Broadening Multicultural Theory: 
Addressing Horizontal Inequalities and the Need 
for Group Mobilization 

by 

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Abstract

Democratic states operate on the assumption that all residents are equal and thus have equal opportunities and rights. Unfortunately the policies put in place to ensure this equality are insufficient in multicultural states, not only because there are extreme inequalities among individuals, but also because there are severe inequalities among groups. I consider how group inequalities affect minorities and what role group mobilization can play in their elimination. I do this by examining the works of Will Kymlicka and Iris Young. Kymlicka argues for minority integration that recognizes the importance of culture. On the other hand, Young argues that group autonomy is necessary for minority groups and that group integration is not an option. Despite Young’s clear call for group mobilization, I argue that this type of autonomy is untenable. Instead, I argue that Kymlicka’s theory of integration is best suited in democratic states though he ignores the important role that group mobilization must play in any such theory.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

All people have one single common attribute: they are all human beings — nothing more, nothing less.
-Shirin Ebadi

It used to be that liberal states had assimilation policies for the minorities that resided within them, with the aim of creating a feeling of connectedness among all state residents and ensuring state stability. Unfortunately these assimilation policies often had the opposite effect and were the cause of civil conflict and social unrest. In trying to treat all residents as equals, states ignored the particularities that made members individuals and gave them a sense of ‘self’. While the agenda of equal treatment of individuals, regardless of their group membership, was rarely malicious, it had the unfortunate effect of creating a hierarchy of culture where the dominant group was considered the norm (Phillips, 1993: 90-102). This in turn caused fissions between groups and individuals, created a hierarchy of groups that ranked the dominant on the top, and saw the equality sought after to be nearly impossible to achieve.

Western liberal states have now abandoned the assimilation approach and have moved towards incorporating minorities through policies of integration. This integration involves the recognition and accommodation of certain group particularities (e.g. Sunday closing laws, official uniform exceptions, cultural festival funding, etc.) while still requiring individuals to conform to particular practices of the state (e.g. language requirements for immigrants, required acceptance of the state legal system, state educational requirements, etc.). This approach has led to varying degrees of multiculturalism within states, that is to say varying levels of cultural difference acceptance and the implementation of policies aimed at maintaining this cultural
diversity. The implementation of integration within states has also made equality between residents more attainable.¹

One of the worries concerning minority groups is the prevalence of horizontal inequalities, defined as the political, socio-economic and ethno-cultural inequalities found between groups, in multicultural states. These types of inequalities make it more difficult for individuals to integrate into the society, that is to become accepted members of the society who are equals while still being able to maintain certain aspects and practices from their own culture, and they also make it difficult for individuals to increase their standards of living and participate as equal members of society within their state of residence. In states where horizontal inequalities are especially pronounced, it may even be impossible for minority members to act as, and be accepted as, full and equal members of the society. These difficulties can be measured by looking at the inequality of the capabilities² that are found between individuals and groups. That is to say, by looking at the capabilities that individuals and groups have, we can see that they face extreme inequalities, which limit their opportunities to be participate as equals in society, and thus they have lower standard of living, less agency and are less likely to be viewed as full members of society. A further problem with horizontal inequalities is that they cannot be ameliorated within one generation or through a single set of state policies. Rather, these inequalities persist over time, sometimes increasing due to lack of acknowledgement, and thereby make it difficult for minorities to integrate into society. It is because of this

¹ This acceptance takes different forms depending on the state being considered and can range from the official recognition of minority languages to government support of minority cultures, and changes in curriculums recognizing the history of minority groups to changing national holidays to better represent the range of religions within the state.

² When referring to ‘capabilities’ I am loosely referring to the types of capabilities put forth in the capability approach as outlined throughout the work of both AmartyaSen and Martha Nussbaum. (See: Sen, 2009; Sen, 1979; Nussbaum, 2003.)
persistence that we must ask whether liberal multicultural theories are capable of capturing the injustices that minority communities (i.e. national, indigenous and ethnic minorities) experience. It seems that any liberal multicultural theory that wishes to adequately deal with horizontal inequalities must take group agency into consideration, but what does this mean and how would it play out? One conception of group agency that will be considered, though found wanting, is that of Iris Young’s group autonomy through differentiated solidarity. It would appear that even achieving the cultural recognition that liberal multiculturalism prescribes (specifically that prescribed by Will Kymlicka) will require, at least in practice, some cooperative collective action on the part of each minority. Thus, the question becomes: Can liberal multiculturalism accommodate the collective agency (later referred to as group mobilization) that is necessary in multicultural states? I argue that there is a conception of collective agency that is compatible with certain theories of liberal multiculturalism despite the contraposition of liberal individualism and group collectivism. It turns out that, while liberal multiculturalism remains individualistic (in that it is the good of individuals that matter), it is necessary to recognize collective action (or group mobilization) in order to adequately protect these goods.

Chapter 2 examines what horizontal inequalities are and outlines why they are of such great concern to multicultural states. While vertical inequalities (the inequalities found between individuals) must be addressed by states, they should not be the only type of inequality that states focus on. Rather, horizontal inequalities should be considered in tandem with vertical inequalities because they have a lasting effect on individuals that makes policies aimed solely towards vertical inequalities insufficient. (This lasting effect
is caused by the interaction of different horizontal inequalities and their persistence, which follows from this interaction.) Horizontal inequalities are most often caused by the lack of group recognition that contributes to social exclusion (which in turn leads to other social problems such as inferior education, unemployment, poor health, lack of political recognition, etc.), and for this reason these inequalities require multicultural policies.

While multiculturalism is often viewed as a theory concerned only with cultural challenges, when horizontal inequalities are considered multiculturalism is forced to take other social inequalities (such as economic inequalities and political inequalities) into consideration. I begin with an overview of the current literature as an attempt to understand its significance in multicultural states. I then consider case studies, specifically of Ghana and Northern Ireland, looking at the impact that different types of policies have on horizontal inequalities. Following this I consider a libertarian argument against the human rights oriented policies and programs addressing horizontal inequalities. I conclude the chapter by arguing that any theory of multiculturalism should aim to positively affect minorities for the long term as, without this positive effect, previous inequalities will reemerge and once again cause considerable difficulties for individuals. It is for this reason that horizontal inequalities must seriously be taken into account when looking at minorities within liberal states and the multicultural theories concerning them that are established.

Chapter 3 outlines Will Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism as found in *Multicultural Citizenship*. I focus specifically on the areas that a) have a considerable effect on horizontal inequalities, and b) are affected considerably by horizontal inequalities. While there is a connection between Kymlicka’s work and horizontal
inequalities, it is not explicit in his work, and so I have attempted to make this connection more clear. I argue that there are three considerations that his theory dismisses: 1) his proposed dichotomy does not allow for all present inequalities to be addressed; 2) while inequalities between the majority and certain minorities are acknowledged, the inequalities between different minorities are downplayed and may even be ignored; 3) by focusing on cultural and political inequalities his theory does not take into account the social and economic inequalities that are not rectified as a result of the first two inequalities being addressed. To conclude the chapter I consider how successful Kymlicka’s theory is when addressing horizontal inequalities. Even though he makes considerable headway in addressing horizontal inequalities, there are oversights in Kymlicka’s early work of which we should remain wary.

Chapter 4 takes a similar approach to Chapter 3, this time looking at the work done by Iris Marion Young. Rather than approaching minorities with the hope of group integration, as Kymlicka does, Young proposes a theory that calls for differentiated solidarity (requiring group cooperation while still maintaining group distinctiveness and differentiation). I look at the aspects of her theory that affect, and that are affected by, horizontal inequalities and the significant roles that they play. I then go on to evaluate the plausibility of Young’s differentiated solidarity being a solution to the inequalities with which I am concerned. I conclude that rather than addressing horizontal inequalities, Young’s differentiated solidarity dismisses these inequalities. While her theory does address some of the concerns brought forth by Kymlicka’s theory, in the end her theory cannot cause the changes that are needed to ameliorate the circumstances within which many minorities find themselves.
Chapter 5 looks at the evolution present in Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism. He addresses some of the concerns brought up by critics, along with expanding his work to include indigenous minorities and to outline in greater detail the types of claims minorities can make against states. It is through this expansion that Kymlicka addresses some of the difficulties concerning horizontal inequalities that I bring up in Chapter 3. While his expanded theory still does not guarantee the elimination of horizontal inequalities, it does address my concerns as found in both Chapters 3 and 4. For this reason I argue that, if the elimination of horizontal inequalities is an integral part of increasing equality and the status of minorities (and I propose that this is the case), then the most plausible approach will be that of Kymlicka’s more recent work as outlined in Chapter 5. Despite arguing this, I maintain that the collective action through group mobilization is a necessary component that is missing from Kymlicka’s theory. In order for states to recognize the issues present within the state, minorities must mobilize in such a way that they can raise the awareness of horizontal inequalities that are present. Even when there is state recognition of horizontal inequalities and policies and programs put in place to address them, group mobilization is still necessary because, without it, it is unlikely that the specific policies and programs can be maintained. There is a cooperative element that must be present in multicultural theories if the results that are prescribed are to be attainable.
Chapter 2
Horizontal Inequalities

In this chapter I will examine horizontal inequalities, how they affect groups and why, rather than just focusing on vertical inequalities, they need to be considered when developing multicultural policies that are meant to ameliorate the position of minority groups in multicultural states. I will begin by giving an overview of the current literature, focusing predominantly on the work of Frances Stewart. Following this, case studies of developed and developing states will be considered with respect to how horizontal inequalities, and the policies concerning them, impact multicultural states (Brown et al., 2006; Stewart et al., 2005; Stewart and Langer, 2007). Lastly, I will consider some reasons why a theory of multiculturalism must take horizontal inequalities into account, not as a way of replacing the general policies that address vertical inequalities, but in addition to them.

2.1 Reviewing the Current Literature

Individuals who belong to minority groups often have to struggle against the inequalities that are found between their group and the numerous other groups that make up the fabric of the country. In an attempt to understand these inequalities, their effects on individuals, and what policies should be established to mitigate them, studies have been undertaken by academics, policy makers, organizations and many others. Unfortunately most of these studies measure the “inequality relat[ed] to the distribution of income only and measure it as vertical rather than horizontal inequality” (Stewart, 2000:15). Vertical measures of inequality focus on the inequalities that are found
between individuals (or households) so that every person is his or her own unit, separate from all other units. Stewart explains that: “income distribution is generally defined as a *vertical* measure, that is, it takes every individual or household in society from ‘top’ to ‘bottom’ and measures their income and consequent inequality” (Stewart, 2000: 16). The problem that arises with this type of analysis is that it neglects to take into account the connections that individuals have with their groups and communities, and how these connections play significant roles in determining the social position of an individual, as well as what opportunities are open to him or her. It is for this reason that Stewart and many others argue that a horizontal measure of inequality must also be considered, thereby establishing the social position of groups. She notes that: “what is needed…is a *horizontal* measure of inequality which measures inequality between groups, where groups are defined by region/ethnicity/class/religion, according to the most appropriate source of group identification in the particular society” (Stewart, 2000: 16). It is this division of groups established by Stewart that gives initial ground for using horizontal measures of inequality when considering minority groups in multicultural states, and thus the appropriate policies needed for establishing equality within these states.

While vertical measures of inequality focus on individual or household income, horizontal measures take a broader view of which inequalities are present in a society, which of these must be taken into consideration, and how the different inequalities interact with one another. There are three general categories for horizontal measures of inequality: political inequalities, socioeconomic inequalities, and ethno-cultural inequalities (Stewart, 2009; Langer et al., 2007). Some of the inequalities that are found within these categories include, but are not limited to, the disparities in education, health,
employment and group recognition between groups within a single state. While each of these inequalities is worrisome in its own right, the interaction between them should cause us even greater worry, because it cannot be sufficient to concentrate only on one inequality at a time, as any ground that is gained on a single horizontal inequality is likely to be lost if other inequalities are not dealt with at the same time. It is for this reason that, if our goal is to establish stable states that treat individuals as equals, policies must address issues across a variety of situations, both spatially and temporally (Stewart, 2009: 315; Stewart et al., 2005: 6-7). While the majority of work on horizontal inequalities has concentrated on the violent conflict that these types of inequalities can cause in developing countries, a variation of this work can be used for the consideration of horizontal inequalities found within developed states as well. Unsurprisingly, the inequalities and conflict found in developing and developed states will differ significantly, but this does not mean that similarities cannot be found in the root causes of these inequalities and their possible solutions. The horizontal inequalities that exist in Canada, France, or Australia may be less pronounced, and thus less worrisome, than the horizontal inequalities that exist in Kenya, Malaysia, or El Salvador, but some similar policies can nonetheless be used to tackle these inequalities in all of the states.\(^3\) Stewart notes the similarities and differences in ‘Horizontal Inequalities: a Neglected Dimension of Development’:

Disturbances arising from horizontal inequalities may take the form of sporadic riots, as has occurred, for example, in the towns of Yorkshire in Britain or various

\(^3\) The horizontal inequalities that are found in developing states often lead to violent conflict such as civil wars and ethnic group clashes. These types of conflict are less likely to be found in developed states where the conflict often takes the form of resentment and feelings of oppression. Stewart gives the example of black youth in the UK: “for example, a major source of resentment among black youths in the UK arises from the fact that they are five times more likely to be stopped and searched by police in London than whites and four times more likely to be arrested” (Stewart, 2003:9).
cities in the US; more extreme manifestations are civil wars, such as the Biafran and Eritrean attempts to gain independence; massacres, as occurred in Burundi and Rwanda; and local and international terrorism. (Stewart, 2003: 4)

While the circumstances in which horizontal inequalities are found are important, the basic theories of how they occur and how they should be dealt with are nonetheless similar and so can be transferred from one situation to another with some amount of adaptation (Stewart, 2000: 26).

As previously mentioned, there are three types of horizontal inequalities that should be considered individually while still recognizing that there is a considerable amount of interaction between all three. Stewart has proposed that, because these inequalities are so closely related, we should not assume that by addressing a single inequality at a time we are necessarily ameliorating the position of a group. However, while horizontal inequalities cannot be dealt with in isolation, for the purpose of exposition and clarity, I will consider each type of inequality in detail separately. The following discussion can also be seen in Figure 1 on page 12 (Stewart, 2003).

**Political Inequalities**

Horizontal political inequalities are concerned with which groups are in power, which groups have access to power, and which groups are ignored in politics. It has been found that, in many developing countries, the arbitrary division of groups established by previous colonizers has been the cause of political inequalities. Referring to case studies done in 26 countries around the world, Stewart has considered the cases of Burundi and Rwanda where there is a clear political divide between Hutu and Tutsi groups:

In both Burundi and Rwanda, the colonial powers had strongly differentiated between Tutsi and Hutu, despite the fact that the people share language, religion, dress, diet, housing and territory, treating Tutsi as superior. (The Tutsi were regarded as 'natural aristocrats and the Hutu as servile peasant folk.') Thus
historical perceptions of differences were entrenched. They were enhanced by
new histories and propaganda. (Stewart, 2000: 21)

Because one group was arbitrarily deemed ‘superior’ to the other, that group has held
more political power, causing resentment between the groups that has escalated into
violent conflict. Political inequalities are, of course, also caused by many other issues
found in countries, but always involve one group having more political power than
others. This can be seen in developed countries such as Canada and Australia where
aboriginal groups have drastically less political pull than the rest of society. Despite the
diverse issues, there are various ways of dealing with political inequality, ranging from
implementing governments that are more democratic (Stewart, 2007: 4, 11-15), to
ensuring that the democratic policies that are in place are politically inclusive. This
involves having inclusive governments where “representation of all [major] groups is [...] essential at the level of the cabinet and other organs of government” and that “politically inclusive members of major groups also need to be included at all levels of the civil service, the army, and the police” (Stewart, 2000: 26). Solutions intended to mitigate the political inequalities found within states, regardless of the level of development, are likely to involve some kind of affirmative action, ranging anywhere from weak affirmative action to strong affirmative action depending on the level of inequality within the state.

Socioeconomic Inequalities

Horizontal socioeconomic inequalities are concerned with the economic inequalities found amongst different groups. Here it is not necessary that all members of a group are less well off than the rest of the society, only that the overall group does more poorly. The conflict that is often caused by socioeconomic inequalities, both
Figure 1: Sources of differentiation [inequalities] among groups
(Stewart, 2003: 9)\(^4\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of differentiation</th>
<th>Political participation</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Employment and incomes</th>
<th>Social access and situations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elements of categories</td>
<td>government ministers</td>
<td>land</td>
<td>incomes</td>
<td>education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>parliament</td>
<td>human capital</td>
<td>private employment</td>
<td>health services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil service – various levels</td>
<td>communal resources, inc. water</td>
<td>&gt; elite = employment</td>
<td>safe water</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>army</td>
<td>minerals</td>
<td>&gt; rents =</td>
<td>housing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>police</td>
<td>privately owned capital/credit</td>
<td>skilled</td>
<td>unemployment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local government</td>
<td>govt. infrastructure</td>
<td>unskilled</td>
<td>poverty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>respect for human rights</td>
<td>security of assets against theft and destruction</td>
<td>informal sector opportunities</td>
<td>personal and household security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^4\) In the table, ‘political participation’ corresponds with political inequalities, ‘economic’ corresponds with socio-economic inequalities, and ‘social access and situations’ corresponds with ethno-cultural inequalities.
violent and non-violent, is often caused by a disparity in who has access to resources in a state. Stewart has noted that it is land and mineral access that are great sources of inequality in Central America and parts of Africa. She notes “this sample gives support to Fairhead’s view that environmental riches rather than impoverishment often causes conflict, although many people, often the majority, may be impoverished in the context of environmental riches at a country level” (Stewart, 2000: 20). These inequalities go beyond asset holdings, however, and affect many other dimensions of everyday life including employment, income and skill. Once again, these issues do not only arise in developing states but are also found in developed states as well. This is an especially visible issue when looking at new immigrants to states who do not have the required education for certain jobs in the state, and who do not have the same assets as do the established residents of the state. Likewise, similar difficulties are found for indigenous groups. Again there are several different approaches that can be taken in tackling these issues, including, but not limited to, policies of affirmative action, aid and education programs aimed at minority groups, and aid for specific regions where these minorities are a substantial percentage of the population (Stewart et. al, 2007: 15-23).

Ethno-Cultural Inequalities

Horizontal ethno-cultural inequalities are found in three major subcategories: recognition of religious practices and observances, language and language recognition, and recognition of cultural practices. Different groups have different levels of these recognitions, ranging from complete exclusion to full inclusion. Part of the reason for the wide range of inclusion is that, while all states have a conception of ‘the good life’, some are more open to alternative concepts of the good life than other states. Because the
conception of the good life must have some basis, it is often, if not always, the majority that dictates what it constitutes. Bhikhu Parekh has noted that it is necessary for a state to have “some conception of the good life to structure its institutions and shape its laws and policies, [and] it unwittingly adopts, institutionalizes and enforces the categories, practices, and values of the dominant culture” (Parekh, 2004: 201). Through this practice the state “discriminates against other cultures, and creates a climate inhospitable to their flourishing or even survival” (Parekh, 2004: 201). While these inequalities may not appear to play as significant a role as those found in the political and socioeconomic domains, they affect individuals and groups on a more personal level, since (depending on the severity of the exclusion) they often feel alienated by the state to which they belong.

_Religious recognition:_ there are many states that adopt a ‘national religion,’ which leads to “varying degrees of privilege” (Langer et al, 2007: 7). This can either mean that national holidays and ceremonies are based on the national religion, but other religious associations can still legally exist in the country, or that all religions outside of the national religion are banned from the state. Other states remain secular though still allowing for religion in the non-governmental public. This means that state ceremonies are expected to be non-denominational, holidays should not be based on religious calendars, and laws and policies should not be based on religious ideology. However, despite states claiming to be secular there is often still an implicit support of one religion over others through national holidays and official practices.⁵

⁵ This is true of most of the West where many states are ‘secular,’ but have holidays that correspond to the Christian calendar. Arnim Langer and Graham K. Brown write that: “in officially secular states there is often nonetheless bias towards the majority religion. In most secular Western European countries, Christianity retains a privileged public position through, for example, the designation of public holidays
Language recognition: it is clear that language is a necessity in the organization of a state, just as it is in the organization of everyday life, and so states cannot refrain from participating in a language as many do regarding religion. Unfortunately, language inequalities are also the cause of many horizontal inequalities. Many states have a single ‘official’ language in which all state affairs are formed, but this places minority groups who use different languages at a disadvantage. One example of this disadvantage is found in early education. Many states only offer early education in the official language, entailing that children who have grown up in a different language are being effectively asked to do twice as much work as those who have grown up in the official language; while these children are learning the school curriculum they are also learning a new language. However, “[c]hildren learn best when they are taught in their mother tongue, particularly in the earliest years [and therefore] bilingual education leads to much less repetition, lower drop-out rates and higher educational attainment[...].” (HDR, 2004: 61).

By having an integrated education system where children have the opportunity to be taught in both the official language and their mother tongue, the quality of their education is increased. As noted earlier, this ties back into other horizontal inequalities, specifically those found in the political and socioeconomic domains (it is hard to participate in politics or the job market if you have less education than the majority.) More generally, and even permitted first names” (Langer et. al, 2007: 7). India is one example of a state that has tried to eradicate this problem by distributing national holidays in correspondence with the important dates of the main religions found in the country. Distribution of Indian national holidays: 5 Hindu, 4 Muslim, 3 non-denominational, 3 Buddhist/Jain/Sikh, and 2 Christian (HDR, 2004: 35).

6 There are many states that are multilingual and therefore conduct state affairs in several languages. While this does mitigate some of the horizontal inequalities found within the state, many still remain especially for the groups whose languages are not considered ‘official’ languages. Even in cases where a state is multilingual there can still be some level of horizontal inequalities between the different language groups as one language is likely to be dominant over the others. An example of this is English and French in Canada. English is predominantly used throughout most of Canada (excluding Quebec and parts of New Brunswick.) While government services are provided in French throughout Canada, English service is likely to be more comprehensive than French service in provinces where French is not broadly spoken. In this way it is clear that language inequalities still exist in states where there are multilingual policies.
multiple language policies help make minority groups feel a part of the state:

“[r]ecognizing a language means more than just the use of that language. It symbolizes respect for the people who speak it, their culture and their full inclusion in society” (HDR, 2004: 9). States may claim not to place more value on one religion over others, but this is not the case with languages; communication between citizens and the state cannot happen without language, and therefore, language is crucial (HDR, 2004: 9). This, however, is not the downfall of tackling horizontal inequalities in multicultural states; while multilingual policies may be costly in the short term, they help build cohesive, stable states where horizontal inequalities are less prevalent.

Ethno-cultural practice recognition: similar to how states can claim ‘neutrality’ on religious issues, some states also claim ‘neutrality’ on issues of cultural practices through ‘benign neglect.’ Unfortunately, because a country’s culture is based on the historical dominance of one cultural group over others, benign neglect often leads the perpetuation of that dominance. One way of tackling this is by adopting ‘tokens’ of different cultures, entailing that a state stereotypes aspects of a culture thereby recognizing certain practices while disregarding others. An example discussed by Kymlicka, and others, is the ‘3S approach’ adopted in Great Britain where minority cultures are stereotyped by “samosas, steel drums and saris” and should be seen as a less inclusive way of recognizing ethno-cultural practices (Kymlicka, 2010: 98). While it is a good first step, there are more inclusive methods and policies of cultural recognition that can be adopted by states. One such method is enacted when the state takes a less stereotypical approach to cultural practices, leaving the practices open to individuals with only certain limitations while still supporting the groups through different avenues. States can support ethno-cultural
practices by promoting inclusive programs that aid minority groups in maintaining their culture and heritage (e.g., funding festivals, associations, educational programs, etc.), along with promoting the education of non-members. Such programs often take the form of putting in place regulations for media limiting stereotyping, recognizing customary laws, and publicly recognizing minority histories (Langer et al, 2007: 8-10).

States often put policies in place that address one (or a select few) of the horizontal inequalities discussed here, but this is not sufficient. As the following discussion will illustrate, there is a strong connection between horizontal inequalities, and so policies must, to one extent or another, address all present inequalities simultaneously. Without multiple policies it is likely that the progress that is made will only be temporary and may eventually lead to greater concerns and inequalities. The task of establishing policies that address several horizontal inequalities at once is not simple because of the vagueness in what horizontal inequalities are and the difficulties in measuring them, but eliminating them should nonetheless be the ultimate goal of states (Stewart, 2009: 332).

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7 While the case of Nigeria recognizing the customary laws of minority groups may not be ideal it is a good example of how some kind of compromise may be made between the state and minority groups. “[I]n Nigeria, the introduction of Islamic shari’a in many of the country’s northern states has contributed to the sense of public recognition and acknowledgement among Muslims” (Stewart et. al, 2007: 27). While shari’a law is accepted by the state in certain northern provinces this does not mean that it cannot be challenged in the court of appeals that remains civil. Likewise, shari’a law only applies to Muslims residing in the northern states. Another example of this kind of accommodation that is appealed to by Stewart et al. (citing the Human Development Report from 2004) can be found in Guatemala. In order for the state to overcome a lack of knowledge around the “customary norms that regulate indigenous community life” and the lack of legal access to the indigenous community, “the Guatemalan government and opposition agreed to implement a range of policies ‘acknowledging the distinct culture of indigenous people in Guatemala’, such as free interpretation services for judicial proceedings into indigenous languages, cultural sensitivity programmes for judiciary members and recognition of indigenous communities’ judicial norms” (Stewart et al., 2007: 26-27).

8 For example, if a group were to use the majority of their resources to support of health and in the process neglect the education system, then any progress made in the healthcare system would not be maintainable. This is because though at first there may be sufficient education for a well-established healthcare system, without consistent funding of education this cannot be maintained.
As previously mentioned, there are a deep connections between various horizontal inequalities that can be explained by looking at the structure of states and how this affects the interactions of individuals and groups. In addition to there being interactions between the different domains of inequalities, there are also interactions within the domains that must also be considered. The close interactions that are found between the capabilities of a group that cause horizontal inequalities can be seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Interactions among capabilities [horizontal inequalities]
(Stewart, 2009:325)

Concerning horizontal ethno-cultural inequalities Langer and Brown note that:

Cultural status inequalities are likely to be associated with exclusion and inequality in the economic and political dimensions. Political and socioeconomic [horizontal inequalities] themselves usually arise where there are cultural differences around which groups form. This in itself need not imply cultural status inequalities. However, often the presence of one form of inequality leads to others. [...] A good example here is language. The adoption of an official language not only increases the cultural status of the groups associated with that language, but it can also have direct material benefits in terms of, for instance, access to employment in the official sphere. (Langer et al, 2007: 6-7)

While language and employment are clearly connected, employment is not the only area that is impacted by the availability of one’s language in a state. Healthcare is often dependent on patients’ ability to fully understand what physicians are telling them. Either
about their illnesses, possible medications, or necessary operations. Unfortunately, in a healthcare system that is dominated by a particular language, an individual from a linguistic minority may not receive equal, or satisfactory medical attention. Of course this is not the intention of the healthcare providers, only an unfortunate consequence of inequality in language usage.

Language inequalities also affect the political sphere. Imagine trying to gain a political position without the ability to effectively participate in campaigning, debates, or meetings. An inequality in language can not only make it difficult, if not impossible, for a minority group to be represented in government, but it can also hinder their ability to ameliorate their position in the state due to a lack of representation. In this way it seems clear that there is an interaction between political, socioeconomic, and ethno-cultural inequalities that must be recognized and addressed in order to ensure that minority groups can gain equal standing and respect in states.

Other cultural inequalities also lead to the unequal treatments of groups in ways that have a resounding effect on them. Take, for example, the ban on headscarves in primary and secondary schools in France; if a Muslim girl wishes to wear her headscarf, she cannot attend a state run school (Scott, 2007). This leaves only a few options open for Muslim girls: stop wearing headscarves in school (thereby often being forced to deny part of their identity), or attend a private religions school (most often a Catholic private school) (Scott 2007: 106-115). This leads to other issues that are felt by the Muslim community in France including low levels of education (often of low quality) and low levels of employment (Scott, 2007: 179). It becomes a matter of making the choice between maintaining part of one's identity (e.g. headscarves for some Muslim girls and
women) and acceptance in mainstream society. The idea that is behind the ban of headscarves in public schools in France is that the French government is protecting individual Muslim girls from the oppression of Islam. The “self selection of cultural reasons may lead to unequal access [to resources...] Policies that simply [address] deprived individuals may therefore fail unless accompanied by policies directed toward group inequalities” (Stewart, 2003: 5). However, part of this policy making must recognize the legitimacy of cultural differences.

It is necessary for vertical inequalities to be measured and ameliorated within states, but this should not happen at the expense of addressing horizontal inequalities as well because they are multidimensional and persist over time. Having said this, vertical inequalities often persist in an individual’s life, as can be witnessed in the individual who grows up in a low-income household and never manages to increase her income bracket by any significant amount. Beyond the single generation persistence of vertical inequalities, it can even be argued that vertical inequalities may persist over a few generations because the environment an individual is raised in is often similar, if not the same, to the environment in which they continue to live (Stewart, 2009: 318). Because vertical inequalities are concerned with income, a fortunate (lucky) individual, or an industrious individual, may rise above the income inequalities they have encountered in the past; since it is up to individuals to better their stature in society it seems silly, and unreasonable, to blame persistent vertical inequalities on the past five or six generations of income inequalities.\footnote{There is a connection between income inequalities and standard of life indicators and the opportunities that are available to individuals, however vertical measures focus specifically on income inequalities. This is part of the reason that I am arguing that horizontal inequalities must be taken into consideration when establishing theories of multiculturalism.} This, however, is not the case for horizontal inequalities. These
inequalities, as seen previously, are multidimensional and interact with one another in such a way that they perpetuate one another. This also means that, while progress may be made in eliminating certain horizontal inequalities, the inequalities that have not been ameliorated can stop any progress that has been made, and can even go as far as to cause a relapse in all progress made. Despite an individual rising above the inequalities that are felt by the group she is a member of, the inequalities felt by the group do not decrease, and beyond this, she is more likely to be pulled back into the inequalities. This likelihood of regression for an individual is caused by the connection she has with her group, leading to the group being “an important aspect of the person’s identity”, and because the “relative impoverishment of the group increases the perception of members that they are likely to be permanently trapped in a poor position, or, if they have managed to do better than others in the group, that they are likely to fall back into poverty” (Stewart, 2009: 316). Where there exists the perception that a group is ‘inferior’ to others, this mentality is transferred to individuals thereby making it difficult for them to rise above their group (because they do not have the confidence, and therefore the ambition to go beyond the expectation of society), and because individuals outside of the group are not likely to give them equal opportunities. In discussing intra- and inter-group networking and the work done by Peter Blau in his book *Inequality and Heterogeneity* (1977), Stewart notes that he “defined groups as having more intra-group than inter-group contacts, and so that, for Blau’s groups, the nature of social capital or networks depends on group membership. If one adds [horizontal inequalities] to this, then poorer groups will have more contacts with poorer people, richer groups with richer people, and asymmetries of social capital follow” (Stewart, 2009: 326). Therefore, due to the interaction between horizontal inequalities, as seen previously, are multidimensional and interact with one another in such a way that they perpetuate one another. This also means that, while progress may be made in eliminating certain horizontal inequalities, the inequalities that have not been ameliorated can stop any progress that has been made, and can even go as far as to cause a relapse in all progress made. Despite an individual rising above the inequalities that are felt by the group she is a member of, the inequalities felt by the group do not decrease, and beyond this, she is more likely to be pulled back into the inequalities. This likelihood of regression for an individual is caused by the connection she has with her group, leading to the group being “an important aspect of the person’s identity”, and because the “relative impoverishment of the group increases the perception of members that they are likely to be permanently trapped in a poor position, or, if they have managed to do better than others in the group, that they are likely to fall back into poverty” (Stewart, 2009: 316). Where there exists the perception that a group is ‘inferior’ to others, this mentality is transferred to individuals thereby making it difficult for them to rise above their group (because they do not have the confidence, and therefore the ambition to go beyond the expectation of society), and because individuals outside of the group are not likely to give them equal opportunities. In discussing intra- and inter-group networking and the work done by Peter Blau in his book *Inequality and Heterogeneity* (1977), Stewart notes that he “defined groups as having more intra-group than inter-group contacts, and so that, for Blau’s groups, the nature of social capital or networks depends on group membership. If one adds [horizontal inequalities] to this, then poorer groups will have more contacts with poorer people, richer groups with richer people, and asymmetries of social capital follow” (Stewart, 2009: 326). Therefore, due to the interaction between horizontal

10 Stewart defines ‘social capital’ as “including trust, networks and contacts” (Stewart, 2009: 323).
inequalities and due to the deep connections that individuals have with the groups to which they belong, horizontal inequalities are far more likely to persist over several generations and thereby tend to trap individuals in unwanted situations more easily than vertical inequalities.

2.2 Considering Case Studies (Ghana and Northern Ireland)

For these reasons it is evident that horizontal inequalities exist and should cause great concern in states that have clearly defined groups, but this alone does not give reasons for why multicultural policies in particular should be concerned with horizontal inequalities. One reason is that group-specific policies and programs are particularly effective as means of achieving general policy goals such as the reduction of poverty and inequality. By looking at cases where general policies were put in place to eliminate inequalities in such areas as income (often in the form of foreign aid policies) and cases where group-specific policies were put in place to eliminate the difference between specific groups it should be clear that group-specific policies are more effective than more general policies.\(^\text{11}\) While general policies are useful in the amelioration of individual social positions, they are unlikely to be effective in aiding groups, and so any advances for individuals belonging to minority groups are unlikely to be maintained. All countries, whether they are developed or developing, have made a commitment to ensuring an adequate standard of living for all residents, a commitment that was made when they became signatories to the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and subsequent

\(^{11}\) It should be noted that the general policies that are put in place tend not to be multicultural policies, but rather, as the name implies, general policies aim at eliminating general inequalities (vertical inequalities). In addition, not all group-specific policies are specifically multicultural policies. However, they are more likely to be and are better able to address multicultural issues even when they are not specifically multicultural.
Covenants. There are two approaches that states can take, either with general policies that promote growth and poverty reduction alone, or combining general policies with group-specific policies. As seen through the following case studies, there is evidence that the latter strategy is more effective than the former.

**General Policies**

In a case study looking at horizontal inequalities in Ghana, Brown and Stewart (2006) show that the most significant “socioeconomic horizontal inequalities among major ethnic groups are between Northern groups and others” (Brown et al., 2006: 20). Looking at several different criteria for measurement (years of education, child mortality, white collar employment and the wealth of the bottom and top quintiles), they have established that, not only are there severe horizontal inequalities between the Northern group and the South, but these inequalities are maintained when Northerners migrate to the South (Brown et al., 2006: 20). A good deal of this inequality can be traced back to colonial regimes that focused development and infrastructure in the South because of the hospitable climate and the relative ease for export Ghana’s predominant crop, cocoa (Brown et al., 2006: 23). In Ghana, foreign aid accounts for a considerable portion of the GDP (9% in 1992), and so, with such a substantial foreign involvement, it would seem that horizontal inequalities should be addressed. Brown et al. note that:

> Aid to Ghana...could potentially have a strong influence on HIs...In the first place, aid accounts for a large portion of government expenditure (over a third) and a much larger proportion of capital expenditure, which gives donors a significant influence. Secondly, both programme and sectoral aid (now including MDBS [multi-donor budgetary support]) offer an opportunity to influence

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Adequate standard of living is specifically mentioned in Article 25.1 that states that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the even of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control” (UN, 1948: article 25.1).
development targets and monitoring; thirdly, project aid can be directed towards correcting HIs, so long as fungibility is avoided. (Brown et al., 2006: 24)

Much of the aid that has been given to Ghana has set targets, but they have involved the poverty-reducing programs that have been state wide rather than area or group specific. This means that a substantial amount of the aid can remain in the South, allowing for horizontal inequalities to be exacerbated, while program targets are still being met. While it is important that inequalities should be dealt with on the level of individuals, it should not be assumed that such an approach would be equally beneficial for all individuals.

*Group-Specific Policies*

Concerning political horizontal inequalities, it must be recognized that different groups feel different grievances and so it should not be assumed that general policies will be sufficient or effective. Stewart et al. (2005) have noted that: “in Northern Ireland, for example, it appears that people are particularly concerned with their employment and housing inequality; in Zimbabwe their actions suggest they pay attention to land inequality; in Britain, young blacks object to being stopped by the police as they go about their business; in Sri Lanka, people’s major concerns are employment prospects and access to higher education” (Stewart et al., 2005: 7-8). While these cases are country specific, it still illustrates that groups have differing concerns and so may suggest that this will be the same within a state (e.g. the concerns of Canadian aboriginals differ significantly from the Québécois, whose concerns differ significantly from newly arrived immigrants to Canada.)

There are also examples of states that have implemented group-specific policies thereby enhancing the political, economic and social standings of these groups. In this context, Stewart and Langer discuss the case of Protestant/Catholic inequalities in
Northern Ireland. The economic inequality favouring Protestants started in the seventeenth century when it was established by government policy and it remained entrenched until the 1960s. They explain that:

[The Protestants] were dominant at all levels of the private sector including the crucial areas of industry and finance. They controlled the apparatus of the state and – within the limits of Northern Ireland’s delegated powers – public policy at regional and local levels. They were the dominant presence in the major agricultural and business organisations, professional associations and influential informal networks. They had higher levels of education and training than Catholics’. (Stewart and Langer, 2007: 20)

The economic inequality led to other inequalities such as the underrepresentation of Catholics in the civil services, the police force and higher levels of education. These inequalities, along with the discriminations that Catholics faced in Northern Ireland led to a severe inequality of income even where equivalent levels of education were attained – “Catholics attained lower returns to education, an estimated increase in incomes of $159 for each extra year of schooling, compared with the $254 for Protestants” (Stewart and Langer, 2007: 21).

In the mid-1970s the United Kingdom and the European Union implemented group-specific policies in an attempt to mitigate the inequalities that were present within Northern Ireland (Stewart and Langer, 2007: 22). These policies had a significant effect on the Catholic population and ensured a decrease in the inequalities found between the two groups. Stewart and Langer have illustrated this through a comparison of the ratio of Catholics to Protestants in the categories of high income households, managerial jobs, years of higher education, houses with more than three rooms, and jobs in the police force (Figure 3).
In contrast with the aid policies in Ghana that were previously considered, the policies implemented in Ireland had a noticeable effect on the minority group (the Catholics) in Northern Ireland. This suggests that while all policies that try to eliminate inequalities between individuals, states that apply both general policies and group-specific policies can most effectively deal with horizontal inequalities. Having said this, it must be noted that while the policies initiated by the United Kingdom and the European Union improved the situation for Catholics significantly, the inequalities they faced were not eliminated entirely. A 2004 study shows that significant inequalities in health and social care remained: “Catholics were 10-19 per cent more disadvantaged regarding standardized mortality rates, 10-19 per cent regarding immunization rates, over 20 per
cent on dental registration and over 20 per cent with regard to hospital admissions”
(Stewart and Langer, 2007: 22).

2.3 Justifying the Welfare State and Multicultural Rights

Despite the plateauing of inequalities found in Northern Ireland, it can still be argued that horizontal inequalities are best addressed by a combination of general and group-specific policies. In order for a state to eliminate (or at least ameliorate) inequalities found within its borders, the connection between inequalities and groups must be recognized. This is best accomplished through multicultural approaches combining the two types of policies. States should focus on eliminating the inequalities felt by individuals, but this should be done in such a way where all residents of the state are equal. The idea of individual equality is not only practiced by most states, but is also outlined in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. It states that “everyone is entitled to the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religions, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” (UN, 1948: article 2). It may appear that this goes against group-specific policies as such policies single out groups. However, this assumes that there is not already some amount of inequality and discrimination between individuals and groups. Based on later articles, it can be argued that states must recognize that there are different groups that make up the country and that there may be a need for differentiated treatment in order to eliminate the horizontal inequalities that are found between them. Article 22 states “everyone, as a member of society, has a right to social security and is entitled to realization...of the economic, social and cultural rights
indispensable of his dignity and the free development of his personality” (UN, 1948: article 22). While all states have general policies and programs in place to ensure these rights to their residents, such policies and programs may not be sufficient when horizontal inequalities are too great (e.g. inequalities in education and income). The Declaration of Human Rights goes farther and states that all humans have the right to equality of employment and remuneration in article 23, the right to equal standards of living in article 25 and the right to adequate education in article 26. Perhaps most significantly, in article 27.1 the Declaration of Human Rights states that: “everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts, and to share in scientific advancements and its benefits” (UN, 1948: article 27.1). Under ideal circumstances the general policies put in place by states to eliminate inequalities should be sufficient; however, because we do not live in an ideal world, and because there are deep seated inequalities between groups, group specific policies are required to ensure that inequalities can be adequately dealt with.

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13 Article 23
1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

14 Article 25
1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the even of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

15 Article 26
1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.
The obvious difficulty with these types of rights is that they often end up costing the state, and since the state has no income without taxation, it is the residents, regardless of whether they benefit from the resulting policies and programs, who pay for them through their taxes. This is the case with government programs that fund cultural events; while these types of multicultural programs benefit the concerned groups and others who are interested in the events, it is the taxpayers, many of whom are undoubtedly uninterested in the cultural events, that end up paying for the events. The same problem arises, though likely to a greater extent, with language policies. State funded language programs aimed at minorities are necessary if we are to take horizontal inequalities seriously. The problem is that all taxpayers pay for the programs while only very few individuals (those belonging to the concerned minorities) benefit from them directly.

It is because all residents end up paying for the benefits of only a few (through taxation) that libertarians are likely to argue against the human rights as set out by the Declaration of Human Rights and against the multicultural rights that are necessary for eliminating horizontal inequalities. Libertarians argue that freedom from coercion “is one’s basic and inalienable right. It is the key to human survival and development” (Hospers, 1995: 8). It follows from freedom from coercion that taxation goes against an individual’s rights. Just as it would be wrong for 100 individuals to agree that it is all right to rob another man of his earnings and send in a single individual to take them, it is likewise wrong for the government to demand taxes of residents (Hospers, 1995). Nonetheless governments make promises to residents that require funds, funds that they do not have themselves and therefore must take from these same residents. This means that in order to fulfill the promises governments can “give to one person only by first
seizing from another; if one person gets something for nothing, another must get nothing for something” (Hospers, 1982: 40). But again, this goes against the individual’s right to be free from coercion. On the other hand, if individuals choose to aid others and limit their own lives and abilities, then no coercion is present (Hospers, 2007: 88-89). It may be right or good for individuals to give to charities and those in need, but this does not mean that the government, or anyone else for that matter, can force them to do so (Hospers, 1974: 2). For this reason it may be right or good for minorities to have cultural festivals and language programs, but they should not depend on the government or other residents of the state to supply them with the necessary funds. Libertarians argue that since individuals have the right to be free from coercion, they decide how they wish to live their lives and therefore must also consider the consequences of their decisions and actions. For this reason, they argue that there should be no free bailouts. John Hospers give the example of two individuals who have chosen to live their lives in different ways where, in the end, one of the individuals puts demands on the other for aid.

One man, A, works hard for years and finally earns a high salary as a professional man. A second man, B, prefers not to work at all, and to spend wastefully what money he has (through inheritance), so that after a year or two he has nothing left. At the end of this time he has a long siege of illness and lots of medical bills to pay. He demands that the bills be paid by the government--that is, by the taxpayers of the land, including Mr. A.

But of course B has no such right. He chose to lead his life in a certain way—that was his voluntary decision. One consequence of that choice is that he must depend on charity in case of later need. Mr. A chose not to live that way. (And if everyone lived like Mr. B, on whom would he depend—in case of later need?) Each has a right to live in the way he pleases, but each must live with the consequences of his own decision (which, as always, fall primarily on himself). He cannot, in time of need, claim A’s beneficence as his right .... (Hospers, 1974: 3)
Libertarians put forth that, while it is unfortunate that minorities find themselves in the circumstances that they do, it should not be the responsibility of the majority to rectify the inequalities through policies and programs paid for by taxes. Since there is such an emphasis placed on the open market, libertarians argue that individuals who belong to minorities have the same rights as anyone else and therefore have the same opportunity to ameliorate their circumstances, thereby eliminating the need for group-specific rights.\(^\text{16}\)

In his critique of libertarianism James Sterba emphasizes that the right to liberty is the *negative right* to liberty (freedom from coercion or interference). Because of the significance on negative freedom libertarians argue that the only kind of state that should be allowed is the 'night-watchman’ state, which ensures that residents are not interfered with and, if residents interfere with others, that they are adequately punished. Sterba argues that, even if negative liberty is the ideal type of liberty for a state, it does not exclude the possibility of a welfare state. He does this by illustrating that libertarians put too much of an emphasis on the interference of a state that is more than a night-watchman state and ignore the possible interference done by private individuals.

As previously seen, libertarians argue that taxation is a form of the government interfering with the everyday actions of individuals because it hinders the individuals’ possibilities (see: Hospers, 2007; Nozick, 1974; Hayek, 1960). They also argue that in a free market this type of interference is not possible because there are always options for

\(^{16}\) Hospers argues that libertarianism requires that individuals be evaluated as *individuals* and not based on their group membership. He writes that: “each person should be judged as an *individual*, on the basis of his individual characteristics (and qualifications, if he is an applicant for a job or graduate status in a university). He is not to be judged more highly because he had a distinguished father, or less highly because he had an undistinguished father. It is his individual characteristics that make him worthy or unworthy, not his membership in a group… if one judges him on the basis of characteristics which he doesn’t have (which his father had, for example) or on the basis of characteristics that he had nothing to do with (such as his race), one is not really judging or evaluating *him* as an individual, but only invoking a stereotype of a race or nationality and evaluating the person on the basis of that class membership (which he inherited)” (Hospers, 2007: 84-85).
individuals to make a variety of voluntary contracts. What should concern us is whether this is actually the case. Sterba looks at two similar situations and considers the interference and limitations which are present in both. The first situation involves an individual who is required to pay $500 into a social security program. In this case the individual “cannot perform the action of refusing-to-pay-into-the-program-without-the-imminent-risk-of-a-greater-financial-loss” (Sterba, 1980: 114). Here the state is interfering with the individual in such a way that it is impossible for her to not pay into the social security program. The second situation is similar, but happens in the free market. Here an individual loses his job and in searching for another, finds that he can only find employment that pays $500 less than his last job. Because there are no jobs that pay his previous salary, “it impossible for him to perform the action of refusing-to-take-a-lower-paying-job-without-the-imminent-risk-of-a-greater-financial-loss” (Sterba, 1980: 114). In this case, if the individual wishes to support himself, it is impossible for him to not take job that pays $500 less. It seems that both of these situations involve interference, with the difference being that the government interference is intentional while the free market interference is unintentional. But if we look to other aspects of our lives, whether an act is intentional or not, we can still be (and in some cases should be) held morally accountable.

But let us go beyond whether interference is intentional or unintentional to whether interference is caused by an act of omission or an act of commission. If sick or starving individuals have been left to their own accord and die, have their liberties been interfered with? Because, for libertarians, interference requires an act of commission, welfare states cannot be justified so long as negative liberty is held as the social ideal. It
would appear, however, that leaving an individual to die because of starvation or illness may be an act of interference. Relying on C. B. Macpherson, who posits that "any humanly alterable condition that prevents a person from doing something either directly or indirectly interferes with that person's life and, hence, restricts his liberty" (Sterba, 1980: 115), Sterba argues that if we understand interference in this manner, then we are able "to defend the practices of a welfare state in terms of an ideal of negative liberty" (Sterba, 1980: 116).

In most cases, people are able to take goods and resources from those who have goods and resources in excess so long as they are not prohibited from doing so. It is these prohibitions, Sterba argues, that are acts of commission that "interfere with people's lives and, hence, restrict their liberty" (Sterba, 1980: 116). In the cases when individuals are not able to take the goods and resources that they need, there tend to be individuals who would be willing to (thereby acting as their agents) if there were not prohibitions on such actions. Again, it is the prohibition that is the act of commission that limits the individuals' liberties. "Consequently, in virtually every case in which people in need are left alone to care for themselves their liberty and/or the liberty of others is actually restricted" (Sterba, 1980: 116). Therefore, even if interference requires an act of commission, it can still be argued that a welfare state may be justified as it may be the case that it would reduce the possible interference that would be present in a night-watchman state. Since it appears that it is impossible to avoid some kind of interference within any type of state, the question that must be asked is: "In What ways should liberty be restricted" (Sterba, 1980: 118)?
If it is recognized that some restrictions are necessary, then, in order to answer the previously posed question, it becomes necessary to decide what restrictions are acceptable. Sterba suggests that, while it would be impractical, we should strive for some kind of state consensus based on everyone thinking about the possible situations rationally and without thinking specifically about their own particulars.\(^{17}\) He proposes that:

If we...assume that the members were well informed of all the particular interests in their society and were fully capable of rationally deliberating with respect to that information, their deliberations would culminate in a unanimous decision. This is because each would be deliberating in a rationally correct manner with respect to the same information and would be using a decision procedure that led to a uniform evaluation of the alternatives; consequently, each would favor the same principles for restricting liberty in society. (Sterba, 180: 119)

Therefore, by having this kind of deliberation about which liberties could be restricted, we could the “acceptable minimum of liberty as the liberty necessary to meet the normal costs of satisfying the basic needs of a person in a society” (Sterba, 1980: 120).

Surely others could not be morally required to do nothing to avoid seriously endangering their health and sanity just because I have already creatively mixed my labor with all the available resources for satisfying their basic needs. Therefore, persons in such dire need, or their agents, would seem to be within their rights to appropriate the surplus goods I possess, unless they have forfeited their rights to an adequate minimum of liberty (e.g., by squandering their possessions or by gambling away their rights to an adequate minimum of liberty for the chance of acquiring greater possessions and thereby greater liberty). (Sterba, 1980: 122-123)

In this way a government can legitimately interfere in the lives of residents through taxation in order to ensure that all residents have the minimum levels of liberty (the ability to stay live). In this way Sterba is able to argue for a welfare state while still relying on the social ideal of negative liberty that libertarians rely on.

In terms of justifying minority rights and group-specific rights that aim at eliminating horizontal inequalities, Sterba’s argument against the libertarian dismissal of welfare states is vital. Minorities have not caused horizontal inequalities and therefore have not “forfeited their rights to an adequate minimum of liberty” (Sterba, 1980: 123). In general it can be seen that the welfare state is justified so as to protect all residents in a state, but can group-specific and multicultural policies and programs be justified in the same way? Yes. In the same way that the hungry individual is being unintentionally interfered with when she is left to starve, minorities are being unintentionally interfered with when the inequalities they face are ignored. Therefore, in order to ensure that they have the same minimum level of liberty as everyone else, group-specific and minority policies and programs may be necessary in addition to the general policies and programs that are found within welfare states.

When general policies are put into place with the aim of eliminating inequalities, minority groups can easily be overlooked, and through such oversight the inequalities between groups within the state increase. As seen with the case of aid in Ghana, general policies can often focus on those who are the ‘easiest’ to help, because it is through the amelioration of their situations that the state as a whole will appear to be faring better – this is an example of the least amount of input for the greatest amount of output. While it may be true that the state as a whole fares better, this only exacerbates the inequalities between the worst off (minority groups) and the best off (the majority) – this should not be, is not acceptable in multicultural states.

On the other hand, while group-specific policies that focus on horizontal inequalities may be more costly than general policies, group-specific policies are better
equipped actually eliminating horizontal inequalities as seen with the case of Northern Ireland. These types of policies help eliminate the inequality gap found between the group that is best off and the groups that are worst off in a state achieving the amelioration of the national equality just as general policies do, but in a unformed way. General policies often focus on horizontal inequalities implicitly but rarely do they explicitly acknowledge these horizontal inequalities. It is this explicit acknowledgement of horizontal inequalities that is necessary in multicultural policies for states if they are to be ameliorated and eventually eliminated consistently throughout a state. Not only do individuals have a strong affinity with the group that they are a member of and so are affected by the standing of the group in their state, but outsiders to a group also make close connections between a group and its members, which can lead to differential treatment and at times discrimination. Therefore without the acknowledgement of horizontal inequalities the policies implemented by a state may not address the underlying causes of the inequalities and difficulties felt by individuals.

2.4 Conclusion

While academics, policy makers, and states have predominantly focused on vertical inequalities relegating horizontal inequalities to a back burner, this hierarchy of inequalities should be reevaluated. As has been seen, not only is there a deep connection between individuals and the groups that they belong to, but there is also a deep connection between the different inequalities that individuals and groups experience. Likewise, as seen with Ghana, if inequalities are only addressed on the individual level through general policies, then their horizontal nature cannot be sufficiently taken into
consideration and addressed. However, when horizontal inequalities are addressed as *group issues* there is a greater likelihood that they will be ameliorated in a significant and lasting way.

It can be argued by libertarians, and likely will be argued by them, that minority rights interfere with the liberty of all residents of the state and therefore cannot be justified. But as seen through the argument made by Sterba, it seems that it is impossible to have a state where *no* interference takes place. Therefore residents of a state must come together and decide which liberties may be interfered with in order to ensure the minimum level of liberty for *all* residents (so long as they have not forfeited their right to liberty). The agreement that the residents will come to, he argues, is that some form of welfare state is the acceptable. If this is the case, then minority rights and group-specific policies and programs are justified in order to alleviate, and eventually eliminate, the horizontal inequalities that minorities face. Just as letting individuals starve to death are unintended acts of commission that interfere with these individuals’ liberty, ignoring horizontal inequalities are the unintended acts of commission that interfere with the liberty of minorities. It is for this reason that we must take horizontal inequalities seriously and promote group-specific policies and programs in addition to the general policies and programs that are found within welfare states.
Chapter 3

*Multicultural Citizenship* and Horizontal Inequalities

In this chapter I will lay out the theory of multiculturalism that Will Kymlicka has established in *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995), as well as consider its possible contribution to the reduction and eventual elimination of horizontal inequalities in multicultural states. This discussion represents Kymlicka’s early work in multicultural theory and thus is the foundation of his more recent work. It should, however, be kept in mind that his work has evolved over the past twenty to thirty years. The more recent developments in his theory will be discussed in chapter 5. Nevertheless there are some distinct features of Kymlicka’s theory that are important when considering horizontal inequalities, such as his division of minority groups into categories, and the difference between internal and external restrictions on these groups. I will begin by giving an overview of *Multicultural Citizenship*, examining how the theory he has outlined affects the horizontal inequalities that are present in multicultural states. Following this, I will consider whether Kymlicka’s early theory is satisfactory in response to these inequalities.

3.1 Categorizing Minorities

In his liberal theory of multiculturalism, Kymlicka has aimed at endorsing minority groups in such a way that they are able to live in a manner that they find desirable, and that they are not overlooked by the majority, while still maintaining the security and unity of the state and society. He has argued that this involves acknowledging the differences between individuals, the importance and protection of these differences, while still ensuring that there is a sense of connectedness between the
groups within the state.

For the sake of clarity, the distinction between different cultural minorities will be established as put forth by Kymlicka. In the past, minorities have often been lumped together into a general group of ‘other’; however, Kymlicka has argued, along with other recent theorists, that distinctions must be made between different types of minorities so that appropriate rights and reparations can be provided accordingly: they propose that ‘national minorities’ must be distinguished from ‘ethnic minorities’. National minorities are understood as groups that have been incorporated into a larger state, often by force, which led to a loss of their self-determination and an inability to fully practice their culture. Because these losses have caused their identity, rights, and culture to be undermined by the dominant group, either intentionally or unintentionally, national groups often “demand various forms of autonomy and self-government to ensure their survival as distinct societies” (Kymlicka, 1995: 10). Ethnic minorities are composed of individuals who have emigrated from their homeland to a new state. These individuals are not looking to recreate their old state, but rather to start new lives while still having the opportunity to maintain certain aspects of their culture, and therefore “seek greater recognition of their ethnic identity [and] to modify the institutions and laws of the mainstream society to make them more accommodating of cultural differences”

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18 Culture can be viewed in many different ways and so ‘cultural minority’ can refer to different types of groups. Kymlicka discusses three different ways that culture can be designated: 1) culture can be defined as ‘customs’ giving the broad view that every group that has different customs should be viewed as a minority, 2) culture can be defined as ‘civilization’ giving the narrow view which places almost all people into the same culture, and 3) culture can be defined in such a way that it is concerned with national and ethnic differences between individuals. Kymlicka uses the third option when looking at ‘multicultural groups’ arguing that this definition is neither too broad, nor too narrow, and correctly identifies groups that need special considerations within a state (Kymlicka, 1995: 17-20).

19 Kymlicka looks to Michael Walzer’s early work on multiculturalism for his distinction between national and ethnic groups. While Kymlicka and Walzer come to different conclusions, the former arriving at group differentiation in the structuring of multiculturalism and the latter arriving at state differentiation in the structuring in multiculturalism, both use the same distinctions in categorizing national and ethnic minorities (Kymlicka, 2009; Walzer 1982).
(Kymlicka, 1995: 11). The type of rights afforded ethnic minorities are not meant to isolate them from the rest of the state but instead are meant to ensure that individuals are able to maintain certain aspects of their culture while not being discriminated against, thereby allowing for smoother integration into the majority culture.\(^{20}\)

By recognizing different types of minorities, Kymlicka has gone on to categorize culturally diverse states as multinational states, polyethnic states, and states which are comprised of a combination of a majority and both minority types. A multinational state consists of a majority nation along with any number of minority nations. These minority nations have been incorporated into the larger state either through historical agreements or through force. Many states are multinational, though this has not always been recognized, and due to increased immigration they can no longer be considered strictly multinational. This can be seen in Canada, which was at one point a multinational state made up of an English majority and French and indigenous minorities, but through extensive immigration can no longer be categorized as such. The United States is another such example, as it was comprised of national minorities including American Indians, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos\(^{21}\), Hawaiians, the Chamorros of Guam, and other Pacific Islanders (Kymlicka, 1995: 11), but now has a much wider demographic due to immigration. The same can be seen in Finland, which includes the Fins and the

\(^{20}\) Majority culture/group refers to the culture/group which has the dominant power in a state. In some cases a minority group may be dominant in certain aspects of the society, but these are rare occasions. An example of this is of the Chinese minority in South-East Asia, specifically in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. "In each of these countries, the Chinese minority forms a small percentage of the population, yet often owns a large part - perhaps even the dominant part - of the economy" (Kymlicka, 2007: 81). Keeping this in mind, for the remainder of my thesis I will refer to the dominant culture/group as the majority unless I am referring specifically to cases where the dominant group is not the majority.

\(^{21}\) Chicanos are "the descendants of Mexicans living in the south-west when the United States annexed Texas, New Mexico, and California after the Mexican War of 1846-8." (Kymlicka 1995: 1).
Laplanders, as well as Switzerland with its German, French, and Italian populations.\footnote{While Switzerland is often referred to as a single nation state because of the sentiment of the citizens towards the country, Kymlicka argues that this is an inappropriate understanding the Swiss situation. Instead he suggests that: “[w]e should distinguish ‘patriotism’, the feeling of allegiance to a state, from national identity, the sense of membership in a national group. […] The Swiss are patriotic, but the Switzerland they are loyal to is defined as a federation of distinct peoples” (Kymlicka 1995: 13). In cases such as Switzerland citizens often identify with the same ‘national’ symbols, however it does not follow that these citizens are members of a single group. Instead it is often the case that these citizens recognize the value of their state and its symbols and therefore take communal pride in them while maintaining their distinctness.}

Ethnic minorities are made up of individuals who have voluntarily emigrated from their homeland to a new state either individually or in familial groups. In the past, most states have had assimilation policies concerning immigration in an attempt to create the ‘ideal’ homogenous state, thereby securing state unity and security, but these types of policies have been largely abandoned, or at least weakened, in favour of immigrant integration policies. A considerable part of past assimilation policies was the imposition of the dominant language on immigrants and the weakening of their traditional culture, however, in the 1970’s pressure from immigrant groups caused many countries (specifically Australia, Canada, and the United States) to reject assimilation and to adopt policies of integration (Kymlicka, 1995: 14). Kymlicka has clarified that “in rejecting assimilation, [immigrant groups] are not asking to set up a parallel society, as is typically demanded by national minorities” (Kymlicka, 1995: 15), but are rather looking to form, and be recognized as, “loosely aggregated subcultures” (Kymlicka, 1995: 15). It is through the accumulation of these subcultures within a state that polyethnic states are formed.

It remains abundantly clear that Kymlicka’s distinction between national and ethnic minorities does not sufficiently cover all minority groups within a state, as many other groups, such as African Americans and refugees, exist as well. Kymlicka has
considered these groups briefly but leaves the majority of the theorizing for later work. He has noted that it cannot be the case that African Americans are similar to immigrants, because they did not leave their homeland willingly, and likewise, they are not similar to national minorities because they do not have a historical territory in the United States (Kymlicka, 1995: 25). Therefore any policy protecting ethnic or national minorities will not appropriately protect African Americans, just as any policy regarding African Americans will not be appropriate for national or ethnic minorities. In a similar way to the case of African Americans, refugee rights cannot be fully covered under national or ethnic minority rights; they did not freely choose to leave their homeland and so cannot be said to have willingly given up aspects of their culture or their right to self-determination. Nonetheless, Kymlicka has suggested that refugees should be accommodated through the policies established for ethnic minorities. He has stated that:

The sad fact is that the national rights of refugees are, in the first instance, rights against their own government. If that government is violating their national rights, there is no mechanism for deciding which other country should redress that injustice. And, unfortunately, it is likely that few countries would voluntarily accept any refugees if they were thereby committed to treating refugees as national minorities... [Therefore,] the best that refugees can realistically expect is to be treated as immigrants, with the corresponding polyethnic rights, and hope to return to their homeland as quickly as possible. (Kymlicka, 1995: 98-99)

While it is clear that this is unfair to refugees, it seems that little else can be expected of states granting refuge. Beyond noting the difficulties faced by both of these anomalous groups, Kymlicka has not gone on to consider the issue further in Multicultural Citizenship.

One worry, brought up by Iris Marion Young, is that Kymlicka focuses his concern on only national and ethnic minorities, and is therefore leaving out a large demography of minority groups in society. Young proposes that a continuum could
provide a method of avoiding the duality which she argues that Kymlicka has established in *Multicultural Citizenship* (Young, 1997: 49). She suggests that Kymlicka makes African-Americans to be “virtually unique” since they cannot be categorized a national minority or as an ethnic minority (Young, 1997: 50). Young gives examples of other such examples, referring to “slaves, transported forced labor, political and economic refugees, guest workers, [and] colonial subjects” (Young, 1997: 50). Because of these ‘anomalies’, Young suggests that adhering to the dichotomy that Kymlicka has proposed would be unwise and that instead we should “think of cultural minorities as a continuum, or perhaps a set of continuua” (Young, 1997: 50-51). Kymlicka does respond to the worries outlined by Young, and points out that he acknowledges in *Multicultural Citizenship* that his theory does not apply to all minority groups. He gives two main reasons for this: (1) “immigrants and national minorities form the most common types of ethnocultural pluralism in Western democracies” and, (2) “these cases are all the result of, and permeated by, injustice [and therefore] fall outside the scope of liberal norms of freedom and equality” (Kymlicka, 1997: 78). By focusing on national and ethnic minorities as he describes them, he has suggested that there will be an indirect positive effect on the groups that are not explicitly dealt with in *Multicultural Citizenship*. It should be noted that in his later work he does address Young’s concerns to a great extent, though they should nonetheless be kept in mind here as well. Furthering Young’s critique of Kymlicka’s dichotomy, these limited categories make it difficult to address the horizontal inequalities that arise between groups. As was discussed in Chapter 2, effective social policies should aim towards eliminating all significant horizontal inequalities that are present within a state. While Kymlicka’s theory does acknowledge and address some
horizontal inequalities, it does not acknowledge or address all the inequalities that are present within societies. I am not suggesting that this was done intentionally, only that it is the byproduct of limiting himself to national and ethnic minorities and thereby omitting many other minorities that are present. Since social policy cannot address the horizontal inequalities that it does not recognize, there is a significant gap in the ability of Kymlicka’s theory to address these inequalities. Having a strict division of minorities into two categories makes it difficult to acknowledge other groups that fare as poorly as (or more poorly than) national and ethnic minorities within their respective states. Having said this, it is not the case that general policies should be abandoned, as they play a significant role in social justice as seen in Chapter 2, only that a wide range of group-specific policies should be put in place as well. While Young’s continuum of minority groups may not be ideal in addressing horizontal inequalities, it nonetheless can widen the recognition of minority groups to additional groups, thereby making group-specific policies aimed at horizontal inequalities easier to implement. Despite the critique by Young, Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism contributes significantly to the minority rights and the alleviation of inequalities and should therefore be considered further.

3.2 Establishing Minority Rights

As previously mentioned, national and ethnic minorities have different histories, relations with their state, and demands of the state. It is for this reason, Kymlicka rightly argues, that different types of rights must be established to adequately address the concerns of different minorities. He divides these minority-specific rights into three types: self-government rights, polyethnic rights, and special representation rights.
**Self-government rights:** Only national minorities are afforded self-government rights, as they are a way of rectifying the harms done to groups upon their incorporation into a large state by another dominant group. Self-government rights are meant to re-establish the autonomy of national minorities allowing them to “ensure the full and free development of their culture and the best interests of their people” (Kymlicka 1995: 27). Self-government rights do not guarantee the national minorities full power over their territory and the politics govern within their boards, however they do give these minority groups substantial powers over decision making on certain internal politics and regulations that directly affect their culture and their ability to reproduce it. Because the maintenance of culture is an on-going concern, self-government rights are permanent and set up to ensure the longevity of these national minority cultures (Kymlicka, 1995: 27).

**Polyethnic rights:** Polyethnic rights are only afforded to ethnic minorities because of their relation with the state. These type of rights were first established as a response to the ethnic minorities’ demand for “the right to freely express their particularity without fear of prejudice or discrimination in the mainstream society”, and are therefore permanent (Kymlicka, 1995: 30). Since the emergence of polyethnic rights their makeup has changed and expanded, however the intention behind them has remained the same: to ensure that members of ethnic minorities do not experience discrimination based on their life choices and to ensure their “exercise [of] common rights of citizenship” (Kymlicka 1995: 31). Certain polyethnic rights may seem redundant to those who belong to the dominant group of a state, nonetheless these rights are necessary in order to ensure that
minority groups can participate in the state as full citizens without being required to give up integral parts of their culture and identity. Polyethnic rights cover different aspects of culture, including the maintenance of culture (e.g. funding for festivals, the arts, language programs, etc.), legal exemptions (e.g. exemptions from mandatory Sunday closing laws, formal dress codes, animal slaughtering regulations, etc.), etc. (Kymlicka, 1995: 31). The hope is that these types of rights will allow ethnic minorities to practice parts of their culture in mainstream society without being penalized for it either economically or politically by the state (Kymlicka 1995: 31). One significant difference between self-government rights and polyethnic rights that must be taken into consideration is that self-government rights are put in place to allow national minorities to differentiate themselves from the majority and give them the right to pull back from mainstream society while polyethnic rights are set up to help ethnic minorities integrate into mainstream society, at the same time as they preserve parts of their culture.

Special representation rights: While self-government rights are only applicable to national minorities (as a way of ensuring the group’s general well-being) and polyethnic rights are only applicable to ethnic minorities (as a way of ensuring the protection of cultural expression and preventing discrimination), special representation rights are meant to protect both minorities as a way of ensuring that they have adequate representation at all levels of government. It is difficult to rectify the discrimination felt by both types of groups, especially in the political sphere, and so special representation rights have been put in place as a form of affirmative action. By implementing these types of rights there are either positions in political parties held specifically for members
of minority groups, or positions can be reserved for them at the different levels of
government throughout the state. By guaranteeing representation for minority groups at
different levels of government it is hoped that their concerns will be heard and considered
by the majority, and that after some period affirmative action will no longer be required.
While the other special rights are thought of as permanent features in a state and its
policies, special representations rights should be seen "as a response to oppression or
systemic disadvantage [and that] they are most plausibly seen as a temporary measure on
the way to a society where the need for special representation no longer exists" (Kymlicka 1995: 32). Once the injustices faced by the minority groups are eradicated,
special representation rights are no longer needed and therefore should no longer be
required by either national minorities or ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{23}

3.3 Internal Restrictions vs. External Protections

MinORITY RIGHTS ARE INTEGRAL TO THEORIES OF MULTICULTURALISM AND ARE, AT THE VERY LEAST, CONCERNED WITH HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES IMPLICITLY. While all theories must start somewhere, it should not be assumed that just because a limited number of horizontal inequalities are tackled that this is sufficient. As seen in Chapter 2, while general policies that are implemented, as a way of alleviating inequalities within a state can be helpful, they are not necessarily adequate. Likewise, only addressing a limited number of horizontal inequalities through select group-specific policies may be useful, but not adequate. Therefore, in addition to group-specific policies such as special representation rights, other group-specific policies are needed. These additional policies can at times

\textsuperscript{23} By focusing exclusively on the well-being of minorities, especially ethnic minorities, Kymlicka is overlooking the importance of group mobilization for the equality of groups. This will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
take the form of ‘group rights’. As individuals living in liberal states, we focus on
individuals fearing that group rights will trump the individual rights that we view as
essential to freedom. This fear, however, is only justified if group rights are considered in
the narrow sense. Instead group rights can be seen as two distinct types of rights – rights
concerned with internal restrictions (rights that allow the group to make claims against
members) and rights concerned with external protections (rights that allow the group to
ask for protections against the dominant society) (Kymlicka, 1995: 35).

The first kind is intended to protect the group from the destabilizing impact of
internal dissent (e.g. the decision of individual members not to follow traditional
practices or customs), whereas the second is intended to protect the group from
the impact of external decisions (e.g. the economic or political decisions of the
larger society). (Kymlicka 1995: 35)

Group rights that focus on internal restrictions are opposed to individual rights; however,
these are not the type of group rights required to eliminate horizontal inequalities. While
all individuals who live in liberal democratic states have the same individual rights, there
are often unintended restrictions placed on minority groups that hinder their members
from living their lives to the fullest. This often happens because institutions, services and
laws are established with the dominant society in mind and thereby do not take other
living modes into consideration. External protections can therefore be set up as a kind of
safeguard for minority cultures, religions, languages, etc. French language laws in
Quebec are an example of such external protection as they guarantee that French is the
dominant language in the province and so, while there are English schools and services,
French is nonetheless easily accessible. Likewise, there are many group rights that
aboriginals claim against the dominant society, including land claims and hunting and
fishing rights. While these are external protections afforded to national minorities, there
are also external protections for ethnic minorities, such as Sunday closing exemptions, and official uniform exemptions (Kymlicka, 1995: 38). External exemptions such as these protect minority groups, but they also go beyond this by furthering the freedom of individual members; without external protections Francophones would not be guaranteed the opportunity to send their children to French schools in Quebec, nor would orthodox Jewish store owners be able to have a 6 day business week as not only would they be closed on their Sabbath, they could also be forced to be closed on Sundays. Unfortunately there are certain cases when there are limitations placed on individuals due to external protections.

We should, however, be wary of allowing internal restrictions within minority groups. Internal restrictions are often placed on members as a way of protecting or maintaining the traditions within a culture. These restrictions are also often used as a way of limiting the mobility of individuals within their community, prohibiting individuals from leaving the group, and limiting the ability of members to question the traditions and authorities within the culture.24 While internal restrictions can be detrimental to the members of minority groups and to society as a whole, it does not follow that multiculturalism leads to this problem. “It is a mistake to suggest that allowing such oppressive practices is the ‘logical’ extension of current ‘multiculturalism’ policies in the major immigrant countries” (Kymlicka, 1995: 41). Instead, multiculturalism should, and often does, create a support system for minority groups in such a way that horizontal inequalities can be dealt with in such a way that they are able to maintain aspects of their

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24 An example of such an exception is the religious freedom restrictions placed on members of the American Indian tribe Pueblo by the group. Another example is the mandatory education law exemptions the United States government grants the Amish community. A short of discussion of this can be found in Multicultural Citizenship on pages 40-42.
culture without withdrawing from mainstream society completely. The goal of groups seeking group rights is rarely to cut themselves off from the rest of society, but rather to make sure that they can partake in the dominant society as equals while not being forced to abandon some aspects of their traditional culture.

3.4 The Importance of Culture

Kymlicka’s argument hinges on the assumption that culture, specifically societal culture, plays an important role in the freedom of individuals. Individuals being ‘free’ requires that they have the freedom to choose what they believe to be the ‘good life’ and equally important, that they have the freedom to reconsider their previous decisions and reformulate what the ‘good life’ consists of. But, of course, the freedom to change one’s mind requires that there is a range of choices from which to choose. While there is an extensive variety of lifestyle and cultural options open to individuals within a single culture, other cultures should not be discounted based on the already existent large variety of choice.

I have previously discussed what Kymlicka means generally by ‘culture’. Here, societal culture is even more specific. Kymlicka explains “the sort of culture I will focus on, however, is a societal culture - that is, a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres” (Kymlicka 1995: 76). He notes that the kind of societal culture that he is referring to is often territorially concentrated and also has a shared language which members use when interacting with one another and with institutions. Kymlicka gives a later explanation of societal culture which, while similar, gives some clarification: “by societal culture, I mean a territorially concentrated culture, centred on a shared language which is used in a wide range of societal institutions, in both public and private life (schools, media, law, economy, government, etc.). I call it a societal culture to emphasize that it involves a common language and social institutions, rather than common religious beliefs, family customs, or personal lifestyle” (Kymlicka, 2002: 346).

Kymlicka argues that there are two preconditions to leading a good life. They are: (1) “that we lead our life from the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life. Individuals must therefore have the resources and liberties needed to lead their lives in accordance with their beliefs about value, without fear of discrimination or punishment”, and (2) that we must “be free to question those beliefs, to examine them in light of whatever information, examples, and arguments our culture can provide.” (Kymlicka 1995: 81)
The recognition of different languages and institutional practices within the dominant societal culture has been a significant step in the transformation of minority assimilation policies into minority integration policies. There has been a realization that there are many different modes of living within in language and community institutions, and that the availability of options is beneficial to all members of a state. This recognition of the variety of lifestyles should not lead to the fear that minority groups will try to establish their own quasi-states within the larger state. Instead we should see these options as a way for individuals of minority groups to maintain aspects of their own culture while also adopting many aspects of the dominant societal culture. The idea is that “this commitment to ‘multiculturalism’ or ‘polyethnicity’ is a shift in how immigrants integrate into the dominant culture, not whether they integrate” (Kymlicka 1995: 78). For ethnic minorities this means that they have the ability to retain their culture within the private sphere, while also being afforded “recognition and accommodation of their heritage” in the public sphere, though to a lesser extent than in the private sphere (Kymlicka 1995: 78). This does not mean, however, that they have established societal institutionally complete cultures that are distinct from the dominant societal culture.

In the past there has been a heavy pressure of national minorities to assimilate into the dominant societal culture. This has been, at least partly, accomplished by weakening the societal cultures of national minorities by placing limitations on their languages and self-government rights, in addition to systematically taking over the land on which they have traditionally resided (Kymlicka 1995: 79). Nonetheless, they have persisted in maintaining their traditions, languages, and institutions to a large extent and have also begun reclaiming the rights concerned with these practices and institutions. It is through
this persistence (and the similar persistence exhibited by ethnic minorities) that we can gain a fuller understanding of why societal culture is important.

The ability to choose one’s own living mode is a crucial aspect to freedom for Kymlicka. It is through having a variety of cultural options that we have this choice available to us, and this is why we regard culture as having such instrumental value. While, as mentioned previously, there is plenty of variety within any one culture, Kymlicka still posits that there is value in having different culture available to individuals.

For meaningful individual choice to be possible, individuals need not only access to information, the capacity to reflectively evaluate it, and the freedom of expression and association. They also need access to a societal culture. Group-differentiated measures that secure and promote this access may, therefore, have a legitimate role to play in a liberal theory of justice (Kymlicka 1995: 84).

Culture, Kymlicka maintains, is a right on which people place great value. It is an integral part of who we are, so while we can choose to renounce our culture for another, we cannot be expected to do so (Kymlicka, 1995: 86). For ethnic minorities who have left their homelands voluntarily, this means that they are not entitled to recreate their societal cultures in their new state, but they are entitled to maintaining the private aspects of their culture on which they place significant value. National minorities, on the other hand, are entitled to re-establish their societal culture, and perhaps even entitled to some aid from the state government in doing so since they, the national minorities, did not voluntarily choose to renounce their societal cultures. 27 Whether individuals left their societal culture

27 Kymlicka recognizes that societal culture expectations of refugees are a special case in itself. These individuals have not left their home states voluntarily and so they should not be expected to willingly give up their societal cultures, but at the same time the host states cannot be expected to give refugees the resources necessary to reestablish their societal cultures and possibly new states. He argues that “the best that refugees can realistically expect is to be treated as immigrants, with the corresponding polyethnic rights and hope to return to their homelands as quickly as possible. This means that long-term refugees suffer an injustice, since they do not voluntarily relinquish their national rights. But this injustice was
or had it suppressed, it is reasonable for all members minority groups to expect the freedom to express their culture at least in part. The desire to maintain aspects of minority societal culture is not a negative desire and should not be seen as threatening to the dominant culture, nor as an attempt to isolate the minority groups. Rather, by having a larger variety of societal cultures open to individuals we are better able to promote an understanding among all members of a state leading to more respect and equal treatment of both national and ethnic minority groups (HDR, 2004).  

Benign neglect is often the suggested way of dealing with societal culture and its preservation. The idea is that if the state refrains from promoting any one culture it will be a case of ‘survival of the fittest’, and those cultures that have ‘value’ will continue to exist. While hypothetically this may be a good idea (and I am not sure this is actually the case), it is exceedingly difficult for a state to fully refrain from supporting one culture over another. States ‘pick sides’ by virtue of needing to communicate, establishing national languages, holding national holidays and promoting certain values through programs and funding. If a state provides public education and healthcare, it needs to have a language in which materials are written and in which individuals communicate. While the state may not be saying ‘this language is better than that language’ explicitly, by only using one language it is doing so implicitly. In states where different languages are not recognized in public institutions, this disadvantages national minorities.  

committed by their home government, and it is not clear that we can realistically ask host governments to redress it” (Kymlicka 1995: 99). Kymlicka does not go one to address this point in much more depth in Multicultural Citizenship.  

Regarding national minorities and distinct societal culture: “there is no inherent connection between the desire to maintain a distinct societal culture and the desire for cultural isolation. In many cases, the aim of self-government is to enable smaller nations to interact with larger nations on a more equitable basis” (Kymlicka, 1995: 103-104).  

This also disadvantages ethnic minorities, but generally part of immigration policies is that individuals must learn the national language. Once again this is a case of choosing to leave one’s societal culture and
are other issues that also arise with benign neglect that affect both national and ethnic minorities—for example, national holidays and official uniforms. National holidays do not only depict the historical events of the state, they are often also based around a certain religion even if the state is a ‘secular state’. This is even more the case if the state had a national religion. This can hinder in the ability of minority group members to participate in their religious days because of having to work and from holding certain jobs that require strict uniforms that are not amenable to traditional dress worn by the individuals.\footnote{Different states have dealt with this issue in different ways, some being more successful than others. One way of trying to make a state more equitable, when considering national holidays at least, is to split the national holidays up amongst the different religions that are present in the state. This is discussed in the 2004 Human Development Report where a breakdown of holidays in India, France, and the United States are given. They are as follows: India - 5 Hindu holidays, 4 Muslim holidays, 3 non-denominational holidays, 2 Christian holidays, 1 Buddhist holiday, 1 Jain holiday, and 1 Sikh holiday; France - 6 Christian holidays and 5 non-denominational holidays; the United States - 1 Christian holiday and 9 non-denominational holidays (Human Development Report, 2004: 35).}

There are three types of arguments given in *Multicultural Citizenship* for minority rights: an equality based argument, a historical based argument, and a cultural diversity based argument. Equality based arguments for minority rights hold that the dominant society and culture are unintentionally favoured by the government, and so restorations should be made in order for minority groups to participate in society as equals and are therefore often established as permanent rights. Historically based arguments apply mainly to national minorities, though they can also be concerned with ethnic minorities,\footnote{Historically based arguments for group-differentiated rights must often protect national minorities, but they can also protect minority ethnic groups. An example of this is the Hutterites in Canada. When the government of Canada was trying to settle the western part of Canada “the Hutterites (a Christian sect) were explicitly promised by Canadian immigration officials that they would be exempt from certain laws regarding education, land ownership, and military service if they settled in western Canada” (Kymlicka 1995: 120). There are, of course, other examples of ethnic minorities who have group-differentiated rights based on historical arguments, but these cases are far fewer than the number of national minorities who have rights based on historical arguments.}
and try to rectify past injustices done to minority groups by the dominant group of the society. Since these rights are based on historical injustices, they tend to also be permanent. It is easily argued that equality and historical backed rights can be argued for on their own merit, the same is not true for rights based on cultural diversity. Arguments for these rights depend on rely on the understanding that minority culture can enrich and broaden dominant culture. The cultural rights sought by national minorities are often based on protecting their culture from the interference of the dominant culture, and thus require a removal of sorts from the mainstream. This can lead to losing certain aspects of dominant culture that previously made it richer and more diverse. Therefore national minority rights cannot be argued for by solely relying on cultural diversity arguments. Of course, the same is not true of ethnic minorities, as they are not trying to replicate their societal cultures. Ethnic minority rights therefore do add richness and diversity to the dominant culture as can be seen with examples such as Chinese New Year, restaurants based on different ethnic foods, and different languages being taught in public schools. Therefore, while national minority rights can be justified using arguments based on equality and history, and therefore stand on their own, arguments based on cultural diversity should only be used as supplemental arguments for the others as they are not sufficient on their own.

Liberals implicitly assume that people are members of societal cultures, that these cultures provide a context for individual choice, and that one of the functions of having separate states is to recognize the fact that people belong to separate cultures... Once we make these assumptions explicit, however, it is clear that, in multination states, some people's cultural membership can only be recognized and protected by endorsing group-differentiated rights within the state (Kymlicka 1995: 125).

I argue that there is a potential fourth argument for multicultural rights – the
horizontal inequality argument. Since horizontal inequalities are the inequalities found between groups, it is reasonable to assume that, if they are present, they will tend to be prevalent in multicultural states. We can also reasonably assume that the goal of states (or at least of democratic states) is to establish themselves as just societies. In trying to establish these just societies, horizontal inequalities must be seen as considerable hurdles since they tend to be prevalent, difficult to identify and therefore also difficult to address.\textsuperscript{32} As argued in Chapter 2, horizontal inequalities cannot be addressed solely through general policies aimed at all inequalities, but must be addressed additionally by a wide range of group-specific policies.\textsuperscript{33} Therefore, if we are to take horizontal inequalities seriously, and we recognize that general policies are insufficient in adequately addressing these inequalities (though still needed), then we must be willing to implement group-specific policies. Because these group-specific policies are \textit{specific to groups}, namely minorities, we can therefore understand them as multicultural policies that correspond to multicultural rights. Hence, by recognizing that horizontal inequalities are prevalent and important in multicultural states, we can thereby justify establishing multicultural rights.

3.5 Present Difficulties

It is clear that the theory outlined by Kymlicka in \textit{Multicultural Citizenship} is significant in the way it establishes the need for rights for minority groups in multicultural states, however, it is not clear that he has gone far enough. By dealing with

\textsuperscript{32} See the argument for this in Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{33} As argued in Chapter 2, liberal states are concerned, and must be concerned, with individuals and their rights. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of group-specific rights, so long as they are \textit{additional} and \textit{supplement} the individual rights. Group-specific rights that have the potential for suppressing individual freedom are not acceptable and should not be implemented.
horizontal inequalities implicitly, Kymlicka opens his theory up to unintentionally address one type of horizontal inequality while not addressing a second type of horizontal inequality. His theory acknowledges that there are horizontal inequalities between minority groups and the majority, but overlooks the horizontal inequalities that are present between minority groups. He has proposed general policies that seem to lead to the recognition of horizontal inequalities found between one type of minority group (e.g., national minority groups) and the majority, but does not necessarily recognize the horizontal inequalities found between two minority groups (between national minorities and ethnic minorities). While this does address certain horizontal inequalities, it cannot be said that it addresses all horizontal inequalities, this ideally being the ultimate goal in liberal states. An example of this can be found when looking at language rights within a state when using the national/ethnic division that Kymlicka has proposed; because of self-government rights, national minorities have the resources and authority needed to teach their children both in their mother tongue and in the national (dominant) language of the state. This gives the children of national minorities an advantage over children of ethnic minorities, and brings them (national minority children) closer to par with children of the majority because their cultural history can easily be taught in schools along with an integration of their mother tongue language with the national language. Most state policies do not allow for a similar integration of mother tongue and national language in the early education of ethnic minorities, understandably because of the difficulty in implementation, but this nonetheless recognizes the horizontal inequalities felt by national minorities, though not ethnic minorities.
One section of the United Nations Human Development Report from 2004 looks at the importance of language recognition for minority groups and their ability to participate in the larger society. The report states that:

Limitations on people’s ability to use their mother tongue - and limited facility in speaking the dominant or official national language - can exclude people from education, political life and access to justice... Does a lack of education in one’s mother tongue stall development? Research suggests that the answer might be yes. In the United States children educated in their mother tongue for the first six years of school perform much better than those immediately immersed in English. And there is every reason to believe that the process of learning would follow a similar pattern in developing countries. (Human Development Report, 2004: 33)

This points to one important horizontal inequality, namely that the dominant group is provided earlier education in their mother tongue, while ethnic minorities are expected to learn a second language and the school material at the same time. This can lead to children of an ethnic minority having lower levels of education, having a harder time understanding the required material, and reinforcing the idea that they are not as intelligent or as capable of learning the material as the children whose mother tongue is the language used in the schooling system.

A possible solution for alleviating this type of horizontal inequality felt by ethnic minorities would be to implement programs of language integration where the ethnic minority population is relatively dense. This could work towards an equal attempt at reducing the inequalities felt by both national and ethnic minorities in two ways: 1) the children of both minorities would have a fairer opportunity to learn school material through their mother tongue, while also having the opportunity to advance their knowledge of the dominant language, both of which support bettering their attitudes towards themselves and education as a whole, and 2) the children of the dominant culture would have the opportunity to learn about the relevant minority cultures, reinforcing a
more positive attitude towards them along with reinforcing the fact that neither group is superior than the other.

Another concern that must be considered is Kymlicka's heavy emphasis on cultural and political inequalities, and his seeming dismissal of social and economic inequalities. As I've argued throughout this chapter, culture is important to the lives of individuals since its recognition allows individuals to express themselves and, with the help of policies ensuring political equalities, individuals can full participate in politics and society. The almost exclusive attention that Kymlicka gives to culture and politics, however, downplays the significance that other inequalities play in the lives of minorities. The interconnectedness found between horizontal inequalities is examined in chapter 2, and if we take this seriously, as I argue we should, then focusing solely on culture is insufficient for states and societies. Instead, there should be a balanced approach that addresses social and economic inequalities in addition to cultural and political inequalities. Without such an approach it is not clear that any progress made in reducing cultural inequalities will be able to be maintained, or even that the implemented policies and programs will have any effect. By focusing his theory on cultural and political inequalities, Kymlicka is limiting himself to the number of horizontal inequalities that can be addressed and thereby is also limiting the scope and effectiveness of his theory. It may be the case that he is making the liberal assumption that if individuals are politically equal, the economic and social equality will follow. However, as discussed above, this is not necessarily the case. While many states implement multicultural policies this fact alone does not guarantee that they will work. Likewise, there are some policies which are merely tokens and so cannot be expected to accomplish
anything. If the goal of multicultural theories and liberal states is to improve the circumstances in which minorities find themselves, then social and economic inequalities must be taken into consideration in addition to cultural and political inequalities.

It may be argued that Kymlicka does not sufficiently acknowledge horizontal inequalities due to the disparities found in his early work as mentioned above. However it is more likely that, because Multicultural Citizenshiprepresents Kymlicka’s early work on the topic, there are underdeveloped implications concerning horizontal inequalities that should be more explicit. This can be seen in the proposed recognition of religious differences; in no way are minority groups denied the right to congregate and practice their religious ceremonies in a state that is secular, but rather, all state institutions, ceremonies, and so on should not involve specific religions. Unfortunately, it is often the case that supposedly secular states nonetheless favour one religion over others when assigning some state holidays.34 This does not mean that the state actively participates in that specific religion, but rather that they implicitly recognize only one religion which is more representational of the state’s population through state holidays. Since national holidays are often based on history, it is not the case that the state is intentionally choosing one religion over others; nonetheless it results in one group being recognized to a greater extent than others. This also leads to a greater recognition of one group’s history over the histories of other minority groups. While it is important that horizontal inequalities found between minority groups and the majority be tackled by the state, this is not sufficient as the horizontal inequalities found between different minority groups are equally important.

34 This does not mean that all state holidays in secular states are based on a religious calendar, only that it is often the case that some of the state wide holidays are based on traditional religious holidays that do not recognize the diversity of religions and cultures within the state.
3.6 Conclusion

It is clear that in *Multicultural Citizenship* Kymlicka has outlined a theory of multiculturalism that takes inequalities seriously and attempts at rectifying the existing differences between different groups. There are, however, four areas in which it is lacking. First, because Kymlicka constructs his theory as a dichotomy of national and ethnic minorities, there is a wide range of horizontal inequalities that may not be addressed because other minorities are not acknowledged. If horizontal inequalities are to be addressed in a significant way, then all possible horizontal inequalities must be recognized and this relies on the acknowledgement of all minorities.

The second area in which Kymlicka’s theory is lacking is in his arguments for multicultural rights. It is not, I argue, that his three arguments are insufficient, but rather that there is a possible fourth argument that should not be ignored; the argument based on horizontal inequalities. If we take horizontal inequalities seriously, we must recognize that there are groups within societies that are disadvantaged as groups. By acknowledging this we should also acknowledge the need for group-specific policies in addition to general policies addressing occurring inequalities. Because these additional policies are group-specific they can be seen as multicultural policies that are correspond with multicultural rights.

Thirdly, there is a discrepancy in the way horizontal inequalities are approached when present between a minority (be it a national or ethnic minority) and the majority, and the lack of acknowledgement of the horizontal inequalities that are present between minorities (e.g. between a national and an ethnic minority). When trying to reduce the
inequalities between groups, *all* groups must be considered – we should not focus on reducing the horizontal inequalities found between the majority and national minorities or between the majority and ethnic minorities, we must also focus on the horizontal inequalities found between national and ethnic minorities. It is by recognizing the different relationships of horizontal inequalities that a state truly eliminates the inequalities found between its residents, and as such these different relationships must be recognized explicitly.

The fourth area in which Kymlicka’s theory is insufficient is in his emphasis on cultural and political inequalities and dismissal of social and economic inequalities. While the former inequalities are important and must be addressed, ignoring the later inequalities makes it difficult, if not impossible for the circumstances that minorities find themselves in to be ameliorated. For this reason any theory of multiculturalism or liberal states that takes horizontal inequalities seriously must expand its focus beyond the cultural and political spheres to all aspects of social life.

Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism as put forth in *Multicultural Citizenship* is extensive and goes far in addressing the difficulties felt by minorities in democratic states. While I have shown that it falls short in addressing some issues concerning horizontal inequalities, it is nonetheless a good start, and this should be acknowledged. We should also recognize that just because his early work addresses these issues in an insufficient manner, it does not mean that his more recent work is likewise deficient. For this reason, Chapter 5 will consist of a similar analysis of his more recent work.
Chapter 4
Freedom as Non-Domination, Differentiated Solidarity, and Horizontal Inequalities

In this chapter I will examine two specific concepts put forth by Iris Marion Young (freedom as non-domination and differentiated solidarity), I will consider what contributions they make in the reduction of horizontal inequalities, and finally I will consider whether freedom as non-domination and differentiated solidarity can, in comparison to Kymlicka’s theory, more effectively ameliorate the horizontal inequalities that minorities face. By focusing on Young’s work outlined in *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (1990), *Inclusion and Democracy* (2000), and *Global Challenges* (2007) I argue that she goes farther than Kymlicka in her recognition of all marginalized groups within states. These groups include, but are not restricted to, ethnic minorities, women, the old, the poor, gays and lesbians, and the disabled. Despite the wide range in Young’s work I will stress the implications of Young’s theory for ethnic, national and indigenous minorities (as defined in the work by Kymlicka) in an attempt to address the difficulties that arise from horizontal inequalities. The significant aspect of Young’s work that will be focused on here is how her concepts of freedom as non-domination and differentiated solidarity lead to a theory of group differentiation that relies on a high level of group cooperation.\(^{35}\)

While both Young and Kymlicka aim towards the same goal, namely the reduction of inequalities among minority groups, the results are notably different because of their approaches. By considering four broad aspects of Young’s theory (how personal identity is closely connected to one’s group; what roles self-development and self-determination play in a group’s freedom; the interaction between minority groups and the

\(^{35}\) This is significantly different than the theory brought forth by Kymlicka that relies on group integration.
majority) it can be shown that while her proposal would achieve the reduction of horizontal inequalities to an extent, it nonetheless lacks the ability to fully address the inequalities experienced by minorities. While it may be the case that Young addresses horizontal inequalities in such a way that rectifies some of the problems that arise for Kymlicka, it should not be assumed that she addresses them fully or in a sufficient manner.

4.1 Examining Freedom as Non-Domination and Differentiated Solidarity

I will briefly discuss the importance of cultural groups and identity, self-development and self-determination, differentiated solidarity, and exclusion and inclusion in Young’s work. It is through the incorporation of these concepts that Young argues that for cooperative group differentiation.

*Cultural Groups and Identity:* Groups are not ‘natural’ insofar as they do not exist without an ‘other’ existing with which individuals can be compared. This means that “[groups only] emerge from the way people interact” (Young, 2000: 90), and so it should not be taken for granted that individuals belong to specific groups.\(^{36}\) If groups need some kind of defining characteristic that is different from an ‘other’ then it can be said that groups are social constructs that are formed through a comparison of traits that unify individuals into different social groups. Young has argued that it is due to this emphasis

\(^{36}\) An example of this is the Maori people of New Zealand; before the British colonized the islands the indigenous inhabitants did not see themselves as belonging to one specific group, but rather as belonging to many small tribes that had familial and territorial ties. This, however, changed once the colonizers came to New Zealand and made their presence known because there was a clear difference between the indigenous tribes and the British while there was at least some degree of similarity between the tribes themselves. Because there were these commonality between the tribes and such a disconnect with the British, the different tribes began to identify with one another more and so started to view themselves in a similar manner to how the British viewed them (Young, 2000: 90).
on difference that cultural groups are formed, due to differences in “language, everyday practices, conventions of spirituality, sociability, production, and the aesthetics and objects associated with food, music buildings, the organization of residential and public space, visual images, and so on” (Young, 2000: 91). It is through practices such as these that we find common ground between individuals, and thus understand them as members of our group or as members of some other group. We have a deep connection with these practices and beliefs and so find it odd when other individuals have different practices or beliefs from us, and consequently we are less willing to accept them into our group, thus marking the divide between groups. It is through these differences that not only do we define who we are, but we also define who the ‘other’ is.\(^\text{37}\)

Despite the clear differences between groups, it should not be assumed that individuals are permanent members of a group, or that characteristics that define a group never change. “Group differences usually cut across one another” (Young, 1990: 48) because we live in complex societies that require us to interact with many different individuals, but also because we have different characteristics that require us to belong to several groups at once.\(^\text{38}\) It should be noted that there are two different kinds of characteristics that place us into groups: characteristics that we have control over, and

\(^{37}\) It should not be assumed that the deep connections individuals have with their group are permanent and unchanging, however they are nonetheless present. In his work Bhikhu Parekh notes that advocates of politics of recognition argue that “human beings are culturally embedded in the sense that they identity is profoundly shaped by and integral tied up with their culture” (Parekh, 2004: 200). He goes on to note that “Even if we do not go as far as saying that they are determined or even constituted by it, they argue, we cannot deny that it is a source of their system of meaning, values, and ideals, forms part of their fundamental human interest, and matters to them deeply” (Parekh, 2004: 200-201). This sentiment is found throughout the work done by Young on marginalized groups. While she is unwilling to advance the notion that groups are natural, she does argue that individuals have deep connections with their groups and cultures and so individuals should not be required to renounce their group identity when entering politics and mainstream society.

\(^{38}\) This sentiment is echoed by Frances Stewart in her work on horizontal inequalities, along with many others. Stewart notes that “most people have multiple affiliations and identities – some location based, some family based, some age or class based, and some culturally differentiated” (Stewart, 2003: 3).
characteristics that we have no control over. That is to say, we can choose what languages we decide to learn and what associations we choose to join, but we cannot choose our sex, gender or ethnicity (Young, 1990: 48). Because, for example, language, sex, gender, and ethnicity are the basis for different groups, individuals must belong to several groups at once. Take the following example - a homosexual Iranian woman living in Quebec. There are five obvious groups listed here that she belongs to: the ‘homosexual group’, the ‘women group’, the ‘Iranian group’, the ‘Canadian group’, and the ‘Québécois group’ – but this does not mean that she only belongs to these groups. The associations that she belongs to and her religious affiliation make up other possible groups to which she may belong. If we consider groups as rigid, we end up “deny[ing] the many shadings and differentiations within the group” (Young, 2000: 89). Young proposes that the best way to think of groups is as follows:

[...]ny group consists in a collective of individuals who stand in determinate relations with one another because of the actions and interactions of both those associated with the group and those outside or at the margins of the group. There is no collective entity, the group, apart from the individuals who compose it. (Young, 2000: 89).

Tension is found between groups because of conflicting ideals, assumptions and practices within the different groups (e.g. the LGBT community and the Catholic church), however, this does not necessarily lead to tension within an individual’s life – just because individuals belong to several groups, this does not entail that they necessarily identify with them all equally. Using the previously given example of the Iranian woman living in Quebec, she may have a strong affinity to the ‘Québécois’ group, but may not identify to any considerable degree with other Iranians. What is crucial is that, just as groups are fluid, affinity is fluid as well. Therefore, throughout the woman’s
life she will come to identify more or less strongly with different groups at different times, thus allowing her to, at different times, belong to groups with conflicting ideals, assumptions and practices while not necessarily feeling torn between these groups.

As should be expected, critics have brought forth worries that, by focusing on the connectedness of group membership and identity, group oppression and group segregation will increase. The worry is that “problems of prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination, and exclusion exist because some people mistakenly believe that group identification makes a difference to the capacities, temperament, or virtues of group members” (Young, 1990: 46). This seems to be a mistake, however, because while many groups are formed due to oppression, group affiliation does not cause the oppression. Nor is it reasonable to assume that individuals can give up all group affiliations. Rather than viewing group affiliation as a cause of societal fracture, it can be a way to bring individuals together in such a way that they become represented to, heard by, and understood by the aggregate of other (i.e. society). It is unlikely that a single average individual will ever have any kind of real ability to change the political sphere or society in general, but when many individuals come together and support one another this type of agency becomes more probable. Young explains that “group differentiation is both an inevitable and a desirable aspect of modern social processes. Social justice...requires not the melting away of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without oppression” (Young, 1990: 47).

Self-development and self-determination: For Young, part of the importance in recognizing groups is that it allows groups, and members of those groups, to play
considerable roles in their development and their determination. Both self-development and self-determination are directly linked to the justice and injustice that is experienced by minority groups. Young explains that “these two general values [self-development and self-determination] correspond to two general conditions of injustice: [1]) oppression, institutional constraint on self-development, and [2]) domination, institutional constraint on self-determination” (Young, 2000:31). While it is clear that both oppression and domination should be avoided, and eventually eliminated, in a just society, we have traditionally focused our attention on oppression making domination into a secondary concern. Self-development should not be under-represented, and so it will be considered here; however, Young has made the connection between domination and the lack of self-determination, and therefore self-determination will be my main focus. A discussion of self-determination will follow a brief discussion of self-development.

Self-development requires that people are equipped with the means necessary to interact and communicate with one another in such a way that everyone is listened to and acknowledged. Young proposes that the means necessary for this include, but are not limited to, “food, shelter, [and] health care” (Young, 2000: 32). The distribution of goods, however, is not sufficient for justice and so she takes a similar stance as found in the capabilities approach as laid out by Amartya Sen, because the “distribution of goods or income [is] per se too limited a way of evaluating justice or well-being” (Young, 2000: 32). Instead of only distributing goods in such a way that individuals are thought to have equal ability for self-development, Young suggests that culture must also be taken into consideration due to the fact that different circumstances (i.e. different cultures) lead to
different levels of self-development. Therefore, if we are to take self-development seriously, it is necessary to view culture as a substantial variable.

In considering self-determination and domination, it should be kept in mind that Young discusses all marginalized groups in society, and not only the limited scope of groups that I am focusing on. For this reason most of her discussion is worded in terms of “professionals” and “the working class”. Nonetheless her discussion is still relevant to ethnic, national and indigenous minorities as the circumstances that are attributed to the working class are similar, if not the same, as the circumstances in which these minorities also find themselves. A key point for Young is that, while some individuals do have more power than others, they can only practice that power if a structure is in place that allows for this. This is clear when looking at examples found in everyday society: “a judge may be said to have power over a prisoner, but only in the context of a network of practices executed by prison wardens, guards, recordkeepers, administrators, parole officers, lawyers, and so on” (Young, 1990: 31). Therefore, in order for an individual or a group of individuals to be dominated in society, there must be a societal structure that allows for and perpetuates that dominance.

The powerlessness that arises from structural domination causes individuals to have little control over their lives leaving them few opportunities to make decisions or, at best, allow for only a select few opportunities from which to choose. Young explains:

The powerless are those who lack authority or power even in this mediated sense, those over whom power is exercised without their exercising it; the powerless are situated so that they must take orders and rarely have the right to give them. Powerlessness also designates a position in the division of labor and the concomitant social position that allows persons little opportunity to develop and exercise skills. The powerful have little or no work autonomy, exercise little creativity or judgments in their work, have no technical expertise or authority,
express themselves awkwardly, especially in public or bureaucratic settings, and
do not command respect. (Young, 1990: 56-57)

It is important to note that with regard to this passage, Young is referring to the
workingclass; however, this type of powerlessness is (I argue) also present in ethnic,
national and indigenous minorities, especially when horizontal inequalities are taken into
consideration. The lower levels of education that are often found among minority groups
lead to individuals having “no technical expertise or authority” within their jobs. This
then leads into having “little or no work autonomy” and “little creativity or judgments in
their work”. There is also the issue of these groups “express[ing] themselves awkwardly”
which follows from insufficient education and work experience. As will be discussed
later in this chapter, Young proposes that the awkwardness that is present in
communication between groups arises from a misunderstanding of other groups and an
unwillingness to be open to ‘different’ types of communication. Due to these types of
misunderstandings or dismissals, minorities are not afforded the opportunities necessary
for raising themselves out of their circumstances, thereby reducing the domination by the
majority and thus reducing persistent horizontal inequalities.

In considering domination and self-determination, Young emphasizes the
constitution of domination, going against the traditional\textsuperscript{39} understanding of it given by
liberal theorists. Simple self-determination is “widely accepted and clearly articulated
[...] as independent sovereignty. An authority is sovereign...when it has final authority
over the regulations of all activities within a territory, and when no authority outside that
territory has the legitimate right to cancel or override it” (Young, 2007: 44-45). This,

\textsuperscript{39} In liberal theories self-determination tends to be understood as having freedom of interference of others. From this point forward I will refer to this liberal conception of self-determination as ‘simple self-
determination’ so as to not confuse it with Young’s conception of self-determination, which involves freedom from domination.
however, leads to the domination that Young has tried to step away from.\(^{40}\) She has argued that “persons live within structures of domination if other persons or groups can determine without reciprocation the conditions of their action, either directly or by virtue of the structural consequences of their actions” (Young, 2000: 32). She has built on the work done by Philip Pettit, who argues that self-determination is not reducible to non-interference, but rather involves a lack of domination by one individual or group over another individual or group. While non-dominance involves non-interference, there are circumstances when institutions “must sometimes regulate and interfere with actions in order to restrict dominative power and promote co-operation” (Young, 2000: 33).

An issue that arises with a simple concept of self-determination is that it limits the possibility of self-determination to sovereign states thereby ignoring the unjust domination of certain groups over others. Before their incorporation into larger states, national and indigenous minorities were their own distinct groups that had power over themselves (i.e. self-determination). This determination, however, was unjustly lost through their incorporation into larger states either through force or agreement. Likewise, treaties are *agreements* and so it would seem that they are just, the loss of determination is loss of something that has intrinsic value and should therefore still be reinstated. Self-determination is not limited to sovereign states, however, if it is understood as being concerned with domination rather than interference – “an agent dominates another when he or she has power over the other and is thus able to interfere with the other arbitrarily” (Young, 2007b: 48). With this understanding it is clear that individuals are equally able to

\(^{40}\) I am not proposing that simple self-determination is unconcerned with domination, only that it is not its main focus. Rather, simple self-determination addresses domination in a secondary way by focusing on interference. While domination is dealt with in a secondary manner, it is nonetheless contrary to all forms of self-determination.
have self-determination, which seems to align with our intuitions far better than individuals lacking self-determination. What is crucial is the ‘able to interfere...arbitrarily’”. Foremost, it is not necessary that an individual does interfere, only that one is able to interfere. This ability leaves the other in fear of interference, which may well be equivalent to interference. Interference, however, is not necessarily bad, rather it is arbitrary interference that must be avoided, and an act is arbitrary “when it is chosen or rejected without consideration of the interests or opinions of those affected” (Young, 2007b: 48). It is unreasonable to propose that any act or decision is bad if it interferes with another, because there are often valid reasons for interference, and in some circumstances interference can even be necessary. When self-determination is understood as an individual or a group as not being dominated it does not mean that interference is not considered. There are clearly cases when interference is related to the absence of self-determination, but this is only the case when it is (as said) arbitrary interference. In addition, non-domination does not rely on activity, but rather ability. By focusing on these two criteria self-determination can be applied more widely and thus concerns individuals and groups along with sovereign states.

In *Global Challenges* Young has considered what the implications of viewing self-determination as non-domination would mean for indigenous minorities. She looks at the example of the Goshutes tribe and the state of Utah. She has described the situation as this:

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41 ‘Take the example of benevolent slave owners who allow their slaves to do as they please. Nonetheless, it seems strange to say that the slaves are free since the slave owners can at any time choose to take that freedom away. Because of this, the slaves act differently than they would if they were truly free for fear of consequences. In this way there is a relationship of dominance between the slave owners and the slaves despite the slave owners lack of action – it is their ability that is important, not just action.'
According to a report in the New York Times, the Skull Valley Band of Goshutes have offered at least part of their reservation as the temporary storage ground for high-level civil nuclear waste. The officials have vowed to block the border of the reservation from shipments of nuclear waste. The Skull Valley Band of Goshutes asserts that they have sovereign authority over the reservation territory and the activities within it, and that the State of Utah has no jurisdiction over this activity. The State of Utah, on behalf of the counties near the reservation, claims that they have the responsibility to protect the health and welfare of the citizens of Utah. Since the storage of nuclear waste carries risks of potential harm that people in counties surrounding the reservation would bear along with those living on the reservation, the State of Utah feels obligated to assert its power. (Young, 2007b: 54)

While it is true that the tribe does have simple self-determination rights according to the laws in the United States, and therefore their decision cannot be legitimately stopped, it is also clear that this decision impacts not only the individuals living on the reservations, but those living around the reservation. Because the self-determination in this case is understood as ensuring that the tribe cannot be interfered with, the State of Utah’s method of dealing with the situation is challenging all self-determination of the tribe. This, however, takes away the ability of the tribe to make any decisions concerning its own affairs. This intrusion could be mitigated, however, if self-determination is understood as non-domination rather than non-interference; non-domination would allow the Goshutes tribe to maintain its self-determination, but would not allow for the nuclear waste to be stored on the reservation. Because of the negative effects on the citizens of Utah, the Goshutes tribe would not be justified in deciding to allow the nuclear waste storage without taking others into consideration. Justification and consideration, in this sense, would entail the open communication between the Goshutes tribe and the State of Utah.

Intergovernmental relations ought to be structured such that, when self-governing entities stand in relationships of contiguity or mutual effect, there are settled
procedures of discussion and negotiations about conflicts, side effects of their activities, and shared problems. (Young, 2007b: 56)

By putting such measures in place in tandem, self-determination rights could be maintained while different entities could also avoid finding themselves in similar situations.

While the example that Young has presented is concerned with an indigenous minority, a state, and how such issues can be overcome, this does not limit the solution to indigenous minorities. Because of the historical similarities between national and indigenous minorities, Young’s solution is easily applicable to national minorities as well. However, she goes even further and suggests and this type of self-determination should be extended to all groups, thereby also encompassing ethnic minorities - “ultimately I believe that the conception of self-determination which I recommend ought to apply to all peoples” (Young, 2007b: 43). This, as will be discussed later, would have important ramifications regarding the equality of groups.

_Differentiated solidarity:_ Conflict often arises when groups interact with one another, especially when one group has more power than others. A clear example of this is found in the difficulties that arise when minorities interact with the majority within a state.

While the majority generally does not aim to cause conflict between itself and minority groups, there are times when difficulties are intentionally caused, such as through the discrimination or discrediting of minority groups.42 While it is clear that discrimination or

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42 Part of this problem is that individuals of the majority believe that they are treating minorities as equals. Unfortunately this is often not the case because more resources, and thus more power, are available to the majority than are available to minorities. The idea that some individuals have more political weight than others is a common theme found throughout political theories. Anne Phillip has given one version of this idea in *Democracy and Difference* where she has argued that “democracy implies equality but, when it is
the intentional discrediting of minority groups is harmful, the harm that is unintentional deserves more consideration. As argued by Young, this type of unintentional harm is often caused through ‘helpful’ policies such as integration. These policies often ignore the fact that certain types of voluntary segregation or clustering, while appearing unjust, are actually desired by the group as a way to provide them with a sense of community and stability. The misunderstandings surrounding voluntary segregation often arises due to a lack of proper communication between the different groups.

In the past, states have used segregation as an active mode of excluding individuals and groups from the mainstream society based on race and income, along with other negatively viewed characteristics. While the official practice of segregation has been largely abandoned by democratic states, it still occurs in less obvious ways, which often leads to the establishment of ghettos. States often try to mitigate the

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43 The integration that Young refers to is not the progressive integration argued for by Will Kymlicka. Rather, she is referring to the type of integration which took place in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s.

44 It should be noted here that the segregation being referred to here is not segregation forced by a government. Here I am referring to the phenomenon where individuals of a single group (or a few similar groups) choose to move to the same communities, send their children to the same schools, work in similar jobs, etc. While this can make an area appear very mono-cultural, thus leading to the appearance of ‘injustice’ being done upon those communities, it is caused by free movement and association and therefore should be viewed as a positive occurrence. From this point forward I will refer to voluntary segregation as ‘clustering’ and forced segregation as ‘segregation’.

45 In theory clustering should be viewed as a positive occurrence, but when it happens under the wrong circumstances it takes a form similar to segregation. In one way this type of grouping can be seen as clustering since individuals are not officially limited in where they can reside, but in another way this grouping is segregation as individuals are forced into areas based on housing, employment and schooling opportunities and income brackets of families and individuals. While this is not necessarily caused by government policies, prejudices and the free market cause it, in so far as employers and businesses can manipulate individuals so that they find themselves in structures of domination. Individuals with limited education often only have low-income employment opportunities, which limits the amount that they can afford on housing. This means that individuals who belong to similar income brackets tend to live in the
detrimental effects of low-income communities by implementing integration policies that aim to incorporate different ethnic groups and different income levels into communities. This type of integration is often thought to be the solution for problems found in these ghettos. Some of the problems that arise from segregation are: 1) the limiting of choices that individuals have for where they can live, either based on income or ethnicity (this violates equal opportunity by limiting the freedom to housing choice); 2) the production and reinforcement of harmful structures of privilege and disadvantage through the limitations on income, housing, education, etc. felt by minorities; 3) the privilege that is obscured in such a way that it becomes invisible to those who are privileged by moving them further and further away from the disadvantaged minority groups; 4) the limitations and impediments of political communication between individuals from different groups due to the lack of required understanding and accessible public forums (Young, 2000: 205-210).

It is true that these types of harms are caused by segregation when forced, but it should not be assumed that (forced) integration is not harmful as well (if not equally harmful then at least harmful to the extent that it should cause public concern). Integration involves individuals moving to different communities and starting new lives, but since there are few policies that states can implement that will entice higher income families to move, it is the low-income communities that end up being dispersed. This means that the wishes of these individuals are not always taken into consideration when same communities. Because individuals have little education and low-income, there is little incentive for school boards to focus their funds in these communities. In addition, because of the low-income, individuals are less likely to be able to afford cars, and are thereby limited in where they can work and shop. This means that there is a high demand for jobs and businesses so that employers can keep the wages they offer low, and businesses can inflate their prices. In this way low-income groupings create the perfect environment for the economic domination of businesses and employers over minorities. Having said this, addressing these issues by forcing minorities to move and integrate into the large community is not the solution as will be discussed.
states attempt to *appear* inclusive and integrated (and by extension *just*). However, Young argues that *clustering* should not always be assumed as a negative:

group-differentiated residential and associational clustering is not necessarily bad in itself, inasmuch as it may arise from legitimate desires to form and maintain affinity grouping. Spatial group differentiation, however, should be voluntary, fluid, without clear borders, and with many overlapping, unmarked, and hybrid places. (Young, 2000: 197)

Self-imposed clustering allows groups to feel a sense of community, to have secure networks of support (networks that cannot always be adequately provided by governments), and increases the possibility for political voice in matters concerning the state. Integration is often forced, or at least strongly suggested, by government policies that attempt to create a just and equal society, but, as seen, integration does not always accomplish this. Involuntary integration, just like involuntary segregation, can lead to harm that must be considered in deciding whether integration is worthwhile under certain circumstances. As with involuntary segregation, Young outlines four harms that involuntary integration can cause: 1) the tendency of requiring the minorities to do the ‘changing’ or moving while leaving the majority relatively unchanged and unaffected; 2) it often “rejects the validity of people’s desire to live and associate with others for whom they feel particular affinity”; 3) the tendency to blame minority groups when this type of integration fails; 4) the focus on the fact that groups are segregated spatially instead of focusing on how groups gain and maintain material privilege over others (Young, 2000: 216-218). Instead of integration, Young proposes that *differentiated solidarity* is best equipped to address the injustices felt by minority groups.

Like integration, differentiated solidarity is committed to “combat[ing] exclusion and foster[ing] individual freedom”, but it also respects and “affirms the freedom of
association that may entail residential clustering and civic differentiation” (Young, 2000: 197). In discussing differentiated solidarity Young looks at solidarity and differentiation separately in an attempt to fully outline the dissimilarity with traditional integration.46

When discussing ‘solidarity’, Young argues that it (solidarity)“invoke[s] a sense of commitment and justice owed to people, but precisely not on the basis of a fellow feeling or mutual identification” (Young, 2000: 222). Throughout our everyday lives we interact with any number different individuals who are most often strangers and who we often do not identify with. Nonetheless, since we interact with these individuals on a daily basis, it seems intuitive that we therefore owe them respect and justice. There is no need for us to identify with these individuals in any special way in order for us to feel that we owe them justice; such an obligation is based on the autonomy of these individuals.47 “Distant strangers often need to care about and co-operate with one another enough to respond to local circumstances and problems that potentially affect most of them, which often originate from the confluence of their individualized actions” (Young, 2000: 223). Though Young is clear that individuals cannot truly identify with one another, this does not mean they cannot, or should not, have an affinity towards one another as an affinity is caused by the interaction between individuals and the resulting effects that they have one another. The more individuals interact with one another, the closer they feel and the more they have in common; it is from here that they begin to form ‘groups’.

For Young, differentiation affirms the separation of smaller groups from the majority so long as the separation is caused by clustering and is not due to unjust situations, which produce or perpetuate forced segregation and discrimination. “The social

46 The direct roles that exclusion and inclusion pay will be discussed in a subsequent section.
47 It should be noted that this type of respect and justice are also present in theories of integration.
and political ideal of differentiated solidarity holds that segregation is wrong, but that social group distinction is not wrong. The ideal affirms a freedom to cluster, both in urban space and in religious, cultural, and other affinity group associations” (Young, 2000: 224). This clustering requires that individuals remain open to having relationships with individuals from other groups while still respecting the differences that are present, as well as maintaining a certain distance between them. While this may appear to be ‘tolerance’, Young argues otherwise:

To be tolerant usually implies a willingness to let them along but not to affirm a relationship with them. Tolerance is too weak a norm for promoting inclusion...however, inclusive political institutions do not require that all members of the polity mutually identify. Differentiated solidarity requires only that these who mutually identify over here in this respect affirm their openness to and engagement with those with different situations and affinities. (Young, 2000: 225)

In his critique of Young’s differentiated solidarity, Chris M. Herbst has described Young’s position as follows:

Given the economic, social, and political interrelatedness of individuals with diverse loyalties and interest within a metropolitan area, there should be an obligation to ‘promote justice among the strangers who dwell together in a region.’ But, at the same time, there can be a certain degree of spatial separation among individuals who actively look for each other in order to celebrate commonalities. (Herbst, 2008: 14)

Individuals have deep connections with their history and culture (etc.) and therefore have an affinity towards others who share this history and culture (etc.). It is these types of differences that cause clustering and groups and therefore must be recognized. Nonetheless there must also be openness towards individuals from other groups because, despite less interaction occurring between these individuals, there is still some amount of interaction that is necessary for everyday life.
The integration Young is concerned with focuses on ensuring that individuals are dispersed throughout society in such a way that there appears to be a just distribution of individuals, religions, cultures, etc.; however, through this process individuals are often taken away from the places and people that make them feel safe, and where they have the most agency. In this way integration is concerned with the movement of people.

Differentiated solidarity, on the other hand, focuses on the movement of resources. This allows individuals to stay in their communities, while not punishing them for their choices by depriving them of opportunities that are available in more affluent areas.

When integration is no longer the focus, policies can also be put in place that take the pressure off individuals to change, and instead provide them with the resources that they need. Young explains that

policy that aims to move resources to people addresses directly the inequalities of material privilege and disadvantage processes of segregation produce. Such policies do not force some to face the choice of leaving the familiarity of home or to be excluded from benefits and opportunities open to others. (Young, 2000: 227)

Not only does this make it possible for individuals to stay in their communities, but it also makes it more likely that investments will be made in the less fortunate areas which, in turn, will bring up property values and safety within them. Through differentiated solidarity, groups are better able to stay together while not being unintentionally discriminated against. Additionally, by making it possible for groups to stay together, and to be recognized as groups, it gives them a greater voice when entering discussions with the majority or with other minority groups. Such ‘open communication’, is a crucial part of ensuring that society is just and inclusive.48

48 This is also the starting point for group mobilization and the possibility of minorities being able to engage with the majority and the state in such a way that they can play an active role in the amelioration of their circumstances. Young wishes to take this group mobilization far by giving groups a type of autonomy
This idea of moving resources rather than individuals is one of the focuses found in policies aiming to reduce horizontal inequalities. By using policies to focus on the need for resources in certain areas, minority communities can remain intact and can therefore maintain the social structures and support networks that they have established. Nonetheless issues can still arise when focusing mainly on the distribution of resources, as this does not ensure that horizontal inequalities will be sufficiently reduced. While minorities do cluster, it is rare that they cluster to such an extent that they make up the entire population of an area. As was seen with the case of Ghana in Chapter 2, while resources may be moved to a certain region of a state, this does not guarantee that those who are the worst off in the state will necessarily be those who benefit directly from the aid and policies. As has been suggested earlier in consideration of the Goshutes tribe in Utah, Young posits that groups should have considerable self-determination. It would seem that this type of equality of agency for groups allows them to receive general aid from the state and decide how to disperse it throughout their group. While this may seem ideal, it can lead to greater issues concerning horizontal inequalities and the capabilities of groups would differ significantly, causing significant long-term horizontal inequalities. A more extensive discussion of this will take place later in this chapter.

Exclusion and inclusion: In a theory of differentiated solidarity, as with liberal theories, there must be communication between groups to ensure that everyone is treated equally.

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based on freedom as non-domination as I examined in her example of the Goshutes tribe and the state of Utah. In section 4.2 I will argue that while group mobilization is needed in the reduction of and eventual elimination of horizontal inequalities, the extensive autonomy that Young argues for is inappropriate.
within the realm of politics. Democracy “entails political equality, that all members of the polity are included equally in the decision-making process and have an equal opportunity to influence the outcome” (Young, 2000: 52). This requires that everyone, including members of minority groups, have a chance to have their voices heard and their opinions and concerns discussed. Internal exclusion gives the impression of including all groups in discussion while actually disregarding some groups by either ignoring them, by dismissing them, or by patronizing their statements and expressions (Young, 2000: 55). This leads to the minorities’ “ideas or modes of expression” as being seen as “silly or simple” and thus being discounted by the majority (Young, 2000: 55). Young suggests three tools that can be used when dealing with internal exclusion: greeting, rhetoric, and narrative.

**Greeting:** Internal exclusion happens when one group is unwilling to recognize some other group or groups. Minority groups are often ignored or belittled by the majority in discussions and debates either because the majority is unwilling to acknowledge that the minority has an important point view, or because they are unwilling to acknowledge that the minority exists. However, when the majority officially ‘greets’ a minority group there is an acknowledgement of the group that leads to a kind of obligation that the majority has to listen and take seriously what the minority has to say.

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49 Young is limiting her discussion to political exclusion and putting social and economic exclusion to the side. It seems that she does this because she assumes that, by addressing political exclusion, social and economic exclusion will be dealt with implicitly in the process. However, when considering the discussion on horizontal inequalities from Chapter 2, this method should seem insufficient. While it is important to address political exclusion, and while it may ameliorate some aspects of social and economic exclusion, the focus on political exclusion is unlikely to cope with the issues as well as Young hopes. In addition, it is likely that by not focusing on social and economic exclusion in addition to political exclusion, some of the advancements made in the political sphere will not be able to be maintained.

50 In addition to internal exclusion, external exclusion is also a concern for democratic states. External exclusion, however, is a largely discussed topic in political theory and is therefore also widely recognized and addressed. While it is of concern for Young, I will focus on internal exclusion as it has not been as widely discussed and because it is harder to identify.
By greeting one another, even in the most minimal way, groups announce that they are present and have something to say that has value. At the same time it also forces the second group to acknowledge the first group through their greeting. While this may seem like a very basic gesture, it is nonetheless the starting point for inclusive democratic communication. “Without the moment of greeting...no discussion can take place at all, because the parties refuse to face one another as dialogue partners” (Young, 2000: 61-62).

When individuals are excluded from political discussion the true democratic process is hindered, and consequently it cannot be said that individuals are being treated as equals or even with respect. The discussion that is necessary can only take place when everyone concerned has been acknowledged, when they have been given a chance to voice their opinions, and when they have had a chance to make their arguments to their own satisfaction. Of course, it should not be assumed that a greeting is a sufficient base for an inclusive democratic state.

*Rhetoric:* Another difficulty that individuals often encounter in democratic participation is that their mode of communication is not accepted as legitimate or worth listening to. Traditionally it has been assumed that only unemotional reasoning is appropriate for political discussion, while rhetoric (emotional accounts) has been seen as unproductive and inappropriate. “Rational speech, on this view, the speech to which deliberative democracy should be confined, consists of universalistic, dispassionate, culturally and stylistically neutral arguments that focus the mind on their evidence and logical connection, rather than move the heart or engage the imagination” (Young, 2000: 63). Any speech that elicits an emotional response is thought to harm the democratic
project by blinding people of the facts and allowing their hearts to pull them in whichever direction. This, however, limits the number of individuals able to ‘properly’ participate, and is thus another way of marginalizing individuals who have not had the opportunity to learn a specific type of rational and dispassionate communication. But, according to Young, rhetoric can actually be a very effective tool for minority groups to have their opinions and concerns heard and understood by the majority as it can give the majority a sense of how the minority feels and is affected through emotion, figures of speech and stories. It may not normally be possible for a minority group to have its concerns put on an agenda, but it may be possible through large protests and impassioned speeches to achieve this end. Of course, not all impassioned speeches or protests will get concerns onto an agenda depending on what they are pushing for and whether or not they are respectful of others, nonetheless it is another tool that can be used in the attempt to have the majority acknowledge minority groups.

Of course the reason behind discourse in the political sphere is for the speaker to change the minds of the audience in such a way that they will support her agenda. Young points out that for this purpose rhetoric is a convenient tactic for changing individuals’ judgments. She notes that “the good rhetorician is one who attempts to persuade the listeners by orienting proposals and arguments towards their collective and plural interests and desires, inviting them to transform these in the service of making a judgment together, but also acceding to them as the judges, rather than claiming himself or herself to ‘know’ ” (Young, 2000: 69). This is particularly useful when the audience is presented with several proposals that, for the most part, are very similar. Here there may be no obvious reason for picking one proposal over any other, and so rhetoric becomes a
tool of persuading the audience that one speaker has a better proposal than the others, thus changing their decision. There are times when a good rhetorician can convince an audience to pick a weak proposal, but it should not be assumed that this is always the case. More often it is the case that an audience dismisses a speaker for being a good rhetorician even when she has a good proposal. Often groups “dismiss those who do not express themselves in the ‘proper’ accent or grammatical structure, or who display wild and funny signs instead of written letters to the editor” (Young, 2000: 70). Not only does this mean that the public misses out on proposals that may be beneficial to them, but it also means that they are excluding individuals and groups based on nothing but assumptions. This, however, is not appropriate for the democratic process and so the audience has an obligation to listen to speakers despite the use of rhetoric, just as speakers have an obligation to speak in such a way that others can understand them and in such a way that is respectful of everyone.

**Narrative:** The third mode of communication that Young proposes is narrative. At times groups are internally excluded because others do not understand their history, experiences, or values and so cannot relate to them. Here we can once again encounter the problem of listening to different groups, but not understanding what they are saying. Young notes that “too often in such situations the assumptions, experiences, and values of some members of the polity dominate the discourse and that of others is misunderstood, devalued, or reconstructed to fit the dominant paradigms” (Young, 2000: 71). She goes on to suggest that narrative is a way of overcoming this, as it allows one group to explain where they are coming from and at the same time allows other groups to learn about histories and situations that are not their own. Narratives, often taking the
form of testimonies and stories, have become a common way of individuals and groups
getting their point of view across to a larger audience, both in the political and the legal
spheres (Young, 2000: 71). It is possible for narrative to have a large impact on the
interaction between individuals and groups because it allows everyone to gain a better
understanding of one another. Young notes that

we must share a description of the problem, share an idiom in which to express
alternative proposals, share rules of evidence and prediction, and share some
normative principles which can serve as premisses in our arguments about what
out to be done. When all these conditions exist, then we can engage in reasonable
disagreement. (Young, 2000: 72)

Presently we find that this is often, though not always, the case.

Through narrative, the preconceived assumptions can be dispelled once the
assuming group learns more about the other groups. As is found with the other forms of
communication that Young proposes for advancing inclusive democracies, narrative is
not always successful in accomplishing inclusion, nonetheless it is a useful method for
trying to expand the knowledge and understanding of a society, thereby lessening the
likelihood of internal exclusion.

While these three modes of communication (greeting, rhetoric, and narrative) will
not bring an end to internal exclusion in the democratic sphere, they are necessary. It
should also be noted that these three modes of communication can also be used against an
inclusive political system. In such cases, however, it is important to remember that it is
not the modes of communication themselves that lead to the misuse, but rather the
structure of the society which is already in place. Nonetheless, without these forms of
open communication an inclusive democracy is even less likely, and so they should not
be ruled out as tools to be used both by the majority and by minority groups. Different
groups have different communication capacities and this must be acknowledged so that
groups can work together in such a way that we can establish a properly functioning
democratic society – this is one of the first, and necessary, steps.

The willingness, or rather unwillingness, for groups to recognize other groups in
the political sphere has a significant effect on horizontal inequalities. Without the
recognition of minorities the inequalities that they face cannot be addressed. There is here
a circularity that is present with recognition: when horizontal inequalities affect education,
and political pull, minorities are unlikely to be able to communicate in a manner that is
found acceptable by the majority, and when the minorities are unable to adequately
partake in political discussions, these horizontal inequalities can be perpetuated. It is for
this reason that Young’s theory of differentiated solidarity, focusing specifically on her
modes of inter-group communication, is significant in putting forward policies and
theories aimed at eliminating horizontal inequalities.

4.2 Present Difficulties

Through her work on differentiated solidarity and minorities (marginalized
groups) it is clear that Young addresses horizontal inequalities in a significant way. One
of the large challenges concerning these inequalities, as pointed out in Chapter 2, is the
necessary recognition of minorities and of the horizontal inequalities that they face.
Young has proposed a theory that focuses on the redistribution of resources, rather than
redistribution of individuals, which means that individuals can remain their groups and
desired locations while still having programs and resources made available to them. In
addition, her theory also calls for the equal treatment of groups regardless of the history
that they share with the state. This equal treatment across the board differs from Kymlicka's theory, as presented in Chapter 3, where groups are afforded different rights based on their history with the state. This means that, unlike Kymlicka who has proposed that national minorities have a claim or a right to X and ethnic minorities have a claim or a right to Y, Young has proposes that rights that are given to one minority group should be given to all minority groups. In this way, when a certain horizontal inequality is tackled, it is tackled for all groups that find themselves in a certain type of situation. With respect to the language recognition issue faced by Kymlicka, when using Young's approach it is not possible to have one group allowed language rights while others are denied them, or, less harshly, not have their language rights actively supported by the state. The problem that arises with this type of equality is that it ignores the historical circumstances that have led to the present inequalities and thus dismisses that there are different reasons behind policies and programs concerning different minorities. While on the surface this may appear to be a great method of treating all minorities equally within a state, it overlooks the important differences found between them and can potentially ignore their specific claims. The inequalities felt by ethnic minorities in Canada are significantly different than the inequalities felt by the Québécois, and so it seems that it would be unfair to treat the groups in the same manner, not only because the equal treatment would most likely lead to significantly different results, but also because history is important to all groups, and so, without a recognition of that history, it is hard to argue that all groups are in fact being treated equally.

If the aim of states should be eliminating horizontal inequalities through policies and programs directed specifically at minorities, then it is necessary to consider whether
Young's differentiated solidarity adequately meets this goal. As has been previously discussed, Young's differentiated solidarity calls for some form of self-determination or freedom from domination for minorities. Initially it appears that group self-determination leads to the elimination of horizontal inequalities because it gives groups the equal ability to make decisions and direct policies and programs that concern them. However, because groups are left considerably to their own devices, groups can give priority to one aspect of life, dismissing another, and thereby jeopardizing aspects of their well-being. Take, for example, a minority that values their culture to such an extent that they prioritize its maintenance while viewing employment and healthcare as secondary concerns. By focusing to such a degree on culture that employment and healthcare are largely forgotten, the group begins to threaten its own well-being. When we consider Young's conception of self-determination as freedom from non-domination we realize that all it entails is that there can be no arbitrary interference. This emphasis on group liberty has no direct connection with the freedom to live well and so it should not be relied on to address horizontal inequalities. Therefore, while at first Young seems to have a theory which addresses horizontal inequalities in a way that Kymlicka neglects, it turns out that her theory is not capable of addressing them in a meaningful way.

I have just argued that the self-determination that Young proposes minorities should be afforded does not positively affect horizontal inequalities and that it may in fact worsen them. Having argued this, it is not that all group self-determination is bad, only that it cannot succeed in eliminating these types of inequalities. I propose instead that what is needed is group mobilization in which groups cooperate with states to tackle all types of horizontal inequalities. If we take development literature, and understand 'non-
elite’ as ‘minority’ and ‘development’ and ‘the elimination of horizontal inequalities’ it can be seen that not only is group mobilization, and thus participation, beneficial, but they are also necessary.

While it is true that states often implement policies and programs to eliminate some inequalities (as seen in Chapter 2), it is not the case that their action alone is necessarily sufficient or even that it is beneficial in the long run. Denis Goulet argues that this is because “elite groups, governmental and other, usually seek to gain some measure of social control over the processes and the participating agents” (Goulet, 1995: 93). He proposes that what is needed is some form of bottom-up participation where non-elites mobilize and play active roles in the decision-making process concerning development projects that affect them (Goulet, 1995: 93-94). Mobilization, Goulet argues, tends to happen due to present crises, but this type of momentum can only be maintained if groups organize so that their participation can be maintained and their concerns can remain in the spotlight (Goulet, 1995: 94).

If it is the non-elite (minority) who knows best when they are experiencing a crisis (horizontal inequalities) then it makes sense that they would mobilize in order to makes others (the state and the majority) aware of their situation. Their mobilizing, however, is unlikely to be able to accomplish much without the support of others (generally the state, though third-party agents can also participate) and so some kind of cooperation is needed. David A. Crocker proposes seven levels of cooperation that can be

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51 He also argues that third-party agents can play a similar role to non-elites in group mobilization, especially in cases where the non-elites are not in a position to mobilize themselves. “Such change agents,” he argues, “usually adhere to ideologies which consider self-reliance in poor people to be a desirable goal” and thus are unlike top-down mobilization (state initiated mobilization) because their goals are not oriented around long-term profits (Goulet, 1995: 94).
found between groups and the state. From weakest participation to strongest participation, they are:

1) Nominal participation – non-elites passively participate insofar as they are a member of the group, but they take no real action

2) Passive participation – non-elites attend meetings and discussions, but merely listen to the elites, not voicing their opinions or concerns

3) Consultative participation – non-elites give their opinion to the elites, but do not discuss the options, nor do they play any role in decision making

4) Petitionary participation – non-elites petition the elite to take certain action though the decision-making process is still up to the elites

5) Participatory implementation – elites establish the goals and main means of the project, but it is the non-elites who implement the goals and to some degree decide what means to use

6) Bargaining – non-elites bargain with elites as adversaries in the hopes of establishing some kind of deal where both parties give-and-take

7) Deliberative participation – non-elites deliberate among themselves, and sometimes with elites, to decide of proposals for policies and programs that the majority is likely to accept (Crocker, 2008: 343-344)

It is through the last five types of cooperation that I propose that group mobilization in cooperation with states can help eliminate horizontal inequalities. This type of group mobilization and cooperation does not limit itself either to political inequalities, as found in Young’s work, or to cultural inequalities, as found in Kymlicka’s
work. Instead, group mobilization is open to action in all situations where horizontal inequalities persist. Of course, just as group mobilization is necessary for horizontal inequalities to be brought to light and for initiatives to be maintained, state cooperation is also necessary as it is the state that most often has the resources and power to implement the initiatives aimed at eliminating these inequalities; without this type of support any advancements are unlikely to occur, and if they do, they are unlikely to be maintained.

Though I have just argued that Young's self-determination is not sufficient for the elimination of inequalities, it should not be assumed that self-determination for minorities is necessarily a negative so long as it arises from group-state cooperation. When states and groups cooperate it allows for the amelioration of the circumstances that minorities find themselves in, and this allows them to gain such things as increased political power, increased economic power, higher levels of education, better healthcare, etc. and with such advancements comes greater ability to determine what happens to their group. For this reason it can be seen that group self-determination can arise from group-state cooperation, but it should not be thought that it is able to address horizontal inequalities on its own.

4.3 Conclusion

Young has proposed a theory for ensuring that minorities within a state are treated as equals through two main approaches: group self-determination through non-dominance and differentiated solidarity, the reinforcement of group affinity and separateness in addition to group cooperation. By proposing a system that is set up in such a manner, it appears that Young can avoid the difficulty of addressing certain
horizontal inequalities felt by one minority and different inequalities felt by another that is discussed in Chapter 3 concerning Kymlicka’s theory. While this appears to be an advantageous approach, as all groups are thought to have the same freedom to ameliorate their circumstance in society with only general help from the state, it turns out that this self-determination does not actually address horizontal inequalities directly and therefore may neglect or even increase them. Additionally, this approach downplays the history between individual minorities and the state. By doing this Young dismisses the variety of claims that minorities make on states and so cannot actively ensure meaningful equal results. (This is a case where unequal treatment is more apt to produce equal results.) It is therefore not appropriate to rely on group self-determination and differentiated solidarity to alleviate the horizontal inequalities that are experienced by minorities. Instead, I have argued, group mobilization in tandem with group-state cooperation is necessary if horizontal inequalities are to be addressed sufficiently. This type of cooperation allows minorities to identify the inequalities that they are experiencing, propose policies and programs that aim at their elimination, and ensures that the state plays an active role while not giving them the ability to override or ignore the minority.
Chapter 5
Expanding Liberal Multiculturalism, Horizontal Inequalities and Group Mobilization

Will Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism, as found in *Multicultural Citizenship*, was discussed in Chapter 3. His theory considers the difficulties felt by national and ethnic minorities in multicultural states and, at least explicitly, addresses the horizontal inequalities that they face. While his theory is thorough and considers many aspects of multicultural states, it nonetheless has some limitations that must be considered if our aim is to eliminate inequalities within these states. The main limitations that were brought forth were: 1) Kymlicka’s dichotomy of minorities which dismisses numerous other groups and thus limits the horizontal inequalities that can be addressed; 2) there is an acknowledgement of horizontal inequalities between minorities and the majority, but the horizontal inequalities that exist between minorities seems to be ignored; 3) insofar as cultural and political inequalities are addressed while social and economic inequalities are downplayed, the circumstances that minorities find themselves in cannot be properly addressed or ameliorated. These limitations were found in examining *Multicultural Citizenship*, some of his earliest work on multiculturalism and so, as should be expected, he has expanded upon his theory. Therefore, for a comprehensive consideration of his theory of multiculturalism, Kymlicka’s recent work must also be taken into consideration. I will begin by outlining what the expansion of his work entails, focusing specifically on the difference between traditional and liberal multiculturalism, focusing on the importance of understanding multiculturalism as being based on group differentiation rather than being based on state differentiation, and finally focusing on the expansion of Kymlicka’s categories of minorities and the rights that follow from these
categories. Following this, I will consider the ways in which Kymlicka is able to avoid the problems that Young experiences with group self-determination. While the expansion of his work does address some of the limitations brought forward in Chapter 3, I will argue that there remain at least two limitations. First, there remains an emphasis on cultural and political inequalities which downplays the need to address economic and social inequalities. Second, Kymlicka’s theory does not mention the need or importance of group mobilization in the elimination of horizontal inequalities, something that I suggest is necessary if any achieved amelioration is to be maintained.

5.1 Expanding a Theory of Multiculturalism

In this section I will consider the evolution of Kymlicka’s multiculturalism, focusing specifically on traditional versus liberal multiculturalism, group differentiation, the expansion of minority categories, and their effects on horizontal inequalities.

*Traditional and liberal multiculturalism:* Multiculturalism is sometimes thought to be a threat to liberal democracies. Because of this perception, some argue that in order to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals, multicultural policies are unacceptable. While there is some justification for this worry, it should not be assumed that *all* types of multiculturalism threaten our liberal values. We have good reason to be apprehensive in respect to ‘traditional multiculturalism’, however not with respect to ‘liberal multiculturalism’. Traditional multiculturalism aims to protect ‘traditional’ cultures in such a way that they become immune to the expectations and requirements of the dominant society concerning human rights and individual autonomy. It relies on
arguments that allow groups (not the members) the freedom and power to maintain aspects of their cultural practices despite the wishes, freedoms, and rights of members. By relying on multicultural arguments, many believe that minorities can claim a deep connection with their traditions to the point that, if these traditions were to change, the culture would no longer 'exist'. Specifically, traditionalist multiculturalism tends to interpret 'culture' "in terms of (or reduced to) a set of discrete practices, preferably 'traditional' and 'authentic' practices" (Kymlicka, 2007: 99). This means that when multiculturalism is called upon to 'protect' minority cultures, the goal is to ensure that there will be no change in the culture since the culture is seen as "essential to the group's identity, and hence to the identity of individual members" (Kymlicka, 2007: 99). If policies of multiculturalism are established on the principles of traditionalist multiculturalism, then there is a great threat to democratic states, as this would allow minorities the power to prevent liberal ideals from entering minority group mentalities, and would prevent minority members from adopting certain practices of the dominant culture. In addition, such policies could lead to the maintenance of horizontal inequalities, if not their exacerbation.

Kymlicka argues that, while traditional multiculturalism is often considered in academia, it is not the form of multiculturalism that is practiced in liberal-democratic states (Kymlicka, 2007: 98). Instead of promoting policies that protect the traditional cultures of minorities, liberal based multiculturalism aims to change cultures in such a way that policies become more inclusive, while still allowing members to maintain aspects of their culture. Kymlicka explains that

the liberal view of multiculturalism is inevitably, intentionally, and unapologetically transformational of people’s cultural traditions. It demands
both dominant and historically subordinated groups to engage in new practices, to enter new relationships, and to embrace new concepts and discourses, all of which profoundly transform people’s identities and practices. (Kymlicka, 2007: 99)

Not only does liberal multiculturalism require an evolution of cultures, it seems to follow the *natural progression* of cultures. It is rarely the case that a culture naturally stays the same throughout history. Rather, a culture changes in accordance with new ideas and innovations from within, in addition to changing based on new ideas and innovations that are encountered through foreign cultures. This would suggest that, not only is traditional multiculturalism not actually practiced, it is likewise not possible for it to exist without the artificial force of traditionalist leaders stunting its natural growth. In this way it is important to recognize that Kymlicka is only promoting one type of multiculturalism, namely *liberal* multiculturalism. This multiculturalism can coexist with liberal democratic states, and is the multiculturalism that naturally forms and is supported by individuals.

Wherever multiculturalism has been adopted and implemented within the West, it is a distinctly liberal model of multiculturalism, supported because and insofar as it is seen as consistent with, and indeed enhancing of, liberal-democratic values and human rights ideals. Where that link is not perceived, either in relation to multiculturalism generally or in relation to the claims of a particular minority group, public support for multiculturalism drops. (Kymlicka, 2007: 108)

Horizontal inequalities cannot be ameliorated when policies are based on traditional multiculturalism, as this is likely to reinforce present inequalities such as caste systems, inequalities among men and women, and what jobs and education levels are ‘appropriate’ for the group. This, however, is not an issue when we recognize that not only is Kymlicka discussing liberal multiculturalism, but also that policies based on traditional
multiculturalism are not implemented by Western democracies. Because of the natural opening of communication and interaction created by liberal multiculturalism, horizontal inequalities can be better addressed as well. As seen with the example of Ghana in Chapter 2, there must be an explicit recognition of groups, their history and their needs. While a state may put general policies in place to address present individual inequalities, this is not sufficient, because individuals have a deep connection with, and are greatly affected by, the group towards which they have an affinity.

*Group differentiation:* Liberal multiculturalism can be approached in two different ways: focusing either on group differentiation or on state differentiation. The type of group differentiated multiculturalism that Kymlicka proposes is the most widely advanced theory and therefore will be my focus. (The main proponent of state differentiated multiculturalism is Michael Walzer.) In reality very few theorists stand on one side or the other of the line between group differentiated multiculturalism and state differentiated multiculturalism. While acknowledging that there is often a kind of hybrid between the two approaches, Kymlicka proposes that group differentiated multiculturalism is the more

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52 While states do not implement policies based on traditional multiculturalism, it nonetheless exists in certain communities throughout Western states. Some religious and ethnic minorities pressure their members to remain true to their practices in the hopes of ensuring their continued existence (e.g., Orthodox Judaism, the Amish, fundamentalist Muslims, etc.)

53 It should be noted that when I discuss 'group differentiation' in this chapter I am not referring to Young's group differentiation as discussed in Chapter 4.

54 While Kymlicka looks at multicultural claims based on different groups belonging to a single state, Walzer looks at multicultural claims based on different types of states. Therefore, instead of having a state that recognizes a majority group along with ethnic minority groups and national minority groups, Walzer sees states as recognizing either a majority group and national minority group or a majority group and an ethnic minority group. In this way there are national states, the former, and ethnic states, the latter. When multiculturalism is structured in this way the claims made by ethnic groups are not recognized in national states, and likewise, claims made by national groups are not recognized in ethnic states. These types of states are largely divided based on if they are part of the 'Old World' (i.e., states comprised of several nationalities brought together either by force or agreement), or if they are part of the 'New World' (i.e., states comprised mainly of migrants who have chosen to move to the state) (Walzer, 1982; 1983).
likely to arise from current policies based on three somewhat implicit assumptions. The first is the “assumption of intrastate deep diversity in claims-making” (Kymlicka, 2009: 375). In almost all states there are different types of groups who seek different types of rights from the state - it would be unreasonable to expect an immigrant from China to expect the same types of rights as a Quebecois. Kymlicka refers to Charles Taylor for an explanation of deep diversity. Taylor writes that

> to build a country for everyone, Canada would have to allow for second-level or “deep” diversity, in which a plurality of ways of belonging would be acknowledged or accepted. Someone of, say, Italian extraction in Toronto or Ukrainian extraction in Edmonton might indeed feel Canadian as a bearer of individual rights in a multicultural mosaic. His or her belonging would not “pass through” some other community, although the ethnic identity might be important to him or her in various ways. But this person might nevertheless accept that a Quebecois or a Cree or a Dene might belong in a very different way, that these persons were Canadian through being members of their national communities. Reciprocally, the Quebecois, Cree or Dene would accept the perfect legitimacy of the “mosaic” identity. (Taylor: 2001: 75-76)

While this example refers only to Canada and the relationships among its citizens, the same conditions can easily be imagined in many other Western state that consist of a dominant group and any combination of different national, ethnic, and religious minorities.

The second is “the assumption of cross-national consistency in claims-making” (Kymlicka, 2009: 375). It is argued that the claims that a type of group (e.g. a national minority) makes is consistent with the claims made by the same type of group (e.g. another national minority) in a different location so long as they are “free to express their identities and aspirations” (Kymlicka, 2009: 375). If this assumption proves itself true, then it suggests that if the Quebecois seek language rights in Canada, then so will the Catalonians and Basque in Spain, the Welsh and Scottish in Britain, any all other national
minorities within different states. This same phenomenon of like claims being made is also found among immigrant groups in different democratic states throughout the West.

Kymlicka explains that

> in any free and democratic society, we should expect to find that indigenous peoples and national minorities seek to belong to the state in a different way from immigrant and refugee groups, with the former seeking forms of territorial autonomy, language rights, and institutional completeness not sought by the immigrant groups. (Kymlicka, 2010: 375)

If this phenomenon is found throughout the Western world (which it is) then it should be clear that merely accepting claims by different minority groups based on the type of state they belong to is not sufficient. Instead, claims should be considered based on the group itself, leading to several different types of claims within a single state.\[^{55}\]

The third is “the assumption of uniformity in normative criteria” (Kymlicka, 2009: 376). This assumes that the reasoning behind the evaluation of claims made by national minorities should be the same reasoning behind the evaluation of claims made by ethnic minorities. In this way, a state cannot be seen as favouring national minorities over ethnic minorities, nor vice versa.\[^{56}\] The idea is that there are “‘nationally anonymous’ liberal-democratic criteria, rather than nationally-specific narratives or self-understandings”, so that all claims are considered on their own grounds and not the grounds of which groups pose the greatest threat to the state (Kymlicka, 2009: 375).

If these three assumptions are already held by liberalism (and Kymlicka proposes that they are), then liberal multiculturalism is based on group differentiation and not on

\[^{55}\] It should be noted that this is not a claim of how things ought to be in Western states, but rather how things are at present. This, of course, does not mean that this is necessarily the best way for minorities to make claims, but it should be taken into consideration and application for practical reasons.

\[^{56}\] As mentioned previously, Walzer makes the distinction between 'Old World' states and 'New World' states. This distinction is based on how the state came to be - either through a coerced, or voluntary, coalition ('Old World') or through the familial, or individual, migration to a new state ('New World') (Walzer, 1982: 1-11).
state differentiation. In addition, because group differentiation acknowledges the different types of groups within a state, this formulation of multiculturalism is more likely to address horizontal inequalities. As noted in Chapter 3, one issue concerning Kymlicka’s theory is that he does not explicitly acknowledge all the possible minorities that may be found within states, and so his theory is not able to address all the possible horizontal inequalities. Walzer’s nation differentiated multiculturalism falls prey to this issue to an even greater extent. By explicitly emphasizing the importance of groups, Kymlicka opens his theory up to addressing these inequalities in a considerable way.

The expansion of minority categories: When considering horizontal inequalities, one of the most important aspects of Kymlicka’s recent work is his expansion of minority categories and the elaboration of claims that are made by these groups. As discussed in Chapter 3, Kymlicka originally divided minorities into national and ethnic minorities, giving only a very general idea of what rights these groups should be afforded. This, unfortunately, left many groups explicitly unacknowledged, and therefore unable to make claims against their states. This has been changed, however, through the expansion of categories to national minorities, ethnic minorities and, the new category, indigenous minorities. While there are still other minorities that have yet to be explicitly recognized, they are implicitly recognized within these categories, as will be demonstrated below.

While Kymlicka still refers to ‘national minorities’, he had divided this category into subcategories with a distinction made between ‘subnational minorities’ and ‘indigenous minorities’. This distinction is important because of the different ways by which these minorities were incorporated into the dominant state, and the different claims...
made by the groups on the state. There are several ways in which subnational minorities may have been incorporated into a larger state, including having been “conquered or annexed by a larger state or empire in the past; ceded from one empire to another; or united with another kingdom through a royal marriage [or through a] more or less voluntary agreement between two or more national groups to form a mutually beneficial federation” (Kymlicka, 2002: 349). In the past, subnational minorities have been encouraged, often forcibly, to assimilate into the dominant society, as it was thought that, by virtue of having been incorporated into a larger state, these nations would be ‘disloyal’, and thus threaten the stability of the state. Part of the reasoning was that subnational minorities had once had the opportunity to be the dominant nation in a state, but had, as it were, lost the battle. Based on the common history found among subnational minorities, the most common cultural and political claims and protections made against states are:

1) federal or quasi-federal territorial autonomy  
2) official language status, either in the region or nationally  
3) guarantees of representation in the central government and/or on constitutional courts  
4) public funding for minority language universities, schools, and the media  
5) constitutional or parliamentary affirmation of state multi-nationalism  
6) accorded an international personality (for example, allowing the sub-state to sit on international bodies, or sign treaties, or have their own Olympic team)  
(Kymlicka, 2010: 101)

It is through these types of claims that subnational minorities are officially recognized by states and afforded some of the rights that were once stripped from them.\(^{57}\) Because rights concerning language, autonomy, representation, etc. are so crucial in ameliorating horizontal inequalities, I argue that these types of policies are required if a multinational

\(^{57}\) In Chapter 3 it was argued that Kymlicka limits himself to cultural and political inequalities and overlooks the social and economic inequalities that minorities experience. This same problem can be seen here.
state is to establish equality between all its citizens.

While indigenous minorities also fall under the larger category of ‘national minority,’ they have unmistakably different claims based on their incorporation into the state and the history that follows. Kymlicka describes indigenous people as “peoples whose traditional lands have been overrun by settlers, and who have been forcibly, or through treaties, incorporated into states run by people they regard as foreigners” (Kymlicka, 2002: 349). While many subnational minorities wish to reestablish, to one extent or another, their own nations within the state, indigenous minorities more often push toward maintaining certain aspects of their traditional way of life and practices (e.g. traditional hunting groups and methods, burial rituals, etc.). The nine most common cultural and political policies put in place to protect indigenous minorities and the claims made by them are:

1) recognition of land rights and titles
2) recognition of self-government rights
3) upholding historic treaties and/or signing new treaties
4) recognition of cultural rights (language; hunting and fishing, sacred sites)
5) recognition of customary laws
6) guarantee of representation and consultation in the central government
7) constitutional or legislative affirmation of the distinct status of indigenous peoples
8) support and ratification for international instruments on indigenous rights
9) affirmative action (Kymlicka, 2010: 101)

One of the most important differences between subnational and indigenous minorities is the claim of land rights. While subnational minorities are usually concentrated in a territory, it was often not their ‘traditional’ territory (i.e., they have annexed it from an indigenous minority in the past), while indigenous minorities inhabit the same territory as they did before they were incorporated into the larger state and before any other group settled the land. Once again these types of rights are critical in the amelioration of
horizontal inequalities between indigenous minorities and the majority. However, these rights are also critical in eliminating the inequalities between these minorities and others as can be seen in rights such as right 6 and right 9 (along with many others). Having said this, it is unclear that these nine policies are sufficient for the reduction of horizontal inequalities. Indigenous minorities tend to lag behind all other groups in development and therefore do not only experience severe cultural and political inequalities, but also experience substantial social and economic inequalities such as low levels of education and poor healthcare systems. These inequalities must be addressed in addition to those already proposed.

As seen in Chapter 3, in Kymlicka’s earlier work ‘ethnic minorities’ were categorized as immigrants who willingly and legally moved to a new state with the intention of becoming citizens. While this, to a great extent, is still his official stance on ethnic minorities, he now implicitly recognizes that this category is in fact comprised of several different subcategories, but who nevertheless are all accorded the same rights by virtue of making similar claims. These groups include immigrants, ethno-religious minorities, metics58, and refugees. While the rights are technically based on the claims made by immigrant groups, they can protect these subgroups as well, though some groups, such as ethno-religious minorities, may also push for additional rights or exemptions from certain norms found within the dominant society. Based on the incorporation of these groups and their history with states, there are eight common

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58 Metics are those individuals who enter a state “as refugees seeking temporary protections or as ‘guest-workers’, such as Turks in Germany. When they enter a country, these people were not conceived of as future citizens, or even as long-term residents, and indeed they would not have been allowed to enter in the first place if they were seen as permanent residents or future citizens. However, despite the official rules, they have settled more or less permanently...[they are] long-term residents who are nonetheless excluded from the polis” (Kymlicka, 2002: 357).
cultural and political policies which are made to accommodate the claims made by these groups:

1) constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at central, regional and municipal levels
2) the adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum
3) the inclusion of ethnic representation and sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing
4) exemptions from dress codes, Sunday-closing legislation and so on (either by statute or by court cases)
5) allowed dual citizenship
6) the funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities
7) the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction
8) affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups (Kymlicka, 2010: 101)

As stated in Chapter 3, it is not the aim of ethnic minorities to create their own states within the larger state, but rather to be afforded recognition of their distinctness within the larger state, as well as acknowledgement of their possible contributions. These policies aid ethnic minorities in their ability to enhance their position in society, bringing them closer not only to the majority, but also to other minorities. This is especially true when considering right 7 (the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction) proposed for ethnic minorities, right 4 (recognition of cultural rights) for indigenous minorities and right 2 (official language status, either in the region or nationally) for national minorities. This directly addresses one of the concerns I brought up against Kymlicka’s theory in Chapter 3, namely that of implementing policies that address the inequalities found between one minority and the majority, but not the

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59 Isolationist ethno-religious minorities are still a special case, as they often do not wish to join the dominant society, fearing that their traditional way of life will be corrupted. “These groups seek exemption from various laws. For example, they demand exemption from military service or jury duty, since these would implicate them in the operation of worldly governments” (Kymlicka, 2002: 355). They also often demand education exemptions, giving them to right to withdraw their children from state run schools before the legal age of 16. The difficulty with these groups is that they are, more often than not, organized in an illiberal manner. However, since these groups were often encouraged to immigrate to the state in order to inhabit previously vacant land, or the traditional land of indigenous groups, they have been allowed to maintain their traditional practices (Kymlicka, 2002: 355-357).
inequalities that are found between different minorities. Unfortunately this does not address my concern of Kymlicka’s focus. Despite the expansion of minority categories and the more explicit list of policies that are often implemented, he still focuses on cultural and political inequalities that are present in multicultural states. While this is a good start, it is nonetheless insufficient. It may be assumed that, through the trickle down effect, social and economic inequalities will be dealt with, but this is not necessarily the case and so should not be relied upon.

Despite having expanded his minority categories to include groups previously left out, African Americans remain outside of the categories and claims outlined by Kymlicka. He remarks that

African-Americans are unlike other ethnocultural groups in the West. They do not fit the voluntary immigrant pattern not only because they were brought to America involuntarily as slaves, but also because they were prevented (rather than encouraged) from integrating into the institutions of the majority culture (through racial segregation, and laws against miscegenation and the teaching of literacy). Nor do they fit the national minority pattern, since they do not have a homeland in America or a common historical language. They came from a variety of African cultures, with different languages, and no attempt was made to keep together those with a common ethnic background. On the contrary, people from the same culture (even from the same family) were typically split up once in America. Moreover, before emancipation, they were legally prohibited from trying to recreate their own cultural structures (e.g. all forms of black association, except churches, were illegal). The situation of African-Americans, therefore, is virtually unique. (Kymlicka, 2002: 360)

Because of their unique history, it is clear that policies relating to national minorities, indigenous minorities and ethnic minorities are not appropriate for African-Americans. Establishing this fourth category of policies, however, is not a simple task because of the long history of discrimination. There are, nonetheless, a variety of suggestions made by Kymlicka that are also largely put into practice today. These policies range from aiming towards historical compensation for past injustices to special assistance in integration and
guaranteed political representation, to support for various forms of black self-organization (Kymlicka, 2002: 361). While these policies are similar to some of the policies concerning national and ethnic minorities, it is clear that they are still unique and aim towards a different end.

Kymlicka has greatly expanded on his liberal multiculturalism. It is now clear that multiculturalism does not come into conflict with liberal democratic practices in the West, as it aims not at cultural stagnation, but instead aims towards evolving cultures to be more accepting of one another, progressive in their ideas about others and more inclusive in their practices. He has also gone on to show why groups should be differentiated, because of the claims that are made on the state by these groups, rather than differentiating states based on the type of minorities that are found within their boarders (i.e. states being categories as only multi-national or multi-ethnic, but not both). From this it follows that he has expanded the categories of minority groups who are afforded the right based on the claims they make against states, going from national and ethnic minorities to national, indigenous and ethnic minorities. It is through such expansions that Kymlicka has made his theory of liberal multiculturalism more inclusive and explicitly concerned with the horizontal inequalities found between minorities, an element that had previously been lacking.

5.2 Present Difficulties

It seems that Kymlicka’s recent work is better able to address some of the issues that were brought forward in Chapters 3 and 4. For instance, by explicitly emphasizing the cultural and political policies that are concerned with national, indigenous and ethnic
minorities, Kymlicka can avoid addressing the horizontal inequalities between a specific minority and the majority while downplaying that these same inequalities exist between different minorities.

Despite this advancement in his work, Kymlicka still focuses almost exclusively on cultural and political inequalities, ignoring the all too important social and economic inequalities. As I noted in Chapters 2 and 3, and in the previous section, addressing some inequalities while neglecting others is unlikely to sufficiently ameliorate the circumstances in which minorities often find themselves. While it is often the liberal assumption that addressing political inequalities will solve social and economic inequalities through the trickle down effect, this is not necessarily the case. While multicultural policies are implemented with the best of intentions, they are not always successful, sometimes due to the attitudes of the minorities, sometime due to the attitudes of the majority and other times because of environment or timing of their implementation. At other times, multicultural policies concerning politics are merely tokens meant to give the impression that the state is addressing the issues faced by the minority of residents within the country. Either way, we should not assume that by addressing cultural and political inequalities, all inequalities will be rectified.

Kymlicka avoids some of the difficulties encountered in Young’s work by not arguing for the same type of group self-determination. Young’s approach seems to address horizontal inequalities by ensuring that minorities are equal in their ability to make decisions, but it turns out that this does not necessarily lead to the alleviation of horizontal inequalities. Instead of arguing that all minorities should be treated in the exact same manner, Kymlicka has established a theory that addresses the historically caused
difficulties felt by minorities. By doing this he can more easily recognize the horizontal inequalities that are present and address them in such a way that their remedies are consistent throughout a society. By having an approach to these inequalities the circumstances of all groups can be ameliorated in such a way that they will begin to have more cultural, political, social and economic pull. While this may not lead to the type of autonomy that Young proposes is necessary, it will help minorities to become more effective in decision-making process and implementation of policy and program that concern them. It would seem that this type of power is just as useful as, and more effective than the type of group self-determination discussed in Chapter 4.

One significant aspect that is missing from Kymlicka's theory is the role that group mobilization plays in the reduction and eventual elimination of horizontal inequalities and the need for group/state cooperation. It seems that in his theory there is no explicitly active participation by minorities except for perhaps making claims on the state concerning culture and politics. This, however, leaves minorities out of the decision-making process and so gives them very little control over what happens to them. In this way it almost seems as though the state is being generous, rather than doing what is right, and is saying: 'There, there, of course you are equals, but here, let us make all the decisions for you.' This hardly seems to entail equality or actual respect. The participation that arises through group mobilization does not necessarily entail that minorities will play active roles in decision making, as seen in the list of the different types of participation given in Chapter 4, but it does increase the potential. If groups actively participate, they are more likely to affect the policies and programs that are implemented by the state that concern them. They will also have a better chance of
ensuring that all inequalities are taken into consideration and not just cultural and political inequalities. Take for example a community where there are severe special and economic inequalities, along with political inequalities, between the majority and a minority. Before the minority mobilizes, the local government acknowledges that political changes must be made in order for the minority to be fully represented in the local government. In order to ensure this type of representation, two political positions are designated ‘minority’ positions. Even when these positions are filled, however, little changes for the minority community. This is because the minority politicians do not have the education necessary to effectively communicate with other politicians, nor do they have the economic pull needed to make significant changes in the local political community. It is not until the minority mobilizes through petitioning that education concerns are adequately dealt with in the community. The minority community also comes together to discuss the difficulties in running their businesses and (the community) deliberate about what should be done about it. They come up with a list of possible programs, such as establishing micro-loans for businesses that are just starting and apprenticeships in well-established businesses, and they present these proposals to the local government and to the community at large. From here everyone is able to discuss the benefits and disadvantages of all the proposed programs and can decide which will be implemented. In this way inequalities that the majority was not aware of are brought to light, the minority plays an active role in developing solutions and thus are empowered,

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60 Petitionary participation is number four on Crocker’s list of group participation as outlined in Chapter 4. Petitioning does not necessarily guarantee that the minority plays an active role in making decisions, but it does ensure that they can voice their concerns in such a way that is not ignored (Crocker, 2008: 343).

61 Deliberative participation is the most involved type of participation in which a group can partake. The minority deliberates among themselves, or with the majority, to come up possible proposals that are then brought forward to the majority or state and decisions are made about which of the proposals are the most feasible (Crocker, 2008: 343).
and a relationship of cooperation, and mutual respect, is established between the minority and the majority. Even with the local government’s attempt at eliminating political inequalities in this example, the social and economic inequalities that are the causes of the political inequalities are not being dealt with. It is not until the minority actively participates and all relevant inequalities are dealt with that actual equality can be achieved. Without this aspect it is hard to see how Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism is able to adequately affect the circumstances in which minorities find themselves.

5.3 Conclusion

In his more recent work Kymlicka has expanded on his theory of liberal multicultural as put forward in *Multicultural Citizenship*. Through 1) an explanation of how liberal multiculturalism does not threaten democratic states, 2) an argument for multiculturalism based on group differentiation rather than state differentiation, and 3) an expansion of minority categories and the rights afforded them, Kymlicka’s theory now addresses some of the concerns relating to horizontal inequalities that had not been adequately addressed in his earlier work. This expansion has allowed for an amelioration of, and perhaps even the eventual elimination of, horizontal inequalities both between minorities and the majority, but also between different minorities. The most explicit example of this is found in the new possible policies afforded to the different types of minorities that address language recognition and usage within the state. While the method of dealing with minority languages within the state vary based on which group is being considered, the end result is nonetheless similar and allows for all minorities to attain similar abilities in language usage.
While considerable work has been done to better ensure that cultural and political inequalities between the majority and a minority, and between different minorities, are addressed in a significant manner, there is still a lack of acknowledgement of the role that social and economic inequalities play in the lives of minorities. If these types of inequalities are not addressed as well, then it is not possible for all horizontal inequalities that exist within a state to be addressed, and so the circumstances that minorities find themselves in are unlikely to be changed in the long term.

Another area in which Kymlicka makes some advancement is in how he proposes that equality-centered policies and programs should be implemented. Where Young proposes that minorities should be given considerable self-determination and so should be able to make their own decisions about policies and programs, Kymlicka proposes that the state should maintain its decision-making role while considering the claims made by minorities. In this way he is able to focus on actual horizontal inequalities while Young’s approach may actually lead to the increase in these inequalities.

I have proposed that what is missing from Kymlicka’s theory is group mobilization and cooperation between minorities and the state. When groups mobilize, inequalities that are not initially recognized by the majority can come to light and can be dealt with. This also allows enables minorities to play active roles in the solutions that are implemented and thus grow their self-respect, agency, and recognition. Group mobilization cannot work on its own, however, and must be joined with group/state cooperation (which I have briefly discussed) and group empowerment (which I have not discussed.) In order to have more extensive understanding of the methods of eliminating horizontal inequalities group empowerment must be considered further, however this
must be left for future research. In the mean time it will have to be sufficient to say that
group empowerment is needed if groups are to mobilize in such a way that they can
establish a partnership with the state in an attempt to eliminate the horizontal inequalities
that they face daily.
Chapter 6
Conclusion

My focus has been threefold: 1) to illuminate the effects that horizontal inequalities have on minorities within multicultural states; 2) to consider what type of theory (integration or cooperative differentiation) is best capable to eliminate those inequalities; and 3) to argue that without some type of group mobilization these inequalities cannot be appropriately addressed. While it is important to address the vertical inequalities that are found within a state, this alone is not sufficient, as it does not explicitly acknowledge the effects of group membership and the long-term effects of group inequality.

I have begun by outlining what horizontal inequalities are, how they affect individuals and groups through examining case studies, and by arguing that they are an integral part of multicultural states that must be recognized and addressed. While states implement policies that are directed at eliminating the inequalities that individuals face, this approach often allows a state to address those whose position is easiest to ameliorate. This is the case with Ghana, as discussed, where the state implemented policies and programs which aided disadvantaged individuals in the South but ignored the disadvantaged in the North (comparatively much worse off than those in the South and therefore also more expensive to aid). By implementing group or region specific policies and programs that allow the position of entire groups to be ameliorated, rather than only implementing general policies and programs that address individuals, we are better equipped to ameliorate the position of the individuals who are the worst off in a state.
Having shown why horizontal inequalities must be taken seriously through case studies, I follow this by considering the possible libertarian argument against the human rights approach to horizontal inequalities. Relying extensively on the libertarian literature written by John Hospers, I have examined the argument that what is most important is liberty and that the state should not be allowed to punish the majority for the hardships felt by minorities through taxes used to implement state policies and programs. (In relation to my work these policies and programs would concern minorities and horizontal inequalities). James Sterba has argued that, even if liberty remains our main concern, we can still argue for a welfare state. If we think of ‘doing nothing’ as interfering with the lives of those who are less privileged, then we have reason to tax individuals at least minimally so that all residents of a state can achieve a certain standard of living. If this is the case, as I believe it is, then there are good reasons to tax the majority and implement policies and programs aimed at eliminating the horizontal inequalities felt by minorities.

In Chapter 3 I considered Will Kymlicka’s multicultural theory of integration as outlined in *Multicultural Citizenship*. He has proposed that minorities should be split into two categories (national and ethnic minorities), with type-specific policies and programs to best address the unique needs of these minorities. Because national and ethnic minorities were not incorporated into a state in the same manner, they should (and do) require different accommodations to ensure just treatment. It would be inappropriate to ask these groups to assimilate into the dominant group; however, it would also be inappropriate for these groups to remain completely distinct from the rest of the state. I have raised three concerns with his theory along with one possible addition. To begin, Kymlicka’s theory hinges on the dichotomy that he has proposed; however, with such a
limited scope it is not possible to acknowledge the other minorities that exist and the inequalities that they experience. Without such an acknowledgement, not all inequalities can be addressed, and equality within the state cannot be attained. The second concern that I have brought forward is that Kymlicka’s theory tends to acknowledge the inequalities that are found between minorities and the majority, but overlooks the inequalities between different minorities. Again, if some inequalities are not acknowledged, then state equality cannot be achieved. Finally, I have argued that Kymlicka’s emphasis on cultural and political inequalities is too restrictive. It may be argued that, if political equality is achieved, then social and economic equality will follow, but I have shown that this is not the case in Chapter 2.

Kymlicka has given three arguments for multicultural rights. I have proposed that there is a fourth – the argument of horizontal inequalities. Some of these inequalities can only be eliminated through multicultural policies and programs. If we are concerned with inequalities, which as proponents of liberal democracies we are, then we must take horizontal inequalities seriously and consider all the means necessary for eliminating them.

Young proposes a theory of cooperative differentiation, which I have discussed in Chapter 4. She has argued that, rather than requiring minorities to integrate, policies of differentiated solidarity should be implemented in states so that groups can have considerable power over their circumstances. Groups should maintain their distinctness and should be given the power to control what happens within their group. The actions and decisions of groups, however, can have considerable effects on other groups, and therefore she asserts that groups must cooperate and that there must be open
communication that allows all affected groups to voice their concerns and play a role in
the decision-making. While Young’s theory (at least taken to the extreme) would grant
groups extensive autonomy, and thereby allow groups to ameliorate the inequalities that
concern them the most, it would not necessarily allow for the long-term amelioration of
horizontal inequalities. I have argue that, by allowing for this extent of autonomy,
Young’s theory is vulnerable to groups focusing on different cultural and social issues
and thereby ignoring the horizontal inequalities that they experience. Because of this,
such a degree of group self-determination is not appropriate if our goal is to eliminate
inequalities.

Young’s approach is based partially on treating all minorities equally (if one
minority is given right X, then all minorities are given right X,) which lets her avoid one
of the issues that I have brought to light in Chapter 3. The problem with this is that it
ignores the group specific history and the claims that follow. If we are to take equality
seriously, then we should recognize that sometimes different policies and programs are
necessary to achieve equality between different groups.

I concluded by examining Kymlicka’s more recent work on minorities. As with
all theories, his work has expanded over the past 20–plus years, and so a fair reading
must also incorporate the new aspects. The main points that I have focused on are his
arguments that multiculturalism, when understood correctly, does not threaten Western
democracies, that multicultural theory requires a group differentiated approach rather
than the state differentiated approach as proposed by Michael Walzer, and his expansion
of the categories of minorities (national, indigenous and ethnic minorities,) which has led
to his list of more detailed policies which are often adopted by states. While this
expanded multiculturalism addresses some of the concerns I have brought forward in Chapter 3, there remain some areas in which more advancement is needed. Through his more explicit list of claims that minorities tend to make on states, Kymlicka has been able to address the problem of horizontal inequalities that arises when it is recognized that certain inequalities exist between the majority and a minority, but not between different minorities. This advancement, however, still does not take into account that there are many inequalities that must be tackled that are not cultural or political. His focus remains on these types of inequalities, and, until social and economic inequalities are openly acknowledged and attended to, horizontal inequalities will remain a worry for democratic states.

While his theory may be somewhat limited when considering horizontal inequalities due to his narrow focus on culture and politics, Kymlicka is nonetheless able to actively address them, unlike Young. I have argued, however, that this is not enough and that a comprehensive theory of multiculturalism should incorporate group mobilization and group/state cooperation. Without this mobilization and cooperation it is hard to imagine how all relevant inequalities can be brought to light and how policies and programs can be effectively implemented. Unless minorities actively participate in the decisions about what counts as inequalities and what should be done to rectify them, it is hard to see how they, the minorities in question, can be seen by others as equals, or can begin to see themselves as equals.

My project has been to show that liberal democracies not only should be concerned about horizontal inequalities, but in fact must be concerned. If we are to ensure that all residents of a state are treated equally, then theories of liberal multiculturalism
should be expanded to take these inequalities into consideration as, without their explicit
acknowledgement, little can ensure a reasonable standard of living for minorities. While
this does involve state implemented policies and programs focused on these goals, it
should also involve minority group mobilization in tandem with group/state cooperation.
This is not something that will happen overnight, and it will require much more research,
but it is nonetheless necessary to ensure the equality of all individuals.
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