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Abstract

Through examining both theoretical and practical approaches, this project explores how practices of security perpetuate the use of violence within international relations. It contends that the process of securitization, combined with the tendency to preserve political order and (privileged) identities, perpetuates delineations of identities into categories of friend and enemy within politics, which subsequently necessitates (violent) security responses beyond constituted political norms. An evaluation of state-centric formulations of security suggests that such notions may be outdated in the advent of globalization, and that more appropriate means to address political problems may be required. Consequently, a cosmopolitan notion of security is proposed. In evaluating these theoretical approaches to security, and three policy approaches to the transnational security problem of genocide, it is demonstrated that violence is an intrinsic component of security. Although imperfect, cosmopolitan notions of global civil society maintain the potential to move towards a politics with less violence.
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Introduction

The world will not evolve past its current state of crisis by using the same thinking that created the situation.

~ Albert Einstein
CHALLENGING (IN)SECURITY

A quick assessment of the political world around us suggests that security remains an integral, and contentious, practice within international relations. New dangers continuously emerge, including threats to nation states and those that are deemed transnational in character, and perpetuate the practice of security. The emergence of problems that are deemed global in nature challenge the utility of state-centric security practices, and suggest that a new approach to, or an extension of, security is needed. Likewise, academic and policy debates assert that security should be reconceptualized to account for the changing nature of the threat environment. Concerns regarding the environment, sustainable development and human rights, are but a few examples of the more recent challenges to security. The emergence of transnational threats questions the usefulness, and narrowness, of state-centric notions of security in a world that is progressively considered interconnected. Moreover, the shift in recent academic and policy debates questions the necessity of a practice predicated upon military preparedness and strategizing, and rooted in Cold War thinking. The question here is simply whether state-centric notions of security offer a useful approach to deal with problems that are global in nature, or whether – as many academics and policy-makers would suggest – a new approach, or extension of the present one, is required.

Recent security efforts suggest that the focus of security is extending from state-centric notions to include the protection of human rights. It would thus appear that notions of security are changing to account for problems that are characterized as global. What has not changed, are the security responses to such problems – rather they remain articulated in military terms. As Simon Dalby asks in his questioning of the concept of...
security, "The question then is whether, in the process of extending the ambit of threats requiring a military response, one is not further militarizing society rather than dealing more directly with political difficulties."\(^1\) Extending this question further, one can ask whether security practices can respond to global problems without utilizing a military response? A quick analysis of past and present security practices would suggest that the answer to this question is no, and that practices of security are rooted in militaristic discourse, and consequently address threats with a military response. What is interesting to note here, is that responding in a militaristic fashion, often contributes to, or worsens, the very problem that practitioners of security claim to be solving. Take for example the transnational problem of the environment. As Dalby suggests, the use of a military response in seeking to address environmental problems in actuality contributes to the further degradation of the very environment such security practices claim to be seeking to preserve.\(^2\)

The question of what the referent object(s) of security practices are presents itself here. For contributing to, or worsening, the very situations they claim to be working to resolve seems antithetical to the preservation of the referent objects of security. The question thus arises of why have military responses remained the dominant approach to dealing with threats to security? It can be argued that such practices are invoked to maintain the (powerful) identities of developed countries, and the political order of international relations in which these identities are sustained.

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\(^2\) Ibid: 9.
PRESERVING ORDER, SUSTAINING (PRIVILEGED) IDENTITIES

The current political order of international relations can be interpreted as being divided between privileged and under-privileged regions and territorialities. It can further be argued that the identity of privileged areas are formulated in opposition, and in relation to, under-privileged and other regions. In order to understand this theoretical claim, the notion of identity will be explored briefly here.

What is identity? Identity is what allows us to make distinctions amongst ourselves, and our surroundings. It is integral to who we are, and who we are not. Political theorist David Campbell asserts that “Identity is an inescapable dimension of being. No body could be without it.”

Identity is thus what permits us to be human. Identity is what allows us to form relations with one another. Identity is ephemeral in nature, and is enabled by difference. In Identity/Difference, political theorist William Connolly asserts that,

An identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized. These differences are essential to its being. If they did not coexist as differences, it would not exist in its distinctness and solidity. Entrenched in this indispensable relation is a second set of tendencies, themselves in need of exploration, to congeal established identities into fixed forms, thought and lived as if their structure expressed the true order of things. When these pressures prevail the maintenance of one identity (or field of identities) involves the conversion of some differences into otherness, into evil, or one of its numerous surrogates. Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self certainty.


The above quote suggests that difference is integral to the formulation of identity. Furthermore, Connolly suggests that Otherness is central to identity. Yet not all difference is interpreted as otherness. The question that arises here, is what permits difference to be interpreted as otherness? The italicized text above insinuates that when difference becomes interpreted as deviating from the specified norm of what is construed to be ‘true’, it becomes characterized as the evil, bad, or enemy Other.

In seeking to understand international relations in accordance with identity, I will read the privileged/under-privileged territorial divide as a fixed order of things resulting from the tendency to coagulate identities into established forms. Moreover, I will read the practice of security as resulting from the pressures that exist within international relations, and amongst international actors, to maintain the privileged identities within international relations. As Connolly suggests above, interpreting difference as otherness becomes central to preserving a set of fixed identities. Otherness thus becomes integral to maintaining political order within international relations, and can be read as those areas that do not fit within the constituted norms of political order. It is these areas, and those deemed responsible for the activity within them, that become interpreted as other, as evil, as threatening.

The question of what motivates the political action of security is paramount amongst international relations scholars and theorists, who seek to explain and interpret the security practices of nation states. Carl Schmitt, a political theorist, asserts that “The specific political distinction to which political actions can be reduced is that between
friend and enemy. Schmitt contends, and it is agreed with here, that this distinction is but one of many factors that can motivate political action. The question of what motivates political actions is vast, and as such cannot be contended with within a single attempt. Rather, this discussion is concerned with the motivation behind the political action of security.

Each approach to security requires the articulation of a threat. Security thus necessitates the interpretation of difference as otherness. The creation of a security issue is a two-fold process, involving a securitizing move consisting of the successful articulation of a threat, and the securitization of an issue through the subsequent acceptance by the general public that it is indeed a threat.

As a speech-act, securitization has a specific structure which in practice limits the theoretically unlimited nature of “security.” These constraints operate along three lines. First, while the securitization process is in principle completely open (any “securitizing actor” can attempt to securitize any issue and referent object), in practice it is structured by the differential capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats, by the forms in which these claims can be made in order to be recognized and accepted as convincing by the relevant audience, and by the empirical factors or situations to which these actors can make reference.

Michael Williams asserts that this process of securitization is one based in the realist tradition of political theorist Carl Schmitt, and claims that “The focus on “existential threats” as the essence of security echoes Schmitt’s views on the specificity of “politics

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as defined by exclusion and enmity." The suggestion here is that the securitization of a threat, and the necessary response of security, parallels the friend/enemy divide raised within the Schmittian concept of the political. The existential threat mirrors the enemy, which is deemed as being a threatening, evil, Other that deviates from a constituted norm, and which seeks to harm the referent object of security. It is precisely the interpretation of some difference as otherness within international relations that permits identities to be privileged and subjugated, and political order to be maintained. The interpretation of difference as otherness thus permits the construction of an existential threat, or an enemy. Schmitt asserts that the enemy "...is nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specifically intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in extreme case conflicts with him are possible." In construing that which is different to be an enemy Other, the practice of security enables the use of violence against that which is deemed to be threatening in character. For as Schmitt asserts in the quote above, interpreting difference as otherness allows for conflict to be utilized against that characterized as Other.

The political world is rich with difference, and with otherness. In considering interpretations of threats and identity, it becomes obvious that actions construed as threats are those considered to be deviant from the specified norm of the political order of international relations. Otherness is threatening and necessitates the political response of security, implemented in the form of acts exceeding normal procedures, that function to

7 Ibid: 515.
8 Ibid: 516.
9 Schmitt: 27.
sustain political order. Typically, these acts involve the exertion of violence, in the form of a military response.

SECURITY IN TODAY'S WORLD: NEW RATIONALE, SAME END

Traditionally, the focus of security has been state-centric, however notions of security are changing. Tragic events such as the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Darfur, have placed the issue of humanitarian intervention on the forefront of international politics. These gross violations of human rights have been articulated as constituting a global security concern that necessitates a response from the international community. As a result, numerous attempts seeking to address such travesties in terms of international responsibility have been initiated. The (re)articulation of human life as the referent object of (global) security, that must be protected from the threat of genocide, is at the basis of such approaches. Humanitarian interventions are presented and read here as practices of global (human) security.

Humanitarian intervention is not the subject of this thesis. However, situations designated as (not) requiring intervention serve as a means to illustrate the assumptions of this study. The question of how many lives must be threatened or lost before an intervention is necessitated invokes questions of identity? When is the action of mass killing interpreted as requiring a security response? Who is responsible for stopping and preventing such travesties? Traditionally, (human) security has been the practice of privileged countries – i.e. modern European and Western states. Not surprisingly then, it is these states that assume responsibility for the practice of humanitarian intervention. If we accept the argument that practices of security protect order and identity, the following

10 Williams: 516.
question arises: Do situations exist where the preservation of order, and (privileged) identities within international relations take precedence over the protection of human life? What is interpreted as a threat, or as an enemy is central to this discussion, and enables the theme of this thesis: that violence is a corollary of the practice of security.

The notion of responsibility is crucial to the practice of humanitarian intervention, and thus to the formulations of security that will be discussed here. Michael Ignatieff suggests that humanitarian intervention, and notions of responsibility, are guises for imperial tendencies seeking to maintain political order within international relations. As such, his work will be drawn upon throughout this discussion to illustrate the imperial tendencies inherent within notions of humanitarian intervention and responsibility. Moreover, as imperialism is a violent practice, Ignatieff's arguments will be used to support the contention that violence is a corollary of security. What is interesting about Ignatieff however, is his argument that imperialistic tendencies are necessary within today's chaotic world to reach a world in which such practices are not necessitated. The suggestion here is that violence, exercised to constitute order within international relations, is a precondition to peace. This argument appears paradoxical in nature, as does the notion of using military responses - i.e. violence - against humans to protect human life. These arguments are much like those presented at the beginning of this discussion illustrating the tension inherent within security practices aimed at environmental preservation.

12 Ibid: 126.
If the practice of security is utilized to maintain political order and (privileged) identities, then it would follow that a political world of self-rulled people will never emerge. Rather, it can be contended that security practices are self-referential, and will thus continue to maintain the political order embodied within the privileged/under-privileged territorial divide, and will use any means necessary to do so. This suggests that any (re)formulation of security results in the maintenance of political order and (privileged) identities within international relations. Moreover, it suggests that global security problems will continue to be addressed with militaristic responses – which in and of itself suggests that violence will remain an integral component of international relations.

The rest of this thesis seeks to analyze the concept of security, through considering the political consequences arising from its state-centric and cosmopolitan conceptualizations. The theme of this argument is that (re)formulations of security seek to preserve order and (privileged) identities within international relations, and consequently enable and perpetuate the use of violence.

This argument proposes that the privileging and subjugation of identities, embodied in the political distinction of friend/enemy, is central to the practice of security and the corresponding exercise of violence. The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that violence is a corollary of security, perpetuated by the preservation of order and (privileged) identities within international relations. Particular attention will be paid to the interpretation of difference as otherness, and the corresponding delineation of identities into categories of friend/enemy. Furthermore, this thesis will seek to explain how the interpretation of difference as otherness serves as a political motive for the
practice of security within international relations. In doing so, this thesis hopes to demonstrate that any articulation of (human) security is paradoxical, as it enables the use of violence against that deemed to be threatening.

Chapter One provides an overview and analysis of conventional state centric notions of security. It will be demonstrated that state-centric articulations of security seek to preserve order and (privileged) identities within international relations, and in doing so enable and perpetuate violence. As the United States is the current hegemonic identity within international relations, its security practices will be analyzed to show how they work(ed) to preserve that identity through the subjugation of Others. This chapter will also demonstrate that the focus of the security is expanding from the nation state to the protection of human life.

The first half of chapter two proposes a (re)articulation of the notion of security from the cosmopolitan theoretical perspective. As humans are declared to be the ultimate unit of concern within cosmopolitan theory, it was chosen for the (re)articulation of security. This chapter asserts that humanitarian intervention is the cosmopolitan tool of securitization. The second half of this chapter will argue that cosmopolitan articulations of security seek to maintain order and identities. Moreover, the imperialistic tendencies inherent within the notions of cosmopolitanism predicated on moral obligations will be analysed to demarcate how responsibility becomes a means by which to preserve order and (privileged) identities. It will be argued that the use of violence in the proclaimed aim of securitizing human life is ironic.

Chapters three to five consist of analyses of current international approaches to (human) security. Each case study will demonstrate that the protection of (privileged)
identities and order is inherent within each of these approaches to security, and subsequently enables the ironic use of violence. Chapter three will analyze the Canadian approach of The Responsibility to Protect. Chapter four will analyze the Dutch approach to security embodied within the report entitled Humanitarian Intervention. Chapter five will analyze the proposed Human Security Doctrine for Europe. Each of these approaches asserts their end to be the protection of human life from gross violations of human rights, and contend that a collaborative approach to global security is the means to do so. What is ironic about each of these approaches it that they enable and perpetuate the use of violence against that which they declare to be securing. Using violence against humans to protect humans contradicts and invalidates the very basis of these approaches. The paradox inherent within the practice of security is that it condemns humans to a continuous state of violence.

The conclusion of this thesis will contend that any approach to security seeks to preserve order and (privileged) identities within international relations, and as such perpetuates violence. This is because the practice of security requires difference to be interpreted as otherness, and thereby permits the use of violence. The privileging of identities, and the corresponding delineation of identities into categories of friend and enemy, condemns humans to a perpetual condition of violence. As asserted earlier, security is part and parcel of the practice of international relations, and thus violence is as well. This thesis will suggest that a new formulation of politics – one that is void of the concept of security - is needed in order to eradicate the use of violence amongst humans. In seeking to discuss what this formulation may entail, Mary Kaldor’s argument

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pertaining to global civil society as conversation will be engaged. Conversation thus becomes the alternative to Ignatieff's proclaimed need for empire as a means to a politics void of violence. The suggestion will be that we should be striving towards a politics within which we have covenants without swords.

This thesis attempts to address an omission within current examinations of security within international relations in two ways. First, this thesis aims to articulate a cosmopolitan approach to global security. It does so in order to illustrate that even such a humanistic approach to security results is paradoxical, as it perpetuates the use of violence in the preservation of identities and order within international relations. Secondly, this thesis analyzes current international approaches to security that are congruent with cosmopolitan notions of security. It argues that within each of these approaches the privileging and subjugation of identities occurs, and subsequently justifies the use of violence against those interpreted to be threatening to the maintenance of political order. This thesis will thus demonstrate that violence is a corollary of security.

Chapter One: Securing the Identity of the Sovereign Nation State

The political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence with another political entity.
~ Carl Schmitt

...sovereignty is not a fact. It is a concept which men in certain circumstances have applied – a quality which they have attributed or a claim they have counterposed – to the political power which they or other men are exercising.
~ F.H. Hinsley
Whether in the form of terrorism, environmental concerns or political action, the securitization of issues continues. Many of these threats have been characterized as global, and as requiring collaborative international security efforts. The emergence of, and attention given to these global threats suggests that security should be reformulated in less state-centric terms. This chapter will discuss conventional post Cold War security practices, and the changing nature of such practices. It will be argued that conventional state-centric security practices work to secure political order and (privileged) identities, and utilize violence to do so. Moreover, it will be contended that notions of duty and responsibility inherent within state-centric notions of security are imperialistic, and seek to preserve the political order. The delineation of identities into categories of friend and enemy will be analyzed to demarcate that security permits violence to be utilized against the latter. This argument will also suggest that the focus of security practices is changing from the sovereign nation state to the global protection of human rights.

CONTINGENT IDENTITIES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SOVEREIGN NATION STATES

International relations consists of the activities and relations that take place between nation states. The identity of international relations can thus be considered dependent on, and mutually constitutive of the identities of nation states. Inherent within the identity of the modern European state is the concept of Westphalian sovereignty, which Krasner defines as "...political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory."¹ This definition suggests that nation states need to consolidate power within a given territory, and thus require

boundaries separating jurisdictions of inside/outside. The power of the nation state is exercised within the inside jurisdiction and serves to keep that on the outside out. Delineating boundaries of where power can (not) be exercised helps preserve order within international relations. Mutually recognizing these boundaries further promotes the political order.

Difference allows for one state to define its identity in opposition, and in relation, to other territories. A sovereign nation state can be understood as a particular identity amongst a universal collectivity of similar territories that constitutes the international realm. The particular thus requires a universal, and vice versa. The question of what is considered part of the universal realm of international relations, and what is not presents itself here. Likewise, the question of what constitutes a (sovereign) nation state, and what does not, arises. Which territories are included within the universal of international relations, and which are excluded – and more importantly, why? Difference becomes invoked in two ways here. Those territories included within the universal of international relations are different from one another, but not other. Those territories excluded from are interpreted as other. Typically those territories interpreted as Other, are those that challenge the specified political order.

The principle of sovereignty is invoked in the process of mutual recognition, and can be understood as one defining – but not necessary - characteristic of a nation state.\(^2\) Sovereignty of a nation state is typically understood to mean autonomy over a region and consequently the loss of such autonomy equates to a loss of sovereignty. However, the

\(^2\) I say 'not necessary' here because it is possible for a state to lose its autonomy, and correspondingly its sovereignty (understood as in relation to autonomy) but not its identity of being a nation state.
notion of sovereignty in the context of international relations maintains a much deeper meaning than this. As sovereignty is one of the definitive characteristics of nation states, it correspondingly becomes an essential attribute of international relations.

Yet sovereignty is not just an idea. It is a way of speaking about the world, a way of acting in the world. It is central to the language of politics but also to the politics of language. It is part of the more general discourse of power whose function is not only to describe political and economic arrangements but to explain and justify them as if they belonged to the natural order of things. Sovereignty in both theory and practice is aimed at establishing order and clarity in an otherwise turbulent and incoherent world. Its historical function has been to act as 'a fundamental source of truth and meaning', to distinguish between order and anarchy, security and danger, identity and difference.3

Sovereignty is thus integral to the notions of the particular (the nation state) and the universal (the international realm).

Sovereignty, as both idea and institution, lies at the heart of the modern and therefore Western experience of space and time. It is integral to the structure of Western thought with its stress on 'dichotomies and polarities', and to a geopolitical discourse in which territory is sharply demarcated and exclusively controlled.4

The 'sovereign' identity associated with nation states lies at the heart of mutual recognition amongst these particulars. It is within the process of mutual recognition that difference arises, and subsequently allows for these differences to be interpreted as otherness. Mutual recognition also permits the political order to be maintained.

It must be recognized that the notion of sovereignty itself is contingent upon the rhetoric of international relations. Sovereignty is predicated upon defined territories, in

4 Ibid.
the form of nation states, that exist within the realm of international relations. "The spatial qualities of the state, understood as a geometric entity with precisely demarcated boundaries, is integral to the notion of sovereignty and to international relations theory."⁵ Sovereign nation states claim to be protecting these defined geographical areas and that which is inclusive within them. In doing so however, sovereignty establishes a basis for the identities of nation states and international relations, and itself as a corollary concept. As such sovereignty preserves political order, and the (privileged) identities constituted within it. Moreover it can be contended that sovereignty invokes a response beyond the constituted norms – in the form of security - as it involves the securitization of an issue, which it must work to ‘secure’ its citizens from.

SOVEREIGNTY: THE QUEST FOR (IN)SECURITY

The creation of any identity involves the corollary creation of an opposition to that identity, a designation of difference. Difference arises within the actions of sovereign nation states directed at the supposed securitization of autonomy; an autonomy acquired through keeping that designated to be ‘other’ or ‘dangerous’ out of the specified territory. Connolly asserts that “The definition of difference is a requirement built into the logic of identity, and the construction of otherness is a temptation that readily insinuates itself into that logic…”⁶ The interpretation of difference as otherness permits for the securitization of an issue.

One primary objective of sovereign nation states is to maintain the security of their territories and citizens. The practice of security requires two elements: a referent

⁵ Ibid: 238.
⁶ Connolly: 9.
object of security to be secured, and a threat that this object must be secured from. Conventional notions of security can be defined as the "...protection of a political community of some sort, community understood as a population with attributes in common." The referent object of state-centric notions of security can thus be understood to be a political community, in the form of sovereign nation states and their citizens. Threats emerge from difference being interpreted as otherness, an otherness necessary for the identity of sovereign nation states. For without the existence of threats, the practice of security, and the exercise of sovereignty, would not be required.

The discourse of sovereignty thus sets up the binary opposition of inside/outside, which ignites the discourse of (in)security, and perpetuates the political distinction of friend/enemy within international relations. Difference interpreted as otherness becomes that which 'we' – the constructed, dominant, common, sovereign identity – should protect ourselves from. The art of security lies in the notion of collectivity, in similarities, commonalities and predictabilities – (in)security is born from interpreting difference as otherness and exhibits itself in the form of collective fear. The designation of what is a threat – achieved through the securitization of an issue - and correspondingly that which we should fear, serves to constitute and reinforce the identity of nation states.

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8 Michael Dillon. “Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the “New World Order” to the Ethical Problematic of the World Order”, in Alternatives 20, 1995: 337.

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A successful securitization of an identity involves precisely the capacity to decide on the limits of a given identity, to oppose it to what it is not, to cast this as a relationship of a threat or even enmity, and to have this decision and declaration accepted by a relevant group. In the process of dividing between “us” and “them” the concept of societal security echoes the determination of friends and enemies beneath Schmitt’s concept of the political, and the acceptance of absolute decision in conditions of emergency.11

The securitization of issues in this manner becomes the basis for the political action of security.

The interpretation of difference as otherness allows a nation state to secure its own identity, and achieve legitimacy in the process. Campbell asserts that “The state grounds its legitimacy by offering the promise of security to its citizens, who, it says, would otherwise face manifold dangers.”12 The failure to acquire security thus defines the identity of the sovereign nation state as that entity which will protect its citizens from threats. Thus, the perpetuation of insecurity necessitates security - provided by a sovereign nation state to its citizens - against the threats posed by that interpreted to be the enemy Other. Citizens thus assume the dual identity of the object/subject of the nation state. The identity of the citizen-as-subject of a sovereign nation state occurs through the exercise of authority by a state over its citizens. The state thus has the purpose of providing governance to its citizens in exchange for their adherence to the laws and structures provided by the state. The alternate identity, the citizen-as-object of the nation state, occurs when the citizen is the purpose of the nation state. As the purpose – i.e. its raison d’être - of the state, the citizen essentially effectuates the survival and

11 Williams: 520.
12 Campbell: 50.
necessity of the state. In subjugating citizens, a nation state is essentially promising them security; whereas the objectification of citizens is what validates the existence of nation states. What is contentious here is that if a sovereign state were to achieve its alleged goal of security, the need for sovereignty would be eradicated.

Should the state project of security be successful in the terms in which it is articulated, the state would cease to exist. Security as the absence of movement would result in death via stasis. Ironically then, the inability of the state project to succeed is the guarantee of the state’s continued success as an impelling identity. The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to the state’s identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility.  

As illustrated by Campbell’s words, the creation of danger essentially turns into the political game of ‘keeping the bad guys out’. The practice of security is thus integral to the identity of the sovereign nation state, and correspondingly the order of international relations. The formulation of threats and the corresponding need for security also provides a milieu in which the political distinction of friend/enemy is unavoidable. Variations of difference become invoked within this political distinction. Difference that is not other, is not perceived as threatening. Not all differences are the same, and thus heterogeneous variations of ‘friends’ can exist within international relations. Difference interpreted as otherness becomes that which ‘we’ should fear, the enemy that poses a threat to the specified collectivity of territories that constitute the political order.

It can thus be suggested that conventional state-centric notions of security are thus self-referential, as their existence is predicated upon the continuous political articulation of threats. State-centric notions of security have a tendency to lead to the political

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12 Campbell: 12.
distinction of friend/enemy. The existence of an enemy necessitates the practice of security, and enables violent means to preserve political order.

FROM SECURITIZING TO SECURITIZATION: USING MEDIA TO GUIDE FOREIGN POLICY

The failure of a nation state to realize its goal of security is precisely what secures its identity as a sovereign nation state. This continued failure, and the identity of the sovereign nation state, is contingent upon the successful securitization of ‘threats’ against the state. As alluded to earlier, the emergence of ‘threats’ is a two-stage process, involving the identification of a threat against the state, and the subsequent acknowledgement that it is indeed a threat by the citizens of that state. “A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such.”14 Articulating otherness- i.e. what is a threat – is thus a securitizing move. Securitization occurs when the citizens of a nation state accept that the articulated threat is ‘real’, and thus necessitates political action in the form of security. In order to justify political actions made in the name of security, the governing body of a sovereign nation state must first articulate what the supposed threat is, and then convince its citizens that it does indeed pose a danger to them, or to their interests.

We do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps.

that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity.\textsuperscript{15}

The practice of security is thus contingent upon securitization. As the above quote illustrates, the process of securitization becomes the justification for the practice of security – be it in the form of precautions, or emergency measures. What is interesting to consider here, is which threats become designated as necessitating violence to subdue them, in the form of emergency measures? What is it that makes one security issue of greater importance than another? Williams contends that

Focusing on the speech \textit{act} highlights the decision to securitize an issue. While the background conditions for enabling securitization to take place must exist, a focus on decision highlights the explicitly \textit{political} nature of such a choice. Securitization can never be reduced to the conditions of its social accomplishment: it is an explicitly political choice and act (Waever, 2000: 252).\textsuperscript{16}

The process of securitization is thus a political act, which raises the question of what purpose does it serve to the entity articulating it as a threat? The contention here is that the securitization of an issue occurs when the political identity, and related interests, of an entity are challenged. The securitization of an issue has the corollary effect of necessitating a security response, in the form of measures exceeding the existing norms and procedures - i.e., emergency measures - to preserve that identity.

The relationship between particular forms of media and United States foreign policy during the Cold War is a salient example of using a threat to enable political action. Sharp illustrates the created need for foreign security policy as a response to the production of fear through her analysis of \textit{Reader's Digest} throughout the Cold War, in

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Williams: 520.
which she articulates that media was used to provoke fear within the readers of Reader’s Digest, so as to provide legitimacy for the American foreign policy in place at the time.\(^{17}\)

The articulation of fear through Reader’s Digest essentially helped constitute the American identity.\(^{18}\) This process involved the securitizing move of presenting the threat to the audience of Reader’s Digest, and the securitization of such a threat through the audience’s acceptance of the threat as posing a ‘real’ danger to them. Sharp contends that differences between Americans and Soviets were highlighted within the pages of Reader’s Digest in order to establish the American identity.

In the case of Reader’s Digest, as well as offering clearly political articles that explain international relations and threats to peace, the magazine provides another geographical context for the operations of political discourse in its descriptions of Americans and Soviet life. Ethnographic articles detail how unlike American Russians are, or how different life in the USSR is from life back home in the United States. Russians’ music is different, their food is different, their sense of humour is different...even their sex life is different. Through the constant creation of this ultimately different place on the pages of the Digest, a picture of a corresponding place – “America” – is created for the magazine’s readers.\(^{19}\)

The suggestion in Reader’s Digest was that the Russians were not like Americans – they were different – with the insinuation that they were also Other, and therefore a threat. The creation of the American identity in this manner served to formulate the basis for U.S. foreign policy. In demarcating how the American identity was constructed in this manner, Sharp also elaborates on how the notion of American ‘Manifest Destiny’ was


\(^{18}\) Ibid: xi.

\(^{19}\) Ibid: x.
correspondingly created. The Russians were interpreted as being the ‘evil’ enemy that posed a threat to Americans, and consequently, that which the U.S. government had to conquer in order to protect its citizens.\textsuperscript{20} “Just as Americans had triumphed over the wilderness of the continent during the frontier experience, so the continuing narration of American destiny necessitated triumph over other threats.”\textsuperscript{21} It is precisely these invocations of ‘Manifest Destiny’ that continuously emerge within the practice of international relations, in response to the securitization of issues.

Sharp argues that the characterization of threats through the media are still utilized in order to provide legitimacy for security practice, and asserts that “The narratives and images of the nation are constantly being reworked and rewritten and provide a vibrant discursive repertoire for political action.”\textsuperscript{22} The images and messages that Americans have received post-September 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2001 from media sources, such as CNN, which interpret U.S. press releases and foreign policy responses are a vivid example of this.

The discourse of American foreign policy and corresponding press releases, ranging from the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy to the latest State of the Union Address, can be understood as a securitizing move of articulating a threat, which if accepted within the minds of the general public, help sustain the American identity. A rhetoric of fear is created within the discourse utilized by American politicians in the construction of Others as uncivilized, evil, barbarians that are seeking to destroy the American way of life. “We live in an age of terror, in which ruthless enemies seek to

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid: xii.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid: 165.
destroy not only our nation and not only to destroy all free nations but to destroy freedom as a way of life.”

This quote from a speech made by then National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, can be read as a securitizing move that seeks to convince the American public that these ‘ruthless enemies’ pose a threat to them. The State of the Union Address, delivered by President Bush in February 2005, contains a similar discourse that paints the picture of America-at-stake – “Our country is still the target of terrorists who want to kill many, and intimidate us all – and we will stay on the offensive against them, until the fight is won.”

A more colourful statement by Bush was made in his 2002 State of the Union Address, in which he coined the term ‘axis of evil’. “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.” These statements can be considered as further evidence that American politicians are attempting to convince the American public that their interests, and safety are at stake. ‘America’ and all that it signifies thus becomes presented as the referent object of security that must be protected from the constructed ‘villains’ that seek to harm and destroy it. In actuality, the referent object of security is the privileged


25 Office of the Press Secretary, “President Delivers State of the Union Address.” Washington, 2002. Accessed on February 8th, 2005 at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html. Note that the ‘states’ that President Bush is referring to in this statement are composed of Iran, Iraq and North Korea, all of which were identified earlier in the Address.
identity of the U.S. and the political order in which it exists. As David Campbell so aptly reminds us, fear is instrumental in the production of (in)security and foreign policy.

While an evangelism of fear has been cardinal for the constitution of many states’ identities, the apocalyptic mode – in which a discourse of danger functions as providence and foretells a threat that prompts renewal – has been conspicuous in the catalog of American statecraft.26

September 11th thus becomes the means by which to obtain the ends - being the production of fear and the justification for an outrageous foreign policy.27 The tragic deaths that occurred on September 11th are continuously manipulated and invoked in the securitizing move of presenting terrorism as a threat to the American people, many of whom accept it as a threat – and thus allow it to become a securitized issue necessitating political action. In his remarks commemorating the accomplishments of the Department of Homeland Security in 2004, President Bush reiterated that “This nation refuses to live in fear.”28 The irony here of course is that this nation needs to sustain a milieu of fear in order to preserve its self-preferred identity of a sovereign nation state. For without threats, and the corresponding need for security, the need for sovereignty would be eradicated. The construction of fear - through the securitization of an issue - serves to reinforce the political distinction of friend/enemy. As alluded to earlier, the construction of identity is multidirectional in that the very construction of identities is contingent upon

26 Campbell: 133.
27 I say outrageous here because the National Security Strategy of 2002 includes the right to pre-emption – this however, is a tangent from the present discussion so will not be addressed in length here.
difference. It can thus be argued that the ‘American’ identity is shaped by its relations with that which it characterizes as different, and as Other.

Recapitulations of ‘manifest destiny’ are also present within the discourse of American politicians. During the Cold War era, the USSR was constructed to be a space where Americans could define their identity by asserting what they proclaimed to be their values. “The USSR offered a mirroring conceptual space to that occupied by America; into this space were projected negative characteristics against which a positive image of American character could be reflected.” Today, what has been termed the ‘axis of evil’ has replaced the USSR as the space against which America defines its’ identity. Where the USSR was once viewed as the battlefield for what America stood for, Iraq, Iran and North Korea now stand place. Essentially then, the current American political discourse serves to create another it can assert its moral identity against, in the same manner it did so with the USSR. “Containment of the USSR simultaneously contained “America”: it disciplined the myriad possible characterizations of “America” into a coherent moral agent – with a clear sense of mission and inevitable destiny – that provided power of authority to those who upheld and espoused their characterizations.” The current U.S. mission is to contain the threat posed by the ‘axis of evil’, which correspondingly works towards preserving the American self-preferred identity of the hegemonic ‘moral agent’ whose duty is the spread of freedom.

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29 Sharp: xii.
30 My argument here is based upon President Bush’s articulation that these three areas constitute what he refers to as the “axis of evil”. Where the USSR was once depicted to be the major threat against Americans, these three nations are now perceived to be the major opposition to the United States.
31 Sharp: xix.
This threat is new, America’s duty is familiar. Throughout the 20th century, small groups of men seized control of great nations, built armies and arsenals, and set out to dominate the weak and intimidate the world. In each case, their ambitions of cruelty and murder had no limit. In each case, the ambitions of Hitlerism, militarism, and communism were defeated by the will of free peoples, by the strength of great alliances, and by the might of the United States of America.32

The above quote by President Bush is laden with subtle references to America’s manifest destiny – that of spreading ‘freedom’ across the globe out of duty to do so. This perceived duty is part of the American identity as the global, freedom-spreading, hegemon that seeks to rid the world of what it construes as Other. It is precisely the notion of duty that is dangerous, as it enables and justifies the use of violence in the name of ‘freedom’. Once again, security discourse utilized in this manner serves to secure the American identity.

It is useful to draw upon the work of political theorist Michael Ignatieff here, who asserts that America’s actions – conducted in the name of freedom and democracy - in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, can be regarded imperialistic in character. Moreover, Ignatieff contends that actions in the name of freedom and human rights are comparable to ancient civilization missions of the past, but that they maintain one significant difference. Ignatieff argues that modern practices of imperialism appear temporary whereas missions of the past sought to maintain imperialism.

Empires of the past, the Romans for example, made permanence the basis of their capacity to enforce obedience. The rule was: we will never be intimidated into leaving, so you have no choice but to obey. By contrast, all modern imperial rule is temporary, justified as the exercise of power.

of force and coercion necessary to restore peoples to their sovereignty.\textsuperscript{33}

Yet these missions are not temporary, but rather are long-term exercises in maintaining an order dictated by a hegemonic actor – in this case the United States. Ignatieff asserts that “This is imperialism in a hurry: to spend money, to get results, to turn the place back to the locals and get out. But it is similar to the old imperialism in the sense that real power in these zones – Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan and soon, perhaps, Iraq – will remain in Washington.”\textsuperscript{34} Thus the new imperialism is thus carried out under the insinuation that it will be short-lived, but its end goal is the same as empires of the past – to implement and preserve order. Imperialistic practices are inherently violent and are predicated upon difference.

In interpreting difference as otherness, the practice of security becomes necessary and justified. The identities of sovereign nation states and international relations, and corresponding state-centric notions of security, are contingent upon threats – in the form of an enemy. The securitizing move of presenting enemies, and the securitization of a corresponding issue, enables the practice of security – in the form of measures exceeding normal procedures. It can thus be contended that (violent) practices of security are predicated upon the interpretation of difference as otherness.

HUMANITY VS. THE SOVEREIGN NATION STATE: EXTENDING THE PRACTICE OF SECURITY

As borders become increasingly transcended by countless factors, the need to re-evaluate the notion of sovereignty and corresponding state-centric ideas of security

\textsuperscript{33} Ignatieff, Empire Lite: 113.
surfaces. As Dillon so eloquently states, the "...sovereignty of states is a peculiar fiction...". The presupposition in assuming that there is a requirement for sovereignty is precisely that there is a referent object that requires securing. This referent object of security is primarily designated in a broad fashion to be the inhabitants of sovereign nation states, and in post Cold War security literature, their corresponding 'rights'. The notion of human rights has become a contentious issue within international relations and has accordingly raised questions of international responsibility with it.

Recent world events reinforce the focus on human rights within the international sphere. Tragedies such as the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Rwanda, and now Darfur, demand attention from human rights advocates who attest that such situations must be addressed and prevented. Amongst their arguments, human rights advocates ask how the 'civilized world' can sit back and watch violations of human life occur and not seek to help - it is here where the notions of humanitarian intervention, and responsibility, become invoked.

In considering the state-centric notion of security in conjunction with the concept of humanitarian intervention, it is obvious that the two are contradictory as humanitarian intervention challenges the notion of sovereignty. "...the philosophical assumption that is at the basis of humanitarian intervention is the primacy of human rights over national sovereignty: the defense of human life is considered more compelling than

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35 Dillon. "Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the "New World Order" to the Ethical Problematic of the World Order": 361.
The notion of humanitarian intervention thus contests state-centric conceptualizations of security, as they are predicated on the preservation of sovereignty. It is when state responsibilities are ignored and human suffering results, that notions of international responsibility and humanitarian intervention surface, despite the fact that they are oppositional to the notion of sovereignty.

The resulting conflict between non-intervention and the ban on force on the one hand, and the growing importance of humanitarian considerations on the others, is equally apparent in the political debate on humanitarian intervention. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increasing recognition that the international community cannot afford to tolerate large-scale violations of human rights...It is furthermore argued that the importance to all states of maintaining a workable system of national sovereignty cannot be lightly ignored. This includes the principle of non-intervention, which also serves an essentially humanitarian purpose – that of preventing warfare.38

The tensions between humanitarian intervention, sovereignty, and international responsibility are quite intricate, and become increasingly convoluted when state-centric conceptualizations of security are thrown into the mix. Humanitarian interventions are costly to the state engaging in the intervention in the form of resources, capital, and people. This notion contradicts the state-centric notion of security that seeks to promote the protection of a collective group of people within a sovereign territory.

So, we have a contrast between two principles that are also the foundations of different moral hierarchies: the primacy of the territorial, political, and cultural identity of nation states (as established since the seventeenth century with the

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Peace of Westphalia) and the primacy of life, dignity, and freedom of individuals belonging to humanity.39

Humanitarian intervention is interpreted here as causing a tension between state sovereignty and the protection of human life. However, it can be argued that humanitarian intervention seeks to promote both the security of nation states and the protection of human life.

Humanitarian intervention appears contradictory to conventional state-centric notions of security, and yet necessary for the protection of sovereign interests and identities. The Advisory Council on International Affairs and the Advisory Council on Issues of Public International Law asserts that "...universal respect for fundamental human rights is also seen as a precondition for a stable international order, as an aspect of the 'constitution of the international community.'"40 Humanitarian intervention in this respect becomes another means by which to protect state sovereignty, but in a different sense than is provided for within conventional articulations of security, as the provision of security extends beyond national borders.

Passivity on the part of the international community thus not only leads to greater human suffering and injustice, but can also threaten collective security, since oppressed or threatened individuals or groups may take the law into their own hands and resort to increasingly drastic forms of action. According to this view, any international order that tolerates genocide or other flagrant violations of human rights is by definition unstable. National and international order are closely connected, and both largely derive their legitimacy from their ability to protect individuals or groups against violence or arbitrary treatment.41

39 D'Agostini: 145.
41 Ibid.
The interpretation of mass human suffering at the international level as a national security concern permits for (re)articulations of security. Securitization efforts in this context shift from those centred around the preservation of singular nation states to the protection of the international order in which these states are based. This movement requires collective efforts towards the securitization of the referent object of human life from what is interpreted as an existential threat, and in doing so works towards the preservation of the international order. Humanitarian intervention thus becomes an instrument in the preservation of the self-preferred identities of sovereign nation states, and the political order.

In seeking to reconceptualize security, it is asserted that "...a focus on human security rather than state sovereignty offers the potential of rethinking international security in a more humanitarian way." It would seem then, that the focus of the discourse of security is evolving from sovereignty to human life. This contention is one reverberated by security scholars who maintain that notions of security are shifting towards an incorporation of matters other than the preservation of sovereignty. These scholars also maintain that the traditional means that are employed to attain the security of the nation state, namely militaries, are increasingly being used for other ends.

Traditional security studies tend to see all military affairs as instances of security, but this may not be the case. For many of the advanced democracies, defense of the state is becoming only one, and perhaps not even the main de facto function of the armed forces. Their militaries may be increasingly trained and called upon to support routine world order activities, such as peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention, that cannot be viewed as

concerning existential threats to their state or even as emergency action in the genre of suspending rules.43

The tools of security are thus already being utilized in the protection and preservation of human life beyond state borders, hence it can be argued that the discourse of security should shift accordingly to reflect this change. As conventional notions of security are state-centric in nature, and thus cannot account for the changing nature of threats - a different theoretical approach to articulating security is required. The emergence of numerous foreign policy approaches that promote the securitization of human rights support the argument that the security environment is changing. The focus on human life within these approaches suggests that the state-centric conceptualization of security is outdated, and that a new approach to security is required.

However, there is another suggestion inherent within arguments that call for a reconceptualization of security – i.e. these newly capitulated notions are still predicated upon the use of military resources. Buzan’s above quote suggests that practices of security are utilized for reasons other than protecting nation states from existential threats. Rather, he suggests that security – in the form of military means - is utilized to protect and promote order within international relations. It can thus be argued that practices of security seek to promote order and (privileged) identities within international relations, and exercise violence to do so.

CONCLUSION

Conventional state-centric conceptualizations of sovereignty and international relations indicate security to be the protection of sovereign national borders and all that is

contained within. Evolving notions of security – those that emphasize the protection of human life – pose a palpable challenge to the static state-centric conceptualizations of security, which provokes the query of what exactly the objective of being sovereign is.

The notion of sovereignty can no longer constitute the simple protection of one state from the ‘dangers’ presented by other territories. For if a state were successful in achieving sovereignty – i.e. the goal of security - the need for sovereignty would cease to be necessary.\footnote{Campbell: 12.} Despite this realization, it is unlikely that the notion of sovereignty will cease to exist as it serves to reinforce the identities of nation states and the political order. Rather, sovereignty is no longer the focal point of security discourse, as the emphasis has shifted to the protection of human life on an international scale. As notions of security change, it is appropriate that the theoretical underpinnings of security discourse also evolve, so as to provide a more appropriate means from which to understand related security actions.

The evolving notion of security is centred around the use of the collectivity - in the form of an international community - in protecting the articulated referent object of security, i.e., the protection of human life from gross violations of human rights. International responsibility is articulated as being necessary when a supposedly sovereign state fails to adequately protect its people. As the protection of human life is the focal point of security, a theoretical understanding that incorporates notions of humanity and morality would be best to rearticulate security from. The cosmopolitan school of thought appears to be the most appropriate for the task as notions of common humanity and moral obligations to the Other are at its basis. The ensuing chapter will seek to construct an
exemplar reconceptualization of the notion of security from the cosmopolitan perspective.

This reconceptualization of security from a cosmopolitan basis will subsequently be used to support the contention that violence is a corollary of any articulation of security. It will be argued that the subjugation and privileging of identities (re)occurs within the cosmopolitan approach of security, and justifies the use of any (violent) means necessary to preserve order within international relations.
Chapter Two: Cosmopolitan Notions of Security: Foundations of Empire

Are all humans human? Or are some worth more?
~ Romeo Dallaire

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As the threat environment changes, it is contended that notions of security must shift accordingly. Many policy makers and academics assert that notions of security should be reformulated to account for the global problems the world now faces. It is contended that

Often under the rubrics of "common security" or "cooperative security," the themes of nonoffensive defense, economic security, environmental security, societal insecurities, drug threats, even human rights and the autonomy of civil society have been added in attempts to reformulate security policies to encompass many new items on the global political agenda.¹

In considering global problems, cosmopolitan theorists suggest that nation states lack the ability to contend with global security issues, and that a collaborative approach to dealing with them should be taken.² The contention that security should be expanded to account for such problems provokes the critical query of does such an expansion mean an increased militarization of world affairs, and if so, is this a useful means with which to deal with political problems, or rather does it further convolute such problems. In seeking to address this crucial question, this chapter will first reconceptualize the concept of security from the cosmopolitan perspective.

Cosmopolitan advocates of global civil society assert that issues that transcend borders can be resolved through cooperation, and accordingly that human society can move beyond the Hobbesian state of nature to a more civilized state. The second half of this chapter will argue that cosmopolitan practices of security lead to an increased

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militarization of world affairs, and in actuality work to maintain political order and (privileged) identities. The similarities that exist between the state-centric conceptualizations of international relations and cosmopolitan accounts of global civil society will be analyzed to demarcate that they both work to reinforce political order within international relations. It will be asserted that both state-centric and cosmopolitan approaches to politics necessitate the (violent) practice of security. Moreover, the parallels between cosmopolitan notions of humanitarian intervention and the Crusades will be analysed. The purpose in doing so is to illustrate how the delineation of identities into the categories of friend and enemy help sustain imperial pursuits. For as long as there exists an enemy against which to protect an ordered society, the means to do so – i.e. the use of violence – will continue to be justified.

COSMOPOLITICS: EXTENDING DEMOCRACY THROUGH GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

The current political formulation of the state of international relations is one often challenged by cosmopolitan theorists who contend that this individualistic, nation-state model is ineffective in dealing with the global nature of the political problems we now face. Advocates of cosmopolitan democracy assert that approaching such problems from the perspective of global civil society would be more effective in solving such issues than the current state-centric approach. Archibugi contends that nation states may not be the most useful configuration of international relations in solving such problems "...it is evident that many of the problems of the political organization of contemporary society
go beyond the scope of the nation-state.”3 Global problems are defined by Archibugi as follows:

There are some problems, such as the environment question and, more generally, all problems concerning security and world survival, which transcend the authority of national governments. These problems can be named ‘global’ since they cannot be addressed effectively by intergovernmental bodies.4

Hence cosmopolitans advocating for global democracy contend that global problems should be addressed by the whole of the international community, and correspondingly that international relations should move from relations between states to relations amongst (sub)states.5 In this sense, it can be contended that cosmopolitans are seeking to move past the problems associated with the nation state approach to international relations. In doing so they extend the order of international relations one step further than the current nation state-citizen based approach, to a global - nation state – citizen based order.

Immanuel Kant, attributed as one of the earliest political thinkers in cosmopolitan thought, emphasized that politics should move towards a global configuration of civil society. “Every people, for the sake of its own security, thus may and ought to demand from any other, that shall enter along with it into a constitution, similar to the Civil Constitution, in which the right of each shall be secured. This would give rise to the

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3 Ibid.
5 Daniele Archibugi. “Cosmopolitical Democracy”: 144.
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PEOPLES.6 Kant asserted that the current configuration of international relations, such that the nation state model, was reflective of a Hobbesian state of nature, in which men, or in this case states, acted in self-interest. Kant asserted that moving relations between states towards civil society was necessary in order to advance towards what he termed ‘Perpetual Peace’. "Kant stressed that Hobbes was right in his characterization of the state of nature, and that as a consequence the fundamental moral duty men are under is to leave the state of nature and enter civil society."7 A Hobbesian approach to problems of a global character then, would entail nation states acting in their self-interest, rather than working collaboratively to find a collective solution, which would inevitably lead to a constant state of war. "Kant saw very clearly that the Hobbesian theory entailed no end to the state of war, for modern states are inextricably involved in a continuous and destructive warfare..."8 As the international formulation of sovereign nation states can only lead to a state of war, it would follow that a movement away from this configuration of politics may be helpful in seeking to effectively deal with global security issues. Kant is interpreted as arguing that “…the conflicts between states would eventually persuade people that they could only enjoy the kind of security for which their wars were fought by creating a system of international agreements between states…”9 Hence, Kant can be interpreted as arguing that an ordered civil society is the means by which that designated to be the referent

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9 Ibid: 218.
object(s) of security could be effectively protected, and furthermore that people would
come to realize that civil society was less likely to resort to violence to solve problems
than the nation state model of international relations.

This contention is one echoed by many current day cosmopolitan theorists who
advocate for global civil society, and the corresponding notion of global democracy.
Archibugi maintains that the level of cooperation within international relations will rise
significantly, and as such could lead to the possibility of a global democracy. However,
Archibugi is careful to assert that there is no guarantee that such a formulation of politics
would result in increased collaboration towards global issues that arise, but that ‘control
mechanisms’ based on democracy may be a viable solution to current problems within
international relations. Moreover, Archibugi also attends to the objections from realists
who assert that nation states act as though they are in a Hobbesian state of nature, in that
they act primarily in self-interest.

Realists are right to stress the importance of national
interests in determining political choices, especially
international choices. But they also tend to underestimate
the development of interests with global scope. The fact is
that commerce, tourism, cultural and social exchanges and
many other activities mobilize massive interests which rely
on an international arena based on cooperation. It is
therefore likely that these interests will lead to a greater
coordination in world politics; this already happened a few
centuries ago when the enlargement of economic and social
areas led to the making of nation-states. The growth in the
number and role of international governmental and non-
governmental organizations and other ‘control
mechanisms’ is proof that such interests have already
achieved significant results.

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11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
In response to realist claims that states within international relations will continue to act primarily in self-interest - and as such global civil society is not a viable possibility - Archibugi asserts that the emergence of, and tasks taken on by international governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations are significant indicators that an ordered civil society may be feasible within international relations.\textsuperscript{13}

Archibugi broadly defines cosmopolitan democracy as follows: “Cosmopolitan democracy is a project to build world a world order capable of promoting democracy on three different but mutually supporting levels: (1) democracy inside nations; (2) democracy among states; (3) global democracy.”\textsuperscript{14} Theoretically, the current nation state based approach to international relations incorporates both democracy inside nations and amongst democratic states. Thus cosmopolitan democracy can be understood as extending the order of international relations one step further than current state centric approaches – in the form of a global level. The notion of global democracy is perhaps best understood from the perspective of the ‘domestic analogy’.

The ‘domestic analogy’ is presumptive reasoning which holds that there are certain similarities between domestic and international phenomena; that, in particular, the conditions of order within states are similar to those of order between them; and that therefore those institutions which sustain order domestically should be reproduced at the international level.\textsuperscript{15}

The primary argument of the domestic analogy is to utilize state-level (‘domestic’) practices of democracy to promote order at the international level of global relations. Doing so would theoretically entail the elimination of the use of violence in solving

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid: 209.
problems that are global in character, and would rather seek to resolve such issues in a more 'civilized', democratic manner, through the use of 'control mechanisms'. The control mechanisms utilized to approach problems that are global in character would consist of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and institutions. This contention is inherent within Archibugi’s description of the aim of cosmopolitan democracy.

Cosmopolitan democracy is therefore a project which aims to develop democracy within nations, among states and at the global level, assuming that the three levels, although highly interdependent, should and can be pursued simultaneously. It stresses that different democratic procedures are needed for each of these levels. Such a project proposes to integrate and limit the functions of existing states with new institutions based on world citizenship. These institutions should be entitled to manage issues of global concern as well as to interfere within states whenever serious violations of human rights are committed.16

Cosmopolitan democracy then, can be understood as challenging the notion of sovereignty as it seeks to extend the authority of international institutions in dealing with global issues, and correspondingly diminishes the authority of nation states in relation to such matters.17 Kaldor asserts that “The general case for cosmopolitan democracy is based on the argument that democracy at a national level is weakened by the erosion of the autonomy of the state and the undermining of the state’s capacity to respond to democratic demands.”18 Cosmopolitan democracy thus proposes that a global democracy would be more capable of ensuring democratic demands, which includes the provision of

security to citizens. What is interesting to note is that cosmopolitan democracy continues to promote the identity of nation states, as they remain the primary agents through which democracy is exercised. The extension of (a cosmopolitan) democracy to a global level can be understood as a means to strengthen the preservation of political order.

The arguments for cosmopolitan democracy also coincide with the contention that state-centric notions of security are outdated, and that resources spent on securing the sovereignty of nation states could be utilized in a more effective manner. Chandler supports this in his claim that “Cosmopolitan theorists are disappointed that after the end of the Cold War the resources of international society have not been devoted towards outstanding ‘global concerns’.”\textsuperscript{19} This can be interpreted as a criticism of the vast amount of resources expended on efforts towards the securitization of sovereignty, that could be utilized in a better manner - namely the protection of human life from genocide.

REFERENT OBJECTS OF SECURITY: FROM SECURING NATION STATES TO PROTECTING HUMAN LIFE

...the philosophical assumption that is at the basis of humanitarian intervention is the primacy of human rights over national sovereignty: the defense of human life is considered more compelling than sovereignty.\textsuperscript{20}

~ Kofi Annan

As asserted in the previous chapter, there has been an increased demand within international relations for the use of humanitarian intervention despite the fact that it contravenes the notion of sovereignty. Accordingly, many questions have surfaced

regarding the responsibility of the international community to respond to situations of genocide. The query of who should be permitted to intervene has generated a great deal of deliberation, and it is often argued that the international community as a whole should respond in such situations. Corollary notions of morality and obligations to those suffering also arise from this debate, and it is precisely here where cosmopolitan advocates for global democracy agree with the contention that an international response is necessary. As asserted earlier, supporters of cosmopolitanism argue that the international relations model of nation states may not be enough to resolve problems of a global scale. 

Rather it is argued that a movement towards ‘cosmopolitical democracy’ is required to make progress towards solving problems that are global in character. 

“Cosmopolitan democracy is based on the assumption that important objectives – control of the use of force, respect for human rights, and self-determination – will be obtained only through the extension and development of democracy.” This suggests that order is needed at a higher level than the present nation state conceptualization of international relations permits.

The emphasis placed on the securitization of human life from genocide is explicit within Archibugi’s description of which areas cosmopolitan democratic institutions would maintain control over. “The institutions of global civil society would exercise direct control in one essential area: the prevention and impediment of acts of genocide or

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21 Daniele Archibugi. “Cosmopolitical Democracy”: 139.
22 Ibid: 144.
23 Ibid.
democide."\(^{24}\) This emphasis supports the contention that humans are the primary concern of cosmopolitan approaches to democracy.

Pogge articulates that there are three components that all cosmopolitan positions share, being individualism, universality, and generality.\(^{25}\)

First, *individualism*: the ultimate units of concern are *human beings, or persons* — rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second, *universality*: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to *every* living human being equally (cf. n. 90) — not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, *generality*: this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for *everyone* — not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or suchlike.\(^{26}\)

As asserted by Pogge, human beings are understood to be the 'ultimate units of concern' amongst cosmopolitan theorists. As such, it corresponds that the protection of human life is the referent object of cosmopolitan security. This (re)articulation of security requires a determination of what exactly securing human beings consists of from a cosmopolitan viewpoint. Not surprisingly, this can be expressed in terms of human rights — which is a prominent issue within cosmopolitan literature that extends back to Kant who asserted that "...a violation of a Right in one place of the earth, is felt all over it."\(^{27}\) In considering this statement in conjunction with the notion of humanitarian intervention, it becomes apparent that the cosmopolitan argument to be made here is precisely that human suffering resulting from genocide should be the concern of all individuals —


\(^{26}\) *Ibid*.

\(^{27}\) Kant: 100.
regardless of their locale. As such, efforts should be made to securitize human life from
gross violations of human rights. The cosmopolitan notion of moral obligations also
lends credence to this argument, as is articulated by Beetham – “There are minimum
duties to strangers that we all owe, which include not merely refraining from damaging
the means to the fulfilment of their basic needs and capacities, but assisting their
realization.” Humanitarian intervention from this perspective can thus be understood as
a tool by which to securitize the life of human beings from the threat of genocide.

From a cosmopolitan perspective the move from a state-centric conceptualization
of security to a cosmopolitan version seems to be a logical one in considering the status
of world affairs. Held argues that we live in a world in which our actions are increasingly
interconnected. As such he contends that we have moved away from living in distinct
nation states to what he terms ‘overlapping communities of fate’, in which our actions
have global effects and repercussions, and in which “…the fates and fortunes of each of
us are thoroughly intertwined.” Correspondingly, Held makes the argument that the
boundaries that the political model of nation states is based upon, are of increasingly less
significance in the world today. As such, Held maintains that the human rights should
not be limited by borders. Held further maintains that “…there are clear occasions
when an individual has a moral obligation beyond that of his or her obligation as a citizen

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28 David Beetham. “Human Rights as a Model for Cosmopolitan Democracy” in Re-
imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, Daniele Archibugi
29 David Held. “Violence, Law and Justice in a Global Age” in Daniele Archibugi (ed.),
30 Ibid.
of a state." From this standpoint, using humanitarian intervention to end human suffering caused by genocide is necessary. In considering these arguments in relation to the concept of security, the replacement of state sovereignty by human life as the referent object of security is commonsensical. The protection of human rights through the use of humanitarian intervention logically follows this argument. Moreover, the securitization of human rights is congruent with the Kantian notion of perpetual peace. If genocide is interpreted as a threat to international order, peace can be secured through its prevention and stoppage. The movement from a state-centric conceptualization to a cosmopolitan understanding of security is also supported by other cosmopolitan theorists. Beck claims that adopting a cosmopolitan approach to politics can result in a ‘positive problem shift’. Hence the progression from a state-centric version of security to one focussed on the preservation of human life can be understood as a positive shift within politics. What can be inferred here is that nation state approaches to preserving order within international relations are inadequate, and that global attempts would be better suited. This shift can be understood as the displacement of the current articulation of identity/difference to one that has the potential to end the gross violations of human rights.

The emergence of a global civil society or global democracy is a contentious issue amongst international relations scholars, especially in relation to the topic of sovereignty. Many within the cosmopolitan school of thought advocate for the emergence of a global

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32 Ibid: 186.
33 Kant: 100.
35 The term identity/difference comes from William Connolly’s book of that same title.
civil society that is responsible for its ‘world citizens’. Furthermore, many of these theorists contend that the emergence of such a society is already occurring. Kaldor asserts that “The changing international norms concerning humanitarian intervention can be considered an expression of an emerging global civil society.” Kaldor also argues that the evolving norms surrounding the issue of humanitarian intervention “…reflect a growing global consensus about the equality of human beings and the responsibility to prevent suffering wherever it takes place, which necessarily has to underpin a global civil society.” These arguments all suggest a movement away from notions of sovereignty and related state-centric conceptualizations of security.

Finnemore argues that humanitarian intervention must be analyzed within the normative context in which it occurs, as it is precisely this factor that shapes the interest of international actors. Moreover, Finnemore asserts that opinions regarding which humans deserve protection from suffering via the means of humanitarian intervention have changed, and that state behaviour has changed accordingly. The basis of the normative context from a cosmopolitan perspective can be understood as common humanity and moral obligations to others. In an international realm of nations and people that are increasingly becoming aware of their interconnectedness with one another, issues of morality and human rights are quick to surface. The number of international organizations and NGOs that have emerged in the past decade is indicative that the

37 Ibid.
normative context is indeed changing, and can be considered as evidence of an emerging global civil society. In terms of security, this changing normative context can be understood as progression of the referent object of security from the nation state to humans, and correspondingly from state-centric conceptualizations of security to a cosmopolitan one. In a broader spectrum, this is related to the proposed movement away from the state-centric formulation of international relations and instead as a gearing towards a cosmopolitical democracy.

The exemplary cosmopolitan approach to security that is articulated here then, is one based upon the fundamental principles of cosmopolitan theory understood in this argument to be individualism, universality, and generality. The referent object of this reconceptualized version of security is the protection of human life from gross violations of human rights in the form of genocide. Humanitarian intervention is articulated as the means to securitize human life from such violent acts. The following section will analyze the cosmopolitan assertions of when to, and who can, intervene in situations characterized as genocides.

COSMOPOLITAN APPROACHES TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

This section will entail an exemplar cosmopolitan approach to humanitarian intervention based upon the reconceptualized notion of security proposed earlier. The securitization process of the protection of humans from genocide will be explored here.

In part, a new approach to humanitarian intervention as a tool of cosmopolitan security is necessary to avoid the fallacies that occur in present day interventions. Issues of self-interest and failures to complete missions are prominent problems amongst current day attempts at ending genocide via the means of intervention. Moreover, many of these
Interventions are unilateral, and thus humanitarian interventions risk being a guise for politics of self-interest. Finnemore asserts that “Humanitarian justifications have been used to disguise baser motives in more than one intervention.”\textsuperscript{40} Cosmopolitan theorists assert that the institutionalization of decision making in regards to humanitarian intervention is a means of avoiding the issues of self-interest that arise within unilateral attempts at intervention.\textsuperscript{41} In proposing guidelines from a cosmopolitan perspective on the use of humanitarian intervention, Archibugi advocates for the use of international institutions – “...a moral cosmopolitanism without a similar institutional cosmopolitanism risks being, at best, an empty shell and, at worst, a modern sorry comfort.”\textsuperscript{42} Essentially, Archibugi is claiming here that interventions ostensibly predicated upon notions of morality risk being a guise for ulterior motives of self-interest. In essence then, cosmopolitans are claiming that a multilateral decision to intervene is better than a unilateral one. Held puts forth a related argument and advocates for the creation of new political institutions that could override the decisions of states in areas of activity that have transnational or international consequences.\textsuperscript{43} In addressing the global issue of genocide in this manner, cosmopolitan theorists argue that the decision to undertake a humanitarian intervention should be made multilaterally, and consequently will have a lower risk of being conducted in self-interest. The assertion that “Humanitarian military interventions now must be multilateral to be legitimate.”\textsuperscript{44} Is

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid: 158.
\textsuperscript{41} Daniele Archibugi. “Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy”: 219.
\textsuperscript{44} Finnemore: 176.
congruent with the cosmopolitan argument that a multilateral approach should be taken
towards intervention. All of these arguments lend credence to the argument that order on
a global level will avoid the problems of order that exist within current nation state based
approaches to international relations.

In using humanitarian intervention as a means by which to securitize human life
from gross violations of human rights\(^4\), four components must first be defined and
consist of: when to intervene\(^4\); who authorizes the intervention; how to intervene; and
who conducts the intervention. In proposing cosmopolitan guidelines to humanitarian
intervention, Archibugi seeks to address these four questions, but first defines
humanitarian intervention as follows: “A military intervention in an area for the purpose
of saving peoples from democide or other major violations of human rights occurring and
carried out by foreign institutions without the consent of a legitimate government.”\(^4\)
Each of Archibugi’s proposed answers to the above questions will be summarized here
and will be considered as an exemplar cosmopolitan approach to humanitarian
intervention for the purposes of this discussion.

The question of when to intervene is a contentious one within international
relations that remains unresolved. Situations are often declared to be genocides long after
it was obvious that they were precisely that, and usually after thousands of humans have

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\(^4\) Cosmopolitan security is understood to be the protection of populations from
democide.
\(^4\) When to intervene can also be understood as when to define a situation as a
humanitarian crisis.
\(^4\) Archibugi. “Cosmopolitan Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention”: 3. Note that this
definition was provided earlier and is the definition of humanitarian intervention being
utilized throughout this argument.
been injured and lost their lives. Part of the current problem then, is the designation of such situations as constituting genocides, and what factors are involved in declaring them as such. Another similar problem is the decision of when to intervene. As asserted earlier, the question of whether to intervene or not is often convoluted by many external factors, including issues of identity and vested interests. It can be contended that cosmopolitan approaches seek to look beyond these identity issues by basing their decisions upon notions of common humanity and morality. In doing so, the cosmopolitans attempt to move beyond the problem of nationalistic interests, and seek to promote universal interests. In proposing cosmopolitan guidelines to humanitarian intervention, Archibugi proposes that military intervention should only be utilized in cases of “...huge violations of human rights and is not extended to the enforcement of all human rights or to the imposition of democratic governance”. Archibugi also asserts that any situation that is a mass violation of human rights should be declared as such, whether or not a feasible intervention is possible.

But this should not imply that major violations of human rights in places where there is no hope for successful intervention should not be declared humanitarian emergencies. Politics can indicate when humanitarian interventions are feasible, but ethics should at least make it possible to denounce an action when organized violence leads to a humanitarian emergency.

Archibugi’s claim is that doing this would ensure that the process of intervention is made more impartial, in that a situation will not be declared a humanitarian crisis solely when governments/interveners have a vested interest in intervention. However, Archibugi also

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48 The current situation in Darfur is a blatant example of this.
asserts that this will not avoid the consideration of vested interests in doing so, but rather that these reasons should not be the primary motive behind intervention.

...the intervention is carried out, at least in principle, primarily or solely with the intention of helping the people who are suffering on account of certain conditions. This does not mean that the intervention needs to be entirely altruistic. As Walzer has rightly pointed out, the fact that an agent has some vested or unvested interests may be good news for peoples in danger of being massacred since that agent will be more prepared to take the risks of intervention.51

Although notions of moral obligations to the ‘other’ and common humanity are at the basis of cosmopolitan thought, room remains for self-interest and identity politics to surface. The above quote illustrates that self-interested actions may have a positive effect on ‘others’ in actuality, and can thus be mutually beneficial to interveners and victims. Finnemore provides a parallel argument in claiming that reasons behind intervention are increasingly mixed, and that “…humanitarian motives may be genuine but may be only one part of a larger constellation of motivations driving state action.”52 In summation, the cosmopolitan perspective maintains that situations involving mass human killing should thus be declared as genocides, whether or not a successful intervention is possible.

Furthermore, the primary motive behind interventions should be to end violations of human rights. However, the self-interests of those conducting the intervention may also be served in the process.

When a humanitarian intervention is necessary is based upon the requirements of need and feasibility. Cosmopolitan theorists assert that delegated international institutions should be responsible for such decisions, as is illustrated by the following

52 Finnemore: 158.
statement from Archibugi: "I think that nongovernmental institutions should deliberate the need for a humanitarian intervention. Ideally, these institutions should be bodies representing the citizens of the world." Cosmopolitan theorists argue that three types of institutions are suited for deliberating whether to intervene or not. The first of these is a World Parliament, advocated as the ideal institution to deal with such matters, but recognized as not being an attainable short-term goal. A second alternative offered by the cosmopolitan advocates for global democracy is the creation of a "Council of Experts" composed of authoritative members of NGOs such as Amnesty International, and the International Peoples' Tribunal. The members of this council would be chosen by governments on the basis of their personal capacity. Furthermore, these individuals would be expected to act independently of their respective governments. The final alternative proposed is to allow the World Court to decide when humanitarian intervention is necessary. The consistent argument amongst all of these propositions, is that international institutions representing 'world citizens' should be responsible for deciding when humanitarian intervention is necessary - "...decisions on humanitarian interventions should not be decided by individual states or even by intergovernmental organizations. If these decisions are taken by independent institutions, it is more likely that they will be taken impartially and nondiscriminatorily, and in turn they will gather greater consent and moral authority." Cosmopolitan theorists assert that a multilateral

54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
institutional approach to decisions of intervention can help avoid unilateral self-interests from being the primary reason behind a mission.

Once it has been decided that a humanitarian intervention is necessary, the question of how to intervene arises. Cosmopolitan theorists contend that guidelines outlining acceptable methods of intervention should be formulated by a joint committee of military and civilian humanitarian organizations.\textsuperscript{60} Furthermore, it is contended that interventions should be treated in the same manner as internal national problems – “A genuine humanitarian intervention ought to apply the same methods accepted within the borders of the state, or states, performing the intervention.”\textsuperscript{61} It is further contended that those involved in the actual intervention should be prepared to risk their lives in order to save the lives of those suffering, as is done by rescue services within the borders of nation states.\textsuperscript{62} Thus, forces conducting the intervention would function in police-like fashion rather than in the typical war stance that is assumed in such operations. Kaldor supports this (re)approach to humanitarian intervention from the cosmopolitan perspective and asserts that “I have argued for a reconceptualization of humanitarian intervention as cosmopolitan law enforcement. Understood in this way, humanitarian intervention has to involve the direct protection of civilians and the arrest of individual war criminals.”\textsuperscript{63} Interventions should thus parallel the policing practices of nation states within their own borders. Theoretically then, those being ‘rescued’ would be treated in the same manner as the citizens of the countries conducting the intervention. Essentially then, humanitarian intervention would be a method of policing global civil society. The

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid: 15.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid: 11.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} Mary Kaldor. “Cosmopolitanism and Organized Violence”: 8.
domestic analogy is a useful basis from which to analyze the proposed creation of a
global police force. Essentially the creation of such a force can be understood as an
extension of a practice that functions to maintain order within the domestic sphere to
global civil society. Thus, global police would be considered the appropriate response to
violations of collective security within global civil society.

The question of who should conduct humanitarian interventions is yet another
contentious issue, especially in relation to the availability of resources required for
completing the task. Humanitarian interventions are demanding on both fiscal and
physical means, and the question of who should bear this burden is a central one.
Cosmopolitan approaches to humanitarian intervention advocate for the creation of a task
force comprised of approximately fifty-thousand soldiers, from fifty of the wealthiest
nations in the world, to undertake such endeavours. The formation of such a task force
would allow the cost of resources to be shared, and hence decrease the risk involved to
those countries partaking in the intervention. "Such a force would be multinational, and
thus one country – namely, the United States – would not have to take too many of the
risks, responsibilities, and casualties on its own." This corresponds with the assertion
that multilateralism is a means of cost-sharing. Furthermore, nation states contributing
soldiers would be those considered to best respect human rights within their own
borders.

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64 Archibugi. "Cosmopolitan Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention": 13. This idea
was first proposed by the President of France, Francois Mitterrand, in 1992, and was
revived here by Archibugi.
65 Ibid.
66 Finnemore: 176.
A central difference in the cosmopolitan notion of humanitarian intervention troops that differs from current day armies, is that these troops would include what Archibugi has termed ‘white helmets’. These white helmets consist of individuals representing various social services such as teachers, social workers, engineers and doctors, who would provide assistance to those being “rescued”. In describing a cosmopolitan approach to humanitarian intervention, Kaldor articulates a corresponding argument,

...a cosmopolitan approach requires global justice, that is respect for economic and social rights even in conflict zones. Indeed, if cosmopolitan politics is to counter the populist appeal of exclusive identity politics, it has to be able to address every day concerns. But this is not just a matter of global distribution, of, for example, the provision of humanitarian assistance, which in many cases helps to feed the forces of violence. It is a matter of building legitimate sources of employment and of providing a way of living that is consistent with human dignity so that young men and women have a real alternative to becoming a criminal or living off humanitarian aid.

Cosmopolitan humanitarian intervention thus includes the provision of social services during and after the actual intervention to those on the receiving end. This enables troops to address the conflict as well as provide victims with appropriate resources to avoid regress to a condition of suffering.

Archibugi further contends that troops conducting interventions should be provided with adequate military protection, and that the U.S. may be an effective ally in providing such protection. Archibugi also asserts that the multinational troop is not the only means through which to address genocide, but rather that some national armies,

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68 Ibid.
69 Kaldor, “Cosmopolitanism and Organised Violence”: 8.
namely that of the U.S., can also engage in interventions.\textsuperscript{71} Humanitarian interventions can thus be conducted in two ways, through using the cosmopolitan multinational force, or through employing national armies. Each method of intervention is equally recognized as being a valid means to address situations of genocide within the international realm.\textsuperscript{72}

To recap then, cosmopolitan theorists assert that intervention guidelines should be formulated by a multinational institution. This institution is also responsible for declaring which humanitarian crises constitute genocides, and whether an intervention is feasible or not. The same institution is additionally responsible for authorizing the intervention into the territory in which the genocide is occurring. Finally, the intervention is to be carried out by a multinational troop created solely for this purpose, and which follows directives on how to appropriately carry out the intervention. However, in creating a global – and supposedly universal – means to deal with genocide, cosmopolitans are in actuality preserving political order and (privileged) identities.

SECURING WHAT? PRESERVING (COSMO)POLITICAL ORDER

\textit{The other is the future. The very relationship with the other is the relationship with the future.}\hspace{1cm}—\hspace{1cm}Levinas

Advocates for cosmopolitan notions of global democracy assert that their ideas represent a new formulation of politics that is more progressive in character than the state-centric approach to international relations. These cosmopolitan advocates appear on the surface to be striving towards a more universalised articulation of politics as notions of humanity and morality form the foundation for their arguments. However, the

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
articulation of the universal can never be truly comprehensive in character, for the identity of the universal is contingent upon the particulars it bases itself upon. The query of whether a global society can exist given the identity politics inherent within international relations is a central one. Buzan cautions that "...there is a need to think about whether there can be a global community given the need for an 'Other' against which to define a 'We'."\textsuperscript{73}

Notions of universality, and related notions of global civil society, are predicated upon moral norms that involve the exclusion of that deemed to abnormal. Norms are articulated by members of a shared, ordered, community, and those that are not considered part of that realm are consequently designated as other. The definition of what is moral is thus contingent upon the context in which it was articulated — "...we can define the just and the good only in the context of the values and norms that are shared by the members of the same political community..."\textsuperscript{74} The political community here is that of cosmopolitan global civil society, and therefore the claims of universality reflect cosmopolitan norms and morals, which are essentially predicated upon notions of Western liberalism. The delineation of an issue as a threat becomes the basis for political acts extending beyond normal procedures. Williams asserts that "The commonality of friendship — and the limits prescribed by enmity — define the parameters within which values can be decided upon and the decisions of a "sovereign" actor or institution


accepted by society at large." The securitization of an issue thus serves to reinforce the identity of global civil society – and the political order in which it is construed - as the medium that provides security from the articulated threats posed by that designated to be the threatening (enemy) Other.

The rhetoric of universalism can be understood as moving beyond the identity of the external other, as it seeks to incorporate all within its scope. However, the presence of the internal other remains alive within this articulation of politics, and consists of those who differ from the specified norm and are interpreted as Other. The internal Other assumes the identity of the 'enemy’, and becomes that which must be secured against.

We know from experience that human life is never completely civilized: the civil condition is imperfect because the people who must be relied upon for civility are almost always intellectually and morally flawed to some degree. International society is also imperfect. We know from past and present experience that some statespeople will trespass on the rights and legitimate interests of other states if the opportunity arises and there is some advantage in doing that. There always will be some predatory people who escape socialization and live at the margins of international society.

The above quote from Robert Jackson asserts that within any approach to society, be it domestic or international in character, Others will exist. In demarcating an enemy – i.e. those who disturb the political order of international relations - cosmopolitan practices of security enable the use of violence. The above quote from Jackson suggests that the rights and interests of privileged actors take precedence over the rights and privileges of Others – and the advantage in doing so is that it permits them to maintain their privileged

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identity, through preserving the current political order. In using the domestic analogy to evaluate notions of global civil society, it becomes apparent that difference from the articulated norm continues to be interpreted as otherness, and thus permits the identity of the enemy to be constructed. In essence then, the external Other does not actually disappear, but becomes (re)articulated as the internal Other. The irony here is that cosmopolitan notions of global civil society work to preserve the notions that these advocates claim to be moving away from, in that they continue to articulate difference as otherness, and thus perpetuate the formulation of the political distinction of friend/enemy within international relations. Otherness necessitates the function of security; correspondingly the notion of security leads to an increased use of violence through the augmented militarization of global political issues. The cosmopolitan argument for the universal becomes undermined by the existence of Others – for they are those excluded from that very universal. The irony here is precisely that supposedly universal notions of humanity become justifications for the use of violence against those deemed to be Other. Exactly what is ethical or moral about using violence against humans to secure humanity is obscure. Rather the militarization of human rights seems antithetical to the preservation of the humans which it claims to be securing.

Kantian notions of global civil society predicated upon the premise that it is the ‘fundamental, moral duty’ of men to move beyond the Hobbesian state of nature to a condition of civilized co-existence are thus problematic. The irony in the cosmopolitan notion of global civil society is precisely that it utilizes violence in order to sustain its ordered condition of a civilized co-existence. Hedley Bull articulates the paradox between the Hobbesian state of nature and global civil society by claiming that,
...if states are indeed in a Hobbesian state of nature, the contract be means of which they are to emerge from it cannot take place. For if covenants without the sword are but words, this will be true of covenants directed towards the establishment of universal government, just as it will hold true of agreements on other subjects. The difficulty with the Kantian prescription is that the description it contains of the actual condition of international relations, and the prescription it provides for its improvement, are inconsistent with one another. Actions within the context of continuing international anarchy is held to be of no avail; but at the same time it is in the international anarchy that the grand solution of the international social contract is held to take place.  

Using coercive means to contend with those deemed belligerent in character for the sake of sustaining peace, through the preservation of order, is thus characteristic of the very (Hobbesian) state of nature cosmopolitan advocates for global democracy assert they are moving away from. To truly move beyond this condition would require the eradication of the use of violence within international relations as a means to create and maintain order.

The expansion of domestic levels of democracy to a global one sustains the requirement for a governing body to oversee the operations of order within a society. Chandler contends that cosmopolitan motives involve much more than mere ethics, but rather seek to secure the identities of governing bodies and correspondingly the identity of international relations.  

...the drive to pursue ethical adventures abroad is not directly related to winning votes, but to an even more basic political instinct of the political establishment - the need for governing administrations to have a sense of self-identity, purpose and self-belief. Governments without a

sense of 'mission' and collective purpose would lose their internal cohesion and soon dissolve into faction fighting and petty squabbles.\textsuperscript{79}

Not surprisingly this echoes state-centric understandings of politics – predicated on sovereign, nation states - which preserve the (privileged) political identities of nation states, and the order of international relations. Kaldor defines global civil society "...as the medium through which a social contract between the governing institutions and the governed is negotiated and reproduced."\textsuperscript{80} Global civil society thus assumes the role of protecting 'world citizens' in the same manner that sovereign nation states currently function to maintain a safe environment for their citizens. The (world) citizen once again assumes the identity of object/subject of the governing body, which in the cosmopolitan articulation of politics are the institutions of global civil society. The citizen as an object remains that which has to be protected from that deemed to be the existential threat; and the citizen as a subject, is that which is to be governed over. Security accordingly becomes a necessity, in that it is the means utilized to defend and protect citizens from that delineated as threatening in character. Within global civil society, this constructed threat assumes the identity of the internal Other. Jackson asserts that security is a requirement in every society, as Others are always present within international relations.\textsuperscript{81} "The necessity of security arises from the fact that people must live together and are thus exposed to each other, and from the fact that some people present a threat which cannot and should not be tolerated."\textsuperscript{82} The securitization of the internal Other as an existential threat to global civil society, permits the suppression of otherness by

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{80} Kaldor. "Cosmopolitanism and Organised Violence": 2.  
\textsuperscript{81} Jackson: 192.  
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
whatever means necessary. Security is thus a self-referential practice, in that bodies of governance engage in the securitization of threats so as to provide themselves with a purpose for existence – such that to preserve the safety of their citizens from the threatening Other. The political distinction of friend/enemy is reflected in practices of security, which involves the successful securitization of an issue, and a subsequent response involving measures beyond the norm. The extension and preservation of ethics by cosmopolitan advocates of global civil society becomes the replacement for the state-centric protection of the notion of sovereignty, but the end goal is tantamount – the conservation of the self-preferred political identities of powerful (liberal) states, and the corresponding protection of political order, maintained through the perpetual use of violence. The failure to move beyond ordered state based relations is ironic in and of itself, as it necessitates the practice of security and simultaneously forces humans to engage in an inevitable condition of violence.

FROM SECURITIZING TO SECURITIZATION: CONSTRUCTING THE ENEMY IDENTITY IN COSMOPOLITAN PRACTICES OF SECURITY

Cosmopolitan advocates for global democracy articulate genocide as the existential threat to global civil society. This securitizing move of constructing genocide as threatening, and simultaneously as that which citizens must be secured from, is rooted in cosmopolitan notions of human rights.

The problematic that arises is that the articulation of human rights is burdened with identity politics. The construction of human rights are predicated upon social norms, and are thus contingent upon the social context in which they are specified. Typically, in seeking to securitize human rights, the delineation of who needs to be secured from
violations of such rights, and who should engage in the securitization of these rights occurs. Mutua refers to the articulation of identity in this manner as the ‘savages-victim-savior’ metaphor. The victims and savages are typically understood to be ‘non-European’ in character, whereas the saviours are demarcated as being ‘Caucasian’. Victims are characterized as different but not other; whereas savages are painted as Other. Mutua asserts that “The savior is ultimately a set of culturally based norms and practices that inhere in liberal thought and philosophy.” The foreign security policy of Western states thereby becomes the saviours’ means to securing the human rights of those constructed to be victims, but is essentially just another means through which Western states protect their own identities within international relations. Moreover, the securitization of human rights through foreign security policy becomes a means to suppress the external other, as it obliges ‘them’ to comply to Western - and supposedly universal – perceptions of human rights standards. Mutua asserts that the universalisation of human rights by Western states

...requires the recipient, usually a non-Western state, to conform aspects of its domestic laws, policies, or programs to human rights or democratic norms. The coercive manoeuvre is intended to civilize the offending state. In this sense, Western states frequently use human rights as a tool of foreign policy against non-Western states.

It can thus be contended that universalising human rights is a means of preserving the international political order and (privileged) identities of Western states.

In relating this to cosmopolitan notions of humanitarian intervention it corresponds that they too are laden with identity politics. The saviours in Mutua’s

metaphor are the more powerful members of the cosmopolitan community of global civil society. The victims and savages are those that the saviours engage in the practice of humanitarian intervention with – essentially those considered as different and other from the cosmopolitan community. Such designations serve to reinforce the identity of the governing body, be it in the form of sovereign nation states or global civil society. Connolly contends that “As obstacles to its efficacy multiply, the state increasingly sustains collective identity through theatrical displays of punishment and revenge against those elements that threaten to signify its inefficacy.” Instead of foreign policy, global civil society dictates internal policy with which to deal with belligerents and thereby suppress the presence of the internal Other. The connotation of difference as otherness, thus serves to reinforce the identity of the dominant body of governance within international relations, be it the sovereign nation state, or global civil society. In actuality, these bodies of governance are part of, and therefore help sustain, a system of order within international relations. As asserted earlier on, the questions of who articulates what constitutes a violation of human rights within global civil society, and subsequently which of these violations require humanitarian intervention are paramount.

The designation of people into categories of victims, saviours and savages raises the query of who is demarcated as ‘human’ within these articulations. The crucial question here is “Can we have a concept of rights without having a definition of who or what is human?” It is precisely this query that challenges notions of human rights, and correspondingly cosmopolitan notions of humanitarian intervention. History is laden

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with tragedies that stain the concept of humanity, and which demonstrate that the
designation of who is authentically human is a dangerous approach to politics. The
categorization of who is human, and who is not, is exemplar of the friend/enemy
distinction, and becomes paradoxical as it perpetuates the use of violence in dealing with
those deemed to be (sub)human - and therefore Other - in character. The designation of
humans into such categories has been tragic throughout history.

We can trace the beginning of concentration camps, of the
‘non-human vermin’ of Auschwitz and the ‘cockroaches’
of Rwanda in this most banal and obvious of definitions
which introduces a strict distinction and hierarchy: human
and subhuman, man and superman, us and terrifying
absolute others. What history has taught us is that there is
nothing sacred about any definition of humanity and
nothing eternal about its scope.86

The demarcation of who is (authentically) human is thus a relative and not universal
concept. The savages within Mutua’s metaphor assume the (sub)human identity of the
‘terrifying absolute others’, that the victims must be saved from, and that the saviours
have to protect them from. Global civil society’s approach to security thus parallels the
state-centric approach, in that an-Other is demarcated to be an existential threat that the
governing body must secure itself and its citizens from. The practice of security is thus
contingent upon the articulation of difference as otherness, as the ‘savage’/(sub)human’.
The securitization of those considered to be the threatening, evil, Other, subsequently
necessitates a security response in the form of measures exceeding the constituted norm.
In Schmittian terms, the Other becomes the “outlaw to humanity”, and therefore that

86 Ibid: 164. (emphasis added)
which must be guarded against.\textsuperscript{87} The purpose of global democracy and domestic state democracy claim their end to be one and the same, such that the protection of citizens from the endless dangers that threaten their very existence. "The principle is exactly the same: the right – indeed the duty – of civilized states to stamp out the worst forms of barbarism, within whatever national boundaries they occur, to make the world a safer and more peaceful place."\textsuperscript{88} In actuality, both state-centric and cosmopolitan notions of democracy serve to preserve political order, and (privileged) identities, and do so through the increased militarization of world affairs. The securitization of issues, and the identity of the enemy are thus utilized to reinforce the identity of cosmopolitan global civil society in the same manner that it was employed to reinforce state-centric conceptualizations of nation states.\textsuperscript{89}

Those advocating for cosmopolitan notions of global democracy and corresponding formulations of humanitarian intervention are those considered to be privileged – as they articulate when, where, how, and who should intervene. Moreover, such articulations are made from a position entrenched within Western liberalism.\textsuperscript{90} What is dangerous about articulating human rights in this manner is that said rights become representative solely of cosmopolitan ideals, and are thus relative in nature despite their


\textsuperscript{89} The use of discourse to protect order within international relations will be demarcated in analyses of The Responsibility to Protect, the Dutch report entitled Humanitarian Intervention, and the Human Security Doctrine for Europe. Each of these approaches is contended to bear congruencies with cosmopolitan notions of global civil society. It will be argued that each approach to security permits the subjugation and privileging of identities, and as such perpetuates the use of violence in efforts to maintain the political order of international affairs.

\textsuperscript{90} Bull.
claims of universality. The problematic that arises in securitizing human rights, through the process of humanitarian intervention, is that these notions are formulated upon what Mutua terms "...a basic assumption about the moral equivalency of all cultures" \(^9\) - an assumed universality which does not exist. As 'saviours' then, cosmopolitans assume that their actions are both moral and ethical, but fail to consider that those conceived of as different but requiring aid - the victims - may have quite a different interpretation of what these terms mean. Moreover, those designated to be Other - the savages - are also excluded from the formulations of such conceptualizations. As such, cosmopolitans - despite their claims of universality - do not avoid the pitfall of privileging their particular version of what is moral. This relates back to Mutua's claim that "...the savages-victims-saviors metaphor and narrative rejects the cross-contamination of cultures and instead promotes a Eurocentric ideal." \(^9\) The promotion of one ideal inevitably involves the subjugation of other perspectives. The cosmopolitan approach to humanitarian intervention is thus not only laden with identity politics, but also whispers of imperialism.

COSMOPOLITAN SECURITY: THE NEW HERMENEUTICAL FOUNDATION FOR EMPIRE

It has often been contended that the discourse of human rights is imperial in nature, as it declares a universality, and correspondingly validates the use of any means in protecting and sustaining that articulated as a universal right. Buzan asserts that "If observance of human rights has to be imposed on those who do not share belief in the value, and/or do not calculate observance of it as being to their advantage, then one faces the problem that this project can, in the short term, only be expanded by coercive

\(^9\) Ibid: 207.  
\(^9\) Ibid: 205.
means."\(^9\) Claims to universality within global civil society allow for the privileging of cosmopolitan ideals of universalism, which simultaneously involves the diminishment of that which does not conform to the ideal. Those designated to be anomalies are subjugated as the internal Other, and become that which must be (militarily) suppressed in order to sustain the identity of the Self.\(^4\) These anomalies assume the identity of the 'enemy'. The demarcation of those deviating from the universal perpetuates the use of violence within cosmopolitan practices of security within global civil society. The use of force to obtain a condition of peace is ironic – for the virtuous notion of peace becomes the ground for the exercise of violence. In privileging the articulation of human rights in this manner, cosmopolitan advocates are essentially promoting their designation of human rights as being constitutive of the global norm. Kant’s contention that it is humankind’s fundamental moral duty to move beyond a Hobbesian state of nature to one of global civil society echoes the premise behind the Crusades, in which the moral duty of man was articulated to be the spread of Christianity. Williams Jr. asserts that “The universal right asserted by popes and Christian princes to enforce Christianity’s vision of “civilization” and natural law legitimated and dignified the conquest, dispossession, and enslavement of non-Christian peoples throughout the non-European world.”\(^5\)

Cosmopolitan articulations of security, predicated upon the Kantian notion that it is man's moral duty to enter a state of global civil society, thus become the new hermeneutical foundation for conquest in the name of universalising human rights. The

\(^9\) Buzan. From International to World Society: 150.
\(^4\) The 'Self' is understood as a universal global civil society, and the internal Other is that which deviates from its articulated norms.
discourse of the universal is essentially a discourse of conquest that permits the
privileging of powerful identities within international relations over weak identities. The
privileging of identity in this manner is perpetuated by the cosmopolitan practice of
security – to which the friend/enemy distinction is integral - in which the ‘enemy’
becomes the object of conquest.

Cosmopolitan global civil society replaces the nation state as the identity that
must be protected, and designates the violation of human life through genocide to be the
ultimate violation of human rights that must be protected against. The securitization of
human life from genocide occurs through the use of humanitarian intervention. Conflicts
over human rights, that involve humanitarian intervention, have been termed ‘new wars’
by Kaldor. The designation of what constitutes a situation requiring humanitarian
intervention is the central issue here, as it is precisely this articulation that allows for the
privileging of cosmopolitan notions of morality over other related expressions. Within a
society that is supposedly universal in character, no external Other exists; however, the
internal Other remains present, and becomes the existential threat that bodies of
governance must secure themselves against. The internal Other thus becomes the
purpose of the body of governance’s existence, and the protection of the internal Self is
its objective. In examining cosmopolitan democracy from the perspective of the
domestic analogy, the means utilized to suppress these internal Others assume a police­
like form. The use of physical force, through the medium of the military, is thus utilized
within global civil society to advance the interests of those holding power within the
global democracy. The demarcation of an enemy is thus integral to the cosmopolitan

practice of security. Similarly, police are utilized at the domestic state level to maintain order, and guard against criminality, as dictated by the sovereign nation state.

The powerful considers his superiority as an indication of moral righteousness, of a just cause, which allows him to turn the enemy into a common criminal who must be punished. The impotent enemy becomes a quasi-internal rebel and the war against him takes on the character of police action.97

The internal Other in cosmopolitan global civil society becomes criminalized, and “...the action against those resisting the new order takes the form of a police operation that aims to prevent, deter, and punish criminal perpetrators rather than political opponents.”98 Yet criminals can be considered political opponents as they challenge the political order by not conforming to it. The criminalization of the internal Other within cosmopolitan global civil society bears similarities to the treatment of those deemed to be infidels in the Crusade. Infidels were considered to possess the same rights and freedoms as Christians, but breaches of natural law led to remedial action against them.99 Similarly, the notion of common humanity is at the basis of all cosmopolitan theory, and those who violate the specified standards of humanity are those deserving punishment. The delineation of identities in this manner demands the consideration of how ‘human’ the theory of cosmopolitanism actually is. For the privileging and subjugation of identities suggests that there are loopholes in the cosmopolitan articulation of humanity that allow them to practice violence towards those designated as Other.

Humanitarian intervention thus becomes the cosmopolitan means of preserving order within international relations. This simultaneously preserves identities, and

97 Douzinas: 174.
98 Douzinas: 172.
99 Williams Jr.: 49.
condemns humans to a condition of violence that is a corollary of security. “Just as, within a realist world, military force is used to advance the political interests of the state, so in this case they would be used to advance and defend key cosmopolitan values and objectives.”\textsuperscript{100} Using force in this manner is ironic, as it permits the commission of the very act that cosmopolitans assert they are working to subdue. The constant securitization of issues leads to the construction of an enemy, and correspondingly the requirement for security, which in turn necessitates the existence of a governing body. Ignatieff asserts that “The humanitarian empire is the new face of an old figure: the democratic free world, the Christian West.”\textsuperscript{101} In a global democracy then, humanitarian intervention – as a tool of security - thus functions to preserve the cosmopolitan notion of global civil society as a means to maintain political order, and also enables it to project its ideals onto Others as well. As Ignatieff suggests, attempting to secure human life through humanitarian intervention in cosmopolitan global civil society parallels claims of spreading humanity through colonization processes in the Crusades. The universal end of a moral society once again serves to reinforce the use of violence in attempts towards its acquisition.

Cosmopolitan advocates for global civil society contend that this collaborative approach to resolving problems that are global in nature is what is needed to move beyond the Hobbesian state of nature to a civilized condition of existence. The identified means that cosmopolitans articulate to advance past this condition to a state of global civil society should rouse caution when compared to civilization missions of the past, for

\textsuperscript{100} Elliott and Cheeseman: 38.
the similarities amongst them are nothing short of frightening. Ignatieff contends that “It would be a mistake to assume that these dilemmas are entirely new. Ruling peoples, with a view to preparing them for self government, is a very old function of empire.”1 In discussing empire, Ignatieff further asserts that

The moral premises of anti-imperialist struggles in this century — all peoples should be equal, and all people should rule themselves — are not wrong. But history is not a morality tale. The age of empire ought to have been succeeded by an age of independent, equal and self-governing nation states. In reality, it has been succeeded by an age of ethnic cleansing and state failure. This is the context in which empire has made its return.13

The suggestion here is that cosmopolitan notions of global civil society are representative of the return of empire, in that they claim morality to be their purpose, in the same manner that the Christians responsible for the Crusades did. The most dangerous contradiction within cosmopolitan notions of security embodied within global civil society is precisely that they engage in their own form of ‘cleansing’ by using force and punishment to subdue the actions of those they demote as being belligerent in character. The end goal of cosmopolitan cleansing is far from being as drastic or horrific as that of genocides, but the premise is the same — to rid the society of those who do not belong: the evil, enemy Others that are inevitably threatening. At its core, this process is imperialistic in character, despite its superficial benevolent appearance. Moreover, it is ironic as it utilizes the supposedly pure concept of humanity as a guise for its imperial exercise of violence against that designated to be the ‘existential threat.’ Kaldor asserts that:

103 Ibid: 123.
In these wars, violence is itself a form of political mobilisation. Violence is mainly directed against civilians and not another army. The aim is to capture territory through political control rather than military success. And political control is maintained through terror, through expulsion or elimination of those who challenge political control, especially those with a different label. Population displacement, massacres, widespread atrocities are not just side effects of war; they are a deliberate strategy for political control. The tactic is to sow the ‘fear and hate’ on which exclusive identity claims rest.\textsuperscript{104}

It can thus be contended that wars fought in the name of humanity are nothing more than a means by which to preserve order – through political control - within international relations. This suggests that the cosmopolitan notion of security is imperialistic in nature, and thus perpetuates the use violence – through the increased militarization of political issues.

The cosmopolitan articulation of the universal – embodied in the discourse of human rights - bears similarities to the discourse of the Crusades, in which it is contended that “…discourse most often served to redeem the West’s genocidal imposition of its superior civilization in the New World.”\textsuperscript{105} The new world - that of global civil society - becomes dominated by the discourse of cosmopolitan notions of human rights. In considering Ignatieff’s claim that “To the extent that human rights justify the humanitarian use of military force, the new empire can claim that it serves the cause of moral universalism.” it becomes apparent that cosmopolitan notions of humanitarian intervention are representative of just this, in that universal notions of morality lay at the basis of their claims - and are thus inherently imperialistic in nature. Although the motives behind intervention may genuinely be humanitarian to some degree, the primary

\textsuperscript{104} Kaldor. “Cosmopolitanism and Organised Violence”: 4.
\textsuperscript{105} Williams Jr.: 7.
motive behind such actions is intrinsically imperialistic in that it seeks to preserve the self-preferred identity of cosmopolitan global civil society. The preservation of global civil society occurs through the securitization of those that oppose it to the identity of the evil, enemy Other - and correspondingly necessitates the practice of security.

The conviction that progressing from a society of sovereign nation states to global civil society will enable a more peaceful condition of international relations is prominent within cosmopolitan arguments for global democracy. The cosmopolitan claim to universal peace is precisely what becomes dangerous here as it allows for any means to be utilized in the securitization of the imperial end of global civil society. Northcott asserts that “The universal story of an enlightened humanity progressing toward peace legitimates a perpetual war to bring it about.” The Kantian claim that perpetual peace will arise from global civil society is thus paradoxical, as it requires the continuous exercise of violence to bear and sustain its existence. What becomes even more ironic here is that the existential threat within cosmopolitan security – the act of genocide – is fundamentally what cosmopolitan global civil society executes on Others, albeit in a much less severe manner.

Cosmopolitans assert that the use of multilateral decision making within global civil society will preserve the validity and integrity of that society, as multilateralism protects against abuses of power. However, this utopian perspective on politics fails to account for expressions of power that occur within any articulation of international relations. The moral and ethical frameworks behind cosmopolitan notions of humanitarian intervention are prone to privileging the identity of the liberal ‘West’, as it

is precisely upon this identity that cosmopolitan ideas of global civil society are predicated. Despite the seemingly 'fair' approach of multilateral decision making in cosmopolitan global civil society, the risk exists that these decisions will be influenced by the more powerful regions to whom the choice to intervene will entail a greater cost in terms of resources.\textsuperscript{107} As Chandler asserts, "The realities of unequal power relations mean that the more flexible decision-making is, ..., the easier it is for the more powerful states to dictate the international agenda."\textsuperscript{108} The more influential regions within global civil society then – undoubtedly Western regions - are those that present the risk of governing the world in their self-interest.

It is useful to draw upon the latter work of Ignatieff here. In \textit{Empire Lite}, Ignatieff asserts that "The ostensible motive that sustains these nation-building projects may be humanitarian, but the real principle is imperial: the maintenance of order over barbarian threat."\textsuperscript{109} The cosmopolitan practice of security through the act of humanitarian intervention can thus be considered as a means to preserve order within international relations. Political order, and the (privileged) identities constituted and maintained within it, thus becomes the ‘true’ referent object of security.

Ignatieff also argues that "...humanitarian relief cannot be kept distinct from imperial projects, not least because humanitarian action is only possible, in many instances, if imperial armies have first cleared the ground and made it safe for the humanitarians to act."\textsuperscript{110} Cosmopolitan articulations of humanitarian intervention are consistent with this description, despite the claim that multilateralism will guard against

\begin{footnotes}
\item[107] Chandler: 346.
\item[108] \textit{Ibid.}
\item[109] Ignatieff. \textit{Empire Lite}: 22.
\item[110] \textit{Ibid}: 19.
\end{footnotes}
plays of power. The use of military force to settle the situation at hand, with the combined presence of ‘white helmets’ to help rebuild the afflicted areas, resonate the actions of those promoting Christianity during the Crusade. The ironically named ‘white helmets’ in Archibugi’s articulation of cosmopolitan humanitarian intervention are reminiscent of missionaries used to ‘civilize’ the ‘savages’ during the Crusades. These cosmopolitan soldiers of humanity thus replace the ‘soldiers of Christ’, but their mission of ensuring security is one and the same: to promote the interests of the powerful – i.e. order - within international relations using whatever means necessary.

Cosmopolitanism thus becomes the new hermeneutical articulation that allows for the emergence of empire, and that requires the identity of international relations to be preserved. For that which is deemed Other within the universal, is that which must be conquered. The constant articulation of an enemy that must be subdued and civilized is the problematic inherent within international relations. For as long as the identity of the ‘enemy’ persists within politics, the use of force and violence in its conversion and conquest will be justified. Ignatieff asserts that “But imperialism doesn’t stop being necessary just because it becomes politically incorrect. Nations sometimes fail, and when they do only outside help – imperial power – can get them back on their feet. Nation-building is the kind of imperialism you get in the human rights era, a time when great powers believe simultaneously in the right of small nations to govern themselves and in their own right to rule the world.”111 The suggestion here is that imperialism is necessary to maintain and achieve order within politics. It would appear then that Ignatieff is suggesting that violence – through imperialism – is a necessary (pre)condition to ensuring

111 Ibid: 106.
peace. Yet the use of violence is antithetical to peace. The assertions of political theorists like Ignatieff - who contend that violence is necessary to maintain order and peace - suggests that humans are condemned to a state of perpetual violence.

PERPETUATING VIOLENCE THROUGH COSMOPOLITAN PRACTICES OF SECURITY

It can be argued that violence is an integral component of cosmopolitan practices of security. Any body of governance within politics requires the securitization of an issue in order to preserve its identity as the entity that provides security to its citizens. Despite its theoretical basis in the notions of common humanity and morality, cosmopolitan global civil society perpetuates the use of (violent) security practices. Cosmopolitan notions of global civil society necessitate the practice of security to guard against the ever-present enemy that challenges political order and (privileged) identities. Security thus remains a self-referential practice within global civil society, as it is within the state-centric understanding of international relations. The paradox here then, is precisely that security is a self-referential practice, and as such it continuously perpetuates violence within politics. For without an existential threat – in the form of, or caused by, the threatening Other – to the order of international relations, the requirement for security would disappear, as would the necessity for a governing body through which to exercise that security. Hence violations of human rights, in the form of genocide, necessitate the practice of cosmopolitan security – in the form of humanitarian intervention. As Kaldor asserts: “The ‘new wars’ are no longer discrete in time and space. The various actors – states, remnants of states, para-military groups, liberation movements, etc. – depend on continued violence for both political and economic
reasons.” Violence thus becomes a necessary condition for establishing and maintaining order within international relations through the practice of security. It would appear then, that violence is a corollary of the practice of security.

The ensuing chapters will consist of case studies consistent with cosmopolitan notions of security. The following three sections will consist of case studies examining current global attempts towards human security. *Humanitarian Intervention, The Responsibility to Protect, and A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*, will be analysed to show how they are congruent with cosmopolitan notions of security. Each analysis will assert that violence is perpetuated through practices of security that seek to preserve political order and (privileged) identities. The work of Michael Ignatieff was involved in each of these pieces, both in direct and indirect ways, and as such will be highlighted in the analyses. The use of Ignatieff's arguments in the formulations of these global security efforts suggests that they are premised upon notions of responsibility that correspond with arguments for Empire. Each of these attempts at global security regards themselves as having a responsibility to respond to situations characterized as genocide.

It will also be contended that the securitization of an issue necessitates a (violent) political response above and beyond normal measures. Cosmopolitan notions of security, much like state-centric notions, are thus correlated with violence. This suggests that violence is an artefact of security, and correspondingly that practices of security are paradoxical to their proclaimed end.

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Chapter Three: *Humanitarian Intervention* – Cosmopolitan Beginnings?

*There can be no authentic rule of law among nations until nations have a common political morality or are under a common sovereignty.*

~Robert Bork
The issue of genocide has become increasingly contentious within the past decade, and has led to the creation of multiple policy approaches that indicate aligned thinking across governments worldwide. Each of the dominant policy approaches to genocide asserts that humanitarian intervention should be utilized to address the transnational problem of genocide, and that doing so will lead to an increase in both national and global security. The emphasis placed on strengthening national security suggests that the international actors proposing the approaches have vested interests in the outcome.

In examining policy approaches to humanitarian intervention, the query of what purpose does the securitization of genocide serve to governments arises. As asserted earlier in this argument, the securitization of an issue subsequently necessitates a (security) response beyond normal measures to address it. Thus, the successful securitization of genocide provides bodies of governance with a reason for existence – i.e., the entity which works to address and stop such situations from occurring. What is disheartening about current approaches to genocide, is that notions of morality and responsibility become a basis for imperialistic politics of self-interest. The paradox here then, is that those conducting humanitarian interventions risk engaging in similar, or more harmful, actions than those they claim they are striving to prevent.

In April of 2003, the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) in collaboration with the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law (CAVV), produced a report entitled “Humanitarian Intervention” (henceforth HI) that
sought to advise the Dutch government on issues of humanitarian intervention. The report was produced in response to the Dutch government's request for the advisory report, and was based on the reflection that there were no legal foundations in place governing humanitarian interventions. As such, the Dutch were concerned that such actions risked being a guise for military operations of a different nature and could also undermine international law. The report was intended to address what was a viable approach from the standpoint of international law, and was to incorporate related moral and political concerns. The report was also intended to examine what potential approaches the international community could take towards ending gross violations of human rights within a state, in addition to how the notion of humanitarian intervention could be more clearly defined within international law. The HI can be interpreted as a nationalistic approach that is based upon cosmopolitan notions of humanitarian intervention.

The following chapter will entail a synopsis and critique of the Dutch attempt towards improving global security through humanitarian intervention, and will show how it is analogous with cosmopolitan propositions of humanitarian intervention. It will be subsequently be argued that the securitization of genocide by the Dutch necessitates the practice of security, which helps preserve political order.

**HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A NATIONALISTIC ATTEMPT AT COSMOPOLITAN IDEALS?**

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2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
The following argument will seek to delineate the cosmopolitan elements intrinsic within the Dutch report in order to make the case that it can be understood as a nationalistic approach towards cosmopolitan notions of security.

Section I of the report serves as an introduction to HI and entails the reasoning behind the Dutch government's decision to commission the report, as outlined above. This section also provides an overview of the remainder of the document. As asserted earlier, this document was meant to address the existing gaps in international law concerning the issue of humanitarian intervention.

Section II of the report incorporates the Basic Principles developed by the joint commission of the AIV and the CAVV (henceforth the joint commission). Section II.1 of the report deals with the approach to the principles, and asserts that they are intended to reflect the moral, political and international law aspects of humanitarian intervention. The decision to incorporate moral concerns can be considered cosmopolitan in nature, as they correlate with arguments of universal morality and common humanity that are at the basis of cosmopolitan thought. The assumption made here is that the HI is congruent with notions of cosmopolitan security, which utilize humanitarian intervention as a tool to securitize human life.

Section II.2 provides a definition of 'humanitarian intervention' as follows:

The threat or use of force by one or more states, whether or not in the context of an international organisation, on the territory of another state:
(a) in order to end existing or prevent imminent grave, large-scale violations of fundamental human rights,

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5 Ibid: 5.
particularly individuals’ right to life, irrespective of their nationality;
(b) without the prior authorisation of the Security Council and without the consent of the legitimate government of the state on whose territory the intervention takes place.7

In regards to this definition, the report asserts that the term ‘large-scale’ is subject to varying interpretations.8 This corresponds with cosmopolitan notions of humanitarian intervention as outlined by Archibugi in the preceding chapter, in which he asserts that all situations that are ‘mass violations of human rights’ should be declared as such so as to make the process of deciding to intervene more impartial.9 The word mass, much like the term ‘large-scale’, can be interpreted in various ways.

Section III of the report addresses the moral and political aspects of humanitarian intervention. Section III.1 is entitled “Sovereignty and humanity”, and deals with the conflict that exists between the principles of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. In this regard, the HI report parallels similar reports addressing the issue of humanitarian intervention, as the centre of these debates surrounds the issue of whether sovereignty or human security should take precedence in such matters. This is also congruent with cosmopolitan arguments surrounding humanitarian intervention, which assert that human rights take priority over sovereignty.10 The report accords that nation states provide the best avenue for upholding human rights, as they can be held accountable to the citizens for whom they are responsible and “...respect for human rights, protection of minorities

8 Ibid.
10 Held: 200.
and development of democracy depend on international stability...".  

11 This bears parallels to cosmopolitan notions of global democracy (as outlined in the preceding chapter), in which nation states remain accountable for the provision of human rights to their citizens.

Universal respect for human rights is seen as being instrumental in maintaining the stability of the international order. The idea of universality here is congruent with cosmopolitan notions regarding the existence of norms within the international community on the issue of human rights, and the corresponding facet that the protection of this supposed universality is important in maintaining the world order.

The HI further contends that the lack of response from the international community is deemed as encouraging "...repressive regimes to use, or continue to use, harsh methods in order to maintain their own positions of power."  

12 These ‘repressive regimes’ are further designated to be those that destabilize the international order, as the violence that begins within their regions is liable to spread to other areas.  

13 The lack of response from the international community towards regimes of this character is deemed as having detrimental effects on collective security and as being permissive of gross violations of human rights. 

14 Passivity on the part of the international community thus not only leads to greater human suffering and injustice, but can also threaten collective security, since oppressed or threatened individuals or groups may take the law into their own hands and resort to increasingly drastic forms of action. According to this view, any international order that

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13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
tolerates genocide or other flagrant violations of human rights is by definition unstable. National and international order are closely connected, and both largely derive their legitimacy and stability from their ability to protect individuals or groups against violence or arbitrary treatment.\textsuperscript{15}

This section also asserts that human rights are the common responsibility of states and the international community, and that the need to find a balance between sovereignty and human rights is an increasingly pressing matter.\textsuperscript{16} The notion of common responsibility is congruent with cosmopolitan theory, which suggests that humans have a moral obligation to one another, and should act accordingly.\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, the argument that states and the international community share this responsibility corresponds with the Kantian argument for establishing a federation of peoples that would act collectively towards the promotion and protection of human rights.\textsuperscript{18}

Section III.2 addresses the ephemeral nature of conflict within the world today and maintains that much has changed since the era of the Cold War and that ethnic tensions, and corresponding government responses, make it difficult to discern between wars and humanitarian interventions.\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, it is contended that it is becoming increasingly challenging to distinguish between inter-state and intra-state conflicts, due to the large scale spread of violence between regions.\textsuperscript{20} The HI asserts that conflicts of this nature are difficult to deal with in a diplomatic manner, and that military intervention is

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid: 9.
\textsuperscript{17} David Held: 185.
\textsuperscript{19} Advisory Council on International Affairs and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law: 10.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
more often than not the sole means to deal with such situations.\textsuperscript{21} The discussion around the changing nature of conflict corresponds with cosmopolitan contentions that nation states lack the ability to contend with global problems, and as such collaborative efforts should be made towards resolving them.\textsuperscript{22} The perception that conflict is no longer limited to activities between or within nation states reflects a move away from state-centric understandings of the security environment, to a cosmopolitan one that accounts for the global character of such problems. The HI asserts that the transcendence of conflict past the borders of nation states requires a global effort towards achieving security, which is congruent with the cosmopolitan assertion that collective efforts should be made by the international community to address such issues.

Section III.3 is entitled "States’ attitudes towards armed intervention" and asserts that efforts should be made to “…establish a degree of consent among the parties involved, monitoring of compliance with agreements, and great emphasis on cooperation.”\textsuperscript{23} This corresponds with the cosmopolitan notion that the extension of democracy to a global level would result in increased cooperation amongst political actors. Furthermore, the report contends that the states which are more able to conduct a successful intervention are often hesitant to do so, especially when political and power issues are involved, and when the legal basis for military intervention remains unclear.\textsuperscript{24} The joint committee asserts that the reluctance of such states to intervene is correlated

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Daniele Archibugi. “Cosmopolitan Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention”: 3.
\textsuperscript{23} Advisory Council on International Affairs and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law: 11.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid: 12.
with "...political uncertainty about actions that do not serve their national interests in the narrowest sense of the term, namely defence of their own territory."\textsuperscript{25}

Section IV of the HI report is entitled "Humanitarian Intervention with a Security Council Mandate" and primarily addresses the role of the United Nations Security Council in issues of humanitarian intervention, and asserts that it is not the best means through which to address the issue of humanitarian intervention.\textsuperscript{26} Based on its' findings in the preceding section, section IV.2 addresses potential "Changes to the way in which the Security Council functions".\textsuperscript{27} This section of the report concludes that efforts to revamp the Security Council may be in vain, and will do little more than enhance the Security Council's legitimacy.\textsuperscript{28} Again, this suggests that the Dutch do not believe the Security Council to be the appropriate means to deal with issues of humanitarian intervention. The argument that the Security Council of the U.N. is inadequate in dealing with the issue of humanitarian intervention corresponds (albeit weakly) to the cosmopolitan argument that current approaches by nation states are insufficient in dealing with transnational problems.

Section V of the report is entitled "Humanitarian Intervention without a Security Council Mandate", and addresses how current international law affects humanitarian intervention, and subsequently how the international legal framework can be further enhanced.\textsuperscript{29} Section V.1 evaluates the current international legal framework and concludes "...that current international law does not provide sufficient legal basis for

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid: 14.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid: 18.
unauthorized humanitarian intervention.”  Furthermore, the joint committee concludes that the prevailing interpretation of customary international law regarding the ‘state of necessity’ or ‘distress’ is insufficient to justify such an intervention.  Section V.2 addresses the ‘Development of the law’ and the questions of if a state of necessity substantiates grounds for intervention, and whether there is “...a newly emerging right of unauthorised humanitarian intervention, based on developing customary law?” The report contends that old rules of customary international law cannot co-exist with the UN Charter as legal grounds for humanitarian intervention, but that identical treaty rules and customary law can co-exist.  In the latter case, the report asserts that in the interpretation and application of such rules a distinction can be made between the two. The joint committee further asserts that in order to answer the two questions posed within this section that state practice based on *opinio juris* must be evaluated. The HI accords that the potential for problems to arise exists, and articulates that “...it will be particularly difficult for a new legal basis for humanitarian intervention to emerge via customary international law.” Furthermore, the report contends that problems may arise in the expression of legal views by states, as the lines of reasoning may be greatly varied. The joint committee accords that it is primarily Western states that are seeking to articulate a justification for unauthorised humanitarian intervention, and as such that there

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31 *Ibid*.
33 *Ibid*.
34 *Ibid*.
36 *Ibid*.
is no universal legal consensus on the legality of intervention.\textsuperscript{37} In regards to the lack of universal consensus on the matter of humanitarian intervention, the report points out that

\textldots even if a regional \textit{opinio juris} regarding a legal basis for humanitarian intervention is emerging, the fundamental question remains whether such a development of customary law is possible if it conflicts with peremptory (\textit{jus cogens}) rules such as the ban on the use or threat of force, unless that exception is deemed to form an integral part of said \textit{jus cogens} rules.\textsuperscript{38}

International law would thus have to be accordingly developed to reflect that the \textit{opinio juris} regarding humanitarian intervention is an exception to existing \textit{jus cogens} within international law. The joint committee further asserts that there is no existence or emergence of a sufficient legal basis for humanitarian intervention, but that it is also no longer possible to ignore situations involving the gross violation of human rights.\textsuperscript{39} The HI asserts that there is an "...international duty to protect and promote fundamental human rights", and that it is precisely this duty that serves as the basis for developing customary law justifications for humanitarian intervention without a related UN Security Council mandate.\textsuperscript{40} This corresponds with cosmopolitan contention that new forms of conflict in today's world transgress borders, and thus demand a collaborative approach from actors within the international sphere.\textsuperscript{41} Furthermore the joint committee asserts that a universal individual and collective obligation exists amongst the international community to protect and promote the rights of individual and groups.\textsuperscript{42} This notion is

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid:} 23.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{41} Archibugi. "Cosmopolitan Guidelines on Humanitarian Intervention": 3.
\textsuperscript{42} Advisory Council on International Affairs and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law: 24.
congruent with the cosmopolitan notions that we have a moral obligations to one another, and that human life should be the referent object of security.

The joint committee also accords that the possibility of states abusing unauthorised humanitarian intervention does exist, and that little can be done in situations such as these, other than making states accountable to the international community for their actions.\textsuperscript{43}

Section VI is entitled “The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention”.\textsuperscript{44} It asserts that in the absence of agreement amongst the permanent members of the Security Council, that legitimacy must be acquired through other means.\textsuperscript{45} The report asserts that if the Security Council does not come to an agreement, that the next step is to submit the matter of the possible intervention to the General Assembly for decision, with the procedure entailed within the Uniting the Peace resolution as a basis.\textsuperscript{46} The General Assembly’s resolution recommends that action must be supported by a minimum of two-thirds of the members.\textsuperscript{47} Section VI.1 is entitled “The use of an assessment framework” and addresses the fact that the General Assembly may not be sufficient in addressing the need for humanitarian intervention.\textsuperscript{48} As such, the joint committee asserts that an assessment framework be developed, under which to evaluate humanitarian interventions, and within which to clarify the minimum conditions to be satisfied. This bears similarities to the proposed humanitarian intervention multilateral decision making framework, proposed by Archibugi, in which he asserts that multilateral decisions are

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Ibid}: 25.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Ibid}: 26.
\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Ibid}: 27.
more legitimate than unilateral ones as they help avoid issues of self-interest from surfacing.\textsuperscript{49}

Section VI.2 provides the outlines of the proposed assessment framework and includes the minimum particulars required for an unauthorised humanitarian intervention.\textsuperscript{50} The proposed framework addresses four major questions surrounding intervention, all of which will be outlined here. The first of these questions addresses which states should be allowed to engage in humanitarian intervention.\textsuperscript{51} The joint committee asserts that every nation state has a legal interest in protecting life, but that “…in practice the operational details of the humanitarian intervention will in general be determined by the overall political context and the situation that has led to military action.”\textsuperscript{52} Furthermore, intervening states cannot be those engaged in the violation of fundamental human rights.\textsuperscript{53} This corresponds with the cosmopolitan contention that only states considered as having the best respect for human rights can conduct interventions.\textsuperscript{54} The report further asserts that preference should be given to countries in the region for operational reasons, but that caution should be taken to ensure that this facet does not encourage abuse.\textsuperscript{55} Moreover, the joint committee asserts humanitarian intervention should be undertaken by a group of states with the support of an international organization so as to ensure better compliance with the conditions and safeguards

\textsuperscript{49} Archibugi. “Cosmopolitan Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention”: 5.
\textsuperscript{50} Advisory Council on International Affairs and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law: 28.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Advisory Council on International Affairs and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law: 29.
outlined in the assessment framework. This contention aligns with the cosmopolitan argument that decisions on humanitarian intervention should be made multilaterally with the support of an international institution.\(^{56}\)

The second question addresses when states should be allowed to engage in humanitarian intervention.\(^{57}\) The joint committee asserts that intervention should only be allowed in circumstances "...in which fundamental human rights are being or are likely to be seriously violated on a large scale and there is an urgent need for intervention."\(^{58}\) It is further articulated within the report that such a situation would be one entailing a "...violation of a broadly interpreted right to life by the legitimate government of a country."\(^{59}\) The joint committee's definition is two-fold, and includes a qualitative element concerning the gravity of a situation, and a quantitative element in assessing the scale of the situation.\(^{60}\) The report defines such violations of human rights as including "...not only extermination by means of summary executions and deliberate armed or police attacks on arbitrary civilian targets, but also torture, taking of hostages, rape, and grave infringements of human dignity such as humiliating treatment."\(^{61}\) Furthermore, intervention is permitted in situations involving 'crimes against humanity' as outlined in the Statutes of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals and Article 7 of the Statute of Rome for an International Criminal Court. In this regard, the joint committee asserts that gross violations of human rights can also be committed by agents other than the state and

\(^{57}\) Advisory Council on International Affairs and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law: 29.
\(^{58}\) Ibid.
\(^{59}\) Ibid.
\(^{60}\) Ibid.
\(^{61}\) Ibid.

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can also constitute grounds for humanitarian intervention.\textsuperscript{62} Moreover, the report asserts that intervention is permitted when an internationally recognised government is unwilling or unable to provide victims of gross violations of human rights with appropriate care, and does not appeal to the international community or other states for assistance and disallows them entry onto their territory.\textsuperscript{63} The joint committee asserts that the perceived threat of an internal or international armed conflict is not sufficient grounds on which to permit intervention.\textsuperscript{64} The HI also asserts that the main objective of the intervention must be humanitarian in character, and as such the goal of the operation must be to prevent or end the humanitarian emergency referred to.\textsuperscript{65} As such, the objectives of the intervention must be clearly articulated to the international community prior to the actual occurrence of the intervention.\textsuperscript{66} The joint committee accords that national interests may still play a role in the decision to intervene, but that role should be secondary to the humanitarian reason behind the intervention.\textsuperscript{67} This corresponds with the cosmopolitan contention that issues of national interest may be a consideration in decisions regarding intervention, but that the protection of human life should be the primary consideration.\textsuperscript{68} The last criteria for intervention contained within the report asserts that all other means of addressing the state engaged in the violation of human rights be exhausted before employing military action.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid: 30.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Advisory Council on International Affairs and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law: 30.
The third question addressed by the report concerns which conditions states must satisfy during a humanitarian intervention. The HI asserts that the manner in which force is used or threatened in a humanitarian intervention must be proportionate to the gravity of the situation. The second facet purports that the humanitarian intervention cannot constitute a greater threat to international peace and security than the large-scale violation of human rights does. Furthermore, the joint committee asserts that the impact of the intervention on the national structure of the country being intervened in must be limited to the actions necessary to achieve the articulated objective of the intervention. This does not mean that the structure of the state cannot be altered so as to prevent future violations of human rights.

The fourth question addresses when and in what manner states should end a humanitarian intervention. The joint committee asserts that actions must be employed to suspend the intervention "...as soon as the state concerned is willing and able to end the large-scale violations of human rights by itself or the Security Council or a regional organisation acting with Security Council authorisation takes enforcement measures involving the use of force for the same humanitarian purposes." The HI also contends that the states conducting the intervention must end their intervention when their objective, the end of the violation of human rights, has been met.

Section VII of the report is a conclusion of the document, and offers a summary of the arguments examined here. It is asserted here that the development of an

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70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid: 32.
assessment framework by countries within the 'Western circle' is of importance. This corresponds with the cosmopolitan contention that those states considered as best representing human rights should be those involved in interventions. Furthermore, the conclusion includes the contention that debates on humanitarian intervention should be encouraged and continued.

This overview has sought to demonstrate that the HI is congruent with cosmopolitan notions of global civil society and security. As such, the Dutch attempt towards human security can be understood as a nationalistic approach towards cosmopolitan ideals of security.

OSTENSIBLE GOOD INTENTIONS:

The proclaimed motive behind the HI is to provide a basis for strengthening international legal foundations for the practice of humanitarian intervention. Although this appears altruistic in character, this argument will contend that the HI permits the privileging of identities, and the preservation of the current political order. The HI results in the successful securitization of genocide, which in turn necessitates the practice of security, and a body of governance to provide that security.

The HI argues that moral, political and international law issues must be considered in formulating guidelines for humanitarian intervention. As such, the HI can be understood as the Dutch attempt to promote and universalize (European) morals, through the protection of human rights. Using morality as a basis for articulating

\[76\] Ibid: 36.
\[78\] Advisory Council on International Affairs and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law: 37.
standards of humanitarian intervention makes the HI inherently problematic, as it becomes predicated upon a universal that proclaims to be global, but is in actuality local. The question of whether a global community can exist without an Other to define its identity in opposition and relation to, arises. Notions of universality are predicated upon articulated norms, and that considered abnormal consequently becomes othered, and excluded from the universal. As human rights are predominantly Western in character, it can be argued that the HI seeks to privilege a Western conceptualization of universal standards, and justifies the use of coercion where necessary to do so. Notions of universality thus become the basis for an increased militarization of politics. This increase poses a challenge to the argument that universal morals can lead to a more civilized society, and suggests, rather, a return to a condition of (Hobbesian) violence. The defence of human rights in this manner serves to sustain (privileged) identities, and the current political order.

The question of when to intervene is a contentious one within the practice of humanitarian intervention. The HI asserts that humanitarian intervention is to be utilized “...to end existing or prevent imminent grave, large-scale violations of fundamental human rights...”, but then admits that terms such as ‘large-scale’ are open to interpretation. This would suggest that decisions regarding intervention are subjective, and thus leave room for self-interest to surface. In a similar report, the criticism was made that no attempt was made to “...quantify ‘large-scale’ and suggests that in most

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80 Buzan: 150.  
cases there is unlikely to be major disagreement in interpretation...”82 The demarcation of which situations necessitate intervention, and which do not, allows for the privileging of identities to occur. Moreover, selectively intervening in situations of mass human suffering questions the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.”83 The definitions of when states can intervene is thus problematic as the threshold for intervention is unclear, and thus leaves room for self-interest and bias to surface in deciding whether to intervene or not. Furthermore, interventions are only permitted in situations where they do not pose a greater threat to the stability of international peace and security than non-intervention would. This suggests that preserving the international order, and the (privileged) identities constituted therein, take precedence over the protection of human life. The counter argument to the claim that interventions cannot be more of a risk to international stability than non-intervention, is precisely that the outcome of (non-)intervention cannot be predicted, and as such questions of feasibility risk becoming a veil for self-interest.84 Questions regarding when interventions are warranted invoke the query of whether all humans are in actuality considered to be human, or as D’Allaire asked, if some are worth more. Ignatieff contends that the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions is undermined by the case-by-case approach, and rather that this suggests interventions are conducted for reasons of self-interest.

84 Welsh: 503.
The HI asserts that decisions to intervene must be articulated to the international committee prior to intervention, as a means to safeguard against issues of self-interest. This parallels the multilateral decision making approach taken to issues of humanitarian intervention advocated by cosmopolitans, which are intended to avoid issues of self-interest from taking precedence over the preservation of human life. What is contentious here, is who is on the inside of the international committee, and who is on the outside? For those on the outside are excluded from this process, and consequently decisions regarding humanitarian intervention are made by an elite group of states from which the ‘international community’ is comprised. The unequal power relations involved in multilateral decision making can be manipulated to promote the interests of the more influential over those that are less so. Cosmopolitans contend that territories exemplary of upholding human rights should be those making the multilateral decision to intervene, which dangerously translates to a decision being made from a Western perspective and thus risks being made in their self-interest. The space for self-interest to surface allows for the privileging and subjugation of identities to occur, and allows some situations of mass human suffering to be ignored in order to preserve and promote the interests of those articulating the terms of intervention – i.e., the current political order. It would thus appear that the HI helps maintain a Hobbesian state of civilization, in which security and violence are necessary, rather than progress towards a civilized society in which the use of violence is minimized.

Identities are delineated into categories of friend/enemy in the identification of who is responsible for the violations of human rights. The HI contends that ‘repressive regimes’ are those predominantly responsible for such violations, and for disturbing the
international order. Those territories and regions designated as repressive regimes become characterized as Other, as the evil, enemy savages that pose a threat to international order, and to human life. The emphasis on the political order here is paramount, as it is indicative of the importance placed on its preservation. The importance placed on preserving the international order correlates with Connolly’s contention that tendencies to preserve what is perceived to be a true order of things result in the process of othering. The current political order is read here as the perceived ‘true’ order of things, and those that pose a challenge to it are interpreted as Other – and that which ‘we’ must be secured against. Furthermore, the securitization of repressive regimes in this manner allows for the political distinction of friend/enemy to be made, and thereby necessitates the practice of security to protect against the threats posed by those interpreted as Other. Repressive regimes become characterized as savages, and in characterizing them as such, the use of violence - in the name of security - against them is justified. This in turn, necessitates a body of governance that provides security to its people.

It can thus be argued that the securitization of threats helps maintain the identity of the Dutch government, in that they necessitate the practice of security. As explored within state-centric conceptualizations of security, the citizen once again assumes the dual identity of object/subject of the government. The need for a governing body becomes predicated upon the existence of threats from which to protect their citizens against, and security simultaneously becomes the means to legitimize the existence of a

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governing body. This suggests that seemingly altruistic motives of humanitarian
intervention may in fact be predicated upon the preservation of governing bodies and
political order.87

The HI report also has intrinsic traces of imperialism. The suggestion that human
rights are the common responsibility of nation states and the international community is
congruent with the Kantian notion that it is man’s fundamental duty to work towards an
‘International Federation of Peoples’ that would collaboratively work towards the
promotion of human rights. What is dangerous in the notion of responsibility is precisely
that it entails the articulation of the needs of Others by those characterized as the
exemplary upholders of human rights – i.e. Western states. Thus, the risk arises that
Western states will seek to impose their standards of rights, or standards of civilization
rather, upon those demarcated as Other. As Ignatieff suggests, those practicing
humanitarian intervention replaces the Christian West in the exercise of imperialism.88
Responsibility to uphold human rights thus becomes the justification for the
(imperialistic) exercise of violence against those construed as Other – i.e. repressive
regimes – and the simultaneous preservation of (privileged) identities and political order.
This parallels the approach of the Christians who claimed a responsibility to civilize
those they construed as heathens, and suggests that the discourse of responsibility is also
one of conquest. The Dutch can thus be interpreted, albeit in a weak sense here, as being
imperialistic in character. It can be maintained that the Dutch are not seeking to form an
Empire, but rather to help maintain the current political order, within which practices of

87 David Chandler. “New Rights for Old? Cosmopolitan Citizenship and the Critique of
88 Michael Ignatieff. Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.
imperialism continuously occur. The cosmopolitan notions of morality and common humanity are at the basis of the notion of responsibility, and serve to justify the (imperial and violent) actions of the Dutch, in collaboration with the international community, against those characterized as Other. The irony here is that violence is utilized to move towards, and sustain, a condition of peace – which suggests a return to a Hobbesian state of nature rather than progression towards cosmopolitan ideals of global civil society.

The primary purpose of the HI is to strengthen international humanitarian law, and it addresses that there may be a new customary law emerging that provides the right to engage in unauthorised humanitarian intervention.\(^8\)\(^9\) The notion of humanitarian intervention is primarily a Western practice, which suggests that no universal legal consensus on intervention exists.\(^9\)\(^0\) Moreover the lack of a universal consensus towards humanitarian intervention suggests that the cosmopolitan argument that an international consensus can be reached on such matters is problematic. Customary international law is based upon the traditional behaviour of states, and as such is an inherently inclusive practice. Those regions and territories not recognized as states are excluded from the formulation of opinio juris, and as such it can be argued that customary international law is not universal in character – but rather is quite particular. The danger that presents itself here, is precisely that international law risks becoming an (imperialistic) tool of the elite, that serves to protect their interests and identities, and in the process subjugate those considered as Other. What is even more dangerous in permitting international humanitarian law to be based on opinio juris is that it risks becoming a justification for

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\(^8\) Advisory Council on International Affairs and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law: 21.

\(^9\)\(^0\) Ibid: 22.
the legitimate exercise of violence in the name of securitizing human life. Robert Bork claims that “In its grandest (or most grandiose) form, international law is about the use or support of armed force against another nation.”\textsuperscript{91} Ignatieff contends that seeking to order the world according to national interests is an inherently imperialistic practice.\textsuperscript{92} International law can be interpreted here as a means to (violently) order the world according to the (collaborative) interests of powerful states. Utilizing universal notions of morality as the basis of international law, privileges a particularistic version of such notions and justifies the use of force in obtaining them. Bork asserts that “The major difficulty with international law is that it converts what are essentially problems of international morality, as defined by a particular political community, into arguments about law that are largely drained of morality.”\textsuperscript{93} Thus, international law risks becoming a means to justify the exercise of violent means to preserve, and promote, the self-interests of (privileged) international actors. International law can be considered as a beginning towards cosmopolitan ideals of global civil society — in that it represents a global approach to dealing with transnational problems. What is disheartening about this approach is precisely that it is exclusive, and becomes the basis for the legitimate exercise of violence in the name of security.

The Dutch attempt at articulating standards for humanitarian intervention can be considered a step in the appropriate direction, in that it recognizes some of the gaps that exist within current approaches towards humanitarian law. However, an analysis of the HI suggests that there is — perhaps, and likely unintentional — a tendency inherent within it

\textsuperscript{92} Ignatieff. Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan: 2.
\textsuperscript{93} Bork: 9.
to protect (privileged) identities and the international order in which they are constituted—i.e. the perceived 'true' order of things. Furthermore, it would appear that the Dutch approach to humanitarian intervention permits violence to be used in the contradictory, and imperialistic, manner of securitizing human life. This lends credence to the argument that violence is an artefact of security.
Chapter Four: Cosmopolitanism in Practice: A Human Security Doctrine for Europe
Efforts to create policy directed at human security have been made on a regional basis, which reaffirms the fact that international actors are rethinking security in less nationalistic terms than during the era of the Cold War. The European Union (EU) has been interpreted by academics as a regional exemplification of cosmopolitan notions democracy and global civil society. This makes current efforts by the EU towards the end of human security a crucial site of interpretation and exploration in this study. As such, the EU attempt at (human) security will be analyzed to demarcate that violence is a corollary of security, enabled by the political distinction of friend/enemy that arises in efforts to preserve (privileged) identities and order within international relations. It will be contended that the political identity of the EU is rendered secure at a cost to those Others outside of the constituted realm of the EU. Furthermore, it will be argued that preserving the identity of the EU supports the current political order.

In September of 2004, the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities produced a document entitled *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities*. The report was directed towards the implementation of the European Security Strategy, aimed at preventive engagement and effective multilateralism, that had been agreed upon by the European Council in December of 2003. The primary scope of the report is to propose a ‘Human Security Doctrine’ for Europe, and asserts that Europe needs the capacity to make a more effective contribution to global security. The doctrine consists of three facets, and promotes human security, which is defined by the Study Group as “...freedom for

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1 I say Others intentionally here as not all territories outside the constituted realm of the EU are considered to be other. Rather some territories are considered ‘friends’ of the EU, including those that work towards similar interests or those that do not pose a threat to the EU.
individuals from basic insecurities caused by gross rights violations.”(5) The *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* is the prominent European approach to human security, and much like the RTP and HI, has elements of cosmopolitan thought reflected within it. The focus on human security rather than state security reflects the cosmopolitan contention that human life takes precedence over sovereignty. Furthermore, the EU is understood in this context to be an exemplary cosmopolitan approach to democracy, in which all citizens supposedly share universal notions of morality, including the contention that people should be protected from gross human rights violations. The protection of people from such violations becomes problematic in and of itself as the questions of what constitutes a ‘gross violation of human rights’ arises, along with the query of who articulates such definitions and why? As asserted in the previous chapter, identity politics are part and parcel of international relations, and remain present within the cosmopolitan proposition of global civil society, and hence within the EU. In seeking to preserve order and (privileged) identities within international relations, difference is construed as otherness, and consequently necessitates practices of security. The construction of difference as otherness in this fashion is precisely what allows for the continued subjugation and privileging of identities, and the presence of the political distinction of friend/enemy within international relations, as the Other becomes the enemy that ‘we’ must be protected against. Cosmopolitan notions of global civil society, exemplified in the EU, are thus condemned to practices of security which inevitably lead to violence. This argument will seek to assert that the EU approach to security perpetuates violence, much like other current efforts towards human security do. As such, it lends credence to the argument that violence is a corollary of security.
TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL PRACTICE OF SECURITY

Section 1 of the HSDE provides an overview and introduction to the proposed approach to human security. The Study Group contends that Europeans need to contribute to global security in order to increase and maintain their own security within the world today. This assertion is cosmopolitan in character as it places emphasis on a collective rather than an individualistic approach to security problems that are global in nature. Archibugi asserts that global problems surpass the ability of nation states to deal with them, and thus necessitate a collaborative response. The attention placed on global security, specifically that of human beings, is also reflective of the cosmopolitan school of thought, as it is primarily concerned with the well-being of individuals and the use of a global approach in achieving that end.

The Study Group also asserts that new approaches that differ from traditional defence and war-fighting methods are required to prevent and contain violence on a global basis, and that initiatives aimed at the creation of these approaches will make the world a safer place for Europeans. This argument can be considered cosmopolitan in character as it seeks to articulate a collaborative approach to address the global problem of violence.

Furthermore, the Study Group contends that “Europe also needs to be able to deploy more police, human rights monitors, aid specialists, and many other kinds of civilian expertise.” This contention bears similarities to Archibugi’s proposed cosmopolitan principles for humanitarian intervention, outlined in chapter three, that

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3 Ibid.
asserts that such a holistic task force be created for intervention purposes.\(^5\) The HSDE is purported to be a ‘bottom-up’ approach to making the EU more capable, and asserts that increasing the security of individual human beings globally is the means to doing so.\(^6\) The increased emphasis on the well-being of humans on a global basis reflects cosmopolitan notions that assert that human beings are the ultimate object of concern.\(^7\) Furthermore the bottom up approach to the EU is reflective of the cosmopolitan school of thought that advocates for global civil society. The Study Group maintains that the specific focus of the report is upon developing the EU’s capabilities for “…dealing with situations of severe physical insecurity, ‘freedom from fear’, rather than the whole range of possibilities and instruments of European foreign and security policy.”\(^8\)

Section 2 of the Barcelona Report is entitled “Human security and the European Union”. Section 2.1 addresses the ephemeral nature of the world and asserts that there is a gap between current global security needs and the capabilities in existence to deal with them. This corresponds with the cosmopolitan argument that nation states lack the ability to contend with global problems.\(^9\) Five major global threats are identified within the HSDE and include “…terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states, and organised crime.”\(^10\) The root causes of these threats are purported by the Study Group to be authoritarian states who engage in the repression of their inhabitants, or a mix of state and non-state armed groups in circumstances of state

\(^6\) Study Group: 8.
\(^7\) Pogge: 169.
\(^8\) Study Group: 8.
\(^9\) Daniele Archibugi. “Cosmopolitical Democracy”: 139.
\(^10\) Study Group: 8.
failure. As such, the Barcelona report calls for a move away from traditional national security approaches that once meant support for authoritarian regimes, and asserts that such an approach is no longer viable in a world of global interconnectedness. This argument is thus cosmopolitan in nature as it signifies a movement away from traditional approaches to security, that are primarily concerned with the safe-guarding of sovereignty, to one that emphasizes the protection of human life in an increasingly connected world. The Study Group further asserts that there is an emergence of ‘new wars’, originating from state collapse, that transcend borders and thus involve both local and global actors, including the EU.\(^\text{11}\) The argument that new wars that transcend borders are emerging reflects the cosmopolitan argument that we live in an interconnected world in which problems of a global nature are arising and must be addressed. Moreover these ‘new wars’ have been described as those involving a military response to violations of human rights.\(^\text{12}\) The argument that we live in an interconnected world, in which mass violations of human rights cannot be tolerated and should be responded to with acts of humanitarian intervention, is cosmopolitan in its very nature. As Kant asserted, a rights violation in one part of the world has repercussions for the rest, and as such, efforts should be made towards what he termed ‘perpetual peace.’\(^\text{13}\) The contention within the HSDE asserting that collaborative efforts should be made towards solving problems of human rights corresponds with Kant’s notion of moving towards perpetual peace.

\(^11\) Ibid.


Section 2.2 deals with the issue of why human security should be a concern to the EU, and provides three reasons why. The first of these reasons is predicated upon supposedly universal notions of morality and common humanity, and the Barcelona Report correspondingly asserts that “Human beings have a right to live with dignity and security, and a concomitant obligation to help each other when that security is threatened.”\(^\text{14}\) Held asserts that there situations exist here individuals have clear moral obligations to one another, that extend beyond the borders of the nation state.\(^\text{15}\) Universal notions of morality and common humanity are both primary principles of cosmopolitan theory, and thus this argument can be understood as being reflective of that approach. Moreover, the argument that there is an obligation between humans to aid one another in circumstances where the security of human life is threatened, reflects the cosmopolitan notion that we have a moral obligation to one another that extend past the boundaries of the nation state.

The second reason provided is that if human security is understood as an element of the protection of human rights, then other nation states and institutions – including the EU – have a legal obligation towards ending gross violation of human rights through the creation and provision of human security.\(^\text{16}\) This is reflected within Article 4 of the Constitution of the EU, which asserts that the EU will uphold and promote its values and interests, including its articulated obligations towards the human security of those outside its borders.\(^\text{17}\) This argument bears similarities to the cosmopolitan argument that human

\(^{14}\text{Study Group}:\, 9.\)
\(^{15}\text{David Held.} \, "\text{Violence, Law and Justice in a Global Age}" \, \text{in } \text{Debating Cosmopolitics, Daniele Archibugi (ed.), p. 184-202: 185.}\)
\(^{16}\text{Study Group}:\, 10.\)
\(^{17}\text{Ibid.}\)
rights transgress the borders of nation states, and the contention that ‘we’ have moral obligations to aid one another in circumstances where violations of human rights occur.\(^{18}\)

A final reason provided for striving towards human security is articulated to be ‘enlightened self-interest’, which is intended to convey that European security is contingent upon the security of other people within the world.\(^{19}\) It is construed that the occurrence of violence in one part of the world will affect the EU – in political, social and economic ways.\(^{20}\) Hence the Study Group asserts that addressing the concerns and needs of people in circumstances of severe insecurity will in turn bolster EU security.\(^{21}\) This notion parallels the Kantian argument that a violation of rights in one part of the world will be felt everywhere, and as such efforts should be made to minimize these very violations.\(^{22}\) Moreover, the HSDE argument that efforts should be made to address concerns outside the scope of the nation state is congruent with the cosmopolitan notion that man should be progressing towards global civil society.\(^{23}\)

Section 2.3 addresses how human security can be enforced by the deployment of EU forces. The types of tasks that EU human security forces can be involved in “...include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation.”\(^{24}\) The Study Group further contends that the aim of the EU forces in each engagement is to

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\(^{18}\) David Held: 185.

\(^{19}\) Study Group: 10.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.

\(^{21}\) Ibid.

\(^{22}\) Kant: 94.

\(^{23}\) Ibid.

\(^{24}\) Ibid: 10.
uphold law and order and maintain human rights. It is further asserted that the operations supporting human security are not to be construed as humanitarian interventions, which they deem to be purely military in character, but rather that the operations take on a more holistic approach. This new approach entails that military force may be required in some situations, but that EU efforts should also incorporate "...humanitarian assistance, effective policing, civilian crisis managements as well as broader political and economic instruments." This parallels the cosmopolitan argument put forth by Archibugi outlining principles for humanitarian intervention, that includes the construction of a multi-faceted task force to be used for humanitarian interventions. Moreover, the assertion within the HSDE that EU efforts should also include effective policing bears congruencies with the cosmopolitan argument of using humanitarian intervention as a type of law enforcement within global civil society.

The Barcelona Report includes five considerations to be taken into account when deliberating whether or not to deploy EU forces to a situation. These five facets consist of the gravity and urgency of the situation; practicality of the mission, risks, chances of success and availability of other actors; special responsibility to neighbouring countries; historic ties and historic responsibilities; and public concern and public pressure. These considerations bear similarities to those outlined by Archibugi regarding what issues must be considered prior to an intervention, which include: when to intervene; who authorizes the intervention; how to intervene; and who conducts the intervention.

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25 Ibid.
26 Ibid: 11.
27 Archibugi. "Cosmopolitan Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention": 14
Section 2.4 is entitled "An opportunity for Europe" and asserts that the EU should promote peace and cooperation on a global level, and utilize military force where necessary to achieve this end. The global promotion of peace and cooperation in this manner parallels cosmopolitan arguments that advocate for global civil society and a change in the way the military force is utilized. Furthermore the HSDE asserts that the EU must develop and maintain the capability to act autonomously in situations of gross violations of human rights. If the EU is understood as being exemplary of a cosmopolitan approach to democracy, then the ability to act autonomously corresponds with the cosmopolitan notion that like-minded states must act collectively to ensure that violations of human rights do not occur. Contributing to global security is also contended by the Study Group to be a means of gaining political support from Europeans for the EU, and correspondingly the means to progressing the development of European institution building.

Section 3 of the Barcelona report is entitled "Principles for a new European security doctrine" and provides seven guiding principles directed at the promotion of human security. The first principle is outlined in section 3.1 and deals with 'the primacy of human rights', which is asserted to be the precedence of human security approaches over traditional neo-realist nation-state based approaches. This corresponds with the cosmopolitan contention that humans are the primary unit of concern, and the corresponding argument that a move away from traditional state-centric notions of

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30 Study Group: 12.
33 Ibid.
security to one that focuses on the preservation of human life is needed. The second principle, outlined in section 3.2, addresses the issue of ‘clear political authority’ and calls for the creation of a “legitimate political authority capable of upholding human security.” The Study Group contends that such political authority can be acquired through a number of methods including diplomacy, the provision of aid, discussions with civil society, and the deployment of civilian personnel to situations of human insecurity. The promotion of civil society and the use of civilian personnel in circumstances requiring intervention is congruent with cosmopolitan arguments for humanitarian intervention. A joint consultation process between EU troops and policy makers regarding situations and reactions to issues of human security are contended as providing a further means to gain political legitimacy. Moreover, the Study Group promotes the creation of an integrated command structure that is accountable to both national parliaments and to the European parliament. This is to avoid the problem of troops not acting unilaterally due to taking commands from their own domestic governments, rather than from a single line of authority. The use of an integrated command structure parallels the cosmopolitan argument that international nongovernmental organizations should decide when and how to proceed with an intervention. Section 3.2 represents the third principle of multilateralism, which is contended to be related to legitimacy. Multilateralism, from the perspective of the HSDE, entails a commitment to work collaboratively with international institutions; creating common rules and norms,

34 Pogge: 169.
35 Study Group: 15.
36 Ibid: 15.
37 Ibid: 16.
38 Ibid: 16.
problem-solving through rules and cooperation, and enforcing the rules; and coordination between relevant policies of the member states, the EU Commission and Council, and of other multilateral actors and regional institutions. A multilateral approach to security is congruent with cosmopolitan notions of humanitarian intervention, which assert that such an approach will help avoid issues of self-interest from surfacing. It is asserted that if the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU cannot be made truly ‘common’, then it will be ineffective in achieving greater European and global security.

Principle four, incorporated in section 3.4, deals with what the Study Group has termed the ‘bottom-up approach’. This approach is constituted to be “A continuous process of communication, consultation, dialogue and partnership…” that can determine what strategies would be most appropriate for the situations at hand. This principle corresponds with cosmopolitan notions of global civil society that advocate for a collective approach to governance.

Principle five, outlined in section 3.5, consists of a ‘regional focus’. The Study Group contends that the ‘new wars’ within the world today are located in regional clusters, and as such the focus of the EU should extend beyond the defined areas of nation states to regions. The argument here is that focussing on conflicts as a regional issue rather than as contained nation state issues will avoid the commonly seen spread of

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40 Study Group: 16.
41 Ibid.
43 Study Group: 17.
44 Ibid.
conflict from one state to a neighbouring area. Moreover, the HSDE asserts that “A continuous regional focus could instead allow successful practices to spread quickly from one locality to the next.” This corresponds with the cosmopolitan argument that the new forms of conflict arising in world today transgress borders, and are thus problems of a global nature that must be approached collectively by actors within the international sphere, so as to prevent their further progression.

Section 3.6 entails principle six, which deals with the ‘use of legal instruments’, and asserts that “…they are at the core of how operations should be conducted.” The Study Group asserts that the use of legal instruments means moving from the traditional use of military force towards the use of law enforcement. This is similar to the cosmopolitan argument promoting humanitarian intervention as a type of law enforcement, in which the aim is to preserve human life and not engage with an enemy.

The seventh principle, incorporated in section 3.7, addresses the ‘appropriate use of force’. This principle asserts that the lives of troop members cannot be privileged, but that members of the human security forces should be prepared to kill in extremis. The HSDE maintains that “Nothing should undermine the inherent right of self-defence. If someone is threatening violence a soldier can respond appropriately, regardless of whether force has been authorized under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.” The Study Group’s reasoning behind this provision is that a lack of force can

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47 Ibid.
48 Ibid: 19.
49 Archibugi. “Cosmopolitical Democracy”: 139.
50 Study Group: 19.
51 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
sometimes result in a worsening of the situation, and provides the example of the failure of the UN mission in Sierra Leone. The Study Group further contends that it may be legitimate to kill someone in the circumstance that a third party’s life is at stake. The argument that the lives of those intervening cannot be privileged, but that forces can use force in extreme situations, is similar to the cosmopolitan argument that those involved in the intervention should be prepared to risk their lives in order to save the lives of those suffering, in the same manner that rescue services do.

Section 4 of the HSDE deals with the capabilities required by the EU to implement a human security policy. Section 4.1 asserts that integrated capabilities are required for the integrated tasks that the human security force will face. As such it purports that “...an integrated civil-military force is most suitable for carrying out human security missions.” Police, tax and customs officers, judges, administrators, aid providers and those specializing in human rights are amongst those to be included within the civilian aspect of the human security forces. The inclusion of civilians in this manner corresponds with the argument for ‘white helmets’, consisting of various social services such as teachers, social workers, engineers and doctors, included in the proposed cosmopolitan approach to humanitarian intervention. Furthermore this section addresses the composition of the forces and states that it will consist of three tiers. The tiers would be comprised of strategic planners and a civil-military crisis management centre; a troop of 5,000 at a constant high level of readiness that can be deployed within days; and a

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55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
58 Study Group: 21.
59 Ibid.
third tier of 10,000 personnel, at a lower level of readiness, that could be called upon for deployment. The HSDE maintains that the personnel of the Human Security Response Force be drawn from three sources. The military personnel would be pulled from the 60,000 troops available under the Headline Goal, and from forces involved in the military/police divide (such as the gendarmerie). The civilian component is to be drawn from “...civilian capabilities made available by member states, under the civilian Headline Goals, including police forces and pools of civilian specialists, already on the Commission’s expert roster.” The HSDE also contends that a voluntary component to the force should exist, and could be comprised of individuals with skills to offer who are mid or post-career, NGOs, as well as students and ‘school-leavers’. Moreover, the HSDE asserts that cultural training will be provided to forces so as to facilitate a smooth cultural shift for force members. The construction of the force in this manner bears further similarities to the proposed cosmopolitan approach to humanitarian intervention as it calls for the creation of a troop combined of over 50,000 military and civilian members from fifty of the wealthiest states in the world.

Section 4.2 addresses the legal framework in which the Human Security Response Force would operate, and asserts that the EU should act as a ‘norms-promoter’ of international law. Furthermore, the HSDE maintains that the EU should address the current gaps within international law, primarily by taking a leadership role in the promotion and development of global rules. In the meantime, the HSDE asserts that the Human Security Response Force should be governed by current international legal

62 Ibid.
63 Ibid: 22.
64 Ibid.
frameworks in place, and that all deployed personnel should be subject to the domestic law of the host state, unless the rule of law is not present, or the domestic law conflicts with existing international law. Moreover, the HSDE contends that the EU legal framework should bring clarity to conflicting forms of international humanitarian and human rights law, and should promote human rights when the two are in disagreement.

Section 5 of the HSDE addresses 'Institutional embedding and resourcing', and contends that the newly created Foreign Minister's cabinet is the appropriate home for the Human Security Response Force. The Foreign Minister, jointly advised by the Political Security Committee and the EU Military Committee, will be accountable to the European Council and the Council of Ministers for the actions of the force. Section 5.1 deals with 'democratic control' and in intended to increase the transparency of the EU. The Study Group asserts that this can be achieved through the augmentation of public access to relevant documents; the enhancement and standardisation of the power of Member States to authorise EU security operations; the strengthening of inter-parliamentary cooperation; and through providing the European Parliament with increased authority in analyzing the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget. Section 5.2 asserts that 'bottom-up accountability' needs to be embedded in the institutional framework of the EU security policy. This is to be achieved through a number of means including the explanation to and consultation of the local population.

66 Study Group: 25.
67 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid: 27.
72 Ibid.
about the goals and methods of the missions. Public accessibility to the legal framework governing missions and the common rules of engagement is promoted as another means of achieving bottom up accountability.\(^7^3\) Furthermore, a complaints procedure whereby citizens can protest the possible violation of human rights by the EU troops should be established to promote bottom-up legitimacy.\(^7^4\) The establishment of such procedures from a bottom-up means parallels cosmopolitan arguments for global civil society, as both emphasize the inclusion of opinions from citizens regarding the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, The HSDE also asserts that an ombudsperson, who would report regularly to the EU Parliament, should be appointed as a more immediate means of dealing with misconduct by EU forces.\(^7^5\) This ombudsperson is also to act as a legal informant to the local population, which would include informing them of their rights and duties, and of the legal principles governing the operation.\(^7^6\)

Section 5.3 addresses the financing of the EU forces and asserts that they should be financed out of the EU’s common budget under the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The issue of resources is of great importance in humanitarian interventions as they are more often than not expensive endeavours requiring financing for a sustained period of time. The issue of resource sharing is a prominent within cosmopolitan guidelines for humanitarian intervention, as it is asserted that doing so will help diminish issues of self-interest from arising.\(^7^7\)

The HSDE report concludes with section 6, and asserts that the EU is at a crucial juncture in which it must recognize that it has a critical interest in developing and

\(^{7^3}\) Ibid.  
\(^{7^4}\) Ibid.  
\(^{7^5}\) Ibid.  
\(^{7^6}\) Ibid.  
\(^{7^7}\) Ibid.  

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maintaining its capabilities so as to effectively contribute to global human security.\textsuperscript{78} The conclusion further asserts that the proposed EU force is not intended to replace existing forces and multilateral structures in place, but rather is intended to complement them.\textsuperscript{79} The final contention of the HSDE is that Europe may have an independent role to play in global security and that it should be striving towards the promotion of human security.\textsuperscript{80} The argument that the EU should have an independent role in achieving global security parallels the cosmopolitan argument that certain states (those that best represent human rights within their own territories) have a responsibility to promote the individual well being of humans on a global basis.\textsuperscript{81}

This overview has sought to demarcate the congruencies that exist between the HSDE and cosmopolitan notions of global civil society and humanitarian intervention. These congruencies suggest that the EU’s attempt towards global human security can be understood as cosmopolitanism in practice – i.e. the HSDE can be considered as representative of cosmopolitan arguments for global civil society, and the suggested notions of security contained therein.

USING THE HSDE TO SUSTAIN THE (COSMO)POLITICAL ORDER

The ostensible motive behind the HSDE is the European contribution to human security on a global basis. A critical analysis of this document would suggest that the ‘true’ end – whether intended or not – is the protection of (privileged) political identities, and the order of international relations. As Connolly contends, identities are contingent

\textsuperscript{78} Study Group: 28.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid: 29.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
upon differences, and tend to be positioned "...into fixed forms, thought and lived as if their structure expressed the true order of things." As asserted in the introduction of this study, the political order is read here as the fixed order of things, resulting from the tendency to assume that the current political order of international relations is an expression of the 'true' order of things. Connolly further asserts that the pressure to maintain the identities considered as constituting the 'true' order of things, invokes "...the conversion of some differences into otherness, into evil, or one of its numerous surrogates." It can thus be argued that pressures exist within international relations to maintain the identities that constitute political order, and involve the demarcation of those regions or actors which differentiate from this divide as Other. The HSDE will be read here as a medium which utilizes (violent) practices of security to maintain the identities constituted within the political order.

Moral and legal obligations to prevent and end genocide, along with the opportunity to increase EU regional security, are the proclaimed basis of the HSDE's attempt to contribute to the improvement of global human security. These ostensible reasons for human security appear altruistic, but in reality help maintain (privileged) political identities, and simultaneously, the order of international relations. The Barcelona Report can be interpreted as the EU attempt to promote and contribute to the universalisation of human rights. This makes it inherently problematic, as the HSDE is predicated upon a universal notion of human rights which does not exist, but rather is the expression of a select (privileged) few. As Buzan asserts, if human rights have to be imposed upon those who do not perceive them as advantageous, then the spread and

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83 Ibid.
maintenance of such rights can only occur through coercion. Universalism, as suggested earlier, is the promotion of a norm – and that which differs from the articulated norm, becomes perceived as Other. It would appear then, that force is necessary to obtain and sustain a condition of peace, which is paradoxical in and of itself. This provokes the query of whose version of peace, premised on whose articulation of human rights, does the HSDE seek to promote? As human rights are predominantly a Western concept, it can be contended that the HSDE privileges Western notions of rights, and simultaneously protects their identity. The assertion that contributing to global security, through addressing the global problem of genocide, will increase EU security within today’s ephemeral world, suggests that the EU is seeking to maintain its privileged political identity within (an ordered) realm of international relations. Universal morals thus become the justification for an increased militarization of politics. Using violence to obtain and maintain a condition of peace, indicates a return to a Hobbesian state of nature rather than a move towards Kantian global civil society. Moreover, the HSDE argument that humans have a concomitant obligation to aid one another in situations where human security is threatening is undermined by the fact that the EU has a threshold for intervention.

The Barcelona report asserts that the primary considerations underlying the decision to intervene are the gravity/urgency of the situation, and the feasibility of success. Decisions regarding the gravity and urgency of a situation are inherently subjective, and thus permit issues of self-interest to arise in such considerations. The designation of some situations of genocide as necessitating intervention and others as not,

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undermines the Barcelona Report’s argument that humans have an obligation to help each other in situations necessitating aid — rather it would suggest that only (some) situations require intervention, which as Ignatieff contends, undermines the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.\(^8^5\) The demarcation of some situations as ‘grave’ or ‘urgent’ enough begs the question of who is authentically human — and it would seem that this is contingent upon the politics of those conducting the intervention. It can thus be contended that the identification of some situations of genocide as necessitating intervention, and others as not, permits identities to be privileged, and the political order of international relations to be maintained. Measuring the feasibility of success is likewise an entirely subjective decision, and thus raises further doubts regarding the legitimacy of interventions.\(^8^6\) Welsh argues that “...decision makers cannot know what would have happened in the absence of action.”\(^8^7\) The fact that some genocides constitute grounds for intervention, while others do not, suggests that self-interest is a central factor within the decision to intervene. It can be suggested here too, that situations deemed as necessitating intervention, are those that challenge the political order, and the (privileged) identities constituted within it.

The notion of responsibility intrinsic within the HSDE is a dangerous one, as it risks becoming a tool for justifying imperialistic actions. The cosmopolitan contention,


reflected in the Barcelona Report, that the EU has a responsibility to respond to what have been termed ‘new wars’, becomes the justification for exercising violence in the name of (human) security. This is exemplified in the HSDE’s contention that human security is an ‘Opportunity for Europe’ to promote peace and cooperation on a global basis, and that military force should be used to do so where necessary. Violence thus becomes articulated as the ironic means of progress towards (cosmopolitan) global civil society. Questions of responsibility and whether to intervene are inherently subjective, and invoke the query of why some situations of genocide are intervened in, and why some are not. Williams contends that an issue is made political by the relationship of actors to it – and suggests that this relationship invokes the political distinction of friend/enemy. The securitization of genocides can thus be interpreted as inducing the political distinction of friend/enemy.

The question of which states are demarcated as being responsible for global security problems is central here, as it illustrates how the HSDE privileges certain identities at the expense of Others. The HSDE asserts authoritarian states to be the root causes of global threats, and contends that notions of security that once supported authoritarian regimes should adapt accordingly. Authoritarian states thus become interpreted as the enemy, and simultaneously as that which ‘we’ should protect ourselves against. As the saviour/friend, it becomes necessary for the EU to exercise measures that address the global security problem of genocide, supposedly caused by the authoritarian savages/enemies. Savages become interpreted as inhuman, and therefore violence is justified in efforts to subdue, and civilize, them to a condition where they no longer pose

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a threat. The use of violence in efforts to obtain and maintain peace suggest a return to a Hobbesian state of anarchic nature, rather than a move towards a peaceful Kantian society.

Moreover, the successful securitization of the issue of genocide, and the specific targeting of authoritarian regimes as responsible for such acts, provides the EU with a reason of existence. The acceptance that there is an existential threat, simultaneously necessitates a security response, and a body of governance to exercise that response. It can thus be contended that the EU, as a governing body, requires threats, and necessitates the practice of security. The citizens of the EU become the object/subject of the institution, and security remains a self-referential practice that continuously necessitates the existence of a body of governance that can provide it. The Barcelona Report’s assertion that a legitimate political authority is required to uphold human security lends further credence to the argument that the securitization of an issue necessitates the existence of a body of governance. Likewise, this corresponds with the contention that cosmopolitan motives seek to secure the identities of governing bodies and the corresponding order of international relations. As such, the Barcelona Report can be understood as a means to preserve political identities and order.

The belief that the (privileged) identity of the EU is a factor within interventions, is substantiated by the Barcelona Report’s assertion that the EU must develop the capabilities to act autonomously. If autonomous, the EU would be able to act without the support and acquiescence of the international community – much like the U.S., as the current world’s hegemon, presently does. If there is a tendency to maintain (privileged)
identities within the world, as is suggested by this study’s interpretation of Connolly, then this would suggest that the EU, as an autonomous actor, would continue to securitize issues through interpreting difference as otherness, so as to preserve a self-preferred autonomous identity. The Barcelona Report asserts that the EU should maintain a leadership role in the promotion of peace and cooperation on a global level - through developing and upholding human rights - and that military force should be utilized where necessary to achieve this end. The establishment of human rights norms by the EU, risk being created in its own self-interest, which would result in the protection of (privileged) identities and order within international relations. This suggests that that which is construed as Other, i.e, those violating these rights, will be dealt with through violence in efforts to promote ‘peace.’ This argument is paradoxical – as it advocates for the use of violence in achieving and sustaining peace – and imperialistic. The promotion of human rights as universal permits the use of any end in the fundamental duty to acquire them. The proclamation that something is universal – and therefore the ‘true’ way of things – allows for any means, be it dispossession, colonization, or ‘civilization’, amongst others, to be used in achieving that end.

Universal ideas of human rights become the basis for notions of responsibility and duty towards the international community. Notions of universality are inherently particularistic and risk becoming the grounds for the exercise of (imperial) violence. In fact it has been suggested that humanitarian intervention has replaced the Christian West

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in imperial practices.90 Where the Christians once proclaimed that it was their duty to spread morality, the EU (as articulated within the HSDE) can spread human rights. Moreover, the Barcelona Report’s argument that humanitarian intervention troops be composed of military and aid workers, supports the notion that the areas being intervened in are being prepared for self-rule. However, preparing people for self-rule through subjecting them to colonization practices is a function of empire.91

The Barcelona Report’s suggestion that a regional focus should be taken towards humanitarian intervention, so as to prevent the spread of conflicts between regions, combined with the assertion that it is primarily authoritarian states that are responsible for genocides, suggests that it is these regions that would likely be the focus of EU interventions. This too is imperial, as it suggests that those territories not conforming to the norm – i.e. democracy – will be those that are targeted for intervention, and subsequently colonization. In doing so, the EU would essentially be engaging in nation-building in its own image. As Ignatieff asserts, the true motive behind humanitarian interventions may appear altruistic, “...but the real principle is imperial: the maintenance of order over barbarian threat.”92 Human security thus becomes a means by which to preserve (privileged) identities and the international order. Moreover, the promotion of legal instruments as a move away from military force to law enforcement suggests that a police-like method will be utilized in dealing with situations of conflict. What is inherently problematic about this assertion is that global, or supranational, policing is reminiscent of empire. Where force was once used to deal with those considered

91 Ibid: 123.
92 Ibid: 22.
belligerent in character, i.e., the infidels, police force will now be utilized to subdue those characterized as Other. The identity of the Other thus shifts from external to internal – and those challenging the perceived ‘true order’ of things become criminalized, and demarcated as the enemy. Global policing thus becomes another means by which to maintain (privileged) identities and political order. Moreover, this suggests that security – as maintained by global police – necessitates an-Other, a threat, an enemy against which it can protect those conforming to the articulated and accepted norm. This substantiates the claim that violence is an inevitable component of the self-referential practices of security.

Despite its benevolent appearance then, it can be contended that the motives of the HSDE are ostensible and seek to promote and maintain political order and (privileged) identities. What is even more crucial, is that the EU is considered to be a regional example of cosmopolitanism in practice – and thus this argument suggests that cosmopolitan notions of global civil society, that include practices of security, are doomed to the paradoxical end of using violence to secure ‘peace’. This lends further credence to the overall theme of this study: that violence is a corollary of security.
Chapter Five: The Responsibility to Protect: Internationalizing the (Cosmopolitan) Notion of Responsibility

_There must be no more Rwandas_

~ ICISS
Horrific events of a shocking and unprecedented nature haunt the history of our world. It is these very events that have spurred the debate over human rights, morality, and the 'right' to intervene. Recent occurrences, such as that of Rwanda, have resulted in large scale losses of human life due in part to the maintenance of territorial integrity. Can those in a position to do something about harm to human life refrain from doing so on the basis of sovereignty and its' corresponding principle of non-intervention under international law? Or should the debate between sovereignty and the 'right' to intervene be recast in less convoluted terms so as to ensure the protection of human life? The deplorable incidents of Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia and Somalia have stimulated the creation of the International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), and their corresponding report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*. Within this document, the Committee seeks to address when states can intervene in matters of other states in order to prevent and halt such catastrophes from occurring. Historically, these matters have led to a debate of intervention versus sovereignty, which has resulted in inaction towards gross violations of human rights based solely on the maintenance of territorial integrity. As a result, the ICISS has recast the terms of the deliberation to be 'the responsibility to protect' instead of 'the right to intervene'. By doing so, it can be contended that the ICISS seeks to create a new type of activism, one that focuses on the 'internationalization of the human conscience' rather than on the sovereignty of states and the inviolability of their territory.¹

The *Responsibility to Protect* can be considered as an approach on the international level that is congruent with cosmopolitan arguments for humanitarian

intervention. As such, it can be construed as taking the notion of responsibility one step further than the Dutch attempt at humanitarian intervention, analysed in the preceding chapter, which sought to articulate a (cosmopolitan) nationalistic approach to security.

The first half of this chapter will entail a synopsis of *The Responsibility to Protect* and its correlation to cosmopolitan notions of security. The latter half will argue that the *Responsibility to Protect* works to preserve the identities of powerful actors within international relations. It will assert that the notion of responsibility upon which this document is based, is imperialistic in nature and seeks to preserve a specified order within international relations. It will be contended that the *Responsibility to Protect* continues the privileging of some identities and the subjugation of Others, in the form of the political distinction of friend/enemy, which enables a tragic perpetual condition of violence.

**INTERNATIONALIZING COSMOPOLITAN SECURITY**

The main argument within *The Responsibility to Protect* consists of the notion that sovereign nation states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from preventable tragedy, and that when these states are unwilling or unable to do so, this responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. This argument is reflective of the cosmopolitan school of thought, as it is primarily concerned with individual well-being and the use of global civil society to achieve this end. Kant’s suggestion of moving towards global civil society in the form of an ‘international federation of peoples’ encompasses the idea that there is an international responsibility to prevent large scale harm to humans. A ‘world community’, in the form of global civil society, exercising a

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\[Ibid: \text{viii.}\]
‘responsibility to protect’ can protect against gross violations of human rights by acting together towards the prevention of such catastrophes. It can hence be contended that The Responsibility to Protect is based in notions congruent with cosmopolitanism, and this is a theme that is evident throughout this discussion.

The first section of the ICISS report regards the challenge to policy posed by the ‘responsibility to protect’. The main concern of this section is the question of intervention, specifically when it should be engaged in. The notion of intervention has been a contentious one since it was first raised. In 1965, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States was established, and affirmed that (in)direct intervention into the internal or external affairs of another state was prohibited, regardless of the reason. This contention is further reflected within Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, which states that no authorization will be provided for the intervention into affairs within the domestic jurisdiction of another state. Furthermore, the principle of non-intervention is an accepted norm (jus cogens) under customary international law. Thus it would appear that intervention is prohibited, however this is not the case as intervention for humanitarian purposes is allowed in strictly defined situations. The U.N. has not condemned the intervention into Kosovo for humanitarian reasons but they have also provided little support or acceptance of the action. The fact that no repercussions were effectuated is important as it shows the acceptance, although on a small scale, of such actions. Moreover, such actions are

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5 Ibid: 1039.
indicative of the fact that the field of international relations is in a constant state of flux, and is seemingly changing to an articulation of politics that is predicated on more humane notions – embodied in cosmopolitanism - that the current sovereign state exemplification in place. Many political problems that require intervention have surfaced, and as such it has become necessary to readdress when and if intervention is necessary. Thus allowing intervention on humanitarian grounds becomes important, although it can be problematic in regards to when it should be invoked. Precautions must be effectuated when deciding to engage in missions of intervention, as highlighted in Section 1.5 of the ICISS report, which asserts the importance of distinguishing between intervening too much and not enough. The case of Rwanda is a numbing example of the cost of non-intervention whereas the situation in Somalia is an indication of intervention gone awry. These cases exemplify the difficulties that ensue with the use of intervention, in particular the issue of whether it is being used for the ‘right’ purposes. As articulated by Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the U.N., and highlighted within this report, the need exists to find common ground in regards to common humanity on which to act, and it is through defining this that ‘we’ will appropriate when intervention is necessary. These words are cosmopolitan in character as they suggest a basis of morality, inherent within the conceptualization of ‘common humanity’, be implicated in deciding if and when to use intervention. In finding Annan’s ‘common ground’ it is important to realize that the concept of ‘human security’ bears implications for people worldwide, meaning that we have interconnected fates and hence the problems of states are a “...risk to people everywhere”. This argument bears cosmopolitan undertones as it suggests that our actions are

7 ICISS: 1.
interdependent, and consequently we should act accordingly in working towards ‘our common fate’. As such, actions should be taken so as to ensure the development of international standards of conduct for (sub)states and people, with emphasis on the securitization of human rights. To a certain degree this has already been effectuated within the international arena, through the formation of legal norms and the establishment of international institutions, directed at the implementation of human rights and international humanitarian law. The emergence of such norms and institutions can be understood as evidence of the emergence of global civil society. These mechanisms create new expectations for the conduct of (sub)states, and subsequently for the corrective action that must be engaged in by (sub)states in order to protect and securitize human rights. Furthermore, as the ICISS report contends, the concept of human security is becoming increasingly more pertinent in both international law and international relations as it provides a framework for international action. The notion of human security also indicates a shift within the debate of intervention from a state-centric based argument to one based in cosmopolitanism. The ‘shift’ thus occurs as the debate moves from concerns regarding traditional notions of sovereignty, understood as territorial integrity, to a conceptualization that embodies the protection of human life.

The ICISS report asserts that the concept of sovereignty entails a dual responsibility which consists of the duty to respect the sovereignty of other states (essentially non-intervention) and the duty to respect the dignity and basic rights of people within the state. It is a combination of both of these aspects, sovereignty and

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid: 8.
human protection, that are at the basis of the ‘responsibility to protect’. Again the change in the character of the debate changes from a focus on state sovereignty, in territorial terms, to one incorporating cosmopolitan perspectives of morality. Moreover, the assertion of dual responsibility reflects the cosmopolitan trajectory of international relations – i.e. the universal - nation state – individual model. Within this model, nation states would have to respect each other’s territorial integrity, and would remain the primary provider and protector of human rights to the individual. It can thus be asserted that the RTP is congruent with cosmopolitan notions of global civil society.

Intervention is an obscure term in that it has many meanings and interpretations. As such, it is necessary to define what is meant by ‘intervention’ in regards to the ‘responsibility to protect’. The ICISS purports intervention to be “...action taken against a state or its leaders, without its or their consent, for purposes which are claimed to be humanitarian or protective.” These actions can consist of military intervention which has raised some opposition in linking the word ‘humanitarian’ to ‘military’. In order to avoid controversy over this matter, the committee has recapitulated this concept in the terms “the responsibility to protect”. Intervention in cosmopolitan notions of security is aligned with this definition of intervention, but actions are taken against those deemed to belligerent individuals or (sub)states, rather than nation states.

The main focus of the RTP is the provision of protection to people who are in situations that pose a danger to their existence, due to the inability or unwillingness of their state to act in a way that would safeguard them. ICISS provides an opportunity to

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11 Ibid.
12 ICISS: 9.
13 Ibid: 11.
the state in question regarding the protections of their citizens, which parallels the
Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies Rule which asserts that states must be permitted to
solve their own problems before international mechanisms can be utilized.\textsuperscript{14} It is
precisely when this mechanism fails that the international community becomes
implicated in attaining the ends of securing of human life. Cosmopolitan advocates for
global civil society can be understood as arguing that the recurring failure of these
national mechanisms within international relations signify a need to move beyond
sovereign nation state approaches to politics to that of global civil society. However,
within any approach to politics, the provision of ‘protection’ is a difficult thing to
implement and requires the development of “…consistent, credible and enforceable
standards to guide state and intergovernmental practices.”\textsuperscript{15} These standards must
incorporate clear rules, procedures and criteria regarding intervention.\textsuperscript{16} Additionally, it
must be ensured that military intervention is resorted to only when necessary, meaning
after all other approaches have failed, and for the appropriate reasons.\textsuperscript{17} Again, what
constitutes an ‘appropriate reason’ for the ICISS is based in cosmopolitan thought, being
the end of protecting human life. According to ICISS, and cosmopolitan advocates for
global civil society, an inappropriate reason for such behaviour is one that would be
supported by either the realist or Hobbesian school of thought, which would emphasize
the self-interest of those intervening. The ICISS asserts that while formulating these
guidelines and engaging in intervention activities, the purpose of eliminating “…the
causes of conflict while enhancing the prospects for durable and sustainable peace” must

\textsuperscript{14} Shaw: 6.
\textsuperscript{15} ICISS: 11.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
always be kept in mind.\textsuperscript{18} The notion of working towards sustainable peace echoes of the Kantian idea of perpetual peace, acquired through the emergence of global civil society. This contention can be considered from a cosmopolitan point of view, which would emphasize that our lives are interconnected and as such we should act to secure ‘peace’ for all people everywhere, through the means of global civil society. The difficulty that arises within the formulation of such guidelines is the constitution of what poses a ‘danger to existence’? What is the ‘existential threat’ that security must work to contain? It needs to be considered whose conceptualization of such a ‘threat’ is being used to invoke intervention as a means of protection, and for what purpose. In the majority of cases, the ‘danger’ posed will be evident, but there may exist situations where it is not. As such, cosmopolitans advocate that precautions should be taken to guard against this type of abuse, through the form of multilateral action (as opposed to unilateral action).

The ICISS, in reflecting upon the words of the Secretary General of the U.N., contends that the notion of sovereignty entails two components that require protection, consisting of the state, and people/individuals. As such, the ICISS extends the idea of rethinking “sovereignty as responsibility”.\textsuperscript{19} Conceptualizing sovereignty in this way places emphasis on state authorities to protect the welfare and safety of their citizens, in addition to embodying responsibilities to the international community through the U.N.\textsuperscript{20} By recapitulating sovereignty in such a manner, The ICISS envisages a change from a ‘culture of sovereign impunity’ to one of ‘national and international accountability’.\textsuperscript{21} This is congruent once again with the cosmopolitan notions of global civil society and

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} ICISS: 13.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} ICISS: 14.
global democracy, which suggest that we have a 'moral obligation' to each other, which supports the notion of 'international accountability'. Moreover, cosmopolitan notions of global civil society reflect a fluid interpretation of sovereignty, in that they visualize an international community of states, within which the securitization of human life trumps the notion of sovereignty. ICISS further purports that the process of acquiring universal justice is becoming attainable through the implementation of institutions and laws which seek to support the realization of human rights on a global scale.\(^{22}\) This argument parallels that of advocates for cosmopolitan democracy, who suggest that the implementation of such institutions is evidence of an emerging global civil society, that will lead to the end of securing human rights worldwide.

Rethinking the notion of sovereignty additionally involves a recapitulation of the notion of 'security'. In consideration of the RTP, 'security' can no longer be simply conceptualized in national and territorial terms but rather must incorporate the idea of human development.\(^{23}\) The cosmopolitan argument that supports the protection of human life as the referent object of security is in accordance with this argument as it asserts that the preservation of human life takes precedence over sovereignty. The ICISS further contends that there is an emerging practice of customary international law which would incorporate the components which form the basis of the RTP.\(^{24}\) This further supports the cosmopolitan contention that the face of international relations is changing and that global civil society is emerging from our current state. Yet another emerging principle recognized by the ICISS is that the use of intervention is acceptable when it is used to

\(^{22}\) Ibid.

\(^{23}\) ICISS: 15.

\(^{24}\) Ibid.
impede human suffering that is occurring or is imminent, in a state that is unwilling or unable to end the injury itself, or is itself the cause of the harm.\textsuperscript{25} This principle reflects the liberal contentions of the cosmopolitan Kant, who maintained that intervention could be utilized in a pre-emptive manner so as to provide against an offence that is being committed or that may be committed.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, the ICISS report purports that legal sources and foundations in favour of using military intervention for human security purposes have begun to emerge.\textsuperscript{27} Again, this contention is reflected in cosmopolitan ideology, which asserts that war can be legitimate when conducted in the interests of a wider ‘human society’.\textsuperscript{28} Furthermore, the emergence of such institutions suggests a changing international relations sphere. Military intervention can thus be considered as a type of ‘war’ that is engaged in for the greater interests of ‘human society’, being the alleviation of large scale losses of human life – which cosmopolitan Mary Kaldor refers to as the ‘New Wars’. The notions of sovereignty and security thus shift, as does the focus of the debate on intervention.

As sovereignty becomes understood to be the protection of citizens as well as territorial integrity, the debate on intervention changes from a focus on the ‘right to intervene’ to the ‘responsibility to protect’.\textsuperscript{29} ICISS contends that this entails is a consideration of issues from the perspective of those requiring or seeking support.\textsuperscript{30} It is important to note here that the responsibility to protect consists of three elements: the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Ibid}: 16.
  \item ICISS: 16.
  \item Tuck: 218.
  \item ICISS: 17.
  \item \textit{Ibid}.
\end{itemize}
responsibilities to prevent, react and rebuild.\textsuperscript{31} A description of what each of these elements necessitate, and how they relate to cosmopolitan notions of global civil society, will ensue.

The "responsibility to prevent" asserts that prevention is the primary responsibility of sovereign nation states and the institutions which help comprise them.\textsuperscript{32} However, the international community is implicated within prevention in terms of providing development assistance, and support in determining the fundamental sources of the conflict. Avoidance of conflict can also be accomplished by the international community through the use of tough and punitive means.\textsuperscript{33} Cosmopolitan theory asserts that anyone engaging in acts of genocide/democide are breaching the standards of morality as articulated within global civil society, and as such repercussions in the form of force can be utilized against them, in a police-like manner. Also inherent within the conception of prevention is the awareness of the issue; as such early warning and analysis of such matters become implicated factors.\textsuperscript{34} The ICISS report calls for additional resources to be used for such purposes, and has obvious implications for the international community.\textsuperscript{35} This raises subsequent questions regarding the reliability of the information provided by states for this purpose.\textsuperscript{36} As such, the ICISS recommends the creation of a specialized unit that would report directly to the Secretary General and collect pertinent information.\textsuperscript{37} The establishment of such information collection would entail addressing

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid: 19.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} ICISS: 21.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid: 22.
\textsuperscript{37} ICISS: 22.
political needs and deficiencies, in which support for the rule of law and promotion of
civil society are implicated.\textsuperscript{38} The promotion of such concepts bears similarities to
cosmopolitan arguments, specifically those of Kant who asserts that it is man’s ‘moral
duty’ to leave a state of nature to pursue one of civil society.\textsuperscript{39} Support for the rule of law
can be understood to be the strengthening of legal protections and institutions, a
contention that has parallels to cosmopolitan ideals of democracy.\textsuperscript{40} According to ICISS,
this encompasses efforts to protect the integrity of the judiciary, the promotion of honesty
and accountability in law enforcement, the enhancement of protection for vulnerable
groups, and the provision of support to local institutions and organizations working to
expand human rights.\textsuperscript{41} In addition, prevention can be achieved through the use of
international legal sanctions, and the fear of retribution.\textsuperscript{42} Examples of institutions and
legislation capable of effectuating such sanctions are the International Criminal Court,
and the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols.\textsuperscript{43} By engaging in such measures,
the move from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention can be appropriated, as will
the establishment of prevention practices at local, national, regional and global levels.\textsuperscript{44}
The use of sanctions in this manner is parallel to the cosmopolitan notion of global
policing, in that it deploys punishment against those considered to be delinquent in
character – i.e. those deemed responsible for the threatening act of genocide.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{39} Tuck: 207.
\textsuperscript{40} ICISS: 23.
\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Ibid: 24.}
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Ibid.}
The second facet of the RTP consists of the responsibility to react. This responsibility entails the requirement to react to situations of compelling need for human protection, and the further responsibility to intervene when such measures fail. Strict conditions for engaging in military intervention should be developed and implemented so as to ensure appropriate use of such measures. However, in circumstances where situations exist that shock mankind or are perceived as a threat to international security, intervention may have to be utilized. The difficulty that arises here is the definition of what constitutes an exceptional circumstance and warrants intervention. In attempting to provide an answer to this question, the ICISS provided six criteria that should be satisfied before engaging in military intervention. These consisted of right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects. The report concluded that military intervention is justified in two sets of circumstances, that of a large scale loss of life or that of a large scale of 'ethnic cleansing, either actual or apprehended'. The cosmopolitan approach to humanitarian intervention articulated by Archibugi, as outlined in the second chapter, seeks to overcome the ambiguousness of the words 'large scale loss of life' by stating that all situations that are genocidal/democidal in nature should be declared as such. However, the cosmopolitan approach additionally contends that the designation of a situation as a genocide/democide does not mean that an

45 ICISS: 29.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid: 32.
51 Ibid.
intervention will be employed – rather this decision is predicated upon what cosmopolites have termed ‘a reasonable chance of success’.

The criteria for intervention are reminiscent of those historically used to determine whether the action of war was ‘just’ or not.\textsuperscript{52} In any case where military intervention is resorted to the primary purpose of such action should be to halt or avert human suffering.\textsuperscript{53} In regards to the criteria of right intention, the ICISS recommends that multilateral action as opposed to unilateral action will avoid intervention for inappropriate reasons.\textsuperscript{54} This aligns with the cosmopolitan notion that approaching the question of intervention multilaterally will avoid international actors acting in self-interest, and rather will ensure that intervention is employed for appropriate reasons. Moreover, the report purports that it may be in every country’s interest to contribute in a cooperative fashion to the resolution of such problems.\textsuperscript{55} This contention is reflective of cosmopolitan ideology as it suggests that acting in a cooperative manner can lead towards the realization of human rights on a global scale. The use of military intervention to put an end to such travesties of human rights, is congruent with cosmopolitan contentions. Kant maintains that military antagonism can be utilized to secure international cooperation, “The means which nature employs to being about the development of innate capacities is that of antagonism within society, in so far as this antagonism becomes in the long run the cause of a law governed social order.”\textsuperscript{56} It can be contended that this

\textsuperscript{52} Shaw: 1016.
\textsuperscript{53} ICISS: 35.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid: 36.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Tuck: 218. (as quoted in)
quote from Kant is essentially supportive of the use of military intervention to secure a rule of law within global civil society, an assertion supported within the ICISS report.

The third component of the RTP that the ICISS report discusses is the ‘responsibility to rebuild’, which implies a follow through after intervention. Implicated in this responsibility is the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of local security forces. ICISS asserts that the behaviour of intervening authorities should be guided by the U.N. Charter, with the aim being the promotion of political, economic and social advancement of the people of the territory in question. This is congruent with the cosmopolitan assertion that ‘white helmets’ should be utilized to promote the well-being of the victims as part of the humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, ICISS asserts that rebuilding entails the promotion of respect for human rights and the equal administration of justice. The ‘responsibility to rebuild’ has implications in international law as it affects the sovereignty of the state in question. The ICISS addresses this factor and asserts that intervention involving rebuilding cannot promote or restore good governance unless the intervening party has authority over the questioned territory, and what this essentially entails is a ‘suspension of sovereignty’. The implication inherent within this description is that sovereignty will be returned to the state in question. This argument is consistent with the cosmopolitan line of thought, which would advocate for the promotion of human rights within global civil society, and the admonishment of those violating said rights.

57 ICISS: 41.
58 Ibid: 44.
59 Ibid.
The following section of the ICISS report deals with the 'Question of Authority'. The primary matter in this area is the question of when force may be resorted to, and what effect this has on the domestic jurisdiction of the state in question. The report asserts that the U.N. is the authority to deal with security threats of all types and that the Security Council has the 'primary' responsibility of dealing with peace and security matters. Moreover, the General Assembly has the general responsibility with regard to any issue falling within the scope of U.N. authority. As such, the recommendation of the ICISS is that guidelines be effectuated regarding the use of veto in matters concerning a large scale loss of human life, in that it should not be allowed in consideration of such concerns. Furthermore, the report asserts that even though the U.N. exists in a realist world, it must still strive for idealism. This assertion is cosmopolitan in character as it assumes that we live in an anarchic world ruled by 'power politics', but that the notion of an ideal society is still a hope we must strive for. In articulating cosmopolitan notions of humanitarian intervention, Archibugi contends that three types of institutions could be utilized to authorize interventions – a world parliament, a council of experts, or a world court. Questions thus arise regarding the danger of inaction by these bodies where there is a 'RTP' and asks whether a threat to the international order or harm to humans is worse. Again, the cosmopolitan school of thought is implicated here – as cosmopolitans would advocate for the prevention of danger to human life over the preservation of order.

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60 Ibid: 47.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid: 52.
64 Ibid: 54.
The seventh part of the report concerns the operational facet of the ‘RTP’. It asserts that preventive operations should be engaged in before any consideration is given to military intervention. This is essentially an invocation of the concept of *jus ad bellum* which is the law governing the resort to force. When military intervention is effectuated, a clear mandate and rules of engagement should be set out beforehand. While engaging in this operation, it must be remembered that the main goal is to restore good governance and the rule of law – or in the case of cosmopolitanism, a return to the civilized state embodied within global democracy. Furthermore, the ‘RTP’ requires the development of a ‘Doctrine for Human Protection Operations’, which begins with preventive efforts and ends with rebuilding whilst working towards the attainment of the aforementioned goal. Moreover, this doctrine must ensure compliance with human rights, as articulated by cosmopolitan advocates of global civil society, and the rule of law. This argument bears similarities with cosmopolitanism as it appears to suggest working towards the acquisition of human rights on a global scale.

The final section of the report deals is entitled “The Way Forward”. This section addresses three concerns raised by the ICISS in regards to implementing the RTP, which consist of the process, priorities and delivery of such a responsibility. The first of these concerns, the process by which to effectuate the RTP, regards the need to ensure that protective action is taken in a manner that reinforces the ‘collective responsibility of the international community’ to address such issues. The words ‘collective responsibility’ echo the contentions of cosmopolitan ideology, which asserts that we have a moral

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obligation to each other, and consequently should act accordingly. The second concern, that of priorities, regards the responsibility to act in an appropriate manner, such that to try and prevent such catastrophes from occurring before engaging in military intervention. Lastly, the concern of delivery regards the failure of the international community to respond to situations of human suffering in a timely manner. The report contends that pleas for international action of this kind have four different types of appeal: moral; financial; national interest; and partisan. It is the moral and national interest arguments that we are primarily concerned with here, as it is this component that is consistent with the cosmopolitan ideology. The writers of the report conclude with the assertion that through clarifying the terms of the debate, and reminding states of their 'common responsibilities', 'we' can move forward. In doing so, the ICISS purports that we can reconcile two objectives, being the strengthening of sovereignty of states and the improved capacity of the international community to act to protect people whose own state is unable or unwilling to do so. It asserts that meeting this challenge is a necessity if the 'RTP' is to be characterized as a basic element in the formation of the 'code of global citizenship'. Again, these words are symbolic of the cosmopolitan debate which articulates that global citizenship, achieved through institutions and the rule of law, is a means by which to secure the end of human rights for people everywhere.

In the words of the ICISS, "if all humans are equally entitled to be protected from acts that shock the conscience of us all we must match rhetoric with reality and principle with practice." Essentially then, the ICISS is contending that the Responsibility to

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69 Ibid: 71.
70 Tuck: 220.
71 ICISS: 75.
Protect is the means by which we can attain the end, being the protection of human life, and the prevention of catastrophes of human suffering. Whether or not this in fact will occur remains to be seen, but two possibilities exist. The first would be consistent with the cosmopolitan veins of thought, in which the ‘RTP’ would be invoked, perhaps through the implementation of a cosmopolitan democracy, or through other less complicated means. Currently, this responsibility is conceptualized in terms of unlawful actions towards other states and subsequent reparations. From a cosmopolitan perspective, this responsibility may change in accordance with the ‘RTP’ to encompass international legal duties towards other states based on morality and ethics. The second would echo state-centric notions, and would consist of more prominent regions within global civil society acting solely for purposes of self-interest and self-preservation (a la Hobbes), at the cost of Others, and the resulting impact of continued state of anarchy within the world. The ensuing section will argue for the latter of these two possibilities, and will assert that cosmopolitan notions of security are predicated upon the political distinction of friend/enemy, and as such perpetuate violence.

RESPONSIBILITY TO WHOM?

Despite its seemingly altruistic character, the RTP is in actuality an elitist political tool by which to preserve order, and the self-preferred identities of powerful actors within international relations. It will be contended here that the securitization of an issue, which subsequently invokes the political distinction of friend/enemy, and results in the need for security measures. Accordingly, this suggests that cosmopolitan security is predicated upon violence.
The RTP can be regarded as a set of standards governing the conduct of states in situations requiring humanitarian intervention. The articulation, and implementation, of these standards can be understood as a means by which to maintain order within international relations. Cosmopolitan advocates for global civil society predicate their ideals on the basis of universal notions of morality. Universality assumes sameness — an ordered collectivity of particulars who conform to a standard of behaviour. Notions of universality are predicated upon norms, and thus deviance from the norm becomes interpreted as threatening in character. The articulation of a universal requires particulars, and it is when these particulars are construed as Other that the practice of security — in the form of humanitarian intervention — becomes necessitated. The RTP asserts that it is necessary to provide protection to people whose lives are threatened, due to the inability or unwillingness of their state to protect them. Those engaging in acts deemed as threatening to human life become characterized as both deviant and Other.

Doing so permits the exercise of violence against them in order to secure (some) human life. The problem inherent within the RTP’s contention of when the provision of protection is necessary, is within the definition of what is considered to be a danger to people’s existence.

The RTP asserts that military intervention is to be utilized in only two types of situations: in the case of a large scale loss of life or that of a large scale ‘ethnic cleansing, either actual or apprehended’. What is designated as constituting a ‘large scale loss of life’ or ‘large scale ethnic cleansing’ is ambiguous here, and is precisely what allows for the political distinction of friend/enemy to surface. “The report does not attempt to quantify ‘large-scale’ and suggests that in most cases there is unlikely to be major
disagreement in interpretation (p.33). It quickly becomes clear, however, that this
threshold is riddled with controversy." The demarcation of which situations require
intervention allows for the privileging of identities to occur. It is asserted that
"Continuing on a case-by-case basis raises the matter of selectivity and arbitrary
application, which affect legitimacy." The question raised by Romeo Dallaire at the
opening of the second chapter regarding the worth of humans is implicated here, as is his
observation that some humans are in actuality worth more to those who deliberate which
situations require intervention. The deliberation over whether intervention is necessary
or not, undermines the very notion of global civil society, and of humanitarian
intervention. Ignatieff asserts that "If some groups under attack receive international
protection and support, while others do not, then the legitimacy of humanitarian
protection is undermined." If some people under duress receive aid in the form of
humanitarian intervention, whereas others do not, then the notion of common humanity
within cosmopolitan theory is invalidated – as some humans are obviously considered to
be of more worth than others. The demarcation of a situation as constituting a genocide,
or in the case of ICISS a ‘large scale loss of life’, entails a commitment to act upon the
situation once it is declared as such. Thus, the classification of situations becomes

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Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” in International Journal, Autumn
73 Neil MacFarlane et al., “The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in
977-992: 979.
74 Michael Ignatieff. “Human Rights, Sovereignty and Intervention” in Human Rights,
Human Wrongs: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 2001, in Nicholas Owen (ed.), New
convoluted by the politics of those not willing to expend their resources in providing aid to Others.

...large-scale loss of life in Rwanda in April 1994 was widely acknowledged within government circles. However, members of the Security Council (particularly the United States) were not prepared to use the word genocide publicly because of the obligations that would have followed from using the term. Similarly, there has been little dispute over whether the threshold for lives lost has been crossed in Chechnya; rather, the public statements of major states cannot be separated from the pursuit of their own national interests or their concern for international stability.75

The delineation of some situations of human suffering as necessitating intervention - and others as not - privileges the identity of (powerful) international actors and seeks to preserve the order of international relations. Those considered to be Other become the reason for the continued use of force, exercised through the notion of security. The cosmopolitan approach articulated by Archibugi seeks to overcome this by stating that all situations that are genocidal in nature should be declared as such. However, the cosmopolitan approach additionally contends that the designation of a situation as a genocide does not mean that an intervention will be employed - rather this decision is predicated upon what cosmopolites have termed ‘a reasonable chance of success’. It has been suggested that “One obvious counter to this charge is that decision-makers cannot know what would have happened in the absence of action.”76 It is within the ambiguous criteria of a ‘reasonable chance of success’ that cosmopolitan notions of humanitarian intervention work to preserve the order of international relations and the privileged identities inherent within it. As suggested earlier, if a lack of action is permitted in

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75 Welsh: 498.
76 Ibid: 503.
situations involving human suffering, then the privileging of identities is inevitable. The question of interest here becomes what situations are declared as deserving of intervention, and more significantly, why are they designated as such? The answer is precisely that such delineations are utilized to reinforce powerful identities and the related order of international relations. The notion of security is part and parcel of international relations, and the political distinction of friend/enemy is inherent within it—and permits violence to be exercised by the powerful identities against those they interpret and designate as disturbing the international order—essentially those considered to be Other. Otherness is the existential threat that necessitates the self-referential practice of security, which permits the maintenance of order and protection of identities.

Moreover, the RTP asserts that military intervention should only be utilized after all other approaches have failed and for appropriate reasons. The articulation of what is an appropriate reason for military intervention is not defined, and as such risks being premised upon the self-interests of those asserting themselves to be saviours. As the decision is subjective, it permits the privileging and subjugation of identities to occur—through the demarcation of who the saviours, victims and savages are. The construction of identities in this manner serves to protect the self-preferred identities of those claiming to be saviours, and works to preserve order within international relations.

Advocates of the RTP and cosmopolitan humanitarian intervention assert that self-interest can be diminished through the use of multilateral institutions in decision-making on whether to intervene or not. However, multilateralism can still be utilized to promote the interests of the more powerful over the weak. Cosmopolitans assert that those regions that have the most respect for human rights should be those making the
multilateral decision to intervene – which translates to a decision committee formed primarily from Western states. As such, decisions to intervene risk being made in Western interest rather than for reasons of protecting human life. The problematic inherent within Archibugi’s proposition is precisely that these institutions are prone to representing the interests of the powerful international actors. Keohane asserts that “Institutions rely on incentives, and institutions that unbundled sovereignty would be no exception.” The suggestion here is that institutions would be prone to representing the interests of those international actors that provided them with funding, amongst other incentives. Furthermore Keohane contends that institutions require external involvement and as such implicate the self-interest of those involved. The space for self-interest to surface allows for the privileging and subjugation of identities to occur. For it permits some situations of human killing to be ignored in order to preserve and promote the interests of those with the capability to end such travesties. Thus despite attempts to move beyond the Hobbesian state of anarchy to a globalized civil society, the human condition of violence – enabled by the securitization of an issue, which leads to the tendency to create categories of friends/enemies.

HUMANIZING THE OTHER

Undertones of imperialism are inherent within the RTP’s argument for sovereignty as responsibility. It is asserted that,

...the concept of sovereignty as responsibility resurrects ‘standards of civilisation’ and ‘the white man’s burden’.

From this perspective the responsibility to protect has the potential to divide the world into ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ zones and promotes a return to semi-colonial practices in the latter. Not least, it is argued that powerful states will determine whose human rights justify departure from the principle of non-intervention.\textsuperscript{79}

Sovereignty as responsibility risks becoming a tool of conquest, a means to civilize those designated as Other to Western standards. Moreover, the designation of Others preserves the notion of security, an essentially self-referential practice. The cosmopolitan argument for global civil society is thus inherently local, as it seeks to universalize its standards through the subjugation of the particular. This in turn leads to the categorization of identities into groupings of friend/enemy. Those that are designated as victims are considered different from the saviours, but not other, and therefore remain friends. Those considered responsible for the act(s) of genocide are demarcated to be enemies, and are interpreted as Other. What is even more disheartening though, is the seeming perpetuation of situations requiring intervention, and the failure of the international community to adequately address genocides. Allowing humans to be slaughtered in order to preserve order and maintain privileged identities suggests that such travesties will continue to persist within our world. Ignatieff contends that “The Western need for noble victims and happy endings suggests that we are more interested in ourselves than we are in the places, like Bosnia, that we take up as causes.”\textsuperscript{80} The suggestion here is that situations necessitating intervention – and correspondingly violence – are required to preserve the self-preferred identities of powerful (liberal) states and the order of

\textsuperscript{79} McFarlane: 979.

international relations. Thus the practice of human security – embodied in the form of humanitarian intervention – perpetuates violence.

Incorporated within the notion of sovereignty as responsibility is the 'responsibility to rebuild' which is inherently imperialistic. ICISS asserts that the behaviour of intervening authorities should be guided by the U.N. Charter, with the aim being the promotion of political, economic and social advancement of the people of the territory in question. This is congruent with the cosmopolitan assertion that 'white helmets' should be utilized to promote the well-being of the victims as part of the humanitarian intervention. The utilization of intervening authorities in this manner hints of the Crusades, with the political, economic and social advancement of victims and savages replacing the colonization of the infidels. Intervention thus resembles conquest, which is part and parcel of empire. Cosmopolitan notions of promoting the well-being of victims can be understood as a means to securitize the political order of global civil society, and the self-preferred identity of the saviours. Ignatieff asserts that "The ostensible motive that sustains these nation-building projects may be humanitarian, but the real principle is imperial: the maintenance of order over barbarian threat."\textsuperscript{81} By claiming that they are seeking to improve the lives of those they are 'saving', cosmopolitans are in actuality preserving their own self-preferred identity, and the order of international relations.

Furthermore, ICISS asserts that rebuilding entails the promotion of respect for human rights and the equal administration of justice. The 'responsibility to rebuild' has implications in international law as it affects the sovereignty of the state in question. The

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Ibid}: 22.
ICISS addresses this factor and asserts that intervention involving rebuilding cannot promote or restore good governance unless the intervening party has authority over the questioned territory, and what this essentially entails is a 'suspension of sovereignty'.\textsuperscript{82} The implication inherent within this description is that sovereignty will be returned to the state in question.\textsuperscript{83} This argument is consistent with the cosmopolitan line of thought, which would advocate for the promotion of human rights within global civil society, and the admonishment of those violating said rights. What is disconcerting here is precisely that cosmopolitan advocates of global civil society see no problem in utilizing military force to ensure that they — the intervening party — have control over the questioned region. Again, this contradicts the basis of global civil society and instead signifies a return to the anarchic Hobbesian state of nature that cosmopolitans so adamantly assert they are evolving from. Moreover, this fluid notion of sovereignty parallels what Ignatieff refers to as 'empire lite'. The notion of rebuilding includes the premise that those intervening are preparing those intervened upon for self-rule. But as Ignatieff suggests, "It would be a mistake to assume that these dilemmas are entirely new. Ruling peoples, with a view to preparing them for self-government, is a very old function of empire."\textsuperscript{84} Thus the argument for nation building — embodied within the responsibility to rebuild — becomes a guise for imperialism. The continuous use of force in this manner — in the name of security — is precisely what is paradoxical, for it would appear that violence is an intrinsic factor of any approach to security.

\textsuperscript{82} McFarlane: 44.  
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Ibid.}  
\textsuperscript{84} Ignatieff: 114.
The notion of universality has elements of imperialism inherent within it as well. The cosmopolitan argument for a universal society in which the use of sanctions would parallel global policing hints at empire. Punishment is essentially deployed against those considered to be delinquent in character, those subjugated to the identity of the internal Other. The use of force is thus utilized to advance the interests of those holding the power within global civil society, those who articulate what (in)appropriate standards of behaviour are. The criminalization of Others within the ICISS articulations in this manner is reflective of the Crusades, in that remedial action is taken against those demarcated as infidels in breach of natural law. Intervention as proposed by ICISS thus becomes the means through which to preserve the order of international relations, and the self-preferred identities of powerful states. The (re)articulation of the external Other to the internal Other suggests that violence is an inevitable component of international relations – and the practice of security - and as such humans are condemned to a state of perpetual violence.

Thus despite its seemingly altruistic appearance, it can be contended that the RTP is a means by which elite political actors can preserve their self-preferred identities through preserving order within international relations. The securitization of genocide risks allowing the killing of humans to become a justification for the exercise of violence on an international scale. This demonstrates that violence remains a corollary of security, even within collaborative international approaches. Moreover, this argument has demonstrated that cosmopolitan notions of security – embodied within the RTP - risk becoming a tool of empire for those conducting humanitarian interventions. It would
seem then, that humans are condemned to a condition of perpetual violence, exercised through practices of security.
Conclusion: Absconding the Epistemological Violence of Security: Towards a Politics Sans Security

One ought to recognize that the present political chaos is connected with the decay of language, and that one can probably bring about some improvement by starting at the verbal end. If you simplify your English, you are freed from the worst follies of orthodoxy. You cannot speak any of the necessary dialects, and when you make a stupid remark, its stupidity will be obvious, even to yourself. Political language - and with variations this is true of all political parties, from Conservatives to Anarchists - is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind. One cannot change this all in a moment, but one can at least change one’s own habits, and from time to time, one can even, if one jeers loudly enough, send some worn-out and useless phrase - some jackboot, Achilles' heel, hotbed, melting pot, acid test, veritable inferno or other lump of verbal refuse - into the dustbin where it belongs.

~George Orwell

Securitization is the Schmittian Realm of the political, and for precisely this reason it is dangerous and – by and large – to be avoided.

~Michael Williams

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THE PERTINENCE OF SECURITY PRACTICES

The critiques of state-centric, and cosmopolitan notions of security, that suggest violence is a corollary of security, as raised by analyses of current national security practices and global policy attempts aimed at curtailing the problem of genocide, question the validity of the political function of security and the pertinence of academic study directed towards understanding the role of security within today’s world.

The failure of governments to adequately address humanitarian crises in the form of genocide, makes the question of what the rationale of post-Cold War security practices are even more germane. Arguments regarding the strengthening of national/regional security, incorporated within current policy attempts directed at addressing the problem of genocide, likewise imply that governments are more concerned with matters of self-interest than dealing with the problem at hand. The selective approach to humanitarian intervention in situations of genocide would suggest the same. It is argued that “…the whole political preoccupation with security is less a matter of a pregiven political reality and more a matter of the social construction of political orders…”1 This would suggest that the political order of international relations is the motive behind security practices, rather than the protection of some referent object. The protection of human life from the threat of genocide, then, becomes a means by which to preserve the current political order. The paradoxical use of violence in acts of humanitarian intervention lend credence to the argument that those articulating the terms of security have more interest in the

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preservation of (privileged) identities and political order, than in the protection of human life.

The analysis of cosmopolitan security practices suggests that the likelihood of establishing practices of 'common security' – i.e., a practice that encompasses the views and concerns of people in different localities – is an improbable prospect. Rather, it suggests that security practices will continue to be used in a manner that supports the place of privileged, Western actors within the order of international relations. This suggests that the practice of security cannot be extended to incorporate the concerns of all humans. This provokes the inevitable query of what value do security practices have in post-Cold War politics.

READING PRACTICES OF SECURITY

It has been demonstrated that state-centric practices of security lead to the use of violence in efforts to secure the identities of (powerful) nation states, and the political order in which they are constituted. The constant securitization of threats – in the form of an enemy - to the national security of the U.S., suggest that American politicians are concerned with maintaining their identity as the entity that provides safety to its citizens. Likewise, security practices predicated on the spread of 'freedom' become a means to justify the imperialistic exertion of violence, and can be read as an attempt to preserve the U.S. hegemonic identity within the political order.

I have articulated an exemplary formulation of cosmopolitan security, and have argued that such practices would entail the use of humanitarian intervention in securing the referent object of human life. The selectivity in deciding which situations warrant intervention suggests that the protection of human life from the act of genocide is not the
true object of cosmopolitan security practices. Rather, arbitrarily choosing which genocides necessitate intervention implies that these decisions are based within self-interest of those conducting the interventions. Moreover, selectivity undermines the universal notions upon which cosmopolitan arguments of global civil society and security are predicated. Rather, universal notion of human rights, embodied within cosmopolitan notions of security, lead to the paradoxical, and imperialistic, use of force in the promotion and protection of those rights. This suggests that violence remains an artefact of security, despite the humanistic approach to the cosmopolitan articulation of the concept.

Analyses of three case studies congruent with notions of cosmopolitan security were conducted in order to illustrate that the use of violence remained a corollary of security in each approach to humanitarian intervention. The major difference between the three documents was the geographical scope of the approach. The case study of *Humanitarian Intervention* can be considered exemplary of a nationalistic approach to human security. The case study of *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*, represents a regional attempt towards cosmopolitan ideals of security. Finally, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s *Responsibility to Protect* represents an international approach to humanitarian intervention.

The analysis of *Humanitarian Intervention* illustrated that Dutch articulations of human security draw close parallels to state-centric arguments of security. The stress on augmenting Dutch security through addressing the problem of genocide is similar to state-centric security arguments that emphasize national security. Moreover, the question of what necessitates a humanitarian intervention (i.e., what is considered to be a ‘large-
scale’ violation of human rights) bears similarities to the question that arises in state-centric notions of security – i.e., what issues become regarded as national security concerns? It also relates to cosmopolitan notions of security, in which the question is what is considered as necessitating a humanitarian intervention? In asking these questions, the corollary question of why such issues are deemed as necessitating a security response arises. The analysis of HI sought to show that this policy approach supports the political order, much in the same manner that state-centric, and cosmopolitan security practices work to preserve it. The assertion within the HI that interventions are solely permitted in situations where they would not pose a greater threat to the stability of international peace and security, and that they would increase national security, suggests that political order takes precedence over human life. This unfortunately, is a recurring theme within all three analysed policy approaches to intervention, that corresponds with the cosmopolitan argument raised in the second chapter regarding the feasibility of a humanitarian intervention, in which I argued that preserving the political identity of (powerful) states took precedence over human life. The delineation of ‘repressive regimes’ as being responsible for violations of human rights represents the interpretation of difference as otherness, and is illustrative of the subjugation and privileging of identities that occurs within security practices, and relates to the argument of constructing identities along the lines of the savages-victims-saviour metaphor raised in the second chapter. Having ‘savages’ necessitates the practice of security, and simultaneously provides a body of governance with a reason to exist. Manipulating political issues into (accepted) threats so as to necessitate a body of governance that provides security, is a theme present throughout all three analysed documents. Notions of common
responsibility and international community, that undermine the Dutch approach, parallel the cosmopolitan arguments suggesting that the international community has a duty predicated on notions of moral obligations to each other, to address genocides. The notion of duty becomes dangerous, as it becomes the (potential) grounds for imperialistic practices – and this is evident throughout each case study.

Issues of self-interest and imperialism were brought out in the analysis of the *Human Security Doctrine for Europe*, and demonstrated that although addressing genocide may have been its articulated purpose, the actual motive behind it was the preservation of the EU identity, and the political order in which it is constituted. This regional approach to security thus parallels state-centric practices of security, with the focus shifting from the protection of the nation state to the preservation of a regional set of territories. The question of whether to intervene in situations of genocide was predicated upon both the gravity of the situation and the feasibility of success, which draws close parallels to the thresholds for intervention outlined within HI. As affirmed earlier, selectivity in addressing situations of genocide challenges the legitimacy of acts of humanitarian intervention, and suggests, rather, that such acts are conducted for reasons of self-interest. Likewise, the manipulation of genocides as posing a potential threat to the citizens of the EU imply that the locus of interest is in fact the identity of the EU, and the political order within which it is constituted. As within the HI, arguments claiming that the EU has an international duty to address the issue of genocide, brought about by virtue of being human, can become dangerous grounds for the justifying imperial practices. Moreover, the securitization of the issue of genocide, implies a paradoxical use of violence to address it. The successful securitization of genocide
evokes the political distinction of friend/enemy, as is represented in the HSDE’s
identification of authoritarian states as being responsible for most acts of genocide. The
demarcation of authoritarian regimes in this manner allows for practices of imperialism to
be employed against them. Doing so supports the current political order in which
democratic states are considered the norm, and correspondingly that which must be
maintained. Furthermore, the use of civilian personnel in exercises of humanitarian
intervention, is reminiscent of the missionaries employed during the Crusades – which
suggests that the EU is engaging in nation-building in its own image. It would seem then,
that the securitization of genocide by the HSDE is in fact the basis for politics of self-
interest.

The RTP is regarded as a global approach to the transnational problem of
genocide, and outlines principles for how to address such situations. The terminology
used in determining the threshold of intervention parallels that used within the HI, and
the HSDE – i.e., ‘large scale’ loss of life – suggests that intervention is embarked upon
arbitrarily, which raises the suspicion that it is conducted in the self-interest of the
intervening actor(s). Correspondingly, thresholds of intervention suggest that the
‘global’ responsibility upon which the RTP is predicated, is in fact particularistic, as is
indicated by the international community’s failure to address all situations involving the
mass killing of humans. The arbitrary manner in which humanitarian intervention is
carried out provokes the query of whether all humans are considered to be authentically
human. Similarly, this incites the question of who is considered part of the global – read
here as the inside – and who is delineated as being on the outside. It would seem then,
that the universal notions of morality upon which the RTP is situated, are in fact
particularistic. In addition to privileging a limited notion of morality, the RTP risks becoming the justification for practices of imperialism. In a similar fashion the to HSDE, the RTP argues for the inclusion of civilian personnel in exercises of intervention, whose ostensible purpose is increasing the sustainability of a region through providing aid and education to the people of that area. Again, these practices of preparing people for self-rule can be read as inherently imperialistic, as they are reminiscent of both civilization and nation-building missions of the past. The most frightening aspect of the RTP, however, is the notion of the responsibility to prevent. Although seemingly harmless, this notion risks becoming the grounds for further practices of imperialism, as it permits for the illegitimate (ab)use of violence in the name of human security. Evidence of this can be found within current U.S. security practices, whose National Security Strategy includes a doctrine of prevention, which has become the basis for the exertion of force against those actors that challenge U.S. interests. Similarly, the responsibility to prevent risks becoming the justification for (privileged) political actors to utilize force in subduing those they deem as threatening to political order. The securitization of genocide once again serves as a justification for the paradoxical use of violence against those that the RTP asserts its aim is to protect.

Each of these case studies, and theoretical analyses of state-centric and cosmopolitan notions of security, suggests that the securitization of an issue subsequently becomes a justification for the exercise of violence.

TOWARDS A POLITICS SANS SECURITY?

What is interesting to note about each of these case studies is that they all directly involve the work of Michael Ignatieff. The divide in Ignatieff’s thinking from his earlier
piece entitled *The Needs of Strangers*, to his recent piece of *Empire Lite*, deserves attention here. In the *Needs of Strangers*, Ignatieff asserts that the articulation of what strangers require to live a ‘human’ life is inherently biased, and risks being imperialistic. “There are few presumptions in human relations more dangerous than the idea that one knows that another human being needs better than they do themselves. In politics, this presumption is a warrant to ignore democratic preferences and to trample on freedom.”

Ignatieff further argues in this piece that claims to a common human identity are dangerous as they perpetuate violence and death. He asserts that.

> Millions of people have perished since 1945 in the wars, revolutions and civil strife safely conducted under the umbrella of a nuclear peace, under the watching gaze of our imperial policemen. Most of this dying has been in the name of freedom, in the name of liberation from a colonial, tribal, religious or racial oppressor. It is a waste of breath to press the claims of common human identity on men and women prepared to die in defence of their claims of difference.  

In considering this statement in conjunction with cosmopolitan notions of security that are predicated upon the notion of common humanity, it would appear that the early Ignatieff would dismiss such attempts at securitizing human life as being imperialistic.

Yet the early Ignatieff also contends that language can be utilized to realize common humanity. “We need justice, we need liberty, and we need as much solidarity as can be reconciled with justice and liberty. But we also need, as much as anything else, language adequate to the times we live in.” Moreover, he asserts that a common language is that

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which will provide “...the right to speak in the name of the strangers at my door.”\textsuperscript{5} The later Ignatieff that emerges within \textit{Empire Lite}, differs from the early Ignatieff of \textit{The Needs of Strangers}.

The later Ignatieff argues that language has become a tool of imperialism. “The UN nation-builders all repeat the mantra that they are here to ‘build capacity’ and ‘to empower local people’. This is the authentic vocabulary of the new imperialism, only it isn’t as new as it sounds. The British called it ‘indirect rule’.”\textsuperscript{6} The divide within Ignatieff’s thinking is evident within his argument supporting imperialism. Where Ignatieff once argued that articulating the needs of Others was dangerous, the later contends that defining and supporting such rights is necessary.

Imperialism used to be the white man’s burden. This gives it a bad reputation. But imperialism doesn’t stop being necessary just because it becomes politically incorrect. Nations sometimes fail, and when they do only outside help – imperial power – can get them back on their feet. Nation-building is the kind of imperialism you get in the human rights era, a time when great powers believe simultaneously in the right of small nations to govern themselves and in their own right to rule the world.\textsuperscript{7}

The later Ignatieff asserts that “The moral premises of anti-imperialist struggles in this century – all peoples should be equal, and all people should rule themselves – are not wrong.”\textsuperscript{8} Hence, the later Ignatieff still holds true to his earlier contention that all humans should be equal. However, he asserts that state failure and genocide have necessitated the

\textsuperscript{5} \textit{Ibid}: 142. 
\textsuperscript{7} \textit{Ibid}: 106. 
\textsuperscript{8} \textit{Ibid}: 123.
return of empire. It is upon the later Ignatieff that current attempts at global security — with the aim of preserving political order — are based. As such, each of these approaches is imperialistic in attempts seeking to articulate the needs of Others. If Ignatieff is to be taken seriously, the suggestion is that we need empire — and simultaneously violence — to obtain peace within international relations. Are humans then condemned to a condition of violence?

Ignatieff's thinking would suggest that self-rule is not a viable possibility within today's political world, and as such efforts should be made to preserve order within international relations so as to avoid the emergence of chaos. The divide from Ignatieff's earlier work to his later work is substantial and indicates the difficulties in attempting to conceptualize a way beyond the violent practices intrinsic within current day politics. The impediment to thinking past violent practices may be that they are situated within the territorial confines upon which politics — and the practice of security - are predicated.

The analyses of state-centric and cosmopolitan notions of security suggest that violence is a corollary of security. It can be further contended that any approach to security will replicate these approaches in that it will enable the use of violence in efforts to preserve the international order and the (privileged) identities constituted therein.

Within current day and proposed cosmopolitan practices of humanitarian intervention, the notion of humanity is utilized in a contradictory manner to itself, in that it becomes the face of imperial conquests and a tool of conversion and conquest. The relationship between notions of humanity and security is necessarily paradoxical, as at its basis, humanity has no enemy. "Humanity as such cannot wage war because it has no

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Ibid.
enemy, at least not on this planet. The concept of humanity excludes the concept of the enemy, because the enemy does not cease to be a human being— and hence there is no specific differentiation in that concept. ¹⁰ Those who wage war in the name of humanity then, are seeking to employ a supposedly universal concept as a means to preserve their self-preferred identities. Williams asserts that,

> Under the conditions of “existential threat” (i.e., attempts at securitizing speech-act by certain actors) to identities, a Schmittian logic of friends and enemies is invoked, and with it a politics of exclusion. It is this very process (which may succeed or fail) that marks the difference between an identity issue (and situation) that has been securitized, and one that remains simply politicized and thus still more open to processes of negotiation, flexibility and multiplicity.¹¹

Working towards ‘humanity’ would require the cessation, or at least a minimization, of the interpretation of difference as otherness, and subsequently an end to the practice of security. Likewise, working towards a politics in which the use of violence is minimized would require similar efforts. As Williams suggests above, keeping an issue from being securitized leaves it open to be addressed by more diplomatic means.

OUTSIDE THE PRACTICE OF SECURITY

It would appear then, that practices of security further convolute political problems. If violence is a corollary of security, as suggested by the analyses of state-centric and cosmopolitan notions of security, then it is implied that it is not an appropriate

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tool for dealing with political problems if we truly are seeking a peaceful society. But if not (human) security, then what?

Mary Kaldor offers an alternative, and contends that civil society – in the global context – is a viable means to ending war. Kaldor defines civil society

...as the medium through which social contracts or bargains are negotiated between the individual and the centres of political and economic authority. Civil society is a process of management of society that is ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down’ and that involves the struggle for emancipatory goals. It is about governance based on consent where consent is generated through politics. In a global context, civil society offers a way of understanding the process of globalization in terms of subjective human agency instead of a disembodied deterministic process of ‘interconnectedness’.12

Moreover, Kaldor asserts that this version of civil society differs from earlier notions as it is transnational and not regional in nature. She contends that earlier renditions of civil society supported the civil/uncivilized divide within international relations that permitted Europeans to maintain a privileged identity, constituted by discourse, exploitation and conquest.13 However, Kaldor argues for a definition of civil society that is not territorially bounded.14 The underlying assumption in this study, is that security is a practice of (supra)nation states, consequently an argument to approaching politics in a way that is not territorially limited implies an articulation of civil society sans security, which correspondingly insinuates a move away from the exercise of political violence.

Kaldor further asserts that “...it is the job of civil society groups to promote national norms and values, to show that the notion of human consciousness can be

13 Ibid: 144.
14 Ibid: 143.
actively practised." Additionally, Kaldor maintains that a global bargaining process is required step in seeking to minimize the exercise of violence. She asserts that “We need to persuade Muslims, attracted to fundamentalism, that Jews and Crusaders are human beings. And we need to persuade Americans that Afghan or Iraqi lives are equal to American lives.” The suggestion here is to convince all humans, that all humans are in actuality human, and in doing so, persuade them that violence is not an appropriate response to the problems that arise between them.

Yet Kaldor admits that an ‘outside’ – that which is construed as Other, and therefore threatening - will likely remain a reality in constructions of politics. What approach then should be taken towards minimizing the exercise of violence in this world? Kaldor asserts that conversation offers a way to think beyond threats and fears, and will perhaps lead us to new spaces where change can occur. She contends that “A conversation that is, at least in some degree, ‘civilized’, that is to say, free of fear, superstition and prejudice. A conversation in which the participants are not just those who can travel and communicate across long distances, but also ordinary men, women and children.” Kaldor’s suggestion implies the inclusion of all humans in the process of politics, through the medium of civilized discussions. Kaldor’s thinking reflects the early Ignatieff, who emphasized that we need a language reflective of our times – which would entail a common language towards solving political problems. It would seem then, that

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15 Ibid: 159.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid: 160.
19 Ibid.
discourse – in the form of conversation, or common language – offers a way to minimize violence.

The conclusion of this study is that we should be seeking a way out of, rather than a way further into, the epistemological violence that is intrinsic within the political practices of security. Whether or not Kaldor’s suggestion of global civil society as conversation is a viable alternative remains to be seen, however it is a step in the right direction – i.e. imagining a political world that is not premised on the violent practice of security. A (re)imagining of politics sans security seems necessary then, if humans are to live together on this earth peacefully.
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