A Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance

by

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A Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance

Submitted by

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Thesis Supervisor

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to argue that governance is the primary concern of human individuals and the collective societies in the Western liberal democracies. From the perspectives of governance, this project illustrates the subjective existence of peoples and their relations with one another, which include: the way we care of ourselves, relate to the other individuals, relate to the other societies and cultures, relate to the ‘other sex’; and the exercises of political power, economic power, institutional power, expert power, technical power, cognitive power to govern the self and others. This venture is an engagement that exploits Foucault and Habermas’s intellectual practices with the assistance of Hunt and Wickham, and Rose’s perspective on governance to construct A Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance by deploying concepts such as: genealogy, agonism, the care of the self, critical ethos of the Enlightenment and communicative action.
Dedication

to

whom I owe my life:
my grand mother--Sarah,
Acknowledgment

I am extremely thankful to my thesis supervisor, Alan Hunt, for his encouragements and patience. Without a doubt his guidance made this project possible. Trevor Purvis--thanks for your clarifications and being there for me. As well, I would like to thank my external examiner William Walters.


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Introduction

Our present condition, that of liberal democratic culture, is a period of complex social, political and moral diversity. Different perspectives on the ways in which we should live, take care of ourselves, relate to other individuals, relate to other societies and cultures, relate to the ‘other sex’ are intermeshed and diverse more than ever before. The underlying philosophical theme in this complex period raises two major questions. First, what are the ways in which we govern ourselves? Second, how can we govern ourselves better, more effectively, justifiably, freely, inclusively and in a prosperous fashion?

Governance in this context is about their relations with one another and the subjective existence of peoples, which include: the exercises of political power, economic power, institutional power, expert power, technical power, cognitive power to regulate the self and the others.

This thesis seeks to argue that governance is the primary concern of human individuals and collective societies of the Western liberal democracies. In the light of some primary literature on governance (Hunt and Wickham, 1994, Rose 1996, 1999), the terrain that this thesis project traverses is a thematic rereading of Jürgen Habermas’s critical theory and Michel Foucault’s genealogy from the perspective of the theories of governance¹. Second, this rereading journey will attempt to offer a comprehensive and a fresh perspective of the ways in which a ‘governance’ reading of critical theory and genealogy can produce a fruitful intellectual scenario to advance theoretical approaches: communicative rational and agonistic care-oriented models of governance. Third, and

¹ 'Governance' is not a single and unified theory, however, an array of conceptual and academic attempts are available trying to define governance, the way it operates and analyze the epistemological presuppositions that create the conditions for governance of the ‘self’ and of the ‘others’.
most importantly, I offer a reading of these two intellectual trends in the light of
governance theory in order to advance A Communicative Agonistic Theory of
Governance.

I do not wish this project to be read as an engagement against Foucault and
Habermas, or, to be seen as undermining the governance literature as incomplete. My
purpose is to use, or even to exploit Foucault’s genealogical reflections on the concepts
of power, technologies of the self, care of the self; and Habermas’s critical transcendental
emancipatory thesis in communicative action, lifeworld, system and discourse ethics. I
employ them to assist me construct A Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance.
This thesis is divided into four chapters.

In Chapter One, I provide a genealogical overview of the concept of governance
and situate the ways in which governance as a practice can be related to practices of
critical theory and genealogy. In a general overview, I will criticize the current usages of
governance, which are related to loose cases of the deployment of the concept
‘governance’ in academic disciplines such as: Law, Sociology, Political Science, Political
Economy, Public and Business Administration. Furthermore, I will identify a visible, an
invisible and a liberal model of governance. In the light of governance theory, I analyze
these three models of governance. Finally, in Chapter One, I open up a brief discussion
of the ways in which I will reread Habermas and Foucault’s intellectual projects from the
perspective of governance.

In Chapter Two, I provide a governance reading of Habermas’s critical theory.
However, before I undertake that task, I will sketch the ways in which Habermas’s
critical theory emerged. I will describe and analyze the ways in which the notions of
Enlightenment and maturity reflected in the works of Kant, Hegel, influenced Habermas's critical theory. Furthermore, I will analyze the ways in which Max Weber's notion of the dualism of 'rationality and culture' motivated Habermas to develop a theoretical perspective on the tension between 'system' and 'life-world'.

In addition, in Chapter Two I will focus on reinterpretation of four main themes of critical theory: the theory of knowledge constitutive interests, communicative action, moral consciousness and discourse from the perspective of governance. Thus, Chapter Two will be concerned with rereading Habermas's critical theory from the perspective of governance that argues critical theory can be read as a communicative rational model of governance.

Chapter Three will be concerned with governance via a reading of Foucault's intellectual projects in which I will construct agonistic care-oriented model of governance. I discuss and analyze Foucault's advocacy of the Enlightenment's critical ethos in relation to Kant's What is Enlightenment? And Nietzsche's impact on Foucault's views of the genealogical critique of the universal transcendental assumptions of Enlightenment thought. As I note that Foucault and Wittgenstein share some views on the discussion of discourse and language games. The underlining argument in Chapter Three will be an attempt to establish Foucault's critical attitude and The Care of the Self as agonistic care-oriented model of governance.

In Chapter Four, I undertake the construction of A Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance. This Chapter will attempt to merge both traditions of thought. However, I will criticize Habermas's 'submission to the force of the better argument' and argue that the absence of interest theory in Habermas's communicative action is a major
concern. Third, I will use the relevant arguments made in Chapters One, Two and Three to make the case for a Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance.

Why this project? This project emerged as the result of a gap in the literature on Foucault/Habermas debate. It is an attempt to recognize important elements of each of the two intellectual projects and using governance perspectives to develop a Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance.

This theory of governance should not be read as an attempt that provides a reconstructive positivist approach that believes it is possible to get the techniques and the theories of governance ‘right’ in general and, more specifically, in advanced liberal democracies. Rather, it is an attempt to call attention to a different focus by undertaking a rereading and a reinterpretation of Habermas’s and Foucault’s intellectual work to pave the way for a new theory of governance.

The framework that I will adopt, in carrying out this project, enables me to provide a constructive insight into the techniques of social (public) and self (private) forms of governance in relations to Habermas’s and Foucault’s intellectual—theoretical work. Moreover, the work of each will be examined with reference to themes of Enlightenment, maturity, modernity, universalism, transcendentalism, agonism, the care of the self, discontinuity of history and a short discussion of action theory. Other themes such as communicative action, discourse ethics, genealogy power/knowledge, discourse and discursive formations will be examined. The relationship between these themes and the theme of this Thesis, governance, is not direct; rather, it is the task of this project to map these links.
The limitation of this project should be taken into account. This project represents only a minor engagement between the two traditions of thought. While I understand these limitations, I would like to propose more research in this area since it represents a source of fruitful engagement for governance scholars and the others who work within Habermasian and Foucaultian traditions.
Chapter One: Genealogy: Embracing a Governance Perspective

1. Introduction

In this chapter I will provide a genealogical overview of the concept of 'governance' and advance a brief introductory discussion of the ways in which the practices of critical theory and genealogy can be interpreted from the perspective of 'governance', a perspective that I will attempt to construct. This genealogical chapter examines the semantics of governance, an analysis of the existing theories and practices of governance, and lastly, offers some opening remarks on a governance reading of Habermas's 'critical theory' and Foucault's 'genealogy'.

This constructive overview will enable me to develop the analytical tools and rationale to view critical theory and genealogy as two models of governance, this in turn, will assist me in the construction program of A Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance in the chapters to follow.

First, the semantic discussion attempts to advance an analytical standpoint with which I will attempt to point out the ways in which governance in my account diverges from usages such as 'management' and 'government'. Second, I will offer a discussion of governance as it has appeared and has been defined by 'governance' theorists. Thus, while I only focus on the aspect of definition, I will tackle that from semantic and theoretical perspectives. Moreover, I review the relevant theoretical works which have contributed to the advancement of these traditions and understandings of governance.

---

2 There are two usages of 'genealogy' in this chapter. It is important to recognize each of these usages. First usage is derived from Michel Foucault's is project, which abandoned "teleology and deontology" for a genealogical view of history. When I engage in the discussion of Foucault's genealogy, I certainly mean this very project. The second usage of genealogy is my method of investigation in this chapter.
Second, I will put these theories in context by preparing a historical discursive synopsis of how the term ‘governance’ has evolved and is perceived in the practical thrusts of power management of the ‘self’ and of the ‘other’.4

Finally, I adopt an angle of vision that opens a line of reasoning on Habermas and Foucault’s intellectual practices as two models of governance. I will not advance a detailed sketch of this undertaking, rather I use the last section as a transformation stage that connects with the next Chapter and conclude Chapter one by preparing the reader for subsequent assertions that ‘governance’, in my account, can pertain to the practices of critical theory and genealogy.

2. Genealogical Engagement

Let me advance a discussion of the ways in which I employ genealogy as a method of investigation in this chapter. My usage utilizes Nietzsche and Foucault’s method of enquiry that defines “genealogy is a form of historical critique, designed to overturn our norms by revealing their origins” (Edward 1992:1). Borrowing this method of investigation from Nietzsche and Foucault neither to ‘attack modernity’ nor to come down in favour of ‘radical politics’, I wish to deploy this method of exploration to examine the discourse and discursive formation of ‘governance’. I am not proposing a teleological or a deontological argument to settle what ‘governance’ means; in simpler terms, my intention is to rescue the concept and give a more defined socio-political and philosophical meaning based on works of prominent scholars (Hunt and Wickham, 1994;
Rose, 1996; 1999). In so doing, it is my intention to contribute to that engagement using
genealogy as a method of investigation.

A genealogical method allows me to explore different engagements with the term;
as a method, it depicts the ability to map out contingent characteristics of knowledge and
practices of politics with respect to divergent usages of governance. Genealogy as a
project has been criticized for its inability to offer any solutions because it only pictures
the world rather than demonstrating the ability to offer answers. This means that
genealogy as a method shows the exchange of differing discourses and discourse
formations. My usage of genealogy is a methodological orientation that denotes an
historical critique and analysis of the ways in which governance is theorized and
perceived presently. I am not in search of ‘true origin’ of governance, as there might not
be a ‘true origin’ after all. Certainly, I will study the past ‘to disturb’ the present, so that
new rethinking—and other beginnings—may emerge.

3. Shaping and Constituting the Semantics of Governance

In this section, I will characterize the ways in which I define and advance a usage
of governance that distinguishes it from other usages such as ‘government’ and
‘management’. In order to realize this task, I will approach the parameters of the
proposed characterization of governance from a semantic perspective and from a
theoretically grounded standpoint. It is with the connotation and the meaning of the term
‘governance’ that I am concerned in this section.

---

5 Habermas launched a continuous critique of Foucault and Nietzsche’s genealogy throughout the 1980s
and 1990s in the name of ‘reason’, the Enlightenment ideals, universal transcendentalism. The critiques of
the critical theorists continue on the Foucaultian tradition charging it with ‘a mixture of empirical insights
Let me briefly elaborate on what I mean by a 'semantic' and a theoretical perspective: how are these two engagements different or related? First, a semantic account is the study of the meaning of the term 'governance' from an historical perspective. It is an examination of significations and changes of theoretical developments in relation to the discourses of 'governance'. Hence, a semantic discussion is an engagement that deals with the meaning, denotation, extension and naming of the term in relation to the ways it has been signified in encyclopedias, dictionaries and governance literature. This investigation is a general semantic outlook on 'governance', and it attempts to shed light on what the term has represented and represents symbolically.

Second, a theoretical account is the elucidation of how the concept has been constructed in the 'governance' literature. This is a search for a plausible definition, an acceptable general principle or body of principles offered in these theories to explain what governance signifies. This undertaking is the observation of the theoretical analysis in relation to discourses and discursive formation of 'governance'. Although, I will provide more elaborate discussion of the theories in question in section two of this Chapter, the theoretical commitment in this section is to engage with the aspect of definition and meaning, it is not a detailed description and analysis of the theories.

Semantically, the word 'governance' brings our attention to government, regime, rule, administration, control and direction. In common practice, it means a system by which a political body controls and continues exercises of authority over a political unit. Although, there are different approaches as to what 'governance' is, as a generic term it refers to the application of control and management in various regimes of political and
administrative organization. As a result of its generic character, there is a range of interpretations of the term. It appears to be fashionable and in style to include the keyword ‘governance’ in the title of articles and research topics. I am puzzled by it. Different forms of governance as well as diverse definitions of the term have made it vague, imprecise and hard to define.

The Social Sciences Encyclopedia argues that while the term ‘governance’ may apply to the exercise of power in institutional contexts, it stipulates that the objective of governance is to guide, take charge and order the activities of citizens with respect to daily political engagements. Accordingly, three terms are crucial for understanding this definition of governance “accountability, legitimacy and transparency” (Kuper and Kuper 1996:387). These three associated terms indicate a close bond between governance and political processes, specifically, with respect to public administration and what used to be called ‘statesmanship’. It is vital to note that accountability, legitimacy and transparency are principally concerned with processes rather than the definition of the bodies that govern.

Distinguishing 'government' from 'governance'. The Dictionary of Social Sciences defines 'government' as an “activity or process of governing, exercising of control over others; the inducing of certain others to behave in specified ways, as required”(Kuper and Kuper 1996:293). I wish to distinguish 'governance' from 'government' and the reason for this separation is to attempt to settle some mischief and overlap the terms governance and government may carry. I argue that 'government' should refer to institution-body or the bodies that govern, and 'governance' should refer to the ruling processes including the epistemological justifications behind it. Thus,
governance involves activities as such orders, rules, legitimatization, validation of the actions of governing bodies and institutions of the body politic in charge of controlling the ‘health and wealth of the population’\(^6\). If we are to settle this overlap between governance and government, then we must be more precise in our engagement with each of the concepts. This argument might seem awkward due to the fact that conventional wisdom and traditional perceptions have used the two terms interchangeably to mean the political body therefore it might be ungainly to propose changes in this respect. It is my objective to define the existing fine line between ’government’ as the institution—body politic—and ‘governance’ as the wide range of processes and activities which the body politic undertakes to govern, control and manage the health and wealth of the population living under its rule.

One of the uses of the term ‘governance’ early in the 20\(^{th}\) Century appeared in a work by Sir Sidney Low titled *The Governance of England*, in which Low used the term to probe British government\(^7\), but the term is not in the index of the book nor defined in the manuscript; it is a synonym for government. Low’s usage of governance is a substitute for ‘government’. Gerry Stoker argues that ‘governance’ traditionally is perceived to be a synonym for government. He states that, “the traditional use of ‘governance’ and its dictionary entry define it as a synonym for government” (Stoker 1998:17). But a paradigm shift has taken place and a move from traditional perceptions of governance has occurred. This paradigm shift has been further influenced by Foucault’s lecture on governmentality in 1978. While there is a common claim that the

\(^{6}\) See Foucault, Michel. 1995.
\(^{7}\) See Low, Sir Sidney. 1914.
'outputs' of government are not different from those of governance, (Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1997; Rosenau 1992; Kooiman, 1993), I wish to contest this assertion.

Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, governance has appeared increasingly in management literature as corporate governance, clinical governance, policy governance, data governance, good governance, globalization governance, board of governance and so forth. In most of the fields of the social sciences and humanities 'governance' is in fashionable usage. To name a few law, sociology, political science, political economy, public administration, business and other related fields of study, one way or the other, have showed interest in and have engaged with 'governance.' The academic literature on governance is eclectic and relatively disjoint (Jessop 1995). Stoker suggests that the theoretical roots of governance are various: institutional economics, international relations, organizational studies, development studies, political science, public administration and Foucaultian inspired theorists (Stoker 1998).

For the most part, in the fields of sociology, philosophy and sociology of law the level of encounter with 'governance' from theoretical and practical perspectives captures the inner complexity of the term. The study of governance in these fields is often influenced by the 'governmentality' literature and other works of Foucault. However, in almost all other fields of study such as political economy, business administration, public administration and policy, the usage is oversimplified, loosely utilized and substituted for one or combinations of the followings: managerialism, government, regulation and corporatism. Such oversimplifications and loose utilizations take away the importance and crucial attributes that a more defined notion of 'governance' carries. Governance in my account should be equated with the process in which a political body/unit engages to
run the business of the society and community that it is ruling: 'governance' includes all the values, basic principles, modes and types of justifications to which the governing body or the political state looks for justifications and validation; because governance cannot be separated from knowledge.

Moreover, another misperception of governance is common when it is perceived in more practical context of the exercise of authority and it does not very much go beyond the analysis of the existing structure. It does not denote clues and hidden discourses, which every now and then get mobilized to achieve certain end-results, or at times discourses are pushed back and trashed as they lack specific criterion of legitimatization, validation or efficiency and therefore impractical. This common perception of governance does not attempt to examine the underlying epistemological presuppositions, and it does not explain the deeper and more complex factors behind ruling in specific manner.

R. A. W. Rhodes states that there are at minimum six diverse usages of "governance: as the minimal state, as corporate governance, as the new public management, as 'good governance,' as a socio-cybernetic system and as self-organizing networks" (Rhodes 1996:653). It is not my inclination to go through each use of governance Rhodes presents, I wish focus on one his examples, which engages with 'governance' from a managerial and administrative perspective.

---

8 I will come back to this discussion later in this section. See Foucault's 'power-knowledge' relationship. See Hunt & Wickham's third principle of governance (1984:87-92).
9 In Britain a massive literature has been published on governance referring to practical exercise of authority. Most of this literature does not engage in the discussion of the discourses relevant to the particular method and ways of governance. This approach is an emerging perspective in the rest of Liberal Democratic societies.
Although management is a term that does not connote the depth of the internal factors as self-imposed rules and regulation in normative and governmentality spheres of governance, management has been related to governance in a close fashion. There exists a relationship between governance and management, however the two are not compatible. There are several reasons to press a conceptual distinction between governance and management. Management as a technique of control that at first instance refers to a market economy and the administration of projects and undertakings. Thus, management is a technical function of market and economic activities of consumers, producers and purchases. Two essential points must be considered with respect to the difference between governance and management.

Managerialism is a kind of engagement concerned with efficiency and fairness, which derives it legitimacy from existing discourses of governance, depending on its interest. My intention is to map out the larger picture of how society can be governed. What are the driving motives, which generate specific modes of thinking and the modes of governance that supplement truth production, justification and fairness for managerial house keeping action?

In contrast to managerialism, governance is concerned with either macro scale society or micro scale social, political and economic activities where it provides the justification and validation for continuity and stability of the existing structure. Thus, it is plausible to argue that disturbing the discourses of governance means the disruption of the existing structure. Management either will be unable to deliver and function efficiently or it must find a way to convince those under its control to agree to the new governing discourses. Specific or combined modes of governance such as liberal and
conservative discourses together might get mobilized to provide for the governance of certain socio-political and economic activity. For example, free trade has always been liberal individualistic discourse; but the Conservative Government in Canada mobilized it at the end of 1980s. The amalgamation of a liberal discourse into conservative discourses of governance resulted in tension within the conservative government and at the end it became one of the reasons, which caused the downfall of conservative party. In this case conservative managerial institutions were not able to do anything to make the case for free trade. Then, where the discourses of governance get mixed, management as a technical skill becomes submissive to these discourses and manages accordingly. I argue that governance is the body of discourses which are employed by the political state, social and financial organizations; and in turn they empower the legal system, social organizations and any other socio-political units to provide justifications and validations for the management action.

While there is a widespread confusion that governance is equivalent to management, this is a misunderstanding of the functions each undertakes. Managerialism is a strong advocate of the ‘existing social and political structure’; it is rigid and discourages creativity, imagination, non-linear thinking and critical attitude. Management is a tertiary skill—a method, not a value—and yet it is being applied to every domain of human life as if it were one of the ideals that human society has achieved. Managerialism reduces even sciences and mathematics to a narrow goal-oriented management tool. I claim that the governance of society is much more complex than these trivialized forms of management can predict.
Management is an authority of a body to which the right and legitimacy to exercise power have been delegated by government, thus management itself is not an independent body able to generate rules of conduct. Management is subordinate to government. In contrast, governance is the total philosophy of the exercise of power providing the underlying epistemological validation for norms, conventions and regulation through enforcing bodies such as a police force (visible exercise of power) and through epistemological justification of truth production, in the sense of governmentalization, normalization and internalization of norms (invisible mode of control and governance). For these reasons, governance in my account differs from management. Substituting governance for management is a common error in public administration, policy making, and business administration.

4. Governance and Its Three Models

I wish to divide governance into the following three models: visible, invisible and liberal modes of governance. I will discuss and explain each in turn.

A visible mode of governance is a procedure and a process by which the population is governed through the use of state apparatuses (i.e., police force employs coercive force to keep the population in line with the basic rules and values of the government). In simpler terms, through the use of coercive force disciplining the population. The second mode of governance is invisible, because it does not enforce rules, regulations, values and norms directly, it does so via deploying various techniques and tactics. To name a few, invisible modes of governance enforce its discourses via professional bodies such as, accounting and medical associations, psychiatry, the school
system and so forth. In addition, norms, conventions, social and ritual practices are composite part of (invisible) mode of governance.

The third mode of governance is liberal model. Liberal mode of governance deploys any of the visible or invisible modes, or it may combine both to govern the health and wealth of the population under its control and mandate. The liberal mode of governance increasingly depends on the rationality of rule that claims truth, neutrality and objectivity of rule. These validity claims are claims of ruling in the name of a number of presuppositions such as: national security, social good, human rights, economic security and so forth. The discursive rationalities of liberal governance assert the provision of a number of solutions to the existing political, moral and economic paradoxes. Governance discourses of law and order, freedom of expression, welfare and social programs are examples of these discourses which liberal governance constructs for the governing of society in the name of the common good (Rose 1996).

4.1 Visible Model of Governance

The practices of this model of governance are relevant to specific political discourses and regimes of power. For example, authoritarian political regimes for the most part rely on the visible model of governance. That is to say the epistemological foundations of these regimes do not appeal to the wider number of their population, or, as Bentham10 proposed, attend to the happiness calculus: happiness for the greatest number. Their techniques of governing are not sophisticated enough to design and produce truths

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10 Jeremy Bentham, a liberal scholar who designed happiness calculus, panoptical eye of surveillance served liberalism greatly. The other great ethical system of the post-enlightenment era is Utilitarianism. Proposed by the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the principal of utility is based on happiness and was seen as being a scientific approach to morality.
on the claims of objectivity and neutrality; at their best they argue for the right to 'good' rule. Thus, good rule is a goal to which they strive.

### Table 1. Visible Mode of Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commanding body (institution)</th>
<th>Commands (object)</th>
<th>Commanded (subject)</th>
<th>Reasons for complying</th>
<th>Relationship between the agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>King, president, house of commons (parliament), prison warden, an army general...etc.</td>
<td>Sanctity of private property, no one shall kill...etc.</td>
<td>A worker, a teacher...etc.</td>
<td>Fearing of prosecution, imprisonment, Other consequences.</td>
<td>The command is not internalized. The values of the commander are separate from those of the complier (subject). There is no epistemological relationship between the subject and its object with respect to trust and truth.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A visible mode of governance is ruling in a manner in which there is a separation between the commander(s) and those commanded. That is to say the social subjects(s) see themselves external to the body that orders and regulates them. For example, in cases where the use of force is imminent and where sanctions are imposed systematically but the will of the commander differs from and is external to the will of the complier, the visible mode of governance becomes manifest in these situations. However, it is important to indicate that in liberal democracies there is a set of complex relationships between visible and invisible modes of governance. This complex relationship is due to the fact that liberalism mobilizes both techniques of rule and wherever there is a need for utilization of either model or both models of governance it mobilizes successfully.

### 4.2 Invisible Model of Governance

An invisible mode of governance does not rely on the use of physical force.

While it is distinctive to liberal democracies only one aspect of it functions in the non-
liberal democratic societies. Namely, the reputation of persons and individuals might get damaged if these individuals and persons do not comply with the prescribed norms and customs. Though, most of the norms and customs if breached will result in severe punishment. Invisible mode of governance is a technique of rule via normative rules of conduct that are traditional practices and conventions. As well, the apparatuses of the state, its administrative agencies, and other third party professional such as medical and engineering might mobilize these customs and norms.

Table 2. Invisible Model of Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commanding body (institution)</th>
<th>Commands (object)</th>
<th>Commanded (subject)</th>
<th>Reasons for complying</th>
<th>Relationship between the agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norms, traditions, (combination of various known and unknown sources of practice). Liberal democracies and its agencies and institutions. Professional practitioners, school system.</td>
<td>Sanctity of private property. No one shall kill</td>
<td>Most of the population, Excluding some very advanced intellectuals who have the ability to question the roots of both norms and practices of the apparatuses of the state.</td>
<td>Internalized truth, The object of the command is part of the compiler's belief system</td>
<td>Commander and the compiler are not separate, No separation between the subject and the object.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 provides us with the ways we can understand how the invisible model of governance works and functions in both normative systems and in non-normative systems where the claims to objectivity with professional knowledge and truth production are present. This model of governance can be related to Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ and Habermas’s ‘discourse ethics’. I am not going to discuss this here in detail, but I make a quick reference to they ways in which governmentality and discourse ethics can be interpreted using the invisible model of governance. Equally, it is important to realize that governance has dual subjects. Thus, governance as the processes and the practices powers intervene with not only the conduct of external agencies to the ‘self,’ as well, it provides for the principle disciplinary practices of power on the ‘self’.
4.3 Liberal Model of Governance

The liberal mode of governance is much more complicated than either visible or invisible modes of governance. Liberalism as a philosophy contains a massive ideological—conceptual baggage ranging from the ethical values of Greek philosophy, the intellectual, spiritual and ethical content of Christianity, the theory of laissez-faire economics, individual freedom of competition to the self-regulating market. As a political philosophy it claims it is based on progress, the essential goodness of the human race, and the autonomy of the individual and standing for the protection of political and civil liberties. This is not a complete list of attributes of liberalism. My purpose is to depict a range of characteristics and attributes of liberalism.

However, the liberal mode of governance does not rely on direct rule generally. Liberalism has adopted new techniques of governing from a ‘distance’ (Rose 1996). There are three components to the liberal mode of governance “rationality of rule, the ‘social’ and strategies of rule” (Rose 1996). But I wish to add a fourth principle, ‘physical force’.

First, rationality of rule is a set of political, moral, philosophical and normative presuppositions of the liberal values as such individualism, free competition, professionalization of every sphere of human activity with crucial focus on market economy. Liberal mode of governance mobilizes moral, political, normative values along with professional expert hypotheses to govern the population under its mandate.

Second, the ‘social’ is a medium between the rule and the ruled, while the ‘social’ itself rules and is ruled. According to Rose, “political rule would not itself set out the
norms of individual conduct, but would install and empower a variety of 'professionals' investing them with the authority to act as experts in the devices of social rule' (Rose 1996:40). Third, while the 'strategies' of liberal rule get actualized through professional bodies, indirectly directing the desire and aspirations of individual citizens, "individual citizens, construed as subjects of choices and aspirations to self-actualization and self-fulfillment" (Rose 1996:41).

I add a fourth principle to these three principles of the liberal model of governance, introducing the principles of physical force as application of direct force in cases of internal criminal activities and external threats to liberalism itself. The degree of force used is not the subject of my discussion, but I suggest that the application of physical force becomes immanent when liberal mode of governance decides that there is a need for its use. As well, at instances of internal criminal behaviour and external threats to its values and economic well being it mobilizes physical force as a legitimate means of keeping order and self-defense. In simpler terms, these sets of presuppositions provide the rationale for liberal rule.
### Table 3. Liberal Mode of Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commanding body (institution)</th>
<th>Commands (object)</th>
<th>Commanded (subject)</th>
<th>Reasons for complying</th>
<th>Relationship between the agents</th>
<th>Liberal: Accumulation of all models in governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>King, president, house of commons (parliament), prison warden, an army general...etc</td>
<td>Sanctity of private property. No one shall kill</td>
<td>A worker, a teacher, Consumers, community ...etc</td>
<td>Fearing of prosecution. Imprisonment, Other consequences</td>
<td>The command is not internalized. The values of the commander are separate from those of the compiler (subject). There is no epistemological relationship between the subject and its object with respect to trust and truth.</td>
<td>Parliament, democratic agencies and institutions. Professional practitioners, school system, prison, police...etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms, traditions, (combination of various known and unknown sources of practice).</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>Most of the population</td>
<td>Internalized truth There is not separation between the command the compiler</td>
<td>There is an existing epistemological relationship</td>
<td>Norms, traditions, customs (combination of various known and unknown sources of practice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal democracies and its agencies and institutions. Professional practitioners, school system</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>Most of the population Excluding some very advanced intellectuals who have the ability to question in a roots of both normative and practices</td>
<td>Internalized truth There unity of subject and the object of command, Prosecution.</td>
<td>Commander and the compiler are not separate No separation between the subject and the object</td>
<td>Discipline, training, deterrence, unity of the object and the subject, governing with no-governance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5. Relevant Theories of Governance and Their Deployment

In this section I will introduce the main theories, I will be using to assist me in developing of my perspective on governance, drawn largely are chiefly Rose and Hunt and Wickham. While the works I draw upon are influenced by Michel Foucault’s work on governmentality, my usage is different and more comprehensive. While, Hunt and Wickham’s model of governance differs from Rose’s model in details I believe their works are equally influenced by Foucault’s work on governmentality, power/knowledge and politics/resistance. However, I must clearly state that Hunt and Wickham’s work on governance is the most articulate work amongst the literature on governance.
In Hunt and Wickham's account governance is "any attempt to control or manage any kind of object, in fact any phenomenon which human beings try to control or manage" (Hunt and Wickham 1994:78). Hunt and Wickham's definition provides a constructive insight into the ways in which my rereading of critical theory and genealogy will develop. They advance four principles of governance.

Principle one "all instances of governance contain elements of attempt and elements of incompleteness (which at times may be seen as failure)" (Hunt and Wickham 1994:79). This principle captures the inner complexity of the indefinable social, political and economic activities of social life. Any indefinable 'object or phenomena' is uncontrollable permanently, therefore, non-governable everlastingly. Take for example, the abortion issue in Canada. Assumably, the law has defined that abortion is a private matter and within the definition of law abortion is permitted at women's choice, as the Supreme Court of Canada ruling in Morgentaler v. The Queen decided. The ruling was an attempt to settle, control and govern abortion in a manner acceptable to the tenets of liberal individualism.

What are the outcomes? Has the abortion issues settled completely, in the way in which the court ruled, after all, the ruling was an attempt to govern human activity with respect to abortion. The answer is negative for various reasons. First, if the governance of abortion had been completed as the result of that legal decision then no other issue in relation to abortion would ever arise in Canada. Second, the fact that we see more and more attempts to govern abortion via other means such as social education, schooling and so forth is testimony to the statement that the governance of abortion is incomplete.
The second principle Hunt and Wickham address is the principle of “power and resistance”. They state “Governance involves power (but in a very particular sense) and as such involves politics and resistance” (Hunt and Wickham 1994:81.) This principle of governance indicates that governance is political in nature and makes political claims.

All forms of politics and exercises of power infer some kind of resistance. The idea that power is fuelled by resistance, that without resistance there will be no power, and that all power fades is a major theme in Foucault's *The History of Sexuality*. In respect of power and strategies, Foucault outlines six areas of power, one of which states that “there are no relations of power without resistances...resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to be real, nor is it inexorably frustrated through being the compatriot of power” (Foucault 1980:142.) In Foucault's terms exercise of power always involves some kind of resistance, so do Hunt and Wickham in their second principle of governance portray this relationship between power and resistance.

Any exercise of power is political in itself thus governance is a political project that attempts to achieve specific ends. Hunt and Wickham suggest that the association between politics and governance cannot be denied (1994:84). It is the exercise of power either in a ‘repressive and exploitive’ way or in a constructive active manner that reinforces the relationship between governance and political practice. Before I mobilize these four principles of governance and turn them into a broader socio-political question, I wish to go further and analyse the third and fourth principles of governance proposed by Hunt and Wickham.

The third principle of governance in Hunt and Wickham's account is that “governance always involves knowledge”(1994:87). In this sense knowledge has two
roles, first it decides what to govern, and second, it directs and settles on the way to govern. They suggest that knowledge and governance are intertwined; knowledge to govern does not exist apart from the act of governing itself. Thus, accordingly knowledge is led by governance, this argument is similar to the Foucaultian argument that power and resistance cannot be taken apart, where there is power there is resistance and vice versa. In their account governance performs power control function and coupled with knowledge; the two produce a power/knowledge relationship; the two are not separate, there cannot be ‘governance’ attempt without knowledge, and knowledge always produces some instances of governance.

Their fourth principle of governance is what they call “social.” This principle explains, “governance is always social and always works to bind societies together (which sometimes, ironically, involves social division)” (1994:92). To understand the ‘social’, we need to look at two views, the traditional view and the Foucaultian view. In the traditional ‘social’ view, all instances of governance are already known, in every instance of governance the object of governance and techniques of governance are made available by the society, they are always already available. In the Foucaultian sense, all the objects of governance are not available and knowable through the social (Hunt and Wickham 1994:93-94). I agree that in all instances of governance the object of governance is known, available and that “governance is always working to bind societies together” (Hunt and Wickham 1994). But the question that arises is in invisible mode of governance, the object and source of governance are not totally clear to every governed person?11

11 See invisible model of governance.
Hunt and Wickham present a similar argument to the Foucaultian notion of a power-resistance relationship: that where there is power there is resistance and vice versa. They similarly imply that if an object is not governed, then it is not known. It is important to ask who is governing who and what is being governed? The 'social' is the society including a body of professionals. The professionals are the medium between the masses and the governing bodies, while they reinforce the validity of governance, they supply the public institutions, such as parliament and city councils, with reasons and validity claims for governing preferences and claims to neutrality, objectivity and truth. It is important to ask two questions, first, what does it mean for something to be known? In this discussion, the governance asserted to be social and known in all occurrences. This argument become a tautology, it is taken too far. I am certainly not keen on this proposal, rather I think all instance of internalized conducts those that are enforced via traditions, and the truth claims of professional liberalism are clear instances of governance, yet, these instances are not clearly perceived by all of those subjected to be governed. Thus, I reject the scheme that all occasions of governance are known.

Rose is another prominent 'governance' scholar. Rose provides that at its general level, the "term 'governance' is used as a kind of catch-all phrase to refer to any strategy, tactic, process, procedure or program for controlling, regulating, shaping or exercising authority over others in a nation, organization, or a locality" (Rose 1999:15). Rose gives two different accounts of governance. First, a 'normative' account and second a 'descriptive' use of governance related to the works of Habermas. The descriptive use is also called a diagnostic model related to the works of Foucault's 'new sociology of governance' (Rose 1999:16). A normative mode of governance probes the 'good' and
‘bad’ aspects and characteristics of governance, but the diagnostic model—the sociology of governance—attempts to characterize the relationship and interactions between a ‘range of political’ and social actors.

According to Rose, from normative renders ‘good governance’ so as to minimizing state role in various social, political and economic activities. He points out that “good governance means less government, politicians exercising power by steering (setting policy) rather than rowing (delivering services)” (Rose 1999: 16). Thus, the value of ‘normative governance’ is the reduction of the size of, and involves less intervention by, the government and state apparatuses in the range of social, political and economic affairs of the society. This, I believe finds its philosophical support in liberal individualism and laissez-faire theory.

The ‘new sociology of governance’—the diagnostic model—tries to map out the relationships between the organizational structure of the state apparatuses and non-state organizations. As well, it probes into the interactions between variety of organizations and associations. Under the sociology of governance “politics is seen as increasingly involving exchanges and relations amongst a range of public, private and voluntary organizations, without clear sovereign authority” (Rose 1999:17). Rose’s treatment of governance is increasingly technical and depicts the liberal mode of governance rather than giving a general and more abstract definition of governance and listing its principles. Thus, his perspective on governance will be useful to me in the analysis of liberal rule and governance.

In summing up the ways in which Hunt and Wickham’s, and Rose’s theories of governance will provide me with the rationale to view Jürgen Habermas’s critical theory
and Michel Foucault's genealogy as two modes of governance, now I turn to a brief
discussion of the ways in which this account will be undertaken.

6. Habermas and Foucault’s Practices as Governance

In this section I will advance a brief introductory discussion of the ways in which
I view critical theory and genealogy as governance and state the reasons why and how I
will pursue this undertaking.

The reasons why is it fruitful to take this approach lie in the perception that both
critical theory and genealogy present two different visions and projects. I am interested in
examining the ways in which each of these two projects describe and rationalize the
location, generation and circulation of power in relation to the governance of the wealth
and the health of the population in liberal democracies. In an attempt to map out the
ways in which I view critical theory as a communicative model of governance and
genealogy as an agonistic model of governance, I will draw emphasis from Habermas’s
and Foucault’s intellectual-theoretical practices by making reference to the themes of the
Enlightenment, modernity, maturity and techniques of both social and self-governance.
To link these discussions to theme of this project, I ask, what are those ‘objects’ and
‘socials’, which critical theory and genealogy attempting to govern? How are they going
to do it? To do justice to Habermas and Foucault, I will present a brief overview of their
respective projects.

For Habermas, the Enlightenment as a project intended to justify the universality
of democratic polity. Thus, a central issue in Habermas’s efforts to sustain the
Enlightenment project is the problem of relativism. This problem underlies several
postmodern critiques of modernity and the Enlightenment (such as Foucault’s critique of modernity), which Habermas thinks would destroy the Enlightenment’s emancipatory dimensions. Taking way the universalist intentions of Enlightenment would suspend its emancipatory dimension.

He believes that if we do not defend the conception of human beings as rational autonomous beings from a universalist perspective, then ‘we’ paralyse ‘our’ capacity to be critical of the norms and the politics that free humanity needs. In short, the loss of universal claims to relativism opens the way to authoritarian politics (Habermas 1987). The threat of authoritarianism is an especially forceful reality for Habermas (Habermas 1992). His example is the Nazi regime. He argues that, to save human autonomy and modern democracy from the real threats of fascism, ‘we’ must reconstruct enlightenment project by promoting ‘reason’ and ‘universalism’. For example, he proposes the need to develop richer conceptions of reasons and communicative action in the light of empirically grounded research in sociology, psychology and speech act analysis. These defences of modernity and offensives on postmodernity are the elements and the reasons for which Habermas’s critical theory surfaces as a project that attempts to govern the health and wealth of liberal democracies with possible attempt to universalize it.

These proposals and claims about the ways in which political community should be governed are testimony to that fact that critical theory is a mode of governance, and it relies on ‘reason’ and ‘communication’ as its principle foundation and legitimization. And human society can be transformed toward a more just society, if the principles of critical theory practiced in an emancipatory fashion. His project is complex, but I have
attempted to present a preliminary discussion of critical theory in order to depict it as a model of governance.

In contrast to critical theory, Foucault's genealogy takes a different approach. Foucault was sceptical of any positivistic and transcendental approach to the human subject. His project denoted the discontinuity of history. However, he did not see discontinuity as a disruption of history, rather as a change and transformation (Foucault 1972). Foucault’s critique of the history of disciplines as the 'history' of ideas, the 'history' of sciences, the 'history' of philosophy, the 'history' of thought is that the trend to pay attention to unities and turn away from 'periods' or 'centuries' of rupture and discontinuity. For Foucault, beneath any continuity of thought and unity there occur incidents of disruption (Foucault 1972). Thus, he rules out any transcendental and teleological character of history.

His discussion linking discursive and non-discursive practices in genealogy is the framework for explaining his vision on historical change. Neither the march of the world spirit nor the class struggle satisfied Foucault as functioning as a motor of history. Thus, it appears that he argued not simply for the death of the transcendental subject, but that he employed a perspective in which the subject is produced through power/knowledge rather than assumed. Foucault's sceptical and agonistic attitude arises from what he calls "hyper and pessimistic activism" (Foucault 1997:256). Hyper and pessimistic activism, according to Foucault, does not view everything as 'bad', but views everything as 'dangerous'. Having dangerousness in mind, always, we will be restless so that we do something constantly. This is an attitude which does not come to terms with linear
thinking and approaches. It depicts the complexity of human relations and human condition.

In his *The History of Sexuality: The Care of the Self* Foucault proposed a reflexive ethics of care, which he calls “care of the self”. Care of the self for Foucault cannot be obtained with egoistic attitude. It can be practiced in relation to caring for the ‘other’. Then, the relationship between ‘self’ and ‘other’ is negotiated and always defined and redefined. Thus, there cannot be a complete settlement as to where to draw the lines and how to govern caring for the ‘self’ and for the ‘other’.

Habermasian and Foucaultian interpretations of ‘what is’ and their treatment of ‘what should be’ are two different approaches. Critical theory proposes a transcendental and communicative perspective; genealogy proposes a non-transcendental care-oriented perspective. Foucault is always open to new dimensions; Habermas settles disputes via communicative reason and consensus. Foucault views the life forms sceptically always; Habermas concludes with consensus. These connotations, I interpret as communicative and agonistic modes of governance. Why governance? Borrowing from Hunt & Wickham, governance is a process that attempts to control, manage, and organize any known activity. Taking this hypothesis and applying it to critical theory and genealogy it becomes plausible to accept that critical theory is a mode of governance that attempts to manage, control organize human society in accordance with communicative rationality. And genealogy attempts to govern human society on the grounds of hyper-and pessimistic activism that is compatible with an agonistic attitude toward caring for ‘oneself’ and the ‘other’, as well, in the social and political relations as part of human activity.
7. Conclusion

This Chapter has allowed me to tackle the definition of governance in a manner in which that goes beyond managerialism, efficiency and accountability. Governance is not only concerned with control at micro level but as well at macro level as well. Moreover, I have shown the ways in which critical theory and genealogy can be read from the perspective of governance. A detailed discussion of this ‘reading’ and ‘rewriting’ of critical theory and genealogy from the perspective of governance is a task which I will undertake in the next Chapter.
Chapter Two: Critical Theory as Governance

1. Introduction

In this Chapter, I will rely on Rose, and Hunt and Wickham's perspectives of governance to interpret Habermas's 'critical theory' as a 'communicative-rational' model of governance. However, before I engage in the elucidation of Habermas's critical theory from the perspective of governance, I will outline the ways in which his communicative-rational project has been influenced by the works of Kant, Hegel and Weber.

In order to portray this venture clearly in this Chapter, I will first briefly introduce Habermas's reconstruction critical theory. Second, I will depict the ways in which the notions of the Enlightenment and maturity, reflected in the works of Kant and Hegel, have influenced Habermas's reconstruction of critical theory. Third, I will analyze the ways in which Max Weber's notion of the dualism of 'rationality and culture' has motivated Habermas to develop a theoretical perspective on the tension between 'system' and 'lifeworld'.

Moreover in my engagement with 'governance', I will first focus on reinterpretations of four main themes of critical theory: the theory of knowledge constitutive of human interests, communicative action, moral consciousness, and discourse ethics from the perspective of governance. Second, from Rose, and Hunt and Wickham's perspectives of governance, I will illustrate the ways in which Habermas's critical theory can be interpreted as a communicative-rational model of governance.

Finally in this Chapter, I will answer the following question: Why is it an important and fruitful intellectual exercise to interpret critical theory as governance? In addition, I will introduce A Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance. This
section will not present a detailed discussion of the construction program of *A Communicative-Agonistic Theory of Governance* rather it opens the account and provides a brief sketch of the ways in which I assemble such a theory in Chapter Four of this thesis.

I do not wish this chapter to be read as an engagement against Habermas’s intellectual project. My purpose is to use, or even to exploit, Habermas’s emancipatory communicative rationalist thesis in order to construct ‘a communicative rational’ model of governance. Subsequently, to realize my proposed venture, it is necessary to understand that the relationship between Habermas’s intellectual project on one hand and my proposed project, *A Communicative-Agonistic Theory of Governance* on the other, is not direct; rather it is the task of this chapter to portray that association.

2. Method\(^{12}\)

I will deploy two methods of investigation in this chapter. First, I will use a ‘genealogical’ methodology. This is necessary because I will read Habermas’s critical theory from an unorthodox perspective that challenges linear and traditional interpretations of critical theory. Second, I will employ a constructive method, in order to construct communicative-rational model of governance.

3. Habermas and Reconstruction of Critical Theory

Jürgen Habermas has contributed to the expansion of *critical theory*, which was developed by Adorno and Horkheimer in the Frankfurt School. His main offering has

\(^{12}\) See Chapter One for the ways in which I deploy genealogy as my method on investigation.
been the reconstruction of first generation critical theory. Habermas’s work is complex and encyclopaedically organized. Consequently, my account in this section does not seek to depict the entire body of his project. Rather, my attempt should be viewed as an effort to illustrate the ways in which Habermas has deployed philosophical and sociological works in light of the Enlightenment practices of ‘reason,’ ‘universality’ and ‘transcendence’ to shape and reconstruct critical theory from a communicative rational perspective.

3.1 The Enlightenment influence

As an advocate of the Enlightenment project “the dominant image of Habermas into the 1980 is the Voice of reason, a Teutonic opponent of Foucault and Lyotard” (Beilharz 1995:41). However, this perspective can be supported by further readings of the ways in which his reconstruction of critical theory developed and I will contextualize his views on the Enlightenment. Let me examine the ways in which his reconstruction project proceeds. For this purpose, it is important to take a closer look at why he advocates the universalization of ‘reason’ that blossomed out of the Enlightenment project.

Since Habermas’s project is the extension of Enlightenment values and principles, it is necessary to start by defining Enlightenment and then show how it has motivated his venture. One major aspect of the Enlightenment project was the universalization of reason through the “dispelling of darkness, fear and superstition; of removing shackles from free enquiry and debate” (Sim 1999:238). Similarly, Habermas’s reconstruction project is an attempt to mobilize free enquiry, debate and ‘communication’ to redeem and
continue the universalization of 'reason' and transcendence in the light of Enlightenment ideals. Habermas's reconstruction of critical theory is influenced by the works of Kant and Hegel in two major ways: firstly by Kant's moral philosophy and secondly by Hegel's consciousness and 'maturity' theses.

3.2 Kant

Three major themes of Kant's moral philosophy: 'universalism,' 'rationality' and 'transcendence' have formed the strength of Habermas's communicative rational project. Kant presented the 'categorical imperative' as a criterion of moral obligation. His account of morality is deontological and is laid out in three of his books: The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, The Critique of Practical Reason and The Metaphysics of Morals.

Kant's engagement with moral philosophy indicates that he was attentive of the traditions of moral philosophy such as: virtue theory, which bases morality on good character traits, and consequentialist accounts, which bases morality solely on the consequences of actions. Kant rejected the traditional theories of morality and argued instead that moral actions are based on a supreme principle of morality, which is objective, rational, and freely chosen, namely the categorical imperative. Kant's clearest account of the categorical imperative is in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.

In section one of the Foundations, Kant explained why the categorical imperative should be the only possible standard of moral obligation. According to him, the function of human will is to select one course of action from among several possible courses of action (for example, my choice to read a book right now instead of going swimming). An
individual’s specific will-full decisions are influenced by several factors, such as laziness, immediate emotional gratification, or what is best in the long run. Kant argued that in moral matters, the will is ideally influenced only by rational considerations, and not by subjective considerations such as one’s emotions. According to him, this is due to the fact that morality involves what is necessary for us to do (e.g., you must be charitable), and only rational considerations can produce necessity.

According to Kant, the rational consideration which influences the will requires a single principle of obligation, for only principles can be given pure rational justification. The principle must be a command (or imperative) since morality involves a command for us to perform a particular action. Finally, the principle cannot be one that appeals to the consequences of an action, such as the joy I would experience from swimming, since appeals to consequences involve emotional considerations. The only principle that fulfills these requirements is the categorical imperative which dictates the universalizability of human actions: I ought to act in such a way that I can also will that my maxim become a universal law (Kant 1959:30-33). Morality, then, consists of choosing only those actions that conform to the categorical imperative.

The categorical imperative thus tests the admissibility of the maxims by testing their consistency. To be universalizable, according to Kant, a maxim must be capable of being conceived and willed without contradicition. Kant stated that, whether the end of an action is reasonable or good is not in question at all, for the question is only about what must be done to attain it. (Kant 1956:30-33). The fact that priority is given to the consistency of the maxims categorizes Kant’s moral philosophy as deontological proceduralism, which overlooks the consequences and outcomes of an action.
Habermas states, "Implied by Kant's conception of formal, differentiated reason is a theory of modernity" (Habermas 1991:4). He further describes the ways in which modernity emphasised change from substantive rationality imbedded in religious views to formal rationality. As it was true for Kant and Weber, similarly it holds true for Habermas that "Modernity is characterized by a rejection of the substantive rationality typical of religious and metaphysical worldviews and by a belief in procedural rationality and its ability to give credence to our views in the three areas of subjective knowledge, moral-practical insight, and aesthetic judgement" (Habermas 1991:4).

According to McCarthy, discourse ethics "replaces Kant's categorical imperative with a procedure of moral argumentation: normative justification is tied to reasoned agreement among those subject to the norm in question" (McCarthy 1991:viii). Thus, his preoccupation with Kant's categorical imperative has contributed to his commitment to the 'procedure of rational argumentation' in discourse ethics. Habermas rescued Kant's 'moral consciousness' from solitary monologue and placed it in the 'life-world' where social interactions take place, however "this must be done publicly; arguments played out in the individual consciousness or in the theoretician's mind are no substitute for real discourse" (McCarthy 1991:ix). Thus, Kant's model of deontological morality is the principle building block of Habermas's ethical program and communicative rationality.

In the principles of universalization as the rules of argumentation, Habermas demolishes "metaethical diversionary tactics of value skepticism" rooted in substantive reason in favour of a "cognitivist approach in ethics" (Habermas 1991:75). The main purpose behind the rejection of 'value skepticism' is to justify the procedure of communicative-rationality from a universal perspective and thereby to embed it in his
ethical program, discourse ethics. Habermas argues that communicative action recognizes that "Discourses take place in particular social contexts and are subject to the limitations of time and space. Their participants are not Kant's intelligible character but real human beings driven by the motives in addition to the one permitted motive of the search for truth" (Habermas 1991:92).

Thus, Kantian themes influenced his work in three essential ways: "(i) a communicative theory of meaning, rationality, and validity that analyses language in pragmatic terms; (ii) a 'transcendental-pragmatic' elucidation of the validity-basis of moral judgment; and (iii) a procedural approach to moral justification" (Croini 1993:xiii). In addition, these three themes are concerned with the idea of "men's" maturity and modernity. Kant's maturity thesis is reflected in his moral philosophical writings, thus; his conception of "maturity consists in showing us how to save the critical and transcendental power of reason and thus the triumph of reason over superstitions, custom and despotism—the great achievement of the enlightenment" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1986:110). Likewise, Habermas's entire communicative-rational project is an attempt to defend the superiority of the 'reason' embedded in the Enlightenment.

Furthermore, Dreyfus and Rabinow show that, for Habermas "the problem of modernity, a unique historical problem, consists in preserving the primacy of reason articulated most recently and fully in Kant's enlightenment critique while facing up to the loss of metaphysical ground of substantive beliefs" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1986:111). The role of reason in the advancement of human maturity is an important theme on which Habermas's reconstruction project is focused. For Habermas, maturity is linked to 'reason,' which in turn defines "men's" critical ability. Maturity for him is "the
discovery of the quasi-transcendental basis of community" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1986:111).

3.3 Hegel

While Habermas’s critical theory is a “departure from the philosophy of consciousness and the philosophy of history which characterizes much of modern philosophy” (Mellos 1991:13), his project abandons the traditions of subject centred reason in favour of a linguistic turn, which he calls ‘communicative action’. In this subsection, I will discuss Hegel’s influence on Habermas’s reconstruction of critical theory. First, I will outline Hegel’s concept of ‘maturity’ and ‘consciousness’; second, I will indicate the ways in which his view has influenced Habermas’s position on maturity, the intersubjective relationship between the subject and the object and communicative-consciousness. I would like to acknowledge that the relationship between Hegel’s and Habermas’s positions on maturity, intersubjectivity and consciousness is much more complex than it appears.

According to d’Entrevès “Hegel was the first philosopher to develop a clear and a systematic understanding of modernity” (d’Entrevès 1997:5). In his lectures on the philosophy of the world history Hegel indicated that the subject of the lectures was the philosophical history of the world, from a universal perspective. The ‘universal’ world for Hegel constituted the idea that history is the world’s court of judgment over and above the nation-states, or national ‘spirits,’ and there resides the mind or spirit of the world, which pronounces its verdict through the development of the history itself. The verdicts of world history, however, are not expressions of simple might, which in itself is
abstract and non-rational. Rather than blind destiny the "world history is the necessary
development, out of the concepts of mind's freedom alone, of the moments of reason and
so of the self-consciousness and freedom of mind" (Hegel 1975: § 342).

The history of 'spirit' is the development through time of its own self-
consciousness, the actions of peoples, states, and the world's historical actors who
absorbed and preserved their own interests. For Hegel "All actions, including the world-
historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the
substantial. They are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world
mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed though it is concealed from
them and is not their aim and object" (Hegel 1975: § 348).

In the appendix to the introduction to lectures on the Philosophy of World History
Hegel distinguished four main stages in the development of maturity in world history.
More specifically, there are four world-historical epochs, for Hegel, each manifested a
principle of 'spirit' expressed through a dominant culture. In the Philosophy of Right,
Hegel discussed these stages briefly in paragraphs 253-260.

In the first stage of the development of the world history, the spirit was in its
childhood realm: Chinese, Indian and Persian cultures. In the second stage, 'Greek
realm' the spirit was in its adolescence stage. In this realm the mind was in its simple
stage of subjective and objective unity. The third stage, the 'Roman realm,' Hegel
interpreted as that in which mind functioned in its abstract universality, this stage Hegel
called "adolescence of spirit". The fourth stage, old age, the 'Germanic realm' there was a
mature "reconciled unity of subjective and objective mind".
The fourth stage, 'Germanic Realm' is most relevant to this discussion, because it is linked to the idea of the Enlightenment as maturity. In this stage, there is a reconciled unity of subjective and objective mind. The principle of subjective freedom comes to the fore in such a way as to be made explicit and also mediated with substantiality. The turning points which are considered landmarks toward "maturity and the old age" discussed in Hegel's *Philosophy of History* are the realization and development of self-consciousness of freedom, in particular the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. One of the most significant features of the modern age for Hegel was the overcoming of the 'antithesis' of church and state that developed in the medieval period. This final stage of spirit Hegel called mature and "old age".

Hegel not only defined maturity, but he sketched the ways in which maturity developed throughout the history of consciousness. For me, in the philosophy of Hegel the inevitable transition of consciousness by contradiction and reconciliation, from an initial stage to its opposite and then to a new, higher conception that involves transcends, maturity and modernity come to the fore.

Consciousness as a theme, runs through the entire corpus of both Hegel's philosophy of the subject and Habermas's communicative reason. Now, I will start to focus on the ways in which these themes are relevant to critical theory. Habermas attempts to rescue 'maturity' and 'consciousness' from the metaphysical determinism proposed by Hegel, in the *Philosophy of the World History* and *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Habermas argues that the growth of empirical sciences, the pluralization of worldviews and other related developments have rendered such an absolutist philosophical approach
generally improbable in application, moreover, it will weaken and reduce 'reason' to a merely instrumental device.

The general definition of modernity as maturity in history, Habermas traces to a state of communal self-consciousness in which a community or a group of people have considered themselves 'modern'. For example, the Romans and Carolingians at different periods in history have considered themselves modern. In a relative proximity, Habermas states that communities and groups, have considered themselves modern “whenever the consciousness of a new era developed in Europe through a renewed relationship to classical antiquity” (Habermas 1997:39).

However, the modern period that corresponds to the Enlightenment differs from other self-considerations of being Modern. The modern period connected to the Enlightenment has a distinctive characteristic, which cannot be interpreted as a simple ‘modish’ or popular attitude, because “modish becomes outmoded once it is displaced into the past, the modern still retains a secret connection to the classical” (Habermas 1997:39). Let me indicate that the form of modernity that has come to the fore with the Enlightenment intellectual practices was “inspired by modern science, of the infinite progress of knowledge and the advancement toward social and moral improvement that gradually lifted the spell exercised on the spirit of these early moderns by the classical works of antiquity” (Habermas 1997:39).

Habermas characterizes the mentality of modernity as a “set of attitudes which developed around a transformed consciousness of time” (Habermas 1997:40). In this consciousness, Habermas sees the birth of a unique modern perspective which we often characterize as the attitude of the Enlightenment and maturity. For Habermas 'modern'
consciousness acquaints itself with present 'risks' and attempts to understand the unknown 'future'. Thus, modern consciousness, according to Habermas 'must find a path for itself in previously uncharted domains' (Habermas 1997:40).

Habermas finds elements of critiquing 'subject-centered reason' in Hegel’s characterization of the modern consciousness, which creates a reconciled relationship between the subject and the object. He states “Against the authoritarian embodiments of a subject-centered reason, Hegel summons the unifying power of an intersubjectivity that appears under the titles of 'love' and 'live’” (Habermas 1992:30). Here Habermas finds a 'reflexive' relationship between the subject and the object and develops a theory of reflexive reconciled intersubjectivity.

His theory of communicative action is the initial step in which he attempts to unify the subject and the object, and discourse ethics provides the final stage of this intersubjective unification. Ultimately, Habermas's theoretical attempt abandons the philosophy of the subject and replaces it with an intersubjectivity of the subject and the object in communicative action, which takes into consideration principles of mutual and shared interest. Habermas agrees with Hegel that “Kant failed to justify or ground the pure concepts of understanding, for he merely called them from the table of forms of judgement, unaware of their historical specificity” (Habermas 1991:4). Further Habermas asks “Can one formulate concepts like universal justice, normative rightness, the moral point of view, and the like independently of any vision of the good life, i.e., independent of an intuative project of some privileged but concrete form of life?” (Habermas 1991:205). He responds to the question in the negative.
The intersubjective characteristics of communicative reason indicate that it is not a formalist project in a pure sense. It would be wrong to interpret communicative reason as an absolute universal project, because agreements reached communicatively are sensitive and sympathetic to intersubjective and mutual benefit of the parties involved. However, I share the view that the procedure of communicative means of arriving at consensus is a universal procedure in communicative action and discourse ethics.

Habermas admits that the non-contextual (universal) definitions of moral principles have not been successful so far.

Maturity for Hegel consists of individual rational action and self-consciousness, which are linked to the common consciousness reflected in his theory of the state. Similarly, Habermas's theory of communicative action is embedded in a republican view of the state with an intersubjective focus to balance inter-subjectively the public and the private relations of individuals. Maturity and old age for Habermas are linked to the logical organization and the self-consciousness of communicative society.

Habermas departs from Hegel on two main grounds. First, he takes a linguistic turn and abandons Hegel's philosophy of subject-centred consciousness. According to Dallmayr, "Habermas finds Hegel's insurgency flawed ultimately unsuccessful—mainly because of its 'subjectivist morings and its excessively theoretical—contemplative character" (Dallmayr 1997:60). Second, he criticizes Hegel's absolutist approach to the development of world history and defines it as predetermined and idealistically triggered.

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13 See the section on 'Critical Theory as a Communicative-Rational Model of Governance' in this Chapter.
In closing this account of Hegel's influence on critical theory, I argue that 'reason' and 'consciousness' as revealed in the spirit of the world's history in the Hegelian sense are linked to the concept of modernity as maturity. Maturity, for both Hegel and Habermas, is the ability to reason and to be self-conscious in relation to the public and the state. Habermas focuses on the inter-subjective relationship between the individual and the public, Hegel rejected the concept of the individual as an independent entity, but subject to the collective consciousness. While, Hegel's concept of maturity focuses on the state centred subject, Habermas focuses on the 'linguistic turn' and communicative reason.

3.4 Weber's Influences

The nineteenth and the twentieth centuries intellectuals also have influence Habermas's work. Entire books can be written about the respective influences of Karl Marx, Max Weber, Husserl, Parsons and Piaget. However, I will only discuss Weber's influence on Habermas's formulation of the tension between 'system' and 'lifeworld'. While, his reconstruction program of critical theory is in tension with Luhmann's systems theory, to provide a response to Luhmann's theory, he deploys Weber's dualism of 'rationality and culture' and reformulates it with the Hegelian optimism as the tensions between the 'system'—a domain of instrumental rationality and the 'lifeworld'—a domain of practical and substantive rationality.

According to Roberts "Habermas transformed Weber's dualism of rationality and culture" (Roberts: 1995:3) into two different spheres of human activity: 'system and lifeworld'. According to Habermas, Weber believed that modernization was not only about
rationalization it was also characterized by differentiation of realms of human activity (Habermas 1984:158.) The differences in the epistemological derive of these two realms of human activity give rise to the tension between practical-cultural rationality and formal-instrumental rationality. As a result, two outcomes and different methods of engagement will come to the forefront. First, where human agencies engage in practical-cultural activities, they engage in substantive-rational activities. Second, where they engage in formal-administrative and market economic activities, in the modern sense, they engage in formal-systemic instrumental rational activities.

Weber was concerned about the domination of culture—an area of substantive rationality—by formal and instrumental rationality. The sweeping power of formal instrumental rationality, Weber thought, will create major problems because what is rational in the context of a ‘realm of human activity’\textsuperscript{14} and a culture might be irrational from the perspective of another realm or culture (Weber 1965). Defining these two types of rationalities will help us to understand the tension between competing rationalities of system and life-world.

Human activities in bureaucratic and administrative organizations, in particular modern “economic, legal, and scientific institutions” (Ritzer 1992:123) are characterized by Weber as formal rational enterprises. The codified Civil Law of the Europeans is considered an example of the formal rational-will of the ‘system’. Further, the

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\textsuperscript{14} In practical-cultural realm of activity the method of engagement is substantive and pragmatic rationality. In the formal-systemic realm of activity, the method of engagement is formal-procedural rationality. In these two realms of human activity substantive-practical and formal-procedural rationalities are methods of problem solving. These two methods of problem solving are different in their epistemological and goal orientation.
calculative aspect of formal rationality, most specifically capitalistic market economic activities is systematic and formal because they are based on mere 'profit'.

Weber thought that formal rationality was becoming more dominant in modern, Western societies and substantive rationality was declining in importance. He noted that formal rationality was developed as capitalistic forms of organizations emerged, whose expansion was associated with the development of formal methods. However, formal rationality and the organizational features associated with it tended to hinder practical and substantive forms of rationality and limited informal rational activities in lifeworld.

Practical rationality—a methodological approach considers ends and the best means or courses of action to achieve specified ends. Practical rationality is a functionalist orientation of human activity. This form of rationality can be considered pragmatic because it provides an array of rich experiences from previous practices. Practical rationality is an accumulation of everyday knowledge, which is compiled through experiences and a trial and error method of learning.

In the clash between competing rationalities, we notice the ways in which formal rationality invades culture and everyday-life via diverse methods and techniques of economic invasion such as bonds, shares, finance, banking, and stock markets. This domination permits capital to be more mobile and allows owners of capital to pursue maximum profits in commercialized areas. Further, this leads to the progress of capitalist economic-activity and promotes the development of market mechanisms. On the other hand, it impoverishes culture and aesthetics because culture and aesthetics are unable to compete with the economic and systematic powers of the formal rationality. In this

\[15\] Profit is a never changing value and it is the logic and the rational will of an economic activity.
tension, culture and aesthetics will not be able to resist the instrumental rational power of the capitalistic economic system effectively. The presence of tension between competing rationalities in different realms of human activities encouraged Weber to propose a 'pluralization' of competing rationalities.

In summary, Weber had mixed views on the development of capitalism and Western forms of formal rationality. On the one hand, he believed that capitalism created the possibility for the development of modern Western societies with its wealth and efficient forms of economic and social organization. The development of formal-instrumental rationality was necessary for modern economic life and corporate organization to emerge and become successful. On the other hand, Weber feared that formal rationality associated with organizations, bureaucrats and capitalism would dominate Western societies, consequently the autonomous and free individual, one whose actions had continuity by reference to ultimate values, would be less able to exercise his or her autonomous substantive rationality (Ritzer 1992:125).

For Habermas the project of modernity as formulated by the Enlightenment philosophers was “to encourage the rationalization of social relations” through “The progressive differentiation of science and knowledge, morality and art, with which Max Weber characterized the rationalism of Western culture” departing from previous traditions and created two realms of human activity, lifeworld and system (Habermas 1997:46). Cultural rationalization in this sense is the process of systemic instrumentalization of everyday life and hermeneutic, hence normative, content of culture and everyday life do not wither away, and there begins a tension between substantive hermeneutic content of the lifeworld and instrumental rationality of the system.
Let me define ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ in turn. Habermas presents system in Parsonian terms of structural and functional maintenance, at the same rejects Weber’s perspective on the theory of action. According to Molles, “System, like lifeworld, is an action co-ordination device” (Molles 1991:34). However, unlike the lifeworld, the harmonization of action in the realm of system is not communicative, it is instrumental. In the realm of action organization of system, Habermas introduces ‘money’ and ‘power’. Money is the steering wheel of the economic subsystem and power shows the administrative subsystem. In addition, Habermas proposes a need for mutual understanding between the two realms of human activity.

Habermas’s theory of lifeworld is connected to the validity of action norms and traditional practices. The purpose of action in the lifeworld is the organization of consensus and cooperation. Lifeworld in this sense is a transcendental realm of progress that has three interrelated facets, “cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization”, and, Habermas “relates each process to culture, society and personality as communicative elements and structural components of the lifeworld” (Mellos 1991:24). According to Mellos, “The theory of lifeworld incorporates Weberian and Piagetian elements in that lifeworld is cast in a developmental dynamic of differentiation of rationalities and progressive rationalization from an historically early and primitive phase of myths and magic to a modern rationalized phase of differentiated forms of rationality.” (Mellos 1991:25). It is unfortunate that Habermas abandons the Weberian ‘pessimism’ on linear historical evolutionary process, and he substitutes it with Hegel’s optimism in that the condition of human rationality and freedom posed the telos of the history.
In drawing the relationship between system and lifeworld, Habermas subordinates system to lifeworld. According to him, the system has a mere instrumental function, thus, it should serve the lifeworld in which the three moments: cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization take place. Habermas believes that the lifeworld is more authentic realm of human activity and corresponds to casual daily life, and therefore system is inferior to lifeworld. He understands that the instrumental rationality of systems dictates instrumentalism to lifeworld. I believe that Habermas’s proposal to mediate the tension between system and lifeworld attempts similar pluralization of competing rationalities that Weber proposed, because Habermas realizes the invasion of lifeworld by instrumental rationality poses a similar threat to the one Weber envisioned. According to Mellos “Habermas places his hope for a restoration of the proper relation between lifeworld and system in the power of communicative rationality to lead dialogical partners to achieve understanding with a claim to universality, as opposed to the brute power of instrumental rationality of system” (Mellos 1991:35).

However, after Habermas separates the formal instrumental rationality of the system from lifeworld rationality, he is unable to reunite them. Giddens states that once Habermas separated the two spheres of rationality “he is unable to reunite them in such a way as to deal with the practical, transformative context of action in terms of the demands of concrete social analysis” (Giddens 1977:13-14). Thus, Habermas’s ‘philosophy of everyday life’ is an aspect of linguistic communication and consensus, culture and substantive rationality fail to provide a concrete remedy to mediate the tension between formal systemic rationality and the lifeworld.
His attempt to overcome the problematics of the tension between lifeworld and system, by rendering the system subordinate to lifeworld fails. This failure is due to the lack of communicative objectivity and enforceability of mutual and shared interest between the two realms of activity. It is unfortunate that Kant’s categorical imperative with an intersubjective relationship between the social actors in communicative reason will not help the lifeworld to take over the system. Even democracy as a procedural form of political organization cannot overcome the burdens of instrumental rationality posited by ‘power’ and ‘money’. Thus, neither in application, nor in theory can the tension between lifeworld and the system be unravelled.

4. Critical Theory as a Communicative Rational Model of Governance

In an attempt to show Habermas’s overall reconstruction project as a communicative rational model of governance, I will focus on his theory of knowledge-constitutive interests of human action, communicative action, moral consciousness and discourse ethics. Then, I will deploy Rose, and Hunt and Wickham’s principles of governance, in so doing, I will be able to illustrate the ways in which critical theory can be read as a communicative rational model of governance.

Five theses arise from Habermas’s theory of ‘knowledge-constitutive’ interests of human action. The first is that “The achievements of the transcendental subject have their basis in the natural history of the human species” (Habermas 1972:312). Second, in his account, this thesis imposes that “reason is an organ of adaptation for men just as claws and teeth are for animals” (Habermas 1972:312). In this sense, reason is organic-equipment and a resource that has rescued ‘men’ from the hardships and threats of nature.
In addition, reason has enabled ‘men’ to organize social and cultural systems of ‘self-preservation’. Thus, for Habermas the sophistication of the human faculty of reason is linked to the idea of natural evolution and human transcendence. ‘Knowledge-constitutive’ interests are the human cognitive processes and related to the intention of drafting and planning social systems “for it is the subject to the criterion of what a society intends as the good life” (Habermas 1972:313).

The third thesis is that “knowledge equally serves as an instrument and transcends self-preservation” (Habermas 1972:313). According to this thesis, transcendental necessity of self-preservation gives rise to the need for three categories of knowledge: information (practical knowledge), interpretation (hermeneutics) and free consciousness (hypnotized power) of the human-interests and intentions. The transcendental necessity of self-preservation, thus, is “linked in its roots to definite means of social organization: work, language and power” (Habermas 1972:313). Work knowledge is technical-informational, practical knowledge is interpretive-hermeneutic and power knowledge is egoistic-authoritative.

He further characterizes and defines these three domains of knowledge as essential aspects of his ‘transcendental necessity of self-preservation thesis’. ‘Work’ is an aspect of technical knowledge. It operates on prediction and it offers an instrumental casual explanation based on positivistic, scientific, empirical, and analytical research methods. It provides “information that expands our power of technical control” (Habermas 1972:313). Second, language is an aspect of practical (hermeneutic) knowledge and it provides the “interpretations that make possible the orientation of action within a common tradition” (Habermas 1972:313). Understanding common
traditions and norms can be attained through ‘hermeneutic’ research methods as the study of the methodological principles of interpretation. Third, he points out that power knowledge is the idea that ‘free consciousness’ depends on ‘hypostatised powers’ (Habermas 1972:313). These three domains of knowledge-constitutive human interest together provide “information that expands our power of technical control; interpretations that make possible the orientation of action within common traditions; and analysis that free consciousness from its dependence on hypostatised power” (Habermas 1972:313)\(^\text{16}\).

Habermas’s fourth and fifth theses both focus on self-reflection in relation to emancipated society. The two theses propose the unity of knowledge and human interest. According to his fourth and fifth theses “in the power of self-reflection, knowledge and interest are one…the unity of knowledge and interest proves itself in a dialectic that takes the historical traces of suppressed dialogue and reconstructs what has been suppressed” (Habermas 1972:314-15). Critical self-reflection is the corner stone of Habermas’s critical theory, which is a ‘reflexive self-knowledge’. Habermas is interested in the unities of knowledge and self-interest, self-reflection and social emancipation because such unities initiate self-criticism. He points out that in a reflexive-society “knowledge for the sake of knowledge attains congruence with the interest in autonomy and responsibility. The emancipation of cognitive interest aims at the pursuit of reflection” (Habermas 1972:314).

\(^{16}\)Habermas’s early work included a substantive consideration of he ‘human interest’ which was the elaboration of the philosophy of the subject. However, with his turn to ‘the linguistic turn’ in communicative action and discourse ethics, he abandoned the philosophy of the subject and interest theory at the expense of the ‘human subject’. For Habermas is different than Foucaultian interpretations of the death of the subject. For him, normative practices of mutual understanding in the modern liberal democracies have weakened the subject and consensus will make the ‘subject’ disappear. More about this in Chapter Four.
Reflexive self-knowledge is the application of free and responsible consciousness that can transcend human society, if individuals and collective communities attempt to engage self-critically and discursively in their daily affairs. In this sense, individuals and community members can achieve the ‘governance’ of their social, political and economic affairs from an emancipated communicative rationalist perspective. Discourse ethics, Habermas’s program, is designed to achieve a reflexive engagement in the process of consensus and consent to the ‘force of the better argument’ as a procedure of rational deliberation between those who are concerned.

Habermas hopes that insights gained through self-emancipation with reflection will lead to a transformed consciousness that might emancipate the society. In this sense Habermas anticipates that the unity of knowledge and interest will utilize emancipation, renew social systems and the body politics. He further indicates, “only in an emancipated society, whose members’ autonomy and responsibility had been realized, would communication have developed the non-authoritarian and universally practiced dialogue from which both our model of reciprocally constituted ego identity and our idea of true consensus are always delivered” (Habermas 1972:314).

4.1 Governance Engagement

I will deploy, Hunt and Wickham, and Rose’s perspectives on governance to analyse technical, practical and emancipatory constitutive-knowledge interests that are centred on work, language and power. And I will characterize critical theory from as a normative model. Such analyses will help me reconstruct critical theory as communicative normative rational model of governance.
4.2 Hunt and Wickham’s principles of Governance

The keywords ‘work,’ ‘language,’ and ‘power’\textsuperscript{17} are linked to human physical, social and intellectual activities. First, let me examine the notion of ‘work’. In the early Greek city-states, work was separated from philosophy and art, and it was considered to have a lower rank because it was only for the slaves to work. In opposition to classical antiquity, with the emergence of capitalism and consumer societies the artistic and philosophic aspirations, which did not have any economic motives, have barely survived or have died. Thus, the advanced capitalist societies focus on work and economic production, and out of the fruit of her/his labour, an individual interest to produce surplus is a self-evident reality. Under this circumstance, work is not only the means of gaining livelihood, but for those who produce more than they can consume, the surplus might get transformed into an instrument of power.

Work constitutes a kind of human activity that consumes energy and intends to produce both material goods and intellectual logical gains, which produce knowledge by mastering certain activities. As I indicated, in advanced capitalist societies work is attached to the concept of economic activity, the intention to gain a livelihood and to produce a surplus. If surplus is reinstated in further economic activity, it creates power relations; therefore it becomes an instrument of domination.

‘Language’ as a means of communication and the sign of the evolution of the human brain, enables human beings to engage in the production of abstract ideas. Three

\textsuperscript{17} Arendt, in \textit{The Human Condition} proposes three fundamental human activities: “labor, work, and action”. Her exposition of these three elements of human activity is Heideggerian, because she treats them as given conditions. However, she argues that ‘work and action’ are socially constructed but driven from ‘labor’. And ‘labor’ corresponds to ‘our natural condition’. This is very much in line with Heidegger’s notion ‘being-there’ with a small ‘b’ which is also a part of Being with a capital ‘B’. I am not interested this Heideggerian-Arindtian trend, rather I am interested in the Foucaultian notion of the ‘social’ which is already ‘there’ and does not pursue the ‘origins’ and how it got ‘there’. As well, see Hunt and Wickham’s fourth principles of governance.
themes: first, language facilitates understanding and analysing the past. Second, it makes possible the interpretation of the present, 'what is'. Third, it assists the provision of planning the future. Those who are in the position and able to deploy such a sound system (language) in a sophisticated manner are in a better position to gain more work surplus and knowledge, and therefore possibly able to dominate those who do not have sophisticated language skills. The latter becomes evident in the case of political speeches and rhetorical uses of language.

The third keyword that I want to analyse is 'power'. Taking a Foucaultian approach power is not negative in itself. It depends on how it is used. The exercise of power either on the 'self' or over the 'others' brings our attention to techniques of governance and control. Thus, power is related to any egoistic activity committed to control and management (not necessarily unjust or bad). If we agree that work, language and power are basic elements of human social activities, then we may also agree that the excessive use of these three areas of human social, political and economic activities might lead to domination and control (either in a just-good or unjust-bad sense). It is clear that Habermas tackles with controlling and governing the excessive uses of 'work,' 'language,' and 'power' via communicative reason from an emancipated and reflexive standpoint as an aspect of lifeworld.

Employing Hunt and Wickham's account of governance will allow me to interpret Habermas's project as an attempt to govern individual and collective action via communicative-reason. In order to perform the act of governance, there must be an actor, or a body of actors. According to Habermas the citizenry in a democratic sense are the authors of their own rights and responsibilities, thus, the citizens deliberate on the
issues of their concern by relying on the universal principles of communicative-reason from a reflexive emancipatory standpoint. Consequently, Habermas's communicative-rational model of governance derives its validity by grounding its principles in proceduralism, democratic-will formation and popular sovereignty.

I interpret Habermas's attempt to control and govern excessive uses of 'work,' 'language,' and 'power' communicatively—as a communicative-rational model of governance. According to Hunt and Wickham governance is "any attempt to control any kind of object, in fact any phenomenon which human beings try to control or manage" (Hunt and Wickham 1994:78.) Thus, any attempt to control a specific phenomenon or activity is an attempt to govern.

Here I will apply Hunt and Wickham's first principle of governance to the concept and process of consensus which is the central part of Habermas's linguistic turn expressed in communicative reason and discourse ethics. In their account "all instances of governance contain elements of attempt and elements of incompleteness (which at times may be seen as failure)" (Hunt and Wickham 1994:79). I argue under communicative-reason there are instances in which the object of deliberation is not accomplished. Since communicative-reason includes instances of failure to reach an agreement, which might result in renegotiation, I consider communicative-reason as an instance of 'governance.' Where the object of communicative-reason remains incomplete, no doubt, communicative-reason is an attempt to govern. For example, if communication fails in the process of defining and writing their rights and obligations, citizens have to take self-emancipation approach and be critical of their conduct. This leads me to the element of 'incompleteness' proposed by Hunt and Wickham. Given that
it implies renegotiating of the object of governance, and in my account renegotiation implies that governance of the ‘object’ of governance is ‘incomplete’.

Habermas’s discourse ethics concentrates on ‘ought’ and proposes what it ‘ought to be’. What is the focus of an “ought” project in general and in Habermasian sense more specifically? What is the horizon of looking at social, political and economic activities with an “ought” perspective? Ought is a by-product of cognitive activity, specifically it is an area of knowledge-constitutive interest. Since ‘ought’ involves the application of knowledge, it will be persuasive to include Hunt and Wickham’s third principle that states, “Governance always involves knowledge” (Hunt and Wickham 1994:87). Any available and accessible knowledge can be used in the process of planning the governance of selected objects or phenomena. The ‘ought’ aspect of governance is generated by the idea of self-preservation and power interest motives. Consequently, an ‘ought’ vision is an attempt to govern with the intention of self-preservation. It attempts to find the ‘best’ way of governance, depending on available knowledge relevant to the object of governance. Habermas’s ‘ought’ proposes an ethical program centred on communicative-rational form of governance. Thus, for me ‘ought’ in itself is an ethical technique of governance focused on envisioning what the future ‘ought’ to be.

Habermas’s analysis of ‘what is’ presents a mixed vision of human society in general. The mixed views, doubts and social divisions which Habermas recognizes further convince me to apply Hunt and Wickham’s fourth principle of governance, in their account “Governance is always social and always works to bind societies together (which sometimes, ironically, involves social division)” (Hunt and Wickham 1994:92).

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18 The individual agencies define ‘best’. In Habermas’s communicative model of governance, ‘best’ is universal and procedural as well ‘intersubjective.’
He takes a sceptical approach, where he examines the colonization of lifeworld by system, and he indicates that the transcendence of human subject acting in the realm of calculative-reason (media, money and economic activities) is a serious problem. While he is critical of colonization of lifeworld by the system, his proposal for change and transcendence is unsuccessful in application.

4.3 Rose's Normative Model of Governance

Rose provides useful insights into the definition, usages and application of governance. For Rose governance is a 'catch all phrase,' which is substituted for "regulation, administration management and the like precisely because it is not overly burdened with conceptual baggage" (Rose 1999:14). Rose identifies 'normative' and 'descriptive' engagements with governance.

First, in a normative sense 'governance can be good or bad' governance tends to be judged good when "political strategies seek to minimize the role of the state, to encourage non-state mechanisms of regulation, to reduce the size of the political apparatus and civil service, to introduce 'the new public management', to change the role of politics in the management of social and economic of affairs" (Rose 1999:14). The second usage of governance is descriptive which is also called 'sociology of governance,' in this sense "Governance refers to the outcome of all these (social, political and economic) interactions and dependencies: the self-organizing networks that arise out of the interactions between a variety of organizations and associations" (Rose 1999:15-16).

I would like to argue that Habermas critical theory is a normative engagement of governance by virtue of attempting to reduce the role of the state and systematic
'colonization' of lifeworld. This normative approach to governance makes old liberal claims, which are reformulated with a newer vocabulary and interpretations such as freedom of speech, human rights, racial equality and so forth. Critical theory values the normative practices of the lifeworld and builds a resistant force against the instrumental rationalization of the political, social and economic systems. Under this normative approach, bad governance means an interventionist and centralized government, and "good governance means less government, politicians exercising power by steering (setting policy) rather than rowing (delivery services)" (Rose 1999:14).

Habermas's critical theory makes assertions about the normative content of the lifeworld, which is a well-known and familiar realm of activity to the citizenry; thus, the lifeworld is the normative and concerned with the past and present, therefore it should play a more decisive role in minimizing the role of instrumental rationalities of the state. Rose makes an interesting argument about the ways in which the normative meaning of governance has been adopted by large world corporations such as the World Bank, which terms "good governance in terms of strategies that purport to disperse power relations amongst a whole complex of public service, judicial system and independent auditors of public finance, coupled with respect for the law, human rights, pluralism and a free press" (Rose 1999:14).

In this sense, I find the normative content of lifeworld which Habermas relies on as the source of traditional values, common and shared understanding, popular sovereignty and democratic will-formation, together serve to minimize the domination and the power of instrumental rationality in the state. An attempt by the citizenry to minimize the role of the state (associated with instrumental rationality) results in the
tension between system and lifeworld. Habermas agrees to the existence of that very
tension, and he acknowledges in that tension that the state colonized lifeworld. While he
is clearly in favour of reversing colonization, he sees the only way to deal with this
problematic is negotiation between the two realms of human activity. Such negotiation
between the two realms of human activity he argues can be mediated by the procedures
of rational argumentation in communicative action and discourse ethics.

According to Rose, this thesis is both misleading and unsuccessful, because it
fails to understand the complex ways in which the systems penetrates into the depth of
citizen's life, and as a result subject and object become one. Rose states "The state
institutions certainly extend the scope of their operations and the depth of their
penetration into the lives of their citizen subjects" (Rose 1999:18). Another problem
worth noting is that Habermas does not recognize 'subject centred reason' and he makes
simplistic assertions about human freedom and individuality.

My conclusions with Rose's account is that Habermas's normative governance is
an attempt to minimize the state interventions into the lifeworld by virtue of
communicative reason. It is this focus on communication-reason that I read a
communicative rational model of governance. In short, Habermas's program centres on
coupling communication and reason as the means of problem deciphering in social,
political and economic activities. Communicative rational engagement rejects other
procedures of problem solving such as civil disobedience and violence.
Table 1. Communicative Rational Model of Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General characteristics</th>
<th>Governing body (institutions)</th>
<th>Governing (objects)</th>
<th>Governing (subjects)</th>
<th>Reasons for Compliance</th>
<th>Relationships between the agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universalist, Formalist Normative, Ethical, Transcendental, Ought, Dialogical, Communicative, Procedural, Reflective, Prescriptive.</td>
<td>The body of citizenry, parliament, governmental institutions, (This includes all community members, as Habermas recognizes that there is not only one public sphere but there are subaltern publics).</td>
<td>Wide variety of issues commanded by those who are concerned to command those who are concerned.</td>
<td>Similar to commanding body. It is the rule of the people by the people for the people. The body of citizenry, parliament, governmental institutions, (This includes all community members, as Habermas recognizes that there is not only one public sphere but there are subaltern publics).</td>
<td>Common and individual good. Here the possibility of a tension between public and private will arise.</td>
<td>Mutual, reflexive, free and voluntary participation, consent to the ‘Force of the better argument’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4 Final Remarks on Communicative Rational Model of Governance

The communicative-rational model of governance concentrates on communication and a dialogical form of mastering the human interrelations in the public and private realms of human activity. A public realm denotes both an engagement with an individual other than the ‘self’ and public engagement in the sense of political commitment. The private realm denotes the sphere of interpersonal relations. In iron-fist totalitarian dictatorship systems, governance is non-communicative and authoritarian. A communicative rational model of governance is an attribute of Western liberal democracies, it is not achieved, it has a potential to be combined with the ‘agonistic-
care' oriented model of governance. "Communicative action is not weak simply because it is rationalist; it is weak because it has no concrete or substantial object and here remains open to "colonization" by the system" (Mellor 1991:35).

Habermas hopes to solve the theoretical and practical problems inherent in the tension between realms of human activity by proposing a discourse ethics that is partly an emancipated knowledge activity of the lifeworld. While discourse ethics is procedurally grounded, it is characterized by reflexive self-emancipation (self-criticism). Thus, Habermas's project invites the individual citizens to govern their private and public affairs in accordance with the procedures of communicative-reason and consent to the 'force of the better argument'. This model of governance provides the citizens with an ethical guideline (discourse ethics) to govern their private and communal affairs and become the 'authors of their own rights' via the procedures of rational argumentation (Habermas 1991; 1993; 1996; 1999).

This model of governance is not agonistic. It is not agonistic in the sense that individuals ought to engage in their daily activities from a reflexive and an emancipatory perspective. Moreover, individuals have to submit to the 'force of the better argument'. Communicative reason gives the citizens an opportunity to generate consensus and come to an agreement, which can be renegotiated and redefined intersubjectively. However, the process of renegotiation is not an open-ended procedure, but it builds and rebuilds on the past consensuses reached by (presumably citizens, community members and those who were in the position to make decisions: such as parliament and city counsels...etc.)

19 'Agonistic care-oriented model of governance' is my reading of Michel Foucault's 'genealogy.' I intend to combine it with the Habermas's communicative rational model of governance.
5. Conclusion: Why a Governance Reading of Critical Theory?

In this section, I will briefly argue that it is an important fruitful intellectual exercise to interpret critical theory as a communicative ration model of governance. I recognize the importance of communicative and linguistic attempts of problem solving between the human agencies and realms of their activities, because it is a safer and a non-violent way at problem deciphering. However, I consider this form of predicament unravelling as an ideal model. In discourse ethics, Habermas proposes the principle of submission to the force of a better argument as an ideal as the means of problem solving and reaching agreements. The principle concern of his discourse ethics is procedural justification of the force of a better argument and it is influenced by Kant’s categorical imperative. I will suggest that an ideal speech situation such as that of Habermas’s (discourse ethics) is not achievable.

To develop this continuation, I will dismantle Habermas’s ‘consensual’ model and render his rule of ‘submission to the force of the better argument’ unjust. I will replace, his consensual model with an agonistic model (Foucault’s hyper pessimistic activism), and substitute Foucault’s ‘attitude of critique and openness’ for Habermas’s ‘submission of the force of the better argument’. Then, in Chapter Four of this thesis I will tackle with the construction program of A Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance.
Chapter Three: Agonistic Action and The Care of the Self

1. Introduction

In this Chapter, I will rely on Rose, Hunt and Wickham’s perspectives of governance to interpret Foucault’s genealogical venture as an ‘agonistic care-oriented’ model of ‘governance’. However, before I construe his intellectual project of genealogy as governance, I will analyse why Foucault advocated the critical ethos of the Enlightenment and I will examine the ways Nietzsche influenced his genealogical engagements. Moreover, I will briefly look into the ways in which Foucault and Wittgenstein share views on discourse and discursive formations.

In this Chapter, first, I will briefly introduce the development of Foucault’s intellectual venture. Secondly, I will discuss and analyse Foucault’s advocacy of the Enlightenment’s critical attitudes in relation to Kant’s What is Enlightenment? Then, I will engage in the analysis and the discussion of the ways in which Nietzsche’s works motivated Foucault’s genealogical critiques of the universal and the transcendental assumptions of Enlightenment thought.

Furthermore, I will engage in a descriptive analysis of Foucault’s genealogy from Hunt and Wickham’s perspectives of governance, and from Rose’s standpoint on the new sociology of governance to construe Foucault’s intellectual practices as an agonistic care-oriented model of governance.

Finally in this Chapter, I will answer the following question: Why is it an important and fruitful intellectual exercise to interpret Foucault’s genealogical practices as an agonistic care-oriented model of governance? In addition, I will introduce the ways
in which I will use my finding in this Chapter to help me cultivate a *Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance* in Chapter Four of this Thesis.

I do not wish this Chapter to be read as an engagement against Foucault’s intellectual project. Rather, my purpose is to use, or even to exploit Foucault’s genealogical, intellectual reflections to construct an agonistic care-oriented model of governance. Subsequently, to realize my proposed venture, it is necessary to understand that the relationship between Foucault’s respective intellectual practices, on one hand, and my proposed venture *Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance* on the other hand, is not direct; rather it is the task of this Chapter to portray that association.

2. Method

I will deploy two methods of investigation in this Chapter. First, I will use a ‘genealogical’ methodology. This is necessary because I will read Foucault’s work from an unorthodox perspective that challenges linear and traditional interpretations of his work. Second, I will employ a reconstructive method, in order to cultivate an agonic care-oriented model of governance.

3. Foucault and Genealogy

In contrast to Habermas’s reconstruction of critical theory—communicative rational model of governance, discussed and constructed in Chapter Two—stands Foucault’s genealogical practices, which can be read as an agonic care-oriented model of governance. As an investigative practice, genealogy is an expression that has come into

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I have indicated my methodological engagement with genealogy in Chapter One and will follow the same trends.
currency since the 1970s, as the result of Michel Foucault's works. Following Nietzsche, Foucault viewed genealogy as a method of analysis that portrays "historical processes with an emphasis on their contingent, non-teleological character" (Craig 1998:3). I believe Foucault's turn to genealogy was the most outstanding accomplishment in his academic career.

Foucault's intellectual venture developed through three major stages. First, in *Madness and Civilization* (1960)\(^2^1\), he traced how in Western societies madness changed from divinely inspired phenomenon to mental illness. He attempted to expose the creative force of madness that was repressed in Western societies. In the second stage, *The Order of Things* (1966), *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969), Foucault questioned the nature of human sciences in relation to a broader socio-political structure of the Western societies. In this stage Foucault questioned the epistemological order of the social organizations and intellectual practices of the disciples such as the history of ideas, the history of science, the history of philosophy...etc.

The third stage of Foucault's intellectual venture began with the publication of *Discipline and Punish* in 1975. It questioned whether imprisonment was more humane punishment than torture. He introduced the notion of problematic\(^2^2\) as a very helpful analytical and research method. Further, questioned the ways in which society orders individuals by the training of their bodies; for example, basic training disciplines and

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\(^2^1\) The dates in brackets refer to the French publication.

\(^2^2\) Foucault's notion of 'problematic' points out the phenomenological dichotomies and dualisms of a 'neither' 'nor' situations. For example, if punishment is a cruel practice in itself, then, any method of punishment would be cruel. That means punishment in itself cannot be detached from cruelty, thus, 'punishment' as a practice cannot be approached differently, because it is a problematic in itself. Legitimation of punishment would be different issue. A normative engagement will be very weak in dealing with the notion of 'problematic'; however, a diagnostic or a descriptive engagement such as Foucault's is better situated to deal with it.
prepares a person to be a solider. Foucault’s last three books—The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction (1976), the Use of Pleasure (1984), and The Care of the Self (1984)—are parts of an unfinished work on the history of sexuality. In these books, Foucault described and analyzed the stages by which people in Western societies have come to understand themselves as sexual beings, and related the sexual self-conception to the moral and ethical life of the individual—as the care of the self. I will argue, later on, that Foucault’s last intellectual developments led him to a soft consideration of Stoic philosophy and the exploration of a possible new ethics—the care of the self.

Foucault did not offer any all-embracing theory of human nature. He was critical of metaphysical and universal theories; all beliefs that claimed to give an exclusive objective explanation of reality. For Foucault, there was no ultimate answer to be uncovered, but there were multiple ‘discursive practices’ to be examined in relation to their social objective(s). In this sense, discourse cannot be independent and objective but its study and understanding is possible in relation to its social and political contexts. Furthermore, the diversities of social discourses adhere to the multiplicities of social actors constantly engaged in the games of truth-making and, the governance of the self and others; the game is constant and it never ends. Constant contingent social action is the core argument of Foucault’s over all genealogical project. I will expand on this theme throughout the rest of this Chapter.

4. Foucault, Kant and the Enlightenment

In this Section, I discuss and analyse Foucault’s advocacy of the critical ethos of the Enlightenment in relation to Kant’s article What is Enlightenment? Kant’s article was
a response to the question ‘What is Enlightenment?’ asked by the Berlinische Montaschift newspaper, in 1784. His response is one of the most analyzed transcripts amongst the Eighteenth Century texts. While the text is not much burdened with heavy conceptual baggage, as Foucault stated ‘it is a newspaper article;’ it provides a stunning explanation, definition and analysis of the Enlightenment as maturity. To this date, Kant’s two and a quarter century old response continues to be re-examined. Foucault re-examined Kant’s response and he equated the Enlightenment to the ‘ethos of critical attitude’.

Kant argued that, “Enlightenment is mankind’s exit from its self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another” (Kant 1996:58). In this sense, enlightenment is an individual’s ability to reason, to stand alone, and to develop an sense of identity by building a ‘semi-independent’24 private use of reason. At the same time individuals have to think of themselves as members of a particular tradition and a community in which they reside. Here, the defining line between the public and the private, the particular and the universal uses of reason is unclear. I will come back to this discussion later.

Further, for Kant self-incurred immaturity obstructs the Enlightenment and “its cause lies not in the lack of understanding, but in the lack of the resolution and the courage to use it (one’s own understanding) without guidance of another. Sapere aude! (dare to know) Have the courage to use your own understanding is thus the motto of enlightenment” (Kant 1996:58). Moreover he stated, “Rules and formulas, those

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23 Berlinische Montaschift was a German newspaper that asked ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in 1784. Kant was one of the philosophers who responded to the question in an article published in the same newspaper, titled What is Enlightenment?
24 In an Enlightened age, private reason, in Kantian model is dependent on public use of reason; this means there is an intersubjective relationship between public and private uses of reason.
mechanical aids to the rational use, or rather misuse, of his (an individual) natural gifts, are the fetters of an everlasting immaturity” (Kant 1996:59). For Kant, the Enlightenment transpires where there is no restriction, on the public use of reason and where individuals have the courage to participate without the fear of being required to follow others in their practices.

For Kant, the decrease of restriction on the public use of reason does not mean that an individual can do or say anything she wants. In *Critique of Judgement*, he laid down three maxims for the ‘motto of the Enlightenment’. The maxims are, “think for oneself, think from the standpoint of everyone else and think always consistently. The first is the maxim of unprejudiced, the second of a broadened, the third of a consistent way of thinking” (Kant 1987:160-62). The first and second maxims are dictums of ‘understanding’ and ‘judgement’ and the third is the maxim of ‘reason’. For Kant, it is necessary to be skilled in the first two maxims before one becomes proficient in the third maxim.25

Now, Foucault’s re-examination of Kant’s response lead him to agree with Kant’s critical attitude that echoes in our ears as ‘dare to know,’ ‘have the courage,’ ‘use your own understanding without the guidance of another’; however, he departed from Kant on one main point: consistency of linear and transcendental thinking, which Kant thought of as the *telos* of the universal ‘reason’. Foucault’s interpretation of the Enlightenment as critical ethos is consistent with Kant’s first two maxims: “think for oneself, and think from the standpoint of every one else”; however Foucault departed from Kant where the

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25 In his first work *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Jürgen Habermas examined the exploration of new forms of public debate and discussion that for him defined the Enlightenment. However, Habermas has always struggled over the provision of accurate definitions of the public and private spheres and the line, which separates the two spheres of human activity.
maxim of consistency comes in because Foucault disagreed with the possibility of a universal consistency.

The maxim of thinking for oneself is an essential component in becoming an individual. An individual always exists in relation to the community in which she resides. Thus, the first maxim, 'to think for oneself', for me means: to think for oneself as an individual and as a part of a group or community. In this sense, thinking for oneself is actually derived from the idea of thinking of oneself, because the self can think for herself only after she is able to think of her self and this is clearly portrayed in Foucault’s 'the care of the self'. This maxim does not enforce the idea of a primordial and a priori universal reason. It does not require that an individual must think for her self on the basis of a universal rule; but I read it as implying an individual thinks for her self—using her own particular abilities, experiences and knowledge. Thus, it is a perspectival maxim rather than a universal one. Again, I interpret this maxim as implying 'self-knowledge' and the care of the self. Hence, it clearly corresponds with Foucault’s intellectual critical practices and it depicts the contingent characteristics of his genealogy; I believe, it is closer to Foucault’s first of the three principles of 'care of the self'.

Although the second maxim, thinking from the standpoint of everyone else, may not assume that everyone thinks and act alike or that everyone is in the same conditions socially, politically and economically. But is assumes a universal practice of 'thinking from the standpoint of everyone else'. Since everyone is not the same, one needs to adopt a perspectival approach tailored to the specificities of each individual. Therefore, a

26 In section Six of this Chapter I will discuss Foucault's care the self.
universal approach cannot be valid as the application of thinking from the standpoint of others; because the ‘other’ is not only a physical concept but ‘it’ denotes difference in attitude, ways of thinking, ways of life and every ‘other’ is not the same. I believe this maxim is in line with Foucault’s critical attitude, which disagreed with the existence of a singular universal standpoint for everyone.

Third, Foucault’s entire genealogical project attempts to reject the maxim of ‘consistency’ of thinking. Consistency as a condition of adhering thoughts together and constituting arguments persistently would not be Foucault’s objection. This kind of consistency, I call transparency of thinking, proficiency in self-expression and the ability to deliver what one thinks, not in accordance with a universal law, but according to the perspectives of each discipline in which the speaker and the writer engage. There has always been a fundamental relationship between the writer and her reader; to achieve her objective, the writer must know who is the reader—and the relationship in this knowledge transaction, I call the consistency of thinking and the transparency in the public display of thought. Foucault would not disagree with ‘consistent’ thinking in this sense; however, he fundamentally disagreed with consistency of transcendental teleology of reason, i.e., Aristotelian, Kantian and Hegelian universal teleology of reason.

Foucault’s works consistently presented genealogy problems. For Foucault, there was not a given singular rational human ‘ontological origin’, but we constitute ourselves rather differently. Foucault focused on “How are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own action?” (Foucault 1997:318). From this standpoint, Foucault thought the limitation of knowledge and its
perspectival characteristics will not allow the application of valid universal reason. In this sense, arguing for a universal consistency of the telos of reason would be naïve; thus, enforcing the universal consistency of transcendental reason becomes a blackmail of humanity. He called this, the universal ‘blackmail’\textsuperscript{27} of the Enlightenment (Foucault 1997:312-315).

In this fashion, I argue that Kant’s definition of the Enlightenment was oxymoronic, and as a project the Enlightenment maintained opposing practices. On one hand, the critical ethos of the Enlightenment encouraged freedom, individuality and personhood; on the other hand, it encouraged a universal transcendental teleology of reason, which at times undermines personhood and individuality. This was the blackmail of the masses, for Foucault. To overcome the universal blackmail of reason imposed by the Enlightenment presupposition of the consistency of teleological reason, Foucault argued for adopting and practicing the critical ethos of the Enlightenment.

Foucault argued that the Enlightenment was an episode of complex historical processes situated at a certain point in European history. This set of complex processes included “elements of social transformation, types of political institutions, forms of knowledge, projects of rationalization of knowledge practices, technological mutations that are very difficult to sum up in a word, even if many of these phenomena remain important today” (Foucault 1997:313). These processes were represented by a critical ethos, which Foucault called the moment of departure from the traditional obedience of

\textsuperscript{27}The universal message that the Enlightenment project preached was a teleological transcendental vision of the human societies and it disregarded difference and diversity. The Enlightenment discourse was a ‘blackmail’ of the masses because the practices of ‘rights’ and ‘equality’ backed by transcendental universalism were the elites’ ideas and practices. People in the bottom of the social ladder were convinced that it was possible for dream to come true. Thus, both on the intellectual and political level the sameness and equality results in dismantling difference and diversity, and therefore it minimizes the attitude of critique and change. Thus, while it is a blackmail of the masses, it becomes a safeguard to preserve the status quo.
governance. Although, he equated this departure to the 'attitude' of critique, he did not agree that the Enlightenment has brought about maturity and 'adulthood'.

Thus, the Enlightenment for Foucault constituted a “point of departure: the outline of what one might call the attitude of modernity” (Foucault 1997:309)\(^{28}\). That very point of departure attempted to attach 'heroic' attributes to the present and distinguished the 'present' from the 'past' as a glorious moment in the history of humanity. Foucault argued that "Modernity is not a phenomenon of sensitivity to the fleeting present; it is the will to 'heroize' the present" (Foucault 1997:310). The idea of the Enlightenment as a moment in the history of humanity as a defining stage of our maturity and adulthood situated the historical epochs as a rational movement of the history from a transcendental perspective. Accordingly, this perspective sought to show the ways in which the history is moving forward in a positivistic sense.

Foucault did not view the Enlightenment as an age of maturity, but he considered the Enlightenment as a “philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era” (Foucault 1997:312). This philosophical 'ethos-critique' attitude is an essential component of Foucault's 'hyper-pessimistic' attitude that everything has its side effects; therefore, everything needs to be approached with an agonistic attitude. In this sense, to be 'agonistically' critical and to avoid submissions would be the route to 'exist' the 'nonage'\(^{29}\) Kant portrayed as a unique characteristic of the Enlightenment attitude. For Foucault, exiting self-imposed nonage did not necessarily guarantee the 'maturity' and 'adulthood' of thought and attitude; however it

\(^{28}\) See also Foucault, Michel 1987.
\(^{29}\) Immaturity
assisted bringing into currency nontraditional views which assisted the primacy of critical agonistic-attitude in social action.

Moreover, Foucault did not agree with the idea that the Enlightenment project has brought 'men' to a state of maturity. He stated, "I do not know whether we will ever reach mature adulthood. Many things in our experience convince us that the historical event of the Enlightenment did not make us mature adults, and we have not reached that stage yet" (Foucault 1997:318). For Foucault, the critical attitudes of the Enlightenment period have helped to broaden the limits and boundaries imposed on us by the universal blackmail of reason. Thus, the critical aspect of the Enlightenment corresponds to Foucault's intellectual practices. Further Foucault argued, "I do not know whether it must be said today that the critical task still entails faith in Enlightenment; I continue to think this task requires work on our limits, that is, a patient labor giving form to our impatience for liberty" (Foucault 1997:319).

5. Nietzsche and the Enlightenment

In this Section, I will briefly describe the ways in which Nietzsche's critiques of the Enlightenment and his genealogy motivated Foucault's project; however, I will not engage in a detailed discussion since Nietzsche's influence on Foucault is well known. As May indicates, "Nietzsche's influence upon Foucault shimmers across the surface of each of Foucault's texts" (May 1993:78).

First, I will briefly outline Nietzsche's critical reflections on the Enlightenment and genealogy briefly. Nietzsche viewed the Enlightenment as a period that ended with the French Revolution, and he provided a virulent and comprehensive critique of its
universal assertions. Nietzsche articulated a "transgressive discourse that disrupts without being decipherable disturbs the social and cultural bonds" of modernity (May 1993:78). With the genealogical turn Nietzsche endeavoured to advance a comprehensive and systematic critique of the Enlightenment, a thread that runs through his entire work. Although, Nietzsche opposed the idea of enlightened faith as progress/maturity and he deemed it to be naïve, his work contains clear elements of the Enlightenment. This is because the Enlightenment project and its ideals were temptations to bring opposing concepts: private/public, universal/particular together by framing them under the command of the 'universal reason'.

Nietzsche saw the Enlightenment as a broad, a potent, a terrifying and an overconfident project. For him, it was an arrogant intellectual ethos that made worrying universal assertions about the nature of human existence and society. He opposed the ideals of the Enlightenment, which insisted that humans were rational autonomous subjects, and that they could attain political freedom through the use of universal reason. Nietzsche criticized universal conceptions of morality. He believed that morality was 'perspectival' (Nietzsche 1989:24-56). This theme is dominant in 'beyond good and evil'.

Nietzsche maintained that human behaviour is motivated by a will to power and that traditional values had their impact over society. Nietzsche believed that there were many ways to distinguish and choose between moral positions, but this could not be done with an appeal to any universal theses. Thus, he believed that his moral perspectivism was a sufficiently strong position that it might displace the moral universalism prevalent in philosophies the Enlightenment period. According to Donner, Nietzsche argued "Let
us not be deceived either in the Kantian or in the Hegelian manner: we no longer believe in morality, as they did, and consequently we have no need to found a philosophy with the aim of justifying morality" (Donner 1991:150). Nietzsche opposed Aristotelian, Kantian and Hegelian teleology and disputed the idea of a need for a universal morality.

Nietzsche had a most significant influence on Foucault. “Nietzsche is a touchstone of Foucault’s early—as of his later—thought” (May 1993:14). In Nietzsche, Foucault found a new power and force, which disturbed and questioned being ‘normal’. Foucault pointed out “Nietzsche’s madness—that is, the dissolution of his thought—is that by which his thought opens out onto the modern world” (Foucault 1986:289).

6. Foucault, Wittgenstein and Discourse

It is worthwhile examining the ways in which Wittgenstein shared views on language, discourse and discursive formation. Although, they might not have been aware of it, they both share their views on discourse. For example Aron argues that Wittgenstein has influenced Foucault’s perspective on discourse, however that claim is disputable. According to Aron the “Critical features of Wittgenstein’s analytics can be found in Foucault’s account of verbal performance; an account while unique to Foucault, and brought to analysis by Foucault and hardly interchangeable with Wittgenstein’s own efforts, seems to warrant the suggestion of an impact of Wittgenstein on Foucault” (Aron 1978: 60). However, Wittgenstein’s latter work is much more compatible with Foucaultian genealogical reflection on discourse.

In Foucault’s account, verbal performances represent knowledge and the mastery of discourse. Knowledge of grammar is a technical ability, which reveals itself in the
structure of well-organized discourses, and thereby generates power/knowledge relationships. Wittgenstein stated that, “A sound is an expression only in a particular language-game” (Wittgenstein §261). The idea of a ‘particular language-game’ gives rise to Foucault’s concept of divergent discursive practices, each with its own specific structure and objective(s). While specific attributes of each language game in the Wittgensteinian sense, and ‘discourse’ in Foucaultian sense, might overlap; they contribute to the truth production and ‘governance’ of the individual’s social conduct by the way of internalization.

For Foucault, a ‘discourse’ is a ‘body’ of knowledge that gets revealed through utterances. Thus, discourse is the reflection of speaker or writer’s knowledge, her understanding ability and the underlying objectives of the discourse. The idea of discourse and discursive formation led Foucault to examine a wide variety of texts, from different communities, classes, groups, historical periods, different disciplines and different genres. As the result, he found that different discourses restructure knowledge regarding a phenomenon or an object differently, and press on different objectives. For example, the ‘discourses’ on madness include writings from psychiatric professionals, writings by doctors who work with the mentally ill, novels with mad characters, and autobiographies of mad people, as well as writing about madness from other disciplines (Foucault 1998:205-222). Foucault’s works on discourse were studies of multiplicities of human activities and practices and the ways in which we constitute ‘ourselves’ and ‘others’ through the use and utilization of different discourses.

The concerns of these studies were: why and how speakers/writers communicate the ways in which they engage in different communicative activities? Foucault described
these activities and practices as 'games' of language. According to Tully, for Foucault, like "Wittgenstein, the languages and forms of action in which they (individuals) are woven... and the games in which the moderns are participants 'not closed by a frontier'" (Tully 1999:166). Foucault attempted to analyse the language games—discursive practices of serious speech acts that laid claim to the production knowledge. He treated these discursive practices as language games, which attempt to formulate truth in different historical periods and fields of human sciences. This indicates that he was attempting to provide the genealogy of knowledge and to show the history of truth claims through examining different discursive construction by which we constitute 'ourselves' and 'others'.

7. Agonistic Care-Oriented Model of Governance

"Genealogy requires patience and a knowledge of the details, and depends on a vast source material. Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and profound gaze of the philosopher might compare to the molelike perspective of the scholar; on the contrary, it rejects the metaphysical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for origins" (Foucault 1998:370).

In an attempt to show Foucault's overall genealogical practices to be an agonistic-care oriented model of governance, first, I will focus on his critique of transcendentalism. Second, I will construe his genealogy as a method that uncovers agonistic engagements in discourse formations and power/knowledge. Thus, for me genealogy is the reflection of Foucault's attitude of critique, which he called a 'hyper pessimistic activism'. Third, I will examine Foucault's the 'care of the self' as the final stage of his intellectual venture.
Although I am aware of a number of works on agonism and governance, my concern in this section is with Foucault's work. My study does not focus on a specific time period neither does it concentrate specifically on the analysis of liberalism or conservatism, but focuses Foucault's agonial reflections. His genealogical practices contain elements of agonism and that is the reason I read his work as an agonistic approach to social action. Moreover, his work on history of sexuality contains elements of ethics of the care of the self. This study draws from Foucault's genealogical practices and it is a deep gaze at the possibility of rooting out transcendental naivety which is a burden and a blackmail created by the diverse sources ranging from religion, knowledge producing institutions, ruling classes and governments to maintain rules and authority over the masses.

It is important to keep in mind that I engage with genealogy as a method of uncovering the nature of social action and the outcome of these actions. In this sense, "A genealogy of values, morality, asceticism, and knowledge will never confuse itself with a quest for their 'origins', will never neglect as inaccessible all the episodes of history" (Foucault 1998: 373). Thus, genealogy is concerned with beginnings and the causal factors of incidents and episodes in the history, it questions how and why an object or phenomenon is governed and it also questions the types of social action. In my account genealogy classifies the attitudes into two major categories: a submissive attitude—transcendental—and an agonistic attitude—critical and constructive. I will expand on this theme throughout the rest of this Chapter. Moreover, Foucault pointed out that

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30 For example, in The Human Condition Ardent raises agonism as a form of liberal politics. But I am not interested in this because I find liberalism to be transcendental enough to carry the blackmails of universalism. Although Nietzsche and Heidegger have influenced her work in many respects, she maintained an optimistic views of liberalism as the conditions of plurality and co-existence.
genealogy "will cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning; it will be scrupulously attentive to their petty malice; it will await their emergence, once unmasked, as the face of the other" (Foucault 1998:373). In this sense, genealogy is fundamentally critical of transcendental views of history.

For Foucault nothing could be the transcendental factor that can transform the subject. Thus, Foucault argued not simply for the death of the transcendental subject, but he adopted a perspective in which the subject is produced through power/knowledge practices. He observed that a shared belief in the knowledge of the past is impossible, because knowledge can be extracted and reconstructed only through the operation of different discursive formations.

Foucault was suspicious of any transcendental progress of human subjects. His genealogy opposed Kant's transcendental theme, Hegel's deterministic maturity thesis and Aristotelian teleology, and it illustrated the discontinuity and the contingency of historical epochs. I will argue that these discontinuities caused by the agonistic engagements between socio-political and economic forces. In this sense, agonistic commitments have triggered the primacy of critique, for example the French Revolution.

Foucault's genealogical project criticized the history of the disciplines such as the history of ideas, the history of sciences and the history of philosophy. He criticized these disciplines for having generalized tendencies to pay attention to unities of events and teleological reason. In contrast to those generalized tendencies, he argued for the ways in which rupture and discontinuity in the history of the Western societies have played an essential role in making possible changes and revisions. For Foucault, beneath any...
continuity and unity of thought there existed some fundamental elements of disruption (Foucault 1992). Thus, agonistic socio-political engagements\textsuperscript{32} have caused these disruptions and discontinuities, which in turn resulted in socio-political changes and transformations.

Foucault borrowed from Bachelard for whom the epistemological thresholds that suspended the continuous accumulation of knowledge, cut the foundational structures of truths, interrupted the transcendental developments that thought and gazed at the social organizations from a new perspective. According to Kusch, “Bachelard’s epistemology emphasizes revolutions, breaks or discontinuities in the history of the natural sciences” (Kusch 1991:27). However, Foucault applied Bachelard’s epistemological thresholds to social sciences, social organizations and social action. Thus, Bachelard’s work influenced Foucault’s \textit{Archaeology of Knowledge} and provided a fundamental epistemological support for Foucault’s genealogical work, which most clearly appeared later in \textit{Discipline and Punish}. These discontinuities, according to Foucault, have made possible transformations of social and political organizations. For example, Foucault considered the French Revolution a disruption of the absolute monarchy that cleansed and transformed the French society to enter a new stage. This example of disruption caused by agonistic engagements\textsuperscript{33}.

\textsuperscript{32} This generalized theme of agonism is not clear in Foucault’s work, however, for me it is clear that genealogy as a method maps the contingent characteristics of the human socio-political and economic engagements. Since genealogy does not propose a specific way of life but has brought into light the self-evident realities of disruptions and discontinuities; I see that genealogy indirectly leads ‘us’ to contingent agonism. In his works the three volumes of \textit{The History of Sexuality}, Foucault brought into light the ethics of ‘care of the self’, which is derived from contingent agonistic attitude.

\textsuperscript{33} Let me indicate two types agonism: a violent and a communicative type. First, a violent agonistic engagement could be a revolution, a civil disobedience or any other forms of violent engagement. The second type is a communicative agonistic engagement, in which communication is a method of engagement between the agon. Here the interest theory is not abandoned like Habermas’s communicative action. I will
I think Foucault rightly pointed out that our never-ending tracing-back, in search 
of new type of rationality, is a testimony that many instances of transformations and 
change in history have not taken effect with unanimity and teleological continuity. If we 
were sure that a smooth transcendental process has fulfilled the telos of the liberal 
democratic state, we would not have searched the past repeatedly to understand how we 
have got here. For example, when a researcher answers the following question: “how 
have we got here?” Her answer may be different from other available answers and 
answers produced by colleagues with similar line of thought. For me, Foucault replaced 
universal transcendental thesis with a perspectival contingent thesis that argues socio-
political and economic forces are almost always agonistically engaged. Thus, I see 
Foucault’s rejection of the transcendental universalism as a pretext arguing for agonistic 
contingent governance of the social. There are two categories of agonistic actions in 
this context: a violent and a communicative or both combined.

A genealogical investigation reveals the diversity and the disunity and not 
unanimity and teleology of knowledge. The scattered characteristic of knowledge and 
knowledge formation become self-evident once different discourses and their formations 
are examined. Thus, there is not a singular truthful knowledge for all times, because truth 
claims are the by-products of causal factors of specific actions in each period. Take for 
instance our knowledge and practice of monogamy in the West is different than the views 
of the polygamous societies in Africa. Their reason for practicing polygamy is 
perspectival and might suit their socio-political system or beneficial to the economic

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come back to this discussion in Chapter Four, in which I will construct “A Communicative Agonistic 
Theory of Governance”.

34 Any act in which the human beings or a human being, an actor(s), engaged in is ‘social’ for me.
productivity of their societies. Furthermore, a medical knowledge on the consequences of poverty and homelessness triggers might recommend an immediate action, but economists and ‘our’ finance minister might recommend otherwise based on the economic well-being of the country. Thus, knowledge of issues differs in different societies and different disciplines might have different views on the same subject.

Similar to differences of ‘accent’ in the English language, truth claims are diverse yet all forms of truth claims are attempts to settle knowledge. For those who want to protect the environment from different discursive perspectives but to achieve similar ends, they speak in different ‘accents’ but the same language because they have the same objective. In this context, the ‘objective’ defines whether discourses differ in ‘language’ or ‘accent’. Difference in accent does not denote difference in objective, though, difference in ‘language’ might mean difference in objective.

Thus, knowledge for Foucault was contextual, because he thought that knowledge was always diffusible. This means that claims to prefect knowledge justifiable in one context might turn out to be both unjustified and false in another. This is a relativist argument. Thus, any validity claim for Foucault was only normative. Foucault’s method of investigation of discursive and knowledge-producing practices is not normative; instead, it is descriptive and interpretive or as he called it ‘diagnostic’. Its potential domain comprises, past and present.

In the games of truth, accordingly, ‘social actors’ engage agonistically. An agonistic engagement is a state or a process in which social actors engage in to preserve their self-interests, and since the ‘self’ is related to the ‘other’; the self acts with a caring attitude towards the ‘other’. The attitude of their engagement is observant, cautious and
critical. Their critical attitude does not reflect ‘reactivism’, rather it is an ‘active’ attitude which builds, changes, renews and transforms their relationship to one another. For example, the suffrage movement of women in early Twentieth Century triggered change and transformation of the Western societies that not only gave women a wider social space and a number of rights but it changed “men’s” life style as well. The rules of engagement are diverse and contingent. While the rules of engagement in Foucaultian sense are not completely free and open-ended game, i.e., democracy is preferable over autocracy, caring for oneself and others is preferable over cruel treatment of others. The knowledge and truths that are produced by different discourses adhere to the fact that socio-political and economic forces are in a constant agonistic encounter. In my account, agonism always infers a critical attitude, and a critical attitude in this sense almost always reflects awareness, alertness and attentiveness to the ‘self’ and the ‘others’. In a sense, it is a reflexive critical attitude. Thus, I find in Foucault’s genealogical method that uncovers the agonistic character of the human species in the history as an imminent force of renewal and change.

7.1 Governance Engagement

In this subsection, I will deploy Hunt and Wickham’s, and Rose’s perspectives of governance to interpret Foucault’s genealogical intellectual practices as an agonistic care-oriented model of governance. Their engagements are the new sociology of governance but they differ. I will engage with Hunt and Wickham’s work in a more elaborate fashion. Later, I will deploy Rose’s perspective of the new sociology of governance, so I will be able to provide a clear distinction between ‘normative’ (Habermas’s communicative
rational model of governance) and 'new sociology of governance' (Foucault's agonistic care oriented model of governance).

First, let me construct a perspective for reading genealogy as agonistic model of governance. Foucault stated that as a method "Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times" (Foucault 1998:369). I further expand this 'meticulous gray' method to help me argue that the casual factors of any historical epochs, for example the emergence of Christianity, the emergence of Islam, the fall of the Rome, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution were agonistic engagements between social actors, and in turn such agonistic engagements brought into currency change and social transformations.

7.2 Hunt and Wickham's Principles of Governance

Hunt and Wickham's perspective on governance is influenced by Foucault's work on governmentality; but in order to avoid overlaps, in the course of interpreting Foucault's practices in genealogy as an agonistic care oriented model I will briefly re-map this connection. I find Hunt and Wickham's definition and their four principles of governance very important, useful and relevant to this discussion; and I will deploy each in turn.

While, I agree that genealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not map the destiny of a people, it uncovers the agonic engagements as the critical attitude that have led to change and transformation. In short, as a method it uncovers the contingent and non-transcendental moments of agonistic social, political and economic
engagements between social actors in the history. Then, agonistic attitudes have triggered change and transformation of the human social and political organization. However, it is important to point out that these contingencies caused by diverse socio-political forces those have engaged or attempted to engage in the game of governance and the truth making. Thus, for me genealogy uncovers the idea that agonism has been an omniscient and omnipresent force, which I see as a force that has attempted to control and manage the governance of human social organizations; however, these attempts have not set a fixed direction of history in a specific fashion. In an interview, Foucault said “I am not looking for an alternative; you can’t find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is the history of solutions—and that’s the reason why I don’t accept the word alternative. I would like to do the genealogy of problems” (Foucault 1994:256).

According to Hunt and Wickham, governance is “any attempt to control any kind of object, in fact any phenomenon which human beings try to control or manage” (Hunt and Wickham 1994:78). In my account, genealogy as a method attempts to establish the contingency and agonistic characteristics of the human engagement in the games of governance and truth making throughout the history. While genealogy does not argue that contingent agonistic governance is or should be the only method of governance explicitly; it implicitly infers this thesis as the essential traits of the human socio-political and economic engagements. Thus, for me every social action has been caused by an agonistic attitude, across the board, at any time, where the control or the management of ‘an object or a phenomenon’ has been attempted.
While there might be disagreement on making ‘agonism’ a method of social action, I argue the most important and crucial changes in the past were triggered by agonistic engagements; moreover, those agonistic moments of the past, we often glorify and honor. Agonism as a practice is problematic in itself, thus, a normative analysis or justification of agonism would be unproductive both practically and intellectually; however, it is a diagnostic concept, which is a suitable domain of a diagnostic descriptive analysis. My interpretation of agonism is inspired by Foucault’s notion of ‘problematic’.

Taking into consideration the diversity and contingency of socio-political and economic forces attempting to engage in the game of ‘governance’, governance always involves ‘agonism’ and elements of incompleteness. Hunt and Wickham argue “all instances of governance contain elements of attempt and elements of incompleteness (which at times may be seen as failure)” (Hunt and Wickham 1994:79). Since diverse socio-political and economic forces have different perspectives on the ways in which governance should be completed, the object of governance remains incomplete and unstable. In this sense the ‘agonists’ are always engaged in the redefinition of governance. I am not arguing that someday in the future the human society will fail to continue the process of building and go back to—where we first started building, but that is possible; for example, as the outcome of a World wide nuclear war. Thus, it is not clear what lies ahead. In this sense, we are caught in the paradigm of our own action. Thus, we define ourselves with ‘action’.

35 Either communicative or violent engagement, because the agonists might engage either communicatively or violently. Both of these methods of engagement with the game of governance have been practiced historically.
36 I am using ‘agon’ as a noun to mean an actor who acts agonistically. The English dictionary contains a noun version ‘agon’ but this noun refers to the state not an actor who acts agonistically. In this sense, ‘agon’ is singular and ‘agonists’ plural.
According to Hunt and Wickham's second principle, "Governance involves power (but only in a very particular sense) and as such involves politics and resistance" (Hunt and Wickham 1994: 80). In this sense, power is the fuel and driving force of governance. The force that engages in the games of governance always encounters resistance, because it always claims some form of authority over the truth and legitimation. Thus, the 'agons' engage in the game of governance not resiliently, but critically and defensively. On this stance, for Foucault and, Hunt and Wickham power relations eviscerate social and political action. Foucault argued that one can never be outside of the practices of power and that power is always around us. He pointed out that the "procedures of power that are at work in modern societies are much more numerous, diverse and rich (than panopticism). It would be wrong to say that the principle of visibility governs all technologies of power used since the nineteenth century" (Foucault 1980:148). It is important to indicate that power and knowledge are interwoven, thus, power increases with knowledge and truth convictions. This formula works both ways.

In the game of governance, the 'agons' seek to understand the phenomenon or the object they attempt to govern; thus, knowledge of the object of governance is necessary before any plan for governing. Hunt and Wickham argue that, "Governance always involves knowledge" (Hunt and Wickham 1994:87). I will deploy Foucault's justification process in the game of governance and truth making to further expand on Hunt and Wickham's third principles. Before, during and after the governance of an object is attempted a justification process in necessary. In this sense, governance essentially relies on knowledge and validity of truth claims. To this effect, Foucault specifies four main criteria of the objective epistemic justification process in any games
of truth "threshold of positivity, threshold of epistemologization, threshold of scientificity and the threshold of formalization" (Foucault 1972:188-189). In these four thresholds, I find the systematic operation of the validity of truth claims, power/knowledge and the ways in which action is justified in the games of governance.

Here, I deploy Hunt and Wickham's fourth principle of governance that indicates: "Governance is always social and always works to bind societies together (which sometimes, ironically, involves social division)" (Hunt and Wickham 1994:92). I expand their fourth principle and argue that governance 'not just sometimes' but always involves social division. Because for me if there is no social division there will be nothing and no attempt to govern. For example; if a conduct, an object or a phenomenon has been governed, there exists no division; thus, there is no act of governance taking place. I think this principle of governance corresponds to the ways in which genealogy maps socio-political and economic engagements between the agons. The agons with different preferences attempt to govern social divisions and social divisions are always diverse in perspective.

7.3 Care of the Self as a Reflexive Governance

Late in his career, Foucault wrote the three volumes of The History of Sexuality. While he presented a genealogical overview of the care of the self and the use of pleasures, he recognized that "The care of the self—or the attention one devotes to the care that others should take of themselves—appears then as an intensification of social relations" (Foucault 1986:53). As an aspect of 'care of the self,' the idea of social relationships becomes an immediate concern, because for Foucault, to care for oneself is
linked to caring for others; thus, the care of the ‘self’ is a social phenomenon not an isolated individualistic trend. In this sense, an individual exists in relation to the other individuals, and only when one defines herself in relation to others she can constitute the ways in which she cares for herself. Thus, for him the cultivation of the one self does not only depend on the care for oneself, because it also depends on customary relation of kinship, friendship, and obligations to others. Some people might think that this argument sounds familiar—psychological egoism—of Thomas Hobbes. I disagree, because the concept of ‘care’ stands at the opposite side of ethics.

In the last volume, *The Care of the Self*, he cultivated the ethics of the ‘care of the self’. Foucault undertook a genealogical study of the care of the self, and he traced it back to the Greeks and, more specifically to the works and the behaviour of Socrates. Foucault indicated “in apology it is clearly as a master of the care of the self that Socrates presents himself to his judges. The gods has sent him to remind men that they need to concern themselves not with their riches, not with their honour, but with themselves and with their souls” (Foucault 1986:44). As well, Foucault heavily relied on the *Discourses* of Epictetus, “It is in Epictetus no doubt that one finds highest philosophical development of this theme Man is defined in the Discourses as the being who was destined to care for himself” (Foucault 1986:47)\(^{37}\).

Foucault drew from the Stoic philosophers the idea that ‘one must fulfill his obligation to oneself and to mankind’. Further to illustrate an elaborated picture of the genealogy of the ‘cultivation of the self,’ he developed three types of ‘attitudes’ related to the care of the self and of the others. The First type of attitude, is the individualistic

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\(^{37}\) While Foucault rightly pointed out that the *Discourses* of Epictetus contain elaborate studies on care of the self, Epictetus’s ethics can also be read as a passive ethics, I do not want to engage in this discussion here.
attitude, which is “characterized by the absolute value attributed to the individual in his singularity and by the degree of independence conceded to him vis-à-vis the group to which he belongs and the institutions to which he is answerable” (Foucault 1986:42). Here, Foucault recognized the intersubjectivity of the ‘self’ and the community in which the ‘self’ resides, thereby indicated that the ‘self’ has obligations to be attentive to the ‘others’.

The second principle attitude, he described is “the positive valuation of private life, that is, the importance granted to family relationships, to the norms of domestic activity, and to the domain of patrimonial interests” (Foucault 1986:42). In this principle, Foucault showed the ways in which private life, including family relationships are organized and governed by patrimonial discourses. And he argued that the discourses governing the private lives of individuals might be released from patrimonial domination and control, if the self comes to the fore as an individual to care for others.

His third categorization maps the individual relationships as “the intensity of the relations to the self, that is, of the forms in which one is called upon to take oneself as an object of knowledge and a field of action, so as to transform, correct, and purify oneself, and find salvation” (Foucault 1986:42). Foucault recognized that these three attitudes could be interconnected. In the analysis of the cultivation of the self, he argued that not every society has practiced these attitudes as the principles of caring for the self.

Foucault presented the examination of different time periods in Western civilizations in which the care of the self was portrayed differently. According to Foucault, Western societies have moved away from this very fundamental ethics of the ‘care of the self’, because as a concept care of the self has been separated from ‘self
knowledge'. In this sense, the separation between self-knowledge and care of the self has been influenced by religious teachings. Morality and religious views have influenced the self-renunciation and 'nothingness' before god; which has resulted in renunciation of caring for oneself. Foucault stated, "Throughout Christianity there is a correlation between disclosure of the self, dramatic or verbalized, and renunciation of the self" (Foucault 1994:249).

While Foucault did not acknowledge this relationship explicitly, in the over all reading of his work on the care of the self and the technologies of the self it becomes clear that to care for oneself requires one to understand her relationships with others and the ways in which she cares for others. At first glance, Foucault's care of the self appears to be individualistic, but after a thorough examination of the ways in which the self can be defined in relation to the others, it becomes apparent that caring for oneself requires caring for others; thus I read his 'care of the self' as the governance of the self and others from an active agonistic perspective between social actors.

Foucault himself was an active agonist. This attitude was quiet clear; in an interview he indicated that his position on caring for one self and other "does not lead to apathy but hyper-and pessimistic activism" (Foucault 1994:256). This hyper pessimistic activism brings into currency the care of the self in relation to others and cultivates the ethos of criticism and an attitude of openness. This attitude is related to the ethos of the critique which was encouraged by the Enlightenment's critical aspect not its transcendental teleological universalism. Although Foucault rejected a systematized ethical program, his genealogical engagement on the 'care of the self' can be read as a soft contemplation of Stoic ethics and an agonistic care-oriented model of governance.
Lastly, to indicate that Foucault's ethics of the care of the self as an instance of governance, I rely on Hunt and Wickham's third principles of governance, in which they layout that "governance always involves knowledge" (Hunt and Wickham 1994:87). Similarly Foucault's care of the self involves knowledge of the self. For Foucault, the care of the self cannot be separated from 'self-knowledge'. Without self-knowledge care of the self is not possible, because to care for oneself requires knowing the 'self'. To know the 'self' is the initial step, and to actively care for oneself, one needs to know her self in relation to others. Thus, knowing oneself is an instance in which the individual attempts to govern oneself and this requires the knowledge of one's own relations with 'others'.

7.4 Rose's Sociology of Governance

Rose advances valuable insights into Foucault's intellectual practices as the new sociology of governance. In this subsection, I will engage with the new sociology of governance, which I read as Foucault's agonistic care oriented mode of governance. The new sociology of governance is influenced by Foucault's works on genealogy and governmentality, which I interpret as a 'descriptive' and a 'diagnostic' model.

Like Foucault's genealogy, the new sociology of governance refers to the outcome of social, political and economic interactions and dependencies: self-organization networks that arise out of the interactions between a variety of organization and the human associations (Rose 1999: 15-16). In this model, governance is descriptive and diagnostic not prescriptive like Habermas's normative usage. Thus, the new sociology of governance "tries to characterize the pattern or structure that emerges as the
resultant of the interactions of a range of political actors (the agons)—of which the state is the only one” (Rose 1999:15-16).

The questions that I am tackling with: what are the results and the outcomes of the governing process in this sense? What motivates the socio-political actors to interact and produce results in the way the do; and what type of attitude gives raise to those socio-political interactions? Similar to genealogical reflections on social interactions, the new sociology of governance depicts a range of political actors always engaged in the definition, distribution and allocation of governance, power and resources. It is this constant engagement that I read as an agonistic behaviour of the political actors.

Although the agons (socio-political actors) have created a broad framework for their socio-political activities (the state) within which they act and interact; sharing the same interaction framework does not mean that they have come to a fixed shared understanding. For example, while almost every human person holds a citizenship status of at least a state, in cases of sharp disagreements between the agons (citizens and community members) the parameters of the political structure (state) gets violated and, in massive numbers citizens engage in civil disobedience. Here, I do not want to engage in a detailed discussion of the ways in which the modern state increasingly operates its political force by deploying various techniques of governance such as: discipline rather than punishment, governmentality rather than panoptic forms of authority.

My argument depicts that governance as always exercised agonistically, and as the resultant of these very agonistic engagements changes, revisions and social transformations have come to the fore historically. Although, the modern states have closed in and minimized sharp-violent agonistic engagements by dictating the rules of
democracy and attempting to legitimize shared understanding, currently political actors are engaged in questioning the new World order, agonistically. However, current engagements between the agons are mostly communicative rather than physically violent, in the Western societies.

Table 1. An Agonistic Care Oriented Model of Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General characteristics</th>
<th>Governing Body (institutions)</th>
<th>Governing (objects)</th>
<th>Governance of (subjects)</th>
<th>Reasons for Compliance</th>
<th>Relationships between the agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perspectival, Consequentialist, Intersubjective, Hyper-pessimistic, Freedom oriented, Wider social individual space. Non-normative, Agonistic, Care of the ‘self’ and care for ‘others’.</td>
<td>The agons (the body of the individual citizenry, both in institutionalized sense and non-institutional). Every social actor participates in the game of governance.</td>
<td>Anything that needs to be controlled and managed, i.e., the health and wealth of the individual in relation to others.</td>
<td>There is a separation between the subject and the object of the command. There is always tension between subjects in the game of life.</td>
<td>Care of the self.</td>
<td>Mutual, reflexive, Fre: agonistic intersubjective relationship between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. While there is a need to care for the other, an individual approaches the other with an agonistic and hyper pessimistic attitude. Agents are always in a caring tension.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

7.5 Final Remarks on Agonistic Care Oriented Model of Governance

Governance in this model is agonistic because political actors engage with a hyper pessimistic activism. While agons represent diverse interests and views, they need to care for themselves; moreover, the care of the self is linked to the caring for others. As the result, the definition and parameters of governance can never be fixed and settled but remains open to change and transformations. Governance in this model means the agonistic attitude of critique and which results in political and social action.

In this model, political actors engaged in “particular ‘stratum’ of knowing and acting. Of the emergence of particular ‘regimes of truths’ concerning the conduct of
conduct, ways of speaking truth, persons authorized to speak truths, ways of enacting truths and costs of so doing” (Rose 1999:19). Moreover, the role of this model of governance is diagnostic not transcendental. As Foucault said, ‘I want to do the genealogy of problems’. For me genealogy of problems involves diagnosis and any attempt to diagnose needs interpretations of ongoing status, as Rose states “to interpret is to interpret interpretations: in this way it is already to change things, ‘to change life’, the present—and oneself” (Rose 1999:20).

8. Conclusion: Why a Governance Reading of Genealogy?

In my rereading venture, I have interpreted Foucault’s genealogy as an ‘agonistic care oriented model of governance’. My rereading endeavours will contribute to the construction of ‘A Communicative-AGONISTIC Theory of Governance’ in the next Chapter. Here I will briefly indicate why is it important to construct such a theory of governance and show why is it an important intellectual exercise to interpret critical theory and genealogy as two different models of ‘governance’.

Foucault’s genealogical studies reveal the essence of social and political engagements between human agencies as agonistic and non-teleological interaction. More simply, his studies disclose that the discontinuity of thought and agonistic attitudes have led to changes and social transformations. Since past incidents have been governed by rupture and discontinuity resulted from agonistic engagements between socio-political forces, I believe that agonism has been an essential factor of change, revision and social transformation of the human socio-political organizations. In this sense, agonistic
engagements between socio-political actors resulted in employment and development of
different discourses in the games of truth and governance.

In the next Chapter, I will criticize Habermas’s ‘consensual’ model and render his
rule of ‘submission to the force of the better argument’ as an unjust and non-applicable
model. Instead, I will replace Habermas’s consensual model with an agonistic model
(Foucault’s hyper pessimistic activism), and substitute Foucault’s ‘attitude of critique and
openness’ for Habermas’s ‘submission of the force of the better argument’.
Chapter Four: A Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance

1. Introduction

In this Chapter, I will construct a Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance. However, first, I will present preliminary remarks to indicate the status of the current stage of this project, which will highlight my primary views and arguments. Then, I will briefly outline our present condition in liberal democracies of the West with respect to the limits of ‘our thinking’, the role of language, agonistic attitudes, the contingency of social action and the diversity of interests in the games of governance. I will introduce a new principle of ‘action’, which may be viewed as the fifth principle of governance that will be an addition to Hunt and Wickham’s four principles of governance.

Third, I criticize Habermas on three fronts: ‘consent to the force of the better argument’, normative use of language and the lack of interest theory in his communicative action. Then, in the light of Foucault and Nietzsche’s concept of ‘the will to power’, I will present my own views on an agonistic model of governance, and I will attempt to merge together communicative-rational and agonistic models of governance. Moreover, I will establish Foucault’s the Care of the Self as the ethical foundation of a Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance.

Last in this Chapter, I will discuss the limitation of my engagement and indicate that the breadths of Habermas’s critical theory and Foucault’s genealogy may have not been depicted well enough in this study, and that there is a need for more research in this area.
Since the 'agonistic attitude of critique', the 'care of the self' and 'communicative engagements' have historical and practical foundations, I neither want this project to be read as a hypothetical or a pure theoretical engagement that has no social and practical groundwork, nor do I want it to be read as an alternative method of social action. Rather I wish to be read as a project that follows Hunt and Wickham (1994) and Rose (1996; 1999), because it focuses on the governance reading of Habermas and Foucault intellectual practices.

2. Preliminary Remarks on this Project

This project was initially inspired by a lack of sensitive and observant engagement between Habermasian and Foucaultian traditions of thought. I will attempt to open up a discussion, not in a detailed fashion but briefly point out the ways in which the gap between genealogy and critical theory may be bridged from the perspective of governance by bringing both of the practices together in the form of a *Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance*.

Contrasting the two intellectual practices, Ashenden and Owen, and Tully state that, Foucault’s work mostly concerned with elaborating a form of critical reflection, but Habermas attempts to establish the form of critical reflection (Tully, 1989; Ashenden and Owen, 1999). Thus, Foucault’s work emerges as the reworking of the changing world and reflects on the social, political and economic activities of human societies using genealogical methodology not searching for an alternative; but Habermas has already established an alternative—the theory of communicative rationality. Moreover, Habermas’s work presents a transcendental normative approach of the status quo which
sensitively conservative to any method of social engagement other than communicative rationality. Since, his views already reflect the status quo and propose improvements upon it, his proposals and claims have received broad support from wide variety of groups, and especially from governments. Taking these arguments into consideration, “it should not be surprising that the Foucault/Habermas debate has been largely driven by the attempt to demonstrate the incoherence of Foucault’s practice of critical reflection” (Ashenden and Owen 1999:1). Further, Ashenden and Owen state that, Fraser (1989); Honneth, (1991); McCarthy, (1990) described Foucault’s intellectual practices as a mixture of empirical insights and normative confusions (Ashenden and Owen, 1999).

The differences stated are reasons for a Habermasian bias in the debate between the two traditions of thought. The Foucaultians have either turned down the dominance of Habermasian criticisms of Foucault by ignoring the debate, or in defence of Foucault’s practices, they have rejected Habermas’s critical theory. According to Ashenden and Owen (1999) the Foucaultian side (most represented by Dean, 1994; Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1986; Owen, 1995; Patton, 1994; Schmidt and Wartenberg, 1994) has not provided solid responses to the Habermasian criticisms. Thus, both sides have either failed to acknowledge the importance of the other side or have not been able to find an intermediate groundwork. In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s the debates between the two intellectual camps reached an impasse.

However, I would like to reopen the debate from an entirely different angle, one which establishes a critical foundation for Foucault’s intellectual practices as the ethos of the attitude of critique, agonistic method of social engagement and the ethics of the care of the self. Thus, reopening the Habermas/Foucault debate in this fashion may provide a
working ground for Foucaultians to reengage in the debate. The following is a brief recap of the ways in which my contribution to this debate will be useful and in favor of Foucault.

Habermas's communicative action is derived from the so-called 'linguistic turn', which is a more recent phenomenon than agonistic social engagements. The emergence of the linguistic turn in Western societies was the result of a number of changes in the socio-political structure of the Western societies, for example, resistances which caused the breakdown of absolute state power and the authority of the Church. These resistances to absolute powers of the state and the Church brought into currency public debates and parliamentary discussions, which were encouraged by Enlightenment ideals. Lesser restrictions on the public use of reason is the fundamental element that gave rise to the emergence of communicative engagements in Western societies. On a broader level, these open communicative engagements derived from democratic and popular sovereignty, which flourished and expanded throughout Western Europe after the French Revolution. With these changes more inclusive degrees of citizenship rights, freedom of association and participation and public debates emerged. More specifically, communicative practices have become the dominant model of social engagement after the First and the Second World Wars.

These themes regarding the development of communicative engagements are clearly set out in Habermas's *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. In his later works, *The Theory Communicative Action* and *Discourse Ethics*, he provides the theoretical groundwork for further practical developments of communicative action as an alternative method of social engagement. While I agree with his analysis of the ways in
which communicative engagements have come into being, his proposals fail to establish communicative action as an alternative method of social action in the light of the Enlightenment ideals of transcendental universalism. The problem with Habermas’s thesis is threefold: first, once he divides the realms of human action into the system and the lifeworld, he is unable to rejoin the two; second, the submission to the ‘unforced force of the better argument’ is unjust; third, it abandons the interest theory in the games of governance. I will attempt to replace interest theory in communicative action using some of the arguments made in Chapter Three on agonistic engagements and the care of the self. I will expand on these themes in section two.

In contrast, I continue to argue that agonistic methods of social action and the ethics of the care of the self retrieved from the works of Foucault, are reflexive practices, which have much deeper historical roots. While Judaism itself is the by-product of agonistic engagements, after the emergence of Judaism, agonism as a method of social engagement and the ethics of the care of the self were come under criticism and were rejected. The Egyptians, the Greeks and the Romans, before they get in contact with Judaeo-Christian teachings were practicing the ethics of the care of the self. However, with the emergence of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, which share similar philosophical foundations, agonistic engagements declined because these religions considered agonistic practices as ‘heretical’ and they deemed the ethics of the care of self to be selfish.

More specifically, Christianity and Islam encouraged the idea of nothingness before God; thus, the ‘self’ became a servant of the God. In this sense, according to these three religions there was no point to care for oneself on the ‘earth’ because it was

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38 An heretical practice in this context can mean challenge to the rule of the God or being critical of the rules of Synagogue, Church or the Caliphate. The interpretation of what might constitute heresy is relative and depends on the religious authorities to deem an action or a belief heretical.
temporary. In contrast one should take of her self by serving God so that one could be rewarded with the good and permanent care of God. Here, I do not want to delve into the history too far, however, my point is that to further expand Foucault’s arguments made in *The History of Sexuality Volume 3* and support agonistic method of social action that was rediscovered by his genealogical method of studying history.

Learning from a genealogical observation of the historical epochs, an agonistic attitude of critique and social action will still remain an essential force of change and social transformation. These themes are clearly observable in Foucault’s intellectual practices, presented in *The Madness and Civilization, The Archaeology of Knowledge, Discipline and Punish, The History of Sexuality Volume 3*, I will recast the argument that social action has always been governed by agonistic, but not always by communicative engagements.

3. Governance in Our Present Condition

We live in a “thought provoking time, yet what is most thought provoking in our thought provoking time is that we are not thinking” (Heidegger 1993:371). Heidegger posed this statement from an ontological perspective that is searching for the origin ‘Being’. I am neither interested in an ontological observation nor do I agree with the statement that ‘we are not thinking’. However, I believe ‘thinking’ is more complex and diverse and most of the academic disciplines have departed from the question of ‘origin’ of ‘Being’, rather they are concerned with the problems related to the health and the wealth of societies. Hunt and Wickham in their fourth principle of governance argue that “society is always already there, there is no point searching for the origins of the society,
in traditional sense, for all one will ever find is society" (Hunt and Wickham 1994:92). Thus, if we agree that the society is ‘always-already there,’ we will save ourselves from searching for origins, because they are bound to be elusive. However, there are different views and paradigms of thinking, which disagree about ‘whether we are thinking or not’.

Almost every thought paradigm deals with limited concepts, which have been analyzed, deconstructed and reconstructed countless times in order to get ‘thinking’ ‘right’ and thereby to define who we are, to direct and govern the self and the other. I want to ask: will we ever get ‘it’ right? Or how can we expand our horizon of thinking or even go beyond the current paradigms and discover broader territories of thinking? Why have we been caught in these paradigms for centuries? Why do we need to be bound by certain and specified rules in thinking, for what purpose? I do not assume that there is a ‘right’ way of thinking, but I believe that we can broaden our thought paradigms and enjoy a wider social space to act and interact. A wider inclusive social space may be obtainable with a communicative agonistic engagement. I will come back to this argument later.

Moreover, the questions I ask attempt to introduce Foucault’s concept of ‘problematic’ and to direct the discussion in this section on to the ways in which we constitute ourselves and attempt to govern ourselves in our present condition. Deploying Foucault’s notion, I argue that ‘thinking’ is ‘problematic’ itself. What makes it problematic is that we are constantly engaged to get it ‘right’ or to improve upon it, but we have not got ‘it’ yet, and we will never get ‘it’. Similar to the notion that there may not be an origin to societies, we may never get ‘thinking’ right. Any ‘problematic’ phenomenon or object cannot be put to rest or governed permanently. This is the reason
that ‘thinking’ is the most ‘problematic’ phenomenon, which never rests and settles, and
cannot be controlled permanently or managed clearly. I treat ‘thinking’ as a
‘problematic’ phenomenon, because it constitutes a positive force similar to Nietzsche’s
‘active force’ and Foucault’s notion of ‘power’. Thus, problematic denotes constant
engagement that results in change and transformation. The present liberal democratic
condition allows wider intellectual and social activities, and it is well depicted by
Foucault’s notion of problematic.

Although every thought paradigm has its weaknesses and limitations, the liberal
democracies of the west have greatly improved the social, intellectual and political spaces
of thinking and action through numerous techniques and discourses, which at times result
in paradigm overlap. Some times there are certain conservative practices deployed and
used by liberals or by the democrats to governance the self and the other. While this
intermeshing between paradigms creates more confusion and burdens our ability to
identify the ways in which we govern ‘ourselves’ and the ‘others’, it shows the
boundaries of our thinking is broadening and that in turn may provide us with a wider
social, political and intellectual space. Moreover, a constant engagement in the games of
governance, often results in change and transformation. Thus, while our present
condition is defined by complex-contingent heterogeneous views of the ways we should
govern and live our lives; the problematics of thinking and governance allow for constant
revisions and change.

In Chapter One, while in light of Hunt and Wickham’s, and Rose’s perspectives I
argued that there are three practicable models of governance, I described governance as
the total philosophy of the exercise of control and management of the ‘self’ and the
‘other’. Further, I claimed that in liberal democracies governance provides the underlying epistemological justification of norms, conventions and regulations through bodies such as the police force, the medical associations and the boards of education. Moreover, on a broader level, governance in my account is a process by which an acting body—a unit engages in running a business, securing the health and the wealth of the society. Thus, governance includes all the values, basic principles, models and types of justifications through which the governing body look for justification and validation, because governance cannot be separated from knowledge. I argue that governance always involves ‘action.’ In order to read governance as ‘action’ and lay the claim that ‘governance’ always emerges as the result of an action to control or manage an object or a phenomenon, I will add the principle of ‘action’ to Hunt and Wickham’s four principles of governance.

The three models of governance I discussed in Chapter One are: a visible, an invisible and a liberal model of governance. A visible model of governance is a procedure and a process by which the population is governed with the use of state apparatuses employing the use of coercive force to keep the population in line with the basic rules and values of the governing body. Through the use of coercive force, the visible model of governance disciplines the population. Second, I discussed the invisible model of governance that also employs various techniques and tactics; to name a few, the invisible model of governance enforces its discourses via professional bodies as such.

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39 See Hunt and Wickham’s fourth principle of governance, “Governance always involves knowledge” (Hunt and Wickham 1994: 87). As well, I have discussed this relationship between governance and knowledge in Chapters One, Two and Three.

40 For further details see section two: On Communicative and Agonistic Action as Governance.

41 Governing body does not necessarily mean the political state, is could mean a person attempting to govern herself, or a group attempting to govern their conduct...etc.
accounting, medical associations, psychiatry, school systems and so forth. Moreover, normative and customary practices and sanctions are part of this model of governance.

The third model was a liberal model of governance, which corresponds to our present condition that deploys any of the visible or invisible models, or it may combine both to govern the health and the wealth of the population under its control. In this sense, on one hand, liberal practices contain numerous normative, traditional and customary practices, which are dependant on the invisible practices of governance. On the other, liberal governance may deploy principles of using force. While a liberal model of governance is increasingly dependant on the rationality and the objectivity of rule, it is constantly challenged by the problematics of governance. It claims the validity of governance in the name of a number of presuppositions as such: national security, social good, human rights, economic security and so forth. These discursive rationalities of the liberal model of governance claim a number of solutions to the existing political, moral and economic paradoxes. The governance discourses of law and order, freedom of expression, welfare and social programs are examples of those discourses, which the liberal governance constructs for the governing of the society in the name of the common good (Rose 1996). The liberal governance draws from far broader moral, political and philosophical practices for justification its rule.

4. A Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance

The Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance that I am about to propose and construct is an action-oriented theory. This theory is a reconstructive project comprising the works of Habermas on communicative action, Foucault's intellectual
practices on the care of the self and agonistic attitude of critique, and the works of Hunt can Wickham, Rose on governance. It is an attempt to establish a theoretical framework for governance as social action.

Borrowing from Hunt Wickham governance is "any attempt to control or manage any kind of object, in fact any phenomenon which human beings try to control or manage" (Hunt and Wickham 1994:78). Since governance involves control and management of any object or a phenomenon, it must involve action. Thus, in order for governance to take place, there has to be an act either willed or unconscious that becomes an instance of governance. Thereby, will or thinking is not enough for governance to take place, in this sense, governance always involves action.

Parsons’s Weberian-inspired perspective of action theory will be helpful to define and to establish ‘action’ as an essential principle of governance. While it is inferred in Hunt and Wickham’s theory, it is not explicit that governance involves action. ‘Action’ as a principle of governance deserves some elaboration and it could serve as the fifth principle of governance, which could be added to Hunt and Wickham’s four principles. Here, I do not want to provide a detailed sketch of Parsons’ theory, but I will briefly describe it and further relate it to my theory.

In his The Structure of Social Action (1937), Parsons argued that an act implies an agent, an ‘actor’ (Parsons 1937:44). An actor is a human person who carries out an ‘act’. An act in this context could be to water flowers, to prepare breakfast, to talk, to undertake research…etc. Second, an ‘act’ must have an ‘end’ and the prospect of a future state of affairs toward which the process of action is oriented (Parsons 1937:44). The end
prospect of an 'act' may require the 'actor' agent to undertake a number of acts for the purpose of achieving the proposed and the intended outcome of the 'act'.

In this sense, an 'act' must have a physical end to it. Third, an act must be initiated in a 'situation' of which the trends of development differ in one or more important respects from the state of affairs to which the action is oriented, the end (Parsons 1937:44). Different situations might give rise to and trigger different intentions, which might result in carrying out different acts. Some of these situations, which trigger the intention to act, might be controllable or uncontrollable for the actor with a specified intention in mind. Thus, failure is connected to the situation, the ability of the actor and the specific intention in mind. The former may be termed the 'conditions' of action, the latter the 'means'. The element of failure involves an attempt to govern. Thus, action is fundamentally related to the governance of anything that human beings attempt to control of manage.

Finally, Parsons thought that there was an inherent relationship between these components of social action system, which he called 'action unit' relationship. The relationship between the components of an act refers to Hunt and Wickham's fourth principle of governance that, "Governance is always social and always works to bind societies together (which sometimes, ironically involves social division)" (Hunt and Wickham 1994:92). The idea of social divisions in Hunt and Wickham provides a crucial insight to criticize the normative element of action proposed by Parson's, of which Habermas is a great advocate. While it is true that social action includes a normative element in which the act is considered as an end in itself, I argue that the weak aspect of this normative model of social action is that it reduces the attitude of critique and
attempts to preserve the status quo. For Parsons, a ‘normative-orientation’ occurs, where
an action “involves sentiments attributable to one or more actors that something is an end
in itself, regardless of its status as a means to any end” (Parsons 1937:75).

4.1 What is Wrong/Right with Habermas’s Communicative Action?

While Habermas directly deploys action theory and reconstructs it from a
linguistic perspective, he does not acknowledge that the ‘normative orientation’ of action
involves an instance of control or management as an invisible model of governance. In
all of his writings he attempts to provide an intermediary ground between two paradigm
of social action, an ‘objectivist’ and a ‘subjectivist’ approach. The objectivist approach is
disinterested in the behavior of social actors and takes the standpoint of an outside
observer. It turns a blind eye on the subject as agency and the intersubjectivity of social
actors. The second approach, the subjectivist, views the social actors as participants
acting intentionally; accordingly, the participants are engaged in constituting their own
worldviews, in which they implement the idea that everyone is for herself.

While Habermas criticizes the subjectivist and the objectivist approaches in
linguistic engagement, he proposes a third category ‘communicative action’ in which
“Reason, language, and action are inherently intermeshed” (Fultner 2001:iix). Action in
his model is communicative and rational orientation of norms. Accordingly, he believes
that social action must take a form of communicative reason as an instrument in
addressing social problems. Habermas argues that there are two classes of actions:
intentional and normative actions. First, he argues that in a narrow and a broader
teleological sense “we call intentions the actor’s intent or will or purpose of realizing an
end. Among an agent’s intentions in broader sense are also her hopes, fears, and expectations, her desires and dispositions, even her emotions: love and hate, anger and shame, disgust, longing, and so on” (Habermas 2001:110). While Habermas acknowledges the presence of intentions in linguistic communications; he abandons it in favor of normative use of language, which generates broader social consensus.

In the normative sense, “language is understood as a medium wherein a consensus on general situation interpretations is secured among members of a social group in the light of common cultural values and norms” (Habermas 2001:125). I believe this normative presupposition of a common culture disregards the possibility that people of a common culture may behave differently, constitute themselves differently and have different interests. Habermas’s interest in common norms and values is inspired by universalist thesis and in turn reduces the attitude of critique.

Considering communicative engagement where reference is made to a future act poses a pragmatic problem. I think it is fundamentally unrealistic to consider communication as ‘action’ in the Habermasian sense, because it poses a pragmatic problem. In the Habermasian sense, language is such model of action that, once I say to a friend ‘I am going to take the bus to go to school’, my friend should assume the act is done. It is interesting to note a cross-cultural similarities between the Habermasian consideration of communicative engagements and a Kurdish proverb, which says, ‘the tongue does not lie’. In both of these cases, if a statement is made about carrying out an act the listener should assume that ‘the act is already-done’. I think this is unrealistic and it is in a complete violation of consequential impacts and the rules of causal effect chain. For example, I may change my mind due to any consequential effects or any causes that
might impair my ability to take that action. Thus, we cannot put such heavy obligation and sincere trust in linguistic communication.

Another problem with Habermas’s thesis is that it abandons the interest theory in the games of governance. The lack of interest theory as the intentional aspect in his communicative action is a diversion from focusing on the diversity of individual and group intentions within a common norm which are crucial in pinpointing different discourses, different models of governance and so forth. I believe interest theory is fundamental to linguistic engagements, because it enables us to look more critically and approach what we see or hear with a sharper eye. The normative analytical use of language is a tool that generates political consensus between social actors. Thus, it is rather a political and a social solidarity tool in this context, but not a critical instrument. For this reason I believe Habermas’s communicative action lacks an important critical element, because his turn to a normative use of communicative engagements undermines the critical observations that the individuals need in contribution to change and transformation. Thus, it is a pretext for the abandonment of the subject centred reason and the interest theory.42

In discourse ethics, Habermas argues, “Argumentation insures that all concerned in the principle take part, freely and equally, in cooperative search for truth, where nothing coerces anymore except the force of the better argument” (Habermas 1991:198).

I argue that the submission to force of the better argument’ is unjust. Since the participants are ordinary citizens but are not philosophers, and might not be equal in social rank, in linguistic competence, in ability to reason; how can it be decided what

42 See the next subsection for more details on the ways in which Habermas attempts to deal with individual shared interest in communicative action.
argument is ‘better’. Moreover, arguments might involve rhetoric and skills in syllogism, i.e., political speeches made to the electorate. In this case, while the campaigners and the electorate might share a common norm on a political level and be members of the same political party, their specific interests and their abilities might differ. Furthermore, we must remember the fact that is it the authority: government officials, professionals like doctors, psychologists, accountants and educators...etc who posses higher degree of skills and ability to reason and argue. Thus, we should be weary of well-reasoned arguments and their enforcement unless we understand them.

I find Habermas’s discourse ethics to be trapped in the pure logical and rational procedural governance, which hardly leaves room for errors, institutions and spontaneity of human action. However, I assume we need to enforce a course in ‘discourse ethics’ at elementary school level through to high school to teach our youngsters about the discourse ethics and the ways they should behave in accordance with its principles.

Lastly, I recognize that linguistic means of communication is a safe method of social engagement. However, I must acknowledge that a communicative engagement in my account serves an instrumental purpose and it has to be constructed in an agonistic fashion; a fashion in which critique and openness are permitted even if that means a deviation from a norm. I do not mean anarchy or sabotaging rules of engagement, but I think if deviation from a norm is supported by the care of the self in a reflexive fashion, such a deviation must be permitted. Thus, I recognize linguistic communications if agonistic attitude of critique and openness is permitted in the governance of the self and other. My interest in communicative engagements is inspired by an attempt to minimize violence but not at all costs. For example, in cases of self-defense violence is justified.
4.2 The Will to Power as Agonistic Action

Foucault’s intellectual practices did not involve direct engagement with action theory. However, influenced by Nietzsche’s genealogy and the concept of ‘the will to power’, one can argue that Foucault’s version of genealogy uncovered an agonistic reading of social action.

An agonistic social action is motivated by a different set of circumstances. In my account, while it takes into consideration the existence of normative elements and the use of language and it does not suppress the generation of consensus and possible ‘shared understanding’ between social actors in the games of governance; it gives more consideration to the intentional use and deployment of language. An agonistic focus on the intentional uses of language will allow the participants to be observant of the interest and the intention of the actors engaged in the games of governance. Thus, it replaces the interest theory as the foci of communicative social engagement. Here I propose a new concept ‘an attempt to act’, which means where an individual uses a Cartesian monologue as means to dialogue with oneself for the purpose of self-regulation and planning a course of action, such an attempted dialogue I consider as an attempt to act. Second, a communicative engagement which involves more than one social actor or where an act is physically committed I will consider a ‘complete’ act.43

It is ‘the will to power’, which opens up a number of possible ways of acting and it is the acting itself that opens up a possible number of judgments on our act (Owen 1995:42). ‘The will to power’ is the foundational force of human action and the

43 A complete act in this sense denotes that an action is taken, it matters not if the intention and the end has been fulfilled.
consequences of the reason for life. Owen states that Nietzsche comments on the importance of 'will to power' in section 259 of Beyond Good and Evil "it is a consequence of the intrinsic will to power which is precisely the will to life" (Owen 1995:42). Thus, the human will to power is the basic principle of existence. It is the observational force and the core value of an individual act. I would like to propose a concept of 'the will to act'. The will to act is the derivative of the will to power, and the will to knowledge.

The will to act, places a clearer focus on the individual intentions in social action. Moreover, it provides a fundamental distinction between actionable wills intentions and the non-actionable ones in social action. 'The will to act' defines 'social action' as the resultant of diverse motives and interests, which are the essential driving force of the 'will to life and will to power'. Nietzsche argued that, "all driving force is will to power, that there is no other physical, dynamic or psychic force except this" (Nietzsche 1976:366). Thus, the will to power gives rise to 'the will to act', and it is the will to act that imposes change constantly. Furthermore, he stated "[My theory would be:—] that the will to power is the primitive form of affect, that all other affects are only developments of it" (Nietzsche 1967:366).

While Nietzsche did not explicitly argue for a will to action, for me his concept of 'the will to power' implies a 'will to action', because he thought that actions are derivatives of the will to power, the will to knowledge and the will to life. He argued that, "All actions must first be made possible mechanically before they are willed. Or: the 'purpose' usually comes into the mind only after everything has been prepared for its

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44 'The will to act' is inspired by Nietzsche work on will to power.
execution. The end is an ‘inner’ ‘stimulus’—no more” (Nietzsche 1967:354). Thus, an action cannot be detached from the intention of an actor.

While for Nietzsche intentions generate a will to power and human action, he believed that actions are not altruistic but agonistic, “The whole of ‘altruism’ reveals itself as the prudence of the private man; societies are not ‘altruistic’ towards one another—The commandment to love one’s neighbor has never yet been extended to include one’s neighbor” (Nietzsche 1967:382). To further his agonistic stance, he stated “That relationship is still governed by the words of Manu: We must consider all countries that have common borders with us, and their allies, too, as our enemies. For the same reason, we must count all their neighbors as being well-disposed toward us” (Nietzsche 1967:382). The deployment of this sharp agonistic interpretation of will to power and will to action is not my intention, but agonism in my account is a basic principle of social engagement. My account of agonistic social engagement is an attempt to enforce the attitude of critique principally reflected in Foucault’s critical reflections that can be uncovered by genealogical method of studying social action in the games of governance. Moreover, it relies on Foucault’s the care of the self. I articulated in Chapter Three.

However, what needs to be added to agonistic engagement is communicative action rather than violent action in the games of governance. Communicative action disperses intentions in communication, because in a Habermasian model communicative action is an instrument to generate consensus; thus, individuals are reduced to mere consensual participants. Any action has at least one underlying motif, which should

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45 While I believe there is a danger in acknowledging and developing sharp agonistic engagement my own interest in ‘agonism’ as model of social is a communicative attitude of critique.
46 Se Chapter Three for more details on the ways in which I have constructed Foucault intellectual practices and an agonistic attitude of critique.
manifest itself in ‘meaning’. As Nietzsche argued “All meaning lies in intention. And if intention is altogether lacking, then meaning is altogether lacking, too” (Nietzsche 1967:351). My theory endorses a communicative agonistic method of social action in the games of governance with focusing on the intention of the participant in communication. More simply, to govern, we should engage communicatively with ourselves and with others, because it is safer method of engagement. However, it is crucial to be agonistically observant to the intentions of other social actors.

4.3 Care of the Self as the Ethical Foundation of Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance

I will argue that there is no other fundamental ethics except for the care of the self. It is the source of all ethics and the mother of them all. Thus, studies of the care of the self should be expanded, because it is a crucial element of a justifiable self-governance and the governance of the others.

I establish the Care of the Self as the fundamental ethics that everyone practices to be the ethical principle of my Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance. The care of the self is not an alien ethics, but it reflects individual attitudes once we observe the ways in which each person takes care of herself. Not invented by philosophers, but studied and observed by the Greek and the Roman Stoic philosophers, the care of the self, is a principle ethics, which everyone practices. The young, adolescents and the elderly, persons of all ages, all classes, both sexes and people of all cultures ‘take care of themselves’. While ‘taking care of oneself’ is perspectival and might differ from one person to the other, from one culture to another; we do not need to teach its basic principles, it is given, it is already there. I do not wish to pin down and extend the
argument to the point that even animals practice the care of the self as a hereditary given practice, however, such an argument can be made as well.

As an essential practice, the care of the self was rediscovered by Foucault's work *The Care of the Self*. The care of the self is not an individualistic egoistic ethics, in Foucault's account, because it takes into consideration caring for the others. In this sense, while the ethics of the care of the self does not disregard interest theory, it allows the practice of agonistic attitude. In the *Technologies of the Self*, Foucault attempted to study the ways in which we constitute our identity through some techniques of the self, which developed through antiquity down to now. In other words, the self for which one will be asked to care is one that is variously constituted. While we constitute ourselves through the exclusion of others, care of the self can only be defined in relation to others. We find ourselves good against a measure of others as 'delinquent'. Our identities are formed, additionally, through the appropriations of conscious and unconscious decisions and actions.

The care of the self is linked to the will to knowledge and to care for the others with the intention of deciphering the social problems in the games of the governance of the self and the others. In *Technologies of the Self*, Foucault examined classical antiquity in search for a solid foundation for the ethics of the care of the self. He divided the development of technologies of the self into two stages and in two different contexts “(1) Greco-Roman philosophy in the first two centuries A.D. of the early Roman Empire, and (2) Christian spirituality and the monastic principles developed in the fourth and fifth century of the late Roman Empire” (Foucault 1997:225-226). In Greco-Roman philosophy, he found a vast amount of literature contemplating of the care of the self. For
example, in the Socratic dialogues, in the works of Plato, Xenophon, Hippocrates, Epicurus... etc he found argumentation for the ethics the care of the self. However, with the rise of Christianity and more specifically the Augustinian confessions, the care one devoted to the self on the 'earth' was vanquished on the ground of selfishness.

While Foucault found the principle practices of the care or the self rooted in classical antiquity, as an early form of ethics, he related its decline to the rise of religious morality of Christianity. Christianity promoted self-knowledge 'know yourself' which according to Foucault "obscured taking care of oneself". He argued that there are "several reasons why 'Know yourself' has obscured 'Take care of Yourself'. First, there has been a profound transformation in the moral principles of Western society. We find it difficult to base rigorous morality and austere principles on the precept that we should give more care to ourselves than to anything else in the world" (Foucault 1997:228). Further he argued that, "We are more inclined to see taking care of ourselves as an immorality, as a means of escape from all possible rules. We inherit the tradition of Christian morality which makes self-renunciation the condition for salvation" (Foucault 1997:228). Since the sixteenth century criticism of established morality has paid attention to the importance of recognizing and knowing the self; as the result, "it is difficult to see the care of the self as compatible with morality...because our morality insists that the self is that which one can reject" (Foucault 1997:228).

For me the ethics of the care of the self has solid social foundations, while almost every human being practices it, we do not explicitly engage in its discussion. We need to recover this essential practice and free it from the limitations and confusions, which have

47 I believe, the Middle Eastern societies its decline is linked to the rise of Islam because it shares the same philosophical foundations as Christianity.
been placed around it by religious views. I believe in the similar findings of Foucault that Epicurus’s letter acknowledges the importance of the care of the self as self-governance and the governance of the other. Epicurus’s letter “Precepts governing every-day life are organized around the care of the self in order to help every member of the group with the common task of salvation” (Foucault 1997:227).

I conclude that the ethics of the care of the self is a natural way of living. Furthermore, in order to care for oneself, one has to take into consideration caring for others. It is a reflexive ethics that everyone already practice, however, it needs to be embraced through the means of communication and understanding. In the games of governance, the care of the self can be practiced mutually and reflexively. Thus, I establish the care of the self as the ethical foundation of my theory.

4.2 Final Remarks on Communicative-Agonistic Theory of Governance

A Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance draws aspirations mostly from Habermas’s communicative action, from Foucault’s genealogy and the care of the self, Hunt and Wickham’s four principles of governance and Rose’s governance engagement. It is not an alternative model of governance, however, it deserves more attention and research before it becomes an alternative model of governance.

Its core argument is three fold. First, it proposes a communicative engagement as a method of problem deciphering in the games of governance. Second, it proposes an agonistic engagement rather than purposive consensual presupposition. This does not mean consensus cannot be reached; however, consensus can be generated only if the actors in the games of governance are free without any constraint, without the force of the
better argument to consent. The purpose of agonistic interaction is the attitude of critique. Since this model does not take into consideration universal action norms, it treats each individual differently according to their wishes and abilities. And in order to achieve this end, it must rely on the ethics of the care of the self that is linked to the care for others.

Last, since we are constantly engaged in the governance of the self and others; and since the act of governance is fundamental to our organizational structure my theory takes into account 'governance' as the process of controlling the self and others. However 'governance' draws from moral, philosophical and intellectual practices principles of justification and validation, thus, governance cannot be separated from knowledge (Hunt and Wickham 1994). It is important to keep in mind that I have proposed this theory, because it provides a wider social space and less restriction on our social, economic, political and intellectual activities. Moreover, my theory is diagnostic in a sense that it does not attempt to settle issues, but it seeks to establish a critical relation to strategies of governance, which may lead to possible openness and wider social space for engagement (Rose 1999). This reflects Foucault's hyper pessimistic critical attitude, which leads to agonistic engagement in social action.
Table 1. A Communicative Agonistic Model of Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Characteristic</th>
<th>Commanding body (Institutions)</th>
<th>Commands (objects)</th>
<th>Commanded (subjects)</th>
<th>Reasons for Complying</th>
<th>Relationship between agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communicative-agonistic, Care-oriented, Intersubjective, Care of the self and the others, Perspectival</td>
<td>The body of the individual citizenry, non-institutional guidelines (this includes all community members)</td>
<td>Anything that needs to be controlled and managed, i.e., the health and the wealth of the individuals in relation to the other members.</td>
<td>There is a separation between the subject and the object of governance. There is always tension between individual actors in the games of governance, tensions are resolved communicatively and agonistically</td>
<td>The care of the self and others, wider network of ethics of the care of the self.</td>
<td>Mutual, reflexive, freely agonistic in an intersubjective manner between the 'self' and the 'others'. While there is a need for caring for others, individuals approach the 'other' with a hyper-pessimistic activism. Agents are always in a caring tension communicatively.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Conclusion

The purpose and the limitations of this project: This project is the outcome of a gap in the Habermas/Foucault debate, which resulted in a governance reading of the two intellectual practices. The scope and substance is limited, however, it opens an avenue for future research.

A fresh reading of Habermas's critical theory and Foucault's genealogy led me to governance reading of the two projects and the construction of a Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance, which is grounded on Habermas's communicative engagement, Foucault's agonistic critical attitude and the care of the self, Hunt and Wickham's, and Rose's perspective of governance. Moreover, my theory is a governance theory that is concerned with the management and governance of the self and the others in the games of governance. It attempts to open a wider social space based on
the attitude of critique and the care of the self. Further, this theory is diagnostic not normative.

The scope of this theory is limited. There is vast amount of literature on Habermas’s critical theory, Foucault’s genealogy and governance engagements. My method has covered a small portion of these engagements, which I have deemed to be helpful in understanding critical theory and genealogy, assist me to provide a governance reading of the two intellectual practices and the construction of A Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance. Not only a Thesis of this volume but many books and articles can be written to cover these traditions of thought and the theoretical engagement I have undertaken. Thus, this work is a preliminary study in this direction.
Conclusion

The *Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance* developed in this Thesis presents a new challenge for the scholars working within the traditions of critical theory, genealogy, ethics, communicative action, action theory and 'governance'. This challenge may provide rewarding theoretical and practical insights, if further research and academic engagements are considered in this area. While this project for a governance reading of Habermas's and Foucault's practices is the major theme of this project, is their intellectual practices provide fruitful insights into the techniques of rule and governance, the onus is on scholars from each tradition of thought to recognize the important knowledge contribution the other side makes. Thus, the challenge is an observant sensitivity to the Foucault/Habermas debate.

The significance of this project, governance, becomes clear once we observe that the liberal democracies of the West are involved increasingly in governance of the 'self'\(^1\) and the 'other'\(^2\) deploying various techniques and methods. Governance engagements are numerous, as Stoker argues, the theoretical roots of governance are various: institutional economics, international relations, organizational studies, development studies, political science, public administration and Foucaultian inspired theorists (Stoker 1998).

In relation to critical theory and genealogy, Rose identifies Habermas's approach as a normative prescriptive use of governance and Foucault's practice as the new sociology of governance, which is descriptive and diagnostic (Rose 1999). However, a

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1 See Chapters One, Three and Four.
2 For more details and definition of the 'other' see Chapters One, Three and Four.
central problem in the governance literature is that the term ‘governance’ is very attractive to managers, corporations, states and almost every academic discipline, because it is not loaded with heavy conceptual baggage (Rose 1999). The attractiveness of the term and its imprecision has resulted in the loose deployments and understandings of the term. This raises the problem of governance.

With the assistance from Hunt and Wickham, and Rose I attempted to establish a solid foundation for governance, by arguing that governance is the total philosophy of the exercise of control and management of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. Further, ‘governance’ cannot be separated from the epistemological justification of norms, conventions and the regulation of the self and the other, which a governing body deploys. Governance is both the act and the philosophy of the actions as well. Thus, I argued that an attempt to govern has to be analyzed in this context. If we analyze and view governance in this context, we will be able to release it from its current loose status.

Moreover, as a fresh challenge this project has taken a middle ground approach between critical theory and genealogy by deploying intellectual insights from both of these traditions of thought and reconstructing them as A Communicative Agonistic Theory of Governance. I argued both Habermasian and Foucaultian scholars should adopt an open attitude, which may enable each side to recognize important practices of the other side.

Since my focus has been on the attitude of critique and openness throughout this project, I have criticized Habermas’s critical theory on universal transcendentalism, normative use of language, consent to the force of the better argument, his attempt to rejoin the lifeworld with system after separating the two and the lack of interest theory.
However, I have not dismantled Habermas’s project, but I showed interest in mobilizing ‘communication’ as a safer method of deciphering social problems. In contrast, I have taken a Foucaultian approach on a range of issues. I have adopted his hyper pessimistic activism (agonism), his ethics of the care of the self, his attitude of critique and openness as signifying the critical ethos of the Enlightenment project. Thus, this project is not engagement against either of the two practices, but it attempts to bring together the two intellectual practices beneath one roof ‘governance’.
Bibliography


