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GOAL DISPLACEMENT IN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS:
A CASE STUDY OF THE SCHISM IN THE LOYAL ORANGE
ASSOCIATION OF MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY CANADA WEST

by

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Bachelor of Arts, Honours Sociology,
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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to explain the tradeoff in the Loyal Orange Association of mid-nineteenth century Canada West, whereby doctrinal purity was exchanged for an environmental niche providing for political influence at the societal level. Most of the relevant information is historical, lending itself to an interpretive sociological analysis. The information concerning the tradeoff is arranged as a case study which has significance in its own right as a careful description and analysis of an interesting and important voluntary organization. The case study has equal significance for "theory" because our sociological problem goes to the heart of the goal displacement process in voluntary organizations. We view organizational economies as incentive systems wherein achieved goals provide public goods. This conceptualization sheds light on the structure underlying ideological considerations such as organizational goals and helps to explain goal displacement at its fundamental level.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER I

THE MEANINGS OF CANADIAN ORANGEISM

The Loyal Orange Association (L.O.A.) has its roots in Ireland, where its parent organization, the Orange Order, was instituted in 1795 to preserve the Orange tradition and organize the Irish protestants for military action against the Irish catholics. The roots of Orangeism go back at least as far as the "Glorious Revolution of 1688" in England, when Prince William of Orange established the protestant ascendancy in Great Britain and Ireland. The Orange Order spread from Ireland in the nineteenth century and became entrenched throughout the British Empire. Orange institutions survive to-day, throughout the former British Empire.

In British North America the Orange tradition was kept alive by the L.O.A. Orangeism became firmly established in the province of Canada West (called Upper Canada before 1841 and Ontario after 1867) by the mid-nineteenth century. As the L.O.A. flourished and grew to an impressive size in Canada West, it became apparent that some of the basic principles of Orangeism were not ideally suited to Canadian society and disputes arose over the meanings which were to be given to this Old World doctrine in the New World.

In the mid-nineteenth century these disputes intensified and led to a schism. The resolution of the schism in 1856 signalled some important doctrinal changes in the L.O.A.. The previous emphasis on anti-catholicism gave way to an officially more
tolerant position and a certain degree of co-operation with catholics became possible. This was accompanied by an increased participation by the L.O.A. as an organization in Canadian politics. These, in turn, changed the position occupied by the L.O.A. in Canadian society. The schism and its resolution provide a classic example of goal displacement in voluntary organizations. Goal displacement is the process whereby the organizational goals are changed or reinterpreted (in light of changed conditions), to facilitate organizational survival.

The L.O.A. was so successful in making the required adjustments to Canadian society that one of its own members, Sir John A. Macdonald, became the first Prime Minister of Canada in 1867. Macdonald joined the L.O.A. as a volunteer in 1844 and was subsequently elected to parliament for the first time. He retained his membership in the L.O.A. throughout his long and distinguished political career. It is part of Orange folklore that Macdonald got his first idea for Confederation from the previous "confederation" of the Orange lodges, established by Ogle Gowan in 1830. (The Grand Lodge is the central administrative bureaucracy of the L.O.A.) Regardless of the truth of this piece of Orange folklore, it is undeniable that the L.O.A. and Orangeism have had an important influence on the development of Canadian society.

A. Historical Case Studies

The schism in the L.O.A. has been studied from the perspective of the history of the organization itself (Mood, 1950; Nelson, 1950; Senior, 1972a) and from the perspective of its
consequences for Canadian society (Creighton, 1952; Careless, 1959; 1967). We are not specifically concerned with writing a history of the schism but historical records do provide the essential starting point for a sociological analysis. Our analysis concerns the relationships between the volunteers and the organization and between the organization as a whole and the society.

The case study approach used in this thesis is similar to the work of the American sociologists, Selznick (1966) and Zald (1970a). One important difference is that we studied a completed event, whereas they studied ongoing events. The schism in the L.O.A. has a clearly defined onset and resolution, as well as including antecedent and resultant events. This facilitates the analysis of change over time and the processes by which the changes took place. In contrast, ongoing events are by definition in a state of flux. One "advantage" of analyzing an ongoing event is that the actors can be interviewed. This must, however, be evaluated in light of the Marxian maxim: men make their own history but they do not know that they are making it. In other words, interviewing the actors is of questionable utility when one is trying to analyze processes which transcend those individuals. Our unit of analysis is the organization, at the level of its leaders. Knowledge of individual actors is useful primarily in characterizing this unit at the stated level. Thus the remoteness of the schism in the L.O.A. is conducive to its developmental study.

The decision to use a case study approach dictates the intensive analysis of one case of goal displacement. This requires pulling together, as a whole, those characteristics which are relevant to the phenomenon. (The wholeness of these relevant
characteristics is an intellectual construct.) In addition, it
is our philosophic belief that this kind of subject matter is best
analyzed by the interpretive, as opposed to "scientific", method.
(For example, we do not adhere to the "unity of method" ideology.)
Interpretive sociology as understood here is that which seeks
to provide understanding and plausible explanations of phenomena.
This kind of analysis is more useful in refining existing general-
izations than in generating new ones. Guided by sociological
"theory" and grounded in the history of the schism in the L.O.A.,
we shall explain the tendency toward goal displacement in voluntary
organizations at its fundamental level.

All of the relevant information comes from written historical
sources. Chief among the primary sources are the Annual Reports
of the Grand Lodge, organizational guidelines (such as the Constitution
and Laws, Forms to be used in all lodges and the Laws and Ordinances),
internal histories, statements of the organizational goals and
contemporary newspaper articles. This information is either
written by or about the organizational leaders. One might well
argue that we are actually studying the schism in the Grand Lodge,
rather than the schism in the L.O.A. as a whole. Such an argument
would neglect what is most basic to the life of voluntary organ-
izations; that is, the voluntary enrolment, participation and
commitment of the volunteers. Information concerning the volunteers
is scanty and hence their characteristics and activities must be
inferred. These inferences are made somewhat easier by the fact
that the doctrinal positions and actions of the organizational
leaders had definite implications for the role of the volunteers.
in the organization and through these for the position of the organization in the society. For example, during the dispute the claims made by the rival factions for the legitimacy of their goals, were presented to the volunteers. All important decisions in voluntary organizations must take into account the volunteers and the position of the organization in the society if the leaders wish to maintain their organization's viability.

In the next chapter we shall introduce the schism as an historical event, the sociological problem suggested by this event and the central argument developed throughout the course of this thesis. We invite the reader to carefully follow the argument developed below, keeping in mind the dual aims of the thesis. This thesis succeeds to the extent that it illuminates the process of goal displacement in voluntary organizations. It contributes to cumulative knowledge to the extent that it helps to provide an interpretive understanding of Orangeism as a doctrine, the L.O.A. as a functioning voluntary organization and the schism in the L.O.A..
CHAPTER 2

PROTESTANT ASCENDANCY OR POLITICAL INFLUENCE: A TRADEOFF

A. The Schism in the L.O.A.: Benjaminites versus Gowanites

In June 1853 a schism occurred in the L.O.A., resulting in the emergence of two rival factions, the Benjaminites and the Gowanites. It is useful to view the schism as having both environmental and internal organizational causes. The environmental causes include a rift in the Conservative party, which paralleled the schism in the L.O.A., and a stormy religious controversy over the Gavazzi affair, which aggravated the internal dispute in the organization. The organizational causes include a conflict of interests between the Benjaminites and Gowanite coalitions (and subsequent factions) and a coup d'état by the Gowanites, which set Gowan up as the Grand Master. (The Grand Master is the highest position in the Grand Lodge.)

A doctrinal dispute was waged during the schism years (June 1853 to June 1856). Both factions agreed that religion was the primary foundation of the L.O.A., but the Benjaminites accused the Gowanites of trying to make the lodge a political instrument. The differences between the factions were in fact largely political. One way of viewing the schism is that both factions sought to "further the interests of Orangeism". The rival factions' perceptions of these interests and the strategies for their furtherance, however, differed dramatically.

The Benjaminites perceived the interests of Orangeism to be the preservation of the protestant ascendancy of a bygone era.
This perception of Orange interests was explicitly religious and unalterable and was defined in relation to the perceived interests of catholicism, which had to be opposed on all fronts. They sought to further these interests by emphasizing doctrinal purity in order to keep the L.O.A. in an environmental niche which would secure its position as the champion of protestantism. This goal would lead to closer co-operation between Orangemen and the political party which best represented their perceived interests. The Benjaminites would definitely not co-operate with any political party which was friendly to catholicism.

The Gowanites, on the other hand, perceived the interests of Orangeism to be that of securing political influence for Orangemen in Canadian society. The Gowanite perception of Orange interests was explicitly political and negotiable. They sought to further these interests by emphasizing politics in the lodge which would put the L.O.A. in an environmental niche enabling it to act independently of political parties yet exert political influence. This goal would lead to increased political activity in the lodge and a neglect of doctrinal purity (as circumstances warranted) in pursuit of political influence. For example, the Gowanites would co-operate with political parties which were friendly to catholicism if such co-operation was politically advantageous.

The doctrinal dispute was marked by rival claims to legitimacy for the factions’ Grand Lodges, leadership and goals. The Benjaminites had stronger claims to legitimacy than the Gowanites since at the time Benjamin was the elected Grand Master
(whereas Gowan subsequently seized the position), thereby having the legitimate authority to lead the Grand Lodge. In addition, the Benjamine goals, and related strategies for their achievement, were constitutionally legitimate, whereas the strategy for the achievement of the primary Gowanite goal was unconstitutional.

The Gowanite Grand Lodge, however, enjoyed much greater support from the volunteers than did the Benjamine Grand Lodge, and Gowan was the more popular of the rival factions' leaders in spite of the relative constitutional weakness of the Gowanite doctrinal position.

In June 1856, the schism ended when the Benjaminees recognized the supremacy of the Gowanite Grand Lodge, and by implication, the Gowanite goals and strategies. The traditional strategy for furthering Orange interests was based on the Protestant ascendancy and the total opposition to the Catholic church in politics. This proved very successful in Ireland, and was championed by the Benjaminees, but was rejected by the majority of Canadian Orangemen as unsuitable to the political realities of Canadian society. The ascendancy of the Gowanite faction brought about organizational changes in the L.O.A.. The constitutional norm, that the defence of Protestant interests should in no way benefit Catholicism, was violated. The volunteers' obligation, to oppose the Catholic church in politics, was also violated. The official goal, to defend Protestant interests, was reinterpreted, resulting in the emergence of a new strategy for its achievement. The interests of Protestantism were no longer defined exclusively in relation to (and in opposition to) the perceived interests of Catholicism, making way for the new strategy of co-operation and
alliance with political parties which were friendly to catholicism.

E. The Sociological Problem Suggested by the Schism

The ascendency of the Gowane fraction moved the L.O.A. into a new environmental niche in Canadian society, ushering in a new relationship between the L.O.A. and catholics in politics. The L.O.A. was now in a position to act as an interest group of independent conservatives, capable of allying with a wide range of political parties (even those representing catholic interests), to secure political influence.

In spite of the fact that we might assume that the volunteers were initially induced to join the L.O.A. partly because of its doctrine (which had been militantly protestant and anti-catholic), Orangemen did not leave the L.O.A. in great numbers to join rival organizations advocating a militant protestantism and anti-catholicism. Something about the L.O.A.'s new environmental niche enabled the organizational leaders to maintain the voluntary enrolment, participation and commitment of the Orangemen, in spite of an important doctrinal change. We know that the vitality of the L.O.A. was maintained because the organization continued to grow and prosper after the doctrinal change was instituted. The problem then is to explain the tradeoff whereby doctrinal purity was exchanged for an environmental niche providing for political influence at the societal level.

C. The Central Argument of the Thesis

This tradeoff between strict adherence to Orangeism and a new position for the L.O.A. in Canadian society can be seen as a result of the net increase in incentives provided by the new
position. The organizational "economy" was ailing in the sense that the traditional lodge activities and their accompanying incentive systems were in decline. The incentives generated by this new environmental niche were more highly valued by the membership than the losses incurred by the neglect of doctrinal purity. This tradeoff was made because total opposition to the Catholic church in politics was not a successful strategy for securing political influence, whereas the environmental niche proposed by the Gowanites provided for political influence.

Components of this argument require some brief elaboration. For example, to understand the tradeoff one must know the incentive systems in operation prior to the tradeoff, the events that brought about the tradeoff and the consequences of the tradeoff for the incentive systems.

1) Incentive Systems

Throughout the early and mid-nineteenth century, there existed three basic activities of the L.O.A.: the "men's house", secret work and immigrant aid. The "men's house" is the name used by anthropologists for the warriors' club in a tribe. The "men's house" activity was inspired by a long tradition of warfare and the Orangemen were fully armed. Secret work involved the performing of rituals and the use of passwords in the lodge and secret meanings that were attributed to public celebrations. Immigrant aid involved helping Orange immigrants to adjust to Canadian society. All three activities were related to the organization's constitution. In other words, these activities were traditional and generated incentives that helped to induce the
leaders and volunteers to contribute their time and effort to Orangism. Differential incentive systems operated for the leaders and volunteers, giving the leaders access to the most highly valued incentives, such as political influence.

In the mid-nineteenth century conditions started to change. The "men's house" activity was important during the rebellion period, 1837-38, when the volunteers were mobilized for military action. The mid-nineteenth century was relatively peaceful and consequently the "men's house" activity, and its accompanying incentive system, suffered. The secret work activity experienced a high point when it came under fire from the citizens and politicians who resented and feared the existence of secret societies. This negative sanction is most vividly displayed by the Reform Ministry's attempt to outlaw secret societies in 1843 and the passage of the Party Processions Act in the same year. (This Act outlawed the organizationally important and extremely popular July 12 Walk of the Orangemen.) In 1851 much of the appeal of secrecy was denied the Orangemen because the Act was repealed. The immigrant aid activity was in decline by mid-nineteenth century because the immigration from Ireland (previously largely Protestant) was now largely Catholic. In summary, the L.O.A. had grown to a large size, but its traditional activities, and accompanying incentive systems, were either experiencing a downward turn in a cycle or were in decline. The L.O.A. was experiencing a "politics of scarcity" because the leaders were faced with the task of maintaining the organization, in spite of a low stock of incentive resources.

In this context of scarcity a new activity (which had the
potential to solve the L.O.A.'s economic problems) was emerging. This was the interest group activity. Interest groups are mobilized to act as units in their environments toward the achievement of their goals. This activity was a natural consequence of the "men's house". In times of rebellion the Orangemen would use the "men's house" activity to fight for their beliefs. In times of relative peace the Orangemen could use the same lodge network to promote their beliefs in the political arena. The interest group activity would seem to be perfect for the L.O.A. because all Orangemen shared the basic social values of Orangeism. The interest group activity was not, however, permitted to emerge without a stubborn fight from the Orangemen who disliked the manner in which the new activity could lead to the open violation of tradition and the defilement of the sacred principles of Orangeism in the name of political expediency.

ii) Factionalism

Disagreements, over the advisability and legitimacy of instituting the interest group activity, led to a schism in the L.O.A. Two factions emerged. The interest group activity was championed by the Gowanites, but denounced by the Benjaminites. The traditional activities of the L.O.A., and their incentive systems, were already experiencing difficulties. The schism turned these difficulties into a crisis. The rival claims made by the factions took on the appearance of a doctrinal dispute, but these claims were most important in their consequences for the organization's environmental niche, activities and incentive systems.

Both factions agreed that religion was the primary basis of
the L.O.A.. Both factions took steps to popularize among the volunteers their different interpretations of the doctrine. The difference was that the Gowanites sought to act as a political interest group in society while the Benjaminsites preferred to leave this activity to the political parties. The Gowanite decision to act as a political interest group meant that they would have to compromise their extreme beliefs if they wanted to ally with other interest groups. The compromise began immediately with the Gowanite support of the liberal-conservative wing of the Conservative party in their alliance with the French-Canadian, catholic Bleu party. This compromise violated the tradition of Orange opposition to the influence of the Catholic church in politics. The Benjaminsites refused to compromise. By arguing for the maintenance of tradition, the Benjaminsites opted for delegating the promotion of Orange interests to the political parties. The weak, tory wing of the Conservative party and the Clear Grit party were delegated to this role in mid-nineteenth century. The Benjamine strategy was counter-productive because it left important activities, such as acting in the political arena to the political parties. Also, a narrow sectarian interpretation of Orangeism was unsuccessful, at this time, in securing political influence at the societal level. The Gowanite strategy, on the other hand, was productive because it provided additional activities and a stronger incentive resource base for the L.O.A.. This environmental niche provided the opportunity for the L.O.A. to exert political influence at the societal level.
iii) Environmental Niche

Following the Gowanite ascendancy, the L.O.A. occupied an explicitly political environmental niche. The interest group activity was fully institutionalized. At the level of the internal organizational incentive systems, this niche provided a strong, incentive resource base. Political Orangemen were induced to seek leadership roles in the lodge, either to generate support for their own political aspirations in Canadian politics, or to work behind the scenes by generating volunteer support for the promotion of Orange interests. The volunteers were induced to attend lodge meetings where they could debate the political issues of the day in terms of Orangeism. Any sign of political influence, by the L.O.A. at the societal level, was a boon to this system because of the perceived benefits and increased incentives provided to the volunteers. At the level of the environmental incentive systems, this niche provided the L.O.A. with "a piece of the action". The L.O.A. became an interest group among others which had to be reckoned with. For example, it became traditional to appoint at least one Orangeman to the cabinet and Orangemen were in a position to demand their share of patronage. The decline in protestant Irish immigration to Canada could be more than compensated for by an increased membership recruitment among native Canadians and other immigrant groups. The tradeoff of denominational purity was a small price to pay in exchange for this with an environmental niche which secured the continued existence and importance of the L.O.A. in Canadian society.
CHAPTER 3

A POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH TO VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

In this chapter we shall bring in a more systematic elaboration of the sociological concepts introduced above. This task should not be understood as the introduction of "sociological jargon". Our aim is to clarify the meaning of important concepts rather than to mystify the reader. This can be justified in three ways. Firstly, the words used to denote sociological concepts usually have everyday meanings and usages which are different from those in sociology. Secondly, a clear understanding of their meaning is an important first step in relating these concepts to the empirical phenomena. Thirdly, a clear understanding of the manner in which the concepts will be used in this thesis is a prerequisite to common understanding between the writer and the reader. Of course it is not enough simply to state the relevant concepts; we shall also state the relationships among these concepts.

A. Incentive Systems

Voluntary organizations and their incentive systems are the two main concepts to be discussed in this section. Voluntary organizations will be discussed first to set the stage for the discussion of their incentive systems. This ordering is required since we are concerned with incentive systems only as they relate to voluntary organizations as a distinct type.
1) Voluntary Organizations

Hall's (1977) definition of "organization" is perhaps the most comprehensive in the literature. "An organization is a collectivity with a relatively identifiable boundary, a normative order, ranks of authority, communications systems and membership coordinating systems; this collectivity exists on a relatively continuous basis in an environment and engages in activities that are usually related to a goal or a set of goals." (Hall, 1977:22-33).

It is Hall's (1977:44) view that voluntary organizations share most of the characteristics common to other organizational types and that their salaried members can be treated just like those of other types. The number of salaried members in voluntary organizations is, however, very small. This fact leaves the mass of volunteers in a membership category which usually does not exist in other organizational types. For example, one does not usually find volunteers (non-salaried members) in business organizations.

We shall outline three distinct characteristics of voluntary organizations which, in addition to Hall's (1977) definition of "organization", give a clear meaning to the concept.

The first characteristic is a basic differentiation between the ruling elite and the volunteers (Rosa, 1954:57; Sills, 1957:19-20; Etzioni, 1975:176). This arises as a result of delegation; "... the primordial organizational act." (Selznick, 1948:25). The ruling elite incumbents are functionally distinct from the other volunteers because they are delegated the authority to run the organization. The delegation of authority and work through a division of labor is essential to the efficient functioning of organizations, but this process is carried to an extreme in the
voluntary type. The volunteers are non-salaried, part-time members who comprise the inactive majority. The ruling elite, on the other hand, typically has some full-time and salaried positions. The delegation of authority is usually institutionalized in a democratic election of the ruling elite (Zald, 1970a:15), having far reaching consequences for the organization. Since the work of Robert Michels (1962), it has been frequently observed that ruling elites, once elected in voluntary organizations, tend to pursue policies which reinforce their positions. The tendency toward oligarchy in voluntary organizations (the "iron law of oligarchy"), increases with the widening gap between the ruling elite and the volunteers, in terms of incentives and benefits (rewards) (Hall, 1977:257). In addition, there is some agreement that volunteers tend to accept this oligarchic control (Selznick, 1957:99; Etzioni, 1975:176). This acceptance is partly by default because the volunteers belong to the organization but have neither the ambition nor the time to take an active part in running it and because this oligarchic control benefits them in some way. The most obvious benefit is the sound management of the organization.

The second characteristic is a shared value position, in the sense that the organization's normative order is shared by all of the members. There is some agreement to the idea that one can infer some of the volunteers' salient values from their membership in voluntary organizations (Gross, 1969:278; Hall, 1977:337). This idea suggests that the organizational values bear a close resemblance to the values of the individual volunteers. In other words, the values of voluntary organizations accurately represent a specific value position of a group of men. For
example, there is a high degree of certainty that a voluntary organization which values protestant supremacy is composed of members who share this value. (This relationship between the values of individual members and organizational values does not necessarily obtain in other organizational types, such as business or coercive organizations.) The shared value position inherent in voluntary organizations (and especially those with highly developed doctrines representing distinctive social values) provides the potential for interest group activity. The values shared within organizations become organizational interests in relation to other group interests (representing their own distinctive values) in society (Greer and Orleans, 1962; Babchuk and Edwards, 1965; Hughes, 1968; Sills, 1968; Ehrmann, 1968).

Voluntary organizations are, in a very real sense, "para political" (Greer and Orleans, 1968:635) because they have the latent potential for interest group activity in society. To realize the voluntary organization's potential for interest group activity the ruling elite must find a means of mobilizing the volunteers. It is possible to mobilize, as interest groups, the members of other organizational types, but there arises the additional problem of trying to standardize the members' value position.

The third characteristic is a tendency toward goal displacement. The goal displacement process has been observed in numerous voluntary organizations, such as the Salvation Army (Clark, 1948), the Townsend Movement (Messeneger, 1955), the March of Dimes (Sills, 1957), the Y.M.C.A. (Zald and Denton, 1963) and the T.W.A. (Selznick, 1966). Berelson and Steiner (1964:366) are of the opinion that the tendency toward goal displacement is one of
the few important and verified generalizations in the sociology of voluntary organizations. Goal displacement is a type of goal change which occurs when the original goals are replaced by those associated with the survival of the organization. According to (1964:92), the ruling elites of organizations with centralized decision making are in the position to initiate the goal displacement. Such decisions, however, clearly go beyond their delegated authority.

Goal displacement can be partially explained by the basic differentiation between the ruling elite and the volunteers.

Max Weber (1964:318, 383) contends that the ruling elite (of the corporate group, of which the voluntary association is a type) which is paid, has economic interests in the continuation of the organization even if the original ideological basis has ceased to exist. One could explain the decision by salaried ruling elite members, to initiate goal displacement, in terms of this economic interest. Goal displacement is also facilitated by the fact that the official goals in voluntary organizations tend to be intangible, in the sense that it is unclear what would constitute goal attainment (Warner, 1967). This puts the ruling elite in the position to make the decision to replace the official goals with those associated with the survival of the organization. It should not be surprising that goal displacement can lead to doctrinal disputes and eventually to schisms in voluntary organizations because although the members share the original organizational goals they may not share the new goals. Voluntary organizations function effectively on the basis of the voluntary enrolment, participation, and commitment of the volunteers. The
ruling which initiates the goal displacement process must take into account the orientation of the volunteers to the original and the changed organization.

The subsidiary concepts which follow are useful because they help us to elaborate specific aspects of voluntary organizations which play an important role in our central argument.

a) Political Economy

The political economy approach was developed by Zald (1970a; 1970b) to help explain the process of change in organizations of all types and for the comparative analysis of organizations. This approach was demonstrated to be effective in Zald's (1970a) analysis of organizational change in the American T.U.C.A. during the twentieth century. (There is a later formulation of this approach, emphasizing its utility in the analysis of public organizations (Wamsley and Zald, 1973a; 1973b), but this is not directly relevant to our argument.) With this approach one abstracts two interrelated aspects of the systemic properties of organizations: the polity and the economy, which are used to guide and focus the analysis. The political economy can be thought of as a system which extends outside the organizational boundary into the environment within which the organization functions. We shall limit the discussion to the internal political economy. (The environmental level will be discussed separately below.)

The organizational polity is composed of the groups and individuals inside or outside of the organization and the positions in the organization which have an active and organized influence
on the decision-making process (Zald, 1970a:23). The ruling elite constitutes the primary component of the polity. The individual volunteers typically have a vote, directly or indirectly, in the election of the ruling elite, but they do not usually have an active and organized influence on the decision-making process. Individual volunteers do, however, have the potential to become part of the polity because their individual interests can be aggregated (as coalitional interests) and then articulated by a coalition spokesman to affect organizational decision-making. This situation is rarely realized because of the volunteers' part-time and voluntary orientation toward the organization, which leads to widespread apathy concerning organizational decisions. Add to this the fact that the ruling elite is delegated the decision-making function, and the exclusion of the volunteers from the polity becomes understandable. Yet individual volunteers do occasionally aggregate their interests and this can be a very exciting occurrence. We think that "demand articulation-aggregation" (Wamsley and Zald, 1973b:167) best conveys the idea behind this process because it probably occurs most frequently when the ruling elite violates the conditions of its delegated authority. A demand generates among the volunteers who aggregate their common interests and choose a spokesman to articulate these coalitional interests to exert an active and organized influence on the decision-making process. The succession process (in voluntary organizations with democratically elected ruling elites) provides an organizational structure within which such a demand articulation-aggregation process can occur. It should be emphasized that some divisive issue is required to set this process in motion;
otherwise elections in voluntary organizations are often little more than rituals whereby the incumbent ruling elite is unanimously re-elected. Organizational coups d'état provide an example of the demand articulation-aggregation process going beyond the organizational structure provided for the succession of ruling elites.

Following Selznick (1957) a basic distinction can be made between routine and critical decisions. Routine decisions are those concerning the administrative management of the organization. The ruling elite has the legitimate delegated authority to make routine decisions. Recruitment and resocialization of members is an example of a routine function of the ruling elite, involving routine decisions. Critical decisions are those which go beyond the ruling elite's legitimate authority. Critical decisions involve the formulation rather than the routine implementation of organizational goals. Such decisions require leadership (rather than routine management) on the part of the ruling elite. It is only with respect to these critical decisions that the demand articulation-aggregation process is relevant. A proposed change in membership qualifications is an example of a critical decision of interest to the entire membership. If the Loyal Orange Association was to consider permitting Catholics to join, then this would be a critical decision of vital importance to all of the members. Such a decision is critical because the volunteers delegate the authority for the routine management of the organization to the ruling elite, but this does not include the legitimate authority to change the organization. The decision to make an important organizational change requires the positive sanction of
the majority of the organizational polity.

The distribution and exchange of incentives is the aspect of the organizational economy which is relevant for our argument. (There are also the system of production and the allocation of resources, but these are not directly relevant.) In Zald's (1970a:19) words: "The term economy should not be conceived narrowly as limited to the exchange of money for goods and services. Rather what is exchanged is a number of goods, or incentives, that bind men to each other." Zald (1970b:251) concludes that the central economic problem for social movement organizations is finding a set of incentives to ensure membership participation. This is also a central "economic" problem for voluntary organizations (which often include a social movement aspect), because their vitality is dependent upon voluntary participation. It is useful to think of this participation as a voluntary contribution of time and effort. The ruling elite controls a stock of incentive resources which it distributes to induce contributions of time and effort from the volunteers. In addition, there is an incentive exchange between the ruling elite and the volunteers, in the absence of which the work load and accompanying incentives and benefits are unequitable. Understood in this sense of an exchange of incentives for contributions, the organizational economy is useful in characterizing the basic division of labor in voluntary organizations. (The incentive systems are discussed separately and in more detail below.)

There are two more concepts (organizational goals and constitutions), which are aspects of the political economy of voluntary organizations.
b) Goals

Hall (1975:13) defines "organization goals" as "... the desired ends or states of affairs for whose achievement systems policies are committed and resources allocated." According to Hall (1975:14) the most important attribute of this definition is that "desired ends" are held by men (decision-makers who are capable of making policy commitments and allocating resources) rather than by the reified construct "organization".

Perrow's (1961) famous distinction between official and operative goals provides the link between the goals and political economy of voluntary organizations. Official goals represent the formal declaration of the general purposes of the organization as put forth in its charter (Perrow, 1961:855). Official goals can be misleading because they are used to inform the public about the organization, thus tending to stress those aspects of its goals which are most conducive to public support (Zald, 1963:214; Etzioni, 1975:104). The official goals of voluntary organizations provide incentives for men to join because they know that they will be among others who share at least the basic values represented by the goals. Official goals are useful for characterizing organizations historically and comparatively, but they must be understood in conjunction with the operative goals. The operative goals represent what the organization is actually seeking to accomplish in terms of its operating policies and commitments (Perrow, 1961:855). Operative goals often represent decisions about alternate ways of achieving official goals, although there is no necessary relationship between the two (Perrow, 1966:180). There is some agreement to the idea that the decision-making
process is an important indicator of operative goals (Perrow, I961; I963; Simon, I964; Price, I972; Hall, I977). Critical decisions indicate the operative goals and the hierarchy among multiple goals. Operative goals are problematic because (unlike official goals) they are not necessarily stated. They must be inferred from evidence concerning organizational decisions and practices with respect to the allocation and distribution of resources in the organizational economy.

c) Constitutions

Just as the official goals provide incentives for men to join voluntary organizations, the constitutional rights and obligations provide incentives for men to retain their membership. Zald (I970a:21-22) defines the organizational constitution as an historic and conceptually defined normative order which specifies the constraints and the opportunities for the exercise of power. The organizational constitution sets out the guiding principles and establishes the rules under which the ruling elite is delegated the authority to manage the organization. The constitution is "conceptually defined" because it embodies traditional, shared agreements concerning the ruling elite's legitimate authority. The constitution also includes traditional agreements concerning the basic organizational values and official goals. In addition, the constitution specifies the relationships between the organization and other collectivities in society. (This environmental aspect of the organizational constitution is developed in more detail below.) The internal aspects of the organizational constitution specify the rights and obligations of the membership with regard
to each other and the organization as a whole. The constitutional rights and obligations establish the formal incentive systems which make the basic division of labor (between the ruling elite and the volunteers) an efficient means of managing voluntary organizations.

ii) Organizational Incentive Systems

Incentives are tangible or intangible scarce resources that constitute the basis of the organizational economy. One infers the incentives and incentive systems from known organizational structures, such as the constitution and organizational goals. The stock of incentive resources is controlled and distributed by the ruling elite in exchange for contributions of time and effort from the volunteers (Wilson and Clark, 1961). A mutually beneficial exchange of incentives between the ruling elite and the volunteers is essential for the survival of voluntary organizations (Salisbury, 1969). The organizational constitution limits, constrains and guides the operation of the economy by specifying a set of exchange terms (Zald, 1970a:234, 239).

For example, the rights and obligations of the membership specify the incentives and benefits accruing to men in exchange for joining and contributing to the organization. In addition, the organizational constitution specifies the incentives and benefits accruing to the volunteers (in exchange for permitting the ruling elite to control the organization) and the ruling elite (in exchange for co-ordinating the organizational activities).

Wilson (1961:377) distinguishes between benefits (rewards) and incentives. Benefits represent a completed transaction,
whereas incentives represent an expected future transaction. This distinction highlights the fact that incentives are social psychological, in the sense that they orient the contributor to future benefits. For example, the volunteers might contribute their time and effort in exchange for incentives which are expected to be realized as benefits at some future date. The ruling elite must occasionally "deliver the goods" to maintain the credibility of the system. Evidence of an actual transaction between the ruling elite and the volunteers (whereby the volunteers receive benefits) puts the exchange on firmer ground. The beauty of incentive systems is that the incentive alone is often enough to maintain the system, as long as there are occasional benefits to maintain expectations and commitment.

Wilson and Clark (1951:134-139) distinguish among three pure types of incentives: material, solidary and purposive.

Material incentives are tangible, usually have a monetary value and are associated with business organizations. For example, better working conditions is a material incentive that unions might offer the workers to induce them to join the union. Another example of a material incentive is the patronage which a member of the ruling elite in a voluntary organization hopes to obtain from a political party which he supports with his organization's combined vote in an election.

Solidary incentives are intangible, tend to be independent of the organizational goals and derive from the act of associating. Solidary incentives are characteristic of voluntary organizations. For example, fellowship is a solidary incentive that a voluntary organization might offer prospective members to induce them to
join. Fellowship is also an incentive to continue participating, even after the original ideological basis of the organization has ceased to exist. The strength of solidarity incentives is one explanation for the acceptance among the volunteers of the frequently observed real displacement process in voluntary organizations.

Prestige is another important solidarity incentive. According to Wilson and Clark (1961:145) alternative incentives to prestige are rarely available in voluntary organizations. This is to a certain extent true because prestige has the property of exclusiveness whereas fellowship cannot easily be denied a member. Wilson and Clark (1961) refer to the solidarity incentives which induce men to join prestigious organizations and induce members to hold prestigious offices in the organization. From the ruling elite's point of view, the solidarity incentive system provides a relatively weak resource base because the volunteers reap their own benefits from the act of associating. The solidarity incentive system does not provide the ruling elite with the chance to earn incentive profits because the accompanying organizational activities are constitutional rights which cannot be denied the membership.

Purposive incentives are intangible, derive from the organizational goals and are a typical resource of ideologically oriented voluntary organizations, especially in the early stages.¹

¹ Wilson and Clark (1961:135) state that in the pure type, purposive incentive systems it is characteristic that goal achievement does not benefit the members in any tangible way. Salisbury (1969) finds fault with the concept of purposive incentives (replacing it with what he calls expressive incentives) because it does not deal effectively with inter-organizational transactions. We concur with Salisbury (1969); but rather than introduce more jargon we have broadened the meaning of "purposive incentives" to include the possibility of tangible benefits to the membership when goals are achieved.
For example, an opportunity to fight against Zionism is a purposive incentive that a ruling elite might offer an anti-semitic to induce him to join the organization. There is a tendency for ruling elites to diversify their incentive base to increase organizational stability (Salisbury, 1969:20). This process of diversification helps to secure organizational survival in the face of changing membership demands and provides the ruling elite with a more stable incentive resource base. For example, organizations originally relying on a purposive incentive system will tend to add solidary incentives to ensure survival, if the original organizational purposes are met or no longer relevant. The infusion of organizations with solidary incentives is, to a large extent, a natural process, whereas purposive and material incentive systems require relatively more co-ordination from the ruling elite.

In addition to types of incentives, Zald (1970a) points out that the amount of incentives offered is also important.

The terms 'politics of abundance' and 'politics of scarcity' refer to political consequences of the state of the economy (the extent to which 'adequate' or 'inadequate' resources — money, prestige, services — are available for distribution). The adequacy of distributional resources (incentives) is, of course, ultimately based on the social definition of a person's 'just due' — what he receives compared with what he believes he should receive. (Zald, 1970a:226).

Organizational economies enjoying a politics of abundance are healthy and those suffering from a politics of scarcity are unhealthy. Those organizations originally relying on one type of incentive system, but suffering from a politics of scarcity, must be infused with another type of incentive system to strengthen the organizational economy. In other words, a politics of scarcity
can lead to organizational change in pursuit of a stronger and more stable organizational economy. In a situation of scarcity, the allocation of resources must be made from a declining resource base, resulting in a loss to one organizational activity (sector) which is equal to the gain to a competing activity (Zald, 1970a:192, 227). The genesis of change, described above, is in the organizational economy. Changes in the allocation of men, money and technology cause concomitant changes in the distribution of incentives. Organizational activities are, however, championed by coalitions and this provides the political dimension to organizational change. Change can foster disputes within the organization because there usually exist competing coalitions (representing competing interests) and one coalition's interests usually lose as the result of a change in the allocation of resources in a situation of scarcity.

B. Factionalism

Organizational factionalism is the main concept to be discussed in this section. Rather than emphasizing its conflict aspect, we view factionalism as resulting from an inability to reach an organizational decision. The process of trying to reach a decision in the L.O.A. was very disruptive and took a long time because it involved goal displacement. The two subsidiary concepts, legitimacy and economic crisis, can be viewed as being always related to goal displacement which involves a doctrinal dispute. The economic crisis is the more fundamental because it reveals the heart of the goal displacement process, but the question of legitimacy is also important in comparing
rival doctrinal positions.

This section serves to draw together many of the preceding ideas. Both the oligarchy and goal displacement tendencies of voluntary organizations are crucial in understanding the schism in the L.O.A.. In addition, the latent potential for interest group activity in voluntary organizations is crucial in understanding the L.O.A.'s economic crisis and its solution.

i) Organizational Factionalism

Siegel and Beals (1960a:103) define factionalism as overt and unresolved conflict between factions which interferes with the achievement of organizational goals. Two types of factionalism are distinguished. Schismatic factionalism is characterized by disputes between the factions, whereas pervasive factionalism is characterized by disputes between and within the factions (Siegel and Beals, 1960a:108-109). It is schismatic factionalism which interests us. Environmental pressures tend to accentuate the existing cleavages in the organization, thereby contributing to the emergence of factions (Siegel and Beals, 1960a:112).

Factional members share the organizational values and official goals, but they have different interests and subsequently disagree over the means of achieving these official goals or over the

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2 Siegel and Beals' (1960a) emphasis on the more general notion of group goals (as opposed to organizational goals) is a reflection of the anthropological viewpoint from which they write. The ideas concerning factionalism are, however, equally relevant for voluntary organizations as for tribes. In addition, Siegel and Beals (1960a), use the group/sub-group distinction whereas we use that of organization/coalition.
operative goals. The dispute inherent in schismatic factionalism tends to intensify with the increasing polarization of the opposing factions and the disruption of co-operative organizational activities. Although there is a clear demarcation between the rival factions, there is, as French (1962:240-241) notes, a great deal of confusion with regard to their doctrinal positions. Hence, the characteristic charges of illegitimacy (made against the opposing faction) are often misplaced due to "ambiguity and irrelevance" (French, 1962). There is, however, the potential for resolving the dispute because the opposing factions value the preservation of the organization (Siegel and Meals, 1960a:109).

In fact, if the dispute is not resolved, then one is dealing with a true schism, because schismatic factionalism is by definition always resolved.

Zaltman (1970a:23) alludes to the fact that the analysis of organizational factionalism is theoretically important:

Before the analysis of organizational polities can be complete, we must develop a framework which encompasses the broad variety of political structures and processes. For instance, we must analyze the political implications of succession and the rules governing succession, from crown prince systems to organizational coups d'état; we must study factions, coalitions and social movements within organizations, as well as the development of quasi-judicial procedures for adjusting claims of members and the structural and ideological conditions of organizations that call forth such systems.

This polarization is both in terms of doctrine and physical space. For example, the factions advocate rival doctrinal positions and constitute rival organizations. "Factionalism" in this anthropological sense is quite different from its more common political sense. Lipset et al (1956) use factionalism in the latter sense. A distinction is drawn between parties (which are legitimate and organized) and factions (which are illegitimate but can be perceived to be legitimate during a crisis) (Lipset et al, 1956:238, 240, 242, 244). Both "parties" and "factions", however, operate within the same organization.
It is useful to think of voluntary organizations as comprising a mass of volunteers who share a commitment to the organizational values and official goals. Within organizations, there are unofficial operative goals representing the competing interests of coalitions (Perrow, 1966:181). Unofficial operative goals bear no necessary relationship to the official goals but can support or violate them. Selznick (1957:15) states that there is a natural tendency in organizations toward internal conflicts expressing coalitional interests. This "natural tendency" derives from the fact that decisions concerning interests usually have winners and losers. Organizational decision-making is a political process whereby a dominant coalition of men summons enough support to set a given operative goal (Cyert and March, 1963:19, 27-28; Pettigrew, 1973:17, 22). The official goals of voluntary organizations typically enjoy unanimous membership support, while the operative goals invariably represent the interests of a dominant coalition which has succeeded in having its unofficial operative goals implemented.

Our contention that factionalism can legitimately be viewed as resulting from the inability to reach an organizational decision draws support from studies of doctrinal disputes. Erzursinski (1962) and Love (1964) deal with doctrinal disputes which are resolved in the short-run. We suggest that this be called the dominant coalition type of organizational decision-making. Whether doctrinal disputes are resolved in the short-run (dominant coalition) or in the long-run (schismatic factionalism), the preservation of the organization is never questioned. As Erzursinski (1962:21-22)
notes, schism is an alternative to the resolution of the dispute that is usually regretted by both factions because doctrinal movements value numerical growth. This overarching concern with preserving the organization suggests that the decision-making process is essentially the same regardless of the length of time required to resolve the dispute. Therefore, we view the ability to reach organizational decisions, with respect to doctrinal disputes, on a continuum from the dominant coalition type to the schismatic factionalism type. The major difference between the two types is the length of time required to achieve a decision. For example, the dominant coalition type is relatively more normal and might take as little as three days to complete. The schismatic factionalism type is relatively more pathological, taking three years of intermittent dispute and negotiation to achieve a decision in the L.O.A. The emergence of factionalism throws the organizational constitution, normative order, goals and economy into relief, making them easier to isolate and study.

a) Legitimacy

The ruling elite or dominant coalition which wants to change the organizational goals (and still maintain membership commitment) must seek legitimation from the volunteers and relevant others. In other words, goal displacement and claims to legitimacy are two aspects of the same process. In Zald's (1970a:234) words: "Organization leaders, however bold, must consider the consequences of violating constitutional norms when they pursue a given course of action." Constitutional norms are historic agreements (among the members of voluntary organizations)
about the legitimate means of implementing goals in terms of activities. The ruling elite or dominant coalition which wants to initiate the goal displacement process must be careful not to alienate the volunteers and hence must seek legitimation for the new organizational goals. Given the condition of schismatic factionalism, there develops rival claims to the legitimacy of the rival doctrinal positions.

An important factor in this process of legitimation of a new normative order, is the presence of a popular leader. Etzioni (1975:305, 312) defines popularity (charisma) as the ability of an actor to exercise diffuse and intense personal influence over the normative orientations of other actors. In this sense, leadership popularity in voluntary organizations can be viewed as a major source of legitimation which builds up the membership commitment to the ruling elite and its ideology.

The ease in achieving a decision (dominant coalition type) should tend to increase with the relative legitimacy of the winning coalition or faction's doctrinal position. Conversely, the difficulty in achieving a decision (schismatic factionalism type) should tend to increase with the relative illegitimacy of the winning coalition or faction's doctrinal position. Ease or difficulty in achieving a decision can be measured in terms of the length of time required and the effect on co-operative organizational activities. Legitimacy then is one important factor in the decision-making process, especially when the decision concerns goal displacement. The question of legitimacy should, however, have a limited impact on the tradeoff in the L.O.A. because of its characteristic "ambiguity and irrelevance". It is only
contended that legitimacy is crucial in determining the relative case or difficulty in reaching an organizational decision with regard to a doctrinal dispute.

The importance of legitimacy for the analysis of schismatic factionalism in voluntary organizations lies in its utility for comparing the rival doctrinal positions of the factions. Legitimacy provides a benchmark with which to compare the rival doctrinal positions in terms of the normative order, constitution and goals. Disputes in voluntary organizations tend to dwell on the doctrinal dimension, but in the final analysis it is the effect that the ascendancy of one of the factions' ideas would have on the organizational economy that is crucial to understanding the goal displacement process.

b) Economic Crisis

We use the idea of an exchange of incentives for contributions of time and effort as the basis for understanding the organizational economy. Organizational economic crises are interruptions in the expected normal flow of incentives or sudden demands for additional contributions of time and effort, or both (Wilson and Clark, 1961:152). Zald (1970a:8) states that these crises (underlying choices and dilemmas) may be caused by changes in the organization or environment. In this section we are concerned only with economic crises which result from changes in the organization. In our case study it is the condition of schismatic factionalism which contributes to the economic crisis in the L.O.A.

As Zald (1970a:223) notes, the very introduction of conflict
breaches the solidary incentive system. The stock of solidary incentives is, therefore, decreased by the doctrinal dispute which accompanies schismatic factionalism. All voluntary organizations are dependent on voluntary contributions of time and effort. The most basic form of contribution is the participation of the volunteers, without which voluntary organizations do not effectively exist. One primary concern of the ruling elite is the disruptive effect of an economic crisis on membership participation. As Zald (1970a:239) points out, the incentive required to obtain the volunteers' initial membership and the incentive required to maintain membership motivation may differ. (It is useful to think of solidary incentives as inducing participation, whereas purposive incentives induce commitment.) In addition to inducing the volunteers to participate in organizational activities, solidary incentives induce the ruling elite incumbents to remain in office. This second point requires some elaboration. Solidary incentives are difficult to maintain when organizations become large. This problem is usually met by creating two levels of membership, the ruling elite and the volunteers. Those members whose contributions are highly valued by the other members receive benefits such as being elected to serve in the ruling elite. A prestige incentive is associated with serving in the ruling elite but this is a scarce resource and the vast majority of the volunteers exchange their contributions for the right to associate with fellow members. The condition of schismatic factionalism breaches the solidary incentive system because all of the members value the preservation of the organization. The ruling elite values the prestige associated with holding office whereas the
volunteers value the fellowship enjoyed in a united organization.

In the early years of voluntary organizations, goals have a paramount importance and often provide the only incentive resources. For example, the only incentive resource in a white supremacist organization in its early years might be the goal of excluding black people from political office. Purposive incentives are, however, difficult to maintain over time, as evidenced by the tendency toward goal displacement in voluntary organizations. The condition of schismatic factionalism is enough to cause an interruption in the expected normal flow of purposive incentives because the accompanying doctrinal dispute leads to the critical re-examination of the basic principles of the organization. Claims made by the members that the organization is not achieving its mission are evidence of a breach in the purposive incentive system. As Wilson and Clark (1961:143, 147) argue, goals in voluntary organizations are ideally related to causes that serve to bind the membership together, rather than to interests which have the potential to divide the membership. The official goals are typically intangible, in the sense that it is unclear what would constitute goal achievement. The problem with goal displacement is that the original goals are replaced by those which are relatively tangible and related to interests which have the potential to divide the membership. The most obvious interest is that of the ruling elite which seeks to maintain the differential incentive system and its oligarchic control of the organization.

Since the ability of ruling elites to induce membership contributions is dependent upon its stock of incentive resources,
an economic crisis must be resolved in order for the organization to survive. Incentives relating to the partisanship of the rival factions cannot maintain indefinitely the sudden demand for contributions of time and effort required to resolve the condition of schismatic factionalism.

When solidary and purposive incentive systems fail, the material incentive system provides an alternate source of incentive resources. Pure material incentive systems are by definition impossible in voluntary organizations. The interest group activity, however, comprises a mixed incentive system in which material incentives play a role. In addition to having interests in the goal displacement process, the ruling elite has interests in the interest group activity. The high degree of ruling elite coordination required to execute this activity puts them in a position to reap the most highly valued incentives and benefits, such as patronage. (The interest group activity is discussed separately and in more detail below.)

C. Environmental Niche

Interest groups and the environmental niche of organizations are the two main concepts to be discussed in this section. Interest groups will be discussed first to set the stage for the discussion of the environmental niche. This ordering is required because we are primarily concerned with the impact of the institutionalization of the interest group activity on the L.O.A.'s environmental niche.
1) Interest Groups

Interest groups are mobilized to act as units in their environments toward the achievement of their goals. All voluntary organizations have the potential to act as interest groups. For example, an organization composed of members who value racial purity has a shared value position in this respect. If this organization is mobilized in its environment toward the achievement of the goal to make racial inter-marriage a crime, then the organization is an interest group, executing the interest group activity. There is a mixed incentive system that operates in conjunction with the interest group activity regardless of whether or not the goal is achieved. The ruling elite is induced to co-ordinate the activity in exchange for material incentives, such as political influence and patronage. The entire membership is induced to contribute its time and effort toward the interest group activity in exchange for purposive incentives, such as furthering the organization's mission. Any of the ruling elite members or volunteers who receive solidarity incentives of fellowship from the act of associating in the common drive to execute the activity find this an inducement to contribute.

Benefits deriving from the achievement of organizational goals can be seen as public goods. All of the members of the organization share in the consumption of public goods, regardless of whether or not they contributed toward the achievement of the relevant organizational goal (Olson, 1971:15). In other words, no member of the organization can be excluded from the benefits of public goods, but they can be excluded from the benefits of
non-public (private) goods. For example, if a union within a manufacturing firm achieves the goal of higher wages, no worker in that firm can be excluded from the consumption of the higher wages although only 50% of the firm might be unionized. The higher wages is the public good. The union might, however, provide non-public goods such as the exclusive use of credit union funds by union members and the benefits of this non-public good could be denied the non-union members. As Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1970:104) note, goods in the economic sense are combinations of scarce resources and the provision of such goods may have positive or negative valuations placed on them. In other words, public goods are not always positively valued (good); they can be negatively valued (bad), depending upon one's point of view and position in the organization. Since operative goals are, typically, the goals of dominant coalitions in voluntary organizations, it should not be surprising to find individuals or coalitions who championed opposing unofficial operative goals (or simply opposed the operative goal) placing negative valuations on the public goods deriving from the achievement of goals which they opposed. Therefore, no member of the organization can be excluded from the consumption of public goods, regardless of the valuation (positive or negative) which the member places on the provision of the goods and in spite of the fact that the member might have either supported or opposed the achieved goal from which the goods derive.

According to Olson (1971), "latent groups" have no tendency to act voluntarily in the promotion of their common interests. Latent groups are very large groups in which individuals do not make noticeable contributions toward the achievement of group
goals and since no one will react if they make no contributions, they have no incentives to contribute toward the achievement of the group goals (Olson, 1971:51). Although the latent group concept is defined in general terms, it clearly applies equally well to voluntary organizations. According to Olson's (1971) by-product "theory" of latent groups, individuals will support their organization's interest group activity only if they are coerced to do so or if they have to support the activity to obtain the benefits from some non-public goods controlled by the organization. Only if one or both of these conditions hold can the interest group potential of latent groups be mobilized (Olson, 1971:134). This is so because individuals in latent groups have no incentives to contribute voluntarily to help achieve the organizational goals from which the public goods derive. They, as individuals, have no noticeable influence on the provision of the public goods and they cannot be denied consumption of the goods regardless of whether or not they contribute. The two key aspects of this "theory" are noticeability and free consumption. Noticeability is certainly a problem if the contribution required of the volunteers is a combined vote, by secret ballot, in an election. Free consumption of public goods has been dubbed by economists the "free rider problem" and this is clearly a problem for the ruling elite which wants to mobilize its volunteers in the execution of the interest group activity.

The by-product "theory" derives its name from the fact that organizations performing the interest group activity typically are able to do so as a by-product of some non-political activities from which they draw their strength and stability. If the
organizational form already exists, then most of the costs of organizing the interest group activity are already being met. This partially explains the ability of such organizations to provide their members with public goods as a by-product of their non-political activities (Olson, 1971:47, 157). For example, organizations which are largely social in character (with established organizational structures) are in the position to add the interest group activity as a by-product of their social activities. Voluntary organizations draw their strength and stability from their non-political activities and they are in the enviable position of being able to add the interest group activity as a by-product. Curiously enough, organizations which are established with the specific mandate of serving the interest group activity are less well equipped to do so over the long-term, because they have no non-political activities from which to draw their strength and stability.

Organizations capable of adding the interest group activity as a by-product still have the problem of mobilizing their membership. Only separate and selective incentives will induce rational individuals to contribute toward the provision of public goods. Selective incentives can be positive by providing benefits only to those who contribute, or negative, by coercing through punishing those who fail to contribute (or do not contribute enough) toward the provision of the public goods (Olson, 1971:51, 61). Olson (1961:176) considers the impact of selective incentives to be so great that most organizations cannot provide themselves with optimal amounts of public goods, if any at all, in their absence.

There are two important features of organizations, which
facilitate the operation of a system of selective incentives; small size and a federative structure. The larger the organization, the greater the tendency for the provision of a suboptimal amount of public goods, but this is less serious in organizations composed of members with greatly different interests in their provision (Olson, 1971:35). Furthermore, federative organizational structures are conducive to the provision of public goods by virtue of the small size of their constituent units (Olson, 1971:63). If the federation provides some service to the small constituent units, then the leaders of the small units can be induced to use their solidary incentives to get their members to contribute toward the provision of public goods for the organization as a whole. This argument is based on Olson's (1971:63) contention that solidary incentives are important only in small groups and play a role in large organizations only when the organizations are federations of small constituent units. These structural features are characteristic of most voluntary organizations, increasing their potential to execute the interest group activity. Olson's (1971:63) contention that solidary incentives are important only in small groups receives some support from the federative organizational structure of most voluntary organizations. The principle of local autonomy among the small constituent units and the basic division of labor between the ruling elite and the volunteers ensures that members of voluntary organizations enjoy the solidary incentives associated with small groups at every level of the organizational hierarchy and at every rank of authority. It is worth noting that these same features of voluntary organizations permit rebellious constituent
units to break from ruling elite discipline in matters of contention, such as which operative goals to pursue.

The emergence of a political entrepreneur is also relevant for the interest group activity. Political entrepreneurs can provide the critical co-ordinative functions necessary to achieve a more optimal amount of public goods (Salisbury, 1969; Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1970). In light of the tendency toward oligarchy in voluntary organizations and the idea that volunteers tend to accept this oligarchic control, the volunteers would probably also accept the presence of a political entrepreneur if he provided a more optimal amount of public goods. As Wilson and Clark (1961:133-134) point out, the routine management of organizations requires the ruling elite to obtain a net surplus of incentives and distribute them to induce contributions from the volunteers. Salisbury (1969:27) takes this process one step further by assuming that profits accrue to the ruling elite through its exchange with the volunteers. This profit is that which exceeds the requirements of maintaining the organization. The political entrepreneur can dispose of these surplus profits to further his own interests independently of the volunteers (Salisbury, 1969:27). In Salisbury's (1969:23) words:

It is not argued that 'profit consumption' is the sole explanation of lobbying or influencing activity or that all such activity is equally well explained this way. It is contended, however, that a significant portion of what we observe to be lobbying activity by group leaders may result not from a mandate derived from membership demands but from the personal choices and values of the group leaders. This conception would fit and make sense of a broad spectrum of data which show group spokesmen taking public policy positions at variance with the apparent views of their members and still suffering no reprisals.

Of course, the political entrepreneur could also legitimately act
on the behalf of the organization toward the achievement of organizational goals and this would constitute interest group activity. Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1970:120) take this process yet one step further and argue that the political entrepreneur's profits, tied to the provision of public goods, act as an inducement for the emergence of competition to the entrepreneur.

There exist differential incentive systems for the ruling elite and the volunteers in voluntary organizations. For example, it is quite plausible that a political entrepreneur might emerge from within the ruling elite and secure profits from his incentive exchange with the volunteers. A material incentive system might operate for the political entrepreneur whereby he is induced to co-ordinate the interest group activity in support of a political party promising him patronage if elected to power. Concurrently, a solidarity incentive system might operate for the volunteers whereby they are induced to follow the political direction of the entrepreneur in exchange for the fellowship enjoyed in the organization under his sound management. Assuming that the volunteers are content with their incentive exchange, it is possible that the political entrepreneur might even be permitted to act independently of the organizational membership, regardless of a wide disparity between the organizational goals and his personal goals.

One explanation for the existence of this situation is the apathy of the volunteers, which results from their position as a "floating membership" of part-time contributors. On the other hand, if an entrepreneur can use an organization to further his personal interests or coalitional interests, then competing entrepreneurs might emerge in a bid to secure the profits accruing from the
routine management of the organization and then seek to further their own interests.

It is only in terms of the environment of voluntary organizations that one can realistically write about the interest group activity. Outside of the organizational boundary the shared value position becomes an interest. These organizational interests compete with other group and personal interests in the environment.

ii) Environmental Niche of Organizations

The organizational polity and economy are systems which extend outside the organizational boundary into the environment. Those groups and individuals in the environment which are interested in and affected by a given organization are "relevant others." These relevant others affect the organizational polity by sanctioning the organization's goals in terms of their perceived legitimacy. They affect the organizational economy by influencing the supply of resources used in production and the demand for the organization's product. "Transactional interdependencies" are exchanges between the focal organization and its relevant others (Emery and Trist, 1965; Terreberry, 1968). These transactions can be thought of as inputs and outputs with respect to the focal organization. This idea helps to provide a benchmark for determining which aspects of society are part of the organization's environment. For example, processes occurring in the society which do not affect the organization, or are not affected by the organization, are not part of the organizational environment.

The constitution sets the relationship between the organization and its environment by establishing the organization's
normative order, which can be compared with that of the society. The normative order of the society acts as a cultural constitution, with the most important norms being encoded in the law. A crisis results if the ideological adherence to its constitutional norms puts the organization out of touch with the cultural constitution (Wamsley and Zald, 1973b:62). Such a crisis usually involves the perceived legitimacy of the organization's goals in terms of the position it has occupied historically in its environment. Change may occur at a faster rate in either the organizational or cultural constitution, resulting in a large discrepancy between the two normative orders. For example, an organization with the mission of promoting western culture, finds itself out of touch with a society which establishes an Islamic republic.

This idea of the political relationship between the organizational and the cultural constitution has a counterpart in the organizational economy. Zald and Denton (1963:234) note that organizations which are protected from their economic environments (the market place) often find themselves poorly adapted to change. On the other hand, organizations which are immediately sensitive to changes in their economic environments (the enrollment economy) can change to meet the shifting demands of their prospective members and users of the organizational products (Zald and Denton, 1963:234). Voluntary organizations with strong ideological bases fit this notion of being protected from changes in their economic environment. The tendency toward goal displacement can be thought of as an attempt on the part of the ruling elite to make the voluntary organization more sensitive to changed conditions in its economic environment. As Wilson and Clark (1961:157) note,
organizations must change their goals when they cease to provide a stable incentive resource base. Goal displacement gives the organizational economy the priority (over political considerations such as the original ideological basis of the organization), because the relatively tangible goals associated with organizational survival permit ruling elites to increase their stock of incentives in spite of doctrinal violations.

The environmental niche is the position occupied by the organization in its environment (Zald, 1970a:51). The pursuit of organizational goals determines this niche. In other words, ruling elites set goals which stake out claims for their organizations. These "domains" identify exchanges between the organization and its relevant others, leading to expectations (for both the organizational members and relevant others) as to what the organization will and will not do (Thompson, 1967:26-27, 127).

The environmental niche occupied historically by an organization leads to alliances, commitments and oppositions to relevant others. For example, the L.O.A. of early nineteenth century Canada West had a goal of defending protestant interests. The L.O.A.'s domain included loyalty to the Crown's representative and opposition to the Catholic church in politics because these were the perceived means to the achievement of their goal. This led to an expectation on the part of the Orangemen and catholics that they would oppose each other on all fronts. This environmental niche indicates that the L.O.A. was the vanguard of militant protestantism.

Thompson and McEwen (1958:29) argue that the organization's very survival depends upon the ruling elite having a clear understanding of the environmental niche. Goal displacement changes
the organization's niche. A larger stock of incentive resources might be secured in the process, but the organization's historic commitments, alliances and oppositions are also changed. The problem emerges of the legitimacy of the changed organization.

Mannigan and Bueneman (1977:126) define organizational legitimacy as the degree to which organizations are accepted by their relevant others: being effective vehicles for the achievement of their goals and as having goals and activities which are congruent with the dominant values of the cultural constitution (the superordinate system). Of course, organizational goals change and as Wamsley and Zald (1973a:67) point out, the cultural constitution also changes, thereby affecting organizational legitimacy. In other words, organizational legitimacy is not granted and then forgotten about; the maintenance of legitimacy is an ongoing process. Dowling and Pfeffer (1975:125-126) clarify the nature of organizational legitimacy by viewing it as a resource that organizations seek to obtain and as a dynamic constraint on organizational activities.

Our case study will serve to operationalize in terms of concrete organizational structures and processes, the abstract concepts presented in this chapter. The problem is to explain the tradeoff whereby doctrinal purity was exchanged for an environmental niche providing for political influence at the societal level.
CHAPTER 4

A CASE STUDY OF THE SCHISM IN THE LOYAL ORANGE ASSOCIATION OF MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY CANADA WEST

The first statement of the central argument and its elaboration in terms of sociological concepts was abstract, involving an artificial three-fold breakdown (incentives, factionalism and environmental niche). The demonstration of this argument will follow the natural development of goal displacement in the L.O.A. Prior to the schism the L.O.A. experienced a politics of scarcity. During the schism the rival factions disputed which actions should be taken to solve what had become an economic crisis. Accompanying the resolution of the schism a tradeoff was made which solved the economic crisis and moved the L.O.A. toward a politics of abundance. Such a demonstration constitutes an explanation of goal displacement in terms of incentives, those relating to activities being fundamental rather than those relating to doctrine.

A. The L.O.A.'s Political Economy Prior to the Schism

In this section we shall present the L.O.A.'s political economy and demonstrate that it was suffering a politics of scarcity. We are primarily concerned with the state of the organization as a system.

1) Orangeism

Orangeism is the doctrine from which the Orangemen derived their normative order. It provided ideological support for the organizational goals, invested the organizational activities with
meaning for the members and helped to establish the L.O.A.'s environmental niche. The Orangeism of early and mid-nineteenth century Canada West was a distinctive Canadian variation of an international doctrine, sharing certain basic principles with Irish and English versions. Canadian Orangeism did, however, develop its own particular meanings in Canada West and it is this specific form of Orangeism relative to historical events in Canada that is most relevant to our case study.

The Orangemen associated their basic principles with the "Glorious Revolution of 1688" in England, whereby Prince William of Orange was invited by a group of nobles to establish a Protestant monarchy. The principles of 1688 include the maintenance of the Protestant religion and succession, the establishment of a free parliament and law and order as a lasting foundation for the kingdoms (Saunders, 1960:15). The first principle is the only one of the three specific to Orangeism. The maintenance of the Protestant religion and succession actually involves two related principles: conditional loyalty to the British monarch and the preservation of civil and religious liberty. These principles formed the basis of Orangeism in Canada West, helping to distinguish the beliefs of the Orangemen from those of the general population.

The first of the two related principles concerns loyalty to the British monarch on the condition that the monarchy remained Protestant. This conditional loyalty underlines the fact that Orangeism was militantly Protestant and that religious values took precedence over political values. In other words, the Orangemen

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4 Roberts (1971) concludes that the Orange Order in Ireland consistently claimed to be a religious institution, [continued]
would not have been loyal to a British catholic monarch. The
protestant succession which the Orangemen sought to maintain in
Britain was that of the Church of England (Anglican), the established
church.\textsuperscript{5} This Church provided a symbol of the protestant ascend-
ancy around which the Canadian Orangemen, as members of the
Empire, could rally.

The loyalty aspect of this first principle derives from the
rebellion period of late eighteenth century Ireland, which resulted
in a traditional distinction between loyal Orangemen and disloyal
catholics.\textsuperscript{6} In Canada West the myth of catholic disloyalty was
sustained by the argument that members of the Catholic church were
incapable of being loyal British subjects because they bore first
allegiance to the Pope in Rome (Orange Association: 26-27).

Loyalty to the British monarch, on the other hand, involved first
allegiance to the head of the British Empire, of which the colony

\textsuperscript{4} [continued] while not denying its political aspect, and
remaining actively involved in politics.

\textsuperscript{5} This situation requires some clarification because although
the Irish Orangemen of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century were largely Church of Irelanders (essentially the
Anglican church in Ireland), 'dissenters soon joined,' most notably
the Scots Presbyterians of Ulster (Senior, I966:40; Bowen,
I978:30). The established church affiliation of the Orange
Order in Ireland is explained by the fact that church establish-
ment was an important surviving symbol of the protestant ascend-
ancy (Senior, I966:238; Bowen, I978:133).

\textsuperscript{6} The Orangemen were considered by the British government to be
the only unquestionably loyal civilian sector of the population,
in the face of a united Irishman plot to overthrow the govern-
ment with the help of a French invasion (Senior, I966:22, 90,
I04). A substantial portion of the catholic population proved
to be loyal to the government during the rebellion period, but
Orangeism distorts this fact.
of British North America was part. The idea of a protestant ascendency over catholicism stems from the battle of the Boyne, fought July 12, 1690 in Ireland. This victory of the protestant King William III (Prince of Orange) over the catholic King James II secured the protestant ascendency "for all time". The battle of the Boyne, and its ritual enactment via the traditional July 12 Walk, was the most important symbol of the protestant ascendency. The protestant ascendency survived in concrete terms in Great Britain and Ireland at least until catholic emancipation in 1829.\(^7\) The protestant ascendency in Canada west was symbolized by the July 12 Walk and the privileges of the Anglican church. It was supported by the widespread perception of the power of Orangeism in Canadian society. The catholics enjoyed the same legal rights as the protestants in Canada,\(^8\) making the informal and symbolic aspects of the ascendency all the more important.

The second of the two related principles concerns the preservation of civil and religious liberty. The Orangemen believed that civil and religious liberty could only be preserved by maintaining the protestant ascendency (Orange Association:27).

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\(^7\) Originally, the protestant ascendency in Ireland meant a protestant, minority subjugation of the catholic, majority people. The formal aspect of the ascendency was a penal code, prohibiting catholics the possession of firearms and excluding them from parliament and high military office (Senior, 1966:4). The informal aspects included the unofficial positive sanction by the government of Orange outrages against the catholic peasants and the July 12 Walk, which often provoked violence.

\(^8\) The treaty of Paris guaranteed the freedom of religion to the catholic subjects of France, who were transferred to english control in Canada, following the conquest in 1759 (L.O.A. Incorporation Bill, 1883:634). In other words, in theory a protestant ascendency never existed in Canada.
This led to total opposition to the political activities of the Catholic church, because the Orangemen believed that civil and religious liberty would end if Catholicism gained an ascendancy over Protestantism. The Orangemen viewed Canada East (called Lower Canada prior to 1841 and Québec after 1867) as a bastion of Catholicism. This "French threat" provided the L.O.A. with a suitable enemy, comparable to the perceived Catholic, republican threat to the Ulster Orangemen in Ireland.

a) Official Goals

The name "Loyal Orange Association" indicates the cautious approach taken by the Canadian organization in light of the legal problems experienced by the Orange Order in Great Britain and Ireland. Canadian Orangemen changed the name of their organization from "Orange Order" to "Benevolent and Loyal Orange Association" to circumvent the Unlawful Societies Act (1325) of the British parliament (Nelson, 1950:8). The L.O.A. in Canada would seem to have been closer in spirit to a short-lived organization in Ireland than to the Orange Order. The Loyal and Benevolent Orange Institution was founded, in 1825, to keep alive the Orange tradition during the three-year period in which the Orange Order was outlawed. Both organizations were more tolerant of Catholics than the Orange Order, as suggested by a condition for membership: "This is,

9 The name "Orange Order" was taken in 1795 by the original Irish organization. Senior (1956:150) summarizes the position of the Orange Order, writing: "Their organization had become the recognized carrier of the Orange tradition, acknowledged by the Ulster peasants, the Protestant clergy and gentry, and the Dublin placemen who together made up the 'Protestant interest'." The Orange Order was an oath-bound, secret society, putting it outside of British law.
exclusively, a Protestant association, yet, detesting an intolerant
spirit, it admit[ed] no persons into its brotherhood, who are not well
known to be incapable of persecuting, injuring, or upbraiding
anyone on account of his religious opinions." (Senior, I:66:207;
Laws and Ordinances, I:840:3). Officially, the L.O.A. retained a
more tolerant position with regard to Catholics than the Orange
Order, but this seems to have been a "public" condition for
membership, having no relationship to the values of the vast
majority of the volunteers.

Official goals of the L.O.A. can be inferred from the basic
principles of Orangeism outlined above. These goals were very
vague, permitting a wide range of interpretation of their meanings
and organizational activities required for their achievement.

The first and most important official goal was to defend
the interests of Protestantism. The preservation of civil and
religious liberty was clearly one of these "interests". Connected
to this official goal was a constitutional norm such that the
goal's achievement should in no way benefit Catholicism. On the
surface, this constitutional norm seems inconsistent with the idea
of toleration toward Catholics. It is ambiguous but nevertheless
consistent with the doctrine. These subtle ambiguities are at
the heart of Orangeism, enabling it to be interpreted as a doctrine

10 These goals are gleaned, in part, from the Laws and Ordinances
of the L.O.A., which were drawn up at the first Grand Lodge
in 1830 and amended and confirmed in 1840. They were formed
when the legality of the L.O.A. was in question, requiring a
knowledge of the history of the organization and less
official statements of purposes for their delineation.
at the highest level and folklore at the lowest level. This constitutional norm served to pit Orangemen against catholics in order to defend protestant interests, thus serving to continue the tradition of anti-catholicism while enabling the L.O.A. to profess publicly that its members were required to be tolerant of catholics.

The second official goal was to maintain the british connection. This goal included loyalty to the monarch (as the symbol of the british connection) and british institutions in general, on the condition that the royal succession remained protestant. Connected to this official goal was a constitutional norm such that the goal's achievement should in no way betray the principles of Orangism. In other words, the british connection was more important as a link to the "Glorious Revolution of 1638" than as a political connection.12 In Canada the tradition of conditional loyalty was sustained by a division among the Orangemen as to whether their first loyalties belonged to Great Britain, as the head of the Empire, or to the rapidly emerging Canadian dominion.

The third official goal of the L.O.A. was to aid their

11 In Senior's (1966:115) words, referring to the Orangism of late eighteenth century Ireland: "It was in the interest of the Orang leaders to discipline their membership, but they could not press such control too far without undermining the anti-catholic spirit which gave Orangism its driving force." Gray (1972:24) refers to the ambiguous nature of the doctrine as a "double-think" that runs through Irish Orangism, enabling the ruling elite to caution the volunteers to be charitable toward their catholic brethren and all the while maintaining Orangism's driving force, sectarianism.

12 The idea of a direct political connection with Britain came under fire from the Irish Orangemen at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when in spite of official Grand Lodge neutrality on the subject, most of the Orangemen opposed the union with Great Britain (Senior, 1966).
brethren and especially Orange immigrants. Whereas the first two official goals were shared by the parent organizations, this immigrant aid goal was more closely tied to the position in which the Orangemen found themselves in Canadian society. The first Canadian Orangemen were immigrants who found comfort and cohesion from the Orange lodge system of organization.

ii) Organization of Authority

The L.O.A. had a federative organizational structure because it was agreement among previously existing lodges which led to the institution of the Grand Lodge as the central governing body in 1830. The jurisdiction of the Grand Lodge included Canada West, Canada East and the Maritimes¹⁳ and it enjoyed complete autonomy with respect to its parent organizations in Great Britain and Ireland (Senior, 1972a:17).

The rules, regulations and ceremonies were approved at the first Grand Lodge (many of which remain unchanged to-day) and the Irish style of organization was adopted (Saunders, 1960:27). There is some disagreement as to what "Irish style"¹⁴ means, but it is sufficient for our purposes that there existed a system of

¹³ We shall limit our discussion to Canada West because it was there that the vast majority of the Orangemen lived and most of the relevant historical events (including the schism) occurred.

¹⁴ Saunders (1960:27), an L.O.A. historian, states that "Irish style" means that the Grand Lodge chooses the County Grand Masters, who then appoint District Masters. Mood (1950:22) states that "Irish style" means that Local Lodge Masters elect the District Master and the District Masters meet to form County Grand Lodges. Senior (1966) reports that all levels of Master in the Orange Order of early nineteenth century Ireland (presumably "Irish style") were elected.
graduated authority from Grand, to County, to District and finally to Local Lodges. Wood (1950:23) characterizes the L.O.A., writing: "...this organizational system provided a closely-woven, powerful unity among a body of men bound by an oath to support common principles." The Grand Lodge was the final arbiter in all matters of dispute (Constitution and Laws, 1919:19) and major decisions could be made only in session. It is, however, characteristic of federations that they adhere to a principle of local autonomy. This led to a great deal of local autonomy in decision-making out of session and provided the potential for local lodges to break from Grand Lodge discipline over controversial issues.

The Grand Lodge constituted the ruling elite of the L.O.A.. The members who were entitled to sit and vote in the annual Grand Lodge included all of its last past and present officers, in addition to the County, District and Local Lodge Masters (Laws and Ordinances, 1840:18). There existed a system of proxy voting, resulting from the difficulties in transportation during colonial times. The nature of the Grand Lodge was alluded

15 The most important officers of the Grand Lodge were the Grand Master, one or two Deputy Grand Masters, the Grand Chaplain, Lecturer, Treasurer and Secretary. The Grand Master was usually the most powerful person at the Grand Lodge and directed most of the L.O.A. affairs with a free hand while out of session. The Grand Chaplain and Lecturer were important as the official guardians of the symbols and mysteries of Orangeism. They dealt almost exclusively with the resocialization of new volunteers and the continual process of reminding the old volunteers of the meanings of Orangeism. The Grand Treasurer and Grand Secretary were important in the routine management of the L.O.A.'s finances and internal communication, respectively. Revenue came from the issue of warrants, dues from the members and contributions from patrons.
to by Gowan in an address to the assembled delegates; "... this is our parliament, you are the assembled representatives of the Orange constituencies throughout the province." (A.R.-G; June 1855:13).

The Grand Lodge's primary functions were the interpretation of Orangeism (especially official goals) and the formulation of operative goals. Of course each operative goal required practices with respect to the allocation of resources toward its achievement, but we shall not elaborate on this aspect. We shall, however, briefly indicate the traditional lodge activities associated with the L.O.A.'s goals; but first we shall characterize the Orangemen over whom the Grand Lodge ruled.

iii) Social Demographic Characteristics of the Orangemen

Although publicly the L.O.A. has always claimed an inflated membership, the ruling elite admitted, internally, problems in determining the organization's size. A report of the Grand Secretary is a case in point: "... according to the Warrant Registry, 1,104 Warrants have been issued, but how many are dormant is not known and whether the L.O.A. numbers 10,000 or 110,000, there is no means of ascertaining — all is conjecture." (A.R; June 1861:17). Keeping in mind the shortcomings of the available data, Table I (page 61), represents a crude measure of the L.O.A.'s membership size in early and mid-nineteenth century

16. An important indicator of the vitality of voluntary organizations is the size of their memberships. It is, however, characteristic that their membership size is very difficult to assess because of the tenuous nature of the voluntary participation and commitment of the volunteers. It is not unrealistic to think of the volunteers as a "floating membership".
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Orangemen</th>
<th>Male Population</th>
<th>Orangemen as a Percentage of the Male Population***</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 16 Years Old</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1833</td>
<td>11,000*</td>
<td>81,235</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1836</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>100,372</td>
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<tr>
<td>1837</td>
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<td>19,000*</td>
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<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 Years Old and Older</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>224,810</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
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<td>100,000</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** (Senior, 1972a: 24, 25, 33, 42, 47); (Wood, 1950: 22, 165); Censuses of Canada, 1865-1871, vol. IV, Table I and Table IV.

* These figures have been rounded off.
- 1833: 10,000-12,000
- 1840: 18,000-20,000
- 1854: 60,000-70,000

** No figures are available for the years between the 1851-52 and 1860-61 censuses. These figures have been estimated for purposes of comparison.

*** The progression from the first four percentages through to the last four is artificial because of the different male population bases. This increase in the number of Orangemen as a percentage of their target group (males, eighteen years old and older), however, appears to be real.
Canada West. The growth in membership size from 11,000 in 1833 to 100,000 in 1860 is phenomenal. An even more remarkable statistic is the percentage of the male population with membership in the L.O.A. The Orangemen accounted for 14% of the male population over 16 years old in 1833. By 1860, they accounted for 29% of the male population 20 years old and older. In spite of the different male population bases available for comparison, it appears that the L.O.A. captured an increasingly larger percentage of its target group (males, eighteen years old and older) in addition to experiencing rapid growth in real numbers.

There were four basic membership criteria. The volunteers had to be male, a minimum of eighteen years old, loyal and protestant (Laws and Ordinances, 1840:14). These criteria narrowed down the universe of possible volunteers considerably and they were intended to do so. The loyal and protestant criteria are predictable, but there are some aspects to the "protestant" criterion that require further elaboration.

17 There appears to have been this many Orangemen in Canada West in 1860 because then Grand Master, J.H. Cameron, presented a petition (signed by 100,000 Orangemen) to Queen Victoria that year, to complain of a royal snub to the L.O.A. by the Prince of Wales, during his Canadian visit and to profess their loyalty to the Crown (Creighton, 1952:304).
Table II (page 64) suggests an interesting dimension to the Protestant membership criterion. If our estimates are correct, then circa 1860, 57% of the Orangemen were church-statists, while 43% were voluntarists. (The church-statist category represents the Church of England and the voluntarist category a combination of the Methodists and Presbyterians.) The full importance of church-statism and voluntarism will be developed below. For the moment, it is enough to know that these were rival religious beliefs, dividing the Protestant denominations.

This information about the denominational affiliation of the Orangemen does not contradict the traditional established church affiliation of Orange organizations. This affiliation was maintained at the symbolic level in Canada in spite of a large section of the membership being dissenters. The Church of England was an "unofficial established church" in Canada, which was allotted, 64% of the clergy reserves when they were divided among the various denominations (Moir, 1959). Even the L.O.A. members who were dissenters recognized the importance of the Church of England as a champion of the Protestant ascendancy, although the dissenters

Two other aspects of the religious dimension are worth noting. Mormons were not permitted to join the L.O.A. (Constitution and Laws, 1919:63), thereby indicating a limit to the extent of dissent that was tolerated within Christian sects. Table II (page 64) indicates that the Mormons represented less than 1% of the total population of Canada West in 1860, but their exclusion is, nevertheless, interesting. Also of interest is the fact that the Protestant criterion extended to the volunteers' families, as evidenced by a resolution stating that volunteers who were married to Catholics or those permitting their children to be educated in Catholic institutions were not permitted to hold office in the L.O.A. (A.R.; June 1857:22).
### TABLE II

Denominational Affiliation of Total Population and Orangemen in Canada West, circa 1860

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>Affiliation of Total Population</th>
<th>Affiliation as a Percent of Total Population</th>
<th>Orangemen</th>
<th>Affiliation as a Percent of Orangemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church of England</td>
<td>311,559</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>56,818</td>
<td>57 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodists</td>
<td>350,373</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>38,636</td>
<td>39 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>23,330</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wesleyan</td>
<td>215,427</td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>6,818</td>
<td>7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episcopal</td>
<td>74,616</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>4,545</td>
<td>5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Connection</td>
<td>25,199</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>27,273</td>
<td>27 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bible Christians</td>
<td>8,801</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterians</td>
<td>303,374</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>4,545</td>
<td>5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>51,578</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of Scotland</td>
<td>108,963</td>
<td>8 %</td>
<td>2,273</td>
<td>2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Church</td>
<td>143,033</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>2,273</td>
<td>2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>258,151</td>
<td>18 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>61,559</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>24,299</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mormon</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>93 %</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>101 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**
(1.P; June 1858:25); Censuses of Canada, 1865-1871, vol. IV, Table II; Table I (page 61).

*An unprecedented number of clergymen were named as Deputy Grand Chaplains in 1858. The Church of England was given 25 representatives, Methodists 17 (12 New Connection, 3 Wesleyan, 2 Episcopal) and Presbyterians 2 (1 Church of Scotland, 1 Free Church). We assume that each Deputy Grand Chaplain represents an equal number of Orangemen. This is reasonable because the Grand Lodge was similar to a parliament, representing the Orange lodges throughout Canada West.*
differed dramatically from the church-statists on purely religious grounds and on the political issues relating to their religious differences. The split among the Orangemen, between the voluntarists and church-statists, suggests that religious differences within protestantism were less important than the common bond of Orangeism.

With regard to race, cultural background and nationality, there were some obvious uniformities among the volunteers. Since the early L.O.A. provided an important immigrant aid activity, we assume that the vast majority of the early volunteers were British subjects, usually having some connection with Ireland. The strongest of these three characteristics seems to have been that of cultural background and this acted as a natural selection process. The Orange tradition seems to have overridden considerations of race and nationality in Canada West.

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19 This in no way supports Nelson's (1950:23) erroneous contention that the Canadian Orangemen were very race conscious, with respect to the superiority of the Anglo-Saxons. The volunteers were (in addition to those of English descent) of Irish, Scottish and even French descent, the Celtic race. The fact that "coloured people" (presumably Canadian Indians), applied to join the L.O.A. as early as 1854 (A.R.G.; June 1894:61), destroys the myth of racism. A racist organization would certainly not receive applications from, or consider admitting, "coloured people". Throughout history, there have existed Canadian Indian lodges and black African lodges in Ghana (Gray, 1972). For example, warrant 1529 was issued to Orornhstehka of the Oneida Reserve, Middlesex County, Ontario, in 1884 and the Six Nations Lodge 2705, Brant County, Ontario was extant in 1960 (Directory of Ontario West Lodges in Saunders, 1960).

20 Bowen (1978:123) characterizes the differences between the catholics and protestants of mid-nineteenth century Ireland in terms of culture: "Each community found life meaningful according to the traditional symbols approved and supported by their people."
In terms of social class background, there was a tradition that the members of the ruling elite were drawn from a higher social class than the volunteers.\(^{21}\) In Canada it was politicians who gave the L.O.A. its prestige, many of whom held positions in the ruling elite. Another aspect of the basic social class distinction between the ruling elite and the volunteers was the formation of an inner circle, a device which is common to secret societies, whereby the ruling elite is given exclusive secret signs and passwords and bound by an oath requiring higher standards of behavior. Senior (1966:78) notes the existence of an inner circle in the Orange Order of late eighteenth century Ireland.\(^{22}\) It appears that the inner circle was a survival which was carried over in Canada.\(^{23}\) The higher standard of behavior expected from

\(^{21}\) Senior (1966:143) reports that this condition existed in the Orange Order of early nineteenth century Ireland: "As the lodges grew older, they outgrew their founders, and began to attract men higher in the social scale. The movement depended on a good deal for its prestige on the connections it could claim in high places. It was, therefore, important that the titular head of the movement should come from as exalted a station as possible." In Ireland the Orange Order could claim several noblemen and Church of Ireland clergy, and in England there were some peers and a couple of dukes.

\(^{22}\) In Senior's (1966:78) words: "Such devices are common to secret societies and provided a means by which gentlemen and reliable plebeians might exercise control over the unruly rank and file."

\(^{23}\) Four degrees existed in the L.O.A., corresponding to the hierarchy of lodges from Orange (Local Lodge), to Purple (District Lodge), to Blue (County Lodge) and, finally, to Scarlet (Grand Lodge) (Laws and Ordinances, 1840:15). The Grand Lodge of 1860 was opened in the "Illustrious Degree of the Royal Scarlet" (A.P.; June 1860), providing evidence for the operation of an inner circle. Those volunteers not possessing this degree were excluded from the meetings.
the ruling elite served to institutionalize the "double-think" inherent in the relationship between Orangeism and Catholicism. They were expected to respect their Catholic brethren and their dissenting religious beliefs, while opposing the Catholic church in politics, and leave the anti-Catholicism to the plebian volunteers.

The social class background of the volunteers is more difficult to characterize because individual volunteers are rarely mentioned in the historical documents. The volunteers as a collectivity can, however, be characterized in very general terms. The dues for the volunteers were one shilling and three pence annually and for the ruling elite there was an additional charge of five shillings (Laws and Ordinances, 1940:16). This differential rate supports the idea that the volunteers were of a lower social class background than the ruling elite. According to Nelson (1950:44) the rural volunteers in Canada were generally small farmers with little education. In the 1840's in York (Toronto), policemen, tavern keepers, carters and laborers formed a significant section of the urban volunteers (Nelson, 1950:77). A pattern of

24 The original form of the Orange Order in Ireland was that of an agrarian secret society, which appealed to the peasants. In the late eighteenth century Ireland, a yeomanry was drawn largely from the loyal Orangemen. Senior (1966:50) provides some information on the social class background of the yeomanry, and by inference that of the volunteers in the Orange Order: "The yeomanry could not be recruited without the co-operation of the lower class Protestants, and the Orange leaders were to be both an agency for employing the energies of the Protestant peasants and a means of keeping them under some degree of gentry control." In addition to many volunteers belonging to the yeomanry, others were in the regular British army. It was the illegality of regimental lodges, and the fact that the Duke of Cumberland was both the field marshal of the regular British army and the Imperial Grand Master of the Orange Order, that the lodges were dissolved in 1836 by the Duke (in response to political pressures) (Senior, 1966:268-273). (Regimental lodges were instrumental in the diffusion of Orangeism throughout the British Empire during the nineteenth century (Senior, 1966:13).)
military affiliation among the Irish volunteers was continued in Canada. In the 1850's in Bytown (Ottawa), the rank and file of the militia (in addition to the justices of the peace who were probably in the ruling elite) were nearly all Orangemen (O'Hanly, 1872:33). In addition, Senior (1968:19) reports that half-pay officers were encouraged to take part in the L.O.A., probably in the ruling elite.

iv) Traditional Lodge Activities

a) "Men's House"

The L.O.A.'s "men's house" activity involved the mobilization of an armed force of men. Common protection, both in the sense of armed protection against enemies and common welfare, was a constitutional right of the volunteers. In addition, all Orangemen had to make an obligation to support the Protestant royal succession in Great Britain, maintain the British connection, resist attempts to weaken British influence in the colonies or dismember the Empire and assist civil and military powers to defend against insurrection (Laws and Ordinances, 1840:12). Interestingly, these four obligations refer implicitly to Catholicism and this religion's alleged mission of political warfare against Protestantism and British institutions in general. One of the Orangemen's most sacred obligations was "... to resist the encroachments of the Church of Rome, at the same time respecting the members of that church." (Orange Association:22). It was through these constitutional obligations that the official goal to defend the interests of Protestantism was implemented in the organizational economy.
The tradition of using the lodges to mobilize an armed force of men began in Ireland. This tradition continued in Canada where loyal Orangemen formed half of the militia and played a major role in supporting the government during the rebellion period, 1837-38 (Nelson, 1950:63-64; Senior, 1972a:31). Gowan was wounded twice at the battle of the Windmill where his militia battalion of Orange volunteers repulsed the invasion forces under the mercenary Von Schoutitz (Nelson, 1950:64). This event was important because it secured a military reputation for Gowan and served as a testimony to Orange loyalty. Gowan's militia battalion was awarded the name "Queen's Royal Borderers", by the Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, Sir George Arthur, for its part in the fighting (Senior, 1972a:34). This formal government recognition was a high prestige item which put the organization in competition with the Family Compact as the most important champion of loyalty to the government.

b) Secret Work

The L.O.A.'s secret work activity involved the secret use of rituals and passwords in the lodge and secret meanings that were attributed to public celebrations. One of the most important

25 According to Weber (1964:352) the "men's house" is the oldest form of professional military organization. This was the form taken by the original Orange Order of 1795 in Ireland. The Orange Order evolved rapidly from an agrarian secret society to a powerful political movement, but retained its "men's house" capabilities.

26 The Family Compact was a group of families whom administered Upper Canada by retaining the confidence of successive Lieutenant-Governors.
constitutional rights of the volunteers was the initiation into the mysteries of Orangeism. This initiation began with taking the Orange Degree and was replete with esoteric rituals and pageantry that rivalled the rites of Freemasonry. The Orangemen took the idea of secrecy seriously, as indicated by their strong reaction to an attempt by some members to print copies of the mysteries of Orangeism.27 As Gist (1940:80, 81) notes, it is typical of fraternal secret societies that their normative orders, and perhaps official goals, are made public, while the volunteers are obligated to keep the rituals secret.

All Orangemen had to make a constitutional obligation to hold sacred the name of King William III (Prince of Orange) and promise to celebrate July 12 (Laws and Ordinances, 1840:12). These were included in the sworn statement for admission to the Orange Degree, highlighting the July 12 Walk as a centuries-old obligation.28 The first obligation is curious in light of the fact that the Orangemen claimed elsewhere that the L.O.A. was true to principles rather than to a man because the revolution of 1633 was organized to establish principles rather than to put a man on the throne (Orange Association:27). These ambiguities in Orangeism...

27 It was resolved by the Grand Lodge that "...all lectures issued in the Cypher, should be called in, and burned, as your Committee consider that the Oral system is one of the fundamental principles of all Secret Societies, and should not therefore, under any consideration, be touched or interfered with." (A.R; June 1858:44).

28 "I will ever hold sacred the name of our glorious deliverer, King William III, Prince of Orange, in grateful remembrance of whom...to celebrate his victory over James at the Boyne, in Ireland, by assembling with my brethren...on the Twelfth day of July in every year." (IK Miller, 1975:6, 12).
arose as a consequence of tensions between making the constitutional obligations public to gain respectability in society and maintaining secrecy as to their real meanings to maintain membership commitment to the doctrine. For example, the July 12 Walk could be publicly proclaimed as a manifestation of the Orangemen's love of civil and religious liberty, all the while symbolizing the protestant ascendancy over catholicism. Senior (1972a:92) emphasizes the importance of the Walk in Canada: "Clashes on July 12 provided new and local traditions which added to Orange folklore, and every celebration of the twelfth offered the prospect of a new encounter".

c) Immigrant Aid

The L.O.A.'s immigrant aid activity involved helping Orange immigrants adjust to Canadian society. The right to immigrant aid was part of the volunteers' constitutional right to common protection. The immigrant aid activity was the product of the direct application of the official goal to aid Orange brethren, and especially Orange immigrants. Due to the massive Irish protestant immigration of the 1830's, the L.O.A. emerged as "... the largest and best organized immigrant association in Upper Canada,..." (Senior, 1972a:14).

Table III (page 72) provides a sketch of the L.O.A.'s success at attracting members from its target group. As background, it is significant that Irish born was the largest category of foreign born residents in Canada West for all of the years recorded from 1842 to 1860-61, often accounting for a total number which was similar to the combined total of English, Welsh and Scottish born (Censuses of Canada, 1865-1871, vol. IV, Table III).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Orangemen* Number</th>
<th>Non-Catholics</th>
<th>%**</th>
<th>Non-Catholic Males Number***</th>
<th>18 years old and older</th>
<th>Irish born Number</th>
<th>%****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1842</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>433,934</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>102,582</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>78,255</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>602,172</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>155,063</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>140,673</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>754,309</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>134,344</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>175,963</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>1,137,940</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>209,079</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>191,231</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: Censuses of Canada, 1665-1871, vol. IV, Table I, Table II and Table III; Table I (page 61).

* These figures are estimates of L.O.A. membership size.

** These figures represent the percentage that the Orangemen accounted for in the category.

*** These figures have been estimated under the assumption that the ages were evenly distributed among the denominations.

**** These figures represent the percentage that the Orangemen would have accounted for in the category if the Orangemen were all Irish born (which they were not).
In other words, the Irish represented far and away the largest immigrant category in Canada West (and Canada East for that matter) in the mid-nineteenth century. The Orangemen accounted for 19% of the non-catholic males, eighteen years old and older, in 1842, and this figure had almost doubled, to 36% of the non-catholic males, 20 years old and older, by 1861. The inclusion of the Irish born category provides an interesting insight. Obviously, all Irish born Canadians were not part of the L.O.A. target group because many were catholic. According to Careless (1970:150), about one quarter of the Irish in Canada West during the mid-nineteenth century were catholic. The percentage accounted for by the Orangemen in the Irish born category doubled from 26% in 1842 to 52% in 1861 and was high during the intervening period of heavy Irish catholic, post-famine immigration. Since not all of the Orangemen were Irish born and many of those in the Irish born category were catholic, the increase in L.O.A. enrolment during the post-famine immigration period probably came from non-Irish immigrants and native born Canadians. In addition, the sons of Irish born Orangemen were joining by this time and they were often Canadian born. For example, Gowan's two sons, H.P. Gowan and Rev. N.C. Gowan were Orangemen. The high membership growth in the late 1850's appears then to have been the result of increased recruitment among native born Canadians and non-Irish immigrants, in addition to the traditional Irish protestants. In all likelihood these non-Irish immigrants were protestant English, Scottish and Welsh.29

29 Rev. V.P. Meyerhoffer (a former Austrian priest), was Deputy Grand Chaplain of the Gowanite faction for the year [continued]
v) The L.O.A.'s Position in Canada West

This section demonstrates the manner in which the L.O.A.'s environmental niche was determined by its goals.

a) Protestants

All of the Protestant churches in mid-nineteenth century Canada West had an "... unmitigated horror and hatred of the Church of Rome." (Kerr, 1959:4). The L.O.A. served to institutionalize and intensify the prevailing sentiments and then staked out anti-catholicism as part of its domain. The official goals concerning protestant interests and the British connection established the L.O.A. as the vanguard of militant protestantism. Since religion was an important political criterion (distinct from party preference), the L.O.A. also staked out the maintenance of the protestant ascendancy as part of its domain. A protestant ascendancy ideology became associated with the L.O.A.'s environmental niche.  

29 [continued]. 1856 (Patriot July 9 1856), giving substance to the idea that men of non-British descent joined the L.O.A.

30 The Orange Order of early nineteenth century Ireland dominated Ulster society and enjoyed political influence, while rigidly adhering to its protestant ascendancy ideology. The report of the select committee, appointed by the British parliament, in 1835, to enquire into Orangeism, serves to characterize the environmental niche occupied by the Orange Order: "These reports established beyond doubt what had been general knowledge in Ireland since 1795 — that is — that the Orangemen controlled the Irish yeomanry, had lodges in the army, enjoyed a certain immunity from justice in Ulster and were frequently involved in civil disturbances." (Senior, 1966:268).
Orangeism had an impact on the British Protestants because it was their ascendancy in the affairs of Canada West that the L.O.A. sought to maintain. The British Protestants constituted, in the mid-nineteenth century, about 67% of the population in Canada West (see Table IV, page 76). Their political influence was far greater than their numbers warranted. The Orangemen were probably more successful at exerting political influence at the local level than federally, since this was true for the British Protestants in general. In fact, as early as 1841 the extent of Orange power and influence in local politics was legendary. The Orangemen, however, exerted little influence at the societal level and the L.O.A.'s leaders sought to redress this perceived inequity.

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31 This impact was reciprocal and mostly positive. For example, two "religious" objects were found in most homes, a Bible and a portrait of Queen Victoria, and after 1850 a third "religious" object was found more frequently, a picture of King William III (Prince of Orange) crossing the river Boyne (Noir, 1967:191). The impact was, however, partly negative because the Protestant ascendancy ideology clearly supported church-stateism over voluntarism and this cleavage among Protestants was paralleled within L.O.A. ranks.

32 Government appointments, as of 1870, under federal authority favored Protestants over Catholics by a ratio of 14 to 1. These appointments under local authority favored the Protestants by a ratio of 25 to 1. The extent of patronage in favor of the British Protestants is indicated by the fact that the total population represented a ratio of only 2 to 1 for the Protestants (O’Hanly, 1872:17-21).

33 A letter from George Nichols to Lord Sydenham (York, March 8, 1841) gives some indication of Orange power and influence at the local level in York (Toronto): "Your Excellency may be enabled to form some idea of the influence of the Society in this city, when informed that several members of the Corporation are members of it, that Alderman Armstrong is the Grand Treasurer and Master of a Lodge in this city, to which the Clerk of the Council, the High Bailiff, the City Inspector, [continued]"
### Table IV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Political Area</th>
<th>Protestants*</th>
<th>Protestants as a Percentage of total population</th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>Catholics as a Percentage of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1851-52</td>
<td>Canada West</td>
<td>634,994</td>
<td>67 %</td>
<td>167,695</td>
<td>18 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canada East</td>
<td>99,351</td>
<td>11 %</td>
<td>746,854</td>
<td>84 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Province of Canada</td>
<td>731,345</td>
<td>40 %</td>
<td>914,549</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860-61</td>
<td>Canada West</td>
<td>965,306</td>
<td>69 %</td>
<td>258,151</td>
<td>13 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canada East</td>
<td>138,056</td>
<td>12 %</td>
<td>943,253</td>
<td>85 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Province of Canada</td>
<td>1,103,372</td>
<td>44 %</td>
<td>1,201,404</td>
<td>48 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Censuses of Canada, 1665-1871, vol. IV, Table I and Table II; Census of the Canadas, 1851-52, vol. I, Comparative Table of the Religious Census of Upper Canada, as taken in the years 1842, 1843 and 1851.

- The Protestant category includes only the Church of Englanders, Methodists and Presbyterians. (Other Christian sects, such as the Baptists, Lutherans and Mormons, have been excluded because they did not constitute a very large sector of the total population (see Table II, page 64) and they were not directly involved with the clear grips' protestant union ambitions.) This British protestant category (in spite of the serious problem of church-statism versus voluntarism within these denominations) provides a better comparison with the relatively more homogeneous catholic category.
b) Catholics

The catholics were the historic opponents of the L.O.A., providing a suitable "threat" to the preservation of civil and religious liberty and British institutions in general. This "threat" provided legitimation for the L.O.A.'s historic opposition to the Catholic church in politics and for the protestant ascendancy.

The Canadian catholics, however, were not placated by the L.O.A.'s distinction between the Catholic church and individual catholics, whose dissenting religious beliefs were officially tolerated. They believed that the L.O.A. was an anti-catholic organization (Nool, 1950:32). This belief was justified, leading political critics of the L.O.A. to point to the protestant ascendancy as its driving force and to argue that such a mission was detestable to catholics (L.O.A. Incorporation Bill, 1883:633; The Orange Question, 1877:5).

...and every constable and policeman (without one single exception) belong, and it is a subject of general remark that tavern keepers, carters and laborers consider it necessary to become Orangemen to ensure success in their applications for licenses or employment." (IN Nelson, 1950:77). We might add that the writer of the letter, George Nichols, was either an Orangeman in 1841 or was so impressed by the L.O.A.'s power and influence that he was induced to join. In 1854, Nichols was one of the Benjaminites expelled from the L.O.A. by Gowan's Grand Lodge (A.R.-G; June 1854:63).

Ottawa provides another example. From 1855 to 1870 most local appointments in that city went to Orangemen, with no catholics being appointed to important positions in the civil service or the administration of justice (O'Mahmly, 1872:31-32).
The Irish constituted a large portion of the Irish Catholic population of Canada West in the mid-nineteenth century (see Table IV, page 76). The Irish Catholics shared an immigrant status with their Orange countrymen and both were subjected to a nativism (a prejudice against immigrants which was held by settlers of long residence in Canada). Resentment of the Protestant ascendancy and memories of wrongs committed against them by Orangemen in Ireland, however, far outweighed this common ground.

As early as 1823, there were attempts by the Irish Catholics to suppress Orangeism in Canada West. They feared that the L.O.A. would keep alive the Orange tradition of religious hatred which they had hoped to leave behind in Ireland.

The Irish constituted a much smaller portion of the Catholic population in Canada East. In addition, the French-Canadian voters tended to support Protestant candidates over Irish Catholics, further reducing their political influence (O'Hanly, 1872: 35). It was the French-Canadians who constituted the vast majority of the 84% Catholic population of Canada East in the mid-nineteenth century (see Table IV, page 76). The geographical

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34 Two separate attempts were made that year. Dr. W.W. Baldwin (the father of Robert Baldwin, the Reform party leader), tried unsuccessfully to have the Walk outlawed by introducing a bill in the Assembly (Senior, 1932a: 9). W. Bargen represented a group of Irish Catholic immigrants in an unsuccessful bid to pass an Orange Clubs bill in the Assembly, to suppress Orangeism (Nelson, 1950: 32-33).

35 An article by D'Arcy McGee, member of parliament for Montréal, provides an Irish Catholic perception of Orangeism: "The head [John A. Macdonald] of a country like this, bidding for emigration and increase of population, has no right to recognize or declare himself, over his own signature, a member of an association [L.O.A.] which, before the courts of justice, has been proved to be inimical to the rights of a portion of the community.... [continued]"
separation between the French-Canadians and the vast majority of
the Orangemen in Canada West contributed to the development of
mutual distrust. In addition, there existed an ignorance of
each other's beliefs. Two pamphlets, written in the late nineteenth
century, but referring to the development of Orangeism and the
L.O.A., provide examples of the French-Canadian perceptions. An
anonymous writer states that "... it is indubitable that they
[Orangemen] foster an inveterate and implacable hatred against
the Catholic church and that their definitive goal is to exterminate
the members of that church and seize the ground for themselves."36
(Les Orangistes, 1878:5). Bellerose (1886) provides an exaggerated
portrayal of an ideological battle between catholicism and Orangeism,
reducing the latter to a doctrine concerned primarily with anti-
catholicism and anti-French-Canadianism.

[continued] No man should abuse his high place in order to
encourage what is obnoxious to the feelings and convictions
of a large portion." (Patriot March 10 1858 IN Mood, 1950:34).

Vestiges of perceived Orange corruption in the 1870's suggests
that the Irish Catholics' fears were warranted. O'Hanly (1872:32) notes the existence of a belief among the Irish
Catholics in Ottawa that the administration of justice was
partial in cases between them and Orangemen.

36 I have translated this passage from the original French:
"Il est indubitable qu'ils nourissent une haine invétérée
et implacable contre l’Eglise catholique et que leur but
definitif est d'exterminer les membres de cette Eglise et
de s'emparer du sol."
c) Conservatives

The L.O.A.'s informal alliance with the conservatives in Canadian politics can be dated from the election of 1836. The main issue was loyalty and the choice was between the Conservative party, which had the confidence of the Lieutenant-Governor and the Reform party, with its radical policies and apparent disloyalty (Nelson, 1950:52). Voting conservative was clearly the prescribed course for the Orangemen because of the L.O.A.'s official goal to maintain the British connection, a goal which included loyalty to the Lieutenant-Governor as the monarch's representative. 37

By the late 1840's the changed political climate of Canada West 38 led to the development of two distinctive wings

37 Nelson (1950:105) concurs that the Orangemen were ultimately predisposed to the conservative side because they looked to the "Glorious Revolution of 1688" as the final settlement in religion and politics. Loyalty to the British Crown and Empire and a reverence for British institutions; in the face of an American threat, formed the basis of conservative values in the 1840's (Wise, 1967:30-31).

38 In 1841 a political union of Canada West and Canada East occurred. In 1846 Britain's adoption of the policy of free trade, over preferential trade with her colonies, compounded with the act of Union to substantially alter Canadian society. The repeal of the British Corn laws in 1846 and other free trade measures meant that British North America was on its own economically and must henceforth compete in world markets (Careless, 1970:208). Britain was, in effect, relinquishing preferential economic ties with her colonies as a step toward lessening the burden of these dependencies. The colony of British North America was approaching nationhood and the united province of Canada was the first concrete political step toward that end.
within the Conservative party. The rivalry that developed between the "Gowanites" (the opponents of the Family Compact) and the "MacNabmen" (the surviving members of the Family Compact and tory hardliners) became a serious problem within the party (Creighton, I952:I20). The "Gowanites" became known as the liberal-conservative wing and the "MacNabmen" the tory wing. This developing rift in the Conservative party was paralleled by that in the L.O.A. between the Gowanite and Benjaminite coalitions.

The leader of the liberal-conservative wing was W.H. Draper. It was Draper's conviction that the key to political power was an alliance with the French-Canadians. This strategy was necessitated by the union of French-Canadian Canada East and English-Canadian Canada West. The Bleu party was returned consistently from I844 onward in Canada East and was usually the largest single group in the Assembly (Cornell, I962:84). The liberal-conservatives realized that they must liberalize their conservatism to achieve wider popular support and facilitate an alliance with the bleus. Gowan and John A. Macdonald inherited this political strategy from Draper.

The Reform party exploited this alliance with the bleus in the I840's and early I850's, examples being the Baldwin-Lafontaine and Hickey-Morin ministries. During the period of the united province of Canada, I841-I867, the Bleu party was never exclusively French-Canadian, but it was composed primarily of French-Canadians (Cornell, I962:84).

Gowan had formed a personal alliance with Macdonald as early as I844 and it is significant that Draper considered Macdonald to be useful on his own merit and also because of his friendship with the Grand Master of the L.O.A. (Creighton, I952:104, I19). Gowan wanted liberal-conservatism to replace the old Compact toryism which he had opposed since arriving in Canada (Mood, I950:73). As Grand Master, Gowan was useful to the liberal-conservatives because of his personal [continued]
The leader of the tory wing was Sir Allan MacNab. The retirement of W.H. Draper in 1847 led to the temporary ascendancy of the tories and MacNab became the new leader of the Conservative party. MacNab had a great deal in common with Benjamin, although their political fortunes were never thrown together as were those of John A. Macdonald and Gowan. MacNab epitomized the Compact toryism and family privilege which the liberal-conservatives detested (Creighton, 1952:176). The tories opposed the liberal-conservative's political strategy. They held on to their traditional

40 (continued) influence over the Orange men. The Orange men were more reform-minded than the tories, those favoring the liberal-conservative wing, because they were mostly immigrants who looked to limited reform as a means to make Canadian society more equitable.

Senior (1972a:36-37) indicates the difference between native converts to Orangeism and immigrant Orange men over the issue of responsible government: "The older United Empire Loyalists, retired officers and those whose family residence antedated the War of 1812, were opposed to responsible government, while immigrant British were in favour on the grounds that the older inhabitants held more than their share of the patronage."

Gowan's advocacy of liberal-conservatism has a development in terms of his career and the history of the L.O.A. In the 1830's the vast majority of the Orange men advocated "immigrant democracy" (Senior, 1972a:13). Liberal-conservatism was a natural development of immigrant democracy because both political platforms were liberal. However, in the 1830's, Gowan's immigrant democracy sought to unite Irish Catholics and Protestants in Upper Canada; while in the 1840's, his liberal-conservatism sought to unite the Canada West conservatives with the blues.

MacNab was of United Empire Loyalist stock, had fought in the war of 1812, was knighted for his part in putting down the rebellion of 1837 and was a railway magnate with tory business connections. In 1849, MacNab denounced the French-Canadians as being rebels and aliens (Careless, 1967:126),
idea of tory privileges in a colonial British North America and their anti-French-Canadianism. The election of Benjamin, as the Grand Master of the L.O.A. in 1846, suggests that many of the Orangemen at that time favored the tory wing. 42

The growing rift in the Conservative party was further widened in the British American League. 43 This was most evident

42 Senior (1972a:44) cites the election of Benjamin as Grand Master in 1846 as an indication of the extent to which Canadian Orangeism had moved away from the "immigrant democracy" of the Gowanite years. It was among the established residents, like Benjamin, that the reform movement, which included strong nativism, began. Many members of the older families, such as the United Empire Loyalists, had taken membership in the L.O.A. and they favored the tories because they sought to retain their privileges. Benjamin clearly espoused the toryism of MacNab, which put him in direct political opposition to the liberal-conservatives in the Conservative party and to the Gowanite coalition in the L.O.A.. Benjamin spoke out in his Intelligencer against the idea of an alliance with the "French radicals" as a betrayal to the tories of Canada East (IN Statesman January 5, 1847). The act of Union had made the English-Canadian tories in Canada East an insignificant group compared with the blues, but the tory wing refused to betray its traditional allies.

43 The League was a conservative and Orange organization, which was formed following the disastrous election defeat of the Conservative party in 1848 and the growing annexationist sentiment among the Montreal tories, prompted by Britain's adoption of free trade. Creighton (1952:43) states that Gowan and John A. Macdonald were the two most important men at the first League meeting and that "It was one of the first illustrations of a political partnership which was to last for years."

Two meetings were held in 1849, the first in July at Kingston and the second in November at Toronto. Once those League delegates who were tending with the idea of annexation to the United States were silenced, they got down to the serious business of discussing Conservative party policy. According to Allin (1915:III), "Although nominally a non-partisan body, in reality it was an attempt to reconstruct the Tory [Conservative] party on a more popular basis. But that attempt rent the League in twain. The conservative [tory] and democratic [liberal-conservative] wings of the organization would not willingly coalesce. They stood for different principles and maintained different ideals."

[continued]
at the meeting in Toronto where Benjamin and Gowan clashed over the issue of elective institutions. 44 Benjamin turned this issue into one of loyalty, referring to his personal preference for monarchy over republicanism and his Orangeman's obligation to maintain the British connection (Minutes of the Proceedings of the Second Convention of Delegates of the British American League, Toronto 1849 Appendix:XLVI). Gowan took this as a personal insult and chose to let his past record testify to the loyalty of his principles. Gowan saw no inconsistency between elective institutions and the British constitution, claiming that increased freedom for Canada would serve to perpetuate the British connexion (Minutes of the Proceedings, Toronto 1849 Appendix:XLVI). Both men claimed that their positions were in keeping with Orange loyalty and the official goal of maintaining the British connection.

43 [continued]

The two League conventions were given wide press coverage. The League members were referred to as the "Children of the Sun" because of their lofty aims and the "Dogs and Ducks", the name of a tavern in which they had once met. George Brown made numerous disparaging remarks about Gowan, referring to him as "... the leading man of the League — the future Prime Minister," (Globe August 9 1849). Brown (Globe July 14 1849) commented on the many shades of conservatism that were present at the League conventions and summed up Gowan's position, writing that "— Gowan and the Orangemen go for Responsible Government, and cunningly devised measures leading to office and emolument."

44 The majority of the delegates, including Benjamin, favored the present system whereby the Legislative Council was appointed by the Crown, with a suggestion that the number of appointees be limited; while the minority, including Gowan, preferred that the Legislative Council be elected by the people. Benjamin spoke out strongly against elective institutions, arguing that they would bring with them republicanism and eventually annexation to the United States.
The major difference was that Gowan opted for Canadian autonomy, while Benjamin held fast to the Tory notion of colonial status for British North America. The ramifications of the repeal of the British Corn laws played into Gowan's hand. Benjamin took the relatively weak position that the only course of action for loyal Orangemen was to maintain the direct and paternalistic, political connection with Britain in spite of that tie having been severed in economic terms.

According to Allin (1915:113) the most important contribution of the League was the rejuvenation of the Conservative party, by sweeping away the old Compact Toryism and colonialism of the past in favor of liberal-conservatism. Although the liberal-conservative wing began to dominate the Conservative party after the League, the old Compact Toryism and colonialism remained the dominant political principles of the Orangemen in the Benjaminite coalition. The Tory wing, however, began to fall apart after the election of 1851, becoming a small minority within the party. The Benjaminites were then obliged to look outside the Conservative party to find expression for their belief that religious values should remain dominant over political values in the L.O.A.. The Benjaminites could not accept the Gowanite advocacy of a political alliance with the bleus because this violated Orangism.
d) Reformers

After 1851, the Benjaminites supported the Clear Grit Reform party in politics. This was an unprecedented move because the reformers were the historical opponents of the L.O.A. in Canada, they carried the stigma of being the remnant of the party that rebelled in 1837 and it was the Baldwin-Lafontaine Reform ministry that had, in 1843, introduced the Secret Societies and Party Processions bills, both aimed at suppressing the L.O.A..

45 The two leading Benjaminites, Benjamin and E.T. Hartnell, advocated, in their newspapers, an alliance with the clear grits in a common front against "papery" (Mood, I950:94).

46 The Secret Societies bill defined all organizations whose members were bound by a secret oath (with the exception of the Free Masons) as secret societies and therefore illegal. The members of secret societies would not be permitted to hold public office or serve on juries and all office holders would have to declare that they did not belong to a secret society (Mood, I950:45; Nelson, I950:81). Nelson (I950:81) cites the official reason for the bill as the fact that members of the L.O.A. and the Hibernian Society (an Irish Catholic organization) had clashed frequently. This was in fact the Reformers' revenge against the Orangemen for supporting the government during the rebellion period, breaking up reform meetings and nativistism; the L.O.A. was resented as an organization of immigrants, seeking political influence and patronage that the native born Canadians considered to be their right.

The animosity between the L.O.A. and the Reform party can be dated from the election of 1836. Mood (I950:17-18) cites two aspects to this opposition. Firstly, Grand Master Gowan promised the L.O.A.'s unqualified support for the conservatives when William Lyon Mackenzie refused to purge his Reform party of extreme radicals. Secondly, public assemblies of reformers were often broken up by Orange gangs. These fights were fuelled by the nativism upon which the reform movements were based (Senior, I978:16).

Henry Sherwood (an Orangeman and conservative member of parliament), defended the L.O.A., maintaining that the Secret Societies bill would set up a system of civil disabilities against the members of an organization whose goals were well known and was proven loyal during the rebellion period. Sherwood warned that the passage into law of such a bill would serve to strengthen Orangeism by driving [continued]
The Party Processions act attempted to suppress the Orangemen's July 12 Walk. This was justified because of the history of disturbances associated with the Walk, but it earned them the Orangemen's enduring hatred. The Benjaminites were able to support the clear grits in spite of all this adversity because they were a splinter reform party whose political strategy appealed to those Orangemen who formerly supported the tory wing of the Conservative party.

The clear grit's political strategy was a "protestant union"; an alliance of Orangemen and clear grit reformers from Canada West, with the surviving tory wing conservatives from Canada East, in a bid to exclude the catholics from political

46 [continued] it underground. Sherwood's position was given official Conservative party support by the party leader, Sir Allan MacNab (Hood, 1950:46).

The Party Processions bill defined party processions as groups marching in celebration of political events (religious groups celebrating rites, observing religious holidays or marching in procession to places of worship, were excluded) and gave the justices of the peace the power to request the dispersal of such processions and fine or imprison the offenders (Hood, 1950:46). Governor General Metcalfe reserved the Secret Societies bill for Imperial consideration, which was in effect a veto, but he signed the party-processions bill, thereby making it law (Senior, 1972a:43).

47 There was a pattern to these Walks which was transferred from Ireland to Canada. The idea was to march armed, wearing Orange insignia and playing tunes that were offensive to the catholics, in order to provoke an attack (Senior, 1966:47; 1968:27). In Canada the Orangemen were immigrants who offended the reformers and the Family Compact, in addition to the catholics. The Cobourg Walk of 1839 led to a riot with the reformers and when the Kingston Walk of 1843 resulted in one death and several injuries, the Party Processions bill was introduced (Nelson, 1950:81).
power (Careless, 1967:135). The influential editor of the Toronto Globe, George Brown⁴³, was the most fervent proponent of a protestant union. This union appealed to many Orangemen because it would be based on religion, rather than the political expediency of the liberal-conservative alliance with the French-Canadian Catholics.⁴⁹

⁴³ Brown was a strong supporter of the Presbyterian Free Church. He entered politics in 1831 to promote his belief in voluntarism (Careless, 1970:226). His beliefs led him to promote the secularization of the clergy reserves and to work toward ending the privileges granted to the Anglican church. Brown resented the "unofficial established church" status of the Anglican church and the power and influence of the Catholic church in the affairs of Canada West. He considered bills to establish separate schools in Canada West to be the result of the "French domination" of the Assembly. In an effort to gain supporters for his cause, Brown consistently emphasized the religious dimension to Canadian politics by warning of the threat posed by "French domination". The following statement is a good example of the rhetoric to be found in Brown's Globe (September 6, 1853): "It cannot be believed that this Province, containing a majority of Protestants, is ultimately to be ruled by a combination of Romanist clergy."

⁴⁹ Table IV (page 76) gives some indication of the reasoning behind the proposed protestant union. Our estimates clearly indicate that the British Protestants were in a substantial majority in Canada West in both 1851-52 and 1860-61. The fact that the British Protestants accounted for 67% and 69% of the total Canada West population for the two years is, however, misleading. Our protestant category includes the Church of Englanders, Methodists and Presbyterians. Important differences between the Church of Englanders, favoring church-stateism, and the Methodists and Presbyterians who favored voluntarism, make this category very heterogeneous. These conflicting religious beliefs led to differences over important political issues such as the clergy reserves and education. Voluntarism was an important feature of the proposed protestant union, indicating something about the Benjaminites. Either the Benjaminites were mostly drawn from denominations favoring voluntarism (an estimated 43% of the Orangemen, circa 1860, favored voluntarism; see Table II, page 64), or they were so fervently anti-Catholic that they preferred an alliance with the voluntarists over the French-Canadian Catholics. It is worth noting that Table IV (page 76) provides more support for Gowan's strategy of allying with the bleus than for a protestant union. The Catholics accounted for a larger percentage than the British Protestants, of the total population of Canada for both 1851-52 and 1860-61. In addition, [continued]
In terms of Orangeism, a protestant union was the logical extension of the protestant ascendancy ideology.

vi) A Politics of Scarcity

This section demonstrates that the ruling elite's stock of incentive resources was low prior to the schism, a condition that was conducive to organizational change.

The "men's house" activity had experienced a cyclical high during the Mackenzie rebellion. This politics of abundance was evidenced by the large stock of incentive resources that were accumulated. Solidary incentives were associated with the formal government recognition of the important role played by the L.O.A., amounting to a positive sanction in terms of its legitimacy. There was a great deal of prestige associated with being an Orangeman at this time and the ruling elite could use this to induce enrolment and participation in the L.O.A. Purposive incentives were associated with furthering the interests of protestantism by helping the authorities defend the British institutions that the rebels sought to overthrow. The intangible nature of this goal was ideal because it oriented the organization to a continual course of action. In other words, it would never be achieved, but would continue to generate purposive incentives as long as there were perceived threats to the interests of protestantism. By mid-nineteenth century

49 [continued] the catholics accounted for a whopping 34 % and 85 % of the Canada East population for the respective years, thereby swaying the tory wing allies of the proposed protestant union in that province.
century the "men's house" activity and its accompanying incentive systems were experiencing a downward turn in their cycle because Canada West was relatively peaceful. The potential to use the lodge network to further the interests of Protestantism was not being realized because there was no demand for an armed force of men.

The secret work activity had experienced a cyclical high during the 1840's when the Party Processions act was in force. During this period of interest in secret societies and defiance of what was considered to be a discriminatory law, the initiation into the mysteries of Orangeism induced enrolment in the L.O.A. Once the neophytes became full-fledged volunteers, there were continual solidarity incentives of fellowship which induced them to participate in the lodge activities. The volunteers had the constitutional right to attend secret lodge meetings, watch and participate in esoteric rituals, share in secret passwords and march in full regalia with the brethren on July 12. The lodge rituals gave the Orangemen an experiential encounter with a militant Protestant God with which the Protestant church services could never compete. Regardless of the precise social psychological incentives associated with the secret work activity, it is evident that the July 12 Walk was the most popular event of the Orangemen, who seemed to have a desire to make public manifestations of their Orangeism in order to increase the value of their internal secrecy. The Walk was important in generating incentive resources, but it also endangered the legality of the L.O.A. because of the violence which often accompanied it. The ruling elite has been
in the difficult position, historically, of having to condone the Walk to help maintain the volunteers' participation in lodge activities and commitment to Orangeism (albeit on the vulgar level of anti-Catholicism) in order to further the political interests of the ruling elite which were not necessarily shared by the volunteers. By the mid-nineteenth century the secret work activity and its accompanying incentive systems were experiencing a downward turn in their cycle because the Walk was once again legal.

During the heavy Irish Protestant immigration of the 1830's and 1840's the immigrant aid activity generated incentive resources for the L.O.A.. The Orange lodges throughout Canada West provided the Irish Protestant community with meeting places. These lodges complemented rather than trying to compete with the Protestant churches. The fellowship associated with meeting with a group of men, who often shared a common cultural heritage and always shared the principles of Orangeism, induced enrolment in the L.O.A.. Orangemen could often help their brethren in tangible ways such as finding them work or helping them to aquire land. This tangible aid provided material incentives to enrol in the L.O.A.. Irish Protestant immigration fell off sharply in the 1850's and this led to a decline in the immigrant aid activity and

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50 In early nineteenth century Ireland the Walk was the most important symbol of the Protestant ascendancy. The Irish ruling elite tolerated the Walk because it helped to keep alive the spirit of Orangeism and because it was so popular among the volunteers that they were unable to suppress it (Senior, 1966:238-239, 248).
the accompanying incentive systems.

With the traditional lodge activities experiencing difficulties, the incentives relative to Orangeism and the L.O.A.'s environmental niche were also affected. The Party Processions act of 1843 had constituted a formal government condemnation of the Walk and the protestant ascendency which it symbolized. Although the Act was repealed in 1851, the cultural constitution had undergone changes, widening the gap between the Orangemen's protestant ascendency ideology and the new importance of catholicism in Canada West. (It should be recalled that the "cultural constitution" is the normative order of the society, an environmental counterpart of the organizational constitution.) The act of Union had thrust the bleus onto the Canadian political scene. Whereas the French-Canadians had previously been a vague and distant "threat" to protestant interests and British institutions, they now had an impact on the daily life in Canada West through the agency of the Assembly. The French-Canadians now had to be dealt with operationally.

Due to this politics of scarcity, the Grand Lodge would have to diversify the L.O.A.'s incentive resource base to increase organizational stability and meet the membership demands. A larger stock of incentive resources was required to exchange for contributions of time and effort from the volunteers. The Grand Lodge controlled the existing incentive resources of the L.O.A., such as those relative to the traditional lodge activities, warrants (documents required to open new lodges) and the revenue. However, the constitutional rights of the volunteers put constraints on
the ruling elite to distribute these resources in their best interests. The most basic interest was organizational survival. This required meeting regularly (participation) and renewing numerical strength by bringing in new volunteers (enrolment). The additional incentive resources captured through diversification would have to be sufficient to induce enrolment and participation while still maintaining commitment to Orangeism. It was this problem of commitment that put further constraints on the ruling elite’s versatility in responding to the politics of scarcity.

By virtue of their membership, all of the Orangemen had access to the incentive systems relative to Orangeism and the traditional lodge activities. In addition, differential incentive systems were in operation for the ruling elite and the volunteers.

51 The Grand Lodge met at least once a year (for a period of two to four days) to elect the ruling elite and discuss L.O.A. affairs. The local lodges generally met once or twice a month. Although it is difficult to measure voluntary participation, attendance at the lodge meetings seems to have been highest in June, when the lodge officers and the ruling elite were elected, and in July, when the final preparations for the July 12 Walk were underway.

52 Roberts (1971:281) argues that the mixture of church and sectarian attributes of the Orange Order in Ireland helps to explain that organization’s success and survival. The church attribute refers to the strong familial membership motivation and the sectarian attribute refers to the membership criteria, which were exclusive and sect-like. These same attributes were found in the L.O.A.. The familial membership motivation is reflected in the traditional Orange ballad, "The Sash My Father Wore".

"My father wore it when a youth,
   In bygone days of yore,
   So on the Twelfth I proudly wear,
   The sash my father wore."
For example, only the volunteers had legitimate access to the incentives relative to anti-catholicism. The ruling elite, on the other hand, had access to incentives relative to political influence. These differential systems gave the ruling elite a greater interest in maintaining the L.O.A. because their incentives derived from the operation of a large voluntary organization, whereas anti-catholicism could be equally as well served by autonomous local lodges. Incentives associated with their prestige of office and furthering the cause of Orangeism induced the ruling elite incumbents to attempt to maintain the L.O.A.'s viability and thereby retain their positions.

The incumbent ruling elite, the Benjaminites, chose to deal with the politics of scarcity by attempting to rejuvenate the traditional lodge activities. They adhered to and even sought to strengthen the traditional protestant ascendancy ideology.

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53 The Walk provides a good example of the differential incentive systems. The Walk generated solidarity incentives, associated with the picnic atmosphere of July 12, which induced the volunteers to participate. It also generated purposive incentives, associated with renewing the basic principles of Orangeism through a symbolic re-enactment of the protestant ascendancy, which induced the ruling elite to organize the event.

54 In addition, other incentives were in operation for specific positions. Power and influence served as incentives for the Grand Master. The dissemination of Orangeism served as incentives for the Grand Chaplain and Lecturer. His salary and the potential to wield informal power served as incentives for the Grand Secretary.
This strategy would lead to an even greater divergence from the cultural constitution, moving the L.O.A.'s domain beyond that of protestant champion to that of British supremacy. The Benjamite strategy did not, however, go unopposed. A demand generated among some volunteers who favored instituting a new activity, the interest group. This rival strategy was articulated by the Gowanites. It required the mitigation of the protestant ascendency ideology and closer conformity with the new cultural constitution. At the same time this would move the L.O.A. into a new environmental niche as the sentinel for protestant interests.

B. The Schism in the L.O.A.

In this section we shall present an account of the schism in the L.O.A., and demonstrate that it was accompanied by an economic crisis. We are primarily concerned with comparing the rival factions' claims to legitimacy.

1) Chronology of Events

The schism occurred at the Grand Lodge of June 1853 in Kingston, Canada West. The precipitating event was a dispute over the use of proxy votes in the annual election of the Grand Master. Then Grand Master George Benjamin adjourned the meeting and Gowan was elected Grand Master by his supporters while

55 This was not a schism in the sociological sense, but it is identified by historians as "the schism in the L.O.A." The "schism" is best described as schismatic factionalism.
Benjamin was re-elected that evening by his supporters (June 1853:1). Two factions emerged, the Gowanites and the Benjaminites, both claiming that theirs was the legitimate Grand Lodge of British North America.

An editorial in the Montreal Gazette (June 28 1853) takes the position that the Gowanites seized power by an organizational coup d'état. There is some supporting evidence that a conspiracy was underway among the Gowanites to have Ogle R. Gowan elected as Grand Master by illegal means. In addition, an article from the Conservative Expositor (Patriot July 13 1853) takes the position that the Benjaminites had previously decided to secede from the L.O.A., if Benjamin was not re-elected. This suggests that the schism was not a spontaneous event; it was the climax of an existing cleavage between rival coalitions which was accentuated by a politics of scarcity in the L.O.A.

56 "An attempt on the part of Mr. Gowan and a few other dis- ruptionists, was made to change the form of election and place him in the chair by a coup d'état. This was properly resisted, but this proceeding led to separate meetings of the two parties, and separate elections. But we learn that Mr. Gowan's movements are generally condemned by the order."

57 Gowan disassociated himself from the L.O.A. for a couple of years and then re-entered the organization in early 1852 with the objective of regaining his former position. He ran for Grand Master at the 1852 Grand Lodge, but lost the election on a division, leaving the way clear for Benjamin, who was re-elected on a division (June 1852:17-18). A demand generated within the L.O.A. to replace Benjamin with Gowan. It was this Toronto based group that organized an illegal proxy vote campaign on behalf of Gowan in 1853. The Benjaminites produced a copy of a letter, circulated by the Toronto Gowanites to lodges unable to attend the annual Grand Lodge, asking for blank proxies to be filled in by Gowanites (June 1853: ii-iii). This was clearly an attempt at ballot stuffing and the illegality of these proxies led to a disruption in the meeting.
Historians cite events further removed from the Grand Lodge as having an impact on the schism. Creighton (1952:195-196) summarizes the effect of these events as follows:

If the weeks that followed the Gavazzi riots [58] the future seemed uncertain. Towards the end of June the Orange Order [L.O.A.] split. A minority of lodges, led by George Benjamin, withdrew in protest against the moderation of Ogle Gowan's pro-Catholic and pro-French policies and it was significant that, in the political field, the 'Benjaminites' preached a union with the clear Grits to defeat Popery.

According to Careless (1952:179) the Benjaminites represented the old tory anti-French tradition[59], and bolstered by the Gavazzi riots occurred June 1853. Gavazzi was a former catholic monk who converted to protestantism and preached against the sins of "popery". A mob disrupted Gavazzi's talk in Quebec, and his attempt to speak in Montreal resulted in a riot. Ten protestants were killed when troops opened fire on a crowd (Careless, 1957:183-184).

An article in the London Free Press, July 19, 1853, (in Mood, 1950:30-31) interprets the schism in the L.O.A. as resulting from the rift in the Conservative party: "The dispute mainly consists of the fact that certain influential members of the Conservative party...have endeavored to destroy his [Gowan] personal and political character, and that Mr. Benjamin has sympathized with them. Mr. Benjamin has always appeared to us to exercise his influence in favour of the party...that represent and support the remnant of the old Family Compact...and consequently to lean towards the personal, and (whilst ostensibly co-operating with him under the same political banner) the political enemies of ex-Grand Master Gowan."

The Benjaminites' support of the clear Grits enabled them to pursue their anti-French-Canadianism. The School bill of 1853, passed by virtue of the bleus to legislate on separate schools in Canada West was particularly disturbing. This was considered to be evidence of the "French domination" of the Assembly of the united provinces. Although favoring religious instruction in the schools (Mood, 1950:38), the L.O.A. has always opposed the spread of catholic separate schools and the use of French in the Assembly because these were considered to be special privileges.
riots and George Brown's anti-catholic crusade, were prepared to ally with other protestants in politics.

The dispute initiated at the Grand Lodge escalated and became a doctrinal dispute. The rival factions' positions and claims to legitimacy were then articulated, often in newspapers. The most important were Gowan's Toronto Patriot and Benjamin's Belleville Intelligencer.

60 Following the Gavazzi riots, Brown made an open invitation for the Orangemen to join him and the clear grites in an all protestant crusade, adding: "And where is Mr. Ogle R. Gowan at this crisis in protestant affairs? Have you observed that in his journal, the Patriot, not one word has been said against the men who attacked women in a Protestant church in Quebec and murdered people in Montreal? ... He wants to make a union with the Papists, the murderers of the Lower Province." (Globe June 18, 1853). Gowan did indeed want to make a union with the "papists" because this was the historic aim of the liberal-conservatives and was consistent with his goal to make the L.O.A. a political instrument.

61 Gowan was able to influence political opinion through his editorials in the Brockville Statesman during the 1840's and the influential Patriot during the 1850's. Gowan's son, Harcourt P. Gowan, was the editor of the Brockville Statesman. Gowan edited the Patriot himself in the early 1850's and continued to use this newspaper to communicate his political views after he sold it to a fellow Orangeman in 1855. E.T. Dartnell made a particularly nasty allegation that the sale of the Patriot was "... the last act in the political treason of Mr. Gowan." (Patriot January 10, 1855). Gowan apparently sold his newspaper for business considerations because the Patriot amalgamated with the Leader soon afterward, making it one of the largest newspapers in Toronto. Benjamin, like Gowan, communicated his political ideas to the Orangemen through editorials in his newspaper, the Belleville Intelligencer. The Intelligencer had a much smaller circulation than Gowan's Patriot.
Although participating actively in the doctrinal dispute, there was an immediate concern among the Benjaminsites that the schism should be resolved. The first Committee of Reconciliation was set up under Benjamin's leadership shortly after the schism. This committee was interpreted by the Gowansites as an attempt by the Benjaminsites to regain admission into the fold of legitimate Orangeism. The Committee was, however, not an admission of error on the part of the Benjaminsites; it was an attempt to introduce changes into the L.O.A., which would permit re-unification and prevent another schism in the future.

62 The Committee was championed by the new Benjamine Grand Master, George Whitehead, in 1854. Whitehead made a plea for unity and called for the two factions to meet together and elect a ruling elite which would have the confidence of all of the volunteers, by excluding from office those who took part in the schism. Whitehead suggested a number of organizational changes, the most important of which were; the abolition of proxy voting, the formation of two Provincial Grand Lodges for Canada West and the establishment of a new ruling elite, composed of Provincial and County Grand Officers and Grand Committee members, to manage the L.O.A. while the Grand Lodge was out of session (A.R.-B; June 1855:2, 10-II). These proposed changes would limit the power of the Grand Master and decentralize the authority of the ruling elite, thereby giving eastern Canada West (the area where the Benjaminsites were strongest) more local autonomy. Again in 1856, the Committee for Reconciliation was supported by the Benjamine Grand Master, John Flannigan, who made a plea for re-union, writing: "... this double administration of affairs should cease." (Intelligencer May 23 1856).

63 The Gowansites were suspicious of the Committee because the chairman was E.T. Dartnell, "... a man believed by many to be a Jesuit in disguise." (A.R.-G; June 1854:17). Describing an opponent's actions with the expression "working Jesuitically", or labelling an opponent a "Jesuit" ranked very high in the hierarchy of insults among Orangemen. This is a testimony to the respect that the Orangemen held for what they perceived to be the cunning and treachery of the members of the Jesuit Order.
The Gowanite faction took the offensive, acting as if it was the legitimate Grand Lodge, expelling Benjamin, E.T. Dartnell, John Flannigan and other leaders. In addition, it was resolved that Orangemen should not associate with Benjaminites (A.G; June 1854:62-63).

The realization of the Gowanite strategy for securing political influence at the societal level in the election of 1854 marked a turning point in the dispute. The resulting Liberal-Conservative ministry marked a defeat for the interests of Toryism and sectionalism within the Conservative party (Careless, 1959:196). This ministry controlled an overwhelming majority in parliament, but was dependent upon the support of the blues, requiring the conservatives to give them a number of concessions (Careless, 1959:193; Creighton, 1952:210). Although the liberal-conservative

64 Cornell (1962:86) refers to the realignment of political parties that occurred in that year as "... a watershed in Canadian political history." After 1854 both of the major political parties in Canada East were predominantly French-Canadian and the remnant of the Canada East Tories were forced to join either the conservative blues or the liberal rouges. In Canada West the once powerful Reform party was smashed, its remnant associating with either the clear grits or the conservatives.

65 It is sometimes referred to as the "Liberal-Conservative party", but this is a misnomer because of the diverse nature and principles of the constituent groups. For example, the tory wing formed a minority of the conservative contribution to the coalition, with one of its members, Sir Allan MacNab, acting as the Conservative party leader. John A. Macdonald provided the intellectual leadership, and became the official leader when MacNab resigned in 1856.

66 These included the acceptance in principle of an elective Legislative Council, the secularization of the clergy reserves and the abolition of seigneurial tenure. These had been opposed or criticized by the Conservative party in the past, but it is significant that the liberal-conservative wing had advocated these policies as early as 1849 in the [continued]
wing saw the ascendency of its policy after 1854, the Conservative party had not been very successful in the election. Brighthorn (1952:206) attributes the problem to the unreconciled dispute between the tory and liberal-conservative wings of the party, and its parallel dispute in the L.O.A.

Following the 1854 election, two Benjamineite newspapers, the Colonist and the British Canadian, complained that they were not receiving their proper share of Conservative party support (in Patriot November 18, 1854). This is not surprising because the liberal-conservatives were repaying their debt to the Gowanites.

By 1855 two Benjamineite newspapers, the Bytown (Ottawa) Orange Lily and the Toronto British Canadian, collapsed (Senior, 1976a:50). Benjamineite tirades against the Gowanites were thereafter limited to the Belleville Intelligencer and, occasionally, the Toronto Globe.

The Liberal-Conservative ministry initiated an energetic system of reform, most of which constituted Conservative party concessions to the bleus. George Brown pointed to the Gowanite

66 [continued] British American League. The liberal-conservatism of W.H. Draper, John A. Macdonald and Gowan supplanted the toryism of Sir Allan MacNab and Benjamin. By allying with the Bleu party, rather than trying to exclude the Catholics from political power, the liberal-conservatives opted for Canadian nationalism rather than the Canada West sectionalism of the proposed protestant union.

67 In 1855 an Elective Legislative Council bill was rejected by the appointed upper house and a school bill was introduced in the continuing attempt by the Catholic church to secure greater rights for separate schools in Canada West (Careless, 1967:196-197). Elective institutions provides yet another example of a divisive issue for the L.O.A. Gowan had advocated elective institutions as early as the 1830's and had clashed with Benjamin over this issue in 1849 in the British American League. The School bill, on the other hand, was interpreted by the Benjamineites as another concession to the catholics.
backing of the ministry, deriding them for their flagrant violation of the L.O.A.'s constitution: "... so much political and so little religious, that it [the Gowmanite faction] supports in politics that which it was religiously created to oppose; it is the ally of popery in its worst form." (Globe October 24 1855).

In spite of the Benjamines continuing to advocate Tory principles throughout 1856 and the advent of the controversial Corrigan murder case, the schism ended at the Grand Lodge in June of that year with the acknowledgement of the supremacy of the Gowmanites. Gowman was unanimously re-elected Grand Master by the combined delegates of the two factions, but he "... expressed

65 Benjamine wrote a series of articles in his Intelligencer, warning of the threat posed by the Catholic church in politics (March 28 1856) and claiming that the Conservative party had betrayed its principles over the clergy reserves issue (May 2 1856) and in the retention of their coalition with the blues (July 4 1856). The Benjamine, John Holland, alluded to the concession made over the Tache Separate School act, writing that Gowman "... had agreed to the demands of the Roman Catholic priesthood." (Globe July 24 1856).

59 Corrigan was an Irish convert to protestantism who was beaten to death in St-Sylvestre, Canada East, by a gang of Irish catholics. The seven assailants were acquitted by a French-Canadian judge and jury, against strong evidence of their guilt (Careless, 1967:192). This supported the traditional Orange contention that protestants did not enjoy civil and religious liberty in "papist" Canada East.

Religious passions ran high at both the onset and the resolution of the schism. However, noted historians (such as Croighton, 1952; Careless, 1959) indicate a relationship between the Gavazzi affair and the onset of the schism, but they do not invoke a similar affinity between the Corrigan murder case and its resolution. It would not make sense to argue that such similar events "caused" such dissimilar outcomes.
his desire for the re-union of the society [I.O.A.], and in order
that he should not stand in the way of that re-union, declined."
(Patriot July 9 1856). A compromise candidate, George L. Allen,
was elected Grand Master on a motion from Reverend J.C. Gowan and
seconded by W.P. Gowan, indicating Gowan's personal influence
over the proceedings.

ii) Benjaminite and Gowanite Claims to Legitimacy

There was no higher authority to which the rival factions
could appeal for a decision to settle their dispute. The burden
of resolving the dispute then fell to the rival ruling elites and
the volunteers. This led both ruling elites to make their claims
to legitimacy to the volunteers, hopeful of winning their support.

a) Grand Lodges

The Benjaminite faction resolved that it was the legitimate
Grand Lodge (A.R.-B; June 1853:31). However, they had considerably
less initial support than the Gowanites. There is some disagreement
over the number of rival lodges70, but we can conclude that the

70 The estimates of the number of lodges taking sides in the
dispute in Canada West range from 432 to 539 to 265, Gowanite
lodges range from 373 to 380 to 405 and Benjaminite lodges
range from 54 to 150 to 160. Gowan reported that there were
405 Gowanite lodges as opposed to 36 "...hostile, doubtful
and waiting in abeyance."
and 74 "...outside the pale of
legitimate Orangeism," which totals 160 Benjaminite lodges.
Gowan also told the Grand Lodge delegates about his personal
campaign underway in eastern Canada West to further increase
his advantage (A.R.-C; June 1855:25). Hood (1950:92) reports
that there were 54 lodges for Benjamin, and that the vast
majority remained with Gowan. Hood (1950:92) makes the
interesting conclusion that the schism was partly based on
geoephy because, although the Benjaminite lodges accounted
for only one-eighth of the lodges in Canada West, they accounted
for one-quarter of the lodges east of Toronto. If Hood's (1950)
figures are correct, then it means that there were 452 lodges
in Canada West, 375 of which were Gowanite. [continued]
Gowanites had a minimum of more than twice as much support as the Benjaminites. In addition, there is evidence that the Benjaminite support was localized in eastern Canada West.71

The Benjaminites made a rational-legal claim to legitimacy for their Grand Lodge, which relied heavily on the illegality of the Gowanite proxy votes, as compared with the proper re-election of Benjamin. The Gowanites made an indirect confession of guilt when it was resolved in 1855 that volunteers could only be appointed as proxies for lodges to which they belonged (A.R.-G; June 1855:22). The Benjaminites, however, failed to fully exploit the obvious illegality of the rival Gowanite Grand Lodge.

The issue of leadership plays a role in these claims since the schism occurred at the Grand Lodge. Obviously, Benjamin had the stronger claim as the legitimately re-elected Grand Master. However, there is the related issue of which man was better qualified to lead the L.O.A. during its politics of scarcity.

The obvious comparison is between the two faction leaders, but it should be noted that the leadership of the Benjaminites was also held by George Whitehead and John Flannigan. This indicates a certain instability in that faction, although

70 [continued] Senior (1972a:50), on the other hand, reports that Gowan carried the Maritimes, took 330 of 530 lodges in Canada West and 46 of 76 lodges in Canada East.

71 In geographical terms, the schism represented a resentment on the part of the Benjaminites in eastern Canada West, to the dominance of Toronto in L.O.A. affairs. Gowan was strongly in favor of Toronto as the headquarters for Canadian Orangeism (A.R.-G; June 1854:28).
Benjamin provided the intellectual leadership throughout the schism. The Benjaminites claimed that the L.O.A.'s finances grew larger than ever before under Benjamin's leadership (A.M.; June 1863:i). Also to Benjamin's credit is the fact that he was perceived to have been instrumental in achieving in 1861 the repeal of the Party Processions Act. Benjamin was an efficient manager of the L.O.A., but leadership was required during the schism years and his business style was no match for the more flamboyant leadership style of Gowan.

Since Benjamin was the incumbent Grand Master and Gowan the challenger, the Benjaminites tried to discredit Gowan by unearthing unsavory events from his past. There was an old allegation that

72 Benjamin was of United Empire Loyalist background, whereas Gowan was an Irish immigrant. The Loyalist settlement in Upper Canada predates that of the Irish. Therefore, Benjamin had the better credentials as a Canadian, while Gowan's were better in terms of the Irish Orange tradition. In addition, Benjamin had 'tory business connections' (Nelson, 1950:96) and was the head of Montreal representative in Belleville.

73 Gowan was a fiery Orange man. Although ruthless and self-interested, he was, nevertheless, recognized as the father of Canadian Orangeism. Gowan established a formidable organization in Upper Canada. According to Nelson (1950:38, 41) he had such a strong hold over the Orange men in the 1830's that his personal views determined those of the L.O.A. as a whole, leading his enemies to accuse him of using Orangeism to further his own political ambitions. Violence on his behalf at the polls resulted in the invalidation of his election to the Assembly in 1834 and 1835. Gowan was defeated in a fair election in 1836 (Nelson, 1950:36-37). Gowan added to his personal prestige by earning a military reputation during the rebellion period, 1837-38, by leading his Queen's Royal Rorshers (Gowan was a Lieutenant-Colonel of Militia) in frontier skirmishes.
Gowan had been expelled from the Orange Order in Ireland\textsuperscript{74} (A.R.-B; June 1853:98). In addition, the Benjaminites claimed that Gowan resigned as Grand Master in 1844, "... and as far as lay in his power dissolved the Institution [O.O.A.] immediately upon his acceptance of office under the Government." (A.R.-B; June 1853:i). Gowan proved both allegations to be false\textsuperscript{75} and in spite of his questionable motives, was securely entrenched as the leader of his faction.

The Gowanites made a claim to legitimacy for their grand lodge which relied heavily on the possession of the original Grand Warrant.\textsuperscript{76} This claim, including rational-legal and traditional

\textsuperscript{74} Senior (1972a:41-42, 48) reports that this allegation was first made by George Perkins Bull in 1830, when a minor schism resulted in Bull leading some of the Orangemen of Lower Canada in an independent connection with the Irish Grand Lodge.

\textsuperscript{75} Gowan denied the Benjaminite accusation, claiming that he was offered a cabinet post by Sir George Arthur on the condition that he resign as Grand Master, but refused the offer (A.R.-G; June 1854:17). It was well known that Gowan remained Grand Master until 1846 and it may have been his disagreement with the Benjaminite coalition over the means of repealing the Party Processions act, rather than his political career, which prompted him to leave the L.O.A. Whatever the case was, Gowan attended the 1849 Grand Lodge as the Master of Lodge Number I, but by 1850 his lodge was dormant (A.R.; June 1849; A.R.; June 1850:7). Gowan disassociated himself from the L.O.A. from at least early 1850 until he re-entered, in Lodge Number 137, as a neophyte in early 1852 (A.R.-B; June 1853:11). Gowan's disassociation from the L.O.A. corresponds to his move from Brockville to Toronto, his increasing involvement with the Patriot and his advocacy of liberal-conservatism in the British American League.

\textsuperscript{76} The original Grand Warrant was issued to Gowan by the parent Irish organization in 1830, giving the Grand Lodge of British North America the right to elect Grand Officers, promulgate an annual password and issue warrants. The Grand Warrant rested on the table of the 1854 Gowanite Grand Lodge and the Benjaminites were accused of trying to steal it; an accusation aimed at increasing the Warrant's propaganda value. [continued]
aspects, involved stressing the minority position of the Benjaminites and suggesting that theirs was a schismatic Grand Lodge. In addition, Gowan emphasized his connections with the parent organization by claiming that the Irish Grand Lodge recognized him as the legitimate Grand Master (Patriot November 23 1353). Senior (1972:52) contends, however, that the Irish refused to take sides in the dispute. To complete his claim, Gowan sought to demonstrate that he was a more competent leader than Benjamin. Gowan reported to his Grand Lodge that under 17 years of his leadership (1830 to 1846 inclusive) 423 new warrants were issued, an average of 25 lodges per year. Under 7 years of Benjamin’s leadership (1846 to 1853) only 56 new warrants were issued, an average of 8 lodges per year (A.R.-C; June 1854:23-29). This statistic is, however, misleading because it must be reconciled with the fact that the membership size in real terms increased by approximately 20,000 in the 17 years under Gowan, compared with approximately 25,000

76 [continued]...and emphasizing the alleged illegality of the Benjaminites (A.R.-C; June 1854:12-13). An article from the "Conservative Expositor" (In Patriot July 13 1853) took the position that the Benjaminite Grand Lodge lacked legitimate authority because it did not have a warrant.

77 Gowan made this point in an address to his assembled delegates: "At the last meeting of the Grand Lodge, certain parties who were then with us, but not of us, finding themselves in a minority, went out from us, and had the daring temerity to organize what they called a Grand Lodge, elect what they called Grand Officers, promulgate an annual password, and actually to issue Warrants authorizing the opening of new lodges." (A.R.-C; June 1854:12).
in the 7 years under Benjamin. 73

The Gowanite claim is interesting because it was based on
fictions and falsehoods. In spite of having a weaker legal
position, the Gowanites succeeded in making a stronger claim for
their Grand Lodge than the Benjaminites. This issue was, however,
inextricably tied to that of doctrine.

b) Doctrinal Positions: Competing Unofficial Operative Goals

The most important aspect of the dispute was that over the
meanings of Orangeism 79 and the organizational goals that should
legitimately be drawn from it. Since the rival factions shared the
same doctrine but differed over its interpretation and application
in the organization, we view them as having competing unofficial
operative goals. The condition of schismatic factionalism serves
to sharpen the differences between the competing goals, thereby
providing an insight into a process which is, under less dramatic

73 By including the original warrants issued by the Grand Lodge
upon its founding in 1830 (approximately 10,000 members) in
the total for the new lodges instituted by him, Gowan created
the illusion of a large membership growth under his leadership.
If it is accepted that the original warrants cannot be counted
toward Gowan's total, and if our approximations of membership
growth can be taken as a valid indicator of lodge growth
(see Table 1, page 51), then it was Benjamin, rather than
Gowan, who accomplished a greater membership growth in real terms.

79 The Benjaminites referred to the doctrinal nature of the
dispute, writing; "... the question at issue is not between
Brother Benjamin and Gowan, but between the latter and all
those who have the true principles, the prosperity and
Gowan told the delegates to his Grand Lodge that the schism
was necessitated by the erroneous Benjaminite principles,
which would have ruined the L.O.A. (A.P.-G; June 1855:30).
conditions, extremely difficult to study. These were niche-shaping goals, in the sense that the one chosen would change the L.O.A.'s position in Canadian society. Each faction's primary goal had consequences for the organizational economy and a political strategy for its achievement. Although we shall emphasize the factions' primary goals, there existed additional and competing goals within the L.O.A.

For example, the repeal of the Party Processions act was an operative goal which was shared by the Gowanite and Benjaminite coalitions. The rival coalitions, however, disagreed over the means of achieving this goal. The Gowanites believed that the Walk was a legal right; and Wood (1950:48) reports that Gowan (as Grand Master) led his Brockville volunteers in the traditional Walk on July 12, 1843. The Benjaminites, on the other hand, chose to respect the law and Benjamin (as Grand Master) reprimanded the volunteers who participated in the Walk in open violation of the law (A.R.; June 1843:10). Benjamin chose to oppose the Party Processions act by presenting petitions, signed by the volunteers, to the Assembly and this strategy was perceived by the volunteers to have been successful in winning the repeal of the act in 1851 (A.R.; June 1849:3; A.R.; June 1852:9-10).

Another example of an operative goal which was shared is the incorporation of the L.O.A. Following the resolution of the schism in 1836, both coalitions worked toward the achievement of this goal. The ever increasing cash flow and the erection of lodge buildings throughout Canada West necessitated an act of incorporation to enable the L.O.A. to hold real property as a corporation. It was resolved at the 1854 Grand Lodge that the volunteers should vote only for parliamentary candidates who pledged to support Orange incorporation, if elected (A.R.-G; June 1854:63). Gowan even applied directly to the Legislature, through the Attorney General of Canada West, J.H. Cameron (an Orangeman who later became Grand Master), for incorporation, but was unsuccessful (A.R.-G; June 1855:21). Although there was consensus among the Orangemen concerning incorporation and agreement over the means of achieving this goal, the celebrated "Incorporation of the Orange" was not achieved until 1890.
i) Gowanites

The Gowanites perceived securing political influence for the L.O.A. at the societal level to be the best means of furthering Orange interests. This would only be possible if the L.O.A. could ally with other groups who were jointly capable of forming a government. The Orangemen could only make themselves acceptable as allies to other groups if they were willing to moderate their most extreme beliefs. Therefore, the Gowanites interpreted Canadian Orangeism to be explicitly political and its claims negotiable. This doctrinal position implicitly rejected the traditional Protestant ascendency ideology as the Gowanites would even ally with Catholics or political parties which represented Catholic interests, if this was politically advantageous.

In the 1850s, the Gowanites supported the liberal-conservatives in Canada West because this provided the best opportunity to secure political influence at the societal level. This involved the de facto support of their ally, the Blues. Gowan argued for the formation of a political alliance with a large popular base, combining liberal-conservatives and Minnsite (moderate) reformers from Canada West with the Blues from Canada East, to override sectionalism and further Canadian progress (United Empire, Toronto: the Semi-weekly Patriot February 14, 17 1854). Unfortunately, for the Gowanites, this proposed alliance undermined Gowan's influence in the L.O.A. In Senior's (1972a:57) words: "This decline is most easily explained by Gowan's preoccupation with his political career and his identification with the liberal-conservative efforts to court the French-Canadian vote, which were unpopular with Orangemen." In fact the Gowanites sought to ally with the Irish Catholics as well, whom they hoped would join the Conservative party in Canada West or the Blue party in Canada East. Gowan's courting of the Irish Catholic vote dates from the 1836 union of the "Orange and the Green". Gowan perceived a common interest of the Protestant and Catholic Irishmen that overrode historic differences. The common interest was the nativism that all of the Irish immigrants were confronted with in Canada. Gowan's pet goal of uniting the "Orange and the Green" was realized, momentarily, in the 1836 election, when the Irishmen combined their voting strength in support of the Lieutenant-Governor. Gowan's pet goal was [continued]
The ascendency of the primary Gowanite goal would add a new organizational activity, the interest group. The Orange men would then be able to participate in Canadian politics as an organization rather than merely as individuals. This would put the L.O.A. in a new environmental niche enabling Orange men to act in concert with, or independently of, the political parties.

The primary Gowanite goal proved to be divisive for the L.O.A. membership because many believed that a political alliance with the Catholics, their traditional enemies, was impossible. A political alliance with the Catholics was unquestionably unconstitutional.

Gowan made a claim to legitimacy for his position in an address to the members of his faction; "... ever remembering that we contend for our Faith, and not for Faction, and that the maintenance of Principle instead of Party, is the great aim of our Loyal Association." (A.R.-G; June 1854:64). In addition, Gowan stated that only Protestantism was important, and he cited Benjamin's speech on the non-political character of the L.O.A. at the Grand Lodge of 1853 (A.R.-G; June 1853:13). This traditional claim to legitimacy was ridiculous because Gowan argued that he was putting Orangeism and Protestantism before politics, while actually the inverse was true. Far from being traditional, the Gowanite doctrinal position was a radical departure from the church's historic opposition to the Catholic church in politics.

[continued] organizationally unconstitutional but not problematic in 1836 because he did not try to make it an operative goal.
ii) Benjamines

The benjamines perceived the preservation of the protestant ascendency to be the best means of furthering orange interests. This would keep the L.O.A. exclusively religious by preventing the institution of the political interest group activity. This emphasis on doctrinal purity would help to retain and even strengthen the L.O.A.'s traditional environmental niche as the vanguard of militant protestantism. Therefore, the Benjamines interpreted Canadian Orangeism to be explicitly and unalterably religious. This doctrinal position led the Benjamines to seek closer co-operation with the political party that best represented their perception of Orange interests. The Orange men would, however, be able to participate in Canadian politics only indirectly, as individuals.

The Benjamines tended to be far more anti-catholic and more fearful of "French domination" than the Gowanites. The Clear Grit Reform party best represented the Benjamines' perception of Orange interests in the 1850's. Although entirely constitutional and relatively more legitimate than the Gowanite political strategy, this was not beyond criticism. Gowan argued, in a letter to the earl of Enniskillen, that the clear grites were disloyal: "They [Benjamines] contend that our Order is exclusively religious, and that the Radicals [clear grites] can be admitted, provided only they are Protestants. We contend on the other hand, that although exclusively Protestant, our Society is also exclusively Loyal and that no Radical or disaffected person, whether Protestant or not, can be admitted into our Brotherhood — this is the only question between us involving any great principle." (Patriot November 23 1853).

Even before the schism, Benjamin stated his fear of "French domination" by citing Canada as an example of French ambitions to gain an ascendency over the British (A.R June 1850:13).
stated in no uncertain terms that "... it is a most fatal revolutionary error, to countenance, to support, or by any means to perpetuate or fraternize with Romanism." (A.R.; June 1853:13-14). It is difficult to determine the personal sincerity of this fiery rhetoric; but it serves, nevertheless, to illustrate the faction's position. Benjamin and Gowan took personal positions with respect to catholics and French-Canadians that were often contradictory and occasionally ludicrous.34

The primary Benjamine objective proved to be divisive for the L.O.A. membership because many believed that the protestant ascendancy ideology was unsuitable to Canadian society. Traditional and rational-legal claims to legitimacy were made for their doctrinal position, relying upon the historic nature of the ascendancy and the Orangemen's obligation to put religion before politics. Their task was made easier by the constitutionality of their position.

The idea that religion was the primary foundation of the L.O.A. was agreed to by both factions, but not followed in practice.35

34 Gowan had an anti-French prejudice which he retained throughout his political career (while promoting the idea that a political alliance with the French-Canadians was acceptable if it could be justified in terms of political advantage). He actually made a request, in 1841, in the Assembly for the abolition of the French language in all public proceedings (Mood, 1950:34-35; Nelson, 1950:79). Benjamin, on the other hand, was considered to be a "Greenback Orangeman" because he insisted on recognizing all of the catholics' legal claims, in spite of leading the strongly anti-catholic and anti-French-Canadian, Benjamine faction (Nelson, 1950:97).

35 Even before the schism, the Benjamine coalition promoted its idea that the real spirit of the L.O.A.'s constitution was religious, and not political, and that the L.O.A. should not be subservient to any political party (A.P.; June 1848:II-12; A.P.; June 1850:55). After the schism, Benjamin reiterated his claim that the L.O.A. was primarily religious, with "... no connexion with, or reference whatever to politics." and exposed the Gowanites for professing to put [continued]
Both doctrinal positions were political in their implications. The Benjaminites stressed the religious dimension, hoping that the volunteers would gravitate to the political party that best represented what they perceived to be the interests of Orangeism. Gowan criticized the Benjaminite protestant union ambitions in an article, "Benjamin, Brown and Co. or the 'Unholy Alliance!'" (In Patriot November 9 1853), because it led them to support the secularization of the clergy reserves. The clergy reserves were claimed by the Church of England, and yet the Benjaminites were forced by political expediency to oppose this claim. The Gowanites, on the other hand, agreed that religion was primary and then set about to make the L.O.A. a political instrument. The Gowanites dictated which party would best serve the volunteers' political interests, because they probably would not have chosen the liberal-conservatives on strictly religious grounds.

[continued] religion first, while continually using Orangeism for political action (A.R.-B; June 1853:iv-v).

The secularization of the clergy reserves was a final settlement of the revenue from the sale of church land, for use in public education. This was an important political issue in early and mid-nineteenth century Canada West.

The protestant ascendency ideology clearly dictated a symbolic attachment between the L.O.A. and the "established church". In addition, the Benjaminites supported the Church of England's exclusive claim to the reserves in the past. Benjamin replied (Intelligencer November 9 1853) to Gowan's article, "Benjamin, Brown and Co. or the 'Unholy Alliance'", stating that they now favored secularization over Bishop Strachan's plan to unite with the catholics to save the reserves. This implies that embracing voluntarism was more palatable to the Benjaminites than uniting with the catholics to save one of the last symbols of the protestant ascendency. In contrast, Gowan had advocated secularization since the 1830's.
iii) An Economic Crisis

We view the schism as turning the L.O.A.'s politics of scarcity into an economic crisis.

There was an interruption in the expected normal flow of solidary incentives because the Orange brethren were divided into two warring factions. More specifically, the accompanying dispute decreased the stock of fellowship and prestige. All Orangemen, but especially the volunteers, enjoyed less fellowship than would have been the case in a united organization. The Grand Lodge incumbents enjoyed less prestige of office because their legitimate authority was being questioned. In addition, this paucity of solidary incentives concerned the ruling elites because of its possible negative effect on membership participation.

There was an interruption in the expected normal flow of purposive incentives because the accompanying doctrinal dispute led to a critical re-examination of the basic principles of Orangeism. The fact that some of the Benjaminsites fraternized with rival organizations and stated publicly that the L.O.A. was not accomplishing its mission is evidence of this breach.

38 John Holland made a speech, in March of 1855, at a Protestant Alliance meeting, praising the Know Nothings in the United States and claiming that the L.O.A. (both factions) was not accomplishing its mission (A.R.-G; June 1855:20-21). The Know Nothings was a secret society, composed exclusively of native Americans, with the dual objectives of putting an end to European influence in American affairs and countering the influence of "popery". Gowan turned this incident to his advantage, in an address to his faction, by associating the Know Nothings with republicans, warning the delegates about would be protestant champions and reiterating that his doctrinal position was "... the constitutional and legitimate Orangeism." (A.R.-G; June 1855:20-21). In addition, a committee of the Kingston Protestant Association (a rival organization) was permitted to address the assembled delegates of the 1855 Benjaminite Grand Lodge (A.R.-B; June 1855:21-22).
in the system. More specifically, the doctrinal dispute decreased the stock of zeal. The L.O.A.'s official goals had previously represented a cause, striving to bind the Orangeen together. In the schism, rival factions advocated unofficial operative interests, serving to divide the Orangeen into Gowanites and Gowanites. Therefore, the entire membership proved a seal for Orangeism because this common cause was weakened by partisanship. In addition, this paucity of purposive incentives concerned the ruling elites because of its possible negative effect on membership commitment.

There was a sudden demand for increased membership contributions of time and effort to resolve the dispute and re-unite the L.O.A. The rival ruling elites became totally occupied with the direction of the affairs of their factions and the presentation of their claims to legitimacy for their Grand Lodges and doctrinal positions. The volunteers were suddenly in a position to affect the extremely critical policy decisions of which faction would emerge as the victor and ultimately to affect the meanings attributed to Orangeism in Canada. Since the ability of ruling elites to induce voluntary contributions is dependent upon their stocks of incentive resources, this process could not continue indefinitely. Organizational survival would require a resolution to the schism and organizational changes to capture a larger stock of incentive resources in the short-run and create a more stable economy in the long-run.

The unconstitutionality and relative illegitimacy of the Gowanite doctrinal position contributed to the economic crisis. Yet their political strategy was perceived to be successful with
the formation of the Liberal-Conservative ministry in 1854.
In addition, the Gowanite's promotion of an interest group activity provided one possible solution to the economic crisis. The institution of this activity would be productive, creating a stronger incentive resource base. The Benjaminite doctrinal position, on the other hand, was constitution and relatively more legitimate. The Benjaminites, however, opposed the emergence of the interest group activity. This was counter-productive because political activities would remain the exclusive domain of the political parties and the Benjaminites offered no alternate means to increase the L.O.A.'s stock of incentive resources.

C. Organizational Change in the L.O.A.

In this section we shall analyze the interest group activity and demonstrate that it helped solve the economic crisis, moving the L.O.A. toward a politics of abundance.

The economic crisis accompanying the schism provided the Gowanites an opportunity to diversify the L.O.A.'s economy by instituting the interest group activity at the societal level. The common value system inherent in Orangism provided the potential for a political interest group. Furthermore, it was a natural development of the "men's house" activity. During the rebellion period, 1837-38, Grand Master Gowan had mobilized an armed force of Orangemen. During the relative peace of the mid-nineteenth century, Gowan could mobilize his Orange volunteers as an interest group in the Canadian political arena.
1) Interest Group Activity

We view the schism as resulting from an inability to reach an organizational decision between the rival coalitions' niche-shaping goals. With the schism resolved, the Benjaminites rejected the political aspect of the primary Gowanite goal while accepting the necessity of its economic aspect. In other words, the Benjaminites re-united with the Gowanites to share the incentives and benefits associated with the interest group activity. The Benjaminites, however, still considered an alliance with the Blues to be unconstitutional and religion to be the L.O.A.'s primary foundation, but these "political" differences did not preclude the shared interest of keeping Orangeism alive in Canada.

There would always be political differences among the Orangemen because the L.O.A. was so large and had such a diverse membership. They were united by the common bond of Orangeism but could not agree on major political issues of the day.

Aside from the partisanship of the rival coalitions, many ruling elite incumbents (such as Benjamin, John Flannigan and Gowan) were above all politicians. They welcomed the resolution of the schism because a united L.O.A. had potential as a political

90 There were political differences between Irish immigrants and Loyalists, nationalists and sectionalists, those favoring representative institutions and those favoring appointed institutions, church-statists and voluntarists, liberal-conservatives and clear grits, those who held first allegiance to the emerging Canadian dominion and those who held fast to the idea of a British Empire, those who would ally with the French-Canadian Catholics to secure political influence and those who were fervently anti-catholic and anti-French-Canadian, and finally, there were those who favored the city of Toronto as the center of Canadian Orangeism and those who favored local autonomy.
interest group. There was even some common ground on organizational goals because both coalitions were eager to achieve incorporation for the L.O.A. In addition, the Benjaminites could continue trying to block the Gowanites' controversial goals, while advocating those of their own.

The burden of acknowledging the Gowanite supremacy was made easier for the Benjaminites by the fact that the primary Gowanite goal was only partially achieved by the success of their political strategy. The Benjaminites could take part in the changes that were required to institute the interest group activity.

a) Institutionalization

Most of the organizational changes made during and after the schism led to the successful institutionalization of the interest group activity. The initial impetus for these changes came from the Gowanites, but other changes initiated by the Benjaminites also contributed.

The most important changes were introduced at the Grand Lodge of 1857, in preparation for the upcoming Canadian election (A.R; Special Session, April-May 1857:17, 21-23). To facilitate the ruling elite direction of membership voting, the Orange counties were divided in accordance with the electoral districts. The volunteers were asked to vote only for those candidates pledging

Gowan had been defeated in his attempt to win a parliamentary seat in 1854, but it is significant that both him and Benjamin won seats in the Sixth Canadian Parliament, in the election and by-election of 1857 (Senior, 1972a:24).
to further the principles of Orangism and support Orange incorporation. They were told to vote for brother Orangemen, and in the event of two Orangemen running in the same riding, a bye vote would be taken to decide which one to support. In addition, it was resolved "... that a committee look into the means of guiding Orangemen in all kinds of elections (parliamentary, municipal, school) in order that the energies, power and influence be more concentrated and effective." (A.R; Special Session, April-May 1857:22).

The emphasis which was given to communication among lodges and especially the controlled communication of ideology to the volunteers (made possible by the two positions, Grand Secretary and Lecturer92) contributed to a more standardized interpretation

92 The Grand Secretary gained its initial importance under Gowan's leadership in the 1840's. By 1851 this position was in the process of upplanting the Grand Master's traditional authority. This is indicated by the Grand Master's address to the assembled delegates at the Grand Lodge, giving way to that of the Grand Secretary (A.R; June 1851:10-11). The Grand Secretary had become a full-time, paid position, which was delegated to the routine management of the L.O.A. out of session. (This position's importance has an historical development. At least as early as 1840, the Grand Secretary was paid and by 1843 the salary was twelve pounds, ten shillings (Laws and Ordinances, 1840:21; A.R; June 1843:27). This position was given more duties as part of Benjamin's system of reform. Benjamin sought to make the L.O.A. easier to manage by emphasizing efficient internal communication and the dissemination of the rules and regulations (A.R; June 1850:34). This was welcomed by the Gowanites because they considered it necessary to have headquarters in Toronto with a full-time Grand Secretary, to help co-ordinate the organization's rapid expansion (A.R.-G; June 1854:29). In 1859 the Grand Secretary became a full-time position with a salary of four hundred dollars per year (A.R; June 1859:34). The routine management of the L.O.A. included control over the vital flow of information between the ruling elite (of which the Grand Secretary was a member), and the subordinate lodges. Perhaps the best indication of the new power and authority of the Grand Secretary is the fact that Gowan's son, H.C. Gowan, was elected to this position in June of 1856. [contined]
of doctrine and a shared value position with respect to political issues and operative goals. This enabled the Gowanites, as the incumbent ruling elite, to promote their interpretation of Orangeism. However, an important change in the organization of authority reduced the Grand Lodge's control over its subordinate lodges.

The former Orange province of Canada West was divided, in 1859, into the provinces of Central Canada (including the Ottawa and Kingston areas) and Western Canada (including the Toronto and London areas) (A.R.; Adjoined Session, August 13, 1859:43). This led to the formation of two Provincial Grand Lodges for Canada West (one of the key organizational changes recommended by the Benjaminite Committee for Reconciliation). This was intended to limit the power of the ruling elite by decentralizing its authority. It was popular with the Benjaminites for two reasons. Firstly, it would help prevent another strong, flamboyant leader, like Gowan,

[continued] The Grand Lecturer gained its initial importance in 1848 under Benjamin's leadership. This position was intended to be partisan to the Benjaminite cause by disseminating an interpretation of Orangeism which was congruent with their emphasis of religion, to the exclusion of politics, in the lodge (A.R.; June 1848:10). The Grand Lecturer reported in 1850 that many local lodges were "... acting merely as voluntary associations, isolated from Grand Lodge discipline," and suggested the formation of a model lodge in each district and the creation of County Lecturers, to standardize the communication of ideology (A.R.; June 1850:28, 30). This position was supported by the Gowanites because it would serve useful for the interest group activity; a role of Grand Lecturer which was definitely not intended by the Benjaminites. In 1855 the Gowanites passed a resolution instituting paid County Lecturers, created a preparatory order, the "Cadets of Orangeism", to indoctrinate youngsters, and suggested that County Lodges should select local newspapers to reach public opinion, as Gowan did with the Patriot (A.R.-G.; June 1855:16, 27, 51).
from exerting personal control over the L.O.A. Secondly, it would give Central Canada (the area where the Benjaminites were strongest) more local autonomy. Gowan vehemently opposed the change on the grounds that it weakened the Grand Lodge, it was unconstitutional and Provincial Grand Lodges would encourage a division of interests within the L.O.A.  

1) Goal Displacement

This implementation of the primary Gowanite goal constituted goal displacement. A tradeoff was made between rigid adherence to the L.O.A.'s protestant ascendancy ideology and an environmental niche that provided for political influence at the societal level.

This tradeoff was made possible by reinterpreting the L.O.A.'s constitution. Since organizational constitutions are historically and conceptually defined normative orders, changes in principle are not necessarily carried out in practice. For example, the Gowanite support of the liberal-conservative alliance with the bleus set a precedent for Orangemen to ally with Catholics. However, the volunteers' constitutional obligation to oppose the

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In addition to the obvious division of interests between the Gowanites and Benjaminites, Gowan feared the weakening of the hold that Toronto (his power base) had come to possess over the L.O.A. (Senior, 1972a:62). Gowan had addressed the assembled delegates of his faction on the importance of Toronto as the centre of Canadian Orangeism, saying that: "Every exertion must be made to give strength and importance, and to consolidate the power and influence of the Order [L.O.A.] upon the most solid foundations, in the city of Toronto... which is a sort of Provincial radius, directly communicating with all parts of the country." (A.R.-G; June 1854:28).
Catholic church in politics remained a condition for membership in the L.O.A.. Concurrently, the volunteers were expected to vote conservative, thereby helping their allies, the bleus, gain political power. This contradiction was alleviated by an implicit reinterpretation of the constitutional norm concerning Catholics, such that Protestants and Catholics might have shared interests. There is no reason to believe that the traditional anti-Catholicism and anti-French-Canadianism of the Orange volunteers changed. The ruling elite mitigated the traditional Protestant ascendency ideology, thereby changing the formal relationships between the L.O.A. and its relevant others. (This change in the 1850's did not preclude a return to the Benjamineite emphasis on traditional values in later periods.)

The formal relationship with the Catholics changed because the L.O.A. would henceforth ally with them for mutual advantage in politics.\footnote{One would question the advisability of any Protestant organization forming a formal alliance with the Catholics in Canada West, least of all the L.O.A.. It is remarkable that the L.O.A. was able to achieve a formal political alliance with the Catholics and yet not to have suffered too greatly in terms of its legitimacy. Noted historians of this period (such as Careless, 1970), develop the theme of the emerging Canadian nation to help "explain" such anomalies. To invoke the general enthusiasm of the period as allowing religious differences to be momentarily put aside, in favor of Canadian progress, would be hopelessly romantic and incorrect. The Conservative party was the buffer for the alliance between the L.O.A. and the bleus and it was the fact that the L.O.A. constituted an independent part of the Conservative forces, and not a distinct political party, that saved the Liberal-Conservative ministry. Political Orangemen, like John A. Macdonald, were embarrassed by the excesses of their brethren and were in the precarious position of weighing the possible effects of political concessions to the bleus on the conditional political loyalty of the Orangemen. In Canada West the Orangemen retained their traditional anti-Catholicism and anti-French-Canadianism, but in the Parliament of the united provinces, their representatives played politics.} Such an alliance was difficult because of the

Gowan's skill as a political entrepreneur is indicated by the fact that he imposed a policy on the L.O.A., at the 1856 and 1857 Grand Lodges, which contributed to the acceptance of a political alliance between the "Orange and the Bleu" and the "Orange and the Green", in spite of his not being the Grand Master \(^{95}\) (Senior, 1972a:54). Allying with the catholics was seen as a small price to pay for political influence at the societal level.

The L.O.A.'s formal relationship with the reformers changed, a distinction being drawn between the Hincksites, as allies, and the clear grits, as opponents. This convenient distinction provides a good example of political advantage and expediency taking precedence over tradition. To the clear grits alone was directed the L.O.A.'s historical animosity for all reformers. This occurred because their political platform was diametrically opposed to that of the Gowanites and in spite of the fact that many Orangemen admired George Brown, the party leader.

\(^{95}\) The political alliance between the "Orange and the Green" was possible because the Irish catholic voters would support the liberal-conservatives in exchange for their support of catholic separate schools. In addition, O'Hanly (1872:61) reports that the trend at this time was for four-fifths of the catholics in Canada West to vote conservative, although voting reform would have been more advantageous in terms of patronage. This suggests that either, schools were more highly valued than patronage or the Irish catholics did not vote in their own best interests.
The formal relationship with the British Protestants changed because the L.O.A. was no longer their most militant champion. This dubious distinction went to the clear Criits. The L.O.A. became a sentinel for "Orange" interests, but these were a blend of volunteer "religious" interests and ruling elite political interests. Regarding the "religious" interests, a certain amount of anti-catholicism and anti-French-Canadianism was required to induce enrolment, participation and commitment. This amount was, however, less than previously required because the L.O.A.'s recruitment base shifted from that of primarily Irish Protestants to a mix of primarily Canadian born sons of Orange en and other British Protestants (see Table III, page 72). This latter class of recruits had similar values to those of the former class but a lesser amount of anti-catholicism sufficed to induce their contributions.

The formal relationship with the conservatives changed because the L.O.A. asserted itself as an independent force in Canadian politics. Senior (1972a:56) concurs that the L.O.A. was not, in the late 1850's, the docile instrument of the Conservative party. After 1856, the Orangemen supported the Liberal-Conservative ministry to secure political influence at the societal level. This "support" was of the nature of an alliance because

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Senior (1972a:54) states that the success of the Conservative party, circa 1857, was dependent upon Gowan's ability to hold the Orange vote, in spite of internal political dissension within the L.O.A. By 1860, most of the Orangemen had (under Gowan's tutelage) become zealous supporters of the Conservative party (Creighton, 1952:301).
it was conditional on the promotion of ruling elite political interests. There arose a tradition of appointing at least one Orangeman to the cabinet and the ruling elite was in a position to demand its share of patronage. 77

77 The tradition of appointing at least one Orangeman to the cabinet in Conservative ministries has an historical development in Canada. Gowan claimed that he was offered a cabinet post by Sir George Arthur in 1844, on the condition that he resign as Grand Master of the L.O.A., but that he refused the offer (A.R.-G; June 1854:17). In the 1847 Conservative ministry, W.H. Draper appointed the Orangeman, John A. Macdonald, as Receiver General; but the attempt to name Gowan to the cabinet was prevented by the opposition of Sir Allan MacNab (Baldwin Papers, Lafontaine to Baldwin, 10 April 1847 In Careless, 1872:116). Macdonald was acceptable at that time because he was a low-profile Orangeman, who was politically important in spite of his membership in the L.O.A. Gowan, on the other hand, was the former Grand Master of the L.O.A. (a very high-profile Orangeman) and it is worth noting that the opposition to his appointment to the cabinet came from within the party ranks. In 1857, the L.O.A. was the docile supporter of the Conservative party. In the MacNab-Korin, Liberal-Conservative ministry of 1854, John A. Macdonald was again in the cabinet; but was joined this time by the high-profile Orangeman, J.H. Cameron, whom was given the post of Attorney General of Canada West. This tradition was continued in the Macdonald-Cartier ministry of 1858, when Macdonald was once more in the cabinet, alone with his fellow Orangeman, Sidney Smith, as Postmaster General. As early as 1854, the Gowanite faction asserted itself as an independent force in the Conservative party and was rewarded accordingly. After 1856, the L.O.A. was in a position to demand that even high-profile Orangemen be given cabinet postings.

The question of whether or not the Orangemen actually received patronage, from successive Conservative ministries, is a moot point. Senior (1972a:77) states that the L.O.A. contributed to the vices which were common to democratic politics; the abuse of patronage and violence during elections. In 1854, Gowan appealed to John A. Macdonald for financial assistance from the Liberal-Conservative ministry, in order that his Patriot might better compete with George Brown's Globe (Creighton, 1952:209). The allegations from two Benjaminite newspapers, the Colonist and the British Canadian, that the Patriot received considerable "support" from the Conservative party under Gowan's management (IN Patriot November 18 1854), suggests that this financial assistance was forthcoming.
b) Effectiveness

In this section we shall distinguish between the theoretical possibility and the widespread perception of the L.O.A. successfully executing the interest group activity.

On the negative side, Olson's (1971) by-product "theory" of latent groups asserts that large organizations such as the L.O.A. have no tendency to act voluntarily as interest groups. In addition, selective incentive conditions for the mobilization of the L.O.A.'s potential political power were present only to a small degree. The L.O.A. was considered to be an oath-bound secret society and the volunteers did accept certain obligations, such as opposing the Catholic church in politics. These obligations would not be enough to induce the volunteers to contribute toward the achievement of organizational goals which they considered to be unconstitutional.

On the other hand, the L.O.A. clearly did control non-public goods, such as positions of high status value, one of which was salaried. These could be denied those volunteers failing to support the interest group activity. (The vast majority of the goods controlled by the L.O.A., such as initiation into the mysteries of Orangeism, immigrant aid and common protection, were public goods.)

On the positive side, three factors are relevant. Firstly, the L.O.A. was in a position to add the interest group activity as a by-product of its non-political activities, but it was expected

\[\text{Footnote: A precedent was set in early nineteenth century England for attempting to employ the interest group activity, as a by-product of the Orange Order's existing organizational network (Senior, 1966:172, I75). Lord Durham made an observation about the possibility of the L.O.A. [continued]}\]
to bolster rather than simply draw on the strength of the organizational economy.

Secondly, both structural features facilitating the operation of a system of selective incentives were present. There existed between the ruling elite (especially the politicians) and the volunteers, a greatly differential interest in the provision of public goods. The ruling elite was generally more committed to Orangeism than the volunteers and they were the only ones standing to benefit from the non-public goods associated with the achievement of certain organizational goals. For example, the achievement of political influence for the L.O.A. at the societal level, provided the public good of prestige to all Orangemen and there was the possibility of some non-public goods, such as patronage, accruing only to the ruling elite. In addition, the L.O.A. was a federation. This second factor must be qualified by the negative influence of the principle of local autonomy and the

98 [continued] of early nineteenth century Upper Canada being used in a similar manner: "It is somewhat difficult to understand the nature and objects of the rather anomalous Orangeism in Upper Canada .... It would seem that their great purpose has been to introduce the machinery, rather than the tenets of Orangeism; and the leaders probably hope to make use of this kind of permanent conspiracy and illegal organization to gain political power for themselves. In fact, the Catholics scarcely appear to view this institution [L.O.A.] with more jealousy than the Reformers of the Province. It is an Irish Tory institution, having not as much a religious as a political bearing." (The Report and Dispatches of the Earl of Durham, Her Majesty's High Commissioner and Governor-General of British North America. London, 1939:I29 IN Senior, 1972a:34).
advent of two Provincial Grand Lodges for Canada West. This weakened the ruling elite's ability to provide direction and discipline for the organization. In addition, it should be noted that although the structural features were present, the amount of selective incentive might not have been great enough to mobilize the volunteers.

Thirdly, in Gowan the L.O.A. had a skilled political entrepreneur, capable of providing the required co-ordination among the local lodges. In short, the L.O.A. was in a position to execute the interest group activity, although not ideally suited to do so.

Regardless of the theoretical possibility, there was a perception in the mid-nineteenth century among the Orangemen and relevant others that the L.O.A. was a successful interest group. This perception is shared by some well-known historians (such as Creighton, 1952; Careless, 1959; 1967; and Senior, 1972a; 1972b). A statement by G.H. Milburn, in the foreword to Senior's monograph on Canadian Orangeism, is typical: "The Orange Order [L.O.A.],

\[99\] A political opponent, Sir Richard Cartwright, stated that the L.O.A., in 1854, was "... the backbone and mainstay of the Conservative party in Ontario [Canada West] and in many other parts of the Dominion." (IN Nelson, 1950:127). It was Cartwright's belief that, by 1860, its numerical strength (100,000) was not the only reason for the L.O.A.'s political influence. The organizational capabilities provided by 2,000 lodges in the 80 ridings of Canada West also counted for a great deal, because each lodge constituted a standing committee for the conservatives, often managing to swing an election in an evenly divided community (IN Nelson, 1950:127).

N.C. Gowan wrote: "The great efforts put forth at every election to secure our support is a clear proof of the power of Orangeism." (The Power of Orangeism, 1859:5).
for example played a significant and controversial role in the story of the nineteenth century, out of proportion, perhaps, to the size of its membership." (IN Senior, 1972a:vii). If our estimates of membership size are correct (see Table I, page 61), then it appears that the power and influence of the L.O.A. did not keep pace with its growth in Canada West. When its amazing membership growth is compared with the number of Orangemen with seats in the first six Canadian Parliaments, it appears that the interest group activity had a negligible effect on the L.O.A.'s political influence. There are confounding factors such as non-Orange candidates who supported the objectives of the L.O.A. and the possibility that the organization enjoyed indirect power and influence, through support and patronage. Unfortunately, the effects of these factors are not documented. However, it is known that the L.O.A. had, as early as 1856, a goal of incorporation. In spite of membership consensus with regard to the goal, it was not achieved until 1890. This suggests that the interest group activity was not as effective as it promised to be.

100 In the first six Canadian Parliaments (during the period of the united provinces), Orange representation in the Assembly was as follows: 1841 (3), 1844 (10), 1848 (6), 1851 (7), 1854 (not known, at least two) and 1857 (3) (Wood, 1950:40-41, 52, 55, 80; Senior, 1972a:54). There were 10 Orangemen elected to the Assembly in 1844, compared with only 8 in 1857. One would expect an increase in Orange representation in the Assembly after the 1857 election, if the interest group activity was working effectively. The combined voting power of an estimated 30,000 Orangemen (27% of the male population, 20 years old and older, in Canada West) elected only 3 brother Orangemen in 1857 (see Table I, page 61).
There is no convincing evidence that Orange power and influence went beyond local politics. The perception of success at the societal level might be a consequence of that displayed in local politics. For example, the 1858 Grand Lodge was held in London's City Hall and mayors of cities in attendance as Orangemen included D'Arcy Boulton of Toronto, Lewis of Ottawa, John Flannigan of Kingston and Glass of London (A.R. June 1853:46-47). It is understandable that one might take the evidence of Orange power and influence in most major city corporations in Canada West and generalize to the societal level, where Orangemen such as John A. Macdonald, the Conservative party leader, and Post Master General, Sidney Smith, held prominent positions in 1853. Such a generalization, however, confuses two distinct levels. Each level requires its own strategies for the successful execution of the interest group activity.

1) A Politics of Abundance

The resolution of the schism lessened the severity of the economic crisis. The expected normal flow of solidary incentives was partially restored. More specifically, the amount of fellowship accruing to all Orangemen, and the amount of prestige of

IOI The interest group activity had its genesis in the tradition of political activity by Orangemen at the local or community level. This was independent of Grand Lodge control and did not, therefore, provide incentive profits for political entrepreneurs in the ruling elite. The Orange success in local politics did not derive from an interest group activity, as such; it was a consequence of large Irish protestant communities in such places as York (Toronto).
office accruing to the ruling elite, increased.

This improvement was partially offset by the continuing
break in the expected normal flow of purposive incentives. More
specifically, the amount of zeal for Orangeism remained at a low
ebb. It would take years before a new "cause", and occasion for
exerting political influence, would bind the Orangemen together
with the same zeal which was displayed in former days. In
addition, the interpretation of Orangeism with respect to political
issues would henceforth be influenced more by the political interests
of the ruling elite than the narrower "religious" interests of the
volunteers.

The Fenian raids of 1866 and the Riel Rebellions of 1870 and
1885 provided the required threats to British institutions
and Protestantism around which a "cause" could be fashioned.
In addition, both events marked an upward swing in the cycle
of the "men's house" activity. As an organization of Irish
American revolutionaries dedicated to overthrowing British
rule in Ireland, the Fenians' one actual invasion in the
Niagara peninsula was not very serious. Yet the "threat"
was there and Saunders (1960:36) reports that the 1866
Grand Lodge was postponed until September because so many
of the Orangemen had taken up arms and gone to the front.
The Riel Rebellions, on the other hand, were relatively more
serious because the loyal Orangemen became alerted to the
"threat" posed by Riel's vision of establishing a second
French-speaking, catholic province in present-day Manitoba.
The fact that Riel's provisional government executed the
Orangeman, Thomas Scott, in 1870, contributed to the L.C.A.'s
involvement. Orangemen helped to suppress both Riel Rebellions
(Saunders, 1960:37). The Orangemen gained cohesion from these
"causes" and certainly influenced public opinion with respect
to the perceived "threats" (especially in lobbying for Riel's
execution), but their direct political influence as an
organization did not reach its zenith until the advent of
the Manitoba School question, which is dealt with below.
It was the interest group activity that provided the solution to the economic crisis. After 1857, it became a constitutional right of the volunteers to take part in these activities. Since the Benjamins were back in the Orange fold, they could not be denied the consumption of the public goods deriving from the interest group activity, in spite of having opposed its institutionalization. (Of course they could be denied the consumption of the non-public goods, and incentives for Gowans might operate as disincentives for Benjamins, due to their dissenting political beliefs.)

The Liberal-Conservative ministry provided public goods for the I.O.A.'s membership in the form of the prestige and relative legitimacy granted the organization as a significant contributor to the conservative forces in the coalition. There is no hard evidence of non-public goods accruing to the political entrepreneurs, such as Gowan, though they appeared to exert political influence and were in a position to demand their share of patronage, thus maintaining the incentive system for the ruling elite. In addition to actual and apparent benefits,

103 Gowan suffered personal defeat in the 1854 election and failed to deliver the Orange vote to the liberal-conservatives (resulting in the Conservative party's failure to win many seats), but they were part of the coalition that formed the government. This provided the illusion of complete victory for Gowan's political strategy.

104 The presence of two Orangemen, J.H. Cameron (future Grand Master) and John A. Macdonald, in prominent government positions, in 1856, supported the notion of Orange political influence. Cameron championed the cause of Orangism in the Assembly by pushing for investigations into the controversial Corrigan murder trial (Senior, 1972a:51).
the Liberal-Conservative ministry provided the ruling elite with a stock of purposeful and material incentives. More specifically, the stock of zeal for those Orange- men who were liberal-conservatives increased and the stock of political opportunities for those Orange- men with ambitions in Canadian politics also increased.

The interest group activity, in itself, generated a more stable stock of benefits and incentives, beyond that provided by the transitory Liberal-Conservative ministry. Senior (1924:6-7) alludes to this aspect of the activity, writing: "In politics the lodges provided a link between the politicians and the electorate, and a forum in which ordinary Orange-men debated important political issues." Incentive resources were generated regardless of whether or not there was agreement on the application of Orangeism to the political issues. More specifically, the stocks of fellowship, prestige and political opportunities increased. All this activity required to be mutually beneficial was an exchange between the ruling elite and the volunteers, of incentives for contributions in the short-run and occasional benefits in the long-run.

The incentive systems accompanying the interest group activity induced enrolment, participation and a certain degree of commitment to the L.O.A.. In addition, this activity was less subject to the cyclical highs and lows of the traditional lodge activities.

In spite of serious problems, which made its de facto effectiveness doubtful, the interest group activity was instituted in the L.O.A. of mid-nineteenth century Canada West, moving the organization into a new environmental niche as the sentinel for
Orange interests. This activity was probably never successfully executed in mid-nineteenth century, but the L.U.A. was able to mobilize its full political power by the end of the nineteenth century, when the Orangemen helped defeat the Conservative government over the celebrated Manitoba School question. More important than any real or alleged accomplishments, this interest group activity generated incentive resources, making it both popular and productive.

105 The Manitoba School question provides the most famous example of the conditional nature of Orange support for the Conservative party and an example of a successful execution of the interest group activity. In the election of 1896, the ruling elite was successful in inducing the volunteers to withdraw their support from the Conservative party, over the issue of schools in Manitoba, and help elect the liberal, French-Canadian, Catholic, Wilfrid Laurier, as Prime Minister. Then Grand Master, W. Clarke Wallace, addressed a special session of the Grand Lodge, stating that this was the "... most important meeting in the history of the Order [L.U.A.]. Orangemen would be placed on record as to whether they were prepared to sacrifice their political views in order to uphold the principles of the Orange association." (Evening Telegram, May 27, 1896). The issue revolved around attempts by the Conservative Government, led by Sir Mackenzie Bowell and later, Sir Charles Tupper, to pass a remedial bill, in the federal parliament, to compel Manitoba to establish a Catholic Separate School System (Sentinel, July 3, 1896). Laurier favored provincial rights and campaigned under the slogan "hands off Manitoba" - a position favorable to the Orangemen because of their longstanding distaste of Catholic Separate schools. The interest group activity, instituted in the mid-nineteenth century, was finally successfully executed in the late nineteenth century, giving substance to the idea of the L.U.A. as an interest group of independent conservatives.
CHAPTER 5

GOAL DISPLACEMENT IN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS: ITS FUNDAMENTAL LEVEL

We explained the tradeoff whereby strict adherence to the Protestant ascendancy ideology was exchanged for a new position as the sentinel for Orange interests, at the same time providing the L.O.A. with political influence at the societal level. Many factors had an impact on this tradeoff. These include the widespread environmental opposition to the "Protestant ascendancy", the political influence enjoyed by Orangemen at the local level and the factions' claims to legitimacy for their Grand Lodges and doctrinal positions. The potential net increase in incentive resources generated by the interest group activity and the Liberal-Conservative ministry were demonstrated to be the most important of these factors.

A political economy approach to voluntary organizations was used. This approach emphasizes two interrelated aspects of the systemic properties of organizations, the polity and the economy. The goal formation aspect of the polity and the distribution of incentives aspect of the economy were emphasized. The political economy can be thought of as a system which extends outside of the organizational boundary into the environment within which the organization functions.

The implementation of the primary Gowamite goal constituted goal displacement. This is of theoretical interest since the Gowamite goal, in spite of its relative illegitimacy, was chosen over that of the Benjaminites. This suggests that in addition
to their political aspect, organizational goals have an important economic aspect, since it was the practices with respect to the allocation and distribution of resources relevant to the Cowanite goal which proved to be decisive.

Goal displacement is the process whereby organizational goals are changed or reinterpreted (in light of changed conditions), to facilitate organizational survival. This process typically requires a tradeoff whereby doctrinal purity is exchanged for an environmental niche which will contribute to this survival. Goals can be changed or reinterpreted to legitimate previously illegitimate activities but the converse is impossible. In other words, the activities rather than the ideas are fundamental. We should expect then to discover a fundamental explanation for goal displacement in terms of the organizational economy.

It is not our intention to replace a one-sided political explanation of goal displacement with an equally one-sided economic explanation. We do not, therefore, reject the goals approach to organizational analysis. Rather we contend that economic considerations are given the priority over political considerations in the goal displacement process.

Goal displacement has a development. Conditions within the organization's political economy change such that survival becomes an issue. Regardless of the content of the changed conditions they will have an impact on the goals, since goals can be viewed as determining the organization's political economy. This can be viewed as a politics of scarcity confronting the ruling elite. (A severe politics of scarcity might create an economic crisis and the following argument is therefore equally valid
for both.) The ruling elite's first priority is to retain its position. This includes maintaining the differential incentive systems and its oligarchic control of the organization. The second and complementary priority is to maintain the volunteers' contributions of time and effort. This includes maintaining participation in the short-run and enrolment and commitment in the long-run.

The ruling elite's strategy for solving the politics of scarcity can be viewed as an attempt to increase its stock of incentives, which can then be exchanged for these contributions. This inevitably requires moving the organization into a new environmental niche which is more congruent with the changed political economy.

The ruling elite/volunteer dichotomy is sufficient to explain a simple instance of the phenomenon. However, goal displacement leads the ruling elite to violate the conditions of its delegated authority and thus the relevant polity can include the volunteers. Therefore, in a complex instance of the phenomenon the decision-making process is overtly political, often involving two competing coalitions.

The strategy chosen to deal with the politics of scarcity is best viewed as an operative goal. It does not matter whether this goal is imposed by an incumbent ruling elite or is that championed by a dominant coalition. Initially, the goal decreases commitment to the organizational doctrine and thus requires a claim to legitimacy. The goal, however, was chosen for economic reasons and thus the political superstructure is of primary importance in uncovering the fundamental economic level. Practices with respect to the allocation and distribution of resources relevant to the
goal constitute goal displacement, moving the organization into a new environmental niche.

The allocation of men, money and technology during a politics of scarcity involves a loss to one organizational activity (or activities) which is more or less equal to the gain to another activity (or activities). This diversification must constitute the institution of a new and relatively illegitimate activity or else goal displacement has not occurred in practice. Activities are often championed by coalitions with rival interests, thereby providing an interesting political dimension. However, the allocation of resources is most important in terms of its accompanying distribution of incentives.

The organizational incentive system constitute the fundamental economic level. The operative goal chosen to deal with the politics of scarcity must generate a net increase in incentive resources if the organization is to survive. The new environmental niche must permit the ruling elite to capture a larger and more stable stock of incentive resources if the organization is to move toward a politics of abundance. We know that the doctrinal content of the goal generates disincentives. The activity content must, therefore, generate a greater amount of incentives than those lost by the doctrinal violation. This explains the ascendancy of the relatively illegitimate but productive Gowanite goal over the relatively legitimate but counter-productive Benjaminite goal. In addition, it provides a plausible explanation of goal displacement at its fundamental level.
A. Suggestions for Further Research

Orangism, as institutionalized and distinctive social values, provides fertile ground for further substantive research. In Canada, this doctrine and the L.O.A. have had an important influence on our society and its development. During the period of the two Canadas, 1841-1867, the L.O.A.'s tradeoff between strict adherence to its protestant ascendency ideology and political influence at the societal level epitomized the type of concessions upon which our dominion was founded. Numerous events and issues relative to the L.O.A. warrant further investigation. The "tea's house" activity has been revived whenever the fate of Canada or the Empire was in jeopardy. The Boer War and the two World Wars provide the most recent examples. In the political field, it should not be forgotten that it was an Orangeman, Joey Smallwood, who brought Newfoundland into Confederation in 1949. In addition to dividing us between protestant and catholic and English and French, the L.O.A. has also served as a cohesive force. Orangism remains a legitimate, if somewhat extreme, brand of independent conservatism.

The political interest group has been an important activity of the L.O.A. since its institution in the 1850's. The most recent example of this activity is the active lobbying by the Orangemen over the substituting of the Maple Leaf as the Canadian flag over the British Union Jack. One issue that pervades the history of the L.O.A. and through it Canadian history is that of separate schools. The Orangemen's historic opposition to the spread of catholic separate schools is still with us to-day,
providing an interesting dimension to education and protestant/catholic relations in Canada.

Since Orangeism has flourished historically and survives to-day in various organizations throughout the former British Empire, the possibilities for comparative sociological research are numerous. For example, one might use the documents concerning Orange organizations to study the impact of the protestant ascendency on social class in the British Empire, 1693-1729.

Incentives, as the "currency", provide one approach to the analysis and understanding of voluntary organizations. Incentives, then, are analogous to money in business organizations. However, they have a greater sociological importance because they include solidaire and purposive types in addition to the material type (usually money). In principle one could determine the type and amount of incentives required to induce contributions from the volunteers, whether it be enrolment, participation or commitment. The best way to determine the "price" required to induce contributions in practice would be to hold oligarchic control over a given voluntary organization and then experiment by changing the mix and amount of incentives offered, since this "price" would vary across organizations and over time. Under less than ideal conditions, the incentive systems must be inferred. A political economy approach to voluntary organizations then (and especially the economy viewed as an incentive system) provides a framework with which to guide the analysis of change in one organization or the comparative analysis of organizations, whether historical or contemporary.
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