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THE CONCEPT OF LOYALTY IN
UPPER CANADA 1815-1850
by
David Mills

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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December 1981
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a study of the evolution of the concept of loyalty—the central political idea in Upper Canada during the first half of the nineteenth century. Loyalty was the basis not only of political legitimacy but also of acceptance into the provincial society. The emphasis will be upon the contribution of moderate Reformers to this evolution.

Tory loyalty, in addition to demanding unquestioning adherence to the imperial connection, was exclusive; it was used as both the means to distinguish the Loyalists from the American late-comers and to differentiate supporters of the political status quo from opponents of the administration.

Tories and Reformers attached different qualities to loyalty. Although the Tories framed the political debate, a moderate Reform conception developed in response. The moderate Reformers did not challenge the importance of loyalty, but they did wish to redefine it in ways that would legitimize their own political goals. They appealed to British political traditions which emphasized the idea of individual dissent based on constitutional rights and the necessary independence of legislators threatened by the arbitrary use of prerogative power and the corruption of the executive. Moreover, as a result of the Alien Question in the 1820's, the moderate Reformers broadened the definition of loyalty. They believed that it would develop naturally through proper social values and good citizenship shaped by settlement in the community—it was an accommodative concept of loyalty.
By the 1830's, the polarization of politics seemed to offer only two choices — loyalty or disloyalty. But this period was transitional, and led to two significant developments. The first was the emergence of moderate Toryism as a response to the exclusiveness of the Family Compact and the political success of their opponents. By incorporating some moderate Reform assumptions, moderate Tory loyalty became more accommodative, accepting that settlement in Upper Canada could produce a loyal feeling for the land. This, in turn, stimulated the growth of provincial sentiment — there was less willingness to accept uncritically imperial interference in local affairs. Moderate Toryism developed because other groups, who were not prepared to acquiesce in their political and social exclusion, had been drawn into the debate over loyalty and made their own contributions to it. The Methodists, for example, rejected Anglican exclusiveness, and brought to Toryism the concepts of the legitimacy of dissent and the assimilative nature of Upper Canadian society.

The second major development was that the moderate Reformers, after having been briefly squeezed out of the political process by the radicals, re-emerged after the rebellion with a clearer emphasis on reform within the imperial context through the introduction of responsible government. Reform loyalty was based on British traditions, and accepted the legitimacy of political dissent and the idea of a formed opposition. Moreover, the acceptance of party government provided the means in practical politics and a justification in political theory for the expansion of local autonomy. The moderate Reformers not only survived in the 1840's, they entered the administration. The moderate Tories also prospered by the adoption of this Reform position. The exclusiveness of the High Tory
definition had been supplanted by an accommodative concept of loyalty which enabled new groups to enter the provincial elite. The result was the formation by the 1850's of a conservative consensus which dominated Upper Canada; and the basis for its conservatism lay in a changed definition of loyalty, which had evolved through the initiative of the moderate Reformers.
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Above all, a special debt is owed to Professor S. R. Mealing for his assistance and patience in supervising this dissertation. From its inception to its final draft, the thesis reflects his interest in my work, his thoughtful criticisms, and careful editing. I only hope that the result justifies in some measure the energy he has invested in it, and that it accomplishes at least some of the things he may have hoped for.

To my wife Janicé I am especially grateful. Her confidence and support were more important to me than she may know.
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CHAPTER 1
THE CONCEPT OF LOYALTY IN UPPER CANADA: AN INTRODUCTION

In an article written over forty years ago, George W. Brown remarked:

The history of the concept of loyalty would form one of the most important contributions to the story of the development of Canadian attitudes, ... and when that history comes to be written one important chapter at least will be given to Upper Canada one hundred years ago.

Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century and across nearly the whole of the political spectrum, the concept of loyalty remained the basis not only of political legitimacy but also of acceptance into the society of the province. It was a complex of ideas, and Tories and Reformers adhered to different combinations of its ingredients, and those ingredients themselves evolved over time. The result of that evolution produced, by the 1850's, an ideological consensus in which loyalty remained as important as ever but in which its definition was at last the common property of moderates of both groups. An analysis of the intellectual and moral qualities attached to the idea of loyalty by Reformers as much as by Tories, is basic to an understanding of the political culture of the province.

Merle Curti undertook such an examination of the idea of loyalty in the United States. He believed that loyalty was a fundamental component of American nationalism which evolved through attachment to, and pride in, a distinct geographical place and ultimately produced a sense of mission; Curti wrote: "... the growth of loyalty was slow and unconscious. In the colonial period one can discern the same broad patterns in the growth of loyalty that appear in the later stages of our (American)
history..."

Curti argued that the imperial connection was weakened because of both the remoteness of the American colonies from the mother country and the impact of the North American environment upon the development of a new society; gradually loyalty was transferred from Great Britain to America. The foundations of American loyalty were thus predicated upon "not only pride in the vastness, the distinctive landscape, and the resources of America but also the conviction that nature had intended a separate and united nation to rise off the shores of the Atlantic."

Loyalty to place was reinforced by the emphasis placed upon the traditions which shaped American society. The consciousness of the past stimulated a belief that the development of the United States was divinely ordained; Americans looked to "the glorious deeds of the fathers, the inspiration of their record, the obligation to remain steadfast to their ideals, admiration of the achievements for which they suffered and sacrificed themselves, (and by)... the conviction that the hand of God had guided American patriotism from the very start." This sense of mission was to be inculcated through a reverence for national symbols; it required continuous nurture through a national system of education; and, it was tested in the crucible of war. Loyalty was fundamental to American nationalism; Curti equated it with patriotism and concluded 'that loyalty was "love of country, pride in it, and readiness to make sacrifices for what is considered its best interest."

Upper-Canadian attitudes about loyalty differed fundamentally from those of the Americans because, of course, there was no rejection of the imperial connection. David Bell has argued that the idea of loyalty in British North America embraced two themes — one was patriotism, which
was attachment to place, and the other was loyalty, or attachment to the
parent. 3 But there has been little comprehensive analysis of the nature
of the concept of loyalty. When first examined by historians with a
focus on constitutional forms, loyalty was discussed as one aspect of the
conflict between the executive and its opponents which resulted in the
triumph of responsible government. Chester Martin, for example, stressed
the importance of both the loyalist tradition and the imperial connection
in shaping Tory attitudes towards Reformers:

For many years, the officials of the province,
most of whom had no personal connection with
the loyalist migration, appropriated the
loyalist tradition and labelled every move-
ment of reform which assailed their privileges
as 'treason and republicanism!' In the motto
of the province 'fidelis' was interpreted as
fidelity to the old colonial system... The
fact that loyalty coalesced in the end almost
everywhere with the prevailing temper of the
British provinces was proof not only of its
own vitality but of a congenial environment.

Recent historiography has emphasized the conservatism of Upper
Canadian political development. S. F. Wise, the most perceptive analyst
of the Tory mind, has suggested that loyalty was "the crux of conservative
attitudes" in the province. "Loyalty did not simply mean adherence to
the Crown and Empire, although it started there. It meant as well
adherence to those beliefs and institutions... considered essential in
the preservation of a form of life different from, and superior to, the
manners, politics and social arrangements of the United States."5 The
Tories envisioned the development of a provincial society, strengthened
by the imperial connection, which was distinct from, and hostile to, the
American republic. Wise has likened them to "men living on the slopes of
a volcano" who "tried to anticipate every rumble from their revolutionary
neighbor through the use of state, church, and school to control immigra-
tion, check loyalty, ferret out treason, and inculcate the right values." Those groups which appeared "soft" on the American question, such as the Reformers, were labelled disloyal; therefore, the concept of loyalty was debated on Tory terms. Upper Canadian Toryism produced an "accommodative" political culture which provided, perhaps, the only means to unify the scattered and diverse population; as Wise has concluded: "It made no assimilative demands beyond its insistence upon adherence to vital survival values -- loyalty, order, stability -- values that coincided with the interests and outlooks of many of the groups and collectivities that made up colonial society."

A straightforward emphasis on growing conservatism, with its focus on Upper Canadian Toryism, has not thoroughly examined other contributions to the concept of loyalty. Tory attitudes alone do not explain the continued importance of the idea in the Union period. The responses to the Tory definition from other individuals and groups in the community brought new components to loyalty. Moderate Reformers, such as John Rolph and Francis Hincks, emphasized the assimilative nature of loyalty and brought to it an acceptance of the idea of legitimate opposition. The Methodists, and their spokesman, Egerton Ryerson, reinforced these attitudes and contributed to the development of a moderate conservative consensus in Upper Canada.

The evolution of the concept of loyalty was central to political debate during the first half of the nineteenth century. In the period before 1830, for example, the Tories drew upon the Loyalist tradition to argue that loyalty required unquestioning adherence to the imperial
connection to ensure the continued existence of the province faced by the ever-present danger of the United States. The American threat was political because it was radical and subversive; it was also social and cultural because the United States was expansionist and aggressive. The external threat was compounded by the massive migration of American settlers into the province—a group whose perceived republicanism challenged the idea that Upper Canada was a special Loyalist bastion. The province was seen as the homeland of persons whose loyalty had been tested and found to be pure during the American Revolution and the War of 1812. Tory consciousness of the past strengthened the exclusiveness attached to loyalty.

The Loyalist tradition was reinforced by the importation of English Tory values and predisposed many Upper Canadians to seek to imitate idealized versions of the forms and institutions of the mother country. It required adherence, for instance, to a stable, hierarchical society and a balanced constitution—both dominated by a Tory elite. The development of opposition to the administration posed a threat to social harmony and political tranquillity; consequently, dissent was not tolerated and was believed to be disloyal. Thus, the Tories used loyalty as both the means to distinguish those of Loyalist origin from the American latecomers and as the means to differentiate those who supported the political status quo from those who did not.

In response, a moderate Reform conception of loyalty began to develop. Although the critics of the government were as committed to the imperial connection and a belief in the necessity of a stable, hierarchical society as any Tory, they introduced new ingredients to the idea of
loyalty. The oppositionists accepted the British constitutional model and looked to the Crown as a symbol of English rights and liberties; but they permitted individual dissent based on the concept of constitutional rights. Drawing upon late seventeenth-century views of politics, they stressed the dangers to the Constitution posed by the arbitrary use of prerogative power and the corruption of the executive. They stood for the maintenance of the old loyalty to British constitutional models, as they understood them, against the misguided policies of colonial ministries — actions which truly threatened the colonial relationship.

By the 1820's, this group, labelling themselves Reformers, began to broaden the definition of loyalty. They shared the Tory belief that loyalty could be earned, or that it could be inculcated through institutions such as the school; yet unlike the provincial Tories, they believed that it could be acquired by assimilation. Loyalty would develop naturally through settlement in the community — the farmer who contributed to the building of the society would become a loyal subject. The Reformers placed less emphasis upon the spiritual or emotional component of loyalty, and more upon material well-being. Loyalty was not exclusive; rather, it became a broad, accommodating concept.

The focus of the debate over loyalty began to change in the 1830's. Upper Canadians became less concerned with the values relating to the nature of loyalty, and concentrated more closely upon the future development of the province — whether it would remain as a British colony, or drift into the American orbit. Politics offered but two choices, loyalty or disloyalty. Explanation of attitudes was no longer necessary because rhetoric had replaced analysis; labels and symbols became the staples of
debate.

Although there were bitter conflicts between the supporters of the administration and its opponents which polarized Upper Canadian politics, the period was transitional. It was characterized by two significant developments. The first was the emergence of moderate Toryism as a response to the exclusive policies of the Family Compact. While the High Tories continued to frame the official definition of loyalty, the moderates contributed new ingredients which reflected an increasing acceptance of some moderate Reform assumptions. Loyalty became less exclusive; "the love of country" could develop through the process of settlement and a commitment to the land. A loyal feeling for the land also stimulated the growth of provincial feeling; moderate Tories were less willing to accept uncritically imperial interference in provincial affairs. Loyalty was expressed with nationalist rather than Loyalist rhetoric.

Other groups were also drawn into the debate over loyalty and made their own contributions to it. The Methodists, for example, were attacked by High Tory spokesmen, like John Strachan, as ignorant, religious enthusiasts -- dissenters whose loyalty was suspect because of their connections with American conferences and their association with the Reformers. Egerton Ryerson, the most forceful defender of the sect, embraced the conservatism of the Loyalist tradition and English Wesleyanism and, therefore, feared the growth of radicalism in Upper Canada. But Ryerson's conservatism was tempered by his opposition to church establishment and Anglican exclusiveness; he brought to Toryism the concepts of the assimilative nature of the provincial society and the legitimacy of individual if not of organized dissent. The Methodist idea
of loyalty contributed to the development of a conservative consensus in Upper Canada.

The Orange Order, which became the institutional means of organizing the Irish Protestant immigrants into a potent political bloc, also exploited the loyalty issue in their attempts to attain social legitimacy. As a group outside the social and political mainstream in 1830, the Orange Irish adopted Tory definitions to emphasize distinctions between settlers of American origin and loyal subjects, and reinforced the political polarization taking place. They believed that only through the imperial connection could Upper Canada remain British, and as a result, they were drawn into the conservative coalition by the mid-1830's.

The emergence of a broad conservative consensus of loyal groups was a major factor contributing to the Tory victory in the "loyalty election" of 1836. But the polarization of politics also contributed to the second major development of the period. The moderate Reformers were gradually squeezed out of the political process in favour of radicals like William Lyon Mackenzie, who favoured the establishment of a social democracy modelled on the United States and sought fundamental changes in the constitution and the imperial relationship. By 1837, the radicals provided the focus for a small "disloyal" grouping supported, as the Tories had always argued, by some American settlers from north of Toronto and around London. The failure of the rebellion eliminated the radicals from the political spectrum and led to the re-emergence of the moderate Reformers. With their goal of responsible government, they sought reform within the imperial context. The loyalty of this group permitted an emphasis upon increased provincial autonomy, based on British traditions; moreover, they accepted the legitimacy of political dissent and the concept of a formed
opposition.

Consequently, the failure of the rebellion did not signify the end of the debate over loyalty. During the 1840's, the emphasis on loyalty was as central as ever; but the definition of it had significantly changed. The moderate Reformers not only survived but soon entered the administration. The moderate Tories also prospered, at the expense of the old Compact, by the adoption of what had been a moderate Reform position. The substance of the change consisted of three steps: the acceptance of formed opposition as legitimate in politics; the further acceptance of parties as necessary without being necessarily evil, and the consequent acceptance of party government. These were tremendous changes because they provided both the means in practical politics and a conservative justification in political theory for the expansion of self-government and for the pursuit of what became nationalist goals. The mid-century consensus was no doubt a victory of conservatism, but it was the conservatism of moderate Reform.

This study discusses the evolution of the concept of loyalty in Upper Canada during the first half of the nineteenth century, with particular attention to the contributions of moderate Reformers. It continues what S. F. Wise has noted as the task of the intellectual historian, "to analyse the manner in which externally-derived ideas have been adapted to a variety of local and regional environments, in such a way that a body of assumptions uniquely Canadian has been built up."

It also reflects John Higham's definition of the external approach to the history of ideas: it stresses the significance of popular beliefs and the reactions to perceived developments in terms of concrete political actions.
The idea of loyalty, and its importance to contemporaries, must be assessed in the context of Higman's statement. Loyalty was not a part of a logical system of belief; the attitudes being examined did not represent a "coherent body of abstract thought" which was the result of general theorizing upon the state of society by political philosophers. Neither were they "rationalizations of socio-economic interests."

Loyalty was simply part of a political and social culture; like many attitudes, it reflected "the intellectual commonplaces of an age, its root notions, assumptions and images ...." The concept of loyalty, for example, was based upon the constitutional rights of British subjects and the idea of a balanced constitution. Upper Canadians appealed to Burke and not to Paine, to British and not to American models, to moderate and not to radical objectives.

Moreover, attitudes about loyalty often remained latent; they must be ascertained through their relationship to the dominant values within the society. An Upper Canadian was "rarely explicit about his most cherished beliefs .... When an Upper Canadian Tory ran for election with a strong belief in the British constitution his only declared platform, neither he nor his sympathetic constituents found such an appeal platitudinous or ludicrously inadequate. Such phrases stood for a whole set of conservative values." Accordingly, while an examination of attitudes poses certain difficulties, the behaviours and statements of (mainly) politicians are sufficiently direct evidence to illustrate contemporary public values. This is especially true of loyalty because of the belief so widely held in Upper Canada that loyalty was central to politics and, consequently was revealed by a variety of political actions. Also, Herbert Bloch, a sociologist, has claimed that:
We are not always conscious of our loyalties: to an extent, we are content to take them at their face values. But a loyalty must always be crystallized and defined to some point of view by our attitudes. It can never in itself be inchoate and aimless. It is the necessary locus in our social definition as individuals.

In order to study the idea of loyalty, a variety of primary sources, both published and unpublished, was utilized; these include personal correspondence, government documents and pamphlets. Newspapers provide the major source for the work because the debate over loyalty was, by and large, a public debate; as Bloch has suggested, the articulation of attitudes about loyalty "arises ... when the need for prerogative and choice presents itself." In the period before 1850, Upper Canada was a society characterized by growth, and change; these produced rivalries which occasioned public and private pressures to make choices and defend particular points of view. Newspapers provided the public forum through which attitudes and ideas could be presented — through editorials, letters or electoral addresses. Newspapers also published the debates in the Legislative Assembly, and therefore were the means by which many Upper Canadians were made aware of differing opinions.
FOOTNOTES


See also:


Other articles which examine the Tory mind in Upper Canada include:

Terry Cook, "John Beverley Robinson and the Conservative Blueprint for the Upper Canadian Community", Ontario History, Vol. 64 (1972), 79-94.


For example, John Davidson, a professor of philosophy and political economy at the University of New Brunswick in the late nineteenth century, wrote of the Loyalist tradition that: and always has been loyal; and the intensity of that loyalty is apt to almost startle people from the Old Country .... (T)he underlying fact of Canadian political life and history is a steady dislike of the United States, and a steady love of the British connection. One does not say loyalty to the Mother Country .... It is a loyalty to British institutions, to the British connection ....


8 Arthur Lower pointed out these implications when he wrote:

Having been cast out of heaven, men could not at once give their hearts to hell. What they did was to erect a kind of imaginary heaven in compensation and to ascribe to it the qualities of far-off fields. This imaginary heaven was placed in the distant metropolis, the mother-country, the heart of empire .... This they endowed with qualities not always corresponding to the actuality .... It was a partial and one-sided English tradition that the Loyalists cherished, a drum and trumpet tradition of mere 'Britishism'.


10 Cf. G. F. Read, "The Rising in Western Upper Canada, 1837-38: The Duncombe Revolt and After", (a Ph.D. dissertation for the University of Toronto, 1974).


For example, it was unnecessary for "Cato" to provide any further elaboration of his views in an address to the Electors of the County of York: "I pause to admire, and gratefully contemplate that noblest fabric of human wisdom, the British Constitution."


16. Ibid.
CHAPTER 2

THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LOYALTY

In the period before 1820, the concept of loyalty reflected the two streams of thought which shaped the conservative tradition in Upper Canada. "One was that brought by the Loyalist founders of the colony: an emotional compound of loyalty to King and Empire, antagonism to the United States, and an acute, if partisan sense of recent history. To the conservatism of the émigré was joined another, more sophisticated viewpoint, first brought by Simcoe and his entourage, and crystallized in the Constitutional Act of 1791: the Toryism of late eighteenth-century England."1 Both sets of attitudes were clearly defined in the province by the War of 1812, although the "broad loyalties" which did exist were markedly colonial in character. The elites were deeply committed to the Crown, to the values of British civilization, and to a conception of their destinies within the British imperium."2

Among the Upper Canadian elites, there was an outstanding acceptance of these broad loyalties, and any challenge to their traditional values met an immediate, almost reflexive, response. The perceived vulnerability of the province in the face of the external threat posed by the United States and the internal menace of republicanism embodied by the massive influx of American settlers was the legacy of the Loyalist experience. English Toryism, expressed by colonial officials and pre-war British immigrants, like John Strachan, reinforced the belief that any opposition to the administration was to be crushed because it created political turbulence and thus disrupted social harmony. The conservative mentality, which became more inflexible as a result of the War of 1812, equated political dissent with disloyalty and so reacted sharply to the
activities of a Scottish radical, Robert Gourlay, who was ultimately expelled from Upper Canada. The pervasiveness of these values imposed a large measure of ideological conformity upon the provincial mind before 1820.

The contribution of the Loyalists to conservatism in Upper Canada was quite significant. In a display of historical over-statement, one writer has even argued that the Loyalist migration was "perhaps the most significant" event in Canadian history because "Upper Canada had an infusion of patriotic blood which has kept alive the fervour and loyalty, as well as developed the intelligence of some millions of people ...." But such assessments offer few substantial insights into the attitudes and beliefs of the original Loyalists. The motivations for loyalty during the American Revolution provide the basis for an understanding of the ideological baggage which the Loyalists brought to Upper Canada.

It is difficult to analyze these attitudes, though, because the Loyalists did not leave a body of literature which reflected their views about the nature of the society in which they lived. G. M. Craig has pointed out that, "Nearly all of those who came into Upper Canada had been farmers in the old colonies .... The ability to attack and conquer the North American wilderness, to reduce it to orderly farms and settled communities, was a hard-earned skill, but it was one the Loyalist possessed." Because most of the Loyalists were farmers concerned with carving homes out of the Upper Canadian forests, few of the rank and file left records. Moreover, few Loyalist leaders articulated their beliefs because they were not concerned with analyzing the reasons for their loyalty; rather they sought to capitalize on their loyalty by linking it with such tangible rewards as land grants, government offices
and political and social influence.6

Loyalist attitudes have, however, been examined in a wide-ranging body of literature.7 Historians, particularly in the United States, have focused much attention upon the question of why the Tories remained loyal during the American Revolution, and, therefore, they have attempted to understand the ideological framework within which the motivations of the Loyalists were shaped.8

Much of the early historiography of the American Tories stressed their fundamental conservatism. Over a century ago, for example, Lorenzo Sabine argued that the Loyalists were "striving to preserve order and an observance of the rights of persons and property."9 Moses Coit Taylor echoed this theme when he stated that the Loyalists were composed of several groups who shared a common conservative outlook — such as government officials, colonial politicians, merchants who were linked to Britain, and the professional classes. While they may have believed that the colonial relationship required some revision, these Tories ultimately refused to break with the mother country over the issue of independence.10

The nature of the conservatism embraced by the Loyalists was analyzed by Leonard Woods Labarée, who suggested that although there were "individual and group differences among the Loyalists and, for many of them, such as the officeholders, owners of large property and merchants, questions of economic self-interests played a significant part, ..." the Tories were persons "of essentially conservative temperament, disposed from the start to resist innovation and to support the old and familiar."11 This "conservative temperament" was manifested by Tory opposition to "the radicals' resort to violence and extra-legal action" which characterized the independence movement. The Loyalists
... saw more clearly than did some of their opponents the values inherent in their colonial past, in the tradition of government by law which was theirs under the British constitution, and in the strength afforded by the British connection. 12

The assessment of Loyalism as a conservative movement has gained general acceptance among Canadian historians; 13 but it is no longer regarded as sufficient to characterize the Loyalists. As W. G. Shelton pointed out: "It is a waste of time to attempt to differentiate the Loyalists from the Patriots on the basis of conservatism, regardless of how one defines it, since the American Revolution is widely recognized as an essentially conservative movement." 14 Mary Beth Norton, for example, argued that it was impossible to make rigid distinctions between Tories and rebels before the Declaration of Independence. It was the question of independence which crystallized political thought and forced the patriots to articulate ideas about politics and society that embraced the principle of equality, stressed the idea that the consent of the governed was the basis of government, and legitimized the necessity for revolution. 15 The Tories, on the other hand, embraced both traditional conservative political views and the belief that the Revolution was precipitated by a minority of radicals; as a consequence, they refused to break with their past. They could regard this refusal as a matter of high principle; Anthony Stokes, a Loyalist who migrated to England, stated:

My Conduct, in America, was not influenced by Events, but by Duty to his Majesty -- an attachment to my native Country -- and a Sense of mine own Honor; nothing therefore can annihilate my Attachment to my King & Country. 16

Because they would neither accept the legitimacy of the Revolution nor break the imperial connection, the Loyalists were forced outside the
mainstream of American politics, and finally into exile.

Wallace Brown developed similar themes when he argued that the fundamental question shaping motivations during the Revolution was sovereignty; that is, whether the Thirteen Colonies would remain within the Empire, or whether the Americans would shape their own future. He suggested that the Loyalists had "a fundamental trust in Britain, the Whigs a fundamental distrust." The Loyalists believed that something central to their existence would be lost as a result of the break with the mother country.

William H. Nelson has provided the most convincing analysis of Loyalist motivations. He agreed that the Revolution was a conservative movement and that both Whig and Tory politicians shared the same basic assumptions. It was the issue of the relationship with Great Britain which was of primary importance. Nelson noted that, although the Tories had an oligarchic outlook,

...the notion that in a well-ordered society political power ought to be in the hands of a wise and wealthy minority was held by all kinds of good Whigs. What distinguished the Tory from the Whig oligarch was that the former needed, and the latter did not need, support from Britain, since the Whig oligarchs could, and the Tories could not, gain sufficient support in America to hold power.

Yet Nelson did not interpret Loyalist ideology solely in terms of the attitudes of Tory elites. He rejected the almost-exclusive focus upon the articulate and well-to-do individuals and groups:

In the folk tales of nineteenth-century America, two kinds of Loyalists were remembered, presumably because a certain romantic interest clung to them. They were the Tory gentlefolk, Royalists who lived in great houses and drove about in fine carriages, and there were fearful outlaws who, in these remembrances,
generally travelled with Indians ... With the disappearance of the frontier and the Indians, the outlaw Tories were forgotten, and historians, in attempting to rationalize the legends of a Tory gentry, slipped into an easy explanation of the Revolution in class terms.

Nelson analyzed the area of Loyalist strength -- the frontier areas from Georgia in the south through the Middle Colonies to Vermont; and the maritime regions of Long Island, the lower Hudson valley, southern New Jersey, the Philadelphia area and the tidal areas of Delaware -- and concluded that the only common link was that they all had "suffered or were threatened with economic and political subjugation by richer adjoining areas. The geographical concentration of the Tories was in peripheral areas, regions already in decline, or not yet risen to importance." As a result, these areas looked to Britain for support for their interests.

In addition to this economic factor, cultural influences -- particularly ethnic and religious differences -- were significant factors shaping the Loyalist outlook. Groups that had not been assimilated into the social mainstream -- groups which, in fact, feared the assimilative threat posed by American society -- required British protection to maintain their cultural differences. This was especially true of the "patchwork societies" of New York and Pennsylvania; for example, the Dutch and German communities which had not been anglicized, and the Highland Catholics in the New York back-country remained loyal. Moreover, "adherents of religious groups that were in a local minority were everywhere inclined towards Loyalism, while adherents of the dominant local denomination were most often Patriots." Therefore, Nelson concluded that the Tories were a socially heterogeneous group who represented a cross-section of society in Revolutionary America. They were linked by one common bond: "Almost
all the Loyalists were, in one way or another, more afraid of America than they were of Britain. Almost all of them had interests they felt needed protection from an American majority.¹⁸

When the culturally diverse communities of Loyalists scattered across what was to become Upper Canada, they retained the intellectual baggage accumulated in Revolutionary America; as a result, several fundamental assumptions shaped their beliefs about the nature of loyalty. It has been suggested that the Loyalists expressed "ideological hostility" towards the American nation because it "was essential for (Upper) Canadians not to believe in the United States and to assume that the country they lived in was not a kind of subarctic, second-best America, but rather a genuine alternative to this revolution-born democracy and organized upon principles and for purposes quite different from it."¹⁹ Loyalist hostility to the United States was stimulated by the belief that the American Revolution was unnecessary and unjust; it was the result of the efforts of a minority of disaffected demagogues seeking their own selfish ends. There had been no grievances serious enough in the Thirteen Colonies to justify rebellion, and, thus, the sense of loss among the Loyalists was intensified. Richard Cartwright, one of the wealthiest merchants in the pioneer society and a prominent political figure as well, had left America in 1777 because he could not reconcile his loyalty with demands for independence; he was "Displeased with the selfish views of the disaffected, feeling no oppression from Parliament, nor greater restrictions than appeared necessary for the unity of all parts of the empire, and convinced that if any grievance existed rebellion was not the remedy." Cartwright also believed that the Revolution was socially disruptive; he wrote of the "disturbed condition of my native Country,
where all Government was subverted, where Caprice was the only Rule and measure of usurped Authority ...." He became a Loyalist because he wanted to be "secure from those petty Tyrants, who had involved my once happy country in every Species of Distress and made all the Misery that Cruelty joined with Power can cause."20

The Loyalists were also strongly attached to the Crown. Loyalty, for men like Cartwright, was a duty; he had been "Brought up in habitual reverence to the King and Parliament by his loyal parents ....," and had always been "a supporter of the liberty and independence of the subject, and a steady asserter of all those privileges which every Briton enjoys by our happy constitution .... (He) knew how easily they were reconciled to the firmest loyalty and patriotism."21 Yet the Loyalists also benefitted from the imperial connection, as Cartwright argued in an address to the Grand Jury:

... we seem little disposed to forget, and base would we be if we could forget, the ties of gratitude as well as duty by which our allegiance is secured.

The new homeland in Upper Canada was to provide a marked contrast to the United States because of its loyal beginnings, and its development as a model British society in North America. The Loyalists, "fondly cherished" the opinion "that the donation of lands to them in this country was intended as a mark of peculiar favour and a reward for their attachment to their Sovereign."22 The strength provided by the imperial connection—especially the economic support provided them and the introduction of British political traditions—would allow the loyal society to flourish. A letter to the Kingston Gazette from "Falkland" articulated this perception most fully just before the outbreak of war in 1812. He
suggested that loyalty did not develop simply

... from the dignified sentiments excited by
these honorable and splendid displays of the
National character; nor from the general
feelings which naturally attach the subjects
of every Government to their country ....
The very soil on which we reside is the gift
of her (England's) bounty ... and she has
moreover liberally assisted us in our exertions
to cultivate and improve it .... We enjoy the
most perfect security for our persons and
property under her own admirable system of Law,
administered by a most respectable judicial
establishment .... She has given us a
Constitution as near to that envied one to
which she owes her greatness as is consistent
with the situation of a Colonial establishment,
and we are called upon for no taxes to defray
the expense (sic) of the Government by which
it is kept in operation. And in matters of
religion we are left free from restrictions .... 23

There would be no grievances in this model society; there would be no need
for dissent to develop and consequently no factious opposition would
emerge. The Revolutionary experience, therefore, had a tremendous
impact upon the Loyalist mentality.

That experience also reinforced the Loyalist expectation that they
would comprise the governing elite of Upper Canada. Proven loyalty was
not the only claim they made in support of that expectation. Cartwright
described the Loyalists as "the most valuable Class of his Majesty's
Subjects in this Province" because of both their proven commitment to pure
loyalty and their former social status. He wrote:

The truth is, that the generality of those
gallant men, so little known, and so much
undervalued by their pretended advocates,
were men of Property; and some of them the
greatest Landholders in America. 24

The Loyalists, in fact, believed that they personified the conception of
loyalty in Upper Canada. An editorial in the York Observer contributed to
Loyalist myth-making after the War of 1812:

Rather than submit to a successful rebellion, they foresook the land of their forefathers,--their homes,--their families,--in many instances, their friends, and all they hitherto held dear upon earth; and plunged unhesitatingly into the depths of difficulties of a boundless forest, there to teach their children, amidst every species of privation those lessons of patriotism and faithfulness, they had so nobly illustrated in action. -- It is impossible not to entertain a profound respect for such men. 25

The "flowering" of the Loyalist myth in the province strengthened colonial conservatism, and this conservatism, as S. F. Wise has argued, "... was a coalition both of interests and of particularisms, whether religious, ethnic or both." 26

The conservatism of the Loyalists was complemented and reinforced by late eighteenth-century Tory attitudes imported from Britain. The "aristocratic resurgence" in England after the American Revolution, for example, resulted in the passage of the Constitutional Act which crystallized these sentiments; and John Graves Simcoe was sent out as the first Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada to carry out the intentions of the imperial authorities. S. R. Mealing has suggested that the British government was attempting to re-establish the old and flexible colonial system in which social and political institutions approximating those of the mother country were to be transplanted in the provinces, as far as colonial conditions would permit. 27 Accordingly, British politicians attempted to strengthen the monarchical and aristocratic branches of the Constitution to restore the balance which they believed had been upset by the growing power of the Assemblies in the American colonies before the Revolution. Simcoe, for example, sought to appoint Aeneas Shaw, a captain in the Queen's Rangers and "a character of approved.
loyalty" to his executive in an effort to strengthen his councils before the disaffection of Robert Hamilton disrupted the colony. He wrote to the Colonial Office:

Upon the whole, there be no systematic opposition to Government, it is apparent, that on the other hand, there is no direct support of its measures; and, in particular, it seems at the present season to avoid making use of the negative of the Crown. I am sorry to observe there is too great reason and probability that the Legislative Council are much more likely to promote than to suppress any attempt that may demand the exertion of that prerogative.

In addition to his power of appointment to the Councils, Simcoe sought to strengthen his colonial executive through such social supports as titles of honour and land grants.28

Yet these attempts to restore balance in the colonial constitution were to be accomplished without departing from representative government; elected assemblies were necessary for taxation purposes. As a result, Simcoe was prepared to make some compromises to the popular branch in order to avoid political problems; for instance, the government persistently denied the demands of the settlers for township meetings -- but, in 1793, a bill was accepted which provided for the annual election of township officers (although the authority to call elections was placed in the hands of justices of the peace, who had real power).29 It was Simcoe's intention to provide Upper Canada "with a Constitution which ... is the very image and transcript of that of Great Britain, by which she has long established and secured to her subjects as much freedom and happiness as it is possible to be enjoyed under the subordination necessary to civilized Society."30

The attitudes of colonial officials such as Simcoe were shared by pre-war British immigrants like John Strachan, an Anglican clergyman and
school teacher. Upper Canadian conservatives believed in the Blackstonian concept of a balanced constitution which provided true liberty and inspired loyalty because, in Strachan's words, it was founded:

... upon the most equitable, rational and excellent principles: a constitution of free and equal laws, secured on the one hand against the arbitrary will of the sovereign, and the licentiousness of the people on the other ....

Of course, not all Upper Canadians were as clear about the constitution as Strachan; in a garbled appeal to the electorate in 1808, one Robert Henderson said: "I am a British-born subject, I have lived under the Government, I have read that great and wonderful production, the Constitution, and admire it."

John Strachan also believed that even in the harsh environment of pioneer Upper Canada, the benefits of the constitution made British subjects "happy and free ...."

\[
\text{behold comfort, wealth and grandeur flowing upon us, and our liberty giving our country the most solid charms, notwithstanding its freezing sky and procrastinated snows. To the freed man, labour loses its pain, he may be poor, but he feels himself independent ....}
\]

In return for "gifts so precious," the subject was expected to be animated by a sense of loyalty -- "Surely ... you will return that affection and love for our august Sovereign which he has manifested to you .... (Y)ou will teach your children the value of the benefits which you have received, and inspire them with gratitude and loyalty."

Therefore, in Strachan's view, admiration of, and commitment to, the British constitution was closely linked with loyalty -- this idea was central to the Tory mind.

Strachan also believed that loyalty implied the recognition of a
hierarchical social structure; it involved "proper resignation and obedience to the laws, a due deference and homage for superiors, and for those who are publicly entrusted with the administration of the province." True loyalty, then, required support of the government. The Tory mind required social harmony and sought to avoid any disaffection; as Strachan said, "... let not this sacred attachment to our king be cankered with the spirit of discontent ...." Political dissent and opposition were equated with disloyalty.  

Political opposition before the War of 1812 was highly personal and of a limited nature -- it reflected the primitive state of politics in Upper Canada. But opposition of any kind was viewed as a threat to order and stability, and, consequently, was interpreted as being disloyal. During the administration of John Graves Simcoe, for example, Richard Cartwright and Robert Hamilton, who were important merchants and members of Simcoe's council, were accused of disloyalty because they criticized the Lieutenant-Governor's programs. As a result, Cartwright, who believed that the Loyalists were the natural leaders of the provincial society, wrote: "It seems, then, that every man who will not be a mere tool, and pay implicit respect to the caprice and extravagance of a Colonial Governor, must be the object of jealousy and malevolence, not only here but at home."  

Perhaps the best example of the intensely personal nature of politics in Upper Canada before 1812 was the official response to the activities of Robert Thorpe. Thorpe, an Irishman who was a friend of Lord Castlereagh, arrived in Upper Canada in September 1805 to serve as a puisne judge of the court of King's Bench. Within months of his appointment, Thorpe was sending letters back to the Colonial Office which
were highly critical of the administration and especially of Lieutenant Governor Hunter. Thorpe exploited his position as a judge to attack the government; in the fall of 1806, he went on circuit in the western part of Upper Canada and encouraged juries to consider the "fifteen years of disgraceful administration in this province." 38

As a result of his activities, Thorpe faced the ever-increasing hostility of the administration, and the colonial elite drew upon traditional Tory perceptions of opposition to get out their case against the judge. There were grounds for the charge that Thorpe associated the redress of provincial grievances with his own personal advancement — Thorpe believed that he should be appointed as Chief Justice to cure the ills of the province. He wrote to the Colonial Office that "in twelve months I will be ready to carry any measure you may desire through the Legislature ...." In a letter to the York Gazette, "Spy" (who was probably S. P. Jarvis, a member of the provincial administration), expressed the Tory fear of faction based upon the selfishness and personal ambition of one man:

You (Thorpe) have endeavoured, while preaching and pratting upon harmony and union to fill one class of subjects with enmities against another, to fill them with foul suspicions of every man in office but yourself and to destroy the original confidence so necessary to the existence of civil society. You endeavoured to violate the peace of the public ... upon the altar of your indistinguishling malice and ... ambition. 39

There was also a strong belief among the elite that Thorpe's charges were unfounded and no grievances existed in the province. The new Lieutenant Governor, Sir Francis Gore, resented Thorpe's activities and wrote to the Colonial Office:

What grievances he alludes to, I do not know,
the most respectable persons, with whom I have conversed do not complain ... and have called upon me for the sake of public tranquility to oppose and discontinue those principles and their supporters which at this moment agitate the Lower classes of the community ... 40

Thorpe and Gore finally met at York on October 31, 1806, and the meeting was recorded by the Governor's secretary, William Halton. Thorpe argued that land in Upper Canada was seen as the reward for men of proven loyalty, and yet it was granted away to the favourites of a corrupt administration. The meeting served to convince Gore that Thorpe's claims of popular grievance were imaginary, and that his industry in sowing "the seeds of Ingratitude and Disloyalty" made him a threat to the continued existence of Upper Canada as a British province. 41 Gore interpreted Thorpe's election to the Assembly in December 1806 as a victory for republicanism:

... he was proposed by the Democratic Party as a proper person to succeed Mr. Weekes .... The solemn mockery of his invoking at the opening of the Poll, the shade of his departed friend, 'as looking down from Heaven with pleasure' on their 'exertions in the cause of Liberty'; The seditious emblem of his Party (a Harp without the Crown); Thorpe and the Constitution inscribed on badges, which he distributed to his partisans, and his almost Treasonable allusion to the American Revolution at the close of the Election, are indeed ample proof, that he was not an unworthy successor to Mr. Weekes. 42

Consequently, Thorpe's opposition was perceived to be disloyal. The effect of his criticism would be disruptive; to Gore, Thorpe was simply a "factions Demagogue" bent on destroying social stability and political harmony. 43

Dissent was not to be tolerated in Upper Canada because of the dubious loyalty of its inhabitants. By the 1790's, the total population
of the province was about 20,000, a majority of them Loyalist. But the Lieutenant Governor, John Graves Simcoe, who believed that a majority of Americans still remained at least passively loyal to the Crown, issued a proclamation in 1792 which invited settlers into the province, and promised them free grants of land upon their taking an oath of allegiance, freedom of religion and free political institutions. 44 The attraction of free and accessible land drew great numbers of Americans into the province and by 1812, there were about 100,000 inhabitants, of whom perhaps eighty percent had recently migrated from the United States. 45 As early as 1799, Richard Cartwright had warned the Lieutenant Governor, Peter Hunter, about the dangers inherent in the massive migration of American settlers into Upper Canada. He did not believe that the Americans came into the province because of "any preference they entertain for our government. They came probably with no other interest than to better their circumstances, by acquiring land upon easy terms. Now, it is not to be expected that a man will change his political principles or prejudices by crossing a river, or that an oath of allegiance is at once to check the bias of the mind ...." 46 Major Graham, of the York garrison, also feared that American settlers would infect the population with republican views:

(T)he Schoolmasters use all their efforts to poison the minds of the youths, by teaching them in republican books .... Youths educated in such books, by and by will have the privilege of voting members for our Assembly, and filling the House with their own kind, and when that is the Case, what may the Governor and the Council of the Province expect — trouble too much ....

Lieutenant Governor Gore believed the loyalty of the American settlers to
be suspect because they retained "those ideas of equality & insubordination, much to the prejudice of this Government, so prevalent in that Country." Official perceptions were shared by articulate members of the populace. A letter from "Sancho," for example, described Upper Canada as "an asylum to exiles and aliens, to atheists and to prawning democrats." Thorpe's opposition to the administration intensified Tory fears about the growth of disloyalty in Upper Canada and, as a result, Gore sought the judge's dismissal. In the fall of 1807, Thorpe was suspended for "exceeding his duties as a Judge, ... mixing in the political parties of the Province and encouraging opposition to the Administration." The activities of Thorpe and his supporters, who included David McGregor, Rogers and Benajah Mallory in the Assembly, plus Joseph Willcocks and John Mills Jackson, were based primarily upon personality conflicts and the ambitions of the men involved. Ethnicity was also a factor because many of the oppositionists were of Irish or Loyalist origin and they distrusted the Scottish clique of merchants surrounding the Lieutenant Governor.

There were also ideological underpinnings to this opposition; these men did articulate a different conception of loyalty from the Tories. Their definition challenged the Tories on three main questions: who was loyal, what was the proper object of loyalty, and did it allow dissent?

After Thorpe's dismissal, an opposition newspaper, the Upper Canadian Guardian or Freeman's Journal, began publication at Niagara. It was published by Joseph Willcocks, an Irishman who had arrived at York in 1800, and had been dismissed as Sheriff of the Home District in March 1807 because of his attacks on the administration. A letter to the newspaper, from "A Loyalist," described a more accommodative conception
of loyalty than that embraced by the colonial elite; Upper Canada was not
the exclusive domain of the Loyalist because loyalty would develop
naturally through settlement in the province. Governor Simcoe had first
articulated this idea in the 1790's because he believed that American
settlers could be assimilated to the dominant British political culture:
"(Even) those who may not see the necessity and immense advantage of
experience in the form of Government ... may be attached to it by the
undisturbed benefits and the prospect of future advantages for their
families." 53 "A Loyalist" also believed that the American farmers could
earn their loyalty through the "sufferings and perseverances" experienced
in settling the "Wilderness;" he asked: "Are these ... not sufficient
to insure us the character of Loyalists, and the rights and privileges of
subjects ...?" 54 The oppositionists did not fear that the American
settlers would retain their republican values because the process of
assimilation would transform them into loyal Upper Canadians. The
oppositionists, therefore, rejected the exclusiveness of Tory loyalty
because the long-term consequences of such a belief would be disastrous
for Upper Canada. David McGregor Rogers, a Loyalist who represented the
counties of Hastings and Northumberland in the Assembly, attacked the
exclusion of American settlers from the administration; he wrote that:

all appointments of consequence are made and
given to persons favourites of those in power
in Europe .... Viewing an appointment in a
distant country, unacquainted with the Capacity
and genius of the people they are sent amongst,
they (the appointees) find themselves in a new
world naturally prejudiced in favour of the
Inhabitants & Country they have left. They
despise those they come amongst ....

The exclusion of the American settlers from the administration of the
province would only weaken the loyalty of the inhabitants and increase
discontent. Rogers believed that the American Revolution had similar causes:

... Americans I suppose have as tender feelings as Europeans and no doubt thought themselves equally entitled to all the privileges of British subjects; but when to the neglect of their persons was added their taxing them and disposing of the revenues arising from such taxes without their consent ... (No) wonder they thought themselves ill used, being completely deprived of the Privileges of the rest of the subjects of the empire.55

"A Loyalist" also stressed the falseness of the claims of government officials to share the Loyalist tradition; their loyalty was not proven; they were simply office-seekers. The people, it was argued, should be protected "from the insults of these pedling (sic), upstart office-hunting hypocrites whose loyalty has never been tried." Tory loyalty was seen as simply the commitment to patronage and the monopoly of office; they arrogate to themselves the right of deciding upon the policy and justice of every public measure, and who with as little effrontery continually assert, that the people are stupid(,) ignorant and rebellious, not competent to judge between right and wrong and that they are utterly incapable of knowing what is calculated for their good, or the extent of their rights and privileges.56

Thorpe's supporters resented the misrepresentations which labelled them as disloyal. The "Independent Freeholders of the East Riding of the County of York, and the Counties of Durham and Simcoe" resolved in January 1807: "That we know no discontented Demagogues nor if we did could not be deluded by them, many of us have fought, bled & sacrificed our families & properties for the British Government, we have exerted & ever will exert ourselves to preserve the freedom of Election from all
undue influence to the last moment of our lives shall we be ready to support our King, & Constitution." The oppositionists, accordingly, rejected Tory loyalty which they argued was too exclusive; neither national origin nor possession of office were sufficient reasons to allow the colonial elite a monopoly on loyalty.

In addition to this assimilative idea of loyalty, the opposition group challenged the Tories on the proper objects of loyalty. Their fundamental assumptions were still conservative because they drew upon late seventeenth-century English political traditions, as C. H. Patterson has noted: 'This impeccable Whig loyalty' to the revolutionary settlement of 1688 differed from the territorially focussed 'loyalty' entertained by American 'loyalists' and English colonial officials. For the object of their (the Tories') allegiance tended to be less a concept of government than the centralized empire that had been challenged by the American revolution.' Thorpe, for example, defined loyalty as "a faithful ... attachment to our king and government(;)... a proper observance of the laws combined with a determination to support the Constitutional rights and immunities of the people." Joseph Willcocks developed this idea in more depth when he wrote:

True loyalty is to be faithful to your King, to guard his prerogative, to support him in his dominions, to protect inviolably the constitution of which he is the head, and to obey and uphold the law which he has sworn to administer and maintain ... (But) surely it would not be loyalty ... to assist a monarch in rendering himself absolute, (for) who would overturn the constitution and subvert the law? Oppositionists like Thorpe and Willcocks appealed to a conservative historical tradition which gave them a clearer and narrower definition
than the Tories could show of the nature of loyalty -- it was attachment to a set of constitutional principles rather than to the administration. It followed that political dissent was not only compatible with true loyalty but might actually be required by it. As British subjects, the inhabitants of the province had constitutional rights upon which the administration might attempt to encroach, and the defence of those rights was as sacred, as loyal, and as distinctively British, as the defence of the empire against rebellion, or of the province against invasion. By 1812, therefore, a distinctive opposition idea of loyalty had developed.

The outbreak of the War of 1812 had important repercussions for attitudes about loyalty in the province, because the views of the Tory elite were strengthened at the expense of those of their opponents. The war confirmed, for example, the worst fears of the Tories about the threat posed by the United States -- they believed that Upper Canada was invaded by "an Army of Banditti whose sole object was cowardly Plunder." According to John Strachan, the province was "environed almost with our enemies, and mixed with doubtful characters and secret Traitors." Hence, it was essential that the inhabitants affirm the loyal character of the society.

John Powell, a son of the Chief Justice William Dummer Powell, stressed the social obligation of every Upper Canadian to prove his loyalty -- "Every Canadian freeholder is, by deliberate Choice, bound by the most solemn oaths to defend the Province as well as his own property; to shrink from that Engagement is a Treason not to be forgiven ...." The continued existence of Upper Canada as a British province was at stake, according to Powell: "It is no longer the time for Indulgence or private feelings & private virtues at the Expense of public duty ...."
While Powell emphasized the idea of social duty, John Strachan linked loyalty with Christian duty in a sermon delivered on August 2nd, 1812:

The Christian soldier loves his country. Were patriotism a determination to support our country when in the wrong, were it an inclination (sic) to do evil to promote her advantage, then might we admit to be a narrow and illiberal prejudice; but the patriotism for which we plead, is an ardent and fixed disposition to promote our country's good ... It is that warm affection which a good man feels for the happiness of his kindred and friends, extended to the society of which he is a member.63

As a result of their own activities during the War of 1812, the Tories immediately adopted a myth that Upper Canadians had proven their loyalty. The accuracy of the myth is beside the point; the Tories believed that loyalty was earned in 1812 as it had been by the original Loyalists in 1776, except that this time it was earned by staying rather than by leaving. John Powell argued that:

In this moment who is not an active friend, is, and must be considered as an Enemy .... If there be, as doubtless there are, amongst us those who cannot conquer their repugnance to meet their kindred in Arms, Honor ... and Honesty require that they should withdraw and abandon the property which they will not undertake to defend.64

The number of people who could claim to have demonstrated loyalty was increased, and yet the exclusiveness of the Tory definition did not have to be relaxed to admit them.

The War also reinforced the anti-American sentiment exhibited by the Tories; it was believed that many American settlers had supported or even joined the armies invading Upper Canada from the United States; the Adjutant General, Edward Baynes, contrasted the role of the inhabitants of Loyalist background with the activities of the American
settlers:

The high value and estimation in which the Loyal settler is deservedly held has been placed in the most conspicuous point of view by the contrast it has formed with the American interloper, industriously undermining the fidelity of his neighbors by disseminating Democracy, affording intelligence to the enemy and frequently concluding his career by going over to him.

John Strachan also felt that the American settlers were disloyal: "In several Districts, where they were the majority, or supposed themselves to be so, rebellion was organized." 65

The survival of the province after the War seemed miraculous and men like Strachan firmly believed that Upper Canadians were truly "God's peculiar people." The province was the homeland of those whose loyalty had once again been tested and found to be pure:

... Upper Canada is the asylum of those brave men who risked their lives to maintain the unity of the British empire -- men ... who proved, in the late war, that they retained the same love for the king and our happy constitution, which conducted them through an unnatural rebellion. 66

Members of the elite also assumed that their vision of Upper Canada was confirmed by the results of the War, and, consequently, Upper Canadian conservatism was fixed "in a rigid mold." 67

The Tory belief in the importance of the imperial connection to the continued political existence and material development of Upper Canada intensified after 1812. John Powell, for example, emphasized the social benefits of the imperial connection and questioned any attempt to end the colonial relationship because grievances simply did not exist under British rule:

Where is the Canadian Subject, who can truely (sic)
affirm to himself that he has been injured by the Government in his person, his Property or his Liberty?  

The Tories also became more insistent upon maintaining the British constitution unaltered. In his electoral address in 1817, Henry John Boulton, a member of the York elite, stressed the importance of constitutional balance as the guarantor of social harmony:

> With respect to my political opinions, I should glory in the name of an independent supporter of the Rights of the People, and the Loyal defender of the Prerogatives of the Crown; each should assimilate and be in unison with the other. -- But must remain inviolable and untouched; as the too great increase of the one, would prevent and destroy the free exercise of the other ...

There was increased emphasis upon the necessity for internal unity in the province in the face of the persistent American threat. Upper Canadians had to support the government, and the administration must be given the authority to maintain social control; John Powell declared, for instance, that "The Law should enable the Government to discriminate and control the few, for the benefit of the whole ...." The desire for internal unity precluded any conception of legitimate opposition, as "A Traveller" noted in a letter to the Kingston Gazette: "The possibility of disaffection is so great, that the slightest murmur against government would almost be considered as a breach of allegiance."

The War had confirmed the belief that dissent was equated with disloyalty because of the defection to the American cause of the most conspicuous pre-war opponents of the government -- Joseph Willcocks, Abraham Markle and Benajah Mallory. Therefore, Tory spokesmen condemned the appearance of opposition in a fragile society like that of Upper Canada; it was factious, and hence, disloyal. John Strachan stated:
In a free country like this, where differences of opinion concerning public affairs may be sincerely maintained, great danger arises lest a few designing men should take advantage of any party spirit that may exist and induce by specious pretences the adoption of the most pernicious measures, under the cloak of securing their liberties, and maintaining their independence.71

In spite of the Tory attempts to eliminate dissent, opposition to the administration began to re-surface in the immediate post-war period. Although this opposition was still largely personal, it did harken back to the pre-war notion that dissent could be loyal if that loyalty was to constitutional principles rather than to the administration. Discontent was fuelled by economic factors — including the end of wartime prosperity, the failure to pay compensation to those who had suffered losses as a result of the American invasions and the failure to make the land grants promised to militiamen as a reward for their loyalty. In addition, there was some resentment of the government policy which prevented justices of the peace from administering oaths of allegiance to American settlers coming into the province; as a result, Americans would be unable to secure title to land and further immigration from the United States might be discouraged. The colonial executive, which controlled provincial expenditure and the land-granting system, was perceived to be the source of these grievances, and during the 1817 sessions of the Assembly, opposition to the administration appeared in the persons of Robert Nichol and James Durand. Nichol, an officer during the War and a large landholder from Niagara, was especially critical of the government for its policies on compensation and American immigration. He introduced a series of resolutions on the state of the province which were critical of
the government and before they could all be passed, the Lieutenant Governor, Sir Francis Gore, prorogued the Assembly. Gore believed that such criticism of the administration would weaken the society and ultimately convey "this devoted Province to the United States of America." 72

The controversy which centered on Nichol was primarily economically based, but during the next session, James Durand, an Ancaster merchant, drew upon the same basis of discontent to pose a constitutional challenge to the government. In his electoral address in 1817, Durand attacked the military rule of Upper Canada during the War which led to the suspension of habeas corpus and the introduction of martial law, and compelled "the people to bear the kicks and cuffs of those who are used to overbearing tyranny." He posed as the defender of the liberty and prosperity of the independent yeoman farmer against the further corruption of executive encroachments upon the rights of the people. Durand's opposition was largely personal and he was expelled from the Assembly; even Robert Nichol labelled the address as a "false, scandalous and malicious libel." By the end of the session, though, only Jonas Jones and Philip Van Koughnet consistently supported the administration, while the four members from Niagara, Nichol and Mahlon Burwell from the Western District, plus Zacheus Burnham, John Cameron, Alexander McMartin and Isaac Fraser often opposed executive measures, and began to proclaim the legitimacy of combining to oppose the government. The spectre of such a significant opposition in an Assembly of just twenty-three members pressured Gore into again proroguing the legislature. 73

It was against this background that the Gourlay agitation met such a sharp response. 74 Robert Gourlay was an erratic Scot and an agrarian
radical who came to Upper Canada in 1817 to gather information for a statistical account of the province as a prelude to his sponsorship of an emigration scheme from Britain. Gourlay travelled the province and concluded that the most significant problem facing the society was the exclusion of American settlers; he wrote later:

On this journey, I found that four-fifths of the settlers had come from the United States, and that there was not one British-born subject among twenty .... The monstrous conduct of the Government, forbidding free ingress from the States, had keenly wounded the feelings of these people.75

Gourlay's conclusion was supported by many prominent Upper Canadians, including William Dickson, a relative of his wife, Robert Nichol and Thomas Clark -- men who were among the largest land holders in the province and therefore, most critical of the ban on the migration of prospective settlers from the United States.

Gourlay also compared the development of Upper Canada unfavourably to the United States -- "They see the property of their neighbours in the United States advancing in value while theirs is on the decline; they see everything in motion there, while all is here at a stand ...." He believed that the subsequent discontent threatened the British connection and laid the blame for the problems facing the province at the feet of the government which pursued "a system of paltry patronage and ruinous favouritism" in its land-granting policies. The nature of Gourlay's criticism is not surprising given his perceptions of the ideal society -- Gourlay envisioned an organic rural community dominated by virtuous yeoman farmers. This ideal society was constantly threatened by the existence of a landed aristocracy which sought to maintain its privileges and thus oppress the lower orders. This was the situation which he
believed had developed in Great Britain; when he came to Upper Canada he applied the same analysis, and accordingly found significant grievances to be redressed. 76

Gourlay articulated many of the themes current in the radical ideology of early nineteenth-century Britain. His appeals were to the past — he sought a restoration of the true Constitution in the face of governmental corruption which diverted people from political issues and kept them in ignorance. Gourlay was concerned with due respect for the Crown and protection for its lawful authority, but he sought to restrict the prerogative of the executive to achieve constitutional balance and guarantee the rights of the people; he wrote:

The British Constitution sets the law above all men; and that the law may be reverenced and implicitly obeyed, it has anointed a King to be its grand Executor .... (In) proportion to the intensity of sentiment which directs our love and regard for the King, should be our watchfulness over those delegated by him to discharge the sacred trust of the laws; and preserve them inviolate.

Gourlay also appointed himself as the guardian of the people's rights — "In politics, I hold myself as having to do with men; and to guard against their tyrannical dispositions, consider it my sacred duty to watch and resist, if required." 77

Like many other British radicals, Gourlay believed that the most important measure of popular opinion was the public meeting and the petition. 78 But his calls for township meetings and later for a provincial convention to catalogue grievances in a petition for the Prince Regent were perceived to be extra-constitutional by the administration and thus a threat to the existing political system. 79 As a result,
Gourlay's activities were labelled as "sedition" and public opinion began to turn against him.

The Tory case against Gourlay focused upon two inter-related themes. The first was an old argument, which stressed the vulnerability of Upper Canada and the subsequent need for internal unity; the second offered a new position -- that the infant state of the province simply would not permit any opposition. The Attorney General, John Beverley Robinson, took up the first question; he believed that Gourlay's activities were:

dangerous to this country, chiefly from their example, as they point out the mode by which popular movements on pretences less specious than the present, can be effected, and as we have no adequate military force in this Province, which it has often been found necessary to resort to in England to check the tumult excited by artful & discontented demagogues.\(^80\)

John Macaulay, a member of the Kingston elite, shared the same view about opposition. He believed "in the special need for order, due morality, and proper subordination in a province so vulnerably situated as Upper Canada. To support government was not to be truly partisan but to be truly loyal; to oppose it on principle was to be factious and even subversive of good order, and hence was to menace the existence of the colony."\(^81\)

The Tories also began to argue in the post-war period that the province was not developed sufficiently to permit opposition to emerge. "A Traveller" noted that Upper Canadians "have not had sufficient experience in politics to know, that a man may be firmly, and ardently attached to that government which he accuses of defects and inconsistencies." John Strachan, for example, wrote that Gourlay "has done a
good deal of mischief in the province by his seditious publications, exciting discontent amongst the people ... A character like Mr. Gourlay, in a quiet colony like this, where there has been little or no spirit of inquiry, and very little knowledge, can do much harm ...." Strachan firmly believed that the infant state of Upper Canada required political unity -- the province was weak, and a strong government was essential if the province was to continue to develop. Therefore, the administration should not be criticized -- dissent simply misled the population. The growing antagonism directed against Gourlay by the administration caused many of his former supporters to back off; men like Nichol and Clark realized that their commercial interests linked them to patronage web centered in York and consequently came to support the administration. Even James Durand believed that Gourlay's attempts to change the system of government were unconstitutional. The controversy became increasingly bitter by 1818 as Gourlay's critics became vehement in their attacks upon him -- William Dickson portrayed the Scottish radical as "an evil-minded, and seditious person" who was endeavouring "to alienate the minds of our subjects in the Province, from our person and Government ... (and) to raise a Rebellion ...." Gourlay himself exacerbated the situation; he was not prepared to compromise and he rejected out of hand any criticism of his activities. He felt that he was being persecuted, particularly by that "monstrous little fool of a parson," John Strachan. Gourlay recognized that loyalty was being used as an ideological weapon against him -- Upper Canadians were afraid to support him openly: "by a strange perversion of sentiment, some of them seem to fancy, that openly to speak out would be
a declaration of disloyalty .... Every sensible man must know that this country cannot be retained to Britain without a radical change of management." Gourlay did not associate loyalty with "passive obedience" and neither did his supporters; an address by a George Adams stated:

"True loyalty did not consist in mere passive submission; it consisted in watching over every part of the constitution, at once, with jealousy and affection." Gourlay and his supporters drew upon the opposition tradition in Upper Canada to emphasize their loyalty through appeals to constitutional principles. One observer noted that Gourlay's supporters had proven their loyalty; they "were not under the influence of any disloyal or disaffected views .... All these men, as it is generally allowed, were before this event as faithful subjects of His Majesty as any in the country, and had given ample proof of their loyalty in the recent combat with the United States."  

The collapse of Gourlay's agitation as a result of his imprisonment and subsequent expulsion from the province certainly indicated that the idea and practice of opposition had not as yet been accepted in Upper Canada. The perceived weakness of the society prompted the Tories to cling to their traditional values and attempt to crush any internal threats, such as that posed by Robert Gourlay -- dissent was still equated with disloyalty. Gourlay had failed to make the case that opposition was legitimate -- that loyalty to constitutional principles did permit dissent. His efforts were hampered by the limits which he himself placed upon legitimate dissent. He did not accept the idea of political party and he rejected altogether the propriety of armed opposition. That left him with the right of British subjects to petition the crown directly, by-passing the provincial administration if necessary. It was a logical position,
but so entirely impractical that it did not enable him to defend himself, let alone the cause of reform. 90

In conclusion, the period before 1820 saw the development of two distinctive definitions about the nature of loyalty. The first was based on the experiences of the oppositionists like Thorpe and Courlay and would provide the ideological foundations for the Reform movement. It was assimilative rather than exclusive; loyalty could be earned, but it also could develop naturally through good behavior in the society. There was also the belief that loyalty was directed towards seventeenth-century English constitutional principles rather than simply to the administration. Moreover, there was an acceptance of the legitimacy of dissent; loyalty did not require acquiescence in abuses. In his electoral address in 1820, W. W. Baldwin stated that even "the purest Administration requires a vigilant activity on the part of all its constitutional checks." 91

The Tory definition, on the other hand, stressed the exclusive nature of loyalty, and, drawing upon the Loyalist tradition, the commitment to the British connection. The Tories also totally rejected the legitimacy of opposition; dissent was disloyal because it disrupted the social equilibrium and political harmony of the province. Dissent was illegitimate for several reasons: Upper Canada remained vulnerable after 1815 and unity had to be maintained; the province was still politically immature; abuses were unthinkable under the British system; and finally, oppositionists were selfish, with suspect motives. Dissent had to be crushed and the Tories were largely successful in their attempts to silence opponents of the administration. As a result, a measure of ideological conformity was imposed in the province; John Macaulay, for example, stated: "While the great body of the people continue loyal, and zealous
as they now are in their attachment to the parent state, faction and discontent can never operate successfully among us ...." The early critics were unable to counter these arguments because they put limits on their dissent, and their alternatives were not very practical. While the oppositionists could justify expressions of dissent on loyal grounds, they did not have a programme to make dissent effective, either by justifying rebellion on the grounds of popular support, or by claiming that the Assembly could legitimately be organized to oppose the administration, or still less by claiming that it could be organized to control the administration. The dissent which their view of loyalty could legitimize was the dissent of the independent legislator. W. W. Baldwin, for instance, said: "I ... profess to you an affectionate regard for British liberty and British Constitution .... I know ... that ... it is not the duty of your Representative to oppose, through a spirit of faction, the fair, official and legitimate objects of the Administration ...."\textsuperscript{92} That dissent was not likely to accomplish much, quite apart from the fact that it was under Tory attack; and any combination of dissenters went beyond what the oppositionists' ideal of loyalty allowed them to justify. But the basis of the debate over the nature of loyalty had emerged by 1820, and these two positions — the Tory and what was to become the Reform — were articulated in more depth as a consequence of the controversy over the Alien Question.
FOOTNOTES


The same theme is developed in E. C. Wright, The Loyalists of New Brunswick (Fredericton, 1955).


6. Robert Hamilton is a good example of a Loyalist leader who was more concerned with translating his loyalty into tangible political and economic benefits than articulating traditional preoccupations about loyalty.


For a discussion of a similar situation in the Maritimes, see Margaret Ellis, "Loyalist Attitudes", G. A. Rawlyk, ed., Historical Essays on the Atlantic Provinces (Toronto, 1971), pp. 44-60.

7. Useful historiographical essays on the Loyalists are found in the following sources:


There are several excellent studies which explain the choice of loyalty by individual Loyalists. These works isolate and then re-integrate the many themes — the importance of personal temperament and beliefs, political pressures and loyal traditions — which shaped loyalism. Among the best of these studies are:

Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchison.


Sources which discuss the American Revolution as a conservative movement include:

Louis M. Hacker, The Triumph of American Capitalism (New York 1940), Part II.


J. T. Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America (Princeton, 1965).


15 These views are developed more fully in Mary Beth Norton, The British-Americans: The Loyalist Exiles in England, 1774-1789 (Boston, 1972), pp. 251-259.

See also:


16 Anthony Stokes to Evan Nepean, February 7, 1785; cited in Norton, p. 128.


The same themes are developed in:


Wallace Brown has drawn similar conclusions. He suggested that although the reasons for loyalty were unique to each colony, Loyalism was primarily an urban and seaboard movement; in New York, the Tories were predominantly farmers. The bulk of the Loyalists were persons of modest means, although the wealthy did produce proportionally more Tories. And, they were also composed of conscious cultural minorities.


Brown's analysis is based upon an examination of 2,908 white Loyalists who submitted claims for losses during the American Revolution — a group considered as a "useful and representative
sample". (p. vii) Although I am more concerned with his conclusions than his methodology, Brown’s evidence has been challenged; Cf. Eugene F. Fingerhut, "Uses and Abuses of the American Loyalist Claims: A Critique of Quantitative Analyses", in the William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 25 (1968), 245-258.


20 Abridged from the Funeral Sermon of John Strachan (1815); in C. E. Cartwright, ed., Life and Letters of the Late Honourable Richard Cartwright (Toronto, 1876), pp. 20-21, 13.

Richard Cartwright, "A Journey to Canada" (1777); cited in Donald C. Macdonald, "Honourable Richard Cartwright, 1759-1815", in Three History Theses (Toronto, 1961), pp. 7, 8.


Cartwright believed that the Loyalists were not motivated by "Pay and Plunder", rather, "they contended for the constitutional Rights of the Crown, and the Supremacy of Parliament, which they had been taught to revere, and which they considered as co-extensive with the British Dominions..."


22 Quoted in C. E. Cartwright, p. 58.

Ibid., p. 95; Cartwright to General Peter Hunter, August 23, 1799.

23 Kingston Gazette; reprinted in the York Gazette, February 12, 1812.

24 Richard Cartwright to Chief Justice John Elmsley, January 7, 1798; quoted in Macdonald, p. 114;

Anonymous (Richard Cartwright), Letters, from an American Loyalist in Upper-Canada, to His Friend in England, p. 15.

25 In the Niagara Gleaner, November 1, 1823.


See also Mealing, p. 311

Simcoe explained his policy to the Colonial Office in the following manner:

... many well affected settlers were convinced that Fence Viewers, Pound keepers, and other Petty Officers to regulate matters of local Policy would be more willingly obeyed if named by the House keepers -- and especially that the Collector of the rates should be a person chosen by themselves ...

It was therefore thought advisable not to withhold such a gratification to which they had been accustomed, it being in itself, and only to take place one day in the year.

Cruikshank, ed., The Simcoe Papers, Vol. II, p. 54; Simcoe to Dundas, September 16, 1793:


Simcoe was not as concerned with the constitutional purity of Upper Canada as he was with its economic development. Therefore, he was prepared to allow some local elections to satisfy the demands of the American settlers. Other colonial officials were not as willing to compromise. Major Graham of the York Garrison, wrote to the Surveyor General in 1802 about his fears of such demands:

I ... find in the disposition of several of the inhabitants of Yonge Street, and in particular those from the Northern States, that they show a very great contempt to the officers of our Government, both civil and military, as it is their whole desire to have the election of all their own officers ...

(PAC, Upper Canada State Papers, Vol. 23, p. 21; Major Graham
to D. W. Smith, March 29, 1802):


31 PAC Pamphlets, John Strachan, A Discourse on the Character of King George the Third. Addressed to the Inhabitants of British America. (Montreal, 1810), p. 43; see also pp. 18, 21.

Strachan also emphasized the strengths of the British Constitution in contrast to the revolution-born republicanism represented by the United States and France which simply produced "a rage for equality" (Ibid., p. 47; see also pp. 31-33, 35).

The Burkean fear of revolution has been discussed in more depth by Terry Cook, in "John Beverley Robinson and the Conservative Blueprint for the Upper Canadian Community", in Ontario History, Vol. 64 (1972), 79-81.

Strachan also believed that the benefits of the British Constitution made the people more content than their American neighbours. He wrote: "In point of real happiness the British are far superior to the inhabitants of this celebrated republic. The frequency of their elections keeps them in a constant broil". (Strachan to Brown, October 21, 1809, in J. L. H. Henderson, ed., John Strachan: Documents and Opinions (Toronto, 1969), p. 26.

See also:


33 Strachan, A Discourse ..., pp. 39-40.

34 Ibid., pp. 43, 42.

Useful discussions of Anglo-American attitudes about opposition and political dissent in the eighteenth century are to be found in the following:


36. Hamilton, for example, was labelled "an avowed republican". Cf. Simcoe to Dundas, September 16, 1793; in Cruikshank, ed., Simcoe Papers, Vol. II, p. 53. Also; Dundas to Simcoe, March 16, 1794; Ibid., pp. 187-188; and Simcoe to Dorchester, June 15, 1794; Ibid., p. 265; see Wilson, pp. 203-233.

Cartwright to Isaac Todd, October 1, 1794; quoted in C. E. Cartwright, p. 56.

Graeme Patterson outlined the personal nature of early politics in York -- the political and ethnic tensions which characterized the relations between Peter Russell and his supporters and Governor Peter Hunter and his supporters -- in his article, "Whiggery, Nationality, and the Upper Canadian Reform Tradition", in Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 56 (1975), esp. pp. 26-30.


The Thorpe controversy is not the only example, of course. John Mills Jackson, an Englishman, became allied with Thorpe against Sir Francis Gore because he was denied a grant of land. CO42/350, p. 12-19 provides Gore's despatch of February 1, 1810 which commented on Jackson's pamphlet, A View of the Political Situation of Upper Canada (London, 1809).

38. PAC CO42/347, p. 151; Gore to George Watson, July 29, 1807.

See also:

PAC CO42/342, p. 108; Thorpe to Edward Cooke; January 24, 1806.

39. PAC CO42/342, p. 108; Thorpe to Cooke, January 24, 1806.

York Gazette, October 31, 1807.

PAC CO42/342, p. 74; Gore to Windham, October 29, 1806.

40. Enclosed in CO42/341, p. 59; Gore to Windham, March 13, 1807.

See also:

Q/310, p. 314; Thorpe to Edwrard Cooke, September 18, 1807; in Report on Canadian Archives, 1892 (Ottawa, 1893).
Note D: "Political State of Upper Canada in 1806-07", p. 111.

Thorpe wrote:

...The liberality of the Crown, the wisdom of Parliament & the system agreed on by the greatest politicians England every produced, as the only mode by which the province could be maintained was despised & the converse pursued. The few were aggrandized and enriched; the many were to be oppressed and impoverished, every establishment was to be kept up & every expense to England continued because the few were to be benefited, but nothing was to be attempted to improve the province; because the many were to be depressed, the Crown land was to be heaped upon the few & withheld from the many .... The shadow of the British Constitution was given to the many, and the substance retained for the few ....

The argument that the political and economic development of a society was retarded as the result of the domination of a corrupt administration over the virtuous population was a recurrent theme in the tradition of Anglo-American opposition.


Halton's account of this interview, along with Gore's comments is enclosed in CO42/341, p. 59; Gore to Windham, March 13, 1807.

PAC CO42/341, p. 59; Gore to Windham, March 13, 1807.

This dispatch, which was Gore's major review of Thorpe's activities, was copied almost verbatim from Richard Cartwright's "Sketch of Mr. Thorpe's Political Conduct", (See Walton, p. 87):

Gore saw Thorpe as the heir to the agitation aroused by William Weekes. Weekes, from Ireland by way of the United States, had been elected to the Assembly in 1805 where he was a critic of the administration until he was killed in a duel a year later.

Gore also linked Thorpe to two republican symbols: The "Harp without the Crown" was a reference to the United Irish Movement. (Cf. Upper Canada Gazette, January 10, 1807; statement by T. B. Gough cited in E. Firth, ed., The Town of York, 1793-1815 (Toronto, 1962); p. 181.

In addition, it was suggested that Thorpe alluded to the symbol of the American Revolution. The Governor was also informed by William Allan that Thorpe had told the electors: "their situation in this country might render them Independent from Great Britain"
(Q306, p. 89; Allan to Gore, January 5, 1807; in "Political State of Upper Canada", p. 69).

43 PAC CO42/341, p. 59; Gore to Windham, March 13, 1807.


The Proclamation was discussed in a letter from Simcoe to the Colonial Secretary, Sir Henry Dundas, dated February 16, 1792; Ibid., pp. 112-115.

45 Population figures from R. C. Harris and John Warkentin, Canada Before Confederation (Toronto, 1974), pp. 116-117.

46 Cartwright to General Peter Hunter, August 23, 1799; in C. E. Cartwright, pp. 96-96.

Cartwright's solution was to encourage the settlement of "men of tried loyalty and who have been bred up in habits of subordination, in sufficient numbers to discountenance that affectation of equality so discernible in the manner of those who come to us from the American republic". (Ibid., p. 93).

Thomas Talbot also supported the immigration of British settlers to check "the growing tendency to insubordination and revolt". (CO42/330, pp. 201-204; Talbot to John Sullivan, October 27, 1802; quoted in Craig, p. 48).

As a result of such attitudes, the Assembly passed legislation which required a seven-year residence, plus an oath of allegiance, before the American settlers were allowed to vote in 1800.


The same themes were also articulated by Gore in an address to "the magistrates, clergy and principal inhabitants of the Eastern District", in March 1811; quoted in E. A. Cruikshank, "A Study of Disaffection in Upper Canada in 1812-13", in Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, 3rd Series, Vol. 6 (1912), p. 15.

Gore to Sir James Craig, January 5, 1808; quoted in S. D. Clark, Movements of Political Protest in Canada, 1640-1840 (Toronto, 1959), p. 229.

Niagara Herald, February 21, 1801.

The perception that the Americans settled in Upper Canada were potentially disloyal was articulated throughout the period before 1812. Thomas Welch, for example, noted that 'about nine out of every ten inhabitants of Oxford County celebrated the Fourth of
July, and he remarked that these settlers "may ... be well enough (,) provided we have no war with the United States, but Should we unfortunately be plunged into a War ... the people above alluded to ... under the cloak of Subjects would ... be much to be dreaded." (Norfolk Historical Society, Thomas Welch Papers, Welch to William Halton, November 11, 1807; quoted in Patterson, "Studies in Elections and Public Opinion ...", p. 20).

In 1812, General Brock believed that much of the population in western Upper Canada was disloyal. He wrote: "There can be no doubt that a large portion of the population in this neighbourhood (Fort George) are sincere in their professions to defend the country, but it appears likewise evident to me that the greater part are either indifferent to what is passing, or so completely American as to rejoice in the prospects of a change of Government."

(Upper Canada Sundries, Brock to General Prevost, July 12, 1812; quoted in Clark, p. 220).

48 CO42/343, p. 59; Gore to Windham, March 13, 1807; see also Walton, pp. 91-94; CO42/343, p. 180; Castlereagh to Gore, June 19, 1807.

49 Thorpe had been extremely critical of the economic and political domination of Upper Canada exercised by Scottish merchants such as Hamilton and Cartwright. In 1806, he wrote to the Colonial Office:

I found (Gore) ... impressed with the high notion of the old system, surrounded by the same Scotch Pedlars that had insinuated themselves into favour with General Hunter and that have so long irritated and oppressed the people; there is a chain of them linked from Halifax to Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, York, Niagara and so on to Detroit -- this Shopkeeper Aristocracy has stunted the prosperity of the Province and goaded the people until they have turned from the greatest Loyalty to the utmost disaffection.

(CO42/342, p. 208; Thorpe to George Shee, December 1, 1806).

50 See Patterson, "Whiggery, Nationality, and the Upper Canadian Reform Tradition", pp. 30-35.

51 It was reported that Willcocks "expressed his admiration of a Republican system of Government hoped that system would prevail thro' the world." (CO42/306, p. 132; Affidavit of John Richardson of York, Farmer and Bailiff, before John Small, February 14, 1807; quoted in W. R. Riddell, "Joseph Willcocks, Sheriff, Member of Parliament and Traitor", in Ontario Historical Society Papers and Records, Vol. 24 (1927), pp. 475-499).

Willcocks was elected to the Assembly in 1808; imprisoned by the other members of the Assembly for libelling them in his newspaper, but was re-elected in 1809. He remained in opposition throughout his political career, and in 1813 joined the American forces
invading Upper Canada. He was killed in action in 1814.

52 Gore believed that "A Loyalist" was Thorpe; CO42/350, p. 212; Gore to Liverpool, August 9, 1810.

53 Cruikshank, ed., Simcoe Papers, Vol. III, pp. 67-68; Simcoe to the Lords of Trade, September 1, 1794.

54 The Upper Canadian Guardian, August 6, 1807; enclosed in CO42/350; Gore to Liverpool, August 9, 1810.

55 OA, Rogers Papers, Memo re School Bill (1808); quoted in Patterson, "Studies in Elections and Public Opinion . . .", pp. 310-311.

56 Ibid., August 6, 1807; Ibid., September 3, 1807.

57 CO42/347, p. 54; in Firth, ed., p. 182.

58 Patterson, "Whiggery, Nationality and the Upper Canadian Reform Tradition", pp. 30-31.

59 The Upper Canadian Guardian, August 6, 1807; letter from "A Loyalist".

Ibid., August 27, 1807; quoted in Patterson, Ibid., p. 30.

60 PAC, Powell Papers, p. 1252; Powell's address to "Volunteers, Men of the Flank Companies and Embodied Militia". (1812).


62 PAC, Powell Papers, p. 1258; letter to the King's Printer, undated.

63 Bethune, pp. 42-43.

64 PAC, Powell Papers, p. 1258; letter to the King's Printer, undated.


This perception was shared by many prominent Upper Canadians, including William Dickson, Robert Nichol, and William Allen. (Cf. Cruikshank, "A Study of Disaffection . . .", pp. 30-31, 35-37.)

S. D. Clark, though, has argued that in reality the American settlers remained "politically passive". (S. D. Clark, Movements of Political Protest in Canada, 1640-1840 (Toronto, 1959), p. 231).
66. S. F. Wise, "God's Peculiar Peoples", in W. L. Morton, ed., The Shield of Achilles: Aspects of Canada in the Victorian Age (Toronto, 1968), p. 34; James Strachan, A Visit to the Province of Upper Canada, 1819 (reprinted New York, 1968), p. 35. This pamphlet was written by John Strachan; but published in Britain under his brother's name.


68. PAC, Powell Papers, p. 1244; Proclamation dated July 22, 1812.

The post-war prosperity associated with the expansion of the staple trades was linked to the Canada Corn Act and the timber duties. Imperial protection for colonial products provided evidence that mercantilism was working.

69. Upper Canada Gazette, February 16, 1817; Address "To the Electors of Halton County."

Peter Robinson, brother of the Attorney-General, John Beverley Robinson, affirmed the same theme and also stressed his admiration of the imperial connection: "I readily avow my attachment to the British connection and my loyalty to the best of Kings -- I am delighted that we belong to that generous nation which fills the whole Earth with admiration at her heroism and magnanimity ..." (Upper Canada Gazette, May 8, 1816). See also PAC, Charles Jones Papers; his electoral address (1816?) emphasized the idea of the balanced constitution and was concerned with further Loyalist myth-making.

70. PAC, Powell Papers, p. 1258; letter to the King's Printer, undated; Kingston Gazette, April 7, 1818.

71. John Strachan, sermon delivered at York, August 2, 1812; in Bethune, p. 43.

Strachan also believed that oppositionists were immoral, as well as factious and designing:

... the principal members in opposition were often unworthy in private life; and, however eminent in talents, could not claim the confidence of the country, by the noble firmness and purity of their contact.

(James Strachan, p. 22).

72. TPL, W. D. Powell Papers, Core to Powell; dated only "Sunday morning"; quoted in Craig, p. 91.

73. Niagara Spectator, February 14, 1817; "Address to the Independent Electors in the County of Wentworth"; Journals of the Legislative Assembly (1818); in Ontario Archives, Ninth Report (Toronto, 1912), p. 348.
See Craig, pp. 89-93 for a more detailed discussion of these activities.

The Gourlay controversy has been thoroughly discussed in several sources, including:


Robert Gourlay himself wrote prolifically on this issue, and the sources of most use for this paper included:

A Specific Plan for Organizing the People and for obtaining Reform Independent of Parliament .... (London, 1809).


The Banished Briton and Neptunian: being a Record of the Life, Writings, Principles, and Projects of Robert Gourlay .... (Boston, 1843-45).


Quoted in Cruikshank, p. 78; Gourlay, "To the Resident Land Owners of Upper Canada", Niagara Spectator, February 5 and 12, 1818. (Second Address); see also Gourlay's letter in the issue of April 23, 1818.

For a more complete discussion of Robert Gourlay's ideas, see S. R. Mealing's introduction to Gourlay's Statistical Account of Upper Canada (reprinted Toronto, 1974), pp. 1-13; as well, there is Gourlay's own Specific Plan.

The Neptunian, no. 18, p. 188; Ibid., no. 33, p. 468.

The same concern with the protection of the people's rights in the face of tyranny and corruption of the ministers of the Crown dominated the Whig ideology in revolutionary America.

Cf. Wood, pp. 28-42.

Gourlay himself defended his position by arguing that the right of petition was protected by the Glorious Revolution; and, more important: "It emanated purely from the people, uninfluenced by Sovereign Policy, or unwayed by domineering aristocracy." (Niagara Spectator, April 23, 1818).

The new Lieutenant Governor, Sir Peregrine Maitland believed that Gourlay was subversive; he wrote the Colonial Secretary that: "A man named Gourlay, half Cobbett, half Hunt, has been perplexing the province". (PAC, CO42/361, p. 115; Maitland to Bathurst, York, August 19, 1818.) In an address to the Assembly, he labelled Gourlay's actions as "attempts which have been made to excite discontent, and to organize sedition." Maitland continued by suggesting that a provincial Convention "cannot exist without danger to the Constitution." (Journals of the Legislative Assembly, quoted in Cruikshank, p. 91.)

PAC, Upper Canada Sundries, Vol. 40; Robinson to Col. Samuel Smith, June 29, 1818; quoted in Milani, p. 163.

Robinson also believed that Gourlay's writings contained passages "plainly and grossly libellous, and so entirely subversive of that respect which the Government of every Country should vindicate to itself, nor so much for its own honor, as the security and welfare of its people." (Robinson to S. P. Jarvis, June 13, 1818; in Cruikshank, pp. 145-146.)


At the height of the Gourlay controversy, The Kingston Chronicle, edited by Macaulay, stated that there were no real grievances in the province, and, therefore, there should be no opposition to the administration:

... Every energy of government appears to be directed to promote its (Upper Canada's) welfare and prosperity. We have heard indeed, of grievances, but what, or where are they? ... We have taxes, but they are scarcely perceptible — poor laws and tithes are not known among us — our laws and commercial restrictions are equal strangers to our happy land. Thus we are permitted to enjoy all the comforts, (s) all the privileges of Englishmen, without being subjected to one of the burdens to which England herself is obliged to submit ...

(January 1, 1819).

83 This view was shared by many Tories; see, for example, a pamphlet entitled Essay on Modern Reformers, by John Simpson, a Loyalist and friend of Strachan. Simpson also emphasized the traditional Tory belief that 'men like Gourlay were simply "self-created reformers ... who court the public favour by instilling the idea of imaginary wants, of visionary sufferings and fancied privations.'

PAC Pamphlets, John Simpson, Essay on Modern Reformers, Addressed to the People of Upper Canada. To Which is added a Letter, to Mr. Robert Gourlay (Kingston, 1818), pp. 6, 18-19; see also Simpson's letter in the Kingston Gazette, May 12, 1818.

An editorial in the Upper Canada Gazette believed Gourlay's activities to be "incendiary frolics," which were 'stirred up by "a sense of duties which he generously imposed upon himself."' (July 1, 1819).

84 See the response of Thomas Clark in the Niagara Spectator, March 12, 1818 and Burand's response in the issue dated February 4, 1819. See also a letter by C. Stuart in the Canadian Argus and Niagara Spectator of April 20, 1820.

85 TPL, W. D. Powell Papers, William Dickson to the Gaoler of the Niagara District, January 1, 1819; see also, OA, Macaulay Papers, Strachan to Macaulay, January 30, 1819.

Strachan believed that if Gourlay's opposition had been allowed to continue, "a civil war would have been the consequence and for no reason but to gratify a man of desperate fortunes." (James Strachan, p. 195).


87 Gourlay, "General Introduction ...", pp. d, d1;

Niagara Spectator, April 27, 1818.

Gourlay was critical of Tory loyalty such as that articulated by Strachan who sought to inculcate love for the sovereign, veneration for the constitution and submission to the civil authorities. (See, for example, Strachan's letters to the Kingston Gazette, August 8, and September 3, 1811).

88 Niagara Spectator, May 14, 1818.

See also the following letters in the Kingston Gazette, from "Agricola" (June 30, 1818); "Spectator" (August 25, 1818) and "A British-Born Subject" (December 15, 1818); and from "A Loyalist" in the Upper Canada Gazette, April 8, 1819, for proofs of loyalty.

In 1837 Gourlay was extremely critical of the treasonable conduct of William Lyon Mackenzie, and provided the Lieutenant Governor, Sir Francis Bond Head, with information about rebel activities in the United States. (See Gourlay, *The Banished Briton*, p. 12, #4, p. 48; cited in Milani, p. 251.)

Upper Canada Gazette, April 6, 1820.

Kingston Chronicle, November 1, 1822; Upper Canada Gazette, April 6, 1820.
CHAPTER 3

THE ALIEN QUESTION AND THE DEBATE OVER LOYALTY

In the mid-1820's, a letter printed in the Colonial Advocate commented on the impact of perhaps the most important political issue of the decade in Upper Canada: the "public mind ... seems occupied with nothing else at present; -- the Alien Bill is the general topic of conversation." The controversy generated by the Alien Question focused upon the status of the largest group of inhabitants in the province, the settlers who had come from the United States after 1792. Although this had been a contentious problem since the end of the War of 1812, it became an important political question in the 1820's when the British courts decided that the American settlers were not legally subjects of the Crown, but aliens; as such, they were unable to hold property or enjoy political rights in Upper Canada. The desire on the part of both the administration and its opponents to settle the question produced a long, bitter and revealing debate.

Two distinct aspects of the Alien Question emerged during this debate. There was the legal question during which the Tories claimed that the American settlers had to be naturalized because they were aliens; the Reformers, on the other hand, appealed to prescriptive rights and convention to confirm the claims of this group to be recognized as subjects of the Crown. But the question developed into far more than a legal controversy; it became a debate over the nature of loyalty in Upper Canada. The Tory position rested upon arguments which had been developed before 1820. The Tories believed that the province was vulnerable because of the settlement of a large body of potentially disloyal Americans within it; and they looked to the imperial connection to guaran-
the continued existence of the province. Tory loyalty was also exclusive; it required adherence to the idea of Upper Canada as a special Loyalist bastion governed by a Tory elite. Throughout the 1820's, this view was challenged by spokesmen of what was to become the Reform movement. Reform loyalty was assimilative rather than exclusive; it was argued that American inhabitants could become loyal subjects through the process of settlement in Upper Canada. This sentiment was accompanied by the development of provincial feeling expressed with nationalist rather than Loyalist rhetoric; as a result, the definition of loyalty was broadened by the Reformers.

The experiences of the War of 1812 crystallized pre-war suspicions and resentment of the American settlers in Upper Canada into fear and hatred. These attitudes produced a major change in government policy towards the American settlers. The perceived vulnerability of Upper Canada as a result of its proximity to the United States and the large American-born population within the province prompted harsh measures from the administration; loyalty oaths were imposed on those suspected of disloyalty, Americans were denied patronage, and immigration from the United States was limited after 1815. John Strachan reflected official attitudes about the American settlers and the Tory vision of the future development of Upper Canada as a British society:

... it was deemed wise to check emigration from the United States for a time, until the passions on both sides were cooled, and until a sort of foundation, or nucleus, could be formed of emigrants from the mother country in the new settlements; by which they might acquire a British tone and character.²

The administration believed that if the pre-war pattern of heavy immigration from the United States continued, the province would become
completely American; therefore, British immigration was encouraged and it became more difficult for Americans to establish themselves in Upper Canada. Magistrates were not allowed to give oaths of allegiance to Americans, making it impossible for them to secure title to land. As a result, the proportion of inhabitants of American origin began to decline after 1815.

But a substantial body of American settlers still remained in the province, and the Tories sought to define their legal status. In 1818, the Attorney General, John Reverley Robinson, presented an opinion which declared that settlers who had remained in the United States after 1783, and had not been naturalized in Upper Canada were aliens. These inhabitants would not be entitled to hold property or enjoy political rights in the province. Robinson was not prepared to pursue the question to its legal conclusion because the consequent insecurity over land titles, which would be faced by both the American settlers and British subjects who may have purchased property from Americans in Upper Canada, would produce significant unrest in the province. Consequently, no action was taken and the status of the American settlers remained unresolved.

This question was raised again after the victory of Barnabas Bidwell in a by-election held for the constituency of Lennox and Addington in 1821. Bidwell was an American settler; he had been born in Massachusetts in 1763, and had remained in the United States after the American Revolution. He subsequently became attorney general for Massachusetts, a member of the United States Congress, and Treasurer of Berkshire County. Accusations of forgery and embezzlement while Treasurer forced Bidwell's emigration to Upper Canada in 1810. His by-election victory was challenged by several constituents on the grounds
that Barnabas Bidwell was both a criminal and an alien. The petition stated that he had taken an oath of allegiance in the United States in which he abjured his status as a British subject; moreover, it was asserted that Bidwell did not consider the oath of allegiance that he had taken in Upper Canada to be binding because it was compulsory.

The petition was supported by the administration because Bidwell had been an active and vocal opponent of the local Tory elite in Kingston, and he had contributed to Gourlay's statistical account. John Strachan, now a member of the executive, had written to John Macaulay before the by-election: "I hope Bidwell will not get in because it would be a disgrace to the Province ...;" after the result was known, he remarked: "It positively made me sick to hear of old Bidwell's return." The prospect of eliminating an opponent like Bidwell was quite appealing for the Tories, and John Beverley Robinson initiated proceedings in the House to disqualify the new member.

Although the debate over his eligibility touched upon the larger question of the status of American settlers in the province, Bidwell was eventually expelled from the Assembly on the grounds of "moral turpitude" rather than because he was an alien. As the Kingston Chronicle reported: "His malversations in office" had forced Bidwell to flee from the United States "into the wilderness of Canada, in order to avoid the swift vengeance with which he was threatened by the uplifted arm of justice.

Barnabas Bidwell was prevented from running again by a statute passed by the Assembly in 1822 to disqualify him; but his son, Marshall Spring Bidwell, did contest the new by-election. The son's qualifications were challenged "upon the ground of his having been born in the United States," and, therefore, being an alien. As a result, the Returning
Officer rejected all votes for Bidwell. Marshall Spring Bidwell petitioned the Assembly to have the decision overturned; the result was voided, and he was declared eligible to sit in the House. But at the same time, the Lieutenant Governor, Sir Peregrine Maitland, referred the question of the Bidwells' qualifications to the Imperial Government for resolution, and a decision was to be made on the basis of the judgement in a case already pending in the British courts.

The legal status of the settlers of American origin remained unclear to many Upper Canadians, and the legal framework within which the Alien Question was debated was complex. W. W. Baldwin, a lawyer himself, stated: "There is a great difficulty in ascertaining what legal provisions, if any, have been made, between Great Britain and the United States, with a view to separate the mass of the people, under the peculiar circumstances of the revolution into American citizens and British subjects." A significant amount of turmoil was generated by the fact that contradictory legal opinions could be brought to bear on the status of the American settlers. The Reformers based their legal position on the concept of perpetual allegiance — they argued that British subjects could not give up their allegiance to the Crown. English Common Law, for example, declared that "a natural-born subject could not shed or lose his nationality by unilateral action of the subject of the Crown." Moreover, two British statutes, passed in 1731 and 1773, stated that "children and grandchildren born abroad of British fathers might retain the status of British subjects." Although Great Britain gave "formal recognition of the severance of allegiance" at the conclusion of the American Revolution, opponents of the administration argued that the Americans who came into the province had remained loyal British subjects. Barnabas Bidwell, for
instance, based this contention on the Blackstonian concept that the
natural allegiance of a British subject could not be severed; the oath
that he took in the United States provided only local allegiance -- he
remained a subject of the Crown. Marshall Spring Bidwell defended his
status on the grounds that he was both the grandson and son of natural-
born British subjects. 13

Although the legality of the Reform position was undermined by
subsequent decisions of the British courts, opponents of the administration
continued to defend the rights of the American inhabitants. They presen-
ted a strong case, based upon good conservative appeals to the
prescriptive rights of the settlers. They stressed history and precedent,
custom and usage, to buttress their position: resolutions passed by the
Assembly in December 1825 stated:

... from the earliest settlement of Upper
Canada ..., (Americans) with the knowledge
and approbation of His Majesty's Government,
came in great numbers to this Province, and
were immediately admitted and uniformly
considered to be entitled ... to all the
rights and privileges ... of natural born
subjects.

Earlier legislation made "no provision for the naturalization of such
persons" and implied, as a consequence, that the "natural allegiance" of
the American settlers "haye'never been in anywise destroyed." 14

Reformers also appealed to convention to strengthen their arguments;

John Wilson stated in the Assembly that:

Governor Simcoe sent proclamations throughout
the U. States of America, calling upon all
those who wished to retain their allegiance,
to come in and renew it, and every person who
came in received lands, upon renewing their
allegiance .... 15

Marshall Spring Bidwell said that "Americans were invited to come in, buy
lands, build homes and expend their money and industry upon that property to which they are now told, they never did, and never would have title."
The policy which now declared the American settlers to be aliens was:

... inconsistent ....with the uniform uninterrupted practice for years past: at every election Americans have been permitted to vote; they have been elected and have served as Members of Parliament, and not a doubt has been hinted of their eligibility.¹⁶

The Reformers, thus, argued that because the American settlers had long enjoyed both property and political rights in the province, they were to be considered as British subjects. There would be disastrous consequences if these rights were withdrawn, as the Upper Canada Herald noted: these inhabitants "... have heretofore not only considered themselves, but have been uniformly considered and treated by His Majesty and by the Provincial authorities and statutes as subjects." To consider them now as aliens "... will disenfranchise a large proportion of freeholders of every district throughout the Province, to their grievous disappointment and injury; and will, in their view at least, be a breach of the public faith."¹⁷

The administration simply did not accept the Reform position; settlers who had remained in the United States after the American Revolution became citizens of the new nation and were, thus, aliens when they arrived in Upper Canada. The Tory spokesman was John Beverley Robinson, the Attorney General, who stated that Barnabas Bidwell, for example, was an alien because under "... the constitution of the U. States, those who had taken the oath of allegiance, were called adopted citizens." Bidwell had taken this oath, and as a consequence, "abjured his allegiance to the Crown of Great Britain ...." Moreover, Robinson countered the perceptions of his critics about the policy of the Simcoe
administration; the Governor did not invite all Americans into Upper Canada, he sought only the loyal subjects still residing in the United States. The Attorney General had examined Simcoe's Proclamation and concluded that: "... his Excellency merely said he would give grants of land to settlers, but not a word about their coming from the United States." He also asked: "Did the proclamation invite all persons without distinction? No; the proclamation expressly invited such persons only whose loyalty, and good conduct in the country where they resided, entitled them to encouragement." Accordingly, Robinson rejected appeals to historical convention on this question; he was "anxious ... to set at rest" the erroneous assumption that Americans "... should be allowed to cross the river, and enjoy all the privileges of British subjects .... The Americans were always treated as aliens by the government ...." 18

Tory opinions were confirmed in 1824 by British legal authorities who decided that the Bidwells, father and son, were aliens because Barnabas had acknowledged the independence of the United States and had taken an oath of office which abjured his allegiance to the Crown; consequently, the son of an alien was also an alien. In the same year, the British courts also decided that persons remaining in the United States after 1783 were no longer British subjects. 19 These decisions had important consequences for Upper Canada because all inhabitants of the province who had immigrated from the United States, except those registered as Loyalists, were declared to be aliens, and therefore, unable to hold property or participate in the political life of the province, unless they were naturalized. Throughout the entire debate over the legal status of the American settlers during the Alien Question, the Tories maintained this position. 20
The Lieutenant Governor, Sir Peregrine Maitland, had recognized that if the American settlers were declared to be aliens, "more than half of the possessions of the colony would be unsettled." In order to resolve the situation, the Colonial Secretary, Lord Bathurst, instructed Maitland to secure proper naturalization legislation which would confer "the civil rights and privileges upon such citizens of the United States as, being heretofore settled in Canada, are declared ... to be Aliens ... although they have hitherto enjoyed, without question, the rights of British subjects." The Governor also wanted to conclude the Alien Question because he was aware of growing discontent among the American settlers which "diminishes their confidence in the protection of the Government." Although Maitland believed that they had proved "their attachment to the British Government and constitution ... by a long residence, and by faithful and valuable services during the late War ...," he felt that they remained potentially disloyal. Their American background made them susceptible to the spread of "godless republicanism" in the province. His solution was to confirm the security of land titles held by the American settlers, but deny them political rights because they were aliens. The Legislative Council passed a Naturalization Bill in November 1825 which conformed to Maitland's views.

Maitland may have intended a compromise rather than a partisan solution, but to Reformers his bill was a concrete and dramatic example of how extreme and how unpalatable the exclusiveness of Tory loyalty could be. In opposing it, they exploited the "tangled nature of the question itself, (and) intransigence on the part of government side" to generate support for their position. They attacked the Tories for changing the rules in the middle of the game to suit the political pur-
poses of the government. Drawing upon traditional opposition arguments, the Reformers appealed to English constitutional principles. They rejected the official position that property rights could be confirmed, but the corresponding political rights denied; the two could not be separated. The Reformers saw themselves as the "watchful guardians of the people's rights" and perceived a Tory "plot" designed to neutralize opponents of the government. The Canadian Freeman reported that "great fears are entertained that some trick is about to be played off by the ministerial party." 24

In addition to the Reform affirmations of loyalty to constitutional principles, there was also a renewed commitment to the British connection. Opponents of the administration believed that the Imperial Government wanted the provincial Assembly to confirm the status of the American settlers as British subjects, but that imperial intentions were being misrepresented by the Tory-controlled administration. A letter to the Upper Canada Herald declared:

The Legislative Council passed a Bill which... contained a declaration that these persons are not subjects, but in its enacting clauses naturalized them so far only as respects the holding of land, but not as to the rights of suffrage and eligibility. The Bill was essentially at variance with the recommendation of His Majesty's Government. 25

This theme was repeated the following year when the administration introduced legislation whose purpose was to naturalize all inhabitants who had resided in the province for seven years and required that "all persons applying for citizenship were to take an oath renouncing their American citizenship and were to be registered as naturalized British subjects." In a letter to Robert Wilmot Horton, the Colonial Under Secretary, John
Rolph articulated the suspicion that the Tories were ignoring imperial instructions about the issue. He wrote: "... the present ministry has attempted to conceal or misrepresent the gracious intentions of His Majesty; an imputation which has frequently taken its origin from the unavailing ambition of some Gentlemen in the Colony to identify themselves with the Members of the Imperial Government."26

Reformers accepted the idea of a court-country dichotomy which was a central theme in the eighteenth-century Anglo-American opposition ideology.27 They did not attack the Crown; rather they focused upon the Governor's advisors who were subverting the intentions of the imperial authorities. Francis Collins, an Irishman who edited the Canadian Freeman, developed this argument in some depth in a pamphlet devoted to a discussion of the Alien Question. He wrote:

... public opinion acquits both His Excellency and the home government of any design against the liberty of the people, and rests the odium of such a trick upon the backs of a few deep and designing politicians who have long nestled about the Colonial Executive — and who, like the fable of the snake and the countryman, the moment they have been warmed into existence by the fruit of the toils and industry of the American emigrant farmers ... turned round upon their benefactors, and shed upon them the deadly poison of their political malice.28

It was the Reformers who would protect the rights and liberties of the people against such encroachments by the executive. William Lyon Mackenzie, a recent Scottish immigrant and editor of the Colonial Advocate who quickly became embroiled in the political conflicts of the province, believed that the greatest threat to the loyalty of the population was "in the inclination to despotic sway, previously exhibited by the few governing against the rights of the many governed." By zealously guarding
the liberties of the people, the Reformers were strengthening loyal sentiment in Upper Canada:

... the possession of political rights, the consciousness of freedom, independence (sic), and a share of self-government, is in itself a great pleasure; and leads to many other enjoyments and exertions, which are at once delightful to the individual and profitable to the community.29

The increased insistence with which Reformers separated the provincial administration from the imperial connection and from British constitutional principles was met by a corresponding increase in Tory suspicion of their motives. Since Tories held that there were no real grievances in the province, they were

... naturally led to inquire, to what circumstance... such an anomaly is attributable -- that the people acknowledgedly possessing greater privileges under their Government, than are enjoyed by any other, should in fact be opposed to that Government.30

The obvious answer was that opposition was stirred up by dissenters seeking their own selfish goals. Opposition to the administration on the Alien Question was led by "a band of factious demagogues whose Acts perceptibly tend to disorganize society, to subvert legitimate authority, and to alienate men's minds from the constitutional government."31 The idea of legitimate opposition was still unacceptable because it disrupted social harmony and political stability. The loyal subject would not oppose the government; the Gore Gazette noted: "... we do not hold that... an admiration of the institutions of our country, are best evinced by a systematic opposition to its government; we conceive, on the contrary, that it is the obvious duty of every good member of society to assist in sustaining the constitutional authorities of his country..."32
The Reformers, of course, reacted strongly against this equation of political dissent and disloyalty; their loyalty was to principles rather than to the corrupt administration. Captain John Matthews, a member of the Assembly for Middlesex, had been accused of disloyalty because he requested a troupe of American actors to sing "Yankee Doodle" after a performance; he believed that the Tories were simply loyal to a government which offered patronage. He said: "Loyalty, loyalty is all the cry now a-days, but analyze the term as it is now used, and you will find that it is loyalty to the Attorney General which is meant, because he is able to give away a great many good things ..."33 William Lyon Mackenzie developed the same theme in much more depth. When accused of "democracy, disloyalty and foul play," he responded by questioning Tory conceptions about the nature of loyalty:

It is true, my loyalty has not descended so low as to degenerate into base fawning cringing servility. I may honour my sovereign surely, and remember the ruler of my people with the respect that is due to his name and rank, without allowing my deportment to be equally respectful and humble to his Majesty's butcher, or his baker, or to his tailor! (sic) ... The doctrines I have advocated will bear any inspection, for they are of a truly British stamp.

Loyalty is an odd sort of word, and readily admits of many definitions; it is for instance a sort which consists in keeping a connection with the party that have places to give away ... 34

The Reformers not only attacked the corruption represented in their eyes by the Tories' attachment to office, they also condemned the partisanship of a measure that would neutralize political opposition by declaring the American settlers to be aliens. John Rolph, an English
doctor and lawyer who sat for Middlesex in the Assembly, claimed that American inhabitants were being required to admit with stoic insensibility, that they have no title to their farms, and no civil rights, but that they seek the honor of an allegiance, ... then shall they be considered freeborn men, sufficiently tamed and chagrined to suit the administration of Upper Canada.

The opponents of the administration also feared the social consequences of a government policy which required the Americans to register as aliens. The process of registration would divide the community by segregating this group from the rest of the population. In the debate over the Alien Bill in 1827, Rolph said:

A man is averse for many and obvious reasons to be considered an alien .... To be an alien, it is said, is no shame. ... True; it is no shame to have unfortunately contracted the itch, yet no man so afflicted desires to register his misfortunes, or to be told of it wherever he goes ....; we should much prefer the honor of being British subjects.

Tory policy threatened social harmony because it would divide the population of Upper Canada into two distinct political classes. Again, it was John Rolph, now the spokesman for the opposition on the Alien Question, who saw that the government's legislation would draw "... an unnecessary line of distinction between British subjects by right and subjects by act of Parliament. The moment that political distinction is created, then invidious feelings will be generated." Francis Collins was even more critical of such developments; he believed that

... the Alien Question has been nothing but a snare -- a hidden trap, with which to destroy the civil rights of the American emigrants in this colony -- an apple of discord, with which first to
divide the people, and then rule them
with an iron rod ....

John Matthews struck at the heart of the matter when he, too, argued that
the ultimate purpose of the Tory administration was to "divide and
govern" the population:

(He) had seen Europeans, Scotch, English,
and Irish pitted against Americans ....
(This) little province was as much divided
by the machinations of certain persons into
political parties, as ever the religious
world had been by sects, and by setting
these parties against each other, the most
intolerant becomes the most powerful. 37

Therefore, the Reformers were drawing upon the old Tory arguments about
the need for internal unity in the society and turning them against the
government. To the Reformers, the continued existence of Upper Canada
was threatened, not by the menacing spread of republican ideas, but rather
by a corrupt administration seeking to limit the political rights of the
people, and to divide the population, in order to secure its own power.
According to John Rolph, "the seeds of distrust and discontent" which had
been planted could soon disturb the political and social harmony of the
province. The lack of public confidence in the administration could shake
the foundations of the government itself. 38

The Reform solution was to appeal directly to the imperial govern-
ment, over the head of the Tory administration, in order to resolve the
Alien Question. In 1827, Robert Randall was sent to Great Britain to
obtain the disallowance of the Tory naturalization legislation passed
earlier in the year. The Reformers' faith in the imperial authorities
as a counter-weight to the provincial government was rewarded by the
success of Randall's mission; the Colonial Secretary authorized the Upper
Canadian Assembly to pass a new bill -- one which would naturalize "all
persons who had at any time received grants of land from the provincial
government, or who had held public office in the province, or who had
taken the oath of allegiance, or who had come in before 1820 ....
Persons who had settled since 1820 ... could be naturalized upon
completing a seven years' residence. 39 Although Maltland and his executive
were shocked by their repudiation at the hands of the imperial government,
they drafted legislation which confirmed the political and property
rights of the American settlers. 40 The Alien Question was finally
resolved. The Reformers had achieved a significant political success.
They had exploited the issue to attack the administration and to appeal
directly to the large group of American inhabitants. The issue was an
important factor in the Reform victory in the election of 1828.

The controversy generated by the Alien Question forced Upper
Canadians to make explicit their definitions of the loyal subject. As a
result of the debate and their defeat over the issue, the Tories became
more insistent on the exclusiveness of loyalty. They were now menaced
not only by the presence and influence of the American republic but also
by the encouragement given to the American settlers in the province and
by the appearance of a formed opposition which they could only explain in
terms of self-interest and sedition. The Tories therefore insisted more
than ever on "constant, unconditional attachment" to the imperial
connection, 41 and on the idea that loyalty had to be proved. Proof could
be earned by imperial service, by acceptance into the Tory elite, 42 but
above all by attachment to the Loyalist tradition. Upper Canada was seen
as the homeland of people who had sacrificed everything to defend the
Crown during the American Revolution and ultimately they were forced to
flee from their old homes. The province represented more than just an,
asylum for the Loyalists, it was given to them as a reward for their loyalty. The original Loyalist expectations of hegemony within the province were dusted off and appropriated by the Tories; in an open letter to the new Lieutenant Governor, Sir John Colborne, "Watkin Miller" wrote that Loyalist principles

... have, in most instances, been carefully instilled into the minds of their descendants, so that, at this period, they form a most valuable and immovable mass of faithful and loyal adherents to the British Crown ...."\textsuperscript{43}

The leadership of the Tory elite was threatened by the breakdown of the social and political distinctions necessary to preserve Upper Canada as a Loyalist province; Christopher Hagerman believed it a "disgrace" that the American settlers were "placed on an equal footing" with the loyal population. \textsuperscript{44} "John Barleycorn" felt a sense of betrayal that the same people who had once driven him from the American colonies were to be afforded equal civil and political rights:

By whom was I robbed of my patrimony ...? Even by such as him (Barnabas Bidwell) who now claims equal privileges with the best of us .... What are ye about, ye sons of Loyalists? Will ye suffer these things.\textsuperscript{45}

The War of 1812 had reinforced Tory hostility to the American settlers; in an emotional outburst, John Beverley Robinson declared that he would not support the naturalization of this group — he "would suffer death before he would consent to a measure that would confer the rights of a subject on men who, but a few years ago, had invaded our country -- ransacked our villages -- burnt our houses -- and murdered our wives and children."\textsuperscript{46}

The Tories believed that as a consequence of their loyalty, Upper
Canada had been preserved as a special Loyalist bastion; but the continued existence of the province as a British colony was threatened by the American settlers. "A True-Born Canadian" asked:

... (A)re we to surrender to them all the privileges that had been purchased for us by the sacrifice of the blood and the property of those from whom it is our boast to have descended ---, ... This is a British Province.\(^4\)

John Strachan believed that the ultimate goal of the American-born inhabitants was to see Upper Canada absorbed by the United States when he wrote: "It is not however to be concealed that many of these persons whatever their intentions may have been, when they first removed into this province, are now desirous of destroying it as a British colony, and of annexing it to the United States."\(^4\)

The Tories concluded consequently, that the American settlers could never be assimilated and they would always pose a threat to the society. "Cathars" developed this theme:

"We can never expect that even favours and kindness will make men educated in republican principles ... loyally attached to our government and laws. No, Sir, they wish the American character and party here to stand out in bold relief ..."\(^4\)

The American settlers were aliens and could only be considered loyal if they sought naturalization; and naturalization was a favour that might be conferred upon the deserving, not a right that the deserving might command. Robinson, for example, stated that "naturalization had to be considered an act of royal favour."\(^5\)

Tory loyalty remained exclusive because loyalty had to be earned -- it was confirmed "by birthright" or proven in defence of the Crown\(^5\) and revealed through attachment to the Loyalist tradition and support for the administration which embraced it. The Tories had a legitimate claim to leadership and
they sought to purify the society by eliminating its disloyal elements.

Another result of the Alien Question was that the Tories had more reason than before to distrust dissent. It was no longer merely individual: it had undermined them at the Colonial Office and beaten them at the polls. It was doubly illegitimate: once for existing at all, and again for being based on an organized and seditious appeal to the disloyal part of the electorate. As a consequence, "Upper Canada, in conservative eyes, was not merely challenged, but was under a state of permanent siege ... The apprehended threat from the large American-born element in the population, and the quite genuine danger, military, political and cultural, from the United States, made 'loyalty' the crux of conservative attitudes." 52

In the debate over the Alien Question, the Reformers presented the Tories with a double challenge: with their expansion of the idea of the nature of loyalty, and with a more formidable idea of legitimate dissent. While they were a long way from the claim of a legitimate opposition party, in practice they went beyond the individual expressions of dissent which had been all that their idea of loyalty could justify earlier. The creation of the York Central Committee in 1828, for example, marked the first attempt at a formed opposition. The Reformers made two claims to justify carrying dissent so far. First, loyalty to constitutional principles justified the defence of the rights of loyal subjects. Second, they accused the administration of being not only corrupt, self-interested and unjust, but also of seeking partisan advantage through the disenfranchisement of American settlers. In Blacksonian terms, a partisan ministry was as improper as a formed opposition, so that even if the Reformers were as yet unable to find new terms on which to legitimize
organized dissent, they were no longer entirely on the defensive when dissent was discussed in Tory terms.

Graeme Patterson has suggested that the traditional interpretations of political development in Upper Canada have emphasized the importance of "constitutional impasses .... Anti-executive representatives, who by the 1820's were coalescing into the Reform party, are treated as being in fundamental conflict with the Tory supporters of the embattled executive, giving rise to a contest only finally resolved with the achievement of 'responsible government' in 1848." The focus upon political developments pushed into the background the differences between the Tories and Reformers about the nature of concepts like loyalty.

For the Reformers, it was essential that loyalty not be closed off by the (partisan) administration. They rejected the exclusive myth presented by the Tories, and through their responses to the arguments of their opponents, outlined their own definition of the loyal subject. The Reform position was far more accommodative than that of the Tories. While Reformers shared the Tory belief that loyalty could be earned or inculcated, they also argued that settlers could become assimilated. Through the process of settlement, the American-born settlers could become loyal Upper Canadians.

Upper Canada, according to Reformers, was not to be the exclusive homeland of the Loyalists and their descendants; the ideal inhabitant was the farmer. A letter from "A U.E. Loyalist" in the Upper Canada Herald claimed that the Americans were as valuable subjects as the Loyalists because they

... contributed as largely (as the Loyalists) to the clearing of the settlement, and improving of the country, and during the late
war did as much and behaved as well in the
defence of it. They are ... faithful
subjects.\textsuperscript{54}

Reform spokesmen believed that the development of the province was
dependent upon the industry of farmers; John Wilson stated in the
Assembly that "all classes ..., from the
highest to the lowest, the Governor, the
Judges, the Lawyers, the Merchants, and
the men in office, were supported by this
class .... The labouring class alone
ought to be respected in a country like
this; where we had nothing but wild woods
a few years ago, we have now fine fields,
and all this has been effected by the
industry and enterprise of our farmers.\textsuperscript{55}

Mackenzie believed that only the Tory administration wanted to exclude
American settlers from Upper Canada; "persons of skill, capital and
scientific information, of industrious habits, and of useful and
productive callings" should be welcomed because they stimulated "our
agriculture, our manufactures, and our commerce.\textsuperscript{56}
John Rolph also
believed that because this group contributed to provincial development,
they should be recognized as good subjects. The Americans should not be
stripped of their rights by a vindictive administration; they

... did not come here to act as squatters
not to live on air, or like the Indian,
to hunt the wild animals of the Forest,
but to become permanent settlers .... They
came at this imperial invitation not to be
dégraded -- they came from a free country,
acquainted with the assurance that they should
enjoy freedom here .... (T)hey had long
been called subjects, and boasted themselves
on account of their loyalty; and now all was
to be swept away, and violence offered to
their feelings ....\textsuperscript{57}

To declare them to be aliens in the 1820's revealed only the desire of
the government to limit the rights and liberties of the people.
The Reformers did not share the Tory suspicion of the American-born inhabitants — they were not perceived to be a threat to the continued existence of the society. William Lyon Mackenzie scoffed at the idea that the American settlers were tainted by "the principle of liberty, and equality, the antimonarchical notions and ideas ... which it is supposed they would disseminate through our colonies ...." John Rolph also rejected the Tory claim that the Americans would infect Upper Canada with republicanism:

I think there is no danger to be apprehended from Americans. If they came there, they do not leave a bad government and barren soil; No -- they come as agriculturalists to subdue not our government, but our forests; to overcome, not our authorities, civil and military but our wastes; and our desolate places ....

These settlers, therefore, had no desire to undermine British institutions; they came to the province because "... they do not find democracy so palatable in practice as in theory" and they "might desire to live under a monarchy." Consequently, they ought to be considered "as stray sheep returning to the fold, and instead of driving them off, we ought to hail with rejoicing their return."

The Americans had also proven themselves to be good, and loyal, subjects. The Gore Gazette praised:

... their hard industry, their fidelity to their allegiance, by defending the rights and honor of the Crown, with their blood; at the same time they believed they were defending their own farms and firesides, from the grasp and ravages of those whom they then conceived, to be their and their King's enemies ....

William Lyon Mackenzie also stressed "their meritorious and loyal conduct, in defence of this Province (during the War of 1812) ...; the gallantry
with which they encountered the dangers — and the patience and cheerfulness with which they endured the privations of war — proved that they justly appreciate the rights which they have so long enjoyed, and are fully entitled to the confidence, protection and paternalism of His Majesty's government. 60

The Reformers, then, shared the Tory assumption that Upper Canada was the homeland of those whose loyalty had been proven by defending their community. The American settlers had earned their rights during the War of 1812, just as the Loyalists had during the American Revolution. The naturalization policy of the administration in the 1820's was perceived as a monstrous injustice because it conferred, rather than confirmed, the rights of this group. In a marvellous distortion of the historical process, Francis Collins thundered against the corrupt Tory government in a long editorial:

... is it just — is it 'equitable' — to reduce the acknowledged subjects of half a century to a level with the alien of last year, when painful requisitions are to be complied with? Is it 'equitable' to compel men who waded thro' fields of blood and slaughter (many of them without shoes or stockings on their feet) in the late war — men who proved their allegiance at the mouth of a cannon and point of the bayonet — ... men, had it not been for whose unshaken allegiance and intrepid valour, the British would not now possess a foot of ground in Upper Canada, from which to drive an alien ... to crouch to an additional attestation of allegiance ...? No — such a notion of justice and 'equity' could never enter the mind of any man save some degraded hireling whose ideas of 'equity' are governed by the caprice of his employers. 61

The process of developing the loyal subject could be reinforced by other factors, as well. Like the Tories, many Reformers believed that loyalty could be inculcated through state-aided education. John Rolph,
for example, asked of the American settlers:

Will not their children be even as our children? Will they not feel a warm affection for the land in which they are reared? Will not education make them as we are now? and if they are taught by proper instructors, will they not love our institutions and never rebel against them?

The Reformers sought to broaden the loyal base of the society; they believed that the good subject could become the loyal subject, as well. Loyalty would develop naturally through settlement in Upper Canada; the farmer would become part of the community in which he lived. Again it was Rolph who asked: "Will not those who come here, and have property, become attached to us, to a government in the welfare of which they have a deep personal interest, and in which they will have a vote ...?" 62

During the 1820's, the Reformers began to articulate an assimilative myth in order to define the nature of loyalty; the American settlers could be accommodated within Upper Canada. They would become loyal because, as John Rolph explained: the "flame of patriotism burns with ardour in the breasts of the people .... Their desire to be considered subjects, arises from their attachment to our government, and a preference for it, grounded in causes which all men experience, but cannot explain. This political attachment is the strength of a nation ...."

A letter from "A Canadian" to The Farmers' Journal summed up the assimilative nature of Reform loyalty. The American settlers did not have "an hereditary attachment" to Upper Canada, "but their attachment is wholly where it should be -- in the country they live in, and where they have property ...." Moreover, he concluded: "another half century will make their children Canadians, at all events; and all distinction of country will then be forgotten." 63
As the Tory idea of loyalty became more rigidly exclusive, the Reformers' idea became more explicitly assimilative. Furthermore, as a Reform conception of loyalty began to emerge, it was expressed through increased provincial feeling; the perceived mishandling of the Alien Question by the imperial authorities stimulated this sentiment. John Rolph, for example, was critical of the Colonial Office in 1826 for requesting naturalization legislation which required American settlers to register as aliens because Whitehall had not taken into account the will of the provincial Assembly. The Reformers also rejected the spiritual and emotional component of Tory loyalty; instead they linked loyalty to the material growth of Upper Canada. The Reformers were stretching the idea of loyalty a little farther, and doing so in a way that accords entirely with the logic of their own argument. They accepted loyalty as the test of political legitimacy as well as of social acceptance, but by extending the possibility of loyalty to any well-behaved settler they found it necessary to provide some definition of good behaviour; that definition includes contributing to the economic development of the province, on the grounds that people will be loyal to what they have helped to build; doing what is good for Upper Canada therefore becomes a way of demonstrating loyalty. While loyalty is still directed towards the imperial connection and British constitutional principles, the province is on the way to becoming the third of the identifiable legitimate objects of Reform loyalty. For the Tories loyalty was a duty for which provincial welfare was a just reward; but for the Reformers the promotion of provincial welfare was a merit for which the recognition of loyalty was due.

The Tories also believed that loyalty was the test of political

"A True Born Canadian" developed the same themes in an open letter to John Rolph, the leader of the Reformers. The Loyalists, he argued, "are not to be deprived of their birthright by an inundation of those very persons whose fathers to a man revolted against their benefactor in another land." (Kingston Chronicle, May 11, 1827).

46 Robinson was quoted in Collins, p. 8; see also U.E. Loyalist, November 17, 1827; "Idea of a Patriot".

47 Kingston Chronicle, May 11, 1827.


This theme was developed more emphatically in a letter from "Argus" to the Kingston Chronicle (January 26, 1827):

Is there any truly loyal, dispassionate, and intelligent person in the Province who will deny that the American settlers ... are enemies to the constitution and opposed to the improvement of the country? ... (Is) it, then, wise or politic to urge the adoption of such a measure (the Naturalization Bill)? -- is it not contrary to the principle justly termed the 'first law of nature' -- 'self-preservation' -- to do so?

39 Reported in the Colonial Advocate, January 5, 1826.

"Waukey Miller" echoed the same sentiments:

There are hundreds of families that settled in this province, not from any feeling of preference for British dominions, but with a most unaffected indifference to everything upon earth beyond their own individual interests; who care not a farthing whether they dwell on British ground, or on that of the United States. Such persons, having no natural or hereditary attachment to the British constitution, and having been early habituated to the customs and laws of a republic (sic), form pliant materials in the hands of designing and ill-disposed persons to work upon, who find little difficulty in persuading them that they are subject to much tyranny and oppression ....
legitimacy and the basis of acceptance into the Upper Canadian community. The Reformers, though, did not believe that they were disloyal; in fact, they shared many of the Tory perceptions about the nature of loyalty. They were committed to the imperial connection and rejected the idea of annexation to the United States. They accepted the argument that Upper Canada must be the homeland of those whose loyalty had been earned; but they broadened the definition of the loyal subject to include the American settlers who had proven their loyalty during the War of 1812. Spokesmen like John Rolph also believed that loyalty could be inculcated through such institutions as schools. A measure of conservative consensus about the nature of loyalty had emerged by the 1820's.

The emotional responses of both Tories and Reformers to the Alien Question drew other groups into the debate over loyalty. The Methodists, for example, were forced to defend their loyalty in the face of Tory attacks on their connections with American Conferences and their apparent alliance with the provincial Reformers. The response of the Methodists, and their spokesman, Egerton Ryerson, illuminate further the concept of loyalty in Upper Canada.
FOOTNOTES

1 Colonial Advocate, January 23, 1827; letter from Jacob Gander to Robert Randall.


3 See G. M. Craig, Upper Canada -- The Formative Years, 1784-1841 (Toronto, 1966), pp. 87-89.


The problem of land titles was taken up by the Assembly of Upper Canada in the 1820's. It drafted an Address to the King which stated:

... in all civil transactions in the Province they (the American settlers) have invariably been considered as British subjects... (and) a very large proportion of all the cultivated land in the Province, either is now held, or has been held and transferred by them, without any question, until lately, as to their legal capacity to do so; and... to regard them as aliens... would... be attended with great inconvenience, and produce incalculable confusion and trouble through the Province....


6 Upper Canada Assembly, Journals (1821), pp. 11-13; in Doughty & Story, pp. 82-83.

7 OA, Macaulay Papers; John Strachan to John Macaulay, June 6, 1820; and Strachan to Macaulay, November 18, 1821. See also J. B. Robinson to Macaulay, November 18, 1821. Letters cited in P. M. Quealey, "The Administration of Sir Peregrine Maitland, Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, 1818-1828". (A Ph.D. thesis for the University

8. Kingston Chronicle, January 11, 1822; for the full debates see Ibid., January 11 - February 15, 1822.


10. A third by-election, which M. S. Bidwell lost, was voided in December 1823 because of electoral irregularities.

Riddell, pp. 240-241.


16. Ibid., February 23, 1823.

See also the speech of Robert Nichol; Ibid., February 8, 1822. Nichol, a land speculator, had opposed attempts to close the border to immigrants from the United States after 1815, and he used the alien issue to attack the inconsistency of the administration over its treatment of American settlers. He asked: "If they were aliens, why pass as Act ... inviting them to come in and settle? Why given them grants of land? Why compel them to enroll themselves in the militia?" In a speech later in the year, he argued that American settlers had come to the province "under the PLEDGED FAITH of the British government, and he trusted would not now be denied their rights or swindled out of their property." (Kingston Chronicle, May 9, 1823).

See also, Upper Canada Herald, March 13, 1823; letter from "A.U.E. Loyalist".

Canadian Freeman, December 1, 1825; letter from "Anglo-Americanus".

Gore Gazette, March 24, 1827; George Tiffany's "To the United States Emigrants, who are now settled within this Province."

17. Upper Canada Herald, March 12, 1822.

See also CO42, Vol. 340-1, p. 177; Memorial of the Assembly of Upper Canada to the King (January 1826) for the development of the same themes.
See also the York Weekly Register, March 22, 1823; "Bidwell's Case".

Cf. speeches by Jonas Jonès in Kingston Chronicle, December 14, 1821 and April 23, 1823; also speech by Christopher Hagerman in Kingston Chronicle, May 2, 1823.

PAC, Q337-2, pp. 386-401, and Q337, p. 45; in "The Case of Mr. Bidwell", in Report on Archives (1898) (Ottawa, 1899), pp. 37-38.


See the Assembly debates reported in the Colonial Advocate, December 15, 1825 and the U.E. Loyalist, February 3, 1827.

CO42/365; Maitland to Lord Dalhousie, October 2, 1820; enclosed in Maitland to Bathurst, December 15, 1820.


Q331, pp. 90-94; Maitland to Bathurst, April 15, 1822; in Doughty & Story, pp. 93-94.


Craig, Upper Canada - The Formative Years, p. 117.

Upper Canada Herald, February 24, 1826; letter from Thomas Coleman to Reuben White.

Cf. Canadian Freeman, December 1, 1825.

Upper Canada Herald, February 24, 1826; letter from "A Freeholder".


CO42, Vol. 380; Rolph to Wilmot Horton, May 18, 1826; quoted Ibid.


The Tories believed that their opponents were stirring up dissent by characterizing government policies as conspiratorial efforts to deprive the people of their rights. S. P. Jarvis, a minor member of the administration in York, wrote that the Reformers were using "(every) method that ingenuity could devise... to inflame the minds of the people" and thus achieve their own selfish political purposes.


33. *Colonial Advocate*, February 1, 1827.

For a more detailed discussion of the Matthews incident, see Craig, *Upper Canada -- The Formative Years*, pp. 119-120.

34. *Colonial Advocate*, June 10, 1824.


36. *Canadian Freeman*, February 8, 1827.


The Tory nativism described by Matthews was also criticized in the *Gore Gazette* (May 24, 1837). The Alien Bill was drawn up, it was suggested, by "certain individuals of European birth, (who) looked down upon the American emigrants, not only with an eye of jealousy upon their professed loyalty, but also as upon an inferior order of beings!"

38. *Colonial Advocate*, February 2, 1826; *Canadian Freeman*, February 8, 1827.

There was some ambivalence in the Reformers' attitudes towards the imperial authorities. During the previous year, Rolph had been extremely critical of the Colonial Office because its instructions for naturalization legislation not only required the American settlers to register, as aliens, but short-circuited the legislative process in Upper Canada, thereby upsetting the constitutional balance necessary for political stability. He asked:

Where will be the balance of power, if the crown can only refuse the royal assent to a measure submitted at the constitutional stages, but inform us before our deliberations begin that deliberation is of no avail — argument of no use — for the bill shall receive the royal assent only upon certain terms? ... Our proceedings would thus become a mere matter of form ... an assembly without a will of its own.

(Canadian Freeman, February 8, 1827).

Rolph was perfectly happy with imperial instructions which conformed to the Reformers' point of view.

40 CO42/381, pp. 370-77; Maitland to Coderich, October 2, 1827; Doughty & Story, pp. 428-31; both sources cited in Craig, Upper Canada — The Formative Years, p. 122.

41 U.E. Loyalist, March 17, 1827; letter from "Vindex".


43 The Farmers Journal and Welland Canal Intelligencer, November 12, 1828. (The Loyalist tradition was also discussed in Niagara Gleaner, November 1, 1823).

44 Kingston Chronicle, April 22, 1822.

45 Kingston Chronicle, February 1, 1822; "John Barleycorn's Address to the Freeholders of the Incorporated Counties of Lenox and Addington", cited in S. F. Wise, "Liberal Consensus or Ideological Battleground:

"A True Born Canadian" developed the same themes in an open letter to John Rolph, the leader of the Reformers. The Loyalists, he argued, "... are not to be deprived of their birthright by an inundation of those very persons whose fathers to a man revolted against their benefactor in another land." (Kingston Chronicle, May 11, 1827).

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This theme was developed more emphatically in a letter from "Argus" to the Kingston Chronicle (January 26, 1827):

Is there any truly loyal, dispassionate, and intelligent person in the Province who will deny that (the American settlers) ... are enemies to the constitution and opposed to the improvement of the country? ... (Is) it, then, wise or politic to urge the adoption of such a measure (the Naturalization Bill)? -- is it not contrary to the principle justly termed the 'first law of nature' -- "self-preservation" -- to do so?

49 Reported in the Colonial Advocate, January 5, 1826.

"Warkin Miller" echoed the same sentiments:

There are hundreds of families that settled in this province, not from any feeling of preference for British dominions, but with a most unaffected indifference to everything upon earth beyond their own individual interests; who care not a farthing whether they dwell on British ground, or on that of the United States. Such persons, having no natural or hereditary attachment to the British constitution, and having been early habituated to the customs and laws of a republick (sic), form plant materials in the hands of designing and ill-disposed persons to work upon; who find little difficulty in persuading them that they are subject to much tyranny and oppression ....
The Farmers Journal, November 12, 1828.

The same theme was developed by Christopher Hagerman; see Kingston Chronicle, January 3, 1823. Also an editorial in the Gore Gazette, August 30, 1828.

50. U.E. Loyalist, February 3, 1827.

Philip Van Koughnet, a member of the Assembly for Stormont, had a more practical view. Loyalty was a tangible commodity — inducement was required "for the subjects of this Province to repel an invasion ... (W)here would be the encouragement when the very next day the invader would be allowed to come into the country, and enjoy the same priviléges ...?" (Kingston Chronicle, February 15, 1822).

51. Kingston Chronicle, February 1, 1822; address by "John Barleycorn".


54. Upper Canada Herald, March 13, 1823.

There was, in fact, some resentment of the Loyalists, as Mackenzie pointed out:

There is, as we all know, a certain feeling among many of the native and immigrant United Empire Loyalists of this day, which teaches them to consider themselves much better subjects, nay, even a superior race to their American brethren who by their later immigration cannot lay claim to the same rights. Nay even British settlers are ... looked upon by these sub-aboriginals as intruders.

(Colonial Advocate, May 4, 1826).


Marshall Spring Bidwell also articulated this "yeoman myth". In a speech which supported the abolition of primogeniture, he argued:

Instead of a peasantry, let us have a yeomanry; and the country, on the one hand, would be more free, and all its liberal and popular institutions be supported with more spirit.

This "yeoman myth" was also developed in a letter from "An Elector" to the *Niagara Gleaner*, April 17, 1824.

56 *Colonial Advocate*, August 19, 1824.

57 *U.E. Loyalist*, January 27, 1827; see also *Upper Canada Herald*, February 20, 1827 and *Canadian Freeman*, February 8, 1827.

58 *Colonial Advocate*, August 19, 1824; *Colonial Advocate*, February 2, 1826.

The same theme was developed in an editorial in *The Farmers' Journal*, March 25, 1829:

It *is* preposterous to infer, as some have argued, that the Yankees come here for the express purpose of harassing, opposing, and overturning the government; "... and building on its ruins a superstructure similar to that of their own...."

... (M)ost of the worthy emigrants from the U. States to Canada, came here without any political object in view whatever: their grand aim being to better their condition in life, by honest industry, in the vocations to which they have been accustomed in early life.

59 *Colonial Advocate*, January 12, 1826.

The Reformers exhibited less fear of the United States than did the Tories. John Ralph, for example, said: "Who is associated most intimately with England for the great and glorious purpose of improving the condition of the human race — America...." (Ibid., February 2, 1826).

60 *Gore Gazette*, March 24; 1827; *Colonial Advocate*, January 4, 1826.

MacKenzie developed the same theme at some length in an emotional outburst attacking the Tories for introducing legislation requiring the Americans to register as aliens.

Men whose industry had cleared the country of forests, who had carried civilization into the wilds of the west, and assisted to repel invasion, found themselves aliens, without any legal security for their property.

Whichever might be the effect of a narrow or
rigid construction of the Alien Law upon these persons, they had not hitherto received the treatment of aliens. They had received grants of land from the crown and devised real property; some of them held offices of trust in the militia, and spilt their blood in defence of the country, in which they were now to be denied the rights of citizens, except upon conditions which they regarded as degrading. It was not to be expected that a man who had fought beside the gallant Brock would feel complimented if asked to take the oath of allegiance.


The Tories, of course, challenged Mackenzie’s assumptions. In an open letter “To the Inhabitants of the District of Johnstown”, Charles and Solomon Jones of Brockville asked:

If they have not (been naturalized), can they be legally regarded as British Subjects? The obvious reply is, No! But it is said we have done all that has been required of us; we fought for the country during the last war and is it now to be said we are not Subjects? Your conduct during the war was praiseworthy, and in conformity with your duty; but such conduct is not a compliance with legal provisions by which you could have become naturalized ....

(Upper Canada Herald, March 27, 1827).

61 Canadian Freeman, March 1, 1827; see also Upper Canada Herald, February 24, 1824, letter from "A Freeholder"; Canadian Freeman, December 1, 1825.

62 Colonial Advocate, February 2, 1826.

William Lyon Mackenzie also believed that loyalty had to develop naturally from within the subject — that it could not be instilled through coercion or by flooding Upper Canada with British immigrants:

... it is not the strength of our fortresses, nor the almost absolute power lodged with our executives, nor the numerical force of our armies, nor the prohibition of republicans, nor the importation of half starved radicals from Glasgow by the hundred, and of hot-headed...
orange-men, ... from Cork and Belfast by the thousand, ... (but rather) the possession of political rights, the consciousness of freedom, independance (sic), and a share of self-government ... .

(Colonial Advocate, August 19, 1824).

63 Upper Canada Herald, February 20, 1827; The Farmers Journal, November 26, 1828.

64 Canadian Freeman, February 8, 1827.

There were even some Tories who expressed the same sentiments. S. P. Jarvis, a member of the York elite, believed that the imperial government exacerbated the controversy by ignoring the advice of the provincial administration.

Cf. TPL, Powell Papers, S. P. Jarvis to W. D. Powell, September 12, 1827.
CHAPTER 4
BORN IN THE BOSOM OF LOYALTY: EGERTON RYERSON AND THE METHODISTS IN UPPER CANADA

During the controversy generated by the Alien Question, the idea of loyalty became increasingly politicized as Tories and Reformers developed different definitions of the loyal subject in Upper Canada. By the late 1820's other groups, the basis of whose definition was not political, had been drawn into the debate over the nature of loyalty. The most important such group was the Episcopal Methodists, whose numbers totalled perhaps as many as 6,100 members by 1824. They were criticized for their disloyalty by High Tory spokesmen, such as the Anglican archdeacon of York, John Strachan, because they were seen to be ignorant religious enthusiasts who maintained close connections with American Conferences -- the sect was tainted by religious dissent and republicanism. This perception was reinforced by the Methodist association with the growing Reform opposition to the provincial administration. As a result, they remained outside the social and political mainstream of the province.

Methodist leaders, and Egerton Ryerson in particular, rejected the Tory charge of disloyalty. In response to their critics, they articulated what might be called a Methodist conception of loyalty. This position reflected a complex set of socio-political assumptions to which, it has been suggested, "... no simple label can be attached .... Their position was ... many-sided and certainly not fixed." Drawing upon the Toryism of English Wesleyanism and the Loyalist tradition, Ryerson sought to demonstrate Methodist loyalty; he stressed, as well, the argument that loyalty could be inculcated through state-aided education. Moreover, as
the increasing radicalism of men like Mackenzie polarized Upper Canada in the 1830's, and as the Methodists' increasing prosperity confirmed their desire to be accepted as respectable, Ryerson came to support the administration. The group became part of the broad conservative consensus which dominated the province.

The Toryism of the Methodists was tempered by their attempts to resolve their opposition to church establishment, to Anglican pretensions to exclusive control of the Clergy Reserves and education on the one hand, and their fears of disloyalty on the other. By rejecting the exclusiveness of the High Tories, the Methodists strengthened moderate Toryism and broadened its ideological base. They accepted, for example, the legitimacy of dissent because of their own religious experience; they accepted the assimilative myth already enunciated by many moderate Reformers and their loyalty became an expression of provincial feeling. The idea of loyalty was fundamental to Methodist social and political attitudes; Egerton Ryerson continued to stress this theme into the 1880's when he wrote that "... the birthplace of Methodism in Canada was in the bosom of loyalty."

Ryerson, who was editor of The Christian Guardian for much of the period between its establishment in 1829 and 1840, was the most prominent spokesman for Methodist views and the most successful defender of Methodist interests in Upper Canada. Ryerson was born into a Loyalist family in Norfolk County in 1803. Although his parents, especially his mother, were devout Anglicans, Egerton, like his three older brothers, sought religious fulfillment in evangelical Methodism. He became an itinerant preacher and in 1825 was assigned to the York and Yonge Street circuit. Ryerson always believed that he was more concerned with the
spiritual than the secular affairs of man; in the first number of the Christian Guardian, he declared:

... we consider it our duty and feel it to be our vocation to devote our limited researches, talents and influence, to the high and holy interests of morality and religion -- to the spiritual welfare of immortal and redeemed men.7

Religion shaped Ryerson's political perceptions and ultimately drew him into debate with John Strachan over their differing perceptions of Upper Canadian society.

Strachan, born a Scottish Presbyterian, had come to Upper Canada as a tutor to the children of Richard Cartwright, a Kingston merchant. By 1812, he had joined the Church of England, established a school in Cornwall where he taught many future members of the elite and then moved to York to assume a parish. By the 1820's, Strachan was a member of both the Executive and Legislative Councils and was perhaps for a time the most influential member of the Family Compact.8 He was also a vocal defender of the Anglican establishment in the province and consequently injected High Toryism with a strong sense of religious mission.9 The continued existence of Upper Canada, he believed, was dependent upon both the continued attachment to the imperial connection and the development of a conservative society distinct from the United States. Loyalty and conservatism, therefore, were the fundamental bases of Strachan's thought, and his responses to other questions, including religious and educational ones, were shaped by this perception.

In order to maintain the conservative social order which was essential for Upper Canadian development, Strachan had to ensure that harmony existed between the religious and political institutions of the
province. He stressed the importance of an established church which must be supported by the state and wrote: "There should be in every Christian country an established religion, otherwise it is not a Christian but an Infidel country." In turn, the church would encourage loyalty to the state; Strachan asked: "Can it be doubted that it is only through the Church and its Institutions, that a truly English character and feeling can be given to or preserved among the population of any Foreign possession?" Strachan also saw the school as an agent of socialization — the purpose of education was to produce a talented governing elite which embodied proper moral values, such as Christian virtue, rationality and the discipline of passions; in short, it produced men of respectability:

... it is only by a well-instructed population that we can expect to preserve our excellent constitution and our connexion with the British Empire — or give that respectability to the Province which arises from an intelligent Magistracy, and from having all public situations filled with men of information.

Strachan emphasized the importance of the school as the means to inculcate loyalty; in his address at the last annual examination at his Cornwall school, he said:

This we deem an object of the greatest importance; living under the best practical form of government, the only one which, in the present wreck and degradation of nations, can be said to cherish true and rational freedom, it is necessary that those that are born its subjects should be aware of its perfection ... To speak of Great Britain is indeed delightful ... He repeated this theme in his plea for a provincial university; such an institution "would tend to establish a most affectionate connexion, between
this Colony and the Parent State, ... (and) would gradually infuse into
the whole population, a tone and feeling entirely English...." In
the final analysis, Strachan believed that the imperial connection was
more dependent upon the strength of the established church and the
educational system than upon economic factors:

It is to be lamented that this great country
(England), in establishing colonies, has
chiefly confined her views to pecuniary
advantage, and seems entirely to have forgot-
ten that the attachment of foreign settlements
depends infinitely more upon moral and
religious feeling than the political arrange-
ment or commercial profit. 14

By the 1820's, the Archdeacon of York became more insistent that
the Church of England was to be recognized as the established church, with
exclusive control of the clergy. Reserves and the school system, to ensure
its dominance in Upper Canada. The Anglican Church, it was argued, had
proven its loyalty during the American Revolution and its position had
been confirmed by the Constitutional Act. 15 As a result, Strachan was
sensitive to any challenge to the exclusiveness of the Church of England,
especially from the Methodists.

Anglican opposition to the Methodists was based upon theological
and political factors. Antipathy to the sect had been apparent since the
early days of settlement in Upper Canada; Bishop Mountain of Québec, for
example, feared the threat to social stability posed by the Methodists
whom he saw as "a set of ignorant enthusiasts, whose preaching is
calculated only to perplex the understanding, & corrupt the morals & relax
the nerves of industry, & dissolve (sic) the bonds of society." 16
Moreover, the loyalty of the group was brought into question because
Upper Canada was part of a Methodist Conference located in New York State
and many preachers were American. In 1814, General Sir Gordon Drummond
called the Methodists "itinerant fanatics, enthusiastic in political as well as religious matters," who came in from the United States to disseminate "their noxious principles." 17

Although the Methodists comprised a significant proportion of the population, the sect had not been active politically before the War. S. D. Clark has suggested that the Methodist appeal was other-worldly and the influence of the preachers was one directed not so much to making people dissatisfied with their system of government, as to make them completely indifferent towards it, and it was in the development of this attitude of political indifference that their influence was most felt as a force weakening a sense of loyalty and attachment to colonial institutions of government and to the British Crown. 18

To the Tory mind, already acutely conscious of the American threat, Methodist indifference to the survival of the province was extremely suspect. And John Strachan became the most ardent post-war critic of the Methodists. 19

Before 1820, Strachan was quite optimistic about Anglican fortunes in Upper Canada; it has been suggested that he assumed that "denomination- al loyalties were in a state of flux and that a tolerant and flexible Church of England would induce Upper Canadians to sever their connection with dissent." 20 While he had "serious political objections" to the Methodists, he was not prepared to antagonize members of the sect because

... they have been useful in preserving a religious feeling in many parts of the Province, where it was becoming dead, ... and all must acknowledge their merit, in undergoing many fatigue and privations to reclaim the vicious, and to soften the hardened. Such benevolent exertions ought to be applauded... 21
But the continued vulnerability of the Church of England in the face of increased opposition to its established position tempered Strachan's toleration of religious dissent.

The Archdeacon of York had strong theological reasons for being critical of the sect; the Methodists believed that faith, alone, was the sole means of attaining salvation and their conversion process occurred in the midst of emotional hysteria. He deplored their excesses:

The Methodists are making good progress among us and, filling the country with the most deplorable fanaticism. You can have almost no conception of their excesses. They will bawl twenty of them at once, tumble on the ground, laugh, sing, jump and stamp ...."22

Strachan emphasized the concept of "rational devotion," and believed that "reason must always be the guiding and ruling faculty — the affections must not lead but follow ...." Salvation was "not to be accomplished in a few minutes or hours or days as it were a miracle — it is the work of time of mature reflection of continued industry of steady perseverance."23

As Curtis Fahey has concluded, "Strachan's opinions reflected the belief that "...salvation was within the reach of all men; it was attained through faith and virtuous conduct ...."24

While Strachan's emphasis upon the rationality of Anglican doctrines made him critical of the emotional excesses associated with Methodism, he also opposed the Methodist attempts to separate church and state. He believed that only through an established Church of England could social order be maintained. And asked

Have not the Methodists in the Province in connexion with the American Conference ever shewn themselves the enemies of the Established Church? Are they not at this moment labouring to separate religion from the State, with which it ought ever to be firmly united, since one of its great objects is to
give stability to good Government, nor can it be separated with impunity in any Christian country? 25

Because of their opposition to the established church, the Methodists were perceived to be dangerous; as well, their close ties with American Conferences made them disloyal. Strachan asserted that the "religious teachers" in Upper Canada, excluding the Anglicans and "a very few respectable Ministers" of the Church of Scotland, "come almost universally from the Republican States of America, where they gather their knowledge and form their sentiments." These dissenting preachers fostered the spread of republican ideas in the province and, as a consequence, "... the mass of our population will be nurtured in hostility to our Parent Church, nor will it be long till they imbibe opinions any thing but favourable to the political Institutions of England." Other members of the Upper Canadian administration shared Strachan's belief that the Methodists were disloyal because of their American ties. The Lieutenant Governor, Sir Peregrine Maitland, expressed his fears in a letter to the Colonial Secretary: "if to preserve the allegiance of the people to the government of the Mother Country be held as an object of importance," then the presence of American Methodist preachers in the province could not be "too strongly disowned." 26

In response to official suspicions that the Methodists were "disaffected to the Government and institutions of the country" 27 and Strachan's accusations of disloyalty in his sermon delivered after the death of Bishop Mountain, Egerton Ryerson, a twenty-three-year-old preacher, was drawn into the debate over loyalty. Ryerson did not accept the High Tory definition of the loyal subject and developed a more moderate position. Methodist loyalty remained conservative because it
was shaped by the English Toryism represented by John Wesley and the Loyalist tradition embodied by Ryerson himself. Ryerson accepted many Tory views such as the belief in the benefits of the British Constitution and antipathy to republicanism. The polarization of politics in the 1830's also reinforced Ryerson's fear of radicalism and his distrust of factious opposition to the administration. Consequently, Ryerson incorporated many Tory ingredients into the Methodist idea of loyalty.

Ryerson drew heavily upon late eighteenth-century English Toryism as a source for his views. John Wesley, the founder of English Methodism, was profoundly conservative; for example, he believed "God not the people to be the origin of all civil power." He also stressed his unquestioning commitment to the Crown -- if "a man does not love the King, he cannot love God." Wesley's religious and political views were cemented by his loyalty: "Loyalty is with me an essential branch of religion .... There is the closest connection, therefore, between my religious and political conduct." In addition to English Methodism, Ryerson's views were shaped by his study of English political theorists like Locke, Blackstone and Paley. He believed that: "Civil government is a social compact, or voluntary association, formed and established on some general rules, or principles, which are called the constitution ...." Civil Government was also sanctioned by "God, who is the Fountain of law, order, and regularity" and, hence, "every member of civil society ought to obey the government." Ryerson's support of the constitution was enhanced by the benefits inherent in its balance; he quoted Dr. Adam Clarke to that effect:

...this government (of Great Britain) possesses in itself all the excellencies of the three forms. It can only become corrupt when any of the three
estates preponderates over the rest: In its nature and regular operation, it secures the prerogative of the monarch; it preserves the honor and property of the nobility; it respects and secures the rights of the people; it is, in a word, a limited monarchy, a popular aristocracy, and an ennobled democracy. God grant it permanence!

The balanced constitution ensured social equipoise as it provided "a tranquility, a fairness of various emulation, a spirit of public enterprise, a pledge of constitutional security, and an impetus to religious industry ...." The benefits of the constitution strengthened the loyalty of the province and thus, Ryerson accepted the constitution "inviolate," he wrote: "I am opposed to the introduction of any new and untried theories of government .... In civil affairs I take my stand upon the established constitution of the country."\(^{31}\)

The focus of Ryerson's loyalty was the colonial governor who symbolized both the balanced constitution and the imperial connection. No opposition to the governor could be countenanced: "(The) civil governor, who administers the laws of a state according to its constitution is the minister of God ....; if he make no attempt to change the constitution, nor break the compact between him and the people; there is, therefore, no legal ground of opposition to his civil authority ...." Ryerson resisted the demands of moderate Reformers, like Robert Baldwin, for responsible government because change would weaken the royal prerogative and ultimately upset the constitutional balance and sever the imperial connection. If the executive was to be drawn from the majority in the Assembly, then the Government is no longer administered by the Representative of the King ..., the authority and prerogative of the crown are annihilated, and the Province becomes an independent Republic ....\(^{32}\)
Ryerson's perception that any political change, including the moderate reform represented by responsible government, was a republican innovation, and so disloyal, revealed that the Methodist spokesman shared solid common ground with the political Toryism of his most severe Tory critics.

Ryerson's Toryism was reinforced by his Loyalist heritage. His father was a Loyalist and many early Loyalists, such as the Hecks, George Neal and William Losee, were Methodists. The foundations of Methodism in Upper Canada were established "by men who had borne arms in defence of their King and country." During the War of 1812, the Methodists had proven their loyalty once again; Ryerson declared:

not one ... deserted from the army — not one of them turned traitor to his country — some of the local preachers, at the alarm of greatest danger, shouldered their muskets and fearlessly stood forward in the hottest battles to defend their country ....

The Methodists were loyal and sought to inculcate that sentiment in Upper Canada; like Strachan, Ryerson believed that the church and the school were agents of socialization which could be used to buttress the society and the government. The Methodist Conference, for example, stated:

Deeply impressed with a due sense of the advantages derived from the connexion existing between this Province and the Mother Country, it will be alike our duty and delight to inculcate, by precept and example, on the numerous people under our pastoral care and institution, those scriptural principles of piety and loyalty which are essential to their peace and prosperity, and to the perpetuation of that connexion.

The role of the school, like that of the church, was to inculcate proper moral values. Ryerson, believed that civil disorder and disloyalty were linked to ignorance; the purpose of education was to make "this country
British in domestic feeling, as I think it now is intentionally at least in loyalty. 35

While Ryerson accepted many of the components of Tory loyalty, its exclusiveness posed a dilemma. That exclusiveness was directed most explicitly against his fellow Methodists; and he was, in fact, drawn into the political arena because of his opposition to church establishment. He made it clear that he would not criticize the Church of England: "I firmly believe in her doctrines, I admire her liturgy, and I heartily rejoice in the success of those principles ...." But the idea of an established church degraded the true purpose of religion: "When we see the heavenly affection which she (the church) infuses into the minds of men represented as nothing more than an attachment to a particular constitution, we are sensible that the religion of the meek Saviour is being made to bleed by a wound more fatal than those which are inflicted by the ravings of infidelity." 36 Drawing upon the Methodist belief that salvation was "free in all and free for all," and, therefore, all men were equal before God, Ryerson argued that all should be equal before the state, as well: "The doctrine of universal equality before the law was the natural result of the doctrine of equality before God in both creation and redemption ...." The best means to ensure religious equality within the society was to maintain the separation of church and state. The establishment of one church meant that "one portion or denomination of the social compact" enjoyed "privileges and immunities which are withheld from another." Every man, Ryerson wrote, has an

undeniable and inviolable right of private judgement in all matters of religious faith and duty .... Religion being a spiritual system of inspired truth, must be promoted only by moral and spiritual influences, and not by the coercion of civil government. 37
The threat to the religious rights of the individual posed by church
establishment made the separation of church and state essential.

Supporters of the "state religion" were also more corrupt than
members of other denominations; their choice was often influenced by
"motives of worldly honor or gain, or both." Their loyalty was ultimately
suspect because they would abandon the Church of England if more
promising prospects were available. A Methodist, on the other hand, was
truly loyal; he "was induced to embrace his system of faith and practice
by an honest submission to what he conceives to be the truth, in
opposition to the allurements of arbitrary fashion and the seductive
maxims of popular policy." Their motives of the Methodists were pure
because of the moral commitment associated with their religious choice.

The coercion and corruption associated with church establishment
thus weakened Upper Canadian society; moreover, Strachan’s claim that
only the Church of England could strengthen loyalty was also challenged.
Ryerson asserted that the province was loyal without a strong Anglican
establishment:

Your general design appears to be to infuse
into the minds of the "inhabitants of these
Provinces a tone and feeling entirely English"
-- to give the Clergymen of the Church of
England the sole direction of education and
to bring the whole population of these
Provinces into the communion of the Church of
England.
(Yet)... the tone and feelings of the popu-
lation in these Provinces are already British,
and to intimate the reverse, is a barefaced
slander upon their tried loyalty.

A report of the Assembly emphasized the same theme; church establish-
ment, it was argued, "cannot be necessary for the security of the Government
(because) the loyalty of the people is deep and enthusiastic ....
Religions instruction ... will promote and strengthen loyalty ...; but
no more when communicated by clergymen of the church of England than by those of any other sect, and probably less if they are ... political teachers and servants of the state ...."\(^{39}\)

With a loyal population, the attempts of the government to support the exclusive claims of the Anglicans simply created social and religious inequalities in the province; the administration's actions were "an infringement and absolute outrage" upon the rights of the people and thus disturbed the social harmony necessary for political tranquility. Ryerson believed that the best means to ensure loyalty was to oppose the divisiveness of church establishment, and encourage a policy of "Equal religious rights and privileges among all denominations of His Majesty's subjects."\(^{40}\) Consequently his views reflected both Toryism and some of the traditional arguments of the provincial oppositionists.

Ryerson was convinced that the Methodists were attacked because they sought "to promote liberal policy in the administration of the government": that is, because of their hostility to the idea of close church-state relations. The Tory administration, for example, equated religious dissent with political dissent:

(In) ... worshipping God according to the dictates of their consciences, they (the Methodists) differ in some of their religious opinions from a Sect, the principle members of which, possessing a controlling (sic) influence in the Executive, have laboured to identify their religious notions with the Civil Government and to saddle their articles of faith and form of worship upon the people as the established religion of the country, and consequently that all who did or should dissent from this so-called Established Religion, must be viewed and represented as enemies to our Civil Institutions.\(^{41}\)

Ryerson refused to accept this argument on Tory terms; while he opposed
the Anglican establishment, he was, and would remain, loyal to the
government:

... however many and great objections I
may have to a religious Establishment in
Canada, I have no objections to the civil
government. I am a British-born subject;
and by my paternal and personal feelings,
I am unwaveringly attached to the British
Constitution.\footnote{42}

Accordingly, Ryerson included the concept of legitimate religious dissent
within his definition of loyalty; true loyalty, he argued, "does not
imply a passive submission to all those measures which may be introduced
and pressed forward by professed subjects, or ministers, or functionaries."
Political dissent "when the object is to improve a deficient and
inadequate state of the supreme Government," was not disloyal. The loyal
citizen, then, could be defined as follows: "None are so truly loyal and
obedient to the laws under which they live as those who feel that, under
the government of those laws, they are not only men, but free men. Such
is every Briton, whether he be born or live in Great Britain or in
Canada."\footnote{43} This justification for dissent was not limited to individual
expressions, and it needed only to be secularized to be equated with the
position the Reformers had been working out in the debate over the Alien
Question.

Methodist loyalty was also shaped by their commitment to the
society in which they lived; Ryerson embraced the assimilative myth which
had been articulated by moderate Reformers during the Alien Question. He
defended the Methodist attachment to Upper Canada:

As to patriotism and loyalty, we shrink
not from a comparison, paternally and
personally, with any of our slanderers,
and we may venture to affirm that those
preachers who faced the winter's storm
and the summer's heat, followed the first
influx of emigration into the country, kept
pace with the sound of the axe through the
tractless forests, and scattered cots of
the wilderness, and planted the pure doctrines
of Methodism in every township in the province;
... such preachers have given much more substan-
tial proofs of their patriotism and love of
Wesleyan Methodism than any cooped-up growling
polemic, whose greatest labour consist in
"slanderously accusing" those whose self-
denial and industry, and devoted zeal, he has
no disposition to emulate.44

Ryerson further believed that in spite of the heterogeneity of the
population, settlers in the province would become Canadian:

From whatever part of Great Britain or
Ireland a man may emigrate, when he settles
in Canada, are not all his interests
Canadian? Is it not in Canada, then, that
his all becomes invested and involved? CANADA
is their HOME in whatever part of the world
they may have been born, and any attempt to
excite feelings from the place of their birth
against those who have been born in the place
of their adopted residence, is unpatriotic,
unchristian and unnatural.45

His loyalty became an expression of provincial feeling as well as a
commitment to the British connection.

Ryerson, therefore, broadened the Tory definition of the loyal
subject to include the Methodists. By rejecting the exclusiveness of
High Toryism through an affirmation of the legitimacy of religious dissent
to protect individual rights and an emphasis upon the accommodative nature
of Upper Canadian society, Ryerson contributed to the development of a
moderate Tory ideology by the early 1830's.46 During his trip to England
in 1833, the differences between the High and moderate Tories were
reinforced, and confirmed Ryerson's place in the moderate camp; he wrote:

An English ultra tory is what we believe has
usually been meant and understood in Canada
by the unqualified term tory; that is, a
lording in power, a tyrant in politics, and a bigot in religion. The other branch ... is what is called the moderate Tory. In political theory he agrees with his high-toned neighbour; but he acts from religious principle, and this governs his private as well as public life -- he contemplates the good of the nation and the welfare of mankind, without regard to party measures, and uninfluenced by political sectarianism. To this class belongs ... a great majority of the Wesleyan Methodists.47

In spite of the apparent conservatism of spokesmen like Ryerson, the Episcopal Methodists continued to be viewed with some suspicion because of their lack of respectability and their American origins. These problems had plagued the sect since the end of the War of 1812, and Reverend Fitch Reed noted in the 1820's that:

A general prejudice existed against the Society -- really, no doubt, because of the obscurity of their social position ... (and) because they were subject to a foreign ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and their ministers and people suffered many annoyances by reason of this foreign element.48

The desire to improve the social status of Upper Canadian Methodism characterized the activities of the sect in the 1820's and 1830's. The belief that respectability demonstrated loyalty shaped their social, religious, and political responses in this period. The Methodists, for example, were becoming integrated into the social mainstream. S. D. Clark has suggested that this development was the result of the increasing institutionalization of the sect within the province. There was a decline in camp meetings exhorted by itinerants and a moderation of the evangelical appeal in favour of urban churches led by educated professional preachers.49 The social status of Methodist congregations also began to change in this period; when Ryerson was preaching at York in 1825, he noted: "Our morning congregation fill the chapel, which was
never the case before; and in the evening the chapel will not contain
but little more than three-quarters of the people. Last evening, several
members of Parliament were present. "In the 1830's, Reverend Benjamin
Slicht was "amazed" at the social composition of his Amherstburg
congregation: "The most respectable people in the town attend, and all
the most respectable & they regularly attend Sabbath after Sabbath; they
also hear with deep and fixed attention. I am given to understand that
they have not been accustomed to do so in times past."

As the Methodists became more respectable they also became more
fully accommodated within the social structures of the province. In the
1820's, the Methodists were viewed as ignorant enthusiasts; by the 1830's,
they had become another group included in the conservative coalition.

Ryerson noted these developments in an editorial published in 1835:

... The Methodists were an obscure, a despised, an ill-treated people; in several instances
their Ministers were unjustly used and shame-
fully persecuted by the local authorities of
the Government under which they lived, and of
which they had always shown themselves faith-
ful and loyal subjects. They were not suffered
to solemnize matrimony even in their own
Societies; nor had the Church the security of
law for a single chapel, parsonage, or acre of
land ....

Now the political condition and relations of
the Methodist Connexion are pleasingly changed.
It has the law of the land for the security of
its chapel property; its Ministers solemnize
matrimony to the same extent with Clergymen of
the Church of England; the rights and privileges
of the body are respected in the highest quarters,
as well as by the public generally; and the
Government itself proposes the removal of every
remaining cause of complaint and dissatisfaction.

In the same editorial, Ryerson also noted that the American
origins of the Episcopalians "excited jealousy and alarm in the minds of
many private individuals, as well as the civil authorities." The claim
that they were disloyal was rejected; Henry Ryan, the presiding elder of
the Genesee Conference, asked: "Who has ever proved any of us to be
rebels? ... Can it be proved that any of us has not been conscientious
in praying for Kings and all that are in authority?" Ryerson also
asserted that Methodist preachers "... are not republicans; neither are
they infected with republican principles; nor have they come 'almost
universally from the republican States of America'. Seven-eighths of the
teachers are British-born subjects ...."52 But the Episcopalians continued
to be attacked, and as the numbers of British immigrants to the province
increased, their critics included the more conservative and more
respectable English Wesleyans.53 As a result, Episcopal spokesmen, like
Ryerson, became more willing to make compromises in order to ensure
denominational harmony.

The period after 1815 had witnessed a struggle between the
Episcopalians and the Wesleyans over control of the province. The English
Methodists were quite willing to adopt Tory tactics to achieve their ends
and they attacked the Episcopalians over their American ties. The Episcopalians
noted the activities of Henry Pope, an English Wesleyan missionary, in
the Niagara District:

Mr. Pope used every means to prejudice the
minds of the people against us. He preached
"Loyalty" "British Authority", etc. He
succeeded in drawing a few away. But his
adherents were, chiefly, persons who had been
shorn of their spirituality by politics and
war.

Some Upper Canadian Methodists did not feel that Wesleyans were any better
than the Episcopalians and asked: "Why should we cast off our preachers that
God has owned in the Salvation of our Souls and be to a vast expense in
fetching over Preachers from England bare, because they were British
The rivalry between the two groups continued until 1820 when a compromise was reached -- the Episcopals were to maintain control of all Upper Canada west of Kingston, while the Wesleyans were restricted to Kingston and the Eastern District. Pressure continued to build on the Episcopals to sever their American connection, and at the annual conference of Methodist preachers held at Hallowell in 1824, a declaration seeking an independent Canadian Conference was passed. Finally, in October 1828, autonomy was achieved with the creation of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Canada. Ryerson believed that such developments removed much of the popular suspicion of the Methodists; only the administration still perceived the Episcopals to be disloyal. A report prepared by the Upper Canadian Assembly seemed to confirm Ryerson's view:

Their influence and instruction, far from being ... a tendency hostile to our institutions, have been conducive in a degree which cannot be easily estimated, to the reformation of their hearers from licentiousness, and the diffusion of correct morals, the foundation of all sound loyalty and social order. There is no reason to believe that, as a body, they have failed to inculcate, by precept and example, ... an attachment to the Sovereign and a cheerful and conscientious obedience to the laws of the country.

The attacks on the Episcopal Methodists did not end with the creation of an independent Canadian Church, or with the Assembly's stamp of approval. Their loyalty, and hence their respectability, continued to be questioned. Ryerson argued that the Methodists were labelled as disloyal in the hopes that their support among recent British immigrants would be transferred to the Church of England:
Much has been said and re-said about "Yankee Methodists" in this Province -- their "republicanism, revolutionary principles," &c. and numerous other frightful things, truly alarming to those strangers among us who are possessed of loyal feelings and have a regard for British rule in Canada, and who have not been long enough in the country to know the real state of things.  

The desire for increased respectability led some Episcopal leaders, like Egerton Ryerson, to compromise by seeking a union with the Wesleyans whose numbers were ever-increasing as a result of massive immigration from Britain in this period. The pressures of both demography and politics produced a union of the two groups in 1833.

The accusations of disloyalty levelled against the Methodists did not end, in spite of the developments of the early 1830's. The Kingston Chronicle noted that the existence of American Methodists would continue to undermine the British values shaping the society:

The British Conference are no doubt deceived as to the true state of the case, although the motives for their proceedings were meant to be good. They have intended to advance the cause of Religion, by the connection of two denominations. The one class have been taught to cultivate British feeling and, when necessary, to appeal to British generosity for aid; the other, the Episcopalians have derived their existence, many of their preachers, and in a good degree their support from another people than the British.

The loyalty of the British Wesleyans was confirmed but the Episcopalians remained suspect.

Political developments had reinforced the suspicion that Episcopalians were disloyal. Until Ryerson made explicit his Toryism in 1833, he had been an acknowledged spokesman for the Reform movement because of his opposition to the administration on the question of Anglican exclusiveness. A letter from "An Anglo-Canadian" to the Kingston Chronicle expressed
support for meetings which would afford the Tories "an opportunity of expressing our abhorrence of the seditious principles of Mackenzie, Ryerson, & Co. ..." Ogle Gowan, the Grand Master of the Orange Order in Upper Canada, believed that Methodist preachers were spreading republican ideas among both inhabitants of Loyalist origin and recent British immigrants:

A large portion of the old Loyalists, having unfortunately deserted the principles, which sustained their Fathers under the privations incident to the first settlement of the country, and many of the European population, being compelled to "fall in" with the instruction given them in the back Townships, by the preachers of a foreign and hostile sect, were led over by political preachers of a foreign and hostile sect, and the weekly instructions of their favorite "Guardian" to embrace revolutionary doctrines, and to seek eagerly after that portion of the press, which the new light they observed in religion and politics, told them was "Independent and liberal."

Even some opponents of the administration distrusted the Methodist-dominated Reform movement; Francis Collins, the editor of the Canadian Freeman, was a constant critic of the "saddlebags" faction in the Assembly.60

Ryerson recognized that critics of the government were labelled "'Yankees', 'rebels', 'demagogues', 'revolutionists', &c to make them odious." Accordingly, he sought to dissociate the Methodists from Reformers like William Lyon Mackenzie. Using good Tory arguments, the Christian Guardian (edited by James Richardson in Ryerson's absence) accused the radicals of disturbing constitutional balance and social stability by generating a "turbulent spirit" in Upper Canada: 
"... (We) will soon be governed, not by a Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy, but by a Mobocracy, alike fatal to Religion, good morals, order, peace, and
the happiness of society."61

Ryerson's suspicion of political radicalism was reinforced during his trip to England in 1833. The radicals, led by Joseph Hume, were both republican and irreligious:

Radicalism in England appeared to us to be but another word for Republicanism, with the name of King instead of President .... And perhaps one of the most formidable obstacles to a wise, safe and effectual reform of political, ecclesiastical, and religious abuses in England, is, the notorious want of religious virtue or integrity in many of the leading politicians who have lamentably succeeded in getting their names identified with reform ....

The close links between the English radicals and those in Upper Canada posed a serious threat to religious and political stability in the provincial society, and to the imperial connection. As a result, Ryerson believed the Upper Canadian radicals to be disloyal, and his suspicions were confirmed by the publication of Hume's "baneful domination" letter:

Lately the King's ministers were respected and honoured, now they are insulted and abused. Lately attachment and loyalty to the British Government were professed; now Independence from it's "baneful domination" is recommended as the motto and watchword of reformers .... (Is so grave a question as whether a country shall remain a monarchy or become a republic -- whether it shall remain an appendage of Great Britain or become an American state -- every Christian and patriot has a duty to discharge .... 62

Ryerson's break with the Reformers, which reflected his own conservative inclinations, produced a tremendous outcry in the province, and a split among the Methodists. Although Egerton was supported by his brother, John, who was also "anxious (sic)" to obtain the confidence of the government & entirely disconnect ourselves with that tribe of villains (sic)
with whom we have been too intimate ...,” other Methodist preachers, including his younger brother, Edwy, were opposed. They wrote Egerton to say that they "were meeting a torrent of opposition" on the circuits, with subscribers cancelling the Guardian .... They stated that they and their 'brethren in the ministry' had not changed their political views, that they still felt themselves to be connected with the reformers, and implored Egerton to abandon the quarrel. But as a result of the polarization of politics in the 1830's, Egerton Ryerson was no longer prepared to countenance the apparent disloyalty of the radicals; he argued that his views were

... a two-edged sword, that cuts all the representations which have been made in years past against our loyalty to the British Government on the one hand, and the misrepresentations of Mr. Mackenzie and his partizans on the other. They show the consistency of our principles with our professions, and of our practice with our duty.64

Although the Methodists maintained a lower political profile after 1833, many continued to support the Reform cause. Joseph Stinson, the Wesleyan Missions Superintendent, noted caustically: "There is not a radical meeting in the country at which some of the Methodist leaders and Local preachers are not the most conspicuous characters." Moreover, during the "loyalty election", seven of the eighteen Radical members elected were Methodists — the largest religious group among the radicals. There was still a strong link between the Episcopalians and the radical movement, in spite of the efforts of men like Ryerson:

But the Methodists had gained a large measure of social and political respectability in this period. Their spokesmen articulated
more forcefully the traditional Tory interpretation of events. The election of 1836 was seen as a contest of loyalty: "The real question seems to be, whether we shall retain our colonial relation, or govern ourselves by elective institutions. In other words, shall we abide under British rule or become a Republic." The editor of the Christian Guardian at that time, Ephraim Evans, fully supported the administration of Sir Francis Bond Head, and he urged voters to declare "for the continuation of that unrivalled national blessing, the British constitution." Some Upper Canadians, such as Francis Hincks, believed that the Methodists played a decisive role in the Tory victory in 1836. Although this perception was probably incorrect, the new Assembly did contain a new group --- three Canadian-Methodist Tories were elected. The Methodists had become another element in the conservative coalition in Upper Canada.

The increased social and political respectability of the Methodists in the 1830's reflected their growing ideological respectability. In response to Tory critics, Ryerson demonstrated Methodist loyalty and articulated a position which could be accommodated quite easily within Upper Canadian Toryism. He believed that the existence of a distinctive provincial society was predicated upon respect for the Sovereign and the Constitution, "freedom of our institutions, and the excellencies of our civilization; it was strengthened by the imperial connection." Years later, in an address presented to celebrate the battle of Lundy's Lane, Ryerson came back to these "true principles of loyalty"; he said:

Canadian loyalty is a firm attachment to that British Constitution and those British laws, ... which best secure life, liberty and prosperity, and which prompt us to Christian and patriotic deeds by linking us with all that is good and noble in the traditions of our national history.
Ryerson steered the Methodists between the radicalism of Mackenzie on the one hand and the High Toryism of Strachan on the other. In resisting an Anglican monopoly of the Clergy Reserves and Anglican control of education he defined the issues on which the Compact ultimately lost popular support, but by his social conservatism and his constitutional principles he also strengthened the moderate Tory element in the province. His defence of Methodist loyalty did not challenge Tory insistence upon the necessity of loyalty, but it necessarily rejected exclusiveness as one of the components of loyalty. He brought into a Tory context his acceptance of the legitimacy of dissent, if only in religious terms; and he adopted the Reformers' concept of the assimilative nature of loyalty in Upper Canadian society. As the Methodists were integrated into the social and political mainstream, they became an important part of the conservative consensus that was to dominate the political culture of the province. Ryerson's conception of loyalty broadened its ideological base, and therefore made possible the emergence, during the early 1830's, of a moderate Toryism as a significant development in the politics of Upper Canada.
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FOOTNOTES

1. J. S. Moir, *The Church in the British Era: From the British Conquest to Confederation* (Toronto, 1972), p. 113. The popularity of the sect was the result of the mobility of itinerant preachers who could reach the scattered pioneer population and the strong emotional appeal of its evangelical message, while other denominations, notably the Church of England lacked both ministers and a strong institutional framework and so faced immediate disadvantages.


2. With their emphasis upon the separation of church and state, the Methodists were, of course, very critical of Strachan's position. But the Presbyterians also challenged Anglican claims to exclusive control of the Reserves and education. Presbyterian spokesmen, like William Morris of Perth, argued that because the Church of Scotland was also established in Great Britain, it was entitled to a share of the Clergy Reserves.


Peter Russell has suggested that the Church of Scotland also played an important role in the transition "from Compact Toryism to more popular conservatism, and has adequately outlined the significant differences between the Anglican-dominated Compact and Scottish Presbyterians. He might have discussed more explicitly the manner in which Presbyterian responses did shape moderate Toryism in Upper Canada in the 1830's and 1840's.


In addition, some Presbyterian sects became concerned with the question of loyalty. The Niagara Presbytery, for example, remained dependent upon the American Home Missionary Society until the late 1830's. Its collapse in 1838 was attributed to its links with Presbyterian groups in the United States. The *Presbyterian* of November 27, 1889 cited an extract from the *Home Missionary* of October 1838:

A little more than a year ago there was a Presbyterian, by the name of the 'Niagara Presbytery of Upper Canada,' comprising seven or eight Presbyterian Ministers, twenty-five churches, and having an aggregate of 700 or
800 communicants. These were situated in the vicinity of the head of Lake Ontario.

But when the insurrection commenced in that neighbourhood, many of the ministers, from their being immigrants from the U.S., fell under the suspicion of disaffection to the Government. This rendered their situation so unpleasant that many of them returned to the American side of the line, congregations were broken up, and their members compelled to emigrate to more peaceful regions.


6 For a biography of Ryerson see C. B. Sissons, Egerton Ryerson: His Life and Letters, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1937, 1947); see also Neil McDonald and Alf Chaiton, eds., Egerton Ryerson and His Times (Toronto, 1978).

7 Christian Guardian, November 21, 1829.

Historians, too, have agreed that religion rather than politics motivated Ryerson. C. B. Sissons wrote that the "primary and dominant motive of his life was religion". Robin Harris has written that: "Ryerson was a Christian, first, last, and all the time; his religious principles were his first principles. He was, of course, a particular kind of Christian, a Methodist, and he subscribed fully to the doctrine of that Church."


8 For a biography of Strachan, see J. L. H. Henderson, John Strachan 1778-1867 (Toronto, 1969).

Strachan's influence over the provincial elite has been noted in Craig, pp. 106-113, 169ff; F. M. Quealey, "The Administration of


The Seventh Report from the Select Committee ... on Grievances (Toronto, 1835), Strachan's testimony, in Craig, p. 170.

PAC Pamphlets, John Strachan, Claims of the Churchmen and Dissenters of Upper Canada Brought to the Test in a Controversy Between Several Members of the Church of England and a Methodist Preacher (Kingston, 1828), pp. 20-21; see also, Strachan, A Sermon Preached at York, Upper Canada, Third of July 1825, on the Death of the Late Lord Bishop of Quebec (Kingston, 1826); in J. L. H. Henderson, ed., John Strachan: Documents and Opinions (Toronto, 1969), pp. 90-91.

PAO, Strachan Letter Book, 1812-1834, Report on Education, February 26, 1845, 7 & 8; see also Strachan's Convocation Address to his Cornwall students (1807), in A. N. Bethune, Memoir of the Right Reverend John Strachan (Toronto, 1870), pp. 26-29.

John Beverley Robinson also believed that selection into the Upper Canadian elite should be based upon merit and respectability. A man must be "the most worthy, intelligent, loyal, and opulent inhabitant ..., a gentleman of high character, of large property, and of superior information."

(J. B. Robinson, Canada and the Canada Bill: Being an Examination of the Proposed Measure for the Future Government of Canada .... (London, 1840), pp. 144-5.

For more detailed discussions of Strachan's views on education, see C. W. Spragge, "John Strachan's Contribution to Education 1800-1823", in Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 22 (1941), 147-158. J. D. Purdy, "John Strachan's Educational Policies, 1815-1841" in Ontario History, Vol. 64 (1972), 45-64; J. Donald Wilson, "The Pre-Ryerson Years" in McDonald and Chaiton, eds., p. 9-42.

Kingston Gazette, September 3, 1811, Strachan's address.

Strachan believed that education must be directed by "Tutors, not merely eminent for their learning, but for their attachment to the British Monarchy, and to the Established Church ...."


PAC Pamphlets, John Strachan, An Appeal to the Friends of Religion and Literature in behalf of the University of Upper Canada (London, 1827), p. 20.

Cf. Spragge, pp. xiv-xv; see also Strachan's Notes, pp. 222-223.


Many Methodist societies dissolved during the War of 1812 because their links with the United States could not be sustained. The Methodists though, were not the only group affected. The War also created problems for many Baptist congregations which had American connections.

PAC, C042/355, p. 70; Drummond to Bathurst, April 30, 1814; quoted in Craig, p. 166.


Fred Landon has noted, though, that: "there is nothing to indicate that Methodists were less ardent in their support of the war than other religious groups ...." (in his Western Ontario and the American Frontier (Toronto, reprinted 1967), p. 77).

G. F. Playter stated that after the War, some itinerant's did not return from the United States, and those of American origin who did remain in Upper Canada were "of moderate politics and prudent conduct." The Methodists had no desire to offend the provincial authorities.


Other High Tories were not as inflexible as Strachan. Although the source is suspect, John Beverley Robinson's son asserted in a biography that his father was not concerned with "the difference between the Church and Dissent". In a pioneer society like Upper Canada, it was important that the principles of the Christian faith be inculcated into the population, even by dissenting preachers. J. B. Robinson was quoted as saying:

Frequently, in the most lonely parts of the wilderness, in townships where a clergyman of the Church of England had never been heard, and probably never seen, I have found the
population assembled in some log building, earnestly engaged in acts of devotion, and listening to those doctrines and truths which are inculcated in common by most Christian denominations, but which, if it had not been for the ministrations of dissenting preachers, would for thirty years have been but little known, if at all, to the greater part of the inhabitants of the interior of Upper Canada.

Robinson believed that all dissenters would eventually return to the Church of England.


The discussion of Strachan's views is drawn from this analysis, pp. 237-272.


22 PAO, Strachan Papers, Strachan to James Brown, July 13, 1806.

23 Kingston Gazette, May 19, 1819; PAO, Strachan Sermons, "Another parable he spake unto them ..." preached on February 1, 1835.

24 Fahey, p. 248.

Strachan made this belief explicit in a sermon delivered in 1847: "Faith ... is not a temporary or impetuous emotion, but a habit, a state of mind, lasting and emotional .... Faith is the yielding up of ourselves to the obedience of Christ -- but to obey Christ is to live the life under which Christ lived (,) a life pre-eminently of good works." (PAO, Strachan Sermons, "If thou wilt enter into life ..." preached on November 21, 1847). Good works, then, were as important as faith as the means to attain salvation; the Methodist emphasis upon salvation "by grace" alone was inadequate. (PAO, Strachan Papers, Strachan to Brown, October 27, 1803).


26 PAC Pamphlets, John Strachan, A Sermon ... on the Death of the Late Lord Bishop of Quebec, in Henderson, p. 93.
PAC, CO42/399, p. 3; Maitland to Bathurst, January 4, 1821.

The traditional Tory distrust of American elements in the province shaped responses to the Episcopal Methodists into the 1830's. Thomas Dalton, editor of The Patriot and Farmers' Monitor, wrote:

It is a scandal to our government that American preachers were ever allowed to come here at all. If Methodism and Presbyterianism be good, and we see not why otherwise, we have the Church of Scotland and the British Wesleyans to furnish us with preachers enough without resort to the United States, whose political institutions being at variance with ours, renders their preachers unsuitable instructors to our youthful generation. (May 10, 1883).

In 1831, Donald Bethune, an Anglican minister from Kingston, petitioned the Assembly:

To prohibit any exercise of the functions of a priest, or exhorter; or elder of any denomination in the Province except by British subjects; 2nd, to prevent any religious society connected with any foreign religious body to assemble in Conference; 3rd, to prevent the raising of money by any religious person or body for objects which are not strictly British, etc.

(Christian Guardian, February 9, 1831).

27 Ryerson, Canadian Methodism, p. 18.


In spite of Wesley's assertions of loyalty, the Methodists in England were suspected of disloyalty because they were religious dissenters during the political turbulence of the 1790's. Therefore, the Methodists found it necessary to conclude their 1792 Conference with a loyal address:

We feel the most unfeigned loyalty to the King and a sincere attachment to the Constitution. We reverence the Government; are conscious of the many blessings we
enjoy under our previous Sovereign, and are thankful to God for them.


30 Christian Guardian, July 3, 1830; Ibid., October 8, 1830.

31 Christian Guardian, March 27, 1830; Ibid., July 11, 1838.


33 Ryerson, Canadian Methodism, p. 1.

34 Christian Guardian, July 3, 1830.

35 Minutes of the Conference, 1836, pp. 135-136; quoted in French, Parsons and Politics, pp. 154-155.

Ryerson to J. M. Higginson, March 8, 1845; quoted in Susan E. Houston, "Politics, Schools, and Social Change in Upper Canada", in Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 53 (1972), 263.

After he became Superintendent of Education in 1844, Ryerson attacked American textbooks which were "Anti-British in every sense of the word"; they were "one element of powerful influence against the established Government of the Country."

(F. Ryerson, "Special Report on Measures which have been Adopted for the Establishment of a Normal School and for Carrying into Effect Generally the Common School Act." (Montreal, 1847), pp. 14-15; quoted Ibid.

See also Neil McDonald, "Egerton Ryerson and the School as an Agent of Political Socialization", in McDonald and Chalton, eds., pp. 81-104.

36 Colonial Advocate, May 11, 1826.

37 Ryerson, Canadian Methodism, p. 133; Christian Guardian, July 3, 1830;
Ryerson, p. 138.

38 Christian Guardian, July 3, 1830.

39 PAC Pamphlets, Letters from the Reverend Egerton Ryerson to The Hon. and Reverend Doctor Strachan. Published originally in the Upper Canada Herald (Kingston, 1828); Letter 2, p. 9.

Upper Canada, House of Assembly Journal (1828); "Report of the Select Committee, to which was referred ... the petition of Christians of all denominations in Upper Canada ..." pp. 3-5.

40 Christian Guardian, July 3, 1830, Ibid., August 21, 1838.

Ryerson also drew upon the Loyalist tradition to confirm the Methodist commitment to religious and political equality:

It was the Loyalists of America, and their descendents, in Upper Canada who first lifted up the voice of remonstrance against ecclesiastical despotism ..., and unfurled the flag of equal religious rights and liberties for all religious persuasions.

(Ryerson, Canadian Methodism, p. 61).


The same theme is developed in the editorials of May 7, 1831; October 8, 1831; January 18, 1832; February 22, 1832; March 1, 1832; April 4, 1832, March 1, 1837; January 6, 1838; January 10, 1838.

In his response to Strachan in 1826, Ryerson attacked the assumption that religious dissenters were disloyal:

The hue-and-cry that "dissenters are disaffected to the Imperial Government," has stunned the ears of almost all Europe for more than two centuries. It was first raised to make dissenters contribute to the support of the Establishment, to increase the revenues of the clergy, and to give more unlimited sway to ecclesiastical domination, ... and now continues its hideous shrieks through the dreary wastes of Canada.

Have the "dissenters" in this country every shown a disposition hostile to the true interests of the colony?

(Colonial Advocate, May 11, 1826).

42 Ryerson, Canadian Methodism, pp. 157-158; see also Christian Guardian,
July 9, 1831.

Christian Guardian, July 3, 1830; Ibid., May 9, 1838. See also editorials of January 18, 1832; October 2 and November 27, 1833.

Christian Guardian, June 6, 1832.

Christian Guardian, November 11, 1840.


Christian Guardian, October 30, 1833.

Quoted in John Carroll, Cass and His Contemporaries (Toronto, 1867-1877), Vol. 2, p. 213.

See also, United Church Archives, Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Correspondence, 1829-1840. Letter from John Fenton and Richard Coates; June 3, 1829.

See Clark, Church and Sect, pp. 262-271.


Christian Guardian, July 17, 1835.

United Church Archives, Wesleyan Records; H. Ryan to A. Clarke, October 9, 1815; quoted in French, Parsons and Politics, p. 71; Colonial Advocate, May 11, 1826.

It has been estimated that the numbers of Methodists in Upper Canada increased from about 38,000 in 1830 to 61,000 by 1839.

Christian Guardian, February 6, 1830; John Strachan to Dr. Burns, February 13, 1839, Glasgow Colonial Society Correspondence; cited in Russell, p. 90.


United Church Archives, Wesleyan Records. Peter Brown, Daniel Cummyns, et al., Yonge Street and Ancaster circuits, to the London Methodist Missionary Society, December 4, 1816; quoted in French, Parsons and Politics, p. 73.


The creation of a separate Canadian Methodist Church did not silence all the critics. Henry Ryan, who had been pushed to the
periphery of the Methodist movement, broke with the main body and created his own small sect, the Canadian Wesleyan Methodist Church. Ryan's flock was concentrated in the Bay of Quinte area and numbered about 200 — some were of Loyalist background and others were Irish Methodists. (Moir, p. 113). Ryan, while angry at the main body for excluding him, also articulated the tensions between his supporters and the "American" Episcopal. Rev. George Ferguson wrote:

My removal to Hallowell (in 1828) was still more distressing to me. Mr. Ryan had commenced his career. He was zealous, and talented withal. Loyalty was his catchword, and he constantly denounced the ministers of the Canada Conference as disloyal. (Quoted in Moir, p. 202).

The Primitive Methodists also perceived the Episcopal to be disloyal because of their American ties:

The Methodists in this Province are very numerous and influential but are supposed (especially by the highest authorities) to be disaffected, a great proportion of them being Emigrants from the United States, are supposed to retain much of the Republican feeling of that Country, and many of their Preachers coming from the United States are expected to exert an influence over their minds prejudicial to our Government.

... If any Emigrants from England Ireland or Scotland joins their Society he is made very uncomfortable by being assailed with political subjects, and unless he consent to join them in their defamation of the Government or at least listen to it with silence he is considered unsound in the faith.


56 Upper Canada, House of Assembly, Journal (1828); "Report of the Select Committee, to which was referred ... the petition of Christians of all denominations of Upper Canada; and other petitions on the same subject ....", pp. 3-5.

See also Ryerson, The Story of My Life, p. 104.

Methodist immigrants from Great Britain did distrust the Episcopalians and viewed both their religious and political views with distaste. The British Wesleyan Society stated in a petition that: "We look forward to the time when thousands of Emigrants from Europe will make this Province their home and when true and genuine Methodism might be universally diffused throughout the country."

(United Church Archives, Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Correspondence, 1829-1840. Petition from the British Wesleyan Society of York, in a letter from Egerton Ryerson, dated October 19, 1831).

The union is discussed in more depth in French, Parsons and Politics, pp. 138-142. Not all Episcopalians saw the benefits of closer relations with the Wesleyans. George Ryerson, one of Egerton’s older brothers, viewed the Toryism of the Wesleyans with distaste:

Perhaps I do not use too strong terms when I say that I detest their blind veneration for the writings of Mr. Wesley (excellent in themselves, but not inspired), and containing much of human infirmity and the prejudices of a High-Church education; their exalted opinion of themselves and their system, their servile reverence for great men and great names and their servile clinging to the skirts of a corrupt, secularized anti-Christian Church. They are generally either anti-Reformers or half-hearted, lukewarm, hesitating reformers...; altogether I fear that the Wesleyan Conference is an obstacle to the extension of civil and religious liberty.

(Christian Guardian, August 6, 1831).

Kingston Chronicle, October 12, 1833.

Kingston Chronicle, March 10, 1832; The Antidote, January 15, 1833; see also Ibid., January 1 and April 9, 1833; Canadian Freeman, August 19, 1830.


Christian Guardian, October 30, 1833; Ibid., June 4, 1834.

William Lyon Mackenzie was more succinct and abusive, in his condemnation of Ryerson: "Another Deserter" had gone "over to the enemy, press, types, & all, & hoisted the colours of a cruel, vindictive tory priesthood." (Colonial Advocate, October 36, 1833).

64 Christian Guardian, November 13, 1833.

65 United Church Archives, Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Correspondence, 1829-1840. Stinson to Alder; April 24, 1834; quoted in French, Parsons and Politics, p. 148.

66 Upper Canada Herald, August 9, 1836. See Table I.

67 Christian Guardian, June 15, 1836; Ibid., June 8, 1836.

68 Sir Francis Hincks, Reminiscences of His Public Life (Montreal, 1882), p. 17.


CHAPTER 5

"WE SEEK TRANQUILLITY AND GOOD GOVERNMENT, ACCORDING TO OUR CONSTITUTION": TORY LOYALTY IN THE 1830'S

Not all Upper Canadians were happy with the ideological emphasis that had characterized the political debate of the 1820's. The editor of the Kingston Chronicle hoped that politics in the new decade would cease to concentrate

... on nice and fanciful distinctions between freedom and prerogative -- questions of little or no utility, while the substantial interests of the country were neglected .... Let this Parliament proceed to measures for the improvement of our roads, the increase of our commerce, and the advancement of agriculture.

But what he deplored as "the reign of theory" continued in the 1830's: the definition of the loyal subject remained at the centre of political contention.

Upper Canadians became more concerned with the political rather than the ideological components of the idea in this period. Loyalty became the means to differentiate the supporters of two irreconcilable value systems -- British monarchy and American republicanism. The Tories framed this debate; loyalty was discussed on their terms, and, as a result, attitudes began to crystallize. Tory loyalty increased its emphasis on the imperial connection and on Upper Canada's infant dependence upon the mother country for its political stability, its defence and its material prosperity. The loss of dependence was equated to the loss of identity; and that loss was threatened by the alarming appearance of a formed opposition to the exclusive leadership of the Tory elite. Tory loyalty excluded the legitimacy of dissent; all Reformers became associated
with the radicalism of William Lyon Mackenzie; they were portrayed as factious demagogues seeking to destroy the society. By the time of the "loyalty election" in 1836, the Tories had simplified politics -- there were but two choices, loyalty or disloyalty. Explanation of attitudes was no longer necessary. Rhetoric replaced analysis -- labels and symbols became the staples of political debate.

This polarization of politics attracted the support of a broad coalition of groups which accepted the central importance of loyalty. Yet within this apparent Tory consensus, new ingredients had been added to the concept of loyalty -- ingredients which were to prove irreconcilable with the exclusiveness to which the Tory leadership was committed, and which gave an ideological basis for the development of moderate Toryism. Moreover, these ideas reflected an increasing acceptance of some moderate Reform assumptions. The definition of the loyal subject, for example, became less exclusive; it was broadened to incorporate the belief that loyalty could develop through a commitment to the land; the process of settlement could also prove the "love of country". It was also argued that loyalty could be earned through respectability; the Methodists had staked out a claim to a measure of political legitimacy in this manner, and the Orange Order was soon to follow them. Moderate Toryism also developed a more provincial view. There was less unquestioning acceptance of imperial governance and increasingly, loyalty was expressed with nationalist rather than loyalist rhetoric. By the end of the 1830's, the moderate Tories subscribed to much of the ideological basis for conservative ideas of loyalty in the province.

To the Tory, Upper Canada was a battle-ground between two conflicting value systems -- on the one hand there was the social and political
stability represented by the British constitution and the imperial connection; on the other, the turbulence of American democracy. The Reform victory in the elections of 1828 appeared to usher in an age of uncertainty because of the prospect of the triumph of democracy. The Upper Canada Herald revealed some of these fundamental fears in an editorial in the mid-1830's:

The present age has been properly characterized as an age of movement. Of movement there is plenty; though in some instances it is retrograde. Individuals and bodies of men are in continual motion, which is more or less rapid according to circumstances, yet in few cases so rapid as the ungovernable spirit of the age impetuously requires. In politics the movement is certainly retrograde, for it goes to place power in the hands of those who are least entitled and qualified to use it, and thus only enables them to injure themselves and society, by pulling down the temples of social order on their own heads and on all who are unfortunately included with them in the edifice. The greatest political struggle of the present time is to establish the absolute rule of democracy.  

The stable hierarchical society, which was central to Tory perceptions, was thus threatened by the forces of political and social equality. To prevent further decay, the Tories demanded loyalty to their vision of Upper Canada.

The imperial connection was equally necessary for the material progress of Upper Canada, an infant society which still required "the most careful nursing" by the mother country. Thomas Dalton, the editor of The Patriot, believed that the society was evolving, but remained dependent on Britain for "men of intelligence and enterprise ... for a few years longer." The immature state of the society made comparisons with the rapid development of the United States unfair; the Upper Canada
Herald attacked radicals who compare the present state of the two countries, but never avert to the time which they have respectively taken in order to arrive at that state. Yet to compare the two countries absolutely without reference to time, is as wise and just as it would be to compare a boy of ten years with a youth of eighteen, without any reference to their age.

The British Constitutional Society, a Tory organization established in 1836 to marshal the forces of loyalty, declared that Upper Canada "principally owes its rapid development in population and wealth to that connexion." The Hamilton Gazette echoed that sentiment, the province, it was argued, cannot stand alone. United with Great Britain in the fullest and firmest affection, she (Upper Canada) must become great, powerful, prosperous and happy. British capital will flow in, converting the swamps of the country into corn-fields — the forests into meadows and orchard, mines will be dug — canals cut — fabrics erected — new channels of commerce explored — old ones improved, and property be materially enhanced.

The Tories looked to the mother country to strengthen the society and make it more attractive in comparison with the apparent benefits of the United States. They saw the imperial connection as a means to ensure both political and material development.

The Tories depended upon the support of Britain to maintain political stability, the Upper Canada Herald stated:

As a people we are minors under guardianship, and can no more expect the entire control of our affairs than a youth under age could expect the entire control of his estates.
Our natural guardian, Great Britain, has always been desirous of promoting our interests and of preparing us for a wise and happy maturity.

The British Government, it concluded, "is the Government of Canada." The Tories professed loyalty to the imperial connection because it protected the province from "the horrors of revolution, the insecurity of their persons, and property, and the experience and tyranny of would-be rulers." In addition to providing political stability, Britain provided a constitutional model for Upper Canada. The Patriot praised the "equipoise" in "the settled and admirable Constitution and Government of our country"; Ogle Cowan, editor of the Orange journal, The Antidote, also stressed the benefits of the balanced constitution:

... it defines more accurately and confirms with more certainty, the powers and privileges of all ranks of men .... It allows to every individual some share of power, as well as privilege; and it makes the powers of all to co-operate towards the security of all. It possesses the strength and despatch of monarchy, the wisdom of aristocracy, and the public spirit of democracy.

The superiority of the British Constitution was apparent to the Tories; it represented the stability and continuity necessary for social development. Upper Canadians were protected by "a constitution, which has stood the admiration of past ages, and will forever defy the ravages of time." It provided the people with "as much liberty as any people under heaven." Consequently, "the Constitution conferred on us by the Mother Country is well adapted to secure our peace, welfare and good government ...."

Because of the political and material benefits associated with the imperial connection, many Tories believed that the continued existence of
the province required British support. In an emotional outburst to the
Kingston Chronicle, "A Subscriber" wrote:

The connection between this Province and the
parent state can never be dissolved,...
since there exists sterling loyalty in the
country... Upper Canada shall continue to
be governed under the mild and paternal rule
of the British Crown ...\textsuperscript{11}

John Beverley Robinson also believed that "if their independence were
granted to them," Upper Canadians "could not maintain it." But loyalty
to the British connection would permit the province to continue its
development within the imperial context. The people, he argued, "do not
waver in their allegiance. This country (Britain) has not the feeling
of attachment to create. It is there; it has taken strong root, and has
a generous growth; she has only to cultivate and shelter it."\textsuperscript{12} In his
electoral address of 1836, W. H. Draper, the victorious Tory candidate
in Toronto, had announced his determination "to preserve inviolate the
connexion of this Province with the beloved Mother Country ... We seek
tranquillity and good government, according to our Constitution."\textsuperscript{13} The
electorate was only too happy to respond in kind; in the Johnstown
District, the people also sought no "disruption of the happy connexion
existing between us and the Mother Country."\textsuperscript{14}

Yet many Tories no longer accepted the imperial connection without
question. In the 1830's the focus for Tory loyalty was beginning to
shift from the mother country to Upper Canada.\textsuperscript{15} Tory confidence in
British officials was sometimes shaken; in 1833, for example, the
Colonial Office ordered the dismissal of the Attorney General, Henry
John Boulton, and the Solicitor General, Christopher Hagerman, as punish-
ment for the repeated expulsions of William Lyon Mackenzie from the
Assembly. In response, George Gurnett, editor of \textit{Courier of Upper Canada},
exploded in a fury:

The minds of all the well affected people of the country ... begin to be unhinged. Instead of dwelling with delight and confidence upon their connection with the glorious Empire of their sires, with a determination to support that connection, as many of them have already supported it, with their fortunes or their blood, their affections are already more than half alienated from the Government of that country and in the apprehension that the same insulting and degrading course of policy towards them is likely to be continued; they already begin to "cast about" in "their minds eye," for some new state of political existence, which shall effectively put the Colony beyond the reach of injury and insult from any and every ignoramus whom the political lottery of the day may chance to elevate to the Colonial Office.16

Chief Justice John Beverley Robinson, the archtypical High Tory, also believed that Britain should not interfere in the internal affairs of the province; the mother country should control obvius imperal concerns such as defence and foreign policy.17 Therefore, Tory loyalty began to reflect a sense of provincial feeling.

Upper Canadians reinforced this provincialism by drawing upon their own past for traditions which strengthened loyal sentiment. The example of the Loyalists remained paramount.18 The belief that the Loyalists had sacrificed everything to prove their loyalty to the Crown and Constitution was central to Tory thought. The idea of Upper Canada as a special Loyalist homeland remained, as did the hope, articulated by the Upper Canada Herald, that the Loyalist example might "serve to inculcate the noble sentiments and principles for which they contended ...." The qualities exhibited by the founders of the province were required of the population in the 1830's, as well -- they formed "the sheet anchor of a conservative government."19
Yet within this loyal society, dissent continued to exist. The Tories feared that the fundamental nature of the changes sought by radicals like Mackenzie — including "the overthrow of the whole imperial-colonial structure and the creation ... of a 'social democracy' in Upper Canada"⁰² — would destroy their conservative community. Radicalism could lead to the "subversion of monarchical institutions --- and the certain introduction of democracy ...."²¹ More important, though, was the fact that the Tories saw no need for any changes; Upper Canadians enjoyed the full benefit of their rights, liberties and properties. In an extended address on passing the sentence of death upon Samuel Lount and Peter Mathews after the rebellion, Chief Justice Robinson gave striking evidence of how persistent and unqualified was the Tory belief that there were no real grievances in the province; he said:

A few months ago, you were, both of you, living in the enjoyment of health and liberty, under circumstances as favourable, perhaps, to happiness, as the condition of human nature admits of .... A long residence in this Province had given you the opportunity of acquiring property, and had enabled you to find a suitable field for your exertion.

You were not the tenants of rigorous and exacting landlords; you were not burthened with taxes for the State ...; you held that middle station of life that which none is happier; you were your own masters ....

You have lived in a country where every man who obeys the law is secure in the protection of life, liberty, and property; under a form of government, which has been the admiration of the world for ages .... In short, you were living in the enjoyment of as full a security against injury of every kind as any people in the world.²²

If Upper Canadians were blessed with every natural advantage, in Tory eyes, the emergence of discontent was the result of factious
opponents to the administration who introduced dissension and discord into the society. A letter from "A Subscriber" to the Kingston Chronicle argued:

There exists in the public mind many discordant materials and conflicting sentiments which form the fuel for continual excitement. ... It must be admitted, however, that this state of affairs is not owing to any innate quality — any constitutional bias in the people, but is altogether an affair of habit. The proneness to excitement — the fondness of controversy — the devotion to party purposes, manifested on the part of the public, is entirely artificial. ... 23

The Tories simply could not accept the concept of legitimate opposition; the Upper Canada Herald noted that: "In every community there are some discontented spirits who will strive to obtain power by flattering and deceiving the people. These selfish and crafty wrigglers for power will surely, though slowly destroy the people's fidelity to the established principles of the best policy existing ..." 24

Tory fears of opposition were intensified by the fact that their critics were no longer acting as individuals, as Thorpe or Gourlay had done; the Reform movement presented the spectre of a formed opposition -- of a party. Since the late 1820's, with the creation of the York Central Committee, the Reformers had become increasingly organized, with predictable consequences, according to the Tories. Party destroyed the social harmony and political consensus necessary for stability; furthermore, as Richard Hofstadter has noted in his study of Anglo-American views of opposition, party was thought to be "the instrument with which some small and narrow special interest could impose its will upon the whole of society, and hence to become the agent of tyranny." 25 Accordingly, Upper Canadian Tories, like Thomas Dalton, editor of The Patriot, were deter-
mined to remain "detached from party .... I have clearly understood what is meant by PARTY. I take it to be a knot here, a junto there, or a cabal anywhere, opposed to the settled and admirable Constitution and Government of our Country, with views of appropriating power and emolument to themselves, at the expense of long-established, and generally venerated institutions."27.

Party was also perceived as an American innovation; it was "anti-British and of a republican tendency." Consequently, the activities of the opposition were not only a danger to the Constitution but were disloyal, as well. The population of Upper Canada was warned

... against the machinations and intrigues of a few individuals, who—unfortunately, are led by those, whose hostility to the British Constitution is such, that they would sacrifice any and every thing to pull it down, in order that they might build up a Republic on its ruins.28

The Tories continually returned to this theme — the success of their opponents would mark the end of Upper Canada as a British colony. The radicals, according to Charles Fothergill, the King's Printer, were "deceivers and would be destroyers ... seeking to blast the fairest hopes of this great and rising Colony, and erect their own fortunes amidst the general devastation their mad schemes must create." The opposition was thus disloyal because they sought to tear Upper Canada away from "the greatest empire at this day upon earth ...." The Hamilton Gazette also attacked "The Faction" of Bidwell, Rolph and Mackenzie; it was viewed as the "greatest impediment to rendering Upper Canada what it ought to be" because it pursued its party goals with impunity "at the sacrifice of the peace, prosperity and all the best interests of the Province." The "half-civilized republicanism" of the radicals threatened to subdue the
"indomitable spirit of the British population."\(^{29}\)

The continued existence of Upper Canada as a British society was further jeopardized because the opponents of the government were "mostly of American origin" and they were supported by the inhabitants of American origin. Sir John Colborne, the Lieutenant Governor, believed that support for the radicals was greatest

... among settlers who entered the Province about 25 years ago from Pennsylvania, and the American population of the Townships of Markham and Vaughan in this country, connected with them ... Mechanics who lived for some time in the States before they settled in the Province. The Colonial Advocate published by Mackenzie is taken in generally by the American population, and has made them discontented.\(^{30}\)

The Tory suspicion of the potential disloyalty of the American settlers in their midst had not abated; in fact, the political controversies of the 1830's merely confirmed their view that the Americans were republicans whose values could infect the loyal population. George Curnett, editor of the Gore Gazette, argued that this group was, by inclination, disloyal; American inhabitants

... who were born and educated under republican institutions, and who ... have been thought to view those institutions as the perfection of political Government -- ... have also been taught to despise and ridicule the monarchical system. Such persons -- whatever may be their protestations of loyalty -- cannot in reality appreciate our institutions or feel an attachment for them ...\(^{31}\)

By labelling their opponents as disloyal, the Tories sought to polarize the population over the issue of loyalty, and, as a result, isolate the radicals. As early as 1832, a Tory political meeting in Middlesex County emphatically concluded that Upper Canada was divided into two groups:
The one will be composed of Loyal men -- the other of Disaffected men, of Republicans, of Revolutionists, and of Rebels. Let every man therefore ask himself this question. Shall I stand up on the same side with these Revolutionary Republicans -- on the same side with these Rebels -- or shall I stand up on the side of Loyalty? 32

During the election of 1834, the Tories focused exclusively on the issue of loyalty in response to both the increased radicalism of men like Mackenzie and his publication of the English radical Joseph Hume's 'baneful domination' letter which called for the separation of the colonies from the mother country. In a masterful display of overstatement, the Kingston Chronicle thundered that the election would 'stamp the political character of a rapidly improving country ...; it will either encourage or annihilate forever the artful and heartless schemes of a disorganizing juncto and their duped adherents.' It was a contest between two parties -- "one steadily supporting the colonial government, in the general policy of administration, and invariably upholding the connection with the Parent empire; -- the other always opposing the government, ... and treating with cold indifference the ties of union which bind the colony to Great Britain." 33

The exploitation of loyalty as an ideological weapon proved unsuccessful in 1834 and reflected the basic weakness of the Tory position; but the Tories were not deterred and they continued to attack the disloyalty of their opponents. By 1836, moreover, they had the support of a powerful and vocal ally, the Lieutenant Governor; Sir Francis Bond Head. Although Head had dismissed his Council over the question of responsibility, he interpreted the subsequent election as a contest between monarchy and republicanism. The election marked the final opportunity
to maintain the British character of the province and check its drift
towards republicanism; the contest was a "moral war ... between those
who were for British institutions, against those who were for soiling the
empire by the introduction of democracy." Head concluded that if he did
not overpower "Democracy ..., it would overpower me." 34

Head also realized that he had to crush the radicals before they
gained more strength. The existence of factious opposition disturbed
both the political tranquillity and the material progress of the province;
as a result, the insecurities of the population about their future were
increased and their doubts about the benefits of the imperial connection
were fed. Head was determined to prove the strength of the government
and reinforce the loyalty of the people; he wrote to the Colonial Office:

... as long as the people in the remote
Districts are allowed to believe that the
Government of this Province feels itself
insecure, so long will they be led to attach
themselves to whatever they conceive has
Stability and Strength, but if their own
Interests be appealed to, if they find that
we are anxious to infuse among them Capital
and Population (both of which they ardently
desire), and that nothing but Dissension
prevents it, they will, I firmly believe,
very quickly correct for themselves the
greatest of all their Grievances, namely a
Factious Opposition to the British
Government. 35

The Lieutenant Governor also believed that he had a vast reservoir
of loyal support upon which he could draw. He declared that: "The people
of Upper Canada detest democracy; they revere their Constitutional Charter,
and are consequently staunch in their allegiance to their King."
Therefore, if they "were disposed to join heart and hand with me, in
loyally promoting the peace and prosperity of the Province, they shall
find me faithfully devoted to their service. In the mean while I will
carefully guard the Constitution of the country."36

Sir Francis Bond Head became the rallying point for the Tories in 1836; he symbolized both the authority of the Crown and the strength of the imperial connection. The Patriot, for example, suggested: "If there be on earth, a condition supereminently enviable, it is that of a Governor, feeling the wants and imagining the good, of the beings he is set over in authority." The people of Upper Canada were prepared to support the Governor because he represented the link between the province and the mother country. A political meeting in Lanark resolved, in 1836, that:

... as subjects of the British Crown and BORN on the BRITISH SOIL, we hold it the first of our constitutional duties to preserve inviolate the rights and prerogatives of our Sovereign, as well as to watch for the liberties of the subject and on all occasions to strengthen the link of connection with our Mother Country ... 37

By the time of the loyalty election of 1836, therefore, several themes which had shaped Tory assumptions had been drawn together, and were crystallized. To the Tory, loyalty was not just a set of attitudes; it had become the central, indeed the only, political issue. As a consequence, the population of Upper Canada had been polarized -- the loyal forces were to be maintained and strengthened, while the disloyal elements had to be eliminated from the political spectrum. The overwhelming Tory victory in 1836 seemed to confirm the strength of loyal forces in the province. The Toronto Albion noted that the success of the Tories was due to: "the appeal made to the people by our excellent Lieutenant Governor, (which) has been responded to with becoming spirit and patriotism." The Patriot stated that the Upper Canadian had been
summoned "to the support of his King and Constitution, and to the defence of all that is dear to him in life ...." John Neilson, the editor of the Quebec Gazette, who had broken with Papineau over the same issue, observed the results as an outsider:

The inhabitants of Upper Canada have nobly vindicated the character of loyalty which they acquired during the last war .... They have repudiated the connection which their representatives had formed with the disaffected in Lower Canada, and disavowed the coalition of Bidwell, Perry, McKenzie & Co. with Roebuck, Papineau & Co., against the rights of the British Crown, the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, and the connection of the North American colonies with the United Kingdom .... They adhere to the constitution as by law established, to their ancient loyalty and the countries of their birth or of their ancestors ....

The conduct of the people of Upper Canada, on this occasion, shews that there is no danger in their enjoying the freedom of the British constitution.38

Tory appeals to loyalty apparently made a deep impression upon the population of the province. But Head also appealed directly to the economic interests of the settlers. In a reply to the inhabitants of the Newcastle District, the Lieutenant Governor warned Upper Canadians that "if you choose to dispute with me you will, to use a homely phrase, only quarrel with your own bread and butter."39 His decision to stop supplies, thereby cutting off support for public works during the summer of 1836, created tremendous discontent. Head, moreover, was prepared to use his government's powers of patronage to ensure the loyalty of the population at this critical time; for example, since their arrival in Lanark in 1818, the Scottish settlers had demanded the settlement of claims to cover the expenses incurred while emigrating. The threat of a
massive emigration of this loyal community to the United States in 1836 prompted the government to make an award of 22,000 pounds sterling shortly before the election. The Scots were praised as "a class of persons who, though hitherto unsuccessful as agriculturalists, are represented to be universally industrious, temperate and moral, and faithfully attached to the British Government." Coincidentally, Lanark returned a Tory candidate in the election. 40

Yet their success in 1836 was also the result of the ability of the Tories to construct a broad coalition of conservative groups in support of the Governor. 41 Included within this coalition were two important political groupings -- moderate Tories and some former supporters of moderate Reform. A moderate Tory, according to the Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, was devotedly attached to the Government, "but is wedded to no abuses, and wishes to improve the condition of the people without encroaching upon the prerogatives of the Crown." The Reformers "in general men of good sense and commendable enterprise" were "anxious to extend the power of the people, and wish to a great extent the privilege of ruling themselves without the interference of the Home Government." Although they had been linked with the radicals in the past because of "their zeal for improvement," they were left with no alternative but to support the administration when loyalty became the central issue. 42 The emergence of these moderates was one of the most important political developments of the 1830's.

Moderate Toryism also broadened the conservative ideology of Upper Canada by contributing new ingredients to the concept of loyalty. Loyalty became more accommodating, for example, as moderates began to resist the exclusive claims of the Anglican Church. They tempered their
acceptance of a social hierarchy with a belief that Upper Canada offered equality of condition and thus the society could assimilate new settlers; they also accepted the belief that loyalty could be demonstrated through respectability. In short, the moderate Tories had adopted some of the ideas about loyalty articulated by their old moderate Reform opponents.

Political observers in the 1830's had noted the existence of different groups among the supporters of the government when they commented upon the lack of unity among Tories in the Assembly. The Patriot, for example, lamented the inability of "the administration party" to dominate the legislature between 1830 and 1834; they "have no acknowledged leader — no mutual understanding — and no common or uniform system of action ...." On questions of Church establishment and control of education, the High Tory policy of Anglican exclusiveness was unacceptable to dissident Tories, like William Morris, a Presbyterian from Perth. Moderates first settled on the idea of "Christian establishment" which would see the proceeds from the sale of the Clergy Reserves divided among all religious denominations, and then, on state-aided education. The official position on other issues, such as the principle of primogeniture, banking legislation and internal improvements was also challenged by Tories in the Assembly.

Moderate Toryism had appeared in the legislature as early as 1816 when Robert Nichol criticized the administration for its failure to settle claims for war losses. Robert Nichol did not envision an idealized, British community developing in Upper Canada; Nichol recognized the "great dissimilarity" between the Province and the mother country. By the 1830's, the nature of these differences was assessed in more depth;
moderates began to outline the importance of the formative impact of the North American environment upon the provincial society. There was a limited acceptance of the concept of equality of condition in Upper Canada. In a pamphlet written by an anonymous "J.K.", it was suggested that: "The inequalities of condition and wealth,—the characteristics of an old and densely populated country,—are not as yet known in Upper Canada." This theme was illustrated at some length:

The humblest and most uneducated labourer who emigrates to this Province from the Mother country, is able, by the honest sweat of his brow, to raise himself to the rank of an independent farmer in the course of a very few years. From the renter of a cottage, and the possessor of a single pig, he is converted into the master of two hundred acres, of a comfortable dwelling, barns, cattle, and horses. Instead of a smock-frock he wears the finest broadcloth. His English meal of potatoes, rarely diversified by a piece of meat, is here succeeded by the varied produce of the farm... (He) enjoys the solid sweets of Canadian independence blended with the loveliness of his native spot. If he be a man with natural powers at all above the common, the House of Assembly and Legislative Council are open to his ambition.46

It was as a land of opportunity that Upper Canada could lay claim to the loyalty of its inhabitants.

Some moderate Tories even adopted the Reform belief that loyalty could develop naturally through the harsh process of settlement in the community; Tory loyalty became more assimilative. The Loyalist, for example, reprinted an article entitled "The Love of Country" which stated:

...the love of country (may) be styled the universal sentiment..., for there is no region where humanity can exist, that it is not found to flourish ... It even appears to grow more intense in proportion as a
country labours under natural disadvantages; but the reason is, that where physical circumstances make it difficult for man to sustain his existence, the dangers, the toil, and the incessant activity of rude enterprise, which occupy and support life, produce hardship of mind and body, which give to all the affections a more decisive energy than they can have where greater opportunities of repose and luxurious enjoyment soften down the human character. ... 47

Although Upper Canada offered everything required by its inhabitants, it remained a society threatened from both within and without. These natural disadvantages could be overcome by building up the provincial community; the process of settlement, moreover, required a commitment to the land. It strengthened "the love of country" and thus reinforced loyalty.

Yet the moderate Tory did not believe that all settlers could share this sentiment; while the definition of the loyal subject was broadened, it remained more exclusive than that of the Reformers. The "patriot passion" was more intense "in the boisterous and inclement regions of the north." 48 Therefore, in Upper Canada, loyalty could be restricted to "English, Scotch, and Irish Emigrants, together with the descendants of the U.E. Loyalists ...." The belief that recent British immigrants were more loyal than other groups in the society was noted by observers like Patrick Shirreff, who wrote as a result of his tour through North America in 1835:

A feeling of toil pervaded most people in the Canadas, ... more especially those lately arrived from Britain. Whig and Radical in the mother country, after becoming possessed of a few acres of forest in Canada, seem to consider themselves part of the aristocracy, and speak with horror of the people and liberality. 49

Loyalty was not automatically confirmed by the processes of immigration
from Great Britain and settlement in Upper Canada. It still had to be earned — loyalty had to be demonstrated by respectability.

This problem proved to be particularly acute for the Orange Order, which asserted its loyalty but had to establish its legitimacy in the 1830's before it could earn a place in the Tory coalition. After 1815, there was massive British immigration to Upper Canada, of which perhaps some sixty percent were of Irish origin. Protestant Irish were more likely to settle on the land and in the province than Roman Catholics and it is estimated that three-eighths of Ontarians were of Protestant Irish stock by the time of Confederation. Some of these Irish immigrants were Orangemen, and during the 1820's, a couple of lodges were established in eastern Upper Canada, in Huntley Township and at Perth. Almost immediately there was an outcry from the small Irish Roman Catholic population which appealed to Sir Peregrine Maitland, the Lieutenant Governor, "to put an end forever to party feeling and distinctions grounded upon religious differences in this country." Many of the old inhabitants of the province were also apprehensive about the growth of the Orange Order; they wanted no part of imported Irish quarrels reflected by the turmoil of the 1790's. Christopher Hagerman, a Tory of Loyalist background, declared: "In this country differences of religion imposed no political distinction, Protestant and Catholic were justly and happily entitled to the same privileges; to encourage degrading distinctions, therefore, was impolitic and unjust." Upper Canadians feared that the Orange Order was a party which would unnecessarily divide the population and so disturb social harmony. W. W. Baldwin, an Irishman himself, rejected attempts to label the Roman Catholics in the province as disloyal; he asserted that:
... the loyalty of all classes of people in this country was undoubted — and why make division when there was no difference — there was no necessity for parties of this kind — when the people of the Province were lately called on to defend it, there were no different feelings — all classes united heart and head in the general defence of the country ....53

John Macaulay and eight other justices of the peace from the Kingston area echoed Baldwin’s complaint seven years later; they rejected the argument that:

... any class of their Protestant brethren should ever have deemed it advisable to transfer to this happy portion of the British Empire, public exhibitions commemorative of the ascendancy of one religious body over another or societies assuming a higher degree of loyalty than their brethren of another faith.54

While the Orange Order represented a threat to political tranquility, it also was not respectable; the Brockville Gazette pointed out that "the most enlightened and influential individuals in the community" were not Orangemen. The lodges were generally composed of Irish immigrants "of the opposition description" who displayed "less discretion and moderation."55 Therefore, the Orange Order lacked social respectability as well as political legitimacy.

The attempts to overcome these disabilities were directed by Ogle Gowan, a Protestant Irishman from County Wexford who immigrated to Leeds County in 1829. Gowan, who had been active in the Orange movement in Ireland, established the Grand Orange Lodge of British America on January 1, 1830 and was installed as the Grand Master. Although the organization was formed to support "the principles and practice of the Protestant Religion," Gowan began to temper the society's religious exclusiveness in favour of its loyalty; its purpose was "to maintain the
Laws and Constitution off (sic) the country. This approach had been advocated earlier by "A Subject" in a letter to the Brockville Gazette who believed that there was some necessity for an organization dedicated to strengthening loyal sentiment in the province:

I could never see the necessity of their (the Orange Lodges') establishment here, while their only effect was annoyance to the feelings of the Roman Catholics. They are not necessary, most certainly, to secure the State from Popish ascendency in this Province, but in another respect they may now, perhaps, be eminently useful; inasmuch, as they tend to encourage and cherish a feeling of loyalty and attachment to our King and Constitution, and may, perhaps, at some future day, be the salvation of this Province from Republicanism ...

By 1832, resolutions passed at the annual meeting of the Grand Orange Lodge omitted any reference to Protestant exclusiveness; the society became a political organization dedicated to the ascendency of British principles and the permanence of the imperial connection "against the traitorous and wily machinations and schemes of a pack of united Democrats, headed by Messrs. Ryerson, Bidwell and McKenzie ...".

Gowan also began to publish his own journal, The Antidote in the same year; he articulated a conservative conception of loyalty which reflected many Upper Canadian Tory attitudes. Gowan believed, for example, that because of the economic and military weakness of the province, combined with its proximity to the United States, the continued existence of Upper Canada could only be maintained within the imperial context. The province would be forever dependent upon the mother country:

We, by no means, assent to the proposition that the Canadas must necessarily, in process of time, be separated (sic) from Great Britain; ... on the very contrary, we hold, that every successive year, tend (sic) to knit us more
closely together; for as the resources of
the Colony are developed, the absolute
necessity of an intimate connexion with
and dependance (sic) on, England, becomes
more and more apparent.

What other nation would buy our grain?
Where is our lumber to be disposed of? and
even if we were independent (!!!) what
country are we to look to for protection
from our powerful and ambitious neighbours?...

We are debarred from access to the sea, for
five months in the year, and in the event
of invasion have nothing but the rigors of
our climate to look to for protection.

Gowan's perception was totally colonial; the British connection defined
the province's status -- "The fact is," he wrote: "we have not the
requisites of nationality, and, therefore, cannot obtain it .... The
idea of a Canadian nation ... is ... preposterous ...."59

Gowan also argued that loyalty required adherence to the idea of
a stable, hierarchical society reflecting constitutional balance. This
social model was threatened by republican principles imported from the
United States; when "the people arrogate to themselves all power, ...
(they) oppress and injure the rest of the community."60 Prominent
Reformers -- especially Mackenzie, Bidwell and Ryerson -- were attacked
because they "were exerting every nerve, and taking advantage of, every
opportunity, to infuse into the minds of the lower orders, the most
preposterous notions, and the most treasonable ideas." Republican agita-
tors disturbed the idyllic harmony shaped by British principles when they
mised the people into believing that they "should govern themselves.
That they are deluded and misled by men in authority, that the standard
of Democracy should be raised upon the ruins of Aristocracy; that the
title of 'Excellency' applied to any man, violates the darling principle
of equality ...." The activities of these grievance-mongering demagogues,
spreading their revolutionary rhetoric, were supported by "almost all the American rabble that have settled amongst us."\(^{61}\) Thus, Gowan was drawing upon traditional Tory arguments to establish the political legitimacy of the Orange Irish. It was no longer Roman Catholicism but rather republicanism which posed the gravest threat to social order and political tranquillity in the province. Gowan's ideas were defined to ensure that Orange loyalty could be incorporated within the dominant conservative consensus shaping the political culture of Upper Canada.

But, during the early 1830's, Gowan's efforts were hampered by his belief that the Irish immigrants had to be protected from the majority of native Upper Canadians. Consequently, loyalty also became the means to reinforce the immigrant identity, and it was a political wedge with which the Orange Irish could meet their socio-political demands.\(^{62}\) Gowan hoped to divide the population into two camps, using birthplace as the main criterion. In 1830, for example, he ran as an independent immigrant candidate, after he had been rejected by the Reformers in Leeds County. The recent immigrants in the area were praised for their devotion to the British Constitution, while native Upper Canadians were attacked for their "apathy, indecision, and disloyalty."\(^{63}\)

Gowan continually pointed out instances of "native prejudice" directed against the immigrants. Marshall Spring Bidwell, for instance, was labelled as disloyal when he accused the British Government of shipping pauper emigrants to the province; a Mr. Keele, an English attorney, was the victim of "monstrous" treatment because he was required to apprentice for five years with an Upper Canadian lawyer.\(^{64}\) Like many conservatives, Gowan made no distinctions among his political opponents, either Reformer or Tory. In reference to the Keele petition, he attacked Christopher
Hagerman, the Solicitor-General, because Hagerman spoke against English attorneys practicing in the province. The Solicitor-General "... considered it no hardship to exclude Lawyers from a FOREIGN COUNTRY!!" Allan N. MacNab was also criticized because he stated that "... it is not reasonable that this Province should be open to a FOREIGN LAWYER!!"

Gowan's response was sharp: ":... has it come to this! Are we in a British colony?..." This "Yankee impudence" would not be tolerated, and the Irish immigrants were assured: "We can never forget the writings of McKenzie, ... and Ryerson, and the speeches of Bidwell, Hagerman and Boulton. Their language needs no explanation." 65

The exclusiveness of Tory loyalty was also attacked in The Antidote; political appointments and land grants were monopolized by the descendants of the Loyalists at the expense of the Irish immigrants. In a letter to the newspaper, "Hibernicus" noted that the sacrifices made by the Loyalists "entitled them to lasting gratitude and ample remuneration."

But, he asked:

... have they not been amply remunerated? Has not the entire province (sic) been placed under their feet? Judgeships, Colonelscies, Sherifvalties, magistracies, all offices were in them, or whosoever they wished. -- The first situations in this Province -- Mill-seats (sic) and town seats were given to reward their loyalty, and to command their interests ....

Interest, not worth, was the sole recommendation to office. They accumulated thousands of acres of the best, and most advantageously situated lands, which they suffered to be waste and uncultivated, till the axe of the hardy emigrant, who purchased it at double price, rendered them valuable.

Gowan believed that the immigrants were perhaps more deserving of rewards because they were "... the true fountains, from which sprang the streams and rivulets of British ascendancy and British feeling (as contra-
distinguished from Canadian). Orànge loyalty was thus more accommodative than that of the Tory; the definition of the loyal subject was broadened to include the immigrant, who was to be the foundation of loyalty in the province.

There was a backlash to Gowan's attempts to polarize the population according to birthplace. "A Native of Upper Canada" protested Gowan's attempts to create an immigrant party; such a development was unjust because it casts the natives of the country into the shade, and seems to class us with the anti-British faction; while all the old country born stand in the opposite light. This were doubly unjust, for not only are all the natives not revolutionists, but some of the very worst of the faction are of British birth and education.

He concluded that "principles -- and not country or birthplace should divide the population." Gowan also found that Irish candidates were unable to win an election on immigrant support alone; as a result, he moderated his position in an effort to attract other conservative groups. By 1833, he was no longer simply a defender of the Irish.

Gowan persisted in exploiting loyalty to achieve his goals; he wrote: "We shall continue to fight under BRITISH COLOURS, and to unite, all the British population under the same Ensigns: -- Country or Religious causes no difference with us, in the grand struggle." But Gowan had accepted the Tory interpretation of developments -- the electorate was no longer to be divided according to place of birth, but between loyal and disloyal groups. The Reformers, who represented both republican and anti-immigrant sentiment, became the focus of Orange opposition. The Irish had been drawn into the coalition of conservative groups which dominated the politics of the province; Gowan was prepared to support the Tories because they were "ready and willing to counteract the
organised system of anti-British feeling that unquestionably prevails." 71

The Orange Irish were also attracted to Toryism because it seemed to confer the respectability which the immigrants lacked. Samuel Thompson, who immigrated to the province in 1832 and later edited the Orange journal, the Toronto Herald, wrote in his reminiscences that he supported "... the Conservative side of Canadian party politics, in which I found so many of the solid, respectable, well-to-do citizens of Toronto ...." 72 Ogle Gowan also commented on the desire for political legitimacy; he expressed disappointment that while the Orange Order possessed "the full confidence of His Excellency the Governor, and the Executive, ... (we) have not a vast number of the Gentlemen & Clergy in the Province enrolled in our ranks ...." 73 Gowan's prospects did improve by the mid-1830's -- he gained a strong measure of political respectability when his Tory running-mate in 1834 was the new Attorney General, Robert Jameson, and both were elected for Leeds. In 1836, Gowan was paired with Jonas Jones, a member of the local elite and again, both Tories were returned after Head's 'loyalty' campaign. 74

Although he had been unable to create an immigrant party which would allow him to dominate local politics, Gowan was drawn into a political alliance with the Tories for ideological, as well as practical, reasons. Orange spokesmen, like Gowan, accepted without question fundamental Tory assumptions about the importance of the imperial connection and the threat of republicanism to the British character of the province. But Orange loyalty was, in its principal object, the reverse of Tory exclusiveness: it was by claiming loyalty that Irish immigrants sought title to participate fully in the society of Upper Canada. Unless the concept of loyalty was assimilative and could be demonstrated by the
achievement of respectability, it could not provide the Irish immigrants with the entrée that they sought. They were therefore attracted to a concept which broadened the definition of the loyal subject, and to assumptions which drew them into the coalition of moderate Tories.

It has been suggested that the Torpes accepted the Orange Order out of political necessity; they exploited the loyalty of the Irish immigrants to defeat their Reform opponents in 1836. S. R. Mealing has hypothesized that "the lines of communication and patronage which linked local Tories to Toronto were increasingly ineffective in the face of the heavy British immigration of the 1830's, and increasingly inaccessible to the members of that group who aspired to political activity. Swamped with this human flood, and resented by those whose ambitions it blocked, the Tory system was in fact crumbling and could only save itself by falling back on inflammatory appeals to loyalty."75

The latent weakness of their political system intensified the exclusiveness that the Tory elite attached to loyalty; it required the unquestioning acceptance of the leadership of that elite and of its assessment of events. The elections of 1836 seemed to confirm that the electorate of the province equated opposition with disloyalty; MacKenzie's rebellion in early December 1837 seemed to confirm the equation of disloyalty with republican subversion. Thomas Rolph wrote to the Hamilton Gazette that: "... it was not reform which they sought, but subversion, and the transfer of the Government to them. Notwithstanding their repeated assertions that they were loyal, ... we discovered that their actions invariably belied their professions ...."76 Chief Justice John Beverley Robinson believed that the rebels were simply selfish and discontented — they should have left the province rather than attempt to
overthrow the government. The radicals had

... too long and unreservedly indulged in a
ingning of envy and hatred towards your rulers
-- which was sure to undermine every just and
generous sentiment, and to lead in the end to
the ruin of your happiness and peace .... 77

The Tories also believed that the response to the rebellion proved
the loyalty of the provincial population; the disaffected comprised a
very small element. Egerton Ryerson said that the uprising revealed a
"universal substratum of loyalty to law and order; the country at large
was loyal to the heart's core ...." 78 Not all the inhabitants responded
loyally though; the traditional Tory suspicion of the American settlers
was reinforced. It was reported that the character of the rebels could
be seen "in the Hiram, the Elijah and innumerable other scriptural names;
we have without further inquiry, sufficient evidence that the disaffected
of the country were principally Americans or descendants of Americans." 79

R. B. Sullivan, in his "Report on the State of the Province", which was
presented to the new Lieutenant Governor, Sir George Arthur, wrote that
the American settlers were

... orderly quiet and orderly, as many of
them are at present but they never had as a
basis an active principle of loyalty or
attachment to England ....

(1) It is not surprising to find The American
settlers and their Children taking the side
in Politics which tended most towards their
favourite republican institutions. 80

Although the rebellion strengthened Tory beliefs that opposition
was disloyal; the flight of Mackenzie and Duncombe and the execution of
Lount and Matthews appeared to purge the province of its dissidents. As
a result, Upper Canada could develop as a model British society which
required no changes. The Kingston Chronicle and Gazette addressed an
editorial to the residents of the United States:

... we never wished your help to detach us from the Mother Country -- to take us from the British Constitution ... -- we tell you ... that nine-tenths of our population prefer the form of government we have to yours -- we tell you that we are not an ill-governed or oppressed people, we are almost wholly free from taxation, we enjoy FULL, FREE and PERFECT LIBERTY.

R. B. Sullivan was more succinct: "So long as the Queens (sic) Government are sincerely desirous of doing justice to the Colonies there seems little occasion for organic changes."81

Consequently, by 1838, the Tories looked to the loyal responses of the Upper Canadian population as proof that their view of the nature of the community and the interpretation of its loyal subject were generally accepted. The Kingston Chronicle and Gazette believed that the future of the province was settled: "Democracy which has so proudly reared its head, ... has been weighed in the balance and found wanting."83 The polarization of politics in the period had crystallized the clearly defined assumptions about loyalty; it excluded the legitimacy of dissent -- the belief that opposition was radical and subversive was confirmed. Moreover, Tory beliefs about Upper Canada as a special Loyalist society dependent upon the imperial connection were not shaken.

While the Tories had framed the debate and simplified politics to a choice between loyalty and disloyalty, the 1830's did produce a broadening of the conservative consensus in the province. The breakdown of the High Tory system and the emergence of moderate Toryism added new ideas to the concept of loyalty. As new groups, such as the Methodists and the Orange Order, were incorporated into the Tory coalition, the definition of the loyal subject also broadened. Loyalty remained a
necessity for social as well as for political acceptance; even W. M. Harvard, the chairman of the Methodist Conference, wrote:

... should any person apply hereafter for admission into our church who may be ill-affected to the Crown under which we live ... tell him kindly but firmly that it is a commodity we do not deal in --- that he has applied at the wrong door. 83

But the concept did become more accommodative; loyalty no longer had to be earned through attachment to the Loyalist tradition or through acceptance into the Tory elite. Loyalty was strengthened by social or political respectability. "The love of country" could also develop through the commitment to the land acquired through the process of settlement. Moderate Reform beliefs about the nature of loyalty had become part of the conservative mind.

Moderate Tories also developed a more provincial outlook. Political events of the 1830's had shaken their faith in the British government to some extent and tempered their unquestioning acceptance of the imperial connection. Moderate Toryism could envision a distinct Upper Canadian community within a larger imperial framework. An ideological gulf had thus developed between the formal spokesmen of the central Compact and the moderate body of their political supporters. That gulf was the opportunity for an accommodation between moderate Tories and moderate Reformers, once the emotional atmosphere of the rebellion had passed.
FOOTNOTES


2. Upper Canada Herald, December 1, 1835.

Tory fears about the advance of democracy were directly related to their pessimism about the nature of man. The Herald argued that "a great majority of men are ignorant and more or less wicked." Democracy was really "mobocracy" and presented the threat of tyranny of the majority. The Herald continued:

If there is any principle more absurd than another in much of modern legislation, it is the principle that political questions are to be decided by mere numbers; for it assumes that all men are in every respect equal .... With the liberals a man whose mind is but one remove from idiocy, is as competent to legislate as a Newton would be. ... Wonderful discovery of modern liberalism! quantity is everything -- quality nothing!

Letters and editorials in the Kingston Chronicle and Gazette reflected the same attitudes. For example, a letter from "Pitt" criticizing the idea of an elective council reflected a marked distrust of the people. The concept of equality was rejected most explicitly in an editorial of June 13, 1835.


3. The Patriot, October 24, 1834; The Upper Canada Herald, June 28, 1836.

4. PAC Pamphlets, Declarations of the Views and Objects of the British Constitutional Society, on its Reorganization (Toronto, 1836), p. 3.

5. Hamilton Gazette, June 8, 1836. See also Niagara Cleaner, September 8, 1828.

Although loyalty was defined in terms of the material benefits of the imperial connection, there were occasional conflicts between loyalty and economic self-interest. John Baldwin, a York merchant, found that he could buy cheaper and better quality goods in the United States than from England. "He then faced the dilemma of being either politically disloyal or economically immoral."

Upper Canada Herald, April 5, 1836; Ibid., April 19, 1836.

In an editorial written two years earlier, the Kingston Chronicle and Gazette (April 15, 1834) had expressed the same sentiments. The central question was: "can a colony be independent?"; the Tory journal answered explicitly that the mother country would always have an interest in Upper Canada.

See also Niagara Gleaner, April 5, 1832; "Address to King William IV from the Inhabitants of Niagara".

PAC Pamphlets, Speech of C. A. Hagerman ... against the adoption of the Select Committee on the subject of the differences between His Excellency and the Executive Council. (April 18, 1836) (Toronto, 1836).

The Patriot, June 3, 1836.

The Patriot, October 23, 1832; The Antidote, February 19, 1833.

The Patriot, March 6, 1832; Upper Canada Herald, April 19, 1836. See also Ibid., November 27, 1839; Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, June 29, 1833.

PAC Pamphlets, Declaration of the Views and Objects of the British Constitutional Society, on its Reorganization (Toronto, 1836), p. 4.

Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, April 9, 1835. See also Gore Gazette, March 3, 1827.


The Patriot, June 7, 1836; W. H. Draper's address "To the Electors of the City of Toronto". See also St. Catharines Journal, June 2, 1836; address of William Rykert.

PAC Adiel Sherwood Papers, "Address of the Electors of the Johnstown District" to the Lieutenant Governor (May 24, 1836).


Wise suggests that "the seeds of a separate nationalism were implicit in the Upper Canadian Tory's approach to the economic
problems involved in public improvements, trade and banking ...." Support for the Welland Canal, as "a national concern," reflected the belief that such projects had not only an economic impact, but "political, social and cultural contexts as well." (Ibid., p. 30).

He has also shown that the Tories were able to erect a provincial political system "based upon the alliance of the central bureaucracy with regional power groups." The responsiveness of this coalition to local needs ensured its "considerable electoral success. As a result, it was able to break down the particularism of its supporters and ultimately to generate a provincial mentality."

(Wise, "Conservatism and Political Development", p. 241, see also his "Upper Canada and the Conservative Tradition", pp. 23-28).

16 Courier of Upper Canada, May 1, 1833.

17 CO42, Vol. 454, Address to her Majesty, on the State of the Province; J. Robinson, Speaker for Legislative Council, February 28, 1838, cited in Cook, p. 91.

Even John Strachan occasionally questioned the actions of the mother country. In 1828, he believed that Britain had been taken over by a "false liberality"; a "House of Commons report on British North American affairs would "do great mischief in all Colonies -- its tendency is to prostrate everything British -- to nourish discontent -- to depress the Friends of Good Government and to strengthen levellers and Democrats."


18 In an address delivered at a town meeting in Kingston in 1832, J. S. Cartwright, the son of the Loyalist merchant, Richard Cartwright, explored this theme:

... The American Loyalists, a set of gallant men, many of whom, were the greatest Landholders in the United States -- Excuse me sir for exhibiting any feeling at the mention of these noble Britons, it may be that they are, considered as foolish, and visionary enthusiasts in the cause of loyalty .... They contended for the constitution, and the rights of the Crown -- they had been taught to regard the supremacy of Parliament as co-extensive with the British dominions; and they hazarded their lives and fortunes, in attempting to put down Rebellion and preserve the unity of the Empire ....
(They chose) to find a home in the wilderness under the sanction, and protection of their Sovereign, than remain citizens of a nation whom they regarded as Rebels.

(The Patriot, March 13, 1832).

19. Upper Canada Herald, June 13, 1837; Ibid., June 20, 1837.

John Beverley Robinson, in his Canada and the Canada Bill (1840), expressed the same sentiments. The feelings of the Loyalists, he wrote, "sprang from a pure source. Their loyalty was sincere for it led to the sacrifice of property, of country, of kindred, and friends." Cited in C. W. Robinson, Life of Sir John Beverley Robinson (Toronto, 1904), p. 193.

This loyalty was confirmed during the War of 1812 when Upper Canadians defended the province "fighting under the immortal Brock". (Niagara Gleaner, April 7, 1832; see also, The Patriot, November 25, 1836).

Some Tories not only stressed the Loyalist tradition, but argued that the Loyalists and their descendants were the natural leaders of the society; Christopher Hagerman said: "we have a priority of right as the earliest settlers of the country." (In Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, February 3, 1836).


21. PAC, Adiel Sherwood Papers, "Address of the Electors of the Johnstown District" to the Lieutenant Governor (May 24, 1836).


Editorials and letters to the newspapers were continually asking Upper Canadians to "examine the reasons for their opposition to the government." For example, George Gurnett, editor of the Gore Gazette asked (August 30, 1828): "... (when) the people of no country in the universe, enjoy a greater share of practical freedom, political & religious — are more lightly taxes by the Government -- or who are more prosperous and happy -- we are naturally led to inquire ... (why) a people acknowledgedly possessing greater privileges under their Government, than are enjoyed by any other, should in fact be opposed to that Government."

"Hibernicus" asked the "Inhabitants of Upper Canada":

... of what do you complain? How do you feel oppressed or aggrieved? Are you loaded with taxes, are you labouring under excessive burthens of rent or tythes? Are you called upon to support a ministry of which you are not members? Are the laws partially or corruptly administered? Are
your roads neglected? or your produce when brought to market deteriorated in value by tolls or customs? ... No!

... (Y)our soil is productive, your markets are steady, your religion is tolerated, your children are educated, the commodities of life are given to you at a price little above the English markets; why then comply with the interests of a self interested faction?

(Kingston Chronicle, March 17, 1832). See also Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, March 3, 1838.

23 Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, April 9, 1836.

24 Upper Canada Herald, June 20, 1837. See also The Patriot, October 24, 1834.

George Gurnett believed that in Upper Canada, there were "a few desperate political adventurers, who are playing a deep game for the promotion of their own ambitious projects -- by exciting a prejudice against the Government and by representing the persons composing the Government in as odious a light as possible."

(Gore Gazette, August 30, 1828).

The Kingston Chronicle printed a letter from "O.P.Q." which condemned the motives of the administration's opponents:

That portion of the community in Upper Canada, who seek to create vague and unfounded dissatisfaction in the Province, may certainly claim the merit of the most singular perversity and opiniativeness: -- and their existence can be accounted for by the individuals concerned, being instigated by those base and obstinate degrees of malevolent envy which always attend a sense of inferiority and a self-reproaching feeling of incapacity, when these are united with an inordinate desire of distinction and an avaricious ambition. (July 30, 1831).

See also the Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, June 29, 1833.


27. The Patriot, October 23, 1832; see other examples, Kingston Chronicle, March 10 and March 31, 1832, and letters from "An Anglo-Canadian" (March 24, 1832) and "Hibernicus" (March 31, 1832); Niagara Cleaner, November 17, 1832, letter on "Party Spirit".

In an address to the electors of Frontenac, Robert Drummond stated: "I am not a party man; I deprecate party spirit; and should you do me the favor to elect me, I shall regard your interests and the interests of the Province, as the sole end and aim of my political career." (Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, July 26; 1834).

28. Gore Gazette, December 13, 1828, see also U.E. Loyalist, November 17, December 1, 29, 1827; and a letter from "An Elector" in the Cornwall Observer, April 18, 1834; and The Patriot, February 21, 1832.

These perceptions gained currency in the conservative mentality of the population. By 1832, addresses to the King contained attacks on the "insidious and crafty politicians ... who are aiming at the utter subversion of every British principle and feeling." (Kingston Chronicle, March 3, 1832; "An Address of the Inhabitants of Cobourg to the King". A Petition from the inhabitants of Kingston in the same issue developed similar themes).

29. The Patriot, September 19, 1834; Charles Fothergill's electoral address Hamilton Gazette, May 18, 1833; "Tiger" Dunlop roared out the same sentiments in his electoral address in 1836:

The present is no time for half measures, while a body of worthless and unprincipled demagogues are driving on their ignorant and deluded followers to involve this peaceful and happy country in anarchy, confusion, and bloodshed, to separate us from the fostering care of the Mother Country, to deprive us of the rational freedom we enjoy under equal and just laws, to injure our liberties and deteriorate our properties ....

(The Patriot, June 14, 1836; see also the expression of similar sentiments in the Niagara Cleaner, April 7, 1832 and the Courier of Upper Canada, January 22, 1835.


Tory attitudes were also reflected by Duncan Cameron, a retired British military officer, who had settled in York Mills in 1836. He wrote to Joseph Gordon in Edinburgh:
... the improvement throughout the country is going on as fast as possible, but radical Yankees and other evil-disposed people have been very busy endeavouring to agitate and poison the mind of the people against the Government, and against everything which tend to the welfare and prosperity of the country, but I think those evil agitators have gone the length of their tether.

(Cameron to Gordon, May 20, 1836; in T. W. L. MacDermot, "Some Opinions of a Tory in the 1830's", in Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 11 (1930), 233.

Core Gazette, December 13, 1828.


Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, September 20, 1834. See also Ibid., June 13, 1835, and a letter from "A Good Subject" in The Patriot, July 29, 1834.


PAC, Adiel Sherwood Papers, Sir Francis Bond Head's "Reply to the Electors of the Home District", (May 28, 1836); and Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, April 27, 1836.

The Patriot, July 26, 1833; Bathurst Courier, May 6, 1836. See also PAC, Adiel Sherwood Papers, Jonas Jones "To the Electors of the County of Leeds", (June 14, 1836).

Similar sentiments about the symbolic role of the Governor were expressed in England; for example, Thomas Carlyle articulated the concept of the hero-governor as an alternative to democracy. (Cf. Walter B. Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830-1870 (New Haven, 1967), p. 329).

All editorials were printed in the Cornwall Observer, August 23, 1836.

Correspondent and Advocate, June 8, 1836.
Cf. Perth Courier, June 24, 1836; in Andrew Haydon, Pioneer Sketches in the District of Bathurst (Toronto, 1925), p. 121.


Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, May 7, 1836.


Cf. Upper Canada, House of Assembly, Journal, 1831, pp. 94-95; March 12, 1831; Ibid., 1833-1834, p. 126 (February 24, 1834).

Upper Canada Gazette, February 15, 1821; see also Ibid., February 22, 1821.

PAC Pamphlets, "J.K.", Plain Reasons for Loyalty, Addressed to Plain People (Cobourg, 1838), pp. 2, 3.

The Loyalist, June 7, 1828.

Ibid. The idea about the superiority of the Men of the North has been analyzed most fully in Carl Berger, "The True North Strong and Free", in Peter Russell, ed., Nationalism in Canada (Toronto, 1956), pp. 3-26.

Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, May 7, 1836. Patrick Shirreff, A Tour Through North America ... (Edinburgh, 1835); quoted in Clark, p. 484.

S. D. Clark has offered the most apt analysis of the factors which produced a strong loyal response among recent immigrants:

Settlement in a new land like Upper Canada involved, immediately at least, a real social and, in many cases, even among the poorer immigrants, a cultural loss. Concern thus tended to be with restoring the ties of the past rather than with seeking the improvement of that which was of the present. The effect thus was to make the overseas immigrant an ardent patriot. He became increasingly ready to spring to the defence of the British empire, the monarchy, the established church, a system of social privilege, and all those other institutions and systems of ideas upon which the society he had known appear to have rested. (Ibid., p. 486).

For a detailed discussion of the patterns of Irish settlement and the growth of the Orange Order, see C. J. Houston and W. J. Smyth, *The Sash Canada Wore: A Historical Geography of the Orange Order in Canada* (Toronto, 1980), pp. 21-34.


W. Fraser to Sir Peregrine Maitland (1827); quoted in Kerr.


Colonel James Fitzgibbon, also of Irish origin, expressed concern about the reaction of the old inhabitants to the prospect of Irish violence in Upper Canada; he wrote:

> When the Irish Emigrants began to arrive in Canada, the old inhabitants often expressed their fears that the evils so unhappily rooted in Ireland would be transplanted into these hitherto peaceful Provinces; and I could not help participating in those fears. I was also afraid that even if party strife were not revived, individual Irishmen would be found more prone to irregular habits than the other emigrants, and such also was the general opinion in this Province.

(Upper Canada Sundries, Vol. 78; Col. James Fitzgibbon, "To the Orangemen of Cavan and Perth, June 18, 1826").

Upper Canada Sundries, J. W. Macaulay and others to Sir John Colborne, February 8, 1830.

*Brockville Gazette*, August 29, 1828.


*Brockville Gazette*, August 29, 1828.

Extract from the Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Grand Orange Lodge ...; quoted in the Cobourg *Star*, July 11, 1832.

The *Antidote*, February 12, 1833.

The *Antidote*, December 10, 1832; see also *Ibid*., February 19, 1833.
Gowan argued that republicanism facilitated mob rule; he included reports of the Nullification Crisis in South Carolina which illustrated his point; the situation was

a precious comment ... upon the "Declaration of Independence," drawn up by that arch-infidel, Paine, unanimously adopted by the thirteen rebellious provinces in Congress on the 4th July, 1776, and since adopted as the textbook by every radical revolutionist who has annoyed the Christian world from that period to the present. Down with Monarchy, and down with Aristocracy, and up with Democracy, and with "the Rights of the People," cry out our mobocratical leaders .... What have been the effects of democracy? It has had a fair trial, been "weighed in the balance, and found wanting." The moment "the people" get power they use it only to oppress their neighbours and to promote their own aggrandizement. "The majesty of the People," is the majesty of tyranny, their liberty, licentiousness, their power, intolerance ....

(The Antidote, February 19, 1833).

Ibid., January 15, 1833, see also January 1, 1833; Ibid., December 10, 1832; Ibid., January 22, 1833.

Gowan believed that the activities of the radicals threatened political harmony in the province because:

Every possible species of abuse is cast upon the Governor; the Sovereign which he represents, and the Imperial Executive, by which he was appointed, are held up to scorn. They (the Upper Canadians) are told that all the upper orders of society are unprincipled knaves, that the Clergy of the Established Church are plundering bigots, the(y) conscientiously believe it, and they hate them. They are told that the principle part of the taxes are levied, to furnish resources, for the dissipation and extravagance of a few officials at York, and that the greatest part of the Provincial debt, was contracted to supply the choicest viands and best wines for the tables of the Chief Justice, the Arch-deacon and others ....

They are told that the laws are oppressive, that the judges are partial, corrupt and imbecile, and they firmly believe all this.
Their hostility is directed against what they believe to be a system of unexampled oppression, knavery and corruption ....

(The Antidote, January 15, and January 22, 1833).

For a useful discussion of the problems faced by the Irish immigrants in Upper Canada, and their political responses, see Patterson, pp. 190-228.

See the Brockville Gazette, September 18, October 2, and October 30, 1830 for details of the local election.

Gowan was praised for his attempts to mould the "Europeans" into a solid political bloc and stimulate a sense of immigrant consciousness. "A Friend to Fair Play and An Enemy to canting hypocrisy" wrote:

It must be a subject truly gratifying to the feelings of every Englishman, Irishman and Scotchman, that a spirit of nationality has been aroused, and now pervades all classes of Emigrants in this Country. Thanks to Mr. Gowan, he has boldly stepped forward to point out the degradation that has been cast on the "Old Country people," to become their unpurchased and unpurchaseable advocate, and to arouse them to a just sense of their situation, the insults they have received, the neglect with which they have been treated, and their power and duty to punish such insult, and prevent such neglect. Let Europeans shake off their apathy, and the cause of justice will be complete, -- the long-drawn whimperings of "Yankee Doodle" will be exchanged for the good old National music of "God save the King."

(Brockville Gazette, October 2, 1830).

The Antidote, December 17, 1832; see also Ibid., December 10, 1832, January 15, February 19, 1833 and The Committee on Orange History, One Man's Loyalty (Toronto, 1953), p. 10. The Antidote, January 1, 1833.

Gowan was totally opposed to the development of any sense of provincial feeling or colonial identity because it could weaken the imperial connection. In an editorial on Lower Canada, he wrote that the animosity of French Canadian politicians "to Old Countrymen and their principles, is only equalled by their hatred of the Government .... They influence the people with the most absurd statements, about the "Canadian Nation", the "Canadian People," their "Church" .... They dread the introduction of British people, because they are well convinced that with them
they will carry their Religion, their Principles and their Wealth. (The Antidote, December 25, 1832).

The parallels with the situation in Upper Canada were obvious to Gowan.

The Antidote, January 1, 1833; Ibid., January 22, 1833.


The Antidote, January 29, 1833.

Cf. a letter from "A Friend to Economy" criticizing the appointment of "a Yankee engineer," (April 23, 1833); a letter from "Amicus Hibernicus" listed political appointments in Leeds County, noting the lack of English and Irish in local offices (April 30, 1833).

Ibid., January 8, 1833.

The Antidote, January 8, 1833; Cf. Ibid., March 19, 1833.

Gowan had lost his election in 1830; in 1832, G. H. Reade, an Orangeman, was defeated in a by-election; see The Antidote, December 17, 1832.

The Antidote, January 15, 1833; see also Ibid., April 16, 1833.

It was reported, for example, that the Reformers promised to come to a political meeting in Brockville in March 1833 "... no matter what might be the consequence; aye, and bring guns too! and shot (sic) those rascally Irish!! Dreadful reports were spread -- "give me but twenty men," cried one "and I'll beat the Irish out of the country ...." (The Antidote, March 19, 1833).

When the Orangemen broke up the meeting, "Hibernicus" declared that they "have gained a glorious victory....

A few years ago, I looked around and saw my fellow countrymen insulted, reviled, trampled upon, bearded from the Magisterial bench by an arrogant, puffed up Magistrate -- commanded in the Militia by boys and minions. Yes, Sir, so far was the enmity carried towards the Irish, that, in an advertisement for a servant woman, it was intimated that no Irish woman need apply. "The vote of any Irishman can be bought for a glass of whiskey," was the cry of a Parliamentary candidate .... We have now got our foot upon their necks, and they, in turn, must bite the dust. (Ibid., March 26, 1833).
The Antidote, December 10, 1832. Cf. an editorial on January 1, 1833, and Gowan's speech, January 22, 1833.


The Orange Order did attract some "respectable" support; Colonel J. Covert, a justice of the peace, wrote:

(W)hen we consider, that our constitution was assailed, the lives and property of the King's subjects in danger, our religious establishments derided and threatened, and every man of virtue and worth insulted, we naturally looked around for the best means to counteract these evils -- it was then to avert these awful evils, to maintain the integrity of the Empire -- to rescue from the sword and insurrection the families of good men, and to assist in accomplishing these hallowed purposes, that I judged it right and wise to join the Orange Society, jointly with other Magistrates and gentlemen of this Country. (The Cobourg Star, August 21, 1833).

Cf. a letter from "Presbyterian" in the Correspondent and Advocate, February 22, 1837 citing reasons for Presbyterian support of the Orange Order.

Electoral violence initiated by Gowan's Orangé Irish supporters was a factor in both elections. The election of 1834 was voided as a result of Orange intimidation of Reformers. For a more-detailed analysis of the politics of the area, see Patterson, pp. 260-287.

Patterson, Ibid., pp. 284-287; see also Wise, "Upper Canada and the Conservative Tradition", pp. 25-26; Mealing's argument is discussed in Bruce Walton, "The 1836 Election in Lennox and Addington", in Ontario History, Vol. 67 (September, 1975), 153.

Hamilton Gazette, December 26, 1837; see also The Church, May 9, 1840; and PAC Pamphlets, Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council, on the State of the Province (Toronto, 1839), p. 10.

Christian Guardian, April 4, 1838. See also PAC Pamphlets, "J.K.", Plain Reasons for Loyalty.
Egerton Ryerson, Canadian Methodism: Its Epochs and Characteristics (Toronto, 1883), p. 385; the loyalty of the population was affirmed by the administration; cf. PAC Pamphlets, Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council, pp. 10-11; See also the Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, January 10, 1838 and the Upper Canada Herald, December 19, 1837.

Conservative groups in the province seemed to use every opportunity to assert their loyalty. During the loyalty election of 1836, Head was flooded with loyal addresses. (See, for example, "Peterborough Resolutions" of April 24, 1836 and an "Address from Toronto" (1836); in G. M. Craig, ed., Discontent in Upper Canada (Toronto, 1974), pp. 187-189.

During the summer of 1837, the Glengarry Highlanders sent a loyal address to Bond Head in which the roots of their loyalty were traced:

Descended from ancestors who, when reluctantly compelled by circumstances to leave their native hills, where they ever were devoted to the cause of loyalty, to look for a place of residence abroad, could not forego their allegiance and attachment to their King by settling themselves in any part of the world where the British flag did not wave, we shall be ever found ready and willing to hazard our lives in defence of our Government and Constitution, and for the maintenance of our connection with the Mother Country ....

(Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, July 5, 1837; "Address from 2nd Regiment of Glengarry Militia").

Loyal values were inculcated by Bishop Alexander Macdonell whose duty it was to instill "in the minds of my flock principles of attachment and loyalty to their Sovereign and the Constitution of their Country." (Macdonell to the Lieutenant Governor's Secretary, March 7, 1836; quoted in J. E. Rea, Bishop Alexander Macdonell and the Politics of Upper Canada (Toronto, 1974), p. 173.


Recent scholarship suggests that Tory perceptions about the nature of the rebels may have been correct. See Read, p. 239; R. J. Stagg, "The Yonge Street Rebellion of 1837: An Examination of the Social Background and a Re-assessment of the Events" (an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation for the University of Toronto, 1976), pp. 199-200, 422.


Sullivan's fear of the spread of republican values was based on Tory perceptions of political developments in the United States. He wrote:

"everything is referred directly to party, and from the highest to the lowest every functionary of the Government is dependent upon the will of the majority for his continuance in office and in many parts of the union individuals can only be secure in personal safety, by following blindly the popular clamour of the day. The Bench of Justice is shamefully dependent on the same source of all power. Trial by Jury has become no better than investigation by public meetings. Law is a dead letter. Punishment for outrages committed by the mob is out of the question. The people that is the majority say we made the law and are consequently superior to it. In short the country is as nearly in a state of Anarchy, as a nation with the form of a Government can be."  

(Sullivan, "Report on the State of the Province, p. 133).

See also, PAC Pamphlets, Report of a Select Committee of the House of Assembly, on the Political State of the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada (Toronto, 1838), p. 62.


The Report of a Select Committee of the Tory-dominated House of Assembly pointed to the benefits of the imperial connection. The people lived in "security and peace"; the province was prosperous because of the expansion of trade and commerce which produced the "accumulation of wealth and independence." Therefore, the people remained loyal during the rebellion. "They point to their ascent -- they point to their deeds in a former war -- and they point to their attitude and bearing at this moment of threatened invasion and revolt." (PAC Pamphlets, Report of a Select Committee, pp. 38, 22).


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82 *Kingston Chronicle and Gazette*, March 3, 1838.

CHAPTER 6

THE CONTROVERSY OVER LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION: REFORM LOYALTY, BEFORE THE REBELLION

The polarization of Upper Canadian politics during the 1830's had important consequences for Reform as well as for Tory conceptions of loyalty. Since the high Tories succeeded in framing the debate, loyalty was discussed on their terms. Moderate Reformers could not escape being tarred with the brush of disloyalty because they did constitute a formed opposition and because it was hard for them to dissociate themselves entirely from the apparent republicanism of radical spokesmen like William Lyon Mackenzie. Charges of disloyalty were effective precisely because loyalty was as important to them as it was to their opponents. The Irish immigrant Francis Collins reflected bitterly that Upper Canadians were:

over anxious to be considered loyal, and too much alarmed at the sound of radical, to act the intrepid part of old country patriots .... The first thing that sickens a European subject on entering the province is the incessant hum of "loyalty! loyalty! loyalty!" -- from both Whig and Tory. 1

The mere exchange of charge and counter-charge suited the defence of the Tory administration, but it reduced the Reformers to ineffectiveness in the political arena by 1836.

Nevertheless, moderate Reform survived the rebellion with a concept of loyalty that had been sharpened during the controversies of the 1830's. Reform loyalty stressed different values from the Tory idea; it insisted that constitutional change was called for by British traditions and that true loyalty required their application to Upper Canada. The Reformers portrayed themselves as defenders of the rights of
the people in a contest against a powerful and corrupt executive; they sought to restore the constitutional balance necessary for social harmony. Drawing upon their perceptions of British practices, the moderate Reformers articulated a concept of loyalty which permitted political dissent based upon the constitutional rights of British subjects, the independence of legislators and the scope allowed to the Assembly by a balanced constitution. The legitimacy of a formed opposition to the administration was also accepted.

While they concurred with the idea of provincial development within an imperial context, the Reformers rejected the Tory argument that Upper Canada was an infant society dependent upon the mother country. Their loyalty reflected a commitment to greater local autonomy. The moderate Reform position gave the society an intellectual and emotional basis for loyalty which was to shape the political debates of the Union period.

The 1830's were marked by the growth of a strong Reform movement in Upper Canada. The electoral success of 1828 had been tempered by the opposition of the Lieutenant Governor, Sir John Colborne, and the Legislative Council to Reform measures — a factor which led to the Tory victory in 1830. But developments in both Great Britain and the United States in this period stimulated a sense of optimism among Reformers. The election of a Whig ministry in the mother country and the passage of the Great Reform Bill were greeted with much enthusiasm. The political and economic progress of Jacksonian America was admired by envious Reformers, especially when the United States was compared with their own province. William Lyon Mackenzie, the editor of the Colonial Advocate, praised the economy, harmony and progress experienced under republican state governments:
One great beauty in American State governments is the harmony of their movements resulting from the absence of all conflicting elements in their compositions. The Governor, the Senate, and the Commons' House all derive their power from the people. The paramount influence of public opinion in the Republican State Governments, and the harmony of their movements, and the unparalleled spirit of improvement and general prosperity which have grown up under their auspices are standing provocations to discontent now.

Mackenzie had noted in 1824, shortly after his arrival, that Upper Canada lagged behind its American neighbour in economic as well as political development:

If a farmer, merchant or manufacturer of Canada, has business in the United States, he observes that certain mark of prosperity, an abundance of precious metals, (while) the colonies are improverished, drained of specie, in debt.

Dr. Charles Duncombe, a Reformer of American birth, developed the same theme in a letter to the Colonial Office over a decade later:

The People of Upper Canada have constantly before them, on the one hand, in their immediate vicinity a Republican Government, highly flourishing, contented, peaceable, and prosperous; while, on the other hand, they are suffering from Discontent and Excitement prevailing to a great Degree, their own Agriculture in a depressed State, without Commerce and without Manufacturers, the Province deeply in Debt, and no Provision made for its final Payment.

The slow political and economic development of Upper Canada was due, in the opinion of Reformers, to the fact that the province was poorly governed; and poor government was due to the fact that the constitution was unbalanced. The Reformers argued that the constitution was dominated by a corrupt executive. They embraced the concept of a "Patriot King" who would promote the welfare and property of the entire society.
their loyalty was directed towards this symbol: "The true sense of loyalty in this country is true to the father of his people -- The interests of our King as such, is identified with the interest of his subjects." In Upper Canada, the Patriot-King was represented by the colonial governor. It was his duty to maintain domestic harmony:

To reconcile jarring interests, to unite all hearts, and invigorate every man, is the first and best task of a virtuous provincial governor; The love of his King and country is ever uppermost in his mind, and inciteth to a patient and laborious, yet effectual co-operation with his parliament in every thing that is good and noble.

Upper Canadians were required to be loyal to this "virtuous provincial governor" because, as the St. Thomas Liberal suggested: "Loyalty is the devotion of the heart and powers of the Subject to a Sovereign who deserves that devotion .... (It) is a passion awakened and called forth by a conviction of elevated excellence."5

The governors of Upper Canada fell far short of this ideal; they were the products of imperial patronage with little skill in the art of governance: "Needy favourites succeeding needy favourites, were successively sent out to govern ... who in their turn, harrassed (and) oppressed (the people)."6 The threat of oppression was compounded by the prospect of official corruption. Sir Francis Bond Head's "bread and butter" appeal during the loyalty election of 1836 was vehemently attacked by the Correspondent and Advocate: "The people of Upper Canada would rather live upon 'potatoes and salt', than eat and drink corruption ... in the greasy and dirty shape of your 'bread and butter.'"7

Moreover, the governors were also invariably military men who knew little about the province they were to administer; therefore, they had to rely upon the advice of their Tory councils. The Hamilton Free Press
criticized Sir John Colborne because he exhibited these flaws; an editorial asked:

What can Sir John possibly know of the Province besides the information he gets from persons whose interest it is to deceive him? Nothing at all. He never travels out in the country, and being a stranger among us what can he know from experience? Like Maitland, too, instead of standing out firm for the country, and keeping free from faction's influence, he allows his mind and opinion to be prejudiced and formed by the advice of the York executive — a faction conspiring to uphold their own arbitrary and exclusive view of things.

The Reformers attacked the Tory officials who surrounded the Governor; drawing upon traditional Anglo-American theories of opposition, they saw the executive as a clique of evil advisors seeking their own aggrandizement at the expense of the people of Upper Canada. MacKenzie wrote that: "The family compact surround the Lieutenant-Governor, and mould him like wax, to their will; they fill every office with their relatives, dependants (sic) and partisans; ... they are the paymasters, receivers, auditors, Kings, Lords and Commons!" The domination of Upper Canadian Toryism produced "a system of favouritism, nourishes flattery and sycophancy, ... and degrades the common mass of mankind in the scale of political consequence." The exclusiveness of the official party — its "tendency to confine political knowledge and consequently political power to a very few" — upset social harmony and, consequently, it was disloyal: the practice weakens the political mind by destroying that affection and good understanding, which ever ought to exist between the governors and the governed.  

The Family Compact was also attacked because it was a party. Most Reformers in the early 1830's shared the conservative fear that
parties divided the society and disturbed political stability; they represented selfish interests seeking to impose their will on the people and thus raised the spectre of tyranny. Francis Collins, the editor of the Canadian Freeman, stated, for instance: "We want no parties, neither ministerial or popular — we want steady honest men who will put their shoulders to the wheel and endeavour to develop (sic) the resources of the country, going hand in hand with the Executive when right, and checking it coolly; when wrong." 10 The same argument that the Tories used to deny legitimacy to a formed opposition was thus turned against them, to deny the legitimacy of a partisan administration.

The Reformers, therefore, built upon the foundations of assumptions drawn from both British traditions defending a virtuous opposition in contrast to the corrupt and disloyal administration. During the controversies of the 1830's, the Reform concept of loyalty, which accepted the legitimacy of dissent based upon the defence of the constitutional rights of British subjects, crystallized. They remained loyal to the system of government, but opposed "the tyrannical conduct of a small and despicable faction in the Colony," 11 which caused the constitution to become unbalanced. They fully exploited the issue of Mackenzie's repeated expulsions from the Assembly in the early 1830's to illustrate their view. The editor of the Colonial Advocate was accused of libelling the Tory-dominated legislature when he wrote that it had degenerated into "a sycophantic office for registering the decrees of as mean, as mercenary an executive", as existed in British North America. 12 Tory spokesmen, like the Attorney General, Henry John Boulton, saw Mackenzie as "a Sword which severs apart the bonds which cement society together" because he introduced "party spirit" into the Province. But the Reformers pictured Mackenzie as the victim of
"the great influence of the Executive in this province." A letter to
the Canadian Watchman stated that he had become "the John Wilkes of Upper
Canada"; the administration had "clothed him with an attractive robe of
popularity, and armed him with the sympathy which a generous public
always feel for a bold defender of popular rights, born down by the arm
of power." 14

The Reformers continually had to defend the rights of the people
against the encroachments of the executive -- "their constitutional rights
are invaded and trampled upon." The Canadian Correspondent, in an
emotional outburst, proclaimed: "Canadians, you were born FREE-MEN! --

Will you give up your glorious birth-right? Will you bend down your necks to the yoke of
a hateful, heartless oligarchy?

But you will say that liberty is as dear to you
as the apple of your eye -- that you are
ardently attached to free institutions -- that
you are deeply impressed with the multifarious
grievances that press like an incubus on the
energies of the country. 15

They believed that in Upper Canada, the British Constitution was no longer
in balance -- it had been tipped in favour of the executive at the
expense of the popular branch. During the loyalty election of 1836, the
Reformers argued that "our CONSTITUTION was designed, and is calculated
to secure ... equal rights and privileges to all men." But the balance
necessary for social harmony had been corrupted by the administration,
and so they asked: "Shall we have the British Constitution which SIMCOE
declared that it was intended that we should have administered in this
Province in all its forms?" 16

An independent legislature was seen as the best means to defend
the rights of the people. John Rolph, for instance, asserted: "... let
the people, through their representatives, have a constitutional control
over the public purse and general expenditure, and then, shall we enjoy the 'blessings of the English Constitution, and the very 'image and transcript' of it.' There was no desire to overturn it; they just wanted to reform the system in Upper Canada so that it conformed to what they believed was the British model. The British American Journal stated:

REFORM simply implies, a change from worse to better: to grow better. Political reform may be defined to be, a prudent but cautious improvement in the existing form of government; not to destroy its specifick (sic) character, but to adapt it, in its better administration, to the wants and interests of the governed. A change of government, is revolution. A change in the system of administering a government, if it tend to promote the national welfare, is reform.

The Cobourg Reformer believed that when reform sentiment had completely "diffused itself over our population," Upper Canadians would "have less to complain of; our grievances will then have an end; our civil and religious liberties will be secured; equal laws and equal rights will be administered; and peace and prosperity and contentment will bless our happy land." Consequently, the Reformers were the true defenders of the British Constitution.

Reformers' attempts to strengthen the rights of the people were accompanied by the belief that there should be increased local control over the internal affairs of Upper Canada. Unlike the Tories, who believed that the province was still an immature society dependent upon the mother country for its continued existence, the Reformers argued that Upper Canada was sufficiently developed to allow the people increased control of their own affairs. The British Colonial Argus described the society in terms remarkably similar to those articulated by the Tories; it was
"unrivalled" in its "immense natural resources ... for agricultural and commercial purposes .... The interior everywhere presents the appearance of a country peculiarly adapted to supply the wants created by civilization, and where enterprise and industry would be sure to meet an abundant reward." Although full development was hampered by the dependence upon British "trading and manufacturing interests," the province would be completely transformed if the people were allowed to manage their own affairs and unleash "that spirit of enterprise which transforms the wilderness into fertile fields; that speeds the plough, the shuttle and the hammer; plants cities, towns and villages; paves the streets; rears the college dome and academic hall; gives life and energy to trade and commerce; ... that gives impetus to the axle, and expansive force to steam; ... and spreads the sail of commerce to every breeze ...." 20

Marshall Spring Bidwell, one of the most prominent Reform leaders, stated this idea in its simplest terms: "It was a sacred principle in all free governments that the people should have a voice in making the laws by which they are governed." 21

Few Reformers evinced any desire to eliminate the imperial connection; the St. Thomas Liberal believed that Upper Canadians were "satisfied ... with paternal England." In the mid-1830's, William Lyon Mackenzie still believed that provincial development should continue within the imperial context; he wrote that: "Under the protection of Great Britain, the province may arrive at a very great height of prosperity .... We cannot be independent. Three hundred thousand settlers, thinly scattered over a vast extent of territory and far distant from the sea could not possibly set up for themselves ...." 22 "Reformers," according to the Brockville Recorder, "wish to preserve unimpaired the
advantages which they derive from being connected with a country possessing the power and resources of the British Empire."²⁴

The moderate Reformers were as insistent as the Tories that the special importance of the imperial connection lay in its provision of a constitutional model for Upper Canada. They hoped to obtain "for the people all those advantages which they conceive themselves entitled (to) according to the true meaning and spirit of the British Constitution."²⁵

Under the leadership of the Baldwins, this hope passed beyond generalities about the balance of the constitution and even beyond the mere legitimization of dissent. So long as the administration was unresponsive to public opinion, dissent within constitutional bounds was unlikely to be effective. The best means to make the administration more receptive to public opinion, and at the same time, facilitate greater internal self-government, was through the introduction of responsible government. The reform would, it was argued, make the provincial constitution conform more closely to that of the mother country — to give Upper Canada "the image and transcript of the British Constitution." The Baldwins' position, simply stated, was that the Governor should accept the advice of his council on local matters and that the executive should have the confidence of a majority in the Assembly; when the ministry lost that confidence it was to resign.²⁶

The St. Thomas Liberal reflected Reform confidence that this plan was no innovation, but the application of traditional British practice; it stated: "... every Governor would have his council to whom he may refer for advice given .... To require that his council in Canada should be accountable to the country is asking no more than is required of the Privy Council in Britain."²⁷ Graeme Patterson has concluded that this moderate Reform position embraced the belief in the natural rights of
British subjects; it was designed to solve local political difficulties, and it was "part of a larger insistence upon an imalienable right of colonials to full parliamentary government." More specifically, it has been shown by W. L. Morton that the Baldwins' support for responsible government was grounded in the Irish Whig theories of local ministerial responsibility developed in the 1790's.

Baldwin insisted that his support for responsible government reflected his own loyalty; he wrote to Glenelg, the Colonial Secretary, in 1836, that he was: "Educated in the warmest attachment to the Monarchical Form of Government, believing it to be the best adapted to secure the Happiness of the People, and fully sensible that it can be maintained in Upper Canada only by means of the Connexion with the Mother Country ...." Moreover, the introduction of the principle "... calls for no Legislative Interference; it involves no Sacrifice of any constitutional Principle; ... it involves no Diminution of the paramount Authority of the Mother Country ...." Executive responsibility conformed to British constitutional practice; it was not a radical innovation, but rather a loyal measure. In any case, it was an article of Reform belief that change was an integral part of the constitution. The Correspondent and Advocate wrote:

Any man with the slightest acquaintance with English history cannot be ignorant that the British Constitution is the result of successive improvements advancing with the intelligence of the people. It has been well compared to a tree of magnificent growth in which decayed parts have at intervals appeared, and been partly absconded, and new and more perfect branches engrafted ....

In a letter to Lord Durham after the rebellion, Baldwin repeated the same themes. The introduction of responsible Government would guaran-
to the rights of the people and maintain the imperial connection.

Your Lordship must adapt the Government to the genius of the people upon and among whom it is to act — it is the genius of the English race in both hemispheres to be concerned in the government of themselves ... You must place the Government in advance of public opinion you must give those in whom the people have confidence an interest in preserving the system of your Government, and maintaining the connection with the Mother Country ....

Many of these Reform attitudes about loyalty had crystallized in the mid-1830's. During the election of 1834, they portrayed themselves as the defenders of the people’s rights and liberties in the face of a corrupt administration; the Brockville Recorder stressed the importance of the contest:

members then to be chosen will, in a great measure, depend whether the people of this province are to become hewers of wood and drawers of water to a petty dominant faction, or whether they will be allowed to exercise that salutary controll (sic) over their own affairs which is at all times so necessary to promote a healthy administration of the laws and a close attention to the public good.

William Lyon Mackenzie's address "To the Reformers of Upper Canada" developed the same themes:

It is to you who call yourselves the friends of freedom, ... the defenders of the rights of Englishmen, the admirers of all that is noble and generous in the institutions of Britain ... -- (who) are to decide, whether a few factious and aspiring men shall yet a little longer mar the happiness of its inhabitants, or whether an honest and intelligent House of Assembly ... will go hand in hand with the King and his excellent ministers in perfecting our political institutions.
The Reformers argued that they would check the corruption of the Tory faction dominating the administration and allow the province to develop fully; as a result, loyalty would be strengthened. In his address to the electors of Stormont County in 1834, William Bruce declared that the Reformers

... would effectually stem the torrent of bribery and organize a patriotic House of Assembly, whose members, instead of seeking places and self emolument, would labour for the commonwealth. Trade would flourish; the farmer might then rejoice over the fruits of his industry. Legitimate Government would become agreeable to the people, and the loyal spirit of their ancestors which now languishes in the bosoms of their children thro' misrule and corruption would be renovated. 35

Their victory in 1834 was interpreted as a confirmation of both the ideas and the loyalty of the Reformers. The St. Thomas Liberal, in a mood of elation, interpreted the victory as the result of the people "becoming sensible ... that they are the fountain of power; and they only have to maintain their allegiance firmly and exercise their powers constitutionally, to enable them to defeat the machinations of their political enemies, and subvert the foundation of corruption." 36 John Rolph, on the other hand, was not so optimistic; he was unsure that the population had truly embraced Reform principles when he expressed these sentiments before the election:

I shall not, however, conceal my apprehension that these movements on the part of the people may be merely the transient ebullition of feelings temporarily excited by the injuries lately inflicted upon their civil and religious liberties throughout the country, and that they may not be grounded on rational and settled principles. It is a vain thing to indulge in the loudest outcry against the administration of public affairs, when the evil, by whatever epithets it may be denounced, can be traced to the hustlings. 37
For the moment at least, these prophetic doubts about the solidity of popular Reform could be set aside. Drawing upon Anglo-American traditions of opposition, the Reformers had asserted the legitimacy of dissent and had seen their assertion vindicated at the polls. The new Assembly, replying to the speech from the Throne in 1835, declared that the existence of opposition did not entitle the executive "to impeach the loyalty, integrity and patriotism" of its opponents. 38 In an address to the king, the Assembly also assured him "of their devoted Loyalty, and their sincere and anxious desire to maintain and perpetuate the connexion with the Great Empire of which they form so important a part." 39

The election of 1834 seemed to the Reformers a victory of common sense, with the true principles of the British constitution at last applied to the public interest in Upper Canada. Peter Perry was blunt in his equation of reform and loyalty: he "had lived long enough to learn that there were abuses in the administration of the government of Upper Canada, and while seeking to remedy them he did not think that the charge of disloyalty applied to him." 40 He was wrong because the Reformers' success in legitimizing opposition was met by the blanket charge of disloyalty; and their response to it, being merely defensive, was ineffective. It did not help to call the Tory tactics unfair, as the Brockville Recorder did when it attacked the attempts of the administration "to impeach the loyalty, integrity and patriotism of those who conscientiously dissent from them on questions of public policy and expenditure -- thereby creating observations and dissensions, destructive of the peace, welfare and good government of the country." 41 The efforts of Reformers like Peter Perry, who believed that "... it is not the loyal
portion of the subjects who are continually crying out loyalty, loyalty..., were also unsuccessful. And accusations that the administration was simply desirous of power were no more effective than the attempts to question the loyalty of those who cried loyalty; the Correspondent and Advocate, for example, argued that "the Tories care neither for King nor constitution, nor the Parliament of Great Britain or Upper Canada ... (T)hey want to keep the Freemen of Upper Canada under their 'baneful domination' by the exercise of unconstitutional power." It did not even help to maintain a Reformer claim to share in the Loyalist tradition; Peter Perry, of Loyalist background himself, "considered the loyal to be those who were natives of Upper Canada, and had borne the heat and burden of the day ...." W. B. Wells also looked with pride to these traditions which he believed strengthened the desire for reform; the Loyalists did not come to Upper Canada...

... to live without liberty! ... He (Wells) owes it to his memory -- to himself -- to his beloved country, not to submit to the usurpations of the few at the expense of the many -- not to continue tyranny in any shape or form.

In the identification of the loyal subject, rhetoric had replaced analysis. In consequence, the assimilative concept of loyalty which Reformers had worked out in the 1820's, and which moderate Tories were coming around to, was inoperative in political dispute. It was not crude or inflammatory enough to compete with the stark dichotomy of high Tory rhetoric, which allowed only unqualified support for the administration on the one hand, or seditious opposition tainted by republican sympathies on the other.

Tory rhetoric was fortunate that its most obviously appropriate target was now the loudest voice attacking the government. William Lyon
Mackenzie had been the focus of Tory wrath throughout the 1830's. The 
Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, for example, thundered that the vocal 
newspaper editor was 

"unseparably connected with the party we oppose. We rejoice that it is so. The 
banner that has floated over ... the 'Reform' party in this province is indelibly inscribed with the name of Mackenzie, 
and there let it remain, as glaring as infamy can make it ... (I)t is a worthy 
name! connected with slander, tyranny and treason. It is in vain that some, especi-
ally the more respectable of his party 
are beginning to be ashamed of him and 
seek to disown him .... (T)hey cannot."

During the election of 1834, Hume's "baneful domination" letter to 
Mackenzie gave the Tories the opportunity to denounce the Reformers as 
"wretched conspirators" who were now "gibbeted together, TRAITORS IN THE 
FIRST DEGREE."

Mackenzie's politics had become more radical in this period and 
his disenchantment with the colonial administration increased. Others 
were drawn to radicalism, as well; men like Marshall Spring Bidwell and 
John Rolph believed that fundamental changes in, rather than simply the 
reform of, the social and political system were in order. They also 
based their position on the traditional opposition appeal to the rights 
and liberties of the people. W. J. O'Grady, a former Roman Catholic 
priest and then editor of the Correspondent and Advocate, wrote:

... we are that vile thing, called a radical 
reformer ... We hold it as a first 
principle, that the people alone are the true 
source of legitimate power -- from which it 
follows, that true loyalty in a Government 
like ours, consists as much in securing the 
rights of the people; as in defending the 
honour, and dignity of the Crown."

The radicals offered the same justifications for change as the moderate
Reformers had because, of course, men like Mackenzie, Bidwell and Rolph, played an important role in shaping the responses of the opposition in the 1820's and early 1830's. They continued to seek the restoration of a balanced constitution, for example, by restricting the prerogative of the Crown and eliminating the corruption which surrounded the executive branch. But by 1836, the radicals were beginning to argue that the Colonial Office was also actively seeking to restrict the rights of the people. In a long examination of the "State of the Colony" during Bond Head's "loyalty election", Mackenzie added to the catalogue of grievances developed by the opposition throughout the 1830's:

if freedom and security be the design and end of good government, we certainly have it not ...

(The) real object (of the Colonial Office) ... was, and now is, to nullify all that is really good in the constitution of 1791 ... 48

As Mackenzie's dissatisfaction with the mother country grew, his admiration for the United States increased. America had a tremendous appeal for radicals, in both Upper Canada and the mother country, because: "The Republic had most of the liberal virtues -- apparently free institutions, a rule of law, the constitutional protection of individual rights and liberties, religious toleration, and minimal government." 50

Radical arguments were based upon two fundamental assumptions -- they believed that Upper Canada was no different from the United States because both societies were North American. They also believed that political institutions shaped the character and development of a society; the inferior position of Upper Canada in relation to America lay in the defectiveness of its political institutions. 51 It has been suggested that
after his tour of the United States in 1829, Mackenzie was attracted by
"the cheapness and efficiency of American ... government, and the
domestic simplicity and accessibility of American officers of govern-
ment."⁵² Therefore, he and other radicals began to look to American
political solutions to correct the problems which faced Upper Canada; in
particular, they advocated the adoption of the elective principle.
Marshall Spring Bidwell, for example, favoured an elected Legislative
Council because it would be infused with "... the principle of
responsibility to public opinion."⁵³

Although the radicals looked to the United States as a political
model, there remained a certain ambivalence in their thought. They
were also preoccupied with the achievement of a responsible
ministry in Upper Canada. Peter Perry criticized the composition of the
executive council:

... the principles of the British Constitution
were not put in practice as it regarded this
Council ... we allude to the fact that persons
had been appointed, or continued as Councillors,
whose political opinions and principles were in
opposition to those of the people and their
representatives, and in many cases to the
expressed wishes and intentions of His Majesty's
Government ... ⁵⁴

This ambivalence in their thought reflected the twin sources of radical
thought -- they drew upon American republican arguments and English
opposition theory to buttress their arguments. The radicals believed
that constitutional balance could only be achieved through a defence of
the liberty of the people, and the maintenance of the privileges and
authority of the Assembly, against both the prerogative power of the
Crown and the corrupt faction surrounding the Governor. Loyalty could be
strengthened if these aims were attained; Bidwell said: "The way to
preserve the connexion is not to keep an irresponsible body there --
particularly in view of the attractions of the United States. Gain the
affections of the people, and you draw bulwarks around the government much
better than those of armies and fortifications." Charles Duncombe
emphasized the same theme; in his address to the electors of Oxford
County in 1836, he stated that he "opposed every measure tending to produce
a separation of this Province from the Parent State;" he supported politi-
cal reform "by every constitutional means ... (and was) firmly and
decidedly opposed to revolution and revolutionary principles."56

Their acceptance of American republican solutions confirmed the
disloyalty of the radicals for both Tories and the Reformers.
Moderates totally rejected the radicals; the British American Journal
declared radicalism was "remote from reform." At "... is the practice of
those who ... are inveighing against the government, ... In
every variety of style and vituperative
invective. Such a course ... may serve to
keep the publick (sic) mind in a constant state
of ebullition, mislead the judgement and inflame
the passions of the people, alienate their
affections from the legitimate and lawful
sovereign, annihilating all reverence for laws
and respect for its administrators ... ."57

The moderate Reformers sought to dissociate themselves from Mackenzie;
they rejected the Tory claim that the fiery Scot represented the main-
stream of Reform. The St. Thomas Liberal stated: "It is true that Mr.
Mackenzie has many friends among liberal minded men, but the Tories are
mistaken if they suppose, for an instant that he is the rallying point
and sole dependance (sic) of Colonial Improvements."58 The Cornwall
Observer interpreted the election of 1834 as a contest between moderates
and radicals; it was a fight between "Reform and revolution ... A reformer is continually on the watch to guard against every innovation, and maintain the constitutional rights of every member of society ... not throwing off approved institutions, but correcting every abuse that may creep into them ...." The Grenville Gazette developed similar themes:

Reform and revolution are as dissimilar in the objects they aim at, as light is to darkness. The former has always been to the British Constitution, what a burnishing steel is to a soldier's flintlock, a polisher and not a destroyer ...

The completeness with which the moderate Reformers failed to dissociate themselves from Mackenzie was revealed in the "loyalty election" of 1836. Moderates were either drawn to the coalition of loyal groups supporting Sir Francis Bond Head or squeezed out of the political arena; Robert Baldwin, for instance, declined to run in the election. The Reformers did not lack organization, but their organization lacked support. The results of the election confirmed the administration's view that the population was overwhelmingly loyal in Tory terms and that republican "principles and views do not belong to any save a few designing radicals ...." The moderate Reformers, though, had a more realistic view -- the Tories, led by the Lieutenant Governor, had fully exploited the potential of the loyalty issue; W. W. Baldwin wrote to his son, Robert: "By appeals to their (the electorate's) fears and patriotism, and other means quite as effective, but less widely advertised, Sir Francis won the elections ...." But Marshall Spring. Bidwell, who had been defeated in the election, believed that the Tory strategy could backfire; no good would be accomplished "by denouncing any man as disloyal, a revolutionist, a traitor who happens to differ from the Provincial
government on questions of expediency or constitutional principle.\textsuperscript{63}

The politicization of the loyalty question, and their crushing defeat in the election, increased radical frustration after 1836. They attributed the Tory victory to "bribery and corruption," and continued to press their attacks against the administration. Radical perceptions about provincial misgovernment and the oppression of the colonial system led to a rejection of the imperial connection. As early as 1835, Mackenzie had written to John Neilson, the editor of the Quebec Gazette:

\begin{quote}
If the English government had done its best to ensure to this colony the advantages contemplated by the (Constitutional) Act, ... I should have remained a contented plodding individual, loyal from inclination (sic) as well as duty ...
\end{quote}

(But) I have seen enough to convince me that we shall continue to have the very worst possible government in Upper Canada until we get rid of the system which binds us to the earth. I therefore am less loyal than I was.

Charles Duncombe echoed similar sentiments in a letter to Robert Baldwin:

"... if ever they (the people of Upper Canada) have good government ..., they must look among themselves for the means of producing it, for they (the British Government) care very little for the people of Canada other than as a source of patronage or revenue."\textsuperscript{64} The Correspondent and Advocate drew a sharp contrast: "In the United States the people are everything ..., here the people have scarcely the shadow of power."\textsuperscript{65}

Before 1837, Mackenzie had always rejected extra-constitutional means. Like Robert Gourlay, he had relied upon the techniques of English radicalism -- township meetings, petitions to the Crown and personal meetings with imperial officials. His Canadian Alliance Society had advocated an elective legislative council and a written constitution.
but revolution was not among the American models that it had adopted. After the debacle of 1836 his emphasis shifted towards popular sovereignty. "Government," he argued, "is founded on the authority and is for the benefit of a people." He declared that "the duty we owe our country and posterity requires from us the assertion of our rights and the redress of our wrongs." During the summer of 1837, the radicals adopted a declaration closely modelled on the American Declaration of Independence, and Mackenzie, finally rejecting the possibility of constitutional change, declared that Upper Canadians had a legal right of rebellion. The ease with which his rising was crushed did nothing to lessen the Tory conviction that his disloyalty was the common attribute of all their opponents, nor to mitigate the embarrassment of moderate Reformers whose dissociation from any radical character or sentiment was incomplete.

The failure of the rebellion did; however, eliminate radicalism as a serious political alternative in Upper Canada. The republican element in the political spectrum had been removed; in Sir Francis Bond Head's words, "The struggle on this continent between Monarchy and Democracy has been a problem which Upper Canada has just solved." For a time, Tory revenge was given free rein: mail was opened, the arrests of Reformers were tolerated, and "disloyal" government officials, such as the postmaster of Toronto, J. S. Howard, were dismissed. The state trials of 1838 culminated in the hanging of Samuel Lount and Peter Mathews. The threat of invasion from the United States strengthened the administration's desire to eliminate all disloyalty. As a result of the increased harassment, many of the supposedly disloyal either engaged in such displays of formal loyalty as joining the militia, or they simply
left the province. Moderate Reformers had to remain on the defensive, vying with one another in condemning a resort to arms. "We are advocates of Reform so far as is consistent with the true principles of the British Constitution ....," wrote the Brockville Recorder on December 14, 1837. "We go no further ...." But as the narrowness of Mackenzie's support became evident, the lesson increasingly drawn was that the population of Upper Canada was, and would remain, fundamentally loyal. Deprived of its spectre of sedition, the exclusiveness of high Tory loyalty lost much of its point; and moderate Reformers could again proclaim their faith that Upper Canadians were "worthy of all the privileges which the British Constitution is intended to confer ...." Before the end of the rebellion winter, the Niagara Reporter had drawn the conclusion that rebellion was a danger only from Tory exploitation of it:

There is danger in imagining we are safe -- the loyalty we have recently exhibited, may be made the means of enslaving us. Let us convince our rulers that it was not for the purpose of perpetuating their tenure of office that the people of this province buckled on their armour. There is danger of a re-action on the part of that "family influence" which has so long ridden rough shod over the liberties and interests of this glorious appendage of the British empire. Now is the time to demand the enactment of liberal (laws) -- now is the time for REFORM.

With their confidence restored, moderate Reformers could once more dispute the exclusiveness of the Tory concept of loyalty, and re-assert their own assimilative and more accommodating model. They could deny that loyalty to the imperial connection implied limitations on the rights or political role of any respectable inhabitant of the province, so long
as he accepted that loyalty. They looked to the mother country as a constitutional model for the province, and believed that there was imbalance in Upper Canada. In an effort to counter the "tyranny" of corrupt administrations, they drew upon traditional English and American opposition theories to assert the legitimacy of dissent, based upon the constitutional rights of British subjects, the independence of legislators and the scope allowed to the Assembly by a balanced constitution. Reform loyalty also incorporated the concept of a formed opposition within the political system. Such a legitimized opposition, especially if linked to the idea of responsible government, would restore the constitutional balance that Tory domination of the administration had upset in Upper Canada. For Baldwinites at least, constitutional balance was acquiring a meaning that reflected British parliamentary reform quite as much as the much-praised eighteenth-century model: its object was to ensure, not that one branch of government would check the others, but that public opinion, reflected in the Assembly, would be able to influence the administration. Responsible government would also strengthen local self-government because the Governor would be required to accept the advice of his council on domestic matters. Reform loyalty incorporated the belief in the need for greater provincial autonomy within the imperial system. The Reformers suggested that the province was sufficiently mature to allow the people greater control of their own affairs. Accordingly, "an intense local patriotism" began to emerge, and loyalty became an expression of Upper Canadian nationalism.

While the implications of loyalty to the imperial connection were different for Reformers than for Tories, both groups were socially conservative. Both assumed that the society of Upper Canada was and
should be hierarchical; and if the Reformers envisaged a looser structure
with easier access, they had no more sympathy than the Tories with
attempts to upset it. "Ideological conflict in Upper Canada was less a
contest between 'conservative' and 'progressive' schools of thought than
a struggle between warring conservative traditions that came into conflict
when transplanted from Europe and other parts of North America to the
new colony."78 This conflict would continue into the 1840's, and ideas
of loyalty would remain at the centre of the debate.
FOOTNOTES

1 In the Colonial Advocate, April 30, 1829; see also Canadian Freeman, October 16, 1828.

2 See, for example, the Christian Guardian, January 8, 1831; the Colonial Advocate, January 13, June 23, 1831 and Cobourg Reformer; quoted in the St. Thomas Liberal, December 27, 1832.

For a more detailed discussion of these developments, see G. M. Craig, Upper Canada -- The Formative Years, 1784-1841 (Toronto, 1963), pp. 188-209.

3 Colonial Advocate, March 25, 1830.

4 Colonial Advocate, May 27, 1824.


Mackenzie totally rejected Tory optimism about the rate of provincial development. While Upper Canada prospered, it did so in spite of the administration:

... our ministerial wiseacres say that the general prosperity of the Province is convincing proof that we can have no grievances to complain of. Yes it prospers, and will continue to prosper. This Province is purely agricultural, and if the Devil himself governed, ... (his) efforts might retard, but could not prevent its prosperity. Witness the now United States while they were yet provinces of Great Britain -- they were also purely agricultural .... Their trade and commerce with foreign Countries restricted also. Their intercourse with each other circumscribed by mandates from home. Yet withal, it only interrupted their prosperity a little, and accelerated a separation; still they continued progressing apace in wealth and strength.

(Colonial Advocate, April 12, 1832).

5 Hamilton Free Press, in the Brockville Recorder, November 17, 1831; Colonial Advocate, May 4, 1826; St. Thomas Liberal, July 25, 1833.

This theme is developed more fully in G. H. Patterson, "Studies in Elections and Public Opinion in Upper Canada", (a Ph.D. dissertation for the University of Toronto, 1969), pp. 443, 477-479.

6 Colonial Advocate, April 12, 1832.

7 Correspondent and Advocate; June 8, 1836.

8 Hamilton Free Press, November 8, 1832; see also the Correspondent and Advocate, December 18, 1834.

Mackenzie lays the economic and political problems of the province at the feet of the Governor who rewarded his political friends rather than address the question of development:

When we consider what immense sums have been placed at the command of the Governors of these colonies, as holding in their hands the civil and military powers; the large and long continued annual grants of the English Parliament, the growing revenue of the country, the rich and fruitful soil of Upper Canada, the temperance of its climate, and the great value of its wheat and other produce ...; we cannot but lament the effects of that cupidity and folly, which stifled enquiry, repressed enterprise, rewarded vice with the wages of virtue, and instead of drawing forth the resources of an important region, encouraging its manufacturers, & promoting its agricultural improvements, sought only to place the meanest and basest of the human race in every office of honour and dignity.

(Colonial Advocate*, May 4, 1826; see also Ibid., December 27, 1827)


The St. Thomas Liberal was even more blunt about the disloyalty of the Tories: "Who ever heard of a tory who was not a pretended stickler for the constitution?". Moreover, it was pointed out with some glee that: "According to our best Lexicographers the word Tory is derived from an ancient Irish word, signifying a robber: the term in English has always been applied to that party in politics who have ever been distinguished, for their strict adherence to the arbitrary, despotic and illiberal principles ..." (November 2, 1832).
Canadian Freeman, October 28, 1830. See also Niagara Cleanner, November 17, 1832; letter on "Party Spirit).

T. T. Orton, a Reformer, stated in his address to the electors of Durham: "I cannot reconcile my mind to the appellation of either Whig, or Tory. I am substantially attached to the spirit of the British Constitution." (Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, August 16, 1834).

The Hamilton Free Press, in The Patriot, June 10, 1834.


The Solicitor General, Christopher Hagerman, believed that Mackenzie's goal was "to excite the feelings of the people in all parts of the country, and alienate their minds from the Government ...." (Colonial Advocate, January 5, 1832).

Christian Guardian, December 14, 1831.

In the Christian Guardian, January 11, 1832; see also, Colonial Advocate, December 29, 1831; "Address to the Electors of the County of York".

Christian Guardian, January 11, 1832; Canadian Correspondent, July 26, 1834.

Hiram Leavenworth, publisher of the British American Journal, also believed that the greatest threat to the rights and liberties of the people was a corrupt administration: "They (the members of the government) have it completely within their power to encroach upon the rights, and trample the liberties of the people in the dust; to withhold the enactment of the most wholesome and salutary laws, and enforce others of the most tyrannical and despotick (sic) character." (January 28, 1834; see also an editorial of July 1, 1834).


Brockville Recorder, January 26, 1830.

The British Colonial Argus argued that the best means for "the people of Upper Canada to proceed in order to obtain a government suited to their condition ... was to follow traditional British political practices. They were to establish Reform newspapers which would "disseminate correct political knowledge"; the people were to create "political UNIONS" and "unitedly petition His Majesty and the Parliament of Great Britain, for a constitution in which the right of the people to self-government should be acknowledged and surrendered." (October 23, 1833).

Appeals to traditional British methods of opposition are also to be
found in the *St. Thomas Liberal*, December 13–27, 1832. The Tories, on the other hand, argued that: "Whatever Unions may be in England, it must be remembered that in this country, with Republicans at their head, they are the next step to Rebellion." (reprinted in the *St. Thomas Liberal*, January 10, 1833; quoted in Fred Landon, *Western Ontario and the American Frontier* (Toronto, reprinted 1967), p. 149).


20. *British Colonial Argus*, August 20, 1833; see also *Ibid.*, October 26, 1833; *the Canadian Correspondent*, July 26, 1834; *Ibid.*, September 27, 1834; electoral address of T. D. Morrison. Mackenzie repeated the same theme:

> We of this Province enjoy many singular advantages; we are lightly taxed — we have a better price for our flour and grain than our neighbours across the Niagara; and in ashes and lumber our traders obtain a preference in the British markets .... The soil and climate are favourable to health and cultivation: and the Canadian settlers, while following the peaceful pursuits of agriculture, might prove, for many years to come, blessings to England ... were she but contented with commercial profits, and unwilling to resign the monopoly of justice, religion, education, revenue, lands, tenements, honour, power, &c. which her agents now enjoy, at the cost and charges of a people, who pay a very high price indeed for a species of protection the most irksome of any — because it involves a denial of managing their own affairs to the best possible advantage.

*(Colonial Advocate*, March 11, 1830).

21. *Brockville Recorder*, April 4, 1834; see also *The Advocate*, September 25, 1834.

22. *St. Thomas Liberal*, October 25, 1832; see also *Ibid.*, August 1, 1833.


St Thomas Liberal, July 18, 1833.

It should also be noted that John Strachan, too, believed that the lieutenant governors should be required to "consult on all occasions with the Executive Council", which should, in turn, "be like the King's Ministers responsible for their advice." (John Strachan Letter Book, 1827-1839, pp. 109-110; Strachan to James Stephen, January 18, 1831 -- quoted in Craig, Upper Canada -- The Formative Years, p. 202).


In Lower Canada, Pierre Bedard, the editor of Le Canadien deduced the concept of ministerial responsibility from his readings of Blackstone before 1809.


Baldwin to Glenelg, July 18, 1836; in Craig, Discontent in Upper Canada, p. 70, 74-75.

Correspondent and Advocate, January 25, 1836.


An address of the Upper Canadian Assembly in 1835 stated that if "persons of worth and talent, who enjoy the confidence of the people" were appointed to the government, loyalty would be strengthened. "We have not the slightest apprehension but the happy connexion between this Province and the parent state may long continue to exist and be a blessing advantageous to both."
(In The Patriot, January 30, 1835).

33 Brockville Recorder, August 2, 1834.

34 The Advocate, September 25, 1834.

35 Cornwall Observer, April 25, 1834.

In his electoral address to "The Reformers of the County of Glengarry", Donald Cameron stressed both his loyalty and his role as a defender of the people's rights. He stated that his beliefs were: "A determined and unshaken loyalty to my King — a firm and steady adherence to the principles of Reform, ... with an ardent and patriotic desire to guard the liberties of the people from innovations and infringements." (Cornwall Observer, April 11, 1834).

36 St. Thomas Liberal, in the Brockville Recorder, October 24, 1834.

37 The Advocate, March 12, 1834.

38 CO42/425; enclosed in Colborne to the Colonial Secretary, January 26, 1835; in Aileen Dunham, Political Unrest in Upper Canada, 1815-1836 (reprinted Toronto, 1971), p. 147.

39 Brockville Recorder, January 20, 1835.

40 Brockville Recorder, February 6, 1835.

41 Brockville Recorder, January 20, 1835. See also the letter from "Algernon Sidney" in the St. Thomas Liberal, September 20, 1832 and the editorial of October 4, 1832 in the same journal.

In an address to "Politicians in the County of York", the Children of Peace vowed not to support any man "that doth abuse the subjects of the Province" by calling them disloyal. (Colonial Advocate, November 4, 1830).

James Wilson stated in the Assembly that a man could not freely express his opinions without being accused of disloyalty. (The Patriot, January 30, 1835).

42 The Patriot, January 27, 1835.

Perry also deplored Tory attempts to generate "loyal support" for the "making of canals, roads and bridges!" (Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, February 24, 1836).

43 Correspondent and Advocate, June 8, 1836.

The Reformers never missed an opportunity to attack Tory loyalty; they were as willing to use this ideological weapon as their opponents. The Tories exploded in anger at the dismissal of
Boulton and Hagerman for their roles in the Mackenzie expulsions, and seriously questioned the imperial connection. In response to Gurnett's "mind's eye" editorial, the Colonial Advocate (May 23, 1833) wrote:

It has never been a practice with us to accuse our opponents of treason, because, they happen to differ from us on political questions; for we have ever been of the opinion, that men may differ on many points of political economy, and still possess a strong attachment to the same government .... This act of the English Ministry is designated as the most arbitrary and high-handed stretch of despotic power; that can well be imagined, it has more than half alienated the affections of Mr. Gurnett, and his party from the British government ....

The jealous advocates for the prerogative of the Crown -- the sticklers for the Constitution and delegated rights -- the noisy pretenders to loyalty -- ready and willing to abandon the 'Empire of their sires,' for a new state of political existence for no other reason, than because the government of that country saw fit to dispense with the services of their public servants, who opposed the line of policy marked out for them and who obstinately persist in an unconstitutional course of conduct in their legislative capacity.

Mackenzie continually re-asserted the loyalty of the population; he also wrote:

Not withstanding the mal-administration of the executive, and the want of confidence felt in the courts of justice, there is yet a powerful feeling of friendship towards England .... As a Canadian, -- Would you desire an established church; the ministers to be paid by the state? He will reply, No, no; let all denominations be equal. Would you desire the law of primogeniture? -- No. The election of your own justices of the peace? -- Yes. The control over your wild lands and all other revenue? -- Yes. Cheap, economical government? -- Undoubtedly. The election of your own governors? -- Ay. Of your legislative councillors? -- Ay. Well then, would you not also wish to be joined to the United States? -- No, never!
(Mackenzie, Sketches of Canada and the United States, p. 155).

"The Patriot, January 27, 1835; Brockville Recorder, February 6, 1835; debate on the speech from the Throne."


In his electoral address in 1834, T. D. Morrison asserted: "We have defended the Constitution in a time of war against the assaults of an external enemy, and we will preserve it, in a time of peace, from the withering influence of corrupt administrations. We have the physical courage for the first struggle, and we have moral courage for the last." (Canadian Correspondent, October 11, 1834; see also Correspondent and Advocate, May 15, 1835).

Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, September 20, 1834; see also Niagara Cleaner, January 28, 1832. The Patriot, May 23, 1834; quoted in Craig, Upper Canada -- The Formative Years, p. 220.

Joseph Hume had written to Mackenzie (in a letter published in The Advocate of May 22, 1834) that Mackenzie's expulsions from the Assembly "must hasten that crisis which is fast approaching in the affairs of the Canadas, and which will terminate in independence and freedom from the Baneful Domination of the Mother Country, and the tyrannical conduct of a small and despicable faction in the colony .... The proceedings between 1772 and 1782 in America ought not to be forgotten."

"Canadian Correspondent, August 16, 1834.

Correspondent and Advocate, June 15, 1836; see also Ibid., May 3, 1837.

For a more complete discussion of Mackenzie and the grievances of Upper Canada, see Craig, Upper Canada -- The Formative Years, pp. 210-225.

It would be misleading to suggest that William Lyon Mackenzie presented a coherent philosophy of opposition. He was a grievance-monger whose newspaper editor mentality allowed him to draw ideas from many sources. He was, in the words of G. M. Craig, "entirely unsuited to the life of politics, unable to work with colleagues toward an agreed objective, and quite without perspective. But ... (with) complete disregard for personal gain or advancement, he put himself unreservedly at the disposal of the plain people of Upper Canada." (in Upper Canada -- The Formative Years, p. 210)

Mackenzie's political ideas have been explored in the following sources:

R. A. MacKay, "The Political Ideas of William Lyon Mackenzie", in


See, for instance, Colonial Advocate, March 11, 1830; Mackenzie, Sketches of Upper Canada (1833).

53 Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, February 6, 1836; see also, Correspondent and Advocate, June 15, 1836; Mackenzie's "State of the Colony".

54 Correspondent and Advocate, April 18, 1836; Report of the Committee on the Executive Council.

55 Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, February 6, 1836; see also Canadian Correspondent, August 23, 1834.

56 PAC, Charles Duncome Papers, "Address to the free and independent electors of the County of Oxford." (1836).

57 British American Journal, September 2, 1834.

58 St. Thomas Liberal, October 18, 1832; see also, British American Journal, July 1, 1834.

Francis Collins had long before labelled Mackenzie as "one of the most degraded characters in the colony -- without honor, consistency, or fixed principle." (Canadian Freeman, July 31, 1828).


The moderate Reformers and the Tories also saw the necessity of organizing for the "loyalty election" in 1836. W. W. Baldwin, for instance, was the president of two Reform organizations -- the Constitutional Reform Society of Upper Canada and the City of Toronto Political Union -- created in 1836. These societies were a response to the British Constitutional Society, formed by the Tories in Toronto, earlier in the same year.

Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, May 11, 1836.

TPL, Baldwin Papers, W. W. Baldwin to Robert Baldwin, July 6, 1836.

Ibid., M. S. Bidwell to Robert Baldwin, July 29, 1836.

PAO, Mackenzie-Lindsey Papers, Mackenzie to John Neilson, December 28, 1835.

TPL, Baldwin Papers, Duncombe to Robert Baldwin, September 15, 1836.

The Correspondent and Advocate also attacked imperial interference in the local affairs of the colony:

...we are constrained to say that this interference of the Colonial Secretary in our local affairs is both presumptuous and intolerable. Can it be endured that a Minister several thousand miles removed from us, shall be permitted to hold us forever in leading-strings, and though ignorant of our condition, prescribe for us, and dictate to us according to his pleasure.

(January 4, 1837; see also Ibid., April 5, 1837).

Correspondent and Advocate, August 3, 1836; Ibid., January 11, 1837.

See also PAC Pamphlets, The Speech of the Hon. John Rolph, M.P.P., delivered on the occasion of the late Inquiry into Charges of High Misdemeanors at the late Elections, preferred against His Excellency Sir Francis Bond Head .... (Toronto, 1837).

The Correspondent and Advocate, in the Brockville Recorder, August 10, 1837.

The Constitution, August 2, 1837.

Mackenzie's growing radicalism can be followed in his newspaper, The Constitution, which began publication on July 4, 1836.

G. M. Craig provides an adequate narrative of the events leading to the rebellion; cf. Upper Canada -- The Formative Years, pp. 240-247.

British Colonist, March 8, 1838.


Brockville Recorder, December 14, 1837.


The Niagara Reporter, in the St. Catharines Journal, February 27, 1838.

Ibid.


Graeme Patterson, "Whiggery, Nationality, and the Upper Canadian Reform Tradition", in Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 56 (March 1975), p. 44.
CHAPTER 7
LOYALTY AND PARTY IN THE 1840's

Once tempers had cooled after the rebellion, there seemed for a
time to be no argument left over loyalty to the imperial connection.
"Upper Canadians and their leaders remained all but unanimous in
endorsing British symbols, sentiments, and precedents for their
community."¹ Throughout the immediate post-rebellion period, Upper
Canadians -- of both Tory and Reform background -- emphasized their
preference for the British constitution and the imperial connection
over closer relations with the Americans. Henry C. Grant, editor of
the Western Herald, published in Sandwich, wrote of his "firm belief
in the excellence of (British) principles ... and a loyal attachment
to the Crown and Government of Great Britain." He argued that Upper
Canadians wished to retain links to the mother country; they evinced
no desire to join "the inhabitants of the land of Basswood -- hams and
wooden nutmegs, of slavery, mobocracy and the Bowie Knife."² There
was also little difference between the editorials of the Tory paper,
the Toronto Patriot, which criticized the American judicial system,
the concept of written constitutions and popular legislative bodies and
the views of Robert Baldwin who "believed the English constitution to
be the best in the world -- infinitely superior to that of the United
States."³

The diminishing ideological tensions between moderate Tories and
moderate Reformers, and "the emergence of a larger degree of consensus"
was "a reflection of the movement toward a two-party system in the
'British North American provinces.'⁴ This development, though, was
accompanied by continued debate over the nature of loyalty. Throughout the entire period before the rebellion, and across nearly the whole of the political spectrum in Upper Canada, the concept of loyalty remained the basis not only of political legitimacy but also of acceptance into the provincial society. Loyalty was a complex of ideas. Tories and Reformers adhered to different combinations of its components, and those components themselves evolved over time. The result of that evolution produced, during the 1840's, a consensus in which loyalty remained as important as ever but in which its definition was at last the common property of moderates of both parties.

The most important feature of the mid-century consensus was that it accepted the legitimacy of a formed opposition in politics and therefore of party government, which in turn was the instrument of expanding colonial autonomy. That consensus, when first examined by historians with a focus on constitutional forms, was characterized as the triumph of Reform in the "struggle" for responsible government. Recent historiography has emphasized its conservatism and even its class basis, especially beyond the realm of party politics. Yet a straightforward emphasis on growing conservatism is not borne out by the evolution of loyalty, the central conception of Upper Canadian politics. As the Baldwinites pressed for the introduction of responsible government, issues such as the constitutional role of the Governor General, who represented and symbolized the imperial connection, and the development of parties came to the fore. During the 1840's most of that evolution consisted of the acceptance by moderate Tories of
positions already worked out by moderate Reformers.

In the wake of the rebellion, the attitudes of the Upper Canadian Tories about the nature of loyalty were strengthened at the expense of those of their Reform opponents. The loyal response exhibited during the rebellion, for instance, was integrated into the Loyalist tradition which shaped the conservative mind, and had been previously expressed after the American Revolution and the War of 1812. The participation of the militia in crushing the rebellion was noted with pride; and dinners were held each December to commemorate "the Defeat of the Traitor Mackenzie and his Rebel Gang at Gallow's Hill."

In 1840, there was a ceremony at Queenston Heights which honoured the hero of the War of 1812, Sir Isaac Brock; the Patriot believed that after the rebellion, such an event would confirm Upper Canadian "feelings of allegiance to our Queen and country ... -- they wish to enjoy ... the protecting influence of the Crown -- and the desire to preserve inviolate on our part, the happy connexion ...".

Others could play the same game, with variations. Ogle Gowan, the Grand Master of the Orange Order, also sought to broaden the interpretation of the Loyalist myth in an effort to include the Orange Irish within that tradition. The loyal response of that group in 1837 proved their commitment to their new homeland -- the Orangemen believed that they had earned their place in the Upper Canadian community. Gowan wrote:

Well do the bulk of the people of Upper Canada deserve that free-and glorious constitution, and rationally and nobly have they defended it
... And are not the Emigrant Britons, as well as those who forfeited their all, rather than their connexion with Britain, and who braved foreign foes and domestic traitors, in perpetuation of that connexion, entitled to some respect? Do they not deserve all the rights of Empire, for the integrity of which they have so nobly, so successfully struggled?

Attempts to broaden the Loyalist tradition were accompanied by increased emphasis upon the belief that the continued existence of Upper Canada could only be assured through the imperial connection—loyalty to the mother country was reinforced.

The Tories continued to feel vulnerable, in spite of their success during the rebellion. They were particularly alarmed by the resurgence of their Reform opponents following Lord Durham's apparent recommendation of the introduction of responsible government as the solution to the political tensions which plagued Upper Canada. Responsible government had long been the goal of moderates like Robert Baldwin, and he had written to the Colonial Office in 1836: "... being an English principle it would strengthen the attachment of the people to the connexion with the Mother country; and would place the Provincial Government at the head of public opinion, instead of occupying its present invidious position of always being in direct opposition to it." After the publication of the Durham Report, Baldwin intensified his demands for the practical application of constitutional principles and the administration of local affairs in Upper Canada: the result would be, in Durham's words, the restoration of "harmony ... where dissension had so long prevailed."
The idea of local self-government was simply incomprehensible to many Tories at this time. They believed that the province was still under-developed and its society was still immature in comparison with Britain. As a consequence, Upper Canada remained dependent upon the colonial tie, and there could be no change in that relationship. The Anglican journal, The Church, proclaimed:

When in Canada we have the same social organization, the same balancing power in the body politic which exists in England, when we possess the same regulation of public opinion as have been established for centuries there; when we have a hereditary peerage, a wealthy country gentry, and the same powerful diffusion of commercial influence; when we have the benefits of a healthy system of education, and the full operation of the principle of an established religion, we might venture thus to entrust the destinies of the country to the "will of the people" -- we might hazard the exercise of public opinion without endangering the prerogatives of the Crown or the supremacy of the Mother Country.

Responsible government, which would confirm local self-government, posed the greatest threat to the imperial connection because, as Sir Allan MacNab said, the reform was "Incompatible with Colonial Government."

Moreover, it was argued that responsible government would lead to the emergence of parties which would produce social and political instability in the fragile Upper Canadian community; the Chief Justice, John Beverley Robinson, feared these consequences when he wrote to the
Colonial Office:

That new species of responsibility ... in reality would be nothing more or less than a servile and corrupting dependence upon a Party -- ... whenever such a system shall be established ... from that moment may be confidently dated the decline of integrity and independence in public servants, of peace and contentment in society, of security for property, confidence in the Laws and attachment to British Institutions. 13

Therefore, the introduction of responsible government was opposed, and the Tories embraced their traditional precepts about loyalty to articulate their position.

In the early 1840's, the focus of Tory loyalty was the Governor General, who symbolized the link between Upper Canada and the mother country; he also represented the social stability and economic progress inherent in the British connections. It was argued that Upper Canadians should co-operate with Sir Charles Poulett Thomson, Lord Sydenham, "in his march of progressive improvement and reform" because the Governor General sought "the general and real improvement of the country." 14 Sydenham, like his predecessor, Lord Durham, saw successful politics as a question of administration rather than philosophical conflict. He recognized that economic prosperity was essential if loyal sentiment in Upper Canada was to be strengthened after the rebellion. He supported the expansion of public works, in particular, because "the rapid settlement of the country, the value of every man's property with it, the advancement of his future fortunes are deeply affected by this question." 15

To ensure economic prosperity, and consequently loyalty, the Governor had to play a central role in the political process. The British Colonist was quite explicit in its assertion that the Governor
General was the political head of his administration — his office was "ministerial — equated with the Prime Minister in England." Furthermore, ... the great body of Electors in Canada place more reliance on the judgement of the Governor General, and his honest intentions for advancing the welfare of the country, than in the judgement of those parties who have made themselves so very conspicuous of late in endeavouring to bring the Government in disrepute. 16

Sydenham agreed with this interpretation because he believed that the people of Upper Canada wanted only "the vigorous interference of a well-intentioned Government, strong enough to control both the extreme parties (High Tories and ultra Reformers), and to proclaim wholesome truths, and act for the benefit of the country at large ...." He sought to put together a coalition in the Assembly, headed by S. B. Harrison, which could attract support from both moderate Tories and moderate Reformers, and at the same time, exclude the High Tories and ultra Reformers. Sydenham said: "I will take the moderates from both sides — reject the extremes — and govern as I think right, and not as they fancy .... I can make a middle reforming party." Sydenham would act as his own Prime Minister to achieve his goals. 17

The moderate Tories supported the Governor General as an expression of their loyalty; one "Roger Roscoe" noted in a letter to The Patriot, that the inclusion of Robert Baldwin in the executive was not sufficient reason to oppose the administration:

My belief is that a mutual distrust has unnecessarily grown up between the Governor General and the Conservatives of this Province, and that its continuance now is unwise and dangerous.

On the one hand, the Governor General is deeply interested in the prosperity of the Province.
On the other hand, the Conservatives are the bulwark of British feeling — in the hour of danger, the unwavering supporter of the Throne.\textsuperscript{18}

The British Colonies was more succinct; the Governor General was entitled to the support of "every loyal Canadian, no matter what may be his party principles."\textsuperscript{19}

The "loyalty election" of 1844 focused many of these Tory attitudes about the constitutional role of the Governor, in particular, and the colonial relationship with Great Britain, in general. The Governor General, Sir Charles Metcalfe, defined the issues of the election, and set the tone for the campaign when he outlined his perceptions of his political role and attacked the Reformers who sought the introduction of responsible government. Metcalfe believed that as Governor General, he was "responsible to the Crown and Parliament, and the people of the Mother Country." The Governor must play an active role in the politics of the colony — he must act as his own Prime Minister and exercise "his own judgement in the administration of the Government;" he was not to be "a mere tool in the hands of the Council."\textsuperscript{20} Metcalfe expressed both his distaste for parties and his perception of his role as head of a coalition comprised of all political groups in letters to the Colonial Office:

> I dislike extremely the notion of governing as a supporter of any political party. I wish to make the patronage of government conducive to the conciliation of all parties by bringing into the public service the men of the greatest merit and efficiency, without any party distinction.\textsuperscript{21}

Metcalfe also argued that the Governor was "virtually responsible to the people of this Country." He had rejected attempts by his Reform councillors to introduce the principle of Cabinet responsibility in 1843
because he perceived it to be "Democratic and Party Government." The Governor General was not prepared to surrender "the patronage of the Crown ... for exclusive party purposes. ... Such a surrender of the prerogative of the Crown is, in my opinion, incompatible with the existence of a British colony." Accordingly, the Governor General defined the election on his terms; it was "a very important crisis, the result of which will demonstrate whether the majority of Her Majesty's Canadian subjects are disposed to have responsible government in union with British connection and supremacy, or will struggle for a sort of government that is impracticable consistently with either."

Metcalfe's position attracted the support of a broad range of moderate Tories and some moderate Reformers in Upper Canada. Egerton Ryerson, for instance, believed that the Governor General was "Now anxiously engaged in a contest for the maintenance of principles rightly deemed by him as absolutely essential to the preservation of the Province to the British Crown." At a public meeting held at Kingston, in December 1843, John A. Macdonald supported "the firm, manly and vigorous manner in which His Excellency has maintained the Prerogative of the Crown and at the same time upheld the just rights of all classes of the people. Isaac Buchanan, a grain merchant and former supporter of Baldwin, also linked support for the Governor General with loyalty: "In rallying around His Excellency, we rally round everything that is dear to us as Britons, or as colonists." He continued:

It is under British monarchical institutions that liberty is protected at once from tyranny and licentiousness .... We love the British Government, not only because it is BRITISH, but because it is the freest and best government on earth, not only because thinking so, our fathers fought and died to sustain its philanthropic principles, but because we, their sons, are prepared to do
so, too, whether we find them openly assailed
in the field, or betrayed by the Judas-kiss
of the colonial republican.

The British Colonist printed several loyal addresses to the Governor
which concurred with Metcalfe's position. 26

Metcalfe represented the maintenance of political stability in the
face of "disunion and party strife" (which) have hitherto been two of the
greatest evils under which, as a people, we have laboured." 27 The tradi-
tional Tory fear of the development of party re-appeared in 1844; the
Governor General symbolized the final barrier to the emergence of party
government. One "U.E. Loyalist," for instance, reminisced in a letter to
the Cobourg Star about the "Golden Age of Politics" which had existed in
the 1820's:

... there was no party in this Province:
every official appointment made by the
Governor was grounded upon fitness for
office -- every member of the Assembly
was elected for the same reason. The
Governor was considered in the light of
a Father to the people -- distributing
justice to all, looked up to by all,
and consequently respected by all.

The development of party, he continued, was the cause of the "restless
and feverish state" of the public mind, and would ultimately ruin the
country... PARTY GOVERNMENT AND A CONNEXION WITH GREAT BRITAIN CANNOT
EXIST IN THIS COLONY. 28

Some of the Tory opposition to the development of parties in the
province related to their fears that the Upper Canadian Reformers were
allied with French-Canadian "rebels." The British Colonist expressed the
Tory concern about French domination:

The BALDWIN-HINCKS Administration never
had a scruple to carry or try to carry
measures affecting Upper Canada alone,
by majorities, not of Upper Canadian members, -- for they could not have got them on some bills, -- but by FRENCH votes, by the followers of LAFONTAINE.

Tory arguments were also based on the traditional fear of "the subtility of faction" and the consequent disruption and corruption caused by the growth of party spirit. They drew upon British political thought to affirm that parties were evil because they were associations of factious men bent on self-aggrandizement. Political competition was also evil: the ideal society was one where unity and consensus prevailed, where the provincial interest was determined by the Governor and his advisors. The recent rebellion had illustrated most vividly the dangers of faction; therefore, the Tories had to support the Governor as the most effective counterweight to the development of party. They saw in the Governor General Lord Bolingbroke's vision of the "patriot king" who:

Instead of abetting the divisions of his people, ... will endeavour to unite them, and to be himself the centre of their union, instead of putting himself at the head of one party in order to govern his people, he will put himself at the head of his people in order to govern, or more properly to subdue all parties.

The Tory fear of factionalism was intensified by the belief that the Upper Canadian political system was not sufficiently developed to accommodate the development of parties. The Monthly Review repudiated "the idea of governing by party as in Great Britain .... "(It) is very unsuitable for Canada, in which parties are comparatively weak." Consequently, drawing upon the political traditions of British conservatism, the Tories were prepared to support coalition ministries, such as Sydenham's, rather than party governments. And the young John A. Macdonald based his entry into politics as a moderate Tory from Kingston on the promise of
protecting "the population against the extremes of party rule." W. H. Draper, the leader of Metcalfe's administration, also disliked the idea of party government:

I do hope that ... the time is not far distant when public consideration will prevail over party feeling, and sound constitutional principles — such as the foundation of free and representative governments — will be carried out in full operation.

He supported "a broad and national party" which would submerge conflicting factions. The British Colonist believed that Upper Canada required "practical measures, rather than party politics."

But more important, the Tories argued that the introduction of party government was a republican innovation, and thus, a threat to the continued existence of Upper Canada as a British province. The Patriot had asserted its loyalty, for instance, by rejecting the concept of responsible government in the early forties; the newspaper was "the unflinching advocate of British Supremacy, and genuine Monarchical principles, and the unsparing enemy of everything in the shape of Republican innovation or Radical quackery with the Constitution."

During the election of 1844, supporters of the Governor argued that the Reformers' attempts to introduce party government were disloyal. Isaac Buchanan wrote:

The difference between the views of the Governor General and those of Mr. Baldwin is, that His Excellency views any party but as a means for the purpose of governing; while Mr. Baldwin would practically degenerate government into a mere means of reward for the purpose of party.

Sir Charles Metcalfe's is the English and Mr. Baldwin's, the American way of it.
The *British Colonist* also emphasized this theme; party development, it was argued, was an American innovation: "in a Republican Government, everything must be done by means of party." But party development threatened the constitutional balance fundamental to social harmony in the province because it took political responsibility away from both the Governor and the people. Under a party system, "the great mass of citizens" was deprived "of all free voice in the determination of measures on the selection of candidates."^{37} Upper Canadians, had to rally around Metcalfe, who, as the representative of the Crown, stood above party and therefore could block its development.

Conservative views about the emergence of a party system were coloured by familiarity with political developments in neighbouring New York State. Martin Van Buren, leader of the Albany Regency in the decade after 1815, and later Vice-President under Andrew Jackson and President (1837-41), personified Tory conceptions about the nature of party. It was Van Buren who appeared to subordinate all things to the party; he was perceived as:

> Having determined that all is to be done by and through party and that our primary duty is to labour for the organization and ascendency of our party, the next thing to be insisted on is, fidelity to the party and strict adherence to its usage -- the surrender of all individual opinions, convictions and preferences, to the decision of the party.^{38}

American historians have devoted much attention to the emergence of the Second American Party System, and especially its development in the state of New York as the result of the activities of the Albany Regency. Martin Van Buren articulated the ideology of party development. He opposed, for example, President James Monroe's "fusion policy," which
was an attempt to break down party distinctions in order to build a coalition of various political groupings. Van Buren believed that the development of parties was inevitable—"political combinations between the inhabitants of different states are unavoidable"—and that the history of the United States illustrated this fact, as the Regency journal, the Albany Argus noted: "From the first organization of the government ... this country had been divided into two great parties." Richard Hofstadter has argued that the politicians of the Albany Regency were "archetypes of the new advocates of party" prepared to follow their leader, Van Buren, "an intelligent and seasoned exponent of the emerging partisan creed ...." 40

Van Buren thought that party was the best way of operating a democratic political system, but he did not seek ideological goals. "In the ethos of the professional politician, the party became the means not of merely institutionalizing strife within manageable limits but also of cementing civic loyalty and creating a decent and livable atmosphere." In order to achieve the development of a party system, Van Buren stressed the techniques of party organization and discipline, control of the press, and judicious use of patronage. 41

During the 1840's, the Reformers had to counter Tory claims that they were disloyal because of their attempts to create a party system in Upper Canada. Robert Baldwin argued that "responsible government was based, "on monarchical principles, in contradistinction to republican, and in conformity with the essence and spirit of the British constitution." 42 William Hamilton Merritt had articulated the same sentiment when he was a supporter of Baldwin in the early forties:

This is no Republican or elective institution.
Here is no upsetting the foundations of society among us; ... here is the simple application of the tried principles of the British Constitution in a British Province ....

Moreover, the introduction of responsible government would be "an effectual prevention against the introduction of Democratic or Republican principles among the inhabitants. Give us the full benefits of the British Constitution and we will become the admiration and envy of the United States." 43

On the issue of responsible government, in fact, the moderate Reformers succeeded in legitimizing it against Tory charges of disloyalty by tactics which had become standard since the debate on the Alien Question. They did not dismiss or evade the question of loyalty, but met it by a direct rebuttal; and the grounds on which they relied for that rebuttal were precedents drawn from British practice and appeals to British constitutional principles. The result was that moderate Tories began to adopt what had been a Reform position. The substance of the change consisted of three fundamental developments -- the acceptance of a formed opposition as legitimate in politics, the further acceptance of parties as necessary without being necessarily evil, and the consequent acceptance of party government. These were important changes because they provided both the means in practical politics and a conservative justification in political theory for the expansion of self-government.

The rebellion of 1837 had intensified the hostility of most Reformers to the process of extra-constitutional change in Upper Canada; but they were still faced with the problem that the Tories refused to recognize the concept of legitimate opposition within the British constitution. Opposition to the Crown had traditionally inferred disloyalty;
therefore, Reformers appealed to the ideal of freedom and the rights of Englishmen in 1844. The support of prescriptive rights in the face of the prerogative power of the Crown was linked to true loyalty by the Reform Association of Upper Canada:

We are firmly of the opinion that the people of this country enjoy, in their connection with the British empire, protection, assistance, freedom, and happiness which leaves them nothing to envy in other countries. We feel a loyal attachment to our Sovereign, a love for the British constitution, and a determination that, so far as we can make it so, the connection of Canada with the British empire should be perpetuated...⁴⁴

These rights of Upper Canadians were threatened by the arbitrary actions of Metcalfe which led to the resignation of his Reform council. James Lesslie, who succeeded Hincks as the editor of the Examiner, defined the main issue of the election as "whether the power of our Governor is virtually to be absolute, ... or whether that power is to be regulated for local purposes, by local restraints, in accordance with British usage, and the principles ... of our own Constitution."⁴⁵ As well, a new Reform journal, The Globe, edited by a young Scot, George Brown, appeared in March 1844 and took as its motto: "The subject who is truly loyal to the Chief Magistrate will neither advise nor submit to arbitrary measures." Other journals echoed the same theme; even the Kingston Chronicle wrote: "There can surely be no disloyalty in contending for the rights and privileges enjoyed by our brethren in England."⁴⁶ The Reformers believed that responsible government provided the best guarantee of the political rights of Upper Canadians. But Metcalfe's arbitrary measures meant that "we have no Responsible Government, we have no political freedom, we do not possess the rights of British subjects."⁴⁷
Some moderate Tories also took up the idea of responsible government. Ogle Gowan, who found that the administration still would not accept the Orange Order, despite its loyalty proven during the rebellion, became a sudden convert to the concept of legitimate opposition in 1839. He also hoped that the introduction of executive responsibility might open the door to government office for the Orange Irish, and himself in particular, in the face of Tory opposition. In an attempt to extend the limits of loyalty, Gowan wrote:

In England, we find the greatest jealousy of, and opposition to, the great contending parties; but there, there is no treason against the state; but simply Whigs against Tories; Ministers against Oppositionists; or, in other words, the Ins against the Outs .... Here every man, no matter how loyal, who asks for the British principle of responsibility, in the administration of the colonial government, is denounced as a rebel and traitor to his country.48

The growing acceptance of the legitimacy of opposition was linked to the development of a party system in the province. The same process had taken place in the United States almost twenty years earlier, and again, the instrument was Martin Van Buren. The most significant contribution made toward the idea of party was Van Buren's acceptance of the concept of legitimate, and permanent, opposition within the political system. He rejected, "the old ideal of national unanimity, or of a consensus transcending party" in favour of "the idea that a sustained opposition has value in its own right." Therefore, the Albany Regency did not seek "to destroy, overwhelm, or eliminate their opponents; they were not ideologues bent on the destruction of evil doers." Its journal, the Argus stated:

Neither party has yielded to the other in
the zeal with which it has sought to procure concert among its members, or to give ascendancy to its principles, and although we may lament the occasional consistencies and the dangerous excesses into which both have unavoidably been betrayed, ... we cannot for a minute admit that the majority of either have been actuated by any other than the purest, the most patriotic, and the most disinterested motives. 49

In Upper Canada, it was argued that the emergence of parties could also be accommodated within the British Constitution. The most articulate spokesman in favour of party development was Francis Hincks, the Martin Van Buren of Upper Canada. Hincks, a businessman and a journalist, was a skilled political tactician; between 1839 and 1841, for instance, he laid the groundwork for the alliance of Reformers from Upper and Lower Canada, led by Robert Baldwin and Louis LaFontaine. 50 Hincks did not draw his ideas about party from American examples, but rather from British sources. Party was not a republican phenomenon; it drew its inspiration instead from British Whiggism. Hincks' newspaper, The Examiner copied an article from the Edinburgh Review, entitled: "Present State and conduct of parties." The Review rejected the concept of the aristocratic basis of politics — the domination of government by a Tory elite; the base of political power, it was argued, rested upon "the whole mass of the population .... It is the diffusion of power among all classes which constitutes the real strength of the state." 51

Parties were the inevitable and necessary instruments of free politics:

In a parliamentary government, there must always be two great and leading divisions, under which parties ... must ultimately be enrolled; -- the one, a party; feeling confidence in the people, will, alike in applying the principles of Executive
government and of legislation, favour all propositions for the extension of public liberty, so far as is consistent with order and security; the other, distrusting the judgement and virtue of the people, which seeks to confine the rights and powers within the narrowest limits compatible with contentment and obedience.52

Hincks opposed attempts to create political consensus because: "there cannot be a greater delusion to imagine that in a free country, enjoying representative institutions, all the people can be got to be of one mind, and of course of one party." He wrote that the Tories were "of late endeavouring to deceive the people into a belief that parties can be amalgamated .... There must be two parties, each ... united in the promotion of great objects; the one carrying out 'Progressive Reform,' the other in thwarting and opposing it." The society, it was argued, would benefit from the competition between parties.53

Furthermore, Hincks believed that Sydenham's attempts to create a political coalition, which the Governor General would lead, were unconstitutional. Sydenham was attacked for acting as his own Prime Minister and becoming actively involved in the elections for the new Union Parliament; Hincks wrote: "the Governor is strictly the Representative of the Crown, and ... his functions should be analogous to those of his Sovereign."54 Hincks prided himself on being a party man, and, in a neat inversion of Tory arguments against party, he attacked political moderates who had no principles -- "their object is to maintain themselves in power ...." He was especially critical of Sydenham's fusion policy, which sought to create a coalition of both Tory and Reform moderates; there was "no principle, but this -- that they support the Government thro' thick and thin!" The inevitable consequence
would be Tory control of the government. Yet Hincks was not an ideologue — as a Reformer, he was "on the side of civil freedom, religious tolerance, civilization and social improvement;" therefore, he supported many of Sydenham's policies. Hincks also believed that the Governor General had conceded "practical responsibility" through the Harrison resolutions, and so was prepared to join the ministry in September 1841. (This entry into Sydenham's coalition may be interpreted as an attempt to circumvent the emergence of a moderate Tory-controlled party controlling the political centre.) He would not offer "factional opposition" to Sydenham because such a course would "aid the Tories in embarrassing (sic) an administration disposed to carry out Reform measures." The creation of a moderate party, with Reform leadership, was Hincks' goal.

Hincks had advocated party unity among Reformers as early as 1836, and initiated correspondence to LaFontaine in an effort to create a party composed of Reformers from both Upper and Lower Canada in the new Union Parliament. The basis of this coalition was to be the pursuit of "liberal and economical" administration through the attainment of responsible government. Such a course would strengthen loyalty in the colony, according to Hincks: "My impression is that a large majority of the people desire British Connexion provided it is consistent (sic) with the entire management of their own local affairs." Hincks also argued that the Reformers had to support the idea of party government if they were to attain their goal:

... we as a party should be prepared to crush any administration in which we have no confidence and as a necessary consequence to be prepared
to take the government into our own hands
if strong enough. This is the system
prevailing both in England (,) France
and the United States, and the only way
by which representative government can
be conducted.60

When Sydenham's successor, Sir Charles Bagot, invited Baldwin and
LaFontaine into his administration in 1842, the Upper Canadian
Reformers believed that their views about party government had been
confirmed. But Bagot had not accepted that development because he
thought no Canadian party was strong or united enough to form a stable
ministry.61 The attempts by Bagot, and his successor, Sir Charles
Metcalfe, to govern without accepting party government led to increasing
tensions with the Reform council and precipitated the resignation of the
executive in November 1843 over the question of patronage. Consequently,
the defence of party became an important theme shaping Reform arguments
after the Metcalfe crisis. Robert Baldwin, for instance, stated:

No government could be carried on
irrespective of party. 'It would be
despotism ... (Baldwin) was always
a party-man, and would remain so.
If appointments were not to be used
for party purposes, let those who thought
differently occupy the treasury benches.62

Moreover, in 1844 during the second "loyalty election," Reformers
stressed the importance of party to the British political system. The
Brockville Recorder, for example, wrote: "Some talk of a No-Party
Government. The thing is not possible under any free Government ....
Men acting together on any given principle, or having a general object
in view, necessarily form a party."63 And Robert Baldwin Sullivan,
writing as "Legion," stated that the Governor must accept the idea of
party. According to the British constitution, Metcalfe had to select his
advisors "from one party or the other, not from both." Hincks was more succinct: "Nothing can be accomplished except by means of a party."

He also stressed the fact that the resignation of the Reform ministry was over the question of responsible government; the Reformers did not want to control patronage simply "to keep ourselves in office .... We desire to carry out the principles of our party, the principles which would lead to such great results as peace, prosperity, and British connection." 64

During the 1840's, therefore, the Reformers outlined a position which recognized the necessity of party development and the acceptance of party government as essential components of the British Constitution. They had also committed themselves to the concept of party as the means of greater autonomy for the province. At the end of the decade, George Brown, wrote:

> The British, as well as every other form of government truly free, is essentially one of party .... (T)he masses used to be ruled -- now they rule -- but they are only yet learning that this must be done by the association of men holding similar sentiments and by the concession of individual views to mutual interest. No free government can long exist, except by party support. 65

The confirmation of party government illustrated by the imperial grant of local self-government would ensure the loyalty of the population: "We are free in name and free in reality ...." Canada was linked to the mother country, "not with the bonds of arbitrary power, but of a free and loyal and attached people." 65

Until the mid-forties, the Tories were more successful than the Reformers in defining the dominant political ideology of Upper Canada.
To do so, however, they had been obliged to confirm the tactics of the election of 1836, and to narrow still further the focus of their conception of loyalty. It was now the governor, no longer the Tory elite itself, for whom loyalty demanded trust and obedience. During the "loyalty election" of 1844, for instance, they made the issue quite clear -- Upper Canadians were offered a choice between the Governor General, who was the focus of loyalty in the province and represented the British connection, and the Reformers, who sought party development and responsible government, and were thus disloyal. The Reformers certainly believed that their Tory opponents, led by the Governor General, had successfully exploited the loyalty issue; Sir Charles Metcalfe had been "the very foremost in the ranks of the opposition in charging his late Executive Council and their supporters with disloyalty." The Reformers had been defeated by a party dependent upon the active political participation of the Governor; the Kingston Herald wrote:

"The Governor can ... return any kind of Parliament that he pleases.

... He takes his own time to call it; makes himself an active partisan in every leading question ...; floods the country with specious declarations in his favour, and plausible insinuations and assertions against those opposed to him; the whole influence of government is exerted to the utmost in his behalf, and with all this combination of intrigue, power, corruption, and every other engine that can be used, his triumph is secure. What is the power of a Ministry compared to the power of a Governor?"

The Tories, of course, interpreted the victory in a different manner -- it represented the "loyal feeling of the people. Upper Canadians had proclaimed to the whole British Empire, that she is sound in her heart and true in allegiance to a loved and honoured Sovereign."
Matthew Richey, a Methodist preacher, was even more emphatic about the results: "Truth, loyalty and justice have triumphed over misrepresentation, faction and republican selfishness! Canada is not to be severed from the greatest Empire on which the Sun ever looked in his ample circuit."\(^{69}\) The Tories had exploited the loyalty question to their benefit in 1844 and were able to attract much of the moderate support in the province; they also benefitted by their control of patronage and their ability to succeed in identifying local grievances so important in the individual constituencies.\(^{70}\)

The Tories' success was also due to the fact they had adopted in practice a Reform position which they still condemned in theory. In spite of their apparent hostility to the development of political parties, the Tories did adopt party organization as a means to strengthen their position after 1844. The new administration, led by William Draper, sought to create a moderate Tory party which would isolate the old High Tories on the one hand, and attract French-Canadian support on the other. While Draper was unable to break the almost solid French-Canadian bloc led by LaFontaine; (he was only able to attract two old war-horses, D. B. Viger and D. B. Papineau, who brought with them a few "loose fish") he was able to minimize the dominance of an "upper class of old ruling families and landed gentility" to a large extent. A new generation of moderate Tory leaders began to emerge after 1844 — men like John A. Macdonald, J. H. Cameron and William Cayley — and this group was "truly bourgeois, representatives of fast-emerging, town-based, capitalist society .... (T)hey remained part of a provincial middle class elite ...."\(^{71}\)

This new political leadership accepted party as the means by which their authority could be asserted and their goals could be pursued. The
moderate Tories were concerned with economic progress rather than ideological conflict, as Macdonald stated:

In a young country like Canada, I am of opinion that it is of more consequence to endeavour to develop its resources and improve its physical advantages, than to waste the time of the legislature and the money of the people in fruitless discussions on abstract and theoretical questions of government.  

What had once been a standard Tory argument against the legitimacy of opposition was now used to recognize the practicality of party. In order to pursue economic development, the Tories were prepared to modify their traditional beliefs about the exclusive nature of loyalty; the Kingston Chronicle wrote:

We do not believe that 'loyalty' is a thing to be put off and on at convenience — ... but we do believe that a Canadian ... talks not much of his loyalty — it is as much a matter of bad taste and indelicacy as for a lady to decant on her virtue.

The Tories had gradually abandoned the belief that opposition to the administration was disloyal — within a party system, dissent could be legitimate. Loyalty simply came to represent the attempt to assimilate "our own character, in its politics, as far as is consistent with the disproportion of our situations, to that of the fatherland." As a result, the moderate Tory, like Macdonald sounded very much like the moderate Reformer, such as George Brown who said:

We should deeply deplore that either party should again, for party purposes attempt to fix the stigma of disloyalty on the other; ... by laying aside party feelings for the advancement of national enterprises; and by setting up the standard — the prosperity of our country — as the rallying point for all.
The moderate Tories had accepted the arguments of their Reform opponents; a measure of ideological consensus on the fundamental assumptions which shaped the society of Upper Canada had developed.

The development of increasing political consensus about the concept of party government in Upper Canada paralleled that which was taking place in the mother country. It has been argued that, even in the 1830's, English politicians had not accepted "the modern principle of government by ministers responsible to Parliament." Moreover, there was only gradual acceptance of the idea of a constitutional opposition. As a result, colonial officials were slow to recognize the same developments in Upper Canada and, therefore, British politicians, such as Robert Peel, were reluctant to grant such concessions as responsible government to the colonies. J. M. Ward has argued:

The surrender of Canada to party government with a power of patronage would, Peel was sure, make the governor-general a mere political machine in all the internal affairs of the colony. As a prisoner of the ruling party, he might not be able to implement imperial policy on matters admittedly imperial, such as defence and commercial policy, or have ordinary guarantees of honest, efficient administration.

The Tories in Great Britain believed that the concession of party government would weaken the imperial connection. Their desire to keep Canada within the empire led to strong Tory support in the mother country for the position of Metcalfe in 1843-44. The concept of loyalty underpinned Tory beliefs in Great Britain, as much as it did in Upper Canada. Norman Cash notes: "Wellington openly, Melbourne and Peel in the last analysis, considered loyalty to the Crown as the highest political duty
of the statesman. 77

Yet the emergence of new political leaders in England who accepted
the concept of party weakened the imperial position. Benjamin Disraeli,
the young Tory, wrote, for example:

Let me stand by the principle by which
they (parties) rise, right or wrong ... .
Above all, maintain the line of demarca-
tion between parties, for it is only by
maintaining the independence of party
that you can maintain the integrity of
public men and the power ... of Parlia-
ment.

The Whigs, especially the third Earl Grey and Charles Buller, also accepted
the idea of party government and so in 1847 were prepared to concede
responsible government to the colonies. They saw it as "a British
institution to which some colonies were fully entitled;" and they "were
powerfully influenced by faith in the imperial destiny of Britain to build
up British communities overseas that would be united to Britain by
kinship, culture, the Crown and similarity of institutions." 78 Accordingly,
when Lord Elgin was sent to North America, Lord Grey's instructions were that:

He was to act generally upon the advice
of his Executive Council, and to receive
as Members of that body those persons,
who might be pointed out to him as en-
titled to be so by their possessing the
confidence of the Assembly. But he was
carefully to avoid identifying himself
with the party from the ranks of which
the actual Council was drawn, and to
make it generally understood that, if
public opinion required it, he was
equally ready to accept their opponents
as his advisors, uninfluenced by any
personal preferences. 79

Whig "acceptance of party government as a convention of the British
constitution" was the precondition of the grant of responsible government
to the Canadas. 80
British recognition of the legitimacy of party government, and its incorporation into the increasing consensus among moderates in both Reform and Tory camps, did not end the central place of loyalty in the political debates of Upper Canada. Reformers believed that responsible government would provide local self-government for the province, and even regarded its attainment as a means to that end. The people, as the Brockville Recorder noted, would demand "the management of their local affairs;" and R. B. Sullivan argued that loyalty to the imperial connection would not be weakened:

We ... repudiate the doctrine that control over our local affairs is inconsistent with allegiance, and we feel in our hearts that loyalty to our Queen, and love of our country, is not extinguished by our desire to possess that freedom which was the living spring from which flowed all that country's greatness, prosperity, and honour.  

It was wrong for the imperial tie to depend "upon the arm of military or ecclesiastical power; when it may and should be established on the affections of a free and prosperous and happy people." With the rules of Canadian politics redefined, the Reformers were now attempting to redefine the nature of the colonial relationship; and that involved the infusion into their concept of loyalty of a sense of local patriotism which was not static but growing. Baldwin, in a letter "to the Delegates for nominating a Candidate for the Representation of the County of Middlesex," was specific about his hopes for such growth:

Born in Canada, educated in Canada, with no property but what belongs to her soil, ... I ... wish to see a provincial feeling pervade the whole mass of our population ... to see every man belonging to us proud of the Canadian name, and of Canada as his country ..... (It) would show to the
Mother Country, it would show to the Sister Colonies, it would show to the world that as Canadians we have a country and are a people.

Baldwin's attempt to redefine the colonial relationship between Upper Canada and Great Britain was seized upon by the Tories as evidence of Reform disloyalty. The desire for local self-government, as expressed through responsible government, was interpreted as an attempt to separate the province from the mother country. The Kingston Herald thus attacked Tory assertions about the disloyalty of the Reformers:

Now, to present this great party as aiming at a separation from England is not only to do them injustice by charging them with what they shall deny, and which cannot be proved, but is to represent the country as in a state of the most deplorable weakness ....

... The Tories, in their zeal for party objects, inflict irreparable injury on national objects ....

A letter from "A Farmer" to the Reformers of Lennox and Addington was shorter and more to the point in its condemnation of Tory tactics: "The burthen of their song is 'Rebel,' disaffected and separationist. And should a reformer be advocating any of the great points of our constitution; or of the privileges arising therefrom, he is taunted with the word 'Rebel'...."

Although the moderate Tories successfully used the idea of loyalty as an ideological weapon against their Reform opponents in the 1844 election, they also began to accept the concept of greater colonial autonomy by the late 1840's. In response to the British withdrawal of mercantilism in the decade, colonial self-interest increased; W. H. Merritt, for example, said: "If the productions of Canada are to receive no advantage over the productions of foreign countries when admitted to
Britain, the manufactures of Britain are not entitled to any advantage over the manufactures of foreign countries when admitted into Canada. 87

The responses to the Rebellion Losses Act and the annexation crisis in 1849 intensified these feelings about increased colonial autonomy and effectively eliminated the last major challenge to the political consensus which was developing in Upper Canada. The last gasp from the High Tories came at the end of the decade, and their collapse isolated them from the political mainstream in the 1850's. The High Tories in Upper Canada were not attracted as readily as their English-speaking colleagues in Montreal to the idea of annexation with the United States. They were less affected by the economic distress of the late 1840's associated with the British adoption of free trade and most were not prepared to break the imperial connection over the perceived threat of French-Canadian domination of the Union. 88 But the Toronto Patriot did flirt with the idea of annexation because:

... Canada is left to depend upon herself -- Canadian loyalists have to contend as they may with republicanism and disaffection, unaided by the Mother Country -- nay, chilled by her indifference. What marvel, then, those upon whom the grievances press most sore -- those who are a second time threatened with the terrorism of 1837 -- should cast about for and against the impending infliction -- should look forward to men of kindred blood, who, however, differing on questions of public policy, -- are at least English -- English in name, in language, in history, in feeling ... 89

An "Annexation Manifesto," printed in 1849, also expressed traditional Tory fears about the threat to social harmony and stability posed by the emergence of political parties. "Canada, it was argued, was "a nation fast sinking to decay" because of the economic disruptions
produced by Britain's withdrawal of preferential tariffs. This situation was intensified by:

The bitter animosities of political parties and factions in Canada (which) after leading to violence and upon one occasion to civil war seems not to have been abated with time, nor is there at the present moment any prospect of diminution or accommodation (;) the aspect of parties becoming daily more threatening towards each other ... (threatened) political revolution ... 90

The Reformers of course did not hesitate to attack the apparent disloyalty of the Tories over the annexation issue. The loyalty question which had been exploited for so long by their opponents was turned against them with glee; for instance, The Globe wrote:

Tory loyalty in this country is not a plant indigenous to British soil, but an exotic, which requires to be constantly nourished by the warm breezes of summer. When visited by a few cold blasts of another season, it withers and dies away and the rank weed of discontent and turbulence grows up in its stead ...

The loyalty of principle is one thing, the loyalty of loaves and fishes another — a constant supply of creature comforts is the greatest nourishment of Tory loyalty. 91

Not only did the Globe associate Tory loyalty with the lust for office, it also attacked the exclusiveness associated with their opponents' conceptions. George Brown outlined Reformers' perceptions of Upper Canadian political development to illustrate his argument about reform loyalty:

The Tory party have ever arrogated to themselves the exclusive monopoly of all the loyalty of the Province, and loud and frothy enough have been their protestations of it. The Liberal party have been stigmatized as rebels and
annexationists since the country had an existence; but they have ever repudiated such feelings, and avowed that the fair operation of British Constitutional principles in the government of the country was the full extent of their desires. 92

Moderate Tory spokesmen in Upper Canada, also attacked the concept of annexation. The British Colonist, for example, wrote:

The discussion of Annexation is gall and wormwood to us. . . . the population of Canada is of a bold and independent spirit, insisting on its rights to form opinions for itself, and not easily and lightly enticed to desert its ancient and favourite ways.

A. N. Bethune, an American clergyman and editor of The Church, also rejected the idea of annexation to the United States simply because of the economic crisis exacerbated by the removal of British preferential tariffs on colonial staples: "We shall not be one of those who would rate their loyalty by a standard of gain, and shift their allegiance with alterations of commerce." 93 The political magazine, Grip, was more succinct when it printed the following cartoon: 94
Moderate Tories were also active in the creation of the British American League to counter the appeal of annexation. A convention in Kingston
"affirmed its loyalty to the Crown, to the British connection, to
monarchical institutions, and the 'mixed forms of government' of the
parliamentary system."95 The moderates rejected the annexation movement
because it was an expression of disloyalty and as a result, they were
able to squeeze the High Tory elements from the party.

By the end of the 1840's, there was increasing ideological
consensus among Upper Canadian political leaders of both moderate Tory
and Reform backgrounds. There was no softening of attitudes towards the
republican model presented by the United States by either group; there
was also general consensus on the desirability of the British
Constitution and the necessity of the continued connection between the
province and the mother country. In addition, the emergence of this
consensus was the result of tremendous changes in both practical politics
and political theory during the decade. The moderate Tories survived,
and later would prosper, by the adoption of what had been a Reform
position. This involved first an acceptance of the legitimacy of
opposition in politics; dissent, in itself, would no longer warrant the
label of disloyalty. There was also an acceptance of the necessity of
parties, and consequently an acceptance of party government, which in
turn became the instrument of expanding colonial autonomy through local
self-government. These acceptances were eased by the concession from
imperial authorities that loyalty must be defined in Canada, "without
rescripts from the Colonial Office,"96 which left the last and narrowest
version of high Tory loyalty inviable in politics.

The acceptance of party — in both ideological and practical terms
— was also the consequence of the emergence of a new generation of political leaders — men with an urban and professional background like Francis Hincks and John A. Macdonald — who were prepared to use party in order to attain their political goals. This new political leadership pushed out the old Compact elite and shaped the formation of parties in the 1850's. The emergence of Macdonald's Liberal-Conservatives and George Brown's Grit Reformers was the legacy of the debates over the role and development of parties in the previous decade.

The concept of loyalty, throughout the 1840's, was the means to focus the attitudes and perceptions developed in the political debates of the decade. Beginning as the ideological basis for dispute, loyalty was defined in more assimilative, accommodating and nationalist terms. The definition was accomplished by compromise among moderate political opponents, who shared a conservative view of its social implications. Loyalty therefore emerged from the political disputes of the 1840's as the basis for a political consensus in the diverse society of Upper Canada.
FOOTNOTES


2 Western Herald, January 3, 1838; Ibid., April 3, 1838; see also issues of June 5 and November 6, 1838 in which traditional Tory beliefs about the American threat were restated with increased vigour in the wake of the rebellion. Cited in R. J. Eady, "Anti-American sentiment in Essex County in the Wake of the Rebellion of 1837", in Ontario History, Vol. 61 (1969), pp. 1-8.


4 Wise, Ibid., p. 45.


The class-based interpretation has been developed in both J. M. S. Careless, The Pre-Confederation Premiers, p. 24, and Alison Prentice, The School Promoters (Toronto, 1977).

7 The Patriot, December 8, 1840. See also December 11, 1840, December 3, 7, 10, 1841. The Patriot, July 3, 1840; also August 7; 1840. Sir George Arthur noted that Upper Canadians "appear to have been cemented by the blood of Sir Isaac Brock whose memory they still ardently cherish. (Arthur to Lord Normanby, June 8, 1839; in C. R. Sanderson, ed., The Arthur Papers (Toronto, 1959), Vol. II, p. 165.

8 PAC Pamphlets, Ogle R. Gowan, An Important Letter on Responsible Government (Toronto, 1839), p. 10. Gowan proved his own loyalty during the rebellion, as he was quick to note:
It is vain to urge that through his whole life he has been a devoted loyalist; that through the partial insurrections and invasions of 1837, 1838, and 1839, he rushed to the post of danger, and volunteered to expose his body to every passing bullet; nay, even the wounds upon his own body, received in his country's defence, are not sufficient to screen him from the malignant opposition of antagonists, or to hush to silence the calumny of the secret and irresponsible enemy .... (Ibid.)

Gowan's attempts to broaden the Loyalist tradition in Upper Canada were largely unsuccessful in the immediate post-rebellion period. It was not until Upper Canadians became aware of the social problems posed by the massive immigration of poverty-stricken Irish Roman Catholics in the 1840's, and began to perceive the increasing "French domination" of the Union that the Orange Order gained some respectability.


9pac, Durham Papers, Baldwin to Lord Glenelg, July 13, 1836; quoted in J. M. S. Careless, "Robert Baldwin", in his The Pre-Confederation Premiers, p. 109.

Baldwin developed the same arguments in a letter to Lord Durham, the themes of which were contained in the Report. Baldwin wrote: "You must give those in whom the people have confidence an interest in preserving the system of your Government, and maintaining the connection with the Mother Country, and then you will hear no grievances because real ones will be redressed, imaginary ones will be forgotten."

(Cf. PAC Reports, 1922 (Ottawa, 1923), p. 327; Durham Papers, Baldwin to Durham, August 23, 1838).


11The Church, April 13, 1839; see also the issues of August 21 and September 7, 1839.

12Toronto Patriot, December 11, 1840; the British Colonist also saw responsible government as a measure "leading to disserver our connection with the mother country" (November 21, 1843).


14British Colonist, September 23, & 30, 1840; see also the Toronto Patriot, September 7, 1841.
15. Legislative Assembly of Canada, Journals, June 13, 1841, p. 7; St. Catharines Journal, July 1, 1841.


18. Toronto Patriot, February 14, 1841.


20. Metcalfe to Lord Stanley, October 9, 1843; quoted in George Metcalf, "William Henry Draper" in Careless, ed., Pre-Confederation Premiers, p. 64. Metcalfe, like Sydenham, linked economic improvements with loyalty, and campaigned on the slogan: "loyal men and liberal measures."


One day later, (April 25, 1843), Metcalfe attacked the development of party sentiment:

"The violence of party spirit forces itself on one's notice immediately on arrival in the colony; and threatens to be the source of all the difficulties which are likely to impede the successful administration of the government for the welfare and happiness of the country."

(Quoted, Ibid., p. 167).

22. Metcalfe to Stanley, October 9, 1843; in Metcalf, p. 64. This sentiment was echoed by many Upper Canadians; in a letter to Peter Brown, Isaac Buchanan stated that the Governor had "Responsibility to the people of the colony." (British Colonist, January 20, 1844); British Colonist, February 16, 1844; Metcalfe's address "To the Warden and Councillors of the Gore District."

Metcalfé's biographer also noted that: "Inevitability, to a man who had spent his life in India, patronage was all important .... Patronage was the spring and framework of government; it was government and surrendering it, you surrendered all."

Metcalfe to Stanley, September 26, 1844; cited Leacock, p. 250.

Quoted in G. French, Parsons & Politics: The role of the Wesleyan Methodists in Upper Canada & The Maritimes from 1780 to 1855 (Toronto, 1962), p. 227; It was a contest between "the royal prerogative as against partisanship in government," Ryerson mistrusted party spirit which he saw as "the bane and curse of this country for many years. It has neither eyes nor ears—nor principle of reason," (Christian Guardian, July 11, 1838); see C. B. Sissons, "Ryerson and the Election of 1844", in the Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 23 (1942) 167, 172. Ryerson saw party government as a "system of political and moral corruption" which was "the essence of responsible government."

PAC Pamphlets, Egerton Ryerson, Sir Charles Metcalfe Defended Against the Attacks of His Late Councillors (Toronto, 1844) p. 143.

Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, December 6, 1843. Thomas C. Street emphasized the same point in a letter to W. H. Merritt—a moderate who broke with Baldwin and supported the Governor over the question of patronage:

I am, of course, as every other inhabitant of the Province ought to be, a staunch supporter of the British Crown, an admirer of British laws and institutions, and naturally jealous of any attempt to lessen or weaken the authority of the Government—by unreasonable demands, or the following up a system of executive policy entirely at variance and inconsistent with what I understand to be Her Majesty's prerogative as exercised in this Province through her legal representative.


British Colonist, January 5, 1844; see also Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, January 10, 1844.

Buchanan attacked Robert Baldwin as "the colonial republican," and attempted to illustrate the Reform leader's disloyalty during the rebellion. Buchanan accepted the traditional Tory argument that loyalty must be proven and said: "Let us say we shall consider a man loyal who would turn out to defend the Government, in case of a rebellion occurring tomorrow; and the proof of this we shall require, is his not having declined to turn out in 1837." Baldwin, he argued, preferred "his party to his country, at the late rebellion, declining to fight against the former, or turn out
in defence of the latter ...." (British Colonist, January 9, 1844).

Even the Tory Kingston Chronicle believed that Buchanan took his charges too far and defended Baldwin's loyalty. "How absurd then is it for Mr. Buchanan to propound such doctrines at this time of day — that because a man has once been suspected of disloyalty, he is forever after to be proscribed although his public acts are not only unexceptionable in themselves but are found worthy of commendation by the great majority. (Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, January 10, 1844).

27 British Colonist, February 16, 1844; see also editions of March 12, & 27, April 9, 1844.

28 Quoted in the British Colonist, April 20, 1844; the same themes were developed in a letter from Thomas Parke, M.P.P., "on the Political State of the Country" to the St. Thomas Chronicle, reprinted Ibid., May 10, 1844.

29 British Colonist, October 11, 1844.


31 Quoted in The Examiner, January 12, 1844.

32 Quoted in Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald: The Young Politician (Toronto, 1968), p. 94.


34 British Colonist, November 21, 1843.

35 The Patriot, May 7, 1841; see also The Church, August 3 & 24, 1839, and British Colonist, November 21, 1843.

36 In the British Colonist, January 5, 1844.

37 Ibid., January 23, 1844; an electoral address by John W. Partridge, "To the Farmers of the First Riding of York" also outlined the belief that constitutional balance was threatened by the emergence of parites. It represented, "the too great power of the Democratic principle." (British Colonist, May 14, 1844).

38 British Colonist, January 23, 1844. Egerton Ryerson also equated party with developments in New York State; cf. PAC Pamphlets, Egerton Ryerson, Sir Charles Metcalfe defended against the Attacks of His
Late Councillor's (Toronto, 1844).


The Argus, April 24, 1824, was quoted in Wallace, p. 477.


Party unity was also seen as the means to combat "the aristocrat's wealth, prestige and connection" in the political conflicts with the Clintonians. (Hofstadter, p. 246; Wallace, p. 470). Gradually their goal became the preservation of the party rather than the pursuit of ideological objectives.

42 British Colonist, December 26, 1843.

43 Merritt, p. 199; see also St. Catharines Journal, January 5, 1844.

44 PAC Pamphlets, To the People of Canada, by the Reform Association (Toronto, 1844), p. 12; see also PAC Pamphlets, Address of the Honourable Francis Hincks to the Reformers of Frontenac (Toronto, 1844) p. 6.

45 The Examiner, October 2, 1844; see also St. Catharines Journal, May 31, 1844. At a reform meeting in March 1844, William Hume Blake stated that Upper Canadians were involved in a struggle for British liberty and freedom.

I hesitate not to declare that, much as I glory in the power of Britain, much as I admire her unparalleled greatness, I had rather see them mouldering in the dust than supported by an infringement of those Constitutional principles of liberty upon which they are founded.


46 Kingston Chronicle and Gazette, April 13, 1844; the address of Read Burritt to the electors of Leeds and Grenville contained the same
message: "I am a Canadian—and a British subject by birth and do not hesitate to balance my attachment to the Throne with any man. We ask no more than has been granted to the people of Great Britain." (Brockville Recorder, July 11, 1844).

47 Brockville Recorder, November 31, 1843; at the meeting of the Reform association a few months later, Baldwin stressed the same points before an enthusiastic audience. Stating that he "had proved himself the firm and uncompromising friend of that great and vital principle of British Constitutional Liberty," Baldwin attacked Metchie for casting the Reformers aside "as a menstruous rag." (PAC Pamphlets, Proceedings ... of the Reform Association ..., p. 5).


The Grand Master was repudiated by his followers who believed that Gowan's arguments were "repugnant to the principles of our glorious Constitution" and posed a threat to the "connexion with the British Empire:" (The Statesman, May 25, 1839):

49 Hofstadter, p. 248; Wallace, p. 476; the Albany Argus, April 4, 1824, cited Ibid., p. 477.


J. M. S. Careless has compared the political approach of Hincks to that of the Reform leader, Robert Baldwin:

Baldwin was conservative and aristocratic by temperament; a man of principle acutely, even self-righteously, proud of his integrity, drawn reluctantly into politics by a sense of noblesse oblige and an abiding belief in responsible government. Hincks was flexible and adaptable, at home in the rough-and-tumble colonial business world, an ambitious opportunist who saw the realities of power in politics and was eager to use them to achieve effective, popular, entrepreneurial rule. Yet in their very differences they complemented each other.

Baldwin furnished the idea and the moral authority. Not only did he have position and prestige; he conveyed an air of unassailable rectitude that was worth whole regiments of hot Mackenzie radicals in this critical era after rebellion .... Hincks was the gifted strategist and tactician who provided the staff work for political action to carry Baldwin's idea into effect.

Quoted in The Examiner, June 24, 1840 and repeated September 9, 1840; Hincks was an admirer of British Whigs such as T. B. Macaulay who contributed to the Edinburgh Review.

PAC Pamphlets, Address of the Honorable Francis Hincks to the Reformers of Frontenac (Toronto, 1840), p. 5.

The Examiner, June 24, 1840. Hincks' views on party development and party organization -- in an editorial of April 14, 1841, he stated the importance of a party being "represented by its organs in Parliament, and by the Press which advocates its views" -- were similar to those developed by the Albany Regency.

The Examiner, October 14, 1840. See also PAC, LaFontaine Papers; Hincks to LaFontaine, August 23, 1840.

The Examiner, September 9, 1840; Kingston Herald, in the Examiner, September 30, 1840, also Examiner, April 21, June 9, 1841.

The Examiner, September 9, 1840; specifically, he supported the Bank of Issue scheme; the creation of District Councils, and the Board of Works; the resolution of the alien question; the marriage bill; the Clergy-Reserve question; modifications of the University charter; improvement of the judicial system and education; and abolition of primogeniture; in sum, "measures of improvement" for the province, including a British loan of 1.5 million pounds sterling for canal construction and to reduce colonial debts.

PL, Baldwin Papers, Hincks to W. W. Baldwin, July 7, 1841.

The Harrison amendments of 1841 represented the response of the administration to Baldwin's resolutions which were designed to make the legislature define its position on the question of ministerial responsibility. Harrison, acting as Sydenham's spokesman, omitted Baldwin's reference to the right of the Assembly to hold the executive responsible for every policy of the government; instead, he simply reaffirmed the need for harmony between the executive and the legislature. Both Baldwin and Hincks were compelled to support the Harrison Resolutions, rather than see the whole measure defeated.


The Examiner, September 8, 15, October 6, 1841; Cf. PAC, LaFontaine Papers, Hincks to LaFontaine August 15 and August 23, 1840. Hincks was disgusted with the breakdown of the Reform party because of the intransigence of ultras like John Neilson. A moderate Reform party would isolate the political extremes. When he joined Sydenham, though, he was accused of "having ratted from his party." (Quoted in Leacock, p. 105).


PAC, LaFontaine Papers, Hincks to LaFontaine, April 12, 1839. "Both Hincks and Baldwin opposed co-operation with the French-Canadian Reformers, if LaFontaine sought to pursue "national questions." Cf. Ibid., Hincks to LaFontaine, April 12, 1839 and September 1839 (no day given); Baldwin to LaFontaine, November 26, 1840; Ibid., Hincks to LaFontaine, September 1839; Hincks to LaFontaine, February 14, 1841.


The Examiner, December 8, 1843.

Brockville Recorder, August 15, 1844; it was argued that the concept of party was supported by such significant British politicians as Edmund Burke, Lord John Russell and Lord Stanley.


The Globe, November 17, 1849; see also June 20, 1849.

The Globe, September 9, 1849; see also November 29, 1849.

Brown's attitudes towards party are also illustrated in a series of editorials in The Globe during August 1849. As well, he outlined the basic themes which shaped Reform loyalty. Brown praised the "rational liberty" inherent in the Constitution; (November 27, 1849). The traditional Upper Canadian hostility to the United States was expressed, in editorials of April 14, July 17, 1849; Brown even dragged out the militia myth associated with the War of 1812 to illustrate the historical basis for the Upper-Canadian rejection of the American republican model. (October 30, 1849).

The Examiner, November 20, 1844.

The British historian, Norman Gash, has described similar events taking place in Great Britain in the same period. He argued that the emergence of a party system "destroyed the aristocratic concept of 'the King's Government'." But in the period from 1830 to 1850, party development "was working under the leadership of men who did not subscribe to a doctrine of party supremacy, still less of party infallibility, and in a society where local interests and opinions were still tenacious."


Brown's views about party were still somewhat ambivalent at this late date because he wrote in the same editorial: "Party spirit has been a serious evil in Canada, but within the last few years many of the most agitating questions have been settled and we may now hope for a more discreet discussion of the political topics of the day. We cannot conceal from ourselves, moreover, that the complete settlement of our constitutional system — the full admission of responsible government — has changed the aspect of political parties, has removed the great line of demarcation, and prepared the way for future co-operation of all parties on questions tending to the advancement of the country."

Although as one English historian has remarked: "The style of British politics down to 1867 was about a generation behind that of American politics." (H. J. Hanham, Elections and Party Management: Politics in the Time of Disraeli and Gladstone (Sussex, 1978) p. x).

(Toronto, 1976), p. 175; Cf. A. S. Foord, His Majesty's
Opposition, 1714-1830 (Oxford, 1964); Cf. Ward, pp. 172-208;
Ibid., p. 264; the Tories supported the harmony concept rather
than party government, pp. 278-279.

77 Cash, pp. xi-xii.

78 Quoted, Ward, p. 205; Ibid., 205-207; Francis Hincks, as noted above,
drew his ideas from Whig political theorists.

Ibid., p. 290; the arguments of the Upper Canadian Reformers
paralleled those of the British Whigs.

79 Quoted, Ibid., p. 278.

80 Ibid., p. 250, See also Martin, Foundations of Canadian Nationhood, p.
116.

81 Brockville Recorder, June 13, 1844.

82 Ibid., see also Kingston Herald, May 7, 1844.

83 The Examiner, March 20, 1844.

84 Kingston Herald, September 10, 1844; see also The Globe, September 10,
1844.

85 Kingston Herald, May 14, 1844.

86 Kingston Herald, October 22, 1844; see also R. B. Sullivan's speech,
PAC Pamphlets, Proceedings of the Reform Association, p. 25 and
Brockville Recorder, December 21, 1843.

The Reformers were drawing upon arguments that they had been using
without noticeable success since the 1830's. They believed that
the Tories were attempting "to arrogate to themselves" exclusive
loyalty. A letter from Adam Fergusson to the Inhabitants of the
Township of Nichol, for example, affirmed Reform loyalty and
attacked the Tories who wished to preserve "the ancient régime by
which the administration of affairs was conducted without any
regard for -- and often in direct opposition to -- the majority of
the people's representatives."

(Hamilton Journal, quoted by the St. Catharines Journal, February
9, 1844).

The Kingston Herald had earlier argued that "the tory principle of
government" was "to concentrate all power and profit in the hands
of a few ...." Moreover Tory loyalty meant "British rule as under-
stood, and administered by themselves .... The Tories closely
connect the maintenance of British rule with the maintenance of
themselves in power." (in The Examiner, January 1, 1840). The
Reformers, of course, believed that they were less self-serving and
more disinterested.


89 Reported in The Independent, October 25, 1849; quoted in G. A. Hallowell, p. 43. Other journals which supported the concept of annexation were the Toronto Mirror, Prescott Telegraph, and Kingston Argus. Several letters to the British Colonist developed the same themes; cf. May 11, 25, 1849.

90 In Merritt, pp. 365-367.

91 Reported in Brockville Recorder, March 15, 1849; repeated May 24, 1849. See also The Globe, March 21, April 14, June 20, July 3, 28, 1849.

92 The Globe, November 17, 1849.

93 British Colonist, October 12, 1849; TPL Pamphlets, A. N. Bethune, The Duty of Loyalty (A Sermon Preached at Cobourg, October 21, 1849) (Cobourg, 1849).

94 In Rev. Walter McCleary, The Committee on Orange Loyalty. One Man's Loyalty (Toronto, 1953).

After its initial flirtation with annexation, the Patriot returned to its traditional Tory position which stressed, like Bethune, the superiority of Canadian institutions over those of the United States: "Stubborn facts prove that Canada, under British rule, with all the drawbacks of a miserable misgovernment, unjust tariffs (sic), denial of protection in British and British colonial markets, uninterlaced with railroads, and with an enormous debt, is advancing in prosperity with greater rapidity, than any portion of the United States . . . ." (November 28, 1849).

95 Minutes of the Proceedings of a Convention of Delegates of the British American League ... (Kingston, 1849), pp. 7-8; quoted in Creighton, p. 144.

See also Debates of the Toronto Convention, cited in Hallowell, p. 53; see also Wise, "The Annexation Movement and its Effect on Canadian Opinion, 1837-1867," p. 44. The Reformers saw the British American League as just another expression of the Tory party. (Cf. The Globe, July 31, August 5, 1849.)

96 Elgin to Lord Grey, March 23, 1850, quoted in Martin, Empire and Commonwealth, pp. 317-318.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

By 1850, after decades of controversy over its meaning and implications, there was a large measure of agreement in Upper Canadian perceptions of the idea of loyalty. That agreement was part, even the central part, of a consensus on which the politics of Canada West were based and which was social as well as political in its content. The mid-century consensus was basically conservative, but the idea of loyalty which it incorporated was very different from the Tory definition that had first been ineffectually challenged fifty years before. For most of that period, Tories had more often than not been able to frame the terms of the political debate over the nature of loyalty; but from the 1820's, moderate Reformers enunciated coherent alternatives to Tory ideas, and during the next two decades those alternatives were not only further elaborated but were also increasingly accepted by moderate Tories. The resulting moderate consensus on the nature of loyalty never had to face a serious challenge from the left, because the weak strain of radicalism in Upper Canada was discredited by its attempt at rebellion. Those High Tories who clung to their original conceptions of loyalty found themselves, in the end, undermined by changing imperial policy and out-numbered by the steady growth of conservative moderation. Loyalty to the imperial connection remained the most central of their political ideas; and on occasion still the most formidable of their political weapons; but the erosion of their position left them unable either to hold political power themselves or to define the terms on which it would be held. That erosion was accomplished by an evolution of the idea of loyalty, not by
its rejection as the central issue in Upper Canadian politics. In the
process of evolution, the most explicit initiatives were taken by
moderate Reformers. Neither able nor willing to challenge the central
importance of loyalty, they proceeded to re-define it in ways that
legitimized their own political goals. Since those goals appeared to
lead to a practicable political system, and since they were acceptable to
moderate Tories, the revised conception of loyalty retained its utility.
It formed the basis for a political ideology more complex, more
adaptable and more widely shared than the Tory beliefs from which it had
begun.

The amalgam of beliefs and attitudes from which the concept of
loyalty was formed by the end of the 1840's included few questions that
would have been new twenty years before, but many of the answers were
different. Loyalty still required adherence to the imperial connection,
but the emotional insistence that the connection was beyond question or
modification had become an anachronism. The tie with Great Britain was
accepted as beneficial to the province, although investment and immigration
had replaced mercantilist regulations as the means of economic support.
British constitutional models were as sacred as ever, even if the aspects
of the constitution that were identified as models continued to be matters
for debate. Loyalty still included a view of the United States as
dangerous, but more as an aggressive and possibly expansionist neighbour
than as a source of radical subversion. It was even possible, without
disloyalty, to refer to the United States as progressive, as sharing a
common Anglo-Saxon heritage or character, or as sharing with Upper Canada
the special position of being in the New World. The idea of the province
as a special Loyalist homeland was not dead, but it was a nostalgic
ornament to loyalty, not a vital part of its political implications. The notion of "fortress Ontario" was no longer of use to support the claim of a Tory elite to exclusive political leadership.

It was the exclusiveness of the old Tory loyalty that had been most thoroughly defeated. It had been supplanted by an assimilative concept of loyalty for which Reformers had argued since before the War of 1812, and which even earlier had lain behind Simcoe's land-granting policy. Loyalty did not have to be earned by attachment to the Loyalist tradition or by acceptance into a Tory elite; it was the common property of respectable inhabitants and could be acquired through proper social values and good citizenship as settlement developed. The old Tory faith in the inculcation of loyalty was retained, but the instrument of inculcation was to be an educational system under state, not Anglican, control.

In the defeat of exclusiveness, however, there was little trace of egalitarianism or of social radicalism. Moderate Reformers were as committed as Tories to a stable, hierarchical society, with a rural base in which inequality would not be a problem because of the widespread ownership of land and the growing prosperity of the province. The assimilative concept of loyalty was based on the constitutional rights of British subjects, especially if those subjects were respectable men of property; there were no democrats among the effective participants in the debate on the nature of loyalty.

Perhaps the shift from an exclusive to an assimilative character was the greatest change made in the understanding of loyalty during the first half of the nineteenth century. It opened the political arena to groups which would hardly have acquired in their continued exclusion, and which would otherwise have had to seek more radical justifications.
for their admission. It transformed the idea of loyalty from an aristocratic apologia for a narrow oligarchy into the basic assumption of a developing middle-class political system. It also enabled the idea of loyalty to encompass a provincial feeling, looking to the future, rather than to the past and expressed in nationalist rather than Loyalist rhetoric. That provincial feeling, in turn, was called upon in support of a desire for increased local autonomy, although the arguments for local autonomy were also legitimized by appeals to British constitutional principles.

The hottest debates involving the nature of loyalty were those over which British constitutional principles should be taken as models for Upper Canada. Here there was a progression both in the success and in the moderation of Reformers. First, they developed a justification for individual expressions of political dissent, based on the constitutional rights of British subjects and, by analogy to the House of Commons, on the independence of legislators; appeals to natural rights and natural law, or to American practice, were too open to counter-charges of disloyalty to be effective. Next came the justification of a formed opposition in the Assembly, and then of ministerial responsibility and of party government. When these justifications were met, not only with moderate Tory acceptance but with imperial sanction, the new measure of agreement over the nature of loyalty was completed; and it had also achieved its definitive political expression.

The acceptance of a party system, with a legitimate opposition and a responsible ministry, was a victory for moderate Reform. Yet the evolution of parties in the 1850's reflected the conservatism of the ideological consensus which had been reached. Parties did not approach
the question of the future political and social development of the province with the same ideological intensity as their predecessors, because that issue had been resolved by the failure of the rebellion and confirmed by the attainment of responsible government. Enduring success went only to those Reformers who became conservative enough to think that it was more important to preserve the new status quo than to keep the banner of Reform aloft. The reorganization of parties in 1854 provided further evidence of this consensus as the Hincksites—the remnants of Robert Baldwin's moderate Reformers—joined the moderate Tories, led by John A. Macdonald, to form the Liberal-Conservative Party. Their opponents, the assorted Reformers and Critics for whom George Brown was sometimes able to speak, also admired British political institutions; they did not look to the example of the United States because local self-government had been achieved within the imperial system.

The development of political consensus was matched by the success of a new political elite. Unlike the old Tory Compact, which reflected the traditional aspirations of landed society, the new elite reflected the concerns of an urban and commercial community. It represented the success of the "respectable" middle class in Upper Canada—prosperous professional men like John A. Macdonald, Francis Hincks, George Brown, and Egerton Ryerson. They represented a class which felt increasingly optimistic about provincial development because of the progress and prosperity spurred by the commercial expansion associated with railway construction, increased investments of British and American capital, and, finally, reciprocity in natural products with the United States. Yet the prospect of closer economic relations with the Americans did not raise the spectre of disloyalty. With the reorientation of traditional trade
patterns in the 1840's, provincial economic development replaced political development as the primary consideration of the administration. The pessimism which underpinned the loyalty debate before 1850 -- the concern about the continued existence of Upper Canada as part of the empire -- had dissipated. Both Tories and Reformers supported reciprocity because greater access to American markets would fuel continued economic growth.

The desire for reciprocity also reflected a shift in Upper Canadian perceptions about the United States. The threat of an aggressive and expansionist neighbour diminished, and there were references to the United States sharing with the province the common position of being in North America. The Globe remarked, for instance: "It is a miserable affair at this time of day to build up the walls between people of the same origin and language, and inhabiting the same country." For the new political elite, like the old Compact Tories, it was essential that the province continue to prosper if it was to survive as a viable community.

The confidence stimulated by provincial development was expressed in a growing sense of nationalism. Clear Grits, defending themselves against the charge of disloyalty because of their sympathy for republican institutions, could assert their loyalty in provincial rather than in imperial terms:

We look with unutterable contempt upon every man ... who attempts to teach us loyalty .... A rough Canadian ... knows what loyalty to Canada means. He knows that in Canada, not in England, are his home, his possessions, his wife, his children....

Our loyalty commences and ends with our country.

The optimism about Canada's future, expressed in nationalist terms,
was maintained as a consequence of the nation-building associated with Confederation and the expansionist movement into the North-West. Politicians like D'Arcy McGee and Edward Blake sought consciously to stimulate a sense of nationalism to complement Canadian development. Edward Blake, a leader of the Liberal Party, declared in his Aurora speech of October 3, 1874 that: "The future of Canada, I believe, depends upon the cultivation of a national spirit." This new sense of nationalism reintroduced a measure of the traditional Canadian distrust of the United States because of the Civil War and the abrogation of reciprocity; the Globe viewed American expansion with alarm; the Americans were "... a people ... (who) have before now proved themselves aggressive -- a people who believe in 'manifest destiny,' 'universal sovereignty,' and other ideas not very reassuring to their neighbours.' As a counter-balance to the American threat, the imperial connection remained important. But there was increased emphasis upon Canadian autonomy; during the Confederation Debates, John A. Macdonald had said that: "Gradually a different colonial system is being developed -- and it will become, year by year, less a case of dependence on our part, and of over-ruling protection on the part of the Mother Country, and more a case of healthy and cordial alliance." While the controversy over the nature of loyalty had diminished, the idea itself still influenced Canadian responses.

Loyalty re-emerged as a contentious issue in the late 1880's. The optimism and confident nationalism of the Confederation period diminished in the face of growing uncertainty about Canada's future. The doubts reflected the heightened conflict between English and French Canadians as a result of the Riel controversy and the pessimism associated with the
disappointing results of the National Policy. The responses were framed in terms of loyalty, and the issue of racial conflict gave an opportunity for the resurrection of many of the old High Tory ideas about the nature of the concept. The emergence of Canadian imperialism in this period, for instance, produced a defence of Canada which looked to British traditions as the predominant influences shaping national development. The emotional loyalty of the imperialists required adherence to the imperial connection without question because of its political and economic benefits; the idea of Canada as a specialist Loyalist bastion re-emerged; and the spectre of annexation to the United States reinforced apprehensions of the expansionist republic to the south. Canadian imperialism, as Carl Berger has concluded, "was one variety of Canadian nationalism—a type of awareness of nationality which rested upon a certain understanding of history, the national character, and the national mission."

The pessimism of the period also engendered significant hostility to the Canadian political system—hostility which was expressed in old Tory terms. The growing criticism of the excessive partisanship and corruption associated with political parties was represented most forcefully in the observations of an outsider—Goldwin Smith. Smith, a former professor of history at Oxford and Cornell, saw himself as a liberal, but articulated the traditional High Tory fears of party; during his association with Canada First in the 1870's, he asked:

What is there to preserve our parties from gradually becoming mere factions, and our country from becoming the unhappy scene of a perpetual struggle of factions for place? ... For party without principles inevitably becomes a faction; and faction as inevitably
supports itself by intrigue, demagogism and corruption. Smith's equation of party government with faction meant that he would not join a political party because he supported the idea of a "national government" which could rise above partisan conflicts. By the 1890's, Smith was arguing that party government was not simply corrupt, it was disloyal; he stated that: "All but pure straightforward and honourable conduct in the management of public affairs is disloyalty." Smith was not an isolated voice; as Berger suggests, the Canadian imperialists and the intellectual community in general expressed hostility to the party system. J.C. Dent, the journalist and historian, who also saw himself as a liberal, believed that there was little to distinguish between Canada's political parties; they had "outlived their usefulness." His newspaper, Arcturus, could support "no individual party or clique" because, quoting the Toronto Mail:

Party government has simply been a contest of factions, each side fighting for its own hand, and both agreeing to shirk those great moral and political questions which must be settled if the prosperity of the country is to endure.

While Smith and Dent shared the disgust of the imperialists with the Canadian political system, they did not support the goal of closer imperial ties. Dent believed imperial federation was "totally impracticable:" he felt that the only alternatives facing the nation were "annexation or independence." As a nationalist, he supported Canadian independence, although he noted that "loyalty to the British name and traditions is quite consistent with a severance of our political connection." Goldwin Smith argued that closer imperial ties represented colonialism rather than nationalism, and were, therefore, disloyal:
To say that loyalty consists in keeping this community always in dependence on a community three thousand miles off, and condemning it to be without a life of its own, is to set loyalty at fatal odds not only with nature but with genuine sentiment.\(^{14}\)

This was an idiosyncratic conception of loyalty. It did not merely omit, it positively excluded the imperial connection; and yet Smith did not share Dent's commitment to national development. He simply believed that Canada -- "a number of fishing rods tied together by the ends" -- had no future. He advocated the unity of the Anglo-Saxon peoples and North America through a reunion with the United States, and wrote:

> On this continent, not in Europe; in the New World, not in the Old, the lot of Canada and of Canadians is cast. This fixes our general destiny.... This sets the mark of our aspirations and traces the line of our public duty. This determines for us what is genuinely loyal.\(^{15}\)

Smith was especially appalled by the exploitation of the loyalty question during the election of 1891. The Liberals had adopted the policy of unrestricted reciprocity as a means to stimulate Canadian economic expansion. It was argued that closer economic links with the United States would, in fact, invigorate feelings of loyalty. W. R. Lockhart Gordon wrote: "by improving the prosperity and increasing the wealth of the country we are strengthening the whole of the British Empire."\(^{16}\) But they were opposed by the Macdonald-led Conservatives, who had been rebuffed in their attempts to attain a reciprocity agreement and were desperate for a political issue to revive their sagging fortunes. As a consequence, they fell back, once more, on the loyalty question. Sir John A. equated the Liberal policy with annexation and so attacked it as
disloyal, in terms that might have been familiar in Tory rhetoric over the Alien Question. He declared that "the great contest that is now going on ... will determine whether Canada is to remain British or become part of the United States." J. Castell Hopkins, an imperialist, later wrote that the election involved "the principles of British unity, British commerce, and British sympathy as against Continental unity, Continental trade, and Continental sympathy." 17

Although many factors contributed to the Tory victory in 1891, the loyalty issue was once again significant, as the Liberals themselves noted in their election post-mortems. 18 The popularity of the question was not lost on that master tactician, Macdonald, either: in a letter to George Stephen, the Prime Minister conveyed his willingness to exploit loyalty yet again for maximum political benefit:

... I was surprised and grieved to find the hold unrestricted reciprocity had got of our farmers ... I have of course pointed out that unrestricted reciprocity meant annexation, and the movements of Cartwright, Farrer and Wiman enabled us to raise the loyalty cry, which had considerable effect. 19

The idea of loyalty therefore had continued vitality in post-Confederation Canada; and with the resurgence of imperialism its rhetoric sometimes raised echoes of its early nineteenth-century form. It remained central to the debate about the country's future in the late nineteenth century; it also remained as a potent political weapon with which the Tories could assail their opponents. Loyalty had been modified and made more assimilative and nationalist by the political evolution of the nation, but a majority of Canadians remained committed to the preservation of a British-Canadian society in North America.
FOOTNOTES


2 The North American, October 30, 1850.


4 Quoted in Frank Underhill, "Political Ideas of the Upper Canadian Reformers, 1867-1878" in his In Search of Canadian Liberalism (Toronto, 1975), p. 82.

5 The Globe, June 1, 1871, quoted in R. C. Brown, "Canadian Opinion after Confederation, 1867-1914", in S. F. Wise and R. C. Brown, Canada Views the United States: Nineteenth-Century Political Attitudes, p. 109. Brown also discusses the continued criticism of the political institutions of the American republic, especially "the lack of impartial responsible authority." (p. 119).

6 Quoted in Frank H. Underhill, The Image of Confederation (Toronto, 1970), p. 10. The Globe echoed the same sentiment in an editorial of August 2, 1864: "The day may come when we shall be in a position to offer to Great Britain the friendship of a powerful and independent ally ...."


11 For a more complete biography of Dent see Donald Swainson's introduction to J. C. Dent, The Last Forty Years: The Union of 1841 to Confederation (Toronto, 1972), pp. v-vi.

12 Arcturus, February 19, 1887; January 15, 1887.
Ibid., January 15, 1887; February 12, 1887.

Smith, p. 236. In commenting on the colonial nature of Canadian imperialism, Smith wrote:

In the British Empire loyalty seems to have the peculiarity of being eminently colonial. It is like the reverence for the Papacy, the intensity of which was always found to vary in direct proportion to the distance from Rome.

(Ibid., p. 229).

Goldwin Smith, Canada and the Canadian Question (reprinted Toronto, 1971), p. 152.


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W. L. Mackenzie Papers (MG 24 B18).

Sir Allan MacNab Papers (MG 24 B17).

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M. S. Bidwell Papers.

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F. J. French Collection.


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Jessup Family Papers.

Solomon Jones Papers.

Macaulay, Papers.

Rebellion of 1837 Papers.

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Sir John Beverley Robinson Papers.
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John Strachan Papers.

3. Toronto Public Library
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Henry John Boulton Papers.
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Jarvis Family Papers.
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W. D. Powell Papers.
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C. Pamphlets

1. Public Archives of Canada

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