovaks in 1921.237 Furthermore, some areas of Slovakia such as Carpatho-Ukraine had a disproportionately high level of illiteracy (50.1%).238 Increased educational opportunities in Slovakia during the inter-war period led to the eradication of Slovak illiteracy. However, the same progress was not seen in the economic situation in Slovakia.

Significant diversity in economic levels existed throughout the territory of the first Czechoslovakia. Overall, Czechoslovakia was relatively successful economically during the inter-war period. The national annual per capita GDP was 380 USD, only 20 USD less than that of Austria.239 Czechoslovakia was also the seventh most

236 Three Slovak language secondary schools were established in the 1860s but were closed in 1875. Furthermore, although there were approximately 2000 Slovak language primary schools in operation in 1869, this number decreased to 240 by 1912, Paul, 197.
industrialized economy in the world with approximately 35% of its population working in industry.\textsuperscript{240} However, industrial development was disproportionately represented in the Czech lands.

The Czech lands were largely industrial having been the industrial heartland of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Slovakia, in contrast, was still an, "agrarian country with islands of industry."\textsuperscript{241} In 1910, over 60% of Slovakia's population worked in the field of agriculture and forestry. In the Czech lands agriculture claimed 34.4% of employees.\textsuperscript{242} Slovakia was well behind the Czech lands in the development of modern agricultural production. For example, a ten-hectare farm in Slovakia produced roughly the same amount as a four-hectare farm in the Czech lands.\textsuperscript{243} The result of the non-modernized Slovak agricultural sector was that in the 1930s, while 36% of Czechoslovak agricultural land was found in the Slovak lands, the Slovak lands only contributed 23% of the country's total agricultural production. Further economic indictors illustrate more pervasive incongruities. During the First Republic, Slovakia administered only 7% of national capital, and contributed only 8% of national industrial production.\textsuperscript{244}

The difference in industrialization is clearly seen in the composition of employment within the Czech and Slovak lands. In Slovakia, 18.4% worked in manufacturing industry, building industry and crafts, whereas 39.6% of Czech employees worked in the industrial sector. The level of Slovaks employed in the industrial sector did not dramatically increase from 1910 to 1930. Less than 20% of the population worked in

\textsuperscript{240} Paul, 139.
\textsuperscript{242} Václav Průcha, "Economic Development and Relations 1918-89," in \textit{The End of Czechoslovakia}, 40-76, 43.
\textsuperscript{243} Průcha, 42.
the field of industry, while roughly 40% of Czech citizens worked in industry during this period. Like agriculture, Slovak industry faltered due to its inability to compete with Czech products. Much of the production and industrial growth that did occur were specialized adjunct products that complimented Czech industry. Thus despite the union with the Czech lands, the Slovak lands remained largely rural and based on agriculture throughout the First Republic.

The gaps in socio-economic levels between the Czech and Slovak lands caused many problems throughout the interwar period. "The economic crisis led to sharp social conflicts, storms, strikes and demonstrations." The economic disenchantment of the Slovaks was also partially responsible for increased nationalism and the advancement of the nationalist Hlinka’s People’s Party. During its independence, the Slovak economy was relatively prosperous. Industry, and in particular, the armaments industry flourished in Slovakia during the war and employment grew. However at the time of reunification in 1945, there were still great disparities between the Czech and Slovak lands. The eradication of these discrepancies was one of the aims that dominated communist economic policies, and thus led to much of Slovakia’s industrialization. In contrast, “modernization processes in Slovakia took place not only later than in the Czech lands, i.e. after 1918 with a rapid growth of the educational system, but also mainly during the socialist era and according to a Soviet model.” For example, the Czech lands

244 Liptak, 249.
245 Průcha, 43.
246 Liptak, 225.
247 Průcha, 57.
"ceased to be an agricultural society by the early 20th century, the Slovaks did so only in 1950s."\textsuperscript{248}

The legacies of the communist planned economy such as the controlled pricing systems, extensive industrial production and the consequential under developed service sector affected the transition of all post-communist states. In addition to these dilemmas, Czechoslovakia suffered from further disadvantages. The communist regime in Czechoslovakia was, in many ways, stricter than its neighbours and retained the Stalinist model. For example, unlike the situation on Poland, private ownership was essentially eliminated in Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, the period of normalization halted the reform process begun in 1968 and returned the country to rigid party control, preventing any type of reforms experienced in other communist states.\textsuperscript{249} The economy of Czechoslovakia under the communists focused on the production of producer goods, largely in the form of metallurgy and heavy industrial machinery. This sector increased from one-third of GDP before 1939, to over two-thirds in 1960. Czechoslovakia was also predominantly dependent on trade with other communist states, being second only to Bulgaria in terms of a supplier to the former communist markets.\textsuperscript{250} The economic restructuring implemented in the 1990s has largely been hindered by the specific experience of the Slovak lands during communism.

The intense industrialization of Slovakia after the Second World War was due to several factors. Ideologically, it was necessary for a communist country to have a predominantly worker population. Practically, the communist state wanted to eliminate

\textsuperscript{248} Musil, 78-79.
regional disparities between the Czech and Slovak lands while concentrating on heavy industry. The intense project to industrialize the Slovak lands included the transfer of industry from the Czech to the Slovak lands, the transfer of funds to Slovakia and steady industrialization in the Slovak lands, which continued into the 1980s. Due to the advanced economic level in the Czech lands at the outset of communism, Slovakia achieved greater growth during the communist period. In addition to production increase, the standard of living also increased dramatically during this period. For the most part the aim of congruence between the Slovak and Czech lands had been achieved by 1989. For example, in 1948, 59.8% of the workforce in Slovakia was employed in the agricultural sector. By 1989 this number had decreased to 12.6%. In contrast, these numbers for the Czech lands were 40.7% and 10.6%, respectively. The percentage of the labour force engaged in industry and construction also saw significant change in Slovakia under communism. In 1948, 21.3% of the Slovak labour force was engaged in this sector. By 1987, this number had increased to 44.3%.²⁵¹ By the end of the communist period Slovakia’s share in the workforce, and gross agricultural and industrial output was roughly equal to its proportion of the population. A close congruency between the average wages of the Czech and the Slovak lands was also attained. In 1948 Slovak average per capita income only equaled 60% of the Czech average. By 1988 Slovaks earned approximately 88% of the Czech average.²⁵² However, although the discrepancies between the Slovak and Czech lands at the end of communism were largely eradicated,

²⁵⁰ OECD, *Regional Problems*, 11-16.
²⁵¹ Wolchik, 188-9.
²⁵² See OECD, *Regional Problems*, 10; Smith and Průcha.
the legacy of the communist system on the transition to market economy was more pronounced in Slovakia.

*The Transition Economy*

The nature of the communist economic system and the rapid industrialization process made transition to a market economy particularly difficult for Slovakia. Because Slovakia was industrialized in the period following 1948, its industrial base was predominantly focussed on heavy industry and armaments. In comparison with the Czech lands, Slovakia had less diversity in its industrial production, and had a deeper reliance on Eastern markets. A differentiation between Czech and Slovak economic development appeared again during the post-communist transition as uneven effects of transition were felt in the two republics. For example, in 1992, unemployment in the Slovak lands was 11% over twice as high as the 5% unemployment rate in the Czech lands. Weaker support for market reforms and a stronger desire to maintain state responsibility for employment were found in Slovakia during the first few years of transition.\(^{253}\) Dissatisfaction was also higher in Slovakia. In 1992, 84% of Slovaks, compared to 68% of Czechs were dissatisfied with the economy.\(^ {254}\) The rapid course of market reforms adopted after 1989 was not as palatable to the Slovak population. This was particularly true of the decision to halt the production of armaments, which was predominantly located in the Slovak lands. The victory of the HZDS in the Slovak lands in 1992 illustrated the appeal of a specifically Slovak economic course. Indeed the rhetoric of the HZDS criticized the reform process as being one that was devised and

\(^{253}\) Smith, 257.

appropriate solely for Czechs. The HZDS, on the other hand, promoted a distinct
Slovak course. However, for the most part, the independent Slovak Republic continued
to administer the initial reform process, begun in 1989, in all areas with the exception of
privatization.²⁵⁵

The Slovak economy rebounded from recession in 1994 when it began to show
positive economic growth. Macro-economic indicators have portrayed a relatively
favourable illustration of the Slovak economy throughout the 1990s. For instance, GDP
has grown resulting in Slovakia finally surpassing its 1989 GDP in 1999, and inflation
has for the most part remained low, especially in comparison to its neighbours. However,
these macro-economic indicators have failed to depict problematic trends in the Slovak
economy, and the consequences of transition to the Slovak population. Firstly, the
economic policy during the period from 1994 to 1998 under the HZDS-SNS-ZRS
coalition has been described as the “stagnation of the transformation process,
postponement of the adoption of solutions to the most pressing problems, attempts to
strengthen the state’s role in steering economic development, soft budgetary restrictions
and an overall lack of clarity in the Government’s economic policy.”²⁵⁶ Although
Mečiar’s tenure resulted in a degree of positive growth, the badly needed restructuring of
the Slovak economy was delayed by political concerns. Furthermore, HZDS-SNS-ZRS
policies often flew in the face of market principles (authority over price regulation,
cronyism in privatization, etc.). The Mečiar regime had both overt and hidden
consequences for the Slovak economy. For instance, the political climate and economic

instability, primarily in the form of non-transparency and corruption in privatization, precluded sufficient foreign direct investment.

The government established in 1994 severely affected the privatization process. Immediately the process was slowed down, and the government altered the privatization law to secure its authority over all privatization processes through the National Property Fund (FNK). The results were that a “clientelist mode of abusing state authority (was) openly practiced in the privatization process.” Privatization scandals were common. Corruption and non-transparency were the norm in privatization. The results of this greatly affected the restructuring the economy, as competitiveness was reduced and the need to restructure the economy was avoided and thus prolonged. The repercussions of the 1994 government on the economic situation of Slovakia became apparent in 1998.

The victors of the 1998 elections were immediately public about the inherited state of the economy. Primarily, privatization was exposed for the scam that it was, and the serious state of the budget was fully realized. After the 1998 elections it was revealed that the enterprises privatized by the FNK between 1995 and 1998 had been sold greatly below their estimated value. During this time, the FNK sold assets with a total book value of 109.2 billion Slovak crowns at a purchasing price of 30.7 billion SK, or at 28.1% of their value. The new democratic coalition also inherited a budget crisis and a significant trade deficit that had accumulated since 1995. Since the elections in 1998 the current government has implemented economic reforms. The new government claimed

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257 Mikloš and Žitňanský, 91.
258 This was further complicated by the nature of most privatization agreements that stipulated that the buying firm could pay over a ten year period. By the end of 1998, then, the FNK had collected only 18% of the book value of the assets it had sold, in Eugen Jurzyca et al., “The Economy of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovakia 1998-1999, 197-232, 220.
economic reform (and the correction of the former regimes mistakes) to be one of its chief aims in *The 1998 Government Policy Programme*. In this document, in addition to criticizing the unethical and non-democratic tendencies allowed to flourish under the former government, the new government addressed the trade and budget deficits, and the bureaucratic, corrupt and clientelistic environment. It stated, "the Government will also have to adopt a number of unpopular measures whose problematic intensity will be all the greater the deeper they have been postponed."\(^{259}\)

The new government began to implement an austerity package in 1999, which had several points in order to reduce public finance, improve an environment of competitiveness in business and to assist low-income groups. The greatest effects for the Slovak citizenry came in the form of the first aim. Many of the policies of the austerity package were implemented on July 1\(^{st}\), 1999. From July 1\(^{st}\) 1999, as a result of the austerity measures, Slovak citizens experienced a rise in the cost of living. Other policies also included raising the VAT from 6-10% which included food, medicine and basic services, and increasing prices for many household consumption necessities: electricity, natural gas, heating and rent. It was estimated that the cost of living would raise by 361SK per capita.\(^{260}\) The government also introduced a restructuring of social services, which saw a reduction in sick pay benefits, social assistance, and stricter regulation for unemployment benefits which included tighter criteria, lower benefits and shorter period of time.\(^{261}\) The amendments to these regulated prices led to a jump in the inflation rates


\(^{260}\) "Costs of Living in Slovakia will become Higher from Thursday," *SITA* 30 June 1999.

for 1999 (10.5%) and 2000 (12%); the highest annual inflation rates since 1994.\textsuperscript{262}

The recent increase in consumer prices has added to the social costs of transition in Slovakia which have been increased cost of living, a slow rate of growth in real wages and, most significantly, a critical unemployment rate.

\textit{The Social and Economic Costs of Transition}

A general trend in the post-communist societies is the dramatic increase in the cost of living. Applying the 1989 consumer prices as 100, the consumer prices in 1999 had risen to 397.9. In contrast, although nominal wages grew throughout the 1990s, real wages at the end of 1999 had not reached their 1989 level, and were 88.3\% of the latter.\textsuperscript{263} Although wage decreases have been seen in all sectors, agriculture has shown the largest decrease. In 1989, monthly wages in agriculture, industry and construction were above the national average. In 1999, the monthly wage in industry (manufacturing) was slightly above the national wage (100.2\%) whereas wages in agriculture and construction decreased to 78.1\% and 92.3\% of the average monthly wage.\textsuperscript{264} The gap between the highest wages and the lowest wages has also increased. In 1999 the highest wages were reported in finance intermediation (19 995 Sk) while the lowest wages were reported in the hotel and restaurant industry (8 126 Sk).\textsuperscript{265}

In July 1999, the Slovak daily \textit{Praca} reported that Slovaks had a lower standard of living compared to its Visegrad members. For example, a “Slovak citizen had to work 196 hours, a Hungarian 158 hours, a Czech 181 hours and a Pole 93 hours for the same

\textsuperscript{263} \textit{Statistical Yearbook 2000}, 36-37.
\textsuperscript{265} \textit{Social Trends in the Slovak Republic}, 33.
bag of consumer goodies.”\textsuperscript{266} In a comparison of standard of living levels between 1989 and 1999, only 16% of respondents stated that their standard of living was better, while 17% believed that the standard of living remained the same. However, almost two-thirds or 61% of respondents believed that the standard of living decreased.\textsuperscript{267}

Other ‘losers’ are the number of people who are dependent on state support. Between 1993-1999, the percentage of the Slovak population considered to be in ‘material distress’ (considered to be those individual’s whose income is below the subsistence minimum) and receiving social benefits rose from 7.2% to 10.8%. Although there is no ‘poverty line’ in Slovak legislation, a minimum cost of living established by the Minimum Subsistence Act is central to social policy on social benefits. As of July 1, 2000, the subsistence minimum for one adult individual was 3490 Sk/month. The subsistence minimum is generally established as 42% of the average monthly income, is adjusted to employment and is calculated to cover basic food, household and personal expenditures.\textsuperscript{268} Interestingly, the minimum wage for 2000 was 4,440 Sk, only 400 crowns more than the minimum subsistence levels suggesting that although only 10% of the population is considered in material distress, many more may be very close.\textsuperscript{269} In addition to the increase in cost of living, loss in real wages and growth in recipients of


\textsuperscript{267} Názory 10:4 (1999), 3.

\textsuperscript{268} Although social assistance and the Subsistence Minimum Act have been in place since 1991, it was restructured in 1998. The new scheme awards three different scales of benefits based on either objective of subjective reasons for distress, and thus the monthly benefits range from 50%, 100% or 120% of the subsistence minimum, see Slovak Republic: Social Policy (Bratislava: Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family, 1999); and Bodnárová and Šimúňková.

social benefits, the most obvious and dire social costs of transition has been Slovakia’s unemployment rate.

The national unemployment rate in Slovakia has grown from 1.6% in 1990 to 19.4% in 2000. The high unemployment has been attributed to numerous factors. Firstly, the socialist economic focus on heavy industry has left large numbers of specialized employees in largely non-viable industries. The nature of the high unemployment rate has been attributed to “the relatively high share of industry on overall employment and the current crisis in certain industrial sectors.” However, agriculture also suffered after 1989. The Soviet Union was the main destination of Slovakia’s exports. Slovak agriculture was not able to compete on the world market. Employment in the agriculture, industrial and construction sectors have all deceased. In 1989 agriculture had 12.1% of the workforce and in 1999, 7.1%; in 1989 industry had 33.4% and in 1999, 26.0%; construction in 1989 had 10.3% and in 1999 6.9%. From 1991-1999 the share of the workforce employed in the service industry rose from 48% to 59.1%.

Secondly, the Mečiar’s regime reluctance to restructure the economy has delayed new job creation. Throughout the 1989-1995 period over-employment persisted. The slow implementation or postponement of key reforms such as bankruptcy laws and revitalizing plans is largely responsible for this. Furthermore there was a tendency to keep unprofitable enterprises alive. Unemployment rose quickly in 1993 then stabilized

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270 Lubyová, 168.
for a few years under Mečiar because employment restructuring in the state sector slowed down, but the economic crisis that came in 1998 again saw a rise in unemployment.\textsuperscript{273}

Unemployment has been felt at a regional level, in all sectors of the economy and in relatively all educational groups, especially those with lower education. The structure of unemployment is also severe because there is a large ratio of job seekers to openings, increased long-term unemployment and significant unemployment among youth. In December 1998, there was one job vacancy for 37 unemployed individuals. By December 2000, the ratio for job vacancy to unemployed was 1 to 84. Furthermore, December 2000 data on unemployment reveal that almost half (44\%) of unemployed individuals had been so for over a year.\textsuperscript{274} The continual high unemployment rate and the data revealing both strong competition for vacancies, and long-term unemployment illustrate the costs of transition for the Slovak public. Opinion polls have also demonstrated a high level of dissatisfaction among Slovaks. For example in November 2001, the largest share of respondents (48\%) stated only small changes to the pre-1989 economic system were needed, while 16\% stated that changes were not needed at all.\textsuperscript{275} Furthermore, in June 2000, the share of citizens (18\%) who stated that they felt secure or ‘more or less’ secure with the political and economic situation in Slovakia had decreased significantly from 1990 when 48\% of citizens stated they felt secure.\textsuperscript{276}

\textsuperscript{273} \textit{Slovak Republic: Living Standards}, 28-29; and Lubyová, 203.

\textsuperscript{274} Data from the Národný úrad práce (National Labour Office) at http://www.nup.sk.


\textsuperscript{276} \textit{Názory} 11:3 (2000), 17.
In 2000, the rise in unemployment appeared to have concerned most people as 82% of respondents listed the solution of the unemployment problem to be the most pressing problem in Slovakia. This was up almost 20% from 1997, when 65% of individuals listed unemployment as the most pressing problem.\textsuperscript{277} However, many Slovak and foreign observers have noted that macro-economic indicators, even that of unemployment, mask the great regional disparities in Slovakia. Furthermore, the disparities have largely increased throughout the decade.

**Economic Regional Differentiation in Slovakia**

The regional differentiation in economic development in Slovakia during transition is perhaps one of the most distinctive features of the Slovak economic transition. Sizeable dissimilarities exist in levels of GDP, standards of living, wages and unemployment rates. From these indicators it is apparent that the social and economic costs of transition have been experienced to different degrees across Slovakia. The considerable gaps in the social and economic costs of transition provide a method to examine the assertion that economics impact civil society.

There is indeed a correlation between the most marginalized areas today and their historical relationship to Slovakia’s development. Many of these areas, particularly those in the fertile southern and eastern parts of the country, have historically been agricultural areas, and this sector still constitutes a significant portion of their economies. Other marginalized areas, particularly those along the northern border, although not agricultural, were industrialized during the later years of communism, and were thus also not closely related to the historical industrialization of Slovakia. Furthermore, it has been

\textsuperscript{277} Názory 4:11 (2000), 33-36.
argued that these areas were mostly removed from the industrialization process because, “as a rule these territories were remote from the communication routes, which accounted for their ever greater lagging behind the civilization process.”

There are many factors attributed to the wide economic disparities between Slovak districts, however, they mostly center on the different forms of economic development experienced during the communist regime. The most significant determinant between successful and depressed regions in Slovakia has been the economic structure they inherited in 1989. For example, some of the areas that have experienced difficulty in transition are those areas that were predominated by the defense industry.

In his work, Restructuring the Regional Economy, Adrian Smith argues that these the incongruities within Slovakia rest on the state of economies inherited from the socialist economy. For example, the regions, which have been very or relatively successful since 1989 have either had a significant concentration of industrial production (Bratislava and Košice); have inherited a diversified industrial base (Liptovský Mikuláš, Žilina, Trenčín); or have inherited a ‘regional monostructure’ (Považská Bystrica, Žiar nad Hronom). Although the latter regions have experienced slow growth, they have not become intensely marginalized. The concentration of industry in these regions, and throughout central western Slovakia, had been established by 1970, and in many ways was a continuation of earlier industrial processes that had begun in the period of 1947-

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279 Primarily this production was found in the towns of Dubnica, Martin, Považská Bystrica and Detva, Milan Buček, “Regional Disparities in Transition in the Slovak Republic,” European Urban and Regional Studies 6:4 (1999), 360-364.
1948, and in some cases earlier. In contrast, in 1970 the areas to the east and the south remained mostly agricultural, and were then industrialized during the 1970-85 period.²⁸¹

For the most part, the areas that have experienced the economic costs of transition the most extensively in Slovakia are these areas that underwent late industrialization. They are either areas that have been predominantly agricultural and located in southern and eastern Slovakia, or they are economies which rested on branch industries that faltered after 1989 usually located in the northern, eastern and southern peripheries.²⁸² Many of these areas failed to develop local industrial bases, and because of their location, inherited poor transportation networks and infrastructure which hindered production in these areas after the subsidization of transport was decreased after 1989.²⁸³

Although economic hardship was felt throughout Slovakia in the initial years of transition, severe inequalities were immediately visible. As early as 1991, the Slovak government distinguished problem areas in Slovakia. Districts identified as being significantly disadvantaged to cope with economic reforms included: Považská Bystrica, Lučenec, Bardejov, Trebišov, Rožňava, Spišská Nová Ves, Čadca, Veľký Krtíš and Rimavská Sobota.²⁸⁴ With the exception of Spišská Nová Ves, which is located in central eastern Slovakia, the remaining areas all located in the northern, southern or eastern borderlands. After the 1996 change to territorial administration, the number of ‘problem’ areas increased to sixteen. Its major criterion of which was an unemployment rate over

²⁸¹ Smith, 259–273.
²⁸² Ibid, 130.
²⁸⁴ This study was conducted by the Ministry of Economic Strategy and evaluated all regions in Slovakia according to their ability to adapt to new economic pressures, as found in OECD, Regional Problems, 56.
20%. Although the Slovak governments throughout the 1990s have implemented various policies in attempts to correct and monitor regional imbalances, disparities between regions not only remain significant but also appear to be widening.  

*Social and Economic Indicators in Slovakia’s Regions and Districts*

Because of the great differentiation among Slovakia’s regions and districts, social and economic indicators vary across Slovakia. For example, Bratislava stands out from the rest of Slovakia in many respects. It has maintained a low unemployment rate, has the highest educated population, the best infrastructure and economy, and the wealthiest citizens in Slovakia. It is also the most urbanized area of Slovakia. The region of Bratislava is by far the densest with 301 citizens per square kilometer. Alone, the city of Bratislava has 1228 individuals per square kilometer. The remaining regions have the following population densities: Trenčín (135), Trnava (133), Košice (133), Nitra (113), Žilina (102), Prešov (87) and Banská Bystrica (70).  

Throughout Slovakia, most individuals have a certain level of secondary education. The largest share of the population (41%) has ‘lower secondary’ education that is training from a secondary vocational school or apprentice institution. The second largest portion of the population (39%) has ‘upper secondary’ education. This may also include vocational schools and academic schools but requires completion of a ‘leaving exam.’ It is generally accepted that this level of education is higher than the former. The national averages of the population that has post-secondary education or only primary or lower, are both 10%. Bratislava boasts the most educated population. In the region of Bratislava, 25% of the population has post-secondary education, whereas only 7% of the

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285 M.E.S.A.10, 8.
population has primary (or less) education. In contrast the regions of Nitra (6%) and Košice (7%) have the lowest share of individuals with post-secondary education. Nitra also has the highest share of individuals who only possess primary or lower levels of education (14%), followed by the region of Trnava (12%).

The World Bank reported that there were significant differences in infrastructure between Slovakia's regions. While 29% of Bratislava's roads were highways or 'first class roads', transportation routes in the regions of Trnava (18%), Banská Bystrica (18%), Prešov (19%) and Košice (16%) were relatively less developed. The World Bank also illustrated the differentiation in levels of population connected to a public water supply. Most of the inhabitants of the Bratislava region (94%) had this basic amenity while roughly three quarters of the population of Prešov (75%) and Košice (77%) had a connection a public water supply. The proportion of citizens with access to public sewage also demonstrates the substantial incongruities in basic infrastructure in the regions. Whereas access to public sewage is common in the region of Bratislava (82%), in the remaining regions it is surprisingly lower. The region of Banská Bystrica has the second highest portion of inhabitants with access to public sewage (57%) while the regions of Trnava and Nitra have the lowest (45%).

In the Bratislava region the average monthly wage in 1999 was 14 611 Sk, significantly higher than the Slovak average (10 961 Sk). In comparison, only the region of Košice surpassed the national average in wages with 11, 157 Sk. The remaining regions had average wages below the Slovak average: Trnava (10 566 Sk), Trenčín (10

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286 Statistical Yearbook 2000, 570.
287 Regionálne porovania v Slovenskej republice, 1999 (Bratislava: SUSR, 1999), 128.
134 Sk), Banská Bystrica (10 019), Nitra (9 968 Sk), Žilina (9 874) and Prešov (9618). Furthermore, the lowest monthly wages recorded in Slovakia were almost 50% lower than Bratislava. The lowest monthly wages were found in the districts of Sabinov (7 961 Sk) and Stropkov (7 959 Sk) located in the region of Prešov. While direct data on the share of the population earning minimum wage has not been found, the UNDP reported that in 1999, the region of Prešov received the second highest share of social benefits in Slovakia (19%). The highest average was found in the region of Košice where 17% of Košice’s population received benefits and 21% of all Slovakia’s benefits were paid out in Košice. In stark contrast was the region of Bratislava, where 3% of the population received benefits, which constituted 3% of the Slovak total.

In 2001, the region of Bratislava’s share in the national workforce (27.9%) surpassed its share in the national population (11.4%). It also claimed the largest share of the national workforce in the construction (31.5%), hotel and restaurant (43.5%), transport (73.8%), trade (36.8%), financial intermediation (91.8%), and real estate (45.3%) sectors. In contrast, it claimed the lowest share of the national agricultural workforce (4.6%) and tied with the region of Trenčín for the largest share of the total industrial workforce (17.4%). It is clear that Bratislava is the most successful and economically diversified region in Slovakia, and is far outperforming the seven other regions in most sectors. The Bratislava region also, importantly, has the largest share in the service or tertiary sectors. Furthermore, these areas have seen the most growth in the

288 Data for 1999 and from Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic as found in Table 5.7 in World Bank, Slovak Republic: Living Standards, 146.
290 UNDP, 82.
past decade. Similarly, from 1997-1999 the region of Bratislava produced over 22% of the national GDP. The region of Košice (14%) produced the second largest share of GDP in 1999, followed by Banská Bystrica (11.8%), Žilina (10.8%), Nitra (10.5%), Trenčín (10.2%), Trnava (10.1%) and Prešov (9.7%).

In addition to variations in educational levels, infrastructure, GDP production and average wages, other economic indicators reveal more specifically divergences in socio-economic dislocation. In particular, there are vast differences in unemployment rates throughout Slovakia. Furthermore, not only distinct regional, but also district level economic disparities are recorded in standards of living. The national census in conducted in Slovakia in 2001 illustrates the discrepancies in standards of living throughout Slovakia. In a poll conducted in October 1999, most respondents (59%) stated that the living standard of their households had worsened since 1989. For example, while almost 75% of residences in the region of Bratislava have a washing machine, just over half (52%) of residences in the region Nitra have a washing machine. The disparity is greater among Slovakia's districts: over 75% of residences in greater Bratislava have washing machines while the lowest percentages are found in the districts of Kysucké Nové Mesto (52%), Galanta (51%), Bytča (49%), Rimavská Sobota (49%), Čadca (48%), Gelnica (48%), Trebišov (48%), Nové Zámky (46%), and Medzilaborce (41%). [Appendix 10: Figure 10] Furthermore, while in the Bratislava region 84% of residences have central heating, other areas have relatively fewer residences with central heating. For example, in the districts of Gelnica (54%), Sobrance (53%), just over half of the residences have this type of heating. Furthermore, the share of households with

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luxury items such as a computer is far higher in greater Bratislava. While 12% of all Slovak households have a computer, approximately a quarter (24%) of households in Bratislava stated that they had a home computer. Like many indicators, the city of Bratislava inflated Bratislava’s regional levels so that it is the only region in Slovakia to have more computers per household than the national average. Although no other region approaches the Bratislava average for household computers, the lowest shares of households with this type of luxury item are found in Čadca, Bytča, Poltár, Gelnica and Sobrance (6%), and Medzilaborce (4%).

The clearest indicator of the broad discrepancies between the socio-economic costs of transition has been the unemployment rates. Throughout the 1990s the unemployment rate in Slovakia has been quite high, but the differences between certain areas exhibit great disparity. For example, the region of Bratislava has maintained a significantly low unemployment rate. In March 2001, the unemployment rate for the region of Bratislava was 6.4%, much lower than the national average of 19.2%. The regions of Trnava (16.1%), Trenčín (13.5%) and Žilina (17.5%) also had unemployment rates below the national average. However, Prešov (24.8%), Košice (26.3%), Nitra (22.9%) and Banská Bystrica (23.8%) had rates of unemployment above the national average. Furthermore, the districts with the highest unemployment rates are found in these regions. [Appendix 11: Figure 11]

Unemployment rates over 30% were found in several districts in the region of Košice: Trebišov (33.3%), Sobrance (32%), Rožňava (32.6%), and Michalovce (31.1%);
and the region of Banská Bystrica: Veľký Krtíš (33.7%), Rimavská Sobota (37.0%) and Revúca (33.7%). All 13 districts in Prešov had unemployment rates over 20%. Many of these districts have been deemed ‘problematic’ since the early 1990s. In 1994, Slovak observers considered the districts of Bardejov, Čadca, Dolný Kubín, Lučenec, Rimavská Sobota, Trebišov, Veľký Krtíš, Rožňava, Spišská Nová Ves, Stará Lubovňa to be the most problematic from an “overall socio-economic” standpoint. Although current data on the situation of Slovakia’s regions and districts are based on the 1996 administrative divisions, the most problematic areas have remained largely the same, and are concentrated in the eastern and southern areas of Slovakia. It has been argued that due to expensive and limited housing in the regions with low unemployment, labour mobility is particularly low in Slovakia, thus, compounding the problem for individuals located in depressed areas. Furthermore, unemployment data reveal that these areas also suffer from both long-term unemployment, and low job vacancies.

The proportion of unemployed individuals who have been so for more than a year ranges from 28% in the Bratislava region to 49% in the Košice region. The regions of Trenčín (35%), Trnava (40%), Žilina (40%) remain in the middle while Prešov (46%) and Banská Bystrica (44%) are slightly higher. The districts with the highest share of

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296 In contrast, with the exception of the Prešov, all current regional capitals: Bratislava, Trenčín, Košice, Banská Bystrica, Žilina, Trnava, Nitra, were considered to be the most successful regions Other areas considered successful in 1994 were those that had inherited a significant industrial economy from the communist period, for example Liptovský Mikuláš and Hummené, see Krivý, “Slovakia’s Regions,” (1995), 291.
297 For example, it has been reported that internal mobility and amount of internal migration has decreased since transition. Whereas the total number of migrants in 1990 was approximately 100,000, by 1999 this number had decreased to 78 965. Data for 1990 in Lubyová, 182; and for 1999 in Social Trends in the Slovak Republic, 27.
long-term unemployed are also located in the regions with the highest unemployment; Banská Bystrica, Prešov and Košice. These are Lučenec (53%) and Revúca (51%) in Banská Bystrica; Humenné (51%) in Prešov; and Sobrance (51%), Trebišov (51%) and Spišská Nová Ves (51%) in Košice. These districts also have above average unemployment rates. Huge discrepancies are also found in the regions and districts when comparing the number of unemployed individuals to posted job vacancies. While vacancies posted with the National Labour Office are by no means exhaustive, the huge discrepancies do illustrate that they is a great disparity. For example, in the region of Bratislava there one job vacancy for 25 individuals. The ratio is slightly higher in the region of Trenčín (1/32), Trnava (1/70) and Prešov (1/89). However the ratios are significantly higher in the regions of Košice (1/265), Banská Bystrica (1/150) and Nitra (1/165). Certain ratios of job vacancies and unemployed at the district level are extremely high and correlate with high unemployment rates. For example, in Rimavská Sobota there are 1842 people for every vacant job. Rimavská Sobota also had the highest unemployment rate in March 2001, at 37%. Similarly the districts of Snina (1/1349) and Michalovce (1/1093) also have exorbitantly high ratios. Michalovce (31%) and Snina (24%) also have high unemployment rates. Furthermore several districts have over 300 individuals for every job. In the Košice region, these are: Košice-okolie (1/306), Rožňava (1/488), Trebišov (1/510), Spišská Nová Ves (1/625); and Lučenec (1/356). In the Prešov region the districts of Kežmarok (1/333) and Medzilaborce (1/439) have significantly high ratios of job seekers per vacancy. This is also found in the districts of Tvrdošín (1/336), Námestovo (1/364), and Dolný Kubín (1/362) in the region of Žilina; and finally Považská Bystrica (1/324) in the region of Trenčín. With the exception of
Považská Bystrica, these former districts all have unemployment rates above the national average.\[^{298}\]

Slovakia’s transition to a market economy has been impacted by its historical development, primarily under the communist regime. For many Slovak citizens transition has meant the decline in real wages and standard of living. For many others transition has brought more difficult hardships such as unemployment. Furthermore, there are great disparities between the extent to which people have experienced the social costs of transition. The huge economic disparities between regions and districts illustrate that certain areas have become intensely marginalized in the post-communist period. It is clear that for several districts in Slovakia the economic transition has been severely costly. If the theory holds true that economic wealth and stability foster democracy and participation in civil society, then it may be expected that these districts exhibit lower levels of civil society than economically successful areas. By using standard of living indicators and unemployment rates in comparison with aggregate numbers of civil society organizations, it can be determined whether there is a relationship between socio-economic factors and civil society organizations at the aggregate level.

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\[^{298}\] Data on job vacancies and long-term unemployment are for December 2000 and from the Národný úrad práce (National Labour Office) at http://www.nup.sk. Unemployment rates for 2001 are from Vybrané údaje o regionoch v Slovenskej republike 2001, 40-41.
Chapter VI: The Determinants of Civil Society

Through an examination of the literature surrounding civil society, this thesis has isolated three factors that several authors have argued will affect civil society. This thesis held as its initial hypothesis that the attitudes of the political elite and the political environment; the political culture and political values of the citizenry; and socio-economic dislocation incurred during transition would impact civil society in post-communist Slovakia. From the distinctive political developments in Slovakia in the 1990s, it is possible to investigate whether the markedly different attitudes and styles of governance of the pre and post 1998 governments have or have not impacted civil society, and whether the different governments have impacted civil society in qualitatively different manners.

Throughout the 1990s the political environment in Slovakia was dominated by the personality of Vladimír Mečiar. His government, the HZDS-SNS-ZRS coalition was hostile toward its opposition and enacted many policies to undermine the power and influence of its opposition and critics. In 1995, civil society became one of the government’s targets. It initiated a public crusade against some of the most prominent Slovak NGOs. Furthermore, comments made by certain elites appeared to question the legitimacy of Slovakia’s third sector in general. The government’s smear campaign against Slovak NGOs was followed by a very controversial proposed Law on Foundations. To many external and internal observers, the government’s actions were a barefaced attempt to limit its civil society opposition.

The change in government in 1998 produced a significantly different political environment, one that has been, indeed, more favourable to civil society. Since 1998, the
Dzurinda government has involved civil society organizations in various projects, and civil society organizations have been very active in advocacy and lobbying, at times successful. The new government has also enacted a favourable tax law, which had been advocated by NGOs for years. Certainly, it is obvious that civil society has been more engaged with the state since 1998, and that the new government has granted civil society organizations a degree of access to decision-making. This is radically different from the period from 1994-1998 when civil society was not only marginalized from the decision-making process, but was forced to defend its interests, and even its existence, against the HZDS-SNS-ZRS government. An examination of the political environment and political elite attitudes during the 1990s, then, seems to support the hypothesis that the political environment and attitudes will impact civil society, at least qualitatively. Since 1998, civil society has been more engaged in the political developments of Slovakia, and has been able to participate with the government on certain projects, where its presence is suitable. However, other indicators suggest that perhaps the dramatically different political elite attitudes and political environment throughout the 1990s in Slovakia did not impact civil society, at least in the manner one would expect.

Firstly, the attitude and actions taken by the Mečiar government against civil society seems to have unwittingly served as the catalyst behind the SOS campaign and the OK’98 campaign. By far these two civil society actions have been the most impressive achievements of Slovak civil society to date. Thus, similar to its impact on all its opponents, the political style of the HZDS-SNS-ZRS inspired the coordination, unification, and the professionalism of Slovak civil society. Slovak civil society unified
to protect its survival during Mečiar’s tenure, and played a significant role in inducing the outcome of the 1998 parliamentary elections.

Secondly, despite the attempts made by the 1994-1998 government civil society continued to grow in Slovakia. For example, in 1993 the Slovak Statistical Office recorded 6,000 NGOs. By 1997 this number increased to 13,800. The government’s hostile attacks on civil society also increased public awareness to civil society organizations. For example, in a poll conducted by the Institute for Research of Public Opinions (UVVM) during the SOS campaign, 80% of respondents stated that foundations were necessary for beneficial activities in society.299 Public opinion polls conducted during the OK’ 98 campaign also illustrated public support for the campaign. Public opinion polls also recorded an increase in respondents who stated that they volunteered for an NGO from 1996 to 1998. It then appears that the actions taken by the HZDS-SNS-ZRS coalition against Slovakia’s third sector had the opposite effect than their intention. During the HZDS-SNS-ZRS term the aggregate numbers of civil society organizations continued to grow, public support for the actions and existence of civil society organizations was revealed to be strong, and internally Slovak civil society strengthened and unified in opposition to the former government.

However, it is important to note that Ladislav Macháček proposes a different interpretation of the relationship between the government and the third sector after 1994. Macháček notes that the leading members of civil society after 1994 were, “those who had been active in political life during the second phase of transition and who were struggling against representatives of Mečiar’s ruling coalition.” Thus, essentially the

conflict between the government and civil society between 1994-1998 was a struggle between the government and 'political' opposition.\textsuperscript{300}

In line with Macháček's argument is the fact that the legislation enacted by the HZDS-SNS-ZRS government affected only a small number of NGOs. According to the registry of the Ministry of Interior, of the four legal forms of NGOs in Slovakia, civic associations constitute 95\% of all civil society organizations. The laws regulating civic associations were not altered during Mečiar's tenure and continue to be governed by the laws established in 1990 as provided in Article 29 of the Slovak Constitution and the Act on the Association of Citizens. The controversial legislation enacted by the 1994-1998 government, then, was directed at specific types of organizations. However, it is important to remember that civic associations include numerous 'non-political' organizations like sports clubs and leisure groups. Furthermore, although the Mečiar government's tactics aimed at specific organizations, it was exactly these organizations that rallied behind the SOS and the OK' 98 campaigns.

Macháček also notes that since 1998, many of the leading civil society members have returned to political life. Since 1998, it is apparent that although there are several examples of government-civil society cooperation, it should be appropriately interpreted that a minority of organizations, largely centered in Bratislava, have attained influence and access to decision-making under the new government. Thus, in many ways, the relations between civil society and the political elites throughout the 1990s could be interpreted as the relations between the political elites and civil society elites. This may be due to Macháček's thesis, which implies that political actors, who left the political

\textsuperscript{300} Ladislav Macháček, "Youth and the Creation of Civil Society," Sociologia 32:3 (2000), 241-255, 244-245.
arena when Mečiar ascended to power, then used civil society to further their political aspirations. It may also be due to the internal development of civil society. The majority of Slovak civil society organizations focus on providing services to either their members or society. It is clear that the struggle between the government and civil society before 1998, and the increased participatory relations between the government and civil society since 1998, have both been dominated by a minority of civil society organizations, or even perhaps a civil society elite.

Although civil society is undoubtedly more engaged with the post-1998 government, the hostile elite attitudes and political environment from 1994-1998 appears not to have thwarted civil society, but unwittingly spurred its development. Although this thesis has found that its initial hypothesis appears to have been supported in that political elite attitudes and political environment have impacted Slovak civil society, they have not impacted in the manner that was expected. Despite hostile political elite attitudes, civil society strengthened under the 1994-1998 government. The post-1998 government-civil society relations are, indeed, closer to what the initial hypothesis expected. That is, that responsive attitudes toward civil society by political elites would foster a more politically engaged civil society.

The second variable that this thesis asserted would influence civil society is political culture. From a review of the literature that examines political culture and its relation to democracy and participation, it was assumed that a political culture with prevalent feelings and attitudes of inefficacy, distrust, and disinterest (or lack of knowledge); and values supporting paternalism and authoritarianism would inhibit participation and the aggregate levels of civil society organizations in Slovakia. Public
opinion polls collected throughout the 1990s in Slovakia reveal that these feelings, values and attitudes exist to a significant degree in Slovakia. Moreover, public opinion polls reveal that the incidence of these attitudes and feelings have largely remained constant. Slovak citizens have continuously favoured social rights over political rights. Furthermore, feelings of inefficacy and disinterest are significant and have remained stable throughout the decade. In addition, interpersonal trust appears strained by the fear of sharing one’s political views in public, which has not improved since the early 1990s. And finally, a significant proportion of Slovaks value a strong leader and firm hand rule. Slovak political culture, then, has shown both a significant tendency toward authoritarian values and a prevalence of values that would inhibit civil society.

Despite both the constancy and prevalence of these values and attitudes, the aggregate number of civil society organizations has continued to grow throughout the 1990s. Thus, on the national aggregate level, there is little evidence to support the claim that political culture will influence the development of civil society. However, an additional analytical tool is provided by the numerous public opinion polls and studies that have illustrated that authoritarian values, which this thesis hypothesizes will negatively impact civil society, are found in above average numbers among certain party adherents.

The political landscape of Slovakia permits an analysis of the extent to which political culture may affect civil society, based on both the district level density of NGOs and the geographical diffusion of party supporters. The concept of distinct regional political cultures has been argued by Archie Brown, who states that, “while seeking to specify whatever wide ranging consensus on fundamental political beliefs and values
may exist-to identify, that is to say, a dominant political culture and to describe its relationship to the official political culture—it is important also to be alert to the probable existence of significant subcultures and to focus attention on different levels and groups within society."301 The diverse regional differentiation in Slovakia permits such an examination.

Calculations of the density of NGOs demonstrate that, with the exception of the Bratislava region, all regions have fewer NGOs per capita than the national average. While the degree varies, the lowest density levels are found in the regions of Trenčín, Prešov and Nitra.302 Because varying political cultures often exist within the national political culture, particularly in regional or among ethnic groups, an examination of political culture at the district level is warranted.303 A study of existing sub-national political cultures in Slovakia is achievable through an examination of the political values of party adherents. However, many caveats should be stated before such assertions may be made.

Firstly, for a variety of reasons party supporters may not necessarily vote according to party preference. Secondly, it is impossible to ascertain with absolute certainty where HZDS voters who support authoritarian values reside, whether perhaps more authoritarian HZDS voters reside in a specific locale. And thirdly, this examination can not be sure that HZDS voters in a particular region are not those involved in civil society organizations, or that non-HZDS supporters are more engaged in civil society.

To be sure, this examination recognizes that it will employ ecological inferences that may

301 Archie Brown, 9.
302 Author’s calculation based on population statistics from December 31, 2000 from Vybrané údaje o regionoch v Slovenskej republike 1/2001, 66; and the data from the registry of the Ministry of Interior.
303 Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, 163.
be disproved in a later study. However, due to the unavailability of public opinion polls conducted by district, the use of aggregate level analysis is necessary to evaluate whether political culture has influenced the geographical differentiation in levels of civil society. Or more specifically, this thesis considers whether there is a correlation between the prevalence of authoritarian values, measured by district electoral support for the HZDS, and the district aggregate data for civil society organizations as provided by the registry of the Ministry of Interior.

The registry of civil society organizations provided by the Slovak Ministry of Interior allows for an assessment of the density of civil society in the eight regions of Slovakia. Civil society is by far the most dense in Bratislava, where there is one organization for every 158 people. The density then ranges from Banská Bystrica (1/349); Žilina (1/386); Košice (1/395), to Trnava (1/406). The lowest activity in the regions is found in Nitra (1/431), Trenčín (1/444) and finally Prešov (1/450). Thus in relation to the survey of political culture, it appears that political culture has not affected the development of civil society, at least on the regional level. For example, although the lowest region of activity is the HZDS stronghold Trenčín, Žilina is only behind Bratislava and Banská Bystrica in terms of civil society activity. In contrast Nitra showed relatively low support for HZDS in the 1998 elections and has the third lowest regional density of civil society organizations. However, election result data and civil society data permits a comparison of civil society and political values at the district level. [Appendix 12: Figure 12]

In the regions of Trenčín and Žilina there are several districts, which have shown particularly strong support for the HZDS. There are also districts located in the rest of
Slovakia that have proven to be isolated areas of deep support for the HZDS. The districts in Trenčín and Žilina which have consistently shown strong support for the HZDS, and thus may be seen to have a higher prevalence of authoritarian values are Púchov, Považská Bystrica, Ilava, and Bánovce nad Bebravou in the region of Trenčín, and Čadca, Kysucké Nové Mesto and Bytča in Žilina.

The HZDS garnished its strongest support in the 1998 elections in the districts of Čadca (54.61%), Bytča (49.48%) and Kysucké Nové Mesto (49.91%). These are all located in northern Žilina and have supported the HZDS throughout the 1990s. Although the change in regional administration in 1996 resulted in new districts in Slovakia, it is possible to trace HZDS support in particular districts. The districts of Bytča, Čadca and Kysucké Nové Mesto were prior to 1996, Čadca, Žilina and Považská Bystrica (the latter is now part of the administrative region of Trenčín). Important to this study is that these areas have remained a reserve of HZDS support. In the 1994 elections the HZDS received its highest share of support in the administrative district of Čadca (57.72%), and over half of the votes in the then districts of Žilina (50.25%), and Považská Bystrica (54.41%). Furthermore, support for the HZDS in these districts has been continuous. In the 1998 local elections the HZDS-SNS again dominated these districts. The percentage of elected councilors belonging to the HZDS or SNS in the districts were: Čadca (58.2); Kysucké Nové Mesto (62.9); Bytča (68.8); and Žilina (63.1). Furthermore these districts were also very supportive of Vladimír Mečiar in his failed attempt at the

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presidency in May 1999. Vladimír Mečiar garnered significant support in the district of Čadca (80%), Kysucké Nové Mesto (79%), and Bytča (76%).

Although the HZDS received the highest proportion of votes in the 1998 parliamentary elections in all districts in the region of Trenčín, the strongest support was found in the districts of Púchov (45.74%), Považská Bystrica (46.85%), Ilava (44.23%) and Bánovce nad Bebravou (40.54%). Again these areas have exhibited a continual affinity with the HZDS. Prior to the 1996 change in regional administration, Bánovce nad Bebravou was a part of the district Topoľčany. In the 1994 elections 53.96% of votes cast in Topoľčany went to the HZDS. Ilava and Púchov were previously contained in a larger Považská Bystrica which in the 1994 elections awarded 54.41% of its votes to the HZDS. Many districts in Trenčín gave Mečiar the majority of votes in the May 1999 presidential election. The highest percentage of support came from the long supportive districts of Považská Bystrica (73.75%) and Púchov (71.37%). And finally, the HZDS and SNS also dominated the districts of Púchov (50.4%), Považská Bystrica (65.0%), Trenčín (57.3%) and Ilava (55.1%) in the 1998 local elections.

Furthermore, two districts located in the Prešov region are notable. In the districts of Stropkov and Svidnik the electoral support for the HZDS in the 1998 elections was significantly high with 41.09% and 41.83% respectively. Support for the HZDS in these districts has also been continuous. Prior to 1996, these two districts were contained in the single district of Svidnik, and in the 1994 elections, the HZDS received 45% of the votes in the Svidnik district. Furthermore, Mečiar received significant support from both

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these regions (Svidník 58.2% and Stropkov 61.4%) in the 1999 presidential elections.

In the 1999 presidential elections two more districts, located in the region of Banská Bystrica; Detva (70.5%) and Žarnovica (67.7%) showed strong support for Mečiar. The HZDS also received the highest amount of votes in these districts in 1998. In Detva the HZDS received 42.4% and in Žarnovica 42.5%.

As this thesis held as one of its initial hypotheses that a political culture which favoured authoritarian values would negatively impact civic participation, and thus be reflected in the aggregate numbers of civil society organizations, it was expected that in those districts where the HZDS garnered continually strong support, density levels of civil society organizations would be low. The districts of Bytča and Čadca, which were among the highest supporters of the HZDS, also reveal lower levels of civil society organizational density, with one organization for 650 inhabitants, and one organization for 620 inhabitants, respectively. However, the district with second highest share of support for the HZDS, Kysucké Nové Mesto, had a significantly higher density of organizations, one for every 472. The following table illustrates the districts with the highest levels of support for the HZDS and the density of NGOs in the district. In fact the densities of organizations among the districts with the highest electoral support for the HZDS range from Stropkov with one organization for every 404 individuals to Čadca with one organization for every 620 individuals. The results suggest that there is no correlation between civil society densities and strong support for the HZDS (as a measurement of proclivity to authoritarian values). [Appendix 13: Table 17]
Table 1: Districts with the Highest Electoral Support for the HZDS in the 1998 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>HZDS votes in 1998 in % (districts with over 40%)</th>
<th>Mečiar votes in % Presidential Election</th>
<th>Density of NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Čadca (ZI)</td>
<td>54.61</td>
<td>80.60</td>
<td>1/620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kysucké Nové Mesto (ZI)</td>
<td>49.91</td>
<td>79.45</td>
<td>1/472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bytča (ZI)</td>
<td>49.48</td>
<td>76.53</td>
<td>1/650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Považská Bystrica (TC)</td>
<td>46.85</td>
<td>73.75</td>
<td>1/448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Púchov (TC)</td>
<td>45.74</td>
<td>71.37</td>
<td>1/560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilava (TC)</td>
<td>44.23</td>
<td>67.97</td>
<td>1/472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topoľčany (NA)</td>
<td>42.96</td>
<td>67.26</td>
<td>1/492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zlaté Moravce (NA)</td>
<td>42.49</td>
<td>68.49</td>
<td>1/223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Žarnovica (BC)</td>
<td>42.52</td>
<td>67.67</td>
<td>1/459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detva (BC)</td>
<td>42.43</td>
<td>70.55</td>
<td>1/607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svidník (PS)</td>
<td>41.83</td>
<td>58.22</td>
<td>1/464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Štrpokov (PS)</td>
<td>41.09</td>
<td>61.38</td>
<td>1/404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bánovce nad Bebravou (TC)</td>
<td>40.54</td>
<td>68.09</td>
<td>1/536</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast the density of civil society organizations in districts with low levels of HZDS support further suggests that political culture and civil society do not correlate.

The average density for the districts listed above with the highest HZDS support was one organization for every 549 individuals. While the average density for the districts with the lowest HZDS support was higher (1/434), the variations within the districts suggest that other factors may be more influential. In fact the densities of civil society organizations in districts with the lowest support for the HZDS are many of the districts

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with the fewest civil society organizations in Slovakia. The following table illustrates the districts with the lowest electoral support for the HZDS and their organizational densities.

**Table 2: Districts with the Lowest Electoral Support for the HZDS in the 1998 Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>HZDS Votes in 1998 (%) (under 20%)</th>
<th>Mečiar votes in Presidential Election</th>
<th>Density of NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dunajská Streda (TN)</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>1/388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komárno (NA)</td>
<td>6.51</td>
<td>8.23</td>
<td>1/385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Košice (KO)</td>
<td>13.94</td>
<td>17.54</td>
<td>1/270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rimavská Sobota (BC)</td>
<td>14.15</td>
<td>24.16</td>
<td>1/404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Šaľa (NA)</td>
<td>15.06</td>
<td>24.22</td>
<td>1/625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rožňava (KO)</td>
<td>17.21</td>
<td>24.14</td>
<td>1/305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trebišov (KO)</td>
<td>17.37</td>
<td>23.96</td>
<td>1/669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Košice okolie (KO)</td>
<td>17.65</td>
<td>21.06</td>
<td>1/606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revúca (BC)</td>
<td>18.50</td>
<td>30.71</td>
<td>1/382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lučenec (BC)</td>
<td>18.65</td>
<td>29.54</td>
<td>1/406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levice (NA)</td>
<td>18.86</td>
<td>29.45</td>
<td>1/380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skalica (TN)</td>
<td>18.98</td>
<td>33.48</td>
<td>1/483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bratislava (BA)</td>
<td>19.04</td>
<td>29.12</td>
<td>1/129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nové Zámky (NA)</td>
<td>19.22</td>
<td>29.48</td>
<td>1/560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galanta (TN)</td>
<td>19.23</td>
<td>29.46</td>
<td>1/543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senec (BA)</td>
<td>19.71</td>
<td>29.97</td>
<td>1/417</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The districts of Šaľa (1/625), Trebišov (1/669) and Košice-okolie (1/606) have very low levels of civil society organizations even though the inhabitants in these districts have given comparatively low levels of support to the HZDS throughout the 1990s.

Furthermore, the district of Zlaté Moravce, which, exhibited significant support for the HZDS has a relatively high density of civil society organizations. Overall it appears that a strong correlation between areas assumed to have a higher incidence of authoritarian

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308 Ibid.
values, that is those districts with high levels of support for the HZDS, and per capita numbers of civil society organizations, does not exist. Neither the district level analysis of political culture nor the examination of the constancy of certain political attitudes and orientations in Slovakia have been shown to have definably impacted either the regional variations in civil society or the continual aggregate growth of civil society. Although this study recognizes its limitations, and appreciates that further study may reveal a strong correlation between political culture and civil society, from the results of this study a strong correlation between political culture and civil society has failed to materialize.

This thesis has also investigated a third factor which it asserted would affect civil society. This hypothesis rests in the assumption that individuals who have incurred significant costs from the economic transition in post-communist countries, and have suffered a loss of economic security will be less apt to be committed to public participation, and thus civil society. Since 1989, the Slovak economy has suffered from the fact that it was mostly industrialized during the communist regime, and despite certain macro-economic indicators, which have exhibited positive development, there have been significant socio-economic costs for many Slovaks. The most acute problem has been the increasing unemployment rate. Incessant unemployment has also been coupled with a low frequency of jobs, decreasing real wages and lower standards of living. Similar to the results with political elite factors and political culture, the deepening of economic dislocation, as could be interpreted by the rising unemployment rate has not appeared to have negatively impacted the national aggregate numbers of civil society as the latter has also shown continual growth. However, the economic transition
in Slovakia has been felt unevenly throughout the country, and there are great
economic disparities between Slovakia's regions and districts.

This thesis holds as its third hypothesis that there will be a correlation between the
levels of socio-economic dislocation sustained in transition and the aggregate per capita
numbers of civil society organizations at the district level. To be sure, the methodology
employed to assess this hypothesis will also make an ecological inference since
individual data on citizens active in civil society organizations has not been found.
However, based on the substantial district level differences in both unemployment and
standards of living, this thesis will compare the economic performance of a district with
its aggregate levels of civil society organizations.

Unemployment rates range dramatically throughout Slovakia. In greater
Bratislava the unemployment rate in March 2001 was 5.4%. However in other districts,
unemployment rates were over 30%. The seven districts that had unemployment rates
over 30% in March 2001 were Rimavská Sobota (37%), Revúca and Veľký Krtiš (34%),
Tresbisov and Rožňava (33%), Sobrance (32%), and Michalovce (31%). The first three
are located in southern areas of the region of Banská Bystrica while the last four are
located in the region of Košice. [Appendix 14: Table 18] The following table illustrates
the districts with the highest unemployment rates, and their organizational densities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: High Unemployment and Organizational Density³⁰⁹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rimavská Sobota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revúca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veľký Krtiš</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trebišov</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³⁰⁹ Unemployment rates from Vybrané údaje o regionoch v Slovenskej republice, 40-41.
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rožňava</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sobrance</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michalovce</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Košice-OK</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vranov nad Topľou</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelnica</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A comparison of the unemployment rates for the ten Slovak districts with the highest unemployment with their organizational densities reveal that the average density for these districts is one organization for every 492 inhabitants. Although the districts of Trebišov (1/669) and Sobrance (1/703) exhibit extremely low organizational densities, other districts inflicted with exorbitant unemployment reveal relatively higher densities. For example the districts of Rimavská Sobota (1/404), and particularly Revúca (1/382) and Veľký Krtiš (1/332) have organizational densities relatively close to the Slovak average (1/342). Moreover in the case of Veľký Krtiš, the district with the third highest unemployment rate has an organizational density higher than the Slovak average.

In contrast, there were 29 districts that had unemployment rates below the national average (19.2%) in March 2001. Of these, 6 districts had unemployment rates of 10% or lower. These were Piešťany (10%), Senec (8.3%), Ilava (8.2%), Trenčín (7.8%), Pezinok (7.3%) and Bratislava (5.4%). These districts are all located in the western regions of Slovakia. Furthermore, Pezinok, Senec and Bratislava are located in the most economically successful region, Bratislava. The table below illustrates the districts with the lowest unemployment rates and their organizational densities. In comparison with the average density for the districts with the highest unemployment rates (1/492), the average organizational density for the districts with the lowest unemployment rates is one organization for every 356 inhabitants. To be sure, this average is very close to the
national average (1/342). Furthermore four of the ten districts below list organizational densities higher than the Slovak average. On the other hand, the district of Púchov is notable. While Púchov has an unemployment rate of 13%, it has a significantly low level of per capita civil society organizations (1/560).

Table 4: Low Unemployment and Organizational Density

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate, March 31, 2001</th>
<th>Organization Density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nové Mesto nad Váhom</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tmava</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Púchov</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banská Bystrica</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piešťany</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senec</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilava</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trenčín</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pezinok</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bratislava</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference between the average organizational density of the districts with the highest unemployment rates (1/492) with those districts with the lowest unemployment rates (1/356) reveals that, on average there are 136 more individuals per organization in the districts with high unemployment rates. However, this thesis will also examine if standards of living have affected organizational density. The share of households with washing machines is taken as the most appropriate standard of living indicator, as a washing machine is on the one hand, a fairly basic commodity, but on the other hand, not an essential amenity. Furthermore, it may be assumed that households would have the sole financial responsibility of providing their own washing machine. The following

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310 Ibid.
The table illustrates the districts with the lowest share of households with washing machines and their organizational densities.

**Table 5: Lowest Share of Households with Washing Machines and Organizational Density**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>% of households with washing machines</th>
<th>Organizations Density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medzilaborce</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nové Zámky</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trebišov</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelnica</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Čadca</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rimavská Sobota</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bytča</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levice</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veľký Krtíš</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revúca</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ten districts with the lowest share of households with washing machines are located in the eastern region of Košice (Trebišov and Gelnica); the eastern borderlands of the Prešov region (Medzilaborce); the northern borderlands in the region of Žilina (Čadca and Bytča); the southern borderlands of the Banská Bystrica region (Rimavská Sobota, Veľký Krtíš, and Revúca); and the southern borderlands in the region of Nitra (Nové Zámky, and Levice). With the exceptions of Veľký Krtíš and Revúca, the districts with the lowest shares of households with washing machines, also have significantly low organizational densities. On average, under half of the households (48%) in these districts stated that they possessed washing machines in the 2001 Slovak census. In comparison the average organizational density in these districts is one organization for every 503 individuals. Interestingly, this appears to be the strongest relationship this

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thesis has uncovered. Furthermore, this relationship is reinforced by the organizational densities in the districts, which record the highest share of households in possession of a washing machine. The following table illustrates the organizational density of those districts, which record the highest incidence of washing machines among households.

Table 6: Highest Share of Households with Washing Machine and Organizational Density

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>% of households with washing machines</th>
<th>Organization Density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Žiar nad Hronom</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liptovský Mikuláš</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senec</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Košice</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prievidza</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pezinok</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poprad</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banská Bystrica</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zvolen</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bratislava</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In comparison with the ten districts with the lowest incidence of household washing machines, on average 70% of households have washing machines in the ten districts with the highest incidence of this commodity. Furthermore the average organizational density in these districts is one organization for every 311 individuals. The standard of living indicator, then, appears to have the strongest relationship with the aggregate numbers of per capita civil society organizations. In the districts with the lowest share of household washing machines, there are 192 more individuals per organization than in those districts with high incidences of washing machines. An examination of districts with the lowest organizational densities furthers supports the 

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312 Ibid.
claim that socio-economic factors have the strongest relationship to civil society. The following table illustrates the Slovak districts which have the lowest organizational densities.

**Table 7: Slovak Districts with Lowest Organizational Densities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Organizational Density</th>
<th>Unemployment rate, March 31, 2001</th>
<th>% of households with washing machine</th>
<th>% of HZDS votes in 1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Námostovo</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>39.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sobrance</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>39.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trebišov</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>17.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bytča</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Šafa</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>15.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabinov</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>32.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kežmarok</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>23.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Čadca</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>54.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detva</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>42.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Košice-OK</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>17.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelnica</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>35.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partizánske</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>36.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Púchov</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>45.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nové Zámky</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>19.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Average</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The districts with the lowest organizational densities are located in the regions of Žilina (Bytča, Namestovo and Čadca), Prešov (Sabinov and Kezmarok), Košice (Sobrance, Trebišov, Košice Okolie, and Gelnica), Nitra (Nové Zámky, and Šafa), Banská Bystrica (Detva), and Trenčín (Púchov and Partizánske). Overall the indicators for unemployment, standard of living and HZDS support in these districts support the initial hypotheses of this thesis. These districts on average have an unemployment rate of 24.11%, and awarded an average of 33.4% of the electoral votes to the HZDS in the 1998 elections. Furthermore, on average 53% of households in these districts are in possession
of a washing machine. The following table illustrates the same indicators for the districts with the highest organizational densities.

Table 8: Slovak Districts with the Highest Organizational Densities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Organizational Density</th>
<th>Unemployment rate, March 31, 2001</th>
<th>% of households with washing machine</th>
<th>% of HZDS votes in 1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trenčín</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>38.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poprad</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veľký Krtiš</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>20.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Žilina</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>36.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolný Kubín</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>30.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trnava</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>32.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Žiar nad Hronom</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>37.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zvolen</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>26.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>26.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rožňava</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>17.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banská Stiavnica</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>34.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Košice</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>13.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liptovský Mikuláš</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>29.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banská Bystrica</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>22.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zlaté Moravce</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>42.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bratislava</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>19.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Average</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All eight of Slovakia’s regions are represented in the districts with the highest organizational density. However Banská Bystrica (Veľký Krtiš, Žiar nad Hronom, Zvolen, Banská Stiavnica and Banská Bystrica) has the most districts with the highest organizational densities. This is followed by the region of Žilina (Martin, Liptovský Mikuláš, Dolný Kubín and Žilina); the region of Košice (Rožňava and Košice); Trnava (Trnava); Prešov (Poprad); Nitra (Zlaté Moravce); Trenčín (Trenčín) and Bratislava (Bratislava). In comparison with those areas with the lowest organizational densities, these districts exhibit on average a lower unemployment rate (18.3%), more households
with washing machines (64.3%) and lower support for the HZDS in the 1998 elections (28%). The following table reveals the correlations between civil society organizational density and the three independent variables measured in this thesis.\textsuperscript{313}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9: Correlation between Organizational Density and Measures of Political Culture and Socio-Economic Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Density (Low Density)</strong> Pearson Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote for HZDS (1998) (High Vote)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.259*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.

The correlation between electoral support for the HZDS and civil society organizational density is the weakest. To be sure there are several districts with high organizational densities that have demonstrated an above average level of support for the HZDS, but, nonetheless, there is still a statistically significant correlation between high vote for the HZDS in the district and low organizational density. The correlations between unemployment and standard of living indicators and organizational density are stronger. The strongest correlation is between percentage of households with washing machines, as a standard of living indicator, and organizational density. These correlations reinforce the earlier calculations presented in this chapter. Thus, the strongest relationship is between civil society and standard of living, followed by

\textsuperscript{313} The correlation is measured by the Pearson's correlation statistic. The districts constituting the city of Bratislava (I-V) were combined into one unit as was the districts constituting the city of Košice (I-V). Data analysis conducted by Dr. Joan DeBardeleben.
unemployment rates and finally political values. It is then assumed that of the three initial hypotheses held by this thesis that socio-economic indicators have proven to be the most influential variable on civil society. The districts with the lowest densities of civil society organizations are also generally those that have a lower standard of living and significant unemployment rates. In comparison, the effects of political elite attitudes and political culture on Slovak civil society have not figured as prominently as this thesis primarily expected. Thus, in the case of Slovakia, it appears that socio-economic indicators, particularly the standard of living indicator, have displayed the strongest correlation with the district disparities in civil society.
Conclusions

Starting from the assumption that civil society exists as an empirically reality, that is the collective sum of civil society organizations, this thesis has sought to discover what factors influence civil society. Despite the proliferation of studies on civil society, few works have either examined or postulated what factors may contribute or hinder the development of civil society. For that reason this thesis has aimed to add to the literature on civil society by examining factors that may have affected civil society in Slovakia since 1993. Through its exploration of civil society in Slovakia in the post-communist period this thesis has tested the assertions that political elite attitudes and the political environment, political culture and values, and socio-economic dislocation will affect civil society. In the end the results of this investigation have not entirely supported the initial hypotheses.

Firstly, the effects of political elite attitudes and the political environment have not manifested in the manner that was expected. To be sure, Slovak civil society has been far more engaged with the government since 1998. This development certainly confirms the initial hypothesis. However, the hostile attitudes and actions aimed at thwarting civil society espoused by the 1994-1998 government did not successfully hinder the development of civil society in Slovakia. Instead it impelled civil society to unify and cooperate against the government, thus fostering the internal development of civil society. This result is significantly different from the initial hypothesis that assumed that hostile attitudes on the part of political elites would, in fact, hinder civil society. Although this thesis has not examined the cause of these results, they do propel certain questions to the forefront since they are in opposition to civil society theory. Further
study may examine the relationship between foreign funding and the developments of
civil society in Slovakia. For example, foreign donors provided the grants behind the
OK' 98 campaign, and many of the most prominent and politically engaged civil society
organizations in Slovakia are funded or related to foreign organizations in some manner.
The effects of foreign funding in the development of civil society in Slovakia remain an
important topic.

Secondly, through its examination of political culture, this thesis has concluded
that political culture and values have not appeared to have impacted Slovak civil society.
The constancy of the values and attitudes assumed to impede public participation has not
been reflected in the aggregate data on Slovak civil society organizations. Furthermore
although the examination of votes for the HZDS at the district level has revealed a
statistically significant correlation with civil society density, support for the HZDS has
actually has been demonstrated to have the weakest correlation with civil society density.
To be sure, limitations on available data precluded this thesis from examining the
political values of individuals engaged in civil society organizations, and this thesis
recognizes that it has made assumptions on individual behaviour. If a future study could
access this type of information, that is, studies or public opinion polls of individuals
active in civil society organizations, the conclusions of this thesis may be either
reinforced or refuted. Further studies could also attempt to analyze the relationship
between political culture and civil society through national comparisons. A study
examining the prevalence of authoritarian values in Slovakia as compared with its
Visegrad neighbours and the aggregate levels of civil society in these states would be
very compelling.
Thirdly, this thesis has found that of the three factors it suggested would impact civil society, the strongest relationship has been found between aggregate levels of civil society organizations and socio-economic indicators. Data analysis has shown that the correlation between unemployment rates and civil society at the district level are significant. Unemployment rates are substantially varied across Slovakia, and the regions with the lowest organizational densities are often those with the considerable unemployment rates. Furthermore, variations in standard of living indicators have demonstrated the strongest relationship with civil society density. The correlation between the percentage of households with washing machines and civil society organizations at the district level were the most robust. This thesis, then, concludes that of its initial three factors, the assertion that socio-economic indicators influence civil society has received the most compelling support. However, this assertion does raise a fundamental question related to the assertions Robert Putnam made in his study of Italy’s regions. That is, do economics affect civil society, or does civil society affect economics. This thesis normatively assumes that economics affect civil society, and would also claim that the relationship between unemployment rates and civil society suggests this causal interpretation. As civil society and unemployment are both relative new phenomena, that is, neither effectively or officially existed under communism economics, it would seem that in the areas with higher unemployment and lower standards of living, civil society has failed to manifest as densely as it has elsewhere. Furthermore, that civil society is a new phenomenon seems to suggest that it has not been able to affect economic indicators, but is most likely to have been affected by economic indicators. Thus, the conclusions of
this study of Slovak civil society in the 1990s strongly supports the hypothesis that economic factors impact civil society.

These conclusions promote further study to analyze the relationship between socio-economic costs of transition and civil society. Analysis of the relationship between socio-economic indicators and civil society through national comparisons would yield compelling results. Specifically a comparison between the Slovak and Czech Republics, or among the Visegrad members might reveal significant results. Furthermore, the influence of foreign donorship and the regional variations in civil society organizations should also be examined. In addition to influencing the political development of civil society in Slovakia, foreign donors may have also impacted the geographical development of Slovak civil society. A study closely examining the geographical disbursement of civil society funding is also warranted. The relationship between economic development and civil society in Slovakia would also benefit from a more in depth study of a much smaller number of districts. There are not only economic divergences between Slovakia’s districts, but also demographic, ethnic, and cultural divergences.

Since the Velvet Divorce the aggregate numbers of Slovak civil society organizations have risen dramatically. Moreover, in qualitative terms, Slovak civil society has also appeared to have attained a noteworthy degree of political engagement since 1998. Despite these positive trends, however, a substantial range in civil society organizational densities exists among Slovakia’s districts. In order to ascertain the causes of these divergences in civil society densities in Slovakia’s districts this thesis has examined organizational density in relation to political culture and values, and socio-
economic indicators at the district level. From this survey, socio-economic factors, and in particular, standard of living, have demonstrated the strongest correlation to civil society. These results, then, reinforce the theoretical assertions that socio-economic factors will be the most influential factor on civil society. To be sure, these results may bring significant consequences as they buttress the long asserted correlation between affluence and economic security with, public participation and, thus civil society, and in turn, for many scholars, democratic stability.
Appendix 1: Table 10: Fields of Activity of NGOs in Slovakia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fields of Activity</th>
<th>% of Total NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>18.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td>10.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation and Leisure</td>
<td>9.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling</td>
<td>7.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>6.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>3.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charity</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and Technology</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>2.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community Initiatives</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third Sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arts and Culture</td>
<td>7.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>7.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These organizations each represented less than 1.5% of the total and included organizations dealing with the fields of religion, international solidarity, social and political sciences, state management, housing and urbanization, worker’s mediation, professional chambers and community initiatives.

Source: SAIA-SCTS, August 6, 2001
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAP LEGEND</th>
<th>ZM</th>
<th>Zlaté Moravce</th>
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<th>Snina</th>
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<td>SB</td>
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</tr>
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<td>ST</td>
<td>Stropkov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Bratislava I-V</td>
<td>SV</td>
<td>Svidník</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Malacky</td>
<td>VT</td>
<td>Vranov nad Topľou</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>PZ</td>
<td>Pezinok</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Senec</td>
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<td>Hlohovec</td>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Michalovce</td>
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<td>PY</td>
<td>Piešťany</td>
<td>RZ</td>
<td>Rožnava</td>
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<td>Senica</td>
<td>SB</td>
<td>Sobrance</td>
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<td>Skalica</td>
<td>SV</td>
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<td>Trebišov</td>
</tr>
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<td>Žilina Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trenčín Region</td>
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<td>Bánovce nad</td>
<td>BY</td>
<td>Bytča</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Bebravou</td>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Čadca</td>
</tr>
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<td>IL</td>
<td>Ilava</td>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Dolný Kubín</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Myjava</td>
<td>KM</td>
<td>Kysucké Nové</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NV</td>
<td>Nové Mesto</td>
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<td>nad Váhom</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Partizánske</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PB</td>
<td>Považská</td>
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### Appendix 3: Table 11: Percent of Population and NGOs by Region

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*Totals are within +/- 1% due to rounding.

Appendix 4: Table 12: Population and NGO Fields of Activity by Region

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*Totals are within +/- 1% due to rounding.
APPENDIX 5: FIGURE 2: CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONAL DENSITY
## Appendix 6: Table 13: Organization Density by District

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Source: Population statistics from *Vybrané údaje o regionoch v Slovenskej republike, 66-67*; data on civil society organizations from registry of Ministry of Interior at the http://www.civil.gov.sk.
Appendix 7: Figure 3: Public Trust in Institutions

Appendix 8: Tables 14 and 15: Measurement of Authoritarian Values

The following tables are the results of opinion polls, which gave respondents the choice between statements A and B. In addition some individuals chose a third option, that is, respondents stated that they did not know.

A. Patience during negotiations is important to politics

B. Decisiveness and the firm hand of a strong personality is important

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<th>Year</th>
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<th>% of respondents who do not know</th>
<th>% of respondents who agreed with B</th>
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<td>2001</td>
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A. A politician should never act contrary to the law

B. In the interest of the people a politician can sometimes breach the law

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<th>% of respondents who do not know</th>
<th>% of respondents who agreed with B</th>
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### Appendix 9: Table 16: Party Support by Region

**Party Support by Region, April 1999**

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### Appendix 9: Figure 4: Support for HZDS by Region (1999 and 2000)

**Support for HZDS by Region**

- *in order to establish long-standing support in a region, an average for the polls per year is cited. Author’s own calculations. Source: *Názory* 11:2 and 11:4 (2000).*
Appendix 9: Figure 5: Support for HZDS in Trenčín (1999 and 2000)

HZDS Support in Trenčín

*Smer was established in 2000. The above are the most popular parties, minimal support and non-decided percentages are not included. Source: Názory (2000) 11:2: 11:4. KDH numbers missing are due to the inclusion of KDH in SDK in polls from March to May 1999. Numbers for SMER are from the end of 2000.

Appendix 9: Figure 6: Support for HZDS in Prešov (1999 and 2000)

Party Support in Prešov

Appendix 9: Figure 7: Support for HZDS in Žilina (1999 and 2000)

HZDS Support in Žilina


Appendix 9: Figure 8: Trust in Mečiar by Region

Trust in Mečiar by Region (April 1999)

Source: Názory (1999) 1:10. (Bratislava), TC (Trenčín), ZI (Žilina), PS (Prešov), KO (Košice), BB (Banská Bystrica), NA (Nitra), and TA (Trnava).
Appendix 9: Figure 9: 1998 Electoral Results

1998 Electoral Results

APPENDIX 10: FIGURE 10: STANDARD OF LIVING BY DISTRICT
As Measured by Percentage of Households with Washing Machines

- 0-10%
- 11-20%
- 21-30%
- 31-40%
- 41-50%
- 51-60%
- 61-70%
- 70% and over
APPENDIX 11: FIGURE 11: UNEMPLOYMENT BY DISTRICT

- above 30.1
- 15.1-19.2
- 25.1-30
- under 15
- 19.3-25
APPENDIX 12: FIGURE 12: HZDS SUPPORT IN THE 1998 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS BY DISTRICT
### Appendix 13: Table 17: HZDS Support and Organizational Density by District

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A) Percent of electoral support for the HZDS in the 1998 parliamentary elections  
B) Percent of electoral support for Mečiar in the 1999 presidential elections  
C) Organization density, individuals per organization
### Appendix 14: Table 18: Economic Indicators and Organizational Density

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B) Index for standard of living, percentage of households with washing automatic washing machines.  
C) Density of civil society organizations.
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Foreign Broadcast FBIS-EEU


*The Slovak Spectator* [January 1998-September 2001].


